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2013-09

Building Toward Trilateral Cooperation
on Extended Deterrence in Northeast
Asia: the First US-ROK-Japan Extended
Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue
Santoro, David
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Issues & Insights ; Vol. 13-No. 14
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37913

Building Toward Trilateral Cooperation
on Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia
The First US-ROK-Japan
Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue

A Conference ReportbyDavid Santoro and Brad Glosserman

Issues & Insights
Vol. 13-No. 14

Seoul, Republic of Korea
September 2013

The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Founded in 2008, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies (asaninst.org) is an independent,
non-partisan think tank with the mandate to undertake policy-relevant research to foster
domestic, regional, and international environments that are conducive to peace andstability on the Korean Peninsula and Korean reunification.

Pacific Forum CSIS
Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as theautonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, DC. The Forum’s programs encompass current and emerging political,
security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue
undertaken with the region’s leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas.
Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from aroundthe Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings andrecommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout
the region.

Table of Contents
Page
Acknowledgements ……………….………………………………………..........

iv

Conference Key Findings …………………………………………….....………

v

Conference Report: ………..……………………………………………….........

1

Appendices
Appendix A: Conference Agenda………………………………………………… A-1
Appendix B: Conference Participant List …..…..………………….…….……
B-1

iii

Acknowledgements

This publication results from research supported by the Naval Postgraduate School’s
Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction (PASCC) via Assistance Grant/Agreement No. N00244-13-1-0023 awarded
by the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUPFLC San Diego). The
views expressed in written materials or publications, and/or made by speakers,
moderators, and presenters, do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the Naval
Postgraduate School nor does mention of trade names, commercial practices, ororganizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.

iv

Key Findings
US-ROK-Japan Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue

The Pacific Forum CSIS, with the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, and withsupport from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD(PASCC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), held a US-ROK-Japan
Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue on Sept. 2-3, 2013. Some 35 US, ROK, andJapanese experts, officials, military officers, and observers, along with 15 Pacific Forum
Young Leaders attended, all in their private capacities. Key findings include:
A changed and changing regional security environment has created new problems
for extended deterrence and assurance. As North Korea becomes capable of striking the
US homeland, some South Koreans raised concern that North Korea might conclude that
Washington would be reluctant to defend them in a conflict. Other participants worried
that North Korea will think that its improved nuclear forces provide cover to be moreaggressive or overconfident at the conventional level China’s nuclear and conventional
force modernization (and its growing assertiveness on territorial and maritime issues) arealso increasingly worrisome,South Koreans and Japanese stress the essential role of US nuclear weapons forextended deterrence and assurance missions; some South Koreans expressed concern
over the US policy to reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons. South Koreansexpressed skepticism about ballistic missile defense and conventional strike options fordeterrence purposes and argued that emphasizing such efforts could undermine extended
deterrence. Americans stressed that the conventional and nuclear components of extended
deterrence are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.
South Koreans and Japanese want clarity on US nuclear doctrine. If nuclear
weapons would only be used in ‘extreme cases,’ some asked for details about what
constitutes an extreme case.
Both allies recognize they must strengthen their defense postures to respond tochallenges that fall below the extended deterrence threshold and emphasized the value of
deterrence by early detection.
South Korean and Japanese governments seek expanded indigenous capabilities
to increase their deterrent capability and as contributions to the alliance. South Korea
concluded an agreement with the US to extend missile ranges and Japan is considering
strike options. Each sees its own actions as positive and the others as potentiallytroublesome.
While no decisions have been made about Tokyo’s pursuit of offensive strike
options, Japanese emphasized that uch capabilities would not be used for pre-emption but
for retaliation; this did not reflect concern about the credibility of extended deterrence
but, rather, concern that the North may be overconfident in its capabilities. Japanese also
noted that the correct English translation of offensive strike does not imply preemption.
South Koreans worry about Japan’s acquisition of strike capabilities, arguing that
the ROK constitution defines all the Korean Peninsula as ROK territory and that a strikeagainst the DPRK would be a strike against the ROK. While this is a legal fiction, itv

demonstrates the sensitivity surrounding Japanese interest in offensive capabilities.
Japanese understand Seoul’s push for the revision of its missile guidelines, but argued
that this was completed in a non-transparent manner.
Japanese called for greater transparency in US-ROK alliance talks, referencing
the OpCon transfer in particular, to assuage concerns about what was happening, why,
and the implications of the process. The US-Japan alliance and the UNC rear are key to
Korean Peninsula defense and Tokyo should be better informed of US-ROK alliancedevelopments.
The crisis in Syria was referenced as a test of US credibility: “red lines should not
be drawn unless you intend to enforce them”; not doing so would damage US credibility
among allies and adversaries. The difficulties faced by the administration to garnerdomestic support for the use of force against Syria prompted concerns about the US
ability to react quickly to a contingency in Northeast Asia.
It is not clear what situations become tests of US credibility and commitment, andwhy. The tendency to see every challenge as such a threat must be resisted. More work
must be done to identify what makes some challenges more critical than others.
While South Koreans are the most reluctant of the three countries to publicly
identify China as a potential threat, most are clear-eyed about the challenges posed by
China’s growing strength. They readily acknowledge that some foreign policy decisions(including those related to missile defense) reflect concern about Korean vulnerability to
Chinese pressure. Japanese are most vocal about a potential Chinese threat, in view of thecurrent row over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. They stressed that the United States should
not acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China. Doing so, they fear, could embolden
Chinese regional assertiveness.
Americans, South Koreans, and Japanese see opportunities for trilateral
cooperation, namely in the form of joint exercises, to deal with the DPRK. However,acknowledging that ‘publics’ shape policy and could derail such cooperation, participants
were divided on whether this process should receive high-level attention or develop at theoperational level. All agree that high-level support is essential to permit cooperation toproceed; the question is whether to highlight lower-level successes.
Tensions in the overall Korea-Japan relationship inhibit greater defense
cooperation, even when such cooperation is seen as contributing to both sides’ national
security.
South Koreans explained that the current debate over reintroducing US tactical
nuclear weapons on the Peninsula and/or developing an independent South Korea nuclear
capability is in part driven by a lack of other options to bring pressure on Beijing toconstrain Pyongyang, arguing that this quest is not reflective of a lack of confidence inthe US extended deterrent.
Americans insisted that reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons and/or
development by Seoul of nuclear weapons runs contrary to US policy, which seeks to
reduce nuclear weapons in the world, and would serve to justify rather than delegitimize
the DPRK’s nuclear policy.

viBoth US allies argued that US consistency is critical to reassurance and warned
that change in US policy if/once North Korea develops a long-range nuclear capability
would undermine US credibility.
While US commitments to force level benchmarks are helpful, South Koreans andJapanese participants said that force readiness was important than numbers.
Efforts by Seoul and Tokyo to develop expanded missile capabilities may
influence Russian thinking. This could impact the debate over the consolidation of US
and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. More attention needs to be paid on how
developments in one region may impact on another.
Americans, South Koreans, and Japanese all acknowledged the value of this
dialogue in promoting trilateral cooperation on extended deterrence and assurance. The
Japanese in particular saw this dialogue as critical in helping promote understanding ofJapan’s positions in Korea. With the right people, this process can produce positive
results. Table top exercises could enhance track-2 and at track-1 dialogue efforts.

vii

viii

Building Toward Trilateral Cooperation on
Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia
A Conference Report byDavid Santoro and Brad Glosserman
North Korea's rapid nuclear and missile developments and China's steady force
modernization are creating new security challenges for Northeast Asian stability. These
challenges have important implications for US extended deterrence, which Washington
has long provided to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Taking stock of these newchallenges, the United States has strengthened its extended deterrence relationships withboth its allies by adapting its force posture and policy and by establishing bilateral
consultative mechanisms that meet on a regular basis to provide alliance solutions tothese problems: the US-ROK Extended Deterrence Policy Committee and the US-Japan
Extended Deterrence Dialogue. While progress has been made, much remains to be donein both bilateral alliances. At the same time, at least from a US perspective, stronger
cooperation on extended deterrence and assurance at the trilateral level would further
strengthen regional stability.
To shed light on ways to enhance US-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation on
extended deterrence and to prod the three countries toward this end, the Pacific Forum
CSIS, with the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, with support from the Naval
Postgraduate School's Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, held a USROK-Japan Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue in Seoul, South Korea on Sept. 2-3,
2013. Thirty-five US, Korean, and Japanese experts and officials, along with 15 Pacific
Forum CSIS Young Leaders from the three countries attended, all in their private
capacities. They examined and compared perspectives on extended deterrence andassurance, China and the balance of power in Asia, North Korea, and changes in national
defense postures in the United States, the ROK, and Japan. Participants also exploredopportunities and challenges to strengthen trilateral cooperation on extended deterrence
and assurance.
Strategic Perspectives and Extended Deterrence
Our Korean speaker opened this session by stressing that North Korea’s nuclear
development and willingness to engage in military provocations meant that business as
usual was no longer an option. As he put it, “we need to revisit what we’re doing.” Whileacknowledging that China’s force modernization and the impact of a crisis with China
should be of concern, these considerations are not yet on Seoul’s radar.
North Korea remains Seoul’s main concern. Pyongyang is determined to hold on
to its nuclear weapons and keep upgrading its arsenal. Our speaker explained that there
are questions as to whether Washington will be able and willing to carry out its defense
commitment as US territory is increasingly going to fall within range of North Korean
missiles, a problem embodied in the concept of “de-coupling.” Even if the administration1

is willing to honor its commitment, it may not be able to do so because the US Congress
may deny action. Another concern is that Pyongyang may see its nuclear arsenal asproviding cover to use conventional forces or cyber weapons for offensive attacks; this is
known in the arm control lexicon as the stability-instability paradox.
Our Korean speaker argued that deterrence by punishment was no longer an
option. As he put it, “why wait to be hit if you know an attack is coming?” Moreappropriate is to focus on deterrence by early detection” identifying (and then removing)
potential threats before they can do damage. He also suggested revisiting thereintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, which would bolster
deterrence of North Korea. Moreover, this would reassure Koreans, who trust, inprinciple, US defense commitments vis-a-vis South Korea, but worry about the reductionof numbers and roles of nuclear weapons in US national security policy. Ballistic missile
defense systems may have a role to play in enhancing deterrence, but their technicalfeasibility is unclear and Seoul is worried about China's reaction to their development anddeployment. Still, Seoul is “cautiously favorable” to missile defense systems and evenfavors cooperation with Japan on such systems, despite the existence of important
emotional reservations associated with any type of cooperation with Japan.
Our Japanese speaker explained that Tokyo’s position on these issues is laid out
in the 2010 Defense Guidelines, which will be updated at the end of the year.
Consistency should be expected. To Japan, the main challenge is “gray zones,” security
threats that fall below the extended deterrence threshold, be it in a contingency with
China (over the Senkaku Islands) or with North Korea. In this context, our speakerconcurred with his Korean counterpart and argued for the need to focus on deterrence byearly detection.
When the Japanese doctrine of “Dynamic Deterrence” was coined in 2010 themain worry was Chinese 'creeping expansionism' in the East China Sea. That promptedJapan to focus on developing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities. Since then, however, Tokyo has come to realize that ISR capabilities may benecessary but they are not sufficient to respond to Chinese and North Korean actions.
Kinetic deterrence has become increasingly important: deterrence by early detection mustbe supported by deterrence by punishment.
Our Japanese speaker explained that Tokyo has no doubt that US extended
deterrence is strong. In view of the US defense budget, he characterized his position as“cautiously optimistic”: he is optimistic because the United States has enough weaponssystems in the pipeline to provide adequate deterrence for the next 10 to 20 years, but
remains cautious because of the F-35 delay. The long, convoluted debate over whether
the United States should strike Syria over its alleged use of chemical weapons also sends
the wrong message to Japan and other US allies. As our speaker put it, “the United Statesneeds to be clear about what it says and what it does.” More generally, our speaker
stressed that nuclear weapons still have a role to play: they cast an important shadow thathelps de-escalate conflict. Plainly, these weapons continue to be essential components ofextended deterrence. In Japanese eyes, it is also fundamental that Washington not2

acknowledge mutual nuclear vulnerability with China, which might tempt Beijing tothink that its nuclear arsenal allows it to be more aggressive at the conventional level(again creating the stability-instability paradox).
Our US speaker noted that the US rebalance to Asia, now two years old, is basedon the belief that the US economy and the country’s future are inextricably linked to theregion. While there is an ongoing debate about what the rebalance should look like,
Washington remains determined to honor the defense commitments it has made to its
allies and partners because their interests are, again, inextricably linked to its own
interests. In the Asia Pacific, the United States is determined to preserve a balance ofpower that prevents the rise of a hegemon, prevents an attack on its homeland and on its
allies and partners, preserves free trade and the freedom of navigation, prevents terrorism
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and favors democracy and humanrights.
While acknowledging the challenges to US extended deterrence posed by theprospect of a contingency with North Korea or China, our speaker stressed that North
Korea cannot decouple the United States from its allies because Washington does notdistinguish between deterrence and extended deterrence. Allies should learn from theCold War, when Washington did not abandon its commitments to allies, even though theSoviet Union was much more powerful than North Korea. Moreover, the US has nointention to acknowledge mutual nuclear vulnerability with China; it may be a “fact oflife,” but it is also true that this is “unequal vulnerability,” in which the United States ismuch more powerful than China.
While Washington does not think of North Korea and China in the same manner,
our US speaker stressed that the two countries represent two sides of the same coin in thatthey present problems and demand increased trilateral cooperation among Washington,
Seoul, and Tokyo. Unfortunately, there is little political urgency to strengthen suchcooperation, mainly because of the bad shape of ROK-Japan relations.
Our US speaker explained that extended deterrence is at work at all levels of
escalation. As always, Washington prefers ambiguity regarding the particular conditions
at which it will respond to maintain flexibility and ensure that neither adversaries nor
allies are emboldened. Moreover, nuclear weapons are not the only means to provide
extended deterrence: conventional weapons as well as ballistic missile defense systems
have assumed a greater share of the deterrence burden. Conventional forces, in particular,
lend themselves well to use in coordination with allies and ballistic missile defense
systems can help reduce ‘de-coupling’ pressures. Looking to the future, it will be
important to stop segregating extended deterrence policy with, on the one hand, nuclear
weapons and, on the other, conventional weapons and ballistic missile defense systems.
The US phased approach on ballistic missile defense systems builds the foundations toaddress immediate security threats (coming from North Korea), while keeping an eye on
China.

3

During discussion, participants focused mainly on the Syrian debate. Both
Koreans and Japanese stressed that US credibility is at stake in this debate: several
speakers emphasized that “red lines should not be drawn unless you intend to enforce
them.” Failure to do so – for whatever reason -- damages US credibility among allies andadversaries. In Korean and Japanese eyes, the difficulties that the Obama administration
faced winning domestic support for the use of force against Syria prompts concerns about
the US ability to react quickly to a contingency in Northeast Asia. Americans counteredby pointing out that there is more at stake than US credibility in the Syrian debate andthat striking Damascus only for credibility reasons would be a mistake. They urged allparties to resist the tendency to see every challenge that the United States faces as a testof US credibility and commitment to its allies. Indeed, additional research is needed tobetter understand when and under what conditions such challenges truly threaten US
credibility. Several participants underscored that a change in US policy after an
improvement in a potential adversary’s capability would be seen as highly damaging to
US credibility.
Koreans and Japanese appeared unconvinced, however. As one Japaneseparticipant put it, “while the US rebalance to Asia is the order of the day, sooner or laterthe United States will rebalance to other regions so, to us, it is a credibility issue.” Thesame participant went on to argue that the row over the Senkaku Islands, similarly, is acredibility test for the United States and the US-Japan alliance. Failure to address it
appropriately would guarantee failure in the emerging territorial conflicts in the South
China Sea.
US budget constraints pose particular problems here, with challenges focusing not
on deployments but force readiness. (In a marked shift from past discussions, Koreans
and Japanese seem to regard US force readiness as more important than “numbers.”)
Americans responded that budget pressures would have only a symbolic impact on force
readiness: US military capabilities will remain second-to-none and more than sufficient
to prevail in any given situation. Here and in subsequent discussions about the ROK
desire to see the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula,
there surfaced a tendency in the ROK to attribute the peace in Europe during the Cold
War to the presence of US tactical nuclear weapons. This is misleading: the US forward
deployed conventional presence in Europe should be credited, not tactical nuclear
weapons. This argument found echo in a Japanese recommendation that the three
countries should harden their military bases as well as make them more resilient andinteroperable.
Japan's interest in enhancing its collective self-defense role triggered considerable
controversy. While seen as a positive development by Americans, it was met withskepticism and concern by Koreans, who insisted that Japan “needs to clarify its past.”
This triggered scrutiny of the Japanese debate about the development of offensive
conventional strike capabilities. Japanese participants explained that the issue was only
“on the table” and that no conclusion had been reached. They stressed that the debate
emerged in response to the growing ballistic missile threat that Japan faces. At any rate,

4Japanese participants insisted that these forces would only be used in retaliation and thatTokyo would deal with the first attack against its territory with missile defense systems.
Views of China and the Balance of Power in the Asia Pacific
Our US speaker kicked off this session by stressing the continuity in US policy
toward China across several administrations. He characterized US policy toward China as
one that “engages and shakes Beijing.” Activism is the norm, which is consistent with US
policy to “extend hands” to potential rivals, such as Iran, in an attempt to gauge andengage. This approach is used at the bilateral level, as well as at multilateralorganizations.
The rebalance is central to this approach. It does not constitute a pivot away fromother regions, but, rather, is merely a refocus on the most dynamic region of the world,
and it proceeds apace, with greater specificity in recent months. Discussions are now
focused on how cooperation can and should work, and the specific capabilities needed.
Our US speaker acknowledged that there is increased skepticism about China in
the United States and its allies. The development of Chinese anti-access and anti-denial
capabilities, in particular, is of concern; in response, the US has had a more focused
debate, one that crystallized with the AirSea Battle concept. Still, today's problems are
the same as those of the Cold War: de-coupling pressures and stability-instability
paradox. The key question for the US today is how to reassure allies so that they don’t
make the same decision as the French in the 1960s, i.e., develop independent nuclear
weapon capabilities.
Our Korean speaker stressed that the impact of China's rise on the regionalbalance of power is undeniable. Beijing's assertive and sometimes aggressive stances inthe East and South China Seas are changing the security environment and, since theannouncement of the US rebalance to the Asia Pacific, relations between the UnitedStates and China have become more heated. While most regional countries havewelcomed the rebalance, they continue to seek to strengthen economic ties with China.
Our speaker explained that China's force modernization efforts will be critical instructuring the balance of power in Asia. In the short- to medium-term, however, theUnited States will maintain military superiority over China. The ROK is determined tomaintain its security relationship with the United States but is equally interested inforging strong ties with China. In this spirit, our speaker pointed out that if Seoul were todecide to participate in the US-led missile defense system program, this would likely fuelBeijing force modernization efforts, leading to an arms race in Northeast Asia.
Our Japanese speaker assessed China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
modernization efforts. The PLA is modernizing its submarine force and developing
fourth-generation fighters as well as stealth technologies. The Second Artillery, thebranch of the PLA that controls nuclear ballistic and conventional missiles, is developing
short-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles (DF-21D), medium-range

5

ballistic missiles (DF-21), as well as tactical cruise missiles. Moreover, China is
expanding its space intelligence capabilities and should have six navigation satellites
operational in 2020.
How can escalation control be maintained in such a changing security
environment? Our Japanese speaker argued that ISR capabilities are no longer sufficientfor Japan. Something more is needed and he argued that Japan should upgrade its own
air-sea capabilities to deal with “gray zone” situations and low- to medium-intensity
conflicts, and US-Japan defense cooperation on high-end operations under antiaccess/area-denial environment should be enhanced. To support extended deterrence, theUnited States should maintain its ability to project force despite China’s anti-access andarea-denial capabilities. In-theater power projection, in particular, will also become
critical and a forward-deployed US presence will continue to be a key feature of extended
deterrence in Northeast Asia.
Our Japanese speaker also expressed concerns about arms races. He suggested
that United States pursuit of the AirSea Battle concept could prompt China to drop its nofirst-use policy. In this regard, he was worried about the omission of the no-first-use
pledge in China’s most recent White Paper.
The discussion began with a focus on the value of trilateral dialogues in Northeast
Asia. Korean participants explained that China has been pushing hard to establish the USROK-China trilateral dialogue because of growing concern about cooperation among theUnited States, the ROK, and Japan. Many participants, however, countered that trilateraldialogues need not be mutually exclusive. In the absence of effective mechanisms toaddress the North Korea problem (the Six-Party Talks have not met since 2009), trilateral
discussions can be useful for crisis management and contingency planning to deal with
Pyongyang. The US-ROK-China dialogue was established with North Korea in mind.
Trilateral discussions among the United States, the ROK, and Japan are meant to focus on
North Korea, but they are broader in scope: they are also designed to enhance ROKJapan defense cooperation, which is weak.
Discussing China in trilateral discussions between the United States, the ROK,
and Japan is difficult because all three countries have different perceptions of andrelations with Beijing. Koreans are the most reluctant of the three to identify China as apotential threat. They remain clear-eyed about the challenges posed by China's growing
strength, however. They acknowledged that some foreign policy decisions (including
those related to missile defense) reflect concern about Korean vulnerability to Chinesepressure. In response, Japanese participants suggested that Beijing would likely act as it
did in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the issue came up for Japan, i.e., in their own
words, “make a big deal out of it until the decision is made, then accept it as a fact oflife.”The discussion moved on to Xi Jinping's willingness to develop a “new type ofmajor country relations,” his recent meeting with President Obama in California, andimplications for the regional balance of power. At the core of this discussion is Beijing's

6intentions. There are three related questions: First, does China seek hegemony? If not, is
it because of domestic concerns which will absorb the regime’s attention? Or, will
domestic pressures mean that the regime cannot be seen to lose a fight? It is impossible toknow, which makes it even more important to focus threat assessments on China's
capabilities. At this point, Beijing's notorious lack of transparency on its militarycapabilities and force modernization plans becomes problematic. Also critical is ensuringthat China is deeply integrated into the fabric of the international system, which in theory
will make it conflict averse.
Views of North Korea
Our Korean speaker explained that the Park government is determined to develop
a healthy inter-Korean relationship and advance a trust process based on “strong
deterrence.” Seoul is also focused on “rule implementation,” as opposed to rule making.
In other words, for Koreans, violators should be held accountable if something goes
wrong. Seoul still believes that dialogue with Pyongyang should be resumed, and it
remains cautiously positive about its potential. Given the traditional cycle of“provocation-engagement-provocation” with Pyongyang, only a cautious approach is
viable. As he put it, “we want to make sure that we see strategic change in North Korea,
not a tactical shift.”
Dealing with North Korea remains a multidimensional problem, one of which is
nuclear. Others include human rights, proliferation, smuggling, and counterfeiting. For
Seoul, the road to Pyongyang runs through Beijing and there is the belief that a ROKChina-US approach could bear fruit. At the same time, it is important to prepare for a
North Korea contingency and for this, US-ROK-Japan cooperation is crucial.
Our Japanese speaker stressed that North Korea has no intention to give up its
nuclear arsenal, particularly now that Pyongyang has amended its constitution, indicatingthat it is a nuclear-armed state. While deterrence of North Korea has worked over theyears (because there has been no large-scale war on the Peninsula since 1953),
responding to Pyongyang’s provocations is increasingly difficult.
Our speaker pointed out that Japan, unlike the United States and the ROK, does
not have a good deterrence policy vis-à-vis North Korea and that Tokyo’s only option is
to strengthen sanctions against Pyongyang if deterrence fails. Japan is addressing thisproblem, however, by strengthening its ISR and ballistic missile defense systems. Tokyoalso believes that joint trilateral US-Japan-ROK exercises would enhance deterrence ofPyongyang. Given strained Japan-ROK relations, however, managing media exposure ofsuch exercises will be critical.
Our US speaker dismissed the idea that restarted Six-Party Talks would yield
results because participants are a “coalition of divided.” There is no coordination ofstrategic interests among members. The United States sees North Korea as a threat toSouth Korea and regional peace, and it also sees it as a nuclear threat, a proliferation
threat, and a credibility threat. South Korea is interested in preventing military7

provocations from the North and in promoting reunification. Given the differences, it iscritical to maintain strong communication among allies, constantly explain what relevantinterests and concerns are, and how they align or diverge. This is more easily said thandone given the many actors involved: leaders, policymakers, and publics all shapepolicymaking.
Our speaker pointed out that the United States is developing a comprehensive
defense strategy, which includes both political and monetary investments, to deter, detect,defend against, disrupt, and, if necessary, destroy North Korean threats. While
recognizing that ROK-Japan relations are difficult, Washington expects the ROK andJapan to cooperate and welcomes joint exercises to prepare for a scenario in which
deterrence of North Korea fails. In short, the United States expects a coordinated allied
response to a North Korean contingency and, upstream, coordinated diplomacy to deal
with Pyongyang.
During the discussion, Korean participants highlighted that the Park
administration's approach to North Korea has two tracks: development of a trust process
and strong deterrence. It does not, as a consequence, constitute a return to the Sunshine
Policy. Korean participants conceded that the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear
weapons on the Korean Peninsula has costs, but there are benefits as well. As one
participant put it, “if North Korea continues to expand its capabilities, the impression isthat we would need to do “something physical.”Japanese participants, for their part, explained that North Korea's nuclear andmissile developments are of utmost concern to Tokyo. Particularly worrisome are No
Dong missiles, which cannot be easily detected. Japan’s Ministry of Defense received areport after the December 2012 North Korean missile launch stressing that Pyongyang's
missile developments have entered a new phase. More generally, Japanese believe that aslong as China wants to keep the regime alive, North Korea will not change.
From a US perspective, North Korea is a serious threat because it has weapons ofmass destruction, it can use them, it can proliferate them, and it will increasingly be able
to decouple the United States from its allies. North Korea, however, will not be able tocontinue to press on with its nuclear and missile developments and achieve economic
prosperity because the United States (and others) will not allow it. Americans also
insisted that it was paramount for US allies to take up a greater share of the deterrence
burden vis-a-vis North Korea and ensure that their capabilities are properly integrated.
(Americans reiterated that Washington sees reintroduction of US tactical nuclear
weapons on the Korean Peninsula as a counterproductive development.) At the policy
level, it is essential that the United States, the ROK, and Japan coordinate their message
to North Korea. Significantly, this coordination does not mean that the three countries
must send the same message. Rather, it means that messaging needs to be coordinated,i.e., shared in advance among the three countries before being issued and contradictorysignals should not be sent.

8Changes in National Defense Postures and Status of Reforms
Our Japanese speaker explained that the return to power of the Liberal
Democratic Party and the fact that the Diet is no longer “twisted” (with a different party
controlling each chamber) should bring stability to Japanese politics, at least until 2016.
This will allow Tokyo to address foreign policy goals that could not be previously
tackled.
Since taking office at the end of 2013, Prime Minister Abe has visited over 20
countries and used Japan’s alliance with the United States as a bridge to enhancecooperation with third parties. In so doing, Japan pursues its version of “favorable
strategic balancer” and “favorable balance of relations” to optimize its strategic positionin the Asia Pacific. Moreover, despite problematic statements about history, Abe has
been relatively cautious in presenting his foreign policy agenda to the region and theworld.
By December, a national security council will be established, a milestone inJapan’s foreign policy, providing guidance and enhancing interagency coordination.
Whether Japan can exercise its right of collective self-defense in view of restrictions
included in Article 9 of its constitution remains unclear. However, our speaker suggested
that Abe will likely revise some security-related laws to be able to conduct collective
self-defense operations. The key objective will be to increase Japan’s indigenous
capabilities, even though numerous questions remain as to how this should be done.
Upgrading Japan’s defense posture will be critical and there are a number of issues to beaddressed so that this can be done in a manner that enhances the US-Japan alliance.
Finally, Japan will continue to build regional capacity to deal with humanitarianassistance and disaster relief as well as maritime security issues and Tokyo will
increasingly aim for “collective balancing” vis-à-vis China.
While recognizing that the US rebalance to Asia should have been morethoroughly defined before being advertised, our US speaker explained that it remains ameaningful concept that helps the United States allocate its resources. In other words,
while its implementation is yet to be made “visible” to Asia, it is shaping US policy
planning.
Our speaker pointed out that strengthening coordination, cooperation, andintegration among allies at the bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral levels is central to therebalance. A key part of this effort is engagement at the operational level, namely throughexercises, but also in other areas, such as AirSea Battle. Thus, the United States continues
to view nuclear weapons as critical to US national security and extended deterrence
policy, but it also assesses that it can safely proceed with nuclear reductions. Moreunderstanding of the non-nuclear elements of extended deterrence is needed, as well as
how deterrence strategies can be better tailored to specific situations.
Our Korean speaker explained the basics of the ROK’s 2012 defense posture andthe recent revision of its missile guidelines, which were conducted in partnership with the9United States. He explained that the ROK’s ballistic missile defense systems are tailored
to its security environment: they are meant to intercept low-altitude missiles. While there
is growing support for the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean
Peninsula, our speaker argued that most people are opposed to the idea. He reckoned thatthe debate about reintroduction is proof that the US must do more to reassure Seoul.
Japan’s development of offensive strike capabilities raises similar challenges: inprinciple, the ROK government understands Japan’s rationale for development, but
remains both suspicious and concerned. Japanese intentions are key. The ROK would like
Japan to provide a clear strategic plan about the way such capabilities would be used.
Still, our speaker argued that the current security environment lends itself well to greater
trilateral coordination among the United States, the ROK, and Japan. Making such efforts
work will be tough given difficult ROK-Japan relations.
During the discussion, Korean participants reiterated that the revision of missile
guidelines is a direct response to North Korea's nuclear and missile developments.
Japanese participants stressed that they understood the need for the ROK to do so but
questioned whether developing ballistic missiles was the best response. Koreanparticipants in turn responded that cruise missiles have already been deployed and canreach North Korean caves and hidden targets, but ballistic missiles are also essential toreach targets behind North Korean mountains. Japanese participants also complained thatthe revision of missile guidelines was conducted with little transparency vis-a-vis Japan;
this is part of a more general Japanese grievance about transparency in the US-ROK
alliance: transparency is sorely lacking from Tokyo’s perspective. This concern wasmade plain in Japanese comments about working out the OpCon transfer.
Korean participants voiced eerily similar complaints about Japanese efforts toloosen restrictions on the exercise of its right to join collective self-defense. They focusedon Japan's possible acquisition of strike capabilities, asserting that the ROK constitution
defines the entire Korean Peninsula as ROK territory; thus a Japanese strike against
North Korea would be a strike against the ROK. While this is a legal fiction, thisdemonstrates the sensitivities surrounding Japanese interests in offensive capabilities.
These two examples underscore a fundamental problem in the Japan-ROK relationshipthat has profound implications for the US: each country sees its own actions as
contributing to regional security yet labels the other’s as potentially destabilizing.
Transparency and trust are in short supply.
Reassurance and Extended Deterrence
Our US speaker opened up this session by pointing out that extended deterrence
has worked well in Northeast Asia thanks to credible threats to potential enemies andcredible reassurance to allies. Reassurance is created by a variety of means: formal treaty
commitments, reinforced diplomacy, official statements, superior conventional militaryforces in the region, power projection, joint exercises and other forms of defense
cooperation. Also central to reassurance (and deterrence) efforts is the US strategic
nuclear deterrent.

10When discussing extended deterrence in Northeast Asia, there are two (verydifferent) reference points: China and North Korea. With regard to China, our speaker
stressed that the United States does not view China as an adversary but, rather, as acompetitor. This contrasts with the Japanese perspective, which views China more as anadversary. That is not to say that the United States doesn’t have important concerns about
China. The US worries about conventional and nuclear force modernization, lack oftransparency, development of anti-area/access capabilities, challenge to freedom ofnavigation in the South and East China Seas, and Beijing’s blase approach toproliferation. The United States must walk a fine line: it must ensure that regional allies
are reassured yet must do so in a a way that does not provoke China.
Turning to the Japan-China row over the Senkaku Islands, our speaker reiterated
US policy: while the US makes no judgment about ownership of the islands (or any other
territorial dispute to which it is not a party), the US nevertheless maintains that they arecovered by Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which calls for the United States
to defend Japan in the event of conflict over territories under Japan's administration(which includes the Senkakus). Washington would be reluctant to be drawn into a
confrontation with China, especially over territory that many consider “strategicallyinsignificant.” So while the US will assist Japan to defend the islands, it encourages
Japan and China to resolve the issue peacefully.
Our US speaker argued that deterrence of major North Korean aggression is
working, if only because there has not been a war on the Peninsula since 1953. At lower
levels of provocation and violence, however, extended deterrence has not always worked.
While things appear to have calmed down, the multiple provocations that took place inthe spring are evidence that North Korea may feel emboldened by its growing nuclear
weapon and missile capabilities, and a new cycle of provocations could resume.
In these circumstances, a number of questions arise. One refers to the extended
deterrence threshold, i.e. when it should kick in, and whether the United States, the ROK,
and Japan agree on this. For attacks “under the wire or for “gray zone” provocations, theissue is how to address these threats and who should do it. The United States? The allies
themselves? Both? With what capabilities? (Current debate in Japan about conventional
strike options should be viewed in this light.) Another question is linked to theimplications for extended deterrence as the United States becomes increasingly
vulnerable to China's and North Korea's arsenals. How can there be tighter coupling
between the United States and its allies without antagonizing China and creating an arms
race? Our speaker rebuffed the ROK call for redeployment of US tactical nuclear
weapons on the Peninsula, arguing that it is unnecessary since the United States can use
nuclear weapons from CONUS, in the remote case that they are needed, it runs counter tothe broader US goal to reduce the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons in US national
security policy, and it could bolster Pyongyang's claim that it needs its nuclear arsenal. At
the same time, however, there are questions about the impact of US nuclear reductions on
extended deterrence: in particular, at what point does the nuclear umbrella become 'too
thin' to be credible?

11Our Japanese speaker stressed that Tokyo is concerned that the United States
could openly acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China. Although many experts
concede that mutual vulnerability between the United States and China is a fact, such
vulnerability is unequal. In Japanese eyes, the United States continues to have a clear
edge over China; the task of reassurance would be considerably more difficult if
Washington acknowledged mutual vulnerability. China’s lack of transparency about its
military activities is another reason why Japanese urge the US to not change its stance.
Our Japanese speaker argued that Pyongyang's nuclear and conventional
capabilities are progressing and there is concern that these developments will de-couple
Japan and the United States. He explained that strong coupling is essential and that
Washington must make sure it acts appropriately vis-a-vis North Korea. A failure to doso would undercut Japanese perception of US credibility and might lead Japanese to
anticipate a similar failure in the event of a contingency with China.
To counter this fear, our speaker argued for a much more visible deterrence
posture on the part of the United States and its allies. US-ROK military exercises, B52
deployment, the revision of US-ROK missile guidelines are all positive developments.
Japan is equally determined to be active, as exemplified by promulgation of new National
Defense Program Guidelines, the revision of collective self defense limts, the creation of
a National Security Council, the creation of a National Security Strategy, and the possible
deployment of offensive strike capabilities. Debate about these capabilities, our speaker
stressed, does not come from concerns about the credibility of US extended deterrence.
Rather, they are meant to enhance Japan's security and contribute to strengthening
extended deterrence when North Korea could become overconfident about its growing
arsenal.
Our Korean speaker began by explaining that successful deterrence is notnecessarily the same as successful assurance. In other words, the United States may deterNorth Korea while failing to reassure the ROK. Successful assurance of the ROK
requires that Seoul resist intimidation from North Korea and refrain from seeking
independent nuclear weapon capabilities.
Today's strategic landscape is different from that of the Cold War. While
deterrence worked then, it might not today since North Korea may see an advantage inusing nuclear weapons. That is why more reassurance of the ROK is needed. In thecontext of US policy favoring the reductions of the roles and numbers of nuclear
weapons, our speaker explained that Seoul is unlikely to be reassured, even less so as theUnited States is making significant cuts to its defense budget. While the redeployment of
US tactical nuclear weapons on the Peninsula may not add significant deterrence value
vis-a-vis Pyongyang, its psychological value for the ROK should not be underestimated.
During the discussion, Koreans and Japanese stressed the essential role of US
nuclear weapons for extended deterrence and assurance missions. Significantly, some
Korean participants expressed concerns over the US policy to reduce the roles andnumbers of nuclear weapons in its national security policy. One Korean warned that

12

Washington should not emphasize the benefits of conventional deterrence over nuclear
deterrence, as this might undermine both extended deterrence and reassurance.
Americans responded that the conventional and nuclear components of extended
deterrence are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.
More generally, both Koreans and Japanese view extended deterrence andassurance as inextricably linked to their broader relationship with the United States. In
other words, extended deterrence and assurance will be strong if the ROK and Japan are,and feel that they are, in sync with the United States. As one Korean put it, “sometimes
our perception of our strategic value to the US matters most to us.” However, a recurrent
theme of the discussion was the need for a more visible type of extended deterrence andassurance. Both the ROK and Japan regard the B2/52 deployment in the Spring of 2013as positive. More work needs to be done to ascertain how extended deterrence andassurance can be made more visible.
Opportunities for Trilateral Relations that Increase Extended Deterrence
Our Korean speaker began by stressing Korean and Japanese concerns about
extended deterrence. Blame North Korea's nuclear and missile development, President
Obama's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and its commitment to reduce theroles and numbers of nuclear weapons in US national security policy and China (eventhough Japanese and Korean perceptions of the Chinese threat are not identical).
Common concerns provide many potential areas of cooperation for the three allies. They
can conduct regular joint military exercises at nearby high seas with the participation of
US aircraft carriers or submarines. Occasional fly-overs of the Korean Peninsula or theJapanese islands by US strategic bombers are another option. US airplanes based in either
the ROK or Japan could be rotated to train for a rapid response to a North Korean
contingency. Improving interoperability and networking among the three armed forces toenhance C4ISR capabilities would also be helpful. The three allies could develop joint
missile defense capabilities, as has been done by the United States and Japan. (Ourspeaker conceded that the ROK government has been hesitant to join such efforts.)
Finally, an organization or a more institutionalized forum among the three countries
could be established to better plan, consult, exercise, and cooperate on extended
deterrence issues. Of course, the United States could also decide to reintroduce tactical
nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.
Cooperation won’t be easy, however. All three countries face budgetary
constraints. Poisonous ROK-Japan relations, exemplified by the failure to sign a General
Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and an Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA) last year, are another obstacle. Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe's recent statements on history and territorial issues have fueled mistrust in Korea; inthis atmosphere the willingness of his Cabinet to normalize the roles and missions ofJapanese armed forces only raises the bar to bilateral cooperation between Seoul andTokyo. Finally, there are Korean concerns about China's reaction to any heightenedcooperation. According to our speaker, the development of trilateral cooperation on

13

missile defense would be particularly problematic for Beijing, which is why Seoul has
resisted it so far.
Our Japanese speaker stressed that it was essential for Japanese and Korean
military forces to practice together because large-scale military operations cannot besustained in the region without Japan-ROK cooperation. Cooperation is needed in time ofcontingency, but also in peacetime, be it on missile defense, information sharing, military
exercises, counterproliferation, or counter piracy. Given political sensitivities to enhanced
bilateral cooperation, an incremental approach should be adopted. Conclusion of a
GSOMIA is a critical first step to strengthen cooperation and, in Japanese eyes, thiswould not antagonize China.
Our US speaker stressed that the United States is interested in operationalizing
and institutionalizing US-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership not only to deter North Korea,
but also to shape its political evolution and enhance regional stability. Focusing on North
Korea is important because this is where the interests of the United States, the ROK, andJapan most closely align. It is also urgent because Pyongyang is pressing ahead with
nuclear and missile developments and the associated challenges will only grow. In thesecircumstances, as he put it, trilateral cooperation is not “a nice thing to do but a must do.”Our speaker acknowledged the hurdles identified by other speakers: history andpolitical issues, practical impediments, such as the lack of a GSOMIA and ACSA, andstrained resources. He urged the three countries to conduct joint exercises, not merely
exchange observers, in areas like missile defense, counterproliferation, and maritime
security, all of which require an ACSA. Given budget constraints, the ROK and Japan
should consider joint acquisition of ISR assets such as Global Hawk, which, again,
cannot occur without a bilateral GSOMIA to protect sensitive information. In addition,
senior-leader visits are critical and should be strengthened, and policy statements on
extended deterrence and assurance should be coordinated.
Our speaker also addressed what the United States should strive not to do.
Avoiding being dragged into bilateral political disputes is by far the most important goal.
Washington is equally determined not to let either Northeast Asian ally hijack the policy
agenda: Washington will not be dragged into an ROK-Japan competition for US
influence at the expense of the other. The US will also endeavor to ensure that trilateral
cooperation is not construed as part of a strategy to contain China. At the same time,
however, the US will push for trilateral cooperation, which can be enhanced without
antagonizing Beijing.
During the discussion, participants concurred that ROK and Japanese security
communities would benefit from deeper coordination and cooperation. Acknowledging
that publics shape policy and could derail such cooperation, participants were divided onwhether this process should receive high-level attention or develop behind the scenes,
i.e., at the operational level. All agree, however, that high-level support is essential if
greater cooperation is to proceed; the question is whether to highlight lower-levelsuccesses. Thus, it was recommended that a campaign to raise public awareness about the14

benefits of enhancing ROK-Japan defense cooperation would help narrow the gap
between security communities and publics.
General Observations, Concluding Remarks, and Next Steps
This trilateral extended deterrence dialogue, the first held by the Pacific Forum
CSIS, was immensely helpful in laying out US, ROK, and Japanese positions on
extended deterrence and assurance. It also provided a forum where the three countries canbetter appreciate, build upon, and develop shared interests on these issues, as well as
coordinate policy. While all participants conceded that they began the discussions withsome trepidation -- given the state of relations between Tokyo and Seoul -- Americans,South Koreans, and Japanese participants readily acknowledged the value of this
dialogue. The Japanese, in particular, saw it as critical in helping promote understandingof Japan's positions in the ROK. With the right people, the right agenda, and the rightchair, this process can produce positive results. Many participants suggested that the next
iteration of this dialogue include a tabletop exercise, which has the potential of
considerably enhancing track-2 and track-1 dialogue efforts.
Hanging over the meeting were tensions in the ROK-Japan relationship, which
inhibit greater trilateral coordination and cooperation, even when it is seen as
contributing to both sides' national security. However, a key takeaway is that thisproblem can be sidestepped if progress at the trilateral level is conceptualized as an effort
to enhance coordination between the US-ROK alliance and the US-Japan alliance, as
opposed to an attempt to coordinate policies among the three countries more generally. In
future iterations of this dialogue, more thought should be given to what this implies andhow this can be done.
Finally, discussions on ways to strengthen the Northeast Asian regional security
architecture brought home the point that developments in one region may impact onanother. A few participants suggested that efforts by Seoul and Tokyo to develop
expanded missile capabilities may influence Russian thinking and impact negatively on
the debate over the consolidation of US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
It is increasingly clear that cross-regional extended deterrence issues should be given
more attention. (Recall that the US-Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
which was concluded in 1987 almost exclusively with the European theater in mind,
raised concerns in Japan as a result of the possible redeployment of Russian systems to
the Far East.) This also makes a strong case for the conduct of a separate effort to discuss(and perhaps coordinate) extended deterrence issues among, for instance, US participants
and Northeast Asian and America’s European allies. This would help US allies better
understand how extended deterrence is conducted in different regions and nudge them
toward better policy coordination and cooperation. This would be an immensely useful
exercise for US Northeast Asian allies in particular, which appear to be increasingly
looking to the “European model” of extended deterrence (exercised through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) as a reference point and model for Northeast Asia.

15

16

Appendix A
US-ROK-JAPAN EXTENDED DETERRENCE TRILATERAL
September 2-3, 2013
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Seoul, Korea
Conference Agenda
Monday, September 2
9:00AM

Introductions

9:15AM

Session I: Strategic Perspectives and Extended Deterrence

The three countries compare and contrast perspectives on regional security threats andchallenges, with special attention to the e role of US extended deterrence. Whatdistinguishes these threats from other security challenges? What are the important trends
or factors that influence the salience of these threats? What is the role of deterrence bydenial and deterrence by punishment for addressing these threats and what role does the
US nuclear arsenal play versus other non-nuclear assets like missile defense,
conventional forces, etc.? How should we apportion our range of resources to these
specific challenges? How should we discuss or frame these challenges to ensure they get
the attention they deserve without inflating them or provoking other countries?
Korea Presenter: CHOI Kang, The Asan InstituteJapan Presenter: Sugio TAKAHASHI, MOD
US Presenter: Shane SMITH, NDU
10:45AM

Coffee break

11:00AM

Session 2: Views of China and the balance of power in the Asia Pacific

How does each country see the balance of power in Asia? Is it changing? If so, how andwhy (i.e, what is driving that shift)? What is the impact of that shift? How does a shift
impact US extended deterrence commitments and the role of nuclear weapons? How does
each country evaluate PLA military modernization efforts (e.g. nuclear forces,
submarines, etc.)?
US Presenter: Eric THOMPSON, CNA
Korea Presenter: KIM Hankwon, The Asan InstituteJapan Presenter: Ken JIMBO, Keio University
12:30PM

Lunch

A-1

1:45PM

Session 3: Views of North Korea

How does each country characterize the North Korean threat? What is the role ofdeterrence? What specific scenarios is each country trying to deter and what are they
doing? What does each government expect the other two to contribute to deterrence andwhat is expected when deterrence fails? At what level does North Korea become a threatthat engages the US extended deterrent and at what point should the US nuclear arsenal
come into play?
Korea Presenter: CHEON Seong-Whun, KINU
Japan Presenter: Hiroyasu AKUTSU, NIDS
US Presenter: Kevin SHEPARD, USFK
3:15PM

Break

3:30PM

Session 4: Changes in national defense postures and status of reforms

What is the status of defense postures and programs, especially given the new
governments in Tokyo and Seoul? What is each government planning to do? How willthose changes impact the extended deterrent? To what degree does the extended deterrent
shape Japanese and ROK plans? What is the status of the rebalance and the Obamaadministration’s plans to try to continue to reduce nuclear weapons on the extended
deterrent? How can these policies best be used to strengthen extended deterrence?
Japan Presenter: Ken JIMBO, Keio University
US Presenter: Bryan PORT, USFK
Korea Presenter: CHO Nam Hoon, MND
5:00PM

Adjourn

Tuesday, September 3
9:00AM

Session 5: Reassurance and extended deterrence

How can the US reassure the ROK and Japan regarding the viability and credibility of its
extended deterrent? What does each government want Washington to do? Is there
anything in particular that would be troubling to these governments? What should the US
NOT do? Are there nonmilitary ways the US can reassure its allies of the durability of its
extended deterrent and its commitment to their defense?
US Presenter: Robert GROMOLL, US State Dept.
Japan Presenter: Sugio TAKAHASHI, NIDS
Korea Presenter: WOO Jung-Yeop, The Asan Institute
10:30AM

Coffee breakA-2

10:45AM

Session 6: Opportunities for trilateral relations that increase extended
deterrence

What can the three governments do together to shore up extended deterrence in East
Asia? When can they cooperate in the region in a meaningful way? Can eachgovernment see ways that the other two countries can cooperate to increase extended
deterrence? Are there things they should not do?
Korea Presenter: KIM Young-ho, KNDU
Japan Presenter: Takehiro FUNAKOSHI, MOFAUS Presenter: Michael URENA, US State Dept.
12:15PM

Lunch

1:30PM

Session 7: Next steps

What should the three countries do to strengthen regional stability and deterrence? How
can this dialogue contribute to that process?
3:00PM

Adjourn

A-3

A-4

Appendix B
US-ROK-JAPAN EXTENDED DETERRENCE TRILATERAL
September 2-3, 2013
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Seoul, Korea
Participant List
Korea
Gen. AHN Kwang-chan (Ret.)
Chair Professor, Dankook University

Japan
Dr. Hiroyasu AKUTSU
Senior Fellow, Northeast Asia Division
Regional Studies Department
National Institute for Defense Studies

Dr. CHEON Seong-Whun
President
Korea Institute for National Unification

Mr. Takehiro FUNAKOSHI
MinisterHead of Political Section
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Embassy of Japan

Dr. CHO Nam Hoon
Policy Adviser to the Minister
Ministry of National Defense

Mr. Yoshiyasu ISEKI
Counselor
Embassy of Japan, Korea

Dr. CHOI Kang
Vice President
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Dr. Ken JIMBO
Assistant Professor
Keio University

Dr. KIM Hankwon
Research Fellow
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Ms. Ayako SHIMIZU
Japan-US Security Treaty Division
North American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Dr. KIM Young-ho
Professor
Department of International Relations
Korea National Defense University

Mr. Sugio TAKAHASHI
Senior Fellow
Policy Studies Department
The National Institute for Defense
StudiesDr. LEE Chung Min
Professor, Yonsei University
Dr. LEE Sang Hyun
Director of Security Strategy Studies
The Sejong InstituteCol. Masashi YAMAMO
Counselor
Japan Embassy, Korea

Dr. WOO Jung-Yeop
Research Fellow
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

B-1

Dr. Robert H. GROMOLL
Director
Office of Regional Affairs (ISN/RA)US Dept. of State

Korea Observers
Ms. Eileen BLOCK
Program Officer
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Mr. Bryan PORT
Deputy Directory & Command Senior
Advisor for Strategic Communication
UNC/CFC/USFK

Ms. HAN Na-lee
Researcher
Seoul National University Graduate
SchoolDr. David SANTORO
Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation andDisarmament Affairs
Pacific Forum CSIS

Ms. JEONG Sangmi
Researcher
Seoul National University Graduate
SchoolMr. KIM Gibum
Program Officer
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Dr. Kevin A. SHEPARD
Deputy Director for Combined Forces
Command Strategy
UNC/CFC/USFK

Ms. LEE Sunghee
Program Officer
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Ms. Lori SHOEMAKER
Political Officer, US Embassy Seoul

Mr. LEE Sungwon
Program Officer
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Dr. Shane SMITH
Research Fellow, Center for the Study of
Weapons of Mass Destruction
National Defense University

Mr. PARK Jun-Sung
Senior Researcher
International Policy Studies InstituteDr. Eric V. THOMPSON
Vice President and Director, Strategic
Studies, Center for Naval Analyses

US
Mr. Ralph A. COSSA
President, Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Michael URENA
Strategic Engagement Division
Office of Strategic Affairs
Bureau of Arms Control, Complianceand Verification
US Department of State

Ms. Nicole FORRESTER
Director - Young Leaders Program
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Joe YOUNG
Acting Foreign Policy Advisor
US Pacific Command

Mr. Markus V. GARLAUSKAS
Director of Strategy, US Forces Korea
Mr. Brad GLOSSERMAN
Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSISUS Observer
Ms. Priya SETHI
Eighth Army G5 Plans
Booz Allen Hamilton
B-2

Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders
Ms. Sunna AN (KOR)
Graduate Student, Yonsei University

Ms. Aiko SHIMIZU (JPN)
Resident SPF Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Young-June CHUNG (KOR)
PhD Candidate
China Foreign Affairs University

Mr. Timothy STAFFORD (GBR)
Associate Fellow, Henry Jackson
Society Georgetown University

Ms. Lisa Dalem COLLINS (USA)
Program Officer
International Law and Conflict
Resolution Center, Asan Institute for
Policy Studies

Ms. Oknam YI (KOR)
PhD Candidate, Kyung Hee University

Ms. Darcie DRAUDT (USA)Assistant Editor, Sino-NK
Dr. Ryo HINATA-YAMAGUCHI (JPN)
Adjunct Research Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS
Mr. Chin-Hao HUANG (THA/TWN)PhD Candidate
University of Southern California
Mr. Akira IGATA (JPN)
Doctoral Student, Keio University
Ms. Stephanie Nayoung KANG (USA)Resident Kelly Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS
Ms. ChungAhn (Jung-Ahn) KIM (KOR)
Reporter, DongA Daily & ChannelA
Mr. Joseph Boyd LENOX (USA)Intern, International Crisis GroupMr. Jonathan MILLER (USA/CAN)
Senior Policy Officer, Asia-Pacific Desk
Canada Border Services Agency
Mr. Joseph OH (USA)Operational Net Assessment analyst
United States Forces Korea future
operations plans division

B-3

B-4