Harnessing Natural Resources
for Peacebuilding: Lessons from
U.S. and Japanese Assistance
A guide to managing natural resources
to build peace following conflict

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The Environmental Law Institute (ELI)
ELI is an independent, non-partisan environmental education and policy research center focused on
advancing environmental protection by improving law, policy, and management. ELI is an internationallyrecognized source of authoritative information and policy research on a wide range of topics in the field ofenvironmental law and governance. ELI delivers timely, insightful, impartial analysis to opinion makers,
including government officials, environmental and business leaders, and journalists.

The Global Infrastructure Fund (GIF) Research Foundation Japan
GIF provides research for the development of infrastructure around the globe to support the sustainable
development of developing countries and the global community, while protecting the environment for
future generations.

The Center for Global Partnership of the Japan Foundation
CGP is dedicated to strengthening the global US-Japan partnership and cultivating the next generation of
public intellectuals necessary to sustain this partnership. To carry out its mission, CGP supports an arrayof institutions and individuals, including nonprofit organizations, universities, policymakers, scholars, andeducators, and believes in the power of broad-based, multi-channel approaches to effect positive change.

Authors:
Carl Bruch, Environmental Law Institute
Mikiyasu Nakayama,
University of Tokyo Graduate School of Frontier Sciences
Ilona Coyle, Environmental Law Institute
Cover design and layout by Ilona Coyle.
Cover photo of the Mekong River by Lisa Goldman.

Acknowledgements:
This policy brief is based on a book presenting the results of a three-year research project, Harnessing Natural
Resources for Peacebuilding: Lessons for U.S. and Japanese Assistance, ed. C. Bruch, M. Nakayama, and I. Coyle(Washington, D.C.: Environmental Law Institute, 2011). Financial support for the project was provided by the Center
for Global Partnership of the Japan Foundation, the Global Infrastructure Fund (GIF) Research Foundation Japan, theUniversity of Tokyo (Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, Department of International Studies, Alliance for Global
Sustainability, and Human Security), Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, and Zonta Club of Tokyo I.

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Table of Contents
Executive summary ...............................................................................................................................

2

Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................
Project summary ................................................................................................................................

4
5

Integrating natural resources into post-conflict peacebuilding ...........................................................
Natural resources cut across peacebuilding priorities ........................................................................
Understanding the natural resource context ......................................................................................
Mainstreaming natural resources into peacebuilding .........................................................................
Conflict-linked resources ................................................................................................................
Relating natural resources to specific peacebuilding priorities .........................................................
Program and project design ...........................................................................................................

6
6
8
10
10
10
12

Adapting natural resource management interventions to post-conflict situations............................
The conflict continuum ......................................................................................................................
Conflict assessments ..........................................................................................................................
Eight characteristics of post-conflict situations ..................................................................................
Focusing on peacebuilding priorities......................................................................................................
Devastated in-country capacity ...........................................................................................................
Volatility and rapid change .................................................................................................................
Unsustainable coping practices ............................................................................................................
Lack of trust and community cohesion ...........................................................................................
Unresolved grievances and persisting tensions ........................................................................................
Lingering insecurity........................................................................................................................
Uncertain rights and overlapping claims..........................................................................................

13
13
15
15
15
16
17
17
17
18
18
19

Natural resources and development challenges ..................................................................................
Supporting long-term commitments..................................................................................................
Coordination ......................................................................................................................................
Public engagement
Monitoring and Evaluation
Adaptability
Institutional learning and memory .....................................................................................................

20
20
20

28

Way forward ..........................................................................................................................................

29

References..............................................................................................................................................

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe United States and Japan are leading sources of(2) adapting NRM interventions to post-conflictsupport to post-conflict and conflict-affected statessituations; and (3) designing NRM interventions to(OECD 2010). This assistance has evolved over the past

address development challenges.

few decades to increasingly focus on the longer-term
The lessons on

processes of establishingsecurity, providing basic
services and infrastructure,rebuilding the economy
and livelihoods, andrestoring governanceand political processes—
four core areas of postconflict peacebuilding(Bruch et al. 2012).

[A] just peace includes not only civil and politicalrights – it must encompass economic security andopportunity. For true peace is not just freedom
from fear, but freedom from want.
It is undoubtedly true that development rarely
takes root without security; it is also true that
security does not exist where human beings do
not have access to enough food, or clean water,or the medicine and shelter they need to survive.

The appropriate selection

President Barack Obama, 2009 Nobel Peace
Prize acceptance speech (Obama 2009).

integrating NRM into
peacebuilding focus onunderstanding that NRM
is relevant, and often
critical, to peacebuilding.
Natural resources cut
across peacebuilding
priorities, both as inputs
and constraints onpeacebuilding efforts.
For example, arable land
can provide livelihoodand implementation ofpeacebuilding approaches influence whether a cessation

opportunities for disarmament, demobilization, andof armed conflict becomes a lasting peace. The risk ofreintegration of combatants (DDR). Yet, the same DDR

relapse into conflict is significant. In the 2011 World

program may be constrained by the amount of arable

Development Report, the World Bank noted that “Everyland available, the security of land tenure rights, and thecivil war that began since 2003 was a resumption of a

productive capacity of the land (i.e. how much land an

previous civil war” (World Bank 2011, 58).

excombatant would need to support a family).

Natural resource management (NRM) offers

Collecting information related to natural resources isopportunities to improve the effectiveness of post-

essential to understand specific post-conflict situations,conflict peacebuilding. U.S. and Japanese experiences

the risks, and the opportunities. This information is key

over the past few decades illustrate this potential. For

to deciding what types of interventions are needed,

example, local management of coastal resources in theprioritizing natural resource interventions, and tailoring

Philippines has provided alternate livelihoods tointerventions to support multiple peacebuilding

excombatants, promoted dialogue between warring

objectives by:factions, and served as a platform for introducing
democratic decision making.
This policy brief highlights practices and lessons from
U.S. and Japanese interventions where post-conflict
peacebuilding and natural resource management meet.

1. Identifying conflict-linked natural resources, and2. Identifying which natural resources are relevant towhich peacebuilding priorities in the specific context.
During program and project design, one can then evaluate

These lessons fall into three categories: (1) integrating which method of program implementation will respond tonatural resources into post-conflict peacebuilding;the most community needs and peacebuilding priorities.

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10/17/2011 4:15:05 PBecause post-conflict contexts are so different fromcollect extensive data on the project’s impacts on naturaldeveloping countries that have not experienced conflict,resource indicators without including conflict mitigation

practitioners leading NRM interventions need aindicators in their monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

comprehensive understanding of and sensitivity to

Improving M&E measures and procedures for projects

conflict and post-conflict dynamics. This sensitivity iswith both natural resource and peacebuilding dimensions

necessary to appropriately adapt standard NRM

is important to enhancing the long-term effectiveness ofpractices and tools to the post-conflict context.

peacebuilding interventions.
In addition to lessons

Some of the most successful
NRM experiences highlighted in this book havebeen designed andimplemented withpeacebuilding in mind.
By explicitly supporting
peacebuilding priorities,
natural resource
interventions can engage

In the transition phase from conflict to peace,
early and comprehensive social and economic
reconstruction and development activities play
crucial roles. Especially necessary infrastructures must be built to enable the co-existence
among diverse elements. While humanitarianorganizations are aware of the most basic
requirements needed by victims, development
agencies have larger resources and greater
management expertise.

communities, governments,
and donors who might not

Sadako Ogata, President, Japan International
Cooperation Agency (Ogata 2010).

otherwise be interested innatural resource issues. Understanding the post-conflict

relating specifically to thenexus of natural resources
and peacebuilding, thisguide highlights six major
challenges that relatebroadly to the nature ofdevelopment. These
challenges include: theneed to adopt long-term
approaches; coordination
among donors and among
stakeholders; engagementof community members and government officials;

context is also essential to empowering communities. For monitoring and evaluation using both qualitative andexample, if the often substantial lack of trust, community quantitative indicators; adaptability to the volatile naturecohesion, and in-country capacity are understood inof post-conflict situations; and the promotion ofadvance, projects can be designed both to cope with and institutional learning by improving institutional memory.
address these limitations so that post-conflict communities Experience from natural resource-related interventions inand governments can eventually assume responsibility

addressing these challenges provides insights for improving

for the long-term management of development

post-conflict peacebuilding and development generally.

initiatives. Finally, post-conflict programming requires
constantly monitoring public security, tensions between
groups, and economic and social circumstances that canchange rapidly and affect the project.

Practitioners and policy makers in the U.S., Japan,
and elsewhere are recognizing the importance of
natural resources to various aspects of post-conflict
peacebuilding, as are the UN Secretary-General (UNSG

While projects often serve multiple peacebuilding

2009, 2010), World Bank (2011), the United Nations

objectives, they tend to be developed within a specific

Environment Programme (UNEP 2009), and the United

strategic category: economic growth, democracy andNations (UN 2011). By building on their experiences,

governance, natural resource management, and so forth. the U.S. and Japan can continue their leadership in
The specific category often dictates the way the project

developing policies, toolkits, training initiatives, andis framed, implemented, monitored, and evaluated. For

methodologies that improve natural resource

example, natural resource management projects may

management to support peacebuilding.

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INTRODUCTION
Both the United States and Japan base their official

in Afghanistan to fisheries in the Philippines and arable

development assistance (ODA) on the understanding

land in Cambodia. There are four broad categories ofthat peace is not just the product of a single agreement

natural resources relevant to post-conflict peacebuilding:or the decisions of political leaders. Peace must beland (such as land near new highways in Afghanistan andbuilt through the efforts of many local, national, anddemined land in Cambodia), water (such as the Iraqi

international actors working to together. The effectiveness Marshlands and transboundary waters in the Mekongof these collaborative peacebuilding efforts determineRiver), other renewable resources (such as timber inwhether a post-conflict situation relapses into conflict.

Nepal and agriculture in Timor-Leste), and extractive
natural resources (such as

Peacebuilding objectives
There is currently nostandardized conceptualor operational frameworkfor post-conflict

Four post-conflict peacebuilding objectives:
1. Establishing security;
2. Providing basic services;
3. Restoring the economy and livelihoods;
4. Rebuilding governance and inclusive politicalprocesses.

peacebuilding. However,UNSG 2009; UN 2011; Bruch et al. 2012.

experience shows that as

militarization, and lawlessness; (2) the disruption of basic
services; (3) low economic performance and livelihood
insecurity; and (4) poor governance and pronounced
societal divisions (UNDESA 2011). This guide adopts aframework for post-conflict peacebuilding that focusesdiamonds in Sierra Leone)(Bruch et al. 2012; Suzuki
and Nakayama 2011*;
Nakayama 2011*; Brady
et al. 2011*; Satoh,
Suzuki, and Miyazawa
2011*). How thesecountries emerge from violent conflict, they face fourmain challenges. These challenges are: (1) insecurity,

oil and gas in Aceh andresources are managed can determine whether they
exacerbate conflict (such as through the poppy trade in
Afghanistan) or support peace (such as by engaging
excombatants to manage coastal areas in the Philippines).
The United States and Japan: Leading donors, diverse
approaches

on activities that support four broad post-conflict
peacebuilding objectives (UNSG 2009; UN 2011; Bruch

The United States and Japan play a substantial role in

et al. 2012): (1) establishing security; (2) providing basic

helping countries to recover from conflict. In 2008, theservices; (3) restoring the economy and livelihoods; andUnited States and Japan contributed 42 percent and 22(4) rebuilding governance and inclusive political processes. percent, respectively, of their ODA to post-conflict, conflictaffected, and fragile states (OECD 2010). Moreover, both
These four objectives are similar to U.S. and Japanesepeacebuilding frameworks (USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI
2009; JICA 2011).
NRM is tied inextricably to peacebuilding

the United States and Japan are the leading donors toseveral countries. The United States is the top donor to
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Kenya, among others(OECD 2010). Japan is the top donor to Sri Lanka and
Myanmar (JBIC Institute 2003; OECD 2010). Accordingly,

Natural resources play varied roles in conflicts and in

U.S. and Japanese policies for ODA play a substantial rolepost-conflict settings, from timber in Liberia and poppies in determining whether these states build a lasting peace.
* Citations marked with asterisks refer to chapters in Harnessing Natural Resources for Peacebuilding: Lessons from U.S. andJapanese Assistance, ed. C. Bruch, M. Nakayama, and I. Coyle (Washington, D.C.: ELI 2011), www.eli.org/program_areas/spcsd/.

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The United States and Japan utilize different approaches characterized by interventions from diverse combinationsin providing assistance. The United States tends to giveof agencies (Lund 2010). In 2009, the U.S. Agency formore ODA directly through bilateral aid, giving slightly

International Development (USAID) and Department ofless than 6 percent of its ODA through multilateralState each distributed approximately 35 percent of thedevelopment partners (OECD 2010). By contrast, Japan

U.S. foreign economic assistance (USAID n.d.b). The U.S.

delivers almost half of its ODA through multilateral

Department of Agriculture (7 percent), the Department

development partners, such as the United Nationsof Defense (6 percent), the Millennium Challenge

Environment Programme’s International Environmental

Corporation (5 percent), and other agencies (12 percent)Technology Centre (UNEP-IETC) or the United Nations

are also responsible for administering significant portions

Development Programme (OECD 2010; Suzuki andof U.S. foreign assistance (USAID n.d.b).

Nakayama 2011*; Miyazawa 2011*).
This leads to complex interagency dynamics, because
The vast majority of Japanese bilateral aid is channeledmultiple U.S. agencies often work in a single country,

through the Japan International Cooperation Agency

and the same project may require coordination among(JICA), which administers all of Japan’s grant aid andmultiple agencies. One example is the Liberia Forest

ODA loans. JICA operates technical cooperation projects Initiative (LFI), which involved U.S. Department ofthat send Japanese aid workers and partner
Agriculture’s Forest Service, the State Department,
organizations abroad to undertake on-the-groundand USAID (Nichols and Goldman 2011*).

development projects (JICA 2009). The JICA ResearchInstitute also conducts and collects research on

The United States, Japan, and this guide

prominent issues and challenges facing developing
countries, focusing on three research areas: peace anddevelopment; environment and development/climatechange; and growth and poverty reduction (JICA-RI n.d.a,n.d.b, n.d.c).

Despite their differences, U.S. and Japanesepeacebuilding experiences have faced common challenges,
developing innovative approaches for mainstreaming
natural resources into peacebuilding. This guide highlights
lessons from these case studies, and examines how the

The United States provides bilateral aid through many

U.S. and Japan can more effectively plan natural resource

government agencies, and aid to post-conflict states isinterventions to support peacebuilding.

Harnessing natural resources for peacebuilding: A three-year journeyThis guide focuses on lessons, technical insights, and policy recommendations developed in Harnessing Natural
Resources for Peacebuilding: Lessons from U.S. and Japanese Assistance (Bruch, Nakayama, and Coyle 2011). The
book was a product of a three-year project coordinated by the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) and the Global
Infrastructure Fund (GIF) Research Foundation Japan, with the support of the Center for Global Partnership of
the Japan Foundation. The project analyzes experiences and identifies lessons regarding the role of natural
resources in post-conflict peacebuilding and diplomacy. It examines a sampling of experiences from U.S. andJapanese assistance programs in a range of post-conflict settings from Iraq and Afghanistan to Sri Lanka andLiberia. While this project focuses on U.S. and Japanese efforts primarily in Asia, it also builds upon andcomplements another global initiative coordinated by ELI, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
the University and Tokyo, and McGill University (see www.eli.org/Program_Areas/PCNRM).

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THE ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING
By understanding the role of natural resources in peacebuilding, practitioners can both increase the positive impactsof peacebuilding efforts and avoid unintended consequences that could undermine peacebuilding initiatives. Thissection reviews:v

How natural resources can be important to almost every peacebuilding priority, both as inputs and potential
constraints on peacebuilding efforts;v

What information is needed to understand the natural resource context of specific post-conflict situations,
including how natural resources affect conflict dynamics and peacebuilding objectives; andv

How to mainstream natural resource initiatives into post-conflict peacebuilding programming.

Natural resources cut across peacebuilding priorities
Natural resources are important to almost allof the various ways that natural resources affectpeacebuilding priorities, including reintegrating

post-conflict peacebuilding.

excombatants, supporting basic services, restoring
livelihoods and the economy, and reforming governance.
Natural resources are assets and inputs to these activities,
providing both opportunities and constraints.
As inputs to peacebuilding, natural resources and their

Natural resources may also act as constraints onpeacebuilding that must be factored into planning andprogramming. Conflict resources—such as timber in
Liberia and opium poppy in Afghanistan—can be used tofinance conflict and may need to be controlled in orderrevenues are increasingly addressed in peace agreements to establish security (Nichols and Goldman 2011*;(Mason, Sguaitamatti, and Gröbli 2012). Agricultural

Catarious and Russell 2011*). Development professionals

production has been important to post-conflict livelihoods must keep in mind that natural resources may also limit
and macroeconomic recovery in many countries, including program planning. For example, “[i]n the refugee camps
Afghanistan and Timor-Leste (Unruh and Shalaby 2011*;

that are established to provide basic shelter, food andSatoh, Suzuki, and Miyazawa 2011*). Natural resources

protection, natural resources are critical assets, providing

can form the basis for international cooperation andland, water, construction materials, and renewable energy.

diplomacy, even among states with histories of tense

Damage to natural resources not only undermines therelations (Bruch, Wolfarth, and Michalcik 2011*; Nakayama delivery of humanitarian aid, but can also cause conflict
2011*). The table on page 7 provides additional examples with host communities” (UNEP 2009, 15).

Understanding natural resources to avoid unintended consequences
Even when interventions do not initially appear to relate to natural resources, development and security
professionals need to understand the relationship between communities and their natural resources to avoid
unintended consequences. For example, road building in Afghanistan caused extensive land grabbing because
development agencies did not effectively consider the increased value of arable land near roads and the weakness
the local land tenure system (Unruh and Shalaby 2011*). Such land grabs are particularly serious since theyaffect both homes and livelihoods; approximately 80 percent of Afghanistan’s population relies on agriculture(Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance 2011, 64).

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ROLES OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN ADDRESSING PEACEBUILDING PRIORITIESPEACEBUILDING PRIORITY

HOW NATURAL RESOURCES CAN ASSIST OR AFFECT THE
PEACEBUILDING PRIORITY

Establishing security

Achieving and maintaining security

Where natural resources are a key cause or driver of conflict, theymust be secured and addressed to resolve conflicts and prevent
resource capture (e.g., compare forests in Cambodia and Liberia)(Wallace and Conca 2011*).

DDR

Natural resources can support reintegration by providing
excombatants with sources of livelihood (e.g., agriculture in
Afghanistan, patrolling coastal fisheries in the Philippines)(Sato 2011*; Brady et al. 2011*).

Providing basic services

Supplying basic services and transportation

Efforts to supply basic services and transportation sometimes go
hand in hand with natural resource management (e.g., supplying
drinking water systems and restoring marshlands in Iraq), andthey sometimes undermine existing natural resource management
regimes (e.g., road construction affecting land tenure andownership in Afghanistan) (Suzuki and Nakayama 2011*;
Unruh and Shalaby 2011*).

Restoring the economy and livelihoods

Rebuilding livelihoods

Communities often use natural resources as a primary source ofincome. Well-designed interventions support livelihoods that
promote rather than undermine peacebuilding (e.g., compare
demining and land use in Cambodia with poppy production in
Afghanistan) (Shimoyachi-Yuzawa 2011*; Catarious andRussell 2011*).

Promoting macroeconomic recovery

Natural resources have the potential to support macroeconomic
recovery (e.g. timber in Liberia, oil and coffee in Timor-Leste)(Nichols and Goldman 2011*; Rasmussen 2009; Satoh, Suzuki,
and Miyazawa 2011*).

Rebuilding governance and political processes

Restoring governance

Natural resource management can be a vehicle for effectively
introducing democratic governance structures and practices on
a local or national level (e.g., community land use managementin the Philippines, public involvement in the development offorestry regulations in Liberia) (Brady et al. 2011*; Nichols andGoldman 2011*).

Confidence building and cooperation

Joint natural resource management and infrastructure
redevelopment can help build confidence and cooperation bothwithin local communities (e.g., reforestation in Timor-Leste) andamong states internationally (e.g., coal and steel in Europe, andinternational management of the Mekong River) (Miyazawa 2011*;
Nakayama 2011*; Bruch, Michalcik and Wolfarth 2011*).

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Understanding the natural resource context
Security and development professionals can maximize

in the resource, markets for trade in the resource,

the effectiveness of conflict analyses by familiarizing

livelihoods sustained by the resource, importancethemselves with the natural resource context of a post-

to human health, etc.), andconflict situation. To determine the importance of anatural resource to peacebuilding or, conversely, how avvalue, abundance, accessibility, and lootability).

particular peacebuilding initiative may affect natural
resources that are important to other peacebuilding
priorities, security and development professionals should
consult with natural resource management professionals
to analyze the role of the natural resource in theparticular post-conflict situation (Carius and Maas 2012).
Important factors to consider include:v

the role of the resource in the conflictthe characteristics of the resource itself (economic

One way to facilitate consultation between security
and development practitioners and natural resource
management practitioners is for agencies (such as
USAID and JICA) to develop searchable online rosters
of experts in the fields of security, development, andnatural resource management. These rosters could be
structured to facilitate searches by the experts’ sector(natural resource management, security, etc.), specialtyv

the social relevance of the resource (history, political (DDR, agriculture, etc.), and geographic experience. Suchcontext, culture, spiritual beliefs)v

a resource could include experts both within and outside
the U.S. and Japanese governments.

the relationship of communities to the resource(the number and variety of stakeholders interested

Forests, conflict, and peacebuilding
Forests exemplify the variety of roles that a single resource can play in different conflict-related contexts.
Disputes over forests spark conflicts in Asia (e.g., the Philippines and Nepal) but less often in Africa; however,regardless of the cause of the conflict, warring factions in post-conflict situations in both Asia and Africa (e.g.,
DRC and Indonesia) export timber to finance continuing hostilities (Wallace and Conca 2011*).
In peacebuilding, forests have even more varied functions. They support livelihoods and economic recovery incountries from Liberia and the DRC to Nepal and the Philippines. By introducing democratic forest management
planning processes, communities in the Philippines have been able to develop inclusive systems of decision
making that have allowed them to resolve land use disputes and encourage reconciliation (Brady et al. 2011*).
Forests have been used as a platform for introducing democratic governance on a national level in Liberia(Nichols and Goldman 2011*).
Forests can also foster reintegration and cooperation. Local forest management groups in Nepal have become
respected enough in local communities that they help reintegrate internally displaced persons by mediating
differences between members of formerly warring factions after the cessation of hostilities (Sanio andChapagain 2012). One reforestation project in Timor-Leste was used as a vehicle to reintroduce cooperative
action and communal savings and loans (Miyazawa 2011*).

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MAINSTREAMING NATURAL RESOURCES INTO PEACEBUILDINGIMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT PROFESSIONALS
Natural resources areimportant to almost all
peacebuilding priorities.

Natural resources can be inputs for peacebuilding (e.g., giving excombatants accessto arable land) or they can be constraints on peacebuilding (e.g., where the amountof arable land available for distribution is limited).

A wide array of informationneeds to be collected inorder to understand thediverse natural resources
and their relevance todifferent sectors of society
in particular post-conflictsituations.

When considering how to mainstream and prioritize natural resources withinpeacebuilding, consider:
The role of the resource in the conflictSocial relevance of the resourcevHistory, political context, culture, and spiritual beliefs

Relationship of communities to the resourcev

Number and variety of interested stakeholdersvMarkets for trade in the resourcev

Livelihoods sustained by the resourcev

Importance to nutrition and human healthCharacteristics of the resource itself
v

Economic value, abundance, accessability, lootability

Consultations with natural resource management practitioners and local communities
can assist in identifying which natural resources may be relevant to peacebuilding
efforts, and how they are relevant. Consultations can also improve community
support for the ultimate interventions.
Information on natural
resources should be
evaluated and categorized
to develop peacebuilding
strategies that mainstream
natural resources into
peacebuilding.

To mainstream natural resources into national or regional-level strategic planningfor peacebuilding, one must use information collected about the natural resource
context to:
1. Identify conflict-linked natural resources; and2. Relate specific natural resources to the various peacebuilding priorities.
Conflict-linked resources are high-value or scarce resources that have been afactor contributing to the cause of conflict, an asset traded to finance conflict, orboth (UNEP 2009).
Peacebuilding priorities should be identified for both conflict-linked resources andfor resources that are not conflict-linked. Natural resources may be related to one,
two, or many peacebuilding priorities, depending on the particular natural resource
and the particular post-conflict situation.
Program and project design should take the large scale peacebuilding priorities
identified and evaluate alternative plans for implementing the natural resource
interventions—based on how they can most effectively meet the needs of thetarget sector or population identified in conflict assessments and needs
assessments.

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Mainstreaming natural resources into peacebuilding
When an agency or organization first engages in a post-

Interventions targeting conflict-linked resources must be

conflict situation, it collects information to determine

launched early in the peacemaking and peacebuilding

what kinds of interventions are needed and to prioritize

processes. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, there

and sequence interventions. This includes an assessment is a limited window of opportunity to address grievancesof which peacebuilding priorities need to be reinforced

through comprehensive changes. These can include

through international support in the particular post-

re-forms to natural resource management regimes, suchconflict situation. The next step, increasingly, is foras land reform. This is because the post-conflict situationinternational, bilateral, and national organizations

is in flux, and due to often substantial interventions of

to develop a peacebuilding strategy based on thisinternational actors. Major reforms are harder toinformation that prioritizes and sequences interventions. accomplish after that period, even though they may
prove essential to preventing a relapse into conflict
To mainstream natural resource
interventions into this planning
process, one must use informationcollected about the natural resource
context to analyze and prioritize
how natural resource interventions
can best support peacebuilding. This

(Bruch et al. 2012).

Conflict-linked resources
are high-value or scarce
re-sources that have been afactor contributing to thecause of conflict, exploited
to finance conflict, or both.

includes two steps:
1. Identifying conflict-linked natural resources, andWhere conflict-linked resources areused to finance hostilities, efforts
should also be made to secure theresources, transit points, and markets
that could be captured by warringgroups (Global Witness 2010).

Relating individual natural resources to the specificpeacebuilding priorities of a particular post-conflict

2. Identifying which natural resources relate to one ormore peacebuilding priorities.

situation is the next step of mainstreaming natural
resources into peacebuilding.

Conflict-linked resources are high-value or scarce

Both conflict-linked resources and natural resources

resources that have been a factor contributing to theunrelated to conflict may relate to one or, sometimes,

cause of conflict, exploited to finance conflict, or both.

many peacebuilding priorities. Some resources are

Where conflict-linked resources are identified in aparticular post-conflict situation, they must be
addressed during the peacemaking and peacebuilding
processes to reduce the likelihood of a relapse into
conflict (UNEP 2009). When such resources are notaddressed, peacemaking and peacebuilding may beundermined if any faction feels that its access to conflict-particularly important because they relate to many
facets of the post-conflict society. All of these interests
should be considered when developing interventions
both to enhance synergetic programming and to
avoid unintended consequences, such as where one
peacebuilding effort undermines other efforts that
rely on the same resource.

linked resources or the revenues therefrom may be

Liberian forests are an example of a resource that touches

limited. Natural resource-linked conflicts are more likely

on multiple peacebuilding priorities. They are conflict-to relapse into conflict within five years after hostilities

linked and relate to security, macroeconomic development,

have ceased (Rustad and Binningsbø 2010).

livelihoods, and governance. The regime of Charles

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Curbing international trade in conflict-linked natural resources
International trade in high-value natural resources such as timber, diamonds, oil, or opium poppy has fueled
many localized conflicts (UNEP 2009). In such situations, development and security professionals may need toaddress a broad range of actors involved in the lifecycle of the natural resource, both in the conflict-affected
country and internationally.
Regulating or reducing the demand for the export of a product can change the dynamics of the conflict. Examplesof this approach include the Kimberley Process governing the trade in rough diamonds and Section 1502 of the
U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requiring companies to disclose the use of
conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (KPCS 2002).
The Responsible Asia Forestry and Trade program (RAFT), launched by the Nature Conservancy and supported
by USAID, engages actors throughout the supply chain to reduce the trade in illegal timber, support conservation
objectives, and increase legal timber (Wallace and Conca 2011*). Through RAFT, timber-processing countries
such as Vietnam and China, NGOs, and the private sector work together to discourage the purchase of timberfrom uncertified timber sources where logging finances conflict.

Taylor sold timber concessions to pay for arms and(UNMIL) to address the role of natural resources in the

military training (Nichols and Goldman 2011*). The

conflict (Nichols and Goldman 2011*; Global Witness 2010).

Liberian government also stopped following the

The United States fostered the creation of the Liberiaprescribed procedures and keeping records of forest

Forest Initiative—including 15 international partner

concessions, slowly losing its capacity to govern timberorganizations—to build Liberia’s capacity to reform andconcessions, which were one of the country’s main

manage legal timber concessions, a task essential toeconomic industries. Community-managed forests

economic recovery and governance in Liberia (Nichols andare also important to livelihoods and food security.

Goldman 2011*). Projects have also addressed community

Traditional Liberian religious beliefs are closely tied

forestry, livelihoods, and conservation, but progress has

to forests. And forests house immense biodiversity.

been slower on these fronts.

Once the natural resource information
has been related to specificpeacebuilding priorities, development
professionals can design natural
resource interventions to focus on
individual peacebuilding objectives; totarget multiple peacebuilding

Natural resources may belinked to one, two, or many
peacebuilding priorities,
depending on the particularnatural resource and theparticular post-conflictsituation.

objectives through holistic
interventions; or to use a combination of strategies.

While conflict-linked resourcesmust be addressed to reduce thelikelihood of conflict relapse,
other resources can be prioritizedbased on the combination of natural
resources that will most effectively
support the identified peacebuilding
priorities. Collecting information

on a wider variety of natural resources and relatingthem to peacebuilding priorities creates a more flexible

In Liberia, the UN Security Council placed sanctions onbank of information that can be developed into multiple

Liberian timber and empowered the UN Mission of Liberia peacebuilding strategies. For example, a community land use

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10/17/2011 4:15:06 Pmanagement program may improve security by demining meet other needs within the community. To conductland, build capacity for governance by supporting

such an analysis, program designers must either review

community-based decision making for land use after

the needs assessment for the community or sector, if
one exists, or conduct such an

demining, and rebuild livelihoodsby giving plots of arable land tohouseholds (Shimoyachi-Yuzawa
2011*). Because the land use
management program does
not address macroeconomic
development, other types ofProgram designers may wish toconsider a range of alternative
program methodologies thatmeet the primary objective anddetermine which could also
meet other needs within thecommunity.

peacebuilding interventions areneeded to complement it. Such initiatives might include
programs to use inland waterway transport to improve
the transportation of goods and services within the
country (Ishiwatari 2011*) or programs to develop
exportable commodities, such as coffee (Satoh, Suzuki,
and Miyazawa 2011*).

assessment.
For example, where food security
is a problem and the national
strategy calls for an increase in
the production of staple foods,
a program manager may wish
to consider a variety of program

alternatives, such as automated agriculture, traditional
agriculture, the nutritional value and exportability ofdifferent seed strains, cooperative farming techniques,
and family farming techniques. Then, the program
designer can narrow down the most appropriate options
based on the needs and peacebuilding priorities of the

The program and project design of individual natural

individual community. Where a post-conflict community

resource interventions can also be geared towardsuffers from a general lack of social cohesion and a highaddressing multiple needs within beneficiary communities. rate of unemployment, agricultural programs may
Program designers may wish to consider a range of

support the development of cooperative agriculture

alternative program methodologies that meet thethat will be labor intensive to address unemployment

primary objective and determine which could also

while also slowly developing community cohesion.

Effective project design: Demining and land use in Cambodia
The Cambodia Mine Action Center Land Use Plan Unit (CMAC LUPU) is a demining program that was designed
and implemented to engage communities on land use, land tenure, livelihoods, governance, basic services, andeconomic recovery (Shimoyachi-Yuzawa 2011*). Using inclusive processes, the CMAC LUPU brought communities
together before demining operations commenced to create land use plans that allocated the newly available
land to farming, schools, roads, and other uses. Teams of community members were trained and paid toperform demining as an income generating activity. Because access to land is integral to livelihoods and theeconomy of Cambodia, it made a strong base for engaging communities on other peacebuilding activities.
The CMAC LUPU intervention is important because it considered how a particular natural resource (deminedland) could be linked to multiple peacebuilding objectives. The program plan also considered a variety of postconflict needs. Other demining initiatives in Cambodia simply use mechanical brush cutters to demine land
(an issue of security) without considering the broader context or using demining to advance additional
peacebuilding objectives. While faster, mechanical brush cutters have, however, been criticized for damaging
soil productivity (Shimoyachi-Yuzawa 2011*).

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ADAPTING NATURAL RESOURCE INTERVENTIONS TO POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS
Post-conflict situations are substantially different from non-conflict contexts, which means that successfully
adapting natural resource interventions to post-conflict situations requires an understanding of and sensitivity toconflict and post-conflict dynamics. If not adapted to the post-conflict context, NRM practices developed in nonconflict contexts may be ineffective or even harmful (Hammill et al. 2009). This means being aware of the potential
implications of interventions on individual communities and the broader conflict dynamics. To effectively incorporate
these considerations, NRM practitioners working in post-conflict contexts must adopt a broader view. In particular,
they need to familiarize themselves with the theories and practices of peacebuilding and consult with security anddevelopment professionals when developing and implementing natural resource initiatives.
This section reviews key concepts and characteristics of post-conflict situations and suggests how natural resource
interventions can be adapted to meet these challenges. After a brief discussion of the conflict continuum andconflict assessments, this section examines eight common aspects of post-conflict contexts that have
implications for how natural resource programming is undertaken:(1)emphasis on peacebuilding priorities;(2)

devastated in-country capacity;(3)

volatility and rapid change;(4)

unsustainable coping practices;(5)

lack of trust and community cohesion;(6)

unresolved grievances and persisting tensions;(7)lingering insecurity; and(8)

uncertain rights and overlapping claims.

The conflict continuum
Programming in the broader conflict context needs to be Different communities may be at different stages of
responsive to the conflict continuum. Conflicts ebb andconflict within the continuum because conflicts are

flow, blurring distinctions between pre-conflict, during

often localized (Brady et al. 2011*; Sugiura 2011*). For

conflict, and post-conflict. This means that there may be example, the MANRECAP program in Sri Lanka was able
substantial uncertainty when violence flares up, as it is

to operate for quite some time, even after conflict had

unclear whether there is a relapse to conflict or simply areignited in other communities in northern and easternbump in the road to peace.

Sri Lanka (Sugiura 2011*).

Conflicts do, however, have junctures (such as peaceThis means that natural resource programs should be

agreements) which present opportunities when

tailored to the individual communities in which they are“post-conflict” approaches can address these issues

working because the levels of security and the politicalespecially effectively, such as when Liberia wasdynamics vary significantly even from locality to locality.

compelled by UN Security Council sanctions to address

Program managers must also stay abreast of changes

the management of conflict timber (Nichols andwithin the community, so they can identify both

Goldman 2011*).

opportunities for progress and emerging risks or challenges.

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HOW THE POST-CONFLICT CONTEXT AFFECTS NRM INTERVENTIONSIMPLICATIONS FOR NRM PROFESSIONALS
Conflict continuum: Conflicts ebb andflow, blurring distinctions between
pre-conflict, during conflict, andpost-conflict

Look for junctures when post-conflict interventions are especiallyeffective, like peace agreements.
Conflict is often localized, meaning that different communities may bein different stages of conflict and programming should be localized.

Post-conflict dynamics

Conduct a conflict assessment to understand (quoting USAID 2005a, 29):
1. Incentives for violence
2. Access to conflict resources
3. Institutional and social capacity for managing violence
4. Regional dynamics
5. Windows of opportunity and vulnerability

EIGHT CHARACTERISTICS OF POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTSv

Peacebuilding priorities drive
donor, country, and community
efforts.

Getting funding, political support, or community support for activities
targeted purely toward NRM is difficult.
Natural resources can and often should be integrated into peacebuilding
objectives.

v

In-country capacity is often
devastated (human, information,
natural resources, andinfrastructure capacity).

Programs should devote significant, long-term investments of resources
to rebuild the capacity of the government, natural resources,
infrastructure, and information.
Engage local communities, drawing on their knowledge to fill gaps in
information.

v

Post-conflict situations undergo
rapid changes and uncertainty.

Projects must be flexible and adaptable.
Build “pause points” into programs to assess whether plans and projects
are still appropriate to the circumstances.

v

Unsustainable, short-term coping
strategies undermine long-termplans.

Focus on strategies that respond to short-term needs while supporting
long-term sustainability.

v

Trust and community cohesion
take time to rebuild after conflict.

Programs and projects should use community-based development
models to rebuild trust and support community reconstruction.

v

Unresolved grievances, lingeringsuspicions, and persisting tensions
affect how assistance is perceived.

Programs and projects should be implemented equally across groups to
avoid creating a perception of favoritism toward one group.
Utilize customary institutions to implement projects and resolve disputes.

v

Lingering insecurity undermines
programming.

When international staff cannot access the site:v Engage local staff who have access to insecure areas, and perform
capacity building outside of the post-conflict situation.
v Consider partnering with the military to provide assistance ininsecure environments (e.g., PRTs).
If a project is underway and the security situation deteriorates:
v Adapt the scope of the project so it can be completed in some form
even if international aid workers are evacuated.
v Develop and maintain procedures to keep both government agentsand contractors abreast of the state of public security to improvetheir ability to adapt their projects accordingly.

v

Uncertain rights and overlapping
claims create the potential for
new conflicts and relapses into
conflict.

Practitioners should be aware of and, where appropriate, work to resolve
competing claims for natural resources.
Where resolving competing claims is not feasible, practitioners should
consider whether interventions will affect property or resource values.

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Conflict assessments
Before launching natural resource management projects

consensus on conflict analyses is that they are necessary

in post-conflict situations, natural resource practitioners

to understand how any given assistance project will interact

should conduct, or at least review, a conflict assessmentwith the existing conflict dynamics to ensure that theof the country where they plan to work to understand how project will alleviate rather than exacerbate factors
managing the resource fits into the broader circumstances contributing to the conflict (Woocher 2011). Conflictsurrounding the post-conflict situation. USAID, the U.S.

assessments can expose the challenges underlying the

Department of State, and JICA all highlight the importance conflict, which are often intertwined with livelihoods, socialof conducting conflict assessments, although they

inequality, corruption, and governance, all of which havecategorize the relevant factors slightly differently. The

been relevant to U.S. and Japanese peacebuilding efforts.

Three conflict assessment frameworks
USAID divides conflictassessments into five broad areas:
1. Incentives for violence
2. Access to conflict resources
3. Institutional and social capacity
for managing violence

The U.S. Department of State led
an interagency working group that
divided conflict assessments into fourmain steps:
Step One: Evaluate the Context of the
Conflict

4. Regional dynamics

Step Two: Understand Core
Grievances and Social/Institutional
Resilience

5. Windows of opportunity andvulnerability

Step Three: Identify Drivers ofConflict and Mitigating Factors

Quoted from USAID 2005a, 29.

Step Four: Describe Opportunities for
Increasing or Decreasing Conflict
Quoted from U.S. Department ofState 2008, 6.

JICA uses two primary principles:(1) Consideration not to foster
conflict factors (avoiding
negative impact by the project)(2) Assistance to actively remove
conflict factors (promoting
positive impact by the project)
Quoted from JICA 2011, 12.
This includes an analysis of “present
political, administrative, security,
economic, and social environmentthat affect the whole country, as wellas the background of the conflict,causes of occurrence and recurrenceof the conflict” (JICA 2011, 12).

Eight characteristics of post-conflict situations
Where NRM practitioners have taken into account thebasic services, the economy, livelihoods, and governance—

unique characteristics of post-conflict situations, theenvironmental conservation and natural resource

resultant programs have tended to be more effective. This management are rarely if ever an explicit priority. It is
section focuses on eight key characteristics of post-conflict difficult to secure funding, political support, or community
situations and suggests opportunities to improve thesupport for activities that are purely targeted toward

conflict sensitivity of natural resource interventions.

NRM; however natural resources can and often should be

Emphasis on peacebuilding priorities
In post-conflict situations, countries, communities, andintegrated into peacebuilding objectives. For example, in
Fiscal Year 2010 assistance to Afghanistan, the U.S. spent
US$5 million on environmental programs out of a total

donors focus on peacebuilding priorities such as security, assistance budget of US$4,144.9 million—about 0.1 percent

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(Foreignassistance.gov n.d.). Even where funding isIndonesian administration (Miyazawa 2011*). Post-

available for NRM projects, it can be difficult to mobilize

conflict countries often lack both information and thecommunities to pursue NRM unless the project also

human resources capacity needed to collect information

implicates peacebuilding objectives. For example, in Timor-(Suzuki and Nakayama 2011*; Fischer and Levy 2011*).

Leste, the communities of Ainaro and Manatuto were not The infrastructure of post-conflict countries is often
inadequate to support NRM

interested in the long-term profits
from reforestation activities unlessthere was a short-term livelihoodcomponent (Miyazawa 2011*).
Natural resource interventionsin post-conflict situations must

In post-conflict situations, human,
infrastructure, information, andnatural resource capacity hasoften been devastated by the
conflict and by unsustainablecoping strategies.

be framed, designed, andimplemented to address both peacebuilding objectives
and NRM objectives. Both donors and communities will
be more supportive of programs that respond to needs
assessments and conflict assessments. This means that a

projects. For example, dilapidated
or nonexistent transportation
infrastructure in Timor-Leste andAfghanistan makes it difficult totransport agricultural commodities
to market, undermining efforts
to strengthen livelihoods (Satoh,

Suzuki, and Miyazawa 2011*; Sato 2011*). Natural resources
may also be casualties of conflict, especially when they
are looted to fund armed conflict as in Timor-Leste or
Liberia (Miyazawa 2011*; Nichols and Goldman 2011*).

forestry program that rebuilds governance, livelihoods,
and cooperation is more likely to be funded than a

The best NRM projects are aware of the capacity gaps ofsimple forest conservation program. Moreover, it may be a particular post-conflict situation, rebuild in-country
necessary to frame the project based on its relevance to capacity where possible, and find ways to cope withpeacebuilding, rather than its conservation values.
Devastated in-country capacity
In post-conflict situations, human, infrastructure,

capacity gaps where capacity cannot be rebuilt in either
the short or long-term. Rebuilding human capacity may
include training government staff on a range of technicaland administrative subjects from the management of

information, and natural resource capacity have often been port facilities to wetlands restoration, as well as
providing equipment and training to maintain thedevastated by the conflict and by unsustainable coping
strategies. People flee the conflict; records (including land equipment (Ishiwatari 2011*; Suzuki and Nakayama
registry offices) are destroyed; equipment is commandeered, 2011*). Rebuilding infrastructure often includes repairingstolen, or destroyed; and buildings, transportation, androads and creating market facilities (Satoh, Suzuki, andcommunications infrastructure are targeted.

Miyazawa 2011*; Sugiura 2011*).

This leaves post-conflict countries with many priorities

Coping with a lack of in-country capacity is essential

for rebuilding, but without the capacity to effectively

where local capacity has not yet been rebuilt. It ismanage large amounts of funding or coordinate theparticularly important for small-scale interventions that

armies of international actors providing technicallack the resources to rebuild certain types of capacity,

assistance and building capacity. For example, five years

such as capital-intensive infrastructure. An example of aafter Timor-Leste had gained independence, the National coping mechanism in Timor-Leste was an NGO that
Directorate of Forestry and Water Resources under thebought its beneficiary coffee cooperative a truck to

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries still had

handle the dilapidated roads (Satoh, Suzuki, andonly 19 percent of the staff that it had during the

Miyazawa 2011*).

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In order to cope with this constant change, it isVolatility and rapid change

important to manage change adaptively. [Developing
Post-conflict situations are often volatile and subject toadaptable programs is discussed further below.]

rapid change (JICA 2011; USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI2009). The conclusion of a peace agreement depends onpolitical concessions—often granted grudgingly—tosignificant governance, social, and economic reforms.
Following the peace agreement, though, there are often
tensions around implementation of these politicalconcessions. Parties may resist the reforms, or
effectively seek to renegotiate the terms of the peaceagreement. Factions may feel that their needs wereunmet by the peace process.
A significant portion of the
population may also be in theprocess of re-integrating into
civilian life after fighting in theconflict for years, or even
decades.
Simultaneously, post-conflict

Unsustainable coping strategies
People often respond to the volatility and hardship ofconflict and post-conflict situations by adopting shortterm coping strategies at the expense of long-term
approaches necessary for sustainable livelihoods (USAID
2005b, 2005c). For example, communities during and
immediately after conflict often engage in mass
deforestation for fuelwood, even though such deforestation
undermines the capacity ofIn order to cope with this constantchange, it is important to managechange adaptively, “through constantlearning and calibration of strategies
to particular country circumstancesthat are always in flux.”

the forest to provide food or
livelihoods and can lead to
long-term environmental
vulnerability to flooding andother threats (Miyazawa 2011*;
Fischer and Levy 2011*).

USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI 2009, 5-32.

countries often face a flood ofdonor assistance, and, as international actors become
engaged in local communities, dynamic relationships
rapidly emerge between the international community,
the national government, ethnic groups, civil society,local communities, and the private sector. This volatility
creates a context in which disputes can quickly escalate
to violence.
This volatility can affect the projects in post-conflict

NRM programs often focus
on long-term strategies that advance sustainable
development. In order to succeed, though, these
programs must also address and redirect these negative
coping strategies. For example, the International
Development Center of Japan introduced energy-efficient
cookstoves to reduce the demand for fuelwood near Dili,
the capital of Timor-Leste (Miyazawa 2011*), althoughcookstoves have had a mixed record globally.
Lack of trust and community cohesion

situations in a myriad of ways (UNDG and World Bank
2007; USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI 2009). The population

Populations traumatized by conflict do not trust eachdemographics of local communities may also shift

other, the government, or development agencies.

dramatically when internally displaced persons (IDPs)

Community-based development programs can help

return or as people move to urban areas for jobs orrebuild trust (USAID 2007; USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI 2009;security. National priorities and counterparts may change JICA 2011). Several NRM and infrastructure development
as the balance of power shifts among competing groups. programs have recognized this challenge and successfully
A program’s understanding of community priorities may

integrated community-based development models intochange as new information is collected or as the needs of their interventions (Brady et al. 2011*; Sugiura 2011*).
formerly marginalized populations are assessed.

Conversely, NRM programs that do not address the lack17

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of trust may experience significant difficulties obtaining

PKSOI 2009; Davitt 2003). This insecurity may curtail orcommunity support for their programs, as waseven prevent development practitioners from accessing

experienced with the initial phase a reforestation

certain areas, such as when the U.N. pulled out of Iraq

program in Timor-Leste (Miyazawa 2011*).

for the safety of its international personnel (Suzuki andNakayama 2011*). However, it is often the most insecure

Unresolved grievances and persisting tensions

areas that need development assistance to support
livelihoods, to provide peace dividends,

Although there may be a peaceagreement, tensions and distrust
often remain among the formerly
warring groups (JICA 2011).
Programs and projects should be
implemented across groups as
equally as possible to avoid creating

Insecurity may curtail oreven prevent development
practitioners from accessing
certain areas; however, it isoften these insecure areasthat most need development
assistance.

a perception of favoritism toward
one group (USAID 2007). In Nepal, community forest
user groups include former members of warring factions
and have successfully mediated interpersonal disputes
related to the conflict to help IDPs return to thecommunity (Sanio and Chapagain 2012).
Lingering insecurity

and to lay the foundation for a longterm peace. Moreover, if a project
assists a secure region but not an
insecure one, this can reinforce local
suspicions that international assistance
supports one group over another.
Some NRM interventions have engaged

local staff who can operate more effectively and safely in
insecure areas. The local staff attend trainings and capacity
building events in more secure places, gain the skills needed,
and administer projects in insecure areas when they return.
Because the UN withdrew staff from Iraq, the UNEP-IETC
Iraqi Marshland Restoration Project used an Iraqi coordinatorand personnel to administer its program while monitoring

Insecurity often remains after the conclusion of peace

the restoration of the marshlands remotely using satellite

agreements or a military victory (USIP and U.S. Armytechnology (Suzuki and Nakayama 2011*).

Conflict-sensitive community forest management in Mindanao, Philippines
The EcoGov project sought to improve environmental governance, addressing forests, coastal areas, and otherresources (Brady et al. 2011*). Because EcoGov was designed with the post-conflict context in mind, it has beenable to successfully engage potential peace spoilers to develop resource use plans. For example, in one community,
EcoGov offered a three-day workshop to which all community members were welcome, including members ofrebel groups, one of whom brought a perimeter defense map to assist in the planning process. By ensuring thatthe planning process was inclusive, the project helped build trust among the formerly warring factions. The land
use plan was even used to mediate local armed hostilities over competing claims over pasturelands.
The project assisted local government units to build participatory decision-making capacity so that they could
then develop and administer plans on their own (Brady et al. 2011*). This included long-term technicalassistance and capacity building on governance, monitoring, and evaluation.
EcoGov also worked with local communities to find alternative livelihoods for excombatants, such as guarding
local marine protected areas and raising mudcrabs and shellfish (Brady et al. 2011*).

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Another approach to working in insecure areas is foreven where land was not a cause of conflict land can be adevelopment workers to partner with the military tosource of tension in post-conflict situations (USAID

provide services while maintaining a secure environment. 2005c; JICA 2011). IDPs often return to their properties
only to find that, during their

The United States pioneered thisapproach through the deploymentof provincial reconstruction teams(PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan,

Property resolution processes raisecomplex questions that bring withthem risks of increased instability.

and other countries have since
deployed PRTs in these countries

USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI 2009,10-194.

government and private sector experts in fields likeurban planning or agribusiness (White House 2007). In
Afghanistan, PRTs included international team members
as well (Civic 2012). PRT team members simultaneously
work toward multiple development objectives, such as
installing water purification systems or teaching farmers’
cooperatives business skills (Civic 2012). The interventions
were, however, only three months long and limited inscope, avoiding activities such as extending microloans
for fear of upsetting the balance of power among
beneficiary communities (Civic 2012).
If the security situation starts to deteriorate when aproject is underway, project managers need to beprepared to adapt, downsize, or even halt a project(Sugiura 2011*). Finally, it is important to haveprocedures to keep both government agents andcontractors abreast of the state of public security to
improve their ability to adapt their projects as the
security situation changes.
Uncertain Rights and Overlapping Claims

occupied by others (USIP and
U.S. Army PKSOI 2009).
Systems of property ownershipor resource rights may also break(Civic 2012). PRTs include a variety
of diplomats, development professionals, andabsence, their lands were

down due to changes in leadership or because parties in
the conflict targeted property records, as in Timor-Lesteand Bosnia-Herzegovina (USAID 2005c).
Where possible, interventions should work to resolve
competing claims to property and resources and develop
systems of compensation that use inclusive andtransparent processes (USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI 2009).
Both the EcoGov project in the Philippines and the CMAC
LUPU demining project in Cambodia specifically focusedon developing the capacity of local governments toresolve competing claims for land and other natural
resources in transparent and inclusive ways, thereby
reducing local tensions (Brady et al. 2011*; ShimoyachiYuzawa 2011*).
Interventions that do not directly address rights tonatural resources or land must still be sensitive to thepotential impacts that their interventions may have on
property ownership. For example, the construction ofroads in Afghanistan increased the value of nearby land,
inadvertently causing massive land grabs of over 80
percent of agricultural land in six provinces along the
new Ring Road (Unruh and Shalaby 2011*). This means

Many developing countries have weak, overlapping,that professionals designing interventions in post-conflictor conflicting statutory and customary systems of rights

situations must consider factors such as whether

to property and other natural resources; however, theinterventions will affect property or resource values,

challenge of resolving competing claims to land andwhether resources rights are firmly established, andresources becomes increasingly urgent and complex inwhether local institutions are strong enough to resolve

post-conflict situations. Competing claims for land andcompeting claims to resources and enforce theirother natural resources can be a cause of conflict, anddeterminations.

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NATURAL RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES
This section analyzes how specific natural resource interventions in post-conflict situations have addressed six major
challenges that relate more broadly to the nature of development:•

supporting long-term commitments for post-conflict natural resource initiatives;•

coordinating multiple actors working in the same post-conflict situation;•

engaging the public and the government of the conflict-affected countries;•

strengthening monitoring and evaluation for a more comprehensive understanding of project effectiveness;•

adapting projects based on changing circumstances, evaluations, and new information; and•improving institutional memory by collecting and exchanging information from interventions.

Supporting long-term commitments
Post-conflict peacebuilding is a multi-year process, andSecuring long-term assistance budgets is often difficult

long-term commitments are essential. In the first ten

because donors are uncertain as to how long the peace

years following the end of violent conflict, the political,

process will persist (and the likelihood of relapse) and theeconomic, and social discourses focus substantially on

nature of donor country appropriations processes. Before

the legacy of the conflict (Bruch et al. 2012). As athe 1990s, USAID programs often lasted for ten years,

practical matter, it is necessary to design programs towith a five-year review to see if changes were needed

meet immediate needs and objectives; however, the(Natsios 2010). Now, programs for countries in transition

objectives must also link to long-term development goals usually last from one to three years. For other countries,(USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI 2009; JICA 2011). Short-term USAID calls for five-year assistance plans (USAID 2010).
projects often have limited impact and their impacts are
harder to measure (Davitt 2003; Hammill et al. 2009). In
Timor-Leste, Liberia, and elsewhere, capacity building
and legal reforms have taken longer to execute than
expected, even for relatively successful projects (Nichols
and Goldman 2011*; Satoh, Suzuki and Miyazawa 2011*;
UNDG and World Bank 2007).

Long-term strategic plans can often address this challenge
by using short-term milestones to justify funding for
subsequent steps. Another strategy is to plan to gradually
reduce external assistance and transition from financial
to technical assistance in conjunction with a slow transition
to management by local groups (Fischer and Levy 2011*).

Coordination and collaboration
Post-conflict situations have many needs and even more

conferences allow donor agencies, NGOs, and national

actors, all trying to help. Coordination and collaboration

actors to develop a shared strategy for peacebuilding

are needed to reduce overlap, improve efficiency, andand to allocate interventions among the various actors.

enhance the effectiveness of interventions (JICA 2006;

Donor conferences are often held at the beginning of a

USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI 2009). Coordination is thepost-conflict process and periodically thereafter. Donor

process of organizing international actors to ensure that

conferences help to ensure that international assistancepriority issues are addressed and to reduce overlap.

addresses a range of needs without emphasizing any

Through collaboration groups work together toparticular geographic area to the detriment of others.

implement programs.

Interventions are assigned to different actors by geographic
area and sector, such as DDR or governance (Fischer andOver the last decade, coordination has been increasing

Levy 2011*; Sato 2011*; Catarious and Russell 2011*).

through activities such as donor conferences. Donor

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CARPE: Long-term strategy, short-term milestones
The Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) has effectively managed for the long-term despite
the brevity of funding cycles. CARPE is a USAID initiative to support management of the Congo Basin’s forest ecosystem,
which included four post-conflict countries: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, andBurundi (CARPE 2010a, 2010b). Launched in 1995, CARPE has just developed a new eight-year strategic plan for workthrough 2020 (Resch 2011). Its planning process began with efforts to envision an ideal end-state for the Congo Basin’s
forests—that of African governments sustainably managing resources in a way that equitably shares the benefits andcosts of that management. The program designers then asked how long it would take to achieve the end-state andwhat milestones could be identified. In designing individual steps, program staff developed discrete objectives to be
met at the end of each funding cycle but which would also indicate next steps in a strategic process. For example, by
the end of one cycle, the program had developed studies analyzing the causes of deforestation and loss of biodiversity
in the basin, which then identified the focus of pilot projects. The evaluations of pilot projects then determinedwhich experiences were replicable and scalable. Finally, the program also partnered with other U.S. government
agencies (e.g., the U.S. Forest Service, Department of State, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), NGOs (e.g., theWorld Wildlife Fund, Wildlife Conservation Society, African Wildlife Foundation, and Conservation International), anduniversities (e.g., the University of Maryland) to broaden its impact and diversify its funding base (CARPE 2010b).
When, however, donor conferences geographically group engage more participants (Wallace and Conca 2011*).
interventions by administrative boundaries, they miss the Other innovative examples of coordination engaged
cumulative impacts of interventions on ecosystems, such new stakeholders, such as private enterprise in timberas watersheds or forests. For example, flood prevention

management or militaries in environmental disaster

efforts in Haiti focus on the downstream administrative

management (Wallace and Conca 2011*; Dabelko anddistricts impacted by severe flooding, but do not promote Rogers 2011*).
efforts upstream where watershed restoration could mosteffectively control flooding (Fischer and Levy 2011*).

Collaboration throughout project implementation can
reduce the duplication of efforts when multiple actors

Organizations operating on the ground may also use

work on related projects or in the same sector (Nichols

coordinating meetings to develop a broad vision for

and Goldman 2011*; Wallace and Conca 2011*; Sugiura

implementation strategies. For example, the Managing

2011*; Nakayama 2011*). For example, the LFI in Liberia

Conflict in Asian Forest Communities project convened

included representatives from fifteen international partners

a meeting in which USAID and the World Wildlife Fundsuch as U.S. government agencies, the World Bank, andbrought together environmental, conflict-resolution,

NGOs that worked with Liberian institutions to provide

and humanitarian-relief NGOs to discuss the impacts offunding and technical support throughout the assessment,

forest conflicts; to develop strategies for intervention byredesign, and implementation of the forest concession

government, NGOs, donors, and industry; and to work to framework in Liberia (Nichols and Goldman 2011*).

Public engagement
The most successful and sustainable programs engage

because many communities in post-conflict contexts depend

local communities and the public every step of the way

substantially on farming, forests, fisheries for livelihoods(JICA 2006; Davitt 2003). Community engagement isand food security. Accordingly, interventions should

particularly important for natural resource interventions

engage all sides of a conflict, local and national governments,

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10/17/2011 4:15:06 Pbusiness interests, local NGOs, and media (USIP and U.S. implement Liberia’s new forestry law (Nichols andGoldman 2011*).

Army PKSOI 2009).

Community engagement is also

While there is broad agreement
regarding the importance of public
engagement, peacebuilding
interventions by the UnitedStates, Japan, and others do notalways engage the right people
at the right times and in the rightways. This uneven engagement
has led to uneven results.

Consult broadly and create
coordination mechanisms with thehost nation population to build trust,prevent dependency, and ensure
ownership, paying particular attention
to women and minorities who may
have special needs.

essential to project development(including the environmental
impact assessment (EIA) process),
implementation, and post-project
evaluations. In Maasim, Philippines,
the EcoGov project convened athree-day workshop for the initial

USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI 2009, 9-133.

project planning that engaged
stakeholders, including members

Public engagement can be initiated at the earliest
stages of conflict analyses and during the developmentof national-level programs. In Liberia, the Liberian
government worked with various partners, including the
LFI, to perform its final forest concession review due topressure from civil society groups that rejected earlier
assessments (Nichols and Goldman 2011*). The LFI also
worked with the government of Liberia develop a noticeand comment process to review the draft regulations toof the local government and the rebel group (Brady et al.
2011*). Similarly, in Labangan, Phillippines, technicalworking groups made up of local stakeholders designed,raised public awareness of and enforced marine protectedareas as part of the EcoGov project. In a number of activities,
EcoGov also used participatory monitoring and evaluation.
Locally directed land use planning and implementation
has also been effective when coupled with demining
efforts in Cambodia (Shimoyachi-Yuzawa 2011*).

MANRECAP in Sri Lanka
The JICA-sponsored MANRECAP project in Sri Lanka effectively combined local coordination and donor engagement(Sugiura 2011*). MANRECAP sought to rebuild local infrastructure in the village of Santhipuram. However, theproject budget was insufficient to address all of the infrastructure gaps identified in the community needs assessment.
To fill the unmet needs, MANRECAP staff (particularly a Japanese consulting firm implementing the project)worked with leaders of community groups to obtain financial, political, and technical support for the remainderof the project by engaging and coordinating local government entities and several international donors.
The project was designed to empower community members by engaging them in negotiations with government
officials and international donors. This new confidence was especially notable because the community was largely
composed of Tamil IDPs who had not previously engaged in cooperative action with groups in the community,with the government of Sri Lanka, or with the international community.
When deteriorating public security in Sri Lanka made it difficult and costly to obtain construction materials for awater supply project, MANRECAP staff adapted to the changes by redesigning it to reduce the scope of theconstruction but still complete the project. JICA personnel also demonstrated flexibility by administratively
approving the redistribution of funding for the project from other areas.

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Monitoring and evaluation
USAID and JICA both recognize the importance ofpolitical process, conflict/instability factors, and from theevaluations to organizational learning (USAID 2011;

viewpoint of peacebuilding, . . . elements such as the

JICA 2006, 2010). This includes learning throughtime of initiating the assistance, content of cooperation,

periodic evaluations during project implementation,

selection of the target area and population, relevance oforganizational learning for broader program planning,

the implementation structure, and the impact” (JICA

and the adaptation of similar projects in new situations

2011, 37; see also OECD-DAC 2008a, 2008b).

(USAID 2011; JICA 2006, 2010). Nevertheless, evensuccessful interventions have experienced difficulties inIn the United States, the USIP engaged multiple

effectively measuring and documenting the outcomes

government agencies and departments to develop theof their projects (e.g., Brady et al. 2011*; Suzuki and

Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)

Nakayama 2011*).

Metrics Framework, which provides indicators, measures,and suggested methodologies for peacebuilding

When designing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plans

evaluation (Agoglia, Dziedzic, and Sotirin 2010;

for development projects, the indicators and procedures

see also MSI 2006).

selected tend to be sector specific. NRM projects havetheir own sets of indicators and M&E procedures, as do

The U.S., Japanese, and OECD resources provide a

projects that focus on building security, providing basic

general foundation for M&E in post-conflict

services, or rebuilding the national economy.

programming, but lack fleshed out discussions of the roleof natural resources. MPICE briefly mentions natural

Even projects that serve multiple peacebuilding

resources in the context of looting and the need for

objectives tend to be developed within a specificgovernance (Agoglia, Dziedzic, and Sotirin 2010). JICA’s

strategic category: economic growth, democracy andHandbook for transition assistance discusses M&E ingovernance, NRM, and so forth. The specific category

post-conflict situations and discusses natural resources;

then dictates how the project is framed, implemented,

however, it does not include NRM indicators (JICA 2006).

monitored, and evaluated. For example, the EcoGovproject in the Philippines, was an NRM project that

Improving M&E measures and procedures for projects

collected extensive data on the project’s impacts onwith both natural resource and peacebuilding dimensions

natural resource indicators; however, it did not include

is important to enhance the long-term effectiveness ofconflict mitigation indicators (Brady et al. 2011*).

peacebuilding interventions. It is necessary to develop
guidance for M&E for projects at the nexus of NRM

The impacts of the post-conflict situation on projectand peacebuilding. Such guidance would address

performance are difficult to accurately predict during

the development and use of appropriate indicators,

design of programs and projects, and post-conflict

as well as use of other M&E procedures.

benchmarks are often based on ordinary development
assistance criteria. As a result, peacebuilding projects

Historically, projects have relied on quantitative data forhave trouble meeting benchmarks that do not accountmonitoring; however, it is difficult to capture the fullfor the post-conflict context (JICA 2011). JICA’s

effects of NRM projects by counting the number of people

peacebuilding guidelines suggest adapting the scope and trained, hectares planted, or wells drilled (Fischer andbenchmarks for activities in post-conflict situations andLevy 2011*). Both Japanese and U.S. projects have had

to develop new evaluation factors that consider “thetrouble identifying, monitoring, and evaluating project

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10/17/2011 4:15:06 Pimpacts on community and individual quality of life

opium poppies in Afghanistan (Suzuki and Nakayama(Suzuki and Nakayama 2011*; Catarious and Russell

2011*; Catarious and Russell 2011*). These remote

2011*). The Iraqi Marshlands Project aimed to improvemonitoring techniques are sometimes coupled with

the quality of life of people that depended on the marsh

on-the-ground monitoring by community members or

for their livelihoods and drinking water; however, theproject staff to ground-truth the remote sensing (Suzuki

project lacked qualitative data to determine whether

and Nakayama 2011*).

marshland restoration had the desired impacts on
peoples’ lives (Suzuki and Nakayama 2011*). Accordingly,
there has been movement toward collecting bothquantitative and qualitative M&E data.

For projects designed to be eventually turned over to thecommunity and managed locally, it is often necessary tobuild the capacity of the target communities to perform
M&E (Fischer and Levy 2011*). Local community members

USAID’s 2011 Evaluation Policy commits at least

must have the necessary basic equipment and training

3 percent of USAID’s program office budget to external

to collect quantitative and qualitative data on project

evaluation (USAID 2011). The policy states that “[f]performance (Suzuki and Nakayama 2011*). The EcoGovindings should be specific, concise and supported byproject in the Philippines was particularly effective atquantitative and qualitative information

including community members in project monitoringand evaluation; as a result,that is reliable, valid andgeneralizable” (USAID 2011, 11).
It also recommends designs that
include observational, quasiexperimental, and experimental

Findings should be specific, concise
and supported by quantitative andqualitative information that isreliable, valid and generalizable.

data (USAID 2011).

communities developed astronger sense of the program’s
accomplishments (Brady et al.
2011*).

USAID 2011, 11.
Another challenge for M&E isJICA created an advisory committee on evaluation

determining the impacts of a single donor’s intervention

in October 2008 to improve its evaluation processes

where multiple donors were involved in the same project.

(JICA n.d.). The committee found that cost-examination

For example, the evaluation process for the MANRECAP

evaluations of projects should consider “costinitiative in Sri Lanka was limited in scope to activities thatcomparisons, . . . specifications, lifespan, and transfer

JICA financed directly (Sugiura 2011*). This meant that thetechnology, . . . qualitative effects[,] . . . the cause-effect evaluation did not consider project components whererelationship and . . . quantitative explanations of theother donors funded the bulk of the construction or

impact . . .” (JICA 2010, 18). JICA has been building

implementation even though these project components

staff capacity for M&E through guidance manuals

would not have been possible without significant technicaland workshops (JICA 2010).

support and coordination performed by MANRECAP staff.

Technology also plays a role in the development of new

Finally, it may be advisable to take a broad view of M&E,

techniques for monitoring and evaluation. The United

and to communicate the results of the achievements to theStates, Japan, and others have made many advances

donor nation’s public. This can build the public awarenessin the use of satellite technology to monitor naturalneeded to maintain long-term taxpayer support forresources. These advances have been instrumental inprograms. For example, UNEP-IETC rarely communicatedmonitoring the restoration of the Iraqi marshlands, aswith the Japanese press about the Iraqi Marshlands Project,

well as tracking trends in cultivating and eradicatingeven though Japan funded the project largely due to an

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USAID Evaluation Policy commits to sharing findings fromand Nakayama 2011*). In contrast, as part of the Obama evaluations “as widely as possible, with a commitment toadministration’s commitment to transparency, the 2011

full and active disclosure” (USAID 2011, 7).

Adaptability
Program adaptability is important for all international

underlying dynamic, the United States has adapted its

development projects; however, it is particularly important counter-narcotics initiatives from eradication to focus onfor projects in post-conflict situations due to the lack ofproviding Afghan farmers with alternative livelihoods.

information that donors have before launching projects—
particularly related to natural resources—and due to the

In response to the uncertain information and the
dynamic post-conflict context, NRM projects in post-

volatility of post-conflict situations.

conflict settings need to be
Assistance projects are often
launched quickly after the end of
hostilities because donor countries
wish to help former combatants

Evaluations inform program
staff of progress, creating
natural opportunities to revise
the program’s approach,timing, or sequencing.

feel the benefits of peace—thedesigned to be flexible in theirapproach, timing, and sequencing(USIP and U.S. Army PKSOI 2009).
USAID’s Office of Transition
Initiatives recognizes the“peace dividend”—as quickly as possible to reduce theimportance of adaptability by performing quarterly

likelihood of a relapse into conflict (USIP and U.S. Armyreviews of programs in complex, high-threat

PKSOI 2009; JICA 2011). Because programs must be

environments (USAID 2010). Regular monitoring andimplemented quickly, projects are often launched withperiodic evaluations of projects help make sure that the

only a basic understanding of the social or economic

projects are still responsive to current circumstances.

situation or the state of natural resources. Baseline data
is usually lacking or limited (Davitt 2003; Fischer andLevy 2011*).

Sometimes adapting a project to changing circumstances
requires additional funding. For example, deteriorating
public security may drive up the costs of construction

Accordingly, the assumptions underlying a project may

materials. This can result in projects that remain

be incorrect or become outdated. For example, in a

incomplete. One way to plan for and respond to thisrice production project in Timor-Leste, JICA staff

need is to create a special trust fund (or otherbelieved that the Timorese population was reduced inmechanism) to help programs adapt to changes in

the conflict, leaving farms short-handed (Satoh, Suzuki,

post-conflict situations. Such a fund could be designed as

and Miyazawa 2011*). Later, the population wasa scaled-down version of the Complex Crises Fund, which

actually found to be increasing and have a high rate

gives USAID the authority to disburse funds quickly toof unemployment, which was problematic because

respond to “emerging opportunities” and “unforeseen

the project was mechanized to reduce the number

complex crises” (Serafino 2011, 4).

of workers needed to produce rice.
Interventions may also be designed to adapt their practices
Similarly, the United States did not initially understandbased on feedback obtained through local engagement.

that Afghan farmers grow opium poppies primarily due

After JICA rehabilitated the port facilities in Juba City, into their need for sustainable livelihoods (Catarious andthen-Southern Sudan, the new government agencies

Russell 2011*). Since refining its understanding of the

had trouble managing the new system, resulting in

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10/17/2011 4:15:06 Plow levels of traffic at the port. In response, JICA added

The adaptability of these projects reflects JICA’sa capacity building component to its intervention tophilosophy that changing a project during the course of

train local government officials on administering theits implementation is not failure, but simply reflects theport (Ishiwatari 2011*). Likewise, in Timor-Leste, Peaceneed to adapt to new circumstances. JICA is currently

Winds Japan adapted the coffee-harvesting practices

amending its evaluation process for projects in post-

and the structure of the cooperative to respond to theconflict situations to examine how well projects adapt

community wishes (Satoh, Suzuki, and Miyazawa 2011*). to changing circumstances (JICA 2011).

Institutional learning and memory
Both JICA and USAID highlight the need to

A current challenge is to expand the available

mainstream information from project evaluations

online documentation to include more projects,

into future programs (USAID 2011; JICA 2006, 2010).

more documents, more consistently. The additional

In a 2010 review of JICA’s evaluation processes,

information could include studies performed and data

73 percent of the JICA employees surveyed statedcollected for the project, interviews, handbooks, forms,

that evaluations were important to organizational

templates, and more. If easily accessible and searchable,

learning (JICA 2010).

such documentation could be used for institutional

Developing public clearinghouses

learning, project development, andneeds to extend beyond evaluations

Every step of USAID’s programming model—from design toimplementation to evaluation—
will be undertaken from theperspective not only of achieving
development objectives, but ofcontributing to the broader goalof learning from experience.

and include a wider range of project

USAID 2011, 10.

for the collection and exchange ofa broad array of information on
development initiatives is essential
to advancing institutional learningand strengthening institutional
memory; however, this information

external analysis of performance.
Information-sharing mechanisms,
like web portals and wiki pages,
could also improve knowledge
exchange and coordination
between government agencies
launching NRM interventions in
post-conflict situations.

documentation. USAID’s online
Development Experience Clearinghouse contains a

Information sharing can extend beyond those experts

large number of documents related to USAID projects;

and agencies working in international development to

the information is searchable by country and sector,

include technical experts in domestic line agencies. Forwith the option for an advanced search by keyword

example, if information on Japan’s domestic experience(USAID n.d.a). In practice, however, the amount ofon capacity building and the use of inland water

documentation available to outside researchers varies

transport in emergencies were readily available, JICA

dramatically from project to project. Project researchers

personnel could more easily incorporate it into JICA’s

who evaluated JICA case studies found that, althoughinternational responses to emergencies (Ishiwatarithe some of the information was available online, much

2011*). In the United States, the State Departmentof the documentation for JICA projects was available

sometimes assigns expert personnel in domestic

only from the field offices, and not at JICA’s offices ingovernment agencies such as the Department ofTokyo (JICA 2001). In the United States, many documents Agriculture to work on individual interventions throughare maintained online; however, the amount of

the Civilian Response Corps (Civilian Response Corps

documentation varies from project to project.

n.d.a, n.d.b; U.S. Department of State n.d.a).

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WAY FORWARD
There is a growing recognition of the importance ofin mind. Practitioners familiar with conflict dynamics

natural resources to the various aspects of post-conflict

can design and implement conflict-sensitive projects

peacebuilding, including security, basic services, economy that incorporate peacebuilding priorities. By supporting
and livelihoods, and governance and political processes.

peacebuilding priorities, natural resource interventions

The United States, Japan, and other donors increasingly

can engage communities, governments, and donors who

recognize the role of natural resources, as has the UN

might not otherwise be interested in natural resource

Secretary-General (UNSG 2009, 2010), World Bank (2011), issues.
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP 2009),
and the United Nations (UN 2011). Indeed in the past
few years, the question has turned from whether natural
resources are important to post-conflict peacebuilding to
how best to manage natural resources for peacebuilding.
This guide offers some lessons on
post-conflict peacebuilding and natural
resource management that speak tosecurity and development professionals
crafting strategies for peacebuilding,as well as natural resource professionals

The final section suggests strategies for how postconflict interventions can address common challenges ofdevelopment. It emphasizes touchstones of international
development, such as long-term commitments,
coordination, public engagement,

In the past few years, thequestion has turned fromwhether natural resources areimportant to post-conflict
peacebuilding to how best to
manage natural resources tosupport peacebuilding.

developing and implementing NRM
projects in post-conflict situations. The guide alsosuggests strategies for how projects in post-conflictsituations can address some of the common challenges
shared by development projects around the world.

monitoring and evaluation,
adaptability, and institutional
memory. It suggests how thesecommon challenges apply to postconflict NRM interventions, as well
as how NRM experiences may offer
strategies for coping with thesemore broadly applicable challenges.
To build upon these experiences and lessons, the next
step is to mainstream these lessons into the development
and implementation of future peacebuilding efforts by

A first step in integrating natural resources into post-

USAID, JICA, and their partners. Specific opportunities

conflict peacebuilding is to understand that NRM is

include building the capacity of staff, updating andrelevant, and often critical, to peacebuilding. Naturaldeveloping new guidance, improving procedural

resources are important inputs—and constraints—on amechanisms to help staff keep abreast of newrange of peacebuilding activities, such as reintegrating

developments in practice, and exchange information.

excombatants, providing basic services, redeveloping
transportation infrastructure, and rebuilding governance.
As a practical matter, this means that it is essential tocollect information related to natural resources and touse that information both when developing the broader
post-conflict peacebuilding strategy and when designingindividual NRM programs or projects.
Some of the most successful NRM experiences in this

As President Obama noted, a lasting peace “mustencompass economic security and opportunity.”
Moreover, as JICA President Ogata observed,
development agencies are uniquely positioned to be able
to lead the way in supporting the transition to peace.
By building on experiences to date, USAID and JICA
can more effectively mainstream natural resources
into post-conflict peacebuilding, and thereby lay

guide were designed from the outset with peacebuilding the foundation for a more durable peace.

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