Law in a Sustainable Asia

8th Asian Law Institute Conference
Thursday and Friday, 26 and 27 May 2011, Kyushu, Japan

COVER PAGE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION

Recent development of legal system on disaster management inIndonesia and its function: The role of law to support sustainabilityof society under the disaster
SHIMADA Yuzuru

Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp

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SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

Introduction
In response to vast damage caused by tsunami and earthquake in Aceh in 2004,
Indonesian government initiated a revision of its disaster management. However,
because of exceptional situation in Aceh, reconstruction strategy in Aceh was acontrasting one to those provided in new disaster management law promulgated in 2007.
It is the reconstruction process after the earthquake hit on Central Java in 2006 that hasa significant impact to the contents of new disaster management law.
Though a drafting of the new law had already started, there was only old legal
mechanism that could be applied to a large-scale disaster at the time of Central Java
earthquake. In order to implement reconstruction policy that is different from Aceh’s
one, government agencies both of local and central level issued various regulations andofficial letters to address a pile of problems for reconstruction1.
In Aceh, administrative and financial competences in reconstruction werehighly concentrated to one agency, the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency(Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, hereinafter referred to as “BRR”) that was
directly responsible to the President. Central government concentrated all budget forreconstruction and a management power of assistance to the BRR. This centralized
scheme was to a certain extent reasonable choice under political and social conditions in
Aceh. Because of huge damage to local society caused by tsunami as well as continued
dysfunction of local administration due to prolonged armed conflict, it was difficult to
expect Aceh local government to take initiative in reconstruction.
However, this reconstruction scheme was criticized for several reason: firstly,
this scheme failed to facilitate people’s participation to reconstruction and most ofreconstruction projects were dominated by international or domestic third parties;
secondly, many of reconstruction activities were not well-designed sustainable ones but
short time and spontaneous projects2; thirdly, because of those reasons, local people was
excluded from reconstruction of their society and became dependent on assistance; andfourthly, massive flow of uncontrolled assistance and lack of people’s active
involvement caused an inefficient use of aid money and serious corruption inreconstruction projects3.
Therefore, local governments in affected area by Central Java earthquake learn
from negative aspects of that centralized scheme and dependence on outer money. Basic
1

Regulations and other official document related to the Central Java earthquake
disaster that this paper refers are cited from the report published by the government of
Yogyakarta Special Province. (Pemerintah Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta,
Rangkuman Kebijakan: Pelaksanaan Rehabilitasi Rekonstruksi Pasca Gempa Bumi diDaerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 2008).
2
Bakri Beck, a presentation on 18-19th November 2008 at work shop “Kegiatan
Apresiasi Manajemen Bencana Melalui Pelatihan Penanganan Rahabilitasi dan
Rekonstruksi Rumah Paska Bencana BerbasisPemberdayaan Masyarakat di Propinsi
DIY dan Jawa Tengah” in Yogyakarta.
3
See Asian Development Bank et.al. eds., Curbing Corruption in Tsunami Relief
Operations, Asian Development Bank, 2005.

1

SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

principles that make a reconstruction in Central Java distinct from that in Aceh aredecentralization and grass-root approaches. Firstly, local governments (Central Java
province and Yogyakarta special province) attempted to transfer the financial powerfrom central government to local government (decentralization). Secondly, a“grass-root” approach was employed to empower affected people.
As mentioned above, decentralized and grass-rooted approaches were devised
through ad hoc communications between central government and local governments inreconstruction from Central Java earthquake disaster. Those approaches have significant
impact on a drafting process of new disaster management law. Therefore, new law has
provisions that imply decentralization and grass-root orientation.
New disaster management law was enacted as the law no. 24 in 2007. Then, on
30th September 2009, strong earthquake measuring 7.9 on the Richter scale struck
Padang and surrounding areas, West Sumatera province, Indonesia, and caused severe
damage in lives, houses and lands4. This quake (hereinafter, West Sumatera earthquake)is the first severe disaster after the promulgation of the law no.24/2007.
The main focus of this paper is to review how disaster management
mechanisms in the law no.24/2007 are implemented, and, if any, its weaknesses.
In next chapter, I briefly review the development of disaster management laws
in Indonesia focusing three keywords: comprehensiveness, independence andempowerment. Second chapter focuses on mechanisms of law 24/2007 in comparison
with practices in reconstruction of the Central Java earthquake. In chapter 3, I review
reconstruction process in West Sumatera based on field research.

4

1197 people died (including 2 missing), 619 seriously injured, and 1179 had minor
injury. House damages were very serious. 249,833 houses were affected in Padang city,
Padang-Pariaman regency, Pariaman city, Agam regency and Pesisir Selatan regency.
114,797 houses collapsed or heavily damaged, 67,198 houses had medium damage, and678,838 houses were lightly damaged.

2

SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

Chapter 1. Development of disaster management laws in Indonesia(1) Legal mechanism for disaster management
For long time, disaster management had been considered as a matter of hard
technology and civil engineering. Disaster management meant designing quake-proof
building structure, constructing dam and dyke to stop flood, constructing seawalls toblock tsunami, or estimating and, if possible, predicting scale and damage of coming
disastrous natural events. Though those scientific technological efforts remain verysignificant, many experts also see social aspects as important parameters of disaster.
Social vulnerability and resiliency to natural hazards would be decisive factor ofdisaster damage to people. Wisner et.al. considers disaster as a combination of scale ofnatural hazard (e.g. earthquake, cyclones, flooding, volcanic eruption, landslide, drought
or toxic virus) and vulnerability5. According to Wisner et.al., “vulnerability is rooted
in social processes and underlying causes which may ultimately be quite remote fromthe disaster event itself.”6
Though Wisner et.al. focused on disaster damage, it might be right to say thatvulnerability is also decisive in reconstruction, and more vulnerable people needs longer
time for reconstruction.
Vulnerability analysis of Wisner et.al. covers root causes such as social andpolitical ideologies and accesses to power, structure and resources. Due to limitation of
space and resource, this paper has to confine its analysis onto specific and more visible
causes of vulnerability. Wisner et.al. puts “unsafe conditions” as vulnerability factorsthat are the closest to disaster. “Unsafe conditions” include not only physicalenvironment but also public actions and institutions, especially lack of preparedness, aswell as social relations such as lack of local institution7.
It is clear how significant a legal system is for those vulnerability factors.
Because vulnerabilities already exist before a disaster, disaster management legal
system for reducing vulnerability should be a comprehensive one that covers a series of
events from pre-disaster (preparedness), occurrence of disaster (emergency) topost-disaster (reconstruction). It is a “comprehensiveness” of disaster management.
Furthermore, because vulnerability comes from various sectors such astechnological, social, economic and cultural conditions, disaster management toimprove vulnerability needs inter-sectoral efforts. Therefore, a disaster management
body has to have a certain extent of financial and administrative independence fromother part of government in order to control and coordinate their activities. This is afactor of “independence” of disaster management.
For improvement of vulnerability, it is important to enhance local institution
and to extend social capital, participation and chance of access. This implies animportance of “empowerment” of people in reconstruction process.
5

Weisner, Ben; Blaikie, Piers; Cannon, Terry and Davis, Ian, At Risk: Natural Hazards,
people’s vulnerability and disasters (second edition), Routledge, 2010, p.49.
6
7

Ibid., p.50.
Ibid., p.50.

3SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

Having those considerations mentioned above, this chapter reviews thedevelopment of disaster management laws in Indonesia by focusing three keywords:“comprehensiveness” in disaster management mechanisms, financial and administrative“independency” of disaster management organs, and “empowerment” of people inreconstruction.
(2) Presidential decision no.28/ 1979
Before enactment of the disaster management law no. 24/2007, “National
Disaster Management Coordinating Agency” (Badan Koordinasi Penanggulangan
Bencana, hereinafter referred to as “Bakornas”) was an organization that took charge ofa disaster risk management. The organic regulation on the Bakornas was not aparliamentary law but a Presidential decision. The first Presidential decision that
established the Bakornas was the Presidential decision no.28/ 1979, and there had been
several amendments until 2005.
According to Presidential decision no. 28/1979, Bakornas stood for the Natural
Disaster Management National Coordination Agency (Badan Koordinasi Nasional
Penanggulangan Bencana Alam, Bakornas). Thus, this decision supposed disaster only
as natural disaster. This decision provided a rescue of victims at the occurrence of adisaster, and to support for the affected people after disaster. Thus, the Presidential
Decision no. 28/1979 lacks comprehensiveness in disaster management.
(3) Presidential decision no.43/1990
Firstly, the Presidential decision no.43/1990 added the disaster caused byhuman activities to the definition of disasters. Secondly, this decision provided that adisaster management should include a disaster management before occurrence as well
as after occurrence of a disaster. By this Presidential degree, necessity of acomprehensiveness of disaster management was recognized in Indonesian disastermanagement legal system. However, the Bakornas would not be convened until when alarge-scale disaster occurred. Therefore, in practice, the Bakornas could not docomprehensive disaster management activities before disaster.
“Independence” factor was not realized yet, too. The Bakornas was chaired by
the Coordinating minister of people’s welfare, and relevant ministers joined as
members8. Secretary General of the agency was the director general of the ministry ofsocial affairs. Chair, members and secretary general, all were concurrent positions. The
operation budget came from budget of the secretariat in the coordinating minister ofpeople’s welfare. Therefore, the Bakornas under the presidential decision no.43/1990
lacked both administrative and financial independence.
(4) Presidential Decision no. 106/1999
This decision added the “disaster caused by a result of social disturbance” asone of definitions of disaster. Thus, it could be said that the comprehensiveness was
8

Minister of social affairs, Minister of internal affairs, Minister of health, Minister ofpublic works, Minister of transportation, chief commander of national military,
governors of affected provinces.

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SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

extended9.
Although committee membership of the Bakornas was extended along with the
expansion of the definition of disaster 10 , all committee member as well as
secretary-general remained concurrent positions. Therefore, independence factor was
not fulfilled yet.
(5) Presidential Decision no. 3/ 2001
By this decision, name of Bakornas was changed to "National Coordination
Agency of Disaster Management and Response to Evacuees (Badan Koordinasi
Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungsi)." This change
corresponded to an expansion of definition of disasters in previous presidential decision.
The presidential decision no.3/ 2001 provided that the response to evacuees was"humanitarian service and protection for evacuees of certain place caused by social orpolitical conflict, including preventive activity, emergency response, reception ofevacuees, transportation of evacuees, as well as return and re-settlement of evacuees."
Other important change was the chair of the agency and source of budget. By
this presidential decision, the vice-President served concurrently as a head of the agency,
and the secretary of the vice-President served concurrently as a secretary general of theagency. The chair of the Bakornas is changed because the Ministry of social affairs andthe Coordinating Minister were abolished by administrative reform.
As a result, the financial independence of the Bakornas was strengthened.
Previously the budget of the Bakornas came from the budget of the secretariat of thecoordinating Minister. After the amendment, Bakornas had its own budget in the statebudget.
9

The background of this amendment was the recognition that the excessive
development was causing disaster, and the perception that the frequent ethnic conflicts
after the end of Soeharto's authoritarian regime should be also a kind of disaster.
Indeed, there were large-scale forest fires in Sumatra Island and Kalimantan Island, as
well as lengthy drought in Irian Jaya (West part of New Guinea Island) from 1997 till
1998. These natural disasters were caused by the over exploitation that exceeded
recuperative power of natural environment, such as haphazard swiddens and excessive
deforestation due to timber exploitation and mining. Because of this excessive
development problem, Ministers related to environmental and development divisionjoined to committee membership where only Ministers related to humanitarian andlogistic division had had membership before.
About the ethnic conflicts, there was a large-scale refugee issue in East Timor in 1999.
Violence in Maluku islands and Sulawesi Island due to ethnic or religious hostility also
caused many cases of murder and a large number of internal displaced persons. In
response to those social disturbances, the Presidential decision 1999 extended thedefinition of "disaster" so that disaster risk management could cover the issue ofrefugees and displaced persons.
10
the Minister of industry and energy, the Minister of agriculture, the Minister of forestand plantation, the Minister of environment, the Minister of science and technology, theMinister of information, and the Minister of national development were newly added tocommittee membership of the Bakornas.

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SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

Other than financial reform, the Presidential decision no.3/ 2001 provided asystematization of the secretariat of the Bakornas, too. The division of disastermanagement, the division of response to evacuees, the division of civil cooperation andparticipation, and the division of general administration were newly set up. Thissystematization indicated the government paid more attention for an importance ofactual comprehensiveness in the disaster management.
The establishment of division of civil cooperation and participation could beinterpreted as a part of people’s “empowerment.” However, “empowerment” factor was
explicitly provided only when the law no.24/2007 and its implementation regulations
were enacted.
(6) Presidential Regulation no. 83/ 2005
This Presidential regulation no.83/ 2005 installed two vice-secretaries. The
Minister of internal affairs and the Coordinating Minister of people's welfare were to bevice-secretaries.
The Coordinating Minister took a charge of "the coordination of cross-sectional
and international activities in disaster and emergency response". The Coordinating
Minister has a jurisdiction over several ministries relevant to logistics in disaster
response, that is, the Ministry of social affairs, the Ministry of health, the Ministry ofenvironment and the Ministry of housing. On the other hand, the Minister of internalaffairs was in charge of "the coordination among provinces, prefectures and cities indisaster management and emergency response." Tasks of the Minister of internal affairs
include the local autonomy and the coordination among local governments.
Therefore, this Presidential regulation reinforced the administrative
independence of the disaster management body (Bakornas) over relevant governmentorgans.

6SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

Chapter 2. Decentralized disaster management system under the law 2007.
Comparison with case of Central Java.
As mentioned in Introduction, competency and budget for reconstruction ofdisaster in Aceh were concentrated to the BRR that was directly responsible to the
President. Thus, the BRR has strong independency over other government agencies, but
the empowerment of people has been paid little attention. The reconstruction of Aceh
has been criticized because it excluded local people, made people dependent on aid,
weakened social capital, and caused a lack of accountability in reconstruction program.
Learning from those negative consequences, local governments of affected
regions pursued decentralized and grass-rooted reconstruction model after the Central
Java earthquake in 2006. Through ad hoc negotiations and scattered regulations, those
local governments formed this model. This chapter compares the reconstruction process
in Central Java with the disaster management law no.24/2007.
(1) Financial decentralization - who handle reconstruction budget?
Before the enactment of the law no.24/2007, local government had had very
limited competence in disaster management. According to the presidential decision no.
106/ 1999, each provinces had an implementation coordinating unit (Satuan Koordinasi
Pelaksana, hereinafter referred to as "Satkorlak") for implementing and coordinating
disaster management at provincial level, and each prefectures had an implementation
unit (Satuan Pelaksana, Satlak) to implement disaster management in each prefecture.
Even though Satkorlak and Satlak are headed by head of each local government, thoseunits had to operate within a disaster management guideline set by the Bakornas, andthere were no clear provisions allowing to transfer disaster management budget to local
governments.
(a) De facto decentralization in Central Java:
In course of reconstruction after the Central Java earthquake, local governmentof Yogyakarta special province requested the central government to move reconstruction
budget down to local government.
After the earthquake, a coordination team headed by the coordinating minister
was installed by the presidential decision no. 9/2006. However, actual competence to
execute state budget for reconstruction was given to the implementation team ofprovince appointed by the governor (governor decision no.20/2006 on 8th July 2006).
This competence was further strengthened by auditing procedure. By the official letter(no.361/o3262 on 30th August 2006), the governor instructed that local institutions
should submit budgetary proposal of reconstruction to the governor, and each budget
implementation should be subject to auditing by local audit agency (Badan Pengawasan
Keuangan Daerah). The governor also sent a letter requesting the minister of finance togive financial flexibility by allowing local government to make own financial regulation(official letter on 13th April 2007).
Furthermore, the governor decided to keep the residue of reconstruction budget
in local government’s bank account at the end of fiscal year (the governor regulation
no.38/2006). The governor also instructed heads of prefecture/ city no to return residueof that budget to central government (official letter on 19th April 2007).

7

SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

This de facto financial decentralization was admitted by the minister of public
works saying “according to the Presidential decision no. 9/ 2006, the implementationteam of the province has a jurisdiction over house reconstruction by paying attention tonecessity and situation of each area.”(b) Financial decentralization in the law no. 24/ 2007 and relevant regulations:
The law no.24/2007 sets the National Disaster Management Authority (Badan
Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, BNPB) on central level and Local Disaster
Management Authority (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah, BPBD) on province
as well as prefecture (kabupaten/ kota) level as agencies to do comprehensive disastermanagement. Especially, in contrast to previous laws, the law provides Local Disastermanagement agency (BPBD) a broad responsibility on disaster management in its
jurisdiction area11.
For subsidies of reconstruction, the regulation of director general for finances
no. 26/2010 provided a detailed procedure of direct subsidy for people (Chapter V, part1). In the light of that regulation, substantial competences for executing budget of direct
support for people are on prefecture level (kabupaten/ kota).
The commitment facilitating officers (pejabat pembuat komitmen, PPK)
appointed by the BNPB are responsible to budget execution for disaster management(art.1 sec.11). Especially, the PPK on prefecture level (PPK-Daerah) appointed by the
BNPB with recommendation of head of local government has competence to authorize
expenditure for resident groups and to request necessary budget to the BNPB (art.9). In
this procedure, PPK in central level has only formal competence to transfer relevant
documents to treasury (art.10 and 11).
In contrast to case of Central Java where the residue of budget was to be kept inlocal government account, article 21 of the regulation provided that if reconstruction
budget still left at the end of fiscal year, that residue has to be returned to the BNPB andkept in central disaster management account. It means that the BNPB and BPBD havevertical relationship in finance.
(2) Grass-root approach in reconstruction(a) Utilization of Pokmas and local wisdom in Central Java
In order to rebuild houses damaged by the Central Java earthquake,governments of Central Java province and Yogyakarta special province allocatedsubsidy for each resident groups (kelompok masyarakat, Pokmas) composed of about 15
households. Since before the earthquake, government utilizes resident group scheme insubsidizing and project implementation of rural development programs (e.g. Pokmas
11

According to the law no.24/2007, the competence of central government andcompetence of local government are clearly divided and decentralized except for thedetermination of disaster level and international relations. For example, disaster risk
management policy for a region is to be determined in accordance to the local
development plan that a local government itself settles on. Central government only
coordinates inter-sectional disaster management with foreign governments, foreign
agencies and international organizations, while a provincial government coordinates
activities of prefectures and cities within its jurisdiction.

8

SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

IDT in rural development program based on the Instruction on underdeveloped villages(Instruksi Desa Tertingal, IDT).) This subsidy allocation was one of the important
schemes in reconstruction after the Central Java earthquake. While local people in Aceh
only received houses supplied by the central government or aid agencies after tsunami
disaster, resident groups in Central Java are expected to take initiative in planning andimplementing house reconstruction.
Unlike the case of Aceh, Central Java region has some favorable conditions
toward the resident group (Pokmas) scheme. For example: (a) village communities still
remained in affected area (because of the scale of damage, relatively low death ratecompare to Aceh, and small scale of population mobility after disaster); (b) richresource of civil society and educational institution that make the grass-root approacheffective. In addition to these, and more importantly, this grass-root approach learned
from negative consequences of the heavily centralized reconstruction scheme in Aceh.
Soon after the earthquake in Central Java, the coordinating minister instructed
to utilize tradition of mutual cooperation in Javanese village community known as
gotong-royong for house reconstruction (official letter on 2nd June 2006). After the
emergency period was over, prefectural governments in affected area set up residentgroups. In order to support activities of resident groups, each governments recruitedfacilitators. Governments also appoint some officers (management officers,
commitment making officers, and program officers) to advise and supervise facilitators.
(b) Formalization of Pokmas in disaster reconstruction
As the law no.24/2007 on disaster management provides an empowerment ofpeople as one of principles of disaster management12, its lower regulations employ
Pokmas scheme as an empowerment mechanism in house reconstruction. Pokmas
scheme is located as a part of “direct subsidy for people” (Bantuan Langsung
Masyarakat, BLM).
According to government regulation no.21/ 2008 on implementation of disastermanagement, government distributes subsidy for victims as a stimulant to houserebuilding (art. 67 (1)), and government subsidize house rebuilding by way empowering
people with attention to local characteristic and people’s culture (art. 67 (3)).
The BNPB’s guideline of disaster management (stipulated in BNPB regulation
no. 11/2008 on guideline of rehabilitation and reconstruction in post-disaster period)
also emphasizes an initiative of local society13. Resident group is an option for realizing
12

Other principles are: promptness and correctness, priority, coordination andcomprehensiveness, efficiency and effectiveness, transparency and accountability,
partnership, non-discrimination, and non-missionary.
13
Chapter 2 section B of the guideline provides:
Strategy of rehabilitation activities is:
1. to involve and empower people in rehabilitation;
2. to pay attention on characteristic of disaster, locality and culture;
3. to stand on actual condition of affected field;
4. to design rehabilitation activities as civil movement by making people not only
victims but also active participants of rehabilitation in volunteer groups, and;5. to distribute support at correct timing, form and amount so that it can arouse larger

9SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

that initiative (chapter 4 section C).

rehabilitation and disaster management activities.

10SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

Chapter 3. Case study in Padang. Decentralization and grass-root
approach under the weak governance.
(1) Outline
After the West Sumatera earthquake in 2009, the West Sumatera government
decided to use the resident group (Pokmas) scheme in house reconstruction, andprovides technical guideline (Petunjuk Teknis Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Pasca
Gempa Bumi Sumatera Barat 30 September 2009 Bidang Perumahan Tahap II).
In Pokmas scheme, mechanism can be divided to the BNPB-BPBD line andlocal government line.
For the former, the BPBD should take main role in reconstruction inaccordance to the law. However, because the BPBD in West Sumatera province had justestablished and not functioned yet when the quake occurred, the BNPB played a central
role. For resident group scheme in West Sumatera, key components under the BNPB
and their function is as follows:a. Activity Operation Officer (Pejabat Penanggung Jawab Operasional Kegiatan,
PJOK):BNPB appoints PJOK on provincial and prefectural level. Because PJOK in
prefectural level has strategic functions in house reconstruction, BNPB
appoints them in accordance with recommendation of heads of prefecture/
mayors. In general, PJOK in prefectural level prepares activity plan andworking regulation for house rebuilding and subsidy, authorizes expenditureof subsidy, and supervises house rebuilding project implemented by eachresident groups with support of facilitators.
b. Facilitator (Fasilitator)
Facilitators are the closest organ to victim in house reconstruction after
disaster. Facilitators support people to form resident groups, prepare
administrative documents, and advise technical issues. They are also incharge of validating data on house damage and monitoring so that houserebuilding to meet safety standards.
For the local government line, local government appoints the people
accompanying team (Tim Pendamping Masyarakat, TPM) in order to facilitate housereconstruction by formal and informal way. TPM is composed of representative of
administration (ward or township), representative of village people, a villager who has
knowledge on house building, and a security officer. One TPM is in charge of about 200
households. TPM accompany to facilitators and give them an advice when facilitators
have trouble with villagers.
(2) Problems related to damage evaluation
Because evaluation and categorization of damage level is directly related to theamount of subsidy victims would obtain, most of the troubles in reconstruction subsidy
come from damage evaluation. In order to receive subsidy, primary datas of damage
made by local government have to be validated by facilitators. It is not rare that thevalidated data differed from a primary data, especially damage category according to11

SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

validated data is lower than primary one.
Primary survey about damage level of each houses was conducted bycommunity leaders who were delegated this competence by local government. However,there was not written criteria about damage levels. As a result, when facilitators
rechecked the damage level, damage level of thousands houses were changed, especially,
to lighter one. Many people complained about those changes, and protested tofacilitators14.
Table below shows comparison between primary data and validated data in avillage in Agam province15:
damage level

primary survey

validated result

collapse or heavily damaged

about 300 hh

128 hhmedium damagedfew

303 hhlightly damaged

0

86 hh

Table: comparison between primary survey and validated result of damage level(Because original data of primary survey was not available, data of primary data isbased on interviewee's memory).
There are many cases of degrading of damage level by validation. House of asurveyor of primary data collecting was degraded from heavily damaged to lightly
damaged after validation. It means that this surveyor padded damage level. In other case,it was found that 4 family members who live at one house would receive subsidy
separately. There was an opposite case, too. If owner repaired his house by his own
money, that owner should be still eligible to subsidy but its damage level was tend to beunderestimated in primary survey.
Though one of factors that makes problem worse might be a personal quality offacilitator, some residents even threat facilitator to manipulate data. Local governments
appointed teams for accompanying people (Tim Pendamping Masyarakat) composed ofcivil servant, security sector and local representative in order to mediate trouble. But theteam is not helpful for troubled facilitators because team members have insufficientknowledge on local situation16.
a. Facilitator problems
In field survey, both government sector (public work officer) and affected
people pointed out the problem of insufficient capacity of facilitators and their corrupt
acts or irregularities.
In case of a resident group in urban area, a facilitator proposed to make the14

Interview to officer of PJOK and office for public works, Padang city (22 Feb. 2011).
Data based on interview with facilitator in Jorong Surabayu village, Agam province(24 Feb. 2011).
16
Interview to facilitator in Jorong Surabayu village, Agam province (24 Feb. 2011).
15

12

SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

procurement plan at the cost of 30,000 rupiah for each house, and the group decided to
pay for facilitator17. Even though there were no further requests of payment, suchpractice clearly contradicted to regulation.
Other forms of unlawful deduction (potongan) from allocated subsidy are notrare. When interviewee's group determined not to deduct any money from subsidy in themeeting, other groups in this district complained about that decision. Other groups
deducted 300,000 - 500,000 rupiah from subsidy for each houses with reasons of
payment for facilitators, neighborhood community associations and public works office.
These payments have no legal foundation, and it is not clear whether this money was
really paid for18.
At a village remote from urban area, resident complained that facilitator did notsurvey village but only the visit village head and recognized a fictive primary data hemade19.
PJOK Officer mentioned to time limitation of program as a reason offacilitators’ incapability. Central government started second budget allocation on July,
2010. According to financial regulation, local government had to implement this budget
by the end of financial year, 31 December. It means that the local government must
prepare and implement projects equivalent to 3 trillions rupiah within only 3 months.
Employment and training of facilitator are also a part of this schedule. As a result, many
facilitators were insufficiently trained, and then it caused many troubles between
facilitators and residents20.
Facilitators themselves recognize problems. But she said some of problems
were caused by local people as well as institutional design. Most of village people are
not familiar with making administrative documents, and ask facilitator to make it.
Because, however, the task of facilitator is only to advice for making document not tomake it, facilitator let village people to pay extra fee. It’s depends on personality of eachfacilitators. Those problems had been recognized in Padang city where reconstruction
program had started earlier than rural area. But government failed to correct thosedeviational practices21.
b. Corruption case
Author found some corruption cases in reconstruction program. Either caserelates to embedded collusion in community since before earthquake and insufficient
checking mechanism to prevent corruptive manner.
Case one: Padang city22
According to interviewee, because facilitator who was responsible to thisvillage did not implement data validation as instructed in the technical guideline, some
17Interview to Pokmas member in Andalas district, Padang city (23 Feb. 2011).
Interview to Pokmas member in Andalas area, Padang city (23 Feb. 2011).
19
Interview to a villager in Gunung Padang-Alai village, Padang-Pariaman province(20 Feb. 2011).
20
Interview to officer of PJOK and office for public works, Padang city (22 Feb. 2011).
21
Interview to facilitator in Jorong Surabayu village, Agam province (24 Feb. 2011).
18

22Interview to a villager in Sungai Sapih district, Padang city (23 Feb.2011)13

SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

residents received subsidy unlawfully. A primary data of damage was made by the headof neighborhood group (RT), and the head told a facilitator not to do further survey ofvalidation.
There are some fictive data in a primary survey. Two resident groups were set
up in this village. Interviewee insisted that only 9 houses of households joined to these
two residents groups are inhabited before the quake and really damaged. He also said
that 85 households were heavily damaged in this village, but only 15 households joined
to resident groups.
In a residential quarter still in development, 35 houses were recorded as heavily
damaged even though most of land plots were still empty (see picture bellow).
Interviewee insisted that the head of neighborhood group conspired with plot owners indata making.
Because some villagers including interviewee put a complaint with local
government against this practice, government stops further subsidy for this area.

According to data, there should be 35 A ruin of traditional wooden house. This
heavily damaged houses on this empty ruin is recorded as a collapsed in validated
area.
data (no habitant since before the quake)。

Case two: Padang Pariaman province
Surveyed village (Padang-alai village, Agam Province) is about two hours
distance from Padang city through steep mountain road. This village was affected by
two earthquakes in 2007. The earthquake in 2009 struck this area while people had notrecovered from previous damage yet.
Interviewee insisted that there were unlawful acts even in 2007. In 2007, data
recorder appointed by village chief decided level of damages of each houses andhouseholds who were eligible to subsidy. There was no data validation by facilitator.
According to Interviewee, data recorder made those data without field observation, andpeople who were close to the data recorder obtained subsidy unlawfully. For example,
two families who shared one house before the earthquake received subsidy separately.
Local government also recognized confusion in subsidy allocation in the case of 2007.

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SHIMADA Yuzuru
Nagoya University
shimadayuzuru@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp
DRAFT version

For reconstruction in 2009, 158 households join to 7 resident groups. Numberof damaged households is based on the primary data made by same data recorder of
2007. But this number is different from data made by a university student team withwhom local government entrusted. According to the student team, 181 houses damaged.
Therefore, interviewee said, some households were excluded from subsidy program.
Data by the student team was submitted to the village head, but discarded.
Interviewee insisted that, as case in 2007, residents with close connection with the data
recorder obtained more subsidies unlawfully. Most of villagers keep silent on this issue
because they afraid to have trouble with the village head.

Area map:

Agam
Padang-Pariaman
Padang City

15