This is a slightly revised version of my essay published in Hokkaido Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 6, 2004,
pp.432-404. Also, to contact: khase@ec.hokudai.ac.jp

Human Well-being and Public Provision†
Ko Hasegawa ‡Without civic morality communities perish; without personal morality
their survival has no value. (Bertrand Russell, Authority and Individual)

1. Introduction: The Place of Human Well-being for Public Institution
Any public institution aims at properly recognizing and realizing people’s claims
in society. And one of the main tasks of normative theories of public institution lies
in articulating public morality, which includes the principles and forms of the proper
treatment of those claims.1
In articulating this public morality, we have to beware the fact of reasonable
pluralism in modern society. 2 People have various claims and related interests intheir thinkings and doings which may be complex and conflicting. If this diversity isinevitable, public institution and its normative theory also have to be responsive toit.
However, to establish this moral sensibility is not easy. One typical example inthis respect is welfare aid. Each individual has her own physiological andpsychological conditions: when she has some kind of disease or handicap, the† This essay is an English recapitulation, with some revisions and complementary remarks, ofthe central claims in my book on justice in Japanese, “Kousei no Houtetsugaku [Fairness andPhilosophy of Law]”, published in 2001, in terms of the human ideal for institutional aid. For
this recapitulation, I was much encouraged by the conversations with Professor Jonathan Wolff
at University College London. He gave me a variety of stimulating suggestions, while I stayed in
UCL in the 2002/03 academic year. I am much grateful to his kindness. Also I thank Ms.
Hyunjoo Naomi Chi, a doctoral candidate in the School of Law at University of Hokkaido, for
her help in editing.
‡ Professor of Philosophy of Law, School of Law, University of Hokkaido.
1 By public morality I understand a certain set of normative principles which regulates various
public provisions especially in the form of law. Contrast to this morality, I think private morality
or ethics as a certain set of prescriptive principles which guides personal activities. Although thedistinction between the two is sometimes not quite clear, public morality is concerned basicallywith the social setting for the individual activities based on private moralities.
2 Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia U.P., 1993), p.63f.
1

content and degree of her disadvantages vary relative to her own circumstance. Thus,
when the government or other organizations try to deal with welfare aid, they needto hold sensible and adequate concerns for the particularities of those in need. Still,
it is not so evident that the government or other organizations may guarantee any aid
for the needy. For, not only are there financial and human limits for welfare aid, butalso it is controversial in principle whether and to what extent the government orother organizations should aid all the needs people can demand. There should becertain room for self-help or be the limits of paternalistic interventions. 3 The
central question to be addressed is how we may be publicly responsive to particularneeds.
When we think about the working of public institution, we have to beware ofseveral characteristics in our perspective. First, public institution has to work in publicstance; second, public institution has to hold public value; and third, public institution
has to maintain certain public structure.
Public stance is the perspective which constitutes and regulates the spaces forevery member of society to perform various activities. Since it is a natural fact thathuman society necessarily tends to generate conflicts among its members, due to thefact of reasonable pluralism, it is also a natural fact that human society necessarily
forms certain institutions which aim at resolving those conflicts in socially adequate
ways. 4 And this social resolution requires a general abstraction from the particular
benefits of particular members in society. This resolution has to be impartial toanybody in society who may have similar interests. Of course, this public stance may
include various types. It might be authoritarian, aristocratic, as well as democratic;
but I simply assume here that it is democratic, which means that in modern society
we need the accountability with a set of reasonable justifications for institutional
resolutions in public stance.5
The necessity of reasonable justifications leads us to the significance of public
value for underpinning public institution. People in modern society hold divergent
values for their own unique lives. Any religious or ethical views are, in principle, to
be tolerated in modern society. However, these divergent views are within a certain
We have here the question of freedom and individual responsibility. Although I don’t thinkthat they are values to be respected only as libertarians believe, they are still important ones tobe taken into account for modern social life.
4 Of course, how this is formed is a question which needs further examination: by convention,
contract, or revolution? However, here, I put this question aside.
5 This point is related to my own moral view that we should endorse egalitarian liberalism. Seelater in this essay, Sections 2, 3.
3

2

limit of reasonableness. These views should not overtly suppress or infringe witheach other and they should be equally promoted to flourish to make human lives
richer. And if the functions of public institution are related to the regulation andpromotion of divergent values, the background value for this institution itself has tobe publicly shared one among divergent people. In this respect, public value has adifferent character from private value. The formal point for public value has to be
detached or non-agent-related, socially embracing, and interactively ordering among
divergent private values. 6 It aims at regulating inter-agent relationships, thus, isconcerned not with solving the ethical problems internal to people themselves but
rather with facilitating necessary and decent conditions for the activities of people insociety.
The relative detachment of public values imposes certain characteristics on the
structure of public institution. If public value regulates divergent claims throughpublic institution, this institution has to arrange these claims in a certain ordering.
Even if it cannot yield the absolute ordering due to the heterogeneity of claims inquestion, it needs an arrangement among them to maintain and promote an adequate
social order. This relative ordering has to have formally at least three important
aspects: width, depth, and mode of regulation. 7 The width of public institution isconcerned with how broadly it should give supports for divergent claims of people;
the depth of public institution is concerned with to what degree it should give
support for each legitimate claim of people; and the mode of regulation isconcerned with by what kind of enforcement it should give supports for people. For
these three aspects, there is a spectrum between the broad, thick, and strong
structure and the narrow, thin, and weak structure; and to find a proper set of those
aspects is the main task for a normative theory of public institution.
I should add in this regard about the importance of law for the construction
and working of public institution. It is sometimes imagined that we need public rules
for the working of various institutions in society and thus is sometimes maintainedthat those rules are to be instrumentally determined according to public decisions by
the people in society. From this perspective, what is called law is nothing but thesepublic rules, which are to be democratically determined; and, if we characterize thislaw in somewhat substantive manner, this will unnecessarily make law a metaphysical
6 Ko Hasegawa, Kousei no Houtetsugaku [Fairness and Philosophy of Law] (Shinzansha, 2001),
p.75ff, p.80ff., Also, cf. Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics (Westview Press, 1998), p.17ff.
7 Public institution has a three-dimensional structure, except for another important dimensionof relations in time.

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entity. However, I maintain that public rules need certain valuational substance, ifthey have to embody certain public values for their workings; and that, if this kindof substantive public rules should be enforceable in various ways, it should be calledlaw. In this respect, the concept of law is not so restricted as ordinarily assumed.
Rather, I understand law to be the combination of political morality, statutes, andsocial convention. This is law in a broad sense.8 Political morality is a part of law as
the basic guideline of statutes. Statutes are law in a narrow sense. Social conventions
are law at the level of tacit social knowledge. My point here is that law is not limited
to statutes and precedents as the positivist understanding of law usually assumes. I
think that the law is itself a comprehensive social order; law in this broad sense isitself the set of shared public values. Thus, public stance with public value is itself
to be expressed as normative considerations for the construction of law in thisbroad sense. 9This outlook on the publicness of law has another important point to be
stressed: that law is public order implies that its working is always general in its width,
depth, and mode of regulation. The issues dealt in law should be socially identifiable
and soluble ones. Of course, we have serious controversies on the limits or the
potential of law in several boundary issues, such as racism, sexism, animal rights, or
global warming. Regarding these issues, the scope and role of law is heavily debated:
to what extent law can save the harms arisen in those cases is the limiting case forthe working of law in a public setting. Still, my point here is simply that when we
think about the forms of public institution as law in a broad sense, we have to beaware of the limits of the reach of exemption, aid, or remedy for individuals. For
example, while it is truly important to give maximal educational aid to children insocial care, we always have to think about this possibility in a generalized way. That is,
we have to aid various children in an equal way. If so, the background idea for thisaid cannot be a specific expectation for the development of a particular child but
rather be some abstract value on the general types of education for all the children in
need. 10
This is a Dworkinian view. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard U.P., 1986), ch. 7.
What I would like to emphasize here is the primacy and importance of normative
considerations in law and politics, as the logical nature of our normative thinking. In otherwords, even if it is surely evident that positive laws are some instruments for social change, theidea of law (or the law) is always the normative foundation for such law-making, adjudicationand other related governmental or non-governmental activities.
10 This does not mean that we do not need specific considerations for a particular individual insome form other than law. Also, it does not mean that we do not need even some legal
considerations on specific aid. I am simply talking about the general requirements of law.
894

This point on the generality of law should not be taken as law’s ungenerosity. It
is important here to recall the spirit of modern constitutionalism. As Ronald
Dworkin eloquently argued, the point of law lies in securing the significant rights ofindividuals against the tyranny of majority or the goal-directed considerations ofsocial interests. 11 This is usually understood as emphasizing the priority of individual
liberty in public considerations. Yet, it should not be neglected that the importanceof the protection of individuals may also include the concern for decent living ofindividuals.12 The tradition of liberal constitutionalism in modern society has been
caring about the broader security of the subsistence of individuals. 13 Thus, in our
problem context, law’s generality can imply the public concern for individual
circumstance which tends to be neglected by social considerations. In this regard, it
may be understood even as an aspect of moral education for mutual respect. 14
Now, a normative theory for public institution has to shape these characteristics
and aspects in a well-balanced way by a certain valuational axis. Apparently, what thisnormative axis should be has been the fundamental question in the recent
development in theories of justice, especially concerning the issue of “equality ofwhat”. Under this heading, modern theories of justice such as utilitarianism,liberalism,

libertarianism,

or

even

communitarianism,

consideration for exploring a better view.

15

may

be

taken

into

This debate cannot be concluded withsimple ideological claims. Rather, to argue for whichever favorable standpoint, a
position is to be determined by a view of human well-being which public institution
can aim at realizing. 16 As mentioned earlier, this is significant in finding a properbalance among the width, the depth, and the mode of regulation for public
institution.
I myself wish to endorse an egalitarian standpoint for the proper working of
pubic institution. I basically take egalitarian liberalism as more promising than any
other positions.17 Still, even within this strand of liberalism, there are several types
Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard U.P., 1977), chs. 4, 7.
Cf. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard U.P., 1985), ch. 9.
13 Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995), ch. 8.
14 I owe this emphasis to an insightful suggestion by Prof. Reiko Gotoh at Ritsumeikan
University.
15 E.g. Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Harvard U.P., 1992), ch. 1. Also, cf. Will Kymlicka,
Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd . ed.) (Oxford U.P., 2002), p. 1ff.
16 Here human well-being is not limited to a narrow conception of preference satisfaction, of
happiness or of welfare. What is this something broader is the question in this essay. Cf. Daniel
Hausman and Michael McPherson, Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge U.P., 1996),
Part III.
17 Hasegawa, op.cit., p. 143ff., p. 181ff.
11
12

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of ideas for equality such as resource equality, capability equality, equal opportunity
for welfare, equal access to advantage, or social equality. 18 At this level again, a key
for further exploration lies in the view of human well-being.
Relevant here is the illuminating distinction between equal treatment and treatment
as equals. 19 Equal treatment means that everyone is to be treated in a flat way in any
contexts, while treatment as equals does not necessarily mean such a flat treatment.
The latter idea is intuitively clear at some abstract level, and is significant because of
its sensibility for substantive equality in various contexts. However, the deeper
question is naturally how we can attain treatment as equals, which is very importantfor us to get a clearer idea of its realistic potential in our lives. Understanding thesignificance of treatment as equals is connected to articulating a view on humanwell-being. Although the concept of human well-being is difficult to interpret, we
will be able to capture the core of it if we establish a certain view of philosophicalethics. The basic question for philosophical ethics is how one can live a decent life,
which is a perennial one for any ethical theory. Yet it is significant for us to explore
some view of it, even if not complete.
My main task in this sketchy essay is, thus, to articulate a conception of humanwell-being for the working of public provision, especially with regard to welfare aid,
in which the significance of treatment as equals is anticipated to be the most evident
and urgent.
2. Self-formation and Equal Access to Moral Independence
In the course of life one has various experiences: joy, misery, hope, despair, luck,
hardship, sorrow, empathy, hate, anxiety, madness, construction, destruction,
fragmentation, integration, frenzy, suppression, arrogance, humility, vanity, sincerity,
selfishness, charity, friendship, insult, attachment, frivolity, dogmatism, beauty,
ugliness, dissipation, reason, or death. One often feels divided within oneself: there
are many factors which push or pull one to different directions in her thinking anddoing. The modes of these experiences are divergent, which are also multifariously
succeeded by next generations; they also include certain limitations under various
resources or circumstances. However, most people try to live for certain objectives,though some of them have to live merely in the burdens of lives with few hopes.
E.g. Stephen Darwall, ed., Equal Freedom (Univ. of Michigan Press, 1995); Louis Pojman &Robert Westmoreland, eds., Equality (Oxford U.P., 1997), Part IV.
19 Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p. 190f.
18

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Some might be able to live quiet and peaceful lives, while some might live hard lives.
Or, a peaceful life might radically change into a hard life, while a hard life might
gradually calm down to a peaceful life. Further, one can live not only for oneself but
also for others. Some people might devote themselves even only to saving others inurgent need. These life experiences are not captured by only one pattern: this is thefact of reasonable pluralism concerning individual lives, which must be the starting
point for considering the significance of human well-being.
With this recognition of plurality, human being is to be regarded as homocomplicatus and also as homo conflictus. Human being is homo conflictus, because her
thinking and doing are motivated by various emotional factors as exemplified
above. 20 These factors make a web of one’s motivations with complex interaction,
and, in a vector-like way, orient one’s thinking and doing toward a certain direction.
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that human being cannot think and act
from a simpler motivation, such as self-interest, passion, or inspiration. However,even if there appears some simple motivation, there is still more complex working ofvarious factors at its background. In this complexity, human being has to face avariety of conflicts. She is, in this regard, homo conflictus. Human subsistence itself is
an arena of inner conflicts: various motivational factors may conflict between, say,reason and passion, or self-interest and integrity. Further, there are also conflicts
with others: different individuals live with different values and interests in, say, theirlife-styles or religious beliefs. Conflicts with others tend to be more difficult to solve
than conflicts within oneself, since the former needs the congruence of different
ethical views. 21
If human being is homo complicatus and also homo conflictus, cannot her life but befluctuating and indeterminate? I think not; I believe rather that in whatever form andmode an individual tends to live her own life by pursuing something important. It
might not be an easy way: life can be contradictory, discontinuous, or fragmented.
However, I believe that one never enjoys such a life, and that one tries to make herlife meaningfully consistent, as much as possible.22
When one tries to pursue a certain meaning of her life under the condition ofcomplexity and conflicts, there should appear a certain ethics in oneself. In holding
ethics, one tries to explain and justify her thinking and doing in life, and to overcome
the pressure of reality and fate. Ethics, in this regard, is a set of private norms, and
Cf. Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 88ff.
Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Harvard U.P., 1983), ch. 7.
22 Cf. Murdoch, op.cit., p. 92ff.
20
21

7

guides one’s life in the best possible way. Yet, ethics is divergent as it is employed byindividuals with their particular lives. Realism, skepticism, hedonism, deontology,
teleology, perfectionism, pragmatism, situational ethics, particular religious beliefs,
relativism, opportunism, or even nihilism ---- human beings may hold many kinds of
ethics. Ethics people hold may converge, and yet it will be partial. As far as
individual lives are divergent, ethics can also be divergent. Within a reasonableboundary, there is no particular right ethics. There are various distinctive points inany of those ethics. This is the fact of human life.
When we recognize the diversity of human life, we cannot seek the core ofdecent life in a particular mode of life or of personal ethics. A particular life or
ethics has unique significance only for a particular individual. No one has theprivilege that her ethics is the best of all in social setting. However, when we think
about it, we find a deeper fact that living in a certain decent way itself has an
intrinsic value for human being, regardless of its various substances. Even if it isfluctuating, frivolous, or even seemingly meaningless, everyone lives somehow to try
to develop her life. This is itself the ultimate fact for human being, and also itself tobe the ultimate ethics for anyone. This view involves a flavor of perfectionism.
Because this view presupposes the fact that people tend to pursue the better
standard of life lead by various objectives, even if gradually. Still, the perfectionism
here, if any, is not the perfectionism of virtuous attainment for life. It is rather theminimal perfectionism of the performance in living. 23
The question then is what the core of this self-pursuit for a better life is. And I
think that it is a certain sort of integral process in personal life: that is, self-formation.
To understand the significance of self-formation, we should start fromconsidering the multiplicity of the self. When we reflect on the ethical conflicts inpersonal life, we find that there are various ethical forces which conflict within
ourselves. To take a few, there are forceful emotions and other rational or reasonableconsiderations, such as self-interest, desirability, practicality, freedom, equality, desert,
needs, special obligations, custom, or autonomy. This will suggest that there works acertain multiplicity of the ethical considerations in the self. The most typicalcharacterization of this multiplicity is the Platonic distinction among reason,
emotion and will. In this type of view, reason has an initiative to guide and regulateemotion and will for a rational pursuit of the ideal in one’s life. 24 However, as Stuart

23
24

Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard U.P., 2002), p. 253ff.
Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 246A and after.
8

Hampshire persuasively criticized, the Platonic master-mind view of the self is notplausible, because reason, emotion and will may be mutually interactive. Hampshire
perceptively maintained that the initiative in the self is taken sometimes by reason,
sometimes by emotion, and sometimes by will, and that all of this process iscontrolled by the process of reflection and prescription with the result of therealization of the decency in the self. Thus, the self should be understood not as
hierarchically monolithic but as heterarchically multiple. 25 In addition to thisHampshirean view of multiplicity of the self, we should be aware the internal layersof the self depicted by Gary Watson. Watson points out the difference between thefirst-order desires and the second-order evaluations in the self. We appreciate which
desires we should pursue by higher-order evaluative reflections.26 This is also an
important insight. If so, we can dub this Watsonian distinction to the Hampshirean
outlook to reach the view that at the internal dimension the self has the multiplicity
by two-tier structure, in which higher-order reflection and prescription can guide andregulate lower-order desires for one’s thinking and doing.
The multiplicity of the self is further elucidated by its external diversity. As
Michael Walzer insightfully pointed out, the self may be divided in relation to social
setting. 27 Walzer grasps the multiplicity of the self in three aspects of social
identities. The first is concerned with the natural property of individuals: race, sex
and other genetic characteristics. The second is concerned with the social relations
surrounding individuals: family, friends, associations, or other social groups. And thethird is concerned with rights and obligations which individuals hold in various
social relations. Walzer thinks that the self is divided into these three aspects, whichsometimes conflict with each other. Still, this self is not completely divided.
According to Walzer, the voices of these aspects can be listened to and there can becertain dialogue among those voices in the self. At any rate, if the self has this kindof external multiplicity, the complexity of internal multiplicity mentioned earlier
becomes at least tripled along the aspects of one’s social identities.
Incidentally, we should understand another external dimension for themultiplicity of the self: that is the plasticity over time. As Derek Parfit suggested in aslightly different context, the constituency of the self may change in the flow of

Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Harvard U.P., 1989), p. 23ff.
Gary Watson, “Free Agency” (in: John Martin Fischer, ed., Moral Responsibility, Cornell U.P.,
1986, pp.81-96), p. 83ff.
27 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1994), ch. 5.
25
26

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time. 28 Putting aside the issue whether this change radically modifies thecommon-sense assumptions on the concept of person or not, it is significant herethat the internal and external multiplicity of the self somewhat changes its content
or mode over time. To add the consideration on the plasticity of the self over timeto the complexity mentioned above makes the multiple character of self much more
complicated than ordinarily imagined.
Even if the human self may be multiple in various dimensions, however, it does
not immediately follow that the self is so fragmented that one cannot integrate not
only synchronically but also diachronically. Rather, I think the case is opposite; there
is a possibility of the integration of the self in a couple of ways.
First, not only the Hampshirean internal multiplicity, but also the Walzerian
external multiplicity of the self does not indicate the impossibility of integration.
Rather they both suggest a certain route of the integration of the self. Hampshire
suggests the controllability of the self by reflection and prescription. Also, with the
Watsonian two-tier structure of the self, we can think that this control is carried out
with a certain evaluation. True, the Walzerian multiplicity of the self may hold theheterogeneous dividedness of social identities in the self. But, Walzer himself alsosuggests that there is some arrangement among the voices from divided parts: theself is considered as embracing something like a chairperson. In this regard, weshould pay attention to the dimension of ethical ordering in the self. Even if various
in its substantive content, this dimension of ethical ordering can determine theparticular mode of the self in each individual. The dimension of ethical orderingclassifies the importance of basic or derivative values in one’s self and shape one’s
thinking and doing along with it. This ethical ordering itself is common to all of us,which is constitutive of the judgmental working of the self in us human beings.
Secondly, the plasticity of the self over time can imply the necessity of theintegration over time. The past may be a potentiality to be incessantly articulated at
the present, thus it should be consistent with the present. Meanwhile, the future issimply non-existent from the standpoint of the present, which means that we always
orient ourselves toward the future, and that, in the flow of time from the future to
the past via the present, we construct our lives. In this sense, we seek the consistency
between the future and the past via the construction of the present. This means thatone pursues certain integrity of life over time, and, if this pursuit synchronicallydepends on the work of ethical ordering mentioned above, the entire self moves
28

Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford U.P., 1984), Part Three.
10consistently toward the realization of a certain objective in life.29
Then, how should we capture the essence of the self ? Although this question ismuch debatable, my view is that we have certain judgmental core in the self whichyield one’s thinking and doing in synchronic and diachronic settings. This core isunderstood as the interpretive spiral of receptivity, sagacity, and practicality: it is thedevelopmental spiral among the intelligent sensibility in understanding, theimaginative ability of progressive response, and the practical power to attain the life
objectives at hand.30 The intelligent sensibility in understanding indicates that one
can interpret other’s thinkings and doings in the best way possible, with a sense thatthese persons basically share certain problem-interests, even if they have different
opinions. The imaginative ability of progressive response indicates that one candevote oneself to reach a better explanation and justification of the problems
discussed. And the practical power to attain life objectives is that one has enoughwill to step forward to the realization of the reasonable solution of the problem athand. Also, this spiral develops successively toward a new dimension over time. One
sensibly perceives the problem situations at hand, imaginatively construct a better
solution for it, willfully carry out what to do reasonably, and then face and perceive
the new problem situation at another stage in life.31 To put these conditions together,
we grasp the significant core of the self, and can share serene feelings with reason.
This is the very process of self-formation, as I understand it.
The important thing to note then is that from the viewpoint of society,self-formation is carried out by every individual in society, despite the deep
differences in mode and substance. The recognition of this social fact sets thestarting point for the respect and concern for people from a public viewpoint. For,
the case that self-formation is significant for every individual means socially thatsociety has to care about any possibility of self-formations among divergent people.
Also this naturally leads to the thought that if we should pay attention to thesignificance of human well-being as the focal idea for public institution, we should
hold self-formation as the candidate of human well-being. 32 Thus we have to

Cf. Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge U.P., 1996), p. 369ff.
This view is developed based on the so-called hermeneutic circle. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Philosophical Hermeneutics (Univ. of California Press, 1976), Part I.
31 This is also a process of incessant problem-solving in human life. Cf. Karl Popper, Objective
Knowledge (Oxford U.P., 1972), chs. 1, 3.
32 There is an interactive relationship between the eye of public viewpoint and the focal pointin people in society. This is not a view which may violate the naturalistic fallacy; rather it can becalled as critical naturalism that normative considerations counter with human conflicts in society.
29
30

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articulate more about the idea of self-formation in the public setting.
Individually speaking, self-formation has a particularly unique character which isconnected to a particular meaning of one’s own ethical life. It might be mostly
perfect, successful, or poor. From a public perspective, however, self-formation is tobe captured as independent of those particular substances or modes of individual
lives. Self-formation in this regard is to be seen as simply dependent on andaccessible through public value. We should recall here that public value has thefollowing characteristics.33 Public value is what has to be somehow publicly shared
among divergent people; it is to be detached or non-agent-related, embracing, andinteractively ordering among divergent values; it aims at regulating inter-agent
relationships; and it is concerned only with facilitating necessary and decent
conditions for the activities of people. Thus, the public view of self-formation isrelated to the common baseline of the activities of people, which may be developed
multifariously by each of them.
The question then is what this common baseline is. Here, I take this as thecommon axis for individual lives which is for the maintenance of the context ofindividual activities in society. In other words, it is the axis around which individual
activities are constituted, performed and developed. In this regard, as for thephenomenological aspects of this axis, we may capture the basis, route, and result ofactivities, which are sequential characteristics common to any individual activities insociety. If so, corresponding to these aspects, self-formation itself has certain
constitutive factors in a successive way: that is, the status, ability, and attainment.
The status in self-formation is the starting point of the spiral of receptivity,
sagacity and practicality, where the moral standing of equals or individual
independence should be maintained. The ability in self-formation is the process of
forming oneself through the spiral of receptivity, sagacity and practicality, where thebasic capacities of individuals are to be enhanced. The attainment in self-formationis the fair share of the products of individual activities, by which the spiral ofreceptivity, sagacity and practicality is to be advanced. Then, the context of humanactivities may also be captured as the spheres of activities. Generally speaking,society has several distinct spheres of human activities. In particular, modernsociology teaches us that the basic units of society are government, family, andassociation. This suggests that we have political activities regarding the working ofgovernment and power, that we have cultural activities regarding the function of
33

Earlier in this essay, p. 2.
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family and socialization, and that we have economic activities regarding thedevelopment of material production and consumption. This recognition is to begeneralized to the effect that in society there are political sphere, cultural sphere, andeconomic sphere, in each of which distinctive goods unique to each sphere are to beprovided. These are political goods, cultural goods, and economic goods, which givenecessary and decent resources for the status, ability and attainment ofself-formation relative to those spherical contexts.
If the context of human activities in society has its aspect and sphere, we may
combine these factors to represent the framework of the context of self-formationin the following nine-cell matrix.
StatusAbility

Attainment

Political
Goods
CulturalGoods
Economic
Goods

Although it be a simpler heuristic device, this matrix also represents the angleof the public concern for self-formation. The fulfillment of this framework in aproper way shows the working of public concern to attain the best realization ofhuman well-being in terms of the support for self-formation. The degree of thefulfillment in each cell is determined by a certain idea of public concern. In thisregard, we may imagine a polar between the minimal support only at status cells andthe full support at every cell, except that these two possibilities are to be rejected as
improper in terms of self-formation as human well-being. For, as has been suggested
so far, self-formation is the idea that people have equal share of basic support for
their diverse lives, while each individual can have divergent objectives for her own
life. This idea is to be located somewhat in between the polar mentioned above. Thus
the relevant thought is that in the framework above a certain well-balanced
distribution of resources, along with the characteristics of matrix, is required inorder for anyone in society to be able to pursue her own life. This means that thefulfillment of the framework in a proper way itself can express a better idea of
public concern for human well-being: each person has equal accessibility to therealization of one’s own life, with fair basic support provided by society. This idea is13

to be called as equal access to moral independence. It corresponds to the best conceptionof human well-being, namely self-formation, as I endorse it.
3. The Value of Substantive Fairness and the Frame for Public Provision
How can an idea of distributive justice attain equal access to moral
independence?
To get the first outlook for this question, we should consider several moral
problems concerning unfairness in society. These are problems concerning, forexample, the infringements of basic rights, the initial imbalance of wealth or social
status, and the ignorance of social handicap or information gap; concerning the lackof the ability for autonomy caused by impairments or handicaps, the insufficiency ofjob-training or educational opportunities, and the impropriety of medical support; or,concerning the unreasonable imbalance of earnings, the necessity of the aid for
unemployment, and the burdens for external negative effects in economic activities.
Without the protection of civil liberties such as the liberty of life, body,property, religion, expression, or choice of office, individuals in society cannot
subsist peacefully. If there is the initial imbalance of social status, wealth, or thepersistence of handicaps, individuals cannot but be unequally burdened with negative
resources which cannot be disposed of for themselves. Also, without the proper
job-training or other educational opportunities and medical support for healthyliving, individuals cannot maintain the minimal abilities for living through their lives.
And if there are no reasonable redistributions of earnings or common burdens forthe external effects in economy, the inevitable opportunity costs of society cannot be
fairly shared among the members of society, nor equity on these matters for the
maintenance of individual life can hold properly. These are, I believe, a basic set ofwell-considered judgments in public morality.34
These judgments show the necessity of public judgment for equal access tomoral independence: without proper supports for individual life in accordance with acertain ideal for it, there cannot be a fair social order in which human well-being interms of self-formation may be adequately realized. Thus, if a proper objective ofdistributive justice should be the realization of equal access to moral independence, aIf these judgments are taken as well-considered ones simply because I have already certain
liberal intuitions, there is a circularity. However, this is not a serious problem here, since I am
now interpretively articulating and elucidating a possible content of a certain idea of distributive
justice which I believe is the best conception of it.

34

14

proper conception of such justice should also respond to this idea. Here, I contend
that we should take substantive fairness as the best conception of distributive justice.
To articulate the content of substantive fairness, let us recall the nine-cell matrix
which captures the necessary framework for the public concern for self-formation
among individuals in society.35 The idea of substantive fairness is to be developed inaccordance with this matrix in which, following also the well-considered judgments
exemplified above, the fulfillment of each cell can be full, partial, or nil in expressing
the necessity and degree of support in question. Those judgments are categorized
and specified relative to each of the following nine contexts: (i) political status, (ii)political ability, (iii) political attainment, (iv) cultural status, (v) cultural ability, (vi)cultural attainment, (vii) economic status, (viii) economic ability, and (ix) economic
attainment.
Regarding political status, for example regarding the protection of civil liberties,
franchise should be guaranteed equally for any qualified member in society.
Regarding the political ability of franchise, however, there is no need for support,
because the political judgment in voting is one’s own private problem regardless ofwhether it is politically good or bad, or significant or meaningless. Regarding
political attainment, one need not to be aided for the result of voting as one wishes,
because it is simply a problem of accidental consequences in terms of democratic
decisions. Next, regarding cultural status, for example, concerning educational
opportunities, basic compulsory education has to be guaranteed for everyone insociety. Regarding the cultural ability in education, one needs certain support if one
may not have adequate ability to follow the necessary curriculum for basic materials.
But, regarding the cultural attainment in education, one does not need to be aided
for getting the same educational result as others, because there should be thedifference in attainment in proportion to the talents and efforts one may have.
Further, regarding economic status, the rights for employment, for example, should
be protected equally without regard to sex or race. Regarding the economic ability inwork, one needs certain supports for unemployment or job-training to the extent
that these are the lacks for which they are not responsible. Regarding economic
attainment, there is certain need to redistribute the results or burdens of economic
activities in society, because one cannot succeed to get profits without any help fromothers or because one should take a part of common burdens which collective
economic activities generate.
35

Earlier in this essay, p. 13.
15

Based on these extended well-considered judgments, we can fulfill the necessityand degree of support in each cell within the matrix above. It may be represented in
the following heuristic way:
StatusAbility

Political
Goods*

Cultural
Goods

*

*

*

Economic
Goods

*

*

*

In this figure, *Attainment**

basically means the requirement of provision which is

expected to realize equality among members of society. Then, **provision for equality in the domain in question, while *indicates fullindicates partial provision

which leave certain room for no aid in the domain in question. Also, non-marked cellmeans that no provision is necessary. The domains with no provisions are the zones
of freedom for people in society in which any ability or attainment is appreciated as
attributed to people’s own responsibilities.
Incidentally, the typical examples of the protected values and interests in thismatrix are the following.
StatusAbility

Political
Goods

Equal Liberty,
Equality under Law

CulturalGoods

Family Rights,Basic
Education

Learning Skills

Economic
Goods

Economic Rights,
Labor Rights

Job Training,Unemployment Insurance

Attainment

Redistributive Tax
Schemes

There are several theoretically important points to note in order to clarify theidea of matrix in terms of the value of distributive justice.
First, the idea of substantive fairness for the protection and enhancement ofself-formation as the best conception of distributive justice is articulated as
multi-dimensional value. Basically, as important public values, we should take liberty,

16equality, and efficiency. 36 These three values orient themselves to regulate therelationships among individuals in society; thus they work publicly. To put it briefly,
liberty expresses the idea that there should be no undue interventions among people;
equality expresses the idea that there should be equitable balance in resources amongpeople; and efficiency expresses the idea that there should be the optimal allocationof resources in society. These three values, embracing divergent lives of people
under them, give the extrinsic constraints for human activities in society. There will
be no denying that these values are important inheritance in our history sincemodernization.
We should note here that those three values have different fields in theirworkings while they have certain interrelationship as well. From the angle of liberty,
while it is advisable that individuals pursue their own lives without any hindrance
from others, it may contradict equality when the results of these activities generateunreasonable discriminations or social differences among people. Also, while liberty
can achieve the efficient optimality in resource allocation especially throughvoluntary transactions in market mechanism, it may conflict with efficiency when
there appear economic problems of high transaction costs, monopoly, externality, or
the necessity of trade-off under scarcity of resources. Further, equality has certain
tension with efficiency. Although in the world of the Rawlsian difference principle orthe Varianian envy-free allocation equality and efficiency can be compatible,37 there
are many prerequisite moral problems concerning discrimination or unequal ability
which are worsened in the pursuit of efficiency without any ex ante or ex post facto
corrections for equality.
Seeing this complex relationship among liberty, equality, and efficiency, we canunderstand it in the following way. Let us assume the basic horizon where individuals
perform their own activities with being fully protected by proper public values. In
this horizon, individual activities are to be circumscribed not to intervene with eachother. This is the working dimension of liberty. But, there are many individuals who
cannot enjoy the basic horizon for their activities because of discriminations orother differences in resources. They are appreciated as living less than the basic level.
There are other values which are seemingly relevant, such as self-interest, perfection, desert,
needs, special obligations, autonomy, or evolutionary standards. However, they are not counted
as public values, because all these values are only agent-relevant ethical values, or the ones whichcannot decide themselves the conflicts on their own understandings, or are too vague or alreadypresuppose more substantive values.
37 Cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Rev. ed.) (Harvard U.P., 1999), p. 65ff.; Hal Varian,
Variants in Economic Theory (Edward Elger, 2000), p. 13ff.
36

17Here is the working space of equality which corrects these gaps for people to enjoy
the baselines for their activities. Meanwhile, when liberty and equality are satisfied,with diverse activities of individuals the level of horizon itself can be increased forthe benefits for all the people involved. Efficiency works here in aiming at therealization of the possibly maximal benefits for all the people. From this triplex
understanding, we may present that liberty, equality, and efficiency are to be properly
harmonized in a well-balanced way. The idea of substantive fairness shows thisbalance as equal access to moral independence in accordance with the matrix for therealization of self-formation for people in society.
In addition, I should mention here about the relationship between liberty andequality. The relationship between these two values has been a focus of debate inpolitical philosophy. 38 In particular, since negative liberty has been regarded ascrushing substantive equality which seeks certain material evenness in resources or
welfare, liberty and equality have been taken as essentially conflicting. Apart fromformal equality such as simple equality of opportunity, the concern for substantive
equality is alleged to infringe negative liberty by violating of property rights or
privacy 39. So the question in our context is whether this problem arises under theidea of substantive fairness endorsed so far. My answer is negative. Under the idea of
substantive fairness, equality focuses on the prerequisites of human activities, andthese activities are developed on the basic resources that may not be exploited by ourown responsibilities. As already seen, under the matrix which articulates the value of
substantive fairness, the resources to be equalized are the political-, cultural- andeconomic-status; the parts of cultural ability and the economic ability; and the part ofeconomic attainment. These should be regarded as necessary prerequisites for people
to perform their lives in society: in other words, by these supports, people can holdequal moral independence in their social activities in which they can freely pursue
their own values and interests. Thus, the key point for the relationship between
liberty and equality lies not in what is exclusively important in society, but rather inwhich is more important concerning the problem-context of self-formation inproviding supports for equal access to moral independence. Liberty and equality are
relatively complementary in this outlook.
Secondly, we should beware of the place of rights under the idea of substantive
See, e.g., Steven Lukes, “Equality and Liberty: Must They Conflict?” (in: David Held, ed.,Political Theory Today, Stanford U.P., 1991, pp. 48-66)
39 This criticism is especially from the libertarian standpoint. E.g. Friedlich Hayek, The
Constitution of Liberty (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), Part III.
38

18

fairness. Basically speaking, rights are the unique normative device to give priorconsiderations for individual’s demands. Although the contents of rights areindividualistic, it is itself a normative concept which intersubjectively claims one’s
reasonable due within society. Thus, the interpretation and application of rights is tobe determined by certain higher public value. This also means that it is basically the
problem of distributive justice in society.40 From the angle of substantive fairness,the distribution of resources along the matrix above is to be determined via proper
rights, when the fairness deficit along the matrix is evident. For example, if nofranchise is given because of racial prejudice, the idea of substantive fairness
requires it to be given to anyone in the race in question with the corresponding pushof rights. The necessity of rights is a positive side and a function of the seriousnessof the fairness deficit.
In this regard, we need two types of rights considerations: one for therecognition of rights, while the other for the moderation between rights. The
recognition of rights is concerned with the cases where public decision or decisionsof others in society generate the unreasonable deprivations of interests ofindividuals. The moderation of rights is concerned with the cases where different
rights claims in question generate the relative deprivations in one of the conflicting
rights. As to the former type, rights claims are regarded as justified, if rights claims
fall under the situation where the matrix of substantive fairness requires equalizationof resources; as to the latter type, one of the rights claims is given priorconsiderations, if this claim falls under the more basic domains in the matrix.
Overall, the necessity of rights is determined by the urgency of the recovery of thefairness deficit according to the matrix of substantive fairness.
Incidentally, we can make new classifications of rights with utilizing the matrix
of substantive fairness: that is, status rights, ability rights, and attainment rights; orpolitical rights, cultural rights, and economic rights; and further the combination ofthese classifications such as political-status rights or economic-attainment rights, andso forth. These new classifications will be of help for grasping the complex
functions of rights in society. 41
40 It is important that when we assign rights to certain vital interests we already appreciate thelack of these interests as infringing justice. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard
U.P., 1977), ch. 7.
41 For example, we may think that there is a functional homology among the rights to freespeech, the rights to education, and the rights to employment, in terms of the prerequisites tothe realization of decent personal life in society. We can also make an ordering of various rights
along the matrix of substantive fairness.

19

Thirdly, the matrix of substantive fairness determines the ordering for public
provisions. When the matrix has a certain order both along the axis of status, ability,
and attainment, and along the axis of political goods, cultural goods, and economic
goods, there is an indication for the ordering among nine cells yielded by the
combination of these axes. Namely, as the aspect of status and also the sphere ofpolitical goods are the most basic parts of this matrix, we may think the ordering
among those nine cells in the way that the more status related and political goods
related the values and interests in question are, the more important public provisions
become for realizing equal access to moral independence. More concretely, we may
think that the political status has a priority to the cultural status, and the cultural
status to the economic status, while the cultural ability has a priority to the economic
ability and the economic attainment. Also other cells left are given no public
provisions. I believe that this is another heuristic content of the idea of substantive
fairness. And I call the conditions determined by the three matrices shown in thissection the frame for public provision.
StatusAbility

Political
Goods

1

Cultural
Goods

2

4

Economic
Goods

3

5

Attainment

6

To add, I should mention about the cases where conflicts of values andinterests are found within the same cell in the matrix: such cases as, say, the conflict
between freedom of expression and the protection of privacy within the cell ofpolitical status. In this sort of cases, the matrix above only seems to show that thequestion is to be located within the same domain which needs certain equalization of
resources. This might seem not enough for the proper solution of such cases. Yet,this will be itself significant heuristic information for the moderation of rights:
being classified within the same category of political status, the two liberties areappreciated both important and to be equally provided as far as possible. Of course,
the fairness deficit between these two liberties cannot be easily detected, because inthis case both of these liberties have certain intrinsic values and thus need anotherstandard for moderation. Here I think that the value of efficiency becomes

20

important, since we can somehow evaluate the permissible social cost in protecting
either of both liberties. This implies that the matrix of substantive fairness implicitly
holds the third value for fairness other than liberty and equality which may sort out abetter position, even if liberty or equality holds along the matrix above.42 In thissense, the idea of substantive fairness articulates itself as a triplet balance of liberty,
equality, and efficiency, corresponding to the problem contexts of concrete cases.
Related to this, a further point to note is the degree of concreteness ofnormative considerations. An example of the importance of this consideration isshown in Rawls’ idea of the Four Stage Sequence for the realization of justicethrough law. 43 However, what I have in mind here is slightly different from Rawls’. It
is rather concerned with the theorizing of the implementation of particular meansfor particular cases along the matrix of substantive fairness as a development oflaw. 44 Here we need to consider the conditions of the integration of abstract
principle and concrete judgment. Especially from the viewpoint of the former
principle to which substantive fairness belongs, it is important to distinguish two
kinds of dimensions in application: simple vs. complex, and direct vs. indirect. Simple
application of principle is a sweeping and rigid application to the problem at hand.
Complex application is a dispersed and sensitive application to the problem. Direct
application is a comprehensive and penetrating application of the principle to the
problem. Indirect application is a partial and bounded application to the problem.
If we assume these distinctions, we apparently have four combinations
concerning the concreteness of normative considerations: simple-direct (S-D),
simple-indirect (S-Id), complex-direct (C-D), and complex-indirect (C-Id). In termsof these combinations, the point I am considering is in what combination thetheorizing in question within our context can imply. I think that S-D or S-Id iswrong, and C-Id is the right stance of the principle-judgment integration from theliberal perspective I have been trying to articulate through the idea of substantive
fairness. This liberal perspective can tolerate various types of diversity: we need theproper spherialization of abstract and concrete theories, and make the working andscope of the abstract principles more sensitive to specific problem-circumstances. In
this sense, our further considerations on concrete cases should be connected to theidea of substantive fairness through the C-Id route suggested above. It should also
be remarked here that the frame for public provision explicated above is a heuristic
On the conditional significance of efficiency, e.g. Hausman and McPherson, op.cit., p.90ff.
Rawls, op.cit., p.171ff.
44 Let us recall that public institution is law in a broad sense. Earlier in this essay, p. 3f.
42
43

21

device for the evaluative direction of our thinking and doing in more concrete public
provisions. It is by giving proper interpretations to the meanings and scopes ofresources in question that we permeate the frame for public provision into ouractivities in society.
Fourth and finally, to note is the significance of public medical aid. This is notadequately indicated in the matrix of substantive fairness. Since medical aid isconcerned with the very fundamental functions of human well-being, it is actually
the external basis of self-formation which tends to fallen outside the matrix. To
extend the spirit of substantive fairness, this fundamental level should be supposed
radically equal, because any kind of status is to be appreciated as equal in the matrix
above. Still, although public medical aid is to be given as equally as possible topeople in need, the degree of it beyond the minimal decent level of protection is adifferent question. For, at the very basic level, too, the measurement of the proper
distribution of resources will be the question of prudence, if not of real efficiency, as
well as in the case of the third dimension of the matrix mentioned earlier. How thenatural deficiencies or impairments of people may be covered by social arrangementsof public provision is itself a deeper question, which cannot be fully dealt here
except for brief remarks later.45
4. Some Complementary Remarks
From the viewpoint of substantive fairness for public provision, how can other
outlooks be appreciated? To conclude this essay, I wish to make some brief remarkson the two interesting views.
Recently Jonathan Wolff developed very interesting ideas for welfare aid. 46 He
contended that there are three variables for welfare aid, such as internal resources,
external resources, and social framework. Corresponding to these variables, heclaimed that there are three forms of remedy, such as personal enhancement,
targeted resource enhancement, and status enhancement, with the supplementary
methodical ideas of nullification and of narrow aim redress47. Also, he suggested, tounderstand the substantive significance of these forms, we need certain views on thehuman need which are plural along each of those forms of remedy. Further, in
Later in the last section of this essay, p. 25f.
Jonathan Wolff, “Addressing Disadvantages and the Human Good”(in: Journal of Applied
Philosophy, 19, 2002, pp.207-218)
47 For detailed explanations, Wolff, op.cit., p. 211f., p.216f.
45
46

22

arguing for this point, he tried to point out a sort of the best mix between theessentialist ideal for individuals (as to personal enhancement concerning internal
resources), the ideal of non-paternalistic corrective support for individuals (as totargeted resource enhancement concerning external resources), and the ideal ofadjusting reconstruction of social settings (as to status enhancement concerningsocial framework), without being drawn into the trap of humiliation, demeaning, or
stigmatization. This is also to be suitable to the ideal of respect and also to the ideaof nullification of obstacles. 48 I believe that Wolff ’s exploration is quite
understandable and stimulating, as well as sensible and significant. Thus, I would liketo comment here on his outlook, especially to explicate my more concrete view onsubstantive fairness in welfare aid.
As Wolff remarks rightly, we still lack an adequate gyroscope for theconcretization of egalitarian concern, even if distinguished theorists have been
exploring viable conceptions of equality at the abstract level. 49 However, Wolff
made an important step for that concretization. Although his standpoint seems moreegalitarian than mine, I don’t have disagreements with his basic ideas on welfare aidthat we need three sorts of remedial considerations suggested above. In particular, it
is important that his classification suggests the circumstantial structure ofindividuals for their activities in society. Still, I think that among Wolff ’s distinctions
or forms of remedy some axis idea of human well-being and distributive justice isnecessary.
While it seems that Wolff is drawn to the plurality of this axis, I believe that theframe for public provision articulated earlier may put Wolff ’s ideas in a certain order.
Utilizing the frame for public provision, we may place welfare aid in the cells of
status and ability in cultural and economic spheres. The point I wish to stress is, first,
that although Wolff ’s distinction among internal resources, external resources, andsocial framework is surely important, we can regard it as, so to speak, aphenomenologically pluralistic distinction which yet expects a certain integrative
assumption on human well-being. We will be able to connect that distinction to the
ethical idea of self-formation and public value of equal access to moral
independence; these integrative values are concretized for realizing welfare aid along
the frame for public provision in my sense. I think that this integrative view can givea more consistent guide for the selection of forms of remedy Wolff pointed out.
This is in the sense of respect which Wolff already developed in his article “Fairness, Respect,
and the Egalitarian Ethos” (in: Philosophy & Public Affairs , 27, 1998, pp.97-122), esp. p.107ff.
49 E.g. Darwall, ibid.; Pojman & Westmoreland, ibid.; Kymlicka, op.cit., p. 82ff., p.95f.
48

23

This leads to the second point I would like to emphasize. If it is possible to
make my idea on public provision overlap with Wolff ’s idea on forms of remedy, we
might find other dimensions to consider on the forms of remedy. One aspect to noteis that the axis of status/ability/attainment may be parallel to Wolff ’s distinction
among status enhancement/targeted resource enhancement/personal enhancement,with a qualification that in the frame for public provision we can also specify thecharacter of redistributed resources along the nature of our social activities. For
example, while the so-called barrier-free project can be required in the domain of
cultural status for equitable distribution of resources as status enhancement, targetedresource enhancement for specific ambitions of children has certain limitation in thedomain of cultural ability. However, we have to also beware that Wolff ’s distinction
on the forms of remedy between targeted resource enhancement and personalenhancement is not exactly parallel to my distinction between ability and attainment;
rather, his distinction cuts across mine. For, while his distinction is focusing on theinternality or externality of remedy for individuals, my distinction is focusing on theprocess or result of individual activities. In my view, Wolff ’s distinction is relativizedalong the sequence of individual activities. If so, my view is not as egalitarian as his
view: in my view, while targeted resource enhancement can fully work at all the
relevant levels in the frame mentioned above, personal enhancement can work only
in a generalizable way in those levels. For example, if some special educational help
for a particular child who wants to be a violinist despite of the handicap in her eyes
is deemed publicly necessary, it is not from a particularly affective concern for thischild but from a suitably generalizable concern for the handicapped individuals who
have reasonable ambitions. 50 Of course, this never means that we should not haveaffection to that particular child. In applying specific aid to this child, it is naturalthat we need special attention to the particular circumstances of this child in orderfor this aid to be effective. My point is rather concerned with the question of generalprinciple for such aid.
Thirdly, as to Wolff’s suggestion on the narrow aim redress, I think that giving
pinpoint aid is an important idea for more concrete nullifications. It will be apractically wiser way to give effective aid for those in need, without being involved
Incidentally, this point is related to Will Kymlicka’s friendly criticism to Wolff’s work.
Although I don’t think that Wolff is so much committed to “social justice” ideas, as Kymlicka
identified. It seems to me that Wolff has been trying to connecting the good points in liberal
thinking and social justice thinking. Especially, Wolff seems to try to deepen decent ways forthe realization of equality concern, and try not to argue for social justice itself. Cf. Kymlicka,
op.cit., p.198ff.
50

24

into serious foundational questions. Nevertheless, even if wiser, I sense that we still
have to clear a couple of problems here: one is the problem of diverse demands, andthe other is the problem of power-relations.
By the problem of diverse demands, I am thinking about a paradox that themore we are ready for specific remedies, the more we have to provide narrower aid
because of the demands aroused by preceding aid. Of course, Wolff himself once
remarked that generally speaking, in the tension between fairness and respect, wehave to sometimes make the way for respect. I think that this is right. 51 Yet, theparadox here is not the question of the egalitarian attitude but the question of
unintended consequences. I think that to deal with this kind of consequences is stilla remaining task for the ideas of effective specific aid.
By the problem of power-relations, I am thinking about the question whether
the causes of the lack of respect are to be avoided by giving adequate aid or not. In
other words, whether to give some aid itself does not really have any humiliating
effects or not. I sense that a certain part of the problem of the lack of respect iscaused by the ubiquitous power-relations among people, which will be inescapable insocial relationship. 52 Thus I sense that, alongside such a sensible way of remedy as
the narrow aim redress, we need certain adequate device for the mode of provisionof aid. Here it will be natural for us to think not only about the governmental aid but
also about the non-governmental aid, or some adequate mixture of these two kindsof aid. For a simple example, we will be able to work out a tax reduction scheme forvoluntary associations which wish to give proper educational aid for children in need.
If we could imagine the substantively perfect ways of remedy for the ideal of respect,
we would still need the procedurally perfect ways of remedy.53
Now, I would like to make another brief remark on the limits of justiceconsiderations on natural assets, in relation to Thomas Nagel’s view on therelationship between justice and nature.54 Nagel thinks that we need the distinction
between the natural and the social to properly limit the concern of justice. Basically,
he maintains that the pure natural characteristics such as sex, or genetic disease,cannot be the objects of the full consideration in justice, because justice is related
only to the socially allocable resources. I think that Nagel’s ultimate concern is in the
Wolff, op.cit., p.118f.
Cf. David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Macmillan, 1991), ch.2.
53 Wolff might have already taken into account this point in the context of British politics,
whereas I have to be keen about this because we Japanese are now much discussing about thewelfare reform in the transition from paternalistic ideas to more rational ideas.
54 Thomas Nagel, “Justice and Nature” (in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 17, 1997, pp.303-321)
51
52

25

maximal possibility of egalitarian conception of justice, even if he suggests that hisview has become less egalitarian than before and if he is cautious of the danger ofthe expansive view of justice. Thus, I think also that he intends to talk about theimportance of the condition of excessive costs in justice considerations.
Understanding Nagel’s concern for the scope of justice, the natural/social
distinction seems, though surely significant, still insufficient for his theoretical
purpose. My sense is that there is another distinction accompanied with thenatural/social distinction, which is between the local and the global in a society.
True, for example, if we find serious genetic disease only for some particularperson, it is not sure whether we should give her a complete medical aid as a matterof justice. However, if we find this genetic disease prevalent in a greater part ofsociety, it may be an urgent problem for justice. Another example is that, if there issexual discrimination in social practice which yet involves a small portion of people
in society, say, in a voluntary association, it will not be considered a matter of justice.
But, if this sort of sexist practice is prevalent in entire society, it must be considered
as injustice. These examples suggest that the problem of scale or amount is relevant
for the scope of justice, thus the combination of natural/social and local/global
distinctions is significant for the determination of the limits of justice. If so, thefour classifications of natural-local/natural-global/social-local/and social-global is tobe distinguished, and we may say correspondingly, from a Nagelian perspective, thatwhile the natural-global and the social-global are to be covered by justice, thenatural-local and the social-local are not to be covered by it. Actually, widely spread
genetic disease and widely shared sufferings of homosexuality, are few of theexamples of the natural-global, while exclusion of homosexuals from a particular
voluntary association is an example of the social-local. 55 The former is to be in theconcern of justice, while the latter not.
This apparently implies that we have to think more about the two cases ofnatural-global and the social-local in order to check the working of the natural/social
distinction by Nagel. If the local/global distinction is also important and even otherDrucilla Cornell criticizes Nagel’s idea more directly. Referring to Nagel’s article, she
discusses the problem of sexual identity (Durcilla Cornell, At the Heart of Freedom, Princeton
U.P., 1998, ch. 3). According to Cornell, to form one’s own sexual identity is very deep work of
one’s mind (in the imaginary domain, in her terminology), and not just a natural determination
but rather such a human effort to make oneself. If so, what Nagel takes as natural difference ofsex cannot be so natural but rather socially relevant one (to the extent that this identification
depends on individual effort). This view is also pulling down the boundary line of the natural
more than Nagel anticipates, by a certain view of the person at a deeper level.

55

26

kinds of factors might be relevant, the natural/social distinction seems too sweeping
for the real concern of Nagelian equality. I think here that the frame for public
provision may have a useful suggestion. Basically, this frame itself indicates thedimension of the social in which the domains of equalization indicate the global, andthe domains of no-provision indicate the local. This implies that although thedimension of the natural is external to the frame, the justice-relevant factors within
the natural may be determined by a projection of the aspects and spheres in theframe. Thus, we will be able to say that the natural-global resources related to thepolitical, cultural, or economic status should be protected equally by the concern ofjustice. This is also a theoretical virtue of the frame for public provision in terms ofthe value of substantive fairness.

27