５）1995 年 阪神・淡路大震災

Item

Sub-item
Date and Time of
Occurrence
Magnitude(source)

Information
5:46AM, January 17, 1995 (UTC: 20:46, Jan. 16, 1995)

CAO1

M 7.3 (JMA)

CAO1

M 6.9 (USGS)USGS

The northern part of Awaji Island
Epicenter
Data onHazardIntensity ofShaking

N34.36, E135.02, Depth: 16km (JMA)
N34.58, E135.01, Depth: 22km (USGS)JMA Intensity scale: 7(Identified by the post-earthquake survey)
Ground shaking were felt wide area of Japan
Max. peak ground acceleration of 818gal was recorded at Kobe.

Ground Motion

Tsunami(maximum height)
Major Affected
Area

Vertical and horizontal shaking occurred simultaneously.
Strong shake continued 10 to 15 sec, and very strong shake(maximum shake) continued about 3 sec.

CAO1
USGS
CAO1

CAO1
CAO2

No Tsunamis
Wide areas of Kinki not only Hyogo pref. but also Osaka and Kyoto
were affected. Especially, Kobe urban area along the fault line wasseverely affected.
Dead:

Human Damage

DataSource

CAO1

6,434

Missing: 3
Injured: 43,792
65years and more occupied half the number of the dead.
Most of death: Crushing death, about 7 % of the death by fires
Estimated time of death of more than 90% of deaths was before
6:00am which is just 15 min after the earthquake.

CAO1
Hyogo1

Complete destruction: 104,906 houses (186,175 households)
Damage ofBuildings

Partial destruction:
Partial damage:
Fully burned:
Partial burned:

144,274 houses (274,182 households)
390,506 houses
7,036 houses
96 houses

FDMA1

Road- Highway:

Data onDamagesElevated Hanshin Expressway was collapsed.
Most of highways and urban express ways
were closed for traffic.
7,245 sections closed to traffic330 bridges damaged
774 places (dykes and other facilities)
damaged347 places- Road:- Bridges:- Rivers:

Infrastructure/Lifeli
ne Damage- Slope failure:
Railway- Shinkansen:- Main lines:- Urban commuters:
Major Port:Electricity:
Water Supply:Gas:
Telephone:

56

Kyoto–Himeji (max.130km, Jan.17, StopOperation)
88km ( Stop Operation)
157km (Stop Operation)
Kobe Port andAmagasaki-Nishinomiya-Ashiya Port
stopped operation.
2.6 million houses power outages (Jan. 17)
1.3 million houses out of water supply
860,000 houses out of supply
more than 300,000 lines stop operation

FDMA1
CAO2
Hyogo2

Item

Sub-item

Information

DataSource

Main Damage
Cause

A lot of people were sleeping as the earthquake occurred in the earlymorning. Many people (70 to 80% of dead) were crushed by the oldtimbered houses or by furniture. On the other hand, not many
people were outside and roads and railways were not clouded, thismay be causes of decreasing damages outside houses.

Hyogo1

Characteristics ofDamages(Physical/SocialAspects)

Large-scale destructions by earthquake and fires were happened inthe areas where old wooden houses were densely constructed.
Severe damages on wooden buildings were found in the range of 6 to
7km form the fault line while fewer damages were found more than
10km away from the fault line.
Damage on the public buildings was also remarkable, and 15 % ofdamaged non-residential buildings were public buildings. As many ofpublic buildings were used for evacuation shelters, some damaged
public buildings were used as emergency evacuation shelters without
confirmation of safety.
Significant damages on buildings that were constructed before 1981
were found and it was pointed out that there was a big difference inthe earthquake resistance before and after enforcement of newbuilding code in 1981.
It was pointed out that severe damages concentrated to the“Inner-City” area. Meanwhile, severe damages also found in theareas where high income people lived.
Many fires occurred in the area where earthquake intensity scale wasmore than 6, especially scale 7, and it was proportionate to the
housing damage.

Hyogo3
CAO1

Direct Economic
Loss

Total:
Buildings:
Lifelines:
Ports:
Industry:
Education/CultureAgriculture/Fishery/Forestry
Medical and Social Services:
Other Public Facilities

hyogo4

Lessons Learned

In general, preparedness for super-scale earthquake was not enough.
Revised building code enforced in 1981 worked. Revision of seismic
design code for infrastructure is necessary.

57

9,927 trillion yen
5,800 trillion yen
1,488 trillion yen
1,000 trillion yen
630 trillion yen
335 trillion yen
118 trillion yen
173 trillion yen
382 trillion yen

NP

Item

Sub-item

Information

DataSource

Police:Rescue activities

4,500 police officers working for helping people per day (Jan.20 toFeb.28)5,500 police officers were dispatched to the disaster area from otherareas and total of 16,000 police officers were allocated to the disaster
relief. Helicopters, mobile units and other cars and equipment wereput in relief activities.
Self Defense Force (SDF):
About 4,500 SDF (GSDF and MSDF) were dispatched the disaster area
on Jan.17 which included cars, ships, airplanes/helicopters andoperation equipment. Max. 21,760 SDF/day worked not only forrescue but also removal of rubbles and disaster wastes.
Fire and Disaster Management Agency:
Total of 32,400 fire department officers were dispatched by the end ofmarch for helping rescue and relief activities.
Community Level firefighting organization:
Members for the community level firefighting organization ware
deployed for search and rescue, firefighting, guide for evacuation andpatrol the area.

CAO4

Collaborative search and rescue activities with several organizations
such as prefectural government, police, SDF and fire department wereremarkable as this kind of collaboration have never happened in theprevious disasters.
Communities played very effective role in rescuing people especially in
More than 70% of rescued people were rescued by communitypeople.

Emergency
Response

Medical services

Medical service points were established by the Ministry of Welfare(161, currently Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare), SDF (15), Red
Cross (12), and other organizations.
Public and private hospitals, universities, medical doctors associationand other organizations dispatched doctors and medical staffs to thedisaster area. On Feb.7, 1,730 doctors and medical staffs fromoutside of the disaster area worked for taking care of the pacients, andtotal of 75,000 medical staffs worked by the end of April.
Travelling clinics were also operated by those medical staffs andvolunteers.

CAO4

Evacuation shelter

About 317,000 people (at the peak on Jan 23) were displaced in 1,153
evacuation shelters.
Though, regional disaster contingency plans designated certain
schools as evacuation centers but many residents went to schools or
public facilities that nearest to their homes.
Foods, water and other emergency relief goods were supplied,
however despite to the government officials’ effort, those goods were
not smoothly provided to the emergency shelters due to lack of proper
information on the shelters especially immediately after the disaster.
Shelters were mainly operated by theOn Aug. 20, 1995, all shelters were officially closed however even one
year after the disaster, about 800 victims could not move totemporary house or other places and kept displaced in shelters.

CAO458

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceFood, water andother relief goods
supplySupply of foods, water and relief goods were mainly done by the local
government with help of the line ministries of central government,
SDF and other local governments. Even though securing water,
foods and other relief goods was the local government responsibility,
the local government could not secure required amount of supplies
because the scale of disaster was extensive. Therefore, the central
government played great role to secure it.
Water supply at temporary water supply point was made by morethan 800 water tender deployed from outside the disaster area and it
was continued till April. Foods and relief goods for displaced people
secured by local government were delivered through various channels
including private companies and volunteers.
Shops of the major retail industry re-opened relatively early and thisgreatly supported the victims’ life because official supply of foods andgoods were not so sufficient.

CAO4

Information andcommunication(Information to thedisaster victims)

Information for the disaster victims were mainly provided by the local
government through various medias.
Local governments opened “information centers” for handlingnumerous inquiries from the residents immediately after the disaster.
The information centers opened around the clock and deployed staffs
who can speak foreign language to address inquiries from theforeigners.
Local government also continuously provided the information on
damage, current situation of shelters, etc. through mass media suchas newspaper, TV and Radio by holding periodical press conference
and having regular programs. That information was also provided inseveral languages.
To improve the accessibility to the information, local governments
provided 15,000 portable radios to the disaster victims.
Paper based information dissemination was also done by the localgovernments. These paper based information that covers allnecessary information for the disaster victims were distributed to theevacuation shelters, public facilities, stations and shops.
To provide area specific information, community FM Radio played bigrole and the disaster victims highly depend on it to get theinformation.
Information for volunteers were provided through the office ofprefectural government’s volunteer promotion section and social
welfare council. The office also acted as a center for volunteer
registration, coordination and guidance.

CAO4

Support from
Private Companies

Not sufficient information on this item was found because at the timeof the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, supports from privatecompanies were made in ad hoc and voluntary basis and not
systematically provide. After Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake,many discussions on cooperation between public and private company
have been made.

-Support fromabroad

70 countries and territories and 3 international agencies offeredsupport and received the supports from 44 countries and territories byFeb. 9.
Rescue teams from Switzerland, France and England (NGO) wereworked on rescue and recovery of body. 8 medical teams fromabroad were also worked in Kobe under exceptional treatment in caseof emergency.
It was pointed out that receiving assistances from abroad forced
additional work to the people in affected area and there were somemismatch between actual needs at the affected area and support fromabroad.

CAO459Item

Sub-item

Information

Lessons Learned

 Importance of establishment of coordination mechanism between
the agencies related to disaster relief before disasters.
 Necessity of strong coordination and collaboration during disaster
relief
 Government staffs and governments’ facilities also affected by thedisaster and faced difficulties for emergency response.
 Importance of ensuring the means of communication and keepfunctioning of information systems.
 Necessity of designation of evacuation shelters and keep it
functioning and sufficient stockpile of emergency relief goods Necessity of special attention and care to the vulnerable person todisaster and foreigners
 Necessity of mechanism to receive assistance (rescue, relief,medical)
 Importance of information dissemination both disaster area andoutside of the affected areas that including abroad.

Infrastructure/Lifeline

Road- Highways and express ways were mostly restored in one to 8month.
Collapsed express way sections were fully restored one year and 8months after the disaster.
- Major parts of national roads were restored in a few days.
Railway- Damaged section of Shinkansen (130km) was restored about 3
months after the disaster.
- Main lines were also restored in 3 months after the disaster.
- Urban commuters were gradually restored and fully restored in 7
months after the disaster.
Electricity:
5 days after the disaster (except collapsed house)
Water Supply:
40 days after the disaster (temporary restored)
3 month after the disaster (fully restored)Gas:
3 month after the disaster
Telephone:Switching equipment - one day after the disaster
Telephone line – 2 weeks after the disaster

Other services

No sufficient information

DataSource

IRPCAO4

Hyogo4

Temporary House

The temporary houses are provided to all the victims who lost theirhouses by the earthquake. Construction of the temporary houses
was started about one month after the disaster, and total number of
temporary houses constructed was 48,300 (46,617 ware occupied inNov. 1995) in Hyogo pref.
All residents of temporary house left in Jan. 2000, and all thetemporary houses were broke down by the end of Mar. 2000. Someof the temporary houses that can be re-used were sent to othercountries such as Turkey and Taiwan as temporary houses for thedisaster victims.

hyogo4

Disaster
Waste/Debris

Total amount of the disaster waste produced by the disaster wasestimated at the 20 billion tons (21.1 billion m3) which was equivalent
to the 9-years waste production of Hyogo pref.
Those disaster wastes were transferred to Osaka Bay reclamation
area and Awajishima reclamation area.

hyogo5

Finance

Central gov. formed a supplementary budget of 1,022 trillion yen for
construction of temporary houses, recovery for lifelines, roads, etc.
and support of victim’s daily life about one month after theearthquake.

CAO2

RecoverySupport from
Private Companies

N/A

Support fromAbroad

N/A

60

Item

Sub-item

Information

DataSource

Temporary housing Policies

Lessons Learned

Principles

 In temporary housing, community members and residents of thefacilities should cooperate with one another and live autonomously.
Coordination of various individuals, including volunteers, specialists
and the government is indispensable to achieving this.
 Project has been undertaken for supporting the day-to-day lives of
those living in emergency housing for disaster reconstruction. The
underlying aims of the project is looking after the community andpromoting social interaction. Various problems, however, have been
pointed out, including the weakening of community ties.
 Securing emergency housing is an important first step in rebuilding
housing for victims, but rebuilding their daily lives is essential toproceeding with full-fledged reconstruction of housing.
 It is therefore important to progress with securing and rebuilding
housing in a way that value the ties among people.
 Some of the emergency housing units constructed after theearthquake that were capable of being reused were provided toTurkey and Taiwan as temporary housing for victims of disasters.
Reconstruction principles of the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake andLaw for reconstruction
1) Promote prompt recovery of livelihood, economy and building safe
community by proper role allocation and collaborative work of central
and national government with respecting the wishes of local residents
2) Through the abovementioned activities, re-create dynamic KansaiArea.

IRPCAO2(1) Support normalization of peoples’ life in affected area

Reconstructio
nKey issues

Organizations(2) Disposal of disaster waste/debris(3) Measures for preventing secondary disaster(4) Rehabilitation of port function(5) Early recovery of infrastructure(6) Upgrade of earthquake resistance(7) Measures for housing(8) Urban development/improvement(9) Ensuring employment, preventing of unemployment(10) Enhancement of medical/health services and welfare(11) Early recovery of education facilities(12) Reconstruction of agriculture and fishery related facilities(13) Economic recovery(14) Cross-cutting measures for smooth recovery and reconstruction(15) Ensuring of safety and smooth traffic(16) Measures for disaster prevention/mitigation
Headquarters for reconstruction of the Great Hanshin Awaji
Earthquake
Chairman: Prime Minister
Members: Ministers
Secretariat: Secretary of National Land Agency and Central
government officers from related ministries.
Other members: Hyogo Pref. gov., Kobe City gov., Economic
Association, Chamber of commerce, etc.
Reconstruction committee of the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake

61

CAO2

CAO2

Item

Sub-item

InformationFinanceCentral gov. formed a supplementary budget about 1,429 trillion yen
for initial reconstruction activities after 3 month of the earthquake.
(780 trillion yen spent directly by central gov. and remaining werespent as subsidy to the local gov. project)
Central gov. continuously allocate budget for reconstruction activities.
Central gov. directly spent 37 % of total amount for reconstruction of
16,300 trillion yen, but the central gov. also provides money forreconstruction as subsidy to the local gov., and as a result about 95%
of reconstruction budget spent by the central gov.
In addition, followings were made for promoting the reconstruction.
- Establishment of special foundation for reconstruction- Issuance of local bonds- Special grants of the “local allocation tax”

Support fromPrivate Companies

N/A

Support fromabroad

N/A

DataSource

CAO2
ESRI

Hyogo Prefecture

Reconstruction
Schedule

Strategic project for reconstruction: 3 years
 Housing reconstruction
Public: 80,500 houses, Private: 44,500 houses
 Industry recovery
Recover to the same economy/industry production level
before the earthquake Urgent infrastructure rehabilitation
5,700 trillion yen
Project for reconstruction promotion: 10 years

CAO4Basic Issue for Reconstruction

Key Target,featuredstrategies/approac
hes etc.

EconomicRecovery

OtherCharacteristics

 Livelihood recovery- Measures for making stable for the peoples’ life
- Create cultural environment
 Economic recovery- Ensure employment- Recover economy- Create more vital economic environment
 Create safe and attractive community- Create a base for disaster resistance, comfort and convenientarea- Create environmental friendly and barrier free community for
older anddisability people
Economic indicators, such as population, industrial production index,
number of tourists, job-offers-to-seekers ratio etc. were generally
recovered to the level before the earthquake in ten years. For
example, census at Nov 2001, population of the affected area exceed
the one before the disaster
N/A62

CAO4

hyogo4

Item

Sub-item

Information

DataSource

Lessons Learned

 Importance of community leaded and government assisted
community/urban reconstruction for creating safer communities
against disasters, which includes keeping community tie andcommunity revitalization,
 Importance of continuous mental health care for disaster victims
 Necessity of continuous take care of elders and other vulnerable
people Necessity of revision of design standard of facilities.
(Revision of design seismic intensity for buildings and full-scale
revision of design concept for civil engineering structures) Necessity of mechanisms that help individual/household level
revitalization including funding for victims and employment
measures.
 Necessity of establishment of mechanisms that promote thereconstruction such as establishment of a special foundation,
enforcement of laws and regulations for economic revitalization,and measures for small and medium sized industry recovery, etc.
 Necessity of promotion of disaster education based on the lessons
learned from the disaster and keep memorize the disaster.
 Necessity of laws and/or regulations that promote activities andparticipation of volunteers, NGOs/NPOs who would beindispensable to post disaster recovery activities.

Hyogo6

Reports

CAO1:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/1info/kyoukun/hanshin_awaji/earthquake/index.html
CAO2:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/4fukkyu_fukkou/hanshin_awaji.html
CAO3:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/1info/kyoukun/hanshin_awaji/download/index.html
CAO4:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/kensho-hanshinawaji/chosa/index.htm
USGS:
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1995_01_16.php
hyogo1: http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/pa20/pa20_000000016.html
hyogo2: http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/pa17/pa17_000000002.html
hyogo3: http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/pa17/pa17_000000001.html
hyogo4: http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/wd33/wd33_000000010.html
hyogo5:
http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/directory/eqb/book/4-367/index.html
hyogo6: Hyogo Prefecture (2005) The Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake. The Report of the 10-Year Reconstruction
hayashi: www.taiwan921.lib.ntu.edu.tw
FDMA1: http://www.fdma.go.jp/detail/672.html
NP : Special issue on report of Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake by the Kobe
Shimbun (Newspaper)
recon: Reconstruction principles of the Great Hanshin Awaji
Earthquake and Law for reconstruction
ESRI: www.esri.go.jp/jp/archive/hou/hou050/hou44-6-2.pdf
IRP:
http://www.recoveryplatform.org/assets/file/irp_casestudies/irp-cs8-jpn.pdf

Data/photos<Photos>
http://www.city.kobe.lg.jp/safety/disaster/earthquake/earthquake0
3.htmlhttp://momo.nishi.or.jp/GIS/AppRoot/hisai_Phot/index.asp
http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/eqb/dlib/eqbdlib-photo.html
http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/directory/eqb/photo/maeda/index.html

References

63