The Bulletin of the Graduate School of Josai International University Vol. 24, March 2021 289-298〈Research Report〉

Immigration easing or restriction?:

A consideration of Japan’s foreign-worker acceptance policy*
Toake Endoh

Introduction
In December 2018, Japan officially lifted the long-standing ban on immigration for less-skilledworkers by revising the immigration law. Concurrently, the renewed foreign-worker acceptance policy
featured a fresh pro-migrant program intent on multicultural inclusion. This monumental policy change
garnered attention, both at home and abroad, as a tipping point toward reform of Japan’s awkward andflawed immigration policy. Do the latest legal and institutional changes attest to a fundamental policy
shift toward open borders and society? Will the Japanese state readily reform its current acceptancesystem—fraught in terms of migrant protection and support—to be more open, just, and inclusive? This
study examines the political implications of institutional development of Japan’s immigration policy,
with a particular focus on the recent policy choices regarding foreign worker acceptance from atheoretical prism of historical institutionalism. I argue that, despite some pro-migrant reforms, theJapanese state upholds its “strict rotation” approach, keeping temporary labor migration under strict
immigration control. This trajectory is defined as what some historical institutionalists call “regime
stretching,” broaching ‘cosmetic’ changes in order to “diffuse and coopt criticism” while skirting majorchanges.
This empirical study uses the within-case, process-tracing method, or what Mahoney (2008) calls“causal process observation.” I trace the processes of institutional development in the policy area of
immigration and integration during the period concerned (from the 1980s to present). The main unit ofanalysis is Japan’s institutions regarding immigration and alien residence control. The analysis isqualitative and data-driven, using government statements and documents, legislative and administrative
records, political party manifestoes and meeting minutes, statistics, and interviews (unstructured) withknowledgeable groups and individuals about the issue.

* This research was supported by the Grants-in-aid for Scientific Research of Japan Society for the Promotion of

Science (Basic Research Program C: 18K11874).

－ 289 －

The past trajectory of Japan’s foreign worker acceptance policy
For decades, the government of Japan (hereafter “GOJ”) had been obscure about acceptance of
foreign workers, especially less-skilled workers. The domestic labor shortage is increasingly acute andwidespread across industries and regions. Policymakers attempted to meet the industrial demand forlabor supply from overseas via a potpourri of heterodox methods, first opening “back doors” to irregular
workers in the 1980s, and later “side doors” to co-ethnics (nikkeijin) from South America, and Asian“non-workers” (i.e., Technical Intern Training Program or ginō jisshūsei and international students). An
orthodoxy for blue-collar migrants, or “so-called immigration” policy—quoting from the former
premier Abe Shinzo (2013–2020)—was carefully avoided for fear of opposition from ethno-nationalists
and xenophobes (Endoh 2019; Igarashi and Nagayoshi 2019).
The inarticulate immigration policy, compounded by the absence of an effective strategy for socioeconomic and cultural integration of migrants and their families into the larger society, has sown muchinconvenience: labor exploitation or abuse, the impoverishment of unemployed or under-employedforeign workers (and/or their dependents), limited access to public services (e.g., schools or hospitals),or their estrangement from the communities, to name a few. The migrants’ hardships are attributed not
only to abusive employers but also to the deeply flawed acceptance programs, or, fundamentally, theJapanese state’s failure to reform the immigration system towards openness, equality, and inclusiveness(Akashi, 2014; Kibe, 2011; Tian and Chung, 2018).
Under mounting pressures to fix the faulty system—business demand for more foreign labor and thehumanitarian outcry for better treatment of new members of the political community—, the Abeadministration moved to revise the national immigration law. The bill of selective “acceptance of foreign
workers with skills needed by the industrial areas with difficulty securing labor force” (“An Act toAmend a Part of the Act on Immigration Control, Recognition of Refugee Status, and the Establishmentof the Ministry of Justice (hereafter “ICA”) was passed at the 197th Diet on December 8, 2018 andimplemented on April 1 of the following year (Kubo, Naito and Takahashi 2018). The law authorizes
less-skilled migrants with the new visa category of Specified Skill Worker (SSW). The SSW visa
program intends to deliver workers to specified industrial areas that “cannot secure workforce[domestically]” (MOJ 2019). Eleven out of these fourteen industries—all labor-intensive—are currently
supported by trainees and students. The GOJ estimates about 345,000 migrants, all for the SSW-No. 1,
a job type more menial than SSW-No. 2, to come from nine Asian nations within five years. For the firsttime in its postwar era, Japan opened its “front door” to basic foreign workers.
Concurrently, the Ministry of Justice (hereafter “MOJ”) announced official guidelines on the new
acceptance program: “A Basic Policy for Implementation of the Institutions for the Designated Skill
Residence Status,” the operation blueprint for the new visa program, and the “Comprehensive Measures－ 290 －

for Acceptance of and Coexistence with Foreign Workers,” instructions relating to the 126 programs
designed to support workers’ amicable “coexistence” within Japanese society in terms of communication,
everyday life, recruitment, and foreign resident control.1 The program’s “coexistence” goal is bolsteredby a large ¥13.4 billion (about US$122.6 million) budget, far more generous than the past budget
appropriations (for instance, ¥1.7 billion in 2012 or ¥1.9 billion in 2017), which suggests the Japanesestate’s formal (if not genuine) commitment to openness and inclusiveness. Observing this and otherpolicy changes, many conclude that Japan has become a nation of immigrants. (Liu-Farrer 2020; Green2017).
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000-

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
SkilledSpecific

TITP

Student

PR

Long-term resident

Families

Special PR

OthersChart 1: The Number of Foregin Residents by Visa Status (2003-2019)
Source: MOJ, zairyū gaikokujin tōkei [Statistics on Foreign Residents].
https://www.e-stat.go.jp/statistics/00250012.

Changes and continuities in the flawed immigration system
In the nine months following its implementation, the SSW program brought in 1,621 foreign workers
from nine countries (as of the end of 2019). This tally is much lower than the official maximum
projection of 47,000 foreign workers per year. In contrast, the number of Technical Intern Training
Program (hereafter “TITP”) workers and student arrivals continues to increase, accounting for 45.7%of the total foreign workforce as of October 2019 (MHLW 2020). This means that Japan’s heavy
dependence on foreign workers for the labor-intensive sectors has unchanged. Also unimproved were－ 291 －

the poor working and living conditions for these Asian workers. (Another problem is their sudden“disappearance,” ostensibly escaping their abusive employers and going “irregular.”) Further, there areother grave but untouched problems associated with nikkei South Americans, migrants’ dependents,
especially children, or so-called “irregular (or undocumented) migrants.” For instance, how can Japan
ensure their rights (workers’ rights as well as human rights) and integrate them into a larger society(especially in education and culture)? Should temporary workers be allowed family reunions after many
years of stay or is a company free to dismiss them and send them home, as they did to nikkei SouthAmericans in the 2000s, or following the economic crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic? Thesequandaries, if left unsolved, are likely to impede Japan’s immigration policy in the long run. The hiatus
between the state’s official willingness to be open and the exclusionary reality is too grave and harmful
to migrants as well as Japan’s multicultural future. Is it still tenable to assume that Japan is on the righttrack for immigration liberalization and migrant incorporation?
Indeed, institutional shortcomings or voids in Japan’s immigration (and integration) policy are too
multifaceted and complicated to be discussed in a significant way in this article. Therefore, I focus on
the above-noted SSW program (qua immigration liberalization) as well as immigration control
administration (qua restriction) by the Immigration Services Agency (ISA) and examine the political
implications of these policies as well as the tacit intent of the Japanese state regarding immigration andframe them in the trajectory of institutional development of Japan’s immigration system.
In a nutshell, the SSW program is an integral part of Japan’s “strict rotation” policy that ensures
seamless in- and out-flows of temporary workers without their long-term or permanent settlement.
Perhaps the architects of the SSW program, the MOJ bureaucrats, squarely wished to mend the otherwise
unsustainable migrant acceptance program. 2 As can be seen in the above-noted “Comprehensive
Measures for Acceptance of and Coexistence with Foreign Workers,” the new program addressed
perceived problems, particularly regarding TITP, in terms of wages (e.g., underpayment by many
employers), working conditions (e.g., overwork and job change prohibitions), and human rights (e.g.,poor living conditions, passport withholding, and physical or mental abuse). SSW workers areguaranteed wages and working conditions commensurate with Japanese nationals, free job andresidential mobility, protection from exploitative brokers (via direct employment), and support from
employers for “[migrant’s] comfortable living.”
Meanwhile, the SSW program treats less-skilled migrants as temporary (in other words, “disposable”)
and provides them less privileges than to their high-skill peers. For instance, the SSW visa offers a pathto permanency, but permanency is almost impossible for most basic migrants under what I call the“double-decker” structure.3 Family reunions are also not allowed for SSW-No.1 workers (for lessskilled work), to the disadvantage of young migrants. (Endoh 2019; Milly 2019). In the eyes of thepolicy’s critics, it is the same wine (a de-facto guest worker program) in a different bottle. But this is－ 292 －

the MOJ’s intended rendering. Justice Minister Yamashita Takashi’s staff testified at the Legal Affairs
Committee of the Upper House, that “the hurdle [from SSW-No. 1 to No. 2] is made fairly high” whenquestioned as to whether [the SSW double-decker system] would lead SSW-No. 1 workers topermanency (Urano and Uchiyama 2018).
In the past three decades, the ISA, a bureaucratic offspring of the MOJ since 2019 and the chief
administrator of immigration including SSW visas, is augmenting its role as the nation’s gatekeeper.
The agency administers (1) immigration (or landing), (2) alien residence beyond ports of entry, and (3)deportation. Chart 2 tabulates newly-introduced major rules and institutions to liberalize (L) and restrict(R) immigration since 1989. The chart illustrates the trajectory of institutionalization of immigration
restriction. In short, the ISA has been rigorous in flexing its stringent muscles against the “undesirable”
foreign persons, almost in parallel to immigration easing (for details, especially about the enhancementof the alien residence control system, see Endoh 2019).
Illustrations of these “parallel” developments include: the criminalization of incitement of illegal
employment [against employers] in 1990 and exposure campaigns of ICA violators from 1991 while
preparing new visa status for talents and nikkeijin (foreign-nationals of the Japanese ancestry) in 1990;
criminalization of overstays in 2000 and the campaign to “halve irregular stayers” starting in 2004, inparallel to the expansion of the TITP program to special economic zones in 2002; and the introductionof the mandatory Resident Card system, contemporaneous with the points-based system for talentmigrants, both starting in 2012. With the revised ICA (Law No. 88 in 2016), the MOJ-ISA bloc
augmented measures against “disguising residence” (gisō taizai) and attempts to immediately revoke
the visas of those who “engaged in unauthorized activities,” such as visa fraud, sham marriages, bogus
asylum claims, or misdemeanors (such as a failure to update registration information).4
The ISA’s pivoting to strictly managed migration led to large-scale removals of “unfavorable foreign
residents.” The number of foreigners whom the MOJ ordered deported (hereafter “deportees”) surged
during the 1990s, particularly from 1992 to 1994, with 203,846 individuals ordered to leave Japan.5
Another surge came during the 2004–2006 period, with 168,933 foreigners ordered to be deported. The
Koizumi Jun’ichiro administration (2001–2006), the MOJ, the police, and the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government formed a joined taskforce to “halve unauthorized stayers within five years” subsequent toJapan’s participation in international counter-terrorism efforts.6 Even after the campaign period, morethan ten thousand foreigners were ordered deported every year. The tally has been steadily rising
recently, with the latest figures showing16,260 deportation orders in 2018 and 19,386 in 2019.
The MOJ’s statistics show the percentage of deportees charged with illegal stays according to theirvisa status: short-term stay visas (32.8%), TITP visa (24.0%), specific activity visa (16.7%), or student
visa (13.4%) (MOJ 2019). The deportees were predominantly male (more than 67% in 2019). They
originated from Vietnam (33.8%), China (22.0%), Thailand (11.8%), and other developing countries－ 293 －(all data for 2019). Ostensibly these irregular migrants were basic temporary workers, —strongly
needed by the Japanese economy (66.1% of males and females engaged in unauthorized work). They
were economically needed, but their long-term settlement unwanted. The nation’s gatekeeper seems
determined to put forth the state’s strict rotation policy as well as its own mandate for security, order,and safety, and thus flexing its restrictive muscles against “transgressors.”

Concluding remarks
As of writing, amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, uncertainties about the future development of Japan’s
immigration policy are looming. Cross-border human mobility, immigration included, is being arrested
acutely. Further, worsening economic conditions and possible transformations in socio-economic
activities, industrial operations, or employment, will inevitably compel the GOJ to adjust or modify its
foreign worker acceptance policy. Perhaps it is too soon to make any critical assessment of theeffectiveness of Japan’s renewed immigration policy. Nevertheless, by observing the past trajectory of
the parallel development of institutions of immigration easing and restriction, compounded by the ISA’s
pivoting to the latter, I tentatively conclude that Japan is likely to uphold its conventional strict rotation
approach toward less-skilled migrants.
In his comparative study of Canadian and U.S. immigration policies, the historical institutionalist
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos presented the model of policy transformation from restrictionism toliberalization into three phases: “stretching” (i.e., procrastinating fundamental transformation),“unraveling” (i.e., reckoning existing shortcomings), and “shifting” (i.e., achieving transformation)(2010). Cast into this transformative trajectory, Japan’s reform movement has been stalled in the“stretching (of established policy essence)” stage, broaching ‘cosmetic’ changes in order to “diffuse andcoopt criticism” while skirting major changes (Triadafilopoulos 2010, 174). For the immigration policy
to be sustainable and successful, regime “unraveling” or “shifting” is arguably indispensable, involving
a fundamental change in the current flawed immigration system for a diversified and inclusive Japan. A
driver for such a radical change is unlikely to be endogenous, given the MOJ’s conservative
temperament and its extrajudicial status (Endoh forthcoming). The force should come from outside then,via a broad political alignment among genuine reformers within the polity and bureaucracies and withcivic allies. That has yet to be seen.

－ 294 －

Notes1

Gaikoku jinzai no ukeire/kyōsei no tameno sōgōteki taiōsaku [A comprehensive measure for acceptance of andcoexistence with foreign-born talents]. Available at: http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001280364.pdf

2

For instance, a high-ranking MOJ official admitted that the trainee and student visa systems were a “pastiche so
as not to authorize foreign workers’ immigration.” Naoki Urano and Shohei Sasakawa (2018), “Shin zairyū
shikaku, mienu zen-yō [Unclear picture of the new residence status].” Asahi Shimbun November 3.

3

The SSW status consists of two tiers: SSW-No. 1 for more basic skills, and SSW-No. 2 for more advanced skills.
Currently, only construction and shipbuilding are designated as SSW-No.2, and both are on hiring freezes.
Therefore, the two-tier mechanism rebuffs most temporary migrants from longer or permanent status since themore privileged No. 2 tier, including family reunion and quicker permanency, requires “as advanced skills as atalent visa” in Justice Minister Yamashita Takashi’s explanation.

4

Forty-five percent of those whose visas were revoked held student visas, and the authorities suspect that these
foreigners were staying illegally after having left school. Ministry of Justice, Bureau of Immigration Control(2017) Shutsunyūkoku kanri hakusho [White paper on immigration control]. Report. Tokyo, p. 70. Available at:
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001240071.pdf

5Source: MOJ, Shutsu nyūkoku zairyū kanri gyōsei kankei tōkei [Statistics on immigration and residence control
administration], 1990–2019.

6

Hanzai taisaku kakuryō kaigi [Cabinet Meeting on Crimes] (2003), “Hanzai ni tsuyoi shakai no jitsugen notameno kōdō keikaku [Action plans for practices towards crime-resistant society]” (December).

REFERENCES
Akashi, Jun’ichi. 2014. “Kokusai jinkō idō ni taisuru seisakuteki kanri no jikkōsei to genkai [The effectiveness andlimits of immigration control policy on cross-border human mobility].” Jinkō Mondai Kenkyū (Journal of
Population Problems) 70 (3), September: pp. 275–291 [In Japanese].
Endoh, Toake. 2019. “Politics of Japan’s Immigration and Alien Residence Control.” Asian and Pacific Migration
Review 28(3): pp. 324–352. DOI: 10.1177/0117196819873733.
Endoh, Toake. Forthcoming. “Problems from Leviathan’s Cells.” In: Toake Endoh (ed.), Open Borders, OpenSociety?: A cross-disciplinary approach to study the trajectory of Japan’s immigration and integration regimes,
Leverkusen, Germany, Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH.
Green, David. 2017. As its population ages, Japan quietly turns to immigration. Migration Policy Institute. March 28.
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/its-population-ages-japan-quietly-turns-immigration (Accessed July 6,2020).
Igarashi, Akira, and Kikuko Nagayoshi. 2019. “Imin haiseki, seron ha ikani seitōka shiteiruka [How does public－ 295 －

opinions justify immigrant exclusion?].” Sachi Takaya (ed.) Imin seisaku towa nanika, nihon no genjitsu kara
kangaeru [What is an immigration policy? Reconsidering from Japan’s reality]. Tokyo: Jinbun Shoin. pp.145–
165.
Kibe, Takashi. 2011. Immigration and integration policies in Japan: At the crossroads of the welfare state and thelabour market. In Vogt G and Roberts GS (eds) Migration and Integration – Japan in Comparative Perspective.
Tokyo: Deutsches Institut fur Japanstudien, pp.58–71.
Kubo, Satoshi, Hisashi Naito, and Mina Takahashi. 2018. Imin wa damedaga—saichō gonen no zairyū shikaku [Noimmigrant is acceptable, but…: Residence status for five years at most]. Asahi Shimbun August 14 [InJapanese].
Liu-Farrer, Gracia. 2020. Immigrant Japan: Mobility and Belonging in an Ethno-Nationalist Society. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen. 2010. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW). 2020. “Gaikokujin koyō jōkyō” no todokede jōkyōhyō ichiran[List of tables of the status of reporting on ‘situations of employment of foreigners’] (October 31).
https://www.mhlw.go.jp/content/11655000/000590311.pdf(Accessed 2020/08/26)
Ministry of Justice (MOJ). 2019. Shutsunyūkoku zairyū kanri-chō no soshiki taisei [Organizational structure of the
Immigration Service Agency]. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001288284.pdf
Tian, Yunchen, and Erin A. Chung 2018. Is Japan becoming a country of immigration?: Why more foreign labor
doesn’t imply liberalization. Foreign Affairs, Snapshot, 3 August.
Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos. 2010. “Global Norms, Domestic Institutions and the Transformation of Immigration
Policy in Canada and the US.” Review of International Studies 36: pp. 169–194.
Urano, Naoki, and Osamu Uchiyama. 2018. “Shibomu tokutei nigō [A shrinking prospect for the designated skill
No. 2 program].” Asahi Shimbun, November 30.

－ 296 －

－ 297 －

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2000

1993

1990

Started to accept EPA nurses and careworkers

coexistence"nikkeijins' long-term residence visa

"Good behavior" added to requirements forinspection

Biometrics requirement at immigration

visa

MOIAC declaration of promotion of "multicultural

Strengthening requirements for entertainer

extension of period of residence for some visa

international organized crimes

Easing requirements for permanent resident visa;

TITP program started

mandatory (by MHLW)

Reporting on foreigner employment maderesident falsifying her info.

Revocation of residence status for an alien

Halving unauthorized stays campaign

Criminalizing unauthorized stays

Heavier fines on overstayers

foreigners violating the ICA started

Deportation

Intensive campaign programs to expose

employment [regarding employers]

Criminalize incitement of illegal

eligibility

Mandatory authentication of aliens’ work

Residence control

permanent residents

Cabinet decision on measures against

Immigration

Restriction

Abolishment of finger-printing requirement for

New visa status (for skilled workers, nikkeijin, etc.)

1989 ICA revision

Liberalization

Chart 2: Major changes in immigration and alien residence control regime

－ 298 －Enacted the law on protection of TITP migrants

Fast-track visa approval system for skilled migrants

Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals started

Workers”

Acceptance of and Co-existence with Foreign

Cabinet decision on “Comprehensive Measures for

Source: Composed by the author.

Note: "Liberalization" includes protective measures.

2019

Specified Skilled Workers program started

centers amidst Covid-19

for permanent residence

Disqualifying TITP and SSW-1 visa workers

Provisional release to de-crowd detention

attendance of foreign students

revocation against law-breakers

Guidelines on strict management of school

Measures against disguising residence; visa

Public-funded return of nikkeijins

foreign residents

Residence Card established

Alien residence control system based on

Strengthening measures against shamrenewal of the third generation nikkeijin

five years

Points-based Preferential Immigration Treatment forJapanese-language test required for visa

Maximum period of residence extended from three to2018 ICA revision

2016

2012

2009

2009 ICA revision