20 Industrial Property Rights Policy in Modern Japan– From 1894 to 1911 –(*)
Research Fellow: Satoshi TSURUOKAIn July 1894, as a result of revisions to the so-called unequal treaties, Japan's accession to the Paris
Convention was secured. This finally made Japan a member of the international community. Since then, whatdevelopments have occurred in Japan in terms of industrial property rights? As a matter of fact, after signing
said Convention, Japan encountered many problems related to industrial property rights in the course ofnegotiations with Western countries and had to struggle to solve them.
This research will examine the types of problems related to industrial property rights that occurred between
Western countries (particularly the U.K. and Germany) and Japan, which had greatly raised its international
status by securing accession to the Paris Convention and undergoing the First Sino-Japanese War and the
Russo-Japanese War. This research will also analyze, based on historical materials on Japan, the U.K., andGermany, how Japan tried to solve those problems through diplomatic negotiations. Furthermore, this research
will reveal how Japan had tried to establish a system to balance national interests and international cooperation
as a member of the international community.

Ⅰ Introduction
The signing of the Anglo-JapaneseCommerce and Navigation Treaty in July 1894
secured Japan's accession to the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property and theBerne Convention for the Protection of Literaryand Artistic Works. This finally made Japan amember of the international community in thefield of intellectual property rights as well.
However, the signing of these conventions
did not necessarily solve all of the industrial
property right-related problems that existed
between Japan and Western countries. Rather,subsequently, a series of new problems related toindustrial property rights occurred between Japanand Western countries, especially the U.K. andGermany.
On the other hand, against this backdrop,
Japan reached a major turning point ininternational politics: the First Sino-Japanese War,which broke out in August 1894, and the
Russo-Japanese War, which broke out in February
1904. These two wars greatly changed Japan's
international status.
Therefore, a study on the history since July
1894 would allow us to understand how Japan,
which had newly become a member of theinternational community and had successfullyraised its international status, dealt withproblems related to industrial property rights
caused by the introduction of many advanced
technologies from Western countries from theperspective of a balance between the policy topursue national interests and the policy to pursue
international cooperation (more specifically, howJapan has formed such policies). It would also
give us valuable insight into what policies on
industrial property rights Japan, as a member ofthe international community, should take in the
future, especially toward emerging countries,
which are undergoing rapid economic development,in order to maintain a balance between the policy
to pursue national interests and the policy topursue international cooperation.
However, this part of Japanese history has
not been analyzed sufficiently.
Therefore, this research will focus on thehistory after the signing of the Anglo-Japanese
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in July 1894,
analyze, mostly from a diplomatic perspective,
what problems emerged with regard to industrial
property rights and what solutions were sought
between Japan, whose accession to the Paris
Convention was secured, and Western countries,
especially, the U.K. and Germany; and it will
reveal how Japan was trying to establish a system
to balance national interests and international
cooperation as a member of the international
community.

(*) This is an English translation of the summary of the report published under the Industrial Property Research
Promotion Project FY2012 entrusted by the Japan Patent Office. IIP is entirely responsible for any errors in
expression or description of the translation. When any ambiguity is found in the English translation, the original
Japanese text shall be prevailing.
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1 ●Ⅱ Industrial Property Rights andthe Japan-Germany Commerceand Navigation Treaty(1) Commencementofnegotiations
between Japan and Germany
In August 1892, the second Ito Cabinet led
by Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito was formed.
Munemitsu Mutsu was appointed as foreign
minister. Foreign Minister Mutsu signed theAnglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce andNavigation in July 1894 and instructed Japanese
Ambassador Aoki Shuuzo in Germany toimmediately begin negotiations with Germany.
Ambassador Aoki replied that the German
Federal Foreign Office did not receive a reportfrom German Ambassador Freiherr von
Gutschmid in Japan and that Germany was still
hesitant to prompt the commencement of theJapan-Germany negotiations.
Therefore, Foreign Minister Mutsu andGerman Ambassador Gutschmid had a meeting inTokyo, after which, Ambassador Gutschmid
prepared a report. The German Federal Foreign
Office received his report on December 14, 1894
and began negotiations with Japan in January
1895.

shown its military power in the First
Sino-Japanese War, would take a stronger position
against Germany.
Ambassador Gutschmid proposed thefollowing negotiation policies for individual
issues: (i) demand for compensation for thecomplete relinquishment of consular jurisdiction,(ii) a consistent request for land ownership,especially mortgage, (iii) scrapping of therestrictions on coastal trade, reconsideration of
the tariff rates and clarification of taxes on
foreigners' residential areas, (iv) relinquishmentof a special agreement concluded under theJapan-Germany treaty signed in 1889, and (v)maintenance of the heritage and guardian system,
the provision concerning marriage and theconsular agreement. With regard to intellectual
property rights, he pointed out the problem that
Article 17 of the Anglo-Japanese Commerce andNavigation Treaty protects Germany's interest
only to a certain extent.
Finally, he proposed that Germany should
conclude a special agreement on particularsubjects such as intellectual property rights,
conclude a protocol on tariffs and conclude amemorandum on Japan's promises concerning
legal codes, etc.
Having received this report, the German
Federal Foreign Office accepted many of his
proposals
andstartedJapan-Germany
negotiations.

(2) Gutschmid's report
In the report, German Ambassador
Gutschmid stated as follows.
First, he pointed out that, although theAnglo-Japanese Commerce and Navigation Treaty
was an equal bilateral treaty, it had someproblems with such matters as coastal trade,consular jurisdiction, land ownership andconsulate's authority.
He also pointed out that, when theJapan-Germany Commerce and Navigation Treaty
was signed in 1889, it was Germany's intention toliberate Japan in phases, except for the issue oftariffs, and that this was a crucial point that led tothe difference between the success of theAnglo-Japanese Commerce and Navigation Treaty
and the failure of the Japan-Germany Commerceand Navigation Treaty signed in 1889. Heproposed that Germany should not conduct
negotiations based on the Japan-Germany
Commerce and Navigation Treaty but based on
the Anglo-Japanese Commerce and Navigation
Treaty. He warned that Japan, which had clearly(3) Presentation of Germany's proposal
and Japan's responseIn
January
1895,
Japan-Germany
negotiations commenced in Berlin between
Ambassador Aoki and the German Foreign
Secretary, Adolf Hermann Freiherr Marschall vonBieberstein. In the negotiations, Germany
requested the signing of a special treaty on
protection for industrial property rights. Japan
accepted this request on the condition that the
special treaty would not take effect before therelinquishment of consular jurisdiction.
Also, they negotiated proposals on tariffs andthe consular treaty. One year later, in February
1896, industrial property rights reemerged as anegotiation agenda. In the negotiations, Germany
demanded the addition of a paragraph specifyingthat "The subjects of each of the two countries
shall enjoy in the other protection of inventions,patterns, and models, trade and manufacture
marks, firm and other commercial names upon
fulfillment of conditions prescribed by law. Thisagreement shall immediately take effect upon the1

Leading up to the signing of theJapan-Germany
Commerce
andNavigation Treaty●

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exchange of ratifications of present treaty." In
comparison with the Anglo-Japanese Commerceand Navigation Treaty and the Japan-U.S.
Commerce and Navigation Treaty, which werepreviously signed, this provision was moreadvantageous to Germany in the sense that only
Germany, ahead of the U.K. and the United States,
can obtain protection for industrial property
rights in Japan, more specifically, immediately
after the exchange of ratifications.
Having received this request, Ambassador
Aoki interpreted that this provision would allow
Japan to immediately restore jurisdiction overindustrial property rights and proposed to accept
this request. Acting Foreign Minister Kinmochi
Saionji accepted the proposal. Despite his
skepticism toward the statements made by
Ambassador Aoki, Acting Foreign Minister Saionji
did not clearly instruct Ambassador Aoki to checkthis point by referring to the explicit provision.
In the end, Acting Foreign Minister Saionji
failed to seek follow-up information fromAmbassador Aoki about this matter before
Japan-Germany negotiations got under way.
(4) SigningoftheJapan-Germany
Commerce and Navigation Treaty
On April 4, 1896, the Japan-Germany
Commerce and Navigation Treaty was signed.
Regarding industrial property rights, Article 17
specified that the principle of national treatment
shall apply to the protection of industrial property
rights and that, if the legally prescribed
conditions are fulfilled, Germans shall be given
protection for industrial property rights in Japan.
Article 21 specified that Article 17 shall takeeffect immediately after the exchange ofratifications. Moreover, Section 4 of the Protocol
referred to the signing of a special treaty due tothe fact that Germany had not signed the Paris
Convention.
However, regarding the issue of consularjurisdiction, it was specified that Germany would
agree to the relinquishment of consularjurisdiction
only
ifGermany's
consularjurisdiction is relinquished simultaneously withthe relinquishment of the consular jurisdiction ofother Western countries. In short, theseprovisions were written in such a way that they
could be interpreted that only Germany could
gain protection for industrial property rights inJapan immediately after the exchange ofratifications, while, as far as Germany's consularjurisdiction over industrial property rights wasconcerned, Japan would not restore jurisdiction●

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over industrial property rights until July 1899,
when the consular jurisdiction of other Westerncountries would be relinquished.
On
thismatter,Ambassador
Aokiemphasized that Article 17 could be interpreted
as stating that Japan was authorized to exercise
its jurisdiction and that Germany had alreadyagreed on this point in the bilateral negotiations.
However, Acting Foreign Minister Saionji
was not convinced by Ambassador Aoki's
explanation and expressed his concern that,
under the principle of most favored nation
treatment, not only Germany but also other
Western countries would gain protection forindustrial property rights in Japan without
allowing Japan to restore its jurisdiction overindustrial property rights.
2

Period between the signing of the Treaty
and the exchange of ratifications(1) Dispute in Japan regarding additional
negotiations
Against this background, in May 1896,
Foreign Minister Mutsu, who returned to his job,
instructed Ambassador Aoki to check the explicit
provision to ensure that Japan was to restore
jurisdiction over industrial property rights.
However, Ambassador Aoki refuted this
instruction.
Foreign Minister Kinmochi Saionji, who was
newly appointed as a foreign minister to replace
Mutsu, gave similar instruction to Ambassador
Aoki in late June of the same year. At the time,
Foreign Minister Saionji instructed Ambassador
Aoki to check whether Germany had agreed toJapan's restoration of the following types ofjurisdiction: (i) the patent office's purely
administrative and practical jurisdiction that islimited to patent grant, refusal, revocation, etc.,(ii) the court's jurisdiction over German people
residing in Japan as far as the enforcement ofJapanese laws concerning industrial property
rights is concerned, and (iii) the court's
jurisdiction covering only German people
requesting protection.
As a result, in late July of the year,
Ambassador Aoki reported that, although it would
be impossible to newly establish such provisions,
Germany secretly indicated that it would agree toJapan's restoration of jurisdiction over industrial
property rights if such jurisdiction only covered
German people requesting protection forindustrial property rights.
However, Foreign Minister Saionji was not
3 ●satisfied with the report from Ambassador Aoki.
Since it subsequently became evident that Japan
and Germany had a different interpretation as totheir "agreed points" concerning Article 17,
Foreign Minister Saionji instructed Ambassador
Aoki, in late August of the year, to delay theexchange of ratifications.
(2) Realization of the difference between
Japan and Germany
Germany started sensing that something was
wrong in August 1896. From early August,Foreign Minister Saionji, First Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs Komura, and German Ambassador
Gutschmid started having meetings in Tokyo. In
these meetings, Germany argued that (i) the
administrative disposition of industrial property
rights should be determined based on Japaneselaw, (ii) the treaty does not have any provision
specifying that Japan has any specific type ofjurisdiction, and (iii) it is impossible to relinquish
jurisdiction over industrial property rights since
it would violate the Constitution and such
relinquishment had not been discussed in thecourse of the negotiations.
These meetings made it clear that
there was a difference between Japan andGermany with regard to the interpretation of the"agreed points" on Article 17. While Japan
requested confirmation on the content of thereport prepared by Ambassador Aoki, Germany
demanded immediate exchange of ratifications.
However, the second Ito Cabinet collapsed in
mid-September, and Foreign Minister Saionji
resigned as a result.
(3) Dissatisfaction of Germany about
Article 17
Meanwhile, dissatisfaction was expressed
within Germany with regard to Article 17. In July
1896, a meeting was held in Berlin between theGerman Federal Ministry of the Interior and theGerman commerce and industrial community withregard to the Japan-Germany Commerce andNavigation Treaty. In the meeting, committee
members voiced their opinion that, since thecurrent provision could not exclude Japanesetrademarks similar to German trademarks, itwould be necessary to put more pressure on
Japan.
In response, the German Federal Ministry of
the Interior made two proposals to the German
Federal Foreign Office: (i) filing requests forrevocation under Article 2, paragraph (3) and
Article 10 of the Japanese Trademark Regulations●

and filing trademark applications under Article 17of the Japan-Germany Commerce and Navigation
Treaty and (ii) analogically applying Article 7 of
the Germany-Austria Treaty on Patents, etc.
The German Federal Foreign Office decided
to accept the first proposal. It actually started
following the application procedure and expressed
its intention to take legal action.
(4) Additional negotiations conducted byForeign Minister Okuma
On September 18, 1896, when the second
Matsukata Cabinet was established, Shigenobu
Okuma was appointed as foreign minister. In
October of the same year, in order to move thenegotiation with Germany forward, Foreign
Minister Okuma decided to use the same
technique as the one adopted to solve a problem
related to the Hunting Act. In other words,
Foreign Minister Okuma made a proposal toGerman Ambassador Gutschmid that Japan would
recognize Germany's consular jurisdiction in
Japan even after the exchange of ratifications and,in exchange, that the consular court should obey
Japanese law when it comes to any disputes
concerning industrial property rights.
However, Germany rejected Okuma's
proposal on the grounds of its domestic law.
Consequently, Foreign Minister Okuma decided
to discontinue negotiations with Germany and to
exchange ratifications because he expected that
there would be few infringement cases where
Germans infringe Japanese trademarks in reality.
He also decided to give other Western countries
the same benefits as those given to Germany
under the principle of most favored nation
treatment.
In a subsequent meeting held in Novemberof the same year, German Ambassador Gutschmid
declared that the content of the report preparedby Ambassador Aoki was unacceptable. Although
Foreign Minister Okuma had expressed his
intention to solve this problem in the course ofnegotiations for the signing of a special treaty
based on the content of the report, he had toaccept Germany's stance again.
(5) Other countries' reaction to theexchange of ratifications
In connection with the scheduled exchangeof ratifications of the Japan-Germany CommerceandNavigation
Treaty,thefollowingdevelopments were observed in other countries.
First, Germany started pressuring Japan not
to give other Western countries, under the
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principle of most favored nation, the same
benefits as it gave to Germany. This was becauseof Germany's intention to enter the Japanesemarket under more advantageous conditions thanthose applied to other Western countries. In
particular, Germany paid attention to the actionsof the United Kingdom. At the same time,
Germany steadily registered its industrial
property rights and made preparations forinfringement lawsuits.
Meanwhile, the United States and Russia
became greatly interested in the issue of Article
17. The United States suggested that it would
take legal action in the future.
On the other hand, when this problem wasreported by the mass media in Japan, it aroused
nationalism. A negative view was expressedagainst the protection of foreigners' industrial
property rights.
(6) Exchange of ratifications of theJapan-Germany
Commerce
andNavigation Treaty
On November 18, 1896, the exchange ofratifications of the Japan-Germany Commerce andNavigation Treaty took place. Before coming tothis point, the problem became complicated due
largely to (i) the unclear instructions given by
Foreign Minister Saionji, (ii) Ambassador Aoki's
behavior, (iii) the difficulty in communication bytelegram, and (iv) the worsening of Germany's
feelings towards Japan.
Regarding(i),althoughawrittenconfirmation should have been obtained regarding
the point that Japan would recover thejurisdiction over industrial property rights
immediately after the exchange of ratifications,
Foreign Minister Saionji replied, "I suggest, but
do not insist," to obtain such written confirmationin response to Ambassador Aoki's report. As for(ii), Ambassador Aoki did not have a complete
understanding of the jurisdiction over industrial
property rights and simply conveyed Germany's
arguments. Regarding (iii), misunderstandings
were easily caused by telegrams, which, unlike
letters, required communications in English andplaced limits on the amount of information
communicated. Regarding (iv), even before thecommencement of negotiations between Japan
and Germany, Germany's feelings toward Japan
had been deteriorating significantly. This was
further aggravated by the Article 17 issue and thedelay in the exchange of ratifications, making it
difficult for Germany to accept Japan's requests.

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Ⅲ Japan-U.K. Relationships Concerning
Industrial Property Rights
1

Anglo-Japanese protocol concerning
mutualprotectionofpatents,
trademarks, and designs(1) Reaction of the U.K. toward theJapan-Germany
Commerce
andNavigation Treaty
Meanwhile, having seen the results of theJapan-Germany negotiations as described above,
the U.K. immediately took action. One week after
the signing of the Japan-Germany Commerce andNavigation Treaty, on April 10, 1896, the U.K.
prepared an English translation of theJapan-Germany Commerce and Navigation Treaty.
In late April of the year, the British Foreign Office
notified the British Board of Trade of thedifferences
betweenthe
Anglo-JapaneseCommerce and Navigation Treaty and theJapan-Germany Commerce and Navigation Treaty
from the perspective of industrial property rights.
In response to a request from the British
Board of Trade, British Foreign Secretary the 3rd
Marquis of Salisbury instructed British Minister
E. Satow in Japan to conduct further research.
In response, British Minister Satow
presented his view, in October of the same year,that it would be desirable to make a claim under
the principle of most favored nation. He proposed,
in November of that year, that, since Japan
permitted the filing of German applications, whilerefusing British applications, the U.K. should
immediately make a claim under the principle ofmost favored nation.
Consequently, at the end of November, theBritish Foreign Office, with the consent of the
British Board of Trade, instructed British
Minister Satow in Japan to immediately make aclaim under the principle of most favored nation.
(2) Japan-U.K. negotiations concerning thetiming for commencement of mutual
protection
In this situation, in mid-December of thesame year, the British Board of Trade proposed
that, in order to obtain mutual protection forindustrial property rights, it would be easiest andmost desirable if Japan were to sign the Paris
Convention, because a special agreement withJapan and an Order in Council were required
under the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act,
1883.
In response to this proposal, British Minister
5 ●Satow argued that such a proposal would not be
regarded as desirable in this situation. In
response, the British Foreign Office proposed theimmediate implementation of Article 17, which
would eliminate the need for an Order in Council.
The British Foreign Office prioritized obtaining
protection for British industrial property rights inJapan over solving the issue of jurisdiction overindustrial property rights. The British Foreign
Office chose an option that would allow theearliest and most efficient accomplishment of thisgoal.
Consequently, the British Board of Tradeagreed to the British Foreign Office's proposal. As
a result of the negotiations between Japan and the
U.K., mutual protection began in January 4, 1897.
(3) Japan-U.K. negotiations on consularjurisdiction
Meanwhile, regarding the issue of consularjurisdiction over industrial property rights, inNovember 1896, Foreign Minister Okuma
proposed to British Minister Satow that Japan
would recognize British consular jurisdiction in
Japan and, in exchange, requested that theconsular court should apply Japanese law byanalogy.
In response, at the end of January 1897,
British Foreign Secretary Salisbury notified
Japanese Minister Takaaki Kato to the U.K. that,
if Japan agreed not to apply Japanese law to
British citizens as long as Japanese law was notenforced on the citizens of other Westerncountries, the U.K. would agree to relinquish
jurisdiction over industrial property rights. In
other words, the U.K. refused to return to Japanthe jurisdiction over industrial property rights inpractice. However, the U.K., which used todemand the unconditional application of theprinciple of most favored nation, agreed toparticipate in negotiations with Japan in view ofBritish domestic law.
Consequently, negotiations between Japanand the U.K. began in London. In February 1897,
Minister Kato sent a draft protocol. Japan and the
U.K. roughly agreed to the draft. Subsequently,
Japan and the U.K. had negotiations on
modifications of wording, etc. On October 20 of
the same year, Japan and the U.K. signed a
protocol on mutual protection for patents, designs
and trademarks.

●

2

Negotiations between Japan and the
U.K. at international conferences(1) Conferencetorevisethe
ParisConvention
In December 1900, the third conference torevise the Paris Convention was held in Brussels.
Since this conference, Japan has become afull-fledged member. In this conference, Japan did
not express any opposition except for the issue ofthe Madrid Protocol.
In May 1911, the fourth conference to revise
the Paris Convention was held in Washington. In
this conference, Japan once again expressed its
stance of non-participation in the Madrid Protocol.
Japan was able to express its opinions on otherissues as well. Gradually, Japan started strongly
claiming its own interests in international
conferences.
(2) British proposal for international
unification
In September 1905, the U.K. made a
proposal for unification of multiple countries'
legal systems for industrial property rights, inother words, unification of the provisions on the
non-use of a patent and the provisions on
trademark registration.
However, Japan refused the proposal on the
grounds that it was not in line with Japanesepolicies, although those policies have been
criticized by Western countries.
3

Negotiations between Japan and the
U.K. on the Anglo-Japanese Commerceand Navigation Treaty(1) Preparation of the Komura draft
In July 1908, Prime Minister Taro Katsura’s
second Cabinet was established. Jutaro Komura
was appointed as foreign minister. In preparation
for the 1911 revision of the Anglo-JapaneseCommerce and Navigation Treaty, which wassigned in July 1894, Foreign Minister Komura
decided to prepare a draft revision.
The Komura draft prepared at the end ofJanuary 1910 did not contain a provision
concerning industrial property rights because it
was found unnecessary based on the fact thatJapan had already signed the Paris Convention.
Komura's draft was approved at a Cabinet
meeting in February of the same year. In early
March of that year, Foreign Minister Komura
instructed Minister Takaaki Kato to the U.K. tocommence negotiations with the U.K.
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(2) Submission of the British draft andJapan's response
In late April 1910, Japan and the U.K.
commenced negotiations in London. Regarding
industrial property rights, the U.K. requested thereason for not establishing a provision on
industrial property rights in the Komura draft anddemanded the establishment of a provision on
trade name protection.
Although U.K.-Japan negotiations were
initially conducted based on the Komura draft,strong oppositions to that draft were heard within
the U.K., and thus the U.K. decided to prepare
one of its own. From early July of that year,
U.K.-Japan negotiations were conducted based on
the newly prepared British draft.
The British draft proposed the establishmentof a new provision specifying the application of
the principle of national treatment to theprotection of industrial property rights, i.e.,
patents, trademarks, trade names and designs.
However, Japan requested the removal of thisprovision by arguing that it was unnecessary
because Japan had signed the Paris Convention.
(3) Compromise proposed by Japan
Japan’s aforementioned argument did noteasily convince the U.K. In February 1911,
Foreign Minister Komura slightly modified
Article 17 of the 1894 Anglo-Japanese Commerceand Navigation Treaty and proposed to include themodified Article in the new Anglo-JapaneseCommerce and Navigation Treaty.
On the other hand, the U.K. proposed that it
would accept Japan's request for removal of theprovision as long as Japan clearly stated in themeeting's minutes that it would not withdraw
from the Paris Convention. In the end, Japan andthe U.K. agreed to state in the meeting minutesthat Japan would not withdraw from the Paris
Convention in exchange for removing thisprovision.
(4) British request for the right to seek
revocation and Japan's reply
Also, the U.K. newly included in the
aforementioned British draft a provision that
permitted third parties to seek revocation ofindustrial property rights such as patents.
In response, Foreign Minister Komura
expressed his intention to oppose the British
draft on the grounds that it would allow the filingof a request for revocation in a wider range ofcases. However, he made a compromise by sayingthat Japan would agree to the British draft if the●

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U.K.
was
not
convincedbyJapan'scounterargument. Consequently, Japan and the
U.K. continued negotiations based on the British
draft.
(5) SigningoftheAnglo-JapaneseCommerce and Navigation Treaty
On April 3, 1911, Japan and the U.K. signed
the Anglo-Japanese Commerce and Navigation
Treaty. The two countries agreed to include in theTreaty a new provision on industrial property
rights, i.e., Article 1, item (vi), to permit third
parties to seek revocation of patents, etc., and tostate in the attached minutes that, if either Japanor the U.K. hoped to withdraw from the Paris
Convention, the two countries were to conclude
an agreement on mutual protection for industrial
property rights.

Ⅳ Conclusion
So far, the proceeding chapters havedescribed the history since the signing of theAnglo-Japanese Commerce and Navigation Treaty
in July 1894, i.e., the history since Japan's
accession to the Paris Convention was secured.
By studying this history, we have learned thefollowing.
First, having gone through the First
Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War,Japan started claiming its national interests withregard to the issues concerning industrial
property rights in a more aggressive manner,
making a shift toward policies to pursue national
interests.
Second, "opening the door to Japan" withrespect to industrial property rights took placeearlier than initially scheduled. As a result of thenegotiations between Japan and Germany, Japan
had to immediately "open the door to Japan" as far
as industrial property rights were concerned.
Therefore, Japan did not have sufficient time tomake necessary preparations either internally or
externally.
Third, the developments observed in thefield of industrial property rights in Japan since1894 is the process that was necessary for Japan
to become a member of the international
community. The negotiations between Japan andGermany marked the "opening the door to Japan"
when it came to industrial property rights. In thissense, the decision of Japan's accession to theParis Convention made in July 1894 did not markthe final resolution of the problem but the
beginning of Japan's participation in the
7 ●international community as a full-fledged
member.
Fourth, it is reasonable to conclude that, likethe U.K., Germany always played an importantfunction in determining the course of thenegotiations for revision of treaties and that,
especially with regard to industrial property
rights, Germany played an extremely importantrole in view of the fact that the result of theJapan-Germany negotiations greatly influenced
the future course of Japan.
In this way, since July 1894, when it came toindustrial property rights, the history of Japan has
been nothing but smooth. As a result of thesigning of the Japan-Germany Commerce andNavigation Treaty, Japan was forced to "open thedoor to Japan" in an unexpected manner before
recovering consular jurisdiction over industrial
property rights. This was the beginning of Japan's
hardship. However, having undergone the First
Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War,Japan enhanced its international status andgradually implemented policies to protect its
international property rights from other countries,
while accepting requests from the international
community to the minimum extent.
This history may be regarded as a process inwhich Japan gradually became a member of theinternational community and pursued theestablishment and harmonization of systems
through communications with the international
community, while taking advantage of its risinginternational status and demanding that theinternational community do the same.

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