現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論Media, scandals, and society: a theoretical introduction

イゴール・プルシャ*
Igor Prusa, Ph.D.

Introduction
Nowadays we are becoming increasingly

professional platform.

used to the fact that certain truths related to

As is widely known, the news devotes

various social phenomena in our media-

most of the media-time to various conflicts,

saturated reality will always necessarily be

accidents, crime – and scandals, which are

mo r e o r le s s d i sto r te d , c o n stru c te d , o rjust one example of such “transgressive”

fabricated. This fact is based on various

media content. The subjects that makeideological biases and technologicalscandal news – often the archetypes of adeterminations, combined with individual

corrupt politician, deviating celebrity, andhuman errors. Besides, various politicallyshady businessman – are similarly alarming

motivated backstage struggles aim at thein any culture, although the manifestation ofmaintenance of established routines ofdealing with transgressions can become ainterconnected social systems, and the elites’

culture-specific phenomenon.

preservation of influence, wealth and

The omnipresent phenomenon of scandal isauthority. These struggles for elite identity

at times seen as too banal, and thecan also result in a form of a mediatedmainstream audience has only a limited idea

scandal. This stands less for a naturalof the complex constitutive process behind

reaction to moral disturbances in society, andthe official presentation of what wemore for an organized effort to uphold social

understand under the somewhat misleading(sub)systems by either covering uplabel of “scandal”. Media scandals

transgressions, or by scapegoating,demonstrate a convergence of competing

sanctioning, and eventually excluding aninterests, actions, and actors. The scandal

individual transgressor from his/her

process is in principle realized and produced

Graduate School of the University of Tokyo Interdisciplinary Information Studies

19

in the context of real social institutions, inwithout reducing them to a mere mass media

order to handle certain crisis (triggered byphenomenon. On the other hand, it offers ainfo-leak), and in order fulfil certain(neo)functionalist, and socially-constructivist

ideological project (political, commercial,

perspective on scandals as social control

socially integrative, etc.). The authorship andmechanisms, secular rituals of renewal, andresponsibility are diluted since media“pseudo-events”. Besides, we want toscandals for the most part are texts/products

indicate that contrarily to other large mediaof the journalistic field of struggle

events (Dayan and Katz 1992) scandals are(Bourdieu). nonetheless, scandals are usuallyless “natural” in terms of their emergence,

initiated from the outside of a media

and despite institutionalized attempts tocompany (i.e. through a whistle-blower).

reform and redress (i.e, setting up post-

These context-bound texts are co-scandal committees, releasing didactic

constructed, shaped and distributed bybrochures), media scandals are non-multiple subjects with various motivationstransformative in terms of dealing with elite(information sources, agencies, media

deviance in society. at any rate, scandals are

institutions, authors, editors, reporters,“ritualistic” in their nature: they stand for aexternal commentators). The final productsort of secular (pseudo)ritual of affliction,

appears in a form of media scandal.

while each scandal manifestation is a

The assumed originality of this treatiseshall lie on one hand in strengthening thevariation on the mythical theme ofdisintegration and renewal.

basic theoretical understanding of scandals

A brief Outline of Scandal Studies
An increasing amount of scholarly literature

however not a new phenomenon. As a matteron scandals (and a growing interest inof fact, we can trace certain indirect roots ofacademic discourse, which the British

the academic curiosity about transgression/

professor of government Anthony King ingossip/scandal in classical sociology, post-war

1985 proposed to call scandology) proves thatsocial anthropology, and various subfields

scandals do present certain qualities ofsuch as political sociology or media studies.

constant social nature that are worth being

The theorists in question had in common the

put through a serious in-depth analysis.

interest in everyday methods the “social

Rese a r c hing a nd th e o r i z i n g sc a n d a l s i screatures” use in order to make sense of the20

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

1

everydayness while being made up duringexisted only few scholarly analytical works

various social interactions. Their insights arethat would focus on the nature of scandal

informative especially for the segment of

including its emergence, development, andscandology which does not limit itself toconsequences (see Thompson 1997). It wasapproaching scandal only as a mass media

the next historical milestone, set in Europe inphenomenon.

1989, that triggered further academic

Media scandals became a social

attention: the end of Cold war and thephenomenon during the 1950s when new

subsequent new post-communist era

media platforms were emerging andstimulated interest in political corruption.

television had been introduced as a mass

Since the 1990s scandals have emerged

medium. By 1960s the media mass circulation

widely in West European Countries, mainly

increased worldwide, along with further

as a consequence of new capitalist rules, newdevelopment of investigative journalism. The

markets, and the new nature of mediatedfirst symbolic watershed came in 1972: thepolitical competition. Besides, the horizontal

Watergate scandal came to serve as aand vertical media integration (plusframework for public discourse about

expansion of cable/satellite TV and internet

scandals. It generated vast amount of original

since early 1990s) have dramatically changed

academic elaborations, and it became a point

the media environment in the West, includingof reference for judging future political

its impact on the logic of media scandal.

corruption.

2

3

In the next decade John B. Thompson

In the following decade Anthony King

touched upon the topic of scandal while

proposed to divide scandals into three

relating the phenomenon to new technologies,

thematic categories (sex – money – power)

media visibility and modernity (Thompson

and to link issues of official misconduct with1995). Further, Thompson proceeded withlarger characteristics of political systems

his “social theory of scandal” in David Lull

(King 1985). Nonetheless, despite frequentand Steven Hinerman’s often-quoted edited

outbreaks of corruption in advanced

volume on scandals (Lull and Hinnerman

democracies in 1980s (including Japan, where

1997), where he showed that scandal

during the 1970s and 1980s corruption

sensitivity depends on the social-historicalscandals became endemic), the events did

context and general moral and cultural

not spark any significant academic attention.

climate of the time. Three years later

Apart from scandal anthologies and insiders/Thompson published his comprehensive

journalists’ accounts on scandals, there

analysis of a political scandal (Thompson

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論21

2000). While drawing examples from theand the strategic are fused in scandal.

Anglo-American world. His main arguments

Further, according to Adut, scandals are not

are that high-profile scandals arerituals of cohesion but “moral disturbances”

symptomatic of a profound transformation ofthat usually follow a predictable pattern.

the relations between public and private life

Scandals reaffirm collective values bysince the technologies of communication are

actually “provoking” a moral position taking

further blurring the boundaries between

and dramatizing lines of difference. Adutpublic and private. Thompson gives

however illustrates these “successful”

significance to increased (mediated)provocations mainly by analyzing scandals invisibility, enabled by the development ofart that led to cultural paradigm shifts in thecommunication media and triggering off a

past.

4

series of events. Moreover, investigative

Western scandal scholars tend to remindjournalism became regarded as accepted andus that Anglo-Saxon countries are inherently

sought-after element of journalistic activity.

inclined to libertarian philosophy where any

In early stages, scandals were indeed giving

exposure leads to a better system – politicalimpetus for changes of broader politicaland economic – which is essentially good,

culture (Thomspon 1997; 2000; 2011) while

although somewhat structurally perverted.

eventually generating challenges to the

As a matter of fact, European scandal

dominant culture in most stable and powerfulscholars are much less optimistic, and morenations (Dayan and Katz 1992; Lull andcritical about the role of the media and theirHinerman 1997). We claim that this impetus

scandal constructs. American scholars often

for change is rare in today’s media. On theaddress political scandals as inherently

contrary,the negative impact on the publicconnected to liberal democracies, but the

may lie in betrayal of social trust whereby

effort to de-westernize scandal theory is ononry reenforcing political cynicism.

the rise as well, demonstrating that not all

In another seminal work on scandal, Ari

Anglo-American theories and expectations

Adut (2008) aimed to provide a generalcan be tied to scandal mediations in non-theory of scandal while combining

Western media cultures. While working

phenomenological (“moral”) and structural

towards a more universalist conception, the(“strategic”) analyses. In a similar spirit as(neo)functionalist theoretical accounts on

Thomspon, Adut points out the diminishingscandal effectively point that scandals are ofconfidence in politics and increased

use to reinforce a community’s collective

transparency, and shows that both the moral

consciousness, including the role of public

225

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

ritual which serves to reinforce the primacy

to focus primarily on sex, money and politics,of shared norms and values (Gluckman 1963;

other scholars keep on introducing new

Alexander 1988; Markovits and Silversteininterdisciplinary approaches to scandal in

1988; Couldry 2003; Neckel 2005). Last but

various non-traditional contexts.

6

not least: while diverging from the initial aim

Social Collectivity
Scandals would be non-existent without theconstituted constructs with moral rules built

existence of an established social collectivity

in them from without.

8

with its moral codes. In functionalist

The spirit of society (or Durkheim’s

understanding transgressions/scandals arecollective conscience) with its mythologies

integral for any collectivity since a breach(or allegorical instructions), stereotypes,

confirms the rule and strengthens theframes and metaphors (Lipmann 1922; Lakoff

integration by the social group accepting it.

2009) is stored in collective unconscious

Thus, the basic form of scandal as a conflict(Jung), and is more or less effectively

resolution pattern is a universal phenomenon

inculcated in each one of us. Without us

since the fundamental tendency to hold theclearly noticing it, these attributes are being

presence of others as one of basic necessities

maintained and legitimized on the level of

7various ideologies. To play our social role

Furthermore, many classical politologists

means then to have our thought (as reflected(e.g. Montesquieu, Rousseau, or Hobbes)

in our actions) supervised by a society’s

indicated that human societies at any point

ideological core values. These ideologicalof time and space hardly survive unless theyvalues in turn inform the norms (moral,

solve the problem of linking the individual topolitical, legal, religious) that become

the broader society. Our social identity isauthentic projections of the general will

however hardly “natural” per se because the(Rousseau 1994), and are being held bysocial actors identify themselves by

everyone as “the most real and the mostsuperimposed world views and modes ofimportant” (Toomer 1991, I.).

of mankind exists practically everywhere.

9

10

thought (Lippmann 1922; Lakoff 2009). Since

Nonetheless conflictual situations within

morals stabilize and uphold society’s

the apparent social consensus do surface,structure, our social identities shall beeventually generating a public scandal. In the

primarily understood as discursively

first place this is caused by the fact that we

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論23

live in intersections of different norms andgetting caught) whereby facilitating to keep

discourses, as diffused by various institutions,our baser instincts under control.

so that our individual morality can grow

Unfortunately, we usually notice these forces

contradictory and inconsistent.

11

Apart fromonly after actually going “against theour social roles (some owned, somestream”. Since deviance from social norm (inresented) it is our staged performance thatfunctionalist jargon: malfunction, or

becomes one aspect of our personality,

misplaying of one’s role) is usually an offence

including its eventual “scandalous” failure

to the sentiment of the collective we, the(Goffman 1959; Hacking 2004), for which we

disapproving reaction to scandal is inare to bear our own responsibility (Sartre

principle collective.

1956; Heidegger 1962). In the second place,

Here, the philosophers of human nature

we must also consider the psychological side-

would contend that people are inherently

effects of power-holding, individual psycho-

aggressive/transgressive,

social weaknesses, or, as Friedrich Nietzsche

family, community (and the media as social

would insist, our unconscious “Dionysian”

institutions) present necessary civilizing

drive towards dissolution of boundaries andforces. These forces (or Freudian superegos)

transgression of limits.

can be objectified by anyone who issues

12

while the state,

We preserve core societal values bycommands – parents, teachers, laws, classbehaving consistently with them, and as

prejudices, public opinions (e.g. Nietzsche

addition to that, our basic needs – most

1966, 110). On the other hand, mamy classic

fundamentally personal security andanthropologists and sociologists teach us that

individual rights – are attained through theconflict enhances a group’s “consciousness of

introduction of law and order which bindskind” and revives its self-image (Turner) insocial actors in social structures.

a society that “needs” friction (Durkheim)

Consequently, also our individual desires

same as law needs crime, religion needs sin-(including the intrinsic, unconscious desire toor, the public “needs” scandal-in order totransgress) must be curbed to a significant

work as a fully dynamic social system. In

degree by restrictive social forces (primarilysuch understanding, transgressions are

the family, and the state). These

functional (and integral) for any collectivity

authoritative forces only rarely react withsince a breach confirms the rule andleniency when sanctioning a potential source

strengthens the integration by the socialof anarchy, and they can generate various

group accepting it.

“disciplinary” emotions (guilt, shame, fear of

24

13

The existence of “liminal phases” of

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

conflict and transgression and “remedialsociocultural patterns. Such homogeneity

phases” of resolution and redemption was

facilitates to maintain discipline (ethos) while

confirmed cross-culturally (e.g. Turner 1990;

sacrificing the power of our inherent instincts

Barkow 1992; Jenks 2003; Jewkes 2011). The

for the sake of the “greater (social) good”

institutional logic related to transgressions/(Durkheim). Besides, our “functionality”

sanctions is however until certain extent

further diminishes once we becometime/space-relative (i.e., what is scandalous

surrounded by ornamental culture (term byhere/today might not be scandalous there/

Susan Faludi) which encourages people totomorrow). Moreover, aforementioned social

play almost no functional roles at thestructures can be contradictory, with diverse

expense of only decorative, consumer roles.

and opposing actors (and far fromAs yet another by-product of thisrepresenting communities that share values

homogenizing force, the “collective

14

The same goes for scandals:

responsibility” is being built into what Nickmany corrupted institutions and corporations

Smith calls the “logical grammar of ourare at the assumed “center of themoral categories” (Smith 2008, 178). This allcollectivities”, where the corrupt police

is happening in a social universe where there

stands for the central symbol of society

exist no universally valid moral standards by(Sherman 1978), and the media “speaks forwhich rightness or wrongness of moralthat corrupt center” (Couldry 2003, 2).

values or belief systems could be objectively

and interests).

Apart from personal security andjudged.

individual rights, which we gain due to our

The notion of social collectivity, thus

self-subordination to collectivity, we enter

disseminated in society, maintains andsocial contract, which is expected to assure

reproduces social structures through

15

The

institutions, organizations and discourses that

limitation of this contract lies inframe and regulate social life (Foucault 1972;

circumscribing our “natural liberties” while

Giddens 1994; Castells 2009; Lakoff 2009).

expecting us to endorse core ideologicalThe existence of these “networks of power”

values. Consequently, we may easily become,is conditioned by forms of social control (anyin a non-coercive way, self-monitoringsocial process that induces conformity toservants of ideological forces (Foulcaudiansocial norms), and if we cross certain“docile bodies”), not to mention that we

threshold, we may trigger a public scandal,

become hardly distinguishable if adopting awhich in turn activates additional control

kind of personality offered by mediatedmechanisms.

our social liberties (Rousseau 1994).

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論

16

In modern media-saturated25

societies, based on collective imaginations,central, while the media agenda aims tocodes of morality, law, mythology, or religion,

become “everyone’s issue”.

the mass-mediated experience becomes

Mass MediaThe formal power to label certain individuals

they at times happen to work as self-(i.e. designate them as deviant, antisocial,

appointed arbiters of justice and guardians ofimmoral and shaming, prosecuting, andthe nation who are endowed with thestigmatizing them) resides within theauthority to pry, publicize, and prosecuteinstitution of state and the criminal justice. It(e.g.Morikawa 1992; Uesugi 2012).

is however not only the ideological climate

A “successful” scandal with the journalistic

which matters, but equally importantly it ismission of “search for truth” at its core is

the journalistic struggle within thetoday unimaginable without the mass media’s

journalistic field which co-constitutes theintervention. In order to effectively exercise

labeling process. These assumptions are

power by impacting human minds, the power

instrumental in creating public consensus

holders cannot refrain from using (multi)

and shaping processes of social integration

media networks of mass communication. The

and control. The mass media however

networks are the source of the construction

facilitate to trigger media-hypes (Vastermanof meaning in the public mind and therefore2005), moral panics and deviancy

the fundamental networks of power-making

amplification (Cohen 2002; Goode and Ben-in society (e.g. Castells 2009). Importantly

Yehuda 2009) and other ideologically/

for the notion of social collectivity, thesetechnologically determined negative media

mass media networks are essentiallyeffects.

17

Furthermore, the disciplinary“conservative”:

discourses of scandal are backed by eventual
use of negative sanctions, both material(incarceration, fine) and symbolic (loss of- t hey believe that morality is obedience toauthority

face, reputational damage). The media as- t hey lay exclusive claims to patriotism

para-institutions of the state (Castells), or- t hey are intolerant towards anyone who

disciplinary apparatuses (Foucault) are thetransgresses their agenda

main sources of these discourses. Although- t hey use archetypes of submission andthe media serve many ideological purposes,

group affiliation (both in popular fiction and

26

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

the news)of social and symbolic order (Hall 1997, 2589).

The role of the conservative media is to

One of pre-emptive means of framing anduse language, ideas, images, and symbols

regulating social life lies in managing, andrepeatedly to activate their desired modes ofappealing to common sense.

thought (lakoff 2009).

establishing a form of self-regulation designed

Furthermore, it is necessary for these media

to meet the requirements of the society

to encompass the (imagined) audience, andbased on notions of what is acceptable, and it

represent this whole as moral majority. In

works as a sort of mass super-ego. It is theterms of language this is usually realized via

mainstream media that not only

the empathic label “we” – in order to stand“manufacture the consent” (Herman andfor the empathic/patriotic social whole,

Chomsky 1988), but they also persecute anddefine parameters of social control, andstigmatize certain social actors by publicizing

18

19This sense is

Such forms of labelling

their transgressions, and it is usually theare in the media realized through the processintrinsically newsworthy mediation ofof stereotyping – dividing the abnormal fromdeviance and crime which has a strong social

normal (the impure, unacceptable, chaotic

control element. Thus, the media facilitate

them from the pure, acceptable, orderly us),the process of forming our conscience andby maintaining a symbolic frontier between

internalizing authority (rules, laws andthem both while symbolically excluding theconventions) through representing violations

latter. This process, which deploys theof these rules on a frequent basis. While astrategy of splitting by reducing and fixing

violation is being (tele)visualised, redressive

difference is important for the maintenancemechanisms are brought into operation.

accumulate profit.

Media Scandals
Since no media scandal in practice exists inbasic preconditions for a scandal movement

its pure form, scholars usually deal with an

are as follows:

ideal type of large-scale, high-profile/highpublicity media scandal where the majorityof scandal non-participants (mostly common

1. t here has to exist a collective definition ofan act/behaviour as transgressive

citizens) are alarmed by the transgression

2. t r a n s g r e s s i o n m u s t b e r e v e a l e d a n d

for a protracted period of time. The fivedenounced by a person or group of persons

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論27

3. t ransgression must be individualized via

effects of institutions intersect (under theseat least one person (i.e. alleged culprit)

movements we understand individualized

4. there has to be a negative response of the“malfunctions” that can lead to betrayal of

public, indispensable for any scandalsocial trust). While adopting the theory ofRobert Merton (1968) we can also state that

Based on these preconditions, we suggest ascandal is a latent dysfunction

processual defintion of an ideal-type media(unanticipated and unintended temporary

scandal:disruption of order and stability) with boththe manifest function (proving that theBased on the commonsensical morality (i.e.,

supervisory organs of the state and thethe culture-specific definition of what ismedia-watchdogs are working) and the latent“scandalous”) a private transgression (elitefunction (e.g. triggering scandal fatigue anddeviance) is publicly disclosed (in principle

political cynicism among the public).

via whistleblowing), individualized (via a

Secondly, scandal can be approached as atransgressing culprit, or a scapegoat), framed

conflict, confrontation, and symbol of certainby the media for a protracted period of time,crisis. On the one hand, scandals express

and eventually publicly denounced. Apart

opposing social claims to the validity offrom the strategic use of scandal (i.e. innorms, and the instruments of power are

attack-politics) the ideal moral/hegemonicused in order to defeat opposing forces. That

aim is to re-confirm and strengthen theis why in political discourse (and in attack-validity of the transgressed norm (symbolic

politics in particular) scandalizing is aor legal).

powerful tool (and not a mere distraction
from the real substance of political life). On

In this treatise we are however more

the other hand, depending on their contentsinterested in theoretical understanding ofand environments, scandals aim to both re-scandals and their function wthin social

establish the morale of the community, andcollectivity. On the most general level, thethey come to present certain form of social

phenomenon of scandal can be approached aspressure. This pressure can also lie in somea social fact (Durkheim). Media scandals

form of encouraging a spirit ofform a coherent system, are basically“togetherness”, or it can represent someindependent from expressions of individuals,

form of direct coercion. While promoting

and they arise from the ground where

social cohesion and supporting the statuscertain “movements of life”, and specificquo, such coercion is then integrative since28

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

big media events can evoke renewal of

accidental, but especially in mediated politics

loyalty to the society with its legitimate

the information leak has a deliberateauthority (e.g. Dayan and Katz 1992; Couldry

character – the scandal which follows is then2003). In such cases, a “successful” scandal

a socio-politically constructed representation

can be also conceived of as a statement ofwith various conflicting actors.

the norm; a declaration of what is considered

words, scandal politics becomes a weapon ofby the members of a society to be good andchoice for competition.

21

In other

Similarly, the practice of scapegoating

proper.
Finally, scandals can be approached as(designing one individual to be punished for

rituals (i.e. standardized patterns of behavior

the errors of others) did originally playand performance that communicate messages

certain role in constituting social order not

about moral order). Frequently recurring

only in Japan (the individual sacrifice forscandals are in this perspective approachedsocial preservation is a social function that is

as a sort of secular rituals, cast into a patternat the core of any society). It is howeverthat is reproduced, institutionalized,

questionable how this legitimieing force ismaintained and understood as such.

being objectified during the mass media-

Especially the big scandals wish to generatesponsored secular rituals of affliction and“common concern”, and it can be argued that

exclusion. This reinforces the norm by

the scandal-mongering media parasitize on

exposing deviance whereby generating public

our inherent desire to community, which“atmosfear” that anyone can happen to begoes back to collectivity of pre-masspublicly tried for defying certain symbolic

societies.

20

convention. At any rate, these rituals

There certainly exist media events that

resemble a sort of perpetuum mobile: themerely present the status quo throughever repeating scandals can hardly bevarious displays of social solidarity, but

understood as an effective prevention of thescandals highlight the same structure

return of a crisis since they are rather

through “representing” deviance, itsvariations on one mythical theme – thedisapproval, and condemnation. The incentive

perpetual, cyclical state of disintegration andfor these representations (i.e. revealed

renewal.

transgressions) is in some cases purely

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論29

Scandal Transgressors
Confusion, contempt and other affective

providing the media with a more or lessreactions to certain conflict/crisis that“spectacular”, audience-attractive material.

outrages society usually has a concrete

The media are likely to publicly manifest

object – someone who can be blamed

opprobrious discourse (Thompson 1997),

responsible. This object of public outrage is

generating sentiments of disgust and distrust

not represented by an impersonal social

among the public. Consequently thesystem or some ideological concept, but intransgressor becomes designated as

principle by a newsworthy individual who

undesirable and “unfit” since he/she wasbelongs to certain rank within the social

found to be inconsistent with certain

elite. Elite deviance is defined as devianceconventions. Nonetheless, his/her charisma

engaged by the highest corporate, military,

can make the public pardon his/her violation,

political, and cultural figures (e.g. Franzese

which in turn influences the way a scandal is2009, 237), and the nearer one is to thishandled.

imagined “sacred center”, the higher theOrdinary citizens who engage in certain

probability of involvement. Since intransgressive conduct certainly can end up

contemporary media-saturated societies it isbeing demonized in the media – e.g. by being

usually the media personalities, celebrities,

depicted as folk devils (Cohen). Nonetheless,political, business or religious leaders, whothey in principle do not become individual

are in charge of representing the illusion ofscandal subjects, because they:

cohesion, they bear responsibility for theirdeviance if their public image suddenly finds
itself in inconsistence with them.

22

Once elite deviance comes into full light,
the elites become untrustworthy. This is also
the case because they previously mystified
their own person: they became rendered as“quasi-transcendent” persons of law equippedwith public dignity (Neckel 2005). If scandal- do not directly represent/symbolize any
system of societal structure- do not belong to any elite institution, nor
do they hold public office- a r e n o t t r u s t e e s o f p u b l i c m o r a lstandards and conventions, and thus
- t heir social status does not wield apotential to violate social trust.

23

cannot be avoided, these extraordinarytransgressors are reduced to the status of

It is in principle the extraordinary,

everyman (or sometimes even lower),“conspicuous” elite (i.e. the visible

30

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

representatives of governmental, political,

become scandalized if, and only if thebusiness, cultural, and other power circles)

violation of moral and/or legal rules has been

whose offences become rendered as

disclosed by the mass-media.

24

eminently newsworthy. These elites however

Audiences and Desires
When critical social scientists observe thecharisma represents specifically exceptional,

map of the contemporary forces of capital

extraordinary qualities that set an individualaccumulation not only in Japan, they often

apart from ordinary people and create a

notice that the consumers are led to believebasis for his/her special treatment (Webertheir own personal empowerment, while1968). This treatment is usually

dissatisfaction is transformed into asimultaneously conditioned by his/her loyalty

commodity through various forms ofwhich is expected to be demonstrated inspectacular rebelliousness and transgression

turn. The notion of charismatic authority lies

(e.g. Debord 1967; Jenks 2003; Heath andin possessing exceptional human qualities,

Potter 2005). As a matter of fact, the scandal

however today it can simply be certain

industry in particular shall be scrutinized aspoliticians who are able to evoke emotional“exploiting” some of our inherent

response in larger populations, and otherpsychosocial affects and moral sentiments.

“extraordinary” cultural representatives that

The key desire in this context is the desire

also often represent this quality.

to relate. The charismatics (primordial,

Regarding the bond between a charismatic

religious, or secular) originates from thispersona and others, both the star/agency ordesire as well: the audiences can relate topolitician/party on the one side, and the fan/

their “idols” (celebrities, politicians, etc.)

voter on the other enter a sort of unwritten

25

social contract, guaranteed by what AlvinContrarily to the original nature (other-

Gouldner (1960) called norm of reciprocity.

worldly, non-mediated) of charismatic

Generally speaking this is a reciprocity ofauthorities (e.g. those individuals who wereservice and return service.

able to perform miracles), the image of many

someone aspires to some form of leadership,

real-world celebrities, politicians or artists is

he/she directly or indirectly provides

often effective only because of theirpotential supporters (voters, fans) withthrough the process of admiration.

charisma.

26

In Max Weber’s understanding,

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論

27

Therefore, if

certain benefits (including the material/

31

financial ones), while in turn gaining

charismatic elements (Storm and Wagner

sympathy, loyalty, and trust. Especially the2011).

material/financial transaction – itself always

Another key desire in our context is thenecessarily asymmetrical and covert – must

desire to know. While utilizing Darwinianbe “blurred” since it borders with corruption

perspective in analyzing emotions in media,

and bribery. Thus, the phenomenon of

Schwab and Schwender (2011) assert thatstructural corruption (kōzō oshoku) can also

the goal of epistemic emotions is knowledge

be understood as blurring the return of thegain. Related to this, Joseph Campbell (2004)

favour in order to avoid accusation, and thereminds us of the unbreakable universal

ideal role of the media would then be todesire of the human spirit to receive and“sharpen” the picture of this transaction.

convey stories of all sorts (the origin of thisApart from recognizing the charismatic

contemplation lies with Aristotle and his

authority and practicing personal devotion,

dictum that all men by nature desire to

the proportionality of service and returnknow). While being informed by these facts,

service is according to Gouldner assuring

the basic narratological pattern lies in initialcohesion and stability of the social system. In

uncertainty, advancing towards certain

terms of media consumption, a sort of ideal,

concluding climax. The elementary unit isbalanced reciprocity can be understood asthus knowledge. Especially the stardom ismaintaining the producer/consumer contract,

structured by this concealment-revelation

where desire is under given rules anddiscourse (e.g. de Cordova 1991), where theconditions “aroused” on one side, andnews media make use of our inherent desire“played with” on the other. If social elites dofor knowledge.

not follow certain expectations (often moral

Clarissa Estes (2004, xxxix) observes thatin the case of celebrities, and material in thethere is something in our psyche thatcase of politicians), there occurs reciprocity

recognizes a wrongful act and wants to tell

imbalance.

28

Depending on the seriousness ofthe story of how it came about and what

the situation, the expression of disapproval

action ought to be undertaken to correct it.

can be apprehended by the public as

Similarly in the case of scandals a private

injustice, exploitation, and finally as awrongdoing is revealed, and the media

betrayal of social trust. One then resorts topresent all upcoming facts to us as “things

negative norms of reciprocity, provoking

we must know” while contaminating thesentiments of retaliation (Gouldner 1960),

media audience (or the whole public in caseand scandal is broken, based on dislocation ofof large-scale scandals) with the desire to32

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

know more about transgressor.

29

Especiallypleasure stemming from schadenfreude, etc.).

in big scandals the spectacle of mediatedFor our purposes it will suffice here to notesearch for truth is throughout the wholethat not only in the case of media scandals

process “inpregnated” with this basic desire

our inherent desires, sentiments andto receive stories with in-built secrets.

emotions actually precede, guide, or even

Apart from the desire to relate and toknow, we register other desires that can beoverride moral contemplation which is
associated with any media narrative.

related to scandals (i.e. the desire forcompassion, the escapist desire, desire togossip, the quasi-sadistic desire and the

Notes
1

Max Gluckman showed early anthropological’ interest in scandal and gossip when researching tribal communities’ involvement
in gossip (Gluckman emphasized the “supportive” function of gossip as a powerful social instrument in the maintenance of social
unity and informal social control). Erving Goffman, who developed among others the notion of stigma, offered interpersonal
dramaturgical perspective in the context of our everydayness which is constituted through staged performances (the scandal
performance is also characteristic of staging while convicted transgressors become stigmatized and temporarily exiled fromtheir professional platform). Alvin Gouldner indirectly contributed to scandology by discussing norms of reciprocity as a point ofbetter understanding of mutual symbolic relationship between scandalized social elites and common public sphere. The criticism
of Guy Debord also enriches the scandal theory since many mediated scandal events are emblematic of a high degree of staged
spectacularity. Victor Turner expanded Durkheim’s solidarity/ritual theory in his theorizing of (originally van Gennep’s) stagesof ritual process, whereby inviting ritual analysis to be applied also to scandals. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann offer the
viewpoint that social reality (including scandals and their mediation) is in various regards a socially constructed phenomenon.
Robert Merton is instructive with his notion of deviance and manifest/latent dysfunction while Antonio Gramsci’s hegemony
theory can be applied when approaching scandals as tools used to maintain power and social order in a non-coercive manner.
Pierre Bourdieu with his interest in aims and consequences of political struggle enriches scandology with concepts such as(political) habitus, political delegation of power, or the journalistic field of struggle.

2

As a Japanese counterpart to Watergate became known the Lockheed corruption scandal which climaxed in 1976 and involved
the Japanese father of money politics, Tanaka Kakuei.

3

One of the epitomes of this new era in Europe, and a sort of counterpart to Ruppert Murdoch in the US, was the Italian media
tycoon, politician and businessman Silvio Berlusconi. Scholars worldwide have ever since criticized Berlusconi’s extensive control
over media, his corruption affairs, and conflicts of interest between politics and ownership of his vast media empire.

4

For instance, after the 1998 Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, there occurred a fundamental change in media environment – namely theelimination of classical notions such as agenda setting or “gatekeeping” as originally understood by Walter Lippmann (Lippmann
1922; Williams and Delli Carpini 2004).

5

Owing to this academic segment we discover that political scandal is rather absent in Argentina (Waisbord 2004), and certain
cultural significance is attributed to emotional responses to celebrity scandals in China (Jiang et al. 2011) or Japan (Prusa
2012a). Besides we find that public political scandals are virtually impossible and nonexistent in dictatorships (Neckel 2005),
or that the Japanese media in general does a very poor job of illuminating many key issues including the government – andbusiness corruption (Prusa 2012b; McNeill 2014).

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論33

6

The scope of this segment ranges from comparing scandal narratives to those of Greek tragedy (e.g. Ruigrok 2007) or conflating
critical philosophical discourses when analyzing sports scandals (Storm and Wagner 2011) to analyzing scandal cases in historyof art and literature (e.g. Adut 2008).

7

It is indeed the case that our humanity and sociality are intertwined, so that Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann can statethat homo sapiens is always in the same measure homo socius (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 49), whose natural inclination toempathy and cooperation is literally hardwired in our brain (e.g. Lakoff 2009; Wetherell 2010). These arguments are supported
by a scientific evidence that there exists an integrative tendency based on physiologically grounded psychological need for
empathy and cohesion in a constitution of man, and that the social kinship of modern humans has its roots in its transition fromthe biological kinship of primates (e.g. Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Lakoff 2009; Allen et al. 2011).

8

Indeed, various expressions of collective memory (Halbwachs) make a powerful contribution to a society’s cultural, political andsocial identity. Nonetheless, formally speaking there is no such thing as “genuine” social identity because man will always not
be anything “until later”, and he will be what he makes of himself (e.g. Sartre 1956). Besides, the images of wholeness, which
are holding together a group of (more or less incoherent) individuals, are usually effectively illusory. All identities (political,
social and cultural) are neither fixed, nor permanent, and they shall be understood as constitutively relational positions (e.g.
Gilbert 2008) After all, our culture-specific modes of virtue are also not really “natural” since they are undergoing varioustransformations before being constituted and incorporated as collective images. Therefore, the belief that our social identity issomehow equivalent to our very own existence is a form of self-deception.

9

By ideology we critically understand any conglomeration of ideas that allow us to form “common identity”, to demarcate us fromthe other, or to become “docile bodies” (Foucault) who “are the rule” in society (Nietzsche).

10

Of course these values are not permanently “true” and fixed, and thus the struggle between/within ideologies represents openended conflicts. Also through some scandals the moral consensus is not reached, and such scandals can provoke discussion
activate their transformative potential.

11

Apart from the fact that we are members of many different groups at the same time (e.g. family, company, political party,
seminar), each individual has also his/her own particular way of thinking about the rules of commonsensical morality. Especiallythe political representatives have to govern their conduct and strategies simultaneously as members of their political subfield(i.e. maintaining party loyalty and alliances), and the broader political field of citizens or non-professionals (see Thompson 1997,47-8). Unsurprisingly, political scandals often render themselves as involving elements of hypocrisy, similarly as any political
donation bears elements of bribery.

12

Apart from the drive of self-preservation (Nietzsche), or the survival of the fittest (Darwin), Sigmund Freud also mentioned
mankind’s innate inclination to aggression and non-cooperative principles at uncivilized level, while Thomas Hobbes even built hiswhole political theory on our chronic anxiety and fear of violent death (due to which we desperately desire power and protection
in a “wolf-like” world). Importantly for political scandals, the political institutions of the state are a sort of evil-but-necessary
entities that only reflect inevitable moral imperfection of democracy in modern human societies. Since these institutions areoperated by other (“wolf-like”) actors just like ourselves, the struggles and conflicts will be always emerging, if only in a form of
media scandal. (This fact lends itself to Jean Baudrillard’s controversial claim that scandals themselves are not really “scandalous”.)

13

In a similar functionalist vein Max Gluckman (1963) discussed the positive (integrative) role of gossiping/scandalizing withincommunities since the dawn of man, as standing in opposition to “negative” gossiping (transactional, egoistic). While the latter isin principle harmful, the former is claimed to underpin social solidarity.

14

For instance Jock Young (1971) and Gary Marx (1981) claimed that authorities themselves actually often contribute to a
deviance they set out to control by generating opportunities and motives for rule breaking. Similarly, Robert Merton (1968)
inquired how political machines continue to operate despite the fact that they frequently defy both the mores, and the law.

15

Social contract is generally understood as a socio-political tool for maintaining social cohesion in the face of the natural freedomof humanity.

34

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

16

Apart from private moral transgressions, scandals often reflect inner political struggles. What matters is the impact of the
struggle among different political and other social elites, ranging from attack-politics to deliberate use of sensitive data duringomnipresent conflicts between parties, within parties, between government and bureaucracy, government and opposition, etc.

17

Moral panic is a means of characterizing the reaction of the media, the public, and agents of social control while voicing populist
sentiments. In our context it points to inappropriate panic over public scandals – usually the transgressions involving public
criminality, homosexuality, pedophilia, drug abuse, food poisoning, etc. The mass media, who are an excellent breeding groundfor moral panics, demonstrate the panic by reflecting certain concerns, but more often they directly influence public opinion(Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009) and manufacture its consent (Herman and Chomsky 1988) within the established discourse offear (Altheide 2002; 2003). Media hype is a media-practiced form of overstatement and exaggeration of events predominantly forthe sake of novelty and newsworthiness. It can be channeled via sensational headlines, melodramatic vocabulary or deliberateheightening of certain elements in the story. As a result, large scandals under the spell of media hype become typically inflated
in size, scope, seriousness, shifting our attention from certain structural problem to various “newsworthy”, sensationalist
elements on the backdrop of a constructed morality tale.

18

For example by representing the moral majority by the empathic personal pronoun watashitachi or wareware (or by using
the “nationalizing” substantives nihonjin, kokumin) the blame is absorbed and moral responsibility diffused because a politicalprojection (“Japan”) cannot itself do anything without individuals on its behalf (Prusa 2012b).

19

Common sense is a shared ability to perceive, understand and judge things in our world, and it is constituted by basic conceptsof object, person, time, and space (e.g. Pinker 2002). By “managing” common sense we refer to disseminating unquestioned
truths that are in fact only culturally derived mythologies. Antonio Gramsci (1971) described these commonsensical “things
we all know” as a fragmentary and incoherent reservoir of historically discontinuous and disjointed ideas that functions as thephilosophy for non-philosophers. This common sense is further reinforced by common knowledge whose definition can be put
forward as “everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows” (e.g. Adut 2008, 19).

20

Like in the Greek Agora, the symbolically interrelated individuals “come together” as imagined community (the mediumof television becomes “gathering place”) in order to collectively express dissatisfaction, anger, solidarity and empathy withscandalized elites.

21

By these actors we mean primary participants (information sources, agencies, media institutions, editors, reporters, external
commentators, etc.), and secondary participants (police, prosecutors, lawyers, entertainment agencies, investigative commissions,nongovernmental organizations, commercial entities, etc.)

22

Celebrity (or a “media person”) is someone known mainly for her well-knownness, created by the media exposure, during
various media pseudo-events (e.g. Boorstin 1992; Dayan and Katz 1992). Besides, it is generally believed that the media are
our access point to society’s assumed center (Couldry 2003), so the media personae tend to impress us as somehow “special”,
and are thus held as worthy of special attention and special treatment. A political persona is usually someone who deliberately
utilizes certain elements of entertainment and emphasizes recognition at the expense of credence or belief. The “celebritization”
of politicians is usually managed by the PR agencies, and contrary to famous persons, celebrities are “idols of consumption” withcommercial market value attached to them.

23

Although ordinary people in principle do not set large-scale scandals in motion, commoners do at times become “accidental
celebrities” (Marshall 2010), dragged in a “psychodrama” (Lull and Hinerman 1997). In such case a private individual issuddenly caught in the glare of publicity through the overwhelming media frenzy, if he/she is somehow associated with certain“newsworthy” transgression as either offender or victim. Needless to say, having these media ritual hierarchies enacted on
ordinary citizen can be a traumatic experience.

24

In the case of large-scale, high-profile scandals the dialectical outcome can lie in character assassination of the transgressing “idol25

The charismatic seduction can be also the result of reaching beyond commonsensical limits through transgressive acts of “freeof the old”, and public veneration of a new object of trust.
will” (e.g. Dayan and Katz 1992), or through various enactments of “radical freedom” (Sartre 1956). Thus, a transgression can

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論35

also form a transgressor’s public image, and can reinforce his/her positive charisma (for related analysis of social banditry see
Hobsbawm 1969).
26

The media again play a significant role in upholding the charismatic aura by altering standpoints and priming audiences’
judgments (this can be based on nonverbal displays and visual portrayals of faces and bodies, or by communicating “sophisticated”
emotional states). Thus, idols have their personality and their actions carefully synchronized.

27

Or seen from the perspective of the exchange theory: A who receives from B must be indebted to B, while B feels legitimate,direct control over A. Since reciprocity is inherent in the nature of basically all social interaction, social scientists posit that man
is homo reciprocus.

28

For instance in the case of material expectations, the Japanese local support bases (kōenkai), backed by local companies andgovernment workers vote for their politicians that are in turn expected to bring money (localized projects) to the representative’s
district.

29

This desire is however always being ahead of itself: the audiences might not “naturally” desire gossip, but their inherent
curiosity is “played with” in order to desire it. Since the inbuilt markers of desire are “always-already”, there the audiences do
not discover the topics/objects of desire, but they rather “re-cognize” them.

Bibliography
Adut, Ari. On Scandal: Moral Disturbances in Society, Politics and Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Alexander, Jeffrey C. “Culture and political crisis: “Watergate” and Durkheimian sociology.” In Durkheimian sociology: cultural
studies, edited by Jeffrey C. Alexander, 187-224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Allen, Nicholas et al., eds. Early human kinship: from sex to social reproduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2011.
Alsford, Mike. Heroes and villains. London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 2006.
Altheide, David. “Mass Media, Crime, and the Discourse of Fear.” Hedgehog Review 5, Issue 3 (2003): 9-25.
Altheide, David. Creating fear: news and the construction of crisis. New York: Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 2002.
Barkow, Jeremy H. “Beneath new culture is old psychology: Gossip and social stratification.” In The adapted mind: evolutionary
psychology and the evolution of culture, edited by Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, 627-637. Oxford:
University of Oxford Press, 1992.
Barkow, Jeremy H., Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, eds. The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the evolution of culture.
Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1992.
Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. The social construction of reality. A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. New York:
Doubleday, 1966.
Boorstin, Daniel. The image: a guide to pseudo-events in America. London: Vintage Books, 1992.
Castells, Manuel. Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Cohen, Stanley. Folk devils and moral panic. Oxon: Routledge, 2002.
Couldry, Nick. Media rituals: a critical approach. London: Routledge, 2003.
Dayan, Daniel and Elihu Katz. Media events: the live broadcasting of history. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Debord, Guy. Society of the spectacle. Detroit: Black and Red, 1967.
deCordova, Richard. “The Emergence of the Star System in America.” In Stardom: Industry of Desire, edited by Christine Gledhill,
17-29, London: Routledge, 1991.
Estes, Clarissa P. Introduction to the 2004 Commemorative edition of The Hero with a Thousand Faces, by Joseph Campbell, xxiii–
lxv. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Foucault, Michel. The Archaelogy of Knowledge. London: Tavistok, 1972.
Franzese, Robert J. The sociology of deviance: differences, tradition, and stigma. Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 2009.
Giddens, Anthony. “Elements of the Theory of Structuration.” In The Polity Reader in Social Theory, edited by Polity, 79-88.

36

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.
Gilbert, Jeremy. Anticapitalism and culture: radical theory and popular politics. Oxford: Berg, 2008.
Gluckman, Max. “Gossip and Scandal.” Current Anthropology, no. 3(4) (1963): 307-316.
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959.
Goode, Erich and Nachman Ben-Yehuda. Moral panics: the social construction of deviance. Oxford: Blackwell, 2009.
Gouldner, Alvin W. “The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement.” American Sociological Review 25 (1960): 161-178.
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison notebooks. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971.
Hacking, Ian. “Between Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman: between discourse in the abstract and face-to-face interaction”.
Economy and Society 33, no.3 (2004): 277-302.
Hall, Stuart, ed. Representation. Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. London: Sage, 1997.
Heath, Joseph and Andrew Potter. The Rebel Sell. How the counterculture became consumer culture. Toronto: Capstone, 2005.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1962.
Herman, Edward and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon
Books, 1988.
Hobsbawm, Eric. Bandits. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969.
Jenks, Chris. Transgression. London: Routledge, 2003.
Jewkes, Yvonne. Media & Crime. London: Sage, 2011.
Jiang, Jiang et al. “Emotional reactions to scandals: When does moral character make a difference?” Asian Journal of Social
Psychology 14, Issue 1 (2011): 1-10.
King, Anthony. “Sex, Power and Money: Political Scandals in Great Britain and the United States.” In Politics in Britain and theUnited States: Comparative Perspectives on Institutions and Political Culture, edited by James Ceaser and Richard HodderWilliams, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985.
Lakoff, George. The political mind: a cognitive scientist’s guide to your brain and its politics.
London: Penguin Books, 2009.
Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion. New York: McMillan, 1922.
Lull, James J. and Steven Hinerman, eds. Media Scandals: Morality and Desire in the Popular Culture Marketplace, Oxford: Polity
Press, 1997.
Markovits, Andrei S. and Mark Silverstein, eds. The politics of scandal: Power and process in liberal democracies. New York:
Holmes & Mayer, 1988.
Marshall, David P. “The promotion and presentation of the self: celebrity as marker of presentational media.” Celebrity Studies 1, no.1
(2010): 35-48.
Marx, Gary T. “Ironies of Social Control: Authorities as Contributors to Deviance Through Escalation, Nonenforcement and Covert
Facilitation.” Social Problems, no. 28:3 (1981): 221-246.
McNeill, David. “Japan’s contemporary media.” In Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan, edited by Jeff Kingston, 64-76. New York:
Routledge, 2014.
Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
Morikawa, Kathleen. “The Popular Media: Self-Appointed Public Avengers.” Japan Quarterly 39, no.2 (1992): 211-217.
Neckel, Sighard. “Political Scandals. An Analytical Framework.” Comparative Sociology 4, Issue 1-2 (2005): 101-111.
Pinker, Steven. The blank slate: the modern denial of human nature. New York: Penguin, 2002.
Prusa, Igor. “Theorizing about scandals and their mediations: the case of Japan.“ In Electronic journal of contemporary Japanesestudies, first published in March 2010.
Prusa, Igor. “Megaspectacle and Celebrity Transgression in Japan: the 2009 Media Scandal of Sakai Noriko.” In Idols and Celebrity inJapanese Media Culture, edited by Galbraith W. Patrick and Jason G. Karlin, 56-71. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012a.
Prusa, Igor. “The Logic of Political Media Scandals in Japan and the Case Study of Ozawa Ichiro.” In Global Media Journal special

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論37

edition, edited by Anne Grüne, Carola Richter and Dirk-Claas Ulrich, Vol. 2, No.2, Autumn/Winter 2012b.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on political economy and the social contract. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Ruigrok, Nel. “Media coverage of scandals: A modern version of Greek Tragedy.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of theInternational Communication Association, San Francisco, CA, May 23, 2007.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and nothingness: a phenomenological essay on ontology. London: Routledge, 1956.
Schwab, Frank and Clemens Schwender. “The descent of emotions in media: Darwinian perspectives.” In The Routledge Handbookof Emotions and Mass Media, edited by Katrin Döveling, Christian von Scheve, and Elly A. Konijn, 15-36. London: Routledge,
2011.
Sherman, Lawrence W. Scandal and Reform: Controlling Police Corruption. London: University of California Press, 1978.
Smith, Nick. I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Storm, Rasmus K. and Ulrik Wagner. “The Anatomy of the Sports Scandal: Outset, Development and Effect.” Paper presented at
Play the Game 2011, Cologne, Germany, October 3-6, 2011.
Thompson, John B. “Scandal and social theory.” In Scandals: Morality and desire in the popular culture marketplace, edited byJames Lull and Steven Hinerman. 35-64, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.
Toomer, Jean. Essentials, edited by Rudolph P. Byrd. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991.
Turner, Victor. “Are there universals of performance in myth, ritual, and drama?” In By means of performance. Intercultural studiesof theatre and ritual, edited by Richard Schechner and Willa Appel, 8-18, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Uesugi, Takashi. Shimbun, terebi ha naze heiki de “uso” wo tsuku no ka [How come the newspapers and TV have no scruples about
lying?]. Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2012.
Vasterman, Peter L.M. “Media-Hype: “Self-Reinforcing News Waves, Journalistic Standards and the Construction of Social Problems.”
European Journal of Communication 20 (2005): 508-530.
Waisbord, Silvio R. “Scandals, Media, and Citizenship in Contemporary Argentina.” American Behavioral Scientist 47 (2004): 10721098.
Wetherell, Walter D. On Admiration: heroes, heroines, role models, and mentors. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2010.
Weber, Max. On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by Shmuel .N. Eisenstadt. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Williams, Bruce A. and Michael X. Delli Carpini. “Monica and Bill All the Time and Everywhere: The Collapse of Gatekeeping andAgenda Setting in the New Media Environment.” American Behavioral Scientist 47 (2004): 1208-1230.
Young, Jock. “The role of the police as amplifiers of deviance” in Images of deviance, edited by Stanley Cohen, Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1971.

Igor Prusa, Ph.D.（イゴール・プルシャ）［生年月］1979 年 2 月 3 日生まれ
［出身大学又は最終学歴］プラハ・カレル大学 社会科学部 メディア研究 博士課程修了
東京大学 大学院情報学環・学際情報学府 IT ASIA プログラム 博士課程
［専攻領域］スキャンダル論、英雄論［主たる著書・論文（3 本まで、タイトル・発行誌名あるいは発行機関名）］“Megaspectacle and Celebrity Transgression in Japan: the 2009 Media Scandal of Sakai Noriko.”In Idols
and Celebrity in Japanese Media Culture, edited by Galbraith W. Patrick and Jason G. Karlin, 56-71. London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
“The Logic of Political Media Scandals in Japan and the Case Study of Ozawa Ichiro.”In Global Media Journal,
special edition, edited by Anne Grüne, Carola Richter and Dirk-Claas Ulrich, Vol. 2, no.2, Autumn/Winter 2012.
„Theorizing about scandals and their mediations: the case of Japan.“ In Electronic journal of contemporary
Japanese studies, March 2010.
［所属］東京大学大学院情報学環学際情報学府 IT ASIA プログラム［所属学会］East Asia Think Tank（EATT）

38

東京大学大学院情報学環紀要

情報学研究

№88

Media, scandals, and society:a theoretical introduction

Igor Prusa, Ph.D.*

Abstract
This treatise seeks to illuminate the theoretical background of a scandal mediation process incontemporary media-saturated societies. Further, it aims to strengthen the theoreticalunderstanding of scandals without reducing them to a mere mass media phenomenon. This
allows us to adopt various theoretical notions and sociological approaches as outlined throughout
the text. The basic assumption is that no matter how arbitrary or fleeting scandals appear to be,after a careful observation they come to present certain qualities of constant social nature thatare worth putting through an in-depth analysis while providing interesting interdisciplinary
insights.

Key Words：media scandal, transgression, social theory

現代社会におけるメディア・スキャンダル論39