The Miracle Creed and SMT*
Abstract
Einstein once observed that the “true theorist believes that the logically simple isalso the real,…a miracle creed, but it is a miracle creed which has been borne out
to an amazing extent by the development of science.” The Strong Minimalist
Thesis (SMT) holds that language too may satisfy the miracle creed at its core.
SMT was proposed only as a guideline for research, but increasingly it seems thatit may be valid in surprising ways. Recent work, reviewed and extended here,
provides some credibility to the strong interpretation of SMT, with many
consequences, if tenable.
*To appear: Matteo Greco & Davide Mocci, eds.

The modern scientific revolution adopted Galileo’s precept that nature is simple
and it is the task of the scientist to show it. In his own words, Nature “does not
act by means of many things when it can do so by means of a few.” A later
version, backed by solid results, was Leibniz’s Principle of Optimality. By now
substantiation is so strong that the bold conjecture has been adopted as a norm
for scientific theory. As Einstein formulated the conclusion, the “true theorist…
believes that the logically simple is also the real,… a miracle creed, but it is amiracle creed which has been borne out to an amazing extent by thedevelopment of science.”1 It is also an expectation for scientific progress. John
Wheeler anticipated that behind it all is a “central idea…so simple, so beautiful, socompelling” that someday, when we grasp it, “we will all say to each other, `Oh,
how could it have been otherwise!’.”2
There is an independent reason to seek maximal simplicity. The goal of serious
inquiry is explanation, which deepens as greater simplicity of theory is achieved.
That maxim has been the guiding motive for the “generative enterprise” since its
1

For review of the history and justification, see McDonough (2022).
Wheeler, J.A. (1986). The actual quote is a little different from the usual rendering on the internet: “Can we everexpect to understand existence? Clues we have, and work to do, to make headway on that issue. Surely someday,
we can believe, we will grasp the central idea of it all as so simple, so beautiful, so compelling that we will all say toeach other, `Oh, how could it have been otherwise! How could we all have been so blind so long!’.” His conclusion
is that behind it all is information communicated in a participatory observer-bound universe: “It from Bit” in his
formula.
2

1

inception.3 The search is reflected in successive versions of UG over the years.
Each step sought a simpler formulation of UG with fewer language-specificconditions (LSCs), hence deeper explanation, leading to another bold conjecture,
the Strong Minimalist Thesis SMT.4
Within the biolinguistic framework, UG must satisfy two primary empiricalconditions.5 One has been called “Plato’s problem”: How can a particularlanguage be acquired on the basis of available evidence, the problem of Povertyof Stimulus (POS)? The second is “Darwin’s problem”: How can the faculty oflanguage FL have evolved under the conditions of human evolution?
The POS problem (“explanatory adequacy”) has been a driving concern since theorigins of the enterprise. It was always known to be severe, but experimental
studies of language acquisition, particularly those of the late Lila Gleitman and her
associates, have shown that the severity had been seriously underestimated. The
problem of evolution of X, of course, can be addressed only to the extent that wehave some idea of what X is, FL in this case. The problem becomes feasible to theextent that UG has achieved a simple enough form. That may well mean that it
must approach SMT, given the empirical constraints on evolution of language,
which appear to be narrow.6
The overarching goal of this line of inquiry is to determine to what extent
language is similar to other natural entities in satisfying the miracle creed, its
fundamental properties resulting from “third factor” laws of nature, in this caseprinciples of computational efficiency, as is natural for a computational system
like language.7 To the extent that this can be achieved, approaching SMT, both

3

Chomsky, N. (2020).
The concept of simplicity, a guide for inquiry generally (SMT in particular), is an evolving one. Clarity of goals andguiding principles often emerges in the course of pursuing them.
5
Understanding UG to be the theory of the faculty of language FL, determining a set of generative grammars, eachthe theory of a particular language. There are other conditions having do with neural coding, but too little is
known about the brain for this to be a significant operative factor today.
6
Berwick, R. and N. Chomsky (2016). More recent work shows that the window for likely evolution of the coreproperties of language is narrower than what we assumed on the basis of information then available. Genomic
studies place separation of the San from other Homo sapiens (the earliest known separation) in the neighborhoodof 100-160kya, all sharing the faculty of language, presumably already in place. Gronau et al. (2011); Kim et al.
(2014); Maier et al. (2022).
7
I will assume as a starting point here the version discussed in Chomsky (2021); henceforth GK. For the revisions
and updating here, I am particularly indebted to discussions with Riny Huijbregts.
42

Plato’s and Darwin’s problem become more feasible, given the narrow empiricalconstraints on “learnability” and evolvability.8
One guideline for inquiry then is the principle S:[S] The computational structure of language should adhere as closely as possible
to SMT
In particular, we hope to show that as few as possible LSCs enter into thecomputational structure of language; optimally none, apart from setting thecomputations in operation by providing the primitive elements to which they
apply (lexical items, we assume here) with their properties. For reasons that will
become clearer below, we restrict attention here primarily to I-language,
understood as generation of the CI interface, independent of Externalization to
one or another sensory modality (typically speech).
As a simple model, we can think of bee nests forming hexagons. The bees
construct tubes, physics turns them into hexagons. To take a more intricate case,deep homology yields outer hair cells, physics turns them into cochlear spirals inmammals.9 Similarly, some disruption of the neural basis for cognitive systems
yielded recursive enumeration, nature then reconstructed the new system as SMT(so we would like to show).
All of this is consistent with how evolution proceeds quite generally.
Schematically, we can distinguish three stages. First some disruption takes place:
perhaps a mutation, or genetic drift, or gene transfer, or one microorganism
swallowing another, generally assumed to be the breakthrough that led tocomplex cells. The second stage is reconstruction: Nature reconstructs the newentity in the simplest way, observing the miracle creed, paying no attention to
how the new entity might be used.10 The third stage is winnowing: the outcomesthat reproduce more effectively prevail. Natural selection.
8“Learning” in quotes, because it is not clear that the category can be seriously distinguished from general growthand development, all aspects of which involve various combinations of the three factors that enter into theseprocesses: innate structure, external data, laws of nature.
9
Lorimer et al. (2015).
10
Accordingly, what evolution yields might be seriously dysfunctional, particularly over a long period as
circumstances impose new demands, even if at each stage of evolution the optimal system is constructed at thereconstruction stage following disruption.

3

That suggests a reasonable scenario for language evolution. First, some minor
rewiring of the brain took place, yielding the new property of recursive
enumeration. The next step is reconstruction: Nature devises the simplest andmost elegant way to organize the new system: SMT. Basic conceptual atoms andtheta theory become available, possibly with more primitive origins. The
computational principles are given, part of natural law. The winnowing stage isnever reached, possibly because of lack of time, possibly – and more interestingly– because the optimal system is so delicately designed that it’s either all or none,
which might be the case, so recent work suggests (see GK).
To illustrate the task we face in pursuing this program, consider perhaps the mostfundamental property of language, with rich consequences for cognitive sciencegenerally: Structure-Dependence -- a property of I-language. StructureDependence follows directly from the optimal assumption. Nature selected thesimplest computational operation, yielding the “Basic Property” of FL: recursive
enumeration of a digital array of structured expressions, each with aninterpretation at the CI interface (essentially as a thought, or instructions forconstructing a thought) and optionally in some sensory-motor domain. That is
the goal we hope to attain as closely as possible for the various components ofI-language – which, we can plausibly assume, exist by virtue of the enabling
function of SMT (see GK).
In the case of Structure-Dependence, Andrea Moro’s work (2016) provides
neurological evidence supporting the conclusion, a very difficult achievement, so
far unique but a goal to be sought throughout. As highlighted by the title, hiscited book deals with a crucial element in explanation, often overlooked: what is
excluded? A true explanation answers the question “Why this, and not that?”
The same reasoning has been extended to a number of modules of language (GK),but foundational problems remain and the basic assumptions must be sharpened
and modified. That’s the topic I will address here.
We take I-language to be a system generating thought, a traditional view that
seems increasingly well supported. Several categories of thought are relevant tolanguage structure and use. One category is propositional: basic theta-

4

structure.11 A second is clausal: force- and information-related (interrogative,
topic, focus,…). The familiar property of duality of semantics.
A familiar quip in the sciences is that the only numbers are 1, 2, 3 and infinity,with 3 doubtful. We can entertain the doubts: the only numbers are 1, 2, andinfinity. The only operations and relations that accord with SMT are unary,binary, and unbounded. Unary operations do nothing in I-language,12 so we canomit them. Binary relations permit the fewest options for carrying a derivation
forward, a sufficient reason for keeping to n=2 for admissible relations and for theoperations that create them, unless shown otherwise.
The binary operation of External Merge provides theta structures {X,Y}, where
one member receives and the other assigns a theta role, an LSC that underlies the
Basic Property. That enables parallel operations, which in turn provide the optionof structurally identical inscriptions that are repetitions, not copies, a crucial
property of language but not of constructed formal systems, which do not makeuse of this option.
If the propositional core of language keeps to binary theta structures, there will
be no n-ary theta structures for n>2. In particular, complex VPs such as doubleobject constructions will have internal structure, as commonly assumed. The
clausal component also keeps to binary structures, but with no theta-marking.
If I-language is basically a thought-generating system, it optimally should observe
the principle T:[T] All relations and structure-building operations (SBO) are thought-related, withsemantic properties interpreted at CI.
T stands alongside of S, the miracle creed for the case of language, as adesideratum.

11

Subject-predicate (SPEC-INFL) and its VP counterpart (object-raising) are not theta structures, but havesecondary semantic properties, along with special properties of phase-internal IM. We put these constructions tothe side for now, keeping to the core operations, returning to them later with the core system better established.
12
NB: in I-language. Without I-language conditions and keeping to the minimal lexicon (one member), Merge
yields the successor function, and further steps towards arithmetical knowledge.

5

Relations are binary. The simplest ones are sisterhood and term-of, the domainsof EM and IM, respectively. The next simplest relation after these relates Xe{X,Y}
to a term of Y: c-command, the output of IM and domain of other relations. We
refer to the structure expressing c-command as a c-command(cc-)configuration.
Optimally, language keeps to these: the simplest relations, the only ones linked totheta-theory/Merge, thus conforming to S and T.
Consider the copy-repetition distinction. To satisfy S and T, it must be expressedin terms of admissible (thought-related) relations/operations. The only candidate
relation is a cc-configuration. Therefore, we take X and Y to be copies if they are
structurally identical and in a cc-configuration. Note that this conclusion is forced
if we keep to S,T.
Earlier work (e.g., GK) postulated an operation FormCopy FC which establishes
the copy relation in a cc-configuration. We can adopt FC for convenience, but it
has no further status; it need not be listed among the admissible operations.13
We assume that the primary SBO is Merge, with its two subcases EM and IM.
Merge should then be defined so as to satisfy S and T.14
The only other permissible relation is unbounded set, with the SBO FormSet (FS).
We can assume this to be a costless operation available freely for all inquiry,
hence almost never mentioned in the study of language or elsewhere. We use it,for example, in constructing the workspace WS and the lexicon LEX.15
Assume for convenience that for XeLEX, X becomes accessible to SBOs only after it
is inserted into WS. Merge selects its (binary) domain in the manner discussed in
GK. FS selects X1,…,Xn from WS and yields {X1,…,Xn}. Binary FS is distinct from
Merge in lacking its special theta-related properties. FS with arbitrary n appears
in language, but in special ways. We will return to it briefly but keep now toMerge.

13

The copy relation and FC observe the phase-impenetrability condition PIC, but that is not an independentcondition. It follows automatically from phase-based derivation, which renders the contents of a phase invisible atthe next step.
14
On definition of Merge, see GK and for more extensive disc ussion, Chomsky et. al. (to appear); henceforth MRG.
15
Exactly what is stored in LEX, and how, raises interesting questions.

6Adhering to the third factor principle of Minimal Search, Merge applies tomembers of WS but not their terms. EM selects X, then Y, in WS and forms thetheta structure {X,Y}.16 IM selects XeWS and then a term Y of X. The choice of Y is
restricted: only certain terms are “eligible.” To keep to principle T, the restriction
should be in terms of theta structures. A term Y of X is always a member of atheta structure (GK). Our prime concern here is the recipients of theta roles(theta-marked elements): e.g., NP in {NP,VP}, {R,NP}, {P,NP}. R,P and other heads
cannot be raised, so the simplest principle would be to restrict eligibility to theterms that are theta-marked. That reflects standard practice, and also undergirds
the intuition that IM is “raising,” whereas technically it is symmetric merging of X
and a term Y of X.
That decision puts aside movement of theta assigners: VP, AP. These operations
have different properties both in form (prosody, etc.) and in interpretation, which
is more like topicalization, e.g.:[1](a) J’s novels, I will never read(b) read J’s novels, I never will
With that qualification, the problem of eligibility is resolved for the propositional
system.
The central question then is this: How much of I-language can be encompassed byMerge/theta theory and simplest relations and operations, conforming toprinciples S and T?
The standard view has been that there are three kinds of movement: A, A’, head(where head-movement means raising of a head to a head position, not justraising of a head). Head-movement is not properly formulable, and can beeliminated (GK). There is strong evidence that A and A’-movement must be
segregated, reviewed in GK, which, however, provides only a loose andincomplete description of the distinction and how it is established.
A-A’ movement are close respectively to EM-IM with their theta-theoretic
correlates, but not quite. Phase-internal raising (SPEC-INFL/object-raising) is
16

We put aside adjuncts and such elements as modals, auxiliaries, left-periphery sites, etc., perhaps properly
analyzed as features of C, v, scattered in various ways in Externalization.

7

again problematic, sharing some properties of standard A’-movement but called
A-movement. Let’s continue to put it aside for now, returning to it later. For thecore system, there is no need to distinguish between A- and A’-positions, A- andA’-movement. There’s just IM and EM, which are ineliminable, satisfying duality.
The next step is to impose segregation. It is established by IM, which carries thederivation from the propositional to the clausal domain. The simplest way toimpose segregation is to keep to that property: IM creates an element that has nofurther interactions with the EM-generated structures that constitute thepropositional domain or with operations that apply there. That is in the spirit of
the principles S and T.
For ease of exposition, we can think of the element E that is IM-ed to the phaseedge as being put in a box, separate from the ongoing derivation D. E musthowever be accessible to D at later phase levels for interpretation at theinterfaces. The GK system maintained the standard assumption that E moves
phase-by-phase to SPEC-phase, where it is interpreted at CI (also at SM if
Externalization is activated). Now there’s no movement and the boxed element E
is accessible at the phase level. If E is not accessible at a phase level it’s asubjacency violation, the counterpart to “no escape hatch” in the standard
version.
The next step is to look more closely at how EM and IM operate in the box theory,comparing this to the standard theory adopted in GK. Let’s take one of thesimplest cases, a VP structure with a NP in SPEC-VP,17 keeping to essentials(subscripts for exposition only):[2] [NP1 [1 V NP2]]Is NP1 formed by IM or EM? If by IM, then NP2 deletes under Externalization andthe two NPs are interpreted the same way at CI. Thus if NP is many people, [2]will be understood as “many people like those very people” and pronounced“many people like”. Plainly that is false. It is understood as “there are many
people who like many people” (John Doe, for example, likes many people) and

17

The NP in SPEC-VP can be the external argument EA theta-marked by VP, or in what is called an A’-position in thestandard theory. We return directly to the distinction.

8

pronounced “many people like many people.” Therefore, it appears that it cannot
be formed by IM.
That, however, is incorrect. NP1 in [2] is in SPEC-VP. But IM to SPEC-VP islegitimate, as in what has been called A’-movement, say Topicalization. Thus [2]would be legitimate if it were formed by IM as the first step of topicalization, with
SPEC-VP considered to be an A’-position (yielding ultimately “John/many people,
Bill likes John/many people”), but it is illegitimate if it is formed by IM with SPECVP considered to be an A-position, with NP1 taken to be the external argument
EA. How does the derivation (and its interpretation) know?
In the box theory, IM of NP2 imposes segregation of NP1; it is boxed and immune
to the processes that apply to EM-generated structures in the system of
propositional interpretation. In particular, it is immune to theta-marking. Henceafter IM raising of NP1, VP still has an unassigned theta role, which means that EA
must be introduced (necessarily by EM) to be theta-marked by VP. IM-generated
boxed NP1 will be accessed for instructions at later phases. We now have an
explanation for the interpretation of [2] at both interfaces, one that extends
without comment to further expansion of [2] as in [3]:18[3] NP1 tried [1 NP2 to win]]
These conclusions adhere closely to principles S and T. They also have strong
empirical support, to which we turn directly.
In the standard theory (taken over in GK), these issues were addressed by
invoking a theta-theoretic principle, Univocality:[U](a) A theta-assigner assigns no more than a single theta-role to an inscription
or a copy pair(b) A theta-position cannot receive more than one theta-role.
The principle U, however, leaves the problems unresolved.
There are, furthermore, problems with invoking U. One is that U(a) is not
relevant: the subject theta role is not assigned by V but by V-complement, by the18

For independent reasons, IM does not apply here. See note 28.

9phrase [1…] in [2]. That is clear for VP idioms and for weak verbs like take or have,but the same is true more generally as careful analysis of semantic interpretation
reveals.19 U is also complex, invoking copy pairs for (a) but a theta-position for (b)(with no clear application).
There are other issues at a more abstract level. Apart from its unwanted
complexity, Univocality is not an essential property of UG. If it is dropped, therest of the system remains intact. Furthermore, it is an LSC, the kind ofassumption we are trying to eliminate in the effort to approach SMT. It also
introduces Theta-theory into the computation, which should be purely
computational in accord with a strict interpretation of principle S.20
In the box theory, all of these problems disappear.
Let’s turn to direct empirical confirmation. One major source is the phenomenonof reconstruction, illustrated by such cases as [4], using the conventional notions
trace and PRO:[4](a) one interpreter each seemed t to be assigned to the diplomats(b) *one interpreter each tried PRO to be assigned to the diplomats
In (a) the matrix subject is raised by IM from t and reconstructed in that position.
In (b) the matrix subject is inserted in-situ by EM and there is no reconstruction;rather interpretation of an independent element PRO. Hence *, since each isstranded.21
We can now eliminate trace and PRO. The distinction in [4] follows directly fromthe box theory. Both t and PRO are copies in a cc-configuration, but only theformer, generated by IM with its antecedent boxed, is a reconstruction site.22 The
reason is straightforward. The boxed element lacks a theta role so interpretationmust be at the trace position; reconstruction. Not so for PRO, whose antecedent
19

The issue was raised in the 18th century critique of the theory of ideas, by César Chesneau Dumarsais, then byThomas Reid, both of whom observed that a phrase like “I have a thought” is distinct from “I have a diamond,” andshould be understood roughly as “I think.” Such phrases are what Gilbert Ryle called “systematically misleading
expressions.” For details, see Chomsky (1966).
20
There are also some technical problems, discussed in GK.
21
For other cases with similar properties, see GK/MRG.
22
There is no need to check the history of derivation, thus violating the general Markovian property ofcomputation.

10

has a theta role so there is no reconstruction. The analysis reduces to EM/IM andprinciple T.
To take a more complex case, consider [5]:[5](a) someone stole many books from the library(b) many books were stolen t from the library(c) many books are easy [to steal t from the library]
Both (a) and (b) mean that there’s a thief on the loose. In (b), t marks the copy in
the reconstruction position left by IM, indicating that interpretation is the same in(a) and (b) for the reasons just outlined.
Example (c) has a different meaning: some category of books, maybe history
books, are easy to steal from the library. t again is a copy left by IM, but not IM ofmany books, as is clear from the interpretation (differing from the raising case(b)). As we know, the bracketed phrase has the properties of long-distance A’movement, now revised with a boxed empty element E interpreted at SPEC-C(that is, at [). E is interpreted as an empty operator leaving an open sentence,
which functions as a predicate, theta-marking the EM-inserted subject, which is in
the same position as the predicate-internal subject in “John saw Bill”. The box
theory again explains why (c) is interpreted differently from (a), (b).
Suppose that X is IM-ed to Y. It can enter into a copy relation with elements of Y
in a cc-configuration (including the position from which it raised). That’s the basis
for analysis of sequences and ATB in GK. That remains unchanged in the box
system. But in the standard (GK) system, if X moves again to a higher phase, it
should also enter into copy relations with elements of Y. Not in the box system,
however, because X doesn’t raise.23 Consider again simple topicalization [6]:[6] Bill, John met yesterday
Stripping down to essentials, in the standard version the structure is [7] while inthe box theory it is [8]:[7] {Bill3, {John, {v*P Bill2, {met Bill1 yesterday}}}}23

Relevant examples are discussed in GK (21-24), but not dealing with deletion under Externalization.

11[8] {C, {John, {v*P Bill2, {met Bill1 yesterday}}}}In both cases, the copy relation <Bill2, Bill1> holds in a cc-configuration, and under
Externalization Bill1 deletes by the standard economy-based principle.
Suppose that we replace John by Bill, structurally identical with the topicalized
element Bill. We then derive [7’] and [8’], respectively, highlighting the elements
involved in topicalization:[7’] {Bill3, {Bill4, {v*P Bill2, {met Bill1 yesterday}}}}[8’] {C, {Bill4, {v*P Bill2, {met Bill1 yesterday}}}}In [7’] the copy relation <Bill3, Bill4> holds in a cc-configuration, and under
Externalization, Bill4 deletes. Mistakenly. The output is [9] for interpretation:[9] Bill, Bill’ met Bill yesterdaywith Bill’ taken to be a repetition at CI, not a copy (and with the copy of Bill
deleted under Externalization). The same with such sentences as [8], with [mostpeople]’ understood as a repetition:[10] most people, [most people]’ regard [most people] as foolish
These facts are unaccounted for in the standard theory (and GK).24 Now they are.
Copies can be formed by IM, but not if IM were to reapply. More generally, what
was formerly successive-cyclic wh-movement does not yield copy pairs, anotherreason to suppose that it does not exist.
In the GK system there were unsolved questions about double object
constructions and the copy relation, which arise here too. One way to deal withthem would be to assume an applicative PP and adopt Henk van Riemsdijk’s
proposal about PP being a phase.25
24

Thanks to Emilio Gonzalez for pointing out this problem in the standard theory (GK). Note that some such
expressions might be (weak) superiority violations, though not if D-linked. Prosody is also involved: “whopersuaded who to leave” vs. *”who perSUAded who to leave” (focal stress on the second syllable of persuaded,and destressing on what follows), and many other cases that raise questions whether superiority exists and how its
effects might be related to focus.
25
Van Riemsdijk (1978).

12

Turning to interpretation, at each phase PH the phase head accesses the box for“instructions”. PH is interpreted at CI and (optionally) at SM, the latter typically at
the matrix (criterial) position.26
Consider some further cases, increasingly complex, all grammatical. Let W =“which pictures of each other,” with boldface W for the occurrence of W in which
each other is interpreted at CI. [1 is the phase containing the antecedent of eachother; [3 is the configuration for anaphora; [2 is the lowest phase, in which W isinterpreted as object of like.
Consider the standard picture in terms of successive-cyclic wh-movement before
raising to SPEC-INFL (avoiding inessentials):[11](a) W [1 C INFL [3 the-men [2 W like W]]]
which pictures of each other do the men like wh- pictures of each other(b) W [1 C INFL [3 the men [W hope Bill [2 W like W]]]]
which pictures of each other do the men hope Bill likes wh- pictures ofeach other(c) W [C INFL [Mary thought [1 C INFL [3 the men [W hope Bill [2 W like W]]]]]]
which pictures of each other did Mary think the men hope Bill likes whpictures of each otherAs the examples illustrate, Externalization, anaphora, and thematic relations are
dissociated. In (c), Externalization is determined at the matrix; anaphora isdetermined at the intermediate phase [1 in the configuration [3; and the verbobject relation is determined at the lowest phase [2.

26For full overt-movement languages, Spell-out of W is at the matrix position, the “criterial position” in Luigi Rizzi’s
sense. There can be non-trivial effects at intermediate positions, as discussed extensively in the subjacency
literature. See also [12], below.

13

In the box theory, W only appears in [2. At each phase, W is consulted todetermine the next step, providing the instructions just indicated. In (c), forexample, the verb-object relation is determined at [2; anaphora is determined atphase [1 in the configuration [3; and Externalization is determined at the matrix.
Note that agreement and anaphora keep to the usual cc-configuration, with
anaphora penetrating the boxed W. We therefore conclude that what is boxed is
inaccessible, but not its terms.
This seems about as simple as possible. Nothing new is added to conventional
assumptions; the standard operation of accessibility to W is reformulated. Suchcases as [9b,c] were not considered within the standard framework. It appears
that mechanisms would have to be more complex.27
Let’s return to SPEC-INFL (similarly its VP analogue), where NP has raised to SPECby IM, internally to the phase (A-movement, in standard terminology). Thereappears to be no need for successive-cyclic A-movement (GK). In that respect,
SPEC-INFL is similar to boxed wh-. We can extend the generalization by banning
IM of SPEC. That follows from restriction of eligibility to theta-marking in the
narrow sense, excluding the secondary semantic roles. Nothing is lost. There’s noneed for raising of SPEC-INFL; anything that looks like that could actually beraising of what occupies its source position. If Externalization is activated, both
occurrences will be deleted in a cc-configuration.
Note that nothing has to be said about deletion. It seems reasonable to assume
that there is none within I-language. The familiar economy-motivated deletion
operation applies if Externalization is activated. It applies to the lower element ina cc-configuration, however it was generated.28
Since SPEC-INFL is not at the phase level, it is not accessed at later phases.
Therefore, it need not to be boxed. And it shouldn’t be, since unlike boxed

27

Consider, e.g., the problem of dealing with the fact that the interpretation of the lowest phase of the derivationis that Bill likes the pictures of the men, although the antecedent-anaphor relation is determined at a later phase.
28
If FC applies obligatorily (as is natural, given that it simply identifies a structural relation), it blocks
externalization of the lower element of the cc-configuration in such single phase expressions as “many people tried
many people to win” or “John1 tried John2 to win.” There are ways to unify the two cases (taking John to be DetJohn with a quantificational interpretation), raising issues that would go too far afield. There are unclear factual
questions as to whether there is a CI interpretation under distinct reference (Case aside), and no obvious way toanswer them.

14elements, SPEC-INFL is accessible to other operations (Agree, Labelling,
Anaphora).29
SPEC-INFL is therefore an anomalous position, similar in some but not all respects
to the output of movement to the lowest phase level by IM. It seems that raising
to SPEC-INFL is an ancillary operation – which is plausible. The structure is an
outlier in the system, related to EPP, Labelling, and secondary semantic roles. The
VP counterpart also has anomalous behavior: there are problems about
optionality that don’t arise in the subject case, also about interpretation (de re, dedicto).
In the box system, an anomaly about the Vacuous Movement Hypothesis
disappears. The standard theory adopted in GK requires wh-movement to thecriterial position, though by VMH that is not the case for NP-movement (Amovement). Now the requirement is nullified. There may also be a handle on
Luigi Rizzi’s observations about SM effects lacking at the first raising operation.
Perhaps, as Riny Huijbregts suggests, at the first and only application of IM raisingof wh-XP to SPEC-v*P, the operation accessing the box is vacuous in that it has
just been implemented, while at later phases accessing the boxed element is notvacuous in this sense.
Another problem with successive-cyclic movement overcome in the box system,
pointed out by Riny Huijbregts, has to do with partial wh-movement, studied byDana McDaniel (1989). With successive-cyclic movement, in such German
expressions as [12] there is a labelling violation at [2, which is not in the criterial
position [1 (t the variable copy of wh-XP):[12] [1 was [C…[2 wh-XP [C…t…]]]]
The problem doesn’t arise in the box theory. At [2, the boxed wh-XP is accessed
and under Externalization, spelled out, but with no labelling problem since thephrase does not appear in the derivation. At [1, scope of wh-XP is determined for

29

With restrictions. Anaphors do not appear in clausal subject position in the dialects considered here. That bars
“they think that each other are in the room” but allows “they think that pictures of each other are in the room.”That violates PIC, but anaphora is not generally restricted by PIC: compare “many people like themselves”, *”manypeople like themselves” (a cc-configuration, barred by PIC). There is much more to say about this matter ofcourse.

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CI, and was is spelled out under Externalization. Other questions about theconstruction remain unanswered, but some at least disappear.
Consider a sample derivation, say, of “who you think that John saw”. The firststep is IM of object of see at the v*P phase:[13] wh1 [see wh2]
wh1 goes into the box. Its copy wh2 is interpreted as direct object. The lower
copy wh2 deletes by the universal economy-based rule if Externalization is
activated. There is no need for a special marking in the I-language (DEL) for what
is to be deleted, as proposed in earlier versions.
That concludes the phase, which is therefore inaccessible to Merge as thederivation proceeds.
The next step is EM of John and INFL, followed by IM of John to SPEC-INFLP. Then
EM of that closes the phase. The lower copy of John deletes if Externalization is
activated. We then go on to the next clause and the criterial position, where thewh-phrase is spelled out and the scope of the quantifier is determined.
Compare [13] with [14], where John1 is theta-marked by the VP:[14] John1 [see John2]
On the surface, it looks as though the two should behave the same way. They
don’t. The reason is timing. In [13], wh-movement is within the v*P phase, whichthen disappears from sight in the derivation. In [14], EM of John1 is in the next
phase. Accordingly, the two occurrences of John are repetitions, not copies.30
That contrasts with [15], a single phase, in which the two occurrences are copies
and the lower one deletes in the normal way:[15] John1 [arrived John2]
30

The assumption here is that the verbal phase is v* with its internal arguments, and that EA enters in the next
phase. We might instead take the verbal phase to be [EA v*P], as has commonly been assumed. In that case thedistinction between [13] and [14] has to be rephrased; simple timing does not suffice. Rather, IM (being
completely within v*P) applies first. Then EM of EA. Then PIC, blocking any relation that crosses the PIC barrier (inparticular, the copy relation in the cc-configuration).

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The same distinctions hold within the v*P phase:[16](i) most people believe [most people to be honest] (repetitions, two phases)(ii) most people try [most people to be honest] (copies, single phase)
Let’s now consider FS, the free operation available for all inquiry. FS applies to
WS, forming the set Z = {X1,…,Xn}, XieWS by Minimal Search. One option is n=2,
but that is not a case of Merge, as noted above. The derivation will crash unlesssome process introduces Z into the derivation. Two cases are discussed in GK:[17](a) John lived in Kansas on a farm near a river(b) John lived in Kansas on a farm and near a river
The two differ in several respects. (a) is a single event; the farm and river are in
Kansas. In (b), the three phrases are independent; John could have lived in
Kansas, then moved to a farm in Iowa, then to Cambridge near a river. In (a),raising is possible (with constraints, which may or may not be grammatical). In (b),raising is barred by strong matching conditions, yielding the Coordinate Structure
Constraint. In both cases order is imposed in Externalization, but contrary to GK,
the ordering imposed by such phrases as respectively is a discourse property.31
Without such a phrase there is no ordering relation, e.g., [18]:[18] Tom, Dick and Harry danced and sang all night
There is no set of conjuncts that expresses the meaning of [18]. Furthermore, theordering can plainly be determined beyond sentence boundaries, as in [19]:[19] John and Bill are good friends. They even write joint papers. They live in
New York and California, respectively
Within sentence grammar, sets formed by FS are introduced into derivations in
the position of single XP’s. A second application of FS (replacing FormSequence of31

See M. Dalrymple and A. Kehler (1995).

17GK) determines what is conjoined and distinguishes compound from independent
events.32
We might ask whether a single XP should be regarded as a singleton set. Thus in“John left,” both John and leave might be understood as the minimal case of a set.
There has been little inquiry into how this might work, among the many issues tobe looked at more carefully.
Discussion here and in the work that is presupposed is limited to I-language, with
only a few side comments on Externalization. The first step in proceeding beyond
I-language would be to consider the transition from I-language to Externalization.
That operation might be expected to conform to the guiding principle T ofI-language. In important ways, it does.
The central property of Externalization, whatever the SM modality, is linearization(only partial for sign), a condition imposed (we are assuming here) by the nonlinguistic SM systems. Linearization observes T in that the non-theta clausal
system is external to the theta-based propositional system. Furthermore, it istypically to the left: there is a left-periphery but no right-periphery.
What about the anomalous case SPEC-INFL and its VP correlate, which share someproperties with the clausal system and some with the propositional system? With
regard to linearization, this case falls together with the clausal system: SPEC is tothe left. Note that there is no hierarchical reason for this. The {SPEC, INFLP}
structure is symmetric: SPEC c-commands the terms of INFLP, and INFLP ccommands the terms of SPEC.
A broad linearization principle, then, could be that all the non-theta elements, notjust those of the clause, are to the left, possibly for pragmatic reasons, which canbe relevant to Externalization.
At this very general level, the next question is linearization of head-complement,a mismatch between CI (with no ordering) and SM (which requires it). At the CIlevel, V-Object and Object-V have the same interpretation; at the SM level they
have to be distinguished. The same for other heads. There seems to be no32

See GK for details, now replacing sequences by sets and eliminating the operation FormSequence, the one
operation assumed in GK that departed from strict adherence to SMT.

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general principle, at least within the domain of this discussion, that provides ananswer.33 The same is true for the fine detail of linearization as in the Rizzi-Cinquecartographic inquiries and much else.
These remarks have been devoted to improving and refining GK/MRG andreplacing some basic assumptions of standard versions that GK/MRG
incorporated. Needless to say, there is a vast terrain to explore to determine howmuch of language can be incorporated within this extremely parsimonious
framework, approaching SMT. It seems however that we can perceive at least theglimmer of a central idea “so simple, so beautiful, so compelling” that someday,
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Chomsky, N. 2021. “Minimalism: Where are we now, and where can we hope togo.” Gengo Kenkyu 160, 1-41 (GK)
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McInnerney, Y. Sugimoto. To appear. Merge and the Strong Minimalist
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In many publications, Richard Kayne has provided ingenious empirical arguments in support of a universal V-Oorder, an approach that requires many applications of IM that would not fall within the options allowed here inorder to yield the observed order. If correct, it would seem to be the only case violating the general conclusionthat ordering is imposed by SM conditions and is missing from I-language and CI-interpretation, where it plays no
role.

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Thesis (Elements in Generative Syntax). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Dalrymple, M. and A. Kehler. 1995. “On the Constraints imposed by respectively.”https://drive.google.com/file/d/11v0r-wybpSCJx080PCvr_tfnfhRU7Zqj/view
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