316 pages 16.04 mm is the spine for 80gsm

IAEA SAFEGUARDS GLOSSARY

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA

IAEA
SAFEGUARDSGLOSSARY
2022 Edition

IAEA SAFEGUARDS GLOSSARY
2022 EDITION

The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
AFGHANISTANALBANIA
ALGERIAANGOLA
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
ARGENTINA
ARMENIA
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIAAZERBAIJAN
BAHAMAS
BAHRAINBANGLADESHBARBADOSBELARUSBELGIUM
BELIZEBENIN
BOLIVIA, PLURINATIONAL
STATE OFBOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINABOTSWANABRAZILBRUNEI DARUSSALAM
BULGARIA
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDICAMBODIACAMEROONCANADACENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
CHAD
CHILE
CHINA
COLOMBIACOMOROSCONGOCOSTA RICA
CÔTE D’IVOIRECROATIACUBACYPRUSCZECH REPUBLIC
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
DENMARKDJIBOUTIDOMINICADOMINICAN REPUBLICECUADOREGYPTEL SALVADORERITREAESTONIA
ESWATINIETHIOPIAFIJI
FINLANDFRANCEGABONGEORGIAGERMANYGHANA
GREECE
GRENADAGUATEMALAGUYANAHAITI
HOLY SEE
HONDURASHUNGARYICELAND
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OFIRAQIRELANDISRAELITALY
JAMAICAJAPANJORDANKAZAKHSTANKENYAKOREA, REPUBLIC OFKUWAITKYRGYZSTANLAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLICLATVIALEBANONLESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
LIECHTENSTEIN
LITHUANIALUXEMBOURG
MADAGASCARMALAWI
MALAYSIAMALI
MALTA
MARSHALL ISLANDS
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICOMONACOMONGOLIAMONTENEGRO
MOROCCOMOZAMBIQUE
MYANMAR
NAMIBIANEPAL
NETHERLANDSNEW ZEALANDNICARAGUANIGERNIGERIANORTH MACEDONIANORWAYOMANPAKISTAN

PALAU
PANAMAPAPUA NEW GUINEAPARAGUAYPERU
PHILIPPINESPOLANDPORTUGALQATARREPUBLIC OF MOLDOVAROMANIARUSSIAN FEDERATIONRWANDASAINT KITTS AND NEVISSAINT LUCIA
SAINT VINCENT AND
THE GRENADINESSAMOASAN MARINOSAUDI ARABIASENEGALSERBIASEYCHELLESSIERRA LEONESINGAPORESLOVAKIASLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICASPAIN
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SWEDENSWITZERLANDSYRIAN ARAB REPUBLICTAJIKISTANTHAILANDTOGO
TONGA
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGOTUNISIATÜRKİYETURKMENISTANUGANDAUKRAINE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATESUNITED KINGDOM OFGREAT BRITAIN ANDNORTHERN IRELAND
UNITED REPUBLICOF TANZANIAUNITED STATES OF AMERICAURUGUAYUZBEKISTANVANUATU
VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN
REPUBLIC OFVIET NAMYEMEN
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE

The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957.
The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge
the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’.

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR VERIFICATIONSERIES No. 3 (Rev. 1)

IAEA SAFEGUARDS GLOSSARY
2022 EDITION

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA, 2022

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IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Names: International Atomic Energy Agency.
Title: IAEA safeguards glossary : 2022 edition / International Atomic Energy Agency.
Description: Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 2022. | Series:
International Nuclear Verification Series, ISSN 1020-6205 ; no. 3 (Rev. 1) |Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: IAEAL 22-01513 | ISBN 978–92–0–122122–3 (paperback : alk. paper) |ISBN 978–92–0–122222–0 (pdf) | ISBN 978–92–0–122322–7 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Nuclear industry — Safety measures — Terminology. | Nuclear
facilities — Safety measures — Terminology. | Terms and phrases. | Nuclear
nonproliferation.
Classification: UDC 341.67 | STI/PUB/2003

FOREWORD
The year 2022 features the anniversaries of several milestones in IAEA
safeguards: 60 years since the IAEA conducted its first in‑field inspection;
50 years since the first comprehensive safeguards agreements were concluded
in connection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
and 25 years since the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Model
Additional Protocol. This anniversary update of the IAEA Safeguards Glossaryreflects the continuing evolution of safeguards to address new challenges andtechnologies in an ever‑expanding nuclear field.
The IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/1)
in 1980, with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards
terminology within the international community. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary
was revised in 1987 (IAEA/SG/INF/1 (Rev.1)) and again in 2001 (IAEA/NVS/3)
to reflect, among other things, developments associated with the Model Additional
Protocol, such as the advent of integrated safeguards and the implementation ofcustomized safeguards approaches for States (known as State‑level safeguards
approaches, or SLAs).
Since then, IAEA safeguards implementation has continued to
evolve, including greater emphasis on ‘State as a whole’ considerations in
the implementation of safeguards, and to reflect numerous technologicaladvancements. The 2022 Edition of the IAEA Safeguards Glossary reflects
these developments, as well as the natural evolution and elaboration ofterminology acquired over twenty additional years of experience in safeguards
implementation.
The IAEA Safeguards Glossary does not represent a comprehensive
collection of all terms used in IAEA safeguards but rather collects those terms
that are unique to IAEA safeguards or that may be used in other domains but havea specific meaning or application relevant to IAEA safeguards. In this edition,
terms deemed to not meet these criteria have been removed and new terms thathave come into use in the past two decades have been introduced.
Each section of the IAEA Safeguards Glossary addresses a specific subject
area relevant to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding, each term includes
a definition and, where applicable, further explanation or examples. The sequenceof terms within a section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject
area. A new section covering ‘State and Regional Authorities, Responsibilities,
Support and Services’ has been introduced, reflecting an increased emphasis on
State cooperation and support with the evolution of the global nuclear industry
since the 2001 Edition.
The terms are numbered consecutively within each section; an index
referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. Within eachdefinition, terms that are defined elsewhere in the IAEA Safeguards Glossary
are italicized. Numbers or abbreviations in square backets refer to the IAEA
documents and publications noted at the beginning of this publication. The terms
have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into
German and Japanese.
The IAEA Safeguards Glossary has no legal status and is not intended toserve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise
during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or
protocols thereto.
The IAEA wishes to acknowledge the many individuals who contributed
to this publication. The IAEA officer responsible for this publication was
J. Martinez of the Division of Concepts and Planning.

IAEA DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS REFERRED TO
IN THIS GLOSSARY
INFORMATION CIRCULARS[9]INFCIRC/9/Rev.2, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of
the IAEA (1967).

[26]

INFCIRC/26 and Add.1, The Agency’s Safeguards (1961, extended in1964) (1964).

[39]

GC(V)/INF/39, The Agency’s Inspectorate (1961).

[66]

INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, The Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as
Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968) (1968).

[140]

INFCIRC/140, Treaty
Weapons (1970).

[153]

INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), The Structure and Content of Agreements
Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty
on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1972).

[179]

GOV/INF/179, The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) (1967).

[193]

INFCIRC/193, The Text of the Agreement Between Belgium, Denmark,the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency inConnection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(1973) (entered into force 1977 (see INFCIRC/193/Add.1)). The
Additional Protocol to [193] entered into force in 2004 and is reproducedin INFCIRC/193/Add.8 (2005).

[207]

INFCIRC/207, Notification to the Agency of Exports and Imports of
Nuclear Material (1974).

on

the

Non‑ProliferationofNuclear[209]INFCIRC/209/Rev.2, Communications of 15 November 1999 Received
from Member States Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of
Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material (2000).

[225]

INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material andNuclear Facilities (2011).

[254]

INFCIRC/254/Rev.4/Part 1, Communications Received from Certain
Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material,
Equipment and Technology (2000); INFCIRC/254/Rev.4/Part 2,
Communications Received from Certain Member States Regarding
Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear‑Related Dual‑Use Equipment,
Materials, Software and Related Technology (2000).

[267]

INFCIRC/267, The Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating
Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance by the
Agency (1979).

[274]

INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (1980); INFCIRC/274/Rev.1/Mod.1 (Corrected), Amendment to
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (2021).

[276]

GOV/INF/276, The Standard Text of Safeguards Agreements inConnection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
Revision of the Standardized Text of the “Small Quantities
Protocol” (1974).

[276/1]

GOV/INF/276/Mod.1 and Corr.1, Revision of the Standardized Text of
the “Small Quantities Protocol” (2006).

[322]

INFCIRC/322, Communication Received from the Resident
Representative of Italy on Behalf of the European Community (1985).

[331]

INFCIRC/331/Add. 1, South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1987).

[361]

GOV/INF/361, Nuclear Installations Under Agency Safeguards (1979).

[395]

INFCIRC/395, Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and theFederative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear
Energy (1991).

[411]INFCIRC/411, Amendments to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) (1993).

[435]

INFCIRC/435/Mod.1, Agreement of 13 December 1991 Between the
Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, theBrazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Applicationof Safeguards (1997).

[512]

INFCIRC/512, The Text of the Cairo Declaration Adopted on the
Occasion of the Signing of the African Nuclear‑Weapon‑Free Zone Treaty(the Treaty of Pelindaba) (1996).

[540]

INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), Model Protocol Additional to theAgreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Safeguards (1997).

[548]

INFCIRC/548, Communication Received from the Permanent Mission ofThailand Regarding the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon‑Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) (1998).

[549]

INFCIRC/549, Communication Received from Certain Member States
Concerning Their Policies Regarding the Management of
Plutonium (1998).

[1998]

GOV/1998/61, The
Americium (1998).

[1999]

GOV/1999/19/Rev.2, The Proliferation Potential of Neptunium andAmericium (1999).

[2002]

GOV/2002/8, The Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards: A
Report by the Director General (2002).

[2013]

GOV/2013/38, The Conceptualization and Development of Safeguards
Implementation at the State Level: Report by the Director
General (2013).

Proliferation

Potentialof

Neptuniumand[2014]

GOV/2014/41 and Corr.1, Supplementary Document to the Report on
The Conceptualization and Development of Safeguards Implementation
at the State Level (GOV/2013/38): Report by the Director
General (2014).

[2554]

GOV/2554, Strengthening of Agency Safeguards, 1. Special Inspections.
2, The Provision and Use of Design Information (1991).

[2629]

GOV/2629, Safeguards, (a) Strengthening the Effectiveness andImprovingtheEfficiency
ofThe
Safeguards
System(GC (XXXVI)⁠/⁠RES⁠/⁠586), Universal Reporting System on Nuclear
Material and Specified Equipment and Non‑Nuclear Material (1993).

[2784]

GOV/2784, Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Safeguards System: A
Report by the Director General (1995).

[2807]

GOV/2807, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiencyof the Safeguards System: Proposals for a Strengthened and More
Efficient Safeguards System: A Report by the Director
General (1995).

NUCLEAR VERIFICATION SERIES[IAEA/
NVS/1]

Safeguards Techniques and Equipment: 2011 Edition, International
Nuclear Verification Series No. 1 (Rev. 2), IAEA, Vienna (2011).

IAEA NUCLEAR ENERGY SERIES[NF‑T‑3.1]

International Safeguards in the Design of Facilities for Long Term Spent
Fuel Management (2018).

[NF‑T‑3.2]

International Safeguards
Plants (2019).

in[NF‑T‑4.7]

International Safeguards
Plants (2017).

in

the

the

DesignDesign

of

of

Fuel

Reprocessing

Fabrication

[NF‑T‑4.8]

International Safeguards in the Design of Uranium Conversion
Plants (2017).

[NF‑T‑4.10]

International Safeguards in the Design of Enrichment Plants (2019).

[NP‑T‑2.8]

International Safeguards
Construction (2013).

[NP‑T‑2.9]

International Safeguards in the Design of Nuclear Reactors (2014).

inNuclearFacility

Designand

SAFEGUARDS TECHNICAL REPORTS[STR‑399]

Enhancing Capabilities for Nuclear Verification: Resource Mobilization
Priorities (2022).

[STR‑400]

Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear
Verification 2022–2023 (2022).

IAEA SERVICES SERIES[IAEA‑SVS‑11]

Guidelines and Format for Preparation and Submission of Declarations
Pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the Model Protocol Additional toSafeguards Agreements (2004).

[IAEA‑SVS‑13(Rev. 1)]

IAEA Safeguards
Guidelines (2021).

[IAEA‑SVS‑15]

Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook (2008).

[IAEA‑SVS‑21]

Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive
Agreements and Additional Protocols (2016).

[IAEA‑SVS‑22]

Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities
Protocols (2013).

and

SSAC

Advisory

Service(ISASS)

Safeguards

[IAEA‑SVS‑30]

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA
Verification Activities (2014).

[IAEA‑SVS‑31]

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and
Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure (2018).

[IAEA‑SVS‑33]

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information
to the IAEA (2016)

CONTENTS
1.

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
RELATED TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS (1.1–1.37) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1

2.

IAEA SAFEGUARDS: PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND
SCOPE (2.1–2.17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

18

3.

SAFEGUARDS CONCEPTS, APPROACHES AND
MEASURES (3.1–3.36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

24

4.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON‑NUCLEAR MATERIAL,
NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND NUCLEAR RELATEDACTIVITIES (4.1–4.60)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

35

5.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY (5.1–5.68) . . . . . . . . . 

48

6.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUESAND EQUIPMENT (6.1–6.40) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

67

7.

CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE (7.1–7.30) . . . . . . . . . . 

77

8.

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING (8.1–8.21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

84

9.

STATISTICAL CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NUCLEAR MATERIAL VERIFICATION (9.1–9.38) . . . . . . . . . . 

89

10.

VISITS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD (10.1–10.32) . . . . . . .  100

11.

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION AND EVALUATION(11.1–11.32) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  111

12.

REPORTING ON SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION(12.1–12.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  120

13.

STATE AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES, RESPONSIBILITIES,SUPPORT AND SERVICES (13.1–13.20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  124

TRANSLATION OF TERMS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  133

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  251INDEX  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  255

1. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
RELATED TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS
Safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
are an important element of the global nuclear non‑proliferation regime. Thissection provides information on legal instruments and other documents in thearea of nuclear non‑proliferation that either provide a legal basis for IAEA
safeguards or are otherwise closely linked to the application of IAEA safeguards.
These include the Statute of the IAEA, treaties requiring verification of nuclear
non‑proliferation undertakings, other relevant treaties, the basic safeguards
documents, safeguards agreements and their relevant protocols, and guidelines
related to the implementation of IAEA safeguards.
1.1. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Statute of the
IAEA was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA and entered into force on 29 July 1957. The Statute has been amended
three times: in 1963, 1973 and 1989. According to Article II, the IAEA shall:“seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace,
health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it isable, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervisionor control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.”
Article III.A.5 authorizes the IAEA to:“establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, andinformation made available by the Agency or at its request or under its
supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military
purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateralor multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s
activities in the field of atomic energy”.
In carrying out these functions, the IAEA may conclude agreements withthe parties concerned which provide for the application of IAEA safeguards or
may implement other verification activities when approved by the IAEA Boardof Governors in accordance with its authority provided for in Article VI.F.
Article XII.A refers to the rights and responsibilities of the IAEA to the extent
relevant to any project or arrangement where the IAEA is requested to apply

1safeguards. Article XII.C refers, inter alia, to actions which may be taken by the
Board in possible cases of non‑compliance with safeguards agreements.
TREATIES AND SUPPLY AGREEMENTS
1.2. Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (orNon‑Proliferation Treaty) (NPT). The NPT is the cornerstone of theinternational nuclear non‑proliferation regime. The Treaty was opened forsignature on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995, theTreaty was extended indefinitely. Pursuant to Article I, each nuclear‑weapon
State (NWS) party undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage
or induce any non‑nuclear‑weapon State (NNWS) to manufacture or otherwise
acquire such weapons or explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.
Pursuant to Article II, each NNWS party undertakes not to receive thetransfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly
or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons or explosive
devices and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of such
weapons or explosive devices.
Pursuant to Article III.1, each NNWS party undertakes to accept
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with
the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards
system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the State’s
obligations under the NPT with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III.1 further provides that these safeguards shall be applied on all source
material or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within
the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control
anywhere. Pursuant to Article III.2, each State party to the NPT undertakes not toprovide source material or special fissionable material, or equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, to any NNWS for peaceful purposes, unless the source
material or special fissionable material is subject to the safeguards required by
Article III.1.
Article IV.1 provides that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted asaffecting the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without2

discrimination and in accordance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Under
Article IV.2, all parties undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in,
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technicalinformation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Pursuant to Article VI, each party undertakes to pursue negotiations in goodfaith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control. Article IX.3 defines
a NWS as one which manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or othernuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. There are five NWS parties
to the NPT: China, France, the Russian Federation (the Soviet Union when theTreaty entered into force), the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
The text of the Treaty is reproduced in [140].
1.3. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America andthe Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty). The Treaty established the first regional
nuclear‑weapon‑free zone requiring Contracting Parties to accept the applicationof IAEA safeguards. The Treaty was opened for signature on 14 February 1967and entered into force for each Government individually. The Treaty prohibits thetesting, use, manufacture and production or acquisition by any means whatsoeverof any nuclear weapons, as well as the receipt, storage, installation, deployment
and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons by States, directly or
indirectly, in the geographical zone of application of the Treaty. Pursuant to
Article 13 of the Treaty, each party undertakes to conclude multilateral orbilateral agreements with the IAEA for the application of IAEA safeguards to its
nuclear activities.
Under Additional Protocol I to the Treaty, States outside the geographicalzone which have de jure or de facto jurisdiction over territories within the limitsof the zone undertake to apply to those territories the statute of denuclearizationin respect of warlike purposes as defined in the Treaty.
Under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty, each of the nuclear‑weapon
States as defined by the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT) undertakes to respect the statute of denuclearization in the region andnot to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty.
The text of the Tlatelolco Treaty is reproduced in [179], with amendments
published in [411].
1.4. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty). The Treaty
established a nuclear‑weapon‑free zone in the South Pacific region. It enteredinto force on 11 December 1986. Each party undertakes not to manufacture orotherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device3

by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone,
not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any
nuclear explosive device and not to take any action to assist or encourage the
manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State. State
parties also undertake to prevent the stationing or testing of any such devices
anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Each State party to theTreaty undertakes to accept safeguards as provided for in a comprehensive
safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA required in connection with theTreaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), or an agreement
equivalent in its scope and effect to such an agreement, and not to provide source
material or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especiallydesigned or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material for peaceful purposes to any non‑nuclear‑weapon State unless subject
to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the NPT, or to any nuclear‑weapon
State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The
Rarotonga Treaty has three protocols: Protocols 1 and 2 contain provisions
similar to those in the two protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty), and Protocol 3
requires each party not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within theSouth Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in [331].
1.5. Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon‑Free Zone (Bangkok
Treaty). The Treaty established a nuclear‑weapon‑free zone in the Southeast
Asia region. It was opened for signature on 15 December 1995 and entered into
force 27 March 1997. The Treaty requires its parties, inter alia, not to develop,
manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over, station, transport,
test or use nuclear weapons anywhere, and not to allow in their respective
territories any other State to develop, acquire, possess, control, station, test or
use such weapons. Each State party to the Treaty undertakes to have in force
an agreement with the IAEA for the application of ‘full scope’ (comprehensive)
safeguards to its peaceful nuclear activities and not to provide source materialor special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to
any non‑nuclear‑weapon State except under conditions subject to the safeguards
required by Article III.1 of the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), or to any nuclear‑weapon State except in conformity withapplicable safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The Annex to the Bangkok
Treaty provides for fact‑finding missions to State parties in order to clarify andresolve a situation which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to
doubts about compliance with the provisions of the Treaty; the Annex outlines therelevant procedures, including provision for the involvement of IAEA inspectors
4

in any such mission. A protocol to the Treaty contains provisions similar to thosein Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty). The text of the Bangkok
Treaty is reproduced in [548].
1.6. African Nuclear‑Weapon‑Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty).1 The
Treaty established a nuclear‑weapon‑free zone in Africa. It was opened forsignature on 11 April 1996 and entered into force on 15 July 2009. The Treaty
requires its parties, inter alia, not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture,stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear
explosive device by any means anywhere, and to prohibit the stationing or testingof any such device in their territory. Each State party to the Treaty is required
to declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; todismantle and destroy any such device that it had manufactured prior to thecoming into force of the Treaty; and to destroy or convert to peaceful uses the
manufacturing facilities, subject to the IAEA’s verification of the dismantling,
destruction or conversion. Each State party to the Treaty undertakes to have inforce a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA required inconnection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),or an agreement equivalent in scope and effect to such an agreement, and not
to provide source material or special fissionable material, or equipment ormaterial especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or productionof special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non‑nuclear‑weapon
State unless subject to a CSA with the IAEA. The Pelindaba Treaty provides aprocedure for a State party to bring complaints against other parties, which could
lead to a request for additional IAEA inspections. There are three protocols to thePelindaba Treaty: Protocols I and III contain provisions similar to those in the
two additional protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty), and Protocol II contains
provisions similar to those in Protocol 3 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty).
1.7. Treaty on a Nuclear‑Weapon‑Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk
Treaty).2 The Treaty established the nuclear‑weapon‑free zone in Central Asia
(CANWFZ). It was opened for signature on 8 September 2006 and entered into
force on 21 March 2009. The Treaty requires its parties, inter alia, not to conduct
1

Final text of the African Nuclear‑Weapon‑Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty),
United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/50/78, UN, New York (1996).
2
Treaty on a Nuclear‑Weapon‑Free Zone in Central Asia, UN Treaty Series Vol. 2970,
No. I‑51633 (2014).

5

research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possessor have control over any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device byany means anywhere, or to receive assistance or take any action to assist or
encourage the conduct of these activities. State parties also undertake not toallow in their territory the production, acquisition, stationing, storage or use of
any nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device and not to allow the disposal
in their territory of radioactive waste of other States. Parties are required tohave in force with the IAEA both a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA)
and an additional protocol (AP) and undertake not to provide source materialor special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissile material, to any
non‑nuclear‑weapon State unless that State has concluded a CSA and an AP with
the IAEA. Under the Protocol to the Treaty, nuclear‑weapon States undertake
not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
against any party to the Treaty.
1.8. Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative
Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy.
Under the Agreement both States parties undertake (a) to prohibit and preventin their territories and to abstain from carrying out, promoting or participatingin, the testing, use, manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear weapon or othernuclear explosive device and (b) to establish the Common System of Accounting
and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) and the Brazilian–Argentine Agency
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to verify, inter alia,that the nuclear materials in all nuclear activities of the parties are not diverted
to the purposes prohibited by the Agreement. This Agreement was signed andentered into force in 1991; it is reproduced in [395].
1.9. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community(Euratom Treaty). The Treaty was signed by the six original signatories inRome on 25 March 1957 and entered into force on 1 January 1958. It established
a common nuclear market among its State parties and provides that special fissile
materials shall be the property of the Community. The Treaty also establishedthe Euratom Supply Agency (ESA), which has the exclusive right to conclude
contracts for the supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials
within the European Union. In accordance with Article 77, Chapter VII of Title IIof the Treaty, the Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community will
satisfy itself that, in the territories of Member States, (a) ores, source materials andspecial fissile materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by
the users and (b) the provisions relating to supply and any particular safeguarding

6

obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with athird State or an international organization are complied with.
1.10. Bilateral cooperation agreement. An agreement providing for cooperationin the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy which is usually concluded between
a supplier State and a receiver State and which covers conditions for the supplyof nuclear material and other specified material, equipment and technology. Suchan agreement may contain undertakings not to use the supplied items so as tofurther any military purpose or for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or othernuclear explosive devices. The agreement may also contain undertakings of thereceiver State to submit to IAEA safeguards a range of facilities, equipment andnuclear material and non‑nuclear material, as identified in each individual case.
1.11. Project and supply agreement. Article III.A.5 of the Statute of the IAEA
envisions the application of IAEA safeguards to assistance provided by or throughthe IAEA. Article XI.F.4 requires that, upon approving a project, the IAEA shallenter into an agreement with the member or group of members submitting the
project. The agreement shall include undertakings that the assistance provided
shall not be used in such a way as to further any military purpose and that the
project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in Article XII, the relevant
safeguards being specified in the agreement. A project and supply agreement witha State that has a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force generally
provides that the safeguards requirements of the project and supply agreement
shall be met by the application of safeguards pursuant to the CSA. A projectand supply agreement with a State that does not have a CSA in force normallyprovides for the application of safeguards based on [66].
1.12. The Application of Safeguards in Relation to the Granting of Technical
Assistance. The provisions established by the IAEA Board of Governors on
24 September 1977 for the application of safeguards in relation to the granting oftechnical assistance, reproduced in the Annex to the Revised Guiding Principles
and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance by
the Agency [267]. The guiding principles governing the provision of technicalassistance by the IAEA provide that IAEA safeguards shall be applied to all
forms of technical assistance in all sensitive technological areas as set forth in the
Annex or as subsequently amended by the Board. In the case of IAEA Member
States which have concluded appropriate safeguards agreements with the IAEA
concerning the relevant activity, no additional safeguards agreements relating
to the benefits obtained from technical assistance provided by the IAEA are
required. In the case of Member States for which such provisions do not apply,
safeguards agreements, where applicable, are required to be drawn up by the7

IAEA to cover materials and facilities utilizing the technology being transferred
and are to be concluded before the delivery of the technical assistance. In the caseof requests for scientific visits and fellowships no safeguards will normally berequired. However, when, in the opinion of the IAEA Secretariat, the quantum ofassistance granted through such means constitutes a “substantial contribution” toa project in a “sensitive technological area” within a requesting Member State,
the matter will be brought to the attention of the Board for appropriate action.
1.13. Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning the Provision ofTechnical Assistance by the IAEA. An agreement concluded between the
IAEA and a State, as required by the guiding principles governing the provision oftechnical assistance by the IAEA to a Member State reproduced in [267]. Under arevised supplementary agreement, a State undertakes that the technical assistanceit receives pursuant to the agreement shall be used only for peaceful applicationsof atomic energy and, in particular, that such assistance shall not be used forthe manufacture of nuclear weapons, for the furtherance of any military purpose
or for uses which could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, suchas research on or development, testing or manufacture of a nuclear explosive
device. To this end, the agreement further provides that the IAEA’s rights andresponsibilities provided for in Article XII.A of the Statute of the IAEA shall be
implemented and maintained with respect to a project subject to the agreement
pursuant to an applicable safeguards agreement which is in force between agovernment and the IAEA or, in the absence of such an agreement, pursuant to asafeguards agreement to be concluded between a government and the IAEA prior
to the implementation of the assistance approved for the project.
BASIC SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENTS
1.14. The Agency’s Inspectors (the Inspectors Document). The Annex to [39],referred to in item‑specific safeguards agreements as the Inspectors Document,
contains detailed provisions relating to IAEA inspectors which were consideredby the IAEA Board of Governors to be in effect as from 29 June 1961. The
document addresses aspects of inspection activities, including the procedure bywhich IAEA inspectors are to be designated to a State; the method of announcing
and carrying out inspections and visits; the conduct of inspections, rights ofaccess, inspection procedures and the obligation to report to the State on the
results of each inspection; and the privileges and immunities of IAEA inspectors.
The provisions of this document acquire legally binding force only when and to
the extent that they are incorporated, by reference or otherwise, into safeguards
agreements. The document in itself does not constitute an agreement.
8

1.15. The Agency’s Safeguards (1961, extended in 1964). The document
containing the provisions of the IAEA’s ‘safeguards system’ was approved by
the IAEA Board of Governors on 31 January 1961, including the principles
and procedures for the information and guidance of Member States and for the
Board itself in the administration of safeguards by the IAEA [26]. The safeguards
procedures in the document cover requirements anticipated by the IAEA at thattime and related only to reactors with less than 100 MW(th) output, to the source
material and special fissionable material used and produced in these reactors,
and to small research and development facilities. On 26 February 1964, the Board
approved provisions to “extend the Agency’s safeguards system” outlined in [26]to make it relate to reactors of 100 MW(th) or more (Add.1). The provisions of
this document acquire legally binding force only when and to the extent that they
are incorporated, by reference or otherwise, into safeguards agreements.
1.16. The Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in1966 and 1968). The document, also known as the ‘Safeguards Document’,was designed to facilitate and standardize as far as possible the content ofsafeguards agreements with the IAEA [66]. Approved by the IAEA Board ofGovernors initially in 1965, the document covered reactors of all sizes, thereby
replacing [26], which covered only reactors with less than 100 MW(th) output.
It was subsequently extended in 1966 and 1968 to cover reprocessing plants,
and conversion plants and fuel fabrication plants (Rev.1 and Rev.2, respectively).
The provisions of this document acquire legally binding force only when
and to the extent that they are incorporated, by reference or otherwise, into
safeguards agreements, also known as ‘item‑specific safeguards agreements’ or‘INFCIRC/66‑type’ safeguards agreements.
1.17. The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency andStates Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons. The document provides the structure and content ofagreements for the application of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in
all peaceful nuclear activities in a State [153]. Approved by the IAEA Boardof Governors on 20 April 1971, it serves as the basis for the negotiationof comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) between the IAEA andnon‑nuclear‑weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as for negotiation of other CSAs concluded
pursuant to nuclear‑weapon‑free zone treaties. The document also provides
the framework for the voluntary offer agreements (VOAs) which the five NPT
nuclear‑weapon States have concluded with the IAEA.

9

1.18. Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) andthe International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards.
The document [540], also known as the ‘Model Additional Protocol’, provides
for those measures for strengthening the effectiveness and improving theefficiency of IAEA safeguards which require complementary legal authority. It
was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on 15 May 1997. The IAEA uses
the Model Additional Protocol for the negotiation and conclusion of additional
protocols (APs) and other legally binding agreements as follows:
(a)
(b)

(c)

With States and other parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements(CSAs), containing all of the measures provided for in [540];
With nuclear‑weapon States, incorporating those measures from [540]that each such State has identified as capable of contributing to thenon‑proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Additional Protocol
when implemented with regard to that State, and as consistent with that
State’s obligations under Article I of the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
With other States that are prepared to accept measures provided for in [540]in pursuance of safeguards effectiveness and efficiency objectives.

1.19. Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The Agreement, reproduced in [9], grants, inter alia,
certain privileges and immunities to the IAEA and its property, representativesof Member States and IAEA officials, including IAEA inspectors, as necessary
for the effective exercise of their functions. The Agreement also provides forthe recognition and acceptance of the United Nations laissez‑passer issued to
IAEA officials as a valid travel document. Safeguards agreements concluded
with States which are not IAEA Member States or which are not party to theAgreement provide for the granting to IAEA inspectors of the same privileges
and immunities as those specified in the Agreement.
SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS, ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
THERETO AND UNDERTAKINGS RELATEDTO SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION
1.20. Safeguards agreement. An agreement for the application of safeguards
concluded between the IAEA and a State or a group of States, in some cases
together with a regional authority responsible for safeguards implementation,such as the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and theBrazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
10

(ABACC). Such an agreement is concluded either because of the requirementsof a project and supply agreement, or to satisfy the relevant requirements ofbilateral or multilateral arrangements, or to apply safeguards at the request of aState to any of that State’s nuclear activities.
1.21. INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement. An agreement concluded on
the basis of [153], including comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) andvoluntary offer agreements (VOAs).
1.22. Comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA). An agreement concluded
pursuant to the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and/or
a nuclear‑weapon‑free zone (NWFZ) treaty under which a State undertakes to
accept, and the IAEA has the right and obligation to apply, safeguards on all
source material or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities
within the State’s territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control
anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since 1972, CSAs inconnection with the NPT and/or NWFZ treaties have been concluded on the basisof [153]. CSAs are also referred to as ‘full scope’ safeguards agreements.
Some CSAs, such as the sui generis agreement between Albania andthe IAEA, and the quadripartite safeguards agreement between Argentina,
Brazil, the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA, were concluded prior to Albania’s accession
to the NPT and the accession of Argentina and Brazil to the NPT and the Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean(Tlatelolco Treaty). The IAEA Board of Governors approved exchanges ofletters with the States concerned confirming that such agreements also meettheir obligations under the NPT (Albania) and the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty(Argentina and Brazil).
1.23. Item‑specific safeguards agreement. An agreement based on [66] or [26].
Such an agreement specifies the items (e.g. nuclear material, non‑nuclear
material such as heavy water), facilities and/or equipment to be safeguarded andprohibits the use of the specified items in such a way as to further any military
purpose. Since 1975, such agreements also explicitly proscribe any use related
to the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.
Item‑specific safeguards agreements can be grouped as follows:(a)An agreement concluded pursuant to a project and supply agreement
between the IAEA and a State that does not have a comprehensive safeguards
agreement (CSA) providing for the supply by or through the IAEA of nuclear
11

(b)

(c)

material, services, equipment, facilities and/or information to the State and,in that connection, for the application of IAEA safeguards.
A safeguards agreement between the IAEA and one or more States
providing for the application of safeguards to nuclear material, services,
equipment or facilities supplied under a cooperation arrangement between
States, or, having been subject to such safeguards, retransferred to States
without CSAs. Some bilateral cooperation agreements concluded before
IAEA safeguards were operational provided for safeguards to be appliedby the supplier State; the parties to those agreements later requested the
IAEA to apply its safeguards instead. A safeguards agreement transferring
the safeguards responsibility to the IAEA, typically concluded between the
IAEA and both the supplier and recipient States, came to be known as asafeguards transfer agreement (STA).
A unilateral submission agreement between the IAEA and a State, concluded
at the request of that State, for the application of safeguards to any of theState’s activities in the field of nuclear energy.

1.24. Voluntary offer agreement (VOA).
An agreement concluded
between the IAEA and a nuclear‑weapon State as defined in the Treaty on the
Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which is not required to accept
IAEA safeguards under the NPT but has voluntarily offered to do so, inter alia, toallay concerns that the application of IAEA safeguards could lead to commercial
disadvantages for the nuclear industries of non‑nuclear‑weapon States. Under
such an agreement, a State offers, for selection by the IAEA for the applicationof safeguards, some or all of the nuclear material and/or facilities in its civil
nuclear fuel cycle. A VOA generally follows the structure of [153], but the scopeis limited to nuclear material and facilities in civilian activities offered by theState for the application of IAEA safeguards. The IAEA has concluded such a
VOA with each of the five NPT nuclear‑weapon States (i.e. China, France, theRussian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America).
1.25. Additional protocol (AP). A protocol additional to a safeguards agreement(or agreements) concluded between the IAEA and a State, or group of States,
following the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol [540]. In the case of
a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA), the AP must containall of the measures included in [540]. In the case of an item‑specific safeguards
agreement or a voluntary offer agreement (VOA), an AP includes those measuresfrom [540] that have been accepted by the State. Under Article 1 of [540], theprovisions of the AP prevail in the case of conflict between the provisions of thesafeguards agreement and those of the AP.

121.26. Original small quantities protocol (original SQP). A protocol to acomprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) concluded between the IAEA anda State based on the text contained in Annex B to [276], published in 1974. The
original SQP holds in abeyance the implementation of most of the safeguards
procedures in Part II of a CSA as long as the eligibility criteria are met by theState. The eligibility criteria for an SQP based on the original standard text arethat the State has nuclear material in amounts less than those specified in para. 37
of [153] and no nuclear material in a facility as defined in [153]. States withoriginal SQPs are required to provide to the IAEA an annual report on imports
and exports of nuclear material and design information before introducing
nuclear material into a facility. They are not required to provide to the IAEA
an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards or early design
information, nor are they required to accept designation of IAEA inspectors
or to allow the IAEA access for inspections. The IAEA Board of Governors
recognized on 20 September 2005 that the SQP based on the original standard
text constituted a weakness in the IAEA safeguards system and that, although
SQPs should remain part of the IAEA safeguards system, they should be subject
to the modifications specified in [276/1].
1.27. Revised small quantities protocol (revised SQP). A protocol to acomprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) concluded between the IAEA
and a State based on the revised standard text approved by the IAEA Board ofGovernors on 20 September 2005. The revised SQP standard text is containedin Annex B to [276/1]. The revised SQP reduces the number of provisions inPart II of the CSA the implementation of which is held in abeyance as long as
the State meets the eligibility criteria. The eligibility criteria for an SQP based on
the revised standard text are that the State has nuclear material in amounts lessthan those specified in para. 37 of [153] and no decision has been taken by theState to construct or authorize construction of a facility as defined in [153]. An
SQP based on the revised standard text is unavailable to a State with a plannedor existing facility. States with revised SQPs are required to provide to the IAEA
an initial report on all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, an annual
report on imports and exports of nuclear material, and early design information;to accept the designation of IAEA inspectors; and to allow access for inspections.
1.28. Suspension protocol. A protocol to a safeguards agreement with a State (orStates) which suspends the application of safeguards under that agreement while,and to the extent that, IAEA safeguards are being applied for the State (or States)
under another safeguards agreement (or agreements) concluded subsequently.
Examples include protocols to suspend the application of safeguards under13

project and supply agreements or under safeguards transfer agreements for States
where comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) have come into force.
1.29. Cooperation protocol. A protocol amplifying the provisions of asafeguards agreement between the IAEA and a State or a group of States,in some cases together with a regional authority responsible for safeguards
implementation, specifying the conditions and means of the cooperation in theapplication of IAEA safeguards provided for in the agreement (e.g. arrangements
to coordinate inspection activities of the IAEA and the parties to the agreement).
Such cooperation protocols have been incorporated into the agreements forthe application of safeguards between the IAEA and Argentina, Brazil and theBrazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials(ABACC); the IAEA and Japan; the IAEA and the non‑nuclear‑weapon States of
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and Euratom; and the IAEA,
France and Euratom.
1.30. Subsidiary arrangements. The document specifying in detail how theprocedures laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied. Subsidiaryarrangements to safeguards agreements consist of a General Part (Codes 1–10),
which addresses such matters as points of contact on safeguards and proceduresfor the application of IAEA safeguards, and attachments for facilities and materialbalance areas (MBAs) outside facilities (facility/location outside facilities(LOF) attachments), which detail the safeguards procedures for each individual
facility/location outside facilities (LOF).
Safeguards agreements based on [153] require the conclusion of subsidiaryarrangements. Under an additional protocol (AP) based on [540], either theState or the IAEA may request the conclusion of subsidiary arrangements to the
AP. These subsidiary arrangements to an AP are included in Codes 11–18 of
the General Part.
Subsidiary arrangements to an item‑specific safeguards agreement areconcluded if so required by the agreement.
1.31. Modified Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements
to a safeguards agreement. Code 3.1 of the General Part of the subsidiaryarrangements to a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) sets out the
timelines for the provision of design information by a State to the IAEA for
facilities and information for locations outside facilities (LOFs). The modified
Code 3.1 requires the State to provide to the IAEA early design information for a
new facility as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a
new facility has been taken, whichever is earlier. The modification was approvedin 1992 by the IAEA Board of Governors based on the proposal by the Director
14General contained in [2554] and effected by exchanges of letters between the
IAEA and States. Prior to the approval of the modified Code 3.1, States wererequired under Code 3.1 to provide preliminary design information for a new
facility 180 days before nuclear material was introduced into the facility.
1.32. Voluntary reporting scheme (VRS) on nuclear material and specified
equipment and non‑nuclear material. The scheme established by the IAEA
in 1993 for the voluntary reporting by States of nuclear material not otherwise
required to be reported to the IAEA under safeguards agreements, and of imports
and exports of specified equipment and non‑nuclear material, as specified
in [2629]. States choosing to participate in the scheme do so through an exchangeof letters with the IAEA. The list of the specified equipment and non‑nuclear
material to be used for the purpose of the VRS is incorporated in Annex II to [540].
1.33. Notification of transfers of nuclear material to non‑nuclear‑weapon
States. To assist the IAEA in its safeguards activities, the five nuclear‑weapon
States as defined in the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT) informed the IAEA [207] that they would voluntarily provide to the IAEA
information on the anticipated export of nuclear material (excluding exports ofsource material for non‑nuclear purposes) in an amount exceeding one effective
kilogram (ekg) for peaceful purposes to any non‑nuclear‑weapon State at leastten days prior to export. Information is also provided under [207] with respect toeach import, in an amount greater than one effective kilogram (ekg), of nuclear
material which, immediately prior to export, is subject to IAEA safeguards, underan agreement with the IAEA, in the State from which the material is imported.
The specifications provided in [207] are incorporated to varying degrees ineach of the voluntary offer agreements (VOAs) between the IAEA and thenuclear‑weapon States.
1.34. Neptunium (Np) and americium (Am) monitoring scheme. On the basisof documents [1998] and [1999], the IAEA Board of Governors decided that the
IAEA Director General should, using relevant information available through theconduct of the IAEA’s regular activities and any additional information provided
by States on a voluntary basis, monitor international transfers of neptunium andamericium to non‑nuclear‑weapon States and any activity to produce separated
neptunium and americium in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements(CSAs) in force. With regard to neptunium, the Board agreed that the proliferation
risk was considerably lower than that with regard to uranium or plutonium andthat exchanges of letters were needed on a voluntary basis between the IAEA
and relevant States to ensure the regular and timely receipt of information as
well as the application of measures required for efficient implementation of15

the monitoring scheme described in [1999]. Although the Board believed that
there was, at that time (i.e. 1999), practically no proliferation risk with regard
to americium, it decided that the IAEA Director General should, using relevant
information available through the conduct of the IAEA’s regular activities andany additional information provided by States on a voluntary basis, including
reporting on exports, report to the Board when appropriate with regard to theavailability of this material and emerging programmes in States which maylead to acquisition of such material. Following this decision, letters were sent to
39 States seeking relevant information about inventories, exports and separationof neptunium and americium, and a commitment to provide annual updates. Flow
sheet verification (FSV) was introduced in [1998] and [1999] as an element ofa monitoring approach through which the IAEA Secretariat could (a) provide
assurance that quantities of separated neptunium and americium in States that
have, or are obliged to have, a CSA remain insufficient to pose a proliferation riskand (b) provide timely notification to the Board if this situation were to change.
GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1.35. Zangger Committee Export Guidelines. The Guidelines agreed on
by a group of States party to the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) in order to clarify States’ commitments under Article III.2 of
the NPT in relation to exports, for peaceful purposes, to non‑nuclear‑weapon
States of source material or special fissionable material and equipment ormaterial especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or productionof special fissionable material. The Guidelines were first developed during aseries of meetings in 1971 chaired by Dr. Claude Zangger of Switzerland and arecontained in communications which have been received by the IAEA since 1974
from participating States. The Guidelines consist of a ‘trigger list’ that includes
source material and special fissionable material and specified equipment andmaterial especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of
special fissionable material whose export requires IAEA safeguards on the source
material or special fissionable material in question. The Zangger Committee, as
it became known, is not a committee of the IAEA. The IAEA is not a member ofthe committee and does not participate in its work. The Guidelines are publishedat the request of States in [209].
1.36. Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines. The Guidelines contained incommunications received by the IAEA since 1978 from States participating in
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Guidelines deal with the export policies
and practices of participating States with respect to transfers, for peaceful16

purposes, to non‑nuclear‑weapon States of nuclear material, equipment andtechnology, and of nuclear related dual‑use equipment, materials, software andrelated technology. The Guidelines currently consist of two parts:
(a)

(b)

Part 1 contains guidelines for nuclear transfers and incorporates a ‘trigger
list’ that includes source material and special fissionable material; nuclear
reactors and designated types of nuclear plant (e.g. reprocessing plants);
equipment especially designed or prepared for such plants; and related
technology. This list includes guidelines for nuclear transfers such as physicalprotection, IAEA safeguards, special controls on sensitive exports, special
arrangements for export of enrichment facilities, controls on material usable
for nuclear weapons, controls on retransfers as well as supporting activities.
Part 2 contains guidelines for transfers of nuclear related dual‑use
equipment, materials, software and related technology, and includes a list
specifying such dual‑use items that could make a major contribution to anuclear explosive device or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.
The guidelines include fundamental principles for IAEA safeguards andexport controls that should apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes
to any non‑nuclear‑weapon State and, in the case of controls on retransfer,to transfers to any State.

The IAEA is not a member of the NSG and does not participate in its work.
The NSG Guidelines were published at the request of Member States in [254,Parts 1 and 2]. In addition, communications from the European Union on acommon policy in connection with the Guidelines are reproduced in [322].
1.37. Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium. Guidelines containedin communications received by the IAEA in 1997 from certain Member States
regarding policies adopted by these States with a view to ensuring that holdingsof plutonium are managed safely and effectively in accordance with international
commitments, including their obligations under the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (and, for States that are members of the European
Union, also under the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community(Euratom Treaty)); with their safeguards agreements with the IAEA; and with othernon‑proliferation commitments. The Guidelines describe, inter alia, the nuclear
material accountancy system, physical protection measures and internationaltransfer procedures applicable to the plutonium subject to the Guidelines. They
further specify the information to be published by the participating States in respectof plutonium management, including annual statements of their holdings of civil
unirradiated plutonium and of their estimates of plutonium contained in spent civil
reactor fuel. The Guidelines are published in [549].
17

2. IAEA SAFEGUARDS: PURPOSE, OBJECTIVESAND SCOPE
Safeguards are applied by the IAEA to verify that commitments made by
States under safeguards agreements with the IAEA are fulfilled. What follows
is an explanation of terms used in connection with the implementation of IAEA
safeguards and within the scope of the relevant safeguards agreements andprotocols thereto.
2.1. IAEA safeguards. The technical means by which the IAEA verifies
States’ undertakings under their safeguards agreements and protocols thereto(see Section 1).
2.2. IAEA safeguards system. A set of legal instruments, technical measuresand administrative procedures implemented by the IAEA in accordance withsafeguards agreements and protocols thereto, concluded between the IAEA
and States or groups of States, in some cases together with a regional authority
responsible for safeguards implementation, to verify that nuclear material,
nuclear facilities and/or other items subject to safeguards are not acquired or used
for proscribed purposes.
The term ‘IAEA safeguards system’ has been used in the past to refer to The
Agency’s Safeguards (1961, extended in 1964) [26] and The Agency’s Safeguards
System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968) [66].
2.3. Purpose of IAEA safeguards. To verify the undertakings of States under
their respective safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
Independent IAEA verification provides assurance to the international
community that States are fulfilling their commitments concerning the peacefuluse of nuclear energy and deters States, through the risk of early detection,from acquiring or using nuclear material, facilities and/or other items subject tosafeguards for proscribed purposes. While it is not possible to provide absoluteassurance, the IAEA seeks to provide credible assurances to the international
community that States are abiding by their safeguards obligations under thoseagreements. These assurances are provided by the safeguards conclusions, which
are reported annually in the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR).
2.4. Scope of IAEA safeguards. The scope of application of safeguards as
defined by the relevant safeguards agreement.
Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA), safeguards are tobe applied on “all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear
18

activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out
under its control anywhere” [153, para. 2]. Such agreements are as suchconsidered comprehensive (or ‘full scope’). The scope of a CSA is not limited to
the nuclear material declared by a State but rather includes all nuclear material
subject to IAEA safeguards under the agreement.
Under an item‑specific safeguards agreement, safeguards are applied only
to the items specified in the agreement, which may include nuclear material,
non‑nuclear material, services, equipment, facilities and information.
Under a voluntary offer agreement (VOA), safeguards are applied to nuclear
material and/or facilities or parts thereof selected by the IAEA from the list ofeligible facilities provided by the State for the application of IAEA safeguards.
2.5. Generic safeguards objectives. Objectives established and pursued by
the IAEA Secretariat to verify a State’s fulfilment of its undertakings under
its safeguards agreement and to draw safeguards conclusions for a State.
Generic safeguards objectives are established on the basis of the scope of theapplicable safeguards agreement. They are common to all States with the same
type of safeguards agreement.
For States with comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), the genericsafeguards objectives are as follows:— To detect any diversion of declared nuclear material at declared facilities or
locations outside facilities (LOFs);— To detect any undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at
declared facilities or LOFs;— To detect any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as awhole.
For States with item‑specific safeguards agreements, the generic safeguards
objectives are as follows:— To detect any diversion of nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards
under the safeguards agreement;— To detect any misuse of facilities and other items subject to IAEA safeguards
under the safeguards agreement.
For States with voluntary offer agreements (VOAs), the generic safeguards
objective is as follows:— To detect any withdrawal of nuclear material from IAEA safeguards inselected facilities or parts thereof, except as provided for in the agreement.
192.6. Diversion of nuclear material. The use of nuclear material required to besafeguarded for purposes proscribed by the relevant safeguards agreement:(a)(b)

Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA), the removal of nuclear
material from peaceful activities for the manufacture of nuclear weapons orother nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown;
Under an item‑specific safeguards agreement, the use of nuclear material
subject to IAEA safeguards for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or othernuclear explosive devices and/or to further any other military purpose.

2.7. Misuse. Under an item‑specific safeguards agreement, this refers to the useof the nuclear material, non‑nuclear material, equipment or facilities specified
in the agreement and placed under IAEA safeguards to further any proscribedpurpose. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA), this refers to theundeclared production, processing or use of nuclear material subject to IAEA
safeguards at declared facilities or locations outside facilities (LOFs).
An example of misuse is the undeclared production of plutonium in a
safeguarded reactor through the introduction, irradiation and subsequent removalof undeclared uranium targets.
2.8. Non‑compliance. A violation by a State of its obligations under its
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
2.9. Undeclared nuclear material and activities.
The term ‘undeclared
nuclear material’ refers to nuclear material which a State has not declared andplaced under IAEA safeguards but is required to do so pursuant to its safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. For a State that has an additional protocol (AP) inforce, undeclared nuclear material also covers nuclear material which that State
has not declared but is required to do so pursuant to Article 2 of [540]. The term
‘undeclared activities’ refers to nuclear or nuclear related activities which a State
has not declared to the IAEA but is required to do so pursuant to its safeguards
agreement or, where applicable, its AP.
2.10. Undeclared facility or location outside facilities (LOF). A nuclear
facility or a LOF, including closed‑down facilities or LOFs and facilities underconstruction, about which a State has the obligation to notify the IAEA in
accordance with its safeguards agreement and for which no such notification
has been given.
2.11. Deterrence. An objective of the application of IAEA safeguards. If a Stateis considering the acquisition of nuclear material for a nuclear explosive device,20

then IAEA safeguards may be expected to have a significant deterrent effectthrough the risk of early detection. Thus, although essentially non‑quantifiable,
the level of deterrence may be expected to be higher the greater the IAEA’s
detection capabilities.
2.12. Starting point of safeguards under a CSA. The point at which thesafeguards procedures of a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) apply tonuclear material or other material containing uranium or thorium.
Paragraph 33 of [153] provides that safeguards shall not apply to material
in mining or ore processing activities. Under Article 2.a.(v) of [540], however, aState with an additional protocol (AP) is required to provide specified information
on uranium mines as well as uranium and thorium concentration plants.
Under paras 34(a) and 34(b) of [153], when a State exports to anon‑nuclear‑weapon State, directly or indirectly, or imports, any material
containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear
fuel cycle described in para. 34(c) of [153], the State is required to inform the
IAEA of the quantity, composition and destination of such imports and exports,
unless the material is imported or exported for specifically non‑nuclear purposes.
Under para. 34(c) of [153], when any nuclear material of a compositionand purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched leaves
the plant or the process stage at which it has been produced, or when such nuclear
material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear
fuel cycle, is imported into the State, the nuclear material becomes subject to all
the other IAEA safeguards procedures specified in [153].
Under Article 2.a.(vi) of [540], the State is required to provide the IAEA
with information on source material which has not reached the composition andpurity described in para. 34(c) of [153]. That information is to be provided bothon such material present in the State, whether in nuclear or non‑nuclear use, andon imports and exports of such material for specifically non‑nuclear purposes.
2.13. Termination of IAEA safeguards. The discontinuation of the applicationof IAEA safeguards on nuclear material or other items subject to safeguards,
based on the procedures provided for in the relevant safeguards agreements andsubsidiary arrangements thereto.
Under paras 11 and 35 of [153] and para. 26(c) of [66], IAEA safeguards
can be terminated upon determination by the IAEA that the nuclear material has
been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable forany nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become
practicably irrecoverable.

21

Under para. 12 of [153], IAEA safeguards terminate on nuclear materialtransferred out of the State when the recipient State has assumed responsibility
therefor, as provided for in para. 91 of [153].
Under para. 26(a) of [66], IAEA safeguards terminate on nuclear material
subject to safeguards if it has been returned to the State that originally supplied it,
subject also to other specified conditions in para 26(a).
Under paras 13 and 35 of [153] and para. 27 of [66], IAEA safeguards canbe terminated on nuclear material to be used in non‑nuclear activities, such as the
production of alloys or ceramics, provided that the IAEA and the State agree thatsuch nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable pursuant to para. 11 of [153].
Paragraph 26(d) of [66] provides that IAEA safeguards can be terminated,with the agreement of the IAEA, in the case of the substitution of material notunder safeguards for safeguarded material.
Under Article 2.a.(viii) of [540], the State is to provide the IAEA withinformation regarding the location or further processing of intermediate or highlevel waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium (HEU) or 233U on
which IAEA safeguards have been terminated pursuant to para. 11 of [153].
2.14. Exemption from IAEA safeguards.
Under para. 37 of [153] andpara. 21 of [66], a State may request exemption for nuclear material up to certain
specified limits.
Under para. 36 of [153], a State may also request exemption for nuclear
material related to the specific use as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)

Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as asensing component in instruments;
Nuclear material, when used in non‑nuclear activities in accordance withpara. 13 of [153], if such nuclear material is recoverable;
Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of 238Pu exceeding 80%.

Under para. 38 of [153], if exempted nuclear material is to be processedor stored together with safeguarded material, reapplication of IAEA safeguards
on the exempted material is required. Accordingly, exempted nuclear material
is required to be de‑exempted if such material is to be stored together withsafeguarded nuclear material or processed.
In certain circumstances there remain some reporting obligations on
exempted nuclear material.
Under Article 2.a.(vii) of [540], the State is required to provide the IAEA withinformation regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear material thathas been exempted from IAEA safeguards under para. 36(b) or para. 37 of [153].
Paragraphs 22 and 23 of [66] also provide for exemptions related to reactors.
22

2.15. Non‑application of safeguards to nuclear material to be used in
non‑peaceful activities. The use of nuclear material in a non‑proscribed
military activity which does not require the application of IAEA safeguards.
More specifically, this refers to the use by a State with a comprehensive
safeguards agreement (CSA) as envisaged in para. 14 of [153] of nuclear material
in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of IAEA safeguards(e.g. a non‑proscribed military activity such as naval nuclear propulsion). The
State is required under para. 14(a) of [153] to inform the IAEA that the use of
nuclear material will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may havegiven and in respect of which IAEA safeguards apply, that the nuclear material
will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and that during the period of
non‑application of IAEA safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the
production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
If a State with a CSA intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material
which is required to be safeguarded under [153] in a nuclear activity which does
not require the application of IAEA safeguards under the CSA, the IAEA andthe State are required to make an arrangement, as provided for in para. 14(b)and 14(c) of [153], so that only while the nuclear material is in such an activity,
the safeguards provided for in [153] will not be applied. Such an arrangement
shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during whichsafeguards will not be applied. Any arrangement pursuant to para. 14 of [153]will be reported to the IAEA Board of Governors.
2.16. Suspension of IAEA safeguards. Under an item‑specific safeguards
agreement, suspension of IAEA safeguards may be agreed upon between a Stateand the IAEA for limited periods and for limited quantities of nuclear material
while the material is transferred for the purpose of processing, reprocessing,testing, research or development [66, para. 24]. Under para. 25 of [66], IAEA
safeguards on nuclear material in irradiated fuel which is transferred for
reprocessing may be suspended if the State, with the agreement of the IAEA, has
substituted therefor nuclear material otherwise not subject to IAEA safeguards.
2.17. Substitution. A provision available in item‑specific safeguards agreements,
based on paras 25 and 26 of [66], to permit the suspension of IAEA safeguards
or termination of IAEA safeguards, with the agreement of the IAEA, on specificquantities of nuclear material or non‑nuclear material (e.g. heavy water) if theState submits to IAEA safeguards nuclear material or non‑nuclear material nototherwise subject to safeguards in accordance with quantity and quality criteria
specified in [66]. Substitution is not applicable under a comprehensive safeguards
agreement (CSA) because under a CSA all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear
activities in the State is subject to safeguards.
23

3. SAFEGUARDS CONCEPTS, APPROACHESAND MEASURES
Approaches to safeguards implementation are designed to enable the IAEA
to meet its safeguards objectives. What follows is an explanation of the basic
concepts and approaches underlying the development and application of IAEA
safeguards and the measures available to the IAEA under safeguards agreements
and, as applicable, under additional protocols.
3.1. State‑level concept (SLC). The general notion of implementing IAEA
safeguards in a manner that considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear related
activities and capabilities as a whole, within the scope of the safeguards agreement.
Background: The IAEA Secretariat first used the term ‘State‑level concept’in the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2004 to describe safeguards
implementation and evaluation based on a State‑level safeguards approach(SLA) developed for each individual State. ‘State as a whole’ considerations
for safeguards purposes were introduced in the context of the IAEA’s efforts
in the 1990s to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards
following the discovery of undeclared nuclear material and activities at
undeclared locations in some States with comprehensive safeguards agreements(CSAs). This involved greater consideration of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle asa whole (as opposed to IAEA safeguards primarily focused on nuclear material
at declared facilities and locations outside facilities (LOFs)) for the purpose of
ensuring that the IAEA is able to exercise its right and fulfil its obligation toensure that IAEA safeguards are applied on all nuclear material in all peaceful
nuclear activities in a State with a CSA, as provided for in para. 2 of [153].
To that end, in 1993 the IAEA embarked on Programme 93+2 to further
strengthen implementation of IAEA safeguards under CSAs by enhancing the
IAEA’s ability to verify not only the correctness but also the completeness of aState’s declaration. This programme led to the adoption of the Model Additional
Protocol in 1997. In 1999, the IAEA drew the first broader conclusion, for a
State which had both a CSA and an additional protocol (AP) in force, that all
nuclear material in the State remained in peaceful activities.
The IAEA began developing and implementing SLAs for individual Statesin the early 2000s, beginning with those States for which it had drawn the broader
conclusion and could therefore implement integrated safeguards, optimizing theimplementation of safeguards measures under CSAs and APs.
The SIR for 2004 stated that the application of the SLC, based on an SLA
developed for each individual State, was planned to be extended to all the otherStates with CSAs.
24

In 2011, the IAEA began to update existing SLAs (for States underintegrated safeguards) and to develop SLAs for other States, customizing the
SLAs through more systematic consideration and better use of the State‑specificfactors and moving away from model (generic) facility safeguards approaches.
The concept was further elaborated in reports to the IAEA Board of Governors
in [2013] and [2014]. The latter document described the SLC as applicable for all
States with a safeguards agreement in force, within the scope of the respective
safeguards agreement and protocols thereto. It also explained that the SLC does
not entail the introduction of any additional rights or obligations on the part ofeither States or the IAEA, nor any modification in the interpretation of existingrights and obligations. Since 2014, all SLAs have been developed as describedin [2013] and [2014].
3.2. State‑level safeguards. The implementation of IAEA safeguards basedon the State‑level concept (SLC). State‑level safeguards are also referred to as‘implementation of safeguards at the State level’. State‑level safeguards entail
the development of a customized State‑level safeguards approach (SLA) to
implement IAEA safeguards for an individual State.
3.3. State‑specific factors (SSFs). The six objective safeguards relevant
factors that are particular to a State which are used by the IAEA Secretariat in
the development of a State‑level safeguards approach (SLA) and in the planning,
conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities for that State. The SSFs are basedon factual information and are objectively assessed.
The exhaustive list of six SSFs is as follows:
(a)

(b)
(c)

(d)

The type of safeguards agreement in force for the State and the nature of
the safeguards conclusion drawn by the IAEA. For example, a State has
a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an additional protocol(AP) in force and the broader conclusion has not been drawn.
The nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabilities of the State. For
example, the State has a nuclear power reactor and locations outside facilities(LOFs), and limited nuclear fuel cycle related industrial capabilities.
The technical capabilities of the State (or regional) system of accounting forand control of nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC). For example, the State or
regional authority responsible for safeguards implementation (SRA) conducts
national/regional inspections or audits and the nuclear material measurement
methods at bulk facilities meet international target values (ITVs).
The ability of the IAEA to implement certain safeguards measures in the State.
For example, whether conditions exist to effectively implement short noticerandom inspections (SNRIs) or remote data transmission (RDT) is permitted.
25

(e)
(f)

The nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the IAEA in theimplementation of safeguards. For example, the timeliness and completenessof State reports, the facilitation of inspector access.
The IAEA’s experience in implementing IAEA safeguards in the State. For
example, existing or recurring field conditions adverse to safeguards, a State
allowing its facility operators to apply IAEA electronic seals to items being
shipped.

3.4. Safeguards approach. An internal document developed by the IAEA
describing the practical implementation of IAEA safeguards. A safeguards
approach consists of a set of safeguards measures and safeguards activities,
along with their corresponding intensity and frequency.
Safeguards approaches may be developed for the State as a whole (i.e. a
State‑level safeguards approach (SLA)) or for separate elements of a State’s
nuclear fuel cycle for the State concerned (referred to as ‘sub‑approaches’ if an
SLA is implemented). In the absence of an SLA, safeguards approaches are based
primarily on the Safeguards Criteria. Separate approaches (or sub‑approaches
in the context of an SLA) may cover elements of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle, forexample the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Facility: the approach for implementation of IAEA safeguards at a specificfacility.
Site: a safeguards approach for a particular group of facilities located on
the same site.
Sector: a safeguards approach for a group of facilities in a State which areof the same type, or produce or process the same type and form of nuclear
material, or are located in close proximity to one another.
Zone: a safeguards approach for all nuclear material of a specified category
or type in all or in a specified subset of material balance areas (MBAs)
within a State.

3.5. State‑level safeguards approach (SLA). A customized approach to
implementing IAEA safeguards for an individual State. An SLA is detailed in aninternal document developed by the IAEA Secretariat.
To develop an SLA, the IAEA conducts an acquisition path analysis or adiversion path analysis and takes into account the State‑specific factors. An SLA
consists of technical objectives as well as applicable safeguards measures andsafeguards activities, along with their corresponding frequency and intensity, tobe implemented in the field and at IAEA Headquarters to address those objectives.
In developing and implementing an SLA for a State, the IAEA consults with theState and/or regional authority responsible for safeguards implementation (SRA),
26

particularly on the implementation of in‑field safeguards measures. In practice,
the SLA is implemented through safeguards activities scheduled in the annual
implementation plan (AIP) for the State.
In cases of complex nuclear fuel cycles, an SLA may consist of a high level
document and several sub‑approaches.
3.6. Broader conclusion. A safeguards conclusion, drawn by the IAEA
Secretariat for a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and an
additional protocol (AP) in force, that all nuclear material in a State remains inpeaceful activities.
A broader conclusion is drawn on the basis of a comprehensive evaluationby the IAEA of all safeguards relevant information available to it and theSecretariat’s finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear
material from peaceful nuclear activities in a State, no indications of undeclared
production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and locations
outside facilities (LOFs) and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or
activities in a State as a whole. When the evaluation has been completed, and no
indication has been found by the IAEA that, in its judgement, would give rise toa safeguards concern, the Secretariat can draw the broader conclusion that all
nuclear material in a State remains in peaceful activities.
3.7. Integrated safeguards. An optimized combination of all safeguards measuresavailable to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) andadditional protocols (APs). Integrated safeguards may be implemented for States
for which the IAEA has drawn the broader conclusion. They are aimed at optimizing
the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation for those States.
Background: Safeguards approaches under integrated safeguards were
initially developed and implemented on the basis of a conceptual framework
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors in [2002] and reflected the additional
measures available to the IAEA under an AP as well as enhanced understandingof a State’s overall nuclear fuel cycle. Integrated safeguards were an important
step in the implementation of State‑level safeguards as the IAEA began todevelop, document and implement individual State‑level safeguards approaches
and annual implementation plans (AIPs) for the first group of States (i.e. thosefor which it had drawn the broader conclusion). For these States, because of theassurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities
in the State as a whole, at certain facilities safeguards measures could be applied
at reduced levels compared with the Safeguards Criteria levels that would havebeen applied without a broader conclusion.
Safeguards approaches under integrated safeguards were based on model(generic) facility safeguards approaches, as described in [2002]. Later, these27

approaches were customized and updated on the basis of acquisition pathanalysis for the State concerned, as elaborated in reports to the IAEA Board ofGovernors [2013] and [2014].
3.8. Programme 93+2. A programme initiated by the IAEA in 1993, describedin [2784] and [2807], that proposed measures to strengthen the effectiveness andimprove the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and to increase the IAEA’s
capability to verify both the correctness and the completeness of nuclear material
declarations under a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA). This programme
involved proposals for measures that could be pursued both within the IAEA’s
existing legal authority under CSAs (referred to as Part I measures) and on the basisof complementary legal authority to be conferred by States (referred to as Part II
measures), which led to the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997.
3.9. Model (generic) facility safeguards approaches.
Approaches forparticular facility types that were developed under the conceptual framework for
integrated safeguards [2002].
3.10. Safeguards Criteria. A set of nuclear material verification activities,
and their frequency and intensity, for each facility type and for locations outsidefacilities (LOFs) based on the associated quantity and type of nuclear material.
The Safeguards Criteria were developed by the IAEA between 1988 and1995. The frequency and intensity specified in the Safeguards Criteria are basedon the premise that the existence in a State of the necessary capabilities to convert
diverted nuclear material into a form suitable for use in a nuclear weapon or othernuclear explosive device cannot be ruled out, regardless of State‑specific factors.
3.11. Safeguards measures. Measures available to the IAEA under a safeguards
agreement and, where applicable, an additional protocol (AP). Examples of suchmeasures include nuclear material accountancy, inspections, design information
verification (DIV) and complementary access.
3.12. Safeguards activities. Implementation of safeguards measures in the field
or at IAEA Headquarters according to established procedures. Examples of suchactivities include examination and comparison of records and reports; materialbalance evaluation; verification of nuclear material; verification of the operator’smeasurement system; sampling for destructive analysis (DA); application,verification and checking the integrity of seals; application of surveillancesystems and review of results; transit matching analysis; taking of environmental
samples for analysis; and analysis of safeguards relevant information.

28

3.13. Diversion path analysis. A structured method used to analyse the paths
by which, from a technical point of view, nuclear material subject to IAEA
safeguards could be diverted from a facility, or by which facilities or otheritems subject to safeguards could be misused. Diversion path analysis is used
to establish technical objectives for States with an item‑specific safeguards
agreement and States with a voluntary offer agreement (VOA). For States with a
VOA, the path analysis includes consideration of the withdrawal from safeguardsof nuclear material subject to safeguards without notifying the IAEA.
3.14. Acquisition path analysis. A structured method used to analyse theplausible paths by which, from a technical point of view, nuclear material
suitable for use in a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device could beacquired. Acquisition path analysis is used to establish technical objectives fora State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force. It does not
involve judgements about a State’s intention to pursue any such path.
3.15. Acquisition path. A sequence of steps which a State could follow toacquire one significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear material (in metallic form)
suitable for use in a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.
For example, the following three steps comprise one acquisition path: (i) thediversion of declared spent fuel; (ii) undeclared reprocessing at a declared facility;and (iii) undeclared conversion to plutonium metal at an undeclared location.
3.16. Protracted diversion. Diversion of nuclear material in a series ofsmall fractional amounts of declared inventory, accumulating in a significant
quantity (SQ) over a material balance period (MBP).
Indications of protracted diversion can be detected through safeguards
activities, for example through material balance evaluation.
3.17. Abrupt diversion. Diversion of a significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear
material from the declared inventory in a single action. A diversion of a smaller
amount of nuclear material in a single action may be also considered abrupt
diversion if it represents a large fraction of the declared inventory.
Indications of abrupt diversion can be detected through safeguards
activities, for example interim inventory verification (IIV) inspection.
3.18. Concealment methods. Actions taken within a given diversion path or agiven acquisition path to reduce the probability of detection by IAEA safeguards

29

activities. Such actions may begin before the removal of material and may becontinued over a considerable time. Examples include the following:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Tampering with IAEA containment/surveillance measures or interferingwith nuclear material accounting activities.
Falsifying records, reports and other documents by overstating decreases ininventory (e.g. shipments, measured discards) or by understating increases
to inventory (e.g. receipts, production), or by presenting false facility
operational data. These are all examples of diversion into D.
For bulk handling facilities, diversion into MUF (material unaccountedfor), diversion into SRD (shipper/receiver difference) or diversion into D.
Borrowing nuclear material from other facilities in the State to replace thediverted nuclear material for the duration of an IAEA inspection.
Replacing diverted nuclear material or other missing items with material
or items of lower strategic value (e.g. dummy fuel assemblies or elements).
Creating obstacles to access by IAEA inspectors so as to reduce thepossibility of their detecting a diversion of nuclear material.

3.19. Significant quantity (SQ). The approximate amount of nuclear material
for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot
be excluded. SQs take into account unavoidable losses due to conversion andmanufacturing processes and should not be confused with critical masses. They
are used in establishing the quantity component of the IAEA inspection goal. SQ
values currently in use are given in Table 1.
3.20. Conversion time. The time required to convert different forms of nuclear
material into the metallic components of a nuclear explosive device. Conversion
time is used to determine timely detection requirements under the Safeguards
Criteria. Conversion time is estimated on the basis of the assumptions that allnecessary conversion and manufacturing facilities exist, that processes havebeen tested (e.g. by manufacturing dummy components using appropriate
surrogate materials), and that non‑nuclear components of the device have been
manufactured, assembled and tested. It does not include the time required
to transport diverted material to the conversion facility, the time required toassemble the device, nor any subsequent time period. The conversion time
estimates applicable under the above assumptions are provided in Table 2.
3.21.		 Detection time. An estimate of the time available for detection of a stepin an acquisition path (e.g. the time from diversion until the end of the path).
Detection time is a parameter used in the planning of the frequency of safeguards
measures and safeguards activities for timely detection purposes.
30

TABLE 1. SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY (SQ) VALUES CURRENTLY IN
USEMaterial
Direct use nuclear material
Plutoniuma
233
U
High enriched uranium (HEU) (235U ≥ 20%)
Indirect use nuclear material
Uranium (235U < 20%)b
Thoriumab

SQ
8 kg plutonium
8 kg 233U
25 kg 235U
75 kg 235U
(or 10 t natural uranium or
20 t depleted uranium)
20 t thorium

For plutonium containing less than 80% 238Pu.
Including low enriched uranium (LEU), natural uranium and depleted uranium.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED MATERIAL CONVERSION TIMES FORFINISHED PLUTONIUM OR URANIUM METAL COMPONENTS
Beginning material form

Conversion time

Plutonium, high enriched uranium (HEU) or 233U metal

Order of days
(7–10)

PuO2, Pu(NO3)4 or other pure plutonium compounds;
HEU or 233U oxide or other pure uranium compounds;
mixed oxide (MOX) or other unirradiatedpure mixtures containing plutonium,
uranium (233U + 235U ≥ 20%); plutonium,
HEU and/or 233U in scrap or other miscellaneous impurecompounds

Order of weeks(1–3)aPlutonium, HEU or 233U in irradiated fuelOrder of months(1–3)

Uranium containing <20% 235U and 233U; thorium

Order of months(3–12)aThis range is not determined by any single factor, but the pure plutonium and uranium
compounds will tend to be at the lower end of the range and the mixtures and scrap at
the higher end.

31

3.22. Technical objectives. Objectives established for a State, through theconduct of acquisition path analysis or diversion path analysis, to guide theplanning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities.
The IAEA seeks to address the technical objectives to detect and deter
any proscribed activity along a possible acquisition path or diversion path. The
technical objectives support the IAEA Secretariat in addressing the genericsafeguards objectives. The prioritization of technical objectives aims at theconcentration of safeguards effort on areas of greater safeguards significance.
3.23. Technical objective performance target. The degree to which a technicalobjective should be addressed in a State‑level safeguards approach (SLA)(e.g. the required detection probability for the diversion of 1 significant quantity(SQ) of nuclear material within a period of time). Safeguards measures andsafeguards activities, along with their frequency and intensity, are selected during
SLA development to meet these targets.
3.24. Verification effort. The level of safeguards activities conducted by the
IAEA for the State, both in the field and at IAEA Headquarters. In the field, thelevel of effort can be expressed as the frequency and the intensity of the activities(i.e. how often and the extent to which they are conducted).
3.25. Intensity of safeguards activity. A parameter defining the amount of effort
associated with a given safeguards activity or the extent of verification required.
For example, the intensity of fresh fuel verification during an inspection
could involve item counting and verification with 50% detection probability
for gross defects.
3.26. Frequency of safeguards activity. A parameter defining how often agiven safeguards activity needs to be conducted.
3.27. IAEA inspection goal. The goal specified for IAEA verification activities
at a given facility based on the Safeguards Criteria. The inspection goal for a
facility consists of a quantity component and a timeliness component.
3.28. Quantity component (of the IAEA inspection goal). Relates to thescope of the inspection activities at a facility that are necessary for the IAEA to
be able to draw the conclusion that there has been no diversion of 1 significant
quantity (SQ) or more of nuclear material over a material balance period (MBP)
and that there has been no undeclared production or separation of direct use
material at the facility over that period.

32

3.29. Timeliness component (of the IAEA inspection goal).
Relates tothe periodic activities that are necessary for the IAEA to be able to draw theconclusion that there has been no abrupt diversion of 1 significant quantity (SQ)or more at a facility during a calendar year.
3.30. Annual implementation plan (AIP). An annual plan developed for eachState on the basis of the relevant safeguards approach, consisting of a scheduleof safeguards activities to be conducted for a State during a given calendar
year in order to address the technical objectives. The AIP is an internal IAEA
document that can be updated during the course of the year to take into accountany needed follow‑up actions resulting from the conduct of safeguards activities
or new information.
3.31. Design information. Information concerning nuclear material subject to
IAEA safeguards under the relevant agreement and the features of facilities relevant
to safeguarding such material (see para. 8 of [153]; see also para. 32 of [66]).
Design information includes the facility description; the form, quantity,
location and flow of nuclear material to be or being used; facility layout andcontainment features; and procedures for nuclear material accountancy andnuclear material control. This information is used by the IAEA, inter alia, todesign the facility safeguards approach, to determine material balance areas(MBAs) and select key measurement points (KMPs) and other strategic points,
to develop the design information verification (DIV) plan and to establish theessential equipment list (EEL).
Design information for existing facilities should be provided by the Stateduring discussion of the subsidiary arrangements; in the case of new facilities,
such information is to be provided by the State as early as possible before nuclear
material is introduced into a new facility. Further, the State is to provide preliminary
information on any new nuclear facility as soon as the decision is taken to construct,or to authorize the construction of, the facility, and to provide further informationon the safeguards relevant features of facility design early in the stages of project
definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning. Facility design
information is to be provided for any safeguards relevant changes in operating
conditions throughout the facility life cycle, including decommissioning. Under an
item‑specific safeguards agreement, the State is to provide design information on
principal nuclear facilities to enable the IAEA to perform the design review at as
early a stage as possible [66, para. 31]. Design information is submitted to the
IAEA by the State using the IAEA design information questionnaire (DIQ).
3.32. Design information questionnaire (DIQ). A document submitted by States
to provide information on the design of a facility in accordance with para. 42
33

of [153] and within the time limits specified in the subsidiary arrangements. An
updated DIQ is submitted whenever there is a planned modification relevant forsafeguards purposes or a significant change in the facility design or operating
practices, and as specified in the subsidiary arrangements. The IAEA provides
States with standard forms to record and submit the design information requiredby it for the different facility types and for locations outside facilities (LOFs).
3.33. Design information examination (DIE). Activities carried out by the
IAEA to determine that the State has provided all relevant descriptive andtechnical information needed, inter alia, to design a safeguards approach for a
specific facility.
3.34. Essential equipment list (EEL). A list of equipment, systems andstructures essential for the operation of a facility. The EEL is facility specific andis established during the design information examination (DIE). It identifies those
items that may influence the facility’s operational status, function, capabilities
and inventory.
3.35. Flowsheet verification (FSV). In the context of the neptunium (Np) andamericium (Am) monitoring scheme, FSV addresses the acquisition path wherebya State could accumulate quantities of separated neptunium and/or americium
through separation activities at relevant facilities in the State (i.e. facilities whichhave nuclear material containing neptunium and/or americium and the actual or
potential capability for separating these materials).
FSV is meant to provide direct confirmation that these facilities are being
operated as declared. The FSV concept and general implementation provisions
are described in [1998] and [1999]. Further advice from the IAEA Secretariat
on technical parameters and modalities which could be applied to distinguishbetween neptunium and americium in the implementation of the monitoring
scheme is given in the Attachment to [1999].
3.36. Quality management system of the IAEA Department of Safeguards.
A formalized system that documents processes, procedures and responsibilities
for achieving quality policies and objectives. The quality management systemis the primary mechanism to ensure that safeguards activities are undertaken
in an efficient, effective and consistent fashion providing oversight of the key
IAEA safeguards processes to ensure impartiality, effectiveness and efficiency ofsafeguards implementation.

34

4. NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON‑NUCLEAR MATERIAL,
NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND NUCLEAR RELATEDACTIVITIES

Safeguards agreements between a State (or States) and the IAEA andprotocols thereto set out the provisions and procedures for the application of
IAEA safeguards on nuclear material, non‑nuclear material, facilities, equipment
and locations and/or for information to be provided in respect of nuclear related
activities in the State (or States). In addition, States may have arrangementswith the IAEA relating to the provision to the IAEA of additional information on
nuclear related activities and on the import and/or export of specified equipment.
What follows is an explanation of safeguards relevant terms used in connection
with nuclear material, non‑nuclear material, facilities, equipment, locations andinformation on nuclear related activities.
4.1. Nuclear material. Any source material or special fissionable material as
defined in Article XX of the Statute of the IAEA; see also para. 112 of [153],
para. 77 of [66] and Article 18.h of [540].
4.2. Nuclide. A species of atom characterized by the number of protons (atomic
number) and the number of protons and neutrons together (mass number).
4.3. Isotope. One of two or more atoms of the same element that have the same
number of protons in their nucleus but different numbers of neutrons. Isotopes
have the same atomic number but different mass numbers. Isotopes of an element
are denoted by indicating their mass numbers as superscripts preceding theelement symbol (e.g. 233U, 239Pu) or as numbers following the name or symbolof the element (e.g. uranium‑233, Pu‑239). Some isotopes are unstable to theextent that their decay needs to be considered for nuclear material accountancy
purposes (e.g. 241Pu has a half‑life of 14.35 years).
4.4. Source material. As defined in the Statute of the IAEA (Article XX.3):“[U]ranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium
depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the formof metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material
containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Boardof Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material as
the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine”.
35According to para. 112 of [153]:“The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore
residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statuteafter the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials
considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall haveeffect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by the State”.
See also Article 18.h of [540].
Ore concentrate is considered to be source material.
4.5. Special fissionable material. As defined in the Statute of the IAEA
(Article XX.1):“[P]lutonium‑239; uranium‑233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235
or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and suchother fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time totime determine; but the term ‘special fissionable material’ does not include
source material.”
See also para. 112 of [153] and Article 18.h of [540].
4.6. Fissionable material. In general, an isotope or a mixture of isotopes
capable of nuclear fission. Some fissionable materials are capable of fission only
by sufficiently fast neutrons (e.g. neutrons with kinetic energy above 1 MeV).
Isotopes that undergo fission by neutrons of all energies, including slow
(thermal) neutrons, are usually referred to as fissile material or fissile isotopes.
For example, 233U, 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu are referred to as both fissionable andfissile, while 238U and 240Pu are fissionable but not fissile.
4.7. Fertile material. A type of nuclear material that can be converted intoa special fissionable material through the capture of one neutron per nucleus.
There are two naturally occurring fertile materials: 238U and 232Th. Throughthe capture of neutrons followed by two beta decays, these fertile materials areconverted into fissionable 239Pu and 233U, respectively.
4.8. Uranium. A naturally occurring radioactive element with atomic
number 92 and symbol U. Natural uranium contains isotopes 234U, 235U and 238U;
uranium isotopes 232U, 233U and 236U are produced by transmutation.

36

4.9. Natural uranium. Uranium as it occurs in nature, with an atomic weightof approximately 238 and containing minute quantities of 234U, about 0.7% 235U
and 99.3% 238U. Natural uranium is usually supplied in raw form by uranium
mines and concentration (ore processing) plants as uranium ore concentrate,
most commonly the concentrated crude oxide U3O8, often called ‘yellowcake’.
4.10. Depleted uranium. Uranium in which the abundance of the isotope
235
U is less than that occurring in natural uranium, for example uranium
in spent fuel from natural uranium fuelled reactors and tails from uranium
enrichment processes.
4.11. Low enriched uranium (LEU). Enriched uranium containing less than
20% in weight per cent (wt%) of the isotope 235U. LEU is considered a special
fissionable material and an indirect use material.
4.12. High enriched uranium (HEU). Enriched uranium containing 20% ormore in weight percent of the isotope 235U [540, Article 18.e]. HEU is considereda special fissionable material and a direct use material.
4.13. Uranium‑233.
An isotope of uranium which is produced by thetransmutation of 232Th by irradiating thorium fuel in a reactor. Uranium‑233 isconsidered a special fissionable material and a direct use material.
4.14. Plutonium. A radioactive element which occurs only in trace amounts innature, with atomic number 94 and symbol Pu. Produced by irradiating uranium
fuels, plutonium contains varying percentages of the isotopes 238Pu, 239Pu,
240
Pu, 241Pu and 242Pu. Plutonium containing any 239Pu is considered a special
fissionable material and, except for plutonium containing 80% or more of 238Pu,
a direct use material.
4.15. Mixed oxide (MOX). A mixture of the oxides of uranium and plutonium
used as reactor fuel for the recycling of plutonium in thermal nuclear reactors(‘thermal recycling’) and for fast reactors. MOX is considered a special
fissionable material and a direct use material.
4.16. Thorium. A radioactive element with atomic number 90 and symbol Th.
Naturally occurring thorium consists only of the fertile isotope 232Th, which
through transmutation becomes the fissionable 233U.
4.17. Americium. A radioactive element with atomic number 95 and symbol Am.
Isotopes of americium, which are formed by neutron capture or by the decay of
37

241

Pu, are fissionable and may have the potential to be used in a nuclear explosive
device. While not defined by the Statute of the IAEA as source material or special
fissionable material, information on separated americium is collected by the
IAEA under the neptunium (Np) and americium (Am) monitoring scheme with
relevant States. Americium has sometimes been referred to as an ‘alternative
nuclear material’.

4.18. Neptunium. A radioactive element with atomic number 93 and symbol Np.
The isotope 237Np is both fissionable and fissile; it is formed during the irradiationof fuel in reactors and may be separated from high level waste and reprocessing
streams. While not defined by the Statute of the IAEA as source material or
special fissionable material, separated neptunium is monitored by the IAEA
under the neptunium (Np) and americium (Am) monitoring scheme with relevant
States. Neptunium has been referred to as an ‘alternative nuclear material.’
4.19. Enrichment. The relative amount (i.e. ratio) of a particular isotope(stable or radioactive) compared with the total amount of all isotopes of the samechemical element within a sample. Enrichment is usually stated as a percentage,either by weight (wt%) or isotopic abundance. The term ‘enrichment’ also refers
to the process by which the ratios of the isotopes of a given chemical element(stable or radioactive) are altered, such as the production of enriched uraniumor heavy water.
In para. 105 of [153] and para. 73 of [66], this term refers to “the ratio of
the combined weight of the isotopes uranium‑233 and uranium‑235 to that of thetotal uranium in question.”
4.20. Depletion. Any process by which the abundance of a specified isotope(e.g. a fissile isotope) in an element is reduced, such as the stripping process inan enrichment plant, the burnup of nuclear fuel in a reactor or radioactive decay(e.g. the decay of 241Pu contained in spent fuel).
4.21. Transmutation. The conversion of one nuclide into another through one
or more nuclear reactions, and more specifically, the conversion of an isotopeof one element into an isotope of another element through one or more nuclear
reactions. For example, 238U is converted into 239Pu by neutron capture followedby the emission of two beta particles.
4.22. Reprocessing. The separation of nuclear material from fission products
in irradiated nuclear material.

38

4.23. Material type. Classification of nuclear material according to the element
contained and, for uranium, the level of enrichment. The types are plutonium,
high enriched uranium (HEU), 233U, depleted uranium, natural uranium, lowenriched uranium (LEU) and thorium.
4.24. Material category.
Categorization of nuclear material according to
its irradiation status and suitability for conversion into components of nuclear
explosive devices. The categories are unirradiated direct use material, irradiateddirect use material and indirect use material.
4.25. Direct use material.
Nuclear material that can be used for the
manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further
enrichment. It includes plutonium containing less than 80% 238Pu, high enricheduranium (HEU) and 233U. Chemical compounds, mixtures of direct use materials(e.g. mixed oxides (MOX)) and plutonium in spent reactor fuel fall into thiscategory. Unirradiated direct use material is direct use material which does notcontain substantial amounts of fission products; it would require less time andeffort to be converted into components of nuclear explosive devices than would
irradiated direct use material (e.g. plutonium in spent reactor fuel) that contains
substantial amounts of fission products.
4.26. Indirect use material. All nuclear material except direct use material. It
includes depleted uranium, natural uranium, low enriched uranium (LEU) andthorium, all of which must be processed further to produce direct use material.
4.27. Material form. Classification of nuclear material according to its physicalform; material can be either in ‘item form’ or in ‘bulk form’. Material is in item
form as long as it consists of individually identifiable units (e.g. fuel assembly,
bundle, pin, plate or coupon, drum or other container). Bulk material is material
in loose form, such as liquid, gas or powder, or in a large number of small
units (e.g. pellets) that are not each individually identified for nuclear material
accountancy purposes.
4.28. Improved nuclear material. As defined in para. 74 of [66], nuclear
material that has been altered in such a way that one of the following is the case:“(a) The concentration of fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or(b) The amount of chemically separable fissionable isotopes in it has been
increased; or(c) Its chemical or physical form has been changed so as to facilitate further use
or processing.”
39

4.29. Effective kilogram (ekg). A special unit used in the safeguarding of
nuclear material. As described in para. 104 of [153] and para. 72 of [66], thequantity of nuclear material in ekg is obtained by taking the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

For plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight inkilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%),
its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001;
For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and forthorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.

4.30. Feed material. Nuclear material introduced at the start of a process
operation, for example UF6 as the feed for an enrichment process or for a UO2
conversion process, or UO2 as the feed for a fuel fabrication operation.
4.31. Scrap. Recyclable nuclear material rejected from the process stream.
Clean scrap comprises rejected process material that can be reintroduced into theprocess stream without the need for purification, while dirty scrap may require
separation of the nuclear material from contaminants, or chemical treatment toreturn the material to a state acceptable for subsequent processing.
4.32. Waste. In the context of IAEA safeguards, this refers to waste containing
nuclear material in concentrations or chemical forms which make the nuclear
material no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point ofview of safeguards, or which has become practicably irrecoverable. Reporting
requirements to the IAEA for nuclear material contained in waste are specified
under the relevant safeguards agreement and additional protocol (AP) thereto,
as applicable. The termination of IAEA safeguards on nuclear material in waste
is based on a determination by the IAEA that certain of the relevant technicalconditions are met. Under an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement,
where these conditions are not met but the State considers that the recovery ofsafeguarded nuclear material from residues is not for the time being practicableor desirable, para. 35 of [153] provides that the IAEA and the State shall consult
on the safeguards measures to be applied, in which case the nuclear material
remains subject to IAEA safeguards but is reported to the IAEA as transferred
to retained waste and is no longer included in the inventory of the materialbalance area (MBA).
4.33. Hold‑up. Nuclear material remaining in and about process equipment,interconnecting piping, filters and adjacent work areas after shutdown of a plant.
40

It may also be referred to as ‘material held up in process’ or ‘in‑process material’
for plants in operation. Hold‑up is difficult to measure and may be a contributor
to material unaccounted for (MUF), and therefore is important to minimize prior
to conducting a physical inventory taking. Some material in hold‑up is recovered
through periodic maintenance such as filter exchanges and cleaning of processequipment, often in preparation for conducting a physical inventory, while othermaterial in hold‑up may be recovered only during the decommissioning of theplant, such as material plated onto the walls of fixed piping. The IAEA nuclear
material accountancy principles require that hold‑up be declared as part of thephysical inventory and/or inventory changes if the related equipment is transferred
between material balance areas (MBAs). Hold‑up is mainly estimated on thebasis of plant or equipment specific models; these models are associated withuncertainties larger than those typically observed for accountancy measurements.
Therefore, hold‑up should be minimized as much as possible prior to conducting
a physical inventory. Developing hold‑up models may involve dedicatedtheoretical and experimental studies combined with the use of operational data
available through periodic maintenance (e.g. filter exchange, cleaning of processequipment) and of information on the amount of hold‑up material recovered
during the decommissioning of similar plants or equipment.
4.34. Fuel element (or fuel assembly, fuel bundle). A grouping of fuel rods,
pins, plates or other fuel components held together by spacer grids and otherstructural components to form a complete fuel unit which is maintained intact
during fuel transfer and irradiation operations in a reactor.
4.35. Fuel component. Any of the components of a fuel element containing
nuclear material sealed in metal cladding (e.g. subassemblies and fuel rods, pinsor plates), as defined in the subsidiary arrangements for batch definition andreporting purposes.
4.36. Specified non‑nuclear material. For IAEA safeguards purposes,
non‑nuclear material that can be used for the production of special fissionable
material. Under Article 2.a.(ix) of [540], States are required to provide the
IAEA with information on exports and, when requested, with the confirmationof imports of such materials in quantities exceeding the limits indicated in
the relevant items of the list of specified equipment and non‑nuclear material
for the reporting of imports and exports according to Article 2.a.(ix) (Annex II
to [540]). The non‑nuclear material specified includes nuclear grade graphite aswell as deuterium and heavy water. Similar information may be provided to the
IAEA by States participating in the voluntary reporting scheme (VRS). Specified

41

non‑nuclear material may also be subject to IAEA safeguards under item‑specificsafeguards agreements.
4.37. Nuclear grade graphite. Graphite with a purity level better than five parts
per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1.5 g/cm3 for use ina nuclear reactor in quantities exceeding 3 × 104 kg (30 t) for any one recipient
country in any period of 12 months. This graphite is listed in Annex II to [540].
Note: The boron equivalent for graphite expresses the quality of the graphite
as a neutron moderator in terms of a concentration of naturally occurring boronthat corresponds to the same capture level for thermal neutrons as the combined
impurities in the graphite.
4.38. Deuterium and heavy water. The isotope of hydrogen with mass number
2 (2H) is commonly called deuterium (D). It occurs naturally with an abundancein water of about 150 parts per million. The highly enriched form of water (heavy
water, more than 99.5% D2O) is used as a moderator in natural uranium fuelled
reactors. Deuterium, heavy water and any other deuterium compound in which
the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear
reactor in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient
country in any period of 12 months are specified in Annex II to [540].
4.39. Zircaloy. An alloy consisting of zirconium and small amounts of othermetals (i.e. tin, iron, chromium and nickel). It is used as a cladding material forreactor fuel, especially in light water reactors. Zirconium metal and alloys in theform of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg in any
period of 12 months, especially designed or prepared for use in a nuclear reactor
and in which the relation of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500 parts byweight are specified in Annex II to [540].
4.40. Nuclear fuel cycle. A system of nuclear installations and activities
interconnected by streams of nuclear material. Such a system may consist of
uranium mines and concentration (ore processing) plants, thorium concentration
plants, conversion plants, enrichment (isotope separation) plants, fuel fabrication
plants, reactors, spent fuel reprocessing plants, and waste management
installations and associated storage locations. The fuel cycle can be ‘closed’ invarious ways, for example by the recycling of enriched uranium and plutonium
through thermal reactors (thermal recycle), by the re‑enrichment of the uranium
recovered as a result of spent fuel reprocessing or by the use of plutonium in afast breeder reactor.

42

4.41. Physical model of the nuclear fuel cycle. A detailed overview of thenuclear fuel cycle identifying, describing and characterizing technical processes
used for converting source material to nuclear material suitable for use in a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, and identifying each process
in terms of the equipment, nuclear material and non‑nuclear material involved.
The physical model is used by the IAEA, inter alia, for acquisition path analysis
and for safeguards State evaluations.
4.42. Nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities. As definedin Article 18.a of [540]:“[T]hose activities which are specifically related to any process or systemdevelopment aspect of any of the following:— conversion of nuclear material,— enrichment of nuclear material,— nuclear fuel fabrication,— reactors,— critical facilities,— reprocessing of nuclear fuel,— processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving
the separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediateor high‑level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or
uranium‑233,
but do not include activities related to theoretical or basic scientificresearch or to research and development on industrial radioisotope
applications, medical, hydrological and agricultural applications, health andenvironmental effects and improved maintenance.”
4.43. Facility. As defined in para. 106 of [153]:“A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant,a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage
installation; or…any location where nuclear material in amounts greaterthan one effective kilogram is customarily used”.
(See also Article 18.i of [540].) Under [66], two kinds of facility are defined (inparas 78 and 81, respectively).

43

4.44. Location outside facilities (LOF). “[A]ny installation or location, which
is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one
effective kilogram or less” [540, Article 18.j]. Under para. 49 of [153], a Stateis required to provide to the IAEA information in respect of nuclear material
customarily used outside facilities (i.e. at a LOF). The corresponding term underpara. 66 of [66] is “other locations”, which is used in item‑specific safeguards
agreements to refer to installations where nuclear material outside principal
nuclear facilities is held, for example source material not stored in a sealed
storage facility.
4.45. Item facility. A facility where all nuclear material is kept in item form
and the integrity of the item remains unaltered during its residence at the facility.
In such cases, IAEA safeguards are based on item accountancy procedures(e.g. item counting and identification, non‑destructive measurements of nuclear
material, verification of the continued integrity of the items). Examples of item
facilities are most reactors and critical assemblies (critical facilities), and storage
installations for reactor fuel.
4.46. Bulk handling facility.
A facility where nuclear material is held,
processed or used in bulk form. Where appropriate, bulk handling facilities
may be organized into multiple material balance areas (MBAs) for safeguards
purposes, for example by separating activities relating only to the storage andassembly of discrete fuel items from those involving the storage or processingof bulk material. In a bulk MBA, flow and inventory values declared by thefacility operator are verified by the IAEA through independent measurements
and observation. Examples of bulk handling facilities are conversion plants,
enrichment (isotope separation) plants, fuel fabrication plants and spent fuelreprocessing plants, and storage facilities for bulk material.
4.47. Facility life cycle. For IAEA safeguards purposes, a set of phases overthe lifetime of a nuclear facility. The facility life cycle phases are planned, underconstruction, in operation, shut‑down, closed‑down and decommissioned forsafeguards purposes. Life cycle phases may apply to locations outside facilities(LOFs), as appropriate.
4.48. Shut‑down facility (or shut‑down LOF). The ‘shut‑down’ status of a
facility or location outside facilities (LOF) involves interrupting the operation ofa facility. During this phase, the facility is not in operation but contains nuclear
material and could be restarted in a short time. The ‘shut‑down’ status of a
facility includes maintenance or modification shut‑down, extended shut‑down
and permanent shut‑down. The ‘permanent shut‑down’ status of a facility begins
44when operations related to the purpose of the facility, as declared in the facility’s
design information questionnaire (DIQ), have been permanently stopped but thenuclear material has not been removed completely. This may include activities
related to the decommissioning (e.g. removal or recovery of nuclear material,
dismantling of equipment, decontamination, cleanout) of the facility.
4.49. Closed‑down facility (or closed‑down LOF). A facility or location
outside facilities (LOF) is in the closed‑down phase when operations havebeen permanently stopped and the nuclear material (including retained waste)
has been removed but the installation or location has not been determined as
decommissioned for safeguards purposes.
4.50. Decommissioned for safeguards purposes. A facility or location outsidefacilities (LOF) is considered to be decommissioned for safeguards purposes
when the IAEA has determined that the operations have been permanently
stopped, the nuclear material has been removed, and residual structures andequipment essential for use of the facility or LOF have been removed or rendered
inoperable so that the facility or location is not used to store and can no longer beused to handle, process or utilize nuclear material.
4.51. Nuclear installations. As the basis for categorization of facilities andLOFs (locations outside facilities) outlined in [361], this term covers facilities andLOFs under [153] and [540] as well as facilities and ‘other locations’ under [66].
It should be noted that the term ‘installation’ is also used more broadly, suchas in Article 18.b of [540], which refers to installations for the provision or useof essential services, including hot cells for processing irradiated materials notcontaining nuclear material; installations for the treatment, storage and disposalof waste; and buildings associated with specified activities identified by a State
under Article 2.a.(iv) of [540].
4.52. Categorization of facilities and LOFs. A classification of facilities andlocations outside facilities (LOFs) based on [361] used for IAEA planning andreporting of safeguards implementation. The categories are as follows:
A:
B:
C:
D:
E:
F:
G:

Power reactors;
Research reactors and critical assemblies;
Conversion plants;
Fuel fabrication plants;
Reprocessing plants;
Enrichment (isotope separation) plants;
Separate storage facilities;
45

H:
I:
J:

Other facilities;
Other locations (LOFs);
Non‑nuclear facilities or locations (for item‑specific safeguards agreementsonly).

4.53. Power reactors. Any device in which a controlled, self‑sustaining fission
chain reaction can be maintained (i.e. a nuclear reactor) intended to produce
electrical power or heat for district heating, industrial or transportation purposes.
4.54. Research reactors. Any nuclear reactor used as a research tool forbasic or applied research or for training. Some research reactors are used forradioisotope production. The fission heat is generally removed by the coolant at
low temperature and is usually not used.
4.55. Critical assemblies. Any assembly used for research and consisting of aconfiguration of nuclear material which, by means of appropriate controls, cansustain a chain reaction. A critical assembly is distinguishable from a research
reactor in that it normally has no special provisions for cooling, is not shielded
for high power operation, has a core designed for flexibility of arrangement, anduses fuel in a readily accessible form which is frequently repositioned and varied
to investigate various reactor concepts.
4.56. Conversion plants.
Any installation for converting the chemicalcomposition of nuclear material so as to facilitate its further use or processing,in particular to provide feed material for isotope separation and/or reactor fuelfabrication. To produce material for isotope separation, natural uranium oreconcentrates or uranium oxides from reprocessing are converted into uranium
hexafluoride (UF6). To produce material for fuel fabrication, the following
conversions are carried out: U3O8 or UF6 to uranium dioxide (UO2); uranium
or plutonium nitrates to oxides; and uranium or plutonium oxides to metal.
Operations to convert UF6 to UO2 normally are performed in conversion sectionsof uranium fuel fabrication plants, while conversions of uranium or plutonium
nitrates to oxides normally are performed in conversion sections of reprocessing
plants or in a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plant.
4.57. Fuel fabrication plants. Any installation for manufacturing fuel elements
or other reactor components containing nuclear material, such as targets. The
associated conversion, storage and analytical sections of the plant may be
included as parts of the fabrication plant.

46

4.58. Reprocessing plants. Any plant especially designed for or containing
essential equipment capable of reprocessing nuclear material.
4.59. Enrichment (isotope separation) plants. Any plant especially designed
for or containing essential equipment capable of enrichment (isotope separation)other than analytical instruments.
4.60. Separate storage facilities. Any installation which stores or is specificallydesigned to store nuclear material generated or to be used by another installation.

47

5. NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY
Nuclear material accountancy within the framework of IAEA safeguards
begins with the nuclear material accounting activities of facility operators andthe State (or regional) system of accounting for and control of nuclear material(SSAC/RSAC), implemented in accordance with the provisions of the safeguards
agreement between the IAEA and the State (or group of States). The IAEA applies
nuclear material accountancy, complemented by containment and surveillance(C/S) measures, to independently verify the correctness of the accounting
information generated by these activities. What follows is a description ofsafeguards relevant terms related to nuclear material accounting, including
relevant verification activities.
5.1. Nuclear material accounting. Activities carried out to establish thequantities of nuclear material present within defined areas and the changes inthose quantities within defined periods. Elements of nuclear material accounting
include the establishment of accounting areas; record keeping; calibrationof nuclear material measurement systems; nuclear material measurement;
preparation and submission of accounting reports; and verification of thecorrectness of the nuclear material accounting.
5.2. Nuclear material accountancy. The practice of nuclear material
accounting by the operator of the facility or location outside facilities (LOF) andthe State or regional authority responsible for safeguards implementation (SRA)
through the State (or regional) system of accounting for and control of nuclear
material (SSAC/RSAC), inter alia, to satisfy the requirements of safeguards
agreements. The IAEA independently verifies the correctness of the nuclear
material accounting information in the facility records and the reports provided
by the SRA to the IAEA. Activities involving nuclear material accountancy
include the following:
Facility level
(a)
(b)
(c)

48

Dividing operations involving nuclear material into material balance areas(MBAs) and establishing material balance periods (MBPs);
Maintaining records on the quantities of nuclear material held within eachMBA;
Measuring and recording all transfers of nuclear material from one MBA toanother or changes in the amount of nuclear material within MBAs due to,for example, nuclear production or nuclear loss;

(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

Determining periodically the quantities of nuclear material present withineach MBA by conducting a physical inventory;
Closing the material balance over the period between two successive
physical inventories and establishing the material unaccounted for (MUF)
for that period;
Providing for an accounting and measurement control programme todetermine the accuracy and precision of calibrations and measurements andthe correctness of recorded source data and other data;
Testing the MUF against its estimated uncertainty (σMUF) to assess whether
all nuclear material flows, whenever applicable, inventory changes andinventories are correctly accounted for.

State/regional authority level
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Preparing and submitting nuclear material accounting reports to the IAEA,
as appropriate;
Ensuring that nuclear material accounting procedures and arrangements areadhered to;Providing for IAEA inspector access and coordination arrangements, asnecessary, to enable the IAEA to carry out its verification activities;
Verifying the nuclear material accountancy performance of facility
operators, as provided for in the State/regional regulations;
Testing the MUF against its estimated uncertainty (σMUF) to assess whether
all nuclear material flows and inventories are correctly accounted for.

IAEA level
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Independently verifying nuclear material accounting in facility records
and State reports by conducting activities as provided for in the safeguards
agreements;
Determining the effectiveness of the SSAC/RSAC;
Providing statements to the State on the IAEA’s verification activities(see Statement on Inspection Results (90(a) Statement) and Statement on
Conclusions (90(b) Statement));
Testing the MUF against its estimated uncertainty (σMUF) to assess whether
all nuclear material flows and inventories are correctly accounted for andwhether the MUF can be explained by legitimate measurement uncertainties
to preclude diversion.

5.3. Inventory. The amount of nuclear material present at a facility or location
outside facilities (LOF) at any given time.
49

5.4. Annual throughput. The “amount of nuclear material transferredannually out of a facility working at nominal capacity” [153, para. 99].
5.5. Throughput. The “rate at which nuclear material is introduced into a
facility operating at full capacity” [66, para. 84].
5.6. Near real time accountancy (NRTA). A form of nuclear material
accountancy, particularly for bulk handling material balance areas (MBAs) withlarge throughput, in which detailed inventory and inventory change data aremaintained by the facility operator for each item containing nuclear material andare made available to the IAEA on a near real time basis. Associated measurement
uncertainties of every measurand used to establish the accountancy data are also
included in these data. This enables inventory verification to be carried out andmaterial balances to be established more frequently than, for example, at thetime of the annual physical inventory taking by the facility operator. When thein‑process inventory cannot be determined by measurement, NRTA requires thatan estimate, including its uncertainty, be made of the inventory in each piece ofequipment containing nuclear material, on the basis of documented techniques.
5.7. Material balance area (MBA). As defined in para. 110 of [153]:“[A]n area in or outside of a facility such that:(a)(b)

The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each“material balance area” can be determined; andThe physical inventory of nuclear material in each “material balancearea” can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified
procedures,in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes canbe established.”
Paragraph 46(b) of [153] provides that design information made available
to the IAEA shall be used as follows:“To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting
purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement
points and which will be used to determine the nuclear material flows and50

inventories; in determining such material balance areas the Agency shall,inter alia, use the following criteria:(i)

The size of the material balance area should be related to the accuracy
with which the material balance can be established;(ii) In determining the material balance area advantage should be takenof any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure
the completeness of flow measurements and thereby simplify theapplication of safeguards and concentrate measurement efforts at key
measurement points;(iii) A number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct
sites may be combined into one material balance area to be used forAgency accounting purposes when the Agency determines that this isconsistent with its verification requirements; and(iv) If the State so requests, a special material balance area around aprocess step involving commercially sensitive information may beestablished”.
5.8. Catch‑all material balance area (CAM). A material balance area (MBA)that covers multiple locations outside facilities (LOFs) in a State for nuclear
material accounting purposes. LOFs covered by such an MBA are often identified
as key measurement points (KMPs) within the CAM.
5.9. Strategic point. As defined in para. 116 of [153]:“[A] location selected during examination of design information where,
under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all“strategic points” taken together, the information necessary and sufficientfor the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a“strategic point” may include any location where key measurements related
to material balance accountancy are made and where containment andsurveillance measures are executed.”
5.10. Key measurement point (KMP). As defined in para. 108 of [153]:“[A] location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may
be measured to determine material flow or inventory. “Key measurement
points” thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including
measured discards) and storages in material balance areas.”51

5.11. Batch. A portion of nuclear material for which the composition andquantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. One batch
may be composed of one item or a number of separate items, or may be in bulk
form as a whole.
5.12. Batch data. As defined in para. 101 of [153]:“[T]he total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case ofplutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The
units of account shall be as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)

Grams of contained plutonium;
Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium‑235 plus
uranium‑233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; andKilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium.

For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be
added together before rounding to the nearest unit.”
5.13. Source data. As defined in para. 115 of [153]:“[T]hose data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive
empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch
data. “Source data” may include, for example, weight of compounds,
conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity,
element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume andmanometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced andpower generated.”
5.14. Identity data (or identification data). Those data needed to uniquely
characterize an item, batch or stratum of nuclear material. Examples are amaterial balance area (MBA), nuclear material type, batch identification,material description, and type and date of an inventory change. Note that a batch
identifier (batch ID) is unique within the MBA. Two batches in an MBA cannot
have the same batch ID at the same time.
5.15. Unified uranium. A category of uranium, used for nuclear material
accounting and reporting purposes under INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards
agreements, where all uranium (i.e. natural, depleted and enriched) is included
in a single (unified) account. The material balance area (MBA) and the State(or regional) system for accounting for and control of nuclear material
52

(SSAC/RSAC) must account for and report the grams of total uranium and gramsof contained 235U plus 233U regardless of the enrichment for the batch of nuclear
material. The use of a unified uranium account is a point of negotiation in thesubsidiary arrangements.
5.16. Material description code (MDC). Description of a nuclear materialbatch in an accounting report under the relevant safeguards agreement. For
example, nuclear material batches are described by four parameters in Code 10:
physical form; chemical composition; containment or type of container; andirradiation status and quality.
5.17. Inventory change. “[A]n increase or decrease, in terms of batches, ofnuclear material in a material balance area” [153, para. 107]. Such a change
may involve one of the following:
(a)
(b)

(c)

Increases: Import, domestic receipt, nuclear production, accidental gain,
retransfer from retained waste and de‑exemption of nuclear material fromIAEA safeguards.
Decreases: Export, domestic shipment, nuclear loss, other loss, measured
discard, transfer to retained waste, exemption of nuclear material fromIAEA safeguards and termination of IAEA safeguards on nuclear materialtransferred to non‑nuclear use.
Rebatching: Changes in the structure or name of a batch are referred to asrebatching and are reported in inventory change reports (ICRs).

Inventory changes are associated with a two‑character code, called theinventory change code. The codes are defined in model subsidiary arrangement
Code 10. The most common inventory change codes are defined below interms 5.18–5.30.
5.18. Import and export (inventory change codes: RF, SF). Internationaltransfer of nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards into or out of a State.
The responsibility for material which is transferred internationally is definedin para. 91 of [153], and the requirements for notification of the IAEA by the
responsible States are provided in paras 63, 92–96 and 107 of [153].
5.19. Domestic receipt (inventory change codes: RD, RN, RS). According topara. 107 of [153], the receipt from other material balance areas (MBAs) withina State, receipt from a non‑safeguarded (non‑peaceful) activity or receipt at thestarting point of safeguards (under a comprehensive safeguards agreement).

53

5.20. Nuclear production (inventory change code: NP). According to para. 107
of [153], the generation of special fissionable material through irradiation offertile material in a reactor. Nuclear production of fissionable material is also
applicable to an accelerator.
5.21. Accidental gain (inventory change code: GA). Unforeseen nuclear
material that is present in a material balance area (MBA), except when detectedin the course of a physical inventory taking by the facility operator.
5.22. De‑exemption (inventory change codes: DU, DQ). “[R]eapplication ofsafeguards on nuclear material previously exempted therefrom on account of its
use or quantity” [153, para. 107].
5.23. Retained waste (inventory change code: TW). “[N]uclear material
generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be
unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored” [153, para. 107]. The actual
inventory change used in accounting records and reports is termed ‘transfer toretained waste’. Nuclear material transferred to retained waste is stored at thematerial balance area (MBA) and continues to be subject to IAEA safeguards but
is not included in the inventory of the MBA. See also waste.
5.24. Domestic shipment (inventory change codes: SD, SN). “[S]hipments toother material balance areas or shipments for a non‑safeguarded (non‑peaceful)activity” within a State [153, para. 107].
5.25. Nuclear loss (inventory change code: LN). “[L]oss of nuclear material
due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear
reactions” [153, para. 107]. Nuclear loss also includes burnup of nuclear material
in a reactor and decay (e.g. of 241Pu) during storage.
5.26. Measured discard (inventory change code: LD). “[N]uclear material
which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposedof in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use” [153, para. 107].
5.27. Exemption (of nuclear material) (inventory change codes: EU, EQ).
“[E]xemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use orquantity” [153, para. 107].
5.28. Termination of IAEA safeguards (inventory change code: TU).
Termination of IAEA safeguards on nuclear material pursuant to para. 35 of [153].

54

5.29. Other loss (inventory change code: LA). “[F]or example, accidental loss
(that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear material as the result of an
operational accident) or theft” [153, para. 107].
5.30. Rebatching (inventory change codes: RM, RP). Batch follow‑up in thematerial balance area (MBA) (up to specified points or over the MBA as a whole),
which may be performed by reporting the decreases and corresponding increases
in the contents of specified batches directly and without associated changes inthe total inventory for the MBA. These decreases and matching increases in given
batches should be reported simultaneously in separate entries, as if they were
inventory changes. Batch follow‑up codes detail changes, which can include, but
are not limited to, structural changes as well as batch names. This procedure may
also be used whenever a batch ceases to exist (i.e. all material is transferred intoanother batch) as well as when a batch is simply renamed.
5.31. Adjustment. “[A]n entry into an accounting record or a report showing ashipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for” [153, para. 98].
5.32. Correction. As defined in para. 103 of [153]:“[A]n entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified
mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously
entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the [prior]
entry to which it pertains.”
5.33. Accounting records. A set of data kept at each facility or location outsidefacilities (LOF) showing the quantity of each type of nuclear material present,
its location within the facility (or LOF) and any changes affecting it. Accounting
records, such as a general ledger, contain the following information:“[I]n respect of each material balance area:
(a)
(b)
(c)

All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the bookinventory at any time;
All measurement results that are used for determination of the physicalinventory; andAll adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of
inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories” [153,para. 56].

55

In addition, “for all inventory changes and physical inventories the records
shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification,
batch data and source data” [153, para. 57].
5.34. Operating records. A set of data kept at each facility on the operationof the facility in connection with the use or handling of nuclear material. The
operating records of a reactor show, for example, the integrated thermal power
produced by the reactor for a given period and the associated data of the reactor
operation for that period as needed to determine the nuclear production andnuclear loss, and the location of each fuel element at any time. Operating records
contain the following information:“[I]n respect of each material balance area:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)

Those operating data which are used to establish changes in thequantities and composition of nuclear material;
The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments andfrom sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality ofmeasurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic
error;A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, andin taking, a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct andcomplete; andA description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause
and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that mightoccur” [153, para. 58].

5.35. Supporting document. A record containing identity data, source data andbatch data for each accounting transaction, such as shipping documents, weight(volume) records, laboratory records, charge and/or discharge records and power
production records.
5.36. Measurement system. Procedures, personnel and equipment, as well as
standards, certifications and calibrations, used for determining the quantities
of nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise added toor removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory, as provided forin paras 32(a) and 32(b) of [153]. This system should provide for, inter alia,
the following:

56

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)

Identification of key measurement points (KMPs), accountability areas,
inventory locations and the characteristics of the nuclear material to bemeasured;Specification of the measurement performance desired;
Specification of the measurement techniques employed;Specifications for measurement equipment;
Equipment maintenance provisions and procedures;
Operator’s qualifications and provisions for training;
Calibration standards and procedures;
Routine measurement and data analysis procedures;
Procedures for controlling measurement quality and maintaining
performance at the desired level;
Procedures for generating sample plans and obtaining representative
samples;
Procedures for combining measurements and measurement uncertainties tocalculate material unaccounted for (MUF) and MUF uncertainty (σMUF);
Evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of
measurement uncertainty (see para. 32(b) of [153]).

Paragraph 55 of [153] provides “that the system of measurements on which
the [facility] records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either
conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to suchstandards”. Such standards include the international standards of accountancy(ISA) and international target values (ITVs).
5.37. Metrological traceability. As defined by the Joint Committee for Guides
in Metrology (bold omitted): “[P]roperty of a measurement result whereby the
result can be related to a reference through a documented unbroken chain ofcalibrations, each contributing to the measurement uncertainty”3.
5.38. International standards of accountancy (ISA). Values of the relative
measurement uncertainty δE expected for closing a material balance. These
values, which were established in the 1970s on the basis of operating experienceat the various types of bulk handing facility, are considered to be achievable
under the conditions of normal operation. Table 3 shows δE (expressed as arelative standard deviation (RSD)) for different types of bulk handling facility.

3

JOINT COMMITTEE FOR GUIDES IN METROLOGY, International Vocabulary ofMetrology: Basic and General Concepts and Associated Terms (VIM), 3rd edn, 2008 Version
with Minor Corrections, JCGM 200:2012, JCGM, Sèvres (2012).

57

TABLE 3. EXPECTED MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY δE (RELATIVESTANDARD DEVIATION) ASSOCIATED WITH CLOSING A MATERIALBALANCE
Bulk handling facility type

δE

Uranium enrichment

0.002

Uranium fabrication

0.003

Plutonium fabrication

0.005

Uranium reprocessing

0.008

Plutonium reprocessing

0.010

Separate scrap storage

0.04

Separate waste storage

0.25

5.39. International target values (ITVs). Values of random and systematic
measurement uncertainty components which should be achievable underregular conditions for typical industrial laboratories and safeguards verification
measurements for destructive analysis (DA), non‑destructive assay (NDA) andbulk measurements (weight, volume) performed on nuclear material. They are
expressed as relative standard deviations (RSDs) and are values for uncertainties
associated with a single determination result. For example, this may be theresult reported by one laboratory on one sample (independent of the analyticalscheme applied internally in the laboratory) or the result of an NDA measurement
performed on a single item. The values are based on actual practical measurement
experiences and are intended to be used as a reference for routinely achievablemeasurement quality by facility operators, State (or regional) systems foraccounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC/RSACs) and the IAEA.
The values are regularly updated to address changes in measurement capabilities,
methods and techniques and their application to nuclear material.
5.40. Stratum/strata.
A grouping of items and/or batches having similar
physical characteristics (e.g. 235U enrichment, plutonium isotopic composition,
container size, homogeneity) and chemical characteristics (e.g. composition,
additives) and for which the operator declared values are based on a common
accounting method. Strata are established to enable effective verification of58

these items and/or batches (e.g. effective statistical sampling plans, effective
measurements) and to perform effective material balance evaluation. The desiredend result of stratification is that the items and/or batches in a particular stratum
are as similar as possible with respect to the physical and chemical characteristics
relevant for verification purposes. Each stratum is given a code with a maximumof five characters (e.g. SF for spent fuel, FF for fresh fuel).
5.41. Rounding adjustment. Used to account for differences between
summarized material balance report (MBR) values and the sum of amounts in thecorresponding entries in inventory change reports (ICRs) or physical inventory
listings (PILs). Each component of the MBR can have a rounding adjustment
denoted by ‘RAxx’, where xx is the MBR component.
5.42. Source documents. The original documents containing the information
used by the operator in its accountancy system (records), including the
documents containing the source data (e.g. the delivery receipts signed by theshipper/receiver supporting documents).
5.43. Book inventory (BI). “[T]he algebraic sum of the most recent
physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventorychanges [increases/decreases] that have occurred since that physical inventory
was taken” [153, para. 102]. The BI value is typically maintained in an accounting
record known as the general ledger.
5.44. Physical inventory. “[T]he sum of all the measured or derived estimatesof batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a materialbalance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures” [153, para. 113].
The beginning and ending physical inventories of a material balance period(MBP) are determined by the facility operator as a result of a physical inventory
taking and are reported to the IAEA in the physical inventory listing (PIL). The
physical inventory is verified by the IAEA during a physical inventory verification(PIV) inspection. The ending physical inventory for an MBP is also the beginningphysical inventory for the next MBP.
5.45. Material balance component. The combination of all strata in one
term of the material balance equation (i.e. the material unaccounted for (MUF)
equation); for example, arriving UF6 cylinders, UO2 powder in drums and anyother increases are combined in the inventory of the material balance area (MBA).
5.46. Material unaccounted for (MUF). “[T]he difference between bookinventory and physical inventory” [153, para. 111]. This is calculated for a59material balance area (MBA) over a material balance period (MBP) using thematerial balance equation, commonly written as:
MUF = ( PB + X – Y ) – PE

where the four material balance components are as follows:
PB		
X		
Y		
and PE

is the beginning physical inventory;
is the sum of increases to inventory;
is the sum of decreases from inventory;
is the ending physical inventory.

Because the book inventory (BI) is the algebraic sum of PB, X and Y, MUF
can be described as the difference between the ending BI and the ending physicalinventory. For item MBAs, MUF should be zero; a non‑zero MUF is an indicationof a problem (e.g. accounting mistakes) which should be investigated. For bulk
handling MBAs, a non‑zero MUF is expected because of measurement uncertainty
and the nature of processing of nuclear material in bulk form (a negative MUF isa ‘gain’ of material). The operator’s measurement uncertainties associated withthe strata in each of the four material balance components are combined withthe material quantities to determine the uncertainty of the material balance, also
referred to as σMUF.
5.47. Cumulative material unaccounted for (CuMUF). The algebraic sum of
the material unaccounted for (MUF) for a material balance area (MBA) over
several material balance periods (MBPs).
5.48. Shipper/receiver difference (SRD) (inventory change code: DI). “[T]hedifference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by
the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving materialbalance area” (para. 114 [153]). The SRD can be positive or negative (a positive
SRD is a ‘loss’ of material). For example, when the receiver declares the shipper
value to be 100 kg in a UO2 drum and the receiver declares a measurement of
95 kg, the SRD is 100 – 95 = 5 kg.
5.49. Cumulative shipper/receiver difference.
The algebraic sum of theshipper/receiver differences (SRDs) for a material balance area (MBA) over
several material balance periods (MBPs).
5.50. Material balance period (MBP). The time between two consecutive
physical inventory takings as reflected in the State’s material balance60report (MBR). Under some item‑specific safeguards agreements, the term isused to refer to what more accurately should be called the book balance period,
since the beginning and the ending dates of the period are not linked to physicalinventory takings or to the inspection dates.
5.51. Examination of records. A set of IAEA inspection activities which
under [153] is referred to as an examination of records and under [66] as auditing
activities. Facility records are examined with the intent of establishing a correct
set of data upon which to base the verification of the flow and the inventory of
nuclear material. Examination of records consists of all or some of the following
activities: examination of accounting records; examination of operatingrecords; reconciliation of accounting with operating records; updating of thebook inventory; and comparison of facility records with State reports and/or
notifications to the IAEA.
5.52. Updating of the book inventory. An IAEA inspection activity which
requires that the inspector establish a book inventory (BI) of a material balancearea (MBA); that is, the amount of nuclear material that should be present in
the MBA. The updating is based on the BI value established during the previous
inspection and uses facility records and supporting documents covering theintervening period. The BI value is the basis for verification of the inventoryof nuclear material actually present in the MBA as of the date when the
BI was updated.
5.53. Inventory change verification. An IAEA inspection activity intended toverify a recorded increase or decrease of the inventory of nuclear material in amaterial balance area (MBA). Verification of inventory changes, as componentsof the material balance, is essential for the IAEA’s verification of the overallmaterial balance and the determination of the inspector’s estimate of material
unaccounted for (IMUF). The verification is based on the inventory change datain the facility records and supporting documents and involves the use of IAEA
accountancy verification methods.
5.54. Inventory verification. An IAEA inspection activity intended to confirm
that the amount of nuclear material actually present at a given time within amaterial balance area (MBA) is in agreement with the operator’s recorded bookinventory (BI) of nuclear material for the MBA. Under [153], the verificationof inventory is performed at inventory key measurement points (KMPs). There
are two types of inventory verification: physical inventory verification (PIV) andinterim inventory verification (IIV).

61

5.55. List of inventory items (LII) (or itemized inventory listing (IIL)). A setof records used by operators to record the itemized inventory, such as in materialbalance areas (MBAs) and at key measurement points (KMPs).
5.56. Physical inventory verification (PIV). An IAEA inspection activity thatclosely follows, or coincides with, the physical inventory taking which closes
the material balance period (MBP). The basis for a PIV is the list of inventory
items (IIL) prepared by the operator. The data are reconciled with the physicalinventory listing (PIL) reports submitted by the State to the IAEA.
5.57. Physical inventory verification equivalent. A physical inventory
verification (PIV) inspection intended after a physical inventory taking when anuclear reactor remains in operation and is not shut down for periodic refuellingin a given calendar year. As a result of changes in fuel design and reactor
operation, facility owners are increasingly operating reactors for extended periods
between refuelling (e.g. 18 months). Therefore, a physical inventory verificationequivalent inspection is a PIV which does not involve the verification of thenuclear material in the reactor core which has been under seal since the previous
PIV. The inspection verification and reporting for a closed core PIV are based on
the itemized inventory list (LII) provided by the facility operator, which is derived
from the previous core loading configuration. The core contents (core fuel items)
will be verified by non‑destructive assay (NDA) and visual observation at thenext core opening.
5.58. Interim inventory verification (IIV). An IAEA inspection activity
that takes place within a material balance period (MBP). Such verification isfor timely detection or, for example, for reestablishment of the inventory of
nuclear material.
5.59. Verification of nuclear material flows within an MBA. An IAEA
inspection activity carried out at strategic points other than key measurement
points (KMPs) or at strategic points for containment and/or surveillance withina material balance area (MBA). Examples include verification of the transfer offresh and spent fuel assemblies into and out of the core of a reactor and samplingof pellets at the rod loading stations of fuel fabrication plants.
5.60. Verification of the operator’s measurement system. A verification
activity carried out to enable the IAEA to assess the quality of the operator’smeasurement system so as to be able to independently estimate its accuracy
and precision, and to compare its accuracy and precision against internationaltarget values (ITVs). Examples of this verification activity include observation62

of the operator’s measurement procedures, including procedures to calibrate
the operator’s measuring equipment; assessment of the operator’s measurementof standards provided by the IAEA; and the taking of samples for destructive
analysis (DA) to assess the quality of the operator’s analytical methods.
5.61. IAEA accountancy verification methods. Methods and techniques usedby the IAEA to independently verify nuclear material accounting information.
Commonly used methods include identification and weighing of nuclear
material, volume determination, sampling and analysis, non‑destructive assay(NDA) (e.g. for bias, partial or gross defects), criticality check for verification,item counting, spent fuel inventory check and seal verification. Each method
is identified by a single letter code according to IAEA procedures. See
also Section 6.
5.62. Code 10. Part of the subsidiary arrangements (General Part) that contains
the reporting formats for nuclear material accounting reports to be used by aState. Code 10 defines the data fields, formats, structure and content of nuclear
material accounting reports. It is a primary reference when addressing nuclear
material accounting and reporting issues. For example, the material description
code (MDC) comprises four characters describing the physical form, the chemical
form, the containment, and irradiation status and quality. As an example, ‘BQ2F’stands for complete fuel elements for a given reactor system (e.g. Assemblies
or bundles), dioxide, discrete fuel units and components, in shipping or storage
containers, fresh fuel elements or fuel assemblies. These types of detail are
specified in Code 10.
5.63. General ledger. The master system of records describing inventorychanges in a safeguarded facility. While the term is not referred to explicitly insafeguards agreements, it is generally understood to include information required
under the relevant safeguards agreement in respect of account records. For
example, paras 56 and 57 of [153] provide that, for all inventory changes andphysical inventories, the accounting records shall show material identification,
batch data and source data; that records shall account for uranium, thoriumand plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material; and that the dateof the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balancearea (MBA) and the receiving MBA or the recipient, shall be indicated for each
inventory change.
A general ledger functions as one of the bases at the facility level of thenational system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as referred
to in para. 7 of [153], and permits a determination of the book inventory(BI) at any time.
63

5.64. Nuclear material control. The State’s system of accounting for andcontrol of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the relevant agreement
includes all the measures to control and be able to report at any time the actual
amounts and movements of nuclear materials for the State and each of its
material balance areas (MBAs).
Nuclear material control measures are included in the safeguards State’ssystem to ensure that the nuclear material in the country will remain in peacefulactivities and that the State itself is capable of timely detection of diversionof nuclear material. For example, the legal establishment of a licensing,enforcement and inspection system within the country constitutes a measure ofcontrol of nuclear material.
5.65. Element code. A single‑letter code used in accounting reports — forexample, under an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement — to characterize
the relevant chemical element (i.e. nuclear material). For IAEA safeguards, theelement name or code of the quantities specified in the subsequent columns
should be given. The codes in Table 4 should be used, unless otherwise indicatedin the relevant subsidiary arrangements and/or facility/location outside facilities(LOF) attachment.
If in a given material balance area (MBA) the code for unified uranium(‘U’) is used, it replaces codes ‘D’, ‘N’ and ‘E’, which consequently may not be
used (for more details, see Code 10).
TABLE 4. ELEMENT CODES USED IN ACCOUNTINGREPORTS
Keyword64

Code

Depleted uranium

D

Natural uranium

N

Enriched uranium

E

Uranium, unified

U

PlutoniumP

ThoriumT5.66. Category change procedure. Various categories of uranium which are
blended and accordingly combined into a single category, or where uranium had
its category changed as a result of blending, enrichment, depletion or burnup.
The associated codes to be used are as follows:— EN: Enriched uranium to Natural uranium;— ED: Enriched uranium to Depleted uranium;— NE: Natural uranium to Enriched uranium;— DN: Depleted uranium to Natural uranium;— DE: Depleted uranium to Enriched uranium;— ND: Natural uranium to Depleted uranium.
For material balance reports (MBRs), the consolidated category changes
should be reported as a decrease for the material balance pertaining to thecategory in which the uranium had its category changed, and as an increase
for the material balance pertaining to the resulting uranium category. The code
appropriate for the category change should be used in inventory change reports(ICRs), and the ‘element’, ‘unit’ and ‘weight of fissile isotopes’ will be reported
pursuant to the category covered in the MBR. There are no category changes foruranium reported as unified (for more details, see Code 10).
5.67. Measurement basis. This information serves to indicate whether or not
the reported batch data are based on measurements made in the material balancearea (MBA) and, if not, what they are based on. One of the keywords or codes inTable 5 should be used.
Whenever at a key measurement point (KMP) only certain — but not
all — quantity parameters are measured (e.g. weight of total uranium in abatch), whereas other parameters are accepted at face value (e.g. enrichment
as stated by the shipper), the keyword ‘measured’ is to be applied (for moredetails, see Code 10).
5.68. Transit matching. An activity performed by the IAEA to match receipts
domestic and foreign from the receiving material balance area (MBA) withshipments domestic and foreign from the shipping MBA or State and, respectively,
to match shipments domestic and foreign from the shipping MBA with respective
domestic and foreign receipts from the receiving MBA or State. A semi‑annual
statement is sent to the Member States to inform them of the results of thisactivity and to request any relevant follow‑up information as needed.

65

TABLE 5. KEYWORDS OR CODES TO DESCRIBE THE
MEASUREMENT BASIS
KeywordCode

Explanation

MeasuredM

The batch data are based on measurements made at thematerial balance area (MBA), including key measurement
points (KMPs) on its boundary.

Measuredelsewhere

N

The batch data are based on measurements made atanother MBA.

TaggedT

The batch data are based on measurements previously
made at the same MBA and have been reported for that
MBA in an inventory change report (ICR) or physicalinventory listing (PIL) and the measurements have notbeen repeated.

Labelled

L

The batch data are based on measurements previously
made at another MBA and have been reported for thepresent MBA in an ICR or PIL without remeasurement.

66

6. NUCLEAR MATERIAL MEASUREMENTTECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT
Nuclear material verification depends on techniques and equipment for
sampling, measurement and analysis of nuclear material. Physical standards are
required for the calibration of measurement equipment and to provide a basis fordetermining the accuracy of measurements.
6.1. Calibration. A set of actions used when setting up the measurement
system and during periodic validation of the performance of an instrument or
measurement system to quantify the relation between instrument output and thevalue of standards considered as representing the true measured values. Throughcalibration, measurement biases can be minimized and the precision of an
instrument or measurement system can be estimated. Calibration is performed
using certified reference materials or standards. The result of the calibration (orcalibrations) is recorded in a document called a calibration certificate and issometimes expressed as a calibration factor or a set of calibration parameters,for example in the form of a calibration curve. The calibration process should
include an estimate of the associated random and systematic components ofmeasurement error variances.
6.2. Reference material. A material, sufficiently homogeneous and stablewith reference to specified properties, which has been established to be fit for its
intended use in measurement or in examination of nominal properties. A ‘certified
reference material’ is reference material accompanied by documentation issued
by an authoritative body which provides one or more specified property values
with associated uncertainties and traceabilities. Certified reference materials
include the following:— Primary (measurement) standards, which are of high metrological quality
and have an acceptable value without reference to other standards;— Secondary (measurement) standards, which are established throughcalibration with respect to a primary standard;— Derived/working standards, which have a value assigned by comparison
with a primary or secondary standard of the same quantity.
6.3. Bulk measurement. Determination of the mass of material subject to IAEA
safeguards verification, such as solid materials or solutions in containers andsolutions or powders in tanks. For material where only volume measurement ispossible, the mass can be calculated by using the density of the material measured,67

to the extent possible, in a manner that is representative (i.e. representative
sample) at the time of the bulk measurement. In the context of IAEA safeguards,
a bulk measurement can be combined with sampling, which also permits theprecise determination of the chemical composition of the material as well as theconcentration of safeguards relevant isotopes.
6.4. Matrix. The components of a sample other than the component being
measured. In some cases, the matrix material has a considerable influence on
the response of the measuring equipment, and therefore on the measurement
results. These are called ‘matrix effects’. For example, the presence of hydrogenor fluorine in a matrix can have an impact on results obtained through the use of
a neutron coincidence counting technique.
6.5. Material sample. A part or quantity selected from a larger group of
items or quantity of material for inspection or analysis. The sample should
be representative, meaning it is typical with respect to certain specified
characteristics of the population or material from which the sample is collected.
A material sample is a small quantity of material taken from one item or container
for measurement. A composite sample is obtained by taking several quantities
from one or more containers, mixing them together and then selecting one ormore aliquots for measurement.
6.6. Representative sample. A sample which is typical with respect to certain
specified characteristics of the population or material from which the sample
is collected. For example, in swipe sampling, selecting only large units from amixed population of large and small units would give a sample that is typicalof the large units; however, it would be a non‑representative sample of themixed population. To obtain a representative sample of this mixed population,
the population should first be divided into two separate groups (strata) of large
and small items and these groups should then be sampled separately. In material
sampling, homogenization of material (e.g. solutions) prior to sampling may berequired to obtain a representative sample.
6.7. Calorimetry. A method used for determining the amount of plutonium
in a sample by measuring its thermal power emission and converting thismeasurement to plutonium quantity by using the abundances of plutonium
isotopes and of americium measured separately, and standard values of thethermal emission rates of the plutonium isotopes and americium.
6.8. Assay. A measurement which establishes the quantity and composition of
nuclear material present in the items being measured; the term is also used as a68

synonym for ‘analysis’. There are two methods used: destructive analysis (DA)and non‑destructive assay (NDA).
6.9. Destructive analysis (DA). Determination of nuclear material content
and, if required, of the isotopic composition of chemical elements present in thesample. DA normally involves destruction of the physical form of the sample. In
the context of IAEA safeguards, determination of the nuclear material content of
an item sampled usually involves the following:— Measurement of the mass of the item;— The taking of a representative sample;— Sample conditioning (if necessary) prior to shipment to the IAEA Safeguards
Analytical Laboratories (SAL) for analysis or to the location of on‑siteanalysis;— Processing of the sample to the chemical state required for the analysis(e.g. dissolution in nitric acid);— Determination of the mass fraction (also called concentration) of thenuclear material (i.e. uranium, plutonium or thorium) present in the sample(i.e. elemental analysis) using, inter alia, techniques described in terms
6.10–6.18;— Determination of the isotopic abundance ratios of uranium or plutonium
isotopes (i.e. isotopic analysis) using, inter alia, techniques described interms 6.10–6.18.
6.10. Chemical titration. A method of chemical analysis whereby an unknown
amount of an element or compound is reacted with an exactly measured amountof a reagent of known composition, leading to the completion or characteristic
end‑point of a well known stoichiometric chemical reaction. Titration methods
are designated according to, inter alia, the mode of detection of the end‑point(e.g. potentiometric and spectrophotometric titration). The IAEA’s Nuclear
Material Laboratory uses potentiometric titration for the determination of
uranium content in 40 mg size uranium aliquots of unirradiated nuclear material(see material type).
6.11. Controlled potential coulometry. An electrochemical method formeasurement of the mass fraction, whereby the element to be analysed is
selectively oxidized or reduced at a metallic electrode maintained at a controlled
potential. The number of electrons (coulombs) used in the electrolysis ismeasured. This is a primary method to determine the plutonium mass fraction
and is used at the IAEA’s Nuclear Material Laboratory to determine plutonium,
especially for reference materials.
696.12. Gravimetric analysis. A technique whereby the element to be analysed
is quantitatively separated and transformed into a well defined and very purechemical compound which is accurately weighed and related to the stoichiometricquantity of the element to be analysed in the compound. For example, at the
IAEA’s Nuclear Material Laboratory, ignition gravimetry is used for determining
uranium concentrations in oxides by converting them to stoichiometric
U3O8 for uranium.
6.13. Isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS).
A quantitative mass
spectrometry technique for the measurement of the total uranium or plutonium
quantities in a sample in which an isotopically enriched tracer (e.g. 233U for
uranium, 242Pu or 244Pu for plutonium) is used as a surrogate internal standard.
The tracer isotope should be normally absent or of low abundance in the sample.
The amount of the analyte is determined by measuring the abundances of all
isotopes present in the sample with a mass spectrometer and then determining the
unknown by considering the quantity of tracer and the isotopic ratios observed in
an unspiked sample, in the tracer and in the spiked sample.
6.14. K‑edge densitometry. A technique for measuring the uranium andplutonium mass fraction/concentration in solutions by determining the ratioof the transmission of photons whose energies closely bracket the K‑electron
absorption edge of the uranium or plutonium. Hybrid instruments combining
K‑edge densitometry and X ray fluorescence (XRF) analysis are used for
determining uranium and plutonium mass fraction/concentrations in mixed
solutions, including highly radioactive spent fuel solutions.
6.15. Mass spectrometry. An isotopic analysis technique whereby small
quantities of a sample are ionized, focused into a beam and passed through amass analyser where the ions are separated according to their mass‑to‑charge
ratios, thereby producing a mass spectrum on a fixed detector or detector array.
The intensities of the deflected beams of ions of different masses are measured toyield the isotopic ratios.
6.16. Gas source mass spectrometry (GSMS). A mass spectrometric techniquein which gaseous samples (e.g. uranium hexafluoride (UF6)) are introduced andionized in the ion source of the mass spectrometer and multiple detectors are used
to simultaneously collect ions of different masses and provide measurements ofuranium isotopic ratios with high precision.
6.17. Thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS). A technique (alsocalled surface ionization mass spectrometry) in which picogram to microgram70

quantities of a sample are deposited on a metallic filament that is then heated
to 1600–2000ºC in a high vacuum. The analyte is ionized through contact
with a high temperature surface, and the ions produced are analysed in a mass
spectrometer to yield isotopic ratios. Highly accurate results require that sample
cross‑contamination be minimized.
6.18. Alpha spectrometry. Measurement of the energy spectrum of alphaparticles to determine the abundance of alpha emitting isotopes such as 238Pu and244
Cm in the material measured. At the IAEA’s Nuclear Material Laboratory, thetechnique is used in parallel with isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) for
the analysis of plutonium and spent fuel samples.
6.19. Non‑destructive assay (NDA). A measurement technique applied tonuclear material and other items of safeguards interest to confirm their isotopic
composition and quantity without destroying the items. NDA measurements
can be conducted in attended mode — if an inspector or a technician has to bepresent for operating the device — or in an automated manner with unattended
monitoring systems (UMSs). There are two broad categories of NDA based on
ionizing radiation:— Passive analysis (assay), in which the measurement refers to spontaneousemissions of neutrons or gamma rays, or to the total decay energy;— Active analysis (assay), in which the measurement refers to a stimulated
emission (e.g. neutron or photon induced fission).
NDA of many other physical quantities of interest — including mass,temperature or non‑ionizing radiation such as Cerenkov glow — can be used forthe verification of nuclear material.
6.20. Gamma ray spectrometry. Measurement of the spectrum (energy andintensity) of gamma rays incident upon a detector for the purpose of establishingthe identity and abundance of isotopes. This is done by referencing the measured
spectrum to well established nuclear data libraries for specific isotopes, or incomparison with spectra obtained from standards in known quantities under welldefined geometrical configurations.
Mathematical (e.g. in situ object counting system (ISOCS) based) absolutedetector efficiency calibrations are sometimes used to characterize a counting
geometry and interpret measured spectra when representative calibration
standards are not readily available.
High resolution gamma ray spectrometry, obtained using instruments suchas high purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, is essential for plutonium isotopic
71

analysis and analysis of the spectra of fission products in spent fuel, while gamma
ray spectrometry measurements of uranium enrichment can sometimes be takenwith lower resolution, for example with sodium iodide (NaI) or lanthanum
bromide (LaBr3) detectors.
In addition, advanced unattended monitoring systems (UMSs) use gamma
ray spectrometry, sometimes in combination with neutron coincidence counting,to provide independent measurement of nuclear material.
6.21. Gamma ray scanning. Measurement of gamma ray emission as a functionof position along an object (e.g. measurement of the gamma ray emission profile
along a fuel rod to verify its loading with pellets).
6.22. Scintillation detector. A device which responds to incident gamma rays or
neutrons by absorbing energy in a scintillator, which then emits photons that arecollected and counted. The most common scintillator for gamma rays is thallium
drifted sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) and lanthanum bromide (LaBr3); for neutrons, avariety of organic and inorganic liquid and solid scintillators can be employed.
For example, scintillation detectors are used in the HM‑5 (scintillation detector)
as well as in unattended monitoring systems (UMSs).
6.23. Semiconductor detector. A device which detects gamma rays by meansof the induced charge displacement in a semiconducting material, such as
germanium (Ge), cadmium telluride (CdTe), cadmium zinc telluride (CdZnTeor CZT) or silicon (Si). Semiconductor detectors are characterized by goodenergy resolution and relatively fast timing characteristics. To achieve the best
performance in terms of energy resolution, cooling of the detector — either withliquid nitrogen or with mechanical coolers — is required.
6.24. Neutron counting.
Measurement of neutron emission from nuclear
material, the emission being either spontaneous or induced by irradiation withneutron sources, in order to identify and measure the nuclear material. Detectionof neutrons is normally accomplished by utilization of a neutron induced reaction(e.g. with 10B, 3He or fission chambers), resulting in the production of a charged
particle which can be detected by its ionizing effect in the tube gas.
6.25. Neutron coincidence counting. A technique that detects correlated prompt
neutrons from spontaneous or induced fission in a sample and distinguishes themfrom uncorrelated neutrons from other sources (such as other fission events, or(alpha, n) reactions) by taking the difference between detected events that occur
closely together in time (real and accidental correlations) and those that are
randomly distributed in time (accidental correlations). The real correlated event72

rate is directly related to the amount of fissionable material in the sample. The
relation is typically determined through calibration with relevant standards.
6.26. Neutron multiplicity counting. A variation on the coincidence counting
technique described for neutron coincidence counting. Coincidence counting
involves measurement of the total number of neutrons detected (single rate)
and a statistical determination of the number of twofold coincidences (doublerate) by analysing the time history of the detected neutrons. The measurementof large plutonium or uranium samples with neutron coincidence counting
requires additional assumptions and mathematical analysis to account for neutron
multiplication and to accurately determine nuclear material mass. Multiplicity
counting includes circuitry to determine higher order coincidences (e.g. triplerate); this allows the direct measurement of neutron multiplication without
additional assumptions. This technique is useful to measure impure nuclear
material where the assumptions required for twofold coincidence counting are
not met. Multiplicity counters usually have a very high efficiency (>60%), which
is needed to measure threefold, or higher order, coincidences with reasonablecounting times.
6.27. Cerenkov radiation detection. A method for the verification of irradiatednuclear fuel in storage pools. Irradiated fuel immersed in water emits fastelectrons that induce a characteristic blue glow in the water. Electro‑opticalimage intensifiers have been adapted to observe this glow from above a storage
pool. When aligned vertically above the tops of fuel assemblies, a Cerenkov
viewing device can distinguish irradiated fuel items from non‑fuel items. The
quantity of Cerenkov light is detected by devices such as the analog improved
Cerenkov viewing device (ICVD), the digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD)
or the next generation Cerenkov viewing device (XCVD) and can be evaluated toconfirm the integrity of spent fuel assemblies.
6.28. Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL).
Includes the Nuclear
Material Laboratory (NML) and the Environmental Sample Laboratory (ESL),
both located in Seibersdorf, Austria. The NML is responsible for destructive
analysis (DA) and non‑destructive assay (NDA) of nuclear material samples,
and the ESL processes and analyses environmental samples for IAEA safeguards
purposes. The SAL also provides support for both DA and environmental
sampling (ES) programmes through the supply of sampling equipment, quality
assurance and training of IAEA inspectors.
6.29. Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL). A group of laboratories
in IAEA Member States that have been officially qualified for the analysis of73

nuclear material and environmental samples, as well as the provision of referencematerials for the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL).
6.30 Gamma ray counting. Measurement of the gamma ray emission from
nuclear material in order to identify and/or measure the nuclear material.
Gamma emission is a signature, in particular, of irradiated fuel and depends onthe fuel history. To this end, low sensitivity detectors, such as ion chambers orsilicon PIN diodes, are normally used. If the fuel history is known, the recorded
emission rate can be compared with the expected gamma emission obtained bymodel calculation.
6.31. Ion chamber. A gas filled device which detects gamma rays by sensing
the direct ionization generated in the gas by their interaction with the gas atoms.
Ion chambers give a measure of the average rate of the gamma ray field towhich they are exposed and therefore cannot be used in gamma ray spectrometry
applications. They are used in gamma ray counting applications with very intense
gamma ray fields, such as inside reactor cores, or for the assay measurement of
irradiated fuel assemblies (e.g. a fork detector system).
6.32. Passive neutron coincidence counter. A device that utilizes the neutron
coincidence counting technique. Passive neutron coincidence counters are used
to measure nuclear material with relatively high spontaneous fission rates suchas plutonium. For example, the high level neutron coincidence counter (HLNCC)
is designed to handle high count rates and therefore large samples of plutonium,
and the plutonium canister assay system (PCAS) is designed to determine theplutonium mass in a mixed oxide (MOX) canister.
6.33. Active neutron coincidence counter. A device that utilizes the neutron
coincidence counting technique and detects prompt neutrons from fission events
induced in fissionable materials such as uranium. Similar to passive counters,
active counter systems consist of a data acquisition module coupled with adetector head which incorporates an isotopic source (e.g. AmLi) that randomly
produces neutrons used to interrogate a fissionable sample. Various instruments
have been developed which incorporate this technology, for example the active
well coincidence counter (AWCC).
6.34. X ray fluorescence (XRF).
A non‑destructive analytical techniqueused to determine the elemental composition of materials by measuring thefluorescent (or secondary) X rays emitted from a sample when it is excited by an
X ray source. Two major types of XRF systems are available: energy dispersive
XRF (EDXRF) systems and wavelength dispersive XRF (WDXRF) systems.
74

XRF analysers determine the chemistry of a sample by measuring thefluorescent (or secondary) X rays emitted from a sample when it is excited by aprimary X ray source. The primary X ray source could be internal to the material(passive XRF) or external (active XRF). For example, the IAEA uses an XRF
identifier for alloys.
The WDXRF technique is used at the IAEA’s Nuclear Material Laboratory
to determine concentrations of major elements in inspection samples. It canalso be used to characterize impurities in uranium bearing materials in order tocomplement inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP‑MS) results.
6.35. Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP‑MS). An elemental
analysis technique capable of detecting most of the elements in the periodic tablein sample solutions at milligram to nanogram levels per litre.
At the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL), ICP‑MS is used for
impurity analysis in samples of uranium materials as well as for assessing
elemental composition of environmental samples and other samples. It can also
detect different isotopes of the same element, making it suitable for isotope
ratio measurements.
6.36. Combined procedure for uranium concentration and enrichment assay(COMPUCEA). A field deployable destructive analytical method that combines
L‑edge transmission and gamma ray spectrometry to measure respectively theuranium element mass fraction and the 235U enrichment in an inspection sample
subject to bias defect verification.
The COMPUCEA method has been applied at various sites of thenuclear fuel cycle, as its timely and accurate on‑site results are one of the main
advantages, and it is particularly adapted for high throughput facilities requiring
quick analytical results.
6.37. Pu(VI) spectrophotometry (PUSP). A simple and rapid destructive
analysis (DA) technique for the quantitative determination of plutonium
concentration in aqueous solutions. PUSP is widely used in the nuclear field andenables reliable measurements in medium and high radioactive environments(hot cells), including highly radioactive liquid waste samples.
The general principle is based on the quantitative oxidation of plutonium tothe hexavalent state by adding cerium(IV) or silver oxide in a nitric acid medium
and measuring the absorption peak at wavelength with a spectrophotometer.
The Pu(VI) peak is sharper and more intense than those of Pu(IV) and Pu(III),and therefore more appropriate for quantitative assay. The method responds
to plutonium concentration levels down to µg/g, significantly lower than theK‑edge method. It is less precise than isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS)
75

but provides faster results and requires a smaller number of staff and a lessexpensive set‑up.
6.38. Equipment Radiation Monitoring Laboratory (ERML).
The
IAEA laboratory which provides radiation monitoring of items returned
from verification activities in the field such as safeguards systems, seals andenvironmental samples. It is located at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna.
6.39. Sample transport. There are three categories used for transporting most
IAEA safeguards related samples:
(a)

(b)

(c)

Exempt consignment. This is the most common method for transporting
environmental samples. The quantities of radioactive material fall below thethreshold for which requirements for transport apply (as determined by the
IAEA Transport Regulations4); hand carrying is permitted in this category.
Excepted package. This is the most common method for shipping uranium
samples. The majority of requirements for the transport of radioactive
material are waived in this category, including UN numbers 3507 for UF6
samples and 2910 for other uranium compounds.
Type A package. This is the most common method for shipping plutonium
bearing samples. The full requirements for the transport of radioactive
material apply in this category, including UN number 2915.

6.40. Laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS). This technique involves
focusing a short pulsed laser onto a target material to produce a plasma plume ofcharacteristic emissions of relaxing ions excited by the laser. The photons fromthe plasma plume can be analysed to gain information about the elemental, andeven the isotopic, composition of the material.

4

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulations for the Safe
Transport of Radioactive Material: 2018 Edition, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR‑6(Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (2018).

76

7. CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE
The IAEA’s safeguards approach for a facility is based on nuclear material
accountancy as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, complemented
by containment and surveillance (C/S) measures and monitoring. The mostdesirable combination of containment and surveillance is that which permits
the safeguards objectives to be achieved at acceptable costs and with minimum
intrusion into routine facility operations.
7.1. Containment. Structural features of a facility, containers orequipment which are used to maintain the continuity of knowledge ofitems by preventing undetected access to, or movement of, the items. The
continuing integrity of the containment is usually ensured by complementary
containment/surveillance measures.
7.2. Surveillance. The collection of information through direct inspector
observation or recording devices for use in maintaining continuity of knowledgeof nuclear material, containment, IAEA assets and site activities.
7.3. Containment/surveillance device. An item of equipment used to perform
one or more containment/surveillance (C/S) functions and capable of providing
its own C/S results. Examples of C/S devices are surveillance cameras, seals andunattended monitoring systems (UMSs).
7.4. Seal. A tamper indicating device used to join movable segments of acontainment in a manner such that access to the containment’s contents without
opening the seal or breaking the containment is prevented. A sealing systemcomprises the containment enclosing the material to be safeguarded, the meansof applying the seal and the seal itself. All three components must be examinedin order to verify that the sealing system has fulfilled its function of ensuringcontinuity of knowledge of the identity and integrity of the material concerned.
Two types of seal are used by the IAEA:(a)

Active seals. Reusable seals with an internal, battery powered electronic
circuit that continuously monitors the integrity of the sealing loop (e.g. fibre
optic cable) and logs opening and closing events. The seal identity and theintegrity of the data from the seal are maintained via strong cryptographic
means. The seal can be verified in the field and/or monitored remotely,
where applicable.

77

(b)

Passive seals. Non‑reusable seals with no electronic circuits monitoring
the integrity of the seals. They can be used with a variety of sealing loops(e.g. metal wire, fibre optic cable), depending on the seal type. The individual
seal identity is established through a unique ID number and unique body
patterns or markings. Depending on the seal type, the seal can be verified
in the field using electronic verifiers or at IAEA Headquarters (or as agreed
between the IAEA and an external party in the case of seals approved forjoint use).

7.5. Containment/surveillance measures. The application of containment
and/or surveillance provided by containment/surveillance devices and systems tocomplement nuclear material accountancy. The use of containment/surveillance(C/S) measures is aimed at verifying information on the movement of nuclear
material or other material, equipment and samples, and/or preserving the integrityof safeguards relevant data. In many instances, C/S measures cover the periods
when the inspector is absent, thus ensuring the continuity of knowledge for the
IAEA and contributing to cost effectiveness.
Examples of applications of C/S measures include the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

During verification of nuclear material flows within an MBA and inventory
verification, to ensure that each item is verified without duplication and thatthe integrity of samples is preserved;
To confirm that there has been no change to the inventory previously verified
and thus reduce the need for remeasurement;
To ensure that IAEA equipment, working papers and supplies have not been
tampered with;
If necessary, to isolate (‘freeze’) nuclear material that has not been verified
until it can be measured.

The indication of an anomaly by C/S measures does not necessarily indicatethat material has been removed. The ultimate resolution of C/S anomalies isprovided by nuclear material verification. If any C/S measure has been, or may
have to be, compromised, the IAEA will, unless agreed otherwise, be notified
by the fastest means available. Examples of compromise include seals whichhave been broken inadvertently or in an emergency, and seals which have thepossibility of being removed after advance notification to the IAEA has been
agreed upon between the IAEA and the State.
7.6. System of containment/surveillance measures. A combination ofcontainment and/or surveillance measures that are used to maintain continuityof knowledge of nuclear material, IAEA assets and site activities. Each78

containment/surveillance (C/S) system is designed to meet a purpose specified
in the IAEA’s safeguards approach. To increase reliability, a C/S system can
include one or several C/S devices. Dual C/S measures are normally applied if
verification of nuclear material is difficult, in order to increase confidence in the
C/S results and reduce the requirements for re‑verification.
7.7. Vulnerability assessment. A formal evaluation of the security of IAEA
equipment, consisting of a vulnerability review by the IAEA and/or by external
experts. Vulnerability assessment is part of the equipment authorization process.
7.8. Joint use arrangement (JUA). A set of documents that specify the joint
use of equipment through specific procedures and approaches, as appropriate.
This documentation addresses the procedures associated with the equipment andany additional measures that will be employed to ensure the independence of the
IAEA’s activities and safeguards conclusions.
7.9. Joint use equipment (JUE). Safeguards equipment authorized by the
IAEA for possible use jointly by the IAEA and an external party (a State or
regional authority or a facility operator). The specific joint use case is part of theauthorization. The JUE is authorized for case scenarios described in the joint use
arrangement (JUA).
7.10. Tamper indication. Physical or electronic evidence of any unauthorized
or undeclared attempt, physically or electronically, to access or alter IAEA
equipment or to compromise the confidentiality, integrity or authenticity ofequipment, containment or data.
7.11. Surveillance review system. Equipment, including relevant software,used to review surveillance data recorded by surveillance systems. Examples
of surveillance review systems are General Advanced Review Software (GARS)
and Next Generation Surveillance Review (NGSR) software.
7.12. Unattended monitoring system (UMS). A tamper indicating systemthat operates continuously and autonomously to perform measurements without
inspector intervention. UMSs are employed in applications of nuclear material
accountancy using non‑destructive assay (NDA), containment/surveillance
devices or a combination thereof.
UMSs consist of radiation detectors and/or sensors for physical andelectrical properties connected to an industrial cabinet containing data acquisition
equipment, power management components, and communication and othersupport devices.
79

The advantages of these systems include a reduction of inspection efforts
and radiation exposure to inspectors, and of the level of intrusiveness to theoperation of nuclear facilities. Where agreed with the State, data may also betransmitted remotely to the IAEA.
For unattended measurements, specific criteria must be met,
including measures to ensure tamper indication, data authentication andencryption/decryption.
7.13. Core discharge monitor (CDM).
An unattended monitoring
system (UMS) featuring neutron and gamma detectors installed close to the coreof an on‑load, refuelled power reactor to monitor the charge and discharge ofirradiated fuel bundles.
7.14. Spent fuel bundle counter. An unattended monitoring system (UMS)featuring gamma detectors located within the guide tubes to count the irradiatedfuel bundles as they are discharged to the spent fuel storage bay of an on‑load,
refuelled power reactor.
7.15. Passive Gamma Emission Tomographic (PGET) System. A partial
defect test system for spent fuel and closed containers capable of detecting single
pin diversion. The PGET System consists of a toroid watertight compartment(enclosure) and a control unit, connected by a composite data and power cable.
7.16. Reactor power monitor. A neutron monitoring system placed outside thereactor biological shield to monitor the power level of the reactor.
7.17. Thermohydraulic power measurement. A technique that measures thetemperature and flow rate of the reactor coolant in order to calculate the actual
thermal power produced by the reactor. This measurement can reveal whether
the reactor has been used to irradiate targets for the production of undeclared
nuclear material and can be used to determine whether substantial amountsof fissile material might have been generated. The technique is mainly used innuclear research reactors through the unattended advanced thermohydraulicpower monitor (ATPM) system.
7.18. Criticality check. A technique that measures the variation of the neutron
count rate inside the reactor core with respect to reactivity change. The reactor
period is calculated from a fit of the exponential increase of the neutron count rate
when the reactor is in a supercritical state. If details of the reactor and fuel typeare known, the reactivity can also be calculated. Criticality check measurements80are performed with an in‑core neutron detector, such as B‑10 tubes or fission
chambers, coupled with a counter.
7.19. Radiation passage monitor. A device used to detect, by the radiation
emitted, the passage of nuclear material through openings in a containment. For
example, panels of 3He proportional counters and gamma ray detectors can beused to confirm irradiated fuel movements through a gateway. These can also bereferred to as gate monitors.
7.20. Authentication measures. Measures providing the IAEA with assurance
that information obtained from any safeguards equipment actually comes fromthe particular equipment and is genuine. In the case of digital data, the use ofcertified authentication algorithms contributes significantly to the required levelof data authentication in unattended safeguards equipment.
7.21. Encryption/decryption. A system of hardware, software and processes forencoding/decoding data, messages and other information in such a way that only
designated safeguards inspectors and other authorized IAEA staff can read them.
7.22. Equipment state of health data.
Data on the operating status ofequipment, especially information that provides an indication of any (potential)
malfunction, limitation on the equipment’s capacity to operate as planned or
tampering. Receiving the state of health data at a regular frequency makes it
possible to detect failures of equipment or tampering early enough for remedialactions to be implemented to satisfy timeliness requirements.
7.23. Safeguards equipment.
A complete, functional system or device(i.e. instruments, core components, or other components), which may include a
combination of hardware, software and/or firmware to make measurements andobservations, used to acquire and evaluate safeguards data. The term ‘instrument’is used synonymously with ‘equipment’.
7.24. Immobilization mechanism. A tool — such as a seal, surveillance or otherauthorized safeguards measure — which provides continuity of knowledge of thestatic position of a movable containment structure, thus avoiding the need for
periodic re‑examination of containment surfaces that are difficult to access. For
example, an IAEA seal can be used between a spent fuel storage container and an
immovable object to avoid having to lift the container for visual examination ofits bottom surface.

81

7.25. Remote data transmission (RDT). A technique whereby safeguards data,collected by RDT systems, are transmitted in a secure and reliable way off‑site
to IAEA Headquarters, a regional office or another IAEA location for review
and evaluation purposes. RDT enables better utilization of equipment, more
optimized planning of inspections and a reduction in the inspection effort needed
to meet verification requirements. It also allows the implementation of more
efficient and timely equipment maintenance driven by the analysis of equipment
state of health data, and even remote maintenance in certain cases.
7.26. Equipment authorization. The IAEA process that provides assurance thatan instrument or system of safeguards equipment meets its intended safeguards
function (i.e. that the results provided by an instrument or system can be usedeffectively in support of the process of nuclear verification). Authorization can
only be sought after the equipment is validated. After successful authorizationof a safeguards system or instrument, all related metadata are entered into thededicated safeguards equipment database.
7.27. Equipment validation. The IAEA process that provides assurance thatan instrument or system meets all required design characteristics and features,and functions safely and securely, thereby confirming the design quality of any
type of equipment (i.e. component, instrument or system). Even where individualcomponents have already been independently validated, their integration must be
validated. Validation confirms that equipment can be deployed and needs to haveoccurred before authorization can take place.
7.28. Safeguards system with remote data transmission capability. Any
unattended containment/surveillance, monitoring or measurement systemauthorized for IAEA safeguards use which is capable of transmitting data off‑site,
via remote data transmission (RDT), to IAEA Headquarters, a regional officeor another IAEA location. The system’s internal recording capability is used for
backup purposes. These systems transmit data ranging from equipment state ofhealth data to verification data. The redundancy feature is particularly useful forunattended containment/surveillance devices and monitoring devices.
7.29. Security critical component. Any hardware or software component ofequipment containing confidential or sensitive information which is critical to its
security. Information produced by equipment with a compromised security criticalcomponent cannot be authenticated by the IAEA and cannot be used to makeindependent measurements or observations for drawing safeguards conclusions.

82

7.30. Near Real Time System (NRTS). A system that supports near real time
verification and performs automated analysis, matching operator declared eventswith events generated through safeguards equipment installed in a given facility.
An NRTS has the capability of providing notifications to the facility operator
to indicate that (i) required safeguards data have been collected; (ii) required
operator declarations have been received and are consistent with previously
declared data; (iii) the data sets match; and (iv) given the previous points, a
subsequent, specific (often irreversible) process step, such as the welding of aspent fuel canister before it enters long term storage, may then be performed.

838. ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING
Environmental sampling is one of the IAEA’s safeguards measures which
contribute to the assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material andactivities. Collection of environmental samples combined with ultrasensitive
analytical techniques, such as mass spectrometry methods, particle analysis andlow level radiometric techniques, can reveal information about past and current
activities related to the handling of nuclear material. For more information on
this subject, see [IAEA/NVS/1].
8.1. Environmental sampling (ES). In the context of IAEA safeguards, thecollecting of samples from the environment with a view to analysing them fortraces of materials that can reveal information about nuclear material handled
or activities conducted. Usually, ES is performed on various surfaces, such as
equipment or building structures. Other media (including, but not limited towater, vegetation or soil) may also be sampled.
8.2. Location specific
Article 18.f of [540]:

environmental

sampling.

As

definedin“[T]he collection of environmental samples (e.g. air, water, vegetation,soil, smears) at, and in the immediate vicinity of, a location specified by
the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions
about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at the
specified location.”
8.3. Wide area environmental sampling. As defined in Article 18.g of [540]:“[T]he collection of environmental samples (e.g. air, water, vegetation, soil,
smears) at a set of locations specified by the Agency for the purpose of
assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared
nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area”.
Article 9 of [540] provides that the IAEA will not seek access to locations
specified for wide area environmental sampling until the use of such sampling
and the procedural arrangements therefor have been approved by the IAEA
Board of Governors and following consultations between the IAEA and the State.

84

8.4. Swipe sampling. The collection of environmental samples by swiping
a surface with a piece of ultraclean medium (such as cotton, cellulose, or othermaterial) to remove from the surface traces of materials present.
8.5. Point sample. A collection of replicate swipes from a contiguous area
at a single location. A point swipe sample is used to characterize activities at a
specific location.
8.6. Composite sample. A collection of replicate swipes from contiguous areasat multiple locations. Composite samples are used to characterize operations overa wider area than a point sample.
8.7. Pre‑inspection check sample. A swipe sample taken from the surface ofthe hands and clothing of the sampling team before they enter a site, facility orother location where environmental sampling (ES) is to be performed which canbe used to check for possible cross‑contamination from the sampling team.
8.8. Cross‑contamination. Unintended introduction of material to the sample
which could lead to false results. Possible sources of cross‑contamination are thesampling medium itself, the sampling kit, another sample, the sampling team andpost‑sampling handling, including analysis.
8.9. Baseline environmental signature. Data (derived from the analysisof environmental samples taken at, and in the vicinity of, a location) whichcharacterize nuclear material handled and activities conducted at that location.
Any inconsistencies between the results of the analyses and the declared
activities at the location are followed up with the State concerned. The baseline
environmental signature is used as a reference to evaluate the analytical resultsfor environmental samples collected later.
8.10. Sampling team.
A team of at least two persons performing swipe
sampling, except for sampling inside hot cells. The team consists of a sampler(collector) and an assistant working according to the procedures intended tokeep the risk of cross‑contamination during the sampling process as low as
possible. The collector comes into direct contact with the medium used to takeswipe samples; the assistant does not, except when taking a pre‑inspection checksample. In the case of sampling inside hot cells, the facility operator is responsible
for the collection, handling and packaging of samples under the direction of the
IAEA inspector.

85

8.11. Environmental sampling kit. A set of items to be used for taking
environmental samples, preassembled in the strictly controlled environment ofa clean room to guarantee the absence of contamination that may compromise
the environmental sampling (ES) results. The following are the mostcommon ES kit types:
(a)
(b)
(c)

A standard swipe ES kit containing several pieces of cotton cloth;
A hot cell sampling kit, intended for sampling inside hot cells using
cellulose swipes mounted on a plastic holder, designed for handling by
remote manipulators;
A swab ES kit containing several swabs (i.e. a cotton tip on a wooden
handle), intended for the collection of samples from difficult to reach or
heavily contaminated points.

8.12. Screening measurement. Measurement performed on each environmental
sample received at the Environmental Sample Laboratory (ESL) to determine
its radioactivity level and to detect the presence of actinide elements (primarily
uranium and plutonium) and fission or activation products. This is usually
performed using gamma ray spectrometry and X ray fluorescence (XRF).
8.13. Bulk analysis. The analysis of the entire swipe, swab or other type ofsample through digestion and chemical separation to determine the amount of
uranium, plutonium and/or other actinides, and the average isotopic compositionof certain elements (typically actinides).
8.14. Particle analysis. The analysis of individual micrometre sized particles
extracted from the environmental sample for their size, morphology andelemental and isotopic composition. The analysis of individual particles within asample can reveal the presence of different materials or multiple activities.
8.15. Fission track analysis. A technique applied to environmental samples
to detect and locate particles containing fissile nuclides (e.g. 239Pu, 235U). This
technique involves transferring particulate material from the sample onto afission track detector substrate, irradiating the detector with thermal neutrons andetching the resulting fission tracks. Fission track analysis is typically combinedwith thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) to provide the isotopic
composition of uranium and plutonium in individual particles.
8.16. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM). A technique used to image andanalyse individual micrometre sized particles extracted from an environmental
sample by depositing them on a conducting substrate and examining them with86

a high magnification electron beam. Secondary electron imaging can be used todetermine the size and morphology of a particle; its elemental compositions canbe derived through energy X ray spectroscopy (EDS) or wavelength dispersive
X ray spectroscopy (WDS).
8.17. Secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) (including large geometry
SIMS (LG‑SIMS)). A technique for measuring the isotopic composition ofindividual micrometre sized particles extracted from an environmental swipe
sample by depositing them on a conducting substrate and bombarding themwith a high energy ion beam. The ejected secondary ions are analysed using
a mass spectrometer to determine the isotopic composition of the particle.
LG‑SIMS provides greater sensitivity and precision for the analysis of minor
uranium isotopes.
8.18. Material characterization. Analysis of minor uranium isotopes, elemental
impurities and other physical or chemical characteristics of nuclear material
controlled by the relevant industrial specifications. In many cases, nuclear
material samples are collected for dual purposes; that is, they are submitted,
in parallel, for material characterization and for destructive analysis (DA) for
accountancy verification. Characterization may also be requested for samplesof non‑nuclear material, for example to assess the samples conformity withtechnical requirements for specific nuclear applications.
8.19. Multi‑collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry(MC–ICP‑MS). A technique for precise isotope analysis of radionuclides andstable elements (e.g. uranium, plutonium, strontium, lead). This is inductively
coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP‑MS) equipped with multiple collectors
for simultaneous detection of ions of interest. Modern MC–ICP‑MS instruments
have extremely high sensitivity for uranium and plutonium isotopes, butalso suffer from polyatomic interferences, therefore requiring an efficientpurification of uranium and plutonium fractions prior to analysis. MC–ICP‑MS
is used by the IAEA’s Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) for bulk
analysis of environmental samples for uranium and plutonium quantities andisotopic composition.
8.20. Minor uranium isotopes. Those isotopes of uranium which are lessabundant or do not occur in nature (i.e. all uranium isotopes except 238U and 235U).
8.21. Environmental samples. In the context of IAEA safeguards, samples
collected from the environment with the purpose of being analysed forparameters that can reveal information about nuclear material handled or related87

activities conducted at the sampled location. These samples are usually collectedfrom various surfaces, following an established procedure and using one of theauthorized environmental sampling kits, but may also include samples of otherenvironmental media.

889. STATISTICAL CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NUCLEAR MATERIAL VERIFICATION
Material balance accounting is an integral part of nuclear material
verification. A requirement of material balance accounting is that the quantities ofnuclear material in all components of the material balance equation be measured.
The measurement results are subject to uncertainty due to errors inherent in allmeasurement systems. Statistical concepts and techniques are used to estimate
the measurement uncertainty associated with quantities of nuclear material
amounts and to establish and maintain control over the quality of measurements.
They are also used in the formulation of sampling plans for nuclear material
accountancy and verification, and as a basis for tests of statistical safeguards
significance in the formulation of safeguards conclusions by the IAEA.
9.1. Material balance evaluation. A statistical evaluation performed by the
IAEA, once the material balance is closed, to:
(a)

(b)

Test whether any non‑zero material unaccounted for (MUF), shipper/
receiver difference (SRD), D statistic, operator–inspector differences orinspector’s estimate of MUF (IMUF) can be explained by measurement
uncertainty or is more likely to reflect other causes;
Assess whether trends over time in MUF, SRD or certain inventory changes(e.g. when used as MUF tuners) indicate other than expected behaviour.

The uncertainties which are associated with the declared amounts ofmaterial making up each of the four components of the material balance
equation are applied to the item or stratum amounts and combined to estimate
the uncertainty of MUF, denoted as σMUF. The material balance evaluation as
performed by the IAEA includes the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Estimation of σMUF, evaluation of the operator’s declared MUF, andassessment of associated trends and of the cumulative material unaccountedfor (CuMUF);
Comparison of σMUF with the international standards of accountancy (ISA);
Estimation of the standard deviation of SRD (denoted as σSRD), evaluation of
SRD, and assessment of associated trends and of the cumulative SRD;
Estimation of the standard deviation of the D statistic (denoted σD) andevaluation of the D statistic for strata verified by the IAEA and for thematerial balance area (MBA);
Evaluation of IMUF.
89

Note:

Statistical MUF evaluation applies only to bulk handling MBAs.

9.2. Inspector’s estimate of MUF (IMUF). The material unaccountedfor (MUF) computed on the basis of amounts of material measured by IAEA
inspectors instead of operator declarations. In practice, an inspector stratum
amount is derived by extrapolating (using the operator declared stratum amount)the measurements of a random sample of items. For those strata for which noitems were measured by the inspector, the operator’s stratum amount is used.
When most of the major strata have been measured by the inspector, IMUF
(algebraically equal to MUF‑D) can support the detection of diversion into MUF,
diversion into D or both.
9.3. Operator–inspector difference. The difference between the operator’s
declared value and the IAEA inspector’s measured value for the quantityof nuclear material in an item. The relative operator–inspector differences((operator value − inspector value)/operator value) are statistically tested toassess whether the difference could be explained by measurement uncertainties.
Significant operator–inspector differences are indicators of a possible diversion(diversion into D) and require further investigation.
9.4. D statistic. The operator–inspector differences observed in verification
measurements performed on a statistical sample projected onto a stratum(stratum D) or material balance area (MBA) (D) level.
9.5. MUF tuners. Inventory changes, such as measured discards (LD),transfers to waste (DT) or nuclear loss (LN), or corrections to accountancy
declarations, which, if not verified for authenticity, can be used to adjust thematerial unaccounted for (MUF) to a desired value in order to conceal diversionof nuclear material.
9.6. Diversion into MUF. A concealment method, of particular concern in bulk
handling facilities, in which an amount of declared material M is removed froma material balance area (MBA) and the accounting records are adjusted to reflect
the amount M removed. There is no falsification of these records. The diverted
amount M is part of the declared material unaccounted for (MUF) which isevaluated when performing the material balance evaluation. The diverter assumes
that the uncertainty of MUF (σMUF) is large enough to possibly mask the removalof M. Diversion into MUF may be detected through observation of a statisticallysignificant value of MUF. However, if σMUF is large because measurement quality
is poor, because there are large quantities of poorly or improperly accounted for90material, or because of very large inventories and/or throughputs in a facility,
then the probability of detection of diversion into MUF is low.
Note: Diversion into MUF may also include the use of MUF tuners.
9.7. Diversion into SRD. A concealment method similar to diversion into MUF
involving the diversion of nuclear material transferred between material balanceareas (MBAs). Diversion can be detected through material balance evaluation bya statistical test based on σSRD.
9.8. Diversion into D. A concealment method in which the diverter removes
an amount of declared material M but does nothing to the operator’s accounting
records to hide the diversion. The accounting records are therefore now false(having been falsified). The diversion causes a discrepancy (i.e. defect) between
the material declared to be present and the material actually present. The only way
to detect the diversion is for the inspector to measure the containers from which
M was removed and to compare the measured value with the operator’s declaredvalue. This concealment method is referred to as diversion into D because it canpotentially be detected through observation of a statistically significant valueof the D statistic during material balance evaluation and/or through significant
individual operator–inspector differences. Diversion into D can be concealed if
measurement quality is poor and the variance of D (σD) is large.
9.9. Defect. For verification purposes, a statistically significant difference
between the declared amount of nuclear material or non‑nuclear material(i.e. the quantity shown in the operator’s records) and the amount of material asdetermined by the IAEA’s verification measurements.
Three levels of defects must be considered when verifying nuclear material:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Gross defect refers to a defect in an item or a batch that has been completely
falsified to the maximum extent possible so that all or most of the declaredmaterial is missing.
Partial defect refers to a defect in an item or a batch that has been falsified
to such an extent that some fraction of the declared amount of material isstill present.
Bias defect refers to a defect in an item or a batch that has been slightly
falsified so that only a small fraction of the declared amount of material ismissing.

9.10. Sample size. The number of items to be verified in order to be able todraw conclusions about the population from which the sample is taken. For IAEA
91

safeguards the basic formula used for estimating the total number of samples (n)to be selected in each stratum is:n = N (1 − β 1/ D ) ( rounded up to the nearest integer )

where
N
β
D

is the number of items in the stratum;is the specified non‑detection probability;
is [M/x], the minimum number of defects in the stratum needed to divert
the goal amount M, rounded up to the next integer;

and x is the average nuclear material quantity in each item (each assumed tohave the same nuclear material amount) in the stratum.
This formula approximates the sample size that would result fromapplication of the hypergeometric probability distribution (i.e. sampling without
replacement) in calculating the probability of selecting one or more defects
in the sample and assuming that measurement error is negligible, so that thedetection probability (which combines selection probability and identification
probability) is the same as the selection probability. If the measurement error
is non‑negligible, the total sample size (n) should be allocated among several
IAEA accountancy verification methods, specifically methods for detecting gross,partial and bias defects.
9.11. Measurement error. The amount by which the measured value differsfrom the true value. All measurements are subject to error. In measurements ofnuclear material, measurement errors arise from bulk, concentration and isotopic
measurements. The causes of measurement error include sampling (selecting alimited number of items from a population, or a small amount of material from acontainer (representative sample and statistical sample)), instrument calibration,
statistical fluctuations due to limited duration counting time, environmental
conditions and background. In nuclear material accountancy terminology,
estimates of error variances include only those error sources that are attributable
to the measurement process (i.e. random error and systematic error) and do notinclude mistakes (e.g. transcription mistakes).
9.12. Random error.
A component of measurement error that occurs inremeasurements of the same quantity whose values vary in a random way
according to some probability distribution, with both positive and negative92

deviations from zero. As the number of measurements increases, the mean ofthese random deviations approaches zero; consequently, the effect of random
error can be reduced by repeating measurements. Random error variance isinversely related to measurement precision: the higher the precision, the smaller
the random error variance.
9.13. Systematic error. Long term and short term systematic error arecomponents of measurement error that remain constant over a series ofmeasurements; consequently, the effect of systematic error cannot be reduced byrepeating measurements. Short term systematic errors are in effect for a periodthat is shorter than the full analysis period and are considered random variables.
Long term systematic errors (also referred to as bias) are in effect for the entire
analysis period and are constant over the whole period. This type of error isusually related to accuracy, because it characterizes how close the measurement
result is to the true value over the entire analysis period; the higher the accuracy,
the smaller the long term systematic error. Short term or long term systematic
error can be estimated by measuring standards. Sometimes a bias adjustment ismade to adjust for long term systematic error.
9.14. Residual bias. An unknown systematic error that remains after a bias
adjustment has been applied (i.e. after the measured values have been corrected
for the part of the systematic error that can be estimated by calibration or bymeasuring standards).
9.15. Error propagation. The determination of the value to be assigned as theuncertainty of a given quantity, using mathematical formulae for the combinationof measurement uncertainties for measurands (i.e. the quantities being measured)from which this quantity is being derived. Error propagation involves many
considerations and the choice of a formula for computing the uncertainty
depends on the functional relations of the measurands involved.5 For example,
the standard deviation of material unaccounted for (MUF) (σMUF) resulting
from closing a material balance can be calculated by the application of the error
propagation formulas that combine the errors of the individual material balancecomponents. The standard deviation of the calculated MUF (or σMUF) is used toevaluate the statistical significance of MUF.
9.16. Limits of error. Limits set around a measured value using estimates ofrandom and systematic measurement uncertainties which have been calculated
5

Definition based on BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY, Safeguards
Dictionary, Rep. WASH‑1173, BNL, Upton, NY (1971).

93from data acquired over a long period of time. These limits are the upper andlower bounds of a confidence interval. The term ‘limits of error’ has the same
meaning as the ‘limits of accuracy’ mentioned in para. 30 of [153].
9.17. Confidence limits. Limits set around a measured value or estimate that
express a degree of confidence with regard to the true value of the measured or
the estimated amount. For example, a confidence interval can be established fora material unaccounted for (MUF) value by setting the upper confidence limit
at MUF + 3σMUF and the lower confidence limit at MUF – 3σMUF, corresponding
to the claim that with 99.73% confidence the true value of MUF lies within thisinterval. Confidence limits of the interval MUF ± 2σMUF correspond to 95.45%
confidence that the true value lies within the calculated interval.
9.18. Outlier. An observed or measured value that is unusually large or
unusually small compared with the range of values expected from the observedor hypothesized distribution of similar observations or measurements. Since asuspected outlier may or may not be an observation of the population of interest,
it is prudent to examine the circumstances surrounding the alleged outlier before
rejecting it. For example, a mistake might have been made in recording the data.
Statistical analytical methods exist for identifying outliers and for treating themfor the purposes of data evaluation. However, discarding outliers for which there
are no clear explanations can result in underestimation of variability within
the population.
9.19. Performance values. Estimates of measurement error standard deviations
derived by the IAEA from a statistical analysis of historical measurement
data, often the paired operator–inspector difference data accumulated over alarge number of inspections. The standard deviation estimates are apportioned
between the operator and the IAEA inspector and are separated into random andsystematic uncertainty components (associated with random error and systematic
error). Performance values are established on the basis of a facility, stratum
and measurement method and are used for planning implementation of IAEA
safeguards and for safeguards statistical data evaluation purposes.
9.20. Hypothesis test. A test of whether an assumption (i.e. hypothesis) isreasonable in view of the relevant data. The hypothesis being tested could refer toa characteristic, such as element concentration, or to a balance statistic, such as theoperator’s true material unaccounted for (MUF) or the true operator–inspector
difference. The test may be either two‑sided (e.g. testing for material loss orgain) or one‑sided (e.g. testing only for loss). The hypothesis may also rest on
assumptions, for example that the population sampled has a normal distribution.
94

For instance, an example of a safeguards relevant application of this test
could be the hypothesis to be tested (called the null hypothesis) that the meanvalue of element concentration of a batch of UO2 powder is 82.2%, while thealternative hypothesis is that the mean value is either greater or smaller than
82.2%. For this test, the limits of error must be set on both sides of 82.2%,
such as 82.0% and 82.4%, to establish an interval for testing; the areas beyond
the interval are called the critical region. One or more samples from the batchin question are analysed for element concentration. If the measured average
concentration is within the established interval, there would be no evidence toreject the null hypothesis. If the measured concentration is in the critical region,
the null hypothesis would be rejected.
9.21. Statistically significant.
Describes a conclusion drawn when
the null hypothesis is rejected. Safeguards relevant tests include test of
material unaccounted for (MUF), inspector’s estimate of the MUF (IMUF),
operator–inspector difference and shipper/receiver difference (SRD). For
example, suppose the null hypothesis is that the expected value of MUF is zero,
which means there is zero loss of nuclear material. An interval is establishedaround the hypothesized value of zero for the true MUF value for a given levelof confidence and based on an estimated σMUF. If the observed MUF is within
the interval around zero, there would be no reason to reject the null hypothesisthat the true MUF is zero, thus the observed MUF would not be considered
statistically significant. However, if the observed MUF is outside the interval,
there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis, thus the observed MUF
would be considered to be statistically significant. Traditionally, the estimatedvalue of σMUF is assumed to be the true value of σMUF, and the MUF values are
assumed to have a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation
σMUF. This means that such intervals are simple to construct, typically by using
0 ± 2 σMUF or 0 ± 3 σMUF, depending on the desired false alarm probability.
9.22. Type I error. In a hypothesis test, rejecting a null hypothesis when thenull hypothesis is in fact true. The probability α of committing a type I error iscalled the significance level of the test and is also referred to as the false alarmprobability. A type I error in the context of IAEA safeguards might result infalsely concluding that nuclear material has been lost when in fact no material
has been lost. Therefore, the value of α chosen is generally very small (e.g. 1%).
9.23. Type II error. In a hypothesis test, failing to reject a null hypothesis
when the null hypothesis is in fact false. This is commonly designated as having
probability β. Since in the context of IAEA safeguards, failure to reject a null
hypothesis is equivalent to a conclusion that diversion did not occur when in fact95

it did occur, the probability β of a type II error is commonly referred to as thenon‑detection probability.
9.24. Power of a test. In a hypothesis test, the probability of correctly rejecting
a false hypothesis. The power of the test depends on the distributions of thetwo populations corresponding to the null and the alternative hypotheses. If theoverlap of the null distribution (e.g. the true material unaccounted for (MUF) is0) and the alternative distribution (e.g. the true MUF is some positive quantity) issmall, then the power of the test is high. If the overlap of the two distributions islarge, then the power of the test is low. In the case of a large overlap, more data
(i.e. a larger sample size) are required to reduce the overlap and thus increase
the power of the test. The power of the test is one minus the probability β ofa type II error.
9.25. Attributes test. A test of a characteristic (or attribute) of an item to which
the response is either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. For example, seal verification is an attributes
test: the seal is inspected and the result should be either that it shows evidenceof tampering or it does not. Testing items by non‑destructive assay (NDA) forradiation emission is also an attributes test: a tested item either emits radiation
within a specified range or it does not. To simplify calculations, an attributes
test is often assumed to have a zero mistake rate. However, in some sample size
calculations, the mistake rate is assumed to be non‑zero, and a corresponding
non‑zero relative standard deviation (RSD) of the measurements is used in theattributes test.
9.26. Variables test. A statistical test that consists of measuring, on a continuous
scale, a quantitative characteristic of an item and determining the significanceof the measured result as compared with the declared value on the basis ofmeasurement uncertainties associated with the applied measurement methods.
Weighing an item and measuring its element concentration by the analysis ofa representative sample are examples of variables tests. When the results ofsuch a quantitative measurement are used only to decide whether or not the item
measured meets a specified criterion, which is a ‘yes/no’ decision, the test is
described as a ‘variables test in attribute mode’.
9.27. Critical region. The region outside the bounds established for a hypothesis
test. If the test result lies inside the critical region (i.e. outside the bounds), thenull hypothesis is rejected. The points at which the critical region begins are also
referred to as reject limits.

969.28. Selection probability. In general, the probability of selecting one ormore defective items in a sample or the probability of performing an action
capable of detecting indicators of an event (of interest) while evidence of theevent is detectable.
For sampled items, the selection probability is most easily calculated as(1 – β) where β is the probability of selecting zero defective items in the sample,
which can be calculated using the hypergeometric distribution. The selection
probability for performing an action capable of detecting events is calculatedon the basis of the frequency of performing the action and the persistence times
associated with evidence of the events having occurred.
9.29. Identification probability. The probability that the measurement method
identifies that a defective item is in fact defective. This is usually calculated byassuming that the measurements are normally distributed with a known standard
deviation. The identification probability in the context of detecting events isbased on the effectiveness of the action performed during the persistence timesof the events (times over which evidence of the events is detectable) in detectingthat the events have occurred (e.g. the probability of detecting a given type of
misuse in a facility during a random inspection).
9.30. Detection probability. The probability of being able to identify an eventof safeguards interest (e.g. the diversion of 1 significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear
material into material unaccounted for (MUF)). In the context of sampling,detection probability is the probability of selecting one or more defective
items in a sample and correctly identifying by measurement that one or moreof those selected defects is defective. Detection probability combines selection
probabilities and identification probabilities.
9.31. False alarm probability. The probability α that statistical analysis of
nuclear material accountancy and verification data indicate that a quantityof nuclear material is missing when, in fact, no diversion has occurred (i.e. α
represents the probability of a type I error). For nuclear material accountancy
verification purposes, α (or the associated critical region) is selected prior toperforming statistical tests in order to minimize the number of discrepancies orfalse anomalies that must be investigated and is therefore generally set to a smallvalue (e.g. 1 %).
9.32. Verification level. The selected confidence level (1 – β) when applying
the IAEA sample size formula, where (1 – β) is the desired detection probability.
Common verification levels are random low, medium and high (with (1 – β) =0.2, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively). Note that the achieved detection probability
97when applying a given verification level is not necessarily as large as (1 – β),because it also depends on the identification probabilities of the applied
verification method(s).
9.33. Sampling plan. In the context of IAEA safeguards, the calculation ofnecessary sample sizes for a given verification situation. Depending on theverification requirements, commonly used sampling plans include the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Nested: distributing the total sample size among two or three different
verification methods, where the number of the most precise measurements
taken is minimized while applying a given verification level for sampling.
Optimized: determining the sample size on the basis of verification
requirements and constraints placed on the number of verifications withgiven verification methods that may be performed during an inspection.
Two stage: calculating sample sizes for efficient verification of multiple
items found in containers or subunits (e.g. fuel assemblies in baskets).
Follow‑up: an additional sampling plan calculated when one or more defects
are identified as defects using the original sampling plan.

9.34. Variable sampling in the attribute mode. The results of quantitative
measurements are used only to decide whether or not the item measured meets a
specified criterion, which is a ‘yes/no’ decision.
9.35. Variable sampling in the variable mode. The results of quantitative
measurements are used quantitatively in further analysis (e.g. in statistical testsof operator–inspector differences or in establishing the D statistic).
9.36. Relative standard deviation (RSD). The relative standard deviation,or coefficient of variation, is defined as δ = σ/µ, where µ is the mean and σ isthe standard deviation of the population distribution. RSD is often expressed
as a percentage. In the IAEA safeguards context, RSD usually refers to relative
measurement error standard deviations.
9.37. Measurement uncertainty. A non‑negative parameter characterizing
the dispersion of the values that could be attributed to a measured quantity. All
measurements are subject to uncertainty, and a measurement result is complete
only when it is accompanied by a statement of the associated uncertainty. This
uncertainty has a probabilistic basis and reflects incomplete knowledge of thequantity value. Uncertainty is usually expressed as a multiple of the standard
deviation of the total measurement error, which can include both random errors
and systematic errors.
989.38. Statistical sample. A set of items selected from a population of items(e.g. cylinders of UF6) using a defined procedure. The types of sampling
procedure may include the following:(a)(b)

Random sampling: sampling based on the random selection of items, which
ensures equal probability of selection for each item in the population.
Systematic sampling: sampling based on the selection of items according toa fixed interval (e.g. every fifth item).

99

10. VISITS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD
Safeguards visits and activities in the field — including inspections
and design information verification (DIV) — are carried out by the IAEA in
accordance with the provisions of the relevant safeguards agreement. For a State
that also has an additional protocol (AP) in force, the IAEA may also conduct
complementary access in that State, as necessary.
10.1. Visit. The presence of the IAEA in a State for a safeguards inspection,
design information verification (DIV), complementary access or other safeguards
related activities (which may take place at locations other than facilities or
locations outside facilities (LOFs)).
Examples of other safeguards related activities include the maintenance or
installation of safeguards equipment; fact finding and technical discussions inconnection with the development of safeguards approaches; and negotiations
and discussions with facility and State authorities regarding safeguards
implementation matters. The term ‘visit’ is relevant to all types of safeguards
agreements and protocols thereto. Some visits are counted as calendar‑days inthe field for verification (CDFVs).
10.2. Design information verification (DIV). Activities carried out by the IAEA
at a facility to verify the correctness and completeness of the design information
provided by the State.
An initial DIV is performed on a newly built facility to confirm that theas‑built facility is as declared. A DIV is performed periodically on existing
facilities to confirm the continued validity of the design information and of thesafeguards approach. The IAEA’s authority for performing a DIV is a continuingright throughout all phases of a facility’s lifetime until the facility has beenverified by the IAEA as decommissioned for safeguards purposes.
10.3. Inspection. A safeguards measure comprising a set of activities carriedout by IAEA inspectors under a safeguards agreement ([153] or [66]) to verify
that nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards remains in peaceful activities
or is otherwise adequately accounted for. Under [66], inspections also include
verification of other items such as non‑nuclear material, facilities, equipment,
services and information (referred to as a design review). Examples of inspections
are described in terms 10.4–10.14.
10.4. Initial inspection. Paragraph 51 of [66] provides that an initial inspection
may be carried out, if so provided in a safeguards agreement, to verify that100

the construction of a principal nuclear facility is in accordance with the design
reviewed by the IAEA. The initial inspection may be carried out as soon as
possible after the facility has come under IAEA safeguards, in the case of a facility
already in operation, or before the facility starts to operate, in the other cases.
10.5. Ad hoc inspection.
An inspection performed by IAEA inspectors
under para. 71 of [153], which provides that the IAEA may make ad hoc
inspections as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)

To verify the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear
material subject to IAEA safeguards under the agreement;
To identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since
the date of the initial report;
To identify and, if possible, verify the quantity and composition of nuclear
material before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into the State.

10.6. Routine inspection. An inspection performed by IAEA inspectors underpara. 72 of [153], which provides that the IAEA may perform routine inspections
at a facility or location outside facilities (LOF) as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)

To verify that reports are consistent with records;
To verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear
material subject to safeguards under the agreement;
To verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for(MUF), shipper/receiver differences (SRDs) and uncertainties in the bookinventory (BI).

According to para. 49 of [66], routine inspections may include thefollowing, as appropriate:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Audit of records and reports;
Verification of the amount of safeguarded nuclear material by physicalinspection, measurement and sampling;
Examination of principal nuclear facilities, including a check of theirmeasuring instruments and operating characteristics;
Check of the operations carried out at principal nuclear facilities andat research and development facilities containing safeguarded nuclear
material.

10.7. Unannounced inspection.
A routine inspection performed by IAEA
inspectors at a facility for which no advance notice is provided by the IAEA to101

the State before the arrival of IAEA inspectors. Paragraph 84 of [153] provides
that, “as a supplementary measure, the Agency may carry out without advance
notification a portion of the routine inspections...in accordance with the principleof random sampling.” Paragraph 50 of [66] makes provision for the IAEA tocarry out unannounced inspections.
10.8. Short notice inspection. A routine inspection performed by IAEA
inspectors at a facility or location outside facilities (LOF) for which lessadvance notice is provided by the IAEA to the State than that provided for underpara. 83 of [153].
10.9. Random inspection. A routine inspection performed by IAEA inspectors
at a facility or location outside facilities (LOF) on a date chosen randomly.
10.10. Short notice random inspection (SNRI). A routine inspection
performed by IAEA inspectors both at short notice and randomly. SNRIs arepart of a safeguards approach developed for fuel fabrication plants under IAEA
safeguards to provide 100% verification coverage of domestic transfers of
nuclear material and borrowing scenarios. The SNRI is based on near real time
submittal of mailbox declarations containing the operator’s operational data.
SNRIs may also be used at other facility types where the safeguards approachcalls for unpredictably scheduled short notice inspections.
10.11. Limited frequency unannounced access (LFUA). A routine inspection
carried out by IAEA inspectors at gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants under
IAEA safeguards in a State with an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement andoperating at a declared uranium enrichment level of 5% or less. LFUA routine
inspections carried out in cascade areas are designed to permit, together withinspection activities outside cascade areas, the timely detection of the diversionof 1 significant quantity (SQ) of uranium, including the production of 1 SQ ofuranium at an enrichment level higher than that declared, while protecting thesensitive technical information related to the enrichment process. The LFUA,
inter alia, secures access at short notice for IAEA inspectors to the cascade area ofthe plant concerned. Inspection activities to be implemented within the cascade
area include visual observation; radiation monitoring and non‑destructive
assay (NDA) measurements; environmental sampling (ES) and nuclear material
sampling; and application and verification of seals. The activities to be performed
and the frequency of access to the cascade area depend on the design andoperational features of the plant.

10210.12. Simultaneous inspections. Inspections performed by IAEA inspectors
simultaneously or within a short period of time at two or more facilities in a Statein order to detect possible diversions arranged in collusion between facilities by,for example, the temporary transfer (‘borrowing’) of nuclear material between
facilities so that the same nuclear material is counted twice by the IAEA, oncein each of the two facilities inspected. The facilities may be of the same type(e.g. light water reactors using fuel assemblies of the same kind) or they may belinked in the same nuclear fuel cycle (e.g. light water reactors, fuel fabrication
plants and reprocessing plants, spent fuel storage areas). Simultaneous
inspections at fuel fabrication plants may be replaced by short notice random
inspections (SNRIs).
10.13. Continuous inspection. Activities that enable the IAEA to maintaincontinuity of knowledge concerning inventory and flow of nuclear material
by witnessing key operations, recording measurement and operating data,
and verifying the information in order to meet the safeguards objectives. The
activities involved may or may not require the continuous presence of an IAEA
inspector or inspectors within the facility. According to para. 80 of [153], forfacilities handling large amounts of plutonium or high enriched uranium (HEU),
the inspection effort foreseen may in practice allow for continuous inspection.
Provisions for continuous inspections under item‑specific safeguards agreements
are given in Annexes I and II to [66].
10.14. Special inspection. An inspection is deemed to be special when it iseither additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in paras 78–82
of [153], or involves access to information or locations in addition to theaccess specified in para. 76 of [153] for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both.
Paragraph 73 of [153] provides that the IAEA may conduct special inspections,subject to the procedures for consultations between the State and the IAEA,
in order to verify the information contained in special reports, or if the IAEA
considers that information made available by the State, including explanations
from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate
for the IAEA to fulfil its responsibilities under the agreement. In case action by
the State is essential and urgent, para. 18 of [153] applies.
According to paras 53 and 54 of [66], the IAEA may carry out special
inspections if the study of a report indicates that such an inspection is desirable
or any unforeseen circumstance requires immediate action. The IAEA may also
carry out special inspections if substantial amounts of safeguarded nuclear
material are to be transferred outside the jurisdiction of the State in which it isbeing safeguarded, for which purpose the State shall give the IAEA sufficientadvance notice of any such proposed transfer.
10310.15. Access for inspection. Paragraph 76 of [153] provides that IAEA
inspectors have access as follows:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

For the purposes of verifying the information contained in the initial reportand identifying and verifying changes in the situation which have occurredsince the date of the initial report, as specified in paras 71(a) and 71(b)of [153], and until such time as the strategic points have been specified
in the subsidiary arrangements, IAEA inspectors shall have access to any
location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection
with it indicate that nuclear material is present.
For the purposes of identifying and verifying the quantity of nuclear
material prior to or following transfer into or out of the State, as specifiedin para. 71(c) of [153], IAEA inspectors shall have access to any locationof which the IAEA has been notified in accordance with para. 92(c) orpara. 95(c) of [153].
For the purposes of verifying the consistency of records and reports; verifying
the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material
subject to IAEA safeguards; and verifying information on the possible
causes of material unaccounted for (MUF), shipper/receiver differences(SRDs) and uncertainties in the book inventory (BI), as specified in para. 72
of [153], IAEA inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points
specified in the subsidiary arrangements and to the records maintained
pursuant to paras 51–58 of [153].
In the event of the State concluding that any unusual circumstances require
extended limitations on access by the IAEA, the State and the IAEA shallpromptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the IAEA to discharge
its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The IAEA
Director General shall report each such arrangement to the IAEA Board ofGovernors.

According to para. 77 of [153], in circumstances which may lead to a
special inspection, the State and the IAEA shall consult forthwith. As a result ofsuch consultations, the IAEA may undertake inspections in addition to the routine
inspection effort provided for under paras 78–82 of [153], and may obtain accessin agreement with the State to information or locations in addition to the accessspecified under para. 76 of [153] for ad hoc inspections and routine inspections.
Under item‑specific safeguards agreements, para. 9 of the Annex to [39]provides that IAEA inspectors shall have access to all materials, equipment andfacilities to which IAEA safeguards are applied.

10410.16. Scope of inspection. Paragraph 74 of [153] provides that for purposesof ad hoc inspections, routine inspections and special inspections performed
under INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreements:“the Agency may:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Examine the records kept…;
Make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject tosafeguards under the Agreement;
Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and othermeasuring and control equipment;
Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; andUse other objective methods which have been demonstrated to betechnically feasible.”

Activities which the IAEA shall be enabled to perform within the scopeof inspection are reflected in para. 75 of [153] and in the relevant subsidiaryarrangements. The scope of a routine inspection under an item‑specificsafeguards agreement is described in para. 49 of [66].
10.17. Frequency of inspection. The number of times per year that a facility
or a material balance area (MBA) outside a facility may be inspected. Under an
INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement, the frequency of routine inspections
at facilities and MBAs outside facilities with a content or annual throughput(whichever is greater) not exceeding 5 effective kilograms (ekg) may not exceed
one inspection per year [153, para. 79]. In all other cases, inspection frequency
is related to the IAEA timeliness detection goals for the nuclear material
considered. According to para. 78 of [153], the number, intensity, duration andtiming of routine inspections shall be kept to the minimum consistent withthe effective implementation of IAEA safeguards. For inspections under an
item‑specific safeguards agreement, see [66], para. 57 and Annexes I and II.
10.18. Advance notice of inspections. A notification provided by the IAEA
to the State or regional authority relative to inspections as provided for under asafeguards agreement. Under an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement, forexample, advance notice for routine inspections is at least 24 hours for facilities
involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5% and one week inall other cases [153, para. 83(c)]. However, according to para. 84 of [153], the
IAEA may carry out without advance notice a portion of the routine inspections
provided for in para. 80 of [153].

105

10.19. Inspection activities. Verification activities performed by IAEA
inspectors during and in connection with inspections at facilities. Under an
INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement (see [153], para. 74), activities
may include nuclear material accounting activities, nuclear material
measurements, verification of instruments and control equipment, theapplication of containment/surveillance measures, and other activities such asenvironmental sampling (ES).
10.20. IAEA inspector. An IAEA official appointed by the IAEA Director
General and approved by the IAEA Board of Governors to perform inspections
and other verification activities in a State pursuant to the State’s safeguards
agreement and protocols thereto, as applicable. After approval by the Board,the inspector is proposed to the respective States in which they are expected toperform official duties. If the State agrees, the IAEA effects the designation. For
States with an additional protocol (AP) in force, the designation procedure isprovided for in Article 11 of [540]. All States are required under their respective
safeguards agreements to grant IAEA inspectors privileges and immunities
necessary for the performance of their functions, as foreseen in [9].
10.21. Calendar‑days in the field for verification (CDFVs). The numberof calendar‑days spent performing inspections, complementary accesses anddesign information verification (DIV) at facilities and information verification at
locations outside facilities (LOFs), and the associated travel and rest periods.
10.22. Person‑day of inspection (PDI). “[A] day during which a single
inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight
hours” [153, para. 109]. This legal definition does not necessarily coincide witha calendar day and is used to calculate the total amount of inspection effort at
facilities compared with the maximum routine inspection effort (MRIE). Where
inspection activities require only a small portion of a calendar day, this still
constitutes 1 PDI.
10.23. Person‑year of inspection. According to para. 109 of [153], aperson‑year of inspection is equivalent to 300 person‑days of inspection (PDIs).
However, the term ‘inspector‑year’ (365 days minus weekend days and minus
some allowance for leave) is used to reflect the average number of days in acalendar year during which an IAEA inspector is available for work.
10.24. Actual routine inspection effort (ARIE). The estimated annual
inspection effort for a facility under an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards
agreement, expressed in person‑days of inspections (PDIs) and included in the106subsidiary arrangements. For estimating ARIE, it is assumed that the facility
operates according to its design data. In accordance with para. 81 of [153], dueconsideration should be given to the following when the ARIE and other elementsof a routine inspection at a facility are being established:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

The form and accessibility of the nuclear material;
The effectiveness of the State (or regional) system of accounting for andcontrol of nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC) and the extent to which theoperator is functionally independent of the SSAC/RSAC;
The characteristics of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle, in particular the number
and types of facilities and the characteristics of such facilities relevant tosafeguards;
The international interdependence of nuclear activities involved and any
relevant IAEA verification activities;
Technical developments in the field of safeguards.

The ARIE is an estimate to be used as a guideline. Operational conditions
and unforeseen situations may require certain deviations from the agreed estimate.
10.25. Planned actual routine inspection effort (PLARIE). The estimatedannual routine inspection effort which, in contrast to the actual routine inspection
effort (ARIE), takes into account the expected operational status of the facility(e.g. extended shutdowns). The PLARIE for a facility in most cases is smaller
than the ARIE. The total PLARIE forecast for all facilities under IAEA safeguards,
corrected by a factor that accounts for the total inspection resources available,
serves as a basis for human resource allocation.
10.26. Maximum routine inspection effort (MRIE). The maximum numberof person‑days of inspection (PDIs) per annum allowable for a facility, as
provided for under para. 80 of [153]. The limit depends on whichever is the largestof the inventory, annual throughput and maximum potential annual production of
nuclear material of the facility. This largest quantity (L) is measured in effective
kilograms (ekg) [153, para. 104]. For all types of nuclear installation with L lessthan 5 ekg, the maximum effort is one routine inspection per annum. For otherfacilities, the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary but
shall be sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventoryof nuclear material. For reactors and sealed stores, the limit is 50 PDI/a. In thecase of facilities containing plutonium and uranium enriched to more than 5%, theequation MRIE = 30 × L PDI / a applies, but the MRIE should not be less than
450 PDI/a. For all other cases, an MRIE equal to (100 + 0.4L) PDI/a is specified.

10710.27. Complementary access. Access provided by the State and carriedout by IAEA inspectors in accordance with the provisions of an additional
protocol (AP). According to Article 4 of [540], the IAEA shall not mechanisticallyor systematically seek to verify the information provided by the State under
Article 2 of its AP. However, the IAEA shall have access to the following:
(a)
(b)

(c)

Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(i) or 5.a.(ii) of [540] on a selective
basis in order to ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear material;
Any location referred to in Article 5.b. or 5.c. to resolve a question relating
to the correctness and completeness of the information provided by theState pursuant to Article 2, or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that
information;
Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(iii) to the extent necessary for the
IAEA to confirm, for IAEA safeguards purposes, the declaration of thedecommissioned status of a facility or location outside facilities (LOF)
where nuclear material was customarily used.

In certain cases where the State is unable to provide the required access, it
should make every reasonable effort to satisfy the IAEA’s requirements, without
delay, through other means and/or at adjacent locations, depending on thecontext [540, Articles 5.b, 5.c and 9].
Under Article 9, the State shall provide the IAEA with access to locations
specified by the IAEA to carry out wide area environmental sampling.
However, the IAEA shall not seek such access until the use of such wide area
enrvironmental sampling and the procedural arrangements therefor have been
approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and following consultations between
the IAEA and the State.
Under Article 8 of [540], the State may offer the IAEA access to or request
the IAEA to perform verification activities at a particular location in addition to
those referred to in Articles 5 and 9.
10.28. Managed access. Upon the request of the State, the IAEA and the State
shall make arrangements for managed access, arranged in such a way as:“to prevent the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, tomeet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect proprietary orcommercially sensitive information. Such arrangements shall not preclude
the Agency from conducting activities necessary to provide credible
assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities atthe location in question, including the resolution of a question relating to the108correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 orof an inconsistency relating to that information” [540, Article 7.a].
The State may, when providing information pursuant to Article 2, “inform the
Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access may be
applicable” [540, Article 7.b].
10.29. Location. In the context of [540], the term ‘location’ usually means
any geographical point or area described in the information supplied by a State or
specified by the IAEA. (‘Location outside facilities (LOF)’ under INFCIRC/153
is equivalent to ‘other location’ under INFCIRC/66.)
10.30. Site. An area delimited by the State in the relevant design information
for a facility, including a closed‑down facility, and in the relevant information ona location outside facilities (LOF) where nuclear material is customarily used,
including a closed‑down LOF where nuclear material was customarily used (thisis limited to locations with hot cells or where activities related to conversion,enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing were carried out). It also includes
all installations collocated with the facility or location for the provision or useof essential services, including hot cells for processing irradiated material notcontaining nuclear material; installations for the treatment, storage and disposalof waste; and buildings associated with specified activities identified by the State
under Article 2.a(iv) of its additional protocol (AP) based on [540].
10.31. Advance notice of complementary access. Notification given by
the IAEA to the State as provided for in Articles 4.b and 4.c of [540] and inconnection with the implementation of complementary access under Article 5of [540]. Advance notice for complementary access is at least 24 hours, except
for access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with design
information verification (DIV) visits or ad hoc inspections or routine inspections
on that site, for which the period of advance notice shall, if the IAEA so requests,
be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, may be less than twohours. Advance notice shall be in writing and specify the reasons for access andthe activities to be carried out during such access.
10.32. Complementary access activities. According to Article 6 of [540], theactivities the IAEA inspectors may perform for complementary access depend on
the type of location. They include the following: visual observation; collectionof environmental samples; utilization of radiation detection and measurement
devices; application of seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices
specified in subsidiary arrangements; examination of records relevant to the109quantities, origin and disposition of the material; examination of safeguards
relevant production and shipping records; collection of environmental samples;and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technicallyfeasible and the use of which has been agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors
and following consultations between the IAEA and the State.

11011. SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION AND EVALUATIONThe IAEA has available to it a broad range of safeguards relevant
information about the nuclear programmes of States, which it uses to perform
safeguards State evaluations. All safeguards relevant information available tothe IAEA about a State at the time of such evaluations is assessed in the context
of the State’s nuclear and nuclear related activities and capabilities, taking
into account the State’s undertaking under its safeguards agreement. Theseevaluations, and the independent review of their findings, are key elements ofplanning safeguards activities in a State and are fundamental to the process ofderiving safeguards conclusions.
11.1. Safeguards relevant information. Information relevant for the
implementation of IAEA safeguards which contributes to the drawing of soundly
based safeguards conclusions. This information is collected, evaluated and usedby the IAEA in exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations under safeguards
agreements. For all States, the IAEA collects and processes three types ofsafeguards relevant information:
(a)
(b)
(c)

Information provided by the State itself (e.g. declarations and reports,
including clarifications and amplifications at the IAEA’s request, andvoluntarily provided information);
Information from safeguards activities conducted by the IAEA in the field
and at IAEA Headquarters (e.g. inspections, design information verification(DIV), material balance evaluations);
Other relevant information (e.g. open source information, third party
information).

The first two types of information make up the great majority of theinformation used for safeguards implementation. All information collected by the
IAEA is subject to rigorous review and is processed through steps that include
validation using well defined processes and relevant technical expertise andconsistency analysis.
11.2. Initial report. Under an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement, anofficial statement by the State on all nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards,
which is to be provided to the IAEA within 30 days of the last day of the calendar
month in which the agreement enters into force [153, para. 62]. From theinitial report, the IAEA establishes a unified inventory of all nuclear material(irrespective of its origin) for the State and maintains this inventory on the basis
111

of subsequent reports and its verification activities. Under an item‑specificsafeguards agreement, the first routine report is considered equivalent to an
initial report.
11.3. Routine report.
Under an item‑specific safeguards agreement, theset of accounting reports and operating reports made by the State to the
IAEA [66, para. 39]. In accordance with para. 40 of [66], the first routine
report is to be submitted as soon as there is any safeguarded nuclear material
to be accounted for, or as soon as the nuclear facility to which it relates is in acondition to operate.
11.4. Accounting report. A report made by the State to the IAEA on the statusof nuclear material subject to safeguards at a material balance area (MBA) andon the changes in that status since the previous report. Accounting reports are
submitted by the State at times specified in the safeguards agreement or in thesubsidiary arrangements. Under an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement,
reporting formats agreed between the State and the IAEA are described in
Code 10 of the subsidiary arrangements. Such agreements provide for three typesof accounting report: inventory change reports (ICRs), material balance reports(MBRs) and physical inventory listings (PILs). Provision for accounting reports
under an item‑specific safeguards agreement is made in para. 39(a) of [66].
11.5. Inventory change report (ICR). An accounting report provided by theState to the IAEA “showing changes in the inventory of nuclear material. The
reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days
after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were
established” [153, para. 63(a)]. In accordance with para. 64 of [153]:“inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data foreach batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory change and, as
appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving
material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompaniedby concise notes”.
11.6. Concise notes. According to para. 64 of [153], information supplied by
the State to the IAEA and accompanying inventory change reports (ICRs) for the
purposes of explaining changes in the inventory (on the basis of the operating datacontained in the operating records) and describing the anticipated operational
programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.

112

11.7. Material balance report (MBR). According to para. 63(b) of [153], an
accounting report provided by the State to the IAEA:“showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear
material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shallbe dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days after thephysical inventory has been taken”.
According to para. 67 of [153]:“the material balance reports shall include the following entries, unlessotherwise agreed by the Agency and the State:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

Beginning physical inventory;
Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases);Ending book inventory;
Shipper/receiver differences;
Adjusted ending book inventory;Ending physical inventory; andMaterial unaccounted for.”An MBR must be submitted even where there was no nuclear material in
the material balance area (MBA) at the time of the physical inventory taking
and where no inventory changes occurred during the relevant material balance
period (MBP), as long as the MBA continues to be subject to IAEA safeguards.
11.8. Physical inventory listing (PIL). A report provided by the State to the
IAEA in connection with a physical inventory taking by the operator “listing allbatches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for eachbatch” [153, para. 67]. Such listings are to be attached to each material balance
report (MBR) even where there was no nuclear material in the material balancearea (MBA) at the time of the ending of the physical inventory taking.
11.9. Operating report. A report by the State to the IAEA on the operation of a
facility in connection with the use and handling of nuclear material. Operating
reports are submitted for facilities safeguarded under item‑specific safeguards
agreements; the requirement is provided in para. 39(b) of [66].
11.10. Special report. In accordance with para. 68 of [153], a report by theState to the IAEA on the loss of nuclear material exceeding specified limits orin the event that containment/surveillance measures have been unexpectedly
113changed from those specified in the subsidiary arrangements. Item‑specificsafeguards agreements also require special reports to be submitted in the eventthat a transfer of nuclear material results in a significant change in the inventoryof a facility; the requirement is reflected in paras 42 and 43 of [66].
11.11. Mailbox declaration. The near real time submittal, into a secure
electronic mailbox, of information on operational activities of safeguards
relevance, as agreed in advance with the IAEA. Mailbox declarations are notused for submitting State reports to the IAEA, but are used for collecting andtransmitting operator data, typically to facilitate inspections on short notice(e.g. through the use of short notice random inspections (SNRIs)).
The contents of the information submitted in mailbox declarations areagreed between the IAEA and the State or regional authority responsible forsafeguards implementation (SRA) in coordination with the facility operator on acase by case basis. For example, a fuel fabrication facility operator might submit
mailbox declarations with information on receipts, material in process, productand shipments of nuclear material on a daily basis. Provision of a mailbox
declaration may also be provided in connection with declarations submitted
pursuant to Article 2.a.(ii) of [540], although an additional protocol (AP) is not
required for mailbox declarations to be provided to the IAEA.
11.12. Notification of transfers.
(a)

(b)

(c)

114

Under an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement, para. 92 of [153]provides that any intended transfer out of the State of safeguarded nuclear
material in an amount exceeding 1 effective kilogram (ekg), or by successive
shipments to the same State within a period of three months each of lessthan 1 ekg but exceeding in total 1 ekg, shall be notified to the IAEA after
the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the transfer andnormally at least two weeks before the nuclear material is to be prepared forshipping. For transfers into the State, similar provisions for notification are
included in paras 95 and 96 of [153].
The five nuclear‑weapon States (as defined in Article IX.3 of the Treaty on the
Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [140]) have committed under
INFCIRC/207 to provide the IAEA with advance notifications of transfers of
nuclear material to non‑nuclear‑weapon States, as indicated in para. 1 of [207].
Under para. 43 of [66], the State shall report to the IAEA, as soon as
possible, and in any case within two weeks, any transfer not requiring
advance notification that will result in a significant change in the quantityof safeguarded nuclear material in a facility or in a complex of facilities
considered as a unit for this purpose by agreement with the IAEA.

11.13. Confirmation of transfers. Under an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards
agreement, a requirement for the exporting State to make arrangements, if thenuclear material will not be subject to IAEA safeguards in the recipient State,
for the IAEA to receive confirmation by the recipient State of the transfer[153, para. 94]. Further, the five nuclear‑weapon States (as defined in Article
IX.3 of the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [140])
that have a voluntary offer agreement (VOA) with the IAEA have undertaken toprovide the IAEA with such confirmations of transfers from non‑nuclear‑weapon
States, as indicated in para. 2 of [207].
11.14. Voluntary reports on nuclear material, specified equipment andnon‑nuclear material. Information provided to the IAEA by States participatingin the voluntary reporting scheme (VRS).
11.15. Declaration pursuant to an additional protocol. Information submitted
to the IAEA by a State about its nuclear programme and related activities as
required by Article 2 of [540]. Examples of such information are the researchand development activities related to the State’s nuclear fuel cycle, descriptionsof buildings on sites, nuclear related manufacturing activities, and exports ofspecified equipment and non‑nuclear material.
Additional protocol (AP) declarations include information about the State’s
nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle which supplements the information
submitted under the comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA). The initial
AP declaration, quarterly AP declarations and annual AP update declarations,
together with other declarations pursuant to Article 3 of an AP, help to improve the
IAEA’s understanding of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and activities.
11.16. Initial AP declaration. Information provided to the IAEA by the State
within 180 days of the entry into force of its additional protocol (AP), consistingof the information identified in Article 2.a.(i), 2.a.(iii)–2.a.(v), 2.a.(vi)(a), 2.a.(vii)and 2.a.(x) and Article 2.b.(i) (see Article 3.a of [540]). If a State has nothing to
declare under a particular article, it should indicate this by stating ‘nothing to
declare’ for that line of the declaration.
11.17. Annual AP update declaration. Annual updates to the informationreferred to in the initial AP declarations, imports and exports related to
Article 2.a.(vi)(a), and changes in location related to Article 2.a(viii) by 15 May
for the period of the previous calendar year (see Articles 3.b, 3.c and 3.e of [540]).
If a State has nothing or no new information to declare under a particular article,
it should indicate this by stating respectively ‘nothing to declare’ or ‘no change’
for that line of the declaration.
11511.18. Quarterly AP declaration. Information provided, on a quarterly basis,by a State under Article 2.a.(ix)(a) of its additional protocol (AP) (see Article 3.dof [540]). This information shall be provided within 60 days of the end of eachquarter. If a State has nothing to declare under a particular article, it should
indicate this by stating ‘nothing to declare’ for that line of the declaration.
11.19. State Declarations Portal (SDP). A web based system supporting
secure bidirectional information exchange between States and the IAEA.
Information shared through the SDP includes but is not limited toacknowledgement letters, additional protocol (AP) declarations, design
information questionnaires (DIQs), nuclear material accounting reports, andother types of State declaration and official communication.
11.20. Protocol Reporter. A software tool which facilitates the preparationof declarations by States pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol Additional
to Safeguards Agreements (additional protocol (AP)). The system assists in thecreation of declarations to the IAEA in electronic form.
11.21. Open source information. Information available to the public fromsources external to the IAEA. Examples of open sources relevant to safeguards
include, inter alia, the following:
(a)
(b)

(c)

(d)
(e)

116

Government: for example, publicly available information from government
entities that is relevant to nuclear policies, activities and plans for its nuclear
programme and the management of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
Nuclear operators and manufacturers: for example, publicly available
information from entities involved in activities such as the operationof nuclear facilities, development of nuclear fuel cycle technologies andmanufacture of nuclear fuel cycle related equipment and material.
Scientific and technical literature: for example, safeguards relevant
information contained in academic and scientific publications, patents,
presentations and conference proceedings which provides insight into
nuclear fuel cycle technology and related research and development
activities.
Trade: for example, statistical and transactional records of imports andexports of nuclear material and nuclear fuel cycle related material andequipment.
Satellite imagery: for example, images collected by satellites (remotesensing data from space‑borne platforms) that are either freely available orprocured from commercial vendors.

(f)Media: for example, safeguards relevant information published by news
organizations or distributed by news monitoring services that is available invarious forms, including electronic and print.

11.22. Third party information. Information made available to the IAEA
by a State or other party (e.g. organizations, individuals), on a voluntary basis,
relating to another State. Such information may include nuclear procurement
related information collected by States (e.g. export denials) and informationcollected through national means.
11.23. Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB). An international databasemaintained by the IAEA in cooperation with participating States. The ITDB
contains authoritative information on incidents of illicit trafficking and otherunauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive
material outside of regulatory control that are reported by participating
States voluntarily.
11.24. Safeguards implementation issue. An issue identified by the IAEA in
the course of safeguards implementation which requires clarification or follow‑up
action. Each safeguards implementation issue is assessed to determine whether it
is a possible anomaly on the basis of the impact of the issue on the IAEA’s ability
to draw a safeguards conclusion for the State.
11.25. Discrepancy. An inconsistency found in the facility operator’srecords, or between facility records and State reports, or between these records
and inspector observations or indications resulting from containment andsurveillance. Discrepancies that cannot be resolved (i.e. ascribed to innocent
causes or otherwise satisfactorily explained) may lead to the determination thatdeclared nuclear material is unaccountably missing. A discrepancy involving
a significant inventory difference arising from material balance evaluation isclassified as a possible anomaly.
11.26. Anomaly. An unusual observable condition which might result fromdiversion of nuclear material or misuse of safeguarded items, or anothersafeguards implementation issue which frustrates or restricts the ability of
the IAEA to draw a safeguards conclusion for a State pursuant to its relevant117safeguards agreement. Examples of possible anomalies include but are notlimited to the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)

Denial or restriction of IAEA access to information or locations to which the
IAEA has a right of access under the safeguards agreement or the additional
protocol (AP), where applicable;
Unreported safeguards significant changes to facility design or operating
conditions;
A significant inventory difference arising from material balance evaluation;
A significant departure from the agreed recording and reporting system;
Failure of the facility operator to comply with agreed measurement standards
or sampling methods;
Evidence of tampering with the Agency’s safeguards equipment, including
containment/surveillance measures;
A question or inconsistency which has not been resolved through follow‑up
action in the process of State evaluation;
Inability to attain an applicable safeguards objective in a State, regardlessof the reason.

11.27. IAEA confidentiality regime.
The regime for the protection
against unauthorized disclosure of all confidential information that the IAEA
acquires, including such information coming to the IAEA’s knowledge in theimplementation of safeguards agreements and of additional protocols (APs). The
regime reflects the requirements for the protection of confidential information asprovided under Article 15 of [540].
11.28. State evaluation. The ongoing evaluation of all safeguards relevant
information available to the IAEA about a State aimed at assessing the consistencyof that information in the context of a State’s safeguards obligations. Stateevaluation is conducted for the purposes of planning, conducting and evaluating
safeguards activities and drawing soundly based safeguards conclusions.
11.29. State Evaluation Group (SEG). A group within the IAEA’s Departmentof Safeguards which evaluates all safeguards relevant information available tothe IAEA about a State and documents the results in a safeguards State evaluation
report, including recommendations for IAEA Secretariat findings and safeguards
conclusions. The SEG also performs acquisition path analysis, develops aState‑level safeguards approach (SLA) and prepares an annual implementation
plan (AIP) for individual States.

118

11.30. Safeguards effectiveness evaluation. A process of evaluating theextent to which the IAEA’s implementation of safeguards is able to achieve
the relevant safeguards objectives. For a State with a State‑level safeguards
approach (SLA), the effectiveness evaluation considers whether the activities in
the annual implementation plan (AIP) meet the objectives of the SLA, whether
the planned activities were actually conducted and whether or not the activities
were conducted in such a way as to achieve the technical objectives to thelevel planned. In the absence of an SLA, the factors considered in safeguards
effectiveness evaluation include the quantitative findings from implementation of
nuclear material verification activities, as prescribed by the Safeguards Criteria,
as well as qualitative safeguards relevant information available about the State’s
nuclear and nuclear related activities, including facility design information and
IAEA knowledge of facility operations.
11.31. Safeguards State evaluation report. An internal report documenting
periodically the findings of the IAEA’s safeguards evaluations performed
for a State. The findings, to be documented in a State evaluation report, areindependently reviewed by IAEA intradepartmental review committees.
11.32. Safeguards conclusions. Conclusions drawn by the IAEA on the basisof findings from its verification and State evaluation activities. Safeguards
conclusions are drawn for each State with a safeguards agreement in force and arereviewed annually. These conclusions are reported for States in the Safeguards
Implementation Report (SIR).

119

12. REPORTING ON SAFEGUARDS
IMPLEMENTATIONThe IAEA uses various mechanisms for reporting to the IAEA Policy‑Making
Organs, States and relevant regional authorities on the implementation ofsafeguards and other verification activities.
12.1. Reporting on design information verification. Under an
INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement, the IAEA sends a formal letter (alsoreferred to as a design information verification (DIV) acknowledgement letter)to the State whenever the IAEA has performed DIV in that State. The letter may
include, if relevant, a request for any amplification, clarification or correction of
the information submitted by the State.
Under an item‑specific safeguards agreement, para. 32 of [66] stipulates
that the IAEA should complete its design review promptly and shall notify theState of its safeguards conclusions without delay.
12.2. Statement on Inspection Results (90(a) Statement). Paragraph 90(a)of [153] provides that the IAEA is obliged to report formally to the State atintervals specified in the subsidiary arrangements (usually within 60 days after
each inspection) on the activities carried out at each facility and their results,
including any discrepancies found and whether they have been resolved. This
Statement on Inspection Results, which is referred to as a 90(a) Statement, isprovided to a State that has an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement inforce; it is of a preliminary nature because evaluation activities may not havebeen completed.
12.3. Statement on Conclusions (90(b) Statement). Paragraphs 30 and 90(b)of [153] state that the IAEA is obliged to report formally to the State on thetechnical conclusions drawn from its nuclear material verification activities foreach material balance area (MBA) over a material balance period (MBP). This
Statement on Conclusions, which is referred to as a 90(b) Statement, indicates,inter alia, the amount of material unaccounted for (MUF) over a specific period,as verified by the IAEA. The statement is made as soon as possible (a) after aphysical inventory taking by the facility operator and verified by the IAEA and(b) after a material balance has been closed. The time limit of the reporting is
specified in the subsidiary arrangements (usually within 60 days after the endof the month in which the IAEA has verified the physical inventory). This
statement is provided to a State that has an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards
agreement in force.
12012.4. Book inventory statement. Under para. 66 of [153], the IAEA is obliged
to provide the State with a semi‑annual statement of the book inventory (BI) of
nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards for each material balance area(MBA). The BI for the period covered by each such statement is based on thelast physical inventory listing (PIL) and the subsequent inventory changereports (ICRs). Book inventory statements do not imply verification by the
IAEA of the data contained therein and are meant, inter alia, to be used by theState (or regional) system of accounting for and control of nuclear material(SSAC/RSAC) to check for any differences with the accounting data maintainedby the SSAC/RSAC.
Similar statements are also provided under an item‑specific safeguards
agreement, if required by the specific agreement (as in the case of the annual
official inventory (OFIN) statement), and to States with a voluntary offer
agreement (VOA) in force.
12.5. Quarterly import communication. A communication prepared anddispatched by the IAEA to a State that has an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards
agreement or a voluntary offer agreement (VOA) in force, indicating any
unmatched foreign shipments and receipts of nuclear material. Issued on aquarterly basis, each ‘import communication’ to a State contains a list of those
shipments to the State (as reported by other States) or those receipts in the State(as reported by the State itself) for which no match has been established. Importcommunications are meant to facilitate the interaction between the IAEA and theState so as to promptly resolve any unmatched foreign transfers. The IAEA has
also established a ‘de minimus quantity’, set at approximately 0.002 significant
quantities (SQs) for each material type, below which any unmatched nuclear
material amounts are not included in the import communication.
12.6. Statement on domestic and international transfers (semi‑annual transit
matching statement). A statement made semi‑annually by the IAEA to a State
that has an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement (referred to in Code 4.1.1of the subsidiary arrangements (General Part)) or a voluntary offer agreement(VOA) in force. This statement covers, inter alia, the following:(a)(b)

Domestic and foreign shipments reported by the State which the IAEA has
been unable to match with information on receipts reported by the State (fordomestic transfers) or by other States (for exports from the State);
Domestic receipts reported by the State and foreign receipts (imports)
reported by other States which the IAEA has been unable to match withshipments reported by the State.

121

The IAEA has also established a ‘de minimus quantity’, set at approximately
0.002 significant quantities (SQs) for each material type, below which any
unmatched nuclear material amounts are not included in this statement.
12.7. Statement of timeliness in reporting. A statement, also known as the‘statement on operation of report system’, provided by the IAEA semi‑annually
to each State that has an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement (seeCode 4.1.2 of the subsidiary arrangements (General Part)) or a voluntary offer
agreement (VOA) in force, which includes information on any reporting delays.
The statement is provided separately for each of the nuclear material accounting
reports (i.e. inventory change report (ICR), material balance report (MBR) andphysical inventory listing (PIL)).
12.8. Reporting on inspections under an item‑specific safeguards agreement.
Information, in the form of a letter, provided to a State by the IAEA after eachinspection carried out under an item‑specific safeguards agreement. The letter,
which is referred to as an ‘INFCIRC/66 verification statement’, informs the Stateof the results of the inspection, as foreseen in para. 12 of the Annex to [39], andof any design review activities, if performed.
12.9. Statements under an AP. Under Article 10 of [540], for a State withan additional protocol (AP) in force, the IAEA is obligated to inform the Stateof the following:
(a)

(b)

(c)

The activities carried out under the AP, including those in respect of any
questions or inconsistencies the IAEA had brought to the attention of theState, within 60 days of the activities being carried out [540, Article 10.a].
This statement is referred to as a ‘10.a Statement’.
The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the
IAEA had brought to the attention of the State, as soon as possible but
in any case within 30 days of the results being established by the IAEA
[540, Article 10.b]. This statement is referred to as a ‘10.b Statement’.
The conclusions the IAEA has drawn from its activities under the AP,
provided annually [540, Article 10.c]. This statement, which is referred toas a ‘10.c Statement’, is prepared to support the timely completion of the
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR).

12.10. Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR). The report presented
annually by the IAEA Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors on
implementation of IAEA safeguards during the preceding calendar year. The
report includes, inter alia, the Safeguards Statement for the year concerned,122

in which the safeguards findings and safeguards conclusions are reported. It
also contains detailed information on the application of IAEA safeguards andsafeguards related developments for the year concerned.
12.11. IAEA Annual Report. The report of the IAEA Board of Governors
to the General Conference of the IAEA. The report, which is available to the
public, concerns the IAEA’s activities during the preceding year, as required by
the Statute of the IAEA, and includes a chapter on nuclear verification.
12.12. Director General’s report on Strengthening the Effectiveness andImproving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards. The report by the IAEA
Director General to the IAEA General Conference describing the measurestaken to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA
safeguards system. Since 1992, the IAEA Director General has produced thisreport annually in response to requests contained in the relevant IAEA General
Conference resolutions.

12313. STATE AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES,RESPONSIBILITIES, SUPPORT AND SERVICESStates and relevant regional entities (such as the Brazilian–Argentine
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or theEuropean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)) have responsibilities under
their respective safeguards agreements and additional protocols (APs) which
require organizational support at both the national and the international level.
The IAEA assists States in identifying relevant knowledge, skills and tasks, andin strengthening the institutions which have responsibilities related to safeguards
implementation. Furthermore, the IAEA works with States to provide support
through various mechanisms and services.
13.1. State (or regional) system of accounting for and control of nuclear
material (SSAC/RSAC). A national or regional system established under [153]under which the State or regional authority responsible for safeguards
implementation (SRA) accounts for and controls nuclear material.
Detailed specifications relating to an SSAC/RSAC are contained inparas 31 and 32 of [153] and Code 2.1 of subsidiary arrangements (General
Part), including that the SSAC/RSAC should be based on a structure of materialbalance areas (MBAs), which provides for the establishment of measures suchas the following:
(a)

(b)

(c)

124

For measurement: a measurement system for determination of quantities ofnuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost, otherwise removed frominventory or on inventory; guidance for the evaluation of the precision andaccuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty;
procedures for taking a physical inventory; and procedures for the evaluationof accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses.
For accountancy: procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating
differences in shipper/receiver measurements; a system of records andreports showing, for each material balance area (MBA), the inventory of
nuclear material and the changes in that inventory, including receipts into
and transfers out of the MBA; procedures for the submission of reports to the
IAEA in accordance with paras 59–65 and 67–69 of [153]; and provisions
to ensure correct operation of the accounting procedures and arrangements.
For control: existing legislation (e.g. laws, regulations, generaladministrative procedures) giving requirements for measurement andaccountancy requirements at the facility or location outside facilities (LOF)
level and assurances that such requirements are carried out correctly byoperators; requirements for records and reports, licensing or authorizationof relevant activities and national inspections; and audits and independentmeasurements at facilities/LOFs to ensure compliance.
The basic obligation to establish and maintain an SSAC under para. 7 of [153]applies for all States with an INFCIRC/153‑type safeguards agreement [153] inforce. Provisions for an SSAC are not included in [66] but may be included inagreements based on [66] and/or related subsidiary arrangements if agreed by
the parties. SSAC/RSAC refers to the entire system of accounting for and control
of nuclear material administered by the State or regional authority responsible
for safeguards implementation (SRA).
13.2. State or regional authority responsible for safeguards implementation(SRA). The term ‘SRA’ was introduced by the IAEA in 2012 to denote theauthority established at the national (or regional) level to ensure and facilitate
the implementation of IAEA safeguards in a State or States of a region. One ofthe primary responsibilities of an SRA is to establish and maintain a State (orregional) system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC).
Such responsibility may also extend to the implementation of the State’s
obligations under an additional protocol (AP) [540].
The responsibilities of the SRA related to the implementation of IAEA
safeguards may include nuclear material accountancy and the reporting ofimports and exports of nuclear material as well as facilitating IAEA inspections.
Where the SRA is responsible for activities associated with the implementationof an AP [540], such responsibilities may include, for example, coordinating thecollection of information required to be reported to the IAEA in AP declarations,
responding to IAEA requests for clarification and facilitating complementaryaccess by the IAEA at relevant locations.
If established within a broader nuclear authority, the SRA may haveadditional responsibilities associated with nuclear safety, security, radiation
protection and export/import controls separate from and in addition to its
safeguards functions.
13.3. Safeguards infrastructure. A State’s safeguards infrastructure is built
on the foundation of a State and/or regional legislative and regulatory system,
providing for oversight and management of nuclear material and activities. The
safeguards infrastructure should allow for effective cooperation with the IAEA
and address three fundamental areas:(1)

Establishment of laws, regulations and a system of accounting for andcontrol of nuclear material at the national and/or regional level which
125

(2)
(3)

ensure that the requirements of the safeguards agreement and associatedprotocols and subsidiary arrangements are fully met;
Provision of timely, correct and complete reports and declarations to the
IAEA;
Provision to the IAEA of support and timely access to locations andinformation necessary to achieve safeguards objectives.

13.4. Safeguards regulatory infrastructure. Laws and regulations which
establish requirements regarding nuclear material possession, handling, use,
import and export. The State’s safeguards regulatory infrastructure addresses thefollowing elements:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Laws and safeguards specific regulations to control and oversee the use of
nuclear material and nuclear related activities in the State, consistent with
the State’s obligations under its safeguards agreement;
The assignment of responsibilities for safeguards activities, and the grantingof legal authority to perform them, to an independent State or regional
authority responsible for safeguards implementation (SRA);
The design and implementation of an effective State (or regional) system ofaccounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC);
The creation of an effective communication mechanism, including a pointof contact, between the IAEA and the State;
The implementation of procedures and practices necessary to facilitate
information gathering, timely reporting and in‑field verification.

13.5. IAEA Safeguards and SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS). An IAEA
peer review service established in 2004 to support the effective and efficient
implementation of IAEA safeguards by identifying opportunities for enhancing
State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs) andincreasing cooperation between State or regional authorities responsible forsafeguards implementation (SRAs) and the IAEA. The service involves an IAEA
advisory service mission to the State to visit relevant institutions and meetwith relevant technical, legal and policy personnel, providing a mechanism for
identifying and disseminating good practices and lessons learned. Such a mission
is carried out at the request of the State. The scope of an ISSAS mission isdetermined in consultation with the State and carried out by an IAEA led teamof experts. The product of the mission includes a report drafted by the IAEA
experts which addresses all the objectives of the mission, documents the team’s
findings and recommendations, and includes an action plan for follow‑up by theState and the IAEA.
The objectives of an ISSAS mission are as follows:
126

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

To evaluate the adequacy of the legal and regulatory framework and theadministrative and technical systems of the SSAC at the State and facility/
location outside facility (LOF) levels;
To evaluate the performance of those systems in meeting the State’s
safeguards obligations pursuant to its safeguards agreements and protocols
in force with the IAEA;
To identify areas where further cooperation with the IAEA could increase
the effectiveness or efficiency of safeguards implementation;
To make recommendations and suggestions on how any gaps or weaknesses
identified could be addressed to enhance the capabilities of the SSAC, while
recognizing good practices identified in the course of the mission.
Guidance on ISSAS missions is provided in [IAEA‑SVS‑13].

13.6. Member State Support Programme (MSSP). A voluntary, structured
collaboration between the IAEA and a Member State through which the former
requests and obtains financial and/or in‑kind extrabudgetary support to help
make its nuclear verification activities more effective and efficient. Examples of
support include, inter alia, in‑kind contributions to host training courses for IAEA
inspectors, equipment design and development to support verification activities,
expert support to provide guidance related to the nuclear fuel cycle, and support
for events such as the safeguards symposium.
13.7. Support Programme Information and Communication System(SPRICS). The administrative IT platform supporting the IAEA’s Member
State Support Programme (MSSP). SPRICS stores safeguards requests for
extrabudgetary support, MSSP decisions and administrative details of theextrabudgetary support.
13.8. Research and Development Plan. A publication, first issued in 2012
and updated periodically thereafter, describing the research and development(R&D) and other support needed by the IAEA to achieve its priority safeguards
objectives. The R&D Plan provided a roadmap for external partners, primarily
Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs), to undertake R&D to address the
IAEA’s safeguards needs. In recognition of requirements that extend beyond
R&D, the R&D Plan was replaced by the publication Enhancing Capabilities for
Nuclear Verification: Resource Mobilization Priorities (RMP) in 2022.
13.9. Enhancing Capabilities for Nuclear Verification: Resource
Mobilization Priorities (RMP). A publication identifying and communicating
the set of capabilities to be developed or enhanced which are of the highest
127

priority to the IAEA and are especially reliant on external support. The RMP
replaces the Research and Development Plan and is intended to help stakeholders
understand the context for the capabilities that are needed and their relation tostrengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency and resilience of
IAEA safeguards. The RMP guides the IAEA’s safeguards collaborations withtraditional and non‑traditional partners and mobilizes resources for activities notfunded through the IAEA’s Regular Budget. External support includes researchand development, financial resources and expertise.
13.10. Development and Implementation Support (D&IS) Programme for
Nuclear Verification. A biennial publication for IAEA safeguards staff andexternal partners (e.g. Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs)) coveringdevelopment and implementation plans that require extrabudgetary or othersupport from external and other partners to improve nuclear verification.
13.11. Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR). A holistic IAEA
peer review to evaluate the status of infrastructure development in a country
introducing nuclear power or expanding its nuclear power programme on thebasis of the IAEA’s ‘Milestones Approach’ (described in the IAEA publication
Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power)6.
Covering 19 infrastructure issues, including safeguards, the approach is intended
to assist countries in identifying areas requiring further development to reach thecorresponding Milestone.
13.12. Nuclear Power Support Group and Integrated Work Plan. The
IAEA uses mechanisms agreed by the Nuclear Power Support Group (NPSG)
to coordinate support to Member States considering or embarking on nuclear
power programmes that have conducted a self‑assessment of the status of theirnational infrastructure based on the IAEA methodology.7 The IAEA establishesa ‘core team’ for each Member State, with representatives of all relevant
IAEA organizational units. The team reviews the status of the Member State’s
infrastructure development on the basis of its most recent interactions withcounterparts and coordinates planning for IAEA support.

6

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Milestones in the Developmentof a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG‑G‑3.1(Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (2015).
7
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Evaluation of the Status of
National Nuclear Infrastructure Development, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG‑T‑3.2(Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (2016).

128

The core team typically meets formally with the relevant Member
State counterparts to review and update the integrated work plan (IWP) andcountry nuclear infrastructure profile (CNIP). The counterparts usually include
senior representatives of the government, the nuclear regulatory body and theprospective nuclear power plant owner/operator.
13.13. Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI).
Established in 1975, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
regularly provides the Director General of the IAEA with expert advice andrecommendations on technical topics related to IAEA safeguards. SAGSI is
composed of up to 20 members who are recognized experts in the area of
safeguards. Members are appointed by the Director General and serve in theirpersonal capacity.
13.14. Safeguards by design. The integration of safeguards considerations
into the design process of a new or modified nuclear facility or location outsidefacilities (LOF) at any point in the life cycle — from initial planning throughdesign, construction, operation, waste management and decommissioning.
The goal of safeguards by design is the improvement of safeguards
implementation by addressing potential efficiency and effectiveness issues
early in the design process. Safeguards by design is a voluntary process thatneither replaces a State’s obligations for early provision of design information
under its safeguards agreement nor introduces new safeguards requirements.
See [NP‑T‑2.8], [NP‑T‑2.9], [NF‑T‑4.8], [NF‑T‑4.10], [NF‑T‑4.7], [NF‑T‑3.2]
and [NF‑T‑3.1].
13.15. Safeguards Traineeship Programme. A ten month programme at the
IAEA open to candidates from States with a limited nuclear fuel cycle or noneat all. The objective of the programme is to increase the number of qualified
candidates from developing countries for the position of safeguards inspector in
the IAEA or in their national nuclear organization. The Safeguards Traineeship
Programme is designed to enhance the technical skills and competence of the
trainees relating to the implementation of IAEA safeguards and to broaden
their knowledge of the peaceful applications of nuclear techniques and theimplementation thereof in their respective States.
13.16. Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials (ABACC). An intergovernmental organization with its own legal
personality created in 1991 by virtue of the Agreement between the Republic ofArgentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful
Use of Nuclear Energy. The functions of ABACC are to administer and apply
129the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC),
whose aim is to verify that all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities of theStates Party are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. This Agreement was signed and entered into force in 1991; it isreproduced in [395]. ABACC also performs functions under [435], which enteredinto force on 4 March 1994 and provides for, inter alia, the cooperation between
ABACC and the IAEA.
13.17. European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Euratom wasestablished in 1957 by the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom Treaty) to further European integration and tackle energy
shortages through the peaceful use of nuclear power. It has the same members as
the European Union (EU) and is governed by the European Commission (EC) andthe European Council, operating under the jurisdiction of the European Court ofJustice. Euratom’s work includes safeguarding nuclear material and technology
in the EU; facilitating nuclear related investment and research and development;
and ensuring equal access to nuclear supplies as well as the correct disposal of
nuclear waste and the safety of operations.
The application of IAEA safeguards in States party to the Euratom
Treaty is governed by regulations adopted by institutions of the EU. The roleof Euratom in maintaining the regional system of accounting for and control of
nuclear material (RSAC) under relevant safeguards agreements with the IAEA
is performed by the EC through its constituent institutions. The EC, acting in
the capacity of Euratom, is responsible for accountancy and control of nuclear
material subject to safeguards under safeguards agreements between Euratom,
relevant Euratom States and the IAEA.
Under Annex III of the additional protocol (AP) to [193], States party
to the AP to [193] may entrust to the EC implementation of certain provisions
which under the AP are the responsibility of the States. Such States are known as‘side‑letter States’.
13.18. New partnership approach (NPA). An approach to implementing
safeguards in the non‑nuclear‑weapons State members of the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom) under [193], agreed between the IAEA and
Euratom in 1992 and later adapted to the introduction of integrated safeguards.
The approach provided for use of common safeguards equipment and safeguards
approaches, joint scheduling of inspections and special arrangements forinspection work and data sharing by the two organizations. The purpose of
the NPA was to enable the IAEA to economize on safeguards equipment andinspection efforts deployed in the relevant States while maintaining its ability toperform independent verification.
13013.19. Side‑letter States. States party to the additional protocol (AP) to [193]which have decided to entrust to the European Commission (EC) implementationof certain provisions which under the AP are the responsibility of the States.
The EC acts on behalf of those States for purposes of the implementation of
the AP to [193].
13.20. Safeguards guidance in the IAEA Services Series. Guidance issued in
the IAEA Services Series which has no legal status but which seeks to enhance
understanding of safeguards concepts, methods and practices by providing
explanations and examples, and share implementation experiences and lessons
learned. The latest safeguards guidance can be found on the IAEA web site.

131

TRANSLATION OF TERMS
1.

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTSRELATEDTO IAEA SAFEGUARDS‫الصكوك القانونية وسائر الوثائق المتعلقة بضمانات الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية‬与国际原子能机构保障有关的法律文书和其他文件
INSTRUMENTS JURIDIQUES ET AUTRES DOCUMENTS
CONCERNANT LES GARANTIES DE L’AIEA
МЕЖДУНАРОДНО-ПРАВОВЫЕ И ДРУГИЕ ДОКУМЕНТЫ,ОТНОСЯЩИЕСЯ К ГАРАНТИЯМ МАГАТЭ
INSTRUMENTOS JURÍDICOS Y OTROS DOCUMENTOSRELACIONADOS CON LAS SALVAGUARDIAS DEL OIEAGESETZLICHE GRUNDLAGE FÜR DIE IAEOSICHERUNGSMAßNAHMEN UND ANDERE SACHBEZOGENE
DOKUMENTE

IAEA保障措置に関連する法的文書及びその他の文書
1.1.

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency‫النظام األساسي للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية‬国际原子能机构《规约》
Statut de l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomiqueУстав Международного агентства по атомной энергии
Estatuto del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica
Satzung der Internationalen Atomenergie-Organisation

国際原子力機関憲章
1.2.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (orNon-Proliferation Treaty) (NPT))‫معاهدة عدم انتشار األسلحة النووية (معاهدة عدم االنتشار‬不扩散核武器条约
Traité sur la non‑prolifération des armes nucléaires (ou Traité sur lanon‑prolifération, TNP)
Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия (или Договор онераспространении) (ДНЯО)Tratado sobre la No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares (oTratado sobre la No Proliferación) (TNP)
Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen (NVV)133

核兵器の不拡散に関する条約（核兵器不拡散条約、NPT）
1.3.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America andthe Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty)‫معاهدة حظر األسلحة النووية في أمريكا الالتينية ومنطقة البحر الكاريبي (معاهدة‬)‫تالتيلولكو‬拉丁美洲和加勒比地区禁止核武器条约（特拉特洛尔科条约）
Traité visant l’interdiction des armes nucléaires en Amérique latine et dansles Caraïbes (Traité de Tlatelolco)Договор о запрещении ядерного оружия в Латинской Америке иКарибском бассейне (Договор Тлателолко)Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América
Latina y el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco)
Vertrag von Tlatelolco über das Verbot von Kernwaffen in Lateinamerika
und der Karibik (Vertrag von Tlatelolco)

ラテンアメリカ及びカリブ諸国核兵器禁止条約（トラテロル
コ条約）
1.4.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)‫معاهدة إنشاء منطقة خالية من األسلحة النووية في جنوب المحيط الهادئ (معاهدة‬)‫راروتونغا‬南太平洋无核区条约（拉罗汤加条约）
Traité sur la zone dénucléarisée du Pacifique Sud (Traité de Rarotonga)Договор о безъядерной зоне в южной части Тихого океана (Договор
Раротонга)Tratado sobre la Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares del Pacífico Sur (Tratadode Rarotonga)
Vertrag von Rarotonga über die kernwaffenfreie Zone im Süd-Pazifik(Vertrag von Rarotonga)

南太平洋非核兵器地帯条約（ラロトンガ条約）
1.5.

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok
Treaty))‫معاهدة إنشاء منطق ة خالية من األسلحة النووية في جنوب شرق آسيا (معاهدة بانكوك‬东南亚无核武器区条约（曼谷条约）Traité sur la zone exempte d’armes nucléaires de l’Asie du Sud‑Est (Traitéde Bangkok)Договор о зоне, свободной от ядерного оружия, в Юго-Восточной

134

Азии (Бангкокский договор)Tratado sobre el Establecimiento de una Zona Libre de Armas
Nucleares en Asia Sudoriental (Tratado de Bangkok)
Vertrag von Bangkok über die kernwaffenfreie Zone in Südost-Asien(Vertrag von Bangkok)

東南アジア非核兵器地帯条約（バンコク条約）
1.6.

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty))‫معاهدة إنشاء منطقة خالية من األسلحة النووية في أفريقيا (معاهدة بليندابا‬非洲无核武器区条约（佩林达巴条约）
Traité sur une zone exempte d’armes nucléaires en Afrique (Traité dePelindaba)Договор о зоне, свободной от ядерного оружия, в Африке
(Пелиндабский договор)Tratado sobre una Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares en África (Tratado de
Pelindaba)
Vertrag von Pelindaba über die kernwaffenfreie Zone in Afrika (Vertragvon Pelindaba)

アフリカ非核兵器地帯条約（ペリンダバ条約）
1.7.

Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk
Treaty))‫معاهدة إنشاء منطقة خالية من األسلحة النووية في آسيا الوسطى (معاهدة سيميباالتينسك‬中亚无核武器区条约（塞米巴拉金斯克条约）Traité portant création d’une zone exempte d’armes nucléaires en Asie
centrale (Traité de Semipalatinsk)Договор о зоне, свободной от ядерного оружия, в Центральной Азии(Семипалатинский договор)Tratado sobre una Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares en Asia Central(Tratado de Semipalatinsk)
Vertrag von Semipalatinsk über die kernwaffenfreie Zone in Zentralasien(Vertrag von Semipalatinsk)

中央アジア非核兵器地帯条約 （セミパラチンスク条約）
1.8.

Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative
Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy‫اتفاق بين جمهوري ة األرجنتين وجمهورية البرازيل االتحادية لحصر استخدام الطاقة‬‫النووية في األغراض السلمية‬135

阿根廷共和国和巴西联邦共和国关于核能仅用于和平利用的协
定Accord entre la République argentine et la République fédérative du Brésil
pour l’utilisation exclusivement pacifique de l’énergie nucléaire
Соглашение между Аргентинской Республикой и Федеративной
Республикой Бразилия об исключительно мирном
использовании ядерной энергии
Acuerdo entre la República Argentina y la República Federativa del Brasilpara el Uso Exclusivamente Pacífico de la Energía NuclearÜbereinkommen zwischen der Republik Argentinien und der Föderativen
Republik Brasilien über die ausschließlich friedliche Nutzung derKernenergie

原子力の平和的利用に限ったアルゼンチン共和国とブラジル
連邦共和国との間の協定
1.9.

Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community(Euratom Treaty))‫معاهدة إنشاء الجماعة األوروبية للطاقة الذرية (معاهدة اليوراتوم‬欧洲原子能联营条约（欧原联条约）
Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de l’énergie atomique (Traité
Euratom)Договор об учреждении Европейского сообщества по атомной
энергии (Договор о Евратоме)Tratado Constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea de la Energía Atómica
(Tratado Euratom)
Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft (EuratomVertrag)

欧州原子力共同体を設立する条約（ユーラトム条約）
1.10.

Bilateral cooperation agreement‫اتفاق تعاون ثنائي‬双边合作协议
Accord bilatéral de coopérationДвустороннее соглашение о сотрудничестве
acuerdo bilateral de cooperación
Zweiseitige Kooperationsvereinbarung

二国間（原子力）協力協定

136

1.11.

Project and supply agreement‫اتفاق مشروع وتوريد‬项目和供应协定
Accord de projet et de fournitureСоглашение о проекте и поставках
acuerdo de proyecto y suministro
Vereinbarung über ein Projektvorhaben oder eine Lieferung

プロジェクト及び供給協定
1.12.

The Application of Safeguards in Relation to the Granting of Technical
Assistance‫تطبيق الضمانات فيما يتعلق بمنح المساعدة التقنية‬与提供技术援助有关的保障的实施
Application des garanties dans le cadre de l’assistance techniqueПрименение гарантий в связи с предоставлением технической
помощи
Aplicación de Salvaguardias en relación con la Asistencia Técnica
Die Anwendung von Sicherungsmaßnahmen im Zusammenhang mit derGewährung von technischer Hilfe

技術支援の供与に関する保障措置の適用
1.13.

Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning the Provision ofTechnical Assistance by the IAEA

‫اتفاق تكميلي منقح بشأن تقديم المساعدة التقنية من جانب الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية‬经修订的国际原子能机构提供技术援助的补充协定
Accord complémentaire révisé concernant la fourniture d’une assistancetechnique par l’AIEA
Пересмотренное дополнительное соглашение о предоставлении
МАГАТЭ технической помощи
Acuerdo Suplementario Revisado sobre la Prestación de Asistencia
Técnica por el OIEA
Geänderte Zusatzvereinbarung über die technische Hilfeleistung durch die
IAEO

IAEAによる技術支援の提供に関する改訂補足協定
1.14.

The Agency’s Inspectors (the Inspectors Document))‫مفتشو الوكالة (وثيقة المفتشين‬137

国际原子能机构的视察员（视察员文件）Les inspecteurs de l’Agence (Document des inspecteurs)Инспектора Агентства (Документ об инспекторах)Inspectores del Organismo (Documento relativo a los Inspectores)
Die Inspektoren der IAEO (das Inspektorendokument)

機関（IAEA）の査察員（査察員文書）
1.15.

The Agency’s Safeguards‫ضمانات الوكالة‬国际原子能机构的保障Les garanties de l’AgenceГарантии Агентства
Salvaguardias del Organismo
Die IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen

機関（IAEA）の保障措置
1.16.

The Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in1966 and 1968)‫ وعام‬1966 ‫ بصيغته الموسعة مؤقتا ً في عام‬،1965 ‫نظام ضمانات الوكالة (نظام‬)1968
国际原子能机构的保障体系（1965年、1966年和1968年临时扩充）
Le système de garanties de l’Agence (1965, provisoirement étendu en 1966
et 1968)Система гарантий Агентства (1965 года, расширенная впредварительном порядке в 1966 и в 1968 годах)Sistema de Salvaguardias del Organismo (1965, ampliado
provisionalmente en 1966 y 1968)
Das System der IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen (1965, vorläufig erweitert
1966 und 1968)

機関（IAEA）の保障措置システム（1965年策定、1966年及び1968年に暫定的に拡張）
1.17.

The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency andStates Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons‫هيكل ومضمون االتفاقات التي تعقد بين الوكالة والدول بموجب معاهدة عدم انتشار‬‫األسلحة النووية‬138

根据《不扩散核武器条约》的要求国际原子能机构与各国之间
的协定的结构和内容
Structure et contenu des accords à conclure entre l’Agence et les États dansle cadre du Traité sur la non‑prolifération des armes nucléairesСтруктура и содержание соглашений между Агентством игосударствами, требуемых в связи с Договором онераспространении ядерного оружия
Estructura y Contenido de los Acuerdos entre los Estados y el Organismo
Requeridos en relación con el Tratado sobre la No Proliferación delas Armas Nucleares
Struktur und Inhalt von Übereinkommen zwischen der IAEO und Staaten
gemäß den Erfordernissen des Vertrags über die Nichtverbreitung
von Kernwaffen

核兵器の不拡散に関する条約に関連して要求される機関（
IAEA）と各国との間の協定の構成及び内容
1.18.

Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) andthe International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards)‫نموذج بروتوكول إضافي لالتفاق المعقود (االتفاقات المعقودة) بين الدولة (الدول‬‫والوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية لتطبيق الضمانات‬各国和国际原子能机构关于实施保障的协定的附加议定书范本
Modèle de protocole additionnel à l’accord (aux accords) entre un État(des États) et l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique relatif(s)à l’application de garantiesТиповой дополнительный протокол к Соглашению(ям) между
государством(ами) и Международным агентством по атомной
энергии о применении гарантий
Modelo de Protocolo Adicional al (a los) Acuerdo(s) entre el (los)Estado(s) y el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica para laAplicación de Salvaguardias
Modell des Zusatzprotokolls zum Übereinkommen zwischen Staaten und
der Internationalen Atomenergie-Organisation zur Anwendung vonSicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置の適用のための各国及び国際原子力機関との間の協定に追加されるモデル議定書
1.19.

Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International
Atomic Energy Agency‫اتفاق امتيازات وحصانات الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية‬139

国际原子能机构特权和豁免协定
Accord sur les privilèges et immunités de l’Agence internationale del’énergie atomiqueСоглашение о привилегиях и иммунитетах Международного
агентства по атомной энергии
Acuerdo sobre Privilegios e Inmunidades del Organismo Internacional deEnergía Atómica
Vereinbarung über die Vorrechte und Befreiungen der Internationalen
Atomenergie-Organisation

IAEAの特権及び免除に関する協定
1.20.

Safeguards agreement‫اتفاق ضمانات‬保障协定
Accord de garantiesСоглашение о гарантиях
acuerdo de salvaguardiasÜbereinkommen über Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置協定1.21.

INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement

INFCIRC/153 ‫اتفاق ضمانات من النوع‬INFCIRC/153型保障协定
Accord de garanties du type INFCIRC/153
Соглашение о гарантиях на основе документа INFCIRC/153
acuerdo de salvaguardias tipo INFCIRC/153
Sicherungsübereinkommen nach dem INFCIRC/153-Modell

INFCIRC/153型保障措置協定
1.22.

Comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA)‫اتفاق ضمانات شاملة‬全面保障协定Accord de garanties généralisées (AGG)Соглашение о всеобъемлющих гарантиях (СВГ)
acuerdo de salvaguardias amplias (ASA)Übereinkommen über umfassende Sicherungsmaßnahmen

包括的保障措置協定（CSA）

140

1.23.

Item-specific safeguards agreement‫اتفاق ضمانات يخص مفردات بعينها‬特定物项保障协定
Accord de garanties relatif à des éléments particuliersСоглашение о гарантиях в отношении конкретных предметов
acuerdo de salvaguardias específico para partidas
Gegenstand-spezifisches Sicherungsübereinkommen

対象物特定保障措置協定
1.24.

Voluntary offer agreement (VOA)‫اتفاق ضمانات طوعي‬自愿提交协定Accord de soumission volontaire (ASV)Соглашение о добровольной постановке под гарантии (СДП)
acuerdo de ofrecimiento voluntario (AOV)Übereinkommen über die freiwillige Anwendung vonSicherungsmaßnahmen

自発的提供協定（ボランタリーオファー協定）（VOA）
1.25.

Additional protocol (AP)‫بروتوكول إضافي‬附加议定书
Protocole additionnel (PA)Дополнительный протокол (ДП)
protocolo adicional (PA)Zusatzprotokoll (ZP)

追加議定書（AP）
1.26.

Original small quantities protocol (original SQP)‫بروتوكول كميات صغيرة أصلي‬原始“小数量议定书”
Protocole relatif aux petites quantités de matières fondé sur le modèle
initial (PPQM fondé sur le modèle initial)Первоначальный протокол о малых количествах (первоначальный
ПМК)
protocolo sobre pequeñas cantidades original (PPC original)
Ursprüngliches Protokoll betreffend geringe Mengen (ursprüngliches SQP)

141

初版少量議定書（初版SQP）
1.27.

Revised small quantities protocol (revised SQP)‫بروتوكول كميات صغيرة منقَّح‬经修订的“小数量议定书”
Protocole relatif aux petites quantités de matières fondé sur le modèle
révisé (PPQM fondé sur le modèle révisé)Пересмотренный протокол о малых количествах (пересмотренный
ПМК)
protocolo sobre pequeñas cantidades revisado (PPC revisado)Überarbeitetes Protokoll betreffend geringe Mengen (überarbeitetes SQP)

改訂少量議定書（改訂SQP）
1.28.

Suspension protocol‫بروتوكول تعليق‬暂停实施议定书
Protocole de suspensionПротокол о приостановлении
protocolo de suspensión
Protokoll über Bestimmungen zur Aufhebung eines Übereinkommens

停止議定書
1.29.

Cooperation protocol‫بروتوكول تعاون‬合作议定书
Protocole de coopérationПротокол о сотрудничестве
protocolo de cooperación
Protokoll über die Zusammenarbeit

協力議定書
1.30.

Subsidiary arrangements‫ترتيبات فرعية‬辅助安排
Arrangements subsidiairesДополнительные положения

142

arreglos subsidiarios
Ergänzende Vereinbarungen

補助取決め（補助取極）
1.31.

Modified Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements
to a safeguards agreement‫ من الجزء العام من الترتيبات الفرعية الملحقة باتفاق الضمانات‬1-3 ‫البند المعدَّل‬保障协定“辅助安排”总则经修订的第3.1条
Rubrique 3.1 modifiée des arrangements subsidiaires à un accord de
garantiesИзмененный код 3.1 общей части дополнительных положений ксоглашению о гарантиях
versión modificada de la sección 3.1 de la parte general de los arreglos
subsidiarios de un acuerdo de salvaguardias
Modifizierter Code 3.1 des Allgemeinen Teils der Ergänzenden
Vereinbarungen zu einem Sicherungsübereinkommen

保障措置協定補助取決め（取極）総論部修正コード3.1
1.32.

Voluntary reporting scheme (VRS) on nuclear material and specified
equipment and non-nuclear material‫نظام تبليغ طوعي عن مواد نووية ومعدات محددة وعن مواد غير نووية‬关于核材料和规定设备及非核材料的自愿报告机制（自愿报告机制）
Dispositif de déclaration volontaire des matières nucléaires et deséquipements et matières non nucléaires spécifiésСхема добровольной отчетности (СДО) о ядерном материале исогласованном оборудовании и неядерном материале
mecanismo de notificación voluntaria (MNV) de material nuclear y equipo
especificado y material no nuclear
Freiwillige Berichterstattung zu speziellen Ausrüstungen undnichtnuklearen Materialien

核物質並びに特定の機器及び非核物質に関する自発的報告ス
キーム（体制）（VRS）
1.33.

Notification of transfers of nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon
States‫إخطار بعمليات نقل مواد نووية إلى دول غير حائزة ألسلحة نووية‬向无核武器国家转让核材料的通知

143Notification de transferts de matières nucléaires à des États non dotésd’armes nucléairesУведомление о передачах ядерного материала государствам, необладающим ядерным оружием
notificación de traslados de material nuclear a Estados no poseedores dearmas nucleares
Mitteilung über Lieferungen von Kernmaterial an Nicht-Kernwaffenstaaten

非核兵器国への核物質の移転に関する通告
1.34.

Neptunium (Np) and americium (Am) monitoring scheme‫نظام رصد النبتونيوم واألميريشيوم‬镎和镅监测机制
Dispositif de surveillance du neptunium (Np) et de l’américium (Am)Схема мониторинга нептуния (Np) и америция (Am)plan de vigilancia del neptunio (Np) y el americio (Am)
Neptunium (Np) und Americium (Am) Überwachungsschema

ネプツニウム（Np）及びアメリシウム（Am）のモニタリン
グスキーム（体制）
1.35.

Zangger Committee Export Guidelines‫المبادئ التوجيهية للتصدير الصادرة عن لجنة تزانغر‬桑戈委员会出口准则
Directives du Comité Zangger sur les exportationsРуководящие принципы Комитета Цангера по экспорту
Directrices del Comité Zangger sobre Exportaciones
Ausfuhrrichtlinien des Zangger-Komitees

ザンガー委員会輸出ガイドライン
1.36.

Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines‫المبادئ التوجيهية لمجموعة ال ُم َو ِّردين النوويين‬核供应国集团准则
Directives du Groupe des fournisseurs nucléairesРуководящие принципы Группы ядерных поставщиков
Directrices del Grupo de Suministradores Nucleares
NSG-Richtlinien

原子力供給国グループガイドライン

144

1.37.

Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium‫المبادئ التوجيهية إلدارة البلوتونيوم‬钚管理准则
Directives relatives à la gestion du plutoniumРуководящие принципы обращения с плутонием
Directrices para la Gestión del Plutonio
Richtlinien für die Handhabung von Plutonium

プルトニウム管理ガイドライン
2.

IAEA SAFEGUARDS: PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE‫ غرضها وغاياتها ونطاقها‬:‫ضمانات الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية‬国际原子能机构保障：目的、目标和范围GARANTIES DE L’AIEA : OBJECTIFS ET CHAMP D’APPLICATION
ГАРАНТИИ МАГАТЭ: ПРЕДНАЗНАЧЕНИЕ, ЦЕЛИ И ОБЛАСТЬ
ПРИМЕНЕНИЯSALVAGUARDIAS DEL OIEA: FINALIDAD, OBJETIVOS Y
ALCANCE
IAEO-SICHERUNGSMAßNAHMEN: ZWECK, ZIELE UND
ANWENDUNGSBEREICH

IAEA保障措置：目的、目標及び範囲
2.1.

IAEA safeguards‫ضمانات الوكالة‬国际原子能机构保障
Garanties de l’AIEA
Гарантии МАГАТЭ
salvaguardias del OIEA
IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen

IAEA保障措置
2.2.

IAEA safeguards system‫نظام ضمانات الوكالة‬国际原子能机构保障体系
Système des garanties de l’AIEA
Система гарантий МАГАТЭ
sistema de salvaguardias del OIEA
System der IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen

145

IAEA保障措置体系
2.3.

Purpose of IAEA safeguards‫الغرض من ضمانات الوكالة‬国际原子能机构保障的目的
Objectif des garanties de l’AIEA
Предназначение гарантий МАГАТЭ
finalidad de las salvaguardias del OIEA
Zweck der IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen

IAEA保障措置の目的
2.4.

Scope of IAEA safeguards‫نطاق ضمانات الوكالة‬国际原子能机构保障的范围Champ d’application des garanties de l’AIEA
Область применения гарантий МАГАТЭ
alcance de las salvaguardias del OIEA
Anwendungsbereich der IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen

IAEA保障措置の範囲
2.5.

Generic safeguards objectives‫األهداف العامة للضمانات‬一般保障目标
Objectifs génériques des garantiesОбщие цели гарантий
objetivos de salvaguardias genéricosAllgemeine Ziele der Sicherungsmaßnahmen

一般的保障措置目標
2.6.

Diversion of nuclear material‫تحريف المواد النووية‬核材料转用
Détournement de matières nucléairesПереключение ядерного материала
desviación de material nuclear
Abzweigung von Kernmaterial146核物質の転用
2.7.

Misuse‫إساءة استخدام‬滥用
Utilisation abusiveИспользование не по назначению
uso indebido
Missbrauch

不正使用
2.8.

Non-compliance‫عدم امتثال‬违约
Non‑respectНесоблюдение
incumplimiento
Vertragsverletzung

不履行
2.9.

Undeclared nuclear material and activities‫مواد وأنشطة نووية غير ُمعلَنة‬未申报核材料和核活动
Matières et activités nucléaires non déclaréesНезаявленный ядерный материал и деятельность
materiales y actividades nucleares no declarados
Nicht-deklariertes Kernmaterial und nicht-deklarierte Tätigkeiten

未申告の核物質及び原子力活動
2.10.

Undeclared facility or location outside facilities (LOF)‫مرفق غير ُمعلَن أو موقع خارج المرافق غير ُمع َلن‬未申报设施或设施外场所
Installation ou emplacement hors installation (EHI) non déclaré(e)Незаявленная установка или место нахождения вне установок (МВУ)
instalación o lugar situado fuera de las instalaciones (LFI) no declarados
Nicht-deklarierte Anlage oder nicht-deklarierter Bereich außerhalb von147

Anlagen

未申告の施設または施設外の場所（LOF）
2.11.

Deterrence

‫ردع‬
遏制
DissuasionСдерживание
disuasión
Abschreckung

抑止
2.12.

Starting point of IAEA safeguards under a CSA‫نقطة بداية تطبيق ضمانات الوكالة بموجب اتفاق ضمانات شاملة‬全面保障协定规定的国际原子能机构保障的起点
Point de départ de l’application des garanties de l’AIEA dans le cadre d’un
AGGНачальная точка применения гарантий МАГАТЭ на основании СВГ
punto inicial de las salvaguardias del OIEA con arreglo a un ASA
Startpunkt der IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen gemäß eines CSA

CSAに基づくIAEA保障措置の開始点
2.13.

Termination of IAEA safeguards‫رفع ضمانات الوكالة‬国际原子能机构保障的终止
Levée des garanties de l’AIEA
Прекращение гарантий МАГАТЭ
cese de las salvaguardias del OIEA
Beendigung der IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen

IAEA保障措置の終了
2.14.

Exemption from IAEA safeguards‫إعفاء من ضمانات الوكالة‬国际原子能机构保障的免除
Exemption des garanties de l’AIEA
Освобождение от гарантий МАГАТЭ
exención de la aplicación de las salvaguardias del OIEA
148

Befreiung von den IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen

IAEA保障措置の免除
2.15.

Non-application of IAEA safeguards to nuclear material to be used in
non-peaceful activities‫عدم تطبيق ضمانات الوكالة على المواد النووية التي يُزمع استخدامها في أنشطة غير‬‫سلمية‬对用于非和平活动的核材料不实施国际原子能机构保障
Non‑application des garanties de l’AIEA aux matières nucléaires devantêtre utilisées dans des activités non pacifiquesНеприменение гарантий МАГАТЭ к ядерному материалу,используемому в немирной деятельности
no aplicación de las salvaguardias del OIEA al material nuclear que vaya autilizarse en actividades con fines no pacíficos
Nichtanwendung der IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen bei Kernmaterial fürnicht-friedliche Verwendung

非平和的な活動に用いられる核物質のIAEA保障措置の適用除外
2.16.

Suspension of IAEA safeguards‫تعليق ضمانات الوكالة‬国际原子能机构保障的中止
Suspension des garanties de l’AIEA
Приостановление гарантий МАГАТЭ
suspensión de las salvaguardias del OIEA
Suspendierung (Aussetzung) der IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen

IAEA保障措置の停止
2.17.

Substitution‫إحالل‬替代
SubstitutionЗамещение
sustitución
Substituierung (Ersetzung)

代替

149

3.

SAFEGUARDS CONCEPTS, APPROACHES AND MEASURES‫مفاهيم ونُ ُهج وتدابير الضمانات‬保障方案、概念和措施
MÉTHODES DE CONTRÔLE, CONCEPTS ET MESURESКОНЦЕПЦИИ, ПОДХОДЫ К ПРИМЕНЕНИЮ И МЕРЫ ГАРАНТИЙ
CONCEPTOS, ENFOQUES Y MEDIDAS DE SALVAGUARDIASSICHERUNGSMAßNAHMEN: KONZEPTE, ANSÄTZE,EINZELMAßNAHMEN

保障措置概念、手法及び手段
3.1.

State-level concept (SLC))‫مفهوم الضمانات على مستوى الدولة (مفهوم مستوى الدولة‬国家一级概念Concept d’application des garanties au niveau de l’ÉtatКонцепция применения гарантий на уровне государства, концепция науровне государства (КУГ)
concepto a nivel de un Estado (CNE)
Konzept auf Staatsebene

国レベル概念（SLC）
3.2.

State-level safeguards‫تطبيق الضمانات على مستوى الدولة‬国家一级保障Application des garanties au niveau de l’ÉtatГарантии на уровне государства
salvaguardias a nivel de un Estado
Sicherungsmaßnahmen auf Staatsebene

国レベル保障措置
3.3.

State-specific factors (SSFs)‫عوامل خاصة بكل دولة‬国别因素
Facteurs propres à l’ÉtatФакторы, характеризующие государство (ФХГ)
factores específicos de un Estado (FEE)
Staatsspezifische Faktoren

国固有要素（SSFs）

150

3.4.

Safeguards approach‫نهج الضمانات‬保障方案
Méthode de contrôleПодход к применению гарантий
enfoque de salvaguardias
Ansatz für Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置アプローチ
3.5.

State-level safeguards approach (SLA)‫نهج الضمانات على مستوى الدولة‬国家一级保障方案
Méthode de contrôle au niveau de l’État (MNE)Подход к применению гарантий на уровне государства (ПУГ)
enfoque de salvaguardias a nivel de un Estado (ENE)
Ansatz für Sicherungsmaßnahmen auf Staatsebene

国レベル保障措置アプローチ（SLA）
3.6.

Broader conclusionً ‫استنتاج أوسع نطاقا‬更广泛的结论
Conclusion élargieРасширенное заключение
conclusión más amplia
Umfassendere Schlussfolgerung

拡大結論
3.7.

Integrated safeguards‫ضمانات متكاملة‬一体化保障
Garanties intégréesИнтегрированные гарантии
salvaguardias integradas
Integriertes System von Sicherungsmaßnahmen

統合保障措置151

3.8.

Programme 93+2

2+93 ‫البرنامج‬93 + 2 计划
Programme 93+2«Программа 93+2»
Programa 93+2
Programm 93+2

93+2計画
3.9.

Model (generic) facility safeguards approaches‫نُ ُهج ضمانات نموذجية (عامة) خاصة بنوع معيَّن من المرافق‬标准（通用）设施保障方案
Méthodes types (génériques) de contrôle d’une installationТиповые (общие) подходы к применению гарантий на установке
enfoques modelo (genéricos) de salvaguardias para instalaciones(Allgemeines) Modell eines Ansatzes für Sicherungsmaßnahmen in einem
Anlagentypモデル（一般的）施設に対する保障措置手法
3.10.

Safeguards Criteria‫معايير الضمانات‬保障准则
Critères des garantiesКритерии гарантий
criterios de salvaguardias
Kriterien für Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置クライテリア
3.11.

Safeguards measures‫تدابير الضمانات‬保障措施
Mesures de contrôleМеры гарантий
medidas de salvaguardias
Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置手段152

3.12.

Safeguards activities‫أنشطة الضمانات‬保障活动
Activités de garantiesДеятельность по гарантиям
actividades de salvaguardias
Sicherungsaktivitäten

保障措置活動3.13.

Diversion path analysis‫تحليل مسار التحريف‬转用途径分析
Analyse des voies de détournementАнализ путей переключения
análisis de las vías de desviación
Abzweigungspfad-Analyse

転用経路分析
3.14.

Acquisition path analysis‫تحليل مسار االقتناء‬获取途径分析
Analyse des voies d’acquisitionАнализ путей приобретения
análisis de las vías de adquisición
Beschaffungspfad-Analyse

取得経路分析
3.15.

Acquisition path‫مسار االقتناء‬获取途径
Voie d’acquisitionПуть приобретения
vía de adquisición
Beschaffungspfad

取得経路

153

3.16.

Protracted diversion‫مطول‬‫تحريف‬َّ持续转用Détournement progressifДлительное переключение
desviación prolongada
Andauernde Abzweigung

少量分割転用
3.17.

Abrupt diversion‫تحريف مفاجئ‬突然转用
Détournement soudainБыстрое переключение
desviación súbita
Abrupte Abzweigung

一括転用
3.18.

Concealment methods‫أساليب إخفاء‬弄虚作假的方法
Méthodes de dissimulationМетоды сокрытия
métodos de ocultación
Verschleierungsmethoden

隠ぺい手段
3.19.

Significant quantity (SQ)‫كمية معنوية‬重要量
Quantité significative (QS)Значимое количество (ЗК)
cantidad significativa (CS)
Signifikante Menge

有意量（SQ）

154

3.20.

Conversion time‫زمن التحويل‬转化时间
Délai de conversion
Время конверсии
tiempo de conversión
Konversionszeit

転換時間
3.21.

Detection time‫زمن الكشف‬探知时间
Délai de détectionВремя обнаружения
tiempo de detección
Entdeckungszeit

探知（検知）時間
3.22.

Technical objectives‫أهداف تقنية‬技术目标
Objectifs techniquesТехнические целиobjetivos técnicos
Technische Ziele

技術的目標
3.23.

Technical objective performance target‫غاية أداء األهداف التقنية‬技术目标实绩指标
Valeur cible de l’objectif techniqueПоказатель достижения технической целиmeta fijada respecto del objetivo técnico
Leistungsvorgabe für Technisches Ziel

技術的目標の指標1553.24.

Verification effort‫جهد التحقق‬核查工作量Effort de vérificationУсилия по проверке
esfuerzo de verificaciónÜberprüfungsaufwand

検認業務量
3.25.

Intensity of safeguards activity‫كثافة نشاط الضمانات‬保障活动强度Intensité de l’activité de garantiesИнтенсивность деятельности по гарантиям
intensidad de la actividad de salvaguardias
Intensität der Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置活動の強度 n3.26.

Frequency of safeguards activity‫وتيرة نشاط الضمانات‬保障活动频率Fréquence de l’activité de garantiesЧастота деятельности по гарантиям
frecuencia de la actividad de salvaguardias
Häufigkeit der Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置活動の頻度
3.27.

IAEA inspection goal

国际原子能机构视察指标
Objectif des inspections de l’AIEA
Цель инспекций МАГАТЭ
meta de inspección del OIEA
IAEO-Inspektionsziel

IAEA査察目標

156‫هدف التفتيش طبقا ً للوكالة‬3.28.

Quantity component (of the IAEA inspection goal))‫مك ِّون الكمية (في هدف التفتيش طبقا ً للوكالة‬（国际原子能机构视察指标的）数量部分

Composante quantitative (de l’objectif des inspections de l’AIEA)Количественный компонент (цели инспекций МАГАТЭ)componente de cantidad (de la meta de inspección del OIEA)
Mengenkomponente (des IAEO-Inspektionsziels)（IAEA査察目標の）量的要素
3.29.

Timeliness component (of the IAEA inspection goal))‫مكون التوقيت (في هدف التفتيش طبقا ً للوكالة‬（国际原子能机构视察指标的）及时性部分
Composante temporelle (de l’objectif des inspections de l’AIEA)Компонент своевременности (цели инспекций МАГАТЭ)componente de oportunidad (de la meta de inspección del OIEA)
Rechtzeitigkeitskomponente (des IAEO-Inspektionsziels)（IAEA査察目標の）適時性要素
3.30.

Annual implementation plan (AIP)‫خطة تنفيذ سنوية‬年度执行计划
Plan annuel de mise en œuvre
Ежегодный план осуществления (ЕПО)
plan anual de aplicación (PAA)
Jährlicher Umsetzungsplan

年間実施計画（AIP）
3.31.

Design information‫معلومات تصميمية‬设计资料
Renseignements descriptifsИнформация о конструкции
información sobre el diseño
Grundlegende technische Merkmale

設計情報

157

3.32.

Design information questionnaire (DIQ)‫استبيان معلومات تصميمية‬设计资料调查表
Questionnaire concernant les renseignements descriptifs (QRD)
Вопросник по информации о конструкции (ВИК)
cuestionario de información sobre el diseño (DIQ)
Fragebogen zu den Grundlegenden technischen Merkmalen

設計情報質問書（DIQ）
3.33.

Design information examination (DIE)‫فحص معلومات تصميمية‬设计资料审查
Examen des renseignements descriptifsИзучение информации о конструкции (ИИК)
examen de la información sobre el diseño (DIE)
Prüfung der grundlegenden technischen Merkmale

設計情報検討（DIE）
3.34.

Essential equipment list (EEL)‫قائمة معدات أساسية‬重要设备清单
Liste des équipements essentielsСписок ключевого оборудования (СКО)
lista de equipo esencial (LEE)
Liste der wesentlichen Ausrüstungen

必須機器リスト（EEL）
3.35.

Flowsheet verification (FSV)‫تحقُّق من سير العمليات‬流程图核实Vérification du déroulement des opérations (VDO)
Проверка технологической схемы (ПТС)
verificación del diagrama de flujo (VDF)
Flußdiagramm-Verifikation

フローシート検認（FSV）

158

3.36.

Quality management system of the IAEA Department of Safeguards‫نظام إدارة الجودة الخاص بإدارة الضمانات التابعة للوكالة‬国际原子能机构保障部质量管理体系
Système de gestion de la qualité du Département des garanties de l’AIEA
Система менеджмента качества Департамента гарантий МАГАТЭ
sistema del Departamento de Salvaguardias del OIEA de gestión de lacalidadQualitätsmanagementsystem der IAEO-Abteilung fürSicherungsmaßnahmen

IAEA保障措置局の品質管理体系
4.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NUCLEAR
INSTALLATIONS AND NUCLEAR RELATED ACTIVITIES‫ واألنشطة المتصلة بالمجال‬،‫ والمنشآت النووية‬،‫ والمادة غير النووية‬،‫المادة النووية‬‫النووي‬核材料、非核材料、核装置和核相关活动MATIÈRES NUCLÉAIRES, MATIÈRES NON NUCLÉAIRES,
INSTALLATIONS NUCLÉAIRES ET ACTIVITÉS LIÉES AUNUCLÉAIRE
ЯДЕРНЫЙ МАТЕРИАЛ, НЕЯДЕРНЫЙ МАТЕРИАЛ, ЯДЕРНЫЕ
УСТАНОВКИ И ОТНОСЯЩАЯСЯ К ЯДЕРНОЙ ОБЛАСТИ
ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ
MATERIAL NUCLEAR, MATERIAL NO NUCLEAR,INSTALACIONES NUCLEARES Y ACTIVIDADES DEL ÁMBITONUCLEARNUKLEARES MATERIAL, NICHT-NUKLEARES MATERIAL,KERNTECHNISCHE EINRICHTUNGEN UND
NUKLEARBEZOGENE TÄTIGKEITEN

核物質、非核物質、原子力構築物及び原子力関連活動
4.1.

Nuclear material‫مادة نووية‬核材料
Matières nucléairesЯдерный материал
material nuclear
Kernmaterial (nukleares Material)

核物質

159

4.2.

Nuclide‫نويدة‬核素
NucléideНуклид
nucleido
Nuklid核種
4.3.

Isotope‫نظير‬
同位素
IsotopeИзотоп
isótopoIsotop

同位体
4.4.

Source material‫مادة مصدرية‬源材料
Matière bruteИсходный материал
material básico
Ausgangsmaterial

原料物質
4.5.

Special fissionable material‫مادة انشطارية خاصة‬特种可裂变材料
Produit fissile spécial
Специальный расщепляющийся материал
material fisionable especial
Besonderes spaltbares Material

特殊核分裂性物質

160

4.6.

Fissionable material‫مادة انشطارية‬可裂变材料
Matière fissileРасщепляющийся материал
material fisionable
Spaltbares Material

核分裂性物質4.7.

Fertile material‫مادة خصبة‬可转换材料
Matière fertileМатериал для воспроизводства
material fértil
Brutmaterial

親物質
4.8.

Uranium‫يورانيوم‬铀
UraniumУранuranio
Uran

ウラン
4.9.

Natural uranium‫يورانيوم طبيعي‬天然铀
Uranium naturelПриродный уранuranio natural
Natururan

天然ウラン

161

4.10.

Depleted uranium‫يورانيوم مستنفد‬贫化铀
Uranium appauvriОбедненный уранuranio empobrecido
Abgereichertes Uran

劣化ウラン
4.11.

Low enriched uranium (LEU)‫يورانيوم ضعيف اإلثراء‬低浓铀
Uranium faiblement enrichi (UFE)Низкообогащенный уран (НОУ)
uranio poco enriquecido (UPE)
Niedrig angereichertes Uran

低濃縮ウラン（LEU）
4.12.

High enriched uranium (HEU)‫يورانيوم شديد اإلثراء‬高浓铀
Uranium hautement enrichi (UHE)Высокообогащенный уран (ВОУ)
uranio muy enriquecido (UME)
Hoch angereichertes Uran

高濃縮ウラン（HEU）
4.13.

Uranium-233

233-‫يورانيوم‬铀-233
Uranium 233
Уран-233
uranio 233
Uran-233

ウラン-233

162

4.14.

Plutonium‫بلوتونيوم‬钚
PlutoniumПлутоний
plutonio
Plutonium

プルトニウム4.15.

Mixed oxide (MOX))‫خليط األكسيدين (موكس‬混合氧化物
Mélange d’oxydes (MOX)Смешанное оксидное топливо (MOX)óxidos mixtos (MOX)
Mischoxid

混合酸化物（MOX）
4.16.

Thorium‫ثوريوم‬钍
ThoriumТорий
torio
Thorium

トリウム
4.17.

Americium‫أميريشيوم‬镅
AmériciumАмериций
americio
Americium

アメリシウム163

4.18.

Neptunium‫نبتونيوم‬镎
NeptuniumНептуний
neptunio
Neptunium

ネプツニウム4.19.

Enrichment‫إثراء‬浓缩度
EnrichissementОбогащение
enriquecimiento
Anreicherung

濃縮度（濃縮）4.20.

Depletion‫استنفاد‬贫化
AppauvrissementОбеднение
empobrecimiento
Abreicherung

減損（劣化）
4.21.

Transmutation‫تحويل‬嬗变
TransmutationТрансмутация
transmutación
Umwandlung

核変換

164

4.22.

Reprocessing‫إعادة معالجة‬后处理
RetraitementПереработка
reprocesamiento
Wiederaufarbeitung

再処理
4.23.

Material type‫نوع المادة‬材料类型
Type de matièresТип материала
tipo de material
Materialtyp

物質タイプ
4.24.

Material category‫فئة المادة‬材料类别
Catégorie de matièresКатегория материала
categoría de material
Material-Kategorie

物質区分
4.25.

Direct use material‫مادة صالحة لالستعمال المباشر‬直接使用材料
Matière d’emploi directМатериал прямого использования
material de uso directo
Unmittelbar verwendbares Material, Material zum direkten Gebrauch

直接利用物質165

4.26.

Indirect use material‫مادة صالحة لالستعمال غير المباشر‬非直接使用材料
Matière d’emploi indirectМатериал непрямого использования
material de uso indirecto
Mittelbar verwendbares Material

間接利用物質4.27.

Material form‫شكل المادة‬材料形态
Forme des matièresФорма материала
forma del material
Materialbeschreibung

物質形状
4.28.

Improved nuclear material‫مادة نووية محسَّنة‬改进的核材料
Matière nucléaire amélioréeУлучшенный ядерный материал
material nuclear mejorado
Verbessertes Kernmaterial

改良された核物質
4.29.

Effective kilogram (ekg))‫كيلوغرام فعال (كغ فعال‬有效千克
Kilogramme effectifЭффективный килограмм (эф. кг)
kilogramo efectivo (kge)Effektives Kilogramm

実効キログラム（ekg）

166

4.30.

Feed material‫مادة تغذية‬供料
Matière d’alimentationСырьевой материал
material de alimentación
Einspeisematerial

供給物質
4.31.

Scrap

‫خردة‬
废料
Rebuts de fabricationСкрап
residuos
Schrott

スクラップ
4.32.

Waste

‫نفايات‬废物
Déchets
Отходы
desechosAbfall廃棄物
4.33.

Hold-up‫مادة عالقة‬滞留量
Matière retenue en cours de procédéОстаточный материал
material retenido
In der Anlage (Apparatur) zurückbleibendes Kernmaterial

ホールドアップ（滞留物）

167

4.34.

Fuel element (or fuel assembly, fuel bundle))‫ أو حزمة وقود‬،‫عنصر وقود (أو مج َّمعة وقود‬燃料元件（或燃料组件、燃料棒束）
Élément combustibleТепловыделяющий элемент (или тепловыделяющая сборка, пучок
твэлов)elemento combustible (o conjunto combustible, haz de combustible)
Brennelement

燃料要素（または燃料集合体、燃料バンドル）
4.35.

Fuel component‫مكون وقود‬ِّ
燃料部件
Composant du combustibleКомпонент тепловыделяющего элемента
componente combustible
Brennelement-Komponente

燃料構成要素4.36.

Specified non-nuclear material‫مادة غير نووية محدَّدة‬规定的非核材料
Matière non nucléaire spécifiéeСогласованный неядерный материал
material no nuclear especificado
Spezifiziertes nicht-nukleares Material

特定非核物質4.37.

Nuclear grade graphite‫غرافيت صالح لالستعمال النووي‬核级石墨
Graphite de pureté nucléaire
Ядерно-чистый графит
grafito de pureza nuclear
Nuklear reiner Graphit

168原子炉級黒鉛
4.38.

Deuterium and heavy water‫ديوتيريوم وماء ثقيل‬氘和重水
Deutérium et eau lourdeДейтерий и тяжелая водаdeuterio y agua pesada
Deuterium und Schwerwasser

重水素及び重水
4.39.

Zircaloy‫سبيكة زركونيوم‬锆合金
ZircaloyЦиркалой
zircaloy
Zirkaloy

ジルカロイ（ジルコニウム合金）
4.40.

Nuclear fuel cycle‫دورة وقود نووي‬核燃料循环
Cycle du combustible nucléaire
Ядерный топливный циклciclo del combustible nuclear
Kernbrennstoffkreislauf

核燃料サイクル
4.41.

Physical model of the nuclear fuel cycle‫نموذج مادي لدورة الوقود النووي‬核燃料循环的物理模型
Modèle physique d’un cycle du combustible nucléaire
Физическая модель ядерного топливного цикла
modelo físico del ciclo del combustible nuclear
Physikalisches Modell des Kernbrennstoffkreislaufes

169

核燃料サイクルフィジカルモデル
4.42.

Nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities‫أنشطة البحث والتطوير ذات الصلة بدورة الوقود النووي‬与核燃料循环有关的研究与发展活动Activités de recherche-développement liées au cycle du combustible
nucléaireОтносящиеся к ядерному топливному циклу научноисследовательские и опытно-конструкторские работы
actividades de investigación y desarrollo relacionadas con el ciclo delcombustible nuclear
Forschungs- und Entwicklungsarbeiten auf dem Gebiet desKernbrennstoffkreislaufs

核燃料サイクル関連研究開発活動
4.43.

Facility‫مرفق‬
设施
InstallationУстановка
instalación
Anlage施設
4.44.

Location outside facilities (LOF)‫مكان واقع خارج المرافق‬设施外场所
Emplacement hors installation (EHI)Место нахождения вне установок (МВУ)
lugar situado fuera de las instalaciones (LFI)
Ort außerhalb von Anlagen

施設外の場所（LOF）
4.45.

Item facility‫مرفق يحتوي على مواد في شكل مفردات‬件料设施
Installation contenant des matières dénombrables
170Установка с материалом в виде предметов
instalación con material en unidades
Anlage zur Handhabung von Kernmaterial in umschlossener Form

アイテム施設4.46.

Bulk handling facility‫مرفق يحتوي على مواد في حالة سائبة‬散料操作设施Installation contenant des matières en vracУстановка с материалом в балк-форме
instalación de manipulación de materiales a granel
Anlage zur Handhabung von Kernmaterial in offener Form

バルク取扱施設
4.47.

Facility life cycle‫دورة عمر المرفق‬设施生命周期
Cycle de vie d’une installationЖизненный цикл установки
ciclo de vida de una instalación
Lebenslauf einer Anlage

施設ライフサイクル
4.48.

Shut-down facility (or shut-down LOF))‫مرفق متوقِّف (أو مكان متوقِّف واقع خارج المرافق‬停运设施（或停运的设施外场所）
Installation ou EHI mis à l’arrêt
Остановленная установка (или остановленное МВУ)instalación en régimen de parada (o LFI en régimen de parada)
Abgeschaltete Anlage (oder abgeschaltete LOF)

操業停止施設（または操業を停止したLOF）
4.49.

Closed-down facility (or closed-down LOF))‫مرفق مغلق (أو مكان مغلق واقع خارج المرافق‬关闭设施（或关闭的设施外场所）
Installation ou EHI mis à l’arrêt avec retrait des matières nucléaires

171Закрытая установка (или закрытое МВУ)instalación cerrada (o LFI cerrado)
Außer Betrieb genommene Anlage (oder außer Betrieb genommener LOF)

閉鎖施設（または閉鎖されたLOF）
4.50.

Decommissioned for safeguards purposes‫إخراج من الخدمة ألغراض الضمانات‬为保障目的退役
Déclassé aux fins des garantiesВыведено из эксплуатации с точки зрения гарантий
clausurado desde el punto de vista de las salvaguardias
Stillgelegt hinsichtlich Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置上の廃止措置完了（保障措置の廃止）
4.51.

Nuclear installations‫منشآت نووية‬核装置
Installations nucléairesЯдерные установки
instalaciones nucleares
Kerntechnische Einrichtungen

原子力構築物
4.52.

Categorization of facilities and LOFs

‫تصنيف المرافق واألماكن الواقعة خارج المرافق‬设施和设施外场所类别Catégorisation des installations et des EHIКатегоризация установок и МВУ
categorización de instalaciones y LFIKategorisierung von Anlagen und LOFs

施設及びLOFの区分
4.53.

Power reactors‫مفاعالت قوى‬动力堆
Réacteurs de puissance172Энергетические реакторы
reactores de potencia
Leistungsreaktor

原子炉
4.54.

Research reactors‫مفاعالت بحوث‬研究堆
Réacteurs de rechercheИсследовательские реакторы
reactores de investigación
Forschungsreaktor

試験研究用原子炉
4.55.

Critical assemblies‫مجمعات حرجة‬临界装置Assemblages critiquesКритические сборки
conjuntos críticos
Kritische Anordnung (Kritische Anlage)

臨界実験装置4.56.

Conversion plants‫محطات تحويل‬转化厂
Usines de conversion
Заводы по конверсии
plantas de conversión
Konversionsanlage

転換工場
4.57.

Fuel fabrication plants‫محطات صنع الوقود‬燃料制造厂
Usines de fabrication de combustible173Заводы по изготовлению топлива
plantas de fabricación de combustible
Brennelementfabrik

燃料加工工場
4.58.

Reprocessing plants‫محطات إعادة المعالجة‬后处理厂
Usines de retraitementПерерабатывающие заводы
plantas de reprocesamiento
Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage

再処理工場
4.59.

Enrichment (isotope separation) plants)‫محطات إثراء (فصل النظائر‬浓缩（同位素分离）厂
Usines d’enrichissement (ou usines de séparation isotopique)Установки по обогащению (разделению изотопов)plantas de enriquecimiento (de separación de isótopos)
Anreicherungsanlage (Isotopentrennanlage)

濃縮（同位体分離）工場
4.60.

Separate storage facilities‫مرافق خزن منفصل‬独立贮存设施Installations d’entreposage séparéesОтдельные хранилища
instalaciones de almacenamiento separadas
Getrennte Lagereinrichtungen

独立の貯蔵施設
5.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY‫ممارسة حصر المواد النووية‬核材料衡算
CONTRÔLE COMPTABLE DES MATIÈRES NUCLÉAIRES
УЧЕТ ЯДЕРНОГО МАТЕРИАЛА
174

CONTABILIDAD DE MATERIAL NUCLEAR
KERNMATERIAL-BUCHFÜHRUNG

核物質の計量5.1.

Nuclear material accounting‫حصر المواد النووية‬核材料衡算活动Comptabilité des matières nucléairesВедение учета ядерного материала
recuento de material nuclear
Bilanzieren von Kernmaterial

核物質の計量活動
5.2.

Nuclear material accountancy‫ممارسة حصر المواد النووية‬核材料衡算
Contrôle comptable des matières nucléairesУчет ядерного материала
contabilidad de material nuclear
Buchführung von Kernmaterial

核物質の計量5.3.

Inventory‫رصيد‬
存量
InventaireИнвентарное количество
inventario
Bestand

在庫
5.4.

Annual throughput‫خرج سنوي‬年通过量Débit annuelГодовая производительность
caudal anual
Jährlicher Durchsatz
175年間処理量5.5.

Throughput

‫خرج‬
通过量
Débit
Производительность
caudalDurchsatz

処理量
5.6.

Near real time accountancy (NRTA)‫ممارسة الحصر في توقيت مقارب للتوقيت الحقيقي‬近实时衡算Contrôle comptable en temps proche du temps réelУчет в режиме времени, близком к реальному (УВБР)contabilidad de materiales en tiempo casi real (NRTA)
Zeitnahe Kernmaterial-Buchführung

近実時間計量（ニアリアルタイム計量）（NRTA）
5.7.

Material balance area (MBA)‫منطقة حصر المواد‬材料平衡区
Zone de bilan matières (ZBM)Зона баланса материала (ЗБМ)
zona de balance de materiales (MBA)Materialbilanzzone (MBZ)

物質収支区域（MBA）
5.8.

Catch-all material balance area (CAM)‫منطقة شاملة لحصر المواد‬一揽子材料平衡区
Zone de bilan matières globaleОбъединенная зона баланса материала (ОЗБМ)zona de balance de materiales general (CAM)
Zusammenfassende Materialbilanzzone

キャッチオール物質収支区域（CAM）

176

5.9.

Strategic point‫نقطة استراتيجية‬战略点
Point stratégiqueКлючевое место
punto estratégico
Strategischer Punkt

枢要な箇所（枢要点）
5.10.

Key measurement point (KMP)‫نقطة قياس أساسية‬关键测量点
Point de mesure principal (PMP)Ключевая точка измерения (КТИ)
punto clave de medición (KMP)
Schlüsselmesspunkt

主要測定点（KMP）
5.11.

Batch

‫دفعة‬
批
LotПартия
lote
Chargeバッチ
5.12.

Batch data‫بيانات الدفعة‬批数据
Données concernant le lotДанные партии
datos del lote
Chargendaten

バッチデータ
5.13.

Source data‫بيانات مصدرية‬
177

源数据
Données de baseИсходные данные
datos de origen
Primärdaten

ソースデータ5.14.

Identity data (or identification data)‫بيانات الهوية‬标识数据
Éléments d’identification (ou données d’identification)Идентификационные данные
datos identificativos (o datos de identificación)
Daten zur Identifizierung

同定データ
5.15.

Unified uranium‫يورانيوم موحَّد‬合计铀
Uranium unifiéУнифицированный уранuranio unificado
Gesamt-Uran

統一ウラン
5.16.

Material description code (MDC)‫رمز وصف المادة‬材料说明代码
Code de description de la matièreКод описания материала (КОМ)
código de descripción del material (MDC)
Code zur Materialbeschreibung

物質記述コード（MDC）
5.17.

Inventory change‫تغيُّر الرصيد‬存量变化
Variation de stock
178Изменение инвентарного количества
cambio en el inventario
Bestandsänderung

在庫変動
5.18.

Import and export (inventory change codes: RF, SF)‫) ـ‬SF ,RF :‫استيراد وتصدير (رمزا تغيُّر الرصيد‬进出口（存量变化代码：RF、SF）
Importation et exportation (codes de variation de stock : RF, SF)Импорт и экспорт (коды изменения инвентарного количества: RF, SF)
importación y exportación (códigos de cambio en el inventario: RF, SF)
Einfuhr und Ausfuhr (Bestandsänderungscode: RF, SF)

輸入及び輸出（在庫変動コード：RF、SF）
5.19.

Domestic receipt (inventory change codes: RD, RN, RS)‫) ـ‬RS ,RN ,RD :‫تسلم محلي (رموز تغيُّر الرصيد‬国内收货（存量变化代码：RD、RN、RS）
Arrivée en provenance de l’intérieur (codes de variation de stock : RD, RN,
RS)Внутригосударственное поступление (коды изменения инвентарного
количества: RD, RN, RS)
entrada de procedencia nacional (códigos de cambio en el inventario: RD,
RN, RS)
Zugang aus dem Inland (Bestandsänderungscode: RD, RN, RS)

国内受入（在庫変動コード：RD、RN、RS）
5.20.

Nuclear production (inventory change code: NP)‫) ـ‬NP :‫إنتاج نووي (رمز تغيُّر الرصيد‬核产生（存量变化代码：NP）
Production nucléaire (code de variation de stock : NP)Ядерное производство (код изменения инвентарного количества: NP)
producción nuclear (código de cambio en el inventario: NP)
Erzeugung durch Kernumwandlung (Bestandsänderungscode: NP)

核的生成（在庫変動コード：NP）
5.21.

Accidental gain (inventory change code: GA)‫) ـ‬GA :‫زيادة عارضة (رمز تغُّر الرصيد‬意外收获（存量变化代码：GA）
Gain accidentel (code de variation de stock : GA)

179

Непредвиденное увеличение (код изменения инвентарного
количества: GA)ganancia accidental (código de cambio en el inventario: GA)
Zufälliger Zuwachs (Bestandsänderungscode: GA)

事故増加（物）（在庫変動コード：GA）
5.22.

De-exemption (inventory change codes: DU, DQ)‫) ـ‬DQ ,DU ‫رفع اإلعفاء (رمزا تغيُّر الرصيد‬解除豁免（存量变化代码：DU、DQ）
Levée d’exemption (codes de variation de stock : DU, DQ)Повторная постановка под гарантии (коды изменения инвентарного
количества: DU, DQ)
exención anulada (códigos de cambio en el inventario: DU, DQ)
Aufhebung der Befreiung (Bestandsänderungscode: DU, DQ)

保障措置再適用（在庫変動コード：DU、DQ）
5.23.

Retained waste (inventory change code: TW)‫) ـ‬TW :‫نفايات مستبقاة (رمز تغيُّر الرصيد‬存留废物（存量变化代码：TW）
Déchets conservés (code de variation de stock : TW)Сохраняемые отходы (код изменения инвентарного количества: TW)
desechos retenidos (código de cambio en el inventario: TW)
Zwischengelagerter Abfall (Bestandsänderungscode: TW)

保管廃棄（物）（在庫変動コード：TW）
5.24.

Domestic shipment (inventory change code: SD, SN)‫) ـ‬SN ,SD :‫شحن محلي (رمزا تغيُّر الرصيد‬国内发货（存量变化代码：SD、SN）
Expédition à destination de l’intérieur (codes de variation de stock : SD,
SN)Внутригосударственное отправление (коды изменения инвентарного
количества: SD, SN)
envío dentro del territorio nacional (código de cambio en el inventario: SD,
SN)
Versand im Inland (Bestandsänderungscode: SD, SN)

国内払出（在庫変動コード：SD、SN）
5.25.

Nuclear loss (inventory change code: LN)‫) ـ‬LN :‫فقدان نووي (رمز تغيُّر الرصيد‬180

核损耗（存量变化代码：LN）
Perte de matières nucléaires par consommation (code de variation destock : LN)Ядерные потери (код изменения инвентарного количества: LN)
pérdida nuclear (código de cambio en el inventario: LN)
Verlust durch Kernumwandlung (Bestandsänderungscode: LN)

核的損耗（在庫変動コード：LN）
5.26.

Measured discard (inventory change code: LD)‫) ـ‬LD :‫ُمهمالت ُمقاسة (رمز تغيُّر الرصيد‬经测量的废弃物（存量变化代码：LD）
Rebuts mesurés (code de variation de stock : LD)Измеренные безвозвратные потери (код изменения инвентарного
количества: LD)
material descartado medido (código de cambio en el inventario: LD)
Gemessener Abfall (Bestandsänderungscode: LD)

測定済廃棄（物）（在庫変動コード：LD）
5.27.

Exemption (of nuclear material) (inventory change codes: EU, EQ)‫) ـ‬EQ ,EU :‫إعفاء (مادة نووية) (رمزا تغيُّر الرصيد‬（核材料）免除保障（存量变化代码：EU、EQ）
Exemption (de matières nucléaires) (codes de variation de stock : EU, EQ)Освобождение (ядерного материала) (коды изменения инвентарного
количества: EU, EQ)
exención (de material nuclear) (códigos de cambio en el inventario: EU,
EQ)
Befreiung (von Kernmaterial) (Bestandsänderungscode: EU,EQ)（核物質の）免除（在庫変動コード：EU、EQ）
5.28.

Termination of IAEA safeguards (inventory change code: TU)‫) ـ‬TU :‫رفع ضمانات الوكالة (رمز تغيُّر الرصيد‬终止国际原子能机构保障（存量变化代码：TU）
Levée des garanties de l’AIEA (code de variation de stock : TU)
Прекращение гарантий МАГАТЭ (код изменения инвентарного
количества: TU)
cese de las salvaguardias del OIEA (código de cambio en el inventario:
TU)
Beendigung der IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen (Bestandsänderungscode:
TU)

181

IAEA保障措置の終了（在庫変動コード：TU）
5.29.

Other loss (inventory change code: LA)‫) ـ‬LA :‫فقدان آخر (رمز تغيُّر الرصيد‬其他损失（存量变化代码：LA）
Autre perte (code de variation de stock : LA)Другие потери (код изменения инвентарного количества: LA)
otras pérdidas (código de cambio en el inventario: LA)
Andere Verluste (Bestandsänderungscode: LA)

その他の損失（在庫変動コード：LA）
5.30.

Rebatching (inventory change codes: RM, RP)‫) ـ‬RP ,RM :‫إعادة تجميع الدفعات (رمزا تغيُّر الرصيد‬重新批处理（存量变化代码：RM、RP）
Réarrangement des lots (codes de variations de stock : RM, RP)Изменение партии (коды изменения инвентарного количества: RM,
RP)
recomposición del lote (códigos de cambio en el inventario: RM, RP)
Chargenverfolgung (Bestandsänderungscode: RM, RP)

リバッチング（在庫変動コード：RM, RP）
5.31.

Adjustment‫تسوية‬调整
AjustementУточнение
ajusteAngleichung, Rundung

調整事項
5.32.

Correction‫تصويب‬校正
CorrectionИсправление
corrección
Berichtigung

訂正事項
182

5.33.

Accounting records‫سجالت الحصر‬衡算记录
Relevés comptablesУчетная документация
registros contables
Buchungsbelege

計量記録
5.34.

Operating records‫سجالت التشغيل‬运行记录
Relevés d’opérationsЭксплуатационная документация
registros operacionales
Betriebsprotokolle

操作記録（操業記録）
5.35.

Supporting document‫وثيقة داعمة‬辅助性文件
Pièce justificativeПодтверждающий документ
documento de apoyo
Ergänzende Unterlage

証拠記録
5.36.

Measurement system‫نظام قياس‬测量系统
Système de mesureСистема измерений
sistema de mediciones
Meßsystem

測定の体系
5.37.

Metrological traceability‫تتبع القياسات‬183

计量可追溯性Traçabilité métrologiqueМетрологическая сопоставимость
trazabilidad metrológica
Meßtechnische Rückverfolgbarkeit

度量衡トレーサビリティ（計量学的追求性）
5.38.

International standards of accountancy (ISA)‫معايير الحصر الدولية‬国际衡算标准Normes internationales de contrôle comptableМеждународные стандарты учета (МСУ)
parámetros internacionales de contabilidad (ISA)
Internationale Standards der Materialbilanzierung (ISA)

計量に関する国際基準（ISA）
5.39.

International target values (ITVs)‫قيم مستهدفة دولية‬国际目标值Valeurs cibles internationales (VCI)Международные целевые значения погрешностей (МЗП)
valores internacionales objetivo (ITV)Internationale Richtwerte

国際目標値（ITVs）
5.40.

Stratum/strata‫شرائح‬/‫شريحة‬层
Strate/stratesСтрата
estratoStratum/Strata

ストラータ
5.41.

Rounding adjustment‫تسوية بالتقريب‬
舍入调整

184

Ajustement pour les arrondisПоправка на округление
ajuste por redondeo
Rundungsanpassung

端数調整
5.42.

Source documents‫وثائق مصدرية‬源文件
Documents sourcesИсходные документы
documentos fuente
Originaldokumente

ソースドキュメント
5.43.

Book inventory (BI)‫رصيد دفتري‬账面存量
Stock comptableЗарегистрированное инвентарное количество (ЗИК)
inventario contable (IC)
Buchbestand (über einen Materialbilanz-Zeitraum)

帳簿在庫（BI）
5.44.

Physical inventory‫رصيد مادي‬实物存量
Stock physiqueФактически наличное количество
inventario físico
Realer Bestand

実在庫
5.45.

Material balance component‫مكون حصر المواد‬材料平衡分项
Composante du bilan matièresКомпонент баланса материала

185

componente del balance de materiales
Komponente der Materialbilanz

物質収支の構成要素
5.46.

Material unaccounted for (MUF)‫مادة غير محصورة‬不明材料量
Différence d’inventaire (DI)Неучтенное количество материала (НКМ)
material no contabilizado (MNC)
Nicht nachgewiesenes Material

在庫差（MUF）
5.47.

Cumulative material unaccounted for (CuMUF)‫محصلة المواد غير المحصورة‬累积不明材料量
Différence d’inventaire cumulée (DI cumulée, DIC)
Совокупное неучтенное количество материала (СНКМ)material no contabilizado acumulado (MNCa)
Aufsummiertes nicht nachgewiesenes Material

累積在庫差（累積MUF、CuMUF）
5.48.

Shipper/receiver difference (SRD) (inventory change code: DI)‫) ـ‬DI :‫الفرق بين قياس الشاحن وقياس المستلم (رمز تغيُّر الرصيد‬发货方/收货方差额（存量变化代码：DI）
Écart expéditeur/destinataire (EED) (indicatif de variation de stock : DI)Расхождение в данных отправителя/получателя (РОП) (код изменения
инвентарного количества: DI)
diferencia remitente/destinatario (DRD) (código de cambio en el
inventario: DI)
Absender/Empfänger-Differenz

受払間差異（SRD）（在庫変動コード：DI）
5.49.

Cumulative shipper/receiver difference‫محصلة الفرق بين قياس الشاحن وقياس المستلم‬累积发货方/收货方差额
Écart expéditeur/destinataire cumuléСовокупное расхождение в данных отправителя/получателя

186

diferencia remitente/destinatario acumulada
Aufsummierte Absender/Empfänger-Differenzen

累積受払間差異（累積SRD）
5.50.

Material balance period (MBP)‫الفترة الفاصلة بين حصر المواد‬材料平衡周期Intervalle entre bilans matières (IBM)Период баланса материала (ПБМ)
período de balance de materiales (MBP)
Materialbilanz-Zeitraum

物質収支期間（MBP）
5.51.

Examination of records‫فحص السجالت‬记录的检查
Examen des relevésИзучение документации
examen de los registrosÜberprüfung der Buchungsunterlagen

記録の検査
5.52.

Updating of the book inventory‫استيفاء الرصيد الدفتري‬账面存量的更新
Mise à jour du stock comptableОбновление зарегистрированного инвентарного количества
actualización del inventario contable
Aktualisierung des Buchbestandes

帳簿在庫の更新
5.53.

Inventory change verification‫تحقُّق من تغيُّر الرصيد‬存量变化核实
Vérification des variations de stockПроверка изменения инвентарного количества
verificación de los cambios en el inventario
Nachprüfung der Bestandsänderungen187在庫変動の検認
5.54.

Inventory verification‫تحقق من الرصيد‬存量核实
Vérification du stockПроверка инвентарного количества
verificación del inventario
Nachprüfung des (Kernmaterial-) Bestandes

在庫検認
5.55.

List of inventory items (LII) (or itemized inventory listing (IIL)))‫قائمة مفردات الرصيد (أو قائمة الرصيد المفصَّلة‬库存物项清单（或件料存量清单）
Liste des articles inventoriésСписок учетных единиц инвентарного количества (СУЕ) (илидетализированный инвентарный список (ДИС))lista de partidas del inventario (LII) (o lista pormenorizada del inventario(IIL))
Liste der Bestandsposten (LII) (oder Einzelaufstellung des Bestands (IIL))

在庫明細表（LII）（LIIまたはIIL）
5.56.

Physical inventory verification (PIV)‫تحقُّق من الرصيد المادي‬实物存量核实
Vérification du stock physique (VSP)Проверка фактически наличного количества (ПФК)
verificación del inventario físico (VIF)
Verifikation des realen Bestandes

実在庫検認（PIV）
5.57.

Physical inventory verification equivalent‫مكافئ التحقُّق من الرصيد المادي‬实物存量核实等效
Équivalent de vérification du stock physiqueЭквивалент проверки фактически наличного количества
equivalente de verificación del inventario físico
Äquivalent zur Verifikation des realen Bestands

188等価実在庫検認
5.58.

Interim inventory verification (IIV)‫تحقُّق مؤقَّت من الرصيد‬存量的中期核实
Vérification intermédiaire du stockПромежуточная проверка инвентарного количества (ППИ)
verificación provisional del inventario (VPI)
Zwischenzeitliche Verifikation des (Kermaterial-) Bestandes

中間在庫検認（IIV）
5.59.

Verification of nuclear material flows within an MBA‫تحقُّق من تدفقات المواد النووية داخل منطقة حصر المواد‬材料平衡区内核材料流量的核实
Vérification des flux de matières nucléaires dans une ZBM
Проверка движения ядерного материала в пределах ЗБМverificación de los flujos de material nuclear en una MBA
Verifikation des Kernmaterial-Flusses innerhalb einer Materialbilanzzone(MBZ)

MBA内の核物質の流れの検認
5.60.

Verification of the operator’s measurement system‫تحقُّق من نظام القياس الذي تستخدمه الجهة المشغلة‬营运者测量系统的核实

Vérification du système de mesure de l’exploitantПроверка системы измерений оператора
verificación del sistema de mediciones del operador
Verifikation des betriebseigenen Meßsystems

事業者の測定体系の検認
5.61.

IAEA accountancy verification methods‫أساليب الوكالة للتحقُّق من ممارسات الحصر‬国际原子能机构的衡算核实方法
Méthodes de contrôle comptable de l’AIEA
Методы МАГАТЭ по проверке ведения учета
métodos de verificación contable del OIEA
IAEO-Methoden zur Verifikation der (Kernmaterial-) Buchführung

IAEAの計量検認手法

1895.62.

Code 10

10 ‫الرمز‬第 10 条Rubrique 10
Код 10
sección 10
Code 10

コード10
5.63.

General ledger‫دفتر االستاذ للحسابات‬总分类账Grand livreОбщая книга учета
libro mayor general
Hauptbuch

台帳
5.64.

Nuclear material control‫مراقبة المواد النووية‬核材料控制
Contrôle des matières nucléairesКонтроль ядерного материала
control de material nuclear
Kontrolle von Kernmaterial

核物質管理
5.65.

Element code‫رمز العنصر‬元素代码
Code matièreКод элемента
código del elemento
Element-Code

元素コード
5.66.

Category change procedure‫إجراء تغيُّر الفئة‬190

类别变更程序
Procédure de changement de catégorieПроцедура изменения категории
procedimiento de cambio de categoría
Verfahren zur Änderung der Kategorie

区分変更手順5.67.

Measurement basis‫أساس القياس‬测量基础
Base des mesuresОснова измерений
base de medición
Bedingung der Messung

測定ベース
5.68.

Transit matching‫مطابقة حاالت العبور‬转运匹配Mise en correspondance des expéditions et des arrivéesСогласованность данных о передачах
comprobación de la correspondencia de traslados
Transitabgleich

移転照合
6.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES AND
EQUIPMENT

核材料测量技术和设备‫تقنيات ومعدات قياس المواد النووية‬TECHNIQUES ET MATÉRIEL DE MESURE DES MATIÈRES
NUCLÉAIRES
МЕТОДЫ ИЗМЕРЕНИЯ ЯДЕРНОГО МАТЕРИАЛА ИИЗМЕРИТЕЛЬНОЕ ОБОРУДОВАНИЕ
TÉCNICAS Y EQUIPO DE MEDICIÓN DE MATERIAL NUCLEAR
METHODEN UND AUSRÜSTUNG ZUR MESSUNG VON
KERNMATERIAL

核物質測定技術及び機器
6.1.

Calibration

191‫معايرة‬校准
ÉtalonnageКалибровка
calibración
Eichung

校正
6.2.

Reference material‫مادة مرجعية‬参考物质
Matière de référenceЭталонный материал
material de referencia
Referenzmaterial

標準物質（基準物質）
6.3.

Bulk measurement‫قياس المواد السائبة‬总体测量Mesure de la masseБалк-измерение
medición de masa
Massenmessung

バルク測定
6.4.

Matrix‫مصفوفة‬基体
MatriceМатрица
matrizMatrixマトリックス
6.5.

Material sample‫عينة المادة‬
材料样品
192

Échantillon de matièreПроба (образец) материала
muestra de material
Material Probe

物質試料
6.6.

Representative sample‫عينة ممثِّلة‬ِّ
代表性样品
Échantillon représentatifПредставительная проба
muestra representativa
Repräsentative Probe

代表試料
6.7.

Calorimetry‫قياس الحرارة‬量热法
Calorimétrie
Калориметрия
calorimetría
Kalorimetrie

熱量分析法（カロリメトリー）
6.8.

Assay

‫قياس‬
分析
Analyse/Dosage
Анализ
análisis
Messung

分析
6.9.

Destructive analysis (DA)‫تحليل متلف‬破坏性分析Analyse destructive (AD)Разрушающий анализ (РА)

193

análisis destructivo (AD)
Zerstörende Analyse

破壊分析（DA）
6.10.

Chemical titration‫معايرة كيميائية‬化学滴定法
Titrimétrie
Химическое титрование
titulación química
Chemische Titration

化学滴定
6.11.

Controlled potential coulometry‫قياس كولوني بالتحكم في القدرة الكهربائية‬控制电位库仑法
Coulométrie à potentiel contrôléКулонометрия с контролируемым потенциалом
culombimetría a potencial controlado
Potentialkontrollierte Coulometrie

定電位クーロメトリー
6.12.

Gravimetric analysis‫تحليل ثقالي‬重量分析
Analyse gravimétriqueГравиметрический анализ
análisis gravimétrico
Gravimetrische Analyse

重量分析
6.13.

Isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS)‫قياس الطيف الكتلي بطريقة التخفيف النظيري‬同位素稀释质谱测定法
Spectrométrie de masse à dilution isotopiqueМасс-спектрометрия с изотопным разбавлением (МС-ИР)
espectrometría de masas por dilución isotópica (IDMS)
Isotopenverdünnungs-Massenspektrometrie194

同位体希釈質量分析法（IDMS）
6.14.

K-edge densitometry‫ك‬-‫قياس الكثافة بطريقة الحد‬K 边界密度计Densitométrie de discontinuité KДенситометрия с использованием эффекта K-полосы поглощения
densitometría de discontinuidad K
K-Kanten Densitometrie

K吸収端濃度計（K-エッジデンシトメトリー）
6.15.

Mass spectrometry‫قياس الطيف الكتلي‬质谱测定法
Spectrométrie de masseМасс-спектрометрия
espectrometría de masas
Massenspektrometrie

質量分析法
6.16.

Gas source mass spectrometry (GSMS)‫قياس الطيف الكتلي الغازي المصدر‬气源质谱测定法
Spectrométrie de masse en phase gazeuseГазовая масс-спектрометрия (ГМС)
espectrometría de masas de fuente gaseosa (GSMS)
Gasmassenspektrometrie

ガス源質量分析法（ガスマススペクトロメトリー）（GSMS）
6.17.

Thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS)‫قياس الطيف الكتلي بالتأيُّن الحراري‬热电离质谱测定法
Spectrométrie de masse à thermo-ionisation (TIMS)Термоионизационная масс-спектрометрия (ТИМС)espectrometría de masas de ionización térmica (TIMS)
Thermoionisations-Massenspektrometrie

表面電離型質量分析法（TIMS）

195

6.18.

Alpha spectrometry‫قياس طيف أشعة ألفا‬α 能谱测定法
Spectrométrie alphaАльфа-спектрометрия
espectrometría alfa
Alpha-Spektrometrie

アルファ線スペクトロメトリー
6.19.

Non-destructive assay (NDA)‫قياس غير متلف‬非破坏性分析
Analyse non destructive (AND)Неразрушающий анализ (НРА)
análisis no destructivo (AND)
Zerstörungsfreie Analyse

非破壊分析（NDA）
6.20.

Gamma ray spectrometry

γ 射线能谱测定法‫قياس طيف أشعة غاما‬Spectrométrie gammaГамма-спектрометрия
espectrometría gamma
Gammastrahlen-Spektrometrie

ガンマ線スペクトロメトリー
6.21.

Gamma ray scanningγ 射线扫描Balayage gammaГамма-сканирование
gammagrafía
Gammastrahlen-Scanning

ガンマ線走査6.22.

196

Scintillation detector‫مسح بأشعة غاما‬‫كاشف وميضي‬闪烁探测器
Détecteur à scintillationСцинтилляционный детектор
detector de centelleo
Szintillationszähler

シンチレーション検出器
6.23.

Semiconductor detector‫موصالت‬‫كاشف بشبه‬ِّ半导体探测器
Détecteur à semi-conducteurПолупроводниковый детектор
detector semiconductor
Halbleiterdetektor

半導体検出器
6.24.

Neutron counting‫عد النيوترونات‬中子计数
Comptage neutroniqueСчет нейтронов
recuento de neutrones
Neutronenzählung (Neutronenmessung)

中性子計数
6.25.

Neutron coincidence counting‫عد تواقُت النيوترونات‬中子符合计数
Comptage neutronique par coïncidenceСчет нейтронных совпадений
recuento de coincidencias neutrónicas
Neutronenkoinzidenzzählung

中性子同時計数
6.26.

Neutron multiplicity counting‫عد تضاعف النيوترونات‬197

中子多重性计数Comptage de multiplicité neutroniqueСчет множественности нейтронов
recuento de la multiplicidad neutrónica
Neutronenmultiplizitätszähler

中性子多重度計数
6.27.

Cerenkov radiation detection‫كشف إشعاعات تشيرينكوف‬切伦科夫辐射探测法
Détection du rayonnement de Tcherenkov
Регистрация черенковского излучения
detección de radiación Cherenkov
Nachweis (Messung) von Cerenkov-Strahlung

チェレンコフ放射光検出
6.28.

Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL)‫مختبر التحليل الخاص بالضمانات‬保障分析实验室
Laboratoire d’analyse pour les garanties (LAG)Аналитическая лаборатория по гарантиям (АЛГ)
Laboratorio Analítico de Salvaguardias (LAS)
Analytisches Laboratorium der IAEO-Abteilung fürSicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置分析所（SAL）
6.29.

Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL)‫شبكة مختبرات التحليل‬分析实验室网络
Réseau de laboratoires d’analyse (NWAL)Сеть аналитических лабораторий (САЛ)
Red de Laboratorios Analíticos (RLA)
Netzwerk von analytischen Laboratorien

ネットワークラボラトリー（NWAL）
6.30.

Gamma ray counting‫عد أشعة غاما‬γ 射线计数198

Comptage des rayons gammaСчет гамма-излучения
recuento de rayos gamma
Gammastrahlen-Zählung

ガンマ線計数
6.31.

Ion chamber‫غرفة أيونية‬电离室Chambre d’ionisationИонизационная камера
cámara de iones
Ionenkammer

電離箱
6.32.

Passive neutron coincidence counter‫عدَّاد توافق نيوتروني خامل‬无源中子符合计数器Compteur de coïncidences neutroniques en mode passifПассивный счетчик нейтронных совпадений
contador pasivo de coincidencias neutrónicas
Passiver Neutronenkoinzidenzzähler

パッシブ中性子同時計数装置
6.33.

Active neutron coincidence counter‫عدَّاد توافق نيوتروني نشط‬有源中子符合计数器Compteur de coïncidences neutroniques en mode actifАктивный счетчик нейтронных совпадений
contador activo de coincidencias neutrónicas
Aktiver Neutronenkoinzidenzzähler

アクティブ中性子同時計数装置
6.34.

X ray fluorescence (XRF)

X 射线荧光‫تألُّق األشعة السينية‬Fluorescence XРентгеновская флуоресценция (РФ)

199

fluorescencia de rayos X (XRF)
Röntgenfluoreszenz

蛍光X線分析法（XRF
6.35.

Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS)‫قياس الطيف الكتلي البالزمي المقرون بالحث‬电感耦合等离子体质谱测定法
Spectrométrie de masse à source plasma à couplage inductif (ICP-MS)
Масс-спектрометрия с индуктивно связанной плазмой (МС-ИСП)espectrometría de masas con plasma acoplado por inducción (ICP‑MS)
Induktiv gekoppelte Plasmamassenspektrometrie

誘導結合プラズマ質量分析法（ICP-MS）
6.36.

Combined procedure for uranium concentration and enrichment assay(COMPUCEA)‫إجراء مشترك لقياس تركيز اليورانيوم وإثرائه‬铀浓度和富集度分析组合程序
Procédure combinée d’analyse de la concentration et de l’enrichissement
en uranium (COMPUCEA)Комбинированная процедура анализа концентрации и степени
обогащения урана (COMPUCEA)
procedimiento combinado de análisis de la concentración y elenriquecimiento del uranio (COMPUCEA)
Kombiniertes Verfahren zur Bestimmung der Urankonzentration und anreicherung

ウラン含有率及び濃縮度分析の統合手法（COMPUCEA
6.37.

Pu(VI) spectrophotometry (PUSP))‫قياس الطيف الضوئي لتركز البلوتونيوم (سداسي التكافؤ‬钚（VI）分光光度测定法Spectrophotométrie du Pu (VI)Спектрофотомерия Pu(VI) (PUSP)
espectrofotometría Pu(VI) (PUSP)
Pu(VI)-SpektrophotometriePu(VI)分光光度法（Pu(VI)吸光光度法）（PUSP）
6.38.

Equipment Radiation Monitoring Laboratory (ERML)‫مختبر الرصد اإلشعاعي للمعدات‬设备辐射监测实验室200

Laboratoire de contrôle radiologique du matériel (ERML)Лаборатория радиационного контроля оборудования (ЛРКО)Laboratorio de Vigilancia Radiológica del Equipo (ERML)
Ausrüstung für das Strahlungsüberwachungslabor

機器放射線モニタリング分析所（ERML）
6.39.

Sample transport‫نقل العينات‬样品运输
Transport des échantillonsПеревозка пробtransporte de muestras
Probentransport

試料輸送
6.40.

Laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS)‫قياس طيف التحلل المستحث بالليزر‬激光诱导击穿光谱法
Spectroscopie de plasma induit par laser (LIBS)
Лазерно-искровая эмиссионная спектроскопия (ЛИЭС)espectrometría de ruptura inducida por láser (LIBS)
Laser-induzierte Plasmaspektroskopie (LIPS)

レーザー誘起ブレークダウン分光法（LIBS）
7.

CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE

封隔和监视‫االحتواء والمراقبة‬CONFINEMENT ET SURVEILLANCE

СОХРАНЕНИЕ И НАБЛЮДЕНИЕ

CONTENCIÓN Y VIGILANCIARÄUMLICHE UMSCHLIEßUNG UND BEOBACHTUNG

封じ込め及び監視
7.1.

Containment‫احتواء‬封隔
Confinement201Сохранение
contención
Räumliche Umschließung

封じ込め
7.2.

Surveillance‫مراقبة‬监视
SurveillanceНаблюдение
vigilancia
Beobachtung

監視
7.3.

Containment/surveillance device‫مراقبة‬/‫جهاز احتواء‬封隔/监视装置
Dispositif de confinement/surveillanceУстройство сохранения/наблюдения
dispositivo de contención/vigilancia
Gerät zur räumlichen Umschließung/Beobachtung

封じ込め／監視装置
7.4.

Seal

‫ختم‬
封记
Scellé
Пломба
precinto
Siegel封印
7.5.

Containment/surveillance measures‫المراقبة‬/‫تدابير االحتواء‬封隔/监视措施
Mesures de confinement/surveillanceМеры сохранения/наблюдения
medidas de contención/vigilancia

202

Maßnahmen zur räumlichen Umschließung/Beobachtung

封じ込め／監視手段
7.6.

System of containment/surveillance measures‫المراقبة‬/‫نظام تدابير االحتواء‬封隔/监视措施系统
Système de mesures de confinement/surveillance (système C/S)Система мер сохранения/наблюдения
sistema de medidas de contención/vigilancia
System von räumlichen Umschließungs-/Beobachtungsmaßnahmen

封じ込め／監視体系
7.7.

Vulnerability assessment‫تقييم جوانب الضعف‬薄弱性评定
Évaluation de la vulnérabilitéОценка уязвимости
evaluación de la vulnerabilidad
Schwachstellen-Analyse

脆弱性評価
7.8.

Joint use arrangement (JUA)‫ترتيب االستخدام المشترك‬共用安排
Arrangement relatif à l’utilisation conjointeДоговоренность о совместном использовании (ДСИ)
disposiciones para la utilización conjunta (JUA)
Vereinbarung zur gemeinsamen Nutzung

共同利用取決め（JUA）
7.9.

Joint use equipment (JUE)‫معدات االستخدام المشترك‬共用设备
Matériel utilisé conjointementОборудование совместного использования (ОСИ)
equipo de utilización conjunta (JUE)
Gemeinsam genutzte Ausrüstung203

共同利用機器（JUE）
7.10.

Tamper indication‫مؤشر تالعب‬干扰指示
Indication de manipulation frauduleuseПризнак вмешательства
indicación de manipulación ilícita
Verfälschungsanzeige

改ざんの徴候7.11.

Surveillance review system‫نظام استعراض المراقبة‬监视审查系统
Système d’examen des résultats de la surveillanceСистема просмотра данных наблюдения
sistema de examen de datos de vigilancia
System zur Auswertung von Beobachtungsaufnahmen

監視レビューシステム
7.12.

Unattended monitoring system (UMS)‫نظام رصد آلي‬无人值守监测系统
Système de surveillance automatiqueАвтономная система мониторинга (АСМ)
sistema de vigilancia automático (UMS)
System zur automatischen Überwachung

非立会モニタリングシステム（UMS）
7.13.

Core discharge monitor (CDM)‫جهاز رصد تعبئة وتفريغ قلب المفاعل‬堆芯卸料监测器
Moniteur de déchargement du cœur (MDC)Монитор выгрузки топлива из активной зоны (МВТ)
monitor de descarga del núcleo (CDM)Überwachungsinstrument für eine Reaktor-Entladung

炉心（燃料）取り出しモニター（CDM）

204

7.14.

Spent fuel bundle counter‫عدَّاد حزم الوقود المستهلك‬乏燃料棒束计数器
Compteur de grappes de combustible uséСчетчик отработавших тепловыделяющих (топливных) сборок
contador de haces de combustible gastado
Zähler für abgebrannte Brennelementbündel

使用済燃料バンドル計数装置
7.15.

Passive Gamma Emission Tomographic (PGET) System‫نظام التصوير المقطعي السلبي بانبعاث أشعة غاما‬无源 γ 发射断层照相系统
Système de tomographie à émission gamma passiveСистема пассивной гамма-эмиссионной томографии (ПГЭТ)sistema de tomografía por emisión pasiva de radiación gamma (sistema
PGET)
Passives Gammastrahlen Emissions Tomographie System

パッシブガンマ断層撮影（PGET）システム
7.16.

Reactor power monitor‫جهاز رصد قدرة المفاعل‬反应堆功率监测器
Enregistreur de la puissance d’un réacteurМонитор мощности реактора
monitor de potencia de un reactorÜberwachungsinstrument für die Reaktorleistung

原子炉出力モニター
7.17.

Thermohydraulic power measurement‫قياس القدرة الهيدروليكية الحرارية‬热工水力功率测量Mesure de la puissance thermohydrauliqueТермогидравлическое измерение мощности
medición de potencia termohidráulica
Thermohydraulische Leistungsmessung

熱水力測定
7.18.

Criticality check205‫تحقُّق من الحرجية‬临界检验
Contrôle de la criticitéПроверка на критичность
comprobación de la criticidad
Kritikalitätsprüfung

臨界確認
7.19.

Radiation passage monitor‫جهاز رصد حركة المواد النووية باإلشعاعات‬通道辐射监测器
Détecteur de passage
Радиационный монитор перемещений
monitor de radiaciones en tránsito
Monitor zur Überwachung von Strahlung an Durchgängen

放射線通過モニター
7.20.

Authentication measures‫تدابير التوثيق‬确证措施
Mesures d’authentificationМеры по обеспечению достоверности данных
medidas de autenticación
Maßnahmen zur Authentifizierung

認証手段
7.21.

Encryption/decryption‫فك التشفير‬/‫تشفير‬加密/解密Cryptage/décryptageШифрование/расшифровка
cifrado/descifrado
Verschlüsselung/Entschlüsselung

暗号化／復号化
7.22.

Equipment state of health data‫بيانات صالحية المعدات للتشغيل‬206

设备完好状况数据
Données sur l’état des équipementsДанные о работоспособности оборудования
datos sobre el estado de funcionamiento del equipo
Daten des Gerätezustandes

機器健全性データ
7.23.

Safeguards equipment‫معدات الضمانات‬保障设备
Matériel des garantiesОборудование для целей гарантий
equipo de salvaguardias
Ausrüstung für Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置機器7.24.

Immobilization mechanism‫آلية تثبيت‬固定机制
Mécanisme d’immobilisationМеханизм иммобилизации
mecanismo de inmovilización
Mechanismus zur Immobilisierung

固定化機構
7.25.

Remote data transmission (RDT)‫نقل البيانات عن بُعد‬远程数据传输
Télétransmission de donnéesДистанционная передача данных (ДПД)
transmisión de datos a distancia (RDT)
Datenfernübertragung

遠隔データ伝送（RDT）
7.26.

Equipment authorization‫ترخيص المعدات‬
设备授权

207

Autorisation des équipementsВыдача разрешений на использование оборудования
autorización de equipo
Autorisierung der Ausrüstung

機器認証
7.27.

Equipment validation‫اعتماد المعدات‬设备验证
Validation des équipementsПроверка оборудования
validación de equipo
Validierung der Ausrüstung

機器検証
7.28.

Safeguards system with remote data transmission capability‫نظام ضمانات مج َّهز بقدرة على نقل البيانات عن بُعد‬具有远程数据传输能力的保障系统
Système de garanties avec capacité de télétransmission de donnéesСистема гарантий с возможностью дистанционной передачи данных
sistema de salvaguardias con función de transmisión de datos a distancia
System der Sicherungsmaßnahmen mit der Fähigkeit zur
Datenfernübertragung

遠隔データ伝送能力を備えた保障措置システム
7.29.

Security critical component‫مك ِّون حاسم من حيث األمن‬安保关键组成部分
Composant essentiel à la sécuritéВажный для безопасности компонент
componente crítico para la seguridad física
Sicherheitskritische Komponente

セキュリティ上重要な構成要素
7.30.

Near Real Time System (NRTS)

近实时系统
Système en temps quasi réel (NRTS)

208‫نظام تحقُّق في وقت شبه حقيقي‬Система функционирования в режиме времени, близком к реальному
(СВБР)
sistema en tiempo casi real (NRTS)
Echtzeitnahes System

近実時間システム（ニアリアルタイムシステム）（NRTS）
8.

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING‫العينات البيئية‬环境取样
ÉCHANTILLONNAGE DE L’ENVIRONNEMENTОТБОР ПРОБ ОКРУЖАЮЩЕЙ СРЕДЫMUESTREO AMBIENTAL
ENTNAHME VON UMWELT-PROBEN

環境試料の採取（環境サンプリング）
8.1.

Environmental sampling (ES)‫أخذ عينات بيئية‬环境取样
Échantillonnage de l’environnementОтбор проб окружающей среды (ОПОС)muestreo ambiental (MA)
Entnahme von Umwelt-Proben

環境試料の採取（環境サンプリング）（ES）
8.2.

Location specific environmental sampling‫أخذ عينات بيئية من موقع محدَّد‬针对场所的环境取样
Échantillonnage de l’environnement dans un emplacement précisОтбор проб окружающей среды в конкретном месте нахождения
muestreo ambiental de un lugar específico
Ortspezifische Entnahme von Umwelt-Proben

特定の場所における環境試料の採取
8.3.

Wide area environmental sampling‫أخذ عينات بيئية من منطقة واسعة‬大范围环境取样209

Échantillonnage de l’environnement dans une vaste zoneОтбор проб окружающей среды на обширной территории
muestreo ambiental de grandes zonas
Großräumige Entnahme von Umwelt-Proben

広域的な環境試料の採取
8.4.

Swipe sampling‫أخذ عينات بالمسح‬擦拭取样
Prélèvement d’échantillon par frottisОтбор мазковых пробmuestreo por frotis
Wischprobe

拭き取り環境試料の採取
8.5.

Point sample‫أخذ عينات من نقطة منفردة‬点样品
Échantillon ponctuelПроба с одной точки
muestra puntual
Punktprobe

ポイント試料
8.6.

Composite sample‫عينة مركَّبة‬混合样品
Échantillon compositeПроба с нескольких точек
muestra compuesta
Zusammengesetzte Probe (Sammelprobe)

コンポジット試料（複合試料）
8.7.

Pre-inspection check sample‫عينة مأخوذة قبل إجراء التفتيش‬视察前检查样品

210

Échantillon de contrôle pré-inspectionПрединспекционная проба
muestra de control previa a la inspección
Kontrollprobe vor der Inspektion

査察前確認試料
8.8.

Cross-contamination‫انتقال التلوث‬交叉污染
Contamination croiséeПерекрестное загрязнение
contaminación cruzada
Querkontamination

二次汚染（クロスコンタミネーション）
8.9.

Baseline environmental signature‫بيانات بيئية أساسية‬基准环境特征Signature environnementale de baseРеперный признак окружающей среды
huella ambiental de referencia
Grundlegende Umweltmerkmale

ベースライン環境試料特徴
8.10.

Sampling team‫العينات‬ِّ ‫فريق أخذ‬取样小组
Équipe d’échantillonnageГруппа по отбору пробgrupo de muestreo
Probenahmegruppe

サンプリングチーム
8.11.

Environmental sampling kit‫طقم أخذ العينات البيئية‬
环境取样盒

211

Trousse d’échantillonnage de l’environnementНабор для отбора проб окружающей среды
juego (kit) de muestreo ambiental
Ausrüstung für Umwelt-Proben

環境試料採取キット（環境サンプリングキット）
8.12.

Screening measurement‫قياسات الفحص‬筛选测量Scrutation gammaПредварительное измерение
medición de determinación
Voruntersuchungsmessung

選別測定
8.13.

Bulk analysis‫تحليل إجمالي‬总体分析
Analyse globaleАнализ пробы в целом
análisis volumétrico
Analyse der Probenzusammensetzung

バルク分析
8.14.

Particle analysis‫تحليل جُسيمي‬微粒分析
Analyse de particulesАнализ частиц
análisis de partículas
Teilchenanalyse

粒子分析（パーティクル分析）
8.15.

Fission track analysis‫تحليل بتعقب النويدات االنشطارية‬裂变径迹分析

212

Analyse par traces de fissionАнализ треков деления
análisis por trazas de fisión
Spaltspuranalyse

フィッショントラック分析
8.16.

Scanning electron microscopy (SEM)‫استجهار بطريقة المسح اإللكتروني‬扫描电子显微镜
Microscopie électronique à balayageРастровая электронная микроскопия (РЭМ)
microscopia electrónica de barrido (SEM)
Rasterelektronen-Mikroskopie

走査型電子顕微鏡法（SEM）
8.17.

Secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) (including large geometry
SIMS (LG-SIMS))‫قياس الطيف الكتلي لأليونات الثانوية (بما في ذلك قياس الطيف الكتلي الكبير النسق‬)‫لأليونات الثانوية‬次级离子质谱测定法（包括大型几何次级离子质谱测定法）
Spectrométrie de masse à émission d’ions secondaires (SIMS) (y compris
la spectrométrie de masse à émission d’ions secondaires à large
géométrie)Вторично-ионная масс-спектрометрия (ВИМС) (в том числе ВИМС сувеличенной геометрией (ВИМС-УГ))espectrometría de masas de iones secundarios (SIMS) (incluida laespectrometría SIMS de grandes dimensiones (LG-SIMS))
Sekundärionen-Massenspektrometrie (einschließlich der
großgeometrischen Sekundärionen-Massenspektrometrie)

二次イオン質量分析（SIMS）（大型SIMSを含む（LG-SIMS
））
8.18.

Material characterization‫تحديد خصائص المواد‬材料表征Caractérisation des matièresХарактеризация материалов
caracterización de material

213

Materialcharakterisierung

物質キャラクタリゼーション
8.19.

Multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (MC–ICP-MS)‫والمزود بمج ِّمعات متعددة‬‫قياس الطيف الكتلي البالزمي المقرون بالحث‬َّ
多接收器电感耦合等离子体质谱测定法
Spectrométrie de masse par plasma induit couplé à la multicollectionМультиколлекторная масс-спектрометрия c индуктивно связанной
плазмой (МК-МС-ИСП)espectrometría de masas con plasma acoplado inductivamente con colector
múltiple (MC-ICP-MS)
Multikollektor induktiv gekoppelte Plasmamassenspektrometrie

マルチコレクタ誘導結合プラズマ質量分析法（MC-ICP-MS）
8.20.

Minor uranium isotopes‫نظائر يورانيوم ثانوية‬微量铀同位素Isotopes mineurs de l’uraniumНезначительные изотопы урана
isótopos menores del uranio
Minore Uran-Isotope

マイナーウラン同位体
8.21.

Environmental samples‫عينات بيئية‬环境样品
Échantillons de l’environnementПробы окружающей среды
muestras ambientales
Umweltproben

環境試料
9.

STATISTICAL CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES FOR NUCLEAR
MATERIAL VERIFICATION‫المفاهيم والتقنيات اإلحصائية المتعلقة بالتحقُّق من المواد النووية‬核材料核实的统计学概念和技术

214

NOTIONS ET TECHNIQUES STATISTIQUES POUR LA
VÉRIFICATION DES MATIÈRES NUCLÉAIRES
СТАТИСТИЧЕСКИЕ КОНЦЕПЦИИ И МЕТОДЫ ПРОВЕРКИ
ЯДЕРНОГО МАТЕРИАЛА
TÉCNICAS Y CONCEPTOS ESTADÍSTICOS PARA LA
VERIFICACIÓN DE MATERIAL NUCLEAR
STATISTISCHE KONZEPTE UND TECHNIKEN ZUR
KERNMATERIALÜBERPRÜFUNG

核物質検認のための統計的概念及び技術
9.1.

Material balance evaluation‫تقييم حصر المواد‬材料平衡评价
Évaluation du bilan matièresОценка баланса материала
evaluación del balance de materiales
Materialbilanz-Auswertung

物質収支評価
9.2.

Inspector’s estimate of MUF (IMUF)‫تقدير المفتِّش للمواد غير المحصورة‬视察员对不明材料量的估计
Estimation de la DI par l’inspecteurОценка НКМ инспектором (ИНКМ)estimación del MNC hecha por el inspector (MNCI)
Inspektor’s MUF Schätzung

査察員によるMUFの推定（IMUF）
9.3.

Operator–inspector difference‫الفرق بين قياس الجهة المشغلة وقياس المفتش‬营运者-视察员差额
Écart exploitant/inspecteur (EEI)
Расхождение данных оператора и инспектора
diferencia operador-inspector
Differenz zwischen Betreiber und Inspektor (D)

事業者－査察員間差異
9.4.

D statistic‫الفرق بين القيمة المعلنة من الجهة المشغلة والقيمة المقاسة من المفتش‬
215

D 统计
Statistique agrégée de la propagation des écarts exploitant/inspecteur
D статистика
estadística D
Differenz (D) Statistik

D統計量
9.5.

MUF tuners‫موالفات المواد غير المحصورة‬不明材料量调整
Modification d’inventaire pouvant ajuster la matière non comptabiliséeМетоды манипулирования с НКМ
parámetros de ajuste del MNC
MUF Tuner

MUFチューナー
9.6.

Diversion into MUF‫تحريف في المواد غير المحصورة‬转入不明材料量
Détournement dans la DIПереключение, связанное с НКМ
material desviado y declarado como MNC
Abzweigung in den MUF

MUFへの転用
9.7.

Diversion into SRD‫التحريف المؤدي لظهور فرق بين قياس الشاحن وقياس المستلم‬转入发货方/收货方差额
Détournement dans l’EEDПереключение, связанное с РОП
material desviado y declarado como DRD
Abzweigung in die SRD

SRDへの転用
9.8.

Diversion into D‫التحريف المؤدي لظهور فرق بين المواد المعلن عن وجودها والمواد الموجودة فعال‬转入D
Détournement dans l’EEI

216

Переключение, связанное с расхождением данных оператора иинспектора (переключение в D)
desviación causante de discrepancia (D)Abzweigung in den D-Wert

Dへの転用
9.9.

Defect‫خلل‬缺损
DéfautДефект
defectoDefekt欠損
9.10.

Sample size‫حجم العيِّنة‬样品量
Taille de l’échantillonОбъем выборки
tamaño de la muestra
Stichprobenumfang oder -größe

サンプルサイズ9.11.

Measurement error‫خطأ في القياس‬测量误差
Erreur de mesureПогрешность измерений
error de medición
Messfehler

測定誤差
9.12.

Random error‫خطأ عشوائي‬随机误差
Erreur aléatoireСлучайная погрешность

217

error aleatorio
Zufälliger Fehler

偶然誤差
9.13.

Systematic error‫خطأ منتظم‬系统误差
Erreur systématiqueСистематическая погрешность
error sistemático
Systematischer Fehler

系統誤差
9.14.

Residual bias

‫االنحراف المتبقي‬残余偏倚
Biais résiduelОстаточное смещение
sesgo residual
Verbleibender systematischer Fehler (Restbias)

残留偏差
9.15.

Error propagation‫انتشار الخطأ‬误差传递Propagation des erreursОпределение суммарной погрешности
propagación de errores
Fehlerfortpflanzung

誤差伝播
9.16.

Limits of error‫حدود الخطأ‬误差限值
Limites d’erreurПределы погрешности
límites de error
Fehlergrenzen
218

誤差限界
9.17.

Confidence limits‫حدود الثقة‬置信限
Limites de confianceДоверительные пределы
límites de confianza
Konfidenzgrenzen

信頼限界
9.18.

Outlier‫متطرفة‬‫قيمة‬
ِّ离群值
Point aberrantВыброс (при измерениях)valor atípico
Ausreißer

外れ値（アウトライヤー）
9.19.

Performance values‫قيم األداء‬性能值
Indicateurs de performanceЗначения, характеризующие качество измерений
valores históricos
Werte für Messunsicherheiten

実績値
9.20.

Hypothesis test‫اختبار الفرضية‬假设检验
Test d’hypothèseПроверка гипотезы
comprobación de la hipótesis
Hypothesentest

仮説検定

219

9.21.

Statistically significant‫ذو داللة إحصائية‬统计显著性
Statistiquement significatifСтатистически значимый
estadísticamente significativo
Statistisch signifikant

統計的有意
9.22.

Type I error‫األول‬َّ ‫خطأ من الطراز‬第一类错误
Erreur du type IПогрешность первого родаerror tipo I
Fehler I. Art

第I種の過誤9.23.

Type II error‫خطأ من الطراز الثاني‬第二类错误Erreur du type IIПогрешность второго родаerror tipo II
Fehler II. Art

第II種の過誤
9.24.

Power of a test‫قوة االختبار‬检验的功效
Puissance d’un testЭффективность проверки гипотезы
potencia de una prueba
Gütefunktion eines Tests

検出力
9.25.

Attributes test‫اختبار الخصائص‬
220

属性检验
Test par attributsАтрибутивный тестprueba de atributos
Test eines qualitativen Merkmals

アトリビュート（属性）検定
9.26.

Variables test‫اختبار المتغيرات‬变量检验
Test par variablesКоличественный тестprueba de variables
Test eines quantitativen Merkmals

バリアブル（計量）検定
9.27.

Critical region‫منطقة حرجة‬临界区域
Région critiqueКритическая область
región crítica
Kritischer Bereich

棄却域
9.28.

Selection probability‫احتمالية االختيار‬选择概率
Probabilité de sélectionВероятность выбора
probabilidad de selección
Auswahlwahrscheinlichkeit

選択確率
9.29.

Identification probability‫احتمالية تحديد العيب‬识别概率
Probabilité d’identification
221Вероятность идентификации
probabilidad de identificación
Identifikationswahrscheinlichkeit

識別可能性
9.30.

Detection probability‫احتمالية الكشف‬探知概率
Probabilité de détectionВероятность обнаружения
probabilidad de detección
Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit

探知（検知）確率9.31.

False alarm probability‫احتمالية اإلنذار الكاذب‬误报警概率
Probabilité de fausse alerteВероятность ложного сигнала
probabilidad de falsa alarma
Fehlalarmwahrscheinlichkeit

誤警報確率
9.32.

Verification level‫مستوى التحقق‬核查水平
Niveau de vérificationПроверочный уровень
nivel de verificación
Nachweisgrenze

検認レベル
9.33.

Sampling plan‫خطة أخذ العينات‬取样计划Plan d’échantillonnageПлан формирования выборки
plan de muestreo

222

Stichprobenplan

サンプリング計画
9.34.

Variable sampling in the attribute mode‫عينات متغيرة في نمط الخاصية‬属性模式中的变量取样
Sondage de variable qualitativeВыборка переменного объема по атрибутивному признаку
muestreo de variables en el modo de atributos
Variable Probenahme im Attributmodus

アトリビュート（属性）モードにおけるバリアブル（計量）サンプリング
9.35.

Variable sampling in the variable mode‫عينات متغيرة في النمط المتغير‬可变模式中的变量取样
Sondage de variable quantitativeВыборка переменного объема по количественному признаку
muestreo de variables en el modo de variables
Variable Probenahme im variablen Modus

バリアブル（計量）モードにおけるバリアブル（計量）サン
プリング
9.36.

Relative standard deviation (RSD)‫معامل التغيُّر‬相对标准偏差Coefficient de variation (CV)Относительное стандартное отклонение (ОСО)
desviación estándar relativa (RSD)
Relative Standardabweichung

相対標準偏差（RSD）
9.37.

Measurement uncertainty‫عدم التيقن في القياس‬测量不确定度Incertitude des mesuresНеопределенность результата измерений
incertidumbre de medición
223

Messunsicherheit

測定の不確かさ9.38.

Statistical sample‫عينة إحصائية‬统计样品
Échantillon statistiqueСтатистическая выборка
muestra estadística
Statistische Stichprobe

統計サンプル
10.

VISITS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD‫الزيارات واألنشطة في الميدان‬现场访问和活动

VISITES ET ACTIVITÉS SUR LE TERRAIN
ПОСЕЩЕНИЯ И ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ НА МЕСТАХ
VISITAS Y ACTIVIDADES SOBRE EL TERRENO
BESUCHE UND AKTIVITÄTEN VOR ORT

訪問と現場活動
10.1.

Visit

‫زيارة‬访问
VisiteПосещение
visitaBesuch訪問
10.2.

Design information verification (DIV)‫تحقـُّق من المعلومات التصميمية‬设计资料核实
Vérification des renseignements descriptifs (VRD)Проверка информации о конструкции (ПИК)
verificación de la información sobre el diseño (VID)
Verifikation der grundlegenden technischen Merkmale

設計情報検認（DIV）
224

10.3.

Inspection‫تفتيـــش‬视察InspectionИнспекция
inspección
Inspektion

査察
10.4.

Initial inspection‫تفتيش أولي‬初始视察
Inspection initialeПервоначальная инспекция
inspección inicial
Erst-Inspektion

冒頭査察
10.5.

Ad hoc inspection‫تفتيش حسب االقتضاء‬特别视察
Inspection ad hocИнспекции для специальных целей
inspección ad hoc
Ad hoc-Inspektion

特定査察
10.6.

Routine inspection‫تفتيش روتيني‬例行视察
Inspection régulièreОбычная инспекция
inspección ordinaria
Routine-Inspektion

通常査察
10.7.

Unannounced inspection‫تفتيش مفاجئ‬225

不通知的视察
Inspection inopinéeНеобъявленная инспекция
inspección no anunciada
Nicht angekündigte Inspektion

無通告査察
10.8.

Short notice inspection‫تفتيش بإخطار عاجل‬临时通知的视察
Inspection à court délai de préavis
Инспекция с краткосрочным уведомлением
inspección con breve preaviso
Inspektion mit kurzfristiger Vorankündigung

短期通告査察10.9.

Random inspection‫تفتيش عشوائي‬随机视察
Inspection aléatoireИнспекция на случайной основе
inspección aleatoria
Zufällig ausgewählte Inspektion

ランダム査察10.10.

Short notice random inspection (SNRI)‫تفتيش عشوائي بإخطار عاجل‬临时通知的随机视察Inspection aléatoire à court délai de préavis (IACP)Инспекция на случайной основе с краткосрочным уведомлением
(ИСКУ)
inspección aleatoria con breve preaviso (IABP)
Zufällig ausgewählte Inspektion mit kurzfristiger Vorankündigung

短期通告ランダム査察（SNRI）
10.11.

Limited frequency unannounced access (LFUA)‫معاينة مفاجئة محدودة التواتر‬有限频度不通知的接触
226

Accès inopiné à fréquence limitéeОграниченный по частоте необъявленный доступ (ОЧНД)acceso no anunciado de frecuencia limitada (ANAFL)
In der Häufigkeit beschränkter, nicht angekündigter Zugang

頻度限定無通告立入（LFUA）
10.12.

Simultaneous inspections‫عمليات تفتيش متزامنة‬同时视察
Inspections simultanéesОдновременные инспекции
inspecciones simultáneas
Gleichzeitige Inspektionen

同時査察
10.13.

Continuous inspection‫تفتيش مستمر‬连续视察
Inspection en continuНепрерывная инспекция
inspección continua
Kontinuierliche Inspektion

常時（常駐）査察
10.14.

Special inspection‫تفتيش خاص‬专门视察
Inspection spécialeСпециальная инспекция
inspección especial
Sonderinspektion

特別査察10.15.

Access for inspection‫معاينة ألغراض التفتيش‬视察接触Accès aux fins d’inspectionДоступ для инспектирования

227

acceso con fines de inspección
Zugang zu Inspektionszwecken

査察のためのアクセス（接近）10.16.

Scope of inspection‫نطاق التفتيش‬视察范围
Portée des inspectionsОбъем инспекции
alcance de la inspección
Umfang einer Inspektion

査察の範囲
10.17.

Frequency of inspection‫تواتُر التفتيش‬视察频度
Fréquence des inspectionsЧастота инспекций
frecuencia de las inspecciones
Häufigkeit der Inspektionen

査察の頻度
10.18.

Advance notice of inspections‫إخطار مسبق بعمليات التفتيش‬视察的预先通知
Préavis pour les inspectionsПредварительное уведомление об инспекциях
aviso anticipado de las inspecciones
Vorankündigung von Inspektionen

査察の事前通告10.19.

Inspection activities‫أنشطة التفتيش‬视察活动
Activités d’inspectionИнспекционная деятельность
actividades de inspección
Inspektionstätigkeiten

228

査察活動
10.20.

IAEA inspector‫مفتش تابع للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية‬国际原子能机构视察员
Inspecteur de l’AIEA
Инспектор МАГАТЭ
inspector del OIEA
IAEO-Inspektor

IAEA査察員
10.21.

Calendar-days in the field for verification (CDFVs)‫أيام تقويمية ميدانية ألغراض التحقق‬现场核查历日Jours calendaires sur le terrain pour des activités de vérification (JCTV)Календарные дни работы на местах в целях проверки (КДМП)días civiles sobre el terreno con fines de verificación (DCTV)
Kalendertage der Verifikationstätigkeiten vor Ort

現場検認のための活動日数（CDFVs）
10.22.

Person-day of inspection (PDI)‫يوم عمل تفتيشي‬视察人-日Journée d’inspectionЧеловеко-день инспекций (ЧДИ)
día-persona de inspección (DPI)
Inspektions-Personentag

査察人日（PDI）
10.23.

Person-year of inspection‫سنة عمل تفتيشي‬视察人-年
Année d’inspectionЧеловеко-год инспекций
año-persona de inspección
Inspektions-Personenjahr

査察人年

229

10.24.

Actual routine inspection effort (ARIE)‫جهد تفتيش روتيني فعلي‬实际例行视察量
Activité réelle d’inspection régulière (ARIR)Реальный объем обычной инспекционной деятельности (РОИД)actividad real de inspección ordinaria (ARIO)
Inspektions-Personenjahr

通常査察実業務量（ARIE）
10.25.

Planned actual routine inspection effort (PLARIE)‫جهد تفتيش روتيني فعلي مخطَّط‬计划的实际例行视察量
Activité réelle d’inspection régulière prévue (ARIRP)Запланированный реальный объем обычной инспекционной
деятельности (ЗРОИД)actividad real de inspección ordinaria programada (ARIOP)
Geplanter tatsächlicher Routine-Inspektionsaufwand

計画通常査察実業務量（PLARIE）
10.26.

Maximum routine inspection effort (MRIE)‫أقصى جهد تفتيش روتيني‬最大例行视察量
Activité maximale d’inspection régulière (AMIR)
Максимальный объем обычной инспекционной деятельности (МОИД)actividad máxima de inspección ordinaria (AMIO)
Maximaler Routine-Inspektionsaufwand

最大通常査察業務量（MRIE）
10.27.

Complementary access‫معاينة تكميلية‬补充接触Accès complémentaireДополнительный доступ
acceso complementario
Erweiterter Zugang

補完的なアクセス
10.28.

230

Managed access‫معاينة محكومة‬受管接触Accès réglementéРегулируемый доступ
acceso controlado
Geregelter Zugang

管理されたアクセス
10.29.

Location‫مكان‬
场所
EmplacementМесто нахождения
lugar
Ort

場所
10.30.

Site‫موقع‬
场址
SiteПлощадка
emplazamiento
Standort

サイト
10.31.

Advance notice of complementary access‫إخطار مسبق بمعاينة تكميلية‬补充接触的预先通知Préavis d’accès complémentaireПредварительное уведомление о дополнительном доступе
aviso anticipado de acceso complementario
Vorankündigung für erweiterten Zugang

補完的なアクセスの事前通告
10.32.

Complementary access activities‫أنشطة معاينة تكميلية‬231

补充接触活动
Activités au titre de l’accès complémentaireДеятельность в рамках дополнительного доступа
actividades de acceso complementario
Tätigkeiten während des erweiterten Zugangs

補完的なアクセスの活動
11.

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION AND EVALUATION

保障资料和评价

‫معلومات الضمانات وتقييم الضمانات‬INFORMATIONS RELATIVES AUX GARANTIES ET ÉVALUATIONDES GARANTIESИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЕНИИ ГАРАНТИЙ И ОЦЕНКА
ГАРАНТИЙ

INFORMACIÓN Y EVALUACIÓN CON FINES DE

SALVAGUARDIASAUF SICHERUNGSMAßNAHMEN BEZOGENE INFORMATION UND
DEREN AUSWERTUNG

保障措置情報及び評価
11.1.

Safeguards relevant information‫معلومات ذات صلة بالضمانات‬保障相关资料Information pertinente pour les garantiesИнформация, имеющая отношение к гарантиям
información de importancia para las salvaguardias
Relevante Informationen über Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置関連情報
11.2.

Initial report‫تقرير أولي‬初始报告
Rapport initialПервоначальный отчет
informe inicial
Anfangsbericht

冒頭報告

232

11.3.

Routine report‫تقرير روتيني‬例行报告
Rapport régulierОбычный отчет
informe ordinario
Regelbericht

通常報告
11.4.

Accounting report‫تقرير الحصر‬衡算报告Rapport comptableУчетный отчет
informe contable
Buchungsbericht

計量報告
11.5.

Inventory change report (ICR)‫تقرير التغيُّر في الرصيد‬存量变化报告Rapport sur les variations de stock (RVS)Отчет об изменениях инвентарного количества (ОИИК)informe de cambios en el inventario (ICR)
Bestandsänderungsbericht

在庫変動報告（ICR）
11.6.

Concise notes‫مذكرات مقتضبة‬简要说明
Notes concisesКраткие справки
notas concisas
Kurzgefaßte Bemerkung

注釈
11.7.

Material balance report (MBR)‫تقرير حصر المواد‬233

材料平衡报告
Rapport sur le bilan matières (RBM)Материально-балансовый отчет (МБО)
informe de balance de materiales (MBR)
Materialbilanzbericht

物質収支報告（MBR）
11.8.

Physical inventory listing (PIL)‫قائمة الرصيد المادي‬实物存量报表Liste des articles du stock physique (PIL)Список фактически наличного количества (СФНК)lista del inventario físico (PIL)
Aufstellung des realen Material-Bestands

実在庫明細表（PIL）
11.9.

Operating report‫تقرير التشغيل‬运行报告Rapport sur les opérationsЭксплуатационный отчет
informe de operaciones
Betriebsbericht

操作報告11.10.

Special report‫تقرير خاص‬专门报告Rapport spécial
Специальный отчет
informe especial
Besonderer Bericht

特別報告11.11.

Mailbox declaration‫إعالن بالصندوق البريدي‬
邮箱申报

234

Déclaration par boîte à lettresЗаявление через «почтовый ящик»declaración enviada a un buzón electrónico
Besonderer Bericht

メールボックス申告
11.12.

Notification of transfers‫إشعار بعمليات النقل‬转让通知Notification de transfertsУведомление о передачах
notificación de traslados
Mitteilung über Lieferungen

移転の通告
11.13.

Confirmation of transfers‫تأكيد عمليات النقل‬转让确认
Confirmation de transfertsПодтверждение передач
confirmación de traslados
Bestätigung von Lieferungen

移転の確認
11.14.

Voluntary reports on nuclear material, specified equipment andnon-nuclear material‫تقارير طوعية عن مواد نووية ومعدات محددة ومواد غير نووية‬关于核材料、规定设备和非核材料的自愿报告Rapports volontaires sur les matières nucléaires et les équipements etmatières non nucléaires spécifiésДобровольные отчеты о ядерном материале, согласованном
оборудовании и неядерном материале
notificaciones voluntarias sobre material nuclear, equipo especificado ymaterial no nuclear
Freiwilliger Bericht über Nuklearmaterial, spezifizierte Ausrüstung undnicht-nukleares Material

核物質、特定機器及び非核物質に関する自発的報告
11.15.

Declaration pursuant to an additional protocol

235‫إعالن بموجب بروتوكول إضافي‬按照附加议定书的申报
Déclaration en application d’un protocole additionnelЗаявление в связи с дополнительным протоколом
declaración presentada con arreglo a un protocolo adicional
Meldung gemäß Zusatzprotokoll

追加議定書に基づく申告
11.16.

Initial AP declaration‫إعالن أولي بموجب بروتوكول إضافي‬初始附加议定书申报
Déclaration initiale au titre d’un PAПервоначальное заявление в соответствии с ДП
declaración inicial con arreglo al PA
Erstmeldung gemäß AP

冒頭AP申告11.17.

Annual AP update declaration‫إعالن استيفائي سنوي بموجب بروتوكول إضافي‬年度附加议定书更新申报
Mise à jour annuelle au titre d’un PAГодовое обновление заявления в соответствии с ДП
declaración anual de actualización con arreglo al PA
Jährliche aktualisierte Meldung gemäß AP

年次AP更新申告
11.18.

Quarterly AP declaration‫إعالن فصلي بموجب بروتوكول إضافي‬季度附加议定书申报
Déclaration trimestrielle au titre d’un PAКвартальное заявление в соответствии с ДП
declaración trimestral con arreglo al PA
Vierteljährliche Meldung gemäß AP

四半期AP申告11.19.

State Declarations Portal (SDP)‫بوابة إلكترونية إلعالنات الدول‬国家申报门户

236

Portail des déclarations des États (SDP)Портал для передачи информации государствами (SDP)
Portal de Declaraciones de los Estados (SDP)
Portal für staatliche Meldungen

国別申告ポータル（SDP）
11.20.

Protocol Reporter

Protocol Reporter ‫البرنامج الحاسوبي‬议定书报告软件
Protocol Reporter
Protocol Reporter
Protocol Reporter
Protocol Reporter

プロトコールレポーター
11.21.

Open source information‫معلومات من مصادر مفتوحة‬公开来源的资料
Informations provenant de sources librement accessibles
Информация из открытых источников
información de fuentes de libre acceso
Information aus öffentlich zugänglichen Quellen

公開情報
11.22.

Third party information‫معلومات من أطراف ثالثة‬第三方资料
Informations fournies par des tiersИнформация от третьих сторон
información obtenida de terceros
Informationen von Drittparteien

第三者情報11.23.

Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)‫قاعدة بيانات الحادثات واالتجار غير المشروع‬事件和贩卖数据库
Base de données sur les incidents et les cas de trafic (ITDB)База данных по инцидентам и незаконному обороту (ITDB)

237

Base de Datos sobre Incidentes y Tráfico Ilícito (ITDB)
Datenbank über (illegale/n) Vorfälle und Handel

インシデント及び不正取引データベース（ITDB）
11.24.

Safeguards implementation issue‫قضية متصلة بتنفيذ الضمانات‬保障执行问题
Question concernant l’application des garantiesПроблема осуществления гарантий
cuestión relativa a la aplicación de las salvaguardias
Problem bei der Umsetzung der Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置実施上の課題
11.25.

Discrepancy‫تضارب‬不符合
ÉcartРасхождение
discrepancia
Diskrepanz

不一致
11.26.

Anomaly‫حالة شاذة‬异常
AnomalieАномалия
anomalía
Anomalie

アノマリー
11.27.

IAEA confidentiality regime‫نظام السرية التابع للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية‬国际原子能机构保密制度
Régime de confidentialité de l’AIEA
Режим конфиденциальности в МАГАТЭ
régimen de confidencialidad del OIEA
IAEO-System zum Schutz vertraulicher Informationen

238

IAEA機密保護（保持）体制
11.28.

State evaluation‫تقييم على مستوى الدولة‬国家评价
Évaluation au niveau de l’ÉtatОценка государства
evaluación a nivel de un Estado
Staatenspezifische Auswertung

国別評価
11.29.

State Evaluation Group (SEG)‫فريق التقييم الحكومي‬国家评价小组
Groupe d’évaluation au niveau de l’État (GEE)Группа оценки государства (ГОГ)
Grupo de Evaluación a nivel del Estado (GEE)
Gruppe für die Evaluierung eines Staates

国別評価グループ（SEG
11.30.

Safeguards effectiveness evaluation‫تقييم فعالية الضمانات‬保障有效性评价
Évaluation de l’efficacité des garantiesОценка действенности гарантий
evaluación de la eficacia de las salvaguardias
Auswertung der Wirksamkeit von Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置有効性評価
11.31.

Safeguards State evaluation report‫تقرير تقييم الضمانات على مستوى الدولة‬国家保障评价报告
Rapport d’évaluation des garanties au niveau de l’ÉtatОтчет об оценке гарантий в государстве
informe sobre las evaluaciones de salvaguardias a nivel de un Estado
Bericht über die staats-spezifische Auswertung von Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置国別評価報告239

11.32.

Safeguards conclusions‫استنتاجات الضمانات‬保障结论
Conclusions relatives aux garantiesЗаключения о применении гарантий
conclusiones de salvaguardias
Schlußfolgerungen aus Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置結論12.

REPORTING ON SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION‫تقديم التقارير عن تنفيذ الضمانات‬报告保障执行情况

PRÉSENTATION DE RAPPORTS SUR L’APPLICATION DESGARANTIESОТЧЕТНОСТЬ ОБ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЕНИИ ГАРАНТИЙ
PRESENTACIÓN DE INFORMES SOBRE LA APLICACIÓN DE LASSALVAGUARDIASBERICHTERSTATTUNG ÜBER DIE ANWENDUNG VONSICHERUNGSMAßNAHMEN

保障措置の実施に関する報告
12.1.

Reporting on design information verification‫تقديم التقارير عن التحقق من المعلومات التصميمية‬报告设计资料核实情况
Présentation de rapports sur la vérification des renseignements descriptifsСообщение о проверке информации о конструкции
presentación de informes sobre la verificación de la información sobre el
diseñoBerichterstattung über die Nachprüfung (Verifikation) von Anlagedaten

設計情報検認に関する報告
12.2.

Statement on Inspection Results (90(a) Statement)))‫(أ‬90 ‫بيان عن نتائج التفتيش (البيان‬视察结果说明（报表90(a)）
Déclaration sur les résultats des inspections [déclaration 90 a)]Заявление о результатах инспекции (Заявление 90 a))
declaración sobre los resultados de las inspecciones (declaración 90 a))
Erklärung über die Ergebnisse der Inspektionen (Nachprüfungstätigkeiten)

240査察結果に関する通報（90(a)通報）
12.3.

Statement on Conclusions (90(b) Statement)))‫(ب‬90 ‫بيان عن االستنتاجات (البيان‬结论说明（报表90(b)）
Déclaration sur les conclusions [déclaration 90 b)]Заявление о выводах (Заявление 90 b))
declaración sobre conclusiones (declaración 90 b))
Erklärung über die Schlußfolgerungen aus den Inspektionen(Nachprüfungstätigkeiten)

結論に関する通報（90(b)通報）
12.4.

Book inventory statement‫بيان الرصيد الدفتري‬账面存量说明Déclaration sur le stock comptableЗаявление о зарегистрированном инвентарном количестве
declaración sobre el inventario contable
Erklärung des Buchbestandes

帳簿在庫通報12.5.

Quarterly import communication‫رسالة استيراد فصلية‬季度进口通报
Communication trimestrielle sur les importationsКвартальное сообщение об импорте
comunicación de importaciones trimestral
Vierteljährliche Einfuhrmitteilung

四半期毎の輸入情報連絡12.6.

Statement on domestic and international transfers (semi-annual transit
matching statement))‫بيان عن عمليات النقل المحلية والدولية (بيان نصف سنوي عن مطابقة حاالت العبور‬关于国内和国际转让的说明（半年度转运匹配说明）Déclaration sur les transferts intérieurs et internationaux (déclaration
semestrielle sur la mise en correspondance des expéditions et desarrivées)Заявление о внутригосударственных и международных передачах
(полугодовое заявление о согласованности данных о передачах)241

declaración sobre traslados nacionales e internacionales (declaración
semestral de comprobación de la correspondencia de traslados)
Erklärung über inländische und internationale Transfers

国内及び国際移転に関する通報（半期移転照合通報）
12.7.

Statement of timeliness in reporting‫بيان عن التأخير في التبليغ‬提出报告的及时性说明
Déclaration sur les délais de présentation des rapportsЗаявление о своевременности представления отчетности
declaración sobre la puntualidad en la presentación de los informes
Erklärung über die Rechtzeitigkeit der Berichterstattung

報告の適時性に関する通報
12.8.

Reporting on inspections under an item-specific safeguards agreement‫تقديم تقرير عن عمليات التفتيش بموجب اتفاق ضمانات يخص مفردات بعينها‬根据特定物项保障协定的视察结果报告Présentation de rapports sur les inspections en vertu d’un accord de
garanties relatifs à des éléments particuliersСообщение об инспекциях в рамках соглашения о гарантиях вотношении конкретных предметов
informes sobre las inspecciones realizadas con arreglo a un acuerdo desalvaguardias específico para partidas
Berichterstattung über Inspektionen im Rahmen eines
gegenstandspezifischen Sicherungsübereinkommens

対象物特定保障措置協定に基づく査察に関する報告
12.9.

Statements under an AP‫بيانات بموجب بروتوكول إضافي‬根据附加议定书所作的说明
Déclarations en vertu d’un PAЗаявления в соответствии с ДП
declaraciones con arreglo a un PA
Erklärungen gemäß Zusatzprotokoll

追加議定書に基づく通報
12.10.

Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)‫تقرير تنفيذ الضمانات‬保障执行情况报告

242

Rapport sur l’application des garanties (SIR)Доклад об осуществлении гарантий (ДОГ)
Informe sobre la Aplicación de las Salvaguardias (IAS)
Bericht über die Durchführung von Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置実施報告書（SIR）
12.11.

IAEA Annual Report‫التقرير السنوي للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية‬国际原子能机构年度报告
Rapport annuel de l’AIEA
Годовой доклад МАГАТЭ
Informe Anual del OIEA
IAEO-Jahresbericht

IAEA年次報告書
12.12.

Director General’s report on Strengthening the Effectiveness andImproving the Efficiency of Agency Safeguards‫تقرير المدير العام بشأن تعزيز فعالية ضمانات الوكالة وتحسين كفاءتها‬关于加强国际原子能机构保障的有效性和提高其效率的总干事的报告
Rapport du Directeur général sur le renforcement de l’efficacité etl’amélioration de l’efficience des garanties de l’AgenceДоклад Генерального директора о повышении действенности иэффективности гарантий Агентства
informe del Director General sobre fortalecimiento de la eficacia yaumento de la eficiencia de las salvaguardias del Organismo
Bericht des Generaldirektors über die Stärkung der Effektivität undVerbesserung der Effizienz von IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen

機関（IAEA）保障措置の有効性強化及び効率性向上に関する事務局長報告13.

STATE AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES, RESPONSIBILITIES,SUPPORT AND SERVICES‫السلطات والمسؤوليات والدعم والخدمات على الصعيدين الحكومي واإلقليمي‬国家和地区当局、责任、支持和服务
AUTORITÉS NATIONALES ET RÉGIONALES, RESPONSABILITÉS,APPUI ET SERVICES
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЕ И РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫЕ КОМПЕТЕНТНЫЕ
ОРГАНЫ, ОБЯЗАННОСТИ, ПОДДЕРЖКА И УСЛУГИ

243

AUTORIDADES, RESPONSABILIDADES, APOYO YSERVICIOS ESTATALES Y REGIONALESSTAATLICHE UND REGIONALE BEHÖRDEN,
VERANTWORTLICHKEITEN, UNTERSTÜTZUNG UNDDIENSTLEISTUNGEN

国及び地域当局の責任及び支援並びにサービス
13.1.

State (or regional) system of accounting for and control of nuclear
material (SSAC/RSAC)‫نظام حكومي (أو إقليمي) لحصر ومراقبة المواد النووية‬国家（或地区）核材料衡算和控制系统（国家核材料衡控系统/地区核材料衡控系统）Système national (ou régional) de comptabilité et de contrôle des matières
nucléaires (SNCC/SRCC)
Государственная (или региональная) система учета и контроля
ядерного материала (ГСУК/РСУК)sistema nacional (o regional) de contabilidad y control de material nuclear(SNCC/SRCC)
Staatliches (oder regionales) System für Buchführung und Kontrolle vonKernmaterial

国内（または地域）核物質計量管理制度（SSAC／RSAC）
13.2.

State or regional authority responsible for safeguards implementation(SRA)‫سلطة حكومية أو إقليمية مسؤولة عن تنفيذ الضمانات‬负责保障执行的国家当局或地区当局
Autorité nationale ou régionale chargée de l’application des garanties(ANR)Государственный или региональный компетентный орган,ответственный за осуществление гарантий (ГРКО)autoridad nacional o regional encargada de la aplicación de lassalvaguardias (ANR)
Staatliche oder regionale Behörde verantwortlich für die Durchführung vonSicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置実施のための国または地域当局（SRA）
13.3.

Safeguards infrastructure‫بنية أساسية للضمانات‬保障基础结构
Infrastructure des garanties

244Инфраструктура гарантий
infraestructura de salvaguardias
Infrastruktur für Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置基盤（保障措置インフラ）
13.4.

Safeguards regulatory infrastructure‫بنية أساسية رقابية للضمانات‬保障监管基础结构
Infrastructure réglementaire des garantiesИнфраструктура регулирования гарантий
infraestructura de reglamentación en materia de salvaguardias
Regulierende Infrastruktur für Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置規制基盤（保障措置規制インフラ）
13.5.

IAEA Safeguards and SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS)‫الخدمة االستشارية التابعة للوكالة والمعنية بالضمانات والنظم الحكومية لحصر ومراقبة‬‫المواد النووية‬国际原子能机构保障与国家核材料衡控系统咨询服务
Service consultatif de l’AIEA sur les garanties et les systèmes nationaux decomptabilité et de contrôle des matières nucléairesКонсультативная служба МАГАТЭ по гарантиям и ГСУК (ИССАС)Servicio de Asesoramiento del OIEA sobre Salvaguardias y SNCC(ISSAS)
Beratungsleistung zu IAEO-Sicherungsmaßnahmen und SSAC

IAEA保障措置及びSSAC諮問サービス（ISSAS）
13.6.

Member State Support Programme (MSSP)‫برنامج الدعم الخاص بالدول األعضاء‬成员国支助计划
Programme d’appui d’États Membres (PAEM)
Программа поддержки со стороны государств-членов (ППГЧ)programa de apoyo de los Estados Miembros (PAEM)
Unterstützungsprogramm eines Mitgliedstaates

対IAEA保障措置支援計画
13.7.

Support Programme Information and Communication System(SPRICS)‫نظام المعلومات واالتصاالت المتعلقة ببرامج الدعم‬信息和通讯系统支助计划245

Système d’information et de communication sur les programmes d’appui(SPRICS)Информационно-коммуникационная система программ поддержки
(ИКСПП)Sistema de Comunicación e Información de los Programas de Apoyo(SPRICS)
Informations- und Kommunikationssystem für Unterstützungsprogramme

支援計画情報及びコミュニケーションシステム（SPRICS）
13.8.

Research and Development Plan

‫خطة البحث والتطوير‬研究与发展计划
Plan de recherche-développementПлан научно-исследовательских и опытно-конструкторских работ
Plan de investigación y desarrollo
Forschungs- und Entwicklungsplan

研究開発計画
13.9.

Enhancing Capabilities for Nuclear Verification: Resource
Mobilization Priorities (RMP)‫ أولويات حشد الموارد‬:‫تعزيز القدرات للتحقق النووي‬加强核核查能力：资源调动的优先事项
Renforcement des capacités dans le domaine de la vérification nucléaire :priorités en matière de mobilisation des ressourcesРазвитие потенциала ядерной проверки: приоритеты в области
мобилизации ресурсов (ПМР)
Mejora de las capacidades de verificación nuclear: Prioridades para lamovilización de recursos (RMP)
Verbesserung der Fähigkeiten zur nuklearen Verifikation: Prioritäten der
Ressourcenmobilisierung

核物質検認のための能力強化：資源投入の優先順位（RMP）
13.10.

Development and Implementation Support (D&IS) Programme for
Nuclear Verification‫برنامج دعم التطوير والتنفيذ في مجال التحقق النووي‬核核查的发展和实施支助计划
Programme de développement et d’appui à la mise en œuvre pour lavérification nucléaire
Программа поддержки опытно-конструкторских и внедренческих
работ для целей ядерной проверки

246

Programa de apoyo al desarrollo y la aplicación de la verificación nuclear
Programm zur Unterstützung der Entwicklung und Durchführung der
nuklearen Verifikation

核物質検認のための開発及び実施支援（D&IS）計画
13.11.

Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR)‫االستعراض المتكامل للبنية األساسية النووية‬综合核基础结构评审
Examen intégré de l’infrastructure nucléaire (INIR)Комплексная оценка ядерной инфраструктуры (ИНИР)Examen Integrado de la Infraestructura Nuclear (INIR)
Integrierte Überprüfung der nuklearen Infrastruktur

統合原子力基盤レビュー（INIR）
13.12.

Nuclear Power Support Group and Integrated Work Plan

‫فريق دعم القوى النووية وخطة العمل المتكاملة‬核电支助组和综合工作计划Groupe d’appui à l’énergie d’origine nucléaire et plan de travail intégréГруппа содействия развитию ядерной энергетики и комплексный планработы
Grupo de Apoyo a la Energía Nucleoeléctrica y Plan de Trabajo Integrado
Gruppe zur Unterstützung der Kernenergie und integrierter Arbeitsplan

原子力支援グループ及び統合業務計画
13.13.

Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI)‫الفريق االستشاري الدائم المعني بتنفيذ الضمانات‬保障执行常设咨询组（保障咨询组）Groupe consultatif permanent sur l’application des garanties (SAGSI)Постоянная консультативная группа по осуществлению гарантий
(САГСИ)Grupo Asesor Permanente sobre Aplicación de Salvaguardias (SAGSI)
Ständige beratende Gruppe für die Durchführung derSicherungsmaßnahmen

IAEA保障措置実施諮問委員会
13.14

Safeguards by design‫إدراج الضمانات في التصميم‬设计中纳入保障

247

Intégration des garanties dans la conceptionУчет требований гарантий при проектировании
incorporación de las salvaguardias en el diseño
Sicherungsmaßnahmen durch Konstruktionsweise

保障措置統合設計
13.15.

Safeguards Traineeship Programme‫برنامج المتدربين في مجال الضمانات‬保障培训计划
Programme de stages dans le domaine des garantiesПрограмма стажировок в области гарантий
Programa de Capacitación en Salvaguardias
Traineeprogramm für Sicherungsmaßnahmen

保障措置研修プログラム
13.16.

Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials (ABACC)‫األرجنتينية لحصر ومراقبة المواد النووية‬-‫الهيئة البرازيلية‬巴西-阿根廷核材料衡算和控制机构（巴阿核材料衡控机构）
Agence brasilo-argentine de comptabilité et de contrôle des matières
nucléaires (ABACC)
Бразильско-аргентинское агентство по учету и контролю ядерных
материалов (АБАКК)Agencia Brasileño-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales
Nucleares (ABACC)
Brasilianisch-Argentinische Agentur für Buchführung und Kontrolle vonKernmaterial

核物質計量管理のためのブラジル－アルゼンチン機関（
ABACC）
13.17.

European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom))‫الجماعة األوروبية للطاقة الذرية (اليوراتوم‬欧洲原子能联营（欧原联）Communauté européenne de l’énergie atomique (Euratom)Европейское сообщество по атомной энергии (Евратом)Comunidad Europea de la Energía Atómica (Euratom)
Europäische Atomgemeinschaft (Euratom)

欧州原子力委員会（Euratom）

248

13.18.

New partnership approach (NPA)‫نهج الشراكة الجديدة‬新伙伴关系方案
Nouvelle formule de partenariat (NFP)Новый принцип партнерства (НПП)
nuevo enfoque de cooperación (NEC)Neuer Partnerschaftlicher Ansatz

ニューパートナーシップアプローチ（NPA）
13.19.

Side-letter States‫دول الرسالة الجانبية‬补充协议国家
États ayant soumis une lettre d’accompagnementГосударства, участвующие в дополнительном соглашении
Estados con carta adjunta"Side-Letter"-Staaten

サイドレター国
13.20

Safeguards guidance in the IAEA Services Series‫إرشادات الضمانات في سلسلة خدمات الوكالة‬国际原子能机构《服务丛书》保障导则
Documents d’orientation dans le domaine des garanties publiés dans lacollection Services de l’AIEA
Руководящие материалы по гарантиям в Серии услуг МАГАТЭ
orientaciones de salvaguardias en la Colección de Servicios del OIEA
Leitfaden für die IAEO-Serviceserie über Sicherungsmaßnahmen

IAEAサービスシリーズによる保障措置ガイダンス

249

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ABACC
AIP
AP
ARIE
ATPM
AWCC
BI
C/S
CDM
CNIP
CSA
DA
DIE
DIQ
DIV
EDXRF
EEL
ERML
ES
FF
FSV
GSMS
HEU
HLNCC
HPGe
ICP-MS
ICR
IDMS
IIL
IIV
IMUF
INIR
ISA
ISOCS
ISSAS
ITDB
ITV

Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of
Nuclear Materials
annual implementation plan
additional protocol
actual routine inspection effort
advanced thermohydraulic power monitor
active well coincidence counterbook inventory
containment and surveillancecore discharge monitor
country nuclear infrastructure profile
comprehensive safeguards agreement
destructive analysis
design information examination
design information questionnaire
design information verificationenergy dispersive X ray fluorescenceessential equipment list
Equipment Radiation Monitoring Laboratory (IAEA)
environmental sampling
fresh fuelflow sheet verification
gas source mass spectrometry
high enriched uraniumhigh level neutron coincidence counterhigh purity germanium
inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry
inventory change reportisotope dilution mass spectrometry
itemized inventory listing
interim inventory verification
inspector’s estimate of material unaccounted forIntegrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (IAEA)
International standards of accountancy
in situ object counting system
IAEA Safeguards and SSAC Advisory Service
Incident and Trafficking Database (IAEA)
international target value
251

IWP
JUA
JUE
KMP
LEU
LFUA
LG-SIMS
LIBS
LII
LOF
MBA
MBP
MBR
MDC
MOX
MRIE
MSSP
MUF
NDA
NNWS
NPA
NPSG
NPT
NRTA
NRTS
NSG
NWFZ
NWS
PCAS
PDI
PGET System
PIL
PIV
PLARIE
PUSP
RDT
RSAC
RSD
SDP
SEG
252

integrated work planjoint use arrangement
joint use equipment
key measurement point
low enriched uranium
limited frequency unannounced accesslarge geometry secondary ion mass spectrometry
laser induced breakdown spectroscopy
list of inventory items
location outside facilities
material balance areamaterial balance periodmaterial balance reportmaterial description code
mixed oxide
maximum routine inspection effort
Member State Support Programme (IAEA)
material unaccounted fornon-destructive assay
non-nuclear-weapon State
new partnership approach
Nuclear Power Support Group
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
near real time accountancy
near real time system
Nuclear Suppliers Group
nuclear-weapon-free zone
nuclear-weapon Stateplutonium canister assay system
person-day of inspection
Passive Gamma Emission Tomographic System
physical inventory listing
physical inventory verification
planned actual routine inspection effort
Pu(VI) spectrophotometry
remote data transmission
regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear
material
relative standard deviation
State Declarations Portal
State Evaluation Group

SEM
SF
SIMS
SIR
SLA
SLC
SNRI
SQ
SQP
SRA
SRD
SSAC
SSF
STA
TIMS
UMS
VOA
VRS
WDXRF
XRF

scanning electron microscopy
spent fuelsecondary ion mass spectrometry
Safeguards Implementation Report (IAEA)
State-level safeguards approach
State-level concept
short notice random inspection
significant quantity
small quantities protocol
State or regional authority responsible for safeguards
implementation
shipper/receiver differenceState system of accounting for and control of nuclear
material
State-specific factor
safeguards transfer agreement
thermal ionization mass spectrometry
unattended monitoring system
voluntary offer agreement
voluntary reporting scheme
wavelength dispersive X ray fluorescence
X ray fluorescence253

INDEXABACC (Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials)
1.20, 1.29, 13.16
3.17, 3.29

abrupt diversion

1.26, 1.27, 3.18, 10.15

access for inspectionaccess to information, denial or restriction

11.26

accidental gain (inventory change code: GA)
accountability areas
accountancy

1.8,

5.17, 5.21

5.36

1.37, 3.11, 3.31, 4.3, 4.45, 5.2, 5.6, 5.61, 7.5
5.36, 5.38

accountancy, international standards of

1.37, 3.11, 3.31, 4.3, 4.27, 4.33, 4.45, 5.2, 5.6, 7.5, 7.12,

accountancy, nuclear material
9.11, 9.31, 13.2
accountancy system

5.42

accountancy verification methods, IAEA
accounting mistakes and corrections
accounting, nuclear material

5.53, 5.61, 8.18, 9.10

5.32, 5.46

3.18, 5.1, 5.2, 5.61, 5.62, 10.19, 11.19, 12.7, 13.1

accounting records

5.1, 5.23, 5.32, 5.33, 5.43, 5.51, 5.63, 9.6, 9.8

accounting report

5.1, 5.16, 5.23, 5.32, 5.62, 5.65, 11.3, 11.4, 11.7, 11.19, 12.7

accounting transactions
accuracy, limits of

9.16

accuracy, measurement
acquisition path

5.35

5.36, 9.8

3.5, 3.7, 3.14, 3.15, 3.18, 3.21

acquisition path analysis 3.5, 3.7, 3.14, 11.29
actinide elements
active analysis

8.12, 8.13
6.19

active neutron coincidence counter

6.20, 6.33

active well coincidence counter (AWCC)
actual routine inspection effort (ARIE)

6.33
10.24, 10.25

255

additional inspections, requests for

1.6

additional protocol (AP) 1.7, 1.18, 1.25, 1.30, 2.9, 2.12, 3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 3.7, 3.11, 4.32, 10.20,
10.27, 10.30, 11.11, 11.15, 11.16, 11.18–11.20, 11.26, 11.27, 12.9, 13.2, 13.17, 13.19
10.5, 10.15, 10.16, 10.31

ad hoc inspection
adjustment

5.31, 9.13, 9.14

adjustment, bias

9.13, 9.14

adjustment, rounding

5.41

advanced thermohydraulic power monitor (ATPM) systemadvance notice of complementary access

7.17

10.31

10.18

advance notice of inspections

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)
Agency’s Inspectors (Inspectors Document)
Agency’s Safeguards (1961, extended in 1964)

1.6

1.14
1.15, 2.2

Agency’s Safeguards System (1965, as Provisionally Extended in 1966 and 1968) (Safeguards
Document) 1.16, 2.2
Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the
Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy 1.8, 13.16
1.10

agreement, bilateral cooperation

Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency
AIP (annual implementation plan)aliquots

3.5, 3.7, 3.30, 11.29

6.5, 6.10

alpha spectrometry

6.18

alternative nuclear material
americium

4.17, 4.18

1.34, 3.35, 4.17, 6.7
1.34, 3.35, 4.17

americium (Am) monitoring scheme
analyte

6.13, 6.17

annual AP update declaration

11.15, 11.17

annual implementation plan (AIP)
annual throughput

256

3.5, 3.7, 3.30, 11.29

5.4, 10.17, 10.26

1.19

anomaly

7.5, 9.31, 11.24, 11.25, 11.26

AP (additional protocol) 1.7, 1.18, 1.25, 1.30, 2.9, 2.12, 3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 3.7, 3.11, 4.32, 10.20,
10.27, 10.30, 11.11, 11.15, 11.16, 11.18–11.20, 11.26, 11.27, 12.9, 13.2, 13.17, 13.19
Application of Safeguards in Relation to the Granting of Technical AssistanceAP, statements under an

12.9

ARIE (actual routine inspection effort)
assay

10.24, 10.25

6.8, 6.19, 6.32, 6.37

assemblies, critical

4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.55

assistance, technical1.12, 1.13

9.25

attributes test

authentication measures

7.20

1.5

Bangkok Treaty

baseline environmental signature
batch

1.12

8.9

5.11, 5.40, 9.9, 11.8

batch data

5.12, 5.13, 5.33, 5.35, 5.63, 5.67, 11.5, 11.8

batch follow-up

5.30

batch identifier (batch ID)

5.14

batch of nuclear material

4.35, 5.11, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.44, 5.48

batch renaming

5.17, 5.30

batch weight

5.12, 5.67

beta decays

4.7

beta particles

4.21

BI (book inventory)
bias adjustment
bias defect9.13, 9.14

9.9, 9.10

biases, measurement
bias, residual

5.33, 5.43, 5.46, 5.51, 5.52, 5.54, 5.63, 10.6, 10.15, 11.7, 12.4

6.1, 9.13

9.14

bilateral cooperation agreement

1.10, 1.23

bilateral or multilateral arrangements

1.1, 1.20

257

book balance period

5.50

book inventory (BI)5.33, 5.43, 5.46, 5.51, 5.52, 5.54, 5.63, 10.6, 10.15, 11.7, 12.4

book inventory statement
boron

12.4

4.37

Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)
1.20, 1.29, 13.16
3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 3.7

broader conclusion
bulk analysis

8.13, 8.19

bulk facilities

3.3

bulk handling facility
bulk material

4.27, 4.46, 5.11
5.39, 6.3, 9.11

bulk measurement
burnup3.18, 4.46, 5.38, 9.6

4.20, 5.25, 5.66

calendar-days in the field for verification (CDFVs)

10.1, 10.21

calibration

5.1, 5.2, 5.34, 5.36, 5.37, 5.60, 6.1, 6.2, 6.20, 6.25, 9.11, 9.14, 10.16

calorimetry

6.7
5.8

CAM (catch-all material balance area)
cascade area

10.11

catch-all material balance area (CAM)

5.8

categorization of facilities and LOFs

4.52

categorization of nuclear material
category change procedure

4.24

5.66

CDFVs (calendar-days in the field for verification)
CDM (core discharge monitor)
Cerenkov glow

7.13

6.19, 6.27

Cerenkov radiation detection

6.27

chemical composition of nuclear material
chemical titration

4.56, 5.16, 5.34, 5.40, 6.3, 10.5, 10.6

6.10

closed-down facility (or closed-down LOF)

258

10.1, 10.21

4.47, 4.49, 10.30

1.8,

2.10, 4.47, 4.49, 10.30

closed-down LOF

CNIP (country nuclear infrastructure profile)
Code 10

13.12

5.16, 5.17, 5.62, 5.65–5.67, 11.4

Code 3.1, Modified

1.31

coincidence counters6.32, 6.33

combined procedure for uranium concentration and enrichment assay (COMPUCEA)
Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC)

1.8, 13.16

3.11, 10.1, 10.21, 10.27, 10.31, 10.32, 13.2

complementary access10.32

complementary access activities

complementary access, advance notice ofcomposite sample

6.36

10.31

6.5, 8.6

comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 1.11, 1.17, 1.18, 1.21, 1.22, 1.23,
1.25–1.28, 1.31, 1.34, 2.4–2.7, 2.12, 2.15, 2.17, 3.1, 3.3, 3.7, 3.8, 3.14, 11.15
COMPUCEA (combined procedure for uranium concentration and enrichment assay)
concealment methods

6.36

3.18, 9.5, 9.6, 9.8

concentration of elements and isotopes 2.12, 2.14, 4.9, 4.28, 4.32, 4.37, 4.40, 5.13, 6.3, 6.9,
6.12, 6.14, 6.34, 6.36, 6.37, 9.11, 9.20, 9.26
concise notes
confidence

11.5, 11.6
9.16, 9.17, 9.21, 9.32

confidence limits

9.17

confidential or sensitive information
confirmation of transfers
containment

7.10, 7.29, 11.27

11.13

3.31, 5.7, 5.16, 5.59, 5.62, 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.10, 7.19, 7.24, 10.16, 11.25
7.3, 7.5, 7.6, 7.12

containment/surveillance device
containment/surveillance measures

3.18, 5.7, 5.59, 7.1, 7.5, 7.6, 10.16, 10.19, 11.10, 11.25, 11.26

containment/surveillance measures, system ofcontinuous inspection

10.13

controlled potential coulometry
conversion of isotopes

7.6, 7.28

6.11

4.21, 4.30

259

conversion plants

1.16, 3.20, 4.40, 4.46, 4.52, 4.56, 4.57

conversion time

3.20

conversion, undeclared

3.15
1.29

cooperation protocolcore discharge monitor (CDM)
correction

7.13

5.32, 12.1

correlations, real and accidental

6.25

coulometry, controlled potential

6.11

country nuclear infrastructure profile (CNIP)

13.12

4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.55

critical assemblies
criticality check5.61, 7.18

critical masses

3.19

critical region

9.20, 9.27, 9.31

cross-contamination

6.17, 8.7, 8.8, 8.10

C/S (containment/surveillance)

7.3

CSA (comprehensive safeguards agreement) 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 1.11, 1.17, 1.18, 1.21, 1.22, 1.23,
1.25–1.28, 1.31, 1.34, 2.4–2.7, 2.12, 2.15, 2.17, 3.1, 3.3, 3.7, 3.8, 3.14, 11.15
CSA, starting point of safeguards under a2.12, 5.19

CuMUF (cumulative material unaccounted for)5.47, 9.1

cumulative material unaccounted for (CuMUF)

5.47, 9.1

cumulative shipper/receiver difference
DA (destructive analysis)

5.49, 9.1

3.12, 5.39, 5.60, 6.8, 6.9, 6.28, 6.36, 6.37, 8.18

D&IS (Development and Implementation Support) Programme for Nuclear Verification
data authentication
data, batch

7.12, 7.20

5.12, 5.13, 5.33, 5.35, 5.63, 5.67, 11.5, 11.8

data encoding/decoding

7.21

data, equipment state of healthdata, identification
data, identity

260

5.14

5.14, 5.35

7.22, 7.25, 7.28

13.10

data measurement, historical

9.19

data, mistakes in recording

5.32, 5.46, 9.11, 9.18

data, source

5.2, 5.13, 5.33, 5.35, 5.42, 5.63

data transmission, remote (RDT)

3.18, 9.2, 9.3, 9.8

D, diversion into
decay

3.3, 7.25, 7.28

4.7, 4.20, 5.25, 6.19

declaration pursuant to an additional protocol
Declarations Portal, State (SDP)
declared material

11.15

11.19

9.6, 9.8, 9.9

decommissioned for safeguards purposes

4.47, 4.50, 10.2

3.31, 4.33, 4.47, 4.48, 4.49, 4.50, 10.2, 10.27, 13.14

decommissioning

7.12, 7.21

decryption/encryption

de-exemption (inventory change codes: DU, DQ)
defect5.17, 5.22

3.25, 5.61, 6.36, 7.15, 9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 9.28, 9.29, 9.30, 9.33

de minimus quantity

12.6

denial or restriction of access to information

11.26

denuclearization

1.3

depleted uranium

3.19, 4.4, 4.10, 4.23, 4.26, 4.29, 5.12, 5.15, 5.65, 5.66

depletion

4.20
1.26, 1.31, 3.31, 5.7, 5.9, 10.2, 13.14

design information

design information examination (DIE)
design information, facility

3.31, 3.32, 3.33, 3.34, 10.30, 11.26, 11.30

design information questionnaire (DIQ)
design information verification (DIV)
destructive analysis (DA)

3.31, 3.32, 11.19
3.11, 3.31, 10.1, 10.2, 10.21, 10.31, 11.1, 12.1

3.12, 5.39, 5.60, 6.8, 6.9, 6.28, 6.36, 6.37, 8.18

detecting events

6.25, 9.28, 9.29

detection, early

2.3, 2.11, 5.58, 5.64

detection of diversion

3.33, 3.34

9.7, 9.8, 10.11, 10.12

261

3.23, 9.6, 9.10, 9.28, 9.29, 9.30, 9.32

detection probability
3.21

detection time

6.22

detector, scintillation
detector, semiconductor
detectors, radiation

6.23

6.27, 7.12, 10.32

detector substrate, fission track
detector system, fork

8.15

6.31

deterrence

2.3, 2.11

deuterium

4.36, 4.38

Development and Implementation Support (D&IS) Programme for Nuclear Verification
DIE (design information examination)

3.33, 3.34

DIQ (design information questionnaire)

3.31, 3.32, 11.19

13.10

3.19, 3.28, 4.12–4.15, 4.24, 4.25, 4.26

direct use material

Director General’s report on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency ofAgency Safeguards 12.12
discrepancy

9.8, 9.31, 11.25, 11.26, 12.2
3.11, 3.31, 10.1, 10.2, 10.21, 10.31, 11.1, 12.1

DIV (design information verification)
3.17, 3.29

diversion, abrupt

diversion, detection of

9.7, 9.8, 10.11, 10.12

3.18, 9.2, 9.3, 9.8

diversion into D

diversion into MUF

3.18, 9.2, 9.6, 9.7

diversion into SRD

3.18, 9.7

diversion of nuclear material 1.8, 1.9, 1.22, 2.5, 2.6, 3.6, 3.10, 3.13, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.20,
3.21, 3.23, 3.28, 3.29, 5.64, 9.3, 9.7, 9.8, 11.26
diversion path

3.5, 3.13, 3.18

diversion path analysis
diversion, protracted

3.5, 3.13
3.16

domestic and international transfers

12.6

domestic receipt (inventory change codes: RD, RN, RS)

262

5.17, 5.19, 5.68, 12.6

domestic shipment (inventory change codes: SD, SN)
D statistic

5.17, 5.24, 5.68, 10.10, 12.6

9.1, 9.4, 9.8, 9.35

dual-use items, nuclear related
dummy fuel assemblies
early detection

1.36

3.18

2.3, 2.11, 5.58, 5.64

EDS (energy X ray spectroscopy)

8.16

EDXRF (energy dispersive XRF) systems

6.34

3.31, 3.34

EEL (essential equipment list)
effective kilogram (ekg)

1.33, 4.29, 4.43, 4.44, 10.17, 10.26, 11.12

ekg (effective kilogram)

1.33, 4.29, 4.43, 4.44, 10.17, 10.26, 11.12

electrolysis
electrons

6.11
6.11, 6.27, 8.16

electronic seals, application ofelement code

3.3, 7.4

5.65

encryption/decryption

7.12, 7.21

energy dispersive XRF (EDXRF) systems
energy X ray spectroscopy (EDS)
Enhancing Capabilities(RMP) 13.8, 13.9
enrichment

for

6.34

8.16
NuclearVerification:

Resource

Mobilization

Priorities

2.12, 4.19, 4.23, 4.25, 4.29, 4.40, 4.42, 4.59, 5.15, 5.65–5.67, 6.20, 6.36

enrichment (isotope separation) plants

1.36, 2.12, 4.20, 4.40, 4.46, 4.52, 4.59

Environmental Sample Laboratory (ESL)
environmental samples
8.19, 8.21, 10.32

3.12, 6.28, 6.29, 6.35, 6.38, 6.39, 8.9, 8.11, 8.12, 8.14, 8.16,
6.28, 8.1–8.4, 8.11, 10.11, 10.19

environmental sampling (ES)environmental sampling kit

6.28, 8.12

8.11, 8.21

environmental sampling, location specificenvironmental sampling, wide area
environments, high radioactive

8.2

8.3, 8.6, 10.27

6.37

263

equipment authorization

7.7, 7.26

Equipment Radiation Monitoring Laboratory (ERML)
equipment, specified

6.38

1.10, 1.23, 1.32, 1.35, 1.36, 11.15
7.22, 7.23, 7.25, 7.28, 10.27

equipment state of health data
7.27

equipment validation

ERML (Equipment Radiation Monitoring Laboratory)

6.38

9.16, 9.20

error, limits of

6.1, 9.10, 9.11, 9.12, 9.19, 9.36, 9.37

error, measurement
error propagation

9.15

9.11, 9.12, 9.19, 9.37

error, random
error, systematic

9.11, 9.13, 9.14, 9.19, 9.37

error, type I

9.22, 9.31

error, type II

9.23, 9.24
6.28, 8.1–8.4, 10.11, 10.19

ES (environmental sampling)

ESL (Environmental Sample Laboratory)

6.28, 8.12

3.31, 3.34

essential equipment list (EEL)

Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community)
Euratom Treaty

1.9, 1.37, 13.17

European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)

evaluation, material balance

1.9, 1.20, 1.29, 13.17, 13.18

11.29

Evaluation Group, State (SEG)

3.12, 5.40, 9.1, 9.7, 9.8, 11.1, 11.26

evaluation report, safeguards State

11.29, 11.31

evaluation, safeguards effectiveness

11.30

evaluation, State

1.9, 1.20, 1.29, 13.17, 13.18

11.26, 11.28
5.51, 10.32

examination of records
excepted package
exempt consignment

6.39
6.39

exemption (nuclear material) (inventory change codes: EU, EQ)

264

2.14, 5.17, 5.27

exemption from IAEA safeguards
export denials

2.14, 5.17, 5.27

11.22

exporting materials

1.34, 1.35, 1.36, 11.13, 11.15, 11.21, 13.2, 13.4

extrabudgetary support

13.6, 13.7, 13.10

4.42, 4.45, 4.55

facilities, criticalfacilities, research and development

1.15, 10.6

2.14, 4.40, 4.46, 4.51, 4.57, 4.60, 5.38

facilities, storage

facilities under construction

2.10, 4.47

facility 1.23, 1.24, 1.26, 1.27, 1.30, 1.31, 2.2–2.5, 2.7, 3.1, 3.4, 3.6, 3.7, 3.31, 4.43, 5.7, 5.33,
7.30, 9.19, 10.2, 10.3, 10.13, 10.17–10.19, 10.21, 10.24–10.27, 11.3, 11.12, 11.21, 13.1, 13.5, 13.14
4.47, 4.49, 10.30

facility, closed-down

facility decommissioning

3.31, 4.33, 4.47, 4.48, 4.49, 4.50, 10.2, 10.27, 13.14

facility design information

3.31, 3.32, 3.33, 3.34, 10.30, 11.26, 11.30

facility, item

4.45

facility life cycle

3.31, 4.47, 10.2, 13.14

facility, misuse

2.5, 2.7, 3.13, 9.29, 11.26

facility, new1.31, 3.31, 10.2, 10.4, 13.14

facility, operational data and information 3.18, 3.34, 4.33, 4.48, 5.34, 5.38, 5.57, 7.12, 8.6, 10.6,
10.10, 10.13, 10.24, 10.25, 11.6, 11.9, 11.11, 11.21, 11.30, 12.2, 13.14
facility operators 3.3, 4.46, 5.2, 5.6, 5.21, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.42, 5.44, 5.46, 5.55–5.57, 5.60, 7.9,
7.30, 8.10, 9.1–9.4, 9.8, 9.9, 9.19–9.21, 9.35, 10.10, 10.24, 11.8, 11.11, 11.21, 11.25, 11.26,
12.3, 13.1, 13.12
facility records

5.34, 5.51, 5.52, 5.53, 11.25

facility, shut-down

4.47, 4.48

facility, undeclared

2.10

false alarm probability
falsifying records

9.21, 9.22, 9.31

3.18, 9.8, 9.9

feed material

4.30, 4.56

fertile material

4.7, 4.16, 5.20

fissile material

4.6, 4.18, 4.20, 7.17

265

fissile material, special
fissile nuclides

1.7, 1.9

8.15

fissionable isotopes

4.28

fissionable material

4.6, 4.18, 6.25, 6.33

fissionable material, special 1.1, 1.2, 1.4–1.7, 1.22, 1.35, 1.36, 2.14, 4.1, 4.5, 4.7, 4.11,
4.13–4.15, 4.17, 4.18, 4.36, 5.20
fissionable sample

6.33

fission chambers

6.24, 7.18

fission, neutron or photon induced
fission products in spent fuel

6.19

6.20

fission, spontaneous or induced

6.25, 6.32

8.15

fission track analysis

1.34, 3.35

flowsheet verification (FSV)
follow-up sampling plan

9.33

formula for estimating sample size
frequency of inspection

10.17

frequency of safeguards activity

3.26

1.34, 3.35

FSV (flowsheet verification)

3.18, 4.34, 5.59, 5.62, 6.27, 6.31, 9.33, 10.12

fuel assembly
fuel bundle

9.10, 9.32

4.34, 7.13, 7.14
7.14

fuel bundle counter, spent
fuel cladding

4.39

fuel component

4.34, 4.35, 5.62

fuel cycle, nuclear
11.21, 13.6, 13.15

1.24, 1.36, 2.12, 3.1, 3.3–3.5, 3.7, 4.40–4.42, 6.36, 10.12, 10.24, 11.15,

fuel element (or fuel assembly, fuel bundle)
fuel fabrication plants
10.12, 10.30, 11.11
fuel, fresh

266

4.34, 4.35, 4.57, 5.34, 5.62

1.16, 2.12, 4.30, 4.40, 4.46, 4.52, 4.56, 4.57, 5.38, 5.59, 10.10,

5.40, 5.59, 5.62

fuel rods

5.59, 6.21

fuel, spent

1.37, 3.15, 4.20, 4.40, 5.40, 5.59, 5.61, 6.18, 6.20, 6.27, 7.14, 7.30

fuel transfer

4.34, 5.59

gamma ray counting

6.30, 6.31

gamma ray detectors

6.20, 6.22, 6.23, 6.31, 7.13, 7.14, 7.19

gamma ray emissions

6.19, 6.21, 6.30

gamma ray measurement
gamma ray scanning

6.19–6.23, 6.30, 6.31

6.21

gamma ray, scintillator for

6.22

gamma ray spectrometry

6.20, 6.31, 6.36, 8.12

GARS (General Advanced Review Software)
gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants

10.11
6.16

gas source mass spectrometry (GSMS)
gate monitors

7.19

General Advanced Review Software (GARS)

generic safeguards objectives

2.5, 3.22

germanium (HPGe and Ge) detectors
graphite, nuclear grade
gravimetric analysis

6.20, 6.23

4.36, 4.37
6.12

3.25, 5.61, 9.9, 9.10

GSMS (gas source mass spectrometry)

6.16

Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium
heavy water

7.11

5.33, 5.43, 5.63

general ledgergross defect

7.11

1.37

1.23, 2.17, 4.19, 4.36, 4.38

HEU (high enriched uranium)

2.13, 3.19, 3.20, 4.12, 4.23, 4.25, 10.13

high enriched uranium (HEU)

2.13, 3.19, 3.20, 4.12, 4.23, 4.25, 10.13

high level neutron coincidence counter (HLNCC)
high level waste

6.32

2.13, 4.18, 4.42, 6.37

267

high radioactive environments

6.37

HLNCC (high level neutron coincidence counter)hold-up

4.33

hot cells

4.51, 6.37, 8.10, 8.11, 10.30

hypergeometric probability distribution

9.10, 9.28

hypothesis, null

9.20, 9.21, 9.22, 9.23, 9.24, 9.27

hypothesis test

9.20, 9.22, 9.23, 9.24, 9.27

IAEA accountancy verification methods
IAEA Annual Report

6.32

5.53, 5.61, 9.10

12.11
11.27

IAEA confidentiality regime

IAEA Department of Safeguards, quality management system
IAEA inspection goal

3.36

3.19, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29

IAEA inspection goal, quantity component of IAEA
IAEA inspection goal, timeliness component
IAEA inspections, requests for additional

3.28

3.27, 3.29, 10.17

1.6

IAEA inspector 1.5, 1.14, 1.19, 1.26, 1.27, 3.18, 5.2, 6.28, 8.10, 9.2, 9.3, 9.19, 10.3, 10.5,
10.7–10.13, 10.15, 10.19, 10.20, 10.23, 10.27, 10.32, 13.6
IAEA safeguards

2.1

IAEA Safeguards and SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS)
2.14, 5.17, 5.27

IAEA safeguards, exemption from
2.3

IAEA safeguards, purpose of
IAEA safeguards, scope of

2.4

IAEA safeguards, suspension of
IAEA safeguards system

1.28, 2.16, 2.17

1.2, 1.15, 1.16, 1.26, 2.2, 12.12

IAEA safeguards, termination of

2.13, 2.17, 5.17, 5.28

IAEA Services Series, safeguards guidance in

13.20

ICP-MS (inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry)
ICR (inventory change report)
identification data (identity data)

268

13.5

6.34, 6.35, 8.19

5.17, 5.41, 5.66, 5.67, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 12.4, 12.7
5.14, 5.35

identification probability

9.10, 9.29, 9.30, 9.32
5.14, 5.35

identity data (identification data)

IDMS (isotope dilution mass spectrometry)
IIL (itemized inventory listing)

6.13, 6.18, 6.37

5.55, 5.56, 5.57
3.17, 5.54, 5.58

IIV (interim inventory verification)

illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material
immobilization mechanism

11.23

7.24

implementation issue, safeguards

11.24, 11.26

implementation of safeguards at the State level

3.2

import and export (inventory change codes: RF, SF)
5.17, 5.18, 11.17, 11.21, 13.2, 13.4
import communication, quarterly
improved nuclear material

12.5

4.28

IMUF (inspector’s estimate of MUF)

5.53, 9.1, 9.2, 9.21

Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)
indirect use material

1.26, 1.27, 1.32, 1.33, 1.36, 2.12, 4.36,

11.23

3.19, 4.11, 4.24, 4.26

inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS)

6.34, 6.35, 8.19

INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement 1.17, 1.18, 1.21–1.25, 1.30, 1.31, 1.33, 1.34, 2.4–2.7,
2.12, 2.17, 3.1, 3.3, 3.8, 3.13, 3.14, 4.32, 5.15, 5.65, 10.17–10.19, 10.24, 10.29, 11.2, 11.4, 11.12,
11.13, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.6, 12.7, 13.1
INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement 1.14, 1.16, 1.23, 1.30, 2.1–2.7, 2.16, 2.17, 3.13, 4.36,
4.44, 4.52, 5.50, 10.13, 10.15–10.17, 10.29, 11.2–11.4, 11.9, 11.10, 12.1, 12.4, 12.8
INFCIRC/66 verification statement
INFCIRC/207

12.8

11.12

INIR (Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review)
initial AP declaration
initial inspection
initial reportinspection

13.11

11.15, 11.16, 11.17

10.4

1.26, 1.27, 10.5, 10.15, 11.2
9.33, 10.1, 10.3–10.32, 11.1, 13.2, 13.18

inspection, access for

1.26, 1.27, 3.18, 10.15

269

inspection activities

1.14, 1.29, 5.51–5.54, 5.56, 5.59, 10.11, 10.19, 10.22

inspection, ad hoc

10.5, 10.15, 10.16, 10.31

inspection, continuous

10.13

inspection, frequency of

10.17
3.19, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29

inspection goal, IAEA

3.19, 3.28

inspection goal, quantity component

inspection goal, timeliness component of IAEA
inspection, initial

10.4
10.22–10.24, 10.26

inspection, person-day of (PDI)

10.23

inspection, person-year of
inspection, planning of
inspection, random

7.25

3.3, 9.29, 10.9, 10.10

inspection, resources available
inspection results

3.29, 10.17

10.25

1.14

Inspection Results (90(a) Statement), Statement on
inspection, routine
inspections

5.2, 12.2

10.6–10.11, 10.14–10.18, 10.24, 10.26, 10.31

3.11

inspections, additional

1.6

inspections, advance notice of

10.18

inspections, advantages of unattended monitoring systems (UMS)
inspection, scope of

10.16

inspections, detection probability
inspection, short notice

3.25

10.8, 10.10

inspection, short notice random (SNRI)
inspection, special

7.12

3.3, 10.10, 10.12, 11.11

10.14, 10.15

inspections, requests for additional
inspections, simultaneous

1.6

10.12

inspections under an item-specific safeguards agreement, reporting on

270

12.8

10.7

inspection, unannounced

inspector, IAEA 1.5, 1.14, 1.19, 1.26, 1.27, 3.18, 5.2, 6.28, 8.10, 9.2, 9.3, 9.19, 10.3, 10.5,
10.7–10.13, 10.15, 10.19, 10.20, 10.23, 10.27, 10.32, 13.6
inspector access, facilitation of

3.3

inspectors and encoded/decoded datainspectors, creating obstacles forinspectors, designation ofInspectors Document

7.21

3.18

1.26, 1.27

1.14
5.53, 9.1, 9.2, 9.21

inspector’s estimate of MUF (IMUF)
inspector-year

10.23

Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR)
integrated safeguards

3.1, 3.7, 3.9, 13.18

integrated work plan (IWP)

13.12

intensity of safeguards activity

3.25

interim inventory verification (IIV)

3.17, 5.54, 5.58

international standards of accountancy (ISA)
international target values (ITVs)
inventory

13.11

5.36, 5.38, 9.1

3.3, 5.36, 5.39, 5.60

3.34, 5.3, 5.36, 5.51, 5.52, 7.5, 10.13, 10.26, 11.2, 11.10, 13.1

inventory, book (BI)inventory change

5.33, 5.43, 5.46, 5.51, 5.52, 5.54, 5.63, 10.6, 10.15, 11.7, 12.4

5.6, 5.14, 5.17, 5.33, 5.53, 5.63, 7.5, 11.5, 13.1

inventory change code

5.17

inventory change code: DI (shipper/receiver difference (SRD))
inventory change code: DT (waste)

5.17

5.17, 9.5

inventory change code: GA (accidental gain)
inventory change code: LA (other loss)

5.17

5.17

inventory change code: LD (measured discard)inventory change code: LN (nuclear loss)

5.17, 9.5

5.17, 9.5

inventory change code: NP (nuclear production)

5.17

inventory change codes: DU, DQ (de-exemption)

5.17

271

inventory change codes: EU, EQ (exemption (nuclear material))
5.17

inventory change codes: RD, RN, RS (domestic receipt)
inventory change codes: RF, SF (import and export)
inventory change codes: RM, RP (rebatching)

5.17

5.17

5.17

inventory change codes: SD, SN (domestic shipment)

5.17

inventory change code: TU (termination of IAEA safeguards)

5.17

5.17

inventory change code: TW (retained waste)inventory change report (ICR)

5.17, 5.41, 5.66, 5.67, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 12.4, 12.7

inventory change verification

5.53

inventory, decreases in

3.18, 5.17, 5.30, 5.43, 5.46, 5.66, 11.7

inventory discrepancies

9.8, 9.31, 11.25, 11.26, 12.2

inventory, diversion of

3.16, 3.17

inventory verification equivalent, physical

5.57

inventory, export of

1.26, 1.27, 1.32, 1.33, 1.36, 2.12, 4.36, 5.17, 5.18, 11.17, 11.21, 13.2, 13.4

inventory, import of

1.26, 1.27, 1.32, 1.33, 1.36, 2.12, 4.36, 5.17, 5.18, 11.17, 11.21, 13.2, 13.4

inventory, increases in

5.17, 5.30, 5.43, 5.45, 5.46, 11.7

inventory items, list of (LII)

5.55, 5.56

inventory listing, itemized (IIL)

5.55, 5.57

inventory locations

5.36

inventory, physical
11.6–11.8, 12.3, 13.1

4.33, 5.2, 5.7, 5.33, 5.34, 5.43, 5.44, 5.46, 5.50, 5.56, 5.57, 5.63,

inventory, rebatching

5.17, 5.30

inventory, unmeasured

13.1

inventory verification

3.17, 5.6, 5.54, 5.56–5.58, 7.5, 9.8, 9.9

inventory verification, interim (IIV)

3.17, 5.54, 5.58

inventory verification, physical (PIV)

5.44, 5.56, 5.57

ion chamber
ionization

6.30, 6.31
6.15–6.17, 6.19, 6.24, 6.31, 8.15

ionizing and non-ionizing radiation

272

6.19

ions

6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 8.17

irradiated material
irradiation

2.7, 2.16, 3.20, 4.22, 4.24, 4.25, 4.51, 6.27, 6.30, 6.31, 7.13, 7.14, 7.19, 10.30

4.13, 4.14, 4.18, 4.34, 5.16, 5.20, 5.62, 6.24, 7.17, 8.15

ISA (international standards of accountancy)isotope5.36, 5.38, 9.1

4.3–4.8, 4.10–4.14, 4.16–4.21, 4.28, 4.38, 6.33

isotope detectors

6.20, 6.35

isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS)
isotopes, alpha emitting

6.18

isotope separation (enrichment) plants
isotopes, minor uranium
isotopes, plutonium
isotopes, tracer

4.56, 4.59

8.17, 8.18, 8.20

2.14, 4.3, 4.5–4.7, 4.14, 6.7, 6.11, 6.14, 6.17, 6.19, 6.20, 6.35, 8.19

6.13

isotopes, uranium

4.3–4.7, 4.8–4.13, 6.15–6.17, 6.19, 6.20, 6.35, 8.17–8.20

isotopic abundance ratios
isotopic composition
isotopic ratios

6.13, 6.18, 6.37

6.9–6.20, 6.35

5.12, 5.40, 6.10–6.20, 6.35, 8.13–8.15, 8.17, 8.19

5.13, 6.11, 6.13–6.17, 6.19, 6.20, 6.35

ISSAS (IAEA Safeguards and SSAC Advisory Service)
ITDB (Incident and Trafficking Database)item facility

13.5

11.23

4.45
5.55, 5.57

itemized inventory listing (IIL)

item-specific safeguards agreement 1.14, 1.16, 1.23, 1.25, 1.30, 2.4–2.7, 2.16, 2.17, 3.13, 3.31,
4.36, 4.44, 4.52, 5.50, 10.13, 10.15–10.17, 10.29, 11.2–11.4, 11.9, 11.10, 12.1, 12.4, 12.8
ITVs (international target values)

3.3, 5.36, 5.39, 5.60

IWP (integrated work plan)

13.12

joint use arrangement (JUA)

7.8, 7.9

joint use equipment (JUE)JUA (joint use arrangement)
JUE (joint use equipment)
K-edge densitometry

7.9
7.8, 7.9
7.9

6.14, 6.37

273

key measurement point (KMP)

3.31, 5.7–5.10, 5.36, 5.54, 5.55, 5.67

KMP (key measurement point)

3.31, 5.7–5.10, 5.36, 5.54, 5.55, 5.67

large geometry secondary ion mass spectrometry (LG-SIMS)
laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS)
L-edge transmission

6.40

6.36

LEU (low enriched uranium)

3.19, 4.11, 4.23, 4.26

LFUA (limited frequency unannounced access)

10.11

LG-SIMS (large geometry secondary ion mass spectrometry)
LIBS (laser induced breakdown spectroscopy)
LII (list of inventory items)

5.55, 5.56

limited duration counting time

9.11

limited frequency unannounced access (LFUA)
limits of accuracy

8.17

8.17

6.40

10.11

9.16

9.16, 9.20

limits of error

list of inventory items (LII) (itemized inventory listing (IIL))

5.55, 5.57

location 2.13, 2.14, 3.1, 3.31, 4.44, 4.49, 4.50, 5.9, 5.10, 5.33, 5.34, 6.09, 8.2, 8.5–8.7, 8.9, 8.21,
10.1, 10.6, 10.14, 10.15, 10.21, 10.27, 10.28, 10.29, 10.30, 10.32, 11.17, 11.26, 13.2, 13.3, 13.14
location outside facilities (LOF) 1.30, 1.31, 2.5, 2.7, 2.10, 3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 3.10, 3.32, 4.44,
4.47–4.49, 4.51, 4.52, 5.2, 5.3, 5.8, 5.33, 10.1, 10.6, 10.21, 10.27, 10.29, 13.1, 13.5, 13.14
location specific environmental sampling
locations, undeclared

8.2

3.1, 3.15

LOF (location outside facilities) 1.30, 1.31, 2.5, 2.7, 2.10, 3.1, 3.3, 3.6, 3.10, 3.32, 4.44,
4.47–4.49, 4.51, 4.52, 5.2, 5.3, 5.8, 5.33, 10.1, 10.6, 10.21, 10.27, 10.29, 10.30, 13.1, 13.5, 13.14
losses3.19, 5.2, 5.17, 5.25, 5.29, 5.34, 5.48, 13.1

losses, unmeasured

5.34, 13.1

low enriched uranium (LEU)
mailbox declaration
maintenance10.10, 11.11

4.33, 4.42, 4.48, 5.36, 7.25, 10.1

managed access274

3.19, 4.11, 4.23, 4.26

10.28

mass fraction

6.9, 6.11, 6.14, 6.36

mass, measurement ofmass number

6.3, 6.9, 6.26

4.2, 4.3, 4.38
6.13, 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 6.35, 8.17, 8.19

mass spectrometry

6.16

mass spectrometry, gas source (GSMS)

mass spectrometry, inductively coupled plasma (ICP-MS)

6.34, 6.35

mass spectrometry, large geometry secondary ion (LG-SIMS)

8.17

mass spectrometry, multi-collector inductively coupled plasma (MC–ICP-MS)
mass spectrometry, quantitative

6.13

mass spectrometry, secondary ion (SIMS)
mass spectrometry, surface ionization

8.17

6.17

mass spectrometry, thermal ionization (TIMS)
mass-to-charge ratios

8.19

6.17, 8.15

6.15

material, alternative nuclear

4.17, 4.18

material balance area (MBA) 1.30, 3.4, 3.31, 4.32, 4.33, 4.46, 5.2, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.10, 5.14, 5.15,
5.17, 5.19, 5.21, 5.23, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.43, 5.45–5.49, 5.52–5.55, 5.59, 5.63–5.65, 5.67, 5.68,
9.1, 9.4, 9.6, 9.7, 10.17, 11.4, 11.5, 11.7, 11.8, 12.3, 12.4, 13.1
5.45, 5.46, 9.15

material balance component
material balance equation

5.46, 9.1

material balance evaluation

3.12, 5.40, 9.1, 9.7, 9.8, 11.1, 11.26

material balance period (MBP)

3.16, 3.28, 5.2, 5.44, 5.46, 5.47, 5.49, 5.50, 5.56, 5.58, 11.7, 12.3

material balance report (MBR)

5.41, 5.50, 5.66, 11.4, 11.7, 11.8, 12.7

material category

4.24

material characterization

8.18

material description code (MDC)
material, direct use
material form

5.16, 5.62

3.19, 3.28, 4,12–4.15, 4.24, 4.25

4.27

material held up in processmaterial, indirect use

4.33

3.19, 4.11, 4.24, 4.26

275

material in mining or ore processing activities
material, irradiated

2.12

2.7, 2.16, 3.20, 4.22, 4.24, 4.25, 4.51, 6.27, 6.30, 6.31, 7.13, 7.14, 7.19, 10.30

material, matrix

6.4
6.1, 6.2, 6.11, 6.20, 6.29

material, referencematerial, rejected recyclable

4.31

material sample

6.5

material, source

1.2, 1.4–1.7, 1.9, 1.15, 1.22, 1.33, 1.35, 1.36, 2.12, 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 4.41
2.13, 2.17

material, substitution ofmaterial type4.23, 5.14, 12.6

material unaccounted for (MUF) 3.18, 4.33, 5.2, 5.31, 5.36, 5.45, 5.46, 5.47, 5.53, 9.1, 9.2,
9.5–9.7, 9.15, 9.17, 9.20, 9.21, 9.24, 9.30, 10.6, 10.15, 11.7, 12.3
material, unirradiatedmatrix1.37, 3.20, 4.24, 4.25, 6.10

6.4

maximum routine inspection effort (MRIE)

10.22, 10.26

MBA (material balance area) 1.30, 3.31, 3.4, 4.32, 4.33, 4.46, 5.2, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.10, 5.14, 5.15,
5.17, 5.19, 5.21, 5.23, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.43, 5.45–5.49, 5.52–5.55, 5.59, 5.63–5.65, 5.67, 5.68,
9.1, 9.4, 9.6, 9.7, 10.17, 11.4, 11.5, 11.7, 11.8, 12.3, 12.4, 13.1
MBP (material balance period)

3.16, 3.28, 5.2, 5.44, 5.46, 5.47, 5.49, 5.50, 5.56, 5.58, 11.7, 12.3

MBR (material balance report)

5.41, 5.50, 5.66, 11.4, 11.7, 11.8, 12.7

MC–ICP-MS (multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry)
MDC (material description code)

5.16, 5.62

measured discard (inventory change code: LD)
measurement accuracy

5.36, 9.8

measurement, active neutron coincidence countermeasurement, alpha spectrometry
measurement basis

5.67

measurement, biases

6.1, 9.13

measurement, bulk

5.39, 6.3, 9.11

measurement, calorimetry

276

3.18, 5.10, 5.17, 5.26, 9.5

6.7

6.18

6.33

8.19

measurement, Cerenkov radiation detection
measurement, chemical titration

6.27

6.10

measurement, combined procedure for uranium concentration and enrichment assay(COMPUCEA) 6.36
measurement, controlled potential coulometry

6.11

3.12, 5.39, 5.60, 6.8, 6.9, 6.28, 6.36, 6.37, 8.18

measurement, destructive analysis (DA)measurement, Equipment Radiation Monitoring Laboratory (ERML)
measurement error

6.38

6.1, 9.10, 9.11, 9.12, 9.19, 9.36, 9.37

measurement, gamma ray

6.19–6.23, 6.30, 6.31

measurement, gas source mass spectrometry (GSMS)

6.16

6.12

measurement, gravimetric analysis

measurement, inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS)
measurement, ion chamber

6.30, 6.31

measurement, isotope detectors

6.20, 6.35

measurement, isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS)

measurement, laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS)

measurement, material sample

6.5

measurement, matrix material

6.4

measurement methods, nuclear material

3.3, 5.1, 5.13, 5.36, 6.20, 6.26, 9.19

measurement, Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL)
measurement, neutron coincidence counting

6.29

6.4, 6.20, 6.25, 6.26, 6.32, 6.33

6.20, 6.24–6.26

measurement, non-destructive assay (NDA)measurement of isotopic ratios

6.40

6.13, 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 6.35, 8.17, 8.19

measurement, mass spectrometry

measurement, neutron counting

6.13, 6.18, 6.37

6.14, 6.37

measurement, K-edge densitometry

measurement of mass

6.34, 6.35, 8.19

5.39, 5.57, 5.61, 6.8, 6.19, 6.28, 7.12, 9.25, 10.11

5.13, 6.13, 6.15–6.17, 6.35

6.3, 6.9

measurement of mass fraction

6.9, 6.11, 6.14, 6.36

measurement of representative sample

6.6

277

6.37

measurement, Pu(VI) spectrophotometry (PUSP)
measurement, quantitative

6.13, 6.37, 9.26, 9.34, 9.35

measurement, reference material

6.1, 6.2, 6.11, 6.20, 6.29

measurement, Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL)
measurement, scintillation detector

6.9, 6.28, 6.35, 8.19

6.22

measurement, semiconductor detector

6.23

measurement standards

6.2, 9.13, 9.14, 11.26

measurement system

5.1, 5.36, 6.1, 7.28, 13.1

measurement systems, calibration of

5.1, 5.34, 5.37, 5.60, 6.1, 6.2, 6.20, 6.25, 9.11, 9.14, 10.16

measurement system, verification of the operator’s

5.60

measurement, thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS)
measurement to detect diversion

9.8

5.36–5.39, 5.46, 6.2, 9.1, 9.3, 9.15, 9.19, 9.25, 9.37, 13.1

measurement uncertainty

6.14, 6.34, 8.12

measurement, X ray fluorescence (XRF)
Member State Support Programme (MSSP)

1.1, 1.11, 1.22, 2.6, 2.15

minor uranium isotopes
misuse13.6, 13.7, 13.10

5.37, 6.2

metrological traceability
military purpose

6.17, 8.15

8.17, 8.18, 8.20

2.7, 3.13, 9.29, 11.26

mixed oxide (MOX)

3.20, 4.15, 4.25, 4.56, 6.32

Model Additional Protocol

1.18, 1.25, 3.1, 3.8

model (generic) facility safeguards approaches

3.1, 3.7, 3.9

Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards 1.18
Modified Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to a safeguards
agreement 1.31
monitor, core discharge (CDM)
monitoring system, neutron

7.13

7.16

monitoring system, unattended (UMS)

278

6.19, 6.20, 6.22, 7.3, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14, 7.28

7.19

monitor, radiation passage

7.16

monitor, reactor powermonitor (ATPM) system, advanced thermohydraulic power
MOX (mixed oxide)

7.17

3.20, 4.15, 4.25, 4.56, 6.32

MRIE (maximum routine inspection effort)

10.22, 10.26

MSSP (Member State Support Programme)

13.6, 13.7, 13.10

MUF (material unaccounted for) 3.18, 4.33, 5.2, 5.31, 5.36, 5.45, 5.46, 5.47, 5.53, 9.1, 9.2,
9.5–9.7, 9.15, 9.17, 9.20, 9.21, 9.24, 9.30, 10.6, 10.15, 11.7, 12.3
MUF, diversion into

3.18, 9.2, 9.6, 9.7
5.53, 9.1, 9.2, 9.21

MUF, inspector’s estimate of (IMUF)
MUF tuners

9.1, 9.5, 9.6

MUF uncertainty (σMUF)

5.2, 5.36, 5.46, 9.1, 9.6, 9.15, 9.21

multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (MC–ICP-MS)
3.19, 4.8, 4.9, 4.23, 4.26, 4.56, 5.15, 5.65, 5.66

natural uranium

5.39, 5.57, 5.61, 6.8, 6.19, 6.28, 7.12, 9.25, 10.11

NDA (non-destructive assay)near real time accountancy (NRTA)

5.6

7.30

Near Real Time System (NRTS)
neptunium

1.34, 3.35, 4.17, 4.18

neptunium (Np) and americium (Am) monitoring scheme
Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL)
neutron, capture

1.34

6.29

4.7, 4.21
6.4, 6.20, 6.25, 6.26, 6.32, 6.33

neutron coincidence counting
neutron counting

6.24, 7.18

neutron count rate

7.18

neutron detection

6.24–6.26, 7.13, 7.18

neutron emission

6.19, 6.24

neutron monitoring system
neutron multiplicity counting
neutrons, fast

8.19

7.16
6.26

4.6

279

neutrons, scintillators forneutrons, thermal

6.22

8.15
13.18

new partnership approach (NPA)

Next Generation Surveillance Review (NGSR) software

7.11

NGSR (Next Generation Surveillance Review) software

7.11

90(a) Statement (Statement on Inspection Results)
90(b) Statement (Statement on Conclusions)
NML (Nuclear Material Laboratory)

5.2, 12.2

5.2, 12.3

6.10–6.12, 6.18, 6.28, 6.34

NNWS (non-nuclear-weapon State)
2.12, 11.12, 11.13

1.2, 1.4–1.7, 1.17, 1.24, 1.29, 1.33–1.35, 1.36,

non-application of safeguards to nuclear material to be used in non-peaceful activities
non-compliance2.15

1.1, 2.8

non-destructive assay (NDA)
non-nuclear components

5.39, 5.57, 5.61, 6.8, 6.19, 6.28, 7.12, 9.25, 10.11

3.20, 10.3

non-nuclear material samples

8.18

non-nuclear material, specified

1.10, 1.11, 1.23, 1.32, 2.4, 2.7, 2.17, 4.36, 11.15

non-nuclear use, transfers of nuclear material tonon-nuclear-weapon State (NNWS)
non-peaceful activities

1.2, 1.4–1.7, 1.17, 1.24, 1.29, 1.33–1.36, 2.12, 11.12, 11.13

2.15, 5.19

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
notification of transfers

5.17

1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.17, 1.18, 1.22, 1.24, 1.33, 1.35, 1.37, 11.12, 11.13

1.34, 10.14, 11.12

notification of transfers of nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon States

1.33, 11.12

NPA (new partnership approach)

13.18

NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty)

1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.17, 1.18, 1.22, 1.24, 1.33, 1.35, 1.37, 11.12, 11.13

NRTA (near real time accountancy)

5.6

NRTS (Near Real Time System)

7.30

NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group)

1.36

nuclear arms race

1.2

nuclear disarmament

280

1.2

nuclear energy, peaceful uses of
5.64, 10.3, 13.15

1.2, 1.4–1.6, 1.8, 1.10, 1.22, 1.33, 1.36, 2.3, 2.15, 3.1, 3.6,

1.24, 1.36, 2.12, 3.1, 3.3–3.5, 3.7, 4.40–4.42, 6.36, 10.12, 10.24, 11.15,

nuclear fuel cycle
11.21, 13.6, 13.15

nuclear fuel cycle, physical model of

4.41

nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities
nuclear fuel cycle, unsafeguarded activity
nuclear grade graphite

4.36, 4.37

nuclear installations

4.51, 10.26

nuclear loss (inventory change code: LN)
nuclear material

4.42

1.36

5.2, 5.17, 5.25, 5.34, 9.5

4.1, 4.4, 4.5
1.37, 3.11, 3.31, 4.3, 4.27, 4.33, 4.45, 5.2, 5.6, 7.5, 7.12,

nuclear material accountancy
9.11, 9.31, 13.2

3.18, 5.1, 5.2, 5.61, 5.62, 10.19, 11.19, 12.7, 13.1

nuclear material accounting

nuclear material accounting report

5.2, 5.62, 11.19, 12.7

nuclear material, acquisition path

3.5, 3.7, 3.14, 3.15, 3.18, 3.21

nuclear material, batch of

4.35, 5.11–5.16

nuclear material, borrowing

3.18

nuclear material, categorization of
nuclear material characteristics

4.24

5.36, 5.40, 9.25

nuclear material, chemical composition of
6.40, 6.8, 10.5, 10.6
nuclear material, classification of

2.12, 4.56, 5.11, 5.16, 5.34, 5.40, 6.3, 6.34, 6.35,

4.23

nuclear material control 3.31,

5.64, 13.1

nuclear material, conversion of

3.15, 3.19, 3.20, 4.42

nuclear material declarations

3.8

nuclear material, direct use

3.19, 3.28, 4.12–4.15, 4.25, 4.26

nuclear material, diversion of 1.2, 1.8, 1.9, 1.22, 2.5, 2.6, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.13, 3.16–3.18,
3.20–3.23, 3.28, 3.29, 5.64, 7.15, 9.2, 9.6–9.8, 9.23, 9.30, 10.11, 10.12, 11.26, 13.6
nuclear material, exemption

2.14, 5.17, 5.27

281

nuclear material, fertile

4.7, 4.16, 5.20

nuclear material, flows

5.2, 5.7, 5.10, 5.59, 10.13

nuclear material, import and export of
11.21, 13.2, 13.4
4.28

nuclear material, improved
nuclear material, indirect use

3.19, 4.11, 4.24–4.26

Nuclear Material Laboratory (NML)
nuclear material, locations of
nuclear material, losses

1.26, 1.27, 1.32, 1.33, 1.36, 2.12, 4.36, 5.17, 5.18, 11.17,

6.10–6.12, 6.18, 6.28, 6.34

2.13, 2.14

3.19, 5.2, 5.17, 5.25, 5.29, 5.34, 5.48, 9.20, 9.21, 9.5, 11.10

nuclear material measurement
nuclear material, misuse of

3.3, 5.1, 5.13, 5.36, 6.9–6.26, 6.30, 6.31, 10.19
2.5, 2.7, 3.13, 9.29, 11.26

nuclear material, recovery from waste
nuclear material, recyclable

4.32

4.31

nuclear material, replacing with items of lower strategic value

3.18

nuclear material, reprocessing of

2.16, 3.15, 4.18, 4.22, 4.56, 5.38

nuclear material, retained waste

4.32, 4.49, 5.17, 5.23

nuclear material, return of

2.13

nuclear material samples

5.36, 5.60, 6.16, 6.18, 6.26, 6.28, 6.29, 6.32, 6.34, 6.35, 6.39, 7.5, 9.10

nuclear material, sampling of

10.11, 11.26

nuclear material, storage of

2.14, 4.40, 4.46, 4.51, 4.57, 4.60, 5.38

nuclear material, substitution

2.13, 2.17

nuclear material, temporary transfer of

10.12

nuclear material, transfer of 1.23, 1.33, 1.36, 1.37, 2.13, 2.16, 4.32, 5.4, 5.17, 5.30, 10.5, 10.6,
10.10, 10.14, 11.10, 11.12, 11.13, 13.1
nuclear material, trigger list

1.36

nuclear material, undeclared

2.5, 2.7, 2.9, 3.1, 3.6, 3.7, 3.15, 7.17, 8.2, 8.3, 10.28

nuclear material used in non-nuclear activities
nuclear material verification activities

2.12–2.15, 5.17

3.10, 3.12, 5.2, 7.5, 10.19, 11.30, 12.3, 13.10

nuclear material, verification of flows within an MBA

282

5.59, 7.5

nuclear material, voluntary reporting of
nuclear material, waste containing

1.32–1.34

4.32

Nuclear Power Support Group and Integrated Work Plan
nuclear production (inventory change code: NP)

nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties
nuclear weapons or explosive devices
2.15, 3.10, 3.14, 3.15, 4.41, 13.16

nuclide5.2, 5.17, 5.20, 5.34

1.36

Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines

nuclear-weapon State (NWS)

1.3–1.7, 1.17, 1.22

1.2–1.8, 1.10, 1.13, 1.17, 1.18, 1.22–1.24, 1.33–1.36, 2.6,

1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.7, 1.17, 1.18, 1.24, 1.33, 11.12, 11.13

4.2, 4.21, 8.15, 8.19

null hypothesis

9.20–9.24, 9.27

NWAL (Network of Analytical Laboratories)
NWFZ (nuclear-weapon-free zone)
NWS (nuclear-weapon State)open source information

6.29

1.3–1.7, 1.17, 1.22

1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.7, 1.17, 1.18, 1.24, 1.33, 11.12, 11.13

11.1, 11.21

operating records

5.34, 5.51, 11.25, 11.6

operating report

11.3, 11.9

operator–inspector difference

9.1, 9.3, 9.8, 9.19, 9.20, 9.35

operator’s measurement system, verification of

5.60

original small quantities protocol (original SQP)

1.26

other loss (inventory change code: LA)outlier

13.12

5.17, 5.29

9.18

partial defect9.9, 9.10

particle analysis

8.14

Passive Gamma Emission Tomographic (PGET) System
passive neutron coincidence counter
peaceful uses of nuclear energy
5.64, 10.3, 13.15
peer review service, IAEA

7.15

6.32, 6.33
1.2, 1.4–1.6, 1.8, 1.10, 1.22, 1.33, 1.36, 2.3, 2.15, 3.1, 3.6,

13.5

283

1.6

Pelindaba Treaty
performance values

9.19

persistence times

9.28, 9.29

person-day of inspection (PDI)

10.22–10.24, 10.26

10.23

person-year of inspection

PGET (Passive Gamma Emission Tomographic System)
photons

7.15

6.14. 6.19, 6.22, 6.40

physical inventory
4.33, 5.2, 5.7, 5.33, 5.34, 5.43, 5.44, 5.46, 5.50, 5.56, 5.57, 5.63,
11.6–11.8, 12.3, 13.1
physical inventory listing (PIL)

5.41, 5.44, 5.56, 5.67, 11.4, 11.8, 12.4, 12.7
5.44, 5.54, 5.56, 5.57

physical inventory verification (PIV)

physical inventory verification equivalent

5.57

physical model of the nuclear fuel cycle

4.41

PIL (physical inventory listing)

5.41, 5.44, 5.56, 5.67, 11.4, 11.8, 12.4, 12.7
5.44, 5.54, 5.56, 5.57

PIV (physical inventory verification)planned actual routine inspection effort (PLARIE)

10.25

PLARIE (planned actual routine inspection effort)

10.25

plasma plume

6.40

plutonium 1.34, 1.37, 2.7, 2.13, 2.14, 3.15, 3.19, 3.20, 4.14, 4.15, 4.23, 4.29, 4.40, 4.42, 4.56,
5.12, 5.13, 5.40, 5.63, 5.65, 6.7, 6.9, 6.11, 6.13, 6.14, 6.18, 6.20, 6.32, 8.12, 8.13, 8.19,
10.13, 10.18, 10.26
plutonium absorption peaks

6.37

plutonium canister assay system (PCAS)
plutonium concentration

2.14, 5.13, 6.9, 6.14, 6.37

plutonium content, determination of
plutonium in samples

1.37, 2.13, 3.20, 4.20, 4.23, 5.12, 8.13, 8.15

6.7, 6.9, 6.13, 6.18, 6.37, 6.39, 8.12, 8.13, 8.19

plutonium in spent reactor fuelplutonium isotopes

4.25, 6.14

2.14, 4.14, 6.7, 6.17, 6.20, 8.19

plutonium, isotopic abundance ratios of

284

6.32

6.9

plutonium, mass of

6.32

plutonium, mass fraction of
plutonium oxides

6.9, 6.11, 6.14

4.15, 4.56

plutonium (Pu-240)

4.6, 4.14

plutonium (Pu-244)

6.13

plutonium (Pu-241)

4.3, 4.6, 4.14, 4.17, 4.20, 5.25

plutonium (Pu-242)

4.14, 6.13

plutonium (Pu-238)

3.19, 4.14, 4.25, 6.18

plutonium (Pu-239)

4.3, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.14, 4.21, 8.15

plutonium recycling

4.15, 4.40

plutonium samples

6.26, 6.32

plutonium, undeclared conversion to
plutonium, waste containing
point sample

3.15

2.13, 4.42, 6.37

8.5, 8.6

polyatomic interferences

8.19

power of a test

9.24

power reactors

3.3, 4.52, 4.53, 7.13, 7.14

pre-inspection check sample

8.7, 8.10

principal nuclear facility

3.31, 4.44, 10.4, 10.6

privileges and immunities

1.19, 10.20

probability α   9.22, 9.31
probability β   9.23, 9.24
probability, detection

3.23, 9.6, 9.10, 9.28, 9.29, 9.30, 9.32
9.21, 9.22, 9.31

probability, false alarmprobability, identification

9.10, 9.29, 9.30, 9.32

probability, non-detection

9.10, 9.23

probability, selection
Programme 93+2

9.10, 9.28, 9.30

3.1, 3.8285

1.11, 1.20, 1.23, 1.28

project and supply agreement
proliferation risk

1.34, 10.28
1.29

protocol, cooperation

1.26

protocol, original small quantities (original SQP)
11.20

Protocol Reporter

1.27

protocol, revised small quantities (revised SQP)
protocol, suspension

1.28

protracted diversion

3.16
6.37

Pu(VI) spectrophotometry (PUSP)
2.3

purpose of IAEA safeguards

6.37

PUSP (Pu(VI) spectrophotometry)

quality management system of the IAEA Department of Safeguards
quantitative characteristics

9.26

quantitative mass spectrometry
quantitative measurement

6.13

6.13, 6.37, 9.26, 9.34, 9.35, 11.30

quantity component (of IAEA inspection goal)
quantum of assistance

1.12

quarterly AP declaration

11.15, 11.18

quarterly import communication
radiation detectors

12.5

6.27, 7.12, 10.32

radiation exposure reduction for inspectors
radiation monitoring

7.19

radioactive material, transport ofradioactive waste disposal

random sample

286

6.39

1.7, 10.30, 13.17

9.11, 9.12, 9.19, 9.37

random inspection
9.2

7.12

10.11

radiation passage monitor

random error

3.19, 3.28

3.3, 9.29, 10.9, 10.10

3.36

random sampling

9.38, 10.7

random variables

9.13

Rarotonga Treaty

1.4, 1.6

RDT (remote data transmission)
reactor core

4.55, 5.57, 5.59, 6.31, 7.13
7.16

reactor power monitor
reactors

3.3, 7.25, 7.28

4.53, 4.54

rebatching (inventory change codes: RM, RP)

5.17, 5.30

recording system, significant departure from agreed
records, accounting
records, auditing

5.1, 5.23, 5.31–5.33, 5.41, 5.43, 5.51, 5.63, 9.6, 9.8
5.51, 10.6

records, discrepancies in

11.25

records, examination of

5.51, 10.32

records, facility

5.34, 5.51, 5.52, 5.53, 11.25

records, falsifying

3.18, 9.8, 9.9records, operating

5.34, 5.51, 11.6, 11.25

reference material

6.1, 6.2, 6.11, 6.20, 6.29

refuelling

11.26

5.57, 7.13, 7.14

regional authority responsible for safeguards implementation

1.20, 2.2, 5.2

regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (RSAC)
5.64, 10.24, 12.4, 13.1, 13.2, 13.4, 13.17
rejected nuclear material

4.31

rejecting a null hypothesis

9.20–9.24, 9.27

relative standard deviation (RSD)

5.38, 5.39, 9.25, 9.36

remote data transmission (RDT)

3.3, 7.25, 7.28

report, annual

3.3, 5.2, 5.15, 5.39,

1.26, 1.27

reporting on design information verification

12.1

reporting on inspections under an item-specific safeguards agreement
reporting on nuclear material in waste

12.8

4.32

287

reporting system, significant departure from agreed
report, initial

11.26

1.26, 1.27, 10.5, 10.15, 11.2
11.3, 11.9

report, operating

11.2, 11.3

report, routine

11.29, 11.31

report, safeguards State evaluation
10.14, 11.10

report, special

reports, timeliness and completion of

3.3, 13.3

reports, voluntary (on nuclear material, specified equipment and non-nuclear material)
representative sample
reprocessing

5.36, 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.9, 9.11, 9.26

2.16, 3.15, 4.18, 4.22, 4.40, 4.42, 4.56, 4.58, 5.38, 10.30
1.16, 1.36, 4.40, 4.43, 4.46, 4.52, 4.56, 4.58, 5.38, 10.12, 10.30

reprocessing plants

research and development

1.15, 4.42, 11.15, 11.21

research and development facilities
Research and Development Plan
research reactors
residual bias

1.32, 11.14

1.15, 10.6
13.8, 13.9

4.52, 4.54, 7.17

9.14

Resource Mobilization Priorities (RMP)

13.8, 13.9

retained waste (inventory change code: TW)revised small quantities protocol (revised SQP)

4.32, 4.49, 5.17, 5.23
1.27

Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning the Provision of Technical Assistanceby the IAEA 1.13
RMP (Resource Mobilization Priorities)
rounding adjustment
routine inspection
routine report

13.8, 13.9

5.41
10.6–10.11, 10.14–10.18, 10.24, 10.26, 10.31

11.2, 11.3

RSAC (regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material)
5.64, 10.24, 12.4, 13.1, 13.2, 13.4, 13.17
RSD (relative standard deviation)
safeguards activities

288

3.3, 5.2, 5.15, 5.39,

5.38, 5.39, 9.25, 9.36

1.33, 3.3–3.5, 3.12, 3.21, 3.23–3.26, 3.30, 3.36, 11.1, 11.28, 13.4

safeguards activity, frequency of

3.26

safeguards activity, intensity of

3.25

Safeguards, Agency’s

1.15

safeguards agreement
5.2, 5.63, 10.1

1.4, 1.5, 1.12–1.16, 1.20, 1.23, 1.25, 1.29, 2.1, 2.2, 2.13, 3.1, 4.32,

safeguards agreement, comprehensive (CSA) 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 1.11, 1.17, 1.18, 1.21, 1.22, 1.23,
1.25–1.28, 1.31, 1.34, 2.4–2.7, 2.12, 2.15, 3.1, 3.3, 3.7, 3.8, 3.14, 3.15, 11.15
safeguards agreement, item-specific 1.14, 1.16, 1.23, 1.25, 1.30, 2.4–2.7, 2.16, 2.17, 3.13, 3.31,
4.36, 4.44, 4.52, 5.50, 10.13, 10.15–10.17, 11.2–11.4, 11.9, 11.10, 12.1, 12.4, 12.8
safeguards agreement, subsidiary arrangements to 1.30, 1.31, 2.13, 3.31, 3.32, 4.35, 5.15, 5.17,
5.62, 5.62, 5.65, 10.15, 10.16, 10.24, 10.32, 11.4, 11.10, 12.2, 12.3, 12.6, 12.7, 13.1, 13.3
safeguards agreement, sui generis

1.22
6.9, 6.28, 6.29, 6.35, 8.19

Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL)

3.4, 3.7, 3.30, 3.33, 10.1, 10.2, 10.10, 13.18

safeguards approachsafeguards approaches, model (generic) facility
safeguards approach, State-level (SLA)

3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.23, 11.29, 11.30

13.14

safeguards by design
safeguards conclusions
12.1, 12.9, 12.10
Safeguards Criteria

3.1, 3.7, 3.9

2.3, 2.5, 3.3, 3.6, 7.8, 7.29, 11.1, 11.24, 11.26, 11.28, 11.29, 11.32,

3.4, 3.7, 3.10, 11.30

Safeguards Document

1.16
11.30

safeguards effectiveness evaluation
safeguards equipment

7.9, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.30, 10.1, 11.26, 13.18

safeguards, exemption from

2.14, 5.17

safeguards, field conditions adverse to

3.3

safeguards guidance in the IAEA Services Series
safeguards implementation issue

13.20

11.24, 11.26

safeguards implementation, regional authority responsible for
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR)
safeguards infrastructure

1.20, 2.2, 5.2

2.3, 3.1, 11.32, 12.9, 12.10

13.3

289

safeguards, integrated

3.1, 3.7, 3.9

safeguards measures

3.3–3.5, 3.7, 3.11, 3.12, 3.21, 3.23, 7.24, 10.3
2.15

safeguards, non-application ofsafeguards objectives

2.5, 3.22, 10.13, 11.26, 11.30, 13.3, 13.8
2.5

safeguards objectives, genericsafeguards on nuclear material in waste

4.32

13.4

safeguards regulatory infrastructure

3.6, 3.12, 11.1, 11.21, 11.28, 11.29

safeguards relevant information
2.4

safeguards, scope of

2.12, 5.19

safeguards, starting point of under a CSA

11.29, 11.31

safeguards State evaluation report
safeguards, State-level

3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5

safeguards, suspension of

1.28, 2.16, 2.17

1.2, 1.15, 1.16, 1.26, 2.2, 7.26, 7.28, 12.12

safeguards systemsafeguards system, Agency’s

1.2, 1.26, 1.15, 1.16, 2.2, 3.8

safeguards system with remote data transmission capability
safeguards, termination of IAEA

7.28

2.13, 2.17, 5.28

Safeguards Traineeship Programme

13.15

safeguards transfer agreement (STA)

1.23, 1.28

SAGSI (Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation)
SAL (Safeguards Analytical Laboratory)
sample, composite

6.5, 8.6

sample conditioning

6.9

sample cross-contamination
sample destruction

6.9

sample, fissionable

6.33

sample, material

6.5

sample, point

8.5, 8.6

290

6.9, 6.28, 6.29, 6.35, 8.19

6.17, 8.7, 8.8, 8.10

13.13

8.7, 8.10

sample, pre-inspection checksample processing
sample, random

6.9
9.2

samples, environmental
8.19, 8.21, 10.32

3.12, 6.28, 6.29, 6.35, 6.38, 6.39, 8.9, 8.11, 8.12, 8.14, 8.16,

samples, excepted package

6.39

samples, exempt consignment
sample size

6.39

9.10, 9.24, 9.25, 9.32, 9.33

samples, non-nuclear material
samples, nuclear material
sample, spiked

8.18

6.28, 8.18

6.13

samples, spent fuel6.18

samples, radioactive

6.39

sample, statistical

9.4, 9.11, 9.38

samples, Type A package

6.39

6.39

sample transport

sampling, environmental (ES)3.12, 6.28, 8.1–8.4, 8.11, 10.11, 10.19, 10.27, 10.32

sampling, homogenization of material

6.6

sampling in the attribute mode, variable

9.34

sampling in the variable mode, variable

9.35

sampling kit, environmental

8.11, 8.21

sampling, location specific environmental
sampling of nuclear material
sampling of pellets
sampling plan

8.2

10.11, 11.26

5.59

5.40, 9.33

sampling, random

9.38, 10.7

sampling, swipe

6.6, 8.4–8.7, 8.10, 8.11, 8.13, 8.17

sampling team

8.7, 8.10

sampling, wide area environmental

8.3, 8.6, 10.27

291

scanning electron microscopy (SEM)

8.16

SCCC (Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials)
6.22

scintillation detector

2.4

scope of IAEA safeguards
10.16

scope of inspection
scrap 3.20,

4.31, 5.38
8.12

screening measurement

SDP (State Declarations Portal)
seal

1.8, 13.16

11.19

3.3, 3.12, 5.57, 5.61, 6.38, 7.3, 7.4, 7.24, 9.25, 10.11, 10.32

secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) (including large geometry (LG-SIMS))
sector

3.4
7.29

security critical component

SEG (State Evaluation Group)
selection probability

11.29

9.10, 9.28, 9.30

SEM (scanning electron microscopy)
semi-annual transit matchingtransfers) 5.68, 12.6

Semipalatinsk Treaty

8.16

statement(statement

on

and

international

1.7

separate storage facilities

4.52, 4.60, 5.38

shipper/receiver difference (SRD) (inventory change code: DI)
9.21, 10.6, 10.15, 11.7, 13.1
shipper/receiver difference, cumulative

5.49, 9.1

shipper/receiver, supporting documents

5.42

short notice inspection

domestic

6.23

semiconductor detector

10.8, 10.10

short notice random inspection (SNRI)
shut-down facility (shut-down LOF)
shut-down LOF

4.47, 4.48

side-letter States

13.17, 13.19

292

8.17

3.3, 10.10, 10.12, 11.11
4.47, 4.48

3.18, 5.31, 5.48, 5.49, 9.1, 9.7,

3.15, 3.16, 3.19, 3.23, 3.28, 3.29, 10.11, 12.6

significant quantity (SQ)

8.17

SIMS (secondary ion mass spectrometry)
10.12

simultaneous inspections

2.3, 3.1, 11.32, 12.9, 12.10

SIR (Safeguards Implementation Report)
site

3.4, 5.7, 7.2, 8.7, 10.30, 10.31, 11.15

SLA (State-level safeguards approach)

3.1–3.5, 3.7, 3.23, 11.29, 11.30

3.1

SLC (State-level concept)

SNRI (short notice random inspection)

3.3, 10.10, 10.12, 11.11

5.2, 5.13, 5.33, 5.35, 5.42, 5.63

source data

5.42

source documents

1.2, 1.4–1.7, 1.22, 1.33, 1.35, 1.36, 2.12, 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 4.41, 4.44

source material

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)
special fissile material

1.7, 1.9
1.1, 1.2, 1.4–1.7, 1.22, 1.35, 1.36, 2.14, 4.1, 4.5, 4.7, 4.11, 4.13–4.15,

special fissionable material
4.17, 4.18, 4.36, 5.20
special inspection
special report

10.14, 10.15

10.14, 11.10

specified non-nuclear material
10.3, 11.14, 11.15
spectrometry, alpha1.10, 1.23, 1.32, 2.4, 2.7, 2.17, 4.36, 4.41, 8.18, 9.9,

6.18

spectrometry, gamma ray

6.20, 6.31, 6.36, 8.12

spectrometry, gas source mass (GSMS)

6.16

spectrometry, isotope dilution mass (IDMS)
spectrometry, mass

6.13, 6.18, 6.37

6.13, 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 6.35, 8.17, 8.19

spectrometry, thermal ionization mass (TIMS)
spectrophotometry, Pu(VI) (PUSP)

6.17, 8.15

6.37

spectroscopy, laser induced breakdown (LIBS)
spent fuel1.4, 1.6

6.40

1.37, 3.15, 4.10, 4.20, 4.40, 5.40, 5.59, 5.61, 6.18, 6.20, 6.27, 7.14, 7.15, 7.24, 7.30

spent fuel assemblies

6.27

293

7.14

spent fuel bundle counter

SPRICS (Support Programme Information and Communication System)

13.7

3.15, 3.16, 3.19, 3.23, 3.28, 3.29, 10.11, 12.6

SQ (significant quantity)

SQP, original (original small quantities protocol)

1.26

SQP, revised (revised small quantities protocol)

1.27

SRA (State or regional authority responsible for safeguards implementation)
13.1, 13.2, 13.4
3.18, 9.7

SRD, diversion into

SSAC Advisory Service, IAEA Safeguards and (ISSAS)

13.5

SSAC (State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material)10.24, 12.4, 13.1, 13.2, 13.4, 13.5

3.3, 5.2, 5.15, 5.39, 5.64,

3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.10

SSFs (State-specific factors)

STA (safeguards transfer agreement)
standard deviation

1.23, 1.28

9.15, 9.19, 9.21

Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI)

11.19

State Declarations Portal (SDP)
State evaluation 11.26,

11.28, 11.32

State Evaluation Group (SEG)

11.29

3.1

State-level concept (SLC)
State-level safeguards

3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5

State-level safeguards approach (SLA)
statement of timeliness in reporting

3.1–3.5, 3.7, 3.23, 11.29, 11.30

12.7

Statement on Conclusions (90(b) Statement)
statement on domestic
statement) 5.68, 12.6

and

5.2, 12.3

internationaltransfers

Statement on Inspection Results (90(a) Statement)

5.2, 12.2

statements under an AP

13.13

2.12, 5.19

starting point of safeguards under a CSA(semi-annualtransitmatching

12.9

State or regional authority responsible for safeguards implementation (SRA)
13.1, 13.2, 13.4

294

3.5, 5.2, 11.11,

3.5, 5.2, 11.11,

3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.10

State-specific factors (SSFs)

State (or regional) system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC)
5.2, 5.15, 5.39, 5.64, 10.24, 12.4, 13.1, 13.2, 13.4, 13.4
State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs)

statistically significant differences/values
statistical sample

9.4, 9.11, 9.38

statistical tests

9.7, 9.26, 9.31, 9.35

9.6, 9.8, 9.9, 9.15, 9.21

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency
4.17, 4.18, 12.11
stoichiometric chemical reaction

1.1, 1.2, 1.11, 1.13, 4.1, 4.4, 4.5,

6.10

6.12

storage facilities, separate
storage locations

13.5

9.21

statistically significant

stoichiometric U3O8

3.3,

4.52, 4.60, 5.38

4.40

strategic point

5.9, 5.59, 10.15

stratum/strata

5.14, 5.40, 5.45, 6.6, 9.1, 9.4, 9.10, 9.19

Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1.17
Subsidiary arrangements 1.30, 1.31, 2.13, 3.31, 3.32, 4.35, 5.15, 5.62, 10.15, 10.24, 10.32, 11.4,
11.10, 12.2, 12.3, 13.1, 13.3
Subsidiary arrangements (General Part)
2.13, 2.17

substitution
substrate

1.30, 1.31, 5.62, 12.6, 12.7, 13.1

8.15–8.17

sui generis safeguards agreement
supporting document

1.22

5.35, 5.42, 5.52, 5.53

Support Programme Information and Communication System (SPRICS)
surface ionization mass spectrometry
surveillance

13.7

6.17

3.12, 5.7, 5.59, 7.2, 7.3, 7.5, 7.6, 7.11, 7.24

surveillance review system

7.11

suspension of IAEA safeguards

2.16, 2.17

295

1.28

suspension protocol
swipe sampling

6.6, 8.4–8.7, 8.10, 8.11, 8.13, 8.17

systematic error

9.11, 9.13, 9.14, 9.19, 9.37

system of containment/surveillance measures

7.6

7.4, 7.10, 7.12, 7.22, 9.25, 10.32, 11.26

tamper indication
technical assistance

1.12, 1.13
3.23

technical objective performance target

3.13, 3.14, 3.22, 3.30, 11.30

technical objectives

temporary transfer of nuclear material
10.a, 10.b and 10.c statements

10.12

12.9

termination of IAEA safeguards (inventory change code: TU)
test, attributes

9.25

test, power of a

9.24

test, variables

9.26

thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS)
thermal neutrons

4.15, 4.40, 7.17

thermal power emission rates

6.7, 7.17

thermohydraulic power measurement
third party information

throughput

7.17

11.1, 11.22

2.12, 4.4, 4.7, 4.13, 4.16, 4.23, 4.26, 4.40, 5.12, 5.63, 5.65

5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 6.36, 9.6, 10.17

time, conversion

3.20

time, detection

3.21

timeliness component (of IAEA inspection goal)
TIMS (thermal ionization mass spectrometry)
titration methods

6.10

Tlatelolco Treaty

1.3–1.6, 1.22

296

6.17, 8.15

8.15

thermal nuclear reactors

thorium (232Th)

2.13, 2.17, 4.32, 5.17, 5.28

3.29, 10.17
6.17, 8.15

tracer isotopes

6.13

training courses, hostingtranscription mistakes

13.6
9.11

transfer of nuclear material 1.33, 1.34, 1.36, 2.13, 2.16, 4.32, 5.4, 5.17, 5.18, 5.30, 10.5, 10.10,
10.14, 11.10, 11.12, 11.13, 13.1
transfer of nuclear weapons

1.2

transfers, confirmation of

11.13

transfers, notification of

1.34, 10.14, 11.12

transfer to retained waste

5.17, 5.23

transit matching

3.12, 5.68

transmutation

4.8, 4.13, 4.21

transport of radioactive

material 6.39
1.6

Treaty, African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty)

Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty)

1.9, 1.37, 13.17

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco
Treaty) 1.3–1.6, 1.22
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty)

1.7

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT))
1.5, 1.17, 1.18, 1.22, 1.24, 1.33, 1.35, 1.37, 11.12, 11.13
Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)
Treaty, South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Rarotonga Treaty)
trigger list
tubes

1.2, 1.4,

1.5

1.4, 1.6

1.36

4.39, 6.24, 7.14, 7.18

two stage sampling plan
Type A package

9.33

6.39

type I error

9.22, 9.31

type II error

9.23, 9.24

UF6 (uranium hexafluoride)

4.30, 4.56, 5.45, 6.16, 6.39, 9.38

UMS (unattended monitoring system)

6.19, 6.20, 6.22, 7.3, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14, 7.17, 7.20, 7.28

297

10.7

unannounced inspection

unattended monitoring system (UMS)

6.19, 6.20, 6.22, 7.3, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14, 7.17, 7.20, 7.28

uncertainty, measurement

5.36–5.39, 5.46, 6.2, 9.1, 9.3, 9.15, 9.19, 9.25, 9.37, 13.1

uncertainty, MUF (σMUF)

5.2, 5.36, 5.46, 9.1, 9.6, 9.15, 9.21

undeclared facility or location outside facilities (LOF)
undeclared locations

3.1, 3.15

undeclared nuclear material and activities
unified uranium

2.5, 2.7, 2.9, 3.1, 3.6, 3.7, 3.15, 7.17, 8.2, 8.3, 10.28

5.15, 5.65, 5.66

unirradiated material

1.37, 3.20, 4.24, 4.25, 6.10

unmeasured inventory

13.1

unmeasured losses

13.1

UO2 (uranium dioxide)

4.56, 5.45, 5.48, 9.20
5.52

updating of the book inventory
uranium

2.10

1.34, 2.7, 2.12, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 10.18, 10.26

uranium, accounting for

5.63

uranium concentration

2.12, 4.9, 4.40, 6.9, 6.12, 6.14, 6.36

uranium content, determination of
uranium, depleted

3.19, 4.4, 4.10, 4.23, 4.26, 4.29, 5.12, 5.15, 5.65, 5.66

uranium dioxide (UO2)
uranium, enriched

6.10, 6.12, 8.12, 8.13

4.30, 4.56, 5.45, 5.48, 9.20

4.5, 4.11, 4.12, 4.19, 4.23, 4.40, 5.12, 5.15, 5.65, 5.66, 10.18, 10.26

uranium, enrichment of

4.19, 4.23, 4.29, 4.30, 4.40, 5.38, 5.40, 5.65–5.67, 6.20, 6.36, 10.11

uranium enrichment plants, gas centrifuge
uranium hexafluoride (UF6)
uranium, high enriched (HEU)
uranium, impurities inuranium isotopes

4.30, 4.56, 5.45, 6.16, 6.39, 9.38
2.13, 3.19, 3.20, 4.12, 4.23, 4.25, 4.42, 10.13

6.34, 6.35

4.8, 8.17–8.20

uranium, isotopic abundance ratios ofuranium, low enriched (LEU)

298

10.11

6.9, 6.16

3.19, 4.11, 4.23, 4.26

uranium, mass fraction of

6.9, 6.14, 6.36

uranium, minor isotopes

8.17, 8.18, 8.20

uranium, natural

3.19, 4.8, 4.9, 4.23, 4.26, 4.56, 5.15, 5.65, 5.66

uranium oxides

4.56, 5.45, 5.48, 9.20

uranium, re-enrichment of
uranium samples

4.40

6.39

238

uranium-238 ( U)

4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 8.20

uranium-235 (235U)

3.19, 3.20, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8–4.12, 4.19, 5.12, 5.15, 5.40, 6.36, 8.15

uranium-233 (233U)
5.15, 6.13, 8.20

2.13, 3.19, 3.20, 4.3, 4.5–4.8, 4.13, 4.16, 4.19, 4.23, 4.25, 4.42, 5.12,

uranium, unified

5.15, 5.65, 5.66

U3O8, stoichiometric

6.12

variable sampling in the attribute mode

9.34

variable sampling in the variable mode

9.35

variables test

9.26

verification activities

1.1, 3.10, 3.12, 10.27, 11.2

verification activities, nuclear materials

3.10, 3.12, 7.5, 11.30, 12.3

verification, design information (DIV)

3.11, 3.31, 10.1, 10.2, 10.20, 10.21, 10.31, 11.1, 12.1

verification effort

3.24

verification, flowsheet (FSV)

1.34, 3.35

verification, interim inventory (IIV)
verification, inventory

3.17, 5.6, 5.54, 5.56–5.58, 7.5, 9.8, 9.9verification, inventory change
verification level

3.17, 5.54, 5.58

5.53

9.32, 9.33

verification methods, IAEA accountancy

5.53, 5.61, 8.18, 9.10, 9.31

verification of instruments and equipment

10.19

verification of nuclear material flows within an MBA
verification of the operator’s measurement systemverification, physical inventory (PIV)

5.59, 7.5

3.12, 5.60

5.44, 5.54, 5.56, 5.57

299

visit1.14, 10.1
1.17, 1.21, 1.24, 1.25, 1.33, 2.4, 2.5, 3.13, 11.13, 12.6, 12.7

VOA (voluntary offer agreement)

voluntary information relating to another State

11.22

voluntary offer agreement (VOA)

1.17, 1.21, 1.24, 1.25, 1.33, 2.4, 2.5, 3.13, 11.13, 12.6, 12.7

voluntary reporting scheme (VRS)

1.32, 4.36, 11.14

voluntary reports on nuclear
material 1.33, 1.34, 11.14

material,

VRS (voluntary reporting scheme)

1.32, 4.36, 11.14

vulnerability assessment

specified

7.7

1.7, 2.13, 4.32, 4.40, 6.37, 10.30, 13.14, 13.17

waste

waste (inventory change code: DT)
waste disposal

9.5

1.7, 10.30, 13.17

waste, high level

2.13, 4.18, 4.42, 6.37

waste, retained

4.32, 4.49, 5.17, 5.23

waste samples

6.37

waste storage, separate 5.38, 10.30
wavelength dispersive X ray spectroscopy (WDS)
wavelength dispersive XRF (WDXRF) systems

8.16
6.34

WDS (wavelength dispersive X ray spectroscopy)
WDXRF (wavelength dispersive XRF)
wide area environmental sampling
X ray fluorescence (XRF)

systems 6.34

8.3, 8.6, 10.27

6.14, 6.34, 8.12

X ray spectroscopy, energy (EDS)

8.16

XRF (X ray fluorescence) 6.14,

6.34, 8.12

XRF systems
yellowcake

6.34
4.9

Zangger Committee Export Guidelines
Zircaloy
zone

300

3.4

4.39

8.16

1.35

equipment

andnon-nuclear

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1x-xxxxx-T

316 pages 16.04 mm is the spine for 80gsm

IAEA SAFEGUARDS GLOSSARY

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA

IAEA
SAFEGUARDSGLOSSARY
2022 Edition