H U M A N
R I G H T S
W A T C H

MARKED WITH AN “X”
Iraqi Kurdish Forces’ Destruction of Villages, Homes
in Conflict with ISISMarked With An “X”
Iraqi Kurdish Forces’ Destruction of Villages,
Homes in Conflict with ISISCopyright © 2016 Human Rights Watch
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 978-1-6231-34235
Cover design by Rafael Jimenez

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NOVEMBER 2016

ISBN: 978-1-6231-34235

Marked With An “X”
Iraqi Kurdish Forces’ Destruction of Villages, Homes
in Conflict with ISIS
Map .................................................................................................................................... I
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1
Recommendations.............................................................................................................. 9
To Kurdistan Regional Government .......................................................................................... 9
To the United States, Germany and Other States Supporting KRG Forces................................... 9
To United Nations Institutions and Agencies ........................................................................... 10

Methodology..................................................................................................................... 11
I. Background ................................................................................................................... 13
II. Building Demolition...................................................................................................... 18
Kirkuk Governorate .................................................................................................................22
Nineveh Governorate ..............................................................................................................58

III. Legal Standards .......................................................................................................... 76
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... 80
Annex I: Official Decree by Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region ................ 81

Map

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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | NOVEMBER 2016

SummarySince early 2014, when the extremist group Islamic State, also known as ISIS, launched its
offensive in Iraq, fighting has displaced over three million Iraqis from their homes. Of
these, an estimated 1.5 million Sunni Arabs now live in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI),
comprising the governorates of Dohuk, most of Erbil and Sulaimaniya governorates, andsmall parts of Nineveh and Diyala governorates. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
cites its openness to displaced Sunni Arabs as a sign of its “willingness to accommodate
for any war-stricken individual or community, regardless of their race or religion.”
Many of the displaced Iraqis now residing in the KRI are from outside of the territory
officially governed by KRI, from Nineveh and Kirkuk where KRG military forces, known as
the Peshmerga, have battled ISIS to retake large areas of territory. The Peshmerga took
Sinjar town in mid-November 2015 and a corridor southwest of Kirkuk city in October 2015.
These are all so-called disputed areas: areas outside the KRI but which KRG officials claim
should properly be part of the KRI. Before the arrival of ISIS they had been largely under
KRG de facto control.
In March 2016, KRG forces along with forces mobilized by the Iraqi government in Baghdad
began military operations aimed at defeating ISIS in Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city. The
offensive to take Mosul, ISIS’ last major remaining stronghold in Iraq, has already caused
an additional influx of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to areas
under the control of the KRG.
This report examines the conduct of KRG security forces in areas where they have defeated
ISIS, all within the so-called disputed areas. The report finds a pattern of apparently unlawful
demolitions of buildings and homes, and in many cases entire villages, between September
2014 and May 2016, in 17 villages and towns in Kirkuk and four in Nineveh governorate.
Human Rights Watch researchers documented numerous cases of destruction of buildings
and homes by fire, heavy equipment and explosives after ISIS forces had been forced toretreat and the villages had come under Peshmerga control. The research was based oninterviews with over 120 eyewitnesses, three Peshmerga officers, seven Kurdish civilians

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who said they participated in demolitions, visits by Human Rights Watch researchers to 13of these towns and villages, and analysis of satellite images of destruction from 20 sites.
In a further 62 villages that researchers were not able to visit, satellite imagery provides
evidence of destruction after Kurdish security forces recaptured them, but a lack of witness
accounts did not allow for definitive conclusions as to the reasons and responsibility forthe destruction.
On April 4, 2016, following a March 7 letter from Human Rights Watch summarizing our
findings and an earlier Amnesty International report on alleged KRG violations, the KRG set
up a committee to investigate allegations of unlawful destruction of property andmovement restrictions of IDPs in the territory controlled by the KRG. According to KRG
officials, the committee, comprising officials from the KRG Presidency, the Interior andPeshmerga Ministries, as well as the department of the Asayish, conducted fact-finding
missions. The KRG on June 30, 2016 sent Human Rights Watch reports from theirinvestigations regarding Nineveh, Erbil, and Kirkuk governorates (as well as Diyala
governorate, which Human Rights Watch does not discuss in this report). These KRG
reports addressed many, but not all, of the allegations contained in this Human Rights
Watch report, and the KRG responses are reflected here.
With regard to destruction of buildings, KRG authorities stated that bombing of ISIS
positions by the US-led coalition, in addition to mortars and artillery fire, caused much of
the destruction. They also stated, and Peshmerga commanders told Human Rights Watch,that Peshmerga detonated ISIS-planted improvised explosive devices in order to defuse
the devices, causing further destruction.
The KRG’s claims regarding the need to destroy homes to defuse improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) in villages they captured from ISIS does not stand up to scrutiny. For
example, in villages in Nineveh governorate visited by Human Rights Watch researchers, itappears that the KRG destroyed only Arab homes while leaving Kurdish ones intact.
Researchers observed demolished Arab buildings in Bardiya next to intact Kurdish
buildings, and the intact Kurdish part of Hamad Agha village next to the demolished Arabpart, and next to Sheikhan, a demolished Arab village a short distance away.

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In addition, in Kirkuk governorate, KRG security forces demolished buildings in Qarah
Tappah and Idris Hindiya Qadima that ISIS never captured, and therefore is highly unlikely
to have suffered damage during battles. Regarding Qoshkaya, another village that ISIS had
not captured, Peshmerga officials said in a response on September 22, 2016 that they
were unable to prevent “a segment of local residents” from destroying homes in the Arabquarter whose owners allegedly had joined ISIS. In Idris Khaz’al and Idris Khubbaz,
Kurdish security forces used bulldozers to destroy homes, which is not a safe way to clear
any booby-traps that ISIS may have planted. Satellite images also show arson in many
villages in Nineveh, also not an effective mine clearance method.
The KRG, moreover, did not demonstrate an imperative military necessity for removing IEDs
by detonating them and destroying the building in which they were planted. Peshmerga
commanders said they lacked demining expertise, and IEDs had caused many casualties.
If this was the case then cordoning off mined villages for later demining would have beensafer than remotely detonating IEDs, which, besides destroying buildings, causes thedispersal of unseen explosives, making the area generally unsafe and complicating efforts
to remove explosive remnants of war.
Another troubling issue is the apparent plan of the KRG not to allow Arabs to return to theirvillages. KRG President Masoud Barzani told Human Rights Watch in July 2016 that the KRG
would not allow Sunni Arabs to return to villages that had been “Arabized” by former
President Saddam Hussein. He said these were, in his view, rightfully Kurdish lands. Such
territorial claims lend credence to the belief of many Arabs that KRG security forces may
have carried out demolitions for the purpose of preventing or dissuading Arabs fromreturning there.
Central to the laws of war is the principle of distinction, which requires parties to a conflictto distinguish at all times between military and civilian objectives. Civilian objects may not
be the target of attack unless they are being used for military purposes. The parties to anarmed conflict have a duty to spare the civilian population and civilian objects from theeffects of hostilities and to minimize damage to civilian objects. The laws of war prohibit
the destruction or seizure of property unless required by imperative military necessity.
They also prohibit indiscriminate attacks on civilians or civilian objects, including attacks
that treat an entire area, such as a village, as a military objective.

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Based on witness accounts and satellite images, Human Rights Watch concluded that KRG
forces, for the most part Peshmerga, demolished buildings in at least 21 villages andtowns after recapturing them from ISIS, in apparent violation of the laws of war. The extent
and timing of much of the destruction in the cases reviewed in this report suggest that it
cannot be explained by ISIS-planted IEDs or damage from coalition airstrikes, shelling orother actions during battle.
Human Rights Watch spoke with about 15 villagers who said that in Qarah Tappah, 14
kilometers west of Kirkuk city, they saw a joint force of Peshmerga, Asayish, and Kirkuk
police on May 5, 2016 destroy 26 houses in the village. They told Human Rights Watch thatmost of the houses belonged to villagers who, they said, had joined ISIS in mid-2014. In
their September 22, 2016 response, KRG officials said that some Qarah Tappah homes
were destroyed by IEDs that security forces were unable to defuse. The destruction camethe day after saboteurs blew up nearby oil wells, which security officials blamed on
persons from Qarah Tappah. The destruction of these houses did not meet the test ofimperative military necessity.
About 15 other villagers from Idris Khaz’al, Idris Khubbaz and Idris Hindiya Qadima, 20
kilometers west of Kirkuk city, said that they saw Peshmerga, Asayish, and armed Kurdish
civilians operating under Peshmerga control loot and then burn or demolish dozens ofhomes with bulldozers in the first days of February 2015. Those interviewed said they did
not see ISIS plant IEDs during its brief 36-hour occupation of Idris Khaz’al and Idris
Khubbaz, and that ISIS never took Idris Hindiya Qadima during its assault on the area on
January 30, 2015. Satellite imagery over the following week shows most of the destructionin the three villages occurred around February 5, after the Peshmerga recaptured the area.
In its March 2016 response to Human Rights Watch, the KRG wrote that in the three Idris
villages, ISIS “could not plant IEDs in this district as Peshmerga forces immediately
launched a counterattack to liberate these areas.” However, in its June 2016 response, theKRG stated that the “large level of destruction [in Idris Hindiya Qadima] was due to IS[Islamic State] planted IEDs and the exchange of fire … between IS and the Peshmerga
forces.” For Idris Khaz’al, the KRG’s June response stated that coalition airstrikes and IEDs
“unavoidably detonated in the cleaning-up mission” destroyed three quarters of the 84
destroyed properties. For Idris Khubbaz, causes of the destruction “were the same as inIdris Khaz’al.”
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4In the village of al-Murra, a village that ended up completely destroyed, three villagers said
that Peshmerga in late February or early March 2015 forced them to leave on account of animpending battle with ISIS. In July 2015, after they returned and after the defeat of ISIS
there, they observed Peshmerga demolishing homes.
The KRG’s September 2016 response said that al-Murra and the nearby village of al-Shahid
were approximately 3 kilometers beyond the Peshmerga frontline “and do not constitutean area which is under the authority of the Peshmerga forces.” In a separate
communication in September 2016, KRG officials said that destruction of homes in the twovillages was “directly related to the fact that the properties belonged to individuals who
had joined the terrorists of the Islamic State and that those houses were being used by theterrorists with the aim of strengthening their presence in these villages.”
Villagers told Human Rights Watch that al-Murra had come under Peshmerga control as ofMarch 2015, and that some homes were damaged, but none demolished. Satellite images
show that the complete destruction of al-Murra occurred between May 20 and November
12, 2015, with damage signatures consistent with the use of high explosives and heavymachinery. From the accounts of villagers, it appears that the demolitions occurred after ashort battle for al-Murra that lasted a few hours in early July 2015, in which the Peshmerga
retained control.
In Nineveh governorate, about 15 witnesses said that Peshmerga and Asayish forces andvillagers demolished homes in Sheikhan, Hamad Agha, Bardiya, and Barzan, all in the
Zummar subdistrict. Peshmerga recaptured these areas from ISIS by late August 2014.
Five Kurdish farmers from the Kurdish village of Kani Azeir (Ewes), 2 kilometers west of
Sheikhan, told Human Rights Watch that ISIS had carried out some destruction in
Sheikhan during its three-week presence there in August 2014. But they also said that they
themselves, along with other Kurdish farmers and Peshmerga forces, participated in theburning of homes and demolition of the village after its recapture. A Kurdish police officer
from the nearby village of Hamad Agha told Human Rights Watch that he joined Peshmerga
and local civilian Kurds and Yezidis in demolishing Sheikhan. Human Rights Watch visited
Sheikhan on August 3, 2015 and found that almost no structure, with the exception of agreen mosque, remained intact.

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Human Rights Watch researchers visited Hamad Agha, which has a Kurdish district and an
Arab district, on August 3, 2015, and found only the Kurdish district intact. The Kurdish
policeman from the village told Human Rights Watch that he participated with Peshmerga
in demolishing the Arab district of Hamad Agha.
In the village of Bardiya, 7 kilometers southeast of Ewes, a Kurdish shopkeeper told
Human Rights Watch that he advanced with the Peshmerga as a volunteer and, together
with fellow Kurdish civilians and Peshmerga and Asayish forces, destroyed the houses ofArab townspeople “because they were Daesh [ISIS].” Human Rights Watch met with agroup of about 15 displaced people from a nearby village squatting on the outskirts ofBardiya. Several of them told Human Rights Watch that they saw Peshmerga and Kurdish
civilians destroy houses in Bardiya. The others agreed. They said that the Kurdish civilians
told them they had once had homes in Bardiya before Arabs moved in as part of former
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s Arabization campaign.
Satellite imagery shows Sheikhan, Hamad Agha, parts of Bardiya, and Barzan leveled to
the ground, and indicates that the destruction occurred after the late August or early
September 2014 recapture of the area by Peshmerga from ISIS. The destruction continued
into 2015.
The KRG stated in its response to Human Rights Watch that 85 properties in Sheikhan and
120 houses in the Arab part of Hamad Agha were destroyed by exchanges of artillery andmortar strikes, along with 523 homes in Barzan, “including those that were subject to IS
IEDs.” The KRG said that “large groups of Yezidis” burned homes there, despite Peshmerga
efforts to stop them, in retaliation for people from Barzan allegedly participating inatrocities against Yezidis. The KRG said that the reason why Barzan was so severely
targeted was because it was the “epicentre of the IS groups’ support base in the general
Sinjar area as well as a recruitment hub for IS fighters and IS commanders.”
Satellite imagery shows that more than half of the destruction in Sheikhan occurred
between November 2014 and March 2015, a further 30 buildings were destroyed thereafter,
and at least a quarter of the destruction in Barzan took place after November 5, 2014, wellafter the Peshmerga took control of both villages. Public sources indicate there were no
attacks by ISIS on Sheikhan or Barzan after late August 2014.

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The fact that in Bardiya, Ewes, Sheikhan, and Hamad Agha Kurdish areas were left intact
while nearby Arab areas were destroyed undermines the KRG’s claim that ISIS or its boobytraps were partially responsible for the widespread destruction in these locations. Equally,
the fact that the bulk of the destruction seen in satellite images occurred after thePeshmerga had taken control of these villages undermines the claim that airstrikes orshelling were the primary cause of the destruction (in addition to the fact that satellite
imagery analysis points to the use of fire, heavy machinery and high explosives).
Furthermore, on the basis of information thus far provided by the KRG, it is not possible toconclude that the destruction of booby-trapped homes occurred for reasons of imperative
military necessity.
In Order No.3 of March 17, 2016, attached as an appendix to this report, KRG President
Masoud Barzani commanded, with regard to “all possible situations, … the protection of
towns and villages which have been liberated by Peshmerga forces.” The KRG fact-finding
mission begun in April 2016, and reflected in the KRG June 30 response to Human Rights
Watch, appears to be the first KRG field investigations into possible violations of the lawsof war by Kurdish forces. However, Human Rights Watch is not aware of any criminal
investigations or prosecutions launched by KRG authorities with regard to alleged
violations, including unlawful destruction of civilian property.
Governments of several countries in the international coalition against ISIS, including theUnited States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Russia, Iran and central andsouthern European states, support the KRG with military hardware and training. Some carryout joint military operations with KRG forces. No officials of these countries have publicly
spoken out about the need for the KRG to end unlawful building demolitions in violation of
the laws of war and international human rights law and to hold those responsible toaccount. The US has Special Operations forces advising Peshmerga on the front lines andhas trained over 1,000 Peshmerga. In April 2016, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said the
US would provide US$415 million in financial assistance to select Peshmerga units. Since
February 2015, Germany has run an international training center for Peshmerga forces in
Erbil. Following reports in January 2016 that German-supplied machine guns to thePeshmerga appeared on the black market and a report that same month by Amnesty
International that documented Kurdish forces’ responsibility for destroying buildings andrestricting Sunni Arabs’ freedom of movement, the KRG told the German government it
would investigate these allegations.
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What happens if the US-led coalition together with Iraqi government and KRG forces
succeeds in the campaign to expel the group from Mosul is a pressing question. The
violations by KRG security forces of international law prohibitions against unlawfulproperty destruction is a recipe for continued conflict even if ISIS is dislodged and ceases
to hold territory in Iraq.
KRG President Masoud Barzani has said he plans to hold a referendum on Kurdish
independence from Iraq in 2016, and Kurdish officials have made no secret of the fact thatthey consider much of the area recaptured from ISIS outside the KRI as historically Kurdish
lands that should be part of an enlarged KRI or an eventual independent Kurdish state.
These political goals do not justify unlawfully demolishing homes and preventing
individuals from returning to their homes.
Human Rights Watch calls on the KRG to investigate the allegations of laws-of-war
violations detailed in this report and to hold those responsible to account. The KRG’s factfinding missions may be a first step to such accountability, but a number of incidents andallegations remain unaddressed, and in other instances the KRG’s findings do notcorrespond to those of Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch also calls on the United States, Germany and other countries providing
military assistance to the KRG to urge it to investigate these allegations and to investigate
the role of its own military assistance in these alleged violations. The UN Human Rights
Council should broaden the investigation mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights on abuses by ISIS to include serious violations by all parties, including
Kurdistan security forces. The council should also appoint a Special Rapporteur on Iraq tomonitor and report on the situation of human rights there and recommend measures toensure accountability for human rights abuses and law-of-war violations.

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8Recommendations
To Kurdistan Regional Government•

Investigate violations of the laws of war and of human rights law mentioned inthis report, in particular demolitions of buildings and homes;•

Discipline members of Kurdish security forces, including Peshmerga, Asayish
and counter-terrorism forces, implicated in violations of international
humanitarian law, and allow the military or civilian judiciary, as appropriate, toindependently investigate, and where the evidence warrants, prosecute theseforces, including officials responsible for laws-of-war violations as a matter ofcommand responsibility;•

Prosecute Kurdish civilians implicated in violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law;•

Take all necessary steps to end unlawful destruction of and damage to civilian
property by KRG forces in the absence of imperative military necessity,
including attacks on property that indiscriminately treat entire villages as
military objects;•

Provide fair compensation and alternative housing to those whose homes KRG
security forces have unlawfully destroyed.

To the United States, Germany and Other States Supporting KRG Forces•

Investigate whether foreign military assistance, including weapons andmunitions transfers and military training, contributed to the laws-of-war
violations documented in this report. End military assistance to units involvedin these violations and explain publicly any suspension or end to military
assistance, including the grounds for doing so;•

Communicate to KRG authorities the need to undertake credible investigations
into allegations of serious laws-of-war violations, in order to maintain transfersof weapons and military training;•

Urge KRG to publicly report, no later than June 30, 2017, on progress toward
accountability for laws-of-war violations;

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•

Ensure that training of Kurdish security forces includes robust instruction on
the principles and application of the laws of war, particularly with regard tohome demolitions;•Vet for human rights abuses and laws-or-war violations all units and agencies
of KRG security forces that receive military aid and security assistance;•

Undertake regular joint monitoring visits to security forces training sites toassess training effectiveness, including on human rights;•

Publicly report violations of agreements by KRG security forces on end-use of
military transfers.

To United Nations Institutions and Agencies•

The UN Human Rights Council should extend the investigation mandate of the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on abuses by ISIS andbroaden it to include serious violations by all parties in Iraq, including Kurdish
security forces;•

The Council should establish a mandate of Special Rapporteur on the situationin Iraq, in order to monitor and regularly publish reports on the situation ofhuman rights and recommend measures to ensure accountability;•

The UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq and the UN Development Programme’s
Stabilization Fund should include housing for returning displaced persons andensure their right to restitution or compensation for loss of property.

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10Methodology
This report is based on interviews with around 120 people in Nineveh, Dohuk, Erbil,
Sulaimaniya, and Kirkuk governorates, during five field visits to areas of Iraq controlled by
Kurdish security forces between September 2014 and May 2016. Those interviewed
included Arab Iraqis displaced by the fight against ISIS in Iraq. Human Rights Watch
researchers spoke to almost all the interviewees in person and in Arabic. One interview
was conducted in Kurdish with translation. Human Rights Watch researchers also visited
locations in Nineveh, Erbil, and Kirkuk governorates where Kurdish forces allegedly carriedout destruction of homes. We also spoke to Peshmerga and KRG government officials
during these visits.
We informed all interviewees about the purpose and voluntary nature of the interviews, andthe ways in which we would use the information, and obtained consent from all interviewees,
who understood they would receive no compensation for their participation. For reasons of
personal security Human Rights Watch has withheld the names and identifying informationof those interviewed, except for officials or those who agreed to be named.
Human Rights Watch is grateful for the cooperation we received from KRG authorities andsecurity officials during our visits to areas under the control of KRG security forces, and inparticular the assistance of Asayish officers in Nineveh, and Peshmerga officers in Kirkuk.
Gen. Sheikh Jafar Mustafa of the Peshmerga gave generously of his time and expertise inanswering our questions at his base in Sulaimaniya in December 2015.
Human Rights Watch conducted a detailed damage assessment of areas in Zummar, Rabi’aand parts of al-Shamal subdistricts in Nineveh, and areas west and southwest of Kirkuk
city, using a time series of very high resolution commercial satellite images recorded on 35
separate dates in 143 towns and villages from June 2014 until March 2016. In each case,the time series of satellite images was taken before, during and after the destruction.1 We

1 Satellite imagery used in this report was recorded on the following dates: March 11, June 7, 22, August 18, September 1, 7,

28, November 5, 11, 2014, January 2, February 5, 10, 14, March 21, April 22, May 20, 21, 26, August 12, September 15, October
9, 10, November 1, 12, 18, 2015, January 24, February 12, March 23, April 5,7, May 23, June 2, July 2, 2016.

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used satellite imagery to identify areas of destruction, to quantify damage levels, toevaluate and corroborate witness statements, and to assess the scale, distribution, andtiming of the destruction of buildings. Further, we used satellite imagery to determine theprobable methods of destruction, as well as to identify damage from airstrikes and any
artillery and mortar fire that occurred during battles between ISIS and Peshmerga forcesand distinguish such damage from demolitions carried out after the battles.
In this report, Human Rights Watch uses the terms Peshmerga to refer to the armed forcesof the KRG, and Asayish to refer to the police forces of the KRG. The term “Kurdish forces”
is used in cases where the witnesses could not specifically identity the type of force or
where other armed forces, such as those of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units(YPG), Yezidi armed groups, and armed Kurdish civilians were also active.
Human Rights Watch communicated its findings to the KRG in January 2015, October 2015,
March 2016, and September 2016. The KRG responded each time, including a detailed
report on March 26, 2016 and the results of its fact-finding missions on June 30, 2016(references to “the KRG response” refer to the June 30 response unless otherwise
indicated). In July 2016, Human Rights Watch met with President Barzani, Foreign Minister
Falah Mustafa, Interior Minister and acting Minister of Peshmerga Affairs Karim Sinjari todiscuss our findings. The relevant parts of the KRG responses are reflected in this report.
Human Rights Watch maintains a dialogue with the KRG to assess the facts presented inthis report and any resulting remedies. Human Rights Watch previously published some
findings of September and December 2014 field visits on February 25, 2015, and of aJanuary 2016 visit on April 5, 2016.

Satellite imagery used in this report was collected by the commercial satellite sensors Pléiades-1A/B, SPOT-6 and SPOT-07(Copyright: CNES 2016; Distribution Airbus DS), WorldView-1, WorldView-2, GeoEye-1 (Copyright: DigitalGlobe 2016 –NextView Distribution License).

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I. BackgroundIraqi Kurdistan has enjoyed relative stability and until recently strong economic growth in
the aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, carving out a politically autonomous
status for the region recognized in Iraq’s 2005 constitution.2 The Kurdistan Region of Iraq
(KRI) has a regional parliament situated in the capital, Erbil. Its internal border is the GreenLine demarcating the status quo between Iraqi government and Kurdish forces as of 1991,
including all of Dohuk governorate, and large but not all parts of Erbil and Sulaimaniya
governorates, and small parts of Nineveh and Diyala governorates. Since 2003, theKurdish sphere of influence has extended into the Nineveh Plains and Sinjar in Nineveh
governorate, Makhmur in Erbil governorate, Kirkuk city in Kirkuk governorate, Tuz
Khurmatu in Salah al-Din governorate, and Khanaqin and Jalawla in Diyala governorate.
These areas are home to many Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities such as
Yezidis, Christians, Shabak, and Kaka’is, in addition to Arab Iraqis.
In the second week of June 2014, forces of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, took over
Mosul in Nineveh and advanced into Salah al-Din, and Kirkuk governorates. Iraqi
government army forces in the region failed to put up resistance and melted away, but thePeshmerga, the armed forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, moved in, securing
areas around Kirkuk city and elsewhere. In August 2014, ISIS drove Peshmerga forces fromthe Sinjar and Nineveh Plains area up to Mosul Lake. After Kurdish forces repelled a brief
ISIS advance on Erbil, they held a frontline along the Greater Zab River to Gwer (Quwayr)
and Makhmur in Erbil governorate, and to Kirkuk city along the mountain ridges runningfrom northwest to southeast.
By the end of 2014, Peshmerga had recaptured much of the Nineveh Plains, an area
reaching from Sinjar mountain in the north to Mosul Lake. They retook Sinjar in November
2015, and pushed south and west from Kirkuk at various points in 2015. In Diyala

2 Iraqi Constitution, 2005, art. 117. On economic growth, see for example: Ministry of Planning, Kurdistan Regional
Government, Regional Development Strategy for Kurdistan Region 2012-2016, 2011, http://www.mop.gov.krd/resources/
MoP%20Files/PDF%20Files/gd_ps/regional_development_strategy.pdf (accessed April 24, 2016).

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governorate, Peshmerga forces in late November 2014 retook Jalawla from ISIS, ending its
three-month presence there.3
By late 2015, Kurdish forces had recaptured from ISIS much of the territory that, although
officially outside of the KRI, had been within the Kurdish sphere of influence since 2003
with a Peshmerga security presence. On March 24, 2016, Iraqi army units that had moved
to Makhmur in coordination with Peshmerga forces began an offensive to recapture Mosul.
***
After 2003, the US-led occupation administration, the Coalition Provisional Authority,
established the Iraq Property Claims Commission (IPCC) with a deadline of December 31,
2007 to resolve property disputes arising from Saddam Hussein’s Arabization and otherpolicies.4 Article 140 of the 2005 constitution mandates the Iraqi government:[t]o remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime’s practices inaltering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, bydeporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing
migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region,
depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality.5
Those practices included the genocidal Anfal Campaign against Iraqi Kurds from 1987 to
1989 that killed over 100,000 people and levelled large areas south and east of Kirkuk city.6
3 “Peshmerga have Jalawla; ISIS on the run,” Rudaw, November 23, 2011, http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/

231120143 (accessed June 3, 2016), and “ISIS defeats Kurds in flashpoint Iraq town of Jalawla,” Alarabiya news, August 11,
2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/08/11/ ISIS-defeat-Kurds-in-flashpoint-Iraq-town-of-Jalawla.html (accessed June 3, 2016).
4 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” March 8, 2004,

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/iraq/tal.htm (accessed June 3, 2016), art. 58.
5 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” March 8, 2004,

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/iraq/tal.htm (accessed June 3, 2016), art. 58.
6 Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, July 1993,https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ . As summarized in a 2011 United States Institute for Peace report:
The Ba’athist-led government also engaged in deliberate and systematic policies to ensure its control overwhat are now called the disputed territories by the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kurds and otherminorities, destruction of hundreds of Kurdish villages, appropriation of Kurdish- and Turkoman-owned land,
distribution of agricultural tenant contracts for this land to mainly Shiite Arab farmers from Iraq’s south, forced“nationality correction” of non-Arab ethnic minorities to identify as Arabs, prevention of non-Arabs fromholding positions in Iraq’s Northern Oil Company and other state-owned enterprises, and ethnic
gerrymandering of administrative boundaries in northern Iraq.

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14

The Iraqi government in 2006 replaced the Property Claims Commission with the Iraq
Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes (CRRPD), maintaining the
mandate but introducing other changes. By September 2007, the commission had decidedaround 37,000 cases out of a caseload of 135,000, but the changes to the CRRPD
procedures meant some 9,000 of those 37,000 cases had to be reviewed, and theremainder had poor rates of enforcement for restitution or compensation.7 By 2009, themechanism had clearly failed to provide redress, and tensions significantly increasedaround property ownership and demography in Kirkuk, Diyala and Nineveh.8 By 2011, thecommitment of senior officials in Baghdad to implement property restitution had
significantly waned.9 By the time ISIS forcibly took control of some of the disputed
territories in June 2014, and the Kurds sent armed forces to secure Kirkuk, prospects forlaw-based means of redressing past violations had faded. In December 2014, Baghdad
and Erbil agreed informally on revenue sharing in an agreement that appears not to haveaddressed the resolution of personal property disputes through adjudication or amechanism for addressing claims for political self-determination.10***
Since 2003, officials of the major Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of
President Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani, a former
president of Iraq, have opened party offices in many towns in the Kurdish sphere of
influence south of the KRI.

Sean Kane, “Iraq’s Disputed Territories. A View of the Political Horizon and Implications for U.S. Policy,’ United States
Institute of Peace, 2011, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/PW69.pdf (accessed April 24, 2016).
7 Peter Van der Auweraert, “Property Restitution in Iraq: Presentation at the Symposium on Post-Conflict Property

Restitution,” hosted by the United States Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; Bureau ofIntelligence and Research; Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization, September 6-7, 2007, System
Planning Corporation, http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/98032.pdf (accessed April 26, 2016), p.8.
8 International Crisis Group, Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line, Crisis Report No. 88, July 8, 2009,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/088-iraq-and-the-kurds-trouble-alongthe-trigger-line.aspx (accessed June 3, 2016), pp.7-17.
9 International Crisis Group, Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears, Crisis Group Report No 103, March 28, 2011,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/103%20Ira
q%20and%20the%20Kurds%20--%20Confronting%20Withdrawal%20Fears.pdf (accessed June 3, 2016), p.4.
10 Haywa Ridha, “Article 140.The Elephant at the Negotiating Table as Kurds and Iraqis Reach Oil Deal,” Niqash, December 11,

2014, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/3593/ (accessed April 26, 2016).

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Human Rights Watch research in Nineveh governorate in 2009 found that Kurdish
authorities engaged in a “two-pronged strategy: they have offered minorities inducements
while simultaneously wielding repression in order to keep them in tow.”11 Minorities of the
Nineveh Plains, such as the Shabak, Yezidis and Chaldeo-Assyrians, confronted “Kurdish
authorities’ heavy handed tactics, including arbitrary arrests and detentions, andintimidation, directed at anyone resistant to Kurdish expansionist plans.”12 On June 10,2016, Hadi Halabjayi, a Peshmerga commander, said of areas around Khazir in Nineveh
governorate captured two weeks earlier, “These territories are Kurdistan's now. We will notgive them back to the Iraqi army or anybody else.”13
The International Crisis Group, a conflict resolution organization, wrote in May 2015 that:
The KDP and PUK follow similar, though uncoordinated, strategies to further
dominance in their areas of influence: the KDP in the Ninewa plain andpoints of access to neighboring Kurdish-populated areas of Syria, the PUK
in Kirkuk and Diyala governorates … Kurdish forces make sure to “liberate”
Sunni Arab-populated areas only after striking deals with local leaders thatsolidify their control by imposing their own leadership and making the local
figures dependent on them for the protection and services essential for
return of the displaced.14
A map published on the website of the KRG’s presidency shows the extent of Kurdish
influence—in many parts, security and political control—in the disputed territories
outside the KRI.15 KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, in a July 2016 interview, said,“We will decide the extent of our borders by what has been liberated with the bold of ourPeshmerga. … Whether we remain with Iraq or be independent or be part of a federation

11 Human Rights Watch, On Vulnerable Ground: Violence against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed
Territories, November 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/10/vulnerable-ground/violence-against-minority-communities-nineveh-provinces-disputed, p. 9.
12 Ibid., p.5.
13 Mohammed A. Salih, “Will Iraqi-Kurdish conflict break out in Ninevah?,” Al-Monitor, June 10, 2016, http://www.al-

monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/iraq-nineveh-kurds-control-isis-army.html#ixzz4BXz46K1I (accessed June 13, 2016).
14 International Crisis Group, Arming the Kurds: Fighting IS, Inviting Conflict, Middle East Report No.158, May 12, 2015,

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/158arming-iraq-s-kurds-fighting-is-inviting-conflict.pdf (accessed June 13, 2016), p.24.
15 See: Presidency of Kurdistan Region, “Kurdistan Region,” with map, no date,

http://www.presidency.krd/english/ndisplay.aspx?sm=5yBwBg+oqQY= (accessed June 13, 2016).

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16

or confederation, our priority will remain the delineation of our borders.”16 According toFalah Mustafa, the head of the KRG’s foreign relations department, “All the areas thathave been liberated by the Peshmerga forces, our forces will stay there.”17 KRG
Spokesperson Safeen Dizayee said the Peshmerga “will not stop their advances until all
Kurdistan’s territories in the Ninevah region are liberated.”18 Gen. Sheikh Jafar Mustafa,
the senior Peshmerga commander, told Human Rights Watch in December 2015 withregard to southern Kirkuk governorate:
All the villages we retook in Daquq in August [2015] had been part ofArabization. This land is Kurdish land and we will never give them the chance
to take this land again. We will not let the Arabs take this land again.19

16 Voice of America, “Exclusive: Kurdish PM Says Mosul Operation Still in ‘Planning Stage’.” July 24, 2016

http://www.voanews.com/a/exclusive-kurdish-prime-minister-mosul-operation-planning-stage/3432751.html, (accessed
September 28, 2016).
17 Susannah George and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “Mosul Fight is Already Redrawing the Map of Northern Iraq,” Associated Press,

August 27, 2016 http://bigstory.ap.org/article/5271b7f7d7e244e5a9be573ea8919058/mosul-fight-already-redrawing-mapnorthern-iraq (accessed September 13, 2016).
18 Ibid.
19 Human Rights Watch interview with Gen. Sheikh Jafar Mustafa, December 1, 2015.

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II. Building Demolition
The laws of war prohibit the destruction or seizure of the property of an adversary, unlessrequired by imperative military necessity, defined by the International Committee of the
Red Cross as “the necessity for measures which are essential to attain the goals of war,
and which are lawful in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”20
When destruction is permitted as a matter of imperative military necessity, it must not bedisproportionate, that is, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct militaryadvantage, and limited to the circumstances at the time, that is, not to past or possible
future military use. Nor does the notion of military necessity allow for the partial or total
destruction of a wide area, such as a neighborhood or village, regardless of proximity tofrontlines. Those responsible for the wanton destruction of civilian property should be
investigated for possible war crimes and held to account.
Many of the villages and towns that Kurdish forces recaptured from ISIS over the past two
years have been scenes of widespread destruction, and some are now devoid of civilian
life. In many cases, the damage to homes resulted after Peshmerga forces had full controlof the area.
Human Rights Watch collected information on 83 towns and villages that bore signs ofsignificant destruction: 61 in Kirkuk governorate, 21 in Nineveh governorate, and one, Abu
Shita, in Erbil governorate. For this report, Human Rights Watch investigated 21 of the 83
towns of villages where available evidence suggested building destruction had been
unlawful (17 in Kirkuk and 4 in Nineveh governorates). Of these 21 towns and villages, wevisited 13 that bore signs of significant destruction (9 in Kirkuk governorate and 4 in
Nineveh governorate).21 In addition, we spoke with residents and witnesses to destruction

20 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary of 1987, Basic Rules, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I, 8 June
1977, para 1389 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/COM/470-750044?OpenDocument, (accessed September 29, 2016).
21 Human Rights Watch visited Idris Hindiya Qadima, Idris Khaz’al, Idris Khubbaz, Maktab Khalid, Al-Bu Muhammad, Tell
Rabi’, Dilis, Qarah Tappah and Qoshkaya in Kirkuk Governorate, and Barzan, Bardiya, Hamad Agha, and Sheikhan in Nineveh
Governorate.

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in eight additional villages and towns (all in Kirkuk governorate).22 Seven of the 13 sites
visited were empty of residents.23 For the other 62 villages and towns, satellite imagery
shows significant destruction consistent with the use of fire, heavy machinery and highexplosives, distinct in appearance from destruction resulting from air strikes and heavy
ground fire prior to ISIS’s retreat from these locations, but a lack of witness accounts does
not allow for definitive conclusions about the circumstances of and responsibility for
destruction in these locations.
Human Rights Watch found that the causes of the destruction of buildings varied. ISIS
blew up some houses, usually the homes of Iraqi security officials, according to residents
from six villages and towns.24 US-led coalition airstrikes also caused damage, residents ofthree villages said and satellite imagery revealed. In at least in one village, Kubaiba in
Kirkuk governorate, damage from airstrikes was considerable and we did not list it amongthe 21 villages and towns where we found evidence of unlawful destruction following KRG
control of the area.25
Almost all of the 83 villages and towns visited or assessed by Human Rights Watch were
either completely or partially razed to the ground, resulting in the destruction of thousandsof civilian homes, as well as administrative and commercial buildings. Human Rights
Watch determined the timing of this destruction by comparing multiple satellite images
recorded before and after the dates on which residents said the Peshmerga hadrecaptured the areas from ISIS. In many locations, the demolition of buildings occurred
over a period of weeks and even months after the Peshmerga took control. Human Rights
Watch determined that building demolition in several locations was initially done by

22 Human Rights Watch interviewed residents of and witnesses to destruction al-Murra, Shahid, Yarmuk, Nahrawan, Abu

Ka’uba, Sa’d, Khalid and Wahda, all in Kirkuk Governorate, where we could not go due to security concerns.
23 Maktab Khalid, Al-Bu Muhammad, Tell Rabi’, Dilis, Barzan, Hamad Agha (Arab part), and Sheikhan were empty ofresidents.
24 Human Rights Watch interview with villager from al-Murra, Kirkuk, December 3, 2015; and with villager from Barzan(ke),Bardiya, August 3, 2015; and with shopkeeper from Bardiya, Bardiya August 3, 2015; and with villager from Wahda, ‘Umar bin
al-Khattab, December 2, 2015.
25 Airstrikes caused considerable damage in Kubaiba, a villager said. Human Rights Watch identified over thirty distinct

impact sites in Kubaiba with satellite imagery recorded on September 15 and October 10, 2015, consistent with the use oflarge, air-dropped munitions. Human Rights Watch interview with villager from Kubaiba, Kirkuk, December 3, 2015. Other
reported airstrikes were in Barzan(ke), Wahda, Sa’d and Khalid, and al-Murra. Human Rights Watch interviews with villagers
from Barzanke, Bardiya, August 3, 2015; with villagers from Wahda, Sa’d and Khalid, in Umar bin al-Khattab, December 2,
2015, and with a villager from al-Murra, Kirkuk, December 3, 2015.

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setting fire generally to smaller, single story buildings, followed by the demolition of larger,
multi-story buildings with heavy machinery and high explosives.
Peshmerga officers in one area, Daquq, told Human Rights Watch that they blew up many
structures that ISIS had booby-trapped in order to protect themselves against accidentallysetting off hidden bombs. In three villages, ISIS could not have planted improvised bombs
because it had never captured the villages in the first place. In two other cases ISIS
controlled the village for less than two days; residents said ISIS did not plant improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) in that time and that they saw Peshmerga carry out destruction
with bulldozers.26
Gen. Sheikh Jafar Mustafa, a senior Peshmerga commander for the Kirkuk area, told
Human Rights Watch that 80 percent of casualties his men had suffered were due to IEDs
planted by ISIS.27 He said that his men were able to defuse only some IEDs, and that thePeshmerga “destroy[ed] the houses with TNT, especially if we think ISIS would use thevillage again.”28 Colonel Ibrahim, a Peshmerga officer on the frontline in Daquq, said, “Wesometimes have to set off any explosives from a distance to protect ourselves.”29
Colonel Ibrahim described his men’s work around Al-Bu Muhammad, Tell Rabi’, and Dilis,
west of Daquq, that the Peshmerga retook on August 15, 2015:
The demining team has also had a lot of casualties. The IEDs are quite
sophisticated. For example, we found two metal shish kebab sticks laidnext to each other on the ground, with just a thin divider between them.
When it gets disrupted and the sticks touch, the mine goes off. Another way
is to have two loose and exposed wire ends close to each other inside aplastic tube, but not touching. When you disrupt it by stepping on it or
driving over it, the wires touch and the IED goes off. Other IEDs we foundhave extremely thin wire that is not really visible attached to doors, andwhen you open the doors, they go off. Sometimes the entire house

26 The four villages are: Idris Khaz’al, Idris Khubbaz, Idris Hindiya Qadima and al-Murra.
27 Human Rights Watch interview with Gen. Sheikh Jafar Mustafa, commander of the 70 division, Sulaimaniya, December 1,

2015.
28 Ibid.
29 Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Ibrahim, Peshmerga, Daquq barracks, December 2, 2015.

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20explodes, but mostly only one room. Others are remotely detonated withcell phones. ISIS saws through electricity poles, and uses the hollow
opening to stuff it with ammonium explosives. Because of the tight packing
in a metal tube, there is a lot of damage when it explodes.30
Brig. Araz Abd al-Qadir Abd al-Rahman, the Peshmerga commander in the Daquq area, told
Human Rights Watch that because ISIS mined so many houses, “We shell villages before
going in to set off some of the IEDs.”31
Devices that explode due to contact with a person fall under the definition of an
antipersonnel landmine, which are prohibited under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. But for
destruction of civilian property to be lawful, KRG forces would have to have an imperative
military necessity to do so. The requirement of imperative military necessity means that
there was no less-destructive alternative to achieving that aim, and that the military
operation must have some concrete link to actual or anticipated fighting. It is unlawful todestroy a civilian object without specific evidence that it is being put to military use or isabout to be so used.
Human Rights Watch spoke to three officials with demining agencies with experience
working in the northern part of Iraq. All agreed that in most circumstances it would bebetter to cordon off mined areas, including entire villages if necessary, and try to carefully
defuse the mines at a later time because uncontrolled explosions risked dispersing
explosives throughout the rubble, making the area, and later clean-up, extremely unsafe.32
Human Rights Watch is not aware, and the KRG has not claimed, that Peshmerga forces
had to establish military positions inside these villages (such as they did in Gwer and Abu
Shita, in Erbil governorate, where destruction also took place). Destruction of villages
weeks or months after the Peshmerga retook them from ISIS indicates that mines and30 Ibid.
31 Human Rights Watch interview with Brig. Araz Abd al-Qadir Abd al-Rahman, commanding officer for Daquq area, Daquq

base, December 2, 2015.
32 Human Rights Watch telephone conversations with three demining experts who requested not to be identified. An

Australian member of the demining team of the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action died west of Daquq on May 17, 2016, froman improvised explosive device. Matt Brown, “Australian demining expert killed while trying to defuse bomb in Iraq,” ABCNews Australia, May 18, 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-18/australian-killed-in-iraq-while-trying-to-defusebomb/7423694 (accessed June 3, 2016).

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booby-traps in villages did not present military obstacles whose removal was animperative necessity. Destruction of buildings and entire villages in order to pre-empt highcasualties in demining teams would also not satisfy the requirement that the destruction
offer a definitive military advantage at the time of destruction. The Peshmerga could havecordoned them off to protect the lives of their forces and demining teams.
In its March 26, 2016 response to Human Rights Watch, the KRG wrote that coalition
airstrikes or fighting between the Peshmerga and ISIS were responsible for some of thedamage to buildings (see below for details). On April 4, 2016, following Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International reports of Peshmerga violations, the KRG set up acommittee to conduct field visits and investigate claims of unlawful destruction.33 In thisreport we reference relevant conclusions from the KRG’s fact-finding mission, which the
KRG sent to Human Rights Watch on June 30, 2016. Dr. Dindar Zebari, the head of thecommittee, told Human Rights Watch on May 25, 2016 that the government might consider
compensation for those whose homes Peshmerga forces had arbitrarily destroyed.34 On
May 19, 2016, Fuad Hussein, chief of staff to KRG President Masoud Barzani, told Human
Rights Watch that the regional government had no policy of building destruction or
discrimination against Arabs, but that “individual mistakes” may have occurred.35 In ameeting with Human Rights Watch on July 28, 2016 discussing alleged violations by KRG
forces President Barzani said, “Today ISIS broke all the rules. Their crimes are so huge thatsome of our people went beyond their instructions.”36

Kirkuk Governorate
Witness accounts, satellite imagery, and on-site visits point to unlawful destruction ofproperties in 17 villages in Kirkuk governorate that Peshmerga forces had recaptured atvarious points in 2015, in addition to one site of destruction in 2016. We chose toinvestigate these sites based on initial indications of destruction and their diverse
locations. Second-hand accounts Human Rights Watch received and satellite imagery
33 “Iraqi Kurdistan: Arabs Displaced, Cordoned Off, Detained,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 25, 2015,

https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/25/iraqi-kurdistan-arabs-displaced-cordoned-detained, and Amnesty International,“Iraq: Banished and Dispossessed: Forced Displacement and Deliberate Destruction in Northern Iraq,” January 20, 2016,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/3229/2016/en/ (accessed June 15, 2016).
34 Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Dindar Zebari, head of committee investigating claims by Human Rights Watch andAmnesty International, Erbil, May 25, 2016.
35 Human Rights Watch interview with Fuad Hussein, chief of staff to KRG President Masoud Barzani, Erbil, May 19, 2016.
36 Human Rights Watch meeting with KRG President Masoud Barzani, Sari Blind, KRI, July 28, 2016.

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22reviewed suggests there is a likelihood that many more villages were destroyed in Kirkuk
governorate during this period – satellite imagery alone shows more than 60 severely or
totally destroyed villages in Kirkuk governorate.
The KRG’s fact-finding committee acknowledged building destruction in Kirkuk governorate,
but stated that “no property was intentionally destroyed and those properties which weredamaged were solely due to the unfortunate consequences of war” such as, in particular,coalition airstrikes, but also ISIS’s planting of IEDs in homes, and artillery, rocket, andmortar fire. The committee also wrote, “Another prominent reason for the destruction ofproperty has been the presence of non-KRG affiliated militias and hostile civilian elements
which have in some cases destroyed segments of property in a village or region.”West of Kirkuk City
Qarah Tappah
Building demolition by security forces using bulldozers in at least one village occurred asrecently as May 2016.
In Qarah Tappah, a village of over 2,600 Arab inhabitants 14 kilometers west of Kirkuk city,
a combination of Peshmerga, Asayish, and Kirkuk police arrived on the morning of May 5,
2016. This was one day after security officials had arrested 42 villagers on suspicion of
involvement in explosions that had occurred the previous day at two nearby wells of the
Khabbaz oil and gas fields.37
Villagers told Human Rights Watch that they saw one security official go around the village
and write a red “X” on over two dozen houses, which they later learned marked them for
destruction.38 The residents of Qarah Tappah told Human Rights Watch that the security
forces had gathered them in a field next to the village the previous day, while a masked
informant pointed out village men whom the security forces then arrested. Thereafter, thesecurity forces ordered the residents back into their houses, from where they observed themarking of houses later the same day.

37 Baxtiyar Goran, “Kirkuk’s oil fields are still on fire,” Kurdistan24.net, May 23, 2016, http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/

news/f9c83ab6-d018-45f3-b41f-ecfa8c355d7f/Kirkuk%E2%80%99s-oil-fields-are-still-on-fire (accessed, May 31, 2016).
38 Human Rights Watch interviews with about 15 villagers, Qarah Tappah, May 20, 2016.

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MARKED WITH AN “X”

24According to residents, the military-uniformed drivers of four bulldozers went to different
parts of the village and began destroying the marked houses. Overall, they destroyed 28
houses: 16 concrete block houses and 12 mud brick houses, villagers said.39 In a brief tourof the village, Human Rights Watch observed 18 destroyed houses. The remains of several
walls were still marked with a red “X.” In addition, researchers observed wide tire tracks
leading to destroyed houses and damage on the corners of two houses along a narrowpassageway where residents said the bulldozer did not manage to pass through.40 The
destroyed houses did not belong to those arrested the previous day on suspicion of
blowing up the two nearby oil wells, villagers said, but for the most part to villagers whoneighbors and relatives said had joined ISIS long ago.41
Three villagers told Human Rights Watch that they remained in the village and saw Rawand
Mala Mahmud, an official of the Kirkuk branch of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK, oneof the region’s two leading political parties) at the scene and heard him order the destruction.
The villagers said fellow security officers referred to Rawand Mahmud by name.42
The destruction of homes in Qarah Tappah was not related to military operations against
ISIS, and appeared to constitute attacks on civilian objects, a serious violation ofinternational humanitarian law.
Dindar Zebari, head of the KRG Foreign Relations Department’s Committee to Evaluate andRespond to International Reports, in a September 2016 communication, said that 18

39 Ibid.
40 Based on accounts of about 10 villagers, the destroyed houses belonged to: Jalal Nuri Khalaf, and five houses in northernpart of Qarah Tappah belonging to his relatives; in the western part of the village, the houses of Majid Muhammad Jaddu’,
Adnan Muhammad Jaddu’, and Umar Jaddu’; and in the southwestern part the houses of Muhammad Khalaf Jaddu’, and his
brother Jasim Muhammad Khalaf. All of these men joined ISIS in mid-2014, villagers said. Kurdistan security forces also
destroyed the houses of Khalid Muhammad Jaddu’, a former detainee, and that of Harith Umar Jaddu’, who relatives said
remains in Asayish detention in Erbil. The house of Husain Khalaf Jaddu’ was marked for destruction, but the bulldozer could
not fit through a narrow passageway, village women said. Large tire tracks and chippings on the edges of houses were visibleat the time of Human Rights Watch’s visit, giving credibility to the women’s account. At the southern entrance to the village,
close to a Peshmerga base, the houses of Shahhab Ahmad Jasim and Taha Salih Jum’a, who remain in the village, weredestroyed.
41 Human Rights Watch interviews with about 15 villagers, Qarah Tappah, May 20, 2016.
42 Human Rights Watch interviews with three villagers, Qarah Tappah, May 20, 2016. Rawand Mala Mahmud, deputy head of
the PUK for Kirkuk, responded to calls and messages asking whether he was present and involved in the destruction orders
and what the security reason behind them were by saying that he was not involved in security affairs, but worked as a media
person for a political party. Human Rights Watch text message exchange with Rawand Mala Mahmud, June 14, 2016.

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Burning oil wells seen from Qarah Tappah on May 20, 2016. © 2016 Human Rights Watch

homes of persons alleged to be armed members of ISIS were destroyed and 10 others
marked with an “X” “by the head of the village and other local residents.” He said thatsome homes were destroyed when security forces were unable to disarm IEDs found inthem.43 In a separate response Falah Mustafa Bakir said, regarding Qarah Tappah, that
“Kurdish forces did demolish 20 houses which belonged to terrorists, most of whom arestill active within the ranks of the Islamic State.”44

43 Dindar Zebari, head of High Committee to Evaluate and Respond to International Report, KRG, letter dated September 22,

2016.
44 Falah Mustafa Bakir, minister and head of KRG Department of Foreign Relations, letter dated September 22, 2016.

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26

House destroyed with a bulldozer in Qarah Tappah May 2016. © 2016 Human Rights Watch

Villagers said they saw security officials steal over 200 head of sheep, two horses, and,from one farm, 10-15 million Iraqi dinars’ (US$8,400-12,600) worth of barley and animal
feed.45 A woman said she saw security forces on May 5, steal a refrigerator, television set,
air conditioner and several canisters from her house.46 Zebari’s communication said
“reprisal attacks were carried out in the form [of] looting” in response to ISIS killings offour residents.

45 Human Rights Watch interviews with the owner of the barley and animal feed, and two villagers who owned sheep, Qarah

Tappah, May 20, 2015.
46 Human Rights Watch interview with three women, Qarah Tappah, May 20, 2016.

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Destroyed houses in Qarah Tappah, with partial red “X” still visible, May 20, 2016. © 2016 Human
Rights Watch

Idris Villages
Eight kilometers southwest of Qarah Tappah are the three villages of Idris Khaz’al, Idris
Khubbaz, and Idris Hindiya Qadima. On the night of January 29-30, 2015, ISIS took control ofIdris Khaz’al and Idris Khubbaz but not Idris Hindiya Qadima, according to residents
interviewed by Human Rights Watch. The residents said they did not see ISIS booby-trapbuildings there. When Peshmerga forces took control on the evening of January 31, 2015,
they ordered the few remaining villagers to leave.47 According to witnesses, a combination ofPeshmerga, Asayish, and civilian Kurds, using bulldozers under the direction and protectionof Peshmerga forces, destroy buildings in all three villages.48 The villagers said they saw the
beginning of the destruction from within the villages as the Peshmerga ordered them toleave Idris Khaz’al and Idris Hindiya Qadima, and observed destruction from two

47 Human Rights watch interviews with about 15 villagers from Idris Khaz’al, Idris Khubbaz, and Idris Hindiya Qadima in theirvillages, November 24, 2015.
48 Human Rights Watch interviews with two villagers in Idris Khaz’al, three villagers who observed events in Idris Khubbaz,

and about 10 villagers in Idris Hindiya Qadima.

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28

checkpoints less than 500 meters away from all three villages a few days later.49 The villages
numbered between 70 and 100 houses each, and the residents were Sunni Arabs.50 Satellite
imagery from February 5 and 14, 2015, after the Peshmerga recaptured the area, show
destruction of large parts of the three villages Idris Khaz’al, Idris Khubbaz, and Idris Hindiya
Qadima consistent with the use of fire, heavy machinery and possibly high explosives.
Villagers told Human Rights Watch that as they were leaving Idris Khaz’al on the night ofJanuary 31, they saw trucks carrying bulldozers drive into the village, which was by thenunder Peshmerga control, and others on the road to the village.51 On February 1, othervillagers said they had been at a Peshmerga checkpoint within sight of Idris Khaz’al andsaw bulldozers destroying houses in the village.52 On February 3, more villagers came tothe checkpoint and observed the damage.53
A villager from Idris Khaz’al told Human Rights Watch that on February 3 he saw a group of
about 11 armed men, dressed like Kurds and speaking Kurdish, looting, burning anddemolishing our homes with a bulldozer.54 He said that he informed Captain Rizgar of thePeshmerga, whom he knew personally, but that Captain Rizgar said he was powerless tostop them.55
Human Rights Watch visited Idris Khaz’al on November 24, 2015, and observed that almost
all buildings belonging to roughly 70 resident families had been demolished; there weresigns of fire damage in several houses and almost no usable household goods remained.
Villagers told Human Rights Watch that airstrikes had hit two houses, one on each end ofIdris Khazal, as well as ISIS vehicles. Peshmerga artillery rounds also landed in the village
but did not cause much damage, they said.56

49 Human Rights watch interviews with about 15 villagers from Idris Khaz’al and Idris Hindiya Qadima in their villages,
November 24, 2015.
50 Human Rights Watch interview with a village elder from Idris Khaz’al, Kirkuk, November 22, 2015.
51 Human Rights Watch interview with two villagers, Idris Khaz’al, November 24, 2015.
52 Human Rights Watch interview with two different villagers, Idris Khaz’al, November 24, 2015.
53 Human Rights Watch interview with a village elder from Idris Khaz’al who was at the checkpoint into the village, Kirkuk,

November 22, 2015.
54 Human Rights Watch interview with a village elder from Idris Khaz’al, Kirkuk, November 22, 2015.
55 Ibid.
56 Human Rights Watch interviews with three villagers, Idris Khaz’al, November 24, 2015.

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Houses destroyed by bulldozers in Idris Khaz’al after February 1, 2015 © 2015 Human Rights Watch

One of two houses in Idris Khaz’al hit by an airstrike, with collapsed roof. ©2015 Human Rights Watch

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A villager who said he remained in Idris Khaz’al during the 36-hour ISIS occupation said
that ISIS took some objects but did not generally loot or demolish buildings. Shelling by
Peshmerga forces did hit a few houses, he said, and an airstrike demolished two buildings
at each entrance to the village as well as cars of ISIS fighters.57
Another villager from Idris Khaz’al said that Peshmerga ordered him out of Idris Khaz’al on
January 31, 2015, and that he first returned, briefly, after three days, when he saw houses
destroyed and others on fire. He said he was able to return for good following an orderfrom Najmaddin Karim, governor of Kirkuk, after 10 days, and at that point found thevillage destroyed.
Idris Khubbaz, about one kilometer to the north, resembled Idris Khaz’al, although agreater number of homes and other buildings remained standing. A villager told Human
Rights Watch that he saw, from a checkpoint outside Idris Khubbaz, several bulldozers
destroy houses after the Peshmerga recaptured the village on January 31.58
In Idris Hindiya Qadima, about 2 kilometers southeast of Idris Khaz’al, villagers told
Human Rights Watch that although ISIS had never entered their village, Peshmerga andAsayish forces, together with armed Kurdish civilians, destroyed much of the village afterordering them to leave on January 31.59 One villager said that when he tried to stop anarmed man in military dress speaking Kurdish from bulldozing his shop, the man
threatened him at gunpoint and proceeded with the destruction. The armed men wore
civilian dress as well as Peshmerga and Asayish uniforms, and mostly spoke Kurdish, avillager said, but they also spoke in Arabic to villagers who were leaving.60
Another villager said he saw four yellow bulldozers driven into the village underPeshmerga control. He said of the around 60 houses at least 30 had been destroyed.61

57 Human Rights Watch interviews with one villager, Idris Khaz’al, November 24, 2015.
58 Human Rights Watch interview with a village elder, Kirkuk, November 22, 2015.
59 Human Rights Watch interviews with about 15 villagers, Idris Hindiya Qadima, November 24, 2015.
60 Human Rights Watch interview with villager, Idris Hindiya Qadima, November 24, 2015.
61 Human Rights Watch interview with another villager, Idris Hindiya Qadima, November 24, 2015.

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Destruction in Idris Khubbaz. ©2015 Human Rights Watch

Destroyed house in Idris Hindiya Qadima. ©2015 Human Rights Watch

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32Destruction by bulldozers in Idris Hindiya Qadima. ©2015 Human Rights Watch

In its March 2016 response to Human Rights Watch, the KRG wrote that in the three Idris
villages, ISIS “could not plant IEDs in this district as Peshmerga forces immediately
launched a counterattack to liberate these areas.” However, in its June 2016 response, theKRG stated that a “Sheikh [from Idris Hindiya Qadima] asserted that the sole reason [forthe] large level of destruction in his village was due to IS planted IEDs and the exchange offire during the conflict situation between IS and the Peshmerga forces.” Regarding Idris
Khaz’al, the KRG stated that “a local Arab tribal leader” claimed coalition airstrikes and
IEDs “unavoidably detonated in the cleaning-up mission by engineering teams” destroyed
three quarters of the 84 destroyed properties. The KRG did not account for the remaining
21 buildings destroyed or say why detonation of the IEDs was “unavoidable.”62 For Idris
Khubbaz, according to the KRG response, causes of the destruction “were the same as inIdris Khaz’al.”

62 Human Rights Watch does not have information to substantiate the claim of ISIS mining 60 houses, but does haveinformation that airstrikes hit two buildings in Idris Khaz’al.

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The information provided in the June 2016 KRG response is at odds with accounts villagers
gave to Human Rights Watch regarding the short duration of ISIS’s control and their claimthat they did not observe ISIS planting IEDs, as well as consistent accounts that ISIS neverreached Idris Hindiya Qadima. A rivulet between Idris Khaz’al and Idris Hindiya Qadimamarked the line of ISIS’s furthest eastward advance there.63 Most of the destruction in Idris
Khaz’al occurred between after the Peshmerga retook the village on the night of January 31- February 1 and February 5, calling into question the claim that demining teams had
quickly determined the necessity of setting off IEDs planted by ISIS.
Multaqa, a village along the water canal 2 kilometers southwest of Idris Khaz’al, was also
destroyed and no civilians had returned, villagers from the area told Human Rights Watch,but researchers could not visit the area to verify the accounts due to security restrictions.64
Satellite imagery shows over 90 percent of village buildings there were demolished, likely
with high explosives, between February 14 and August 29, 2015.
Other villages northwest of Kirkuk city that remained within Kurdish security forces’ control
also displayed extensive building destruction with signatures consistent with the use offire, heavy machinery and high explosives. The sheer extent of building destruction andthe type of damage signatures identified in these villages was not consistent with air or
artillery strikes.

63 Outside sources also confirm the brief duration of ISIS’s raid targeting the Khabaz oil fields, a short distance from Idris

Khaz’al and Idris Khubbaz villages: Institute for the Study of War, “Iraq Situation Report: January 31 – February 1, 2015,”
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20SITREP%202015-1-31-2-1.pdf (accessed April 29, 2016).
64 Human Rights Watch interviews with villagers, Idris Khaz’al and Idris Hindiya Qadima, November 24, 2015.

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In Qoshkaya, 20 kilometers northwest of Kirkuk city, Human Rights Watch spoke to threevillagers who said that Peshmerga forces a year earlier destroyed 30 houses belonging tovillagers who they said had joined ISIS.65 Human Rights Watch observed 10 of thedestroyed houses when researchers visited on May 20, 2016. Destruction was limited to
the Arab part of Qoshkaya, south of the Kirkuk-Dibis road, but did not affect the Kurdish
part to the north. The KRG response of September 2016 said that “the destruction ofHomes carried out in the Arab quarters of the village was instigated by a segment of local
population as a means of revenge for their joining of IS.” Peshmerga forces, the KRG said,
attempted to stop the attacks but “the crowds proved too large to restrain or control.”66 A
separate response, from Falah Mustafa Bakir, minister and head of the KRG Department of
Foreign Relations, said that some 50 inhabitants of Qoshkaya had joined ISIS and that
Peshmerga, not village residents, destroyed the homes. “When the city was liberated fromthe terrorists by the Peshmerga forces in November of 2015, the houses of those who hadjoined the terrorists were demolished so that those houses would not be used for sleeper
cells or other activities of the terrorists.”67 Such destruction for reasons other than
immediate military necessity is a violation of the laws of war.
A few kilometers further northwest of Qoshkaya, along the road to Dibis, Human Rights
Watch saw that isolated structures around the villages of Mar’i and ‘Amsha werecompletely destroyed, exhibiting similar signs of destruction as in Qarah Tappah, the Idris
villages, and Qoshkaya. Human Rights Watch found no villagers to interview about thecircumstances of destruction.

Western Arc from Maktab Khalid to Maryam Bek
Satellite imagery shows significant destruction consistent with accounts by residents in anarea resembling an arc from the major intersection at Maktab Khalid to al-Murra, Shahid,
Yarmuk and Maryam Bek, and comprising the villages of Abu Ka’uba and Nahrawan—all
Arab villages, some built during Saddam Hussein’s Arabization campaign in the mid-1980s.
Of these villages Human Rights Watch was only able to visit Maktab Khalid, which had
been entirely razed to the ground.

65 Human Rights Watch interviews with three villagers, Qoshkaya, May 20, 2016.
66 Dindar Zebari, head of High Committee to Evaluate and Respond to International Report, KRG, letter dated September 22,

2016.
67 Falah Mustafa Bakir, minister and head of KRG Department of Foreign Relations, letter dated September 22, 2016.

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Maktab Khalid
Battles to expel ISIS from Maktab Khalid took place starting on January 29, 2015, withfurther skirmishes in February and March 2015.68 Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that
ISIS attacked Maktab Khalid in February 2015 but did not occupy the village andPeshmerga forces retained control.69 Peshmerga repelled another ISIS attack in early July
2015, according to media reports.70 By November 24, 2015, when Human Rights Watch
visited, there was barely a stone standing, and Peshmerga fighters were sifting through the
rubble for valuables. Peshmerga pointed out large craters by the side of the road that theysaid came from coalition airstrikes, but similar craters were not visible in the formerly built
up areas north and south of the main road. Satellite images from the mornings of February
5 and February 14, 2015 show that the near complete destruction of the village occurred inthis nine-day period. Further satellite imagery shows that the commercial part of the village
south of the main road was destroyed between May 2015, and March 2016. In lateNovember 2015, Maktab Khalid was in a no-man’s land stretching several kilometers to thewest and just in front of Peshmerga defensive positions, Peshmerga officers told Human
Rights Watch.
The KRG in its response to Human Rights Watch about this area cited as causes ofdestruction “coalition airstrikes,” “clashes between Peshmerga forces and IS,” andvehicle-borne improvised explosive devices “detonated amidst … homes.” The response
said that in Maktab Khalid, ISIS planted more IEDs “than [in] any other village in the Kirkuk
governorate,” booby-trapping nearly all homes.
Human Rights Watch found that the destruction of Maktab Khalid mainly took place at atime when the area was under Peshmerga control. While air strikes and heavy ground68 “(By Video) Daesh Displays Peshmerga Prisoners in Iron Cages Near Kirkuk “[ ‫)ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻳﺩﻳﻭ( ﺩﺍﻋﺵ ﻳﻌﺭﺽ ﺃﺳﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺷﻣﺭﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ‬‫]ﺃﻗﻔﺎﺹ ﺣﺩﻳﺩﻳﺔ ﻗﺭﺏ ﻛﺭﻛﻭﻙ‬,” Qoraish.com, February 14, 2015, http://www.qoraish.com/qoraish/ (accessed April 29, 2016).

69 Human Rights Watch interview with villager from al-Murra, Kirkuk, December 3, 2015, and with another villager from al-

Murra, Kirkuk, May 20, 2015, and with a villager from Shahid, Kirkuk, May 20, 2015. See also: Mohammed A. Salih, “Kurds
and ISIL battle over Kirkuk. Desperate for a Victory, ISIL Sets its Eyes on Kirkuk Threatening the Core of Kurdish Heartland,”Aljazeera.com, February 5, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/kurds-isil-battle-kirkuk-150205055953557.html(accessed August 12, 2016), and a TV news segment filming a Peshmerga commander at Maktab Khalid saying thePeshmerga repelled ISIS’s offensive in the area after 10 hours to a maximum of one day: “Exclusive: Iraqi Peshmerga drive
ISIL out of Kirkuk’s Borders with Mosul, Tikrit,” February 9, 2015, PressTV.com,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eiFWheGNnC4 (accessed August 12, 2016).
70 “Peshmerga Forces Repel Daesh Attack From Several Axes Southwest of Kirkuk ( ‫ﻗﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺷﻣﺭﻛﺔ ﺗﺻﺩ ﻫﺟﻭﻣﺎ ً ﻟـ”ﺩﺍﻋﺵ” ﻣﻥ ﻋﺩﺓ ﻣﺣﺎﻭﺭ‬‫)ﺟﻧﻭﺏ ﻏﺭﺑﻲ ﻛﺭﻛﻭﻙ‬,” Altaghier.tv, July 6, 2015, http://altaghier.tv/2015/07/06/‫ﻉ‬-‫ﻣﻦ‬-‫ﻟـﺪﺍﻋﺶ‬-ً ‫ﻫﺠﻮﻣﺎ‬-‫ﺗﺼﺪ‬-‫ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺸﻤﺮﻛﺔ‬-‫ﻗﻮﺍﺕ‬/ (accessed
April 29, 2016).

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fighting could well account for destruction of a number of buildings, damage signatures forthe most part are consistent with demolition using high explosives and heavy machinery.
The KRG did not argue or provide evidence that imperative military necessity required
demolishing homes to detonate what the KRG states were ISIS-planted IEDs, thereby
destroying the entire village. The KRG response did not address why the Peshmerga did notcordon off the village and leave the IEDs in place and to be dismantled later.

Al-Murra, Shahid, and Nearby villages
In June 2014, ISIS took control of al-Murra, 4 kilometers southwest of Maktab Khalid.71
Peshmerga regained control in February 2015, a resident told Human Rights Watch.72 The
Institute for the Study of War, which monitors developments involving ISIS in Iraq, reported
that ISIS attacked Peshmerga forces in al-Murra on April 20, 2015.73 The seemingly
privately maintained Facebook page “News of the Peshmerga Heros” (‫)ﺍﺧﺒﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺸﻤﺮﻛﺔ ﺍﻻﺑﻄﺎﻝ‬reported Peshmerga forces in control of al-Murra on July 6, 2015, showing Peshmerga withbodies of ISIS fighters there.74 A resident of al-Murra said there had been a brief ISIS attack
on al-Murra in July 2015.75
This resident said he had stayed in the village while it was under ISIS control until late
September 2014. He said he then decamped to ISIS-controlled Garha village, between thetowns of Rashad and Riyadh, before returning to al-Murra after learning that Peshmerga

71 Human Rights Watch was unable to visit al-Murra, Shahid, Yarmuk, Abu Ka’ub, or Nahrawan due to security restrictions.
72 Human Rights Watch interview with villager from al-Murra, Kirkuk, December 3, 2015.
73 Institute for the Study of War,” Iraq Situation Report, April 18-20, 2015,” http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/
files/Iraq%20SITREP%202015-4-20%20-%20print_0.pdf (accessed August 3, 2016), and: Institute for the Study of War, “Iraq
Situation Report: July 2-6, 2015,” http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/iraq%20SITREP%202015-7-6.pdf(accessed August 3, 2016).
74 Post on July 6, 2015 to Facebook page “News of Peshmerga Heros (‫ ”)ﺍﺧﺒﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺸﻤﺮﻛﺔ ﺍﻻﺑﻄﺎﻝ‬displaying photos of what it

claimed were killed ISIS fighters in al-Murra. The text of the post is: “Exclusive photos … corpses of the dogs of hell #Daesh
the Kharajites of our age in the village of al-Murra and al-Humaira…Kirkuk Axis in the hands of the heroic Peshmerga forces(‫ ﺻﻮﺭ ﺣﺼﺮﻳﺔ‬.‫ﻣﺤﻮﺭ ﻛﺮﻛﻮﻙ ﺑﻴﺪ ﻗﻮﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺸﻤﺮﻛﺔ ﺍﻻﺑﻄﺎﻝ‬... ‫ﺻﺍﻋﺶ ﺧﻮﺍﺭﺝ ﺍﻟﻌﺼﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺮﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﺤﻤﻴﺮﺓ‬# ‫) ﺟﺜﺚ ﻛﻼﺏ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺭ‬,”https://www.facebook.com/%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B4%
D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-765431270160421/(accessed June 3, 2016). On the same day, July 6, the Facebook page Center for the News of Iraq (‫ )ﻣﺮﻛﺰ ﺍﺧﺒﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ‬posted avideo that purports to show Peshmerga driving military vehicles around Kirkuk city with the corpses of ISIS fighters killed thatday in al-Murra. The text of the post is: “#witness Kurdish Peshmerga forces display the corpses of members of the [Islamic]
state in the streets of Kirkuk after they entered the village of al-Murra (‫ﺷﺎﻫﺩ‬#)‫ﻗﻭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺑﻳﺷﻣﺭﻛﺔ ﺍﻟﻛﺭﺩﻳﺔ ﺗﺳﺗﻌﺭﺽ ﺑﺟﺛﺙ ﻋﻧﺎﺻﺭ ﻣﻥ ﺗﻧﻅﻳﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺷﻭﺍﺭﻉ ﻣﺩﻳﻧﺔ ﻛﺭﻛﻭﻙ ﺑﻌﺩ ﺩﺧﻭﻟﻬﻡ ﺍﻟﻰ ﻗﺭﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﺓ‬.),https://www.facebook.com/newsofiraq3/?fref=nf (accessed June 3, 2016).
75 Human Rights Watch interview with villager from al-Murra, Kirkuk, December 3, 2015.

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had captured the village in February 2015.76 He said that he found a portion of the houses
in al-Murra destroyed; he said he did not know by whom or how, but that ISIS had not
destroyed houses in the months he had stayed there.
Another villager from al-Murra gave Human Rights Watch a similar account. Before he leftthe village in December 2014, he said, there had been some shelling into al-Murra.77 On
May 4, 2015, he crossed from al-Aghair in ISIS-controlled territory to al-Murra, which he
had heard the Peshmerga had recaptured. He said that during the crossing with otherfamilies, two girls died from an IED, and others were injured, including five of his children.
He said he briefly went through the village, finding it largely intact, before taking hischildren to a hospital in Kirkuk. When he returned 10 days later to al-Murra, he said, hishouse was intact, albeit looted, with Peshmerga and Kirkuk police present in the village
blaming one another.78 The Peshmerga ordered him out of the village in late June 2015, hesaid, and he went to nearby Yarmuk. The Peshmerga repelled an ISIS attack in early July, aweek after he left, he said, and after that they brought bulldozers to demolish the village inthe presence of local police. The villager said his account was based on his own
observations and the account of a relative who was with the Peshmerga.79 He said thePeshmerga used explosives to destroy the mosque and school, as seen in a video he said
his relative had taken.80
The first villager from al-Murra also told Human Rights Watch that in July 2015 Peshmerga
warned him and other villagers to leave al-Murra due to an impending battle. ISIS briefly
retook al-Murra, he said, but Peshmerga drove them out again within five hours in one
night. He said he observed the battle from the vicinity of nearby Yarmuk. The villager said
he approached to within about a kilometer of al-Murra in the two weeks after the July battle
and could see people blowing up houses.81
Satellite images of al-Murra from May 20, 2015 indicate relatively little damage tostructures in the village. Images from November 12, 2015 show extensive destruction, with
76 Ibid.
77 Human Rights Watch interview with a second villager from al-Murra, Kirkuk, May 20, 2015.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Human Rights Watch received the video from the resident of al-Murra who said his relative was with the Peshmerga when

they blew up the local school.
81 Human Rights Watch interview with villager from al-Murra, Kirkuk, December 3, 2015.

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virtually all building structures reduced to rubble, consistent with the use of highexplosives and heavy machinery.
In its March 26, 2016 reply to Human Rights Watch, the KRG stated, “The village of Murah
is currently under the control of the IS terrorist network.” In May 2016, villagers from alMurra who said they were in touch with Peshmerga there told Human Rights Watch it wasthen under Peshmerga control, just outside a berm the Peshmerga had constructed.82
Satellite images show extensive building destruction occurring in Shahid between May 20
and November 12, 2015.83
The KRG’s September 2016 response does not directly address the question of whether
Peshmerga forces were responsible for the destruction in al-Murrra and al-Shahid, saying
only that the villages were “three kilometers away from the nearest Peshmerga forces
frontline position and thus do not constitute an area which is under the authority of thePeshmerga forces.”84 In his response, Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir said that “Kurdish
forces have withdrawn from these two villages by a distance of approximately 3 kilometers
and the destruction of houses inside these two villages is also directly related to the factthat the properties belonged to individuals who had joined the terrorists of the IslamicState and that those houses were being used by the terrorists with the aim ofstrengthening their presence in these villages.”85 This argument does not satisfy therequirement under the laws of war that to be lawful property destruction must meet a
concrete military objective (military necessity) and not be excessive or indiscriminate.
Satellite imagery also shows extensive building destruction occurring in Yarmuk, although
at a later period, between November 12, 2015 and January 24, 2016. The KRG, in its June
2016 response, stated that although Yarmuk was on the frontline, “the properties of[Yarmuk] have remained largely intact and were not subject to any damage.” According to82 Human Rights Watch interview with two villagers from al-Murra, Kirkuk, May 20, 2015.
83 Images from May 20, 2015 do not show destruction in Shahid, whereas images from November 12, 2015 show extensive

building destruction.
84 Dindar Zebari, head of High Committee to Evaluate and Respond to International Report, KRG, letter dated September 22,

2016.
85 Falah Mustafa Bakir, minister and head of KRG Department of Foreign Relations, letter dated September 22, 2016.

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the Institute for the Study of War, on June 11, 2015 Peshmerga forces repelled an attempt
by ISIS to set up positions in Wastana, a few kilometers south of Yarmuk.86
Villagers from al-Murra, Shahid, and Yarmuk told Human Rights Watch they briefly lived inor passed through Yarmuk and found it largely intact as of mid-July 2015.87
Two villages between Maktab Khalid and Maryam Bek, Nahrawan and Abu Ka’uba, show
extensive destruction in satellite imagery. Satellite imagery on May 20, 2015, indicates
extensive fire-related building destruction in Abu Ka’uba’s western part; imagery from
November 12, 2015, shows the entire village destroyed, and damage signatures consistent
with the use of high explosives and heavy machinery.
A villager from Shahid said that Abu Ka’uba, like Yarmuk, lies on the Peshmerga-controlledside of the berm the Peshmerga erected as the front line later in 2015. The villager claimed
that following ISIS attacks on Maktab Khalid in December 2014, Peshmerga had
demolished Nahrawan, one of the villages built under Saddam Hussein’s Arabization
campaign in the 1980s. Satellite imagery confirms that Abu Ka’uba, Yarmuk, andNahrawan are on the Peshmerga side of the berm, while Maktab Khalid, al-Murra andShahid lie just on the other side, but in an area defensively controlled by the Peshmerga.
In its response to Human Rights Watch, the KRG wrote, without giving dates, that thedestruction in Nahrwan was the result of heavy coalition airstrikes, which satellite imagery
also shows, and IEDs planted by ISIS. The response does not address how or why the IEDs
were set off. The KRG response asserted that Peshmerga in the village stopped people
from neighboring villages from destroying homes in Nahrawan.

86

Institute for the Study of War,” Iraq Situation Report, June 11-12, 2015,”
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/iraq%20SITREP%202015-6-12.pdf (accessed August 3, 2016).
87 Human Rights Watch interview in Kirkuk with two villagers from al-Murra, December 3, 2015, and May 20, 2016, twovillagers from Shahid, November 24, 2015 and May 20, 2016, and one villager from Yarmuk, November 24, 2015.

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Cluster of Three Villages Between Taza and Daquq
The Arab villages of Sa’d and Khalid are located 2 kilometers west of the Kirkuk-Tuz
Khurmatu highway at about mid-point between Taza and Daquq. Wahda, a third village,
lies almost directly west of this main road, 2 kilometers further south.
Villagers from the three villages told Human Rights Watch that they stayed a few months
after June 2014 under ISIS but left before an impending battle with Peshmerga in late
September 2014.88 According to two of the villagers, ISIS confiscated private cars, livestock,and some tractors but were otherwise not present inside the village, controlling it from theoutskirts.89 Before the September battle, ISIS shelled the area, killing 15 people andwounding 33 including local Arab fighters defending the village as well as civilians. Whenthe villagers left, they said, all the houses were largely intact.90
ISIS fended off the Peshmerga in September 2014 but five months later, in mid-March 2015,
Peshmerga recaptured the area, including the three villages. The Institute for the Study ofWar, a Washington-based military affairs research institute, quoted Wasta Rasul, thecommanding Peshmerga officer for the region, as saying that on March 9, 2015, “thePeshmerga launched an operation to clear the Tel al-Ward area, the Maktab Khaled area,
and Wahda village, southwest of Kirkuk city.”91 The institute earlier reported on February 10
that “coalition airstrikes targeted ISIS gatherings and a headquarters in the [three]villages,” adding that Peshmerga also fired artillery and mortars into the area.92
Villagers told Human Rights Watch that the Peshmerga took three of them back to thevillages as local guides. One of the three told Human Rights Watch that apart from some88 Human Rights Watch interviews with 18 villagers from Wahda, Khalid, and Sa’id, in ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, December 2,

2015.
89 Human Rights Watch interviews with two villagers from Wahda and Khalid, in ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, December 2, 2015.
90 Human Rights Watch interviews with about 15 villagers from Wahda, Khalid, and Sa’id, in ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, December

2, 2015.
91 Institute for the Study of War, “Iraq Situation Report, March 9, 2015,” http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/

files/Iraq%20SITREP%202015-3-9_approved.pdf (accessed April 29, 2016). See also reports on March 10, 2015, in which
Wasta Rasul says that Peshmerga rebuffed an ISIS attack on Maktab Khalid attack and retook Tel al-Ward and Wahda.
“Report Reveals the Situation of Iraq on March 9, 2015 (2015 ‫ ﻣﺎﺭﺱ‬/‫ ﺍﺫﺍﺭ‬9 ‫)ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﻳﻜﺸﻒ ﺍﻭﺿﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ ﻓﻲ ﻳﻮﻡ‬,” Rawabet
Center for Research and Strategic Studies, March 10, 2015, http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/4753 (accessed June 13,2016).
92 Institute for the Study of War, “Iraq Situation Report, February 10-11, 2015,” http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/

default/files/Iraq%20SITREP%202015-2-10-11_V3.pdf (accessed October 6, 2016).

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damage from shells and bullets, Wahda’s houses were standing when the Peshmerga
took over.93
After village elders met with Aso Mamand, the Kirkuk head of the PUK, the dominantKurdish party in the area, villagers said, he briefly allowed them back to their homes, twodays after the battle. In Wahda, one villager said, almost all houses were burned, but not
destroyed, with all belongings gone. Another villager said that when he returned two days
after the battle to Sa’d, his house was still smoldering, the entire village burned down, andseven houses demolished. The one villager who accompanied the Peshmerga said he hadseen most belongings in place and no fires immediately after Peshmerga had driven ISIS
from Sa’d and Wahda. Satellite imagery shows evidence of fire-related damages to amajority of buildings in the three villages occurring between February 14, 2015 and April 5,2016.94 Based on accounts by local residents, diplomats, humanitarian workers and thePeshmerga, the US-based website Foreign Policy in July 2015 reported from Wahda that,consistent with the account villagers gave to Human Rights Watch, most homes were intact
and belongings in place when the local scouts accompanied the Peshmerga into thevillage in mid-March 2015.95 Several days later, according to a village elder, “ThePeshmerga … entered the village [and] brought a Kurdish mafia specialized in taking
everything – wiring, washing machines, everything we owned.”96
The KRG response stated that coalition airstrikes and “Katyusha rockets, large mortar
rounds, and artillery” caused destruction in Wahda and Khalid, and that ISIS boobytrapped homes there. The response did not address destruction in Sa’d, or allegations oflooting and arson in all three villages.

93 Human Rights Watch interview with villager from Khalid, ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, December 2, 2015.
94 The determination of fire as the probable source of damage identified from satellite imagery is normally made at the levelof individual buildings, each evaluated separately based on the relative presence (or absence) of a set of usually distinct
signatures including, for example: the presence of intact, load-bearing walls with a collapsed rooftop, the presence of fireburn scars on or immediately adjacent to the property, and destroyed adjacent tree/vegetation cover, along with the absenceof significant debris fields external to the building foundation. When possible, this is corroborated with thermal anomaly
data collected by environmental satellite sensors, which can generally locate the presence of active fires to within one
square kilometer.
95 Satellite imagery shows a large number of buildings in Judaida and Jididi, two villages five kilometers north of Wahda,

destroyed by fire, and an active fire on the morning of February 1, 2016, and Judaida’s main mosque demolished with highexplosives between February 1, and April 5, 2016.
96 Sara Elizabeth Williams, “Destroying Homes for Kurdistan,” Foreign Policy, July 23, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/

2015/07/23/peshmerga-war-crimes-ethnic-cleansing-islamic-state-iraq/ (accessed May 2, 2016).

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Destruction in Al-Bu Muhammad in September 2015. ©2015 Human Rights Watch

Southwest of Daquq
On December 2, 2015, Human Rights Watch researchers accompanied Peshmerga to thefrontline at Al-Bu Muhammad, 12 kilometers southwest of Daquq. The Peshmerga were
finishing construction of a berm just west of Al-Bu Muhammad. A Peshmerga colonel told
Human Rights Watch that ISIS had heavily mined the village, which Peshmerga had
retaken in August, and that they exploded ISIS’s IEDs remotely.97
Human Rights Watch found the small, mostly Arab village entirely destroyed, with only
some mudbrick walls still standing and few roofs intact. The village was devoid ofhousehold items or other belongings.

97 Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Ibrahim, Al-Bu Muhammad, December 2, 2015, and “Kurdish Socialist Party

leader and Peshmerga commander wounded in Kirkuk offensive,” Ekurd Daily, September 11, 2015,
http://ekurd.net/kurdish-socialist-party-leader-wounded-kirkuk-2015-09-11 (accessed May 2, 2016), and Arina Moradi,“Kurdistan: Battle-tested Kakai Battalion Begs to Retake Villages,” Rudaw, August 24, 2015,
http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/240820153 (accessed May 2, 2016).

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Pointing northwest from an outpost on the front line, Peshmerga fighters said that thethree villages of Lower and Upper Dilis and Tel Rabi’, now in a no-man’s land defensively
controlled by the Peshmerga, were also destroyed as a result of airstrikes and Peshmerga
detonation of ISIS-planted IEDs.98 Satellite imagery of the villages shows them almost
completely razed by methods not solely attributable to airstrikes.

98 Human Rights Watch interviews with Colonel Ibrahim and two other Peshmerga, Dilis frontline, December 2, 2015.

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A senior Arab community leader in Kirkuk governorate told Human Rights Watch that alarge number of villages were destroyed, starting from Dibis area to Daquq, including Al-Bu
Muhammad, ‘Atshana, al-‘Azairiyya, al-Murra. He said his community accepted that somedestruction was inherent in the military conflict, and they wanted to prevent ISIS fromusing them, but that some village destruction was for what he said were “other reasons,”
namely, to prevent Arabs from returning.99

Nineveh Governorate
In Nineveh governorate, Peshmerga recaptured the area between Sinjar mountain and Mosul
Lake from ISIS between late August and December 2014. Peshmerga established control
over Zummar subdistrict from the Syrian border in the west up to, but not including, Zummar
town in the east, by early September 2014. Control over Zummar town changed back andforth between ISIS and the Peshmerga, who took and finally held it in late October 2014.
Since early 2015, the recaptured territories have remained largely free of incidents.100
In December 2014, Human Rights Watch documented the destruction of large numbers of
Arab homes, and in some cases entire Arab villages, in areas in Nineveh’s Zummar
subdistrict that at the time of our visit were under Peshmerga control. Human Rights Watch
published these findings in February 2015, including statements by Peshmerga andAsayish officials claiming that such destruction occurred during battles, including bycoalition airstrikes and ISIS forces.101
Information Human Rights Watch subsequently obtained in July and August 2015 indicatesthat Peshmerga and Asayish forces were responsible for destruction in the days, weeks,
and months following their recapture from ISIS, in particular in three villages in Zummar
subdistrict that Human Rights Watch visited: Sheikhan, Hamad Agha, and Barzan, and also
in the town of Bardiya.
An analysis of satellite imagery from various points in 2014 and 2015 shows that, in
addition to the initial destruction Human Rights Watch documented in December 2014,
99 Human Rights Watch interview with Arab community leader, Kirkuk, November 24, 2015.
100 The Institute for the Study of War, which has continually tracked reported battles with ISIS, includes no references toclashes between Peshmerga and ISIS forces in 2015 and 2016 in the areas under consideration.
101 “Iraqi Kurdistan: Arabs Displaced, Cordoned Off, Detained,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 25, 2015,

https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/25/iraqi-kurdistan-arabs-displaced-cordoned-detained.

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significant additional destruction occurred in early 2015, at a time when the area was not
an active battlefield. A Human Rights Watch visit to the area in August 2015 foundevidence corroborating this.
Only a few days after ISIS swept through the Nineveh Plains in the first days of August 2014
and routed Peshmerga from Sinjar and other towns, Kurdish forces launched acounterattack, moving along the southern shores of Mosul Lake southeastward.102 The area
has a mixed population of Arabs and Kurds, as well as some Yezidis.103

102 “After Peshmerga Control of Zumar, Civilians to Return Home,” ARANews, September 5, 2014,
http://aranews.net/2014/09/peshmerga-control-zumar-civilians-return-home/ (accessed July 11, 2016).
103 Diplomatic Cable from Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq, “Article 140: Ninewa Faces Serious Downside Risks From

Encroaching ‘Green Line’,” to US Secretary of State, August 23, 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/
07BAGHDAD2827_a.html (accessed May 12, 2016), and more generally: Human Rights Watch, Iraq--On Vulnerable Ground.
Violence against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territories, November 10, 2009.

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60During a visit on August 2, 2015, driving along the border with Syria, from Peshabor in thenorth to just above Sunune, by Sinjar mountain, in the south, Human Rights Watch saw
scenes of destruction line the road. The subdistrict capital of Rabi’a showed signs ofintense fighting in the town—even the minarets bore signs of bullet holes. The stretch ofroad south from Rabi’a was lined with destroyed isolated homes and entire villages. In one
village about 30 kilometers south of Rabi’a, no destruction was visible; local residents told
Human Rights Watch that this was a Kurdish village.104
Kurdish forces recaptured Rabi’a town in early October 2014 and Sunune, further south, inlate December 2014.105
Allegations of Peshmerga destruction of homes after the battle, in violation of the laws ofwar, surfaced almost immediately.106 A journalist who interviewed Arab and Kurdish
villagers, as well as Peshmerga, documented destruction of Arab homes in Sheikhan,
nearby Umar Khalid, and Barzan in September 2014. His interlocutors acknowledged that
Peshmerga and Kurdish civilians burned down, looted, and destroyed homes in revenge.107

Zummar Subdistrict
In August 2015, Human Rights Watch met five Kurdish farmers from the intact Kurdish
village of Kani Azeir (Ewes). They said they were farming fields of Arab villagers from
Sheikhan, about 2 kilometers to the west, and that the Arab owners had left with ISIS to
Mosul after the Peshmerga retook the village in late August 2014.108 They said that ISIS had
destroyed some structures in Sheikhan in the three weeks of its presence there in August
2014 but that they, along with other Kurdish farmers from surrounding areas and104 Human Rights Watch interview with three residents in a village 30 kilometers south of Rabi’a on the border highway,

August 2, 2015. The villagers did not tell Human Rights Watch the name of their village, only that it was Kurdish.
105 Richard Spencer, “Isil Jihadists Driven out of Rabia after Two-Day Siege,” The Telegraph, October 2, 2014,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11137455/Isil-jihadists-driven-out-of-Rabia-after-two-daysiege.html (accessed July 11, 2016), and “Sinjar Battle: Kurds 'Take Control' of Large Area from IS,” BBC News, December 21,
2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30569313 (accessed July 11, 2016).
106 On September 24, 2014, Abd al-Rahman al-Luwaizi, a member of Iraq’s parliament for Nineveh governorate, alleged that
Peshmerga were “destroying houses and government schools” in the Zummar subdistrict. Institute for the Study of War, “Iraq
Situation Report, September 23-24, 2014,” http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2014-0924%20Situation%20Report.pdf (accessed June 13, 2016).
107 Martin Bader, “Kurden brennen Dorf nieder. Rache an sunnitischen Arabern (Kurds Burn Down Villages. Revenge on Sunni

Arabs),“ Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 13, 2014, http://www.nzz.ch/international/naher-osten-und-nordafrika/rache-ansunnitischen-arabern-1.18402498 (accessed May 2, 2016).
108 Human Rights Watch interviews with five Kurdish farmers, Ewes, August 3, 2015.

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Peshmerga forces, burned homes and demolished the town of Sheikhan after thePeshmerga retook it in late August 2014.109
The Institute for the Study of War reported on August 22, 2014, the beginning of aPeshmerga offensive, supported by US-led coalition airstrikes, in Zummar district.110
Human Rights Watch visited Sheikhan, in Zummar subdistrict, on August 3, 2015, andfound that almost no structure remained intact, with the exception of a green mosque.
The KRG response to Human Rights Watch regarding Nineveh governorate stated that, “inthe village of Sheikhan, which is located on the frontline, half of the properties weredestroyed due to the exchange of fire (170 houses, 85 of which were destroyed) … due toartillery and mortar strikes.”

109 Ibid.
110 Institute for the Study of War, “Iraq Situation Report, August 22, 2014”

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2014-08-22%20Situation%20Report.pdf (accessed June 13, 2016).

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Torched and demolished houses in Sheikhan with graffiti on destroyed wall “long live the Peshmerga.”©2015 Human Rights Watch

Based on the analysis of satellite imagery, Human Rights Watch found evidence of limitedbuilding damage in Sheikhan consistent with the exchange of heavy ground fire occurring
before September 7, 2014. Human Rights Watch also found evidence in satellite imagery
that the majority of building destruction in Sheikhan was likely caused not by groundfighting but rather the use of fire, heavy machinery and high explosives. Building
destruction started sometime after September 7, 2014, and accelerated between
November 5, 2014 and March 21, 2015. This period, in which Peshmerga controlled
Sheikhan, accounts for over half of all building destruction. Demolition continued in 2015
with over 30 buildings destroyed between April 22 and October 9, 2015.

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In Hamad Agha (also referred to as Tell Hamad Agha or Ahmad Agha), 3 kilometers south ofKani Azeir, a Kurdish police officer told Human Rights Watch on August 3, 2015 that he had
volunteered with the Peshmerga to recapture villages and towns from ISIS. He said hejoined Peshmerga and local civilian Kurds and Yezidis in demolishing Sheikhan.111
Hamad Agha itself, just inside Rabi’a subdistrict, has a Kurdish part along the main road(in some maps, this is part of Ewes) and an Arab part further south. When Human Rights
Watch visited on August 3, 2015, the Kurdish part was intact while the Arab part wasdestroyed. The policeman told Human Rights Watch that he participated with Peshmerga indemolishing the Arab part of Hamad Agha, a short distance south, away from the mainroad, where Human Rights Watch could clearly see the destroyed houses.112 Satellite
imagery analysis shows 177 destroyed buildings in Hamad Agha, representing over 98
percent of the village. The majority of buildings were likely demolished with heavymachinery or burned down between June 7 and September 7, 2014. Building demolition
continued with the remaining larger building structures likely demolished with highexplosives around November 5, 2014.
The KRG response to Human Rights Watch’s findings stated that in “the village of Hamad
Agha … 120 houses were destroyed … due to artillery and mortar strikes.”
The KRG March 2016 response to Human Rights Watch noted that Bardiya, a town 8
kilometers east of Hamad Agha, in Zummar subdistrict, “and its surrounding areas, ispopulated by Kurdish villagers (the Hasini tribe to be precise) and has no Arab
population.” Human Rights Watch visited Bardiya on August 3, 2015, and met with Kurdish
residents and officials and one Sunni Arab policeman from a nearby village. The Kurdish
residents said that they had lived side-by-side with their Sunni Arab neighbors for years
without incident, and could not believe some of them joined ISIS.113 While Human Rights
Watch cannot say what portion of Bardiya’s residents are Sunni Arab, local residents
indicated that Sunni Arabs lived among them.

111 Human Rights Watch interview with Kurdish policeman, Hamad Agha, August 3, 2015.
112 Ibid.
113 Human Rights Watch interviews with three Kurdish residents of Bardiya, Bardiya, August 3, 2015.

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Chicken farm of local ISIS leader who allegedly killed 24 Yezidis close to the farm on Mosul Lake,
destroyed by what local residents said were Peshmerga. ©2015 Human Rights Watch

A short distance from Bardiya, near a water pumping station, there is a chicken farmbelonging to a local Sunni Arab man who Kurdish residents and Sunni Arab engineers at
the pumping station said had become the local chief of ISIS and was responsible forsummarily executing a Yezidi family who worked for him.114 Locals said Peshmerga forces
destroyed the chicken farm with explosives.
Right behind the offices of the KDP in Bardiya is an open area with the adjacent houses
destroyed. Officials and residents said that ISIS destroyed about 10 houses in the town
belonging to Kurdish security officers in the three or four weeks they were in Bardiya in
August and September 2014.115

114 Human Rights Watch interviews with three people living in the compound of the pumping station near Bardiya, August 3,

2015.
115 Human Rights Watch interview with Kurdish Democratic Party leader; shopkeeper; and residents of the pumping station

compound, Bardiya, August 3, 2015.

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68Arab houses allegedly destroyed by Peshmerga and Kurds in Bardiya. ©2015 Human Rights Watch

A Kurdish shopkeeper told Human Rights Watch that he advanced with the Peshmerga asa volunteer in late August 2014 but stopped at Bardiya. There, he said, he and fellow
Kurdish civilians together with Peshmerga and Asayish forces destroyed the houses ofArab villagers “because they were Daesh.” “Some of them had been my neighbors foryears,” he said. The shopkeeper said that all Kurds fled the town when ISIS came, and all
Arabs left when the Peshmerga came.116 About 15 displaced people from a nearby village
squatting on the outskirts of Bardiya told Human Rights Watch that they saw Peshmerga
and Kurdish civilians destroy houses in Bardiya; they said that the Kurdish civilians told
them they had come from Erbil and Sulaimaniya to Bardiya, where they once had homes
before Arabs moved in as part of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s Arabization
campaign.117

116 Human Rights Watch interview with shopkeeper, Bardiya, August 3, 2015.
117 Human Rights Watch interview with about 15 people displaced form Barzan, Bardiya, August 3, 2015.

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The KRG in a June 5, 2016 email message wrote that in Bardiya, “83 houses were destroyedby airstrikes.”118 The June 30 KRG response to Human Rights Watch does not address
building destruction in Bardiya.
During a December 2014 visit to Zummar subdistrict, Human Rights Watch found that walls
near some destroyed homes were spray-painted with anti-Arab slogans. Only Kurds had
resettled there since the Peshmerga had routed ISIS by October 2014, and many homes in
the Arab quarter bore signs of having been torched. Graffiti on one wall read “Endowmentof Islamic State” in Arabic, with the words “Islamic State” crossed out and replaced with
“Kurds.” Several residents pointed to the ruins of one home and said they saw Peshmerga
bulldoze it because it had belonged to an alleged Sunni Arab ISIS collaborator. Some
Kurdish residents said that they saw local Kurds destroy Arab homes in Bardiya, Sheikhan,
and Barzan upon their return, while others said they saw Peshmerga do it.119
Satellite images from between June 2014, and March 2016, show three distinct areas ofdestruction in Bardiya, with overall 365 buildings destroyed, the overwhelming majority
after January 2015, by which time the Peshmerga had firmly established control. By late
October 2014, Peshmerga forces had taken the town of Zummar, 20 kilometers south ofBardiya.120 Human Rights Watch is not aware of ISIS attacks on areas north of Zummar after
this date. Satellite images taken between January and December 2015, show destruction ofover 200 buildings in Bardiya during this period.

118 Human Rights Watch email communication with Dindar Zebari, June 5, 2016.
119 “Iraqi Kurdistan: Arabs Displaced, Cordoned Off, Detained,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 25, 2015,

https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/25/iraqi-kurdistan-arabs-displaced-cordoned-detained.
120 Institute for the Study of War, “Iraq Situation Report: October 25-26, 2014,”

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2014-10-26%20Situation%20Report_0.pdf (accessed June 13, 2016).

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Destruction in Barzan. ©2015 Human Rights Watch

In a fourth village, Barzan, 6 kilometers southeast of Bardiya, Human Rights Watch inAugust 2015 found a scene of utter destruction. Hardly a standing structure remained.
Peshmerga guards were stationed at both ends of the village.
Villagers displaced from Barzan told Human Rights Watch on August 3, 2015 that there had
been one airstrike while ISIS occupied it, targeting a checkpoint at Ain Faras, 3 kilometers
south of the village, killing an ISIS guard.121 ISIS also destroyed a few houses of security
officials in Barzan, they said, and Peshmerga artillery shelling caused minor damage to
one house. The villagers said they were able to go to nearby Sumud, 5 kilometers to theeast, as Peshmerga moved in, and that they stayed there while the Peshmerga retook
Barzan. They said they saw Peshmerga in Barzan when they approached the checkpoint
just outside the village on the road to Bardiya.122

121 Human Rights Watch interview with about 15 villagers displaced form Barzan, Bardiya, August 3, 2015.
122 Human Rights Watch interview with about 15 villagers displaced form Barzan, Bardiya, August 3, 2015.

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They said that after Peshmerga recaptured Barzan, no other forces entered the village, butevery day for several weeks they heard explosions from their village, at least three per day,and one day as many as 27 explosions. From Sumud and the checkpoint, they said, theysaw flames and smoke from burning houses. They said that they did not see airstrikes inthat period.123
The KRG response to Human Rights Watch stated that “[a] large majority of properties inthe village were subject to arson attacks by large groups of Yazidis in retaliation for [theresidents’] participation in the mass-killing of Yazidis.” The response says the Peshmerga
efforts to stop the arson failed because “the sheer number of Yazidi residents proved too
overwhelming.” Regarding building destruction, the KRG wrote that “523 homes weredestroyed in Barzanke village, including those that were subject to IS IEDs,” leaving open
who carried out the destruction. The reasons for “targeting” Barzan “particularly severely”
was its role as the “epicentre of the IS groups support base … as well as a recruitment hub
for IS fighters and IS commanders [and it being the home to] many of the perpetrators ofthe mass-killing of Yazidis.” This argument does not satisfy the requirement under thelaws of war that to be lawful property destruction must meet a concrete military objective(military necessity) and not be excessive or indiscriminate.
Satellite images indicate that at least a quarter of the destruction in Barzan occurred afterNovember 5, 2014, when no skirmishes occurred in or around the village and it was underPeshmerga control.124

123 Ibid.
124 On September 3, 2014, Barzan was under Peshmerga control: Nabih Bulos, “Iraqi Kurds, Buoyed by U.S. airstrikes, EyeMore Sunni Arab Towns,” Los Angeles Times, September 3, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraqbarazan-20140904-story.html (accessed July 11, 2016), and it remained so. Human Rights Watch interview with Hasan Khalu,
head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in nearby Bardiya, August 3, 2015. See also: Richard Spencer, “Ghost Villages In
Northern Iraq Ripped Apart by ISIL Jihadists,” The Daily Telegraph, October 5, 2014,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11142115/Ghost-villages-of-northern-Iraq-ripped-apart-byIsil-jihadists.html (accessed July 11, 2016), and Donatella Rovera, “Revenge Time in Barzan,” @DRovera, October29, 2014,
https://twitter.com/drovera/status/527589137596289026 (accessed July 11, 2016), and a December 2014 visit by Human
Rights Watch: “Iraqi Kurdistan: Arabs Displaced, Cordoned Off, Detained,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 25,
2015.

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The proximity of the intact Kurdish-inhabited villages of Ewes and Hamad Agha as well aslarge parts of Bardiya to destroyed Sunni Arab-inhabited Sheikhan, Hamad Agha and partsof Bardiya do not support the claim that ISIS was responsible for the systematic
destruction of these locations. The fact that the vast majority of the destruction seen insatellite images occurred after the Peshmerga had taken control with damage signaturesconsistent with the use of fire and heavy machinery in addition to high explosives does notsupport the claim that airstrikes or shelling primarily caused the destruction. The KRG
provided no explanation why setting off ISIS-planted IEDs in Barzan constituted animperative military necessity at a time when its forces were in control of the area.
According to the US Department of Defense, US airstrikes against ISIS between earlyAugust and mid-September 2014 “near Mosul Dam” hit 10 fighting positions, 3 mortar
positions, 3 machine gun positions, 3 buildings, and 10 IED emplacements, in addition tovehicles and checkpoints. The roughly thirty strikes are insufficient to account for thedestruction of several entire villages, and witnesses reported only a few airstrikes on
Barzan village.125

125 U.S. Department of Defense, Operation Inherent Resolve. Targeted Operations Against ISIL Terrorists,

http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve (accessed February 25, 2016).

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III. Legal Standards
International humanitarian law—the laws of war—governs the conduct of hostilities inarmed conflicts as does international human rights law, which applies at all times.
The rules concerning the methods and means of warfare are primarily found in the First
Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I).126 Most of the First
Protocol’s provisions are considered reflective of customary international law applicable tonon-international armed conflicts.127
Central to the laws of war is the principle of distinction, which requires parties to a conflictto distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians. Warring parties may direct
operations only against combatants and other military objectives; civilians and civilian
objects may not be the target of attack or reprisal.128 Civilian objects are all objects that are
not military objectives. Military objectives are those objects that “by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers adefinite military advantage.” Civilian objects remain protected from attack except during
the time they are military objectives.129
Parties to a conflict must take care to spare the civilian population and civilian objects
from the effects of hostilities.130 They are required to take precautionary measures with a

126 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force December 7, 1978. Iraq became aparty to Protocol I in 2010. The “means” of combat generally refer to the weapons used, while “methods” refer to the mannerin which such weapons are used.
127 See, for example, Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 11 Dinstein states, “Much of the Protocol may be regarded as declaratory of customaryinternational law, or at least as non-controversial.”. See, ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law.
128 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 1, Protocol I, art. 48. According to ICRC, Commentary on the

Additional Protocols, “The basic rule of protection and distinction is confirmed in this article. It is the foundation on which
the codification of the laws and customs of war rests.” Ibid., p. 598. http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-57524f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf (accessed October 6, 2016).
129 Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), it is a war crime to intentionally direct attacks

against civilian objects, except during the time they are military objectives. ICC Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(ii).
130 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 15, Protocol I, art. 57(1).

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view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury tocivilians, and damage to civilian objects.131
The laws of war prohibit the destruction or seizure of the property of an adversary, unlessrequired by imperative military necessity.132 The International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), in its Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 1977, defines military necessity as“the necessity for measures which are essential to attain the goals of war, and which arelawful in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”133
The laws of war also prohibit attacks which are indiscriminate – that is, attacks that are
not directed at a specific military objective. Article 51 (5)(a) states that indiscriminate
attacks would include “an attack by bombardment by any method or means which treats
as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives
located in a city, town, village, or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians
or civilian objects.”
Human Rights Watch found in the cases detailed in this report that the destruction ofproperty by Peshmerga forces, in some cases together with Asayish internal security forces
and Kurdish civilians, was extensive and in apparent violation of the prohibition against
destruction of civilian objects. There was no evidence that the destruction, especially in its
completeness in many cases, met the requirements for imperative military necessity, if
indeed some civilian buildings had been military objectives at the time of their destruction
and the destruction at the time offered a definite military advantage.
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are activated by the presence, proximity or
contact with a person fall under the definition of an antipersonnel landmine. The 1997
Mine Ban Treaty, to which Iraq is a state party, prohibits the use of antipersonnel
landmines under any circumstances. There are several reasons why the KRG argument thatits forces had to demolish buildings due to IEDs does not make such demolition lawful.
(The KRG explicitly makes such an argument only for one location, Idris Khaz’al, where

131 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Protocol I, art. 57(2).
132 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 50 Rome Statute of the ICC, art. 8(2)(e)(12).
133 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p. 393. The “four foundations” of military necessity, according to the ICRC,

include “urgency, measures which are limited to the indispensable, the control (in space and time) of the force used, and themeans which should not infringe on an unconditional prohibition.” Ibid., paragraph 1396.

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there is no indication that ISIS planted IEDs. Elsewhere the KRG refers merely to IEDs
having caused destruction, without specifying how or why this occurred). First, theargument does not address the fact that in several locations only Arab and not adjacentKurdish properties were destroyed, while in other locations there were no IEDs planted inbuildings that were destroyed. In Nineveh governorate, demolished Arab parts of Bardiya
were next to intact Kurdish parts, and the intact Kurdish part of Hamad Agha village (Ewes)
next to the demolished Arab part, and to demolished Arab Sheikhan, a short distanceaway. In Kirkuk governorate, KRG security forces demolished buildings in Qoshkaya, Qarah
Tappah and Idris Hindiya Qadima, places that ISIS never captured and that therefore did
not suffer damage during battles and were not riddled with ISIS-planted booby-traps. (InQoshkaya and Qarah Tappah it appears that the demolitions may have been carried out in
retaliation for the owners having allegedly joined ISIS; attacks against civilian objects inretaliation and in the absence of military necessity are prohibited.) In Idris Khaz’al andIdris Khubbaz, Kurdish security forces used bulldozers to destroy homes, which is not asafe way to clear booby-traps, if there were any. Satellite images show arson in multiple
villages in Nineveh, also not an effective mine clearance method. In some places ofbuilding demolition, belongings were looted, undermining the claim that destruction was
the only way to dispose of the IEDs.
Second, for removal of IEDs through explosion to be lawful, the KRG would have to show
imperative military necessity, but it has made no such argument. To the contrary, KRG
forces for weeks and months apparently left IEDs in place, if there were any, as building
demolition occurred weeks or months after ISIS had been defeated in a certain location.
This leaves unanswered the question why Peshmerga could not have left IEDs there longer
until competent demining teams arrived. Peshmerga commanders also said they lacked
demining expertise and IEDs had caused many casualties. Again, cordoning off minedvillages would have been safer than remotely detonating IEDs, which causes the dispersalof unseen explosives, making the area generally unsafe and complicating future efforts toremove explosive remnants of war, which the KRG stated it is conducting.
Serious violations of the laws of war committed with criminal intent are war crimes. War
crimes include “[d]estroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such

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78

destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict,”134 andcollective punishment, defined as the imposition of sanctions or harassment on the basisof collective rather than individual responsibility.135
Under the laws of war, states have a duty to investigate war crimes allegedly committed bymembers of their armed forces and other persons within their jurisdiction. Individuals may
be held criminally liable for attempting to commit a war crime, as well as assisting in,facilitating, or aiding and abetting a war crime. Responsibility also may fall on persons
who plan or instigate the commission of war crimes.136 Commanders and civilian leaders
may be prosecuted for war crimes or crimes against humanity as a matter of command
responsibility when they knew or should have known about the commission of war crimes
and took insufficient measures to prevent them or punish those responsible.137
Those found to be responsible should be fairly prosecuted before courts that meetinternational fair trial standards.138 The laws of war also require a state to make full
reparations to victims of laws-of-war violations.139
The Pinheiro Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced
Persons include the right to restitution or compensation for property of which they were
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived (Principles 1 and 21), non-discrimination based onreligion, race or language (Principle 3), the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s
possessions (Principle 7), the right to freedom of movement (Principle 9), and the right tobe protected against arbitrary displacement (Principle 5).140

134 158 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 156, citing ICC Statute, art. 8(2)(e)(xii). This offense during
international armed conflicts is referred to as “wanton destruction,” described in the Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 147, as
the “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully andwantonly.”
135 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 156, citing Protocol II, art. 4.
136 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rules 151-152.
137 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 153, citing ICC Statute, art. 28.
138 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 158, citing the Geneva Conventions and the ICC Statute.
139 See ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 150.
140 See: Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons. Implementing the ‘Pinheiro Principles’, FAO,
IDMC, OCHA, OHCHR, UN-Habitat, and UNHCR, March 2007,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/pinheiro_principles.pdf (accessed May 8, 2016).

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Acknowledgements
A researcher in the Middle East and North Africa division of Human Rights Watch
researched and wrote this report. Letta Tayler, senior terrorism and counterterrorism
researcher at Human Rights Watch also conducted research reflected in this report.
Josh Lyons, satellite imagery analyst at Human Rights Watch, provided analysis andsatellite images to the report. Sarah Leah Whitson and Joe Stork, executive director anddeputy director in the Middle East and North Africa division, and Tom Porteous, deputy
program director, edited the report. Clive Baldwin, senior legal advisor, provided legal
review. Middle East and North Africa division senior associate Sarkis Balkhian provided
production and proofreading assistance.
Olivia Hunter, publications and photography associate, Fitzroy Hepkins, administrative
manager, and Jose Martinez, senior coordinator, prepared the report for publication.
Human Rights Watch sincerely thanks all the individuals who shared their knowledge andexperience, without which this report would have been impossible. In many cases
individuals provided us information personal risk and in extremely difficult circumstances.

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80Annex I: Official Decree by President of theKurdistan Region
The Kurdistan Region and its governing authorities attach great importance to the mattersof human rights and humanitarian law, especially in the current wartime phase. Thus, allavailable measures are employed in order to ensure any violations of these principles areprevented. To this end, Kurdistan Region, the Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani
has himself passed a decree in March 2016 which outlaws any alienated instances where
human rights and humanitarian law is not fulfilled.
This decree is testament to how seriously the Kurdistan Region views the matter of good
governance and the observance of human rights., even during periods of conflict within
this decree, a number of matters are outlined which are also relevant to some of thematters discussed in the memorandum, and are thus important to be brought to theattention of the Human Rights Watch. Below is a translated version of the presidential
decree:Order Number (3) – March 2016
Based on the amended “Kurdistan Region Presidency Act Number 1 of 2006”, and in lightof the current realities in the Kurdistan Region, including the full-scale war against theIslamic State terrorist organization, and maintaining the reputation and great
achievements of the Peshmerga forces in the international community, by this order, it isand obligation for all Peshmerga commanders and officers to observe and abide by thefollowing regulations.
1. Reiterating our commitment to order number 120, dated on the 21st August 2014,
which was relayed to the Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior,
Ministry of Peshmerga, and other relevant entities, to maintain the excellent
reputation of the Peshmerga forces and to protect civilians during the war against
IS by defending their lives and operating through good treatment.

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2. In all possible situations, civilians should be protected from any threat on theirlives and properties, as well as the protection of their towns and villages whichhave been liberated by Peshmerga forces.
3. No civilian should be arrested without sufficient legal evidence to any legislativeact. All cases must be relayed to a specific court which is relevant to their charges,
and proceedings must be in accordance to judicial laws and regulations.
4. No civilian should be transferred from his original place of residence in areas
liberated by Peshmerga forces without sufficient legal or military
rationale/justification.
5. The free movement of civilians in liberated areas is non-restricted within theframework of security and military regulations held in the Kurdistan Region. The
exception to this is areas which are located immediately on the frontlines between
Peshmerga forces and IS fighters.
6. International principles of human rights and humanitarian law must be observedwith regards to civilians in areas located on the frontline.
7. Any individual or entity who acts against the aforementioned regulations will facelegal action.

******* This order is enforceable on the date of its issue *******
Masoud Barzani
President of the Kurdistan Region
Commander-in-Chief of Peshmerga Forces

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MARKED WITH AN “X”
Iraqi Kurdish Forces’ Destruction of Villages, Homes in Conflict with ISIS
Peshmerga and other forces of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have been at the forefront of military operations toretake areas of northern Iraq from the Islamic State (ISIS). This report, based on field visits, interviews with witnesses, and analysis
of satellite imagery, documents a pattern of unlawful destruction of Arab homes and sometimes entire villages between September
2014 and May 2016 after they came under Peshmerga control and when there was no imperative military necessity that would
warrant the destruction.
The destruction took place in disputed areas of Kirkuk and Nineveh governorates that are outside of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
but under KRG control, areas which KRG leaders have said they intend to incorporate into the Kurdistan Region.
Marked with an X concludes that the pattern and extent of Peshmerga destruction violated the laws-of-war prohibition against
destroying civilian objects that an enemy is not using for military purposes, and the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks,
including attacks that treat an entire area, such as a village, as a military objective.
KRG and Peshmerga officials claim that, in addition to destruction from bombing by the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and Peshmerga
artillery fire, Peshmerga often needed to destroy homes because ISIS had rigged them with improvised mines and explosive
devices. However, Human Rights Watch documented cases where KRG forces destroyed Arab homes but left Kurdish ones intact.
In other instances, they demolished buildings in villages that ISIS had never captured.
Human Rights Watch calls on the KRG to investigate these serious allegations of laws of war violations and hold accountable those
responsible for ordering, supervising or carrying them out. The United States and other countries providing military assistance tothe KRG should push for such investigations, and the UN Human Rights Council should broaden the investigation mandate of the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on ISIS abuses to include serious violations by all parties, including KRG security
forces.

House marked with red “X” for destruction in
Qarah Tappah in May 2016.
©2016 Belkis Wille/Human Rights Watch

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