Towards a

Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication

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UNEP, 2011, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication,www.unep.org/greeneconomy
ISBN: 978-92-807-3143-9
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Towards a

Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication

Acknowledgements
The writing of this report would not have been possible
without a coordinated effort from a cast of talented authors
and contributors over the past two years. Acknowledgements
first go to Chapter Coordinating Authors: Robert Ayres, Steve
Bass, Andrea Bassi, Paul Clements-Hunt, Holger Dalkmann,
Derek Eaton, Maryanne Grieg-Gran, Hans Herren, Prasad
Modak, Lawrence Pratt, Philipp Rode, Ko Sakamoto, Rashid
Sumaila, Cornis Van Der Lugt, Ton van Dril, Xander van Tilburg,Peter Wooders and Mike D. Young. Contributing Authors of thechapters are acknowledged in the respective chapters.
Within UNEP, this report was conceived and initiated by the
Executive Director, Achim Steiner. It was led by Pavan Sukhdev andcoordinated by Sheng Fulai under the overall management andguidance of Steven Stone and Sylvie Lemmet. Additional guidance
was provided by Joseph Alcamo, Marion Cheatle, John Christensen,
Angela Cropper, Peter Gilruth and Ibrahim Thiaw. Alexander
Juras and Fatou Ndoye are acknowledged for their leadership in
facilitating consultations with Major Groups and Stakeholders. The
initial design of the report benefited from inputs from Hussein
Abaza, Olivier Deleuze, Maxwell Gomera and Anantha Duraiappah.
The conceptualization of the report benefitted from discussions
involving Graciela Chichilnisky, Peter May, Theodore Panayotou,
John David Shilling, Kevin Urama and Moses Ikiara. Thanks also
go to Kenneth Ruffing for his technical editing and contribution
across several chapters and to Edward B. Barbier and Tim
Swanson for their contributions to the Introduction Chapter.
Numerous internal and external peer reviewers, acknowledgedin the individual chapters, contributed their time and expertiseto improve the overall quality and sharpness of the report.
In addition, hundreds of people offered their views and perspectives
on the report at four major events: the launch meeting of the Green
Economy Initiative in December 2008, a technical workshop in April
2009, a review meeting in July 2010, and a consultative meetingin October 2010. Although they are too numerous to mention
individually, their contributions are deeply appreciated. Experts
who commented on specific draft chapters are noted accordingly
in the relevant chapters. The International Chamber of Commerce(ICC) warrants special mention here for its constructive feedback on
numerous chapters.
The report was produced through the dedicated efforts of
the UNEP Chapter Managing Team: Anna Autio, Fatma Ben
Fadhl, Nicolas Bertrand, Derek Eaton, Marenglen Gjonaj, Ana
Lucía Iturriza, Moustapha Kamal Gueye, Asad Naqvi, BenjaminSimmons and Vera Weick. They worked tirelessly to engage theChapter Coordinating Authors, interact with relevant experts
in UNEP, solidify outlines, review drafts, facilitate peer reviews,
compile review comments, guide revisions, conduct researchand bring all chapters to final production.
Additionally, several UNEP staff members provided technical andpolicy guidance on various chapters: Jacqueline Alder, Juanita
Castaño, Charles Arden-Clark, Surya Chandak, Munyaradzi
Chenje, Thomas Chiramba, Hilary French, Garrette Clark, Rob
de Jong, Renate Fleiner, Niklas Hagelberg, Arab Hoballah, James
Lomax, Angela M. Lusigi, Kaj Madsen, Donna McIntire, Desta
Mebratu, Nick Nuttall, Thierry Oliveira, Martina Otto, David Owen,
Ravi Prabhu, Jyotsna Puri, Mark Radka, Helena Rey, Rajendra
Shende, Soraya Smaoun, James Sniffen, Guido Sonnemann,
Virginia Sonntag-O’Brien, Niclas Svenningsen, Eric Usher, Cornis
Van Der Lugt, Jaap van Woerden, Geneviève Verbrugge, Farid
Yaker and Yang Wanhua. Their contributions at various stages of
the report development are deeply appreciated.
We acknowledge and appreciate the partnership and support of
the team from the International Labour Organization (ILO), led
by Peter Poschen. Many ILO staff, in particular Edmundo Werna
and those acknowledged in the individual chapters, provided
contributions on employment related issues. The tourism
chapter was developed in partnership with the World Tourism
Organization (UNWTO), through the coordination of Luigi Cabrini.
Special recognition and thanks are due to Lara Barbier, Etienne
Cadestin, Daniel Costelloe, Moritz Drupp, Jane Gibbs, Annie
Haakenstad, Hadia Hakim, Jasmin Hundorf, Sharon Khan, Kim
Hyunsoo, Andrew Joiner, Kim Juhern, Richard L’Estrange, Tilmann
Liebert, François Macheras, Dominique Maingot, Semhar
Mebrahtu, Edward Naval, Laura Ochia, Pratyancha Perdeshi, Dmitry
Preobrazhensky, Marco Portugal, Alexandra Quandt, Victoria Wu
Qiong, Waqas Rana, Alexandria Rantino, Pascal Rosset, Daniel
Szczepanski, Usman Tariq, Dhanya Williams, Carissa Wong, Yitong
Wu and Zhang Xinyue for their research assistance, and Désirée
Leon, Rahila Mughal, and Fatma Pandey for administrative support.
Many thanks are also due to Nicolas Bertrand and Leigh Ann
Hurt for managing the production; Robert McGowan, Dianna
Rienstra, and Mark Schulman for editing; Elizabeth Kemf forcopy-editing; and, Tina Schieder, Michael Nassl and Dorit Lehrfor fact-checking.
Finally, we would like to extend a special thanks to Anne
Solgaard and the team at UNEP/GRID-Arendal for preparing thelayout and design of the report.

UNEP would like to thank the governments of Norway, Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland as well as the International Labour Organization, the UN World Tourism Organizationand the UN Foundation for their generous support towards the Green Economy Initiative.

Foreword
Nearly 20 years after the Earth Summit, nations are again on the Road to Rio, but in a world
very different and very changed from that of 1992.
Then we were just glimpsing some of the challenges
emerging across the planet from climate change and theloss of species to desertification and land degradation.
Today many of those seemingly far off concerns are
becoming a reality with sobering implications for not
only achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals,
but challenging the very opportunity for seven billion
people − rising to nine billion by 2050 − to be able tothrive, let alone survive.
Rio 1992 did not fail the world – far from it. It provided
the vision and important pieces of the multilateralmachinery to achieve a sustainable future.
But this will only be possible if the environmental andsocial pillars of sustainable development are given equal
footing with the economic one: where the often invisible
engines of sustainability, from forests to freshwaters, arealso given equal if not greater weight in development
and economic planning.
Towards a Green Economy is among UNEP’s key
contributions to the Rio+20 process and the overall goalof addressing poverty and delivering a sustainable 21st
century.
The report makes a compelling economic and social
case for investing two per cent of global GDP in greeningten central sectors of the economy in order to shiftdevelopment and unleash public and private capital
flows onto a low-carbon, resource-efficient path.
Such a transition can catalyse economic activity of atleast a comparable size to business as usual, but witha reduced risk of the crises and shocks increasingly
inherent in the existing model.
New ideas are by their very nature disruptive, but far lessdisruptive than a world running low on drinking waterand productive land, set against the backdrop of climatechange, extreme weather events and rising natural
resource scarcities.
A green economy does not favour one politicalperspective over another. It is relevant to all economies,
be they state or more market-led. Neither is it areplacement for sustainable development. Rather, it
is a way of realising that development at the national,
regional and global levels and in ways that resonate
with and amplify the implementation of Agenda 21.
A transition to a green economy is already underway, apoint underscored in the report and a growing wealthof companion studies by international organisations,countries, corporations and civil society. But thechallenge is clearly to build on this momentum.
Rio+20 offers a real opportunity to scale-up and embed
these “green shoots”. In doing so, this report offers not
only a roadmap to Rio but beyond 2012, where a far
more intelligent management of the natural and humancapital of this planet finally shapes the wealth creationand direction of this world.

Achim Steiner
UNEP Executive Director
United Nations Under-Secretary General

Contents
Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Foreword  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
PART I: Investing in natural capital  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Agriculture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
PART II: Investing in energy and resource efficiency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Renewable energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Buildings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453
PART III: Supporting the transition to a global green economy  . . . . . . 495
Modelling global green investment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
Enabling conditions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627

Introduction

Setting the stage for a green economy transition

Towards a green economy

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.201112

Introduction

Contents
1

Introduction: Setting the stage for a green economy transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4

From crisis to opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
What is a green economy?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Pathways to a green economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Approach and structure – Towards a green economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
List of tables
Table 1: Natural capital: Underlying components and illustrative services and values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

List of boxes
Box 1: Managing the population challenge in the context of sustainable development  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Box 2: Towards a green economy: A twin challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

13

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction: Setting the stage
for a green economy transition
1.1 From crisis to opportunity
The last two years have seen the idea of a “green economy”
float out of its specialist moorings in environmental
economics and into the mainstream of policy discourse.
It is found increasingly in the words of heads of state andfinance ministers, in the text of G20 communiques, anddiscussed in the context of sustainable development andpoverty eradication.
This recent traction for a green economy concept has no
doubt been aided by widespread disillusionment withthe prevailing economic paradigm, a sense of fatigue
emanating from the many concurrent crises and market
failures experienced during the very first decade of the
new millennium, including especially the financial andeconomic crisis of 2008. But at the same time, there isincreasing evidence of a way forward, a new economic
paradigm – one in which material wealth is not delivered
perforce at the expense of growing environmental risks,
ecological scarcities and social disparities.
Mounting evidence also suggests that transitioning
to a green economy has sound economic and social
justification. There is a strong case emerging for aredoubling of efforts by both governments as wellas the private sector to engage in such an economictransformation. For governments, this would include
leveling the playing field for greener products byphasing out antiquated subsidies, reforming policies
and providing new incentives, strengthening market
infrastructure and market-based mechanisms, redirecting
public investment, and greening public procurement.
For the private sector, this would involve understanding
and sizing the true opportunity represented by green
economy transitions across a number of key sectors, andresponding to policy reforms and price signals throughhigher levels of financing and investment.
An era of capital misallocation
Several concurrent crises have unfolded during the last
decade: climate, biodiversity, fuel, food, water, and more
recently, in the global financial system. Accelerating
carbon emissions indicate a mounting threat ofclimate change, with potentially disastrous humanconsequences. The fuel price shock of 2007-2008 andthe related skyrocketing food and commodity prices,14reflect both structural weaknesses and unresolved risks.
Forecasts by the International Energy Agency (IEA) andothers of rising fossil fuel demand and energy prices
suggest an ongoing dependence as the world economy
struggles to recover and grow (IEA 2010).
Currently, there is no international consensus on the
problem of global food security or on possible solutions
for how to nourish a population of 9 billion by 2050.
See Box 1 for further information on the population
challenge. Freshwater scarcity is already a global
problem, and forecasts suggest a growing gap by 2030
between annual freshwater demand and renewablesupply (McKinsey and Company 2009). The outlook for
improved sanitation still looks bleak for over 1.1 billion
people and 844 million people still lack access to clean
drinking water (World Health Organization and UNICEF
2010). Collectively, these crises are severely impacting
the possibility of sustaining prosperity worldwide
and achieving the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs) for reducing extreme poverty. They are also
compounding persistent social problems, such as job
losses, socio-economic insecurity, disease and social
instability.
The causes of these crises vary, but at a fundamental
level they all share a common feature: the grossmisallocation of capital. During the last two decades,much capital was poured into property, fossil fuels
and structured financial assets with embedded
derivatives. However, relatively little in comparison wasinvested in renewable energy, energy efficiency, public
transportation, sustainable agriculture, ecosystemand biodiversity protection, and land and water
conservation.
Most economic development and growth strategies
encouraged rapid accumulation of physical, financial
and human capital, but at the expense of excessive
depletion and degradation of natural capital, which
includes the endowment of natural resources andecosystems. By depleting the world’s stock of natural
wealth – often irreversibly – this pattern of development
and growth has had detrimental impacts on the wellbeing of current generations and presents tremendous
risks and challenges for the future. The recent multiple
crises are symptomatic of this pattern.

Introduction

Box 1: Managing the population challenge in the context ofsustainable development
The link between population dynamics andsustainable development is strong and inseparable,
as reflected in Principle 8 of the 1992 Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development.
“To achieve sustainable development and a higher
quality of life for all people, States should reduce andeliminate unsustainable patterns of production andconsumption and promote appropriate demographic
policies.” Rio Declaration, Principle 8 (UN 1992).
This year the world population will reach 7 billion
and by mid century grow to over 9 billion. Contrary
to previous projections the most recent population
projections expect continued population growth
thereafter (UN DESA 2009 and 2011). Population
growth raises the stakes in efforts to reduce poverty.
It not only increases the challenge of feeding a
growing population, which crucially depends onhigher agricultural output (FAO 2009 and 2010;
Tokgoz and Rosegrant 2011), but also requires
creation of sufficient employment opportunities,
which in turn depend on favorable economic
development (ILO 2011; UNFPA 2011a; Basten et al.
2011; Herrmann and Khan 2008).
A transition to a green economy can assist in
overcoming the contribution that population
growth makes to the depletion of scarce natural
resources. The world’s least developed countries(LDCs) are more strongly affected by environmental
degradation than most other developing countries(UNCTAD 2010a), so therefore have much to gainfrom the transition to a green economy.
In addition, changing spatial distributions of
populations, driven both by rural to urban migration
and by urban growth, are changing environmental
impacts and vulnerabilities. When planned,

Existing policies and market incentives have contributed
to this problem of capital misallocation because they allow
businesses to run up significant, largely unaccounted for,and unchecked social and environmental externalities. To
reverse such misallocation requires better public policies,
including pricing and regulatory measures, to change theperverse incentives that drive this capital misallocationand ignore social and environmental externalities. At thesame time, appropriate regulations, policies and public
investments that foster changes in the pattern of private

urbanisation can be a powerful driver of sustainable
development. Given that in 2008 the share of theurban population has for the first time exceeded theshare of people living in the rural areas at the global
level (UNFPA 2007), a transition to a green economy
becomes increasingly important. Significantly, inthe least developed countries where the majorityof people are still living in the rural areas, 2000
to 2010 was the first decade that growth of theurban population outpaced the growth of the rural
populations. These types of changes at a societal
level can also present opportunities for a green
economy to develop.
For example cities can provide essential services,
including health and education, at lower costs per
capita due to economies of scale benefits. Efficiencies
are also realised in the development of vital
infrastructure including housing, water, sanitationand transport. Urbanisation can also reduce energy
consumption, particularly in transport and housing,and create interactive spaces that further cultural
outreach and exchange. Realisation of these positive
benefits requires proactive planning for the future
demographic changes.
Forward planning by governments and local
authorities can address population dynamics in aproactive way. For example, one tool available toassist countries is to make better use of available
population data and conduct a systematic
population situation analysis (UNFPA 2011b), aiming
to highlight how current and projected population
trends affect the development of countries. Suchanalysis provides the necessary foundation toaddress population dynamics and their links tosustainable development and poverty reduction
strategies.
Source: UNFPA

investment are increasingly being adopted around theworld, especially in developing countries (UNEP 2010).
Why is this report needed now?
UNEP’s report, Towards a Green Economy, aims to debunk
several myths and misconceptions about greening the
global economy, and provides timely and practicalguidance to policy makers on what reforms they needto unlock the productive and employment potential ofa green economy.

15

Towards a green economy
Perhaps the most prevalent myth is that there isan inescapable trade-off between environmental
sustainability and economic progress. There is now
substantial evidence that the greening of economies
neither inhibits wealth creation nor employment
opportunities. To the contrary, many green sectors
provide significant opportunities for investment, growthand jobs. For this to occur, however, new enabling
conditions are required to promote such investments inthe transition to a green economy, which in turn calls forurgent action by policy makers. 			
A second myth is that a green economy is a luxury only
wealthy countries can afford, or worse, a ruse to restrain
development and perpetuate poverty in developing
countries. Contrary to this perception, numerous
examples of greening transitions can be found in thedeveloping world, which should be replicated elsewhere.
Towards a Green Economy brings some of theseexamples to light and highlights their scope for wider
application.
UNEP’s work on green economy raised the visibilityof this concept in 2008, particularly through a callfor a Global Green New Deal (GGND). The GGND
recommended a package of public investments andcomplementary policy and pricing reforms aimed at
kick-starting a transition to a green economy, while
reinvigorating economies and jobs and addressing
persistent poverty (Barbier 2010a). Designed as a timely
and appropriate policy response to the economiccrisis, the GGND proposal was an early output from theUnited Nations’ Green Economy Initiative. This initiative,
coordinated by UNEP, was one of the nine Joint Crisis
Initiatives undertaken by the Secretary-General of the
UN and his Chief Executives Board in response to the2008 economic and financial crisis.
Towards a Green Economy – the main output of the Green
Economy Initiative – demonstrates that the greeningof economies need not be a drag on growth. On thecontrary, the greening of economies has the potential
to be a new engine of growth, a net generator of decent
jobs and a vital strategy to eliminate persistent poverty.
The report also seeks to motivate policy makers to create
the enabling conditions for increased investments in atransition to a green economy in three ways.
First, the report makes an economic case for shifting
both public and private investment to transform key
sectors that are critical to greening the global economy.
It illustrates through examples how added employment
through green jobs offsets job losses in a transition to agreen economy.
Second, it shows how a green economy can reduce
persistent poverty across a range of important sectors

16– agriculture, forestry, freshwater, fisheries and energy.
Sustainable forestry and ecologically friendly farming
methods help conserve soil fertility and water resources.
This is especially critical for subsistence farming, uponwhich almost 1.3 billion people depend for theirlivelihoods (UNEP et al. 2008).
Third, it provides guidance on policies to achieve this shiftby reducing or eliminating environmentally harmful orperverse subsidies, addressing market failures created byexternalities or imperfect information, creating marketbased incentives, implementing appropriate regulatory
frameworks, initiating green public procurement and by
stimulating investment.

1.2 What is a green economy?
UNEP defines a green economy as one that results in“improved human well-being and social equity, while
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecologicalscarcities” (UNEP 2010). In its simplest expression, agreen economy is low-carbon, resource efficient, andsocially inclusive. In a green economy, growth in income
and employment are driven by public and private
investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution,enhance energy and resource efficiency, and preventthe loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services.
These investments need to be catalysed and supported
by targeted public expenditure, policy reforms andregulation changes. The development path should
maintain, enhance and, where necessary, rebuild
natural capital as a critical economic asset and as asource of public benefits. This is especially important forpoor people whose livelihoods and security depend on
nature.
The key aim for a transition to a green economy is toenable economic growth and investment while
increasing environmental quality and social
inclusiveness. Critical to attaining such an objective is tocreate the conditions for public and private investments
to incorporate broader environmental and social
criteria. In addition, the main indicators of economic
performance, such as growth in Gross Domestic Product(GDP) need to be adjusted to account for pollution,
resource depletion, declining ecosystem services, andthe distributional consequences of natural capital loss
to the poor.
A major challenge is reconciling the competing
economic development aspirations of rich and poor
countries in a world economy that is facing increasingclimate change, energy insecurity and ecological scarcity.
A green economy can meet this challenge by offering adevelopment path that reduces carbon dependency,

Introduction
promotes resource and energy efficiency and lessens
environmental degradation. As economic growth andinvestments become less dependent on liquidating
environmental assets and sacrificing environmental
quality, both rich and poor countries can attain moresustainable economic development.
The concept of a green economy does not replacesustainable development; but there is a growing
recognition that achieving sustainability rests almost
entirely on getting the economy right. Decades ofcreating new wealth through a “brown economy” model
based on fossil fuels have not substantially addressedsocial marginalisation, environmental degradation
and resource depletion. In addition, the world is still
far from delivering on the Millennium Development
Goals by 2015. The next section looks at the important
linkages between the concept of a green economy andsustainable development.
A green economy and sustainable development
In 2009, the UN General Assembly decided to hold asummit in Rio de Janeiro in 2012 (Rio+20) to celebrate
the 20th anniversary of the first Rio Earth Summit in1992. Two of the agenda items for Rio+20 are, “Green
Economy in the Context of Sustainable Development
and Poverty Eradication”, and “International Framework
for Sustainable Development”. With the green economy
now firmly established on the international policy
agenda, it is useful to review and clarify the linkages
between a green economy and sustainable development.
Most interpretations of sustainability take as theirstarting point the consensus reached by the World
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)in 1987, which defined sustainable development as“development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987).
Economists are generally comfortable with this broadinterpretation of sustainability, as it is easily translatable
into economic terms: an increase in well-being today
should not result in reducing well-being tomorrow. Thatis, future generations should be entitled to at least thesame level of economic opportunities – and thus at least
the same level of economic welfare – as is available tocurrent generations.
As a result, economic development today must ensurethat future generations are left no worse off than current
generations. Or, as some economists have succinctly
expressed it, per capita welfare should not be declining
over time (Pezzey 1989). According to this view, it is thetotal stock of capital employed by the economic system,
including natural capital, which determines the fullrange of economic opportunities, and thus well-being,available to both current and future generations (Pearce
et al. 1989).
Society must decide how best to use its total capitalstock today to increase current economic activities andwelfare. Society must also decide how much it needs tosave or accumulate for tomorrow, and ultimately, for thewell-being of future generations.
However, it is not simply the aggregate stock of capitalin the economy that may matter but also its composition,in particular whether current generations are using up
one form of capital to meet today’s needs. For example,
much of the interest in sustainable development is driven
by concern that economic development may be leading
to rapid accumulation of physical and human capital at
the expense of excessive depletion and degradation ofnatural capital. The major concern is that by irreversibly
depleting the world’s stock of natural wealth, today’s
development path will have detrimental implications forthe well-being of future generations.
One of the first economic studies to make theconnection between this capital approach to sustainable
development and a green economy was the 1989 book
Blueprint for a Green Economy (Pearce et al. 1989). The
authors argued that because today’s economies arebiased towards depleting natural capital to secure
growth, sustainable development is unachievable. A
green economy that values environmental assets,
employs pricing policies and regulatory changes totranslate these values into market incentives, and adjusts
the economy’s measure of GDP for environmental losses
is essential to ensuring the well-being of current andfuture generations.
As pointed out by the Blueprint for a Green Economy
authors, a major issue in the capital approach tosustainable development is whether substitution
among different forms of capital – human capital,
physical capital and natural capital – is possible. A
strong conservationist perspective might maintain thatthe natural component of the total capital stock must
be kept intact, as measured in physical terms. However,this may be questioned in practice, especially in thecontext of developing countries, if natural capital isrelatively abundant while physical and human capitalneeds to be developed to meet other human demands.
This type of substitution reflects the unfortunate realitythat the creation of physical capital – for example roads,
buildings and machinery – often requires the conversionof natural capital. While substitution between natural
capital and other forms of capital is often inevitable,
there is often room for efficiency gains. There is also a
growing recognition of environmental thresholds thatwould constrain substitution beyond minimum levels
needed for human welfare.

17

Towards a green economy
Biodiversity

Ecosystem goods andservices (examples)

Economic values (examples)

Ecosystems (variety & extent/area)• Recreation• Water regulation• Carbon storage

Avoiding greenhouse gas emissions by conserving forests: US$ 3.7 trillion (NPV)

Species (diversity & abundance)• Food, fiber, fuel• Design inspiration• Pollination

Contribution of insect pollinators to agricultural output: ~US$ 190 billion/year

Genes (variability & population)• Medicinal discoveries• Disease resistance• Adaptive capacity

25-50% of the US$ 640 billion pharmaceutical market is derived from genetic resources

Table 1: Natural capital: Underlying components and illustrative services and values
Source: Eliasch (2008); Gallai et al. (2009); TEEB (2009)

Yet, there has always been concern that some forms ofnatural capital are essential to human welfare, particularly
key ecological goods and services, unique environments
and natural habitats, and irreplaceable ecosystem
attributes. Uncertainty over the true value of theseimportant assets to human welfare, in particular thevalue that future generations may place on them if they
become increasingly scarce, further limits our ability todetermine whether we can adequately compensate future
generations for today’s irreversible losses in such essential
natural capital. This concern is reflected in other definitionsof sustainable development. For example, in 1991, theWorld Wide Fund for Nature, the International Union forConservation of Nature (IUCN), and UNEP interpreted
the concept of sustainable development as “improving
the quality of human life within the carrying capacity of
supporting ecosystems” (WWF, IUCN and UNEP 1991).
As this definition suggests, the type of natural capitalthat is especially at risk is ecosystems. As explained
by Partha Dasgupta (2008): “Ecosystems are capital
assets. Like reproducible capital assets … ecosystems
depreciate if they are misused or are overused. But theydiffer from reproducible capital assets in three ways:(1) depreciation of natural capital is frequently
irreversible (or at best the systems take a long time
to recover); (2) except in a very limited sense, it isn’t
possible to replace a depleted or degraded ecosystem
by a new one; and (3) ecosystems can collapse abruptly,
without much prior warning.”
Rising ecological scarcity is an indication that we are
irrevocably depleting ecosystems too rapidly, andthe consequence is that current and future economic
welfare is affected. An important indicator of thegrowing ecological scarcity worldwide was provided
by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) in 2005,
which found that over 60 per cent of the world’s major
ecosystem goods and services covered in the assessment
were degraded or used unsustainably.
Some important benefits to humankind fall in thiscategory, including fresh water; capture fisheries; water18

purification and waste treatment; wild foods; genetic
resources; biochemicals; wood fuel; pollination; spiritual,religious and aesthetic values; the regulation of regional
and local climate; erosion; pests; and natural hazards.
The economic values associated with these ecosystemservices, while generally not marketed, are substantial(see Table 1).
One major difficulty is that the increasing costs
associated with rising ecological scarcity are notroutinely reflected in markets. Almost all the degradedecosystem goods or services identified by the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment are not marketed. Some goods,
such as capture fisheries, fresh water, wild foods, andwood fuel, are often commercially marketed, but due
to the poor management of the biological resourcesand ecosystems that are the source of these goods, andimperfect information, the market prices do not reflectunsustainable use and overexploitation.
Nor have adequate policies and institutions beendeveloped to handle the costs associated withworsening ecological scarcity globally. All too often,
policy distortions and failures compound these
problems by encouraging wasteful use of natural
resources and environmental degradation. The uniquechallenge posed by rising ecological scarcity andinefficient resource and energy use today is to overcome
a vast array of market, policy, and institutional failuresthat prevents recognition of the economic significanceof this environmental degradation.
Reversing this process of unsustainable development
requires three important steps. First, as argued by the
Blueprint for a Green Economy authors, improvements inenvironmental valuation and policy analysis are required
to ensure that markets and policies incorporate the fullcosts and benefits of environmental impacts (Pearce et al.
1989; Pearce and Barbier 2000). Environmental valuation
and accounting for natural capital depreciation must be
fully integrated into economic development policy andstrategy. As suggested above, the most undervalued
components of natural capital are ecosystems andIntroduction
the myriad goods and services they provide. Valuing
ecosystem goods and services is not easy, yet it isfundamental to ensuring the sustainability of global
economic development efforts.

progress in reversing unsustainable development calls
for more widespread interdisciplinary collaboration
to analyse complex problems of environmental
degradation, biodiversity loss and ecosystem decline.

A major international research effort supported by UNEP,
the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), is
illustrating how ecological and economic research canbe used to value ecosystem goods and services, as well
as how such valuation is essential for policy making andinvestments in the environment (Sukhdev 2008; TEEB
2010).

Interdisciplinary research also needs to determine
the thresholds that should govern the transformationof specific types of natural capital into other forms ofcapital. For example, how much forestland is allowed
for conversion into farmland, industrial use or urban
development in a given area? How much undergroundwater is allowed for extraction each year? How muchand what fish species can be caught in a given season?
Which chemicals should be banned from production
and trading? And more important, what are the criteria
for setting these thresholds? Once these standards
are established, incentive measures at national orinternational levels can be devised to ensure compliance.

Second, the role of policy in controlling excessive
environmental degradation requires implementing
effective and appropriate information, incentives,
institutions, investments and infrastructure. Better
information on the state of the environment, ecosystems
and biodiversity is essential for both private and publicdecision making that determines the allocation ofnatural capital for economic development. The use of
market-based instruments, the creation of markets, andwhere appropriate, regulatory measures, have a roleto play in internalising this information in everyday
allocation decisions in the economy. Such instruments
are also important in correcting the market andpolicy failures that distort the economic incentives for
improved environmental and ecosystems management.
However, overcoming institutional failures andencouraging more effective property rights, good
governance and support for local communities, is also
critical. Reducing government inefficiency, corruption
and poor accountability are also important in reversing
excessive environmental degradation in many countries.
But there is also a positive role for government inproviding an appropriate and effective infrastructure
through public investment, protecting criticalecosystems and biodiversity conservation, creating new
incentive mechanisms such as payment for ecosystemservices, fostering the technologies and knowledge
necessary for improving ecosystem restoration, andfacilitating the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Third, continuing environmental degradation, land
conversion and global climate change affect thefunctioning, diversity, and resilience of ecologicalsystems and the goods and services they supply. The
potential long-term impacts of these effects on the healthand stability of ecosystems are difficult to quantify andvalue. Increasing collaboration between environmental
scientists, ecologists and economists will be required toassess and monitor these impacts (MEA 2005; Polasky
and Segerson 2009). Such interdisciplinary ecologicaland economic analysis is also necessary to identify andassess the welfare consequences for current and future
generations from increasing ecological scarcity. Further

The other key to balancing different forms of capital
recognises that substitutability is a characteristicof current technologies. Investing in changing andsubstituting these technologies can lead to newcomplementarities. Most renewable energy sources,
such as wind turbines or solar panels, considerably
reduce the amount of natural capital that is sacrificed
in their construction and the lifetime of their operation,compared to fossil fuel burning technologies. Bothof these types of solutions – setting thresholds andaltering technologies – are important for achieving agreen economy.
In sum, moving towards a green economy must becomea strategic economic policy agenda for achieving
sustainable development. A green economy recognisesthat the goal of sustainable development is improving
the quality of human life within the constraints ofthe environment, which include combating global
climate change, energy insecurity, and ecologicalscarcity. However, a green economy cannot be focused
exclusively on eliminating environmental problems andscarcity. It must also address the concerns of sustainable
development with intergenerational equity anderadicating poverty.
A green economy and eradicating poverty
Most developing countries, and certainly the majority of
their populations, depend directly on natural resources.
The livelihoods of many of the world’s rural poor are also
intricately linked with exploiting fragile environments
and ecosystems (Barbier 2005). Well over 600 millionof the rural poor currently live on lands prone todegradation and water stress, and in upland areas, forest
systems, and drylands that are vulnerable to climaticand ecological disruptions (Comprehensive Assessmentof Water Management in Agriculture 2007; World Bank
2003). The tendency of rural populations to be clustered19

Towards a green economy
on marginal lands and in fragile environments is likely
to be a continuing problem for the foreseeable future,
given current global rural population and poverty trends.
Despite rapid global urbanisation, the rural populationof developing regions continues to grow, albeit at a
slower rate in recent decades (Population Division of theUnited Nations Secretariat 2008). Furthermore, aroundthree-quarters of the developing world’s poor still livein rural areas, which means about twice as many poor
people live in rural rather than in urban areas (Chen andRavallion 2007).
The world’s poor are especially vulnerable to theclimate-driven risks posed by rising sea levels, coastal
erosion and more frequent storms. Around 14 per centof the population and 21 per cent of urban dwellers
in developing countries live in low elevation coastal
zones that are exposed to these risks (McGranahan et al.
2007). The livelihoods of billions – from poor farmers tourban slum dwellers – are threatened by a wide rangeof climate-induced risks that affect food security, water
availability, natural disasters, ecosystem stability andhuman health (UNDP 2008; OECD 2008). For example,
many of the 150 million urban inhabitants, who arelikely to be at risk from extreme coastal flooding eventsand sea level rise, are likely to be the poor living in cities
in developing countries (Nicholls et al. 2007).
As in the case of climate change, the link between
ecological scarcity and poverty is well-established forsome of the most critical environmental and energy
problems. For example, for the world’s poor, global
water scarcity manifests itself as a water poverty
problem. One-in-five people in the developing world
lacks access to sufficient clean water, and about half thedeveloping world’s population, 2.6 billion people, do nothave access to basic sanitation. More than 660 million of
the people without sanitation live on less than US$ 2 aday, and more than 385 million on less than US$ 1 a day(UNDP 2006). Billions of people in developing countries
have no access to modern energy services, and those
consumers who do have access often pay high prices for
erratic and unreliable services. Among the energy poorare 2.4 billion people who rely on traditional biomass
fuels for cooking and heating, including 89 per cent of
the population of Sub-Saharan Africa; and, the 1.6 billion
people who do not have access to electricity (IEA 2002).
Thus, finding ways to protect global ecosystems, reduce
the risks of global climate change, improve energy
security, and simultaneously improve the livelihoods ofthe poor are important challenges in the transition to agreen economy, especially for developing countries.
As this report demonstrates, a transition to a green
economy can contribute to eradicating poverty. A

20number of sectors with green economic potential areparticularly important for the poor, such as agriculture,
forestry, fishery and water management, which havepublic goods qualities. Investing in greening these
sectors, including through scaling up microfinance, islikely to benefit the poor in terms of not only jobs, butalso secure livelihoods that are predominantly basedon ecosystem services. Enabling the poor to accessmicroinsurance coverage against natural disasters
and catastrophes is equally important for protecting
livelihood assets from external shocks due to changing
and unpredictable weather patterns.
However, it must be emphasised that moving towards
a green economy will not automatically address
all poverty issues. A pro-poor orientation must be
superimposed on any green economy initiative.
Investments in renewable energy, for example, will haveto pay special attention to the issue of access to clean
and affordable energy. Payments for ecosystem services,such as carbon sequestration in forests, will need tofocus more on poor forest communities as the primary
beneficiaries. The promotion of organic agriculture
can open up opportunities, particularly for poor smallscale farmers who typically make up the majority of the
agricultural labour force in most low-income countries,
but will need to be complemented by policies to ensurethat extension and other support services are in place.
In sum, the top priority of the UN MDGs is eradicating
extreme poverty and hunger, including halving the
proportion of people living on less than US$ 1 a day by
2015. A green economy must not only be consistent withthat objective, but must also ensure that policies andinvestments geared towards reducing environmental
risks and scarcities are compatible with ameliorating
global poverty and social inequity.

1.3 Pathways to a green economy
If the desirability of moving to a green economy is clear
to most people, the means of doing so is still a workin progress for many. This section looks at the theoryof greening, the practice and the enabling conditions
required for making such a transition. However, before
embarking on this analysis, the section frames thedimensions of the challenge.
How far is the world from a green economy?
Over the last quarter of a century, the world economy has
quadrupled, benefiting hundreds of millions of people(IMF 2006). However, 60 per cent of the world’s major
ecosystem goods and services that underpin livelihoods
have been degraded or used unsustainably (Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment 2005). This is because theIntroduction

Box 2: Towards a green economy: A twin challenge
health, education, and potable water. The challenge
for countries is to move towards the origin of
the graph, where a high level of humandevelopment can be achieved within planetary
boundaries.

African countries
Asian countries
European countries
Latin American and Caribbean countries
North American countries
Oceanian countries

10

8

6

World average biocapacity per capita in 1961

4

World average biocapacity per capita in 2006

2

Ecological footprint (global hectares per capita)

12

UNDP threshold for high human development

Many countries now enjoy a high level ofhuman development – but at the cost of alarge ecological footprint. Others have a very
low footprint, but face urgent needs toimprove access to basic services such as

High human development
within the Earth’s limits
0.2

0.4

0.6
United Nations Human Development Index

0.8

1.0

Source: Global Footprint Network (2010); UNDP (2009)

economic growth of recent decades has beenaccomplished mainly through drawing down natural
resources, without allowing stocks to regenerate, andthrough allowing widespread ecosystem degradationand loss.
For instance, today only 20 per cent of commercial fishstocks, primarily low priced species, are underexploited;
52 per cent are fully exploited with no further room for
expansion; about 20 per cent are overexploited; and 8
per cent are depleted (FAO 2009). Water is becoming
scarce and water stress is projected to increase withwater supply satisfying only 60 per cent of world
demand in 20 years (McKinsey and Company 2009).
Agriculture saw increasing yields primarily due to theuse of chemical fertilisers (Sparks 2009), yet has resulted
in declining soil quality, land degradation, (Müller andDavis 2009) and deforestation – which resulted in 13
million hectares of forest lost annually over 1990-2005(FAO 2010). Ecological scarcities are seriously affecting
the entire gamut of economic sectors that are thebedrock of human food supply (fisheries, agriculture,
freshwater, and forestry) and a critical source of
livelihoods for the poor. At the same time, ecologicalscarcity and social inequity are clear indicators of an
economy that is not sustainable.
For the first time in history, more than half of the world
population lives in urban areas. Cities now account for 75
per cent of energy consumption (UN Habitat 2009) andof carbon emissions (Clinton Foundation 2010).1 Risingand related problems of congestion, pollution and poorly
provisioned services affect the productivity and healthof all, but fall particularly hard on the urban poor. With
approximately 50 per cent of the global population now
living in emerging economies (World Bank 2010) that are
rapidly urbanising and developing, the need for green city
planning, infrastructure and transportation is paramount.
The transition to a green economy will vary considerably
among nations, as it depends on the specifics of eachcountry’s natural and human capital and on its relative
level of development. As demonstrated graphically, there
are many opportunities for all countries in such a transition(see Box 2). Some countries have attained high levels of
1. For a critique of these figures, see Satterthwaite, D. (2008), “Cities’contribution to global warming: notes on the allocation of greenhouse gas
emissions”, Environment and Urbanization, 20 (2): 539-549..

21

Towards a green economy
human development, but often at the expense of theirnatural resource base, the quality of their environment,
and high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The challenge
for these countries is to reduce their per capita ecologicalfootprint without impairing their quality of life.
Other countries still maintain relatively low per capita
ecological footprints, but need to deliver improved levelsof services and material well-being to their citizens. Theirchallenge is to do this without drastically increasing
their ecological footprint. As the diagram illustrates, oneof these two challenges affects almost every nation, andglobally, the economy is still very far from being green.
Enabling conditions for a green economy
To make the transition to a green economy, specificenabling conditions will be required. These enabling
conditions consist of national regulations, policies,
subsidies and incentives, as well as international market
and legal infrastructure, trade and technical assistance.
Currently, enabling conditions are heavily weighted
towards, and encourage, the prevailing brown economy,
which depends excessively on fossil fuels, resource
depletion and environmental degradation.
For example, price and production subsidies for fossil
fuels collectively exceeded US$ 650 billion in 2008 (IEA
et al. 2010). This high level of subsidisation can adversely
affect the adoption of clean energy while contributing
to more greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast, enabling
conditions for a green economy can pave the way forthe success of public and private investment in greening
the world’s economies (IEA 2009). At a national level,
examples of such enabling conditions are: changes tofiscal policy, reform and reduction of environmentally
harmful subsidies; employing new market-based
instruments; targeting public investments to green key
sectors; greening public procurement; and improving
environmental rules and regulations, as well as theirenforcement. At an international level, there are also
opportunities to add to market infrastructure, improve
trade and aid flows and foster greater international
cooperation (United Nations General Assembly 2010).
At the national level, any strategy to green economies
should consider the impact of environmental policies
within the broader context of policies to address
innovation and economic performance (Porter and Van
der Linde 1995).2 In this view, government policy plays acritical role within economies to encourage innovationand growth. Such intervention is important as a means
for fostering innovation and for choosing the directionof change (Stoneman ed. 1995; Foray ed. 2009).
2. This point has been debated since at least the time of the initialstatement of the Porter Hypothesis. Porter argued then that environmental
regulation might have a positive impact on growth through the dynamic
effects it engendered within an economy.

22

For some time, economists such as Kenneth Arrowhave shown that competitive firms and competitivemarkets do not necessarily produce the optimal amountof innovation and growth within an economy (Arrow
1962; Kamien and Schwartz 1982).3 Public intervention
within an economy is therefore critically important forthese purposes. This is because industries in competitivemarkets have few incentives to invest in technologicalchange or even in product innovation, as any returns
would be immediately competed away. This is one of thebest-known examples of market failure in the context
of competitive markets, and provides the rationale forvarious forms of interventions (Blair and Cotter 2005).
Examples of spurring growth and innovation can be seenfrom histories of many recently emerged economies. In
the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese and South Korean
governments chose the direction of technologicalchange through importing the technology of othercountries (Adelman 1999). This changed in the 1970s
when these economies shifted to aggressive policies
for encouraging energy-efficient innovation. Shortly
afterwards, Japan was one of the leading economies
in the world in terms of research and development(R&D) investment in these industries (Mowery 1995).4
This pattern of directed spending and environmental
policies is being repeated today across much of Asia.
The cases of South Korea and China in particular are
illustrative, where a large proportion of their stimulus
packages was directed at a “green recovery” and has
now been instituted into longer-term plans for retoolingtheir economies around green growth (Barbier 2010b).
Thus, moving towards a green development path is almost
certainly a means for attaining welfare improvements acrossa society, but it is also often a means for attaining future
growth improvement. This is because a shift away from basic
production modes of development based on extraction
and consumption and towards more complex modes ofdevelopment can be a good long-term strategy for growth.
There are several reasons why this shift might be good forlong-term competitiveness as well as for social welfare.
First, employing strong environmental policies can drive
inefficiencies out of the economy by removing thosefirms and industries that only exist because of implicit
subsidies in under-priced resources. The free use ofair, water and ecosystems is not a value-less good forany actor in an economy and amounts to subsidisingnegative net worth activities. Introducing effective
regulation and market-based mechanisms to contain
3. It has been known since at least the time of the seminal work of Kenneth
Arrow (1962) and the structural work of Kamien and Schwartz (1982) thatcompetitive firms and competitive markets need not produce the optimal
amount of innovation and growth within an economy.
4. By 1987, Japan was the world leader in R&D per unit GDP (at 2.8 per cent)and the world leader in the proportion of that spent on energy-related R&D(at 23 per cent).

Introduction
pollution and limit the accumulation of environmental
liabilities drives the economy in a more efficient direction.

both a macroeconomic level and a sectoral level will beessential to informing and guiding the transition.

Second, resource pricing is important not just forthe pricing of natural capital and services, but also
for pricing of all the other inputs within an economy.
An economy allocates its efforts and expenditures
according to relative prices, and under-priced resources
result in unbalanced economies. Policy makers should
be targeting the future they wish their economies toachieve, and this will usually require higher relative
prices on resources. An economy that wishes to develop
around knowledge, R&D, human capital and innovation
should not be providing free natural resources.

To complicate matters, conventional economic indicators,
such as GDP, provide a distorted lens for economic
performance, particularly because such measures fail toreflect the extent to which production and consumption
activities may be drawing down natural capital. By either
depleting natural resources or degrading the ability of
ecosystems to deliver economic benefits, in terms ofprovisioning, regulating or cultural services, economic
activity is often based on the depreciation of natural capital.

Third, employing resource pricing drives investments
into R&D and innovation. It does so because avoiding
costly resources can be accomplished by researching
and finding new production methods. This will include
investment in all of the factors (human capital andknowledge) and all of the activities (R&D and innovation)
listed above. Moving towards more efficient resource
pricing is about turning the economy’s emphasis
towards different foundations of development.
Fourth, these investments may then generateinnovation rents. Policies that reflect scarcities thatare prevalent in the local economy can also reflectscarcities prevalent more widely. For this reason, asolution to a problem of resource scarcity identified
locally (via R&D investments) may have applicability
and hence more global marketability. The first solution
to a widely experienced problem can be patented,
licensed and marketed widely.
Fifth, aggressive environmental regulation may
anticipate future widely-experienced scarcities andprovide a template for other jurisdictions to follow. Suchpolicy leadership can be the first step in the processof innovation, investment, regulation and resource
pricing described above (Network of Heads of European
Environment Protection Agencies 2005).
In sum, the benefits from a strong policy frameworkto address market failures and ecological scarcities
will flow down the environment pathway that comesfrom altering the direction of an economy. Policies andmarket-based mechanisms that enhance perceived
resource prices creates incentives to shift the economy
onto a completely different foundation – one based moreon investments in innovation and its inputs of humancapital, knowledge, and research and development.
How to measure progress towards a green economy
It is difficult, if not impossible, to manage what is notmeasured. Notwithstanding the complexity of an overall
transition to a green economy, appropriate indicators at

Ideally, changes in stocks of natural capital would
be evaluated in monetary terms and incorporated
into national accounts. This is being pursued in theongoing development of the System of Environmental
and Economic Accounting (SEEA) by the UN Statistical
Division, and the World Bank’s adjusted net nationalsavings methods (World Bank 2006). The wider useof such measures would provide a better indicationof the real level and viability of growth in income andemployment. Green Accounting or Inclusive Wealth
Accounting are available frameworks that are expected
to be adopted by a few nations5 initially and pave theway for measuring the transition to a green economy at
the macroeconomic level.
How might a green economy perform over time?
In this report, the macroeconomic Threshold 21 (T21)model is used to explore the impacts of investments ingreening the economy against investments in businessas usual. The T21 model measures results in terms of
traditional GDP as well as its affects on employment,
resource intensity, emissions, and ecological impacts.6
The T21 model was developed to analyse strategies
for medium to long-term development andpoverty reduction, most often at the national level,complementing other tools for analysing short-term
impacts of policies and programmes. The model isparticularly suited to analysing the impacts of investment
plans, covering both public and private commitments.
The global version of T21 used for purposes of this reportmodels the world economy as a whole to capture thekey relationships between production and key natural
resource stocks at an aggregate level.
The T21 model reflects the dependence of economic
production on the traditional inputs of labour and physicalcapital, as well as stocks of natural capital in the form of
5. World Bank, together with UNEP and other partners, have recently(at Nagoya, CBD COP-10, October 2009) announced a global project on
Ecosystem Valuation and Wealth Accounting which will enable a groupof developing and developed nations to test this framework and evolvea set of pilot national accounts that are better able to reflect and measuresustainability concerns.
6. See the Modelling chapter for details on the T21 model.

23

Towards a green economy
resources, such as energy, forest land, soil, fish and water.
Growth is thus driven by the accumulation of capital –whether physical, human or natural – through investment,
also taking into account depreciation or depletion ofcapital stocks. The model is calibrated to reproduce the past
40-year period of 1970-2010; simulations are conducted
over the next 40-year period, 2010-2050. Business-as-usual
projections are verified against standard projections fromother organisations, such as the United Nations Population
Division, World Bank, OECD, the International Energy
Agency, and the Food and Agriculture Organization.
The inclusion of natural resources as a factor of production
distinguishes T21 from all other global macroeconomic
models (Pollitt et al. 2010). Examples of the direct
dependence of output (GDP) on natural resources are
the availability of fish and forest stocks for the fisheries
and forestry sectors, as well as the availability of fossil
fuels to power the capital needed to catch fish andharvest timber, among others. Other natural resources
and resource efficiency factors affecting GDP include
water stress, waste recycle and reuse and energy prices7.
Based on existing studies, the annual financing demand
to green the global economy was estimated to be in therange US$ 1.05 to US$ 2.59 trillion. To place this demand inperspective, it is about one-tenth of total global investment
per year, as measured by global Gross Capital Formation.
Taking an annual level of US$ 1.3 trillion (2 per cent of
global GDP) as a reference scenario, varying amounts ofinvestment in the 10 sectors covered in this report weremodelled to determine impact on growth, employment,
resource use and ecological footprint. The results of themodel, presented in more detail in the modelling chapter,suggest that over time investing in a green economy
enhances long-term economic performance. Significantly,
it does so while enhancing stocks of renewable resources,
reducing environmental risks, and rebuilding capacity togenerate future prosperity. These results are presented in adisaggregated form for each sector to illustrate the effectsof this investment on income, employment and growth,and more comprehensively, in the modelling chapter.

1.4 Approach and structure– Towards a green economy
This report focuses on 10 key sectors considered to be
driving the defining trends of the transition to a green
economy. These trends include increasing human well7. The T21 analysis purposely ignores issues such as trade and sources ofinvestment financing (public vs private, or domestic vs foreign). As a result,the analysis of the potential impacts of a green investment scenario at a
global level are not intended to represent the possibilities for any specificcountry or region. Instead, the simulations are meant to stimulate further
consideration and more detailed analysis by governments and otherstakeholders of a transition to a green economy.

24

being and social equity, and reducing environmental
risks and ecological scarcities. Across many of these
sectors, greening the economy can generate consistentand positive outcomes for increased wealth, growth ineconomic output, decent employment and reduced
poverty.
In Part I, the report focuses on those sectors derived fromnatural capital – agriculture, fishing, forests and water.
These sectors have a material impact on the economy as
they form the basis for primary production, and because
the livelihoods of the rural poor depend directly uponthem. The analysis looks at the principal challenges
and opportunities for bringing more sustainable andequitable management to these sectors, and reviews
investment opportunities to restore and maintain theecosystem services that underpin these sectors. In sodoing, the chapters highlight several sector-specificinvestment opportunities and policy reforms that areof global importance as they appear replicable andscalable in the goal to transition to a green economy.
In Part II, the report focuses on those sectors that may becharacterised as “built capital”, traditionally considered
the brown sectors of the economy. In these sectors– such as transportation, energy and manufacturing– the report finds large opportunities for energy andresources savings. These savings, it is argued, can bescaled up and become drivers of economic growth andemployment, as well as having important equity effects
in some cases. Resource efficiency is a theme that has
many dimensions as it cuts across energy efficiency inmanufacture and habitation, materials efficiency inmanufacture, and better waste management.
Finally, after providing an in-depth overview of themodelling conducted for this report and before
examining options for financing the green economy,
Part III focuses on enabling conditions for ensuring
a successful transition to a green economy. These
include appropriate domestic fiscal measures and policy
reforms, international collaboration through trade,finance, market infrastructure, and capacity building
support. Much has been said about the potential for agreen economy to be used as a pretext for imposing
aid conditionalities and trade protectionism. This reportargues that to be green, an economy must not only
be efficient, but also fair. Fairness implies recognising
global and country level equity dimensions, particularly
in assuring a just transition to an economy that is lowcarbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive. These
enabling conditions for a fair and just transition are
described and addressed at length in the final chaptersof this report before conclusions, along with the steps
necessary to mobilise finance at scale for a global
transition to a green economy.

Introduction

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Introduction

27

Part I

Investing in natural capitalSimon Rawles

Agriculture

Investing in natural capitalAcknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Author: Dr. Hans R. Herren, President,
Millennium Institute, Arlington, VA, USA.

Treyer (International Institute for Sustainable Development andInternational Relations).

Asad Naqvi and Nicolas Bertrand (in the initial stages of the
project) of UNEP managed the chapter, including the handlingof peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating author onrevisions, conducting supplementary research and bringing thechapter to final production. Derek Eaton reviewed and edited
the modelling section of the chapter. Sheng Fulai conductedpreliminary editing of the chapter.

Richard Piechocki (Rabobank Nederland), Lara Yacob (Robeco),and Daniel Wild (Sustainable Asset Management AG) provided
information for some case studies and success stories. Annie
Haakenstad, Waqas Rana, Zainab Soomar, Pratyancha Pardeshi
and Marco Portugal provided valuable help in collecting dataand evidence. Ivo Mulder (UNEP) facilitated the coordination
with investment institutions.

The following individuals contributed to different sections of
the chapter through research and writing: Sithara Atapattu(formerly with International Water Management Institute andnow Deputy Team Leader on the Asian Development Bank
project Strengthening Capacity for Climate Change Adaptationin Sri Lanka), Andrea Bassi (Millennium Institute), Patrick Binns(Millennium Institute), Lim Li Ching (Third World Network),
Maria Fernandez (formerly with Center for Tropical Agriculture(CIAT) and now with Rural Innovation, Gender and Participation,Lima, Peru), Shahrukh Rafi Khan (Professor of Economics, Mount
Holyoke College), Dekshika Charmini Kodituwakku (Consultant
on Forestry and Environmental Management, Mandurah,
Australia), Rattan Lal (Carbon Sequestration Management Center,
Ohio State University), Adil Najam (Director, Pardee Center for
the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University), Asad
Naqvi (UNEP), Peter Neuenschwander (International Instituteof Tropical Agriculture), Jyotsna Puri (UNEP), Manuele Tamo
(International Institute of Tropical Agriculture), and Sébastien

We would like to thank the many colleagues and individuals
who commented on various drafts and provided suggestions
including Ana Lucía Iturriza (ILO), Charles Arden-Clarke (UNEP),
Arab Hoballah (UNEP), Peter Gilruth (UNEP), Tessa Goverse (UNEP),Ann Herbert (ILO), Ulrich Hoffmann (UNCTAD), Anne-Marie Izac
(CGIAR), Elwyn Grainger-Jones (IFAD), Harald Kaechele (LeibnizCentre for Agricultural Landscape Research, ZALF), Alexander
Kasterine (ITC), Rashid Kaukab (CUTS - Geneva), Kristen Kurczak(UNEP), James Lomax (UNEP), Robert McGowan (Independent
Expert), Christian Nellemann (UNEP/GRID-Arendal), Rajendra
Paratian (ILO), Michaela Pfeiffer (WHO), Philip Riddell (Independent
Expert), Gunnar Rundgren (Independent Expert), Nadia El-Hage
Scialabba (FAO), John D. Shilling (MI), Roland Sundström (IFAD),
Naoufel Telahigue (IFAD), Sophia Twarog (UNCTAD), Justin
Perrettson (Novozymes), Katja Bechtel (CropLife International), Dr.
Babatunde Osotimehin (UNFPA), Mayumi Sakoh (World Society
for the Protection of Animals), Morgane Danielou (International
Fertiliser Industry Association) and Ylva Stiller (Syngenta).

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.201132

Agriculture

Contents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4

General background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Conventional/industrial agriculture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Traditional/small farm/subsistence agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
The greening of agriculture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

2

Challenges and opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

2.1
2.2

Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Opportunities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

3

The case for greening agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4

The cost of environmental degradation resulting from agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Investment priorities for greening agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The benefits of greening agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Modelling: Future scenarios for green agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

4

Getting there: Enabling conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

Global policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
National policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Economic instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Capacity building and awareness-raising  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

5Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

33

Towards a green economy

List of figures
Figure 1: Total average contribution to poverty reduction from growth of agricultural, remittance andnon-farm incomes in selected countries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Figure 2: Contribution of agriculture to GDP and public expenditure on agriculture as a proportion ofagricultural GDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Figure 3: Global trends in cereal and meat production, nitrogen and phosphorus fertiliser use, irrigationand pesticide production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
Figure 4: Regional distribution of small farms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Figure 5: Distribution of population by age in more developed and less developed regions: 1950-2300 . . . . . 44
Figure 6: Urban and rural population trends in developing regions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Figure 7: Trends in food commodity prices, compared with trends in crude oil prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Figure 8: Percentage of country populations that will be water stressed in the future  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Figure 9a-b: The makeup of total food waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Figure 10: Expected future food insecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Figure 11: Share of overseas development assistance for agriculture (1979–2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Figure 12: Global trade in organic food and drinks (1999-2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 13: Estimated producer support by country (as a percentage of total farmer income) . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

List of tables
Table 1: Potential indicators for measuring progress towards green agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table 2: Selected evidence on benefits and costs of plant and animal health management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table 3: Selected evidence on benefits and costs of soil management strategies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Table 4: Selected evidence on benefits and costs of water management strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Table 5: Selected evidence on benefits and costs of agricultural diversification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Table 6: Incremental annual agricultural investment figures by region needed to counteract climatechange impacts on child malnutrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Table 7: Results from the simulation model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

List of boxes
Box 1: Agriculture at a crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Box 2: Opportunities for improved sanitation systems and organic nutrient recycling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Box 3: Innovations in the agricultural supply chain increase shareholder and societal value . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Box 4: Cost of training smallholder farmers in green agriculture practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Box 5: Simple storage: low investment, high returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Box 6: Investment in sustainable agriculture: case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Box 7: Innovative sustainable and social capital investment initiatives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Box 8: Organic versus conventional cotton production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

34

Agriculture

List of acronyms
ADB
AKST
BAU
BCI
BSI
CAADP
CGIAR
CSIRO
DEFRA
EU
FAO
FAOSTAT
FiBL
G8
GAP
GDP
GHG
GMO
GRID
HICs
IAASTDICARDA
IDH
IEA
IFAD
IFOAM
IFPRI
ILO

Asian Development Bank
Agricultural knowledge, science andtechnology
Business-as-usual
Better Cotton Initiative
Better Sugar Initiative
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Programme
Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research
The Commonwealth Scientific andIndustrial Research Organisation
Department for Environment, Foodand Rural Affairs (UK)European Union
Food and Agriculture Organisation of
the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organisation
Statistical Databases
German Research Institute of Organic
AgricultureGroup of EightGood Agricultural Practices
Gross Domestic ProductGreenhouse gas
Genetically modified organism
Global Resource Information DatabaseHigh Income Countries
International Assessment ofAgricultural Knowledge, Science andTechnology for Development
International Centre for Agricultural
Research in the Dry Areas
Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative
International Energy Agency
International Fund for Agricultural
Development
International Federation of Organic
Agriculture Movements
International Food Policy ResearchInstituteInternational Labour Organisation

IMF
IP
IPCC

International Monetary FundIntellectual Property
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
ChangeIPM
Integrated Pest Management
ITC
International Trade Centre
LICs
Low Income Countries
LMICs
Lower Middle Income Countries
MDG
Millennium Development Goal
MSCI
Morgan Stanley Capital International
NCAR
National Centre for AtmosphericResearchNGO
Non-governmental organisation
ODA
Oversees Development AssistanceOECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development
PAHM
Plant and animal health management
PES
Payment for Ecosystem Services
PICS
Purdue Improved Cowpea Storage
R&D
Research and development
ROI
Return on investment
RSPO
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
RTRS
Round Table on Responsible Soy
SAM
Sustainable Asset Management AG
SOM
Soil organic matter
SRI
System Rice Intensive
SWFs
Sovereign wealth funds
UMICs
Upper Middle Income Countries
UNCTAD
United Nations Conference on Trade andDevelopment
UN DESA
United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs
UNDP
United Nations Development
Programme
UNEP
United Nations Environment Programme
UNESC ECA United Nations Economic and Social
Council, Economic Commission for Africa
WDR
World Development Report
WIPO
World Intellectual Property Organisation
WTO
World Trade Organisation
WWAPWorld Water Assessment Programme35

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. Feeding an expanding and more demanding world population in the first half of this century,
while attending to the needs of nearly one billion people who are presently undernourished andaddressing climate change, will need managed transitions away from “business-as-usual” (BAU)
in both conventional1 and traditional2 farming. In different ways and in varying degrees, current
farming systems deplete natural capital and produce significant quantities of global greenhousegases (GHG) and other pollutants, which disproportionately affect the poor. The continued demand
for land-use changes is often responsible for deforestation and loss of biodiversity. The economic costof agricultural externalities amounts to billions of US dollars per year and is still increasing. A packageof investments and policy reforms aimed at greening agriculture3 will offer opportunities to diversify
economies, reduce poverty through increased yields and creation of new and more productive green
jobs − especially in rural areas, ensure food security on a sustainable basis, and significantly reduce theenvironmental and economic costs associated with today’s industrial farming practices.
2. Green agriculture is capable of nourishing a growing and more demanding world population at
higher nutritional levels up to 2050. It is estimated that an increase, from today’s 2,800 Kcal availability
per person per day to around 3,200 Kcal by 2050, is possible with the use of green agricultural practices
and technologies. It is possible to gain significant nutritional improvements from increased quantityand diversity of food (especially non-cereal) products. During the transition to a greener agriculture,
food production in high-input industrial farming may experience a modest decline, while triggeringsignificant positive responses in more traditional systems run by small farmers in the developing world,and producing the majority of stable crops needed to feed the world population. Public, private andcivil initiatives for food production and social equity will be needed for an efficient transition at farmlevel and to assure sufficient quality nutrition for all during this period.
3. Green agriculture will reduce poverty. Environmental degradation and poverty can be
simultaneously addressed by applying green agricultural practices. There are approximately 2.6 billion
people who depend on agriculture for livelihood, a vast majority of them living on small farms andin rural areas on less than US$1 per day. Increasing farm yields and return on labour, while improving
ecosystem services (on which the poor depend most directly for food and livelihoods) will be key toachieving these goals. For example, estimates suggest that for every 10 per cent increase in farm yields,
there has been a 7 per cent reduction in poverty in Africa, and more than 5 per cent in Asia. Evidenceshows that the application of green farming practices has increased yields, especially on small farms,
between 54 and 179 per cent.
4. Reducing waste and inefficiency is an important part of the green agriculture paradigm.
Crop losses due to pests and hazards, combined with food waste in storage, distribution, marketing
and at the household level, account for nearly 50 per cent of the human edible calories that are
produced. Currently, total production is around 4,600 Kcal/person/day, but what is available for humanconsumption is around 2,000 Kcal/person/day. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) suggeststhat a 50 percent reduction of losses and wastage in the production and consumption chain is a
1. Refer to section 1.2 for more details about what this report categorises as conventional or industrial agriculture.
2. Refer to section 1.3 for detailed information about what this report considers traditional, smallholder and subsistence farming.
3. Refer to section 1.4 for detailed information about a green agriculture paradigm.
4. For details, refer to the Modelling Chapter of this report.

36

Agriculturenecessary and achievable goal. Addressing some of these inefficiencies – especially crop and storage
losses – offers opportunities that require small investments in simple farm and storage technology on
small farms, where it makes the most material difference to smallholder farmers. The FAO reports that
although reducing post-harvest losses could be achieved relatively quickly, less than five percent ofworldwide agricultural research and extension funding currently targets this problem.

5. Greening agriculture requires investment, research and capacity building. This is neededin the following key areas: soil fertility management, more efficient and sustainable water use, cropand livestock diversification, biological plant and animal health management, an appropriate levelof mechanisation, improving storage facilities especially for small farms and building upstream anddownstream supply chains for businesses and trade. Capacity building efforts include expanding
green agricultural extension services and facilitating improved market access for smallholder farmers
and cooperatives. The aggregate global cost of investments and policy interventions required for thetransition towards green agriculture is estimated to be US$ 198 billion per year from 2011 to 2050.4
The value added in agricultural production increases by 9 per cent, compared with the projected BAU
scenario. Studies suggest that “Return on investments (ROI) in agricultural knowledge, science andtechnology across commodities, countries and regions on average are high (40-50 per cent) and havenot declined over time. They are higher than the rate at which most governments can borrow money”.
In terms of social gains, the Asian Development Bank Institute concluded that investment needed tomove a household out of poverty, in parts of Asia, through engaging farmers in organic agriculture,
could be as little as US$ 32 to US$ 38 per capita.
6. Green agriculture has the potential to be a net creator of jobs that provides higher return on
labour inputs than conventional agriculture. Additionally, facilities for ensuring food safety andhigher quality of food processing in rural areas are projected to create new better quality jobs in thefood production chain. Modelled scenarios suggest that investments aimed at greening agriculture
could create 47 million additional jobs in the next 40 years, compared with the BAU scenario.
7. A transition to green agriculture has significant environmental benefits. Green agriculture
has the potential to: rebuild natural capital by restoring and maintaining soil fertility; reduce soil
erosion and inorganic agro-chemical pollution; increase water-use efficiency; decrease deforestation,
biodiversity loss and other land use impacts; and significantly reduce agricultural GHG emissions.
Importantly, greening agriculture could transform agriculture from being a major emitter of GHG to
one that is net neutral, and possibly even be a GHG sink, while reducing deforestation and freshwater
use by 55 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively.
8. Green agriculture will also require national and international policy reforms and innovations.
Such policy changes should focus particularly on reforming environmentally harmful subsidies that
artificially lower the costs of some agricultural inputs and lead to their inefficient and excessive use. In
addition, they should promote policy measures that reward farmers for using environmentally-friendly
agricultural inputs and farming practices and creating positive externalities such as improved ecosystemservices. Changes in trade policies that increase access of green agricultural exports, originating indeveloping countries to markets in high income countries, are also required, along with reforms of tradedistorting production and export subsidies. These will facilitate greater participation by smallholder
farmers, cooperatives and local food processing enterprises in food production value chains.
37

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
This chapter makes a case for investing in greening
the agriculture5 sector, emphasising the potential
global benefits of making this transition. It provides
evidence to inspire policymakers to support increased
green investment and guidance on how to enable thistransformation, which aims to enhance food security,
reduce poverty, improve nutrition and health, create
rural jobs, and reduce pressure on the environment,
including reducing GHG emissions.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of agriculture at
the global level, followed by a discussion on conceptualissues including two predominant farming-practiceparadigms, i.e. conventional (industrialised) agriculture
systems and traditional (subsistence) smallholder
agriculture. The section ends with a brief description of
key characteristics of the green agriculture paradigm.
Section 2 presents the major challenges and opportunities
related to the greening the agriculture sector and Section
3 discusses a wide range of sustainable agriculture
practices, mostly using examples and evidence fromthe organic sector, which is relatively rich in data. The
section starts with an overview of the cost of degradation
resulting from current agricultural practices and benefitsof greening the sector. It is followed by an outlineof some of the priorities for investment. The section
ends with a discussion on the results of an economic
modelling exercise, which presents future scenarios forgreen agriculture and business-as-usual (BAU). Section 4shows how global and national policy as well as capacity
building and awareness raising can facilitate necessary
investments and encourage changes in agricultural
practices. Section 5 concludes the discussion.

1.1 General background
Agriculture is a major occupational sector in many
developing countries and is an important source ofincome for the poor. World Bank statistics (2010) show
agricultural value-added as a percentage of GDP to be
3 per cent for the world as a whole, and 25 per cent for
low income countries (LICs), 14 per cent for lower middle
income countries (LMICs), 6 per cent for upper middle
income countries (UMICs) and 1 per cent for high income
countries (HICs).6 Approximately 2.6 billion people rely on
agricultural production systems – farming, pastoralism,
forestry or fisheries – for their livelihoods (FAOSTAT 2004).
To date, global agricultural productivity has more than
kept up with population growth (FAO 2009; IAASTD

382009). However, agricultural productivity per worker
and per land unit varies a great deal across countries.
Agricultural productivity per worker in 2003-05 was 95
times higher in HICs than in LICs, and this difference
increased compared with 1990-1992, when it was 72
times higher. Industrial agriculture mostly practiced
in developing countries, continues to generate highlevels of production – more than 50 per cent of theworld value added in agriculture and food processing– but it also accounts for proportionally more adverse
environmental impacts than lower-yield traditionalfarming (World Bank 2010). Agriculture in developing
countries is becoming more productive. Over the above
period, aggregate agricultural productivity per worker
in developing countries increased by 21 per cent, albeit
from a very low base.
Despite the increasing productivity of agriculture, nearly
1 billion people remain malnourished. Between 2000 and
2007, over a quarter (27.8 per cent) of children under theage of five in LICs were malnourished (World Bank 2010).
Moreover, over half of food-insecure families are rural
households, often in countries such as India that havefood surpluses. A transition in the agricultural paradigm
must also assist in meeting this challenge.
Agriculture also has tremendous potential to alleviate
poverty. A large proportion of the rural population andlabour force in developing countries is employed inagriculture. On average, the contribution of agriculture
to raising the incomes of the poorest is estimated to be atleast 2.5 times higher than that of non-agriculture sectors
in developing countries. Underscoring the relationshipbetween increasing yields and return on labour withpoverty, Irz et al. (2001) estimate that for every 10 per centincrease in farm yields, there was a 7 per cent reductionin poverty in Africa and more than a 5 per cent povertyreduction effect for Asia. Growth in manufacturing andservices do not show a comparable impact on poverty
reduction. The World Bank (2010) reported that anincrease in overall GDP derived from agricultural labour
productivity was, on average, 2.9 times more effective inraising the incomes of the poorest quintile in developing
countries than an equivalent increase in GDP derived
5. In this report agriculture includes only crop and animal husbandry
unless clearly indicated otherwise. Forestry and fisheries are covered inseparate chapters.
6. World Bank Classification: Low-income economies (US$ 1,005 or less),
Lower-middle-income economies (US$ 1,006 to US$ 3,975), Upper-middleincome economies (US$ 3,976 to US$ 12,275), High-income economies(US$ 12,276 or more); Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/countryclassifications/country-and-lending-groups.

Agriculture
the development of a thriving agriculture sector.
Government expenditure on agriculture in developing
countries dropped from 11 per cent in the 1980s to
5.5 per cent in 2005, with the same downward trend
observed in official development assistance goingto the agriculture sector, which fell from 13 per centin the early 1980s to 2.9 per cent in 2005 (UN-DESA
Policy Brief 8, October, 2008). In Africa, governments
publicly committed in the Maputo Declaration of 2000
to spending 10 per cent of their GDP on agriculture,including rural infrastructure spending (UNESC ECA
2007). However, only eight countries had reached theagreed level by 2009 (CAADP 2009).

Non-Agriculture
Remittances

13%

35%

52%

Agriculture

Figure 1: Total average contribution to poverty
reduction from growth of agricultural, remittanceand non-farm incomes in selected countries
Source: OECD calculations based on data from Povcalnet (2009); WDI (2009)

from non-agricultural labour productivity. Using crosscountry regressions per region, Hasan and Quibriam(2004) found greater effects from agricultural growth onpoverty (defined as less than US$ 2 per day per person)
reduction in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. (Thistrend was not seen in East Asia and Latin America where
there were greater poverty-reducing effects of growthoriginating in non-agriculture sectors).
Despite the potential contribution of agriculture topoverty alleviation, mainly owing to the urban bias ofmany national government policies (Lipton 1977), ruralsectors in most developing countries have not received
the levels of public investment required to support

Between 1980 and 2000, an inverse association wasnoted between the contribution of agriculture to GDP
and public spending on agriculture as a percentage
of agricultural GDP as shown in Figure 2, which
distinguishes between agriculture-based, transforming
and urbanised countries7.
The result of this long-term neglect of the agriculture
sector in developing countries is that rural poverty rates
consistently exceed those in urban areas, with more than75 per cent of the world’s most impoverished people living
in rural areas, and many seeking ways to migrate to cities(IFAD 2003). We note that in this scenario, poverty can
result in environment-related economic consequences ifcrop production is based upon unsustainable land use,which in turn results in the depletion of soil nutrients andcultivation of unsuitable, marginal land that can lead tosoil erosion, degradation of ecosystems and the reductionof natural habitats8 for biodiversity.
In the following paragraphs, we discuss particularattributes of conventional and small-scale agricultural
practices that have exacerbated these trends.

Agricultural GDP/GDP
Percent

30
25
20
15

Public spending on agriculture/agricultural GDP
Percent

29 29
1980

24
16

2000

14

Agriculture-based Transforming

Urbanized

10 11

10
5
0

2000

17

15

5
0

1980

25
20

10

10

30

12

4 4
Agriculture-based Transforming

Urbanized

Figure 2: Contribution of agriculture to GDP and public expenditure on agriculture as a proportion ofagricultural GDP
Source: EarthTrends, based on year 2000 data obtained from WDR Overview. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/2795087-1192112387976/WDR08_01_Overview.pdf

7. Agriculture based = developing, Transforming = new industrialised, Urbanised = developed-countries.
8. This poverty-environment nexus is a well researched area. For a framework and review, see Opschoor (2007).

39

Towards a green economy

1.2 Conventional/industrial agriculture
Conventional (industrial) agriculture is characterised byfarming practices that rely on use of external farming
inputs. Most of the large scale industrial farming is
considered energy-intensive (using 10 calories ofenergy for every calorie of food produced), whosehigh productivity (kg/ha) relies on the extensive use ofchemical fertilisers, herbicides, pesticides, fuel, water,
and continuous new investment (e.g. in advanced seedvarieties and machinery).
The impressive productivity gains of the Green
Revolution of the last few decades took place mainly
in conventional agriculture. These productivity gains
were triggered by investment in agricultural researchand expansion in public-sector extension services.9 The
productivity increases of the Green Revolution reliedprimarily on the development of higher-yield varietiesof major cereal crops (i.e. wheat, rice and corn/maize),a significant increase in the use of irrigation, inorganic
1

1/11/11

10:43 AM9. For an overview refer to Ruttan (1977), and for a critique refer to Shiva(1989).

Global total use of nitrogen and phosphorus fertilisers

360

38

Meat

34

340

30

Cereals

320

26

300
280

1960

22

1970

1980

1990

2000

0.28

Nitrogen40
20

Phosphorus

0

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Pesticides
Millions tonnes

Water

0.20

2.0

1.0

0.16

1960

60

3.0

0.24

0.12

80

Total global pesticides production

9

Global irrigation (billions [10 ] ha)Increased use of irrigation

Per capita meat production (kg)

Per capita cereal and meat production (kg)Global trends in cereal and meat production
380

Despite substantial gains in total crop production, theconsequences of the revolution have not been entirely
positive. Production gains have been highly correlatedwith increased use of non-renewable resource inputs,
and have often entailed significant environmental costs
due to their overuse (Figure 3). Industrial agriculture
consumes on average 10 exosomatic energy calories(derived from fossil fuel energy resources) for every
food endosomatic energy calorie (derived from humanmetabolism of food) that is produced and delivered
to the consumer (Giampietro and Pimentel 1994).
This energy-intensity, in many cases, is encouraged
by subsidising inorganic fertiliser, fuel and electric
power used on farms. In addition, biodiversity losses
have resulted from production subsidies targeted at
a limited number of crops. Industrial agriculture has
also resulted in shrinking the agricultural labour force
even as farm outputs have dramatically increased,a trend intensified to some extent by subsidies forfarm mechanisation. (Lyson 2005; Dimitri et al. 2005;
Knudsen et al. 2005; ILO 2008).

Millions tonnes. World, excluding former USSR

fig3.pdf

fertilisers, pesticide/herbicide use and fossil fuel-based
farm machinery.

1970

1980

1990

2000

0

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Figure 3: Global trends in cereal and meat production, nitrogen and phosphorus fertiliser use, irrigationand pesticide production
Source: Tilman et al. (2002) and IAASTD/Ketill Berger, UNEP/GRID-Arendal (2008). Available at: http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/global-trends-in-cereal-and-meat-production-total-use-ofnitrogen-and-phosphorus-fertilisers-increas

40Agriculture

1.3 Traditional/small farm/subsistence agriculture
Traditional (subsistence) smallholder agriculture typically
rely on indigenous and traditional knowledge that isbased on farming practices used for several generations,
has limited or no use of off-farm inputs, and results in lowproductivity, low value added per worker and primarily
reliant on extracting soil nutrients with insufficient
replenishment by either organic or inorganic fertilisers.
Generally, it is susceptible to yield losses due to erratic
rainfall, pest and weed infestations and other productionrelated risks. It can trap already poor farmers in a downward
spiral of growing poverty and social marginalisation.
Traditional agriculture has limited scope for capitalintensive farm mechanisation and intensive use of
external agrochemical inputs. Many smallholders’plots, overarchingly located in developing countries,
are too small to realise the economies of scale required
for most of the available commercial farm machinery.
In addition, the high cost of purchased inputs, suchas chemical fertilisers, pesticides and seeds, generally
require that at least some portion of the crops produced
must be sold to recover costs. Failure to modernise
land tenure systems, which can facilitate distribution,
consolidation, and the use of land as security for bankloans are important barriers to the commercialisationof small-scale agriculture in many developing countries.
Commercialisation is further limited by inadequate
road transportation linking food-producing areas tolarge urban centres. For these reasons, value added
per worker in developing countries is far below that ofindustrialised economies. Whereas the average value
added per agricultural worker in OECD countries in 2003
was US$ 23,081 (which grew at 4.4 per cent per year
between 1992 and 2003, in Africa, the figures were only
US$ 327 and 1.4 per cent, respectively (IAASTD 2009b).
Worldwide, there are 525 million small farms, 404 millionof which operate on less than two hectares of land
(Nagayets 2005). These small farmers in the developingworld produce the majority of staple crops needed tofeed the planet’s population (Altieri 2008). Their highest
share is in Africa where about 90 per cent of all agricultural
production is estimated to be derived from small farms,(Spencer 2002). In many instances their contribution is
growing at the national level. While the issue is contested,
there is substantial evidence that smaller farms havehigher yields than large farms (Banerjee 2000; Rosset
1999; Faruqee and Carey 1997; Tomich et al. 1995; Barrett
1993; Ellis 1993; Cornia 1985 and Feder 1985). In Kenya,
the share of national agricultural production contributedby smallholders increased from 4 per cent in 1965 to49 per cent in 1985 (Lele and Agarwal 1989). In India,
smallholders contributed over 40 per cent of food grain
production in 1990-91, compared with only a third ofBox 1: Agriculture at a
crossroads
The key message of the Assessment of Agricultural
Knowledge, Science and Technology for
Development, published in 2009 is: “The way theworld grows its food will have to change radicallyto better serve the poor and hungry if the world
is to cope with a growing population and climatechange while avoiding social breakdown andenvironmental collapse.” The Assessment calls fora fundamental shift in agricultural knowledge,
science and technology (AKST) to successfully meetdevelopment and sustainability objectives. Such ashift should emphasise the importance of the multifunctionality of agriculture, accounting for thecomplexity of agricultural systems within diverse
social and ecological contexts and recognising
farming communities, farm households, andfarmers as producers and managers of ecosystems.
Innovative institutional and organisationalarrangements to promote an integrated approachto the development and deployment of AKST are
required as well. Incentives along the value chain
should internalise as many negative externalities as
possible, to account for the full cost of agricultural
production to society. Policy and institutionalchanges should focus on those least served in
the current AKST approaches, including resourcepoor farmers, women and ethnic minorities. Itemphasises that small-scale farms across diverse
ecosystems need realistic opportunities to increase
productivity and access markets.
Source: IAASTD (2009)

Africa8%

Europe4%1% Americas

87%
Asia

Figure 4: Regional distribution of small farms
Source: Nagayets (2005), based on FAO 2001c and 2004c and national statistical agencies.
Note: Small-scale farms are defined as those of less than 2 hectares. The total number ofsmall-scale farms is 404 million.

41

Towards a green economy
the total in 1980. As of the late 1990s, they also owned
the majority of livestock and dominated the dairy sector(Narayanan and Gulati 2002).
Despite their higher output per hectare and thesignificant contribution they make to food production,
however, small farmers are often very poor. In a survey ofsmallholder households, 55 per cent in Kenya and 75 percent in Ethiopia, respectively, fell below the poverty line
(Jayne et al. 2003). Low prices, unfair business practices
and lack of transportation, storage and processing
infrastructure contribute to this situation. Half of all
undernourished people, three-quarters of malnourished
African children and the majority of people living in
absolute poverty are found on small farms (Millennium
Project Task Force on Hunger 2004; IFAD 2001). In
the majority of countries, poor rural people are bothsellers of food commodities and buyers of foodstuffs,
at different times of the year. Typically, they sell
immediately after harvest, usually at very low prices, tomeet their immediate cash requirements, and buy foodin the months prior to the following harvest, usually athigher prices, to meet their food needs (IFAD 2010b).
It is expected that expanding smallholder production
through green agricultural practices and greatercommercialisation and integrating them into supply
chains will create more better rewarding jobs in rural
areas. As farmers get wealthier, they are likely to withdraw
from occasional labour (Wiggins 2009). Wealthier farmers
are also likely to spend more on locally-produced goods
and services leading to multiplier effects. Rural linkage
models in Africa have estimated multiplier effects
ranging from 1.31 to 4.62 for Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal
and Zambia (Delgado et al. 1994).

Farming practices and technologies that are instrumental
in greening agriculture include:■■ restoring and enhancing soil fertility through theincreased use of naturally and sustainably produced
nutrient inputs; diversified crop rotations; and livestockand crop integration;■■ reducing soil erosion and improving the efficiency ofwater use by applying minimum tillage and cover crop
cultivation techniques;■■ reducing chemical pesticide and herbicide use byimplementing integrated and other environmental
friendly biological pest and weed management
practices; and■■ reducing food spoilage and loss by expanding the useof post-harvest storage and processing facilities.

■■ reduce negative externalities and gradually lead topositive ones; andThe greening of agriculture does not imply ruling out
technologies or practices on ideological grounds.
If a technology works to improve productivity forfarmers, and does not cause undue harm to society
and the environment, then it is very much part of theefforts for greening of agriculture. Although natural
methods of pest and weed management and organic
sources of fertiliser and seed are at one end of agreen agriculture spectrum, the highly efficient andprecise use of inorganic fertilisers, pest controls andtechnological solutions may also be included in the
broad spectrum of sustainable farming practices. The
Foresight Report (2011) presents resembling ideas given
the need for the global food system to deliver much
more than just food, and food security in the future. So
greening of high input dependent agriculture, which
has a high ecological footprint, could start by making
the use of inputs most precise and efficient, gradually
moving toward farming practices that have low or no
ecological footprint.

■■ rebuild ecological resources (i.e. soil, water, air andbiodiversity natural capital assets) by reducing pollution
and using resources more efficiently.

To be able to measure success in moving towards theobjectives of greening agriculture, two categories ofindicators are proposed in Table 1.

1.4 The greening of agriculture
The greening of agriculture refers to the increasing use offarming practices and technologies that simultaneously:■■ maintain and increase farm productivity andprofitability while ensuring the provision of food andecosystem services on a sustainable basis;

42

A diverse, locally adaptable set of agricultural techniques,
practices and market branding certifications such as
Good Agricultural Practices (GAP), Organic/Biodynamic
Agriculture, Fair Trade, Ecological Agriculture,
Conservation Agriculture and related techniques andfood supply protocols exemplify the varying shades ofgreen agriculture.

Agriculture

Action indicators

Outcome indicators

Number of enacted and implemented policy measures and officially approvedplans that promote sustainable agriculture (including trade and export policy
measures, payment for ecosystem services through agriculture, etc.)

Percentage and amount of land under different forms of green agriculture(organic, GAP-good agriculture practices, conservation, etc.)

Level of governmental support to encourage farmers to invest in conversion togreen agriculture and get the farm and the product certified

Decline in use of agro-chemicals as a result of conversion to green agriculture;and the number and percentage of farmers converting to green agriculture

Percentage of agricultural budget that is earmarked for environmental objectives

Increasing proportion of Payments for Environmental Services as a percentage of
total farm income

Proportion of available producer support utilised for environmental objectives asa percentage of total agricultural producer support

Number of agriculture extension officers trained in green agriculture practices

Approved measures that reduce or eliminate barriers to trade in technologies andservices needed for a transition to a green agriculture.

Number of enterprises set up in rural areas, especially those that produce local
natural agricultural inputs, to offer off-farm employment opportunities.

Table 1: Potential indicators for measuring progress towards green agriculture

43

Towards a green economy

2 Challenges and opportunities
Today, agriculture stands at a crossroads. There are calls
for changing the way food is produced and distributed
if the poor and hungry are to be served better and if theworld is to cope with a growing population and climatechange. This section presents some major challenges
and opportunities in transitioning to a green agriculture.

countries (Figure 5), and a rise in income levels inemerging economies. Demand for meat and processedfood is rising with growing affluence. The current global
population of more than 6 billion, of which 925 million
are undernourished (FAO 2010), is forecast to reach 8.59 billion by 2050, and per capita incomes are expected
to rise by as much as a factor of 20 in India and 14 in
China, respectively (Goldman Sachs 2007). Figure 6
shows that rural populations are increasingly migrating
to urban and peri-urban areas in developing countries.
This has consequences for food demand and field-totable supply chains because the diets of urban dwellers
show an increased proportion of processed foods. The
prospect of the human population expanding by almosta third by 2050, combined with an expected rise in percapita demand for meat, dairy and vegetable products,
requires geographically-focused efforts and a change in
agricultural production patterns.

2.1 Challenges
Agriculture is facing a multitude of challenges on both
the demand and supply side. On the demand side, theseinclude food security, population growth, changing
pattern of demand driven by increased income, andthe growing pressure from biofuels. On the supply side,
limited availability of land, water, mineral inputs andrural labour as well as the increasing vulnerability ofagriculture to climate change and pre-harvest and postharvest losses are the main challenges.

Competing demand from biofuels
Growing interest in producing first-generation liquidbiofuels to augment and replace petroleum-basedtransportation fuels is adding to the demand for starch,sugar and oilseed food commodities. For example,

Increasing demand for food
The most significant factors contributing to theincreasing demand for food are the continued growthof the global population, especially in developing

Population (billion)

Population (billion)

8

8

> 100
80-99

7

7

60-79
45-59

6

6

30-44
15-29

5

5

0-14

4

4

3

3

2

More developed regions

1

2
1

0
1950

Less developed regions

0
2000

2050

2100

2150

2200

2250

2300

1950

2000

2050

2100

2150

2200

2250

2300

Figure 5: Distribution of population by age in more developed and less developed regions: 1950-2300
Source: UN ESA, World Population to 2300. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/WorldPop2300final.pdf

44Agriculture
In addition, some 3.4 billion hectares of pasture andwoodland are now used for livestock production(Bruinsma 2009). The agricultural productivity of theavailable arable land is extremely varied. Crop yields
in developed countries are generally far greater than
the yields realised in most developing countries. These
productivity differences result from different levels ofnatural soil fertility; fertiliser, pesticide and herbicide use;quality of cultivated plant species and seeds; availability
and access to water; farmers’ education and access to
information, credit and risk insurance and the degree ofagricultural mechanisation.

the production of ethanol and bio-diesel fuels are
predominantly based on food commodity feed stocks
such as corn, sugarcane, soy, canola, sunflower andpalm oil. Despite growing ethical, environmental, andeconomic concerns surrounding the use of food staples
for producing these biofuels, there is continued publicand private-sector interest in their development. No
matter where these crops are grown, they will inevitablycompete with food crops for land, water and nutrients.
Figure 7 shows food prices tracking fuel prices. At present,
this alignment of food and energy prices may primarily
result from the cost of fossil fuels used as an input infood production. But it is expected that the pattern will
become more marked because of the competition forfood crops that are used to produce biofuels.

Only limited additional land can be readily brought
into agricultural production through conversion or
rehabilitation. Moreover, the often highly fertile arable
land surrounding cities is rapidly being converted into
residential and commercial development as urbanisation
gathers pace (Pauchard et al. 2006). Expanding cultivatedareas is no longer the obvious way to increase production(exceptions are parts of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America where some savanna areas could be brought
into production). Furthermore, over-grazing by livestockand extended drought conditions are accelerating thedesertification of fragile arid and semi-arid regions.
Agriculture has contributed to land degradation in all
regions, but is most severe in input-intensive production
systems (notably in East Asia, Latin America, North America
and Europe). Agricultural activities account for around 35
per cent of severely degraded land worldwide (Marcoux
1998). Given the high risk of further deforestation,
developing countries will need to meet food-supply
2008-11-13
11:42:32
gaps by1_102_commodityvsoil.pdf
simultaneously
increasing
productivity andAs a result, significant efforts are being made to develop
technologies for second-generation biofuels, which can beproduced from non-food biomass feedstock such as lignocellulosic wood and crop-residue wastes, perenniallygrown switch grass and algae. Such technologies canpotentially enable the production of biofuels to be scaled
up with fewer adverse impacts on global food security.
However, much more analysis is needed regarding thedegree to which converting large quantities of cellulosic
feedstock to biofuels would displace the recycling oforganic nutrients from crop residues to arable land,
pastures and forests (Balgopal et al. 2010).
Limited arable land and scarce water
Approximately 1.56 billion hectares or 12 per cent of theearth’s total land surface area is arable land being used
to producefig6.pdf
crops for1 human
livestockconsumption.
1/11/11 and
10:46
AM
Urban and rural populationin less developed regions (billion)
4

Food prices (index)

Crude oil price (index)

400

600

300

450

C

M

C

3

M

Rural

Y

Y

CM

CM

MY

2

MY

Oil

300

200

CY

CY

Wheat

CMY

Urban

CMY

K

K

1

Rice
100

Estimates Projections

0
1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Index reference: 100=1998-2000

0

2030

Jan-00150

Maize

Jan-02Jan-04Jan-060

Oct-08Figure 6: Urban and rural population trends indeveloping regions

Figure 7: Trends in food commodity prices,compared with trends in crude oil prices

Source: Nordpil, Ahlenius (2009); United Nations Population Division (2007); World

Source: Nordpil, Ahlenius (2009); Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations(2008). International commodity prices., Available at: http://www.fao.org/es/esc/prices, IMF
2008. IMF Primary Commodity Prices, monthly data for 8 price indices and 49 actual priceseries, 1980 – current, Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp

Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database, Available at: http://esa.
un.org/unup/index.asp?panel=1

45

Towards a green economy

Percent
>80
60-80
40-60
20-40
1-20
<1

Figure 8: Percentage of country populations that will be water stressed in the future
Source: Rost et al. (2009) Water limitation of crop production in the absence of irrigation, i.e. ratio of NPP (INO simulation) and NPP (OPT simulation), 1971–2000 averages. The lower the ratio
the stronger the water limiation. Available at: http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/4/4/044002/fulltext

greening their agricultural practices, rather than seeking
widespread expansion of arable land.
The agriculture sector is the largest consumer of fresh
water, accounting for 70 per cent of global use, including
rainfall run-off. A majority of crop lands are exclusively
rain-fed, and only 24 per cent of arable land is cultivatedwith the help of irrigation from flowing surface waters
or groundwater aquifers (Portmann et al. 2009). Thisdistinction is important because irrigated fields aremuch more productive and produce nearly a third of all
agricultural output (Falkenmark and Rockstrom 2004).
The increasing disruption of historical rainfall patterns
experienced in many areas of the world is a cause forgreat concern since rain-fed farming is the dominant formof agriculture. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report concluded thatmany observed changes in extremes, such as more frequent,
heavy precipitation events and longer, more intense
droughts, are consistent with warming of the climate
system (IPCC 2007a). While affecting rain-fed agriculture,
precipitation changes also adversely affect the recharge
rates of aquifers and watersheds. The continued worseningof water-stress conditions suggests that efforts to increase
the use of irrigation will gradually increase agricultural
production costs. Clearly, practices that increase water-use
efficiencies are required to alleviate this trend.
Figure 8 shows projections for global water stress inthe future. The figure also underscores the need forincreased coordination in water use nationally and acrossborders. In this context, the Mekong River Commission,
which coordinates the watershed development plans ofmember states, is one of several promising supra-nationalriver basin initiatives.

46

Limited availability of mineral inputs
Industrial farming practices are dependent on inorganic
fertilisers. In turn, the production and prices of thesedepend on the availability of fossil fuels, minerals andpetro-chemicals. In this context, the demand for two
major minerals – potassium and phosphorous – usedBox 2: Opportunities for
improved sanitation systems
and organic nutrient recycling
There is a critical need to recover and recycle
nutrients from organic waste streams and use
them as productive inputs of organic fertiliser.
Enormous quantities of valuable organic nutrients
could be recovered from intensive livestock
farming; food processing sites; municipal green
wastes; and human sewage wastes in both ruraland urban communities. It is particularly important
to maximise the recovery of phosphorous
nutrients from organic wastes; as a mineral,phosphate is essential to agricultural productivity
and it has been estimated that economically
recoverable global reserves may be depleted
in 100 years (Cordell et al. 2010). Technologies
are under development that would eliminate
pathogens and other toxic elements from thesewaste streams and recover commercial quantitiesof phosphorus (Frear et al. 2010). It is expectedthat the rising costs of inorganic fertilisers will help
accelerate research and commercialisation of suchorganic nutrient-recovery technologies.

Agriculture
Edible crop
harvest4,600 kcal

4,000

After
Harvest harvest
losses 4,000 kcal

kcal/capita/day

Animal
feed
3,000

2,000

Developing
Countries
Meat
and dairy
2,800 kcal
Distribution
losses and Foodwaste consumed
2,000 kcal

USA

UK
0

1,000

20

40

60

80

100
Percent

0On-Farm
Field

HouseholdTransport &Processing

RetailFood
Service

Home &
Municipal

Figure 9a-b: The makeup of total food waste10
Source: Lundqvist et al.: SIWI (2008). Saving Water: From Field to Fork; Curbing Losses and Wastage in the Food Chain. Available at: http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/losses-in-the-food-chain-fromfield-to-household-consumption; (Godfray (2010); Food Security: The Challenge of Feeding 9 Billion People. Available at: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/327/5967/812.figures-onlyin fertiliser production, has been increasing. But known
supplies of readily accessible, high-grade stocks, especiallyphosphate rock, are falling. Estimates of the longevity ofthese stocks vary dramatically.11 Nevertheless, only onefifth of the phosphorus mined for food production actuallycontributes to the food we consume, while the remainder
is either polluting the world’s water or accumulating insoils or urban landfills (Cordell et al. 201012). Although it
is expected that the increasing prices of phosphates andother minerals will lead to increases in supplies, including
recovery of phosphate from wastewater treatment
facilities, these prices are likely to continue to put upward
pressure on the cost of fertilisers and food prices, which
affects the poor’s access to food disproportionately.
Post-harvest spoilage
Today, the volume of food produced globally is morethan sufficient to feed a healthy population. But
significant amounts of food produced around the world
are lost or wasted after harvesting. As Figure 9b shows,in developed countries this primarily occurs in the retail,home and municipal food-handling stages. For example
in the USA, around 40 per cent of all food produced iswasted, resulting in losses of all embedded inputs suchas energy (equivalent to wasting 350 million barrels ofoil per year), water (equivalent to about 40 trillion litresof water every year) and huge volumes of fertilisersand pesticides (Hall et al. 2009). Losses in developed
countries are often caused by factors such as retailers’
10. Retail, food service, and home and municipal are aggregated fordeveloping countries.
11. Steén (1998) indicates that phosphate stocks will be depleted by 50-100
per cent by the end of 21st century, whereas Isherwood (2003) suggeststhat supplies could last between 600-1,000 years.
12. Available at: http://liu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:291760.
13. Available at: http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/006/Y4751E/y4751e0o.htm.

rejection of produce due to poor appearance or supersized packages leading to post-retail spoilage. The latter
can account for up to 30 per cent of the food bought byretail distributors. Post-retail food losses tend to be lower
in developing countries. There, they mainly result from alack of storage facilities, on-farm pest infestations, poorfood-handling and inadequate transport infrastructure.
For example, rice losses in developing countries may be
as high as 16 per cent of the total harvest (Mejía 200313).
Thus, there is ample scope for increasing food supplies
and food security in developing countries through simple
targeted investments in post-harvest supply chains.
Rural labour
The accelerating migration of rural populations tourban and peri-urban areas in developing regions of theworld (Figure 6) has resulted in significant demographic
changes in rural populations. Working-age men are likely
to relocate to cities in search of employment, reducing
the pool of men available for agricultural work. This rural
out-migration of men has also resulted in a dominantrole for women as smallholders in these regions;more than 70 per cent of smallholders in sub-SaharanAfrica are women (World Bank, FAO and IFAD 2009).
These demographic changes, while offering economic
opportunities, have placed additional responsibilities
on women, who invariably also have to care for theirchildren and the elderly.
Increased vulnerability of agriculture due toclimate change
Modelling by the IPCC suggests that crop productivity
could increase slightly at mid- to high-latitudes for mean
temperature increases of up to 1-3°C (depending on thecrop) (Easterling et al. 2007). However, at lower latitudes,
especially in the seasonally dry and tropical regions, crop47

Towards a green economy

Stunting prevalence% under 5 (2000-2001)<= 40 (High capacity)
Stunting prevalence>%40(Low 5capacity)under(2000-2001)<= 40 (Highfuture
capacity)
Figure 10: Expectedfood insecurity> 40 (Lowcapacity)
Source: CGIAR 2011. Available
at: http://ccafs.cgiar.org/sites/default/files/assets/docs/ccafsreport5-climate__hotspots_advance-may2011.pdf

productivity could decrease as a result of even small local
temperature increases (1-2°C).
Further warming could have increasingly negative impacts
in all regions. Climate change scenarios suggest that by
2080 the number of undernourished people will increase,mostly in developing countries (see figure 10 ), by up to 170
million above the current level. Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change modelling indicates that an increased
frequency of crop losses due to extreme climate events may
overcome any positive effects of moderate temperature
increases in temperate regions (Easterling et al. 2007).
In South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where some of thepoorest people live and farm, the scenarios of climatechange’s impacts on agriculture present a dire picture.
Recent studies confirm that Africa is the most vulnerable
continent to climate change because of multiple abiotic
and biotic stresses and the continent’s low adaptive
capacities (IPCC 2007b). Yields in Central and South Asia
could decrease up to 30 per cent by the mid-21st century(IPCC 2007a). In drier areas of Latin America, climatechange is expected to lead to salinity and desertification ofsome agricultural land, reducing the productivity of some
important crops and animal husbandry (IPCC 2007a).
Share of ODA for agriculture
Percent

20
15
10
5
0

1979

1983

1987

1991

1995

1999

2003

2007

Figure 11: Share of overseas development
assistance for agriculture (1979–2007)
Source: Based on OECD (2010). The agricultural sector includes forestry and fishing,although they are separately identifiable in the data from 1996 onwards. Private funding
is not covered. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/38/44116307.pdf

48

2.2 Opportunities
Many opportunities exist for promoting green agriculture.
They include increased awareness by governments,
donor interest in supporting agriculture development
in low income countries, growing interest of private
investors in sustainable agriculture and increasing
consumer demand for sustainably produced food.
Government awarenessGovernments, particularly in developed countries, havebecome increasingly aware of the need to promote moreenvironmentally sustainable agriculture. Since the mid1980s, OECD countries have introduced a large numberof policy measures addressing environmental issues inagriculture. Some of these are specific to the agriculture
sector, including the practice of linking general support
to environmental conditions; others are included inbroader national environmental programmes. The result
is that the environmental performance of agriculture has
begun to improve in OECD countries.
The proportion of global arable land dedicated to organic
crops has increased from a negligible amount in 1990 toaround to 2 per cent in 2010, and as much as 6 per centin some countries. The extent of soil erosion and theintensity of air pollution have fallen; the amount of land
assigned to agriculture has decreased even as production
has increased, and there have been improvements inthe efficiency of input use (fertilisers, pesticides, energy,
and water) since 1990. However, subsidies for farm-fuelhave continued to be a disincentive to greater energy
efficiency (OECD 2008).
Donor support for agriculture development
Agriculture-related Overseas Development Assistance(ODA), which has fallen steadily over the past 30 years,
began to pick up in 2006 as the current food crisis
escalated. In 2009, at the G8 summit in Italy, wealthy
nations pledged US$ 20 billion for developing-country
agriculture. However, there is a pressing need to ensurethat these investments, as Ban Ki-moon put it, “breathe
new life into agriculture, one which permits sustainable

Box 3: Innovations in the
agricultural supply chain increase
shareholder and societal value

US$ billion

Agriculture

60

54.9
50

46.1

40

For investors, water risk exposure is increasingly
becoming material for mitigating investment
risk in companies. For example, Robeco AssetManagement invests in mainstream companies
and encourages them, through active dialogue, toimplement policies and innovative practices thatmitigate risks resulting from water scarcity to theiroperations and reputations. In doing so, it also
encourages companies to find solutions that canenhance their performance, increase shareholder
value and therefore contribute in the long-term tobuilding and sustaining a green economy.
Cotton, one of the most water-intensive crops,is the focus of a dialogue with companies inthe textile industry to develop water-efficiency
targets and adopt sustainable supply-chain
practices. Through Better Cotton Initiative (BCI),
a platform has been created for exchange ofexperiences on the use of efficient irrigation
technologies, farmer education programmes
and reduction in the use of pesticides andacceptance of transparent sourcing efforts.
Source: Based on the information from Robeco Asset Management received
through Lara Yacob, Senior Engagement Specialist (2010)

yield improvements with minimal environmental
damage and contributes to sustainable development
goals”.14 Recently, the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO), World Bank, the United Nations
Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) andthe International Fund for Agricultural Development(IFAD) have jointly proposed Principals for Responsible
Agricultural Investments.15
Private funding interest
Preferential access to credit and investment capitalis one of the most important incentives to catalyse atransition to greener agriculture. The number, volume
and rate of return of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs),
pension funds, private equities and hedge funds withinvestment in agriculture, are increasing (McNellis2009). Major financial institutions are expanding theirgreen portfolios to offer investment credit to companies
that manufacture and market products that enable
more efficient use of agricultural inputs and introduce
innovative private enterprises (see Box 3). The public
sector, especially in developing countries, should
support finance mechanisms (e.g. loan-guarantee funds)

33.2
30

25.5
20.9
20

15.2

10

0

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

Figure 12: Global trade in organic food and drinks(1999-2009)
Source: Prepared by Asad Naqvi, Pratyancha Pardeshi based on the data from Sahota, A. (2009)that can leverage larger multiples of private capital loans
to smallholders who need working capital to undertake
sustainable agriculture practices.
Increasing consumer demand for sustainable foodOver the last few years, consumer demand for sustainably
produced food has increased rapidly. Purchasing
patterns of fairtrade products have remained strong
despite the global economic downturn. In 2008, global
sales of fairtrade products exceeded US$ 3.5 billion.
Data collected by the International Trade Centre (ITC)
and the Forschungsinstitut für biologischen Landbau(FiBL) shows that the major markets for organic foodand beverages expanded on average by 10 to 20 per
cent per year between 2000 and 2007 and reached US$
54.9 billion in 2009. This figure does not include markets
for organic fibre, cosmetics and other luxury products.
This demand has driven a similar increase in organicallymanaged farmland. Approximately 32.2 million hectares
worldwide are now farmed organically. In addition,
as of 2007, organic wild products were harvested on
approximately 30 million hectares.

14. Ban Ki-moon. (2010). Media coverage of his statement: available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26670 , retrieved on 26
January 2011.
15. These Principles are available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTARD/214574-1111138388661/22453321/Principles_Extended.pdf

49

Towards a green economy

3 The case for greening agriculture
Both conventional and traditional agriculture generate
substantial pressure on the environment, albeit indifferent ways. With very different starting positions, thepathways to green agriculture will vary substantially andwill have to be sensitive to local environmental, socialand economic conditions. Industrial agriculture needs tolessen its reliance on fossil fuels, water and other inputs.
Both large and small farms can benefit from more on-farmrecycling of nutrients by reintegrating livestock, which
provide manure, and the cultivation of green manures toimprove and maintain soil fertility (IAASTD 2009).

3.1 The cost of environmental
degradation resulting from agriculture
Several studies have estimated the cost of externalities
caused by current agricultural practices, which include
those from use of inputs such as pesticides and fertilisers
leading, or example, to the pollution of waterways
and emissions from farm machinery and food-relatedtransport.
Agricultural operations, excluding land use changes,
produce approximately 13 per cent of anthropogenic
global GHG emissions. This includes GHGs emitted by theuse of inorganic fertilisers agro-chemical pesticides andherbicides; (GHG emissions resulting from productionof these inputs are included in industrial emissions);
and fossil fuel-energy inputs. Agriculture also produces
about 58 per cent of global nitrous oxide emissions andabout 47 per cent of global methane emissions. Both ofthese gases have a far greater global warming potential
per tonne than CO2 (298 times and 25 times respectively).
Moreover, methane emissions from global livestock areprojected to increase by 60 per cent by 2030 undercurrent practices and consumption patterns (Steinfeld
et al. 2006). The expansion of agricultural land at theexpense of forests has been estimated to represent anadditional 18 percent of total global anthropogenic GHG
emissions (IAASTD 2009 and Stern 2007).
A study by Jules Pretty et al. (2001) estimated the annual
costs of agricultural externalities to be US$ 2 billion inGermany and US$ 34.7 billion in the USA. This amounts
to between US$ 81 and US$ 343 per hectare per yearof grassland or arable land. In the UK, agriculture’s total
environmental externality costs, including transportingfood from the farm to market and then to consumers,
have been calculated to be £ 5.1 billion per year
for 1999/2000, a cost greater than annual net farmincome (Pretty et al. 2005). In China, the externalities of50

pesticides used only in rice systems have been estimatedto amount to US$ 1.4 billion per year in health costs topeople, and adverse effects on both on- and off-farmbiodiversity (Norse et al. 2001). The national pollution
census in China revealed that agriculture was a larger
source of water pollution than industry, discharging 13.2
MT of pollutants (China’s National Pollution Census 2007;
New York Times 2010). In Ecuador, annual mortality inthe remote highlands due to pesticides is among thehighest reported anywhere in the world at 21 people
per 100,000 people. The economic benefits of Integrated
Pest Management (IPM) based systems that eliminate
these effects are increasingly beneficial (Sherwood et al.
2005). Land degradation is costing ten Asian countries
an economic loss of about US$ 10 billion, equivalent to 7
per cent of their combined agricultural GDP (FAO 1994).
At the same time, as a result of the poor managementof fertiliser usage during the last half-century, thephosphorus content in freshwater systems has
increased by at least 75 per cent, and the flow ofphosphorus to the oceans has risen to approximately
10 million tonnes annually (Bennett et al. 2001;
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Rockstrom
et al. 2009). The combined effects of phosphate andnitrogen water pollution, much of it linked to the use of
inorganic fertilisers is the main cause of eutrophication,
the human-induced augmentation of natural
fertilisation processes which spurs algae growth thatabsorbs the dissolved oxygen required to sustain fishstocks (Smith & Schindler 2009). The estimated costs ofthe eutrophication in the USA alone run as high as US$
2.2 billion annually (Dodds et al. 2009).
Not all agricultural externalities are quantified andthus the calculations above probably underestimate
the total cost to society. Conventional agriculture,for example, causes millions of cases of pesticide
poisoning per year, resulting in over 40,000 deaths (FAOILO 2009). It is important to note that most such cases
remain unreported.
Farmers who use chemical/synthetic farm inputs are
significantly more indebted, especially in developing
countries (Eyhorn et al. 2005; Shah et al. 2005; Jalees2008). For example, in Central India, cotton farmers
bought inputs with loans at annual interest rates
between 10-15 per cent (from cooperative societies)
to over 30 per cent (from private money lenders). By
contrast, those engaged in organic agriculture were farless likely to take loans owing to lower production costs
and greater use of on-farm inputs (Eyhorn et al. 2005).

Agriculture
Although there is a difference of opinion on the issue,
Jalees (2008) has argued that the main cause for theextremely high rate of suicide among Indian farmers isthe debt-servicing obligations for working capital (e.g.
fertilisers, pesticides and GM seeds) costs.
The following section present some on- and off-farminvestment strategies that will help minimise, eliminate andgradually reverse the environmental and economic costs
resulting from currently predominant forms of agriculture.

3.2 Investment priorities forgreening agriculture
Investments in R&D and Agribusinesses
One of the major reasons for the wide spread adoptionof the Green Revolution that greatly increased
agricultural productivity was the level of first public, thenprivate-sector investment in R&D and the subsequentdissemination and commercial implementation of
the results. These gains were also achieved with theintroduction of irrigation and greater applicationof inorganic agrochemical inputs. A new wave ofinvestment is needed to develop, deploy and diffuse
resource-efficient technologies and agricultural inputs,
farming practices, and seed and livestock varieties thatwould counter the environmental externalities that areoften associated with the green revolution.
The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge,
Science and Technology for Development noted that ROI
in AKST across commodities, countries and regions on
average are high (40-50 per cent) and have not declined
over time. They are higher than the rate at which most
governments can borrow money (Beintema and Elliott2010). The commercial rate of return, however, should
not be the only determinant of the decision to invest in
R&D for greening agriculture. The social rate of returnwould be considerably higher if rural communities
could adequately monetise the ecosystem, livelihoodand socio-cultural benefits that would accrue with theiradoption of greener agriculture practices and landstewardship (Perrings 1999).
Research to improve the performance of biologicalnitrogen fixation processes, breeding plant, livestock
and aquatic species for improved yields and adaptive
resilience and developing perennial cereal crops would
enable significant reductions in the energy, water andfertiliser inputs needed to cultivate commodity grains.
Such research may require several decades to produce
commercially viable crop varieties with these beneficial
attributes. However, the impacts would be significant
in terms of providing options for future generations’dependency on expensive fossil fuel-based fertilisers
and adapting to expected climate change.

Plant and animal health management (PAHM)
Field trials of improved PAHM practices have resulted inincreased profitability of farms. Various intercropping
strategies utilise selected plant species’ biochemical
emissions to either attract or repel different insects,
nematodes and other pests. One of the most effective
such techniques is known as “push-pull”, which involves
intercropping, for example, certain species of legumes
and grasses with maize. Aromas produced by legumes
planted on the perimeter of a field repel (push) maize
pests, while scents produced by the grasses attract (pull)insects to lay their eggs on them rather than the maize.
The implementation of push-pull in eastern Africa hassignificantly increased maize yields and the combined
cultivation of N-fixing forage crops has enriched the soil
and has also provided farmers with feed for livestock.
With increased livestock operations, the farmers areable to produce meat, milk and other dairy products
and they use the manure as organic fertiliser that
returns nutrients to the fields. In small-holder farming
operations, the ability to support livestock for meat, milk
and draft animal power is an important added benefit ofthis strategy (Khan et al. 2008). An economic analysis ofa push-pull field trial in East Africa with 21,300 farmers
revealed a benefit-cost ratio of 2.5 to 1. (Khan et al. 2008).
The income returns for labour were US$ 3.7 per preson/
day with push-pull as opposed to US$ 1 person/day
with their previous maize mono-cropping practice. The
gross revenue ranges between US$ 424 and US$ 880 per
hectare under push-pull and US$ 81.9 to US$ 132 perhectare in maize mono crop. Similar systems are being
field-trialed for other cropping systems and it is likelythat comparable rates of return will be realised.
Another example of PAHM practices is seen in Cameroon.
In this case study (Dieu et al. 2006), cocoa farmers weretrained in pruning, shade adjustment and phytosanitary
harvesting methods that effectively maintained yields
comparable to conventional practices that used
multiple applications of fungicides. The farmers whopracticed these techniques used 39 per cent fewer
fungicides. Although labour costs increased by 14 percent, total production costs decreased by 11 per centrelative to conventional practices. By introducing green
farming, methods that relied on more knowledgeable
labour inputs, a much larger share of the total costs ofcocoa production was paid to workers within the local
community. Imports of fungicide chemicals were also
reduced, saving valuable foreign exchange. Additional
benefits included reduced health costs and lessenvironmental pollution (Velarde 2006).
Investments in PAHM should focus on research, training
and investments in natural pest- management processes
that defend, defeat and manage the many organismsthat threaten agricultural production. While there are a

51

Towards a green economy

Box 4: Cost of training
smallholder farmers in green
agriculture practices
In a recent report on organic agriculture, theADB concluded that the cost of transition forfarmers to move from conventional agricultural
practices to organic practices, including thecost of certification, was approximately US$
77-170 per farmer for an average farm sizeof 1 hectare (ADB 2010). Training costs were
estimated at US$ 6-14/farmer. These are fairly
modest compared to the overall investment
required for extricating farmers from poverty(an approximate investment of US$ 554-880,
according to the World Bank (2008a). Yet there
remain additional costs. These are the costsof enabling policies that allow research anddevelopment, market linkages and creating
incentive systems on the demand and supply
side. These costs cannot be understated andobviously require multilateral and bilateralsupport in the international arena.

wide range of low-cost natural bio-control practices that
improve the ability of plants and livestock to resist andsuppress biotic stresses and combat pests, during thepast few decades there has been a substantial increaseof private and, to a much lesser degree, publicly-fundedefforts to develop genetically modified (GM) crops toovercome pest and weed problems. After initial success,there is growing evidence of an evolving resistanceto GMO crops by many pests and weeds. The IAASTD
report (2009) recommended that research on theecological, economic and social questions concerning
the widespread application of GM crops should be
increased, particularly in the public R&D sector, whose
scientific advances could be more broadly and equitably
available for use in developing countries.
Table 2 presents selected evidence on the costs andbenefits of plant and animal health management
strategies (PAHM). Plant and animal health management
practices reduce farmers’ input costs and their exposure
to hazardous chemicals while effectively supporting
productive crop yields. Plant and animal healthmanagement practices also reduce or replace the useof chemical insecticides that often kill non-targeted
insects. Many insect species killed as collateral damage
from such insecticides have beneficial environmental
and agricultural roles as pollinators and as predators ofother pests, and are part of the natural food chain.
Evidence presented in Table 2 show that all PAHM
interventions are highly profitable. Intercropping is aparticularly useful strategy with high benefit to costTrends in revenues and profits
after including additional costsof greening

Strategy

Crop and country

Costs

Benefits

Intercropping

Maize intercropped with
Desmodium uncinatum, East
Africa (Khan et al. 2008).

Most costs are associated withadditional labour costs.

Maize grain yield increases ranged
from double to five times inplots using push-pull strategies
compared to monocropped plots.
Levels of pests reduced significantly
and were completely eliminatedin some. (Reductions ranged from
75% to 99%).

Benefit to cost ratio is 2.5 to 1
using the push-pull strategy.
Gross revenues with push-pull
were US$ 424-880/ha comparedto 82-132/ha using a monomaize cultivation strategy.

Pest Management

The wasp predator to fightthe cassava bug in Africa(Norgaard 1988). Cocoa in
Cameroon (Dieu et al. 2006).

The cost of introducing thewasp across cassava growing
countries in Africa (19782003) is estimated at US$
14.8 million. This includes
research and distribution
costs. For cocoa, IPM meantthat labour costs increasedby 14%. But total production
costs decreased by 11% due toreduced use of fungicides.

Introducing the wasp predator
introduction helped avoid 60% of
the losses caused by the cassava
mealy bug. In cocoa plantation,
IPM reduced cost of fungicides
by 39%.

Benefit cost ratio of 149 to 1 forthe wasp predator strategy, acrossall cassava growing countries inAfrica, 1978-2003. Reduced costsof fungicides in the context ofobtaining similar yields can leadto increase in profitability for the
farmers.

Bio-pesticides

Fungal spores in fighting
grasshopper in Benin, maize
and cassava, cowpea andgroundnuts crops (De Grooteet al. 2001).

Estimated cost for effective
intervention was US$ 4/ha.

Cumulative mortality ofgrasshoppers after 20 days ofspraying was over 90%.

Bio-pesticides have small costs
and major benefits of avoided
damage. Yield losses due tograsshoppers can reach 90% in
cowpea and 33% in maize.

Table 2: Selected evidence on benefits and costs of plant and animal health management

52

Agriculture
ratios of 2.5 to 1. Compared with mono-cropping
strategies push pull strategies and intercropping both
imply an increased use of labour, but demonstrated
returns are more than 200 per cent.
Similarly, pest management strategies that include
introducing new predator species in Africa to combat
losses caused by the mealy bug have proven to be
extremely effective. Most significant costs are associatedwith research development and extension but theresulting increase in effective produce and diminishedpost-harvest losses contribute to more than an order ofmagnitude increase in returns. Unlike push-pull, thesetypes of strategies are usually managed at a country orinter-country level and thus benefit from scale, whileproviding benefits to all farmers, regardless of their size
and their possibility to invest in pest control.
Scaling up adoption of green agriculture by partneringwith leading agribusinesses
A small number of corporations control a large
share of the global agribusiness. The four biggest
seed companies control more than half of thecommercial seed market (Howard 2009), the biggest
ten corporations (four of them are among the top 10
seed companies) together control 82 per cent of theworld pesticides business. The share of the top-ten
corporations in the global market for food processing
is 28 per cent, and the top 15 supermarket companies
represent more than 30 per cent of global food sales(Emmanuel and Violette 2010). Investment decisions ofthese approximately 40 companies have the power todetermine, to a large extent, how the global agriculture
sector could endorse and encourage green andsustainable farming practices.
By greening the core business operations and supply
chains, these corporations can play a major role insupporting a transition to greener agriculture. In
addition, they can provide investments to develop andimplement viable strategies for ensuring global foodsecurity based on optimal use of inorganic inputs andbuilding capacity to recycle on-farm nutrients. Investingin building consumer awareness about benefits ofsustainable agrifood products is another area that offers
benefits for the environment and these businesses.
One of the promising developments in the area ofagribusiness and NGO partnerships to promote green
agriculture is the Sustainable Food Laboratory.16
Strengthening the supply chains for green products
and farm inputs
Demand for sustainably produced products is increasing
but it is concentrated in developed countries. Investments
in developing new markets in developing countries and16. http://www.sustainablefoodlab.org.

expanding existing market in developed countries could(i) create new and high return employment opportunities
for on- and off-farm sectors (e.g. certification auditors);(ii) shorten the field-to-market supply chains, andthus offer better prices to farmers in these countries;and (iii) help maintain the price premiums, which canrange from 10 per cent to more than 100 per cent overa variety of conventionally- produced foods (Clark andAlexander 2010). A major challenge in this regard isconsumer demand for less expensive food and highdemand elasticities associated with premium prices
for organic food and other products. As incomes riseand consumers learn more about lifestyle diseases, andin the absence of good food safety regulations or lackof their implementation, the negative health effects
of some cheaper, conventionally produced foods, we
expect to see in upper and middle income consumers anincreasing willingness to pay for more environmentally
sustainable and ethically produced (e.g. fairtrade, etc.)
foods at prices that would cover their higher costs.
The limited availability of substantial quantities ofnatural fertiliser and pesticides in many countries is amajor constraint to the growth of sustainable farming
practices. Large-scale composting of organic matter andrecovery of livestock manures for commercial organic
fertiliser products will be required in most farming
regions. Investments in the production, supply andmarketing of non-synthetic, natural inputs for farming
will not only offer competitive returns but will also help
in set up new small-scale businesses in rural areas. The
bulk and volume of organic fertilisers that are required
for equivalent applications of inorganic fertilisers makethem not very cost-effective for long distance transport,thus necessitating relatively localised or regional
compost-production capacities.
Farm mechanisation and post-harvest storage
Appropriate mechanisation of small and medium farms
can significantly increase agricultural productivity andhelp green the farming practices. The degree to which
there is access to farm mechanisation equipment (bothdraft animal and modern fuel-powered technology) will
substantially determine achievable levels of productivity
per unit of labour and of land. Use of (i) more energyefficient cultivating machines that incorporate plant
residues into the soil to increase fertility, (ii) zero-tillage
and minimal-tillage direct seeders for optimum planting
uniformity and minimal topsoil disturbance, (iii) precisionapplication systems for more efficient use of agrochemicals,(iv) drip and sparkling irrigation, and (v) harvest and postharvest operations that include village-level processing offarm products and by-products are central to the green
mechanisation of farms (Rodulfo and Geronimo 2004).
Since most farm mechanisation technologies require
modern fuels or electric power to operate and fossil fuel53

Towards a green economy

Box 5: Simple storage: low
investment, high returns
An FAO programme that supported the
production and use of household andcommunity- scaled metal silos for grain storage
estimated that farmers who invested in silos
were able to earn nearly three times the pricefor maize sold four months following harvest
as opposed to the price paid at harvest (US$38/100 kg of maize compared with US$ 13/100kg). The production costs for these metal silos
ranged between US$ 20 for a 120 kg smallcapacity unit to US$ 70-US$ 100 for an 1800 kg
large-capacity silo in a variety of countries. Most
farmers realised a full return on their investment
within the first year of use (Household Metal
Silos, FAO 2008). The FAO reports that although
reducing post-harvest losses could be relatively
quickly achieved, less than 5 per cent ofworldwide agricultural research and extension
funding currently targets this problem.
Similar improvements in reducing postharvest losses are possible with cost-effective
hermetically sealed packaging materials andhandling processes that protect grains andpulses from insect and mold contamination.
A notable example of such technologies is
the Purdue Improved Cowpea Storage (PICS)
system, which is composed of two polyethylenebags and a third outer bag of woven
polypropylene. The PICS materials are made byseveral West African manufacturers and have
proven to offer safe and inexpensive storageof cowpea and other grains for 4-6 months andlonger (Baributsa et al. 2010).

price increases are seen as inevitable, it is importantthat non-conventional energy sources such as biodiesel
fuels and biogas power generation and process heat be
developed and used in mechanised farming systems indeveloping countries. While there are examples of rural
bioenergy production technologies operating throughout
the world, in most cases these technologies remain
uncompetitive mainly due to subsidies and policy support
for fossil fuels and related farm machinery.
Coupled with farm mechanisation, which may negatively
affect on-farm employment opportunities, investment
in off-farm employment opportunities is needed. Food
packaging and processing in rural areas would enable
new non-farm jobs and could improve market access for
agricultural produce. However, the feasibility of added

54

value processing would be substantially determinedby the quality of rural road infrastructure that connect
to urban centres, ports and airports and the availabilityof skilled labour capable of operating food-handlingfacilities. In those cases where rural food processing is
implemented, the residues from food processing should
be composted or processed into organic fertilisers inorder to avoid waste and to return needed organic
nutrients to the nearby farm land.
With regard to post-harvest storage, simple technologies
with small investments can make a big difference. Small
holder farmers with limited access to dry and sanitarystorage and cold chain facilities often suffer post harvest
food losses that can range from 20 per cent to more than
30 per cent of their crop yields. Furthermore, without
crop storage systems, farmers are usually compelled tosell their entire crop immediately at the time of harvest
when market prices are much lower than levels possible
several months after harvest (Kader and Rolle 2004).
Investments in post-harvest storage can bring multiple
economic and development benefits (Box 5).
Improving soil and water management anddiversifying crops and livestock
One of the most significant consequences of conventional
agriculture is the rapid depletion of soil organic matter(SOM). Repeated cultivation degrades soils and lowers
crop yields hence increases production costs. Strategies
for better soil management have been experimented
in Colombia, England, Morocco, Mexico and the USA.
Results show yield increases ranging from 30 per cent to
140 per cent. Some of these strategies include, growing
and integrating back in soil nitrogen fixing fodder andgreen manure crops such as pea, ferns and cloves or ricestraw, no-tillage and planting new seeds in crop residues,using waste biomass or biochar (still needs research to
fully understand its true potential), and organic andmineral fertilisers. Table 3 presents evidence from fieldtrials and plots in Colombia, England, Morocco, Mexicoand the USA that show yield increases ranging from30 per cent to 140 per cent resulting from better soil
management strategies. Nonetheless, each strategy does
require some additional investments. Strategies such as
nitrogen-fixing fodder or green manure mainly involve
additional labour costs: additional labour is required to
distribute fodder over land and for sowing and growing
green manure plants. In addition, in some countries, thecost of fodder can be substantial since it can be usedalternatively for feeding animals. Nevertheless, crop yield
increases as high as 40 per cent are capable of making
the investments profitable for farmers.
The use of a no-tillage system strategy mainly requires
additional capital outlays, which can be significant.
In countries with developed markets for agriculturalequipment no-tillage systems can be cheaper thanAgriculture

Trends in revenues and profits
after including additional costsof greening

Strategy

Crop and country

Costs

Benefits

Use of nitrogen-fixing
fodder and cultivating
green manure

Cultivation of maize in Spainand rice in India, Indonesia
and Philippines. (Tejada et al.
2008); (Ali 1999).

Costs varied depending on
methods and country. Ricestraw use (for green manure)costs ranged from US$ 18/ha inIndonesia and Philippines, to
US$ 40/ha in India. Azolla (typeof fern) for nitrogen fixing andgreen manure meant additionalcosts ranging from US$ 34/ha
in India, to US$ 48/ha in thePhilippines.

Maize crop yields increased
approximately 40% in the firstyear, 5% in second year and
20% in year three. No significant
increases in yields were observed
in rice crops compared to the useof inorganic fertilisers but resultin long term soil improvements.
Maize crop yields increased after
the first year, by 28%, 30% and140% in the last 3 years of thestudy. No impact was seen on
soybean crop yields.

Revenues increased even though
there was no difference in thecosts of using green manure overinorganic fertiliser for rice crops.

No-tillage practices

Maize in Mexico, wheat in
Morocco and cereal grain cropin England. (Erenstein et al.
2008); Mrabet et al. 2001;
Baker 2007). Sorghum andmaize in Botswana, (Panin
1995) Maize, sorghum andcowpea in Nigeria, (Eziakor
1990). Soybean in Australia(Grabski et al. 2009).

The capital costs for a small
scale No-tillage planting
system are estimated to be US$
25,000 to 50,000 (ICARDA).
No tillage system was cheaper
by US$ 156/ha when rented
from a contractor in England,
compared to renting tillingsystems. In Botswana, cost
per household of tractor was
US$ 218.

Maize yields increased by 29 per
cent; wheat yields by 44 per cent.
No impact on total cultivatedareas, crop yields and total crop
output in traditional tillage
systems vs. animal power or
manual usage (Botswana
and Nigeria). An average yield
increase in soybean yields of
27% over 14 years in no-tillage
vs. till systems.

No-tillage systems are
economically profitable, evenafter incorporating the costs ofno-till systems. (Baker 2007).

Biochar use

Cultivation of maizeintercropped with soybean(Colombia) and wheat (USA).
(Major et al. 2010; Galinato etal. 2010).

Biochar production costs range
between US$ 87-350/tonne
depending on source of inputs
and mode of production.

Maize crop yields increased after
the first year, by 28%, 30% and140% in the last 3 years of thestudy. No impact was seen on
soybean crop yields.

In the US, wheat production
increased sufficiently togenerate a profit of US$ 414/
acre, but only while using
low-price biochar. Higher-costbiochar reduces profits.

Table 3: Selected evidence on benefits and costs of soil management strategies

using tilling machinery, in developing countries
the investment in farm equipment may represent asignificant barrier. Farmer cooperatives and extension
services can help defray these costs.
Biochar usage represents a costly investment, mainly
because of the high cost of production for biochar (US$87-350 per tonne depending on the source of inputs andmode of production). Although it can bring significant
increases in crop yields, biochar profitability is still highly
dependent on the cost of production.
Similarly, the use of water for irrigation is rapidly exceeding
the natural hydrological rate of recharge in many river
basins (Johansson et al. 2002; WWAP 2003; Wani et al.
2009). Practices such as flooding fields, poor drainage
and excessive pumping imply that there are many
opportunities for using ground and rainwater in more
efficient and sustainable ways (Steinfeld et al. 2006). Somesustainable water-use strategies include drip irrigation
systems, pressurised water pipe and sprinkler systems anduse of manual treadle pumps. According to some studies(Burneya et al. 2009; Sivanappan 1994; Belder et al. 2007),
drip irrigation has resulted in yield gains of up to 100 per
cent, and water savings of 40 to 80 per cent.

Using leaf and straw mulch reduces surface evaporationand helps to retain moisture near plant roots, thusincreasing water-use efficiency (Sharma et al. 1998).
Landscape contouring and vegetative barriers arean effective means of minimising rainfall runoff andretaining moisture in fields. Using drought-resistantvarieties of crops can also help conserve water.
For example, System Rice Intensive (SRI) practices
substantially reduce the amount of water and otherexternal inputs through decreased planting densities,
which require less seed and fewer workers. The
approach generally achieves between 40 per centand 200 per cent greater crop yields compared withconventional flooded rice cultivation (Zhao 2009). Table 4
demonstrates that most water-saving technologies
can bring about increased profits despite additional
infrastructure and operating costs. Most water-saving
techniques require additional equipment and increased
working capital to cover the costs of increased labour
use. Additional labour is required for strategies suchas the use of mulching fields, raising plant beds andaligning furrows, and in other land contouring strategies.
Such labour costs are nevertheless easily recovered
through increased crop yields, and the reduced risk oflosses during drought or dry years.

55

Towards a green economy
Table 4 shows that investment costs in drip irrigation
systems and in manual treadle pumps are recovered
more quickly; returns to investments have on average
been more than 10-fold. These technologies havedemonstrated their effectiveness in reducing income
vulnerability and uncertainty for small-holder farmers
across the continent. Drip irrigation systems also allow
the more efficient use of water and are particularly
useful for multiple cropping; in Nepal women farmers
have been able to earn additional incomes by growing
high value crops on otherwise barren land. Strategies
such as the use of drought-resistant varieties of crops
mainly involve investment in research and distributionof new seeds. In this context, estimated returns on
investment are an order of magnitude higher, especiallyas witnessed in water-starved regions of Africa.
The success of these strategies also implies thatagronomic research and development on improving
water management practices in rain-fed agriculture andon tilling practices has been successful although much
more is required. A strategy that remains relatively

untapped is community-led watershed management.
Watershed management has conventionally meant
large hydraulic engineering efforts that are applied
to local streams or river basins to establish a networkof water reservoirs, catchment areas and other water
impoundment and storage infrastructures. However,community-led watershed management strategies that
protect and improve soil, water and plant resources ina catchment area are rapidly gaining traction and are
rapidly becoming a lucrative opportunity for farmers
who can benefit from Payment for Ecosystem Schemes(PES). These community led watershed management
strategies offer important opportunities for increased
efficiencies in irrigation (Krishna and Uphoff 2002).
As far as crop and livestock diversification is concerned,
genetic resources for plant and animal breeding are
the basis for food production. Genetically diverse crops
can combine the best traits of local varieties of crops
derived from indigenous species and other higher
yielding varieties. Similarly, selecting and mating local
animal breeds with high-performance breeds increases

Strategy

Crop and country

Costs

Benefits

Trends in revenues and profits
after including additional costsof greening

Cover mulch

Grain in India (Sharma et al.
1998); Groundnut in India(Ghosh et al. 2006).

In groundnut cultivation thecost of wheat straw mulch was
US$ 58/ha. Cultivation required
5 tonnes of mulch per hectare.
Black plastic covers cost much
more (US$ 1.8 /kg, vs. straw at
US$ 0.01/kg).

Average yields for grain and straw
were the highest in fields that received
cover mulch of 6 tonnes/ha: Yields
increased by 130-149% over 3 years.
Using wheat straw mulch cover
increased pod yield of groundnut by
17–24%. Using both– wheat straw
mulch and black plastic covers led toyield increases of 30 to 86% acrosstest fields.

For groundnut crops, analysis ofprofitability showed that both
systems (wheat straw and wheat
straw with plastic cover) havepositive income returns of US$
92/ha and US$ 42/ha respectively. For grain crops, long-term
profitability is possible with theuse of mulch depending on thecosts of mulch.

Furrow contouring

Corn in China (Li X. et al.
2001).

Technique used plastic covers
and constructed furrows. Costsof plastic and labour are notprovided.

Corn yields increased by 60-95%
during drought years, 70-90% in
wet years and 20-30% in very
wet years.

Revenues and profits are likely to
be positive and increase, except
during very wet year.

Manual treadle pump

Major staples including
cassava, maize, rice and yam
in Ghana (Adeoti et al. 2007
and 2009) and a varietyof crops, Zambia (Kay andBrabben 2000).

Depending on region the costof a manual treadle pump in
Ghana was US$ 89. Users had
to pay additionally for labour.
Total production costs increased
by US$ 162/farm on average.
In Zambia the cost of suction
pumps ranged from US$ 60–77
and cost of pressure pumps was
US$ 100–120.

In Ghana, treadle pump users wereable to grow multiple crops. In
Zambia Treadle Pump users of wereable to grow three crops a year.

Incomes for Treadle Pump users
increased by more than 28 percent in Ghana. On average users
earned almost US$ 343/farmer
over non-users in Ghana. In
Zambia, incomes rose more thansix- fold. Farmers earned US$ 125with bucket irrigation on 0.25 haof land to US$ 850-1,700.

Drip irrigation

Vegetables in Nepal(Upadhyay 2004) Maize andvegetables in Zimbabwe(Maisiri et al. 2005).

On average farmers had to pay
US$ 12/farmer in Nepal for drip
irrigation system (perforated
tubing and a suspended watercontainer).

Barren land became moreproductive in Nepal. In Zimbabwe
no significant differences in yield
were observed. Water use reduced
by 35%.

In Nepal, women farmers earned
an additional US$ 70 annually by
selling surplus vegetables.

Using low-water varietiesof crops

Maize varieties in 13 countries US$ 76 million was investedof eastern, southern and West in cultivating low-water
Africa (La Rovere et al. 2010). varieties of crops over 10 years
in these countries.

Average yield increases estimatedto be between 3-20%.

Maize yield increases translate
into US$ 0.53 billion. The ratio ofreturns to investment is estimatedto be between 7 and 11 times.

Table 4: Selected evidence on benefits and costs of water management strategies

56Agriculture

Box 6: Investment in sustainableagriculture: case study
Current trends of population growth, climatechange and resource scarcity make sustainableagricultureacompellinginvestment
opportunity. Sustainable Asset Management
AG (SAM) taps into this potential throughits sustainable theme funds, investing incompanies that offer cost- effective, eco-friendly
technologies that enable more efficient use ofwater or more sustainable food production.
SAM has pursued water investments because theneed for adequate water supplies is one of today’s
major challenges. Advanced micro or drip irrigation
systems can halve farmers’ water requirements
and limit the need for chemicals while boostingyields by up to 150 per cent. Countries affectedby water shortages are adopting thesetechnologies at rapid rates (see chart).
Million hectares

8
p.
a

.

7
6

9%

Diversification strategies are not useful to ensurediminished vulnerability but also to increase profitability
and yields of existing farming systems. Table 5 below
presents selected evidence for costs and benefits ofagricultural diversification strategies in Asia and Africa.
Diversifying across crops has demonstrated increased
yields in India and Bangladesh and shows potential forrecovering research and extension costs. In both Africa
and Asia, diversifying into animal husbandry has meant
increased profits. The main on-farm costs for all thesestrategies is usually the cost of increased labour, but also
the cost of training and learning new practices. In addition,
diversification into animal husbandries may involve
important capital costs in farm equipment. In countries
where employment opportunities are few, diversification
represents a potent poverty alleviation strategy for boththe farmer and the labourer. After the analysis of costs ofcurrent agriculture and some strategies for a managed
transition away from BAU, the following section lays out
the benefit expected from greening the agriculture sector.

There are various examples of higher productivity andprofitability in developing countries. Another study by
Pretty et al. (2006) showed an average yield-increaseof nearly 80 per cent as a result of farmers in 57 poor
countries adopting 286 recent best practice initiatives,+1

diversity and can bring significant biological, social andeconomic benefits. Replenishing soil nutrients withbiological nitrogen fixation and crop-residue recycling,
reducing thermal stress and water evaporation rates,
and attracting beneficial insects for pollination and pest
predation, and deterring pests are all important benefitsof crop diversification. Combining the horticultural
production of higher-value vegetables and fruits withthe cultivation of cereals and cash commodity crops canraise farm income, along with grass-fed livestock, which
also enables people to acquire protein and calories
derived from otherwise inedible biomass resources.
Recycling of livestock manures as organic nutrientsfor soil is an essential element of greening agriculture.
In addition, there are numerous opportunities for
combining a wide variety of trees and shrubs with thecultivation of crops, horticulture and specialty crops (e.g.
coffee, tea, vanilla, etc.) to maximise the output of a farm

5
4
3
2
1

3.3 The benefits of greening agriculture
The greening of the agriculture sector is expected togenerate a range of benefits including increased profits
and income for farmers, gains at the macroeconomic
level, enabling the sector to adapt to climate change andbenefits for ecosystem services.
Profitability and productivity of green agriculture
No business is sustainable unless it is also profitable.
Many studies have documented the profitability andproductivity of sustainable farms, both in developed
and developing countries. An FAO study (Nemes 2009)that analysed 50 farms, mostly in the USA, reported: “Theoverwhelming majority of cases show that organic farms
are more economically profitable”.

0

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009E

2011E

The SAM Sustainable Water Fund currently
encompasses an investment universe ofabout 170 companies worldwide and assets
under management of € 1.14 bn. The fund has
consistently outperformed its benchmark, the
MSCI World, with annual return on averageoutperforming the benchmark by 4.14 percent (in Euros) since launch in 2001 at arisk comparable to that of the MSCI. Strong
growth in micro irrigation fosters sustainableagriculture and creates interesting investment
opportunities.
Source: Based on text provided by Daniel Wild, PhD, Senior Equity Analyst, SAM (2010)57

Towards a green economy

Strategy

Crop and country

Costs

Benefits

Trends in revenues and profits
after including additional costsof greening

Crop diversification

Rice with pigeon pea,groundnut and blackgramin India (Kar et al. 2004).
Variety of crops in Bangladesh(Rahman 2009).

US$ 41.8 million allocated topromoting crop diversification
for a 5-year plan in Bangladesh.
Empirical study shows reduced
variable cost for diversified
farmers of US$ 40/ farm (Jan.
1997 exchange rate).

In India, intercropping of rice withpigeon pea, groundnut and blackgram
approximately tripled the yield ofcrops (rice and alternative crops) vs.
rice alone.

In Bangladesh, similar net profits
were earned by diversified andnon diversified farmers; but
positive environmental benefits
accrued to the diversified farms.

Diversification into
animal husbandry andhorticulture

Variety of crops and animals
in Africa (Seo 2010). Surveyof crops and countries inAfrica and South East Asia
(Weinberger 2007).

In Kenya the production ofsnowpeas and French beans,require 600 and 500 labourdays per ha, respectively. In
Mexico, the horticultural sector
required more than 20% of thetotal labour days within the
agricultural sector.

The impacts of climate change
on farms diversified into animalhusbandries range from 9% loss
to 27% gain depending on climate
scenarios.

Profits of farmers diversified
into horticulture wereconsistently higher compared to
non-diversified farmers (29% in
Bangladesh to 497% in Kenya).
Estimates show that integrated ordiversified farms have the potential
to become more profitablecompared to non-integrated farms
50 years from now, in the context
of climate change.

Table 5: Selected evidence on benefits and costs of agricultural diversification

including integrated pest and nutrient management,
conservation tillage, agroforestry, aquaculture, water
harvesting and livestock integration. The study covered
12.6 million farms, encompassing over 37 million
hectares (3 per cent of the cultivated area in developing
countries). All crops showed water use efficiency gains,with the highest improvement occurring in rain-fed
crops. Carbon sequestration potential averaged 0.35tC/
ha/year. Of projects with pesticide data, 77 resulted in a
decline in pesticide use by 71 per cent, while yields grewby 42 per cent. In another example, bio-dynamic farms
recorded a 100 per cent increase in productivity perhectare due to the use of soil-fertility techniques such ascompost application and the introduction of leguminous
plants into the crop sequence (Dobbs and Smolik 1996;
Drinkwater et al. 1998; Edwards 2007).
For small farms in Africa, where the use of synthetic inputs
is low, converting to sustainable farming methods has
increased yields and raised incomes. In a project involving
1,000 farmers in South Nyanza, Kenya, who were
cultivating, on average, two hectares each, crop yields
rose by 2-4 tonnes per hectare after an initial conversion
period. In yet another case, the incomes of some 30,000
smallholders in Thika, Kenya rose by 50 per cent within
three years after they switched to organic production(Hines and Pretty 2008).
A significant part of a farm’s production costs is linked
to its energy inputs and organic agriculture tends tobe more energy-efficient. Growing organic rice can,for example, be four times more energy-efficientthan the conventional method (Mendoza 2002). The
study also shows that organic farmers required 36 percent of the energy inputs per hectare compared with

58

conventional rice farmers. Niggli et al. (2009) foundthat organic agriculture reduces production systems’energy requirements by 25 to 50 per cent comparedwith conventional chemical-based agriculture. Energy
consumption in organic farming systems is reduced by
10 to 70 per cent in European countries and by 28 to 32
per cent in the USA compared with high-input systems,with the exception of certain crops including potatoes
and apples, where energy-use is equal or even higher(Pimentel et al. 1983; Hill 2009).
Market price premiums often exist for certified
sustainably produced products, however this incentive
may not be adequate in the long run unless there is acommensurate increase in global consumer demand
for sustainable agricultural products (e.g. in countries
other than primarily the EU and USA). Premium priceincentives are likely to relatively decrease in response
to supply and demand elasticities (Oberholtzer et
al. 2005). However, if prices of conventionally grown
food (crops and animals) included the costs of theirexternalities, sustainable products may become
relatively less expensive than conventional products.
Furthermore, if the positive ecosystem service benefitsof sustainable practices were valued and monetised
as incremental payments to green farmers, greener
agriculture products would become more competitive
with conventional products.
Macroeconomic benefits from greening agriculture
Significant secondary macro-economic and poverty
reduction benefits are expected from greening
agriculture. Investments aimed at increasing the
productivity of the agriculture sector have proved to be
more than twice as effective in reducing rural poverty

Agriculture

Box 7: Innovative sustainable andsocial capital investment initiatives

Box 8: Organic versus
conventional cotton production

Institutional investments for greening agriculture
are emerging. For example, Rabobank Groupis supporting sustainable agriculture throughthe launch of the Rabo Sustainable Agriculture
Guarantee Fund and supporting initiatives
such as the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative(IDH), the Schokland Fund and Round Table of
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), the Round Table
on Responsible Soy (RTRS), and the Better
Sugar Initiative (BSI). In addition, it has launchedprogrammes to improve the financial strengthand resilience of small farmers in developing
countries via the Rabobank Foundation andRabo Development. It has also introduced
new financial services such as the Sustainable
Agricultural Fund to try out innovative financing
models such as the Xingu River Basin Projectin Brazil, under which 83 hectares have been
replanted in the last two years. Rabobank has
invested nearly US$ 50 million to purchasecarbon emission reduction credits that are
created by the Amazon reforestation by farmers.

An Indo-Swiss research team comparedagronomic data of 60 organic and 60
conventional farms over two years andconcluded that cotton-based organic farming
is more profitable. Organic farming’s variable
production costs were 13-20 per cent lower
and inputs were 40 per cent lower. But yields
and profits margins were 4-6 per cent and 3043 per cent higher respectively during the twoyears. Although crops grown in rotation withcotton were sold without a price premium,organic farms achieved 10-20 per centhigher incomes compared with conventional
agriculture (Eyhorn et al. 2005). Similarly, an
impact assessment study for organic cotton
farmers in Kutch and Surendranagar in eastern
India, concluded that farmers who participatedin the project enjoyed a net profit gain of 14
to 20 per cent resulting from higher revenues
and lower costs. The updated version of thestudy surveying 125 organic cotton farmers
concluded that 95 per cent of respondents
found their agricultural income had risen since
adopting organic agriculture, on average by 17
per cent. Most farmers attributed this largely
to the reduced cost of production and anincrease in output price (MacDonald 2004). Raj
et al. (2005) also found in Andhra Pradesh thatorganic cotton was much more profitable.

Another example of social capital investment
institutions is the Acumen Fund, which haschannelled investment worth millions of US
dollars to private entrepreneurs in developing
countries, enabling businesses and otherinitiatives to flourish, from those that provide
drip-irrigation products to those operating
village-scalebiogaspower-generation
services. Acumen provides both patient capital
investments and business management
capacity-building support to the private
businesses in their portfolio

than investment in any other sector (ADB 2010). The
greatest success stories in terms of reducing hunger
and poverty are from China, Ghana, India, Vietnam
and several Latin American nations, all of which haverelatively higher net investment rates in agriculture per
agricultural worker than most developing countries(FAO n.d.). The World Bank has estimated that the cost ofachieving the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG
1) amounts to between US$ 554 and US$ 880 per head(based on growth in income in general), while a study
published by the Asian Development Bank Institutehas concluded that the cost of moving a householdout of poverty through engaging farmers in organic
agriculture could be only US$ 32 to US$ 38 per head(Markandya et al. 2010).

Source: Nemes (2009)

In addition, green agriculture directs a greater share of
total farming input expenditures towards the purchaseof locally-sourced inputs (e.g. labour and organic
fertilisers) and a local multiplier effect is expected tokick in. Overall, green farming practices tend to require
more labour inputs than conventional farming (e.g. fromcomparable levels to as much as 30 per cent more) (FAO
2007 and European Commission 2010), creating jobs inrural areas and a higher return on labour inputs. This isespecially important for developing countries, wherelarge numbers of poor people continuously leave rural
areas in search of jobs in cities and growing proportionsof young people are imposing enormous pressures forjob creation (Figure 6). In addition, most developing
countries run substantial trade deficits (World Bank
2010) with the lack of foreign exchange representing
a key resource constraint. Greening agriculture canrelax the foreign-exchange constraint by reducing theneed for imported inputs and by increasing exports ofsustainable agrifood products. Reducing deficits would

59

Towards a green economy

South
Asia

East Asia andthe Pacific

Europe andCentral Asia

Latin America
and theCaribbean

Middle East andNorth Africa

Sub-SaharanAfricaDeveloping
countries

Agricultural research

172

151

84

426

169

314

1,316

Irrigation expansion

344

15

6

31

–26

537

907

Irrigation efficiency

999

686

99

129

59

187

2,158

Rural roads (area expansion)

8

73

0

573

37

1,980

2,671

Rural roads (yield increase)

9

9

10

3

1

35

66

Total

1,531

934

198

1,162

241

3,053

7,118

Agricultural research

185

172

110

392

190

326

1,373

Irrigation expansion

344

1

1

30

–22

529

882

Irrigation efficiency

1,006

648

101

128

58

186

2,128

Rural roads (area expansion)

16

147

0

763

44

1,911

2,881

Rural roads (yield increase)

13

9

11

3

1

36

74

Total

1,565

977

222

1,315

271

2,987

7,338

Scenario
NCAR with developing-country investments

CSIRO with developing-country investments

Table 6: Incremental annual agricultural investment figures by region needed to counteract climatechange impacts on child malnutrition17
Note: These results are based on crop model yield changes that do not include the CO2 fertilisation effect.
Source: Nelson et al. (2009)enable these countries to purchase technology andother critical inputs for their economies.
Climate adaptation and mitigation benefits, andecosystem services
Making agriculture more resilient to drought, heavy
rainfall events, and temperature changes is closely linked
to building greater farm biodiversity and improved soilorganic matter. Practices that enhance biodiversity allow
farms to mimic natural ecological processes, enablingthem to better respond to change and reduce risk. The useof intra and inter-species diversity serves as an insurance
against future environmental changes by increasing thesystem’s adaptive capabilities (Ensor 2009). Improved soilorganic matter from the use of green manures, mulching,
and recycling of crop residues and animal manure
increases the water holding capacity of soils and theirability to absorb water during torrential rains.

60

for agricultural research (Nelson et al. 2009). However,assessments of green investment options that would
include agro-ecological soil fertility enhancement;water-use efficiency improvements for rain-fed farming;
breeding for drought and flood tolerance; integrated pest
management; and post harvest handling infrastructures,still remain to be done.

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
estimates that an additional US$ 7.1-7.3 billion peryear are needed in agricultural investments to offset
the negative impact of climate change on nutrition
for children by 2050 (Table 6). The International Food
Policy Research Institute recommended investments
were needed primarily for basic infrastructure suchas rural roads in Africa and expanded irrigation, and

The IPCC estimates that the global technical mitigation
potential from agriculture by 2030 is approximately
5,500-6,000 Mt CO2-eq/yr (Smith et al. 2007). Soil carbon
sequestration would be the mechanism responsible
for most of this mitigation, contributing 89 per cent of
the technical potential. Therefore, agriculture has thepotential to significantly reduce its GHG emissions,and possibly to function as a net carbon sink within
the next 50 years. The most important opportunity for
GHG mitigation is the application of carbon-rich organic
matter (humus) into the soil. This would significantly
reduce the need for fossil fuel-based and energyintensive mineral fertilisers and be a cost-effectivemeans of sequestering atmospheric carbon. Further GHG
mitigation gains could be achieved by improving yields
on currently farmed lands and reducing deforestationpressures and by adopting no/low tillage practices that
reduce fuel usage (Bellarby et al. 2008; ITC andFiBL 2007;
Ziesemer 2007).

17. Note: 1) NCAR: The National Center for Atmospheric Research (US); 2) CSIRO:
The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (Australia).

The environmental services provided by greening farms
are substantial. The Rodale Institute, for example, has

Agriculture
estimated that conversion to organic agriculture could
sequester additional 3 tonnes of carbon per hectare
per year (LaSalle et al. 2008). The carbon sequestration
efficiency of organic systems in temperate climates isalmost double (575-700 kg carbon per ha per year) thatof conventional treatment of soils, mainly owing to theuse of grass clovers for feed and of cover crops in organic
rotations. German organic farms annually sequester 402
kg carbon/ha, while conventional farms experiencelosses of 637 kg (Küstermann et al. 2008; Niggli et al.
2009). From such studies, it is possible to approximatethat if only all the small farms on the planet employedsustainable practices, they might sequester a total of
2.5 billion tonnes of carbon annually. Such verifiablecarbon sequestration levels could be equivalent to US$
49 billion in carbon credits per year, assuming a carbon
price of US$ 20/tonne. The FAO has documented thata widespread conversion to organic farming could
mitigate 40 per cent (2.4 Gt CO2-eq/yr) of the world’s
agriculture greenhouse gas emissions in a minimum
implementation scenario; and up to 65 per cent (4 Gt
CO2-eq/yr) of agriculture GHG emissions in a maximum
carbon sequestration scenario (Scialabba and MullerLindenlauf 2010).
Furthermore, emissions of nitrous oxides and methane
could be reduced if farmers use nitrogen and otherfertilisers more efficiently, including through precisionapplications and introducing improved crop varietiesthat more effectively access and use available nitrogenin the soil. Greening agriculture also has the potential toeventually become self-sufficient in producing nitrogenthrough the recycling of manures from livestock and crop
residues via composting; and by increased intercropping
rotations with leguminous, nitrogen-fixing crops (Ensor
2009; ITC and FiBL 2007).
Additional ecosystem benefits resulting from greeningof agriculture include better soil quality18 with moreorganic matter, increased water supply, better nutrient
recycling, wildlife and storm protection and flood control(Pretty et al. 2001; OECD 1997). Systems that use natural
predators for pest control also promote on-farm and offfarm biodiversity and pollination services.

3.4 Modelling: Future scenarios forgreen agriculture
In this section we assess a scenario in which an additional
0.16 per cent of the global GDP is invested in green
agriculture per year (equalling US$ 198 billion) between
2011 and 2050. This is as part of a green investment
scenario in which an additional 2 per cent of global
GDP is allocated to a range of key sectors. More details
are available in the Modelling chapter of this report. In
the part of the modelling exercise, which focused on

agriculture sector, these additional green investments
are undertaken equally in the following four activities:■■ Agricultural management practices: one-fourth of theinvestment is assumed to be invested in environmentallysound practices;■■ Pre-harvest losses: another one-fourth of theadditional budget is invested in preventing pre-harvest
losses, training activities and pest control activities;■■ Food processing: one-fourth of the investment isassumed to be spent on preventing post-harvest losses,
better storage and improved processing in rural areas.
■■ Research and Development: the remaining onefourth amount is assumed to be spent on research anddevelopment especially in the areas of photosynthesis
efficiencies, soil microbial productivity, climate
adaptation biological processes, and improvements ofenergy and water-use efficiency.
The green scenario19 is compared with a BAU2 scenario,
where the same amount of additional investment ismade in conventional and traditional agriculture overthe 40-year period.
The results are stark. Overall, the green investments
lead to improved soil quality, increased agricultural
yield and reduced land and water requirements. They
also increase GDP growth and employment, improve
nutrition and reduce energy consumption and CO2
emissions (Table 7).
■■ Agricultural production and value added: In thegreen scenario, total agricultural production (including
agricultural products, livestock, fishery and forestry)increases significantly compared to other scenarios.20
This change is driven by increased crop production,
which is able to satisfy a growing population that isprojected to reach 9 billion by 2050. Similarly value
added in agricultural production increases by 9 per centcompared with the BAU2 scenario. It is important tonote that despite an increase in agricultural production
and value added, there is no increase in area harvested.
This suggests positive synergies between ecologicalagriculture investments and forest management.
Similarly, improved water-efficiency reduces water
demand by almost one-third by 2050, compared with the
BAU2 scenario. On the other hand, energy consumption
18. Such soils are better quality, contain greater organic matter andmicrobial activity, more earthworms, have a better structure, lower bulk
density, easier penetrability and a thicker topsoil (Reganold et al. 1992).
19. Here we have presented results of scenarios that are referred to as
G2 and BAU2 in the Modelling chapter.
20. Detailed information about these results can be found in the Modelling
chapter.

61

Towards a green economy
Year

2011

Scenario

Baseline

Green

BAU2

Green

BAU2

2030

2050

Agricultural sector variables

Unit

Agricultural production

Bn US$/Yr

1,921

2,421

2,268

2,852

2,559

Crop

Bn US$/Yr

629

836

795

996

913

Livestock

Bn US$/Yr

439

590

588

726

715

Fishery

Bn US$/Yr

106

76

83

91

61

Employment

M people

1,075

1393

1,371

1,703

1,656

b) Soil quality

Dmnl

0.92

0.97

0.80

1.03

0.73

c) Agriculture water use

KM3/Yr

3,389

3,526

4276

3,207

4,878

Harvested land

Bn Ha

1.20

1.25

1.27

1.26

1.31

Deforestation

M Ha/Yr

16

7

15

7

15

Calories per capita per day(available for supply)

Kcal/P/D

2,787

3,093

3,050

3,382

3,273

Calories per capita per day(available for household consumption)

Kcal/P/D

2,081

2,305

2,315

2,524

2,476

Table 7: Results from the simulation model (a more detailed table can be found in the Modelling chapter)increases by 19 per cent in 2050 compared with BAU2,
due to higher production volumes.

with interventions in the forestry sector, net emissions
decline considerably.

■■ Livestock production, nutrition and livelihoods:
Additional investment in green agriculture also
leads to increased levels of livestock production,
rural livelihoods and improved nutritional status. An
increase in investment in green agriculture is projected
to lead to growth in employment of about 60 per
cent compared with current levels and an increase ofabout 3 per cent compared with the BAU2 scenario.
The modelling also suggests that green agriculture
investments could create 47 million additional jobs
compared with BAU2 over the next 40 years. The
additional investment in green agriculture also leads
to improved nutrition with enhanced production
patterns. Meat production increases by 66 per cent asa result of additional investment between 2010-2050
while fish production is 15 per cent below 2011 levels
and yet 48 per cent higher than the BAU2 scenario by2050. Most of this growth is caused by increased outlays
for organic fertilisers instead of chemical fertilisers andreduced losses because of better pest management
and biological control.

We also specifically analyse the generation ofagricultural waste, residues and biofuels in thesemodels. In the green economy case, we assume thatinvestment is allocated to second-generation biofuels,
which use agricultural residues, non-food crops andare primarily grown on marginal land. On average
we find that the total amount of fresh residues fromagricultural and forestry production for secondgeneration biofuel production amounts to 3.8 billion
tonnes per year between 2011 and 2050 (with anaverage annual growth rate of 11 per cent throughout
the period analysed, accounting for higher growthduring early years, 48 per cent for 2011-2020 andan average 2 per cent annual expansion after 2020).
Using the IEA’s conversion efficiency standards (214
litres of gasoline equivalent (lge) per tonne of residue)
we project that additional green investments lift the
production of second-generation biofuels to 844
billion lge, contributing to 16.6 per cent of world
liquid fuel production by 2050 (21.6 per cent when
first-generation biofuels are considered). This would
cost US$ 327 billion (at constant US$ 2010 prices)per year on average and would require 37 per centagricultural and forestry residues. The IEA estimatesthat up to 25 per cent of total agricultural and forestry
residues may be readily available, and economically
viable (IEA Renewable Energy Division 2010), forsecond-generation biofuel production. Residues not
used for second-generation biofuels are expected
to be returned to the land as fertilisers, and in other■■ GHG Emissions and biofuels: Total CO2 emissions toincrease by 11 per cent relative to 2011 but will be 2
per cent below BAU2. While energy-related emissions(mostly from fossil fuels) are projected to grow, it isworth noting that emissions from (chemical) fertiliseruse, deforestation and harvested land decline relative
to BAU2. When accounting for carbon sequestration in
the soil, under ecological practices, and for synergies

62

Agriculturecases may be used as livestock feed. More details
on the projections on first- and second-generation
biofuels production are available in the Modelling andEnergy chapters.
Overall, combining these results with research fromother sources we find the following results:■■ Return on investments in BAU agriculture willcontinue to decrease in the long run, mainly owing to
the increasing costs of inputs (especially water andenergy) and stagnated/decreased yields;■■ The cost of the externalities associated with brown
agriculture will continue to increase gradually, initiallyneutralising and eventually exceeding the economic
and development gains; and■■ By greening agriculture and food distribution,
more calories per person per day, more jobs andbusiness opportunities especially in rural areas, andmarket-access opportunities, especially for developing
countries, will be available.
While any of the proposed measures contributes to theshift towards a green agriculture sector, the combinationof all these interacting actions together will yieldpositive synergies. For instance, the investment in moresustainable farming practices leads to soil conservation,
which increases agricultural yield in the medium tolonger term. This allows more land for reforestation,
which in turn reduces land degradation and improves
soil quality. The higher yield and land availability also
benefits the promotion of second-generation biofuels,
which may help mitigate the effects of climate change.

63

Towards a green economy

4 Getting there: Enabling conditions
Despite the clear logic and economic rationale for moving
more rapidly towards greener agriculture, the transition
will require a supportive policy environment and enabling
conditions that could help level the playing field between
conventional and green agricultural practices.
Environmental and economic performance in agriculture
is most likely to be improved by employing a mix ofpolicies. There needs to be a greater use of regulations
and taxes that impose penalties for pollution in order
to include externality costs into market prices for these
inputs, as well as economic incentives that reward green
practices. There are also opportunities for applying
market solutions as alternatives to direct regulation, forexample, by using tradable permits and quotas to reduce
pollution from greenhouse gases and water-borne
nutrients. In general, governmental subsidies for farmer(producer) support should be increasingly decoupledfrom crop production and alternatively be retargeted toencourage farmers’ efforts and investments in adopting
green agriculture practices.
In the absence of good governance, collusion andexcessive profit taking are constant dangers for incentive
programmes. Instilling greater levels of transparency could
help reduce such abuses of public-support programmes.
In this section we present some of the key conditions thatwill facilitate a transition to a green agriculture.

4.1 Global policies
At the global level, the enabling conditions aresynonymous with improvements to the international
trading system and economic development cooperation
for promoting sustainable agriculture. An enabling
environment for greening agriculture should include a
range of interventions at various points along the entireagri-food supply chain:
Elimination of export subsidies and liberalisingtrade in agricultural products
Current multilateral trade policies at the global level haveprimarily focused on the gradual reduction and removalof national tariff barriers. While such policies aim at
facilitating trade, many developing nations are concernedthat they are not well positioned to benefit from suchtrade policies as are the more developed nations.
These concerns are particularly relevant while domestic
subsidies and other producer-support programmes

64

remain in many developed countries. These measureseffectively distort and diminish any competitive
advantages that developing nations might have. In
addition, subsidies have effectively reduced global
commodity prices, making it frequently unprofitableto produce certain products in many developing
countries, especially for smallholder farmers. This
combination of international trade laws and national
subsidies can impede development of commercial
agriculture in many developing countries, negatively
affecting their efforts to achieve economic growth andpoverty reduction.
Such trade and subsidy policies need to be reformed toliberalise trade in environmentally- friendly products andservices while allowing developing countries to protect
some domestic food crops (special products) frominternational competition when they are particularly
important to food security and rural livelihoods. The World
Trade Organisation (WTO) already makes a dispensation
for countries with a per capita GDP of less US$ 1,000(Amsden 2005). Furthermore, agricultural subsidies
need to be redirected to encourage more diverse crop
production with long-term soil health and improved
environmental impacts. A major shift of subsidy priorities
is needed in which governments would help reducethe initial costs and risks of farmers’ transition efforts toimplement sustainable farming practices.
Market power asymmetry
Asymmetric market power in trade is an important
issue for WTO competition policy. Leading firms are
predominantly located in industrialised countries
and maintain significant control over the food systemstandards and regulatory processes at all stages ofthe supply chain (Gereffi et al. 2005). In such market
conditions, primary producers generally capture only afraction of the international price of the commodity. Thus,
the degree of poverty reduction and rural development
benefits of supplying global trade have been limited. A
recent study (Wise 2011) shows that even in a resourcerich country like the United States, despite rapid increasein prices for food commodities since 2006, “small-to-midscale family farmers had lower farm incomes in 2009 thanthey did earlier in the decade when prices were lower”.
A green agriculture system would require trade policies
that redress these chronic asymmetries.
Food safety standards
The already stringent food safety standards andverifiable logistics management systems that are

Agriculture
applied in international markets are likely to become
more sophisticated over the next few decades. Currently,
most domestic food supply chains in developing
countries have relatively low levels of food safety andhandling practices. Improving capacity to develop andimplement sanitary and food safety standards that canensure compliance with international requirements
can increase prospects for small farmer communities tosupply international markets (Kurien 2004). Furthermore,
it is particularly important to support international
efforts to harmonise the variety of sustainable andorganic certification protocols and standards. Today’s
fragmented certification procedures impose hightransaction and reporting costs on farmers and limit
their access to international markets.
Another important issue is that the cost of certification
and reporting is to be borne only by sustainableproducers while polluters can market their products
freely. The burden of proof must be shifted to thepolluter through introduction of certification protocols
and labeling schemes which, at a minimum, show thequantities of different agrochemical inputs used in the
production and processing of a product, and whether
the product contains GMOs or not.
Intellectual property
The application of Intellectual Property (IP) regimes
has, in some cases, restricted the results of agriculturalresearch and development being made available as
public goods. Private-sector and often public-sector
IP rights restrict the access of many in developing
countries to research, technologies and genetic
materials. Supporting the implementation of theWorld Intellectual Property Organisations (WIPO)
Development Agenda and providing improved accessto and reasonable use of IP that involves traditional
knowledge, ecological agriculture techniques andgenetic resources in international IP regimes would help
advance development and sustainability goals.

4.2 National policies
At the domestic public policy level, the key challenge
is creating the conditions that would encourage more
farmers to adopt environmentally sound agriculture
practiscs instead of continuing to practice unsustainable
conventional farming methods.
Support for improved land tenure rights ofsmallholder farmers
In order for farmers to invest capital and more labour
into the transition from brown to green agriculture,
major land reforms will have to be implemented,
particularly in developing countries. In the absence ofmore secure rights to specific plots of land for many
years into the future, many poor farmers are unlikely totake on additional risks and efforts to gradually build up
the natural capital of their farms beyond a one or twoyear horizon.
Targeting programmes for women smallholder farmers
Small-farm diversification often requires a division of labourat the household level that may result in gender-based
distribution of management roles and responsibilities
for both on and off-farm tasks. This has resulted in the
majority of smallholder farms, especially in Africa, being
run by women. Securing collective and individual legal
rights to land and productive resources (e.g. water, capital),
especially for women, indigenous people and minorities isimportant. Improving women’s access to working capitalthrough microfinance is an option that would allow muchgreater numbers of small-scale producers to procure
green inputs and related mechanisation technologies(World Bank, IFAD and FAO 2009).

80

Switzerland
NorwayJapan
European Union*
OECD**USA
New Zealand

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007p* EU-12 for 1990-94, including ex-GDR;
EU-15 for 1995-2003; EU-25 for 2004-06;
then EU-27.
** Austria, Finland and Sweden are includedin the OECD total for all years and in the EUfrom 1995. The Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and the Slovak Republic are includedin the OECD total for all years and in the EUfrom 2004. The OECD total does not include
the six non-OECD EU member States.

Figure 13: Estimated producer support by country (as a percentage of total farmer income)Source: Bellmann (2010), adapted from OECD (2007). Available at: http://poldev.revues.org/143

65

Towards a green economy
Public procurement of sustainably produced foodGovernment-sponsored food programmes for schools
and public institutions and public procurement
policies should be encouraged to source foods that are
sustainably produced. The Strategic Paper on Public
Procurement, prepared by the UK Department forEnvironment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in January
2008, provides a good example of how organic andsustainable products can be supported through public
procurement policies.21

4.3 Economic instruments
Agriculture’s environmentally damaging externalities
could be reduced by imposing taxes on fossil fuel inputs
and pesticide and herbicide use; and establishing specificpenalties for air emissions and water pollution caused byharmful farming practices. Alternatively, tax exemptions forinvestments in bio-control integrated pest management
products; and incentives that value the multi-functional
uses of agricultural land have proven effective in
improving the after tax revenues for farmers that practicesustainable land management. The OECD countries havedeveloped a wide range of policy measures to addressenvironmental issues in agriculture, which include
economic instruments (payments, taxes and charges,
market creation, e.g., tradable permits), community
based measures, regulatory measures, and advisory
and institutional measures (research and development,
technical assistance and environmental labelling).
In OECD countries, the partial shift away fromproduction-linked support has enabled the agricultural
sector to be more responsive to markets, thus improving
growth. Importantly, some support measures havebeen linked to specific environmental objectives,
research and development, information, and technicalassistance, food inspection services, biodiversity, floodand drought control, and sinks for greenhouse gases
and carbon storage. There is a need to strengthen theserecent trends in developed countries and replicate themin those developing countries that offer farm subsidies
in order to target these funds to specific objectives for
greater and sustainable economic and environmental
performance (OECD 2010).
Payment for Ecosystem Service (PES) can further
incentivise efforts to green the agriculture sector. This is
an approach that verifies values and rewards the benefitsof ecosystem services provided by green agricultural
practices (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005;
Brockhaus 2009). A key objective of PES schemes is togenerate stable revenue flows that help compensate
farmers for their efforts and opportunity costs incurred in
21. The paper is available at http://www.sustainweb.org/pdf2/org-238.pdf.

66

reducing environmental pollution and other externality
costs that adversely impact the shared commons of
the local, national and global environment. Such PES
arrangements should be structured so that small-scale
farmers and communities, not just large landowners, areable to benefit. Innovative PES measures could include
reforestation payments made by cities to upstream
communities in rural areas of shared watersheds for
improved quantities and quality of fresh water formunicipal users. Ecoservice payments by farmers to
upstream forest stewards for properly managing the flowof soil nutrients, and methods to monetise the carbon
sequestration and emission reduction credit benefitsof green agriculture practices in order to compensate
farmers for their efforts to restore and build SOM andemploy other practices described in this chapter areimportant elements of PES programmes that have been
implemented to date (Pagiola 2008; Ravnborg et al. 2007).

4.4 Capacity building andawareness-raising
The availability and qualitative capabilities of rurallabour are critical resources needed for implementing
green agriculture practices. Green agricultural practices
emphasise crop and livestock diversification; local
production of natural fertiliser and other more labourintensive farm operations. The seasonal variability ofcrop-specific farming tasks affects temporal labour
surpluses and shortages, which must be managed
throughout the year. Whether rural labour provides anadvantage or a constraint for the adoption of green
agriculture practices is highly contextual with specificregional and national conditions. The relative age
and gender distribution of rural populations, theirhealth, literacy and family stability, gender equity withrespect to access to training and financial services, andother factors will determine the degree to which rural
farming communities respond to public and private
encouragement of their adoption of green agriculture(Foresight 2011).
Supply chains, extension services and NGOs
Green farming practices in developing countries must
be promoted and supported by information outreachand training programmes that are delivered to farmers
and their supply-chain partners. These enhanced andexpanded training programmes should build uponestablished agriculture extension service programmes
in those countries where they are now functioning.
However, in order to effectively use existing agriculture
extension services, it should be recognised thatsome extension services over the past 50 years havefailed due to a pervasive attitude that small farmers
need to be “taught”. The green agriculture paradigm
requires participatory learning in which farmers andAgriculture
professionals in agro-ecological sciences work together
to determine how to best integrate traditional practices
and new agro-ecological scientific discoveries. Efforts
should also be made to partner with NGOs that support
farmers, field schools, demonstration farms and othersuch initiatives. It is also important to support small
and medium business enterprises that are involved insupplying agriculture inputs; particularly those firmsthat offer green agriculture products and services suchas organic certification auditing and reporting.
Integrating information and communications
technologies with knowledge extension
Support is needed to improve farmers’ access to market
information including through IT in order to enhancetheir knowledge of real market prices so that they canbetter negotiate the sale of their crops to distributors
and end customers. There are also opportunities tosupport the construction of meteorological monitoring
telemetry stations that could support national andregional weather forecasting capabilities that would
help farmers determine best times for planting, fertiliser
applications, harvesting and other critical weathersensitive activities. Such networks could help support
the introduction of innovative financial services such as

weather-indexed crop insurance that would help reducerisks associated with adopting new technologies andshifting to green practices and marketing methods.
Better food choices
In an era where global human health is undermined bymalnourishment and obesity, there is an opportunity to
guide and influence people’s food consumption into agreater balance with sustainably produced and more
nutritious foods. Raising awareness about better foodand its availability at affordable prices can reduce andreshape food demand trends. In this regard, there is aneed to invest in public education and marketing thatwould encourage consumers to adopt more sustainabledietary habits (OECD 2008).
Large-scale industrial farming practices, in many cases,
pose enormous public health risks due to the overuseof inputs such as antibiotics, pesticides and synthetic
growth hormones. There are neither policies nor any
labels that transparently display the level of use andresidues of these inputs. Introducing labelling schemesthat can help consumers to make informed choices will
dramatically shift the consumer behaviour towards safeand healthy food.

67

Towards a green economy

5 Conclusions
A transformation of today’s predominant agriculture
paradigms is urgently needed because conventional(industrial) agriculture as practiced in the developed
world has achieved high productivity levels primarily
through high levels of inputs (some of which have limited
known natural reserves), such as chemical fertilisers,
herbicides and pesticides; extensive farm mechanisation;high use of transportation fuels; increased water usethat often exceeds hydrologic recharge rates; and higher
yielding crop varieties resulting in a high ecologicalfootprint. Similarly, traditional (subsistence) agriculture
as practiced in most developing countries, which has
much lower productivity, has often resulted in theexcessive extraction of soil nutrients and conversion offorests to farmland.
The need for improving the environmental performanceof agriculture is underscored by the accelerating
depletion of inexpensive oil and gas reserves; continued
surface mining of soil nutrients; increasing scarcity
of freshwater in many river basins; aggravated waterpollution by poor nutrient management and heavy useof toxic pesticides and herbicides; erosion; expanding
tropical deforestation, and the annual generation ofnearly a third of the planet’s global greenhouse gas
emissions (GHG).
Agriculture that is based on a green economy vision
integrates location-specific organic resource inputs andnatural biological processes to restore and improve soil
fertility; achieve more efficient water use; increase cropand livestock diversity; support integrated pest andweed management and promotes employment andsmallholder and family farms.
Green agriculture could nutritiously feed the global
population up to 2050, if worldwide transition efforts
are immediately initiated and this transition is carefully
managed. This transformation should particularly focus
on improving farm productivity of smallholder andfamily farms in regions where increasing populationand food insecurity conditions are most severe. Rural
job creation would accompany a green agriculture
transition, as organic and other environmentally
sustainable farming often generate more returns on
labour than conventional agriculture. Local input
supply chains and post-harvest processing systems
would also generate new non-farm, value added
enterprises and higher skilled jobs. Higher proportionsof green agricultural input expenses would be
retained within local and regional communities,

68

and the increased use of locally sourced farm inputs
would substitute for many imported agri-chemical
inputs, helping to correct developing countries’ foreign
trade imbalances.
Ecosystem services and natural capital assets would
be improved by reduced soil erosion and chemical
pollution, higher crop and water productivity, anddecreased deforestation. A greener agriculture has
the potential to substantially reduce agricultural GHG
emissions by annually sequestering nearly 6 billion
tonnes of atmospheric CO2. The cumulative effect ofgreen agriculture in the long term will provide theadaptive resilience to climate-change impacts.
Investments are needed to enhance and expand
supply-side capacities, with farmer training, extension
services, and demonstration projects focusing on green
farming practices that are appropriate for specific local
conditions and that support both men and womenfarmers. Investments in setting up and capacity buildingof rural enterprises are also required.
Additional investment opportunities include scaling
up production and diffusing green agricultural inputs(e.g. organic fertilisers, biopesticides, etc.), no-tillage
cultivation equipment, and improved access to higher
yielding and more resilient crop varieties and livestock.
Investments in post-harvest storage handling andprocessing equipment, and improved market accessinfrastructures would be effective in reducing foodlosses and waste.
In addition to production assets, investments are
required to increase public institutional research anddevelopment in organic nutrient recovery, soil fertility
dynamics, water productivity, crop and livestock
diversity, biological and integrated pest management,
and post-harvest loss reduction sciences.
Secure land rights, and good governance, as well as
infrastructure development (e.g. roads, electrification,
the internet, etc.) are critical enabling conditions for
success, especially in the rural sector and particularly
in developing countries. These investments would
have multiple benefits across a wide range of green
economy goals and enable the rapid transition togreener agriculture.
Public policies are needed to provide agriculture
subsidies that would help defray the initial transition costs

Agriculture
associated with the adoption of more environmentallyfriendly agriculture practices. Such incentives could
be funded by corresponding reductions of agriculture
related subsidies that reduce the costs of agricultural
inputs, enabling their excessive use, and promotecommodity crop support practices that focus on shortterm gains rather than sustainable yields.

Public awareness and education initiatives are neededin all countries to address consumer demand for food.
Investments in consumer-oriented programmes that
focus on nutritional health and the environmental andsocial equity implications of dietary behaviours could
encourage local and global demand for sustainably
produced food.

69

Towards a green economy

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iStockphoto/Nico Smit

Fisheries

Investing in natural capitalTowards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Author: Dr Rashid Sumaila, Director,
Fisheries Economics Research Unit, University of British
Columbia, Canada.
Moustapha Kamal Gueye of UNEP managed the chapter,
including the handling of peer reviews, interacting with thecoordinating author on revisions, conducting supplementaryresearch and bringing the chapter to final production.
The lead authors who contributed technical background
papers and other material for this chapter were Andrea M.
Bassi, John P. Ansah and Zhuohua Tan, Millennium Institure,
USA; Andrew J Dyck, University of British Columbia, Canada;
Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, University of Southern Denmark,Denmark; Ling Huang, University of British Columbia, Canada;
Mahamudu Bawumia, Oxford University and formerly Bank of
Ghana, Ghana; Gordon Munro, University of British Columbia,
Canada; Ragnar Arnason, University of Iceland, Iceland; Niels
Vestergaard, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark;Rögnvaldur Hannesson, Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration, Norway; Ratana Chuenpagdee,
Memorial University, Newfoundland, Canada and Coastal andOcean Management Centre, Thailand; Tony Charles, Saint Mary’s
University, Canada; and William Cheung, University of East Anglia,
United Kingdom.
The chapter benefited from additional contributions from
Andres Cisneros-Montemayor, University of British Columbia,
Canada; Ana Lucía Iturriza, ILO; Vicky Lam, University of British

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.201178

Columbia, Canada; Daniel Pauly, UBC Fisheries Centre; Wilf
Swartz, University of British Columbia, Canada; Lydia Teh,
University of British Columbia, Canada; David Schorr, World
Wide Fund For Nature; Reg Watson, UBC Fisheries Centre; andDirk Zeller, University of British Columbia, Canada.
We would to thank fisheries experts and practitioners who peer
reviewed and provided substantive comments and suggestions
on the draft chapter: Åsmund Bjordal, Institute of Marine
Research, Norway; Elisa Guillermina Calvo, Department of Fishery
Economics, Ministry of Agriculture of Argentina, Argentina; John
M. Conrad, Cornell University, USA; Ray Hilborn, University ofWashington, USA; Cornelia E. Nauen, European Commission,
DG Research; Jake Rice, Department of Fisheries and Oceans,
Canada; and Andrew A. Rosenberg, Conservation International.
The following colleagues provided valuable substantive review
and comments: Rolf Willmann, United Nations Food andAgriculture Organization; Brand Wagner, International Labour
Organization; Marceil Yeater, Secretariat of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna andFlora (CITES); Anja von Moltke, UNEP; Joseph Alcamo, UNEP;Charles Arden-Clarke, UNEP; Elizabeth Khaka, UNEP; James
Lomax, UNEP; and Robert Wabunoha, UNEP.
We are particularly grateful to Jacqueline Alder, Head, Marine andCoastal Environment Branch, UNEP Division of Environmental
Policy Implementation, for guidance, substantive review andsupport throughout the project.

Fisheries

Contents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84

1.1
1.2

Objectives and organisation of the chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Review of the status of global fisheries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

2

Challenges and opportunities in global fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87

2.1
2.2

Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Opportunities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

3

The economic case for greening fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5

The contribution of fisheries to economic activity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The potential contribution from rebuilding and sustaining fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The cost of greening global fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Cost-benefit analysis of greening fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Managing fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

4

Enabling conditions: Institutions, planning, policy and regulatory reform andfinancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6

Building effective national, regional and international institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Regulatory reform  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
The economics of fishery management tools  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Managing the transition process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Learning from successful international experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Financing fisheries reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

5Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

79

Towards a green economy

List of figures
Figure 1: Landings and landed value of global marine fisheries: 1950-2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Figure 2: Spatial distribution of marine capture fisheries landed value by decade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Figure 3: Status of fish stock exploitation: 1950-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

List of tables
Table 1: Top ten marine fishing countries/entities by fleet capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table 2: Global fisheries subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Table 3: Ecosystem-based marine recreational activities in 2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Table 4: World marine capture fisheries output by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Table 5: Green fisheries: key figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

List of boxes
Box 1: Inland capture fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Box 2: Subsidies and small-scale fisheries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Box 3: Small-scale fishing in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Box 4: How improvement in fishing gear can contribute to green fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Box 5: Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and the greening of fisheries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Box 6: Updating international law on shared fish stocks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

80

Fisheries

List of acronyms
BAU
CBD
CTQ
EC
EEZ
EFR
FAO
GEF
GFF
ITQ
IUU
MCS
MEY
MPA
MRA
MSY
NRC
OECD
PPP
RFMO
SCFO
SSF
T21
TAC
TURFs
UN
UNCLOSUNEP
WTOBusiness-as-usual
Convention on Biological Diversity
Community Transferable Quota
European Commission
Exclusive Economic Zone
Environmental Fiscal Reform
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Global Environment Facility
Global Fisheries Fund
Individual Transferable Quota
Illegal, unreported and unregulated
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
Maximum economic yield
Marine Protected Area
Marine recreational activity
Maximum sustainable yield
National Research Council
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Public-private partnership
Regional Fisheries Management Organization
Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans
Small-scale fisheries
Threshold 21 model
Total allowable catch
Territorial rights in fisheries
United Nations
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
United Nations Environment Programme
World Trade Organization81

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. The world’s marine fisheries are socially and economically vital, providing animal protein
and supporting food security to over 1 billion people. An estimated half of these people live inclose proximity to coral reefs, relying on them not just for fish, but also for livelihoods – from small-scale
fishing to tourism. Currently, the world’s fisheries deliver annual profits of about US$ 8 billion to fishingenterprises worldwide and support 170 million jobs, directly and indirectly, providing some US$ 35
billion in household income a year. When the total direct, indirect and induced economic effects arisingfrom marine fish populations in the world economy are accounted for, the contribution of the sector to
global economic output amounts to some US$ 235 billion per year.

2. Global marine fisheries are currently underperforming in both economic and social terms.
Society at large receives negative US$ 26 billion a year from fishing, when the total cost of fishing (US$90 billion) and non-fuel subsidies (US$ 21 billion) are deducted from the total revenues of US$ 85 billion
that fishing generates. This negative US$ 26 billion corresponds roughly to the estimated US$ 27 billion
in subsidies a year (including US$ 21 billion in non-fuel subsidies), the latter of which contributes directly
to over-fishing and depletion of fish stocks.

3. Investing to achieve sustainable levels of fishing will secure a vital stream of income in thelong run. Greening the sector requires reorienting public spending to strengthen fisheries management,
and finance a reduction of excess capacity through de-commissioning vessels and equitably relocating
employment in the short-term. Thus, measures to green the sector will contribute to replenishing overfishedand depleted fish stocks. A single investment of US$ 100-300 billion would reduce excessive capacity. In
addition, it should result in an increase in fisheries catch from the current 80 million tonnes a year to 90 million
tonnes in 2050, despite a drop in the next decade as fish stocks recover. The present value of benefits fromgreening the fishing sector is about 3 to 5 times the necessary additional costs. In a scenario of larger and82

Fisheries

deeper spending of 0.1 to 0.16 per cent of GDP over the period 2010-2050, to reduce the vessel fleet, relocate
employment and better manage stocks to increase catch in the medium and longer term, 27 to 59 per centhigher employment would be achieved, relative to the baseline by 2050. In this same scenario, around 70
per cent of the amount of fish resources in 1970 would be available by 2050 (between 50 million tonnes and
90 million tonnes per year), against a mere 30 per cent under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, where no
additional stock management activities are assumed.

4. Greening the fisheries sector would increase resource rent from global fisheries
dramatically. Results outlined in this chapter indicate that greening world fisheries could increase
resource rents from negative US$ 26 to positive US$ 45 billion a year. In such a scenario, the total value
added to the global economy from fishing is estimated at US$ 67 billion a year. Even without accounting
for the potential boost to recreational fisheries, multiplier and non-market values that are likely to berealised, the potential benefits of greening fisheries are at least four times the cost of required investment.

5. A number of management tools and funding sources are available that can be used tomove the world’s fisheries sector from its current underperforming state to a green sector
that delivers higher benefits. Aside from removing environmentally harmfully subsidies, a range ofadditional policy and regulatory measures can be adopted to restore the global potential of fisheries.
Economic studies generally demonstrate that marine protected areas (MPA), for example, can be beneficial
under specific conditions as an investment in the reproductive capacity of fish stocks. Currently, MPAs
comprise less than 1 per cent of the world’s oceans. To fully utilise MPAs as a management tool, the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development set a target to establish a global network of MPAs covering
10-30 per cent of marine habitats by 2012. This deadline was extended to 2020 and the target loweredto 10 per cent at the CBD meeting in Nagoya, Japan in late 2010.

83

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
1.1 Objectives and organisationof the chapter
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the current
economic and social value of marine fisheries to theworld and, more importantly, estimate the sector’s fullpotential economic and social value if it were managed
within the framework of a green economy. Setting theconditions that will be needed to shift marine fisheries
to a more sustainable future is crucial, and the chapter
explores how best to provide appropriate incentives,
engender reforms and channel investment.
Specific objectives of the chapter are to:■■ Gain a better understanding of the contribution andimpact of marine fisheries to the global economy;■■ Demonstrate the potential benefits of sustainably
managing the world’s fisheries to national and regional
economies and to the global economy;■■ Estimate the financial requirements for investing infisheries conservation and sustainable use, comparing
these to long-term economic, social and environmental
gains; andFish are one of the planet’s most important renewable
resources. Beyond their crucial role in marine andfreshwater ecosystems, fish make a vital contribution
to the survival and health of a significant portionof the world’s population. Marine fisheries provide
nutrition and livelihoods for millions of people incoastal communities, notably in South and South-East
Asia, West Africa and Pacific Island states. As coastal
populations continue to grow, the future benefits
these resources can provide will depend on how well
fisheries can be greened. We present an estimate of thecurrent economic and social contributions from marine
fish populations, and what they could amount to if thesector were greened. We also state the institutional
conditions under which we can increase economic
benefits while conserving these vital renewable ocean
resources for the benefit of all.

The fisheries sector consists of three main parts: 1)
marine capture; 2) inland capture; and 3) aquaculture.
This contribution focuses on marine fisheries. Inland
fisheries and aquaculture are discussed with respect to
how they relate to marine-capture fisheries.

Often, fisheries managers and policy-makers are underpressure to sacrifice the long-term health of marine fish
resources in favour of perceived short-term economic
benefits to the fishing industry and consumers. Gaining
a better understanding of the potential contribution
and impact of marine fish populations on the global
economy will provide broader, longer-term, economic
and social perspectives. Our goal is to show policymakers that a green economic approach will chart thecourse to balancing increasing demands for fish with thelimits to the capacity of oceanic and coastal fish stocks.

The prospects for greening the world’s marine fisheries
are explored in this chapter. For fisheries, we interpretgreening as: 1) recognizing that there are limits towhat the oceans can provide; 2) acknowledging thatrebuilding overfished and depleted fish populations isneeded to maximise sustainable yield, through time,
for the benefits of both current and future generations;3) essential habitats for living marine animals need
to be protected and preserved; and 4) fishing andother activities involving ocean fish populations areorganised to minimise the release of greenhousegases. We will emphasise point 2) in this reportbecause there is general consensus that many of theworld’s capture fisheries are in crisis. Overexploitation,

We present the current status of global fisheries in
the next section with an emphasis on catch and catchvalues, employment and the contribution of marine
and coastal recreation and tourism to the global
economy. The challenges and opportunities associatedwith establishing green fisheries are discussed in
Section ‎2. In Section ‎3, we focus on scenarios of fleet
adjustment, and estimate the potential costs andbenefits of rebuilding depleted fisheries. Section ‎4
explores some of the conditions and the institutions,both national and international, that will be required
to bring about the greening of the world’s fisheries. We
devote Section ‎4.6 to the discussion of how to financethe transformation.

■■ Demonstrate that the long-term economic benefit
of investing in rebuilding fisheries and improving their
management outweighs the short-term costs.

84

pollution and rising temperatures threaten 63 percent of the world’s assessed fisheries stocks (Wormet al. 2009). However, several fisheries are reasonably
well managed, which provide important lessons forour effort to shift the world’s fisheries to a greener,
more sustainable state.

90

100

80

90

Landed value

80

70

70

60

Landings

50

60
50

40
40
30

30

20

20

10

10

0

1950

Landed values (real 2005 US$ billion)

Marine fisheries landings (million tonnes)

Fisheries

0

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Figure 1: Landings and landed value of global marine fisheries: 1950-2005
Source: Based on Sumaila et al. (2007) and Watson et al. (2004)

1.2 Review of the status of global fisheries
The total catch from the world’s marine capture fisheries1
rose from 16.7 million tonnes in 1950 to 80.2 million tonnes
in 2005. It reached a peak of 85.3 million tonnes in 1994
(Figure 1). For these 56 years, fish comprised about 86 percent of the total landings, with crustaceans and molluscs
accounting for 6 per cent, and 8 per cent respectively. The

total landed value (gross output value) of the world’s
marine capture fisheries was about US$ 20 billion2 in 1950.
It increased steadily to about US$ 100 billion in the late1970s and remained at that level throughout the 1980s
despite further increases in the total landings (FAO 2005; Sea
Around Us project3; Sumaila et al. 2007; Watson et al. 2004).

2. All values are expressed in real 2005 US$.
1. Excluding catch of marine mammals, reptiles, aquatic plants and algae.

3. The Sea Around Us project, compiles a global fishery database based on
FAO reports and many other data sources (Pauly 2007).

Box 1: Inland capture fisheries
Around the world, inland fisheries are an increasingly
important factor for communities because ofincreasing consumption per capita and the inabilityof people to purchase other animal protein. In a
recent State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture report,
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
estimates that inland fisheries generate 10 million
tonnes in landings annually; this amounts to about
11 per cent of the total capture fisheries catch fromboth inland and marine sources (FAO 2009). SouthEast Asia’s Mekong river system, which is home tomore than 850 freshwater species including many
economically important species of catfish and carp,
is estimated to provide fisheries landings worth
around US$ 2 billion per year (Barlow 2008).

than 500 species of freshwater fish. Of these, Nileperch, tilapia and dagaa (a small sardine-like fish)
are highly sought-after in commercial fisheries, withlandings totalling more than 1 million tonnes per
year and a landed-value of US$ 350-400 million.4
Unfortunately, estimates of inland capture landings
and value must be viewed with a high degree of
uncertainty, owing to a lack of consistent datacollection in many countries.

Lake Victoria in Africa’s rift valley, the world’s
second-largest inland body of water, contains more

4. Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization, Available at:

For this reason, it is inherently difficult to include
inland capture fisheries into global analysis of thefisheries sector. Nevertheless, many concepts frommarine capture fisheries such as over-capacity andsubsidisation are also applicable to inland fisheries.

http://www.lvfo.org

85

Towards a green economy

Fishing Effort (million kW sea days)

Landings (million t)2

Landed value (2005 real US$ billion)*

Russia

432

3

3.2

Japan

398

4

14.4

China

301

10

15.2

Taiwan

261

1

2.7

USA

225

4.8

4.2

Spain

147

0.9

1.3

Korea Republic

138

1.6

2.5

France

116

0.6

1

New Zealand

115

0.5

1.1

Italy

100

0.3

1

* Total world landings were 80.2 million tonnes in 2005 with an estimated landed value of US$ 94.8 billion.

Table 1: Top ten marine fishing countries/entities by fleet capacity
Source: Based on Sumaila et al. (2007), Watson et al. (2004) and Anticamara et al. (2010)

Since the late 1980s, landed values have declined, fallingfrom around US$ 100 billion to almost US$ 90 billion in2005 (Figure 1). The decline in the landed value throughthe early 1990s corresponds to the increase in landingsof low-valued Peruvian anchoveta, which accounted
for over 10 per cent of the total landings from 1993
to 1996 and reached 15 per cent in 1994 (Sumaila etal. 2007; Watson et al. 2004). The top ten countries/
political entities by fleet capacity are reported in Table
1. The fleet capacity indices in Table 1 are relative to86

the estimated capacity for Spain. Hence, Russia, sittingat the top of the table is estimated to have nearly
three times the fishing capacity of Spain, while the US
has 30 per cent more capacity. The top ten countries/
political entities captured about a third of the global
annual catch in 2005, with an estimated landed valueof nearly 50 per cent of the global total. This implies
that for the world to succeed in greening the fishingsector, the ten countries listed in Table 1 will have to becommitted participants.

Fisheries

2 Challenges and opportunities
in global fisheries
2.1 Challenges
Overfishing
In the early 1970s, fishing activity expanded, particularly
in Asia, but also along the Chilean coast, where large
quantities of anchoveta were taken, and along the coast ofWest Africa. By 2005, there was a contraction of high-value
areas. However, there has been a considerable expansionof fisheries into the high seas, most notably in the North
Atlantic and South Pacific. The maps in Figure 2 represent
the annual landed values of the world’s fisheries bydecade from 1950 to 2005. In all six maps, concentrations
in catch value can be seen in the productive coastal areasof Europe and Asia, as well as areas characterised by thesignificant upwelling of nutrient-rich water, such as thewestern coast of South America.
The spatial expansion of marine fisheries around theworld partially masks the extent to which fisheries havebeen overfished (Swartz et al. 2010). In fact, the FAO
believes that only about 25 per cent of the commercial
stocks, mostly of low-priced species, are currently
underexploited, 52 per cent are fully exploited with nofurther room for expansion, 19 per cent overexploitedand 8 per cent depleted (FAO 2009). Studies haveestimated that by 2003, some 29 per cent of theworld’s marine fisheries had collapsed in the sense that
their current catch level was less than one-tenth ofthe maximum registered catch (Worm 2006). In thebusiness-as-usual (BAU) scenario, as presented in the
Modelling chapter, half the amount of fish available in1970 would be available by 2015 and only one-third in
2050. Practices such as "fishing down marine food web",where species are targeted and fished to depletion fromlargest to smallest species, can bring about significant
changes to the balance of species in the ecosystem(Pauly et al. 1998; Hannesson 2002).
The collapse of cod stocks off Newfoundland in 1992
devastated local communities and the economic
aftershock is still being felt far beyond Canada’s Atlantic
coast. Some 40,000 people lost their jobs, fishing towns
shrank in population by up to 20 per cent and theCanadian taxpayer spent billions of dollars dealing withthe aftermath of the collapse (Mason 2002; Rice et al.
2003; SCFO 2005). Despite a moratorium on fishing codsince 1992, the stock has failed to rebuild to pre-crashlevels (Charles et al. 2009).

Halting the fishing of vulnerable, overexploited species
and establishing conditions so that stocks can recoverare clearly major challenges that have to be achieved
despite demand for fish. Explaining the scale of the issue
is a challenge in developed and developing countries
and catalysing policy reform is particularly difficult
when there are legitimate fears that fish stocks might
not recover even if complete bans on fishing in certain
areas are enforced.
Subsidies
Fisheries subsidies are defined here as financial transfers,
direct or indirect, from public entities to the fishingsector, which help the sector make more profit than it
would otherwise (Milazzo 1998). Such transfers are often
designed to either reduce the costs of fishing or increase
revenues. In addition, they may also include indirect
payments that benefit fishers, such as management anddecommissioning programmes. Subsidies have gained
worldwide attention because of their complex role intrade, ecological sustainability and socio-economic
development (UNEP 2003; UNEP 2004; 2005; 2011).
It is widely acknowledged that global fisheries areover-capitalised, resulting in the depletion of fisheryresources (Hatcher and Robinson 1999; Munro andSumaila 2002). There are many reasons for the declineof fishery resources, but the contribution of subsidies
to the expansion of capacity and overfishing cannot
be over-emphasised (Milazzo 1998; WWF 2001). Global
fisheries subsidies have been estimated at US$ 27bn in2003 (Sumaila et al. 2010). Regional estimates of about
US$ 12 billion have been provided for the Asia Pacific
Rim (APEC 2000) and around US$ 2.5 billion for the North
Atlantic (Munro and Sumaila 2002).
Khan et al. (2006), classified subsidies into three
categories labelled “good”, “bad” and “ugly” according
to their potential impact on the sustainability of
the fishery resource. Good subsidies enhance theconservation of fish stocks through time (for example
subsidies that fund effective fisheries management
or marine protected areas). Bad subsidies are thosethat lead to overcapacity and overexploitation, suchas fuel subsidies. Ugly subsidies can lead to either theconservation or overfishing of a given fish stock, such as
buyback subsidies, which, if not properly designed, canlead to overcapacity (Clark et al. 2005).

87

Towards a green economy

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

Low

High

Figure 2: Spatial distribution of marine capture fisheries landed value by decade
Source: Sumaila et al. (2007)

The challenge is that once subsidies are provided they
become entitlements, which makes them politicallydifficult to remove. Only concerted action by groups suchas civil society organisations, international bodies andgovernments can bring about the removal of such subsidies.
Also, one strategy that may help is to keep the amountof the subsidy within the fishing community but divert itfrom increasing overfishing to enhancing fish stocks. Thiscan be achieved by converting bad subsidies into good
ones, using bad subsidies to fund transition programmes
to help fishers move to greener fishing approaches andother non-fishing activities to support their livelihoods.
Small-scale fisheries
A key issue along any coast is that of the local small-scale
fisheries (SSF), which often provide crucial food supplies,
sustain regional economies and support the socialand cultural values of the areas, but are threatened aspressures on coastal areas are growing. This poses what
is undoubtedly a major socioeconomic challenge: how
to balance current and future needs for fishery resources.

88

There are many definitions of small-scale but such
fisheries are usually characterised by being relatively
more labour-intensive and less capital-intensive,
more tied to coastal communities and less mobile(Berkes et al. 2001; Charles 2001; Pauly 2006). Other
terms sometimes used for these fisheries are artisanal(versus industrial), coastal or inshore.
While all fisheries face a range of challenges, for SSF
many of the challenges are related to factors that are
external to the fisheries per se but within the broadersocial-ecological system (McConney and Charles 2009).
These include (1) negative impacts of industrial andforeign fleets, depleting coastal fish stocks, and in somecases destroying coastal fishing gear; (2) degradationof coastal environments and fish habitat, throughland-based sources of marine pollution, developmentof urban areas, shrimp farming, tourism, mangrove
extraction, etc., leading in each case to reduced fishstocks; (3) infrastructure challenges, such as limitations
on transportation of fish products; and (4) global forces,Fisheries

Stock Exploitation
Stock (%)

Stock = (Family, Genus, Species) by FAO areas, max annual catch >= 1,000t and year count >=5100

Crashed80

Over exploited60

Fully exploited
40

Developing

20

0

Underdeveloped

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

Figure 3: Status of fish stock exploitation: 1950-2000
Source: Froese and Pauly (2003)

such as climate change and globalisation of fish markets,that can negatively affect the small-scale fisheries. In
addition, over-fishing by SSF contributes to the problem
in many cases. It is important to recognise that given
the above external factors, solving the sustainability
challenge for SSF requires coordinated, multi-faceted
approaches that aim to improve fishery governanceat a local level – so that coastal fishers are involved indeveloping, and thereby support fishery management
measures – while simultaneously dealing with otherfleets, and market and infrastructure issues to improve
coastal environmental quality. An integrated approachis thus unavoidable.
Certain realities of SSF pose challenges but also
provide opportunities:■■ Small-scale fisheries are relatively immobile and areclosely tied to coastal communities. This implies thatfishers may have few other livelihood opportunities andmay have high dependence on the fishery resources.
Such a situation can lead, at times, to over-fishing, butalternatively this can lead to stewardship over local fishstocks that are so important to the community. The key
is to discourage the former and encourage the latter;■■ Small-scale fisheries benefit a very large number ofpeople, and the recognition of this reality can make it
difficult to reduce fishing effort when that is needed toensure ecological sustainability. On the other hand, thelabour-intensive nature of SSF also means that there isless sunk capital – the capitalisation, and consequentdebt payments, that seriously limit flexibility in industrial
fisheries. Furthermore, small-scale fisher organisations canbe drawn upon to play a constructive role in policy actions(Salas et al. 2007). It should be noted that the high levelsof employment provided by SSF may well help to limit
resource exploitation elsewhere in coastal areas. Again,
an integrated systems analysis is required to properly
recognise these interactions (Garcia and Charles 2007); and■■ Many small-scale fishing fleets are capable of depletingfish stocks and damaging aquatic ecosystems. There isthus a direct challenge both to the aquatic ecosystemand to economic sustainability. Moving to sustainable
paths for the future implies improving the ecologicalsustainability of SSF. At the same time, SSF also provide
an opportunity for environmental improvement, onethat arises in comparing such fisheries with the majoralternative, namely, fuel-intensive industrial fishing.
Industrial fisheries are not only a threat to coastal smallboat fishers, as discussed above, but also contribute most
Type

World total (US$ billion)

Good

7.9

Bad

16.2

Ugly

3.0

Total

27.1

Table 2: Global fisheries subsidies
Source: Sumaila et al. (2010)89

Towards a green economy
significantly to the negative climate externalities imposedby fisheries (due to their fuel-intensive nature) and to
excessive high-seas resource exploitation. Furthermore,they receive the bulk of fishery subsidies globally. Given
the above, there is an opportunity to move to a moresustainable model for the future, through an approach as
in Indonesia, in which coastal waters are reserved for SSF.
In this approach, industrial fleets are used only to catch
fish that are beyond the reach of the SSF, and then only
if such fishing is profitable from a full-cost accounting
perspective (i.e., including the negative externalities
resulting from such activity).
Greening aquaculture
According to FAO (2009), aquaculture supplies around 50
per cent of the world’s seafood. However, a close look at
the total world fish supply from aquaculture reveals two
disturbing issues. Firstly, as the supply from aquaculture
increases, the supply from capture fisheries decreases. In
fact, there is an almost one to one change in opposite
directions. This means that aquaculture is not adding to
the world supply of fish; rather it is displacing wild fish
supplies. Secondly, aquatic plants account for about 23
per cent of the reported increase in aquaculture supply.
Even in Japan, where aquatic plants are commonly
eaten, these plants do not replace the need for real fish;
they are used mainly as supplements. Deducting the23 per cent of aquaculture supply that is aquatic plants
reveals that the total supply of real fish from both thewild and farms is declining.
There are many challenges to aquaculture as a source ofanimal protein in a green economy. Many farms still rely

on wild caught fish as feedmeal and oil. The potential for
disease from fish farms impacting wild populations is
also an issue. Finally, there is the potential that fish farms
can pollute the environment because of the waste they
produce. Given these challenges, it is clear that current
aquaculture practices need to be modified to make fish
farming green.
The sector needs to 1) be organised to ensure minimal
environmental degradation (Naylor et al. 1998); 2) stop
the farming of carnivorous fish such as salmon, bluefin
tuna and seabass until non-wild fish sources of fishmeal are developed; 3) adopt integrated technologies
that would make fish farming as self-contained as
possible; and 4) develop reliable management systems
for green aquaculture practices.
Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions infisheries
Climate change has begun to alter marine conditions,particularly water temperature, ocean currents,
upwelling and biogeochemistry, leading to
productivity shocks for fisheries (Diaz and Rosenberg2008). Shifts in species distribution that appear to
be caused by changes in sea temperature are well
documented (Cheung et al. 2009; Dulvy et al. 2008;
Perry et al. 2005), as are variations in growth rates(Thresher et al. 2007). Climate change may also
alter the phonology of marine organisms, creating
mismatches between the availability of prey andpredator requirements and leading to coral bleaching
and habitat loss for reef-associated fish species. Thesechanges would affect the distribution and volume ofBox 2: Subsidies and small-scale fisheries
Moves to shift to a green economy can provide
opportunities to invest in SSF in a manner thatenhances sustainability of the resource base as wellas the coastal economy and society. The key lies inusing the investments to build institutional strengthand suitable incentives at a local scale. Measures suchas subsidies and investment strategies can be used
as incentives to change human behaviour positively,
supporting long-term objectives in moving thefishery toward sustainability, without serious
negative impacts. For example, this could involve
providing funds to encourage certain actions such as
conversion of fishing gear to less damaging choices,or a shift from fuel-intensive to more labour-intensive
fishing methods.
In the context of SSF, this implies a careful examinationof which subsidies are truly sustainable, equitable

90

and moving in the direction of conservation. For
example, a fuel subsidy is common in fisheries,
but this tends to promote more fuel-intensive andcapital-intensive fleets, which leads not only to overfishing, but also to inequitable expansion of catching
power for some (those who can take advantage of thesubsidy) at the expense of others (with less capital).
On the other hand, a subsidy that is used to provide
more secure livelihoods for coastal fishers, and onethat leads to a shift of SSF, where necessary, to more
ecologically suitable methods, may be very helpful.
The subsidy issue also relates to the balance of smallscale and industrial fishing. Past subsidies on vessel
construction and on fuel led to a favouring of industrial
fleets that are too capital- and fuel-intensive. A better
policy would be to orient subsidies as incentives tobalance industrial and small-scale fisheries, thereby
generating both human and ecological benefits.

Fisheries
catch worldwide, thereby affecting global fisheriessocially and economically (Cheung et al. 2010). For
instance, recent studies estimate that climate change
may lead to significant losses in revenues, profits
and/or household incomes, although estimates are
considered preliminary (Cooley and Doney 2009; Eide,
2007; Sumaila and Cheung 2010; Tseng and Chen 2008).
It is estimated that the world’s fishing fleet contributes
1.2 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions(Tyedmers et al. 2005). The challenge is to find ways
to reduce this contribution, such as by phasing out
subsidised trawler fleets, which generate extremely
high emissions per tonne of fish landed.

2.2 Opportunities
Greening the world’s fisheries will help restore damaged
marine ecosystems. When managed intelligently,
fisheries will sustain a greater number of communities
and enterprises, generating employment and raisinghousehold income, particularly for those engaged inartisanal fishing.
Jobs supported by global fisheries
The world’s fisheries provide livelihoods to millions ofpeople in coastal regions and contribute significantly tonational economies. They are relied upon as a safety net
by some of the world’s poorest, providing cash income
and nutrition, especially during times of financial hardship.
Healthy fisheries support the wellbeing of nations, throughdirect employment in fishing, processing, and ancillary
services, as well as through subsistence-based activities.
Overall, fish provides more than 2.9 billion people with atleast 15 per cent of their average per capita animal protein
intake (FAO 2009). The impact of the collapse of fisheries

would be devastating. Some 144 of the world’s countries
possess marine fisheries, which provide jobs for local andforeign workers alike. It is estimated that in 2006, about 35
million people around the world were directly involved,
either part time or full time, in fisheries primary production.
When considering post-catch activities and workers’
dependants, the number of people directly or indirectly
supported by marine fisheries is about 520 million ornearly 8 per cent of the world’s population (FAO 2009).
There has been a steady increase in fisheries employment
in most low-and middle-income countries, while in mostindustrialised countries, the trend has been towards adecrease in the number of people employed in capture
fisheries. For example, since 1970, the number of fishers
has fallen by 61 per cent and 42 per cent in Japan and
Norway, respectively (FAO 2009).
Recreation and tourism
Marine recreational activities (MRAs) such asrecreational fishing, whale watching and diving havegrown in popularity in recent years and they haveconsequently come to the forefront of discussion
and research on the ecological, economic and social
impacts of more benign forms of interacting with thesea (Aas 2008; Hoyt 2001; Pitcher and Hollingworth2002).
To estimate the value of MRAs, Cisneros-Montemayor
and Sumaila (2010) first identified three indicators ofsocio-economic value in ecosystem-based marine
recreational activities, which are 1) the level ofparticipation; 2) the total employment in the sector;
and 3) the sum of direct expenditure by users. A
database of reported expenditure on MRAs wasthen compiled for 144 coastal countries. Using thisBox 3: Small-scale fishing in Indonesia
Located at the north-eastern tip of Bali, Indonesia, isthe fishing community of Les. Around 7,000 people
live there, of whom some 1,500 make their livingfrom fishing in coastal waters that have traditionallybeen rich in coral, fish and other marine organisms.
Fishing for the aquarium trade has become one of
the main sources of livelihood, with 75 households
in the village now fully engaged in catchingornamental fish (UNEP 2006). Fishers in Les andneighbouring communities are switching frompelagic to ornamental fishing as the pelagic stocks
become depleted in traditional fishing grounds,
but ornamental fish are themselves threatened bydamage to in-shore coral reefs caused by practices

such as cyanide fishing. As a result, villagers arebeing forced to fish for ornamentals further offshore
and for longer periods.
Poison fishing has also led to substantial losses inrevenue - estimated to amount to a net loss of as muchas US$ 476,000 per km2 a year in Indonesia (Cesar 2002).
The authors also estimate that the net loss from thedeterioration of fisheries could be about US$ 40,000 per
km2 a year. Given that Indonesia has the world’s largest
coral reef system, Wicaksono et al. (2001), estimatethat the country could meet 60 per cent of global
demand for ornamentals, compared with just 6 percent currently, if its fisheries are managed effectively.

91

Towards a green economy

Item (units)

Recreational Whalefishing
watching

Divingandsnorkelling

Total

Participation (million)

60

13

50

123

Expenditure (US$ billion)

40

1.6

5.5

47.1

Employment (thousand)

950

18

113

1,081

Table 3: Ecosystem-based marine recreational
activities in 2003
Source: Cisneros-Montemayor and Sumaila (2010)

database, the authors estimated the missing values
and calculated the yearly global value for MRAs interms of expenditure, participation and employment.
They found that currently, recreational fishing occurs
in 118 maritime countries and that country-level dataon expenditure, participation and employment areavailable in 38 of these countries (32 per cent of total).
The authors estimated that in 2003, nearly 60 million
recreational anglers around the world generated a
total of about US$ 40 billion in expenditure, supporting
over 950,000 jobs. In their analysis, countries withdata account for almost 95 per cent of estimated total
expenditure and 87 per cent of participation, so theauthors argue that this estimate likely provided a close
approximation to actual recreational fishing effort
and expenditure.
Data on whale watching were found for a total of 93
territories (70 countries), mostly from 1994-2006 (Hoyt
2001; Hoyt and Iñiguez 2008). It is estimated that over
13 million people worldwide participated in whale
watching in 2003, with expenditure reaching around
US$ 1.6 billion in that year (Cisneros-Montemayor andSumaila 2010). It is also estimated that 18,000 jobs
worldwide are supported by this industry each year.
These numbers are only an indication of the potential
economic contribution that can be expected fromwhale watching, given that the marine mammals
are found in all of the world’s oceans (Kaschner et
al. 2006). Currently only a few countries have wellestablished whale watching industries.
There is limited country-level data on recreational
diving outside of the USA, Australia, and to someextent, Canada and the Caribbean region. Using
market surveys and other data on active divers,
it is estimated that every year, 10 million active
recreational divers (Cesar et al. 2003) and 40 million
snorkelers generate over US$ 5.5 billion globally indirect expenditure, supporting 113,000 jobs. In total,
it is estimated that 121 million MRA participants
generate US$ 47 billion in expenditure annually andsupport over one million jobs (Cisneros-Montemayor
and Sumaila 2010) (Table 3).

92

Marine protected areas
Marine protected areas (MPAs) have been implemented
in many countries and are regarded as a very importantmanagement instrument for fisheries. The assumption
underlying the MPAs is that they can conserve theresources and increase the biomass therein, andconsequently benefit surrounding areas through species
migration and enhanced recruitment. Economic studies
generally demonstrate that MPAs can be beneficial under
specific conditions (Hannesson 1998; Sanchirico andWilen 1999; Sumaila 1998). In addition, the MPA literatureevaluates effectiveness of MPAs (Alder et al. 2002;
Hockey and Branch 1997), Hockey and Branch (1997).
In terms of policy design and implementation, manyquestions need to be addressed, including how to select
MPA sites, how large should an MPA be, and how costly
are MPAs, etc.
Marine Protected Areas will be a valuable management
instrument for the greening of certain fisheries. Thereis growing consensus in the literature on the need to
add MPAs in marine management plans (Costanza etal. 1998; Sumaila et al. 2000). Currently, MPAs compriseless than 1 per cent of the world’s oceans (Wood et al.
2008). To fully utilise MPAs as a management tool, theJohannesburg Plan of Implementation adopted at theWorld Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002
aims to establish a global network of MPAs covering
10-30 per cent of marine habitats by 2012. This deadline
was extended to 2020 and the target lowered to 10 per
cent at the CBD meeting in Nagoya, Japan in late 2010.
Consumer AwarenessIn recent years, we have seen a relative explosion in thenumber of programmes that seek to help consumers
make informed decisions in terms of sustainability about
their consumption of fish products. Although suchprogrammes are not without criticism, it is clear that
consumer awareness of marine fishery issues, if properly
designed and implemented, would be an important driverof greening world fisheries as such awareness programmes
expand into more and more places around the world.
Examples of resources that consumers can use to informtheir purchase of sustainably caught fish include:■■ The Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Seafood Watch,
Available at: (http://www.montereybayaquarium.org/
cr/seafoodwatch.aspx);■■ The Marine Stewardship Council certification
programme, Available at: http://www.msc.org/; and■■ The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s Fish Watch, Available at: http://www.
nmfs.noaa.gov/fishwatch/

Fisheries

3 The economic case forgreening fisheries
3.1 The contribution of fisheries toeconomic activity

3.2 The potential contribution fromrebuilding and sustaining fisheries

Recent estimates of gross revenue from marine capture
fisheries suggest that the sector directly contributes US$
80-85 billion to world output annually (Sumaila et al.
2007; World Bank and FAO 2009). However, this amountis by no means the total contribution from marine fish
populations. As a primary industry (Roy et al. 2009), there
are a vast number of secondary economic activities –from boat building to international transport – that aresupported by world fisheries (Dyck and Sumaila 2010;
Pontecorvo et al. 1980).

As discussed earlier, global ocean fisheries caught anestimated 80 million tonnes of fish with a total value ofabout US$ 85 billion in 2005. The question we address inthis section is: what are the potential gains, if any, fromrebuilding marine fish stocks? We discuss this in termsof the potential increase in current catches, catch value,
profits, resource rent and employment.

The weighted mean cost of fishing was estimated by Lam
et al. (2010) to be US$ 1,125 (range of US$ 732 - US$ 1,605)
per tonne, which works out at about US$ 90 billion for anannual catch of 80 million tonnes. The cost per tonne issplit into the following cost components: 1) fuel cost (US$216); 2) running cost, for e.g., cost of selling fish via auction,
cost of treatment of fish (US$ 162); 3) repair cost (US$ 108);4) payments to labour (US$ 434); 5) depreciation (US$101); and 6) payment to capital (US$ 101).
Although the national contribution of fisheries toeconomic output is officially recorded as ranging
between 0.5 per cent and 2.5 per cent for many
countries (based on the total value of fish when theychange hands for the first time after leaving the boat),the sector supports considerable economic activity by
way of trickle-up linkages (Béné et al. 2007), also referred
to as multipliers. The multiplier effect can be dramaticin coastal communities where small-scale fisheries not
only generate direct revenues, but also represent theeconomic heart of coastal communities and the engineof the broader economy.
Dyck and Sumaila (2010) applied an input-output
analysis to estimate the total direct, indirect and induced
economic effects arising from marine fish populations in
the world economy. Their results suggest there is a great
deal of variation in fishing-output multipliers between
regions and countries. When the output multipliers wereapplied at the global scale, the authors found that thecontribution of the sector to global economic output
amounted to some US$ 235 billion per year (Table 4),
close to three times the conventionally measured exvessel value of marine capture fisheries.

Using data from a recently published paper (Srinivasan
et al. 2010), we assume that world fisheries landings
could increase by 3.6 million tonnes-19.2 million tonnes
per year if currently over-fished species are rebuilt tostock sizes allowing for maximum sustainable yield(MSY). This represents a potential to increase thevalue of landings by US$ 6.4 billion-US$ 36 billion per
year. We nevertheless recognise the limitations of the
MSY approach in global fisheries. However, since theapproach involves rebuilding those fisheries currently
classified as collapsed, we avoid issues involved whenassuming all species can be fished at MSY.
For the further analysis, we make the following
assumptions:■■ The real price (nominal price adjusted for inflation)of fish is constant through time. There is evidence from
historical data that real prices for fish have not changed
much in the last few decades;

Landed value(US$ billion)

Indirect effect(US$ billion)

Africa

2

5

Asia

50

133

Europe12

36

Latin America& Caribbean

7

15North America

829

Oceania517World Total

84

235

Table 4: World marine capture fisheries output
by region
Sources: For landed values see Sumaila et al. (2007) and for multipliers see Dyck andSumaila (2010)93

Towards a green economy
Current fisheries(US$ billion)

Green fisheries(US$ billion)

Value of landings

85

101

Cost of fishing90

46

Non-fuel subsidies

21

10*

Rent**

-26

45

Wages

35

18

Profit8

4

Total added-value

1767* The estimated US$ 10 billion in green subsidies would be to fund management
programmes.
** The rent is the return to owners of fisheries resources, which is the surplus
from gross revenue after total cost of fishing is deducted and subsidies taken into
account. Here, rent is total revenue (US$ 85 billion) less total cost (US$ 90 billion)
less non-fuel subsidies (US$ 21 billion). Note that fuel subsidies are usually in theform of rebates at the pump and therefore are already excluded.

Total value added, or fisheries contribution to humanwelfare, in a green economy scenario is estimatedat US$ 67 billion a year (the sum of resource rent +payments to labour + normal profits). This represents
a green economy improvement of US$ 50 billion peryear compared with the sector’s existing contribution tohuman welfare (Table 5).

■■ As overfished stocks are rebuilt, there would be no
substitution between capital and labour. That is, thevarious costs of fishing would stay in proportion to thecurrent situation;

Indirect benefits from rebuilding
As the value of the global marine catch increases
from about US$ 85 billion to US$ 101 billion a year ina green-economy scenario, the total of direct, indirect
and induced economic effects, arising from marine
fish swells from US$ 235 billion to US$ 280 billion peryear, assuming a linear relationship between catch andmultiplier effects.

■■ The practice of providing harmful subsidies to thefisheries sector is fundamentally at odds with green
fisheries. Therefore, we assume that the estimated US$
16 billion per year in harmful subsidies are eliminatedor re-directed toward aiding the transition to green
fisheries. Similarly, we assume that the US$ 3 billion peryear in ambiguous subsidies, such as those for buybacks,
would also be re-directed or eliminated;

Benefits from recreation and tourism
In general, recreational fishers do not necessarily
fish for the catch but rather for experience. It should
be reasonable to assume that a healthier ocean richin biodiversity is likely to increase the utility andtherefore the benefits derived by recreational fishers.
However, owing to the lack of information, we refrainfrom doing so in this report.

Table 5: Green fisheries: key figures■■ The cost of fisheries management would increaseby 25 per cent, from about US$ 8 billion a year to US$
10 billion a year, to support better management undergreen fishing regimes;■■ Fisheries rent, that is, the return to owners offisheries resources, would be US$ 45 billion per year ina green economy scenario. This is based on evidence
from a recent report showing that potential total rent
in world fisheries is about US$ 50 billion per year at
Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), where the catch isabout 10 per cent lower than our proposed scenario(World Bank and FAO 2009).
Given the above assumptions, global marine fisheries
are projected to catch 90 million tonnes a year ina green economy scenario with lower and upperbounds of 84–100 million tonnes. The estimated value
corresponding to this level of catch is about US$ 101
billion per year (with a range of US$ 91 billion-US$ 121
billion. The total cost of fishing in a green economy
scenario is estimated to be US$ 46 billion, compared
to US$ 90 billion currently. Assuming that payments

94

to capital (normal profit) and labour (wages) remain
proportionally constant in relation to total costs, thenormal profit and wage income would amount to US$
4 billion and US$ 17.8 billion, respectively. Resource
rent for a green fisheries sector is assumed to be US$ 45
billion per year based on recent research (World Bankand FAO 2009).

3.3 The cost of greening global fisheries
A key element of greening the fisheries sector involves
moving from the current situation where we are notfishing the resource in a sustainable manner to one
where the fish we catch each year is equal to or less than
the growth of wild stocks. To make the change from thecurrent state of affairs would require some investment
into adjusting fishing capacity, managing transitions inlabour markets, management programmes and scientificresearch. Two modelling exercises were undertaken
to estimate the cost of greening fisheries. A one time
investment of US$ 100-300 billion was calculated inthis chapter to reduce excessive capacity, retrain fishers
and improve fisheries management. Under the Green
Economy Report T-21 modelling, a scenario of a larger
and deeper spending of 0.1 to 0.16 per cent of GDP overthe period 2010-2050 was considered to reduce thevessel fleet, relocate employment and better manage
stocks to increase catch in the medium and longer term.5
5. See the Modelling chapter in this report.

Fisheries
Identifying greening efforts
There is widespread agreement that the world’s fisheries
are currently operating at overcapacity. Advances intechnology have made it possible for a much smaller
global fleet to catch the maximum sustainable yield, but
the global fishing capacity keeps on growing owing to thecommon property nature of fisheries and the provisionof fishing subsidies by many maritime countries of theworld. Also, the use of sometimes damaging fishingmethods such as bottom-trawling, unselective fishing,pollution and human-induced variations in climate haschanged the productivity of many aquatic environments.
The issue of overcapacity can be addressed byinvestigating some of the common sources of excess
fishing capacity. In several places, fishing is considered
employment of last resort, attracting people withfew other job options. Investing in re-training andeducation programmes for fishers and creating
alternative employment has been successful in
reducing fishing pressure, especially in places that are
known for artisanal fishing.
Fishing capacity can be curtailed by taking steps todecommission fishing vessels or by reducing the numberof permits or licences. Much attention has been given to
decommissioning programmes, which are intended toreduce effort by reducing the number of fishing vessels.
Unfortunately, some research suggests that vessel buyback schemes may actually increase fishing effort if notproperly implemented (Hannesson 2007). This occurs
when loopholes allow decommissioned vessels to findtheir way to other fisheries and increase their catchingcapabilities (Holland et al. 1999). Fishing enterprises may
also act strategically in anticipation of a buy-back by
accumulating more vessels than they would otherwise(Clark et al. 2005).
Many fishing grounds that have been over-exploited
have suffered lasting damage to the sea bed by trawl
nets, affecting the ability of certain species to reproduce(Morgan and Chuenpagdee 2003). In these cases, as wellas in instances where pollution or climate change have
had an impact, mitigating investment in the naturalenvironment is essential if ecosystems are to be broughtback to past levels of health and productivity.
The cost of fishing fleet adjustment
The world’s current fishing capacity is widely estimatedto be 2.5 times more than what is needed to land the
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) (Pauly et al. 2002).
This implies that in order to shift the fishing industry
to MSY levels, we would need to trim excess fishingcapacity. However, the cumulative power of the global
fleet is presently increasing at a rapid rate, notably in
Asia (Anticamara et al. in press).
It is estimated that some 4 million boats6 are actively
engaged in marine fisheries. If we assume that current
fishing capacity is between 1.5 and 2.5 times the levelneeded to maximise sustainable catch, fishing effort
would need to be reduced by between 40 and 60 per
cent. This means that the active fishing fleet may need tobe reduced by up to 2.4 million vessels. This calculation
does not, however, account for differences in fishingcapacity by vessel type. For instance, areas dominated bylarge-scale vessels (i.e., vessels larger than a given size,
which varies from one country to another) may need toreduce fewer vessels than areas with more small-scaleboats because large-scale operations represent greater
fishing effort per unit.
It is estimated that the fishing industry employs morethan 35 million people, which implies that between
15 and 22 million fewer fishers would be required in agreen-fisheries scenario. However, research indicatesthat up to 75 per cent of fishers in Hong Kong would
be willing to leave the fishing industry if suitablecompensation were available (Teh et al. 2008).
Alternative livelihood programmes that have beensuccessful involve activities such as seaweed farming
6. Based on 2002 data and stagnant growth in fleet size as suggested by
FAO trends. Available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/1616/en.

Box 4: How improvement in fishing gear can contribute to green fisheries
The potentially devastating impact of trawling,
especially in terms of damage to the sea bed
and bycatch, is well known (Hall 1996; NRC 1999;
Watling and Norse 1998) and has given rise tolegislation such as the mandatory use of turtleexcluder devices in shrimp trawls and bans oftrawlers in the in-shore waters of many nations. In
California, a shift from trawls to traps in the state’s
spot prawn fishery in 2003 resulted in a significant

reduction of rockfish bycatch (Morgan andChuenpagdee 2003). Recent improvements to thedesign and use of fishing gear to minimise seafloor
contact and to reduce bycatch, such as the use of
the Nordmore grate in shrimp fishery (Richards andHendrickson 2006) have been encouraging, butmore investment is needed to address the impactsof large scale trawling and other high-impact
fishing gear.

95

Towards a green economy
and recreational angling (Sievanen et al. 2005). Clearly,
this is a difficult task for policy-makers to implement.
Nevertheless, there are options:than under scenarios one and three is that the cost ofcompensating, re-training and re-settling small scale
fishers is much higher in those two cases.

Scenario one: An across-the-board fishing capacity cut
Assuming that the current global fishing fleet represents
an average distribution of capacity throughout theworld, we estimate that decommissioning of between
1.4 – 2.4 million vessels would be required. Similarly,
between 15 million and 22 million workers would be
removed from a green fishing industry. Based on vessel
and crew data from the European Union (EC 2006), we
calculate that the average cost of a vessel buyback isroughly equal to the average interest payments ona vessel for five years and the average cost of crew
retraining is estimated as 1.5 years average annual crew
wages. These values are estimated to be US$ 15,000
per vessel buyback and US$ 18,750 per crew retraining,respectively. Based on this information, we estimatethat the total investment needed to reduce fishingcapacity in this scenario to be between US$ 290 billion
and US$ 430 billion worldwide. It should be noted that
this total amount can be spread over time if necessary.

Scenario three: Global fleet capacity distribution
If large and small scale fishing vessels were evenly
distributed around the globe, scenario two would be aneffective strategy to minimise the effect on employment
numbers by decommissioning only the large scale
vessels and affecting a smaller number of workers.
However, many large-scale vessels are concentrated indeveloped countries while small-scale vessels are mostly
found in developing countries. Although the same
green economy result could potentially be achieved bymaking cuts to just large-scale vessels, this would be
ineffective in areas dominated by small-scale fishing thatare currently overfished, such as in India and Senegal.

Scenario two: Accounting for catch capacity
distribution differences
The above scenario assumes that, on average, vessels have
similar catch capacity and impact ecosystems in similar
ways. In fact, the distribution of fishing effort exhibits
a great deal of variation around the globe (Anticamara
et al. in press). Large-scale, high capacity vessels also
tend to use more capital in place of labour so that the
number of workers per weight of landings is lower thansmall scale fleets. For policy-makers concerned about
reducing fishing effort while minimizing the impact onworkers, it is probably prudent to focus on buybacks oflarge-scale fishing vessels.
The catching power of large-scale vessels implies that
160,000 of the world’s 4 million fishing vessels catchthe same amount of fish as the remaining 3.84 million
vessels. Using data on fishing employment in small
and large scale fleets (EC 2006), we calculate that, on
average, large scale vessels employ about 3.6 times as
many workers as small scale vessels. This implies thatlarge scale fleets employ about 5 per cent of the world’s
35 million fishers or 4.6 million workers. Combining
these figures with our assumptions outlined above
implies that cutting 130,000 – 160,000 large-scale
vessels along with 1.4 – 1.7 million jobs supportedby these vessels will achieve roughly the same green
economy results as cutting 15 to 22 million fishingjobs across the board. In this scenario, the total costof adjustment to green fisheries is between US$ 115
and US$ 175 billion since the high cost of worker retraining is minimised. The reason why the cost ofgreening world fisheries under this scenario is lower

96

In this scenario, we explore the possibility of putting threequarters of the responsibility for cutting fishing effort onlarge-scale vessels, with the remaining quarter filled bysmall-scale vessels. In such a case, reducing a combinationof 120,000 large-scale vessels and 960,000 small-scale
vessels would halve the world’s fishing capacity. However,unlike scenario one, the effect on workers in this scenario
is greatly reduced, requiring provisions to deal with 1.3
million large-scale workers and 8.3 million small-scale
fishers. Also, in this scenario, we allow for differences in
the cost of decommissioning and re-training to vary
between large and small-scale vessels. Using data fromLam et al. (2010), we calculate that large and small-scalecrew workers earn average wages of US$ 20,000 and US$
10,000 per year, respectively. Furthermore, we determinethat large and small scale vessels pay an average of US$
11,000 and US$ 2,500 per year in capital costs. This implies
that, following the same assumptions as scenario one,the average cost of decommissioning for large and smallscale vessels is US$ 55,000 and US$ 12,500, respectively.
Likewise, retraining efforts for large and small-scale crew
members are estimated to be between US$ 30,000 and
US$ 15,000 per worker.
By focusing effort reductions on large-scale vessels,
the total cost of adjustment to green world fisheries inthis scenario is much less costly than the first scenario,
requiring a one-time total investment of between US$
190 billion to US$ 280 billion with a mean of US$ 240
billion to decommission vessels and provide for workers
as they transition to other forms of employment. It would
also be necessary to increase management expenditureby 25 per cent to US$ 2 billion on an annual basis.
Given the current distribution of large and small-scale
fishing vessels in the world, both scenarios one andtwo appear to be unrealistic. Therefore, we use thecost estimates in scenario three in the following costbenefit analysis.

Fisheries

3.4 Cost-benefit analysis
of greening fisheries
As presented earlier, greening the fisheries sector would
lead to an increase in value added from fishing, globally,
from US$ 17 billion to US$ 67 billion a year. This is a netincrease of US$ 50 billion a year. Given that the cost ofrestructuring the global fishing fleet under scenario three
is a one-time investment of about US$ 240 billion, benefits
would be realised very quickly if fish stocks recover fast.
Discounting the flow of US$ 50 billion per year over the
next 50 years at 3 per cent and 5 per cent, real discountrates represent a present value from greening ocean
fisheries of US$ 960 and US$ 1,325 billion, which is
between 4 and 5.5 times the mean estimate of the costof greening global fisheries. This signals that there is apotentially a huge green advantage. Although a varietyof assumptions are needed to produce estimates in thissection, it is clear that economic gains from greening
world fisheries are substantial enough to compensate foreven drastic changes in these assumptions.

3.5 Managing fisheries
Effective management is crucial for ensuring a green
marine fisheries sector, although this has so far proved
difficult to achieve. Research suggests that implementing
a form of management known as individual transferable
quotas (ITQs), also known as catch shares, can explain
the improvement and rebuilding of many fish stocks
around the world (Costello et al. 2008; Hannesson 2004).
However, it has also been argued by many authors that
ITQs are no panacea and need to be designed carefully(Clark et al. 2010; Essington 2009; Gibbs 2009; Hilborn
et al. 2005; Pinkerton and Edwards 2009; Townsend
et al. 2006).

Catch shares can be an effective tool in controlling fishingpressure. Because they are underpinned by Total Allowable
Catch (TAC) limits, they can constrain catch to sustainablelevels and, therefore, become valuable management
tools (Arnason 1995). Individual transferable quotas
do not confer full property rights to the ITQ owner, andfurthermore, it is widely acknowledged that even if they
were to provide such rights, there are still conservationand social concerns to worry about (Bromley 2009).
Understanding these limitations to ITQs as a management
regime, where this tool is implemented, must be part ofa broader management system that ensures that theselimitations are addressed appropriately. Measures areneeded to ensure that ITQs work to improve economic
efficiency, while ensuring the sustainable and equitable
use of the fishery resources and the ecosystems that
support them.
Below are some of the strategies that are needed aspart of an ITQ management system if it is to achieve
economically, ecologically and socially desirable
outcomes (Sumaila 2010):■■ Individual transferable quotas must be supported
by an arm’s-length stock assessment unit that is
independent of industry and backed by strong
monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) to
deal with the lack of full property rights, which
can lead to "emptying" the ocean of fish undercertain conditions;■■ Some restrictions on the ownership of ITQs to people
actively engaged in fishing may be needed to mitigate
against diluting ITQ performance when quota owners
are different from those who fish;■■ Measures to ensure resource sustainability by taking
an ecosystem-based management approach including

Box 5: Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and the greeningof fisheries
The FAO identifies Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated(IUU) fishing as one of the major factors driving
overexploitation of marine resources worldwide (FAO
2001). Based on case studies, MRAG (2005) estimatethat the total loss due to IUU fishing is about 19 per centof the total value of the catch. The commonly accepted
economic reason for the persistence of IUU fishing isthat detection rates and fines are too small relative tothe catch value (Griggs and Lugten 2007; Kuperan and
Sutinen (1998). In fact, Sumaila et al. (2006) suggest thatthe reported fines should be increased by at least 24
times to equalise the expected costs and benefits.

To green fisheries and prevent overexploitation, it
is necessary to reduce IUU fishing. The direct way
is to strengthen monitoring and control throughstrict policy enforcement, and the indirect way
is through economic incentives, e.g., increasingfines or decreasing reporting costs. While
reducing IUU fishing within a country using these
direct and indirect ways is important, cooperation
among countries is also very critical, since lotsof IUU fishing occurs in the areas accessed bymultiple countries.
Source: OECD (2004)97

Towards a green economy

special attention to essential habitats, safe minimum
biomass levels, input controls, etc.;

There are several areas of management where increased
investment can be extremely beneficial. These include:■■ Networks of reasonably large marine protected areas
may be needed to accompany the implementation of ITQs
to deal broadly with the ecosystem effects of overfishing,to allow for recovery, and to recognise uncertainty inthe performance of ITQs. Such a network would benefit
greatly by ensuring that it is designed to be compatible
with conservation and ITQ goals and objectives;■■ Stock-assessment programmes;■■ Imposing limits to quota that can be held by eachquota owner, to mitigate social problems associatedwith the concentration of fishing power, although its
effectiveness is very variable. It is worth noting that
this is already a feature of many existing ITQ systems. In
some fisheries, equity concerns may be alleviated byallocating quotas to communities or to residents of aterritorial area in the form of community transferable
quotas (CTQs) and territorial user rights in fisheries(TURFS), respectively (Christy 1982; Wingard 2000;
Charles 2002). With such schemes in place, the economic
efficiency benefits of ITQs may be captured while
minimising negative social impacts; and■■ Auctioning of quotas can be used in some fisheries
to deal with the problem of initial allocation of quota
and its equity implications (Macinko and Bromley 2002;
Bromley 2009).

98■■ Monitoring and control programmes; and■■ Establishment of marine protected areas (MPA).
Stock assessment programmes are basic for fishery
managers who require reliable statistics to inform themof the state of fish stocks so that they may keep a careful
eye on whether fishing effort is appropriate for thesustainable use of the stock (Walters and Martell 2004).
Monitoring and control programmes are those thatallow fisheries managers to determine whether fishers
are acting in compliance with catch quotas or not. Suchprogrammes are also necessary in terms of mitigating
the impact of illegal and unreported fishing activities.
Historically, MPAs have not been used as a major tool inthe management of the world’s fisheries. However, theirrole as a management tool has become more popular inrecent years. Marine Protected Areas attempt to maintainthe health of fish stocks by setting aside an area of theocean that is free from fishing activity – allowing maturefish in these areas to escape into unfished areas, thereby
ensuring the future resilience of the fishery.

Fisheries

4 Enabling conditions: Institutions,planning, policy and regulatory
reform and financing
4.1 Building effective national, regional
and international institutions
The root cause of overexploitation of fish stocks is thelack of control over fish catches or fishing capacity, orboth. Individual fishers competing with many others
have an incentive to take as much fish as quickly as theycan. If this incentive is not controlled, the result of such
uncoordinated efforts of many competing fishers is thedepletion of fish stocks to the point of harming futurefish catches, raising the cost of catching fish, and possibly
wiping out fish stocks once and for all (Hannesson 2004;
Hardin 1968; Gordon 1954. Fortunately, it has beenshown over the past several decades that very often
communities or groups of fishers develop institutions thatcan regulate the incentives and create the conditions forsustainability (Dietz, T. et al. 2003). This is not guaranteed
to occur, however, and it is unlikely in industrial or highseas cases, where other measures are needed.
In this regard, note that privatising use of the fisheryresource is not necessarily advisable. Even if a fish
resource is privatised, there are conditions under which
the private owner may find it optimal to overfish thestock, sometimes to extinction (Clark 1973; Clark et al.
2010). This happens when the stock in question grows
very slowly compared to the rate of discount, so that thepresent value of future catches is low, compared to theonce-and-for-all gain from depleting the stock. However,such restrictions are not necessarily best imposed bya governmental fisheries administration. Successful
examples around the world of community-based or
fisher-led restrictions are common, often in conjunction
with spatial or territorial limits.
We need effective institutions at all levels of government,from the local to the provincial/state to the national,
regional and international because of the migratory
nature of many fish stocks. Many fish stocks spend
their lives completely in the Exclusive Economic Zones(EEZ) of countries – they do not migrate across EEZs ofother countries or straddle into the high seas. For thesefish stocks, effective national institutions are all that isneeded. Then we have fish stocks that are shared by two
or more countries, the so-called transboundary fish stocks
that live completely within the EEZs of more than one

country. For these fish stocks, participants in the fisherymust agree on the management of the stock in order tomake it effective (Munro et al. 2004). Then there are fishstocks that are partly or wholly located in what is left ofthe high seas. It has for a long time been a concern thatthe regulation of these fisheries is ineffective and that
regulation of stocks that are governed by one or morecoastal states but which straddle periodically into thehigh seas is undermined by the open access to the highseas. This prompted a conference on high seas fisheries
in the 1990s under the auspices of the UN. This resulted
in what is usually called the UN Fish Stocks Agreement,
which vests the authority to regulate high seas fisheries inRegional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs)(United Nations 1995), whose functioning was recently
reviewed by Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly (2010b) and generally
found wanting.

4.2 Regulatory reform
The basic requirement for a successful management ofa fish stock is limiting the rate of exploitation to somesensible level. This necessitates 1) a mechanism to set
such a target catch level and 2) a mechanism to monitor
and to enforce it. The basic question to ask is whether
the scientific, administrative and law-enforcing
capability is in place to make this happen. The presenceof strong social norms and cultural institution are great
tools for enforcement where they work.
In practice, effective management institutions would
have in place mechanisms for providing scientific advice,
as well as a mechanism to set the rate of exploitationon the basis of that advice and in such a way that it
maximises long-term benefits in the form of foodsupplies or fishing rent (difference between revenues
and costs adjusted for subsidies). The latter requires anefficient and uncorrupted administration that strives forthe best possible economic (or food supply) situation of
the country in question (UNEP 2008).
As to the specific means by which the fisheriesadministration achieves its goals, these must be decided
on a pragmatic basis. A limit on the total catch is perhaps
the most obvious instrument to use, but there are99

Towards a green economy
circumstances where it might not be adequate. Catchlimits are notoriously difficult to monitor in small-scale
fisheries, and even monitoring the boats and theiruse need not be much easier in that context. Yet, it isquantitative restriction of either kind that is needed inorder to limit exploitation of fish stocks.
It has been pointed out repeatedly and supported
by empirical evidence that limiting fish catches
alone achieves very limited objectives in the fisheries(Costello et al. 2008; Hannesson 2004). It may, and it
often has, succeeded in maintaining the fish stocks at
healthy levels, while leaving the industry in shambles
economically, with short fishing seasons, inferior
products, low economic returns, and even threats tolife and limb through undue risk-taking encouraged
by narrow time opportunities to catch fish. One way todeal with this is to allocate the total fish quota among
the vessels or fishing communities in the industry andmake the quota allocations transferable, where feasible.

4.3 The economics of fishery
management tools
The basic fishery management tools can be grouped
into 1) output controls; 2) input controls; and 3)
auxiliary measures. Both 1) and 2) control the rate of
exploitation, which is the fundamental factor thatneeds to be controlled, as stated earlier.
Output controls mean limiting the total amount of fishthat can be caught. We do not know what this means interms of rate of exploitation unless we know what thesize of the fish stock is. This can only be estimated witha considerable and possibly high degree of imprecision.
Nevertheless, catch quotas are often set on the basis ofsome target rate of exploitation, and to make any senseof them we must have a reasonably reliable idea about
what the stock size is. This is admittedly an unlikely
scenario in most fisheries of the world, which are smallscale and local in nature, and for which output controls
may be of limited use. However, where feasible, thetarget output should be set on the basis of maximizing
either food supply or fishing rent, depending on whatis deemed most appropriate.
Where it is feasible to set a catch quota, and where there
are strong monitoring and enforcement capabilities,
it might be feasible to allocate the quota among theplayers in the industry, and make it transferable. Thisshould help avoid wasteful competition for the largest
possible share of a given catch and to achieve areasonable correspondence between the fleet capacity
and the available catch quotas. We stress reasonable,
because there are several reasons why there is likely tobe some mismatch between fleet capacity and catch
quotas. One is variability of the fish stocks, another isthe remuneration system used on the fishing boats. The
optimal solution is ideal, but in practice we are unlikely
to achieve anything better than getting closer to it.
Under some circumstances, effort controls could bebetter than quota controls. This can happen if quotas are
difficult to monitor, or if the size of the fish stock cannot
be estimated while we can be reasonably certain that it
is always evenly distributed in a given area so that a unitof effort produces a given rate of exploitation. A problem
here is technological progress by which a unit of effort(say, a boat-day) becomes more and more effective overBox 6: Updating international law on shared fish stocks
A shared fish stock is one that either 1) is a highly
migratory species (i.e., tuna); 2) occurs in the EEZwaters of more than one political entity; 3) occurs in
the high seas where it may be targeted by a multitudeof fleets; or 4) any combination of the previous
three. Often, the management of shared fish stocks
is needed to counter what game theorists term theprisoner’s dilemma, where parties sharing a stock
would be better off cooperating on management
initiatives but fail to do so because they are concerned
other parties may free-ride on their investment in the
resource.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) was implemented to deal withsome problems associated with shared fish stocks,

100

giving special rights and responsibilities over nearshore marine resources to coastal nations. However,this agreement and the 1995 United Nations Fish
Stock Agreement, which was meant to reinforce
UNCLOS, have left the management of shared andtransboundary fish stocks open to management
problems that game theorists have predicted (Munro2007). It is suggested that, in order to green fisheries
that are shared or transboundary in nature, the bodyof international law concerning access rights infisheries must be re-examined with a focus on theestablishment of RFMOs with the teeth to oversee theuse of these fish stocks; for such laws to be effective,
international law should be reviewed as soon as
possible – before serious harm to shared fish stocks
occurs.

Fisheries
time. Such increases in effectiveness usually reach 2–3
per cent per year, and hence can double the impact ofa fleet after two decades (Pauly and Palomares 2010).
In fact, this method of management encourages
technological progress for the sole purpose of catching
more fish, even to the point of exceeding the target
rate of exploitation. Some efficiency gains are likely tobe realised through allowing trade in effort. The total
effort should be determined on the basis of the same
principles as the total catch quota.
Then there are several measures which are termed
auxiliary, as they do not primarily address the basic
problem of controlling the rate of exploitation but
promote greater yields from fish stocks in various
ways. One is selectivity of fishing gear (mesh sizes, forexample). Larger meshes allow young, fast growing
fish to escape capture and to be caught at an age when
they have grown to a more appropriate size. Closing
off nursery areas serves the same purpose. Protecting
the spawning stock could be desirable, if the extent thesize of the spawning stock is critical for recruitment ofyoung fish. Regulations such as mandatory discardingof marketable fish are highly doubtful, as is mandatory
retention of unmarketable fish. The rationale for suchmeasures is to discourage people from seeking fishthat they are not authorised to take. While this is indeed
desirable, such regulations are economically wastefuland one should look for ways to achieve the desired
outcome in less wasteful ways.

4.4 Managing the transition processThis would be most challenging when we are dealing
with depleted fish stocks that need to be rebuilt. Thissituation arises because the capacity of the fishing fleet
has outgrown the available resource, and so the fleet
would have to be downsized. Both of these necessitate
a cutback in fishing activity. Fish quotas that are lower
than contemporary and recent catches which havedepleted the fish stock are necessary to rebuild thestock. Such small quotas mean that some of the fishingcapacity is redundant, and even with rebuilt stocks
it is highly likely to remain redundant if a repeateddepletion of the stock is to be avoided.
All this implies investment in the fish stocks as it were,
through foregone earnings in the short-term for the
purpose of obtaining higher benefits in the future.
Likewise, having some boat owners leave the fisherymeans that they would be foregoing earnings they
otherwise would have obtained, and those who leave
would in any case not share in the higher benefits
to be realised in the future. Since the justification forrebuilding fish stocks is higher future benefits, it would
in principle be possible for those who remain in thefishery to buy out those who leave; in this way sharethe future income recovery with them (Martell et al.,2009). The problem is, however, that future income isan expected and not a certain variable, and the vagaries
of nature could in fact greatly delay the realisation of
any income recovery. Those who remain in the industry
could, therefore, be reluctant to offer much of theincome recovery they expect.
There is also a key issue in SSF, particularly a lack of accessto capital, limiting the potential for this process. Thereis therefore a case for governments to come up withfunds to finance the transition from overexploitationand overcapacity to an optimally exploited fishery with
optimal fleet capacity. It should be stressed, however,that this is only bridge financing; in due course those
who remain in the fishery should pay back the loans they
got for the transition. Anything else could create theexpectation that boat owners in an overexploited fisherywill always be bought out, which could entice people
to invest in overcapacity purely on the expectation of
being bought out later.

4.5 Learning from successfulinternational experience
There are a number of cases of successful transitions froman overexploited fishery, or a fishery with overcapacity,
to a better managed fishery, albeit not fully optimal.
Below is a non-exhaustive selection of these cases andtheir most salient features are mentioned.
New Zealand
One of the early cases of control by ITQs is the bottom
trawl fisheries in New Zealand. One interesting aspectof how that regime was implemented in the inshore
fishery was how excess fishing capacity was boughtout by having fishers tendering quotas. These buyouts
were, however, financed with public money and neverrecovered; plans to charge resource rentals wereabandoned early on. This case is well documented ina number of papers (Ackroyd et al. 1990; Batstone andSharp 1999; Clark et al. 1989; Hersoug 2002).
Pacific halibut
Individual transferable quotas were first introduced in
the Canadian halibut fishery. One noteworthy feature
is industry participation and payment for monitoring of
quotas. Another lesson is how individual quotas provide
economic benefits in the form of higher catch value due
to longer fishing season and more leisurely fishing (Foxet al. 2003; Rice 2003; Turris 2000; Wilen 2005).
Ayvalik-Haylazli Lagoon fishery
The Ayvalik-Haylazli Lagoon fishery, near a major agriculturaland commercial centre city in Turkey, is an example of101

Towards a green economy
successful community management (Berkes 1986). In thisfishery, fishers from three neighbouring villages formed acooperative in 1994. This cooperative organised fishers tocooperate in work to reduce fishing costs and restricted theresources access only to those members.
Alaska Regional Fisheries Association
This association, formed by fishers themselves toconserve and rebuild salmon stock in the middle of1970s, is another successful case of fishery management.
By self-imposing a tax of 3 per cent of the value of theircatch, the association was able to increase salmon
abundance and benefit the fishers (Amend 1989).
Fisheries adjustments in Spain
Starting in the mid-1970s, the extension of national
fisheries jurisdiction into 200-nautical mile exclusive
economic zones forced Spanish distant fishers wereforced to depart from various fishing grounds where
they had fished for decades, if not centuries. This
resulted in a decline in employment by roughly a third
over a few decades. However, government-supported
unemployment subsidies, training programmes, public
investment and transfers to new sectors, such as fish
farming, fish processing and coastal tourism, enabled
Spanish communities that were reliant on fishing toensure a continued high standard of living and to avoid
any major social crisis, despite a significant decline infisheries employment (OECD 2000).
The lessons that can be learned from these cases are
the following:■■ It is important to find an initial allocation of a quota
that is generally understood to be equitable andimmune to challenge as far as possible (there mightalways be controversial cases, however);■■ The allocation criteria should be fixed as quickly as
possible, to avoid positioning such as participationin the fishery or investment in boats only to ensure
inclusion in the system. The latter aggravates theoverexploitation and overcapacity prior to establishinga quota system (bringing loans only);■■ There may be a case for government to help withthe provision of funds, to be paid back later, to buy out
excessive fishing vessels;■■ Equitable distribution of gains from individualtransferable quotas is important, in order to avoid
challenges on the grounds that the quotas make only
a few people rich and leave little for the rest of society.
Note that these challenges can emerge well after thequota system is established and even if the initial
allocation of quotas was deemed acceptable, as gains
from a quota regime take some time to emerge;

102■■ There can be very substantial gains from individual
quotas, in the form of lower fishing costs and a higher
catch value. Not all these gains are due to rebuilding offish stocks. Some are due to less fishing capacity used,others to longer fishing season and more leisurely
fishing; and■■ Under certain circumstances, fishing communities
have the potential to maintain resources sustainably(Berkes et al. 2001; Ostrom et al. 1999).

4.6 Financing fisheries reform
As shown earlier, green fisheries require accessing or
raising the necessary funds to meet the economic,
environmental and social goals in order to: ensure thelong-term future of fishing activities and the sustainable
use of fishery resources. Financing is required formeasures to adapt the fishing fleet; promote the useof appropriate gear; strengthen markets in fisheryproducts; promoting partnerships between researchersand fishers; diversify and strengthen economic
development in areas affected by the decline in fishingactivities; and provide technical assistance and (human)capacity building in developing countries.
Activities aimed at greening the fisheries sector are diverse
and would take place at the local, national, regional andglobal levels. Financing arrangements or options would
also have to be tailored to meet the needs at these levels.
We must also keep in mind when considering options forfinancing fisheries reform that ample investment may
not be sufficient for greening the fisheries sector if not
combined with effective management regimes.
Public investment in fisheries reform
Since fisheries are considered by many to be a publicresource and the public has much to gain throughimproved management, significant public investmentin this industry can be justified. Public funding forfisheries sustainability includes direct funding fromnational budgets, contributions from multilateralfunds, resources raised from capital markets backed
by government guarantee and a share of government
taxes, levies or revenues earmarked at a national level
for a fisheries fund. A Global Fisheries Fund (GFF),
run by the United Nations, along the lines of the
Global Environmental Facility (GEF), can be set up.
Funding from various public sources can be pooled
for greening the fisheries sector. A high level forum
on international fisheries finance can be established
to bring together key decision makers from the public
and private financial sector, as well as international
financial institutions. It could regularly review
funding availability and expenditure and provide
recommendations for improvements.

Fisheries
National fisheries reform funding opportunities
National fiscal incentives can be a powerful source ofinvestments for green fisheries since political economy
problems that would normally be encountered in trying
to raise funds at the regional and/or global levels can
be avoided. Such sources of investment may be mosteffective when the distribution of fishery resources
is fairly well contained within national boundaries.
However, given the transboundary nature of many
marine species such as tunas that are targeted by many
countries, national funding programmes may fail togenerate adequate funding to green some fisheries. Two
fiscal incentive programmes that can be effective forfunding fisheries investment are Environmental Fiscal
Reform (EFR) and the redirection of harmful subsidies togreen activities. These are:Environmental Fiscal Reform refers to a range oftaxation and pricing measures which can raise revenue
while furthering environmental goals (OECD 2005). In theabsence of taxation, the financial benefit from exploiting
fisheries resources are fully captured by the private sector,
without compensation to society at large. Additionally,
individual operators have little direct incentive torestrict their catch, since they do not, individually,
derive any direct benefits from doing so while others
continue to over-exploit. Imposing levies on the volume
of catch, in combination with proper management
measures – which may include restricting access tofishing grounds – can be effective in both generating
revenue to compensate the owners of the resource, (i.e.,the country whose fishing stocks are being exploited)as well as create a natural incentive to reduce fishingeffort.
Redirection of Subsidies or elimination redirecting
existing harmful subsidies in the fisheries sector
globally can provide a significant additional source offinancing for greening the fisheries sector. Fisheries
subsidies have been estimated at some US$ 2530 billion annually (Sumaila et al. 2010). Limiting
subsidies to those used for management, the so-called,
beneficial subsidies, would generate savings of about
US$ 19 billion annually, which can be reallocated tofinance green fisheries initiatives.
Regional financing arrangements
A regional financing facility or mechanism is one inwhich:■■ the activities it funds are limited to a given region(e.g., the Coral Triangle in the Western Central Pacific orWest Africa); and■■ the arrangement’s member countries from within agiven region have a substantial role in decision-making(Sharan 2008).

Regional financing of the greening of fisheries isimportant for a number of reasons. First, while the issueof fisheries sustainability is a global one, it has strong
regional dimensions as well. Obstacles and measuresrequired to adapt depend on regional biological andpolitical landscapes and as such, would not be identicalfor all regions. The decline of the fish stock and its impacts
is unlikely to be confined within any one country, andone country would not be able to address such impacts
alone. Thus, regional financing arrangements would
strengthen the overall global collective action forgreening fisheries. A regional approach also offers
proximity benefits such as closer interaction and learning,
and lower transaction costs. A regional financing
arrangement can also attract additional resources within
the region as countries feel that they are in charge ofdecisions. In this regard, Regional Fisheries Funds can be
set up in various regions of the world.
Private investment in fisheries reform
Venture capital and private equity – Consumers
are increasingly sensitive to the wider impacts ofunsustainable fishing practices as they are with climatechange. The result has been consumer pressure for
products that are certified as environmentally friendly
or consistent with sustainability. Emerging high growth
sectors have traditionally been a target for venture
capitalists, who invest in entrepreneurial activities andexpect high returns for their risks. Markets for sustainableproducts and services such as eco-tourism and certified
seafood can present attractive sources of income for the
management of protected areas and their surrounding
communities. Enabling productive projects for private
sector actors in protected areas, with specific profit
sharing agreements, have the potential to be an
important potential source of financing.
Public-private partnership
While the public and private sectors have importantroles to play in generating new sources of funding
for greening the fisheries sector, the mechanism ofa Public Private Partnership (PPP) where the public
sector’s investment is leveraged to attain private sector
participation in projects with public good characteristics
can be applied in the fisheries sector.
Evaluation of financing options
There are a myriad of financing options that have beenoutlined above ranging from those best implemented atnational or global scales and those operated by public
or private entities. Given the common property nature
over much of the world’s oceans living resources, which
is detrimental to the success of private investment, it isunlikely that this avenue can be expected to fill muchof the needed investment. That said, where sufficient
access rights and regulations exist, this environment
has the potential to spawn a great deal of innovative103

Towards a green economy

private business activity that can be effective in bothgreening fisheries as well as driving new employment
opportunities and wealth creation.
In regions of the world where rights are difficult toimplement or communities prefer other forms ofmanagement, it is clear that the public has a large rolein investing in green fisheries. This is an opportunity for
public funds to be used in an area that will create jobs
and yield benefits for public resource owners. National

104

strategies such as environmental fiscal reform are likely
to be successful in cases where fish stocks remain within
national boundaries. In other cases where stocks travel
between the boundaries of two or more countries,
regional or global strategies such as market based levies
combined with international cooperation have a great
deal of potential. Even in cases where green investment
is to operate at the national level, international
cooperation on topics such as the redirection of fisheries
subsidies can be highly influential in driving change.

Fisheries

5 Conclusions
Our analysis confirms that global marine fisheries areunderperforming both in economic and social terms.
Greening the fisheries sector by rebuilding depleted
stocks and implementing effective management could
increase the overall marine fisheries catch, and raise theeconomic contribution of ocean fish populations to theglobal economy.
While important efforts have been made in national
fisheries administrations around the world, and throughregional fishery management organisations, more isneeded to enhance the management of the resources ina green economy context.
In order to achieve sustainable levels of fishing from an
economic, ecological and social point of view, a serious
reduction in current excessive capacity is required.
Given the wide difference in the catching power, the job
creation potential, and the livelihood implications of largescale versus small-scale fishing vessels, it appears that a
reduction effort focused on large-scale vessels could reduce
overcapacity at lower socio-economic costs to society.
This chapter demonstrates that greening the fisheries
sector would cost billions of dollars. However, the gains

from greening would more than pay for the investments.
Most of the cost involves helping the fisheries sector
adjust to lower fishing capacity, which is a prerequisite
for greening the fisheries sector and keeping it
economically viable over the long-term.
The contribution revealed that there are successful
experiences with mechanisms to manage the transition
and adjustment within the fishing industry, throughvessel buyback programmes, compensation, provisionof social security and retraining programmes for fishers,
to learn from and build upon.
More investment is required to improve fisheries
management in most parts of the world. This would enable
a more effective implementation of all management
tools that have proven to be effective, including stock
assessments, monitoring and controlling programs,
transferable and non-transferable quota systems,
and expanding marine protected areas. In addition,
strengthening fishery institutions both in national
administrations and regional fishery management
organisations would allow a more effective governanceand management of resources within and outside nations’Exclusive Economic Zones.

105Towards a green economy

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WaterInvesting in natural capitalTowards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Author: Prof Mike D. Young, Executive
Director, The Environment Institute, University of Adelaide,
Australia.
Nicolas Bertrand of UNEP managed the chapter, including thehandling of peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating
author on revisions, conducting supplementary research andbringing the chapter to final production. Derek Eaton reviewed
and edited the modelling section of the chapter.
Eleven Background Technical Papers were prepared for this chapter
by the following individuals: Arfiansyah, Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (PALYJA);Paulina Beato, Pompeu Fabra University, Spain; Alvaro Calzadilla,
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Germany; Irma Damayanti,
Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (PALYJA); Fulton Eaglin, Pegasys Strategy andDevelopment; Philippe Folliasson, Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (PALYJA);
Vincent Fournier (PALYJA); David Kaczan, MSc. candidate, Universityof Alberta, Canada; Sharon Khan, independent consultant; Anna
Lukasiewicz, PhD candidate, Charles Sturt University, Australia;
Luc Martin (PALYJA); Claude Ménard, University of Paris-Pantheon
Sorbonne, France; Mike Muller, University of Witwatersrand, South
Africa; Andrew Ogilvie, IRD UMR G-eau; Guy Pegram, Pegasys
Strategy and Development; Katrin Rehdanz, Kiel Institute for theWorld Economy and Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Germany;
Rathinasamy Maria Saleth, Madras Institute of Development Studies,
India; Barbara Schreiner, Pegasys Strategy and Development;
Richard S.J. Tol, Economic and Social Research Institute, Irelandand Institute for Environmental Studies and the Department of
Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit, The Netherlands; Håkan Tropp,
Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI), Sweden; Antonio
Vives, Cumpetere and Stanford University; Constantin von der
Heyden, Pegasys Strategy and Development; and John Ward, CSIRO,
Australia. An edited reprint of the executive summary of the 2030
Water Resources Group report, Charting Our Water Future, (initiallypublished in 2009) and an updated version of “Free basic water– a sustainable instrument for a sustainable future in South Africa”(initially published in 2008 in Environment & Urbanization) wereprepared as additional Background Technical Papers. Additional
material was prepared by Andrea M. Bassi, John P. Ansah and
Zhuohua Tan (Millennium Institute); and Carlos Carrión-Crespo and
Ana Lucía Iturriza, International Labour Organisation(ILO).
The compilation of Background Technical Papers was edited by
Christine S. Esau.
During the development of the chapter, the Chapter Coordinating
Author received invaluable advice from a Global Reference Groupconsisting (in their personal capacity) of Shahid Ahmad (Member,
Natural Resources, Pakistan Agriculture Research Council); Dianned’Arras (Senior Vice President, Technology and Research Suez
Environnement); Wouter Lincklaen Arriens (Lead Water Resources
Specialist, Asian Development Bank); Ger Bergkamp (Director
General, World Water Council); Don Blackmore (Chair, eWater CRC
Board; former CEO, Murray Darling Basin Commission); Benedito
Braga (Vice President, World Water Council; Professor of Civil andEnvironmental Engineering, University of São Paolo); Margaret
Catley Carlson (Chair, Global Water Partnership; former Deputy
Minister of Health and Welfare Canada); Vasile Ciomos (President,
Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011

112

Romanian Water Association); Alberto Garrido (Associate Professor,
Technical University of Madrid); Jerry Gilbert (consultant); Vincent
Gouarne (Director, Latin America and the Caribbean, International
Finance Corporation); R. Quentin Grafton (Professor, Australian
National University); David Grey (Senior Advisor, World Bank); Kathy
Jacobs (Executive Director, Arizona Water Institute); Mohamed
Ait Kadi (President, General Council of Agricultural Development,
Morocco); Helmut Kroiss (Head, Institute for Water Quality, Vienna
University of Technology); Alain Locussol (formal Specialist, World
Bank); David Molden (Deputy Director General, International Water
Management Institute); Jack Moss (Senior Advisor, AquaFed – The
International Federation of Private Water Operators); Mike
Muller (former Director-General, Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry, Government of South Africa); Herbert Oberhaensli(Assistant Vice President, Economic and International Relations,
Nestlé S.A.); Kirit Parikh (Emeritus Professor and Founder Director,
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research); Usha RaoMonari (Senior Manager, Infrastructure Department, International
Finance Corporation); Brian Richter (Director, Sustainable Waters
Programme, The Nature Conservancy); Rathinasamy Maria Saleth(Director, Madras Institute of Development Studies); Mark Smith(Head, IUCN Water Programme); A. Dan Tarlock (Distinguished
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law); Lee Travers (Sector
Manager, World Bank); Henry J. Vaux Jr. (Professor, University ofCalifornia-Berkeley); Antonio Vives (former Manager, Sustainable
Development Department, Inter-American Development Bank);
Hao Wang (Academician, Chinese Academy of Engineering, China
Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research; Vice
President, Chinese Committee of Global Water Partnership); James
Winpenny (Consultant, Wychwood Economic Consulting Ltd.); andSascha Zehnder (Science Director, Alberta Water Research Institute).
Jack Moss is also to be thanked for his in-depth review of the advancecopy of the chapter (February 2011).
We would like to thank the many colleagues and individuals whocommented on various drafts, including Joana Akrofi (UNEP),
Chizuru Aoki (UNEP), Joseph Alcamo (UNEP), Ger Bergkamp(World Water Council), Peter Börkey (OECD), Munyaradzi Chenje(UNEP), David Coates (CBD Secretariat), Salif Diop (UNEP),
Renate Fleiner (UNEP), Ryuichi Fukuhara (UNEP), Habib El-Habr(UNEP), Melanie Hutchinson (UNEP), Elizabeth Khaka (UNEP),
Arnold Kreilhuber (UNEP), Olivia la O’Castillo (UNSGAB), Razi Latif(UNEP), Lifeng Li (WWF International), Peter Manyara (UNEP),
Robert McGowan, Patrick Mmayi (UNEP), Madiodio Niasse(International Land Coalition), Lara Ognibene (UNEP), Neeyati
Patel (UNEP), Elina Rautalahti (UNEP), Nadia Scialabba (FAO),David Smith (UNEP), David Tickner (WWF-UK), Chris Tomkins,
Cornis van der Lugt (UNEP), and Lew Young (Ramsar Convention
Secretariat). Renate Fleiner, in particular, coordinated input
from the UNEP Interdivisional Water Group on the review
draft and subsequent versions of the chapter. The support of
the UNEP Division of Environmental Policy Implementation(DEPI) / Freshwater Ecosystems Unit (Thomas Chiramba, Chief ),throughout the project, is also gratefully acknowledged.
Within the University of Adelaide, the following individuals arealso to be thanked: Sam Fargher, Nobiko Wynn, Adriana Russo,
Sarah Streeter, Husam Seif, Jane Rathjen and Sanjee Peiris.

WaterContents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5

The aim of this chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Scope and definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Water in a green economy – A vision  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Measuring progress towards a green economy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
The world’s water resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

2Water: a unique natural resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

2.1
2.2
2.3

Services from natural infrastructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Water accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Water and energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

3

Challenges and opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

3.1
3.2

Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Opportunities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

4

The economics of greening water use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

4.1
4.2
4.3

The economics of investing in water and ecosystems  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Selecting projects and initiatives for investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Flow of benefits from investment in the water supply and sanitation sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

5Enabling conditions – Overcoming barriers and driving change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6

Improving general institutional arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
International trade arrangements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Using market-based instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Improving entitlement and allocation systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Reducing input subsidies and charging for externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Improving water charging and finance arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

6Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

113

Towards a green economy

List of figures
Figure 1: Green water and Blue water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Figure 2: Prevailing patterns of threat to human water security and biodiversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Figure 3: Water consumption for power generation, USA (2006)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Figure 4: Global progress towards Millennium Development Goals’ target to reduce the number ofpeople without access to adequate sanitation services to 1.7 billion people by 2015.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Figure 5: Progress towards attainment of the Millennium Development Goals’ sanitation target tohalf the number of people without adequate sanitation by 2015  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Figure 6: Areas of physical and economic water scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Figure 7: Number of people living in water-stressed areas in 2030 by country type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Figure 8: Aggregated global gap between existing accessible, reliable supply and 2030 water withdrawals,
assuming no efficiency gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Figure 9: Projection of the global demand for water and, under a business-as-usual scenario, theamount that can be expected to be met from supply augmentation and improvements in technicalwater use efficiency (productivity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Figure 10: Assessment of expected increase in the annual global demands for water by region . . . . . . . . 129
Figure 11: Schematic representation of a master meter system managed by a community-basedorganisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Figure 12: Relative costs of different methods of supplying water in China  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Figure 13: Predicted effect of a 10 per cent and 20 per cent reduction in the proportion of people
obtaining their primary water supply from surface water or unprotected well water on child mortality
and child morbidity (stunting), Niger River basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Figure 14: Regional virtual water balances and net interregional virtual water flows related to thetrade in agricultural products, 1997–2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Figure 15: Annual returns from selling allocations and capital growth in the value of a water entitlementcompared with an index of the value of shares in the Australian Stock Exchange, Goulburn Murray
System, Murray-Darling Basin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Figure 16: Development of Murray Darling Basin water entitlement transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Figure 17: Array of mixes of transfer, tax and tariff approaches to the provision of infrastructure finance  . . .142

List of tables
Table 1: Examples of the estimated costs and benefits of restoration projects in different biomes . . . . . . 130
Table 2: Modelled results of the Green Investment scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Table 3: Change in regional welfare over 20 years as a result of climate change and trade liberalisation . . . . 138
Table 4: Water Tariff Structure in Western Jakarta, US$ per m3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

List of boxes
Box 1: Economic impacts of poor sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Box 2: Millennium Development Goals and water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Box 3: Two examples of governments investing in river restoration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Box 4: Micro-scale infrastructure provision in Western Jakarta  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Box 5: Empirical analysis of the relationship between poverty and the provision of access to waterand sanitation in the Niger River basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Box 6: Australian experience in the role of water markets in facilitating rapid adaption to a shift to adrier climatic regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Box 7: Recent experience of private companies providing water to households  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

114

WaterList of acronyms
BAU
BRIC
CAGR
CEWH
ESP
FAO
FSC
GDP
IFPRI
ILO
IPCC
IUCN
IWMI
MDG
MENA
OECD
PES
RO
RoW
TEEB
UNEP
UNESCOUNICEF
USAID
USC
WHO

Business-as-usual
Brazil, Russia, India and China
Compound Annual Growth Rate
Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder
Environmental Service Program
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
Forest Stewardship Council
Gross Domestic ProductInternational Food Policy Implementation
International Labour Organization
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeInternational Union for Conservation of Nature
International Water Management InstituteMillennium Development Goal
Middle East and North Africa
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Payments for Ecosystem Services
Reverse osmosis
Rest of the WorldThe Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity
United Nations Environment Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations Children’s Fund
United States Agency for International Development
Ultra-Super Critical Technology
World Health Organization

115

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. Water, a basic necessity for sustaining life, goes undelivered to many of the world’s poor.
Nearly 1 billion people lack access to clean drinking water; 2.6 billion lack access to improved sanitation
services; and 1.4 million children under five die every year as a result of lack of access to clean water andadequate sanitation services. At the current rate of investment progress, the Millennium Development
Goal for sanitation will be missed by 1 billion people, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.
2. The existing inadequacies in provision of water and sanitation services generate considerablesocial costs and economic inefficiencies. When people do not have access to water, either large amountsof their disposable income have to be spent on purchasing water from vendors or large amounts of time,in particular from women and children, have to be devoted to carting it. This erodes the capacity of thepoor to engage in other activities. When sanitation services are inadequate, the costs of water-borne
disease are high. Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, for instance, together lose about
US$ 9 billion a year because of poor sanitation – or approximately 2 per cent of combined GDP. Access toreliable, clean water and adequate sanitation services for all is a foundation of a green economy.
3. Continuing current practices will lead to a massive and unsustainable gap between global
supply and demand for water withdrawal. This is exacerbated by failure to collect and treat
used water to enable subsequent uses. With no improvement in the efficiency of water use,water demand is projected to overshoot supply by 40 per cent in 20 years time. Historical levels of
improvement in water productivity, as well as increases in supply (such as through the constructionof dams and desalination plants as well as increased recycling) are expected to address 40 per cent of
this gap, but the remaining 60 per cent needs to come from investment in infrastructure, water-policy
reform and in the development of new technology. The failure of such investment or policy reform tomaterialise will lead to the deepening of water crises.

116

Water

4. The availability of an adequate quantity of water, of sufficient quality, is a service provided
by ecosystems. The management of, and investment in, ecosystems is therefore essential to address
water security for both people and ecosystems in terms of water scarcity, the over-abundance of water(flood risk) and its quality.
5. Accelerated investment in water-dependent ecosystems, in water infrastructure and in water
management can be expected to expedite the transition to a green economy. Modelling suggests
that, under the green investment scenario, global water use can be kept within sustainable limits andall the MDGs for water achieved in 2015. With an annual investment of US$ 198 billion on average overthe next forty years, water use can be made more efficient, enabling increased agricultural, biofueland industrial production. By 2030, the number of people living in a water-stressed region is 4 per centless than under BAU and up to 7 per cent less by 2050.
6. When investment is coupled with improvements in institutional arrangements, entitlement
and allocation system, the expansion of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), and theimprovement of water charging and finance arrangements, the amount that needs to beinvested in water can be reduced significantly. Moreover, a significant proportion of water
management policies and measures in other sectors such as input subsidies are undermining
opportunities to improve water management. Resolving global water supply problems is heavily
dependent upon the degree to which agricultural water use can be improved. Irrigated land produces
40 per cent of the world’s food and, as populations grow, a significant proportion of this water willneed to be transferred to urban, commercial and industrial uses.

117Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
1.1 The aim of this chapter
This chapter has three broad aims. First, it highlights
the need for providing all households with sufficientand affordable access to clean water supplies as well as
adequate sanitation.
Second, it makes a case for early investment in water
management and infrastructure, including ecologicalinfrastructure. The potential to make greater useof biodiversity and ecosystem services in reducing
water treatment costs and increasing productivity isemphasised.
Third, the chapter provides guidance on the suite ofgovernance arrangements and policy reforms, which,if implemented, can sustain and increase the benefits
associated with making such a transition.

1.2 Scope and definition
The scope of this chapter is restricted to freshwater
ecosystems, the water supply and sanitation1 sectors
and the government and market processes that
influence how and where this water is used.
The crucial contribution water makes to agriculture,
fisheries, forestry, energy and industrial production is
discussed in other chapters.
The perspective offered in this chapter is one thatlooks forward 20 years to 2030 and, where possible,
to 2050. During the next 20 years, a considerable risein demand for water of sufficient quantity and quality
is expected and changes in local supply conditions
are forecast.
The chapter builds on a substantial body of work
undertaken in recent years by organisations andcommittees concerned about the way water resources
are being managed.2 To assist with its preparation, 11
background papers were prepared. References to these
papers are marked in bold.
1. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines “sanitation” as “the provisionof facilities and services for the safe disposal of human urine and faeces.
Inadequate sanitation is a major cause of disease world-wide and improving
sanitation is known to have a significant beneficial impact on health bothin households and across communities. The word ‘sanitation’ also refers to
the maintenance of hygienic conditions, through services such as garbage
collection and wastewater disposal.” Available at http://www.who.int/topics/
sanitation/en/

118

Structure of the chapter
This chapter identifies the contribution that water canplay in assisting a transition to a green economy. We
first present a vision of the role that water ecosystems
can play in the transition to a green economy and thenprovide an overview of the world’s water resources andthe services offered by the water supply and sanitation
sector. After highlighting some of the more uniquecharacteristics of water, we identify challenges andopportunities to make better use of water and water
dependent ecosystems. Building on this knowledge
base, the benefits of investing in the water supply andsanitation sector, as a means to assist with a transition toa green economy, are quantified. The chapter closes byidentifying institutional reforms, which, if implemented,
would increase the returns that could be gained from acommitment to a transition to a green economy.

1.3 Water in a green economy – A vision
As stressed in earlier chapters, in a green economy there
is emphasis on the pursuit of opportunities to invest in
sectors that rely upon and use natural resources andecosystem services. At the same time, there is a transition
to a suite of policy and administrative arrangementsthat neither degrade the environment nor impose
costs on others. The interests of future generations
are considered carefully. In the case of water, many ofthe potential gains are achieved simply by deciding toinvest in the provision of water and sanitation services.
Where water is scarce, this scarcity is acknowledged
and managed carefully. Progress towards the pursuitof green objectives can be accelerated through theredesign of governance arrangements, the improved
specification of property rights, the adoption of policies
2. The recommendations developed in this chapter have been significantly
influenced by the:• Development of the Dublin principles in 1992 which observes that “Water
has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized
as an economic good” (Global Water Partnership 1992);• Camdessus Report on financing water infrastructure that called for drastic
improvements in accountability, transparency and capacity-buildingin the public utility sector coupled with a doubling of funding for thesector (Winpenny 2003);• Guria Task Force Report on “Financing water for all”, which recommends
a transition to full cost recovery, the phasing out of subsidies and thedevolution of responsibility for water supply and treatment to local
government and municipalities (Guria 2006);• World Commission on Dams (2000) which warned of the need to carefully
assess the costs and likely benefits of major infrastructure investments;• WHO's various reports on global water supply and sanitation; and• 2030 Water Resources Group’s report (2009) on ways to avoid water crises.

WaterRainfall(thousandsof cubic
kilometres
per year)
110
100%

Green
water

Bioenergy
forestproducts
grazing lands
biodiversity
Landscape
56%

Blue
water
RiversWetlands
Lakes
Groundwater

Soilmoisturefrom rain
Crops
livestock
Rainfedagriculture
4,5%

Crops
livestockaquaculture
Irrigated
agriculture
0.6% 1.4%

Green water

Water storage
aquatic biodiversity
fisheries
Open
water
evaporation
1.3%

Blue water

Cities andindustries
0.1%

Ocean
36%

Figure 1: Green water refers to rainwater stored in the soil or on vegetation, which cannot be diverted to adifferent use. Blue water is surface and groundwater, which can be stored and diverted for a specific purpose
Source: after Molden (2007)

that reflect the full costs of use including the costs ofadverse impacts on the environment, and throughimproved regulation. Use is kept within sustainable
limits.
In green economies, the role of water in bothmaintaining biodiversity and ecosystem services andin providing water is recognised, valued and paid for.
The use of technologies that encourage efficient formsof recycling and reuse is encouraged.

1.4 Measuring progress towards
a green economy
In many countries, there is a lack of reliable data on thewater-storage capacities of river basins, the condition of
built infrastructure and the performance of the watersupply and sanitation sector. One of the more significant
opportunities to improve investment and management
is to assemble data in a manner that enables water to be
managed effectively and the performance of one region
to be accurately compared with other regions.
Signposts of success in terms of progress towards agreener set of economic arrangements include:■■ Evidence of increased investment in the watersupply and sanitation sector that gives consideration
to the environment;■■ The formal definition of rights to use water and its
allocation to users and the environment;■■ Legislative recognition of the important role that
ecosystem services can play in supporting an economy;■■ Investment in the development of institutional
capacity to manage ecosystems, including water, on asustainable basis or using an ecosystem approach;■■ The removal of policies that discourage ecosystemconservation and/or have perverse effects on water use
and investment;■■ Progress towards arrangements that reflect the fullcosts of resource use in ways that do not compromise
the needs of disadvantaged people in a community; and■■ Addressing ecosystem degradation by increasing
efforts for restoring and protecting ecosystems criticalto supply of water quantity and quality.
Indicators to be tracked include data on:■■ Recognition of the value of the benefits provided bygood water management and costs (negative value) of
not doing so;■■ The number of people without access to reliablesupplies of clean water and adequate sanitation;

119

Towards a green economy■■ The volume of water available per person in a region;■■ The efficiency of water supply in the urban sector andwater use;■■ The efficiency of water use in the agricultural andindustrial sectors; and■■ The water use and water related impacts of companies
and countries.

1.5 The world’s water resources
Access to the world’s water resources is heavily
dependent upon the nature of the water cycle. While a
massive amount of water reaches the earth’s land surface,much less, around 40 per cent, makes its way into creeks,rivers, aquifers, wetlands, lakes and reservoirs, before
cycling back into the atmosphere (see Figure 1). Of thewater that is extracted for human purposes, on average,
approximately:■■ 70 per cent is used for agricultural purposes;■■ 20 per cent is used by industry (including power
generation); and■■ 10 per cent is used for direct human consumption.

120

Given that the vast majority of usable fresh water ischannelled towards agriculture, any global considerationof water allocation must consider the factors that
determine the efficiency of water use in the sector.
Irrigated land produces around 40 per cent of the world’s
food (Hansen and Bhatia 2004; Tropp 2010). One of thebiggest challenges facing water managers is to find away to significantly increase the productivity of irrigatedagriculture so that water can be transferred to othersectors without adversely affecting the environment or
food security. In many parts of the world there are few
opportunities to enhance supplies at reasonable cost.
But general observations can be misleading. No two water
bodies are the same. Managing large, complex, transboundary water systems typically requires a different
approach to overseeing smaller water systems, where local
issues are often all that need to be considered. In developing
countries, water management and investment are typically
geared towards reducing poverty and enabling economic
development; the priority for developed nations tends
to be maintaining infrastructure and supplying access towater at reasonable cost. In both cases, there is a need tofocus more on long-term sustainability of the systems andservices provided. Demand and supply also vary greatly.
In Singapore, for example, almost all water is extracted forurban and industrial purposes, while in many other parts of
the world, the majority of water is extracted for agriculturalor mining purposes (Cosgrove and Rijsberman 2000).

Water

2 Water: a unique natural resource
Unlike most other natural resources, water flows readily
across and through landscapes in complex ways that
affect its availability and opportunities to manage it.
Understanding these water flows is critical to the designof investment programmes and policies necessary tosupport a transition to a green economy.

2.1 Services from natural infrastructure
Water makes an irreplaceable contribution to ecosystemservices that stem from the earth’s natural capital andvice versa. Protecting the natural ecosystems of river
basins and restoring degraded catchment areas is crucial
to securing the world’s water supplies, maintaining their
quality, regulating floods and mitigating climate change(Khan 2010; TEEB 2008, 2009a, b, c). The role of otherecosystems, such as forests, wetlands and floodplains inproviding access to water also needs to be recognised
and quantified. Gauging the true value that theseecosystems provide is a key part of charting a course to agreen economy.
Recent analysis is showing a close global correlation
between the threats to biodiversity and threats to water
security. As shown in Figure 2, regions where threats tohuman water security is high, but the threat to biodiversity
is low, are rare. When the threat to human water security
is high, usually the threat to biodiversity is high. Thissuggests that there may be considerable opportunities
for governments to improve biodiversity outcomes byinvesting in water security (Vörösmarty et al. 2010). Waterdependant ecosystems also play an important role in
the provision of cultural benefits (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment 2005).

2.2 Water accounting
As water flows through and across land, it is used andreused. This makes information about water difficult toassemble and use for management. When, for example,a policy promotes a more efficient irrigation system, it
is critical to decide whether or not the savings are to be
used to expand irrigation or returned back to the riveror aquifer from which the water was taken (Molden
1997). Gains in one area can be associated with losses
in another area. When the savings are not returnedback to the river or aquifer, the result can be asignificant reduction in the quantity of water available
to the environment and to other users (Independent
Evaluation Group 2010).

Low
High

Human water
security threat

Biodiversity threat
Low
High

Figure 2: Prevailing patterns of threat to human water security and biodiversity. Adjusted human water
security threat is contrasted against incident biodiversity threat. A breakpoint of 0.5 delineates low fromhigh threat
Source: Vörösmarty et al. (2010)121

Towards a green economy
Another common water accounting error is to assume
that ground and surface water systems are not connected
to one another and to administer them separately. Manyrivers play an important role in replenishing aquifers, while
aquifers can provide much of a river’s base flow (Evans
2007). Failing to account for these interactions can resultin the serious problems of over-use and degradation. One
administrative solution is to reverse the onus of proof andrequire managers to assume that ground and surface
water resources are linked and manage them as a single
connected resource until such time as disconnection canbe shown (NWC 2009).
Land-use changes can have similar effects on the volume
of water available for use. For example, whenever aplantation forest is established, a hillside is terraced, ora farm dam is constructed, run-off is usually reduced. As
a result, the quantity of water available for extraction
from a river or aquifer is less than it otherwise would be.
Accounting for water in a way that is consistent with thehydrological cycle and that avoids double counting of its
potential is critical to developing the robust allocationand management systems that underpin a green
economy (Young and McColl 2008).

Geothermal
steam - CL Tower

Solar troughCL Tower

Nuclear
CL Pond

Nuclear
CL Tower

Fossil, biomass
or waste - CL Tower

Fossil, biomass
or waste - CL Pond

2.3 Water and energy
The interdependence of water and energy demands also
needs careful attention as arrangements are put in place
for a transition to a green economy. There are at least
two dimensions to this relationship.
First, water plays an important role in energy generation,
notably as a coolant in power stations. In the USA,for example, 40 per cent of industrial water-use is for
power-station cooling (National Research Council 2010),
although water-use efficiency varies with the technology
used (Figure 3). By 2030, it is expected that 31 per cent of
all industrial water-use in China will be for cooling power
plants (2030 Water Resources Group 2009). Generally,
as countries become wealthier and more populous,
industrial demand for water is expected to increase.
In China, more than half of the increase in demand forwater over the next 25 years is expected to result froma significant expansion in its industrial sector (see Figure10), which will need to be accommodated through asimultaneous reduction in the amount of water used for
irrigation in the agricultural sector.
Second, the water supply and sanitation sector is a large
consumer of energy. Relative to its value, water is heavy
and in energy terms expensive both to pump over long
distances and to lift. In California, USA, where large volumesof water are transported over long distances, the watersector consumes 19 per cent of the state’s electricity and30 per cent of its natural gas (Klein et al. 2005).

122

NuclearOL Cooling

Fossil, biomass
or waste - OL Cooling

Coal IGCC
CL Tower
Natural gas
CL Tower
Natural gas
OL Cooling

Litres per MegaWatt/hour
5,300
2,000
350

Average value
Minimum value
Maximum value

Notes:
OL - Open Loop cooling
CL - Closed Loop cooling

Figure 3: Water consumption for power
generation, USA (2006)
Source: the U.S. Department of Energy (2006)

WaterIn developed countries, the relatively high energy
costs of pumping and treating water for household,industrial or mining purposes are broadly accepted.
In developing countries, great care must be taken to
ensure that water treatment and distribution systems
remain affordable. The relatively modest financial
returns from food production in both developed anddeveloping countries means it rarely pays to pumpwater over long distances for agricultural purposes. In
recognition of this, Saudi Arabia has recently shifted
its food security policy from one that subsidises water
use at home to one that invests in the developmentof agriculture in other countries where water supplies
are more abundant. This is enabling Saudi Arabia
to access food at more affordable prices and use therevenue saved for other, more sustainable, purposes(Lippman 2010).

Appreciation of the nexus between water and energy
highlights a set of green investment opportunities thatare starting to emerge. In Durham, Canada, for example,
a water efficiency field trial3 was able to reduce water
use by 22 per cent, electricity by 13 per cent and gas
by 9 per cent, with a resultant annual reduction in CO2emissions of 1.2 tonnes per household – an 11 per centreduction (Veritec Consulting 2008).
3. The field trial took a sample of 175 households in the region of Durham,
east of Toronto. The sample homes were given upgrades in efficient
clothes washers, dishwashers, toilets, showerheads, fridges and landscapepackages to quantify the potential water, energy, gas, and CO2 savings
from efficient fixtures, appliances and landscape design. To control andmeasure demand for each of the resources, sub-meters and data loggers
were installed on fixtures and appliances within the home. The savings inresources could be attributed to both efficient fixtures and appliances andefficient water and energy use habits of the homeowners. The annual utility
cost savings are expected to be more than US$ 200 a year, which allows
recovery of the additional installation cost in 3.4 years.

123Towards a green economy

3 Challenges and opportunities
This section identifies the challenges associated withwater scarcity and declining water quality in many parts of
the world. It outlines opportunities for societies to manage
their water resources more efficiently and to make thetransition to a green economy. In doing so, societies canachieve the Millennium Development Goals.

year, 1.4 million children5 under the age of five die due toa lack of access to clean water and adequate sanitation
services (UNICEF 2004). In east Nigeria and north
Cameroon, every 1 per cent increase in use of unprotectedwater sources for drinking purposes is directly associatedwith a 0.16 per cent increase in child mortality (Wardet al. 2010).

3.1 Challenges

Gleick (2004, 2009) argues that failure to provide
people with affordable and reliable access to waterand sanitation services is one of humankind’s greatest
failings. Lack of sanitation makes people sick. When wateris unclean, water-borne diseases such as diarrhoea andwater-washed diseases including scabies and trachoma
are common (Bradley 1974). Diarrhoea is the third mostcommon cause of child mortality in West Africa after
malaria and respiratory infections (ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD
2008). New water-borne diseases such as the Whipple
disease are still emerging (Fenollar et al. 2009).

Poverty, access to clean water and adequate sanitation
services
Nearly 1 billion people lack access to clean drinking
water and 2.6 billion lack access to improved sanitation
services (WHO/UNICEF 2010)4. As a direct result, every
4. WHO (2010) notes that rapid urbanization between 1990 and 2008
has led to an increased (urban) population of 40m not using water from
improved sources and an increased (urban) population of 260m not using
improved sanitation.

Box 1: Economic impacts ofpoor sanitation
Together, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines
and Vietnam lose an estimated US$ 9 billion ayear because of poor sanitation (based on 2005
prices). This amounts to around 2 per cent of
their combined GDP, varying from 1.3 per cent in
Vietnam, 1.5 per cent in the Philippines, 2.3 percent in Indonesia and 7.2 per cent in Cambodia.
The annual economic impact of inadequate
sanitation is approximately US$ 6.3 billion inIndonesia, US$ 1.4 billion in the Philippines,
US$ 780 million in Vietnam and US$ 450 million
in Cambodia. In these four countries, the total
value of this impact is US$ 8.9 billion per year.
In 1991, a cholera epidemic swept through mostof Peru6 and cost US$ 1 billion to control. If one
tenth of this amount (US$ 100 million) had beenspent on the provision of sanitation services,
the epidemic would not have occurred.
Source: World Bank – Water and Sanitation Program (2008) and Tropp (2010)

6. The epidemic also spread into several other countries inSouth, Central and North America

The adverse impacts of water-borne disease on an
economy can be large (Box 1). When people are sick,they cannot work and, among other costs, considerable
expenditure on medical treatment is needed.
The adverse impacts of inadequate access to cleanwater, however, do not stop with water-borne disease.
When water is not on tap, people (mainly women andchildren) must either spend a large amount of time
fetching water or pay high prices for it to be carted
to them. In Western Jakarta, Indonesia, the cost ofwater purchased from a water cart is ten to fifty times
the full cost to a water utility of establishing a reliablemains water supply (Fournier et al. 2010). In certain
circumstances, it is challenging to to find a way toconvince governments and private investors to go
ahead despite a widespread perception that poor
people are not able to pay for water (services) andthat it is not cost-efficient to supply water to informal
settlements. A lack of easy access to clean water alsoerodes the capacity of the poorest to engage in otheractivities. When children, for example, spend a large
proportion of their days fetching water, they have less
opportunity to attend school and obtain the educationnecessary to escape from poverty. When women areforced to spend time carting water, they have little
opportunity for gainful employment elsewhere. Morethan a quarter of the population of East Africa live
in conditions where every trip to collect water takes
more than half an hour (WHO/UNICEF 2010).
5. 3,900 children per day.

124

WaterBox 2: Millennium Development Goals and water
In 2000, governments committed to a wide range ofMillennium Development Goals (MDG) that rely upon
access to water and made a specific commitment tohalve the number of people without access to cleanwater and adequate sanitation by 2015.

Population without improved sanitation

45

Significant progress has been made in India andChina (WHO/UNICEF 2010).

42

40

The 2010 update on progress towards the water
specific goals reports that 884 million – nearly
1 billion people – lack access to clean drinking
water. When it comes to sanitation, 2.6 billion
people do not have access to improved sanitation
services. One in seven of those people without
access to adequate sanitation services live in rural
areas (WHO/UNICEF 2010).
At the current rate of investment progress, theMillennium Development Goals for sanitation will bemissed by 1 billion people (Figure 4). Most of thesepeople live in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (Figure 5).

4540

39 (2008)
36 (projected)

35

1 billion% 50 4630
25

23 (target)
1.7 billion

15
10
5
0
1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Figure 4: Global progress towards MDGs’ target
to reduce the number of people without access toadequate sanitation services to 1.7 billion people
by 2015.
Source: WHO/UNICEF (2010)

Progress towards MDG target
On track
Progress but insufficient
Not on track
No or insufficient data

Figure 5: Progress towards attainment of the MDGs’ sanitation target to halve the number of people
without adequate sanitation by 2015
Source: WHO/UNICEF (2010)125

Towards a green economy

Little or no water scarcity

Approaching physical water scarcity

Physical water scarcity

Economic water scarcity

Not estimatedDefinitions and indicators• Little or no water scarcity. Abundant water resources relative to use, with less than 25% of water from rivers withdrawn for human purposes.
• Physical water scarcity (water resources development is approaching or has exceeded sustainable limits). More than 75% of river flows arewithdrawn for agriculture, industry, and domestic purposes (accounting for recycling of return flows). This definition – relating water
availability to water demand – implies that dry areas are not necessarily water scarce.
• Approaching physical water scarcity. More than 60% of river flows are withdrawn. These basins will experience physical water scarcity in thenear future.
• Economic water scarcity (human, institutional, and financial capital limit access to water even though water in nature is available locally tomeet human demands). Water resources are abundant relative to water use, with less than 25% of water from rivers withdrawn for humanpurposes, but malnutrition exists.

Figure 6: Areas of physical and economic water scarcity
Source: Molden (2007)

From a government perspective, when water supply
and sanitation services are inadequate, large amountsof revenue are spent dealing with the impacts of disease,rather than generating wealth (Tropp 2010).
In recognition of these fundamental and pressing
challenges, governments have committed collectively toa set of MDGs, which, among other things, aim to halve
the number of people without access to clean waterand adequate sanitation services by 2015 (Box 2). By
providing access to clean water and adequate sanitation
services at an affordable price people can begin to save,
invest and take a longer-term view of their future7. A
transition to greener approaches to resource use andinvestment becomes possible.
Water scarcity
Exploring opportunities to invest in the constructionof dams, the International Water Management
7. In this context, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) initiatives, andspecially the teaching of basic sanitation and hygiene to communities andschool children will also prove critical.

126

Institute (IWMI) has identified two types of water
scarcity: physical scarcity and economic scarcity (Figure6). In regions where there is physical scarcity, thesustainable supply limit has been reached and little
opportunity to construct more dams remains. In regions
where the scarcity is economic, however, it is possible toincrease supplies if the financial resources necessary tobuild a new dam can be found. The International Water
Management Institute is of the view that economic
scarcity is widespread in sub-Saharan Africa and inparts of South and South-East Asia (Molden 2007).
There is general consensus that when people haveaccess to less than 1,700 cubic meters of water per
year, a considerable proportion of them will be
trapped in poverty (Falkenmark et al. 1989). Taking
a different approach, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines water
stress as “severe” when the ratio of total water use to
renewable supply exceeds 40 per cent (OECD 2009).
Using this measure, the OECD has estimated that by
2030 nearly half the world’s population (3.9 billion

people) will be living under conditions of severe water
stress (Figure 7). The reasons for the emergence of thisscarcity include:■■ Population increase – by 2030 the world’s
population will have increased by 2.4 billion people.
All of these people will to demand access to water
for basic needs, to supply industrial goods andgrow food;■■ Increased living standards – as countries develop andpeople become wealthier, they tend to consume morewater and more water-intensive products such as meat;■■ Over-exploitation – around the world a considerable
proportion of aquifers and river systems are overused. It has been estimated that 15 per cent of India’s
total agricultural production is being delivered via
groundwater depletion – the situation that occurs
when extraction exceeds replenishment (Briscoe andMalik 2006);■■ Water pollution – an increasing number of watersupplies are becoming contaminated by pollutants, withthe consequence that less water is available for use or it
costs much more to make it usable;■■ Ecosystem degradation – over the last 50 years
ecosystems have been degraded faster than ever before(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Freshwater
ecosystems, which provide critical services such as the
purification of water by wetlands or forests are the mostthreatened and have been among the hardest hit, and;■■ Adverse climate change8 – when combined witheffects of climate change on dryland production
systems, the International Food Policy Research Instituteestimates that the aggregate effect of climate change islikely to be a significant reduction in total agricultural
productivity. The greatest adverse impacts of climatechange on people are expected in South Asia. In the next
40 years, child malnutrition is expected to increase by
20 per cent as a direct result of climate change (Nelson
et al. 2009).

8. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report lists 32 examples of major projected
impacts of climate change amongst eight regions (covering the whole
Earth). Of these: 25 include primary links to hydrological changes; of theother seven, water is implicated in four and two are general; only one
refers to main impacts not obviously linked to the hydrological cycle: coralbleaching. The IPCC technical report (2008) underpinning this assessment
report concludes unambiguously, inter alia, that: "the relationshipbetween climate change and freshwater resources is of primary concern
and interest". So far, "water resource issues have not been adequately
addressed in climate change analyses and climate policy formulations";
and, according to many experts, "water and its availability and quality willbe the main pressures, and issues, on societies and the environment underclimate change". The Scientific Expert Group Report on Climate Change
and Sustainable Development (2007) prepared for the 15th Session of theCommission on Sustainable Development came to similar conclusions.

Millions of people

Water

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

2005
2030
OECD
No

2005

2030
BRIC

Low

Medium

2005
2030
RoW
SevereFigure 7: Number of people living in waterstressed areas in 2030 by country type
Source: OECD (2009)

Balancing supply and demand
In an attempt to understand the magnitude of thisemerging water-scarcity challenge, the 2030 Water
Resources Group has projected global demand for water
and, under different scenarios, compared it with likely
supply. They concluded that if there is no improvementin the efficiency of water use, in 2030 demand for water
could outstrip supply by 40 per cent (Figure 8). Clearly, agap of this magnitude cannot (and will not) be sustained.
Figure 9 offers an alternative perspective on themagnitude of the emerging water-supply challenge.
Under a business-as-usual scenario, improvements inwater productivity can be expected to close around20 per cent of the gap between global demand andsupply. Increases in supply through the construction ofdams and desalination plants, coupled with actions suchas increased recycling, can be expected to close the gap
by a similar amount. The remaining 60 per cent, however,must come from increased investment in infrastructure
and water-policy reforms that improve the efficiency ofwater use. If the resources are not found to facilitate asignificant increase in efficiency and if the water-policy
reforms are not implemented, water crises must be
expected to emerge. Figure 9 suggests that the averagerate of improvement in water productivity and supply
enhancement needs to increase at double the rate of
improvement achieved in the past decade. Globally, thetime for procrastination is past.

127

Billion m3, 154 basins/regions

water withdrawals, assuming no efficiency gains
Towards a green economy

6,900
2%
CAGR

1,500
Municipal &domestic
Industry

4,500
600
800

3,100

Existing
withdrawals2

-40%

2,800

4,200

100

4,500
Agriculture

1900

Relevant supply
quantity is much lower
than the absolute
renewable water
availability in nature

Basins with2030
withdrawals3 deficits

Basins withsurplus700

Groundwater

3,500

Surface water

Existing accessible,
reliable, sustainable supply1

Existing supply which can be provided at 90% reliability, based on historical hydrology and infrastructure investments scheduled through 2010; net of environmental requirements

2

Based on 2010 agricultural production analyses from IFPRI

3

Based on GDP, population projections and agricultural production projections from IFPRI; considers no water productivity gains between 2005-2030

Figure 8: Aggregated global gap between existing accessible, reliable supply and 2030 water withdrawals,
assuming no efficiency gains
Source: 2030 Water Resources Group (2009)

Business-as-usual approaches will not meet demand for raw waterBillion m3

Portion of gap
Percent

8,000
Demand with no productivity
improvements
7,000
Historical improvements
in water productivity1

20%

Remaining gap

60%

Increase in supply2 underbusiness-as-usual

20%

6,000

5,000

3,000
Today2

2030

Existing accessible,
reliable supply3

1 Based on historical agricultural yield growth rates from 1990-2004 from FAOSTAT, agricultural and industrial efficiency improvements from IFPRI
2 Total increased capture of raw water through infrastructure buildout, excluding unsustainable extraction
3 Supply shown at 90% reliability and includes infrastructure investments scheduled and funded through 2010. Current 90%-reliable supply does not meet average demand

Figure 9: Projection of the global demand for water and, under a business-as-usual scenario, the amountthat can be expected to be met from supply augmentation and improvements in technical water use
efficiency (productivity)
Source: 2030 Water Resources Group (2009)

Figure 10 on page 131 shows the nature of expected
increase in demand for water throughout the world. As
discussed, one of the more significant challenges is to findways to supply more water to the industrial sector while
increasing agricultural production. Significant transfersof water from rural areas to the industrial sector can be
expected, especially in China and in North America (2030
Working Group 2009). In anticipation of the pressurethat these shortages will place on water-dependent
business, a number of large companies are beginningto quantify and account for their water use and water128

related impacts and the nature of the water-related risks
they face (Lloyds 2010; United Nations 2010a).

3.2 Opportunities
Investing in biodiversity and ecosystem services
In terms of ecosystem health and function, global
assessments of the health of the world’s water river
systems and aquifers suggest that the aggregate trend

WaterBillion m3
China

178

300

India

338

Sub-SaharanAfrica320

Rest of Asia

28

243

N America

181

124

72

100

12 184

S America

89

68

23 180

MENA

85

6
9 99

21 7 2854
89

40 468

92

440

80

440

117

EuropeOceania

Change from 2005 (%)

21

532

326

61
58
283
54
43
50

Municipal and domestic
Industry
Agriculture

95
47
109

Figure 10: Assessment of expected increase in the annual global demands for water by country and region(2005-2030)
Source: 2030 Water Working Group (2009)is one of decline (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
Report 2005; WWF’s Living Planet Report 2010; the UN
World Water Development Report 2010). Examples ofthis decline include:■■ In Manila, the Philippines, groundwater extraction,
primarily for industrial purposes, is lowering the watertable at a rate of between 6 metres and12 metres per
year (Tropp 2010), and;■■ Barriers have been laid across China’s Taihu Laketo stop regular algal blooms reaching the water
treatment plant that supplies water to over 2 million
people (Guo 2007);■■ In 1997, China’s Yellow River flowed all the way
to the sea only for 35 days. For much of the year theriver’s last 400-plus miles were dry (Fu 2004).

■■ From October 2002 until October 2010, the absenceof flow has meant that dredges have been used to keep
the mouth of the Australia’s River Murray open to the sea;

There is a new recognition of the positive synergy thatemerges between healthy environments and healthy
communities. As documented by Le Quesne et al. (2010),
some countries are now investing large amounts of

Box 3: Two examples of governments investing in river restoration
Korea
In July 2009, the Republic of Korea announced
a Five-Year Plan (2009-2013) for Green Growthin order to implement the National Strategy forGreen Growth. This includes a 22.2 trillion Korean
Won (US$ 17.3 billion) investment in a Four
Major Rivers Restoration Project. The five key
objectives of the project are as follows: (1) securing
sufficient water resources against water scarcity,(2) implementing comprehensive flood control
measures, (3) improving water quality whilst
restoring the river-basin eco­systems, (4) developing
the local regions around major rivers, and (5)developing the cultural and leisure space at rivers.
Overall, it is expected that the project will create
340,000 jobs and generate an estimated 40 trillion
Won (US$ 31.1 billion) of positive economic effects
as rivers are restored to health.

Australia
In January 2007, the Australian government announced
a A$ 10 billion (US$ 10 billion) commitment to restore
health to the seriously over-allocated Australia’s
Murray Darling basin and appoint an independent
authority to prepare a new plan for the basin using
the best available science. Some A$ 3.1 billion is being
spent on the purchase of irrigation entitlements from
irrigators and the transfer of these entitlements to
a Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder, A$
5.9 billion on the upgrade of infrastructure with half
the water savings going to the environment, and A$
1 billion on the collection of the information necessary
to plan properly.
Sources: Office of National River Restoration (under the Ministry of Land, Transportand Maritime Affairs) (2009); Korean Ministry of Environment and Korea Environment
Institute (2009) and Murray Darling Basin Authority (2010). Available at http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/prime-ministers-10-billion-water-plunge/storye6frg6nf-1111112892512

129

Towards a green economy

Biome/ecosystem

Typical cost of restoration(high-cost scenario)

Estimated annual benefits
from restoration(avg. cost scenario)

Net present valueof benefits over
40 yearsInternal rate of
returnBenefit/cost
ratio

US$/ha

US$/ha%Ratio

Coastal232,700

73,900935,400

11%

4.4

Mangroves

2,880

4,290

86,90040%

26.4

Inland wetlands

33,00014,200171,300

12%

5.4

Lake/rivers

4,000

3,800

69,70027%

15.5

Table 1: Examples of the estimated costs and benefits of restoration projects in different biomes
Source: Adapted from TEEB (2009a)money in the restoration of degraded river systems
and the development of policies and administrative
arrangements designed to prevent degradation ofthese systems. Two examples are summarised in Box
3. Table 1 summarises the general nature of returns
to investment in the restoration of ecosystems. When
astute investments in the restoration of ecosystems are
made, internal rates of return in excess of 10 per cent are
attainable.
Investment in sanitation and drinking water supply
In many developing countries, one of the biggest
opportunities to expedite a transition to a green
economy is to invest in the provision of water andsanitation services to the poor.
A recent estimate puts the cost of achieving the2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) at US$
142 billion per year for providing sanitation services
and US$ 42 billion per year for drinking water supply
to households (Hutton and Bartram 2008b). Moreinvestment is required for sanitation services than
drinking water as the number of households without
access to adequate sanitation services is muchhigher (WHO/UNICEF 2010; Tropp 2010).
Although the amount of money needed to attainthe Millennium Development Goals for water isconsiderable, when spread over a number of years anddivided by the number of people expected to benefit
from such expenditure, the investment case is strong. In
Ghana, for example, the OECD estimates that investment
of US$ 7.40 per person per year over a decade would
enable the country to meet its MDG target (Sanctuary
and Tropp 2005). Estimates of the required per capita
expenditure in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Tanzania andUganda range from US$ 4 to US$ 7 per capita peryear (UN Millennium Project 2004; Tropp 2010).
Taking a different approach, Grey (2004) has estimatedthe amount that each sub-Saharan country would
need to spend to achieve water supply and sanitation
standards now achieved in South Africa. Depending on

130

the country, the amount needed to be spent varied from
US$ 15 to $ 70 per capita per year over the ten years from2005 to 2015.
As shown later in this chapter, returns to investmentin the provision of these services can be high. In
particular, Sachs (2001) has found that the average rateof economic growth in developing countries wheremost of the poor have affordable access to clean waterand adequate sanitation is 2.7 per cent greater than thatattained in countries where these services are not well
supplied.9 This observation, reinforced by background
papers prepared for this chapter (Tropp 2010; Ward etal. 2010), suggests that failure to invest adequately inthe provision of affordable access to clean water andadequate sanitation acts as a barrier to development
and that early investment in these areas is a necessary
precondition to progress. Grey and Sadoff (2007)
argue that a minimum amount of investment inwater infrastructure is a necessary precondition todevelopment; using a range of case studies, they identify
a close association between adequate investment ininfrastructure and environmental degradation.
Investing in smaller, local water-supply systems
As observed by Schreiner et al. (2010), the presenceof economic water scarcity should not be interpreted
as a recommendation for the construction of largedams. In many cases, greater returns can be achieved
from the construction of smaller storages that are
built by and serve local communities. At this scale,community engagement and management of
infrastructure is easier and adverse environmental
impacts tend to be fewer in both urban and rural
settings (Winpenny 2003).
In China’s Gansu province, for example, investment in thecollection of local rainwater at a cost of US$ 12 per capita
9. Sachs (2001) estimated that the rate of growth in GDP per capita incountries where most of the poor had access to clean water and adequate
sanitation services was 3.7 per cent. When these services are not available,
however, he found that the average annual rate of growth in GDP per capita
was 1.0 per cent.

Mainline

Water

Mastermetre

Water utility PALYJA’s responsibility

Community-based organisations’ responsibility

Figure 11: Schematic representation of a master meter system managed by a community-basedorganisation

Box 4: Micro-scale infrastructure provision in Western Jakarta
In Jakarta, Indonesia, a significant proportion of
the population lives in informal settlements. While
the government does not want to legitimise theunlawful occupation of land, it realises that theprovision of access to safe water and sanitaryconditions is necessary. A private water utility,
PALYJA, is responsible for water supply in Western
Jakarta and it is expected to supply water to all
residents, including those in informal settlements.
To this end, PALYJA has a water-supply contract withthe government whereby they are paid for the cost ofdelivering water to users and for the cost of building
and maintaining the necessary infrastructure.
As part of this process, PALYJA is trialling the provisionof access to groups of informal houses by establishing

was sufficient to enable a significant upgrade of domestic
water supplies and to supplement irrigation. One project
benefited almost 200,000 households (Gould 1999). At
the micro-scale, it is possible to make much greater use

community-based organisations. Each organisation
is given access to a single master water meter and is
responsible for the management of the community’swater- supply infrastructure as well as paying for thevolume of water taken (Figure 11). MercyCorps hashelped connect 38 households to a single meter, while
USAID’s Environmental Service Program (ESP) has
brought 58 households together. Once established, thecommunity signs a supply contract with PALYJA, with a
special tariff arrangement to account for the fact thatmany households are using a single meter. Under thisarrangement, both sides benefit: the community getsreliable access to an affordable waste supply, while
PALYJA supplies a large number of houses with water atmuch lower overhead and administrative costs.
Source: Fournier et al. (2010)of aid organisations and local knowledge. In Western
Jakarta, for example, the local water utility is working
with non-government organisations to provide water topeople in informal settlements in a manner that would131

Towards a green economy

be impossible for a government utility to do so without
being seen to sanction the presence of these settlements(see Box 4).
Accessing new (non-traditional) sources of water
One of the most common approaches to resolving watersupply problems is to build a large dam. Constructing
them typically involves significant cost, the dislocationof many people and many adverse environmental
problems.10 Schreiner et al. (2010) observe thaturban communities have historically relied on large
dams for their water supplies. More recently, however,water-supply options have expanded to include thecapture and storage of stormwater and desalination,
fog interceptions in cloud forests (notably in the Andes
mountains), transfers between islands, inter-basinwater transfers, bulk transport such as by pipeline orMedusa bags (giant polyfibre bags holding up to 1.5
billion litres of potable water that are towed by ships).
Other communities and countries are investing insewage recycling. Singapore, for example, has invested
in the development of systems that treat sewage to a
standard allowing it to be used for drinking purposes.
Most of these technologies, however, are reliant upon
the use of increasing amounts of energy and, as aresult, the costs of water provision are rising in mostregions where there is physical water scarcity.
Desalination has the advantage that it is climate
independent but, as with most of these alternative
sources of supply, is disadvantaged by the fact thatit requires access to large amounts of energy. Usually,
sewage recycling is cheaper than desalination as
it uses the same reverse osmosis technology, but
requires about half as much energy per unit ofwater treated (Côté et al. 2005). Public opposition tohousehold use of recycled sewage water, however,is strong (Dolnicar and Schäfer 2006). A carefulassessment of the costs of these alternative sources
10. For an authoritative response to the controversies surrounding largedams, see World Commission on Dams (2000).

132

of supply often reveals that it is cheaper to invest in
demand control (Beato and Vives 2010; 2030 Water
Working Group 2010). In a green economy, there
is much more attention to the long-term costs andimpacts of resource use on the environment.
Producing more food and energy with less water
As the world’s population increases, more water will
be needed for household and industrial purposes withthe consequence that in many areas, either more foodwill have to be imported, or more food produced withless water. When asked, “Is there enough land, water,and human capacity to produce food for a growing
population over the next 50 years – or will we ‘run out’of water?”, analysis undertaken by the International
Water Management Institute (IWMI) reveals that, that
“It is possible to produce the food – but it is probablethat today’s food production and environmental
trends, if continued, will lead to crises in many partsof the world” (Molden 2007).
For example, in many developing countries, typicalirrigated maize yields are in the vicinity of one tothree tonnes per hectare, whilst they could be as
high as eight tonnes per hectare. There is a significant
opportunity to increase crop yields and avoid a global
food security crisis. If this opportunity is realised, thennot only will it also be possible to divert water toother uses, but it will also be possible for developing
countries to produce a surplus for sale to others.
Institutional reform
When coupled with more traditional hard approaches
to investment in built infrastructure, the softer
approach of developing more effective administrative
arrangements and policies that encourage private
investment can significantly reduce the amount ofmoney that governments need to invest in the watersector to achieve the same outcome. Opportunities of
how to do this are developed in section 5. Typically,
soft approaches focus on incentives and the factorsthat motivate consumers to manage their water use.

Water

4 The economics of greening water use
Research around the world suggests that there areno single-shot solutions to the world’s mounting
water access, sanitation and scarcity problems. Eachcircumstance has its own unique set of challenges andopportunities. At the most general level, it is becoming
apparent that the best results come for the pursuit of
mixed solutions. Simple single-shot solutions tend
to be prohibitively expensive and, in many cases, areinsufficient to solve known supply problems (2030
Water Resources Group 2010). In the Zambezi Basin,
it has been estimated that even full development of
the area’s irrigation potential would benefit no morethan 18 per cent of its rural poor (Björklund et al. 2009).
A much more sophisticated investment strategy isneeded (Ménard and Saleth 2010).

4.1 The economics of investingin water and ecosystems* The water-related investments are part of an integrated green investment scenario, G2, in
which a total of 2 per cent of global GDP is allocated to a green transformation of a range of
key sectors. The results of this scenario, in which the 2 per cent is additional to current GDP,is compared to a corresponding scenario in which an additional 2 per cent of global GDP isallocated following existing business-as-usual trends,BAU2 (see Modelling chapter for moredetailed explanation of scenarios and results).

Under the global model developed for the Green Economy
Report by the Millennium Institute, the green investment
scenario assumed investment in the water supply andsanitation sector would equal that estimated by Huttonand Bartram (2008b) as necessary to achieve the MDGs forwater by 2015. Once this is achieved, it is assumed thatgovernments will decide, once again, to halve the numberof people without access to a reliable mains water supply
and adequate sanitation. This new goal is achieved in
2030. Any funds left over during this second period areallocated to other water-related investments. In areas
where there is economic water scarcity, priority is given
to the construction of dams. In other areas, investment ischannelled into making water-use more efficient. Where
possible, and economically appropriate, desalination
plants are constructed. These are assumed to supply water
into the urban sector at a cost of US$ 0.11/m3 – in constant
US$ 2010, same unit for monetary values below.
Under the business-as-usual scenario, water use remains
unsustainable and stocks of both surface and groundwater
decline. Under the green investment scenario, global
water use is kept within sustainable limits and all the
MDGs for water are achieved in 2015. Water use is more
efficient, resulting in increased agricultural, biofuel andindustrial production. The number of people living in awater-stressed region is 4 per cent less under the green
investment scenario by 2030 compared to business-asusual, up to 7 per cent by 2050.
The results from this modelling are encouraging interms of both economic terms and from the perspective

2% GDP invested in green
sectors
Unit

2030

2050

Additional investment inwater sector

US$ Bn/year

191

311

Additional water fromdesalination

Km3

27

38

Water from efficiency improvements (driven by green
investments)

Km3

604

1,322

Total employment in thewater sector

Mn people

38

43

Change in total employment
in the water sector relative
to BAU2*

%

-13

-22

Table 2: Modelled results of the Green
Investment scenario
of water management (see Table 2). For 2050, total
employment and income is greater under the green
investment scenario, whereas the number of people
working in the water sector is lower. This counterintuitive finding occurs because the sector becomesmuch more efficient. Labour and other resources, which,under BAU2 would have been retained in the watersector, are freed for use in other sectors. In addition,
as water is used more efficiently, more is available for
manufacturing and other purposes with the result that
more people are gainfully employed.11
The overall conclusion from this assessment is that,
where there is water scarcity or when large proportionsof a population do not have access to adequate watersupply and sanitation services, early investment inwater is a necessary precondition to progress.

4.2 Selecting projects and initiatives
for investment
While it is useful and informative to examine theeconomics of investing in water at the global level,
investments must be made primarily at the river basin,
catchment and local level.
11. These findings are consistent with those of Hagos et al. (2008)
who found that, as access to water improves, employment in othersectors expands.

133

Towards a green economy
China – Water availability cost curve
Industry

Agricultural

Specified deficit
between supply andwater requirements
in 2030

SupplyMunicipal & domestic

Supply/demand gap in 2030 = 201 billion m3
Total cost to fill gap = - US$ 21.7 billion

Cost of additional water availability in 2030, $/m3

Genetic crop development (irrigated)
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1
-1.2
-1.4
-1.6
-1.8
-2.0
-2.2
-2.4
-2.6
-2.8
3.0
-3.2
-3.4
-8.2

20

40

60

New laundry machines
Power: Dry cooling

Desalination (thermal) – co-located with power plant
Local water conveyance
Seawater direct use

Desalination (RO)New toilets
Fresh water transfer – inter-basin
Rain water harvesting – roof top
Wastewater reuse – municipal/industrial
Drip irrigation

Irrigation schedulingRetrofit showerheads
Integrated plant stress mgt. (irrigated)
No till (irrigated)
New faucets
Integrated plant stress mgt.
(rainfed)
Others: waste other reuse

Retrofit toilets

Dam & reservoir - large
80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

Incremental availability
billion m3

260

Fresh water transfer – intra-basin

Steel: wastewater reuse
Wastewater reuse in commercial buildings

Rainwater harvesting
Groundwater pumping - deep

New showerheads

Mulching
On-farm canal lines
Pipe water conveyance
Improved fertilizer balance (rainfed)
Efficient sprinkler irrigation

Municipal leakage
Power: wastewater reuse
No till rainfed
Steel: dry dedusting
Commercial building leakage

Dam & reservoir - small
Groundwater pumping - shallow
Post-harvest transport and storage

Paper: concealed filtration
Power: condensed water cooling
Steel: condensed water cooling
Textile: wastewater reuse
Paper: intermediate water reuse

Genetic crop development – rainfed
Aquifer recharge
Local water pumping
Retrofit faucets
Improved fertiliser balance (irrigated)
Rice Intensification

Paper: white water reuse
Steel: coke dry quenching
Power: USC

Figure 12: Relative costs of different methods of supplying water in China
Source:20302030
Water
WorkingGroup(2009)SOURCE:
Water
ResourcesGroup

Estimated child morbidity (stunting)

Estimated child mortality

20% reduction

10% reduction

Current

Average proportion of childhood
deaths (<5 yrs)

Average age for height ratio(St. Dev. below ref. median)
0.0

Mortality

(Low)
0.2

0.35

(High)
Morbidity

-3.2

0

400

800

Kilometres

Figure 13: Predicted effect of a 10 per cent and 20 per cent reduction in the proportion of people obtaining
their primary water supply from surface water or unprotected well water on child mortality and childmorbidity (stunting), Niger River basin
Source: Ward et al. (2010)134

WaterIn areas where the costs of enhancing water supplies fromtraditional sources are rising, the 2030 Water Working
Group is recommending the preparation of formal costs
curves similar to those shown in Figure 12. These cost
curves rank each potential solution to a problem in termsof the relative cost per unit of desired outcome achieved
and can be used to assess the likely costs and benefitsof each solution. One of the most striking features ofthis approach is that one often finds solutions that bothmake more water available and cost less money. In China,
for example, constructing water-availability cost curves
identified 21 opportunities to make more water available
for use and save money (Figure 12). These include increased
paper recycling, investment in leakage reduction, wastewater reuse in power stations and commercial buildings
and investment in water-efficient shower heads. All ofthese approaches are consistent with the development ofa green economy, which seeks to minimise the impact of
economic activity on the environment.

4.3 Flow of benefits from investment in
the water supply and sanitation sector
Many returns to investment in the water sector are
indirect. Build a toilet for girls in a school and they
are more likely to go to school. This simple statement
highlights the fact that investment in water opens upother opportunities for development. Assessing thecase for more investment in water infrastructure in the
Niger Basin, Ward et al. (2010) report that investmentin providing access to potable water and in education
are the only two variables that are consistently related
to poverty reduction across the whole Niger Riverbasin (Box 5).
Highlighting the complex spatial nature of responses
to water investment, Figure 13 shows the predicted
reductions in child mortality and morbidity from theprotection of drinking water supplies.

Box 5: Empirical analysis of the relationship between poverty and theprovision of access to water and sanitation in the Niger River basin
Ninety four million people live in the Niger River basin.
The proportion living below the poverty line in Burkina
Faso is 70.3 per cent, in Guinea 70.1 per cent and in Niger
65.9 per cent. Childhood mortality rates are up to 250
per 1000 live births. In 2004, only 53 per cent of thoseliving in the Niger River basin were found to have accessto a reliable and safe source of drinking water. Only 37
per cent had access to adequate sanitation facilities.
The quality of water used by households appears tobe as important, or more so, than the total quantityof water available in the environment in predicting
poverty levels. The use of unprotected well or surface
water is generally positively correlated with increased
child mortality and increased stunting.
In north-west Nigeria and east Nigeria, a 10 per centdecrease in the number of people using unprotectedwater is correlated with a decrease in child mortality of
up to 2.4 per cent. Increased irrigation development iscorrelated with reductions in child stunting in central
Mali, north-west Nigeria, central and eastern Nigeria andNorth Burkina Faso. Increased time spent in education issignificantly correlated with a reduction in child mortality
and child stunting. In much of the Mali Inner Delta, a oneyear rise in the average level of education is associatedwith an approximate 3 per cent fall in child mortality.
The area of irrigated land was associated withdecreases in poverty in only two cases, north-west

Nigeria and eastern Nigeria and northern Cameroon.
This suggests that the contribution of irrigation tototal rural welfare is low in the Niger River basin andthat the levels of irrigation potential are too small
at present to offer a discernable improvement inlivelihoods at this scale of analysis. This is in contrast
to the general literature on development in thisregion that suggests irrigation will be crucial forthe future economic wellbeing of the basin, alongwith improvements in the productivity of rain-fed
agriculture. However, it may be that the benefits ofirrigation do not yet accrue to the people engaged in its
practice or that they do so at levels too small to registerin these statistics.
The data suggest poverty reduction initiatives that
rely solely on hydrologic probabilities or fail to accountfor the different causal relationships of spatiallydifferentiated poverty are likely to be less effective
than those that take a mixed approach.
Strong spatial patterning is evident. Education
and access to improved water quality are the only
variables that are consistently significant andrelatively stationary across the Niger River basin. At all
jurisdictional scales, education is the most consistentnon-water predictor of poverty. Access to protectedwater sources is the best water-related predictorof poverty.
Source: Ward et al. (2010)135

Towards a green economy

5 Enabling conditions – Overcoming
barriers and driving change
The first half of this chapter focusses on the case forinvesting in the provision of ecosystems services and in thewater supply and sanitation sector. In the second half, we
focus on the institutional conditions, softer approaches,
which have the potential to speed the transition toincrease the return on investment and reduce the amountof money that needs to be invested in the water sector.
Without significant water policy reform to enable thereallocation of water from one sector to another, financiallyreward those who make water use more efficient andso forth, a global analysis by the 2030 Water Working
Group (2010) suggests that some nations will not beable to avoid the emergence of a water crisis in many
regions. If wide ranging reforms are adopted, however,then the group’s analysis suggests that most water crises
can be averted. Investment in water policy reform andgovernance enables greater engagement and use of local
knowledge and for investments to be made at a multitudeof scales. When such approaches are taken, the 2030
Water Working Group estimates that the global amount ofmoney that needs to be invested in the water sector canbe reduced by a factor of four.

5.1 Improving general institutionalarrangements
Arguably, the greatest impediment to investment inwater infrastructure and management arrangements has
been the difficulty in establishing high-level governanceand political support for arrangements that support
effective governance (Global Water Partnership 2009a).
Problems range from a simple lack of institutional
capacity to the presence of widespread corruption12 andopportunities to gain political favour. Building uponthese observations in a background paper prepared
for this chapter, Ménard and Saleth (2010) reportthat governments are learning that improvement inarrangements for the administration of water resources
offers one of the least-cost opportunities to resolve
water-management problems in a timely manner. Long12. The 2008 Global Corruption Report found that corruption in the watersector is likely to increase the cost of achieving the Millennium Development
Goals by US$ 50 billion (Transparency International 2008). US$ 50 billion isabout the same amount of money as the 2030 Water Resources Group’s
estimate of the annual cost of implementing the least-cost solution to theresolution of global water problems.

136

term solutions such as the establishment of reliable,
stable governance arrangements for the supply of water
are central to a green economy.
A parallel issue is the question of rights or entitlements to
use land and water. When these rights are insecure, theincentive to take the long-term perspective necessary
to encourage green approaches to investment isweak. When land tenure, water entitlements and otherforms of property rights are well-defined, far moresustainable forms of resource use can be expected.
Early investment in the development of land registers
and other similar processes are simple ways to expedite
the transition to a green economy.
Increases in the capacity of a nation to collect taxes
will clearly make it easier to move to full-cost pricing
arrangements and, where appropriate, provide rebates
and other forms of assistance to the most needy without
having to resort to inefficient cross-subsidies.
Another example of an enabling condition is the useof education and information programmes designed
to increase awareness of opportunities to act in anenvironmentally responsible manner. If members of acommunity feel obligated to look after the environment
then they are more likely to do so.

5.2 International trade arrangements
The Enabling Conditions chapter discusses the roleof international trade and trade-related measures in
influencing green economic activity. Whether or notfreer trading arrangements will ultimately be to thebenefit of water users depends upon the degree oftrade liberalisation that occurs and what exceptions
are made. As agriculture uses around 70 per centof all water extracted for consumptive purposes,
and large amounts of water are embodied in manyof the agricultural products traded (Figure 14), thispolicy option deserves careful consideration. When
trade is unrestricted and all inputs priced at full cost,communities have the opportunity to take advantageof the relatively abundant sources of water in otherparts of the world. When trade in agricultural products
is restricted, water use is likely to be less efficient. Fewercrops can be grown per drop of available water. As a

WaterNet virtual water import
Gm3/yr- 108 North America- 107 South America- 70 Oceania- 45 North Africa

Former Soviet Union

Western Europe
North America

Eastern Europe

Middle East

- 30 South-east Asia
- 16 Central Africa

Centraland South Asia

Central America- 5 Southern Africa
2 Central America

North Africa
CentralAfricaSouth-east Asia

South America

13 Former Soviet Union
18 Eastern Europe

Southern Africa
Oceania47 Middle East
150 Central and South Asia
152 Western Europe

Figure 14: Regional virtual water balances and net interregional virtual water flows related to the trade in
agricultural products, 1997–2001. The arrows show net virtual water flows between regions (>10 BCM/yr)
Source: Chapagain and Hoekstra (2008)

whole, the world is generally worse off. However, somecountries strive for food sovereignty for various reasons
including security.
In an attempt to understand the likely impacts of freer
trading arrangements on water use, a background paper
to this chapter uses a model to estimate the likely effects ofagricultural trade liberalisation on water use (Calzadilla
et al. 2010). The model used differentiates between
rain-fed and irrigated agriculture and includes functions
that take into account the effects of climate change on
the volume of water available for extraction. The tradeliberalisation scenario is based on the proposals being
developed as part of the Doha round of negotiations,which seek to move the world towards a regime where
agricultural trade is less restricted. In particular, theanalysis assumes that there is a 50 per cent reduction
in tariffs, a 50 per cent reduction in domestic support
to agriculture and that all export subsidies are removed.
Given that progress towards such a regime will taketime to implement, the scenario is examined with andwithout climate change. The climate-change scenarios
are based on those developed by the International Panelon Climate Change (IPCC) (2008).
Table 3 presents a summary of the findings of thismodelling exercise, presented in more detail in the
background paper. The introduction of Doha-like freer
trading arrangements increases global welfare by US$
36 billion. If strong climate change occurs, global welfare

is reduced by US$ 18 billion. The model assumes nochange to the policies that determine how the welfare
benefits from increased trade are distributed. Calzadilla
et al.  conclude that trade liberalisation:■■ Increases the quantity of agricultural products
traded and the capacity of nations to trade with one
another with the consequence that global capacity toadjust to climate change is greater than it otherwise
would be;■■ Tends to reduce water use in water-scarce regions
and increase water use in water-abundant regions,even though water markets do not exist in mostcountries; and■■ Makes each nation more responsive to changing
conditions and, as a result, reduces the negative
impacts of climate change on global welfare by 2 per
cent. Regional changes, however, are much larger thanthis.
In summary, the modelling suggests that freerinternational trading arrangements for agriculture will
significantly reduce the costs of facilitating adjustment
and attaining MDG targets. Trade liberalisation can be
expected to reduce water use in places where supplies are
scarcest and increase water use in areas where they areabundant. Trade liberalisation increases the capacity toadapt to climate change and reduces its negative effects.

137Towards a green economy

Regions

50% reduction in tariffs, no export
subsidies and 50% reduction indomestic support to Agriculture

Strong Climate Change
Scenario

Both scenarios combined(Free trade and strong climatechange)United States-1,069-2,055-3,263

Canada

-285

-20

-237

Western Europe

3,330

1,325

4,861

Japan and South Korea

11,099-189

10,970Australia and New Zealand

622

1,022

1,483

Eastern Europe

302

538

883

Former Soviet Union

748-6,865-6,488Middle East

2,104

-3,344-1,213Central America

679

-240

444

South America

1,372

805

2,237

South Asia

3,579

-3,632-28

Southeast Asia

3,196

-3,813

-552

China

5,440

71

5,543

North Africa

4,120-1,107

3,034

Sub-Saharan Africa

218

283

458

Rest of the World

285

-308

-17

Total

35,741-17,530

18,116

Table 3: Change in regional welfare over 20 years as a result of climate change and trade liberalisation,
US$ million (findings from a model developed by Calzadilla et al. 2010)

5.3 Using market-based instruments
Market-based instruments that can be harnessed tofoster a green economy include:■■ Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES);■■ Consumer-driven accreditation and certification
schemes that create an opportunity for consumers to
identify products that have been produced sustainably
and pay a premium for access to them; and■■ Arrangements that send a scarcity signal including
the development of offset schemes, the trading ofpollution permits and the trading of access rights towater.
Each of these approaches has direct application to thewater sector and the degree to which communities
are likely to become interested in maintaining andinvesting in the provision of ecosystem services.
Payments for Ecosystem Services
From a water perspective, there are two main types of
payments for ecosystem services – those financed by theuser of a service and those financed by a governmentor donor (Pagiola and Platais 2007; Engel et al. 2008). In
either case, such schemes can be successful only whena secure source of money for the scheme has been138

identified and committed. Arguably, the most efficientare operated by users who are able to identify which
services they want and the price they are willing to pay forthem. Most government-financed programmes dependon financing from general revenues and, because they
typically cover large areas, they are likely to be less efficient.
Moreover, because they are subject to political risk, they
are less likely to be sustainable. When a government or
financial conditions change, support for the scheme cancollapse (Pagiola and Platais 2007; Wunder et al. 2008).
Payments for Ecosystem Services schemes are becoming
common in Latin America and the Caribbean region. In
Ecuador, Quito’s water utility and electric power company
pays local people to conserve the watersheds from which
this company draws its water (Echavarría 2002a; Southgate
and Wunder 2007). In Costa Rica, Heredia’s public-service
utility pays for watershed conservation using funds derived
from a levy on consumers (Pagiola et al. 2010).
Many small Latin American towns have similar schemes,
including Pimampiro in Ecuador; San Francisco
de Menéndez in El Salvador and Jesús de Otoro in
Honduras (Wunder and Albán 2008; Herrador et al. 2002;
Mejía and Barrantes 2003). Hydroelectric producers arealso becoming involved. In Costa Rica, for example, publicsector and private-sector hydro-electricity producers arepaying for conservation of the watersheds from which theydraw water. Pagiola (2008) reports that these companies

Waternow contribute around US$ 0.5 million per annum towards
the conservation of about 18,000 ha. In Venezuela, CVGEdelca pays 0.6 per cent of its revenue (about US$ 2
million annually) towards the conservation of the Río
Caroní’s watershed (World Bank 2007). Some irrigation
systems, such as those in Colombia’s Cauca Valley, haveparticipated in schemes like these (Echavarría 2002b).
More generally, and as explained in Khan (2010),
as countries shift to a greener set of economic
arrangements, the costs of more traditional hardengineering approaches to water management involving
the construction of treatment plants, engineering
works to control floods, etc. become more expensive. In
contrast, the cost of operating an ecosystem payment
scheme is much less likely to increase. For this to occur,
however, parallel investments in the development ofproperty rights and governance arrangements may benecessary to ensure water-supply utilities can enter into
contracts that maintain access to ecosystem services andexpect these contracts to be honoured. Well-definedland tenure systems, stable governance arrangements,
low transaction costs and credible enforcement
arrangements are essential (Khan 2010).
As noted elsewhere in this chapter, early attention to
governance arrangements is a necessary precondition
to the inclusion of water in a transition strategy to agreen economy.
Strengthening consumer-driven accreditation
schemes
Whilst rarely used in the water sector, in recent years
there has been a rapid expansion in the use of avariety of product accreditation schemes that enableconsumers to pay a premium for access to products thatare produced without detriment to the environment
including its capacity to supply water-dependent
services. As observed by de Groot et al. (2007), theseaccreditation schemes rely on the self-organising
nature of private market arrangements to provide
incentives for the beneficiaries of the improved service
to pay for it. Once established, these arrangements canplay an important role in encouraging the restorationof natural environments.
Arguably, one of the better-known examples is thelabelling scheme developed by the Forest StewardshipCouncil (FSC). The Council guarantees that any timberpurchased with its label attached has been harvested ina manner that, amongst other things, seeks to maintainecological functions and the integrity of a forest. Where
appropriate, this includes recognition of the essential
role that forests play in water purification and inprotecting communities from floods.13
13. For more information see http://www.fsc.org/pc.html

Increasing the use of tradeable permit, off-set andbanking schemes
A broad class of market-based instruments of relevanceto a green economy are those that limit opportunity
to pollute and / or use a resource. There are many
variants of such schemes, but all work by using a market
mechanism to reward people who are prepared to ceaseor reduce a water-affecting activity, thus allowing others
to take up the same activity and thereby ensuring an
overall controlled impact on the environment.
One such example is a mechanism whereby a water
treatment plant can release more nutrients into awaterway by arranging for the reduction of nutrient
pollution from a nearby dairy farm. In many cases, theresult can be a significant improvement in water quality
at a much lower cost if the water treatment plant is
not allowed to increase its emissions. In rural areas,
nitrate pollution charges and trading schemes are often
suggested and are now operational in parts of the
USA (Nguyen et al. 2006).
Another example, well developed in the USA, is the useof wetland banking schemes that require any person
proposing to drain a wetland to first arrange for theconstruction, restoration or protection of another wetlandof greater value (Robertson 2009). In these schemes, it
is possible for a person to restore a wetland and thenbank the credits until a third party wishes to use them.
Three quarters of these wetland banking arrangements
involve the use of third-party credits (U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers 2006; Environmental Law Institute 2006).14

5.4 Improving entitlement andallocation systems
The last class of market-based instruments of particular
relevance to water are those that use water entitlement
and allocation systems to allow adjustment to changing
economic and environmental conditions by allowing
people to trade water entitlements and allocations.
In well-designed systems, water-resource plans are used
to define rules for determining how much water is to beallocated to each part of a river or aquifer and a fullyspecified entitlement system is then used to distribute
this water among users. Under such an arrangement
rapid changes in supply conditions can be managed
efficiently (Young 2010). Australian experience in thedevelopment of fully-specified entitlement systems is
described in Box 6. Among other things, the approachenables people to use bottom-up market based
14. In each of these schemes banking and trading is possible only because
they involve the development of indices that enable wetlands of differingvalue per hectare to be compared with one another.

139

Annualised return (%)

Towards a green economy
Total returns – median allocation and entitlement prices comparedto capital growth, and S&P ASX accumulation index returns
50
40
30
20
10

Nov-05Jul-05Mar-05

Nov-04

Jul-04Mar-04

Nov-03

Jul-03Mar-03

Nov-02

Jul-02Mar-02

Nov-01

Jul-01Mar-01

Nov-00Jul-00Mar-00Nov-99Jul-99Mar-99

Nov-98

Jul-980

5 year holding period ending

Annual return – median

Annual return – capital growth

Annual return – S&P ASX

Figure 15: Annual returns from selling allocations (dark blue) and capital growth (light blue) in the valueof a water entitlement compared with an index of the value of shares in the Australian Stock Exchange,
Goulburn Murray System, Murray-Darling Basin
Source: Bjornlund and Rossini (2007)

approaches to respond rapidly to changes in watersupply. Consistent with the notion of increased returns
from taking a green approach to the development of an
economy, the introduction of water markets in Australia
has produced an estimated internal rate of return inexcess of 15 per cent per year over the last decade (seeFigure 15). The result has been a considerable increase in
the wealth and welfare of those involved.
In a green economy, the environment is given rights thatare either equal or superior to those of other users of a water
resource. In countries where property right systems arerobust and users comply with entitlement and allocation
conditions, environmental managers are beginning topurchase and hold water entitlements for environmental
purposes. In Oregon, USA, for example, the Oregon
Water Trust has been buying water entitlements from
irrigators since 1993 (Neuman and Chapman 1999) andthen using the water allocated to them to maintain andimprove the function of streams and water-dependent
ecosystems (Scarborough and Lund 2007). In Australia,
the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH)
has recently acquired 705 GL of water entitlements from
irrigators for similar purposes in the Murray Darling Basinand has announced its intention to continue to do thisuntil it holds in the vicinity of 3,000 to 4,000 GL of water
entitlements (Murray Darling Basin Authority 2010). If thisprocess is completed, the CEWH will hold between 27 percent and 36 per cent of all the Basin’s water entitlements.

5.5 Reducing input subsidies andcharging for externalities
In some cases, subsidies can be justified but unlessimplemented with great care, they can have a perverse

140

effect on progress towards the greening of an economy.
In most cases, subsidies encourage the exploitation ofwater at unsustainable rates. In India’s Punjab Province,for example, electricity for groundwater pumping
is supplied to farmers either at a heavily subsidised
price or for free. Experience is now showing that thesesubsidies encourage farmers to pump much more water
than otherwise would be the case and, as a result, waterlevels in 18 of Punjab’s 20 groundwater districts are
falling rapidly. Officials are aware of the adverse effectsof subsidising electricity to this extent but have been
unable to find a politically acceptable way to phasethem out (The Economist 2009).
Processes that attempt to reflect the full cost of electricity
use include funding research on the adverse effects
of providing these subsidies and stimulating publicdebate about the wisdom of continuing to do so. If thisresearch is rigorous and the communication strategies
well developed, it is hoped that ultimately there will be
sufficient political pressure to enable these subsidies to be
removed (Ménard and Saleth 2010). As soon as this starts
to happen, the money saved can be used to invest in othermore sustainable activities. An alternative, much more
expensive approach is to build a separate rural power
supply system so that access to electricity can be rationed.

5.6 Improving water charging andfinance arrangements
As noted by the OECD (2010), water-supply pricing policies
are used for a variety of economic, social and financial
purposes. Ultimately, water policies need mechanismsthat distribute water to where it is needed, generate
revenue and channel additional sources of finance.

Transfer Volume (GL)

Water

1200

Total Temporary (GL)Interstate Permanent (GL)

1000

Interstate Temporary (GL)Intrastate Permanent (GL)800

Intrastate Temporary (GL)

600

400

200

2008/09

2007/08

2006/07

2005/06

2004/05

2003/04

2002/03

2001/02

2000/01

1999/00

1998/99

1997/98

1996/97

1995/96

1994/95

1993/94

1992/93

1991/92

1990/91

1989/90

1988/89

1987/88

1986/87

1985/86

1984/85

1983/840Figure 16: Development of Murray Darling Basin water entitlement transfers
Source: Young (2010)

Box 6: Australian experience in the role of water markets infacilitating rapid adaption to a shift to a drier climatic regime
Recently, Australia’s Southern Connected River
Murray System experienced a rapid shift to a drier
regime that has demonstrated both how difficultand how important it is to specify water rights as
an entitlement only to a share of the amount ofwater that is available for use and not an amount.
At the time that this shift occurred, the plans thatwere in place assumed that inflows would continue
to oscillate around a mean and that known wateraccounting errors in the entitlement system could
be managed. As a result, when a long dry period
emerged, stocks were run down and managers
decided to use environmental water for consumptive
purposes on the assumption that more water could
be made available to the environment when it
rained again.
After four years of drought, and as the drought
moved into its fifth, sixth, seventh and now eighthyear, plans had to be suspended and new rules
for the allocation of water developed (National
Water Commission 2009). A new Basin Plan is
now in the process of development and will seek,
amongst other things, to deal with an acute overallocation problem. In parallel with these changes,

considerable investment has been made in thedevelopment of the scientific capability to assemble
the knowledge necessary to prevent these problems
from re-emerging.
Another key feature of the system now being usedin all Basin States is the definition of entitlement
shares in perpetuity and the use of water markets
to facilitate change. All water users now understandthat they will benefit personally if they can makewater use more efficient. As a result, a vibrant watermarket has emerged and significant improvementsin the technical efficiency of water use have occurred.
In this regard, Australia was lucky its entitlement
system and the associated administrative processes
had been developed in a manner that facilitatedthe rapid development of the water market
possible (see Figure 16). Among other things, thisincluded a much earlier commitment to meter
use and established governance arrangementsthat prevent people from using more water
than that allocated to them and the unbundlingof water licences so that equity, efficiency andenvironmental objectives can be managed using
separate instruments.

141

Towards a green economy
2. Tax revenue can be used to subsidise operating costs
and cover capital costs; and

% 100
90

3. Grants and other forms of transfer payment can besourced from other countries.

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

Tariffs

Taxes

Egypt (Cairo)

Georgia9

Armenia8

Moldova7

Mozambique6

Ethiopia5

MexicoKorea

Czech Republic
inv WSS4

Austria WW3

Austria WS2

France0

Transfers1

1. Includes ODA grants as well as private grants, such as through non-governmental organisations.
2. Water supply
3. Wastewater
4. Composition of capital investment for water supply and sanitation
5. 2005/06
6. Rural WS, 2006
7. 2006
8. 2005
9. 2007
Source: OECD (2009b), Strategic Financial Planning for Water Supply and Sanitation,

OECD internal
www.oecd.org/water
Figure17:document,
Arrayof mixes of transfer, tax and tariff
approaches to the provision of infrastructure
finance

Source: OECD (2009)

From a greening economy perspective, we recognise,
however, that there is little agreement about the best
way to charge for access to water and sanitation services.
Three background papers were adapted to assist withpreparation of this chapter – a primer on the economics
of water use, a primer on financing and a paper onSouth African experience with the supply of free accessto basic water (Beato and Vives 2010; Vives andBeato 2010; Muller 2010). Relevant insights can also
be gained from the background paper on Indonesian
experience with the provision of water to Western
Jakarta (Fournier et al. 2010). The United Kingdom ispioneering various pricing arrangements that reflect thefull costs of providing water. The approach emphasises
the role of pricing and charging in catalysing innovationand in encouraging communities to share access towater resources.
Sources of revenue
Known as the “3 Ts,” in essence, there are three ways tofinance water infrastructure and the costs associatedwith operating that infrastructure (OECD 2009):
1. Users can be charged a tariff for the water provided
to them;

142

Figure 17 shows how different countries combine eachof these approaches. Very few countries rely only upontariffs to finance infrastructure investment, even thougheconomic theory would suggest that charging people atariff in proportion to the service provided is the mostefficient option. Reliance on tax revenue is common and,
when donors are willing, transfer payments (donations)can play a significant role. In OECD countries, it is now
common for urban water-supply utilities to set a tariffthat is sufficient to cover the full operating costs ofsupplying water (OECD 2010).
Charging for access to water
Shifting to a green economy usually involves acommitment to begin charging for the full costs ofresource use. With regard to water, however, there
is a dilemma as access to clean water and adequate
sanitation services is a human right (United Nations
2010a). In a green economy, the efficient use of resources
is encouraged, as is investment in built infrastructure.
There is also an emphasis on equity.
When considering the most appropriate charge to set,from an efficiency perspective, it is useful to distinguishbetween:■■ The capture, storage, treatment and supply of waterfor public rather than private purposes;■■ Situations where water supplies are abundant andwhen supplies are scarce;■■ The supply of water to households, to industry and for
irrigation;■■ Regions where institutional capacity to collectcharges is strong and when it is weak; and■■ The need to recover daily operating costs and the needto make an adequate return on capital so that the supplier(whether public or private) can afford to maintain bothnatural and built infrastructure.
Complicating the issue, there is also a need to consider
the implications of charging people for the full cost ofproviding sanitation services. First, sanitation service
provision generally requires access to water. Second, there
are important public health issues to consider. When, forexample, one person defecates in the open, health risks
are imposed on all who live nearby. In an attempt to
avoid the emergence of such problems, governments

Waternormally set building standards that require the provisionof toilets and connection either to a sanitation service
or an appropriate on-site treatment of the waste. When
there is no effective building control and, especially when
informal settlements are involved, a way to efficiently
engage with communities needs to be found.
When water is used for public purposes, such as
the maintenance of a wetland for biodiversity or
recreational benefits, access is usually provided
for free and funded by the government throughtaxation. Usually, this is efficient as the beneficiaries are
numerous and not easily identified. Moreover, there
is no congestion problem; many people can benefit
without detracting from the benefit received by others.
When water supply (consumption) is for private benefit,
however, use by one person typically excludes use
by another. In such situations, the efficient strategy
is to make water available to those who want it at – atleast – the full cost of supply. Then, every water user
has a greater incentive to use water efficiently. But thissimple observation fails to consider important equity
considerations that are discussed in the next section.
When water supplies are scarce, the efficient strategy isto price access to water at the marginal cost of supplying
the next unit of water (Beato and Vives 2010). Costs
increase as more and more water is produced. The
efficient charge is equal to marginal cost – the cost of
producing the next unit of water. Typically, this cost rises
as more and more water is supplied.
When water supplies are scarce and no more water
can be accessed by, for example, more desalination or
recycling, economic theory would suggest the need fora scarcity charge.
When water supply is abundant, however, water pricing
theorists face an interesting dilemma. As more and morewater is supplied, the cost per unit of water supplied
declines. Moreover, the cost of supplying the next unit ofwater is less than the average cost of supply. The result isa regime where, if water charges are set at marginal costof supply, the revenue collected will not be sufficient tocover average costs - the water supply business will gobankrupt unless the supply charge is set above average
long run cost of supply and/or a government makes up
the shortfall (Beato and Vives 2010).
The question of whether or not a government shouldfund any revenue shortfall experienced by a water utility
depends upon its capacity to collect revenue from othersources. When institutional capacity to collect revenue
is strong, the most efficient charge is one that charges
all users in proportion to the metered volume of watertaken. When institutional capacity is weak, however,it may not be possible to do this. Before volumetriccharges can be introduced, meters must be installed andrevenue collection procedures established.
Finally, it is necessary to differentiate between dayto-day operating costs and the cost of ensuring thatsufficient money is set aside to fund infrastructure
upgrades and maintenance, ecosystem restoration andto ensure an adequate return on capital. The former issometimes known as the “lower bound cost” and thelatter as the “upper bound cost”.
As a general rule, the faster any system shifts to lower
bound cost and then onto upper bound cost, the more
efficient, the more sustainable and more innovative water
use will be. When institutional capacity is strong, the mostefficient strategy is to set a price that is the greater ofmarginal cost and average cost. Mechanisms other thanwater pricing policies should be used to transfer income
to disadvantaged households and businesses.
Financing access for the poor
In an environment where a large number of children die
as a result of lack of access to adequate water, what is theright tariff to set? Western Jakarta provides an illustrative
case study. Some 37 per cent of the people living inWestern Jakarta do not have access to a reliable mains
water supply. Most of these people are poor and either
buy water from carts operated by water vendors or collectit from an unhygienic source. Those forced to buy waterfrom a cart pay up to 50 times the full cost of providing
water access to a mains water supply. In addition, they
incur the costs linked with poor quality and inadequate
volumes of water. Government policy, however, requires
the poor be provided access at a highly subsidised priceso, in practice, those poor people who get access to mains
water are supplied it at a price that is 70 times less thanthe price paid to water vendors. Since the government
cannot afford to pay this subsidy, it is actively discouraging
the water utility from making water available to thesepeople (Fournier et al. 2010). The poor who receive accessto reliable subsidised water benefit, but this assistance isof no benefit to the 37 per cent of people who do not haveaccess to a reliable mains water supply. Table 4 shows thetariff structure used in Western Jakarta.
South Africa provides a different perspective on thequestion of what tariff to set. In 1996, South Africa
devolved responsibility for water management to local
government and then introduced a policy that required
local governments to provide a basic amount of waterto all people free of charge, using funds redirected from
central government. As a result, the proportion of the
population without access to a reliable water supply has
dropped from 33 per cent to 8 per cent (Muller 2010).
Whether or not the same, or more, progress could havebeen made if users had been required to pay the full cost143

Towards a green economy
of supplying water to them is not known and probably
cannot be determined reliably as water has played acentral role in the political transformation of this country.
Recently, the Constitutional Court of South Africa (2009)
ruled that a local government could charge for accessand use pre-paid meters as a means to do this.
Seeking empirical evidence in the Niger Basin, Ward etal. (2010) found that access to education and to cleanwater are the most consistent predictors of economic
progress. Having analysed the data and, particularly,
the high costs of delaying access because of revenue
shortfall, one can observe that if countries cannot afford
to make drinking water available at less than full costof supplying it to all poor people, then an alternative
approach is to focus on the efficient provision of waterto all poor people at the cost of supply. From a green
economy perspective, the strategy to pricing to adopt
is the one that most speeds the transition.
Cross-subsidising (selectively taxing) water use
In many countries, the water tariff regimes are used
to cross-subsidise the cost of supplying water to thepoor. In Jakarta, this is achieved by charging wealthierhouseholds and/or those who use large volumes ofwater more than the cost of supply and then using theresultant revenue to enable water to be supplied tothe poor at less than full cost (Table 4). As a transitional
strategy in countries with little other capacity to transfer
wealth from the rich to the poor, a case can be made forthe use of cross-subsidies, even though this approach

Volume of water used
Code

Customer Type

K2
K3A
K313
K4A
K413

0-10 m3

11-20
m3>20 m3Low-Income Domestic$ 0.105$ 0.105$ 0.158

Middle-Income Domestic$ 0.355$ 0.470$ 0.550$ 0.490$ 0.600$ 0.745$ 0.683$ 0.815$ 0.980$ 1.255$ 1.255$ 1.255

High-Income Domestic andSmall Business

Non-Domestic

Prices converted to US$ and rounded to 3 decimal places

Table 4: Water Tariff Structure in Western
Jakarta, US$ per m3
Source: Adapted from Fournier et al. (2010)

distorts investment in water use. In developed countries,
however, the use of a water charging regime to transfer
income from one group of people or one region toanother is extremely inefficient. For this reason alone,
Beato and Vives (2010) conclude that subsidies should
be targeted as tightly as possible and accompanied by atransparent strategy for their removal. The result is the
emergence of a regime that encourages investment andinnovation. Infrastructure is located in places where its

Box 7: Recent experience of private companies providing water
to households
Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority in Cambodia
has seen major transformations between 1993 and2009. The number of connections increased sevenfold, non-revenue water fell from 73 per cent to 6
per cent, collection efficiency rose from 48 per centto 99.9 per cent, and total revenues increased from
US$ 300,000 to US$ 25 million, with a US$ 8 million
operating surplus. After receiving initial grants andsoft loans from international financial institutions,the utility is now self-financing. Tariffs increased
steeply in the early years, but they have been held
constant at around US$ 0.24/m3 since 2001, because
the combination of service expansion, reduced water
losses and high collection rates has guaranteed asufficient cash flow for debt repayment as well as
capital expenditure.

144

Balibago Waterworks Systems serves around 70,000
customers in a rural area of the Philippines. The
business has grown by going out to adjacent towns
and villages and asking each community whether
they would like the Balibago to build a networkthat would enable them to supply piped water toit. When Balibago does this, it begins by showing
the community its regulated schedule of tariffs.
The community is then asked if they want access to
piped water and are prepared to pay the scheduled
price for access to it. Balibago is finding that inmany cases, the result is judged as an attractive
proposition for communities that might previously
have relied on hand pumps and wells, and it makes
good money for the company’s investors.
Source: Adapted from Global Water Intelligence (2010)

Wateruse can be sustained. Sustainable jobs and more green
growth follows.15
Increasing private-sector participation
As a transition to efficient supply of water at fullcost occurs, opportunities for the involvement ofprivate enterprise in the provision of water supply
and sanitation services increase. The main reason
for considering such arrangements is that researchis showing that private-sector engagement can help
to deliver benefits at less cost and thereby release
revenue for green growth in other sectors. Onceagain, this opportunity is controversial. Several
private-sector participation arrangements have

15. When water is supplied to businesses at less than full cost, businesses
tend to locate in locations chosen on the assumption that subsidised
access to water will continue. This, in turn, encourages people to live in andmigrate to such places and locks an economy into a regime that becomes
dependent upon the subsidy. As each of these steps occurs, opportunities
for development are undermined.

failed. Nevertheless, there is little to suggest that thefrequency with which these problems occur is less thanthat found among publicly-run systems (Ménard andSaleth 2010).
Closer analysis is showing that when contractual
arrangements are well developed, use of the private
sector can offer a wide range of benefits and, when welldesigned contractual arrangements are in place, canoutperform the public sector. For example, Galani et al.
(2002) show that Argentina’s temporary privatisationof approximately 30 per cent of its water supplies met
with positive results. Child mortality was found to be 8
per cent lower in areas where water provision had been
privatised. Moreover, this effect was largest (26 per cent)in the areas where people are poorest. The experience isequally positive in regions where businesses are allowed
to supply water at full cost – operators are findingthat many people are prepared to pay for the services
they offer (Box 7).

145

Towards a green economy

6 Conclusions
Access to clean water and adequate sanitation services iscritical to the future of each and every household. Water
is clearly fundamental to food production and providing
ecosystem services and vital for industrial productionand energy generation.
Finding a way to use the world’s water more efficiently
and making it available to all at a reasonable cost, whileleaving sufficient quantities to sustain the environment,
are formidable challenges. In an increasing number ofregions, affordable opportunities to access more water are
limited. But progress has to be made to improve efficiency
use and working within scientifically established andcommon practice limits. Direct benefits to society can be
expected to flow both from increased investment in thewater supply and sanitation sector, including investmentin the conservation of ecosystems critical for water.
Research shows that by investing in green sectors,
including the water sector, more jobs and greater
prosperity can be created. Arguably, these opportunities
are strongest in areas where people still do not haveaccess to clean water and adequate sanitation services.
Early investment in the provision of these services
appears to be a precondition for progress. Once made,the rate of progress will be faster and more sustainable,
thus making transition to a green economy possible.
Arrangements that encourage the increased
conservation and sustainable use of ecosystem services
can be expected to improve prospects for a transition toa green economy.
Ecosystem services play a critical role in the productionof many goods and in many of the services neededby the world’s human population but pressure onthem is increasing. By investing in arrangements that
protect these services and, where appropriate, enhancethem there is opportunity to ensure that the greatest
advantage is taken of these services. Often the mosteffective way forward is to invest first in the developmentof supply and distribution infrastructure so that pressure
is taken off the systems that supply ecosystem services.
Significant opportunities for improvement include thedevelopment of arrangements that pay people who
provide and do the work necessary to maintain access toecosystem services.
Another opportunity is the formal allocation of waterrights to the environment. Where water resources have146

been over-allocated, there are significant opportunities
to fund restoration at a reasonable cost before changes
become irreversible.
The costs of achieving a transition will be much less if theincreased investment is accompanied by improvements
in governance arrangements, the reform of water
policies and the development of partnerships with theprivate sector.
The opportunity to improve governance arrangements
is one of the biggest opportunities to speed transition
to a greener economy. In any area where there is water
scarcity, it is critical that governance arrangements are
put in place to prevent over-use and over developmentof the available water resource. Building administrative
regimes that are respected and trusted by local
communities and industry takes time; however, thisis essential in ensuring a return on the investmentssuggested in this chapter. These new arrangements,
among others, will need to be able to facilitate thetransfer of water from one sector to another.
Individual decisions about how to use resources
and where to invest are influenced by policy. Froma green economy perspective, there are significant
opportunities to reform policies in ways that canbe expected to significantly reduce the size of theinvestment needed to facilitate progress. Phasing out
subsidies that have a perverse effect on water use andadopting freer trading arrangements, brings direct
benefits to many sectors. Other opportunities, such as
the establishment of tradeable water entitlement andallocation systems, bring benefits initially to the watersector.
In green economies, there is a commitment to factoringsocial equity into the transition to arrangements, suchas full cost accounting, that influence investment
and decisions by people and industry. Ultimately,
the question of how fast this transition should occur
depends on a case-by-case assessment of the influenceof the arrangement on the expected rate of progress.
Where capacity exists, financial transfers and tax
revenues collected from other sources can be used tofund the infrastructure necessary to provide householdswith access to services but, when this approach slows
progress, tariffs should be raised to at least cover the fullcosts of service provision. Preference should go to thevarious pricing arrangements that enable most rapid
progress.

Water

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World Health Organization. 2008. Progress on drinking water andsanitation: Special focus on sanitation:
WHO/UNICEF joint
monitoring programme for water supply and sanitation. Available at
http://w w w.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/
jmp2008/en/index.html
World Health Organization. 2010. UN-Water Global Annual
Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS) 2010: Targeting
Resources for Better Results. WHO, Geneva. Available at http:// www.
who.int/water_sanitation_health/glaas/en/
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). 2010. Living P lanet Report
2010: Biodiversity, biocapacity and development. Available at
h t t p : / / w w f.
panda.org/about_our_earth/all_publications/living_planet_report/
Wunder, S. and Albán, M. 2008. “Decentralized payments forenvironmental services: The cases of Pimampiro and PROFAFOR in
Ecuador.”Ecological Economics 65(4):685–698.
Wunder,S.,Engel,S.,andPagiola,S. 2008. “Takingstock:Acomparative
analysis of payments for environmental services programs indeveloped and developing countries.” Ecological Economics
65(4):834–852.
Young, M. and McColl, J. 2010. “A robust framework for the allocationof water in an ever changing world.” Chapter 5 in Bjornlund, H. (ed.)
Incentive and Instruments for Sustainable Irrigation. WIT Press,
Southampton.
Young, M.D. and McColl, J.C 2008. “Double trouble: the importanceof accounting for and defining water entitlements consistent withhydrological realities.” Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource
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Forests

Investing in natural capitalTowards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Authors: Maryanne Grieg-Gran, Principal
Researcher, Sustainable Markets Group, and Steve Bass
Head, Sustainable Markets Group, International Institute forEnvironment and Development (IIED), UK.
Nicolas Bertrand of UNEP managed the chapter, including thehandling of peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating
authors on revisions, conducting supplementary research andbringing the chapter to final production. Derek Eaton reviewed
and edited the modelling section of the chapter. Sheng Fulai
conducted preliminary editing of the chapter.
Five Background Technical Papers were prepared for this chapter
by the following individuals: Steve Bass (IIED), Susan Butron (CATIE),
Rachel Godfrey-Wood (IIED), Davison J. Gumbo (CIFOR), Luis Diego
Herrera (Duke University), Ina Porras (IIED), Juan Robalino (CATIE),
Laura Villalobos (CATIE). Additional material was prepared by Andrea
M. Bassi, John P. Ansah and Zhuohua Tan (Millennium Institute);
Edmundo Werna, Saboor Abdul and Ana Lucía Iturriza (ILO).

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011

152

We would like to thank the many colleagues and individuals
who commented on various drafts, including Illias Animon(FAO), Mario Boccucci (UNEP), Marion Briens (UNECE/FAO
Forestry and Timber Section), Eve Charles (UNECE/FAO Forestry
and Timber Section), Tim Christophersen (CBD Secretariat),
Paola Deda (UNECE/FAO Forestry and Timber Section), Niklas
Hagelberg (UNEP), Franziska Hirsch (UNECE/FAO Forestry
and Timber Section), Walter Kollert (FAO), Godwin Kowero(African Forest Forum), Roman Michalak (UNECE/FAO Forestry
and Timber Section), Robert McGowan, Cédric Pène (UNECE/
FAO Forestry and Timber Section), Ed Pepke (UNECE/FAO
Forestry and Timber Section), Ravi Prabhu (UNEP), Jyotsna
Puri (UNEP), Johannes Stahl (CBD Secretariat), and Raul
Tuazon (IADB).
Within IIED, the following individuals are also to be thanked:
Kate Lee, James Mayers, and Essam Yassin Mohammed. We
would also like to thank former IIED interns: Anais Hall andDavid Hebditch.

Forests

Contents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4

Current state of the forest sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Scope of the forest sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Vision for the forest sector in a green economy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Indicators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

2

Challenges and opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

2.1
2.2

Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Opportunities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

3

The case for investing in greening the forest sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6

Options for green investment in forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Investing in protected areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Investing in PES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Investing in improved forest management and certification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Investing in planted forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Investing in agroforestry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

4Modelling green investment in forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5

The green investment scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
The baseline scenario: business-as-usual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Investing to reduce deforestation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Investing in planted forest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Impacts of investment in reducing deforestation and in planted forest  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

5Enabling conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6

Forest governance and policy reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Tackling illegal logging  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Mobilising green investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Levelling the playing field: Fiscal policy reform and economic instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Improve information on forest assets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Making REDD+ a catalyst for greening the forest sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

6Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

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List of figures
Figure 1: The forest spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Figure 2: Deforestation reduction under the green investment scenario (G2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Figure 3: Employment under the green investment scenario (G2) and business-as-usual (BAU) . . . . . . . . . 182

List of tables
Table 1: Estimates of the value of forest ecosystem services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Table 2: Forest-dependent employment and livelihoods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Table 3: Trends in forest cover and deforestation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Table 4: Management status in tropical permanent forest estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Table 5: Green investment options for various forest types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Table 6: Costs of reforestation and afforestation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Table 7: Rate of return of agroforestry compared with conventional farming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Table 8: Forests in 2050 under the green investment scenario and business-as-usual (BAU)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

List of boxes
Box 1: Economic importance of the forest industry in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Box 2: The value of forest ecosystem services: climate regulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Box 3: Forest transition theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Box 4: The national PES scheme in Costa Rica  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Box 5: Costs of effective enforcement of protected areas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Box 6: Research on the impact of PES on deforestation in Costa Rica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Box 7: Research on the profitability of Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Box 8: The high cost of SFM plans in Gabon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Box 9: Costs and benefits of certification for producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Box 10: Afforestation in China: The Sloping Land Conversion Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Box 11: Evidence on the impact of incentives for silvo-pastoral practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Box 12: The EU licensing system for legal wood products  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Box 13: Wood procurement policy in the UK  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Box 14: The effect of financial support to livestock in Brazil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

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Forests

List of acronyms
ABS
AIDS
AIJ
BAU
BNDES
BOD
CDM
CI
CO2
CPET
EMBRAPA
ESC
EU
FAO
FLEG
FLEGT
FONAFIFO
FSC
G2
G8
GDP
GEF
GHG
GIS
GPGs
HIV
ICRAF
IEA
IFC
IIED
ILO

Access and benefit-sharing
Acquired immune deficiency
syndrome
Activities implemented jointly
Business-as-usual
Brazilian National Development Bank
Biological oxygen demand
Clean Development Mechanism
Confidence interval
Carbon dioxide
Central Point of Expertise on Timber
Brazilian Government Agricultural
Research Agency
Environmental Services Certificate
European Union
Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations
Forest Law Enforcement andGovernance
Forest Law Enforcement Governanceand Trade
Costa Rica’s National Forestry
Financing Fund
Forest Stewardship Council
Green Scenario 2Group of Eight
Gross Domestic Product
Global Environment Facility
Greenhouse gas
Geographic Information Systems
Global public goods
Human immunodeficiency virus
International Center for Research inAgroforestry
International Energy Agency
International Finance Corporation
International Institute for Environmentand Development
International Labour Organization

IOE
IRR
ITTO
ITUC
IUCN
LDCs
LPG
NGO
NPA
NPV
NWFPs
OECD
PEFC
PES
PFE
REDD
RIL
RUPES
SFM
SIEF
SSA
UNEP
UNFCCC
VETE
VPAs
WRM

International Organisation of
Employers
Internal rate of return
International Tropical Timber
Organization
International Trade Union
Confederation
International Union for Conservation of
NatureLeast Developed Countries
Liquefied petroleum gas
Non-governmental organisation
Natural Protected Areas
Net Present Value
Non-wood forest products
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Programme for the Endorsement ofForest Certification
Payment for Ecosystem Services
Permanent Forest Estate
Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation
Reduced impact logging
Rewarding the Upland Poor in Asia forEnvironmental Services
Sustainable forestry management
Solomon Islands Eco-Forestry
Sub-Saharan Africa
United Nations Environment
Programme
United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change
Village Eco-Timber Enterprises(Solomon Islands)
Voluntary Partnership Agreements
World Rainforest Movement

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Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. Forests are a foundation of the green economy, sustaining a wide range of sectors andlivelihoods. Forest goods and services support the economic livelihoods of over 1 billion people,
most of whom are in developing countries and are poor. While timber, paper and fibre products yield
only a small fraction of global GDP, public goods derived from forest ecosystems have substantial
economic value estimated in the trillions of dollars. Forests sustain more than 50 per cent ofterrestrial species, they regulate global climate through carbon storage and protect watersheds.
The products of forest industries are valuable, not least because they are renewable, recyclable andbiodegradable. Thus, forests are a fundamental part of the earth’s ecological infrastructure andforest goods and services are important components of a green economy.
2. Short-term liquidation of forest assets for limited private gains threatens this foundationand needs to be halted. Deforestation, although showing signs of decline, is still alarmingly high at
13 million hectares per year. Although net forest area loss amounts to five million hectares per year,
this is a result of new plantations that provide fewer ecosystem services than natural forests. Highrates of deforestation and forest degradation are driven by demand for wood products and pressure
from other land uses, in particular cash crops and cattle ranching. This “frontier” approach to natural
resources – as opposed to an investment approach – means that valuable forest ecosystem services
and economic opportunities are being lost. Stopping deforestation can therefore be a goodinvestment: one study has estimated that, on average, the global climate regulation benefits ofreducing deforestation by 50 per cent exceed the costs by a factor of three.
3. International and national negotiations of a REDD+ regime may be the best opportunity
to protect forests and ensure their contribution to a green economy. To date, there has been
no clear and stable global regime to attract investment in public goods that derive from forests
and to assure their equitable and sustainable production. Such a regime promises to tip thefinance and governance balance in favour of longer-term sustainable forest management (SFM)1 –which would be a real breakthrough where the viability of SFM has been elusive in many countries.
Management for forest public goods would then open up the prospect of new types of forestrelated jobs, livelihoods and revenues – where local people can be guardians of forests and forest
ecosystem services. It will require REDD+ standards as well as effective systems for local control offorests, and transfer of revenue, to ensure these livelihood benefits are realised.

1. Sustainable forest management may be defined as “the stewardship and use of forests and forest lands in a way, and at a rate, that maintains theirbiodiversity, productivity, regeneration capacity, vitality and their potential to fulfil, now and in the future, relevant ecological, economic and social functions,at local, national, and global levels, and that does not cause damage to other ecosystems” (FAO 2005b).

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4. Tried and tested economic mechanisms and markets exist which can be replicated andscaled up. There are enough existing glimpses of green-economy forestry to warrant more serious
policy attention, including certified timber schemes, certification for rainforest products, payments
for ecosystem services, benefit-sharing schemes and community based partnerships. They need tobe catalogued, assessed for the ecosystem services they offer, promoted widely and scaled up. We
contribute to that process in this chapter.
5. Investments in natural forests and plantations can deliver economic benefits. Modelling for
the Green Economy Report (GER) suggests that an investment of just US$ 40 billion per year over 2010
to 2050 in reforestation and paying landholders to conserve forests could raise value added in the forest
industry by 20 per cent, compared to business-as-usual (BAU). In addition, it could increase carbon
stored in forests by 28 per cent, compared with BAU. Provided investments are also made in sustainableproductivity-enhancing improvements in agriculture (see Agriculture chapter), this expansion in forest
plantations need not threaten food production. However, tree planting would have to be carefullytargeted to ensure that it does not displace poor farmers, who have ill-defined tenure; tree planting
should also provide another livelihood option in rural areas.
6. Legal and governance changes are needed to tip the balance towards sustainable forestry,
which is not yet at scale, and away from unsustainable practice, which is entrenched in boththe forest sector and competing sectors. Well-managed forests are the cornerstone of ecologicalinfrastructure; as such, they need to be recognised as an “asset class” to be optimised for its returns.
These returns are largely public goods and services, such as carbon storage, biodiversity and water
conservation and need to be better reflected in national accounting systems. Private forest goods canalso have significant economic and social benefits if sustainably produced. Yet, expansion of SFM andgreen investment face competition from unsustainable and illegally-sourced wood and fibre products, aswell as policy biases towards competing land uses such as pasture, agriculture and mining. Both carrots(support for skills training, independent verification of SFM and preferential government procurement)
and sticks (tightening up laws and enforcement against illegal logging and marketing) are needed. Also
necessary is a revision of policies favouring other sectors, which can erode forest benefits, notably thecosts and benefits of agricultural subsidies.

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Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
This chapter makes a case for greening the forest sector. It
does so by assessing the gap between BAU in the forest
sector and the role of the sector in a green economy. To
support that assessment, the chapter reviews the current
range of green investments in forests and how they arelikely to affect both the timber industry and ecosystemservices on which the livelihoods of the poorest depend.
This section includes a description of the forest sector’scurrent state and a vision for forests in a green economy.
Section 2 presents the challenges and opportunities
facing the sector. Section 3 identifies a number of green
investments in forests of different types. It reviews thestate of knowledge on their magnitude, private and social
rate of return, and economic, social and environmental
impacts. Section 4 presents the results of modellingthe impacts of directing 0.035 per cent of global GDP
to two particular green investments: a public-sector
investment that pays landholders to conserve forests;
and a private-sector investment in reforestation. Section
5 gives an overview of the enabling conditions for green
investments in forests to be effective. Section 6 concludes
the chapter.

Box 1: Economic importanceof the forest industry in subSaharan Africa (SSA)
While a figure of 6 per cent contribution to GDP
is often quoted for the entire SSA, such a figure
masks the disparities between tropical and nontropical countries. For example, forests play amajor role in the economies of Cameroon, theCentral African Republic, Congo, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and
Gabon, and in the livelihoods of local people. The
forest sector contributes, on average, between 5
and 13 per cent of the gross domestic product(GDP) of these countries. Up to 60 per cent ofexport earnings for Gabon are from timber
products, while for the Central African Republic
it is about 50 per cent. Gabon is the biggest
exporter of industrial roundwood, exportingnearly 97 per cent of its total production. Exportof medicinal plants is a significant foreignexchange earner for Cameroon, amounting toaround US$ 2.9 million a year.
Source: Gumbo (2010)

158

1.1 Current state of the forest sector
In 2006, the forest industry (defined as roundwood
production, wood processing, and pulp and paper)
contributed approximately US$ 468 billion or 1 per centof global gross value added, of which pulp and paper
represented about 40 per cent (FAO 2009). Although thiswas an increase in absolute terms from 1990, the share of
the forest sector declined due to the much faster growthof other sectors (FAO 2009). Nevertheless, the forest
industry is extremely important for some developing
countries (Box 1). Not captured in these figures on GDP
share are the contributions made by forest ecosystemservices to human wellbeing and the role of forests insustaining livelihoods. With a broader concept of GDP,
such as the GDP of the poor, which captures the relianceof rural populations on nature, the contribution of theforest sector is greatly increased (TEEB 2009).
Besides wood products and paper, the world’s forests also
produce a large amount of the energy used in developing
countries, particularly among low-income households.
About half of the total roundwood removed from forests
worldwide is used for energy, including traditional
heating and cooking and for heat and power production
in industrial operations (FAO 2009). More than 2 billion
people depend on wood energy for cooking, heating
and food preservation (UNDP 2000). Figures on biomassenergy (wood plus crop residues and animal dung) from
Openshaw (2010) give an indication of the economic
and social importance of the energy derived from wood.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2007),for the world as a whole, biomass energy accounted foran estimated 10 per cent of primary energy in 2005 (47.9
ExaJoule (EJ), of which 39.8 EJ were in Least Developed
Countries (LDCs). But in many developing countries
it dominates, with over 50 per cent of total energy use.
Although much of it is used by the subsistence sector, inmany countries biomass energy is the most important
traded fuel, both in terms of employment and value. In
sub-Saharan Africa, biomass fuels account for as much as
80 per cent of energy consumption.
Forests are also home to important non-wood forest
products (NWFPs) that make a significant contribution
to local economies and livelihoods; in some cases NWFPs
are important exports. The main product categories arefood from plant products, raw material for medicine andaromatic products and exudates such as tannin extract
and raw lacquer (FAO 2009). It has been estimatedthat in 2005 the value of NWFPs extracted from forests
worldwide amounted to US$ 18.5 billion, but this wasForests
Service

Estimates of value (US$/ha)

SourceGenetic material< 0.2 – 20.6

Simpson et al. (1996)
Lower estimate: California
Higher estimate: Western Ecuador

0 – 9,175

Rausser and Small (2000)

1.23

Costello and Ward (2006) mean estimate for most biodiverse region

Watershed services (e.g. flow regulation,
flood protection, water purification)

200 – >1,000 (several services combined intropical areas)
0 – 50 single service

Mullan and Kontoleon (2008)*

Climate regulation

650 – 3,500

IIED (2003)*

360 – 2,200 (tropical forests)

Pearce (2001)*

10 – >400 (temperate forests)

Mullan and Kontoleon (2008)*

Recreation/tourism<1 – >2,000

Mullan and Kontoleon (2008)*

Cultural services – existence values

0.03 – 259 (tropical forests)

Mullan and Kontoleon (2008)*

12 – 116,182 (temperate forests)

Mullan and Kontoleon (2008)** Lowest and highest estimates from a review of valuation studies

Table 1: Estimates of the value of forest ecosystem services
believed to cover only a fraction of the total value
because of incomplete coverage of the statistics (FAO
2010). Numerous studies have shown the importanceof the subsistence use of NWFPs for people’s livelihoods.
In a review of 54 case studies, over half of which werefrom Eastern and Southern Africa, Vedeld et al. (2004)
estimated that the average annual forest environmental
income amounted to 22 per cent of household income.
While a large part of this was from fuelwood, wild foods
and fodder for animals were also important.
Forests, which sustain more than 50 per cent ofterrestrial species (Shvidenko et al. 2005), play a vitalrole in protecting watersheds and regulating climate(ecosystem services) and they have great cultural andsymbolic significance. Valuation studies of these services
conducted in many different countries have shown awide variation in results, reflecting the importance oflocation, the methodologies and assumptions aboutbiophysical linkages, e.g. between forest cover andwatershed services (Table 1). Studies that concentrateon the value of the climate-regulation services of forests
associated with reducing deforestation also produce
substantial estimates (Box 2).
Scaling up from such wide-ranging values is challenging,and estimations of values at a national or global scale haveproduced huge ranges. While there is still a high degree of
uncertainty about the value of forest ecosystem services
at a global level, even conservative estimates tend to behigh, measured in trillions of US dollars, This indicatesthe importance of taking these services into account indecision-making on land and resource use.
Forests also provide significant employment, with thecontribution of the formal sector greatly outweighedby that of the informal sector. About 10 million people
are employed in forest establishment, management
and use worldwide (FAO 2010). Adding employment inprimary processing, pulp and paper and the furnitureindustry brings the figure to about 18 million people(Nair and Rutt 2009). Despite growing informality andmechanisation, forestry is still a highly significant sector,
with roughly 0.4 per cent of the global workforce (FAO

Box 2: The value of forest
ecosystem services: climate
regulation
Hope and Castilla-Rubio (2008), contributing
to the Eliasch Review (2008) estimated thatthe net present value of benefits in terms of
reduced climate-change damage associatedwith reducing deforestation and hence
emissions by 50 per cent each year from 2010
to 2100 would be US$ 5.3 trillion (mean) with a
90 per cent confidence interval (CI) of US$ 0.6
to US$ 17 trillion. Reducing deforestation by
90 per cent from 2010 was estimated to yield
benefits of US$ 10 trillion (90 per cent CI of US$
1 trillion to US$ 30 trillion). The mean benefits
from reducing deforestation in both scenarios
were found to greatly exceed the mean costs
by a factor of approximately three (3.12 for a
50 per cent reduction and 2.86 for a 90 per centreduction). In both cases there is a possibility
that net benefits could be negative but theprobability is very low.

159

Towards a green economy
Scope

Estimate

SourceFormal employment in forestry, wood processing and pulp and paper

14 million

FAO (2009)

Formal employment in furniture industry

4 million

Nair and Rutt (2009)

Informal small forest enterprises

30–140 million

UNEP/ILO/IOE/ITUC (2008), citing Poschen (2003) and Kozak (2007)
for lower and higher estimate, respectively

Indigenous people dependent on forests

60 million

World Bank (2004)

500 million–1.2 billion

UNEP/ILO/IOE/ITUC (2008)

71–558 million

Zomer et al. (2009). For agricultural land with 10% tree cover up
to 50%

119 million–1.42 billion

Lower bound assumes overlap between indigenous people­dependence and agroforestry

People dependent on agroforestry
Total

Table 2: Forest-dependent employment and livelihoods2009). Outside of the formal sector there is greater
uncertainty about the number of people dependent
on forests for employment and livelihoods, as shown in
Table 2. As a result, the estimate for the total number ofpeople dependent on forests ranges from 119 million to
1.42 billion. But even conservative estimates of people
engaged in informal forest enterprises, indigenous
people dependent on forests and people dependent on
agroforestry, greatly exceed employment in the formal
forest sector.
There are regional variations, however. The employmentrole of the sector has been declining, particularly in Europe,
East Asia and North America, most probably becauseof gains in labour productivity (FAO 2010). The only
countries in Europe that have increasing employment in
the forest industry sector are Poland, Romania and theRussian Federation. Latin America and the Caribbean andthe developing Asia-Pacific region are the two regions
where the forest industry sector has been expandingon all fronts over the last decade. This has been driven
by various factors, including the abundance of low-cost,skilled labour, relatively abundant forest resources, a highrate of economic growth, specific polices to encourage
development and investment in the sector and a general
improvement of the investment climate (Lebedys 2007).
The production and trade of fuelwood is also importantfor employment. Openshaw (2010), while notingthat there are no definite estimates, suggests thatnearly 30 million people worldwide may be involvedin the commercial production, transport and trade of
biomass- energy products, generating around US$ 20
billion annually. More specifically, a survey in Malawi in
1996/7 found that 56,000 people were involved in tree
growing, fuelwood and charcoal production, transportand roadside and urban trading in the country’s four
principal towns. This was many times greater than thenumber employed in kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas(LPG) and electrical production, transport or transmission
and trading for the household sector, estimated at160

350 to 500 (Openshaw 2010 citing Openshaw 1997aand b). A repeat survey carried out in 2008 found that
employment in growing, production, transport andtrade of biomass energy had increased significantly to133,000 (BEST 2009).

1.2 Scope of the forest sector
The forest sector can be considered in various
ways: from merely forest management and primary
production, to the whole supply chain of forest products
and to the provision of ecosystem services. The focusof this chapter is on forests and the production andmanagement of forest ecosystem services, including
carbon management/climate regulation, water-quality
management, energy provision and ecotourism.
While issues of resource and energy efficiency andclean production are important in the manufactureof secondary wood-based and fibre-based products,
they also apply to a number of other industrial sectors,
and are therefore covered in the Industry and Energy
chapters of this report.
The management of forest ecosystem services is uniqueto the forest sector (albeit influenced by other sectors)
and we therefore give it priority here. The focus on forest
ecosystem services also has the effect of widening therange of products and services that can be consideredpart of the downstream forest sector.
Confining the scope of the chapter to the productionof forest ecosystem services simplifies matters but stillleaves open the question of what types of forest to
consider. FAO’s official definition of forests covers a broad
spectrum from pristine natural forests undisturbed byhuman intervention, often known as primary forests,
to intensive high-yield plantations, as shown in Figure
1. In between, are natural forests with varying degrees
of human modification, and various types of planted
forests. We are interested in all of these forest types, in theForests

FOREST

Biodiversity

Primary forest

Modified natural

External input intensity

Semi-natural

Indigenous plantation

Exotic plantation

AGROFORESTRY

Traditional shifting cultivation and home gardens

Internally generated systems

Mixed systems

Alley cropping

Externally generated systems

Figure 1: The forest spectrum
Source: Adapted from Bass et al. (1996)

extent to which each of these are managed for a rangeof ecosystem services, and the balance between them.
Not covered by FAO’s definition are various agroforestry
systems, including admixtures of tree, crop and livestock
regimes at the field or landscape level, under the
management of the farmer. We include them in thischapter because they often provide many, if not all, forest
ecosystem services and are important for livelihoods.

1.3 Vision for the forest sector
in a green economy
Greening the forestry sector implies managing it andinvesting in it as an asset class that produces a wide
range of benefits to society. The wider economic rolesof forests in a green economy include: as factories of
production (producing private goods from timber tofood), as ecological infrastructure (producing public
goods from climatic regulation to water-resource
protection) and as providers of innovation and insurance
services (forest biodiversity being key to both).
The greening of the forest sector will be driven by societal
demands for ecosystem services spread across several

sectors, encompassing the traditional industries of woodprocessing and paper manufacture as well as tourism,
energy, water management, carbon trading and newforest-based products. Forestry in a green economy will
also meet critical livelihood needs of local communities
by providing a stream of fuelwood, construction materials,
food sources and medicinal plants. Effective local control
and management of forests need to be improved but
governments, through access and benefit-sharing(ABS), and new markets, such as ecosystem services,
will ensure there are greater economic incentives to doso. These incentives would emerge from a robust andfair international system that ensures forest-related
public goods, notably carbon storage and biodiversity
conservation, are transferred between nations. Forests
would also attract interest from financial institutions
opening up forests as a new economic asset.
With greater understanding and recognition of the
public goods generated by forests, and the increasing
financial rewards for producing them, it becomes criticalfor forest managers and governments to account more
effectively and transparently for forest stocks andflows. This entails being able to measure and value
the forest sector’s contribution to societal wellbeing in161

Towards a green economy

more sophisticated ways and capturing the full rangeof marketed and non-marketed goods and services,
including the significant contribution they make to thelivelihoods of the poor and marginalised.

1.4 Indicators
In order to assess how far the forest sector is shifting
towards a green economy, it will be important tokeep track of indicators that measure the following:
1) the changing proportion of consumption made162

up by forest goods and services, and particularly therate of substitution of carbon-intensive productswith forest products; 2) changing markets for forest
ecosystem services; 3) investments in sustainable forest
enterprise and production, especially those which aim
at several ecosystem services and include sustainability
conditions; 4) the changing ownership of forest land andforest enterprise, notably the inclusion of local forest
stakeholder groups; 5) forest governance improvements;and 6) the sustainability of forest management, fromstand to landscape to national levels, in environmental,social and economic terms.

Forests

2 Challenges and opportunities
2.1 Challenges
The major challenges facing the forest sector include theloss of forest, competing land uses, market, policy andgovernance failures. These challenges are connected.
Competing land uses, especially from agriculture, areimmediate causes of forest loss. These competing
land uses are, in turn, driven by market, policy andgovernance failures.
Trends in forest cover and deforestation
There are clear signs that forests are not being sustainably
managed. Table 3 shows that the world’s forested area
is declining both in absolute terms (deforestation) andin net terms (taking account of forest planting andnatural expansion), although at a slower rate than inprevious decades. Changes in total forest area at the
global level, however, mask regional variations. Forest
cover stabilised in North and Central America andexpanded in Europe and Asia, in the latter case mainly
owing to large-scale afforestation in China, which offset
continued deforestation in Southeast Asia. Africa andSouth America underwent the largest net loss of forestsin this period (2000-2010) and Oceania also experienced
net loss (FAO 2010).
In its latest Forest Resource Assessment, FAO (2010)
revised upwards its deforestation estimate for the 1990s.
In the Forest Resource Assessment 2005 (FAO 2005a),
deforestation in the 1990s was estimated at 13 million
hectares per year.
Trends for different types of forests are also important. Of
most concern is the decline in primary forests, 40 million
hectares of which have been lost or modified since 2000. In
contrast, planted forests are expanding more rapidly, witha 50 per cent increase in the growth rate over the previous
decade, and now account for 7 per cent of the total forest
area worldwide (FAO 2010). This expansion – explainedby the forest transition theory – is expected to continue(see Box 3). Carle and Holmgren (2008) predict that thearea of planted forest in 2030 will reach between 302.7
million hectares and 345 million hectares, depending on
assumptions about productivity increase. Three-quartersof all planted forests consist of native species, althoughintroduced species are more common in a number ofcountries with large areas of planted forests across subSaharan Africa, Oceania and South America (FAO 2010).
Competing uses of land
Agricultural expansion, often combined with timber
extraction and the expansion of infrastructure, whichfacilitates access, has been found to be the main
proximate cause of deforestation in tropical areas
over the last two decades (Geist and Lambin 2002;
Chomitz et al. 2006). Increasing population, increasing
income and shifts in tastes to more meat-based diets
are forecast to increase the demand for food by 70 per
cent (in value terms) by 2050 (Bruinsma 2009). To meetthis demand, further clearing of forest will be required
unless agricultural productivity can continue to risesignificantly. Increasing demand for biofuels means
they will compete with food crops for land, putting
further pressure on forests. Climate change, where it
has an adverse impact on agricultural yields, will add tothe pressure for converting forests to agricultural land.
It also affects forests directly through changes in their
growth rate or in fire propensity.
Market, policy and governance failures
Underlying the loss of forest and competing landuses are governance and market factors that renderdeforestation a rational (and often legal) course ofaction, irrespective of the environmental and social costs.
Governance drivers include the lack of forest rights for
local stakeholders, which discourage local investment
in intact forests and which enable appropriation of land
and/or forest resources by more powerful outsiders.
These are compounded by market failure, as not all of
the important ecosystem services provided by forests
are captured in markets. Those taking decisions on thepractices used in timber extraction and conversion offorests to other land uses do not factor in the adverse
effect on the provision of ecosystem services (Pagiola
et al. 2002). Because maintenance of these otherecosystem services is not usually rewarded, there is very
little incentive for forest managers to take them into
account (De Groot et al. 2010).

1990

2010

World forest area (hectares)

4.17 billion

4.03 billion

World planted forest area (hectares)

178 million

264 million

1990-2000

2000-2010

Annual net forest loss
(hectares/year)

8.3 million

5.2 million

Annual deforestation (hectares/year)

16 million*

13 million

Annual increase in planted forest(hectares/year)

3.6 million

4.9 million

Table 3: Trends in forest cover and deforestation
Source: Compiled from data in FAO (2010)* In its latest Forest Resource Assessment 2010 FAO revised upwards its deforestation
estimate for the 1990s. In the Forest Resource Assessment 2005 (FAO 2005a), deforestationin the 1990s was estimated at 13 million hectares per year.

163

Towards a green economy

Box 3: Forest transition theory
Globally, the area devoted to planted forests is
growing. Planted forests are estimated to produce
1.2 billion m3 of industrial roundwood, whichamounts to about two-thirds of all production (Carleand Holmgren 2008). Further shifts in production
to planted forests are expected. Improvements
in technology mean that more and more can beproduced per hectare of land. For example, eucalyptus
plantings in Brazil have reached productivity levels
exceeding 50 m3 per hectare (FAO 2009). In view ofsuch improvements, FAO (2009) predicts that growth
in production from planted forests will keep pacewith growth in demand for industrial roundwood.
This can be expected to reduce the pressure on
primary forest, although much of the latter could
be lost by the time the switch to planted forest has
taken place.
This growth of planted forests is explained by
the forest transition theory (Mather 1992) andthe stages of forest development (Hyde 2005,
which draws on von Thunen’s rent model; see alsoAngelsen 2007 who combines the von Thunen andforest transition theories). The theory suggests thatcountries start with high forest cover and as they
develop, the forest is converted to other land uses,
agriculture in particular. The process accelerates as
infrastructure improvements open up frontier forest
areas and makes timber extraction and agriculture
economically viable. Over time, as timber becomesscarce, and as the economy develops, providing
off-farm employment opportunities, a series ofadjustments are made. It becomes profitable tomanage forests and plant new ones. The area offorest cover starts to increase again.
This process has been followed by many developed
countries and some developing nations, including
Costa Rica, which is in the later stages of thistransition. Similarly, Vietnam saw its forest coverdecline from 43 per cent in 1943 to 20 per cent in 1993
as a result of agricultural expansion and migration

Governments have sought to secure these otherecosystem services of forests through designation ofprotected areas, restricting extraction of timber, oraccess or through regulations on timber harvesting
and forest management. But these can be difficult
to enforce, particularly when development throughforest clearing is the norm. At the same time, thesemarket failures can be exacerbated by policy failures or164

into forested areas. Since then, considerable
efforts have been made to increase forest cover,an ambitious programme of reforestation. By 2009
forest cover had increased to 39 per cent of the landarea (FCPF 2010). In Vietnam, while forest cover has
increased as a result of reforestation programmes,
the quality of natural forests continues to be more
fragmented and degraded (FCPF 2010). This iswhere valuation is important, as it would show theeconomic consequences of letting the standard
forest transition takes its course.
There are other market adjustments in response toincreasing scarcity of wood, in particular, increasinguse of wood-processing residues and recovered
paper and wood products. While global demand
for wood and fibre is expected to almost double by2030, global production of industrial roundwood is
projected to increase by a more modest 40 per cent
(FAO 2009).
Thus, taking this longer-term perspective, theconcern about forests is not so much about theability to provide the world’s increasing demand fortimber and fibre but about the ability to continue
providing livelihoods for forest-dependent people
outside of the formal economy and to continue
providing non-marketed ecosystem services. The
latter are currently unpriced and therefore largely
ignored in management decisions to date. This raises
the question of how to change the shape of thisforest transition (Angelsen 2007). Is it an inevitable
pattern of development or can a combination ofpolicies ensure the retention of greater areas ofprimary forest cover? Neither the forest transition
theory nor the land-rent model distinguish between
forest cover of different types – i.e. primary forestand secondary forest, degraded forest and planted
forest. The provisioning services, such as timber andfibre, of forest may be maintained through market
adjustments, but other valuable ecosystem services
could be lost.

intervention failures, which increase the private benefitsof conversion through tax incentives and subsidies. The
impact of subsidies for cattle ranching on deforestationin the Brazilian Amazon in the 1980s and 1990s has
been well documented (Browder 1988; Binswanger1991). Similarly, in Cameroon, incentives for plantation
agriculture led to natural forests being cleared forcommercial agriculture (Balmford et al. 2002).

Forests

2.2 Opportunities
Together with the challenges facing the forest sector,
there are also opportunities for greening the sector.
They include the establishment of sustainable forest
management (SFM) criteria and indicators, the growthof protected areas, the concept of reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) andthe growing acceptance of payments for ecosystemservices (PES).
Sustainable forest management (SFM)
Although there is no consistent, routine andcomprehensive assessment of forest management
globally, considerable effort has gone intodeveloping SFM criteria and indicators to describe
comprehensively the elements of good practice. They
cover the economic, social/cultural, environmental andinstitutional dimensions of SFM, based on scientific andtechnical knowledge of forest systems. Regional criteria
include those of the International Tropical Timber
Organization (ITTO), which apply to all its member
countries. Recent initiatives led by civil society groups
and some forest companies and industry associations
have developed voluntary SFM codes of practiceand management guidelines. Certification schemes
provide an independent assessment of adherence
to the standards and statistics on them provide anindication of the extent of best practice, although lackof certification does not necessarily imply bad practice.
Currently over 5 per cent of the world’s production forests
are certified under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)
standard, at 133 millions hectares certified in 79 countries,
including 77.6 millions hectares of natural forests, 12.5
millions of hectares of plantations and 43.3 millions ofhectares of mixed natural/plantation landscapes (FSC2010 data as of 15/04/10). Over 80 per cent of FSCcertified forests are boreal and temperate. Tropical andsubtropical forests account for 13 per cent of the total
FSC-certified area, with 16.8 million hectares (FSC 2010).
The other major international forest certification
scheme is the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest
Certification (PEFC). Some 232 million hectares of forest
are certified to PEFC’s Sustainability Benchmark, nearly
twice the area of FSC certification, although someforests are certified by the PEFC and FSC. Almost all the
PEFC endorsed certified forests are in OECD countries,
just under half in Canada with most of the rest in
USA, Scandinavia and Brazil in the tropics (PEFC 2010).
However, China is developing a national scheme and is
expected to join the PEFC in 2011 (PEFC 2011).
In 2005, ITTO (2006) found that only 7 per cent of its
member countries’ production forests (25 million

AfricaAsia and LA and thethe Pacific Caribbean

Total closed natural forest(FAO 2001, ’000 hectares)

208,581

226,984

788,008

1,223,573

Total area under permanent
forest estate (PFE)

110,557

206,705

541,580

858,842

Percentage

53%

91%

69%

70%

71,286

135,726

190,331397,343

64%

66%

35%

46%

Total area

70,461

97,377

184,727

352,565

With management
plans

10,01655,06031,17496,250

Certified

1,480

4,914

4,150

10,544

Sustainably managed

4,303

14,397

6,468

25,168Percentage sustainably
managed

6%

15%

4%

7%

Total area

825

38,3495,604

44,778With management
plans

488

11,4562,371

14,315

Certified

-

184

1,589

1,773

39,271

70,979351,249

461,499

Production PFE

Total

Natural production forests

Planted production forests

Protection PFE

36%

34%

65%

54%

With management
plans

1,216

8,247

8,374

17,837

Sustainably managed

1,728

5,147

4,343

11,218Percentage of PFE thatis sustainably managed(excludes planted areas)

5%

12%

2%

4%

Table 4: Management status in tropicalpermanent forest estate (PFE) (2005, ’000
hectares)*Source: ITTO (2006). Includes forests in the tropical PFEs of all ITTO producer member
countries except India* Permanent forest estate (PFE) refers to “certain categories of land,
whether public or private, that are to be kept under permanent forest
cover to secure their optimal contribution to national development” (ITTO2006). Closed natural forests are defined by FAO (2001) as forests “wheretrees in the various storeys and the undergrowth cover a high proportion(>40 per cent) of the ground and do not have a continuous grass layer”.

hectares) were being sustainably managed. Whilst every
ITTO producer-country’s policies promoted sustainable
management of forests in 2005, management plans
existed for only 27 per cent of the 353 million hectaresof production forests, and just 3 per cent werecertified (Table 4). Despite the low level of sustainable
management, however, this is a huge improvement on
the mere 1 million hectares of all tropical forests that
ITTO had assessed as sustainable in 1988. Furthermore,
ITTO noted that some countries have made notable
improvements, including Bolivia, Brazil, the Republicof Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Malaysia and Peru. There is165

Towards a green economy
still considerable room for improvement, in view of
ITTO’s conclusion that resources for enforcement andmanagement are woefully and chronically inadequate,
trained staff, vehicles and equipment are all in short
supply, while systems for monitoring and reporting
forest management are often limited or lacking.
In OECD countries, it is likely that there is a greater
extent of sustainable management. The European
Union estimates that 80 per cent of its forested area isunder a management plan and 90 per cent of that area
is managed sustainably: a large proportion of the area
is managed by small private owners who have held theforest for generations. A majority of Canadian and many
US production forests are certified. Although there aregood examples of forest management in Russia, overlogging has occurred, especially in the Russian Far East,near the border with China (Sun et al. 2008).
It is also possible that a large proportion of small-scale
informal forest enterprises (family forests, indigenous
forests), which are beyond the scope of assessments
like that of ITTO, are sustainably managed. This can be
judged by the longevity of the forest resources, passed

from generation to generation, and evident productionof multiple goods and services. However, there is little
information to go on, apart from the minority of foreststhat are certified.
Growth of protected areas
One apparently positive trend from the environmental
perspective is that the area of protected forests isincreasing. About 13.5 per cent of the world’s forests
are protected according to IUCN categories I-VI and7.7 per cent (about 300 million hectares) for categories
I-IV, involving more restrictions on land use (Schmitt etal. 2009). The area of protected forests has increased by
94 million hectares since 1990, of which two-thirds has
been since 2000 (FAO 2010).
In Latin America designation of protected forests has
been one of the most used strategies for the sustainable
management of forests. It is estimated that there are
100 million hectares under IUCN categories I, II and III(which are the most restrictive) in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Robalino et al. 2010). Growth in protectedareas has been particularly rapid since the 1980s. In
sub-Saharan Africa, 32.5 million hectares of forests andBox 4: The national PES scheme in Costa Rica
The Costa Rican Payments for Ecosystem Services
programme (PSA, in Spanish) was created in 1996,
through the Forestry Law 7575, which recognises
the provision of ecosystem services from forests.
Based on the beneficiary pays principle, it suggeststhat forest owners should be compensated for thefollowing services:■■ Mitigation of greenhouse gases (GHG) (reduction,sinking, fixing and storing carbon);■■ Protection of water for rural, urban or hydroelectricuse;■■ Protection of biodiversity for conservation,scientific and pharmaceutical use; and■■ Landscape beauty for tourism.
Forest owners are currently paid for several landmanagement practices, and all except agroforestry
are paid per hectare over five years: forest
conservation (US$ 320), offering higher payments
in hydrologically-sensitive areas (US$ 400), areas
identified as “conservation gaps” (US$ 375),
reforestation (US$ 980), forest management (active

166

before 2003 and again in 2010, receiving US$ 250);
forest regeneration, which could be in areas thatmeet the additionality criteria (US$ 320), or not (US$205); and agroforestry (US$ 1.3 per tree, paid overthree years).
In order to finance this program, FONAFIFO(Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal or
National Forestry Financing Fund) receives funds
from different funding sources: public funds inthe national budget, donations, credits concededby international organisms, private funds, own
generated funds and timber and fuel taxes. Also, in2001 FONAFIFO created the Environment Services
Certificate (ESC), which is a financial instrument
where FONAFIFO receives funds from companies
and institutions interested in compensating forest
owners for preserving forests.
Between 1997 and 2008 FONAFIFO distributed US$
206 million, an average of US$ 17.2 million per year
(Porras, 2010). The majority of funds were for forest
protection (73 per cent), covering 460,000 hectaresof forest, and almost 6,600 contracts were signed
across the country.
Source: Robalino et al. (2010)Forests
woodland, corresponding to 5 per cent of the total forest
area, are formally protected (IUCN categories I-VI) andas much as 8 per cent, if forestry reserves are included(Gumbo 2010).
It should be noted, however, that although there has
been a marked expansion in protected areas, there is no
guarantee that they will be well-enforced. This is evidenced
by the continuing loss of forests and other natural
ecosystems within protected areas. Effectively enforcing
the land and resource-use restrictions in protectedareas is challenging and many are being encroached on,particularly in densely populated countries (Chape et al.
2005). Unsustainable land uses within protected areas areanother cause (Cropper et al. 2001). Strassburg and Creed(2009), in a study of 133 countries in Latin America, Africa,
the Middle-East, Asia and Eastern Europe, estimate that
only one-third of the protected forest area is effectively
legally protected, corresponding to 6 per cent of thetotal forested area in these countries. Of the five regions
examined, Latin America has both the highest proportionof legally protected forests (24 per cent) and effective
legal protection (9 per cent).
Payments for ecosystem services (PES)and REDD+
New, incentive-based approaches to conserving forests
have emerged over the last 10 to 15 years.2 The mosthigh-profile of such initiatives are PES, which pay forest
landowners for providing watershed protection, carbon
storage, recreation, biodiversity, etc. These range fromlocal-level schemes, such as the local government in the
town of Pimampiro in Ecuador, which makes payments
ranging from US$ 6-$12 per hectare per year to a small
group of farmers (19 in 2005), to conserve forest andnatural grassland in the area surrounding the town’swater source (Wunder and Albán 2008; Echavarría et al.
2004), to national schemes such as in Costa Rica, where
farmers are paid US$ 64 per hectare per year in five year
contracts (to protect biodiverse forests (see Box 4) andglobal schemes e.g. a range of voluntary carbon offset
schemes for planting or conserving trees to fix CO2 andstore it. Some environmental payments schemes also
factor in social needs, attempting to persuade poor andmarginalised groups to become engaged in providing
the service, for example the schemes developed under
the RUPES programme in Asia (Rewarding the Upland
Poor in Asia for Environmental Services they Provide).
One of the most long-standing global payment schemesis the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action projectin Bolivia, which was developed as a pilot project in1997 under the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ)
programme of the UNFCCC. A consortium of international
and local NGOs, some US energy companies and the
2. PES has also been used to promote reforestation and agroforestry.

Bolivian Government bought out local timber concession
holders and implemented a community development
programme in order to extend the Noel Kempff Mercado
Park. Through avoided deforestation the project was
expected to avoid emissions of up to 3.6 million tonnes ofcarbon over 30 years (May et al. 2004).
While PES is primarily associated with developing countries,
there are some well-known examples in industrialised
countries. The New York City water utility – faced with
the need to improve water quality – provides incentives
to farmers and owners of forest land in the catchment
areas to conserve the forest and adopt agriculturalenvironmental management measures. This proved far
less costly than building water-filtration systems (LandellMills and Porras 2002). In north-east France, the mineralwater producer, Vittel, paid local landowners to conserve
the watershed (Perrot-Maître 2006).
Until recently, the main driver of investment in PES
schemes involving forest conservation was the need toprotect watersheds. The rules of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) limited eligible forest carbon activities
to afforestation and reforestation. This meant that carbon
projects based on forest conservation were confined to
the voluntary carbon market. But as the contribution of
deforestation and forest degradation to GHG emissions
has become recognised, this approach to mitigation has
moved up the agenda in international climate negotiations,first as REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation anddegradation) and more recently as REDD+, which adds
conservation, sustainable management of forests andenhancement of forest carbon stocks to the list of eligible
activities.3 REDD+ has been likened to a multi-layer PES
scheme, with transfers of finance between industrialised
countries and developing countries in exchange foremission reductions associated with improvements
in forest protection and management, and furthertransfers from the national level to forest landowners
and communities (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff
2008). Although PES will not be the only strategy used bygovernments to achieve forest-based emission reductions,
it is likely to be important.
Unlike the project-based approach of international PES
to date, REDD+ is likely to involve more national-levelapproaches, with finance being supplied by developed
countries individually or as a bloc against the performanceof national-level commitments to reduce deforestationand emissions. This is exemplified by Norway’s contribution
3. These are defined by Angelsen (2009). Angelsen also notes that REDD+
means different things to different people. The + sign captures the second
part of UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.13–11 “policy approaches and positive
incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation andforest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation,
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon
stocks in developing countries”. Addition of a further + to give REDD++ isbeing promoted by ICRAF to include agroforestry.

167

Towards a green economy

to the Amazon Fund in Brazil, which is conditional on theachievement of deforestation-reduction targets4. In 2010
Norway announced a grant of US$ 1 billion to Indonesia
in return for agreed measures to tackle deforestation anddegradation. Indonesia, under the terms of the agreement,
has accordingly announced a 2-year moratorium on new
4. Available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/md/Selected-topics/
climate/the-government-of-norways-international-/norway-amazon-fund.
html?id=593978

168

permits to clear natural forests and peatlands (Richardson
2010). The sums of money being estimated for full
implementation of REDD+ amount to tens of billions of
US$ worldwide. Already, the financial support committed
for preparation activities and bilateral programmes
greatly exceed what has been provided so far in PES,
providing grounds for optimism that this new mechanism
can capture and transfer important new resources forecosystem services provided by forests.

Forests

3 The case for investing in greening
the forest sector
As indicated in the last section, there are promisingdevelopments such as certification of sustainable forest
management, targets to increase protected areas andthe growing momentum of PES and REDD+ schemes.
But without a major change in the recognition given to
the full suite of forest ecosystem services, in particular inclimate negotiations, and in the absence of improvementsin the agriculture sector, loss of primary forest is likely tocontinue. Protected areas will continue to expand but alarge proportion will not be effectively enforced. The
forest sector will meet the market demand for timber
through planted forests and efficiency improvements
in processing, but pressures on natural forests fromother sectors, agriculture in particular, will continue,
exacerbated by climate change. As a result, ecosystemservices will continue to be lost.
Additional resources and policies are therefore needed
to internalise the value of forest ecosystem services forforest landholders and ensure forests are worth more
standing than cleared (Viana 2009). Investments targeted
at increasing the profitability of sustainable harvesting
techniques and making tree planting worthwhile canalso make a contribution. This section reviews a range
of investment options for greening the forest sector andidentifies the economic, social, and environmental effectsof these options.

3.1 Options for green investment
in forests
Some broad categories of green private and public
investments can be distinguished for the main forest
types, including agroforestry, as shown in Table 5. Green
investment can be targeted at reversing the loss of forest
area by conserving existing areas of primary forest or
promoting expansion of forests through regeneration
and reforestation. Green investment can also be directed
to improving management in existing forests andagroforestry systems to ensure they continue to provide
a wide range of ecosystem services. Such investment can
only be considered green if it ensured that the forests
conserved, established or restored meet principles ofsustainable forest management, and balance the needs ofdifferent stakeholders. For example, creating a protectedarea that displaces forest-dependent communities would
not meet the principle of supporting relevant socioeconomic functions. Moreover, creating a protected area

does not guarantee enforcement. Similarly, extending theforest area through tree planting may be contentious if
it uses a large amount of external inputs and directly or
indirectly displaces local people from their land.
Some of the green investments listed in Table 5 arestraightforward to quantify, although there will beconsiderable variation by location and species. Some ofthe public sector investments are not well-documented,
in particular the amounts being spent on controlling
illegal logging.
Because of the public-good nature of some forest
ecosystem services, the private sector and holders offorested land are not always able to perceive a sufficientincentive to make green investments in forests, even

Forest typePrimary forest

Investment
Private*Public**Ecotourism development

Create new protected areas

Private nature reserves

Improve enforcement ofprotected areas

Pay landowners to protect
watershed

Pay forest landholders toconserve forests
Buy out logging concessions

Natural modified
forestReduced impact logging andIncentives for improved
other forest management
forest management
improvements
Certification to sustainable forest management
standards

Support establishment ofcertification systems
Control illegal logging

Planted forest

Reforestation and afforestation for production

Incentives for reforestation/afforestation

Improve management ofplanted forests

Incentives to improve
management
Reforestation to protect
ecological functions

Agroforestry

Extend the area withagroforestry systems

Incentives to landholders

Improve management ofagroforestry systems

Incentives to improve
management
Technical assistance* Private could also include investments made by communities** Some of the public investments listed here may also be made by the private sector, often on amore limited scale.

Table 5: Green investment options for various
forest types

169

Towards a green economy
if such investments often involve a positive rate of
return for society as a whole. Investment by the public
sector is therefore needed in some cases to provide
forest ecosystem services directly, to provide financial
incentives to the private sector to make green investmentcompetitive and to prevent unsustainable forest
management, i.e. by controlling illegal logging. The returnon investment for the public sector is measured in termsof social and environmental benefits. Research carried out
as part of TEEB on the costs and benefits of investing inecological infrastructure indicates that the rate of return
could be very high, with a benefit cost ratio of over 13 to 1
in the case of active restoration of eucalyptus woodlands
and dry forest in Australia, and over 30 to 1 for restorationof Atlantic forest in Brazil (Neβhöver et al. 2009).

3.2 Investing in protected areas
The creation of protected areas to restrict access andcertain land-use practices has been the dominant
approach used by governments to secure ecosystemservices by controlling deforestation and forest
degradation. In some cases the investment in protectedareas may be made by NGOs. A well-known example
is the conservation concessions whereby conservation
organisations lease forest lands that would otherwise
have ended up as logging concessions. Such concessions,mostly led by Conservation International but involving
other major NGOs and donors, have been establishedin a number of countries, including Guyana, China,
Cambodia, Ecuador and Madagascar (Rice 2002). Privatecompanies do sometimes operate protected forest

Box 5: Costs of effective
enforcement of protectedareas
The total annual cost of managing the existing
network of protected areas effectively wasestimated in 1999 to be around US$ 14 billion
per year. This included increasing management
costs (then estimated at US$ 6 billion) by over athird and introducing compensation payments
to communities living in protected areas of some
US$ 5 billion (James et al. 1999). A later estimateof US$ 20-28 billion (Balmford et al. 2002) added
the cost of up-scaling protected areas to ensure
protection of 15 per cent of land area in eachregion. Assuming that forests constitute 60 per
cent of terrestrial protected areas, this would
suggest a cost of US$ 12-17 billion per year for
effective management of protected forests.

170

areas, usually where there is a tourism interest or where
the public sector is providing an incentive. In Brazil, forexample, private landowners that set aside a protectedarea can receive a reduction in land tax (May et al. 2002).
The investment involved for the protected area authority,
whether government, NGO or private sector, includes
the administrative costs of demarcating and managing
the area and keeping unauthorised users out. For theowners and users of the protected forest land it means
forgoing timber royalties and giving up the net benefits
from agriculture and other land uses that compete with
forests. This latter cost has rarely been factored in, except
where compensation schemes operate.
Balmford et al. (2002) estimated current expenditure on
protected areas at US$ 6.5 billion per year, of which half
was spent in the USA. A more recent estimate suggests
this could range from US$ 6.5 to US$ 10 billion peryear (Gutman and Davidson 2007). These estimates do
not distinguish between forest ecosystems and otherecosystems in the protected areas. For example Mullan
and Kontoleon (2008) cite an estimate by Bruner et al.
(2003) of US$ 8 billion of total expenditure on protectedareas, of which approximately 60 per cent covers forested
land. This suggests a little under US$ 5 billion per year or
US$ 16.7 per hectare (assuming IUCN categories I-IV) is
being spent on protected forests.
Many protected areas do not receive adequate funds
to ensure their effective management. Very little isspent on compensation to those local communities
who lose access to land and resources when protectedareas are created. Protected areas are a vital part of the
management of forest ecosystem services, but they needto address concerns over ineffective enforcement andshare benefits with local communities. Estimates madeof the cost of effective enforcement of protected areas
with compensation for local communities are two to
three times the amount currently spent (Box 5). Increased
investment is needed to ensure better integration ofcommunities’ interests and to improve effectivenessalong with better buffer- zone management.
Investing in protected areas may bring economic benefits
to the national economy in the long term. Some countries
have been able to build up a lucrative nature-based
tourism industry, which has brought in foreign exchange
and generated employment. For example Costa Rica,
where protected areas received more than 1 million
visitors per year in the five years up to 2006, generated
entrance-fee revenue of over US$ 5 million in 2005 anddirectly employed 500 people. Protected areas in Latin
America receive large numbers of visitors and generatemany associated jobs. For example, Mexican protectedareas recorded 14 million visitors per year and 25,000 jobs
(Robalino et al. 2010).

Forests
Nature-based tourism is also a major economic activity
in sub-Saharan Africa and the number of tourist arrivals
is growing faster than the global average (in 2004 at
14 per cent compared with 10 per cent worldwide).
In the Great Lakes region, revenue from tourism
based on gorilla viewing and other activities brings
in about US$ 20 million annually (Gumbo 2010). But
the tourism industry in Africa also has human andenvironmental costs, contributing to the displacementof communities, thus undermining rights andlivelihoods (Gumbo 2010).
Admittedly, setting aside forests as protected areas hasoften been controversial because it is seen as preventing
more productive activities such as timber harvesting
and agriculture and as being damaging to livelihoods
and to human rights, particularly where indigenous
people are involved (Coad et al. 2008). Adverse social
impacts of protected areas identified by these authors
include: displacement of local communities, changes
in traditional land tenure, denied or restricted accessto resources, loss of employment, crop damage andlivestock predation.
Cost-benefit studies have been conducted forprotected forests in different regions. These examine
costs and benefits at local, national and global levels
but are not able to monetise all of the social costs
identified above (Balmford et al. 2002; Coad et al. 2008).
While there is some variation, a number of the studies
conclude that global benefits and sometimes national
scale benefits outweigh the overall costs including thetangible opportunity costs to local communities. For
example, the protection of the Virunga and Bwindi
afro-montane forests of Eastern and Central Africa –home of mountain gorillas – show positive benefits
as opposed to costs, but most of them accrue to theinternational community (Hatfield and Malleret-King,
2004). Overall, gorilla tourism generates US$ 20.6
million per year in benefits, with 53 per cent accruingto the national level; 41 per cent to the international
level, and only 6 per cent locally.
Another study (Ferraro 2002), one of six reviewed by
Coad et al. (2008), examines the costs and benefits of
the Ranomafana National Park in Madagascar, which
was created in 1991. It finds that the opportunity
costs to local communities amounted to US$ 3.37
million or US$ 39 per household per year, but weregreatly exceeded by the global- and national-scale
benefits. Earlier studies of the Mantadia National Park
Madagascar (Kramer et al. 1995) and Mount Kenya
National Park in Kenya (Emerton 1998) reached similar
conclusions.
These studies indicate that, in theory, those gaining
from the protected areas should be able to compensate

local communities and still be better off. Historically, thiscompensation to communities has rarely happened. Thishighlights a challenge and an opportunity in a green
forest sector for capturing the global benefits and creating
redistribution mechanisms that are able to compensate
local communities and improve their livelihoods.
As far as environmental effects are concerned, although
the creation of a protected area does not guarantee
environmental effectiveness and many are being
encroached on, there are positive examples suggestingthat this investment option merits further attention.
Protected areas are considered critical for conserving
residual tropical-forest biodiversity (Lee et al. 2007;
Rodrigues et al. 2004). Studies in South-east Asia show thatparks and reserves consistently recorded larger numbersof endemic bird species and higher population densities
than surrounding human-modified areas (Lee et al. 2007).
Figueroa and Sánchez-Cordero (2008) evaluated theeffectiveness of Mexican Natural Protected Areas(NPAs) for preventing deforestation. They constructed
an effectiveness index, based on the protected areas’
percentage of transformed areas, the rate and absolute
extent of change in these areas, the comparison between
rates of change observed inside the protected area andin an equivalent surrounding area, and between the NPA
and the state(s) in which it is located. They found thatover 54 per cent of NPAs were effective in preventing
land-use or land-cover change.

3.3 Investing in PES
There are no precise statistics on the amount of money
currently channelled into PES schemes, but Canbyand Raditz (2005) estimate this as being hundredsof millions of US$. The majority of this money comesfrom governments directly or from international donor
support. These funds cover two main types of cost: thepayment to the landholder or forest concession holder,compensating for the opportunity cost of forgone landuse, along with the costs of any actions necessary forconservation such as fencing or employment of guards,
and the transaction costs of designing, setting up andoperating the payment scheme, including contract
management, fund management, the transfer of funds
and monitoring.
The evidence on the social and economic impacts of PES
schemes is mixed, both in terms of the extent to which
the poorest groups participate in the schemes and theextent of livelihood benefits for those who do (Engel etal. 2008; Porras et al. 2008). Evidence of impact on nonparticipants is particularly scanty, and largely confined
to observations in Costa Rica where a high proportionof those receiving payments hire labour to carry out

171Towards a green economy
conservation-related work (Ortiz Malavasi et al. 2003;
Miranda et al. 2003).
The two national PES schemes involving forest
conservation in Costa Rica and Mexico provide
contrasting experiences in terms of the nature ofparticipants, reflecting to some extent differences inland and forest-tenure regimes. In Costa Rica, wheremost land is held privately, small farmers have very
little participation in the PES scheme in spite of efforts
made to prioritise the poorest regions (Porras 2010).
In Mexico, a high proportion of forest land is held ascommon property by local communities and eventhough criteria for selecting priority areas wereprimarily biophysical, the poorest groups were fairly
well-represented. In 2003 and 2004, 72 per cent and83 per cent respectively of the total paid out went toforests associated with marginalised population centres(Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008).
Local schemes such as at Pimampiro in Ecuador and
Los Negros in Bolivia have achieved a fairly wide
participation of local forest landowners, albeit over asmall area, partly because they have been able to adapt
to local circumstances (Porras et al. 2008). In Los Negros,for example, the majority of landowners did not haveclear land title, but the scheme went ahead on the basisof local recognition of farmers’ landholding (Robertson
and Wunder 2005).
Analysis of the livelihood benefits of PES schemes inseveral Latin American countries has given varied results;
in general they have been welcomed by participants.
The cash payments, with some exceptions, appear to berelatively insignificant when compared with opportunity
costs and household income (Porras et al. 2008). This has
led some researchers to conclude that the paymentsfunction more as support, providing recognition ofexisting good practice, rather than constituting a real
incentive for land-use change (Ortiz Malavasi et al. 2003;
Kosoy et al. 2007).
Non-financial benefits, such as capacity building,strengthening of land and resource tenure are therefore
often considered to be significant. For example, PES
schemes have been found to strengthen resource
management and social coordination capacities of
the community institutions involved (Tacconi et al.
2009). Capacity building is commonly reported as abenefit from PES schemes (i.e. increasing agricultural
productivity in Pimampiro, Ecuador (Echavarría et al.
2004); apicultural training in Bolivia measured at US$
35 per participant (Asquith and Vargas 2007). However,for Tacconi et al. (2009) there is little evidence available
about the long-term impact of capacity-building
activities, for instance whether new knowledge andskills were applied in practice.
The evidence on the effectiveness of PES in reducing
deforestation is also mixed, reflecting difficulties inestablishing a clear counterfactual of what would
have happened in the absence of the scheme and in
predicting the location of deforestation (Cropper et al.
2001; Nelson and Hellerstein 1997). The national schemein Costa Rica reflects reductions in national deforestation
rates after the scheme started, but much of the researchon this scheme throws doubt on a causal link between
the two (Box 6). The same can be said for the MexicoBox 6: Research on the impact of PES on deforestation in Costa Rica
In Costa Rica’s Virilla watershed Miranda et al. (2003)
asked PES participants about their motivations andfound that many of them planned to retain their forests
regardless of the scheme. But as forest clearance
is prohibited by law, this may have influenced the
responses of the landholders as they might not want
to state openly that they would contemplate illegal
activity. These responses only represent a snapshot intime. It is unclear how these motivations would change
as macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions
change. Another study examined the characteristics
of land included in the PES scheme. In the isolated
Peninsula of Osa, for example, it was found that land
under protection contracts corresponds mainly toforest that may not be in direct danger of being
converted because of its remoteness and difficultaccess (Sierra and Russman 2006).

172

Analysis by Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. (2007) at a national
level found that although the average deforestation
rate dropped from 0.06 per cent per year in 19861997, to 0.03 per cent per year in the first phase of the
PES programme 1997-2000, there was no significant
difference in the rate of deforestation between areasin the national PSA scheme and areas that were not.
They suggest that this could reflect lack of targetingof areas under deforestation pressure and also theimpact of previous forest conservation policies,
including a 1997 legal restriction on forest clearing.
Similar results were found in a more recent study
by Robalino et al. (2008) i.e., the efficiency of PES in
reducing deforestation between 2000 and 2005 was
also low. Less than 1 per cent of the parcels of land
enrolled in the programme each year would havebeen deforested without payments.

Forests
national scheme (PSAH). The only major study so far of
this scheme, (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008) found that muchof the land being put under payments was not at risk ofbeing converted because of its low opportunity costs. In
2003, only 11 per cent of the participating hectares inthe scheme were classified as having high or very highdeforestation risk. This increased to 28 per cent in 2004
but fell again to 20 per cent in 2005.
A common thread in this research is the importance oftargeting specific areas in improving the effectivenessof PES. Robalino et al. 2010, noting that in Costa Rica
there was improvement in 2000-05 compared with the
1997-2000 period, argue that targeting areas affectedby some deforestation pressure and including spatiallydifferentiated payments are two plausible next steps
to improve the effectiveness of the scheme. This also
points to the importance of developing monitoring
and verification schemes and data collection (including
the use of easily available GIS databases) that can help
identify additional areas.
The PES experience also shows that while challenges
have been faced in achieving environmental objectives
and ensuring the participation of small-scale forest
owners and marginalised groups, there has been
considerable learning and adaptation to make
improvements. In particular, ways have been foundof including landowners without formal land title in
PES schemes. The most important actions appear to
be to introduce environmental and social criteria fortargeting, actively promoting the PES option amongst
groups that would not otherwise get involved and/or to reduce transaction costs. The involvement ofintermediaries or facilitating organisations that havea community development mission is also important(Grieg-Gran 2008).
The main constraint on the expansion of PES schemes
has been lack of funds to scale up from pilot projects.
Even national-level schemes such that in Costa Rica
have been constrained by lack of resources, withapplications to enter the scheme greatly exceeding
the funds available (Porras et al. 2008). If a REDD+
mechanism is negotiated, there will be a stepchange in the amount of funds available: the sums
currently involved in the readiness phase are alreadysignificant.
However, if payment schemes are implemented atmuch larger scales and in locations where governanceis weak, facilitators will have to guard against elite
capture and more attention will have to be given tostrengthening the land tenure of local communities(Bond et al. 2009). Attention to such safeguards willneed to be a part of any investment in scaling up
PES under REDD+.

3.4 Investing in improved forest
management and certification
This investment approach recognises the importanceof the production of timber, fibre, and energy in naturalforests; if managed well, they need not conflict with theprovision of other ecosystem services. Moreover, the ability
to generate returns from forests through timber harvestingthat are high enough to compete with other land uses is an
important factor preventing total conversion.
Since the early 1990s, various sets of timber-harvesting
guidelines on Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) have been
produced in different regions of the world, designed toreduce the adverse environmental impacts associatedwith tree felling, yarding and hauling (Putz et al. 2008).
Some of the requirements of RIL imply higher costs
for logging companies, in the form of new equipment,
safety gear, technically qualified supervisors, reductionsin the area harvested and/or the need to use helicopter

Box 7: Research on the
profitability of Reduced
Impact Logging (RIL)
Studies of the costs and benefits of improved
forest management produce conflicting results.
Two studies in the Brazilian Amazon, in Tapajos
National Forest (Bacha and Rodriguez 2007) andParagominas (Barreto et al. 1998) have concluded
that RIL can be highly profitable. But Putz et al.
(2008) highlight other studies that have shown
conventional logging to be more profitable(Healey et al. 2000) or have given mixed results(Applegate 2002). They conclude that it is notpossible to draw general conclusions about thefinancial viability of RIL because of the wide
range of forest conditions and practices that
influence profitability in the tropics.
An earlier review of cost information in over
250 RIL studies (Killmann et al. 2002) concluded
that RIL does cost more, but not as much as
expected. Activities where RIL involved higher
costs included planning, where the mediandifference (10 observations) was US$ 0.28 per
m3, and felling, where RIL was US$ 0.56 per m3
higher than conventional logging or 48 per centhigher. It is possible that the experience gainedwith RIL techniques since this review was carriedout has led to a reduction in costs and a greater
chance of profitability, as reflected in the more
recent studies from Brazil cited above.

173

Towards a green economy
or cable systems to log areas with steep slopes (Putzet al. 2008). Given the planning it entails, RIL should
involve less wastage of saleable timber and there werehigh hopes when it was first promoted that it would be
sufficiently financially attractive for logging companies
to adopt it as part of their normal practice.
The evidence on its financial benefits is mixed though,reflecting the wide range of forest practices andconditions (see Box 7).
Reduced Impact Logging is just one aspect of SFM
criteria and indicators used in national standards andin voluntary certification schemes which describe morecomprehensively the elements of good practice. There
are a number of cost-increasing requirements beyond
RIL, which makes it unlikely that increased efficiency will
be sufficient to offset these.
The experience from Africa and Gabon in particular has
shown that meeting government SFM standards canbe challenging (Box 8). SFM management plans are
expensive and, as a result, there has been limited uptake.
Many schemes have emerged to certify forest
management against SFM standards, as well as woodtracking systems to ascertain sustainable and/or legal

Box 8: The high cost of SFM
plans in Gabon
Rough calculations show that to invest in a
15,000 hectare concession (for locals) a sum of
US$ 4,505,000 is needed, of which US$ 2,850,000(63 per cent) will go towards the developmentof a management plan and the rest into various
associated studies and impact assessments,
the most costly being those of fauna. Thesefigures do not include management training
and other costs such as licenses. Sustainable
forest management has complex requirements.
To formulate a Sustainable forest management(SFM) plan for a concession, an inventory offorest resources is needed and funds are required
for associated mapping, in-forest measurement
and assessment, and development of the plan
and a process for implementation. These actions
alone entail heavy investments. In addition, theForestry Code for Gabon calls for low-impact
logging practices; workers’ compounds must be
established for at least 25 years, and associatedagricultural sites must be taken into accountand studied in advance.
Source: Gumbo (2010)174

wood sources. Independent inspectors assess a mix offorest management documentation and actual fieldpractice. There are two international approaches withwidespread support: FSC and PEFC. Both also offer
chain-of-custody certification, tracing products from
SMFs and verifying they are not contaminated by other(potentially unsustainable) products. The logistics canbe challenging, especially for pulp, where many wood
sources are mixed. It usually operates through anelectronic system of tagging logs with bar-codes andtracking subsequent products.
Companies opting for certification not only have to meetthe costs of any improvements needed to meet thestandards, but also the direct costs or transaction costsof the certification application. For small forest areas
these can be relatively significant (Bass et al. 2001). The
direct costs of FSC certification have been estimated torange between US$ 0.06 and US$ 36 per hectare certified,depending on the size of forest area, as unit costs declinewith scale (Potts et al. 2010). In certification, links to markets
and the possibility of premiums or improved access tohigh value markets provide the incentive for investment .
An analysis of the impact of forest certification by Cashore
et al. (2006) used case studies from 16 countries in four
regions (sub-Saharan Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe
and Russia and Latin America). Positive social effects
were consistently reported, including improved pay andconditions for workers, the development of community
infrastructure and the provision of training. There wasless consistency in these case studies and other recent
literature on the market benefits of certification forthe companies concerned, raising concerns about its
financial sustainability in some areas (Box 9).
While a niche market may exist for some certified
timber, many companies (especially in developing andtransitional countries) produce for local and national
markets. In these cases, tools such as FSC certification
will not provide a significant impact on prices received(Cashore et al. 2006). Studies of certification in Africa,
Eastern Europe and Latin America provide support for thisfinding. Nevertheless, in three tropical-forest countries in
Asia and the Pacific, there is some evidence of positivemarket benefits from certification. In other cases, in South
Africa and Finland, certification is found to be beneficial inmaintaining existing market share (Box 9).
Box 9 provides examples of both positive and negative
cost-benefit ratios related to the uptake of certification.
Certification has so far been taken up by forest
operations of all sizes in developed countries, as well
as by larger companies (often plantation companies)
in developing nations. None of the ten largest certified
forests are in the tropics and few certified forests areForests

Box 9: Costs and benefits of certification for producers
In Uganda, there is no internal market for certified
products and most exports are destined for other
African countries that do not require certification(Gordon et al. 2006). Paschalis-Jakubowicz (2006)
reported that although FSC certification increased costs
for private producers, this was not reflected in the priceof lumber in Polish markets. In Guatemala and Mexico,
economic benefits of certification have generally notlived up to expectations, despite major government
initiatives encouraging its use in communities andindustry (Carrera Gambetta et al. 2006; Anta Fonseca
2006). In Guatemala, the direct and indirect costsof certification in the Maya Biosphere reserve havebeen estimated to range between US$ 0.10 and US$
1.90 per certified hectare per year, US$ 8-107 perhectare harvested per year, and US$ 4.2-52.9 per m3of harvested round timber. This indicates considerable
variation but suggests that for some forest owners
the costs are very high. While premiums have beenobtained, they are not high (in the case of certified
mahogany, US$ 0.05-0.10 per board feet, equivalent
to less than 10 per cent of the sales price), and it
was found that prices for non-certified wood sooncaught up (Carrera Gambetta et al. 2006).

community-run (FSC 2010). This reflects challenges
in interpreting and meeting social standards locally,
addressing insecure rights and assets of tropical forest
land-holders and managers, and poor access to capital,
skills and markets (Bass 2010).
However, there are some important exceptions thatsuggest these challenges could be overcome. Mexico
contains more than 700,000 hectares of communitymanaged FSC-certified natural forest, spanning 33
communities with stands ranging from 56 hectares
to 252,000 hectares. Most of these (26 out of 33) coverless than 20,000 hectares (Robalino et al. 2010). The
Mpingo Conservation Project in Tanzania was awarded
an FSC group certification for its community forests in2009 and Kikole village, one of the project’s constituent
rural communities, sold the world’s first harvest of
FSC-certified African blackwood in January 2010
(FSC 2009).
In terms of the environmental impacts of certification, there
is a general perception that certification has been taken
up by forest enterprises that were already practising good
forest- management. Some support to this perception
is given by the geographic pattern of the uptake ofcertification, which is heavily concentrated (80 per cent

Malaysia has benefited from an average premiumof 37 per cent on sawn timbers (see Shahwahid etal. 2006). Muhtaman and Prasetyo (2006) foundthat Perum Perhutani in Indonesia received a 15
per cent price premium, and Wairiu (2006) reported
an increase in price per cubic metre for Solomon
Islands Eco-forestry (SIEF) timber marketed
through Village Eco-Timber Enterprises (VETE) in
the Solomon Islands.
A survey of the furniture industry in South Africa
found that although FSC certification does notlead to price premiums, there are other benefits inmaintaining existing markets and contributing toquality control (Morris and Dunne 2003) cited inBlackman and Rivera 2010).
In Finland, a survey of perceptions of certified andnon-certified wood products companies foundthat certification was not considered to improvefinancial performance or to result in premiums
but was important for signalling environmental
responsibility and maintaining market share (Owari
et al. 2006 cited in Blackman and Rivera 2010).

in the case of FSC) in temperate and boreal areas (FSC2010). The evidence on the impact of forest certification
on biodiversity has been reviewed by van Kuijk et al.
(2009) who concluded that while there is no conclusive
quantitative evidence about the effects, the good forestmanagement practices associated with certification are
beneficial for biodiversity. These include reduced impact
logging, riparian buffer zones, green tree retention inclearcuts, protected areas within forest management units
and biodiversity corridors. The review also showed thatmany species and ecosystems are negatively affected byany form of logging, highlighting the need for a mix ofconservation areas and production areas of forest.
A more recent review and expert survey (Zagt et al. 2010)
draws a heavily qualified conclusion that certification
has helped reduce biodiversity loss in the tropics. The
caveats to this conclusion relate to the limited area ofcertified natural forest in the tropics and the rangeof extra-sectoral threats to tropical forests which
certification can do little to address.
In short, while there are some positive examples ofpremiums being received by developing country
producers, and good evidence of positive social impacts,
the slow pace of expansion of forest certification in175

Towards a green economy
tropical and sub-tropical areas suggests that moreproactive support is needed for scaling up. The
evidence on environmental impact shows that there ispotential, but that investment in certification needs tobe accompanied by other measures aimed at protecting
high conservation-value forest, controlling illegal
logging and policies directed at other sectors.

3.5 Investing in planted forests
Investment in planted forest can take a number offorms. It can be for productive purposes and range fromsystems using native species to high-yield plantations.
Alternatively, trees can be planted to promote ecologicalrestoration and ecosystem services, as in the case of
China (Box 10), although use of timber and fuelwood insuch cases is often not precluded. A distinction is often
made between reforestation and afforestation.5
Historically, governments have played a strong role insubsidising plantations, often providing as much as 75
5. Afforestation refers to planting of trees on land that has not had forest
cover for many years (for more than 50 years under the rules of the Clean
Development Mechanism) and that is therefore not considered forest land.
Reforestation refers to planting of trees on land that has had forest cover
removed recently (e.g. within the last 50 years) and that therefore can beconsidered as forest land.

Box 10: Afforestation in China:
The Sloping Land Conversion
Programme
The Sloping Land Conversion programme (orGrain for Green programme) started in 1999 witha goal to convert around 14.7 million hectares of
erosion-prone farmland to forest within criticalareas of the watershed of the Yangtze River andYellow River in China by 2010 (Bennett 2008).
This includes 4.4 million hectares of farmlandon slopes greater than 25 degrees (Ibid.).
There was also a goal to afforest a similar areaof wasteland (Ibid.). Total investment has been
US$ 4.3 million per year (Porras et al. 2008). By
the end of 2003, 7.2 million hectares of cropland
had been converted and 4.92 million hectaresof barren or wasteland had been afforested(Xu et al. 2004). By the end of 2006, the areaof cropland converted had reached 9 million
ha (Chen et al. 2009). This was a considerable
increase over previous trends for conversion ofcropland to forests, estimated at just 1.2 million
ha from the late 1980s to 2000 (Bennett 2008).

176

per cent of total costs (Canby and Raditz 2005). This has
been particularly significant in low- and middle-income
countries, where governments have justified large
subsidies in order to increase domestic timber supplies,
supply industry with low-cost wood, and even to relievepressure on natural forests (Canby and Raditz 2005).
Global subsidies for plantations between 1994 and 1998
totalled US$ 35 billion, of which US$ 30 billion went
to non-OECD countries (van Beers and de Moor 2001;
Canby and Raditz 2005).
In Brazil, for many years, industrial forest plantations
were promoted for production purposes (fibre for pulp
and charcoal) through national government financial
incentives (Viana et al. 2002). But several programmes
now promote reforestation for ecosystem services.
For example, in Piraçicaba in Sao Paulo state, the local
authorities in charge of water supply provide assistanceto farmers in the form of seedlings and technicalassistance to restore riparian forests (Porras et al. 2008).
A number of countries have invested in mangrove
restoration in order to improve sea defences.
The cost of planting forests and the rate of return on
investment varies according to the species, location,
and whether planting is for productive or protective
purposes. Differences in assumptions about the inclusionof opportunity costs of the land or the land price also leadto variations in reported costs (van Kooten and Sohngen2007). Table 6 gives an indication of the variation in costs.
Taking the range of costs in Table 6 and an annual increaseof 5 million hectares, the current level of investment
in extending the forest area could range from US$ 1.25
billion to over US$ 40 billion per year.
The rate of return on private investment in planted
forest for productive purposes can be very high.
Estimates made by Cubbage et al. (2009) of the financial
viability of industrial plantations based on exotic
species indicate that excluding land costs, returns
for exotic plantations in almost all of South America –Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela,
and Paraguay – could be substantial, with an internalrate of return (IRR) of 15 per cent or more. Yet the recordof public incentives in plantations has been poor, withthe wrong choice of sites, poor genetic material, poor
maintenance and location too far from markets (Bull et
al. 2006; Cossalter and Pye Smith 2003). Changes in local
and global markets are also a major factor affecting rateof return. The depressed timber prices on world markets
at the end of the 1990s and the early years of the last
decade led to smallholder plantations in the Philippines
becoming unprofitable (Bertomeu 2003).
The social impacts of reforestation can be very
controversial, particularly where it involves largescale plantations run by private companies because

Forests
Activity

Location

Cost/haReference

Restoring eucalyptus woodlands

S.E Australia€ 285–(passive i.e. natural regeneration) –€ 970 (active i.e. replanting)

Dorrough and Moxham (2005) in
Neßhöver et al. (2009)

Restoration of degraded stands

Atlantic forest, Brazil€ 2,600

Instituto Terra (2007)

Replanting of mangroves

Thailand

US$ 8,240 plus US$ 118/ha per year for
maintenanceSathirathai and Barbier (2001)

Reforestation for carbon sequestration
and wood

Costa Rica

US$ 1,633

Based on payment in national PES
scheme of US$ 980/ha (Robalino etal. 2010) which covers 60% of costs(Miranda et al. 2004)

Reforestation for carbon sequestration
and wood

Ecuador

US$ 1,500

Wunder and Albán (2008)

Afforestation

India various regions

US$ 413 (2001 prices). Mean of 25
estimates from 21 studies ranging from
US$ 12 to US$ 755

Balooni (2003)

Industrial forest plantation

Sabah, Malaysia (Acacia mangium)

US$ 921–1,052 (2001 prices)

Chan and Chiang (2004)

Average for Southern hemisphere,
USA and China – main species

US$ 957

Uruguay (Eucalyptus globules)

US$ 500

US (Douglas fir)

US$ 1,300

Colombia (Pinus tecunumani and
Eucalyptus)

US$ 1,800

Industrial forest plantations

Cubbage et al. (2009) excludes landcosts, and uses 8% discount rate.

Table 6: Costs of reforestation and afforestationof concerns about land grabs, withdrawal of accessto local communities to common-property forest
resources and replacement of perceived degraded or
low-value common property forest, or land importantfor food production, by forest plantations (WRM
2008a). Other reviews acknowledge these issues but
point out that in some areas plantations can provide
benefits to the local poor. Garforth, Landell-Mills andMayers (2005) highlighted the employment generated
by the plantation sector in South Africa, directly andindirectly in small-scale processing and retailing andsupporting industries, estimating that about 7 per centof the population depend on the sector. Bull et al. (2005)
pointed to extensive outgrower schemes and social
programmes of HIV AIDs, education and job training as
benefits from plantations in the Southern Hemisphere.
But Garforth et al. (2005) stressed that significant
investment in local bargaining power is needed foroutgrower schemes to offer routes out of poverty.
Small-scale reforestation on the part of communities
or small farmers has been less controversial because
it is often an important livelihood option introducedwith a poverty- reduction aim. Farmers in India havebecome important suppliers of wood as a result of suchprogrammes (Saigal 2005). A number of reforestation
schemes have been targeted at the provision of
ecosystem services, notably carbon sequestration.
While some case studies have been generally positive,e.g. Miranda et al. 2004, on Costa Rica and Wunder andAlbán (2008) on PROFAFOR in Ecuador, concerns havebeen raised about the long time scales involved forbenefits to accrue to farmers and the need for capacity
building. The Sloping Land Conversion Programme
in China was welcomed by farmers in its early years
because the compensation offered outweighed the lossof agricultural return (Xu et al. 2004). However, surveys
in five provinces found that there were shortfalls for asignificant proportion of farmers from 7 per cent to 77
per cent (Uchida et al. 2005; Xu et al. 2004).
The environmental impacts of reforestation andafforestation vary considerably. Plantations can becontentious owing to their more intensive use of waterand chemicals, as well as introduction of exotic andgenetically modified tree species. There has been much
criticism of monoculture plantations of exotic species(WRM 2008b). Recognising plantations’ high potential
to produce wood, potentially taking pressure off naturalforests, their sustainability is often conferred at thelandscape level rather than within the plantation – siting
plantations on less biologically and culturally importantland within a land-use mosaic, so that the landscape as awhole provides the range of goods and services required.
Even where tree planting is for protective purposes
rather than production, much depends on the way
programmes are carried out. The mangrove-planting
programme in Vietnam has been widely hailed for its
environmental benefits. It involved an investment of
US$ 1.1 million in planting (carried out by volunteers)and protecting 12,000 hectares of mangroves but

177

Towards a green economy
Type of agroforestry system

Location

Rate of return/comparison with conventional farming

Reference

Silvo-pastoral

Central and SouthAmerica

4–14%

Pagiola et al. (2007)

Peruvian Amazon

Lower return than shifting agriculture with short time horizon but
higher return over a longer period

Mourato and Smith (2002)

Three strata: 1) fruit trees, 2)banana, papaya, lemon 3) spices

Northern­Bangladesh

Agroforestry is more profitable than conventional farming with orwithout the inclusion of family labour costs and less risky

Rahman et al. (2007)

Mixed agroforestry, timber, horticulture, agriculture – timber
harvested after 15 years

Chittagong Hill
Tracts, Southern
Bangladesh

Agroforestry gives lower annual return per land unit than shifting
cultivation in year 1, 5, 9 and 13 and higher in other years. Agroforestry Hossaiin et al. (2006)
has a higher NPV over 15 years at 10% discount rate

Contour hedgerows

Eastern Visayas,
Philippines

Through soil conservation and improved yields increases agricultural
profits by average US$ 53/household or 6% of total income but
outweighed by opportunity costs of land and labour.
Excludes on-farm benefits such as fuelwood and fodder as well as longrun and external benefits

Pattanayak and Mercer (1998)

Fertiliser tree fallows

ZambiaOver 5 years at 30% discount rate, agroforestry is more profitable thancontinuous maize with no mineral fertilisers

Ajayi et al. (2006)

Rotational woodlots

Tanzania

Agroforestry has an NPV of US$ 388/ha, six times that of conventionalmaize

Franzel 2004 cited in Ajayi et al.
(2006)

Table 7: Rate of return of agroforestry compared with conventional farming

saved US$ 7.3 million per year on dyke maintenance(Neßhöver et al. 2009). In contrast, mangrove
restoration in the Philippines produced poor results
because trees were planted in the wrong places leading
to low survival rates (Neßhöver et al. 2009).
Similarly, the Sloping Land Conversion Programme in
China, although effective in bringing about tree planting
on large areas of land, has problems of low survival
rates and lack of technical support (Bennett 2008). The
suitability of this approach for drier regions of China
has also been questioned, for example by Zhang et al.
(2008), who estimated that in the sub-alpine region ofsouth-western China, afforestation would reduce water
yield by 9.6 - 24.3 per cent, depending on the type of
species and the climatic conditions. Another study (Sunet al. 2006) which applied a simplified hydrologicalmodel across the diverse regions of China, estimatedhigher annual water yield reductions from afforestationfrom 50 per cent in the semi-arid Loess Plateau region
in the north to 30 per cent in the tropical south.
To conclude, private investment in reforestation has
a place in a green forest sector to ensure sufficient
supplies of wood. But it needs to take place withinmanagement of the landscape and should not
replace natural forests, nor land that is importantfor subsistence food production. The economies ofscale of planted forests, particularly high-yield, fastgrowing, single-species plantations are such thatmarket forces will drive expansion. But incentives
are often given in forms that lead to their replacing
natural forests. The CDM also was restricted toreforestation and afforestation, putting natural forest
management at a further disadvantage in developing

178

countries. As stressed by Bull et al. (2005) incentives toplantations should be directed instead at promoting
forest ecosystem services and social development.
Governance conditions are also required that will tilt
the balance away from those planted forests that do notsupport many ecosystem services towards those that
do. It is important that certification schemes continue
to provide criteria for planted forests, including highyield plantations, to encourage best practice while notputting sustainable timber harvesting from naturalforest at a disadvantage.

3.6 Investing in agroforestry
Agroforestry encompasses a wide range of practices
as demonstrated by a definition given in a recent
assessment (Zomer et al. 2009): “Agroforestry systems
range from subsistence livestock silvo-pastoral
systems to home gardens, on-farm timber production,
tree crops of all types integrated with other crops,
and biomass plantations within a wide diversityof biophysical conditions and socioecologicalcharacteristics. The term has come to include therole of trees in landscape level interactions, suchas nutrient flows from forest to farm, or community
reliance on fuel, timber, or biomass available within
the agricultural landscape.”
Zomer et al. (2009) estimate that as much as 1 billion
hectares of agricultural land could currently beconsidered as agroforestry if a threshold of 10 per
cent tree cover is taken. With a higher threshold of 30
per cent tree cover, the area of agroforestry would beconsiderably lower at 375 million hectares, but still

Forests
significant. They conclude that trees are an integral
part of the agricultural landscape in all regions
except North Africa and West Asia. Agroforestry
is relatively important in Central America, SouthAmerica and South-east Asia, where there are many
long-standing management traditions as well as
new scientific forms of agroforestry, but agroforestry
is also practiced on large proportion of Africa’s landarea.
As with reforestation, the costs and rates of return ofagroforestry systems vary considerably dependingon location, species and management type. FAO(2005b) cites a review by Current and Scherr (1995)
of agroforestry practices in Central America andthe Caribbean which found that in 2/3 of the cases,
Net Present Value (NPV) and returns to labour werehigher than for the main alternative practices. Some
more recent studies in different locations that havecompared the profitability of agroforestry systems
with conventional farming systems are shown in
Table 7. They are generally consistent with theconclusions in Current and Scherr (1995) but show
the importance for the results of time horizons,discount rates and the range of benefits included. A
common conclusion of the studies that find in favourof the profitability of agroforestry is that it requiresconsiderably higher investment in the early years.
This constitutes a major obstacle to its adoption.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations’ review of the benefits of agroforestry (FAO
2005b) cited a number of positive impacts for farmers,
an additional source of cash income, provision of
products such as fodder for livestock, fuelwood andfertiliser in the form of nitrogen-fixing trees, that thefarmer would otherwise have to buy, decreased risk
because of the wider range of products on the farm,and the ability to earn income throughout the year
and accrue benefits at different times, over the short,medium and long term.
Research on the payments for agroforestry scheme
introduced in Costa Rica in 2004 as an additional
eligible activity in the national PES scheme, provides
some evidence on the social impact of providing
incentives for agroforestry (Cole 2010). A highproportion (78 per cent) of the farmers interviewed
reported an increase in income. This was not fromsale of harvested timber but from money left overafter planting and maintenance costs were covered.
This was particularly important in indigenous
communities because of their strong dependence
on subsistence farming and little other opportunity
for outside income. However, farmers commonly
viewed the plantings as a savings account for future
generations and saw little short-term benefit. While
the payments were concluded to be effective inovercoming initial economic and technical obstacles,
the need for ongoing capacity building and support
from strong local organisations was highlighted.
A number of projects and programmes have promoted
the wider adoption of agroforestry on the basis of its
significant on-site and off-site environmental benefits.
The Alternatives to Slash and Burn programme
showed that tree-based farming systems, whether
mixed or monocultural, had significant carbon storage
benefits, in part due to its limited soil cultivationand consequent oxidation of soils, in part due tomaking use of many vertical layers of vegetation.
It has been estimated that in Sumatra, Indonesia,

Box 11: Evidence on the impact of incentives for silvo-pastoral practices
Around US$ 4.5 million was invested in payments tofarmers in Central America and Colombia to fund atransition to greater use of silvo-pastoral practices incattle ranching. The payments to farmers were basedon a scoring system for environmental services.
Research on the implementation of this scheme in
Quindío, Colombia (Rios and Pagiola 2009) showsa significant difference between participants andthe control group after four years of payments. Only
13 per cent of the land area in the control groupexperienced any change in land use and the effectof this change was to increase the environmental
service score by 7per cent. In contrast, changes
in land-use practices extended to 44 per cent of

the area occupied by participants in the payment
scheme and the environmental service scoreincreased by 49 per cent. Similar conclusions basedon casual observation of neighbouring areas are
drawn for the silvopastoral scheme in Matiguás-Rio
Blanco, Nicaragua (Rios and Pagiola 2009).
Although water-related services were not a focus of
the payment scheme, some positive impacts werealso found. The silvo-pastoral scheme in Quindío,
Colombia monitored water quality upstream andfound a rapid drop in turbidity, biological oxygen
demand (BOD) and coliforms after measures had
been taken to reforest riverbanks and protect themfrom livestock entry (Pagiola et al. 2007).

179

Towards a green economy

rubber agroforestry systems store about 116 tonnesof carbon per hectare, 45 per cent of the amountstored by undisturbed natural forests (254 t/C perha), whereas continuous cultivation of cassava stores
only 39 tonnes of carbon per hectare (Tomich et al.
2001). The Food and Agriculture Organization of theUnited Nations (2005b) cites evidence of various
types of environmental benefits from agroforestry. In
Sumatra (Murniati et al. 2001) showed that householdswith diversified agroforestry systems depend less ongathering forest products from protected areas thanfarmers cultivating wetland rice. In the USA, trees
planted as wind breaks have been estimated toincrease crop yield significantly, for example, by 23
per cent for winter wheat (Kort 1988). More recently,
the GEF-funded Silvopastoral project in Colombia,

180

Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which targeted areas ofdegraded pasture, provides some rigorous evidenceof the environmental benefits of creating incentives
for agroforestry (Box 11).
In general, agroforestry has potential to be bothbeneficial to farmers and to provide offsite-benefits
in the form of carbon sequestration, reduced
sedimentation in surface water, and maintenanceof a wider basis of biodiversity than agriculture. But
the economic evidence shows that farmers needboth financial assistance and technical assistancein making the transition to modern forms ofagroforestry. Investment in incentive schemescombined with longer-term technical support canbe effective in promoting its expansion.

Forests

4 Modelling green investment in forests
In this section we examine the impacts at a global
level of increasing investment in two of the options
discussed in the previous section: private investment
in reforestation and public investment in payments toavoid deforestation. This is because both are highly likely
to play a role in climate-change mitigation and will form
part of a post-2012 international climate agreement.

4.1 The green investment scenario
Under the global model developed for the Green
Economy Report by the Millennium Institute, the green
investment scenario (G2) allocates 0.034 per cent of
global GDP to reforestation and incentives for avoiding
deforestation/forest protection between 2011 and
2050.6 This equates to US$ 40 billion (in constant 2010
US dollar prices) per year on average, with 54 per cent or
US$ 22 billion directed to reforestation and 46 per centor US$ 18 billion per year to avoided deforestation.
This is similar in order of magnitude to estimates madein the 1990s of the amount of investment needed
for sustainable forest management in production
forests of US$ 33 billion per year (Tomaselli 2006) andestimates made in recent years for the cost of avoiding
deforestation, which range from US$ 5 billion to US$ 15
billion per year (Stern 2007; Grieg-Gran 2006) to US$ 1728 billion (Kindermann et al. 2008). The amount indicatedfor avoiding deforestation also compares well with theestimate of US$ 12-17 billion per year made in Section
3.2 of the investment needed for effective managementof protected forests (based on Balmford et al. 2002).

4.2 The baseline scenario:
business-as-usual
In the model, the baseline scenario or business-as-usual(BAU) for the forest sector replicates the historical trend
from 1970 and assumes no fundamental changes inpolicy or external conditions going forward to 2050.
6. The 0.034 per cent of GDP for forest-related investments is part of an
integrated green investment scenario, G2, in which a total of 2 per cent of
global GDP is allocated to a green transformation of a range of key sectors.
The results of this scenario, in which the 2 per cent is additional to current
GDP, is generally compared to a corresponding scenario in which an
additional 2 per cent of global GDP is allocated following existing businessas-usual trends, BAU2. In the case of the forestry sector, there is no significant
difference between the BAU2 scenario and the BAU scenario, which also
projects a business-as-usual path but without additional investments (see theModelling chapter for more explanation of the scenarios). Hence the green
investment scenario (G2) can be compared to the BAU which also represents
the model’s projections of future trends on a business as usual path.

Under business-as-usual, the projection is for a steadydecrease in forest cover from 3.9 billion hectares in 2010
to 3.7 billion hectares by 2050. As a result, carbon storage
in forests will decline from 523 Gt in 2009 to 431 Gt in
2050. The contribution of the forest sector to global GDP
and employment is projected to grow at 0.3 per cent per
year between 2010 and 2050 to reach US$ 0.9 trillion and25 million jobs by 2050. This is in line with growth rates inthe sector between 1990 and 2006 (FAO 2009).

4.3 Investing to reduce deforestation
The cost of avoiding deforestation is assumed to startat US$ 1,800 per hectare, increasing to US$ 2,240 per
hectare by 2050. This is based on the global averagevalue added per hectare of crop production plus thevalue added of forest products per hectare (measured
in constant 2010 US$ prices), which is taken to represent
the opportunity cost if forests are conserved with no
extraction of forest products or clearing. This approachto estimating opportunity cost is somewhat different
from that taken in a number of studies on this topic (e.g.
Grieg-Gran 2006; Börner et al. 2010), which add together
the present value of agricultural revenues net of costdiscounted over several years and the stumpage fees fortimber, but the result is within the range of most such
estimates.7 It can be considered a generous estimateof the opportunity cost as in many locations thereturns to converting forests to smallholder agriculture,subsistence and cash crops and to cattle ranching are
considerably lower than US$ 1,800 per hectare. This
figure is more representative of higher-value land uses
such as oil palm (see Grieg-Gran 2006; Chomitz et al.
2006; Börner et al. 2010).
Nevertheless, the cost of designing and administering apayment scheme, the so-called transaction costs, can beconsiderable, particularly in developing countries andin remote forest areas. While existing national-level PES
schemes in Costa Rica and Mexico have administration
costs of well below 10 per cent of the overall amountspent (Wunder et al. 2008), analysis of the Bolsa Floresta
scheme in Amazonas state in Brazil indicates a muchhigher proportion, around 40 per cent (Viana et al. 2009).
The cost figure used in this model is high enough toincorporate some provision for transaction costs.

7. It is equivalent to the cost of purchasing the land or the cost of making
annual payments (as in PES schemes) to compensate for forgone annual
returns to land over an appropriate time period (30-50 years) discounted
at an appropriate rate.

181

20

Million persons

Million hectares/year

Towards a green economy

18

BAU

16
14

35

G2

30
25

12

BAU
20

10
8

G2

6

15

4

10

2
0

0
1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Figure 2: Deforestation reduction under the green
investment scenario (G2)

Figure 3: Employment under the green investment
scenario (G2) and business-as-usual (BAU)

The investment would enable payments to be made toforest landholders over a steadily expanding area, withthe yearly increase reaching 6.76 million hectares by2030 and then decreasing to 6.66 million hectares by
2050, in effect reducing the annual rate of deforestation
by just over 50 per cent, as shown in Figure 2. This isconsistent with other studies, which have predominantly
estimated the cost of reducing deforestation by 50 per
cent (Stern 2007; Eliasch 2008; Kindermann et al. 2008).

The modelling examines the full cost to a landowner of
establishing a planted forest rather than the incentive
payment that might make such a land use competitive.
On average, the investment allocated will cover the costof reforesting an additional 9.6 million hectares per year
or 386 million hectares over the 40-year period.

4.4 Investing in planted forest

The economic and environmental impacts of the green
investment scenario are shown in Table 8. In the shortterm the reduction in deforestation leads to a decreasein the value added of the forest sector (wood, woodprocessing and pulp and paper) so that it is 1.7 per centbelow the baseline in 2013. Similarly, employment is 2
per cent below the baseline level in 2013. However, thisdoes not take account of the economic impacts on othersectors such as tourism, which may benefit from thereduction in deforestation and also the economic valueof the reductions in carbon emissions. In the longer term,as the area of planted forest increases, value added in
the conventional forest-based industries rises to US$
10.4 trillion, some 19 per cent above BAU. The increase isaccompanied by growth in employment from 25 million
to 30 million worldwide, or 20 per cent above businessas-usual (Figure 3).

The cost of planting forests is assumed to be US$ 1,630
per hectare based on the costs of reforestation in
Costa Rica’s national PES scheme, which pays farmers
US$ 980 per hectare (Robalino et al. 2010) to cover 60
per cent of the costs of establishment (Miranda et al.
2004). As shown in Table 6, this is within the range ofcosts estimated for production planted forests, whichis the type of reforestation under consideration here.
Key forest-sector
indicators in 2050

BAU

Green investment
scenario (G2)Natural forest area

3.36 billion ha

3.64 billion ha

Deforestation rate ha/
year

14.9 million ha

6.66 million ha

Planted forest area

347 million ha

850 million ha

Total forest area

3.71 billion ha

4.49 billion ha

Carbon storage in forests

431 billion tonnes

502 billion tonnes

Gross value added

US$ 0.9 trillion

US$ 1.4 trillion

Employment

25 million

30 million

Table 8: Forests in 2050 under the green
investment scenario and business-as-usual (BAU)** See footnote 6.

182

1970

4.5 Impacts of investment in reducing
deforestation and in planted forest

The main environmental impact is on the area of naturalforest, which in 2050 is 8 per cent more extensive in thegreen investment scenario than under BAU, and on the
total area of forest (natural and planted) which in thegreen investment scenario is 21 per cent more extensive
in 2050 than under BAU and 14 per cent higher thanthe current forest area. This has positive implications forbiodiversity and carbon storage and results in reduced
greenhouse gas emissions. The increase in the forest

Forests
area is made possible by the investments in improved
agricultural productivity (see the Agriculture chapter).
This means that demand for agricultural production canbe met from a smaller area of land, freeing up land forreforestation or afforestation. It also means that there isless pressure on natural forest.
These projections indicate the potential of increasing
green investment in the forest sector. But much depends
on how the investment is made and in what policy andinstitutional context. As discussed above, reforestation
programmes do not always work financially, socially or
environmentally, and the small amount of investment

in avoiding deforestation so far, mainly in the national
PES schemes in Costa Rica and Mexico, has struggled
to demonstrate cost-effectiveness. Large investment
programmes on the scale modelled here will be morechallenging although they can draw lessons from theexisting experience. Global aggregate projections of
this nature cannot, owing to limitations of their design,
capture the differences in response between tropicalcountries and non-tropical countries, or between
countries with high forest cover and low forest cover, or
between high income and low income countries. They do,
however, indicate what can be achieved at a global levelin the appropriate policy and institutional conditions.

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5 Enabling conditions
Increased investment needs to be catalysed and backed
up by improvements in forest governance, institutions
and policy (UNFF 2009). Enabling conditions are needed
to motivate the private sector and forest communities
to make investments in sustainable forest managementand downstream activities, and to support public-sector
investments and ensure they realise value.
This section discusses important enabling conditions,
including: forest governance and policy reform, actions
to tackle bad practice in forestry and extra-sectoral
drivers of forest loss, and information technology tocharacterise forest assets.

5.1 Forest governance andpolicy reform
An overarching requirement is to ensure that good
forest governance is in place at the national levelbased on specific, country-led analysis of the economic,
social and institutional drivers of forest loss. This good
governance includes a vision for the future of a country’s
forests, and of forest-based economies, which addresses
the sustainable and equitable provision of all forest
ecosystem services. It also includes a policy frameworkthat balances global and national public goods withprivate goods and community requirements, captures
the value of forest ecosystem services in private andpublic decision-making, and creates clear incentives
for good practice and disincentives for bad practice. In
addition, it includes transparent, secure and fair rights toforest resources and allocation mechanisms especiallyfor forest-dependent groups such as indigenous peoples.
The fundamentals of good governance in a country (ruleof law, freedom of association, respect for property
rights, accountable legislature, etc.) will be critical.
At an operational level, good forest governance includes
forest management principles, and a related hierarchy of
criteria, indicators and standards that support progressfrom mere legality to SFM. It also includes participationof forest stakeholders – with special support to poor
communities and indigenous peoples. Furthermore,
it includes transparent and accessible databases andaccountability mechanisms that record forest use bystakeholders and are linked to incentives and sanctions.
Subsidies, fiscal instruments and other means to get theprice right for given forest ecosystem services should
also be covered, ensuring that externalities are reflectedin payments for services. Finally, good forest governance184

should include a capacity-developing, step-wise
approach, helping stakeholders to continually improveforest management.

5.2 Tackling illegal logging
Illegal logging is a serious problem. The international
trade in illegally sourced wood products was estimatedto be worth US$ 8.5 billion in 2008. Sustainably produced
wood products will not be able to compete if large
volumes are produced illegally or unsustainably, withlow production costs, unreported taxes and royalties
and unfair prices below market price. Because there areeven larger volumes of illegal wood products that do notenter international trade and are consumed within the
producing country, the actions that the governments
of producing countries take to tackle illegal logging are
likely to have leverage effects. However, the governmentsof countries that import wood products and the financial
institutions that back forestry and manufacturing ofwood products can also play an important role.
The 1998 G8 meeting was catalytic in drawing attention
to illegal logging and setting in motion a significant
international policy process – one that is increasingly
influential and has recently reduced illegality, although
has not yet stopped it. Subsequent intergovernmental
agreements, in particular the Forest Law Enforcement andGovernance (FLEG) processes coordinated by the World
Bank, have helped to raise awareness of the issue andhave resulted in agreements that “all countries that export
and import forest products have a shared responsibility
to undertake actions to eliminate the illegal harvesting offorest resources and associated trade”.8
The initiatives involve governments of importer
countries increasingly excluding illegal products fromtheir markets: by setting up border mechanisms toprohibit imports; by using public procurement policy
to create protected markets for legal products; by using
their own legal systems more aggressively to target
companies involved in importing illegal goods; and byoffering information and encouragement to importing,processing and retailing companies to control their
supply chains. The USA became the first country to
ban the import and sale of illegally harvested wood,and to require declaration of species and country of
8. Europe and North Asia FLEG Ministerial conference, 2005 St. Petersburg
Declaration. Available at http://194.84.38.65/files/specialprojects/enafleg/
25dec_eng.pdf

Forests
origin, extending the Lacey Act to wood products. The
European Union has established a licensing system
based around Voluntary Partnership Agreements(VPAs), which are negotiated with cooperating exporter
countries (Box 12) under the Forest Law Enforcement,
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan.
The success of these tools will depend upon how
extensive the uptake is and how well they close off theopportunities for circumvention by e.g. trade throughthird countries. This is highlighted in a recent study ofillegal logging trends up to 2008 (Lawson and MacFaul
2010), which notes that there has been a reduction in
illegal logging and in trade of illegally sourced wood
products – although importing country measures had
played a relatively small role in this. While FLEGT and
the Lacey Act can be expected to have an impact in
the future, the main challenge is the arrival of illegallysourced wood via third party processing countries,
notably China. The authors note that governments inprocessing countries are not taking adequate action toaddress illegal logging (Lawson and MacFaul 2010).
Further and more widespread improvement requires
a transformation of forest governance in producing
countries with wider stakeholder participation in the
allocation of forest resources, and the determination oflaws so that there is greater legitimacy for laws relating
to forests and timber harvesting (as emphasised in5.1). Both carrots (support for skills training in SFM,
independent verification of SFM, and preferential
government procurement for SFM) and sticks (tightening
up laws and enforcement against illegal logging
and marketing) are needed. The measures taken by
consuming countries may help to promote this broader
governance improvement, as the process of negotiating
the VPAs has involved the inclusion of partner-country
civil society in the negotiations (Brack 2010).

5.3 Mobilising green investment
Investment in forests can target conserving existingareas of primary forest, promote expansion of forests
through regeneration and reforestation, improve forest
management in existing forests of different types, andincrease the number of agroforestry systems. Each ofthese will have different attractions for specific investors,
e.g. agroforestry for agricultural investors aiming forlong-term resilience in food and other markets. Thereis increasing evidence that private investments that
seek long-term growth and security are attracted towell-managed forestry (such as pension funds, aswell as specialist vehicles such as forest bonds). Morerecently, social stock exchanges and partnerships withcorporations and government have revealed significant
scope for social investments in locally-controlled forestry.

Because of the public-good nature of some forest
ecosystem services, however, businesses and forest
landholders usually do not perceive a sufficient incentive
to make green investments in forests. Where suchinvestments indicate a positive rate of return for society as
a whole, investment by the public sector can be warranted:
to provide forest ecosystem services directly; to provide
financial incentives to the private sector to make green
investment competitive; and/or to prevent unsustainable
forest management. Central to this will be a hard-headed
examination of national competitiveness in sustainable
forest management, and effective regimes supporting
financial rewards for producing forest ecosystem services,and notably Global Public Goods (GPGs).
A major incentive measure is public wood procurement,
which has had a significant impact in a few importing
countries and can have a knock-on effect on private
procurement policy. Six EU countries including the UK(Box 13) have established procurement policies. Thesepublic procurement systems are driven by the power ofpublic spending in the EU (which accounts for 16-18 percent of GDP). They differ in some aspects, e.g.: whether
they separate out legal and sustainable categories;
whether they include social norms; and how they verify

Box 12: The EU licensing system
for legal wood products
The EU’s licensing system is based on VPAs withproducing countries. These VPAs put in placea licensing system in each country, to identify
legal products and license them for importto the EU. Unlicensed, and therefore possibly
illegal, products will be denied entry to the
EU. The agreements include: capacity-building
assistance to set up the licensing scheme,
improved enforcement and, if necessary,reform laws; and provisions for independent
scrutiny of the validity of the issue of thelicenses, as well as verifying legal behaviour
through the chain of custody of the timber. The
VPAs’ impact is as yet unknown: the first two
agreements with Ghana and Republic of Congo
were signed too recently (September 2008 andMarch 2009, respectively) for any impact to bediscernible. As developing a licensing systemis estimated to take two years, the first FLEGTlicensed timber will not enter the market untillate 2010. Negotiations are also underway with
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Malaysia,
Indonesia and Liberia (Brack 2010).

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Towards a green economy

Box 13: Wood procurement
policy in the UK
The UK central government’s wood procurement
policy started with a requirement to source only
legally-produced forest products (compulsory
for all government contracts). A requirement forsustainable forestry was originally optional, butbecame mandatory from 2009, albeit with a sixyear exemption for FLEGT countries (CPET 2010).
The UK policy recognises FSC and PEFC , andincludes an independent Central Point ofExpertise on Timber (CPET) to advise specifiers,
contractors, etc.9

non-certified imports. Public procurement policies fortimber also exist for Japan and New Zealand, as well
as some local authorities in the EU and USA. There isclearly room for improvement but a good start has
been made.
Another incentive is in the hands of key investors, such as
the IFC and major private banks, which operate coherent
controls and have specific policies for sustainable forest
investment. Most of them have already stopped investingin unsustainable forestry and forest industry, and requirecertification associated with all forest investment (HSBC
2008). Some financial institutions have followed the leadof NGOs such as Tropical Forest Trust, Rainforest Allianceand Woodmark in promoting a step-wise approach to
improving practice that culminates in full certification.
A stepwise approach presents less of a challenge – andpossibly more of an attractive business proposition– than the big stretch that is often required to movestraight to full SFM certification. HSBC for example, isallowing five years to progress to certification (HSBC
2008).

5.4 Levelling the playing
field: Fiscal policy reform andeconomic instruments
Forests are not so much a sector as a resource, which othersectors and livelihood systems use, e.g. the energy sector(low-cost wood can move in and out of energy markets)and the agriculture sector (forests can be a continuingsource of food and an asset to be liquidated for farming).
Policy measures which favour competing activities for
9. Available at http://www.cpet.org.uk/evidence-of-compliance/categorya-evidence/approved-schemes.

186

forest land and demand for the products derived fromthese activities can undermine efforts to conserve andsustainably manage forests. Mining and infrastructure
projects, often prioritised for their contribution to
government revenue, can have destructive direct impact
on forests and indirect impacts through opening up
remote areas. Government regulation of such projects
and the due diligence procedures of financial institutions
that back these projects provide important levers forgood practice in siting, construction and operation to
mitigate impacts on biodiversity.
Some governments and financial institutions areactively promoting biodiversity offsets to ensure thatareas of rich biodiversity such as tropical forest that are
unavoidably lost through capital development projects
are offset through conservation actions to restore forest
elsewhere or reduce risks. Engaging with a wide rangeof stakeholders is also critical, asking the question:
which supply or demand factors (including particularspecific goods and services) are tipping markets andgovernance regimes towards environmentally-sound,fairer, and more competitive outcomes? Which factors
are mutually supportive and could lead to leveraged
outcomes if more widely applied? The ecosystemapproach can be used as a common framework forassessing potential trade-offs and synergies between
sectors and stakeholders.
The most significant driver in terms of forest area isagriculture. For much of the 1980s and 1990s, thesubsidies given to agriculture resulted in farming being
the biggest cause of deforestation, and often also of
inequity between farmers, where subsidies tend to be
captured by larger farmers. With the onset of structuraladjustment programmes, subsidies for key agricultural
inputs such as fertiliser were reduced or phased out
altogether in many developing countries. However,agriculture remains the engine of development of most
low-income countries and is the focus of national andinternational efforts to ensure food security, particularly
in response to the recent food price spike. Thus, it is
not surprising that agriculture remains favoured overforests, if by means other than input subsidies – inparticular, through water allocation systems, artificially
low irrigation charges and infrastructure expansion, androads. Today, the drive for biofuels expansion, oftenwith substantial government support, is a new source of
unequal competition and pressure on natural forests.
It is unrealistic to expect support to agriculture to be
removed altogether if development and food security
objectives are to be met. Agroforestry is one means toincrease synergies between the two sectors. Mechanisms
such as REDD provide incentives for forest conservation
but will be undermined if agriculture is still subsidisedin ways that are not coordinated with forest policy. Ways

Forestsshould be sought for them to be mutually reinforcing(See Box 14). The chapter on Agriculture sets out thetypes of investment in sustainable agriculture that canmeet world food needs and support conservation ofnatural forests and expansion of forest area.

5.5 Improve information
on forest assets
In determining the relative priority to give to the forest
sector versus agriculture and other sectors and to therange of forest ecosystem services, governments need tohave better information on forest stocks, flows and costbenefit distribution. This should go beyond counting
trees and measuring area to assessing the magnitude,
value and quality of forest ecosystem services. To dothis requires information technology that can handle
complexity. Geo-referenced information is needed onforest resources and the ecosystem services they provide.
The associated economic, social and environmental
benefits of forest ecosystem services also need to be
captured in monitoring and economic statistics andincluded in multi-criteria analysis as basis for decisionmaking. There is adequate experience to take this toscale, so that countries have an accurate assessmentof the stocks and flows of ecosystem services andwho benefits from them. This is also needed to accessecosystem services markets that demand verification,and to improve the case made in public expenditure
reviews.
At present, there are considerable uncertainties in
estimating the value of ecosystem services at the
local, national and particularly at the global level,reflecting gaps in information on biophysical linkages
and how they depend upon both the type of forest
and its management, and the site-specific nature ofmuch of the research done to date. Publicly supported
research on ecosystem services is needed to reduce
the gaps in information and to document more fully
the contribution made by the forest sector to theeconomy, livelihoods and social development indifferent downstream sectors. Improved knowledgeof ecosystem services is essential for ensuring the fullvalue of forests is acknowledged in wider development
decisions. The link between forests and water supply
particularly requires better information.

5.6 Making REDD+ a catalyst forgreening the forest sector
There is no clear and stable global regime to attract
investment in Global Public Goods (GPGs), and to assure
their production in ways that are effective, efficientand equitable. Yet such a regime is essential to tip theBox 14: The effect of financial
support to livestock in Brazil
A study of the livestock sector in Brazil highlights
the challenges for policy coordination with
forestry. Financial support from the Brazilian
National Development Bank (BNDES) has
played a significant role in the expansion of the
livestock sector. The major part of this support
has been targeted at purchase of stock, withless than 6 per cent of the funds being used topromote improvement of pastures. However,studies made by EMBRAPA, the Brazilian
government agricultural research agency
indicate that, with improvements in livestock,feed and management, it would be possible
to increase the number of livestock by 42 percent, while reducing the area of pasture by
35 per cent from its 2006 level. As the area of
pasture in the Brazilian Amazon increased by 44
per cent between 1985 and 2006, driving muchof the deforestation there, this has important
implications for REDD: redirecting government
support to improve pastures could reinforce
efforts to control deforestation and restore
forest cover.
Source: Smeraldi and May (2009)

finance and governance balance in favour of longerterm, sustainable forest management. Management
for GPGs, as opposed to wood production alone, also
opens up the prospect of new types of forest-related
employment, livelihoods and revenues, including
management partnerships with local communities.
However, standards that support the co-production of
local benefits with global benefits will be needed, as
well as effective systems for local control of forests, toensure livelihood benefits are realised and an equitable
distribution of costs and benefits.
Payments for the climate regulation services of forests
through the CDM and REDD+ mechanisms offer perhaps
the greatest opportunity for countries and landholders
to capture the value of their forest ecosystem services.
The experience with PES provides valuable lessons fordeveloping effective and equitable REDD+ mechanisms.
Considerable work needs to be done, however, to resolve
the issue of additionality10, that is to ensure that payments
are targeted at forest conservation and enhancement
activities which would not otherwise take place. This has
proved challenging for existing PES schemes.
10. Additionality is aimed at improving efficiency.

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Towards a green economy

However, this appears to discriminate against
countries and forest landholders who have alreadyconserved forests or taken early action. Determining
the counterfactual or reference level of forest-related
emissions – from forests that would otherwise not be
conserved – is also challenging, as this is not necessarily
the same as the formal development plans laid out by thecountry concerned; neither is it necessarily determinedby whether forest conversion is permitted by nationallaw. While there is scope for technical improvements inassessing deforestation and degradation and measuring
forest carbon, determining reference emission levels into
the future requires political negotiation (Bond et al. 2009).
The methodological guidance that came out of the
Copenhagen COP was for reference emission levels in
REDD+ to be based on historical rates adjusted for national
circumstances (UNFCCC 2010). Reaching agreement on
how these adjustments will be made will require bothbetter understanding on the part of forest countries of
how different rules on adjustment will affect them, anda pragmatic approach that recognises existing efforts toconserve forests and improve forest management.

188

Safeguards are also needed to protect the rights offorest-dependent people, particularly when theserights derive from traditional systems, rather thanformal legal systems and to ensure that those whobear the costs of REDD+ schemes, in terms of land
and resource restrictions, receive an appropriate
share of the benefits. Specific models need to be
developed for small-scale producers and local
communities. As with protected areas, long-term
effectiveness and efficiency of REDD+ schemes
may often depend critically on ensuring thesebenefits for local stakeholders. Some projects in thevoluntary carbon market, or as part of readinessactivities and project design standards such as
those of the Climate Community and Biodiversity
Alliance, are showing how these equity issues canbe addressed at the project level. At the national andinternational level, the payment against performance
approach being promoted in some bilateral deals
could employ a broader concept of performance– one that incorporates not only emission
reductions, but also considerations of equity andlocal co-benefits.

Forests

6 Conclusions
Understanding and accounting for the full range ofservices provided by forests is the most important task
for the sector in a green economy. The active protectionof tropical forests, for example, is now widely perceived
as a crucial ecosystem management priority and acost-effective way to reduce global carbon emissions.
While the loss of forest carbon can be offset by planting
trees, and some growing timber demand can be met byplantations, the loss of primary forest is often irreversible.
Competing demand for forest land, especially fromagriculture, is likely to continue driving deforestation.
Policy measures beyond the forest sector, such as
agricultural subsidies, are therefore at least as importantas policies within the forest sector and innovative
policies that exploit synergies between the two sectors
will be especially valuable.
There are reasons for optimism, but greening the forest
sector requires a sustained effort. Various standards
and certification schemes have provided a sound basis
for practising sustainable forest management, but
their widespread uptake requires a strong mandateand consistent policies and markets. Protected areas,
although controversial from the beginning, remain an
important option for preventing the permanent lossof critical ecosystems and biodiversity. Their effective
and equitable enforcement remains a challenge. The
emerging PES and REDD+ schemes are ambitious andinnovative avenues for funding the greening of theforest sector. Their interface with existing standards,
certification schemes and networks of protected areas,
however, needs to be monitored to ensure they build on
or learn from earlier experiences.
Investment in greening the forest sector should
consider sustainable forest management, PES and
REDD+, planted forest, agroforestry, and indeed
protected areas, although the modelling exercise –for illustrative purposes – focused only on reducing
deforestation and increasing the area of planted forest.

Investing in greening the sector may involve short-term
sacrifices in terms of income and jobs, as the forest
stock in general requires time to grow or recover. This
is why compensation schemes – whether national orinternational – are essential for communities.
Countries face a choice, whether to allow the prevailingforest transition to take its course or to change theirforest economy to sustain a mix of forest goods
and services that adds value and confers long-term
resilience. Forests have tended to be associated with
benefiting only the early phases of the development
transition, where their intentional liquidation produces
other forms of capital. Yet Sweden, Finland, Canada
and other countries demonstrate how forests canplay a sustained role in high-income countries, too.
Maintaining forests in such countries has not inhibited
wealth creation or labour markets; rather, there are
significant forward linkages to many economic sectors
with real opportunities for investment and related
growth in wealth and jobs. These sectors could in
turn, benefit from the renewable, recyclable, andbiodegradable inputs that forests can provide. There
are also highly significant public benefits in terms of
biodiversity, health and recreation that are provided atrelatively low cost.
The prospect of payments for ecosystem services
such as carbon and biodiversity extends this practical
proposition to those countries – notably low and middleincome – that are bold enough to make policy choices
in favour of investing in the ecological infrastructureof forests, but that do not yet have the resources toinvest in a modern forest industry. Protecting forests tomaintain biodiversity and reduce carbon emissions do
not require intensive management inputs, although they
do require scrutiny and protection, and stable financial
mechanisms. The alternative, a steady stripping of forest
assets where the wider costs are unsupportable and thebenefits are often uncertain, is no longer tenable.

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193

Part II

Investing in energy and resource efficiency

iStockphoto/Carmen Martínez Banús

Renewable energy
Investing in energy and resource efficiency

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Authors: Ton van Dril, Raouf Saidi and
Xander van Tilburg, Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands(ECN) and Derek Eaton (UNEP).
Derek Eaton and Fatma Ben Fadhl (in the initial stages of the
project) of UNEP managed the overall preparation chapter,
including the elaboration of modelling scenarios, the handlingof peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating authors on
revisions, conducting supplementary research and bringing thechapter to final production.
The lead authors who contributed technical background papers
and other material for this chapter were Lachlan Cameron(ECN), Suani Coelho (Brazilian Reference Center on Biomass,
CENBIO) Heleen de Coninck (ECN), Amit Kumar (Tata Energy
and Resources Institute, TERI, India), Alexandra Mallet (Sussex
University, UK), Joyce McLaren (National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, NREL, USA), Tom Mikunda (ECN), Jos Sijm (ECN),

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011198

Raouf Saidi (ECN), Laura Würtenberger (ECN), Peter Zhou (EECG
Consultants). Additional material was prepared by Andrea M.
Bassi, John P. Ansah and Zhuohua Tan (Millennium Institute);
Andrew Joiner and Tilmann Liebert (UNEP), Ana Lucía Iturriza
and Yasuhiko Kamakura (ILO).
We would like to thank the many colleagues and individuals
who commented on various drafts and provided specific inputs
and advice, including John Christensen (UNEP Risoe Centre
on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development, Denmark),
Yasuhiko Kamakura (ILO), Punjanit Leagnava (UNEP), Anil
Markandya (Basque Centre for Climate Change, Spain), Mohan
Munasinghe (Munasinghe Institute for Development, Sri Lanka),David Ockwell (Sussex University, UK), Martina Otto (UNEP), Ian
Parry (IMF), Mark Radka (UNEP), Serban Scrieciu (UNEP), Virginia
Sonntag-O’Brien (REN21), Shannon Wang (OECD), Peter Wooders(IISD), and Dimitri Zenghelis (Grantham Research Institute,London School of Economics and Political Science, UK).

Renewable energy

Contents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

1.1

The energy sector and the position of renewable sources of energy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

2

Challenges and opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4

Energy security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Climate change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Impacts of energy technologies on health and ecosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Energy poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

3

Investing in renewable energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5

Recent trends in renewable energy investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Technical advances and cost competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Externalities, subsidies and cost competition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Employment potential in renewable energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Investment required for renewable energy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

4Quantifying the implications of investing in renewable energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

4.1
4.2

Business-as-usual (BAU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Green investment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

5

Overcoming barriers: enabling conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7

Policy commitment to renewable energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Risks and returns  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Financing mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Electricity infrastructure and regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Innovation and R&D  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Technology transfer and skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
Sustainability standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

6Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

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Towards a green economy

List of figures
Figure 1: Evolution of fossil fuel prices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Figure 2: Renewable energy share of global final energy consumption, 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Figure 3: Global new investment in renewable energy in US$ billions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Figure 4: Range in recent levelised cost of energy for selected commercially available renewableenergy technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Figure 5: External costs of energy sources related to global health and climate change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Figure 6: Trends in BAU and G2 scenarios in total energy consumption and renewablepenetration rate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Figure 7: Trends in BAU and G2 scenarios: power generation (left axis) and renewable penetration
rate in power sector (right axis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Figure 8: Total employment in the energy sector, and its disaggregation into fuel and power, andenergy efficiency under the G2 scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Figure 9: Total energy-related emissions and reductions under G2 by source, relative to BAU . . . . . . . . . . 225
Figure 10: Policies for supporting renewable energy technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Figure 11 : Public finance mechanisms across stages of technological development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Figure 12: Illustrative financing options for the poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Figure 13: Public-sector low-carbon R&D spending per capita as a function of GDP per capita andCO2 emissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

List of tables
Table 1: Primary energy demand by region in the IEA Current Policies scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Table 2: World primary energy mix in the IEA Current Policies scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Table 3: Millennium Development Goals and links to energy access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Table 4: Stages of technological maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Table 5: Learning rates of electricity-generating technologies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Table 6: Energy technologies for power generation in the EU – moderate fuel price scenario . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Table 7: Mitigation project costs per tonne of CO2 (US$ at 2007 prices), given different values for natural
gas prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Table 8: Employment in renewable energy, by technology and by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
Table 9: Average employment over life of facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
Table 10: Lifespan of selected power and transportation assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Table 11: Comparison of energy mix in 2030 and 2050 in various GER and IEA scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Table 12: Emission abatement shares from GER modelling compared with IEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

List of boxes
Box 1: Carbon markets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Box 2: Tunisia’s Solar Energy Plan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Box 3: Brazilian ethanol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Box 4: Grameen Shakti programme in Bangladesh  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

200

Renewable energy

List of acronyms
AGECC
BAU
CCS
CDM
CENBIO
CO2
DEFRA
ECN
EEA
EIA
ELI
EREC
ESMAP
EU
EU ETS
GDP
GER
GHG
GNESD
GSI
HRS
IEA
IIASA
ILO
IOE
IPCC
IQ
IRENA
ITIF
ITUC
LCOE
MDGs
MI

Advisory Group on Energy andClimate Change
Business-as-usual
Carbon capture and storage
Clean Development Mechanism
Brazilian Reference Center on
Biomass
Carbon dioxide
Department for Environment, Foodand Rural Affairs (UK)
Energy Research Centre of theNetherlands
European Environment Agency
Energy Information Administration
Environmental Law InstituteEuropean Renewable Energy Council
Energy Sector Management
Assistance Programme
European Union
European Union Emissions Trading
SchemeGross domestic productGreen Economy Report
Greenhouse gas
Global Network on Energy for
Sustainable Development
Global Subsidies Initiative
High Road Strategies
International Energy Agency
International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis
International Labour Organization
International Organisation of
Employers
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
ChangeIntelligence quotientInternational Renewable Energy
AgencyThe Information Technology andInnovation Foundation
International Trade Union
Confederation
Levelised cost of energy
Millennium Development Goals
Millennium Institute

NH3
NMVOCs
NOX
NRC
NREL
OECD
OPEC
PFM
PM10
PV
R&D
REN
RPS
SHSs
SO2
SRREN

T21
UN DESAUNCTAD
UNDP
UNEP
UNEP SEFIUNFCCC
UNIDO
WEO
WHO
WMO
WTO
WWEA

Ammonia
Non-Methane Volatile Organic
Compounds
Nitrogen oxides
National Research Council
National Renewable Energy
Laboratory
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries
Public Finance Mechanism
Particulate matter of 10 microns indiameter or smaller
Photovoltaic
Research and development
Renewable energy
Renewables portfolio standard
Solar household systems
Sulfur dioxide
Special Report on Renewable
Energy Sources and Climate Change
Mitigation (IPCC)
Threshold 21 model (Millennium
Institute)
United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs
United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development
United Nations Development
Programme
United Nations Environment
Programme
United Nations Environment
Programme Sustainable Energy
Finance Initiative
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
United Nations Industrial
Development Organization
World Energy Outlook
World Health Organization
World Meteorological Organization
World Trade Organization
World Wind Energy Association

201

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. Investments in renewable energy have grown considerably with major emerging economies
taking the lead. For 2010, new investment in renewable energy is estimated to have reached a record
high of US$ 211 billion, up from US$ 160 billion in 2009. The growth is increasingly taking place in nonOECD countries, especially the large emerging economies of Brazil, China and India.

2. Renewable energy can make a major contribution to the twin challenges of responding to a
growing global demand for energy services, while reducing the negative impacts associatedwith current production and use. Investments in renewable energy are making a growing contribution
towards mitigating climate change, but to stay below a 2 degree Celsius increase in average global
temperature, these developments need to be significantly enhanced. Renewable energy has other socialand environmental benefits, including mitigating or avoiding many health problems and impacts on
ecosystems caused by the extraction, transportation, processing and use of fossil fuels.

3. Renewable energy can help enhance energy security at global, national and local levels.
Most of the future growth in energy demand is expected to occur in developing countries, and against abackground of rising fossil fuel prices and resource constraints; this raises serious concerns about energy
security. In off-grid areas, renewable energy sources can ensure a more stable and reliable supply of energy.
Examples include local mini-grids and household level PV or biogas systems.

4. Renewable energy can play an important role in a comprehensive global strategy to eliminate
energy poverty. In addition to being environmentally unsustainable, the current energy system is also
highly inequitable, leaving 1.4 billion people without access to electricity and 2.7 billion dependent on
traditional biomass for cooking. Many developing countries have a rich endowment of renewable energythat can help meet this need.

5. The cost of renewable energy is increasingly competitive with that derived from fossil fuels.
Improved cost-competitiveness is due to rapid R&D progress, economies of scale, learning effects throughgreater cumulative deployment and increased competition among suppliers. In the European context, forexample, hydro and on-shore wind can already compete with fossil fuel and nuclear technologies, andoff-shore wind will soon be competitive with natural gas technologies. Solar energy for water heating
purposes (low temperature solar thermal) is commercially mature and commonly used in China and manyother parts of the world.

6. Renewable energy services would be even more competitive if the negative externalities
associated with fossil fuel technologies were taken into account. These include both the current
and future health impacts of various air pollutants, as well as the costs necessary to adapt to climatechange and ocean acidification resulting from CO2 emissions. The existing evidence clearly shows that theexternal costs from fossil fuel technologies are substantially higher than those of most renewable energy
alternatives.

202

Renewable energy

7. Substantially increasing investments in renewable energy can be part of an integrated
strategy to green the path of global economic development. Modelling studies carried out for theGreen Economy Report (GER) project that an average annual investment of approximately US$ 650 billion
over the next 40 years in power generation, using renewable energy sources and second-generation
biofuels for transport, could raise the share of renewable energy sources in total energy supply to 27 percent by 2050, compared with less than 15 per cent under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. Increased useof renewable energy sources could contribute more than one-third of the total reduction in greenhousegas emissions (GHG) of 60 per cent achieved by 2050, relative to BAU.

8. A shift to renewable energy sources brings many new employment opportunities, but notwithout transitional challenges. Due to the higher labour intensity of various renewable energy
technologies compared with conventional power generation, increased investment in renewable energy
will add to employment, especially in the short-term, according to modelling conducted for the GER.
Overall impacts on employment of investing in renewable energy, taking into account possible effects
in fossil fuel-related sectors, will vary by national context, depending on supportive policies, available
resources and national energy systems.

9. Policy support will need to be expanded considerably to promote accelerated investment
in renewable energy. These investments carry enhanced risks, such as those typically associated withthe development and diffusion of new technologies, exacerbated by high upfront capital costs. A range of
public support mechanisms have been developed to mitigate risks and to enhance returns. The growing
competitiveness of renewable energy has been achieved in part due to policy support to overcome barriers.

10. Government policy to support increased investment in renewable energy needs to becarefully designed in an integrated manner; there is no one-size-fits-all approach. The rangeof regulatory policies, fiscal incentives and public financing mechanisms to support renewable energy
is broad and can be complemented with support to R&D as well as other measures, such as those tostimulate investments in adapting grid infrastructure. The diversity of circumstances among countries,
including existing energy systems and potential renewable development, requires that policy frameworks
be carefully designed and tailored to specific situations.

203

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
This chapter assesses the options for increasing
investment in greening the energy sector by increasing
the supply from renewable energy technologies.1 The
current highly carbon-intensive energy system depends
on a finite supply of fossil fuels that are getting harderand more expensive to extract leading to concerns
about national energy security in many countries. The
challenges are compounded by the need to provide
clean and efficient energy services to the 2.7 billion
people without access. It is, thus, not sustainable ineconomic, social, and environmental terms. Furthermore,
the current state of the energy sector leaves many
countries exposed to large swings in oil import prices
and also costs billions in public subsidies.

2005 US$/MBtu

Greening the energy sector will require improvements inenergy efficiency and a much greater supply of energy
services from renewable sources, both of which will leadto reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and othertypes of pollution. In most instances, improvement inenergy efficiency has net economic benefits. Global
energy demand is still likely to grow in order tomeet development needs, in the context of growing
populations and income levels. Greening the sector
also aims to end “energy poverty” for the estimated 1.4
billion people who currently lack access to electricity.
Moreover, 2.7 billion people who are dependent on
traditional biomass for cooking need healthier and

Growth rate[%]

Share in totalenergy demand
[%]

2008

2035

2008-2035b

2008

2035

OECD

5,421

5,877

0.3

44.2

32.6

Non-OECD

6,516

11,696

2.2

53.1

64.8

Europe/Eurasia

1,151

1,470

0.9

9.4

8.1

Asia

3,545

7,240

2.7

28.9

40.1

China

2,131

4,215

2.6

17.4

23.4

India

620

1,535

3.4

5.1

8.5

Middle East

596

1,124

2.4

4.9

6.2

Africa

655

948

1.4

5.3

5.3

Latin America
Worldc

569

914

1.8

4.6

5.1

12,271

18,048

1.4

100.0

100.0

a. Million tons of oil equivalent. b. Compound average annual growth rate. c. World includes
international marine and aviation bunkers (not included in regional totals), and some countries/
regions excluded here.

Table 1: Primary energy demand by region in the
IEA Current Policies scenario
Source: IEA (2010d)

more sustainable energy sources (IEA 2010a). Modern
renewables offer considerable potential for enhancing
energy security at global, national and local levels. In
order to secure all these benefits, enabling policies are
required to ensure that the investments are made forgreening the energy sector.

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2

Coal

Natural gas

Crude oilFigure 1: Evolution of fossil fuel prices
Source: Energy Centre the Netherlands (ECN)

2009

2000

1990

1980

1970

1960

1950

0

204

Total energy
demand [Mtoe]aThis chapter is structured as follows: Section 1 briefly
describes features of world energy supply and thegrowing role of renewable sources of energy within it.
Section 2 discusses the challenges and opportunities
related to the energy sector, and the potential
contribution of renewable energy. Section 3 reviews
investments in renewable energy, covering recent trends,
developments in cost-competitiveness, the importanceof externalities, employment effects and expected
investment needs. Section 4 presents the results ofgreen investment scenarios (from the GER modelling
chapter), in which investments in renewable energy
are considerably expanded, as part of an integrated
strategy also addressing energy efficiency and otheraspects of demand. Section 5 discusses the barriers toincreasing investments in the renewable energy sector
and the policies to address these. Section 6 concludes
the chapter.
1. The demand issue of energy efficiency is comprehensively covered inother chapters such as those on buildings, transport and manufacturing.

Renewable energy

Wind/solar/biomass/geothermal
power –generation 0.7%
Biofuels 0.6%

Fossil fuels
81%

Renewables
16%

Biomass/solar/geothermal
hot water/heating 1.5%
Hydropower 3.4%
Traditional biomass 10%

Nuclear
2.8%

Figure 2: Renewable energy share of global final energy consumption, 2009
Source: REN21 (2011)

1.1 The energy sector2 and the positionof renewable sources of energy
World primary energy demand3 is expected to continue
growing. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Current
Policies scenario, which assumes no major change inpolicies as of mid-2010, projects a growth rate of 1.4 percent per year up to 2035 (Table 1). The fastest growth isexpected in non-OECD countries with a projected rateof 2.2 per cent per year, particularly in China and India
and other emerging economies in Asia and the Middle
East. Many non-OECD countries are also expected to seelarge increases in imports of oil or gas or both.
Energy demand is growing against the backdrop offluctuating, but generally increasing fossil-fuel prices(see Figure 1). Expenditure on oil alone increased from
1 per cent of global GDP in 1998 to around 4 per cent at
the peak in 2007, and is projected to remain high in the
period to 2030 (IEA 2008b).
2. While comprehensive figures are lacking, the energy sector comprises
somewhat more than 5 per cent of world GDP, indicating its importance forthe economy as a whole
3. Primary energy refers to the energy contained in an energy resource
before it is subject to transformation processes, where losses – sometimes
substantial – always take place.

Findings from this chapter indicate that the share of
renewables in total energy supply is expanding andthat the greening of the energy sector can contributeto the growth of income, jobs and access by the poor
to affordable energy, which are other objectives ofsustainable development. Worldwide investment inrenewable energy assets – without large hydropower –grew by a factor of seven from US$ 19 billion in 2004 to
US$ 143 billion in 2010. For OECD countries the shareof renewable energy sources in total primary energy
demand has risen from 4.6 per cent in 1973 to 7.7 percent in 2009 (IEA 2010d).
This chapter follows the IEA definition of renewableenergy:Renewable energy is derived from natural processes
that are replenished constantly. In its various forms, itderives directly or indirectly from the sun, or from heatgenerated deep within the earth. Included in the definitionis energy generated from solar, wind, biomass, geothermal,hydropower and ocean resources, and biofuels andhydrogen derived from renewable resources (IEA 2008a).
Figure 2 indicates the share of renewable energy inglobal final energy consumption in 2009 at 19 per cent.

205Towards a green economy

2 Challenges and opportunities
The global community and national governments are
faced with four major challenges with respect to theenergy sector: 1) concerns about energy security; 2)combating climate change; 3) reducing pollution andpublic-health hazards; and 4) addressing energy poverty.
Greening the energy sector, including by substantially
increasing investment in renewable energy, provides
an opportunity to make a significant contribution toaddressing these challenges.

2.1 Energy security
Increasing energy demand together with rising energy
prices raise concerns about energy security, a topic
which covers a range of issues but primarily is associatedwith the reliability and affordability of national energy
supply. Such concerns are particularly relevant for lowincome countries, but also for emerging and developed
economies, where a relatively high dependence on alimited range of suppliers can mean higher risks to thesecurity of national energy supply due to geo-politicaland other developments. Risks to national energy
security can also carry downwards to impinge on energy
security at local levels.
The IEA’s Reference Scenario, the trends of which are
depicted in Tables 1 and 2, represent a baseline of how
global energy markets would evolve without policychanges (IEA 2009a). In the scenario, oil importing
countries (especially developing countries and emerging
economies) are expected to become increasingly
dependent on OPEC countries for oil. While total nonOPEC output is expected to remain about constantuntil 2030, production in OPEC countries is projected
to increase, especially in the Middle East. OPEC’s sharein the world oil market consequently rises from 44 percent in 2008 to 52 per cent in 2030, above its historicalpeak in 1973. For natural gas, increases in exports aremainly projected to come from Russia, Iran and Qatar,
which would increase the world economy’s energy
dependency on these countries (IEA 2009a).
The increase in oil prices since 2002 has increased
pressure on the balance of payments of developing
countries (Figure 1). To protect consumers from increased
fossil-fuel prices, some countries have increased theirfuel subsidies putting additional strain on government
budgets, and underpinning the demand for fossil fuelimports. Oil accounts for 10 to 15 per cent of total
imports for oil- importing African countries and absorbs
over 30 per cent of their export revenue on average

206(UNCTAD 2006, ESMAP 2008a). Some African countries,
including Kenya and Senegal, devote more than halfof their export earnings to energy imports, while India
spends 45 per cent. Investing in renewable sources thatare available locally – in many cases abundantly – could
enhance energy security for such countries (GNESD
2010). Energy security would then be influenced moreby access to renewable technologies, including boththeir affordability as well as the capacity to adapt anddeploy those technologies. Diversifying the energy
matrix thus presents both a considerable challenge andopportunity for oil importing countries.

2.2 Climate change
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC)
fourth assessment report (IPCC 2007) underscored theimportance of mitigating future human-induced climatechange – mostly driven by the combustion of fossil fuels– and adapting to the changes that occur. Estimates ofthe damages of climate change and costs of mitigation
and adaptation vary widely. Substantial damages will
occur even with a rapid greening of the energy system,
but will be much higher if no action is taken. The annual
global costs of adapting to climate change have been
estimated by the United Nations Framework on Climate
Change Convention (UNFCCC 2009) to be at least US$ 49- US$ 171 billion by 20304. About half of these costs will
be borne by developing countries. Moreover, climatechange is likely to worsen inequality because its impacts
are unevenly distributed over space and time anddisproportionately affect the poor (IPCC 2007).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(2007) and International Energy Agency (IEA) (2008c)
estimate that in order to limit the rise of average global
temperature to 2 degrees Celsius, the concentration of
GHGs should not exceed 450 parts per million (ppm)
CO2-eq. This translates to a peak of global emissions in2015 and at least a 50 per cent cut in global emissions by
2050, compared with 2005. In 2009, the G8 committed
to an 80 per cent cut in their emissions by 2050 inorder to contribute to a global 50 per cent cut by 2050,
4. This estimate is very rough, approximate and conservative; it does
not include key sectors of the economy such as energy, manufacturing,retailing, mining, and tourism, nor the impacts on ecosystems and thegoods and services they provide. Other studies that take into accountadditional direct and indirect impact of climate change related to water,
health, infrastructure, coastal zones, ecosystems, etc., have assessed thatcost of adaptation to be 2-3 times greater than that put forward by the
UNFCCC (IIED 2009). In general, adaptation costs should only be interpreted
as lower-bound estimates of the possible economic impacts of climatechange (see also Stern 2006).

Renewable energy
although a precise baseline was not specified. The 80 per
cent reduction would yield some space for developing
countries to have a less stark reduction trajectory while
reaching the global 50 per cent target. There are stilllarge uncertainties, however, concerning how to reachthe emission reduction goals and the two-degree target
agreed by most countries at the UN Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen in 2009. If pledges madesubsequent to the conference were implemented
together with other policy options under considerationin the negotiations,5 emissions in 2020 are projected toreach 49 GtCO2-eq, which leaves a gap of at least 5 GtCO2eq relative to the projected level required for the twodegree target of 39-44 GtCO2-eq (UNEP 2010b). In the
IEA Current Policies Scenario, fossil fuels are projected tocontinue dominating energy supply in 2030 (see Table 2).
Additionally, several models project that GHG emissions
will rise fastest in high-growth countries such as China
and India (IEA 2010b, 2010d).

Total energy
use[Mtoe]
2008

2035

Coal

3,315

5,281

Oil

4,059

Gas

Growth rate
2008-2035a[%]

Share in totalenergy mix
[%]
2008

2035

1.7

27.0

29.3

5,026

0.8

33.1

27.8

2,596

4,039

1.7

21.2

22.4

Nuclear

712

1,081

1.6

5.8

6.0

Hydro

276

439

1.7

2.2

2.4

Biomass and­agricultural waste
and/or residueb

1,225

1,715

1.3

10.0

9.5

Other renewables

89

468

6.3

0.7

2.6

12,271

18,048

1.4

100.0

100.0

Total

a. Compound average annual growth rate. b. Includes traditional and modern uses.

Table 2: World primary energy mix in the IEA
Current Policies scenario
Source: IEA (2010d)

A shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy in theenergy supply can contribute to achieving ambitious
emissions-reduction targets, together with significant
improvements in energy efficiency. To reduce emissions
to a level that would keep the concentration of GHGs at
450 ppm in 2050, the IEA projects that renewable energy
would need to account for 27 per cent of the required
CO2 reductions, while the remaining part would
result primarily from energy efficiency and alternative
mitigation options such as carbon capture andsequestration (CCS) (IEA 2010b). A major part of the CO2
reductions resulting from the promotion of renewables
would take place in developing countries.

2.3 Impacts of energy technologies
on health and ecosystems
There are high indirect costs associated with thepollution arising from combustion of fossil andtraditional fuels. The release of both black carbon
particles (from incomplete combustion of fossil fuels)and other forms of air pollution (sulphur and nitrogenoxides, photochemical smog precursors, and heavy
metals, for example) have a detrimental effect on publichealth (UNEP and WMO 2011). Indoor air pollution fromburning solid fuel accounted for 2.7 per cent of the
global burden of disease in 2000 and is ranked as thelargest environmental contributor to health problems
after unsafe drinking water and lack of sanitation (WHO
5. These options include countries moving to higher ambition, conditional
pledges; and the negotiations adopting rules that avoid a net increase inemissions from (a) “lenient” accounting of land use, land-use change andforestry activities, and (b) the use of surplus emission units (UNEP 2010b). .
6. The IEA calculation includes international costs of pollution control
equipment and has been done using a four per cent (social) real discountrate. All costs and prices are expressed in constant € 2005 and include“current policy” pollution control legislation.

2006). Burning fossil fuels costs the United States about
US$ 120 billion a year in health costs, mostly because of
thousands of premature deaths from air pollution (NRC2010). This figure reflects primarily health damage fromair pollution associated with electricity generation andmotor vehicle use. According to the IEA, the costs of air
pollution controls worldwide amounted to about € 155
billion in 2005 and are estimated to triple by 2030 (IIASA
2009; IEA 2009a).6 Renewable energy can mitigate or
avoid many of these public health risks caused by themining, production and combustion of fossil fuels.
The use of fossil and traditional energy sources in bothdeveloped and developing countries also impacts global
biodiversity and ecosystems through deforestation,
decreased water quality and availability, acidification ofwater bodies, and increased introduction of hazardous
substances into the biosphere (UNEP 2010a). These
impacts also reduce the natural capabilities of the planet
to respond to climate change.
Renewable energy technologies are not without impacts
and careful planning to address possible environmental
and social impacts are essential. Production of biofuels,
for example, can have negative impacts on biodiversity
and ecosystems, while the environmental and social
impacts of large-scale hydropower can be significant.
The World Commission on Dams has provided guidelines
for reducing possible negative impacts of hydropower
development. First-generation biofuels have also
received substantial attention for their impacts due toland-use change and agricultural production practices,leading to the development of biofuel sustainability
standards (see Section 5.7). Increased mining activity
and deforestation could result from increased use ofrenewable energy sources requiring rare earth elements,

207

Towards a green economy
Millennium Development Goal

How modern energy will help attain the MDGs

1

Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger byreducing the proportion of people whose
income is less than US$ 1 per day (in US$ PPP)

Increases household incomes by improving productivity in terms of time saving, increasing output, and valueaddition, and diversifying economic activity.
Energy for irrigation increases food production and access to nutrition.

2, 3Achieve universal primary education andpromote gender equality

Provides time for education, facilitating teaching and learning by empowering especially women and children to
become educated on health and productive activities, instead of traditional energy related activities.

4, 5, 6

Reduce child and maternal mortality andreduce disease

Improved health through access to clean water, cleaner cooking fuels, heat for boiling water, and better
agricultural yields.
Health clinics with modern fuels and electricity can refrigerate vaccines, sterilise equipment, and provide lighting.

7

Ensure environmental sustainability

Cleaner fuels, renewable energy technologies, and energy efficiency can help mitigate environmental impacts at
the local, regional and global levels.
Agricultural productivity and land-use can be improved to run machinery and irrigation systems.

Table 3: Millennium Development Goals and links to energy access
Source: based on GNESD (2007) and Modi et al. (2006)

and this is an area getting increased attention to reduce
possible negative impacts as much as possible (IPCC
2011).

2.4 Energy poverty
Expanding access to energy is a central challenge fordeveloping countries. Reliable and modern energy
services are needed to facilitate poverty reduction,
education and health improvements, as reflected in a
number of studies (GNESD 2007, 2010; Modi et al. 2006)
identifying access to energy services as crucial for theachievement of most of the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). Table 3 shows the link between various
MDGs and modern energy access.
The scale of the challenge is massive with 1.4 billion
people currently lacking access to electricity, and 2.7
billion depending on traditional biomass for cooking
in developing countries as calculated by IEA, UNDP
and UNIDO (IEA 2010a). In Sub-Saharan Africa 80 per
cent of people rely on traditional use of biomass fortheir cooking, making it the region with the highest
dependence on this energy source. While 53 per centof urban populations in sub-Saharan Africa have accessto electricity, the figure for the rural population is only
8 per cent (UNDP 2007). This rural-urban electrification
imbalance contributes to a highly uneven spatial
distribution of economic activity, encouraging larger
and more rapid rural-urban migration. On average, 26
per cent of people have access to electricity in subSaharan Africa, ranging from 3 per cent in Burundi,
Liberia and Chad, to 75 per cent in South Africa and to92 per cent in Togo at the top (UNDP and WHO 2008).
Unless dedicated new efforts are implemented, the IEA
estimates that by 2030 1.2 billion people will still lackaccess to electricity and the number relying on biomass
will even rise slightly to 2.8 billion. In some Africancountries, the share of the population without accessto electricity might even increase. Renewable energy
sources offer some cost-effective solutions to solving

208

energy poverty; one of the opportunities is explored in
the next section.
Solutions for energy access
There are various technological options to addressing
the energy-poverty challenge described above.
Implementing most of these options requires additional,
publicly-financed investment, including development
assistance, as the commercial market potential is likely toremain limited in some cases. Public-private partnerships
may be one option along with promising alternative
financing mechanisms, including cost- recovery fromusers, and are discussed in section 4 below.
In terms of technologies for electricity delivery, there arepotentially three broad options for expanding access. First,
existing centralised grids can be expanded to non-served
areas, potentially based on new renewable sources ofenergy. Second, decentralised mini-grids can be installed
to link a community to a small generating plant. Third,
off-grid access can be facilitated by producing electricity
for a single point of demand. The optimal mix of these
options for any given country is determined by theavailability of energy resources, the regulatory and policy
environment, the institutional and technical capacity,
geographic considerations, and relative costs (AGECC
2010). Intelligent planning should allow for the flexibility
to integrate these systems as countries develop.
Grid expansion is generally the lowest-cost option
in urban areas and in more densely populated rural
areas. Successful expansion has been achieved
recently on a large scale in China, South Africa andVietnam. Grid expansion at a regional level in Africa
could facilitate hydropower trading among countries,
thereby supplying low-cost power while reducing thecontinent’s vulnerability to varying oil prices and its
carbon emissions (World Bank 2009).
In remote locations, off-grid and mini-grid options tend to
be more cost effective than expanding existing electricity
grids. Renewable off-grid solutions – small hydro, mini-Renewable energy
wind, bio-energy, and the increasingly popular solar
household systems (SHSs) – have the potential toalleviate rural energy poverty and even to displace costly
diesel-based power generation (GNESD 2010; IEA 2010a;
REN21 2011). Furthermore, they can contribute to thedecoupling of energy supply and GHG emissions, andavoid increasing fuel imports for low-income countries.
SHSs typically generate around 30 to 60 watts from a PV
module and include a rechargeable battery to power, forexample, 4 to 6 compact fluorescent lamps, a TV, andpotentially a mobile-phone charger. The technology isalso useful for providing clean drinking water. The pricein Asia for an average system ranges from US$ 360 – 480
for 40 peak watts, thus US$ 8–11/watt, while in Africa
it is higher at US$ 800 (e.g. in Ghana) for 50 watts, thus
US$ 16–17/watt (ESMAP 2008b). The main advantage of
renewable off-grid solutions is that running costs are very
low, although upfront investments are still high.7
The availability and diffusion of clean biomass
technologies, such as improved and alternative cook
7. Potential financing mechanisms are discussed in section 5.3.
8. The estimated investment needs are not broken down by IEA, UNDP
and UNIDO (IEA 2010a) according to energy source, but in discussing
opportunities for renewables, the potential promise of combining different
sources of renewable energy in a power system supplying rural mini-grids
is highlighted.

stoves and biogas systems, which reduce unsustainable
and inefficient use of firewood and hazardous air
pollution, can constitute an intermediate step tothe provision of modern energy services for rural
populations dependent on biomass. In fact, somehave singled out clean biomass technologies forhouseholds and small industries as a priority for Africa,
with the potential of developing industries suitable forrural areas and to leap-frog development of energy
technologies (Karekezi et al. 2004). Projections by the
IEA, UNDP and UNIDO (IEA 2010a) for ensuring universal
access to modern cooking facilities by 2030 recognise
this potential and include 51 per cent of the investment
target of US$ 2.6 billion per year allocated to biogas
systems and 23 per cent to advanced biomass cooking
stoves, both in rural areas.
For many remote rural areas and for a large proportionof the 1.4 billion who lack access to energy, renewableenergy sources thus present an increasingly viableoption for addressing their unmet demand. IEA, UNDP
and UNIDO (IEA 2010a) estimated investment to ensure
access to electricity for all by 2030 at US$ 756 billion,
corresponding to a relatively modest sum of US$ 36
billion per year, the bulk of which would be for offgrid systems, including various renewable options, inaddition to conventional diesel generation.8

209

Towards a green economy

3 Investing in renewable energy
Both the challenges and opportunities facing the energy
sector call for scaling up investment in renewable energy.
This section summarizes recent investment trends inrenewable energy and the associated evolution of thecompetitiveness of renewable energy technologies. Thisis followed by an analysis of how this competiveness is
distorted by the lack of mechanisms to account for thelarger negative externalities associated with the useof fossil fuels, reviewed in Section 2. The section thendiscusses the potential employment potential offered
by renewable energy. The section closes with a review
of estimates of the future investment required to meetthe challenges of growing energy demand and climatechange mitigation, complementing needed investments
to improve energy efficiency across sectors.

3.1 Recent trends in renewableenergy investment
During the past 10 years the growth of investment inrenewable energy has been rapid, albeit from a low base.
From 2004 to 2010, total investments into renewableenergy exhibited a compound annual growth rate of
36 per cent9. There were a number of reasons for thisperformance:■■ The relatively easy access to capital for project
developers and technology manufacturers in thedeveloped world and major emerging economies andlow interest rates supported the growth of renewableenergy technologies;■■ For some renewable energy technologies,
technological developments have led to a significant
decline in costs and increased reliability of the technology,
which have made investments more attractive;■■ High oil prices contributed to the interest in renewableenergy investments; and■■ Regulatory support for renewable energy
technologies increased over the past 10 years. Between
2004 and early 2011, for example, the number of countries
that have supportive renewable energy policies in placerose from about 40 to almost 120 (REN21 2011).
For 2010, Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates that
global new investment in renewable energy hit a newrecord of US$ 211 billion. This is an increase of more than
30 per cent from the US$ 160 billion invested globally in2009 and the US$ 159 billion in 2008 (UNEP SEFI 2011).

210

The global financial crisis that began in 2008 appears
to have temporarily reduced investment in renewableenergy, with growth in new investments slowing in 2008
and 2009 (see Figure 3). Despite more difficult access tocapital, especially the availability of debt finance, thesector as a whole has so far proven to be fairly resilient.
This buoyancy may be due partly to the stimulus
provided by discretionary fiscal packages in many
countries (IEA 2009b) launched in 2008 and 2009,
some of which included support for renewable energy(HSBC 2009). In the US, for example, there were two
separate packages, with a total of around US$ 32 billion
allocated to renewable energy.10 South Korea and China
also included renewable energy investments in theirstimulus spending programmes. An estimated US$ 194
billion in green stimulus funding had been allocatedto support clean energy globally, including renewableenergy technologies, energy-smart technologies,
carbon capture and storage, and transport (UNEP SEFI2011). Less than 10 per cent had actually been spent by
the end of 2009, and just under half by the end of 2010.
The delay reflects the time it takes for spending to beapproved through administrative processes, and thefact that some projects were only formally presented
after the programmes were announced.
The investments in renewable energy in emerging
economies have been growing rapidly since 2005 (UNEPSEFI 201111). In that year OECD countries accounted foralmost 77 per cent of global investment in renewableenergy.12 By 2007, however, the share of non-OECD
countries had risen to 29 per cent and further increased
to 40 per cent in 2008 (Bloomberg New Energy Financedatabase). In 2008, for example, China was the secondlargest country for renewable energy investments after
Spain, with the US ranking third. Brazil was ranked fourthand India seventh. China took the lead though in 2009,
maintaining this position in 2010, with US$ 49 billion
in new investment in renewable energy. Overall, from2005 to 2008, investments in renewable energy assets
grew by more than 200 per cent in OECD countries, but
9. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act; these included the extension of the Production Tax
Credits for wind and the Investment Tax Credit for solar.
10. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act; these included the extension of the Production Tax
Credits for wind and the Investment Tax Credit for solar.
11. See also previous editions of the UNEP SEFI Sustainable Energy
Investment Trends Report (UNEP SEFI 2008a, 2009, 2010).
12. New financial investment in renewable energy excludes small scale
systems, as well as corporate and government investment in R&D, which areincluded in Figure 5 and accounted for US$ 68 billion, or almost one-third,of the US$ 211 billion total in 2010 (UNEP SEFI 2011).

Renewable energy

Growth: 75%
US$ billion

by more than 500 per cent in non-OECD countries. In
2010, new financial investments in renewable energy
by developing countries, at US$ 72 billion, edged past
the amount invested that year by developed countries,
at US$ 70.5 billion (UNEP SEFI 2011). This recent rapid
growth has led to predictions that developing economies
may well soon have larger installed renewable energy
generating capacity than the OECD countries (ITIF 2009,
Pew Charitable Trusts 2010).

57%

43%

23%

0.4%

32%

250

211
200

159

160

2008

2009

150

129

Among developing countries, by far the largest shareof investments in renewable energy has been in thethree large emerging economies of China, India andBrazil, which together account for almost US$ 60 billion,or 90 per cent. Other developing countries, while
representing only 10 per cent of the total, are also
experiencing accelerated growth, with Latin America(excluding Brazil) seeing investments almost tripling,
Asia rising almost one-third, and Africa increasing fivefold in 2010 (UNEP SEFI 2011). These investments tend
though to be concentrated still in a limited number ofcountries. For renewable energy investments to expand
on a large scale in other developing countries, however,major efforts are needed to develop infrastructure suchas transmission and distribution systems, improve thefunctioning of financial markets and other institutions,and provide a supportive incentive framework.
In addition to installing significant renewable energy
capacity, fast-growing emerging markets have also
built up large equipment manufacturing industries inthe sector, both for export to the global market and for
local use. China has, for example, become the world’s
largest producer of solar PV panels and solar water
heaters. The government has supported investment
in manufacturing capacity for renewable energies, forexample, by establishing preferential electricity tariffs
for the solar industry.

3.2 Technical advances andcost competitivenessAs renewable energy technologies have matured
their costs have come down, making many of themincreasingly competitive with other energy technologies.
This section briefly reviews such developments, drawing
on recent reviews of relative maturity and costs ofdifferent energy technologies (for example, IPCC 2011;
IEA 2010b, c, d).
Overall, the IPCC (2011) review of renewable energy
technologies concluded that technical potential, at a
global level, does not present a constraint to continued
13. For example, the International Hydropower Association’s Hydropower
Sustainability Assessment Protocol; available at: http://hydrosustainability.
org/

100

90
57

50

33

0
2004

2005

2006

2007

2010

Figure 3: Global new investment in renewableenergy in US$ billions
Source: UNEP SEFI (2011)

growth in the use of these technologies. In its assessment,
the review also found that a growing number of these aretechnically mature and are being deployed at significant
scale. Table 4 shows the stages of maturity of principal
renewable energy technologies according to four stagesof maturity: research and development; demonstrationand deployment; diffusion; and commercially mature. The
most mature technology is hydropower, which currently
meets 16 per cent of the world’s electricity demand. Manyhydropower installations are large-scale where impacts
potentially can be significant on livelihoods, biodiversity,
water supply, etc. In order to address potential adverse
impacts installations should follow sustainability
guidelines as developed by the World Commission on
Dams or other best practices.13 Smaller-scale hydropower
projects, by contrast, have fewer such impacts and havegreat potential in many developing countries. In termsof sustainable biomass applications, the production ofsugarcane bioethanol-based transport fuels in Brazil
is a commercially mature technology (see Box 3 inSection 5). Onshore applications of wind energy are alsocommercially mature, while offshore wind energy is in
the diffusion phase and, in some situations, approaching
the commercially mature phase.
Solar energy technologies for heating purposes (lowtemperature solar thermal), are commercially matureand commonly used in many parts of the world.
Solar PV for electricity in small-scale applications isapproaching commercial maturity, such as solar rooftop home systems or solar lanterns in off-grid areas, butis generally still dependent on subsidies or price support
mechanisms. Concentrating solar thermal power has
been in the demonstration and deployment phase for211

Towards a green economy
Research and Development

Hydropower

Biofuels

Wind

Solar

Geothermal

Ocean

Aquatic plant-derived fuels

Higher-altitude wind generator

Solar fuels

Demonstration and
Deployment

Diffusion

Commercially Mature

Hydrokinetic turbines

Run-of-river
Reservoirs
Pumped storage

Pyrolysis-based biofuels
Lignocellulose sugar-based biofuels

Gasification-based power
Lignocellulose syngas-based biofuels

Traditional usage
Cookstoves
Domestic heating
Small/large-scale boilers
Anaerobic digestion
Combined heat and power
Co-firing fossil fuels
Combustion-based power
Sugar and starch-based ethanol
Plant and seed oil-based biodiesel
Gaseous biofuelsWind kites

Offshore, large turbine

Onshore, large turbines
Distributed, small turbines
Turbines for water pumping

Solar coolingSolar cooking
Concentrating PV
Concentrating solar thermal power

Photovoltaic (PV)Low temp solar thermal
Passive solar architecture

Submarine geothermalEngineered geothermal systems

Direct use applications
Geothermal heat pumps
Hydrothermal, binary cycle
Hydrothermal, condensing flash

Ocean currents

Wave
Tidal currents
Salinity gradients
Ocean thermal energy conversion

Tidal range

Table 4: Stages of technological maturity
Source: Based on Table 1.3 in IPCC (2011)

some time and diffusion has recently begun in a few
locations. Geothermal energy can be harnessed for heatin almost any temperate climate, and in some locations
also for power generation. It is mature in many countries,
including among others Italy, Kenya, New Zealand,
the Philippines and the United States; Iceland and El
Salvador, for example, derive over 15 per cent of theirelectricity needs from geothermal sources (IPCC 2008).
Diffusion and commercial maturity of many renewableenergy technologies reflects ongoing, and in somenotable cases rapid, improvements in their costcompetitiveness. Figure 4 from the IPCC (2011) illustrates
cost estimates (per kWh) under a levelised cost ofenergy analysis (LCOE) for principal renewable energy
technologies, grouped according to three principal
uses: electricity generation, heat and fuel for transport.
The figure highlights the large range of variability of(unsubsidized) cost estimates for any given technology.
For each of the three groups of technologies, thecosts can be compared to a corresponding range from
non-renewable technologies, which also depend on
assumed prices for fossil fuels. Overall the IPCC review
demonstrates that costs of renewable technologies are
increasingly competitive with fossil fuel technologies,

212

though this is dependent on specific circumstances,such as locations with favourable resource conditions
or without other low-cost energy options. The analysis
also indicates though that further rapid deployment isdependent on supporting policies (discussed below in
Section 5).
The IPCC (2011) review of renewable energy technologies
also illustrates the pace at which costs have declined forsome specific technologies. For example, average global
PV module prices dropped from about US$ 22 per wattin 1980 to less than US$ 1.5 per watt in 2010 (IPCC 2011)14.
Cost reductions are driven by R&D, achieving economies
of scale, learning effects through deployment andincreased competition among suppliers, although therelative importance of individual factors is not always
fully understood.
The importance of learning effects, which refers to thetendency for the costs of new technologies to decline
as cumulative production or cumulative investment in
R&D, and thus experience and know-how, increases is
14. The IPCC (2011) cites Bloomberg New Energy Finance as the source of
these price estimates, which are calculated in US$ with 2005 as the baseyear.

Renewable energy[US$ cent2005 /kWh]
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Biomass Electricity
Solar Electricity
Geothermal Electricity
Hydropower

Lower Bound

Non-Renewables

Medium Values

Electricity
Heat

Ocean Electricity

Transport Fuels

Upper BoundWind Electricity
Range of Non-Renewable
Electricity Cost

Biomass Heat
Solar Thermal Heat
Geothermal Heat
Range of Oil and Gas
Based Heating Cost

Biofuels
Range of Gasoline
and Diesel Cost

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

[US$2005 /GJ]
Notes: Medium values are shown for the following subcategories, sorted in the order as they appear in the respective ranges (from left to right):

Electricity

Heat

Transport Fuels

Biomass:

Biomass Heat:

Biofuels:

1. Cofiring
2. Small scale combined heat and power, CHP(Gasification internal combustion engine)
3. Direct dedicated stoker & CHP
4. Small scale CHP (steam turbine)
5. Small scale CHP (organic Rankine cycle)

1. Municipal solid waste based CHP
2. Anaerobic digestion based CHP
3. Steam turbine CHP
4. Domestic pellet heating system

1. Corn ethanol
2. Soy biodiesel
3. Wheat ethanol
4. Sugarcane ethanol
5. Palm oil biodiesel

Solar Electricity:
1. Concentrating solar power
2. Utility-scale PV (1-axis and fixed tilt)
3. Commercial rooftop PV
4. Residential rooftop PV

Geothermal Electricity:
1. Condensing flash plant
2. Binary cycle plant

Solar Thermal Heat:
1. Domestic hot water systems in China
2. Water and space heating

Geothermal Heat:
1. Greenhouses
2. Uncovered aquaculture ponds
3. District heating
4. Geothermal heat pumps
5. Geothermal building heating

Hydropower:
1. All types

Ocean Electricity:
1. Tidal barrageWind Electricity:
1. Onshore
2. Offshore
The lower range of the levelised cost of energy for each RE technology is based on a combination of the most favourable input-values, whereas the upper range is based on a
combination of the least favourable input values. Reference ranges in the figure background for non-renewable electricity options are indicative of the levelised cost ofcentralised non-renewable electricity generation. Reference ranges for heat are indicative of recent costs for oil and gas based heat supply options. Reference ranges fortransport fuels are based on recent crude oil spot prices of US$ 40 to130/barrel and corresponding diesel and gasoline costs, excluding taxes.

Figure 4: Range in recent levelised cost of energy for selected commerciallyavailable renewable-energy technologies
Source: IPCC (2011)213

Towards a green economy
Technology

Investment cost reduction (%)

Advanced coal

5-7

Natural gas
combined cycle

10-15

New nuclear

4-7

Fuel cell

13-19Wind power

8-15

Solar PV

18-28

Table 5: Learning rates of electricity-generating
technologies
Learning rates of electricity-generating technologies
in bottom-up energy system models (per cent)
Sources: Messner (1997), Seebregts et al. (1999), Kypreos and Bahn (2003), and Barreto
and Klaassen (2004)

illustrated by Table 5. This shows a range of percentage
declines in the investment cost of various technologies
associated with a doubling of cumulative production
capacity.15 Thus, the investment costs of solar PV decline,
on average, by between 18 and 28 per cent as production
capacity is doubled, compared to a lower decline of
between 5 and 7 per cent for advanced coal. In general,the learning rates are higher for less mature energy
technologies, such as wind and solar, whose cumulative
production capacity or knowledge stock is usually muchsmaller than conventional technologies. Consequently,
the investment costs – and, hence, total production
costs – may decline much faster over time for renewableenergy technologies than for conventional technologies.
Most importantly, the analysis does not take two formsof market distortions into account: energy subsidies,
which heavily favour fossil fuel technologies, and thedifferences in unaccounted external costs, which are
generally larger for fossil fuel technologies. These arereviewed in the next section.

3.3 Externalities, subsidies
and cost competition
The considerable externalities generated by fossil fuelenergy sources include both the current and future
health impacts of various air and other pollutants, aswell as the costs necessary to adapt to climate change
and ocean acidification resulting from CO2 emissions.
In many cases, there is a lack of political willingness toapply mechanisms to price these externalities. Failure to
do so distorts the relative costs and returns of investingin renewable energy compared to fossil fuel alternatives.
The health externalities from fossil fuel energy usage
are widespread and difficult to translate into monetary
terms. In a recent study on global health, the World HealthOrganization found external environmental risks accounted

214

for up to 10 per cent of the global death and disease
burden; over half of which is a direct result of fossil fuel use(WHO 2009). ExternE, a project funded by the European
Commission, cites increased morbidity rates, congestive
heart failure, and a loss of IQ in children among the many
externalities readily assessed due to air particulate matterand byproducts of fossil fuel combustion.16 A study from
Harvard Medical School showed the true cost of energy
from coal in the United States to include an externalised US$
0.27 per kWh (Epstein et al. 2011), compared to an average
cost of energy production of US$ 0.09 per kWh of electricity
production (EIA 2011). By way of comparison, a study ofgovernment energy subsidies to the fossil fuel industry by
the Environmental Law Institute demonstrates US subsidies
for coal in the same year at US$ 0.27 per kWh (ELI 2009).
Climate change-related externalities from fossil fuelcombustion affect consumers directly through changes
in weather patterns, loss of arable land/agricultural yield,
increased water scarcity, and diminished ecosystems(NRC 2010). Largely a result of CO2 emissions, these
impacts are difficult to assess in monetary terms andrequire complex cost-benefit analysis compared withenergy usage. A study of the external cost of electricity
production in the EU by the European Environmental
Agency (EEA 2008) examined the specific damage costs
associated with emissions of CO2, as well as impacts
associated with other air pollutants (NOx, SO2, NMVOCs,
PM10, NH3); in 2008 traditional fossil fuel electricitygeneration externalities were estimated to reach 25.9
Eurocent/kWh (in the EU-27).
Figure 5, from the IPCC SRREN (2011), displays the
additional cost (in US cents) per kilowatt hour of energy
produced by the most common renewable and fossil
sources over facility lifecycles, differentiating between
costs in terms of health impacts and those due to climatechange. The figure illustrates the wide range of estimatesavailable for both categories of external costs. In
general, external costs from generating electricity fromcoal or gas-fired plants produces higher externalities
than renewable energy technology alternatives, withdifferences on the graph being larger than they appear
due to the logarithmic scale. In addition, the medianexternal costs of climate change impacts from the useof coal or gas for electricity generation exceed thehealth impacts by about one order of magnitude.17
There is evidence, though, indicating that an integrated
approach addressing both air pollutants and GHG
emissions can be considerably less costly than dealing
15. These rates have been either assumed or estimated econometrically,
based on expert knowledge or empirical studies. For a review of theliterature on learning curves, including 42 learning rates of energy
technologies, see McDonald and Schrattenholzer (2002) and Junginger etal. (2008).
16. See http://www.externe.info/
17. Except where carbon capture and storage (CCS) is potentially possible.

Renewable energy

Coal Fired Plants(A) Existing US Plants(B) Coal Comb.C n=46%(B) Coal n=43%(B) Lignite Comb.C n=48%(B) Lignite n=40%(C) Hard Coal 800 MW(C) Hard Coal Postcom. CCS(C) Lignite Oxyfuel CCS

HealthClimate Change

Natural Gas Fired Plants(A) Existing US Plants(B) Natural Gas n=58%(C) Natural Gas Comb.C(C) Natural Gas Postcom.CCS

Renewable Energy(B) Solar Thermal(B) Geothermal(B) Wind 2.5 MW Offshore(B) Wind 1.5 MW Onshore(C) Wind Offshore(B) Hydro 300 kW(B) PV (2030)(B) PV (2000)(C) PV Southern Europe(C) Biomass CHP 6 MWel(D) Biomass Grate Boiler ESP 5
and 10 MW Fuel

0.01

0.1

1

10

External Costs [US$ cent/kWh]Figure 5: External costs of energy sources related to global health and climate change (logarithmic scale)
Source: IPCC (2011)

with those issues separately (IPCC 2007), strengthening
the argument for taking measures to control air pollution.
The size of the externalities calculations indicates thatvarious renewable technologies would already becompetitive if important external costs were internalised
to producers and consumers, but are primarily
illustrative as there are acknowledged uncertainties inclimate-change modelling and the calculation of theresulting damage costs. Because these external costs are
not adequately reflected in energy prices, consumers,
producers and decision-makers do not receive accurate
price signals that are necessary to reach decisions about
how best to use resources.
Governments should, though, consider these externalities informulating policy and strategy for the energy sector. Table
6 by the European Commission (2008) is an example of how
18. Note that steam cycle power plants require a reliable supply ofwater that in many areas is an increasingly valuable commodity subject
to competing uses. Hence the analysis presented in Table 6 makes
conservative assumptions concerning production costs of electricity fromfossil fuels.
19. The Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007) reviewed damage
cost estimates in peer-reviewed literature at the time of preparation of theassessment (up to 2005), reporting an average of US$ 12 per tonne of CO2,
and an upper bound at US$ 95 per tonne of CO2. As discussed below, a more
recent review by the German Aerospace Centre and Fraunhofer Institute for
System and Innovation Research (DLR/ISI, 2006) proposed a much higher
range of € 15-280 per tonne of CO2, based primarily on a modelling reportfor the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).

incorporating the external costs of CO2 emissions, together
with expected cost reductions for various technologies canalter the competitiveness, in economic terms, of renewableenergy technologies in the EU. The table, providing a
range of estimates for various technologies, under amoderate fuel-price scenario illustrates how some sourcesof renewable electricity – in particular hydro and wind –can compete with fossil fuels and nuclear technologies inthe EU. It also shows that in the EU the production cost ofelectricity from on-shore wind could soon be competitive
with natural gas technologies. For biomass in the EU, thewide range reflects uncertainties in the costs of biomass.
Costs of other renewable energy technologies, namely
those for which only prototypes presently exist, are still
significantly higher than conventional technologies.18
The cost of electricity generated in the EU by solar PV is
projected to fall by around a factor of three by 2030, but
it is expected to remain considerably more expensive thanthat generated by other sources.
Table 6 also illustrates the important role played by
the carbon price in assessing the cost-competitivenessof renewable energy generation compared with thatderived from fossil fuels. The scenarios assume thateach tonne of CO2 directly emitted attracts a levy of€ 0/ tCO2 in 2007, € 41/tCO2 in 2020 and € 47/tCO2 in
2030. This assumes a relatively steep rise comparedwith the current (2011) levels of € 10-15, highlighting
the potential of carbon markets (see Box 1).19 If the215

Towards a green economy
EnergysourcePower generation technology

Production cost of electricity (COE)State-ofthe-art
2007€ 2005/MWH

Naturalgas

Oil

Projection
for 2020

Projection
for 2030€ 2005/MWH€ 2005/MWH

Net
efficiency
2007

Direct(stack)emissions
Kg CO2/MWh

Indirect
emissionsLife cycle
emissions

Kg CO2eq/MWh

Kg CO2eq/MWh

Fuel pricesensitivity

Open cycle gas turbine (GT)-65-75b90-95b90-100b

38%

530

110

640

Very highCombined cycle gas turbine(CCGT)

-

50-60

65-75

70-80

58%

350

70

420

Very high

CCS

n/a

85-95

80-90

49%

c

60

85

145

Very highInternal combustion diesel
engine-100-125b140-165b140-160b

45%

595

95

690

Very highCombined cycle oil-fired
turbine-95-105b125-135b

125-135b

53%

505

80

585

Very highPulverised coal combustion
(PCC)
Coal

Life cycle GHG emissions

Circulating fluidised bed
combustion (CFBC)

-

40-50

65-80

65-80

47%

725

95

820

MediumCSS

n/a

80-10575-100

35%c

145

125

270

Medium

-

45-55

75-85

75-85

40%

850

110

960

MediumIntegrated gasification
combined cycle (IGCC)

-

45-55

70-80

70-80

45%

755

100

855

Medium

CSS

n/a

75-90

65-85

35%c

145

125

270

MediumNuclear

Nuclear fission

-

50-85

45-80

45-80

35%

0

15

15

Low

Biomass

Solid biomass-

80-19585-20085-20524%-29%

6

15-36

21-42

MediumBiogas-55-21550-20050-19031%-34%

5

1-240

6-245

Medium

Wind
Hydro
Solar

On-shore farm-

75-110

55-90

50-85

-

0

11

11

Off-shore farms-

85-14065-115

50-95

-

0

14

14

Large

-

35-14530-14030-130

-

0

6

6

Small

-

60-18555-16050-145-0

6

6Photovoltaic-

520-850

270-460

170-300

-

0

45

45

Nil

Concentrating solar power-

170-250

110-160

100-140

-

120

15

135

Low

d

d

d

d

d

Nil
Nil

a. Assuming fuel prices as in “European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030 – Update 2007” (barrel of oil US$ 54.5 (US$-2005) in 2007 and US$ 63 (US$-2005) in 2030). b. Calculated assuming base load
operation. c. Reported efficiencies for carbon capture plants refer to first-of-a-kind demonstration installations that start operating in 2015. d. Assuming the use of natural gas for backup heat production.

Table 6: Energy technologies for power generation in the EU – moderate fuel price scenario
Source: European Commission (2008)

full range of externalities from carbon emissions suchas air pollution-related health hazards were included
in carbon pricing, the relative position of renewableenergy would be strengthened considerably. Minimum
standards on fossil-fuel plants, which would raise theproduction costs of fossil fuels, could also increase thecompetitiveness of renewable energy.
The competitive position of renewable energy would
be strengthened if subsidies for fossil fuels were also
phased out. In many developing countries, government
support to the energy sector is used to decrease theprice of energy consumption to below market levelsin the belief that this will reduce poverty and spur
economic growth. Economically, the most efficientapproach to making renewable energy attractive forlarge-scale market penetration is to remove all subsidies
on fossil fuel and impose a price on carbon (for example
through fossil-fuel taxes), and then to use the proceeds
to subsidise renewable energy for a set duration and to216

provide targeted subsidies to poor households. Phasingout fossil-fuel subsidies is difficult because doing so has
impacts throughout the economy and affects those withvested interests. Any politically-viable reform would
thus have to be well planned and probably phased in
gradually.
Using a price-gap methodology, IEA estimated thatfossil-fuel-related consumption subsidies amounted
to US$ 342 billion in 2007 (IEA 2010d), US$ 557 billion
in 2008 (IEA, OPEC, OECD and World Bank 2010), whenfossil-fuel prices rose to particularly high levels, and
US$ 312 billion in 2009 (IEA 2010d). Subsidies for
producers of fossil fuels are estimated to be in the orderof US$ 100 billion per year (GSI 2009). This support,
totalling approximately US$ 500-700 billion per year,
for conventional energy (mostly fossil fuels) creates
an uneven playing field for the adoption of renewableenergy. By comparison, the IEA (2010d) estimatedgovernment support for electricity from renewables andRenewable energy
for biofuels at US$ 57 billion in 2009. Realigning thesesubsidies is the most obvious way to alter the market
advantage in favour of sustainable energy production,
as was recognised by the G20 in 2009 when it pledged tophase out “inefficient and wasteful” fossil-fuel subsidies(Victor 2009; GSI 2009, 2010). The IEA has calculated thata complete removal of consumption subsidies would
reduce CO2 emissions by 5.8 per cent, or 2 Gt, in 2020
(IEA 2010d).

Brazil, China, Japan, Germany and the United States(see Table 8). China accounts for the largest number,with total employment in renewable energy in 2010
estimated at more than 1.1 million workers (Institutefor Labor Studies et al. 2010). In Germany, the industry
employed 278,000 people in 2008, with 117,500 new
jobs having been created since 2004 (UNEP, ILO, IOE and
ITUC 2008). These five countries are also those with thelargest investments in renewable energy assets, R&D,
and production.

3.4 Employment potential
in renewable energy

Among technologies, wind energy generation has
undergone particularly rapid growth, jobs having morethan doubled from 235,000 in 2005 to 550,000 in 2009
(WWEA 2010). The most dynamic growth took place inAsia, where employment grew by 14 per cent between
2007 and 2009, followed by North America. Amongpower generation options, solar PV offers the higher
employment rates, though this is likely to decrease

Employment in the renewable energy sector has become
substantial – in 2010 more than 3.5 million people
worldwide were estimated to be working either directly
or indirectly in the sector. A small group of countries
currently account for the majority of jobs, especially

Typical project

Natural gas price
US$ 2.00/MMBtu

US$ 4.00/MMBtu

US$ 8.00/MMBtu

Coal mine methane capture

US$ 5.77

US$ 0.79

Negative

Large-scale wind energy

US$ 47.08

US$ 8.50

Negative

Coal-to-gas fuel-switching*

US$ 15.12

US$ 72.44

US$ 187.07

Pulverised coal CO2 capture**

US$ 279.99

US$ 220.86

US$ 102.59* Assumes coal prices stay constant. ** Lost electricity sales are assumed due to the energy penalty associated with CO2 capture.

Table 7: Mitigation project costs per tonne of CO2 (US$ at 2007 prices), given different values fornatural gas prices
Source: Ecosecurities Consulting (2009)

Box 1: Carbon markets
Carbon markets are an instrument for reducing
carbon emissions and targeting greenhouse-gas
externalities from fossil-fuel use. They are essentiallya group obligation to limit the total emissions ofspecified sources. A limited amount of tradable
emission allowances are sold or given gratis, thus
creating an artificial market from which a carbon pricecan emerge. This price imposes extra costs on the useof fossil fuels, making non-fossil based alternatives
more competitive. These alternatives can include not
only renewables, but also energy-efficiency measures,
nuclear power generation, carbon capture and storage(CCS) and the reduction of non-CO2 greenhousegases. As of 2010, the two most prominent schemes
for developing markets for carbon emissions are the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). These are actuallyinterlinked as the ETS is the principal market in which
CDM credits are traded. Owing to the low current
carbon prices and uncertainty about their futurelevels, however, carbon pricing mechanisms have not
yet led to large-scale deployment of renewables.
The return on investment for renewable energy
projects, relative to fossil fuel alternatives, is sensitive
to both the carbon price and market power prices,in addition to the specific support measures forrenewables. The carbon price is in turn sensitive topolicy decisions. Table 7 illustrates, for example, thatwind energy, assuming set capital and operating
costs, can go from being an expensive carbon
mitigation option at low natural gas prices, to a costeffective technology in its own right at higher natural
gas prices.

217

Towards a green economy
Estimated employment worldwide

Selected national estimates
Denmark Germany

Italy

Japan

Spain

US

Brazil

China

India

150,000

10,000Technology
Biofuels> 1,500,000

730,000

Wind power~ 630,000

Solar hot water~ 300,000

Solar PV~ 350,000

120,000
120,000

24,000100,000

Biomass power-

Geothermal-

13,000

Biogas-

20,000~ 15,000

Total

40,00085,0007,000

Hydropower

Solar thermal power

28,00026,00014,000250,000

14,00017,0005,000

66,000

7,000

8,000

120,000

9,000
1,000

1,000

> 3,500,000

Notes:> : at least~: approximately
Estimates are rounded to nearest 1,000 or 10,000 as all numbers are rough estimates and not exact. Estimates come from different sources, detailed in REN21 (2011), some of which have been calculated based on installed capacity. There are significant
uncertainties associated with most of the numbers presented here, related to such issues as accounting methods, industry definition and scope, direct vs. indirect jobs, and displaced jobs from other industries. Despite the existence of some national estimatesfor employment in biomass power, hydropower and geothermal, there are no reliable estimates of worldwide employment.

Table 8: Employment in renewable energy, by technology and by country
Source: REN21 (2011)

Average emplyment over life of facility(Jobs per megawatt of average capacity)
Manufacturing,
construction,
instalation

Operating &maintenance/
fuel processing

Solar PV5.76-6.21

1.20-4.80

6.96-11.01

Wind power

0.43-2.51

0.27

0.70-2.78

Biomass

0.40

0.38-2.44

0.78-2.84

Coal-fired

0.27

0.74

1.01

Natural gas-fired

0.25

0.70

0.95

Total

Note: Based on findings from a range of studies published in 2001-04. Assumed capacity factor is
21% for solar PV, 35% for wind, 80% for coal, and 85% for biomass and natural gas.

Table 9: Average employment over life of facility(jobs per megawatt of average capacity)
Source: UNEP, ILO, IOE and ITUC (2008)

alongside PV cost declines (see Table 9) which does notincorporate more recent cost declines from the last five
years20).

218

sectors in 2009. The findings were that the solar sector
could expect significant net job creation between
2008 and 2025 (from 173,000 to 764,000), although
the wind sector would only see modest gains (from309,000 to 337,000). These more modest numbers forwind reflect the current policy environment, as wellas ongoing technological developments, in particular
sharp increases in productivity and thus lower demand
for labour. Jobs created by the renewable energy
sector can be safer, in terms of potential health risks,
compared to employment within the fossil fuel energy
sector, ensuring longer term employment periods andincreased human capital (IPCC 2011).
Large-scale electricity technologies with high upfront investments are capital intensive, whether
renewable or conventional (see Table 9). Biomass, aswell as coal production and transport are, by contrast,labour intensive. Small-scale technologies tend to belabour intensive in manufacturing and installation. In
general, for most renewable energy technologies, themanufacturing, construction and installation phases are
the ones that offer the greatest job-creation potential.
The opposite is true for fossil-fuels such as coal andnatural gas.

Further growth in employment in renewable energy
generation will depend on such factors as the size ofinvestment, the choice of available technologies to investin, further maturing of technologies, overall progress ineconomic development, market size, national regulation,and the quality and cost of the labour force. The Green Jobs
Report (UNEP, ILO, IOE and ITUC 2008) estimated that, withstrong policy support, up to 2.1 million people could be
employed in wind energy and 6.3 million in solar PV by 2030.

In some cases, the growth of employment in the
renewable energy industry may compensate for some job
losses elsewhere in the energy sector, at least in aggregate
terms if not for individual workers. A recent study inAragon, Spain, for example, found that the renewable

More recently, Bloomberg New Energy Financeconducted a green jobs analysis on the wind and solar

20. More recent studies (for example, Wei et al. 2010), not captured inTable 9. show continued cost declines for renewable energy technologies,
including lower employment factors.

Renewable energy
energy industry generates between 1.8 and 4 times morejobs per MW installed than conventional sources (Llera
Sastresa et al. 2010). China’s growing labour force inrenewable energy generation may be partially offset byjob losses, estimated at more than half a million by the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, resulting from theclosing of more than 500 small inefficient power plants
between 2003 and 2020 (Institute for Labor Studies etal. 2010). Presumably, labour retrenchment will take theform of not replacing workers that retire. In other cases,
redeployment of workers to other sectors will be needed,accompanied by targeted retraining programmes.

Infrastructure

Expected lifetime (years)

Hydro station

75++

Building

45+++

Coal station

45+

Nuclear station

30-60

Gas turbine25

Aircraft

25-35

Motor vehicle

12-20

Table 10: Lifespan of selected power andtransportation assets
Source: Stern (2006)

3.5 Investment required
for renewable energy
Forecasts for future investment needs are based on
estimated costs of meeting climate change mitigation
targets, while still satisfying the growing demand forenergy. For the 450 ppm scenario, the IEA’s World Energy
Outlook 2010 (IEA 2010d) projects that a total additional
investment in low-carbon technologies and energy
efficiency (not only renewable energy) of US$ 18 trillion
is needed in the period 2010 to 2035.21 Only US$ 2.2
trillion (or 12 per cent) is incurred in the first 10 of these
25 years, but more than half in the second decade, 20202030. The World Energy Outlook 2010 does not specify
the proportion or amount of these totals to be devoted
only to renewable energy, but analysis in the previous
year’s Outlook estimated the needed investments inrenewables by 2020 at US$ 1.7 trillion under the 450ppm scenario (IEA 2009a).
There are a number of other analyses with varying
estimates of the investments required in renewableenergy. The World Economic Forum (2010) suggeststhat to limit the global average temperature increase
to 2°C, global investment in clean energy needs toreach US$ 500 billion per annum by 2020, while current
policies imply that this figure would likely only reach
US$ 350 billion per annum by 2020. Greenpeace andthe European Renewable Energy Council (Greenpeace/
EREC 2010) estimate that a total additional investment
in renewable energy over 2007-2030 of US$ 9.0 trillion
21. These estimates are additional to investment costs projected under theCurrent Policies Scenario.
22. The total projected investment over 2007-2030 in renewable energy
for the Reference scenario is US$ 5.1 trillion and for the Advanced Energy[R]evolution, US$ 14.1 trillion. The IPCC (2011) selected this scenario as
one of four illustrative scenarios, out of its review of 164 scenarios from 16
different large-scale models. The Advanced Energy [R]evolution represents
a scenario in which considerable investments are made in reducing growthin energy demand, and without the use of CCS to reduce GHG emissions.
23. The [R]evolution scenario has a similar target, but assumes a technicallifetime of 40 years for coal-fired power plants, instead of 20 years; theestimated additional investment needed for this scenario averages to US$
229 billion per year above the Reference scenario.
24. As quoted in UNEP SEFI (2009).

(averaging US$ 390 billion per year) is required for the“Advanced Energy [R]evolution scenario”.22 The target of
this scenario is the reduction of CO2 emissions down toa level of around 10 Gt per year by 2050, and a second
objective of phasing out of nuclear energy.23
New Energy Finance estimated that for CO2 to peak
before 2020, annual investments in renewable energy,
energy efficiency and carbon capture and storage needto reach US$ 500 billion by 2020, rising to US$ 590
billion by 2030.24 This represents an annual average
investment of 0.44 per cent of GDP between 2006 and2030. In summary, various sources estimate the capital
investments into renewable energies required for
mitigating climate change to be around US$ 500 billion
per year until 2020.
For climate mitigation, however, it is not only the scale ofinvestments into renewable energy capacity that is crucial,
but also the timing of these investments. This is due tothe risk of locking-in a high-carbon power infrastructure
because the energy sector is characterised by long lifespans of power plants and distribution infrastructure(see Table 10). The carbon emissions in the decades tocome are, therefore, determined by today’s investment
decisions. The early retirement or retrofitting of power
assets, for example, tends to be very expensive and carefultransition strategies are therefore needed (Blyth 2010).
Some studies also show that any significant delays inaction by governments and the private-sector to movethe energy sector onto a low-carbon growth pathwill lead to significantly higher costs to reach a given
mitigation target. For example, the IEA (2009a) estimatesthat every year of delay in moving the energy sector
onto the 450 ppm trajectory would add approximately
US$ 500 billion to the global costs for mitigating climatechange. Such modelling is sensitive to assumptions
about marginal abatement costs at different points intime, but the outcomes are broadly consistent with otherstudies. Another study (Edmonds et al. 2008) estimatesthat delaying mitigation actions in developing countries
after 2012 could double the total discounted costs to219

Towards a green economy
society by year 2020, with even greater cost increases by
years 2035, and 2050, respectively.
It is important to note that the estimated costs ofeliminating energy poverty are much smaller thanestimates of energy investments to cope with growing
energy demand or to address the challenge of mitigatingclimate change. In April 2010, the UN Secretary-General’s
Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change (AGECC
2010) published a report, which estimates the required
capital investment for universal modern energy accessto meet basic needs25 to be US$ 35-40 billion per year

220

through 2030. For improving energy efficiency in lowincome countries, the same report estimates the needfor an average of US$ 30-35 billion per year. A portionof these costs could be accounted for by renewableenergy technologies (as discussed in section 2 above). A
bigger push to invest in renewable energy more broadly
need not, though, come at the expense of the relatively
modest costs of ensuring universal access to modern
energy.
25. Energy required for cooking, heating, lighting, communication,
healthcare and education.

Renewable energy

4 Quantifying the implications ofinvesting in renewable energy
To assess the implications of increasing investments ingreening the world economy, including greening theenergy sector, the Millennium Institute (MI) conducted aquantitative analysis based on its Threshold 21 nationalmodel (T21) adapted for the purpose of the global
Green Economy Report (T21-Global). Described in moredetail in the modelling chapter, T21-Global is a system
dynamics model of the global economy in which theeconomic, social, and environmental spheres interact
with each other.
This modelling exercise covers both energy supply anddemand. Energy supply is broken down into electricity
and non-electricity. It includes a variety of fossil-fuelsources as well as nuclear, biomass, hydro and otherrenewable sources. Fossil-fuel production is based on
stocks and flows, including discovery and recovery
processes. Fossil-fuel prices are endogenous in the model,
i.e. determined as a result of the interactions between
the forces of supply and demand considered within themodel. Energy demand is determined by GDP, energy
prices, and technology (i.e. level of energy efficiency),
and is disaggregated by source according to the IEA
classification. In the model, GDP is also dependent onenergy demand, which implies a feedback mechanismthat plays an important role in the various scenarios.
The scenarios modelled for the next few decades up to2030 and 2050 include: 1) business-as-usual (BAU), which
is based on the historical trajectory and assumes no majorchange in policy and external conditions; 2) allocating 1
or 2 per cent of the global GDP as additional investments
into business as usual – BAU1 and BAU2 respectively; and
3) allocating 1 or 2 per cent of the global GDP as additional
investments to green 10 economic sectors – G1 and G2,
respectively. Under G2, the energy sector receives a muchlarger allocation, bringing the analysis closer to the policy
targets of reducing GHG emissions to levels necessary tomaintain atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at 450 ppm.
The presentation below focuses, therefore, on G2 and its
comparison with BAU2.26
26. More detail on the scenarios, including G1, is presented in themodelling chapter.
27. At the global aggregated level, this is also reasonably similar to the
WEO 2010 (IEA 2010d) Current Policies Scenario.
28 Increases in the supply of energy from modern renewables are moremodest than growth in total investments reviewed in Section 3.1, as thelatter include total financial investments.

4.1 Business-as-usual (BAU)
The BAU scenario in the GER modelling analysis is similar
to the WEO 2009 Reference Scenario27 (IEA 2009a), in
which world energy resources are generally adequate tomeet demand in the foreseeable future. With respect tooil, however, the long-term picture is of serious concern,even with a peak of conventional oil projected to takeplace after 2035.
This BAU scenario should be interpreted as representing
how energy use would evolve over the next 40 years if
current trends were simply extrapolated. This assumption,
however, ignores important potential consequences ofclimate change on economic activity or other aspects ofhuman well-being, and is thus optimistic in terms of thelikely implications of following a BAU path.
In the BAU scenario, the current growth (2.4 per centannually) of world primary energy demand slackens
between 2010 and 2050 to an average yearly increaseof 1.2 per cent, due to slowing population growth andeconomic growth. Despite slower growth, however,global energy demand still increases by about one-third,from approximately 13,000 Mtoe today to almost 17,100
Mtoe in 2050. Similarly, world electricity demand would
continue to grow, but at a much slower pace (fromabove 3 per cent now to 1.1 per cent per year by 2050).
Under BAU, fossil fuels remain the dominant source ofenergy, with a constant share of about 80 per cent throughto 2050. Currently, renewable energy supplies some 13
per cent of world’s energy demand, most of which istraditional biomass and large-scale hydropower. Under the
BAU scenario, energy from modern renewables (excludinghydro, traditional biomass and agricultural waste andresidues) would continue to register the strongest – but
gradually reduced – growth rates (from around 3 per centper year now to 1.1 per cent during 2030-2050).28 Amongthe other sources in the energy mix, nuclear energy
continues to expand, but the annual growth rate in supply
drops from 1.3 per cent in short term to 0.6 per cent in thelong run. Constant growth of coal and natural gas (1.3 percent and 1.5 per cent annual growth respectively) and the
projected decline in oil in the mid to longer term allows
coal and natural gas to account for the largest shares ofdemand: 24 per cent for natural gas, 33 per cent for coal221

Towards a green economy
and 24 per cent for oil in 2050. The share of other sources ofenergy remains almost constant through to 2050.
With respect to energy end-uses, the transport sector
surpasses industry under BAU to become the largest
energy consumer (29 per cent) by 2050. The annual growth
rates for transport and industry are 1.4 per cent and 1.0
per cent respectively. The residential sector, which is mostdirectly influenced by population growth, is projected
to exhibit the fastest growth throughout the simulation
period (1.7 per cent per year) to reach 28.9 per cent of
total energy demand in 2050. All these trends imply that
under BAU, energy-related CO2 emissions will grow from
28 Gt in 2007 to 41 Gt in 2030, and 50 Gt in 2050.

4.2 Green investment scenarios
The renewable energy subsector receives an additional 0.52
per cent of global GDP in the G2 scenario, on top of current
investment and capacity trends in the sector.29 These
investments are mostly directed into the supply of renewableenergy. A considerable portion of the remainder of theinvestment portfolios is also invested in energy efficiency,
particularly in the transport, buildings and industry sectors.
Such investments on the demand side interact with supplyside investments, particularly through the (endogenised)
price for fossil fuels. The effects of investments in curbing
the growth of demand are discussed in other chapters, but
are also summarised in this section.
The following is a discussion on the different resultsfrom G2 and BAU, focusing on energy savings on the
demand side, the penetration rate of renewable energy
on the supply side, jobs and GHG emissions. The effects
on GDP at the global aggregate level are covered in themodelling chapter of this report, as it is difficult to isolate
such effects by inter-related sectors such as energy
and manufacturing. As mentioned above, comparedwith G1 the allocation of additional investments underG2, with a heavy concentration on energy supply anduse, is designed to achieve the maximum reductionin emissions, based on existing knowledge andassumptions.
Effects on energy demand – achieving energy savings
Under the G2 scenario, additional green investments
totaling US$ 651 billion (at constant US$ 2010 prices,
same unit for monetary values below) per year over the
next 40 years are allocated to improve efficiency for enduse energy demand.30 These are concentrated in poweruse (across sectors) and in fuel use in both industry (seealso HRS-MI 2009) and transport (transport investments
are analysed in detail in the Transport chapter as funds
are mostly allocated to the expansion of the public
transport network as opposed to increased efficiency).

222

Under G2, these energy savings efforts curb total
primary energy demand by 15 per cent by 2030 and by
34 per cent by 2050, compared with BAU, with demandreaching 14,269 Mtoe in 2030 and 13,051 Mtoe in 2050.
Total fossil-fuel demand is 41 per cent lower than under
BAU in 2050.31 The lower energy consumption generates
considerable savings on energy expenditure. Avoided
capital and fuel costs in the power sector, for example,
result in savings averaging US$ 760 billion per year
between 2010 and 2050. As explained above and in otherchapters, these results are driven by the expansion of the
public transportation network (rail and buses) and byimprovements in energy efficiency (e.g., in the industrial
and buildings sector), as well as the increased use ofrenewable energy and energy recovered from waste.
Effects on energy supply – raising the penetration rateof renewable energy
In G2, the energy supply sector receives additional
investments of US$ 656 billion per year between 2010 and
2050 to expand biofuel production and power generation
using renewables. The unit costs of investments applied in
the simulations are based on estimates in the IEA’s Energy
Technology Perspectives 2010 (IEA 2010b) and a rangeof other published sources (detailed in the Modelling
chapter and its technical annex).32
Additional investments in energy supply go to boththe use of renewables in power generation and biofuel
production. Fifty per cent of the additional investment(US$ 327 billion (G2) per year over the 40-year period) is
allocated to power generation.33 The power-generation
investment is further divided into nine areas: eight
power-generation options plus carbon capture andstorage (CCS). Two of the renewable power- generation
options dominate:■■ Solar power generation: 35 per cent of powergeneration investment (additional US$ 63 billion in 2011
under G2) with an average additional investment of US$
114 billion per year over the 40-year period.
29. As published and projected by IEA (2010b, 2010d).
30. These are investments in the remainder of the G2 investment portfolio,
as described above; i.e. G2 allocates 0.52 per cent of GDP of investments torenewable energy supply, and an additional portion of the total 2 per centof GDP portfolio to energy efficiency in the sectors described.
31. Somewhat similarly, fossil fuel demand is 48 per cent lower under G2,
compared to BAU2.
32. In general, the scenarios do not significantly alter current trends ofdevelopment of nuclear energy, and the potential for developing carbon
capture and storage (CCS) is kept fairly modest, in order to focus theanalysis on renewable sources.
33. It is important to recall that the amounts of investment modeled in
the G2 scenario (and also G1) are additional to existing investment trends
in the energy sector, including in renewable energy sources. The amounts
cited here for the investment scenario are therefore substantially lower
than figures of total investment, for example, in renewable energy, as
published by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, UNEP SEFI and others, thatare elsewhere in this chapter.

20,000

27%

30 %

25
19%

15,000

13%

13%

13%

40,000

45%

13%

15

10
5,000

40
29%

25,00030
24%

20,00015,000

20%
16%

16%

20

10,000
5

0

0
2010
BAU

2050
BAU

Energy demand

2010
G2

2050
G2

RE in energy

50 %35,00030,00020

10,000TWh/yrMtoe/yr

Renewable energy

10

5,000
0

0
2010
BAU

2050
BAU

Power generation

2010
G2

2050
G2

RE in power

Figure 6: Trends in BAU and G2 scenarios in totalenergy consumption (left axis) and renewablepenetration rate (right axis)

Figure 7: Trends in BAU and G2 scenarios: power
generation (left axis) and renewable penetration
rate in power sector (right axis)■■ Wind power generation: 35 per cent of power
generation investment in 2011, declining to 15 per centin 2050 (additional US$ 63 billion in 2011 under G2),
with an average additional investment of US$ 76 billion
per year over the 40-year period.

increase the penetration rate of renewables to 27 percent of total primary energy demand by 2050 under G2,
compared with 13 per cent under BAU. In the power sector,
renewables (including hydro, waste, wind, geothermal,
solar, tidal and wave) will account for 45 per cent of total
electricity generation by 2050, substantially higher thanthe 24 per cent under BAU. The share of fossil fuels, coal inparticular, will decline accordingly to 34 per cent in 2050,
compared with 64 per cent in the BAU scenario, mostly
due to the expansion of renewables (Figure 6, Figure 7,
and Table 11). Table 11 compares the resulting energy mix
under G2 to the IEA’s BLUE Map 450 Scenario as publishedin the ETP 2010 (IEA 2010b). The results are similar interms of renewables penetration and differ primarily interms of the lower share of nuclear energy in G2, as thistechnology is not targeted with additional investments.
As discussed below, this partly explains the fact that
the G2 scenario does not receive the same amount ofemissions reduction as the BLUE Map 450 Scenario.

Biofuel production accounts for the other 50 per cent of theenergy investment, with an average additional investment
of US$ 327 billion per year over the 40-year period underG2. Increments in biofuel production are assumed to shift
from first generation to second generation biofuels, using
agricultural residues. In general, second-generation biofuelsconsiderably reduce the pressure on diverting agriculturalland from food production in the simulations.34 In 2025 and
2050, the production of second-generation biofuels, fromagricultural and forestry residues, is projected to reach 490
billion litres of gasoline equivalent (lge) and 844 billion lge,
meeting 16.6 per cent of world liquid fuel consumption
by 2050 (21.6 per cent when first generation biofuels arealso considered). Around 37 per cent of agricultural andforestry residues would be needed in the G2 scenario. Incase residues above 25 per cent are not available or usable(as indicated by the IEA 2010b), marginal land is assumed to
be used for growing crops for biofuels.
The substitution of investments in carbon-intensive
energy sources for investment in clean energy will
34. Note that investments in the agricultural sector, as part of the green
investments scenarios, are also increasing the productivity of land, thus also
reducing the potential conflict between biofuels and food production.
35. The IPCC (2011) review was conducted before the GER modelling
results were published; see Krey and Clarke (2011) for more details of the
IPCC review, which does cover studies published during or after 2006. Of
the 164 scenarios reviewed, 26 (about 15 per cent) constitute baseline
scenarios.

In general, G2 can be seen as conservative relative tosome more ambitious scenarios that have been modeledby other. The results of G2 are relatively close, though,to the median found by the IPCC (2011) in their reviewof 164 global scenarios from 16 different large-scale
integrated models.35 These scenarios cover a wide rangeof renewable energy penetration rates, with the highest
reaching approximately 43 per cent of primary energy
supply in 2030 and 77 per cent in 2050. More than half ofthe reviewed scenarios resulted in the share of renewableenergy in primary energy supply reaching at least 17 percent by 2030, and at least 27 per cent by 2050, comparedwith 19 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively, under G2.
On the other hand, most baseline scenarios reviewed by223

Towards a green economy%
Scenarios*WEO
Current
Policies

2030
GER *WEO

GER

BAU

450

G2

2050
*ETP GER
BLUE
G2
Map

Coal

29

31

19

25

15

15

Oil

30

28

27

24

19

21

Gas

21

23

21

23

21

25

Nuclear

6

6

10

8

17

12

Hydro

2

2

3

3

Biomass andwastes

10

8

14

12

Other RE

2

3

5

5

Total

100

100

100

100

4
29

16
8

100

100

End-use electricity
efficiency

49%

Fuel efficiency

G2

G2

2030

2050

19%

22%

27%

35%

23%

28%

7%

6%

Industry
8%

16%

22%

Supply-side abatement

Transportation
50%

46%

54%

46%

Power generation fromlow carbon sources (RE& Nuclear)

30%

27%

39%

33%

Biofuels

3%

6%

5%

CCS

17%

9%

7%

19%

*Additional sources: IEA (2010b, 2010d)

NB: Columns may not add up to 100% due to rounding. *Additional sources: IEA (2010b, 2010d)

Table 11: Comparison of energy mix in 2030 and
2050 in various GER and IEA scenarios

Table 12: Emission abatement shares from GER
modelling compared with IEA

the IPCC show moderately stronger deployment of RE
than BAU from the GER modelling.

the sectoral effects, whereas the wider effects on
output and jobs in the rest of the economy38 (coveredin the Modelling chapter) depend on how the relative
availability and price of capital, labour and energy areaffected as a result of increased investment in renewableenergy. It should also be pointed out that considerable
net job creation can imply higher-cost energy, which
can constrain economic growth and development.
Finally, the global analysis does not capture effects on
specific countries. Some of these, such as oil-exporting
countries, may well see negative effects on employment
in the energy sector.

Effects on employment – increasing jobs fromgreening the energy sector
The total employment in the energy supply sector is
projected to decrease slightly over time in the BAU scenario,
from 19 million in 2010 to 18.6 million in 2050, owing toincreasing labour productivity in fossil-fuel extraction
and processing. In the green investment scenarios, there
is some short-term net job creation primarily becauseof the higher labour intensity of renewable energy
generation compared with thermal power generation.
In the longer term, increasing productivity also leads toa roughly comparable decline, reaching 18.3 million in
2050 in the G2 case. Between 330,000 and 1 million jobs
would be created in the production and processing of
biofuels and agriculture residues, which would rise to 3
million if a mix of agricultural residues and conventional
feedstock is used. There is a major shift in employment,
however, with growth in renewable power generation andbiofuels production matched by a considerable decline
in coal extraction and processing, and to some extent
gas production (Figure 8). The additional investment inenergy efficiency in the buildings sector36 also includedin the G2 scenario, however, leads to an additional 5.1
million jobs in 2050. The net effect is thus a projected
increase in energy-sector employment of approximately
21 per cent over a comparable BAU scenario.37
It should be noted that the modelling of renewableenergy investment includes only “direct jobs” that will
substitute new jobs from not expanding energy ofother sources (in the case of increased demand) or evenreplace existing jobs in other energy technologies. It
does not include “indirect jobs” – created or displaced– in sectors that supply energy industries. These are

224*WEO 450 *ETP BLUE
Scenario
Map
2030
2050

Effects on GHG emissions
Under the green investment scenarios, global energy
intensity (in terms of Mtoe/US$ billion GDP) declines
by 36 per cent by 2030, and the cumulative global
energy- related CO2 emissions would be considerably
mitigated by 2050 (Figure 9). Under G2, emissions areapproximately 60 per cent lower in 2050 as compared to
BAU. In absolute amounts, this corresponds to a decline
from 30.6 Gt of energy-related CO2 emissions in 2010 toabout 20 Gt in 2050 (see Figure 9).
Table 12 compares the contribution to emissions
reduction under G2 from both demand- and supply-side
investments with those of the IEA’s BLUE Map scenario.
Both exercises project a contribution to emissions
abatement of 46 per cent from supply-side investments.
The green investment scenario G2, however, does not
36. These are essentially for the buildings sector, as potential job
implications of investments in energy efficiency in industrial and transport
sectors could not be captured.
37. The point of comparison for employment generation is the simulated
effects of an additional investment of 2 per cent of GDP in current
investment patterns (see the Modelling chapter for more details).
38. Also sometimes referred to as “induced jobs” (NREL 1997).

Million persons

Renewable energy

25

Energy efficiency

20

RE power
15

Thermal powerGas production

10

BiofuelOil production
5

Coal production
0
1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Gt CO2

Figure 8: Total employment in the energy sector, and its disaggregation into fuel and power, and energy
efficiency under the G2 scenario

60

Business-as-usual

50

Power use efficiency
Transport efficiency
and fuel switching

40

Industry fuel efficiency
and fuel switching

30

Renewable energy
power generation
biofuels
Carbon capture & storage
2% green investment scenario

20

10

0
1970

1990

2010

2030

2050

Figure 9: Total energy-related emissions and reductions under G2 by source, relative to BAU
fully achieve the emissions reductions projected by IEA
as necessary for limiting atmospheric concentrations to
450 ppm.39 Part of this difference is due to the positiveeffect of various green investments on overall economic
growth (GDP) that, in turn, results in increased energy
demand, a form of the rebound effect. In addition, thegreen investment scenarios do not include substantially
39. However, as explained in the Modelling chapter, with the potential
carbon sequestration of the measures to green the agricultural sector, theG2 is expected to reduce the concentration of CO2 to 450 ppm by 2050.

increased investments in nuclear power, nor in CCS,
both major components of the IEA’s BLUE Map 450
scenario (see Table 11 and Table 12). Note also thoughthat only about a quarter of the scenarios reviewed forthe IPCC (2011) SRREN result in a CO2 concentration
not exceeding 440 ppm by 2100, and more than half
lead to concentrations by the end of the century in
the range of 440 to 600 ppm. Thus, the G2 investment
scenario constitutes a relatively conservative emissions
reductions path, but one which is more feasible thanmore ambitious projections.

225

Towards a green economy

5 Overcoming barriers:
enabling conditions
The preceding analysis has explored the results fromincreased investments in renewable energy, in termsof energy savings, penetration of renewable energy,
increased jobs, and reduced GHG emissions. However,as noted in section 3, current levels of investment inrenewable energy are still below what is needed toaddress the challenges facing the energy sector outlined
earlier in the chapter. This section discusses the barriers
to increasing investments in renewable energy and themeasures that are needed to address these barriers.
The major barriers and respective policy responses may
be grouped under the following headings: 1) energy
policy framework; 2) risks and returns associated withrenewable energy investments, including fiscal policy
instruments; 3) financing constraints for renewableenergy projects; 4) electricity infrastructure andregulations; 5) market failure related to investments ininnovation and R&D; 6) technology transfer and skills;
and 7) sustainability standards.

5.1 Policy commitment torenewable energy
In general, the growth in investment and deploymentof renewable energy technologies, documented above,
has been driven by an increasing number and varietyof policies (IPCC 2011). These are reviewed below
in the subsequent sub-sections. Individual policies
to overcome various barriers to renewable energy
development and deployment are most effective when
they are part of a broad enabling policy framework,
which builds on complementarity between a range ofmeasures operating at multiple stages of the chain fromresearch and development, through to deployment anddiffusion. An enabling policy framework for renewableenergy includes clear commitments to long-term
development of the sector. Such commitment canbe manifested by targets for investment in additional
capacity and penetration rates within the energy mix.
When supported by other enabling policies, setting
targets to achieve these goals can send a strong signal
to potential investors.
Important targets for energy access have beenannounced at the international level. The AGECC (2010)
calls on the UN and its Member States to commit
themselves to two achievable goals: universal access to226modern energy services and a global energy intensity
reduction of 40 per cent by 2030. The report highlights
that, “Delivering these two goals is key to achieving
the [MDGs], improving the quality and sustainability ofmacroeconomic growth, and helping to reduce carbon
emissions over the next 20 years”.
Many countries have already adopted targets forrenewable energy. By early 2011, there were national
policy targets in 98 countries, including all 27 EU member
states (REN21 2011).40 A large number of these targets
concern renewables’ shares of electricity production,and generally fall in the range of 10-30 per cent within
the next 1-2 decades. Targets are also set for the share of
renewable energy in total primary or final energy supply,
installed capacities of various specific technologies, thetotal amounts of energy production from renewables,or for the share of biofuels in transportation fuels.
While earlier many targets were set for the 2010-2012
timeframe, targets set more recently concern the next
decade to 2020 or beyond. For example, EU countries
have set a target of 20 per cent of their final energy
supply to be provided by renewable sources by 2020.
Policy targets for renewable energy have also been
established in many developing countries. In fact,
more than half of the national targets have been set
by developing countries. Between 1997 and 2010, thenumber of developing countries with national targets
doubled from 22 to 45. Developing countries withtargets for 2020 or beyond include, among others, Brazil,
China, Egypt, India, Kenya, the Philippines and Thailand.
Box 2 illustrates the example of Tunisia, which has
been encouraging the use of renewable energy since2004. In addition to such national targets, there aremany countries with sub-national targets at the state orprovincial level.
The REN21 Global Status Report 2011 (REN21 2011)
illustrates that a number of countries had either met
their targets for 2011 or were about to do so. Finlandand Sweden had already met their targets for 2020. The
report also indicates though that some countries have not
met their targets, while others have revised their targets
downwards. For example, India missed its target for 2 GWof added wind power in 2010. The US reduced its target for
40. The following description and examples of policy targets here arebased on information from the REN21 Global Status Report 2011 (REN21
2011).

Renewable energy
about 950 million litres of advanced cellulosic biofuels by
2011 (as originally envisioned in the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007) to about 25 million liters, due
to difficulties in financing commercial production. The
range of experience highlights the need to adjust targets
according to evolving conditions. The achievement oftargets requires a strategy of tailored policy measures,
discussed in the further in the following sections.

5.2 Risks and returns
As is the case in other sectors, the nature of risks, relative
to expected returns, influences the incentive to invest
in renewable energy. If a project or company has an
expected risk-adjusted rate of return on investmentthat is sufficiently high, it is considered an interesting
opportunity for financing. Taking first the risks inrenewable energy projects, these can be categorised asfollows (UNEP SEFI, New Energy Finance and Chatham
House 2009):■■ Technical and project-specific risks, including risks
associated with lead times, construction costs, novelty ofthe technology, fuel and resources, and operations andmanagement. Newer technologies have higher risks than
traditional ones. As long as investors are unfamiliar witha technology and there is little in-country expertise, theperceived risk is high. Resource availability may also be
an issue for specific technologies like geothermal where
determination of good locations is costly and subject
41. This includes either anticipating or being able to adapt to unanticipatedadverse effects from the deployment of a new renewable energy project. A
prominent example is the production of biofuels, in which the EU and the
US have adjusted their respective policy support

to uncertainty. Some resource dependency also occurs
with hydro, wind, and biomass-based technologies. Risks
will therefore differ at regional or national levels.
■■ Country-specific institutional risks such as stabilityof the government, reliability of the legal system,transparency of business dealings, currency risks, andgeneral instability due to wars, famine and strikes. For
large-scale investments in a specific country, a long-term
stable policy regime with a sound legal basis is needed;■■ Political risk and regulatory risks, such as
unexpected changes in policy or uncertainty about
the future direction of policy. Given the long pay-backperiods, the contribution of policies to predictability,
clarity and long-term stability in the investment climate,are viewed as critical in being able to stimulate moreinvestments;41 and,■■ Business and market risks, including: 1) financial
risks relating to the capital structure of the project suchas high upfront capital intensity and the project’s ability
to generate enough cash flow; 2) economic risks relating
to interest rates, exchange rates, inflation, commodity
prices, counterparty credit risk; and 3) market risks
associated with, for example, future electricity and carbon
prices (which may also be influenced by political andregulatory risks). Most renewable energy technologies
are less vulnerable to the price and availability of fuelduring the operation of a project. Those technologies
that are dependent on biomass, however, do facepotential market-price risks if the opportunity cost of
biomass production is related to agricultural commodity
prices and also because a reduction in fossil-fuel prices
can make renewable energy less competitive in fuel andBox 2: Tunisia’s Solar Energy Plan
In order to become less dependent on energy
imports and the volatile prices of oil and gas, theGovernment of Tunisia decided to develop thecountry’s potential for renewable energy generation.
A 2004 law on energy management provided alegal framework. In 2005, funding mechanisms
such as the National Fund for Energy Management
became available for deploying renewable energy
technologies and increasing energy efficiency.
Between 2005 and 2008, clean energy plans enabled
the government to save nearly € 900 million in energy
expenditures (equivalent to 10 per cent of primaryenergy consumption), with an initial investment inclean energy infrastructure of only € 260 million. The
renewable energy supplies and energy efficiency
measures are expected to have reduced total energy

consumption from conventional sources by about 20
per cent in 2011. In December 2009, the government
presented the first national Solar Energy Plan andother complementary plans with the objective of
increasing the share of renewable energy sources to
4.3 per cent of total energy generation in 2014, up
from the current level of 0.8 per cent. The objective
is to transform Tunisia into an international cleanenergy hub. The Solar Energy Plan is based on
three main technologies: solar PV, concentrating
solar power and solar water heating systems, andcomprises 40 renewable energy projects. The Plan’sbudget through to 2016 is € 2 billion, while its savingson energy imports are expected to reach more than
20 per cent per year by the end of that year.
Source: Agence Nationale pour la Maîtrise de l’Énergie (2009)227

Towards a green economy
power markets. Such risks may be reduced with second
generation, relative to first generation biofuels.
Various government initiatives, including regulatory
policies, fiscal incentives and public financing
mechanisms, can reduce many of these risks and thusincrease expected returns (Ecofys 2008). Such measures
include offering long-term policy commitment toincreased deployment of renewable energy investment,
helping to mitigate political and regulatory risks.
Shorter-term political commitment is similarly important.
Owing to the long-lead times for project development,
clarity over the development of regulation in support ofrenewable energy over a five-year horizon is desirable.
Political and regulatory risks, as well as some countryspecific risks, can also be reduced through governmentsponsored initiatives to share risks, including throughloan guarantees (discussed again under section 5.3) or
public participation in the project or related infrastructure
investments. Technical and project-specific risks canbe addressed through action to improve permitting
procedures, as well as grid connection procedures in
the case of power generation projects. Well-designed
measures to reduce the above risks have been estimatedto decrease the production costs by as much as 30 per
cent, in a European context (Ecofys 2008).
A range of further public support mechanisms can alsoenhance returns to investments in renewable energy,
by either helping to lower costs or to enhance income.
Measures to reduce costs include subsidies and fiscal
measures, such as investment tax deduction, production
tax deduction, and preferential depreciation schemes.
Public finance mechanisms, such as loans, also lower
risks to investors and this particular type of support isdiscussed in more detail in the next section.
Direct subsidies for renewable energy have been used toprovide assistance in the early stages of market diffusion.
In July 2009, for example, China initiated the Golden
Sun Policy, which provides subsidies for 500 MW of PV
projects until 2012 to temporarily support the domestic
solar industry in response to reduced demand for PV
panels in Germany and Spain. The policy supports largescale PV, which complements the existing Solar Roofs
Program that began in March 2009 (REN21 2010). Suchsubsidies can be in the form of investment support andgrants to reduce capital costs, or in the form of operating
support. Currently, they are estimated at US$ 27 billion
in 2007 for renewables (excluding hydroelectricity) and
US$ 20 billion for biofuels at the global level, clearlydwarfed by subsidies to fossil fuels.
Subsidies, however, need to be judiciously designed.
Subsidies will most likely need to be adjusted over timein order to be efficient, and such changes are likely to
be opposed by businesses or consumers who benefit

228

from them. Such support also needs to take into accountrequirements of international agreements, in particular
the rules and regulations of the WTO. Box 3 gives theexample of Brazil, which used taxes on petrol to crosssubsidise ethanol from sugarcane.
Taxes can be an alternative fiscal measure to subsidies(or used in combination) in order to shape the structureof incentives facing producers and consumers in energy
markets. A tax is one of the most efficient measures foraddressing the externalities of carbon emissions in energy
production and use. Given the pervasiveness of energy
use and, thus, the broad tax base, it may be desirable
on both efficiency and equity grounds to embed suchtax measures in a broader fiscal reform package with aview to offsetting a carbon tax with reductions in othertaxes, especially those which distort markets; this would
produce a win-win for society as a whole.
Renewable energy producers, for example, may be
granted exemptions from general energy taxes. Suchmeasures are potentially most effective where overall
energy taxes are high, such as in Nordic countries (IEA
2008e). The United States and Sweden, for example,
provide a 30 per cent tax credit for solar PV, France offers
a 50 per cent income tax credit, and Australia provides
rebates up to AUS$ 8/watt (REN21 2010).
In addition to measures to reduce costs for renewableenergy investments, governments employ a range of
production support measures to enhance the income
earned on such investments. These include obligation
schemes, such as renewable portfolio standards forenergy utilities mandated by government (discussed
below under section 5.4) or feed-in tariffs.
Support mechanisms can elicit private investment
in renewable energy, and while most support is
implemented in high-income countries, incentives
are becoming common place in developing countries.
Currently 79 countries have at least some form of
regulatory policy, such as a renewable quota, and 80
countries have at least one form of fiscal incentive inplace (REN21 2011). Public finance and investment
are being utilised, but at a slower rate than othermechanisms. In most support schemes the government
must be actively involved to assure investment certainty.
Feed-in tariffs, much like preferential pricing, guarantee
payment of a fixed amount per unit of electricity
produced or a premium on top of market electricity
prices. Feed-in schemes can be flexible and tailored;
for example, tariffs can be based on technologyspecific costs, possibly decreasing over time to follow
actual cost reductions. This instrument is popular withproject developers for the long-term certainty it can
provide and, thereby, a considerable reduction ofRenewable energy
market risk (IEA 2008e). To achieve the required returns,
incentive mechanisms such as feed-in tariffs need to beguaranteed for 15-20 years, though the level of support
can be expected to decrease.
By early 2011, feed-in tariffs had been implemented in
more than 61 countries and 26 states/provinces, morethan half of which have been enacted since 2005 (REN21
2011). Developing countries are increasingly employing
feed-in tariffs, including 13 lower middle-income
countries and three lower-income countries, as of early
2011. Ecuador, for example, adopted a new system of
feed-in tariffs in early 2011, building on an earlier policy
dating from 2005 (REN21 2011). Kenya introduced afeed-in tariff on electricity from wind, biomass andsmall- hydro power in 2008 and extended the policy in2010 to include geothermal, biogas and solar-generated
electricity (AFREPREN/FWD 2009).
As with any kind of positive support, the design of feed-in
tariffs is crucial for their success. Important issues include
tariff levels, graduated tariff decreases over time, time
periods for support, the formula for cost-sharing among
different groups of consumers, minimum or maximum
capacity limits, payment for net versus gross generation,
limitations based on type of ownership and differential
treatment of technology sub-classes. For example, rates
for solar PV feed-in tariffs have recently been (or arein the process of being) revised in various countries inreaction to price reductions of PV panels, and thus thedeclining cost of installations (REN21 2010, 2011).
Apart from feed-in tariffs, which are basically financed bycross subsidies among electricity users, the feebate has

also been proposed as alternative regulatory measure
to enhance incentives to invest in renewable power
generation. Feebates have been applied in the transport
sector on vehicle emissions (Small 2010). In the power
sector, feebates would impose a per kWh charge on
generators in proportion to any difference between
their average emissions per kWh and the industry as awhole, and a rebate to generators with below average
emissions per kWh. Feebates could thus have little
overall effect on energy prices, enhancing their overall
feasibility and acceptability, and be revenue-neutral.
Initiatives to price carbon emissions would likely also
have an important impact on the returns to renewableenergy investments (see Box 1 in Section 3). At theinternational level, the most important policy initiativethat would alter the relative profitability of renewables
would be a framework agreement on carbon emissions
that established a robust pricing mechanism for full costaccounting of health and climate externalities. Withestimates reviewed by the IPCC (2007) ranging up to
US$ 95 per tonne of CO2, these additional costs of fossil
fuels would make a variety of renewables attractive
and spur wider investment and adoption over time.
Accompanying measures would also be required though
to minimise negative impacts on energy poverty.
Some possibilities for selecting and adapting these various
support measures to the level of technological maturity
and market development is illustrated in Figure 10. Support
to earlier stages of innovation and R&D is discussed
further in section 5.5. Policies, incentives and mechanisms
influencing risks and returns as discussed above generally
contribute as deployment is initiated (in niche markets)

Box 3: Brazilian ethanol
The Brazilian Alcohol Program (Proalcool) wasestablished in 1975 for the purpose of reducing
oil imports by producing ethanol from sugarcane.
Incentives aimed at both production and consumptionof ethanol, including vehicle technology advancement
through flexible fuel engine development, madepetroleum substitutes competitive on the Brazilianenergy market (United Nations 2011). The ethanol
costs declined along a “learning curve” as production
increased at an average rate of 6 per cent per year, from
0.9 billion gallons in 1980 to 3 billion gallons in 1990
and to over 15 billion gallons by 2005 (IEA 2006). The
unlevelised cost of ethanol in 1980 was approximately
three times the cost of petrol, but cross-subsidies paid
for the price difference at the pump. The subsidies
came mostly from taxes on petrol and were thus
paid by vehicle drivers. The democratization of Brazil

provided an increasingly deregulated ethanol market,
culminating in the termination of Proalcool and theremoval of all remaining ethanol subsidies in 1999.
Cumulative subsidies to ethanol are estimated tohave amounted to about US$ 50 billion over the
20- year period ending in 1995, but were morethan offset by a cumulative reduction of petroleum
imports amounting to US$ 100 billion by the endof 2006 (IEA 2006). As of 2006, Brazil accounted forover 50 per cent of the world’s ethanol exports (IEA
2006). Other measures, such as the requirementthat vehicle manufacturers provide so-called flex
fuel vehicles that could operate on either ethanol or
petrol, also supported the market for biofuels. These
were introduced in 2003 to accommodate higher andfluctuating prices for sugar which had reduced the
incentive to produce ethanol.

229

Market deployment

Towards a green economy

Mature technology(hydro, geothermal)

4. Accelerate adoption byaddressing market barriers
Measures to stimulate demand,e.g. building codes

1. Development
and infrastructure
planning
RD&D financing
capital cost support
for large-scaledemonstration

Low cost gap(onshore wind, biomass
power in some markets)

Green certificates, GHG tradingHigh cost gap(solar CSP, solar PV)

2. Stable, technology-specific incentives

Prototype and demo stage(e.g. fuel cells,
2nd generation biofuels, )1. Technology development
and demonstration

3. Technology-neutral
but declining support

Feed-in tariffs, for credits, loan guarantees

2. Niche markets

3. Achieving
competitivenessTime

4. Mass market

Note: The figure includes generalised technology classifications. In most cases, technology will fall in more than one category for any given time.

Figure 10: Policies for supporting renewable energy technologies
Source: Adapted from IEA (2008e, 2010b)

and as competitiveness improves. Measures targeting
consumption and demand may be more relevant at laterstages of diffusion and market development.

5.3 Financing mechanisms
As mentioned in the previous section, public financemechanisms are one group of public support measuresthat governments can use or promote in order to influence
the specific risk/ return profile of renewable energy
technologies. These Public Finance Mechanisms (PFM,
see Figure 11), can be categorised by stage of economic
development, by stage of technological development,by type of investors, by type of risk to private investors,
or by addressing specific barriers or constraints (UNEPSEFI 2005; UNEP/ Vivid Economics 2009; UNEP SEFI,New Energy Finance and Chatham House 2009). Public
Finance Mechanisms vary from simple grants to complex
conditional funding structures. As a general rule, PFMs aim
at complementing the private sector and not substituting
for it as part of an integrated and coherent enabling
environment alongside regulations, taxes and subsidies.
In high- and middle-income countries, one of the key aimsof PFMs is to mobilise (or leverage) as much private capitalfor investments as possible (UNEP SEFI 2008b). Exceptions
may occur in developing country contexts, where there is230

very limited private-sector involvement. Here, PFMs canbe part of programmes to create and catalyse markets.
Even when risk-return ratios are favourable, one of
the specific financing barriers that renewable energy
projects may face can be due to high up-front capitalcosts or small project-size. Small-scale projects are at a
disadvantage in attracting large mainstream investors
such as pension funds. This can be a particularly relevant
constraint in developing countries. Small project sizes
also lead to planning and transaction costs that are highrelative to the overall project cost.
Over the past decade, a variety of formal and informal
financial institutions and financing arrangements haveemerged that offer facilitate small-scale products for theenergy-poor in rural areas. Figure 12 gives an overview
of the various options available to the poor at different
levels of poverty.42
The smallest projects are found in consumer-driven
renewable energy solutions in developing countries,
such as solar home systems. The high transaction
costs involved call for innovative consumer finance
42. A broader discussion of the role of the financial services and investment
sector in supporting the greening of the energy sector is included in thefinance chapter of this reportRenewable energy

Stage 1
R&D

Stage 2Demonstration

Stage 3
Deployment

Stage 4
Diffusion

Stage 5
Commercial maturity

Guarantees and insurance products/
risk mitigation instruments
Public/private
VC funds
Soft loans
Mezzanine debt
R&D
supportGrantsLoan facilities

CarbonPublic/private equity funds
Incubators
Credit lines

Project development assistanceOf greatest interest to institutional investors

PFMs to engage
institutional investors

Other PFMs

Figure 11 : Public finance mechanisms across stages of technological development
Source: UNEP SEFI (2009)

More formal

Insurance companies
Commercial/postal banks
FX/remittanceMicro finance institutions

Less formal

Saving & credit cooperatives
Community-based organizations
Rotating saving & credit associations
Very poor

Poor

Less poor

Figure 12: Illustrative financing options for the poor
Source: UNDP (2009)231

Towards a green economy
mechanisms that address the particular needs of ruraldeveloping country customers. These mechanisms
can make renewables attractive and cost effective foraddressing energy poverty in off-grid situations (Box 4).
Beyond private companies and governments, however,bilateral and multilateral development assistanceagencies are also expected to scale up funding while
collaborating with existing energy programmes andfunds43 to administer and distribute resources (IEA
2010d). Engaging developing countries in the global
mitigation challenge will require international funding
and the agreement to establish the Copenhagen
Green Climate Fund at the 2009 UNFCCC conference
represents potentially significant progress in this area.
Countries producing renewable energy may also benefit
from increased revenues from selling emissions credits(through the CDM) or green certificates, and lower risk

5.4 Electricity infrastructure
and regulations
The increased use of renewable energy in power
generation faces specific barriers due to the demands
it makes on existing electricity infrastructure. Electricity
generation by wind and solar PV adds variability andlower predictability to the power system, requiring
more attention to the design and regulation of energy

systems and markets (Owen 2006; Heal 2009; IEA 2008d).
More reserve capacity, storage or increased trade
between countries or regions is needed to provide thenecessary flexibility to match demand with variability
in supply. Smart grids with variable cost pricing andmicro-metering is a new area of development with thepotential to provide increased demand flexibility andenhance energy efficiency.
The additional investment costs for adapting the
distribution and transmission systems, thoughsubstantial, should be manageable. For example, theECF (2009) roadmap 2050 indicates that the investments
required to expand the grid and effectively reduce
intermittency challenges amount to around 10 per centof overall investment in electricity generation.
In some situations, vested interests and control ofaccess to the grid by incumbent power companies canpose barriers for independent providers of power fromrenewable sources. Similarly, oil companies may impede
the distribution of biofuels through networks, such as
pipelines, that they control. The construction sector
may be reluctant to integrate renewable heating andcooling technology in their practices and building codes.
Authorities have to be alert to signals from renewable
43. Such as the Climate Investment Funds, the Global Environment Facility
and GTZ’s Energising Development (IEA 2010d).

Box 4: Grameen Shakti programme in Bangladesh
Grameen Shakti (or Grameen Energy in English),founded in 1996, provides electrification to ruralcommunities in Bangladesh through a marketbased approach: micro-credit. The experience ofGrameen Shakti provides an example of successful
entrepreneurship combined with effective energy
policy. Capitalising on the network and experienceof the Grameen Bank, Grameen Shakti provides soft
credits through different financial packages to makesolar-home systems (SHSs) available and affordable
to rural populations. By creating a market for solar
energy and providing multiple advantages overkerosene, Grameen Shakti succeeded in installingover 320,000 SHSs by December 2009.
One aspect that has been essential to the success ofthe program has been the creation of partnerships
with indigenous organizations that have succeededin cutting programme costs and increasing
business development (United Nations 2011).
Government financial and policy support provided

232

the coordination necessary for safe investments
in renewable energy. Through effective policy
guidelines, the industry had a greater potential for
success and future growth (IPCC 2011). Grameen
Shakti has also installed numerous improved
cooking stoves and biogas plants that contributeto the reduction of woody biomass use and, in turn,decrease indoor pollution, while biogas technology
further helps with sustainable waste management.
Grameen Shakti aims to install over 1 million SHSs
by 2015, and simultaneously provide the necessary
maintenance, while training the necessary
technicians and users, thereby generating local
employment, and generating social value throughstakeholder
engagement.
GrameenShaktidemonstrates the potential that can be mobilised
to reduce energy poverty efficiently, while also
contributing to mitigate climate change, with
innovative financing and business models in
partnership with public support (Wang et al. 2011).

Renewable energy
energy companies and move quickly to address suchmarket entry barriers.
Regulations may thus be needed to promote the typesof investments in infrastructure necessary for further
development of electricity from renewable sources.
In Europe, for example, the 2009 Renewable Energy
Directive requires EU countries to provide accelerationof authorisation procedures for grid infrastructure,including coordinated approval of grid infrastructurewith administrative and planning procedures.
Beyond regulations on electricity infrastructure,
governments can establish obligations for renewableenergy consumption or production more generally (asdiscussed in section 5.2). In an obligation system – also
referred to as a renewables portfolio standard (RPS)or renewable energy target – a minimum amount or
proportion from eligible renewable energy sources
is prescribed. The obligation is typically imposed on
consumption, often through supply or distribution
companies. The implementation of an obligation system
usually involves a penalty for non-compliance to ensurethat the obligated parties meet their renewable energy
purchase obligations (Gillingham and Sweeney 2010).
Obligations for renewables, however, can only be
implemented when supply has developed sufficiently
to ensure price competition among suppliers. They
are typically used for mature technology and may
be the successor of fiscal incentives or subsidies (seeFigure 10). For investors, the perceived policy risks ofobligations are smaller than those of subsidies, since
they are not subject to government budget decisions.
As of early 2011, there were 10 national and at least 30
state/provincial/regional jurisdictions with RPS policies(REN21 2011). Most of these require renewable powershares between 5 and 20 per cent.

5.5 Innovation and R&D
The technological development of renewable energy
faces barriers due to the market failures inherent ininnovation. Knowledge spillovers from research anddevelopment activities to create better products at lower
costs benefit both consumers and other enterprises, but
the potential innovator may not receive sufficient shareof these to justify the investments (Gillingham andSweeney 2010). Furthermore, new technologies can be
intuitive and easily learned, which contributes to cost
reductions, which others are also able to apply. Bothsituations result in a general under-investment along all
stages of the innovation chain.
There is little systematic evidence quantifying theextent of this market failure in renewables and thus towhat extent investment and innovation in this sector
would be higher if the market failure were eliminated.
Nonetheless, the costs of some of the important
technologies for renewable energy have declined
steeply as installed capacity has increased, as seen
above in section 3.3 in the discussion of learning effects
for solar PV (IPCC 2011). These learning effects represent
an important spillover benefit, as the cost reductions are
generated and disseminated throughout the industry
relatively “free-of-charge” (Jamasb 2007).
To achieve a socially optimal rate of innovation, therefore,
policy support is needed (Tomlinson et al. 2008; Grubb
2004). In particular, public support for R&D is essential
for supporting high-risk, fundamental research with along-term perspective, whilst the private sector tends
to focus on near-competitive technologies and shorterterm demonstration projects.
The public sector can support research institutes andacademic institutions, fund research programmes
targeted at specific technologies, and supply grants or
use other means support to private-sector R&D efforts.
Energy research has been found to be most effective
when targeted R&D programmes, e.g. “technology
push” projects, are joined seamlessly with “market pull”
policies on deployment (IEA 2010b; IPCC 2011; United
Nations 2011).
Research and development for the energy sector in the
28 IEA member countries has recently shown signs ofgrowth, having been stagnant for some time. In 2006,
when the share of renewables was just above 10 per
cent, R&D spending in real terms was only slightly above
levels registered 30 years earlier (IEA 2008e). In 2009, R&D
and deployment in renewable energy by governments
and business totalled US$ 24.6 billion (UNEP SEFI 2010).
Government support to R&D increased in that year by
50 per cent, accounting for US$ 9.7 billion. Corporate
spending, at US$ 14.9 billion, declined somewhat,reflecting the economic recession. There are also manydifferences between countries in terms of public R&D
expenditure (see Figure 13).
In developing countries, R&D for renewables may
warrant specific attention, although there are many
positive signs already. In many cases, local technicalcapabilities for developing or adapting technologies
are virtually absent. The focus here should be on
creating capacity to facilitate technology transfer, adapt
technologies to local market conditions and support
private-sector players that install, manufacture, operate
and maintain the technologies. At the 2010 UNFCCC,
COP16 in Cancun, Mexico countries agreed to establisha Climate Technology Mechanism. Its purpose is toaccelerate the development and transfer of climate
friendly technologies, especially to developing countries,233

GDP/capita (thousand 2008 US$)

Towards a green economy

95
Norway85
75

Denmark

65

Austria
FranceSwitzerland

55

UK
CanadaGermany

Belgium

45

Sweden35
New Zealand

25

Japan

Australia

Finland

USA

Italy
Spain

Korea

15
10

100

1,000

The size of the bubble indicates public spending on a per-capita basis.

10,000CO2 emissions, log scale (Mt CO2)

Figure 13: Public-sector low-carbon R&D spending per capita as a function of GDP per capita and CO2
emissions
Source: IEA (2010b)

to address both climate mitigation and adaptation(UNFCCC 2010). However, the exact functioning of
the mechanism’s two components – the Technology
Executive Committee and the Climate Technology
Centre and Network – remains to be specified.
Market failures in innovation notwithstanding,considerable cumulative benefits can accrue tocountries that generate first-mover advantages fromleading development in the renewable energy sector.
Simulation modelling has illustrated how overall
economic competitiveness can improve when acountry or region, in this case the EU, commits itself tounilateral climate-change mitigation action involving
the penetration of renewables on a large scale (Barker
and Scrieciu 2009).

5.6 Technology transfer and skills
Technology transfer is the flow of knowledge, experienceand equipment from one area to another. Often,
technology transfer is exclusively seen as being froman industrialised country to a developing country, but it
can also be between developing countries or even fromurban areas to rural areas.
Like other new technologies, renewable energy faces
barriers that relate to technology transfer. Before atechnology can be transferred successfully, enabling
conditions need to be fulfilled, such as institutional andadaptive capacity, access to finance, and both codified
and tacit knowledge of the technology. In developing
countries, especially in remote rural areas, however,234

such conditions are often not present. Even when theeconomic feasibility of renewable energy options in
those areas is favourable, these barriers can prevent
their application.
Recent studies have argued that, in order to allow
developing countries to adopt renewable energy
technologies in the local and regional context, thecapacity to maintain and operate the systems is not
sufficient by itself; indigenous innovation capabilities
also need to be addressed (Ockwell et al. 2009; Bazilian etal. 2008; United Nations 2011). The required capabilities
to undergo the process of adaptive innovation are
considerable and depend on a knowledge infrastructure
usually encompassing centralised R&D and requiring
higher levels of education. Indeed, the flows of technology
and knowledge are of vital importance for technology
transfer to developing countries (Ockwell et al. 2009).
A related issue is skill shortages. Employment in
the renewable energy industry requires some skills
that do not necessarily coincide with those foundin the traditional energy industry. In Germany, forexample, the renewable energy industry has recently
experienced a shortage of skilled workers. Lehr et al.
(2008) reported that almost all energy sub-sectors lackskilled workers, the most acute shortage being skills inhydro energy, biogas and biomass technologies. Windenergy companies in Europe have also reported anacute shortage of highly-skilled workers. The shortageis most pressing for manufacturing and development,
particularly engineering, operations and management,
and site-management activities. The sector also needs
skilled employees in R&D.

Renewable energy

5.7 Sustainability standards
Renewable energy is not synonymous with sustainability. The
term renewable refers largely to the naturally regenerative
nature of the energy source, whereas sustainability has abroader scope, including economic, social and environmental
considerations. Although renewable energy technologies
are generally perceived as being more sustainable compared
to nonrenewable sources, due to smaller environmental
impacts, there is still a need to develop agreed standards
to reduce and manage these impacts. The environmental
and social impacts of large hydropower reservoirs are one
prominent example, including their potential to releasecarbon dioxide and methane from decaying biomass intropical locations. Concern about minimizing impacts has
led to the development of policy principles and guidelines
under the coordination of the World Commission on Dams.
Biofuels are another example, as their production in somecircumstances has been associated with unsustainable land
use and land-use change, with potential consequencesfor GHG balances, biodiversity and food security; at thesame time, there is also a risk of excessive water use
and contamination (UNEP 2009).44 Different renewable
technologies may, therefore, rank differently according to
44. Impacts on GHG balances vary depending on feedstock, location, input
and production methods, previous land use, conversion technology, allthroughout the life-cycle (UNEP 2009).
45. See for example ongoing climate policy planning guidance work by
UNEP: http://www.MCA4climate.info.

varying sustainability criteria. Methodologies to quantify
effects and trade-offs are still under development.45
For biofuels, the sustainability challenge is slowly being
addressed on the project and policy level. National
biofuels policy, regulatory frameworks, international
standards, and environmental impact assessment
methodologies increasingly incorporate sustainability
criteria and standards. For example, sustainability
criteria for biofuels and bio-liquids were developed
and adopted in the EU Renewable Energy Sources
Directive (EU Directive 2009/28/EC), to be implemented
by member states. Certification schemes can be usedfor validating the fulfillment of sustainability criteria.
However, many countries lack the institutional capacity
to effectively implement and enforce certification
schemes, inhibiting the development and adoption ofsustainability standards for biofuels.
Another challenge is balancing stringency and flexibility,
as manifested in the introduction of sustainability
standards for biofuels in the EU, which has led to tradedisputes within the WTO. Overly rigid standards would
be a disincentive for producers to enter the market
and may limit investment, particularly in developing
countries (Devereaux and Lee 2009). Policy makers,
therefore, need to balance long-term sustainability
concerns with shorter-term interests when promoting
renewable energy.

235

Towards a green economy

6 Conclusions
The challenges posed to the global community andnational governments, in terms of energy security,
climate change, health impacts, and energy poverty arepressing, making the greening of the energy sector animperative. The existing challenges are exacerbated by
the expected growth in the global demand for energy,
as population and incomes rise. Shifting from fossil fuels
to renewable energy plays a critical role in greening theenergy sector, along with other changes, in particularraising energy efficiency.
The cost effectiveness of renewable energy technologies
has evolved considerably in recent decades. Many
renewable energy technologies are maturing rapidly
and their costs becoming competitive with fossil fuelalternatives. Consequently, the investments in deploying
renewable energy increased dramatically in the last decade.
These developments have been driven by a range ofpolicies. National targets for renewable energy are
spreading. A number of governments have supported
innovation to help reduce costs, while many more are
increasingly putting in place regulations, fiscal incentives
and financing mechanisms that mitigate risks andincrease returns to investing in renewable energy. At
the international level, the formal creation in 2011 of theInternational Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) indicatesa willingness of governments to work collaboratively in
expanding the role of renewable energy.
Despite encouraging progress, a number of roadblocks
still remain on the route towards a green energy sector.
Most importantly, the overall incentive framework underwhich the energy sector operates has not yet beenreconfigured to consistently support the development
and deployment of renewable energy technologies anda managed phasing-out of emissions from fossil fuelsources. This is due to both vested interests and an energy
system, comprised of both hardware, such as electricity
infrastructure, and software, in the form of organisations
and institutions, that are locked in to supporting
conventional energy technologies. Although developing
countries may have fewer cumulative investments
in conventional energy systems, they face financial
constraints and also a shortage of institutional and humancapacity to acquire and manage new technologies.

236

To reduce such roadblocks, policymakers need to takean integrated approach that supports various stagesof the development and diffusion of renewable energy
technologies within an overall strategy that also
addresses the rest of the energy system, on both supply
and demand sides. In so doing, there is considerable
scope for governments to work with market forces tocreate a level playing-field for the further growth ofrenewable energy. Phasing out subsidies for fossil fuels
and pricing in health and environmental externalities
from fossil-fuel combustion can speed up thetransformation of the energy sector, though attention
needs to be paid to impacts on low-income groups.
Increasing investments in renewable energy, as part ofa green economy strategy spanning all major sectors,
can contribute to reducing health and environmental
impacts from energy production and use, while
ensuring the basis for long-term economic growth.
Such a strategy is based on the substitution of fossil
fuel energy with renewable energy, savings fromenergy efficiency in manufacturing, buildings andconstruction, and transport, and behavioural change.
Such an integrated strategy can increase national energy
security and reduce carbon emissions while providing
new employment opportunities that may, in global
terms, more than compensate for jobs that disappear.
This, however, should not prevent policymakers fromrecognising that in specific countries, depending on
the extent to which fossil-fuel subsidies are phasedout and negative externalities addressed, there could
be net declines in employment, at least in the shortterm. The focus should be on specific countries and on
practical ways of building capacity and skills to facilitatea transition to a green economy.
In order also to play a role as part of an integrated
strategy to reduce energy poverty, specific aspects ofrenewable energy development needs to be tailored tothe circumstances in rural areas where the majority ofthe poor in developing countries live. Mini-grids and offgrids may provide a cost-effective means of delivering
electricity to the poor, while also reducing growth in
GHG emissions. This requires additional financing flows,
as well as continued development of new financing
models.

Renewable energy

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iStockphoto/Peisen Zhao

Manufacturing

Investing in energy and resource efficiency

Towards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Authors: Robert Ayres, Professor
Emeritus, INSEAD, France and Cornis van der Lugt, Resource
Efficiency Coordinator, UNEP.

of Sao Paulo, Brazil; Arnold Tukker and Carlos Montalvo, TNO,
Netherlands ; and Jeroen van den Bergh, Universitat Autònoma
de Barcelona, Spain.

Fatma Ben Fadhl of UNEP managed the chapter, including thehandling of peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating
authors on revisions, conducting supplementary research andbringing the chapter to final production.

During the development of the chapter, the Chapter
Coordinating Authors received advisory support from Desta
Mebratu, and contributions from Ruth Coutto and Tomas Ferreira
Marques of the United Nations Environment Programme, as well
as David Seligson and Ana Lucía Iturriza of the International
Labour Organization (ILO).

This chapter benefited from initial research conducted by thefollowing individuals (in alphabetical order): Robert Ayres,
Professor Emeritus, INSEAD, France; Andrea Bassi and ZhuohuaTan, Millennium Institute, USA; Fatma Ben Fadhl, United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP); Alan Brent, Stellenbosch
University, South Africa; Haifeng Huang and Xue Bing, China’s
Research Centre for Economic Transition at Beijing Universityof Technology, China; Sergio Pacca, André Simoes, University

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011242

We would also like to acknowledge the peer reviews of thechapter by Raimund Bleischwitz, Wuppertal Institute, Germany;
Donald Huisingh, University of Tennessee, USA; Vasantt Jogoo,
Mauritius; Thomas Lindqvist, IIIEE Lund University, Sweden; Roy
Shantanu, Environment Management Centre Mumbai, India;
and Hans Schnitzer, Graz University, Austria.

Manufacturing

Contents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

1.1
1.2
1.3

Structure of the chapter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Manufacturing in the global economy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Scope and definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

2

Challenges – the risks and costs of inaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

2.1
2.2
2.3

Natural resource scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
The external costs of industrial air pollution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Hazardous substances and waste  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

3

Opportunities – Strategic options for the manufacturing sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

3.1
3.2

Decoupling and competitive advantage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Innovation in supply and demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

4Investment and resource efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

Investing in material and energy efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Investing in water efficiency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Investing in a transition to green jobs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Growth and rebound – lessons for developing markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

5Quantifying the implications of greening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

5.1
5.2

Business-as-usual trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
Trends under a green investment scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

6Enabling conditions for a green transformation in manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

6.1
6.2

Policy priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Policy instruments to enable green manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

7Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

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List of figures
Figure 1: Primary production supplies and their end products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Figure 2: Global material extraction in billion tonnes, 1900-2005. Industrial production drives mostof the ores extraction, and significant parts of biomass and construction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Figure 3: Water demand in end-use by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Figure 4: Discovery rate of oil trend, 1965-2002. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Figure 5: Commodity metals price index, June 1990-May 2010 (2005 = 100), includes copper, aluminum,iron ore, tin, nickel, zinc, lead, and uranium price indices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Figure 6: Relative contribution of material groups to environmental problems (EU27 + Turkey)  . . . . . . . . 256
Figure 7: Global Relative Decoupling trends 1980-2007  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Figure 8: Contribution to CO2 reductions from industry per type of measure – IEA model (2009b) . . . . . . 271
Figure 9: Employment per manufacturing sector by 2050 in G2 and BAU scenarios (person per year) . . . 271
Figure 10: Energy-related CO2 emissions per manufacturing sector by 2050 in G2 and BAU (tCO2/year) . 272
Figure 11: Energy costs per manufacturing sector by 2050 in G2 and BAU scenarios (US$/year)  . . . . . . . . 272

List of tables
Table 1: Global resource extractions, by major groups of resources and regions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Table 2: Life expectancies of selected world reserves of metal ores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Table 3: Cost of air pollution from sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and volatile organic compounds
as a percentage of GDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Table 4: Examples of major industrial accidents and related economic and social costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Table 5: Examples of investment and environmental returns from energy-efficiency initiatives indeveloping countries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Table 6: Greenhouse gas emissions and structure of major manufacturing industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

List of boxes
Box 1: Steel production with higher components of recycled materials. Direct and indirect impacts
on jobs. Estimation for the EU27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Box 2: Taxing plastic bags in an emerging market: the case of South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

244

Manufacturing

List of acronyms
BAT
BAU
BPT
BRIICS
CCS
CDM
CHP
DMC
EROIE
ETFP
EU ETS
EPR
FTE
GHG
GDP
HPV
IWRM
IEA
IIASA
ILO
ISEAL
ISIC
LCD
LDCs
OHS
OECD
ROI
REACH
RoHS
SME
WEEE
WBCSD

Best available technology
Business-as-usual
Best possible technology
Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa
Carbon capture and storage
Clean Development Mechanism
Combined heat and power
Domestic material consumption
Energy return on investment in energy
Ethical Trade Fact-finding Process
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
Extended producer responsibility
Full-time equivalent
Greenhouse gas
Gross Domestic ProductHigh production volume
Integrated water resource management
International Energy Agency
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
International Labour Organization
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling AllianceInternational Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities
Liquid Crystal Display
Least Developed Countries
Occupational Health and Safety
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Return on investment
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals
Restriction of Hazardous Substances
Small and medium-sized enterprise
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
World Business Council for Sustainable Development245

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. As currently configured, manufacturing has a large material impact on economy, environmentand human health. Manufacturing is responsible for around 35 per cent of global electricity use, over
20 per cent of CO2 emissions and over a quarter of primary resource extraction. Along with extractive
industries and construction, manufacturing currently accounts for 23 per cent of global employment.
It also accounts for up to 17 per cent of air pollution-related health damage. Estimates of gross air
pollution damage range from 1 to 5 per cent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
2. Key resource scarcities − including easily recoverable oil reserves, metal ores and water – will
challenge the sector. As industries resort to lower-grade ores, more energy is required to extract
useful metal content. Improved recovery and recycling will increasingly become a decisive factor
for both economic performance and environmental sustainability. The same applies to water use byindustry, which is expected to grow to over 20 per cent of global total demand by 2030.
3. Win-win opportunities exist, if manufacturing industries pursue life-cycle approaches andintroduce resource efficiency and productivity improvements. This requires supply and demandside approaches, ranging from the re-design of products and systems to cleaner technologies andclosed-cycle manufacturing. If the life of all manufactured products were to be extended by 10 per cent,for example, the volume of resources extracted could be cut by a similar amount. The costs of endof-pipe pollution control can be reduced by cleaner production approaches in management, cleaner
raw material selection, and cleaner technologies that reduce emissions and integrate by-products into
the production value chain. With the use of alternative production equipment, processes and inputs,
returns on investment can be substantial and with relatively short payback periods.
4. Key components of a supply-side strategy include remanufacturing – for example of vehicle
components – and the recycling of heat waste through combined heat and power installations.
Closed-cycle manufacturing extends the life-span of manufactured goods, making revamped goods
available for re-use, and reduces the need for virgin materials. Repair, reconditioning, remanufacturing
and recycling are fairly labour-intensive activities, requiring relatively little capital investment.
Remanufacturing operations worldwide already save about 10.7 million barrels of oil each year, or an
amount of electricity equal to that generated by five nuclear power plants.

246

Manufacturing

5. While direct job effects of greening manufacturing may be neutral or small, the indirect
effects are significantly higher. Manufacturing has become increasingly automated and efficient,which has been accompanied by job losses. This can be countered by life-cycle approaches andsecondary production, for example, in the form of recycling, to secure jobs, for which safe and decent
working conditions are of paramount importance.
6. Green-investment-scenario modelling for manufacturing suggests considerable improvements
in energy efficiency can be achieved. By 2050, projections indicate that industry can practically“decouple” energy use from economic growth, particularly in the most energy-intensive industries. Green
investment will also increase employment in the sector. Tracking progress will require governments tocollect improved data on industrial resource efficiency.
7. Innovation needs to be accompanied by regulatory reform, new policies and economic
instruments in order to enable energy and broader resource-efficiency improvements.
Environment-related levies, including carbon taxes, will be required to ensure producers include thecost of externalities in their pricing calculations. Mindful that manufacturing is not a uniform industry,
governments need to consider approaches that meet the realities of specific industries and their value
chains that often stretch across national economies. Governments are also challenged to find mixes ofpolicies and regulatory mechanisms that best suit national circumstances. Developing countries havea strong potential to leapfrog inefficient technologies by adopting cleaner production programmes,
particularly those that provide support to smaller companies, many of which serve global value chains.
Of special importance to manufacturing is the introduction of recognised standards and labels, backed
by reliable methodologies.

247

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
Manufactured products are a key component of humanconsumption, whether as finished or semi-finished goods.
Manufacturing processes are a key stage in the life-cycleof material use, which begins with natural resource
extraction and ends with final disposal. Basic industries
such as cement, aluminum, chemical and steel supply
the semi-finished, or intermediate goods, used to build
houses, cars, and other appliances used in daily life. Other
industrial sectors produce finished goods such as clothing,leather, fine chemicals, electrical and electronic products.
In Our Common Future (1987), the Brundtland
Commission foresaw industrial operations that are more
efficient in resource use, generate less pollution andwaste, are based on the use of renewable resources,
and that minimise irreversible impacts on human healthand the environment. This vision became the drive forconcepts such as Cleaner Production promoted by UNEP
and others since the 1980s. It remains a challenge for
manufacturing industries world-wide, highlighting aneed for more fundamental change in which the purposeof products and side-effects of manufacturing become asource of inspiration for re-design and beneficial output(Braungart and McDonough 2008).
In order to implement a strategy of sustainable useof natural resources based on integrated resource
management and resource efficiency, policy
interventions supplemented by voluntary initiatives areneeded at each stage of the life-cycle of production anduse. The balance between upstream and downstream
interventions is up for policy debate. Upstream policy
interventions, for example, at the stage of mineral
extraction or forest harvesting, to minimise adverse
environmental impacts or to charge users appropriately
for depletion or appropriation of resource rents, would
have the effect of raising input prices to manufacturing
companies.
Policy interventions targeted at manufacturing
companies with the aim of reducing pollution to air
and water, safeguarding health from exposure to toxic
chemicals, and emitting greenhouse gases can also havethe effect of increasing the cost of using resource inputs.
These, together with other measures, can be powerfuldrivers in encouraging manufacturing industries tobecome more efficient in their use of natural resourcesand energy. Measures intended to improve theperformance of markets for secondary raw materials
and to encourage recycling can help to improve theperformance of manufacturing companies in reducing
their use of virgin raw materials. These are all building

248

blocks for moving us closer to the vision described in
Our Common Future.

1.1 Structure of the chapter
The chapter starts with a brief sketch of global
manufacturing and its importance to developing
economies. It then explains the choices of manufacturing
branches, which are the main focus of the chapter , theenvironmental pressures associated with them, recent
trends in decoupling economic growth from thosepressures and a definition of green manufacturing.
Section 2 describes the costs of failure to implement
a strategy of greening manufacture. These relate toexcessively rapid depletion of natural resources, which
could adversely affect future economic growth, thenegative externalities of industrial air pollution and theuse of hazardous substances.
Section 3 outlines a number of strategic approaches toencourage green manufacturing that involve investment
in innovation, cleaner energy technologies, resource
efficiency and a transition to green jobs. This includes a
supply-side strategy involving the redesign of processes andtechnologies employed in the major materials-intensive
subsectors of the manufacturing sector, including closedcycle manufacturing where feasible. It also includes
a demand-side strategy to change the composition ofdemand, both from within industry and from end-users.
Section 4 argues that there are many opportunities forinvestments that can lower costs by using less material,
energy and water. At the micro-level this can translate
into an increase in profitability, if the rate of return onsuch investment is greater than that of an alternative
investment. The section provides numerous examplesof green investments highlighting, in particular, theirimpacts on energy savings and CO2 emissions reductions,water savings and employment creation. However, theprocess of transition may be slowed by the problem oflock-in, owing to the capital-intensive nature of many
manufacturing processes and long plant lives.
Section 5 presents the results of model-based quantitative
analysis done for this study that shows how investing to
improve resource efficiency in manufacturing can often
be profitable to business and increase employment
while reducing environmental pressure. At the macrolevel it can mean greater Gross Domestic Product (GDP)and a higher level of environmental services.

Manufacturing

Aluminium global mass flow infinished products as of 2009 (%)

Distribution of global steel use by
end-using industry as of 2008 (%)
Oil Other
& gas
3
3

Other
10

Building
33

Engineeringand cable
28

Packaging1

Othertransport
12

Metal
products
8Transport
vehicles13
Machinery24

Automotive
16

Source: Adapted from “Global Aluminum Industry Sustainability Scorecard” (IAI, 2010)

Apparent use of Portland Cement by market 2008 (%)

Source: Adapted from “Trends in the global steel market”, OECD (2009)

EU chemical industry supply by sector as of 2004 (%)
Industrial
machineryMetal
2
products
3

Nonconstruction
Other
5
public works
4
Utilities
4
Residentialbuildings
25

Water & Waste
Management
11
Bridges7
Streets& highways
27

Construction
49

Consumerproducts
30

Publicbuildings
4

Services
16

Commercial
buildings
8

Construction
5

Farmconstructions
5
Source : Adapted from Portland Cement Association (2008)

Paper & printing
products
5

Automotive
5

Source : Adapted from European Chemical Industry Council (2004)

Figure 1: Primary production supplies and their end products

Section 6 discusses the enabling conditions for a green
transformation in manufacturing. The various typesof policy measures are discussed in some detail. These
include regulatory and control mechanisms, economicor market-based instruments; fiscal instruments andincentives; voluntary action, information and capacity
building.

1.2 Manufacturing in the
global economy
During the 20th century, the growth of manufacturing
was phenomenal. World steel production, for example,
rose by a factor of six between 1950 and 2000 to over
1.2 billion metric tonnes (World Steel Association, 2009).

Aluminum production doubled between 1980 and 2005
(USGS 2009). The growth of industrial production has
also been accompanied by increasing pressure on theenvironment. Industry is responsible for over a third ofglobal electricity use and over a fifth of CO2 emissions(WRI 2007; IEA 2008).
Manufacturing has been a major driver of overall
economic growth in developing countries since 1995.
During this period, developing countries’ GDP nearly
doubled. In 2009, Manufacturing Value Added (MVA)
grew by 2.5 per cent while in some major industrial
countries it dropped by more than 10 per cent (UNIDO2010). Following the start of the global financial crisis
in 2008, a collapse in industrial production in 2009 was
drastic in many countries dependent on manufacturing249

Figure 2: Global material extraction in billion tons,
1900–2005 (Krausmann et al., 2009). Industrial
Towards
a greeneconomyproduction
drivesmost of the ores extraction, andsignificant parts of biomass and construction

50

80

40

60

30

40

20

20

10

GDP ( trillion international dollars)Material extraction (billion tons)

1.3 Scope and definition
100

This chapter focuses on those manufacturing subsectors that are energy-intensive or heavy users ofnatural resources. It excludes power generation as well
as food and refined petroleum products, which are dealt
with in the chapters on agriculture and energy. The
following manufacturing sub-sectors are given special
attention in this chapter: 1■■ Iron and steel (ISIC 241) Cement (ISIC 239)■■ Chemicals and chemical products (ISIC 20)■■ Pulp and paper (ISIC17)001900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Construction minerals
Ores and industrial minerals
Fossil energy carriers
Biomass
Gross domestic product (GDP)

Figure 2: Global material extraction in billion tonnes,
1900-2005. Industrial production drives most of theores extraction, and significant parts of biomass andconstruction
Source: Krausmann et al. (2009)

exports. In a front-page article entitled “The collapseof manufacturing”, The Economist (2009), noted thechallenges governments face in dealing with the varied
and constantly changing difficulties in the world’s
manufacturing industries. Governments are often slow
to design and amend manufacturing programmes.
If anything, the recent financial crisis highlighted abroader shift in the location of centres of manufacturingthat supply global value chains. The contribution of
manufacturing to developing world GDP increased toalmost 22 per cent by 2009, compared with 18 per cent in1990 (UNIDO 2010). Broadly defined, industry (excluding
agriculture and services, but including manufacturing,extractive industries and construction) accounted forabout 23 per cent of global employment, representing
over 660 million jobs in 2009, and grown by more than
130 million since 1999 (ILO 2011). In manufacturing, thechemical, iron and steel, and paper and pulp industries
generate the highest revenues. However, in terms of
employment, the textile sector (highly important forLesser Developed Countries (LDC) and developing
countries) and the basic metals sector (highly important
for transition and developed countries) are leading, eachaccounting for 20-25 per cent of global employment in
manufacturing (ILO 2010).

250■■ Aluminum (ISIC 242)■■ Textile and leather (ISIC 13 + 15)■■ Electrical and electronic products (ISIC 26 + 27)
Throughout the analysis in the above subsectors, it
should be noted that manufacturing is not a uniform
sector and that geographic dispersion in its value chainsis part of the complexity that the industry faces. Figure 1
illustrates where the products of some of the above-listed
manufacturing industries go. The breakdown signals
end products such as buildings, vehicles and consumer
products that end-users are familiar with from their daily
lives. It signals resource intensive consumption clusters
related to housing and transport (cf the buildings andtransport chapters). This is a reminder of insights fromfollowing a value-chain approach, considering green
innovations upstream and downstream. Some would say
the point of departure for green intervention needs tobe design, since most of the business cost of production
is determined during the initial design stage. A range ofoptions, upstream and downstream, will be consideredin this chapter.
In terms of CO2 emissions, the branches of manufacturing
covered in this chapter account for 22 per cent of global
emissions. Emissions from the iron and steel, cement
and chemical industries account for most of them, while
industries such as textiles and leather can generatesignificant negative externalities if their effluents are nothandled properly. The electrical and electronic goods
industries have a crucial role in the global economy,
with 18 million jobs (ILO 2007), and account for most of
1. The International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic
Activities (ISIC), Revision 4 (United Nations 2008) divides manufacturing into
24 divisions, which are in turn divided into numerous groups and classes.
The activities discussed in this chapter include those found in all or partsof eight of the ISIC divisions. Among the manufacturing industries notdiscussed explicitly in this chapter are glass, ceramics, wood products andmachinery. This chapter needs to be read in conjunction with the Energy,
Buildings, Forests, Waste and Water chapters of the Green Economy Report.

Manufacturing
the growth in manufacturing at present. They too have
harmful environmental impacts if hazardous chemicals
and metals in production and final disposal are notcarefully managed.
Historically, GDP has grown more rapidly than material,
energy and labour inputs required to produce it. Thishas been owing to a combination of structural change,as service consumption sectors have grown faster thanmaterial consumption, technical change, which, hasreduced material and labour inputs (e.g. automation) per
unit of production, and more stringent environmental
policies, which have driven up the cost of using somepollution-intensive inputs. This resulted, among others,
in relative decoupling of resource input from output
and absolute decoupling of some of the associatedenvironmental pressures. Yet resource- efficiency gains
have been offset by economic and population growth:

overall emissions, energy use and material use continued
to grow despite lower emissions, energy and material use
per unit output (Figure 2). Without absolute decoupling,
continuous economic growth implies continuously
higher energy and resource demands, to levels that put
the health of our natural resource base at risk.
The greening of manufacturing is essential to any effort
to decouple environmental pressure from economic
growth. Green manufacturing differs from conventional
manufacturing in that it aims to reduce the amountof natural resources needed to produce finishedgoods through more energy- and materials-efficientmanufacturing processes that also reduce the negative
externalities associated with waste and pollution. This
includes more efficient transport and logistics, which
can also account for a significant percentage of the total
environmental impact of manufactured products.

251

Towards a green economy

2 Challenges – the risks
and costs of inaction
The new economic reality for manufacturing industries
today include key structural changes such as theglobalisation of production with transnational supply anddemand, strong economic growth in Asia (notably China)
and an increase of raw material prices. The following
analysis focuses on the challenges of natural resource
scarcity, the external costs of air pollution, as well as risks
associated with hazardous substances and waste.

2.1 Natural resource scarcity
Resource scarcity is an increasing threat to future
economic growth and a real challenge to the
manufacturing industries, especially scarcity of fresh
water, oil and gas, and some metals. Secure resource
provision needs to be supported by healthy ecosystems,
the vitality of which depends on biodiversity. The TEEB
for business report (TEEB 2012) highlights what is called
the “impacts and dependencies” of the manufacturingindustry on biodiversity and ecosystem services,reflecting the footprint of facilities and the pollution
arising from production processes, as well as the role ofsuppliers of raw materials or semi-finished goods. These
linkages are often complex and sector- specific. In thecase of direct impact and dependency on biodiversity,

Agriculture

Domestic

Industry

% 100

80

60

40

20

0
East
Asia
&
Pacific

EuropeLatin
Middle&America
East
Central&& NorthAsia Caribbean Africa

South
Asia

SubSaharanAfricaFigure 3: Water demand in end-use by region
Source: World Bank (2008)252

the industries most implied include the pulp and paperindustry as well as the textile and leather industry. If
one considers high dependence on specific ecosystemservices, this points to a wider range of industries. Whatthey face is dependencies that pose risks associated with
operations, markets, finance, regulations and reputation.
A clear operational risk is that of increased scarcity andcost of natural resources.
Land use is mainly a problem related to agriculture andfood production, rather than industrial production (UNEP
2010a). The exception may be the future production of
biomass for energy and feedstock purposes in industry.
But industry is likely to face a significant challenge withregard to water in some countries or regions although
it is responsible for less than 10 per cent of water use
globally. Agriculture dominates with 70 per cent,followed by the energy sector and domestic uses, eachwith 10 per cent (UNESCO 2009).
Owing to expected high growth of industrial production,water use by industry is expected to grow to over 20 per
cent of global total demand by 2030 (Water ResourcesGroup 2009). At the same time, by 2030 a potential water
shortage of 40 per cent of expected demand, comparedto maximum sustainable supply, is projected at the
global level. The extent to which industry drives water
demand is highly differentiated by region and river basin(World Bank 2008; Figure 3). The implications of this arethat industries operating in regions of high water stress,
and regions where industrial water demand is relatively
important compared with other water demand, must
improve their water productivity greatly or relocate tomore water-abundant locations. This is particularly true
for industries with high water use, such as the paper andpulp, textiles and leather and the steel industries.
Demand for water by industry (and for the electric power
sector) increasingly competes with water demand by
agriculture and urban consumers. In addition, all of thisneeds to be balanced with water demand by ecosystems
and biodiversity. Water treatment is a necessary
precondition for industrial (or consumer) water use.
About half of industrial water use is for cooling purposes,
and about a fifth of this water is lost as vapor, but muchof the other four-fifths can be used downstream forother purposes (although the discharge of heated water
can be harmful to aquatic ecosystems). The best way
to reduce water loss for cooling large central powerGigabarrels annually

Manufacturing

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

Figure 4: Discovery rate of oil trend, 1965-2002
Source: Heinberg (2004)

facilities is to find productive uses for the heat. This
strategy, called co-generation or combined heat andpower (CHP), is applicable in urban areas, industrial
parks and in buildings generally, but its widespread
application requires a major change in the structureof the electric power grid. Other industrial water uses
include quenching of hot coke or red hot steel ingots,
wood pulping, washing, rinsing and dyeing of textiles,
tanning of leather and surface finishing of metals(including electroplating). These uses leave polluted
and sometimes toxic waste streams that need treatment(which uses even more water), and whose costs in many
instances are not reflected in the cost of production.
Reserves of easily recoverable oil are diminishing,stimulating technological innovation to extract oil fromdeep ocean underwater reservoirs and non-conventionalsources, such as oil and tar sands, and natural gas fromshale, as a close substitute for many uses of petroleum.
Since the early 1980s the amount of new oil discovered
each year has been less than the amount extracted andused (Figure 4). The overall peak is only a question oftime. However, market forces including high prices may
reduce demand and increase the use of substitutes,
causing demand to peak before supply. Some thinkpeak oil may still be 20 years in the future. Others thinkit has happened already (Campbell and Laherrère 1998;
Campbell 2004; Heinberg 2004; Strahan 2007).
The energy and other costs of replacing oil explorationand development are rising. The energy return on
investments in energy (EROIE) of oil discovered in the

1930s and 1940s was about 110, but for the oil producedin the 1970s it has been estimated at 23, while for new
oil discovered in that decade it was only 8 (Cleveland etal. 1984). Decades ago, only 1 per cent of the energy inoil discovered was needed to drill, refine and distributeit, but since then the EROIE has declined drastically. In
the case of deep-water oil, the EROIE is not above 10. For
Canadian tar sands the EROIE appears to be only about
3, which means that a quarter of all the useful energy
extracted is needed for the extraction itself. These costs
are reflected in the rising price of oil (and gas, which is apartial substitute) and are a sign of increasing oil scarcity.
High quality metal ores are also gradually being
depleted (OECD 2008). While absolute scarcity is not yet
perceived as an immediate problem for most metals,
the indicators on the life expectancy of reserves (cfTables 1 and 2) show that lower grade ores must be
used. However, in order to do so more energy is needed
to extract the useful metal content, adding marginallyto GHG emissions. And whilst metals appear above
ground in our economies in increasing quantities, a
UNEP Resource Panel report on metals has shown theopportunity for much improved recycling rates (UNEP
2010a). Metals such as iron and steel, copper, aluminum,
lead and tin enjoy recycling rates that vary between
25 and 75 per cent globally, with much lower rates insome developing economies. Improved recovery andrecycling rates are also important for high-tech specialty
metals that are needed in manufacturing to make key
components for products that range from wind turbinesand photovoltaic panels to the battery packs of hybrid253

Towards a green economy

2002

WORLD

OECD

BRIICS*

RoW**

Rate of change

Rate of change

Rate of change

Rate of change

1980–2002

2002–2020

2002

1980–2002

2002–2020

2002

1980–2002

2002–2020

2002

1980–2002

2002–2020

Amounts extracted (billion tonnes)
Total

55.0

36%

48%

22.9

19%

19%

17.7

67%

74%

14.4

35%

63%

Metal ores

5.8

56%

92%

1.8

41%

70%

2.2

110%

100%

1.9

30%

104%

Fossil energy
carriersa

10.6

30%

39%

4.1

12%

6%

3.7

58%

59%

2.9

31%

60%

Biomassb

15.6

28%

31%

4.5

11%

6%

5.9

49%

33%

5.2

25%

50%

Other mineralsc

22.9

40%

54%

12.6

21%

21%

5.9

81%

115%

4.4

58%

63%

Per capita (tonne/capita)
Total

8.8

-4%

22%

20.0

0%

8%

6.0

19%

51%

6.7

-16%

20%

Metal ores

0.9

11%

58%

1.5

19%

54%

0.7

51%

73%

0.9

-19%

51%

Fossil energy
carriersa

1.7

-8%

14%

3.6

-6%

-4%

1.3

13%

38%

1.3

-18%

18%

2.5

-9%

8%

3.9

-6%

-4%

2.0

7%

15%

2.4

-22%

11%

-1%

27%

11.0

2%

10%

2.0

30%

86%

2.0

-2%

21%

Biomassb
Other mineralsc

3.7

Per unit of GDP (tonne/1,000 US$ )
d

Total

1.6

-26%

-14%

0.8

-33%

-24%

4.6

-35%

-32%

4.5

-21%

-26%

Metal ores

0.2

-15%

11%

0.1

-20%

9%

0.6

-18%

-23%

0.6

-24%

-8%

Fossil energy
carriersa

0.3

-29%

-19%

0.1

-37%

-32%

1.0

-38%

-38%

0.9

-24%

-28%

0.4

-30%

-24%

0.2

-37%

-32%

1.5

-42%

-48%

1.6

-27%

-32%

0.6

-24%

-11%

0.4

-32%

-22%

1.5

-29%

-17%

1.4

-8%

-26%

Biomassb
Other mineralscNotes: a. Crude oil, coal, natural gas, peat. b. Harvest from agriculture and forestry, marine catches, grazing. c. Industrial minerals, construction minerals. d. Constant 1995
US$. * BRIICS = Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa. ** RoW = Rest of the World

Table 1: Global resource extractions, by major groups of resources and regions
Source: (OECD 2008)

Metal ores

1999 reserves(tonnes)

1997–99 averageannual primary
production(tonnes)

0%

2%

5%

Aluminium

925 x 106

123.7 x 10

202

81

48

2.9

Copper340 x 10612.1 x 106

28

22

18

3.4

Iron

74 x 10126

559.5 x 10

132

65

41

0.5

Lead

6

64 x 1033,070.0 x 10

21

17

14

-0.5

Nickel6

46 x 103

1,133-3 x 10

41

30

22

1.6

Silver3

280 x 103

16.1 x 10

17

15

13

3

Tin

8 x 106

207.7 x 103

37

28

21

-0.5

Zinc

190 x 1067,753.3 x 103

25

20

16

1.9

a

Life expectancy in yearsb, at three growth rates in primary
productionb

Average annual
growth inproduction
1975–99 (%)

Notes: a. For metals other than aluminium, reserves are measured in terms of metal content. For aluminium, reserves are measured in terms of bauxite ore.
b. With current production and consumption patterns, technologies and known reserves.
c. Life expectancy figures were calculated before reserves and average production data were rounded. As a result, the life expectancies in years (columns 4, 5, 6) may
deviate slightly from those derived from reserves and average production (columns 2 and 3).

Table 2: Life expectancies of selected world reserves of metal ores
Source: OECD (2008)

cars, fuel cells and energy-efficient lighting systems.
(UNEP 2010a). With respect to the availability of critical
metals, the EU published in 2010 a list of 14 critical metals

254

or groups of metals that are important to its economy,
where supplies may be adversely affected by shortages
or political tension (Graedel 2009).

Resource scarcities – absolute or relative, actual or
perceived – impact the prices of commodities andmanufacturing inputs. Since the mid-2000s, commodity
prices have shown an increasing volatility, which ismainly owing to a series of energy, financial and foodcrises. Economic recession, in turn, reduces demandfor oil and can be followed by an equally drastic pricedecline that is further exaggerated by speculation. Thus,
price volatility can seriously inhibit long-term green
investment.
Since the early 2000s, other commodity prices, especiallynon-ferrous metals, have also been sensitive to shortterm factors such as the boom in China coupled withrecession in the US, depreciation of the US dollar (allcommodities are priced in US$) and speculative activity(Figure 5). In 2008, commodity prices exceeded previous
records from the 1970s. Higher prices induce investment
in alternatives, but excessive volatility tends to have theopposite effect, because it prevents rational planning.
It is important to differentiate between short andlong-term impacts and trends. When prices for natural
resources rise because long-term trends in demand
begin to exceed long-term trends in supply, or when
governments internalise some of the environmental
costs of natural resource extraction or use to business,the response of market participants can facilitate the

200

150

100

50

Jan 09Mar 10

Nov 07

Jul 05

Sep 06

May 04

Jan 02Mar 03

Nov 00Jul 98

Sep 99

May 97

Jan 95

Mar 96

Oct 92

Nov 930
Jun 90Not all industrial production sectors are equally affectedby these challenges, and not all materials are equallyimportant in terms of economic or environmental
impacts. This is illustrated by Figure 6 that combines
information about physical material use in Europe withthe life-cycle environmental impacts per kilogram ofmaterial (UNEP 2010b). Many minerals that dominate
consumption by mass are of marginal importancefor global warming, human toxicity, land use, oran integrated “Environmentally Weighted Material
Consumption” index (van der Voet 2005). Indeed,environmental impacts are dominated by fossil fuels,
their derivatives (such as plastics) and biotic materials(UNEP 2010b).

250

Aug 91

Against this background, resource-intensive sectors facea multitude of challenges. First, rapidly industrialising
economies are building their infrastructure rapidly andrequiring large amounts of resources. Competition overaccess to resources is likely to grow. Second, high quality
metal ores are gradually being depleted. This leads to use
of lower grade ores, which require much more energy
to extract its useful metal component. Third, at local
level resource extraction can have significant impacts
on ecosystems and landscape. Mitigating these impacts
through environmental policy or industry initiatives canalso increase the cost of extraction. Fourth, there arerisks of security of supply and price volatility.

Index number

Manufacturing

Figure 5: Commodity metals price index, June
1990-May 2010 (2005 = 100), includes copper,
aluminum, iron ore, tin, nickel, zinc, lead, anduranium price indices
Source: Index Mundi (2010)

adjustment process. Manufacturers are more likely
to adopt innovative technologies that can improve
resource efficiency. To the extent that this is not fully
sufficient to absorb the increase in costs, the selling priceof their products will increase, providing an incentive for
consumers to search for less costly substitutes in themarket place. Meanwhile, exploration and developmentof additional resources will occur, and markets will reacha new equilibrium at a higher price that stimulates
innovation.

2.2 The external costs ofindustrial air pollution
Most manufacturing processes cause, to varying degrees,
air, water and soil pollution – costs to society and theenvironment that need to be accounted, or internalised, andreduced. In this section, the focus is on air pollution. Besides
GHG emissions, industrial facilities release pollutants suchas particulate matter, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide,
lead, and chemicals that react to form ground-level ozone.
These hazardous air pollutants can cause health and safety
problems that are well known and degrade ecosystems.
Some studies have sought to quantify the health andother costs of air pollution. For instance, the cost of air
pollution in China, which was estimated in 2005 at 3.8 percent of GDP, was found to be mainly driven by increasing
industrialisation, which depends on coal-fired power plants
and is led by an increasing urban population (World Bank
2007; Wan You and Qi 2005). Chinese coal on averagecontains 27 per cent ash and up to 5 per cent sulphur.

255

Towards a green economy

% 100

90

80

70

CountryYear

GDP (per cent)

China

2008

1.16-3.8

European Union

2005

2

Ukraine

2006

4

Russia

2002

2-5

USA

2002

0.7-2.8

Table 3: Cost of air pollution from sulphur
dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and volatile organic
compounds as a percentage of GDP

60

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2008); Markandya and Tamborra (2005); Strukova etal. (2006); Bobylev et al. (2002); Mendelsohn and Muller (2007).
50

yields, impaired visibility, deterioration of man-madematerials, and diminished recreation services, although
the health-related damages constitute 95 per cent of thetotal (not counting GHGs). Another 2009 assessment,by the U.S. National Research Council (2009), found thatburning fossil fuels costs the USA about US$ 120 billion
a year in health costs, mostly because of thousands ofpremature deaths from air pollution.

40

30

20

10

0

Consumption
by mass

Globalwarming
potential

Land usecompetition

Human
toxicity

Environmentallyweightedmaterial
consumption

Plastic
Coal (heating and electricity in housing)Natural gas (heating and electricity in housing)
Crude oil (heating and electricity in housing)
Biomass from forestry (wood, paper and board)
Animal products (animal protein and fish)
Crops
Iron and steel
Other metals (zinc, lead, nickel, lead, copper, aluminium)
Minerals (glass, salt, concrete, ceramics, clay, sand and stone)

Figure 6: Relative contribution of material groups
to environmental problems (EU27 + Turkey)
Source: UNEP (2010b)

In the USA, damage from air pollution, mostly (95 percent) in the form of health costs, is estimated to amountto between 0.7 per cent and 2.8 per cent of GDP. Thisestimate depends on assumptions about the value oflife, as a function of age, and the relationship between
exposure and mortality (Mendelsohn and Muller 2007).
The USA data, taken from 10,000 locations, are consistent
with European data. In Europe, the greatest contributors
to emissions of particulate matter in 2000 were from theenergy and electric power sectors (30 per cent), roadtransport (22 per cent), manufacturing (17 per cent) andagriculture (12 per cent) (Krzyzanowski et al. 2005).
The cost estimates presented in Table 3 are based onhuman health effects, including premature mortality,
chronic illness, such as bronchitis and asthma, andseveral acute illnesses. Muller and Mendelsohn (2007)
also measure the damages from reduced crop and timber

256

The International Energy Agency (IEA) and theInternational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis(IIASA) have estimated the cost of control policies for
air pollution caused by the combustion of fossil fuels
to be US$ 190 billion in 2005, some of it paid and some
unpaid. This cost is projected to increase in a BAU
scenario by a factor of three by 2030, owing to higher
activity levels and increasingly stringent controls (IEA,
IIASA 2009). However, the avoided costs to health andthe environment are much greater, resulting in a highly
favourable balance of benefits and costs. In addition, thecosts of end-of-pipe pollution controls can be reduced
by cleaner production approaches in management,
cleaner raw material selection and cleaner technologies
that reduce emissions and integrate by-products into a
production value chain.
Air pollution and climate change are linked in several
ways, and they could be beneficially addressed byintegrated policy (Raes 2006). The analysis, using (IIASA)GAINS (Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollution Interactions
and Synergies) model, reveals that significant cobenefits on local air quality can be expected fromreduced Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) emissions
and that climate change mitigation measures would cut
SO2, NOx and particulate matter emissions at no extra
cost and reduce local negative health impacts from fineparticulate matter accordingly (IIASA 2009).

2.3 Hazardous substances and waste
Other significant environmental externalities at a
global scale include impacts associated with hazardousManufacturing
Location

Date

Cost (US$)

Number of fatalities and injured

Bhopal, India

03/12/1984

US$ 320 million in claims & compensation; US$ 10 million in economic, medical, social,environmental rehabilitation. However, the Indian government estimated the cost of the
Bhopal disaster at US$ 3.3 billion.

2,800 fatalities and estimated 170,000
long-term adverse health effects

Toulouse, France

21/09/2001€ 2 billion (environmental and social cost)

31 fatalities and 4,500 injured

North Sea

06/07/1988

US$ 3.4 billion (mostly clean-up cost)

167 fatalities

Gulf of Mexico

20/04/2010

US$ 6.1 billion (as of 09/08/2010), (containment, relief, grants to the US Gulf states,
claims paid, and federal costs); creation of a US$ 20 billion escrow account for clean-up
and other obligations.

11 fatalities (oil platform workers)

Chemical industry

Oil & Gas industry

Table 4: Examples of major industrial accidents and related economic and social costs
Source: Adapted from Mannan (2009), Grande Paroisse - AZF (2010), Kuriechan (2005) and BP (2010).

substances and waste. The waste sector produces
pressure on the environment through releases fromlandfills, domestic and commercial waste-water
treatment and industrial wastewater. According to
Havranek (2009), the waste management sector in the
EU in 2005 generated external costs of € 2.7 billion(assuming a low figure of € 21 per tonne of CO2eq
emissions). A large component of this was owing toemissions of methane. For comparison, in the same year,
the chemical industry in EU27 produced € 3.6 billion of
external costs attributed to GHG emissions, which is asimilar order of magnitude.
Releases of toxic substances cause health and safety
problems and ecosystem degradation. Some countries
have made significant progress by applying cleaner
production, product substitution and end-of-pipe
measures. In developed countries, toxic emissions havebeen one of the few success stories, with releases andexposure diminishing while production and GDP grew.
This is related to the fact that most toxic substances are
emitted as small mass flows, and for which substitution
or emission reducing measures are relatively easy toachieve. Production patterns have changed radically,
with industries based in developed countries focusing
on high-value chemicals and pharmaceuticals. The
manufacture of high production volume (HPV)
chemicals, on the other hand, has been progressively
migrating to developing countries, where regulatory
frameworks are often lacking and where costs for thesound management of industrial (hazardous) waste arerarely internalised.
In the absence of good waste management, the following
industries in particular may face toxicity challenges:■■ Textile industry and leather industry in relation to
dying and tanning products;■■ Paper and pulp industry in relation to bleachingprocesses and related water emissions;■■ Chemical and plastics industry, depending on thetype of chemicals produced; and■■ High-temperature processes such as in the cement
and steel industry, where the formation of by-products
or emissions of metals can be a problem.
Data provided by the International Council of Chemical
Associations indicate that worldwide chemical sales
in 2007 were € 1.8 trillion, a 28 per cent increase from2000 (Perenius 2009). Over 60 per cent of these sales
originated in Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries (€ 1.1 trillion).
The BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China,
and South Africa) countries account for another 20
per cent of these sales (€ 400 billion in 2007). Of thehundreds of thousands of chemicals on the market,
only a small fraction has been thoroughly evaluatedto determine their effects on human health and theenvironment. Some chemicals that have been used inlarge quantities for many years are now suspected ofcarcinogenicity or teratogenicity. Some of the most
toxic and dangerous chemical products (such as DDT)
have been phased out, at least in the OECD countries.
Adverse human health effects of chemicals include
acute and chronic poisonings, neurodevelopmental
disorders, reproductive/developmental disorders andcancer (WHO 2004). Preventing chemical pollution
at the source avoids generating harmful wastes andemissions while reducing and eliminating costs ofcleanup.
Gaps in applying standards for industrial safety andaccidents give historical examples of the risks andsocietal costs that can be associated with industrial
production, in particular where hazardous substances
are involved. International Labour Organisation (ILO)
global figures for 2003 indicated that there were about
358,000 fatal and 337 million non-fatal occupational
accidents in the world; an additional 1.95 million diedfrom work-related diseases. The number of deaths257

Towards a green economy

caused by hazardous chemicals alone was estimated at
651,000. When taking into account compensation, lostworking time, interruption of production, training andretraining, medical expenses, social assistance etc., theselosses are estimated annually at 5 per cent of the global
gross national product. Latest ILO estimates indicate thatthe global number of work-related fatal and non-fatal
accidents and diseases does not seem to have changed
significantly in the past ten years. One complication in
manufacturing and ship-building is the distribution ofoccupational safety and health (OSH) obligations in theprincipal contractor–subcontractor relationship (ILO
2009).

258

The cost of industrial accidents represents a great sourceof public and private expenditure and social distress.
Over the past three decades, a rough cost assessment of
only a few of the major industrial accidents worldwide
shows that a minimum of US$ 40 billion have beenspent on addressing the damages. If smaller incidents
are taken into account, the real economic cost is likely to
double, while deaths and injuries would be on the scaleof several hundreds of thousands. Some major incidents
are listed in Table 4. Clearly, there are global benefits
in human and environmental health associated withcleaner and safer industrial production, which has to bepart of a transition to green manufacturing.

Manufacturing

3 Opportunities – Strategic options
for the manufacturing sector

To what extent will green investments in efficiency havea more favorable payoff than conventional investments?
Big companies normally set their hurdle Rate of Returnon Investment (ROI) at around 25 per cent, pre-tax. Thereis overwhelming evidence of significant opportunities
for efficiency investments that yield much higher rates
of return, even under current economic conditions. The
economic opportunities increase dramatically at higher
carbon prices.

pressure associated with resource consumption from
economic growth. This will be easier to achieve to theextent that resource use itself becomes more efficient.
In recent decades, OECD countries have decreased
their extraction intensity per US$ of GDP, reflectingsome decoupling of primary resource extraction from
economic growth. This trend is expected to continue.
The main drivers are increased applications of morematerial-efficient technologies (technology effect),
shifts from the primary and secondary sectors towards
the service sector (structural effect), and associatedincreases in material-intensive imports (trade effect)owing to outsourcing of material-intensive production
stages to other world regions (OECD 2008). For the world
as a whole, of course, there is no trade effect because
one country’s imports are another country’s exports.
The decoupling of material use from GDP growth has beenless pronounced in fast-growing transition economies
that need to build infrastructure, which requires more
Index 1980=100

In its Vision 2050 report, the World Business Council on
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (2010) describes
a world in which the manufacturing industries follow
life-cycle approaches that enable dematerialisation andexpanded service systems. In a sustainable world of
about 9 billion people by 2050, a complete range of new
products and services is offered, based on high longevity,
low embodied water, as well as low-energy and material
content. This transition will not happen overnight, andit will require substantial investment. A major challenge
is one of transition in industrial production, to becomeless carbon and material intensive while at the sametime preserving jobs or reinvesting in completely new
employment opportunities. This is particularly relevant
for developing and emerging economies that currently
invest heavily in conventional production infrastructure.
Both at the country and industry sector level, improved
resource-efficiency and decoupling offers the opportunityof competitive advantage and a sustainable future.

225

200

175

150

3.1 Decoupling andcompetitive advantage
As indicated earlier, historical evidence shows thatdeclining energy intensity in industry and relative
decoupling have typically been offset by increases inenergy demand associated with higher levels of GDP.
In addition, there may have been additional demandfor energy as an input owing to a decline in its relative
price and to the increase in economic growth owing
to the gain in resource efficiency itself; the two effects
together are sometimes called the rebound effect.
Overall emissions, energy use and material use have kept
on growing despite lower emission, energy and material
use per unit output as seen in Figure 7 (Krausmann etal. 2009). Resource extraction per capita has been stable
or increasing only slightly. What economies world-wide
need is absolute decoupling of the environmental

125

100

75

50
1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Gross domestic product (GDP)Resource extraction
Population
Material intensity

Figure 7: Global Relative Decoupling trends
1980-2007

Note: This figure illustrates global trends in resource extraction, GDP, population andmaterial intensity in indexed form (1980 equals a value of 100).
Source: (SERI 2010)259

Towards a green economy
resources (in mass terms) than in economies with low
growth rates (Bleischwitz 2010). Similarly, the energyintensive industrial sectors are not equally affected.
The cement industry drives large material flows, but ofrelatively non-scarce resources such as limestone andclay. Iron ore and bauxite are not particularly scarce, andnear substitutes are available. The paper and pulp andthe natural fibre-based textile industry use renewable
resources where the challenge is to avoid using thembeyond the maximum sustainable yield. The challenges
for the electrical and electronic industry may be more
fundamental. High grade (>1per cent) and easy-torefine copper ores are becoming scarcer and low-gradeores need more energy in the extraction and refining
stages. Rarer metals such as silver, indium and tellurium
are mostly extracted from other metallurgical wastes.
One of the major effects of the globalised natureof the world economy is the increasing shift of the
manufacturing base from developed to developing
and transition economies. This means that associatedenvironmental damages from local pollution are also
shifting. Accordingly, decoupling energy use and CO2
emissions from GDP growth needs to be consideredin the international context, rather than in terms ofindividual countries (see OECD 2008a). The relationshipbetween Global Competitiveness Index ratings, material
productivity and the introduction of leading technology
strategies have been highlighted in recent researchby Bleischwitz et al. (2009, 2010). A correlation was
performed between resource productivity, Domestic
Material Consumption (DMC) and competitivenessdata by the World Economic Forum. Covering 26
countries, it showed a positive relationship between thematerial productivity of economies (measured by GDP
in purchasing power parity US$ per kg DMC) and theircompetitiveness index scores.
Improving the environmental efficiency of production
at the global level can occur through technology andknowledge transfer from developed economies or throughtechnology spillovers that occur as a result of international
investment and globalised supply chains. With demand
increasingly being driven from outside the advanced
economies, these transfers and spillovers have dual
benefits – not just reducing the extent of environmental
damage exported from developed countries, but also
helping developing economies shift to a more resourceefficient growth path (Everett et al. 2010).

3.2 Innovation in supply and demand
Making society more efficient with regard to the use ofenergy, water, land and other resources is a challengethat requires changes along the full chain of production
and consumption. Authors such as Von Weizsäcker et260

al. (1997, 2009) have suggested that one way to realise“Factor X”2 improvements in resource productivity would
be a radical change in end-use products, new ways of(e.g. shared) using products (e.g. sharing), and changes
in consumption habits. This includes considerationof concepts such as “sufficiency” and asking criticalquestions about the function and service of proposed
products.
It also requires a life cycle approach, which is what
the WBCSD (DeSimone and Popoff 1997) has pursued
in promoting the concept of eco-efficiency over thelast decade. This concept focuses on those resource
efficiency measures that also generate a positive rateof return to business on the required investments.
Eco-efficiency provides a graphic tool for combining
different measures, yet still has shortcomings in allowing
quantification and comparison based on empiricalindicators. The guidelines behind eco-efficiency
include reducing the material and energy intensity of
products, enhancing material recyclability, extending
product durability and increasing the service intensityof products. Eco-efficiency in manufacturing can bemeasured through indicators related to resourceuse intensity and environmental-impact intensity.
Considering its application at national level, UNESCAP(2009) has defined the following as key indicators for
manufacturing in the Asia Pacific Region:
Resource-use
intensity:

Environmental
impact intensity:

Energy intensity [J/GDP]
Water intensity [m3/GDP]
Material intensity [DMI/GDP]

CO2 intensity [t/GDP]
BOD intensity [t/GDP]
Solid waste intensity [t/GDP]

Considering the full life-cycle and chain of supply anddemand, Tukker and Tischner (2006) proposed a rangeof step-change measures along a full productionconsumption chain, and speculated about their factor
efficiency potential. Importantly, this reflects a fullvalue-chain perspective, one that reflects product andservice combinations as well as producer and user or
consumer challenges. The entry point in this chapter
is the upstream side and base industries such as steel
and iron, cement, chemicals, paper and pulp andaluminum – industries that supply primary materials forthe manufacturing of products such as cars, buildings
and refrigerators that end-users know from daily life.
Considering the full value chain can identify a range ofareas for innovation and green investment, including
product design and development (PD), material and2. “Factor X” relates to a factor 4 or 10 improvement in energy and resource
efficiency. Achieving factor X would in some cases require the applicationof disruptive new technologies. In addition, the concept of “exergy”
promoted by Ayres (2010) and others focuses specifically on “useful energy”(as opposed to static energy and mass) and efficiency as a ratio of useful
output compared to resource input.

Manufacturing
energy substitution (MES), process modificationand control (PM) and new, cleaner technologies andprocesses (CT). These become the building blocks ineither a supply or demand-side strategy for improving
resource efficiency in manufacturing.

establish new modes of production that have afundamentally higher material- and energy efficiency.
To start with, major savings potential in manufacturinglies in improving the resource efficiency of existingprocesses; andA supply-side strategy involves redesign and improving
the efficiency of processes and technologies employedin the major materials-intensive subsectors of the
manufacturing sector (ferrous metals, aluminum,
cement, plastics, etc.). On the other hand, if a green
economy means improving not only productivity but
also efficiency by a factor of four or more, a demand-sidestrategy is also required.

■■ Redesign systems, especially the transportation
system and urban infrastructure down-stream, to utilise
less resource-intensive inputs. The first target must be
to reduce the need for and use of automotive vehicles
requiring liquid fuels in comparison to rail-based masstransportation, bus rapid transit and bicycles.

A demand-side strategy involves changing thecomposition of demand, both from within industry
and from final consumption. This requires modifying
output, i.e. to use final goods embodying materials andenergy much more efficiently and/or to design productsthat require less material in their manufacturing. For
instance, the need for primary iron and steel fromenergy-intensive integrated steel plants can be reduced
by using less steel downstream in the economy (i.e. inconstruction, automobile manufacturing, and so on).
Design for dismantling is a key step in advancing re-use
and recycling of, for example, metals contained in theend-product.
The supply-side and demand-side approaches consist
mainly of the following components:■■ Re-design products and/or business models
so that the same functionality can be delivered with
fundamentally less use of materials and energy. This also
requires extending the effective life-time of complex
products and improving quality, by incorporating repair
and remanufacturing into a closed-cycle system;■■ Substitute green inputs for brown inputs wherever
possible. For example, introduce biomass as a source ofchemical feedstocks. Emphasise process integration andupgrade of process auxiliaries such as lighting, boilers,
electric motors, compressors and pumps. Practice goodhousekeeping and employ professional management;■■ Recycle internal process wastes, including wastewater, high temperature heat, back pressure, etc.
Introduce CHP if there is a local market for surplus
electric power. Use materials and energy with lessenvironmental impact, e.g. renewables or waste as
inputs for production processes. Advance recyclabilityof materials used and find or create markets for processwastes such as organics;■■ Introduce new, cleaner technologies and improvethe efficiency of existing processes to leapfrog andNote that these transitional changes will occur
automatically only to the extent that they are perceived
by business managers and owners to increase
competitiveness. Moreover, the manufacturing sectors
are intermediates, which means that what they produce
depends both on the availability and cost of raw materials
and on the demand from downstream sectors, final
consumers and governments. The latter can influencebusiness decision-making by introducing new standards
or subsidies. To ensure that a strategic transition tosustainable industrial production is realised in different
parts of the world, both public and private investment
in leap-frogging technologies would be highly desirable.
Despite technological advances, there will always besome inefficiency and waste. What is possible, however,is to use resources much more efficiently than it is used
now. There is plenty of room for doing so. The USA’s
economy today converts primary energy into useful work
– mechanical, chemical or electrical – with an aggregate
efficiency of 13 per cent (Ayres and Warr 2009; Ayres
and Ayres 2010). IEA data suggest that Russia, China andIndia remain less energy efficient than the USA (at leastin the industrial sectors) (IEA 2009b). Japan, the UK andAustria are more efficient, overall, than the USA (20 percent) (Warr et al. 2010). But this still means that morethan 80 per cent, or four-fifths, of the high quality energy
extracted from the earth is wasted. To cut that waste
by only a quarter or a third could produce significant
economic gains. From a macro-economic perspective,
this is an enormous opportunity.
Closed-loop, circular systems in manufacturing
Drawing on the principles of industrial ecology, closedcycle manufacturing is a particularly ambitious approachto supply-side innovation. This concept refers to an ideal
manufacturing system that maximises the useful life of
products and minimises the waste and loss of valuable andscarce metals. At a broader systems level, another versionof closed-cycle manufacturing is industrial symbiosis or
eco-industrial parks. They are modeled on the Kalundborg(Denmark) example, within which wastes from certain
manufacturing operations can be used as raw materials
for others. In Kalundborg an oil refinery that produces261

Towards a green economy
low temperature waste heat (warm water) is used forgreenhouses suppling organic raw materials for a drug
company that manufactures insulin. There is a coal-burning
power plant from which desulfurization wastes are used bya wallboard manufacturer (Ehrenfeld and Gertler 1997).
Although there have been a number of attempts to create
eco-parks – there are now over a hundred around the world– it has been hard to reproduce such synergies elsewhere.
One reason is the need for an eco-park to grow around afairly large (and long-lived) basic industry that generates
predictable wastes, with usable elements or componentsthat smaller operations next door can utilise. And while
policies should certainly promote the construction of
more green factories and clusters of green factories, agreater challenge in developing economies today is how
to retrofit, convert, and install more efficient and cleaner
processes in existing factories.
At the product level, closed-cycle manufacturing
achieves life-cycle efficiency by facilitating maintenanceand repair, reconditioning and remanufacturing, withdismantling and recycling at the end, in contrast to
today’s linear throw-away paradigm. The usual oneway flow of products from the factory to the salesroom
is changed to a two-way flow. If the useful life of all
manufactured products (and buildings) were to beextended by 10 per cent, the volume of virgin materials(except fuels) extracted from the environment would be
cut by a similar amount, other things being equal, andresource prices would tend to fall. This would eliminate
jobs for miners, but it would employ more people indownstream stages – especially repair and renovation
and recycling – and cut costs through the supply chain
all the way to final consumers, who would then havemore disposable income. It is important to recognisethat radical change is seldom painless. Schumpeter’sphrase “creative destruction” (1942) expresses this ideavery well. Extending product life may also cut the rateof technological improvement. The lifetime extension ofa product through increased reuse and recycling often
results in relatively higher energy consumption levels
because recent technological improvements have notbeen embodied in the reused products (such as cars andrefrigerators). Life-cycle assessment of many products
shows that most of the environmental pressure arises
from their use and disposal rather than from the direct
and indirect impacts of their production. The inability tocapture technological improvements is especially acutein the area of electric power generation, where toughnew source standards have inhibited the replacement ofold generating facilities.
Remanufacturing is also becoming increasingly
significant, particularly in areas such as motor-vehicle
components, aircraft parts, compressors, electricaland data communications equipment, office furniture,vending machines, photocopiers and laser toner262

cartridges. The Fraunhofer Institute (see UNEP et al.
2008) in Germany has calculated that remanufacturing
operations worldwide save about 10.7 million barrels ofoil each year, or an amount of electricity equal to thatgenerated by five nuclear power plants. They also savesignificant volumes of raw materials. In the USA, it has
been estimated that re-manufacturing is a US$ 47 billion
business that employs over 480,000 people (UNEP et al.
2008). In terms of employment and economic impact,
the remanufacturing industry rivals such giants ashousehold consumer durable goods, steel mill products,
computers and peripherals, and pharmaceuticals.3
Some companies are now introducing specialised
collection, sorting and dismantling plants aroundthe world, either to save spare parts or to produce
low-cost versions of their top-of-the line products.
This encourages product redesign to facilitate theprocess. Caterpillar is probably the world’s largest remanufacturer, with a global turnover of US$ 1 billion
and plants in three countries. About 70 per cent of atypical machine (by weight) can be re-used as such,
while another 16 per cent is recycled (Black 2008).
Large diesel engines are routinely re-manufactured.
Aircraft are essentially remanufactured continuously
by replacement and reconditioning of most parts otherthan the body and frame (which is why some DC-4 andDC-6 aircraft manufactured in the 1930s or 1940s werestill in use 50 years later.) Xerox and Canon, which began
remanufacturing photocopiers in 1992, are among thecompanies that have pushed this concept.
The major obstacle to re-manufacturing is thatstrategies for extending the useful life of manufactured
products depend upon active cooperation from original
equipment manufacturers (OEM). The OEMs have resisted
this approach to date. In fact, the current trend is exactly
the opposite: products are increasingly being madeas un-repairable as possible, so that old products are
discarded and usually sent directly to landfills. Anotherbarrier is the fact that most products are not sold directlyby their manufacturers or agents. This makes collection
and return difficult. Original equipment manufacturers
would have difficulty providing warranties for products
remanufactured by other firms. Also, some companies
are reluctant to market re-manufactured products incompetition with their own new machines. Instead,customers are encouraged to replace old, but still
functioning products with new ones. This problem is lessacute in product categories (such as computers) with
rapidly changing technologies, where new products
have much greater functionality than reconditionedor re-manufactured old ones. Most consumer productcompanies see repaired, renovated or remanufactured
3. For an analysis of over 7,000 remanufacturing firms in the USA, see
the database and research by Lund (1996) and Hauser and Lund (2003) at
Boston University, Available at www.bu.edu/reman/Manufacturing
products as directly competing with their new products
and will continue to do so unless legislation is enacted or
pricing differentials are introduced.
Three central components in the waste minimisation
hierarchy are the 3Rs: reduce, re-use and recycle (see theWaste chapter). Following repair and remanufacturing
to enable the re-use of products, recycling is a key stepin the closed manufacturing system. This can support
the use of the by-products of production processes,
whilst also providing solutions in the substitution of
inputs in manufacturing. The most important input
substitution in the metals industry per se is the use of
scrap in place of ore. In the US and Europe half or moreof the carbon steel production is now based on scrap.
Scrap is routinely sorted into grades, depending on thepresence of contaminants. Research on ways to separate
contaminant metals from the iron is needed, if only tofacilitate recovery of the chromium, zinc, copper and soon. Yet, surprisingly, the recycling rate for iron and steel
has dropped in recent years from a high of 60 per cent in1980 to 35 per cent in 2006. The IEA projections assume
that the decline will reverse and that a recycling rate ofaround 55 per cent will be achieved by 2050 (IEA 2009b).
However, a significantly higher rate may be achieved byappropriate policy interventions, including measures toadvance recyclability and design for dismantling.

waste heat from processes such as coke ovens, blast
furnaces, electric furnaces and cement kilns, especiallyfor electric power generation using combined heat andpower (decentralised CHP). Virtually all of these examples
are technically suitable for small combined heat andpower plants with paybacks of the order of four years,
providing only that the power can be utilised locally.4 The
pulp and paper industry has reported heavy investment
in CHP technology to reduce energy consumption, notingthat CHP installations allow savings of between 30–35
per cent of primary energy (UNEP 2006). Where CHP is
not an option, the next example of input substitution
is the use of waste fuel, such as biomass or municipal
waste.
On the demand side, numerous measures can reduce
absolute water use through efficiency and recycling
measures. Recycling waste water from a variety ofindustrial processes is increasingly important because of
the scarcity of fresh water in conjunction with growing
demand for water in many parts of the developing world,such as northern China and India. The world market forwater treatment in 2008 was US$ 374 billion, of which
US$ 70 billion was in the US alone. Half of this market
could be served by new modular systems using magnetic
separation technology, which has been successfully
applied to mining and industrial wastes as well as
municipal wastewater (Kolm et al.1975; Svoboda 2004).

Recycling is especially energy-efficient in the cases ofaluminum and copper. Recycled aluminum requires only
five per cent as much energy as primary production, but
the recycled product, which often contains alloying
elements, is not easy to roll into sheets or foil. Effective
ways to purify the recycled metal (and to recover thealloying elements) would be very valuable. In the caseof copper, a single tonne of metal requires the mining
and processing of anywhere from 100 to 300 tonnes ofore (depending on the country), so the recycled copper
requires much less energy than the virgin metal from ore(Ayres et al. 2003).

Water used in chemical wood pulping is mostly recycledinternally to recycle the chemicals. Metallurgical,
chemical, textile and other surface-finishing operations
generate polluted wastewater that must be treated before
it can be re-used. In the longer term, there are numerous
possibilities for reducing the need for water treatment
after use by making the processes more efficient or
cleaner. In particular, the need for industrial cooling water
can and should be reduced dramatically by introducing
co-generation of electricity to take advantage of hightemperature heat that is currently wasted.

One of the most important (and under-exploited) nearterm opportunities for improving energy efficiency inindustrial processes lies in recycling high-temperature

4. Under current rules in most countries, only electric power companies
can sell electricity. This means that the utilities are also monopolist buyers.
The price at which they are willing to buy electricity from other producers isoften too low to make the investment worthwhile.

263

Towards a green economy

4 Investment andresource efficiency
Making the investment decision to pursue green
manufacturing
opportunities
requirescarefulconsideration of real net benefits and longer term
consequences of decisions made today. This includes
consideration of research, development and design
options that enable users and consumers to move awayfrom the throwaway consumption paradigm. Sometechnology innovations hold potential for drastic gains
in resource efficiency, while others – such as carbon
capture and storage (CCS) – may bring more costs thanbenefits. The cases of energy and water resources display
the importance of having appropriate regulations
and pricing in place. The area of human resources andemployment highlights the importance of carefully
considering direct and indirect impacts, as well as therole of taxes, price elasticity and rebound effects.

4.1 Investing in material
and energy efficiency
To create a greener economy, many believe that
fundamental changes are needed – changes which somehave referred to as a social-technological transition (Geels
2002). The magnitude of the challenges is underscoredby the fact that current unsustainable systems (sociotechnical regimes) are locked-in by a multitude of
demand- and supply-side-related factors. Yet, if theconcept of closed-cycle manufacturing could be extended
to mass-market products such as cars, washing machines,
refrigerators and air-conditioners, the potential benefits
to society would be significant. Firstly, by extending
the average life-span of manufactured goods, theneed for extracting virgin materials is correspondingly
reduced. In the second place, repair, reconditioning, andremanufacturing are fairly labour-intensive activities,
requiring relatively little capital investment. Thus,
governments of developing countries have an interestin promoting imports of used goods that are capableof being remanufactured, not only in reducing global
GHG emissions and resource consumption, but also inmaintaining domestic employment and availability ofmodestly-priced goods for domestic consumption.
Most cleaner technology innovations will struggle toattract venture capital under current conditions, evenin industrialised countries. Venture capital firms arelooking for investment opportunities that offer highmargins and require low capital expenditures and264

low-cost testing of their market potential. Changing
this situation to encourage innovation, especially intransitional and developing countries, depends on theenabling conditions (section 5). Those innovations thathave attracted venture capital interest in recent years
are mostly related to the Internet or renewable energy.
While investment in core clean energy (including energy
efficiency) decreased in 2009, owing to the global
economic downturn, there was a record investment inwind power (UNEP SEFI 2010).
The field of electronics recycling is another promisingarea for research and development. Currently, there issome recycling of television sets to recover lead andglass, but e-recyclers mostly try to recover silver andgold, without recovering other scarce metals. New
processes exist for recovering liquid crystal, indium metaland glass (LCD) from discarded flat-panel TV screens(Black 2008). These LCD panels constitute an increasing
share of electronic waste, and the recovery process may
be profitable enough to justify significant investment
in a more structured approach to the electronic waste
recovery problem as a whole.
Design initiatives in these areas are clearly within thescope and in the interests of manufacturers, because
they contribute to competitiveness and cut costs.
However there is another type of design innovationthat is more directly relevant to overall resource
efficiency, while being less profitable to manufacturers
per se. This involves design changes to permit easierreconditioning, re-manufacturing and (finally) recyclingof scarce metals. For example, it is important to facilitate
the separation of electrical and electronic components
from structural components of appliances and vehicles.
This is important both to recycle rare metals (silver, gold,
platinum, indium, etc.) that are increasingly being usedin electronic products, and to reduce the extent to whichthese same metals (especially copper) become unwanted
contaminants of secondary (recycled) aluminum andsteel. Clearly, there is a huge opening for design-forreparability, re-manufacturability and recyclability, i.e.
for closed-loop manufacturing. In the case of used cars,
open international markets currently provide incentives
for material leakages that could be turned into business
opportunities by using closed-loop systems.
A 2010 report from the Greco Initiative Regional
Activity Centre for Cleaner Production (Greco Initiative)

Manufacturing
Countries

SectorEnergy-efficiency initiatives

ROI

Payback

CO2 savings

Bangladesh

Steel

Reparation of leaks and insulation of pipelines

260%

3.5 months

137 tons/year

China

Chemicals

Installation of a heat recovery system to recover heat for a CHP

96%

7 months

51,137 tons/ year

Ghana

TextilesInstallation of hi-tech de-scaling equipment for the boiler and steam
pipes. Water conservation measures resulted in comparable savings.

159%

4 months

Not available

Mongolia

CementImprovements in the dust control system (filter bags) using newelectric motors.

552%

2 months

11,007 tons /year

Honduras

Sugar

Replacement of steam turbines in the crushing mill with electricmotors, powered by CHP; surplus electricity sold to the gridNot available

1 yearNot available

See the following links accessed June 2010: http://www.energyefficiencyasia.org/, http://www.ghanaef.org/publications/documents/2savingenergyindustry.pdf
and http://www04.abb.com/global/seitp/seitp202.nsf/0/316e45d4d67ae21bc125751a00321e72/$file/Sugar+mill+case+study.pdf

Table 5: Examples of investment and environmental returns from energy-efficiency initiatives indeveloping countries
Source: Adapted from Energy Efficiency Asia UNEP, SIDA, GERIAP, Energy Foundation Ghana, ABB Switzerland

described the effects of applying many of the strategies
discussed here to a variety of manufacturing industries
in the Mediterranean region. The study found that withthe use of alternative machines and production input,
ROI can be substantial. In the automotive industry ROI
reached 250 per cent, in textiles 26 per cent, in chemicals
9 per cent, and in electronics 6 per cent, with payback
periods varying between 3.4 and 11.3 months. However,
the magnitudes of identified savings were not large. On
the energy-efficiency front, case studies from around theworld show similar levels of economic and environmental
benefits from energy-efficiency initiatives (Table 5).
The IEA (2008, 2009b) scenarios – aimed at realisingemission levels by 2050 that limits GHG concentrations to
450 ppm and average temperature rise to 2-3oC – imply
high expectations of both technological innovation
and regulation. It presents a BAU scenario that includes
regular resource- and energy-efficiency improvements,
implementation of best-practice technologies, andprofitable recycling and valorization options thatfirms can implement profitably under existing market
conditions5. The energy efficiency or carbon-reducing
measures presented in the BLUE scenario would be moredifficult to implement, and less likely to yield positive
returns on investment6. For example, the scenario
assumes the use of expensive forms of carbon-neutralelectricity, including power plants equipped with CCS toachieve almost two-thirds of the required reductions ofCO2. The IEA is frank in spelling out the cost implications,explaining that the drastic reductions in the BLUE
scenario would require the widespread use of regulatory
policy instruments, such as economic instruments, that
5. This includes resource-efficiency measures such as enhanced steel,paper and aluminum recycling, and the use of secondary fuels and solid
waste as secondary raw materials in cement kilns.
6. Unfortunately, IEA (2009a) does not provide information on whichenergy efficiency measures presented in the BLUE scenario can be
implemented with positive returns for industry.

would gradually increase the price of carbon to US$ 150
per tonne of CO2 by 2050.
The case of CCS shows the advantage of an integrated
resource-efficiency perspective, as opposed to pursuinginvestment decision-making focused on single measures(such as carbon emissions) at the cost of lower resourceefficiency and lower economic growth. CCS systems
involve capturing, liquefying and injecting CO2 deep into
the earth’s crust. CCS requires flue gases to be filteredand passed through a chemical process that dissolves the
carbon dioxide in another chemical, then compresses andliquefies the carbon dioxide so that it can be pumped or
shipped to a long-term storage site. The problem is thatCCS requires a lot of energy. CCS systems being considered
for cement plants today could double a current market
price of US$ 70 per tonne. In the case of electric power, a
500 megawatt power plant would need to use between 25
per cent and 40 per cent of its output to capture and store
the CO2 (Metz et.al. 2005). This would increase the numberof power plants needed to supply the same amount ofelectric power to the rest of the economy by a factor of 4/3
to 5/3, adding significantly to the cost of electric power.

4.2 Investing in water efficiency
Water scarcity and hence the costs and benefits ofreducing water scarcity are highly region-specific.
Overall, by 2030 there is expected to be a water gap
between potential demand and reliable supply (4,200
bio m3) of 40 per cent of potential demand (6,900 biom3). Industry is currently responsible for an estimated 10
per cent of global water demand, the energy sector foran equivalent amount and agriculture for 70 per cent.
The fraction used by industry will probably rise beyond
20 per cent in the next decades, in line with the growthof industrial production (Water Resources Group 2009;
OECD, 2007; World Bank 2008; UNESCO 2009).

265Towards a green economy
In some countries with high water stress, such as
Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey, it has been estimatedthat unsustainable use of groundwater now already
reduces GDP by 1-2 per cent (World Bank 2007). For
these countries alone, this would imply a GDP loss ofaround US$ 10 billion. This report refrains from making
extrapolations on a global scale owing to the strong
regional character of the water gap problem. But since
the physical water gap has to be closed, the question is
how this can be done most cost-effectively.
The Water Resources Group (2009) has done probably
the most comprehensive study globally into cost curves
for measures that could close the water gap in four
regions (China, India, South Africa and the Sao Paolo
area in Brazil). Total costs of all measures (including inother sectors as industry) to close the water gap are
US$ 5.9 billion in India, US$ 21.7 billion in China, US$ 0.3
billion in Sao Paulo and negative in South Africa. These
numbers typically represent 0.5 per cent or less of GDP.
The measures to be taken in the industries examined inthis chapter show a mixed picture. In India, measures
to close the water gap have to be taken predominantly
in agriculture and to a lesser extent in industry. Most
water conservation measures technically possible inindustry would yield a positive social benefit-cost ratio.
However, their commercial profitability at the enterpriselevel depends upon water-pricing policies. In China,
the paper and pulp, steel and textile industries arewell positioned to enhance water efficiency at a profit
for themselves, whereas the picture is unclear in South
Africa. The findings for the textile industry in China arein conformity with anecdotic case studies Turkey, whereindustrial users also pay for water supply and treatment,
revealing a payback period of 3-5 years (Kocabas et al.,2009). However, in South Africa such investment would
not seem to be profitable for industry because users do
not pay a sufficiently high percentage of the costs ofwater supply and treatment.
Steel production facilities are often situated close to
the ocean for shipping purposes and can use seawaterfor cooling purposes. A subsidiary of Arcelor in Brazil
uses seawater for 96 per cent of total water used for its
steel manufacturing. In South Africa, the proximity of a
RAMSAR wetland has caused Saldanha Steel to build azero-effluent plant, showing that it is possible for the
steel industry to achieve zero water pollution levels (VonWeizsaecker 2009).
Improved monitoring of water use through emerging
water accounting methods is an area where
manufacturing companies can learn from agrifood
industries. The Waterfootprint Network has highlighted,
however, that the diversity of industrial products, thecomplexity of manufacturing production chains and266

differences between countries and companies makes
it more realistic to determine average amount of waterused for industrial products per unit of value (e.g. 80 litres
per US dollar) rather than per unit or by the weight of the
product.7 Faced with unpredictable climate conditions,manufacturing industries are starting to investigate
this more closely. In a benchmark survey of reportingon water use by a hundred multinational corporations,
CERES (2010) found that 10 of the 15 chemical companies
examined disclosed market opportunities related to
products intended to save water or improve water
quality. Four companies disclosed new investments inresearch and development (R&D) to bring more water
efficient products to the market. For example, Dow
Chemicals reported on the construction of a new Water
Technology Development Center to support its goal ofdriving a 35 per cent reduction in the cost of water reuseand desalination technologies by 2015.

4.3 Investing in a transition
to green jobs
The industries analysed in this chapter employ morethan 70 million workers8. During recent years these
sectors have exhibited differing employment trends.
Iron and steel, chemicals, pulp and paper and cement
sectors have observed stagnating or declining levelsof employment. Conversely, electrical and electronic
products and textiles have experienced an expansion in
their employment levels.
The manufacturing industries face serious deficits indecent work. From shortcomings related to occupational
health and safety to rising informality, various
dimensions of decent work are compromised. For
example, operations in the iron and steel industry may
expose workers to a wide range of hazards or conditions
that could cause incidents, injury, death, ill health ordiseases. The ship-breaking industry in Asia, a major
supplier of recycled steel, is illustrative of poor healthand safety conditions. In the textile sector, the needfor greater flexibility is the root cause of relocations, agreater reliance on sub-contracting arrangements andconsequent instability of employment.
Greening the manufacturing sector entails changes
in the level and composition of jobs. In the metals
value chain, for instance, significant green job creation
opportunities are expected from the use and recyclingof valuable byproducts and scraps. On the other hand,
7. The Waterfootprint Network has calculated industrial water uses that
range from nearly 100 litres per US$ in the USA to 20-25 litres per US$ in
China and India, Available at www.waterfootprint.org/
8. According to the ILO, the textiles industry employs 30 million workers;
electric and electronic products 18 million; chemical industries 14 million,
iron and steel 5 million, pulp and paper 4.3 million, aluminum 1 million, andcement 850,000. All figures are approximations.

Manufacturing
efficiency improvements in manufacturing tend to
reduce the need for workers in the same industry unlessthere is a resulting increase in demand (rebound). Whilethe impact of greener practices on employment should
not be overestimated, the empirical evidence supports
positive effects of green practices on jobs. Direct effects
of greening options may be neutral or small, but theindirect effects could be much larger (Lutz and Giljum2009). This indicates that the economy would gain,
especially in employment terms, from the introductionof greener production systems (Box 1). It must be notedthat technological innovations are typically laboursaving and have often been accompanied by job losses.
After significant restructuring in the last century andincreased automation and computerization in recent
years, metals manufacturing is no longer the source ofjobs it once was. Business-as-usual projections for the
steel industry in Europe and the USA suggest job lossesof 40,000-120,000 over the next two decades, faced withgrowing competition from Asia where production costs(wages) are lower. A BAU scenario in a study on climate
action by the European Trade Union Confederation(ETUC et al. 2007) projected that up to 2030, thede‑localisation of 50 to 75 MT of steel outside the EU, orthe equivalent of 25- 37 per cent of current production, ispossible. This would have an impact of 45,000 to 67,000
direct job losses, to which 9,000 to 13,000 outsourced
direct jobs are to be added – resulting in a total loss of
54,000 to 80,000 jobs directly related to production. In
an alternative scenario, where European authorities andindustry were assumed to pursue a low carbon strategy,
it is estimated that 50,000 direct jobs, internal andoutsourced, could be saved in the European iron andsteel industry. This strategy would involve investment in
R&D, installing more efficient technologies and applying
a tariff on steel imports based on carbon content, thus
enabling steel production by low carbon processes to becompetitive.
Similarly, the capital intensive aluminium industry
cannot be expected to be a major source of green jobs.
The same applies to the less labour-intensive cement
industry, where the introduction of more energyefficient plants in major producing countries such as
China and India will lead to fewer workers required there
as well. In this scenario, greening becomes a criticalfactor for competitive advantage (delivering low carbon
products) and job retention rather than job generation.
Against this background, secondary production(recycling), therefore, becomes a proxy for a greener
industry (UNEP et al. 2008). This requires appropriate
processing equipment and recovery systems, supported
by effective government regulations. Japan has largely
abandoned domestic primary production and switched
to secondary production and imports. In the EU,

secondary production of aluminum provided 40 per centof total output by 2006. The world’s largest producer ofaluminum, China, is increasing its secondary production
and faces shortages in availability of scrap metals. In thecases of India and Brazil, which has the highest recovery
rate in the world for aluminum cans, endemic poverty isa key factor in driving recycling. This raises the challengeof ensuring decent work in an industry (recycling) where
work can be dangerous, unhealthy and poorly paid.
Experience from the consumer electronics industry,
producing products with increasingly short life-cycles,
has shown how a growing problem of e-waste – going
to destinations such as China, India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh – results in environmental and healthproblems for both workers and society (owing to heavy
metals and organic contaminants ending up in water andthe food chain). While recycling is of great value in termsof resource conservation, it can entail dirty, undesirable
and even dangerous as well as unhealthy work.
In the metals value-chains, there are significant jobcreation opportunities to be found in the use andrecycling of valuable byproducts and scraps. Around 21
million tonnes of ferrous slags were recovered from ironand steel mills in the USA in 2005 (van Oss 2006). This
provided employment for over 2,600 people. Assuming
comparable labour productivities in other countries,
extrapolating USA data to other countries suggests thatslag recycling worldwide might employ some 25,000
people (UNEP et al. 2008). Recycling of steel itself saves
up to 75 per cent of the energy needed to produce virginsteel. In sectors such as the automotive industry andconstruction, steel recycling rates can reach up to 100
per cent. Less developed recycling systems and related
infrastructure in developing countries result in lower
recycling rates. A report by UNIDO (2007) has put theshare of secondary (recycled) steel at 4 per cent in India,
10 per cent in China and 25 per cent in Brazil.
In the pulp and paper industry, where modernised andmore efficient plants require fewer workers, recyclingis the fastest growing source of substitute as well as
new, green employment (UNEP et al. 2008). Recycling islabour-intensive and creates more jobs than incinerationand land filling. This comes in addition to major savingsin GHG emissions and landfill waste avoided. Paper
comprises about a third of all municipal solid waste.
Paper waste, growing faster than any other material incountries like China, is driven by increasing population
growth, urbanisation and consumption patterns. For
all materials considered here, studies have shown thatrecycling is preferable to landfills and incineration
not only on an environmental basis but also since it
creates more jobs. Related regulations on, for example,
packaging will also impact job creation in the recycling
industry.

267

Towards a green economy

Box 1: Steel production with higher components of recycled materials.
Direct and indirect impacts on jobs. Estimation for the EU27:
In a 2007 study (European Commission 2007), GHK
Consultants evaluated the economic significance ofthe environment in terms of employment, output andvalue added associated with the range of activities
that make use of, or contribute to, environmental
resources in the EU27. Input-output tables for each
Member State were used to estimate the indirect andhence total economic impacts of defined activities
that are linked to environmental resources. The
study also considered policy interventions directed
to improve resource efficiency. One of the policy
scenarios examined assumes a switch of 10 per centby value in raw material inputs to steel production
from virgin materials to recycled materials. As aresult of the intervention, positive total impacts arereported for output and employment. The results
can be summarised as follows:
The initial direct impact is neutral as the reductionin output from one sector is met by an increase in
output from another sector. However, the net indirect(including induced) impact of this substitution leads

to an increase in output of nearly € 197 million andan extra 1,781 jobs. Adding the direct and indirect
effects indicates that this substitution would add €197 million of output and 3,641 (1,860 direct and
1,781 indirect) jobs.
The net positive impact on jobs and output is mainly
owing to the supply-chain effect of the recycledmaterials sector. The recycled materials sector uses
inputs from many other sectors, thus creating morejobs and wealth. If the substitution were to lead to anincrease in the costs to the steel sector – since inputsof recycled materials cost more than virgin materials– this would be reflected in the cost of steel andpaid by users of steel. Output and profits of the steel
sector would be expected to fall due to higher costsof steel products. The ability to pass costs on to users
will depend on factors such as the price elasticity ofdemand for steel. According to parameters of themodel used, the steel sector could pass on 45 percent of its unit costs to its customers and would
have to absorb the rest as reduced profits.
Output (million Euros)

Jobs (FTE)

Virgin material sector: loss of output and jobs

-489.0-4,092.0

Recycled material sector: gain in output jobs

489.0

5,952.0

0.0

1,860.0

Virgin material sector: fall in demand for inputs and subsequent fallin output from suppliers to the virgin material-83.0-753.0Recycled materials sector: Increase in demand for inputs andsubsequential increase in demand from various sectors

280.0

2,534.0

Net direct impact (2)197

1,781.0

Total impact (3)=(1)+(2)197.0

3,641.0

Direct impacts

Net direct impact (1)Indirect impacts

Industries such as steel and aluminum can expect growing
demand from new markets in the form of clean-techsuch as solar technologies, being an important sourceof materials and components required for these. These
potentials can be identified by considering industries
not in isolation, but as part of a broader value- chainthat contains possible hidden economic opportunities.
Following this approach, a study by Gereffi et al. (2008) in
the USA shows the example of how solar manufacturing
can replace jobs lost in automotive manufacturing.
Infinia Corporation has developed a concentrating solardish system specifically designed to be mass-produced
by Tier 1 and Tier 2 auto manufacturers in the USA. Infinia

268

included US auto suppliers from the very beginning in
product development and design. The product can be
manufactured on existing auto production lines whichhave high surplus production capacity. Infinia estimateseach unit of auto production capacity can be retooled to
produce 10 units of their Solar Power System, producing
120,000 MW of solar capacity and securing as many as
500,000 manufacturing jobs. In cases like these, wherecertain jobs are potentially replaced with jobs in anothersector, calls have emerged for a “fair and just transition”
in which those harmed by the changes are adequately
assisted and the new opportunities created shared by
specific groups of worker constituencies.

Manufacturing
As suggested by the US auto industry case, creating
new job opportunities may lie in the introductionof new technologies, looking beyond just efficiency
improvements, and considering possibilities that lie
in diversification and in the value chains that provide
green technologies such as solar and wind power. The
IEA estimates that for every US$ billion invested in cleanenergy technology, 30,000 new jobs will be created.
As indicated by Martinez-Fernandez et al. (2010) thesefigures must be dealt with cautiously, without ignoring
job losses and social stress that will go with a period oftransition.
Remanufacturing and recycling of scarce metals provide
primary opportunities in the manufacturing sector
per se. Significant opportunities may also lie in thearea of industrial symbiosis (new products from oldprocesses), highlighting also the importance of broader
systemic (cross-sectoral) impacts as considered in themodelling (see next section) done for this report. Public
policies, such as extended producer responsibility or
returnable deposits, can help to promote closed cycle
manufacturing and extend product life cycles, thereby
saving resources and creating more jobs in maintenance,
repair, remanufacturing and recycling. Collection andsorting of used or end-of-life products (reverse logistics)
could be a significant employer. Shifting taxes awayfrom labour on to waste emissions and/or materials
extraction could also be an effective way of creating
more jobs by cutting labour costs vis a vis direct energy
costs, or capital costs.

4.4 Growth and rebound – lessons
for developing markets
The eventual advent of peak oil means that the supplyof cheap oil and gas cannot be expected to continue inthe future. Future economic growth will depend morethan in the past on technological progress and capital
deepening because growth in the world labour force is
projected to slow gradually. The rate of energy efficiency
increase has been slowing down since the 1960s. An
acceleration of technological progress vis-a-vis resource
efficiency seems possible, but it is unlikely to happen
without an unprecedented global effort.
Future economic growth is expected to be driven by
emerging countries, led by China and India. However,they are expected to shift away from their current
emphasis on export-oriented growth to more domestic
demand-driven growth, as growth of the labour force andrural-urban migration slows, leading to wage increases,
and as social safety nets are put in place or strengthened.
Increased consumption relative to savings will reduce
global imbalances, but their GDP growth rates will also

slow. The greatest resource-efficiency effort is required
in weaker developing country economies where most of
the population increase will take place, and where theeconomic and social impacts of resource scarcity andcommodity price volatility will probably be most severe(Shin 2004).
Economic growth is evidently the primary means of
reducing global poverty, although it has a less direct
impact on inequality. Increased demand from urbanising
populations for products and services and productivity
growth will be the basic drivers of economic growth.
Increased resource efficiency can be expected to
explain part of the future growth in productivity. This is
the reason why some point to a likely rebound effectusually on the basis of historical examples and evidenceof the Jevons paradox– and question the extent to whichinvestment in efficiency will really cut resource use.
There is little doubt that technological innovations–byincreasing efficiency, cutting the cost of basic materials
and energy, and by increasing labour productivity–havebeen the main drivers of economic growth in the past.
Lower cost of inputs generates increased demand forexisting goods or for new products and services that did
not exist previously.
There is not just one rebound channel or mechanism,
but several, which include: more intensive use ofenergy-consuming equipment by current users becauseof a higher energy efficiency and thus a lower effectiveenergy cost; purchase of larger units or units with moreenergy-consuming functions/services and consequently
more energy use (e.g. vehicles with air-conditioning);
more energy- and resource-efficient technologies diffuse
to new sectors and applications (including households),
which partly undoes savings resulting from per-unit
improved efficiency; re-spending of money savings
owing to energy conservation on other energy-intensive
goods and services (income effect); creation of new
demand (i.e. new users) owing to a lower market priceof energy if initial energy savings are large; and diffusionof more energy-efficient general purpose technologies
like batteries or computers (Van den Bergh 2008, 2011).
These examples all depend ultimately upon price or cost
reductions owing to efficiency gains. However, the next
few decades are almost certainly going to experiencesignificant energy prices increases, once the costs of
CO2 abatement have been set at levels sufficiently
high to stabilise atmospheric CO2 and have been fullyinternalised to users. In this case, greater take-up of more
efficient technologies will help to abate the otherwise
negative impacts on economic growth resulting fromhigher energy prices. Yet energy-efficiency proposals
cannot rely on higher oil prices as such, with others
alternatives like coal available. This reality underlines theneed to have appropriate regulatory policies in place.

269

Towards a green economy

5 Quantifying theimplications of greening
5.1 Business-as-usual trends
Summarising findings from the Millennium Institute’s
T21 model for investment scenarios up to 2050, we startwith BAU in manufacturing. The IEA projects that under
all scenarios, GDP will quadruple between 2010 and
20509 and manufacturing (as defined for purposes of thischapter) will contribute 27.6 per cent of GDP and 24.2 percent of global employment in 2050. Yet, if peak oil occurs
sooner than the IEA assumes, the global economic growthrate may be much lower than foresaw by the IEA (2009).
Heavy reliance on energy and manufacturing industries
account for one-third of global energy use and 25 percent (6.7 Gt) of total world emissions, 30 per cent of whichcomes from the iron and steel industry, 27 per cent from
non-metallic minerals (mainly cement) and 16 per centfrom chemicals and petrochemicals production. CO2
emissions from fossil-fuel combustion in the industrial
sector totaled 3.8 Gt in 2007, a 30 per cent increasesince 1970. They are projected to continue increasing toreach 5.7 Gt in 2030 and 7.3 Gt in 2050 in the BAU case,primarily owing to increased consumption of coal.
The amount of water withdrawal for industrial
production is expected to increase from 203 km3 in 1970
to 1,465 km3 in 2030 and 2,084 km3 in 2050. Industrial
water as a share of total water demand is expected toincrease from 9.4 per cent in 1970 to 22 in 2030 and 25.6
per cent by 2050.

5.2 Trends under a green
investment scenario
The Millennium Institute’s T21 model uses IEA estimates
selectively (among others) to simulate what the economywide effect of investments in the greening of sectors
would be, using indicators such as industrial production
and GDP growth, employment, resource consumption,
and CO2 from fossil-fuel use (Figure 8). These results
9. The IEA economic model is typical of neo-classical growth models, inassuming that growth can and will continue at historical rates regardlessof the availability or price of energy. This assumption has been strongly
challenged by the econometric work of Ayres and Warr (Ayres et al. 2004,
2009a), who argue that growth is actually proportional to the output of“useful work” by the economy as a whole. Useful work is the product ofenergy consumption times conversion efficiency.

270

are presented in this section, covering six industry subsectors: steel, textile aluminum, leather, paper and pulp,
and chemical and plastics products. Other industrial
sectors are covered in the broader and aggregatedindustrial macro sector, presented in the modelling
chapter. Energy intensive industries such as cement,
the non-metallic mineral products and electrical andelectronic products sub-sectors are not disaggregatedin the model owing to lack of data.
In the T21 green economy model, the green investment
scenario G2 in the industry sector assume the allocationof 3 per cent of the total additional green investment10
to improvements in industrial energy efficiency. Thistranslates into US$ 79 billion per year on average
between 2010 and 2050. Investments are allocated toboth the broader industrial sector and to the selected
subsectors) in more efficient, low carbon, development.11
Faster growth, all else being equal, translates into higher
demand for basic materials, resulting in higher energy
demand and generation of greater CO2 emissions in theindustrial sectors.
Results of the simulation indicate that investing in
the industry sector reduces energy consumption andemissions. This, in turn (other things being equal) helps
to reduce the price of fossil fuels and yields higher valueadded and employment (both within the industrial sectors
analysed and across the economy). The total industrial
employment is projected to be about 1.04 billion (people
employed) in the G2 scenario (21 per cent of overall
employment across all sectors) in 2050, 2.4 per centlower than in BAU2. Concerning employment in the six
manufacturing sectors analysed in more detail, the total
number of jobs is 109 million in the G2 scenario in 2050,
15 per cent more than in BAU2 (Figure 9). The change (netreduction) in total employment is driven by the interactionof several factors: (1) higher demand for the industries
analysed –increasing employment (the dominating factor
making employment rise in the energy intensive sectors
studied in more detail); (2) higher efficiency and capitalintensity (as opposed to labour intensity, also due to thefact that running capital is cheaper in G2, for instance
10. Additional green economy investments worth 2 per cent of GDP for G2.
11. This investment is estimated using the industrial CO2 abatement cost
published by the IEA in the WEO 2009 but with limited investment in CCS.
See Modelling chapter.

Manufacturing
due to lower energy costs) – reducing employment; and(3) higher productivity of work (driven by higher life
expectancy and access to social services in G2). However,
our calculation does not include potential employment
creation from energy efficiency improvements (which isthe case for end-use in the residential and commercial
sectors), due to the lack of relevant literature.

At the industry level, the avoided energy consumption
averages 52 per cent by 2050 – comparing G2 to BAU2
– (or 52 per cent relative to BAU2), resulting in avoided
costs of up to US$ 193 billion relative to BAU 2 per year,
on average, between 2010 and 2050 depending on theindustry considered12. The chemical and plastics sector
provides the greatest opportunity, with a potential of
US$ 193 billion relative to BAU2 in yearly avoided energy
costs. Steel follows with an average US$ 115-136 billion
potential savings per year. Paper and pulp saves US$ 37
billion, textiles US$ 17 billion and leather US$ 8 billion.
Aluminum is the least promising, with US$ 44 billion of
yearly avoided energy cost in the G2 case. The above
estimates are only proposed as examples, based on
an assumed investment of US$ 37.6 billion per year on
average between 2011 and 2050 (Figure 11).

CCS (energy
and process)
14

Energyefficiency
16
Electricity
demandreduction
9

Figure 8: Contribution to CO2 reductions fromindustry per type of measure – IEA model (2009b)
Adapted from: Tukker and Tischner (2009)

120

100

80

60

The model also assumes the same cost per tonne ofemissions abatement for all industries, although inreality they rely on very different technologies. But theG2 model runs provide some insight into the aggregatedpotential opportunity cost of investment in low carbon
technologies and efficiency improvements.

40

The average total cost of emissions in the BAU andgreen economy scenarios (based on IEA projections)would be US$ 629 billion (BAU2) and US$ 380 billion(G2). Assuming an emissions cap-and-trade mechanismwith carbon prices aligned with the recent US domestic
proposal, and no free allowances, the green economy
investment would yield US$ 264-US$ 249 billion per year
on average between 2011 and 2050 in avoided costs
relative to corresponding brown scenarios (or US$ 230US$ 195 billion from the BAU case).

0

12. Avoided costs are not pure economic gain, since they imply
disinvestment and disemployment in the traditional energy sectors (theinverse of rebound).

Fuel swiching
11

Electricity
supply side
measures50

Millions (person)

The green investment will lead to a considerable energy
efficiency improvement by 2050, practically decouplingenergy use and economic growth, particularly in themost energy-intensive industries. The improved energy
efficiency is projected to mitigate total energy andprocess-related CO2 emissions in the industrial sector by
51 per cent (3.7 Gt in the G2 case) by 2050, curbing thetrend of growth as of 2025. Total emissions from the six
selected manufacturing sectors would also decline to 1.3
Gt in the green case, from 2.7 Gt in the brown alternative(BAU 2) - (Figure 10).

BLUE high-demand 2050 (%)

20

BAU

BAU2

G2

Chemicals and plastic
Paper and pulp
Leather
TextileAluminium
Iron and steel

Figure 9: Employment per manufacturing sector
by 2050 in G2 and BAU scenarios (person per year)
Source: IEA (2009)

271

3

Billions (US$/year)

Billions (tCO2 /year)

Towards a green economy

2,5

2,000

1,500
2.0

1,5

1,000

1
500
0,5

0

0

BAU

BAU2

G2

BAU2

Chemicals and plastic

Chemicals and plastic

Paper and pulp

Paper and pulp

Leather

Leather

TextileTextileAluminium

Aluminium

Iron and steel

Iron and steel

Figure 10: Energy-related CO2 emissions per
manufacturing sector by 2050 in G2 and BAU(tCO2/year)
Source: IEA (2009)

It is worth repeating that the necessary simplificationsin the model (indeed, any model) result in simulated
outcomes that may be quite different from reality,
inasmuch as they are unable to take into account avariety of cause-effect chains unrelated to the assumed
investment-growth-employment relationships. However,
the optimistic results of the simulation are realistic,at least in magnitude. The existing global economic
system, and especially its industrial component, hasbeen built upon a base of under-priced fossil energy
and other ecosystem services. This has enabled grossly
wasteful production and consumption practices inmany parts of the world. For several reasons, the priceof energy is probably going to rise significantly in the
future. This will induce everyone in the system to seekenergy-conserving products and services. The ultimate
effect will be to enable existing goods and services to

272

BAU

G2

Figure 11: Energy costs per manufacturing sector
by 2050 in G2 and BAU scenarios (US$/year)
Source: IEA (2009)

be produced with much less energy. Whether increased
efficiency will fully compensate for higher costs (thuspermitting the same amount of economic growth ormore) remains to be seen in practice, but a double
dividend potential may well exist and is illustrated in theG1 and G2 scenarios.
Recent analysis for the US provided an assessment of
the economic impact of the climate-energy legislation(APA-ACELA) pending in the US, together with a version
with enhanced energy efficiency features, as comparedto the reference forecast BAU in the 2010 International
Energy Outlook, published by the Energy Information
Administration (US, DOE). It covers the period 20132030. Its results tend to confirm that the results by theMillennium Institute reported here, especially as regards
employment, are forecast accurately.

Manufacturing

6 Enabling conditions for a green
transformation in manufacturing
The manufacturing sector can make a significant
contribution in greening national economies byproducing goods that are more resource-efficient andhave lower environmental impacts over their life-cycles.
This applies, in particular, to the highly resource-intensive
value chains such as metals and car manufacturing.
But for the manufacturing industries to make thistransition, they need to receive the appropriate policy
and price signals. Under certain conditions it also needs
institutional support from governments, in particular
ensuring that supportive investments in physicalinfrastructure and education are sufficient to enable atransition that requires new systems and skills.
The past several decades have witnessed a major
restructuring of the global economy, with theglobal manufacturing industry base shifting toward
developing countries and emerging economies, anddeveloped countries becoming ever more serviceoriented. Globalization through increased crossboundary trade and investment flows is driving thisrestructuring, along with technological and associatedorganizational changes. This transition process, driven
by global factors of production and markets rather thanlocal development factors, has resulted in significant
capacity gaps in developing and transition economies
in managing the structural transformation of theireconomy on a more sustainable basis. This situation is ahandicap for small enterprises to adopt more resourceefficient technologies as they face growing demand
to meet the new standards required to market theirproducts through global supply chains.
With this background in mind, this section on enabling
conditions focuses on actions that mainly governments
can take to help induce the transition to green
industrial production both through incremental andtransformational changes. It is a transition that faces
drivers such as resource scarcities and rising energy
costs as well as barriers such as inefficient monopolies,
outdated regulations that restrict new technologicalapproaches and principle-agent conflicts. It is atransition in which, for example, power monopolies
need to be challenged by government support for
decentralised energy production and investment insmart grids that saves electricity transmission losses. It isalso a transition in which governments need to consider
the integrated resource efficiency perspective, avoiding
technology policies (the example of Carbon Capture andStorage) that focus on a single measure (such as carbon
emissions) at the cost of increased fossil fuel extraction,
lower resource-efficiency and lower economic growth.
Before reflecting on appropriate instruments for action,
two key policy priorities for greening manufacturing
are recommended and the promotion of closed cycle
manufacturing and related life cycle approaches withsupportive recovery and recycling infrastructure,and regulatory reform to enable factor efficiency
improvements in energy use, for example through theintroduction of co-generation and CHP technologies
and the feed-in of decentralised power generated byuse of renewables. The latter needs to be supported byinvestment in smart grids and approaches such as feedin tariffs and time-of-day pricing (see Energy chapter).

6.1 Policy priorities
Closed-cycle manufacturing and life cycle approaches
Efforts to promote resource efficiency at the product,
production process and company level need to becomplemented by resource-efficiency innovations at
the industrial cluster and systems level. At the company
level, this starts with approaches such as eco-design,
life-cycle management and cleaner production. At theindustry and systems level, this implies innovations
such as the greening of supply chains and clusteringof industries in a given economic zone to become aplatform for resource efficiency through optimised
resource flows between industries. The industrial parksof the future could be eco-parks to maximise industrial
symbiosis and secure green jobs.
The move toward a closed-cycle manufacturing throughremanufacturing and reprocessing of post-consumption
products and materials that are currently thrown away
as a waste, represents an important opportunity forthe transition toward a green economy. Two broad
categories of post-consumption waste that could be
the focus in such a transition are e-waste and materials
such as metals, glass, plastics and paper products. The
latter category constitutes the most diverse groupof industrial products, which are already a target ofsome degree of recycling, albeit in varying degree oforganisation and with an informal character in many
developing societies. The policy focus would thus be273

Towards a green economy
on formalising and structuring the waste recovery andrecycling process in such a way that it will bring added
economic, environmental and social benefits. In thecase of e-waste, this implies a high-tech value chain
where the production of electronic goods is done bymultinational companies in developed and emerging
economies. It is a value chain with labour-intensive
disassembling work required for the recovering usefulparts. The combination of these features could also
serve as a basis for the evolution of a different form of
symbiosis involving economic actors from developed
and developing markets.
Co-generation: combined heat and power
Most industrial applications have a need for heat, andmost of the potential for co-generation applications canbe found in energy-intensive industry sectors such as
steel, aluminum, cement, chemicals, pulp and paper. It
is technically and economically feasible to recycle hightemperature waste heat or other combustible wastes
from industrial enterprises such as coke ovens, steel
mills, cement plants, glass producers, brick and ceramic
works. This provides the opportunity, should policy andregulation allow, to complement centrally- generated
electricity networks with local heat and power systems
where electricity is generated and heat re-used at
the local industrial site level. It is an opportunity forsignificant factor-improvements in resource productivity,
combined with investment in smart grids.
The world is undoubtedly electrifying, and demandfor electric power continues to grow everywhere.
Numerous industrial, commercial, and domestic users
consume fossil fuel simply for purposes of cooking,hot water, heating air for space-heating, or producing
industrial steam at moderate temperatures. There isno technical reason why most of these applications of
low-temperature heat could not be supplied by meansof small co-generation CHP facilities, based on diesel
engines, small gas turbines, high-temperature fuel cells
or even rooftop solar collectors. Small CHP systems
remain a largely untapped market (Von Weizsaecker
et al. 2009). Furthermore, a number of industry sectors
have significant potential for generating electricity fromwaste heat, as in the case of steel mills.
In order to make effective use of such possibilities,
it would be necessary for all of these electricityproducing units to be connected to the grid, both tosell their surplus and to buy during occasional periodsof breakdown. However, in most countries the electric
power industry is a legal monopoly, whether public or
private, with exclusive rights of distribution. Besides thenatural tendency of inducing inefficiencies across thewhole chain of production, distribution and use, suchmonopolies are acting as major institutional barriers
for the development of CHP facilities at different scales.

274

The primary problem faced by would-be CHP investors,
according to the IEA (2009b), is difficulty in securing afair market value for any electricity that is exported to
the grid. Overcoming these barriers requires policy
measures that encourage innovative technologies
such as CHP, applied to industrial waste heat and waste
biomass in particular.

6.2 Policy instruments to enablegreen manufacturing
The spectrum of instruments available to governmental
institutions to shape the enabling environment forgreening industry and manufacturing can be categorised
as follows:■■ Regulatory and control mechanisms;■■ Economic or market-based instruments;■■ Fiscal instruments and incentives; and■■ Voluntary action, information and capacity building.
An assessment of policy priorities and preferred
instruments needs to consider that manufacturing isoften dispersed across different countries and industry
subsectors, as highlighted in the introduction of thischapter. The industries involved are likely to preferholistic approaches that enable better sharing ofcosts, responsibilities, resources, and rewards across
manufacturing value chains. This requires, among others,
advances in corporate disclosure and governance, fiscal
incentives to drive change in the design and take-backof products, policy support for the development ofappropriate standards in sustainable manufacturing, andincentives and training to improve existing processes
and the retrofitting of factories to be more resource
efficient. It requires policy mixes the components ofwhich are discussed below.
Regulatory and control mechanisms
The major sources of significant quantities of emissions
and effluents in manufacturing industries havetraditionally been the initial targets for regulatory andcontrol instruments. Legislation with clearly defined
standards of technology and/or performance can drive
green investment, encouraging industries to use natural
resources more efficiently and create markets for green
products and production. Regulatory requirements canbuild in cleaner technology standards in the licensingof new industrial operations. It can establish emission
and discharge standards for industries with clear
requirements for the best available or best possible
technology (BAT, BPT). However, care needs to be takenthat setting standards by regulation does not impede

Manufacturing
innovation and fail to keep pace with technologicalprogress. Experience in China has shown how ecoindustrial development or industrial symbiosis canbe held back by regulations that enforce too low fines
on discharges and forbid or limit the exchange of byproducts between companies (Geng et al. 2006).
Licensing of operations provides an opportunity toprovide incentives, for example related to land-use
planning, to encourage existing industrial estates andparks to move toward a more closed-loop manufacturing
paradigm through materials recycling and exchange
schemes. Policy and planning provisions can be used toensure that the development and management of new
industrial parks and estates are in accordance with theprinciples of industrial symbiosis and turn them into
eco-industrial parks. This also requires governments toinvest in supportive infrastructure for waste treatment
and the conversion of wastes into resources. In addition,
quota systems for resource (e.g. water) use can be set
up in industrial parks, with a penalty mechanism that
requires tenants to pay several times the normal rate forthose resources they use whenever they exceed theirallotted quota.
Regulatory and control mechanisms can promoteprinciples such as Prevention (3P, 3R), Polluter Pays andExtended Producer Responsibility (EPR) to encourage large
manufacturers with complicated supply chains to favour
closed-cycle manufacturing and more efficient take backsystems for remanufacturing and recycling. In recent years
regulations such as the Waste Electrical and Electronic
Equipment (WEEE), Restriction of Hazardous Substances(RoHS), and Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation ofChemicals (REACH) directives of the EU have had impact
world-wide on standards applied in the manufacturing anduse of products.
Traditional command and control regulations
introduced in many countries since the 1970s havetended to be technology-based or performance-based.
They focused on end-of-pipe solutions, not considering
more preventative approaches and ways to improve
resource efficiency through more systemic changes tothe production process or even product design. This left
limited incentive for manufacturers to continually andfundamentally improve standards (dynamic efficiency),
as opposed to economic instruments that put a price onemissions and effluents to create a permanent incentive
for improvement. Whilst appearing simple to introduce,command and control regulations can be costly andinefficient in use.
The historical example of vehicle manufacturingshows how regulatory and control approaches can be
combined with fiscal and voluntary instruments to bringabout shifts in technological innovation. Mandatory

or voluntary standards and taxes can drive shifts ininnovation along a technology frontier or shifts of thefrontier (OECD 2010b). The type of changes described forthe manufacturing industry in this chapter also require a
shift of frontier, including redesign of products and theintroduction of new production systems for closed-loop
manufacturing. However, changes along the frontier forcontinual improvement remain important. In the case ofvehicle manufacturing, these can involve innovation in
end-of-pipe emission abatement, input substitution (e.g.
of fuels), factor substitution (more efficient, redesigned
engines) and output substitution (greater fuel efficiency
of a redesigned vehicle). Analysis of invention andpatents in car manufacturing over the period 1965-2005
by the OECD (2010b) has shown a strong positive effectof petrol taxes–combined with regulatory pressure–on
engine redesign technologies, with factor-substitution
showing the highest growth in patent applications overthe period considered.
Economic or market-based instruments
Economic instruments for pollution control and reducing
other environmental pressures include charges and fees
for non-compliance, liability payments as well as tradable
permit systems targeting, for example, air pollution,water quality and land management. Instruments
regulating price have the advantage of ensuring thatthe marginal cost of abatement is equalised among all
polluters. Charges can target emissions and products(at the level of manufacturing, use or disposal), as well
as byproducts such as packaging and batteries. The
latter has also been addressed through deposit-refund
systems, which can become of increasing significanceworld-wide for industries such as electronics and car
manufacturing. New legislation can encourage recyclingby mandating returnable deposits on recyclable
products. Direct regulation on emissions can becomplemented usefully by returnable deposit rules andend-of-life disposal rules.
To promote integrated water resources management
amongst industrial water users, Government can either
establish prices through taxes, fees and royalties or limit
quantities through tradable permit schemes. In the caseof the latter, a market for water use in a shared river
basin can allow users with relatively high-valued wateruses to purchase or lease water from users with relatively
low-valued water uses. Similar to air- pollution credit
schemes, the aim is to transfer reduction responsibilities
to agents with the lowest costs of use reduction. In theUSA, markets have been created in arid states to allocate
water with relative success. Canada is an example ofan industrialised country where power production andmanufacturing are the principle water-using sectors.
Most of the water used by manufacturing plants has
traditionally been discharged directly into a receiving
water body. Examination by Renzetti (2005) of the use

275

Towards a green economy
Aluminium

Steel

CementChemicals

Share in GHG
emissions

0.8% of global emissions and
4% of manufacturing industries’
emissions

3.2% of all global emissions andan estimated 4.1% of global CO2
emissions; approx 15% of all
manufacturing emissions – with
70% of emissions from direct fueluse and 30% emissions indirectlyfrom electricity and heat

4 % of global emissions (process
emissions and energy use) and
5% global CO2 – this is expected
to double in next 40 years, mostof the increase in developing
countries; 18% of all manufacturing emissions, emitted at various
points in the production process

5% of global emissions. and 23%
of emissions associated with
manufacturing and constructionindustries

Concentration ofactorsTwelve countries represent 82%
global production; China, Russia,
the EU, Canada and the US accountfor 61% of total production;
ten leading companies (mostly
multinationals) produce 55% ofworld’s aluminum

Around 90% of total steel-making
GHG emissions is produced bynine countries or regions. The top
25 steel-making companies collectively accounted for approx 43%
of global production in 2006

Relatively low concentration,with the 16 largest companies accounting for around 25% of global
output. About 81% of production
takes place in 12 countries; Chinaalone produces around half of theworld’s cement

Highly concentrated geographically– the EU, US, Japan and China
account for 75% of global chemical
production. Diversity of productsmeans that overall there is a low
concentration of actors in thissubsector; small and medium-sizedenterprises are common

Table 6: Greenhouse gas emissions and structure of major manufacturing industries
Source: UNEP (2009); WRI (2007)of economic instruments for integrated water resource
management (IWRM) in Canada has shown that theuse of economic instruments can reduce monitoring
costs, but designing them properly and setting them atappropriate levels requires that federal and provincial
environmental regulators use economic analysis (suchas cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis).
In regulating acid-rain emissions, the US was a pioneer
in introducing an emission-trading scheme to reduceSO2 and NOx emissions (1990 Clean Air Act), whilst the
EU introduced a regulatory approach through its Large
Combustion Plant Directive (1989). In 2005, the EU
activated the first region-wide emissions trading scheme(a cap-and-trade system) to meet its Kyoto commitments
under the climate change convention (UNFCCC). The
scheme has shown the complications regulators face inintroducing emission trading schemes through either“grandfathering” (free allocation based on existing
emissions by industries) or auctioning. Whilst initial
over-allocation in the EU ETS resulted in a zero-carbon
price, allocation rather than auctioning would tend to bepreferred by heavy industries such as aluminum and steel
that face direct international competition. Compared tocommand-and-control instruments such as licensing andtechnology standards, emissions trading can performbetter in terms of criteria such as cost-effectiveness,long-term effects and dynamic efficiency, i.e. promoting
ongoing improvement. Experience in the climate field has
shown that the cost-effectiveness of trading systems canbe determined by the visibility and robustness of the goal
and the system, the effectiveness of the carbon price andthe effectiveness of the constraint (Buchner et al. 2009).
Manufacturing industries based in developing countries
can be introduced to credit and trading schemes throughindustry sector initiatives and project-based activities
such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under276

the UNFCCC. Provided that procedures under the CDM
or similar type mechanisms are streamlined to reducetransaction costs, it can provide a promising avenue
for greening manufacturing in developing countries.
By 2010, many CDM projects involved investment inrenewable energy technologies but a much smaller
number involved investment in energy efficiency and fuelswitching. These are important areas for transformative
investments in manufacturing; these are areas wherereal opportunities can be taken, if technology standards
are to be applied with reference not only to individual
projects but also industry sector-wide best practice.
Sectoral approaches to climate action have received
considerable attention as second best option (as opposed
to global cap and trade) for introducing economic
instruments and policies to reduce GHG emissions, inparticular implying manufacturing industries worldwide. Economic factors to consider in the introduction of
sector approaches in developing countries include thefollowing (UNEP 2009):■■ Nature of the adjustment costs associated with
reducing emissions;■■ Potential for avoiding capital lock-in;■■ Nature of technical capacity within specific sectors
and countries; and■■ Availability of access to appropriate data andtechnology.
Some have argued (Bodansky 2007) that a few industry
sectors stand out as ideal candidates for climate initiatives– being large, homogenous, highly concentrated andhighly competitive (Table 6). These include aluminum,
steel, cement, transport and power generation. The

Manufacturing
cement industry, although also relatively homogenousand highly concentrated among countries, includes manysmaller producers and is less subject to competitivenessissues than aluminum and steel. Emission targets could
be defined for a given sector, with emissions allowances
being allocated to individual emitters within that
sector, and with trading allowed between countries
participating in the agreement and/or with countries
with economy-wide or other sectoral targets. Even if not
introduced at international level, the debate on sector
approaches provides important lessons for developing
country governments in introducing climate policies withcompetitive, high impact industries in a step-by-stepmanner. This is particularly important to industrialisingcountries that host major emitting industries discussed
in this chapter, notably China, India, Brazil, South Africa,
Indonesia, Thailand, Chile, Argentina and Venezuela.
The analysis of using market instruments throughsector approaches also shows the flaws of introducing
approaches that target only high emitting industries on asector basis, as opposed to full value chains of supply anddemand with these and other industries implied.
Fiscal instruments and incentives
Fiscal policy, comprising public expenditure, subsidies
and taxation, can provide powerful incentives thatalter the basic cost-benefit calculation of producers
and consumers, thus driving change in behavior from
BAU. Taxes are unrequited in the sense that the benefits
provided by government to taxpayers in exchange
are not necessarily in proportion to their payments.
Tax exemptions can be made for specific products orindustry sectors. Tax revenues can be earmarked for a
specific purpose, which may or may not relate to the fieldof activity that was taxed in the first place. An example
would be a tax on landfills or plastic bags, the revenuesof which is used for waste management infrastructure orother purposes. By 2009, the Government of South Africa
was expecting revenue of US$ 2.2 million from its plastic
bag levy (Box 2), income that was due, among others, tosupport development of the local waste management
industry. In 2010 the Government of India announced
a carbon tax on coal production, from which it was
expecting to raise US$ 535 million and planning to use therevenue for investment in clean energy (Pearson 2010).
Historical research by the OECD has found that most of
the taxes identified in member countries were leviedon a specific tax base related to energy, transport andwaste management. In designing different types oftaxes, governments need to consider case-by-case thenature of the target industry involved. In its latest survey,
the OECD (2010a) noted that taxes levied closer to theactual source of pollution (e.g. taxes on CO2 emissions
versus taxes on motor vehicles) leave a greater rangeof possibilities for innovation, mindful of complications
where sources are dispersed and varied.

By the end of the 1990s, the OECD (1999) noted from asurvey of its members an increasing use of environmentrelated taxes for pollution control, raising revenues of
up to 3 per cent of GDP and a growing percentage ofoverall tax revenues. A decade later, the OECD (2010a)
confirmed a growing movement towards environmentally
related taxation and tradable permits in OECD economies,
underlining the value of green taxes to boost innovation as
could be seen in evidence of increased investment in R&D
and registration of patents on new, cleaner technologies.
In 2010, the OECD also reported that revenue fromenvironmentally-related taxation has been gradually
decreasing over the past decade relative to both GDP and
total tax revenue. This trend is driven mainly by motorfuel taxes, which still accounted for the vast majority ofenvironmentally-related tax revenue. In many countries,
these have increased fuel prices to sufficiently high levels tohave greatly moderated the demand for motor fuels. It didforesee that additional revenue from carbon taxes and fromthe auctioning of tradable permits may increase the role ofenvironmentally-related taxation in government budgets.
Stimulus packages introduced by governments
following the global financial crisis have included
new subsidies for greening industry and cleaner
technologies. In addition to its total stimulus package of
US$ 586 billion, of which an expected 34 per cent wasdevoted to green investments, China announced solar
subsidies to help local manufacturers which face a drop
in international demand. The car industry worldwide
has benefitted from US$ billions of emergency bail-out
loans, scrappage subsidies and consumer subsidies. In
China, the world’s largest car market today, the Ministryof Finance announced that it will offer substantial
subsidies for the purchase of green cars and financing
for the construction, in five cities, of the infrastructure
for charging cars with electric power (Waldmeir 2010).
It would offer up to Rmb 50,000 (US$ 7,800) in subsidies
for the purchase of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles andRmb 60,000 (US$ 9,400) for pure electric vehicles in cities
such as Shanghai. The level of subsidy would be reduced
after carmakers sold 50,000 green cars.
The subsidisation of green cars raises questions about
its relative priority, compared with public transport
vehicles and systems. A range of historical subsidies have
prevented transformative investments in manufacturing
since fuel prices did not reflect the cost of externalities
and they resulted in a perverse principle of “the polluter
being paid”. Greening industry, therefore, also needs toinvolve the abolishment of perverse direct and indirect
subsidies on resource use that allow favored groups
access to free water, free use of the environment for
purposes of waste disposal, or cheap electricity and fossil
fuels well below regular market prices. It is increasingly
important to reflect the full economic and social costs ofsuch use. Where this is politically impossible or otherwise277

Towards a green economy

Box 2: Taxing plastic bags in an emerging market: the case of South Africa
Plastic bags have attracted increasing environmental
concern over the last decade, visibly known for theirrole in littering roadsides, clogging sewer drains
and getting ingested by animals and marine life. A
number of countries have started to tax their usage
or ban plastic bags. At a time when China decided
to ban free plastic bags in 2008, the Worldwatch
Institute reported that people in China used up to 3
billion plastic bags daily and disposed of more than 3
million tonnes of them annually. It signaled estimatesthat China refines nearly 5 million tonnes (37 million
barrels) of crude oil each year to make plastics used
for packaging.
In 2003, South Africa became one of the first countries
to introduce a plastic bag levy that targets consumers
directly. It addressed the thin plastic bags with handles
typically distributed in retail outlets. The regulationtabled under the Environmental Conservation Act
noted that the bags are indiscriminately dumped
and not collected because the thin plastic film they
are made of has little commercial value. It added thatthe problem is severe in low-income areas wherewaste collection services are inadequate. Since
2003, shoppers have to provide their own bags or
pay for thicker, recyclable bags. Consumers wanting
more information or report retailers who are notin compliance have the option of dialing a hotline
number run by the Department of Environmental
Affairs. Consumers could re-use the thicker plastic
bags, paying up to 25 cents for the 10-litre plastic
bag, 31 cents for the 12-litre bag and 49 cents for the
24-litre bag. The thickness of the bag was lowered in acompromise agreement with industry. Some retailers
agreed to lower food prices in order to compensate
poor consumers for the extra expense of the new bags.

not feasible, a distant second-best solution is to allow
accelerated depreciation and relatively low taxes oninvestments in renewably energy and resource-efficienttechnologies. As a rule, subsidies should really only be
used in case of the clear existence of positive externalities
and possibly in support of infant industries.
Green manufacturing can also be supported by financial
instruments such as revolving funds, green funds,
insurance funds, soft loans and other forms of green
subsidies. Providing rewards rather than penalties, green
subsidies and feed-in tariffs can be important instruments
to boost cleaner technologies and green products, as wellas waste prevention and recycling schemes. Technologyspecific instruments such as green subsidies can help

278

The proposed regulation caused extensive debate,
involving environmentalists, consumer organizations,industry and labour unions. Developmental
considerations included the position of poor
households in rural areas, who more typically use
plastic bags available free of charge, and the concernsof workers involved in the manufacturing, packaging
and retail industries. Business and unions raised
concerns about jobs, income and equipment loss aswell as the need to have a holistic approach to waste
management rather than targeting a single product.
Education, awareness and strong anti-litter penalties
were proposed by industry and labour as appropriate
responses to the problem of plastic shopping bags
waste rather than regulation. A study commissionedby the National Economic Development and Labour
Council examined possible impacts of the proposed
regulation on investment, employment (including job
losses or creation, shifts in skills profiles), distortionsin the market (including supply and demand balancesand between different products due to the focus on
one part of the packaging industry), and industry(e.g. petrochemicals and plastics). The study warnedof a possible close-down of the local plastic-bag
manufacturing industry, with consequent job losses.
It also showed, using recovery economics, that aneffective stimulus to local recycling is dependent
on addressing constraining factors such as the needto create additional demand in the local market forrecycled polymer.
Debates emerged around the need to promote locallymade facilities producing two alternatives, namely a
Green Bag and Biodegradable Plastic Bag. The caseshowed the importance of finding reliable life cycle
inventory data to compare the environmental impacts

to unlock and guide alternative technology paths. This
needs to be combined with appropriate regulation suchas carbon taxes. Governments can also develop national
financing mechanisms that would favour providing loans
to those small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) thatare willing to improve their resource efficiency but have
limited access to financing from commercial banks. Suchfunding mechanisms could be operated using revenue
generated through environmental taxes.
Voluntary action, information and capacity building
In its analysis of environmental policy mixes, the OECD (2007)
has argued that in the case of “multi-aspect” environmental
problems, policy-makers should supplement instrumentsthat address total amounts of pollution with instruments

Manufacturingof paper, plastic and cloth carrier bags. A factor in theanalysis is different environmental criteria applied,criteria such as primary energy consumption, resource
depletion, acidification, nutrient enrichment, ecotoxicity, air and water emissions. Those in favour of
paper bags argue that while increased demand for
paper bags could lead to more deforestation, paper
grocery bags used in many countries today are
increasingly made from recycled content.
The environmental levy is one way to make consumers
more sensitive to the implications of excessive plastic
bag consumption. The question is whether charges forthe polluting product should be applied as producer
taxes, as behavior-related charges (e.g. returning forrecycling deposits) or as simple consumer charges.
Experience shows that if, as was the case in Ireland, thelevy on plastic bags was set high enough, success wasmore certain. If however, the levy was set too low, as
happened in South Africa, it is not effective in the longterm in promoting recycling. To be effective, changes
in the price should be large, obvious increases andnot small increments. This is the lesson Botswana
learned in subsequently following the Irish example,
having greater impact with an approach that ensured
constant high prices of plastic bags, so that the initial
significant decline in consumption continued.
Analyses of the results in South Africa suggest thatplastic bag demand is relatively price inelastic,
implying that instruments based on price alone
would have limited efficacy. While the combinationof standards and pricing successfully curbed plastic
bag use in the short run, the effectiveness of thelegislation may be declining over time. This does not
imply that price regulation is necessarily less effective

than voluntary action by industry. Rather, the low
recovery rate for plastic bags relative to the otherpackaging sectors can be explained by the differingcharacteristics of the plastic bags that make them lessamenable to recycling. Factors such as their lower
value per unit and relative lack of post-recycling
applications, implies that they have a low recycling
value relative to other waste streams. Regulation
therefore has a special role in cases where the material
in question has little inherent recycling value, leaving
little incentive for industry to take the initiative. Where
regulatory initiative is taken, the level of pricing andcombination with other factors such as infrastructure
and awareness-raising will be decisive.
South African government officials consider the
regulation a success and have started implementing
similar initiatives to regulate other waste products suchas used tyres, oil and glass, confirming a trend towards
waste product regulation. The example inspired othercountries such as neighbouring Botswana. It also
sparked debate about government use of the revenue,and how it could be used to boost the local waste
management industry. In addition, it displayed thechallenge government faces in introducing a common
tax that impacts households of very different income
levels. By 2009, in his budget review, the Minister ofFinance announced an increase in the levy on plasticbags and the introduction of a levy on incandescentlight bulbs targeting local manufacturing and imports.
The plastic-bag levy was expected to generate US$
2.2 million while the incandescent light bulb levy was
expected to generate US$ 3 million.
Sources: Dikgang and Visser (2010); Fund for Research into Industrial Development,
Growth and Equity (2001); Hasson, Leiman and Visser (2007); Nahman (2010); Nhamo(2005); and Yingling Liu (2008)

that address the way a certain product is used, when it
is used, where it is used, etc. In these cases, regulatory
and information instruments are often better suited thanfor example introducing taxes or credit trading systems.
Information instruments can take a variety of forms,
including product information, labeling and reporting.

regulation of (environmental) marketing claims is, andself-regulation seems to be becoming, more common(Symbeyond Research Group, 2010). 13 In recent years,
national eco-labelling schemes have been initiated in
Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Indonesia, Thailand
and Tunisia.14 In addition to introducing such schemes

Public institutions can support the validation andharmonization of eco-labeling schemes, and establish
consumer awareness and education programmes toensure consumers are able to make informed decisions
and recognise newly introduced labeling and productinformation schemes. A recent study for the Ethical Trade
Fact-finding Process (ETFP) Group including Consumers
International, ISEAL and others, found that the

13. The Eco-label Index database keeps track of 373 eco-labels operatingin 25 industry sectors and countries world-wide. Available at www.
ecolabelindex.com/
14. By 2000, 43 countries – mostly in Europe and Asia – had household
appliance efficiency programmes in place, seven times as many as in 1980.
Standards “push” the market by requiring manufacturers to meet minimum
standards. They are well complemented by eco-labeling programmes,
which “pull” the market by providing consumers with information to
help them make responsible purchasing decisions, and hence encourage
manufacturers to design and market more eco-friendly products(Worldwatch Institute 2004).

279

Towards a green economy

in collaboration with the private sector, the public
sector can also lead by example and support recognised
green labeling schemes and standards through its own
sustainable public procurement programmes.
Governments can introduce support programmes withspecial focus on cleaner production or eco-efficiency,
targeting specific sizes of companies or specificindustries. An example is the provision of management
and technology assistance to assist SMEs in exploiting
opportunities for increased resource use efficiency andrecycling.15 Another example would be public-private
partnerships for the disassembling and collection ofe-waste in socially and environmentally beneficial
ways in developing countries that have a comparativeadvantage in this industry. In addition to creating
employment and decent work that meets recognised
occupational health and safety standards, a formalised
and advanced system of collecting and recycling e-waste
can also boost the rate of recovery.
Public institutions can support R&D, revised educational
curricula and training programmes to promote cleaner
processes and systems, eco-design, products andservices. Faced with possible job losses, training needsin the heavy manufacturing industries include training
related to change in production processes (energy
and resource efficiency, recycling, hazardous waste
management), environmental impact assessments,
skills upgrading for technicians and retraining into otherheavy industries (Strietska-Ilina et al. 2010); MartinezFernandez et al. OECD 2010).
Self-regulation in the form of voluntary initiatives by
manufacturing industries includes longstanding initiatives
such as Responsible Care by the chemicals industry,
with participants from over 50 countries. As of 2004, theInternational Council of Chemical Associations and its
members developed a Global Product Strategy to improve
the global chemical industry’s product stewardshipperformance. Since the 1990s, manufacturing industries
have been involved in a range of voluntary initiatives
started with the aim to fulfill or exceed standards set bylegislation. The trigger for these has often been shock
events such as industrial accidents during the 1980s.
Voluntary initiatives by manufacturing industries can becomplemented by public-private partnerships to facilitate
dialogue with governmental bodies. A recent example
is the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals
Management (SAICM), a policy framework which promotes
chemical safety around the world.
15. UNEP and UNIDO have been supporting such approaches through a
growing network of National Cleaner Production Centres in developing
countries. Available at www.unep.fr/scp/cp/network/

280

In the last decade, many industry voluntary initiatives
introduced more systematic stakeholder engagement
practices, monitoring and disclosure through reporting
requirements. The reporting guidelines of the Global
Reporting Initiative have been supplemented by sector
specific guidance developed with the mining and metals,
automotive
manufacturing,telecommunications,apparel and footwear industries. Reporting on strategic
management approach by these industries provide an
opportunity for investors and other stakeholders to
discuss with management what greening the relevant
industry entails.
From an overview with 22 industry groups of progress
made since the 1992 Rio Summit with sustainable businesspractices, UNEP (2002) among others recommended thatvoluntary initiatives be made more effective and credible
as a complement to government measures. In an updateof this review five years later, UNEP (2006) received
report cards from 30 industry groups including the
manufacturing sectors covered in this chapter. Industry
groups reported voluntary initiatives for promoting
awareness and integration of sustainability concepts
into their daily operations as well as initiatives related
sustainability reporting. Many industries reported thedevelopment of sector-specific voluntary standards.
Some of these were developed in consultation withregulatory authorities (e.g. the automotive sector’sfuel-efficiency standards in Europe). Few referred more
specifically to certification and labelling initiatives, as wasdone by the pulp and paper industry.
The reporting process facilitated by UNEP (2006) showed
growing interest in measurement of progress in greening
industry. Use of and reporting against agreed indicators
at industry sector level can help to fill the gap between
national, macro level and company, micro level indicators.
The Iron and Steel Institute, for example, reported
agreement by its Board on the use of 11 indicators, which
resulted in a collective report for which 44 member
companies provided data.16 The International Aluminium
Institute reported agreement by its members to twelve
sustainability objectives supported by 22 indicators.
It developed a material resource mass-flow computermodel to identify future recycling flows. The model
projected that global recycled metal supply from postconsumer scrap will double by 2020 from a 2004 level of
6.7 million tonnes. It undertook to report annually on its
global recycling performance.
16. The four economic indicators were: investment in new processes
and products, operating margin, return on capital employed and valueadded. The five environmental indicators were: greenhouse gas emissions,material efficiency, energy intensity, steel recycling and environmental
management systems. The two social indicators were: employee training
and lost time injury frequency rates (UNEP 2006).

Manufacturing

7 Conclusions
This chapter provides an overview of a number ofgreening opportunities in the manufacturing industries,
focusing in particular on sub-sectors that are main
contributors to GHG emissions globally and that havehigh impact by virtue of their broader contribution to
global resource use, associated environmental impacts,
GDP and employment. It notes the growing importanceof manufacturing to developing countries, responsiblefor 22 per cent of global GDP by 2009.
The analysis has shown challenges manufacturing faces,
highlighting the costs and risks of inaction and an
illustrative BAU scenario to 2050. In major economies,
the external costs of air pollution–mainly in the form ofhealth costs–could be well over 3 per cent of global GDP.
The possible future scarcity of some natural resources,
for example growing dependency on water, poses risks
associated with operations, markets, finance, regulations
and reputation. Reserves of easily accessible oil are being
depleted. While global demand for metals such as copperand aluminium is increasing, high quality metal ores aregradually being depleted. Increasing resource scarcities
put upward pressure on commodity prices and on the
manufactured products for which they are used as inputs.
While progress is being made in responsible chemicals
management, concerns persist about the lack ofthorough evaluation of the effects on human healthand environment of thousands of chemicals on themarket. The case of three toxic metals–mercury, lead andcadmium–show the challenges that globalisation andtrade brings; metal is often sourced in one region of theworld, refined in a second, incorporated into products
in a third, and disposed of in yet another region. These
realities challenge large corporations and their supply
chains to improve traceability and safe management
practices globally. Recent industrial accidents provide
stern reminders of the costs of unsafe practices in the
management of hazardous substances.
Real opportunities for manufacturing lie in taking alife cycle approach to its logical consequences andpursing supply and demand side strategies to close theresource use cycle in manufacturing. Such strategies
could enable even rapidly industrialising economies
to decouple environmental damage from economic
growth and improve their longer term competitiveness.
At the industry level, the greening transformation
involves a value chain that starts with the re-design ofproducts, production systems and business models, andleads to extended producer responsibility in the formof take-back or reversed supplies, remanufacturing andrecycling on a scale not seen before. The case of metal
stocks in our economies is illustrative. While only a few
metals currently have an end-of-life recycling rate ofabove 50 per cent, many opportunities exist that canhelp to improve recycling rates and increase secondary
production, which requires potentially only a fifth ofthe energy and causes up to 80 per cent fewer GHG
emissions than primary production.
Investment strategies for greening manufacturinghighlighted investment in cleaner technologies andinnovation, associated benefits in efficient use ofenergy and water, investment in a transition towards
green jobs and likely prospects for resource efficient
growth in developing markets. Following years ofautomation and related cuts in manufacturing jobs, thegreening of manufacturing will not generate jobs in all
sectors. However, recycling and re-manufacturing haveconsiderable potential to create jobs. There will also be
more skilled jobs in energy-service companies, in repair
and maintenance and in recycling scarce materials.
Government training programmes to upgrade skills will
be needed in virtually all countries, but the kinds of skills
required will vary according to the level of developmentof the local industry.
Results of the simulations indicate that investing ingreening the manufacturing industries will help reduceenergy consumption and emissions, reduce the upward
pressure on prices of fossil fuels and – through avoided
energy costs – help boost productivity and profit whilst
stimulating GDP and overall employment. From thesectors covered in this chapter, the chemical and plastics
industry shows the greatest potential for energy savings.
To track progress in how a green investment scenario
evolves, governments need to begin to collect improved
data on industrial resource efficiency.
Overall, there is abundant evidence that the global
economy still has untapped opportunities to produce
wealth using less material and energy resources. It
is important to understand though that increasing
resource efficiency is consistent with almost any
definition of green, whereas cutting carbon or other GHG
emissions per se may not be consistent with increased
efficiency. An example of this is CCS technology, which
is very energy intensive and resource inefficient. In sharp
contrast, the wider implementation of comprehensive
efficiency incentives, recycling, and CHP, together
with closed-cycle manufacturing (repair, renovation,
remanufacturing and recycling), will correspondingly
increase resource efficiency. In many cases this could281

Towards a green economy

reduce extraction and processing costs, thereby
supporting economic growth.
Discussion on the enabling environment highlight
two recommended policy priorities, namely closedcycle manufacturing with supportive infrastructure
and regulatory reform to enable factor efficiency
improvements in energy use through greater use ofcleaner technologies like CHP. Governments shouldseek ways to encourage closed-cycle manufacturing, forexample, by encouraging large multinational systems
integrators which manufacture aircraft, automobiles,
home appliances, electronic goods, etc. to be responsiblefor integrated materials management throughout theentire supply and demand chain– from the point of
extraction to final disposal. The main objective must be
to make manufactured goods last longer, by means ofgreater emphasis on re-design, repair, reconditioning,
re-manufacturing and recycling. Extended producer
responsibility (ERP) laws, refundable deposit schemes,
and improving the functioning of markets for secondary
raw materials are the most likely tools for getting started.
Each country will need to consider its appropriate policy mixof regulatory instruments and approaches to make thetransition happen, mindful that basic physical processes
and damaging impacts associated with pollution andunsustainable resource use are universal.17 As major
point sources of pollution, the manufacturing industries
have traditionally been easy targets of command-andcontrol regulations. In some cases these need reform, inothers new ones are required to scale up transformation.
Command-and-control regulations need however tobe better combined with market-based approaches,allowing appropriately structured markets to reflect thereal price of energy and other resources and allowing
17. During the annual UNEP Business & Industry Global Dialogue on 11-12
April 2011, manufacturing industry representatives agreed on the need fora predictable regulatory framework, enabling long-term strategic thinking
and longer-term investment, as precondition for business and industry
to contribute to a “step” or transformative change that goes beyond
existing voluntary industry initiatives. At the same time, it was stressedthat regulation needs to be applied to local context, considering local
approaches and social circumstances.

282

manufacturing industries to innovate and compete on afair basis. Recent history shows that the introduction oftaxes can be a strong driver for technology innovation(petrol taxes and vehicle engine technology). Use of
economic instruments can also reduce monitoring costs
for regulators, but requires a willingness to undertake
thorough economic analysis on their likely costs, benefits
and effectiveness in order to design them correctly.
The concentration of certain heavy industries in somecountries, as well as the dominance of their markets bya core group of corporations may point to opportunities
for advancing climate mitigation strategies with anindustry-sector approach, even if only on a national basis.
This may be a way of addressing competition concerns
and avoiding capital lock-in by industrialising countries
in outdated technologies. At the same time, crediting
and trading schemes is likely to offer greater economic
efficiencies if introduced across industries. This canalso be explored throughout global supply chains byusing CDM-type projects to share cleaner technology
applications among developed and developing markets.
Governments will also need to consider ways of
supporting the greening of manufacturing throughinstitutional support and soft technology approaches, forexample, education and training in areas such as cleaner
production and considering smaller, supplier enterprises
in particular. Institutional support can vary from thefinancial, ensuring the provision of green subsidies
and loans, to the provision of infrastructure, ensuring
appropriate systems for deposit refunding, waste
recovery, recycling and distribution. Scaled-up investment
in establishing eco-industrial parks can be a key building
block in this, an area open for public-private partnership.
Voluntary initiatives by manufacturing industries over thelast ten years have shown growing willingness to measure
and communicate relevant performance and discuss withinvestors and other stakeholders what indicators to use
in the process. Greening national economies and markets
require reliable methodologies underlying these andsimilar efforts to communicate performance via green
product labels and certification schemes.

Manufacturing

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Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Author: Dr Prasad Modak, Executive
President, Environmental Management Centre (EMC),
Mumbai, India.
Vera Weick and Moustapha Kamal Gueye (in the initialstages of the project) of UNEP managed the chapter,
including the handling of peer reviews, interactingwith the coordinating author on revisions, conducting
supplementary research and bringing the chapter to
final production. Derek Eaton reviewed and edited themodelling section of the chapter. Sheng Fulai conductedpreliminary editing of the chapter.
In order to ensure a global representation with a focus on
sectoral, geographical and regional aspects of the subject,renowned waste management experts across different
regions of the world have been involved as contributing
authors in developing this chapter. These authors include
Toolseeram Ramjeawon, Professor of Environmental
Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering, Facultyof Engineering, University of Mauritius; C. Visvanathan,
Professor, Environmental Engineering and Management
Program, School of Environment, Resources andDevelopment, Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), Thailand;
Hardy M. Wong, Environmental Consultant for Global
Organizations and President, EPM International Inc.,
Toronto, Canada; Shailendra Mudgal, Executive Director,
BIO Intelligence Service (BIOIS), France and N.C. Vasuki,
Environmental Consultant, United States). The chapter
additionally benefited from contributions received fromLouise Gallagher (UNEP) and Andrea M. Bassi, John P. Ansah
and Zhuohua Tan (Millennium Institute).
Swati Arunprasad, Senior Environmental Specialist,
EMC, provided technical and research assistance to
the Coordinating Author in collation of inputs fromcontributing authors, preparation of the drafts andeditorial checking for correctness and consistency.

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011

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The following individuals are to be thanked for providing
support in compiling data and providing inputs to various
sections of the Chapter: Prem Ananth, Senior Research
Associate, AIT for assisting C. Visvanathan and Sandeep
Pahal, Consultant, BIOIS for assisting Shailendra Mudgal. T.
During the development of the Chapter, the Coordinating
Author received valuable inputs from various regional andinternational workshops and expert meetings. These meetings
include International Forum on Green Economy, co-organizedby Ministry of Environment, People’s Republic of China and
UNEP, 6-7 November 2009; International Consultative Meetingon Expanding Waste Management Services in Developing
Countries, Tokyo, Japan, 18-19 March 2010; Second Meetingof the Regional 3R Forum in Asia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
4-6 October 2010 and Intersessional Consultative Meetingon Waste Management in Africa, Rabat, Morocco, 25-26
November 2010. In addition to the interactions in thesemeeting, the Coordinating Author benefited from various
presentations made by some of the leading experts in thefield of waste management that provided useful data and casestudies. These invaluable inputs are gratefully acknowledged.
Further comments were provided as part of the public review
process from individuals in the International Chamber ofCommerce and the World Steel Association.
We also would like to thank the many colleagues and individuals
who commented on the Review Draft, including Rene van
Berkel (UNIDO), Arlinda Cézar-Matos (Instituto Venturi Para
Estudos Ambientais, Brazil), Surya Chandak (UNEP), James
Curlin (UNEP OzonAction), Luis F. Diaz (CalRecovery, Inc.), Ana
Lucía Iturriza (ILO), Vincent Jugault (ILO), Robert McGowan,
Matthias Kern (Basel Convention Secretariat), Changheum
Lee (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea), Antonios
Mavropoulos (International Solid Waste Association), Rajendra
Shende, (UNEP OzonAction), Guido Sonnemann (UNEP), andHenning Wilts (Wuppertal Institute, Germany).

WasteContents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

1.1
1.2
1.3

Scope of the waste sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Greening the waste sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
A vision for the waste sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

2

Challenges and opportunities in the waste sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

2.1
2.2

Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

3Making an economic case for investing in greening the waste sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

3.1
3.2
3.3

The goals and indicators for greening the waste sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Spending in the waste sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Benefits from investment in greening the waste sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

4Effects of increased investment in the waste sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

5Enabling Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4

Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Economic incentives and disincentives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Policy and regulatory measures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Institutional arrangements between formal and informal sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

6Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326

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List of figures
Figure 1: The waste management hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Figure 2: Composition of MSW by national income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Figure 3: GDP per capita vs. MSW per capita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Figure 4: Estimated generation of MSW across regions of the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Figure 5: Relationship between private consumption and municipal waste in OECD countries . . . . . . . . . 299
Figure 6: Trend in GDP and packaging waste growth from 1998 to 2007 in EU15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
Figure 7: Trends in glass recycling from 1980 to 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Figure 8: Total public and private expenditure on reclamation of contaminated sites in Europe . . . . . . . . 307
Figure 9: Growing capacity of recycled aluminium industry in Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Figure 10: Energy production from renewable and non-renewable municipal waste in Europe . . . . . . . . . 314
Figure 11: CDM projects registered by a few Non-Annex I Countries (as on December 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Figure 12: The World Bank’s estimated investments in MSW management across various regions  . . . . . . 320

List of tables
Table 1: Estimates of e-waste generation (tonnes per year)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Table 2: Indicators to measure the greening of the waste sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Table 3: Waste collection typologies by GDP per capita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
Table 4: Energy savings and GHG flux savings due to waste recycling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Table 5: Community cooperation in waste management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

List of boxes
Box 1: Global metal stocks and recycling rates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Box 2: Companies resorting to eco-friendly packaging due to increased consumer pressure  . . . . . . . . . . 303
Box 3: Recession and the paper-recycling rate in the UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Box 4: Cost savings and resource recovery from recycling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Box 5: The social dimension of waste management and recycling jobs – implications for decent work andpoverty reduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Box 6: Turning urban manure into organic fertiliser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
Box 7: Rural energy supply from waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Box 8: Waste-based carbon credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Box 9: Incentives for private investment in brownfield clean-up and remediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Box 10: Landfill diversion in the UK  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322

290

WasteList of acronyms
3Rs
ADB
BAU
BIR
C&D
CBO
CDM
CE
CEIT
CER
CO2
DBOT
DfD
DfE
EAWAG
EEA
EoLV
EPA
EPR
EU
E-waste
FFTC
CER
GDP
GHG
GIS
GMS
GPS
HDPE
HSWA
ICC
IFC
ILO
ILSR
IPCC
ISWM
LDCs
LDPE
MBT
MEA
MIS

Reduce, Reuse and Recycle
Asian Development Bank
Business-as-usual
Bureau of International Recycling
Construction and Demolition
Community-based organisation
Clean Development Mechanism
Circular economy
Countries with economies in transition
Certified Emission Reductions
Carbon dioxide
Develop, Build, Operate and Transfer
Design for Disassembly
Design for Environment
Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic
Science and Technology
European Environment Agency
End-of-life Vehicles
United States Environmental Protection
AgencyExtended Producer Responsibility
European Union
Electronic waste
Food and Fertilizer Technology Center
Certified Emissions Reductions
Gross Domestic ProductGreenhouse gas
Geographic Information System
Greater Mekong sub-region
Geographic Positioning System
High Density Polyethylene
Federal Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (USA)International Coastal CleanupInternational Finance Corporation
International Labour Organization
Institute of Local Self RelianceIntergovernmental Panel on Climate
ChangeIntegrated Solid Waste Management
Least Developed Countries
Low Density Polyethylene
Mechanical and biological treatment
Multilateral Environmental Agreement
Management Information System

MLF

MRF
MSW
NGO
NIMBY
NRDC
ODS
OEA
OECD
OHS
PAYT
PFI
PPP
RCRA
RDF
RMB
ROI
SCRAP
StEP
SO2
TEAP
THB
UNCTAD
UNDP
UNEP
UNFCCC
UNU
USGS
VBWF
WEEE
WtE

Multilateral Fund for the
Implementation of the Montreal
ProtocolMaterial Recycling Facility
Municipal Solid Waste
Non-governmental organisation
Not in my back yard
Natural Resource Defense Council
Ozone depleting substance
Waste and Resources Action
Programme
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Occupational Health and Safety
Pay-as-you-throw
Private Finance Initiative
Public-private partnershipResource Conservation and Recovery
Act
Refuse Derived FuelRenminbi, currency in People’s
Republic of China
Return on investment
School and Community Reuse Action
Project
Solving the e-waste Problem
Sulfur dioxide
Technology and Economic Assessment
Panel of the Montreal Protocol
Thai Baht, currency in Thailand
United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development
United Nations Development
Programme
United Nations Environment
Programme
United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change
United Nations University
United States Geological Survey
Volume Based Waste Fee
Waste Electrical and Electronic
Equipment Directive
Waste to Energy291

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. The increasing volume and complexity of waste associated with economic growth are posing
serious risks to ecosystems and human health. Every year, an estimated 11.2 billion tonnes of solid
waste are collected worldwide and decay of the organic proportion of solid waste is contributing toabout 5 per cent of global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. Of all the waste streams, waste fromelectrical and electronic equipment containing new and complex hazardous substances presents thefastest-growing challenge in both developed and developing countries.
2. The growth of the waste market, increasing resource scarcity and the availability of newtechnologies are offering opportunities for greening the waste sector. The global waste market,
from collection to recycling, is estimated at US$ 410 billion a year, not including the sizable informal
segment in developing countries. Recycling is likely to grow steadily and form a vital component ofgreener waste management systems, which will provide decent employment. While currently only
25 per cent of waste is recovered or recycled, under the green investment scenario modelled in theGreen Economy Report (GER), the amount of waste destined for landfills would be considerably
reduced. These gains, implying the development and expansion of new market opportunities, would
be achieved through the doubling of the recycling rate of industrial waste (an increase from 7 to 15
per cent), near full recycling of e-waste (from a current estimated level of 15 per cent), and an increaseof about 3.5 times over the current recycling rate of Municipal Solid Waste – the principal source ofrecycled materials, from 10 to 34 per cent. Furthermore, by 2050, effectively all organic waste would
be composted or recovered for energy, compared with 70 per cent under a business–as-usual (BAU)
scenario.
3. There is no one-size-fits-all when it comes to greening the waste sector, but there arecommonalities. Most of the waste management related standards are national or local; however, as acommon feature, greening the waste sector includes, in the first instance, minimisation of waste. Where
waste cannot be avoided, recovery of materials and energy from waste, as well as remanufacturing
and recycling waste into usable products should be the second option. The overall goal is to establish
a global circular economy in which material use and waste generation is minimised, any unavoidable
waste is recycled or remanufactured, and any remaining waste is treated in a manner least harmful
to the environment and human health, or even in a way which generates new value such as energy
recovered from waste.
4. Investing in greening the waste sector can generate multiple economic and environmental
benefits. Recycling leads to substantial resource savings. For example, for every tonne of paper
recycled, 17 trees and 50 per cent of water can be saved. By recycling each tonne of aluminium, thefollowing resource savings could be accrued: 1.3 tonne of bauxite residues, 15 m3 of cooling water,
0.86 m3 of process water and 37 barrels of oil. These are in addition to the avoidance of 2 tonnes of CO2
and 11 kg of SO2 released. In terms of new products, the Waste to Energy (WtE) market was already292

Wasteestimated at US$ 19.9 billion in 2008 and projected to grow by 30 per cent by 2014. In terms of climate
benefits, between 20 to 30 per cent of projected landfill methane emissions for 2030 can be reduced
at negative cost and 30 to 50 per cent at costs of less than US$ 20/tCO2-eq/yr.

5. Recycling creates more jobs than it replaces. Recycling is one of the most important sectors interms of employment creation and currently employs 12 million people in just three countries - Brazil,
China and the United States. Sorting and processing recyclables alone sustain ten times more jobs
than land filling or incineration on a per tonne basis. Estimations made in the context of this reportsuggest that with an average of US$ 152 billion invested in waste collection as part of an overall green
investment strategy over the period 2011 to 2050, global employment in waste collection activities by
2050 will be 10 per cent higher in a green economy scenario than projections under BAU. While higher
rates of recycling may reduce employment opportunities in extraction of virgin materials and related
activities, the overall net employment appears to be positive.
6. Improving labour conditions in the waste sector is imperative. The activities of collecting,processing and redistributing recyclables are usually done by workers with few possibilities outside
the sector. Thus, despite the potentially significant contribution to employment creation, not all of therecycling and waste management related jobs can be considered green jobs. To be green jobs they alsoneed to match the requirements of decent work, including the aspects of child labour, occupational
health and safety, social protection and freedom of association.
7. Greening of the waste sector requires financing, economic incentives, policy and regulatory
measures and institutional arrangements. Improved waste management and avoided
environmental and health costs can help reduce the financial pressure on governments. Private sector
participation can also significantly reduce the costs, as well as enhance service delivery. Micro-financing,other innovative financing mechanisms and international development assistance may, in addition,
be tapped to support operational costs for waste treatment. A range of economic instruments canserve as incentives to green the sector (such as taxes and fees on waste, recycling credit and otherforms of subsidies). Their use could be combined with policies and regulations such as targets for theminimisation, reuse, recycling and displacement of virgin materials in products; regulations relevant to
the waste management market; and land-use policies and planning and regulations to set minimum
safety standards that protect labour.

293

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to make an economic case for investingin greening the waste sector and it aims to provide policymakers with guidance on how to mobilise such investment.
It demonstrates how green investment in the waste sector
can create jobs and contribute to economic growth,
while addressing environmental issues, in a pro-poor andequitable manner.

Most
preferred

Prevention

Reduction

The environmental and social (including health-related)benefits from greening the waste sector have been stressedalready for a long time. The impact of this has, however,been limited, as environmental and social concerns areoften seen as competing with economic imperatives.
Environmental and social aspects of greening the waste
sector are discussed, but the emphasis is on making an
economic case based on the available data.
The chapter starts with an explanation of the scope of thewaste sector and what is meant by the greening of thewaste sector, followed by a discussion of the challenges
and opportunities facing the sector. It then discusses thegoals for greening the sector and the potential economic
implications of additional green investment, including
the results from a modelling exercise. Finally, the chapter
presents conditions that are important for enabling thegreening of the waste sector.

1.1 Scope of the waste sector
The waste sector has traditionally referred to municipal
solid waste (MSW) and excludes wastewater, which tends
to be categorised under the water or industry sectors. The
scope of this chapter is therefore limited to management of
MSW and special waste streams such as used electrical andelectronic equipment as well as vehicles and vehicle parts,
construction and demolition waste, health-care waste, andbiomass waste or agricultural residues.

1.2 Greening the waste sector
Greening the waste sector refers to a shift from lesspreferred waste treatment and disposal methods suchas incineration (without energy recovery) and different
forms of landfilling towards the three Rs: Reduce,
Reuse and Recycle. The strategy is to move upstream
in the waste management hierarchy, based on theinternationally recognised approach of Integrated Solid
Waste Management (ISWM) (Figure 1).

294

Recycling

RecoveryLeast
preferred

Disposal

Figure 1. The waste management hierarchy
The ISWM is a strategic approach to managing all sourcesof waste; prioritising waste avoidance and minimisation,practicing segregation, promoting the 3Rs, implementing safe
waste transportation, treatment, and disposal in an integrated
manner, with an emphasis on maximising resource-use
efficiency. This marks a departure from the usual approach
where wastes are managed mainly from a compliance pointof view characterised by end-of-pipe treatment such as
incineration (without energy recovery) and landfilling.
Under ISWM, activities of greening the sector can include:■■ Resource conservation, which avoids excessive
resource consumption;■■ Waste reduction through resource use optimisationthat minimises resource wastage;■■ Waste collection and segregation,
appropriate waste treatment;

ensuring■■ Waste reuse, which circulates waste and avoids theuse of virgin resources;■■ Waste recycling, which converts waste into usefulproducts;

Waste■■ Energy recovery, which harnesses residual energy
from waste;■■ Landfill avoidance, which conserves land and avoids
risks of contamination; and■■ Proportion of total waste disposed in landfill; and■■ Extent of capture, recovery and/or treatment ofpolluting emissions such as leachate and landfill gas.

■■ Resource consumption rate (material use in kg per
capita);In relation to an overall green economy, indicators ofgreening the waste sector can include the value of – andjobs related to – the goods generated through the greeningof the waste sector such as remanufactured products,
recovered energy, and the services in terms of waste
collection, segregation, and processing. Economic and social
benefits in terms of health, property values, tourism as well
as direct and indirect job creation should also be included.
Not all of these indicators may, however, be readily available.
Proxies are used where possible in this chapter to gauge andestimate the economic significance of greening the sector.

■■ Waste generation rates (kg per capita/year, overall
and by economic sector);

1.3 A vision for the waste sector■■ Construction and maintenance of infrastructure
for waste collection, recovery of materials from waste
streams (collection and segregation) and application of
3R technologies and associated activities.
Indicators to measure the progress of greening the sector
can include:■■ Proportion of waste being collected and segregated;■■ Proportion of materials in waste streams being reusedor recycled;■■ Proportion of virgin material displacement inproduction;■■ Proportion of waste used for energy recovery;■■ Proportion of materials in waste streams diverted
from landfill;■■ Reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to
avoided landfilling;

The long-term vision for the waste sector is to establish
a circular global economy in which the use of materials
and generation of waste are minimised, any unavoidable
waste recycled or remanufactured, and any remaining
waste treated in a way that causes least damage to theenvironment and human health or even creating additional
value by recovering energy from waste. To achieve this vision,
radical changes to supply-chain management, especially tothe product and industrial design part of the supply chain,
are needed. Specifically, the 3Rs need to guide industrial
design – with implications for materials at all stages – andbe overlaid on the entire supply chain. This requirement is,in turn, expected to motivate innovation. The chapter on
manufacturing further elaborates on life-cycle approaches,
including closed loop and circular systems in manufacturing.

295

Towards a green economy

2 Challenges and opportunities
in the waste sector
2.1 Challenges
The waste sector is facing three sets of challenges: 1)
increasing growth in the quantity and complexity of waste
streams associated with rising incomes and economic
growth; 2) increasing risk of damage to human health andecosystems; and 3) the sector’s contribution to climatechange.
The growing volume and complexity of waste
The exploitation of the earth’s resources continues apace;material use increased eight-fold in the last century(Krausmann et al. 2009). According to the Wuppertal
Institute, an average European consumes about 50 tonnesof resources a year, around three times the amountconsumed per capita by emerging economies. Furthermore,on average, Europeans dispose twice as much as citizens
from emerging economies (Bleischwitz 2009). Per-capita
resource use in emerging economies is also increasing
considerably while the world’s Least Developed Countries(LDC) are beginning the transition towards an industrial
type of societal metabolism, as incomes rise and purchasing
power is deployed in consumer spending.
Currently, 3.4-4 billion tonnes of municipal and industrial
waste are produced every year, of which non-hazardous
industrial waste accounts for 1.2 billion tonnes (Chalmin
and Gaillochet 2009). A major share of the waste generated
is MSW originating from urban settlements (1.7-1.9 billion

Low income countries

3

3

tonnes, or 46 per cent of the total waste generated) with 0.77
billion tonnes of this being produced by 25 Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries
alone (UNEP 2010).
As a country develops and becomes wealthier, thecomposition of its waste stream typically becomes morevaried and complex. Figure 2 illustrates the high proportionof organic-rich MSW in middle and lower income countries
with a gross national income per capita of less than US$
12,196, while the high-income countries’ MSW streams
contain a large proportion of paper and plastics.
Apart from MSW, other major types of waste streams arelisted below:■■ Construction and Demolition (C&D) waste represents 1015 per cent of total waste generated in developed countries(Bournay 2006) and some countries have reported a muchhigher proportions. For example, OECD (2008a) estimatedthat Germany generates 178.5 million tonnes of C&D waste,
which is about 55 per cent of the total waste reported. C&D
waste can be classified as high-volume waste with relatively
low impact compared with other types of waste.
■■ End-of-life Vehicles account for 8-9 million tonnes ofwaste in the European Union (EU) with Germany, UK, France,
Spain and Italy responsible for approximately 75 per centof EU-25 vehicles de-registrations (Eurostat 2010a). Japan

Middle income countries

10

High income countries
10

12
3

7
7

9
43

11
10

65

13

33

28
Organic /biomass

Paper and cardboard

Figure 2: Composition of MSW by national income
Source: Chalmin and Gaillochet (2009) and averaged

296

30

3

Plastics

MetalsGlassGDP per capita (US$)

Waste

45,000USA

Japan

IcelandDenmark
IrelandUK
FinlandGermany
FranceCanada23,000Australia

Netherlands

Belgium
Austria
Italy
Spain

Republic of Korea

Argentina

Czech Republic
PolandChina

Mexico New Zealand
Hungary
BrazilBulgaria

Turkey

0
0

900

450

Per capita MSW (kg)

Quadrant

Economic status and waste generation

Country and year of data

Q1

GDP: More than US$ 23,000
Waste: More than 450 kg per capita

USA: United States of Americaa (2006)
IRL: Ireland (2004)
DNK: Denmark (2005)
ISL: Iceland (2004)
GBR: United Kingdom (2004)

Q2

GDP: More than US$ 23,000
Waste: Less than 450 kg per capita

FIN: Finland (2004)
CAN: Canada (2004)

JPN: Japane (2007)

Q3

GDP: Less than US$ 23,000
Waste: Less than 450 kg per capita

BRA: Brazilb (2002)
ARG: Argentinac(2002)
CHN: Chinad (2004)
POL: Poland (2005)

CZE: Czech Republic (2005)
MEX: Mexico (2006)
KOR: Republic of Korea (2002)
NZL: New Zealand (1999)
TUR: Turkey (2004)

Q4

GDP: Less than US$ 23,000
Waste: More than 450 kg per capita

AUS: Australia (2002)
HUN: Hungary (2004)
BGR: Bulgariaf (2003)

ITA: Italy (2004)
AUT: Austria (2004)
ESP: Spain (2004)

NLD: Netherlands (2004)
DEU: Germany (2004)
FRA: France (2004)
BEL: Belgium (2002)

Note: US$ 23,000 represents the median point in the GDP data.

Figure 3: GDP per capita vs. MSW per capita1

Source: MSW data sourced from a EPA (2007), b Borzino (2002), c Methanetomarkets (2005), d World Bank (2005), OECD 2008a and e Yatsu (2010) and f GHK (2006); Population data available at
http://esa.un.org/unpp/; GDP data sourced from World Bank.

generates about 0.7 million tonnes of Automobile Shredder
Residues (ASR) every year – materials such as plastic, rubber,foam, paper, fabric, glass, etc. that remain to be recycled
after the reusable parts of the automobile are removed
from shredded EoLV (Kiyotaka and Itaru 2002). In the UnitedStates of America, ASR amount to 5 million tonnes annually(EPA 2010).

■■ Biomass waste includes agricultural and forestry
waste. It is estimated that globally 140 billion tonnes ofagricultural residue is generated every year (Nakamura
1. This figure was generated by using latest available data from 27 countries
including developed and developing countries from specified sources(using the GDP and population data for the year for which the latest waste
data is available).

297

Towards a green economy

Annual MSW in million tonnes
1995
300

1998

2003

Asia

2005

2007

EU27

250

USA
200

150

Latin America and Caribbean

and electrical goods. It is estimated that in 2004 alone, 315
million personal computers (PC) became obsolete globallyand 130 million mobile phones were estimated to havereached their end of life in 2005 (UNEP 2005). The USA
produces most electronic scrap, reportedly 3.16 million
tonnes in 2008 (EPA 2009). The total e-waste generated
worldwide rose from 6 million tonnes in 1998 to 20-50
million tonnes in 2005 (UNEP 2005). Jinglei Yu et al. (2010)
predict that obsolete PCs in developing regions will exceed
those of developed regions by 2016-2018 and that by 2030
they could amount to 400-700 million units (comparedwith 200-300 million units in developed countries).
■■ Hazardous waste requires special handling andtreatment even in low quantities. They may also mix up
with the stream of waste generated in the municipal
or agricultural sector, for e.g. used batteries, spent
paints and residual chemical pesticides as well as Ozone
Depleting Substances (ODS) such as refrigerators, airconditioners, fire extinguishers, cleaning products,
electronic equipments and agricultural fumigants. Reports
submitted to the Basel Convention suggest that at least
8.5 million tonnes of hazardous waste have been crossing
international boundaries every year (Baker et al. 2004).

100

50

0

Figure 4: Estimated generation of MSW acrossregions of the world
Source: Acurio et al. (1998), World Bank (1999), EPA (1999) and (2009),
Hoornweg and Giannelli (2007) and Eurostat (2010b)

2009). Like C&D, biomass waste is a high-volume wastewith a relatively low impact.
■■ Health-care waste is sometimes classified as a
subcategory of hazardous waste. No global estimates areavailable. On average, however, low-income countries
generate between 0.5 kg and 3 kg of health-care waste
per capita per year, which includes both hazardous andnon-hazardous components. High-income countries
have been reported to generate up to 6 kg of hazardous
waste per person per year from health-care activities(WHO 2010).

■■ Packaging waste and its management has become amajor issue in high-income countries. For example, EU15
recorded an increase in packaging waste from 160 kg per
capita in 1997 to 179 kg per capita in 2004. According
to the European Environmental Agency (EEA 2009), an
increase in packaging waste has been observed in botholder and newer European Union (EU) member states.

■■ Electronic waste (e-waste) continues to increase
dramatically amid growing global demand for electronic■■ Marine litter consists of material discarded directly or
indirectly from recreational/shoreline, ocean/waterway,
smoking-related, dumping and medical and personalhygiene-related activities and sources (UNEP 2009a). The
International Coastal Cleanup (ICC) study between 1989
and 2007 counted 103,247,609 pieces of waste in theCountries

Assessment Date

PCs

Printers

Mobile phones

TVs

Refrigerators

Total

South Africa

2007

19,4004,300

850

23,70011,40059,650

Kenya

2007

2,500

500

150

2,800

1,400

7,350

Uganda

2007

1,300

250

40

1,900

900

4,390

Morocco2007

13,500

2,700

1,700

15,1005,200

38,200

Senegal

2007

900

180

100

1,900

650

3,730

Peru

2006

6,000

1,200

220

11,5005,500

24,420Colombia

2006

6,500

1,300

1,200

18,3008,800

36,100

Mexico2006

47,500

9,500

1,100

166,500

44,700269,300

Brazil2005

96,80017,2002,200

137,000

115,100

368,300

India

2007

56,300

4,700

1,700

275,000

101,300

439,000

China

2007

300,000

60,0007,000

1,350,000

495,000

2,212,000

Table 1: Estimates of e-waste generation (tonnes per year)
Source: Adapted from UNEP and UNU (2009)298

Waste

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Index: 1980=100200
Private consumption

150
Total municipal waste generated

Waste generated per inhabitant100

Figure 5: Relationship between private consumption and municipal waste in OECD countries

Note: The indicators presented here relate to amounts of municipal waste generated. They show waste generation intensities expressed per capita
and per unit of private final consumption expenditure (which excludes public expenditures on education, health and similar categories) in 2006, andrelated changes since 1980.
Source: OECD (2008b)

world’s seas. Cigarettes and cigarette filters accounted
for almost a quarter of the material (25,407,457 pieces)(UNEP 2009a). Marine litter has been reported to havesignificant impacts on wildlife and sensitive ecosystems,
human health and safety and the economies of coastal
areas (Ocean Conservancy 2010).
Waste generation is linked to both population andincome growth. Of the two, income level is the more
powerful driver. Figure 3 shows the correlation between
MSW generation and GDP. In high-income countries, anurban population of 0.3 billion generates approximately
0.24 million tonnes of MSW (0.8 kg per capita per day),while in low-income countries around the same amount(0.26 million tonnes per day) is generated by 1.3 billion
people (0.2 kg per capita per day), a quarter of the levelin high-income countries.
Figure 4 shows estimates of MSW generation in different partsof the world. It rose in the US and the EU by 21 per cent and14 per cent respectively from 1995 to 2007. However, due
to increased awareness and policy interventions addressing
waste management (for example, EU regulations stimulating
recycling of obsolete vehicles since 2000 and electrical andelectronic waste since 2002), the rate of MSW generation
slowed in the EU and (to a lesser extent) in the US in the period
from 2003 to 2007. The linkage between affluence and waste
generation remains quite strong, in spite of improvementsin efficiency, and represents a significant challenge fordeveloping countries as they become wealthier, particularly
in Asia (World Bank 1999). At best, relative decoupling has
begun in OECD countries, with a stabilisation of per-capita
waste generation in the last decade, as shown in Figure 5.

The recent awareness on benefits of waste minimisation, butalso the shifting of waste-intensive production to developing
and emerging countries may have contributed to thisdevelopment. Landfill remains the predominant method of
disposal in these countries (OECD 2008b).
Waste volumes are not necessarily the most important
challenge ahead. Mixed MSW, hazardous health-care waste,
and industrial waste streams can impose serious healthand ecological risks if these wastes remain uncollected or
dumped in uncontrolled and unsecured landfill sites. In lowincome countries, for example, collection rates are lower
than 70 per cent, with more than 50 per cent of the collected
waste disposed through uncontrolled landfilling andabout 15 per cent processed through unsafe and informal
recycling (Chalmin and Gaillochet 2009). Given the amountof valuable components in MSW, the mixing of wastes
also means a lost opportunity to recover components that
could be recycled and used as new resources. Box 1 gives
an overview of challenges and issues to be addressed to
improve recycling rates of global metal stocks.
E-waste presents a serious and growing challenge toboth developed and developing countries. It is a highly
heterogeneous waste stream and one of the fastestgrowing segments of MSW, especially in developed andemerging economies. Table 1 gives the estimated quantityof e-waste generated in 11 countries. China generates 64
per cent of the world’s e-waste, followed by India (13 percent) and Brazil (11 per cent). Senegal, Uganda, India, China
and South Africa are examples of countries where e-waste
generation is expected to rise by a factor of 2 to 8, by 2020
(UNEP and the United Nations University 2009). E-waste299

Towards a green economy

Box 1: Global metal stocks and recycling rates
The rapid pace of industrialisation around theworld has brought about increasing demand formetals, which are considered as core raw materials
for infrastructure and manufacturing of products.
The demand for metals is expected to maintaindynamic in the future: in developing countries due
to economic growth, and in industrialized countries
due to modern technologies with dissipative metal
applications. Since metals are a finite resource,
the potential challenge on metal supply could be
addressed through recycling across the life-cycle.
Among the various steps of the metal life-cycle,
societal or in-use metal stocks, which include all
metals put into use and currently providing service,
are the most relevant metal stocks to focus. On a
global level, most of the world’s in-use stocks reside
in more developed countries. For instance, Japanand the United States posses the highest in-use
stocks and exceed the value of China by 9 and 13
times. Moreover, data suggests that per capita inuse stocks in more-developed countries typicallyexceed those in less-developed countries by factorsof 5 to 10.
One of the key strategies in meeting this increasing
demand is to take advantage of anthropogenic
mines, or urban stocks, which has a great potential
to reduce dependency on virgin metal resources
and mitigate the environmental degradation causedby mining activities. However, tremendous weak
points have been found in global metal recycling.
For instance, mass-scale use of specialty metals
like gallium, indium, etc, in the last three decades
and the lack of infrastructure for recycling in many
developing countries has led to dissipative losses ofsuch metals.
Here are the recycling rates (EOL-RR) of various kindsof metals.
■■ Ferrous metals: predominantly iron-based, andmostly magnetic. An end-of-life recycling rate of
70-90 per cent can be estimated for iron and steel,which is one of the highest among all the industriallyused metals.
■■ Non-ferrous metals: contain no iron, and usedin quantities second only to the ferrous metals.
Most have high recycling rates, especially lead (EOL
recycling rate > 50 per cent).

300■■ Precious metals: Most are efficiently recycled
due to the scarcity. The highest EOL recycling rates
include: palladium (60-70 per cent), platinum (60-70
per cent) and rhodium (50-60 per cent).
■■ Specialty metals: the largest group with 37 kindsof metals, and are in great demand. For 32 of the 37
specialty metals, the EOL recycling rates are very
close to zero (<1 per cent).
Challenges and Way Forward to Sustainability
Thus, the recycling rates for some of the metals,
especially specialty metals are relatively low.
It has been recognized that creating a circular economy
is key for increasing metal needs of the future. Settingof appropriate metal recycling infrastructure andservices in urban areas - that are tomorrow’s metal
mines – is essential and should be given high priority.
The International Resource Panel decisively
states that it is important to enhance capacity
building, technology transfer and international
cooperation in developing countries throughinternational recycling conferences, technological
implementation programmes and specific scientificexchange programmes.
The Panel also highlights three key issues that
require urgent attention:■■ Research & development. Data acquisition andanalysis, recycling technologies research, andother research and development efforts should bea priority in the development process. Global dataon a large variety of metals on equal spatial andtemporal resolution is actually not available■■ Stopping illegal waste transport. Internationalorganisations like UNEP and OECD have to multiply
their engagement in the monitoring and controllingof illegal scrap exports.
■■ Continuous improvements of legislative
systems. The more developed countries
should reinforce their attempts to help the lessdeveloped countries install appropriate legislative
systems and ensure their enforcement in orderto take advantage of metal stocks in society.
Source: Source: UNEP (2011)

Waste

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Index: 1990=100
120

Total packaging waste generation

110

GDP growth rate

Packaging waste generation (glass, metals, paper, plastics)
100
Figure 6: Trend in GDP and packaging waste growth from 1998 to 2007 in EU15
Source: EEA (2009)is a major source of new and complex hazardous waste
additions to MSW.
Globally, UNEP and the United Nations University (UNU)
estimate that 20 to 50 million tonnes of e-waste aredisposed of each year, which accounts for 5 per cent of
all MSW. E-waste also has a significant role to play in therecycling sector in developing countries even though it is
not necessarily generated in those countries. With sales ofelectronic products in China and India and across Africa andLatin America predicted to rise sharply in the next ten years,
the challenge is only set to grow (UNEP and UNU 2009).
Adding to the complexity of waste streams is the impact
of increasing trade on waste. Lack of information on theconstituents of waste products, such as valuable raw
materials and toxic pollutants, makes trading of such
waste challenging and risky. There have been increasing
packaging requirements to minimise damage to goodsin transit. Packaging requirements have also increased tomeet tightened food health and safety standards. Figure 6
shows the steady increase in packaging waste coinciding
with rising GDP in EU15 from 1998 to 2007. As this trendof increasing trade and packaging continues, so will theincrease in the absolute generation of packaging waste
and complexity of the MSW streams.
The waste problem has been accentuated by the issueof waste trafficking. Several developed countries havebeen illegally dumping hazardous waste and exporting
significant quantities of used electrical and electronic
2. It may, however, be noted that the export of used electronic products
is legal if the importing country has a sufficient recycling infrastructure todeal with these wastes.

products to developing countries that do not have adequate
infrastructure to manage them. Such illegal shipments area matter of global concern. The Basel Convention requires
its members to report the aggregated numbers, but there
is ambiguity in the available data on hazardous shipments
and difficulty in dealing with illegal activities. Another issue
is the difficulty in classifying used electronic or electrical
products as second-hand products and hazardous waste.
These shortcomings heighten the threat that the hazardous
waste poses to the environment and human health.2
Health and environment risks
The increasing volume and complexity of waste poses
serious risks to human health and the environment. Theserisks are most obvious in situations where waste collection
and treatment is insufficient or even absent but can also
occur in situations where collection and treatment methods
are already established. In industrialised countries, despite
progress on sanitary landfill technology and incineration,and the control of direct human exposure to the waste
at the related facilities, there are concerns over wastedisposal-related syndromes. While few studies exist, many
health indicators have been considered in epidemiologicalresearch for health impacts from landfill sites and older
incinerators, including cancer incidence, mortality, birthdefects and low birth weight (WHO 2007). Protests overwaste facilities in developed countries are now morethan a simple Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) reaction. Local
residents often reject landfills and incinerators because offears over health and safety and mistrust of the authorities
to ensure that minimum safety or environmental protection
standards are enforced. A related problem is the falling
property values or the loss of livelihoods (e.g. related toagriculture, tourism) around landfill areas.

301

Towards a green economy
In developing countries, owing to low or inappropriate
collection, deficient waste treatment and disposal
infrastructure, limited financial resources, and weak
enforcement of laws, open, uncontrolled, and unsecured
dumps are the most commonly-used method of managing
waste. At these sites, dumping of mixed waste occurs alongside
open burning, grazing of stray animals and leakage ofhazardous substances such as leachate and gas. Uncontrolled
dumping can also block drainage systems and contributeto floods, which cause additional health and environment
problems such as disease outbreaks and water pollution.
Uncontrolled dumpsites have been linked to many harmful
health effects such as skin and eye infections, respiratory
problems, vector-borne diseases like diarrhoea, dysentery,typhoid, hepatitis, cholera, malaria and yellow fever.
Rodents and other stray animals have also been known to
spread a variety of diseases including plague and flea-born
fever. There are, however, no global estimates of wasterelated health costs or economic costs of waste and only alimited number of country studies exist. In the Republic of
Palau (an island nation in the Pacific Ocean), for example,
the cost of waste-related health damage amounts to US$
697,000 per year (about US$ 32 per capita) (Hajkowicz et al.
2005). In Tonga, total economic cost of waste was estimatedto be at least TOP 5.6 million a year (about US$ 2.8 million)of which US$ 0.45 million was related to the health cost to
private individuals (Lal and Takau 2006).
A lack of alternative livelihoods and the value of recoveredmaterials entice many poor men, women, and even children
to engage in dumpsite scavenging in low- and middleincome countries. Waste pickers are vulnerable to intestinal,
parasitic and skin diseases. A UNEP (2007) study carried out
at a 30-acre Kenyan dumpsite called Dandora found thatabout 50 per cent of the examined children and adolescentsliving close to the dumpsites (from a total of 328) had
respiratory ailments and blood lead levels exceeding
international threshold (10 micrograms per decilitre ofblood). Further 30 per cent were confirmed to have highexposure to heavy metal poisoning detected by red blood
cell abnormalities. Other severe effects observed in wastepicker children in India include worm infestation, scabies,
xerophthalmia and lymph-node enlargement (Hunt 1996).
The volume of waste generation is one challenge forcontrolling the impact on human health and ecosystems, but itis the growing hazardous component of all waste streams thatis most alarming. Unless action is taken to properly collect andsegregate waste materials, many developing countries face
the challenge of mixed and growing waste streams beyond
what the current waste-management infrastructure can copewith. Investment in institutions and physical infrastructure
to properly collect and segregate waste materials needs tohappen to avoid imminent and serious consequences toenvironmental quality and public health in these countries
with potentially long-term economic impacts.

302

GHG emissions
The organic fraction of the municipal waste sector
contributes to about 5 per cent of the total GHG emissions
known to be responsible for climate change. According
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC)(Bogner et al. 2007), post-consumer waste-generated
GHG emissions were equivalent to approximately 1,300
MtCO2-eq in 2005. In the waste sector, landfill methane
is the largest source of GHG emissions, caused by theanaerobic degradation of organic material in landfills andunmonitored dumpsites. In the EU, emissions from waste(including disposal, landfill sites and water treatment)
amount to 2.8 per cent of total EU27 GHG emissions(Eurostat 2010c). Emissions from landfills depend on
waste characteristics (composition, density, particle size)and conditions in landfills (moisture, nutrients, microbes,
temperature and pH). Landfill gas (LFG) is about 50-60 per
cent methane with the remainder CO2 and traces of nonmethane volatile organics, halogenated organics and othercompounds. Further, ozone depleting substances (ODS)
released from discarded appliances (e.g. air conditioners,
refrigerators) and building materials (foams), as well as
industrial waste practices, contribute to ozone-layer
depletion. Many of those ODS are also potent GHGs that
contribute to climate change.

2.2 Opportunities
The opportunities for greening the waste sector comefrom three inter-related sources: 1) growth of the waste
market, driven by demand for waste services and recycled
products; 2) increased scarcity of natural resources and theconsequent rise in commodity prices, which influence thedemand for recycled products and WtE; and 3) emergenceof new waste-management technologies. Thesedevelopments have opened up significant opportunities
for greening the waste sector.
Growth of the waste market
Despite data limitations, there is a clear indication thatthe market for waste management is growing. The world
market for municipal waste, from collection to recycling,
is worth an estimated US$ 410 billion a year (Chalmin and
Gaillochet 2009). This estimate can only be indicative sinceassessing the exact market size is difficult given the paucityof reliable data, particularly in developing countries, andexisting data being limited to the formal component of thewaste-management sector.
Four factors are driving this growth: 1) the overall increasein the volume and variety of the waste generated; 2) rising
political awareness of the need to better manage waste
in the context of avoiding ecological and health risks andclimate change; 3) urbanisation in emerging economies,
which is typically accompanied with a growing interestin a better living environment including better waste

WasteBox 2: Companies resorting to eco-friendly packaging due toincreased consumer pressure
Increased consumer demand for recycled products hascompelled many companies to refurbish their productpackaging to reduce the impact on the environment.
Examples in North America include Hewlett Packard(HP), EnviroPAK (St. Louis) and Oxobioplast Inc.
(Toronto). Hewlett Packard insists that all its packaging
be recycled and labelled as such. EnviroPAK has shown
great interest recently in using complex recycled paper
pulp for packing electronic, small household appliances,management; and 4) development of formal and informal
trade in secondary raw materials recovered from waste.
Change in the consumer demand is a major determinant
underlining the potential greening of the waste sector.
With increased environmental awareness, more and moreconsumers have started demanding recycled products
and waste-derived compost. Box 2 gives examples ofcompanies switching to eco-friendly packaging in response
to consumer demand. In order to accrue benefits fromrecovered resources, there has been increased interest ininvesting in technologies such as biomethanation and WtE.
Of course, the waste market as it stands today is not necessarily
green and the ways in which waste is collected and recycled
may not fully comply with environmental standards andregulations. Very little data exist at present with which toestimate the magnitude of the green waste market, beyond
estimates of rates of recycling. Indeed, with recycling rates

Box 3: Recession and thepaper-recycling rate in the UK
The UK paper industry produced 4.3 million
tonnes of paper and cardboard in 2009, which
was 14 per cent less than the previous year.
Consumption declined by 10 per cent andexports dropped by 8 per cent comparedwith 2008, owing to the recession. The paperrecycling rate rose, however, to an all-timehigh of 90 per cent in 2009 and the collection
rate increased by 2 per cent year on year. The
UK’s paper-recycling rate is expected to rise to
100 per cent with the advent of new private
enterprises investing in facilities for the sector.
Source: Adapted from Packagingeurope (2010)

medical products, consumer goods, CDs and DVDs,
automotive parts and food and bottled goods. By opting
for paper pulp in the place of expanded polystyrene,
the company has claimed to save 70 per cent inpackaging and shipping costs. Oxobioplast Inc. uses
an additive called “Revert” to render its plastic products
biodegradable by breaking apart their polymer chains
after a permitted period of use.
Source: Adapted from MachineDesign (2008)

tof the informal sector reaching 20-50 per cent and existingsolid-waste management activities being of poor standard
in developing countries, it may not be prudent to use theexisting data without prior validation (Wilson et al. 2009).
Furthermore, where waste collection and recycling involves
child labour or indecent and unsafe working conditions, thewaste market should not be considered green.
The growth of the waste market, however, does provide
an opportunity for greening the sector. As the market
evolves and becomes mature, consumers are likely todemand stringent standards in order to avoid any healthand environmental risks. In the waste sector, existing
standards focus mostly on the protection of environmental
and human health, but working conditions and standards
for recycled products are increasingly receiving attention.
Market development in this direction thus provides aplatform on which to systematically introduce green
standards into waste management systems.
Scarcity of resources
Rapid population growth and economic expansion have
led to escalating demand for energy, basic industrial
commodities and consumer goods. Energy consumption,for example, is expected to rise steeply as the world’s
population is estimated to grow by 2.3 billion over the
next 40 years. This is expected to be almost entirely
concentrated in the urban centres of Asia, Latin Americaand Africa (Pareto and Pareto 2008). According to Leggett(2005), however, the world’s oil reserves are not adequate
to cope with the combined forces of depletion and demand
between 2008 and 2012. According to Energy Watch Group(2007) the fastest coal reserve depletion is happening
in China and USA is already beyond peak production ofcoal. Global coal production is expected to peak around2025 at 30 per cent above present production in the bestcase. Reduced energy supply has an immediate impact onenergy-intensive manufacturing sectors such as mining
and metal industries, reducing the production of materials
and pushing up the cost of manufacturing.

303

Towards a green economy
Percentage
1980

1987

1990

1993

1996

1999

2002

2005

100
80
60
40
20
0
USA

Iceland

EU 15

New Zealand

Korea

Switzerland

Japan

NorwayTurkeyFigure 7: Trends in glass recycling from 1980 to 2005 (percentage of apparent consumption)
Source: OECD (2008b)

Apart from oil and other commodities, metals are ofvital importance to the global economy, whether inthe manufacturing of buildings or cars or in the rapidly
expanding production of mobile phones, air conditioners,
refrigerators and other electronic consumer goods. If thetotal world population were to enjoy the same level ofmetals-use as in industrialised countries, the demand formetal stocks would be 3 to 9 times present levels.

in 2009 and 2010. Box 3 shows how recession had a positive
impact on the paper-recycling rate in the UK. The same,
however, cannot be said of countries such as China andIndia, where the average value of municipal scrap dropped
by up to 45 per cent during the economic slowdown,
probably because of the shrinkage of aggregate demand.
Similarly, the prices for used paper dropped dramatically inGermany when demand in China and India declined.

Amid this rapid consumption of the earth’s resources there
appears to be great potential to create new markets byrecycling and reusing existing metals, minerals, plastic,
wood and other materials. Currently, however, only aquarter of the 4 billion tonnes of municipal waste produced
each year is recovered or recycled (Chalmin and Gaillochet2009). For example, scrap metals, paper and cardboard,
compost, plastics are all valuable, relatively easy to recoverfrom waste streams and can displace raw materials thatare likely to become less readily available. One tonne ofelectronic scrap from PCs, for example, contains more gold
than that recovered from 17 tonnes of gold ore and 40
times more concentrated copper than that found in copperore (USGS 2001).

New technologies
The greening of the waste sector is also facilitated by significant
breakthroughs in technologies required for collection,
reprocessing and recycling waste, extracting energy fromorganic waste and efficient gas capture from landfills.
Compactor trucks, fore-and-aft tippers, container hoists andopen-or-closed top tailers are now available for the collection
and transportation of waste. Recovering energy and otheruseful products from waste has been enabled by considerable
technological breakthroughs. WtE technologies have
replaced incineration in many OECD countries. Mechanicaland biological treatment (MBT) and biomethanation have,for example, been recognised as suitable for processingorganic wet waste in developing countries. However,incomplete segregation of dry and wet organic waste has
been a major barrier to the widespread successful adoptionof these technologies in these countries. Techniques suchas vermin-composting and rapid composting have led toconversion of organic waste into useful agricultural manure
at a pace faster than natural decomposition. With the aid ofadvanced technologies, energy-rich components of waste
can be converted into useful products – a classical case ofthis concept is Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF), a popular productderived from high-calorific-value waste.

The increasing scarcity of resources and the rising costof extracting raw materials, which feeds into higher
commodity prices, are turning waste into a new source ofresources to be mined. Examples include the reprocessingof metal waste, composting, waste to energy, recycling of
e-waste and C&D waste. Figure 7 shows the rising trend
in glass recycling in several OECD countries. Demand forrecycled products can also increase at times of economic
difficulty, such as has been experienced in many countries

304

Waste3 Making an economic
case for investing in greening
the waste sector
A case for investing in greening the waste sector may bemade on various grounds. In the past, cases have been
made largely on environmental and health-related grounds,
based on costs that can be avoided by proper collection
and disposal. These arguments, particularly health-relatedones, continue to be important for motivating policy
actions.
In order to scale up the greening of the sector, however,environmental and health-related arguments alone are
inadequate or may be seen as competing with economic
imperatives. For policy-makers to channel significant
resources towards the greening of the sector, they need
to appreciate how such actions are likely to contributeto economic performance and job creation relative to
BAU scenarios. Adequate economic arguments are,therefore, needed to motivate fundamental changes in the
management of the sector.
To make a primarily economic case for investing ingreening the waste sector, three steps are needed, which
are elaborated on in this section. First, we need to have an
idea of the extent to which the sector could be greened.
Second, we need to have some ideas about the financing
gaps for priority areas. Third, given the priorities of greening
the sector, we need to show the potential gains if green
investment is made in those areas.

3.1 The goals and indicators forgreening the waste sector
There are no established international targets for greening
the waste sector, apart from the control of specific hazardous
substances as governed by international conventions. Most
goals are national or even local. For example, in northern
Europe, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, over 50 per
cent of waste is subjected to material-recovery processes(Chalmin and Gaillochet 2009). Japan has set material-flow
indicators that fall under three categories: input, cycle andoutput, to compare developments in recycling rates withthose of previous years. The indicators include resource
productivity in Yen per tonne (increased from 210,000 in1990 to 390,000 in 2010), recycle-use rate (increased from
8 per cent in 1990 to 14 per cent in 2010), and final-disposal
amount (decreased from 110 million tonnes in 1990 to

28 million tonnes in 2010 (Ministry of Environment, theGovernment of Japan 2008).
China has adopted the Circular Economy (CE) approach ina move towards achieving a more balanced growth as partof its 11th five-year plan. Pintér (2006) has shortlisted two
input indicators (direct material input and total material
requirement), one output indicator (domestic processed
output), two consumption indicators (domestic material
consumption and total material consumption) and twobalance indicators (physical trade balance and net addition
to stock) that could give credible information on the statusof implementation towards achieving the CE goal.
The Republic of Korea planned to increase its waste-recycling
rate of MSW from 56.3 per cent in 2007 to 61 per cent in 2012
(Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea, 2008). Under
the directive on packaging and packaging waste, the EU
increased the target for overall recycling from 25 per cent(min.) and 45 per cent (max.) in 1994 to 55 per cent (min.) and80 per cent (max.) in 2004 (EC 2009). As an example of citylevel 3R policies, London’s draft 2011 waste-management
plan sets a goal of 45 per cent municipal waste recycling/
composting by 2015, 70 per cent commercial/industrial
waste recycling/composting by 2020 and 95 per cent re-use
and recycling of C&D waste by 2020 (Mayor of London 2010).
Table 2 gives further examples of goals and targets that canbe used to measure progress in greening the waste sector.
In its Draft National Waste Management Strategy (NWMS),
the Department of Environmental Affairs (2010) of South
Africa has set out a minimum set of target parameters foruse by municipalities in the provision of waste services. The
target parameters include, number of households receiving
a waste service (per cent over time), budget allocations toensure financial support (percentage increase in budget
over time), equipment and infrastructure provision, numberof staff trained or capacitated to improve service, proportionof community that is aware of the waste-management
services, reduction of waste to landfill and improvementof cost recovery measures. Individual municipalities are
required to set out relevant target figures under theseparameters.
It is, therefore, difficult to have one-size-fits-all goals for thegreening of the waste sector. Generally speaking, however,305Towards a green economy
Targets

Resource efficiency or productivity

Examples
1. Japan’s Sound Material Cycle Society Target
Resource productivity (yen/ tonnes) calculated as GDP divided by amount of natural resources, etc. invested, to be increased from
210,000 in 1990 to 390,000 in 2010.
2. London Waste Targets from London Plan Draft, Mayor of London
85% regional self-sufficiency by 2020 (meaning dependency on only local and recycled resources).
1. Republic of Korea’s Green Growth Target for Waste
Increase in percentage of MSW recycling from 56.3 % in 2007 to 61 % in 2012.

Waste recycling rate

2. Japan’s Sound Material Cycle Society Target
Cycle use rate (Cyclical use amount ÷ [cyclical use amount + amount of natural resource input]), to increase from 8% in 1990 to 14%
in 2010. The status as of 2000 was 10%.
3. London Waste Targets from London Plan Draft, Mayor of London
45% municipal waste recycling/composting by 2015
70% commercial/industrial waste recycling/composting by 2020
95% re-use and recycling of C&D waste by 2020.
1. The EC Landfill Directive Council Directive 1999/31/EC
not later than 16 July 2016, biodegradable municipal waste going to landfill must be reduced to 35 % of the total amount by weightof biodegradable municipal waste produced in 1995 or the latest year before 1995 for which standardised Eurostat data is available.

Waste landfilled

2. Japan’s Sound Material Cycle Society Target
Amount of waste landfilled to be reduced from 110 million tonnes in 1990 to 28 million tones in 2010. The status in 2000 was 56
million tonnes.
3. Flemish Waste Management Policy, Belgium
Residents should not generate more than 150 kg of residual waste (waste to be landfilled or incinerated) per inhabitant per year.

Table 2: Indicators to measure the greening of the waste sector
Sources: EC (1999), Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan (2008), Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea (2008), EEA (2010), Lee (2010), Mayor of London (2010)

in greening the waste sector, all countries should seek
to: 1) avoid waste in the first place through sustainablecommunity practices, 2) minimise the generation ofwaste; 3) recover materials and energy from waste andre-manufacture and recycle waste into usable products,
where waste is inevitable; and 4) treat any remaining
unusable waste in an environmentally friendly or in the least
damaging way. For developing countries, one of the goals
should be the formalisation of the waste sector, following
environmental guidance and labour- protection measures.
The goals of greening the waste sector cannot be
achieved without increased investment. Minimisingwaste generation requires changes to product design
and production processes upstream (some of the related
issues are addressed in the Industry chapter). Downstream
recovering, remanufacturing, recycling, and final treatment
require new facilities or upgrading of existing facilities.
Investment is also needed to train the labour force in the
sector as well as to formalise the informal sector.

306

sector. The percentage of the waste spending relative to
GDP may be similar for developing and developed countries(looking at specific cases), but there is a significant differencein the amount spent on waste management expressed inper capita terms. Dhaka city, for example, spends US$ 0.9 per
capita per year (0.2 per cent of GDP) on MSW management
whereas Vienna spends US$ 137 per capita per year (0.4 percent of GDP) (Fellner 2007).
Another major phenomena to note is that developing countries
typically spend more than half of their waste budget in collection
alone (mainly on labour and fuel), although the collection rate
remains low and the transport of waste inefficient. Spending
on other segments of the waste management chain, such astechnologies and facilities for treatment, recovery and disposal,
is generally rather low.

3.2 Spending in the waste sector

In these countries, increased investment in basic collection
services, the transport of waste and cleaning up dumpsites
is a starting point for greening the sector. Investment canbe targeted, for example, at techniques such as route
optimisation and transfer stations, which can bring down
the capital and operational costs of providing waste services.

There is a substantial variation across countries in themagnitude of government spending on the waste sector.
Waste management is a municipal service that is mostly
financed through municipal funds, although private
involvement has been observed in recent times. Section
5.1 describes the various financing options available for the

In emerging economies with rapid growth and urbanisation,
the need for increased investment in greening the waste
sector is particularly strong. The World Bank, for example,
has estimated that China has to increase its national waste
management budget by at least eight-fold from 1999
levels by 2020, which requires the allocation of 230 billion

Waste100

112,27 238,4 104

0,95

55

840

0,18

84,6

259

3,5

16,5

10,15

82

120

2

80
1,5

60
1
40
0,5
20

0

Austria

Czech
Republic

Belgium

Estonia

Denmark

FranceFinland

Hungary

NorwayNetherlands
FYR ofMacedonia

Spain

Slovakia

Switzerland

Expenditure on Contaminated Sites as % of GDP

Breakup of public and private expenditure (%)

Total expenditure (in million Euros)
67

Expenditure on
contaminatedsites aspercentage
of GDP
Publicexpenditure
Privateexpenditure0

SwedenFigure 8: Total public and private expenditure on reclamation of contaminated sites in Europe
Source: Adapted from EEA (2007)

RMB (US$ 126 billion) to provide and construct MSW
management infrastructure (World Bank 2005).
European countries spend a significant amount on
reclaiming contaminated sites, which can become valuableassets for industrial estates and commercial areas (seeFigure 8). Expenditure ranges from 0.4 to 0.5 per cent of GDP
in countries including Belgium, France, the Netherlands andSwitzerland, to 1 per cent in Hungary and 1.8 per cent in
the Czech Republic. In most of these countries, the private
sector participates in funding the reclamation. In the Czech
Republic, the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia,
and Spain, however, the spending comes entirely from thepublic sector.
The appropriateness of different waste treatment methods
can be influenced by factors such as urban population density,
availability of space and policy enforcement capacity. In placesof higher population density and limited space such as in thecities of Japan and northern Europe, most waste is incinerated.
In places of lower population density and greater availabilityof space such as Australia, controlled sanitary landfilling ismore common. State-of-the art sanitary landfilling is also usedin the UK, Ireland, the USA, Greece, Spain and Italy. In somedeveloping countries, emerging economies and even regionsof developed countries where policy-enforcement capacity is
weak, open landfills and incineration without energy recovery
remains common practice.
Fundamentally, however, the choice of treatment options
is based on a cost-benefit analysis. For example, if we only
focus on the cost of technologies, landfilling appears to be
as attractive as composting. Porter’s data of 2002, however,shows that landfilling will incur an additional environmental

and social cost of between US$ 45 and US$ 75 per tonne. In
this context, composting becomes a more attractive option
than landfilling. Thus, a total cost-benefit analysis that
addresses economic, environmental and social perspectives
becomes necessary in making the right choice of technology.
Recognising the negative impacts of the least-preferredwaste management options, many national and regional
authorities have established command-and-control targets
for better management of landfill sites and incinerators, anddiversion of waste away from these facilities. For example,
the U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)(1976) was amended (Federal Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (HSWA) in 1984 to include the phasing outof land disposal of hazardous solid waste. The Landfill
Disposal Programme Flexibility Act (1996) also stipulates
environmental management standards for land disposal. In
Europe, the European Union Landfill Council Directive 99/31/
EC of 26 April 1999 aims to prevent or reduce as far as possible
negative effects on the environment from the landfilling ofwaste, by introducing stringent technical requirements. The
Landfill Directive also obliges Member States to reduce theamount of biodegradable waste going to landfill to 35 percent of 1995 levels by 2016. The Directive on the Incinerationof Waste (2000/76/EC) produces similar regulation forthermal treatment facilities. Japan’s Sound Material Cycle
target was to reduce the amount of waste landfilled from
110 million tonnes in 1990 to 28 million tonnes in 2010.
These Command and Control (CAC) approaches have beeneffective, particularly because economies of scale could beachieved by the legislative measure and the supply of wastematerials could subsequently be ensured. However, CAC
approaches are costly and require substantial enforcement
capacity to produce results.

307

Towards a green economy
Particulars

Low-income countries

Middle-income countries

High-income countries< $5,000$5,000 – $15,000$5,000 – $15,000

20

20 – 70

130 - 300

Municipal waste (kg/capita/year)

150 – 250

250 – 550

350 – 750

Formal collection rate of municipal waste< 70%

70% – 95%

> 95%

Statutory waste management framework

No or weak* national environmental
strategy, little application of thestatutory framework, absence ofstatistics

National environmental strategy,
Ministry of the Environment,
statutory framework but insufficient
application, few statistics

National environmental strategy,
Ministry of the Environment,
statutory framework set up andapplied, sufficient statistics

Informal collection

Highly developed, substantial volume
capture, tendency to organise incooperatives or associations

Developed and in process ofinstitutionalisation

Quasi non-existent

Organic/fermentable

50 – 80

20 – 65

20 – 40

Paper and cardboard

4 – 1515 – 40

15 – 50

Plastics

5 – 12

7 – 15

10 – 15

Metals

1–5

1–5

5–8

Glass

1–5

1–5

5–8

GDP in $/capita/year
Average consumption of paper and cardboard by
kg/capita/year

Municipal waste composition (% weight basis)

Moisture content

50% – 80%

40% – 60%

20% – 30%

Calorific value (in kcal/kg dry basis)

800 – 1,100

1,100 – 1,300

1,500 – 2,700

Waste treatment

Uncontrolled landfills > 50% Informal
recycling 15%

Landfill sites > 90%, start of selective
collection, organised recycling 5%,
coexistent informal recycling

Selective collection, incineration,
recycling > 20%

Informal recycling

Highly developed, substantial volume
capture, tendency to organise incooperatives or associations

Developed and in process ofinstitutionalisation

Quasi non-existent* In some countries, environmental strategies are weak and not comprehensive.

Table 3: Waste collection typologies by GDP per capita
Source: Adapted from Chalmin and Gaillochet (2009)

In low-income countries, recycling is mostly controlled
by an informal sector that is usually unrecognised bygovernments and primarily driven by the cost of raw
materials and cheap labour. But the poor collection-togeneration ratio and exploitation of the available recyclable
component by the informal sector makes it difficult to
calculate overall recycling levels in developing countries.
Table 3 gives the waste collection typologies by GDP per
capita, which shows the informal sector being a dominant
force in the waste management system.
Global data, however, do not exist to show the investment
gaps between the current state of the waste sector and thedesired green state. This poses a challenge for estimating
how much investment is required, globally, to green thewaste sector.

3.3 Benefits from investment ingreening the waste sector
Greening the waste sector is expected to generate
substantial economic, environmental and social benefits.
They include: 1) natural resource and energy saving;2) creation of new businesses and jobs; 3) compost

308

production supporting organic agriculture; 4) energy
production from waste; 5) reduced GHG emissions; and 6)
contributions to equity and poverty eradication. Improved
health, avoided health costs, avoided water contaminationand the consequent cost of alternative water supply arealso important streams of benefits. In addition, greening
the waste sector in the entire supply chain is expected togenerate a whole range of benefits not fully identified in
the above list. Given the limited availability of quantitative
information, however, this section is not able to substantiatethese benefits. Further research is needed in these areas.
Resource and energy conservation
Practicing 3R reduces the demand for raw materials.
This is called the resource conservation effect (Ferrerand Ayres 2000). The United States Energy Information
Administration (EIA) suggests, for example, that recycling
paper will save up to 17 trees and reduce water-use by 50
per cent. Also related to this resource conservation effectis the embedded market value of the waste recyclables.
In the State of Washington, USA, for example, such value(which was not captured) from solid waste recyclables
disposed – including paper, cardboard, metals, plastics,
glass, and electronics – grew from US$ 182.4 million in 2003
to US$ 320 million in 2008 (State of Washington 2010). A

Wastepositive example, however, is found in Viridor, a leading UK
waste management company whose turnover in 2008/09
reached £ 528 million and whose profit had grown at 22
per cent since 2000/01, 40 per cent of which resulted fromvalue recovered from waste (Drummond 2010).
Aluminium is a major recyclable resource. According to
the European Aluminium Association and Organizationof European Aluminium Refiners and Remelters, theglobal aluminium recycling rates are about 90 per centfor transport and construction appliances and 60 per centfor beverage cans. The lower cost of recycled aluminium
results from drastically lower energy consumption than isrequired to smelt it from the raw material, bauxite. Recycled
aluminium can be used in all its applications, from castings
for automotive and engineering components to extrusion
billets, rolling slabs to a deoxidising agent in the steel
industry.
Figure 9 shows the growing capacity of the aluminium
industry in Western Europe, which almost tripled its output
from about 1.2 million tonnes in 1980 to 3.7 million tonnes
in 2003, primarily because the recycling activity of smelters
increased by 94 per cent in this period. By doing so, Europe
conserved approximately 16.4 million tonnes of bauxite
and 200,000 tonnes of alloying elements such as silicon,
copper, iron, magnesium, manganese, zinc and otherelements used for strengthening and other purposes.
Europe also saved 1.5 million m3 of landfill space in theprocess.
European Environment Agency (EEA) demonstrates thatby recycling 1 tonne of aluminium, the following resourcesavings could be accrued: 1.3 tonnes of bauxite residues;
15 m3 of cooling water and 0.86 m3 of process water.
Furthermore, 2 tonnes of CO2 and 11 kg of SO2 can be
avoided.
Aside from resource conservation, there also exists anenergy-saving benefit from substituting virgin materials
with resources recovered from waste streams. According
to the Natural Resource Defence Council (NRDC), recyclingis the most energy conserving of all waste management
strategies. The Natural Resource Defense Council (1997)
stresses that materials sent to an incinerator release energy
only once, whereas recycling can provide energy savings
through several production cycles. Recycling a tonne ofaluminium and steel, for example, saves the equivalent of
37 and 2.7 barrels of oil, respectively. On the contrary, whenincinerated, these materials absorb heat and reduce theamount of net energy produced.
Energy savings in turn bring reductions in GHG emissions. For
example, using recycled blast furnace slag to make cement
is believed to save up to 59 per cent of the embodied CO2
emissions and 42 per cent of the embodied energy required
to manufacture concrete and its constituent materials

Number of companies

200

Production ofrecycled aluminium
Metric tonnes / year

189

< 10,000< 40,000

150< 50,000> 50,000

100

74
50
37
0

31
2

14 15

4

1994

2003

Figure 9: Growing capacity of recycled aluminium
industry in Western Europe
Source: Adapted from EEA and OEA (2006)(World Steel Association 2010). Recycling in the UK, in
general, is already saving around 10-15 million tonnes of CO2
equivalent per year (WRAP 2006). Table 4 provides estimateson energy savings from waste recycling and the net GHG
flux savings (which refers to the net amount of GHG saved inan activity factoring the related emissions, absorptions, andoffsets) from avoided landfilling.
A potential trade-off from making the transition to a
resource recovery-based economy, however, may include
Savings on carbon
price in US$ per1000 tonnes ofrecycled material(US$ 13.4 per
tonne of CO2 eq.)

Type ofmaterial

Energysavings1,2 (%)

GHG flux savingfrom recycling3(kg CO2 eq. per
tonne of recycledmaterial)

Aluminium

90-95

95

1,273

Ferrous

74

63

844

Textiles

NA

60

804

Steel

62 - 74

1,512

20,260

Copper35 - 85

NA

-

Lead

60 - 65

NA

-

Paper

40

177

2,372

Zinc

60

NA

-

Plastic

80 - 90

41 (HDPE)

549

Glass

20

30

402

NA: Data not available

Table 4: Energy savings and GHG flux savings
due to waste recycling

Source: BIR (2008), BMRA (2010), Glass Packaging Institute (2010), World Steel Association (2011) and European Communities (2001)309

Towards a green economy

Box 4: Cost savings and resource recovery from recycling■■ The Prostheses Foundation in Chiang Mai, Thailand
conducts a sensational programme using recycledmaterials. The foundation produces artificial limbs
from aluminium ring-pulls collected from beverage
canisters. The ring-pulls contain titanium, a light,
strong, lustrous, corrosion-resistant and valuable
metal. They are collected from sources all over thecountry including several large companies. Some
35,000 ring-pulls produce 1 kg of useable metal,from which two artificial limbs can be fashioned. The
foundation has recycled nearly 5,000 tonnes of ringpulls and has created a positive net socio-economic
impact. Prosthetics made of recycled aluminium aremuch cheaper (typically Thai Baht 5,500 (US$ 160)
a piece) than similar imported ones (THB 90,000(US$ 2,650). Furthermore, an artificial leg made froman initial loss in economies of scale already establishedin extraction, which could have implications for the
manufacturing industries, perhaps in terms of increased
cost of goods in the short to medium term. This has yet
to be quantitatively studied. In any event, it is expectedthat – as the systems of 3R get mainstreamed in businessprocesses and as the markets mature – the costs of goods
will stabilise and could even go down. Box 4 provides
examples of recycling leading to cost savings and therecovery of precious metals.
Job creation
The labour force that underpins the recycling sector
contributes significantly to solving one or more global
environmental issues (e.g. climate mitigation or preventing
pollution). These workers, whether they are formallyemployed or are self-employed, should be considereda category of the agents of change that environmental
and economic policies rely upon. The high value of theircontribution to climate policies and social value-added
should therefore be widely and more clearly recognised.
Recycling is one of the most important sectors in termsof employment creation. However, many recycling or
waste-management-related jobs can not be consideredgreen as they do not match the basic requirements ofdecent work. Priority indicators of decent work include:
child labour, occupational health and safety, social
protection and freedom of association (various forms oforganisation of workers such as unions, local associations
and cooperatives). On the other hand, because jobs inthe recycling chain represent a source of income forworkers who usually have low levels of education orpoor backgrounds, these jobs are an important element

310

recycled ring-pulls weighs just 6 kg, while many similar
imported products weigh about 11 kg.
Source: Prosthetic Foundation (2007)■■ A recycling campaign to collect used mobile
phones in Japan was launched in November 2009and involved 1,886 stores and supermarkets. Those
who returned used mobile phones in exchange forpurchasing a new device were invited to enter a lottery
to win coupons worth 1,000-50,000 Yen (equivalent
to US$ 12 to US$ 600) depending on the price of themobile phone they bought. The initiative collected569,464 mobile phones containing precious metals
amounting to 22 kg of gold, 140 mg of silver, 10 g ofcopper and 4 mg of palladium in just four months.
Source: Mohanty (2010)of poverty alleviation. A detailed discussion of the social
dimension is presented in Box 5.
A recent estimate suggests that up to 15 million people areengaged in waste collection for their livelihood in developing
countries (Medina 2008). The US recycling industry is
estimated to have earned US$ 236 billion in revenue in 2007,
employing over a million people and accounting for about 2
per cent of the country’s GDP (EPN 2009). Over half a million
waste pickers have been reported in Brazil and the country
has close to 2,400 companies and cooperatives involved inrecycling and scrap trading (UNEP 2008).
In Buenos Aires, an estimated 40,000 waste scavengers
are estimated to have an economic impact of US$ 1.78
million per year, close to 0.05 per cent of the city’s GDP(Medina 2008). Other estimates put the number of waste
scavengers in India at least at a million, while in China up
to 10 million workers are reportedly involved in recycling
activities (UNEP 2008). Scheinberg et al. (2010) studied
informal recyclers in six cities: Cairo, Egypt; Cluj-Napoca,
Romania; Lima, Peru; Lusaka, Zambia; Pune, India; andQuezon City (part of Metro Manila), the Philippines. They
found that more than 75,000 individuals and their families
are engaged in recycling about 3 million tonnes of waste
per year with an economic value of more than US$ 120
million.
In developing countries the recycling segment of the waste
industry is predominantly controlled by the informal sector,
and it is often hazardous, unsafe work. Typically, 1 per centof the urban population in developing countries is involved
in informal scavenging, most of whom are women andchildren. Hence, efforts are needed to provide recognition,WasteBox 5: The social dimension of waste management and recycling
jobs – implications for decent work and poverty reduction3
In recent years, motivated by the need tosimultaneously address the environmental
degradation and boost income generation at the
local and community level, a number of projects
for recycling materials have been implemented indeveloping countries. Given that jobs involving
the collection, processing and distribution ofrecyclables are usually performed by workers who
have few options elsewhere in the economy, jobs
in the recycling chain bear a significant pro-poorcomponent.
In Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, a project forcollecting and recycling plastic waste has helped
improve the environmental situation and has
created jobs and generated income for locals. The
project gave rise to the first recycling centre in the
country, which is managed by 30 women and two
technicians, all locals working eight hours a day, fivedays a week, and earning the equivalent of US$ 50
per month, a relatively good salary compared withother occupations in the local economy. The 2,000
or so waste collectors earn up to US$ 0.8 per day.
Since implementation, the city and its suburbs arecleaner. Furthermore, many people have managed
to secure an income, either by collecting the plastic
waste or by working as full-time employees at therecycling centre. Many of them used to be among
the poorest of Ouagadougou’s suburban population(ILO 2007).
In Dhaka, Bangladesh, a project generating compost
from organic waste helped create 400 new jobs incollection activities and 800 new jobs in the processof composting. Workers collect 700 tonnes of organic
waste per day, which produces 50,000 tonnes ofcompost per year. These jobs provide workers withhealth insurance, access to a daycare center and afree meal. Other benefits include cheaper compost,a reduced need for irrigation and improved soil
quality (Sinha and Enayetullah 2010).
From an employment/social perspective, it iscritical to address the need for the progressive
formalisation of the waste sector at the same timethat environmental and economic objectives arebeing pursued. This can be tackled by creating
new types of jobs and reorganising the economic

segments. Typical examples include door-to-doorcollection of MSW, up-stream sorting of municipal
and industrial waste, industry-to-industry waste
exchanges, segmentation of waste collection
and waste recovery services (e.g. used lead acidbatteries and oily waste), the emergence ofcontracting services, collective organisations, skillsdevelopment programmes to come to terms withthe type of material that is handled by workers
and enterprises and the use of environmentallysound technologies for waste management and theintroduction of targeted Occupational Health and
Safety (OHS) programmes.
The application of national labour laws and OHS
legislation to the informal economy is one of the mostimportant challenges facing many countries. At thesame time, OHS provides possibly the easiest entry
point for the extension of basic labour protection
including basic OHS measures. The work of the ILO
and its recommendations regarding the informal
economy should be considered in the context ofthe formalisation of the waste-management sector(workers, skills, OHS, co-operatives, etc) (ILO 2010).
Social innovations have proven critical in achieving
sustainable outcomes by favouring a stakeholders
approach. In this regard, utilising social andenvironmental entrepreneurs and/or trade unions
to help informal waste workers to improve theirworking and living conditions are key options to
consider. For example, the Best of 2 Worlds project, aresult of joint work by Solving the e-waste Problem(StEP) and Umicore a precious metal refining group,
investigates the eco-efficiency of the manual
dismantling of e-waste in China with control overenvironmental factors.
From a green-economy perspective, enhancing
decent work and labour standards are also an
equally important priority for the creation of
productive jobs alongside the need to exploit theeconomic opportunities that the waste sector canyield. This can be partly achieved through technicaland technological improvements. However, thesector is also replete with attempts to introduce
technologies that are not adapted to local contexts,
leading to major setbacks.

3. Box developed based on contributions received from ILO to this chapter.

311

Towards a green economy

Box 6: Turning urban manure into organic fertiliser
The Kunming Dongran Technology Company in China
is a business that specialises in treating human waste
through anaerobic digestion and turning the bio-slurry
into an organic fertiliser. Dongran Technology was
founded in 2003 with a capital investment of 10 million
RMB (1.5 million US$). With the advancement of itsscientific capabilities, the Yunnan National Reform andDevelopment Commission approved Dongran as a BuildOperate-Transfer project for Kunming City’s Wu HuaDistrict. This allows the enterprise to receive government
funding to finance, design, construct and operate a facility,
and to recover its investment, operation and maintenanceexpense. In most urban areas, human waste is treatedwith wastewater, but Dongran specifically treats humanwaste as a separate entity and therefore reduces therespect and appropriate protection to ensure that issues
related to health and safety are adequately addressed.
According to the Institute of Local Self Reliance (ILSR), sortingand processing recyclables alone sustains ten times morejobs than landfilling or incineration on a per-tonne basis.
The recycling industries in the USA experienced remarkable
growth from 8,000 companies employing 79,000 people
and generating US$ 4.6 billion in sales in 1967 to more than
56,000 public- and private-sector facilities that sustained 1.1
million jobs generating US$ 236 billion in gross annual sales
in 2000 (ILSR 2002). Recovery and recycling of used electricaland electronic appliances creates servicing or technician
jobs. Such working skills should be developed throughtraining and national certification programmes focusing on
repairing and servicing requirements for used appliances.
As the waste business becomes more sophisticated,
new avenues for employment are opening up. These
include the application of information technology (e.g.
for waste-tracking and mapping using Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) and/or Geographic Positioning
Systems (GPS), accounting software for waste-charging
using Management Information System (MIS); masscommunication for awareness and training for skill
development. Data on these new developments are,however, not readily available.
Although waste collection, segregation, and reprocessing
are labour-intensive activities, the overall effect on
net employment cannot be generalised. Reduction in
employment could result from centralisation of energy
recovery and treatment operations such as composting
and landfilling. Porter (2002) cautions that jobs createdby recycling replace jobs elsewhere in the economy andare often low-wage positions. In the process of greening,312

likelihood of disease transmission. Additionally, throughDongran’s separation of manure from the wastewater
treatment process, the Environmental Protection andSanitation Bureau’s waste management burden is
reduced. While Dongran receives money from Kunming’s
Wu Hua District to treat the waste, Dongran’s main sourceof income is from producing organic manure through thefermentation of human waste, which turns the waste intoa marketable product. The solid organic manure is used
on tobacco farms, a major industry and source of income
for Yunnan Province, and also on vegetables, flowers,
fruits and tea, and the liquid organic manure is often used
as a nutrient for seeds.
Source: Greening China. Available at: http://greeningchina.wordpress.com/2010/08/
25/turning-urban-manure-into-organic-fertilizer/

job losses in industries involved in the extraction of virginmaterials and associated utilities could be of concern, as
the increased use of recycled material implies reduced
resource extraction, despite broader gains to the economy.
However, the overall net employment effect appears to bepositive. For example, studies have found that for every
100 jobs created in recycling, 13 jobs are lost in solid waste
and virgin material extraction in North Carolina, USA (CEQ
1997).
The concept of creative re-use has also arisen, generating
new jobs and value-added products that could be soldfor profit. United Nations Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD) observes that international tradein creative goods and services grew at an unprecedented
average rate of 8.7 per cent a year from 2000-05, with China
being the leading exporter (UNCTAD 2008). Organisations
such as the School and Community Reuse Action Project(SCRAP) in the USA and the Scrap Arts Project Limited in the
UK promote the creative reuse of waste by offering training
through workshops. China has a thriving business in the
manufacture of recycled products that are mostly madefrom waste or semi-finished recycled products available
in Africa (see Box 5 for an example of waste recycling
generating decent jobs and helping to reduce poverty).
Compost production
The use of composted organic waste as a fertiliser andsoil conditioner brings economic benefits to small-scale
farmers and reduces nutrient run-off and nitrogen leaching(Nyamangara et al. 2003). It could also increase carbon
management properties of the soil and enhance the crop
yields. An estimate of the economic value of these benefits,
however, is not readily available. Box 6 provides an example
on how organic waste can be turned in to a marketableproduct with wider benefits for the municipality. The

WasteBox 7: Rural energy supply from waste■■ Agri-business ventures promoting conversionof organically-rich biomass waste into biogas havegreat potential to supply power to rural regions. The
Asian Development Bank (ADB) has supported theinstallation of over 7,500 biogas digesters in morethan 140 rural villages in China and has suggested
potential models for agri-business ventures such ascommunity-based, small-scale industries, small- andmedium- scale industries and large-scale industries
for the Greater Mekong sub-region (GMS).
Source: Owens 2009■■ Anaerobic digestion of organic solid waste to
generate fuel for cooking has been shown to be a
promising option for villages and small towns intropical countries such as India. More than 2,000 small-

chapter on agriculture expands on the business case forusing waste to enhance crop production.
An indirect estimate is in terms of the avoided loss of tradeowing to the excessive use of chemical fertilisers. The Foodand Fertilizer Technology Center (FFTC) for the Asia andPacific region, for example, have attributed the reduction
in export volume and foreign demand of some agricultural
produce in the region to high fertiliser residue levels.
Such economic losses could be avoided by using organic
compost for agricultural production.
Energy production from waste
Recovering energy and other useful by-products fromwaste has been made possible by considerable technologicalbreakthroughs, which have led to the implementation of
WtE projects. The WtE market was estimated at US$ 19.9
billion in 2008 and according to forecasts, the market wouldgrow by 30 per cent by 2014 (Argus Research Company,
Independent International Investment Research Plc and
Pipal Research Group 2010). The Republic of Korea, forexample, has a set a target for proportion of energy to besourced from waste and biomass at 3.17 per cent in 2013
and 4.16 per cent in 2020 (Ministry of Environment, Republicof Korea, 2009). This is expected to result in a reductionof GHG emissions of 9.1 million tonnes in 2013 and 44.82
million tonnes in 2020. The nation has planned to convert allof its waste facilities to energy-recovery by 2020 by building
at least 74 RDF and biogas plants, 24 energy-generating
incinerators and 25 landfill-gas recovery plants (Ministry ofEnvironment, Republic of Korea, 2009).
In most cases, energy-recovery projects provide
opportunities for generation and distribution of power onscale plants running on kitchen and market waste anda few anaerobic medium-scale plants in India and Sri
Lanka are reportedly working successfully.
Source: EAWAG (2007)■■ About 500 rural households in the Indian stateof Bihar have been benefiting from off-grid power
generated from rice husk since 2008. Three quintals(300 kg) of rice husk are used per day in a power
plant to generate 32 kilowatts of power. The rice husk
costs Rs 60 (US$ 1.3) per quintal. The production cost
per plant per month is about Rs 20,000 (US$ 426).
There is sufficient electricity for a household to lightup two rooms and charge a mobile phone for about
US$ 2 per month.
Source: IFC (2010)

a decentralised basis where the electricity grid may not
be available. For example, agricultural residue generated
primarily in rural areas amounting to 140 billion tonnes
globally has been reported to have an energy potential
equivalent to 50 billion tonnes of oil (UNEP 2009c). Box
7 provides examples of the role of waste in meetingthe demand for rural energy in Asia and successful
entrepreneurial endeavours.
Energy-recovery projects have also been the recent focusof government investments in developed countries. In
particular, there has been much interest in the EU owing
to the binding targets under the EU Renewable Energy
Directive (OECD 2009). Figure 10 shows the rising trend forenergy production from renewable (biomass residues) andnon-renewable (pellet-based waste to energy) municipal
waste in the EU.
While biomethanation has been successful in Europe
owing to excellent source-segregated waste upstream,
the technology has not been so successful in many Asian
cities where segregation of waste at source is low oralmost absent. Large-scale biogas plants have proved tobe economically viable with return on investments (RoI)
reported to be in the order of 7 per cent to 15 per cent(Singh 2006). Smaller decentralised biogas plants benefit
from a lower pay-back period owing to the avoided cost of
disposal, resulting in a pay-back of two to four years.
With advanced technologies, waste itself can be converted
into useful energy products. The EU alone has been
estimated to produce three million tonnes of RDF in 2003
(EC 2003). Thermal technologies have been reported
to contribute to a major share of the market, namely to313

Towards a green economy

Renewable waste
Thousand TeraJoule net
1980
600

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2006

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2006

500
400
300
200
100
0

Non-renewable waste
Thousand TeraJoule net
1980
600

1984

500
400
300
200
100
0
OECD Total

OECD Pacific

OECD North America

OECD Europe

Figure 10: Energy production from renewable and non-renewable municipal waste in Europe
Source: UN (2010a)

about 93 per cent (US$ 18.5 billion). The rest of the market
share, about 7 per cent (US$ 1.4 billion), was attributed tobiological technologies. Japan, Canada and the UK are also
experimenting with advanced thermal technologies such as
Plasma Arc Gasification.
Reduced GHG emissions
The greening of the waste sector offers promising
opportunities to mitigate climate change. According torecent national estimates by the UNFCCC, the waste sector,
including waste water, produces on average 2.8 per centof national GHG emissions (IPCC 2007a). The Montreal
Protocol’s Technology and Economic Assessment Panel(TEAP) estimated that worldwide ODS banks are available

314

at approximately 3.78 million ODP-weighted tonnes in2002 (55 times the global consumption of ODS in 2007)
and have the potential to release over 20 billion tCO2-eq of
GHGs (UNEP 2009b).
Incineration and industrial co-combustion for WtE are
believed to be able to provide important climate-related
benefits in two areas.
First, these technologies help reduce GHG emissions.
According to IPCC (2007b), the total global mitigation
potential for reducing landfill methane emissions in 2030 isestimated to be more than 1000 MtCO2-eq (or 70 per centof estimated emissions) at costs below US$ 100/tCO2-eq/

Wasteyr. Between 20 and 30 per cent of projected emissions for2030 can be reduced at negative cost and 30-50 per centat costs of less than US$ 20/tCO2-eq/yr. More significant
emission reductions are achievable at a higher cost, byadditionally exploiting the mitigation potential in thermal
processes for WtE.
Second, they can earn carbon credits. The CDM introduced
under the Kyoto Protocol awards credit to avoided
emissions from waste and hence can be applicable for all
waste to energy, landfill gas recovery for power generationand composting projects. Figure 11 depicts the total
number of CDM projects registered by a few non-annex I
countries and the fraction of projects registered in the waste
sector as on February 2010. The World Bank has estimatedthe potential annual carbon finance revenues per million
residents at US$ 2,580,000 for landfill gas recovery, US$
1,327,000 for composting, up to US$ 3,500,000 for recycling
and US$ 115,000 (plus the fuel savings) for transfer stations(Hoornweg and Giannelli 2007). Landfill gas recovery from
1 million tonnes of waste leads to a reduction of 31,500
tonnes of CO2 equivalent to a potential yielding revenue of
US$140,000 per year (carbon price at US$ 4.5 per tonne),
when registered as a CDM project (Greiner 2005).

Percentage
0
20
Egypt

40

60

80

100
7

Argentina
18

Brazil
180

India
582

China
1100

Total CDM Projects

Figure 11: CDM projects registered by a few NonAnnex I Countries (as on December 2010)
Source: UNFCCC (2010)

Box 8: Waste-based carbon credits
n Fly ash re-utilisation earns carbon credits
In India, about 26,000 hectares of land is coveredby ash ponds. This land contains nearly 90 million
tonnes of flyash that is generated annually in the
country. It is estimated that every tonne of flyash
reused to make concrete reduces 1 tonne of CO2
equivalent GHG emissions. Lafarge India Pvt. Ltd.
has implemented a CDM project activity throughfly ash reuse to replace clinker in Arasmat Cement
Plant in Chattisgarh, India. By increasing the fractionof flyash (to replace clinker) added to blended
cement procured from a thermal power station,
the project activity has been successful in reducing
approximately 69,359 tonnes of CO2e per year, witha potential to earn CERs worth US$ 0.9 million.
Source: UNFCCC (2006)

n Material recycling from solid waste earns
carbon credits
A new small-scale methodology called “AMS-III AJ
Recovery and Recycling of Materials from Solid Wastes”
valid from 26 March 2010 was approved by the CDM
Executive Body (EB). This enables the recovery andrecycling of High Density Poly Ethylene (HDPE) and
Low Density Poly Ethylene (LDPE) plastics in MSW toprocess them into intermediate or finished products
such as plastic resin. It negates the need to produce
virgin HDPE and LDPE materials in dedicated facilities
and results in energy savings and reduced emissions
and is eligible to earn carbon credits. However, thewastes must be procured locally, from sources locatedwithin 200 km of the recycling facilities; plastics alreadysegregated from the rest of the waste and transported
more than 200 km distance are not eligible.
Source: CDM EB (2010)

n CDM projects in Dhaka, Bangladesh
Waste Concern, a non-profit organisation in
Bangladesh, has registered two waste-related CDM
projects in Dhaka. One of the projects involves
composting 700 tonnes of organic waste a day in thecity and generating some 624,000 tCO2 equivalents
over the first crediting period of 2006-2012. The
project will reduce GHG emissions by diverting
high organic waste from a landfill to an aerobic
composting process. Another project on landfillgas extraction and utilisation at Matuail landfill site,
Dhaka, has been registered to realise 566,000 tCO2
equivalents over the same period.
Source: UNFCCC (2005)

315

Towards a green economy
Most of the landfill sites in China and India have been small
and non-sanitary, and many larger sites have only been
built over the last ten years. This has resulted in the low
number of CDM projects in the waste sector (9 per cent of
all registered CDM projects). This situation is expected tochange over the next ten years.
Brazil is the leading developing country that has exploited
the CDM option for the waste sector with 72 registeredprojects and over 10 million Certified Emissions Reductions(CER). The CER potential of proposed Landfill Gas to Energy(LFGTE) projects in 11 landfills from four countries: Brazil (3),Colombia (6), Peru (1) and Uruguay (1), has been estimatedat 16.98 million tCO2eq by the World Bank. The CER benefits
from waste recycling are illustrated in Box 8.
Supporting equity and poverty reduction
Waste is the sector in which the issue of equity and poverty
is probably most acute. The pollution from many belowstandard waste treatment and disposal facilities directly
impact populations living close to these facilities. It has been316

observed that hazardous waste dumps and incinerators
are mostly located in the poorest neighbourhoods, bothin developed and developing countries (Wapner 2002).
Much of the literature citing waste facilities in the USA
discusses race and poverty elements (Jenkins et al. 2002).
Furthermore, the lack of alternative livelihood options
and the value of recovered materials entice many poormen, women and even children to engage in scavenging
activities in the low and middle income countries without
any health protection.
Greening the waste sector includes considerations of theseequity and poverty issues. Investing in greening the sector
is not only about building facilities; it also includes theformalisation of the sector so that workers receive training,
health protection and benefits, and a fair compensation
for their labour. In addition, greening the waste sector
favours decentralised, localised and labour-intensive waste
treatment systems as opposed to centralised, large-scale,
capital intensive waste facilities so as to generate job
opportunities for local communities.

Waste4 Effects of increased investmentin the waste sector
A systems-dynamics model was used to identify the likely
effects of increased investments in the waste sector at the
global level (working with global averages), with particularemphasis on waste management and recycling. In an
ideal case, the analysis of investments in improved solid
waste management would cover both the generation ofwaste and the entire waste management chain, includingcollection, segregation, transportation, recycling andrecovery, treatment and disposal, but lack of data has
limited the inclusion of all this. The estimates presented
below should therefore be interpreted as illustrating thenature and scale of waste generation and highlighting
possibilities to invest in waste collection and treatment.
There are also considerable differences between countries,
which are not reflected in the global figures, including bothgeneration and costs.
The economy-wide model assumes 2 per cent of the
global GDP to be allocated on a yearly basis as additional
investment in 10 green sectors (G2) over the period 20112050. The results of this investment are then compared withthose of a BAU scenario without additional investment, anda BAU2 scenario, in which the same additional amount isinvested following the projected trends of BAU.
Within this multi-sector model, the waste sector is allocated0.16 per cent of the global GDP or US$ 108 billion in 2011,
which rises with GDP to US$ 310 in 2050, corresponding
to an average annual investment US$ 198 billion overthe period 2011-2050. The purpose of the exercise is
to illustrate what would happen if a given amount ofadditional investment is made available to green the waste
sector (alongside the greening of the other sectors). The
approach, however, does not lead to results as to howmuch investment is needed to reach a specific target ingreening the sector. Due to data limitations, the modelis also not able to estimate effects in terms of the market
values of, for example, recycled materials and products,
recovered energy and composted fertilisers. The modellingof the overall green economy investment scenarios acrosssectors is presented in detail in a separate chapter.
In the model, waste generation (i.e. before recycling andrecovery) is driven primarily by population and GDP. In
2010, an estimated 11.2 billion tonnes of solid waste
were collected globally.4 Of this, 8.4 billion tonnes wereagricultural and forestry organic waste and 1.8 billion
tonnes were MSW, and the rest consisted of industrial
waste, e-waste and waste from construction anddemolition (C&D waste).5 Under a BAU Scenario (withno additional investments) the amount of solid waste
generated each year is projected to rise 17 per cent to13.1 billion tonnes in 2050.
The total waste collected is treated, in general, using six
different approaches, including landfill, energy recovery,
material recovery, incineration, composting and recycling,which all are likely to expand in the future. For example, thetotal power generation from waste in 2010 was estimatedat about 71,600 GWh incinerating 192 million tonnes ofmunicipal waste, with a capacity of 54 GW primarily fromwaste combustion plants. Under BAU (without additional
investments), this generation capacity is expected to growmodestly to just over 200 GW by 2050, corresponding to
0.5 billion tonnes of waste incinerated per year. The size oflandfills is also expected to expand, especially if no additional
efforts are made to build WtE plants. In the BAU scenario,
total accumulated waste in landfills will increase by 50 per
cent from the currently almost 8 billion tonnes to 12 billion
tonnes. The modern municipal waste landfills that enableproduction of biogas, only account for a small share, but
further improvement in terms of technology and economic
performance are expected in the future. Regarding material
recovery from wastes, under the BAU scenario, the total
amount of recyclables in MSW is projected to increase from
0.18 billion tonnes in 2010 to 0.28 billion tonnes in 2050.
The green investment scenario then allocates 0.16 per centof the global GDP to three areas of waste management:
waste recycling, composting of agricultural and forestry
organic waste and waste collection. Investments for waste
recycling and composting (including energy recovery) are
prioritised (to support material recovery and agriculturalactivities) and the residual investment is spent on increasing
waste collection. An average of about US$ 46 billion peryear is allocated to waste recycling and composting overthe entire period, under G2, based on a global average
estimated cost of recycling of US$ 100 per tonne of waste.
The average annual investment for waste collection is US$
152 billion for G2. The allocation for waste collection underG2 reflects the need to handle the net increase in waste
generation in the coming decades.
4. The model refers to collected and not generated as typically only thewaste that is collected appears in statistical data.
5. Note that these two categories overlap: The MSW can also include partsof organic waste. Please note that Chalmin and Gaillochet (2009) havereported that 3.4 to 4 billion tonnes of municipal and hazardous waste areproduced every year.

317

Towards a green economy
In the G2 scenario, the investment leads to an increasein the percentage of MSW, industrial waste and e-waste
recycled from 9.9 per cent in 2010 to 33.4 per cent 2050,
which is 6.6 per cent higher than in the BAU.
These improvements can be broken down into: 1) a
doubling of the recycling rate of industrial waste,(increase from 7 to 15 per cent), and 2) near full recyclingof e-waste (from a current estimated level of 15 percent)6, and 3) an increase of about 3.5 times over thecurrent recycling rate of MSW – the principal source ofrecycled materials, from 10 to 34 per cent.
Further, by 2050, all organic waste would be composted
or recovered for energy in the simulations, compared with
70 per cent under both BAU scenarios. The increase incomposting would increase the supply of organic fertiliser
with positive impacts on soil quality and yield in the
agriculture sector.7
Under the BAU scenario the proportion of total waste
collected that ends up in landfills is projected to increase
from 22 per cent to 28 per cent by 2050. With the additional
investment assumed under G2, this proportion would
6. Given the time period for the projection of 40 years, a significant increase
for the amount of e-waste being recycled is possible, while, however,acknowledging that a rate of 100 per cent may not be realistic.
7. As discussed in the chapter on agriculture.
8. This is based on a labour intensity of 1,760 persons/million tonnes ofwaste collected.

318

be reduced to less than 5 per cent. The primary reason
for the reduction is a decrease in the proportion of MSW
reaching landfill declining from 60 to 20 per cent. Further,
the reduction can be attributed to the increased recyclingof organic waste, C&D and e-waste. The total amount oflandfill waste would stabilise at 8 billion tonnes in the G2case in 2014, and decline sharply to return to a 1970 level of
3.5 billion tonnes in 2048.
Based on relatively simple assumptions of the labour
intensity of waste recycling, composting and collection
activities, the assumed green investments in the wastemanagement sector are also expected to contribute to job
creation. Almost 10 per cent additional jobs globally are
expected to be created by 2050, compared to BAU2 at 2324 million, only in waste collection activities.8 These global
averages, however, do not reveal regional differences.
It is reasonable to expect, for example, that higher job
increases could be achievable in faster growing, emerging
economies where current rates of collection and recycling
are low. It is also important to recall that these simulations
do not include investments in reducing waste generation,
which could reduce the stream of waste generated andthus cost the corresponding downstream jobs.
In summary, the simulations, though limited in scope anddetail illustrate the potential for considerably reducing the
proportion of solid waste going to landfill – by four-fifths –by investing in collection, recycling, including composting,as well as generating energy from organic waste.

Waste5 Enabling Conditions
Mobilising increased investment in greening the waste
sector on a large scale will not take place automatically.
There are a number of essential conditions required toenable countries to move towards that direction. Thissection describes four of them: 1) financing; 2) incentives;
3) policy and regulatory measures; and 4) institutionalarrangements.

5.1 Financing
Investing in greening the waste sector requires substantial
financial resources for both capital expenditures andoperation. Such resources may be found from: 1) private
investments; 2) international funding; 3) cost recovery fromusers; and 4) other innovative financing mechanisms. For
financing from the general banking system and capital
markets, further information is provided in the Finance
Chapter.
Private investment
Private-sector involvement, often in the form of PublicPrivate Partnerships (PPPs) can, if certain conditions are met,
be efficient and reduce the fiscal pressure on government
budgets. Private-sector involvement has, for example,
reduced the waste service cost by at least 25 per cent incountries including the UK, USA and Canada and by 23 percent in Malaysia (Bartone 1999). Privatisation of transport
services for waste management has resulted in a cost savingof 23 per cent for the city of Rajkot in India (USAID 1999).
Studies in the Republic of Ireland have also found that
tendering can substantially reduce the costs incurred by
local authorities in providing refuse collection services.
Crude comparisons of costs before and after tenderingand the costs of local authorities versus private contractors
indicate that tendering can yield savings of between 34 and45 per cent. The bulk of these cost savings are attributed toreal efficiency gains as a result of contracting out (Reeves
and Barrow 2000).
Public-Private Partnership arrangements can be of many
types. In the case of service contracts, the private partner
has to provide a clearly defined service to the public
partner. In the case of a management contract, the private
partner is responsible for core activities like operationand maintenance. Some types of private participation
arrangements are leased, where the private partner isfully responsible for operation and maintenance and the
public partner is responsible for new investments. Single ormultiple private players may be involved depending on thetype of waste management solution.

Developing countries are beginning to see the benefitsof PPPs (Ahmed and Ali 2004). In many Columbian cities
and a few large cities in India and China, municipalities
provide infrastructure and equipment while private waste
collectors provide the labour. In New Delhi, India, an aerobic
windrow composting plant is run through a concessionagreement for 25 years and a waste management project
leased for ten years on the basis of Develop, Build, Operate
and Transfer (DBOT) (Babu 2010).
In the Philippines, a privately-built high-temperatureincinerator for high-risk health-care waste is being usedby more than 200 medical centres and hospitals with amonitoring system. Dakar, Senegal, experienced a publicprivate joint venture that was initially a monopoly butlater took to more competitive privatisation arrangementwith multiple service contracts. These are some examples
of innovative financing through PPPs to deliver improved
services and enhanced cost efficiency.
International funding
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) can be a potential
source of inter-governmental funding. However, at the
moment, the CERs issued to waste-sector projects are much
lower than the CERs claimed by the project proponents
in the documents submitted to UNFCCC. Modelling formethane generation and avoidance estimations has been
unclear, leading to over-estimation of CERs, which in turnresult in project rejections in some cases. A few technicalissues such as high leachate levels inhibiting gas extraction
and other problems in monitoring and verification havebeen major barriers in developing countries. Addressing
such barriers will enable developing countries to utilise
CDM revenues for greening the waste sector.
Apart from CERs, another major international sourceof funding for greening the waste sector is multilateraldevelopment banks. For example, about 199 waste-related
projects worth US$ 15.7 billion were supported by theWorld Bank in various regions in 2009. Of all the regions,
East Asia and Pacific has been receiving a major portion (37per cent) of the support, with commitments of up to US$
3.1 billion in 2009, as depicted in Figure 12.
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) lead to thecreation of specific funds that can support initiatives thatlead to greening of the waste sector. For example, the Multi
Lateral Fund (MLF) for the Implementation of the Montreal
Protocol, the Global Environment Facility and bi-lateral
donors have offered their financial assistance to the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to enable
developing countries and Countries with Economies In

319

Towards a green economy
Million US$
South Asia
428
EuropeandCentral Asia
5%
1,322

Africa1,266
East Asia
and Pacific
3,103

15%

16%

37%

21%
Latin America
and Caribbean
1,752

6%
Middle Eastand North Africa
515

Figure 12: The World Bank’s estimated investments
in MSW management across various regions
Source: World Bank (2009)

Transition (CEIT) in complying with the Montreal Protocol’s
control measures pertaining to the phase-out of ODS.
In this process, aspects of product discards and waste
management get addressed. ICF (2008) suggests thatwhile non-Article 5 countries use ODS levies (e.g., tax per
kg of refrigerant imports/production), municipal taxes, andtaxes on new equipment, A5 countries could use direct
assistance from the MLFs, and/or through appropriate
carbon trading platforms such as CDM for implementing
an approved ODS destruction methodology. MLFs could
consider co-funding incremental costs associated with theremoval and destruction and/or recovery and recycling of
ODS refrigerant and foam from appliances, or finance thedisposal of older appliances.
Cost recovery from users
Waste services are provided as public services in many
countries. Payments for waste collection and transport
services by households, enterprises, and large-scaleindustrial installations, for example, can help recover thecapital cost and defray the operational costs.
Indeed, cost recovery is a strategy to generate funding
for investing in greening the waste sector. It has thepotential to shift the costs of environmental and publichealth management – including administrative, capital,and operational costs – to households, allowing for
more appropriate sharing of costs following the polluter
pays principle. Cost-recovery measures can include
administrative charges and fees covering the establishment
and maintenance of registration, authorisation or
permitting systems, and user charges and fees for publicly

320

provided waste collection, treatment and disposal services.
Environmental liability measures or environmental fines
can also be designed in a way that helps ensure the cost of
remediation and clean-up as well as environmental healthcost is covered by the negligent parties, i.e. responsible
polluters rather than drawing resources from public budgets.
Other innovative financing mechanisms
Micro-financing and hybrid financing are particularly
useful innovative financing mechanisms for supporting
small-scale efforts. The Participatory Sustainable Waste
Management Project established in Brazil in 2006, forexample, created micro-credit funds from donations(Hogarth 2009). These funds are used as working capitalfor financing waste transportation and waste-related
emergency responses. The funds are also used to extend
loans to waste-pickers who will repay their loans after
receiving payment from recycling depots.
Another example is that of micro-financing for microenterprises managing a 40-year-old, 2 million tonnes
garbage heap called Smokey Mountain in Metro Manila,
Philippines. The micro-enterprises are involved in collection,sorting, and sales of waste through a Material Recycling
Facility. Micro-financing enabled these enterprises toborrow loans and increase their capacity to generate
revenue. Through a donated bioreactor, the enterpriseis processing up to 1 tonne of waste daily, supported byawareness programmes on segregation of organic waste in
21 buildings in the neighbourhood (UN 2010b).
Hybrid financing models (combining debt and equity)
are being increasingly explored to support economicallychallenged waste management projects. Examples exist
from the early 2000s in the UK, when the British government
introduced prudential borrowing which gave municipal
councils more freedom to borrow, removing any restriction
on how much debt they could run up (UN 2010b).9
Another innovative financing model includes joint
financing by two or more municipalities to optimise
investments and attract modern technologies (such as
WtE projects), which are not competitive on smaller scales(OECD 2007).

5.2 Economic incentives
and disincentives
Economic incentives and disincentives serve to motivate
consumers and businesses to reduce waste generation
9. Local authorities could decide for themselves whether and at what levels
they borrow money for financing any purpose relevant to their functions
provided that they meet requirements for prudent management of theirfinancial affairs (Asenova et al. 2007). The Department of Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs of the UK government advised prudential borrowing
for low-risk investments. For example, about 60 per cent of an MBT process
was funded through prudential borrowing in West Sussex Council.

Wasteand dispose of waste responsibly, thereby contributing
to increased demand for greening the waste sector.
The incentives commonly prevalent in the waste sector
include: 1) taxes and fees; 2) recycling credit and otherforms of subsidies; 3) deposit-refund; and 4) standards andperformance bond or environmental guarantee fund.
Volumetric landfill taxes can encourage the reductionof waste and are easy to implement. Their effectiveness,
however, depends on the tax rate per tonne of waste andon the existence of adequate monitoring and enforcement
measures. It is also important to ensure that the tax
does not result in increased illegal dumping rather than
encouraging 3R.
Pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) is another way of discouraging
waste generation. Precaution against illegal waste dumping
or misuse of recycling facilities, should be taken, however.
Full financing of the waste-management infrastructure has
to be assured and sufficient awareness-raising is necessary.
PAYT has a positive impact on recycling. For example, PAYT
increased the recycling rate from 7 per cent to 35 per centin Portland, Oregon and from 21 per cent to 50 per centin Falmouth, Maine in just one year of implementation(Shawnee Kansas 2009).
Waste avoidance can also be achieved by assigning adisincentive for items such as plastic bags. For example,
Nagoya city in Japan, after extensive consultation withretailing companies and two years of piloting, assigned acharge for plastic shopping bags in April 2009. The scheme
was adopted by 90 per cent of the shopping market. The
initiative reduced plastic-bag usage during shopping by
90 per cent as of December 2009. About 320 million bags
weighing 2,233 tonnes were estimated to have been saved
between October 2007 and October 2009 (Environmental
Affairs Bureau 2010).

It is important to formalise the informal sector enterprises
and support them through incentives in order to develop
local markets and small and medium formal recycling
enterprises. Recycling credit schemes can be a way toincentivise municipal or private recycling by raising its
profitability, but they have had limited applications so far.
Another form of positive incentive is subsidies to offset
the costs of clean-up. Box 9 gives an example in New YorkCity.
At the household-level waste-collection fees basedon weight or volume for brown waste – to be either
incinerated or landfilled – in tandem with free collection
for recyclables, including organic matter, are widely used
to incentivise 3R activities. This type of policy usually coexists with investments in either kerbside collection orcommunity deposit sites for recyclables. For example,
in the Republic of Korea, a Volume Based Waste Fee(VBWF) system was introduced in 1995 to replace a fixedfee system. Volume Based Waste Fee is a pay-per-sackscheme where households place residual waste in prepaid sacks and recyclables are collected free of charge.
The VBWF system led to a reduction of MSW generationof 21.5 per cent from 1994 to 2009 and an increase in
the recycling rate from 15.4 per cent in 1994 to 61.1 percent in 2009 (Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea,2010).

5.3 Policy and regulatory measures
The most common types of policy and regulatory measures
include:■■ regulated targets for minimisation, reuse, recycling;
and required targets for virgin materials displacement inproduction inputs;

Box 9: Incentives for private investment in brownfieldclean-up and remediation
In August 2010, the Mayor of New York City and theCommissioner of the New York State Department ofEnvironmental Conservation announced an agreementthat paved the way for the city to start cleaning up
brownfields, or light-to-moderately contaminatedareas that are not toxic enough to qualify for federal orstate Superfund clean-up programmes. About 7,000
vacant or underused acres around the city could bereadied for new development under the programme.
In 2008, the city created an Office of Environmental
Remediation to run the programme, which beganwith a small site in the Bronx. One of an estimated1,500 to 2,000 brownfields around the city, it waschosen as the site of Pelham Parkway Towers, anaffordable housing complex.
The brownfields programme, which offers financial
incentives to developers to offset some of the costsof cleaning up properties, is expected to expedite
the cleaning process and put an end to selfdirected clean-ups managed by developers without
government oversight.
Source: New York Times (2010)321

Towards a green economy■■ regulation relevant to the waste management
market, i.e. permitting/licensing requirements for
waste handling, storage, treatment and final disposal;
and recycled materials standards; facilities standards,
including pollution control technologies; and■■ land-use policies and planning.
In most cases, a particular piece of policy or legislation
may encompass these different types of regulations. The
discussions below will, therefore, not differentiate thesedifferent types.
Regulatory pressure in waste management started off in
the mid-1970s with the tightening of waste disposal laws indeveloped countries. The EU directive (1975) on the disposalof waste oil and the US RCRA (1976) governing disposal ofsolid and hazardous waste have been the foremost regulatory
measures that identified waste management as a municipal
issue for government policy.10 Box 10 gives an example of
how an EU directive has influenced the UK to cut down on
the amount of biodegradable waste going to landfill.
The Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement ofHazardous Wastes and their Disposal was adopted in
1989 and entered into force in 1992. The Convention
provides for a strict notification scheme and addresses
issues such as minimising the generation of hazardous
wastes in terms of quantity and hazardousness, disposing
them of as close to the source of generation as possible,
reducing the movement of hazardous wastes, maximising
environmentally sound waste reuse and recycling,promoting environmentally sound waste disposal andtreatment and extending waste service coverage.
Since the early 1990s, the EU has been actively developing
waste-related policy measures. The following EU Directives
and Strategies have been instrumental in greening theregion’s waste management industry: Packaging (1994), Waste
Communication Strategy (1996), Landfill (1999), End of Life
Vehicles (EoLV 2000), Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment(WEEE 2002), the Thematic Strategy on Waste Prevention andRecycling of Waste and Sustainable Use of Natural Resources(2005), the EU’s revised Waste Framework Directive (2008) and
the Raw Material Initiative (2008). Meeting the 85 per cent EoLV
target by 2006 had the potential to reduce the landfilling costfor the EU by € 80 million per year, which is a cost saving of
40 per cent, compared to the cost that prevailed prior to thedirective. Meeting the 95 per cent target by 2015 will reducethe cost further by 80 per cent (GHK and Bio Intelligence
10. RCRA was the Principal Federal law enacted in the USA governing
the disposal of MSW and hazardous waste and covers many regulatory
functions of hazardous and non-hazardous waste. Its most prominent
provisions is said to be the Subtitle C programme which tracks the progressof hazardous wastes from their point of generation, their transport, andtheir treatment and/or disposal. Superfund Sites refer to the abandoned
waste management facilities that are regulated under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).

322

Service 2006). The WEEE directive has compelled electrical andelectronic firms across the world to adopt effective productlife-cycle policies such as take-back and recovery policies.
Overall, green initiatives such as the one taken to meet EoLV
and WEEE requirements have been beneficial to the companies
and overall save the company 40-65 per cent in manufacturingcosts through the reuse of parts and materials (Ali and Chan
2008).
Individual countries have also moved forward with waste
related regulations and their enforcement. The German
Packaging Ordinance introduced in 1991 helped encourage
recycling of packaging waste which is collected througha third party organisation. British Columbia Recycling
Regulation of 2004 brought about a considerable increasein the proportion of recycled waste in Canada.
Developing-country examples include the Law of thePeople’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Controlof Solid Waste Pollution adopted in 1995, South Africa’s
National Waste Management Strategy in 1999, India’s
Municipal Waste Management and Handling Rules in
2000, the Philippines’s Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act in 2000, Malaysia’s Solid Waste and Public Cleansing
Management Act in 2007 and Indonesia’s Act regarding
Waste Management in 2008. Although the real effectsof such measures will come from implementation, theexistence of these instruments provides a signal of politicalcommitments to greening the waste sector.
Apart from broad national policies and legislations,
there are also specific regulations. Extended Producer

Box 10: Landfill diversion in
the UKThe EU landfill directive has been a key driverin pushing the UK to look for private investors
to manage its waste. The directive requires
member states to cut down on the amountof biodegradable waste going to landfill toless than 35 per cent of 1995 levels by 2020.
Rising generation of waste is making it evenmore difficult for member states such as the
UK to meet the landfill targets. Therefore, theDepartment for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs is promoting a pipeline of projects
costing up to US$ 12.8 billion in investment thatwill require funding under the government’s
Private Finance Initiative (PFI). More incinerators
are also being planned by private contractors.
Source: Adapted from Reuters (2010).

WasteLocation
Dhaka, Bangladesh

Description of community cooperation
In Dhaka, decentralised composting has been effectively implemented through community involvement. Waste Concern in Dhaka has establisheda business model to this effect. Community contributions in the form of a user-charge account for 30 per cent of the project revenue and made thispractice financially viable. The programme created new employments for the communities and improved livelihoods in the region.
Source: Zurbrügg et al. (2005)

Nagpur, India

Door–to-door (D2D) collection of waste with community cooperation has achieved a concrete savings of the order of Rs 50 million (equivalent to
US$ 1 million) in the municipality’s solid waste services. An NGO was involved to boost the involvement of the community. The initiative provided
livelihoods for 1,600 people from the most deprived segment of society. The effort also boosted the financial credibility of the NGO involved, raising
the budget level at least thirty-fold.
Source: Agarwal (2005)

Cairo, Egypt

The Zabbaleen minority community has been engaged in informal waste picking in Cairo, Egypt, since the 1930s. About 20,000 Zabbaleen wereinvolved in waste-picking (30-40 per cent of an estimated 9,000 tonnes per day), recycling up to 80 per cent of the waste collected. Since theestablishment of associations in 1970s, and launching a Zabbaleen Environment and Development Programme in 1981 with support from theFord Foundation, the World Bank, Oxfam and others, working conditions and the basic infrastructure for waste collection and sorting has improved
considerably. During the 1990s, the Zabbaleen continued to work under a franchise system by paying a license fee to the Cairo and Giza Cleansing
and Beautification Authorities for the exclusive right to service a specific number of apartment blocks. They collected fees directly from households(on average US$ 0.3 to 0.6). A primary school, a paper recycling project, a weaving school, a health centre and a project to support small industries
have all been established to support the waste pickers. The use of donkey carts for waste collection was banned.
Source: Aziz (2004) and Wilson et al. (2006)

Table 5: Community cooperation in waste management
Responsibility (EPR) or Producer Take-Back Responsibility
programmes such as the Green Dot Programme in Europe
have motivated European-based manufacturers to simplify
packaging. Such programmes have triggered innovative
design concepts such as Design for Environment (DfE) and
Design for Disassembly (DfD). Enforcing concepts such as
cleaner production and continual quality improvement
in manufacturing processes could lead to generation of
better quality waste for reuse and recycling. These concepts
can help heightened green awareness in the supply chain
and consumer behaviour. In the Republic of Korea, forexample, EPR was enforced on packaging (paper, glass, iron,aluminium and plastic) and specific products (batteries,
tyres, lubricating oil and fluorescent lamps) since 2003.
According to the Ministry of Environment of the Republicof Korea, the initiative resulted in the recycling of 7.7 million
tonnes of waste between 2003 and 2008, representing an
increase in the recycling rate by 13.5 per cent, comparedwith the rate before EPR implementation. This resulted in an
economic benefit of 1.7 trillion Won, equivalent to US$ 1.6
billion (Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea, 2010).
Industries can have voluntary, self-regulatory measures.
For example, Hitachi has designed washing machinesthat can be easily disassembled, saving 33 per cent of the
manufacturing time, and machines that need less service,winning consumer confidence and reducing disposal cost.
Similarly, Fuji Xerox collects used photocopy machines,
printers and cartridges from nine countries in the Asia
Pacific region, disassembles and classifies the parts into 64
categories for reuse in new machines. Philips has launcheda range of green flagship products such as Ultra High
Performance lamps with 52 per cent less packaging, 25 watt
T8 lights with 40 per cent less mercury, flat-screen TVs with
17 per cent less packaging, DVD players weighing 26 percent less and defibrillators weighing 28 per cent less thantheir predecessors, among others.

In order for new opportunities and application to open up
for reuse of waste materials and also the term “waste” not to
be a misnomer, further policy developments into definitionsof waste stressing its resource value is required. In addition,
policy measures towards promoting awareness, education,
research, training and capacity development will beessential to nurture skills and expertise required for waste
management and also to bring about behavioural changes.

5.4 Institutional arrangements
between formal and informal sectors
In many developing countries, command and control
policies may not be as effective as economic instruments
due to institutional capacity. Additionally, investmentsin the waste technologies have sometimes failed to reap
benefits because of weak institutions. Investments areoften deterred because of flawed institutions or missing
markets.10 Furthermore, institutional capacities to control
imports of used goods/waste into developing countries areeither non-existent or non-functional.
One of the major institutional issues in the waste sector is
the relationship between the formal and informal segmentsof the sector. A major cause for a thriving informal sector indeveloping countries is the difficulty to achieve economies
of scale in formalising the existing informal recycling units.
Porter (2002) identifies five types of market failures in formal
recycling: 1) Failure to provide households with correct
market signals on recycling; 2) Failure to recycle the correct
amount and choose the appropriate method of recyclingby municipally owned or controlled recycling facilities (asthey are bound by constraint on profit making); 3) Failure toincrease stability in the recycling market, which is by nature
unstable; 4) Failure to make optimal policy on taxing andsubsidising substitutes for virgin products; and 5) Failure323

Towards a green economy
to provide manufactures with correct market signals on
disposal and recycling of their products and packaging.
Yet, the informal sector plays a significant role in waste
management, especially through informal waste collection
and recycling. Incentivising formal recycling activities,
providing micro-finance and access to the markets could
help in shifting the informal sector to a formal regime. In
addition, raising awareness on the social and health related
benefits of formalisation may help in understanding theimportance of intangible benefits.
The operations of the informal waste businesses are subject
to risks to human health and often imply working conditions
that are not decent. It is important to address the health andsafety risks from use of recycled and recovered products andto devise appropriate policies, regulations, and standards.
Developing countries will need to adapt some of theseframeworks to ensure that the workers in the informal sector
and customers of the recycled products are well protected.
Suchada et al. (2003) highlight that when there was a close
operating relationship between the formal and informal
sectors of the waste recycling industry, the sector wasobserved to function efficiently, achieving a recycling rate324

of 38 per cent of the total waste stream. Often, however,cooperation between government authorities and workers
in the informal waste sector is weak owing to distrust.
The formalisation of waste-pickers, where desirable,
often requires political support and policy reforms.
But formalisation is not the only way to secure greater
cooperation between the public, formal private andinformal private sectors. Community based organisations(CBO) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) havecontributed to empowering the informal waste workers byextending micro-credits and arranging for external funding.
In community-based waste management programmes, acommunity leader identifies a service provider and/or plans
and manages the services. Micro and small enterprises arealso taking shape in developing countries such as Brazil, which
unlike CBOs and NGOs, engage in waste picking activities
for-profit (Ahmed and Ali 2004). Community cooperation has
helped achieve considerable success in many developing
countries. Waste collection through community organisation
into cooperatives and micro-enterprises has been useful tomanage municipal waste. Table 5 describes a few examples
across the world where community cooperation has helped
set up businesses in waste management.

Waste6 Conclusions
The increasing volume and complexity of waste is posing
threats to ecosystems and human health, but opportunities
do exist to green the waste sector. These opportunities
come from the growing demand for improved waste
management and for resource and energy recovery fromwaste. This change in demand is driven by cost savings,
increased environmental awareness and increasing
scarcity of natural resources. The development of newwaste-related technologies on 3Rs and technologies suchas MBT and advanced biomethanation has facilitated thegreening of the sector. The growth of the waste market isa reflection of the underlying demand for greening thesector – especially the new paradigm of linking waste toresource use across the life-cycle of products.
Different countries face different waste related challenges,
but the path to greening the waste sector shares common
milestones. Prevention and reduction of waste at sourceis essential for all countries, although this is particularly
important in developing countries given their higher
level of population growth and increasing material andresource consumption. The absolute growth of populationand income implies that the absolute volume of waste isunlikely to decline. Greening the sector is therefore theonly way to decouple. It is important to reduce conversionof used materials into municipal waste. Proper collection,
segregation, transport, and recycling of waste as well as theconstruction of basic facilities are essential steps in many
developing countries. In most cases, in these countries, anadditional intervention is the cleanup of existing dumpsites,
which are harming the environment and the health ofwaste pickers most of whom are poor men, women andeven children. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that stringent
regulations are in place and comprehensive environmental
policies addressing the necessity of recycling and reducing
landfills are developed.
The waste recovery and recycling part of the waste
treatment chain probably holds the greatest potential
in terms of contributions to a green economy. As natural
resources become scarcer and with the prospect of peakoil, the commercial value of materials and energy recoveredfrom waste could be substantial. The current recycling rateof all types of waste is likely to improve. Some developed
countries and emerging economies have set high standards
for themselves in this area and are likely to acquirecomparative advantages in remanufactured and recycled
products. Developing countries, when planning theirtreatment facilities, may want to take into consideration
the potential growth of resource and energy recovery as
an increasingly significant industry. The choice of waste
treatment options ought to include a full range of benefits
including avoided environmental and social costs andshould not be based only on technology costs.
Indeed, there are multiple benefits from greening thewaste sector, although quantitative data are hard to comeby. These benefits include resources recovered from waste
helping to avoid extraction of raw materials, new products
such as compost and energy derived from waste, lower costof reducing GHG emissions, carbon credits, avoided healthcosts, and job creation. Greening of the sector will involve
formalisation of the informal sector in many developing
countries, including the provision of proper training, healthprotection, and decent level of compensation for waste
workers, and thereby contribute to improving equity andpoverty alleviation. Additional efforts are needed to collectdata and conduct quantitative analysis at country level –taking a total cost perspective – to enable policy makers
to design their strategy for greening the waste sector on amore informed basis.
Mobilising investment to green the waste sector requires
a number of enabling conditions. Governments should
increase their budgetary allocations to the sector. Further,entering into partnerships with the private sector has thepotential for reducing fiscal pressure while enhancing
the efficiency of service delivery. In many developing
countries, the success of such arrangements is to a large
extent dependant on a reasonably sound institutionalframework and sufficient capacity to ensure transparency
in awarding contracts to private service providers. Microfinancing, international development assistance andother financing mechanisms can also be explored tosupport localised waste treatment systems that provide
employment opportunities to local communities while
reducing the need for distant transport of waste. Anotherimportant component in greening the waste sector inmany developing countries is building trust between
the public sector and the informal waste sector. Special
care should be taken to include poor waste-pickers in theformalisation process.

325

Towards a green economy

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329

iStockphoto/Arpad Benedek

Buildings

Investing in energy and resource efficiency

Towards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Authors: Philipp Rode, Senior Research
Fellow and Executive Director, LSE Cities, London School of
Economics and Political Science, UK; Ricky Burdett, Professorof Urban Studies and Director, LSE Cities, London School of
Economics and Political Science, UK; Joana Carla Soares
Gonçalves, Professor, Departamento de Tecnologia da
Arquitetura, University of São Paolo, Brazil.

Paulo, Brazil; Renata Sandoli, Researcher, Departamento deTecnologia da Arquitetura, University of São Paulo, Brazil; Etienne
Cadestin, James Schofield, London School of Economics andPolitical Science, UK; Cornis van der Lugt (UNEP); Jacob Halcomb(UNEP SBCI); Peter Graham (UNEP SBCI); Andrea M. Bassi, John P.
Ansah and Zhuohua Tan (Millennium Institute); Edmundo Werna(ILO); Abdul Saboor (ILO); and Ana Lucía Iturriza (ILO).

Vera Weick and Moustapha Kamal Gueye (in the initial stagesof the project) of UNEP managed the chapter, including thehandling of peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating
authors on revisions, conducting supplementary research andbringing the chapter to final production. Derek Eaton reviewed
and edited the modelling section of the chapter. Sheng Fulai
conducted preliminary editing of the chapter.

Project coordinators: Daniela Tanner and Gesine Kippenberg, LSE
Cities, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK.

Contributing authors: Ludger Eltrop, Head of Department,
Institute of Energy Economics and Rational Use of Energy, Dep.
SEE, IER, University of Stuttgart, Germany/ Visiting Professor,
University of Johannesburg, South Africa; Duygu Erten, City
Director-Istanbul, Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI), Istanbul,
Turkey; Jose Goldemberg, Professor, Universidade de São Paulo,
Brazil; Andreas Koch, Researcher, European Institute for Energy
Research (EIFER), Karlsruhe, Germany; Tom Paladino, President,
LEED AP, PE, Paladino and Company; Brinda Viswanathan,
Associate Professor, Madras School of Economics, Chennai,
India; Gavin Blyth, LSE Cities, London School of Economics andPolitical Science, UK.
Additional authors: Sebastien Girard, European Institute forEnergy Research (EIFER), Karlsruhe, Germany; Barbara Erwine,
Senior Consultant, Paladino and Company, Seattle, U.S.A.; Klaus
Bode, Founding Partner, BDSP Partnership of Environmental
Engineers, London, UK; Sandro Tubertini, BDSP Partnership,
London, UK; Ishwarya Balasubramanian, Madras School of
Economics, Chennai, India; Marlies Härdtlein, Institute of Energy
Economics and Rational Use of Energy, Dep. SEE, IER, Universityof Stuttgart, Germany; Till Jenssen, Institute of Energy Economics
and Rational Use of Energy, Dep. SEE, IER, University of Stuttgart,
Germany; Leonardo Marques Monteiro, PhD researcher,
Departamento de Tecnologia da Arquitetura, University of São
Paulo, Brazil; Roberta Consentino Kronca Mulfarth, Professor,
Departamento de Tecnologia da Arquitetura, University of São

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011332

We would like to thank the many colleagues and individuals whocommented on the Review Draft, including Laura Altinger (UNECE),
Christopher Beaton (IISD), Karin Buhren (UN Habitat), Chia-Chin
Cheng (UNEP Risoe), Matthew French (UN Habitat), Greg Kats(Capital e), Robert Kehew (UN Habitat), Kian Seng Ang (Building
and Construction Authority Singapore), Christophe Lalande(UN Habitat), Robert McGowan, Donna McIntire (UNEP), Kevin
Mo (The Energy Foundation), Jeffery Kwei Sung Neng (Building
and Construction Authority Singapore), Synnove Lyssand
Sandberg, Niclas Svenningsen (UNEP), Mark Swilling (Universityof Stellenbosch, South Africa), Tan Tian Chong (Building andConstruction Authority Singapore), Kaarin Taipale (Marrakech
Task Force on Sustainable Buildings and Construction), Oesha
Thakoerdin (Building and Construction Authority Singapore),
Benjamin Henry Towell (Building and Construction Authority ofSingapore), and the following members of the UNEP FI Property
Working Group and the UNEP Sustainable Buildings & Climate
Initiative (SBCI) who commented in their personal capacity:members of UNEP FI Property Working Group: Paul McNamara(PRUPIM), Blaise Debordes (Caisse de Dépôts), and Preston R.
Sargent (Kennedy Associates); and members of UNEP SBCI: MariaAtkinson (Lend Lease Corporation, Australia), Robert Beauregard(Canada Wood), Caroline Frenette (Canada Wood), Paravasthu
Jagannathan (EHS, UAE), Sylvain Labbé (Canada Wood), Rodney
Milford (CIDB, South Africa), Dominik Oetiker (SIKA, Switzerland),and Sarah Turner (Lend Lease Corporation, Australia).
We also would like to thank the individuals who assisted in the
research and/or editing process, including Omer Cavusoglu (LSE),
Miranda Iossifidis (LSE), Hanif Kara (AKT), Irina Kraicheva (LSE),
Emma Rees (LSE), Guido Robazza (LSE), Liz Rusbridger (LSE), andNatza Tesfay (LSE).

Buildings

Contents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

1.1
1.2
1.3

The aim of this chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
Scope and definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
Structure of the chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338

2

Challenges and opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

2.1
2.2

Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Opportunities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

3

The case for investment in green buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4

Investment needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
Measuring the costs and benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Economic, environmental and social impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
Investment scenarios for increased energy efficiency in buildings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

4Enabling conditions and policy instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361

4.1
4.2

Barriers to green buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Policy instruments and tools  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362

5Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

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Towards a green economy

List of figures
Figure 1: Commercial and residential floor space in China, the EU, Japan and the USA (2003)  . . . . . . . . . . 340
Figure 2: IPCC projections of CO2 mitigation potential in 2030  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
Figure 3: Investment potential for new construction and building retrofits relative to the current
sustainability level of building construction in representative countries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
Figure 4: Fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in the building sector: current, reference
and mitigation scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
Figure 5: Total power demand per year in buildings sector 2010–2050 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
Figure 6 : Total CO2 emissions per year in buildings sector 2010–2050 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

List of tables
Table 1: Projected CO2 emissions from buildings to 2030  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
Table 2: Summary of the major opportunities for green buildings in different sectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
Table 3: The economics of global building transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
Table 4: Financial benefits of green buildings (US$ per sq.m) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Table 5: Twenty-year net economic impact of a US$ 1 million investment in green building
improvements: Illustrative examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Table 6: Emissions intensity in the GER model simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

List of boxes
Box 1: Life cycle cost for a commercial office in a tropical climate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
Box 2: Residential construction in China  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
Box 3: Retrofitting existing office buildings in the USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
Box 4: Water savings in a 4-person single house . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
Box 5: The social dimension of green buildings: implications for decent work and poverty reduction . . . . . 356
Box 6: The rebound effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Box 7: Reliable measurement and accounting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Box 8: Tools to promote the greening of buildings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

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Buildings

List of acronyms
ADB
ADEME
BAU
BCA
CDM
CEDEFOP
CEU
CFL
CHP
CO2
CRC
CSIR
DVD
EC
EEFS
EPBD
EPC
ESCO
EU
FIDE
G2
GBC
GDP
GER
GHG
GRIHA
HVAC
ICT
IEA
ILO
INFONAVIT
IOEAsian Development Bank
French Environment and Energy
Management Agency
Business-as-usual
Building and Construction Authority(Singapore)
Clean Development Mechanism
European Centre for the Developmentof Vocational Training
Central European University
Compact fluorescent lamp
Combined heat and power
Carbon dioxide
Carbon Reduction Commitment
Council of Scientific and Industrial
Research
Digital versatile disc
European Commission
Energy Efficiency Co-Financing
SchemeEnergy Performance of Buildings
Directive (EU)Energy performance contracting
Energy service company
European Union
Fund for Electric Energy Savings(Mexico)Green Scenario 2
Green Building Council
Gross Domestic ProductGreen Economy Report
Greenhouse gas
Green Rating for Integrated Habitat
Assessment
Heating ventilation and air
conditioning
Information & Communication
Technology
International Energy Agency
International Labour Organization
National Workers’ Housing Fund
Institute (Mexico)International Organisation of
Employers

IPCC
ITUC
KfW
LCA
LED
LEED
LPG
LTCR
MEPS
MURE
NPV
O&M
OECD
OSHA
PV
PwC
RIRs
SB
SEEP
TBL
TCO
UN DESAUN Habitat
UNEP
UNEP SBCIUNFCCC
WBCSD
WHOIntergovernmental Panel on Climate
ChangeInternational Trade Union
Confederation
German Development Bank
Life-cycle assessment
Light emitting diode
Leadership in Energy andEnvironmental Design
Liquefied petroleum gas
Lost time case rates
Minimum efficiency performancestandards
Mesures d’Utilisation Rationnelle del’Energie
Net Present Value
Operation and management
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration (USA)Photovoltaic
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Recordable incident rates
Sustainable Buildings
Serbian Energy Efficiency Programme
Triple bottom line
Total cost of ownership
United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs
United Nations Human Settlements
Programme
United Nations Environment
Programme
United Nations Environment
Programme Sustainable Buildings andClimate Initiative
United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change
World Business Council for Sustainable
Development
World Health Organization335

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. The Buildings sector of today has an oversized ecological footprint. The buildings sector
is the single largest contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), with approximately
one third of global energy end use taking place within buildings. Furthermore, the construction
sector is responsible for more than a third of global resource consumption, including 12 per centof all fresh water use and significantly contributes to the generation of solid waste, estimated at
40 per cent of the total volume. Therefore, the building sector is central to any attempt to use
resources more efficiently.
2. Constructing new green buildings and retrofitting existing energy- and resource intensive
buildings stock can achieve significant savings. There are significant opportunities to improveenergy-efficiency in buildings, and the sector has the greatest potential, out of those covered in thisreport, to reduce global GHG emissions. Various projections indicate that investments, ranging from
US$ 300 billion to US$ 1 trillion (depending on assumptions used) per year to 2050, can achieve savingsof about one-third in energy consumption in buildings worldwide. In addition, these investments
can significantly contribute to the reduction in CO2 emissions needed to attain the benchmark 450
ppm concentration of GHGs. Emission reductions through increased energy efficiency in buildings
can be achieved at an average abatement cost of -US$ 35 per tonne, reflecting energy cost savings,
compared to -US$ 10 per tonne costs in the transport sector or positive abatement costs on the
power sector of US$ 20 per tonne.
3. Greening buildings also brings significant health and productivity benefits. Greening
buildings can also contribute significantly to health, liveability and productivity improvements. The
increased productivity of workers in green buildings can yield savings higher than those achieved
from energy-efficiency. In residential buildings in many developing countries, indoor pollution
from poorly-combusted solid fuels (e.g. coal or biomass), combined with poor ventilation, are amajor cause of serious illness and premature death. Lower respiratory infections such as pneumonia
and tuberculosis linked to indoor pollution are estimated to cause about 11 per cent of humandeaths globally each year. Women and children tend to be most at risk due to their daily exposure.
Improved access to water and basic sanitation are other significant benefits that come with green
building programmes.
4. Greening the building sector can lead to an increase in jobs. Investments in improved energyefficiency in buildings could generate additional employment in developed countries where there islittle growth in building stock. It is estimated that every US$ 1 million invested in building efficiency

336

Buildings

retrofits creates ten to 14 direct jobs and three to four indirect jobs. If the demand for new buildingsthat exists in developing countries is considered, the potential to increase the number of green jobs
in the sector is still higher. Various studies point to job creation through different types of activities,
such as new construction and retrofitting, production of resource-efficient materials and appliances,the expansion of renewable energy sources and services such as recycling and waste management.
Greening the building industry also provides an opportunity to engage the informal sector andimprove working conditions across the industry, by implementing training programmes targeting
new skill requirements and improving inspection approaches.

5. Developing countries have the opportunity to lay the foundation of energy-efficientbuilding stocks for decades to come. Significant new construction is expected in the developingworld in order to provide adequate housing for over 500 million people, while providing access toelectricity for some 1.5 billion people. Urbanisation and economic growth in emerging economies
also point to the rapid growth of new building stock. In developing countries, taking into accountsustainable building considerations at the time of design and construction makes good economic
sense. Green retrofitting at a later stage invariably carries higher costs, both financially andenvironmentally, than integrating sustainability considerations already at the early stages of designand construction. For developed countries, which account for the majority of the existing building
stock, the priority is to put in place measures and incentives that will enable large-scale investments
in retrofitting programmes.
6. The role of public policy and leadership by example is vital in triggering the greening of thebuilding sector. A life-cycle approach is required covering the building design, the manufacturingof material supplies, the construction process, buildings operation and maintenance as well as
the disposal, recycling and reuse of building, construction and demolition waste. Considering, inparticular, the hidden costs and market failures that characterise the building industry, regulatory
and control measures are likely to be the most effective and cost-efficient in bringing about agreen transformation of the sector. These need to be combined with other pricing instruments for
greater impact, given realities such as the level of development of the local market and householdincome-levels. Additionally, government-owned buildings such as public schools, hospitals andsocial housing units are ideal locations to begin implementing greener building policies, including
green public procurement. At the same time, the role of progressive private sector actors organised,for example, through Green Building Councils can drive the transition to lower carbon and moreresource-efficient buildings.

337

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
1.1 The aim of this chapter
This chapter makes a case – focusing on economic
arguments – for greening the building sector. It also
provides guidance on policies and instruments thatcan bring about this transformation. The broader goal
is to enable public- and private-sector actors to seize
environmental and economic opportunities, such as theefficient use of energy, water and other resources, toimprove health, boost productivity and create jobs thatreflect decent work and reduce poverty.

1.2 Scope and definition
This chapter encompasses both new construction andthe retrofitting of existing buildings, with the focus on
urban areas, which are expanding and now home to morethan half the world’s population. The chapter covers anenvironmental and socio-economic agenda, with special
consideration given to climate, health and employment.
The analysis of resource use focuses mainly on energy,
given its importance to the building sector and the relative
abundance of data at the global scale. While efficiency inthe use of water and land as well as recycling and waste
is considered, covering a comprehensive environmental
agenda of all life-cycle impacts is beyond the scope of
this analysis.
According to the International Energy Agency (Laustsen2008), green buildings are characterised by increased
energy efficiency, reduced water and material
consumption, and improved health and environment.
The International Organization for Standardization’s
definition of sustainable buildings combines a minimum

338

adverse environmental impact with economic andsocial aspects across various geographic scales. In thischapter, the concept of green buildings is similarly broad,including not only the environmental dimensions, butalso economic dimensions (such as energy savings, thecost of greening, payback periods, productivity andjob creation) and social dimensions (such as indoor
pollution and health).

1.3 Structure of the chapter
This chapter has three main parts. Firstly, it introduces
the sector and highlights key challenges andopportunities it faces today. Developmental, energy andenvironmental challenges are highlighted. The section
notes trends in population growth and urbanisation,
drivers for growth in the industry, and its resource use
and environmental impact. Secondly, the next section
sets out the case for investment in green buildings.
This starts with a description of investment needs,
cost benefit analysis and efficiencies to be gained. An
overview of benefits covers energy and water, waste andmaterials, productivity and health, as well as job creation.
Special consideration is given to the policy target of
reducing GHG emissions from the building sector,
based on 450 parts per million (ppm) as climate benchmark used by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in
its climate change mitigation scenarios. Modelling by
the Millennium Institute provides a green investment
scenario for the sector, quantifying the implicationsof going beyond business-as-usual (BAU). Thirdly, thechapter gives an overview of policy instruments andtools that can be used by Government or regulatory
institutions at different levels to advance green building.

Buildings

2 Challenges and opportunities
2.1 Challenges
The last 40 years have seen much experimentationand significant progress with low-energy building
design strategies and technologies. However, in mostcountries, green buildings are still at a nascent phaseof development. Yet they are expected to become thenorm in future. Experimentation with net-zero-carbon
buildings, passive houses and energy-plus buildings
are emerging worldwide. The main challenges facing
green buildings are discussed with special reference
to the sector’s significant use of resources andemissions of CO2. This covers both existing building
stock and the projected growth of new construction.
A key component of green buildings is related to theirlocation and how they interact with other componentsof urban and regional systems, which is covered in the
Cities chapter.
Sizing the building sector
Driven by population growth and urbanisation, thebuilding sector itself is a significant contributor to
economic growth, both globally and at the national level.
Globally, it is estimated to be worth US$ 7.5 trillion peryear or approximately 10 per cent of global GDP (Betts
and Farrell 2009) and the construction sector employs
more than 111 million people (ILO 2001). At the national
level, the sector generates 5-10 per cent of employment(UNEP SBCI 2007a).
There are important differences between developed
and developing countries in both the current building
stock and projected building-sector growth. Developed
country populations are broadly more urbanised andmore economically reliant on the service sector than on
industry or agriculture. They also have higher householdincomes than developing country populations.
Developed countries currently account for the majorityof the world’s existing building-related energy demandand CO2 emissions.
This picture is changing rapidly. Projected economic
growth is modest and projected population growth flator even negative in Western Europe, Russia and Japan.
Thus building-related energy demand and CO2 emissions
in these countries will see little growth in the coming
decades. There are some exceptions among richer
countries such as the United States of America, where
higher fertility and immigration rates are expected. In
contrast, developing countries are fast-growing, rapidly

urbanising and are projected to add 2.3 billion to global
population over the coming four decades (UN DESA
2009). Of the 9 billion people predicted to live on Earthin 2050, 70 per cent are expected to live in urban areas(UN-HABITAT 2010).
India is short of 24.7 million homes (NHHP 2007; Roy et al.
2007) and the country will need millions of homes to bebuilt over several decades to accommodate projected
income growth and urbanisation. New construction
growth for commercial and residential buildings
currently averages 7 per cent per year in China and 5 percent per year in India and South-east Asia, comparedwith only 2 per cent in developed countries (Baumert etal. 2005). As estimates of the global building stock are
not available, Figure 1 provides an overview of the scaleof residential and commercial floor space in China, theEU, Japan and the USA.
China is expected to add twice the amount of current
US office space between 2000 and 2020 (WBCSD 2009).
Another study indicates the stock of office space in China
as 3.5 billion m2 and predicts it will grow by over 70 per
cent by 2020 (Zhou et al. 2007). In 2007 alone, 0.8 billion
m2 of new buildings were constructed in China and it isprojected that in each year to 2020, an additional one
billion m2 of new buildings will be constructed (Cheng2010). Global cement production is set to double by
2050, with China and India accounting for nearly half ofall production (WBCSD 2007b).
Historical trends demonstrate that increasing wealthleads to higher space standards and an increase inhousehold appliances, with implications for energy
consumption. Another critical factor in developed
countries is demographic and societal change, witha significant increase in one-person households. For
example, in Germany, the energy consumption for spaceheating increased by 11 per cent from 1995 to 2000
before decreasing by 7 per cent from 2000 to 2005 –mainly because of higher energy costs – resulting in an
overall rise of 2.8 per cent from 1995 to 2005. Domestic
hot-water consumption decreased slightly (by 1.4 percent) in the period but home appliances still contributed
17 per cent to total energy consumption despite
substantial improvements in their energy efficiency.
While great improvements in energy efficiency havebeen achieved in certain sectors, the overall energy
consumption of private households in Germany rose by
3.5 per cent between 1995 and 2005 (UBA 2006).

339

40

Floor space per person (m2)

Floor space (billion m2)

Towards a green economy

35
30
25
20

100

80

60

40

15
10

20

5
0

0

China
Commercial

EU-15

Japan

US

Residential

China
Commercial

EU-15

Japan

US

Residential

Figure 1: Commercial and residential floor space in China, the EU, Japan and the USA (2003)
Source: WBCSD (2011)

Developmental challenges
Developing countries are urbanising at a rate two to
three times faster than developed countries, resulting inmassive informal settlements and slums (UNEP, ILO, IOE,
ITUC 2008). In the majority of the developing world, thescale of informal and low-cost housing is vast. In somecities, the informal city is bigger than the formal city.
In Indonesia, an estimated 70-80 per cent of housing
construction is informal (Malhotra 2003). In Brazil, morethan half of all low-cost homes are built by the informal
sector (UNEP SBCI 2010b).
In this context, providing affordable green housing
for the poor is a considerable challenge when somany already face major economic barriers to afford
conventional housing. Analysis of social housing,
however, does not lead to clear results as to whether
green social housing is more expensive at the point ofconstruction; environmental design features may be but
do not have to be, more expensive than the conventionalfeatures. For example, a detached social housing project
Casa Alvorada (48.50 m2) in the city of Porto Alegre, Rio
Grande do Sul, in Brazil, was 12 per cent more expensive
per square metre than the typical housing solution ofsimilar size implemented by the municipality, but still 18
per cent cheaper per square metre compared to anothermunicipal typical model of about half of the floor area perunit (23 m2) (Sattler 2007). Further, if the environmental
features are more expensive at the point of construction,
they may yield benefits in terms of savings on water andenergy during the occupation of the building.
Poverty and housing raises other unique challenges forsustainable building and construction in developing
societies. Slums, be they informal settlements or rundown and overcrowded housing estates, are associatedwith social and environmental challenges including340

lack of access to electricity, fresh water, health-care andeffective waste management. Marginal locations poorly
connected to public transport services are an additional
obstacle in that they constrain access to employment
opportunities (see Cities chapter).
Greening of buildings can be one of a series of strategies
that improve access to basic services and reduce
vulnerability and, more broadly, contribute to better
living conditions of the poor. Facing this challenge, India,
for example, is experimenting with three approaches,
namely vernacular building (which focuses on local
solutions and traditional knowledge), green building(supported by the internationally recognised Indian
GRIHA rating systems, developed by TERI) and; energyefficient building (focused on energy-use in commercial
buildings) (UNEP SBCI 2010a). New approaches cancontribute to providing electricity to the 1.5 billion
people in the developing world currently living withoutit (IEA 2010a), and to lifting 100 million people fromslum conditions and providing them with safe water andsanitation – a distinct Millennium Development Goal.
Cleaner and more efficient energy use will be critical to
avoid any possible lock-in effect for poorer segments ofsociety. Savings on energy costs can also free resources
for investment in other basic needs. A recent study
by the CSIR for the ILO (Van Wyk et al. 2009) provides
several examples of energy-related projects in Africa:
the installation of solar PV systems on schools, clinics
and community centres in Zambia, the introductionof solar lighting and electricity into homes by local
solar entrepreneurs in Malawi, the electrification of 60
health centres using solar energy in Mozambique, andthe construction of windmills and solar-powered water
systems as well as 10,000 improved cooking stoves formore than 250,000 people in Somalia.

Buildings
Some aspects of improved well-being (e.g. health, water,
sanitation and energy access) can be linked to building
design and technology. Yet developmental challenges
have to be seen in a broader context and go beyond theconstruction of housing to consider social and economic
inclusion and the link to other urban activities (see Cities
chapter). The poverty relevance of green buildings in thiscontext is closely linked to the impacts of electrification
programmes (see discussion in the Energy chapter)as well as the impacts of city structure and transportsystems on poverty (see Transport and Cities chapters).

countries from poorly combusted solid fuels combinedwith poor ventilation is a major cause of serious illness
and premature death. Lung infections such as pneumonia
and tuberculosis linked to indoor pollution are estimatedto cause about 11 per cent of all human deaths globallyeach year (UNEP SBCI 2010b). The WHO (2009) estimatesthat every year about 1.3 million people (mostly womenand children) die prematurely owing to indoor air
pollution from biomass. Estimates by the WHO (2009)
further attribute 76 per cent of all lung cancer deaths to
the indoor use of solid fuels.

Energy and environmental challenges
Whether existing building stock or projected growthof building stock, this sector is already the singlelargest contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions.
Approximately one-third of global energy end-use
takes place within buildings (IEA 2010a). Nearly 60 per
cent of the world’s electricity is consumed in residential
and commercial buildings, although this usage varies
widely according to geographical location, climate
and consumption patterns (IEA 2009b). For developed
countries located in cooler regions of the world, spaceheating, on average, represents 60 per cent of residential
energy consumption, followed by water heating at 18
per cent (UNEP SBCI 2007a).

Apart from energy use and emissions, the building sector
is responsible for more than a third of global resource
consumption annually, including 12 per cent of all
fresh water use. The manufacture of building materials
consumes about 10 per cent of the global energy supply.
Building construction and demolition waste contributes
about 40 per cent of solid waste streams in developed
countries, with most waste associated with the demolition
phase (UNEP SBCI 2010b).

Projections for 2030 based on IPCC scenarios suggest
CO2 emissions from buildings will continue to accountfor around one-third of total CO2 emissions. Table 1
summarises these projections for CO2 emissions under
two scenarios (IPCC 2007). In the high-growth scenario,
the largest contribution is from developing countries
while in the low-growth scenario the largest share is from
North America and developing Asia, which includes China
and India. If per-capita CO2 emissions are considered,both scenarios suggest that by 2030 the greater share ofemissions will still be from OECD countries.
GHG emissions are the single most important negative
externality from excessive fossil fuel consumption but
the burning of fossil fuels also causes other externalities
such as air pollution and health problems. Approximately
3 billion people world-wide rely on bio-mass and coal
to meet cooking and other energy needs (IPCC 2007).
Indoor air pollution in residential buildings in developing

CO2 emissions (in GtCO2)
Largest share from
Average annual CO2 emissions growth rate (2004-2030)

Data challenges
When considering the environmental credentials
of buildings, the true measure of their performance
only becomes evident with occupation, given theimpact of factors such as behaviour (cultural habits,
environmental expectations and life-style), climaticchanges and particularities of the control of technicalsystems in buildings. The only realistic way to rate theenergy efficiency of a building is by measuring how
much energy has been consumed during a period of
occupation, ideally, a minimum of two years. A dearthof accurate data is hampering our understanding of
impacts such as occupation, design and technologicalcomponents.

2.2 Opportunities
The major opportunities for greening the building sector
are the relatively low cost of the process, be it retrofittingor new construction, the availability of technologies,
and the green evolution of energy supply and demand.
These trends are encouraging the effort to transform thebuilding sector.

High-growth scenario (A1)

Low-growth scenario (B2)

8.6 → 15.6
(2004) (2030)

8.6 → 11.4
(2004) (2030)

Developing Asia, Middle East/North Africa, Latin
America, sub-Saharan Africa

North America anddeveloping Asia

2.4%

1.5%

Table 1: Projected CO2 emissions from buildings to 2030
Source: IPCC (2007)341

Towards a green economy

GtC02-eq/yr

Non-OECD/EIT
7

EIT

Energy supply

OECD

Transport

World total

Buildings

Industry

Agriculture

Forestry

Waste

6
5
4
3
2
1

00

0
<5

<1

0
<2

0

00
<1

0

<5

<2

00

0
<5

<1

0
<2

00

0
<5

<1

0
<2

00

0
<5

<1

0
<2

00

0
<5

<1

0
<2

00

0
<5

<1

0
<2

0
US$/tCO2-eq

total sectoral potential at <US$100/tCO2-eq in GtCO2/yr:
2.4-4.7

1.6-2.5

5.3-6.7

2.5-5.5

2.3-6.4

1.3-4.2

0.4-1.0

Figure 2: IPCC projections of CO2 mitigation potential in 2030
Source: IPCC (2007)

Low net cost
Although the building sector is the largest contributor tohuman-related GHG emissions, it also holds the greatest
potential to reduce these emissions (IPCC 2007). Basedon 80 studies spanning 36 countries, the IPCC reportsuggests that a 29 per cent reduction in projectedbaseline emissions by 2020 is achievable at zero cost(below 0 US$/tCO2-eq), while further improvements
could be made with relatively low levels of investment.
Figure 2 shows sectoral estimates of the economic
mitigation potential of using technologies and practices
expected to be available by 2030, at various costs in
US dollars per tonne of CO2-equivalent (tCO2-eq). The
mitigation potential is expressed in GtCO2-eq/yr and themarginal cost in US dollars per tCO2-eq. For each sector,
the mitigation potential is represented as three ascending
bars, according to the amount that can be achieved atless than US$ 20, less than US$ 50 and less than US$ 100
per tCO2-eq.1 In the building sector, assuming a cost per
tCO2-eq of no more than US$ 100, the global economic
mitigation potential ranges between 5.3 and 6.7 GtCO2eq/yr by 2030. Most importantly, about 90 per cent of
this potential could be achieved at less than US$ 20 per
tCO2-eq, far more than could be achieved in any of theother sectors depicted. This range is represented by thesegment within the third bar for buildings (<100). The
bulk of this mitigation potential can be attributed to nonOECD/EIT (Economies in Transition) countries, followed
by OECD countries and to a lesser extent EIT countries.
1. Note that potential that can be achieved for less than US$ 50 per t CO2-eq
includes the potential that can be achieved at less than US$ 20 t CO2-eq,
and similarly for US$ 100 per t CO2-eq. Hence the bars grow in size fromleft to right.

342

Adapting behaviour patterns
Before addressing the technical, financial and regulatory
potential of green buildings and their impacts on
the green economy, it is important to recognise that
profound changes in attitudes and behaviour will be
required amongst policy-makers, investors, consumers
and occupants in order to implement real change. People
spend most of their lives in their homes, places of workand other buildings; North Americans, on average, spend
90 per cent of their time indoors (United States General
Services Administration 2008) and there are deeplyrooted attitudes and practices relating to how people
establish patterns of comfort and efficiency. For thisreason, understanding the economic and psychologicalrationale of decisions made by individuals andinstitutions is increasingly recognised as fundamental toachieving energy-efficiency improvements in buildings.
For example, a recent report on energy efficiency in the
USA highlighted various behavioural biases affecting
consumers’ energy consumption decisions (Swim et al.
2009; Granade et al. 2009).
The core concept of “thermal comfort” is more of astate of mind (reflecting different cultural, class andgeographical conditions) than a technical certainty(ASHRAE 2005). Assessing the right level of thermal
comfort is critical to setting performance standards forbuildings (Cena and Clark 1981) but requires not just anunderstanding of what a human body can bear, but also
to what extent people are ready to make behaviouralchanges in the way they experience comfort in theirenvironment. This affects the way building occupiersinteract with their environment in very precise ways –from choosing to pull down external blinds to limit sun

Buildings
penetration at certain times of day (rather than switchingon the air conditioning) to putting on a sweater whenthe external temperature drops (rather than turning up
the thermostat). On balance, green buildings require amore proactive engagement between occupier and theenvironment, which reflects the degree of “active” or“passive” environmental design techniques available inindividual buildings, to which the report now turns.

lighting, heating, ventilation, air conditioning andshading can achieve a 64 per cent reduction in energyuse (Griffith et al. 2006). In the UK, energy consumption
guidelines indicate that the introduction of naturalventilation can achieve 55-60 per cent reduction inenergy consumption in office buildings, compared withfully air-conditioned and fully glazed office buildings(CIBSE 2004).

Design and technology
The greatest opportunities to achieve a higher
environmental performance for buildings can befound in the early stages of their design. An integrated
design methodology of green buildings combines
environmental principles and technological inputs at
various design stages. It requires a multidisciplinary
approach and broadens conventional building design
by including rigorous assessment procedures tocomply with performance targets (Baker and Steemers
1999). Designing buildings based on environmental
considerations implies continuous feedback between
different design components, as decisions regarding
building form, orientation, components, otherarchitectural aspects as well as building systems are
entirely integrated.

Greater attention is now given to the impact ofsustainable environmental design solutions on therunning costs of buildings and how much energy isembodied in construction materials and processes.
Increasingly, life-cycle assessments (LCA)2 are being
applied, which include not only operation andmaintenance, but also the manufacture of construction
materials (McDonough and Braungart 2002). In addition,a new generation of building guidance is focussing on
the total energy costs of buildings, from the design stage
through to completion, including considerations about
their recyclability (Anderson et al. 2009; Hammond andJones 2008).

There are two basic paradigms of green building. The
first is based on the concept of “passive” design wherebuildings respond to their local site context by using
natural elements (such as air-flow and sunlight) tolimit the effect of external conditions on the internal
environment. Many traditional buildings with thickwalls and small windows in hot climates, or with natural
through-ventilation with courtyards and terraces inhumid areas, belong to this category. Passive design
aims to provide a comfortable environment whileeliminating or reducing the need for space heating,cooling, ventilation or artificial lighting. The second
paradigm is based on a more “active” approach thatuses newer technology and state-of-the-art building
management systems to reduce the energy load ofbuildings. Solar screens, lighting scoops, environmental
flues, photovoltaic cells (PV), wind turbines and otherdevices are found in most state-of-the-art high-techbuildings. Both paradigms can be applied to newbuildings as well as retrofitting existing building stock.
Many passive design techniques are finding their way
into a new generation of building designs across thedeveloped world, while new forms of green energy
generation are being integrated in building projects inthe developing world (Baker and Steemers 1999; Hawkes
1996; Herzog 1996). The field is littered with examples
of how both passive design and technology havesuccessfully reduced the energy footprint of buildings. A
recent study of 5,375 commercial buildings in the USA
showed that in new buildings the use of energy-efficient

Beyond the fabric and construction of the building, amore holistic approach to the design of buildings andtheir use also requires consideration of all energy-related
components, including appliances and equipment usedin buildings. Their relative energy use varies from country
to country, based on climatic and cultural differences.
The following listing of appliances and equipment
by residential and public or commercial categories
demonstrates the range of supplier industries involved.

Residential building sector

Office and commercial
building sector• Space heating and cooling• Mechanical ventilation• Hot water systems• Appliances (incl. cooking, washing,refrigeration, entertainment andcleaning)• Indoor lighting• Space heating, cooling and ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC)• Indoor lighting• Outdoor lighting• Office equipment• Servers and data centres

In commercial buildings, office equipment comprises
the fastest-growing area of energy consumption. In
residential buildings world-wide, a growing proportionof energy consumption is associated with household
appliances, including televisions, DVD players andhome computers. Implementing the best available
technologies can reduce their energy consumption by
2. Life-Cycle Assessment (LCA) is a tool devised for evaluating theenvironmental impact of a product, process or a service across its life cycle,
also referred to as the “environmental footprint”. All inputs and outputs ofmaterial, energy, water and waste over the entire product life cycle andtheir relative impacts are accounted for, including the extraction of raw
materials, processing, manufacturing, transport, use and disposal. The main
objective of a LCA is to compare the impacts of several alternative processes
in order to chose the least damaging one.

343

Towards a green economy
more than 50 per cent. The household-appliance shareof energy consumption in residential homes vary from21 per cent in China in 2000, to 25 per cent in the EU in
2004 and 27 per cent in the USA in 2005 (von Weizsäcker
et al. 2009).
Managing energy supply and demand
Energy use and emission patterns are affected by abuilding’s environmental performance and its energy
load (on the demand side) or by the extent of its useof green sources of energy (on the supply side). Recent
developments in design and technology offer significant
potential to change the way energy demand and supply
is managed in buildings.
On the demand side, there is growing evidence thatenergy consumption can be reduced by modifying thespecification of technologies, appliances and fittings
within buildings – in addition to designing the built
form in a more sustainable way. Leading Information &Communication Technology (ICT) Infrastructure firms
produce software for command centres, which canactively help to reduce a building’s carbon footprintby monitoring and controlling all components of abuilding’s energy use, from heating/cooling demand, tolighting and printing.
But the pattern of energy use in buildings varies
considerably among regions and countries according togeographical location, climate, consumption patterns
and state of development and urbanisation (IPCC 2007).
Space heating is a dominant component of energy use
in Europe and northern China, while water heating is ofgreat significance in Japan (WBCSD 2009). In these areas,
effective means of controlling energy demand andemissions include the improvement of heat-recovery
systems, optimising daylight penetration with shallower
buildings, substituting incandescent lighting with moreenergy-efficient systems such as CFL and LED lamps
and introducing solar shading to reduce overheating.3
In addition to these design solutions, smart metering,which provides utility customers with information in
real-time about their domestic energy consumption,
has also proved effective at reducing overall household
electricity consumption, with a 5-10 per cent drop
recorded in private households in Germany and the
UK (Luhmann 2007). In contrast, buildings located inwarmer regions do not usually require space heating
and require less hot water. Energy needs in lowincome rural communities are largely determined bycooking (70 per cent) and other household activities(15 per cent) (Nekhaev 2004). In these locations, theimpact of energy use will be more radically affectedby introducing greener and cleaner fuel sources and3. For example, as part of the Serbian Energy Efficiency Programme (SEEP
1) (IDA Credit and IRBD loan), 28 schools and hospitals were refurbished in
Belgrade in 2005-09 with average energy savings of 39 per cent.

344

more efficient domestic appliances than by introducing
green building technologies.
On the supply side, there has been a significant shift insome countries in favour of renewable energies with
bio-fuel and solar heating technologies becoming
competitive with conventional sources (European
Renewable Energy Council 2008). Photovoltaic (PV)technology is still relatively expensive but with
the increasing volume of installed capacity andimprovements in production, prices are lowering
steadily.4 District heating and cooling systems5 that linkbuildings are also proving effective at reducing energy
costs, notably in Iceland, where 94 per cent of heat
demand is now provided by these technologies (EuroHeat & Power 2009).
Retrofitting and new construction
In developed countries, opportunities for greening thebuilding sector are found mainly in retrofitting existingbuildings to render them more environmentally
efficient by reducing energy demand and using
renewable energy sources. The urbanised regions ofnorthern Europe and North America are no longer
increasing their building stock rapidly. In the UK, forexample, 75 per cent of the existing building stock is
expected to be in use in 2050. In such circumstances,
retrofitting existing buildings becomes a critical area ofintervention to reduce energy demands and thus GHG
emissions (Ravetz 2008).
For the majority of non-OECD countries, which havea significant housing deficit, the greatest potential toreduce energy demand will come from new generationsof buildings with more efficient design performancestandards (WBCSD 2007a). It follows that the major
environmental and business case for the OECD residential
and commercial sector will depend on retrofitting
existing buildings, while non-OECD countries will haveto invest heavily in new forms of sustainable design that
goes beyond the performance of individual buildings(as discussed in the Cities chapter). Nonetheless, there
are significant opportunities for retrofitting buildings
in some of the bigger cities of the developing world
by adopting energy efficiency design measures suchas solar technology, clean water supplies and reducing
4. Grid parity, where the electricity produced by PV panels is available atthe same cost level as electricity provision from the grid, is predicted to beachievable by 2013-14 based on data from Germany (Bhandari and Stadler2009).
5. District heating and cooling describes systems distributing heat and/or
cold generated in a centralised location for heating and combined heat andpower respectively. District heating serves both, space and domestic water
heating. Moreover, commercial and industrial as well as public buildings
can be supplied with process heat. The heat often comes from combined
heat and power plants (CHP) and therefore has the ability to achieve
higher efficiencies and lower emissions than a separate heat and power
production. Historically, district heating stations are dependent on fossil
fuels but in the last years renewable sources were introduced.

Buildings
Green building investment opportunities

Green retrofit investment opportunities

10

China

8

Russia6

Indonesia

TurkeyBrazilPoland2

2

Low green share

Australia
SwedenUK
Germany
FranceNetherlands Canada
Mexico0

S. Korea

India

4

0

Scaled by value of potential retrofit stock – 2007

Retrofit potential

New construction potential

Scaled by value of new construction

4

Spain

USA

Italy

Japan
6

8

Moderate green share

108

MexicoPoland6

RussiaUK
Netherlands
USA
Italy
S. Korea

TurkeySpain
Japan
BrazilSwedenAustralia
Germany
CanadaFrance4Indonesia

2

10High green share

0

0

2

Low green share

China

India

4

6

Moderate green share

8

10High green share

Sustainability level*

Sustainability level** Excluding economic factors* Excluding economic factors

Figure 3: Investment potential for new construction and building retrofits relative to the current sustainability
level of building construction in representative countries
Source: Nelson (2008)

dependency on air-conditioning through technicalimprovements.6 In India, for example, potential energy
savings of 25 per cent have been estimated throughcost-effec­
tive retrofitting of existing commercial
buildings (UNEP SBCI 2010a).
The pros and cons of constructing a new building or
retrofitting an existing structure have to be individually
examined and compared. In some cases, retrofitting
allows a further reduction of the energy load bypreserving building materials, which can contain highlevels of embodied energy7, expended in the extractionof resources, the manufacture of materials and theirtransportation. Both new building construction and
6. In Brazil, for example, refrigerators are responsible for 33 per cent of allelectricity use in residential buildings over the year, with electric showers,
lighting and air conditioning accounting for 20, 11 and 10 per centrespectively (Ghisi, Gosch and Lamberts 2007).
7. Embodied energy is energy needed for the production and processingof materials, transport and demolition as well as for manufacturing of
furniture, appliances and the provision of infrastructure services such as
water and sanitation. Embodied energy is highly dependent on the designand construction technique of buildings.

retrofitting are fundamental for catalysing a green
building transformation. Retrofitting in developed
countries can yield significant energy savings as thedesign, construction and technology of older buildings
is often significantly less efficient than current bestpractices. In addition, retrofits that address daylight or
on-demand ventilation to improve air quality can bring
benefits through lower health care costs and higher
productivity levels.
While less significant in terms of volume compared withnew construction, retrofits can play an important role inaddressing energy poverty in developing countries. At
least 20 per cent of the world’s population lack access toelectricity and it is expected that 1.2 billion people will
still be without electricity in 2030; 87 per cent of themliving in rural areas (IEA 2010a). Equipping householdswith electrical appliances, heating and cooling systems
and either on-site renewable energy generation (such as
rooftop solar panels) or a connection to the power gridmay increase overall energy demand. Yet it will comein a far cleaner form than the coal, dung or wood many

Building retrofits

New construction

Developed Countries(Key focus)• Single homes that lack efficiency norms (e.g. EU)• Homes to increase lifespan (e.g. Japan)• Appliances in large, relatively new homes (e.g. USA)
• Older multi-family buildings (e.g. Europe)(Secondary focus)• High rate of new construction expected in USA and Japan. High potential tomeet green standards, e.g. zero-carbon, zero-waste and 3R (Japan).

Emerging Economies(Secondary focus)• Single homes built by the informal sector to meet basic
efficiency standards (e.g. Brazil)• Multi-family homes (e.g. China, Brazil and Russia)• Predominance of single homes in countries such as India –needs retrofits to sustenance levels (basic electricity, bettercooking fuels, durable)(Key focus)• Huge housing shortage – opportunity for greening through publicly
subsidized and privately financed housing (e.g. India, China, Brazil, Russia
and other emerging economies)• Huge demand for office space. Potential for greening through corporate
demand.

Table 2: Summary of the major opportunities for green buildings in different sectors
Source: Based on WBCSD analysis (2007a)345

Towards a green economy

households currently use for lighting, heating and cooking.
Replacing these traditional fuel sources will produce
significant environmental and public-health benefits.
Table 2 summarises elements that describe theretrofitting and new construction potential in greening
the building sector in developed countries andemerging economies. It is clear that there is a strong
case for retrofitting buildings in developed countries. In
emerging economies, retrofitting and new construction
both have compelling cases although the potential for
new construction is much greater than retrofitting. Figure
3 correlates the expected value of new construction
and retrofitting potential with its level of sustainability(from low to high share of green construction). It can beseen that emerging economies such as China and India
have a great potential for new construction, but it is not

346

expected to be particularly green. Developed countries
have a high potential for retrofitting, with a high levelof sustainability. The new construction potential in thesecountries is very low.
A conscious effort is needed to turn new construction
green in developing countries and emerging economies,
given that buildings generally last for decades and often
centuries, whereas a country’s car fleet may be turned
over in as little as 12 years. If a building is constructed
to low standards of efficiency, retrofitting it later is an
unnecessary complication compared with getting
it right the first time. Retrofitting existing buildings,
however, reduces energy demand compared with newbuilds through a lower demand for building materials
such as steel, glass and cement, which themselves
require considerable amounts of energy to produce.

Buildings

3 The case for investment
in green buildings
3.1 Investment needs
The analysis in this chapter is predicated on climatechange and GHG emissions being an overriding
concern for the building sector. Related to this are
key environmental challenges such as water scarcity,
land use, waste and sanitation. Climate change both
impacts and is impacted by these. The social andeconomic dimensions are addressed in terms of how
a more efficient use of resources in the building sector
and a reduction of its GHG emissions can contribute toenergy savings, health and productivity gains, as well as
job creation. Overall, green building investment needs
are primarily driven by climate and resource scarcity or
efficiency imperatives.
Buildings currently account for 40 per cent of energy
use in most countries (IEA 2010b), with projections
that demand in this sector will increase by 60 per
cent by 2050 (IEA and OECD 2010). This is larger thaneither the transportation or industrial sector. The IEA
and OECD (2010) estimate that building sector carbon
emissions will need to be reduced from the 15.2 Gt per
year currently projected for 2050 to approximately 2.6
Gt per year as part of a strategy to successfully address
climate change.8

Greening the global building stock will require considerable
investment in new technologies and sustainable building
materials as well as in design and engineering expertise.
This will increase the upfront cost of building construction
relative to continuing with business-as-usual. The IEA andOECD (2010) estimate that a 12.6 Gt reduction by 2050
could be achieved with an average investment of US$
308 billion per year between 2010 and 2050.9 A higher
estimate of US$ 1 trillion per year on average between
2010 and 2050 was obtained in a separate study by thePeterson Institute for International Economics (Houser
8. This reduction of 12.6 Gt CO2 emissions by 2050, published in the Energy
Technology Perspectives 2010 (IEA and OECD 2010) revises earlier estimatesthat CO2 emissions from buildings would need to be reduced by 8.2 Gt froma projected 20.1 Gt in 2050 to 11.9 Gt (IEA 2008). The earlier estimates formeda reference point for other analysis, including by the Peterson Institute forInternational Economics (Houser 2009). The 2010 estimates also include
reductions achieved by fuel-switching and electricity de-carbonisation,
whereas the earlier estimates were limited to efficiency measures.
9. The IEA and OECD (2010) modelled a scenario that estimates a total
investment of US$ 12.3 trillion required over this 40-year period, consistingof US$ 7.9 trillion in the residential sector, and US$ 4.4 trillion in the services
sector. IEA’s estimates are all in US$ 2007.
10. Net present value is calculated by subtracting the additional up-front
operation and maintenance cost required for the more-efficient investment
from the expected energy cost saving over the lifetime of the more-efficientinvestment. Energy cost savings are discounted by 6 per cent annually. NPV
is then divided by the cumulative change in emissions resulting from theinvestment over the course of its life-time. This is known as abatement costand expressed in US dollars per tonne of CO2 (Houser 2009).

Country/region

Additional investment, 200550 (US$ billion /year)

NPV 2005-5010

CO2 reduction*(million tonnes 2050)

Ave. abatement cost, 2005-50(US$/ tonne)

OECD N. America

244

-46

1699

30

USA

209

-40

1555

28

OECD Europe

170

-26

915

30

OECD Pacific

67

-17

353

48

Japan

37

-9

168

52

Transition Economies

78

-12

548

24

Developing Asia

188

-26

2,343

14

China

114

-15

1427

14

India

19

-2

221

12

Latin America

31

-5

148

39

Middle East

80

-17

663

32

Africa

29

-3

298

10

WORLD

1,042

-180

8,200

25

*Relative to business-as-usual

Table 3: The economics of global building transformation
Source: Adapted from Houser (2009)347

Towards a green economy

In the example, a 100,000 m2 commercial building
is being designed for the tropics. Based on thebuilding programme typically employed by theowner, there are several green technologies thatcan be added to the baseline cost to improve overallbuilding performance. The new technology either
costs more than the baseline technology it replaces,or it adds a new technology and additional cost. The
technology investment is being considered because
it produces higher performance and yields savings
over the baseline technology. By expressing thesavings as positive cash flow, and showing the total
accumulated savings (net present value, NPV) overthe life of the technology, it can be shown that theoverall investment (added cost plus accumulated
savings) pays off over time.
In this example, the building is a centre of commerce
and the occupants will be wearing Western business
attire, so air conditioning was considered necessary.
Given this high cooling load, technologies that
could mitigate solar gain and meet the load more
efficiently were considered. These include window
film, exterior shading, a wider comfort band on thethermostats, demand control for ventilation and wallinsulation. Three envelope packages are compared
to a building built to the local standard practiceconstruction methods. The costs of the features
were estimated using standard construction pricing
techniques. Energy savings were estimated using
energy simulation software. The blue line shows
the Minimal Impact package (window film andoptimised wall insulation), which is the cheapest
technology to implement. The dark window filmin this package, however, offsets potential daylightsavings and does not provide much benefit over its
useful life (as shown by the flat slope of the blueline). The Medium and High Performance scenarios
have higher first costs, which are offset by higher2009) in order to reduce emissions in the building sector
by 8.2 Gt per year by 2050 (see Table 3).11
Retrofits in developed countries will account fora meaningful share of this additional investment,
particularly in the early years of greening the buildings.
11. The analysis by Houser (2009) uses a different approach to estimating
the costs of achieving the emissions reduction of 8.2 Gt/year, whichcorresponds to the earlier estimated necessary reduction from IEA (2008)– see footnote 8 above. Houser’s estimates use data and an investment
cost model developed by WBCSD (2009) and notes various explanations forthe higher cost estimates, including the assumptions on the cost of solar
photovoltaic technology, as well as future projections of energy prices.

348

NPV (US$)Box 1: Life cycle cost for a commercial office in a tropical climate12
1,000,000
Minimal impact
Medium performance

800,000

High performance
600,000

400,000

200,000

1

6

11

16

21

Time (years)(200,000)(400,000)(600,000)

energy savings over the life of the building. The
steep purple slope of the High Performance package(including exterior window shading and demand
control ventilation) means that the owner will seea large reduction in the total cost of ownership overthe life of the building – almost US$ 800k for theperiod of the analysis shown.
Similar studies analysing the trade-offs between
building components have shown that there
can even be a net initial cost saving for green
measures. An assessment of the TCO for a Passive
House concluded that the integrated design could
immediately provide net initial cost savings because
the incorporation of higher insulation levels
eliminates the need for a traditional heating system(Laustsen 2008).

But the bulk of the incremental investment will occur
through greening new buildings, an opportunity firms
and households are already starting to take advantage of.
For the USA, a recent study predicts that the green
retrofits of non-residential buildings will grow to a US$
6.6 billion market by 2013, targeting the third of the UScommercial building stock that could benefit from sucha retrofit – a US$ 400 billion market (Pike Research 2009).
For new commercial construction and new residential
12. Simulations and text contributed to this chapter by Tom Paladino.

Buildings
construction, an estimated 10-12 per cent and 6-10 per
cent is green, representing a US$ 24-29 billion and US$
12-20 billion market, respectively. By 2013, the green
commercial construction market is expected to growto US$ 56-70 billion annually and the green residential
market is expected to grow to US$ 40-70 billion (McGraw
Hill 2009).
Although impressive, this market-driven change is
not sufficient to meet the US$ 209 billion averageannual investment required in the USA alone to reducethe building sector’s carbon footprint in line with the
IEA’s projected low-carbon pathway (Houser 2009).
Increasing investment in green buildings will requirepolicies, and smart policy design requires an accurate
appraisal of the costs and benefits of green building
investments.

3.2 Measuring the costs and benefits
A correct evaluation of green building economics
requires a Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) approach,where the differences in upfront investment costs(known as first costs) are considered alongside long-termcosts and benefits. While certain green buildings may
cost more to construct than a conventional alternative,
the first cost premium may be recouped through lower
energy bills, avoided climate change impacts, improved
public health or increases in worker productivity. Box
1 describes the economic benefits of green buildings
technologies and how these can offset their investment
costs over time.
Looking only at the cost differential between
constructing green and conventional buildings, a
recent study by Greg Kats (2010) suggests that costpremiums are considerably lower than generally
perceived. Data from 170 green buildings in the
USA showed that they cost on average only 1.5 percent more than conventional buildings, while public
perception of the average additional costs of goinggreen were 17 per cent. Per square metre the green
premium ranged from US$ 0/m² to US$ 764.2/m²
with a median of US$ 36.6/m².13 While Kats found thepremium to be often greater for buildings achieving
higher green standards, these same high standards
were in many cases achieved with minimal or zero
additional cost. This suggests that the green-cost
premium depends to a great extent on the skill of thedesigners and builders, rather than on the level ofgreenness per se. The study also indicated that green
retrofits have a slightly higher average green premium
than new construction.
13. Original text indicates per square foot a green premium ranging from
US$ 0/sf to US$ 71/sqf with a median of US$ 3.40/sqf.

Comparative efficiency by sector and region
The economic benefit of green building investment isbacked up by low or even negative costs of greening thebuilding sector. One study estimates that 3.5 gigatons of
CO2 emissions could be reduced through investment ingreen buildings by 2030 at an average abatement cost of-US$ 35 per tonne.14 This compares with -US$ 10 per tonnein transportation, US$ 17 per tonne in steel production
or US$ 20 per tonne in the power sector (McKinsey 2009).
Going beyond 2030, the Peterson Institute study Houser(2009) found that achieving the 8.2 Gt (i.e. aiming at 450ppm) of emission reductions from the building sector
by 2050 would cost US$ 25 per tonne, but it would stillbe among the cheapest sources of abatement. Failure
to transform the building sector and reliance on morecostly emission reductions from the transport, power
and industrial sectors would increase the economic costof combating climate change by at least US$ 500 billion
per year globally between 2010 and 2050.
Boxes 2 (China) and 3 (US) show the challenge of
weighing short- and longer-term costs and benefits, aswell as the tendency for growing energy consumption
to undermine efficiency gains in commercial andresidential buildings. Box 2 presents a case studyof residential construction in China and illustrates
the energy savings from design and management
interventions. From this and other studies, it is clear thatgreen buildings have a significant economic return on
investment, and should occupy centre stage for longterm policies that aim to change patterns of production
and consumption behaviour.
Although a wealth of energy efficiency measures andtheir attendant carbon emission reductions come at zeroor even negative cost, policy intervention is needed totransform the global building stock in line with what the
IEA sees as necessary to put the world on a low-carbon
pathway. They also show the need for approaches that are
regionally specific to reflect local building industry andlocal economic realities, mindful that the urban challenge
in green building shows many similarities across regions.
An example of new policy and regulatory intervention
comes from the EU’s Energy Performance of Buildings
Directive15 (EPBD), which has generated debate abouttime frames for meeting requirements, the level ofharmonisation across countries and the possible
administrative burden imposed (e.g. compulsory
14. The reduction of 3.5 Gt of CO2 emissions from buildings throughincreased energy efficiency is part of a larger emission reduction of 38 Gt in
11 sectors, which aims to bring CO2 emissions close to the 450 ppm target
by 2030.
15. The EPDB directive combines regulatory (energy performancerequirements) and information-based (certification and inspection)measures and provides a holistic approach to emissions reduction, which
encompasses the energy needs for space and water heating, cooling,
ventilation and lighting.

349

Towards a green economy

Box 2: Residential construction in China
Multi-family new building construction in China
Base caseGreen development

Difference savings (or costs)~ 530 billion kWh/yr~ 305 billion kWh/yr~ 225 billion kWh/yr

Incremental cost per year

NA

~ US$ 12 billion(~ US$ 12 billion)

Space heat energy savings

NA

76%

76%

Value of energy savings per year

NA

About equal to costs on annual basis~ US$ 12 billion

Growth in energy use 2005-2050

In China, the demand for multi-family dwellings
will continue to grow rapidly owing to rural-urban
migration and rising incomes. Between 2010 and
2050, the World Business Council on Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) estimates electricity demandin multi-family buildings will increase by 200 per
cent for lighting and 325 per cent for appliances.
Current building practices are characterised bypoorly designed and insulated building envelopes
and inefficient heating systems, while energy forheating is priced at a fixed rate irrespective ofconsumption. Analysis by WBCSD (2009) looks at
the impact of improving the efficiency of typical
blocks of multi-family buildings in China (a six-story
building containing 36 apartments) over a 45-year
period spanning 2005-2050.

inspections by accredited experts). An impact assessment
was recently conducted of the directive, which cameinto force in 2002 (Haydock and Arbon 2009). The study
concluded that a reduction of 5-6 per cent of the EU’s
final energy demand, with 60-80 Mt of energy savings
per year, was possible. This accsounts for 4-5 per cent of
the EU’s CO2 emissions. It showed that savings of 160210 Mt CO2/year can be achieved by 2020, along with thecreation of 280,000-450,000 new jobs. This confirms thatgreening costs are low compared with the mid- to longterm benefits. Moreover, abolishing the EPBD’s current
1,000 m2 compliance threshold could yield an additional€ 25 billion energy cost savings per year by 2020 at anadditional capital investment cost of € 8 billion per year –an overall negative CO2 abatement cost (EC 2008).

3.3 Economic, environmental andsocial impacts
Energy benefits
The primary benefit of green buildings is the reductionin tenant energy costs through improved energy

350

The table shows the impact of a 76 per centimprovement in building energy efficiency througha series of design and management interventions,
including a better-designed and insulated building
envelope, apartment-level temperature controls
and electricity sub-metering. If replicated at anational level across China, these steps could leadto a total saving of about 225 billion kWh per year,
or US$ 12 billion per year at current electricity
prices. However, although substantial building
energy savings are achieved, the growth in nationalbuilding stock in China will outpace the efficiency
improvements, resulting in a net increase of 305
billion kWh per year in energy demand over the
given time period.
Source: WBCSD (2009)

efficiency. McKinsey estimates that in the United Statesof America, US$ 229 billion of investment in residential
energy efficiency between 2009 and 2020 would yield
US$ 395 billion in energy cost savings and reduce overall
residential energy demand by 28 per cent. In commercial
buildings, US$ 125 billion in investment would reduceenergy demand by 29 per cent and yield energy costsavings of US$ 290 billion (Granade et al. 2009). In
developing countries, the firm estimates that US$ 90
billion in energy efficiency investment would reduceenergy expenditure by US$ 600 billion (McKinsey 2010).
In its 2009 World Energy Outlook, the IEA estimated that
US$ 2.5 trillion additional investment in green buildings
globally between 2010 and 2030 would yield US$ 5
trillion (undiscounted) in energy savings over the life of
the investment. A study by the World Business Council on
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) found the potential
for US$ 150 billion a year of green building investment in
the USA, EU, Japan, China, India and Brazil where energy
cost savings would pay back the additional upfront
investment in less than five years. An additional US$
150 billion a year of investment would pay back withinBuildings

Box 3: Retrofitting existing office buildings in the USA17
US commercial buildings

10% energy savings

40% energy savings

Existing commercial building area (EIA 2003)

72 billion sq.ft.

72 billion sq.ft.

Existing office-building area (EIA 2003)

12.2 billion sq.ft.

12.2 billion sq.ft.

Number of office buildings (EIA 2003)

824,000

824,000

Office energy use/sq.ft. (EIA 1998)

97.2 kBtu/sq.ft./yr

97.2 kBtu/sq.ft./yr

Assumed office-space retrofit per year

100 million

100 million

10%

40%

Assumed energy savings (converted to kWhr)2.85 kWhr/sq.ft./yr

11.4 kWhr/sq.ft./yr

Total value of energy savings (at US$ 0.105/kWhr)US$ 29,925,000

US$ 119,700,000

Assumed cost of retrofit (Pike Research 2009)

US$ 1/sq.ft.

US$ 25/sq.ft.

Assumed energy savings (%)

Total cost of retrofit

US$ 100 million

US$ 2.5 billion

Assumed productivity increase 1%

US$ 2.5/sqft/yr

US$ 2.5/sqft/yr

Total value of productivity

US$ 250 million

US$ 250 million

Assumed discount rate5%

5%

15 years

15 years

Net present value (direct energy benefits)

US$ 210 million

US$ 1.26 billion

Net present value (direct energy + indirect productivity benefits)

US$ 2.81 billion

US$ 1.34 billion

Assumed life of retrofit measures

The market size of existing office retrofit building
stock in the USA is about 12.2 billion square feet (EIA2003) while the median age of US office buildings in1995 was 23.5 years. Office buildings consume themost energy of all building types, with an energyuse intensity of 97,200 Btu per square foot (EIA 1998).
Over the next four years alone, the US retrofit market
for non-residential buildings is projected to grow from
US$ 2.1-3.7 billion in 2010 to US$ 10.1-15.1 billion by
2014 (McGraw Hill 2009). Energy savings of 10 per
cent can be achieved with an investment of less than
US$ 1 per square foot. To achieve a more aggressive
target of 40 per cent, an investment of US$ 10- 30 per
square foot is required (Pike Research 2009).

5-10 year (WBCSD 2009). The average payback time fromenergy savings for the green buildings analysed by Kats
was six years, while over 20 years financial gains fromreduced energy costs exceed the green premium by afactor of four to six – US$ 43.1 to US$ 172.2 per square
metre (Kats 2010).16
But the opportunity for energy saving in buildings is notequally distributed at the global level. A recent UNFCCC
study, illustrated in Figure 4, shows that in developing
Asia (including India and China) there is a significant
16. Original text indicates green premium of US$ 4 to US$ 16 per squarefoot.

The table shows it is easy to justify the investment
because the 10 per cent energy savings alone show
a positive NPV of US$ 210 million after a 15-year lifeof the retrofit measures. This increases to US$ 2.81
billion savings if a 1 per cent productivity increase isassumed. However, for the more aggressive scenario
of 40 per cent energy savings, the NPV is negative
after 15 years unless productivity increases aretaken into account. While this case study confirms
the benefits of investing in green building retrofits,
it also sets out the complexities associated withsignificant capital outlays, which cannot be easilytranslated into short-term gains.
Source: WBCSD (2009)

difference between current emissions and projected
mitigated emissions, reflecting the accelerated
economic growth of these nations and their subsequent
need for energy. In contrast, the study shows that OECD
countries can mitigate emissions by 2030 to levels as
low as those seen in 2000, confirming that advanced
economies have the potential to make major strides in
reducing energy demand in critical sectors such as thebuilding industry.
17. This example from the USA is referring to square foot. In the table theexisting commercial building area corresponds to an area of 6.7 billion sq.m,with an office energy use of 1.1 million Btu/sq.m./yr, assumed energy savingsof 30.7 kWhr/sq.m./yr (10%) and 122.7 kWhr/sq.m./yr (40%), assumed costof retrofit of US$ 10.8/sq.m. (10%) and US$ 269.1/sq.m (40%), and assumed
gains from a productivity increase of 1 per cent of US$ 26.9/sq.m/yr.

351

1,500

1,500

1,200

1,200

900

900

600

600

300

300

0

OECD
North America

OECD
Pacific

OECD
EuropeTransition
Economies

Developing
Asia

Latin
America

AfricaFuel consumption (mitigation 2030)

Emissions (mitigation 2030)

Fuel consumption (BAU 2030)

Emissions (BAU 2030)

Fuel consumption (2000)

Emissions (2000)

Middle East

Emissions (MtCO2)

Fuel Consumption (Mtoe)

Towards a green economy

0

Figure 4: Fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in the building sector: current, reference andmitigation scenarios
Source: UNFCCC (2007)

Water benefits
The water efficiency of green buildings translates
into cost savings for the supply of potable water. A
variety of water-efficiency strategies is being pursued
particularly by countries facing water stress and water
scarcity. In India, innovation in indigenous and green
building approaches include rainwater harvestingwith segregation of surface and roof-top run-off, theuse of pervious paving to maximise groundwater
recharge, as well as the introduction of waterless urinals(UNEP SBCI 2010a). In Mexico, a Green Mortgages
programme of the public fund, INFONAVIT, provides
credit for water and energy-conservation measures,
including the introduction of solar water heating andlow-flow showers (UNEP SBCI 2009b). In New South
Wales, Australia, the government-owned land andproperty developer, Landcom, has defined principles
such as water sensitive design, which have to be met
by suppliers. It has promoted building-sustainability
indicators, introduced by state regulation and requiring
40 per cent improvement in GHG emissions and water
management in all new housing (Martinez-Fernandez
et al. 2010). In Melbourne, City Council House II has
achieved a 72 per cent reduction in mains water usage
through a combination of water efficiency, rainwater
harvesting, water recycling and sewer mining (vonWeizsäcker et al. 2009).
Further, demand-side management of householdwater-use covers appliances used for toilets, urinals,
showerheads, taps, washing machines and dishwashers.
Using water efficient appliances in the home can result352

in significant water savings. For example, modern water
efficient dishwashers and toilets can use as much as a
50 per cent less water than less efficient older models oreven 100 per cent less in the case of waterless toilets andurinals (Waterwise 2011a and 2011b).
According to Kats (2010), the net present value of 20
years of water savings in a typical green building in the
USA range from US$ 5.4 to US$ 21.5 per square metre.18
He further suggests that these direct savings in green
buildings outweigh the initial costs of water-efficiency
strategies such as rainwater harvesting, waterless
urinals and the use of grey water for all building types.
A specific example is provided in Box 4. Reducing hotwater usage also brings benefits by reducing water andenergy costs for households, businesses, institutions
and water utilities.
Waste and material benefits
The building sector can be called the industry of “thirds”:
over a third of all CO2 emissions come from building
construction and operations, over a third of all energy andmaterial resources is used to build and operate buildings,
and over a third of total waste results from construction
and demolition activities. Considering efficiency inuse of land and materials, green building presents anopportunity to address growing scarcity issues thatmany societies face owing to the unsustainable use of
ecosystem services. It also presents an opportunity toaddress other environmental and health problems such
18. Original text indicates a range from US$ 0.50 to US$ 2 per square foot.

Buildings
as noise pollution, chemical pollution and hazardous
waste issues such as asbestos and lead content in paint(UNEP SBCI 2010b).
Avoiding waste, in addition to minimising energy andwater consumption over a building’s life-cycle, is crucial
to the sustainable performance of buildings. Life-cycle
management brings a cradle-to-cradle perspective,
covering a building value chain that includes the
manufacturing of material supplies, the construction
process, building operation and maintenance as well as
the disposal, recycling, or reuse of building, operations,construction, and demolition waste.
Buildings consume great quantities of materials, energy
and other resources, the root of which start with planningand design and reach all the way to eventual demolition.
The consumption of these resources can have significant
environmental impacts at global and local levels.
Ensuring that undesirable impacts are minimised,architects and design professionals play a major role inenergy conservation and responsible resource usage.
Research into the energy consumption of buildings
today is directed towards analysis of operational energy(during use phase) as well as the energy embodied
within the fabric of the building, energy needed to
extract and process raw material into finished building
components, as well as energy used in the constructionof the building. As operational energy consumption is
improved, embodied energy becomes proportionallymore significant. The embodied energy of a building’s
materials is one measure of its ecological impact anduse of ecosystem services, which raises questions about
the acquisition of raw and processed materials.
Measuring the embodied energy of building material
components, or the building as a whole, presents anenormous challenge unless information is systematicallycollected from the design stage to the completing of
construction and is made available by all manufacturers
involved.
In order to reduce the building impact and fulfill acomplete life-cycle of building and material construction
analysis, it is necessary to establish low-impact criteria
during the design process; construction, operation/
maintenance and disposal/recycling. The following
criteria can be considered: raw material availability;
land and water availability; minimal environmental
impact; embodied energy efficiency (production andprocess energy requirements); transportation; productlifespan; ease of maintenance; potential for productre-use; and material durability and recyclability. In
order to analyzse the environmental impact of thematerials according to their entire life-cycle, building
materials are divided in three groups: organic, ceramic
and metallic. Organic building materials include

timber. Ceramic building materials are the inorganic,
non-metallic ones, primarily consisting of concreteand masonry products as well as glass. The metallic
building materials include steel, aluminum, copper andlead. These are all natural resources. Issues also arise
from the increasing use of synthetic materials such as
plastics, which tend to be complex materials that posedifficult problems for recycling and reuse. Reducing thenumber of material components in products as well
as separating natural from synthetic material allows
higher rates of recyclability and reuse (McDonoughand Braungart 2002).
Comparative analysis of materials using the abovelisted criteria (Lawson 1996) shows that, by example,
sustainably-sourced wood is one of the best options
for ensuring low embodied energy and a minimal
environmental impact. While metallic materials havethe highest embodied energy, they also perform wellin terms of their lifespan, maintenance, reuse andrecyclability. Lawson’s study, carried out in Australia,
reported that 95 per cent of embodied energy thatwould otherwise go to waste can be saved by the reuseof building materials. Savings range from 95 per cent foraluminium to only 20 per cent for glass.
The recycling of building materials is a relatively new
concept and has only been assessed in a few studies.
In a study carried out in Sweden, two cases werecompared: (a) a building with a large proportion of
re-used materials and components, and (b) the sameBox 4: Water savings in a
4-person single house
Water use in a standard 4-person single-family
detached house can be reduced by 57 per cent(from 500 litres to 218 litres per day) by installing
more efficient devices in place of conventional
toilets, showerheads, taps, dishwashers,
washing machines etc. (van Wyk 2009). Waterefficient appliances such as rainwater harvesting
systems and systems for re-using grey waterrequire additional investment costs, but mostcost-saving effects relate to saved potable water.
These are determined by the average cost of
potable water. In the case of a 4-person singlefamily household, setting a high price for water(US$ 1.91 per m3, as in Germany) will result in asaving of about US$ 202 per year, whereas witha lower price of US$ 0.40 per m3 (as in Canada)
the saving will be about US$ 42 per year .
UNESCO (2001)

353

Towards a green economy
building for which new materials and components
were used. The results showed that the environmental
impacts caused by reused materials are at 55 per centof the impact caused if all materials had been new(Thormark 2000 and 2006). Other studies show thatby using recycled materials between 12 per cent and40 per cent of the energy used for material production
could be saved. Reasons for the mixed results between
studies include differences in recycling rates and thematerial composition in buildings.
Although recycling building materials requires energy
consumption, studies show that recycling materials
still delivers net emissions savings. Following a lifecycle approach (Sára 2001), compared CO2 emissions
from produced recycled clay/gravel with and without
selective dismantling and classification. The research
indicates that CO2 emissions were reduced from 107.7
kg to 6 kg per tonne of recycled clay/gravel produced.
Recycling rates of specific materials that are significant
in construction and demolition waste streams can besignificant indicators of sustainability. In developing
societies, recycled building components are often
cheaper and of higher quality than conventional
materials, providing benefits to the urban poor (UNEPSBCI 2010a).
Productivity and health benefits
Green buildings provide benefits beyond environmental
advantages at a low or negative cost. These include
improved worker productivity and work quality
resulting from a more comfortable office environment
as well as improved public health resulting fromreduced indoor air pollution (after replacing biomass
with electricity or clean burn biomass in developing
countries), reduced noise pollution and reduced overall
air pollution (owing to reduced use of fossil fuels indeveloped countries and emerging markets).
These benefits can rival, if not supersede, the energy
cost and climate benefits outlined above. For example, arecent study for the US Green Building Council estimatedthat greening an average US commercial office building
saves US$ 5.6 per square metre per year in energy
costs (Booz Allen Hamilton 2009).19 While significant in
absolute terms, energy costs for most businesses palein comparison to labour costs, particularly in developed
countries. Even a 1 per cent increase in productivity
resulting from investment in green buildings yields
a labour-cost saving several times higher than theenergy-cost savings noted above. Results from a seriesof research studies on the effects of environmental
conditions within workplaces show that productivity
savings can be significantly greater than 1 per cent:
19. Original text indicates saving of US$ 0.52 per square foot per year inenergy costs.

354■■ Indoor air quality: 6-9 per cent productivity gain
(Wyon 2004);■■ Natural ventilation: 3-18 per cent productivity gain
(NSF/IUCRC 2004);■■ Local thermal control: 3.5-37 per cent productivity
gain (Loftness et al. 2003);■■ Daylighting: 3-40 per cent productivity and sales gain
(Loftness et al. 2003); and■■ Rent premium: up to a 36 per cent increase (Baker et
al. 2008).
Increased day lighting, views and contact with nature
have also been linked to positive health and productivity
impacts beyond commercial workplaces, for example,
in hospitals and schools. Enhanced environments
within school buildings are linked to improved student
performance (Aumann et al. 2004) and those in hospitals
have been associated with faster patient recovery(Ulrich 1984). Of 13 studies linking improved access tothe natural environment with gains in individual andorganisational productivity, seven identified 3-18 percent increases in individual productivity (including
student test results) and 40 per cent increases in sales(an organisational productivity measure) as a result of
the introduction of daylight to workplaces (Loftness
et al. 2003).
One of the earliest and most widely-cited studies
on economies from green buildings documented
33 commercial buildings with green certification in
California (Kats 2003). The report found an averagegreen-building cost premium of US$ 32.3-53.8 persquare metre.20 The total benefits of the investment
are highlighted in Table 4, which measured netpresent value (NPV) over a 20-year period, showing net
benefits of between US$ 516.7-721.2 per square metre,depending on level of certification.21
In developing countries, the health benefits ofinvestment in the green buildings, specifically intechnologies and appliances for heating and cooking,are directly contributing to improved human well-being.
Indoor pollution is a major cause of serious illness andpremature death in developing countries. Greening thebuilding sector, in this context, is expected to derive
its main benefits from reducing indoor pollution andimproving the health of the poor, particularly womenand children. Studies conducted by Ezzati and Kammen(2002) showed that the cost-effectiveness of measures
20. Original text indicates an average green-building cost premium of US$
3-5 per square foot.
21. Original text indicates net benefits of between US$ 48-67 per square foot.

Buildingssuch as distributing cooking stoves was superior to
many public-health programmes around the world.
Analysis of low- and middle-income countries for
the WHO has shown that by 2015, the availability of
improved stoves to half of those who in 2005 were stillburning biomass fuels and coal on traditional stoves“would result in a negative intervention cost of US$ 34
billion a year and generate a return of US$ 105 billion
per year” (Hutton et al. 2006). The study concludes
that “economic benefits include reduced health-related
expenditure as a result of less illness, the value ofassumed productivity gains resulting from less illness
and fewer deaths and time savings due to the shortertime spent on fuel collection and cooking.” A potential
global demand for 0.61 billion LPG stoves or electrical
hot plates by 2030 to replace open-fire biomass fuel forcooking augurs well for job opportunities in areas suchas sales, transport, maintenance and manufacturing(Keivani et al. 2010).
Benefits in employment
The construction sector (including buildings) accounts
for 5-10 per cent of employment at the national level,amounting to over 111 million people directly employedworldwide (UNEP SBCI 2007a; ILO 2001). Three-quartersof construction jobs are in developing countries and 90
per cent in firms of less than 10 employees or micro firms(Keivani et al. 2010). The real figure is likely to be much higher,
as many construction workers are informally employed
and therefore not accounted for in official statistics.
Greening the global building stock will impact global
employment through job creation, job substitution, jobelimination and job transformation. There are manychannels through which green buildings generate
employment including: the new construction andretrofitting of buildings, increased production of green
materials, products, appliances and components,
employment through energy-efficient operations andmaintenance, the expansion of renewable energy
sources and generation mix, and tangential activities
such as recycling and waste management.
Several studies estimate the number of jobs created asa result of different types of green building investment.
Before reporting the evidence, it is important tomention two key aspects of these studies. Firstly, newjobs created as a result of green investments are notnecessarily green jobs. According to ILO definitions, tobe considered green, jobs must meet as well the criteriaof decent work. Some indicators in the building sector
point to serious shortfalls in decent work. Box 5 discusses
this issue in more detail.
Secondly, case studies often report the gross impact ofinvestment on the labour market. Yet an accurate labour-

Category

20-year NPV

Energy value$ 62.3Emissions value$ 12.7

Water value$ 5.5

Waste value (construction only) – 1 year

$ 0.3

Commissioning O&M value$ 91.2

Productivity and health value (certified and silver)$ 397.1

Productivity and health value (gold and platinum)$ 595.6

Less green cost premium($ 43.1)

Total 20-year NPV (certified and silver)$ 526

Total 20-year NPV (gold and platinum)$ 724.5

Table 4: Financial benefits of green buildings(US$ per sq.m)22
Source: Kats (2003)

market assessment also requires evaluating the net effects.
A number of jobs will be lost when investment is redirected
to green buildings, when green materials replace brownmaterials, and so on. In practice, substitution, budget andexternal effects are not easily quantifiable.
Considering research on new construction, Booz Allenand Hamilton (2009) estimated that in the US greenbuilding construction supported over 2.4 million jobs
between 2000 and 2008 and these are projected to
grow to up to 7.9 million between 2009 and 2013.
Another study on the green building industry in Brazil
shows that jobs related to greening the construction,commercialisation, maintenance and use of buildings
grew from 6.3 per cent of the total number of formaljobs in 2006 to 7.3 per cent in 2008 (ILO 2009).
In terms of retrofitting activities, it is generally acceptedthat every US$ 1 million invested in building-efficiency
retrofits would create 10-14 direct jobs and 3-4 indirect
jobs. Using a value of 12.5 jobs per US$ million invested,a recent report (Hendricks et al. 2009) calculated thejobs that could be created if 40 per cent of US building
stock – 50 million buildings – is renovated by 2020 withan average investment of US$ 10,000 per retrofit. This
would result in a US$ 500 billion market, which would
lead to 6,250,000 jobs over ten years. Table 5 further
illustrates how the economy might benefit from a US$
1 million investment in green buildings and how thiswould generate a net gain of 16.4 job-years over 20 years.
Important additional employment opportunities arealso generated from the design of environmentally22. Original text presents the figures in US$ per sq.ft: $ 5.79 of energy value; $1.18 of emissions value; $ 0.51 of water value; $ 0.03 of water value (constructiononly) for a year; $ 8.47 of commissioning O&M value; $ 36.89 of productivity andhealth value (certified and silver); $ 55.33 of productivity and health value (goldand platinum); $ 4.00 of less green cost premium; $ 48.87 of total 20-year NPV(certified and silver); $ 67.31 of total 20-year NPV (gold and platinum).

355

Towards a green economy

Box 5: The social dimension of green buildings: implications fordecent work and poverty reduction23
The building sector has high potential for propoor economic growth through its high labour
absorption capacity in developing countries.
The sector employs a wide range of workers withdifferent levels of education and has the ability toabsorb the excluded (de Souza 2000). This has strong
implications for income generation and poverty
reduction. Take the example of the Johannesburg
Housing Company project in South Africa (Keivani
et al. 2010). This project involves the introduction ofenergy-efficient light bulbs and day-night sensors,solar energy systems for heating water and theinsulation of boilers. It provides jobs for over 1,000
contractors in maintenance, cleaning and security
services and even more in specialised functions suchas plumbing and electrical services. The Watergy
Soweto project for the rehabilitation of plumbing
fixtures has provided 1,500 temporary jobs.
Despite this potential, workers of the constructionindustry are often subject to poor working
conditions. High informality, low wages, instability,
gender discrimination, frequent accidents andoccupational diseases characterise the working
conditions of a large share of workers in the building
sector around the world, especially in developing
economies where construction work is more
precarious and less formalised.
Where the employment relationship of contractors,
subcontractors and workers is casual or informal,
workers’ rights are often unclear and they enjoyless protection from the law than those directly
employed. In recent years it has become the norm
for workers to be employed on a short-term basis,
and instability of work is one of the major problems
facing the building industry.
Construction is also one of the most dangerous
occupations. Workers in this sector are 3-4 times
more likely than other workers to die from accidents
at work. Many others suffer and die from diseases
arising from exposure to dangerous substances at
the workplace, such as asbestos. In regard to socialsound materials, products and renewable energy. A
study conducted by ADEME (2008) in France displays
the number of jobs directly involved in carrying out
23. This Box was prepared based on contributions from ILO to this chapter.

356

protection, there is evidence that many employers
do not pay into social security funds for workers who
are on temporary contracts, depriving them fromhealth care, holiday pay, and compensation owing
to unemployment, ill health, accidents or old age.
For a long time the ongoing dialogue with employers
as well as the government has been a successful
approach for workers to collectively negotiate better
wages and working conditions. However, nowadays
a large workforce of temporary, casual, informal andunemployed workers find it very difficult to organise
themselves to engage in such dialogue. The greeningof buildings may provide a new opportunity for social
dialogue. Many employers and government authorities
have shown enthusiasm for green construction.
This may open a new door to dialogue with workers
on labour issues in the context of greening of theindustry, involving workers in green management,
resource efficiency and safety improvements.
In the area of working conditions, greening thebuilding sector will have an impact on health andsafety. Green construction is however not safer per
se, as is shown in research by the American Societyof Civil Engineers. With data collected through astructured questionnaire survey, the study tested
the presence of a difference in Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) recordable
incident rates (RIRs) and lost time case rates (LTCRs)
between green and non-green projects. Therewas suggestive, but inconclusive evidence of astatistically significant difference in the RIRs of thegreen and non-green building projects that were
examined. Also, no statistically significant difference
was found between the respective LTCRs.
These considerations provide further cause to turnthe role of labour inspectors to one of educationand prevention, as opposed to mere inspection andprosecution. The greening of the industry brings theopportunity to create synergies between inspection
about the environmental and the health & safety
components of construction.

insulation work of opaque walls, which involve interior
insulation of the walls, ceilings and floors and the useof associated materials. In 2006 the industry accounted
for 9,700 jobs related to these activities and 7,150 jobs
related to the production and application of related

Buildings

Amount (millions)

Job multiplierJob impact(job years)

Green premium increases construction spending

$ 1.0

12

12.00

Consumer Spending

Because of the green premium, consumers spend less in the short term

$ -0.611-6.60

Consumer savings

Because of the energy savings, consumers spend more in the long term

$ 1.0

11

11.00

Lost utility revenues

Utility revenues decrease because of energy savings$ -0.83-2.40

Loan intrest

Intrest paid to banks on construction loans

$ 0.3

8

2.40

Spending category

ImpactConstruction

Net-job years: 20 year total

16.40

Table 5: Twenty-year net economic impact of a US$ 1 million investment in green building improvements:
Illustrative examples
Source: Kats (2010)

materials. The figures are projected to grow to 21,000
and 15,000 respectively by 2012. The same study
concludes that roof insulation activities accounted for
3,050 direct jobs in 2006, expected to double by 2012.
The use of green appliances and components has
high job creation potential as well. Research by the
U.S. Department of Energy estimates that adopting
standards for washing machines, water heaters, andfluorescent lamps alone would create 120,000 jobs inthe USA by 2020. In India the introduction of a single
appliance, fuel-efficient bio-mass cooking stove toreplace the traditional stoves in 9 million households
could produce 150,000 jobs in addition to the healthbenefits (UNEP, ILO, IOE, ITUC 2008).

Under the “deep renovation” scenario, job creation is
calculated to peak in 2015 with a massive new 184,000
jobs, notwithstanding employment losses in the energysupply sector. It is important to highlight that close to 38
per cent of these employment gains result from indirect
effects on sectors supplying the construction sector, as
well as from the higher spending power resulting fromthe previous rise in employment.

Green investment associated with recent government
stimulus packages has boosted investment in green
buildings. An estimated 13 per cent of Germany’s overall
stimulus package (around US$ 105 billion) is expected
to create 25,000 jobs in manufacturing and construction
for retrofitting buildings (UNEP 2009a). Opportunities
for training in retrofitting are also increasing as the lackof skilled and certified professionals is proving to be asignificant barrier in the adoption of green buildings,
especially in developing countries.

A number of studies have demonstrated thatinvestments in green buildings produce more jobs thanthey replace in the energy-supply industry. A study by
Wei, Patadia and Kammen (2010) found that solar panels(often used in green buildings) create 0.87 job-years per
gigawatt-hour (GWh) produced and energy-efficiency
investments create 0.38 job-years per GWh saved. Thatis considerably higher than coal (0.11 job-years per
GWh), natural gas (0.11 job-years per GWh), or nuclear
power (0.11 job-years per GWh) create. A study by David
Roland-Holst (2008) found that between 1976 and 2006,
energy-efficiency improvements in California created
1.5 million jobs, net of the jobs lost in energy-producing
industries. Nevertheless, the ILO (CEDEFOP 2010) has
reported job losses in the cement industry associatedwith employment shifts to other industries, which
underline the need for retraining and upgrading skills.

Focusing on existing residential and public-sector
buildings, a recent study by Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2010)
investigated the net employment impacts of a largescale energy-efficiency renovation programme in
Hungary. The study simulates five scenarios that arecharacterized by two factors: the type or depth ofretrofits included in the programme and the speed ofrenovation assumed. The BAU scenario assumes nointervention and a renovation rate of 1.3 per cent of thetotal floor area per year. Conversely, the “Deep Retrofit,
fast implementation rate” scenario assumes that 5.7 percent of the total floor area will be renovated per year. This
research demonstrates that a renovation programmeof this scale could generate up to 131,000 net newjobs in the country, whereas a less ambitious scenario
would see the creation of only about 43,000 new jobs.

The studies referenced here confirm the potential for job
creation in the building construction sector. If the hugedemand for new buildings (social housing, hospitals,
schools, etc.) that exists in developing countries is tobe considered, the potential is much higher. Further,
programmes for greening the sector will provide an
opportunity to address informal production and ensure
creating green and decent jobs, engaging and updating
the skills of both the formal and informal sector
workforce. On the other hand, most of the studies do
not net out the jobs lost from redirecting investment
into green buildings that would have otherwise been
invested elsewhere in the economy. Also there is arange of barriers, which hamper the employmentgenerating potential of construction investment being
fully realised.

357

20,000,000

Gigatonne CO2 /year

GWh

Towards a green economy

16,000,000
12,000,000
8,000,000

12
10
8
6
4

4,000,000

2

0
2010

2020

G2

2030

2040

2050

BAU

1970

1980

1990

G2

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

BAU

Figure 5: Total power demand per year in buildings
sector 2010–2050

Figure 6 : Total CO2 emissions per year in buildings
sector 2010–2050

Source: GER model simulations

Source: GER model simulations

Removing these barriers, for example through theapplication of appropriate policy instruments, will
increase overall economic output and net employment
by increasing average returns to capital economywide. Policy interventions (more below) also need toaddress constraints in the planning and procurementof construction projects, and the lack of capacity in thelocal industry.

3.4 Investment scenarios for increased
energy efficiency in buildings
A comprehensive analysis of investment in greening
the building sector would investigate the effects from
implementing the range of measures discussed above
including new building and construction methods
and design as well as retrofitting existing buildings.
Conducting such analysis is, however, limited by a lackof global data particularly on the building stock and its
evolution in recent years.
The modelling of green investment scenarios in thisreport includes an analysis of the effect from increased
energy efficiency in buildings.24 This analysis is feasibleusing existing data on energy supplied to the building
sector. Although investment in energy efficiency is only
part of a range of investment needed to shift to green
buildings, it is a major component.
24. The modelling of green economy investment scenarios is presented indetail in a separate chapter.
25. In order to be conservative about projected reductions in emissions in
the buildings sector, G2 results are compared here with BAU only. When G2
results are compared with BAU2 results, the extent of emission reductions
would be more significant because BAU2 projects higher growth inemissions than BAU.
26. All monetary figures are in constant US$ with base year 2010.
27. As seen below, the somewhat lower investment amounts modelled
here also lead to lower emissions reductions than in IEA (2010), although
as explained, part of the emissions reduction in the G2 scenario owes
to investment in renewable energy, which is not included in the costspresented for investment in energy efficiency.

358

0

The economy-wide model assumes 2 per cent of
the global GDP to be allocated on a yearly basis asadditional investment in 10 green sectors (G2) over theperiod 2011-2050. The results of this investment arethen compared with those of a BAU scenario without
additional investment, and a BAU2 scenario, in which
the same additional amount is invested following the
projected trends of BAU.25 Within this multi-sector
model, the building sector is allocated 0.2 per cent of the
global GDP to increase energy efficiency. Since model
projections result in GDP growth (under all scenarios),
this annual investment under G2 continues to rise: from
US$ 134 billion in 2011 to US$ 389 billion in 2050 (witha yearly average of US$ 248 billion).26 These amounts are
somewhat lower than but generally comparable in scale
to the latest estimates from IEA and OECD (2010).27
The effectiveness of these investments in energy
efficiency is simulated in the model by using the average
emission-abatement costs estimated by IEA (2009a) for
introducing the measures in the building sector. Theserise from about US$ 18/unit/t CO2 in 2015 to US$ 58/
unit/t in 2030 and US$ 166/unit/t in 2050, reflecting the
expectation that measures to reach further efficiency
improvements will become more costly over time.
Under a BAU scenario, power demand from the building
sector almost doubles from 9.4 million Gwh in 2010 to 17
million Gwh in 2050 (Figure 5). The G2 results, in contrast,
suggest the possibility of decoupling buildings’ power
demand from economic growth. In the simulation,
power consumption peaks at 10.9 million Gwh in the
period 2025-2030, then drops slightly to 10.1 million
Gwh by 2050 while GDP continues to grow in that period.
In terms of reduction in the intensity of buildings’ power
demand per unit of GDP, the results of the simulation
show that under G2, by 2020, the intensity will decline
by 17 per cent over the baseline in 2010, comparedwith a reduction of 5 per cent under BAU. By 2030, theBuildings
Scenarios

Emission intensity – CO2 emissions per US$ GDP
Reduction between 2005 and 2050

Carbon intensity – CO2 emissions per unit of energy consumption

Reduction relative to BAU in 2050 Reduction between 2005 and 2050

Reduction relative to BAU in 2050

BAU

-45%

-

-3.2%

-

G2

-76%

-57.0%-45.0%-42.8%

Table 6: Emissions intensity in the GER model simulations

reduction in this intensity under G2 will be 36 per centcompared with 9 per cent in the BAU. In 2050, the G2
scenario would deliver a 64 per cent reduction in theintensity of power demand relative to BAU.
Power demand, however, only accounts forapproximately 30 per cent of energy use by all buildings
in 2010 (21 per cent for residential buildings and 51 percent for commercial buildings). Efficiency improvementsin the use of other energy sources in buildings were notsimulated, due to lack of data. In these partial results ofthe simulation, therefore, total energy use in the building
sector, which is influenced in the model primarily byeconomic growth, continues to rise. It turns out that theincreased energy use from non-power sources, such asfuel for heating, driven by additional economic growthin the green investment scenarios, approximately offsets
the savings in power demand. Thus, total energy-use
rises similarly under all scenarios. This is, in part, an
example of the rebound effect (see Box 6). It shouldbe emphasised, however, that improvements in theefficiency of energy use from non-power sources, which
are not captured by the model and its simulations,should entail lower energy use under any potential
green investment scenario.

As mentioned, the green investment scenario modelled
includes an integrated package of investments in
multiple sectors, which affect each other, sometimes
indirectly, through inter-sectoral linkages and economywide effects. For this reason, the results in one sector,
such as the buildings, need to be seen as a result of both
direct effects from the specific investments in the sector,
in this case energy-efficiency, as well as indirect effects,
such as those that affect GDP growth.
The multi-sector G2 scenario also entails substantial
investment in the supply of energy from renewablesources. In the G2 scenario, 0.5 per cent of GDP iscommitted to renewables with the aim of reaching
the targets set in IEA’s Blue Map scenario (IEA 2008).
Although total energy use in buildings may still continue
to rise under any scenario due to continued economic
growth, the level of emissions would be much lower due
to the increased share of renewables.
The simulations (see Figure 6) reveal that by 2050 thegreen scenario leads to levels of emissions that are 4.7
GtCO2 below the BAU and approximately 27 per centlower than current emissions. In G2, the absolute levelof CO2 emissions increases slightly during the first years

Box 6: The rebound effect
The phenomenon known as the “rebound effect”
describes the limits to energy savings achievableby increasing the energy efficiency of a given
technology. Financial savings incurred owing togreater efficiency may lead to increased use of thesame product or to the consumption of other energyconsuming goods and services. This highlights
the Jevons paradox, where efficiency gains froma new technology are undermined by increase in
consumption of the resource involved. Examples areleaving lights on because they are energy-saving
bulbs and driving a more efficient car further orusing the money saved on petrol to buy anothercar. It highlights the importance of accompanying
new technologies with appropriate behavioural andinstitutional change. This rebound effect is widely

recognised, but its estimated magnitude varies
by activity, as shown by the following estimates(WBCSD 2007a):■■ Space heating: 10-30 per cent■■ Space cooling: 0-50 per cent■■ Lighting: 5-20 per cent■■ Water heating: 10-40 per cent■■ Automobile: 10-30 per cent.
The rebound effect has to be viewed differently in
low-income countries, where consumption increases
from a low status quo. Here energy efficiency cancontribute to development as reduced expenditureon energy enables poor families to invest in othernecessities of daily life.

359

Towards a green economyof the projection. In 2015, it drops back to the 2010 level,
which represents a 5.5 per cent reduction comparedwith BAU. In 2050, worldwide CO2 emissions in thebuilding sector are slightly below the level of 1990 and
43 per cent lower than BAU.
The most important result of these projections is thatthe green investment scenario for the building sector
reaches substantial emission reductions compared with
BAU, although the additional investment in the building
sector and across the economy leads to an increase in
GDP and energy demand. This shows the potential of theintegrated investment package to reduce carbon intensity
by decoupling economic growth from CO2 emissions.
Table 6 illustrates the general trend for emissions
intensity relative to GDP in the building sector andthe significant projected reduction of carbon intensity
per unit of energy consumption resulting from theadditional investment in greening the sector. The
investments modelled in G2 result in a reduction of
45 per cent of carbon intensity compared with 2005,
reflecting the stabilisation of energy demand throughenhanced energy efficiency.
When considering the enactment of a cap and trademechanism with carbon prices aligned with the 2009 US
domestic proposal (reaching US$ 77 per tonne of CO2 by2030 and US$ 221 by 2050, in constant US$ 2010), the360

reduction in emissions in the building sector as a resultof the green investment scenario would translate toabout US$ 330 billion per year on average between 2012
and 2050.
Finally, energy efficiency will have an impact on
job creation and employment. Energy-efficiency
investments are estimated to create 0.38 job-years per
GWh saved (Wei et al. 2010). The GER model simulations
thus estimate that these investments would generate
more than 1.2 million jobs by 2030, and a total of 2.6
million jobs by 2050 in the G2 scenario. Additional
investments in greening the buildings and construction
sector in other ways, such as more sustainablebuilding materials, also have the potential to generate
employment. It was not possible to include these in themodel simulations, but it is important to note that sucha shift will likely also require investments in workers’
education and training in addition to other transitional
measures.
In summary, the green investment scenarios are limited
in terms of specific investments in the building sector toenergy efficiency, and have not been able to capture awider range of possible measures. However, the resultsof even these limited simulations reveal the potential
savings in buildings’ power demand. When the effectsof rising renewable energy use are included, substantial
reductions in GHG emissions are projected.

Buildings

4 Enabling conditions andpolicy instruments
The climate and resource-use challenges in the building
sector are clear. Technological solutions exist to green
the sector at low or even negative average cost. The
socio-economic case for greening the sector is strong.
But the greening of buildings has not taken place on alarge scale in either developed or developing countries.

Financial constraints
Key financial constraints relate to upfront costs andpayback periods, misalignment between investors
and beneficiaries, the ability of households to pay, andinvestors’ policies on what to include in their investment
portfolios.

Besides more general constraints in advancing green
building policy and regulation such as those related
to governance and capacity, two key barriers relate to(a) financial constraints and (b) market and industry
structures. These are discussed below, following which
an overview of available instruments and tools is given.
The latter will build on research done by the Central
European University (CEU) for the UNEP Sustainable
Buildings and Construction Initiative (UNEP SBCI 2007b),
considering evaluation studies or reviews of policy
instruments implemented in countries all over the world.
Of key consideration is the relative effectiveness of
instruments and tools in achieving high energy savingsand GHG reductions, and their cost effectiveness.

Upfront investment cost and payback period: Althoughbuildings can be greened at low or zero net cost overthe lifetime of the investment, the initial additional
capital outlay, the so-called “first cost”, could be adeterrent for those who demand finance for greening
buildings (home owners, construction firms, and small
businesses). In developing countries with acute housing
shortages, actual or perceived high upfront costs areoften a key barrier. Furthermore, energy-efficient multifamily housing is still widely perceived to be much
more expensive to build than is actually the case (innew construction, 20 per cent improvements in energy
consumption are achievable with modest financial costs(Brown and Wolfe 2007)).

4.1 Barriers to green buildings
Barriers to environmental and energy-efficiency
improvements in buildings can be economic or financial,resulting from hidden costs and benefits, market failures
or a specific market and industry structure. They can also
be political or structural, associated with behavioural ororganisational constraints, or linked to information andcapacity limitations (UNEP SCBI 2007b). Recognising
the latter two barriers is of particular importance ina developing-world context. Hidden costs include
transaction costs associated with securing energyefficient solutions and risks associated with replacement
technologies (Westling 2003; Vine 2005). Transaction
costs are often high owing to the fragmented structureof the building sector with many small owners andagents. Market failures can take the form of misplaced
incentives, such as when building tenants (as bill-payers)
have an interest in environmental improvements thatare not shared by the building owners. While low energy
prices may give little incentive for affluent households
and businesses in developed countries to change
their behaviour, subsidies often keep energy prices indeveloping countries artificially low and again takeaway any incentive to change.

Moreover, although investments in greening buildings
tend to have relatively short payback period (say 5-10
years), many private investors may not proceed unlessthe net benefit stream starts flowing in within a coupleof years. For large-scale green-building programmes,
governments usually need to raise significant funds.
Split incentives: A related barrier is that the benefitsof energy savings may not go directly to the person
making the investment. For example, the owner of abuilding is likely to be responsible for making energyefficiency investments, but the occupier may receive
the benefit of lower energy bills (although landlords
could benefit from higher rents if regulations so allow).
On the other hand, if the landlord is responsible for theenergy bills, the tenant has no direct incentive to invest
in saving energy.
Household ability to pay: Financial capacity is an
impediment particularly in multi-family housing whereresidents often have low incomes. While this group
stands to save the highest percentage of income, they
are likely to have the greatest difficulty in paying foreffective investments, especially as the best results
are achieved through a comprehensive retrofitting
approach, which encompasses the modernisation361

Towards a green economyof the building envelope (insulation and windows),
together with the replacement of heating and airconditioning systems. The benefits of such an approach
are clear, with efficiency improvements of 50-75 percent documented, and savings of 30 per cent routinely
achieved.

4.2 Policy instruments and tools
Following the analysis of UNEP SBCI (2007b), policy
instruments and tools for greening buildings can beclassified as follows:■■ Regulatory and control mechanisms, which cover

Institutional investor offering: For financial institutions,energy-efficiency projects in buildings are often
associated with the following major hurdles: low
financial returns, credit risks, uncertainty, and difficultyin evaluating the added financial value of green
buildings. If the projects are small-scale, they do not fit
into the traditional financial toolbox. But this situationis also changing. After the recent financial crisis, somelong-term institutional investors such as pension funds
have started searching for new asset classes to rebalance
their portfolios. Green buildings – retrofitted or newly
constructed, as well as the manufacturing of relatedmaterials and equipment – may become an asset classthat can help diversify portfolios and generate steady
growth of earnings. Additional discussion on this canbe found in the Finance chapter of this report, which
includes the case study: “The emergence of responsible
property as an asset class”.
Market and industry structure
The building market is highly fragmented with manysmall landlords, corporate property owners managing
multiple buildings, usually in local or regional markets,and public housing authorities, which are also mostly
local. Coordination between all these stakeholders inthe building and construction value chain is uncommon.
By example, decisions taken during the feasibility
assessment and design phases will have a major impact
on the level of emissions during the building use oroperational phase, but feasibility assessments tend not
to account for the life-time running costs of the building
since these are not paid for by the property developer(UNEP SBCI 2009b).
Owing to the fragmentation of the building market,
it is difficult to make use of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) as building projects often do notprovide sufficient carbon emission reduction pay-off andstakeholder commitment. In addition, the fragmentation
also makes it difficult to comply with baselines andadditionality requirements. Other obstacles include theCDM methodologies and procedures (see below).
Another aspect of the fragmentation is reflected in the
differing interests of individual households and utilities.
While householders may be intrigued by the prospect ofgreening their homes and reaping energy savings andhealth benefits, utilities face a potential reduction in
their sales revenue and therefore may have little interestin supporting investment in green buildings.

362• Regulatory-normative mechanisms such as
standards and• Regulatory-informative mechanisms when theend-user is informed but not obliged to follow theadvice (e.g. labelling);■■ Economic or market-based instruments;■■ Fiscal instruments and incentives; and■■ Information and voluntary action.
These categories of instruments and tools are analysed
below in terms of their use, efficiency and likely
effectiveness in different contexts.
Regulatory and control mechanisms
Regulatory and control mechanisms have to bemonitored, evaluated and updated regularly to remain
in touch with technological developments and market
trends. They are easier to enforce with respect to
new rather than existing buildings. Examples of suchmeasures are appliance standards, building codes,
procurement regulations, energy-efficiency obligationsor quotas, mandatory audit programmes and utility
demand-side management programmes. Examples of
their cost-effectiveness expressed in US$/tCO2 for mostof the cases are the following (UNEP SBCI 2007b):■■ Appliance standards: – US$ 65/tCO2 in 2020 (USA), –US$ 194/tCO2 in 2020 (EU);■■ Building codes: from – US$ 189/tCO2 to – US$ 5/tCO2
for end-users (Netherlands);■■ Procurement regulations: US$ 1 million in purchases
saves US$ 726,000 per year (Mexico);■■ Energy Efficiency Obligations: – US$ 139/tCO2 (UK);■■ Mandatory certification and labelling: – US$ 30/tCO2(Australia); and■■ Utility Demand-side Management Programmes: –US$ 35/tCO2 (USA), – US$ 255/tCO2 (EU).
Complications in the use of these regulatory instruments
relate mainly to lack of enforcement and the reboundeffect, where the end-user buys more of or uses the more
efficient technology more extensively than before andBuildings

Box 7: Reliable measurement and accounting
To ensure that information is accurate, there is aneed to collect robust data on the performanceof green buildings and their subsequent costs.
Current methods of accounting mainly include
energy audits and labelling, Triple Bottom Line28
indicators and sustainability certificates. These tools
can be effective, but must be tailored to target
group needs. Energy audits and labelling identify
opportunities to upgrade built environments andtrack the progress of existing energy efficiency
investments. Recent evidence on the performance
gap in one of the certification systems (LEED) has
highlighted the importance of such measures(Murphy 2009), triggering renewed discussion on
their efficiency. Building certification systems cancauses emission reductions to be offset by increased
consumption. The latter provides an example of where theinstrument needs to be combined with other instruments
to guide users to more efficient use of technologies.
Improved enforcement requires adequate educationand training, for example, of building-inspection andprocurement officers. This is confirmed by recent
examples of energy-efficiency improvement measures
introduced in the public sector in Mexico, China, Thailand,South Africa, Kenya and Ghana. The case of Mexico has
shown how introducing public procurement regulation at
the city level may be a more effective point of departure
before launching a programme nationally.
In the case of building codes applied to newbuildings in developing countries, the basis for
improved enforcement can be laid through startingwith voluntary schemes, the use of incentives andimproved inspection. China is showing how building
regulations, together with voluntary and self-regulating
market systems for green buildings can become key
drivers in ensuring a higher level of energy-efficientconstruction and the deployment of environmentallyresponsive technologies. Anderson, Iyer and Huang(2004) propose with regards to developing countries
a structured implementation phase, including thenecessary provisions for building code administrationand enforcement structures, the development ofand conduction of training programmes and theconstruction of multiple demonstration buildings.

28. The concept of the Triple Bottom Line (TBL), also known as “people,
planet, profit” or “the three pillars” represents a comprehensive set ofcriteria for evaluating the development of organisations and societies –
economically, ecologically and socially.

be static, i.e. based on engineering design estimatesand assumptions, or dynamic, being updated asbuilding-use patterns change. A wide range ofaudit systems are available, many of which arevoluntary, although governments are increasingly
favouring mandatory audits as opportunities tocollect data and enable interventions. An important
challenge posed by energy audits is the significant
administrative cost posed by their implementation,
including energy consultants, monitoring, andtime and resource burdens on the owner. Energy
benchmarking, as opposed to auditing, can serve asa lower burden alternative to identify energy-saving
potential. In the benchmarking process, energy use
is measured and compared with related values.

Control and regulatory mechanisms, especially codesand standards, can be a rapid way to implement
effective technology and best practices and lure riskaverse investors (Granade et al. 2009). In the general
assessment of energy efficiency in building codes
two mayor types of energy codes can be identified:“prescriptive” and “performance-based” (Hitchin 2008;
Laustsen 2008). Although performance-based codes are
more complex in their application, they yield a numberof benefits, These, according to Hitchin (2008), consist
in the flexibility for policy makers to weight different
aspects of the building’s energy balance, even after
the first implementation of the legislation; and also inthe possibility of using the calculation procedure tointegrate an energy performance labelling scheme orenergy audits.
Mandatory energy audits are an extension of building
codes and commissioning processes (UNEP SBCI 2009b)
and underline the importance of reliable measurement
and accounting (Box 7). In many European countries,
governments have made energy audits mandatory for
their public buildings as well as other major energy
consuming sectors. The EU’s Energy Performancein Buildings Directive (EPBD) requires mandatory
energy performance certificates to be presented tothe customer during any sale or lease transaction of abuilding. It also requires public buildings of a certain size
to publicly display their energy certificates, althoughcritics point out that it does not account for the energy
used by buildings’ occupants, which constitutes a largepart of overall performance (Ries et al. 2009).
Economic and market-based instruments
These instruments include energy performance
contracting, cooperative procurement, efficiency

363

Towards a green economy
certificate schemes and credit schemes such as flexible
mechanisms29 introduced under the UNFCCC and mostrecently, cap-and-trade schemes. Examples of their costeffectiveness are the following (UNEP SBCI 2007b):■■ Cooperative procurement: – US$ 118/tCO2 saved (USA);■■ Energy efficiency/white certificate schemes: US$
0.013/kWh expected (France); and■■ Kyoto flexibility mechanisms: – US$ 10/tCO2 (Latvia).
Energy performance contracting involves an energy
service company (ESCO) as an implementing agent,guaranteeing certain energy savings over a period oftime, implementing improvements and getting paid outof the energy savings. They are already used in the USA,
Germany, China and Brazil. They do require supportive
legal, financial and business environments and theabsences of subsidies that send the wrong energy-pricesignals. Analysis of the experience in the Netherlands(Keivani et al. 2010) has shown the importance ofinstitutional support for ESCOs that can facilitate
measures that reduce energy consumption costs for all
stakeholders, particularly households.
Advanced institutional structures are also required
for the running of efficiency certificate schemes. The
Fund for Electric Energy Savings (FIDE) in Mexico
offers a “seal of quality” to certify energy efficientequipment, materials and technologies. FIDE is a joint
initiative of the state-owned electric power utility, theMexican electric workers union and members of thebusiness community (Martinez-Fernandez et al. 2010).
The UK Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) programme,a cap-and-trade scheme, aims to reduce greenhousegases by 2050 by at least 80 per cent compared with the1990 baseline (DECC 2010). Now called the CRC Energy
Efficiency Scheme, it applies to organisations that have anelectricity consumption measured through half-hourly
metering greater than 6,000 MWh per year (equivalent
to an annual electricity bill of about £ 400,000-£ 500,000).
This covers organisations that fall below the thresholdfor the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, yetaccount for some 10 per cent of the carbon emissions
in the UK. These tend to be organisations such as hotels,
supermarkets, banks, national and local public authorities.
Organisations will purchase their first allowances in 2011,
and the more each consumes over 6,000 MWh per year,
the more each organisation will have to pay. Participantorganisations will report progress annually and pay
penalties for non-compliance.
29. Among the flexible mechanisms (sometimes referred to as flexibility
or Kyoto mechanisms) introduced under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions
trading, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism only
the latter two are considered in the building sector.

364

Carbon credit trading schemes crucially require reliablemeasurement and baselines. One of the reasons that theCDM under the Kyoto Protocol attracted so few building
energy-efficiency projects was the fragmentation of thebuilding market with few baselines and reference casesthat could be used to determine additionality. Hightransaction costs and the absence of a sector-specificmethodology was another reason for so few CDM projects
in developing countries involving the building sector. The
accumulative impact of change at the level of many small
units has been a further complication. Energy-efficiency
projects for buildings are often small in scale and use
a variety of measure to decrease overall consumption.
The necessity to validate, audit, monitor and verify eachmeasure generates tremendous effort and extra costs
that strongly impact the viability of the projects. Other
limitations include the methodology to assess the impact
of soft or non-technological measures (building design,
occupants’ behavior). Finally, CDM has its limitation forthe low-income housing sector where energy poverty
induces low-energy consumption and carbon emission(Cheng et al. 2008; Schneider 2007; Ellis and Kamel 2007).
Considering ways of improving the use of an international
credit scheme for the building sector, industry partnersof the UNEP SBCI (2007a) made six recommendations
for a post-Kyoto agreement. These underlined the needfor using performance-based indicators (eg energy
consumption per square metre) along with technologybased indicators, as well as the need for common baselines
and national building energy-efficiency standards. In
addition, it called for special recognition of energyefficient housing for low-income groups, providing thepoor with access to energy in an efficient manner evenwhile absolute levels of energy consumption may be
increasing (Ellis and Kamel 2007).
In April 2010 the Tokyo Metropolitan Government
introduced the world’s first cap-and-trade scheme forurban buildings, covering 1,400 buildings, includingcommercial office buildings and industrial facilities(World Bank and Padeco Co. LTD. 2010)30. At the sametime, the Seoul Metropolitan Government started athree-year trial of a carbon-trading system among 47
state-run public agencies, with a goal to achieve a 10 per
cent reduction in GHG emissions (Hee-sung 2010).
Common carbon metrics are a recent international
initiative to promote sustainability in the building sector.
It is being developed by UNEP SBCI, the World Green
Building Council (World GBC31) and the Sustainable
Building Alliance (SB Alliance32). The focus has been on
energy GHG emissions, but the metrics will address waste,
30. It sets a 2020 target of reducing carbon emissions by 25 per cent (below
2000 levels), with a cap set at a level of 6 per cent below base emissions forthe first compliance period (2010-14), and then approximately 17 per centbelow base emissions from 2014 to 2020.

Buildings
water, indoor air quality and financial performance(UNEP SBCI and WRI 2009; UNEP SBCI 2009a).
Fiscal instruments and incentives
These instruments include energy or carbon taxes, tax
exemptions and reductions, public benefits charges, andcapital subsidies, grants, subsidised loans and rebates.
Further details as well as examples are provided inBox 8. They target energy consumption and/or upfront
investment costs. Examples of their cost-effectivenessinclude (UNEP SBCI 2007b):■■ Tax exemptions: Benefit/Cost Ratio 1:6 for new houses(USA);■■ Public benefits charges: - US$ 53/tCO2 to - US$ 17/
tCO2 (USA); and■■ Subsidies: Benefit/Cost Ratio 12:1 (Brazil), - US$ 20/
tCO2 (Denmark).
Taxes can reinforce the impact of other instruments suchas standards and subsidies, affecting the whole building
life cycle and making energy efficiency investments
more profitable. They offer governments the possibilityof investing tax revenues into green-building
improvements. A challenge in their implementation
remains low price-elasticity of demand, depending on
how households spend their disposable income and theavailability of substitute technologies.
Grants and subsidies are well suited to low-income
households, which tend not to make investments inenergy efficiency even if they have access to capital.
By providing unconditional grants and subsidies,governments can provide direct capital rather thanaccess to capital (UNEP 2009b). Grants are also best
suited to encourage innovators and small businesses
who would like to invest in R&D but find it difficult
to access capital from the market. For example, theDanish energy authority made an agreement withthe glass industry to develop highly-efficient doubleglazed windows (de T’Serclaes 2007). Under the Energy
Premium Scheme, the Dutch energy agency provided
grants to evaluated buildings for introducing energysaving measures (Keivani et al. 2010).
For middle- and upper-income households, preferential
loans may be more appropriate for those wishing tocarry out energy-efficiency improvements. These can be
granted through public-private partnerships in whichgovernments give some fiscal incentives to banks, which
31. World GBC is a worldwide union of national Green Building Councils:
Available at http://www.worldgbc.org/
32. SB Alliance is an international organisation that regroups key actors fromthe property and construction industries, standard-setting organisms andnational building research centres: Available at http://www.sballiance.org/

in turn establish low interest rates for their customers. For
example, KfW, a German development bank, launchedpreferential loans using a double-edged mechanism
to finance them through public tax exemption forinvestments in efficiency projects coupled with directpublic subvention (de T’Serclaes 2007).
For larger-scale, commercial greening efforts, theintroduction of reduced fees and waivers can significantly
aid the uptake of green building measures. Ordinarily,building and permit fees are significant barriers to new
development projects – green or otherwise – as they
are non-trivial and have to be paid upfront. Reducing
or waiving these fees if a building meets certain green
criteria helps stimulate green building development.
Another effective measure for developers is a reduction
or temporary freeze in property taxes tied to the energy
performance of buildings. These rewards can be used tocover any additional costs that green-building measuresincur, meaning that building green need not cost any
more than conventional construction. For example,
the Oregon Department of Energy offers energy tax
credits to businesses that invest in energy conservation,
recycling, renewable energy resources and reductions
in transportation related energy use on both retrofit
and new construction projects. The Business Energy Tax
Credit is 35 per cent of eligible project costs, the increased
project cost above industry standard. Since the scheme
has been introduced more than 7,400 energy tax credits
have been awarded (Oregon Department of Energy2010). Tax exemptions and reductions are efficient instimulating initial sales of alternative technologies.
Important is that the tax credits are sufficiently high tocreate a real incentive.
Public benefits charges are a special form of energy tax,
whose revenues are invested in efficiency improvements.
In Brazil for example, all distribution utilities are required
to spend at least 1 per cent of their revenue on energyefficiency improvements. Governments can also requireutilities to adopt a business model based on the deliveryof energy service (including efficiency improvements)
rather than the delivery of energy per se.
Finally, and across several of the categories above,
public-sector financial institutions have an importantrole to play in addressing credit barriers. Backed bygovernments they also help local financial institutions
to share the risk related to energy-efficiency projects.
For example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has
supported green buildings and other energy efficiency
programmes through partial credit-guarantee schemes(UNEP 2009b). The total investments towards newenergy-efficient green buildings and building retrofits
supported by guaranteed loans is expected to exceed
US$ 150 million by 2012 (ADB 2009).

365Towards a green economy

Box 8: Tools to promote the greening of buildings
Carbon credit

As of 2005, large-scale renewable energy projects accounted for 60% of total CDM projects. While the building sector offers
theoretically great potentials only around 1% of the certificates have been generated through demand-side energy- efficiency
measures (Fenhann and Staun 2010)1. Therefore, the potential for green buildings to be eligible for carbon credits needs to be
explored further.

White certificates

Used in Australia, France and Italy, these certificates can enable building owners and even residential landlords to trade theiremissions allowances (Ries et al. 2009). In principle, the various trading schemes will promote the desired effect, such as the
reduction of GHG emissions, at a minimal cost (Bürger and Wiegmann 2007).

Third-party financing
arrangements

Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), by engaging in Energy Performance Contracting – sometimes referred to as Energy Savings
Performance Contracting – with building owners, develop, install and monitor projects designed to improve energy efficiency.
Compensation for an ESCO service and often the initial investment needed are directly linked to the energy savings associatedwith the project. Hence, the major barrier of upfront cost is addressed by allowing future energy savings to pay for the investment (Bleyl-Androschin and Schinnerl 2008).

Rebates

These can be built into the tax system to give credits to homeowners for adopting specific energy saving measures rather thanwhole building performance. The Power Saver Program in Austin, Texas currently supports more than 1,000 privately-owned
solar power systems as well as around 70 commercial and several dozen municipality-run systems, which in all provide morethan 4 megawatts of generation capacity (Austin Energy 2010).

Feebates

This new form of credit incentive is currently being tested and is based on a carbon tax or a tax on the carbon footprint of a building or sale certification fees. The feebate rewards homeowners who maintain energy efficient homes or carry out upgrades prior
to sale. They pay less or their fees get waived, rebated or tax credited. In this system, tax revenue is not lost because the feebates
pay for themselves as higher fees offset lower fees. The level of feebates can also adjust to higher standards of efficiency and cangear up as more building owners go above minimum requirements.

Green mortgages

Credits based on a home’s energy efficiency are factored into the mortgage, allowing individuals to finance energy-efficient
improvements in their property (Hendricks et al. 2009).

Equity finance or external
capitalThis is used for funding high-risk projects whereby project developers sell a majority of their ownership in the project to entities
that have sufficient resources to finance the project. The disadvantage is giving up part of the control over the project.

Revolving Funds

Loans can be repaid with the cash-flow arising from energy savings. The repaid loans then finance new energy efficiency
projects. For example, in Hungary, the PHARE Energy Efficiency Co-Financing Scheme (EEFS) provides interest-free credit from a
Revolving Fund with a total budget of € 5 million for energy-efficiency purposes (EuroACE 2005).

Capacity support, information and voluntary action
This category of instruments includes voluntary
certification and labelling programmes, voluntary andnegotiated agreements, public-leadership initiatives,awareness raising and education, as well as detailed
billing and disclosure programmes. Examples of theircost-effectiveness are the following (UNEP SBCI 2007b):■■ Voluntary labelling: US$ 0.01-0.06/kWh (USA);■■ Leadership programmes: US$ 13.5 billion savings by
2020 (EU) – US$ 125/tCO2 (Brazil); and■■ Info and awareness raising initiatives: US$ 8/tCO2 forEnergy Trust programmes (UK).
International building labels are a source of inspiration.
Passivhaus and Minergie have succeeded in promoting
different combination of measures to achieve nationaltargets and policy objectives for green buildings
within the developed world. When applying labels indeveloping countries, however, they clearly need toadapt to local geographic and cultural conditions.
Appliance efficiency standards and labels are also
important in greening the building sector (Meyers,

366

McMahon and Atkinson 2008). Among the oldest andmost comprehensive are the US Federal Minimum
Efficiency Performance Standards (MEPS) programme,
the comparative labelling programme implemented
by the European Union (European Parliament andCouncil Directive 2010/30/EU and the US Energy Star
endorsement label programme. An example of voluntarylabelling programmes in developing countries is theenergy efficiency standards for air conditioning andrefrigerators introduced in Thailand.
The public sector, which can include both housing andinstitutional buildings, is unique in that it can act as an
exemplar for environmental targets. Public leadershipprogrammes can reduce costs in the public sector andprovide demonstration of new technologies that can befollowed by the private sector. In Germany, 25 per centof energy was saved in the public sector over 15 years. In
Brazil, where the government agency PROCEL provides
funding for retrofits in Government buildings, 140 GWh
are saved yearly (UNEP SBCI 2007b).
A number of developed countries are leading theway for green public procurement to drive the green
transformation in the building sector. A recent PwC
survey of seven European countries concluded that

Buildings
energy reduction targets had been put in place by at least
two-thirds of all those procurement agencies surveyed
in each country, with the UK and Germany reaching 100
per cent. The most common requirements were doubleglazing and insulation standards. The study further
suggests that where green procurement is applied, a 70
per cent reduction in CO2 emissions per functional unit isachieved while life-cycle costs are reduced by 10 per cent(PricewaterhouseCoopers, Significant and Ecofys 2009).
An example of billing and disclosure programmes is thesmartcard meter for prepayment of electricity. Similar to
information instruments, these can be particularly effective
in targeting households. The use of smartcard meters inhouseholds have proven their value recently in South
Africa, when electricity supply-shortages have caused thegovernment and the power utility to pay closer attention
to demand-side management. Moreover, smart metering
providing customers with information on a real-time basis
may help reducing energy demand by 5-10 per cent.
With respect to education and training, it is evident
that the green transformation the building sector
necessitates large numbers of skilled professionals.
While in developed countries, there is already a criticalmass of such professionals, many developing countries
still lack the necessary expertise in the development
and implementation of building codes and standards,
standards for appliances, green building design, energy
auditing, labelling and certification, and energy efficient
operation & management (O&M). CEDEFOP (2010) listed
the following new skills required for the building industry:■■ Knowledge of new materials, technologies andenergy efficiency-adapted technical solutions;■■ Cross-cutting knowledge of energy issues;■■ Understanding other occupations related to building
renovation; and■■ Client counselling/advice to meet new market demands.
A Green Skills Checklist prepared for the UK Government(DEFRA, UK and Pro Enviro Ltd 2009) noted the following
areas of need for the building sector: building energy
management, integration of renewable energy, energyefficient construction, facilities management (including
water and waste management), as well as building energy
auditing and carbon rating. Based on its Strategy for
Reduction of Energy Consumption in Buildings Denmark isdeveloping a strategic skills development response for thebuilding and construction value chain (CEDEFOP 2010). In
Thailand, the Ministry of Energy has launched an initiative
to train technicians in energy management, technology
and end-use systems in buildings and companies. The
Brussels Capital Region has created a Construction

Reference Centre, anticipating possible skills shortages
and initiating training programmes to increase thesupply of trained labour in the eco-construction industry(Martinez-Fernandez et al. 2010). Courses are offeredin, for example, isolation and water proofing, energy
efficiency and handling of materials. As part of its Second
Green Building Masterplan the Singapore Building andConstruction Authority (Singapore BCA 2009) announced
a comprehensive training framework aimed at educatingaround 18,000 green building-design, construction andmaintenance professionals over the next 10 years.33
Evaluation of policy instruments
The analysis in UNEP SBCI (2007b) of 80 case studies
world-wide conclude that regulatory and control
measures are probably the most effective as well as
the most cost-effective category, at least in developed
countries. Grants and rebates are especially needed indeveloping countries because the first cost-barrier often
completely prevents energy efficiency improvements
there. Tax exemptions appeared to be the most effective
tool in the category of fiscal instruments. Subsidies,
grants and rebates can also achieve high savings, but
can be costly to society. It was concluded that financial
instruments are typically most effective if they areapplied in a package with other instruments, such aslabelling combined with a tax exemption.
The results of the UNEP SBCI study as well as of
the MURE database34 appear to contradict general
expectations, especially the high effectiveness and costeffectiveness of regulatory instruments compared witheconomic ones. These findings are probably specific tothe building sector, considering which barriers specificpolicy instruments address. Regulatory and control
instruments are particularly effective in addressing two
key barriers in the building sector, namely hidden costs(transaction costs) and market failures.
Governments would be well-advised to consider
combinations of policy instruments, an approach likely
to result in synergistic impacts and higher savings.
Appliance standard are, for example, often combinedwith labelling and rebates to give incentives forinvestments beyond the minimum level required by theenergy-efficiency standard. Also, labelling of energyefficient products can be critical in enabling financial
incentives such as loans, subsidies and tax credits to be
more effective. In the USA, mandatory energy-efficiency
33. For further information and case studies please see Second Green
Building Masterplan and Inter-Ministerial Committee on Sustainable
Development (2009); A lively and liveable Singapore: Strategies forsustainable growth. Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources(MEWR) and Ministry of National Development (MND), Singapore.
34. The MURE (Mesure d’Utilisation Rationnelle de l’Energy) database,developed by European experts, provides online a description and brief
assessment of policy measures for energy efficiency in EU member states.
Available at http://www.isisrome.com/mure/367

Towards a green economy

regulations are coupled with voluntary labels and tax
credits for both manufacturers and consumers. This
combination eliminates the least efficient products
while compensating manufacturers for some of theincreased production costs through tax credits andpremiums charged for Energy Star designs.
Barriers that are particularly prominent in developing
countries are “subsidised, not cost-reflective energy
prices, lack of awareness on the importance and thepotential of energy efficiency improvements, lack offinancing, lack of qualified personnel and insufficientenergy service levels” (UNEP SBCI 2007b). Several
developing countries have enacted legislation onenergy efficiency in buildings. Special enabling factors
to support measures for green buildings in developing
countries are the need for:■■ Getting the energy price right, so that more efficiency
investments become profitable;■■ Technical assistance and training;■■ Demonstration projects and information to build
trust;

Clearly, adjusting the priorities of enabling instruments
to their context is critical. In developing countries
the first step might introduce non-mandatory standards
that act as educational platforms. The next move could
include mandatory standards, which exclude lessefficient products from the market. Subsidies or rebatesthat provide an incentive to replace old equipmentwith new, more efficient products are yet a further
possible step. At the same time, public leadership andenergy-performance contracting can play a key rolein public housing projects. In developed countries
mandatory standards and regulatory actions are theway to start, followed by rebates for retrofitting andgreen mortgages.
An integrated policy framework that combines
regulatory instruments, such as standards or mandatory
audits in certain buildings, capacity-building, training
and information campaigns as well as demonstration
projects coupled with (fiscal or other) incentives ismost likely to effectively reduce GHG emissions indeveloping countries. The following policy instruments,for example, can be effectively combined (UNEPSBCI 2007b):■■ Standards, labelling and financial incentives;■■ Financial assistance or funding mechanisms;■■ Regulatory measures, such as mandatory audits,
combined with incentives such as subsidies or awards;■■ Monitoring and evaluation (requiring baseline data);■■ Institutionalisation (e.g. establishing energy agencies
independent of utilities); and■■ Adaptation to local circumstances, including climate
and culture.

368■■ Regulatory instruments and information programmes;
and■■ Public leadership programmes and energy
performance contracting (EPC) in the public sector.
In assessing the impact of instruments in developing
countries, it is important to note that initiatives to address
restricted energy services aim not to reduce energy
consumption, but rather to ensure more energy services
can be accessed and afforded with the available resources.

Buildings

5 Conclusions
The building sector should be central to any attempt
to use resources more efficiently. Buildings consume
a large proportion of the global energy supply but
opportunities to improve efficiency are huge and thesector has the greatest potential – more than any othercovered in this report – to reduce global GHG emissions.
Great gains can also be achieved from a broader, more
holistic approach to buildings; a life-cycle perspectivethat covers each stage from the building design andthe extraction of resources to construction and usage
and through to disuse and eventual demolition and therecycling or disposal of the building materials. The mostsignificant environmental impact of buildings lies in theirenergy demand over decades or even centuries of use. As
a result, the design and use of energy efficient buildings
has a key part to play in mitigating climate change andthe transformation to a global green economy.
Whether construction of new or retrofitting existingbuildings, they both offer a high GHG reduction potentialand environmental benefits at low cost.
Patterns of energy consumption and emissions, as wellas the predicted future trends, vary widely across thedeveloped and developing world. Major regions of theworld need to pursue green building strategies thatare appropriate to their respective circumstances. For
developed countries, which account for most of theexisting building stock, the priority is to put in placemeasures and incentives that will enable large-scale
investments in retrofitting programmes. Those will
come not only with the benefits of energy savings but
also a high potential of net job creation. For developing
countries, particularly fast-growing economies that areexperiencing a construction boom, the priority is toensure that new buildings will be green by investingin the most appropriate available technology, whether
traditional or high-tech, and design options and avoiding
any possible lock-in to an inefficient building stock withlong-term consequences.
In both cases, retrofitting and new construction, payback periods of investments in energy efficiency arereasonably short and they offer a significant return on
investment in the medium- and long-term. On a global
scale, aggregated investments in energy efficiency inbuildings pay back two fold in energy savings over 20
years. These savings are, in most cases, sufficient tojustify investments in greening, beyond the positive
externalities associated with mitigating climate change.
Greening also brings the opportunity to improve
efficiency in use of water, materials and land, and avoid

risks associated with climate change and hazardous
substances.
The process of greening buildings and their subsequent use
provides a wide range of direct social benefits, including
the improved health, productivity and wellbeing of those
who live and work in them and the creation of jobs inconstruction, maintenance and the supply of energy, waterand sanitation.
The increase in the productivity of employees working
in green buildings can yield labour-cost savings that
may be higher than energy-cost savings, which arethemselves substantial. The construction of new, green
buildings, retrofitting and accompanied use of resourceefficient construction materials, products and energy
supply and maintenance can provide net jobs gains anddecent work. While the construction industry in many
countries has a poor image with respect to meeting
workers’ rights, green building offers an opportunity
to use improved training, skills management andinspection to improve the quality of employment.
Improved health and quality-of-life benefits of green
buildings are equally significant. In developing
communities, where most household energy is used
for cooking, more efficient appliances (cleaner stoves)
can bring extensive economic benefits in the form of
reduced health-related expenditure as a result of lessillness, associated productivity gains and time-savings.
The benefits of simple measures, such as replacing
solid fuels with electricity in informal and low-cost
housing, are particularly striking when considering thedevastating health impacts of indoor air pollution on
women and children.
Improved regulation and control, adjusting energy prices tointernalise external costs and other policy instruments suchas tax exemptions and grants are required to overcome
persistent barriers such as market failure and non-costreflective energy prices in particular:
Despite these opportunities, investment in green
buildings is held back owing to assumed cost premiums
that are exaggerated and a range of barriers that range
from financial constraints to the fragmented structure of
the industry. While some barriers relate to hidden costs
or benefits and market failure, others relate to behavioral
culture, lack of awareness and capacity.
Seeking to address these and create an enabling
environment, governments need to take stock and369

Towards a green economy

determine the most appropriate mix of policy instruments,
considering regulatory and control mechanisms,
economic or market-based instruments, fiscal instruments
and incentives, as well as information and voluntaryaction. Considering in particular the hidden costs andmarket-failure barriers the building industry faces, analysis
of cases world-wide suggests that regulatory and control
measures are likely to be most effective and cost-efficientwhen adequately implemented. This is particularly thecase in developed countries.
Regulatory and control instruments can be combinedwith other instruments for greater impact, considering
local realities such as the level of development of thelocal market and income-level of households involved.
Among fiscal instruments, tax exemptions appear to be
the most effective, while subsidies, grants and rebates
can achieve high energy savings in developing countries
by helping organisations or families overcome upfront
investment or first-cost barriers. Examples from Brazil
and Thailand have shown high cost-benefit ratios in
the use of subsidies and grants to support energy
efficiency improvements, combined with mandatory
audits, awareness raising, training and demonstration tobuild capacity and trust in the use of new technologies.

370

A particular challenge in developing countries, at thesame time, is doing away with subsidised, non-costreflective energy prices.
Facing global demand for more and better housing andfacilities, governments at all levels can lead by example
through public procurement and green housing schemes:
Finally, governments can set a leadership example
by using public procurement in the construction andmanagement of their facilities to drive the greeningof the building sector. Experience from Mexico andChina has shown how energy-efficiency improvement
programmes in the public sector can also be boosted
by the immediate pressure of high energy prices andenergy shortages. Public assets, be they in the formof government buildings, hospitals or schools, holdwide-ranging opportunities of greening measures that
result in a more efficient use of resources, reduced
GHG emissions, improved productivity and avoided
illness resulting from indoor air pollution. In addition,
government-supported social housing schemes provide
an opportunity to combine socio-economic andenvironmental gains in designing and building single ormulti-family homes.

Buildings

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373

iStockphoto/backhandingTransport

Investing in energy and resource efficiency

Towards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Authors: Holger Dalkmann and Ko
Sakamoto, Transport Research Laboratory, UK.
Fatma Ben Fadhl of UNEP managed the chapter, including thehandling of peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating
authors on revisions, conducting supplementary research andbringing the chapter to final production.
The chapter benefited from research conducted by the following
experts: Dario Hidalgo, Aileen Carrigan, Prajna Rao, Madhav Pai
and Clayton Lane (Embarq – the WRI Center for Sustainable
Transport); Andrea M. Bassi, John P. Ansah and Zhuohua Tan(Millennium Institute); Yoshitsugu Hayashi (Nagoya University);
Juan Carlos Dextre Quijandria and Felix Israel Cabrera Vega
(Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru); Sanjivi Sundar, Chhavi
Dhingra, Divya Sharma and Akshima Ghate (The Energy andResources Institute); Anne Binsted, Kate Avery, Catherine Ferrisand Ellie Gould (Transport Research Laboratory); Marianne
Vanderschuren and Tanya Lane (University of Cape Town); andAna Lucía Iturriza (ILO).

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011376

The coordinating authors would like to acknowledge theextensive work of the contributing authors, all of whom
devoted a significant amount of time and effort in compiling thebackground papers. Much of their contributions were generously
made in kind to make this work possible.
During the development of the chapter, the authors received
advisory support from Rob De Jong and contributions from Elisa
Dumitrescu, Kamala Ernest, Patricia Kim and Martina Otto fromthe United Nations Environment Programme.
We would also like to thank the peer reviewers (in their personal
capacity) of the chapter consisting of Brinda Wachs and Romain
Hubert (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe), ATM
Nurul Amin (North South University, Bangladesh), Carmen Polo(consultant), Hernan Blanco (Research and Resources for Sustainable
Development), Ian Parry (IMF), Justin Perrettson (Novozyme), andArvid Strand (Oslo Transportøkonomisk institutt). A special thank also
goes to Yuki Tanaka Iwao Matsuoka (Institution for Transport Policy
Studies) as well as Lew Fulton and François Cuenot (International
Energy Agency) for their role in facilitating access to data.

Transport

Contents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

2

Challenges and opportunities in the transport sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

2.1
2.2

Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
Opportunities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387

3Transport in a green economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389

3.1
3.2
3.3

Supporting green growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
Creating jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
Supporting equity and poverty reduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390

4Quantifying the economic implications of green transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

4.1
4.2
4.3

Transport trends under business as usual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
The Avoid, Shift and Improve strategy as a basis for redirecting investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Investing in green transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396

5Enabling conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4

Designing appropriate regulation, planning and information provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
Setting the right financial conditions and economic incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
Ensuring technology transfer and access  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
Strengthening Institutions and Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405

6Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408

377

Towards a green economy

List of figures
Figure 1: Image of green transport as a goal, and actions and investments to achieve this goal  . . . . . . . . 382
Figure 2: Passenger light-duty vehicle fleet and ownership rates in key regions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
Figure 3: Changes to energy consumption by sector and region between 2007 and 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
Figure 4: Reported deaths by type of road user, region and income group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
Figure 5: Moving towards a green trajectory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
Figure 6: Modal split by income group in Surabaya  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
Figure 7: Global transport carbon abatement cost curve  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Figure 8: Effect of a combination of Avoid, Shift and Improve measures to reduce CO2 emissions
from the transport sector in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
Figure 9: Level of vehicle activity under BAU and the green scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
Figure 10: Modeled changes to CO2 emissions in the transport sector under the green and BAU
scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
Figure 11: Growth patterns for cities around the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399

List of tables
Table 1: Accident costs from various world regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
Table 2: Avoid, Shift and Improve strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
Table 3: Economic impacts per US$ 1 million expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
Table 4: Green transport businesses in the Avoid, Shift and Improve groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
Table 5: Costs and benefits of investing in green transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Table 6: Overview of instruments to support Avoid, Shift and Improve strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
Table 7: Regulatory measures in practice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
Table 8: Options for financing green transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Table 9: Various technologies to support green transport goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404

List of boxes
Box 1: Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
Box 2: Maritime and aviation emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
Box 3: Benefits of cleaner fuels in sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
Box 4: Re-examining the employment generating effects of aviation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
Box 5: Green transport as a business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
Box 6: The role of transport in reducing rural poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
Box 7: Net savings from greening the transport sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
Box 8. Effects of combining investments in measures in the Avoid, Shift and Improve areas on
reducing transport emissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
Box 9: Share the Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
Box 10: The future role of climate finance in enacting green transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
Box 11: Fuel subsidies – transitional arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
Box 12: Congestion charging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
Box 13: The global fuel economy initiative  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405

378

Transport

List of acronyms
BAU
BRT
CAFE
CBD
CDM
CIF
CO2
CTF
ECMT
ETS
FIA
G2
GEF
GDP
GFEI
GHG
HC
ICC
IEA
IET
IMO
IQ
ITF
JI
LDVs
Mtoe

Business-as-usual
Bus Rapid Transit
Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Central Business District
Clean Development Mechanism
Climate Investment Fund
Carbon dioxide
Clean Technology Fund
European Conference of Ministers ofTransport
Emissions Trading Scheme
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
Green Scenario 2
Global Environment Facility
Gross Domestic Product
Global Fuel Economy Initiative
Greenhouse gas
Hydro Carbon
International Chamber of Commerce
International Energy Agency
International Emissions Trading
International Maritime Organization
Intelligence quotientInternational Transport Forum
Joint Implementation
Light-duty vehicles
Million tonnes of oil equivalent

NAMA
NAFTA
NMT
NOX
ODA
OECD
PKM
PPP
PT
R&D
SLoCaT
SOX
SSA
T21
TDM
TKM
TNA
TPK
TRL
UNEP
VKM
VOC
VTPI
WHO

Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
North American Free Trade Agreement
Non-Motorised Transport
Nitrogen oxide
Official Development Assistance
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development
Passenger per kilometres
Public-private partnership
Public transport
Research and development
Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon
Transport
Sulphur oxide
Sub-Saharan Africa
Threshold 21 modelTransport Development Management
Tonnes per kilometre
Technology Needs Assessment
Tonnes per kilometre
Transport Research Laboratory (UK)
United Nations Environment Programme
Vehicle kilometres
Volatile Organic Compounds
Victoria Transport Planning InstituteWorld Health Organization379

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. Present patterns of transportation – based mainly on petrol and diesel-fuelled motor
vehicles – generate serious social, environmental and economic damage and are highly
unsustainable. At present, transportation consumes more than half of global liquid fossil fuels;
emits nearly a quarter of the world’s energy-related CO2; generates more than 80 per cent of the air
pollution in cities in developing countries; results in more than 1.27 million fatal traffic accidents
per year; and produces chronic traffic congestion in many of the world’s urban areas. These costs tosociety, which can add up to more than 10 per cent of a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), arelikely to grow, primarily because of the expected growth of the global vehicle fleet.
2. Business-as-usual (BAU) will significantly enlarge vehicle fleets and exacerbate their costs
to society. If we continue on a BAU path, the global vehicle fleet is set to increase from around
800 million to between 2 and 3 billion by 2050. Most of this growth will take place in developing
countries. Aviation growth is expected to increase exponentially in the coming decades, fuelledlargely by income growth in developing countries. Carbon emissions from shipping could also growby up to 250 per cent.
3. A three-pronged investment strategy is needed to transform this sector: promote accessinstead of mobility; shift to less harmful modes of transportation; and improve vehicles towards
lower carbon intensity and pollution. A fundamental shift in investment patterns is needed, basedon the principles of avoiding or reducing trips through integrating land use and transport planningand enabling more localised production and consumption. Shifting to more environmentally
efficient modes such as public and non-motorised transport (for passenger transport) and to rail andwater transport (for freight) is recommended. Investment in public transport and infrastructure that
promotes walking and cycling generates jobs, improves well-being and can add considerable value
to regional and national economies. Improving vehicles and fuels is a priority in order to reduce urban
air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Green transport policies will also reduce roadaccidents and alleviate poverty by improving access to markets and other essential facilities.

380Transport

4. Investment in public transportation and vehicle efficiency improvements generates
exceptional economic returns. Several scenarios show that a green, low carbon, transport sector
can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 70 per cent without major additional investment. A
reallocation of just 0.34 per cent of global GDP in support of public transport infrastructure andefficiency improvements to road vehicles would reduce the expected increase in travel volume ofroad vehicles by around one-third by 2050. It would diminish the use of oil-based fuel by up to onethird and promote strong and sustainable employment in the sector.
5. Enabling conditions for green transportation have to be wide-ranging in order to beeffective. Such investments, among other measures, should be enabled via policies, including
land use planning to promote compact or mass-transit corridor-based cities; regulation of fuel andvehicles; and the provision of information to aid decisions by consumers and industry. In addition,
shifting financing priorities towards public transport and non-motorised transport, coupled withstrong economic incentives such as taxes, charges and subsidy reform will also send a strong signal.
Finally, developing and widely applying green transport technology; as well as setting up andbuilding the capacity of institutions to foster greener transport will help ensure close cooperation
with other key sectors.

381

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
Transport is central to the lives of citizens across the world,
yet the current patterns of transport, dictated mainly
by fossil-fuel driven motor vehicles, generate a range ofenvironmental, social and economic costs. It is estimated,for example, that transport is responsible for nearly aquarter of global energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2).

of sustainable transport1. The analysis encompasses
all modes of freight and passenger transport, with
an emphasis on land transport, and it takes into
account the varying circumstances of developed anddeveloping countries, regional differences and ruralurban disparities.

There is a growing consensus on the need for moresustainable patterns of transport activity but investment
patterns are still heavily skewed towards supportingthe “motorisation” model of development. The recent
economic recession has led to various stimulus packages
that focus (with notable exceptions) on preserving
current industries and forms of transport such as car
manufacturing and road building.

Given the pivotal role of transport in the global
economy, much of the analysis of the potential forgreening the sector is interwoven with other chapters,
notably cities, energy, manufacturing and tourism.
The chapter was compiled through extensive
collaboration with experts from around the world,whose background papers are available in theaccompanying Full Technical Report.

This chapter examines the role of transport in agreen economy and makes a case for ensuring future
investment in the sector is increasingly green. It
highlights a strategy of avoiding or reducing trips,
shifting to more environmentally-friendly modes oftransport and improving the efficiency of all modes oftransport. It explores the challenges and opportunities
posed by shifting to a greener transport system andexamines the various options for conditions that canenable actions and investments for the development

1. Green transport is hereby defined as one that supports environmental
sustainability through e.g. the protection of the global climate, ecosystems,
public health and natural resources. It also supports the other pillars ofsustainable development, namely economic (affordable, fair and efficienttransport that supports a sustainable competitive economy as well asbalanced regional development and the creation of decent jobs) and social(e.g. allowing the basic access and development needs of individuals,
companies and society to be met safely and in a manner consistent withhuman and ecosystem health, and promoting poverty reduction and equity
within and between successive generations). This definition was developed
through extensive discussions with transport experts including those at UN
agencies and was based on a review of existing and well-acknowledged
definitions such as European Conference of Ministers of Transport (2004).

Strategy:
Avoid-Shift-Improve

Currenttransport

Actions/Investments

Greentransport

Enabling
conditions

Figure 1: Image of green transport as a goal, and actions and investments to achieve this goal382

Transport

2 Challenges and opportunities
in the transport sector
2.1 Challenges

These trends translate directly into various costs for theenvironment, society and economy including:Unsustainable trends
The challenges for the transport sector in becoming
green are made obvious by observing current trends,
whereby:■■ Overall demand for transport activity (for bothpassenger and freight) is growing rapidly, and it ispredicted to roughly double between 2005 and 2050
(IEA 2009b);■■ Transport activity is increasingly motorised (private
cars for passenger transport and lorries for freight,
almost all of which are propelled by internal combustion
engines);■■ The global vehicle fleet is set to multiply three or fourfold in the next few decades, with most of this growth
set to occur in developing countries. In 2050, two-thirdsof the global vehicle fleet is expected to be in non-OECD
countries; and

300

750

250

625

200

500

150

375

100

250

50

125

0

0

European United
Union
StatesChina

2007 (IEA estimate)

India

Japan

2015

RussiaVehicle per thousand people

Million■■ Technological improvements such as fuel-efficient
vehicles and alternative power sources have not been
rapid enough to offset the impacts of this growth.

■■ Congestion (and associated losses in productivity ofurban areas);■■ Resource depletion and land grab;■■ Degradation of human health (through air pollution,
noise, vibration, etc);■■ Reduction in human security (through traffic
accidents);■■ Reduction of accessibility
communities; andandseveranceof■■ Loss of biodiversity.
It should be acknowledged that such costs varysignificantly between regions, and that priorities may
differ between regions and by urban and/or nonurban area.
Fuel and natural resources
The transport sector’s impact on natural resources is
wide-ranging, including through manufacturing ofvehicles and/or rolling stock (e.g. metals and plastic)
and the construction of infrastructure2 (e.g. concreteand steel). Fossil fuels, engine oil, rubber and otherconsumable material (including biofuels, which incertain circumstances may deplete farmland for foodproduction) are consumed through the operation andmaintenance of vehicles.
Transport consumes more than half of global liquid
fossil fuels (IEA 2008) and it is expected to account for
97 per cent of the increase in the world’s primary oil
use between 2007 and 2030 (Figure 3).

2030

Vehicle ownership (right axis)

Figure 2: Passenger light-duty vehicle fleet andownership rates in key regions
Source: IEA (2009a)■■ Energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions(GHG);

Greenhouse gases
The transport sector’s consumption of fossil fuelstranslates into around a quarter of global energy-related
2. Infrastructure is not limited to roads, bridges and railways, but also
includes supporting infrastructure such as parking facilities, fuelling
stations, etc.

383

Towards a green economy

China

Transport

India

Non-energy use

Middle East

Industry

Other Asia

Power generation

Latin America

Other

AfricaE. Europe/Eurasia
OECD Europe
OECD Pacific
OECD North America
-200

-100

0

100

200

300

400

500
Mtoe

Figure 3: Changes to energy consumption by sector and region between 2007 and 2030
Source: IEA (2009a)

CO2 emissions3, which is projected to increase by 1.7 percent a year from 2004 to 2030.4 Land transport accounts
for roughly 73 per cent of the sector’s total CO2 emissions,followed by aviation (11 per cent) and shipping (9 percent). Passenger transport accounts for the lion’s share ofoverall emissions, with freight transport – predominantly
road-based trucks – comprising 27 per cent of alltransport energy use (and therefore emissions). More
3. OECD (2005) CO2 Emissions from Combustion 1971-2003.
4. IEA (2006) World Energy Outlook 2006, Available at http://www.
worldenergyoutlook.org/2006.asp

Box 1: Externalities
Economic efficiency requires prices of goods
or activities to match their social marginal cost
including all external costs. Prices for transport
services need to include costs imposed on society
through congestion, accidents, infrastructure
wear and tear, air pollution, noise and climatechange so that choices made by the users oftransport will take into account these costs(World Bank 2001; Button 1993).
Congestion, accident and pollution externalities
make up a significant and increasing cost to theeconomy, amounting in some cases to over 10
per cent of national or regional Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). A recent study by Creutzig and He(2009) estimates that in Beijing, China, the social
costs induced by motorised transportation areequivalent to between 7.5 per cent and 15 percent of the city’s GDP.

384

than 80 per cent of the predicted growth in transport
emissions is expected to come from road transport indeveloping countries (IEA 2009b).
Moreover, it is estimated that around 15 per cent of thetotal CO2 emissions generated from the car are a resultof manufacturing and disposal, when a full life-cycle
analysis is conducted (King 2007).
Pollution and healthTransport-related pollution, noise and vibration
can pose serious threats to human health andwellbeing.5 Local air pollution is caused by exhaustemissions produced by traffic, mostly in the form of
Sulphur Oxides (SOx), Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Carbon
Monoxide (CO), Hydro Carbon (HC), Volatile Organic
Compounds (VOC), Toxic Metals (TM), Lead Particles6
and Particulate Matter (PM) – including Black Carbon.7
These emissions represent a large proportion ofpollutants, especially in developing cities.
Such air pollutants are a cause of cardiovascular/
pulmonary and respiratory disease. For example,
exposure to lead can cause increased blood pressure,
5. The UNECE’s Transport, Health and Environment Pan-European
Programme (PEP) has published guidelines for improved cooperation onsustainable transport among various sectors (see UNECE 2009). A system ofmonitoring and reporting is being instituted to assess the extent to which
Member States are effectively implementing the mechanisms agreed,
and to measure progress against the priority goals of the Amsterdam
Declaration, in particular Amsterdam Goal 1: “To contribute to sustainableeconomic development and simulate job creation through investment inenvironment and health-friendly transport.”
6. Although almost all countries have now banned leaded gasoline, there
are still seven countries in which action is still needed.
7. Black carbon is “the solid fraction of PM2.5 that strongly absorbs lightand converts that energy to heat” (ICCT 2009). Black carbon not only affects
public health, but also contributes to climate change. Actions are needed
to both reduce CO2 and black carbon. Available at: http://www.theicct.org/
pubs/BCsummary_dec09.pdf.

Transport

Region*

GNP, 1997 (US$ billion)

AfricaEstimated annual crash costs
As percentage of GNP

Costs (US$ billion)

370

1

3.7

Asia

2,454

1

24.5

Latin America and Carribean

1,890

1

18.9

Middle East

495

1.5

7.4

1.5

Central and Eastern Europe

659

Subtotal

5,615

Higly motorised countries

22,665

9.9
64.5

2

Total

453.3
517.8

GNP: Gross National Product* Data are displayed according to regional classification of the Transport Research Laboratory Ltd, United Kingdom

Table 1: Accident costs from various world regions
Source: Jacobs et al. (2000)

liver and kidney damage, impaired fertility, comas,
convulsions, and even death. Children are particularly
vulnerable; they can suffer from reductions in IQ andattention span, learning disabilities, hyperactivity,
impaired growth and hearing loss (Rapuano et al.
1997). Hatfield et al. (2010) estimate that the removalof lead from vehicle fuels has resulted in more than
1 million avoided premature deaths per year withannual financial benefits over US$ 2.4 trillion.
Sánchez-Triana et al. (2007) note that for Colombia,
the health cost of urban air pollution was roughly
0.8 per cent of the nation’s GDP, amounting to 1,500
billion pesos (US$ 698 million).8 Noise pollution
generated by transport can be detrimental to healthand well-being, particularly if it contributes to sleep
disturbance, which can lead to increased bloodpressure and heart attacks (WHO 2009b). Research by
8. Calculated based on 2150 Colombian Pesos to US$ 1.

Lambert (2002) and Martínez (2005) indicate that theeconomic cost of noise can reach nearly 0.5 per centof GDP in the European Union.
Human security and accidents
The latest report from the World Health Organization(WHO 2009a) confirms that road accidents remain aserious public health issue. Every year more than 1.27
million people die in road accidents, of which 91 percent occur in low and middle income countries. Abouthalf of those who die in road accidents worldwide
are pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists, for whom
infrastructure provision is often neglected. In Europe,
traffic accidents are a major cause of fatalities foryoung people, particularly men aged between 15 and
25 (WHO 2008).
It is estimated that the cost of traffic accidents amounts
to US$ 518 billion, and represents between 1 per centand 1.5 per cent of GDP in low-and middle-income

Box 2: Maritime and aviation emissions
Road transport accounts for the majority of
GHG emissions and their predicted growth, but
those from maritime and aviation transport are
increasing at a very rapid rate.
For maritime transport, developments in world
trade are increasing while both the volume anddistance of goods are being shipped at a pacethat exceeds growth in world GDP. International
Maritime Organization (2009) predicts that by 2050,

in the absence of additional policies, emissions
from ships may grow between 150 per cent and 250
per cent (compared with 2007).
Despite a temporary slowdown in demand owing
to the economic recession, the fundamental growthin the aviation sector remains strong. Aviation
emissions are projected to increase exponentiallyin the next few decades, fuelled by income growth
and reductions in the price of air travel.

385

Towards a green economy

AfricanregionLIC

Region of
the Americas

LIC

South-East
Asia region

LIC

Eastern
Mediterranean
region

LIC

MIC

MIC

MIC

MIC
HIC

Europeanregion

LIC
MIC
HIC

Western
Pacific
region

LIC
MIC
HIC
0

20
Vulnerable road users

40

60

80

Occupants of four wheeled motorised vehicles

100
Per cent
Others

LIC = low-income countries; MIC = middle-income countries; HIC = high-income countries

Figure 4: Reported deaths by type of road user, region and income group
Source: WHO (2009a)

Box 3: Benefits of cleaner fuelsin sub-Saharan Africa
A recent modelling study by Inner City FundInternational for the World Bank and theAfrican Refiners Association looked at the costs
and benefits of investing in refineries in subSaharan Africa (SSA) to improve the quality of
their produced fuels. It found that by reducing
the sulphur content of fuels used for transport,a significant amount of health costs could besaved (US$ 640 million per year in West SSA, US$
340 million per year in East SSA). These benefits
were amplified by many-fold when coupledwith policies to improve emission controls,particularly for motorcycles.
Source: ICF International (2009)386

countries and 2 per cent of GDP in high-income
countries, as shown in the table below (Jacobs et al.
2000). For example, reducing accidents requires asystematic approach incorporating elements of better
infrastructure, vehicle inspection and education tocontrol speed and alcohol consumption.
Congestion
Congestion is caused when the volume of traffic
reaches the capacity of infrastructure. It is particularlycommon in urban areas, where it can severely limit thepositive effects of agglomeration (see Cities Chapter).
Travel times for public transport users, as well as
pedestrians and cyclists, frequently increase if dedicatedinfrastructure is not provided. Congestion also increases
fuel consumption and the level of pollution, as fuel is stillconsumed whilst cars are stationary.
According to Texas Transport Institute, congestion costs
are increasing. Congestion costs in 439 urban areasof the United States were estimated at US$ 24 billion

Transport
Strategy

Developed Countries

Developing Countries

Avoid

Reduce vehicle kilometres (VKM) through Transport Demand
Management (TDM), land use planning, localised production, andshorter supply chains.

Avoid unnecessary generation of VKM through land use and transport planning.

Shift

Shift from private vehicles to Non-Motorised Transport (NMT) andPublic Transport (PT) and from aviation to rail/PT. Transfer freightfrom road to rail and water transport.

Enable conditions for the lowest-emitting modes (both freight andpassenger).
Prevent shift from NMT and PT to private vehicles by ensuring that
attractive alternatives to private vehicles exist.

Improve

Improve existing vehicles. Down-scale vehicle engine size. Increase
penetration of electric vehicles and carbon-neutral liquid fuels.
Electrify rail (for both freight and passengers).

Ensure future vehicles/fuels are cleaner, encouraging small efficientcars. Design innovations for traditional NMT such as cycle rickshaws.

Table 2: Avoid, Shift and Improve strategy
Source: Dalkmann (2009)

in 1982, US$ 85 billion in 2000, and US$ 115 billion in2009. Furthermore, congestion in the US cost 3.9 billion
gallons of wasted fuel and 4.8 billion hours of extra time.
According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (2009), congestion in Toronto, Canada
costs the city around US$ 3.3 billion Canadian dollars a
year in productivity (1.2 per cent of Toronto’s GDP), whilein the UK the estimated cost of time lost in traffic is £20 billion a year, or 1.2 per cent of GDP (The TelegraphBusiness Club et al. 2009). In developing countries, a lackof traffic data often makes it difficult to estimate the lossof productivity. Data are available for Lima, Peru: people
living within the city are estimated to lose an averageof four hours in daily travel, which leads to a loss ofapproximately US$ 6.2 billion, or around 10 per cent of
GDP every year (UNESCAP et al. 2010). The traditional
approach to tackling congestion – providing more roadcapacity – has often been counter-effective, as the extra
capacity induces further demand for traffic activity(SACTRA 1997).

2.2 Opportunities

Accessibility and severance
Traffic-filled roads can become physical and psychologicalbarriers that can sever communities and divide entire
cities (see Cities Chapter). There are various ways inwhich accessibility and severance can be quantified
and monetised. Although values are highly contextdependent and differ greatly by region, Sælensminde(2002) in VTPI (2007) notes an extra cost of US$ 0.54-0.62
per mile of vehicle activity shifted from non-motorised
transport to the car. Transport systems dominated by
motor vehicles have been shown to hinder access tojobs, markets and essential facilities, particularly for thepoorest and most vulnerable members of society.

This can be achieved by integrating land use and transport
planning; designing denser, more compact settlements;
harnessing telecommunication technologies suchas teleconferencing and localising production andconsumption10. Demand for freight transport can be
reduced by localising production and consumption andby optimising logistics to reduce empty runs and ensure
a high load factor.

Land use and loss of biodiversity
Roads, railways, airports, harbours and other transport
infrastructure can have a severe impact on the naturalenvironment, from the removal of vegetation during
construction or the subsequent fragmentation of
habitats (CEU 2002; Kaczynska 2009). Fragmentation,
without proper ecological infrastructure planning canseverely disturb wildlife and reduce biodiversity.

Leapfrogging towards green transport
Responding to these challenges will require a paradigm
shift in the way the transport sector develops in the
coming decades. Action is required in all countries, butopportunities are greatest for developing countries,
where future patterns of transport can be shaped by
the investment and planning decisions made today.
Investing in green transport will enable such countries
to leapfrog towards a sustainable path, rather than
reproducing the mistakes made by industrialised
countries (Dalkmann 2009).
Avoid, Shift and Improve strategy
Making a decisive shift to green transport arguably
requires a holistic strategy that combines the following
three elements:9
1. Avoiding or reducing the number of journeys taken.

2. Shifting to more environmentally efficient forms oftransport.

9. For further information, see Dalkmann and Brannigan in GTZ (2007), andthe Common Policy Framework on Transport and Climate Change, which
represents an increasing level of consensus amongst transport experts
and policy makers on this approach. Available at: http://www.sutp.org/
slocat/bellagio-process/common-policy-framework-cpf-on-transportand-climate-change-in-developing-countries/ The combination of theabove three strategies will ensure transformation of both behaviour andtechnology.
10. Such technologies may not necessarily reduce the demand for travel
activity by itself, and need to be combined with measures to reduce
incentives to travel by private modes, such as road user charging, parking
charges, vehicle tax and fuel tax.

387

Towards a green economy

This involves promoting public transport as well as
walking and cycling, which usually requires substantial
investment in infrastructure. For public transport torival the private car it needs to be frequent, reliable,
affordable and comfortable. Railways and waterways are
generally greener methods of transporting freight, andshifting to them frees up road space.

transport and therefore present opportunities forcreating more sustainable transport systems than thosein developed nations (see Table 2).

3. Improving vehicle and fuel technology to reduce
adverse environmental effects such as pollution andresource depletion.

■■ Infrastructure such as tracks for buses and rail,
pavements and cycle routes and park-and-ride facilities;12

Enhancing the fuel economy of conventional engines;
reducing the weight of vehicles and developing
alternatives such as electric and hybrid vehicles,
biofuels, and hydrogen fuel technologies are all
examples of this strategy.11 Further efficiency gains
can be achieved through an improvement in theoccupancy rate of vehicles, or through better driving(eco-driving).

388

Enacting the Avoid, Shift and Improve strategy requires
adequate investment in the research, development,
production and operation/management of:■■ Greener vehicles and transport modes (including
bicycles, public transport vehicles and low emission
vehicles, utilising technologies listed in section 5.3);■■ Cleaner fuels;■■ Telecommunication technology
tosubstituteconventional transport, e.g. telework/ teleconferencing;andGiven that transport systems vary greatly around theworld, it is important that the above three strategies areapplied in ways which fully consider the context andmain problems facing each region. Many developing
countries are heavily reliant upon non-motorised■■ Technologies to enact green transport, e.g. GPS systems,
Intelligent Transport Systems, green logistics, etc.

11. It is important that the generation of electricity, production of hydrogenand biofuels are all conducted in a sustainable manner.

12. It is vital that such infrastructure promote connectivity between
modes, so that journeys are made seamless.

The above would need to be supported by appropriate
enabling conditions, which are explored in Section 5.

Transport

3 Transport in a green economy
This section examines how a green transport sector canlead to green economic growth, create jobs and reducepoverty.

design and planning and impacts would be decoupledfrom growth through providing high quality, low carbon
transport, especially through public transport, NMT
infrastructure and cleaner, more efficient vehicles. For
individuals, the lower levels of congestion and reduced
travel time would leave more time for productive
activities, especially if there is access to more frequent,reliable and affordable public transport services. By
reducing fuel use and transport time, companies can be
more competitive and profitable. McKinnon (2008) and
UNEP (2008c) show that measures designed to improvethe efficiency of freight transport reduce operationalcosts in addition to delivering carbon savings.

3.1 Supporting green growth
Investment in transport is often justified on the grounds
that the movement of goods, services and workers isthe vital fuel of the economic engine. Freight transportvolumes have traditionally been thought to strongly
correlate with economic growth on the supply side andpassenger car use to be driven by economic growthon the demand side. There is evidence, however, tosuggest that high levels of GDP can be accompanied bytransportation systems that rely less on the private car,as may be seen in Figure 5.

Of the various channels through which investment canflow into green transport, investment in infrastructureoffers the greatest potential for economic growth byencouraging government investment and stimulating
new business opportunities. Investment in green
transport technology is also likely to benefit the overall
economy, particularly through its potential to stimulate
government investment (see Table 3).

Modal share of motorised private mode (per cent)This figure shows that cities and regions can significantly
decouple car use – and the associated environmentalpressures – from economic growth. In a green economy,
mobility needs would be reduced through better city

100

RiyadhPhoenix
San Diego
Calgary
Perth

HoustonLos Angles

Brisbane

Ottawa Toronto
Wellington
SydneyMontreal
Tel Aviv
Melbourne

80

Kuala Lumpur

MexicoCity
Abidjan40

Vancouver

ChicagoDenverWashington
San Francisco

North American pattern

New York

Athens
Lille

Manchester
TaipeiGlasgow60
Ho Chi Minh City
Tehran Cape Town

Atlanta

Seoul
Curitiba
Salvador

Turin

Newcastle
Barcelona

Cairo

Johannesburg
Fio de Janeiro
Sao Paulo Moscow
Buemos Aires
BogotaCasablanca
Budapest
Jakarta Warsaw Prague
HarareBeijing
Manilla Cracow
20
Tunis
Dakar Guangzhou
Chennai
MumbaiRome Bologne

NantesHamburg

Oslo Lyon
GenevaStockholm
Copenhagen
Milan
Marseille
Ruhr
Singapore
European pattern
LondonStuttgart
Graz Sapporo
ZurichBerlinViennaBrussels
Paris Düsseldorf
Frankfurt
Osaka
Berne
MunichTokyo

Amsterdam

MadridMost efficient pattern

Hong Kong

Shanghai00

10,00020,00030,00040,00

50,00060,000GDP per capita (US$)

Figure 5: Moving towards a green trajectory
Source: UITP database (2005)

389

Towards a green economy

3.2 Creating jobs
Transport is fundamental to the functioning of
economies and it is also a key sector in its own right interms of generating employment, from manufacturing
vehicles to refining fuels, managing transport services
and developing and maintaining infrastructure.13
Under a green economy, transport-sector jobs would
increasingly be those that are generated throughinvestment in green transport infrastructure andvehicles, alternative fuels and telecommunication andother technologies (see section 2.2).
Empirical studies are scarce, but several studies suggest
a strong link between green jobs and the transport
sector. Based on US figures, the Economic Development
Research Group (2009) and the Surface Transportation
Policy Project (2004) suggest that US$ 1 billion spent on
public transport generates around 36,000 jobs (averaging
between operations and capital projects14), which is 9
per cent and 19 per cent higher than the job-creation
potential of road maintenance or new road projects
13. Furthermore, by providing the physical link between jobs and workers,transport contributes to employment.
14. The methodology employed by the Economic Development ResearchGroup includes direct effects (public transportation manufacturing /construction and operations jobs), indirect effects (jobs at suppliers of partsand services) and induced jobs (jobs supported by workers re-spending
their wages). See http://www.apta.com/gap/policyresearch/Documents/
jobs_impact.pdf

Box 4: Re-examining theemployment generating
effects of aviation
It is often claimed that aviation is vital for the
economy, because it generates jobs both directly
and indirectly; the latter through the facilitationof tourism and business (OEF 2006). This is often
given as a key reason to exempt aviation fromfuel taxes and other levies, which not only distorts
competition between modes, but leaves aviation
externalities unchecked. Sewill et al. (2005) argue
that the economic case for investing in aviation isoften overstated, if not weak, owing to the large
amounts of externalities the sector produces. He
suggests that alternative forms of employment
can be generated through taxing high-polluting
industries such as aviation, and using the revenue
to promote other sectors. As an example, the EU in
its Emissions Trading Scheme should consider theuse of revenue from aviation credits (EC 2011) forclimate mitigation actions in developing countries,
which could also create new forms of green jobs.

390

respectively, with the same amount of resources spent.
Chmelynski (2008) suggests that in the US, each US$
million block of consumer spending that is shifted fromvehicle fuels to public transport generates 18.5 jobs.15
Furthermore, a study by Weisbrod and Reno (2009) of 13
public transport investments in Europe suggests that aunit of investment in public transport would yield between
2 and 2.5 times this value to the regional economy.
UNEP (2008a) estimates that roughly 250,000 jobs inthe car industry are targeted at relatively green cars andtheir components.16

3.3 Supporting equity and poverty
reduction
Current transport systems, built primarily for private
motor vehicles are, by nature, inequitable and impede
efforts to reduce poverty by continuing the mobility
15. Local employment potential depends heavily on the local context, forexample, how much of the good/service is provided domestically (versus
imported). The figures are meant to be indicative.
16. Such figures depend heavily on the definition of green jobs, as well as
the assumptions regarding the penetration rate of green vehicles. Further
work is required to estimate a more accurate set of figures.

Value added
2006 dollars

Employment
FTEs

Auto fuel1,139,110

12.8

516,438

Other vehicle expenses

1,088,845

13.7

600,082

Including auto expenses 1,278,440

17.0

625,533

Redistributed auto
expenses

1,292,362

17.3

627,465

1,815,823

31.3

1,591,993

Expense category

Compensation
2006 dollars

Household bundles

Public transit

Table 3: Economic impacts per US$ 1 million
expenditures
Source: Chmelynski (2008)

Box 5: Green transport as abusiness
There are many revenue-generating oppor­
tunities for the private sector to support
or complement sustainable transportation
systems and operations. These may take theform of public-private partnerships, concession
contracts between a public agency and private
entity, or a for-profit business providing a service
or product directly to users. Table 4 lists suchbusinesses in the context of the Avoid, Shift andImprove strategy for sustainable transport.

Transport
Avoid, Shift,
Improve

Sustainable business

Emissions reduction potential

ExamplesAvoid

Telecommunication technology and services

Medium – Provides alternatives to physicaltravelTeleconferencing and teleworking by major companies in Europe, US,etc.

Parking providers

High – by providing formal parking spaceand replacing informal parking

Private parking operators in Tokyo

Shared vehicle systems

High –by encouraging less private car usage

Car-sharing integrated with rail and public transport in Switzerland;
Bicycle sharing such as: JCDecaux/Cyclocity, Paris, Clear Channel/
SmartBike, Barcelona

Public transport operations (including fare collection, depot/fleet management, station management,
security)High – by increasing the quality of service
and making transit systems more attractive

Bus Rapid Transit systems in Bogotá, Pereira, Curitiba, Ahmedabad,
Guayaquil, Mexico, Leon, Guadalajara, Guatemala;Bus systems in Santiago, Sao Paulo (and most Brazilian cities);
Metro rail systems in Singapore, etc.

Taxis and paratransit
operations

Medium – by providing door-to-door
alternative to private cars (depends on fueltype and operational efficiency)

Auto-rickshaws in India, Pakistan

Non-motorised transport(NMT) services

High – particularly when coupled with land
use patterns that support shorter journeys
achievable by NMT.

Bicycle rickshaws in India, New York City, San Francisco;
Bicycle stations in Germany;
Bicycle rentals in Amsterdam;
Walking tours in Boston

Avoid and Shift

Shift

Medium – optimising transportation
Intelligent Transportation
system performance to minimising vehicle
Technology providers in Santiago, Guayaquil
Systemsdelays and making public transport attractive

Improve

Commercial enterprises inpublic spaces, advertisingand street furniture

Medium – improves the user experience oftransit/non-motorised transport oriented
citiesBarcelona, Buenos Aires, Guayaquil

Low carbon vehicles

High – by allowing better energy efficiency

Small, lightweight vehicles, ultra low emission engines, hybrid vehicles, plug-in hybrids linked with sustainable generation of electricity

Alternative fuelsHigh – by allowing lower CO2 per unit ofenergyBiofuels, conforming to stringent and comprehensive sustainability
criteria

Vehicle MaintenanceMedium – proper vehicle maintenance canreduce emissions and GHG

Annual vehicle checks in e.g. Indonesia

Table 4: Green transport businesses in the Avoid, Shift and Improve groups

Box 6: The role of transport in reducing rural poverty
There is a large body of empirical evidence thatshows a positive correlation between transport
investment and economic outputs Liu (2005).
Binswanger et al. (1993) and AITD (2003) foundthat rural road investment directly contributes
to the growth of agricultural output, increased
use of fertilisers, commercial bank expansion
and overall improvements in the socio-economic
conditions of rural villages in India. Khandker et al.
(2009) their research for the World Bank, Khander
et al. (2009) found that rural road investments in
Bangladesh reduced poverty significantly throughhigher agricultural production, higher wages,
lower input and transportation costs and higher
output prices. Rural roads were also found to leadto higher rates of school attendance for both girls
and boys and to be pro-poor. However, together

with rural road infrastructure, investments alsoneed to be made in facilities for public transport,
NMT and a multi-modal transport infrastructure.
For those without access to private motor vehicles,
this would lead to their increased mobility. Thisis especially the case when connecting urban
centres with rural areas. Van de Walle (2002), in
her work for the World Bank, argues that failingto consider the equity objective alongside theefficiency one can bias investment against poorer
areas and poor people. This is particularly true
in Asian transition economies where roads are
one of many constraints on development. Theireconomic, social and environmental benefits will
be dependent on other factors such as whether or
not affordable transport services follow the roadinvestment.

391

Per centTowards a green economy

divide. In many developing countries there is a vast gap
between income groups in terms of access to paved
roads, as well as affordable and safe transport.

100

80

60

40

20

0

Lower

MiddleUpper
IncomeCar

MotorbikeBus

Rickshaw

BicycleWalking

Figure 6: Modal split by income group in Surabaya
Source: GTZ (2002)

392

Investment in green solutions such as public transport
networks that are accessible, reliable and affordable
can help alleviate poverty in a number of ways;
providing people with the means to reach employment
opportunities, education and healthcare. New jobs canbe created in previously isolated areas, for example,
by involving local workers and co-operatives in roadmaintenance.17 Stimulating the local economy canalso bring down costs and foreign exchange, while
lower travel costs and reduced journey times can makeessential goods and services cheaper. Safe and cleantransport networks help protect the most vulnerable
members of society from some of the adverse
impacts of transport such as road traffic accidents
and air pollution.

17. Such methods could be equally targeted at the construction andmaintenance of infrastructure for public and non-motorised transport.

Transport

4 Quantifying the economic
implications of green transport
To quantitatively assess the macroeconomic implicationsof investing in green transport at the global level,
the study applied a modelling approach utilising theMillennium Institute’s T21 model.18 Within the multisector green investment scenario in which 2 per cent of
the global GDP is allocated for investment in greeninga large number of sectors, transport was assumed toreceive 17 per cent of the total.
This section describes the differences between investing
the assumed additional amount in green transport andin the business-as-usual-scenario (BAU), including theirmacro-level implications up to the year 2050. Due tothe scarcity of studies that employ the same modelling
technique, the outcomes are to be interpreted as indicativeof the direction of change that can be expected with green
investment, and should be validated through further work.
The figures should be assessed together with projections
made by other models such as the IEA’s Mobility Model, towhich comparisons are made in this section.

4.1 Transport trends underbusiness as usual
Under BAU without additional investment, the total
number of road vehicles19 increases rapidly. The stockof light-duty vehicles (LDVs) in particular would growfrom the current 0.8 billion to 2.2 billion by 2050.20 Inline with the future growth in total vehicle stock, travel
volume would increase for both passenger and freighttransport. In the year 2050, passenger transport would
reach 103 trillion passengers per kilometre (pkm),
whereas freight transport would be approximately
38 trillion tonnes per kilometre (tkm). Compared withbaseline figures from IEA, these figures are higher,

especially for freight where IEA predicts only 13 trillion
tkm in the same year.
In BAU, for passenger transport LDVs would continue todominate all transport modes with an increasing share (47per cent in 2010 rising to 62 per cent in 2050) of the passenger
travel load over the period, while the share of buses would
decline from 25 per cent to 15 per cent.21 A steady shareof the passenger travel load (6-7 per cent) is expected to
be by rail, and around 10 per cent by aviation. For freighttransport, the volume carried by rail would decline from 55
per cent in 2010 to 52 per cent in 2050, contrasted with anincrease in road-based transport (trucks).22
With regards to energy use and carbon emissions, bothare projected to increase by nearly 50 per cent by 2030
and more than 80 per cent by 2050 in the BAU case. The
modes that will contribute most to emissions in 2050
are LDVs (56 per cent), trucks (16 per cent) and aviation(18 per cent). By 2050 the CO2 emissions of the transport
sector would have increased to one fourth of global
energy related CO2 emissions.
In the BAU case, total employment in the transport sector,
which is 67.9 million in 2009, will continue to grow by 1.3
per cent per year on average through to 2050 and reachapproximately 116 million.23

4.2 The Avoid, Shift andImprove strategy as a basis for
redirecting investments
The transport sector will see massive investments inthe coming decades, mainly through city planning,
infrastructural works, public transport systems and

18. The information contained within this section draws from modelling
work conducted by the Millennium Institute (MI). Whilst every effort has
been taken to accurately integrate the modelling results throughout theentire report, there may be certain figures which are subject to further
refinement or corrections, based on the larger modelling process andchanges in other sectors. Note also that the modelling process has
been limited by the relative lack of standardised evidence and data, forexample assumptions on employment in the transport sector, harmonised
information on transport activity by city, region and country, standardised
figures on transport externalities and the interrelationships between
modes and sectors.

21. Of all passenger transport, IEA estimated, in terms of passenger-km
per year (different from the measure in this model), 7 per cent to 6 percent by rail, from 10 per cent in 2010 to 15 per cent in 2050 by air, andthe remainder by road transport modes, in which 45-56 per cent of allpassengers are carried by LDVs. Within road passenger transport, for which
IEA reported total travel distance in km traveled by all road vehicles per year
(same measure as in the model), LDVs account for 67-78 per cent of roadpassenger travel volume in 2010-2050.

19. Includes both urban and non-urban, freight and passenger.

23. These figures exclude the large level of informal labour in the transport
sector (for example, the maintenance of vehicles, operation of micro busesin developing countries), which were not able to be estimated due to data
restrictions. Such forms of employment may also benefit from the shift ininvestments towards a green scenario.

20. Others predict that this growth could even be higher. For example, IEA
predicts the number of LDVs to reach 2.7 billion by 2050.

22. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates the percentage offreight transport load, in terms of tonne-km per year, that is carried by roadvehicles increases from 55 per cent in 2000 to 59 per cent in 2050.

393

Towards a green economy

Euro per metric tonne ofCO2-equivalent reduced

-20

Cost

60

Car fuel economy
improvements(271 Mt, -€ 44/tonne)
0

0

80

Sea transport (432 Mt, -€ 7/tonne)

Cost savings

20

Euro per metric tonne ofCO2-equivalent reduced

100

Sugarcane ethanol (215 Mt, -€ 3/tonne)40

Air transport(360 Mt, € 13/tonne)-40

Plug in gas hybrids(220 Mt, € 14/tonne)

-60
-80

Heavy-duty vehicle improvements(219 Mt, € 14/tonne)-100

Each rectangle representents an option for reducing emissions. The width measures the option’s potential
emissions reduction from business-as-usual, in millions of metric tonnes (Mt), in the year 2030.

Figure 7: Global transport carbon abatement cost curve
Source: ClimateWorks (2010)

procurement of transport vehicles. IEA (2010) predicts that
under BAU by 2050 the world will spend another US$ 150
trillion on motor vehicles24. There will be an investment ofanother US$ 100 trillion in other types of transport vehicles(trucks, ships, aircraft, etc.) and US$ 150 trillion in fuels.
However, in a green economy these investments, if properly
designed, would help limit the growth in emissions.
Redirecting investment to green transport options canprovide the same mobility needs but with significant
reduced societal and environment impacts and in somecases even for less money. The global carbon abatement
costs curve of McKinsey (2010) – presenting carbon
benefits from investment in potential actions to reduce
24. Undiscounted dollars over the next 40 years worldwide.

INVESTMENTS
Directinvestment

carbon emissions – shows that investing in green transport
can be among the most cost-efficient actions to reducecarbon emissions. For example, investing in improving thefuel efficiency of vehicles is claimed to be able to generate
net savings of € 65 per tonne carbon abated. The global
transport carbon abatement cost curve of ClimateWorks(2010), see figure 7, shows a similar amount for initial
improvements in fuel efficiency.
It is important to look not only at carbon abatement
efficiency but also other impacts on the various
challenges identified in the first chapter of this report.
When comparing interventions and their costs andbenefits it is also important to look at secondary impacts.
For example, some interventions can result in major
increases or decreases in tax revenue. Table 5 shows thatBENEFITSLong term costs/
investment

Air quality

GHG emissions

Congestion

Road safety

Bus Rapid Transit
(BRT)

++

+

++

++

++++

++++

++

Light Rail

+++

++

++

++

++++

+++

++

Rail

++++

++

+

++

+++

++

+

Cleaner & more
efficient vehicles

++

+

++++

+++

+/-

+/-

+/-

NMT infrastructure

++

+

++

+

+++

+++

+++

City planning/
design

++

++

+++

++

++++

++++

+++

Table 5: Costs and benefits of investing in green transport
Source: Estimates by UNEP and authors. The more the pluses the bigger the investment or the benefit associated with the intervention.

394

Transport
accessibility

Transport

While there are differing views on the role that biofuels
can play in reducing GHG emissions in the transport
sector, its use has been rapidly increasing over the past
years. Much of this development has been triggeredby mandates for blending biofuels into vehicle fuels,
enacted in at least 41 states/provinces and 24 countries
at the national level. Ethanol, made primarily from cornand sugar cane, and biodiesel, produced primarily
from oil seeds such as rapseed and oil palm seeds, arecurrently the key biofuels for transport. Most mandates
require blending 10-15 per cent ethanol with gasoline
or blending 2-5 per cent biodiesel with diesel fuel.
Standards comprehensively addressing environmental
and social concerns raised in the context of productionof biofuels should be applied to ensure sustainability.
To achieve a green transport sector and meet targets
set in terms of improved urban air quality, reduced
carbon emissions and reduced road accidents, a mix ofstrategies is needed combining Avoid, Shift and Improve
interventions. Models of the International Energy Agency(IEA, 2009b) and the European Environment Agency(EEA, 2010) show that a package of measures, combining
measures in the Avoid, Shift and Improve areas, areneeded to achieve major emissions reductions (see Box
7). UNEP’s work also arrives at a similar conclusion (seeBox 8).

Box 7: Net savings fromgreening the transport sector
In the context of climate-change mitigation, it isoften claimed that actions in transport are costly
due to the required new technologies. However, as
demonstrated by several studies such as Cambridge
Systematics (2009) in its “Moving Cooler” study and
McKinsey’s and ClimateWorks’cost abatement curves(see earlier), the cost of many transport interventions
and especially a comprehensive set of policies
based on the Avoid, Shift, and Improve strategy
can often result in net savings to the economy as awhole. The savings in fuel costs brought about by
a mixture of behavioral and technological changes
far outstrip the implementation costs. A World Bank
(2009) study on Mexico notes that projects targetedat improving the efficiency of bus networks, rail
freight and vehicle-inspection schemes generated
large net savings.

Index of emissions (1990 = 100)

while some transport interventions are cost effective ways
to reduce carbon emissions, others are more effective inincreasing accessibility or decreasing congestion.

160

Business-as-usual

140
120
100

1

80
60

2

40

Target

20
0
1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Each curve shows the additional effect ofadding further instruments.
1. Improve package: improved engine andvehicle design, electric cards, low-carbon fuels
and technologies encouraging behaviouralchange. These measures lead to a 44 per centreduction in transport CO2 emissions.
2. Avoid and shift package: road pricing, carclubs, increasing population density in cities
and travel planning. These measures lead to a
20 per cent reduction in transport CO2
emissions.

Figure 8: Effect of a combination of Avoid,
Shift and Improve measures to reduce CO2
emissions from the transport sector in theEU
Source: EEA (2010)

Box 8. Effects of combining
investments in measures in
the Avoid, Shift and Improveareas on reducing transport
emissions
UNEP has been working closely with IEA andothers in promoting clean and efficient vehicles.
In doing so, UNEP has found that major reductions
can be achieved through the introduction ofcleaner fuels and vehicles. However, UNEP also
found that to achieve the emissions reductions
needed investments must be made in all threeareas: Avoid, Shift and Improve. Models of the
IEA and European Environment Agency (EEA)
show that emissions reductions of 70 per centor more are possible with the right policies andinvestments – with about two-thirds comingfrom measures in the Improve area and one-thirdfrom measures in the Avoid and Shift areas.

395

Vehcle kilometers

Towards a green economy

4.3 Investing in green transport

80000

Inputs and assumptions
The green investment scenario (G2) assumes US$ 419
billion in constant US$ 2010­invested per year over the
next 40 year period into:

70000

60000

50000

■■ Expanding the public transport infrastructure(promoting modal share to bus and rail transport); and40000■■ Increasing the efficiency of road vehicles.

30000

20000

10000

0

2010

2/3 wheelers

2050 BAU

2050 BAU2

LDVs

2050 G2

buses

trucksFigure 9: Level of vehicle activity under BAU andthe green scenarios

Megatonnes of CO2

Source: Based on modelling conducted for this report

15000

9000

6000

3000

2010

2050 BAU

2050 BAU2

2/3 wheelers

carspassenger rail

freight rail

2050 G2

buses

trucksair

water

Figure 10: Modeled changes to CO2 emissions in
the transport sector under the green and BAU
scenarios
Source: Based on modelling conducted for this report396

With respect to energy efficiency improvement, around
US$ 384 billion is assumed to be invested in more
efficient vehicles on average each year between 2011
and 2050. Note that the investments assumed in themodel for measures under the Avoid, Shift and Improvestrategies are in line with the EEA and IEA green transport
investment scenarios discussed earlier.
Furthermore, to represent future changes in travel needs
under the green scenarios, a 25 per cent avoidance of
total transport volume is initially assumed, in accordancewith IEA’s outlook on total travel volume.25 This reduction
is assumed to happen at no cost as a result of changing
needs and behaviour motivated by the various enabling
conditions such as better city planning, more e-working,strict regulations, etc. Note that the above assumptions
on investment and behavioural changes directly mirror
the Avoid, Shift and Improve paradigm set out in Section
2.2. These are shown to impact on the transport modal
split, energy consumption, energy-related emissions,and employment as discussed below.

12000

0

With respect to public transport infrastructure,investments are made to reduce LDV (cars) and air travel
and increase bus and rail travel volume, promoting amodal shift to less carbon intensive forms of transport.
An annual investment of around US$ 24 billion isallocated to transport infrastructure over the 40 year
period.

The annual green investment in the transport sector
would generally encourage the shift from (or retain
the modal share of ) private transport to public or nonmotorised transport, compared to the various BAU
scenarios. The total travel volume of road vehicles will
limit its increase from 21 trillion VKM in 2009 to 39
trillion VKM in 2050, 35 per cent below BAU2 (BAU withthe same amount of additional investment as in G2). The
25. Assumed to be primarily driven by transit oriented development,
telework, shorter but more frequent trips, among others (as indicated in
IEA’s Transport, Energy and CO2 study). On the other hand, the positive
impact of the green scenarios on GDP are projected to push total travel
volume higher, partially offsetting the impacts of this initial assumption.

Transport
figure below shows the level of road transport activity(in vehicle kilometres) under various BAU scenarios aswell as the green investment scenario.
In terms of modal split, the green investment scenario
assumes a fall in the share of passenger kilometres by
car in 2050 from 62 per cent (BAU2) to 33 per cent26. For
freight, rail retains a relatively large share of 52 per centof the transport volume (tkm).
The total energy consumption of the transport sector
will be limited to 2.2 thousand million tonnes of oil
equivalent (Mtoe) in 2050 in green investment scenario.
About 874 Mtoe are satisfied by biofuels,27 limiting oilbased fuels to 1,251 Mtoe in 2050, 81 per cent lower
than BAU2. Considerable energy savings come from theswitch to public transport as the increase in emissions
by buses and electrified rail are much smaller than the
avoided emissions from LDVs.
Results
As a result of these investments, carbon emissions
are reduced radically, by 8.4 Gt of CO2, or 68 per centrelative to BAU2 in 2050. The green investment scenario
corresponds roughly to the level of emissions modelled
by IEA in their low carbon (BLUE Map) scenario, which
combines incremental improvements in fuel efficiency
of conventional engines, a 20-fold increase in biofuels
and uptake of new vehicles such as hybrids and fuelcell vehicles. In the BLUE Map scenario, IEA estimates
26. This figure heavily depends on the assumptions that are used on theeffectiveness of measures to avoid the need for travel, as well as to what
extent the demand shifts towards public and non-motorised transport.
27. Care needs to be taken to ensure that the biofuels used comply strictlywith sustainability criteria that cover the different environmental and social
concerns including food prices.

$20 trillion additional investments in vehicles (for more
efficient vehicles including electric vehicles) but abouta similar, US$ 20 trillion, savings in fuel costs due toincreased fuel efficiency28 (IEA 2009b). Therefore, a major
global carbon reduction can be achieved without any cost
(but would need investment policies that would promote
investment in cleaner and more efficient vehicles).
Total employment in the transport sector will remain
substantial, with large growth in public transportmodes such as passenger rail. Overall employment
in the transport sector in 2050 is modeled to behigher in the green scenario compared to BAU2, byroughly 10 per cent. Jobs related to cars (including
production and maintenance) will also grow, albeit
less rapidly compared with BAU2 owing to the lower
levels of car ownership under the green scenario.29 As aresult of the large reductions in carbon emissions,
together with continued strong growth in transport
employment, the carbon intensity of each transport
job is reduced by around 70 per cent compared with
BAU2, reflecting the decoupling of transport emissions
from economic growth, and the greening of jobs in this
sector.30
28. 2008 as a base year.
29. Note: Reliable job estimates on maintenance of cars could not be foundand have not been included explicitly in the modelling. Concerning public
transport, management and operation job numbers were calculated basedon EU data (excluding France and Germany which have disproportionately
high levels of employment in this subsector) to estimate employment
at the world level.
30. The approach taken in this chapter to quantify the greenness of jobs
may help inform existing and future definitions of green jobs – forexample those from the International Labour Organization (ILO). Further
refinement and coordination of approaches in this aspect would prove
beneficial in better quantifying and monitoring the transition towards agreen economy.

397

Towards a green economy

5 Enabling conditions
Enabling conditions are background conditions in theinvestment and political environment that collectively
allow the transition to a green economy. They will assist
the implementation of the green investments identified
for the transport sector, particularly if efforts are taken
to ensure a harmonised and integrated approach thatfacilitates best available policies and technologies acrossthe world. Below, we explore the key enabling conditions
for green transport, namely:■■ Economic Instruments – can provide incentives tochange behaviour regarding choice of: vehicle type, fuel,type and timing of travel mode, etc. (see 5.2 for details).

■■ Designing appropriate regulation, planning andinformation provision;

Details of how these policies can enable green transport
are provided in the sections below.

■■ Setting the right financial conditions and economic
incentives;

Planning
Planning is essential in realising sustainable
development. Good planning on all levels (urban,
regional, and national) is a prerequisite for green
transport, as land use often determines patterns oftransport for many years (see the Cities chapter).

■■ Ensuring technology transfer and access; and■■ Strengthening institutions and capacity.
Transport is a complex sector, which is shaped over along period of time, and by various external sectors andfactors (EEA 2008). Therefore, a combination of strategic
approaches and policy instruments is required to green
the transport sector. An inventory of policy instruments
for environmentally sustainable transport and extensive
discussion of their possible use in selected countries
may be found in (OECD 2002).

5.1 Designing appropriate regulation,planning and information provision
A wide range of policies could support the Avoid, Shiftand Improve strategies for green transport, namely:■■ Planning – can reduce the need or distance to travel bybringing closer together the people and the activities thatthey need to access. It can enable the implementation,and increase the attractiveness of new green transport
infrastructure, including for public transport, cycling
and walking;■■ Regulation – can be used to restrict the use of certain
motorised vehicles but can also influence the types ofvehicles used and the standards that they should adhere to(both in terms of vehicle performance and road regulations);■■ Information – can increase peoples’ awareness ofalternative means of transport, leading to a modal shift.
Information can also be provided to improve driver
behaviour and reduce fuel consumption; and398

Examples are provided in Table 6. Combining these
individual policies is imperative to increasing theireffectiveness. For example, restrictions on parking (orhigh fees) push users away from cars, whilst planning for
public transport pulls them towards green transport.

Planners have investigated and postulated growth
patterns for cities over the years. Six of the mostcommon forms of city evolution or current growth
patterns are outlined in Figure 11. The “compact city”,
which accommodates increases in population throughdensification of the city centre and the “corridor city”,
which is synonymous with transit-oriented development
are thought to be the most sustainable spatial approaches.
The mid-sized city of Freiburg, Germany is a good exampleof the former, whereas Tokyo, Japan is a good example ofthe latter. Efforts have been made in many developing
countries to build cities suited to public transport andnon-motorised transport,31 and Aguascalientes, Mexico isa good example (Embarq, no date). On the other hand,the “fringe city” based on suburban sprawl is synonymouswith a heavily private car-dependent society, a result of a
traditional, sectoral-based, planning approach.
Regulatory instruments
Owing to the inelastic nature of transport demand,
economic signals such as the price of fuel are often
insufficient on their own to trigger a large shift inbehaviour for both consumers and industry. Regulatory
instruments therefore play a large role in creating
additional incentives to enable change. Timilsina and
31. The potential for land use and urban planning to shape long-termtransport patterns is higher in developing countries, where cities arestill emerging and have not yet locked themselves into a car-dominatedsociety. To incorporate the increasing population brought by the trend
towards urbanisation, cities in developing countries can set clear
physical boundaries to define the outer perimeter of the city, promote
mixed land use, and (if needed) develop new land around public
transport corridors.

Transport

CBD

Inner

MiddleOuter

Business-as-usual(dispersed city)

Compact city

Edge city

Ultra city

Corridor city

Fringe city

Figure 11: Growth patterns for cities around the world
Source: Newman et al. (1997)

Dulal (2009) note that the main regulatory measuresused to reduce environmental externalities in transport
are those that relate to (1) fuel economy; (2) vehicle
emission levels; (3) fuel quality; (4) vehicle inspection
regimes and (5) measures to discourage vehicle use or
encourage high occupancy of vehicles. At present, many
countries, and especially developing countries, lackcomprehensive policies to regulate these five main areas.
Practical applications of these regulatory measures areprovided in the table below.
Regulation must be considered in conjunction witheconomic measures to ensure economic efficiency
and avoid government failure. Regulation must also
be feasible to enforce. Often a well-intended scheme
results in unforeseen consequences. For example, inJakarta, a policy to mandate vehicle occupancy of three
persons in one vehicle in the city centre has resulted inillegal “jockeys” receiving money from drivers to ride in
their cars to help evade penalty fees.
Information instruments
Information instruments may induce further changes
in behaviour through raising awareness of alternativemodes or methods of travel. Public-awarenesscampaigns, mobility management, labelling of new cars,and driver education are representative examples.
By monitoring, accounting for and communicating thereal financial, environmental and social implicationsof motorised transport, users may actively choose
mobility patterns more in line with the Avoid, Shift andImprove approach. It is important to communicate
the benefits of green transport in ways that directly
relate to people’s lives, such as improved health,32 lessfinancial expenditure, and reduced commuting timeand stress.
Driver education and training can focus on “ecodriving” techniques, which can typically save between
5 and 10 per cent of fuel (ecodrive.org 2010).
Highlighting the reductions in fuel costs through ecodriving is likely to appeal particularly to operators ofcommercial vehicles.

5.2 Setting the right financial
conditions and economic incentives
In order for investments in green transport to reach theirfull potential, a set of changes must be made to the current
financing framework, coupled with the creation of market
conditions that permit green transport to be economicallyfeasible. These issues as well as the relationship of green
transport with global trade will also be discussed below.
32. The World Health Organization has developed a methodology
on evaluating the costs and benefits of human-powered mobility:
Methodological guidance on the economic appraisal of health effects
related to walking and cycling. Available at: http://www.euro.who.int/__
data/assets/pdf_file/0007/87478/E90944sum.pdf.

399

Towards a green economy
Type

Avoid

Shift

Improve

Planning

High density mixed land use development.
Parking standards.

Integrated public transport planning. Land use
planning.

Planning of smart grids.
Planning of decarbonised electricity sources.

Regulatory

Traffic restrictions and travel bans (e.g. in city
centres).

Parking restrictions. Road space allocations.
Restrictions on the type of vehicles.

Vehicle standards (on e.g. emissions). Speed
limits. Regulation of production processes.

Information

Increase awareness of the real costs of travel
by various modes. Mobility management andmarketing.

Increase awareness of alternatives. Mobility
management and marketing. Co-operative
schemes.

Eco-driving
Public awareness campaigns.
Labelling of the environmental performanceof vehicles.

Economic

National subsidies for low carbon transport city
design and planning.

Public-private partnerships for public transportsystems (esp. BRT and lightrail). Removal offuel subsidies/ taxing of fuels. Allocating fixed
percentage of road infrastructure for NMT.

Fiscal incentives for cleaner and more efficient
vehicles. “Cash for clunkers” programmes (buyout of old/ polluting vehicles). Fiscal incentives
for cleaner fuels.

Table 6: Overview of instruments to support Avoid, Shift and Improve strategies
Source: Authors’ estimate

Options for financing green transport
Transport is a major attractor of public and private
investment (Sakamoto, in Leather et al. 2009),
characterised by:■■ Strong prevalence of public-sector funding fortran­sport infrastructure;■■ Strong preference by international donors andnational governments for the roads sector (particularlyinter-city highways);■■ High level of private and informal provision oftransport services; andTo enact green transport, it is clear that financing
patterns must be reformed, so that:■■ Adequate funding is provided for green transport
in all aspects (e.g. technology, capacity-building,operation, infrastructure, etc.) so that all extra costs
associated with green transport can be recovered;■■ Resources shifted from supporting non-sustainable
forms of transport towards green transport, andadditional resources are mobilised and scaled up
wherever they are lacking;Regulatory measure

Example application

Effects

Keys to successMeasures on fuel economy(regulating fuel consumption per kilometre of travel)

Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards in
the US.

■■ 50 per cent increase in fuel economy between 1975 and 1995.
(Greene 1998)■■ Modelled net increase in jobs (140,000 by 1985). (Dacy et al.
1980)■■ Fuel saving of US$ 54 billion (in 1990 dollars). (Geller et al. 1992)■■ Continuous improvement in
the stringency of standards.

Measures on vehicle emission levels(regulating level of tailpipe
emissions)

EURO standards in Europe,with gradually increasinglevel of strictness for CO, HC,
HC+NOx, Nox and PM.

■■ Reduction of transport-related PM (-30 per cent), acidifying substances (-34 per cent) and ozone precursors (-48 per cent) between
1990 and 2007. (EEA 2010)■■ Adoption of identical or similar standards (with time lags) invarious developing countries.

■■ Combination with othermeasures such as fuel economy
standards, fuel quality standards
and fuel taxation to further
improve effectiveness.

Measures on fuel quality

Phasing out of lead, sulphuretc. from fuels, biofuel blending mandates in Brazil, etc.

■■ Reduction in health problems associated with lead and sulphur
intake.
■■ Reduction in carbon intensity of fuels.

■■ Strong political will■■ Continuous pressure from civilsociety.

Measures for vehicle
inspection

Vehicle inspection andmaintenance system in e.g.
Beijing.

■■ Reduction of local emissions by 28 to 40 per cent.(Kebin andChang 1999)■■ Proper enforcement andtackling of corruption.

Measures to discouragevehicle use/encourage highoccupancy of vehicles

Car-free zones in e.g. Germany, partial traffic bans in
Mexico, speed restrictions.

■■ Increased quality of life and regeneration of economic activity incity centres.
■■ Reduction of traffic congestion and air pollution.

■■ Prior communication of thebenefits to local businesses andresidents.

Table 7: Regulatory measures in practice
Adapted from Timilsina and Dulal (2009)400■■ Limited recognition of, and funding for, green tran­sport.

Transport
Funding stream

Avoid

Shift

Improve

Transport oriented funding streams

PublicSectorFunding

Fuel tax

+++

++

+++

Vehicle taxes

++

++

++

Parking charges++++

Road pricing

+++

+++

Fare revenue*+

Public transport subsidies+

Business taxes (e.g. Versement Transport in France)+

Land related taxes and charges

+++

++

Grants, loans, tax transfers++++

Advertising
Private sector investments

+
+

++

+
+

+

+++

Environmental taxation and subsidies

+

++

++

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

P

P

P

Joint Implementation (JI)

P

P

P

International Emissions Trading (IET)

P

P

+/ P

Green funding streams

Global Environmental Facility (GEF)

P

+

+

Multilateral/ bilateral funds

PPP+ / PPP+ / PP

Green Climate Fund, Fast Start Financing

PP

PP

PP

+++: High contribution; ++: Medium contribution ; +: Low contribution;
P: Low future potential, PP: Medium future potential, PPP: Large future potential* Fare revenue in many cases also accrues to the private sector, if the transport operator is private.
* * Funding NAMAs could potentially be linked to the Avoid, Shift and Improve paradigm.

Table 8: Options for financing green transport
Modified from: Sakamoto (2009)■■ Public funding at all levels (international – including
Official Development Assistance and climate-related
funds – national and local) is mobilised to support
green transport;33■■ Private finance is leveraged, through the appropriate
design of markets and the creation of consistent, longterm incentives to invest in green transport and throughthe application of public-private sector models to invest
in and operate green transport systems (such as Bus
Rapid Transit (BRT) systems); and■■ Financing flows from different sources are designed
to complement each other, rather than work towards
different goals.
A range of financing streams could contribute toproviding support for green transport. These include
not only funds and mechanisms devised specifically to
33. Decision-making tools (e.g. project appraisal) should be reformed
to ensure consistency with supporting green transport. Independent
environmental analyses for transportation projects may be used to screen
potential projects before they occur. They should also fully incorporate thepotential synergies and trade-offs between projects for different modes/
sectors. Promoting transversal programmes without a sectoral focus may also
be a way of integrating land use, transport and social services spontaneously.

support green options, but also existing sources. Table 8
outlines these options and assesses their relative support
with regards to the Avoid, Shift and Improve strategies.
Typically, public-sector funding provides a major part ofthe overall financing volume for transport infrastructure
investments, at an average of 52.9 per cent in developing
countries (UNCTAD 2008). Here, efforts are required toscreen transport investments according to sustainability
criteria, so that resources will flow towards green
transport (Sakamoto 2009). The creation of a national
green transport fund34 (mirroring existing road funds
found, for example, in Japan, fed by fuel and vehicle taxes)
may be another option to guarantee adequate resources
for green transport and help recoup any additional costs
associated with green modes.
As transport investments are costly, increasingly publicprivate partnerships have become common. Suchpartnerships are also increasingly common in developing
countries, for example in the operation of BRT systems.

34. Alternatively, such a fund could be set up under a wider “national
green investment fund” which mobilises resources in all green sectors
including transport.

401

Towards a green economy
Private-sector funding can be mobilised through, forexample, Build-Operate-Transfer schemes, which havesuccessfully channelled private resources into large
infrastructure projects in many developing countries.35
Furthermore, there are a number of climate-oriented
financing instruments with increased levels of funding
available for green transport. For example, the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) has released US$ 2.675 billion fortransport projects over the last 20 years (GEF, 2009).36 The
Climate Investment Fund (CIF) and its Clean Technology
Fund (CTF) have started to address transport as a key sector.
The financing framework (or the combination of theabove options) for green transport would need toconsider the following issues (Sakamoto et al. (2009):■■ Its ability to generate the level of funding required toshift the emphasis towards sustainable transport;■■ The ongoing stability of funding – enabling thesustainable transport strategy to be continuously
implemented and long-term goals to be pursued;Box 10: The future role ofclimate finance in enacting
green transport
In the context of the ongoing negotiations
on climate change, the design of financial
instruments need to take into account the
failure of existing instruments such as the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 37 to
be fully applied to the transport sector. Undera Post-2012 framework, mitigation actions
in transport in developing countries arelikely to fall under the umbrella of Nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs),
which could be financed through:■■ A transport window under a Mitigation
Fund such as the future Green Climate Fund;■■ Efficiency – ensuring that resources are allocatedto their best use, and reducing transaction costs
throughout the system;■■ An up-scaled, programmatic CDM;

35. For practical guidance on utilising private finance for transport, see forexample World Bank/ICA/PPIAF (2009).

■■ A transport-specific instrument (seeBridging the Gap, 2010 for a proposal for a
sectoral approach in transport); and36. US$ 201.5 million of direct finance matched by US$ 2.47 billion in cofinancing as of May 2009.

Box 9: Share the Road
UNEP’s Share the Road campaign promotes
non-motorised transport (NMT) by advocating
increased investment by donors and govern­ments in NMT infrastructure within roadprojects (e.g. at least 10 per cent of the overallbudget). The emphasis is on a paradigm shift
towards roads that benefit all users and thus
re-thinking how space and resources are shared
between pedestrians, cyclists, users of public
transport and motorists. Increased investment
in NMT infrastructure can substantially benefit
the environment (air quality, GHG emissions),
development (accessibility, affordability), andsafety (protected facilities for vulnerable users),
and it is a prerequisite for building resourceefficient, liveable cities. Share the Road is working
with partners with a view to making safe, lowcarbon and accessible mobility a reality for allusers (UNEP and FIA Foundation, forthcoming at
www.unep.org/transport/sharetheroad).

402■■ Equity – both horizontally (i.e. fair treatment of alltransport users) and vertically (i.e. across income groups,
ensuring support to those who are most deprived);■■ Other potential funds specific to capacitybuilding or technology.
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
supported by developed countries are likely to
be backed by fund-type instruments, whereas
actions taken to acquire credits would beenacted through a crediting scheme such as an
up-scaled CDM.38
37. Of the 2,400 registered CDM projects (as of October 2010)
only three are transport projects, and only 32 out of the 5,529
CDM projects in the pipeline relate to the transport sector.
Transport therefore only constitutes less than 0.l per cent of
expected CERs. Source: UNEP-Risoe Centre.
38. The framework surrounding NAMAs is continuing to evolve,
with the Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreeing
at its 16th session in Cancun Mexico that developed countries
shall provide support for preparation and implementationof developing country NAMAs, and that a registry will be
set up to match finance, technology and capacity building
support to NAMAs seeking international support. Nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Actions are principally driven by
the developing countries. As noted in Binsted et al. (2010),
many developing countries (26 of the 43 countries that
submitted NAMAs to the UNFCCC by September 2010)
have proposed NAMAs in the transport sector. Available at::http://w w w.transpor t2012.org/br idging/ressources/
files/1/913,828,NAMA_submissions_Summary_030810.pdf

Transport■■ Practicality – both in terms of political acceptability
and technical feasibility, taking into account local
conditions and priorities; and■■ Measurability and transparency – to ensure that theeffects of the new funding arrangements on carbon
emissions can be monitored and evaluated against
various criteria including cost effectiveness.
Pricing practices and their reform (energy costs,
taxation, subsidies)
The market for transport is currently distorted in many
ways. Firstly, the various impacts of motorised transport(see Section 2) are in most cases not accounted for intransport costs. Secondly, roads, fuels and sometimes
vehicles are subsidised in many countries. Thesesubsidies can be significant, in the European Union they
are estimated to amount to 4 per cent of GDP (however,total taxes related to transport are about the same size).
This results in unsustainable transport patterns and isa major barrier to the introduction of green transportmodels. On the other hand, studies show that there isan economic case for subsidising mass transit systems.
For example, a study by Parry and Small (2007) shows
subsidies for public transport are warranted as they
support a reduction of urban traffic congestion andvarious scale economies that can be exploited (e.g. lesstime wasted waiting at stops when trains and buses run
more frequently).
To escape this deadlock, economic instruments suchas charges and taxes need to be applied, which can be
designed to reflect at least some of the external costs onto
the users. As regards transport taxes, Hayashi and KatoBox 11: Fuel subsidies –transitional arrangements
The implementation of policies and shifts infinancing priorities will inevitably lead to somegroups in society to be worse off, at least in the
short term. The elimination of fuel subsidies may
impact disproportionately on poorer households,
with little access to alternative sources of energy.
UNEP (2008b) argues that targeted subsidies
towards the lower income groups may offset suchimpacts. Lessons can be learnt from the recent
reduction of fuel subsidies in Indonesia, which
has been coupled with cash compensations andincreases in other types of social benefits forvulnerable groups, such as staple food prices andeducation (Bank of Indonesia 2008).

(2000) point out that such instruments can be applied atthree different levels, namely car purchase, car ownershipand car use (e.g. fuel/mileage tax, road user charging andparking charges). The distinction between car ownershipand use is important. Many developed countries, especiallyin Europe, combine high levels of car ownership with limited
vehicle use. For example, the city of Vienna has one of thehighest car ownership rates among European cities, while
the use of public transport is also among the highest. Taxing
car use rather than ownership, together with providing highquality public and non-motorised transport alternatives,
seem to be able to limit car use in many European cities.
Changes in pricing are essential in promoting green
transport. Revenues from a full-cost-priced transportsystem39 can be used to invest in green transport. Suchchanges do not necessarily have to result in increased tax
burden; reforming existing tax structures can effectively
reduce congestion and reduce emissions. London’s
Congestion Charge scheme, for example, directs partof its revenue towards improving the quality of thecity’s bus services (see Box 12). Pricing private modes oftransport correctly will also ensure a level playing field
for public transport.
The relationship between levels of trade andenvironmental sustainability is complex and their impacts
should be assessed from a holistic perspective. In somecases, importing goods from other countries may actually
39. Especially in developing countries where coverage of all transport costs
is difficult due to existing structures, one may begin by initially pricing for thevariable (operational and maintenance costs), and/or subsidising certain
elements of transport from other transport revenues in the form of crosssubsidies, for example, using fuel tax revenue to cover rail transport infrastructure.

Box 12: Congestion charging
Congestion charging, a fee charged to motorist
to enter a zone prone to heavy congestion, may
be an important element of more comprehensive
energy price rationalisation in the longer term,
particularly in developed countries. Congestion
charging in London is thought to have reduced
the vehicle volumes by around 15 per cent in
2003-2004 (Green Fiscal Commission 2009).
The Eddington Review (2006), for example,emphasised the importance of controllingspiralling future congestion costs in the UK.
This may facilitate a restructuring – and in somecases perhaps lowering – of fuel excises to focus
them on the objectives they are best served toaddress, such as climate change mitigation.

403

Towards a green economy
Level of importance/significance*
Green Transport Goals

Technologies

2010

2020

2030

■■ Improved internal combustion engines (ICEs)

+++

++

+

■■ Vehicle technology improvements (e.g. material substitution, aerodynamics)

++

+++

+++

■■ Retrofitting technologies

+++

+++

+

■■ Hybrid and Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles

+++

+++

++

■■ Battery electric vehicles

++

+ ++

++

■■ Solar electric vehicles

+

+

+

■■ Fuel cell vehicles

+

+

+++

++

+++

+++

+

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

+++

++

+++

+++

■■ Use of Information technologies for traffic management (smart infrastructure)

++

+++

+++

■■ e/tele-technologies for travel demand reduction

++

+++

+++

■■ Integrated ticketing

+++

+++

+++

■■ Eco-driving and speed control

++

+++

+++

■■ Waste minimisation■■ Material substitution, use of composite materials

++

+++

+++

■■ Reduction in land pollution■■ Recycling technologies

++

+++

+++

■■ Electric vehicles, hybrids

++

+++

+++

■■ Silencers, etc.

+

++

++

■■ Vehicle safety technologies such as tyre-pressure monitoring, Adaptive cruise
control/collision mitigation, Emergency brake assist/collision mitigation, etc.

++

+++

+++

■■ Improvement in energy
efficiency■■ Reduction in air pollution
and greenhouse gases■■ Increased use of renewable
resources■■ Flex-fuel vehicles■■ Alternative fuel technologies – Biofuels, CNG, LNG, LPG and hydrogen1■■ Non-motorised transport vehicles■■ Reduced use of non-renewa■■ Public transport systems
ble resources■■ Intelligent transport systems■■ Reduced noise pollution■■ Safety+++ : Central, ++: Highly Relevant, + : Relevant
1 Compressed natural gas (CNG); Liquefied natural gas (LNG); Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)

Table 9: Various technologies to support green transport goals
Authors’ assessment based on IEA (2009); Petersen et al. (2009)

be less carbon intensive – for example if organicallygrown imports replace food crops grown in greenhouses.
In other cases, there could be a renewed case for local
production and consumption of seasonal products.
A related issue is the trading of transport vehicles
themselves. On the one hand, the global market may
allow the rapid diffusion of the most recent technology,
including green vehicles. On the other hand, Davis andKahn (2009) point out that free-trade agreements (suchas NAFTA) have enabled used cars (often not meeting
environmental standards) to flow from rich countries
to developing countries and adversely affect theenvironment. In this context, it is vital that environmental
standards are harmonised to mitigate the creation ofpollution havens.40
40. UNEP is currently working, with partners in the Partnership for Clean
Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV) to regulate the export of used vehicles todeveloping countries and transitional countries. For additional information,see: www.unep.org/PCFV. see: www.unep.org/PCFV.

404

5.3 Ensuring technology
transfer and access
A wide range of technologies are relevant togreen transport, as shown in Table 9. Conventional
technologies involve the use of fossil fuels for vehicle
propulsion, which are the main cause of air pollution and
GHG emissions. Advanced transportation technologies
aim at energy efficiency, switching from fossil fuels to
renewable and clean technologies, improvements inpublic transport and non-motorised transport systems
and infrastructure and travel demand management inorder to reduce the negative externalities caused byconventional technologies.
In order to meet the sustainable transport development
challenge for future, it is important to continue todevelop new technologies. According to the International
Chamber of Commerce (2007), technology developmentsin the transport sector should focus on:Transport
1. Promoting use of existing efficient technologies;
2. Retiring existing inefficient technologies; and3. Supporting R&D for advanced technology
developments.
At the same time, there is a need for commercialisation
and widespread dissemination of existing efficienttechnologies. For example, applying already existing
efficiency measures at a global scale (weight saving
measures, stop-and-start technology, low resistancemeasures and hybridisation of vehicles, etc.) can alreadydouble the fuel economy of the global vehicle fleet. Thisis without introduction of state-of-the-art technologies
such as electric and hydrogen vehicles (see Box 13).
Technology transfer/access needs
Technologies developed for developed nations often
cannot simply be transferred to developing countries.
According to UNEP (2009), effective technology transfer
in the transport sector requires:■■ Accelerated deployment and diffusion of technologies;

Box 13: The global fueleconomy initiative
Improving the efficiency of conventional
engines is shown (at least in the short term)as one of the most cost-effective means to
reduce environmental impacts (McKinsey andCompany 2009). In this context, UNEP works
with the IEA, the International Transport Forum(ITF) and the FIA Foundation in the Global Fuel
Economy Initiative (GFEI)41 to promote vehicle
efficiency worldwide. The GFEI is promoting
at least a doubling of global vehicle fuelefficiency by 2050, and through this will makea major contribution to a future climate regime
and meeting of climate targets. By providing
the space for discussion and consensus on
automotive fuel economy, the GFEI serves as abridge between the car industry, governments,
international organisations and NGO groups
worldwide, in addition to providing support forthe development of national clean and efficient
vehicle policies.

■■ Learning from the technology progress withincountries already practicing technology transfer; and■■ Supporting mechanisms through appropriate financial
mechanisms, knowledge networks and capacity building.
Technological, financial, institutional, information andsocial barriers can prevent the effective transfer oftechnology. The United Nations Environment Programme(2009) highlights economic and market barriers as someof the main obstacles of technology transfer. Furthermore,
technology and knowledge transfer in transport shouldtake place between developing countries, for example, toshare experiences in applying low cost transport solutions
such as BRT systems.
To facilitate an increased level of technology transfer,a detailed inventory of relevant technologies should
be developed at national and regional levels. Thismay be linked to a Technology Needs Assessment,
currently undertaken by many developing countries,
which could also identify key actions for support fromthe international community.

5.4 Strengthening Institutions
and Capacity
Realising the changes to investments and enforcing/executing the aforementioned policies, regulations andstandards for green transport calls for strong institutionalarrangements at both national and sub-national levels:■■ National level institutions, such as Ministries ofTransport (in strong coordination with Ministries ofFinance, Environment, Energy, Urban Development
and Health) can help direct investments towards green
technology to promote sustainable low carbon transport,
bring in fiscal measures such as taxes and subsidies on
vehicles and fuels and introduce regulations that restrict
or discourage the usage and development of energyintensive modes/ transport systems.
■■ Sub-national level institutions, such as the Municipal
Transport Agencies (in strong coordination with land use
planning agencies and other local level agencies) can
help integrate urban land use planning with transport
infrastructure development, coordinate public transportsystems, and introduce transport demand management
measures such as congestion pricing, parking
management, etc. (see section 5.1 for further details). The
development of integrated urban transport agencies as
seen in Singapore may help towards these aims.
Capacity building can help fine-tune the existing
institutions to remove their infirmities and develop newones to fill the vacuum, wherever it exists. To enablegreen transport, capacity building can in particular betargeted at:
41. See http://www.globalfueleconomy.org/

405

Towards a green economy■■ Improving administrative capacity of national andsub-national institutions to frame and execute green
transport policies as well as develop core financing
mechanisms directed towards investment in sustainabletransport;■■ Methods to raise public awareness to use environmentfriendly and energy efficient modes of transport;

406■■ Methods to mobilise the private sector, including themanagement of Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP), andsupport for indigenous technological development,
encompassing R&D capability; and■■ Collection and maintenance of data which areessential for planning and monitoring progress towards
green transport.

Transport

6 Conclusions■■ The source of typically more than 80 per cent ofdeveloping cities’ local air pollutants;

global GDP) in support of public transport infrastructureand efficiency improvement of road vehicles would(in the year 2050, and compared to BAU) avoid travel
volume of road vehicles by 27 per cent and 35 per cent,shift the share of private-car transport to other modes(by nearly 30 per centage points), reduce oil-based
fuel usage by between 16 per cent and 31 per cent,reduce carbon emissions by 5 to 8.1 Gigatonnes (38to 63 per cent compared with BAU), and retain strong
and growing employment. Most of the green transportmeasures would actually be cost-efficient – for example
major carbon reductions can be achieved with little orno extra investment.

■■ More than 1.27 million fatal traffic accidents per year,
mostly in developing countries; andMoving towards a green transport sector as part of an
overall green economy strategy would also result in:■■ Chronic traffic congestion amounting to time andproductivity loss.

■■ Green growth, by supporting cities with lesscongestion, air pollution and other costs;

Such costs, which can add up to nearly or over 10 per
cent of a region or country’s GDP, were shown to growfurther under the current trends of ever-increasing
motorisation. This trend is unsustainable.

■■ The creation of jobs, particularly through thedevelopment for public transport infrastructure andoperations; andThis report highlighted that the current patterns oftransport activity, based primarily on private motorised
vehicles, generates many social, environmental andeconomic costs, represented for example by:■■ Consumption of more than half of global liquid fossil
fuels;■■ Emission of nearly a quarter of the world’s energyrelated CO2.;

There is a need for a fundamental shift in investment
patterns, based on the principles of:■■ Avoiding or reducing trips through integration ofland use and transportation planning, and localised
production and consumption;■■ Shifting to more environmentally efficient modes
such as public transport and non-motorised transport
and to rail and water transport (for freight); and■■ Improving fuels and vehicles through introduction ofcleaner more efficient fuels and vehicles.
Models and scenarios show that a global paradigm shift
is possible; investing in green transport measures could
reduce emissions of the global transport sector by asmuch as 70 per cent. However this is only achievable withintegrated policies that combine measures from all threecomponents of the Avoid, Shift and Improve strategy.
Quantitative analysis using an integrated macroeconomic model suggests that a small reallocation of
investments (approximately 0.16 to 0.34 per cent of■■ The alleviation of poverty by increasing affordabilityof transport and improving accessibility to markets andother essential facilities.
Furthermore, it was highlighted that, among others,
such investment should be enabled via:■■ Policies, including land use planning to promotecompact or mass transit corridor-based cities andconservation-basedtransportation
infrastructure,
regulation of, for example, fuel and vehicle standards,
and the provision of information and awareness raising(e.g. on the health and safety benefits of active travelsuch as cycling and walking) to promote behaviouralchange in the form of modal choice;■■ A shift in financing priorities towards public and nonmotorised transport, coupled with strong economic
incentives (via taxes and charges) to promotesustainable consumption patterns and behaviour andto ensure green modes are commercially feasible andeconomically attractive; and■■ Development and application of green transporttechnology.

407

Towards a green economy

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Peter Prokosch

Tourism

Investing in energy and resource efficiency

This chapter was developed in partnership with the World Tourism Organization

Towards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Author: Lawrence Pratt, Director of theLatin American Center for Competitiveness and Sustainable
Development (CLACDS), INCAE Business School, Alajuela, Costa
Rica.
Lead authors also included Luis Rivera, Economics Consultant andAmos Bien, Sustainable Tourism Consultant.
Nicolas Bertrand of UNEP managed the chapter, including thehandling of peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating author
on revisions, conducting supplementary research, conducting
preliminary editing and bringing the chapter to final production.
Derek Eaton reviewed and edited the modelling section of thechapter.
The chapter was developed in partnership with the World Tourism
Organization. The project manager for UNWTO was Luigi Cabrini,
Director, Sustainable Tourism Programme.
Background Technical Papers prepared for the developmentof this chapter were drafted by the following individuals:
James Alin (Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Malaysia), Ravinder Batta(Government of Himachal Pradesh, India), Tom Baum (Universityof Strathclyde, UK), Kelly Bricker (University of Utah, USA and
TIES Board of Directors, USA), Rachel Dodds (Sustaining Tourism,
Canada), Ramesh Durbarry (University of Technology, Mauritius),
Ioanna Farsari (Technological Educational Institute of Crete,
Greece), Carolyn George (TEAM Tourism Consulting, UK), Stefan
Gössling (Lund University, Sweden), Gui Lohmann (Southern

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011

414

Cross University, Australia), Anna Karla Moura (Governmentof the State of São Paulo, Brazil), Awangku Hassanal Bahar Bin
Pengiran Bagul (Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Malaysia), Paul Peeters(Breda University, The Netherlands), Philip Sarnoff (Universityof Utah, USA), Jeremy R. Schultz (University of Utah, USA),
Daniel Scott (University of Waterloo, Canada), Anna Spenceley(Spenceley Tourism and Development, South Africa), Davina
Stanford (TEAM Tourism Consulting, UK), Louise Twining-Ward(Freelance consultant), Carolyn Wild (WILD International tourism
consultancy, Canada). The preparation of Background TechnicalPapers was coordinated by Carolyn George and Davina Stanford(TEAM Tourism Consulting, UK). Additional material was preparedby Andrea M. Bassi, John P. Ansah and Zhuohua Tan (Millennium
Institute); Wolfgang Weinz and Ana Lucía Iturriza (ILO).
We would like to thank the many colleagues and individuals
who commented on various drafts, including Stefanos Fotiou(UNEP), Stefan Gössling (Lund University), Sofia Gutierrez(UNWTO), Donald E. Hawkins (George Washington University),Marcel Leijzer (UNWTO), Brian T. Mullis (Sustainable Travel
International), David Owen (UNEP), Helena Rey de Assis (UNEP),
Ronald Sanabria Perera (Rainforest Alliance), Andrew Seidl (IUCN),
Daniel Scott (University of Waterloo), Deirdre Shurland (IUCN),
Richard Tapper (Environment Business & Development Group),
and Zoritsa Urosevic (UNWTO). The support of the UNEP Divisionof Technology, Industry and Economics (DTIE), Sustainable
Consumption and Production Branch, Goods and Services Unit
(Charles Arden-Clarke, Head), throughout the project, is also
gratefully acknowledged.

Tourism

Contents
List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
1Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420

1.1

Tourism in a green economy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420

2

Challenges and opportunities for tourism in a green economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421

2.1
2.2

Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

3

The case for investing in the greening of tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6

Spending in the tourism sector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
Benefits in employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
Local economic development and poverty reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
Environmental benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
Cultural heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
Modelling tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433

4

Overcoming barriers: enabling conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5

Private-sector orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
Destination planning and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
Fiscal policies and economic instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438
Financing green tourism investments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Local investment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440

5Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442

Annex 1: Economic sizing of the sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
Annex 2: Drivers and likely implications of investment in sustainable tourism strategicareas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
Annex 3: Assumptions of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449

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Towards a green economy

List of figures
Figure 1: World international tourist arrivals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
Figure 2: Accommodation linkages and tourist income distribution in Tanjong Piai, Malaysia  . . . . . . . . . . 429

List of tables
Table 1: Sample of tourism employment multipliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
Table 2: Impact of tourism on poverty rates in Costa Rica, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
Table 3: Breakdown of tourism income and pro-poor income (PPI) contribution in Malaysia  . . . . . . . . . . . 429
Table A1-1: Economic relevance of tourism in selected countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
Table A2-1: Drivers and likely implications of investment in sustainable tourism strategic areas . . . . . . . . 445

List of boxes
Box 1: Water consumption for tourism and local communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422
Box 2: Investment in energy efficiency and savings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
Box 3: Strengthening the Protected Area Network (SPAN)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
Box 4: Financial cost-recovery of green programmes in tourism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
Box 5: Differential economic contribution from cultural areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433

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Tourism

List of acronyms
ACIF
BAU
CBD
ECLAC
CESD
CO2
CSR
DFI
DMO
ERT
EU
FAO
FDI
FONAFIFO
G2
GDP
GEF
GER
GFANC
GHG
GSTC
IEA
ILO
IPA
ISO
ITF-STD
IUCN
LDCs
OECD

Amazon Carbon and Biodiversity
Investment FundBusiness-as-usual
Convention on Biological Diversity
Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean
Center on Ecotourism and Sustainable
Development
Carbon dioxide
Corporate social responsibility
Development Finance Institutions
Destination Management Organization
Environment-related tourism
European Union
Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations
Foreign Direct Investment
Costa Rica’s National Forestry
Financing FundGreen Scenario 2
Gross Domestic Product
Global Environment Facility
Green Economy Report
German Federal Agency for Nature
Conservation
Greenhouse gas
Global Sustainable Tourism Criteria
International Energy Agency
International Labour Organization
Investment Promotion Agency
International Organization forStandardization
International Task Force on Sustainable
Tourism Development
International Union for Conservation of
NatureLeast Developed Countries
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PES
PPI
RM
ROI
SIFT
SME
SNV
SPAN
ST-EP
TEEB
TIES
TPRG
TSA
UNCCD
UNCTAD
UNEP
UNEP FI
UNESCOUNFCCC
UNWTO
VFR
WEF
WTP
WTTC
WWF

Payment for Ecosystem Services
Pro-poor income
Ringgit Malaysia, currency of Malaysia
Return on investment
Sustainable Investment and Finance inTourism
Small and medium-sized enterprise
Netherlands Development
Organization
Strengthening the Protected Area
Network
Sustainable Tourism for Eliminating
Poverty Initiative
The Economics of Ecosystems andBiodiversity
The International Ecotourism Society
Tourism Planning Research Group
Tourism Satellite AccountUnited Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification
United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development
United Nations Environment
Programme
United Nations Environment
Programme Finance Initiative
United Nations Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization
United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change
World Tourism Organization
Visiting Friends and Relatives
World Economic Forum
Willingness to Pay
World Travel and Tourism Council
World Wide Fund for Nature417

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. Tourism has significant potential as a driver for growth for the world economy. The tourism economy
represents 5 per cent of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while it contributes to about 8 per cent of
total employment. International tourism ranks fourth (after fuels, chemicals and automotive products)
in global exports, with an industry value of US$1 trillion a year, accounting for 30 per cent of the world’s
exports of commercial services or 6 per cent of total exports. There are around four billion estimateddomestic arrivals every year and in 2010, some 940 million international tourists were recorded. Tourism
is one of five top export earners in over 150 countries, while in 60 countries it is the number one export.
It is also the main source of foreign exchange for one-third of developing countries and one-half of least
developed countries (LDC).
2. The development of tourism is accompanied by significant challenges. The rapid growth in bothinternational and domestic travel, the trends to travel farther and over shorter periods of time, andthe preference given to energy-intensive transportation are increasing the non-renewable energy
dependency of tourism, resulting in the sector’s contribution of 5 per cent to global greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions, which is expected to grow substantially under a business–as-usual (BAU) scenario.
Other challenges include excessive water consumption compared with residential water use, dischargeof untreated water, the generation of waste, the damage to local terrestrial and marine biodiversity andthe threats to the survival of local cultures, built heritage and traditions.
3. Green tourism has the potential to create new, green jobs. Travel and tourism are human-resource
intensive, employing directly and indirectly 8 per cent of the global workforce. It is estimated that one
job in the core tourism industry creates about one and a half additional or indirect jobs in the tourismrelated economy. The greening of tourism, which involves efficiency improvements in energy, water andwaste systems, is expected to reinforce the employment potential of the sector with increased local
hiring and sourcing and significant opportunities in tourism oriented toward local culture and thenatural environment.
4. Tourism development can be designed to support the local economy and reduce poverty. Local
economic effects of tourism are determined by the share of tourism spending in the local economy
as well as the amount of the resulting indirect economic activities. Increasing the involvement oflocal communities, especially the poor, in the tourism value chain can, therefore, contribute to thedevelopment of the local economy and to poverty reduction. For example, in Panama, households
capture 56 per cent of total local tourism income. The extent of direct benefits to communities andpoverty reduction will largely depend on the percentage of tourism needs that are locally supplied, suchas products, labour, tourism services, and increasingly “green services” in energy and water efficiency
and waste management. There is increasing evidence that more sustainable tourism in rural areas canlead to more positive poverty-reducing effects.
5. Investing in the greening of tourism can reduce the cost of energy, water and waste and enhance thevalue of biodiversity, ecosystems and cultural heritage. Investment in energy efficiency has been foundto generate significant returns within a short payback period. Improving waste management is expectedto save money for tourism businesses, create jobs and enhance the attractiveness of destinations. The
investment requirement in conservation and restoration is small relative to the value of forests, mangroves,wetlands, and coastal zones including coral reefs, which provide ecosystem services essential for thefoundation of economic activities and for human survival; the value of ecosystems for tourists remains
undervalued in many cases. Investment in cultural heritage—the largest single component of consumer
demand for sustainable tourism—is among the most significant and usually profitable investments.
Under a green economy investment scenario, tourism makes a larger contribution to GDP growth, while

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Tourismsignificant environmental benefits include reductions in water consumption (18 per cent), energy use(44 per cent) and CO2 emissions (52 per cent), compared with BAU.
6. Tourists are demanding the greening of tourism. More than a third of travellers are found to favour
environmentally-friendly tourism and be willing to pay between 2 and 40 per cent more for this experience.
Traditional mass tourism has reached a stage of steady growth. In contrast, ecotourism, nature, heritage,
cultural and “soft adventure” tourism are taking the lead and are predicted to grow rapidly over the next
two decades. It is estimated that global spending on ecotourism is increasing at a higher rate than theindustry-wide average growth.
7. The private sector, especially small firms, can, and must be mobilised to support green tourism.
The tourism sector involves a diverse range of actors. The awareness of green tourism exists mainly in a
selection of larger-scale firms. Smaller firms are mostly outside this sphere and diverse supplier groups
may not be connected at all. Specific mechanisms and tools to educate small and medium-sized tourismrelated enterprises are critical and are most effective when they are accompanied by actionable items.
The promotion and widespread use of recognised standards for sustainable tourism, such as the Global
Sustainable Tourism Criteria (GSTC), can help businesses improve sustainability performance, including
resource efficiency, and assist in attracting additional investment and customers.
8. Much of the economic potential for green tourism is found in small and medium-sized Enterprises(SMEs), which need better access to financing for investing in green tourism. The majority of tourism
businesses are SMEs with potential to generate greater income and opportunity from green strategies.
Their single greatest limiting factor for greening, however, is lack of access to capital. Governments andinternational organisations can facilitate the financial flow to these important actors with an emphasison contributions to the local economy and poverty reduction. Public-private partnerships can spreadthe costs and risks of large green tourism investments. Besides reducing administrative fees and offeringfavourable interest rates for green tourism projects, in-kind support such as technical, marketing or
business administration assistance, could also help.
9. Destination planning and development strategies are the first step towards the greening of
tourism. In developing tourism strategies, local governments, communities and businesses need toestablish mechanisms for coordinating with ministries responsible for the environment, energy, labour,
agriculture, transport, health, finance, security and other relevant areas. Clear requirements are neededin such areas as zoning, protected areas, environmental rules and regulations, labour rules, agricultural
standards and health requirements particularly related to energy, emissions, water, waste and sanitation.
10. Government investments and policies can leverage private sector actions on green tourism.
Government spending on public goods such as protected areas, cultural assets, water conservation,
waste management, sanitation, public transport and renewable energy infrastructure can reducethe cost of green investments by the private sector in green tourism. Governments can also use tax
concessions and subsidies to encourage private investment in green tourism. Time-bound subsidies
can be given, for example, on the purchase of equipment or technology that reduces waste, encourages
energy and water efficiency, the conservation of biodiversity and the strengthening of linkages withlocal businesses and community organisations. At the same time, resource and energy use as well as
waste generation need to be correctly priced to reflect their true cost to society.

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Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to make the case, primarily an
economic one, for investing in the greening of tourism
and it provides guidance on how to mobilise suchinvestments. The objective is to inspire policy makers
to support increased investment in greening the sector.
The chapter shows how green investment in tourism cancontribute to economically viable and robust growth,
decent work creation, poverty alleviation, improved
efficiency in resource use and reduced environmental
degradation.
A growing body of evidence shows that greening tourism
can lead to broad economic, social and environmental
benefits for host countries and their communities (Milland Morrison 2006, Rainforest Alliance 2010, World
Economic Forum 2009a, Klytchnikova and Dorosh 2009).
Tourism’s potential for creating employment, supporting
livelihoods and enabling sustainable development ishuge, given that it is one of the main sources of foreignexchange income—the principal source for one-thirdof developing countries and one-half of the world’s
LDCs according to the UN Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD 2010).
The chapter starts with an explanation of what is meantby greening tourism, followed by a discussion of thechallenges and opportunities facing the sector. It thendiscusses the goals for greening the sector and thepotential economic implications of green investment
being made in the sector, including the results from amodelling exercise. Finally, the chapter presents theconditions that are important for enabling the greeningof the sector.

1.1 Tourism in a green economy
Tourism in a green economy refers to tourism activities
that can be maintained, or sustained, indefinitely in theirsocial, economic, cultural and environmental contexts:“sustainable tourism”. Sustainable tourism is not a special
form of tourism; rather, all forms of tourism may strive
to be more sustainable (UNEP and UNWTO 2005). A

clear distinction should be made between the conceptsof ecotourism and sustainable tourism: “the term
ecotourism itself refers to a segment within the tourism
sector with focus on environmental sustainability, while
the sustainability principles should apply to all typesof tourism activities, operations, establishments andprojects, including conventional and alternative forms”. 1
Sustainable tourism describes policies, practices andprogrammes that take into account not only the
expectations of tourists regarding responsible naturalresource management (demand), but also the needs ofcommunities that support or are affected by tourism
projects and the environment (supply)2. Thus, sustainable
tourism aspires to be more energy efficient and climatesound (e.g. by using renewable energy); consume lesswater; minimise waste; conserve biodiversity, cultural
heritage and traditional values; support intercultural
understanding and tolerance; generate local income andintegrate local communities with a view to improving
livelihoods and reducing poverty. Making tourism
businesses more sustainable benefits local communities
and raises awareness and support for the sustainable useof natural resources. In this chapter, the conceptual andoperational framework for sustainability in tourism isbased on the Global Sustainable Tourism Criteria (GSTC),
an international consensus on the minimum criteria that a
tourism business should follow to approach sustainability3.
A group of key variables based on the GSTC are used forthe analysis of the greening of tourism in this chapter.
The movement toward more sustainable tourism
promotes significant improvements in the performanceof conventional tourism, as well as growth andimprovements in smaller, niche areas centred on natural,cultural and community resources. The expansion of thelatter, as a proportion of the industry as a whole, may
have especially positive implications for biodiversity
conservation and rural poverty reduction. However, thegreening of conventional and mass tourism is likely tohave its largest effects on resource use and management,
as well as on increased economic spillovers and theinclusion of disadvantaged populations.

1. International Year of Ecotourism 2002, available at http://www.unep.fr/scp/tourism/events/iye/pdf/iye_leaflet_text.pdf.
2. ILO (2010b) views sustainable tourism as “composed of three pillars: social justice, economic development, and environmental integrity. It is committed
to the enhancement of local prosperity by maximizing the contribution of tourism to the destination‘s economic prosperity, including the amount of visitor
spending that is retained locally. It should generate income and decent employment for workers without affecting the environment and culture of the
tourists’ destination and ensures the viability and competitiveness of destinations and enterprises to enable them to continue to prosper and deliver benefits
in the long term”.
3. The Global Sustainable Tourism Criteria (GSTC) were developed as part of a broad initiative managed by The Partnership for Global Sustainable Tourism Criteria(GSTC Partnership), a coalition of over 40 organisations working together to foster increased understanding of sustainable tourism practices and the adoptionof universal sustainable tourism principles. The Partnership was initiated by the Rainforest Alliance, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), theUnited Nations Foundation and the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). See www.gstcouncil.org/resource-center/gstc-criteria.htm.

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Tourism

2 Challenges and opportunities
for tourism in a green economy
2.1 Challenges
The tourism industry faces a multitude of significant
sustainability-related challenges. Challenges thatneed to be resolved through the greening of theindustry include (1) energy and GHG emissions; (2)water consumption; (3) waste management; (4) loss of
biological diversity; and (5) effective management of
cultural heritage.
Energy and GHG emissions
The tourism sector’s growing consumption of energy,
especially in travel and accommodation, and its
dependence on fossil fuels has important implications for
global GHG emissions and climate change as well as for
future business growth. Several elements contribute totourism’s increasing energy consumption, including growth
rates in international tourist arrivals and domestic travel;
trends to travel further and over shorter periods of time; aswell as preference given to energy-intense transportation(e.g. aircraft and car travel over train and bus, and flying firstand business class instead of economy (Peeters et al. 2010).
The sustainability and competitiveness of tourism depends
in part on energy efficiency (reductions in overall energyuse) and a more intensive use of renewable resources.
After transport, accommodation is the most energyintensive component of the tourism industry, throughits demand for heating or cooling, lighting, cooking(in restaurants), cleaning, pools and, in tropical or arid
regions, the desalination of seawater. A general rule isthat the more luxurious the accommodation, the moreenergy will be used. In a wide review of studies, energyuse in hotels range between 25 and 284 MJ/guestnight (Peeters et al. 2010). Tourism-related transport
consumption of energy is related to travel mode. Coachand rail transport, cars and buses, aircraft and cruise
ships have diverse energy intensities.4
There is no systematic international country dataset
on energy consumption from tourism activities. The
UNWTO and UNEP (2008) estimate 250 MJ per person
is consumed through activities not related to travelto the destination or accommodation on an averageinternational tourist trip, 50 MJ per person is expended
on shorter and less activity-oriented business trips and
100 MJ per person for Visiting Friends and Relatives(VFR) trips. The weighted global average of energy
consumption for activities of international tourists is
estimated at 170 MJ per trip, excluding transport andaccommodation. As a comparison, world daily energy
consumption per capita is estimated at 135 MJ (a valuethat includes energy generation and industry).5
Given the rising global trend for travel and the growing
energy intensity of most trips, future emissions from thetourism sector are expected to increase substantially,
even considering current trends in technologicalenergy-efficiency gains in transport (air and ground) andaccommodation. Tourism is estimated to create about 5
per cent of total GHG emissions (1,302 Mt CO2), primarily
from tourist transport (75 per cent) and accommodation(21 per cent, mainly from air-conditioning and heating
systems). A globally-averaged tourist journey is estimatedto generate 0.25 tonnes of CO2 (UNWTO and UNEP 2008).
The World Economic Forum (WEF 2009b), using a different
set of sub-sectors, estimated global GHG emissions fromtourism to be 13 per cent higher (1,476 Mt CO2 in 2005).
The report distinguishes direct and indirect emissions
from tourism, with direct emissions being defined as“carbon emissions from sources that are directly engaged
in the economic activity of the tourism and travel sector.”
While these are included in the WEF estimate, indirectemissions are excluded, i.e. emissions from electricity
usage in airline or travel agent offices, and emissions fromtransportation of hotel consumables, such as food or
toiletries (Peeters et al. 2010). Scott et al. (2010) estimate
the sector contributed between 5.2 per cent and 12.5 percent of all anthropogenic radiative forcing in 2005.
Over the next 30-50 years, GHG emissions from thetourism sector are projected to grow substantially ina business-as-usual scenario, in large part because
emissions from aviation, the most important emitter in
the industry, are expected to grow by at least a factorof 2 to 3 (UNWTO and UNEP 2008, WEF 2009b). Aviation

4. For instance, in New Zealand, the total energy consumed for tourism transport and accommodation is distributed by 43 per cent for road transport, 42 percent for air travel, 2 per cent for sea transport and 1 per cent for rail transport, with accommodation comprising the remaining 12 per cent. For local travel,
coach tourism consumes the greatest energy per day, followed by camper tourists, soft comfort and auto tourists (Becken et al. 2003).
5. Own estimation with data from the International Energy Agency, available at http://data.iea.org/ieastore/default.asp.

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Towards a green economy
and tourism are expected to account for a large shareof emissions unless a major change in the emission
trajectories is achieved (Peeters et al. 2010).
Water consumption
While water use by tourism, on a global basis, is far lessimportant than agriculture, industry, or urban domesticuse, in some countries and regions, tourism can be themain factor in water consumption. In such areas, it canincrease pressure on already diminished water resources
and compete with other sectors as well as subsistenceneeds of local populations (Box 1). Tourism can also
directly affect water quality, for example, through thedischarge of untreated sewage or freshwater abstraction(Gössling 2010).
Global direct water consumption by international tourism(accommodation only) is estimated to be 1.3 km3 per year
(Gössling 2005). Available data suggests that direct water
use in tourism varies between 100 and 2,000 litres per
guest night, with a tendency for larger, resort-style hotels
to use significantly more water than smaller, pension-likeestablishments or campsites. The main water-consuming
factors are golf courses, irrigated gardens, swimming
pools, spas, wellness facilities and guest rooms.
UNEP (2003) estimates that in the USA, tourism andrecreation consume 946 million cubic metres of water
per year, of which 60 per cent is linked to lodging (mostly
spent on guest consumption, landscape and property
management and laundry activities), and another 13 percent is for foodservice. Total yearly water consumption

by tourism in Europe is estimated at 843 million cubic
metres. Each tourist consumes 300 litres of freshwater
per day on average, whereas luxury tourists canconsume up to 880 litres. By comparison, average percapita residential consumption in Europe is estimated at
241 litres per day.6
Waste management
Waste management is another increasing and wellrecognised challenge in the industry. Every international
tourist in Europe generates at least 1 kg of solid waste perday, and up to 2 kg/person/day for the USA (UNEP 2003).
By comparison, CalRecovery and UNEP (2005) report
total country waste generation, including industrial andother sources, for Austria (1.18 kg/person/day), Mexico(0.68 kg/person/day), India (0.4 kg/person/day) and theUSA (2.3 kg/person/day).
Impacts are also considerable for wastewater
management, even in high-income countries. In the
Mediterranean region, for instance, it is commonplace
for hotels to discharge untreated sewage directly into
the sea (WWF 2004), with 60 per cent of water used in
tourism resulting in sewage in need of disposal (GFANC
1997). In the European Mediterranean, only 30 per centof municipal wastewater from coastal towns receives
any treatment before discharge. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that this is also the case in many other countries
outside the European Union (Gössling 2010).
6. Author’s estimation with data from AQUASTAT-FAO. Available at http://
www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/agricult/agl/aglw/aquastat/dbase/index.stm.

Box 1: Water consumption for tourism and local communities
Tourism development is concentrated in coastal areas
and on small islands, where potable water is typicallyscarce. This scarcity can be caused by either a physicalabsence of freshwater, or because the necessary
infrastructure or resources are lacking. A tourismthirsty industry can secure its water needs wherever it
operates, although this can create situations of starkwater inequity between tourists and neighbouringcommunities. Tourism’s water demands can evenlead to the appropriation of supply to the detrimentof local domestic and agricultural needs, caused by
the overexploitation of aquifers and reservoirs andthe lowering of groundwater tables.
In a popular resort area of one South Asian country,
for example, privately-owned water tankers buy
water from villages through local elites and transport
it to supply nearby hotels. This leaves villagers withwater supply to their communal standpipes for a422

few hours a day only (Tourism Concern 2009 and2010). Luxury resorts on an East African island are
estimated to use up to 2,000 litres of water per
tourist per day, almost 70 times more than the
average daily domestic consumption of local people(Gössling and Hall 2006).
Golf tourism is rapidly expanding. An estimated
9.5 billion litres of water are used to irrigate theworld’s golf courses per day, equivalent to the dailyneeds of 80 per cent of the global population. One
Mediterranean island, where water is so scarce
it must sometimes be shipped in, is planning toincrease its golf courses from three to 17, with
tourism cited as the principal driver. This will involve
building over agricultural land and constructing
several desalination plants to ensure continualsupply (Tourism Concern 2009).
Source: Tourism Concern (2010)

Management of cultural heritage
Interest in unique cultures by tourists can result in adverse
impacts and severe disruption for communities. Thereare examples of communities overrun by large numbersof visitors, commercialisation of traditions and threats
to cultural survival from unplanned and unmanaged
tourism. Tourism destinations are occasionally built byoutsiders (usually with government approval) in areasthat indigenous or traditional communities consider
to be theirs, and where the development was neither
desired nor locally validated. These situations lead toconflicts that make cooperation and mutual benefits
nearly impossible to achieve, and instil animosities thatnegatively affect the local communities and the tourism
destination. Frequently, the cultural issues overlap andare aggravated by environmental issues such as accessto water, coastal resources and wildlife. Over the last two
decades, with the growth in ecotourism and alternative
travel, tourism impacts on vulnerable cultures has
begun to be taken seriously by the tourism industry,
governments, non-governmental organisations and thecultural groups involved (Wild 2010).

2.2 Opportunities
The following trends and developments provide aparticularly promising space for greening tourism: (1)sizing and growth of the sector; (2) changing consumer

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Loss of biological diversity
There are many examples where large-scale tourism has
had detrimental effects on biodiversity, including coral
reefs, coastal wetlands, rainforests, arid and semi-arid
ecosystems and mountainous areas (UNWTO 2010d).
Coral ecosystems have suffered strong adverse impacts
from the use of coral for construction materials forhotels, over-fishing off reefs to feed tourists, sewage
dumping and sedimentation from improperly managed
runoff from buildings, parking lots, and golf courses.
Coastal wetlands, particularly mangroves, have routinely
been damaged or destroyed to build beach resorts.
And in arid and semi-arid ecosystems, golf courses andother water-intensive activities have lowered watertables affecting local fauna and flora. Biodiversity will
be greatly affected by the way in which tourism grows
and develops, especially in developing countries (UNEP2010). Moreover, failure to incorporate biodiversity
concerns in destination planning and investment will
have detrimental effects on the natural environment,
increase conflict with local communities, and leadto reduced value-creation potential for both thedestination and investors (notably as interest in naturebased tourism is growing rapidly around the world
and represents a strategic argument for maintaining
biodiverse environments, which are often tourist
destinations in developing countries).

MillionTourism

Figure 1: World international tourist arrivals
Source: UNWTO (2008, 2010b and 2011)

patterns; and (3) maximising potential for addressing
local development and poverty reduction.
Sizing and growth of the tourism sector
Tourism is one of the most promising drivers of growth
for the world economy. The sheer size and reach of
the sector makes it critically important from a global
resource perspective. Even small changes towardgreening can have important impacts. Furthermore, thesector’s connection to numerous sectors at destinationand international levels means that changes in practices
can stimulate changes in many different public andprivate actors.
The tourism economy represents 5 per cent of global GDP,
while it contributes to about 8 per cent of total employment.
International tourism ranks fourth (after fuels, chemicals andautomotive products) in global exports, with an industry
value of US$ 1 trillion a year, accounting for 30 per cent of
the world’s exports of commercial services or 6 per cent of
total exports. Tourist arrivals have shown continuous yearly
growth over the last six decades, with an average 4 percent annual increase during 2009 and 2010. This trend has
held in spite of occasional short drops from international
crises, such as pandemics, recessions and terrorism. There
are around four billion estimated domestic arrivals every
year (UNWTO and UNEP 2008) and international tourism
arrivals reached 922 million in 2008, dropped to 880 million
in 2009, and then recovered in 2010 with 940 million(UNWTO 2011) (Figure 1). The tourist industry has been
sensitive but resilient to economic, political and social
global phenomena. The number of tourist trips is expected
to continue to grow for the next decade, with the numberof international tourist arrivals expected to reach 1.6 billion
by 2020 (UNWTO 2001).
However, the economic significance of tourism is highlyvariable across countries. While it represents only 1.9

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Towards a green economy
per cent and 3.3 per cent of GDP in Japan and Peru
respectively, it represents 7.7 per cent and 10.9 per centof GDP in South Africa and Spain respectively (UNWTO
2010c; WTTC 2010b). Regarding employment, thetourism industry contributes with 2.8 per cent, 3.1 per
cent, 6.9 per cent and 11.8 per cent of total employment
for the same countries (UNWTO 2010c; WTTC 2010b); in
terms of investment, it accounts for 5.8 per cent, 9.9 per
cent, 13 per cent, and 13.8 per cent of total investment
respectively (WTTC 2010 and 2010b).7
Proportionately, tourism will grow faster in less developed
countries than in developed economies in the next ten
years. Destinations in emerging economies receive 47
per cent of worldwide international tourist arrivals andUS$ 306 billion in international tourism receipts (36per cent of the global total). Moreover, growth in thedecade since 2000 has been most marked in emerging
economies (58.8 per cent). Market share has also grown
more significantly in emerging economies (from 38.1
per cent in 2000 to 46.9 per cent in 2009). Recent trends
and forecasts point to a spreading of tourism to newdestinations, largely in developing countries, where
there is outstanding potential to support development
goals, and where new environmental and cultural
attributes can make an important contribution to moresustainable tourism destinations (UNWTO 2010b).
Changing consumer patterns
Tourist choices are increasingly influenced bysustainability considerations. For instance, in 2007
TripAdvisor surveyed travellers worldwide and 38 percent said that environmentally-friendly tourism was aconsideration when travelling, 38 per cent had stayed at anenvironmentally-friendly hotel and 9 per cent specificallysought such hotels, while 34 per cent were willing to pay
more to stay in environmentally-friendly hotels (Pollock2007). Center on Ecotourism and Sustainable Development(CESD) and International Ecotourism Society (TIES) (2005)
found that a majority of international tourists are interested
in the social, cultural and environmental issues relevant to
the destinations they visit and are interested in patronisinghotels that are committed to protecting the local
environment. Increasingly, they view local environmental
and social stewardship as a responsibility of the businesses
they support. Choice experiments conducted in Uganda
conclude that biodiversity attributes increase thewillingness to visit tourism attractions, independently ofother factors (Naidoo and Adamowickz 2005). Researchalso indicates that consumers are concerned about the
local environments of their travel destinations and arewilling to spend more on their holidays if they are assured
that workers in the sector are guaranteed ethical labour
conditions in the places they are visiting (ILO 2010b). On
7. See Annex 1 for an indication of the economic dimension of tourism ina country sample.

424

the other hand, Rheem (2009) argues that less than athird of American travellers indicate a willingness to pay
some sort of pre­mium for green travel, higher prices (costpremium) being seen as a demand barrier for 67 per centof respondents.
Traditional mass tourism such as “sun-and-sand”
resorts has reached a steady growth stage. In contrast,
ecotourism, nature, heritage, cultural and soft
adventure tourism, as well as sub-sectors such as ruraland community tourism are taking the lead in tourism
markets and are predicted to grow most rapidly over the
next two decades. It is estimated that global spendingon ecotourism is increasing at a higher rate than theindustry-wide average growth. Nature-based tourism is
an important economic component of the entire tourism
market, including 75 per cent of Australia’s international
tourism, while 42 per cent of European recreational
tourists in 2000. In 2006, nature tourists contributed
US$ 122.3 billion to the USA’s tourism market (UNWTO
2010d). About 14 per cent of international visitors toSouth Africa in 1997 engaged in an “adventure activity”
during their stay (Travel to South Africa n.d.). Of the826,000 tourists to Kenya in 1993, 23 per cent visitednational parks and reserves for wildlife safari tourism(Sindiga 1995). In 1993, the Asia-Pacific region alone
reported 10 per cent of tourism revenue came from
ecotourism activities (Dalem 2002).
There is empirical evidence that tourists seeking
environmental and culturally differentiated destinations
are willing to pay more for this experience. Inman
et al. (2002) estimate this to be between 25 per centand 40 per cent. The World Economic Forum (WEF)(2009) estimates that 6 per cent of the total number ofinternational tourists pay extra for sustainable tourism
options and 34 per cent would be willing to pay extra
for them. One third to one half of international tourists(weighted toward the USA) surveyed in a CESD and
TIES (2005) study said they were willing to pay more
to companies that benefit local communities andconservation. Research by SNV (2009) records twostudies where 52 per cent of respondents in a UK survey
would be more likely to book a holiday with a company
that had a written code to guarantee good working
conditions, protect the environment and support local
charities, while some 58.5 million US travellers would
pay more to use travel companies that strive to protect
and preserve the environment.
Wells (1997) presents a survey of nature-tourism
willingness to pay (WTP) studies and shows that, in almost
all cases, consumer surplus (private value of benefits fromnature tourism) is higher than collected fees from tourists.
In other words, the value of ecosystems for tourism isundervalued in many cases. For instance, Adamson (2001)
estimates that 50 per cent or more of the economic value

Tourismfrom Manuel Antonio National Park in Costa Rica is not
captured in entrance fees. Willingness to pay (WTP) for
entrance fees from international tourists was estimated at
US$ 12 (compared with a US$ 6 actual entrance fee) and
US$ 6 for national tourists (compared with an actual feeof US$ 2). Furthermore, it is estimated that the averagevalue of coral reef opportunities for recreation and tourism
is almost US$ 68,500 per hectare per year in 2007 values,
while it could reach up to more than US$ 1 million (TEEB
2010). The maximum monetary value of ecosystem services
for tourism, per hectare per year, has been estimated forcoastal systems (US$ 41,416), coastal wetlands (US$ 2,904),
inland wetlands (US$ 3,700), rivers and lakes (US$ 2,733)
and tropical forests (US$ 1,426) (TEEB 2010).
Potential for local development and poverty reduction
Making tourism more sustainable can create stronger linkages
with the local economy, increasing local development
potential. Of particular and recognised importance (Hall andColes 2008) are: purchasing directly from local businesses,
recruiting and training local unskilled and semi-skilled staff,
entering into neighbourhood partnerships to make thelocal social environment a better place to live, workand visit for all, and ability to improve the local naturalenvironment within its areas of direct and indirect
influence (Ashley et al. 2006). The move toward moresustainable tourism has been shown in a numberof destinations to enhance this local development
potential through several means:

1. Its ability to harness biodiversity, landscape andcultural heritage available in developing countries
can play a major role in enhancing incomes andemployment opportunities;
2. Tourism is a relatively labour-intensive sector
traditionally dominated by micro and small
enterprises with activities particularly suited for
women and disadvantaged groups;
3. A tourism product is a combination of different
activities and inputs produced by many sectors:
enhanced spending by tourists can benefit
agriculture, handicrafts, transport, water andwaste management, energy efficiency and otherservices;
4. As tourism development at destinations requires
investment in facilities such as roads, watersupply, and energy, it improves the basic common
infrastructure facilities required for developmentof other sectors and improvement of quality of life
(Bata 2010); and5. Tourism employs more women and young people
than most other sectors: providing economic
benefits and independence to women is very
important in terms of supporting child development
and breaking the cycle of poverty.

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Towards a green economy

3 The case for investing in
the greening of tourism
3.1 Spending in the tourism sector
Tourism drives significant investments. Adding evensmall percentages of investment for a greener sector
results in very significant increases in investment
flows. Furthermore, much new investment flow is
directed toward developing countries, where increased
investment could have greater impact on green
outcomes. It is estimated that travel and tourism-sector
investments reached US$ 1,398 billion in 2009, or 9.4
per cent of global investment. It increased on averageby 3 per cent during the last decade, notwithstandinga significant contraction in 2009 (-12 per cent). Global
investment in tourism has fluctuated between 8 percent and 10 per cent of total world investment over thelast 20 years. In developing countries, such as in the
Caribbean region, this figure could be as high as 50 per
cent (WTTC 2010).8 In OECD countries, investment inhotels, travel agencies and restaurants range from 6 percent of national gross value added in Germany to 32 percent in Portugal (OECD 2010).
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is an important sourceof world tourism investment. The stock of outward
and inward FDI in the hotels and restaurants sector
reported by UNCTAD (2009) accounts for almost 1
per cent of total FDI stock. This figure, however, does
not take into account other tourism-related elements
in other sectors, such as construction, transport orbusiness activities. There is a growing focus on tourism
as a generator of FDI in developing countries, where it
is a priority of many Invest­ment Promotion Agencies(IPAs). In this regard, the case of Costa Rica is illustrative
as foreign investment in the tourism sector represented
17 per cent of total FDI inflows in 2009 and 13 per centon average for 2000-09.9

3.2 Benefits in employment
Tourism is human-resource intensive due to the service
nature of the industry. It is among the world’s top job

creators and allows for quick entry into the workforce foryouth, women and migrant workers. The wider tourism
economy provides, both directly and indirectly, morethan 230 million jobs, which represents about 8 per centof the global workforce. Women make up between 60
and 70 per cent of the labour force in the industry andhalf the workers are aged 25 or younger (ILO 2008). In
developing countries, sustainable tourism investment
can help create job opportunities, especially for poorer
segments of the population.
The move toward more sustainable tourism canincrease job creation. Additional employment inenergy, water, and waste services and expanded local
hiring and sourcing are expected from the greeningof mainstream tourism segments. Furthermore, anincreasing body of evidence suggests significantly
expanded indirect employment growth opportunities
from segments oriented toward local culture and thenatural environment (Cooper et al. 2008; Moreno et al.
2010; Mitchell et al. 2009).
Tourism creates jobs directly and leads to additional(indirect) employment. It is estimated that one job in
the core tourism industry creates about one and a half
additional jobs in the tourism-related economy (ILO
2008). There are workers indirectly dependent on each
person working in hotels, such as travel-agency staff,
guides, taxi and bus drivers, food and beverage suppliers,
laundry workers, textile workers, gardeners, shop staff forsouvenirs and others, as well as airport employees (ILO
2008). These relationships influence the many types of
workplace relationships that include full-time, part-time,
temporary, casual and seasonal employment and havesignificant implications for employment opportunities
within the sector. A study of South Africa shows that
direct employment in the core tourism sector only
accounts for 21 per cent of total employment creation
due to tourism spending in 2008 (Pan African Research& Investment Services 2010). Available data indicate thatevery new job in tourism can have multiplying effects inthe whole economy, as illustrated in Table 1.

8. It is worth mentioning that WTTC estimates incorporate all fixed investment expenditure by tourism service providers and government agencies, infacilities, capital equipment and infrastructure for visitors. In this sense, it could be overestimating infrastructure investments that are not tourism sector
specific but affect the whole economy (for instance, road improvements or airport construction). Still, it is the only cross-country source of tourism investment
data available.
9. Author’s calculations with data from the Central Bank of Costa Rica. Available at www.bccr.fi.cr, accessed on September 12, 2010.

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Tourism
For the EU 27, GHK (2007) estimates direct and indirect
employment multipliers for environment-related tourism
at between 1.69 and 2.13. This means that for every 100
jobs directly created in the sector, 69 more are createdelsewhere in the economy as a result of indirect effects
and the figure increases to 113 when induced effects
are taken into account. The authors define Environmentrelated tourism (ERT), as activities where the naturalenvironment (not the built environment) is responsiblefor influencing the choice of destination for the tourism
activity, including visits to hills, mountains, coasts,
farmland, woods, forests, springs, lakes and wildlife andthe activities of fishing (sea, game and coarse), walking,climbing, golfing, skiing, cycling, bathing/swimming, etc.
It is estimated that sustainable tourism in Nicaragua, adestination that focuses very prominently on its culture
and natural environment, has an employment multiplierof 2. That is, for every job in the tourism sector, additional
local employment is created, with higher wages than thenational averages (Rainforest Alliance 2009).

3.3 Local economic development
and poverty reduction
Local economic development
Tourism is an important and effective driver of local
economic development. Tourist spending enters the
local economy to varying degrees depending principallyon the structure of the tourism business and its supply
chain at a destination. The economic contribution
entering the economy is the local contribution and istypically measured as an average amount per tourist,and as a percentage of the total tourism spending thatstays in the local economy. That which is not retainedin the local economy is “leakage.” Multiplier effects arelimited by leakages, which reduce the positive economic
impacts of tourism. Wells (1997) reports values of leakage
as a percentage of gross tourism receipts ranging from
11 per cent (Philippines) to 56 per cent (Fiji)
The income multiplier is used to describe the amount of
the indirect economic activity resulting from the local
contribution. The economic development potentialof tourism is a direct function of the local contribution
and multiplier – larger local contributions and larger
multipliers each lead to greater economic activity inthe local economy and there are important synergies
between them. From a global perspective, Mill and
Morrison (2006) review the literature on income
multipliers and present a list of estimations fromdifferent countries and regions. Income multipliers
can be relatively low for specific destinations such as
the City of Winchester (0.19) and higher for a country
such as Turkey (1.96). According to Cooper et al. (2008),
tourism impacts income in different ways depending

Total employment
per single job in the
tourism sector

Employment per
US$ 10,000 tourist
expenditure

Jamaica

4.61

1.28

Mauritius

3.76

not available

Bermuda

3.02

0.44

Gibraltar

2.62

not available

Solomon Islands

2.58

not available

Malta

1.99

1.59

Western Samoa

1.96

not available

Republic of Palau

1.67

not available

Fiji

not available

0.79

UK (Edinburgh)

not available

0.37

Table 1: Sample of tourism employment
multipliers
Source: Cooper et al. (2008)

on the country or region where it develops. Every US
dollar spent by overnight tourists impacts income in theeconomy between 1.12 to 3.40 times. This high variability
indicates that local economic impact development will
depend on particular characteristics of the tourism
business model, in particular the quantity and type of
products and services sourced from the local economy.
In destinations where a large percentage of tourist
needs are locally supplied (beds and linens, food andbeverage, equipment and supplies, labour, tour andtransportation services, souvenirs, among others), local
contribution and multipliers tend to be high, and theresulting economic impact correspondingly greater. In
destinations where substantial income is not captured
locally, economic impact from tourism is less. This effectcan vary dramatically between destinations:■■ For Granada, Nicaragua, the Rainforest Alliance (2009)
reports a case study of sustainable tourism where local
purchases represent only 16 per cent of total purchases;■■ For the Canary Islands, Hernández (2004) finds that 43
per cent of total tourism expenditure is supplied fromoutside the local economy through direct, indirect andinduced imports; and■■ In New Zealand, it is estimated that 24 per cent of
tourism expenditure is for imports of goods and services
sold directly to tourists by retailers (Hernández 2004).
Looking at a single destination illustrates how substantial
tourism’s economic impact can be. For example, forPanama, Klytchnikova and Dorosh (2009) present a
detailed evaluation of tourism’s impact in the local
economy of three different regions. The income multiplierfor the tourism industry (hotels and restaurants) is thelargest of all economic sectors. An additional US$ 1 in

427

Towards a green economy
value added results in US$ 2.87 total income. This large
multiplier is due to strong backward linkages in terms of
demand for local food products as well as forward linkagesof household spending from tourism income. This gain
results from consumer spending effects as incomes
earned in various activities are spent in the domestic
economy. In comparison, multipliers are smallest (1.30
to 1.64) in sectors such as the Panama Canal, mining andtextiles where there are few production linkages (as muchof the inputs are imported). In contrast, the multipliers forfruit, shellfish and other agricultural exports are especiallylarge because much of the income earned accrues to rural
households who spend a high proportion of their incomeson non-tradable goods and services in the local economy.
There is an increasingly convincing body of evidence
indicating that more sustainable tourism can increase
both the local contribution and multiplier effect. Withina given (or similar) destination, local contribution andmultiplier increase the more the local community is
involved in the tourism value chain, through the supplyof products, labour, tourism services and, increasingly,“green services.” The few available meta-studies indicate
considerably higher multipliers for natural and culturallyoriented destinations (Chang 2001). Destination-specificstudies, such as Brenes (2007) for Costa Rica indicate
similar effects. The logic is sound – more local purchases(substituting imports) will increase local contribution,and the income effect will be greatest when local actors
are the beneficiaries of those linkages.
Poverty reduction
When tourism-related income grows with a substantial
reorientation in favour of the poor, poverty can be
reduced. Thus, in 2002 the UNWTO launched theSustainable Tourism for the Elimination of Poverty
initiative (ST-EP), aimed at reducing poverty levels
through developing and promoting sustainable formsof tourism.10 Increased tourism, local contributions andmultiplier effects can accrue to wealthy, middle income,or the poor. Therefore, interventions must be made tohelp poor people become part of the processes thatdrive the industry (ILO 2010a). Investors and developers,
as well as local and national governments, play a criticalrole in determining the role poorer populations play inthe tourism industry. The local industry can also help byengaging in and encouraging the use of local companies
10. ST-EP has identified seven different mechanisms through which
the poor can benefit directly or indirectly from tourism: (1) Undertaking
measures to increase the level of the poor working in tourism enterprises;(2) Maximising the proportion of tourism spending that is retained in local
communities and involving the poor in the supply process; (3) Promoting
the direct sales of goods and services to visitors by the poor from informal
businesses; (4) Establishing and managing more formal tourism enterprisesby the poor, either individually or at a community level; (5) Using taxes orlevies on tourism income or profits with proceeds benefiting the poor; (6)Supporting the poor in money or in kind, by visitors or tourism enterprises;and (7) Investing in infrastructure that offers local communities the chance
to gain new access to available resources (UNWTO 2004b).

428

for the provision of transport, services and food in orderto generate local income and employment multipliersand contribute to alleviate local poverty:■■ In the case of Malaysia, Tourism Planning ResearchGroup (TPRG 2009) describes the case of accommodation
businesses and the shares of income generated anddistributed across the chain. The final impact on local
communities depends on the business structure and theeconomic activities related to tourism. In the case of theaccommodation sector, most income is captured by hotel
owners. However, an important share is received by smallbusiness owners and local people involved in informal
activities (Figure 2). From all tourism expenditure, 28 percent is captured by hotels, while craft artisans obtain 5
per cent and local small businesses get 11 per cent.
■■ In Zanzibar, Tanzania, Steck et al. (2010) estimate that
only 10.2 per cent of total tourism income is captured bypoor local people. The study found that the industry isheavily dependent on imports for both primary supplies
and staff of suitable quality, both of which are normallyavenues for participation of locals.
■■ In Panama, households capture 56 per cent of
total local tourism income (Klytchnikova and Dorosh2009). Which households benefit the most, however,depends on the region in which the tourism revenues
are generated. In the Colón Zone, most of the gains inhousehold incomes (63 per cent) go to urban non-poorhouseholds and only 20 per cent of the income gains
accrue to poor households. In contrast, in Bocas del Toro,
where poor households account for a larger share of theregional labour force, 43 per cent of the total increasein household incomes accrues to the poor while thepercentage gain in household incomes is nearly thesame across household groups. The results for Chiriqui
Province report household income gains received by thepoor of 19 per cent, although the share earned by rural
households is higher (46 per cent).
Empirical studies suggest that, at best, between onefifth and one-third of total tourist expenditure in thedestination is captured by the poor from direct earnings
and supply chains (Mitchell and Ashley 2007). The
impact of tourism on poverty depends on various factors
including employment, the skill level of the labour force,changes of prices (goods and services and factors of
production), ownership of micro and small enterprises
and labour-market composition. As with income effects,
there is increasingly convincing evidence that moresustainable tourism (particularly in rural areas) can leadto more positive poverty-reducing effects.
■■ In Costa Rica, Rojas (2009) estimated the impact
of tourism on poverty levels and found that without
tourism incomes the local incidence of poverty would

Tourism

Tourist
RM300
100%

Bee Farm
RM13
4%

Local People
RM124%

Coconut Farm
RM13
4%

Local People
RM12
4%

Seafood Restaurant
RM65
22%

Local Fishermen
RM60
20%

Homestay
ProviderRM125
42%

Figure 2: Accommodation linkages and tourist income distribution in Tanjong Piai, Malaysia
Source: TPRG (2009). Note: RM=Ringgit Malaysia (1 RM=US$ 0.30)

be higher in urban and rural sectors (Table 2). This result
is consistent with other studies for the country. For
instance, the Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2007) estimates that tourism
contributes to a reduction in poverty of 3 per cent in
Costa Rica (and 1 per cent in Nicaragua). From a site
comparison perspective, Brenes et al. (2007) estimatedthe impact of Tamarindo (mass tourism destination)and La Fortuna (natural and adventure attractions
destination) and found that average monthly wages in
La Fortuna (US$ 437) were higher than in Tamarindo(US$ 392). Moreover, they estimated a 0.64 probability ofincome improvement for La Fortuna inhabitants whenworking in the tourism sector. The evidence indicatesthat tourism is contributing to poverty reduction in
Costa Rica, with the sustainability approach of thecountry as a driver of living conditions improvement.

currently not of a sufficient quantity to draw any
robust conclusions, it is clear that there is an increased
awareness of the need and value of conserving uniquenatural, social and cultural assets of destinations.

■■ In Malaysia, using a value-chain analysis, TPRG
(2009) finds that economic benefits received by local
people account on average for 34 per cent of total
income generated by tourism. The relatively high propoor income share, particularly in restaurants (Table3), may reflect various public and private initiatives
to employ or involve locals in tourism business operations.

Table 2: Impact of tourism on poverty rates in
Costa Rica, 2008

Private and public investment in tourism includes
infrastructure (roads, airports, national parks, private
reserves, hospitality installations and other sites
and facilities); environmental conservation (natural
attractions, beaches, mountains, rivers, biodiversity,
natural barriers and endemic species); education (labour-

With tourism income

Without tourism income

National

17.69%

19.06%

Urban

16.93%

18.40%

Rural

18.73%

20.0%

Source: Rojas (2009)

Share in tourism
revenue

Share of PPI

Accommodation and hotel meals

88.4%

7.3%

Restaurants

4.4%

47.0%

3.4 Environmental benefits

Retail

3.7%

27.0%

Tours and excursions

3.0%

18.8%

There is increasing motivation from both the private
and public sectors to invest in making tourism moresustainable. Although the availability of global
investment data specific to sustainable tourism is

Other

0.5%

n.a

Table 3: Breakdown of tourism income and propoor income (PPI) contribution in Malaysia
Source: TPRG (2009)429

Towards a green economy
force skills, including the greening of the skills base);
capacity building; and technology improvements (cleaner
production, sustainable management). Investment insustainable tourism offers a wide range of opportunities,
notably in the areas of water, energy, waste andbiodiversity, which can generate significant returns.
There is a growing trend within the tourism industry ofinvestment in sustainability. For instance, the Accor hotel
chain has been testing environmental technologies suchas photovoltaic electricity, grey water re-use and rainwater recovery. Additional capital expenditure in energy
efficiency and sustainable construction and renovation
projects is estimated at a relatively modest 6 per centof total construction costs (for a 106-room hotel),with excellent returns (WTTC 2009). Sol Meliá Hotels& Resorts have institutionalised their sustainability
programme with independent certification for thecompany, including hotels and corporate offices on aninternational level, and a specific budget for the strategic
project of sustainable development, financed entirely
by company funds (WTTC 2010).
EnergyIn hotels and other accommodation there isconsiderable scope for investment in energyefficient features and services, including refrigeration,
television and video systems, air conditioning andheating (particularly reduction or elimination of thesesystems through improved design), and laundry. Suchinvestments are driven by increasing energy costs;
likely carbon surcharges; increasing expectationsof customers (particularly from Europe and North
America); technological advances with low-carbon
technology; and in some cases, government incentives.
Many leading airlines are exploring alternative fuelstrategies, as well as changes in routing, aircraft andflight practices. The railroad industry, particularly inEurope, is positioning itself as a green and communitylinking alternative to air travel. Increased energy
efficiency for tourism translates as reduced operationalcosts, increased customer satisfaction, and higher
investment in energy efficiency (through retrofits andimprovements).
Evidence suggests that investment in a more efficientuse of energy in the sector generates significant returns(Box 2). Hamele and Eckardt (2006) reported the resultsof environmental initiatives in European hotels, bed &breakfast and camping sites, on energy consumption.
On average, energy costs in hotels represented about
6 per cent of their annual turnover, whereas in the bestpractice es­tablishments, this expense factor typically
represented 1.5-2.8 per cent. Recent studies have shownthat a 6 per cent increase in investment in energy-efficientdesign & equipment can lower electrical consumption
by 10 per cent (Six Senses 2009); low-cost water-efficientdesign and operation can reduce consumption by 30
per cent (Newsom et al. 2008, Hagler Bailly 1998), andthat overall financial cost-recovery of a destination’sBox 2: Investment in energy efficiency and savings
Six Senses, a luxury hotel group, reports that thereturn on investment of various energy-savings
measures applied in resorts located in Thailand
ranges from six months to ten years:■■ The energy monitoring system cost US$ 4,500,
enabling the resort to achieve 10 per cent energy
savings and to identify areas for further savings;■■ Investment for the mini chiller system was US$
130,000, which saves US$ 45,000 annually, and thus
pays off in 2.8 years;■■ The heat-recovery system cost US$ 9,000, saving
US$ 7,500 annually, corresponding to 1.2 years
payback time;■■ The laundry hot-water system cost US$ 27,000,
saving US$ 17,000 annually (1.6 year payback time);■■ Efficient lighting cost US$ 8,500, resulting in US$

430

16,000 savings per year, i.e. taking six months to pay
back (not considering the longer life-span of thelights);■■ Investment in a water reservoir was US$ 36,000,
leading to annual savings of US$ 330,000 (less thana month payback time);■■ Biomass absorption chillers cost US$ 120,000,
resulting in US$ 43,000 saving annually, i.e. 2.8 years
payback; and■■ Medium voltage (6.6kV) underground electriccopper cables cost US$ 300,000. Payback isroughly 10 years from lower energy loss, butother benefits include less radiation, less powerfluctuation, reduced fire risk and a prettier resort
without old hanging low voltage electrical cables.

Source: Six Senses (2009)

Tourismgreen strategy (ratio of present value savings to present
value capital expenditures) can be between 117 per centand 174 per cent for investment recovery from hotel
buildings operation efficiency (Ringbeck et al. 2010).
Rainforest Alliance (2010) presents an estimate ofcosts and benefits of sustainable-energy management
practices for a sample of 14 tourism businesses in Latin
America (Belize, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala andNicaragua) based on GSTC indicators. The energy bill
was reduced in 64 per cent of companies, with averageannual savings of US$ 5,255 (maximum of US$ 17,300).
Required investment ranged from 1 per cent to 10 per
cent of annual operations costs. Average investment
was US$ 12,278 (maximum US$ 56,530). The average
payback of investments is 2.3 years.
Water
Internal water efficiency and management programmes,
and investments in water-saving technology in rooms,
facilities and attractions reduce costs. Greater efficiency
and improved management allows for the increaseof number of rooms/visitors in water-constrained
destinations. With regard to the most water-consuming
factor, irrigation, considerable reductions can beachieved through alternative gardening (choice ofspecies, landscaping) as well as the use of grey water.
Golf courses can be designed to require less water, andoperators can measure soil moisture to help control andoptimise water use. Hotels with spas and health centres
can engage in a range of water-saving measures, while
new hotel construction can seek to avoid pool landscapesand other water-intensive uses (Gössling 2010).
With regard to direct water use for tourists, Fortuny
et al. (2008) demonstrated that many water-saving
technologies relevant to hotels and other businesses
have short payback times (between 0.1-9.6 years),
making them economically attractive. Investments inwater-saving systems, grey water reuse and rainwatercollection and management systems can help reducewater consumption by 1,045 m3 per year, or a 27 per centlower volume per guest per night.
In the Rainforest Alliance (2010) study, the water bill
was reduced in 31 per cent of companies, with averageannual savings of US$ 2,718 (maximum of US$ 7,900),
a particularly large number given the very low price ofwater charged in those countries. Required investment
ranged from 1 per cent to 3 per cent of annual operations
costs. Average investment was US$ 2,884 (maximum
US$ 10,000). Average annual savings were US$ 2,718, fora payback period of 1.1 years.
Waste
Improved waste management provides opportunities
for business and society. Lower levels of generation

improves financial return for private sector actors, andbetter management of that waste creates opportunities
for jobs, and enhances the attractiveness of destinations.
Hamele and Eckardt (2006), reporting the results ofan analysis of 36 hotels in the 2 to 4-star categories
in Germany and Austria, showed average values per
overnight-stay for solid waste (1.98 kg) and waste water(6.03 litres). The average cost of managing these twowaste streams is € 0.28 per occupied room night. In
Rainforest Alliance (2010), solid waste was reduced in 71
per cent of companies, with average annual savings of
US$ 3,600.
Biodiversity
UNEP (2010) argues that biodiversity conservation
will be greatly affected by the way in which tourism
grows and develops, especially in developing countries
hosting biodiversity hotspots, where tourism is expected
to become increasingly important. Demand growthfor experiences that involve contact with wildlife
and pristine (or near pristine) ecosystems and the
expectations from guests that tour operators respect andprotect the natural resource base are increasingly driving
changes in the tourist industry. Policies of mainstream
tourism are likely to change towards more effective
conservation of sensitive ecosystems, driven by market
demand and large operator programmes (for instance,
cruise-industry guidance on coastal systems). Moreover,the increasing trends for nature-based tourism willencourage conservation and tourism revenues (including
protected-area fees) to grow in tandem. Current trends
towards increasing nature-based and ecotourism arelikely to continue or accelerate as pristine areas become
increasingly rare, leading in turn to the incorporationof natural areas in tourism development and greatertransfer of benefits toward natural areas.
Conservation and restoration provides a highly profitable,
low-cost investment for maintaining ecosystem services(Box 3). Avoiding loss of ecosystems by conservation,
particularly of forests, mangroves, wetlands and coastal
zones, including coral reefs, is a sound investment froma cost-benefit analysis. This appears to hold from both asocietal investment perspective as well as a private one.
The review of dozens of restoration projects worldwide
concludes that restoration compared with biodiversity
loss provides a benefit/cost ratio of 3 to 75 in return ofinvestments and an internal rate of return of 7 to 79 percent (Nellemann and Corcoran 2010).
More than 70 per cent of Latin American hotels surveyed
by Rainforest Alliance (2010) support biodiversity
conservation while 83 per cent of them indicate thatconservation practices have created competitive
advantages through operation savings, improved image
and process improvements. Ringbeck et al. (2010) reportsignificant returns of green investments in tourism431

Towards a green economy

Box 3: Strengthening the Protected Area Network (SPAN)
Strengthening the Protected Area Network (SPAN)
is an initiative funded by the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) designed to maximise the potential of
the protected-area system in Namibia by bolstering
its management and establishing partnerships. It isa six-year project with a GEF grant of US$ 8.5 million
and co-financing amounting to US$ 33.7 million.
Global Environment Facility analysis indicates that
tourism in Namibia’s protected areas contribute to
3.1 to 6.3 per cent of the country’s GDP. Investmentby the government of Namibia in the past 20
years has achieved a rate of return of 23 per cent.
The government has increased the annual budget
for park management and development by 300

at major sun and beach destinations in Spain (Box 4).
The authors estimated a present value of investments(capital expenditure) on water and energy efficiency,
emissions mitigation and biodiversity conservation of
US$ 1 billion and a significantly higher present valueof savings (US$ 2.5 billion), with strongest investment
recovery from biodiversity.

per cent in the past four years. A quarter of thepark-entrance revenue is to be reinvested in park
and wildlife management through a trust fund,providing additional sustainable financing of US$
2 million annually. First implemented in 2007, The
National Policy on Tourism and Wildlife Concessions
on State Land has approved more than 20 new
tourism and hunting concessions. After two years it
had generated more than US$ 1 million annually infees payable to the government. Local communities
were granted most of the concession rights inprotected areas, creating revenue and jobs for local
people.
Source: GEF (2009)

3.5 Cultural heritage
The largest single component of consumer demand
for more sustainable tourism is for cultural authenticity(CESD and TIES 2005). Cultural heritage includes living
cultures, both mainstream and minority, as well as
historical, religious, and archaeological sites. Tourism

Box 4: Financial cost-recovery of green programmes in tourism
Based on its experience with the greening process
of one of the world’s leading sun-and-beach tourist
destinations (a seaside locale in Spain), Booz &Company report significant returns from investment
in energy efficiency and GHG emissions, lower
water consumption, better waste management
practices and biodiversity conservation. The green

Biodiversity
Resilient water supply
Green water transport
Green building design
Buildings operations efficiency (others)
Buildings operations efficiency (hotels)
0

200

400

600

Savings/capital expenditure (present value)

432

800
%

transformation strategy was developed after athorough baseline analysis that showed, like most
tourist destinations, unsustainable water andenergy consumption patterns, problems with waste
management and the risk of total depletion of key
natural resources such as coral reefs and marine animals(main attractions). Capital expenditure on greening
the tourism sector can quickly be offset by the savingsin operation costs, which include not only the costsof greening initiatives, but also the socioeconomic
effects of lost tourism revenue. Savings by reducing
operation costs from green programmes, comparedwith the capital expenditure, range from 174 per cent(hotel buildings operation efficiency) to 707 per cent(biodiversity conservation). Private investment andpublic funding was used to secure sufficient funding.
The greening transformation followed a three-stepprocess, including an assessment of the destination’senvironmental status, the development of a green
strategy and the collaborative execution of projects
related to the green strategy.
Source: Ringbeck et al. (2010)

Tourism
can offer opportunities for continuation, rejuvenation orenhancement of traditions and a way of life.
Culture is rarely static, and linking tourism and culturalsurvival may bring benefits as well as changes andchallenges for a community to address. The possible
socio-cultural costs and benefits of tourism to a vulnerable
culture are rarely quantified. Tourism projects need toinclude a programme to monitor economic and cultural
benefits so that vulnerable cultures can assess and manage
the impacts of tourism on their communities (Wild 2010).
Aside from the intangible benefits, most commentators
believe that investment in cultural heritage is among themost significant, and usually profitable, investments asociety, or tourism sector, can make (Box 5).

3.6 Modelling tourism

11

To quantify the likely effects of increased investments intourism, the green investment scenario (G2) simulated
in the modelling exercise allocates on average 0.2 percent of global GDP12 (or US$ 248 billion at constant 2010
US dollar prices) per year between 2011 and 2050 to
the tourism sector, which is further disaggregated into
energy, water and waste management, staff training,and biodiversity conservation.13 The green investment
represents 4% of tourism GDP. This would most
likely comprise a mixture of public as well as private
investments. Assumptions of the model are presented
in Annex 3 and results of simulations are detailed below.
Results of the simulation
The results of the simulations of the green investment
scenario indicates that total arrivals of international
tourists will increase by 2.8 per cent per year by 2030
and then at a lower rate of 2.5 per cent per year in
the longer term to reach 2.6 billion in 2050, whichis 30 per cent below the corresponding business-asusual scenario (BAU2) due to the shift towards lessfrequent -but longer- trips in the green scenario14. The
immediate impacts of international and domestic
tourism will lead to a yearly direct tourism expenditureof US$ 11.3 trillion on average between 2010 and 2050
in the green investment scenario (in such areas as
sales in the hotel sector, hotel payments for wages andsalaries, taxes, and supplies and services). These direct
11. This section (including forecasts and simulations regarding
international tourism growth) is based on the Millennium Institute’s workfor the Green Economy Report.
12. Tourism accounts for 5% of global GDP.
13. In the G2 green investment scenario, an additional 2 per cent of global
GDP is allocated to a green transformation of a range of key sectors, ofwhich tourism is one (see Modelling chapter for more detailed explanationof scenarios and results).
14. BAU2 refers to the BAU scenario with an additional 2 per cent of global
GDP per year invested according to current patterns and trends (seeModelling chapter).

expenditures have strong impacts on the destination
economies resulting from various rounds of re-spendingof tourism expenditure in other industries (i.e. industries
supplying products and services to hotels). The total
expenditure, including direct and indirect expenditures,will reach US$ 21.5 trillion on average over the next
40 years in the green scenario. The resulting higher
economic growth drives the sector GDP to grow from
US$ 3 trillion today to US$ 10.2 trillion in 2050, exceeding
the corresponding BAU scenario by 7 per cent. Direct
employment in this sector is expected to grow to 580
million in the green scenario by 2050, compared with
544 million in the corresponding BAU projection. The
training of these new employees requires US$ 31 billionof investment per year on average in the next 40 years.
Despite the rising flow of tourists, the green investment
will lead to significant resource conservation throughconsiderable efficiency improvements and reduction oflosses:■■ Tourism water consumption is projected to be
6.7 km3 in 2050 in the green scenario, undercutting
the corresponding BAU scenario by 18 per cent. In
the meantime, additional investments are projected
to increase water supply, which is essential for many
tourism-dependent, water-stressed countries – onaverage 0.02 km3 per year above BAU2 from desalination,and 0.6 km3 per year from conventional sources (treatedwastewater, surface and underground water) throughbetter management over the 40-year period.

Box 5: Differential economic
contribution from culturalareas
In Western Australia, attempts have been madeto measure the economic value of cultural
heritage through direct tourism expenditure,using three locations: the city of Freemantle,
the city of Albany and the town of New Norcia.
In order to determine the proportion of thetotal overnight visitor expenditure that could
be directly attributable to cultural heritage, anattribution factor was generated based on datafrom visitor surveys and other sources. The study
found that between 63 per cent and 75 per centof a visitor’s expenditure was due to the cultural
heritage of the area, generating in the region of
US$ 40-$ 80 per visitor per day.
Source: Tourism Western Australia, available at
http://www.westernaustralia.com, accessed on September 10, 2010433

Towards a green economy■■ Under the green scenario, tourism energy supply anddemand will see both the expansion of renewables andefficiency improvements across all tourism activities. The
incremental renewable-energy supply associated with
tourism will be 43 Mtoe per year on average, including
the expansion and introduction of renewable power
generation and biofuels. On the demand side, thetotal energy consumption for various tourism activities
will reach 954 Mtoe in 2050 under the green scenario,
representing 44 per cent of avoided energy use relative
to BAU2. These savings come from a mix of effective
measures in individual activities – a modal shift to lesscarbon-intensive transport (e.g. electrified train and coach),behavioural changes (e.g. shorter-haul trips) to reduce total
travel distance, better energy management (e.g. setting
targets and benchmarking for hotels) – as well as acrossall sectors – technological advances in fuel efficiency andfewer inefficient uses due to better equipment or greater
environmental awareness. More specifically, tourism
transport, thanks to the transport-sector investments, will
see the largest saving (604 Mtoe below the corresponding
BAU scenario), followed by tourist accommodation, with150 Mtoe of avoided consumption in 2050.
■■ As a result of these energy savings, CO2 emissions will
be mitigated substantially relative to the corresponding
BAU projection (-52 per cent by 2050), returning to
the current level of 1.44 Gt in 2050, or 7 per cent of
global emissions. The relative increase of the share of
global emissions generated by tourism derives froma projected growth of tourism GDP higher than the
average projected growth of global GDP. Tourism is
expected to grow faster than most other sectors; and,without green investments, its environmental impacts
would be much higher. By 2050, transportation is434

expected to still be the principal emitter (0.7 Gt), withaviation and cars accounting for 74 per cent and 24 percent of the reduction respectively. Accommodation, as
the second-largest emitter, will account for 0.58 Gt ofemissions in 2050. The remaining CO2 emissions (98 Mt)
are caused by other tourism activities. In addition to themitigation of CO2 emissions in the green economy, as
climate is a key resource for tourism and the sector ishighly sensitive to the impacts of climate change, thesesustainable practices should strengthen the capacity of
tourist destinations to adapt to unfavourable climaticconditions.
■■ Furthermore, investment in tourism waste
management allows for a higher rate of waste collection
and reuse (recycling and recovery). In 2050, 207 Mt ofwaste will be generated by the tourism sector in the green
scenario, compared with 180 Mt in the corresponding
BAU scenario (due to higher GDP and tourist visitor nights
in green scenarios). On the other hand, green investment
is estimated to allow 57 Mt more reuse of waste than in
the corresponding BAU scenario, therefore cutting net
waste disposal (taking into consideration waste reuse) in
2050 by 30 Mt relative to BAU2.
■■ These savings will result in potential avoided costs
that can be reinvested in socially and environmentally
responsible local activities (such as protected areas, local
transportation or staff capabilities and skills), increasing
the indirect and induced effects of tourism expenditure
on local development. In particular, spending by visitorsfrom wealthier regions to developing countries helps tocreate much-needed employment and opportunities
for development, reducing economic disparities andpoverty.

Tourism

4 Overcoming barriers:
enabling conditions
Tourism can have positive or negative impacts
depending on how it is planned, developed andmanaged. A set of enabling conditions is required
for tourism to become sustainable: to contribute tosocial and economic development within the carrying
capacities of ecosystems and socio-cultural thresholds.
This section presents recommendations to create
the enabling environment for increased investment
in sustainable tourism development, overcoming
barriers in the areas of (1) private-sector orientation;(2) destination planning and development; (3) fiscal
and government investment policies; (4) financeand investment; (5) local investment generation.
Recommendations are based substantially on thepolicy recommendations of the International Task Forceon Sustainable Tourism Devel­opment (ITF-STD).15
Tourism market tendencies indicate that the main drivers
towards sustainable tourism investment decisions
are consumer demand changes; business actions to
reduce operational costs and increase competitiveness;coherent policies and regulations for environmental
protection; technology improvements; private efforts
for environmental and social responsibility andnatural resource conservation. These are leading thetransformation of the industry and determining thereturns on investments.16 The systemic characteristic of asustainable tourism industry stresses the need to invest
more in energy and water efficiency, climate-change
mitigation, waste reduction, biodiversity conservation,
the reduction of poverty, the conservation of cultural
assets and the promotion of linkages with the local
economy. The savings and higher returns expected fromactions in those areas can simultaneously be invested in
new green investment projects, creating a self-enforcing
greening dynamic that could enhance competitivenessand strengthen sustainability.

A cross-cutting barrier to greener or more sustainable
tourism investment is the lack of understanding
and recognition of the value created for companies,
communities and destinations from the greening of
tourism. The sharing of knowledge, information andexperiences among public, private and civil society actors
is a necessary first step towards overcoming these barriers.

4.1 Private-sector orientation
Tourism is a heterogeneous industry17 where hundreds(and sometimes thousands) of actors operate in multiple
market segments, even within a single country or region.
These segments include conventional and mass tourism
as well as niche areas such as ecotourism, adventure
tourism, rural tourism, community-based tourism, sports
fishing, cruise tourism and more recently, health tourism.
The principal businesses within the tourism industry areaccommodation, tour operation, and transport (land, air,and aquatic). In addition, tourism has diverse linkages
through several economic activities, from lodging,entertainment and recreation, to transportation,
professional services and advertisement, among
others.18 While all can and should benefit in the medium
to long term, greening will require very different actions
and investments, and benefit companies in different
ways – there is no single strategy or recipe for all tofollow. A coherent strategy for green tourism growthmust, therefore, cover all segments and activities, andthe ways in which they interact.
The tourism industry is dominated by Small and Mediumsized Enterprises (SMEs). Although online travel agencies
and large conventional tour operators control an
important share of international travel from Europe andNorth America, tourism destinations are characterised

15. The ITF-STD was comprised of members from UNEP, UNWTO, 18 developed and developing countries, seven other international organisations, seven nongovernmental organisations, and seven international business associations. It was an outcome of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, which
declared that “fundamental changes in the way societies produce and consume are indispensable for achieving global sustainable development”. The work of
the Task Force will continue with its successor, the Global Partnership for Sustainable Tourism (http://www.unep.fr/scp/tourism/activities/partnership/index.htm).
16. Drivers and likely implications of sustainable investments in key strategic areas for tourism (energy, climate change, water, waste, biodiversity, cultural
heritage and the local economy) are summarised in Annex 2.
17. Tourism does not fit the standard notion of an “industry” because it is a demand-based concept. It is not the producer who provides the distinguishing
characteristics that determine how tourism is classified, but rather the purchaser, i.e. the visitor (OECD 2000).
18 The Tourism Satellite Account (TSA) indicates that “tourism industries comprise all establishments for which the principal activity is a tourism
characteristic activity.” Tourism characteristics consumption products and tourism industries are grouped in 12 categories: accommodation for visitors,
food and beverages serving activities, railway passenger transport, road passenger transport, water passenger transport, air passenger transport, transport
equipment rental, travel agencies and other reservation services activities, cultural activities, sports and recreational activities, retail trade of country-specifictourism characteristic goods, and other country-specific tourism characteristic activities (see UNWTO 2010c).

435

Towards a green economy
by the predominance of smaller businesses. For example,
close to 80 per cent of all hotels worldwide are SMEs
(WEF 2009a) and, in Europe, this figure is 90 per cent.19
Additionally, providers of goods and services for theindustry tend to be small, local businesses. Reachingout to such a wide variety of small businesses, acrossnumerous sectors, continents and languages is a daunting
task. Without information, knowledge and tools, greening
will be nearly impossible. Nonetheless, engaging these
critical actors is a necessary condition for a sustainableindustry. In Nepal, for instance, incentives for privatesector participation in capacity-building events and theimplementation of sustainable action plans have helped
to increase their access to international sustainable
tourism markets, improved project performance andstimulated interest among other companies in Nepal insustainable tourism business practices, creating synergies
throughout the industry (UNEP 2008).
Organisational management is a key element ofbusiness sustainability. According to By and Dale (2010),
successful management of change (political, economic,
social and technological) is crucial for the survival andsuccess of tourism SMEs, particularly with the following
eight critical factors: adaptability and flexibility;commitment and support; communication and cooperation; continuous learning and improvement; formal
strategies; motivation and reward; pragmatism; andthe right people (skilled and motivated collaborators).
Kyriakidou and Gore (2005) argue that best performing
SME operations in hospitality, tourism and leisureindustry share cultural features such as cooperative
setting of missions and strategies, development of
teamwork and organisational learning.
Tourism businesses are no different to other businesses
when it comes to the criteria that must be considered
in deciding whether to invest in them. However, there
are some specific characteristics that will affect tourism
business costs (Driml et al. 2010):■■ Tourism businesses are relatively labour-intensive
and therefore labour costs often make up the largest
proportion of operating costs;■■ The cost of inputs for capital investment and operation
are higher for remote locations;■■ The cost of capital will attract a premium if there is
uncertainty about returns from investment in tourism;■■ The price of land in tourist-desirable locations will begoverned by competition with other land uses which
may be able to pay more (due to higher returns);
19. Available at www.hotelenergysolutions.net, accessed on September 30,
2010.

436

■■ Project planning and approvals cost will be high if
assessment is lengthy or complex; and■■ Labour and land make up a high proportion of inputs
and are subject to payroll tax and land tax.
A question is how to address these basic issues while
making sustainable investment decisions. In this regard,
the ITF-STD recommends that “tourism businesses andgovernment institutions in charge of tourism should
adopt innovative and appropri­
ate technology to
improve the efficiency of resource use (notably energy
and water), minimise emissions of greenhouse gases(GHG) and the production of waste, while protecting
bio­
diversity, helping reduce poverty and creating
growth and sustainable development conditions for
local communities.” The business case for investing inthese areas is sound. At the private-sector level, hotel
owners, tour operators, and transport services can play a
key role in protecting the environment and influencing
tourists to make sustainable choices. Increased
public environmental awareness, including traveller
awareness, has contributed to the development of ahost of voluntary industry initiatives and the definitionof environmental performance at the national, regional
and international levels (UNEP 1998). Many larger
corporations are already addressing their environmental
and social impacts. In many countries, SMEs accountfor the vast majority of businesses and can have asignificant environmental impact; however, they tend
to be more reactive to addressing environmental issues(Kasim 2009). Nevertheless, increasing pressure fromconsumers could force them to address more impacts inorder to remain competitive.
Enabling conditions for engaging the industry
1. Tourism
promotionorganisations,
resource
management agencies and Destination Management
Organizations (DMOs) should link tourism products (i.e.
parks, protected areas and cultural sites) more closelywith marketing positions. This will ensure a consistentand unique selling position in world tourism markets
based on high-value experiences at natural andcultural sites in a compact geographical area.
2. Tourism industry associations and wider industry
platforms play an important role in engaging tourism
businesses in sustainability as well as developing
practical tools to respond to many common
challenges. As in most industries, the concept ofcorporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly
recognised in the tourism sector and is being
promoted by industry bodies, at the international aswell as national levels. However, a formal response,
including measures such as triple-bottom-line
reporting, environmental management systems andcertification appears to be prevalent only withinTourisma selection of larger firms. Smaller firms are largely
outside this sphere, and diverse supplier groups
may not be connected at all. Experience in many
countries has shown that well designed mechanisms
and tools to educate SMEs are critical, but are mosteffective when they are accompanied by concrete,actionable items.
3. International development institutions, such as
multilateral and bilateral cooperation agencies, andDevelopment Finance Institutions (DFIs) should
engage directly to inform, educate and work
collaboratively with the tourism industry to integrate
sus­tainability into policies and management
practices, and secure their active participation indeveloping sus­tainable tourism. At the national level,
government and civil-society engagement should
be a critical part of these efforts to coordinate action.
4. The increased use of industry-oriented decisionsupport tools would help speed the adoption ofgreen practices. Hotel Energy Solutions, TourBenchand SUTOUR are examples of projects designed toprovide assistance to Europe’s tou­rism enterprises
to identify potential investments and cost-saving
opportunities for sustainable decision making
to ensure profitability and competitiveness(saving money and investment in ecologicalbuilding measures and equipment with low
energy consumption); provide visitor satisfaction(fulfilling their demands and expectations for highenvironmental quali­ty); achieve efficient use ofresources (minimising the consumption of waterand non-renewable energy sources); secure a clean
environment (minimising the production of CO2 andreducing waste); and conserve biological diversity(minimising the usage of chemical substances anddangerous waste products).
5. The promotion and widespread use of internationallyrecognised standards for sustainable tourism isnecessary to monitor tourism operations andmanagement. The private sector tends to perform
best when clear criteria, objectives and targets
can be identified and incorporated into theirinvestment plans and business operations. The
Global Sustainable Tourism Criteria (GSTC), issued in
October 2008, provides the most promising current
platform to begin the process of grounding andunifying an understanding of the practical aspectsof sustainable tourism, and prioritising private
sector investment.20 The GSTC should be adopted in
20. The Global Sustainable Tourism Criteria Partnership began in 2007
and member organisations include the World Tourism Organization(UNWTO), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), United
Nations Foundation, Expedia.com, Travelocity-Sabre, and over 50 otherorganisations (Bien et al. 2008).

order to assess industry’s performance and support
policy recommendations. At a national and evensub-national level, GSTC, supported by information
sharing and access to experts and experienced
greening pioneers, is a critical step.
6. Economies of scale in the tourism sector could beachieved by means of clustering. A high environmental
quality is a key input by those companies that
pursue competitive advantages based on soundenvironmental management. In the case of tourism,
the conservation of the natural capital of a country
has a chainable effect and complementary influenceon many firms. Clustering can strengthen backward
and forward linkages in the tourism value chain anddrive sustainability in the whole industry. Naturaland cultural attractions are the most valuableassets for tourism development. The tourism cluster
must become actively engaged in environmental
management and conservation. Active collaboration
with the public sector and community organisations
will strengthen competitive position for the entire
cluster. In the case of Croatia, for instance, Ivanovic
et al. (2010) show that small businesses dominate
the tourism market share in the total number ofenterprises and generate the highest employment
rates and income. However, they also show the lowest
rate of productivity. This situation partly results fromlimited understanding of the potential benefits ofclustering in tourism, including economies of scale;growth of technological and organisational knowhow, and higher market share.

4.2 Destination planningand development
Destination planning and development strategies will bea critical determinant for the greening of tourism. Every
destination is unique, and therefore each development
strategy must be sensitive to the destination’s uniqueassets and challenges, while creating a vision to deliver
the destination’s goals for environmental sustainability.
Destination planners and policy officials are frequently
unaware of the opportunities that greener tourism
can bring to their destination. And even those who areaware usually lack the skills or experience necessary tobuild sustainability into new or ongoing destination
development efforts.
Advancing greening goals through tourism planningand destination development requires the ability andinstitutional capacity to integrate multiple policy areas;consider a variety of natural, human and cultural assets
over an extended time frame; and put in place thenecessary rules and institutional capacity. A destination
cannot successfully implement a green tourism strategy

437

Towards a green economy
without the right laws and regulations in place, or theright governance structure to oversee them. Legislation
should protect the environment, limit potentiallyharmful development, control detrimental practices, andencourage healthy behaviour. Clear rules in these areas,
based on the destination strategy and its unique asset base,determine the direction, scale and scope of government
and private investment in more sustainable tourism.
Enabling conditions for greener destination planning
1. Higher-level government, community and private
tourism authorities must establish mechanisms for
coordinating with ministries responsible for theenviron­ment, energy, labour, agriculture, transport,
health, finance, security, and other relevant areas, aswell as with local governments. Clear requirements
such as zoning, protected areas, environmental rules
and regulations, labour rules, agricultural standards,
and health requirements (particularly for water, waste
and sanitation) establish clear rules of the game, anddefine the operating climate for investment. These
decisions relate very closely to fiscal and investment
considerations discussed in the following section.
2. Organisations engaged in developing tourism
strategies should make use of credible scien­tific methods and tools encompassing economic,
environmental and social approaches and assess­ments for sustainable development that will help
stakeholders related to different components of thevalue chain understand their environmental andsocio-cultural impacts.
3. Tourism Master Plans or Strategies provide a supplyside approach for developing a tourism destination.
Environmental and social issues must be included inthese plans in order to manage the critical assets andpromote greener outcomes. Green transformation
programmes will be more effective if produced bya multi-stakeholder participatory planning proc­ess,
as well as through the development of partnerships
at local, national, regional and international levels.
Multilateral environmental and social agreements
and the organisations that support them should be
included in the process.21 Public, private and civilsociety stakeholders should make a decision on thekind of tourism industry they want to consolidatein the medium and long terms, considering thepossible impacts on the natural resource base and21. For instance, these include the principles of the Global Code of Ethics
for Tourism adopted by UNWTO and endorsed by the UN Gen­eral Assembly
as well as the recommendations and guidelines provided by Multilateral
Environmental Agreements and conventions, as appropriate, including theConvention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the World Heritage Conven­tion,
the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli­mate Change (UNFCCC),
the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and theCode of Conduct for the protection of children against sexual exploitationin travel and tourism.

438

the development opportunities for the country.
Therefore, the creation of a sound institutionalframework is required. Coordination among key
actors and environmental regulations enforcement
are key conditions. In addition, when investing intourism sustainability, main short-, medium- andlong-term objectives should be followed, based on:■■ The contribution to country macroeconomic
balances;■■ The creation of local direct and indirect
employment;■■ The use of local raw materials and inputs;■■ The benefits created in other productive sectors(multipliers outside the industry);■■ The effects on local development and poverty;■■ Themodernisation,
diversification
sustainability of the tourism value chain; andand■■ The growth of the internal and external demand
for sustainable tourism.
4. When promoting sustainable tourism, a coherent
destination planning policy is necessary to createa sound international reputation, a country brandthat differentiates and positions the countrycompetitively. According to FutureBrand (2008),
while tourism is often the most visible manifestationof a country brand, it is clear that the image,
reputation and brand values of a country impact its
products, population, investment opportunities andeven its foreign aid and funding. Therefore, a holistic
nation approach is required in order to align public
and private sector initiatives to create a successful
country brand based on sustainability.
5. Assessment of carrying capacity and social fabricshould be considered to take into account external
and internal impacts of tourism at destination. While
it is difficult to evaluate due to great differences fromone destination to another, maximum thresholds
could be agreed on so as to provide guidance for thedevelopment of planning policies.

4.3 Fiscal policies andeconomic instruments
The greening of tourism will require a more sophisticateduse of instruments within government purview, such as
fiscal policy, public investment, and pricing mechanisms
for different public goods.

Tourism
Tourism investment from government should focus on
business motivations for sustainable management as
key targets. Incentives should be consistent with both
environmental protection and value added creation.
Market trends and competitive advantages need to be
mutually reinforced. In this regard, policy coherenceis a necessary condition. From a national perspective,
sustainable tourism policy should address market failures(including externalities) in a consistent manner, avoiding
the creation of additional distortions through government
interventions. Like markets, governments can fail.
Selected interventions must promote a more efficient
allocation of goods and resources than would occur inthe absence of government action. Social policy should
address compensation and benefits to workers, access toimproved opportunities, human resource development,
and value chain integration strategies. In the case ofsustainable tourism policies, more coherence in terms oftargets (location investments, development of specificareas for destination, national and local infrastructure
investments), management (institutional coordination,
impact analysis studies) and incentives (effectiveness,cost-benefit, and adequacy) is required to maintainsound competitive advantages. Where possible, the useof incentives should be based on market instruments
rather than command and control measures. Some formsof market failures deserve special attention, particularly
those that prevent learning how new sustainable tourism
businesses can be produced profitably (self-discovery
externalities), impede simultaneous and integrated
investments which decentralised markets cannot
coordinate (coordination externalities), and omit public
inputs (legislation, accreditation, transport and otherinfrastructure, for instance).
Enabling conditions in fiscal and government
investment policies
1. In the case of tourism, policy intervention towards
investment sustainability can be justified as far as
enabling conditions promote the sustainable useof natural resources and therefore create positive
externalities for the society. Alternative, lessproductive uses of natural resources (i.e. unsustainableagriculture) or possible depletion activities (i.e.
housing construction) could be compensated (for theiropportunity cost) with policy instruments that increase
profitability for sustainable tourism businesses andgenerate positive environmental externalities. Freeriding (non-compliance by companies) should be
avoided with an effective performance monitoringand impact evaluation mechanism. There is a need to
conduct periodical evaluations and impact analysisof tourism incentives, from an economic, social andenvironmental perspective.
2. Defining and committing to critical government
investments in the green enabling environment

plays a central role in determining private sector
investment and direction. Government investments
in protected areas, cultural assets, water, waste
management, sanitation, transportation and energy
infrastructure investments play a critical role inprivate sector investment decisions toward greener
outcomes. Investments in public infrastructure
related to tourism or investments in private
tourism businesses should estimate their socialand environmental impacts and adopt economic
measures to compensate and offset unavoidable
impacts.
3. Appropriate taxation and subsidy policies shouldbe framed to encourage investment in sustainable
tourism activities and discourage unsustainable
tourism. Use of taxation is often resorted to forkeeping developments in limits (for instance, taxes
on use of resources and services at the destinations)and controlling the specific inputs and outputs (likeeffluent charges and waste services).
4. Tax concessions and subsidies can be used toencourage green investment at the destinations
and facilities. Subsidies can be given on purchaseof equipment or technology that reduces waste,encourages energy and water efficiency, or
the conservation of biodiversity (payments forenvironmental services) and the strengtheningof linkages with local businesses and community
organisations.
5. Establish clear price signals to orient investment andconsumption. The price for such public goods aswater production and supply, electricity and waste
management send important signals to the private
sector. Governments frequently price these goods atvery low levels (frequently even free) to encourage
investment, only to find that low prices encourage
waste, place a drain on communities and make itvery costly (financially and politically) to raise prices.

4.4 Financing green
tourism investments
Environmental and social investments are relatively
new, and remain outside the mainstream of financial
markets (particularly in developing countries). In manycases, barriers are based on misperceptions or lack ofknowledge. For example, for many green investments,
payback periods and amounts are not clearly
established (due to limited experience with them),
creating uncertainty for banks or other investors thatcan jeopardise financing. Also, the return on many green
investments includes easily measurable components(such as energy savings), combined with more difficult439

Towards a green economy
to measure components such as guest satisfaction
which can make calculating returns tricky.22
In other cases, framework conditions in destination
countries limit investment. For example, higher interest
rates in many countries make investments that arecompletely viable in wealthy countries, unviable in the local
environment. Another frequently cited situation found inmany developing countries is that the financial regulatory
systems classify environmental investments as nonproductive assets, requiring banks to hold greater reserves,
resulting in higher interest rates and less investment.
Enabling conditions for finance
1. The single greatest limiting factor for SMEs in moving
toward greener tourism is lack of access to capital forthis type of investments. Green investments must be
seen as value-adding and made on their economic
and financial merits, without prejudice. This will
require greater private sector awareness of the valueof green investment, and also policy coordination
with Ministries of Finance and regulatory authorities.
2. Regional funds for local tourism development
could help overcome financial barriers for green
investments where investments also generate public
returns (through positive externalities). Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI), private equity, portfolio
investment, and other potential funding sources
should be also aligned with sustainable projects
and strategies for the tourism industry. Ringbeck
et al. (2010) argue that not all green initiatives arefinancially possible for the local or national parties
undertaking them, and destinations are not always
able to generate enough revenue through their own
resources. When local financial resource limitations
exist, obtaining external funding could help ensure
the long-term sustainabil­ity of investments.
3. Mainstream sustainability into tourism de­velopment
investments and financing. In this regard, theSustainable Investment and Finance in Tourism (SIFT)
network is working to integrate the expectationsof private inves­tors, the leveraged strength of thefinancing and donor community, and the needs ofdeveloping destinations. The SIFT Network aims
to establish a common, voluntary standard to en­
courage greater sustainability in tourism invest­mentsby public, private and multilateral investors; intensify
financing of sustainable tourism projects; increasesustainable investments in the tourism sector;
improve capacity of developing destinations; and22. For example, Frey (2008) found in a survey of South African tourism
businesses that 80 per cent of respondents agree that responsible tourism
management leads to enhanced employee morale and performance,
improves company reputation and is an effective marketing tool. However,businesses are not investing sufficient time or money into changing
management practices.

440

leverage unique knowledge and reach others. SIFT
efforts should permeate to regional, national andlocal financial organisations (counterparts), and help
integrate other global sustainable financial initiatives(e.g. UNEP FI, Equator Principles) to support green
investments in tourism.
4. Establish partnership approaches to spread the costs
and risks of funding sustainable tourism investments.
In the case of SMEs, for example, besides sliding
fees and favourable interest rates for sustainability
projects, in-kind support like technical, marketingor business administration assistance, could help
to offset the cash requirements of firms by offering
them services at low cost. In addition, loans and loan
guarantees could include more favourable grace
periods, soften the requirements on personal asset
guarantees or offer longer repayment periods. Loansfor sustainable tourism projects could be set up withguarantees from aid agencies and private businesses,
lowering risk and interest rates.

4.5 Local investment
As discussed above, sustainable tourism creates
additional opportunities to increase local economic
contribution from tourism. An often-overlooked aspectof these linkages is that they also offer opportunities
for increased investment in local communities.
Capitalised and formalised businesses in the tourism
value chain enhance local economic opportunity(through employment, local contribution and multipliereffects) while also enhancing local competitivenessamong tourists demanding greater local content. Thiswin-win situation is recognised in the UNWTO’s ST-EP
initiative. Notably, many of the targeted mechanisms areinvestment enhancing as well as local-income enhancing.
This promotes a greater number and variety of
excursions in a given destination, a “buy local”
movement in food and beverages sector and growthof specialised niches. Efforts by tourism businesses toinclude local communities within value creation, public
and private initiatives of local workers training, and thedevelopment of infrastructure and supporting industries,
creates new conditions for business development, more
equitable growth and less leakage. These businesses
require investment, and can expect substantial growth
opportunities in successful destinations.
Enabling conditions for increasing local contribution
1. Strengthen tourism value chains to back SME
investment. Destination tourism is usually stableenough to provide sufficient guarantees for investors
and bankers. Long-term contracts for products andservices to hotels or other anchor businesses create

Tourismsuitable conditions, and simple mechanisms tomonitor performance.
2. Expand the use of solidarity lending mechanisms
to permit groups of local suppliers to access credit
and build capital. Solidarity lending (guarantees
provided by a peer group) has proven successful infisheries, agriculture, and handicrafts – all industriesof critical importance to successful sustainable
tourism destinations.
3. Enhance development bank access to individuals
and small businesses that are not eligible for credit,or are involved in the provision of public services(such as protected areas management, guiding,waste management, infrastructure construction,
among others).
4. Establish seed funds to permit new green industries
to develop locally. For example, solar collectors andphotovoltaic systems can be imported as complete
systems, or can be assembled locally from imported
components. The latter encourages local investment
and promotes local economic contribution. It also
permits adaptation of the technologies to better suit
local tourism needs.

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Towards a green economy

5 Conclusions
Tourism is a leading global industry, responsible fora significant proportion of world production, trade,
employment, and investments. In many developing
nations, it is the most important source of foreignexchange and FDI. Tourism growth, environmental
conservation, and social wellbeing can be mutually
reinforcing. All forms of tourism can contribute towards
a green economy transition through investments
leading to energy and water efficiency, climate-change
mitigation, waste reduction, biodiversity and cultural
heritage conservation, and the strengthening of linkages
with local communities. Making tourism businesses
more sustainable will foster the industry’s growth, create
more and better jobs, consolidate higher investment
returns, benefit local development and contribute topoverty reduction, while raising awareness and support
for the sustainable use of natural resources.
The potential economic, social and environmental
costs of a BAU scenario in the tourism industry are
not always considered when evaluating the cost ofinvestments toward sustainability. Concern about
required investments and financing sources availability
are common when considering actions for making
tourism more sustainable. Nevertheless, empiricalevidence shows that demand for traditional mass
tourism has reached a mature stage whereas thedemand for more responsible forms of tourism isbooming and are predicted to be the fastest growing
tourism markets in the next two decades. Tourismmarket tendencies indicate that main drivers towards
investment in sustainable tourism relate to consumer
demand changes, actions to reduce operations costs
and increase competitiveness, coherent policy andregulations, technology improvements, stronger efforts
for environmental and social responsibility and natural
resource conservation. These are leading transformationof the industry and determining the returns on
investments.
In a BAU scenario up to 2050, tourism growth will
imply increases in energy consumption (111 percent), greenhouse gas emissions (105 per cent), water
consumption (150 per cent), and solid waste disposal (252
per cent). On the other hand, under an alternative greener
investment scenario (in energy and water efficiency,
emissions mitigation and solid waste management)of US$ 248 billion (i.e. 0.2 per cent of total GDP), thetourism sector can grow steadily in the coming decades(exceeding the BAU scenario by 7 per cent in terms of thesector GDP) while saving significant amounts of resourcesand enhancing its sustainability. The green investment

442

scenario is expected to undercut the corresponding
BAU scenario by 18 per cent for water consumption, 44
per cent for energy supply and demand, 52 per cent forCO2 emissions. This will result in potential avoided costs
that can be reinvested in socially and environmentally
responsible local activities – such as local transportationand staff capabilities and skills – increasing the indirect
and induced effects of tourism expenditure on local
development. In particular, the spending by foreign
visitors from wealthier regions in developing countries
helps to create much-needed employment andopportunities for development, reducing economic
disparities and poverty, notably through the multipliereffect and the reduction of leakage.
Tourism can have positive or negative impacts
depending on how it is planned, developed andmanaged. Various enabling conditions are required
for transforming tourism to contribute to social andeconomic development within the carrying capacities
of ecosystems.
To promote sustainable tourism in a green economy,
the national, regional, and local economy should firstprovide a good investment climate, featuring security
and stability, regulation, taxation, finance, infrastructure,and labour. Various tourism stakeholders shouldcollaborate and share knowledge and tools in orderto understand the overall picture of environmental
and socio-cultural impacts of tourism activities at
destinations. There is also a need for policy coherence,
which can include economic instruments and fiscal
policy to reward sustainable investments and practices
and discourage the most costly externalities associatedwith uncontrolled tourism expansion. In the case of
tourism, government and private tourism authorities
should coordinate with ministries responsible for theenviron­ment, energy, agriculture, transport, health,finance, security, and other relevant areas, as well as withlocal governments.
By steering the direc­tion of policy and spearheading
sustainability efforts, government authorities canmotivate and influ­ence other stakeholders – both public
and private – to engage in behaviour that bolsters adestination’s sustainability. It is necessary that tourism
promotion and marketing initiatives emphasise
sustainability as a primary option. To create local
development opportunities, marketing efforts should
ensure access to domestic and international markets
by sustainable local, small, medium, community-based
and other tourism suppliers (especially in developing

Tourismcountries). As the tourism industry is dominated by
SMEs, it is also essential to facilitate their access toindustry-oriented decision-support tools, information,knowledge as well as to capital. Partnership approaches
to lower the costs and risks of funding sustainable
tourism investment and in kind support to SMEs should
be considered so as to facilitate the shift toward green
tourism activities.
The design and implementation of a sustainable tourism
enabling environment should be based on a sound formal
and well-documented analysis. Policymakers should set
baselines and measurable targets with regard to short-,
medium-, and long-term results of sustainable tourism
promotion and marketing. It is important to note thatthe success of tourism destinations should be evaluated
not only in terms of arrivals but also in terms of broader
economic, social and environmental drivers, as well as
its impacts. Sustainable tourism policymaking should
be based on sound quantitative analysis. Valuation
exercises (such as choice experiments) can help identify
opportunities for sustainable tourism development fromthe demand side. Tools such as input-output and generalequilibrium models, business surveys, and the Tourism
Satellite Accounts (TSA) can support policy design
and business strategy. The adoption of international
standards and criteria (e.g. GSTC) at a global scale ishighly recommended in order to assess comparable
results and unify an understanding on the practicalaspects of sustainable tourism enabling prioritising ofprivate sector investments. Further, increased adoptionof management standards for environmental and labour
performance23 would greatly assist tourism operators
in strengthening their internal management capacity
to reduce environmental impacts and protect theirworkers, and enhance capacity to relate to community
stakeholders.
The effects of tourism can vary dramatically between
destinations. More quantitative studies are necessary
to clearly understand the reasons for such variations,to expand the evidence base at a national and subnational level on tourism and local employment,
procurement through local supply chains, poverty
reduction, environmental benefits, and other relevant
areas. Domestic tourism (in many countries the mostimportant source of tourism income) should be further
analysed. Business performance and the determinants ofhigher Return on Investment (ROI) on green investments
are key variables to study.
This chapter analyses the main variables that influence
tourism development and aims to demonstrate thatconcerted greener policies can steer the growthof the sector toward a more sustainable path,generating economic benefits, while strengthening
its social and environmental context. Its findings
and recommendations are addressed to all tourism
stakeholders.
23. These include the ISO 14000 series for environmental management,
ISO 26000 series for social responsibility management and S.A. 8000 series
for working conditions.

443

Towards a green economy

Annex 1: Economic sizing of the sector
Country

Domestic tourism
consumption / total tourism
consumption (%)*

Tourism gross domestic
product / GDP (%)*

Jobs in tourism industries /total jobs (%)*

Tourism investment / total
investment (%)**

Australia

73.9

4.1

4.8

12.5

Chile

75.0

3.1

2.6

7.5

China

90.8

4.2

2.3

8.5

Czech Republic

45.3

3.0

3.3

11.0

Ecuador

69.4

4.1

1.8

12.4

Honduras

54.5

5.7

5.3

8.4

Israel

61.0

1.8

2.6

7.6

Japan

93.5

1.9

2.8

5.8

Latvia

51.4

1.9

9.0

7.4

Lithuania

56.4

2.6

2.6

9.8

Netherlands

80.8

3.0

4.3

7.3

New Zealand

56.2

12.0

9.7

15.0

Peru

74.4

3.3

3.1

9.9

Philippines

80.7

6.9

9.7

11.3

Poland

41.0

2.0

4.8

7.1

Romania

47.7

2.2

8.3

7.3

Saudi Arabia

61.5

5.0

3.9

3.9

Slovakia

44.1

2.9

7.3

11.4

Slovenia

43.0

4.9

11.5

12.0

Spain

42.3

10.9

11.8

13.8

* Estimated with TSA country data for latest year available (mainly 2007). ** 2009 values.

Table A1-1: Economic relevance of tourism in selected countries
Source: Author’s calculations with data from UNWTO (2010c) and WTTC (2010)444

TourismAnnex 2: Drivers and likely
implications of investment insustainable tourism strategic areas
Strategicarea

Sustainability drivers

Likely implications

Energy■■ Increased energy costs■■ Likely carbon surcharges■■ Customers expectations (particularly from Europe andNorth America) driving operators and entire supply chain■■ Availability of low-carbon technology■■ Possible government incentives■■ Decreasing costs of renewable energy technologies■■ Eco-labels and/or voluntary standards■■ Regulations/legislation on energy efficiency and performance of buildings■■ Maintain or reduce operating costs for tourism operators through energy efficiency■■ Increased customer satisfaction■■ Investment in energy efficiency (retrofits, improvements)■■ New energy-efficient investment stock■■ Investment in more energy efficient features and services (such as efficient refrigeration, television and video systems, air conditioning and heating and laundry)■■ Differentiation of operators and their value chains■■ Modest shift toward short-haul versus long-haul tourism, with the effect increasing
with energy costs (and offset to the extent efficiency is increased)

Climatechange■■ Costs of GHG emissions (driven by post-Kyoto rules)■■ Concern of customer base about carbon footprint■■ Host government policies and priorities (climate change
mitigation and energy)■■ Uptake of corporate social responsibility (CSR)■■ Climate change impact on tourism sites■■ Same as for energy efficiency■■ Increased substitution of fuels toward electricity, particularly increased investment inpassive solar collectors, photovoltaics and alternative fuels for vehicles■■ Increased number of project developers orienting business strategies toward lowercarbon footprint■■ Expectations of broader stakeholder base■■ Demand for carbon offsets and other mechanisms to compensate for residual emissions

Water■■ Water scarcity■■ Price for water and conflicts■■ Expectations from travellers for responsible water
management■■ Expectations from major tour operators■■ Reduction in water costs from internal water efficiency■■ Investments in water saving technology in rooms, facilities (such as laundry andswimming pools) and attractions (such as golf courses, gardens and water-based
attractions)■■ Increase in number of rooms/visitors in water-constrained destinations■■ Slight advantage to destinations with more abundant water supplies in terms ofvariety of activities and cost of water resources■■ Increased use of water treatment systems, at firm/project level and destination

Waste■■ Customer demand for clean destination■■ Public opinion■■ Degradation of water resources owing to waste dumping
and waste water■■ Pressure from major tour operators■■ Lower pollution and natural resource■■ Improved solid waste management■■ Reduction of open waste dumping sites and poorly managed landfills■■ Investments in waste water management equipment, treatment and disinfection.
■■ Investment in sanitary landfills and solid waste recycling capacity■■ Lower sewage and clean-up fees

Biodiversity■■ Increased tourist preference for experiences that involve
contact with wildlife and pristine (or near pristine)
ecosystems■■ Expectations from guests that operators protect thenatural resource base■■ Government regulations regarding sensitive ecosystems
such as coral reefs, coastal wetlands and forests■■ National policies to attract resources through tourism
capable of protecting critical biological habitat■■ Ecosystem services potential for tourism revenue generation■■ Demand for nature-based tourism likely to accelerate as pristine areas become
increasingly rare■■ Increased number of policies and related practices in mainstream tourism to more
effectively protect sensitive ecosystems■■ Improved design of individual projects and destinations incorporating biodiversity
conservation in situ, and through compensatory mechanisms■■ Increased incorporation of natural areas in tourism development and greater transfer
of benefits toward natural areas through entrance fees and Payment for Ecosystem
Services (PES) schemes

Table A2-1: Drivers and likely implications of investment in sustainable tourism strategic areas
Source: Author’s compilation445

Towards a green economy
Strategicarea

Sustainability drivers

Likely implications

Culturalheritage■■ Tourist preference for experiences that involve contact
with authentic cultural landscapes■■ Expectations from guests that their tourism operators
respect and protect traditional culture■■ Increased awareness of World Heritage Sites■■ Recognition and appreciation for cultural diversity■■ Respect and recognition of traditional culture, particularly in context of assimilation into a dominant culture. Help to community members to validate their culture,especially when external influences of modern life cause the young to become disassociated from traditional life and practices■■ Conservation of traditional lands and natural resources on which the culture has
traditionally relied■■ Help to reduce poverty within a community or cultural group. Increased opportunities
for young to remain in community instead of seeking alternative opportunities in cities and towns. Meet the needs of cultural groups, such as health care, access to cleanwater, education, employment and income■■ Reduced risk of losing unique cultural attributes

Linkageswith Local
Economy■■ Demand for more contact with local communities■■ Greater number and variety of excursions in a given
destination■■ “Buy local” movement in food and beverages sector■■ CSR uptake■■ Public and private initiatives of local workers training■■ Growth of specialised niches (ecotourism, rural tourism,
adventure tourism, sports fishing, agrotourism andcommunity-based tourism)■■ Development of infrastructure and supporting industries■■ Concerted efforts by tourism authorities, local officials and civil society organisations
to increase local content■■ Responses by tourism operators and increasing use of indicators to track local contribution (which feed into tourism satellite accounts)■■ Deepened supply chain in local economy, generating increased indirect employment■■ Increased spending in local economy from income effects in direct and indirect
employee consumption and purchases■■ Improved income distribution among industry stakeholders■■ Decreased leakage (imports of intermediate goods and foreign workers)

Table A2-1: Drivers and likely implications of investment in sustainable tourism strategic areas
Source: Author’s compilation

446

TourismAnnex 3: Assumptions of the model
1. Tourism energy management:
25 per cent of the tourism sector green investment (onaverage US$ 61 billion per year) is allocated in 2011-2050
to both energy demand reduction through efficiency
improvements and increase of renewable energy supply.
Abatement of emissions from energy use: Emissions
from tourism activities are reduced in the green scenario
through efficiency improvements in tourism electricity
and fuel consumption and behavioural changes towards
longer stay and fewer trips, shorter travel distance andtransport modal shifts (from aviation and private cars tocleaner transport, e.g. coach and electric railway). This
investment adds up to US$ 18 billion per year on averageover the next forty years, or 29 per cent of the tourism
energy green investment in the green investmentcase (G2). The same rates of efficiency gain and modal
shifts as in associated GER sectors are assumed, while
the assumption in increase of stay (by 0.5 per cent peryear) and reduction of trips (to retain total guest nights)
is based on the scenarios presented by UNWTO and
UNEP (2008). The investment is estimated by using
CO2 abatement costs included in International Energy
Agency (IEA) (2009). More specifically, for tourism
transportation:■■ The length of stay is assumed to increase by 0.5 percent per year (on average 3.7 days in 2050) instead of
a 0.5 per cent decrease per year (2.5 days in 2050) in
BAU, in line with the scenarios of UNWTO and UNEP
(2008). To be consistent with the projected total guest
nights in other scenarios, tourist arrivals in the green
investment scenario are reduced. Thereby thesetravelling behavioural changes result in fewer but longer
trips, but would not affect total number of guest nights.
In addition, IEA’s assumption of reduced travel is a good
fit with the green tourism goal (short travel and longer
stays).
■■ With respect to transport modal shift and energy
efficiency in the green scenario, to ensure coherence
across the sectors, the same assumptions as in the GER
transportation sector are used for tourism. In accordancewith IEA’s reports, it is assumed that by 2050 in the green
scenario, 25 per cent of car travel and air travel is replacedby bus or rail. The ratio of transport energy efficiency inthe green investment scenario (by 60 per cent) is basedon the amount of green investment and unit abatement
costs from IEA.
■■ Renewableenergyproduction:
Additional
investments of 71 per cent of the tourism energy green
investment (or US$ 43 billion on average per year)

between 2010 and 2050 are allocated to the introductionand expansion of renewable power generation andbiofuel production. The cost assumptions are collectedfrom IEA (2009).
2. Tourism water management:
0.1 per cent of the tourism-sector green investment(on average US$ 0.24 billion per year) is allocated in
2011-2050 to both water demand reduction throughefficiency improvements and increase of water supply24:
Water efficiency improvement: The amount ofinvestment in water-efficiency improvement, aimed
at reducing tourism water demand, is assumed to be
US$ 0.16 billion per year on average (or 65 per cent ofinvestment in tourism water management) over the 40year period. The unit cost is assumed to be US$ 0.28/m3.
Water supply: The remaining (35 per cent) of tourismsector water investment (US$ 0.86 billion per year on
average between 2010 and 2050) aims to increasewater supply from desalination and conventional water
sources:■■ Desalination: 30 per cent of water-supply investment(US$ 0.026 billion per year on average), over the 40-year
period will be invested in water desalination. The cost to
supply water desalination is set at US$ 1.1/m3.
■■ Conventional water supply management: 70 per centof the total water-supply investment (US$ 0.06 billion
per year on average) is allocated to conventional watersupply management measures, including treatmentof wastewater, reservoir storage, and surface andunderground water supply. The unit cost to increase
conventional water supply is set at US$ 0.11/m3.
3. Waste management:
13 per cent of tourism-sector green investment (onaverage US$ 32 billion per year) is allocated in 20112050 to upstream (collection) and downstream (reuse)
waste treatment:■■ Waste reuse: 8 per cent of the tourism waste
investment is invested in waste recycling and recovery,
totalling on average US$ 2.4 billion per year over the
next 40 years under the green investment scenario. The
unit costs of recycling and compost are assumed to be
US$ 138 per tonne and US$ 44.85 per tonne respectively.
24. The low level of investment allocated to tourism water sector is due tothe relatively small amount of water consumption in tourism compared tothe total of all sectors, as the same unit costs and improvement percentage
are used for all water users.

447

Towards a green economy■■ Waste collection: the remaining 92 per cent of green
investment in tourism waste management is allocated to
improve the waste collection rate, totalling on average
US$ 30 billion per year over the next 40 years under thegreen investment scenario. The upstream cost of waste
treatment is assumed to rise from US$ 1,083 per tonne in1970 to US$ 1,695.5 per tonne in 2050.
4. Training of employees:
12 per cent of tourism investment in the green
investment scenario, or US$ 31 billion on average eachyear between 2011 and 2050. The cost of training per
employee is assumed to be US$ 117 for 120 hours, while
all new employees attend training for one year in total
over the duration of their career (together with theassumption that as many as possible would be local
workforce). Overall, the total cumulative cost of training
one employee is assumed to reach US$ 2,854. A varietyof scenarios were simulated to study and evaluate theimpacts of the variation in training cost per employee
per year, in the range of between 30 per cent lower and448

higher than the assumed cost (or from US$ 1,998 to US$
3,711).
5. Biodiversity conservation:
50 per cent of tourism investment, or US$ 123 billion
on average each year between 2011 and 2050. Three
scenarios are simulated based on different biodiversity
conservation costs. These are (a) US$ 119 per hectare,assuming only forest conservation – using the average costoffered by FONAFIFO25; (b) US$ 451 per hectare assuming
the possibility to undertake forestry and agriculture onthat land (based on the experience in Costa Rica, from
Forestry chapter); (c) US$ 1,380 per hectare assuming that
housing and other related business opportunities can becreated, based on what is offered by Amazon Carbon andBiodiversity Investment Fund (ACIF)26.
25. Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal, Costa Rica.
26. The Amazon Carbon and Biodiversity Investment Fund (ACIF) offers
between US$ 276 and US$ 3,450 per ha, but it is a very specific case for
100,000 ha (US$ 3,450/ha seems high for an average). As a consequence, US$
1,380/ha is used as a maximum value of conservation cost in this analysis.

Tourism

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medpotourismreportfinal_ofnc.pd

Tourism451

Cities

Investing in energy and resource efficiency

Towards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Authors: Philipp Rode, Senior Research
Fellow and Executive Director, LSE Cities, London Schoolof Economics and Political Science, UK; and Ricky Burdett,Professor of Urban Studies and Director, LSE Cities, London
School of Economics and Political Science, UK.

Joerg Spangenberg, PhD candidate, University of São Paulo,
Brazil.

Vera Weick and Moustapha Kamal Gueye (in the initial stagesof the project) of UNEP managed the chapter, including thehandling of peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating
authors on revisions, conducting supplementary research andbringing the chapter to final production. Sheng Fulai conductedpreliminary editing of the chapter.

We would like to thank the many colleagues and individuals
who commented on the Review Draft, including Andrea
Bassi (Millennium Institute), Karin Buhren (UN Habitat), Maike
Christiansen (UNEP), Marie-Alexandra Coste (Caisse de Dépots as
Member of UNEP FI Property Working Group), Daniel Hoornweg(World Bank), Ana Lucía Iturriza (ILO), Ariel Ivanier (UNECE),
Gulelat Kebede (UN Habitat), Markus Lee (World Bank), Tan Siong
Leng (Urban Development Institute, Singapore), Esteban Leon
(UN Habitat), Robert McGowan, Carolina Proano, Alexis Robert(OECD), Susanne Salz (ICLEI), Synnove Lyssand Sandberg, Sanjeev
Sanyal (Sustainable Planet Institute), David Satterthwaite (IIED),
Christian Schlosser, (UN Habitat), Soraya Smaoun (UNEP), Niclas
Svenningsen (UNEP), Mark Swilling (University of Stellenbosch,South Africa), Kaarin Taipale (Marrakech Task Force on Sustainable
Buildings and Construction), Raf Tuts (UN Habitat), Edmundo
Werna (ILO), and Xing Quan Zhang (UN Habitat).

Contributing authors: Edgar Pieterse, Director, African Centre
for Cities and Professor of Urban Policy, University of Cape Town,
South Africa; Brinda Viswanathan, Associate Professor, Madras
School of Economics, Chennai, India; Geetam Tiwari, Professor forTransport Planning, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, India;
Dimitri Zenghelis, Director, Climate Change Practice, Cisco andVisiting Fellow, Grantham Institute for Climate Change and theEnvironment, London School of Economics and Political Science,
UK; Debra Lam, Senior Policy Consultant, ARUP, London and HongKong; and Xin Lu, Partner, International Building Organisation,
Shanghai, China.
LSE Research Team: Antoine Paccoud; Megha Mukim; Gesine
Kippenberg and James Schofield, all LSE Cities, London School of
Economics and Political Science, UK.
Additional authors: Max Nathan, Research Fellow, LSE Cities and
PhD Candidate, Spatial Economics Research Centre, London
School of Economics and Political Science, UK; Gavin Blyth,
LSE Cities, London School of Economics and Political Science,
UK; Michelle Cullen, PhD candidate, LSE Cities Programme,
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK; andCopyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011

454

Project coordination: Daniela Tanner, LSE Cities, London Schoolof Economics and Political Science, UK.

Additional comments were provided as part of the public review
process by colleagues in the IMF, UNFPA and ICLEI.
We also would like to thank the individuals who assisted in the
research and/or editing process, including Henry Abraham,
Ishwarya Balasubramanian (MSE), Stephen Barrett (RSH+P),
Richard Brown, Andrea Colantonio (LSE), Omer Cavusoglu(LSE), David Dodman (IIED), Nicky Gavron (GLA), Frederic Gilli(SciencePo), Anjula Gurtoo (IISB), Atakan Guven (LSE), Miranda
Iossifidis (LSE), Jens Kandt (LSE), Claire Mookerjee (LSE), Martin
Mulenga (IIED), Alex Payne (LSE), Emma Rees (LSE), Peter
Schwinger (LSE), Natza Tesfay (LSE), and Rick Wheal (Arup).

CitiesContents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
1Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460

1.1
1.2

Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Green cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460

2

Challenges and opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461

2.1
2.2

Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
Opportunities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463

3

The case for greening cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466

3.1
3.2
3.3

Economic benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
Social benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
Environmental and health benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472

4Greening urban sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8

Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
Buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
Energy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
Vegetation and landscape  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
Water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
Food  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
Waste  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
Infrastructure and digital technology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476

5Enabling green cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7

Barriers and constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
Enabling strategies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
Governance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
Planning and regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
Information, awareness and civic engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
Incentives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484

6Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486

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Towards a green economy

List of figures
Figure 1: Urban environmental transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
Figure 2: Ecological Footprint, HDI and urbanisation level by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
Figure 3: Carbon emission and income for selected countries and cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
Figure 4: Private transport fuel expenditure and urban density of selected cities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
Figure 5: Enabling conditions, institutional strength and democratic maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478

List of tables
Table 1: Infrastructure costs for different development scenarios in Calgary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Table 2: Capacity and infrastructure costs of different transport systems  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Table 3: Investment and operating costs of selected green city projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
Table 4: Urban transport employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
Table 5: Mercer quality of living city ranking 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
Table 6: Selected planning and regulatory instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
Table 7: Selected information-based instruments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
Table 8: Selected incentives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
Table 9: Selected financing instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
Table 10: Top-up training for low-carbon jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483

List of boxes
Box 1: Green jobs in the urban economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470

456

Cities

List of acronyms
ARPU
BAU
BedZED
BRT
C40
CDM
CDS
CO2
CHP
EU
FAO
FAR
GDP
GHG
GIS
GLA
GNP
HDI
ILO
IOE
LSE
MTR
OECD
PES
R&D
PV
UNEP

Average revenue per user
Business-as-usual
Beddington Zero Energy Development
Bus rapid transit
Cities Climate Leadership Group
Clean Development Mechanism
City Development Strategy
Carbon dioxide
Combined heat and power
European Union
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Floor area ratios
Gross Domestic ProductGreenhouse gas
Geographic Information System
Greater London Authority
Gross National Product
Human Development Index
International Labour Organization
International Organisation of Employers
London School of Economics and Political Science
Mass Transit Railway
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Payment for Ecosystem Services
Research and development
Photovoltaic
United Nations Environment Programme457

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. Urban development will have to fundamentally change to facilitate the transition towards
a green economy. Urban areas are now home to 50 per cent of the world’s population but theyaccount for 60-80 per cent of energy consumption and a roughly equal share of carbon emissions.
Rapid urbanisation is exerting pressure on fresh water supplies, sewage, the living environment
and public health, which affect the urban poor most. In many cases, urbanisation is characterised
by urban sprawl and peripheralisation – which is not only socially divisive, but also increases energy
demand, carbon emissions and puts pressure on ecosystems.
2. Unique opportunities exist for cities to lead the greening of the global economy. There are
genuine opportunities for national and city leaders to reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance
ecosystems and minimise environmental risks. Compact, relatively densely populated cities, with
mixed-use urban form, are more resource-efficient than any other settlement pattern with similar levelsof economic output. Integrated design strategies, innovative technologies and policies are available toimprove urban transport, the construction of buildings and the development of urban energy, water
and waste systems in such a way that they reduce resource and energy consumption and avoid lock-in
effects.
3. Green cities combine greater productivity and innovation capacity with lower costs andreduced environmental impact. Relatively high densities are a central feature of green cities,
bringing efficiency gains and technological innovation through the proximity of economic activities,
while reducing resource and energy consumption. Urban infrastructure including streets, railways,
water and sewage systems comes at considerably lower cost per unit as urban density rises. The
problem of density-related congestion and associated economic costs can be addressed and offset
by developing efficient public transport systems and road charges.
4. In most countries, cities will be important sites for the emerging green economy. This is forthree main reasons. First, the proximity, density and variety intrinsic to cities deliver productivity
benefits for companies and help stimulate innovation. Second, green industries are dominated byservice activity – such as public transport, energy provision, installation and repair – which tends
to be concentrated in urban areas where consumer markets are largest. Third, some cities will also
develop high-tech green manufacturing clusters in or close to urban cores, drawing on knowledge
and skill spillovers from universities and research labs.

458

Cities

5. Introducing measures to green cities can increase social equity and quality of life. Enhancing
public transport systems, for example, can reduce inequality by improving access to public services
and other amenities, and by helping to relieve vehicle congestion in poorer neighbourhoods.
Cleaner fuel for transport and power generation can reduce both local pollution and healthinequality. Reducing traffic and improving conditions for pedestrians and cyclists can help foster
community cohesion, an important aspect of quality of life, which also has positive impacts on
economic resilience and productivity. Evidence shows that children who live in close proximity togreen space are more resistant to stress, have a lower incidence of behavioural disorders, anxiety, anddepression, and have a higher measure of self-worth. Green space also stimulates social interactionand enhances human well-being.
6. Only a coalition of actors and effective multilevel governance can ensure the success ofgreen cities. The most important fundamental enabling condition is a coalition of actors fromthe national and local state, civil society, the private sector and universities who are committed
to advancing the green economy and its urban prerequisites, placing it centrally within the top
strategic priorities for the city. The central task of this coalition is to promote the idea of a long-term
strategic plan for the city or urban territory. Equally, it is crucial to develop strategic frameworks
not just at the local and urban level, but also at regional and national levels, ensuring coordinateddesign and implementation of policy instruments.
7. Numerous instruments for enabling green cities are available and tested but need to be
applied in a tailored, context-specific way. In contexts with strong local government it is possible
to envisage a range of planning, regulatory, information and financing instruments applied at the
local level to advance green infrastructure investments, green economic development and a multitrack approach to greater urban sustainability. In other contexts, local governments, in a more
pragmatic approach, could target a few key sectors such as water, waste, energy and transportand commit those to a limited number of specific goals as a point of departure for greening urban
sectors.

459

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
This chapter makes a case for greening cities. It describes
the environmental, social and economic consequencesof greening urban systems and infrastructure andprovides guidance to policy makers on how to makecities more environmentally friendly.
An introduction to the concept of green cities is followed
by Section 2, which presents related challenges andopportunities. Section 3 analyses the economic, social,and environmental benefits of city greening, while Section
4 summarises green practices across a number of urban
sectors. Section 5 offers advice on enabling conditions forgreen cities. Section 6 concludes the chapter.

1.1 Cities
A city is a social, ecological, and economic system withina defined geographic territory. It is characterised by aparticular human settlement pattern that associateswith its functional or administrative region, a criticalmass and density of people, man-made structures
and activities (OECD and China Development
Research Foundation 2010). Most commonly, cities
are differentiated from other settlements by their
population size and functional complexity (Fellmann
et al. 1996). The definition of cities varies significantly
from nation to nation, and is not always dependent on
population size but can also reflect administrative or
historical status (Satterthwaite 2008). The definition ofurban areas tends to rely more on a population minimum
but varies dramatically since it is dependent on unit size
designations given by individual governments, which
can range from minimum thresholds of 200 to 20,000
inhabitants upwards (UN Statistics Division 2008).1

1.2 Green cities
Green cities are defined as those that areenvironmentally friendly.2 Indicators measuring
environmental performance can include: levels ofpollution and carbon emission, energy and water
consumption, water quality, energy mix, waste volumes
and recycling rates, green-space ratios, primary forests,
and agricultural land loss (Meadows 1999; Brugmann1999). Other indicators include the share of apartment
living, motorisation rate, and modal share of urban

460

transport. Another important measure of humanity’s
demand on nature is the Ecological Footprint (Ewing etal. 2010).3 Defining green cities by their environmental
performance does not mean social equity issues are
ignored. In fact, and as detailed below, greener living
environments can play an important role in making
cities more equitable for their residents.
There are also existing cities that are referred to as green
because of their ambitious green policies, a range ofgreen projects and a principal trajectory towards a
better environmental performance. A number of cities
in western Europe, the USA and Canada have pioneered
green strategies.4 Freiburg, a city of 200,000 inhabitantsin Germany, has a long tradition of sustainablebuilding and investment in recycling and it reduced
CO2 emissions per capita by 12 per cent between 1992
and 2003 (Duennhoff and Hertle 2005). Several cities
in developing countries, especially in South America,
have also branded themselves green. Authorities inCuritiba, Brazil introduced policies to integrate landuse and transport planning and by the 1970s the city
was equipped with an innovative bus rapid transit
system (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010). Singapore
introduced the world’s first road-charging scheme in
the 1980s and it is now at the forefront of sustainable
policies on waste, water and the greening of theenvironment (Phang 1993; Suzuki et al. 2010).

1. Satterthwaite (2008) estimates that a quarter of the world’s population
lives in cities below 500,000 and another quarter in urban areas below
500,000 inhabitants. He suggests that roughly two-thirds of the world’s
population live in rural areas and small towns. This indirectly suggests thatabout one-third of the global population might live in cities.
2. The greening of cities requires some, or preferably all, of the following:(1) controlling diseases and their health burden; (2) reducing chemical andphysical hazards; (3) developing high quality urban environments for all;(4) minimising transfers of environmental costs to areas outside the city;and (5) ensuring progress towards sustainable consumption (Satterthwaite1997). This chapter cuts across all five areas, but the issue of cities in relation
to climate change – given its primacy in international environmental policy– is given added weight.
3. Ecological footprint measures how much biologically productive land
and water area a human population or activity requires to produce theresource it consumes and to absorb its wastes, using prevailing technology
and resource management practices. These areas are scaled according totheir biological productivity to provide a comparable unit, the so-called
global hectare.
4. While many of these initiatives have made major strides in reducing
carbon emissions, it is important to note that none of these cities possesses
an ecological footprint below 4 hectares per capita (UN-HABITAT 2008;
own calculation by Arup) – more than twice the world average biocapacity
per capita in 2006 – suggesting that there is still some way to go in
implementing sustainable change.

Cities

2 Challenges and opportunities

2.1 Challenges
The rapid pace of urbanisation
In 2007, for the first time in human history, 50 per cent of
the global population lived in urban areas. Only a century
ago, this figure stood at 13 per cent but it is now predicted
to reach 69 per cent by 2050 (UN Population Division 2006
and 2010). In some regions, cities are expanding rapidly,
while in others, rural areas are becoming more urban.
A significant part of this urbanisation is taking placein developing countries as a result of natural growthwithin cities and large numbers of rural-urban migrants
in search of jobs and opportunities. Often this happens
despite widespread anti-urbanisation policies, which aim
to balance development and to sustain rural economies(UNFPA 2007). However, such efforts have mostly been
unsuccessful and risk that urban agglomerations areleft unprepared for inevitable increase in population
growth. Rapid urban growth tends to overwhelm cities
where the struggle to develop infrastructure, mobilise
and manage resources has negative consequences forthe environment.
The scale of the problem comes into sharp focus in
India and China. India’s urban population grew from
290 million in 2001 to 340 million in 2008 and it isprojected to reach 590 million by 2030 (McKinsey
Global Institute 2010). The country will have tobuild 700-900 million square metres of residential
and commercial space a year to accommodate thisgrowth, requiring an investment of US$ 1.2 trillion tobuild 350-400 kilometres of subway and up to 25,000
kilometres of new roads per year. Similarly, China’s
urban population is expected to increase from 636
million in 2010 to 905 million by 2030 (UN Population
Division 2010). It is predicted that by 2050 the country
will need to invest 800-900 billion RMB per year to
improve its urban infrastructure, about one-tenth of
China’s total GDP in 2001 (Chen et al. 2008). The nature

Household sanitation

Ambient air

Carbon emissions

Severity

Urbanisation
bringsbothchallenges
andopportunities for green cities. Challenges include therapid pace of urbanisation and related pressure on theenvironment and social relations if it continues on thesame trajectory (the business-as-usual or BAU model).
Opportunities for green cities include the possibility
to design, plan and manage their physical structure
in ways that are environmentally advantageous,advance technological innovation as well as profit
from synergies that exist between the constituent
elements of complex urban systems.

WealthShifting environmental burdens
Local
Immediate
Threaten health

GlobalDelayedThreaten life-support systems

Figure 1: Urban environmental transition
Source: McGranahan et al. (2001)of this investment will have significant effects on thepotential of Indian and Chinese cities to be green.
Urbanisation and the environment
Cities of different wealth levels impact the environment
differently. Local environmental threats are most severe inpoorer cities and relate to issues such as fresh water, sewage,
health and the degradation of the living environment.
As cities become more prosperous, with wider anddeeper patterns of consumption and production, theirenvironmental impacts are increasingly felt at the global
level (Figure 1: Urban environmental transition).
Urban areas in prosperous economies concentrate
wealth creation as well as resource consumption andCO2 emissions. Globally, with a population share of justabove 50 per cent but occupying less than 2 per centof the earth’s surface, urban areas concentrate 80 per
cent of economic output, between 60 and 80 per centof energy consumption, and approximately 75 per centof CO2 emissions (Kamal-Chaoui and Robert 2009; UN
Population Division 2010). This pattern is not equallydistributed across the globe and reflects the concentrationof particular activities within individual cities. Buildings,
transport, and industry – which are constituent
components of cities and urban areas – contribute 25, 22,
and 22 per cent, respectively, of global energy-related
GHG emissions (Herzog 2009). Between 1950 and 2005,
the urban population grew from 29 per cent to 49 per centof the global population (UN Population Division – World

461

Towards a green economy

National ecological footprint (global ha/person) 2006

Human development, ecological footprint and urbanisation level

Urbanisation levelin 200512>90%
80-90%
70-80%

1060-70%
50-60%
40-50%

830-40%
20-30%
<20%

6

4

2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8
1.0
Human development index 2007

Figure 2: Ecological Footprint, HDI and urbanisation level by country
Source: LSE Cities based on multiple sources

Urbanisation Prospects 2007), while global carbon
emissions from fossil-fuel burning increased by almost
500 per cent (Boden et al. 2010).
At the national level, urbanisation goes hand in handwith increasing resource consumption, more energy
intensive food supply, and ever-increasing flows ofgoods and people. This general trend is illustrated in
Figure 2: Ecological Footprint, HDI and urbanisation levelby country, which compares the National Ecological
Footprint with the Human Development Index (HDI) for
countries worldwide, including their urbanisation levels.
The graph shows that countries with higher urbanisationlevels tend to have a significantly greater ecologicalfootprint per capita, suggesting that cities may be badfor the environment. But, the story is more complex.
Brazil, for example, maintained relatively low per capita
carbon emissions despite its growing urbanisation(World Bank 2009). Other nations also raised their carbon
emissions with no or little increase in urbanisation(Satterthwaite 2009).5 Cities per se are neither drivers ofclimate change nor the source of ecosystem degradation;
5. It is important to note, however, that the term urban in most countries
includes any form of settlement with relatively low number of residents(thresholds typically range from anything between 200 and 20,000), andtherefore does not capture the way which cities of a significant size perform
in relation to these parameters.

462

certain consumption and production patterns as well as
certain population groups within cities are.
The relationship between carbon emissions and income
levels is not straightforward, either, as shown in Figure 3:
Carbon emission and income for selected countries andcities. Carbon emissions are directly related to income. Per
capita incomes are generally higher in cities than in rural
areas, generating higher average per capita demand inmajor emissions sources. But this is the case only up to acertain income level, after which cities typically become
more carbon-efficient compared with the average, as
can be seen by the relatively low levels of CO2 emissions
produced by high income cities like Tokyo or Paris.
A recent survey of the energy intensity (a measure of
the energy efficiency of an economy calculated as unitsof energy per unit of GDP) of fifty cities by the WorldBank confirms differential patterns of environmental
performance. From this study, it appears that the
combined energy intensity of major cities like Paris,
Dhaka, São Paulo, London, Hong Kong, and Tokyo,
amount to about one-quarter of that of the five highestscoring cities and less than half of a fifty-city average(World Bank 2010).
In order to better understand these variations, data on
735 cities in six regions were analysed. The results showCO2 emissions (tonnes of CO2 equivalent per capita)

Cities30

Australia
25

USA
CanadaSydney20

15Germany

ShanghaiCape Town

10

South Africa

Japan

FranceMexico5

China

New York City

UK
Hamburg

TorontoTokyo

LondonParis

Mexico City

Brazil

India
0

Delhi
0

São Paulo
20,00040,00060,00080,000GDP PPP per capita in US$ 2008

Figure 3: Carbon emission and income for selected countries and cities
Source: LSE Cities based on multiple sources, see Appendix 1

that a majority of cities in Brazil, China, South Africa, India,
Europe and the United States cities outperform theirnational average in terms of income per capita, educationand employment levels. In terms of carbon emissions,energy, electricity and water consumption, dwelling andtransport patterns and motorisation, however, there isa very marked difference between cities in developed
and developing countries. Whereas cities in Europe, theUSA and Brazil have a lower environmental impact thantheir respective countries, cities in India and China havea much larger impact owing to their significantly higher
income levels compared with their national averages.
The social implications of traditional urban
development
Patterns of urbanisation in many areas also raise
important social challenges. The traditional businessas-usual (BAU) model of urban development – typicalof rapidly urbanising areas – is characterized byuncontrolled, often even incentivised, horizontal
expansion. This leads to urban sprawl of affluent
populations with lower development densities andincreased dependency on the private car and to
peripheralisation of the urban poor, decreasing theiraccess to the city and its workplaces, services andinfrastructure. Typical developments further include
the emergence of socially divisive neighbourhoods inthe form of gated communities, shopping centres andbusiness districts and, a significant increase in the levelof informal development with large swathes of slum
housing with no access to basic services, infrastructureand sanitation. At a general level, the rapid growth ofmany cities coupled with insufficient resources andpoor management compromises fresh water andelectricity supply, waste treatment, transport, and otherinfrastructure provision, affecting the urban poor most.

2.2 Opportunities
Structural capacity
The environmental performance of cities is dependent on
a combination of effective green strategies and physicalstructure – urban form, size, density and configuration.
They can be designed, planned and managed to limit
resource consumption and carbon emissions. Or, they
can be allowed to become voracious, land-hungry, allconsuming systems that ultimately damage the delicate
global energy equation.
More compact urban forms, reduced travel distances
and investment in green transport modes lead to greater
energy efficiency. Lower surface-to-volume ratios ofdenser building typologies can result in lower heating
and cooling loads. Greater utilisation of energy efficientutilities can contribute to lower embedded energy

463

Towards a green economy
demand for urban infrastructure. Cities can be structured
to make use of green grid-based energy systems suchas combined heat and power and micro-generationof energy as well as rainwater harvesting, access toclean water and efficient waste management. In short,effective urban planning and governance, as will beshown below, can have significant effects on sustainableurban lifestyles, making the most of urban critical mass
and reducing individual patterns of consumption.
Despite a rich debate on the links between physicalstructure and energy use in cities, there is growing
evidence that compact urban environments, withhigher-density residential and commercial buildings (asopposed to low density, sprawl-like development) and awell distributed pattern of uses and an efficient, transportsystem based on public transport, walking and cycling
reduce the energy footprint (Newman and Kenworthy
1989; Owens 1992; Ecotec 1993; Burgess 2000; Bertaud2004). Research has shown that the so-called “compactcity” model (Jenks et al. 1996) has lower per-capita carbon
emissions as long as good public transport is provided at
the metropolitan level (Hoornweg et al. 2011).
This relationship between urban form and energy
performance also applies at the local, neighbourhood
level. In Toronto, for example, a recent study found thatcar use and building-related emissions jumped from 3.1
tonnes of CO2 per capita in some inner-city areas to 13.1
tonnes in low-density suburbs located on the edges of
the city (Van de Weghe and Kennedy 2007). While theevidence does not identify an ideal size or configuration
for green cities, it suggests that highly concentrated
urban systems produce public transport efficiencies, andthat medium-sized cities tend to perform better than verylarge or very small cities when it comes to public transportand energy-related efficiency (Ecotec 1993; Bertaud 2004).
Many cities around the world have recognised such
structural opportunities for green cities. Copenhagen,Oslo, Amsterdam, Madrid and Stockholm (EIU 2009),
together with Curitiba, Vancouver and Portland in
the Americas, have all prioritised compact urban
development, creating walkable urban neighbourhoods
supported by accessible public transport systems.
Mumbai, Hong Kong and New York are high density
cities where housing, commercial, retail and leisure are
in close proximity, thus limiting the length of everyday
trips (from home to work). In addition, they possess
efficient and extensive public transport networks. In
Mumbai, these patterns are related to high levels ofpoverty and overcrowding, while in Hong Kong and
New York they combine considerable levels of energy
efficiency with high living standards.
Clearly, there is an upper limit for urban densities
to deliver environmental benefits without creating464

adverse social outcomes due to overcrowding
and strained social infrastructure such as health oreducational facilities. But if appropriately designed,
cities can accommodate relatively high thresholddensities even in low-income scenarios (and not justin highly serviced upper income environments). In
their study on high density, low income housing in
Karachi, Hasan, Sadiq and Ahmed (2010) concluded
that net residential densities of up to 3,000 persons
per hectare can be reached without compromising
environmental or social conditions.
Technological potential
Cities are incubators of innovation due to the closeinteraction of their residents and workers who benefit
from the exchange of ideas and opportunities. In
particular, they benefit from the concentration ofdiverse yet specialised skill-sets in research institutions,firms and service providers that can pilot and scale
new technologies in an already highly networked
environment. The OECD calculates, for example, that
there are ten times more renewable technologies
patents in urban than rural areas and that 73 percent of OECD patents in renewable energy comefrom urban regions (Kamal-Chaoui and Robert 2009).
The fast-growing cleantech clusters in Silicon Valley
and the North East of England are both examplesof “nursery cities”, fostering innovative activity(Duranton and Puga 2001). Silicon Valley businessleaders have been working for years to leverage thevalley’s innovation advantage in a green economy(Joint Venture Silicon Valley Network 2009). Section 4
illustrates how urban systems can be readily adapted
to innovative technologies that support the transition
to green cities, especially in the energy sector.
Urban synergy and integration potential
Green cities can benefit greatly from synergies
between their constituent parts. Recognising, forexample, the interrelationship of energy systems
and city fabric can lead to particular synergies, as
pioneered by the Rotterdam Energy Approach andPlanning (Tillie et al. 2009). In New York City, a newmechanism introduced by the Mayor combines thecleaning-up of light-to-moderately contaminatedbrown-field sites with urban re-development (City of
New York 2010). Water-sensitive urban design, whichhelps to retain storm water in public spaces and parks,
has increased the reliability of urban water supply in
US and Australian cities (see Water Chapter).
An urban setting, which tends to support a diverseand compact pattern of production and consumption
is further advantageous to advance the notion of“industrial ecology” (Lowe and Evans 1995). By optimisingand synergising different industrial sectors and resource
flows, outputs of one sector that become the input ofCities
another create a circular economy (McDonough andBraungart 2002). Principles of symbioses can also help
minimise or recycle waste. São Paulo’s Bandeirantes
landfill, for example, is sufficiently large to provide
biogas that generates electricity for an entire city district(ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability 2009a).
These opportunities have led to intensified efforts
in designing cross-sectoral green city strategies
when developing new districts or eco-cities. Recent
examples of new green communities include the
car-free neighbourhood of Vauban in Freiburg andBeddington Zero Energy Development (BedZED)6 in
London (Beatley 2004; Wheeler and Beatley 2004; C40
Cities 2010a). In the latter case, new homes achieved
an 84 per cent reduction in energy consumption andfootprints related to mobility decreased by 36 per cent.
Recycling reduced waste by between 17 per cent and42 per cent (Barrett et al. 2006).7 Examples of green
city districts include Amsterdam-Ijburg, CopenhagenOrestad and Hammerby Sjostad in Stockholm while
eco-cities have become fashionable in several rapidly
urbanising Asian countries. In recent years, highprofile investments have been made in sustainable
new towns, including Tianjin Eco-City in North China,
the Songdo Eco-City in Incheon, Republic of Korea
and Masdar Eco-City in Abu Dhabi, but it is early days
to make a comprehensive assessment of their longterm sustainability, especially given the very highcapital and development costs of these show-caseprojects.
6. The footprint of BedZED residents averages 4.67 global hectares(BioRegional 2009). While this is lower than the UK average of 4.89 hectares(Ewing et al. 2010) it is still more than twice the “fair share” of 2 hectares.
This demonstrates the limitations of insular approaches. While BedZED
enables residents to reduce their footprint on site, a lot of their ecologicalimpact is made outside of it, in schools, at work, and on holiday. BedZED
residents fly slightly more frequently than the local average, presumably
due to their higher average income. These limitations, however, do notinvalidate the achievements of the development, but point to the need ofscaling up energy efficiency measures in wider urban settlement systems aswell as the issue of energy still being comparatively cheap in high-income
societies, resulting in overall unsustainable levels of energy consumption,with rebound effects partly offsetting efficiency gains due to greater overall
consumption levels (Binswanger 2001) .
7. In recent years, the French government has increasingly become
attached to the concept of éco-quartiers and has initiated a range of
projects including Quartier ZAC de Bonne in Grenoble, Quartier Lyon
Confluence and Quartier du Théâtre in Narbonne (French Government,
Ministère de l'écologie, du développement durable, des transports et dulogement 2010).

465

Towards a green economy

3 The case for greening cities

Annual fuel expenditure per capita(US$ at 2008 national price, as % of GDP PPP per capita)

Agglomeration economies
Larger, denser cities – which help lower per capita
emissions – are good for economic growth. From an
economic perspective, cities matter because they bringpeople and things closer together, help overcome
information gaps, and enable idea flows (Glaeser 2008;
Krugman 1991). It is for these reasons that 150 of theworld’s most significant metropolitan economies
produce 46 per cent of global GDP with only 12 per%
6

North America
Western Europe
543Agglomeration economies exist in both developed anddeveloping countries. Empirical studies in developed
countries find that doubling the employment densityof an urban area typically raises its labour productivity
by around 6 per cent (for a summary of the literature
see Melo et al. 2009). The same basic patterns are foundin developing countries, with strong evidence thaturbanisation boosts productive efficiency by loweringtransport costs and widening trade networks (Duranton
2008; Han 2009). Agglomeration economies can also be
achieved by connecting several cities as in China’s Pearl
River Delta region (Rigg et al. 2009), with the additional
benefit of addressing inequality between leading andlagging regions within countries (Ghani 2010).

Annual fuel expenditure per capita

3.1 Economic benefitscent of the global population (Berube, Rode et al.
2010). These agglomeration economies translate into
productivity gains for firms, and higher wages andemployment rates for workers. For many firms andworkers, particularly those in service sectors, there is
still a premium on face-to-face contact – to maintain
trust, build relationships, and manage interactions thatcan not yet (and may never) be digitised (Charlot andDuranton 2004; Sassen 2006; Storper and Venables
2004). Knowledge spillovers between firms andeconomic agents tend to be highly localised and dieaway within a few miles of the urban core (Rosenthal
and Strange 2003).

(US$ at 2008 EU average price, as % of GDP PPP per capita)

The case for greening cities can be made in terms ofinter-linked economic, social, and environmental
benefits. Economically, the benefits include
agglomeration economies, lower infrastructure
costs and reduced congestion cost while reducing
carbon emissions and other environmental pressure.
Socially, the benefits include employment creation,
poverty reduction and improved equity, and qualityof life including improved road safety and community
cohesion, among others. Environmental benefits areembedded in most of the economic and social benefits.
Additional environmental benefits include reduced
pollution, which helps improve public health. Anotherenvironmental benefit is the potential for improving
ecosystems within urban areas.

%
6

North America
Western Europe
5

4

3

2

2

1

1

0

0
1,000

2,500

5,000

10,000Net density (people per km² of built-up land)

1,000

2,500

5,000

10,000Net density (people per km² of built-up land)

Figure 4: Private transport fuel expenditure and urban density of selected cities, 2008 fuel prices (left-handgraph) and EU fuel prices throughout (right-hand graph)
Source: Kenworthy 2003 (1995/6 fuel consumption and density per city), GTZ 2009 (National 2008 fuel prices), PWC 2009 and UN 2010 (City GDP PPP per capita); see Appendix 1

466

Cities
Total cost (CA$ billion)
Dispersed Recommended Difference Percent
scenario
directiondifferenceRoad capital cost

17.6

11.2

6.4

-36

Transit capital

6.8

6.2

0.6

-9

Water and wastewater

5.5

2.5

3.0

-54

Fire stations

0.5

0.3

0.2

-46

Recreation centres

1.1

0.9

0.2

-19

Schools

3.0

2.2

0.9

-27

Total

34.5

23.3

11.2

-33

Table 1: Infrastructure costs for different
development scenarios in Calgary
Dispersed scenario: additional 46,000 ha;
recommended direction: additional 21,000 ha
Source: IBI Group (2009)

In developing countries, however, urbanisation may notprovide the same kind of economic gains across cities andfirms. For example, Brülhart and Sbergami (2009) find thatwithin-country agglomeration boosts GDP growth only
up to national income levels of US$ 10,000 per head. The
main reason for this is that very rapid – and sometimes
chaotic – urbanisation can outstrip national and city
governments’ ability to provide adequate infrastructureand services (Cohen 2006). Congestion could eat up
the benefits of higher density as in the case of cities like
Shanghai, Bangkok, Manila and Mumbai (Rigg et al. 2009).
Venables (2005) similarly suggests that “the presence ofincreasing returns to scale in [some developing country]
cities leads to urban structures that are not optimally sized”.
Lower infrastructure and operating costs
Densification reduces the capital and operating costs ofinfrastructure. Evidence suggests that linear infrastructure
including streets, railways, water and sewage systems aswell as other utilities come at considerably lower cost
per unit the higher the urban density (Carruthers andUlfarsson 2003). Comparing smart growth areas anddispersed, car-dependent developments, Todd Litmansuggests direct cost savings between US$ 5,000 and
US$ 75,000 for building road and utility infrastructure
per household unit (Litman 2009a). A recent exercise forCalgary (IBI Group 2009) indicates cost savings beyond
pure linear infrastructure but also for schools, firestations and recreation centres (see Table 1). Similarly, a
recent study of Tianjin concluded that infrastructure costsavings as a result of compact and densely clusteredurban development reach 55 per cent compared with adispersed scenario (Webster et al. 2010).
Figure 4: Private transport fuel expenditure and urban
density of selected cities shows how urban density
can be an essential measure for decreasing long-term
operating costs. Critically, this relationship is made evenstronger in the right-hand graph which standardises
2008 fuel prices at the EU average (US$ 1.41) – in otherwords, it assumes that all cities in the sample face thesame fuel price. It is clear that EU cities tend to be denser
than North American cities and significantly more
effcient in terms of fuel consumption – citizens of more
sprawling North American cities tend to travel further.
But even with current US fuel prices, density pays
back. In the case of New York City, CEO for Cities (2010)
estimates that density-related cost savings throughreduced expenditure on cars and petrol translates intoa green dividend of US$ 19 billion annually.
While denser city strategies tend to promote
greater energy efficiency and cheaper infrastructure,promoting transport modal shifts can deliver higher
lifecycle capacity and lower running costs (see Table 2:
Capacity and infrastructure costs of different transportsystems). The most significant cost saving is derived
from a shift away from car infrastructure towards
public transport, walking and cycling. For example, atsimilar capacity levels, bus rapid transit (BRT) offers
significant costs savings compared to traditional metro

Capacity[pers/h/d]

Capital costs[US$/km]

Capital costs/
capacity

Dual-lane highway

2,000

10m – 20m

5,000 – 10,000

Urban street (car use only)

800

2m – 5m

2,500 – 7,000

Bike path (2m)

3,500

100,000

30

Pedestrian walkway / pavement (2m)

4,500

100,000

20

Transport Infrastructure

Commuter Rail

20,000 – 40,000

40m – 80m

2,000

Metro Rail

20,000 – 70,000

40m – 350m

2,000 – 5,000Light Rail

10,000 – 30,000

10m – 25m

800 – 1,000

Bus Rapid Transit

5,000 – 40,000

1m – 10m

200 – 250

10,0001m – 5m

300 – 500

Bus Lane

Table 2: Capacity and infrastructure costs of different transport systems
Source: Rode and Gipp (2001), VTPI (2009), Wright (2002), Brilon (1994)

467

Towards a green economy
and regional rail. Bogotá’s TransMilenio infrastructure
cost US$ 5.8 million per km, US$ 0.34 per passenger
over three years compared with estimates for metro railwith US$ 101 million per km, US$ 2.36 per passenger(Menckhoff 2005). As a result and unlike most public
transport systems, TransMilenio is not only able tocover its costs but is making a profit (Whitelegg and
Haq 2003).
A preliminary study has been carried out to provide
additional information on the costs and potential
savings of green city projects (Table 3: Investment andoperating costs of selected green city projects). Column
3 in Table 3 contains either the project operating
revenue (such as the fares collected or the sale of thecollected energy) or the savings the project allowed.
The savings have been calculated by looking at thedifference between what would have been spent inresources without the project and what has been spentsince its realisation. For example, Tokyo’s water leakage
control leads to savings both in terms of electricity(less of which is needed for the same amount of waterreaching end-consumers) and in terms of water.
Reduced congestion costs
Bigger, more productive cities tend to suffer from crowding
and congestion, as firms and households compete forspace in the most popular locations (Overman and Rice2008). Real-world examples of urban agglomerations
such as Mexico City, Bangkok and Lagos suggest that theeconomic advantages of being in cities tend to mitigate
even severe congestion problems (Diamond 2005). Evenso, however, the financial and welfare costs to cities andcitizens can be substantial. In the largely urbanised
European Union, these costs are 0.75 per cent of GDP(World Bank 2002). In the case of the UK, they amountto an annual costs of up to £ 20bn (Confederation of
British Industry 2003). They reach even higher figuresin developing countries. The costs of congestion in
Buenos Aires are 3.4 per cent of GDP, in Mexico City
2.6 and in Dakar 3.4 per cent (World Bank 2002).
One proven method for controlling congestion isdemand management via charging. For example,
Central London’s congestion charge reduced
congestion by 30 per cent from February 2003
to February 2004 compared with previous years( Transport for London 2004a) and led to benefits
such as the reduction in the number of trips by private
vehicles entering central London (Transport for London
2004b) and a 19.5 per cent drop in CO2 emissions(Beevers and Carslaw 2005). Stockholm’s congestion
tax also resulted in a reduction in traffic delays by onethird and a decrease in traffic demand by 22 per cent(Baradaran and Firth 2008). The annual social surplusof Stockholm’s congestion tax is estimated to be in theregion of US$ 90 million (Eliasson 2008).

468

Many public transport projects around the world havebrought about significantly reduced congestion costs,
notably BRT systems such as in Bogotá and successfully
emulated in Lagos, Ahmadabad and Guangzhou andJohannesburg. A synergetic interplay of compact urban
form and an efficient bus system has been observedin Curitiba, which boasts the highest rate of public
transport use in Brazil (45 per cent). There, reduced
congestion means much less fuel is wasted in traffic
jams: only US$ 930,000, compared with an estimated
US$ 13.4 million in Rio de Janeiro (Suzuki et al. 2010).

3.2 Social benefits
Job creation
Greening the cities can create jobs on a number of fronts:
1) urban and peri-urban green agriculture; 2) public
transport; 3) renewable energy; 4) waste management
and recycling; and 5) green construction. Green services
will generally be more urban-orientated than green
manufacturing or primary industry, although there will
be some high-tech green manufacturing clusters in or
close to urban cores, drawing on knowledge spillovers
from universities and research labs. Already, the 100
largest metropolitan regions in the USA have far greater
shares of low-carbon employment in wind and solar
energy (both 67 per cent), energy research (80 per cent)and green buildings (85 per cent) compared with the66 per cent share of the national population (Brookings
and Battelle 2011).
At the same time, specific sectors and firms may combine
remote or off-shored production with highly urbanised
consumer/service/support markets. This means that
there is potential for cities to grow both green tradable
activity (high value, exportable) and develop greener
non-tradable activities (lower value, goods and services
for local consumption) (Chapple 2008). Overall, a green
economy cannot be expected to create or destroy net jobs
in the long run; the supply and demand for labour tend toequate in accordance with labour market conditions. In awell-functioning labour market, in the long run, increased
demand for labour in one sector will put upward pressure
on the going wage rate and displace labour in anothersector. Labour creation in low-carbon sectors will crowdout labour creation elsewhere. Hence, although gross
employment in the sector may rise in the long run, net
employment across all sectors may not. In the shortrun, with unemployed resources, the net employment
creation effect is likely to be larger.
First, there is considerable policy interest in urban
and peri-urban agriculture (Smit and Nasr 1992;
Baumgartner and Belevi 2001). Green urban agriculture
can reuse municipal wastewater and solid waste,
reduce transportation costs, preserve biodiversity andCities
Initial capital costs(million US$)Operating costs(million US$)Operating revenue / savings(million US$)

480

692

1,746

1,970 (until 2016)

around 20/year

around 18.5/year

525

136.5

184

96 (private investment)

4.1 (private)3.96/year (city), 72/year (private)

Bogotá CicloRutas (1999-2006)

50.25

-

40/year (fuel savings)

Toronto Atmospheric Fund (1991-2010)

19

-

2.2

Austin Energy’s GreenChoice Program--

3.9 (customer energy savings in 2006)

Austing Green Building Programme (1991-2010)-

1.2/year

2.2/year (customer energy savings)

Freiburg PV system (1986-2010)

58.6

-

-

Berlin’s Energy Saving Partnership (1997-2010)--12.2 (energy bills)

Toronto Lake Water Conditioning (2002-2010)

170.4

-

9.8/yearTokyo Water System-

60.3/year

16.7 (electricity savings), 172.4 (leakage prevented)

San Francisco Solar Power system (2004-2010)

8

-

0.6

São Paulo waste to energy (2004-2010)

68.4

-

32.1 (from carbon credit auction)

Curitiba BRT (1980-2010)

-

182.5

201

Stockholm Congestion Charge (2007-2010)

350

-

70

NYC public plaza improvements (2008-2010)

125.8

-

-

Project
London Congestion Charge (2002-2010)
Bogotá Transmilenio (2000-2010)
Copenhagen District Heating (1984-2010)
Paris Velib’ (2007-2010)

Strasburg’s 53.7 km tram (1994-2010)

-

167.7

168.3

Copenhagen’s 3% of waste to landfills (1990-2010)--

0.67/year

Copenhagen offshore 160MW windfarm (2002-2010)

349

-

-

NYC Greener, Greater Buildings Plan (2009-2010)

80 (city), 16 (federal)-

700/year (residential energy costs)

Hong Kong Combined Heat and Power plant (2006-2010)

0.9-

0.3/year

Portland SmartTrips (2003-2010)-

0.55/year-

Portland LED traffic lighting (2001-2010)

2.2

-

0.335

Seoul car-free days (2003-2010)

3-

50/year (fuel savings)

Table 3: Investment and operating costs of selected green city projects
Source: multiple sources, see Appendix 1

wetlands, and make productive use of green belts. The
findings of national censuses, household surveys andother research suggest that “up to two-thirds of urban
and peri-urban households in developing countries are
involved in agriculture” (FAO 2001).
Second, transport activities typically make up asignificant share of a city’s employment (operationallyand in infrastructure development). In many countries,
public transport jobs account for between 1 per centand 2 per cent of total employment (UNEP, ILO, IOE
and ITUC 2008). In New York almost 80,000 local jobs
are related to its public transport sector, in Mumbai
more than 160,000 and in Berlin about 12,000 (Table
4: Urban transport employment).
Third, the International Labour Organisation research(UNEP et al. 2008) indicates that shifting fromconventional to renewable energy will result in small
net job losses, but cities are well-placed to benefit

from new opportunities. As well as research anddevelopment activity, renewable energy systems may
often involve decentralised production, which locates
power generation close to urban consumer cores.
Critically, installation and servicing activities are bothlabour-intensive and urban-orientated. These domesticor personal service activities will be an important sourceof green jobs in urban areas.
Fourth, waste and recycling activity is similarly labourintensive. A recent estimate reveals that up to 15
million people are engaged in waste collection for theirlivelihood in developing countries (Medina 2008). For
example, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, a project for generating
compost from organic waste helped create 400 new jobs
in collection activities and 800 new jobs in the processof composting. Workers collect 700 tonnes/day of organic
waste to obtain 50,000 tonnes/year of compost (see Waste
Chapter). And in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, a project forcollecting and recycling plastic waste has helped improve469

Towards a green economy

Box 1: Green jobs in the urban economy8
The process of making the world’s cities andurban fabric greener and maintaining them in asustainable way will bring considerable employment
opportunities. Upgrading to greener infrastructure
generates jobs, whether by improving roads andbuildings, establishing public transport networks,
repairing and enhancing drainage and seweragesystems or creating and managing efficient recycling
services. Many of these jobs will require knowledgeof new technologies or working practices, forexample, in constructing, installing and maintaining
local hydrogen fuel-cell power stations or a networkof charging points for electric vehicles. Providing
training and support is fundamental to the process,within local authorities and for private companies,
particularly small enterprises.
In creating the jobs that will enable cities to begreener, there is a great opportunity to address
urban poverty, which is widespread (and in many
places increasing at a faster rate than rural poverty),
particularly in developing countries. Providing
job opportunities where there are few is clearly
important, but to make real inroads into poverty,
employment must also encompass workers’ rights,
their social protection and social dialogue. The

the environmental situation and has created jobs andincome for local people (ILO Online 2007).
Fifth, many developed nations have also started
looking at green construction as the largest possible
employment provider. Germany’s 2006 retrofitting
programme created nearly 150,000 additional full-time
equivalent jobs in 2006 (UNEP et al. 2008). Retrofitting
existing building stocks will provide a massive

City

Persons employed (operations)in public transport sector

New York

78,393London24,975

Mumbai

164,043

São Paulo

15,326

Johannesburg

22,276

Tokyo

15,036

Berlin12,885Istanbul

9,500

Table 4: Urban transport employment
Source: LSE Cities based on multiple sources, see Appendix 1

470

burgeoning international movement on “the rightto the city” promotes community and consumers’
rights but workers’ rights are increasingly being
recognized. Coalitions of urban workers in Brazil,
for example, are helping to draw attention to andreduce informal, casualised labour. Inappropriate
working and living conditions expose many urban
workers to risk on a daily basis, while many do nothave access to an adequate system of health care,pay for holidays and protection against loss of pay
when they are unable to work. Several ILO initiatives
provide a sound basis for action on improvingsocial protection, and other efforts of communities
to organise their own risk protection should be
supported.
In Marikina, Philippines and through the municipal“decent work” programmes of Belo Horizonte
and São Paulo, Brazil, progress has been madein improving labour conditions by establishing
meaningful dialogue between workers, employers
and local governments. In sum, the greening of cities
can and should provide significant opportunities fordecent employment, which can bring prosperity
and, if carefully managed, reduce inequality andrural-urban differentials.

employment opportunity for many mature cities, since
work is undertaken on site (see Buildings Chapter).
Higher environmental standards for construction andfittings also create employment potential. The U.S.
Department of Labor estimates that new standards
for water heating and fluorescent lamps, among otherproducts, could generate 120,000 jobs through to 2020
(UNEP et al. 2008). Most excitingly, green construction
has also the potential of making buildings to go frombeing exclusively consumers of resources to becoming
producers – in esources like water, energy, food andmaterials, or even green space.
Poverty reduction and social equity
The World Development Report (2009) describes
increasing economic density – one of the main features ofa green city – as “a pathway out of poverty”. Along similarlines, Nadvi and Barrientos (2004) assess the impact ofclusters or agglomeration effects on poverty in several
urban areas of developing countries. It is observed thatthese clusters are labour-intensive, informal in nature
and also employ a lot of women as household-workers.
Based on a study of industrial clusters in Kumasi (Ghana),
8. This box was prepared based on contributions from ILO to this chapter.

Cities
Lima (Peru), Java (Indonesia), Sinos Valley (Brazil), Torren(Mexico) and Tiruppur (India), it is shown that usually
there is a high rate of employment growth among matureclusters drawing the poor from rural areas. Alongside anincrease in employment, this study also showed thatwage levels in clusters were higher than average regional
wage levels but with longer working hours.

Rank 2010

City

Country

Qol index 2010

1

ViennaAustria108.6

2

Zurich

Switzerland

108

3

GenevaSwitzerland

107.9

4

Vancouver

Canada107.4

While urbanisation has helped to reduce absolute poverty,
the number of people classified as urban poor is on therise (Ravallion et al. 2007). Between 1993 and 2002, there
was an addition of 50 million poor in urban areas while thenumber of rural poor declined by 150 million (Ravallion etal. 2007). Urban growth puts pressure on the quality of
the local environment, which disproportionately affects
poorer people, such as the lack of adequate access toclean water and sanitation. This results in a huge disease
burden that further affects their livelihood options.
Moreover, a large proportion of the urban population
is in the informal sector with: a) inadequate access tosocial security, including health insurance; b) homes in
informal settlements in disaster-prone areas – both ofwhich make them more vulnerable to crises. With climatechange posing its own threat, the urban poor are likely to
be more affected as most live in non-durable structuresand in more vulnerable locations such as riverbanks anddrainage systems. More generally, the poor have little if
no means to reduce potential risks and prepare for theconsequences of or be insured against natural disasters.

4

Auckland

New Zealand

107.4

6

Dusseldorf

Germany

107.2

7Frankfurt

Germany

107

7

MunichGermany

107

9

Bern

Switzerland

106.5

10

SydneyAustralia

106.3

11

Copenhagen

Denmark

106.2

12Wellington

New Zealand

105.9

13

Amsterdam

Netherlands

105.7

14

OttawaCanada105.5

15Brussels

Belgium

105.4

16

TorontoCanada105.3

17BerlinGermany

105

18

Melbourne

Australia

104.8

19

Luxembourg

Luxembourg

104.6

20

Stockholm

Sweden104.5

Innovative approaches to urban planning andmanagement can make urbanisation inclusive, propoor and responsive to threats posed by environmental
degradation and global warming. For example,
enhancing public transport use can reduce inequality inaccess to public services and other amenities, on top of
reducing carbon emissions (Litman 2002). It can also playa part in improving poorer neighbourhoods by relieving
vehicle congestion (Pucher 2004). Switching to cleaner
fuels for cooking, transport and power generation canminimise local pollution and reduce health inequality(Haines et al. 2007). Poor urban households in lowincome nations have to spend a large proportion of theirincome on energy needs including food and cooking
fuel (Karekezi and Majoro 2002). Introducing cleaner
and more efficient sources of energy offers the potential
to both reduce direct expenditure and to lower healthcosts connected to indoor-air pollution (Bruce et al.
2002). In Brazil, for example, an initiative in the City ofBentim to install solar heaters in housing estates for low
income families resulted in 20 per cent savings in energy
consumption and up to 57 per cent savings in the energy
bill for the average 3 to 4 member family (ICLEI 2010b). 9

Table 5: Mercer quality of living city ranking 2010

9. The significant reduction in the energy bill can be explained throughthe fact that low energy consumption is rewarded by tax benefits. The
installation of solar heaters helped the families to reach the threshold of< 90khW/month.

Source: Mercer (2010)

There are other examples of how greening cities canaddress poverty and equity concerns. Improving sanitationand fresh water supply can reduce persistent poverty andthe adverse impacts of water-borne disease (Sanctuary
et al. 2005). Retrofitting older buildings in lower-income
neighbourhoods can improve energy efficiency andresilience, reducing the vulnerability of poorer communities
when energy prices rise (Jenkins 2010). Upgrading
infrastructure in slum areas offers both health benefits andfewer adverse impacts on the environment (WHO 2009).
Improvement in quality of life
Community cohesion is one aspect of quality of life andaffects individuals, families and social groups at theneighbourhood and district level. Social relationships
not only have particularly positive impacts on physicaland mental health but also on economic resilience andproductivity (Putnam et al. 1993; Putnam 2004). Thisis especially the case for disadvantaged people, as
community cohesion and social inclusion are linked(O’Connor and Sauer 2006; Litman 2006).
Improving the urban environment by measures suchas traffic calming and promoting walkability can help471

Towards a green economy
foster a sense of community (Frumkin 2003; Litman
2006). Such changes are often designed to counteract
instances of community severance, as identified by
Bradbury et al. (2007):■■ Physical barriers whereby either spatial structures
themselves prohibit interaction or certain activities
cause disruption, as in the case of road traffic;■■ Psychological barriers that are related to theperception of certain areas determined by traffic noiseand pollution or perceived danger; and■■ Long-term social barriers where residents change
behaviour following initial disruptions and create amore sustained form of being disconnected from certain
people and areas close-by. Putnam’s research implies thatten minutes avoided in commuting increases time spenton community activities by 10 per cent (Putnam 2000).
Kuo et al. (1998) observed that the more trees andgreenery form part of inner-city public spaces, themore these spaces are used by residents. The study
also found that, compared with residents living nearbarren spaces, those closer to greenery enjoy moresocial activities, have more visitors, know more of theirneighbours, and have stronger feelings of belonging.
Wells and Evans (2003) found that children with naturenear their homes are more resistant to stress; havelower incidence of behavioural disorders, anxiety, anddepression; and have a higher measure of self-worth(Grahn et al. 1997; Fjortoft and Sageie 2000). Green
space also stimulates social interaction between
children (Moore 1986; Bixler et al. 2002).
A further dimension in the quality of life surrounds roadsafety. Road traffic accidents are the leading cause ofdeath among young people between 15 and 19 years,
according to a report published by the WHO in 2007
(Toroyan and Peden 2007; see also Transport Chapter).
Road traffic collisions cost an estimated US$ 518 billion
globally in material, health and other expenditure. For
many low- and middle-income countries, the cost ofroad crashes represents between 1-1.5 per cent of
GNP and in some cases exceeds the total amount thecountries receive in international development aid(Peden et al. 2004). Mohan (2002) showed that this is,in fact, underestimated and evaluated that these costs
represent 3.2 per cent of India’s GDP.
Some of the most effective strategies to improvepedestrian and cyclist safety include dedicated facilities
and motorised vehicle speed controls. An averageincrease in speed of 1 km/h leads to a 5 per cent higher
risk of serious or fatal injury (Finch et al. 1994; Taylor
et al. 2000). Dedicated lanes for buses, bicycles andpedestrians, especially along arterial roads should also472

be a priority. Evidence from the Netherlands, Bogotá
and Denmark shows that restricting the space available
to cars, limiting their speed and providing safe facilities
for pedestrians and cyclists result in the adoption ofgreen transport modes.
Other major attributes of green cities are also consideredpart of the quality of life, such as walkability, access togreen spaces, cycling infrastructure and recreational
facilities (HM Government, Communities and Local
Government 2009). In developing countries, this may
partly explain the relationship between green cities
and cities with a high quality of life. Among the top 20“quality of living cities” identified by Mercer in 2009, atleast half have particularly strong green credentials(Table 5). The top five includes best-practice green cities
such as Vienna, Zurich and Vancouver. In Zurich, thecity’s focus on public transport has been an important
contribution to its favourable ranking in the Mercer
survey (Ott 2002). Similarly, the integration of green
space and natural elements within the city significantly
enhance the quality of living.
At least in developed countries, a city’s overall qualityof life (or quality of place), may be linked to economic
advantages, mainly as a result of greater attractiveness to
skilled workers and high paying firms (HM Government,
Communities and Local Government 2009; Lee 2005).
Evaluation of the largest companies (more than 500
employees) in the European Union suggests that about
10 per cent of these firms consider quality of life as
one of the top three attributes determining location
decisions (Healey and Baker 1993 in Rogerson 1999).
These decisions, it is argued, are increasingly based on
so-called city “lifestyle amenities” which attract highlyskilled, mobile workers with their general flexibility inchoosing living and working locations (Hasan 2008).

3.3 Environmental and health benefits
Reducing pollution and improving public healthAir pollution in cities remains a major public healthburden, particularly in the developing world. In extreme
cases such as Dakar, pollution-related health costs areabove 5 per cent of GDP, while a range between 2 and3 per cent is observable for several mega cities in Latin
America and Asia (World Bank 2003). In urban areas
globally, around 800,000 deaths per year are caused byair pollution (Dora 2007).
Many cities have already taken decisive action andsignificantly improved the situation. Outside Europe
and the USA, cities with PM 10 levels of 20 mg/m3 havea mortality rate almost 10 per cent lower than thosewith levels of 150 mg/m3 (Dora 2007). Urban greeneryprovides a unique opportunity to improve air quality. In

Cities
Chicago, urban trees provided a service for air cleansingthat is equivalent to US$ 9.2 million dollars and theirlong-term benefits are estimated to be more than twice
their costs (McPherson et al. 1994).
There is a broader set of public health issues aroundhealthier lifestyles in cities. It is estimated that physicalinactivity accounts for 3.3 per cent of all deaths globallyand for 19 million disability-adjusted life-years (Bull et
al. 2004). Green urban transport is a unique opportunity
to link physical activity and emissions reduction bypromoting walking and cycling. In Europe, more than
30 per cent of trips made by cars are for distances ofless than 3 km and about half still below 5 km, intheory allowing for their replacement by cycle journeys(European Commission 1999).
It is no coincidence that cities with a long tradition of
applying land-use planning, public transport strategies
and a focus on public green space are among thehealthiest cities in the world. Portland was rated
number one of the 100 largest USA cities in meeting
Healthy People 2000 goals (Geller 2003), Vancouver
is first amongst the Canadian cities (Johnson 2009),
Copenhagen and Munich rank amongst the top 10
healthiest and safest cities and Melbourne among thehealthiest and safest in Australia (Sassen 2009).
Ecosystem services and risk reduction
Urban greenery and vegetation represent a range of
ecosystem services with significant wider welfare effects(TEEB 2010). A study of Toronto’s Green Belt estimatedthe value of its ecosystem services at CA$ 2.6 billion
annually, an average of around CA$ 3,500 per hectare(Wilson 2008).

Ecosystem services further play a critical role in risk
reduction measures. Tropical cities such as Jakarta havedramatically increased their risk exposure to flooding
as a consequence of local deforestation. The city’s mostrecent floods in 2007 affected 60 per cent of the city
region, killed 80 persons and forced more than 400,000
residents to leave their homes (Steinberg 2007). Similarly,
the 2005 floods in Mumbai, which killed more than 1,000
people and paralysed the city for almost five days (Revi2008) were linked to a lack of environmental protectionof the city’s Mithi River (Stecko and Barber 2007).
Restoration of urban ecosystems is part of the city
greening effort, which can reduce the impact of freak
weather conditions. Coastal regions in particular canbenefit both in terms of lives and money. Mangrove replanting in Vietnam, for example, saves US$ 7.3 million
annually on dike maintenance while it costs only US$ 1.1
million (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies 2002). More generally, an increase in theamount of green cover in urban areas not only increases
a city’s ability to reabsorb CO2 but also ameliorates theurban heat island effect (McPherson et al. 1994).
Safeguarding natural ecosystems in cities’ hinterlands
is also important in reducing their exposure to risk.
This is of particular relevance to fresh water supply andfood security. As they have expanded, many cities haveexhausted local fresh water sources and rely on importingwater from their wider region. Such requirement toimport water is already associated with enormous costs
for cities such as Mexico City and São Paulo. In New York
City, the protection of its fresh water supply has allowed
the city to avoid paying US$ 5 to US$ 7 billion for an
additional filtration plant (TEEB 2010).

473

Towards a green economy

4 Greening urban sectors
Having illustrated the general economic, social, andenvironmental benefits of greening cities, this section
looks at examples of how the greening of specificsectors – including transport, buildings, energy, water,
waste and technology – can be achieved at the city
scale. Most of these sectors are addressed more broadly
in the respective chapters of this report, and some ofthe examples below are referenced elsewhere in thischapter to support broader, cross-sectoral strategies to
aid the transition to green cities.

4.1 Transport
Most green transport policies that follow the “avoidshift-improve” paradigm outlined in the Transport
Chapter can be found in cities. While “avoiding
transport” is mostly covered by structural adjustments
to the shape of cities introduced earlier, classic
green transport strategies in cities primarily focus
on reducing car use or at least slowing its growth. In
Central London, for example, the congestion charge
reduced daily vehicles trips by 65,000 to 70,000(Transport for London 2004 b) and CO2 emissions by
19.5 per cent (Beevers and Carslaw 2005). Singapore’s
Electronic Road Pricing and Vehicle Quota System
slowed increasing car use and motorisation (Goh 2002).
Bogotá’s BRT system has contributed to a 14 per centdrop in emissions per passenger (Rogat et al. 2009). It
is encouraging, therefore, to see that the BRT system
has been replicated in Istanbul, Lagos, Ahmadabad,
Guangzhou, and Johannesburg.
In Europe, cities are following Zurich’s example ofinvesting in a tram system as the backbone of urban
transport in preference to an expensive undergroundsystem (EcoPlan 2000). Emission standards and car
sharing schemes (Schmauss 2009; Nobis 2006) have
reduced car dependency while low-emission zones andtimed delivery permits have helped reduce congestionand pollution (Geroliminis and Daganzo 2005).
In recent years, some cities have led efforts toelectrify road-based transport, even though walking
and cycling are still the greenest forms of transport.
Copenhagen, Amsterdam, London, and New York areinvesting in pro-cycling and walking strategies. Cyclehire schemes have changed attitudes towards cyclingin London and Paris. In South America, cities such as
Bogotá, Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro have instituted
regular car-free days or weekend street closures (Parraet al. 2007).

474

4.2 Buildings
Tackling the energy demand of existing building stock isa priority for cities, and urban green building strategies
also include more efficient use of other resources suchas water and materials. As outlined in the Buildings
Chapter, three principal green building strategies canbe differentiated: design, technology, and behaviourrelated. Particularly in a developing world context,
passive design solutions to improve environmental
performance are by far the most cost-effective
approaches. For example, housing projects on the
coast in Puerto Princesa City, the Philippines, have been
designed to reduce energy demand through increased
natural light, improved ventilation, the cooling effect of
the roofing material, and strategic planting (ICLEI, UNEP
and UN-HABITAT 2009).
Stringent building codes, mandatory energy certificates,
tax incentives and loans, have had a measurable
impact on energy demand in a number of Europeanand US cities (C40 Cities 2010b). Toronto’s revolving
energy fund and Austin Energy’s Power Saver Program
have imposed higher energy efficiency standards for
new buildings and are leading to a comprehensive
retrofitting programme of existing building stock (C40
Cities 2010c, Austin Energy 2009). Berlin requires a solarthermal strategy for all new buildings and Freiburg’s
energy efficient housing standard has reduced average
household energy consumption for space heating
by up to 80 per cent (von Weizsäcker et al. 2009). As
owners of large amounts of public property, municipal
authorities are able to set an example by implementing
green strategies on their own public building stockwith beneficial effects on the development of a local
green building market.

4.3 Energy
Cities uniquely concentrate energy demand and rely
on energy sources beyond their boundaries. But cities
have the potential to either dissipate the distribution ofenergy or optimise their efficiency by reducing energy
consumption and adopting green energy systems
including renewable micro-generation, district heating,and combined heat and energy plants (CHP). Rizhao,
China has turned itself into a solar-powered city; in its
central districts, 99 per cent of households already use
solar water heaters (ICLEI, UNEP and UN Habitat 2009).
In Freiburg, PV systems, encouraged by Germany’s
generous feed-in tariff, now supply 1.1 per cent of theCitiescity’s electricity demand. A biomass CHP system andwind turbines provide for a further 1.3 per cent and 6 percent respectively of the city’s energy needs (IEA 2009).
Oslo and São Paulo have harnessed power generated by
nearby hydro-electric facilities to gain a relatively highshare of renewable energy. Wind and tidal power are
becoming increasingly important sources of renewableenergy for cities, while geothermal heat can also be
exploited to provide reliable, secure, low-cost, power.
Manila, located on the island of Luzon, receives 7 per centof its electricity from geothermal sources (ICLEI, UNEP
and UN Habitat 2009). A grid-based, decentralised energy
system, with district heating systems can provide space
and water heating for large urban complexes (like hospitals,
schools or universities) or residential neighbourhoods.
They can significantly reduce overall energy demand.
Their efficiency further improves with combined heat andpower energy generation systems. Copenhagen‘s district
heating system, for example, supplies 97 per cent of theCity with waste heat (C40 Cities 2010d).

4.4 Vegetation and landscape
While cities are principally made up of buildings andinfrastructure, they can contain a significant proportionof open space. Despite sustained growth, cities like
Johannesburg, London and Delhi have maintained highlevels of green open space (parks, public and private
gardens), while others like Cairo, Tokyo or Mexico City
have far lower levels of green space. Parks, protected
green space and gardens, street trees and landscaping
provide vital ecosystem services, acting as green lungs
absorbing and filtering air pollution or as acting as filters
for waste water (TEEB 2010). They also provide a habitat
for wildlife and offer recreational benefits to city dwellers.10
As noted above, a study of Toronto’s Greenbelt identified
its wetland and forests as one of its most valuable assets
in terms of ecosystem services including carbon storage,
habitat, water regulation and filtration, flood control,
waste treatment and recreation (Wilson 2008).
In addition, the presence of green landscaped areas helps
regulate natural processes, including the mitigation of
local temperature extremes: a ten per cent increase intree cover reduces cooling and heating energy use by
between five per cent and ten per cent (McPherson etal. 1994). Vegetation and soft open space also play a rolein decreasing stormwater volumes, thus helping cities
to manage the consequences of heavy rainfall, and are
10. At the macro level, strategies for greening the city protect existing
green areas from development. Such measures are of particular importancealong the city fringe, where urban growth boundaries in cities such as
Portland and London restrict development. In Stockholm, thanks to theprotection of green areas, almost the entire population lives within 300
meters of parks and green areas (City of Stockholm 2009).

effective in helping flood protection in coastal cities.
New design strategies have pioneered the use of green
roofs and facades on buildings, to add to the quantity ofnatural (as opposed to man-made) surfaces in cities andto reduce cooling energy demand. For example, Itabashi
City in Tokyo is promoting climbing plants as “green
curtains” around public buildings and private homes toavoid buildings overheating in summer and to reduce
the use of air conditioning (ICLEI 2009b).

4.5 Water
Cities require significant transfers of water from rural tourban areas with water leakage being a major concern.
Upgrading and replacement of pipes has contributed
to net savings of 20 per cent of potable water in manyindustrialised cities. Over the last ten years alone, Tokyo’s
new water system has reduced water waste by 50 per
cent (C40 Cities 2010e). Volumetric charging has provenmost effective in incentivising more efficient wateruse. Many cities are introducing water meters and areshifting away from simple water access fees. A measure
to maximise utility of fresh water is the cascading ofwater use where the waste water generated by one
process can be used in another with a lesser quality
requirement (Agudelo et al. 2009).
To further reduce water consumption and provide
alternatives to piped water supply, rain can be harvested
and used as drinking and non-drinking water. Suchservices can only be implemented in cities where there isa greater willingness to pay for water than in rural areas(see Water Chapter). To counter severe water shortages
in Delhi, the Municipal Corporation made rainwater
harvesting a requirement for all buildings with a roof
area above 100 square metres and a plot area greaterthan 1,000 square metres. It is estimated that 76,500
million litres of water per year will be made available
for groundwater recharge (ICLEI, UNEP and UN-HABITAT2009). In Chennai, urban groundwater recharging
raised the city’s groundwater levels by four metres
between 1988 and 2002 (Sakthivadivel 2007). Fiscal
incentives have proved successful, notably Austin’s tax
rebates for harvesting systems saving an estimated 8.7
gallons per person per day for a single family rainwater
harvesting unit (Texas Water Development Board andGDS Associates 2002).

4.6 Food
The food footprint of a city has significant impacts
on its green credentials, especially if one takes into
account the energy use generated by transporting foodfrom remote locations to urban marketplaces (Garnett
1996). For example, the food supply of European

475

Towards a green economy

cities accounts for approximately 30 per cent of their
total ecological footprint (Steel 2008). More broadly,
urbanisation is usually accompanied by a loss of nearby
arable land and a rise in demand for processed foodsby urban consumers. While there is some way to go
to see a substantial reduction in the food footprints ofhighly consumptive cities such as London and New York,
there is evidence that farmers’ markets are successfully
re-establishing links between inner cities and regional
agriculture. Other cities benefit from their location at theheart of rich agricultural landscapes, which reduces theneed for long and expensive travel of food products. In
Milan, Italy, up to 40 per cent of daily produce is grownwithin a four-hour radius of travel, reflecting the city’s
proximity to the agricultural plains of the Po Valley andthe Mediterranean Sea.
Approximately 15-20 per cent of the world’s food is
produced in urban areas, with urban crops and animal
products often representing a substantial part of theurban annual food requirement (Armar-Klemesu andMaxwell 2001). The extensive role of food production
in cities is a common feature of many developing world
cities. Estimates suggest that 35 per cent of households
of Nakuru, Kenya were engaged in urban agriculture in1998 and nearly half of households in Kampala, Uganda
in 2003 (Foeken 2006; David 2010). In Accra, Ghana
90 per cent of the city’s vegetable supply is produced
within the city’s boundaries (Annorbah-Sarpei 1998).
Successful urban agriculture projects are scatteredacross some Western cities, albeit usually on a small
scale, making use of communal gardens, roof spaces
and unused urban spaces. In shrinking cities such as
Detroit, urban farms have been established in some of
the areas with particularly low development pressureson land (Kaufman and Bailkey 2000).

4.7 Waste
By concentrating people and activities, cities havebecome centres of the waste economy, which plays
a dominant role in a city’s ecological footprint. Yet,cities have demonstrated considerable resilience infinding green solutions that reduce overall waste,increase recycling and pioneering new forms ofenvironmentally friendly treatment of unavoidable
waste. In developing world cities which typically sufferfrom insufficient formal waste collection, it is a large
workforce of mostly informal recyclers and reclaimers,

476such as the Zabbaleen in Cairo, who have implemented
sophisticated reuse and recycling systems (Bushra
2000 in Aziz 2004). However, these jobs mostly do notmatch decent work requirements and green waste
strategies in these contexts often fail to recognise
the potential role of these actors (Medina 2000) and
implement expensive, technology-driven recycling
models (Wilson et al. 2006).
In many European cities, recycling levels are in the regionof 50 per cent, while Copenhagen only sends three percent of its waste to landfills (C40 Cities 2010f ). In 1991,
Curitiba established a green exchange programme(cambio verde) that incentivises people to exchange
recyclable waste for fresh fruits and vegetables
acquired by the city from local surpluses (Anschütz
1996). Composting is a further critical component forgreening waste. Positive examples range from Dhaka’s
decentralised composting to San Francisco’s municipal
food composting programmes (Zurbrügg et al. 2005).

4.8 Infrastructure and digitaltechnology
The assessment of digital technology on greener cities
lies outside the scope of this section of the Report, but
a growing body of evidence suggests that cities are thenatural sites of investment in smart infrastructure todeliver more sustainable environments. Cities provide
a critical mass of potential users for a wide range ofIT-based services which build upon complex physicalinfrastructure (such as roads, rail, cabling and distribution
systems). The digital infrastructure of the internet anddata centres create an intelligent infrastructure thatconnects people to people, people to city systems andcity systems to each other, allowing cities and theirresidents to respond to changing circumstances byadapting in near real-time and to recognise patterns to
help make informed decisions.
In addition, smart transport systems are being used totackle congestion, facilitate road user charges or supply
real-time information on traffic problems. Examples
include Stockholm’s congestion tax and Singapore’s
electronic road pricing. They also facilitate bike hire
schemes in many cities around the world. Amsterdam
currently trials smart work centres that allow workers to
use local office facilities rather than commuting to theirmain office (Connected Urban Development 2008).

Cities

5 Enabling green cities
The previous sections of this chapter confirm that thegreening process is complex, fragmented and multilayered. Enabling green cities is and will continue to beequally complex and piecemeal in the near future. Thereis no single silver bullet that can help shift cities to agreen agenda but those that are flexible and diverse will
be in a strong position.
This section addresses the key barriers that constrain
the adoption of green policies in cities and puts
forward a number of practical suggestions on the way
forward, based on enabling best practices found in
metropolitan regions across the globe. While a “one-sizefits-all” model is neither envisaged nor proposed, it isargued that there are common barriers and constraints
in cities in developing and developed countries thatneed to be overcome before green development
can take hold. It further suggests that a combinationof political restructuring, policy innovation, market
stimulation and consumer participation is essential toenable the gradual transition towards green cities in the
coming decades.
Before identifying key constraints, it is important torecognise that the shift to environmental responsibility– in cities, as in all other aspects of the green economy
debate – is not just a technical issue, but one thathas deep cultural and political ramifications. Hence,
governance and democratic accountability, together
with a dynamic involvement of the private sector, need
to be given equal attention in the discussion about
implementation as innovations in policy, planningand regulation. Green city solutions will not berealised overnight by classic top-down or bottom-up
approaches, but by the actions of a coalition of actors
from the national, state and local levels, from civilsociety and its multiple subdivisions, from the private
sector and institutions including universities, not-forprofit foundations and interest groups who share acommitment to advance the green economy in cities.

5.1 Barriers and constraints
This chapter has argued that there are compelling
reasons why the green economy model can be adopted
in cities across the world. Section 4 identified examples
of best practice in cities across both advanced anddeveloping nations, but they are a drop in the ocean withrespect to the vast majority of new urban developmentin Africa, Asia and the Americas. Today, most cities are
adopting fundamentally non-sustainable practices asa result of a combination of the following barriers andconstraints, which vary in significance according togeographical location and position with the economic
and political development cycle:■■ Fragmented governance – lack of coordination
between policy frameworks that promote green
economy measures at supra-national, national, regionaland metropolitan levels;■■ Affordability – even cost-effective green measures
may be out of the reach of poorer cities, leaving themsaddled with more wasteful urban infrastructure;■■ Lack of investment – despite wider acceptance ofthe relevance of the green economy to well-being, theprivate and public sector have not prioritised green
investment in basic city infrastructure (such as green
planning, public transport and housing strategies);■■ Negative tradeoffs – without effective policy
intervention and infrastructure investment, (which
promote productivity and resource efficiency) green
city strategies can lead to greater congestion (of people
and traffic), higher land values and costs of living;■■ Consumer preferences – when given a choice
consumers may not be willing to adopt new models
of urban living that require changes in individual andcollective patterns of consumption (e.g. high-density
apartment living, public transport use);■■ Switching costs – high short-term transition (welfare
and capital) costs for businesses that shift from brownto green, leave many companies without adequate
compensation to make the investment;■■ Vested business interests – industry dynamics inconstruction, road-building and infrastructure areresistant to change that challenges existing businessmodels and threatens the potential of short-term
return on investment;■■ Risk aversion – individuals, corporate andgovernment organisations are resistant to any changethat does not demonstrate immediate improvement ineconomic well-being, quality of life or enhanced status
within the community;■■ Perverse policies – these produce underpriced goods
and services, thereby encouraging overconsumption.
Such policies include subsidised road infrastructure;477

the failure to charge developers fully for the cost ofservices and infrastructure new developments require;various tax abatements encouraging home ownershipand other public policy measures that facilitate urban
sprawl and the use of the private car as a dominantmeans of transport; andStrong institutions

Towards a green economy

Figure 5: Enabling conditions, institutional strength anddemocratic maturity illustrates the breadth of policy
instruments and tools that can promote investment
in greening cities. Importantly, it correlates theireffectiveness over time in relation to the strength of
local institutions and the strength of the democraticsystem in different urban contexts. By plotting theenabling conditions available in systems with bothstrong and weak institutions against weaker and moremature democracies, it suggests that the process ofchange is in most cases a long one, and requires thedevelopment of mature institutions before long-termchange can be implemented, whilst recognising thatcivil-society activism and autonomous green initiatives
can be effective in the short-to-medium term, especiallyin weaker institutions and less mature democracies.
All of these transition factors suggest that it is criticalto develop policy frameworks not just at the local
and urban level, but also at the regional and national
level. More broadly, policy makers need to look at
the conditions that will enable cities in different
parts of the world to make the transition to green
economy models in relation to the maturity of theirown political infrastructure.
To overcome existing barriers and constraints, joining
up is essential. For example, engineering solutions
need to be complemented with fiscal instruments suchas carbon pricing (Birol and Keppler 2000, in Allan etal. 2006) to harvest the benefits of improved technicalefficiencies, while avoiding undesirable rebound effects.
11. see Allan et al. (2006). However, von Weizsäcker et al. (2009) suggestthat energy cost savings can provide households with the capital needed
to invest in further energy saving measures and the State to invest in R&D inrenewable energies, thus even enabling a positive feedback loop.

478

Information

Policies
Co-delivery
Proposals

LegislativereformWeak institutions

Overcoming this set of barriers and constraints requiresa multi-faceted response across different sectors, which
are addressed in turn, from governance and planning toincentives and financing.

Regulatory tools

Financial instruments■■ Behavioural response and the rebound effect –consumers may respond to reduced energy costs(generated by energy efficiency measures) by either
increasing per capita energy consumption or by spendingsavings and increasing overall consumption per head.11

5.2 Enabling strategies

Planning systems

Civil
societyactivism

Monitoring
Advisory

Autonomous
green
initiatives

Weak democracy

Mature democracy
Time

Figure 5: Enabling conditions, institutional
strength and democratic maturity
It remains difficult to achieve green city synergies
which simultaneously deliver economic prosperity,
reduce resource intensity and promote social inclusion
because economic added value is derived fromprocesses and regimes that fail to account properly forenvironmental and social externalities. Until this issue
is properly addressed, it is unlikely that fundamental
economic enabling conditions to advance green cities
will be found.
An efficient global response to the problem of climatechange will therefore entail up-front finance andtechnological support to enable fast-growing cities inthe developing world to “leap-frog” developed world
cities in planning and installing the latest, most efficient,infrastructure that will bring down resource intensity
and save money for decades. But it is to governance that
we first turn, to establish the principle for core enablingstrategies that can bring about change.

5.3 Governance
Governance encompasses the formal and informal
relationships linking the various institutions involvedin the urban system – the local, metropolitan, regional,
state, civil society and private-sector actors – and its
quality depends on the depth of reciprocity, trust, andlegitimacy. These are enhanced by mechanisms andopportunities to facilitate meaningful dialogue, andby well-structured organisations in civil society, thebusiness sector and the relevant government level.

Cities
The practical imperatives of debating trade-offs andpriorities in pursuing green city development cancontribute to the maturing of governance relationships.
In contexts with strong local government it is possible
to envisage a range of planning, regulatory andfinancing instruments to advance green infrastructure
investments, green economic development and amultitrack approach to greater urban sustainability. In
countries where local government is weak or marked
by mistrust and disinterest due to its inefficiency and/or corruption, it is important to underscore that unlessbroad-based cultural movements are fostered that canshift the aspirational horizons of ordinary people, it will
prove very difficult to promote and institutionalise thenumerous green city reforms proposed in this chapter.
In poorer cities, the building up of such capacities isimportant, as is their access to financial resources forinvesting in the various sectors of green cities. Here it may
be prudent to adopt a more pragmatic and minimalist
approach, which primarily commits municipal sectors
such as water, waste, energy and transport to a limited
number of strategic goals. These are the major areas
where the support from national governments andinternational organisations is needed.
Coalitions that work to advance green city principles
and practices need to identify practical ways inwhich they can design and execute mass-based
campaigns to make alternative approaches toroutine consumption a desirable option for ordinary
people, especially the middle and working classes
but also the large segments of the population that
one can term the working poor. In these contexts, it
is important to drive home the connections between
poverty reduction through effective slum policies,
which of course can be dovetailed with aspects ofgreen infrastructure such as decentralised systems
and community maintained systems.
However, external (to the local) actors, be they funding
agencies or national departments who operate throughlocal offices, are also working on city-wide infrastructure
investments and these protagonists should be targeted
as well to ensure that they see the potential value oftechnological leap-frogging and more communitybased decentralised delivery systems. But such an ideal
immediately sounds naïve because these technologicalapproaches effectively undermine the political control
of national elites over local territories. In this sense,
advancing effective and deep democratic institutions
become a truly foundational enabling condition forgreen cities.
Effective governance will also come into its own
through a substantive agenda or vision that is sharedby diverse stakeholders. Such a coalition can promote
the idea of a long-term strategic plan for the city
complementing the more conventional spatial andenvironmental planning instruments. For example, theinternationally-based Cities Alliance (2007) promotes socalled City Development Strategies (CDS), as appropriate
tools to address the nexus between sustainableeconomic growth and ecological preservation andrestoration. They are based on the premise that local
governments have little power and funding to promote
or impose change, and that partnerships are the only
practical way forward.12
This should be backed up by effective resource allocationand decision-making systems that demonstrate to
everyone in the city that systematic progress is being
achieved towards the long-term goal of becoming agreen city. To date, however, city level green economy
initiatives have been largely decoupled from national
policy frameworks. Glaeser and Kahn (2010), in a studyof US metro areas, find that the cities with the lowest
per capita CO2 emissions also tend to have the tightest
planning restrictions. They suggest that “by restricting
new development, the cleanest areas of the country
would seem to be pushing new development towards
places with higher emissions” (Glaeser and Kahn 2010).
To avoid a patchwork of uncoordinated targets, goals, andprogrammes, and to allow the most cost-effective emission
reduction opportunities to be exploited, national and city
initiatives need to be synchronised as part of a coordinateddesign and implementation of policy instruments. In theexample of the USA above, the city-level coordination
failure could be dealt with at national level through apersonal carbon tax that internalises the environmental
costs of household behaviour, including location decisions.
Governance restructuring witnessed in many parts of theworld often simultaneously involves devolution as well as
powers shifting to supranational bodies. These processes
increase the role of municipalities as independent
policy actors. In addition, they play an important rolein implementing national policies at the local level andin shaping the immediate living environment via longstanding municipal policy instruments. However, these
also need to be improved as decentralisation efforts
in most developing countries, and especially in least
developed countries remain deeply flawed, uneven andpartial (Manor 2004).
Within this framework, it is possible to generalise fromeveryday practice, and suggest a potential distribution
12. “Local governments alone cannot turn a city around. They control aminuscule portion of the capital available for city building and often have aneven smaller proportion of the available talent in urban innovation. Although
important as catalysts and as representatives of the public interest (in theory,at least), local governments should work in partnership with private interestsand civil society to change a city’s developmental direction – CDS processes are
based on private, public, and civil society partnerships” (Cities Alliance 2006).

479

Towards a green economy
of functions within a three-tier system of governancewhich could help deliver green city strategies more
effectively. In addition, international bodies and bilateral
networks can help enabling developing country
governments to invest in green cities by providing
finance and by helping with technology transfer.
■■ The national/state level creates the general conditions
under which the economy works and for example, has astrong focus on social security; ensuring national policy
on water; supplying infrastructure of national importance;and ensuring design standards by implementing generalbuilding regulation. In the context of a green economy,
national government can set a price on carbon (carbontax), create markets for clean technologies (carbon
pricing, regulation, tax breaks), fund or enable major
infrastructure investment (smart grid) and set minimum
standards. Besides financing, the national level should
also employ preferential policies to enable green cities.
■■ The metropolitan/regional level includes the entire
functional city-region, even though there is often a
non-alignment between political boundaries and urban
development. Metropolitan governance directly addresses
three of the five principle categories of environmental
performance (health, hazards and high quality urban
environments) with a responsibility for a wide range offunctions such as strategic planning, regulating waste
disposal and water management, overseeing regionalbanks and land banks, ensuring skills training matches
targets for the regional economy, promoting green
transport infrastructure and operations, and setting
specific building standards regarding flexible use,
additional green targets and climate change adaptation.
Increasingly, it is also the metropolitan level that addresses
the transfer of environmental costs and sustainableconsumption with targets regarding carbon reduction. In
these cases, strategic actors such as publicly owned utility
companies able to invest long-term or integrated, multimodal transport agencies facilitating the greening oftransport have proved to be extremely beneficial.
■■ The local/municipal borough or district level operates
for areas that might include between 100,000 to 500,000
residents and is responsible for implementing policies
developed at other spheres; managing green objectives;
implementing food and resource management in close
consultation with residents; overseeing local policing;and providing input on socio-economic development
for other spheres.

5.4 Planning and regulation
While the large proportion of informal practices makesplanning and regulation less relevant in some cities
in developing nations, they are the most common

480

policy instruments that shape urban development inmore complex and mature political environments. In
these instances, they range from strategic and landuse planning to building codes and environmental
regulation. Besides regulating for desired environmental
outcomes, they help to kick-start green innovation andcreate demand for green products at various levels.
To maximise synergies across different urban sectors,
integrated planning that combines land use and urban
development with other policies and cuts across theurban functional region of cities is critical in achieving
greater environmental performance. The recently
launched World Bank Eco2 Cities programme, forexample, demonstrates why planning, finance andinfrastructure imperatives are inextricably linked in a
low-carbon world (Suzuki et al. 2010). This programmeargues for a one-system approach to: “realise the benefitsof integration by planning, designing and managing thewhole urban system.” On a practical level this implies that
all cities need to understand their urban form and thenature and patterning of material resource flows throughthe urban system.
The intersections of infrastructure and the dynamics,
resilience or vulnerability of urban form are crucial. As
described previously, it is not untypical for poor people
to live without access to various infrastructure networks
in the most climate-vulnerable areas of a city (Moser
and Satterthwaite 2008). Possible impacts on urban
form and resource flows need to be considered whenplanning infrastructure investments, especially given
the enormous sums required for capital expenditure in
rapidly urbanising areas. More than anything else, urban
sustainability will depend upon how these sums aregoing to be allocated.
A combined understanding of urban form and resource
flows helps isolate effective actions to achieve greater
overall resource efficiency. It also forces a longer-termhorizon for understanding trends, the most strategicintervention points, and how to weigh up trade-offs
between various spaces of an urban region. If it is basedon sound data, it will hold the potential to provide ashared basis for understanding what is going on in acity, where it may be leading and what needs to be done
to change the efficiency of the overall system (Crane,
Swilling et al. 2010). It is only when this kind of analysis
and political discussion becomes commonplace, that one
can achieve a broad-based commitment to effective longterm strategic planning.
The recent UN-Habitat Global Report on Human
Settlements seeks to bring planning back to thecentre of urban development debates (UN Habitat2009), reinforcing the idea of strategic spatial planningthat focuses on a “directive, long range, spatial plan,Cities

Urban growth boundaries

Establish clear limits to any form of building development around cities to limit urban sprawl; create green corridors that protect
existing ecosystems

Land-use regulation

Introduce zoning regulation that prioritises development of inner-city, previously developed (brownfield) land over greenfielddevelopment at city-wide level

Density regulation

Provide minimum rather than maximum density standards; establish clear density standards at city-wide level (e.g. Floor Area
Ratios, FAR*) in support of compact city development with a hierarchy of higher density, mixed-use clusters around public transport
nodes

Density bonus

Provide development bonuses that allow increased development rights (i.e. extra floor area with respect to standard planning
regulations) for green projects that support city-wide and local sustainability

Special planning powers

Establish urban development corporations or urban regeneration companies to promote and enable green projects

Vehicle and traffic regulation

Regulate for vehicle types, emission standards, speed limits and road space allocation that favours green transport and especiallygreen public transport

Parking standards

Provide maximum rather than minimum parking standards; reduce private car parking standards to a minimum (e.g. less than one
car per household) especially in areas of high public transport accessibility

Car-free developments

Provide planning incentives for car free developments in higher density areas with high public transport accessibility

Minimum emission standards

Regulate minimum carbon emission and energy efficiency standards at the local level for buildings and vehicles

Table 6: Selected planning and regulatory instruments* FAR is the most common density measure for planning purposes. It is calculated by adding all the area of residential and business floor
space and dividing it by the entire area of the development site.

and broad and conceptual spatial ideas” as opposedto traditional master planning with detailed spatial
designs. A central component of strategic planningis the linking-up of spatial and infrastructure plans
and the promotion of public transport to drive urban
compaction and accessibility. Many cities, particularly
in Western Europe, have adopted strategic planning
while some, including Johannesburg are turning to newplanning-regulatory frameworks that serve as a basis
for new approaches.
For city governments to insist on planning reform isalso crucial for implementing the actions required toaddress the global environmental crisis. Playing thoseroles requires a much greater capacity for effectual
planning. The planning implied is a clinical engagementwith the urban form and flows of the city to identify
how best to sequence, coordinate and integratevarious infrastructure investments that will set thelong-term course for urban efficiency, competitivenessand inclusivity.
The examples cited in previous sections of this chapter
suggest that the most effective green city planning
strategies have a direct impact on the shape and sizeof a city and its metropolitan hinterland. Reusing
existing urban land while restricting urban sprawl
and peripheralisation is central to the creation ofsustainable urban environments, especially whenretrofitting mature cities with previously developed
industrial land. Increasing and maintaining urban
density levels is desirable but can only be successful
if associated with other services, such as high quality
public transport and public space. Urban design
and public space standards and a polycentric urban
structure that encourages mixed-use developments

and varying densities with peaks around nodes
supported by public transport are essential. To ensure
environmental sustainability, there should be a policy
bias against greenfield development in mature or
recently established cities, until all available urban landis developed at appropriate densities. While a wide
range of planning and regulatory tools exist that can beof particular relevance to the implementation of green
cities, Table 6 summarises some of the most effective
instruments that have brought about sustainablechange in examples reviewed in this chapter.

5.5 Information, awareness andcivic engagement
Effective planning and governance across different
administrative levels requires high-quality information
to raise awareness amongst urban residents to promote
behaviour change. In addition, given that cities containlarge consumer markets which are potentially valuable
to producers of green goods and services, information is
also an essential tool to influence consumer choice. But
consumer preferences, in developed and developing
nations, are not always green. For example, very dense
urban development is not always popular in many parts of
the UK and Europe (Cheshire 2008) and the North American
propensity for suburbanisation is well documented.
At the same time, information and active communicationon the potential benefits of greener lifestyles in cities
can enable consumers to make more informed decisions.
For example, in Munich new residents are given an
information package on green mobility opportunities.
Using such tools can also impact on the behaviour ofbusinesses as the Indian city of Surat, one of Gujarat’s

481

Towards a green economy
Monitoring
Environmental performancemeasures

Introduce new accounting and benchmarking standards for environmental performance at the city level

Environmental performancetargets

Set clear time-based and sector specific targets based on robust indicator for green city development

Carbon budget

Ensure that any urban development strategy or policy across all levels will have to be looked at in terms of carbon emission effects

ecoBUDGET

Introduce this new management system for natural resources and environmental quality measured and accounted for in a budget

City Biodiversity Index

Adopt a city biodiversity index which combines quantifying biodiversity, related ecosystem’s services and related management

Geographic Information
Systems (GIS)

Integrate this map based analysis tools in all processes allowing cities to better track and plan developments

Engagement
Online access

Increasing internet access particularly of poorer communities while making all relevant information available online

Public consultation

Issue-based engagement with local communities and public debates with politicians presenting and defending development plans

Local activism

Harness the potential of local activism to improve quality of life and the environment through community-based projects

Transparency

Ensure maximum levels of transparency and advance on freedom of information legislation

E-democracy

Recognise role of e-governance and participation in providing information and access to monitoring and achieving sustainability
targets

Awareness
Education

School curriculums to include “green education” and provision of professional “green training” for public and private organisations

Public campaigns

Raising awareness of the advantages of green city strategies, particularly on compact city living and green transport

Labelling

Eco-labelling of consumer items to help consumers make more informed choices and provide additional incentives for green products

Smart meters

New smart monitoring and metering devices can provide real time information on resource use: Without smart metres no smart
consumers

Welcome packs

Providing new residents with information packages on green living as behaviour can be best changed when building a new daily
routineBest Practice

Disseminating information on green city projects that have worked elsewhere to inform local adaptations

Demonstration projects

Establishment of test projects within cities to allow for better assessment and public exposure to new approaches

Table 7: Selected information-based instruments

largest industrial centres, has shown. A combination of
information and regulatory enforcement tools are used
to force textile firms to reduce water pollution – saving
money in the process. One large firm reduced pollution
by 90 per cent, energy use by 40 per cent and chemical
use by 85 per cent (Robins and Kumar 1999).

Fuel taxes

Increase fuel tax to internalise external costs of private vehicle use and to adjust demand to the road capacity

Carbon pricing

International, national or regional cap and trade schemes that set a maximum for carbon emissions which are being traded

Pricing for ecosystem services

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) that linking beneficiaries and suppliers of related services

Reduce perverse incentives

Cut tax reductions or incentives that encourage longer commuting (Germany) or single family housing (US)Tax incentives

Provide funding or tax reductions for citizens or companies investing in renewable energy, retrofitting buildings or other green
projects

Road user charges

Managing traffic demand and adjusting vehicle levels to available or reduced road capacities by charging private vehicle use in cities

Parking charges

Charging for on- and off-street parking based on market prices to reduce parking demand and release space for higher value usage

Land development tax

Taxing the release of new land to maximise usage and to contribute to financing green infrastructure development

Land auctioning

Limiting over-consumption of land by capping the release of new land to then be auctioned

Licence plate auctioning

Limiting the growth of private vehicles by capping at certain numbers and auctioning related licences

Table 8: Selected incentives

482

Table 7: Selected information-based instruments
presents a range of informational tools covering threebroad categories of monitoring, engagement andawareness. The instruments selected have either been
critical to successful examples of greening cities or havegained particular prominence in the current discourse.

Cities
Taxes

Cities need to be able to raise local taxes and service charges as they are the main revenues sources that can be used for public green
city strategies

Cost recovery

Introduce user fees of municipal services to help greening these services and supporting the development of greener alternatives

Land value capturing

Financing public transport based on integrated “transport-property” development models

Micro-financing

Critical financing opportunity where micro-enterprises are involved in green city strategies, e.g. recycling developing country cities

Profit-making publiccompanies

Cities to hold shares of profit making companies, e.g. utilities to allow for long-term green investments

Purchasing pools

Cities can also work together to purchase technology thereby bringing down the cost

Carbon credits

Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) already pay for a range of green city projects in Bogotá, São Paulo and Dhaka

Table 9: Selected financing instruments

5.6 Incentives
Information alone is insufficient to change behaviour
patterns; it needs to be supplemented by incentives
to bring about lasting change. In part, this may
be to minimise adjustment costs to citizens andfirms. For example, firms and workers in brown industries
may face higher prices as cities shift their industrial
structures towards greener models. National and citylevel policy makers need to compensate these shortterm losers while recalibrating urban economies.
Incentives may be within the tax system (e.g. tax breaks
or taxing environmental “bads”), other types of charges(e.g. road pricing) or payments (e.g. targeted subsidies).
Subsidies were successfully used as part of the policy
mix in Bavaria during the 1990s and 2000s. The state’s
Future Bavaria and High-Tech initiatives spent over 4bn
Euros, mainly on R&D and technology transfer aroundthe city of Munich. The investments helped kick-start
the city’s environmental technologies sector, with thecity garnering Germany’s highest share of cleantech
patents in 2007 (Rode et al. 2010).
Apart from providing direct economic incentives, city
governments also provide public services – such as

workforce education and training, business spaces andgreen infrastructure. Such services not only reducethe costs to business of going green, but also shift thebusiness environment towards one in which low-carbon
activity is the norm.
At the same time, full cost pricing (internalisingexternal environmental costs), whether as taxes or user
charges is essential for inducing behaviours to be consistent
with green city criteria. Full cost pricing measures havebeen successful in managing demand for energy, waterand other resources and find increasing applicationsin urban contexts. Many cities in the USA have recently
introduced impact fees to recover the cost of additional
infrastructure, such as roads, telecommunication, or
schools, necessitated by new development (Brueckner
2000). They can also help avoid negative rebound effects
with over-consumption as a result of efficiency savings.
Furthermore, one such measure – environmental tax –can be used to cut costs for labour, thereby proving an
impetus for employment creation.
Major pricing tools in the urban context are presented inTable 8: Selected incentives, which summarises some of
the most effective instruments that have brought aboutsustainable change in examples reviewed in this chapter.

Current job

Core training
requirement

Additional low-carbon
skill requirement

New low-carbon job

Electrician

Apprenticeship

Working on roofs; installation of solar
PV panels

Solar PV fitter

Apprenticeship

Offshore wind technology

Offshore wind maintenance technician

Apprenticeship
Undergraduate degree, masters degreeand paid work experience

Technology-specific knowledge
Energy efficiency and zero-carbon
knowledge
Carbon literacy, understanding or
carbon trading schemes
Sustainability and energy management
issuesWind turbine technician

Offshore oil or gas maintenancetechnician
Aerospace technician
Architect
City trader

Undergraduate degree

Facilities manager

No specific qualification required

Low-carbon architect
Carbon trader
Low-carbon facilities manager

Table 10: Top-up training for low-carbon jobs
Source: adapted from IPPR (2009)483

Towards a green economy

5.7 Financing
Finance can be a stumbling block to the introduction ofconcerted policies to shift cities away from a carbon andresource-intensive metabolism. Although several sourcesof revenues exist, in many countries national fiscal policy
prevents local authorities from raising enough capital
both, locally and on international financial markets. Thishas been reinforced in many parts of the developingworld by decentralisation reforms that have often entailed
a dispersal of central government functions, without any
transfer of resources and power to autonomous lower
level authorities. Layered on top of this has been thecompetitive pressure to offer tax concessions in order toattract potential foreign and domestic investors.
Three imperatives are central to advance on green
city finance. First, getting a detailed understandingof the existing financial position in terms of potential
revenue. This analysis should be based on domestic
and international comparison with cities of similar size.
Second, city governments need to initiate various formsof partnership with local businesses and community
organisations. If cities set the framework for engagement,
act transparently and accept the return on investmentsfor private actors, then there is considerable room forleveraging private-sector capital. Third, horizontal andvertical networks are required. According partnerships
and coalitions allows for cross-municipal cooperation
and regional and international participation in various
local government policy forums.
Many of the green city investment projects are within thereach of city governments, which can leverage nationalor private funds to pay for the initial capital investments.
In Hong Kong, the enormous costs for new urban rail
infrastructure are covered by the city’s principle rail
operator, the MTR Corporation, which capitalises on
the real-estate potential of its stations as part of an
integrated rail-property development model (Cervero
and Murakami 2009). In Paris and London, urban bikehire schemes are paid for privately in return for prime
advertising space, while the biogas in São Paulo’s landfills
are a resource that is privately turned into energy and forwhich the city receives carbon credits. Once the initialinvestment has been made, these projects bring in a484

steady revenue stream that can be reinvested. Some
projects do not even need initial capital investments
as they rely on statutory regulations, such as the green
building programmes in Berlin or Austin.
Table 9: Selected financing instruments provides
a general overview on financing instruments thathave been central to existing green city strategies. In
successful cases, many of these tools have been directly
available to city governments.
A priority in any green urban planning is investment incost-effective public transport infrastructure particularly
over investment in road construction that further
promotes private car use. Surface public transport suchas bus rapid transit needs to play a central role particularly
in lower income contexts. Non-motorised transport has
to be recognised as basis of any transport system andrequires greater shares of overall transport budgets.
In both developing and developed countries, anotherpriority is investing in education and training at the citylevel. Training of workers in green technologies and job
skills would be required to ensure that they can accessgreen employment opportunities. Table 10: Top-up
training for low-carbon jobs provides some UK examples
developed by the Institute for Public Policy Research(IPPR 2009), illustrating the nature and the extent ofadditional training that will be required to foster a shift
towards a lower-carbon economy.
For poorer cities, however, access to finance, green
technologies and skills may be out of reach. This
is where support in up-front finance, technology,
and capacity building is needed from the national
government and international community. In thecase of climate change, for example, the Copenhagen
Accord proposes generating US$ 100 billion per yearby 2020 in the support of climate change mitigation
and adaptation in the developing world (Glemarec,
Waissbein and Bayraktar 2010). Such finance would
be particularly effective to enable fast growing cities
in the developing world to “leap-frog” developed
world cities in planning and installing efficient
infrastructure that will reduce resource intensity andsave money for decades.

Cities

6 Conclusions
Cities are where some of the world’s most pressing
challenges are concentrated: unsustainable resourceand energy consumption, carbon emissions, pollution,and health hazards. But cities are also where hopelies. They are magnets attracting hundreds ofmillions of rural migrants in search for economic
opportunities. The net effect of urbanisation on
poverty reduction has been effective at the global
level. Although urbanisation has been accompanied
by increased pressure on the urban environment andthe increase of the urban poor, these problems are notinsurmountable.
As the nations of the world explore more sustainable
development trajectories, this report argues thatcities can and should play a leading role in greening
economies – in both developed and developing
countries. There are clear opportunities for nationaland city leaders to exploit urban areas to reducecarbon emissions and pollution, enhance ecosystems
and minimise environmental risks.
Greening cities can also produce a set of wider
economic and social benefits. First, as well as lowering
per capita carbon emissions, densification as a central
green city strategy tends to enhance productivity,
promote innovation, and reduce the capital andoperating cost of infrastructure. Densification can also
raise congestion and the local cost of living, but green
city strategies and interventions to subsidise housing
costs can help to mitigate these.
Second, in most countries cities will be important sites
for the emerging green economy. Cities’ basic offer ofproximity, density and variety delivers productivity
benefits for firms, and helps stimulate innovation andnew job creation – for example in high-tech clusters, as
are already emerging in urban regions like the Silicon
Valley. Much of a green economy is service-based, andwill tend to cluster in urban areas where consumer
markets are largest.
Third, social considerations can be fully integrated
into the design of green cities. An emphasis on public
transport, cycling, and walkability, for example, notonly contributes to road safety and community
cohesion but also works in favour of the urban low
income class who rely on these transport modes
much more than other segments of society. The
consequently improved access to jobs, education andmedical facilities, clean energy, safe drinking water,and sanitation may hold the key to lifting the urban
poor out of poverty altogether.
Greening cities is not cost free. There are tradeoffs
and switching costs, creating both winners and losers.
Consumer preferences are not always green. Cities may
face financial, structural and technological constraints.
And fragmented governance may lead to perverse
outcomes of policy, if action is not carefully joined up
between different spatial levels. The “rebound effect”,
where energy-saving innovations actually raise totalenergy consumption, illustrates how many of theseissues come together.
These factors suggest it is critical to look at bothnational and urban policy levers; and at the conditions
that will enable cities in different parts of the world
to make the transition to green economy models. In
practice, green cities will require a coalition of actors
across public, private and civil society sectors – andmultilevel governance models that allow these actors
to come together effectively.
Numerous instruments for enabling green cities
are available and tested but need to be applied ina tailored, context-specific way. In contexts withstrong local government it is possible to envisagea range of planning, regulatory, information andfinancing instruments to advance green infrastructure
investments, green economic development and amultitrack approach to greater urban sustainability.
City governments need to coordinate policies anddecisions with other levels of government, but more
importantly, they need to be equipped with strategic
and integrated planning capacities, including thecapacities to choose regulatory tools and economic
incentives to achieve locally appropriate green city
objectives.
In poorer cities, the building up of such capacities isimportant, as is their access to financial resources forinvesting in the various sectors of green cities. Hereit may be more prudent to adopt a more pragmaticand minimalist approach, which primarily commits
municipal sectors such as water, waste, energy
and transport to a limited number of overarchingstrategic goals. These are the major areas where thesupport from national governments and internationalorganisations is needed.

485

Towards a green economy

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Appendix 1 – Data sources
1.1 General Sources
Boden, T.A., Marland G. and Andres, R.J. (2010). Global, regional,
and national fossil-fuel CO2 emissions. Carbon Dioxide Information
Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department ofEnergy, Oak Ridge, Tenn., U.S.A. doi 10.3334/CDIAC/00001_V2010.
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_glob.html
Mercer (2010). Quality of Living City Rankings. Go to www.mercer.
com and follow the document links.
UN Development Programme (2010). Human Development Report
database. [online] Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
data/ [accessed 10 December 2010].
UN Population Division (2006). World Urbanisation Prospects: The
2005 Revision. Executive Summary, Fact Sheets, Data Tables. UN,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York. Available at:
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Highlights_color.pdf.
UN Population Division (2008). World Urbanisation Prospects: The
2007 Revision Population Database. [online] Available at: http://esa.
un.org/unup/index.asp [accessed 10 December 2010]
UN Population Division (2010). World Urbanisation Prospects: The
2009 Revision Population Database. [online] Available at: http://esa.
un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm [accessed 10 December 2010].
World Bank. World Development Report Database. [online]
Available at: http://wdronline.worldbank.org/ [accessed 10
December 2010].
World Resources Institute (2010). Climate Analysis Indicators Tool.
[online] Available at: http://cait.wri.org/ [accessed 10 December
2010].
World Resources Institute (2007). Earthtrends. [online] Available
at: http://earthtrends.wri.org/ [accessed 10 December 2010].

1.2 Regional Analysis
BrazilBrazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
Demographic Census 2000. [online] Available at: http://www.sidra.
ibge.gov.br/cd/default.asp [accessed 10 December 2010].
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). National
Household Survey 2005 (PNAD). [online] Available at: http://www.
sidra.ibge.gov.br/pnad/default.asp [accessed 10 December 2010].
Brazilian Ministry of Cities, National Transit Department(DENATRAN). Car ownership database. [online] Available at: http://
www.denatran.gov.br/frota.htm [accessed 10 December 2010].
UN Development Programme, Brazil Country Office. Brazilian
Atlas of Human Development. Metropolitan Human Development
Index. [online] Available at: http://www.pnud.org.br/atlas/
ranking/Ranking_RM.xls [accessed 10 December 2010].

South Africa
South African Cities Network. Sustainable cities report 2009. Go
to www.sacities.net and follow the document links.
South African Department of Transport. National Household
Travel Survey 2003. Go to http://transport.dot.gov.za and follow
the document links.
Statistics South Africa. StatsOnline. [online] Available at: www.
statssa.gov.za [accessed 10 December 2010].
Sustainable Energy Africa. State of energy in South African cities
2006: Setting a baseline. Sustainable Energy Africa, Westlake. Go
to www.cityenergy.org.za and follow the document links.
Sustainable Energy Africa. Sustainable energy: Towards

490

productive cities. Available at: http://www.cityenergy.org.za/
files/resources/energy%20data/00Intro.pdf[accessed
10
December 2010].

China

China Statistical Yearbooks (go to http://chinadataonline.org/):
National; Provincial: Shanghai, Beijing, Chongqing, Tianjin; City
(sub-prefecture level): Shenzhen, Xian, Wuhan, Wenzhou,
Guangzhou, Qingdao, Changchun, Shenyang, Hangzhou, Wuxi,
Shaoxing, Changzhou, Jiaxing, Xinjiang, Pudong, Nantong, Anqing,
Baotou, Changsha, Chengdu, Dalian, Danyang, Donqguan, Fuzhous,
Guangan, Guilin, Guiyang, Haikou, Handan, Harbin, Hohhot,
Huizhou, Jiangyin, Jilinc, Jinan, Jinhua.

India
Census of India. Census of India 2001. [online] Available at: http://
www.censusindia.net/ [accessed 10 December 2010]
Center for Sustainable Transport India. [online] Available at:
http://www.cstindia.org/ [accessed 10 December 2010].
The India National Council of Applied Economic Research(NCAER) and FCR (2008). The next urban frontier: Twenty cities towatch.
Availableat:
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EventDetails/E7Aug2008/Presentation.pdf [accessed 10 December
2010].
Singh, S.K. (2005). Review of Urban Transportation in India.
Journal of Public Transportation, 8, 1, 79-97.

EuropeEuropean Commission, Eurostat. General and regional statistics,
Urban Audit. [online] Go to www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu andfollow the document links.
Economist Intelligence Unit (2009). European Green City Index.
Siemens AG, Munich. Go to www.siemens.com/greencityindex andfollow the document links.
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2009). Energy Balances ofOECD Countries, 2009 edition. IEA Publications, Paris.
Additional sources: Brussels-Capital Region Health and Social
Observatory; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic; Polish Central
Statistical Office, Concise Yearbook of Poland 2009; General Secretariatof the National Statistical Service of Greece; Statistics Catalonia

USA

NASA/U.S. Department of Energy/Purdue University (2007). The
Vulcan Project database. [online] Available at: http://www.purdue.
edu/eas/carbon/vulcan/research.php [accessed 10 December
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United States Census Bureau (2010). American Community Survey,
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United States Census Bureau. Topologically Integrated
Geographic Encoding and Referencing system (TIGER). Metropolitan
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United States Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Cities
United States Geological Survey, Land Cover Institute. National
Land Cover Dataset 1992. [online] (Updated May 2010) Available at:
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1.3 Figures and Tables
I. Ecological Footprint, HDI and urbanisation levelby country
Global Footprint Network. National Ecological Footprint database.
[online] Available at: http://www.footprintnetwork.org/images/
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UN Development Programme. Human Development Report
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UN Population Division (2010). World Urbanization Prospects: The
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un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm [accessed 10 December 2010].

II. Carbon emission and income for selected
countries and cities
Hoornweg, D., Sugar, L. and Trejos Gomez, C. L. (forthcoming at
date of print). Cities and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Moving
Forward. Environment & Urbanization
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010). World Economic
Outlook Database, October 2010. [online] Available at: http://www.
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PricewaterhouseCooper (2009). Which are the largest city
economies in the world and how might this change by 2025? UK
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pwc.co.uk/pdf/ukeo_largest_city_economies_in_the_world_
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UN Population Division (2010). World Urbanization Prospects: The
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un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm [accessed 10 December 2010].

III. Fuel expenditure and urban density, 2008 fuelpricesDeutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)(2009). International Fuel Prices, 6th Edition – Data Preview. [online]
Available at: http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-internationalfuel-prices-data-preview-2009.pdf
Kenworthy, J. (2003). Transport Energy Use and Greenhouse
Gases in Urban Passenger Transport Systems: A Study of 84 Global
Cities, Presented to the international Third Conference of theRegional Government Network for Sustainable Development,
Notre Dame University, Fremantle, Western Australia, September
17-19, 2003
PricewaterhouseCooper (2009). Which are the largest city
economies in the world and how might this change by 2025? UK
Economic Outlook November 2009. [online] Available at: http://
www.pwc.co.uk/pdf/ukeo_largest_city_economies_in_the_world_
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UN Population Division (2010). World Urbanization Prospects:
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2010].

IV. Investment and operating costs of selected green
city projects
Asia-Pacific Environmental Innovation Strategies (APEIS).
Research on Innovative and Strategic Policy Options (RISPO), Good
Practices Inventory. TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit System of
Bogota, Colombia. Available at: http://cmapspublic2.ihmc.us/rid=1211030483752_937220900_6795/Bogota%20Rapid%20
Transit%20Good%20Practices%20Inventory.pdf[accessed
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December 2010].

Bogota Capital District, Transmilenio S.A. Estado de actividad
financiera, economica, social y ambiental del 01 de enero al 31 dediciembre de 2009. Transmilenio, Bogota. Available at: http://www.
transmilenio.gov.co/AdmContenidoUpload/ administrador.
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Centralkommunernes Transmissionsselskab (CTR) (2007). Annual
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Compagnie des Transports Strasbourgeois (2008). Rapport
d’Activité
2008.
CTS,
Strasbourg.
Available
at:h t t p : / / w w w. c t s - s t r a s b o u r g . f r / Po r t a l s / 0 / P D F / e n t r e p r i s e /Rapport%20activite%202008.pdf [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Austin, U.S.A.: Austin’s renewable energy program
reduces C02 emissions by 370,257 tons a year. [online] Available at:
http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/renewables/austin_renewable.jsp [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Austin, U.S.A.: Austin’s green building programfacilitates the construction of sustainable buildings. [online] Availableat:
http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/buildings/austin_
standards.jsp [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Berlin, Germany: Energy Saving Partnership
Berlin (ESP) – An effective and innovative model to reduce CO2 andenergy costs without expenses for building owners. [online] Availableat:
http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/buildings/berlin_
efficiency.jsp [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Bogotá, Colombia: Bogotá’s CicloRuta is one of
the most comprehensive cycling systems in the world. [online]
Available at: http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/transport/
bogota_cycling.jsp [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Copenhagen, Denmark: 97% of Copenhagen city
heating supplied by waste heat. [online] Available at: http://www.
c40cities.org/bestprac tices /energy /copenhagen _heat.jsp[accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Copenhagen, Denmark. Copenhagen’s waste
plan 2008: Copenhagen puts only 3% of waste into landfill. [online]
Availableat:
http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/waste/copenhagen_landfill.jsp [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Copenhagen, Denmark. One of the largest offshore wind farms in the world powers 150,000 Danish households.
[online] Available at: http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/
renewables/copenhagen_wind.jsp [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Freiburg, Germany: an inspirational city poweredby solar, where a third of all journeys are by bike. [online] Available at:
http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/energy/freiburg_ecocity.
jsp [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Paris, France: Velib – a new Paris love affair.
[online] Available at: http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/transport/paris_cycling.jsp [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Stockholm, Sweden. Stockholm to introduce
congestion charge – trial cut CO2 by 14%, traffic by 25%. [online]
Available at: http://www.c40cities.org/bestpractices/transport/
stockholm_congestion.jsp [accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Tokyo, Japan: World leader in stopping waterleakage. [online]
Availableat:
http://www.c40cities.org/
bestpractices/water/tokyo_waterworks.jsp [accessed 10 December
2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Toronto, Canada: Lake water air conditioning
reduces energy use by 90%. [online] Available at: http://www.
c40cities.org/bestpractices/energy/toronto_energy.jsp [accessed
10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Toronto, Canada: Toronto’s Atmospheric Fundmakes sustainability affordable. [online] Available at: http://www.
c40cities.org/bestpractices/energy/toronto_fund.jsp [accessed 10
December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). San Francisco, U.S.A.: Largest city-owned solar
power system in the United States. [online] Available at: http://www.
c40cities.org/bestpractices/buildings/sanfrancisco_eco.jsp[accessed 10 December 2010].
C40 Cities (2010). Sao Paulo, Brazil.: Sao Joao and Bandeirantes
Landfills. [online] Available at: http://www.c40cities.org/docs/
casestudies/waste/sao-paulo-landfill.pdf [accessed 10 December
2010].

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C40 Cities (2010). Hong Kong: Combined Heat and Power
Generation System. [online] Available at: http://www.c40cities.org/
bestpractices/energy/hongkong_chp.jsp [accessed 10 December
2010].
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. Portland, USA: SmartTrips
Portland. [online] Available at: http://www.c40cities.org/
bestpractices/transport/smart_trips_portland.jsp [accessed 10
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C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. Portland, U.S.A.: Portland
replaces 1,000 traffic intersection signals with LED lights, saving
millions of kilowatt-hours per year. [online] Available at: http://www.
c40cities.org/bestpractices/lighting/portland_led.jsp [accessed 10
December 2010].
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. Seoul, South Korea: Seoul
car-free days have reduced CO2 emissions by 10% annually. [online]
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Demery, J. (2004). Bus Rapid Transit in Curtiba: An Information
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http://www.publictransit.us/ptlibrary/specialreports/sr1.
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New York City Council – Finance Division (2009). Budget Report:
Analysis of the Fiscal 2010 Preliminary Budget and Fiscal 2009 Preliminary
Mayor’s Management Report for the Department of Transportation.
[online] Available at: http://www.council.nyc.gov/html/budget/PDFs/
budget_report_dot_3_12_09.pdf [accessed 10 December 2010].
New York City Global Partners’ Innovation Exchange (2009). Best
Practice: NYC Greener, Greater Buildings Plan. [online] Available at:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/unccp/gprb/downloads/pdf/NYC_
GreenBuildings.pdf [accessed 10 December 2010].
New York City Global Partners’ Innovation Exchange (2010). Bestpractice: Landfill emissions control, Sao Paulo. [online] Available at:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/unccp/gprb/downloads/pdf/SaoPaulo_
landfills.pdf [accessed 10 December 2010].
Transport for London (TFL). Transport for London Congestion
Charging, Greater London Authority Act 1999, Schedule 23, Four Year
Programme, 2006. [online] Available at: http://www.tfl.gov.uk/
assets/downloads/Four_Year_Programme_2006.pdf [accessed 10
December 2010].

492

V. Urban transport employment
Berlin: Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG). [online] Available at: http://
www.bvg.de/index.php/de/3901/name/BVG+Zahlenspiegel.html
Istanbul: İstanbul Elektrik Tramvay ve Tünel İşletmeleri Genel
Müdürlüğü (IETT). [online] Available at: http://www.iett.gov.tr/en/
section.php?sid=57
Johannesburg: Joburg – Vision and Strategy. [online] Available at:
http://www.joburg-archive.co.za/city_vision/AnnualReport02Ch2.pdf
London: Transport for London. [online] Available at: http://www.
tfl.gov.uk/microsites/pensions/documents/tfl-pension-fundreview-2009.pdf
Mumbai, bus: Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. [online]
Available at: http://www.tifr.res.in/~xvincamp/mumbai.htm
Mumbai, rail: Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Agency.
[online] Available at: http://www.regionalplan-mmrda.org/N-4.pdf
New York City: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. [online]
Available at: http://assembly.state.ny.us/Minority/20090629/report.
pdf
São Paulo, bus: São Paulo Transporte (SPTrans). [online]
Available at: www.sptrans.com.br/pdf/empresas_credenciadas/
REGULAMENTO_CRED_004_09.pdf
São Paulo, metro: Companhia do Metropolitano de São Paulo(2008). Relatório da administração – 2008. [online] Available at:
http://www.metro.sp.gov.br/empresa/relatorio/2008/raMetro2008.
pdf
São Paulo, rail: Companhia Paulista de Trens Metropolitanos(CPTM). [online] Available at: http://www.cptm.sp.gov.br/e_
contabeis/Balanco_Patrimonial_2008.pdf
South Africa: Department of Trade and Industry (1999). Labour
Statistics: Survey of total employment and earnings. [online]
Available at: http://www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/P0271.htm
Tokyo, bus and subway: Tokyo Metropolitan Government,
Bureau of Transportation. [online] Available at: http://www.kotsu.
metro.tokyo.jp/english/images/pdf/organization.pdf
Tokyo, metro: Tokyo Metro. [online] Available at: http://www.
tokyometro.jp/global/en/about/outline.html

Cities493

Part III

Supporting the transition to a global green economy

Version 02.11.2011

Modelling

global green
investment scenarios

Supporting the transition to a global green economy

Towards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Author: Dr Andrea M. Bassi,
Deputy Director, Project Development and Modelling,
Millennium Institute, USA, with support from John P.
Ansah and Zhuohua Tan, Millennium Institute.
Contributing Author: Matteo Pedercini, Millennium
Institute.
Derek Eaton and Sheng Fulai (in the initial stages ofthe project) of UNEP managed the chapter, including
the elaboration of modelling scenarios, the handlingof peer reviews, interacting with the coordinating
authors on revisions, conducting supplementaryresearch and bringing the chapter to final production.
Peter Poschen and numerous colleagues at theInternational Labour Organization (ILO), including
among others, Ekkehard Ernst and Mathieu Charpe,
contributed substantially with insights, data andcritique, particularly on employment-related aspects.
Ana Lucía Iturriza provided support to the chapter
managers and coordinated ILO’s contributions.
The following members of chapter author teams
contributed to the refinement of the model andprovided feedback on results: Bob Ayres, Amos
Bien, Holger Dalkmann, Maryanne Grieg-Gran, Hans
Herren, Andreas Koch, Cornis van der Lugt, Prasad
Modak, Lawrence Pratt, Luis Rivera, Philipp Rode, Ko
Sakamoto, Rashid Sumaila, Arnold Tukker, Xander van
Tilburg, Peter Wooders; and Mike D. Young.
During the development of the modelling analysis,
the Chapter Coordinating Author received invaluableadvice and inputs from the following: Alan
AtKisson (AtKisson Group, Sweden); Laura Cozzi(International Energy Agency); Paal Davidsen and
Erling Moxnes (University of Bergen, Norway);

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011

498

Prakash(Sanju)Deenapanray(Ecological
Living in Action); Prakash (Sanju) Deenapanray(Ecological Living in Action); Alan Drake (USA);
Jospeh Fiksel and Emrah Cimren (Ohio State University,USA); Michael Goodsite (National Environmental
Research Institute, Denmark); Cornis van der
Lugt (UNEP); Desta Mebratu (UNEP); Donatella
Pasqualini (Los Alamos National Laboratory USA);
Mark Radka (UNEP); Kenneth Ruffing (Consultant);
Guido Sonnemann (UNEP); Serban Srieciu (UNEP);
William Stafford (Council for Scientific Industrial
Research, South Africa); Niclas Svenningsen (UNEP);
Mathis Wackernagel (Global Footprint Network); Jaap
van Woerden (UNEP GRID); and Joel Yudken (HighRoad Strategies, USA).
We would like to thank those who provided
detailed comments on the review draft, including
Santiago Arango Aramburo (National University ofColombia); Simon Buckle (Grantham Institute for
Climate Change, Imperial College London, UK); Jean
Chateau (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development); Jeanneney Guillaumont (CERDI,
University of Auvergne, France); Li Shantong(Development Research Center, State Council, China);
Peter Poschen (International Labour Organization);
Mohamed Saleh (Cairo University, Egypt); and Stefan
Speck (European Environment Agency).
We would also like to thank individuals andorganizations who offered comments on theadvance copy, including Tim Jackson (Universityof Surrey, UK); Peter Victor (York University,
Canada); the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the
US Department of Commerce; the Global Footprint
Network; Novozymes; and the United Nations Fundfor Population Activities (UNFPA).

ModellingContents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  503Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5041

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  506

2

Understanding the green economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  507

3

Modelling the green economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  509

3.1
3.2

A characterisation of modelling approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
The Threshold 21 World model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509

4Scenario definition and challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  511

4.1Defining investments and methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513

5Results of the simulations and analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  515

5.1
5.2

Baseline projection (BAU)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
Green economy projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518

6Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  533

Annex 1. Technical specifications of the Threshold 21 (T21) World model . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  537References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  541

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Towards a green economy
List of figures
Figure 1: The relations between economic growth and natural resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
Figure 2: Conceptual overview of T21-World  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
Figure 3: Representation of the main underlying assumptions of green and BAU investments  . . . . . . . . . 512
Figure 4: Simulation of population in BAU compared with population values of WPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
Figure 5: Simulation of total volume of crop yield in BAU compared with values of FAOSTAT . . . . . . . . . . . 515
Figure 6: Simulation of oil demand in BAU compared with values of WEO* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
Figure 7: Simulation of arable land and forestland in BAU compared with values of FAOSTAT. . . . . . . . . . . 516
Figure 8 and Figure 9: Simulation of fossil-fuel CO2 emissions in BAU compared with WEO values;
Simulation of footprint/biocapacity in BAU compared with values of Global Footprint Network . . . . . . . . 517
Figure 10: Results of the G1 scenario relative to the BAU1 case in 2015, 2030 and 2050 (per cent)  . . . . . . 519
Figure 11: Results of the G2 scenario in 2015, 2030 and 2050 relative to BAU2 (per cent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
Figure 12: Trends in GDP growth rate (right axis) and stocks of natural resources (left axis: oil
discovered reserves, fish stock and forest stock, relative to 1970 levels), in the BAU and G2 scenarios . . . 520
Figure 13: Trends in annual GDP growth rate, historical data (WDI, 2009) and projections in
BAU, BAU2 and G2 scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523
Figure 14: Fossil fuel CO2 emissions in additional BAU and green scenarios relative to the BAU case . . . . 524
Figure 15: Composition of ecological footprint in 2050 in various scenarios, relative to 1970
value and indication of the projected footprint-biocapacity ratio in 2050 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524
Figure 16: Causal loop diagram (CLD) representing the main factors influencing crop yield in the
agriculture sector of the model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
Figure 17: Land allocation in 2050 under BAU and the G2 scenario, in billion hectares and asa share of total land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
Figure 18: Total forest stocks and flows of deforestation and reforestation in BAU, BAU2 andG2 scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
Figure 19: Fish stock relative to 1970 level and fish catch in BAU, BAU2 and G2 scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
Figure 20: Results of the sensitivity analysis for (a) fish stock relative to 1970 level and(b) fish catch in tonnes/year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
Figure 21: Global conventional oil production scenarios considered in the GER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
Figure 22: Trends in BAU and G2 scenarios (a) in total energy consumption and renewablepenetration rate (right axis), (b) power generation and renewable penetration rate in power sector . . . . 529
Figure 23: Composition of power supply employment in 2050 in various scenarios in power plants(in manufacturing, construction, installation and operation and management), power supply fuels,
energy efficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
Figure 24: Total employment in the energy sector, and its disaggregation into fuel and power, andenergy efficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531
Figure 25: Water supply by source and water demand by sector (km3), under BAU baseline andG2 scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532
Figure A1: Spheres and sectors of T21-World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538

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List of tables
Table 1: Comparison of scenarios for selected sectors and objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
Table 2: Allocation of investments across sectors in the G1 and G2 scenarios as a share of total
investment and GDP (2011 – 2050 average) and sectoral targets of green scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
Table 3: Transport emissions by mode in business-as-usual scenarios of GER and IEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
Table 4: Main indicators, BAU and green investment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
Table 5: Comparison of energy mix in 2030 and 2050 in various GER and IEA scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529
Table 6: Transport energy consumption in green scenarios of GER and IEA, in selected years . . . . . . . . . . . 531
Table 7: Main indicators in BAU and green investment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
Table 8: Comparison (per cent) of main indicators in G1 scenario relative to BAU1 scenario(1 per cent case) and G2 scenario relative to BAU2 scenario (2 per cent case) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536

List of boxes
Box 1: Changes in natural capital stocks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522
Box A1: The Cobb-Douglas production function in T21 for agriculture, industry andservices macro sectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539

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502Modelling
List of acronyms
AR4		
BAU		
CCS 		
CD		
CGE		
CLD		
CO2-eq		
DC		
ETP		
FAO		
FAOSTAT
GDP		
GER		
GFN		
GGND		
GHG 		HDI		IEA		IIASA		ILO		IPCC		Lge		
MDGs		
ME		
MoMo		
Mtoe		NDP		
O&M		OECD		
R&D		
RE		
ROI		
SD		
T21		
TFP		
UNEP		
WDI		
WEO		
WPP		

Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC
Business-as-usual
Carbon capture and storage
Cobb-Douglas
Computable General Equilibrium
Causal loop diagram
Carbon dioxide equivalent
Disaggregated Consistency
Energy Technology Perspectives
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization Statistical Database
Gross Domestic ProductGreen Economy Report
Global Footprint Network
Global Green New Deal
Greenhouse gas
Human Development Index
International Energy Agency
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
International Labour Organization
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Litres of gasoline equivalent
Millennium Development Goals
Macro-Econometric
Mobility Model (Transport Model of IEA)
Million tonnes of oil equivalent
Net Domestic ProductOperations and maintenance
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Research and development
Renewable energy
Return on investment
System Dynamics
Threshold 21 model
Total factor productivity
United Nations Environment Programme
World Development Indicators
World Energy Outlook
World Population Prospect503

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. A Green Economy grows faster than a brown economy over time, while maintaining andrestoring natural capital. Quantitative modelling for the Green Economy Report demonstrates
that greening can not only generate increases in natural capital, but also produce a higher rate of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth – a classical, if outdated, measure of economic performance.
Gross Domestic Product in the green scenario is projected to overtake business-as-usual (BAU)
within ten years. An adjusted measure of net domestic product, accounting for both physical capitaldepreciation and also for natural capital depletion, achieves this result even earlier, indicating thata green economy offers improved and integrated capital management.
2. Business-as-usual can only deliver development gains at an unaffordable price. Under a
BAU scenario, which replicates historical trends and assumes no fundamental changes in policy or
external conditions to alter the trends, development benefits in terms of GDP growth and poverty
reduction may continue for some time. But, these development gains would be achieved at an
unaffordable price. Business-as-usual continues on the current high carbon intensity development
path, with its associated environmental impacts, especially in terms of the long-term concentrationof atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHG), which would approximate 1,000 ppm CO2-eq by 2100,
resulting in temperature increases most likely around 4 degrees centigrade (as per IPCC scenarios
A1B and A2). In addition, BAU would also significantly draw down natural capital assets; the results
indicate that the global ecological footprint would be more than two times the available biocapacity of the earth.
3. A green economy promotes pro-poor growth and achieves energy and resource efficiency.
A green economy strengthens pro-poor economic growth through building up natural capital, on
which the livelihood of the poor depends. In a green investment scenario, 2 per cent of global GDP
is allocated to greening the energy, manufacturing, transport, buildings, waste, agriculture, fisheries,
water and forests sectors. In the simulations, these investments help to, by 2050, potentially double
fish stocks, and increase forestland by one-fifth, as compared to BAU. They would also reduce use offossil fuels by 40 per cent, and demand for water by about 20 per cent, relative to BAU. By maintaining
and building up natural capital and mitigating resource scarcity, these investments would provide
the basis for enhanced human well-being, and sustained economic growth over the next 20 to 40
years, at least as strong as BAU with considerably reduced downside risks.

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Modelling

4. A green economy has the potential to create additional jobs in the medium to long run.
A shift to a green economy also means a shift in employment, which, at a minimum, should not leadto a net loss of jobs. The jobs created will at least make up for the losses that would be incurred fromtransforming environmentally unsustainable activities. In the short- and medium-term, the net direct
employment under green investment scenarios may decline due to the need to reduce excessive
resource extraction in sectors such as fisheries. But between 2030 and 2050, these green investments
would create employment gains to catch up with and likely exceed BAU, under which employment
growth will be further constrained by resource and energy scarcity and the impact of climate change.
5. The greening of most economic sectors would reduce GHG emissions significantly. With
about 1.25 per cent of global GDP invested in raising energy efficiency across sectors and expanding
renewable energy, including second generation biofuels, global energy intensity would be reduced
by 36 per cent by 2030 and annual volume of energy-related CO2 emissions would decline to 20
Gt in 2050 from 30.6 Gt in 2010. Including the potential carbon sequestration of green agriculture,a green investment scenario is expected to reduce the concentration of emissions to 450 ppm by
2050, a level essential for having a reasonable likelihood of limiting global warming to the thresholdof 2 degrees centigrade.
6. A green economy sustains and enhances ecosystem services. Green investments in theforestry and agricultural sectors would help reverse the current declines in forestland, rejuvenating
this important resource to about 4.5 billion hectares over the next 40 years. Higher yields frominvesting in green agriculture would reduce the amount of land used for crops and livestock in 2050
by 6 per cent compared with projected BAU trends, while producing more food. Soil quality would
rise by a quarter on average in 40 years. In addition, investments to increase water supply and expand
access, while improving management, would provide an additional 10 per cent of global watersupply in both the short- and long-term, and also contribute to sustaining groundwater and surface
water resources. In the fisheries sector, the reduction of excessive capacity would help fish stocks
to recover by 2050 to 70 per cent of their total level in 1970, as compared with a projected further
decline to 30 per cent of the 1970 level under BAU. These investments in “ecological infrastructure”
help to restore the earth’s bio-capacity and also to enhance human well-being.

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Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
This chapter describes the modelling exercise
conducted for the entire Green Economy Report (GER)
and presents its results. The modelling was to test
the hypothesis – which gave rise to this report –that investing in the environment delivers positive
macroeconomic results, in addition to improving theenvironment. The modelling tool used is the Threshold
21 World model (T21-World), which comprises several
sectoral models integrated into a global model. The
sectoral models are at the core of the modelling
exercise supporting the analysis carried out by theauthors of the GER. The modelling traces the effects ofinvesting various amounts of GDP in green – as opposed
to business-as-usual (BAU) – economic activities interms of stimulating the economy, improving resource
efficiency, lowering carbon intensity, and creating jobs.
The next section describes the key issues that need
to be addressed by a modelling framework that tries
to quantify the challenges of moving towards a green
economy. The third section describes key featuresof the modelling structure. This is followed by asection describing the assumptions underlying thevarious scenarios: a BAU scenario with no additional506

investment, two BAU scenarios with increased
levels of investment, but no change in energy andenvironmental policies (BAU1 and BAU2), and two
green scenarios which combine the higher levels ofinvestment with improved environmental polices(G1 and G2). After that, a fifth section describes theresults of the various scenarios. This is followed by ashort concluding section. Additional technical details
are provided in an Annex as well as in the separate
Technical Background Material.
It should be noted that all sector chapters in this reporthave, to a varying extent, made use of the results fromthe modelling exercise presented here. Although themodelling includes a number of scenarios, the sector
chapters generally compare only one green scenario,
G2, with the corresponding BAU2 scenario, in addition
to describing relevant aspects of the baseline BAU
scenario. The G2 scenario is more relevant as it explicitly
aims to reduce CO2 emissions sufficiently to achieve an
atmospheric concentration of 450 ppm, as well as anumber of other policy targets in the areas of nutrition,
fisheries management, reducing deforestation, water
availability and waste management.

Modelling

2 Understanding thegreen economy
The key drivers of a green economy, as represented in the
global model developed for the analysis carried out in the
GER, are stocks and flows of natural resources in addition
to the stocks and flows of capital and labour which areimportant in any long-term economic model. Stocks areaccumulations of inflows and outflows (as forests are theaccumulation of reforestation and deforestation). In the
T21-World model, moreover, capital and labour are needed
to develop and process natural resource stocks. Thus, three
key factors transform natural resources into economic
value added: the availability of capital (which accumulates
through investments and declines with depreciation),labour (which follows the world demographic evolution,
especially the age structure, and labour force participation
rates), and stocks of natural resources (which accumulate
with natural growth – when renewable – and decline withharvest or extraction). Examples of the direct impact ofnatural resources on GDP are the availability of fish andforest stocks for the fishery and forestry sectors, as well as
the availability of fossil fuels to power the capital needed tocatch fish and harvest forests, among others. In this respect,
the T21 model accounts for both monetary and physicalvariables representing each sector in a coherent andconsistent manner. Other natural resources and resourceefficiency factors affecting GDP include water stress andwaste recycling and reuse, as well as energy prices, all ofwhich are endogenously determined.
The analysis carried out in the GER focuses on the transition
towards a green economy, characterised by high resourceefficiency and low-carbon intensity, assessing the needs
for a short- to medium-term transition and evaluating theimpacts of a longer-term green economic development.
Emphasis is therefore naturally put on stocks because
they define the state of the system, as highlighted byprojections of many key indicators for sustainability, suchas the ecological footprint.1 In fact, longer-term sustainablegrowth is related to the sustainable management of natural
resources, such as water, land and fossil fuels. Increasing
the efficiency of use and curbing waste of such resources
would reduce the decline of stocks, or even support their
growth in certain cases. In this respect, understanding therelationship between stocks and flows is crucial (e.g. theconcentration of emissions in the atmosphere may keepincreasing, even if yearly emissions are kept constant or
decline. Carbon concentration will decline only if yearly
1. The ecological footprint is a measure of humanity’s demand on nature. It
represents how much land and water area a human population requires toregenerate the resources it consumes and to absorb its wastes (GFN 2010).

emissions are below the natural sequestration capacity offorests and land, among others).
The economic growth of recent decades, while profitingfrom the contribution of natural resources, did not allow
stocks to regenerate (as has been illustrated by theMillennium Ecosystem Assessment). For instance, today
only 25 per cent of the commercial fish stocks, mostlyof low-priced species, are underexploited (FAO 2008)
and some 27 per cent of the world’s marine fisheries
had already collapsed by 2003 (Worm et al. 2006); oil
production has reached its peak and is declining in mostcountries (EIA 2009), and global peak oil is expected totake place between now and 2015 according to some
(ASPO-USA 2010) or after 2030 according to others

Gross Domestic
Product

Resource
inflow

Supply ofnatural resources

Demand ofnatural resources

Fossil fuels
Water
Forests

Resource
depletion
Resource efficiency

Figure 1: The relations between economic growthand natural resources
Natural resources are both a driver and a possible
constraint of economic growth. The higher GDP,the higher demand for natural resources; growing
demand leads to higher production, which depletes
stocks – all else being equal. Declining stocks, on theother hand, reduce potential medium- to longer–term production of natural resources, potentiallyconstraining economic growth. Resource efficiency is
promoted in the GER, to reduce demand and improvethe management of supply. The rebound effect is also
taken into consideration, as it normally reduces theintended benefits of efficiency improvements byincreasing demand.

507

Towards a green economy(IEA 2009); water is becoming scarce and water stress is
projected to increase with water supply satisfying only 60
per cent of world demand in 20 years (McKinsey 2009);
agriculture saw increasing yields primarily owing to theuse of chemical fertilisers (FAOSTAT 2009), which, on theother hand reduced soil quality (Muller and Davis 2009)by almost 10 per cent relative to 1970 level, and did not
curb the growing trend of deforestation-remaining at 13
million hectares per year in 1990-2005 (FAO 2009).
There has been a long-standing perception among
both the general public and policy makers that thegoals of economic growth, environmental protection,national and energy security involve a complex
set of trade-offs, one against another (Brown andHuntington 2008; CNA 2007; Howarth and Monahan
1996). This study aims at analysing the dynamic
complexity of the social, economic, and environmental
characteristics of our world with the goal of evaluating
whether green investments can create synergies and508

help move toward various green economy goals:
resilient economic growth, job creation, low-carbon
development and resource efficiency.
By adopting an integrated approach focused on
the interaction of stocks and flows across sectors,
this chapter examines the hypothesis that a correct
management of natural resources does not necessarily
imply accepting lower economic growth going
forward. Instead, it explores the question of whether
equal or higher growth could be attained with a moresustainable, equitable and resilient economy, in which
natural resources would be preserved through more
efficient use. This initial framing is in contrast witha variety of sectoral reports focused on energy andclimate change mitigation scenarios. By way of contrast,
the green economy approach supports both growthand low-carbon development, by reducing emissions
and conserving stocks in the short-term to profit fromtheir healthier state in the future.

Modelling

3 Modelling the green economy
National governments often formulate long-term
development objectives and a strategic approach toachieving them articulated in a development plan. A
description of policies and measures to achieve thestated development goals forms the basis for shorterterm decision-making, such as the expenditureand revenue-raising plans reflected in the annual
budget. Quantitative models have been developed toapproximate the relationships among policy measuresand development objectives.

spreadsheets representing the fundamental national
macroeconomic accounts, and enforcing consistency
among them; well-known examples of such categoryof models include the World Bank’s RMSM-X (Evaert
et al. 1990) and the International Monetary Fund’sFPF (Khan et al. 1990), mostly used to analyse themacroeconomic impact of adjustment programmes.
The three methods described above focus primarily on
the economic aspects of development, and in general
are not designed to support integrated, long-termplanning exercises.

3.1 A characterisation ofmodelling approaches

As a technique to analyse a variety of development
issues (Saeed 1998), including national policy analysis(Pedercini and Barney 2009), the methodology ofsystems dynamics (SD), conceived in the late 1950s at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), hasgreatly evolved over the last 25 years (see Forrester
1961 for early examples on the use of this methodology).
Specifically, the SD method has been adopted invarious instances to analyse the relationship between
structure and behaviour of complex, dynamic systems.
In SD models, causal relationships are analysed, verified
and formalised into models of differential equations(see Barlas 1996), and their behaviour is simulated andanalysed via simulation software. The method uses a
stock and flow representation of systems and is well
suited to jointly represent the economic, social, andenvironmental aspects of the development process.

Over the last 40 years, a variety of applied models
and modelling methods have been developed tosupport national planning. Among those tools, themost commonly used today include: DisaggregatedConsistency (DC) models, Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) models, Macro-Econometric (ME)models and System Dynamics (SD) models.2 Thesemethods have proven useful to different degrees forvarious kinds of policy analyses, especially for midshort-term financial planning. While recent global
developments have stressed the importance of jointly
addressing the economic, social, and environmental
dimensions of development, most of the methods
mentioned above do not effectively support integrated
long-term planning exercises.
More specifically, CGE models are based on a matrix
of flows concept, where actors in the economy
interact according to a specified set of rules andunder
predeterminedequilibrium
conditions(Robinson et al. 1999). Initially conceived to analyse
the economic impact of alternative public policies,
e.g. those that work through price mechanism, suchas taxes, subsidies, tariffs, recent CGE models include
social indicators (Bussolo and Medvedev 2007) andenvironmental ones (OECD 2008). Macro-Econometric(ME) models are developed as combinations ofmacroeconomic identities and behavioural equations,estimated with econometric methods (Fair 1993), andthey are largely used by national and international
financial organisations to support short and midterm macroeconomic policy analysis, such as
general fiscal and monetary policies. DisaggregatedConsistency (DC) models consist of a combination of

3.2 The Threshold 21 World model

2. For more information on models for national development, planning
see Pedercini (2009).

3. The name Threshold 21 comes from the belief that the 21st century isgoing to be a threshold period for humankind.

The approach proposed uses system dynamics as
its foundation and incorporates optimisation (fortechnical choice in the energy sector), econometrics(for parameters of production functions) in theconstruction of the model, and simulations to illustratepossible alternative futures.
The model developed for the GER, largely drawing
upon the Threshold 213 family of models created by
the Millennium Institute (see, among others, MI 2005,
Bassi 2010b), builds on assumptions (structural andnumerical) from existing detailed sectoral economic
and physical models into a comprehensive structurethat generates scenarios of what is likely to happen
throughout an integrated economic, social, andenvironmental system (see Figure 2).

509

Towards a green economy

Environment
Environment
Society

EconomyEconomySociety

Figure 2: Conceptual overview of T21-WorldThe environment, society and the economy represent the highest level of aggregation in the model (see left).
Although our environment encompasses society and the economy, for simplicity we represent them separately inthis report, to highlight the interconnections existing across them (see right).

By generating systemic, broad and cross-sectoral
scenarios over time that address environmental,
economic, and social issues in a single coherent
framework, the global model simulates the main short-,
medium- and longer-term impacts of investing in agreen economy. As a global model without regionalor national disaggregation, changes in geographicalpatterns of economic activity, social characteristics orenvironmental impacts are not explicitly represented(as explained in Annex 1). Furthermore the global
model does not address explicitly the responsibilities
or reactions of different actors, particularly
governmental authorities. The most important
contribution of this model is its systemic structurethat includes endogenous links within and across

510

the
economic,social,andenvironmental
sectors (all defined at a global aggregate level)
through a variety of feedback loops.4 Most existingmodels focus on one or two sectors, but makeexogenous assumptions about other sectors that affectand are affected by the sector under consideration.
Using endogenous formulations instead improves
consistency over time and across sectors, becausechanges in the main drivers of the system analysed arereflected throughout the model and analysis throughfeedback loops.

4. Feedback is a process whereby an initial cause ripples through a chain of
causation ultimately to re-affect itself (Roberts et al. 1983).

Modelling

4 Scenario definition and challenges
The model was used to simulate two green investment
scenarios – promoting resource efficiency and lowcarbon development – to be compared with BAU or
baseline scenarios that favour a more conventional use ofresources and fossil fuels.
The BAU case replicates history over the period 19702009, and assumes no fundamental changes in policy
or external conditions going forward to 2050. This
scenario is set up and calibrated to reflect baseline
projections of various existing sectoral models andreports on population, economy, energy, transport
and water, including among others: United Nations’World Population Prospects (WPP) (UNPD 2009), WorldBank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) (WB 2010),
OECD’s Environmental Outlook to 2030 (OECD 2008),
FAO’s FAOSTAT (FAO 2010) and State of World’s Forests(FAO 2009), McKinsey’s Charting Our Water Futurereport (McKinsey 2009), IEA’s World Energy Outlook
2010 (IEA 2010), Sustainable Production of Second
Generation Biofuels (IEA 2010), Transport, Energy andCO2 (IEA 2009) and Energy Technology Perspectives(IEA 2010) and Global Footprint Network (GFN) reports(GFN 2010).
The two green scenarios (G1 and G2) assume increased
investments over the period 2010 to 2050, and these
are contrasted with two respective business-as-usual
scenarios (BAU1 and BAU2) in which the same amounts
of investments are simulated, but allocated according toexisting patterns.5 Green scenarios simulate additional
investments that increase resource efficiency and reducecarbon intensity while creating jobs and stimulating
economic growth. Efficiency improvements driven by
investments can be achieved both directly - throughthe construction of more efficient infrastructure
and adoption of resource-saving technologies - andindirectly - through technological advances due torelevant research and development. Examples include
investments in renewable energy (e.g. power supply) andenergy-efficiency improvements. Further, investments
are allocated to reduce deforestation and increasereforestation, or to reduce extractive capacity in thefishery sector and support the restoration of fish stocks.
5. Two different methods were developed to simulate green economy
investments and analyse them. (1) The first approach simulated additional
investments, both green and following business-as-usual, across sectors. (2)The second approach shifts investments from business-as-usual to green. In
this case investments are practically reallocated to green investment acrosssectors. The first approach is presented in this chapter. A comparison of
the results obtained through the simulation of both methods is presented
in section I, Technical Background Material. In brief, our analysis indicatesthat when using the same assumptions, results of the simulations do notsignificantly differ from each other for most variables.

The green scenarios build on and extend therecommendation of UNEP’s Global Green New Deal Policy
Brief (UNEP 2009), which called for a significant portionof the stimulus packages – at least 1 per cent of GDP – tobe channelled towards investments in a range of green
sectors. As a response to the multiple crises facing theworld, such an investment was proposed as a means torevive the global economy, while embarking on a new lowcarbon, resource-efficient growth path. At the global level,commitments fell well short of this target, although theRepublic of Korea and China both stand out as countries
that allocated more than 5 per cent of GDP, in the form of
their stimulus packages, to investments in green sectors.
The Republic of Korea also extended this programme into
its medium-term “Five-Year Green Growth Plan” (20092013), which devotes 2 per cent of GDP to investments inclimate change and energy, sustainable transport and thedevelopment of green technologies. The green scenarios
here represent a similar strategy of embedding green
investments and enabling policy framework into a longterm commitment.
As stated, the BAU1 and BAU2 scenarios assume
additional investments, as in the green cases, but project
the continuation of the current trends for resource
use and energy consumption, among others. Morespecifically, these scenarios assume that no additional
investments – relative to BAU – will be allocated tothe expansion of renewable energy, that agriculture
will continue to rely on chemical fertilisers, and that
deforestation will not be curbed.6 Instead, growth will beattained through resource exploitation, including draw
down of fossil fuels, fish and forest stocks.
The comparison of green and BAU scenarios for selected
sectors and actions are listed in Figure 3 and Table 1.
The G1 and G2 green investment scenarios areconstructed for different purposes and emphases,7
but are not meant to be exhaustive in terms of thepotential breadth and extent of scenarios. The 1 per
6. The BAU does already incorporate, though indirectly, current trends
in investments in such sectors, but does not anticipate major changes inthose trends.
7. A variety of additional investment scenarios could be easily simulated
and analysed. On the other hand, for simplicity and to present a solid
analysis that could be easily compared with other leading studies, the 1
per cent and 2 per cent cases were selected. Investment scenarios beyond
2 per cent of GDP were also carefully assessed, and discarded due to lackof information on (1) potential feasible reductions in energy and material
consumption and (2) related costs (e.g. carbon abatement cost) beyond
peer reviewed and published estimates. For instance, if carbon abatement
were to be pushed beyond IEA’s estimations, assumptions on the marginal
costs of doing so would need to be made by the authors. In our analysis
instead, we rely on existing estimates, to be consistent and coherent withstate of the art research across sectors.

511

Towards a green economy
BAU
Scenario

Green
Scenarios

Resource
exploitation

Resource
efficiency

Fossil fuels

RenewableenergyJob creation

Job creation

Figure 3: Representation of the main underlying
assumptions of green and BAU investments
cent case (G1) is an experimental exercise to clarify
and illustrate the concept of green economy – as it
assumes an about equal allocation of funds acrossthe sectors analysed – and to compare the projected
impacts of the implementation of a green economy
strategy with, among others, climate scenarios suchas IEA’s 450 case. On the other hand, the 2 per centcase (G2) can be considered more relevant andcoherent. In this case, current key issues, such as
climate change, water scarcity and food security,
determine the allocation of the investment acrosssectors. Being central to addressing climate change,energy investments are prioritised in this scenario
to reach the emissions targets of IEA’s 450 and BLUE
Map scenarios. It is important to note that, for the mostpart and unless otherwise stated, the sectoral chaptersin the GER refer to G2 as the green investment scenario.
More specifically, these scenarios include investments
in agriculture, fisheries, forestry, water, waste andenergy, also allocated across sectors, such as industries,
transportation, buildings and tourism. Cities are also
analysed. More details on the scenarios follow:
Sector and objective

Scenario G1: assumes that 1 per cent of global GDP ischannelled annually through green investment. In thisgreen scenario, 1 per cent of GDP is generally divided
equally among the sectors, each receiving 10 per cent of
the green investment, with some exceptions, as
highlighted in Table 2, depending on specificsectoral targets. This distribution of funds serves toillustrate the broader benefits of greener investments,
providing national leaders facing socio-economicand environmental challenges with insights on likely
impacts of increasing green investments. For cities, inaddition to analysing the impacts of global investment
on urban settings, we simulate the allocation of 1
per cent of urban GDP to expand public transport,
being key to cities’ socio-economic as well as spatial
development.
Scenario G2: assumes that 2 per cent of global GDP
is channelled annually through green investments. In
this scenario, priorities are driven by sectoral policy
targets, emphasising energy and climate change (whichaccording to the IEA would require approximately 1 percent of global GDP through 2030 to reduce emissions to
450 ppm concentration, and limit global warming to 2o
C). As a consequence, a higher share of GDP is allocatedto energy (both demand and supply measures) andthe remainder is shared across the remaining sectors(e.g. agriculture, forestry, fishery, waste and transport
infrastructure).
The investments under G1 and G2 take place on an annual
basis over the period 2010-2050, implying a concerted
but gradual shift in shifting the economy’s capital stockand reducing potential: costs of premature obsolescence.
Scenarios BAU1 and BAU2 also assume additional
investments of 1 per cent and 2 per cent of GDP, as is thecase with G1 and G2, but these are allocated across the
economy in a BAU context, without targeting specificsectors. Generally, the effects of G1 and G2 are evaluatedin comparison to projections under BAU1 and BAU2 (theadditional BAU scenarios), respectively.

BAU Scenariosa

Green Scenarios

Higher utilisation of chemical fertilisers

Expansion of conservation agriculture, using organic
fertilisers, among others

Thermal generation (fossil fuels)

Renewable energy power generation

Fisheries
Increase production

Expansion of the vessel fleet, pushing catch in the short-term

Reduction of the vessel fleet, investing in stock management
to increase catch in the medium- and longer-term

Forestry
Increase production

Increase deforestation

Curb deforestation and invest in reforestation(expanding planted forests)

Increase water supply through higher withdrawal

Invest in water efficiency measures, water management(including ecosystem services) and desalination

Agriculture
Yield increase
EnergyExpansion of power generating capacity

Water
Manage supply and demandaRefers to BAU1 and BAU2 with additional investments allocated to match existing patterns.

Table 1: Comparison of scenarios for selected sectors and objectives

512Modelling

4.1 Defining investments
and methodology
It is worth noting that a variety of policies are
simulated together with the allocation of investments
to green sectors. In fact, our scenarios account for
both public and private investments, and assume thatthe total amount allocated is effectively spent acrosssectors. For this reason, when we refer to investment,
we consider both public and private expenditure. The
former can be represented by fiscal policies to stimulate
the purchase of more efficient capital (e.g. tax rebates
for purchasing a fuel efficient car, or a refrigerator) andthe latter is the actual private expenditure to make thepurchase. In addition, investment is generally referredto here in its economic sense as increases to fixed
capital, including infrastructure.9 It will be important
to develop criteria and indicators that can be used tomonitor relevant investments under eventual green
investment scenarios.
In the modelling exercise, the source of funding forgreen investments is not explicitly defined. This isdue to the fact that different governments, facing
different constraints and being characterised byvery heterogeneous contexts, may prefer to relyon different policies and schemes to support thetransition to a green economy.

Share of green
investment

Share of GDP

G1

G2

G1

G2

Agriculture

10

8

0.1

0.16

Increase nutrition levels to 2800-3000 Kcal/person by 2030 (FAO 2009).

Buildings

10

10

0.1

0.2

Increase energy efficiency to reach energy consumption and emissions reduction targets set in IEA’s BLUE Map
scenario (IEA 2008).

Energy (supply)

15

26

0.15

0.52

Increase the penetration of renewable energy in power generation and primary energy consumption to reachtargets set in IEA’s BLUE Map scenario (IEA 2008).

Fisheries

10

8

0.1

0.16

Restore fish stock to potential reach the maximum sustainable yield set by FAO by 2050.

Forestry

3

2

0.03

0.03

Phase in a 50% reduction in deforestation by 2030, and increase planted forests to sustain forestry
production.

Sector

Sectoral targets

Industry

6

3

0.06

0.06

Tourism

10

10

0.1

0.2

Transport

16

17

0.16

0.34

Expand public transport and increase energy efficiency to reach energy consumption and emissions
reduction targets set in IEA’s BLUE Map scenario (IEA 2008).

Waste

10

8

0.1

0.16

Reducing 70% of waste that goes to landfill through proper implementation of 3Rs.

Water

10

8

0.1

0.16

Attain the MDGs for water and reduce water intensity (reduce consumption and increase supply) (see McKinsey2010).

Total

100

100

1%

2%

Power and fuelefficiency*

33

35

0.33

0.71

Increase energy efficiency to reach energy consumption and emissions reduction targets set in IEA’s BLUE Map
scenario (IEA 2008).

Table 2: Allocation of investments across sectors in the G1 and G2 scenarios
as a share of total investment and GDP (2011 – 2050 average) and sectoral targets of green scenarios8* This category includes all energy efficiency investment (both fuel and power) implemented across sectors. These include most,but not all, investments allocated to buildings (residential, commercial and agriculture), industry, tourism and transport. In
addition, the impacts of the green investment scenario for sectors for which the investment concentrates exclusively on energy
efficiency - buildings, industry - are not presented separately below, but are captured under energy.

8. Investments allocated to cities are not presented in this table. Modelling
work on cities has proven difficult to carry out do to the lack of data on
a variety of key variables, including water and energy consumption.
Emphasis was therefore put only on transport, as indicated in the Cities
Chapter, given its relevance to urban development.

9. For some sectors, including natural-resource based sectors, such as
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, investments included under the green
investment scenarios do have a broader character, including expenditureon programmes (both capital and operating costs) to restore or maintainnatural capital. These can also be considered as investments in natural
capital in an economic sense, even though such investments have anindirect nature.

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Towards a green economy
Further, as opposed to several studies that only
provide information on “net costs” (or required
additional investments), 10 disaggregated capitalcosts and savings (or avoided costs) are used in T21World. This approach is useful because as capitalcosts are an immediate expenditure, as opposed tooperational savings – that are accumulated over the
lifetime of capital – it allows the model to calculate
the actual capital formation that corresponds to theadditional investment simulated in the green and
BAU1, 2 scenarios.
As indicated above, the calculation of required capital
investment and operational costs includes a detailed
assessment of costs associated with various technologies(capital) and their required inputs (e.g. energy). For
instance, we account for the capital and O&M cost of awind turbine, which, on a per MW basis, is often similar
to the cost of a coal-fired plant. On the other hand, wind
does not require fuel inputs and does not generate
emissions, but it is an intermittent source of energy witha relatively low capacity factor when compared to coal.
All these factors are considered in our analysis to break
down as much as possible the costs and savings related
to green investments.
Determining both the gross and net cost of moving
toward a green economy has various purposes.
These include the need to estimate (and disaggregate)
present costs and future benefits for the key actors
involved, both in economic terms and expressed aspreservation of natural resource stocks. Also, it supports
the further evaluation of the impact of policy options
in light of the associated opportunities and risks. For
instance, if a government has set an environmental
goal (e.g. reducing emissions below 1990 levels) anddecides to rely considerably on incentives (e.g. tax
breaks or discounts) to support the shift from old to
new capital and/or to more sustainable consumption,
the buy-in of households and the private sector will
be a key factor defining the success or failure of
the policy. In this case, the government risks missing
the targets and goals for emissions reduction; at thesame time, if the private sector does not participate
as expected, the economic expenses of the government(and the private sector) would be also be less. This policy
option normally targets negotiated goals to mitigate
the economic burden on households and the private
sector. As an alternative case, when governments set
mandates, the buy-in of households and private sector
is assured by law, and the economic cost is either shared(if incentives are put into place) or fully sustained by
10. When considering the cost of purchasing, for instance, a more efficient
refrigerator, the net cost is calculated as capital expenditure minus savings
occurred in the operation of the refrigeration (i.e. savings originating fromthe reduced energy consumption). This is the case of McKinsey Cost Curves(for water see McKinsey 2009).

514

households and the private sector. In this case emphasis
is put on reaching the policy target (through mandates)
and costs can be more easily estimated knowingthat both economic actors (public or private, indifferent ways) will have to sustain the costs associatedwith the full implementation of the mandate.
This study serves primarily to quantify the impacts ofinvestments, identify opportunities and avoid deadends. Given that similar policies will be more or lesssuccessful in different countries, the global study is
focused on the value of allocating funds to greener
investments, providing a broad range of information
to national policy makers, as presented in the following
sections. Additional information on funding options andenabling conditions (i.e. required policy frameworks) areavailable in the respective chapters.

Modelling

5 Results of the simulations
and analysis
5.1 Baseline projection (BAU)
The baseline projection of the T21-World model ismodelled on the assumption that current trends
will continue, with only minor progress shifting to agreen economy (e.g. high energy use and emissions
and continued unsustainable exploitation of natural
resources). Total population is projected to grow by
29 per cent in the period 2010 – 2050, reaching 8.9
billion people, matching historical data from WDI and
future projections from WPP (Figure 4). These WPP
projections are based on continuing declines in fertility,and dependent on population policies and programmes,
including universal access to sexual and reproductive
health. When looking at the population pyramid, we
see that when under-five mortality rates decline and life
expectancy increases the population will become moreequally distributed across age cohorts. Employment is
projected to increase to 4.6 billion in 2050, driven by
economic growth.11 Real GDP, endogenously simulatedby the model, is in fact projected to grow by 2 per centper year on average between 2010 and 2050, reaching
US$ 151.3 trillion, or US$ 17,068 per capita, using 2010
as the constant US dollar base year,12 which compares tohistorical data from WDI. As a result of economic growth,
the proportion of people living below the poverty line
will decline to 16.8 per cent in 2020 and 11.1 per cent in
2050 and the income distribution will improve over time,with more people being lifted out of poverty and intohigher income classes.13

2010 and 2050, accounting for 1.4 per cent, 23.4 per cent,and 75.2 per cent of real GDP in 2050. At this time, theshare of total employment by sector will be: 32.3 percent (agriculture), 23 per cent (industry), 39.3 per cent(service), and more specifically, 0.3 per cent (fisheries),
0.5 per cent (forestry), 2.5 per cent (transportation), 0.4
per cent (energy), 0.5 per cent (waste) and 1.1 per cent(water). In the agriculture sector, total volume of crop
yield (Figure 5) has increased by 1.8 per cent per annum
between 1970 and 2009, following FAOSTAT values, andis projected to continue to grow by 0.8 per cent per year
for the next 40 years. As a result, a projected 36 per cent
growth in crop production value between 2010 and
2050 will improve the average nutrition level by 7 percent over the simulation period. The fishery sector andforestry industry will contribute 0.04 per cent and 0.6
per cent of global GDP by 2050, with an average growthrate of -1.6 per cent and 0.3 per cent per year.
Owing to the growth of population and GDP, theworld’s primary energy demand will grow by over 57
per cent in the coming decades, reaching 19,733 Mtoe
in 2050. To meet the rising demand, the production
Billion people
10
World Population Prospects scenario
BAU scenario
864

In line with the overall GDP growth, the value added
generated by agriculture, industry and service sectors is
projected to increase by 0.7 per cent, 1.9 per cent, and
2.1 per cent per year on average respectively between

2
1970

PROJECTION

1975

1980

1985

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045 2050

Figure 4: Simulation of population in BAU comparedwith population values of WPP

11. Note that although the T21-World model does not incorporate an
explicit labour market, it does not assume full employment.

Billion tonnes
8
BAU scenario
FAOSTAT measures
7

12. Note: All monetary values in the chapter are presented in constant2010 US dollars.

6

13. T21-World projects income but not inequality. Gini coefficients are
assumed, following historical trends, and income distribution in this chapter
indicates how many people are living in each income class, including thosebelow the poverty line. As a result, changes in projected poverty levels arelargely driven by the simulated level of income (endogenously determined
and impacted by the investment assumed). We estimate poverty levels
using economic indicators (e.g. income), but do also consider access tobasic services (without calculating an aggregated indicator accounting forsocial and monetary factors at once). Since it is unfair to reduce poverty
to monetary poverty only, we consider social aspects as well in broader
poverty-related considerations.

1990

5
4
PROJECTION
3

2
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045 2050

Figure 5: Simulation of total volume of crop yield in
BAU compared with values of FAOSTAT

515

Towards a green economy
Million barrels
50 000BAU scenario
World Energy Outlook
40 00030 000PROJECTION

20 000

10 000
1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045 2050

Figure 6: Simulation of oil demand in BAU comparedwith values of WEO*
*For past and future projections, the model fits well with WEO values
in terms of oil demand-R-square of 98.3 per cent and average point-topoint deviation 0.69 per cent.

of fossil fuels, nuclear and renewable energy will
increase from 10,174 Mtoe, 755 Mtoe and 1,620 Mtoe
respectively in 2011, to reach 16,073 Mtoe, 1,089 Mtoe,and 2,577 Mtoe respectively in 2050, with the share offossil fuels remaining at 81 per cent throughout 2050.
For oil demand, among other fossil fuels, the simulated
trends of growth in BAU and corresponding WEO
values are illustrated in Figure 6. The projection ofoil price follows IEA’s WEO, and increases faster after
2030, due to the peak of conventional oil projected totake place after 2035.
Driven by the same factors, total water consumption
is projected to reach 8,141 km 3 in 2050 – 70 per
cent above its current value – with total watersupply heavily relying on groundwater reservoirs
and streams well beyond sustainable withdrawals.
This production level would probably compromise
aquifers, increasing salt-water infiltration in coastal
areas and forcing massive migrations.

Concerning land use, total agricultural land will expand
to 5.4 billion hectares by 2050, with pasture and arable
land growing by 11 per cent and 6 per cent between
2010 and 2050. The harvested area in turn will reach
1.3 billion hectares by 2050, a 9 per cent increase
relative to 2010 to meet the increasing food demand.
In addition, settlement land will grow by 0.7 per centper year on average, reaching 226 million hectares in
2050. Correspondingly, forestland will suffer from anaverage net loss of 6 million hectares per year and a
deforestation rate of 15 million hectares per year, with
only 3.7 billion hectares of forestland left by 2050. As aresult, the total carbon storage in forests will decline byabout 7 per cent between 2010 and 2050. The fisherysector will also face challenges such as declining stocks.
The total amount of fish caught is projected to decline
by as much as 46 per cent between 2010 and 2050, due
to overcapacity and ineffective management of theindustry and natural resources.
Finally, owing to the larger population and higher
income, the world is expected to generate over 13.2
billion tonnes of waste in 2050, 19 per cent higher than
the amount in 2009.
As a consequence of these trends, total world CO2
emissions are projected to increase throughout thesimulation, with fossil fuel emissions reaching about 50
billion tonnes (Gt) per year in 2050, 71 per cent above
2009 and 138 per cent above 1990 emission levels(Figure 8). This increase corresponds also to a 26 percent reduction in global carbon intensity (calculated as
emissions per US$ of GDP) between 2009 and 2050. The
transport sector, as a major emitter, will account of 13 Gt

Billion hectares
4

3

2

1

0

1970 1975 1980
Arable land
FAOSTATBAU scenario

1985

1990 1995 2000
Forestland
FAOSTATBAU scenario

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

Figure 7: Simulation of arable land and forestland in BAU compared with values of FAOSTAT

516

2040 2045

2050

Modelling
Gigatonnes

Footprint/Biocapacity ratio

60

2.5
BAU scenario
World Energy Outlook

BAU scenario
Global Footprint Network
2.0

45

1.5
30
1.0
PROJECTION

1501970 1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

PROJECTION

0.5

2040

2050

0
1970 1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Figure 8 and Figure 9: Simulation of fossil-fuel CO2 emissions in BAU compared with WEO values (left);
Simulation of footprint/biocapacity in BAU compared with values of Global Footprint Network (right)of CO2 emissions per year in 2050, doubling the current
level (see Table 3 below for transport emissions in BAU
and corresponding IEA’s projections). With this level ofemissions, the long-term concentration of atmosphericgreenhouse gases will approximate 1,000 ppm by 2100,
and likely remain in the range of 855 ppm to 1,130 ppm
CO2-eq, as projected by the IPCC for scenarios A1B and
A2. In addition, over the next 40 years, the ecologicalfootprint will reach 25 billion hectares, consuming morethan twice the biocapacity of the planet (i.e. sustainable
natural supply). In fact, the ratio of ecological footprint
to biocapacity rises to 2.1 in 2050 from 0.81 in 1970 and
1.5 in 2009 (Figure 8).

A long-term concentration of atmosphericgreenhouse gases of about 1,000 ppm CO2-eq would
have an extremely low probability (<5 per cent) ofrestricting global warming to 2oC. It is more likelythat the temperature increase will approximate 4oC,
ranging between 1.7oC and 5.5oC (see A1B and A2
scenarios from IPCC (2007) AR4). In such a scenario, thenegative impacts will be many and varied, including,according to the IPCC, consequences for water supply,
food production, human health, the availability ofland and ecosystems. In particular, by 2050, hundredsof millions of people will face increasing water stress;
sea-level rise will accelerate coastal storm surges,
leading to land loss and erosion and intrusion ofsaltwater into surface and groundwater; 15 to 40 per
cent of species will face extinction with 2°C of warming;
crop yields, especially in Africa, will decline, probably
leaving hundreds of millions without the ability to
produce or purchase sufficient food. Developing

On top of the impacts estimated in this study, according
to current state of the art research, the projected BAU
trends for emissions and ecological footprint are notsustainable and will trigger considerable negative
consequences on society, economy and environment.
Mt/year

2010

2020

2030

2050

Transport mode

* MoMoBAU* MoMoBAU* MoMoBAU* MoMoBAU

Total emissions

6,221

6,989

7,573

8,387

9,308

10,175

12,70912,991

Cars

2,826

3,084

3,557

3,945

4,494

5,129

6,652

6,923

Buses

424

485

443

511

453

518

470

505

Other passenger
road

157

185

180

220

209

248

291

314

Trucks

1,211

1,375

1,364

1,513

1,603

1,750

2,143

2,157

Passenger rail

29

32

34

39

41

44

57

60

Freight rail

127

138

137

155

143

157

152

168

Air

721

972

1,030

1,229

1,451

1,507

1,864

1,995

Water

727

718

827

776

915

822

1,080

868

Table 3: Transport emissions by mode in business-as-usual scenarios of GER and IEA* Source: MoMo Transport Model (IEA, 2009)517

Towards a green economy
countries are the most vulnerable to climatechange impacts. As many of the effects of climatechange depend on the degree of adaptation, whichitself will be determined by income levels and market
structure, these countries have fewer resources to adapt
socially, technologically and financially. It is estimatedin Stern’s Review of the Economics of Climate Change(2006) that climate change will impose an overall costequivalent to 0.5 to 1 per cent of world GDP per annum
by the middle of the century if no emission mitigation
measures are taken in the short- and medium-term.
Further, the report indicates that if we start to takestrong action now to achieve a stabilisation between
710ppm and 445ppm CO2-eq by 2050, the global
average macro-economic costs for GHG mitigation are
between negative 1 per cent and positive 5.5 per centof global GDP, which is equivalent to slowing averageannual global GDP growth by about 0.12 per cent per year.

falls from about 2.7 per cent per year in the period
2010-2020 to 2.2 per cent in 2020-2030 and further to
1.6 per cent in 2030-2050.

5.2 Green economy projections
Investing various additional proportions of GDP in thegreen economy or following BAU has various impacts
throughout society, economy and the environment.
Despite difficulties in estimating global impacts ofinvestments, we were able to calculate the generalrepercussions on GDP and estimate employment,
avoided costs and state of natural resources for mostof the sectors analysed in the GER. The main impactsof simulating green and additional business-as-usual
investments in various scenarios are highlighted in Table
4, Figure 10 and Figure 11.
Generally, the green economy scenarios show the
beginning of the marked decoupling of natural resource
uses from economic growth (see Figure 12). In fact,
the key difference between green and additional BAU

In the GER BAU scenario, the feedback effects fromnatural resource depletion are sufficiently importantthat the annual rate of world GDP growth gradually
2011
Unit

2015

2020

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

Additional investment

US$ bn/year

0

763

1,535

0

760

1,524

885

1,798

0

883

1,789

Real GDP

US$ bn/year

69,33478,65179,306

77,69478,38478,69091,02892,58388,73890,91592,244GDP per capita

US$/person/year

9,992

10,868

10,95910,737

10,832

10,87412,00012,205

11,698

11,983

12,156* Annual GDP per
capita^%/year

1.8%

2.1%

2.3%

1.8%

2.1%

2.2%

1.9%

2.1%

1.7%

2.0%

2.2%

Consumption per capita

US$/person/year

7,691

8,366

8,435

8,264

8,338

8,370

9,236

9,394

9,004

9,224

9,357

Population below $2/
day

%

19.5%

18.1%

17.9%

18.3%

18.1%

18.1%

16.4%

16.2%

16.9%

16.5%

16%

Total employment

billion people

3.2

3.4

3.4

3.4

3.4

3.4

3.7

3.7

3.6

3.7

3.7

Energy intensity

Mtoe/US$ bn

0.18

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.21

Fossil fuel CO2 emissions

Gt/year

30.6

33.3

33.6

32.9

32.0

30.7

36.6

37.1

35.6

33.2

30.3

Footprint/biocapacity

Ratio

1.5

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.5

1.5

1.7

1.7

1.6

1.6

1.4

1,719

3,889

2011

Continued.
Additional investment

US$ bn/year

0Real GDP

US$ bn/year

69,334* Annual GDP per
capita^US$/person/year

GDP per capita growth
rate

2030
1,137

2,334

0

2050
1,150

2,388

1,616

3,377

116,100 119,307 110,642

117,739

122,582

164,484

172,049 151,322

174,890

199,141

9,992

14,182

14,577

13,512

14,35814,926

18,594

19,476

17,068

19,62622,193%/year

1.8%

1.5%

1.6%

1.3%

1.7%

2.0%

1.6%

1.7%

1.4%

1.5%

2.2%

Consumption per capita

US$/person/year

7,691

10,916

11,22010,401

11,052

11,48814,312

14,991

13,138

15,106

17,082

Population below
US$ 2/day

%

19.5%

13.9%

13.5%

14.6%

13.7%

13.2%

10.4%

9.8%

11.4%

9.8%

8.4%

Total employment

billion people

3.2

4.1

4.2

4.1

4.1

4.1

4.7

4.8

4.6

4.8

4.9

Energy intensity

Mtoe/US$ bn

0.18

0.15

0.15

0.15

0.13

0.12

0.13

0.13

0.13

0.08

0.07

Fossil fuel CO2 emissions

Gt/year

30.6

42.7

43.8

40.8

35.6

30.0

53.7

55.7

49.7

29.9

20.0

Footprint/biocapacity

Ratio

1.5

1.8

1.8

1.8

1.6

1.4

2.2

2.2

2.1

1.4

1.2

Table 4: Main indicators, BAU and green investment scenarios* Annual GDP per capita growth rate

5180

Modelling
2015

2030

2015

2050

%
20

%
20

10

10

0

6
0

1

0

0

0

0

-1

-6

-10

0

-2 -1

-1

-4

-5

3
-1

1

1

1

-1

1
-2 -1

-2

-10

-6
-17

-20

-22
-27

-30

-40

-8

-14

-27

-30

2050

16

-13

-15

-20

2030

-38

-40
-50

-50
-60

Employment
Real GDP

Nutrition(caloric
availability)

Poverty(% population)

Footprint/
biocapacity

Water
stress(% population)

Figure 10: Results of the G1 scenario relative to the
BAU1 case in 2015, 2030 and 2050 (per cent)** Footprint-biocapacity ratio (or biocapacity ratio): the ratio of ecological footprint overbiological capacity. The biological capacity (or biocapacity) is the ability of an ecosystem
to produce resources it consumes and to absorb wastes generated by humans (GFN2010).

investments is created by the projected future of stocksof natural resources (see Box 1, based on section VI in
the Technical Background Material, which presents
the changes in natural resource stocks in more detail,including estimates of changes in the value of natural
capital assets and adjusted net domestic product –NDP). Business-as-usual scenarios push consumption,
stimulating economic growth in the short- and mediumterm, thus exacerbating known historical trends ofdepletion of natural resources. As a consequence, in thelonger-term, the decline of natural resources (e.g. fishstocks, forestland and fossil fuels) will have a negative
impact on GDP (i.e. through reduced production
capacity, higher energy prices and growing emissions)and results in a lower level of employment. Additional
consequences may include large-scale migration driven
by resource shortages (e.g. water), faster global warming
and considerable biodiversity losses.
The green scenarios, by promoting investment in key
ecosystem services and low-carbon development,show slightly slower economic growth in the short- to
medium-term, but faster and more sustainable growthin the longer-term. In this respect, the green scenarios
show more resilience, by lowering emissions, reducing
dependence on volatile fuels and using natural resources
more efficiently and sustainably. In other words, thegreen economy investment scenarios take the earth offof the collision course it is currently on with biophysicalconstraints. A more detailed summary of key results
across sectors is presented below.
Worth noting, while BAU investments show a higher
return on investment (ROI) in the short- and mediumterm, green investments indicate higher economic ROI
in the longer-term, outperforming BAU investments by

-48

-60

Employment
Real GDP

Nutrition(caloric availability)

Poverty(% population)

Footprint/
biocapacity

Water
stress(% population)

Figure 11: Results of the G2 scenario in 2015, 2030
and 2050 relative to BAU2 (per cent)over 25 per cent throughout 2050-yielding, on averageby 2050 over US$ 3 for each US$ invested. Also, bothinvestments yield positive economic returns after aboutnine to 11 years in the green cases and seven to 9 years
in BAU scenarios. More specifically, it can be observedthat BAU investments will drive faster economic growth –in terms of total and per capita GDP14 – than the green
alternatives in the short-term, with only marginal
difference in social improvements (poverty reduction,
employment, nutrition). In the medium- to longerterm, however, the economic and social development
in a green economy is expected to outperform theBAU cases. Moreover, the green scenarios always see
lower negative impacts on the environment (e.g. energy
intensity, emissions and footprint), which will contributeto the faster medium- to longer-term economic growthobserved in green scenarios relative to BAU ones.
Results of the BAU and green scenarios indicate that
global real GDP would reach between US$ 175 and
US$ 199 trillion by 2050 respectively in the G1 and G2
scenarios, which exceeds the US$ 164 in the BAU1 and
US$ 172 trillion in BAU2 cases, by 6 per cent and 16
per cent respectively. The average annual growth rate
reaches, on average, 2.3-2.7 per cent between 2010
and 2050 in the green scenarios, although the relevant
comparison is to the BAU1 and BAU2 scenarios. Theselatter scenarios see faster economic developmentin the short to medium term, with 2.3 per cent to 2.4
per cent annual growth rate between 2010 and 2050.
However, GDP in the BAU1 and BAU2 scenarios in 2050
is lower than in G1 and G2, due to natural resource
depletion and the higher energy costs (Figure 13). Thiscan partly be seen in calculations of NDP adjusted
for depreciation of both fossil fuel and fish stocks (see14. Even by this limited, conventional measure, which does not represent
progress nor wealth (See Box 1).

519

Towards a green economy
Natural resources,
relative to 1970 ratio
1.4

Annual GDP
growth rate, %
3.5

1.4
BAU

G2 SCENARIO

1.2

1.2

3.0

1.0

1.0

2.5

0.8

0.8

2.0

0.6

0.6

1.5

0.4

0.4

1.0

0.2

0.2

0.5

0

1990
Relative fish stock

2010

2030

Relative forest area

2050

1990

2010

2030

2050

0

Relative oil reserves

Figure 12: Trends in GDP growth rate (right axis) and stocks of natural resources (left axis: oil discovered
reserves, fish stock and forest stock, relative to 1970 levels), in the BAU and G2 scenarios
Stocks are better managed and saved for future generations in G2, while supporting GDP growth already in themedium- and longer-term.
Box 1). Economic development in a green economy
pushes total employment up to 4.8-4.9 billion in the G1
and G2 scenarios (3 per cent to 5 per cent above BAU)
(see Table 4). Depending on the investment simulated,
and its timing, the total net direct employment ingreen sectors may decline in the short-term (primarily
due to a decline in the fishery and forestry sector
employment15), to then converge or rise above
BAU employment in the medium to long run. The
employment gain is projected to range from 134
million to 238 million for the G1 and G2 scenarios,
depending on the projected growth of sectors that
depend on natural resources.16 In the additional BAU
scenarios, employment is expected to range between
97 million and 176 million higher than BAU in 2050,
which assumes, perhaps optimistically, that the trend of
depletion of natural stocks does not inhibit productionand employment growth. On the other hand, when
accounting for the indirect employment effect acrossthe economy as well (jobs created or lost in sectors
depending on the ones analysed in more details in thisstudy, e.g. fish distribution), we observe a growth in
the range of 149 million to 251 million jobs for green
15. Employment in the fisheries sector, when adopting the second
approach proposed in the Fishery Chapter (i.e. the reduction of fishingcapacity will affect primarily large vessels and industrial production), will
be reduced by only 1-1.2 m people in the short-term – as opposed to a lossof about 10 m direct jobs. In this case, employment in the fishery sector in
the longer-term will be largely above the BAU cases.
16. As noted above, the T21-World model does not assume full
employment. In addition to the further details on employment per
sector are presented below, an additional analysis of employment
impacts based on contributions by the ILO can be found at
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/documents/
publication/wcms_152065.pdf.

520

scenarios and 126 million to 223 million for BAU1
and BAU2 scenarios respectively by 2050. The results
highlight the need to confront transition costs ofgreening, particularly with regard to retraining andrepositioning labour for a lower carbon future.
More specifically on short-term impacts, world GDP will
be slightly higher (less than 1 per cent in 2015 and 2020)in the additional BAU scenarios, relative to green cases.
In 2020, total GDP in both scenarios will reach about
US$ 91-92 trillion, or 2.5 per cent to 4 per cent above
BAU. In accordance, total employment will be 8-21
million (or 0.2 per cent to 0.6 per cent) lower in agreen economy than in BAU1 and BAU2 cases,
respectively by 2020, while it will be 2 to 3 per centhigher in G1 and G2 when only net direct employment
in green sectors is considered.
Pressure on natural resources increases as GDP grows,
and tends to slow the rate of GDP growth in both
BAU1 and BAU2. Lower soil quality, higher water
stress and fossil fuel prices all impact GDP negatively,
in turn impacting indicators such as the HDI. Natural
resources have varied impacts on the ecologicalfootprint, which pushes resource use to 2.2 times what
the planet can sustainably generate by 2050 in the BAU2
case, from 1.5 times in 2010 and 1.7 times in 2020. In
the G1 and G2 scenarios, while investments support
the transition to a lower carbon and more resource
efficient economy, they generate higher GDP, as well as
greater energy and water demand than would otherwise
have been the case. As a consequence, the impact ofgreen investments on resource conservation will beModelling
partially offset by the additional GDP and associatedconsumption. Synergies, as explained below, canbe found in investments in energy efficiency andrenewable energy among others, because theygenerate a net reduction in fossil fuel demand,
which in turn pushes prices below the BAU projection
and generates considerable savings (or avoided
costs) over time, despite the impact of the rebound effect.
As a result of green investments, global energy demandand CO2 emissions will be mitigated considerably by
2050 relative to BAU (Figure 14). Even without explicitly
modelling and analysing the positive impacts onemissions of transitioning to conservation agriculture,17
we project a concentration in the range of 500-600 ppm
in the green scenarios.18 This indicates a moderate to
unlikely probability that global warming will be limited
to 2oC, as indicated in the IPCC AR4 report (IPCC 2007).
More specifically, the projections result in a 36 per centreduction in global energy intensity by 2030 in the G2case, with the annual volume of energy-related CO2
emissions declining to 30-20 Gt in 2050 from 30.6 Gt
in 2010, also a 40 per cent and 60 per cent below BAU
in 2050 for the G1 and G2 scenarios respectively, which
is more significant than the short-term mitigation(reducing BAU by 3 to 6 per cent in 2015 and 7 to 15
per cent in 2020). Non-energy related emissions fromfertiliser use, deforestation and harvested land will belower than BAU by 16 to 25 per cent, 33 per cent and
1 per cent in 2015, and 45 to 68 per cent, 55 per centand 4 per cent, respectively in 2050. It is worth noting
when considering the enactment of a cap and trademechanism with carbon prices aligned with the recent
US domestic proposal (reaching US$ 77 per tonne ofCO2 by 2030 and US$ 221 by 2050, in constant US dollars
at 2010 prices), that the reduction in emissions from thegreen economy investment would represent a savingsin avoided permit costs of about US$ 1000-1,650 billion
per year on average between 2012 and 2050.
Finally, under the green economy scenarios, theecological footprint will also improve in the medium tolong run after a slight increase in the short-term, withthe biocapacity ratio reaching 1.5 (or 4 per cent to 6 percent below BAU) in 2015 and then stabilising at 1.4-1.2
throughout 2050, well below 2.0 in the BAU and 2.212.4 in the BAU1 and BAU2 scenarios (See Figure 15), andyears of life expectancy lost due to emissions will be
reduced by 3.6 per cent and 7 per cent on average in
the G1 and G2 cases.
17. Due to the lack of global estimations on soil carbon absorption underconservation agriculture practices.
18. The concentration of emissions could be lowered to 450 ppm when
accounting for the potential carbon sequestration of organic andconservation agriculture. Conservative estimates for the annual global
sequestration potential of OA amount to 2.4–4 Gt CO2-eq, while otherestimates point at a potential of 6.5-11.7 or even more (see Müller andDavis (2009); Nelson et al. (2009).

Since the green investments simulated have economic
impacts (e.g. GDP), as well as social (e.g. employment,poverty) and environmental impacts (e.g. energy
consumption, emissions, land and water management), thecontext in which they are applied are particularly relevantto the analysis. Developing countries, such as sub-Saharancountries, facing extreme poverty and considerable
challenges in reaching the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) (World Bank 2007), are heavily dependent
on agriculture and highly vulnerable to climatic changes.
Improving socio-economic conditions, through higher
access to water and energy, but also improved nutrition,and the efficient utilisation of natural resources are key
goals of green economy strategies in these countries.
Developing countries strive to improve productivity andincrease their economic resilience in order to sustain strong
economic growth. Here, energy and resource efficiency are
key to longer-term development. Equatorial nations, often
endowed with oil and other natural resources, are a good
example: being a net exporter of resources these countries
can profit from a reduction in domestic demand, and bypreserving forest and other stocks of natural resources- possibly through payments for ecosystem services - canmaintain Earth’s biodiversity stocks. Finally, developed
countries can more actively contribute to technology
development and become a solid example of how matureeconomies can become resource efficient and reduce theircarbon path, while creating jobs.
Agriculture
In the case of the green investment scenarios, theadditional investment in the agriculture sector(US$ 118-US$ 198 billion per year on average in 20112050 in G1 and G2, respectively) is allocated to more
extensive use of organic fertiliser, agricultural researchand development, pest control, and food processing.
In these scenarios, the volume of agricultural (crop)
production (excluding livestock forestry and fishery), is
projected to increase by 7 to 11 per cent in 2030 and 11
to 17 per cent in 2050 compared with BAU.19 Relative
to BAU1 and BAU2, value added in the green cases will
be between 3 and 5 per cent in 2030 and in the rangeof 5 to 9 per cent in 2050. This development is mainly
due to higher yield per hectare (15 to 22 per centhigher than BAU and 6 to 10 per cent than additional
BAU scenarios by 2050, with BAU1 and BAU2 having ahigher yield than the green scenarios in the short- to
medium-term only), driven by improved soil quality(thanks to the extensive use of organic fertilisers), R&D
efforts and effective pest control. As is presented in
Figure 16, natural crop yield per hectare depends ona number of primary factors, with the actual effective
19. When assuming that a price premium could be applied to certified
products, or those goods originating from sustainable agriculture practices,
the total value of agricultural GDP in the G1 and G2 cases would be on
average 28 per cent higher than BAU1 and BAU2 and 40 per cent higher
than BAU. This calculation assumes, among others, that producers haveaccess to markets that demand (or reward) sustainable practices.

521

Towards a green economy

Box 1: Changes in natural capital stocks
Conventional economic indicators, such as GDP,
provide a distorted lens on economic performance
particularly since such measures fail to reflect theextent to which production and consumption
activities may be drawing down natural capital. By
either depleting natural resources, or degrading
the ability of ecosystems to deliver economic
benefits, in terms of provision, regulating or
cultural services, economic activity may be basedon the depreciation of natural capital. Various
alternative approaches to adjusting the systemof national accounts and aggregate economic
indicators are being refined and discussed at theinternational level (e.g. Integrated Environmental
and Economic Accounting – SEEA*).
The T21 model tracks the evolution of various
natural resource stocks over time as highlighted
in Figure 12 and in more detail in section VI
of the Technical Background Material. The
green economy scenarios are characterised
by investment in and recovery of these stocks,
providing a basis for sustained income gains overthe medium- to longer-term.
It is insightful to undertake some additional
calculations,using
relatively
simplistic
assumptions, to generate some sense of thepotential economic magnitude of the improved
management of natural capital. The table below
presents changes in the value of three resource
stocks-fossil fuels, forests and fisheries-over the
short- and medium-term in both absolute terms
and relative to GDP. The change in physical values
for fossil fuels and fish is valued using estimatesof the economic value (unit rent), and forforests, using estimates from TEEB. Following themethodology employed by the World Bank (2006),
these estimates of depreciation (or appreciationwhere changes below are positive), these amounts
can be seen as reflecting additional components
of a measure of negative net savings in global
wealth (as could be represented in asset accounts
following system of national accounts).
According to these calculations, annual drawing
down fossil fuel stocks is equivalent to 1.8 percent of current GDP. Under BAU, this remains
roughly the same in the short-term and thenrises in the medium- to longer-term. The G1
and G2 scenarios reverse this trend with thisdepreciation, as a ratio to GDP, declining overthe period 2010-2050, reaching 0.5 per cent of
GDP by 2050 under G2, reflecting the marked
reduction in fossil fuel dependence of the global
economy in this scenario.

522

Lower and upper bound values of the value ofthe depreciation of natural capital in the formof forest land are presented due to the wider
range of uncertainty concerning global reference
values (see section VI, Technical Background
Material, which makes use of results from TEEB
research). Current depreciation of forestland isthus estimated at between US$ 2.8 billion and US$
2.6 trillion - spanning three orders of magnitude- which is between 0.01 per cent and 5.4 per centas a proportion of GDP. Note that the higher range
estimates are comparable to, and indeed well
above, those for fossil fuels. The green scenarios
considerably reduce this loss within the short-term
and turn it around into modest positive growth - orappreciation instead of depreciation - by 2050.
Similar improvements can be seen in fish stocks.
The current estimate of depletion of this natural
asset is valued at US$ 116 billion per year, which
is -0.24 per cent when expressed as a ratio to GDP.
The green scenarios succeed in reducing this lostand over the medium- to longer-term, stabilising itor turning into a net appreciation.
Although a range of results is only presented forforest resources, due to the wide range of existingmeasures, the estimates for fossil fuels and fish
could also be developed into ranges. These would,
however, probably not have the same degree ofvariability as those for forests.
It is important to bear in mind that even though
the results are presented in a way that makes
comparison between the estimated depreciationof the different assets comparable, this should
be done and interpreted with care. In particular,
the three assets are not substitutes for eachother. Fossil fuels are a source of energy. Forests,
including how they are valued here, provided a
range of provisioning and regulating services, both
locally but also much more widely, including evenglobally. Fisheries provide a major source of protein
and employment to a substantial proportion of
the world’s population but many of these people
would not be able to substitute forests for fisheries
as a source of food and livelihoods, or vice-versa.
In general, the results underline the substantial
economic significance of how the world iscurrently managing its natural capital, as wellas the potential gains that can be won frompursuing a green economy strategy. This allows
the global economy to invest in natural capitalthat is critical for sustained well-being, while
reducing the dependence on fossil fuels.

Modelling

2011
Unit

2015
BAU1

BAU2

2020

BAU

G1

G2

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

Real GDP

US$ billion/year

69,33478,65179,306

77,69478,38478,69091,02892,58388,73890,91592,244NDP

US$ billion/year

59,31069,082

69,62568,244

68,89869,17479,70080,98177,70579,76681,007

Change in fossil fuel stocks US$ billion/year-1,212-1,447-1,471-1,413-1,309-1,221-1,730-1,788-1,645-1,392-1,163

ratio to GDP

-1.8%

-1.8%

-1.9%

-1.8%

-1.7%

-1.6%

-1.9%

-1.9%

-1.9%

-1.5%

-1.3%

US$ billion/year

-160

-151

-151

-149

-77

-36

-141

-141

-134

-46

1

ratio to GDP-0.24%-0.19%-0.19%-0.19%-0.10%-0.05%-0.16%-0.15%-0.15%-0.05%<0.01%

US$ billion/year

57,992

67,53368,052

66,73367,51567,87877,87579,09775,97378,30579,771G1

G2Change in fish stocks
Adjusted NDP

2011
Unit

2030
BAU1

BAU2

2050

BAU

G1

G2

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

Real GDP

US$ billion/year

69,334

116,100 119,307 110,642 117,739 122,582

164,484

172,049 151,322 174,890

199,141

NDP

US$ billion/year

59,310100,686 103,215

96,006102,638 107,133

139,621

145,483 128,599 149,887

172,198

Change in fossil fuel stocks US$ billion/year-1,212-2,616-2,787-2,373-1,692-1,127-4,705-4,972-4,312-2,306-979

ratio to GDP

-1.8%

-2.3%

-2.3%

-2.1%

-1.4%

-0.9%

-2.9%

-2.9%

-2.8%

-1.3%

-0.5%

US$ billion/year

-160

-122

-122

-116

-9

52

-91

-91

-88

40

142

ratio to GDP-0.24%-0.11%-0.10%-0.10%-0.01%

0.04%-0.06%-0.05%-0.06%

0.02%

0.07%

US$ billion/year

57,992

97,988100,345

93,558100,939 105,930

134,855

140,450 124,231 147,509

171,129

Change in fish stocks
Adjusted NDP

Box 1 cont. Notes: The results here, based on calculations presented in section VI of the Technical Background Material, consist largely of supplementary
calculations using T21 model results on evolution of physical natural resource stocks over time and complimenting that with data from other studies.
Adjusted net domestic product (NDP) deducts the changes in the value of fossil fuel and fish from NDP*.
* See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seea.asp

Growth rate
0.05

0.04

G2 scenario
0.03

BAU scenario

0.02
Historical trend (WDI)

PROJECTION

0.01

0
1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

BAU2 scenario

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Figure 13: Trends in annual GDP growth rate, historical data (WDI, 2009) and projections in BAU, BAU2 and G2
scenarios

yield being further affected by pre-harvest losses (inaddition, post-harvest losses will reduce the amount of
final food supply).20
Higher yields allow using a lower amount of land, 4
per cent less than BAU and 6.2 per cent less thanadditional BAU cases in 2050. As a result, the quantity
20. Causal loop diagrams (CLD) for each sector modelled and analysed in
the GER are presented in section VII, Technical Background Material.

of calories consumed per person in the green cases will
be higher than BAU and additional BAU investment
scenarios, especially in the longer-term, by 4 to 7 percent and 1 per cent to 1.4 per cent by 2030 respectively,
reaching close to 3,100 Kcal/person/day. By 2050 theoverall quality of nutrition is projected to rise by 9 to13
per cent relative to BAU, with 3,250 and 3,380 Kcal
being consumed per person per day. In line with theagricultural production increase in the green scenarios,
employment in the agriculture sector will reach 1.62

523

Towards a green economy
6.0

Percentage
20

2015

2030

2050

0
Relative to 1970

4.0

-10
-20
-30

-50
-60

BAU1
BAU2
G1
G2

Figure 14: Fossil fuel CO2 emissions in additional
BAU and green scenarios relative to the BAU case(selected years)
billion and 1.7 billion in 2050 in the G1 and G2 cases
respectively, well above the BAU1 (1.6 billion), BAU2
(1.66 billion) and BAU (1.5 billion) scenarios.
In line with the medium- to long-term improvements,
the same trends are observed in the short-term, albeit
to a lesser extent, with crop production and nutrition
being 3.3 to 5.1 per cent and 1 to 2 per cent higher thanBAU in 2015. Soil quality, in particular, will rise by only
1 to 2 per cent in five years compared to 10 to 14 percent and 21 to 27 per cent in 20 and 40 years due to thedelayed effect of more sustainable agriculture practices.

524

2.0

1.5
3.0
1.0
2.0
0.5

1.0
0

BAU

BAU2
CroplandGrazing land
Fishing ground
CarbonFootprint/biocapacity ratio

Ecological footprint-biocapacity ratio

5.0

10

-40

2.5

0.0
G2
ForestBuilt-up land

Figure 15: Composition of ecological footprint in
2050 in various scenarios, relative to 1970 value(left), and indication of the projected footprintbiocapacity ratio in 2050 (right)
high external input agriculture typical of industrialised
countries, would provide an even clearer picture of thepotential equity benefits of such investments.22

It can be argued that green investments should beallocated to agriculture more predominantly where
this sectors is a major driver of economic and social
development. This is the case of sub-Saharan countries,
among the least developed countries in the world,
where investments in the promotion of more sustainableagriculture could increase yields and production, also
improving nutrition and food security. As an exercise, if all
investments simulated in the primary sector (including
agriculture, fishery and forestry) were allocated toagriculture-based countries, the value added per capita
of rural inhabitants would grow on average by around
US$ 600 per year, or US$ 1,450 when considering only
the rural poor population.21 Even if only 20 per cent ofthese investments were to reach agriculture-based
countries, increasing per capita GDP by US$ 118 and US$
290 per person per year for rural population and rural
poor respectively, it would still be a important increase
considering that GDP per capita in agriculture-based
countries in 2005 was US$ 524 per year. A disaggregatedagricultural sector, for example most simply between
smallholder agriculture of developing countries andForestry
In the green economy scenarios, green investmentin the forestry sector, totalling US$ 40 billion peryear on average between 2010 and 2050, is allocatedto both deforestation reduction and reforestation.
The average annual deforestation rate of naturalforests in the green scenarios is projected to be 50
per cent lower than BAU between 2010 and 2030
(See Figure 17 and Figure 18). With the deforestation
rate declining to 6.7 million hectares per year
from 2030 in the green cases, an estimated 283
million hectares (or 8 per cent) of natural forest
area is saved. Additional green investments willconsiderably increase reforestation (planted forest)
to 19 million hectares per year in 2050. Thus, planted
forests will be 497 million hectares (or 143 percent) more than BAU by then, providing sufficient
resources for forestry production to exceed baseline
projections in the longer-term (after 2015). In
accordance with the forestry production growth ingreen scenarios, forestry employment will reach 30
million people in 2050, which is 20 per cent above
BAU. As a result of the enhanced reforestation andavoided deforestation efforts, total forestland is
projected to reach 4.5 billion hectares over the 40year period, outperforming the BAU case by 21 percent. This will allow 502 Gt of carbon to remain in

21. Population estimates and trends were calculated using data publishedin the 2008 World Development Report (World Bank 2008).

22. The feasibility depends primarily on the availability of adequate data
and this is being explored in further versions of the model.

Modelling

Water
efficiency

WaterdemandWater
stressAgriculture
labourSustainable
management

Agriculture
capitalNatural crop
yield per ha

Forestland

Organic
fertiliser

Soilquality

Chemicalfertiliser

Fertiliseruse

Effective crop
yield per ha

Pre harvest
lossesR&D

Harvested
area

Oil
price

Agriculture
production

GDP

Population

Figure 16: Causal loop diagram (CLD) representing the main factors influencing crop yield in the agriculture
sector of the model (blue boxes). Orange boxes represent the green investment options analysed
The effective crop yield is defined as the difference between natural yield and losses due to plant diseases. The
natural crop yield instead is influenced by capital and labour, as well as by R&D (e.g. seed improvements), soil
quality, the use of fertilisers and water availability. Soil quality is further influenced by the use of fertilisers and byforestland.
forest ecosystems in 2050, which is 71Gt above BAU
and 21Gt higher than the current level. Furthermore,
a greater extent of forested land improves soil
quality and often increases water availability, two
factors that impact agriculture production positively(Pretty et al. 2006). In the short-term, however,
the efforts of reforestation (2.5 and 3 times thatof BAU) and avoided deforestation (60 per centand 46 per cent above BAU) as a result of green

investment do not bring immediate benefits to theenvironment, given the time it takes to increase thearea of planted forests. The total forest area (around4 billion hectares) is projected to be 1 per centand 3 per cent higher than BAU in 2015 and 2020.
Forestry production will start seeing benefits around
2020, reaching US$ 840 billion of value added in
2020, which is 12.5 per cent higher than baseline,
creating around 3 million additional jobs.

525

Towards a green economy
Billion hectares
BAU
Forest3.70

Agriculture 5.40
Pasture
3.76

28%
42%
28%
2%
Settlement 0.22

Others3.63
G2
Forest4.50

Fisheries
The green investment in fisheries, (US$ 118-198 billion
per year over the next 40 years) is allocated to threeareas: 1) vessel buyback programmes to prevent overcapacity of fishing, 2) retraining and relocation offisheries employment, and 3) fisheries management tosupport fish-stock regeneration. In these green scenarios,
the fishery sector will also move toward sustainability
through a reduction in vessel capacity and investmentsin the management of fish stocks.23 With the withdrawalof vessels between 2011-2020, fishing capacity will be
26 per cent lower than BAU by 2020. This will cause
the global fish catch to drop to 50 million tonnes by
2017, considerably lower than current levels – and onefourth lower than BAU – but a necessary step to restore
the fish stock, which would halt its decline and level
off around 2020. Once the decline of the fish stock iscurbed and investments are freed up to promote better
management of the industry, the fish catch could growwell above the projected 50-63 million tonnes in 2050 in
the G1 and G2 cases, with 2 to 4 per cent more catch peryear on average than BAU between 2010 and 2050.

29%
13%
Arable 1.65

Agriculture 4.90
Pasture
3.42

35%
37%
26%
2%

Others3.36

Settlement 0.26

26%
11%Arable 1.46

Figure 17: Land allocation in 2050 under BAU andthe G2 scenario, in billion hectares and as a share of
total land
Forests are very important for many countries,
where both their harvesting and preservation areimportant economic drivers. In certain cases, waste
land could be converted to forests over time, without
negative impacts on agriculture and settlements.
Simultaneously, better control measures would
reduce the rate of deforestation, limiting the rapid
depletion of forestland and natural resources.
BAU
Forest area increase in m Ha/ year
2010

2030

2050

25
20
15
10

While lower fishing capacity will reduce direct
employment in the short-term (by 19-20 million
people in 2020 under G1 and G2 relative to 24 million
under BAU and 29 million in 2011), higher stock levels
and better management of the sectors are projected
23. Fish stock represents the total number of fish. Modelled as a stock
variable, its value changes by accumulating fish birth and reducing by fish
death per year, and is dependent on values of previous year. Similarly, forest
and agricultural land stocks represent sizes of land areas for forests andagricultural production, that changes by annual conversion among typesof land. Other stocks include resources of fossil fuels and water sources.

BAU2

G2
2010

2030

2050

Forest area in m Ha/ year
5 000
2010 2030 2050
4 000
3 000
2 000

5

1 000

0

0

-5
-10
-15
-20
Forest area decrease in m Ha/ year
Figure 18: Total forest stocks (right axis), and flows of deforestation and reforestation (left axis) in BAU, BAU2and G2 scenarios

526Modelling
Relative fish stockin m Tonnes/year
0,874

Fish catchin m Tonnes /year
74

80

74

0,7

63
58

52

0,6
0,5

60
43

0,4

70

53

50
40

40

0,3

30

0,2

10

0,1

20

0

2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050

BAU

BAU2

0

G2

Figure 19: Fish stock relative to 1970 level (left axis)
and fish catch (right axis) in BAU, BAU2 and G2
scenarios
to lead to 27 to 59 per cent higher employment levelin the green scenarios relative to the baseline by
2050.24 On the other hand, additional BAU investments,
24. Employment in the fisheries sector, when adopting the alternative
approaches proposed in the Fishery chapter (e.g. the reduction of fishingcapacity will affect primarily large vessels and industrial production), will
be reduced by only 1-1.2 million people in the short-term – as opposed toa loss of about 10 million direct jobs. In this case, employment in the fisherysector in the longer-term will be largely above the BAU scenarios.

assumed to be allocated to current business practices,
will further deplete fish stocks, expected to be largely
exploited by 2050 (it is estimated that only 56 percent and 33 per cent of the fish available in 1970 will
be in place by 2015 and 2050), leaving few resources
for what could be currently considered cost-effective
fish catch (Figure 19). Here again, the results indicate
the need to offset transition costs in the short run toreach higher productivity and employment levels in
the future under a green economy scenario.
To carefully evaluate the effectiveness of investmentsin the fishery sector, a variety of scenarios were
simulated where the cost (effectiveness) of fish-stock
management interventions are assumed at between
US$ 354 and US$ 1,180 per ton (BAU is US$ 736, or a
1:4 ratio of cost/benefit), following a random uniform
distribution. The results of the corresponding
changes in fish stock and fish catch are presented in
Figure 20.
In the two extreme scenarios, the global fish stockin 2050 will respectively return to the 1970 level(lowest cost case) and current level - around half of1970 volume - (highest cost case). In the G2 scenario,
around 70 per cent of the amount of fish resourcesin 1970 is available by 2050, which drops to a mere
30 per cent under BAU, where no additional stock
management activities are assumed. As a result,
the world fish catch will recover, after a short-term
decline, to the relatively wide range of between 50
million tonnes and 90 million tonnes per year in 2050,

BAU

G2 (w
(with
confidencewith confiden
nce regions byy colour)
n
50%
%

75%
%

Stock ratio

Fish catch ((million tonne
tonnes)
ees)

2.0

100
00

1.5

75

1.0
.0

5
50

0.5

25
2

0.0
2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

0
1990

2005

95%
%

2020

100%
100

2035

2050

Figure 20: Results of the sensitivity analysis for (a) fish stock relative to 1970 level (left) and (b) fish catch intonnes/year (right)21
21

Area in yellow: 50 per cent of the range of scenarios in the sensitivity analysis, green for 75 per cent, blue for 95 per cent and grey for 100 per cent.

527

Towards a green economy
BAU (with confidence regions by colour)
50%
50

75%
75

95%
9

100%
10

World oil production rate, million barrels/year
45 00030 000

15 000

0
1970

1990

2010

2030

2050

Figure 21: Global conventional oil production scenarios considered in the GER“World oil production rate”: Annual conventional world oil production, in million barrels/year.

exceeding the baseline volume in early 2020s and in2035 under the two scenarios.
EnergyThe green investment in energy will contribute toboth the supply side (expansion of low-carbon power
generation and biofuel production), and the demandside (energy efficiency improvements for end-use energy
demand, involving industry, transport and buildings
sectors). It is worth noting that synergies are found underan early peak-oil scenario (see also Bassi et al. 2010),
where the increased efficiency and a faster transition
beyond fossil fuels, driven by green investments, will
reduce energy prices below BAU throughout thesimulation period, making the economy more resilientand sustaining economic growth. A variety of scenarios
were simulated to study and evaluate the impacts of thetiming of several conventional oil production trends. The
total amount of resources and reserves was changed toendogenously obtain world oil production. While a moredetailed analysis is available in Bassi et al. (2010), therange of scenarios analysed is presented in Figure 21.
Energy supply
In the green economy scenarios, the energy supply sector
will receive green investment of US$ 174 - US$ 656 billion
per year between 2010 and 2050 to expand biofuel
production and power generation using renewables andadvanced technologies (such as CCS).
The substitution of green investment in clean energy for
additional BAU investments in carbon intensive energy
sources will increase the penetration rate of renewables528

to 19 to 27 per cent of total primary energy demand by
2050, compared with 13 per cent under BAU and 12 percent in the BAU2 scenario.
In the power sector, the capacity of power generation
by energy sources in green cases will reach: 1.7 TW(hydro), 204 GW (waste), 955-1515 GW (wind), 38-54 GW(geothermal), 655-1304 GW (solar), 8-21 GW (tidal), and3-16 GW (wave) in 2050 respectively. As a result, theserenewable sources of energy will account for 29 to 45 percent of total electricity generation by 2050, significantly
higher than the 24 per cent in BAU and 23 per cent under
BAU2. The share of fossil fuels, coal in particular, will
decline accordingly to 34 per cent in 2050, comparedwith 64 per cent in the BAU scenario, mostly owing to the
expansion of renewables (See Figure 22 and Table 5).
The green scenarios are expected to see the introduction
and major expansion in second generation biofuels. In
2025 and 2050, the production of second generation
biofuels is projected to reach 151-490 billion litresof gasoline equivalent (lge) and 254-844 billion lge,
contributing to 4.2 to 16.6 per cent of world liquid fuelproduction by 2050 (8.4 to 21.6 per cent when first
generation biofuels are considered). Between 12 percent and 37 per cent of agricultural and forestry residues
would be needed in the G1 and G2 scenarios respectively.
In case residues above 25 per cent are not available or
usable (as indicated by the IEA 2010), marginal land isassumed to be used. Between 330,000 and 1 million jobs
would be created for biofuels and agriculture residues,
and the figure would increase up to 3 million if a mixof agricultural residues and conventional feedstocks isModelling% RE in energy
30
27Energy demand in mtoe/year
20 000% RE in power
50
45Power generation in TWh/year
40 00025

40

30 000

15 000
20

29

19
15

10 000
13

13

13

13

30

24

20 000

20

20

16

10

16

10 000

5 000

10

5
0

2010 2030 2050

2010 2030 2050

BAU

G2

0

0

2010 2030 2050

2010 2030 2050

BAU

G2

0

Figure 22: Trends in BAU and G2 scenarios (a) in total energy consumption (left axis) and renewable penetration
rate (right axis), (b) power generation (left axis) and renewable penetration rate in power sector (right axis)
used. Additional scenarios were simulated to test the
impacts of variations in the labour intensity of secondgeneration biofuels, for which very few estimates were
found (e.g. Bio-era 2009). The values considered range
from 1/6 and 1/3 of the employment of first generation
biofuels. Also considered is a scenario where second
generation biofuel share the same labour intensity
as first generation biofuels. In the first case, therange considered would result in projected biofuel
employment to grow rapidly and reach between
almost 3 million and 4 million in 2050, compared with
3.1 million in G2 and 2 million under BAU. On the other
hand, assuming that the labour intensity of biofuels
does not change with the introduction of second
generation biofuels, total employment would reach 7.7
million by 2050.
%

The total employment in the energy sector is
projected to slightly decrease over time in the BAU
scenario, reaching 18.6 million by 2050 against
19 million in 2010, owing to increasing labour
productivity in fossil fuel extraction and processing.
In the green scenarios, short-term net job creation
is observed (for both G1 and G2) primarily due tothe higher labour intensity of renewable energy
versus thermal power generation. In the longer-term
instead, the G1 case shows lower employment levels
than BAU (4 per cent below BAU in 2050), while theemployment in the G2 case (23.3 million) will behigher than the BAU1 scenario (19.5 million), andwill greatly outperform the BAU (18.6 million) byalmost 26 per cent when energy efficiency jobs are
considered (Figure 23).

2030

2050

*WEO

GER

*WEO

GER

*ETP

GER

Reference

BAU

450

G2

BLUE Map

G2

Coal

29

31

19

25

15

15

Oil

30

28

27

24

19

21

Gas

21

23

21

23

21

25

Nuclear

6

6

10

8

17

12

Hydro

2

2

3

3

Biomass and wastes

10

8

14

12

Other RE

2

3

5

5

Total

100

100

100

100

Scenarios

4
29

16
8

100

100

Table 5: Comparison of energy mix in 2030 and 2050 in various GER and IEA scenarios
Source: WEO 2010 (IEA 2010); ETP 2010 (IEA 2010)529

Towards a green economy
Millions of persons
15
5,1
10
3,3

5

5,2

5,5
5,3

0

1,8

0,8
G2

BAU
Thermal power plant

Energy efficiency

Thermal power fuelRE power plant

Figure 23: Composition of power supply
employment in 2050 in various scenarios in power
plants (in manufacturing, construction, installationand operation and management), power supply
fuels, energy efficiency
Considering short-term impacts of the green investment,
the energy sector will see the expansion of renewableenergy with less significant improvements comparedwith the longer-term: the renewable energy penetration
rate will rise to 19 to 22 per cent in power supply and 14
to 17 per cent in total energy supply by 2020, from 18
per cent and 13 per cent respectively in BAU. By then,green investments will push the production of secondgeneration biofuels up to 133-424 billion lge, creating
1.5-1.9 million jobs (12 per cent to 40 per cent above
BAU) in biofuel production. As a result, total energy
employment will be 5.5 per cent higher in G2 (21million) than the baseline (20 million), but 2 per centlower than BAU in G1 (19 million). These figures include
the 0.25-0.62 million jobs created by 2020 throughenergy- efficiency improvements.
Energy demand
Additional green investments, totalling US$ 277US$ 651 billion per year over the next 40 years, areallocated to improve efficiency for end-use energy
demand, especially in power use (across sectors) andin fuel use in industry (see also HRS-MI 2009) andtransport (transport investments are analysed in a
separate section looking at the expansion of the public
transport network as opposed to increased efficiency).
These energy savings efforts are projected to curb total
primary energy demand by 4 to 6 per cent, 10 to 15

530

per cent and 26 to 34 per cent by 2020, 2030 and 2050
respectively compared with BAU, reaching 14,12013,709 Mtoe in 2020, 15,107-14,269 Mtoe in 2030 and
14,562-13,051 Mtoe in 2050.25 Total fossil fuels demand
will decline by 6 to 12 per cent relative to BAU in 2020,
and 22 to 41 per cent relative to BAU and up to 28 percent to 48 per cent relative to BAU1 and BAU2 by 2050,
driven by the expansion of the public transportation
network (rail and buses) and by improvements inenergy efficiency (e.g. in the industrial and buildings
sector), as well as the increased use of renewableenergy and waste, as mentioned above (IEA 2008).
The lower energy consumption will generateconsiderable savings on energy expenditure (e.g.
avoided capital and fuel costs in the power sector will
result in savings averaging US$ 415-US$ 760 billion peryear between 2010 and 2050).
Furthermore, green investments allocated to energy
efficiency are expected to create an additional 2.95.1 million jobs by 2050, causing the total energy
employment in G2 to reach 23.4 million in 2050,
above the baseline by 26 per cent (See Figure 23 forpower-sector employment and Figure 24 for a detailed
breakdown of energy employment).
Transport
The green investments in the transportation sector,
totalling US$ 187-US$ 419 billion per year over the 40year period, will be allocated both to improve energy
efficiency across all transport modes, as mentioned
above, and to support the shift from private transport
to public or non-motorised (e.g. walking or cycling)transport. In 2050, private cars account for only onethird of total passenger travel - in terms of passengerkm/year - almost cutting the baseline percentage in
half, resulting in a reduction in the number of cars by
34 per cent relative to BAU. Accordingly, the shares ofpassenger travel carried by trains and buses increase
drastically to 18 per cent and 35 per cent by 2050
in the G2 scenario. The combination of this modaltransition, further energy efficiency improvements andexpected changes in total travel volume is expected tolead to energy savings in almost all transport modes between 57 and 75 per cent for cars and 40 to 65 percent overall in the green economy scenarios relative
to BAU. This outweighs the slight increase in rail andbus energy consumption (Table 6). As a consequence,
total CO2 emissions from transport energy use are
expected to decline to 7.8-4.6 Gt per year in 2050 in
the green scenarios, compared with around 13 Gt
per year in the baseline. By then, cars will account for
25. As a point of comparison, energy efficiency in OECD countries has
reduced projected growth in energy consumption by 56 per cent over the
30-year period, 1973-2004 (IEA 2008).

Million persons

Modelling

25

Energy efficiency

20

RE power
15

Thermal power
BiofuelGas production

10

Oil production
5

Coal production
0

2000

1990

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Figure 24: Total employment in the energy sector, and its disaggregation into fuel and power, and energy
efficiency under the G2 scenario
a declining share of the emissions from 53 per centunder BAU to 38 per cent in the green scenarios.
Primarily as a result of the job gains in public transport
expansion, total employment in the green scenarios
will increase to 124-130 million in 2050 (or 5 to 10 per
cent above the baseline).

possible due to the higher demand of iron and steel,among other things.
Water
In the green economy scenarios, US$ 118 US$ 198 billion per year is invested on average
between 2010 and 2050 in the water sector to
expand the access to potable water and water
services, to improve water-use efficiency, andto increase water supply through desalinationand supply management measures. With theseinvestments, water demand will be curbed byabout 24 per cent to 19 per cent in the G1 andG2 scenarios by 2050 relative to BAU (3 per centby 2015 and 13 to 12 per cent in 2030). This
reduction is mainly a result of increased water
efficiency in the agriculture sector as well as
investments in the industrial and municipal sectors.
Furthermore, investments to manage and increase
supply and improve access to water will support
the preservation of groundwater and surface water,
contributing to about 10 per cent of global water
demand both in the short- (2015) and longer-term

In the short-term, private cars will account for 41 per centof passenger travel due to green investments in 2020
compared with around half under BAU, allowing theshare of rail transport to grow to 11 per cent from 7 percent in BAU. As a result, the total energy consumptionof automobiles is curbed by 28 per cent relative to
BAU, resulting in a 20 per cent reduction in total energy
consumption and emissions from all vehicles by 2020.
At the national level we find synergies in allocating
investments to increase fuel efficiency, expanding andelectrifying the rail network. If non-thermal powersources are adopted, this leads to reduced liquid fueldemand, higher efficiency and lower carbon intensity.
At the same time, the economy and employment will
benefit from infrastructure construction and reduced
congestion but short-term increases in emissions are
Mtoe/year
Scenario

2020

2030

2050

* WEO/450 Scenario

G2*WEO/450 Scenario

G2* IEA's BLUE Scenarios

G2

Total transportenergy consumption

2,710

3,155

3,182

3,139

2,100-3,200

2,163

in which oil

2,483

2,699

2,891

2,526

in which biofuel

193

427

245

580

400-800

874

Table 6: Transport energy consumption in green scenarios of GER and IEA, in selected years
Source: * WEO/450 Scenario: WEO 2010 (IEA 2010); IEA’s BLUE Scenarios: Transport energy and CO2 (IEA 2009)531

Towards a green economy
in infrastructure could result in more efficientuse of water and increasing agricultural yields contributing to poverty reduction, especially inrural areas.

Thousands of km3 per year
8
1,122

6

1,530

2,084

621

4

4,369

810

6,611
4,935

2

3,350

1,322
38

0

882

2010

2050
BAU

2050
G2 Demand

2050
G2 Supply

Municipal

Demand reduction
from green investement

Water saving due toefficiency improvements

Industry

Water demand

Desalinisation -fromgreen investments

Agriculture

Conventional surface
and groundwater supply
not from green investment

Conventional -fromgreen investment

Figure 25: Water supply by source and water
demand by sector (km3), under BAU baseline and G2
scenarios(2050) (See Figure 25). In accordance with the higher
availability of fresh water resources in the green
economy scenarios, the fraction of population underwater stress will increase to 60 per cent in 2020 andstabilise in the long-term to around 62 per centin 2050, compared to 67 per cent in the baseline.
Water-sector employment will reach 40-43 million
in 2050, which is 24 to 19 per cent below BAU owing
to the reduction in total water consumption, but it
is still 30 to 38 per cent higher than the 2010 level.
In the short-term, employment will remain about
the same, 34 million in 2015 under the green and
BAU scenarios. It is worth noting that investmentsin the water sector could have considerable impacts
in developing countries, where interventions toimprove sanitation would considerably increase
access to potable water, and higher expenditure532

In the case of lower precipitation in the decades
to come, water stress is projected to be higher andto have more serious impacts on, among others,
agriculture production. More specifically, with
precipitation being 10 per cent below BAU by 2050,
water stress is expected to affect nearly 70 per centof the population in 2050. Under this scenario, green
investments will reduce water stress by about 6 per
cent, reaching 64 per cent.
Waste
In the green economy scenario, a total of
US$ 118 - US$ 198 billion per year on average
is invested in the waste sector to increase
the waste collection rate and promote
recycling
andcomposting
practices.
The
higher collection rate of wastes (around 82 to
83 per cent between 2010 and 2050) as wellas the projected economic development in
the green scenarios are projected to increase
the total usable waste volume in BAU and green
scenarios by 2 to 3 per cent in 2020 and 9 to 12 percent in 2050. However, owing to the significant
improvement in waste recovery (e.g. recycling rateis 7 per cent in green scenarios, 2.2 per cent in
BAU and additional BAU cases in 2050), the annual
amount of waste directed to landfills in the green
scenarios will be much lower than the BAU scenario
by 2050. Thanks to the improvements in upstream
waste treatment, its employment will reach 25-26
million jobs in 2050, which is 2-3 million higher thanunder BAU (the employment gain in 2020 is 0.4-0.54
million). It is worth mentioning the contribution ofrecycling to reducing energy demand and emissions
as well as production costs - positively affecting
industrial GDP.

Modelling

6 Conclusions
The simulation of future scenarios with an integrated
cross-sectoral model highlights the characteristicsof the green economy approach and provides anassessment of the global impacts of green investments,
relative to BAU. These impacts are summarised below.
Undertaken at the global level, this analysis
necessarily does not reflect different national orregional circumstances, which should be an area
for additional work. Among other aspects, suchanalysis will need to pay attention to the means andability of governments to direct investment at thescale envisaged, including necessary international
financial flows. 26
The projections in the additional BAU investment
scenarios (BAU1 and BAU2), are for increases in GDP
and employment, but accompanied by a growing
depletion of natural resources. More specifically,
water stress will worsen, impacting population
growth, agriculture and industrial production. A
larger number of vessels in the fishery sector willallow fish catch to rise in the short-term but fall in themedium- to longer-term, limited by a considerable
decline of fish stocks in capture fisheries in the next
40 years. The increased use of chemical fertilisers
is projected to increase yields in the agriculture
sector in the short-term at the expenses of a longerterm decline of soil quality. This will require moreland - converted from forest area to farmland - to feed
the growing population. Moreover, the increasinguse of fossil fuels projected in the additional BAU
scenarios will further jeopardise energy security
and tend to slow economic growth, through higher
energy (especially oil) prices. As a consequence ofhigh fossil fuel dependency and deforestation, CO2
emissions are projected to grow beyond BAU overthe 40-year period. As a consequence, while GDP
will still grow, its pressure on natural resources will
increase, pushing our ecological footprint to over
two times the available biocapacity by 2050 andatmospheric carbon concentrations to over 1,000
ppm by 2100.
In the green economy scenarios, one observes
significant efficiency improvements, resource
conservation and carbon mitigation, which
contribute to stronger and more resilient economic
growth in the medium- and long-term. The

sustainable management of natural resources,
resulting from a reduction in fishing capacity, adecline in deforestation, the promotion of organic
fertiliser and a reduction in fossil fuel use, will allow
the restoration of stocks of key natural resources, orgreatly mitigate their depletion. For example, fishstocks, forestland and soil quality are estimated toincrease by 64 to 106 per cent, 21 per cent and 21 to
27 per cent respectively relative to BAU by 2050, withclear benefits for the productivity of these sectors.
In addition, the efficiency improvement of water andenergy use in a number of sectors will considerably
curb the consumption of these resources (below
BAU by 34 to 50 per cent for fossil fuels and 24 to
19 per cent for water in 2050) and avoid negative
consequences arising from their depletion. With
increased carbon sequestration from forests,
the potential sequestration from conservation
agriculture (still to be estimated in detail), and thesubstitution of traditional energy resources with
low-carbon alternatives, CO2 and GHG emissions,will be considerably lower than BAU over the next
40 years.
Increasingly decoupled from the consumptionof natural resources, GDP growth under a green
scenario is expected to surpass that under BAU in
the medium- to long-term. Taking into account the
improved maintenance of natural capital in theG1 and G2 scenarios, an adjusted measure of net
domestic product would probably perform evenmore favourably relative to the BAU scenarios (seeBox 1). Driven primarily by green investments andthe subsequent push to economic development,
total net direct employment in the sectors analysedin this chapter is projected to be lower thanadditional BAU cases in the short-term, and to thenrise above all BAU scenarios in the medium to longrun (2-3 per cent above BAU1 and BAU2 scenarios,
respectively, and 8 to 14 per cent above BAU in2050). When total employment is considered, thegreen scenarios are expected to converge to thecorresponding BAU cases in the longer-term, andexceed BAU by 3 to 5 per cent in 40 years. These results
point to the need for policies that recognise and manage
the transition costs involved in moving towards
a green economy, with a focus on an equitable
distribution of costs and benefits that emerge fromnew opportunities.

26. Such issues are discussed in more detail in the chapters on enabling
conditions and finance.

533

Towards a green economy
2011

2015
BAU1

BAU2

BAU

2020

Unit

BAU

G1

G2

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

Real GDP

US$ bn/year

69,33478,65179,306

77,69478,38478,69091,02892,58388,73890,91592,244GDP per capita

US$ bn/year

9,992

10,868

10,95910,737

10,832

10,87412,00012,205

11,698

11,983

12,156

Agriculture production *US$ bn/year

1,921

1,965

1,967

1,945

1,963

1,976

2,066

2,071

2,035

2,146

2,167

Crop

US$ bn/year

629

674

677

657

679

691

713

718

690

726

744

Fishery

US$ bn/year

106

101

101

99

73

75

95

95

88

69

72

Forestry

US$ bn/year

748

718

718

718

740

740

747

747

747

840

840

Livestock

US$ bn/year

439

471

471

471

471

471

511

511

511

511

511

Industry
production

US$ bn/year

17,16819,304

19,457

19,146

19,363

19,43922,091

22,444

21,727

22,33022,642Services
production

US$ bn/year

50,24557,382

57,88256,60457,05857,27566,871

68,06864,97566,43967,434

Consumption

US$ bn/year

53,36860,53961,04459,80360,33460,56970,066

71,26368,30369,97971,002

Investment

US$ bn/year

15,966

18,874

19,79817,892

18,24018,502

21,847

23,11820,435

21,157

21,689Additional
investment

US$ bn/year

0

763

1,535

0

760

1,524

885

1,798

0

883

1,788

Economic sector

Social sector
Total population

billion people

6.9

7.2

7.2

7.2

7.2

7.2

7.6

7.6

7.6

7.6

7.6

Calories per capita

Kcal/P/D

2,787

2,829

2,857

2,791

2,834

2,865

2,887

2,946

2,802

2,897

2,955

Population below $2/day

%

19.5%

18.1%

17.9%

18.3%

18.1%

18.1%

16.4%

16.2%

16.9%

16.5%

16.2%

HDI

Index

0.594

0.600

0.601

0.600

0.600

0.601

0.610

0.611

0.608

0.611

0.613

Total
employment

million people

3,187

3,407

3,419

3,392

3,420

3,441

3,685

3,722

3,641

3,676

3,701

Agriculture

million people

1,075

1,119

1,123

1,113

1,147

1,167

1,185

1,200

1,167

1,215

1,244

Industry

million people

662

725

728

723

722

721

803

810

796

793

790

Services

million people

1,260

1,366

1,371

1,361

1,357

1,357

1,491

1,506

1,476

1,465

1,461

Fisheries

million people

29

28

28

28

21

21

27

27

24

19

20

Forestry

million people

21

20

20

20

21

21

21

21

21

24

24

Transportation

million people

70

75

75

74

79

79

79

80

78

85

85

Energymillion people

19

20

20

20

20

21

20

20

20

19

21

Waste

million people

20

20

20

20

20

21

21

21

21

21

21

Water

million people

31

34

34

34

33

33

37

37

37

35

35

Forest landbillion ha

3.9

3.9

3.9

3.9

4.0

4.0

3.9

3.9

3.9

4.0

4.0

Arable landbillion ha

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

Harvested areabillion ha

1.20

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

Unit

BAU

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

Environmental sector

Water demand

km /Yr

4,864

5,264

5,275

5,251

5,079

5,081

5,767

5,792

5,737

5,357

5,375

Waste generation

Mtonnes/year

11,238

11,514

11,527

11,475

11,607

11,66011,836

11,864

11,77512,002

12,084

3

Total landfill

billion tonnes

7.9

8.4

8.4

8.4

8.0

8.0

9.0

9.0

9.0

7.6

7.7

Fossil fuel CO2 emissions

Mtonnes/year

30,64133,26933,55732,86731,96630,74636,55637,06935,64533,23130,323

Footprint/
biocapacity

Ratio

1.5

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.5

1.5

1.7

1.7

1.6

1.5

1.4

Primary energy demand

Mtoe/year

12,54913,58913,674

13,47013,315

13,245

14,92615,086

14,651

14,12013,709Coal production

Mtoe//year

3,620

4,098

4,150

4,026

3,975

3,858

4,592

4,671

4,435

4,202

3,907

Oil production

Mtoe/year

3,838

4,059

4,079

4,028

3,847

3,704

4,344

4,398

4,264

3,907

3,591

Natural gas production

Mtoe/year

2,715

2,886

2,897

2,869

2,840

2,804

3,233

3,259

3,195

3,107

2,980

Nuclear power

Mtoe/year

755

807

807

807

820

848

869

869

869

897

956

Hydro power

Mtoe/year

257

279

279

279

280

280

309

309

309

310

311

Biomass and waste

Mtoe/year

1,077

1,132

1,132

1,132

1,208

1,372

1,202

1,203

1,201

1,289

1,484

Other renewables

Mtoe/year

286

328

328

328

344

378

377

377

377

410

481

RE share of primary demand

%

13%

13%

13%

13%

14%

15%

13%

13%

13%

14%

17%

Table 7: Main indicators in BAU and green investment scenarios* Note: Agriculture production includes production of crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry products. All monetary values are presented in constant 2010 US dollars.

534

Modelling
2011

2030

2050

Unit

BAU

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

Real GDP

US$ bn/year

69,334

116,100

119,307

110,642

117,739

122,582

164,484

172,049

151,322

174,890

199,141

GDP per capita

US$ bn/year

9,992

14,182

14,577

13,512

14,35814,926

18,594

19,476

17,068

19,62622,193

Agriculture production *US$ bn/year

1,921

2,259

2,268

2,219

2,383

2,421

2,545

2,559

2,494

2,773

2,852

Crop

US$ bn/year

629

786

795

752

806

836

898

913

849

941

996

Fishery

US$ bn/year

106

83

83

75

69

76

61

61

57

72

91

Forestry

US$ bn/year

748

803

803

803

918

918

870

870

870

1,038

1,039

Livestock

US$ bn/year

439

588

588

588

589

590

716

715

718

721

726

Industry
production

US$ bn/year

17,16827,62928,311

26,831

28,61429,692

37,73839,21835,571

41,45546,588Services
production

US$ bn/year

50,24586,212

88,727

81,59286,742

90,469124,201130,272

113,258

130,661

149,701

Consumption

US$ bn/year

53,36889,364

91,83385,16390,626

94,354

126,606

132,429

116,476

134,616

153,282

Investment

US$ bn/year

15,96627,87229,80825,47927,401

28,82539,49342,996

34,84740,704

46,831

Additional
investment

US$ bn/year

0

1,137

2,334

0

1,150

2,388

1,616

3,377

0

1,719

3,889

Total population

billion people

2,787

2,973

3,050

2,840

3,001

3,093

3,178

3,273

2,981

3,238

3,382

Calories per capita

Kcal/P/D

19.5%

14%

14%

15%

14%

13%

10%

10%

11%

10%

8%

Population below $2/day

%

0.594

0.630

0.633

0.626

0.635

0.643

0.671

0.680

0.663

0.688

0.714

Unit

BAU

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

BAU1

BAU2

BAU

G1

G2

HDI

Index

0.594

0.630

0.633

0.626

0.635

0.643

0.671

0.680

0.663

0.688

0.714

Total
employment

Mn people

3,187

4,137

4,204

4,057

4,108

4,143

4,739

4,836

4,613

4,762

4,864

Agriculture

Mn people

1,075

1,331

1,371

1,284

1,351

1,393

1,580

1,656

1,489

1,618

1,703

Industry

Mn people

662

923

931

915

907

900

1,064

1,067

1,059

1,051

1,042
1,843

Economic sector

Social sector

Services

Mn people

1,260

1,663

1,680

1,643

1,629

1,622

1,837

1,851

1,813

1,836

Fisheries

Mn people

29

23

23

21

19

21

17

17

16

20

25

Forestry

Mn people

21

23

23

23

26

26

25

25

25

30

30

Transport

Mn people

70

89

90

87

100

98

99

120

122

117

130

EnergyMn people

19

19

19

19

18

20

19

19

19

18

23

Waste

Mn people

20

22

22

22

22

23

24

24

23

25

26

Water

Mn people

31

43

44

43

37

38

43

44

43

43

44
4.5

Environmental sector
Forest landbillion ha

3.9

3.8

3.8

3.8

4.1

4.1

3.7

3.7

3.7

4.5

Arable landbillion ha

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.5

1.5

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.5

1.5

Harvested areabillion ha

1.20

1.27

1.27

1.27

1.25

1.25

1.31

1.31

1.31

1.26

1.26

Water demand

km3/Yr

4,864

6,735

6,784

6,668

5,810

5,889

8,320

8,434

8,141

6,220

6,611

Waste generation

Mtonne/Yr

11,23812,445

12,49912,342

12,785

12,946

13,40013,505

13,201

14,305

14,783

Total landfill

billion Tonnes

8

10

10

10

6

6

12

12

12

1

2

Fossil fuel CO2 emissions

Mtonne/Yr

30,641

42,66943,78540,83535,63529,96753,70355,684

49,67929,943

20,039

Footprint/
biocapacity

Ratio

1.5

1.8

1.8

1.8

1.6

1.4

2.2

2.2

2.1

1.4

1.2

Primary energy demand

Mtoe/year

12,54917,407

17,755

16,832

15,107

14,26921,044

21,687

19,733

14,562

13,051

Coal production

Mtoe/year

3,620

5,447

5,636

5,143

4,126

3,660

7,512

7,930

6,602

2,677

2,049

Oil production

Mtoe/year

3,838

4,910

5,019

4,726

4,026

3,478

4,968

5,102

4,727

3,770

2,724

Natural gas production

Mtoe/year

2,715

3,901

3,951

3,816

3,578

3,218

4,906

5,000

4,744

4,114

3,239

Nuclear power

Mtoe/year

755

968

968

968

1,024

1,151

1,089

1,089

1,089

1,179

1,500

Hydro power

Mtoe/year

257

373

373

373

374

377

459

459

459

461

467

Biomass and waste

Mtoe/year

1,077

1,341

1,342

1,339

1,447

1,709

1,525

1,524

1,528

1,687

2,079

Other renewables

Mtoe/year

286

467

467

467

532

676

584

584

584

673

992

RE share of primary demand

%

13%

13%

12%

13%

16%

19%

12%

12%

13%

19%

27%

Table 7: Main indicators in BAU and green investment scenarios (continued)* Note: Agriculture production includes production of crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry products. All monetary values are presented in constant 2010 US dollars.

535

Towards a green economy
2015
1% case
Economic sector
Real GDP-0.3
GDP per capita-0.3
Agriculture-0.1
production *Crop
0.6
Fishery-27.6
Forestry
3.0
Livestock
0.0
Industry
0.3
production
Services-0.6
production
Social sector
Total population
0.0
Calories per capita
0.2
Population below
0.3$2/day
HDI
0.0
Total
0.4
employment
Agriculture
2.5
Industry-0.4Services-0.6
Fisheries-27.6
Forestry
3.2
Transport
6.0
Energy
0.1
Waste
0.8
Water
-3.5
Environmental sector
Forest land
1.3
Arable land
-1.1
Harvested area
-0.3
Water demand
-3.5
Waste
0.8
generation
Total landfill-5.3
Fossil fuel CO2-3.9
emissions
Footprint/-5.0
biocapacity
Primary energy-2.0
demandCoal production-3.0
Oil production-5.2
Natural gas-1.6
production
Nuclear power
1.6
Hydro power
0.1
Biomass and
6.7
waste
Other
4.9
renewables
RE share of
7.5
primary demand

2020

2030

2050

2% case1% case2% case1% case2% case1% case2% case

-0.8
-0.8

-0.1
-0.1

-0.4
-0.4

1.4
1.2

2.7
2.4

6.3
5.6

15.7
13.9

0.5

3.9

4.7

5.5

6.7

9.0

11.4

2.1
-26.1
3.0
0.0

1.7
-27.1
12.5
0.0

3.6
-23.9
12.5
0.0

2.6
-15.9
14.4
0.2

5.2
-7.6
14.4
0.3

4.9
17.8
19.4
0.7

9.0
47.5
19.5
1.6

-0.1

1.1

0.9

3.6

4.9

9.9

18.8

-1.0

-0.6

-0.9

0.6

2.0

5.2

14.9

0.0
0.3

0.0
0.3

0.0
0.3

0.2
0.9

0.3
1.4

0.7
1.9

1.6
3.4

0.7

0.1

0.4

-1.3

-2.4

-6.0

-14.3

0.0

0.2

0.3

0.9

1.5

2.5

5.1

0.6

-0.2

-0.6

-0.7

-1.5

0.5

0.6

3.9
-0.9
-1.0
-26.1
3.2
5.5
6.8
1.2
-3.7

2.5
-1.3
-1.7
-27.1
12.7
7.5
-3.1
1.4
-7.1

3.7
-2.5
-2.9
-23.9
12.7
6.7
3.2
1.9
-7.2

1.5
-1.8
-2.1
-15.9
14.6
10.1
-5.9
2.7
-13.7

1.6
-3.3
-3.5
-7.6
14.6
10.0
4.8
3.6
-13.2

2.4
-1.2
0.0
17.8
19.8
3.0
-6.3
6.8
-25.2

2.8
-2.4
-0.4
47.5
19.9
6.4
21.0
9.5
-21.6

1.4
-1.1
-0.3
-3.7

3.2
-2.6
-0.7
-7.1

3.3
-2.6
-0.7
-7.2

7.9
-5.8
-1.7
-13.7

8.1
-5.8
-1.6
-13.2

21.1
-11.4
-3.8
-25.2

21.2
-11.4
-3.7
-21.6

1.2

1.4

1.9

2.7

3.6

6.8

9.5

-4.9

-15.6

-15.1

-39.0

-38.3

-87.6

-87.2

-8.4

-9.1

-18.2

-16.5

-31.6

-44.2

-64.0

-7.5

-7.1

-12.5

-12.8

-21.5

-37.8

-47.9

-3.1

-5.4

-9.1

-13.2

-19.6

-30.8

-39.8

-7.0
-9.2

-8.5
-10.1

-16.4
-18.4

-24.3
-18.0

-35.1
-30.7

-64.4
-24.1

-74.2
-46.6

-3.2

-3.9

-8.5

-8.3

-18.6

-16.1

-35.2

5.0
0.3

3.2
0.2

10.0
0.6

5.9
0.3

19.0
1.0

8.3
0.4

37.8
1.8

21.2

7.2

23.4

7.9

27.4

10.6

36.4

15.2

8.7

27.3

13.8

44.7

15.2

69.9

20.5

12.4

32.5

24.3

57.5

58.7

129.1

Table 8: Comparison (per cent) of main indicators in G1 scenario relative to BAU1 scenario (1 per cent case),and G2 scenario relative to BAU2 scenario (2 per cent case)* Note: Agriculture production includes production of crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry products.

536

Modelling

Annex 1. Technical specifications of
the Threshold 21 (T21) World model
Finding that currently available national and global
planning models are either too detailed or narrowly
focused, and perhaps too decision oriented andprescriptive, this study proposes an approach thata) extends and advances the policy analysis carriedout with existing tools by accounting for the dynamic
complexity embedded in the systems studied, andb) facilitates the investigation and understanding of
the relations existing between energy and society,economy and the environment. This is crucial, since
understanding the characteristics of real systems,
feedback, delays and non-linearity is fundamental
for the correct representation of structures, whose
behaviour is outside their normal operating range(Sterman 2000; see also Figure 1). The inclusion ofcross-sectoral relationships - social, economic andenvironmental - allows for a wider analysis of theimplication of policies by identifying potential side
effects or longer-term bottlenecks for development. In
other words, a policy can have very positive impacts
for certain sectors and create issues for others. Also,
successful policies in the longer-term may have negative
short-term impacts, for which mitigating actions may bedesigned and implemented.
As indicated earlier, the approach proposed uses
System Dynamics as its foundation and incorporates
various methodologies, such as optimisation (in theenergy sector) and econometrics (in the economic
sectors). The integrated global model is used to:(1) provide an integrated analysis and evaluationof investment choices; (2) generate projections of
future developments (though acknowledging that
long-term accurate projection cannot easily be
produced, even when simulating a large number ofendogenous key variables (Sarewitz 2000); (3)increase the understanding of the relations underlying
the system analysed; and (4) and bring consistency tomodels.
The Threshold21 (T21) World model (T21-World) is
structured to analyse medium- long-term development
issues. The model integrates in a single framework the
economic, the social, and the environmental aspects ofdevelopment planning. T21-World modelling structure
includes both monetary and physical indicators, tofully analyse the impacts of investments on natural
resources, low-carbon development, economic growthand job creation. Key characteristics of the model arehighlighted below.

Boundaries: Variables that are considered an essential
part of the development mechanisms, object of theresearch, are endogenously calculated. For example,
GDP and its main determinants, population and its main
determinants, and the demand and supply of natural
resources are endogenously determined. Variables thathave an important influence on the issues are analysed,
but those that are only weakly influenced by the issues
analysed or that cannot be endogenously estimatedwith confidence are exogenously represented.
Granularity: The T21-World model presented in thischapter is a global model, with no regional or national
disaggregation; although, the model is routinely
developed for specific countries, and is applicable atother scales such as communities.27 Nonetheless, themain social, economic and environmental variables of
T21-World are disaggregated in considerable detail. For
example, population is divided into 82 age-cohorts and 2
genders, and the age-gender distinction is used in mostsocial indicators; production is divided into industry,
services and agriculture, this last further divided into
crops, fishery, animal husbandry and forestry; land isdivided into forest, agriculture, fallow, urban and desert.
Finally, given its level of aggregation, the model isgenerally based on global average values for variables
such as unit costs and prices.
Time horizon: T21-World is built to analyse mediumto long-term development issues. The time horizon
for simulation begins in 1970 and extends to 2050.
Beginning the simulation in 1970 ensures that, in mostcases, the historical patterns of behaviour characterising
the issues being investigated can be replicated by themodel.
Modules, sectors and spheres: T21-World is a relatively
large model, which includes more than 200 stock
variables and several thousand feedback loops. Becauseof its size and level of complexity, the structure of themodel has been reorganised into smaller logical units,
called modules. A module is a structure, whose internalmechanisms can be understood in isolation from therest of the model.28 The 80 modules comprising T2127. As it is emphasised later on in the text, although it is possible tounderstand the internal mechanism of a specific module in isolationfrom the rest of the model, the fully understanding of its functioning andrelevance requires studying its role in the whole model’s structure.
28. For more information, see Bassi and Baer (2009), Bassi and Yudken(2009), Bassi and Shilling (2010), Bassi et al. (2009a, 2009b, 2010), Magnoni
and Bassi (2009), Pedercini and Barney (In Press), Yudken and Bassi (2009).

537

Towards a green economy
Society

EconomyEnvironment

Population

Agriculture

Land

Nutrition

Fishery

Water

Education

Forestry

EnergyEmployment

Industry

Waste

Poverty

Services

EmissionsPublic infrastructure

Economic accounts

Footprint

Figure A1: Spheres and sectors of T21-World

World are grouped into 18 sectors: 6 social, 6 economic
and 6 environmental sectors, as listed in Table 9. Sectors
are groups of one or more modules of similar functional
scope. For example, the water sector groups both thewater demand and water supply modules. Finally, forconvenience in summarising and communicating theresults, society, economy and environment are known as
the three spheres of T21-World. All sectors in T21 belong
to one of the three spheres,29 depending on the type ofissue they are designed to address. Modules are built to
be in continuous interaction with other modules in thesame sector, across sectors, and across spheres.30 Table 9
lists the spheres, sectors and modules of T21-World.
The Social sphere of T21-World contains detailed
population dynamics organised by gender and age
cohort. Fertility is a function of the level of income andeducation and mortality rates are determined by thelevel of income and the level of access to basic healthcare. Access to education and health care services,nutrition, employment and basic infrastructure are also
represented in this sphere. Access to basic social services
is used – in addition to income – to determine poverty
levels in a broad sense. Social development is highly
connected to economic performance in T21-World. As
economic conditions improve, a higher proportion of
expenditure is allocated to health care and education,
among others, increasing labour productivity and, thus,
faster economic growth.
The Economy sphere of the model contains several
major production sectors (agriculture, fishery, forestry,
industry and services). Production is generally
characterised by modified Cobb-Douglas production
functions (See Box A1) with inputs of labour, capital, andtechnology, with the specification varying from sector
to sector. Agriculture, fishery and forestry production
is highly influenced by the availability and quality of
29. In certain country customisations, with energy being a key areaof analysis and using a variety of modules, we represent it as the 4th
sphere of T21.
30. Causal loop diagrams (CLD) highlighting the main structuralcomponents of each sector modelled and analysed in the GER arepresented in section VII, Technical Background Material.

538

natural resources. While capital and labour contributeto production, the stock of fish, forest and the quality ofsoil - together with water availability for agriculture - arealso important determinants of output in these sectors.
For this reason T21-World tracks the physical flow of key
natural resources, endogenously calculating depletion
and its impacts on production.31 Further, production in
the three major economic sectors is influenced by social
factors, such as life expectancy and education level,
included in the calculation of total factor productivity(TFP) together with the impact of natural resources
availability and energy prices. These feedback effects
are sufficiently important that in the business-as-usual
scenario, the annual rate of world GDP growth gradually
falls from about 2.7 per cent per year in the period 2010–2020 to 2.2 per cent in the period 2020–2030 and further
to 1.6 per cent in the period 2030–2050.
The Environment sphere tracks land allocation, water,
waste and energy demand and supply. T21-World
calculates also air emissions (CO2, CH4, N2O, SOX
and greenhouse gas) and the ecological footprint.
Economic activities and demographic growth create
increasing pressure on natural resources, while atthe same time allowing for development of betterand more efficient technologies. In the case ofenergy, stocks of fossil fuel resources and reserves
are explicitly and endogenously modelled. These
stocks are among the primary drivers of fossil fuelprices, which are calculated by taking into accountshort and longer term trends. Fossil fuel prices, inturn, influence oil exploration and discovery as well as
energy demand, and, as a consequence, oil recovery– creating a variety of feedback loops (see Bassi 2009,and section III in the Technical Background Material
for more details).
In order to validate the model, both structural andbehavioural tests were carried out. On the structuralvalidation, T21-World and its sectors were designed
based on existing state-of-the-art sectoral models
with updated data. The knowledge gained throughthe review of these models was then translated into
T21-World, exogenous inputs were replaced withendogenous ones, and causal relations were explicitly
represented in a disaggregated manner. The new
structure of each sector was then verified and validated
comparing the behaviour of the model against
historical data (normally from 1970 until 2008). Moredetailed analyses were then performed to identify andanalyse the causal relations included in the model andthe relevance of exogenous assumptions (or drivers),
through the simulation of sensitivity analyses for
31. There is no requirement imposed, even in the green investment
scenarios, that stocks reach an equilibrium state.

Modelling

Box A1: The Cobb-Douglas production function in T21 for agriculture,industry and services macro sectors
The classic form of the CD production function is expressed as following:
Y = A × Kα × L(1-α)
Where here the traditional technology term, A, is used to represent a series of factors affecting total factor productivity(TFP; as in a growth accounting approach), K represents the stock of capital, and L represents labour. The constant α
represents the elasticity of output to capital: the ratio between the percentage change of output and the percentagechange of an input. The elasticity of output to labour is set to 1-α, assuming that there are constant returns toscale (the production function is thus first order, homogeneous). In T21 the standard CD production function istransformed into a more transparent algebraic form, and TFP is expanded to include several different elements.
The equation used to estimate industry production is as shown below:
yit = yi0 × rictα × riltβ × fpit
Where yit is the current industry production, yi0 is the initial industry production, rict is the relative industry capital(relative to 1970), ricl is the relative industry labour and fpit is the industry total factor productivity. Moreover, α isthe elasticity of capital and β is the elasticity of labour. The T21 takes an approach whereby total factor productivity
is comprised of a number of components related to human and natural capital. Thus, total factor productivity inindustry fpit is determined by a range of human and natural capital related components, including health (relative
life expectancy rlet), education (relative years of schooling ryst), energy (relative oil price ropt ), relative waste recycle
rate rwrt , and relative water stress rwst. The total factor productivity of industry is calculated as follows, with relative
oil price and water stress having a negative impact on productivity, reflecting the negative effects that scarcitiesof these have on industrial production, either through higher prices or other costs that have to be incurred tocompensate:ƒpit = rystα / roptc × rletβ × rwrtd × rwste
The equation used to estimate agricultural production is defined in terms of yield, still determined by a transformed
Cobb-Douglas production function, uses different inputs for TFP. The equation below is used to estimate natural
yield per hectare. Effective crop yield is the natural crop yield per hectare minus yield lost due to pest diseases. By
multiplying the harvested area by effective crop yield per hectare, we determine the total crop yield. Total crop
yield multiplied by crop value added gives agriculture (food processing) production, or the total value added.
yt = yit-1 × rctα × rltβ × ƒ(R & D, sq, ƒt, , 1/ws)
Where yt is the current natural crop yield per hectare, yit-1 is the initial natural crop yield per hectare, rct is the relative
capital, and rlt is the relative labour. Where ƒ is the effect of R & D (relative research and development), sq (relative
soil quality), ƒt (relative fertiliser use) and ws (relative water stress) on crop yield. Moreover, α is the elasticity ofcapital and β is the elasticity of labour. Labour in the agriculture production function represents human capital thatconsists of quantity and quality of labour. The quantity of labour is agriculture employment while quality of labouris determined by literacy (average years of schooling) of the labour force and health conditions (life expectancy).
selected variables (e.g. availability of reserves andresources, or the elasticity of GDP to oil prices). Further,
extreme condition tests, feedback loop analysis as
well as unit consistency tests were performed on allmodels. Further, boundaries as well as structural(i.e. causal relations and equations) and parameterconsistency tests were normally checked with experts inthe field analysed. Overall, the structure of the models
presented in the five studies presents less detailed
disaggregation but higher dynamic complexity (crosssectoral relationships and feedback loops) whencompared with other existing models (e.g. MARKAL,

in the energy sector). In other words, each sector
developed for the studies is relatively simple whentaken in isolation, and the complexity comes out of the
feedback loops built into the model across modules andsectors.
Concerning behavioural validation, over 450 social,economic and environmental variables were simulated
against history. Historical projections generally match
well with data, as partly illustrated in Figures 5, 6, 8 and 9,
and, as shown in section III in the Technical Background
Material. During the modelling process particular539

Towards a green economy
emphasis was given to the analysis of the performanceof aggregated indicators, and details were added andmore carefully addressed in the models of the specificsectors analysed in the GER - where adding granularity
was useful to provide insights on the impact of selected
investments. Furthermore, future projections werecompared with those from other organisations, as
shown in section III of the Technical Background Material,
including among others, the IEA, FAO, World Bank,UNIDO, United Nations Population Division, United
Nations Statistics Divsion, and McKinsey & Company.
Finally, it is worth mentioning at the outset that themodel has several limitations relative to the breadth of
the GER. T21-World is a global model (with no regional or
national disaggregation, and no explicit representationof trade) that focuses on medium- to longer term trends.
In addition, T21-World includes only a limited amountof feedbacks linking GHG emissions to health andeconomic activity, and accounts for a limited numberof natural resources (e.g. details on stock of non-fuelminerals are not included in the model). Further, themodel does not quantify biodiversity and does not fully
capture a number of important features of the labour
market (while labour force, employment figures andincome are calculated endogenously, disaggregatedreal wages by sector are not estimated and the qualityof work, or “decent work”, could not be determined withconfidence). Finally, the capital and financial markets
are not specifically modelled, and T21-World uses a
supply-side approach to production, although in manycases both demand and supply are calculated at thesectoral level.32 33

32. Other existing models used to support medium- to longer termplanning exercises and analysis face similar issues, and often have very
narrow boundaries compared to T21-World. OECD models employed
to project scenarios presented in their environmental outlook do not
explicitly account for the labour market and unemployment, and WorldBank budgetary frameworks often do not single out capital and financial
markets. Sectoral models - normally based on case studies - exist, butthere is little agreement on the extent to which these relate to othersectors and dynamic projections of future trends are normally missing.
More details on model specifications are provided in various sections of
the Technical Background Material.
33. More information on T21, and several customizations and country
applications can be found at www.millennium-institute.org. Selectedpublications include: Bassi (2010a, 2011), Bassi and Baer (2009), Bassi and
Yudken, (2009, Forthcoming), Bassi and Shilling (2010), Bassi et al. (2009a,
2009b, 2010), Cimren et al. (2010), Magnoniand Bassi (2009), Yudken andBassi (2009).

540Modelling

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Enabling conditions
Supporting the transition to a global green economy

Towards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Chapter Coordinating Author: Peter Wooders, Senior
Economist for Climate Change, Energy and Trade,
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).
Benjamin Simmons and Anna Autio of UNEP managed
the chapter, including the handling of peer reviews,
interacting with the coordinating author on revisions,conducting supplementary research and bringing thechapter to final production.
The following individuals at IISD contributed to thischapter under the oversight of Mark Halle, Director Trade and Investment, and European Representative at
IISD, and the Chapter Coordinating Author: Christopher
Beaton, Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Aaron Cosbey,
Heather Creech, Tara Laan, Kerryn Lang, Don MacClean,
Oshani Perera and David Sawyer. Contributions were also
received from Yasser Sherif (Environics Consulting Firm).
During the development of the chapter, the Chapter
Coordinating Author received invaluable advice from thefollowing experts in their personal capacity: Dr. Edward B.
Barbier (Professor, Department of Economics, Universityof Wyoming); Dr. Alex Bowen (Principal Research Fellow,
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and theEnvironment, London School of Economics); Dr. Simon
Buckle (Policy Director, Grantham Institute for Climate
Change, Imperial College); Paul Ekins (Professor of Energy
and Environmental Policy, University College London);Oliver Greenfield (Head of Sustainable Business andEconomics, WWF-UK); Dr. Sylviane Guillaumont (Professor,
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement
International); Hazel Henderson (President, Ethical Markets
Media LLC); Chris Hewett (Associate, Green Alliance); Dr.
Raghbendra Jha (Professor and Executive Director, Australia
South Asia Research Centre, Australian National University);Peter May (President-elect, the International Society
for Ecological Economics); Daniel von Moltke (Wegelin

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011546

Responsible Investment, Wegelin & Co. Privatbankiers);
László Pintér (IISD Senior Fellow and Associate); Nick
Robins (Head, Climate Change Centre of Excellence, HSBC);
Dr. Kenneth Ruffing (formerly Deputy Director and Chief
Economist, OECD Environment Directorate); Dr. Dorothea
Seebode (Senior Director of Sustainability, Philips Research);
Vicky Sharpe (President and CEO, Sustainable Development
Technology Canada); Professor Mike Young (Director of theEnvironment Institute, University of Adelaide); Dr. Soogil
Young (President, Korea National Strategy Institute); andDr. Simon Zadek (Chief Executive, AccountAbility).
We would like to thank the many colleagues andindividuals who commented on various drafts, including
Laura Altinger (UNECE), Charles Arden-Clarke (UNEP),
Jamie Attard (UNEP), Mario Berrios (ILO), Christian Blondin(WMO), Nils Axel Braathen (OECD), Graeme Buckley(ILO), Karin Buhren (UN Habitat), Munyaradzi Chenje(UNEP), Ezra Clark (UNEP), Garrette Clark (UNEP), DavidO’Connor (UN DESA), Jan Corfee-Morlot (OECD), James
Curlin (UNEP), Sabrina De Gobbi (ILO), Thierry De Oliveira(UNEP), Mercedes Durán (ILO), Jane Gibbs (UNEP), Carlos
Andrés Enmanuel Ortiz (UNEP), Nathalie Girouard (OECD),
Etienne Gonin (UNEP), Elliot Harris (IMF), Ulrich Hoffmann(UNCTAD), Christine Hofmann (ILO), Gulelat Kebede (UNHabitat), Elianna Konialis (OECD), Ralf Krüger (UNCTAD),
Vesile Kulaçoğlu (WTO), Vivien Liu (WTO), Cornis van der
Lugt (UNEP), Angela Lusigi (UNEP), Nara Luvsan (UNEP),
Synnøve Lyssand Sandberg (UNEP), Robert McGowan,
Helen Mountford (OECD), Hans d’Orville (UNESCO),
Martina Otto (UNEP), Romain Perez (UN DESA), Peter
Poschen (ILO), Alexandria Rantino (UNEP), Anabella
Rosemberg (International Trade Union Confederation),
Nadia Scialabba (FAO), Rajendra Shende (UNEP), Anne
Marie Sloth Carlsen (UNDP), Luc Soete (UN-MERIT), Olga
Strietska-Ilina (ILO), Elisa Tonda (UNEP), Carlien van Empel(ILO), Jaap van Woerden (UNEP), Geneviève Verbrugge(UNEP), Farid Yaker (UNEP) and Wanhua Yang (UNEP).

Enabling conditions

Contents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
1Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552

2

Key policy tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5

Promoting investment and spending in areas that stimulate a green economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553
Addressing environmental externalities and market failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557
Limiting government spending in areas that deplete natural capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
Establishing sound regulatory frameworks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
Strengthening international governance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565

3

Supporting actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570

3.1
3.2

Supporting capacity building and the strengthening of institutions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
Investing in training and education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572

4Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574

Annex 1 – Enabling conditions: A sector overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578

547

Towards a green economy

List of figures
Figure 1: Economic value of fossil fuel consumption subsidies by type.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562

List of boxes
Box 1: Investing in green infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
Box 2: The Marrakech Task Force on sustainable public procurement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556
Box 3: Private finance initiatives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557
Box 4: Feed-in tariffs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558
Box 5: Peak pricing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558
Box 6: Environmental taxes and innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
Box 7: Green tax shifts – A double dividend for jobs and the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557
Box 8: Energy subsidy reform in action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
Box 9: Voluntary private sector action and corporate social responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 566
Box 10: The Montreal Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567
Box 11: Trade-related capacity building  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568
Box 12: Harnessing Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571

548

Enabling conditions

List of acronyms
APEC
BIT
CSR
DTIS
FSC
G20
GDP
GHG
GRI
ICT
ITC
MDG
MEA
MSC
NAFTA
NGO
ODS
OECD
PES
PFI
PIC
PROCOPPROPER
R&D
REDD
SCP
SME
TRIPS
UNCTAD
UN DESAUNDP
UNEP
UNFCCCUS EPA
WTO
WWF

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Bilateral Investment Treaty
Corporate social responsibility
Diagnostic trade integration study
Forest Stewardship Council
Group of Twenty
Gross Domestic ProductGreenhouse gas
Global Reporting Initiative
Information and Communication Technology
International Trade Centre
Millennium Development Goal
Multilateral Environmental Agreement
Marine Stewardship Council
North American Free Trade Agreement
Non-governmental organisation
Ozone depleting substance
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Payment for Ecosystem Services
Private Finance Initiative
Prior informed consent
São Paulo State Industrial Pollution Control Programme (Brazil)
Programme for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating (Indonesia)
Research and development
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
Sustainable consumption and production
Small and medium-sized enterprise
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environment Programme
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
United States Environmental Protection Agency
World Trade Organization
World Wide Fund for Nature549

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. Enabling a green economy means creating a context in which economic activity increases
human well-being and social equity, and significantly reduces environmental risks and ecologicalscarcities. Changing the economic environment in this way is an ambitious undertaking which requiresa holistic set of policies to overcome a broad range of barriers across the investment landscape. This
chapter identifies six key areas of policy-making which most governments will need to focus on in order
to correct the incentive structures in current, unsustainable markets and to alter investment landscapesin the short to medium-term. It also raises the question of whether classical measures of economic
performance, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, are adequate for assessing wealth creationand human well-being in the transition to a green economy.
2. Carefully designed investment and spending can stimulate the greening of economic sectors.
While the bulk of green economy investment will ultimately have to come from the private sector, theeffective use of public expenditure and investment incentives can play a useful role in triggering thetransition to a green economy. A number of sector chapters in the report recommend public investments
in infrastructure and public services to enable green markets and ensure more efficient use of theenvironment and natural resources. Governments can also stimulate markets by using sustainable public
procurement practices that create high-volume and long-term demand for green goods and services.
This sends signals that allow firms to make longer-term investments in innovation and producers torealise economies of scale, leading in turn to the wider commercialisation of green goods and services,
as well as more sustainable consumption. Investment and spending for a green economy, however,require regular assessments to ensure equity, transparency, accountability and cost effectiveness.
3. Taxes and market-based instruments are powerful tools to promote green investment andinnovation. Significant price distortions exist that can discourage green investments or contribute to
the failure to scale up such investments. In a number of economic sectors, negative externalities, suchas pollution, health impacts or loss of productivity, are typically not reflected in costs, thereby reducing
the incentive to shift to more sustainable goods and services. A solution to this problem is to internalise
the cost of the externality in the price of a good or service via a corrective tax, charge or levy closer tothe source of the pollution or, in some cases, by using other market-based instruments, such as tradable
permit schemes. Also, markets establishing payments for providing ecosystem services, such as carbon
sequestration, watershed protection, biodiversity benefits and landscape beauty, can influence land use
decisions by enabling landholders to capture more of the value of these environmental services thanthey would have done in the absence of the scheme.
4. Government spending in areas that deplete environmental assets is counterproductive
to a green economy transition. A number of the sector chapters highlight how poorly managed
government spending can represent a significant cost to countries. Artificially lowering the price ofgoods through subsidisation can encourage inefficiency, waste and overuse, leading to the prematurescarcity of valuable finite resources or the degradation of renewable resources and ecosystems. Suchoutdated subsidies can also be socially unfair. Moreover, they can reduce the profitability of green
investments: when subsidisation makes unsustainable activity artificially cheap or low risk, it biases themarket against investment in green alternatives. Reforming environmentally harmful and economicallycostly subsidies can therefore bring both fiscal and environmental benefits. However, short-term support
measures accompanying the reform may be necessary to protect the poor.
550

Enabling conditions

5. A well-designed regulatory framework creates incentives that drive green economic activity.
The sector chapters in this report emphasise that a robust regulatory framework at the national level,
as well as the effective enforcement of legislation, can be a potent means of driving green investment.
Such a framework reduces regulatory and business risks and increases the confidence of investors andmarkets. The use of regulations is often necessary to address the most harmful forms of unsustainablebehaviour, either by creating minimum standards or prohibiting certain activities entirely. In particular,
standards can be effective in promoting markets for sustainable goods and services and can induce
efficiency and stimulate innovation, which can have a positive effect on competitiveness. Standards
may, however, pose a challenge to market access for small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly
from developing countries. It is, therefore, crucial for countries to balance environmental protection
through the use of standards and other regulations with safeguarding market access.
6. Investing in capacity building and training is essential to support a transition to a green
economy. The capacity to seize green economic opportunities and implement supporting policies
varies from one country to another, and national circumstances often influence the readiness andresilience of an economy and population to cope with change. A shift towards a green economy
could require the strengthening of government capacity to analyse challenges, identify opportunities,
prioritise interventions, mobilise resources, implement policies and evaluate progress. Training and skill
enhancement programmes may also be needed to prepare the workforce for a green economy transition.
Temporary support measures may, therefore, be required to ensure a just transition for affected workers.
In some sectors, support will be needed to shift workers to new jobs. In developing countries, intergovernmental organisations, international financial institutions, non-governmental organisations, theprivate sector and the international community as a whole can play a role in providing technical andfinancial assistance to facilitate the green economy transition.
7. Strengthened international governance can assist governments to promote a green economy.
Multilateral environmental agreements, which establish the legal and institutional frameworks foraddressing global environmental challenges, can play a significant role in promoting green economic
activity. The Montreal Protocol on the Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, for instance, led
to the development of an entire industry focused on the destruction and replacement of ozonedepleting substances. The international trading system can also have significant influence on green
economic activity, enabling or obstructing the flow of green goods, technologies and investments. If
environmental resources are properly priced at the national level, then the international trading regime
allows countries to sustainably exploit their comparative advantage in natural resources that benefits
both the exporting and importing country. Finally, an active role by governments in international
processes, such as the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 (Rio+20) and theUnited Nations Environmental Management Group’s work on green economy, can promote coherence
and collaboration in the transition to a green economy.

551

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
A green economy focuses on improving human wellbeing and reducing social inequity over the long term,
while not exposing future generations to significant
environmental risks and ecological scarcities. It seeks
to do this in two ways. First, by increasing investmentin the sustainability of ecosystem services upon whichmuch of the world’s poor depend, it ensures that theenvironment can continue to be used for the benefitof current and future generations. Second, by basing
strategies for economic growth on the sustainable
use of natural resources and the environment, a green
economy generates the long-term jobs and wealth thatare needed to help eradicate poverty. A green economy
also recognises that conventional economic indicators,
such as GDP, may provide a distorted lens for economic
performance. This is because such indicators fail toreflect the extent to which production and consumption
activities may be drawing down natural capital.
The various sector chapters of this report havedemonstrated that while there is a clear economic
case for promoting a green economy, certain enabling
conditions need to be created and maintained so thatprivate sector actors will have an incentive to invest in
green economic activity. This chapter focuses on theseenabling conditions, and in particular, explores themeasures that can be used to create them.
Enabling conditions are defined as conditions that makegreen sectors attractive opportunities for investors
and businesses. If the right mix of fiscal measures,laws, norms, international frameworks, know-how
and infrastructure is in place, then the green economy
should emerge as a result of general economic activity. In
addition to these policies, creating the right conditionsin the investment environment requires a combinationof capacity, information, dissemination of good policy
practice, social assistance, skills, general education andawareness to make sure that green measures are welldesigned, implemented, enforced and understood,
without causing unintended impacts or being prevented
by practical or political challenges.
Enabling conditions can be created by a wide rangeof actors and institutions, including, first and foremost,
governments, but also intergovernmental organisations(IGOs), international fora such as the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum or the Groupof Twenty (G20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors, multilateral environmental agreements

552(MEA), such as the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), internationaland national non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
unions, and private sector actors from international
conglomerations and large firms to small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs).
This chapter focuses on the changes that could
feasibly be introduced in the short to medium termby governments at all levels, from the executive power
to particular ministries (such as those responsible forenvironment, finance and the general economy), andprovincial and local authorities. The chapter provides asurvey of the main categories of policy tools available
to governments to promote a transition to a green
economy. It begins with a discussion of five key areasof policy-making that have been highlighted in theprevious chapters as creating the enabling conditions
that support a green economy transition:
1. using public investment and spending to leverage
private investment, including public infrastructure
projects, green subsidies and sustainable public
procurement;
2. using market-based instruments, such as taxes andtradable permits to level the playing field and provide
market incentives in order to promote the greeningof key sectors;
3. implementing subsidy reform in areas that deplete
and degrade natural capital;
4. designing a country’s regulatory framework oflegislation, institutions and enforcement to channel
economic energy into environmentally and sociallyvaluable activity; and5. the role of international frameworks that regulate
economic activity, including the international
trading system, in driving a green economy.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of additional
supporting measures that may be required, namely,
capacity building and investment in training andeducation. A summary of the enabling conditions
identified in the sector chapters of this report is includedin Annex 1. Given their importance and complexity,
measures related to finance are discussed in a separate
chapter.

Enabling conditions

2 Key policy tools
The sections below outline the main categories of policy
tools that governments may use to promote a transition
to a green economy. As an introductory remark, it isworth noting that green economy strategies and related
timeframes will vary based on a country’s circumstances.
The mix of policy tools, and the timeframes for theirimplementation, will consequently vary from one
country to another. Moreover, a country’s particulartransition strategy may arise as a result of government
decisions at the most senior level or may instead emerge
gradually from initiatives being taken at a sectoral or
sub-sectoral level by ministries and local government
authorities, as well as in response to innovation fromthe private sector and civil society. Given these factors,
it is not possible or advisable to prescribe a single green
economy policy mix that is relevant and applicable toall countries. Rather, in supporting a green economy,transition countries will likely prioritise their choice ofpolicy based on a number of factors, including:■■ Existing development plans and commitments. These
include state economic and development plans, nationalsustainable development strategies, poverty reduction
strategies, and strategies for meeting the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). To avoid duplication, policy
tools for a green economy should complement andcontribute to these existing strategies;■■ National circumstances. These include the cost andabundance of labour and capital, environmental andnatural resource endowments, the extent of locked-in
capital stock, availability of renewable energy resources,
institutional capacity and governance strengths andweaknesses, political stability, demographic profile, andthe strength of the private sector and social actors;■■ Sub-national differences. In many cases, the greeningof key sectors will have differential impacts on rural andurban areas, or different sub-national regions. Regionswith pressing environmental or social problems might
be targeted as a focus for green development;■■ Culture and traditions. These factors can influence
a community’s material aspirations and consumer
behaviour, thereby affecting a country’s path to a green
economy. More broadly, culture and traditions will inmany cases require long-term attention to ensure a justtransition; and■■ Costs and timescales of different policies. In some sectors,
there are quick wins that can be targeted and achieved ona relatively short time scale. Elsewhere, medium- to long-term preparation might be needed to overcome technicaland political economy challenges. In some circumstances,such as the design of cities or investments in renewableenergy, there might also be pressing reasons to act now
to prevent significant future losses despite high financial
and political costs in the short term.
A careful analysis of the above factors will also assist
countries in assessing the feasibility of implementing
a given policy reform or tool. No matter which policies
are prioritised, the existence of robust institutions – ata national and an international level – is vital. Strong
institutional capacity provides the basic functions forthe effective design, implementation and operationof any policy intended to enable a green economy:
consistent, science-based measurement, analysis anddecision-making; inclusive consultation and strategicplanning; monitoring the performance of policies
and economic actors; adaptation of policies where
necessary; enforcement of laws; transparency andaccessibility regarding information of interest to citizens;and existence of systems that ensure the accountabilityof decision-makers. The need for strong institutional
capacity reinforces the importance that should be placedon the international community to provide technicaland financial assistance for building such capacities indeveloping countries.

2.1 Promoting investment
and spending in areas that
stimulate a green economy
While the bulk of green economy investment will ultimately
have to come from the private sector, in some situations
the careful use of public expenditure and investment
incentives can play an important role in enabling markets
to incentivise green economic activity. Such situations
might include the need to overcome market barriers or theneed to act quickly, due to fear of locking in unsustainableassets and systems, or of losing valuable natural capital thatpeople depend on for their livelihoods. Three importantfocuses for public spending are: (a) the promotion of
innovation in new technologies and behaviours thatare vital to green markets; (b) investment in common
infrastructure that is required for certain green innovations
to flourish; and (c) fostering infant green industries, as partof a strategy to build comparative advantage and drive
long-term employment and growth.
Public expenditure can be harnessed in a number ofways to alter the operation of markets. Many of these553

Towards a green economy
measures are already being used by governments to
support investments more generally in the economy,
but can be targeted specifically and strategically atchanging market dynamics for green projects, sectors
or investors. Considerable caution is needed, however,in considering such strategies: fiscal resources are scarceand it is not possible or advisable for governments to try
to spend their way out of an unsustainable economy.
Ultimately, if it is to enable markets, the short-term use of
public expenditure should be prudently applied in waysthat alter market dynamics in the long-term. Choosing
which green investments to support, for example,
is not an easy task; governments have a chequered
record of choosing specific technologies and goods
as winners. Such decisions are particularly difficult in
the context of immature technologies. Comprehensive
analysis of national conditions and a range of potential
interventions can help determine what to support andhow – from investing in infrastructural improvementsthat will enable rural communities to embraceconservation agriculture, to establishing feed-in tariffs
that will foster an infant renewable energy industry.
Although situations vary, most interventions should:■■ Be aligned with sustainable development priorities,
taking into account possible impacts across economic
sectors;■■ Be aligned, where possible, with strategies tostrengthen a country’s national comparative advantage;■■ Not replicate or support investments that are likely to
be made anyway;■■ Be solution-neutral, avoiding designating specifictechnologies or firms as champions, and allowing
market forces to best determine how green outcomescan be achieved;■■ Be strategically targeted to have long-term impacts
on market dynamics, that will continue after the funding
is withdrawn; and■■ Be designed with mechanisms to control costs.
The following section discusses in more detail some of
the ways in which additional public expenditure might
be applied, as well as how existing expenditure can beharnessed to stimulate markets through sustainablepublic procurement.
Public expenditure measures
There are a variety of measures that governments canuse to promote investment in the green economy.
Several of these measures can be considered a subsidy.
Subsidies are not just direct financial transfers, but also
include advantages such as exemptions from taxes or554

regulations, accelerated depreciation of assets, or belowmarket access to government-owned resources. A
number of the sector chapters in this report recommendthat subsidies should be used to help promote
innovation, establish green common infrastructure andfoster green infant industries (see Box 1).
Government subsidies for innovation may be needed
where market barriers dissuade private investments, orwhere accelerating the development of an innovation isclearly in the public good. Innovation – in its broadest
sense, transformational improvements in meetingsocial needs – includes not only the development
and deployment of new technologies, but also themodification of technologies to new contexts and thedevelopment of new behaviours. Governments can“push” innovation by providing subsidies to parts of
the research and development (R&D) chain, from basic
research in universities to applied research in labs andindustry, often on a cost-sharing basis. In addition to
subsidising R&D, governments are increasingly offering
support for the demonstration of projects with costs thatare too high to attract private investors. Alternatively,
policies can be designed to “pull” innovation, by creatingclear demand for, say, a certain technology in themarketplace, such that the private sector has a strong
incentive to drive the innovation process.
“Pull” policies overlap with green industrial policy moregenerally – that is to say, policies dedicated to thecreation or fostering of green markets. This might involvethe creation of common infrastructure required to green
economic activity, such as smart grids, or affordable
access to broadband internet connections. It could also
involve targeted support to key green industries. Shortterm support from governments can give businesses
the time they need to achieve competitiveness througha range of factors, such as reducing costs throughlearning-by-doing and producing at economies ofscale, or establishing a customer base through market
recognition. Packages of investment incentives arealso often used to attract foreign direct investment or
retain large domestic investors. This can be particularly
important for the stimulation of local sourcing and thetransfer of skills and technology to domestic businesses.
There are a large number of mechanisms thatgovernments regularly employ to this end. Foregoinggovernment revenue is one such example. Turkey, forinstance, offers reduced licence fees for entities applying
for licences to construct renewable energy facilities andprovides deductions for the rent and right of access andusage of the land during the investment period (Gaupp2007). Tax incentives are another variant of this type of
support. A number of municipalities in India, for instance,
have established a rebate in the property tax for users ofsolar water heaters. In some cases this rebate is 6-10 perEnabling conditions

Box 1: Investing in green infrastructure
A number of sector chapters in this report
recommend specific public investments ininfrastructure or public services that enable green
markets and more efficient use of the environment
and natural resources. Improving the physical andtelecommunications infrastructure of agriculturalcommunities, for example, can stimulate growthin sustainable agricultural markets and provide
employment and development opportunities inrural areas.
It is estimated that the vast majority of green
infrastructure investment will take place indeveloping countries to address issues related tothe quality and availability of essential economic
goods and services including energy, water,
sanitation and transport (UNEP 2010b). These
investment choices will have a significant bearing
on future patterns of economic development
and environmental conditions, and can therefore

cent of the property tax (Ministry of New and Renewable
Energy of India 2010). Similarly, accelerated depreciation
is often used to encourage the production of energy fromrenewable sources. It allows an investor to depreciate
the value of eligible fixed assets at a higher rate, which
reduces the investor’s taxable income. In Mexico,investors in environmentally sound infrastructure havebenefited from accelerated depreciation since 2005,
and in Hong Kong, buyers of environmentally friendly
vehicles benefit from a reduction in registration tax
and other tax incentives (National Ecology Institute of
Mexico 2007; Environmental Protection Department ofHong Kong).
Loan support is also common, either through favourable
lending conditions (such as loan guarantees or lessstringent repayment conditions) or low-cost financing(such as subsidised interest rates or soft loans). Thesetypes of measures have been successfully implemented
in both developed and developing countries. In Brazil, forinstance, the São Paulo State Industrial Pollution Control
Programme (PROCOP), established in 1980, provided
preferential credit and technical assistance to polluters,
making the pre-treatment process less burdensome.
The project was funded by the state government andthe World Bank and administered by the state pollution
control agency, CETESB, and it is considered to haveplayed an important role in encouraging environmental
pollution control activities and improving environmental
quality in São Paulo, Brazil (Benjamin and Weiss 1997).

have a considerable impact on the transition to agreen economy.
Globally, it is estimated that from 2008-2009 some
US$ 512 billion out of US$ 3.3 trillion in publicfunds committed to government stimulus packages
was earmarked for low carbon and environmental
infrastructure investments (Barbier 2010b). For
example, in January 2009, at the height of the
global recession, the Republic of Korea launched its
national Green New Deal plan. At a cost of around
US$ 36 billion, or approximately 3 per cent of GDP,the initiative aims to create 960,000 jobs based on
green infrastructure projects and public services.
The low-carbon projects include developing
railroads and mass transit, fuel efficient vehicles
and clean fuels, energy conservation andenvironmentally friendly buildings. Additional
projects aim to improve water management andecological protection (Barbier 2010a).

Many countries also provide legislative support tofavoured industries. The establishment of mandates canguarantee a market for producers, such as the European
Commission’s Renewable Energy Directive, which
requires EU countries to source 20 per cent of theirenergy from renewables by 2020. Feed-in tariffs operate
in a similar fashion, by requiring electricity suppliers topurchase renewables-based electricity from producers
at a certain price.
The important thing to note, however, is that noneof these policies are free – they all use up scarce fiscal
resources, and are vulnerable to capture by industry.
The essence of green industrial policy should be thatgovernment investments are targeted at helping infantindustries mature, are closely monitored, and are strictly
time-limited (see Ensuring rational public expenditure
for more information).
As an alternative to committing additional funding to
the stimulation of green industry, governments can also
focus on how their existing spending is being used –namely, sustainable public procurement. Procurementof goods and services by governments and state-owned
enterprises usually represents a large proportion of total
public spending. Analysis in 2001 estimated that OECD
countries spent between 13-20 per cent of their GDP on
procurement of such goods and services as buildings,
rail and road infrastructure, cleaning and other services,and purchases of office supplies and energy (IISD 2008).

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Towards a green economy
Although less data is available regarding procurement
in developing countries, literature suggests similar and,in some cases, higher percentages: 8 per cent of GDP in
Kenya and Tanzania; 30 per cent in Uganda (Odhiambo
and Kamau 2003); 35 per cent in South Africa; 43 percent in India; and 47 per cent in Brazil (IISD 2008). By
committing to purchase goods which meet certain
criteria for sustainability, governments can therefore
represent a powerful force of market demand.
Like many of the subsidy mechanisms identified above,
government demand for green goods and services canprovide businesses with a high-volume and long-term
buyer. The market signal allows firms to make longer term
investments in innovation, and allows producers to realise
economies of scale, lowering costs. In turn, this can lead to
the wider commercialisation of green goods and services
and thereby promote sustainable consumption. One
study examining 10 product groups found that the mostadvanced sustainable public procurement programmesin Europe reduced the carbon footprint of procurementby an average of 25 per cent (Pricewaterhouse Coopers,
Significant and Ecofys 2009). Unlike most other subsidies,it can be achieved largely through the reorientation ofexisting spending. It also provides governments witha valuable tool to demonstrate their commitment tosustainable development. Nearly all developed countries
have some kind of sustainable public procurement
policies, and many developing countries, such as India,
Chile, South Africa and Vietnam, are in the process ofestablishing their own (Perera, Chowdhury and Goswami2007) (see Box 2).
Ensuring rational public expenditure
There are a number of challenges associated with theimplementation of public expenditure measures, andthese challenges can be particularly pronounced incountries with limited institutional capacity. In somecases, governments may lack the capacity to design
effective incentives and incentive schemes, or to
implement and monitor the measures. In other cases,
governments may lack the technical expertise to ensurethat an asset is constructed and operated (or a service
provided) in the most cost-effective and sustainable way,or there may be a lack of available public funds. A numberof innovative initiatives have been launched to overcome
these constraints (see Box 3).
Given the institutional capacity that is often required toensure that a public expenditure measure is effective andleads to a desired outcome, it is important to carefully
assess what type of measure should be used. The various
measures discussed above have their strengths andweaknesses and the choice of measure depends in largepart of the overall policy objective. For instance, directspending to support the development of environmentallysound technologies may in some cases be preferable
to tax incentives because it can be difficult to ensurethat expenditure in the form of tax incentives promotes
innovation that generates social rather than private
benefits (UNEP 2010b). Nevertheless, where the tax
incentive supporting technology development is basedon performance and rewards the best observed practices,
the instrument is likely to be efficient (OECD 2010b).
In some cases, performance incentives may be moresuitable for ensuring that economic activity is green.
These incentives can be used to help reduce the cost ofadherence to environmental and social standards withoutcompromising those standards. For example, several
regional investment incentives in India, the Philippines,
Chile and Costa Rica have established funds for thecertification of management systems on environmental
and social performance. The International Organization

Box 2: The Marrakech Task Force on sustainable public procurement
The Marrakech Task Force on Sustainable Public
Procurement was launched by the governmentof Switzerland in 2005, and is one of seven Task
Forces in the Marrakech Process on Sustainable
Consumption and Production, led by UNEP and theUnited Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs (UN DESA). It is an international initiative
to promote sustainable public procurement indeveloping and developed countries. Since 2008,
its objective has been to roll out an approachfor the implementation of sustainable public
procurement in 14 countries, with pilot projects
currently being conducted in Mauritius, Tunisia,

556

Costa Rica, Colombia, Uruguay, Chile andLebanon. The approach consists of first assessing acountry’s procurement status; identifying thelegislative framework for procurement andpossibilities for integrating social and environmental
criteria into procurement activities; carrying out
a market readiness analysis to scope the existing
supply-side capacity in sustainable goods andservices; and finally the development of a countrybased sustainable public procurement policy,
including a capacity-building programme forsustainable public procurement officers (UNEP
2010c; UNEP 2010d).

Enabling conditionsfor Standardization estimates that these measures haveplayed an important role in the uptake of the ISO 14000
series on environmental management and the ISO 14065
series on greenhouse gas monitoring in lower income
countries and small organisations (IISD 2009).
Despite their potential for kick-starting a green
economy, once incentives and subsidies have beencreated, they can be difficult to remove as recipients
have a vested interest in their continuation. In general,
governments can try to keep expenses to a minimum bydesigning subsidies that are time-bound and with cost
control in mind. For example, depending on the support
mechanism, this might include regular programme
reviews, with agreed conditions for adjustment, as wellas caps on total spending and clear sunset provisions(Victor 2009). Moreover, an International Energy
Agency (IEA) analysis of subsidies for renewable energy
suggests that, where countries aim to stimulate private
investment in a sector, it is important that the support isstable and predictable, gives certainty to investors, andis phased out over time in order to motivate innovation(OECD/IEA 2008).
In terms of sustainable public procurement, oneof the biggest hurdles facing governments is thatenvironmentally and socially preferable goods andservices can have higher up-front costs than lesssustainable alternatives. This is especially true where
markets for green alternatives are still in their infancy.
There are a number of strategies to reduce these costs,
such as:■■ Focusing on goods and services, which promise lower
overall costs in the short-to-medium term once theirefficiency gains in running costs are taken into account;■■ Considering long-term leasing of items such as
electronic equipment, vehicles and furniture, whichtransfer the costs of maintenance, repair, upgrading andreplacement back to the suppliers;■■ Transforming tenders for individual products into
tenders for integrated services; and■■ Exploring cooperative contracts and central
purchasing platforms, through which the purchases ofmany agencies can be collectively negotiated to obtainsizable bulk discounts.

2.2 Addressing environmental
externalities and market failures
Supporting a green economic transition will require thatgovernments address existing market failures, including
where markets are completely lacking, as is the casefor many ecosystem services, or when markets fail toaccount for the true costs and benefits of the economic
activity. Unsustainable economic activity often enjoys
a price advantage when there is a negative externality;that is, where the production or consumption of
goods and services has negative spill-over effects on
third parties, the cost of which is not fully reflected inmarket prices. In essence, an externality means thatthe market price of an unsustainable good or service
is lower than its actual social costs, with the difference
borne primarily by people other than the buyer andseller. For instance, in a number of economic sectors,
such as transportation, negative externalities such aspollution, health impacts or loss of productivity, aretypically not reflected in costs. The situation for waste issimilar, where the full cost associated with the handlingBox 3: Private finance initiatives
Where governments lack the technical expertise
to ensure that an asset is constructed and operated(or a service provided) in the most cost-effective
and sustainable way, or where the availability of
public funds is limited, one alternative is private
finance initiatives (PFIs). Under a PFI arrangement,a tender is advertised specifying what asset or service
a government would like to achieve, including
criteria for promoting sustainable development
objectives. It then selects the best bidder andenters into a contract where the design, financeand construction are all provided by theprivate sector, often through a consortium ofenterprises. The logic is that by integrating thesefunctions in one package, sustainable design

and green technologies can be planned for in an
integrated manner and better efficiencies can beachieved. A variant on this model is co-investment,
whereby the public sector provides a share of the
project capital.
The advantage of the PFI model is that it allows
the private consortium to operate the asset for a
substantial period of time, thus harnessing theiringenuity and efficiency and often creating costsavings. PFIs also involve extensive risk transfer
to the private sector and, as a result, greater costcertainty for the government. Of course this comesat a cost – the private sector will not bear the risk
without being compensated.

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Towards a green economy

Box 4: Feed-in tariffs
Feed-in tariffs can be a powerful market-based
instrument to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,enhance energy supply security, and enhance
economic competitiveness. A feed-in tariff isregulated by the government and makes it
mandatory for energy companies responsible for
operating the national grid to purchase electricity
from renewable energy sources at a pre-determined
price that is sufficiently attractive to stimulate newinvestment in the sector (UNEP 2010e).
Feed-in tariffs are the most common policy usedby governments to promote renewable power
generation. Of the 83 countries that currently haverenewable energy policies, at least 50 countries –both developed and developing – and 25 states/
provinces have feed-in tariffs. Over half of theseand disposal of waste is usually not reflected in the priceof a product or waste disposal service. Aside from the
problem of basic fairness, this is a problem because
in order for markets to efficiently allocate resources,
prices need to accurately reflect the full social costs ofeconomic activity.

tariffs have been adopted since 2005 (REN21 2010).
Analysis of the use of feed-in tariffs in the European
Union suggests that the tariffs achieve greater
renewable energy penetration than other market
based instruments, and do so at lower costs for
consumers (European Commission 2008). In Kenya,
it is expected that a recently revised feed-in tariff
policy will stimulate around 1300 MW of electricity
generation capacity, contributing significantly
to energy security in the country. Moreover, theKenyan feed-in tariff is expected to stimulate thebuilding of renewable energy infrastructure as wellas lead to the implementation of projects to increase
the capacity of sugar companies for biomass-basedcogeneration, thereby contributing to employment
and development in rural areas (UNEP 2010e).

This section looks at how market incentives might bealtered by improving price signals through the useof environmentally-related taxes and other marketbased instruments (see Boxes 4 and 5). In so doing, theenabling condition of a more level playing field would
be established between green activities and theirBox 5: Peak pricing

558

Peak pricing is a pricing technique commonly usedby electricity distributors, whereby electricity usage
charges are higher during periods of peak demand.
This gives electricity consumers an incentive to
reduce consumption, at least during peak periods.
Peak pricing has been used by developed anddeveloping countries. For instance, in 1987, peakpricing was introduced in some areas of China toaddress the country’s electricity supply shortages,
and led to a variation in the cost of hydropower
between dry and rainy seasons (Zhao 2001).

proven successful in managing the congestion ofSingapore’s roads (Keong 2002). Congestion pricing
is a useful mechanism for making users aware of thenegative externalities of road transport, such as airand noise pollution, environmental degradationand delays, as these costs are internalised so that
consumers are obliged to pay for their contribution
to traffic congestion. The economic rationale is thatcongestion charges encourage users to consider
cheaper alternatives, such as travelling during offpeak times, or switching to public transport.

Congestion pricing is a similar technique, used
to manage traffic congestion. One of the earliest
examples of congestion pricing is Singapore’s roadcharging scheme, which subjects road users to acongestion fee each time they enter a cordoned
area. Road charges vary depending on traffic
conditions at the pricing points (Land Transport
Authority of Singapore 2011). The scheme has

Peak pricing and congestion pricing canencourage electricity and road users to reduce
their consumption. Furthermore, peak pricing may
facilitate increases in the proportion of electricity
supplied by renewable sources, by enabling
electricity distributors to manage periods when
renewable energy supply is low, such as during
periods of low wind or sunlight.

Enabling conditions

Box 6: Environmental taxes and innovation
In a recent study, the OECD found that placing
a price on pollution creates opportunities forinnovation as firms seek out cleaner alternatives.
For instance, in Sweden the introduction of a tax
on NOx emissions led to a dramatic increase in
the adoption of existing abatement technology –from 7 per cent of the firms adopting the technology
prior to the tax to 62 per cent the following
year. Taxation has an advantage over moreunsustainable competitors. In addition to their priceeffects, some of these policies also have the potential toincrease public revenue, which could make an important
contribution to the financing of a green economy.
Generally, the key actors involved in creating this change
are governments, although, as will be made clear in thesubsequent discussion, there are challenges regarding
data, implementation and politics that other actors canhelp overcome.
Environmentally related taxes
As noted above, failing to reflect environmental
externalities in prices makes it harder for sustainable
alternatives to compete, biasing the market against
investment in green sectors and retarding thedevelopment of green economic activity. A solution tothis problem is to use pricing techniques to internalise
the cost of the externality in the price of a good or service
via a corrective tax, charge or levy, also sometimes
referred to as full-cost pricing. Another solution is touse other market-based instruments, such as tradable
permit schemes.
Environmentally related taxes can be broadly broken
down into two categories: “polluter pays” focused on
charging producers or consumers at the point that they
are responsible for the creation of a pollutant; and “userprescriptive instruments, such as regulations, byencouraging innovation across a range of activities
from the production process to end-of-pipe
measures. The study also found that the design ofthe measure is of critical importance. Taxes thatare levied closer to the source of pollution (e.g. taxes
on CO2 emissions versus taxes on motor vehicles)
provide greater opportunities for innovation(OECD 2010b).

pays”, which focuses on charging for the extraction or
use of natural resources. Such taxes can provide clear
incentives to reduce emissions and use natural resources
more efficiently. Environmentally related taxes have also
been shown to be particularly effective in stimulating
innovation (see Box 6).
The revenue raised from environmental taxes can beused to mitigate the damage done by unsustainableproduction and consumption; to promote green
economic activity; or to contribute to other priority
spending areas. The overall tax burden can be kept
unchanged by lowering incentive-distorting taxes
simultaneously with the introduction of environmentally
related taxes. This can help make green taxes politicallymore acceptable and may also result in a double oreven triple dividend – a reduction in pollution at
the same time as an increase in efficiency and,possibly, employment (Green Fiscal Commission 2009)(see Box 7).
Tradable permit schemes
Like taxes, other market-based instruments, such as
tradable permits, are being increasingly used to addressa range of environmental issues. As opposed to taxes
which fix a price for pollution and then allow the market
to determine the level of pollution, tradable permit

Box 7: Green tax shifts – A double dividend for jobs and theenvironment
Governments can use taxes to put a price on pollution
and the use of scarce natural resources, and, at thesame time, maintain the same amount of overall tax
revenue by proportionately reducing taxes on sociallybeneficial activity, such as human labour. A study
by the International Labour Organization (ILO) on
the impact on the global labour market found that

imposing a price on carbon emissions and using therevenue to cut labour costs by lowering social security
contributions would create 14.3 million net new jobs
over a period of five years, which is equivalent to a
0.5 per cent rise of world employment (ILO 2009).
Even carbon-intensive industries see an increase inemployment (ILO 2009).

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Towards a green economy
schemes, including cap-and-trade systems, first establish
an overall level of pollution allowed and then let the open
market determine the price. Tradable permit schemes
were first introduced by countries several decades ago
and have gained renewed attention more recently given
their application for addressing climate change. For
instance, the Kyoto Protocol provides countries with theability of trading greenhouse gas emissions reduction
credits. In total, the Protocol resulted in 8.7 billion tonnesof carbon traded in 2009 with a value of US$ 144 billion(World Bank 2010).
Likewise, markets establishing payments for providing
ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration,watershed protection, biodiversity benefits andlandscape beauty, have gained considerable attention
over the last several years. Payments for ecosystemservices (PES) schemes aim to influence land use
decisions by enabling landholders to capture more of
the value of these environmental services than theywould have done in the absence of the scheme (Barbier
2010a). The evidence on the effectiveness of PES
schemes in reducing deforestation has been mixed. A
number of studies looking at national PES schemes in
Costa Rica and Mexico found that much of the land being
put under payments was not at risk of being converted
because of its low opportunity costs (Muñoz-Piña et al.
2008; Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007; Robalino et al. 2008).
As the contribution of deforestation and forest
degradation to greenhouse gas emissions has become
better understood, the potential to create an international
PES scheme related to forests and carbon has become a key
focus of international climate negotiations. The scheme,
coined REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation) and more recently as REDD+,
which adds conservation, sustainable managementof forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks to
the list of eligible activities, represents a multilayer PES
scheme with transfers of finance between industrialised
countries and developing countries in exchange foremission reductions.
The sums of money being estimated for full implementationof REDD+ are in the tens of billions of US dollars worldwide.
The amounts committed for preparation activities andbilateral programmes greatly exceed what has been
provided so far in PES, providing grounds for optimismthat this new mechanism can capture and transfer
important new resources for ecosystem services provided
by forests. Although PES will not be the only strategy
used by governments to achieve forest-based emission
reductions, it is likely to be important.
Ensuring effective use of environmentally related taxes
The sector chapters in this report identify many promising
applications for environmentally related taxes and560

market-based instruments to internalise environmental
externalities such as the cost of greenhouse gases,industrial pollutants, impacts of fertiliser and pesticideuse, waste, and the over-exploitation of common
resources such as fisheries, forests and water.
Environmentally related taxation on some level has beenused successfully by countries around the world since the1970s and 1980s, including China, Malaysia, Columbia,
Thailand, the Philippines and Tanzania (Bluffstone 2003).
China, for example, developed an extensive system ofcharges since the late 1970s, which raised over US$ 2
billion in revenues by 1994 (OECD 2005). Likewise, levies
on natural resource extraction are common practice andmany developing countries are highly dependent onrevenues from resource extractive industries (UNEP 2010b).
There are some key issues to bear in mind when
considering the use of environmentally related taxation
instruments. For one, their applicability is often limited tounsustainable economic activity that governments would
like to reduce or better manage, not to those activities
they want to eliminate entirely. In cases where the activity
should be prohibited, regulatory measures are typicallya more appropriate instrument than taxes. It is also wellrecognised in taxation literature that to be most effective,
taxes should be levied at the point where the externality
is created, and to the extent possible, set at a rate equal tothe cost of the externality (UNEP 2010b; Roy 2009).
In reality, it is not always possible to meet theseobjectives rigorously. Setting taxes at the correct
level, for example, requires regular monitoring of
externalities and undertaking studies to estimate
their cost. Where tax rates are set higher than theamount strictly needed for internalization of theexternalities, the end result can be a socially sub-optimal
resource allocation in which value-generation thatinvolves sustainable levels of pollution or resource
extraction is foregone. Likewise, it is not always possible
to directly tax the externality in question. In somecases, proxies are used, such as a road tax as a proxy fora CO2 emissions tax. However, these taxes may fail todiscriminate between the different amounts ofexternalities generated by actors engaged in the sameactivity, such as the aforementioned road tax which isinsensitive to more and less efficient car engines.
As with subsidy reform, although the overall aim of agreen tax will be to increase welfare, this net gain willalmost certainly mask individual winners and losers
within an economy. It is widely recognised, for example,
that high-carbon industries such as cement or steel
manufacturing would find it difficult to competewith international rivals if carbon pricing were only
implemented in their country of operation. Similarly,
low-income households are sensitive to any priceEnabling conditions
increases, energy use being a higher portion of their
total incomes, and might be unduly affected by a newtax. Any increase to the overall tax burden will have some
negative effect on economic output. For these reasons,comprehensive research is usually needed to estimate
how green taxes will affect an economy and to help
design complementary policies that can ease transition.
Experience with existing environmentally related taxes
shows that these dilemmas are commonly overcome
by introducing tax exemptions to certain economic
sectors. Although these may be effective politicalsolutions, they risk weakening the incentive effect of thetax. Carbon tax exemptions for high-carbon producers,
for example, often carve out exactly those firms thatare contributing most powerfully to the problem. The
best alternative would be international agreements –globally, regionally or sectorally – to tax externalities at a
specific level, thus offsetting competitiveness concerns.
An intermediary step towards this end-point might
be to agree on minimum levels of taxation of certain
externalities; or, via regional agreements, to simply
begin by agreeing on lists of externalities to tax, butleaving the rate of taxation up to member countries todetermine. Any remaining impacts could be dealt with byrecycling tax revenues into aid for industry restructuring.
A portion of this might involve support for capacity
reduction, including welfare payments for unemployedworkers and retraining schemes. Where international
agreements cannot be reached, countries with
ambitious internalisation policies might alternatively beable to negotiate conditions for the use of a border tax
on imports in the World Trade Organization (WTO), thus
mitigating any competitiveness impacts.
Similar solutions are often proposed for offsetting
any negative social impacts: tax revenues can be rechannelled into social welfare safety nets or otherwelfare-enhancing programmes, potentially allowing
governments to make the final outcome sociallyprogressive, as opposed to simply neutral. As with subsidy
reform, it is vital that social impacts are properly assessed
before implementation to ensure that the right flanking
measures are in place to deliver socially just outcomes. It
is equally important that such complementary policies bewell communicated if they are to help overcome political
opposition to change. Governance is also a significant
issue and public support for green taxation can beincreased if governments introduce effective measures
to ensure transparency and accountability. It should be
noted that the practice of earmarking – committing torecycle revenues for particular purposes, often politicallyeffective at increasing popular support for green taxes –is generally considered to place excessive constraint on
public finances, particularly assuming that the share ofrevenue sourced from environmentally related taxation
is to increase substantially (UNEP 2010b).

A green tax shift is another strategy for minimizing
or indeed entirely offsetting the economic costs ofincreased environmentally related taxation. Revenues are
re-chanelled by reducing taxes on things that promoteeconomic and social well-being, such as jobs, incomesand profits (Green Fiscal Commission 2009). The goal is adouble dividend that decreases losses in environmental
capital at the same time as boosting employment. In the
1990s and the early 2000s, modest green tax shifts took
place in a number of European countries, with broadly
positive outcomes in energy demand, CO2 emissions,employment and GDP.

2.3 Limiting government spending inareas that deplete natural capital
As noted earlier, subsidies are any form of preferential
treatment that is provided by governments to producers
or consumers. In their most obvious form, they are
direct financial transfers that, for example, reduce theprice of a good. However, support can be transferred inmany other ways, such as tax rebates, exemption fromlegal obligations or below-market prices for accessto government land (GSI 2010). They are a popular
policy instrument for many governments because themechanisms to implement subsidies do not require
much administrative capability, and they can be used
to win political support by appealing to specific lobby
groups or the perceived needs of the general populace.
Environmentally harmful subsidies
Although, as noted above, there are legitimate
reasons for using subsidies in some cases, they can beenvironmentally harmful in other cases. Moreover, once
they have been created, subsidies are hard to remove,and they entail a high opportunity cost. According toanalysis by the World Bank, a large number of countries
spend more on fuel subsidies than they do on publichealth (World Bank n.d.). When spending is linked to
product prices or volatile markets, it can increase tolevels far beyond those originally intended.
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) survey of 42
developing and emerging market economies showedthat rising oil prices in 2007 led to an average increasein explicit subsidies equal to 1.5 per cent of GDP and
implicit subsidies equal to 4 per cent of GDP (Mati 2008).
Sometimes the cost of subsidies is paid for with the longterm deterioration of important public services. In somecountries, utility companies are expected to absorb thecost of subsidizing basic goods like electricity and water,
leading to insufficient investment in maintenance andasset renewal (Komives et al. 2005).
Subsidies can also encourage poor environmental andresource management. Artificially lowering the price of561

Towards a green economy

Billion US$

Coal

Oil

Gas

Electricity

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2007

2008

2009

Figure 1: Economic value of fossil fuelconsumption subsidies by type.
Source: World Energy Outlook 2010 © OECD/International Energy Agency 2010
Note: Subsidy estimates are made by the International Energy Agency and do not
represent the official position of G20 countries.

goods through subsidization encourages inefficiency,
waste and overuse, leading to the premature scarcity ofvaluable finite resources or the degradation of renewable
resources and ecosystems. For instance, global subsidies
to fisheries have been estimated at US$ 27 billion annually,at least 60 per cent of which have been identified as
harmful, and are thought to be one of the key factors
driving over-fishing (Sumaila et al. 2010). It is estimatedthat depleted fisheries result in lost economic benefit in
the order of US$ 50 billion per year, more than half thevalue of global seafood trade (World Bank/FAO 2009).
Subsidies reduce the profitability of green investments.
When subsidization makes unsustainable activity
artificially cheap or low risk, it biases the market against
investment in green alternatives. Fossil fuel consumption
subsidies were an estimated US$ 557 billion worldwide
in 2008 and production subsidies accounted for an
additional US$ 100 billion (IEA/OPEC/OECD/World Bank
2010) (see Figure 1). By artificially lowering the cost ofusing fossil fuels, such subsidies deter consumers andfirms from adopting energy efficiency measures thatwould otherwise be cost-effective in the absence ofany subsidies. Indeed, there is consensus that thesesubsidies pose a significant barrier to the developmentof renewable energy technologies (UNEP 2008a;
World Bank 2008; el Sobki, Wooders and Sherif 2009).
Moreover, it is estimated that phasing out all fossil fuelconsumption and production subsidies by 2020 could
result in a 5.8 per cent reduction in global primaryenergy demand and a 6.9 per cent fall in greenhouse gas
emissions (IEA/OPEC/OECD/World Bank 2010).
Subsidies can be of questionable benefit to the poor.
Subsidies are often created to benefit low-income
households, but unless the aid is targeted the majority of562

the spending often flows to higher income households(UNEP 2010b). Similarly, subsidies intended to support
small-scale businesses are often captured by large firms(Environmental Working Group n.d.). In other cases,
subsidies in developed countries actively harm the poor.
The level of government support provided to agricultural
producers in OECD countries, for example, estimated at
US$ 265 billion in 2008 (OECD n.d.), is significantly tradedistorting, causing large welfare losses in developing
countries. Similarly, half of global subsidies to fisheries areprovided by developed countries, distorting prices andcosts in favour of developed country fishing industries(Sumaila and Pauly 2006). It has been estimated thatremoving subsidies and tariffs to cotton alone would
increase real incomes in sub-Sahara Africa by US$ 150
million per year (Roubini Global Economics 2009).
Reforming harmful subsidies
The difficulty of reforming subsidies is practical andpolitical: careful policy implementation is needed to offset
undesired secondary impacts, and a combination of strong
political will and compensatory policies may be necessary
to overcome opposition from vested interests. In somecases, subsidy reform can negatively affect the welfare of
the poor, and flanking measures will be required to ensure
a socially neutral or ideally progressive outcome.
Subsidies are complicated and often poorly understood.
The total support granted to a sector can come froma large number of programmes, given by different
arms and levels of government, and the economic,
environmental and social outcomes are complex tounravel. A consistent, methodical approach is forgovernments to adopt a three-stage process of: (i)defining their subsidies; (ii) measuring them; and (iii)
evaluating them against the objectives of reform. Suchan approach establishes which subsidies are harmful andhelps decide priorities for implementation (GSI 2010).
Existing reporting and monitoring of subsidies varies
considerably. It is most extensive and internationallystandardised in agriculture, but in other sectors, suchas energy and fisheries, it is weak. Every three years,
WTO Members are required to provide new andfull notifications of which subsidies are granted or
maintained in all sectors, but reporting rates are low,
notifications are often submitted late and there areproblems with accuracy and completeness of data
(Thöne and Dobroschke 2008).
Although national governments should theoreticallyhave a strong interest in tracking their subsidy spending,as it facilitates the rational use of resources, there isoften a lack of political will to act because of the way
subsidies benefit vested interests. Where governments
find it difficult to act for practical or political reasons,NGOs and IGOs can help fill the gap. Support can also beEnabling conditions
offered from international forums and peers. Additional
mechanisms, such as a template to facilitate andencourage full subsidy reporting to the WTO, have beensuggested as a way to remove obstacles to monitoring(Steenblik and Simón 2011).
The next step is to design a strategy for the implementationof subsidy reform. Although the underlying argument forreform is that it will improve overall welfare, there will bewinners and losers. For example, the removal of harmful
fishery subsidies helps to encourage the managementof a valuable resource, improving the likelihood that it
will permit a lower but sustainable level of employment
in the long term and liberate revenue that can benefit
the economy elsewhere. Another common impact ofsubsidy reform is to increase the price of goods thathave been subsidised. Although low-income groups
typically benefit from only a small share of subsidies,
they spend a larger proportion of their income on basic
goods, including food, water and energy, and can bedisproportionately affected if subsidies for these goods
are removed. In some cases, careful policy sequencing
may be required, to ensure that the poor can accessreasonably priced alternatives to subsidised goods andservices, as a prerequisite for subsidy removal.
The uneven distribution of the benefits and costs ofsubsidy reform explains why there is usually strong
political opposition. Complementary measures need
to be designed to offset some of these concerns, suchas short-term restructuring aid for industries, supportand retraining for workers and welfare transfers forthe poor (see the section on Supporting Actions formore information). These types of programmes should
include substantial stakeholder consultation and arelikely to take considerable amounts of time and effort
in countries that do not already have the resources andsystems in place. The IMF recommends a gradual reform
strategy and suggests a number of potential shortterm support measures, including the maintenance ofsubsidies that are most important to the budgets of thepoor – mainly by replacing subsidies to producers withtargeted consumption subsidies to poor households,
and the redirection of funds into high priority areas for
public spending, such as healthcare or education (seeBox 8). Given the ultimate importance of stakeholder
buy-in, a strong communication strategy is needed toreassure affected groups that they will be supported.
The third and final step is ongoing monitoring andreview, essential to determine the effectiveness and any
unintended consequences of subsidy reform, and whether
the mitigation policies – especially financial support – arereaching their intended beneficiaries and achieving theirobjectives. If mitigation measures are designed withtime boundaries or maximum levels of spending, it canhelp avoid their becoming entrenched and enable thegovernment to adapt them to changing circumstances.

2.4 Establishing soundregulatory frameworks
The sector chapters in this report emphasise that certain
regulatory reforms at the national level, such as thoseregarding property rights, traditional environmental

Box 8: Energy subsidy reform in action
Cash transfers – When Indonesia reduced its energy
subsidies and raised fuel prices in October 2005, thegovernment established a year-long programme totransfer unconditional quarterly payments of US$
30 to 15.5 million poor households. Considering
its quick implementation, the programme isconsidered to have operated well (Bacon andKojima 2006). The same move was taken when fuelprices were raised in May 2008, with US$ 1.52 billion
being allocated to cash transfers to low-income
households (IISD 2010).

the education and health of poor communities(IISD 2010). Payments are made to female
household heads through post offices on thecondition that they meet requirements to use healthand education services (Hutagalung et al. 2009;
Bloom 2009).

The proxy means testing method that was used to
identify poor households when reforming subsidies
was subsequently used in the government’s
design and trial of an ongoing conditional cashtransfer programme, the Hopeful Family Program(Program Keluarga Harapan), intended to increase

Basic services – When Ghana reformed its fuelsubsidies, fees for attending primary and juniorsecondary schools were eliminated and thegovernment made extra funds available for primary
healthcare programmes concentrated in the poorest
areas (IMF 2008).

Microfinance – In Gabon, the impact of subsidy
reform was offset by using liberated revenue to help
fund microcredit programmes for disadvantaged
women in rural areas (IMF 2008).

563

Towards a green economy
command and control regulations, and standards, aswell as the effective enforcement of these laws, canbe important in driving green investment. This section
considers key national regulatory tools identified by thesector chapters in this report.
A well-designed regulatory framework can create rights
and incentives that drive green economic activity,
remove barriers to green investments, and regulate themost harmful forms of unsustainable behaviour, either
by creating minimum standards or prohibiting certain
activities entirely.
Regulations provide the legal basis that government
authorities can rely on for monitoring and enforcing
compliance. A well-designed regulatory framework can
reduce regulatory and business risks, and increase theconfidence of investors and markets. It is often betterfor businesses to work to clear and effectively enforced
standards, and not have to deal with uncertainty or facecompetition from those who do not comply with therules (Network Heads of European Protection Agencies
2005). Moreover, regulations may also be particularly
appropriate where market-based instruments are notapplicable or appropriate, such as where no market
exists for ecosystem services (UNEP 2010b).
In many cases, the challenge is not to establish new
regulations but to better align existing regulatory
frameworks with government objectives to promote
green economic activity. Good practice in regulation
involves periodic review, and when this is undertaken it
should be fact-based, analytically rigorous and should
promote procedural and legal certainty by being
timely, transparent and non-discriminatory. To use
regulatory tools to promote green economic activity in
key sectors, it is important to first establish the extent
to which existing regulatory frameworks are alignedwith policy objectives. This makes it possible to decide
which laws should be amended and whether or not
any new legislation is needed. The sector chapters of
this report have identified a number of areas where
regulatory frameworks need to be better aligned withenvironmental and social development objectives.
Although they may be more or less relevant dependingon the regulatory frameworks of different countries andjurisdictions, they are illustrative of the type of problems
and solutions that find their source in legislation.
Designing fair and effective rules and regulations requiresa deep understanding of the regulated sectors. Suchrules should seek to be open to encourage and enable
trade, investment and financing. The Manufacturing
chapter, for example, notes that some industries arehighly heterogeneous, making them difficult to regulate
without being too soft or too severe. As regulators work564

with firms to establish appropriate rules, there is also therisk of “regulatory capture”, where the resulting legislation
is more in the commercial than the public interest. Even
where a regulation is well-designed, adequate institutional
capacity is nevertheless essential to ensure that as little
administrative burden as possible is placed on businesses.
Standards
Standards can be effective tools for achieving
environmental objectives and enabling markets insustainable goods and services. This is because they informconsumers about products and production processes, andcreate or strengthen demand for sustainable products.
Technical standards (i.e. requirements on products and/or
processes and production methods) are mainly developedand implemented at the national level, althoughstandards that aim at enhancing energy efficiency andthat set targets for emission reductions are also developed
internationally. The requirements may be based on thedesign or the particular characteristics required, such as
many biofuel standards, or they may be performancebased, as is the case with many energy efficiency standards(WTO-UNEP 2009). Mandatory standards, in particular, canbe very effective in achieving a desired outcome.
In some cases, environmental regulation can drive
innovation and economic growth. Companies innovate
in response to, for example, tighter waste regulations
by changing product design and production processes
so that they generate less waste (Network Heads ofEuropean Protection Agencies 2005). It has been argued
that countries with high environmental standards
often have market-leading firms and record better
economic performance than countries with lower
standards. This is because higher standards can induce
efficiency and stimulate innovation, which can have apositive effect on competitiveness for those needing tocomply with the standards (Porter 1990).
Nonetheless, the development of standards posessome risks. In many cases, it can be difficult to establish
a standard with certainty. Even if an appropriate
standard can be found, as time passes it can create a“ceiling of mediocrity”, failing to adequately promotefurther improvements in performance if there are nomechanisms for regular review and revision (Smith
2008). Complex standards also risk discriminating
against small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly
in developing countries, which often lack adequate
resources to comply with legislation and demonstratecompliance to regulatory authorities.
Property laws and access rights
In a number of chapters – Agriculture, Forests, Fisheries
and Water – a common message emerges: unless people
have clear rights over a resource, they will lack the incentive

Enabling conditions
to manage it well. In the case of agriculture, an absence or
weakness of legal rights over a piece of land gives farmers
little reason to manage it for the long term (Goldstein andUdry 2008). Access rights can also have important effects
on the management of a resource: there is little incentive
for individual actors to make sustainable use of fisheries
and water resources, for example, when they know that
other users may simply increase their own appropriations.
This is the classic tragedy of the commons problem, andit can lead to degradation of the ecosystems, which are
the basis of much economic activity and well-being,
especially in developing countries and among the world’s
poor (Nellemann et al. 2009).
In addition to strong property laws that promotesustainable resource management, zoning regulations
can be crucial in coordinating and integrating green
infrastructure investments. While zoning regulations
have long been used in developed countries, they remaina relatively underused policy tool in developing countries.
Establishing strong zoning regulations, therefore,
presents developing countries with the opportunity
to establish clear geographical limits around cities torestrict urban sprawl. Well-designed zoning regulations
can also be instrumental to create green corridors that
protect ecosystems or to prioritise the developmentof the poorest areas of a city in an environmentally
sustainable manner.
Property laws and zoning regulations are politicallychallenging to establish and change. The legal provision ofrights also requires substantial administrative and judicial
capacity, sometimes requiring modern technologies toenforce. These political and institutional challenges cancome up against an additional layer of complexity whennational legislation overlaps with international legislation,
as in the case of transboundary fish stocks and crossborder water sources.
Negotiated and voluntary agreements
Not all rules and regulations are created by legislation;
exceptions include negotiated and voluntary agreements,
and industry self-regulation. These measures are
established by governments negotiating with firms, orby one or more firms taking voluntary action themselves,and usually consist of non-binding commitments tocertain standards or principles. They can be a usefulcomplement to government rules and regulations as
they take away some of the burden of information andadministrative costs from government authorities.
Moreover, they can be in the interest of businesses if they
involve cost-savings (eco-efficiency) or create positive
branding. First-mover advantage, and potentially lower
legal and regulatory risks, may also motivate industry
participants to enter into voluntary agreements or set up
a voluntary regulation (Williams 2004).

The risk of regulating via negotiated and voluntaryagreements is that they can result in unambitious targets
that would be achieved anyway, and some research
has questioned their environmental effectiveness andeconomic efficiency, especially where government
involvement is low (OECD 2003b). Nonetheless, anumber of such agreements, such as Indonesia’s
Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating(PROPER), show that in the appropriate circumstances
they can deliver significant environmental benefits(Blackman 2007). In the end, they are not a substitutefor government regulatory capacity, since without thecredible threat of regulation as a fall-back option there
is little incentive to comply with voluntary approaches,
and they still require government capacity to assess
their effectiveness against their objectives.
Information-based tools
The sector chapters in this report also identify awide number of information-based tools that can beused to help promote a green economy. Awarenesscampaigns, for example, can raise general understanding
about a particular issue and can be important inpushing through difficult political solutions. They canbe government-led, as in the case of independent
commissions to research and raise awareness about agiven issue, or NGO initiatives like the Greenpeace Stop
Climate Change campaign (Green Fiscal Commission n.d.;
Ranjan 2009; Greenpeace n.d.). Information programmes
can teach people basic skills as well, and promote
behaviour that reinforces green economy objectives.
Governments might also introduce regulations to makethe provision of certain information mandatory, to enableconsumers and investors to more effectively assess
the sustainability performance of firms, including theirecological and carbon footprints (see Finance chapter
for further detail.) There are also examples of voluntary
certification and labelling that have become an industry
norm on their own merits before being made a legal
requirement, such as the City of Vancouver’s energy andemissions targets for buildings (Coleman and Stefan 2009).
Moreover, corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes
and tools have become commonplace in many companies
and are influencing the ways in which these companies andtheir suppliers conduct business. (See Box 9)

2.5 Strengthening international
governanceIn addition to national laws, there are also a number ofinternational and multilateral mechanisms that regulate
economic activity. The following section describes
those mechanisms that can play an important role in atransition to a green economy.

565

Towards a green economy
Multilateral environmental agreements
Multilateral Environmental Agreements tend to focus
on regulating unsustainable economic activity withstandards or prohibitions. The negotiating processusually begins with the collective recognition of anenvironmental problem, and moves forward withdiscussions to agree on the nature of the issue, sharedneeds and goals, and finally ends with the developmentof a draft text. In some cases, the process results in legallybinding obligations and mechanisms to encourage
compliance, and in others only a declaration of principles
or aspirations (UNEP 2006).
Multilateral Environmental Agreements can play asignificant role in promoting green economic activity.
They can be the only viable solution to the governanceof some global common resources and, even when they
result in relatively soft commitments, they nonethelessestablish important principles and norms, and increase
monitoring and information flows. Although many of the
major global environmental issues have been tackled
already by MEAs, there is still much room for proactive
multilateral policy-making, whether in improving
existing MEAs or creating new agreements. The Fisheries

chapter, for example, highlights the need to create
regional fisheries management organisations that havethe “teeth” to properly manage the use of fish stocks,
and a recent analysis of the Basel Convention, identified
by the Waste chapter as an important regulatory tool,argues that its prior informed consent (PIC) system andcompliance committee can and should be strengthened(Andrews 2009).
One MEA with the potential to influence the transition
to a green economy is the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC’s
Kyoto Protocol has already stimulated growth in a
number of economic sectors, such as renewable energy
generation and energy efficient technologies, in order toaddress greenhouse gas emissions. However, the futureof the climate regime is still uncertain as negotiations
are mired in the difficult process of designing anarchitecture to come into force after the Kyoto Protocol’s
first commitment period ends in 2012.
As regulatory tools, MEAs can be more or less effective,
and more or less difficult to agree, depending on
how they are designed and the issue in question. The

Box 9: Voluntary private sector action and corporate social
responsibility
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a reflection of
the duty of the private sector “[…] to contribute to theevolution of equitable and sustainable communities
and societies”, as outlined in the Johannesburg
Declaration on Sustainable Development (paragraph27). It requires a voluntary commitment to enhanced
accountability for social, environmental and economic
impacts across an organisation’s operations andproducts. Such voluntary commitment by leading
companies can serve to complement and pave theway for eased introduction of new regulation andmarket instruments to green national economies.
One such example is corporate initiatives on
ecological footprinting and related labelling, which
can benefit from recognition and incentives bygovernment bodies. CSR initiatives can also serve toboost the policy goal of sustainable consumption
and production (SCP), driving improved efficiency inthe use of ecosystem services and reducing resource
degradation, pollution and waste.
Leading companies are increasingly adopting CSR
as an integral element of their business strategies,
recognising that CSR can yield tangible businessbenefits. Such benefits include cost savings, greater

566

access to capital, enhanced productivity, enhanced
product quality (through enhanced employee moraleand better working conditions), attraction and retentionof human resources, enhanced reputation and brand,
and reduced legal liability (Googins et al. 2007).
CSR can also increase the accountability andtransparency of organisations to society throughthe use of a variety of communication instruments,
including stakeholder engagement, productinformation and reporting systems. Reporting
trends today are moving towards the developmentof integrated environmental, social and governancereporting (see, for instance, the revision process by
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) of its guidelines
for sustainability reporting, available at www.
globalreporting.org). In addition, international
management standards such as the ISO 14000 series
on environmental management and the recently
adopted ISO 26000 on social responsibility offer anincreasingly referenced framework for action. For
example, ISO 26000 provides basic guidance on
the underlying principles of social responsibility topromote a common understanding and consistentpractices.

Enabling conditions
Montreal Protocol, for example, is widely considered to
be one of the most successful MEAs (see Box 10). A partof this success is due to its skilful drafting, which enabled
flexible solutions and included provisions for common
but differentiated responsibilities, as well as the creationof robust financing through the establishment of aMultilateral Fund to assist developing countries tocomply with the control measures of the Protocol, inparticular with the incremental costs of implementation.
The Montreal Protocol also succeeded because of thenature of the problem being regulated: it could focus
on a specific range of products for which substitutes
could be developed, and conferred relatively large
benefits to politically influential players at relatively low
costs (Sunstein 2007). With a more complex issue likeclimate change – which has impacts across industries,
comes at high cost and disputed benefits, and involves
challenges such as the allocation of emission rights andthe financing of adaptation – it has proven to be muchharder to reach collective consensus.
Even when the process is relatively smooth, theeffectiveness of MEAs is sometimes hampered byrelatively weak enforcement mechanisms. Few
MEAs result in punitive action, and most compliancemechanisms consist of self-reporting and facilitation
measures – an area where, again, some MEAs could
perhaps be strengthened (UNEP 2006).

International trade law
The multilateral trading system can have significant
influence on green economic activity, enabling or
obstructing the flow of green goods, technologies andinvestments. Much of trade’s influence − for good orfor bad − depends on the types of domestic policies
discussed elsewhere in this chapter. If environmental
resources are properly priced at the national level, thenthe international trading regime should allow countries
to sustainably exploit their comparative advantage innatural resources for mutual gain. Analysis in the Water
chapter illustrates, for example, the potential for waterscarce regions to relieve pressure on local supplies
by importing water-intensive products from waterabundant regions. Similarly, if domestic regimes andpolicies are in place that allow poor countries to fully
exploit the potential gains from trade liberalization,then trade can be a powerful driver of development andpoverty alleviation.
At least part of the influence of trade stems from theinternationally agreed rules by which international
trade is conducted. The current WTO Doha Roundnegotiations include issues that could support thetransition to a green economy. For example, negotiations
are currently focused on the removal of fisheries
subsidies, which often contribute directly to overfishing.
Trade negotiators are also discussing the reduction ofBox 10: The Montreal Protocol
The implementation of the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has beensuccessful in not only controlling substances that
deplete the ozone layer but also in driving a green
economy. To date, the international convention
has reduced the production and consumption ofnearly 100 industrial chemicals known as ozone
depleting substances (ODS) by more than 97 percent (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2010). Most ODS havehigh global warming potential, and the phasingout of many of these chemicals has had the
additional benefit of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions by about 11 billion tonnes CO2-equivalent
per year, which is 5-6 times the reduction target of
the Kyoto Protocol for the period 2008-2012 (Velders
et al. 2007). It is estimated that the implementationof the projects in developing countries thathave been approved to date under the Montreal
Protocol’s funding mechanism – the MultilateralFund (see multilateralfund.org) – will result inclimate mitigation co-benefits estimated at morethan 3 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent (GtCO2-eq)
at a cost of around US$1/tonne CO2-eq.

Other benefits derived from the implementation of
the Montreal Protocol include savings associatedwith reduced ultraviolet radiation damage to crops,
livestock and materials, and the avoidance of cancer
and eye cataracts in humans. For example, the UnitedStates Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA)
recently reported that the Protocol will result in the
avoidance of more than 22 million additional new
cataract cases for those born between 1985 and 2100
in the US alone (US EPA 2010).
The Montreal Protocol has also generated
considerable economic and social benefits, including
the creation of opportunities in the replacement andphase-out of unwanted ODS, the production of ODS
substitutes, the development and marketing of ozone
and climate friendly equipment, and in the creationand funding of National Ozone Units in developing
countries (Multilateral Fund Secretariat 2010). The
benefits from the Montreal Protocol are expected
to grow as countries are now committed to phasingout hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and replacethese with climate and ozone friendly alternatives.

567

Towards a green economy
tariff and non-tariff barriers on environmental goods
and services. A World Bank study found that tradeliberalisation could result in a 7 to 13 per cent increasein trade volumes in these goods (World Bank 2007).
Likewise, the ongoing negotiations to liberalise tradein agriculture could yield green economy benefits.
These negotiations are expected to lead to a reduction
in agricultural subsidies in some developed countries
that should stimulate more efficient and sustainableagricultural production in developing countries. It isessential, nonetheless, that developing countries aresupported through capacity building to fully exploit thepotential gains from trade liberalization (see Box 11).
The trade rules governing intellectual property
rights (IPRs) and the use of standards and labelingby governments have important implications for thetransition to a green economy. Rules regarding theenforcement of IPRs are included in most modern trade
agreements. Proponents of strong IPR rules argue thatthey can help foster a green economic transition by
providing incentives for innovators, who can be morecertain that their investment in R&D will be rewarded.
This is particularly important at a time when new clean
technologies are urgently needed; it has been estimatedthat almost 36 per cent of the reductions in carbon
emissions needed by 2020 could be achieved through theapplication of new technologies in the energy, transport,
buildings and industry sectors (Tomlinson 2009).
On the other hand, IPRs create barriers to the transferof the very technologies and innovations to which

they give rise. Although the WTO Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
was designed to take into account the need for balance
between innovation and dissemination, noting theneed for “maximum flexibility” with regard to leastdeveloped country Members, many sector chapters inthis report identify IPRs as an important barrier to thedevelopment of green markets. Moreover, some studies
note that the TRIPS Agreement has come under criticism
for failing to adequately serve the needs of developing
countries (Foray 2009).
The use of standards and voluntary labeling schemes isanother trade-related area of importance from a green
economy perspective. Such tools can be effective forachieving environmental objectives and enabling
markets in sustainable goods and services by informing
consumers about products and production processes. In
the manufacturing sector, for example, standards often“push” the market by requiring manufacturers to meet
minimum guidelines, and these are often complemented
by voluntary eco-labelling schemes to “pull” the market byproviding consumers with relevant information to makeinformed purchasing decisions. The Forest StewardshipCouncil (FSC), for example, provides internationallyrecognised standard-setting, trademark assurance andaccreditation services for companies, organisations andcommunities. The Forests chapter identifies certificationas having the largest influence on forest policy over thelast decade. Similarly, the Marine Stewardship Council(MSC) recognises and rewards sustainable fishing by
working with fisheries and commercial partners to giveBox 11: Trade-related capacity building
Trade is considered to be one of the major global
engines of development, and the sector chapters inthis report identify many ways that the trade system
can facilitate green markets, from enabling the more
efficient use of resources to the transfer of important
technologies. But one of the greatest criticisms of the
trade system is that many countries lack the capacitythat would let them take advantage of these potential
gains. There is, however, an existing model that has been
designed to address these challenges: the Integrated
Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to
Least-Developed Countries, or simply, the IF.
The IF – now the enhanced IF – was inaugurated in
1997 at the WTO High Level Meeting on Integrated
Initiatives for Least-Developed Countries’ Trade
Development, and involves a collaboration of the
IMF, the International Trade Centre (ITC), United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development

568(UNCTAD), United Nations Development Programme(UNDP), World Bank and WTO.
The IF involves a diagnostic phase, where the hostcountry government works in close cooperation
with technical experts to identify barriers toincreased integration into the global trading
system. The resulting diagnostic trade integration
studies (DTIS) not only identify challenges but also
solutions. Typical solutions include policy changes,
such as new laws and regulations; investments ininfrastructure, such as new transportation corridors,
customs facilities and equipment; or skills capacity
building, such as training for trade negotiators. The
host country then prioritises those elements of the
DTIS that most closely fit with national priorities,
mainstreaming the recommendations in theirnational development planning.
Source: IF Secretariat (2009)Enabling conditions
buyers and consumers an easy way to find seafood froma sustainable source (MSC 2009).
More generally, standards and voluntary labelling
schemes can also play an important role in sustainablepublic procurement. Although it is generally consideredbad practice for procurement officials to requirecompliance with a particular standard – companies
might have high sustainable credentials without being
part of the specified standard, or as part of anotheraccreditation programme – they are often used by
procurers to identify good-practice criteria for theevaluation of a good or service’s sustainability.
Although standards and labelling schemes can be
powerful instruments to drive a green economy, they
can also create barriers for small and developing country
producers who may not have adequate resources to prove
compliance, or for whom the standards are inappropriate.
For instance, Uzbek farmers seeking certification in the
French organic fruit and vegetable market are reported tohave faced compliance costs higher than the national GDP
per capita (Vitalis 2002). Elsewhere, water-use standards
based on limited water availability in one country have
proven to be inappropriate for others where the water
availability situation is entirely different (Vitalis 2002). Froma trade perspective, the concern is that standards – andmandatory standards in particular – could hinder accessby developing country exporters to lucrative markets
in developed countries. Yet improving market access fordeveloping country products is essential for development.
It is therefore critical to find the right balance between
environmental protection and safeguarding market
access. Multilateral dialogue and negotiations, wheneverpossible, are essential to ensure that this balance is met.
Moreover, as noted in the Forests chapter, it may bepossible for standard bodies to support a step-wise
approach – setting benchmarks for companies thatmeasure their progress towards sustainable criteria andgiving them support in planning and building capacity
to achieve higher standards (Morrison et al. 2007).
Official development assistance can also be used tohelp developing country exporters successfully meetstringent standards in their main export markets.
International investment framework
The international investment framework is made up
of a web of treaties between states, and contracts

between states and private investors, that describe
rights and obligations regarding foreign investments.
State to state agreements, such as bilateral investment
treaties (BITs), regional investment treaties andinvestment chapters in trade agreements like the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), provide
rights and protections to investors from covered states.
Contracts between a state and an investor, often called
investment contracts or host government agreements,
set out the rights and obligations of the investor andthe host state, including the conditions applied to theoperations of a single investor and its subsidiaries in theagreeing host country. Host government agreements
are most common in developing countries, where
often there are fewer general regulations covering
investment rights.
An increasing number of recently signed regional trade
agreements incorporate environmental considerationsin their respective investment chapters. The agreements
may expressly promote investment activity that isundertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns, as is the case with the New Zealand–Malaysia
free trade agreement. Certain agreements, suchas the Canada–Jordan free trade agreement, alsoseek to promote the enforcement of domestic
environmental laws and to ensure that such laws are
not derogated from for the purposes of encouraging
investment or trade. Although environmental
considerations feature increasingly in the international
investment framework, many investment treaties
and investment contracts do not expressly promotesustainable over unsustainable investments (Mannet al. 2005). A key concern regarding investment
contracts, for example, stems from “stabilization clauses”– provisions in host government agreements thatfreeze legislation at a certain point in time or that
require host states to compensate in case of changes
in the law that adversely affect profits. Concerns havebeen raised that such clauses limit a state’s ability toregulate effectively so as to protect the environmentand human rights (Shemberg 2008), and this could
have consequences for the promotion of a green
economy where regulations are established to drive
green growth. It is therefore important that both thebenefits and constraints associated with international
investment frameworks are properly understood when
they are negotiated to ensure they support a green
economic transition.

569

Towards a green economy

3 Supporting actions
Depending on their level of development, countries will
have a different range of capacities to implement thetypes of policies discussed in the preceding sectionsof this report and to cope with the change entailed
by a green economic transition. In particular, robust
institutions, including the polices, practices and systems
that allow for the effective functioning of an organisation
or group, are vital to the success of government policies
intended to green key sectors (UNDP 2009). A strategy toenable increased green economic activity must therefore
include efforts to improve capacities to implement
policies and to manage change.
More specifically, countries may need assistance withregard to resources, technical expertise, training,technology development and diffusion, political backing
and other kinds of aid from a broad range of actors,
including inter-governmental organisations, international
financial institutions, bilateral aid agencies, multilateralcompanies and non-governmental organisations.

3.1 Supporting capacity building andthe strengthening of institutions
UNDP has identified five basic functional capacities ofgovernments that determine the outcome of development
efforts. They include a government’s capacity to: engage
stakeholders; assess a situation and define a vision;
formulate policies and strategies; budget, manage andimplement policies; and evaluate outcomes (UNDP 2009).
These generic functional capacities will all be called on to
successfully make a green economic transition.
Three of the most important capacity-building issues
that are emphasised across the sector chapters are
improved information-based capabilities, the needfor integrated planning, and adequate enforcement ofpolicy requirements and laws.
The importance of research, data collection and data
management cannot be understated. The sector
chapters of this report establish that there is alreadya substantial amount of information about the statusof natural resources and ecosystems and how they
contribute to economic well-being, as well as the green
economic opportunities that can be exploited in every
sector of the economy. Nonetheless, a common message
is that these generalities need to be carefully nuancedwith respect to specific national and local conditions. In
addition to technical and human capital, this requires

570

the development of institutions that adopt a consistent,science-based approach to the assessment and analysisof environmental resources. Hard or soft rules must also
exist to ensure that scientific analysis is appropriately
factored into policy decision-making and that feedback
loops enable ongoing learning and adaptation.
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)
may also play an important role in supporting datacollection and research (see Box 12).
Information is also an important issue for good governance.
In policy planning processes, awareness of the needs,
concerns and knowledge of stakeholders, and interaction
on this basis, is vital to ensure socially optimal outcomes.
Once objectives are stated and measurable, and theoperation of policies is being monitored, the provision of
information is also necessary to ensure policy effectivenessand accountability (see the modelling chapter for more
information about indicators and measurement). Data also
needs to be credibly evaluated and used as the basis for any
policy adaptation.
Amassing sufficient information to inform good policymaking is not an easy task. It often requires increased
financial resources, improved administrative capacity,
technical training and access to technology, as well
as developing institutions that allow for the effectivefunctioning of the research and consultation processes,
and their interaction with policy-making decisions.
Strategic integrated planning is equally important.
Most sector chapters emphasise the need for a holistic
approach to policy-making to ensure decisions arealigned with the overall objectives of a green economy.
This includes the development of processes and norms
to systematise taking into account how policies in one
sector might affect others; carefully assessing decisions
that have long-term consequences; incorporating skills
development policies; and using an appropriate mix ofpolicy tools to achieve a given objective.
Research on the use of multiple policy tools confirmsthat different combinations of informational, regulatory
and market instruments can be more or less effective
and efficient in different situations (OECD 2007). The
most striking illustration of this principle is in the Cities
chapter, which concludes that urban planning has
significant, often unalterable impacts on the costs ofliving and ecological efficiency. Similarly, in promoting
renewable energy technologies, it is now wellrecognised that the establishment of income support

Enabling conditions

Box 12: Harnessing Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)
ICTs enabling the green economy
Over the past two decades, the products and services producedby the information and communication technologies (ICTs)
sector have been catalysts for economic growth. They haveenabled productivity gains and transformed production
processes, markets and industries in both developed anddeveloping countries. A recent study found that internet-related
consumption and expenditure – the central nervous system of
the digital economy – is bigger than agriculture or energy. The
study also found that the Internet’s total contribution to global
GDP is bigger than the GDP of Spain or Canada, and is growing
faster than Brazil’s (McKinsey Global Institute 2011).
There is growing recognition among ICT policy-makers
and stakeholders that ICTs can be powerful enablers of thegreen economy through the transformation of economic
infrastructures, industry sectors, and social behaviours. Theycan:■■ Increase the efficiency of production and consumption inenergy, transportation, building and manufacturing sectors,
through the deployment of smart systems. It is estimated that
ICTs could reduce global GHG emissions by 15 per cent by
2020, compared to a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario with a2002 baseline (The Climate Group 2008).
■■ Wholly or partially “de-materialise” physical products,
services and processes, resulting in significant reductions inenergy and materials consumption. Examples include papersaving through electronic billing; greater use of tele-workarrangements; and virtual meetings in the public and private
sectors.
■■ Increase access to education, health care and other public
services; create new opportunities for social interaction andcultural expression; and facilitate participation in public life.
Future applications of ICTs could enable green economic
activity in other ways. The development of new kinds of
networks that include objects in the natural environment– commonly referred to as the Internet of Things – would
enhance the capacity of public and private actors to monitor
all manner of natural and human systems in real time, as wellas to manage the operations and impacts of these systems in
more sustainable ways. This would have implications for many
sectors, including: natural systems providing ecological goods
and services; agriculture; forestry; energy; transportation; andbuildings and their facilities.
Notwithstanding, policy-makers should also recognise that
ICTs come with sustainability challenges too – for example,
by increasing overall demand for non-renewable energy andmaterial resources. The ICT sector has also become a major
source of toxic pollution through e-waste and GHG emissions.
Such effects need to be carefully balanced against the gains
of ICTs, and mitigated where possible, to best promote green
economic activity.
Enabling ICTs
As with a number of green technologies, governments needto create the right enabling environment that will allow ICTs toflourish. This requires close collaboration between government
agencies responsible for ICT and green economy initiatives,
along with their respective stakeholder communities.
Government interventions to enable ICTs to contribute to agreen economy include:■■ Universal, affordable access to broadband networks andservices. To a large extent, this objective can be achieved
through regulatory frameworks that encourage private
investment, promote competition among broadband
service providers, ensure open network access to creators ofbroadband applications and content, and protect the rights
of consumers to access broadband services, applications andcontent of their choice – a policy generally known as “netneutrality”. However, experience also shows that providing
access to broadband networks in some geographic areas
is uneconomic, and that broadband service is unaffordable
for some groups. In such circumstances, many governments
have subsidised broadband network deployment and service
access through various forms of public investment, subsidies
and regulatory requirements.
■■ Transition to IPv6. Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), a new
addressing system, was developed more than a decade ago
to succeed IPv4. Although it provides the virtually unlimited
number of addresses that will be needed to support the
deployment of smart systems and innovations such as
the Internet of Things, its take-up has been slow. Public
procurement can have a powerful effect in enabling a smoothtransition to IPv6 by stimulating demand for IPv6 products andservices. Regulatory requirements can also have a powerful
effect.
■■ Confidence and trust in the online environment. Policymakers need to develop robust legal frameworks, regulatory
arrangements, and enforcement mechanisms that will protect
personal privacy and the rights of citizens and consumers,
combat cybercrime, ensure the security and stability ofelectronic networks, and balance the rights of users andcreators of information products and services. Industry canalso contribute, by developing codes of practice that help
protect consumers, and developing tools that allow internet
users to manage their online identities.

571

Towards a green economy
alone might be insufficient or unnecessarily expensive if
policy-makers fail to take into account issues such as thegrid infrastructure or obstructive planning permission
processes (OECD/IEA 2008).
Enforcement of laws and regulations is another areaof importance. The effectiveness of any policy tool
is dependent upon a chain of actors and institutions
working together to ensure it is appropriately
implemented – from verifying the use of appropriate
award of tenders in sustainable public procurement
to ensuring that environmentally related taxation is
being levied on relevant economic activity. Financial,administrative and technical capacity is required toadequately monitor compliance, and robust institutions,
including social and cultural norms, as well as
enforcement organisations with adequate authority, areneeded to ensure that the appropriate penalties can belevied where protocol and regulations are violated.
Intergovernmental organisations,international
financial institutions, NGOs, the private sector, andthe international community as a whole can play arole in providing technical and financial assistance indeveloping countries. Enabling a smooth transition toa green economy will require a sustained international
effort by these actors. The United Nations Conferenceon Sustainable Development summit in 2012 (Rio+20)
provides an invaluable opportunity for the international
community to promote green economy action giventhat one of the two themes for the summit is “a green
economy in the context of sustainable development
and poverty eradication” (General Assembly Resolution
64/236). The commitment and action by governments,
international organisations and others over the next two
years will determine whether the summit provides theimpetus and direction required for driving the transition.
In addition, the United Nations and its partners have along history of supporting national capacity building
and training activities and can utilise this expertiseto support national green economy efforts. Current
efforts are underway within the UN system throughthe Environmental Management Group to harmonise
green economy support at the national level. Under
this initiative, 32 organisations from the UN system aredeveloping an inter-agency assessment report on how
the expertise of the different UN agencies, funds andprogrammes can contribute to supporting countries
in the transition to a green economy (Environmental
Management Group 2010).
Moreover, South-South cooperation is critical: many
developing country experiences and successes inachieving a green economy can provide valuable impetus,
ideas and means for other developing countries to addresssimilar concerns – particularly given the impressive572

gains and leadership that have been demonstrated inpractice (UNEP 2010e). South-South cooperation canthus increase the flow of information, expertise andtechnology at a reduced cost. More broadly, as countries
take steps towards a green economy, formal and informal
global exchanges of experiences and lessons learned canprove a valuable way to build capacity.

3.2 Investing in training and education
Training and skill enhancement programmes will beneeded to prepare the workforce for a green economy
transition. A joint study between UNEP, ILO and otherpartners found that the impact on workers from a green
economic transition will vary greatly depending on thespecific economic sector and country in question. In
some cases, the transition could mean that jobs would
be lost, and in other cases, it is expected that new green
jobs would be created. Available studies on a sectoral andeconomy-wide level suggest that, on balance, there will be
more jobs in a green economy (UNEP 2008b). Renewableenergy, for example, creates more jobs per dollar invested,
per unit of installed capacity and per unit of power
generated than conventional power generation. Likewise,
public transport tends to generate more employment
than reliance on individual cars and trucks (UNEP 2008c).
It is also estimated that the pace of green job creation is
likely to accelerate in the future (UNEP 2008b).
Rather than replacing existing jobs with entirely new
green jobs, however, it is the content of the jobs (e.g. theway the work is performed and the skills of the workers)
that will often change (ILO 2008). A skilled workforce
is a prerequisite for a green economy, and it may benecessary to focus education efforts on aligning skills
with the needs of the labour market. This is particularly
relevant for the so-called STEM (science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics) disciplines. A numberof jobs throughout the economy are expected to betransformed to respond to a more energy and resource
efficient economy. For instance, builders will remain in
the same employment, but start to provide new, green
services. These shifts signal the need for training and skill
enhancement of the workforce.
Current shortages in skilled labour could frustrate efforts
by governments to transition to a green economy
and deliver the expected environmental benefits andeconomic returns. For instance, almost all energy subsectors lack skilled workers with the most pronounced
shortages found in the hydro, biogas and biomass
sectors. Shortages are also pressing for manufacturingin the renewable energy industry, particularly forengineers, operation and maintenance staff and sitemanagement (UNEP 2008b). Given this, it is essential thatgovernments work with employers to close the current

Enabling conditions
skills gap and anticipate the future workforce needs for agreen economy transition.
In addition to re-skilling workers, there is a need toensure managers develop the new perspectives,awareness and capacities required for ensuring asmooth transition. A recent OECD study noted that“[b]usinesses will need to ensure that their managers areable to learn and understand the new skills needed torespond to the changes taking place within their realmsof responsibility; to develop more green-oriented
managerial capacities; as well as to make adequate useof the skills their staff has obtained” (OECD 2010c).

For many countries and businesses, particularly
small and medium-sized enterprises, support fromgovernments, inter-governmental organisations andnon-governmental organisations in re-skilling workers
and management will be required. It is also importantto remember that while some groups and regions
will make significant gains in the transition to a green
economy, others will incur substantial losses. In thosecases where jobs will be lost, support will be needed toshift workers to new jobs or provide social assistance. In
the fisheries sector, for example, fishermen may need
to be trained for alternative livelihoods, which could
include participation in the rebuilding of fisheries stocks.

573

Towards a green economy

4 Conclusions
Even when there is a clear economic case for green
investments, enabling conditions are generally needed.
This chapter has identified five key policy-making areas
which could feasibly be introduced by government at
all levels in the short-to-medium term, with a view todriving the innovative and transformational change
which could arise from collaboration between different
sectors on the green economy in the longer term.
The first of these, public investment and spending,can be important in the short term to attract green
investment and promote the development of green
markets, especially where alternative policy tools
are practically or politically impossible. A second key
area of policy-making is the use of environmentally
related taxes and other market-based instruments
to address environmental externalities and market
failures. A number of innovative measures, including
tradable permit schemes and feed-in tariffs, have beensuccessfully used by governments in recent years to
speed the transition to a green economy.
The chapter also discusses the importance of reforming
government subsidies that are environmentally harmful.
Although reforming such subsidies is challenging, anumber of good practice examples exist, illustratingthat reform is clearly possible. The two other key areasfor policy-making – improving regulatory frameworks

574

and strengthening international governance – focus on
the importance of national and international laws andregulations in stimulating green economic activity.
The chapter makes clear that capacity building is needed
for the effective implementation of policy tools, such as in
the areas of research, data collection, data management,
consultation and enforcement, with the role of institutions
being particularly important to the effectiveness ofpolicy. Support is also needed to ensure that workers are
fairly treated, that the labour market is prepared to meetthe demand for green jobs, and that the groups mostvulnerable to change receive adequate compensation.
Overall, it is clear that a wealth of policy options
exist for governments to enable the greening of key
sectors and that implementing strategies for greening
the economy will involve a broad suite of measuresand appropriate indicators to measure progress.
The challenge now is to set priorities at the country
level and to identify strategies for how to green
key sectors in ways that are aligned with existingcommitments to sustainable development andpoverty eradication. The need for detailed policy design– based on the lessons of experience, a deep knowledgeof local context and full consultation – should not be
underestimated, but neither should the breadth of areas
for action and the ultimate rewards.

Enabling conditions

Annex 1 – Enabling conditions:
A sector overview
The following table summarises the enabling
conditions that have been identified by the sector
chapters in this report. It explains how each condition
can enable green economic activity and be createdby various measures, as well as identifying thesectors in which each measure may be particularly

Enabling condition

Rationale: How it enables

important. The conditions are grouped into fivethemes – finance, governance, market, infrastructure
and information. There is, unavoidably, some overlap
among these groupings. In addition, the list ofmeasures should be considered illustrative andnot exhaustive.

Measures that can create theenabling condition

Sectors in which these measures are
particularly importantFinance
See Finance chapter

Increased availability of financefor governments andbusinesses in green sectors

In order for green businesses toemerge and expand, adequatelevels of private investment
need to be available. It may
also be necessary to increase
the availability of public financeso that a range of policy tools
can be used to leverage private
finance.

Note also:
The following policy tools, usedprimarily for their ability to correct pricedistortions, can also increase levels ofavailable public finance:→All

Subsidy reform→

Agriculture, Renewable Energy, Fisheries, Forests,
Manufacturing, Water

Environmentally related taxation, othertax instruments, fees and charges,
tradable permits→

Agriculture, Buildings, Renewable Energy,
Fisheries, Forests, Manufacturing, Transport,
Waste, Water

Strategic, integrated planning (e.g.
establishing ‘vision’ for the future ofparticular sectors); baskets of complementary policies; considering the effects
of policies across sectors and at local,
provincial, national and international
levels; stakeholder recognition andconsultation, etc.

→

All

→

Agriculture, Fisheries, Water

Rules and regulations, standards or
prohibitions (e.g. vehicle engine efficiency standards, zoning laws in cities,
outlawing bottom-trawling, food safety
standards, waste disposal laws)→

All

Negotiated and voluntary agreements→

Buildings, Cities, Forests, Manufacturing, Tourism,
Waste

International cooperation on agreements, laws and organisations needed
for the development of green goods andservices (e.g. reducing concentration ofmarket power in international agricultural value chains; preferential accessfor imports from low income countries;
reform of international fishing laws)→

Agriculture, Fisheries, Renewable Energy,
Transport, Water, Waste

Governance

A network of laws and norms
that encourage long-term andefficient management anduse of natural resources andenvironmental protection

The right combination of rights,
responsibilities, laws, incentives
and agreements can encourage
environmental protection andthe rational use of natural
resources, which can help toensure the sustainability of theeconomic activities that relyon these resources. National
and international organisations
can be instrumental in the
management of these laws andnorms.

Design of property rights and ecosystemaccess laws575

Towards a green economy

Enabling condition

Rationale: How it enables

Laws and norms that encourage technology transfer

Access to technology can be
instrumental to the improved
management of the environment and natural resources,
helping sustain the economic
activity that relies on them. It
can also create new economic
opportunities.

Improved administrative andtechnical capacity in government and other organisations

In some cases, governments
may need to enlarge theiradministrative and technicalcapacities as a prerequisite toenacting policies that stimulate
investment in green economic
activity.

Improved transparency andaccountability

Transparency and accountability are pillars of good
governance. They allow formonitoring and evaluation ofpolicies intended to stimulate
green investment, and in thisway can help ensure that policies are efficient and effectiveat achieving their objectives.

Effective enforcement of laws

Unless laws can be adequately
enforced, they may partially or
fully fail to alter investments
flows towards green economic
activity.

Measures that can create theenabling condition

Sectors in which these measures are
particularly important

Design of intellectual property rights→

Agriculture, Renewable Energy, Transport

Removal of trade barriers to the transfer
of green technologies; international
cooperation on green technology
transfer→

Agriculture, Renewable Energy, Transport, Water

Investments in technical and administrative capabilities→

Fisheries, Manufacturing, Renewable Energy,
Transport, Waste

International cooperation (e.g. Bali
Strategic Plan for Technology Support
and Capacity Building, etc.)→

Fisheries, Transport, Waste, Water

Monitoring and evaluation as acomponent of other policies→

All

Transparency to make info, about
decision-making and spending available
in a user-friendly way→

Cities, Forests, Transport

Accountability mechanisms as a component of policies (e.g. critical reviews,
performance targets)→

All, Forests

See Modelling chapter for information
about measurement indicators→

All

Create adequate enforcement incentives(e.g. adequately priced fines for noncompliance)→

Cities, Fisheries, Forests, Manufacturing, Waste

Develop capacity to enforce→

Fisheries, Forests, Manufacturing

Increased funding for the innovation
chain (e.g. research, development,
deployment, information-sharing)→

Agriculture, Cities, Manufacturing, Renewable
Energy, Waste

Green subsidies, e.g. PPPs, low-interest
loans, feed-in tariffs, investment
incentives, exemption from certain→
regulation, stewardship jobs, support forgreen SMEs, etc.

Agriculture, Buildings, Cities, Fisheries, Forests,
Manufacturing, Renewable Energy, Transport,
Waste

Sustainable public procurement→

Agriculture, Buildings, Cities, Renewable Energy,
Waste

Investment-grade policy design (e.g.
long-term guarantees, predictablechanges, gradually phased out support,
etc.)

→

Renewable Energy, Transport

MarketGreen economic activity is
encouraged by government
support

Policy support for green sectors
is clear, predictable and stable576

In some sectors, direct support
may be required to effectimmediate change (especiallywhere there is lengthy capitalstock turnover) or to support
infant green industries. This
support must be carefully
designed to avoid expensiveor otherwise perverse andunintended outcomes.

Investors may be cautiousof industries that rely onpolicy support. Investment canincrease if support of green
sectors is predictable, clear andhas long-term stability.

Enabling conditions

Enabling condition

Rationale: How it enables

Prices that reflect true costs ofgoods and services

When the price of an unsustainable good or service does notreflect its true social cost, it ismore likely to be used to excess,leading to overexploitation ofnatural resources, inefficiency
and waste. Prices that reflect
true costs can make green
opportunities relatively more
attractive for businesses andinvestors alike.

Measures that can create theenabling condition

Sectors in which these measures are
particularly important

Reform of harmful subsidies→

Agriculture, Fisheries, Forests, Manufacturing,
Renewable Energy, Water

Environmentally related taxation, othertax instruments, certificate trading
markets, fees and charges→

Agriculture, Buildings, Cities, Fisheries, Forests,
Manufacturing, Renewable Energy, Transport,
Waste, Water

Payments for ecosystem services→

Agriculture, Forests

Public works programmes; policy
structure similar to green subsidies (e.g.
PFIs, PPPs, low-interest loans, feed-in
tariffs, etc.)→

Agriculture, Cities, Fisheries, Renewable Energy→

Agriculture, Fisheries, Tourism, Transport, Waste

Retraining and support schemes forworkers using new techniques orchanging employment to new sectors(e.g. workshops, secondary and tertiary
education)→

Agriculture, Cities, Fisheries, Manufacturing,­Tourism, Transport, Waste

Support to encourage the take-up of
new technology→

Renewable Energy, Transport

Local, national, regional and international knowledge-sharing and skills
workshops, participatory learning→

Agriculture, Tourism, Waste

Infrastructure

Existence of key green infrastructure

Some sectors require specificpieces of infrastructure thatare a prerequisite for further
investment, e.g. electricity
grids able to handle large fluctuations in supply, telecommunications services that provide
farming data.

Information
Increased data and analysis
about ecological conditions

A workforce equipped with theskills needed to take advantage
of green opportunities

Policy must be informed by accurate information, and in mostcases data collection needs tobe improved.

As many of the innovations ingreen sectors require particularskills and knowledge, theworkforce will need to adapt
to take advantage of newopportunities.

See Modelling chapter for information
about measurement indicators

Increased awareness aboutsustainability challenges

Increased awareness of sustainability challenges will increase
popular demand for green
goods and services, and forpolicies that support them.

Educational initiatives, e.g. a government vision for the green economy,
information campaigns, material instate education→

Agriculture, Buildings, Fisheries, Forests, Tourism,
Transport, Waste

Increased information aboutlife-cycle costs of goods andservices

Increased information about
the life-cycle costs of goods
and services helps consumers
choose which products theywould prefer to buy and canincrease the market share ofgreen good and services.

Label and certification schemes, green
audits, or legal requirements fordisclosure, designed to be affordable
and verifiable→

Agriculture, Buildings, Forests, Manufacturing,
Tourism, Waste

577

Towards a green economy

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Finance

Supporting the transition to a global green economy

Towards a green economy

Acknowledgements
Principal Author: Paul Clements-Hunt, Head, UNEP FinanceInitiative
The chapter was developed by a task force under the directionof Paul Clements-Hunt. Marenglen Gjonaj (Programme Officer –UNEP FI) managed the chapter, including the handling of peer
reviews, conducting supplementary research and bringing thechapter to final production. Sheng Fulai conducted editing onan earlier draft of the chapter. During the development of thechapter, invaluable advice was received from UNEP FI Advisory
Council on Green Economy consisting of Barbara Krumsiek(President, CEO and Chair of Calvert Group, Ltd. Director andChair of Acacia Life Insurance Company); Matthew J. Kiernan(Inflection Point Capital Management); Richard Burrett (Partner,
Earth Capital Partners LLP); Jonathan Maxwell (CEO, Sustainable
Development Capital Partners LLP); Paul Hilton (Director of
Sustainable Investment Business Strategy, Calvert Investments);
Raj Singh (Chief Risk Officer, Swiss Reinsurance Company);
Andreas Spiegel (Vice President , Risk Management, Swiss
Reinsurance Company); Sergio Rosa (President, PREVI); Rafael
Castro (Strategic Planning Manager, PREVI; Masahiro Kato (Headof SRI, Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation); Thomas
Loster (Chair, Munich Re Foundation)
The chapter also benefited from advice and specific inputs
received from Remco Fischer (Programme Officer – Climatechange); Paul McNamara (Director: Head of Research, PRUPIM);

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011584

Butch Bacani (Programme Officer – Investment /Insurance);
Valborg Lie (Special Adviser, Norwegian Government PensionFund); Ivo Mulder (Programme Officer – Biodiversity / Water& Finance); Derek Eaton (Economic Affairs Officer, UNEP
Economics & Trade Branch); Dan Siddy (Director, Delsus Limited);
Andrew Dlugolecki (Andlug Consulting); Cornis Van Der Lugt
(Coordinator: Resource Efficiency,UNEP); Blaise Debordes (Headof Department for Sustainable Development, Caisse des Dépôts
et Consignations); Murray Ward (Principal, Global Climate Change
Consultancy); Anton van Elteren (FMO); Marijn Wiersma (FMO)
We would like to thank the many colleagues and individuals
who provided contribution to this chapter and reviewed earlier
drafts including, Eric Usher (UNEP); Angelo Calvello (Journalof Environmental Investing); Herman Mulder (Independent
advisor and Advisory Board TEEB a.o.); Takeyiro Sueyoshi(Special Advisor to FI in Asia-Pacific region); Nick Robins (Head,HSBC Climate Change Centre) Paul Watchman (Chief Executive,
Quayle Watchman Consulting); Steve Waygood (Head of
Sustainability research and Engagement SRI, Aviva Investors);
Paul Watchman (Chief Executive, Quayle Watchman Consulting);
Julie Fox Gorte (Senior Vice President: Sustainable Investing,
PaxWorld Management LLC); Mark Eckstein (Managing Director,
International Finance, WWF); Michele Chan (Economic Policy
Project Director, Friends of the Earth); Gerhard Coetzee (HeadMicroenterprise Finance Unit, Absa); and Miroslaw Izienicki(President & CEO, Fifth Capital Group).

Finance

Contents
List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587
Key messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588
1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590

1.1

Scope of this chapter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590

2The state of play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591

2.1

The scale of the challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591

3Emerging investment in the green economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595

3.1
3.2

From crisis to opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
New markets and instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595

4

Opportunities and challenges in financing the green economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6

Addressing the full cost of externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604
Providing pre-investment finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605
Integrating ESG risks into financial and investment decision making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606
Expanding green insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608
Creating public-private mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613
Scaling up microfinance for a green economy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 613

5Greening global finance and investment: enabling conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 614

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4

Setting policy and regulatory frameworks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 614
Enhanced environmental and social disclosure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 614
Supporting institutions and facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615
Fiscal policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620

6Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 622

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 624

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List of figures
Figure 1: Investment in sustainable energy, 2004 2009 US$ billion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
Figure 2: Global carbon market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601
Figure 3: Agricultural marginal abatement cost curve (MACC), optimistic case (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603
Figure 4: Private financing mechanisms to address financing gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607
Figure 5: Development and investment phases of renewable energy technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607

List of tables
Table 1: Annual green economy investment by sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592
Table 2: Selected indicators of the global market size by sector and the share committed tosustainability, 2008-2009 (banking, investment and insurance sectors) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
Table 3: ESG integration for internally actively managed AUM (assets under management)1 relative
to total investment market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
Table 4: Market potential for various BES asset classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 598
Table 5: Recent green bond issues by the World Bank Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
Table 6: World Insurance in 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 610

List of boxes
Box 1: Copenhagen fast track financing – a status update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597
Box 2: Overview of REDD+  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
Box 3: Building an insurance market for forest carbon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
Box 4: Green Investment Bank, UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601
Box 5: Financial materiality and fiduciary responsibility (KfW Symposium 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605
Box 6: The universal owner theory explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606
Box 7: Banking risks around climate change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608
Box 8: Insuring against the worst for the best  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 610
Box 9: Mobilising private investment into sustainable energy in India  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 611
Box 10: Microfinance, environmental and social risk management and sustainable opportunities . . . . . . 612
Box 11: Greening the finance sector in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615
Box 12: Caisse des Dépôts and its long-term investment model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 618
Box 13: The Global Environment Facility (GEF)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619
Box 14: Norwegian Pension Fund Global . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620

586

Finance

List of acronyms
A/R
ADB
AUM
BAU
BCBS
BES
BIS
CCX
CDM
CERC
COP
DFI
EBRD
EIB
ESG
EU ETS
FDI
FMO
FSB
G20
GEF
GDP
GHG
GIB
GRI
IEA
IFC
IFLS
IIRC
IMF
IPCC
KfW
KP
MDGs

Afforestation and Reforestation
Asian Development Bank
Assets under management
Business-as-usual
The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision
Biodiversity and Ecosystem
The Bank for International Settlement
Chicago Climate Exchange
Clean Development Mechanisms
Search Results Central Electricity
Regulatory Commission
Conference of Parties
Development Finance Institutions
European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development
European Investment Bank
Environmental, Social andGovernance
EU Emissions Trading System
Foreign Direct Investment
The Netherlands Development
Finance Company
Financial Stability Board
Group of Twenty
Global Environment Facility
Gross Domestic ProductGreenhouse gas
Green Investment Bank
Global Reporting Initiative
International Energy Agency
International Finance Corporation
International Financial Services
LondonInternational Integrated Reporting
Committee
International Monetary FundIntergovernmental Panel on Climate
ChangeGerman Development Bank
Kyoto Protocol
Millennium Development Goals

MFIs
NAMAs
ODA
OECD
PE
PFMs
PRI
R&D
REDD
REN21
RICS
SWFs
TEEB
UNDP
UNEP FI
UNEP SBCISEFIUNFCCCUOTUS SEC
VC
WBCSD
WEF
WFE
WRI
WWF

Microfinance Institutions
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
Measures
Official Development Assistance
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Private equity
Public Financing Mechanism
United Nations-backed Principles for
Responsible Investment
Research and Development
Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation
Renewable Energy Policy Network forthe 21st Century
The Royal Institution of Chartered
Surveyors
Sovereign wealth funds
The Economics of Ecosystems andBiodiversity
United Nations Development
Programme
United Nations Environment
Programme Finance Initiative
United Nations Environment
Programme Sustainable Buildings
and Climate Initiative UNEP
United Nations Environment
Programme Sustainable Energy
Finance Initiative
United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
Universal Ownership Theory
U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission
Venture capital
The World Business Council for
Sustainable Development
World Economic Forum
World Federation of Exchanges
World Resource InstituteWorld Wide Fund for Nature587

Towards a green economy

Key messages
1. A global green economy transformation will require substantial financial resources.
Indicative figures such as those from the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) scenarios for halving
worldwide energy-related CO2 emissions by 2050 and on modelling, in this report, show additional
investments required will likely be in the range of 1 to 2.5 per cent of global Gross Domestic Product(GDP) per year from 2010 to 2050. A considerable amount of investment will be needed in energy
supply and efficiency, particularly in greening the transport and buildings sectors.
2. Financial investment, banking and insurance are the major channels of private financing
for a green economy. The financial services and investment sectors control trillions of dollars
that could potentially be directed towards a green economy. More importantly, long-term public
and private institutional investors, banks and insurance companies are increasingly interested inacquiring portfolios that minimise environmental, social and governance risks, while capitalising on
emerging green technologies. Microfinance has a potentially important role at the community andvillage level to enable the poor to invest in resource and energy efficiency as well as increase theirresiliency to risk.
3. Opportunities exist to meet the financing needs of a green economy. The rapid growth andincreasingly green orientation of capital markets, the evolution of emerging market instruments
such as carbon finance and microfinance, and the green stimulus funds established in responseto the economic slowdown of recent years, are opening up space for large-scale financing for a
global green economic transformation. But these flows are still small compared to investment
needs and must be scaled up quickly if the transition to a green economy is to jump-start in thenear term. Concentrated pools of assets, such as those controlled by pension systems and insurancecompanies, the US$ 39 trillion-plus controlled by the high net worth community and the growing
assets of sovereign wealth funds will need to support the green economy in coming decades.
4. Advances in disclosure and sustainability reporting are increasing transparency anddriving change. In 2009, the global market size for institutional assets was estimated at just over
US$ 121 trillion. Of the actively managed components of these assets, controlled by a broad range oflarge institutional investors, some 7 per cent was subject to the integration of environmental, social

588

Finance

and governance (ESG) considerations. Considering the environmental costs attributable to businessand human activity – estimated at more than US$ 6 trillion in 2008 – much more transparency isneeded. Scaling up resources for investment adhering to ESG principles is urgent and will requireinnovation and leadership by business and industry, collective action and public-private approaches
as well as supportive regulatory frameworks.

5. The role of the public sector is indispensable in freeing up the flow of private financetowards a green economy. Governments should involve the private sector in establishing clear,stable and coherent policy and regulatory frameworks to facilitate the integration of ESG issues into
financial and investment decisions. In addition, governments and multilateral financial institutions
should use their own resources to leverage financial flows from the private sector and direct them
towards green economic opportunities.
6. Public finance is important for triggering a green economic transformation, even if publicresources are significantly smaller than those of private markets. The role of public development
finance institutions (DFIs) in developed and developing countries in supporting the transition to agreen economy could be strengthened further. Development Finance Institutions can adopt thegoal of supporting development of the green economy, allocate significant proportions of their
new lending towards financing green economy transition projects and link it to specific targets
such as reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, access to water and sanitation, biodiversity
promotion and poverty alleviation. Policies can be designed to improve the “green efficiency” oftheir portfolios, for example, by examining the carbon and ecological footprints of their investment
portfolios. In addition, DFIs can jointly define protocols for green due diligence, as well as standards
and goals for sectors in which they have a major influence, such as transport, energy and municipal
finance.

589

Towards a green economy

1 Introduction
1.1 Scope of this chapter
The earlier chapters of this report have highlighted
how the successful emergence of a green economy iscritically dependent on new approaches to finance andinvestment. Innovation is needed to consistently deliver
dramatically higher volumes of annual investment in
key segments of the green economy market. The vast
majority of this investment will need to come fromthe private financial sector, supported by the enabling
actions of farsighted policy makers, as well as thecatalytic role of development finance institutions (DFIs)
and supranational bodies such as the United Nations.
The quality of this investment – such as tenor and risk/
return requirements – is arguably just as important as
the quantity. As a result, many other interrelated issues
need to be considered. For example, partnership isneeded to support pre-investment market development
and formulate cost-effective policy-based incentives
that facilitate private sector investment in the green
economy. International accounting practices need to
evolve to incorporate environmental externalities. New

590

instruments need to be developed for risk-sharing andfinancial intermediation. These new instruments could
enable more private investors – ranging from individual
savers to large pension funds representing thousands ofpeople – to participate in financing the transition to agreen economy.
This chapter examines how the green economy iscurrently being financed and explores the priorities andpotential methods for increasing this investment. The
chapter seeks to make the case for scaling up financing
available for the transition to a green economy andamplifying the financial sector’s role as an agent ofchange.
The analysis emphasises investing, lending by banks, andinsuring - focused primarily on private sector sources offinance. In addition, reference is made to the enablingand complementary role of governments, DFIs and othernon-private sector entities. There is already significant
momentum in this field, but greater challenges lie
ahead. This chapter also examines the main challenges,
opportunities and key enabling conditions for progress.

Finance

2 The state of play
2.1 The scale of the challenge
Estimated investment needs up to 2050
There is no complete estimate yet of resources needed tomake the transition to a green economy. One indicationof green investment gaps for low-carbon energy supply
and energy efficiency at the global level is provided by
the IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2010, based on
CO2 emission reduction targets. This high-end estimate
does not include other aspects such as resource efficiency
across sectors. The IEA BLUE Map scenario aims to halve
worldwide energy-related CO2 emissions by 2050.
Investments required from 2010 to 2050 in this scenario
are US$ 46 trillion higher – an increase of 17 per cent – thanwhat is required in the Baseline scenario. This corresponds
to approximately US$ 750 billion per year up to 2030 and
US$ 1.6 trillion per year from 2030 to 2050 (IEA 2010).
Additional investment needs under the BLUE Map scenario– which increases projected global investment needs to
US$ 316 trillion by 2050 – are dominated by the transport
sector, which take up 50 per cent of total additional
investments, particularly in the area of alternative vehicle
technologies. The buildings sector absorbs 26 per cent of
the additional investment, energy supply 20 per cent andindustry 4 per cent. These indicative amounts correspond,on average, to the scenarios modelled for the Green
Economy Report, which analysed investments averaging
US$ 1.35 trillion per year over 2010 to 2050, across a rangeof sectors – not just those related to greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions.
Alternatively, an earlier IEA study estimated (IEA 2009)that over the next 30 thirty years, US$ 1 trillion annuallyis required to enable the world’s energy infrastructure to
maintain and extend the supply of power to more people(US$ 500 billion) and to finance the transition to a low
carbon, cleaner energy infrastructure (a further US$ 500
billion). The projected annual shortfall to drive this lowcarbon transition in developing economies alone is US$
350 billion. While relying heavily on an industrial approachto reducing carbon emissions, the IEA estimates can beconsidered as a high-end estimate of annual investment
needs and correspond to a range of 1 to 2 per cent of
global GDP.
Estimates by the private financial sector also underline thescale of the challenge. The World Economic Forum (WEF
2010a) and Bloomberg New Energy Finance calculatethat clean energy investment must rise to US$ 500 billion

per year by 2020 to restrict global warming to 2oC. HSBC
estimates the transition to a low carbon economy will see
a total growth in cumulative capital investments of US$ 10
trillion between 2010 to 2020 (HSBC 2010).
Furthermore,theconceptof “additionality” isfundamentally important. In the context of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC);
additionality refers to an effort that is supplemental tothe business-as-usual (BAU) scenario in at least two areas:
the additionality of financial contributions of developed
countries beyond BAU official development assistance(ODA) to assist climate change adaptation in developing
countries; and the additionality of investment to reduce
GHG beyond BAU. Additionality of financial resources
to the widely agreed target for ODA of 0.7 per cent ofdeveloped country gross domestic product (GDP) isthe contribution that developing countries seek fromdeveloped nations as a key element of a global resolutionof climate change problems in the context of the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol (KP) (UNFCCC 1998). Despite adecade of attempts to define additionality, the concept
continues to be poorly understood and its application
contested. However, additionality is likely to continue tobe an important criterion for climate finance beyond 2012.
Breakdown by sector
Given the pioneering and cross-cutting nature ofresearch on greening the economy, the quantificationof the demand for finance and investment to support a
global green economy for each major economic sector isa work in progress. However, the data in Table 1, drawn
from information in the sectoral chapters of this Green
Economy Report (GER), give a broad range of estimatedannual investments required to make this transition.
The spread of targets illustrates the need for common
metrics for finance and investment in this arena, toallow proper comparisons. (See disclosure requirements
discussed in Section 5 of this chapter, Greening Global
Finance & Investment: Enabling Conditions.)
Based on a range of specific sectoral policy targets,
the Green Economy Report modelling allocates
investments totalling 2 per cent of global GDP acrossthe range of given sectors, with the heaviest emphasisin transforming key sectors such as buildings, transport,
and energy. These investment allocations are largely
consistent with assessments taken from other sources,
such as IEA and estimates associated with achieving the
MDGs. The estimated annual investment for all sectors

591

Towards a green economy

SectorGreen Economy
Report investment
allocation 2011
(US$ bn/yr.,see Note 1)

Agriculture

108

Target: increase and maintain nutrition levels to 2800 to 3000 Kcal/person by 2030

Buildings

134

Target: increase energy efficiency to reach energy consumption and emissions targets set in IEA’s BLUE
Map scenario

Investment
assessment(US$ bn/yr.,see Note 1)

308
Energy (supply)

Fisheries

IEA ETP 2010 BLUE Map scenario, Additional (see Notes 3 and 4).
Target: increase penetration of renewables in power generation and primary energy consumption to atleast reach targets set in IEA’s BLUE Map scenario

362
233

IEA ETP 2010 BLUE Map scenario, additional (see Notes 3 and 4).

500

World Economic Forum (2010a) estimate of annual spending on clean energy necessary by 2020 torestrict the increase in global average temperatures to 2°C

611

European Renewable Energy Council and Greenpeace Energy [R]evolution (2010) Advanced Revolution
scenario estimate of average global investment in renewable energy to 2007 to 2030 (see Note 5).

460 – 1,500

HSBC (2010) estimate of total investments in low carbon energy generation (supply) and energy efficiency and management (demand), required to build a low-carbon energy market by 2020 (see Note 6).
Achieve maximum sustainable yield by an aggregate world cut in fishing effort of 50 per cent by decommission of vessels, reallocation of labour force, and fisheries management.

108
90 - 280

Forestry

Details

Same (from Global Economy Report fisheries chapter analysis).
Target: 50 per cent reduction in deforestation by 2030 as well as increased planted forests to sustain
forestry production.

15
37

Effective management of the existing network of protected forests and 15 per cent of land area in eachregion (Balmford et al. 2002) – adjusted for inflation.

2 - 30

REDD+ (more an assessment of potential flow of funds).
Target: increase energy efficiency to reach energy consumption and emissions targets set in IEA’s BLUE
Map scenario.

Industry

76

Tourism

134

Transport

194

Waste

108

Target: reduce the amount of waste going to landfills by at least 70 per cent .

Water

108

Target: Meet Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to halve the number of people without access towater and sanitation by 2015, plus reduce water intensity (without quantitative target).

50 - 63

Target: increase energy efficiency to reach energy consumption and emissions targets set in IEA’s BLUE
Map scenario, and expand public transport.
325

Total

1,347

IEA ETP 2010 BLUE Map scenario, additional (see Notes 3 and 4).

IEA ETP 2010 BLUE Map scenario, Additional (see Notes 3 and 4).

18

Meet MDG to halve the number of people without access to water and sanitation by 2015 (Hutton and
Bartram 2008).

50

Meet world’s water needs (2030 Water Resources Group, McKinsey).

1,053 – 2,593(See Note 2).

Notes to Table 1:
1. All amounts are annual investment figures; Green Economy Report investment allocation in 2010 dollars; IEA investment needs are in 2007 dollars (difference should be considered negligible relative to imprecision of estimates). The GER investment portfolio allocates investments totalling 2 per cent of global GDP across the range of given sectors, with a number of specific sectoral targets, which are describedin the details column. These will rise over the period 2011 to 2050 as economic growth proceeds to reach US$ 3.9 trillion in 2050 (in constant 2010 dollars). Investment needs are assessments generally takenfrom other sources, but many of which have influenced the allocation of the Green Economy Report investment portfolio, especially IEA.
2. For the investment assessment under the right-hand column, the range of total investments corresponds to the sums of low and high estimates per sector.
3. Most IEA figures are simple averages of estimated total investment over 2010 to 2050; however, it appears that lower investments are projected for earlier years, and higher figures for later years.
4. The figures for IEA Energy Technology Perspectives (2010) BLUE Map Scenario represent only the additional investment, totalling an average of US$ 1.15 trillion per year, and do not include the projected
investments for the reference scenario, which involves investments to meet increased energy demand through a continuation of existing investment trends.
5. The European Renewable Energy Council and Greenpeace’s Advanced [R]evolution scenario have a key target for the reduction of CO2 emissions down to a level of around 10 gigatonnes per year by 2050,
and a second objective of phasing out of nuclear energy. The [R]evolution scenario has similar target, but assumes a technical lifetime of forty40 years for coal-fired power plants, instead of 20 years; theestimated average global investment needed for this scenario is US$ 450 billion (European Renewable Energy Council and Greenpeace 2010).
6. These estimates are for HSBC’s Conviction scenario, which projects “the most likely pathway to 2020”, which sees the EU meeting renewable but not energy efficiency targets, limited growth in clean energy
in the USA, and China exceeding current clean energy targets. This scenario does not correspond to any specific climate policy target. In addition to the supply of low carbon energy, this estimate also includes
energy efficiency investments that would be undertaken in transport, buildings and industry sectors. In terms of the breakdown, HSBC estimates that US$ 2.9 trillion will be required between 2010 and 2020
in total for low carbon energy supply and US$ 6.9 trillion for energy efficiency and management.

Table 1: Annual green economy investment by sector592

Finance

Total assets ofinternational banking (2009)/
Global bank assets (2008)

Total assets under management in 2009 Premium volume(covering public equities, real estate,(2008)
bonds, asset-backed securities, etc.)

Global market size

Approx. US$ 34 trillion (BIS) / approx.
US$ 97.4 trillion (IMF, BIS, etc.)

Approx. US$ 80 trillion (IFLS Research)

Approx. US$ 4.3 trillion (Swiss Re,
IFLS Research)

Share committed to sustainability

Approx. US$ 50 trillion of bank assets
signed commitment to sustainability

Approx. US$ 25 trillion of assets signed to
PRI (UNEP FI/PRI)In excess of US$ 500 billion of insurance premium volume committed tosustainability

Notes to Table 2:
1. The figures in this table are indicative and should be interpreted with caution due to existence of other industry collaboration initiatives that provide frameworks for commitment to sustainability. Therefore, the share of respective global markets committed to sustainability could be higher.
2. Financial institution types covered in the asset management classification in this table include pension funds, insurance funds, mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, private equity and hedge funds.
3. Shares committed to sustainability are rough estimates and provide an indication of financial institutions engagement to sustainability (e.g. commitment to statement and principles of UNEP FI/PRI).
4. Total assets of banks committed to sustainability given in this table also include assets held by banks via various investment instruments and in a few cases include insurance instruments.

Table 2: Selected indicators of the global market size by sector and the share committed to sustainability,
2008-2009 (banking, investment and insurance sectors)
Sources: The Bank for International Settlement (Securities statistics and syndicated loans 2007-2009), IMF (Global Financial Stability Report 2009), TheCityUK, Swiss Re, UNEP FI and PRI

2008 AUM figures in US$ billions

Total signatoryinternally active
AUM

Internally active assets
subject to integration via
PRI signatories

Share of signatoryinternally active AUM
subject to integration

Market size

Share of total market
subject to integration by
PRI signatories*

Listed equity (developed markets)

2,264

1,337

59%

27,107a5%

Listed equity (emerging markets)

308

185

60%

a

5,313

4%

Fixed income-sovereign

3,430

690

20%

b

24,596

3%

Fixed income-corporate issuers

1,978

883

45%

6,380

14%

Private equity

232

105

45%

2,492

6%

Listed real estate or property

289

74

26%

694d

14%

Non-listed real estate or property

303

239

79%

10,915e3%

Hedge funds

210

25

12%

1,500

2%

Infrastructure

67

39

59%

f

19,900

0.2%

9,081

3,578

39%

98,897

4%2009 AUM figures in US$ billions

Total signatoryinternally active
AUM

Internally active assets
subject to integration via
PRI signatories

Share of signatoryinternally active AUM
subject to integration

Market size

Share of total market
subject to integration by
PRI signatories*

Listed equity (developed markets)

3,674

2,525

69%

37,500a8%

Listed equity(emerging markets)

700

478

68%

9,589

6%

Fixed income-sovereign

5,253

1,579

Fixed income-corporate issuers

2,437

1,373

Private equity

201

Listed real estate or property

Total

b

a

30%

b

30,232

6%

56%

7,329c

22%

122

61%

2,337

9%

297

172

58%

d

678

34%

Non-listed real estate or property

497

418

84%

10,256

5%

Hedge funds

188

36

19%

1,700

5%

Infrastructure

71

63

89%

21,600f

0.4%

13,3176,766

51%

121,220

7%Total

a. Split developed and emerging markets by MSCI country membership. Deduct listed real estate by market capitalisation weighting. b. Sovereign plus quasi-sovereign. c. Corporate plus high yield but­excluding asset backed. d. Figures for public equity. e. Figures for private debt, public debt and private equity. f. Estimated total stock of infrastructure assets in public ownership.
* This per cent conservatively underestimates the findings of the survey. In fact, the numerator does not include the externally managed funds, to avoid some double counting. Moreover, the market size inthe denominator includes passive managed funds, which instead are not measured in the numerator as not necessarily subject to Principle 1.

Table 3: ESG integration for internally actively managed AUM (assets under management)1 relative tototal investment market
Source: Principles for Responsible Investment (2010)

1. Assets Under Management (AUM) - market value of assets that an investment company manages.

593

Towards a green economy
for the period 2011 to 2050 based on the 2 per cent of
GDP green economy scenario is nearly US$ 1.35 trillion
on average. For the nine sectors covered, excluding
fisheries, the estimate for the lower range for annual
investment 2011 to 2050 is almost US$ 1.2 trillion per
year. This estimate rises to over US$ 3.4 trillion per year,
a high-end estimate that applies to later decades, when
global GDP is presumably much higher.
The table clearly demonstrates very significant overall
investment needs to transition the green economy aswell as the considerable range for some key sectors, suchas energy, to move towards a more sustainable basis
for economic growth. It shows in particular the large
volumes of resources required to expand and transformthe inventory of built capital, in the form of energy supply,
public transport, and energy and resource-efficientbuildings. The table also shows the resources required tochange to a sustainable way of managing natural capital
assets such as forests, fisheries and agricultural lands.
It is estimated that more than 80 per cent of the capitalneeded to address climate change issues in future
decades will come from the private sector (Parry et al.
2009), highlighting the significant role of the private
sector in the transition to a green economy. The message
for both policy makers and the financial services sector
is clear: to achieve this transition by 2050, substantial
financial resources, including public, private, hybrid andnew blended approaches, will have to be mobilised. In
addition, private resources and capital markets will haveto play an instrumental role in providing the required
finance and investment. This will require appropriate
regulatory frameworks comprising a rich policy mix
to stimulate demand for these funds, together withtargeted flanking policies to protect households below
the poverty line from possible unintended consequenceson the costs of basic goods and services.
Tracking new trends in finance and investment flows
The roles of lending, investment, insurance andpublic finance all remain critical in greening different
economic sectors and establishing more resource
efficient societies. While global ODA often processed bygovernment-owned agencies dropped (United Nations2008) DFIs was estimated to be around US$ 108 billion
in 2010. website), annual private finance goes into the594

trillions (TheCityUK 2011). The critical role for publicfinance lies in being a catalyst, early stage investment
provider, co-sharer of risk and guarantor of public
infrastructure and services. As far as private finance isconcerned, the relative size of lending, investment andinsurance as well as their commitment to sustainability
is provided in Table 2.
The tracking and precise quantification of financial andinvestment flows to greening and social responsibility,
across asset classes, geographies and sources (public,
private, public-private, and hybrid) is a work in progress.
Some asset classes, notably cleaner energy technologies,
already have sophisticated and globally recognised
methods in place to accurately capture annual global
flows. These are highlighted later in this chapter. The
following section provides a snapshot of how investment
capital from the world’s largest institutional investors
is starting to flow to the green economy, but is notcomprehensive in its coverage given the information,
data, and methodological challenges for what, in manycases, are nascent green economy-related asset classes.
At the global level, the quantification of how ESG
considerations are integrated into various asset classes;
for example, listed equity (developed and developing
markets), fixed income (sovereign), fixed income(corporate), private equity, real estate and property (listed
and non-listed), hedge funds and infrastructure, only
commenced systematically in 2008, thanks to the United
Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment(PRI) . In 2009, it was estimated that the global market sizefor overall actively and passively managed assets2 wasjust over US$ 121 trillion, up from nearly US$ 99 trillion
in 2008 (PRI 2010). Of these assets, controlled by a broad
range of large institutional investors (such as pension
funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies,
and foundations), the internally actively managed
component of the investable universe, some 4 per cent
(US$ 3.578 trillion) in 2008, rising to 7 per cent (US$6.766 trillion) in 2009, were subject to integration of ESG
considerations (see Table 3 for a complete breakdown)
2. Active management of assets refers to a strategy where a portfolio
manager makes specific investments with the aim to outperform an
investment benchmark index. Passive management refers to a strategy
where a portfolio manager makes investments in line with a pre-determined
investment strategy.

Finance

3 Emerging investmentin the green economy
3.1 From crisis to opportunity
In recent years, a broad range of financial developments
have emerged that support the transition to a green
economy. Despite the turbulence in world markets andthe lack of an international regulatory framework to
direct finance towards a green economy, capital markets
have continued to evolve in ways that can help foster agreen transition. Some examples include:■■ The arrival of cleaner energy technologies as new
asset class and the four-fold increase in new investment
in sustainable energy from US$ 46 billion in 2004 to US$
162 billion annually by 2009 (UNEP SEFI 2010);■■ The creation of carbon markets where the value ofannual trading volumes rose to US$ 122 billion by;■■ 2009. Studies estimate that emissions were reduced
by around 120m to 300m tonnes in the first three yearsof the European Union Emissions Trading System (Pew
Center on Global Climate Change 2008); and■■ The possibility of new markets associated with more
effective management of natural resources, the provisionof integrated urban environmental infrastructure andlow carbon transport systems for cities, as well as low
carbon industrial, commercial and residential property.
As indicated in the previous section, private capitalsources are estimated to supply more than 80 per centof the investment required for the transition to a low
carbon economy. Access to capital and the magnitudeof the necessary investment remains significant.
The ability of public and private finance to interact
within stable and resilient capital markets will be a key
determinant if capital is to be provided at a sufficientscale to finance the transition to a green economy in atimely manner. Given the significant role that private
capital sources are expected to play in the transition toa low-carbon economy, the smart deployment of publicfunds supported by a coherent policy framework will
have a pivotal role in catalysing and leveraging greater
private investment in a green economy. In the post-crisis
government stimulus packages, some US$ 470 billion
out of US$ 3 trillion-plus in public funds committed(HSBC 2009) to head off a severe global depression

was earmarked for low-carbon and environmental
infrastructure investments.
Together with these recent developments, the role ofmultilateral financial institutions (MFIs), such as theWorld Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC),
and the thirty-plus regional MFIs, national developmentbanks, as well as export credit and investment guarantee
agencies, will be critical in fostering new and emerging
niches in financial markets as private finance andinvestment adjust to and gain confidence in evolving
green economy policy frameworks. Importantly, toarchive best environmental and social outcomes,
incentives should be designed and used in areas withthe greatest potential for reducing GHG emissions alongwith job creation and other green economy objectives. .

3.2 New markets and instruments
Renewable energy
The renewable energy sector is by far the largest
destination for green investment in the GER scenarios.
Financial markets have already been mobilising
substantial amounts. A total of around US$ 557 billionof capital was deployed to the renewable energy market
between 2007 and mid-2010 (UNEP SEFI 2010). This
market has seen a four-fold increase in new investment
from US$ 46 billion in 2004 to US$ 162 billion annually in2009 (see Figure 1). The US$ 30 billion fast track financing
pledged at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen (COP 15) has also focused
greater business and investor interest in this market (seeBox 1). Furthermore, analysts expect financial flows tothis market to increase considerably in coming years. One
recent study indicates that the low-carbon energy market
size will reach US$ 2.2 trillion by 2020 (HSBC 2010).
Institutional investors, despite being considered risk
averse and conservative, provided some 65 per centof the finance for renewable energy in 2008 to 2009,
contributing US$ 192 billion out of a total of US$ 294
billion. The remainder was spread among venture capital(VC)/private equity (PE), and research and development(R&D) sources, with some public stimulus money in2009, offsetting a decline in VC/ PE funds (UNEP SEFI2010). Notably, the Cleantech Group predicted that 2010595

Towards a green economy

US$ billion

Growth:

56%

52%

44%

10%

Overcoming these barriers will require a more supportiveand stable policy and regulatory framework (UNEP FI
2004).

-7%

200

173
162

157
150

109
100

72
50

46

0
2004

2005

2006

Third party investment

2007

2008

2009

SDC, corp RD&D, gov R&D

Figure 1: Investment in sustainable energy, 20042009 US$ billion
Source: UNEP SEFI (2010)

would end up as the second largest year on record for VC
investment in clean technology with a full year total of
about US$ 7.3 billion, less than the US$ 8.5 billion raisedin 2008, but well ahead of the US$ 5.7 billion raised in2009 (Cleantech Group and Deloitte 2010). The increase
in VC and PE investments in renewables will likely havea multiplier effect over time by sending signals of steadysectoral growth to other capital sources.
However, the obstacles remain considerable to scaling up
investment in this sector to the levels required for a global
green economy. Currently, renewables supply less than
5 per cent of the primary energy for power generation
globally. The barriers to increasing this figure are financial
and economic and include:■■ Higher upfront costs, capital-intensive nature of
projects and the use of subsidies for conventionalenergy;■■ Political and regulatory; generally, policies do notfavour renewable technologies;■■ Environmental and social; for example, planningobjections;■■ Technical; for example, the intermittent nature of
renewable technologies, and;■■ The scale of the projects, mainly higher transaction
costs.

596

A recent report by the World Economic Forum (WEF) andBloomberg New Energy Finance estimated that moving
to a low-carbon energy infrastructure and restricting
projected global warming to below 2°C will require
global investment in clean energy of approximately
US$ 500 billion per year by 2020 (WEF 2010a). HSBC
similarly concluded that building the low-carbon energy
market would require total capital investments of US$
10 trillion between 2010 to 2020 (HSBC 2010). However,public and private investment in clean energy in 2009
was far below needed levels. Furthermore, given the
expected geographic shift of the global economy, as
much as US$ 400 billion of climate change mitigation,
including investment into energy, will have to flow tothe developing and emerging world (World Bank 2010a).
Emergence of green property as an asset class
Property investments have a considerable influence
on both financial markets and carbon emissions. The
outlook for green property investment is encouraging.
The estimated significant growth in ESG integrationlevels in listed real estate and property from 26 to 58
per cent (see Table 3), the successful launching andclosing of over 18 “improver” property funds from 2006
to 2010 financing the energy efficiency retrofitting ofcommercial buildings (Preqin 2004-2010), numerous
green property development funds, and the increasing
preference of occupants for green offices and residences
are key indicators of green property becoming an
emerging and increasingly attractive asset class.
The built environment, through its construction anduse accounts for 40 per cent of both global energy
use and carbon dioxide emissions. It is responsible for30 per cent of raw materials usage and 20 per cent ofwater usage (UNEP SBCI 2007). Buildings have also been
identified as the greatest potential source of carbon
mitigation at lowest cost (IPCC 2007). Many actions thatinvestors and occupiers of property can take to reduceoverall environmental and social impacts, including
improving the environmental efficiency and social
utility of investable properties (UNEP FI PWG 2011b), are low cost, estimated to be worth around US$ 12
trillion globally, (DTZ Research MiP 2009). Such actions
are immediately economic – a good example of ecoefficiency (Ceres 2010).
There is growing recognition of a range of economic
and financial drivers to enhance the environmental
credentials of existing buildings in rental and equity
markets. For example, a 2009 report (RICS 2009) foundan aggregate premium in rental rates for buildings witha sustainable rating of 3 per cent per square foot, orFinance
above 6 per cent adjusted for building occupancy levels.
In terms of selling prices, the report found a premiumin the order of 16 per cent. Further, empirical evidenceof such valuation differentials is growing (RICS 2009).
The business case for green property investment has
emerged strongly with a considerable effect on theoperation of the market. However, vast opportunities
remain to scale up green property investment.
It is also increasingly being argued that collectively,
ever more stringent regulations, rising energy prices
and changing occupier and investor preferences will
increasingly affect the context within which property
investment and letting decisions take place (UNEP FI
PWG 2011a). As a result, the expectation is growing that,over time, greener buildings will experience higher net
income growth through lower depreciation and lower
operational costs, and as a result, be viewed as less risky.
Enforceable regulations that drive higher environmental
standards, greater consistency between fiscal incentives

and policy objectives/targets for GHG reductions inbuildings, and the promotion of metrics systems that are
more compatible, simpler, more relevant to investors andmore capable of capture across whole portfolios will be
critical in accelerating the greening of property market.
Forestry – Reducing Emissions from Deforestation andForest Degradation (REDD+)
For the financial services and investment community,
understanding and developing prospective markets
related to biodiversity and ecosystems services (BES) is
challenging. The coverage of actual demand and theestimates of potential market value for the banking,insurance and investment community are poor. However,
several recent initiatives have begun to frame the potential
in nascent existing markets and prospective future ones.
For example, the 2008 value of the bio-carbon market
was estimated by the Ecosystem Marketplace to be at
US$ 37 million (see Table 4). This estimate includes theincreasingly important concept of REDD+ (see Box 2).

Box 1: Copenhagen fast track financing – a status update
The Copenhagen Accord notes developed countries’commitment to provide fast track financing of US$
30 billion for the 2010 to 2012 period and building to
US$ 100 billion per year by 2020.
This fast track financing will enhance action on
mitigation, including Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD),
adaptation, technology development and transfer,and capacity building. Fast track financing will
not only enhance implementation of the UNFCCC
by developing countries between now and 2012,
but also aims to help them prepare for sustained
implementation beyond 2012. It is thus often
referred to as enabling readiness for the post2012 period. It will also provide lessons for climate
financing over the longer term. The fundamental
questions regarding the issue of fast track financing
today are:■■ Commitments at the country level According to
the World Resources Institute (WRI), country pledges
today add up to roughly US$ 27.9 billion;■■ Are funds being disbursed or earmarked? Of
the total of US$ 30 billion, only approximately US$
5 billion have been committed in national budgets
and allocation plans, and only thirty-two concrete
programme activities have been earmarked to besupported by these funds. Developed countries,
therefore, still have much to do to concretise theirpledges to remain credible regarding their financing
commitments;■■ Are funds dedicated towards climate financing
new and additional? At the time of writing of thisreport, it remains unclear as to whether the funds
pledged will be entirely additional to existingcommitments in the areas of climate change
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries
or, more broadly, ODA. However, some pledged
funds will be additional. It appears that most, if not all,funding denominated as fast track financing under
the Copenhagen Accord will be counted towards
developed countries’ ODA efforts and reported assuch to the OECD’s DAC (Development AssistanceCommittee) office. Past ODA efforts by developed
countries have repeatedly been criticised for notreaching the target of 0.7 per cent of GDP, commonlyreferred to as a level of ODA commitments towards
which developed countries should aim; and■■ Will public fast track money leverage private
climate finance? Most, if not all, of the programmes
put forward as qualifying for fast track financing aim
at increasing the institutional capacity and readinessof developing countries to initiate climate change
mitigation activities, rather than at directly reducing
GHG emissions. These types of activities usually lacka commercial dimension or potential for private
participation and, as such, will not be able to attract orgenerate private climate financing.

597

Towards a green economy
BES asset classMarket value

Year

Market type

US$ 1.8 – 2.9 billion

2008

Cap-and-trade/voluntary

Voluntary over-the-counter (forestry carbon), incl. REDD+

US$ 31.5 million

2008

Private voluntary

Chicago Climate Exchange – forest carbon

US$ 5.3 million

2008

Private voluntary

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – afforestation/reforestation

US$ 0.3 million

2008

Cap-and-trade

Cosmetics, personal care, pharmaceuticals:
bio-prospecting contracts

US$ 30 million

2008

Private voluntary

The Economics of Ecosystems andBiodiversity study (TEEB) D3

Certified agricultural products, incl. Non-Timber Forest Products(TFPs)

US$ 40 billion

2008

Private voluntary

Bishop et al., 2008. Building
Biodiversity Business.

Certified forest products – Forest Stewardship Council (FSC),
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC)

US$ 5 billion (FSC certified
products)

2008

Private voluntary

TEEB D3

Payments for Watershed Services (private voluntary)

US$ 5 million (various pilots
e.g. Costa Rica, Ecuador)

Private voluntary

TEEB D3

Biodiversity mitigation/offsets

SourceEcosystem Marketplace, 2009

Bio-carbon:
Ecosystem Marketplace, 2009

Payments water-related ecosystem services (government)

US$ 5.2 billion

2008

PublicTEEB D3

Other payments for ecosystem services (government-supported)

US$ 3 billion

2008

PublicTEEB D3

Private land trusts, conservation easements (e.g. North America,
Australia)

US$ 8 billion (in the USA
alone)

2008

PublicTEEB D3

Table 4: Market potential for various BES asset classes
Source: UNEP FI BES (2010)

REDD+ and related initiatives, such as new insurance
products related to forest carbon, (see Box 3) demonstrate
an increased understanding of the potential market scale
for financial services and the policy steps needed tofacilitate development of such markets. Appropriate, clear
and consistent global and national policy frameworks willbe critical if the BES market is to be developed at scale.
For many mainstream insurers, insurance premiums for
managed forests barely reach the scale to classify it asa market per se. However, given the right global policy
choices within climate negotiations in the coming years,
the carbon market in forests could reach US$ 90 billion by2020 (CDC Mission Climat 2008).
Green bonds
The green bond market is still relatively small, but
has the support of triple AAA rated institutions andgrowing momentum. Bonds are a very regular means forgovernments, institutions and even large corporations
to raise debt (borrow money) from the capital markets.
In recent years, the term green bonds, or sometimes
clean energy bonds or climate bonds, has been
increasingly featured in discussions about finance forclean development3. Green bonds are simply a variant ofgeneral bonds wherein the issuer of the bond guarantees
to use the money raised for some specific environmental
purposes. They are designed to particularly attract
investors who wish to lend money for these purposes.

3. The Climate Bonds Initiative is a project established in 2009 by the
Network for Sustainable Financial Markets (NSFM) operating as a joint
project of NSFM and the Carbon Disclosure Project. http:// climatebonds.
net.

598

The market for green bonds is still very limited. Althoughissuance of green bonds is relatively small in size, current
issues provide an encouraging example. EIB and theWorld Bank (see Table 5) issued various green and climatefriendly bonds between 2007 to 2010 valued at US$ 1
billion and US$ 1.5 billion respectively. Additionally, the
IFC has issued four-year US$ 200 million fixed-rate green
bonds for 2010 to 2014 to finance renewable energy
and energy efficiency projects in developing countries.
In 2010, the ADB and African Development Bank bothissued their first Clean Energy Bonds.
While issuances of green bonds from the multilateraldevelopment banks have garnered much of therecent attention, green bonds have also been used
at a municipal level to finance green projects. For
example, in the United States, a green bond is a typeof tax-exempt municipal bond, issued by organisations
and local governments that have been qualified by
the US federal government to do so. The full name forthese green bonds is a Qualified Green Building andSustainable Design Project Bond. These green bonds
are meant to promote environmentally friendly land
use and development, for example, the Destiny USA
retail complex in New York that expects to have all of its
energy needs met by renewable sources.
The global market size of bonds in emerging markets alone
stood at US$ 79 billion in 2009 (IMF 2009), which suggests
a greater potential for green bonds, for example, energy
efficiency bonds for large scale retrofitting of composite
urban units. High-grade fixed income investments,
such as bonds, represent a promising instrument forFinance

Box 2: Overview of REDD+
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD) is an effort to create financial value
for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives
for developing countries to reduce emissions fromforested lands and invest in low- carbon paths tosustainable development. REDD+ goes beyond
deforestation and forest degradation, and includes
the role of conservation, sustainable management offorests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
Much of protecting existing forests (REDD+) or
reforesting areas (afforestation and reforestation– A/R) is achievable at considerably lower costs
than other abatement technologies, and brings
immense potential co-benefits such as biodiversity
conservation and watershed protection – “free”
services with an estimated value of up to US$ 1 trillion/
year by 2100. Nevertheless, achieving this potential
will require considerable investment, estimated at aminimum of US$ 17 to 33 billion per year just to halve
the rate of tropical deforestation by 2030 (The Eliasch
Review 2008). Investment on this scale is unlikely
to come from governments alone, and thus active
participation of private sector financial institutions isessential. This in turn depends on making protectionand enhancement of forests investable while
intensifying efforts to accurately measure and reporton carbon stored in forests . The main investment
sources in the forestry sector in general (i.e. other thanin the context of climate mitigation) are private (93per cent ) representing about 1.5 per cent of global
direct investment (UNEP FI 2011a and UNEP FI 2011b).
The forestry sector, REDD+, and A/R can be ofinterest to financial institutions if they can not only
be profitable, but to also diversify lending, insurance
and investment portfolios. This sector can also be ofinterest to financial institutions because of politicaland associated reputational imperatives. A range ofmainstreaming institutional investors to deploy larger
amounts of investment in the environmental sector. Withbond holdings representing 31 per cent of financial assets
worth US$ 39 trillion in 2009 (Capgemini 2009), high net
worth individuals represent a significant segment ofpotential demand for green bonds.
Equally, the public sector at the national and international
levels should support the growth of these emerging
segments by funding research and promotional
activities to foster a better understanding of green bondpolitical, market and general business risks need to beconsidered. Risk mitigation tools available to financial
institutions to make REDD+ and A/R projects more
attractive include guarantees, insurance, and bonds.
Although negotiations are still ongoing at UNFCCC
level about the exact shape and structure of a
REDD+ mechanism, around 40 countries are alreadyengaging in REDD+ strategy development (Phase 1)
and pilot activities. It is expected that private sector
finance for REDD+ will scale up as initial reforms andinstitutional strengthening take effect and REDD+
programmes are scaled up (Streck et al. 2010). The
five current scenarios that are on the table withininternational climate negotiations include
Scenario 1: National crediting under a UNFCCC
agreement.
Scenario 2: Sub-national or project crediting
under a UNFCCC agreement.
Scenario 3: The nested approach as hybrid
solution between Scenarios 1 and 2.
Scenario 4: International fund with nationallevel incentive payments.
Scenario 5: Voluntary markets only (nointernational REDD agreement).
The most promising policy option for private sector
involvement in REDD seems to be the nested
approach described in Scenario 3. In the absence ofa global climate agreement, market players need to
be prepared to make use of the opportunities within
the voluntary market, or dedicated national capand-trade schemes that allow for REDD offsets (e.g.
future US scheme and/or EU ETS Phase 3).
Source: UNEP FI

markets, green commodity markets, and environmental
and social stock exchanges. The Climate Bonds Initiative,
a global civil society network launched in 2009, develops
policy proposals for governments, finance and industry,and develops advice on large-scale climate mitigation
opportunities suitable for long-term debt finance (TheClimate Bonds Initiative 2009).
Carbon markets
Carbon markets comprise one of the key areas of green
finance and provide an important discovery mechanism for599

Towards a green economy
Issue (Rating)AmountMaturity Date

CouponInvestors

Inaugural Issue Swedish Krona (SEK) denominated Green Bond (Aaa/AAA)

2.85 billion SEK
November 2014
(in three tranches)

3.5 per cent p.a.

Swedish National Pension Funds
Skandia Life
UN Staff Pension Fund
OthersFirst US$ denominated Green Bond (Aaa/AAA)

US$ 300 million

Floating rate

State of California

Third World Bank Green Bond (Aaa/AAA)

US$ 180 million(in two tranches)

December 2013

2 per cent p.a.

California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS)
Swedish National Pension Funds
Swedish insurance provider SEB Trygg Liv
UN Staff Pension Fund, Others

Fourth World Bank Green Bond (Aaa/AAA)NZD 150 million

January 20155.23 per cent S.A.

Japanese investors

IFC Inaugural Green Bond (Aaa/AAA)

US$ 200 million

April 20142.25 per cent p.a.

Details not available

April 2012

Table 5: Recent green bond issues by the World Bank Group
Source: World Bank and IFC websites

the price of carbon. In total, 8.7 billion tonnes were tradedin 2009 (see Figure 2), with a value of US$ 144 billion (US$123 billion in allowance-based cap-and-trade) trading and
US$ 21 billion in project-based deals under instruments
such as the CDMs. The largest carbon market by far is theEuropean Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), theannual value of which rose to US$ 122 billion in 2009.
There is considerable uncertainty about the future
structure of carbon markets following an inconclusive

outcome to the 2009 UN Climate Change Conferencein Copenhagen and a stalemate on establishing anational carbon trading scheme in the US (TheCityUK2010). Primary CDM transactions, making up the bulkof the project market, nearly halved to 211 million
tonnes in 2009 from 404 million tonnes in 2008, due todifficulties in accessing finance, lack of bankability of
CDM and Joint Implementation (JI) credits after 2012,and ever lengthening delays in the CDM process (seeFigure 2).

Box 3: Building an insurance market for forest carbon
Carbon markets have not tackled emissions from theloss of natural forests. There are several concerns: theissues of likely permanence, additionality, leakage,measuring and monitoring, and risks of projectbased changes in carbon stocks or GHG emissions.
It is a significant gap in mitigation - as much as 20
per cent of anthropogenic GHGs are estimated tooriginate from land use change. Unlike the reduction
or avoidance of GHG emissions with all other typesof mitigation activities, GHG sequestration into
biomass is non-permanent. Sooner or later, thesequestered carbon will be re-released into theatmosphere. In the case of forestry this can happen
due to natural hazards, land-use decisions and otherevents (UNEP FI 2008).
To date, regulators have treated forest-based GHG
permits as temporary, which has greatly reduced
their value and thus demand. In the voluntary
certificate sector, the approach for addressing
non-permanence is to require projects to maintainadequate buffer reserves of non-tradable carbon
credits to cover unforeseen losses in carbon stocks.
Another alternative is the deployment of insurance
and other financial risk management instruments toguarantee the permanence of carbon sequestered

600

through forests. This means that the land occupiedby the buffer would be available for a variety of
purposes. In principle, the loss of carbon from aforest is insurable, and the use of financial tools issuperior economically. Private sector providers offorest insurance focus on plantations, not public
and natural forests. The primary reason is themore sophisticated risk management systems (e.g.
watchtowers and firebreaks, fire-fighting personnel,
equipment and procedures) in place for privately
owned forests, where there is a clear financial interest.
Even for plantations, the total acreage insured is low.
The main reasons for the lack of demand are its highexposure to catastrophic losses (exacerbated byclimate change); low demand and inadequate pricing;and insufficient risk management, compoundedby the possibility of moral hazard. Also, forest risks
require specialist knowledge, and the valuationof forest carbon is difficult. While forest insurance
products have been underwritten via traditional,
indemnity-based insurance policies, some are also
exploring the viability of alternative risk transfer andfinancing solutions including catastrophe bonds.
There is some evidence that public sector forest
insurance has been successful, for example, in Japan.
Source: UNEP FI (2008)

One sign of this was the change in fortunes of the
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), which announced in
October 2010 that it would be ending its operations as
a clearing house for a voluntary cap-and-trade scheme
among industrial members. At its inception in 2003,
CCX was viewed as a proving ground, and at one time
more than 400 members, including many large utilities
and to learn how a cap-and-trade system would work.
Their emission reductions accounted for about 88 percent of the nearly 700 million metric tonnes of carbon
dioxide reduced by CCX since 2003 (Chicago Climate
Exchange 2011). Carbon offsets account for the rest. The
voluntary members’ scheme was scheduled to terminate
in 2010 and, after cap-and-trade legislation failed to passin the US Senate, renewal was deemed infeasible. The
exchange will continue trading voluntary carbon offsets,
a different kind of contract created by projects, such as
planting trees, to reduce carbon dioxide or other GHGs.
In the U.S. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),a mandatory programme capping power plant CO2
emissions in 10 north-eastern states, permit volumes
exchanged slumped to 36 million metric tonnes in thethird quarter of 2010, down from 329Mt in the same
period of 2009 (Bloomberg New Energy Finance 2009).
However, in addition to regulatory uncertainty, carbon
markets have flaws (Dag Hammarskjold Institute 2009).
Within the UNFCCC system key issues are the credibilityof offsets from industrial gas projects under the CDM
and the surplus in emissions allowances held by former
Soviet countries. However, the EU seems determined tocontinue with its own scheme. The potential for evolutionof the EU ETS system is explored in the final section ofthis chapter. It is noteworthy that in the first three yearsof trading, emissions in Europe were estimated to havebeen reduced by around 120 to 300 million tonnes (Pew
Center on Global Climate Change 2008).
New initiatives such as the UK’s Green Investment Bank
are also providing potential foundations for more cofinancing and risk sharing between the private banking
sector and public entities (see Box 4).
Low carbon transport
Measurement of finance flowing into low carbon
transport is challenging. The measures required forincreasing financial flows in this sector are different
in developed and developing countries. In developed
countries low carbon solutions would need to be graftedon to existing transport networks.
In the UK for example, two-thirds of GHG emissions savings
under road transport would come from more efficient andlow carbon vehicles, particularly electric/plug-in hybrid
vehicles (Parliament Committee on Climate Change, UK2010). Given the current state of electric car technology,
to develop an electric car market would only require

Million tonnes CO2

Finance

9000
8000

Projectbased

7000
6000
5000
4000

Allowancebased

3000
2000
1000
0
2004
EU ETS

2005

2006
Other

2007

2008

2009

Other CDM

Figure 2: Global carbon market
Source: World Bank Carbon Finance Unit

Box 4: Green Investment
Bank, UK
In 2010, the UK government announced that
it would create a £ 1 billon Green Investment
Bank (GIB) that would make direct financial
interventions to help the government meet its
ambitions for green infrastructure. Although
at the time of writing the specific governancestructure of the GIB were still unpublished, it isexpected to have a mandate to deliver and debt
products, and share the risk in financing green
infrastructure where the market on its own
currently cannot adequately accommodate
such a risk. Areas of investment are expected toinclude the offshore wind sector and the carbon
capture and storage (CCS) industry. The UK
government is also reported to be examining
types of de-risking products for construction
and operating phases to help the private sector
introduce cheaper forms of low- risk capital.
As well as reducing risk to mobilise additional
capital in the market, the GIB will also seek tomake a return on investment and to reinvest
the proceeds into further green infrastructure
financing. It has also been suggested that the GIB
take a role in developing marketplace standards
for green bonds by creating environmental
integrity standards that would increase theproduct’s credibility with institutional investors.

601

Towards a green economy
transitional financial support from government for car
purchase and investment in a battery recharging network.
The battery charging infrastructure could be a largely homebased network and would enable 240,000 electric cars to beon the road in the UK by 2015, rising to 1.7 million by 2020.
This is similar to the Japanese government’s objective
to achieve a 15 to 20 per cent market share of electricand plug-in hybrid cars by 2020. Once the electric/plugin hybrid vehicle penetration is at these levels, it is likelythat the private sector finance could be relied on tocomplete the conversion.
However, in developing countries, there may be an
opportunity to avoid the private car centred model oftransport and provide sustainable, high quality masstransport sooner, and at less cost (Sakamoto, Dalkmann,and Palmer 2010). Public finance is, and will remain,
the core source of funds, using both domestic andinternational flows, such as ODA and export credits.
Improved waste management
Sustainable waste management is a major issue inhuman society and a growing source of efficiency
savings in industrial management. Around 4 billion
tonnes of waste are produced around the world eachyear of which scarcely one-quarter is thought to be
recovered or recycled, including many secondary
materials that can substitute for raw materials that arebecoming increasingly scarce (Veolia Environmental
Services 2009).
From being primarily a local activity, the scale ofsustainable waste operations has mushroomed withthe emergence of worldwide markets for a numberof secondary materials, such as scrap and paper, forwhich 2007 and 2008 revenues matched those for raw
materials, such as steel and paper pulp. This industry forindustrial, municipal, and hazardous waste is served bya range of public municipal agencies and private sector
enterprises. Together with the other economic activities
associated with waste, from collection to recycling, it
would appear to represent a world market of some € 300
billion, shared about evenly between municipal waste,
and industrial and construction waste.
Finally, institutional investors are also playing a part. For
example, former US President Bill Clinton has announced
an investor-led survey of how companies use and track
plastic in their businesses. Investors with more than US$
5 trillion in assets under management (AUM) are to backthe Plastic Disclosure Project (PDP). The first PDP survey
is scheduled for the first half of 2011 (McCabe 2010) and,as suggested by its name, is similar to the successful
Carbon Disclosure Project, which sends out a detailed
questionnaire to firms on their carbon emissions, targets
and mitigation strategies.

602

Improved freshwater provision
While public water companies provide most water
and wastewater services worldwide, the numberof people served by private water companies hasgrown significantly in the last two decades. As water
infrastructure is very capital-intensive, private sector
investment or support for public investment via bonds
financed by investors is increasingly important. Private
financing for infrastructure to produce freshwater is one
area of potential significance for a green economy.
Currently, 95 per cent of global potable water is financed
and provided by the public sector (OECD 2004). However,limited renewable freshwater resources and greater humanwater withdrawals are increasingly causing water stressand severe scarcity. About 2.8 billion people (UN MDGs
2008) endure some form of water scarcity of which 1.2
billion live under conditions of physical water scarcity and1.6 billion people live in areas of economic water scarcity,where the costs of water provision have been rising. New
infrastructure and improved water treatment technologies
are central in improving water supply and wastewater
management. The Camdessus Panel (World Water Council
2003) estimated the funding gap in the water sector for
developing countries and emerging markets alone toamount to US$ 100 billion per year — the bulk of which isfor household sanitation, wastewater treatment, treatment
of industrial effluents, irrigation and multipurpose
schemes. Private finance would have to at least double toclose the public investment gap in the water sector.
Sustainable agriculture
Until recently, agriculture has been ignored by financial
market participants focused on sustainability. However,global demand for agricultural commodities is now
pressing on supply and high-tech has entered theagricultural laboratories. It has also become clearthat farming is a highly polluting industry and posessignificant equity issues. The perception that agriculture
is now a potentially risky, but profitable, opportunity
has begun to attract the attention of the sustainability
component of the finance sector. This report is unable
to offer any reliable global estimates of green financecurrently flowing into sustainable agriculture as a whole.
However, the examples of responsible finance for palm
oil and GHG reduction in the UK may be illustrative.
Global production of palm oil has doubled over the last
decade to over 36 million metric tonnes per year and is
expected to double again by 2020. In 2008, when prices
were especially high, the market in crude palm oil was
worth more than US$ 25 billion. About 80 per cent is used
for food, for example, margarine (WWF Internationaland Profundo 2008). Sustainable palm oil production
can help to meet the world’s growing demand for edibleoils and generate income and employment for rural
economies in tropical regions.

£/tCO2e

Finance250
Adopting systems less reliant on inputs
200
Separating slurrymineral nitrogen
application
and usingcomposts

150

100
Nitrification
inhibitors

50
£ 40
5

0

Species
introduction(including
legumes)

1015

MtC02eImproved drainage-50
CAD poultry
5 MW

Ionophores(dairy)-100

Improvedmineralnitrogentiming-150

Improvedorganic
nitrogentimingFertility(dairy)-200
Productivity(dairy)-250
Improver nitrogen-use plants

Crop/soils-3450

Livestock

AD/manure management

Ionophores (beef )Figure 3: Agricultural marginal abatement cost curve (MACC), optimistic case (2020)
Source: Scottish Agricultural College

However, unsustainable practices in parts of the industry
have had serious impacts, such as forest clearancesthat destroy rich natural ecosystems and release hugevolumes of GHGs into the atmosphere. There have also
been social issues such as native communities being
unwillingly dispossessed of their land. Because suchproblems may entail the risk of financial penalties, client
default and reputation risk, many commercial banks havestrengthened their risk assessment policies on palm oilloans, and have developed written policy statements on
palm oil, noting that a responsible palm oil policy needs
to cover the full range of companies involved in thepalm oil sector, including upstream companies as the
producers of crude palm oil and downstream companies
involved in refining, trading and use of palm oil products.
In most OECD countries, the GHGs emitted by the
agricultural sector are significant and comprise mainlyof methane and nitrous oxide, which interact with soil
and microbial processes in ways that are not completely
understood (Climate Change Task Force UK 2010).

Also, the actors are many, dispersed and small, so thatmeasuring emissions and enforcing regulations are noteasy. Thus, increasing attention is being given to marketbased instruments such as tradable emission permits. To
that end, the UK has developed a Marginal Abatement
Cost Curve (MACC) for UK agriculture (see Figure 3).
This exercise identified a technical potential of 9 MtCO2eq (metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent) that could
be abated at negative cost (i.e. this would save moneyfor farmers under the assumptions used in the MACC),
with an additional 4 Mt CO2-eq below £ 40/t CO2-eq. This
indicates a scenario for GHGs policy, characterised bytaxes and subsidies or a cap-and-trade scheme, with up to
6 Mt CO2-eq potentially available for abatement by 2020
(Climate Change Task Force UK 2010), a market of over
€ 100 million. Because the biggest reductions may comefrom the least efficient and least aware operators, linking
environmental performance to improved profitability
is likely to be effective and should also prove to be an
attractive business model for financial institutions.

603

Towards a green economy

4 Opportunities and challenges
in financing the green economy
Section 2 showed that current financial flows into agreen economy need to be dramatically scaled up while
Section 3 showed that innovative financial mechanisms
have emerged for many environmental and natural
resource areas and have begun to channel funds tothem. This section identifies some of the key barriers toscaling up these flows throughout the typical life cycleof investments from pre-investment to final exit, andsuggests ways to remove them.

4.1 Addressing the fullcost of externalities
If the costs of environmental degradation and social harm
remain external to the costs of business and investment
activity, then the risk/reward equation that underpins
so much of financial services and investment activity
will continue to promote environmentally and sociallyunsustainable business practices and financial activity.
For most of the period in which a formal investment
industry has evolved over the past 200 years, ESG issues
were not considered in the investment policy-making anddecision-making processes of most mainstream financial
institutions.
One of the primary reasons for this omission was thatexternalities – costs that are external to a company’sbalance sheet such as pollution or destruction of
ecosystem services – have simply not been assessed,
priced or accounted for in traditional market activity andthe associated investment processes that have supported
that activity. Analysis in the recent TEEB business report(TEEB for Business 2010) confirmed that standard businessvaluation techniques for most part still fail to capture
the values of basic ecosystem services. In addition,
criteria employed in accounting to ensure relevant andreliable financial reporting are framed in a way thattypically excludes intangible issues such as impacts anddependencies on ecosystems and biodiversity.
The failure to internalise the wide and diverse range ofenvironmental and social externalities prevents larger
amounts of capital flowing into a green economy.
While governments, through their regulatory activities(direct regulation, environmental taxes, user charges,
and tradable permit systems) and budgetary activities(payment for environmental services) will play a major

604

role to address these externalities, voluntary initiatives
within the financial and investment sectors cancontribute also. While externalities remain unaccounted
for in investment activity, the risk/reward equationthat underpins most capital market activity makes thedramatic scaling up of financial flows to a green economy
infeasible in the short-term. In recent years, however,some of the world’s largest investors have begun to focus
on the questions of fiduciary responsibility and fiduciary
legal issues in the context of ESG matters (see Box 5).
In particular, it is in the interests of large, diversified
institutional investors that own a fairly representative
sample of the global economy – so called universal
owners – to act to reduce negative externalities (see Box
6). While interest around the universal ownership theory
continues to grow, it has yet to attain mainstream status
and there are some dissenting views with respect to theoverall thesis.
Most recently, there have been attempts to put a priceon the damage caused by business to human health, thedegradation of ecosystems, and the depletion of natural
resources. Avoiding these costs represents one of themain benefits to society from greening the economy.
For example, UN-backed research found that the humanuse of environmental goods and services in 2008 caused
an estimated US$ 6.6 trillion in environmental costs,
equal to 11 per cent of the global economy (UNEP FI
and PRI 2010). As the economic perils of a broad rangeof the “slow failures” or “creeping risk” (WEF 2010b)
become more apparent, there is an accelerating need forcapital markets and financial institutions to understandhow natural and social value at risk will impact theirinvestments in both the short and long-term.
A strategic commitment to capture these values andincorporate their consideration in internal decision
making can help pave the way for greater capital flows
to a green economy. Focused public policy action
will speed up this process. The need to understandnatural and social value at risk and its implications for
economies poses a series of complex questions forthe financial services sector, as well as for the broader
business community. These questions are crucial for
those parts of the financial system, such as the pensions
and investment sector, which need to protect and growassets over the long term.

Finance

Box 5: Financial materiality and fiduciary responsibility(KfW Symposium 2008)
In 2003, a group of asset managers (UNEP FI AMWG
2004-2009) collectively representing US$ 1.7 trillion in
AUM began to reconsider the financial materiality ofa range of ESG issues that until then had traditionallybeen overlooked or undervalued by many investment
approaches. Over subsequent years, the process
yielded three major reports that have transformed
thinking within the investment world.
In the Materiality Series (UNEP FI Materiality Series
2004 to 2010) mainstream financial analysts exploredthe relevance of a range of ESG issues, such as climatechange, occupational and public health, human labourand political rights, and both corporate trust andgovernance, across a range of commercial and industrial
sectors. The sectors included aviation, the auto
industry, aerospace and defence, chemicals, food andbeverage, forest products, media, non-life insurance,
pharmaceuticals, property, and utilities. What theMateriality Series was so effective in doing was to holdthe coming-out ball for the idea that ESG (particularly
environmental and social) factors have financial
relevance, and are as useful in constructing a synthesisof management quality as strictly financial factors.
The Materiality Series also helped lay the groundworkfor the development of the PRI, now backed by morethan 900 institutional investors representing US$ 25
trillion in assets4. The third and, to date, final reportin the series focused on climate change and was
published just two months ahead of the December
2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen. The report mainly takes the form of areview of key financial analyst research on climatechange.
Along with the growing acceptance of the financial
materiality of ESG issues, parallel work wasundertaken to show that considering ESG issues ininvestment policy making and decision making wasconsistent with legal frameworks that govern thefiduciary duty of many institutional investors to act

4.2 Providing pre-investment financeAt least 83 countries now have some type of policy
designed to promote sustainable energy, but only a few
have seen scaled-up investment in renewable energy
4. The Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), launched in April 2006,
is an investor initiative backed by United Nations Environment Programme
Finance Initiative and the UN Global Compact. www.unpri.org

in the best interests of their beneficiaries. In October
2005, a landmark legal interpretation covering the ninemajor capital market jurisdictions opened up a new
potential for the world’s largest institutional investors
to consider ESG issues in their investment processes(UNEP FI and Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2005).
In fact, the interpretation argued that the appropriate
consideration of ESG issues – from both risk and reward
standpoints – was an obligation in most major capital
market jurisdictions and mandated by law in some.
The Freshfields Report greatly strengthened the casewithin the investment industry around the need forinvestors to fully integrate material ESG considerations
in all aspects of their investment processes. In short,
this work moved the discussion forward on the needfor key market actors to integrate, account for andprice the risks associated with a broader range ofexternalities than had previously been the case ininvestment practice. The Freshfields legal interpretation
was followed in 2009 by the Fiduciary II (UNEP FI 2009)
report that built on the initial interpretation. The
Fiduciary II report concludes that ESG issues should beembedded in the legal contract between asset owners
and asset managers, with the implementation of thisframework being governed via ESG-inclusive reporting
to asset owners. It also makes a case that advisors to
institutional investors, such as asset managers andinvestment consultants, have a duty to proactively
raise ESG issues with their clients, and that those who
do not open themselves to potential legal liabilities.
Finally, the study argues that responsible investment
should be the default position for all investment
arrangements. To achieve this the fiduciary duty
should be aligned better with environmental andsocial dimensions. This evolving process that seen
ESG issues being embedded in the thinking aroundfiduciary responsibility and legal considerations goesto the very heart of many investment policy making
and decision making processes.

and energy efficiency operations (REN21 2010). Analysis
suggests that one of the most important barriers toscaling up is the lack of pre-investment finance. Figure
4 demonstrates the phases of investment, from publicgrants, VC funding, and production subsidies required
to develop a new renewable energy technology to thepoint that it can begin to demonstrate a track record andattract second stage funding. Figure 5 shows the private

605

Towards a green economy
financing mechanisms used to address financing gaps,
which might be through an Initial Public Offering (IPO)or project finance loans from banks. The term “Valley ofDeath” is often used during the phase discussed above
to describe the difficulties of accessing commercial
finance between the initial VC investment and thedemonstration, or from demonstration to commercial
rollout with secondary VC investment.
The diagrams show where public grants or specificsubsidies are essential. One can conclude that theprivate sector is capable of providing finance in moremature stages of commercial development, but is lessreliable for early-stage finance where VC/PE operates. It
demonstrates the need for a potential sharing of risk at
the initial stages between private and public investors,
for example, by providing incentives for private
investment in the early deployment of new technologies
or by improving the capacity of the insurance market.

Box 6: The universal ownertheory explained
The universal owner theory (UOT) concerns a solution
to an important contradiction in the investment
system: short-term rewards for some are potentiallyavailable where externalities, such as climate change,
ecosystems destruction or ignoring the rule of law) are
not adequately accounted for. However, in the longer
term these externalities may undermine the value ofinvestments for all. Emerging work around the UOT is
deepening our understanding and starting to quantify
the economic, financial and investment implicationsof externalities along the investment chain.
A joint UNEP FI/PRI report on the subject estimatedthat the equivalent of US$ 6.6 trillion of damage wasexternalised in 2008, or 11 per cent of the value ofthe US$ 60 trillion global economy (UNEP FI and PRI2010). Without action, the cost of environmental andsocial externalities relative to the value of the global
economy is projected to increase by 62 per cent from2008 to 2050. If environmental externalities are notaddressed, the damage incurred annually continues
over time and accumulates. The study also foundthat companies in the MSCI All Country Index areassociated with over US$ 1 trillion in environmental
externality costs annually. This equates to 5.6 percent of the market capitalisation of companies
in the Index, and 56 per cent of their earnings.
Environmental externalities could present a financial
risk to universal owners invested in equity markets.
Source: UNEP FI/PRI (2010 )606

4.3 Integrating ESG risks into financial
and investment decision making
To date, the degree to which ESG risks are factored
explicitly into banking considerations is limited, largely
due to the difficulties in establishing the financial
materiality of such risks. Although public policy shifts
have set processes in motion to strengthen the financial
materiality of a range of these risks (see Box 7), there is asignificant lag between a clear reflection of such risks inpublic policy at global, regional and national levels andits integration into the inner workings of the financial
system. For the banking sector, this particularly relates
to understanding and quantifying the credit risk, forexample, linked to the likelihood of new regulation, anddefault implications of these emerging risks as well as
the negative impact on collateral.
Also, the speed with which financial institutions are able
to transfer risk into the system by removing the liability
from their own balance sheet is an important factor in theassessment of how these emerging risks impact banking
operations and the degree to which they are financiallymaterial for individual institutions. A 2006 report (UNEP FI
and EcoSecurities 2006) concludes that in many cases forNorth American banks there was no link between banklending and climate change risks because of the shortaverage maturity of such loans and the speed with whichbanks transferred loans off their own balance sheet.
If the information that investors receive is shallow andshort-term then their investment decisions can show
similar characteristics, which is why the finance andinvestment community is demanding more data on
ESG issues such as carbon emissions from the entities
in which they invest. This type of sustainability/ESG
reporting (hereafter “sustainability reporting”) has grownexponentially in recent years, for example, the GRI Financial
Services Sector Supplement and Equator Principles.
However, methodologies and international norms can still
be improved. There are now significant moves towards
more integrated reporting. To that end, in July 2010 theInternational Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC) was
formed to try and create a globally accepted framework
for accounting for sustainability – a framework that brings
together financial and ESG information in a clear, concise,consistent and comparable format. This issue is also being
discussed by global stock exchanges.
However, the link between improved accounting andreporting and actual business practices is somewhat
weak. Some 1,100 financial institutions (UNEP FI and
PRI) now support United Nations -backed principles
and statements that advocate firm steps towards asustainable financial system and a responsible approach
to investment, but progress in putting these statements
into practice can be inconsistent and, in many cases,

Finance

Company
conception

Stage

Prototype
testing

Demonstrator
project

Furtherdevelopment

Proventechnology
Public grant &production subsidy

Secondary VC
investment

Funding
Public grant &production subsidy
Initial VC
investment
Public funding
R&D grants

Year 1

Year 10Figure 4: Private financing mechanisms to address financing gaps
Source: UNEP SEFI

embryonic. As stated earlier in this chapter, over 900
investment organisations managing more than US$ 25
trillion of assets have now signed the PRI. The results of
the PRI’s annual assessment survey shows that US$ 6.7

Stage 1
R&D

Stage 2Demonstration

Stage 3
Deployment

Valley of death

GAPS

trillion of the PRI signatories actively managed assets,accounting impressively for some 51 per cent of such
assets managed by PRI supporters, were subject to
ESG integration in 2009. However, this represents only

Stage 4
Diffusion

High perceived risks

Lack of project development
capacities and capital

Debt-equity gap

Equity

Debt

age
ack

CarbonSoft loans

Grantsgp

Insurance

n
nci

fina

Venturecapitalcts

MezzanineAngel
investors

roje
er p

g
Lar

R&D support

FINANCING

Stage 5
Commercial maturity

Loan facilities
Incubators

Public/private
equity funds
Public/private
VC funds

Public finance mechanisms

Credit lines
Guarantees

Commercial financing mechanism

Figure 5: Development and investment phases of renewable energy technology
Source: UNEP SEFI (2010)607

Towards a green economy
around 7 per cent of the overall market of institutionallymanaged assets (PRI 2010).
Although progress remains slow, there is also evidence
in the PRI’s Annual Assessment Survey of how the asset
owners that lead this initiative are catalysing change
throughout the investment chain. For example, 87 percent of the investment managers that participated in
the survey now have an overall investment policy that
addresses ESG issues, and 66 per cent of asset ownersignatories now put specific ESG considerations into
their contracts with managers and investment advisors.
The banking sector has also shown positive signs ofreform. In the late spring of 2010, the sector was warned
that post crisis, “private players will be held accountableto new and stricter standards of economic integrity andprudent management” (Trichet 2010). An international
body, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision(BCBS), part of the Bank for International Settlements(BIS)5, plays a key role internationally to define the rules
5. The Bank for International Settlements was established 17 May 1930, andis the world’s oldest international financial organization. The BIS fosters
international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a bank forcentral banks. http://www.bis. org/about/index.htm

governing how banks handle risk to bolster the stability
and resilience of the financial system, while ensuring
sufficient lending to foster economic growth. The
executive summary of the BCBS’s consultative document– Basel III – on major banking reforms states, “A strong
and resilient banking system is the foundation forsustainable economic growth, as banks are at the centreof the credit intermediation process between savers andinvestors” (BCBS 2009).
Moreover, banks provide critical services to consumers,
small and medium-sized enterprises, large corporate
firms and governments who rely on them to conduct
their daily business, both at a domestic and international
level. Considering a broader range of environmental andsocial risks into banking processes and disciplines suchas those governed by the BCBS would have profound
implications for the banking sector and would catalyse
the transition to a green economy.

4.4 Expanding green insurance
The insurance industry is uniquely placed in our
economies as a private market mechanism for theBox 7: Banking risks around climate change
As carbon liabilities become internalised within
accounting and financial systems, banks will be affected
increasingly both directly through impacts on the valueof their own capital and indirectly through changes to thevalue and risk profiles of the loan portfolios of institutions
and the collateral held against those loans. Climatechange creates concerns at the macro prudential level interms of its long-term systemic risks that jeopardise whole
regions, economies and industries.
Climate change also creates concerns at the micro
prudential level in terms of risks embedded in thefinancing and investment undertaken by banks. The
policy, legislative and regulatory changes underway inmany countries to more fully account for a broader rangeof ESG risks will also strengthen the fiduciary duty (UNEP
FI AMWG 2009) and fiduciary legal (UNEP FI & Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer 2005) arguments that call for a fulland proactive effort to integrate financially material risks
in all aspects of investment policy making and investment
decision making.
These changes have implications for banks, as well as themany other forms of financial intermediaries that exist
along the investment chain. In previous guidance, theBCBS has sought to “promote a more forward-looking

608

approach to capital supervision, one that encourages
banks to identify the risks they may face, today and in the
future, and to develop or improve their ability to manage
those risks.” (UNEP FI AMWG 2009) It is in this forward
looking perspective where full consideration by the BCBS
of financially material ESG issues are required, such as therisks posed by climate change, resource scarcity and thedestruction of ecosystems, as well as governance issues
related to micro and macro prudential regulation. Aligning
Basel regulations and standards with ESG issues carries thepromise of a stable, resilient and robust financial systemthat can deliver capital for green projects and initiative.
Including a full range of ESG considerations in the capital,
adequacy requirements of banks will be a significant stepto align the worldwide banking system with the needsof a future green economy. Post crisis, and following
criticisms that the Basel II framework was ineffective, theBCBS, under a G20 mandate from the Financial Stability
Board (FSB) is in the vanguard of efforts to reassess theresilience of the banking system. To this end, a review ofmany of the key supervisory requirements was initiatedin 2009. The opportunity to reinforce the importance of
ESG issues into ongoing Basel Committee considerations
remains current as the standards-setting pursues well into
the next two years.

Finance
sharing of risk, with the global pooling of what would
be risks otherwise borne solely by individuals andentities estimated at roughly US$ 400 trillion (UNEP FI
IWG 2009). As this risk pooling is integral to the efficient
functioning of markets, economies and societies, theinsurance industry is a key focus of regulators andpolicy makers. The risk pooling afforded is only possible
with investors’ willingness to put capital at risk; hence,value creation is necessary for its continued existence.
The convergence of public and private interests in theinsurance industry is nowhere more apparent than in
the risks and opportunities presented by ESG issues.
The insurance – including reinsurance – community,with its expertise in assessing, pricing and managing
risk and freeing the flow of risk capital, can play a criticalrole to support the emergence of a green economy
agenda across business, industry and the markets. It is
important to understand that insurance is not only a risk
transfer mechanism to compensate financial losses, butalso a risk management mechanism because insurers
carry out loss prevention and loss mitigation measuresin conducting their business. The insurance industry,
therefore, has an unparalleled capacity to understandand engineer approaches and mechanisms to manage
emerging ESG risks.
As such, the industry is a strong lever for the transition toa green economy due to its size, the extent of its reach
into the community and the significant role it plays in
the economy, not only in the risk management and risk
transfer spheres, but also as an investor through the vastpool of insurance company reserves. In 2008, worldwide
premium volume for life and non-life insurance businesscombined exceeded (Swiss Re 2009) US$ 4.2 trillion,
making insurance the largest industry in the global
economy. The industry’s global AUM in 2010 stood at
US$ 24.6 trillion (TheCityUK 2011). Table 6 highlights thepremium make-up of the global insurance industry in
2008, and also gives an indication of the insurance gap
between developed and developing regions.
The insurance industry has long been in the vanguardof understanding and managing risk, and has served
as an important early warning system for society by
amplifying risk signals. For example, the insurance andreinsurance community were amongst the first financial
service organisations to engage in and explain the longterm economic risks posed by climate change (UNEP
FI 1995). In addition to the threats posed by global
warming, insurers today are communicating strongrisk signals stemming from a wide range of ESG issues
such as biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation,water scarcity, poverty, emerging manmade healthrisks, ageing populations, child labour and corruption(UNEP FI IWG 2007). Because certain risks are too large
to be borne by an individual insurer, these risks are

spread across the industry in a complex risk-sharing
system comprising of many players, with the underlying
principle of “one for all, all for one” that has supported
social and economic development throughout humanhistory. Insurers, reinsurers and retrocessionaires, are allrisk carriers, as they put capital at risk and ultimately pay
claims. Insurance agents and insurance brokers provide
services to insureds and insurers. Similarly, reinsurance
brokers and reinsurance underwriting agents provide
services to insurers, reinsurers and retrocessionaires.
The common denominator for agents and brokers inthe system is that they are all intermediaries who act
as channels in spreading risks. There are other service
providers, such as catastrophe model vendors, loss
adjusters, and rating agencies, but they are not directly
involved in the risk-sharing process.
Over the last two decades, the insurance industry has
also witnessed the emergence of insurance-linked
securities, such as catastrophe bonds, where risk
carriers have transferred peak risks in their portfolios tothe capital markets by securitising, for example, theiraccumulated risk exposure in a specific territory due tonatural hazards. Through loss prevention and mitigation,
carrying risks, and as major investors, the insurance
industry has protected society, catalysed financeand investments, shaped markets and underpinned
economic development. However, the importance of
the insurance industry as a driver of a green economy
is poorly understood by policy makers, the broader
business community and the wider public.
Uniquely positioned to understand the fundamental
nature of emerging risks to communities, the global
economy, whole industry sectors and its own
investments, the insurance industry is now starting
to explore the commercial viability of conceiving,developing and rolling out new products and services
that address global sustainability issues (UNEP FI IWG
2007). The insurance industry is also beginning torealise the potential of microinsurance – insurance
for low-income people – as both a prime business
opportunity and a powerful tool for financial inclusionand sustainable development. Potential new markets
include insurance for emerging manmade health risks
and the protection of natural resources, in particular,
biodiversity and ecosystems (e.g. forests) and water. The
insurance industry is also awakening to the fact that
acting sustainably, as in the cases of internal resource
efficiency and the recycling of damaged assets, saves
money and is a concrete way of leading by example (seeexamples in Box 8).
Clearly, insurance companies are unique entities. Theirinsurance and investment operations are highly intricate
systems, with many players and functions, creating an
industry that is not readily or fully understood by many609

Towards a green economy

RegionPremium volume(US$ million)

Real growth

Share of world
market (%)

Premiums as percent of GDP(penetration)

Premiums per
capita (US$)(density)

America

1,450,749

-2.4

33.98

7.29

1,552.7

North America

1,345,816

-3.1

31.52

8.54

3,988.8

Latin America and Caribbean

104,933

8.4

2.46

2.53

175.8

Europe1,753,200

-6.2

41.06

7.46

2,043.9

Western Europe

1,656,281

-6.9

38.79

8.33

3,209.2

Central and Eastern Europe

96,919

9.0

2.27

2.79

299.2

Asia

933,358

6.6

21.86

5.95

234.3

Japan and newly industrialised Asian economies

675,109

3.8

15.81

10.41

3,173.2

South and East Asia

229,036

16.3

5.36

3.20

65.5

Middle East and Central Asia

29,213

4.7

0.68

1.45

110.3

Oceania

77,716

8.6

1.82

7.02

2,271.9

Africa54,713

4.9

1.28

3.57

55.6

World

4,269,737-2.0

100.00

7.07

633.9

Industrialised countries

3,756,939

-3.4

87.99

8.81

3,655.4

Emerging markets

512,799

11.1

12.01

2.72

89.4

OECD

3,696,073

-3.2

86.56

8.32

3,015.2G72,925,946

-4.4

68.53

8.96

3,930.2

EU, 27 countries

1,616,461

-6.7

37.86

8.28

3,061.3

NAFTA

1,364,839

-3.0

31.97

8.10

3,065.7

ASEAN

45,493

0.4

1.07

2.99

85.1

Table 6: World Insurance in 2008
Source: Swiss Re (2009)

Box 8: Insuring against the worst for the best
Drought is a major risk in Ethiopia where 85 per centof the population is dependent on smallholder, rainfed agriculture. Less than 0.5 per cent have insurance.
Climate change is threatening agricultural output
as rainfall becomes less predictable, and many run
the risk of falling into debt or having to sell assets.
The use of index-based weather insurance cansignificantly improve lives.
Through the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for
Adaptation project, Swiss Re has been working
with Oxfam America and Columbia University toprotect the rural poor against drought risk. The
project engages farmers in community-led, locallydesigned climate adaptation initiatives such asreforestation and crop irrigation projects, where
they earn premiums by making and using compost,
constructing water-harvesting structures, planting
nitrogen-rich trees and vetiver grasses. This uniquerisk management approach has allowed rural
households, many led by women, to benefit from610

insurance. Since its launch in 2008, uptake has
increased from 200 households in the first year to
1,300 in 2010. The project now covers five villages,
two climatic zones, and four crop varieties.
HSBC Insurance’s Green Insurance products in Brazil
are linked to investment to preserve forests. For
motor insurance, HSBC commits to preserving 88 m²
of forest for five years; and for home insurance, 44
m² for the same period. The calculations are basedon the environmental footprint of an automobile
or residence during that period. HSBC has alreadyinvested nearly R$ 8 million (US$ 4.8 million)
preserving 3,000 hectares of Atlantic Seaboard
Rainforest, equivalent to roughly 4,800 soccer
fields and about 1 per cent of remaining pristine
Araucaria forest. The work is carried out with theNGO, Sociedade de Pesquisa em Vida Selvagem.
Funds are disbursed to landowners, each receiving amonthly sum for areas to be preserved and a forestry
management plan.

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stakeholders. It is crucial for insurers to generate income
from both sides of the house at all times – prudent
and disciplined risk management, underwriting andinvestment management are key processes to sustain
profitability and long-term value creation. ESG issues are
relevant to both the insurance and investment sides asrisks posed by ESG issues can undermine the solvencyof an insurance company and the long-term economic
health of the insurance industry and its partners,
ranging from insureds – households, businesses, andgovernments – to the entities financed by insurance
capital. Thus, it is imperative for insurers, regulators, andpolicy makers to collectively address ESG issues in theinsurance industry.
The main reasons that adversely affect the insurabilityof risks can be classified as supply-side and demandside barriers. The supply-side barriers include volatility
in the occurrence of claims, particularly for weatherrelated insurance. This can be smoothed to some extent
with reinsurance, but this raises the related barrierof inferior data quality. Poor data on climate change
related hazards and exposures means that uncertainty
is much greater and this makes the private insurance
and reinsurance market less willing to participate in risk-

bearing. Geographical, economic and climate data tend
to be poorer for developing countries and access to suchinformation is often prohibitively costly.
There are also regulatory barriers. A balance needs tobe found between regulatory control of the market
to protect consumers and flexibility in managing
insurance operations in response to a changing risklandscape. Overly rigid insurance regulations will
deter private insurers or result in suboptimal insurance
solutions. Also, it is important that public control of
the risk management framework (land development,
safety regime, etc.) is maintained. Equally important,regulators must set a reasonable standard of care forpolicyholders to avoid moral hazard, that is adopting
very risky practices in the belief that regulators will
restrict insurers’ freedom to modify policy terms. A
final difficulty is high administrative expenses, a major
problem for policyholders with only few assets because
conventional insurance products have relatively highoverheads. Simplified products can help solve this.
Some demand-side barriers can be overcome by theprivate sector through time; others may need public
sector intervention. The most significant is probably low

Box 9: Mobilising private investment into sustainable energy in India
India has the fifth largest installed renewablecapacity in the world. In 2009, private investmentsof renewables in India amounted to US$ 2.3 billion
ranking India in the top ten G20 members, while VC/
private equity financing stood at US$ 100 million (Pew
Charitable Trust and Clean Energy Economy 2010).
This has been driven by a suite of policy measures atstate and federal level that have included:■■ ■ Clear short and medium-term targets have been
identified for renewable energy and energy efficiency
amounting to 14 GW of new renewable energy
capacity by 2012, and an ambitious plan to install
20 GW of solar energy by 2022 (Pew Charitable Trustand Clean Energy Economy 2010), financed througha national system of gradually increasing renewablepurchase obligations (RPO) for power utilities
combined with gradually decreasing feed-in tariffs;■■ Feed-in tariffs and tax allowances for solar
photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal power,
supplemented with support for PV manufacturing
in special economic zones (CERC website) have been
implemented. These policies led to US$ 18 billion in
new solar PV manufacturing investment plans or
proposals by private companies;■■ A renewable portfolio standard for utilities has
been set up, starting at 5 per cent in 2010, rising to15 per cent in 2020. One state has already enforced
penalties on utilities not complying with thestandard;■■ Nationwide energy conservation codes are inplace for residential buildings, hotels, and hospitals
with centralised hot water systems, requiring at least
20 per cent of water heating capacity from solar;■■ The National Mission on Energy Efficiency (NMEF)
will initiate trading in energy certificates for several
industrial sectors. NMEF will have two funds one
to provide guarantees to banks providing loans toenergy efficiency projects and the other to support
investments in the manufacturing of energy efficient
products and provision on energy efficiency services.
The trading scheme will potentially generatetransactions close to US$ 15 billion by 2015; and■■ A coal tax of US$ 1 per tonne was put in place in2010 to feed the National Clean Energy Fund. India
depends on coal for 66 per cent of its energy needs
and this tax would generate annual revenue of US$
600 million.

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Towards a green economy

Box 10: Microfinance, environmental and social risk management
and sustainable opportunities
The Netherlands Development Finance Company(FMO) is one of the largest bilateral private sector
development banks worldwide and has helped
to finance and manage sustainable microfinanceprojects in countries such as Kenya, Nepal, Mongolia,
Cambodia, and Bolivia.
For example, in Nepal, FMO has financed the Clean
Energy Development Bank Ltd. (CEDB). CEDB is a
Nepalese development bank that provides access tofinance for small and medium-sized entrepreneursin agriculture, industry, trade and other productive
business. CEDB’s key focus is to invest in clean energy
through its innovative renewable energy products,
including mini and medium-sized hydropower
projects, as well as solar and biogas projects thatprovide rural communities with the sustainable
electricity/energy that is so crucial for private sector
development. CEDB also provides microfinanceloans to individuals in rural areas through MFIs andits own branch networks.
Similarly, FMO has invested in K-Rep Bank, a Kenyan
microfinance institution (MFI) involved in financing
implementation of a broad range of programmeswith environmental and social themes such as:■■ Small piped community water and sanitation
projects;■■ Household rain harvesting/water storage tanks;■■ Integrated solid waste management in urban
informal settlements;

risk awareness, particularly in the case of low frequency,
high severity events. In the case of catastrophe
insurance, the introduction of compulsory catastrophe
insurance by governments may be an important elementin overcoming this problem. It is often stated thatpremiums are unaffordable. This may be a signal fromthe private insurance market that the risk is very highand unsustainable, there is great uncertainty, the scaleof operations is too small, or more risk management by
at-risk parties is needed.
The insurance industry has an unparalleled capacity tounderstand and engineer approaches and mechanisms
to manage ESG risks as they emerge, and has served
as an important early warning system for society by

612■■ Small hydro-power/community water supply;■■ Eco sanitation – pay-per-visit toilets in peri-urban
areas;■■ Installation of solar lighting system for schools in
the rural areas;■■ Wind powered systems for water pumping;■■ Household biogas; and■■ Use of composted manure in kitchen gardening.
FMO provides an innovative MFI Sustainability
Guidance toolkit for all MFIs that wish to reduce
environmental and social risks. FMO has also
developed and introduced the mechanism of asustainability pricing incentive, usually an interest
reduction, as part of a loan agreement. As an
example, FMO has agreed upon a pricing incentive
with the El Salvadorian Federation of Credit
Associations and Workers’ Banks (Fedecredito). The
trigger to award the interest reduction is the timely
development and implementation of a portfoliowide environmental and social risk management
system across Fedecredito banks.
The implementation of practical environmental andsocial risk management measures within micro and
SME finance and the success stories of specific MFI/
SME sustainability financing demonstrate that MFIS
and SME banks may substantively contribute to agreen economy.

amplifying risk signals. Steps towards improving risk
knowledge, including perhaps better use of technology
to measure risk accurately, and more consumer
education to drive demand for sustainable insurance
products, can help the insurance industry overcome
the barriers and become a leader in mobilising financial
flows to the green economy (PSI forthcoming).6

6. Principles for Sustainable Insurance Initiative (PSI) is a group ofleading global insurance companies that are members of United Nations
Environment Programme Finance Initiative are currently spearheading thePrinciples for Sustainable Insurance Initiative, which will establish a global
best practice sustainability framework for the insurance business, and a
global initiative of insurers tackling sustainability risks and opportunities.
These principles will be launched at the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable
Development (Rio+20 Earth Summit).

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4.5 Creating public-private mechanisms
The lack of adequate public financing is also an
important barrier to increasing the flow of green
investment. Public financing is justified by the positive
externalities expected from a green economy and it
can be important for leveraging private investment. For
example, it has been established that US$ 1 of public
investment spent through a well-designed public financemechanism (PFM) can leverage between US$ 3 to US$ 15
of private sector money (UNEP & Partners 2009). However,
simply having one or several disparate policies in place is
not enough to catalyse a fresh supply of capital at scale.
The example from India (see Box 9) shows that an array ofwell-orchestrated policy instruments, mechanisms andresponsive institutions are needed to catalyse financealong the innovation continuum.
In 2009, UNEP and its partners explored which types of
PFMs could be effective in mobilising funds from theinstitutional investors into low carbon infrastructure,
particularly in developing countries (UNEP & Partners
2009). Five key barriers were identified, together withremedial PFMs. A case was made that investment-grade
policies to mobilize the private financial sector for theenergy revolution needed to be ambitious (Chatham
House 2009) and should:■■ Adopt legally enforceable targets and schedules forthe adoption of renewable energy on a rolling 15 year
programme and within a framework for the stabilisationof global GHG emission concentrations;■■ Refocus energy policy: adopt full-pricing for nonrenewables in a progressive schedule; provide atapered support programme for renewables, graduallyeliminating subsidies; and simplify and clarify the regime
for renewable energy projects and carbon finance;■■ Align other policies, particularly transport,
development, education with climate change policy;■■ Keep key financial institution decision makers wellinformed about climate change and renewable energy
technologies; and■■ Ensure that multilateral and national public sector
financial institutions support the transfer of renewable
technologies adequately (UNEP FI 2004).

4.6 Scaling up microfinancefor a green economy
Opportunities for sustainable lending are also prevalentat the microlevel. In addition to its well-known successin helping to provide sustainable livelihoods and reducepoverty, microfinance has recently been extended
to such areas as drinking water and sanitation andsmall-scale decentralised energy systems (see Box 10).
Growing in maturity and tested by global economiccrisis, the microfinance industry in recent years has seen
higher intensity of credit and liquidity risks, along withgreater competition, volatility and systems integrity
issues as more financial intermediaries are involved. This
underlines the need to move from crisis management
to more systemic and comprehensive risk management
systems as the industry matures. The experience also
shows the importance of developing meaningful
partnerships and alliances with organisations involvedin the relevant industry, for example the agrifood, value
chain (ADB 2008).
Microinsurance products provide the potential tohelp households, SMEs and other “micro agents”
at local level to adapt to challenges such as climatechange. For example, the first microlevel rainfall
insurance in the world was launched in India in 2003,
through close collaboration among BASIX, an Indian
MFI (microfinance institution), the World Bank, andprivate insurers and reinsurers. The pilot scheme has
been viewed as an impressive success because all
the stakeholders gain: government by reduced relief
payments and social problems, and easier budgeting;the insurer by fulfilling its social insurance quota; theMFI complements its client services and reduces thedefault rate on its loans; the poor farmers receive
reliable protection for their income and assets; andoverseas development agencies avoid disruption
from emergency relief calls, and can claim speedierassistance for clients.

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Towards a green economy

5 Greening global finance andinvestment: enabling conditions
5.1 Setting policy andregulatory frameworks
Regulatory frameworks across capital markets are
critical to channel financial resources at scale towards agreen economy. The gaps between high policy, nationallaws and a financial and capital market system thatfully internalises green economic thinking, althoughnarrowing, remain significant. The legislative, regulatoryand quasi regulatory systems, including the supervisory
bodies and credit rating agencies that govern financial
services, are at best a work in progress and are at worst
poorly designed and not fit- for-purpose for a green
economy. These systems are important because theytransmit green policy goals along the investment chain
and into the processes of financial intermediation, andthrough them into the real economy. It is also important
to note that there is a compressed timetable in which tocreate a policy framework to address these gaps. Climatechange and resource scarcities are already starting toadversely impact social and economic development aswell as environmental integrity. Annual economic losses
associated with climate change and natural disasters
topped US$ 150 billion a year in 2005 (Munich RE
2009) and a credible scenario (UNEP FI CCWG 2007) has
suggested that with BAU, a US$ 1 trillion loss in a given
year by 2040 is possible.
However, it is important to note that the formal linkagesof financial and sustainability-focused policy making at
the highest level are still relatively new. The first formal
gathering of Finance Ministries to discuss climate change
only took place in December 2007 in a meeting parallelto the United Nations climate summit in Bali, Indonesia,
when Ministers or high-level financial policy makers
from 38 countries gathered for two days. The convening
in 2010 by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of a HighLevel Panel to explore the financing response to climatechange is a much-welcomed development.
This section briefly sets out to describe some of the
proposed standards and policy initiatives to help
integrate non-traditional “creeping risks” such as climatechange and resource scarcity into financial policy making.
These include frameworks for enhanced environmental
and social disclosure within the investment sector andcodes for green lending and environmental liability.

614

It is clear that sound public polices and enabling
regulatory frameworks are indispensable for freeing up
the flow of private finance towards a green economy. The
risk/reward equation still works unfavourably for wouldbe green investors. Governments should involve theprivate sector in establishing stable and coherent policy
and regulatory frameworks that require the integrationof environmental, social, and governance issues infinancial policy making. In addition, governments
and multilateral financial institutions should use theirown resources to leverage the financial flow from theprivate sector towards the fledging green economic
opportunities

5.2 Enhanced environmental
and social disclosure
Investors demand full ESG disclosure from companies
so that risks can be monitored. The same approach canbe applied to the finance and investment practitioners.
For example, this year 40 per cent of signatories to the
PRI disclosed in full their annual assessment of how they
are implementing responsible investment. The ground
prepared by this voluntary initiative is now being
closely examined by financial markets and regulators
worldwide. The UK has introduced the Stewardship Code
– a “comply or explain” code for institutional investors toreport on their stewardship activities.
Guidance by the GRI and others on sustainability andintegrated reporting provides an opportunity for bothprivate and public financial institutions to disclose their
management approach to a green economy agenda andreport progress in applying ESG criteria. Combined withtargeted stakeholder engagement, this can improve
management’s ability to effectively consider the direct
and indirect impacts and footprint of the services they
provide. This requires building capacity in the use ofrecognised indicators and metrics for proper assessment,
comparison and Finance benchmarking. Public andprivate banks could be encouraged to measure thenet contribution of their activities to climate change,
biodiversity loss and the green economy at large. Policies
can be designed to improve their green efficiency, forexample by examining and reporting the carbon andecological footprint of their investment portfolios.

Finance
Related standards that can be linked with requirements
for disclosure on progress include governance codes forstock exchanges, green lending and investing standards,
green standards for SWFs, environmental liability
standards, and mandatory endorsement of voluntaryfinance and investment codes. When such standards
and progressive policy are combined the effects canbe impressive, as is the case in the rapid progress of thegreen finance sector in China (see Box 11).

5.3 Supporting institutions
and facilities
Policy frameworks also need to support institutions
and facilities that can finance the transition to a Green
Economy. Key areas of focus include market-based
instrument (i.e. emissions trading schemes, payment forecosystem services schemes, etc.) green bond markets,listing rules and corporate ESG performance, the role of
DFIs, greening sovereign wealth funds, and fiscal policies
Market-based instruments: Emissions trading schemes
Emissions trading schemes are still new to financial
markets and early pilots such as the EU Emission
Trading System (EU ETS) have proved useful, butneed improvements if they are to be more effective.
Domestic and international policies in both developed
and developing countries need to ensure strong
and sustained price signals on carbon emissions andcreate well-designed carbon markets that avoid an
overabundance of permits or a lack of enforcement
capacity.
Expanding and deepening the international carbon
market will need to include greater clarity on the futureinterplay of the CDM, Joint Implementation projects,
and emerging credit mechanisms such as NationallyBox 11: Greening the finance sector in China
Chinese policy makers have in recent years
introduced green credit guidance for the country’s
banking sector and environmental liability guidance
for the insurance industry. China’s leading banks areworking to operationalise revised credit assessment
systems across their main business lines. Also, thecountry’s city-based commercial banks, rural banks
and cooperatives are involved in greening thecountry’s credit system. Similarly, 20 of the country’s
insurers are actively exploring new environmental
liability insurance products and services, while aseries of pilot environmental insurance initiatives
have been carried out with a number of provincial
and municipal authorities around the country.
The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
is tasked with regulating and supervising banks
and non-bank financial institutions. In 2007, CBRC
introduced Energy Conservation and Emission
Reduction regulations requiring financial institutions
to establish an organisational framework and internal
procedures to advance green criteria. Among otherthings, the CBRC’s regulations require a senior banker
in each regulated institution to be responsible andaccountable for green credit as well as to boost
lending to the renewable energy and green sectors.
The CBRC sees two roles for the institutions it
regulates. First, through lending to facilitate newenergy sectors such as wind and solar. Second,by imposing restrictions on clients that are non-compliant with environmental laws and regulations
and by withdrawing existing lending in extreme
cases. Banks are required to submit a report to
CBRC annually to outline their advances in the areaof green credit and in turn the regulator reports
developments to the State Council. The CBRC
encourages its regulated institutions to applyinternational protocols that support sustainability
in financial services.
The role of international financial institutions in
supporting the greening of the Chinese financial
sector is important. For example, the Industrial
Bank of China, Pudong Development Bank, andBeijing Commercial Bank have worked closely with
the IFC to advance energy efficiency projects. The
IFC provides guarantees and assists the banks in
preparing for CDM projects. The Industrial Bank of
China estimates that over two years the reduced
CO2 emissions from its energy efficiency projects is
equivalent to the total emissions of the Beijing taxi
fleet.
On the banking side, ICBC, the largest bank in theworld by market capitalisation, has created a Green
Credit Policies Department in an effort to become
the leading green bank in China. In addition, thebank is active in disaster relief and rural education.
On green credit, ICBC classifies clients into nine
categories and has a colour coding system – black,green, red, and grey – to assess eligibility for credits.

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Towards a green economy
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and REDD+(see Box 2).
Also, the different regional schemes must ensure
consistency and comparability on how emissions andoffsets are measured, verified and reported, and must
avoid the growth of an opaque carbon derivatives
market that might have harmful systemic consequences.
Under Phases I and II of the EU ETS, emissions allowanceswere distributed free, partly to avoid carbon leakage
from industrial production relocating offshore. However,this led to windfall profits for some firms, and has
been subject to gaming by heavy industry to ensurethat the emissions caps were not too challenging. The
consequence has been a rather low carbon price and amuted effect on emission levels themselves compared
to what is deemed to be required.
However, the European system is evolving. In 2010,
the European Commission worked to adopt decisions
governing critical aspects of Phase III of the EU ETS forthe period 2013 to 2020. These include the introduction
and operation of an auctioning system for emission
permits in mainstream sectors, as well as the amountand distribution of free allowances to sectors exposed tocarbon leakage, i.e. competition from countries without
emissions limits. There is also the prospect of revising
the European emission reduction objective upwards
from -20 per cent to -30 per cent by 2020, in line with theEU’s objective of avoiding dangerous climate change,
which is considered to be a temperature increase of 2°C(CDC Climate Research 2010).
Green bond markets
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the green bond market
is growing rapidly. An increasing number of multilateraldevelopment banks are issuing these products, which
are also being issued at the municipal level. There is alsocollaboration with the corporate sector. For example, in
April 2010 the European Investment Bank (rated Moody’s:
Aaa/S&P: AAA) and Daiwa Securities Group announceda € 300 million issuance of Climate Awareness Bonds tofinance the bank’s future lending projects in the fields ofrenewable energy and energy efficiency.
Clearly, policy frameworks need to be flexible enoughto support the differing ideas emerging and the scalerequired. If green bonds are to reach the scale required
to finance a transition to a green economy, then they run
the risk of endangering the AAA ratings of the multilateraldevelopment banks that issue them. These institutions
can only raise so much additional debt before it could
affect their credit rating, which is preciously guarded bytheir treasury departments. This is also true of developed
countries, especially in light of recent very high deficits andconsequent heavy borrowings during the financial crisis.

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Bond issues in the hundreds of millions and even low
billions are within a scale that should not present
fundamental problems. However, consideration of thetens or hundreds of billions of bond issues needed in thegreen scale-up are a different matter. This issue needs
to be addressed by policy makers and regulators. To
some extent, it will be mitigated by improvements in
the global economy and as governments and financial
institutions worldwide repair their balance sheets.
Local institutions may also need human capital support
in moving to the needed scale. Given the risk taken on
by bond issuers and the need to get low-cost capitalflowing, the question is who is best placed to makequick and good decisions to put capital to work ingreen investments that earn adequate returns. To help
close the “green gap”, much lower cost-of-capital debt
ultimately needs to be available to the sponsors anddevelopers of green projects. This likely means it needs
to be channelled through local financial institutions in
the developing countries where these projects exist. This
needs to occur efficiently and with as little as possible lostin carrying costs charged by these intermediaries. Someargue for asset-backed and rated bonds to be issued
directly by major project developers. This alternative
may develop over time.
Listing rules and corporate ESG performance
As the central marketplaces between buyers and sellersof equity securities and other assets, exchanges can –and often do – play a key role in promoting enhanced
corporate ESG disclosure and performance (World
Federation of Exchanges 2009).
Globally, exchanges provide approximately 50 different
sustainability indices, ranging from the generalist
FTSE4Good Index to the specialised Deutsche Börse’s
DAXglobal® Alternative Energy index. Exchanges such
as BM&FBovespa in Brazil, the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange, and Bursa Malaysia also help to drive theavailability of ESG information through corporateawareness raising, and integrated corporate governanceguidelines. In several markets, such as South Africa,
Malaysia and China, exchanges have worked withregulators to incorporate ESG disclosure requirements
into listing rules and company law.
Exchanges that have taken such initiatives have so far
had mixed results in terms of positive reinforcementfrom investors. In addition, companies often highlightthe fact that mainstream investment analysts need to
pay closer attention to ESG issues (UNEP FI and WBCSD
2010). Nevertheless, at a global level the quantity andquality of ESG disclosure by listed companies is highlyvariable and has significant gaps. There is growingpressure from some investors under the framework of
the PRI to strengthen regulation on ESG disclosure. One

Financeoutcome of this, for example, is that in January 2010,
the US SEC issued interpretive guidance on existing
SEC disclosure requirements as they apply to businessor legal developments relating to the issue of climatechange. The following areas are examples of whereclimate change may trigger disclosure requirements::■■ Impact of legislation and regulation (US SEC 2010):
When assessing potential disclosure obligations, acompany should consider whether the impact of certain
existing laws and regulations regarding climate change
is material. In certain circumstances, a company should
also evaluate the potential impact of pending legislation
and regulation related to this topic;■■ Impact of international accords: A company should
consider and disclose, when material, the risks or effects
on its business of international accords and treaties
relating to climate change;■■ Indirect consequences of regulation or businesstrends: Legal, technological, political, and scientificdevelopments regarding climate change may create
new opportunities or risks for companies. For instance,
a company may face decreased demand for goods that
produce significant GHG emissions or increased demand
for goods that result in lower emissions than competingproducts. As such, a company should consider, fordisclosure purposes, the actual or potential indirectconsequences it may face due to climate change related
regulatory or business trends; and■■ Physical impacts of climate change: Companies
should also evaluate for disclosure purposes the actualand potential material impacts of environmental matterson their business.
Development finance institutions
Providing long-term public funding at home andabroad, Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) canplay a significant role in supporting key elements ofthe emerging green economy. Issues such as climatechange, energy security, and food security were a
key consideration in the decision of shareholder
governments to provide significant capital increases to
the key multilateral development banks in 2010. DFI’s
include:■■ Multilateral DFIs such as the World Bank, the IFC, theInter-American Development Bank, the ADB, the African
Development Bank, the EBRD, and the EIB, which in 2009were reported to have committed US$ 168 billion (WorldBank 2010b);■■ Bilateral DFIs, such as KFW group, which is German
government-owned, with two subsidiaries focusedon international development finance; AFD, a Frenchgovernment-owned bank focused on developing
and emerging countries and the French Overseas
Communities; FMO, an entrepreneurial development bankfounded by the Dutch government, targeting the private
sector in developing countries; CDC, a UK governmentowned institution, providing investment capital forbusiness in particularly Sub-Saharan Africa and SouthAsia; and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation/
Japan International Cooperation Agency; and■■ National DFIs such as the Development Bank ofSouthern Africa, a South African government-ownedbank focused on infrastructure development in South
Africa and its sub-region; the Brazilian Development Bank,
which is government-owned and finances developmentin Brazil and expansion of national companies abroad;the Caisse des Dépôts group, a public investor
supporting the economic development of France; andthe Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which
is US government-owned and supports US business athome and abroad.
Some of these institutions belong to more than
one category. For example, the KfW is both a majordomestic financial institution and a strong international
development bank. Within this group of banks, many
provide loans, both concessional and non-concessional,
to governments only. But a growing number fund subregional entities, state-owned corporations, and private
sector businesses.
These Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) play a critical rolein funding macroeconomic policies, sectoral policies,
major infrastructure projects, and private sector
development. Their contribution to greening national
economies is already significant. They fund major
sectors such as water, renewable energy, forestry,
and agriculture. FDIs have been instrumental inmainstreaming microfinance and supporting thedevelopment of private industries in risky green
sectors at early stages of development. But their role
could be strengthened further, taking advantage ofthe prominent position they occupy in the funding ofdomestic investment programmes. Steps in this direction
would include better identification of green economy
aspects in their strategic targets, greater share of theiractivities devoted to these aspects, better measurement
and reporting methodologies, improved cooperation
among themselves, and sharing of best practices.
Governments are in a position to officially task these
institutions to support green economy development,
backed by concrete goals and targets. Carbon emissions
reduction, access to water and sanitation, biodiversity
promotion, etc., could become official goals for FDIs, inaddition to poverty alleviation (UNDP 2007/2008) andinfrastructure financing.

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Towards a green economy
Development banks also have a major indirect or direct
influence through the conditionalities they tie theirfunding to and through the due diligence they practice,for instance when they fund private corporations. They
also provide technical assistance to public and private
institutions. The three categories of institutions cancollaborate in defining standard protocols for green
due diligence, and work on standards and goals for
sectors in which they have a major influence, such as
municipal finance, transport, and energy. Domestic andsome international DFIs play a major role in municipal
finance and housing. These are two critical areas forthe green economy: developing green practices for
local municipalities and greening the housing sector,
especially social housing.

The shareholders of the private sector dedicated DFIs, or theprivate sector arms of development banks, could consider
promoting even further their traditional role in incubating
and developing nascent green markets. Given the shortageof equity, a barrier even higher for green activities thanaccess to credit, this could include additional support forcleantech private equity and green VC funds in developing
countries. They could also play a greater role in further
influencing the private banking sector, providing dedicatedcredit lines to green market activities at low interest rates
and incentives for public and commercial banks to movetheir services towards green economy goals.
At the international level, some – such as the WorldBank – focus solely on sovereign finance, which isBox 12: Caisse des Dépôts and its long-term investment model
The group Caisse des Dépôts, a French publicfinancial institution, is defined by law as a long-term
investor serving the public interest and economic
development. It has integrated ESG criteria upstream
in its investment decision making process, as well as inits shareholder’s activities through a constant dialogue
with the companies listed on the stock exchange
market in which it holds shares. The Caisse des Dépôts
model is now widely recognised. A first global forum
gathering the main public financial institutions
comparable to Caisse des Dépôts was held in Moroccoin early 2011 to examine the potential of this model tobe replicated and address long-term economic needs.
What characterises long-term investors such as
Caisse des Dépôts is their robust capital base,which enables them to absorb short-term financial
fluctuations. As such, they are in a position toaddress green economy financing challenges from
R&D to production. They can foster innovation by
financing platforms that gather research centers andprivate companies in order to value technologicalbreakthroughs in the fields of eco- innovation andrenewable energies. Long-term investors also havethe capacity to finance projects yielding revenues
only as of five to ten10 years. Caisse des Dépôts hascreated such a platform and since2008 is implementing a € 150 million investment planin several fields, such as photovoltaic solar energy,
biomass, windmills, and water power, to contribute toFrance’s efforts to cut its GHG emissions by 20 per cent.
The bank has also joined forces with other longterm investors in the framework of the Long-Term

618

Investment Club and created with its partners –Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, KfW Bankengruppe, andthe EIB – two investment funds in the infrastructure
sector. One of them, the 2020 Marguerite fundfor energy, climate change and infrastructures, isdedicated to the EU-27 zone and committed toinvest in renewable energies for 35 to 45 per centof the total size of the fund. The other, InfraMed, isfocused on the Union for the Mediterranean zone.
The management of both follow a philosophy oflong-term investments, which means:■■ The investments are stable for 20 years and nocore sponsor may transfer its shares during the lockup period of 10 years;■■ The investments are stable for 20 years and nocore sponsor may transfer its shares during the lockup period of 10 years;■■ The incentives of the advisory team are basedon long-term performance criteria and are fully
consistent with the general principles of long-term
performance endorsed by the G20; and■■ In terms of governance, a good balance between
the interests of the investors and the autonomy of
the advisory team is sought. For the InfraMed fund,strict ESG criteria are applied on the basis of the EIB
requirements.
The experience of European long-term investors
could serve as a basis for building up a doctrine
for responsible public investment in the green
economy.

Finance
lending and other support to governments. Others, likethe IFC and the EBRD, are wholly or mainly concernedwith private sector development in emerging markets,and invest on commercial terms. DFIs deploy a range
of instruments including debt financing, equity
investment, guarantees, and trade finance programmes.
Multilateral development banks also leverage grantfunding from donor governments or entities such as
the GEF and provide technical assistance and advisory
services.
The DFI community also includes long-term investors,
such as the French CDC, the Italian CdP, Germany’s
KfW, and the Moroccan CDG, characterised by a low
reliance on short-term market liquidity thanks tostable resources, often comprised of regulated or
guaranteed deposits, long-term savings products orlong-term borrowing. These institutions typically havea robust capital base, stemming mainly from reserve
accumulation, which enables them to absorb short-term
fluctuations in financial markets. As such they can invest
in – often illiquid – capital or debt instruments that yielda profitable return in the long run, such as those issuedby companies operating in sectors such as generalinterest utilities, infrastructures or renewable energies(see Box 12).
The World Bank’s operations range from the integrationof climate change issues into sectoral strategies to the
management of specialised investment funds andraising capital for project finance through green bonds.
In the private sector arena, the IFC provides a suite offinance and advisory services ranging from energy
efficiency financing facilities for intermediation by local

banks, to support for low carbon investment indices andthe issuance of green bonds. As a global fund dedicatedto the environment, the GEF (see Box 13) provides
funding to cover the incremental or additional costs
associated with transforming a project with national
benefits into one with global environmental benefits.
Its Earth Fund targets private sector engagement
through public private partnerships. Up to 2009, the
GEF has invested US$ 2.7 billion to support climatechange mitigation projects in developing countries andeconomies in transition, and leveraged another US$
17.2 billion in project co-financing. With its longer term
focus, it can provide critical support in scaling up green
economy projects in areas such as climate, water, land,
forest and chemicals management.
The EBRD’s Sustainable Energy Initiative (SEI) has aninvestment target of € 3 billion to € 5 billion from2009 to 2011, with a corresponding carbon reduction
target of 25 to 35 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent per
annum. Amongst other activities, EBRD has emerged
as the dominant investor in renewable energy in its
region of operations – Central and Eastern Europe, andCentral Asia – concentrating primarily on wind power.
Like the World Bank Group, the EBRD has also begun
to increase its focus on climate change adaptation
by developing new tools to integrate adaptation risk
into project due diligence and structuring, as well as
financing infrastructure projects such as flood defence
schemes. IFC, EBRD and other DFIs are also collaboratingon protocols for GHG assessment and several of them
report publicly on the annual emission reductions andemission increases associated with new projects signed
each year.

Box 13: The Global Environment Facility (GEF)
The Global Environment Facility (GEF), the world’s
largest public environmental fund, provides
grants to developing countries and countries witheconomies in transition for projects related tobiodiversity, climate change, international waters,
land degradation, the ozone layer, and persistentorganic pollutants. The GEF serves as a financial
mechanism for the UN conventions on Biological
Diversity, Climate Change, Persistent Organic
Pollutants and Desertification. The GEF partners
with ten intergovernmental agencies, including
UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank as implementing
agencies. The latter has also served as the Trusteeof the GEF Trust Fund since 1994. Established in
1991, the GEF is today the largest funder of projects
to improve the global environment. The GEF has

allocated US$ 9.2 billion, supplemented by morethan US$ 40 billion in co- financing, for more than
2,700 projects in more than 165 developing countries
and countries with economies in transition. Throughits Small Grants Programme (SGP), the GEF has also
made more than
12,000 small grants directly to nongovernmental
and community organisations, totalling US$ 495
million. Grants can be awarded up to a US$ 50,000
ceiling with an average grant typically about US$
25,000 per project. The small grants network which
has been designed to empower local communities
make investment choices that have the multiple
benefit of generating green jobs at home while
protecting the global environment.

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Towards a green economy
Development finance institutions can play a key role inincubating and developing nascent markets. They havebeen instrumental over the last decade in supporting
microfinance to the extent that it is now a relatively
mature asset class. Current activities in frontier sectors
include support for cleantech private equity and VC
funds in developing countries, and an increasingemphasis on solutions for poor consumers.
Greening sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)
The growth of state-owned investment funds willing toinvest globally is relatively new, but already significant in
its impact. While there are concerns about the growing
influence of SWFs – such as their capacity for exploiting
market inefficiencies and a lack of transparency – thesefunds can play a major role in financing the green
economy transition.
Support should go towards helping SWFs to incorporate
climate risk considerations directly and systematicallyinto their actual stock selection and portfolio
construction processes, as is the case with the exampleof the Norwegian Pension Fund Global (see Box 14).
Suggestions such as the creation of mutual green funds

invested in by collaborating SWFs – such as Brazil’s
Amazon Fund launched in 2008 to solicit international
donations to save the Amazon forest – are also worth
considering.
Like pension funds, SWFs tend to have a long- termhorizon. As a result, SWFs have a clear interest
in improving the environmental performance ofcompanies and other entities in which they invest, so as
to enhance their long-term returns and better manage
risk and reputation.

5.4 Fiscal policies
Green Economy fiscal policy options fall into five broad
categories. These cover environmental tax reforms
and instruments such as carbon taxes, tax exemptions
and reductions; broader and robust pollution charges;
green subsidies, grants and subsidised loans to reward
environmental performance; removing environmentally
harmful subsidies; and direct public expenditure on
infrastructure. They can serve, among other things,
to address high upfront investment costs. This smart

Box 14: Norwegian Pension Fund Global
The Norwegian Pension Fund Global, one of thelargest SWFs in the world, has a broad ownership in
approximately 8,400 companies worldwide. The fund islargely passively invested and holds an average ownershipshare of 1 per cent in each company it is invested in. The
fund is a universal owner with a long investment horizon,
and inherently has a clear financial interest in companies
taking good corporate governance and environmental
and social issues duly into account. Fiduciary responsibility
for the fund also includes safeguarding widely shared
ethical values. In the area of environmental issues,
including climate change mitigation and adaptation, thefund employs the following tools:
Research
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance, acting as
principal for the fund, currently participates in a
climate change and strategic asset allocation research
project between the investment consultancy Mercerand 13 other large international pension funds from
Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia. A reportfrom this project was published in February 2011.
Environmental investment programme
The Norwegian Finance Ministry has established a
new investment programme for the fund that will620

focus on environmental investment opportunities,
such as climate-friendly energy, improving
energy efficiency, CCS, water technology, andthe management of waste and pollution. The
investments will have a clear financial objective(Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2010). At the endof 2009, over NOK 7 billion had been invested
under this programme, a faster escalation thanoriginally assumed (Norwegian Ministry of Finance2011).
Dialogue with companies
The pension fund’s manager, Norges Bank throughits asset management department Norges Bank
Investment Management (NBIM), has set out
its expectations on companies’ climate change
management. As a long-term investor, it is of vital
importance that the fund is able to evaluate thedegree to which a specific company is exposed to
the risks and opportunities that arise from climatechange, both in its direct operations and across its
supply chain. NBIM considers companies’ efficient
adaptation to this transition to be a significant factor
when protecting the financial assets of the fund,and expects companies to develop a well-defined
climate change strategy.

Finance
combination can also be mutually reinforcing, forexample, using taxes to reinforce the impact of other
instruments such as standards and subsidies. In thefield of building and construction (see the Buildings
Chapter), tax credits can be used to boost green or
energy-efficient development, and the renovation of
investment property.

stock that supports the green economic transition (UNEP2010). As noted earlier, between 15 to 20 per cent of the
US$ 3 trillion global public stimulus packages pledged
in response to the financial crisis, upward of US$ 470
billion, was earmarked for green economy spending,including significant amounts for job-creating green
infrastructure projects.

The cases of tax incentives and subsidies show that
it is not simply about new incentives, but also about
making sure that existing incentives do not support
unsustainable activities. Some approaches and reforms
are more difficult to implement than others. For
example, the creation of green subsidies or removing
environmentally harmful subsidies is often technicallyand politically difficult, especially when public finances
are stretched and subsidy removal is thought to haveadverse impacts on poor households. Also, the reality ofthe mainstream financial sector is that it remains wedded
to serving the finance, investment and insurance needsof the brown economy and traditional infrastructureneeds across heavy industry, power generation andtransportation – a classic case of vested interests.

These investments are not confined to short-term
responses to the financial and economic crisis, however,and new thought is being given beyond the recovery
to ensuring a lasting transition. For example, during the12th five-year plan period starting 2011, the Chinese
government will invest US$ 468 billion in green sectors
compared to US$ 211 billion over the last five years, with afocus on three sectors: waste recycling and re-utilisation;clean technologies; and renewable energy. With thisamount of public investment, China’s environmental
protection industry is expected to continue growing at
an average of 15 to 20 per cent per year and its industrial
output is expected to reach US$ 743 billion during the
new five-year period, up from US$ 166 billion in 2010.
The multiplier effect of this emerging sector is estimatedto be 8 to 10 times larger than other industrial sectors.

For example, it is estimated that the removal of the US$
500 billion in subsidies underpinning the fossil fuel sector
globally could boost the global economy by around 0.3
per cent (UNEP 2010), a clear mid to long-term benefit
for financial service institutions. Yet, in the short to midterm, removing such subsidies fundamentally changes
the risk/reward equation for the entire fossil fuel sector.
Thus, their phase-in would need to be gradual andflanking measures put in place targeted on protecting
the poor from potentially adverse impacts.
Achieving an optimal configuration of public policy
and investment choices in infrastructure that acts to“crowd in” rather than “crowd out” private finance andinvestment – for example, building a smart electricity
grid – will be a requirement to create long-term capital

In countries where public financing based on tax
revenues and governments’ ability to borrow from
capital markets are constrained, reform of subsidies
and taxation policies can be used to open fiscal spacefor green investments. Subsidies in the areas of energy,
water, fisheries and agriculture, for example, reduce
the prices and encourage excessive use of the related
natural capital. At the same time, they impose a recurrent
burden on the public budget. Phasing out such subsidies
and introducing taxes on the use of energy and natural
resources can enhance efficiency while strengthening
public finance and freeing up resources for green
investments. Removing subsidies in these four sectors
alone, for example, would save between 1 to 2 per centof global GDP every year.

621

Towards a green economy

6 Conclusions
The financial sector’s role in facilitating progress towards
sustainable development has evolved considerably
since the concept first received global attention at the
UN Conference of Environment and Development in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The intervening years have seen
significant developments, ranging from successful
partnership initiatives such as the UNEP FinanceInitiative7 and the PRI8 to the integration of ESG factors
in asset ownership and significant growth in private
sector flows to niche asset classes such as microfinance,
clean technology and sustainable energy. Investors
are increasingly moving from responsible investment(do no harm) to sustainable investment (investment insolutions to sustainability challenges).
A global transition towards a green economy will require
substantial redirection of investment to increase thecurrent level of public and private sector flows to key
priority areas, the bulk of which will need to be mobilised
through financial markets. Analysis and modelling
conducted for the Green Economy Report suggests thatthe level of additional investment needed is between 1
to 2.5 per cent of global GDP per year from 2010 to 2050.
Currently, green economy investment is well below 1 percent of global GDP.
The vast majority of the investment that needs to be
re- directed to the green economy will need to comefrom the private financial sector if key sustainable
development goals are to be achieved in the necessary
time scales. National and international public sector
resources are significantly smaller than those of the
global financial market. Following the 2008 to 2009
financial crisis, the BIS has projected a high debt/GDP
ratio for many major economies for the next twenty
years. As a consequence, public funds available for a shift
to a green economy are likely to be far below the level
required. Developing countries, with the exception of
the most vibrant emerging economies, will have limited
fiscal options to support a green economy.
If a robust business case can be created and properly
demonstrated, for example, by governments fully
implementing the “polluter pays” and “user pays”

7. In 2010, 200 banks, insurers and investment organizations weresignatories to the United Nations Environment Programme FinanceInitiative. http://www.unepfi.org
8. A further 900 investment organizations, including service organizations,
support the UN-backed Principles for Responsible Investment. http://www.
unpri.org/principles

622

principles agreed by OECD countries, then arguably
some of this re-deployment of capital will occur
naturally as investors pursuing enlightened self-interest
shift their assets from less attractive brown economy(based on fossil fuels) activities. Opportunities for scaling
up green finance exist across the market, especially insectors such as renewable energy or green property,
and in mainstream finance through the growing trend
towards consideration of ESG issues and accounting forenvironmental externalities. However, less mature andnascent segments of green economy finance – such as
REDD+ or sustainable energy services for the poor – will
require patient and wise incubation.
However, public financing is essential for the transition
to a green economy and more than justified by the
positive externalities that would be generated. The roleof public finance in supporting a green economy wasdemonstrated by the green components of the massive
fiscal stimulus packages launched by G20 countries
in responding to the financial and economic crisis,
which broke out in 2008. Out of the US$ 3 trillion of thestimulus funds, more than 15 per cent was allocated togreen sectors or to greening brown sectors.
Public financing for green investments is not confined toshort-term responses to the financial and economic crisis.
The Republic of Korea, for example, has included publicfunds for green investments in the country’s five-year
development plan. In many least developed countries,
however, public financing covering tax revenues andgovernments’ ability to borrow directly from capital
markets is seriously constrained. In these countries,
international and regional development banks should
explore how they can increase development financethat supports agreed priorities for green investment.
Green stimulus packages and agile financial markets
alone are unlikely to unlock the scale of private financeneeded for the transition to a green economy. Sound
public polices and enabling regulatory frameworks arealso indispensable. Although an increasing number offinancial institutions are becoming interested in a green
economy, the majority of market players remain wedded
to the traditional, brown economy. This is largely due toinadequate policy and regulatory frameworks that failto provide a level playing field. The risk/reward equation
still works unfavourably for would-be green investors.
Governments should involve the private sector inestablishing stable and coherent policy and regulatory

Financeframeworks that would better integrate environmental,social, and governance issues in investment decisions
and financial policy making. In addition, governments
and multilateral financial institutions should use theirown resources to leverage the financial flows from theprivate sector and direct them towards the fledgling
green economic opportunities.
In the lead up to the Rio+ 20 Earth Summit in Brazil in
2012, there is a need to establish clear and workable
frameworks, including regulation where necessary, torebalance the risk/reward equation for financial andinvestment practitioners in favour of green investment.
It is clear that across banking, investment and insurance– the core activities of the world’s financial system –significant changes in philosophy, culture, strategy andapproach, notably the overwhelming dominance of“short-termism”, will be required if capital and financeare to be reallocated to accelerate the emergenceof a green economy. At the same time, fundamental
aspects of international accounting systems and capital
market disciplines, as well as our understanding of
fiduciary responsibility in investment policy making andinvestment decision making, will need to evolve to fully
integrate a broader range of ESG factors than takes place
today. Without these changes, the pricing signals andincentives that could support the transition to a green
economy will remain weak.

623

Towards a green economy

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Conclusions

Towards a green economy

Conclusions
Moving towards a green economy has the potential
to achieve sustainable development and eradicate
poverty on an unprecedented scale, with speed andeffectiveness. This potential derives from two concurrent
changes. First, there is a changed playing field in which
our world and the risks we face have materially changed.
These changes require a fundamental rethinking of ourapproach to the economy. Second, there is a growing
recognition that the natural environment forms thebasis of our physical assets and must be managed as asource of growth, prosperity and well-being.
As this report has argued, reallocating public and private
investments – spurred through appropriate policy
reforms and enabling conditions – is needed to build up
or enhance natural capital such as forests, water, soil andfish stocks, which are particularly important for the ruralpoor. Green investments will enhance new sectors andtechnologies that will be the main sources of economic
development and growth of the future: renewableenergy technologies, resource and energy efficientbuildings and equipment, low-carbon public transportsystems, infrastructure for fuel efficient and clean
energy vehicles, and waste management and recycling
facilities. Complementary investments are required inhuman capital, including greening-related knowledge,
management and technical skills to ensure a smoothtransition to a more sustainable development pathway.
One of the major findings of this report is that a green
economy supports growth, income and jobs, and thatthe so-called trade-off between economic progress andenvironmental sustainability is a myth, especially if one
measures wealth as stocks of useful assets, inclusive of
natural assets, and not narrowly as flows of produced
output. The results of the report indicate that in the
short term, economic growth under a green scenario
may be less than under business-as-usual. However, inthe longer term – 2020 and beyond – moving towards agreen economy would outperform business-as-usual byboth traditional measures (GDP growth) as well as more
holistic measures (per capita growth).
The report also finds that in a number of importantsectors, such as agriculture, buildings, forestry andtransport, a green economy delivers more jobs in the
short, medium and long-term than business-as-usual.
In sectors where capital is severely depleted, such as
fisheries, greening will necessitate the loss of income
and jobs in the short and medium-term to replenish
natural stocks, but this will prevent the permanent

628

loss of income and jobs. In such cases, transitionalarrangements are needed to protect workers fromnegative impacts on their livelihoods.
Although the bulk of the investments required for the green
transformation will come from the private sector, public
policy will also play a leading role in overcoming distortions
introduced by perverse subsidies and externalised costs. In
addition, public investment will be required to jump-startan effective transition to a green economy.
There is much more private capital available than thefinancial resources of the public sector. However, many
developing countries have limited access to private
capital. A large amount of the funds needed for green
investments at scale in the initial stages of the transition
towards a green economy must come from new andinnovative financing mechanisms. In this regard, the
new Green Climate Fund and nascent REDD+ funding
mechanisms offer significant hope for achieving thefinance required. Where national budgetary conditions
are limited, multilateral development banks are ideally
positioned to offer financial assistance to enable thesecountries to embark on a green development trajectory.
Directions for further researchThis report has analysed the enabling conditions required
to mobilise investment, and the potential benefits ofthis investment in greening the world economy. It
has provided fresh perspectives on the synergistic
relationships between investing in low-carbon, resource
efficient technology and socially inclusive economic
growth.
Inevitably, as new research is provided new boundaries
of knowledge and gaps are found. A number of areas
where further research will be needed to provide more
specific guidance on a green economy transformation
have emerged in the process of writing this report.
These areas include research to answer the following
questions, among others:
1. How to manage a smooth and fair transition froma brown economy to a green one at global level? In
this report, responses to transitional issues have focusedon capacity building, training and educational efforts.
Also important, however, is how countries should set anappropriate pace for a transition from the predominantly
brown economy to a green one. Many countries arefacing rigidities of an infrastructure and industrial basethat was developed under the brown economic model.

Conclusions
In many cases, due to this rigidity, the inertia of moving
along the brown economy path is likely to continue
for some time. How should the move towards a green
economy take such inertia into account?

the limited number of indicators that can measure theprogress countries have made in transforming theireconomic structure from brown to green, including
more adequate indicators for measuring economic
prosperity and wealth creation beyond GDP.

2. How to ensure that green policies are not used
as a pretext for trade protectionism? This report has
identified the positive role trade can play in facilitating
the transfer and deployment of environmental
technologies across countries. It has also cautioned
against using green economy policies as a pretext for
trade protectionism. Practical solutions are needed to
manage emerging conflicts. In some countries, “buylocal” can arguably be a green economy policy, as
reduced need for transport may reduce the ecologicalfootprint. However, this type of policy can have adverse
impact on the exports of other countries, including
those that need foreign exchange to import goods thatare essential for reducing poverty and improving living
standards.

Towards a green economy
This report marks a first step in outlining key issues formoving towards a green economy at a national andglobal level. In summary, it has found that a green
economy values and invests in natural capital. Ecosystemservices are better conserved, leading to improved safety
nets and household incomes for poor rural communities.
Ecologically friendly farming methods improve yields
significantly for subsistence farmers. Improvements infreshwater access and sanitation, and innovations for
non-grid energy (solar electricity, biomass stoves, etc.),
add to the suite of green economy strategies, which canalso help alleviate poverty.

Another emerging conflict surfaces because countries
that provide state support to green economic sectors
such as renewable energy technologies give domestic
enterprises a competitive edge in the export of thesetechnologies. The question arises: Is it possible toensure fair trade, while recognising the need for stateinterventions in jump-starting the transition to a green
economy?

A green economy substitutes clean energy and lowcarbon technologies for fossil fuels, which addresses
climate change, creates decent jobs and reduces importdependencies. New technologies promoting energy
and resource efficiency provide growth opportunities
in new directions, offsetting brown economy job losses.
Resource efficiency in both energy and materials use
becomes a driving proposition, be it in better waste
management, more public transportation, green
buildings or less waste along the food chain.

3. How to measure progress in the transition to agreen economy? The various chapters of this report
have used a wide range of indicators to highlight:■■ The extent of the challenges, for example, levels of
CO2 emissions and the number of people lacking accessto energy;■■ The extent of the opportunities, such as the size ofthe market for more resource efficient and low-carbon
technologies;■■ Policies established, such as renewable energy
targets; and,■■ Policy outcomes, such as the rate of recycling
achieved, as well as the material and energy intensity of
production and consumption.
Although different sectors will need different matrices
to measure progress towards greening, at a national
economy level there is a need for aggregates to inform
policy making. At the moment, such aggregates are
not fully developed or agreed upon by the statisticalcommunity. Further research is needed on what are

Regulations, standards and targets are important toprovide direction. However, developing countries mustbe allowed to move at their own speed, respecting theirdevelopment objectives, circumstances and constraints.
Developed nations have a key role to play in building
skills and capacity in developing countries and increating an international market and legal infrastructure
for a green economy.
Enabling conditions have to be managed and adequate
finance provided for a successful transition to a green
economy. Both are eminently achievable. Environmentallyand socially harmful subsidies are a deterrent and should
be phased out. However, in select circumstances and overdefined periods, rational use of subsidies can facilitate thetransition to a green economy. Taxes and other marketbased instruments can be used to stimulate the necessary
investment and innovation for funding the transition. The
scale of financing required for a green economy transitionis large, but it can be mobilised by smart public policy
and innovative financing mechanisms.
A green economy can generate as much growth andemployment as a brown economy, and outperforms629

Towards a green economy

the latter in the medium and long-run, while
yielding significantly more environmental and social
benefits. Of course, there are many risks and challenges
along the way. However, the biggest risk of all is toremain with the status quo and not engage in a transition
towards a green economy.

Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011
Version -- 02.11.2011

630

Moving towards a green economy will require world
leaders, civil society and leading businesses tocollaboratively engage in this transition. It will requirea sustained effort on the part of policy makers andtheir constituents to rethink and redefine traditional
measures of wealth, prosperity and well-being.

www.unep.org
United Nations Environment Programme
P.O. Box 30552 - 00100 Nairobi, Kenya
Tel.: +254 20 762 1234
Fax: +254 20 762 3927
e-mail: uneppub@unep.org
www.unep.org

Towards a Green Economy is among UNEP’s key contributions to the Rio+20 process andthe overall goal of addressing poverty and delivering a sustainable 21st century.
The report makes a compelling economic and social case for investing two per cent of
global GDP in greening ten central sectors of the economy in order to shift development
and unleash public and private capital flows onto a low-carbon, resource-efficient path.

Job number: DTI/1360/GE