Policy Proposal

Maritime Security and the Rightof Self-Defense in Peacetime
Proposals for a National Security Strategy and
the New National Defense Program Guidelines(SUMMARY)

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Policy Research at the Tokyo Foundation
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Maritime Security and the Right of
Self-Defense in Peacetime
Proposals for a National Security Strategy and the
New National Defense Program Guidelines(SUMMARY)

THE TOKYO FOUNDATION

About the National Security Policy Project
The Tokyo Foundation established the National Security Policy project in 2007 tooffer cogent proposals for security policy professionals in the light of a rapidlychanging security environment, and many of the recommendations issued to datehave been incorporated into key security documents. In 2013, the project produced proposals for the first-ever National Security Strategy and revisions to the
National Defense Program Guidelines, both of which were issued by the Shinzo
Abe administration in December and which represented important steps for Japan’s security policy. The project has also hosted seminars for academics andpractitioners from around the world and co-organized the “Quad-Plus” Track 2
dialogue on maritime security with US, Australian, and Indian think tanks.
Project Leader
Tsuneo Watanabe: Director of Foreign and Security Policy Research & Senior Fellow, Tokyo Foundation
Co-Leaders:
Yoji Koda: Adviser, Japan Marine United Corp.; former Commander in Chief, Self
Defense Fleet
Ken Jimbo: Senior Fellow, Tokyo Foundation; Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University
Members:
Masahiro Akiyama: President, Tokyo Foundation
Takaaki Asano: Research Fellow & Project Manager, Tokyo Foundation
Ippeita Nishida: Research Fellow & Project Manager, Tokyo Foundation
Bonji Ohara: Research Fellow & Project Manager, Tokyo Foundation

This proposal gained valuable input from another Tokyo Foundation project on Linking
Japan’s Foreign Aid and Security Cooperation.

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CONTENTS
Map of the Nansei Islands ............................................................................. 4
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................. 4
Foreword .................................................................................................. 5
Overview ................................................................................................. 7
Summary of Proposals
The Right of Self-Defense in Peacetime and Other Pressing
Issues surround the Right of Self-Defense .................................. 12
Systematic Approach toward Maritime Security ....................... 16
International Security Policies of the Ministry of Defense andthe Self-Defense Forces ................................................................... 22

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ASDF
AWACS
C4ISR
DPJ
GSDF
JCG
J-CSI
LDP
MSDF
NDPG
NSC
NSS
ODA
SDF

4

Air Self-Defense ForceAirborne Warning and Control Systems
Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Democratic Party of Japan
Ground Self-Defense ForceJapan Coast Guard
Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership of Japan
Liberal Democratic Party
Maritime Self-Defense Force
New National Defense Program Guidelines
National Security Council
National Security Strategy
Official Development AssistanceSelf-Defense Forces

FOREWORD*W

hat are the most pressing national security challenges confronting Japan today? Over much of 2013, members of theTokyo Foundation’s National Security Project examined
this topic and summarized the findings into a set of recommendations,at a time when the government was working to articulate its first-evernational security strategy and to update its National Defense Program
Guidelines.
One of the biggest challenges the country faces, no doubt, is in thearea of maritime security, inasmuch as Japan is an oceanic state. China’s rapid expansion of its naval power exerts a significant influence
on Japan’s security, and so we made an estimate of China’s naval capacity around 2020. We also analyzed the directions in which North
Korea is likely to head in regard to its nuclear capabilities and warhead stockpile, which are serious concerns for Japan.
To meet these challenges, members of the project team formulated 16 proposals in areas that we feel require the greatest and mosturgent attention, including the right of self-defense in peacetime; policies affecting maritime security; institutional measures; and issues
regarding defense technology, which are closely linked to Japan’s
Three Principles on Arms Exports.
As government policymakers now draw up the national security* Japan’s first national security strategy and the updated National Defense

Program Guidelines were approved by the cabinet in December 2013. In
April 2014, the government announced the “Three Principles on Transfer ofDefense Equipment and Technology” to relax Japan’s self-imposed restrictions on arms exports, and it also stated it will update the ODA Charterby the end of the year. While many of the proposals here were incorporated
into the strategy and the guidelines, the Tokyo Foundation will continue toadvocate the establishment of the right of self-defense in peacetime, which
was not fully reflected in the documents.
5

policies and strategies that will guide our country over the mediumto long-term, we hope that they will take note of and actively incorporate the proposals presented here.
November 2013
Masahiro Akiyama
President, Tokyo Foundation

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OVERVIEW

F

ollowing its December 2012 landslide victory in the House ofRepresentatives election, the Liberal Democratic Party beganconsidering a revision to the December 2010 National Defense
Program Guidelines, drafted when the Democratic Party of Japan wasin power. Inasmuch as the first DPJ Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama,
was forced to resign in June 2010 over his mishandling of theFutenma base relocation issue, the DPJ’s national security policy, particularly with regard to the US-Japan alliance, is often viewed as having been inappropriate. But the overall direction of the 2010 Guidelines was not inconsistent with the defense policies that were in place
under the LDP. In fact, the 2010 Guidelines contained many ambitious and proactive elements, such as the concept of a Dynamic Defense Force, adopted in response to a new security environment—thediversification of threats and the rising importance of the defense of
the Nansei Island chain, including the Ryukyu Islands, southwest of
Kyushu, where China’s posture had become more provocative. Since
only three years had elapsed from the last revision, moreover, somefelt that another update was not yet necessary.
But Japan’s security environment has undergone considerable
changes since 2010. On September 11, 2012, the Japanese government
purchased the three Senkaku Islands of Uotsurishima, Kitakojima,
and Minamikojima, which had until then been privately owned. In
response, China, which unilaterally claims the islands as its own territory, began dispatching law enforcement ships and planes on an ongoing basis, leading to tense face-offs with the Japanese Coast Guardand the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces patrolling the area. On
January 30, 2013, a Chinese naval frigate directed its fire control radarat Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Yudachi in the East China

7

Sea, a highly provocative incident that had the potential of accidentally igniting a conflict.
Another change in the security environment relates to cyberspace.
From about 2011, cyber attacks targeting the Japanese government
and private companies, especially those in the defense industry, haveintensified. The US military established a Cyber Command in May
2012, and the annual report of the US Department of Defense to Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China,” released three months later, stated that computers worldwide, including those in the United States, were being
hacked from within China. The report also noted that such activities
are in step with efforts by the Chinese military to develop cyber warfare capabilities, although there is no clear evidence of direct militaryor government involvement. China has repeatedly denied the claims.
Japan, too, inaugurated the Initiative for Cyber Security Information
Sharing Partnership of Japan (J-CSI) in October 2011 to facilitate thesharing of information on cyber attacks between the government andthe private sector. But additional steps are necessary to cope with therapid sophistication of cyber threats.
In March 2013 North Korea successfully conducted a nuclear test
for the third time. This, coupled with the development of its longrange missile technology, as evidenced by its December 2012 launchof a satellite into orbit, shows that threats to Japanese security are increasing, as Pyongyang is steadily acquiring the offensive capability
that would put mainland United States within range of a nuclear attack.
In Japan, a much expected revision of the Three Principles on
Arms Exports was omitted from the 2010 Guidelines—issued during
the second DPJ administration of Naoto Kan—for political reasons.
The subsequent Yoshihiko Noda administration eased the Principles,though, clearing the way for Japan to participate in international
weapons development programs and broadening the scope of Japan’s
8foreign assistance to include security capacity building of other nations. Any revision to the 2010 Guidelines, then, needs to build onsuch newly introduced concepts as a Dynamic Defense Force andmake proactive adjustments in conformance with the changes in the
security environment and mid- to long-range trends.
Currently, the LDP administration of Shinzo Abe is moving forward with the establishment of a National Security Council and theformulation of a national security strategy. Japan’s long-term strategic
issues had hitherto been addressed in the National Defense Program
Guidelines in the absence of other appropriate strategy documents,
but henceforth, conceptual, strategic issues should ideally be addressed in the NSS, with the Guidelines focusing on concrete, defense-capacity measures needed to ensure preparedness. This policy
proposal thus offers recommendations for issues that should be addressed by not only the Guidelines but also the NSS.
Unlike the previous Tokyo Foundation proposal on national security, published in October 2008, when we adopted a broader perspective in analyzing issues and offering recommendations (“New Security Strategy of Japan: Multilayered and Cooperative Security Strategy”) with the hope they would be incorporated into the 2010 Guidelines, this time we have focused on the most urgent issues confronting
Japan in a changing strategic environment.
As for the strategic environment, we have reviewed the situationin waters affecting Japan as a maritime nation and estimated China’s
naval capabilities, in addition to predicting North Korea’s nuclear
capabilities. Based on these analyses, we have made various proposals in the following three categories.
The first is Japan’s right of self-defense in peacetime—an issue
requiring immediate attention if we are to prevent the standoff with
China around the Senkaku Islands from escalating into open conflict.
This is an issue that has not been fully debated, however, as it is often
overshadowed by arguments regarding the right of collective self9

defense. In this context, the proposals also address the question ofdeveloping the capacity to attack strategic, logistic bases and such
new issues as cyberspace and joint operations involving the amphibious capabilities of the Ground Self-Defense Force.
The second major category addressed here is maritime security.
Defending the sea lines of communication stretching from the Eastand South China Sea to the Indian Ocean is a matter of primal importance for Japan, and so is ensuring the security of the emerging
Arctic shipping route. The proposals below call for a more systematic
approach to Japan’s engagement in maritime security.
The third concerns measures to promote international security,
including the role of the Self-Defense Forces. A new policy horizon
for Japan is assistance for Asian countries in the domain of capacity
building. Proposals are offered for this and such other issues as maintaining the level of Japan’s defense technology and production base,as well as the overseas transfer of defense-related equipment and theprotection of Japanese nationals living or visiting abroad—a growing
concern in the light of the January 2013 terrorist attack on an Algeriannatural gas processing facility, in which 10 Japanese hostages were
killed.
Finally, it must be emphasized that these proposals are not intended to incite discord or to heighten tensions with China. There isno meaning in advocating a Cold War containment strategy in thelight of China’s deepening economic interdependence with Japan, theUnited States, and other countries around the world. Rather, these
proposals are intended to form the basis of an engagement policy toencourage China to make a bigger contribution to regional stability.
This is a position echoing the Tokyo Foundation’s June 2011 policy
proposal on “Japan’s Security Strategy toward China: Integration,
Balancing, and Deterrence in the Era of Power Shift” calling for China
to be more fully integrated into the regional security architecture.
The tension between Japan and China in the seas around the10

Senkaku Islands is a source of great anxiety for security specialists
around the world. Successfully resolving the current crisis throughefforts by Japan, China, and other concerned countries and newly establishing a stable order in the Indo-Pacific region would not only
engender great benefits for Japan but could also open up new horizons for Japan’s security strategy.

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SUMMARY OF PROPOSALSThe Right of Self-Defense in Peacetime and Other Pressing Issues
surrounding the Right of Self-Defense
Proposal 1: Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law and establish a basic
national security law to clear the way for the use of the right of selfdefense prior to the issuance of a defense mobilization order—that is, for“gray zone” situations during peacetime—as well as to enable the exerciseof the right of collective self-defense. Regarding gray zone situations,
identify issues the government needs to clear, establish a decision-making
structure, and conduct periodic government-level command post exercises
for specific situations.

Given the current situation around the Senkaku Islands, the scenarios under which the SDF are most likely to be called into action
will be “gray zone” cases: violations of Japanese sovereignty thatare not clear military invasions requiring the issuance of a defense
mobilization order but are beyond the policing capacity of the Japan Coast Guard. There has not been a review of how best to copewith such infringements, though, in discussions of Japan’s defense
to date. As matters stand, Japan has done little to legally define
gray zone situations, to identify issues the government must clear,or to establish a decision-making structure. The government is currently considering the approval of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, but this is a matter involving the repulsion of
an invading force through military means as an act of self-defense
following the issuance of a defense mobilization order. This, too, is
no doubt an important issue, but inasmuch as gray zone infringements are taking place even now, enabling Japan to exercise its
right of self-defense in peacetime—as proposed here—should sure12

ly be addressed first, before engaging in a full-scale debate on theright of collective self-defense.
Proposal 2: To enable a proper response to gray zone incidents, relax thegovernment’s interpretation of the Constitution, according to which three
conditions must be met for Japan to use armed force in the exercise of its
right of self-defense. In particular, a more flexible interpretation of thefirst condition—“an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression”—isneeded.

The three conditions that must be met for Japan to use armed force inthe exercise of its right of self-defense, under the government’s current constitutional interpretation, are: (1) when there is an imminentand illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; (2) when there is no
appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and (3) when the use of armed force isconfined to the minimum necessary level. These conditions were established during the Cold War—when a distinction could clearly bemade between peacetime and a state of emergency—and based on theassumption of a full-scale Soviet invasion. In the near future, Japan ismuch more likely to confront a gray zone crisis that cannot clearly beclassified as an “imminent and illegitimate act of aggression”—aproduct of a strict interpretation of the UN Charter’s Article 51 by thegovernment of Japan in the mid-1950s. A clear discrepancy thus exists
between the government institutions in place now, built on outdated
assumptions, and current realities. Under the circumstances, it may
be difficult to deal effectively with violations of national sovereignty
or invasions owing to delays in invoking the right of self-defense following the issuance of a defense mobilization order.
Proposal 3: Japan (SDF) should establish the capacity to attack strategic,
logistic bases through the strengthening and utilization of the combined
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Japan-US security framework. The following three goals should be pursued: (1) a posture/structure within the combined Japan-US framework
enabling Japan to autonomously utilize this capacity of the US forces; (2)a posture/structure enabling bigger mission roles and deeper involvementby the SDF for attacks on strategic, logistic bases, premised on combined
Japan-US action; and (3) a clear policy statement by the government thatJapan possesses the inherent right, as an independent country, to maintain the capacity to attack strategic, logistic bases.

Ever since the establishment of the SDF, Japan has never taken specific action to establish the defense capacity or operational structure toattack strategic, logistic bases of enemy forces on foreign soil, despite
a constitutional interpretation that permits such attacks under certain
conditions. For the SDF to be equipped with such capabilities is intrinsically desirable from the perspective of meeting Japan’s defense
needs and ensuring the SDF’s autonomy. But this deficiency has been
covered to date by the Japan-US security alliance, in which Japan has
confined itself to serving as a “shield,” with US forces acting as the“spear.” Given the severe budgetary and organizational restrictions ofequipping the SDF with this capacity, even when used only in cases
meeting certain conditions, such a step will not likely be a realistic
option in the immediate future. But this proposal is one that can be
implemented over a period of about 10 years, which is the timeframe
covered by the new Guidelines. It is essential that Japan take steps
toward these goals through the strengthening and utilization of the
combined Japan-US security framework.
Proposal 4: Station members of the GSDF in the Nansei Islands as a clear
statement of Japan’s intentions to defend its territory. Establish a positionof deterrence through joint operations with the MSDF and ASDF in partnership with the US military. Establish well-balanced amphibious capabilities (akin to those of the US Marine Corps) that will repel invasions and14

quickly retake islands in the event that deterrence fails. This will entail
detailed consultations with US forces regarding respective roles, responsibilities, and capabilities to ensure effectiveness and efficiency.

The Nansei Islands are pivotally located between the western Pacificand the East China Sea, impeding the passage of China’s North Sea
Fleet and East Sea Fleet into the Pacific. The chain of islands also
forms the crux of the US forward deployment strategy in the Pacificand is an important forward position for its Air-Sea Battle concept.
With the exception of Okinawa Island, though, there is virtually no
military presence on these strategically important islands, creating ahighly unstable situation that could invite military adventurism byneighboring countries. The situation should be improved by stationing GSDF troops on a permanent basis, on not only Okinawa Island
but also major islands in the Miyako and Yaeyama chains, as well as
the island of Amami Oshima. Japan should make a clear statement of
its intentions to defend its territory, taking steps to deter territorial
infringements and thereby promoting stability. The stationed troops
should coordinate closely with US forces in order to complement
America’s forward deployment strategy and Air-Sea Battle concept,
achieving a synergistic effect through joint operations with the MSDF
and ASDF, as well with as the US military. In the event that deterrence fails, Japan must have the ability to quickly retake the islands
with integrated amphibious capabilities.
Proposal 5: Lay down utilization objectives and strategies for cyberspace.
Establish a cyber unit in the SDF to address not only defense-related operations but all cyberspace issues. Assign primary responsibility for thegovernment’s use of cyberspace to the SDF, giving it authority to oversee
the IT departments of each ministry and agency. Also, promote cooperation with the private sector to access the latest technologies and knowhow.

15

The United States has named cyberspace the fifth security domain
after land, sea, air, and space, for cyber attacks can not only obstruct
intelligence gathering activities but also inflict actual physical damage.
Many of the world’s leading cyber countries have well-defined utilization objectives, concepts, and strategies, according to which they
manage their organizations and troops to defend against cyber attacks. Japan, too, has launched a number of initiatives, but government awareness of cyberspace use is still low. Cyber networks for information sharing remain largely underdeveloped, and there is little
understanding of the implications of cyberspace for foreign and security policy. A unit to conduct cyber operations should be establishedwithin the SDF—which is capable of securing the necessary humanresources and budgetary allocations—to oversee the IT activities ofsuch government agencies as the Ministry of Defense, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications,
Ministry of Finance, and National Police Agency. Cooperation withprivate companies that have more advanced knowledge than thegovernment is also indispensable in order to maintain leading-edge
cyber capabilities. This should go beyond just joint research or the
sharing of information; budgetary approaches relying on a costaccumulation formula also need to be reassessed. The latest technologies in the private sector must be tapped by applying the constantly
evolving knowhow and capabilities of private companies to government systems for intelligence gathering and processing.
Systematic Approach toward Maritime Security
Proposal 6: Set aside a section in the new Guidelines emphasizing theimportance of a more systematic approach toward maritime security andmake clear this is a pressing issue for Japan’s defense policy today. Closely
monitor and analyze the maritime security situation that has been undergoing rapid change in recent years, especially in the seas with relevance16

for Japan, such as the western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, other seasaround Asia, and the Arctic Ocean, and indicate the basic directions forthe country’s comprehensive response.

The ocean is open to all users. The reasons shipping remains the mostefficient mode of transporting goods are because there are no bordercheckpoints, giving ships free passage to any port in the world, andbecause there is no theoretical limit to the volume of goods that canbe transported by freighters. Moreover, considerable progress has
been made in recent years in the exploration of offshore energy
sources. The safety of the seas is thus of vital interest to Japan, an island country surrounded by the sea. Of great importance are not justJapan’s shores and nearby waters, though, for problems in any of theworld’s oceans can have a major impact. Because Japan is dependent
on maritime transport for its economic activity, the country needs topay special attention to security issues in the maritime domain. The
new Guidelines should thus devote greater attention to the issue ofmaritime security, outlining both a comprehensive framework andconcrete measures for key issues.
Proposal 7: Strengthen coordination among the Ground, Maritime, and
Air SDF from the perspective of maritime security. Because maritime security involves the defense not only of territorial waters but also the airspace
above those waters and remote islands, strengthen joint operations
among the three services. A joint command for SDF operations should beachieved through the establishment of a unified C4ISR system, implementation of joint exercises, and the joint formulation of a common maritime
security strategy.

The defense of remote islands is a vital component of maritime security that requires the closer integration of the Ground, Maritime, and
Air SDF. Integrated operations are predicated on the sharing of in17

formation and a unified command structure, but each SDF branch
now employs a different C4ISR (command, control, communication,
computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) system. This
prevents the seamless coordination of targets and hampers the implementation of tasks central to joint operations, such as the assignment or transferring of targets among the different branches. An integrated C4ISR system is indispensable. Another key issue is unifying
the command structure. The three branches should conduct joint
training and exercises on a regular basis to promote a better understanding of each other’s special characteristics and ensure the effective movement of troops. Joint operations necessitate the coordinationof targets. Toward this end, the three branches should work together
to formulate a maritime security strategy, clarify objectives, and draw
up concrete tactical operation plans.
Proposal 8: Ensure that the MSDF and ASDF have the capacity to maintain sea and air superiority in the territorial seas far from mainland Japanin the face of a changing maritime security environment. Qualitatively
and quantitatively upgrade the ships, fighter jets, patrol aircraft, and
AWACS aircraft of both forces, and begin discussions on the introductionof an aircraft carrier that can provide the air cover (air boundary defense)
necessary for the defense of territorial waters.

Maintaining good relations with neighboring countries and diplomatic efforts are essential components of maritime security. But this does
not preclude the need to maintain sea superiority by Japanese andallied forces, without which Japan may become vulnerably exposedin a contingency. Achieving superiority on the seas requires dominance of airspace as well, for a maritime fleet will be hard pressed to
win a sea battle without air cover. Upgrading Japan’s ships, fighter
jets, anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and aircraft carrying airborne
warning and control systems (AWACS) is thus a priority issue. Given18the importance of defending remote islands, the self-defense capabilities of the GSDF must also be upgraded in such areas as surveillance,
ability to secure bases of operation, and the conferring of amphibious
capabilities. Establishing air cover around the Nansei Islands would
require either new bases on land or an aircraft carrier. The former
would be difficult, though, from a political and operational (ability towithstand attack) standpoint, so the remaining option would be to
employ an aircraft carrier. Japan would not need (or be able to finance) a carrier strike group like those employed by the United States.
Japan should thus consider reinforcing the capability of warships
now possessed by the MSDF, such as Izumo-class 22DDH destroyers,
and the purchase of F-35Bs with vertical take-off/landing capabilities.
Proposal 9: Strengthen the Japan Coast Guard and promote effective
cooperation with the SDF in defending territorial waters and remote islands and in ensuring order at sea. Involve all relevant ministries andagencies in the drafting, sharing, and operation of a crisis management
program. Advance coordination and cooperation between the SDF and
JCG, as well as with such other relevant agencies as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry ofLand, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism; National Police Agency;
Fisheries Agency; and Agency for Natural Resources and Energy to assure
a seamless response in the transition between peacetime and a national
contingency.

The defense of territorial waters and remote islands should intrinsically be based on the right of self-defense. But due to inconsistencies
in Japan’s legal system, there is no choice at present but for “grayzone” incidents to be addressed by the Japan Coast Guard as part ofits maritime law enforcement duties. Of urgent importance, therefore,
is not only to eliminate such inconsistencies, as described in Proposal
1, but also to quickly and boldly upgrade and expand the structure
19and posture of the JCG. There is also a pressing need to create a structure for seamless coordination between the JCG and SDF in case thesecurity situation deteriorates. In concrete terms, a crisis management
program should be drawn up and shared by all ministries and agencies that would be involved in the transition between peacetime and anational contingency.
Proposal 10: With the situation around the Nansei Islands becoming
increasingly complicated and transnational in scope, promote cooperation
with other countries and maritime industries. The international community should be broadly informed of attempts by Chinese law enforcement
vessels to alter the status quo through repeated intrusions into Japanese
territorial waters so that a shared perception can be formed regarding thedangers of harassment activities by Chinese paramilitary forces accidentally triggering a conflict.

International cooperation is critical in dealing with the increasingly
complicated and transnational nature of defending Japan’s territorial
waters. Diplomatic efforts must be made to broadly inform the international community of attempts by China to alter the status quo
through the use of force so that a shared perception can be formed
regarding the need to prevent an escalation of such activities. Cooperation must also be advanced with maritime industries; there is aneed for closer coordination on the utilization of stratospheric platforms to improve the monitoring of ocean areas and enhance telecommunication capacity—issues directly related to the freedom ofnavigation, the development of marine resources, and other majorinternational concerns.
Proposal 11: Raise the rank of the SDF’s “legal affairs general” to that of“rear admiral/major general,” as in the United States, in view of the importance of legal issues in ensuring maritime security. Restrain moves by20

countries that ignore rules and the legal order, while at the same timeworking to integrate them into the established legal order. Have the MSDF
learn from the practice of evidence accumulation, now conducted by law
enforcement agencies.

Many maritime conventions and statutes have been established inaddition to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which stipulates fundamental rules for the use of the oceans. There are also manyrules, including customary law, covering military activities on the sea,
both during peacetime and in contingencies. In view of the increasing
importance of the legal order in maritime security in recent years, legal affairs general (equivalent to captain/colonel) in the SDF (especially the MSDF) should be raised to the rank of “rear admiral/major
general,” as in the United States. Actions by countries that ignore
maritime rules and the legal order need to be restrained. At the sametime, efforts should be made to integrate them into the establishedlegal order, such as by demonstrating the importance Japan places on
observing the maritime order. Inasmuch as the United States is theworld’s largest maritime nation, Japan should also strongly appeal toits alliance partner to swiftly ratify the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea.
Proposal 12: Promptly establish a maritime security strategy for the Arctic Ocean, as the melting of polar ice is likely to usher in significant
changes in the near future—perhaps in just a few years. Draft a strategy
that takes into consideration the commercial use of Arctic sea lanes, theexploration and development of marine energy resources, and the emergence of a new maritime security environment. Participate actively in the
Arctic Council and dispatch oceanographic observation vessels to Arctic
waters by revising the Self-Defense Forces Law.

Recently released scientific analyses suggest that the melting of the21Arctic ice cap will henceforth progress at a rapid pace. This will havewidespread repercussions for maritime transport, natural resources
development, fishing, and environmental conservation in the Arctic
Ocean. In response, coastal countries are now developing new security and defense policies. Significant changes in global naval movement
patterns can also be expected. Given the likelihood of major changes
in the Arctic Ocean in the near future, Japan should promptly establish a security strategy for the Arctic.
International Security Policies of the Ministry of Defense and the
Self-Defense Forces
Proposal 13: Significantly expand the budget and content of capacity
building programs for the defense and law enforcement agencies of foreign countries, playing a dynamic role in improving the regional andglobal security environment. Organically coordinate the capacity building
assistance offered by the Ministry of Defense, official development assistance provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and financing from theJapan Bank for International Cooperation.

The National Defense Program Guidelines currently call for steppedup efforts to support capacity building in other countries to improve
the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and around theglobe. The Capacity Building Assistance Office was established in theInternational Policy Division of the Defense Ministry’s Bureau of Defense Policy in fiscal 2011, and it is engaged in supporting capacity
building and human resources development—primarily in Southeast
Asian countries—in nontraditional security areas. Such support iscurrently offered in a limited number of fields and on a small scale,
however, with an annual budget of no more than 300 million yen.
Both the content and budget for such activities should be expanded
significantly, bolstering Japan’s engagement in the region through22

closer coordination among various ministries and agencies. The
greater part of capacity building assistance is targeted toward Southeast Asia, so emphasis should firstly be placed on strengthening joint
military exercises and training with those countries. Secondly, Japan
should provide financial and technical assistance to strengthen theirdefense capabilities and related infrastructure. National defense is not
simply a matter of amassing frontal combat equipment; other important factors include such infrastructure as airports, ports, roads,
electric power, telecommunications, energy, and software, as well as
the organization and human resources to operate such facilities. The
provision of such infrastructure and resources will be of decisive importance in raising the defense capabilities of Southeast Asian countries.
Proposal 14: Substantially enhance coordination between international
peacekeeping activities and official development assistance. Create apermanent center for security cooperation within the newly established
National Security Council responsible for analyzing trends in UN peacekeeping operations and the peace-building and antipiracy activities ofmultinational forces, as well as for promoting cross-agency cooperationand coordination on ODA and other issues on an ongoing basis.

The government must have the capacity to make decisions across various ministries and agencies, given the need to proceed with greatcare in addressing the Senkaku issue and to effectively respond to
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other unanticipated situations.
The council will undertake long-term analyses of the domestic andinternational situation; create common, cross-agency national objectives; and formulate guidelines (strategies) for the development anduse of policy resources to achieve those objectives. A center for security cooperation should be established within the section responsiblefor drafting the long-term security strategy to analyze trends in UN23

peacekeeping operations and the peace-building and antipiracy activities of multinational forces, as well as to promote cross-agency cooperation and coordination on ODA and other issues on an ongoing basis.
Proposal 15: Further streamline the Three Principles on Arms Exports inthe new Guidelines, enabling Japan to strengthen its defense technology
and production base and to advance reasonable arms exports, joint international development, and international cooperation. In particular, relax
the remaining conditions for the transfer of arms to third countries. Decisions regarding arms exports should be made by the prime minister basedon strategic advice from the NSC and implemented by the minister of
economy, trade and industry, who has jurisdiction over the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act.

The Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, Etc., issued by the Yoshihiko
Noda administration in 2011, announced a comprehensive easing ofgovernment policy regarding contributions to peace, international
cooperation, and joint development and production of defense
equipment, marking a shift from the piecemeal, ad hoc measures that
had been taken until then. This was a step in the right direction, andgovernment-led efforts should henceforth be made to strategicallystrengthen Japan’s defense technology and production base; at thesame time, a setup to enable an “all Japan” response, transcending
differences among ministries and agencies, must be created to advance reasonable arms exports, joint international development, andinternational cooperation. Also necessary is the relaxation of the requirement—which has remained intact even after the 2011 revisions—for rigid controls to prevent the transfer of exports, supplies,
and jointly developed defense equipment to third countries. The new
Guidelines should take these points into consideration in outlining a24

clear and simple policy on the transfer of defense equipment, joint
development and production, and such forms of international cooperation as capacity building assistance.
Proposal 16: Looking toward the future, build a system of defense cooperation with industry and academia to promote the development of defense-related technology, including those with dual-use capabilities, partly
to make effective use of Japan’s limited funds for research and development. As a first step, organically link the development of defense-related
technologies with the Cabinet Office’s Comprehensive Strategy on Science,
Technology, and Innovation. In this regard, there is an urgent need to develop experts who not only are intimately familiar with defense technology and its lifecycle but also have a broad understanding of all aspects ofscience and technology.

Another issue in maintaining Japan’s defense production base is expanding domestic R&D funding for new technologies and equipment.
Such funding for development, design, and production have been
allocated to the Technical Research and Development Institute of the
Ministry of Defense, and complicated application procedures are required to transfer these tasks to the private sector. Because of the scarcity of partnerships with Japanese universities—which have advanced knowhow of underlying technologies—moreover, the capacity of private companies to develop new equipment is not robust. If
this situation goes unaddressed, and Japanese industry’s competitiveness erodes, maintaining a stable defense production base will
prove elusive even if the hurdles on arms exports and joint development with other countries are lowered. Ideally, an “all Japan” framework for a comprehensive science and technology policy should beestablished through close coordination between the Defense Ministry’s planning and development project team and the Strategic Innovation Creation Program (provisional name), scheduled to be25

launched in the Cabinet Office’s Council for Science and Technology
Policy. Such a framework will entail huge political costs, though, given bureaucratic sectionalism—particularly the reluctance of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology to give up control of the
R&D budget—and academia’s lingering aversion to military technology, but this is a task that cannot be put off.

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