Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

LATIN AMERICAN CASES
Hurricane Mitch (1998),
Flash Floods and Landslides in Venezuela (2000),El Salvador Earthquakes (2001)
Carlos Villacís
MPA, International Consultant

INTRODUCTION
Disaster mitigation, risk reduction, recovery and rehabilitation after acatastrophe and the creation of safer societies require the active participation ofand interaction among numerous actors at the local, national, and international
levels. In Latin America, the contribution by the international community todisaster mitigation and management has been through internationalorganizations, bilateral agencies, and non-governmental organizations.
Under the current schemes, however, international collaboration has not beeneffective in creating the institutional, financial, legal, political, and social
frameworks necessary for the implementation of self-sustainable, long-term risk
reduction initiatives and programs. This is true not only for disaster reduction
but even for the programs intended to promote development of the so-called
developing countries.
Take the case of Nicaragua, for example. Many years of significant foreignassistance and attention from international organizations have not contributed
to strengthen Nicaragua as an independent, self-sufficient nation. From 1991 to
2003, Nicaragua received about US$ 500 million per year in international
assistance. However, and after almost fifteen years of this continuous flow offoreign assistance, 80% of the current public investment and most of the NGO’s
projects are paid by international collaboration funds.1 Nicaragua’s total exports
are roughly equivalent to just 35% of the country’s total imports resulting in acontinuous deficit and an increasing debt (currently equivalent to 160% of theannual GNP).2 Nicaragua is now more dependent on foreign assistance thanprobably any time before in its history.
The situation in the field of disaster reduction in Nicaragua is not much different.
After the devastating impact of Hurricane Mitch (1998), millions of dollars havebeen given in foreign assistance mainly to implement mostly technical and, inmany cases, repetitive and uncoordinated projects. The result of foreignassistance for disaster reduction has been many reports, maps, andpublications that are not being utilized and whose existence is, in many
1 José Luis Medal, Is Foreign Assistance a Positive Factor in Nicaragua?, La Prensa, May 24, 2004
2 Nicaragua Central Bank, May 20, 20041

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

instances, completely ignored. Very few technical studies have actually been
implemented in practice and there is no practical way to determine whether
Nicaragua’s risk of natural disasters is higher or lower than five years ago.
Similar to the country’s economy, Nicaragua remains very much dependent on
foreign assistance for disaster reduction activities.
The many projects implemented in Nicaragua through international
collaboration schemes have had little impact in building local capacity. Most of
the products produced by the international assistance projects are left unrevisedand unchanged by the local technical specialists, who, in many cases, areunable to repeat, reproduce, modify or expand the produced results. As a result,
there are many maps and reports whose validity and accuracy are notcompletely clear and whose usefulness has not been reliably determined.
Moreover, due to the lack of understanding of the methodologies utilized,
existing results cannot be updated through the proper incorporation of new
information that may be generated or obtained.
The observed impact (or lack of it) of international cooperation in reducing
natural disasters risk in developing countries seems to indicate that importantchanges are required in the mechanisms that are currently utilized to provide,
implement, and evaluate this assistance. To analyze the effectiveness ofinternational cooperation in Latin America, the cases of three different disasters
are presented in this report:
・ Hurricane Mitch (October 1998)
・ Flash Floods and Landslides in Venezuela (December 2000)
・ El Salvador Earthquakes (13 January and 13 February, 2001)
For each of these disasters, a brief description of the phenomenon and its main
effects is first presented. Then, and considering that all these disasters’ effects
were exacerbated by the existing levels of poverty and that their impact resulted
in even higher levels of poverty, a description of each disaster’s impact on thenational economy is presented. The main emergency response activities
performed by both national and international organizations are then recounted
and, finally, the reconstruction and recovery processes are described andanalyzed putting special emphasis on the role played by the international
cooperation.
To conclude the report, a short list is presented of possible ways to improve theeffectiveness of international cooperation in the process of reducing natural
disaster risk in developing countries.

2

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

HURRICANE MITCH (OCTOBER 1998)
Description
Hurricane Mitch struck Central America at the end of October 1998, causing thelargest natural disaster in the region’s history. It claimed the lives of over 10,000
persons, leaving some 9,000 unaccounted for, 1.5 million displaced, andaffecting one out of every five inhabitants in Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala,and El Salvador. Agricultural production suffered heavy losses; vital economic
and social infrastructure was destroyed. Estimates are that the overall economic
losses amounted to over four billion dollars, slowing the expected annual growthrate for 1999 from 5.3 to 2.9 percent. The poor and vulnerable were the mostaffected. Most already lived in conditions of extreme poverty and food insecurity.
Mitch aggravated these conditions, leaving over one million people in need ofemergency food and with practically no source of income.3 The extent of thedamage was exacerbated by the considerable environmental degradation andchronic poverty that existed before the storm. Some experts classified the Mitch
Tragedy as the biggest environmental denunciation of the last few decades.
With generous pledges of support from international donors, Central Americans
set out to rebuild in 1999. The exposed environmental degradation and extreme
poverty of the region dictated that reconstruction could not be simply rebuilding
what had existed before. Instead, the situation called for transformation bycreating the structures and systems to mitigate the damage from future natural
or man-made disasters. It also called for reducing the poverty and theenvironmental exploitation that had made the region so vulnerable. The
recognition of these points demanded new thinking and new approaches toreconstruction and development.
Hurricane Mitch swept across Honduras, Nicaragua El Salvador, Guatemala,Belize, and Costa Rica early in the week beginning October 26, 1998, resulting
in torrential rains, flooding and landslides. At its height on 26 and 27 October,the hurricane had sustained winds over 300 km per hour. Although the region isoften affected by tropical storms, Hurricane Mitch reached category V (thehighest) and was one of only four hurricanes the last century to reach this level
in Central America.
The loss of life, devastation and ruin resulting from the effects of a natural
phenomenon, Hurricane Mitch, were severely compounded by man-madefactors. Population pressure leading to a large-scale deforestation and thecultivation of marginal lands without soil conservation provoked mudslides.
Flooding was aggravated by a lack of adequate watershed management. The
poorest sectors of the population, who have restricted access to land and live inmarginal, high-risk areas, bore the brunt of the disaster effects. The Hurricane
3 World Food Program, Assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation for families in Central America affected by
Hurricane Mitch, January 19993

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

uncovered the extreme vulnerability of large parts of the population andrevealed the pressing need for sustainable, environmentally responsible policies
focusing on social equity and poverty alleviation.
The proportions of the tragedy in Honduras and Nicaragua were immense. El
Salvador and Guatemala were also hard hit. Belize was affected to a muchlesser extent. Over three million people were directly affected by Hurricane
Mitch and over half a million people lost their homes.4 The irretrievable loss oflife, the impact on food availability and thus particularly on the nutritional statusof vulnerable groups, damage to basic infrastructure, agriculture, production,industrial and commercial entities meant that, in some areas, over twenty yearsof development were virtually wiped out. The potential increase in international
and international and internal migration became a huge challenge to beaddressed in the short term by the countries in the region.
Impact on the Economy
The rains, floods and overflowing rivers had a strong impact on the people ofCentral America. The regional total of dead and missing was higher than
18,0005 concentrated in Honduras and Nicaragua. Those directly affected (dead,injured, missing and evacuated) reached almost 3.5 million people, or 11 percent of the total population of Central America. No other single phenomenon is
on record as having simultaneously affected all five countries, and causing somany victims.
The impact on the population of an event on this scale cannot be fully
appreciated through a purely economic assessment of the losses. As yet noparameters are available for conducting an evaluation of the effects of
temporary family disintegration, the loss of the pillars of the household economy,
the disappearance of personal terms of reference, the traumatic effects ofphysical disability or the irreversible weakening of the family unit.
As in previous disasters, most of the affected population belonged to lowincome groups, whose suffering was exacerbated by the loss of their homes,
furniture and personal effects, which is of enormous significance. Unfortunately,
the settlement of particularly vulnerable areas by these groups had increased
as the population and marginalization had grown. Many people did not haveaccess to the social services that would alleviate their sanitary vulnerability.
They were particularly affected by the lack of drinking water sources andadequate human waste removal systems. The hurricane highlighted the fragile
nature of infrastructure to mitigate these deficiencies. Many water mains and4 United Nations, Hurricane Mitch, Inter-Agency Transitional Appeal for Relief and Immediate Rehabilitation in
Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize. Dec. 1998
5 No official figures are available on the number of missing people who were later found4

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

latrines were destroyed by floods and landslides, which in turn contaminatedwells and water mains.
The rural population was the worst affected by the destruction of farmland andlocal roads and bridges, along with those employed in trade in agriculturalcommodities. This was worsened by the loss of income sources and thesituation continued critical for more than a year in areas such as bananagrowing regions.
As a result of the disaster’s many effects, around 466 000 people had to remain
in shelters for several months, and some 82 000 families were unable to returnto their homes for a long time, which worsened problems stemming from theinternal and external migration of a large number of men of working age.6
Hurricane Mitch modified the favorable prospects for growth that werebeginning to prevail in the region. In fact, from 1994, when the last and oldest
conflict in the region was put to an end in Guatemala, the countries of Central
America were beginning to feel the effects of a long process of macroeconomic
adjustment that they had begun at the end of the eighties. Increased disciplinein financial policies and the initiation of certain economic reforms had enabled
them to keep control, albeit still precariously, of the imbalances that had
prevented a return to the road to firm, significant growth during the previous
decade.
On the whole, economic activity in the region had been on the increase prior tohurricane Mitch and was expected to continue developing rapidly in 1998 due tostrong foreign demand, capital inflows and sustained capital formation. However,
the hurricane’s effect on production, amounting to more than one per cent of thegrowth rate of gross domestic product (GDP), reflects the magnitude of thedisaster.
The fiscal situation was also affected, both by the increase in recurrent
expenses to tackle the emergency and address the most pressing rehabilitationneeds, and by the decrease in tax collection stemming from short-term
production losses. In some cases this increased the vulnerability and fragility ofthe public apparatus and posed major challenges in terms of strengthening
institutional and fiscal systems in order to carry out reconstruction work.
In some countries the macroeconomic effects lasted for two or three years.
Loss of crops
led to a direct drop in exports, which coupled with an increase in imports toensure food supplies and inputs for reconstruction, added to the trade deficit.

6 Most of the information in this section was taken from UN-Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean’s Report Central America: Assessment of the Damage Caused by Hurricane Mitch, 1998-Implications for
economic and social development and for the environment, May, 1999.

5

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

The impact on each country was different. In Honduras, losses amounted to theequivalent of 80 per cent of the 1997 GDP, whereas in Nicaragua they were
almost 49 per cent of GDP. The impact on the other countries was relatively
smaller. In total, the damages amounted to the equivalent of 13 per cent ofCentral America’s GDP in current dollars and seriously affected the region’s
payment capacity: total losses represented 34 per cent of the region’s foreign
debt and 67 per cent of annual gross capital formation.
GDP growth in the region as a whole during 1998 was calculated at 4.6 per cent,or 1.3 per cent lower than the rate envisaged prior to the disaster. Honduras
suffered the most dramatic drop, from an estimated 5.1 per cent to 3 per cent,while Nicaragua’s was cut by 2 per cent. In the other countries the immediate
impact was less significant.
Lower income and damage to infrastructure had also a negative effect on intraregional trade. Although total imports increased as a result of the need for
inputs to replace equipment and supply products to substitute domestic goods,
the region’s capacity to meet these needs was limited.
Taking the region as a whole, total losses were estimated at some US$6 billion,of which a little over 3.100 billion were in capital assets and pending production(direct damages), with a slightly lower sum (2.918 billion) corresponding to lost
income, interrupted production processes, services not performed, unpaid taxes,
diminished exports and other items (indirect damages). Replacing lost or
damaged infrastructure and direct losses were estimated at slightly less than
US$5 billion, with direct implications on the balance of payments for over 1.600
billion.
Damage to the social sectors —amounting to more than US$795 million— wasparticularly critical in health infrastructure, because in addition to the facilities
destroyed, an extraordinary demand was placed on health services during the
emergency phase. This became a problem of regional scope due to the risk of
epidemiological transmission from one country to another, which was
aggravated by the migration of displaced people.
The chronic lack of housing prevailing in the region before the disaster was
exacerbated by the direct loss of 386 000 units in this sector. A speeded-up
housing reconstruction program of that magnitude entailed a far higher amountthan the countries’ demonstrated building capacity. The sector, therefore,
needed substantial investments over a period of between three and five years.
Foreign assistance has also been crucial to attend the housing needs.
Emergency response activities
The governments of the most affected countries mobilized all resources andpersonnel immediately to mitigate the suffering of the victims. Owing to themagnitude of the disaster, the President of Honduras, for example, launched an

6

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Centerinternational appeal for assistance and, from the beginning, the government, as
well as religious institutions and NGOs, spared no effort in providing assistanceto those in need; donating food, water, clothing, and medical supplies.
Preliminary estimates of private contributions totaled approximately US420,000,
not including medical and other supplies.7
A national Ad-hoc Emergency Management Committee (CONE) was created tofunction as an information center, headed by a Minister of State. The permanentCommittee for Contingencies (COPECO) was the coordinating body for all the
Regional Disaster Committees (CODERs) and Municipal Disaster Committees(CODEMs). Information was fed from the CODEMs through CODERs to
COPECO and CONE.
Regarding the United Nation initiatives, in Honduras, for example, the UN
System moved quickly to mobilize its resources immediately after the hurricane.
Providing assistance to the national services involved in relief and rescue
operations, including financial and technical support for the provision of food,aid, water supplies, and medical care.
The office of the UN Resident Coordinator performed the vital function offacilitating the flow of information on the situation, enhancing a coordinatedresponse between the UN System, the Government, and the international donor
community. A special “Mitch” website was established to keep the international
community regularly updated. In addition, a United Nations Disaster
Assessment and Coordination team was mobilized to assist the overall situationand needs assessment and in the coordination of the international assistance,
and a senior emergency adviser was recruited to facilitate the coordination
between all the main actors.
The operational agencies quickly responded to the emergency, too. In the
Honduras case, for example, WFP, FAO, UNDP, WHO/PAHO and UNICEF
developed emergency plans with the support of United Nations Volunteers(UNVs) and were closely involved in relief assistance to the victims of thisdisaster (food, medical supplies, essential drugs, clean water, and logistics).
In the short term, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) made a transitional appeal of more than US$150 million to theinternational donor community to fund the region's relief needs and the mostimmediate rehabilitation requirements. FAO, for example, was the UN agency
responsible for the agricultural component of the consolidated appeal whichamounted to US$22.4 million. The Organization's Special Relief Operations
Service (TCOR) organized the distribution of basic inputs - including seeds,
fertilizers and hand tools - to the hardest-hit rural communities. The idea was

7 United Nations, Hurricane Mitch, Inter-Agency Transitional Appeal for Relief and Immediate Rehabilitation in
Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize. Dec. 19987

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

that, by encouraging local food production, farmers would be better equipped tofeed themselves and their families and the need for food aid would be reduced.
Responding effectively to such widespread level of destruction and damage
was not an easy task, though. Local and international relief workers worked
around the clock in Honduras and neighboring countries to deliver food, waterand medical supplies, repair roads and bridges, and rebuild water systems. Two
weeks after the hurricane hit, however, relief workers still faced incredible
obstacles trying to deliver much-needed supplies to the hardest hit areas. While
increasing numbers of airborne relief missions were being carried out daily,
ground conditions made it impossible to land helicopters in many communities.
Widespread flooding and mudslides cut off access to many isolated towns, andcollapsed bridges and impassable roads further hindered access to areas still
desperate for help. As many as 40,000 people were estimated to still be
isolated in the region, some with little or no food or water, according to theInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).8
In response to repeated appeals for aid from Central American leaders,
governments from around the world pledged their financial support. US
President Clinton authorized nearly $70 million in aid, the European Union
approved $7.7 million in aid, and Canada, Spain, Taiwan and Japan also madefinancial contributions to the relief effort. The World Bank announced its plans toredirect existing loans to provide $20 million in immediate aid to Central
American countries battered by Hurricane Mitch. Some of the countries' debts
were also forgiven. The IFRC launched an appeal for 12.5 million Swiss francs
to provide food, shelter and medicine to 180,000 people for three months.9
Recovery/ Reconstruction activities
The impact of Hurricane Mitch on Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Belize was of an unprecedented magnitude. The impact wascompounded by large-scale deforestation and the cultivation of marginal lands
without soil conservation.
A concerted high-level regional and international effort was undertaken to begin
addressing the medium and long-term needs for rehabilitation andreconstruction. The Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Guatemala made a joint appeal for a Rehabilitation andReconstruction Plan for the countries hit by the Hurricane Mitch and aConsultative Group Meeting held in December 1998 by the Inter-American

8 Turk, Michele, Despite Massive Relief Effort in Central America, Recovery Will Take Time, Disaster Relief
Organization website
9 Turk, Michele, Despite Massive Relief Effort in Central America, Recovery Will Take Time, Disaster Relief
Organization website

8Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

Development Bank reviewed preliminary reconstruction programs.10 Moreover,an Inter-agency meeting (FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNCTAD, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA,UNHRC, UNICEF, UNIDO, WFP, WHO, IDB, IMF, World Bank, IOM, IFRC,
InterAction) co-chaired by UNDP and OCHA on 18 November 1998 underlined
the need for a Transitional Appeal in order to raise adequate support forcontinuing relief needs as well as to forge links with longer-term rehabilitation.
The overall total of the appeal was of US$ 152,934,914 distributed as follows(in %) among country-level and regional programs: 54.2% for Honduras, 25%
for Nicaragua, 10.6% for El Salvador, 9.3% fro Guatemala, 0.6% for Belize, and
0.3% for regional activities. The following main sectors were covered by theappeal: health, water and sanitation, shelter, food security, agriculture,
education, coordination, and management.11
On December 10-11, 1998, within six weeks of the Hurricane, the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) sponsored an emergency donor meeting at
its headquarters in Washington, DC. Delegations from Central American nations
and representatives from the donor community heard presentations from theWorld Bank and the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) of initial comprehensive data on the extent of
the hurricane's destruction and costs. It was at this forum that the IDB agreed toconvene a Consultative Group meeting for the Reconstruction andTransformation of Central America in Stockholm.
In a special meeting of the Bank’s Governors held in December, 1998, the IDB
pledged $100 million to their newly established Central America Reconstruction
Fund that would provided concessional loans to Honduras and Nicaragua.
Under the Fund for Special Operations (FSO) Honduras and Nicaragua became
eligible for approximately $120 million in concessional loans per year. (Theseloans generally have up to 40 years final maturity and up to a 10-year grace
period for principal payments; normally they carry an interest rate of 1% during
the grace period and 2% afterward.). The Central America
Reconstruction Fund provides an additional source of concessional lending forreconstruction projects.
In addition, the IDB administered Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) established
a $12 million Microenterprise Recovery Program to help Central American
micro-lending institutions suffering from losses from loans that could not be
repaid on time due to the hurricane, or for lending institutions that needed torebuild their own damaged infrastructure, by providing long-term low interest
financing and technical cooperation assistance.

10 United Nations, Hurricane Mitch, Inter-Agency Transitional Appeal for Relief and Immediate Rehabilitation in
Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize. Dec. 1998
11 United Nations, Hurricane Mitch, Inter-Agency Transitional Appeal for Relief and Immediate Rehabilitation in
Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize. Dec. 19989

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

Finally, the IDB also offered Central American governments non-financial
assistance to strengthen and modernize their procurement systems.
A cornerstone in the design and implementation of the regional reconstruction
and rehabilitation processes was the Stockholm Consultative Group Meeting.
On May 25-28, 1999 in Stockholm, Sweden, the Inter-American Development
Bank chaired a meeting of the Consultative Group (CG) for the Reconstruction
and Transformation of Central America. The conference was a forum for Central
American nations to present their plans for national reconstruction andtransformation, and an opportunity for donor countries to make pledges andcoordinate funding priorities in response to the crisis provoked by Hurricane
Mitch.
The Central American governments estimated the financing required forreconstruction and transformation to be approximately $9.1 billion for the region.
Based on the proposed plans for reconstruction, the international donor
community made pledges to finance various parts of the programs. The IDB
announced that it was prepared to provide approximately $3.5 billion in
financing over the next four years to assist Central American countries. The
representatives for Honduras and Nicaragua estimated their reconstructionneeds to be roughly $4 billion and $2.5 billion, respectively. Of the funding
provided by the IDB to Central America, approximately $1.3 billion inconcessional loans were designated for Honduras and Nicaragua, the twocountries worst hit by the hurricane; the rest would be provided in ordinary
capital (commercial rate) loans to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. The
Bank also agreed to follow-up the Stockholm meeting by convening national
consultative group meetings in Honduras and Nicaragua in the year 2000.
In addition, delegates from donor nations, Central American countries, andmultilateral lending and development agencies agreed on a final statement, theso-called “Stockholm Declaration,” with the following priorities to guide thereconstruction and transformation process:• Reduce the social and ecological vulnerability of the region, as the overriding

goal.
• Reconstruct and transform Central America on the basis of an integrated
approach of transparency and good governance.
• Consolidate democracy and good governance, reinforcing the process ofdecentralization of governmental functions and powers, with the active
participation of civil society.
• Promote respect for human rights as a permanent objective. The promotion ofequality between women and men, the rights of children, of ethnic groups andother minorities should be given special attention.
• Coordinate donor efforts, guided by priorities set by the recipient countries.

10Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center• Intensify efforts to reduce the external debt burden of the countries of theregion.12
Hurricane Mitch gave Central American governments and civil society groups,
bilateral and multilateral donors, and international NGOs the opportunity tointervene in and shape reconstruction priorities and programs in light of theirown goals and ideology. Five years later, much of the damaged infrastructure ofCentral America has been repaired. There are the beginnings of early systems
to warn populations of impending natural disasters and prepare for them. There
are also nascent efforts to relocate housing and other buildings from vulnerable
areas. But regional economies have changed little and poverty continues to be
severe. Governments have barely begun to institutionalize the fight against
corruption (a problem that can be considered a constant man-made threat) andhave only reluctantly begun dialogues with civil society groups on themes they
consider their areas of expertise.
Millions of dollars in international assistance have been utilized to implement
many projects that seem to lack proper coordination and, therefore, have not
had the expected impact. Moreover, there is not practical way to measureprogress in regional risk reduction. As a consequence, it is impossible to say
whether the risk levels in the countries of the region have actually been reduced
or not. There is still a long way to go in the process of making the region safer
to natural disasters.

12 From “The Stockholm Declaration.” 1999 – An Inter-American Development Bank Document11

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

FLASH FLOODS AND LANDSLIDES IN VENEZUELA (DECEMBER 2000)
Description
On December 15th and 16th, 1999, a large scale disaster caused by debris flows
and floods in the Vargas State along the Caribbean Sea and also in the
Caracas Metropolitan Area, resulted in a huge amount of casualties anddamage. In the Vargas State, the disaster destroyed lifelines such as roads anddrinking water supply systems, and completely devastated seven towns in the
coastal area. Thousands of houses were destroyed and many lives were lost. In
the Caracas Metropolitan Area, the debris flow was fortunately small comparedwith that of the Vargas State, probably because of less rainfall. But still morethan 300 landslides and slopes collapsed at some 70 locations, some 100
people were missing or dead. In total, an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people
died, more than 8,000 homes were affected,13 and authorities had to plan theevacuation of about 500,000 survivors from the region.14
Ten days of torrential rains triggered deadly flash floods and massive mudslides
that raged through nine northern states where 75 percent of the country’s
population live, sweeping away thousands of homes. Roads were completely
washed out, making relief efforts extremely difficult. Rainfall above annual
averages started in July 1999 and increased during the first days of December
reaching their peak on December 15th and 16th, when daily rainfall records werehigher than the total annual average of 950 mm.15 As a result, severe damageof costly consequences was observed covering extensive areas of the
Venezuelan territory caused by mudslides and floods that catastrophicallyaffected human settlements, urban and rural infrastructure, basic services, andinterrupted productive activities.
Lack of basic information hampered the initial evaluation of damage andsubsequent emergency response activities. Faulting hydro-meteorologicalmeasurement stations did not allow the proper assessment of the natural
phenomenon and the outdated regional cartography did not reflect recent
occupation and development of the affected areas and its corresponding levelof vulnerability. Early warning systems were not available to prepare authorities
and communities for the emergency. Immediate response activities, however,allowed a good assessment of the catastrophe’s magnitude that facilitated theorderly implementation of search, rescue, and shelter-provision activities withthe participation of the armed forces, governmental authorities, and the generalpublic.

13 Website of the European Union’s External Relations, The EU’s Relations with Venezuela-Cooperation
14 Long, Cynthia, Death Toll Mounts in Venezuela Floods, Disaster Relief Organization report, Dec. 20 1999
15 CEPAL, PNUD, Los Efectos Socioeconómicos de las Inundaciones y Deslizamientos en Venezuela en 1999.
February 2000.

12

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

Impact on the Economy
According to the United Nations’ Economics Commission for Latin America andthe Caribbean, CEPAL, the damage caused by the rain, floods, and mudslides
amounted to a total of US$ 3,237 million, which is equivalent to 3.3% ofVenezuela’s GNP. The actual impact to the economy, however, can be better
understood when the damage by state is considered. While the damage in the
Caracas Metropolitan Area amounts to 3% of the state’s contribution to the
GNP, the losses in the states of Vargas, Falcón, and Miranda amount to 167%,
11%, and 6% of the corresponding state contributions to the GNP. This showsthe extraordinary magnitude of the catastrophe in Vargas state and the very
important impact of the disaster on the economies of the Falcón and Miranda
states.
Huge mudslides and movement of earth masses caused extensive damage tobuildings, infrastructure, and industrial facilities. Sixty percent (US$ 1,961
million) of the total losses correspond to direct physical damage while theremaining losses are due to indirect damage caused by the disruption of
production and other economic activities. Most of the losses were due todamage to the transportation, water-supply, sanitary, and electricity
infrastructure.
The analysis of the impact to each economic sector showed that thetransportation sector was the most affected concentrating 23% of the total
losses followed by the housing sector (16% of the total) and the tourism sector(9% of the total). The physical damage was so extensive that it was estimatedthat, if the entire Venezuelan construction sector were to dedicate all its efforts,
exclusively, to repair the damage to the infrastructure, the reconstruction
process would take almost three full years.
Emergency response activities
Due to the magnitude of the damage over a considerable part of the
Venezuelan territory, the President declared National Emergency on December
15th, that is, on the very same day when the precipitations reached their peak.16
On December 16th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized the need torequest assistance from the international community.
The response from the various sectors of the Venezuelan society was
immediate and commendable. The Armed Forces had a crucial role in themaritime evacuation of the people that had been left isolated due to theextensive damage to roads and transportation infrastructure. The activities by
the national civil society and the private sector were also crucial in the rescue ofand assistance to victims. According to CEPAL, the contributions by the civil
16 Gaceta Oficial de la República de Venezuela, No. 36 851, Caracas, December 15, 1999

13

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Centersociety (US$ 22 million) were equivalent to the entire international assistancefor emergency response.
After the first days, a second phase of the governmental response plan was
initiated to provide assistance to the affected communities to start the recovery
process. This phase was coordinated by the National Committee for theEmergency lead by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare andconcentrated its actions over three areas: infrastructure, social development,
and public information and support.
Finally, the third and final phase, the reconstruction process, was coordinatedby the Ministry of Science and Technology in the Vargas State, the most
severely affected one, and by the Planning Ministry in the rest of the country.
The response of the international community to the emergency was immediate
and generous through international organizations, bilateral governmental
agreements, and the civil society. Five days after the disaster, the totalinternational financial assistance amounted to more than US$ 8 million comingfrom more than 20 countries, international agencies and non-governmentalorganizations. The main contributions came from the governments of Italy,
Norway and Sweden through the United Nations system while the largest direct
assistance (more than US$ 3 million) came from the United States.
The international assistance continued actively flowing in the next weeks. By
January 6, 2000, the total received assistance was of more than US$ 21 million
with important contributions by the Office of Humanitarian Assistance of theEuropean Commission (ECHO) to support the activities of European NGOs.
Besides the assistance from the United States, significant contributions weremade by Spain, Italy, Japan, and Switzerland.
The United Nations Program for Development (UNDP) had a leading role in theemergency, recovery, and rehabilitation processes. Immediately after the
emergency, UNDP performed a comprehensive and multidisciplinary damage
evaluation that was provided to the Venezuelan Government and coordinatedthe activities of the multiple actors, both national and international, thatparticipated in the emergency response. The UNDP established the
Cooperation Management System (SIGCO) that served as an information andcoordination center for the international emergency assistance. Also, UNDP has
an active participation in the recovery and rehabilitation processes.
Other United Nations agencies offered important contributions in their
specialized fields of action. The Geneva’s Office for Coordination of Human
Affairs (OCHA) sent a mission to perform the first damage evaluations andcoordination efforts. The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) worked
with the Venezuelan Ministry of Public Health to provide medical care andpotable water. UNICEF focused its activities in the children’s psychological14

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Centerattention and welfare. FAO coordinated the provision of food among theaffected and displaced people.
Recovery/ Reconstruction activities
As regards reconstruction/rehabilitation, while the international assistance has
been generous, its effectiveness has been hampered by the difficult politicalsituation in Venezuela. Several member countries of the European Union, forexample, declared themselves prepared to offer concessional loans to
Venezuela amounting to an estimated total of over USD 100 million. Multilateralorganizations provided an estimated total of USD 1 250 million (Inter-American
Development Bank: USD 337 million; World Bank: USD 588 million;
Corporación Andina de Fomento: USD 325 million) intended primarily for thewater sector, communications and housing. A large proportion of this, however,was made available through the reallocation of loans granted but not yet
disbursed. The actual disbursement of these funds depended on thepresentation of detailed programs for their use. Six months after the disaster,
however, the social and economic situation was still very precarious (especiallyin the state of Vargas) and certain points were cause for concern:17– The authorities – particularly the highest levels – seemed to have somedifficulty fulfilling their role of administering efforts and prioritizing needs. Therewas, for example, still no real overall reconstruction program which included
long-term planning for all the necessary activities and efficiently combined theconcepts of land management and natural risk prevention. This situation
constituted a sizeable obstacle for the donors, faced with multiple but isolated
calls for assistance which were difficult to evaluate outside a global context andled to duplication of efforts.
– Substantial financial resources available from national and internationalsources for reconstruction took some time to reach their destination because of
bureaucratic difficulties linked to political upheavals affecting the country. Thereis a justified fear that the amounts reaching their destination were far lower than
expected.
– The issue of the division of responsibilities and decision-making between
central and decentralized powers could not be clearly settled and wassometimes a source of conflict. The serious political upheavals which thecountry has experienced over the past few years helped to complicate thissituation.
Domestically, the perception is that the international assistance, while effective
and generous during the emergency response period, did not have a significant

17 Commission of the European Communities, Working Document, Venezuela-Programme to Support Regions Affectedby the Floods of December 1999, Sept. 2000

15

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

participation in the rehabilitation and reconstruction processes.18 Due mainly tothe difficult international relations of the current Venezuelan administration, local
experts indicate that the implementation of the reconstruction and rehabilitation
processes has been carried out by the government. However, and due to thesame political difficulties, the government’s work has had many limitations andthe rehabilitation and reconstruction processes have mostly depended on theactions implemented by the affected people themselves. This has been
especially true for the sectors of medium and high income while the poor
sectors have had to rely more on the government initiatives. The many studies
and reports prepared immediately after the disaster by international missions
from the USA, Italy, France, Japan, among others, did not necessarily evolved
into proper reconstruction and rehabilitation programs.
According to local experts, the participation of international assistance troughstudies and several uncoordinated activities has not been enough to correct thetraditional practice of reproducing the risk. Most of the reconstruction has takenplace on the same locations that were occupied before the disaster or on areas
where scientific research indicates that similar natural phenomena haveoccurred in the past. Several of the people relocation programs have failed due
to lack of proper incentives for the relocated people to remain in their new
locations. Faced with new difficulties and few opportunities, the relocatedpeople have finally decided to return to their place of origin, re-occupying
hazardous areas.
While the international assistance could have had some role in theimplementation of some preventive measures such as the construction of sabodams, there has not been a coordinated, comprehensive program to reduce risk
and avoid similar disasters in the future. Many of the sediment-retention dams
and channels that were constructed after the 1999 disaster have not a proper
maintenance plan or system. Almost five years after the disaster, most of thosepreventive constructions are filled with sediments and significantly reduced intheir capacity to reduce the disaster risk.
There are not any serious studies to evaluate the actual impact of foreignassistance (and local actions, for that matter) on the risk reduction achieved
through the reconstruction and rehabilitation processes. Similarly, there are no
evaluations of the effectiveness of the foreign assistance during the wholeprocess of disaster recovery. The implementation of several externally fundedreconstruction projects have brought some new techniques and methodologies
to Venezuela although there has not been an evaluation of the significance ofthe technology transfer. Finally, there is not any systematic way to evaluate
whether, five years after the disaster, there is any significant advance in the
reduction of the of the affected areas’ risk level.

18 Personal communication with experts of FUNVISIS and the Central University of Venezuela

16

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

EL SALVADOR EARTHQUAKES(13 JANUARY AND 13 FEBRUARY, 2001)
Description
In the beginning of 2001, El Salvador, the Central American country, was hit by
two earthquakes. On January 13, 2001, an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the
Richter scale with an epicenter just off the coast of El Salvador devastated thecountry. Exactly one month later, on February 13, as the people of El Salvador
were still digging out of the destruction, a second earthquake measuring 6.6
struck the nation. More than 3,000 aftershocks took place during this time andafterwards including earthquakes on February 17 and February 28 that
registered 5.1 and 5.6 on the Richter scale.
The damage caused to this country with just over 6 million inhabitants wasenormous. Official government figures supplemented by other sources declared
the following: 1,259 people killed, 8,964 injured, 149,563 houses destroyed,
185,398 houses damaged, 2,647 public schools, 24 hospitals, 28 health clinics,
2,300 kilometers of roads, and 75% of potable water systems damaged or
destroyed. Overall, 1.5 million people, 25% of the population of El Salvador,
suffered deep losses from the earthquakes. Damaged infrastructure left
unusable by the earthquakes include 40% of hospital capacity and 30% of thenation's schools. Total economic loss is estimated at $1.255 billion, equivalent
to one-half of the annual national government budget. 19
The atypical succession of earthquakes that took place in El Salvador was due
to ruptures in the two plates that define the regional seismicity, the Cocos Plateand the Caribbean Plate. The largest earthquake (of January 13th) originated in
the Cocos Plate whereas the second one had its origin in the Caribbean Plate.
The second event was due to the movement of local faults, probably due to thesubduction stresses generated by the Caribbean Plate over the Cocos Plate.
While the first earthquake affected the entire country, the one on February 13th
affected a less extended area. The most important damage was observed in the
Departments of La Paz, San Vicente, San Salvador, and Cuscatlán, althoughdamage was observed (or aggravated from the one caused by the firstearthquake) in neighboring Departments, too. Many buildings damaged by the
first earthquake collapsed completely during the second event. Especiallyaffected by the second earthquake was the Department of Cuscatlán, where
only slight to moderate damage was observed during the January earthquake.
The second earthquake caused landslides in extensive areas along the slopesof San Vicente Volcano and part of the Balsamo Range, especially around
19 Government of El Salvador (GOES), 2001, Recovery plan from the damage caused by the earthquakes of Jan 13th
& Feb 13th, 2001, Government of El Salvador, Consultative Group Meeting, Coordinated by the Inter-American
Development Bank, Madrid, Spain, March 7 th, ReliefWeb, 7 March 200117

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

Ilopango Lake and along the Jiboa River. This caused loss of agriculture landespecially dedicated to coffee production-as well as damage to roads anddwellings. Thousands of houses that had been affected by the January event
collapsed and many more were destroyed in the Departments of La Paz, San
Vicente, and Cuscatlán.
Damage to lifeline systems was considerable. Power supply was interrupted in
the most affected areas while a water conduction line for San Salvador was
broken and an entire system of wells and water purification for several
communities was seriously damaged. Additionally, cultural and historicalmonuments were seriously affected and impact on the small- and medium-size
economic activities was particularly severe. The health care and educational
infrastructure suffered considerable damage as well.
Over 2,000 aftershocks and 500 landslides were reported in the week following
the initial quake, causing additional damage and death. The biggest landslide
was in Las Colinas, a neighborhood in Santa Tecla, in the department of La
Libertad, where at least 300 homes were buried. The majority of deaths werereported here, but the greatest infrastructural damage occurred in thedepartment of Usulután.
The January earthquake destroyed or left uninhabitable over 192,000 homes,
displacing over one million people, including 340,000 people in the department
of Usulutan. CISPES El Salvador representatives report that San Agustín andBerlín in the department of Usulutan, as well as Armenia in Sonsonate wereleveled, or "wiped off the map." Makeshift refugee camps and tent cities were
set up around the country.
Deforestation worsened the effects of the earthquakes. Environmental activists
and local authorities in a town where a mountainside buried an entire
neighborhood said deforestation and greed contributed to the disaster.
Long before the hill came crashing down on top of the Las Colinas
neighborhood outside San Salvador, environmentalists had asked Congressand municipal officials had asked the Supreme Court to block the constructionof mansions on the hillside, saying the trees there helped prevent landslides.
Congress didn't respond, the Supreme Court denied the petition in 2000, andconstruction continued. Business boomed and several estates, complete withswimming pools and gate houses, were built above the middle-classneighborhood.20
Santa Tecla Mayor Oscar Ortiz stated that construction contributed to thelandslide, and accused the constructors of putting the bottom line above human
life. Hundreds of people were buried when the mountain gave way in the
20 Alemán, Marcos, Associated Press Writer, Deforestation Worsened Quake, CISPES, "El Salvador Watch" No. 91,
January-February 200118

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

magnitude-7.6 earthquake, turning the neighborhood into a lake of dirt. "Thismountain range showed us just how sensitive it is," Ortiz said.21
Impact on the Economy
The 2001 earthquakes affected a total of 1,412,938 people, which is equivalent
to 22% of the country’s population. 967 people died or disappeared, 8,122 were
injured, and 87,500 had to be taken to temporary shelters.
The housing sector was also severely affected. A total of 334,866 dwellings
were damaged in some way, with 149,528 of them completely destroyed. The
damaged houses represented about 24% of the total housing stock of El
Salvador. The damage to residences aggravated the housing deficit existingeven before the earthquakes. The pre-disaster deficit was of 555,600 hosing
units.22 The damage to residences was especially severe in the Departments of
La Paz, San Vicente, and Usulután, moderate in Sonsonate, La Libertad, andCuscatlán, and minor in Ahuachapán and San Miguel.
The health sector suffered from the impact of the 2001 earthquakes. Twentyone hospitals were destroyed or damaged (86% of the nation’s total) and 131
health centers were affected (42% of the total). In spite of this level of damage,
the health sector was able to respond immediately to the emergency
implementing several preventive activities that avoided the occurrence of
epidemics or new diseases.
The education and culture sector suffered from important damage to theinfrastructure, facilities, and historic capital. In total, 397 school buildings wereaffected (7% of the nation’s total), 7 sport centers were destroyed, and morethan 120 churches were damaged or destroyed.
Similarly, the productive sectors of Agriculture, Fishery, Industry, Commerce,
and Services suffered considerable damage that affected the entire Salvadoran
economy. The damage to the infrastructure affected the power supply system atthe urban, inter-urban, and rural levels. The water supply system was also badly
damaged and water had to be distributed in tank trucks and other means.
Damage to the Pan-American Highway interrupted the national andinternational commerce and caused an increase in costs due to the use ofalternate, longer transportation routes.
The economic losses caused by the 2001 earthquakes amounted to US$ 1,604
million, two thirds of which correspond to damage to private property.
Considering the main economic sectors, the distribution of the losses is as

21 Idem
22 Jovel, Roberto, Economic, Social, and Environmental Impacts of the El Salvador Earthquakes, Lessons from the2001 El Salvador Earthquakes, EIRD-PAHO Publication, July, 2001

19

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

follows: Social Sectors 39%, Infrastructure 29%, Productive Sectors 21%,
Environmental Impact 6%, and Others 5%.
The impact on the nation’s economy was very significant. The total losses wereequivalent to 12% of the GDP and to 40% of the country’s total exports. The
impact on the employment levels was also important. A total of 46,156 jobs
were lost distributed in the following way: 32,540 in the small and medium-sizebusinesses, 8,900 in the coffee industry, and 4,716 in other agriculturalactivities. This loss of jobs increased the social problems in El Salvador andaggravated the poverty levels already found before the earthquakes.
The earthquakes not only brought economic activity to a standstill in earthquake
areas (one in ten micro and small businesses nationally suffered severe
damage) but also exposed weaknesses in the country’s national disastermanagement response capability, the lack of disaster mitigation and land use
planning at municipal levels, and the need for improvements within the
Government of El Salvador (GOES) in the areas of seismic and volcanic
monitoring
Emergency response activities
A state of national emergency was decreed and an appeal for international
assistance announced a few hours after the earthquake. The National
Emergency Committee (COEN in Spanish) immediately activated theEmergency Operations Center. COEN concentrated its efforts on the mostaffected regions, focusing on search and rescue operations, salvage,
evacuation, establishment of provisional shelters, provision of medical attention,
security measures and rehabilitation of services. The overriding goal was tominimize the loss of lives and quickly respond to emergency needs.
The response by the Salvadoran authorities and organizations had serious
limitations. Even though El Salvador is on a major fault line and has a history ofearthquakes (a 7.5 quake in 1986 left 1,000 dead), the country had no national
emergency plan. There were no search-and-rescue teams, recovery dogs, or
special equipment. In these earthquakes, the official rescue operation began
only when international teams arrived from Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, andSpain.23
In response to this disaster, President Flores established the "National
Solidarity Committee" (CNS) to coordinate relief and reconstruction efforts andput Mr. Roberto Murray Meza, a prominent businessman, in charge. The CNS
was composed almost entirely of ARENA (the official political party) members
and private business people who are members of the National Association ofPrivate Enterprise (ANEP).

23 CISPES, "El Salvador Watch" No. 91, January-February 2001

20

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

Unfortunately, politics and old resentments played a role in the response
activities. Many of the hardest hit areas were municipalities governed by the
FMLN (the opposition party) and received little aid because of their politicalaffiliation. The Municipality of Santa Tecla, one of the most affected by theearthquakes and the place where the largest number of lives was lost, was an
example. Santa Tecla municipal spokesperson, David Hernández said, "We
don't know what [the central government] is doing, whether it's out of negligenceor incapacity, but the need here is immense and they have sent neither food nor
medicines." During the first days after the disaster, the only aid reaching the
12,000 people in El Cafetalón refugee camp came from direct donations from
non-governmental organizations (NGO's). The first official aid shipment toSantiago Nonualco was comprised of two mattresses, one pound of spaghetti,
three pounds of salt, and one high-heeled, silver shoe24
The national response included the deployment of 600 troops for search andrescue activities, the provision of 54 new temporary shelters in which some
12,000 people were accommodated, and the establishment of a reception
center for humanitarian flights at the Comalapa's Air Base. The reception center
was under the responsibility of the National Emergency Committee (COEN) andthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The international response included the UNDAC team making continued
assessment of damage and needs, and an FAO assessment of damage to theagricultural sector. The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) launched an
additional appeal seeking USD 5.6 million for medical equipment,
epidemiological surveillance and rehabilitation, and provided medical equipment
and supplies to hospitals in the affected areas. Engineering and sanitation
teams were also deployed to assess quality of water in the worst affected rural
areas. UNICEF worked with the National Administration for Water Distribution(ANDA), the armed forces and Swedish Cooperation, on safe drinking waterproduction, using water equipment systems provided by Norway.
The World Food Program (WFP), together with the Salvadorian Red Cross,distributed 1,000 family food rations for two weeks in the three most affected
communities, and WFP requested US$ 3 million to finance this rapid response.
UNICEF donated medical supplies and distributed kitchen utensils, shovels andpick axes. ECHO announced a further contribution of between Euro 5 and 8
million for emergency relief operations, and other contributions included airlifts
and assistance in kind from Mexico, Spain, Venezuela and the Dominican
Republic.
The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) launched an increased
appeal totaling CHF 7,645,698 reflecting a doubling of the beneficiaries to
11,600 vulnerable families. The appeal included the support and resettlement of
the displaced and homeless, the prevention of the outbreak of diseases, health,24 CISPES, "El Salvador Watch" No. 91, January-February 2001

21

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

disaster preparedness and branch development. Other aid agencies which
worked in the region include Save the Children Fund, Oxfam, Action Aid, andCARE International, SCIAF, and Plan International.25
The United States Government responded with over $20 million in emergency
relief assistance, including $12.8 million from the USAID Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA).26
In partnership with six U.S. NGOs, USAID provided nearly $7.5 million for theconstruction of emergency shelters for 23,000 poor families, 33 temporary
schools, and 12 temporary health facilities. The emergency shelters were inplace prior to the onset of the rainy season that began in May. Nearly $5 million
in emergency supplies and commodities were provided, including rice, beans,water tanks, water jugs, mattresses and blankets. In all, 1,750 metric tons offood were delivered.
The U.S. Military donated, transported and installed a mobile hospital at the siteof the badly damaged San Rafael Hospital in Santa Tecla at a cost of more than
$7 million, and conducted medical readiness exercises. In addition, the US
Military provided transportation for personnel and supplies, including helicopter
support, for a total cost of $850,000.27
The United States Geological Survey provided technical assistance to monitor
seismic and volcanic activity and evaluate risk zones.
Recovery/ Reconstruction activities
By mid-2001, the reconstruction process had started although with mixed
results. The Salvadoran government finished its crash program to build
temporary housing, and claimed that 218,000 temporary homes, mostly ofroofing tin, had been built by the Salvadoran army, the FISDL (thegovernmental Fund for Social Investment), and various NGO's. However, theconstruction of more permanent housing remained slow.28
The Ministry of Education (MINED) had raised its estimate of damages to theschools to $US 100 million. However, close inspections of schools haverevealed many problems that were not caused by the earthquakes. MINED
reimbursed repair funds to some of the 1500 schools that were moderately
damaged, and that paid for repairs out of their operating funds. Also, MINED
started a bid process with private construction companies to fix some of the
25 Department for International Development, Second El Salvador Earthquake: Situation Update 23 Feb 2001,
ReliefWeb
26 USAID-El Salvador, Emergency Operations: US Government Response, USAID Website
27 USAID-El Salvador, Emergency Operations: US Government Response, USAID Website
28 ECONOMIST. "Rebuilding El Salvador: Homeless and Increasingly Hopeless (19 Jul 2001). URL:
www.economist.com

22

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

more serious damages and, on June 1, 2001. announced that 40 schools would
be demolished.
The Vice-Ministry of Housing had identified 106,000 families who lost theirhomes to the earthquakes and did not have the capacity to pay for new
permanent homes. However, the Vice-Ministry only had a loan to pay for 26,000
homes, of which, about 17,000 would be built on the same site where the oldhome was, and the remainder would be built in the "New Organized
Settlements." The money for these homes came from a $US 70 million loan
from the Inter-American Development Bank.
USAID/El Salvador reconstruction assistance focused on the revitalization ofsocial infrastructure for the rural poor, including: housing, schools, child carecenters, public health infrastructure, and potable water and sanitation systems.
The USAID/El Salvador reconstruction program included the following activities:•

Construction of 26,000 permanent houses, providing shelter to 130,000
people.
• Reconstruction and re-equipping of up to 49 schools, providing classrooms
for approximately 15,500 students.
• Reconstruction and repair of 30 childcare centers, directly benefiting 1,800
families.
• Reconstruction of 5 Ministry of Health clinics; construction of a health facility
by a USNGO expected to treat up to 78,000 patients annually, and repair of
the national prosthetics center, FUNTER.
• Operation of the San Rafael Mobile Unit Self-Contained Transportable(MUST) Hospital, expected to treat 6,462 patients annually and perform
1,460 surgeries per year for 2 years.
• Provision of equipment and supplies to 1,660 community health workers
who suffered losses from the earthquakes.
• Friends of Americas mobile clinic, operating in three Departments (La Paz,
Cuscatlán and San Vicente), and providing basic health care services to
11,000 patients annually.
• Provision of potable water to 120,000 beneficiaries through rehabilitated orreconstructed water systems, and the construction/rehabilitation of 27,000
latrines benefiting a total of 162,000 beneficiaries.
On March 2, U.S. President George Bush met with El Salvador's President
Flores and announced the USG pledge of $52 million in post-earthquake
reconstruction assistance to El Salvador for FY 2001. This funding waschanneled through USAID/San Salvador.
USAID's Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) contributed 1,750 MT ofemergency food commodities valued at $917,700 to WFP to replenish thestocks it distributed to the victims of the January 13 and February 13
earthquakes. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) provided

23

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

USAID/San Salvador with $2 million to be used by the NGO CARE to support
housing reconstruction in the hardest hit areas of the country.29
The Government of Canada provided $805,000 to PAHO/WHO, IFRC, andNGOs for emergency assistance and approximately $2.7 million in relief andreconstruction assistance to the Government of El Salvador. Approximately$645,000 of the funding was to be used to support rehabilitation efforts such as
the reconstruction of houses, repairs to schools and potable water systems, andhealthcare services in the earthquake-affected areas.30
The Government of Spain sent relief supplies, four doctors, and five search andrescue experts to El Salvador and offered to loan $36 million for relief efforts.
The Government of Japan gave approximately $2.1 million to the Governmentof El Salvador for the procurement of materials to construct 10,000 units ofprefabricated housing, and about $345,000 to the Japanese Red Cross for
emergency shelter.31
The European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) provided
approximately $7.3 million in response to the February earthquake, bringing its
total earthquake contribution to more than $9.1 million. ECHO channeled thefunds through several partner NGOs and other international organizations.
Almost half of the funding was used to provide temporary emergency shelters
and the remainder for health, water, and sanitation interventions.32
In spite of all the generous assistance from the international community, thereconstruction and rehabilitation process has not been as effective as it would
have been desired. For example, although over 200,000 temporary shelters
were erected shortly after the earthquakes, the construction of more permanent
housing has remained slow until now. Of the 335,000 homes that weredestroyed or damaged, only 32,000 replacement homes had been provided by
the government as of early 2002 and much of that reconstruction was in areas
prone to landslides.33 34
By the end of April 2002 only an estimated half of all families who lost theirhousing in the earthquakes were living in proper housing, the other halfremained in a “vulnerable condition” in temporary metal or plastic shelters
referred to as “microwaves” because of how rapidly they heat in the sun; overall
there remained a “significant shortage of housing throughout the country”.35
29 USAID, El Salvador Earthquakes: Final Fact Sheet (FY 2001), ReliefWeb
30 Idem
31 Idem
32 Idem
33 Inter Press Service (IPS). Muñoz, Néfer. "El Salvador: The Scars Left by the Earthquakes" (28 January 2002)
34 ECONOMIST. "Rebuilding El Salvador: Homeless and Increasingly Hopeless” 19 July, 2001
35 World Food Program (WFP). “ODM-WFP Emergency Situation Report on Latin America & the Caribbean" (08 May
2002), published by ReliefWeb, URL: www.reliefweb.int

24

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

To compound the problem, Salvadoran officials estimated that 70 percent offamilies without adequate housing might have to remain in temporary shelters
because they lacked proper title to their destroyed homes, without whichinternational relief agencies would not replace them.
By the beginning of 2002 there had been little reconstruction in the health sector,
the seven most damaged hospitals were described by health officials as still in“a critical state,” and work on rebuilding smaller healthcare facilities had only
begun. A World Bank loan intended to partially address this problem wasannounced in December 2001 when health care was still being provided fromtents and trailers.36 Most major highways had been repaired but local roads stillneeded work as of September 2001.
The economic situation has greatly deteriorated in El Salvador. Economic
losses that finally reached almost 15% of the GDP caused that, according to the
UN Development Program, 51 percent of the population now lives below thepoverty line, a proportion nearly four percentage points higher than in 1999 andconsidered to be due to the quakes.37 In 2002, more than 200 Salvadorans
were reported to be emigrating every day due to poverty.
Following the earthquakes, a drought left at least 35,000 subsistence farming
families destitute, affecting some 318,000 people, mainly in the eastern portionof the country, causing damage of about $189 million, with the situation
exacerbated by food stocks already depleted following the earthquakes.38 39 In
April 2002 up to 200,000 people were still threatened by “food insecurity,” with
the next harvest not until August and prospects for subsistence substantiallyworsened by lack of wage labor due the collapsing coffee industry.40 (EFE 24
Apr 2002, WFP 12 Feb 2002).

36 LA PRENSA GRAFICA. Rivas, Ena. “Hospitales Necesitan $310 Millones” (San Salvador: 13 Jan 2002).
37 Inter Press Service (IPS). Muñoz, Néfer. “Development – El Salvador: A Forgotten Country” (San Jose, Costa Rica:
2 Apr 2002)
38 International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC). “For Some Farmers in El Salvador Drought Was ‘The Last Straw’”(26 Feb 2002), published by ReliefWeb
39 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). “Central America – Drought 2002 OCHA Situation
Report No. 1” (5 Apr 2002), published by ReliefWeb
40 World Food Program (WFP). “ODM-WFP Emergency Situation Report on Latin America & the Caribbean" (12 Feb
2002), published by ReliefWeb25

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

INCREASING FFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
THE PROCESS OF REDUCING NATURAL DISASTER RISK

1) Shift emphasis of cooperation from emergency response and relief todisaster prevention and risk reduction.
As in most of the natural catastrophes affecting developing countries, thesample cases presented in this report demonstrate that international
cooperation was quick, generous, and effective in responding to the emergency
and providing relief. However, the reconstruction and rehabilitation processes
have been much less effective and participative. In most cases, after a few
months of frantic activity following a disaster, the international presence
diminishes significantly, its interest attracted, perhaps, by a new disaster
happening somewhere else. International cooperation should be more active
and effective in the implementation of long-term risk reduction and disastermitigation processes that would stop the disasters from happening in the firstplace. That is the most rational, cost effective way for the international
community to deal with natural disasters in the developing world.
2) Move from the implementation of projects to the establishment of longterm processes
Most of the international cooperation is now being implemented through shortterm (2-3 years in the best cases) projects. The existing risk, however, is theresult of decades or centuries of unplanned growth and risk creation and,
therefore, cannot be realistically reduced by short lived efforts. Long-term, selfsustainable risk reduction process should be established that have local support
and the participation of the entire community. Long-term goals should be
defined and the necessary financial, legal, political, and social conditions should
be prepared to ensure an effective reduction of risk.
3) Decentralize the procedures
Currently, most of the cooperation provided by international organizations iscanalized through central governments. This generates several problems. First,
all the international assistance (millions of dollars in most of the cases) is totallycontrolled by a small group of government officials with enough authority to
avoid domestic control. This results in lack of transparency, arbitrary
management of the available funds, and plain waste of resources. Secondly,
most of the officials in the central government are not in direct contact with therealities of the affected areas nor they respond directly to the affected people.
This causes that the actual needs of the affected areas are not properly or
opportunely attended. There should be a process of decentralization in which
local authorities, the ones in direct contact with their constituencies have directcontact with and access to international cooperation programs.

26

Latin American Cases

Asian Disaster Reduction Center

4) Make of technology transfer and capacity building the first priority ofcooperation
Reduction of local risk and the creation of safer communities is not the
responsibility of international or bilateral organizations but of the local people.
Only local people really understand the local realities, the characteristics of the
problems, and the effectiveness of the possible solutions (what works and what
does not). Transfer of ownership should be the goal of any international
cooperation program and the necessary capacity and knowledge should be
provided to the local community for them to locally continue the long-term
processes that would eventually achieve an effective reduction of the existingrisk. Local communities should be freed from their current dependency frominternational cooperation.
5) Integrate disaster reduction into public policy and development
planning
There is a close linkage between development and disasters. Poverty results insocial and physical vulnerability to disasters, which is made evident by the factthat in any given natural disaster the most affected are always the poorest
communities. In the same way, disasters generate and perpetuate poverty by
causing huge financial losses and destroying infrastructure. There is, therefore,a vicious circle of poverty causing increasing vulnerability to natural disasters
and disasters causing increasing poverty. In consequence, any initiative that
reduces poverty will reduce the effect of disasters and, similarly, any action thatmitigates the impact of disasters will help to reduce poverty and promote
development. From this perspective, it is only logical for risk reduction to be an
integral part of public policy, urban planning, and development processes.
6) Measure progress and impact
Currently, there are not any standardized means to measure progress in therisk reduction process or the impact of international cooperation. Most of thecooperation is currently measured just in terms of the total financial amounts ofthe donations. Millions of dollars are spent and considerable efforts are invested
in international cooperation programs but there are no practical ways tomeasure weather any real progress in reducing the risk has been achieved fromall these investments and efforts. There is no way to monitor advances or
evaluate the actual impact. It is crucial to start by setting up benchmarks basedon comprehensive evaluations of the current situation and then develop tools
and mechanisms to periodically monitor progress and evaluate impact.

27