New Diplomacy Compass
Crossing Borders, Demystifying Japan
January 2022

Japan’s Dilemma: Caught between Its“Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy”
and the Demands of the Japan-US Alliance
Kyoji Yanagisawa
New Diplomacy Initiative (ND) Board Member
Former Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary

What Is Japan’s “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy”?
In 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers, and the military was disarmed under the rule of the occupying USforces. The new Constitution of Japan, drafted by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers staff, states thatsovereignty rests with the people, not with the emperor. It commands the government to respect fundamental humanrights. It also states that the sovereign right of the nation to war is forever renounced, and that maintaining land, sea
and air armed forces is prohibited. These were welcomed by the Japanese people, who were suffering from a scarcityof goods and restrictions on their freedom, as well as the damage caused by the war.
The renunciation of war in Article 9 came to regulate the fundamental direction of Japanese politics as a symbol of
the antiwar inclinations of the Japanese people. Japan depended on the US to ensure its national security, but when
Japan achieved economic growth and increased its national power, the US started requesting Japan to strengthen its
own defense capabilities from the 1970s. Thus, Japan's defense-related debate is focused on how to handle thecontradiction between the cooperation with the US and the anti-war clause in the Constitution.
The exclusively defense-oriented policy has been Japan’s basic defense posture since the 1970s. It means thatmilitary force can only be used in the event of an attack and to show Japan’s defensive posture, but not to threaten
other countries. The policy determines the criteria for how the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) comply withArticle 9 of Japan’s Constitution, which prohibits “the threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes.” Together with Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles, adopted in 1967, which ban the possession,production, and introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory, the exclusively defense-oriented policy
formed the foundation of a national consensus for a Japanese security and defense policy proclaiming that Japan will
not become a military power that could pose a military threat to other countries.

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Crossing Borders, Demystifying Japan

Specifically, it manifested in the guiding principles for the operations and weapons system employment of Japan’sSDF. The principles are the following:
1 The right to self-defense is exercised only when an armed attack from a foreign country against Japan occurs or
is imminent. The use of force is limited to the minimum necessary to repel the attack.
2 Japan does not possess weaponry capable of striking other countries and inflicting catastrophic damage, such as
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic bombers, and aircraft carriers.
3 During joint defense operations with the United States in time of emergency, the U.S. Forces can conduct
offensive operations, but the SDF is limited to conducting defensive operations within Japanese territory,including protecting US bases and the sea around Japan. In other words, this operational coordination gives therole of the spear to the U.S. Forces and the role of the shield to the SDF.
In the 1970s, Japan, which is geographically located on the frontline of any possible confrontation between the US
and the Soviet Union, relied on US deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella, but avoided the risk of getting
involved in a war between the two superpowers. The exclusively defense-oriented policy avoided the complicationsof maintaining strategic stability among superpowers, and limited Japan’s role to defending Japanese territory.
Furthermore, although the US encouraged Japan to modernize its defense capacity, it did not want Japan to become
an independent military actor. The U.S. Forces in Japan had the double roles of deterring the Soviet Union andproviding security assurances to Japan, as well as preventing Japan’s military expansion.

The Japan-US Alliance And the Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy
It was not until the 1980s that the Japanese government started to call the Japan-US relationship, established underthe 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security an ‘alliance.’ Until then, terms associated with military
alliance had been avoided because of a sense of aversion towards previous wars and the Vietnam War.
Since the late 1970s, the threat from the Soviet Union – who had been making strides in modernizing its military –had increased. As a response, Japan positioned itself as a “member of the West”, and aimed to improve its ability todetect and attack Soviet submarines in the three straits of the Japanese islands as well as along 1,000 nautical milesof sea lanes.
At the time, economic friction between Japan and the US became a significant political issue. Japan took this matter
seriously and incorporated the term “Japan-US alliance” as a message to the US, indicating that security relations
should be prioritized over economic conflict.
Defending the sea lanes in the Western Pacific expanded the JSDF’s role geographically, and it became clear thatits position was to complement the military strategy of the US. However, the Japanese government sought public
approval by limiting the JSDF’s operations to defense and also by emphasizing non-deviation from the exclusively
defense-oriented policy.

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New Diplomacy Compass
Crossing Borders, Demystifying JapanThe End of The Cold War and New Alliance Cooperation
After the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union was collapsed, the Japanese public demanded a reduction indefense expenditures. The Japan-US alliance also lost a common focus and faced ‘the era of drifting.’
During the Gulf War in 1991, Japan was not able to contribute militarily. The experience prompted Japan, as adeveloped country, to realize the necessity of contributing to international peace. Japan enacted a new law allowing
non-combat corps to be deployed to the United Nations peacekeeping operations. The law created a new legal
framework that is not contrary to the use of force prohibited under the Constitution. In this framework, Japan sent
the JSDF’s corps of engineers to the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in 1992.
After the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea was revealed in 1993, the necessity for renewed
cooperation within the Japan-US alliance seemed required in this new security environment, which was different
from the one during the old Cold War between the superpowers.
Japan and the US redefined their alliance and revised the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 1997.
While the prior guidelines limited defense cooperation between the JSDF and the U.S. Force to a time ofemergency in Japan, the new guidelines allowed the JSDF to support the U.S. Force’s operations even if it was notfor defending Japan. However, the JSDF’s support was geographically limited to the region near Japan and to noncombat missions, including the transportation of cargo, information sharing, and search and rescue. The Japanese
government explained that the SDF’s operation would not exceed the level set by the exclusively defense-orientedpolicy.
After 9.11, the US declared war on terror and requested countries to join its “Coalition of the Willing.” Japan
dispatched the JSDF in 2004 to assist with post-war reconstruction in Iraq, and the Japan-US alliance was said to be“better than ever”. However, JSDF operations were limited to civilian projects such as road repairs, and wereseparate from the search-and-destroy operations done by the U.S. Forces. The division of roles in this alliance –touted as better than ever before – can be described as “the US eating the food and Japan washing the dishes, alongwith NATO”. Or in other words, Japan and the NATO clean up after the US fought the war.
On another note, no soldier has been killed or injured during these JSDF overseas operations, which is a reason why
the majority of the Japanese public are in support of such dispatches.

The Rise of China
China emerged as a threat to US dominance while the US was focused on the war against terrorism. As the US
came to prioritize withdrawal from the Middle East, the Japan-US alliance lost its quality described as “better thanever before”. Now it faces a new phase of drifting.
When the US pursued dialogue with China and considered reducing military expenditures, Japan became concerned
about the credibility of the US security assurance to Japan. Therefore, Japan set out to strengthen the Japan-USalliance assertively to seek further security reassurance from the US.

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New Diplomacy Compass
Crossing Borders, Demystifying Japan

In 2015, Japan enacted a national security bill. It is a policy package, including the below-mentioned capacities of
the JSDF:
1 Exercising the right to collective self-defense – which had been understood as a violation of the Constitution
since WWII – in order to conduct operations for protecting U.S. Forces in a situation other than a time ofemergency in Japan.
2 Providing logistic supports to U.S. Forces when they are engaged in military activities in regional hotspots.
Such support includes supplying ammunition and refueling aircraft that are conducting military operations.
3 Protecting US naval vessels and aircraft during joint operations, such as military drills and surveillance.
This led to the advancement of the operational integration of the JSDF and the U.S. Forces. By enacting thenational security legislation, Japan chose to be involved in wars launched by US armed forces, and thus attempted
to allay concerns about potentially being “forsaken” by the US.
The exclusively defense-oriented policy based on the separation of the SDF’s operation from the U.S. Force’s
combat operation is now in name only. However, the Legislation for Peace and Security does not suggest that theSDF can strike an adversary’s territory.

The Missile Arms Race
The exclusively defense-oriented policy is also being challenged by the development of ballistic missiles. Theinterception of ballistic missiles is difficult, and the missiles can be carried by mobile launchers. It is impossible todestroy all these missiles.
With the aspiration of being able to strike missiles bases in a foreign country, Japan started to develop long-range
cruise missiles and high-speed gliding ballistic missiles. Although the Japanese government has not made adecision about it yet, these missiles will likely be introduced to the JSDF. That will virtually end the exclusively
defense-oriented policy. Moreover, it will increase the incentive for preemptive strikes. Because of theserepercussions, there is a concern about losing the strategic stability Japan has maintained with that policy for such along time.
China continues to develop and possess intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to strengthen its ability tointimidate and attack US forces. It has more than 1000 IRBMs that can reach Guam and may be able to attack US
aircraft carriers. On the other hand, the US does not possess these kinds of weapons, because of past compliancewith the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The gap in this capacity has led some people to think that US
dominance in the West Pacific is at stake. Now the US plans to develop new intermediate-range missiles anddeploy them to Japan.
Japan is becoming the center of a new missile arms race. However, Japan and the US would have a different
perception of the threat posed to their security, because Japan and China are within the range of intermediate-range
missiles, whereas the US is not. Furthermore, the deployment of missiles to Japan would be politically difficult
because local people would oppose it.

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New Diplomacy Compass
Crossing Borders, Demystifying JapanConclusion
The optimal plan for Japanese deterrence amidst the US-China confrontation is nowhere in sight. If Japan’s
deterrence strategy focused on expanding missile force, it would only increase the risk of Japan getting involved ina missile war. It is clear that ‘balance of terror’ is not the most suitable solution for Japan. What Japan needs to do
now is reassess the meaning of the exclusively defense-oriented policy and change its approach by pursuing aconflict-mitigating diplomacy and seek an exit that way. The exclusively defense-oriented policy “does not makethe opponent surrender by force; it is a strategy that does not win the war”. This – paradoxical as it may seem – isintended to eliminate fear of Japan, which is the primary cause behind neighboring countries possibly attempting towage war against Japan. The US deterrence strategy, on the other hand, is to strike fear into the hearts of potential
enemies: it is intended to deter opponents from waging war against the US by threatening to take revenge.
Postwar Japan has been utilizing both types of approach in its security policy for different purposes. If we incline
towards the deterrence strategy though, we may face the increasing risk of getting involved in a US-China war.
Reconstructing Japan’s national security is being called into question here.

Kyoji Yanagisawa
New Diplomacy Initiative (ND) Board Member and Former Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary. After graduatingfrom the University of Tokyo, Kyoji Yanagisawa took up a position as the Deputy Vice-Minister at the Defense
Agency (the predecessor of the Ministry of Defense) and served as director at the National Institute for Defense
Studies. He served as the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for the Koizumi, Abe, Fukuda, and Aso administrations
from 2004 to 2009. During this time, he oversaw national security and risk management. Today he is the director atthe International Geopolistic Institute Japan.

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