Commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Globalization andInternational Development Research:

Study Report on“Development Strategy of Fragile States”

Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development
February 2009

Contents
Preface
Introduction
Chapter 1: Definition and Classification of “Fragile States”
1-1 Definition and Indicators of Fragile States and the Fragility of States
1-2 List of Fragile States
Chapter 2: Approach to Fragile States by Major Development Assistance Institutions
2-1 OECD-DAC
2-2 World Bank /International Development Association (IDA)
2-3 United States (US)
2-4 United Kingdom (UK)2-5 France
2-6 UNDP
Chapter 3: Japan’s Measures for Fragile States
3-1 Assistance for Governance
3-2 Peacebuilding Assistance
3-3 Initiatives Taken by Respective Assistance Executing Institutions
3-3-1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
3-3-2 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
3-3-3 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
3-4 Characteristics of Japan’s Assistance: A Comparison with Other Donor Countries
and Organizations
Chapter 4: Providing Assistance to Fragile States—Challenges and Issues that JapanFaces
4-1 Establishing a Basic Assistance Policy Stance for Fragile States
4-2 Strategy and Policy
4-3 Research and Study
4-4 Implementation
4-5 International Collaboration
4-6 Consideration to the Principle of “Do No Harm”

1Conclusions
Bibliography2Preface
This is an English version of excerpts from the original Japanese study report,“Globalization and International Development Research – Development Strategy ofFragile States”, prepared at the request of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
FY2007.
The developing economy today is largely polarized. Some countries, such as
China, India and Brazil, are experiencing rapid economic growth, increased per capita
income and steady progress in poverty reduction. At the same time, other countries aretrapped in a vicious cycle of internal conflict or weak governance and thus experiencing
economic stagnation or regression. These countries are referred to as “fragile states.”
Many of these fragile states are in Africa (particularly the Sub-Saharan region) and inpart of South Asia, and facing a myriad of critical challenges; in some cases thegovernment is unable to exercise control over a part of its own territory due to ethnic
conflicts or insurgencies. In other cases, the government has serious problems in its
governance. Many fragile states have difficulties in achieving development objectives,
such as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Fragile states can also become
potential hotbeds for terrorists and therefore development assistance to these statesneeds to focus on political development (such as state-building and institution-building)in addition to social and economic development. Another key challenge is how toensure aid effectiveness in delivering aid to these countries. Despite a greater urgency
and need for aid, fragile states generally have weak governance capacity or weak will,
and are prone to suffer from reduced aid allocation compared to countries with good
governance. The purpose of this study is to explore appropriate aid strategies to fragile
states from the context of Japanese development assistance.
Current official development assistance (ODA), provided on the basis ofinter-governmental agreement in which the government of a developing country is anequal counterpart, is limited in its ability to effectively deliver aid to all citizens of acountry when the government lacks capacity or will to provide needed services for its
people. We believe that a drastic paradigm shift is needed in considering development
assistance to fragile states. To explore approaches to development assistance to fragile
states, this paper will first clarify the definition and classifications of “fragile states”,
then it will present a broad overview of a number of approaches to fragile statescurrently taken by major donor countries and aid organizations as well as the measurestaken by Japan. Following this overview, problems and issues that Japan may face whenrendering assistance to fragile states will be reviewed. In addition to the contents

3described above, the original Japanese study report contains a review of current
academic debate on the fragile states issue as well as a case study on Nepal,.
The chief editor of this book is Takamasa Akiyama, senior advisor for theInternational Development Research Institute of FASID. We extend our heartfelt
gratitude to Mr. Yuichi Sasaoka, a visiting expert on assistance to fragile states in Africa
from the Institute for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation
Agency for his written contribution to the Japanese report. In addition to Takamasa
Akiyama, other contributors from the International Development Research Institute of
FASID were Naonobu Minato (Acting Director), Yuki Nakamura (Program Officer),
Mai Ono (JPO) and Hiroaki Hamana (JPO).
The content of each chapter reflects the individual views of the author and are
not the views of FASID. The positions of the authors are as stated at the time thechapters were written.
We hope this paper will serve to expand discussions on assistance strategies forfragile states and subsequently, be of use to Japan’s future contribution to the peace andstability of nations.

Naonobu Minato
Acting Director
International Development Research InstituteFoundation for Advanced Studies on International Development

4

Introduction
The September 11 attacks in 2001 on the U.S. have radically changed the trend ininternational development assistance. Although there were terrorist attacks before, the9/11 incident claimed the heaviest casualties in a single assault on the U.S. mainland
and the political and social impact was profound. The fact that al-Qāida was based in
Afghanistan where the poverty rate is notably high and the legitimacy of thegovernment is weak inevitably aroused serious concern in the U.S. government overso-called “fragile states.” The fact that subsequent military interventions in Afghanistan
and Iraq as well as US state-building efforts in these countries did not progresssatisfactorily raised the level of concern over fragile states even further. Consequently,
in addition to the U.S., main donor countries and international organizations such as
OECD-DAC, the World Bank and the UNDP have come to consider the issue of fragile
states as a major challenge. The awareness that many countries which do not have thepolitical will or the capacity to provide their people basic services (especially security)
have a higher probability of threatening the security of their surrounding regions or even
the world’s security further heightened their increased concern over fragile states. Prior
to 9-11, the issue of fragile states was addressed either as a combined security andmilitary problem or as a development issue (poverty and governance). However, thefocus of recent discussions seems to have shifted to issues such as what is the state or
how can a legitimate state be built (i.e. state-building) or what can be done to prevent
conflicts in these countries. These types of questions will in all likelihood bring about aprofound transformation in the existing development paradigm from its current
emphasis on economics and poverty reduction to an emphasis on politics or in somecountries, on security. If so, for DAC states, the issue of fragile states is no longer amatter of development or economic cooperation that can be dealt with by one specificdepartment/bureau, but requires the whole-of-government approach in which diplomacy,
defense and development (3Ds) are all involved. This argument has many implications
for Japan as well and suggests the need to rebuild Japan’s basic policy stance at theearliest stage possible.
OECD-DAC provides the most widely-accepted definition of the FS defining
state fragility in terms of the capacity and/or willingness of state structures in delivering
key services needed for poverty reduction, development, security and the protection ofhuman rights. Most donors avoid labeling any specific country as a “fragile state”
probably due to diplomatic considerations. The exception is the World Bank, which
identifies 34 states according to its CPIA ratings. Often, donors and researchers focus on

5the 39 nations that are included in the fourth and fifth quintile of the World Bank’s
CPIA ratings, including OECD-DAC. The discussions presented in this report are basedon the OECD-DAC’s definition of state fragility.
The purpose of this report is twofold, first to review discussions concerning
fragile states held in the international development community and among researchersand second, to study the implications fragile states have on the international
development community and Japan. The issue of fragile states has stirred up interest in
the international development community rather recently, and therefore discussions arestill fluid. We believe Japan will be able to play a significant role in these discussions
and hope this report will help identify appropriate ways in which Japan’s aid community
should address the challenges posed by fragile states.
This report is organized as follows. Chapter 1 explores the various definitions,classifications and indicators of “fragile states” as identified by main donor countries,
international organizations, research organizations and individual researchers. Although
not all aid institutions adopts the term “fragile states,” discussions concerning countries
based on the above OECD-DAC definition have been pursued in many institutions.
Chapter 2 sketches out the policies and trends in assistance to fragile states by major
donor countries, and Chapter 3 provides a broad overview of Japan’s approach andperformance to fragile states and the differences between Japan’s approach and other
donors. In chapter 4, Japan’s past policy towards and assistance to fragile states isanalyzed. Based on this analysis, the chapter will discuss what course Japan should takein the future and will address the subsequent issues that will arise. Key points areraised in Chapter 4 but discussions on such complex issues are only preliminary. The
points raised in Chapter 4 regarding fragile states should, however, provide basic
material for further discussions. Chapter 5 presents our conclusions.

6

Chapter 1: Definition and Classification of Fragile States
After the high-level forum jointly held by UNDP, World Bank, EC and OECD-DAC in
London in 2005, the international community began to use the term “fragile state” torefer to unstable and conflict-affected countries. However, there is no agreed-upondefinition of the fragility of a state, nor is there general consensus as to which countries
fall under the fragile state category. Countries identified as being fragile may beafflicted by extremely weak governance and sudden outbreaks of conflicts; and during
the post-conflict transitional period, they often face social instability, a lack of publicorder, fissures among social groups, widespread political corruption, a collapse of therule of law, stagnated demand for investments and depleted development resources.
Fragile states are generally recognized as being trapped in complex and chronic
problems that are qualitatively different from other low-income countries, and therefore,
often require a careful political response that is different from those taken in the past.1
For this, the international community has agreed on the importance of carrying out
sound analysis on the factors of fragility and has agreed to deliver aid that well-reflects
the specific conditions of a recipient country (Prest et al. 2005) and, in accordance with
their own aid purposes, policies, and relationship with partner countries, has developed
various tools for assessing factors of state fragility.
The definitions and classifications of fragile states used by donors andresearchers vary, depending on whether the focus is on the country’s proneness todissolve into conflicts, their potential effect on global security, or the degree of
institutional and political maturity. The difference also reflects the perception gap
among donors and researchers with regard to the country in question. The explicit list offragile states by the World Bank, calculated based on the Country Policy Institutional
Assessment (CPIA – to be discussed later), provides a cornerstone for international
debate on fragile state issue 2 . It should be noted, however that the problems andconditions facing each so-called fragile state are in flux and therefore the classificationof fragile states based on such situational analyses can only be considered tentative andexplorative in nature.
This chapter will examine the concept of fragile states (the fragility of states)

1

In order to realize this, OECD-DAC, etc. has been advocating the importance of the “whole-of-government”
approach in which collaboration should be consciously promoted with security and judicial system in addition to thedevelopment department/bureau that had been the main agency in the past.
2
In 2002, the World Bank started the Initiatives for Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS, which is discussed
later) and first used the term LICUS. The World Bank has in recent years been in a transitional process in its use of
the term, fragile states.

7

through a broad comparative study of the practical definitions and classifications offragile states used by major donor organizations, NGOs, private think tanks andscholars.
1-1 Definition and Indicators of Fragile States and the Fragility of States
As stated above, the definition of fragile states and the criteria for their classificationvary depending on the assistance strategy of each donor country or organization and its
relationship with the aid-recipient country, but the focus of these discussions can beconsolidated into three areas (1) governance and the economic performance of theadministrative organization of the aid-recipient country, (2) threat to international
security and (3) human security. The first area, governance and economic development,
focuses on the absence of sound administrative systems and social infrastructure infragile states, and the resulting restricted and unstable flow of aid funds to fragile statesin comparison to countries with good performance (“aid orphan”). In regards to thesecond area, since the terrorist attacks in 2001, focus has been placed on defining fragile
nations from the standpoint of international security, and this approach has rapidly
gained momentum. The U.S. is an excellent example of a donor that has incorporated
assistance to fragile nations as a part of its international security strategy. The issue ofhuman security in area (3) considers fragile states primarily from the perspective ofpoverty reduction and MDGs— the U.K. (DFID) is an example of this approach.
However, many major donor countries and organizations define fragile states using a
combination of the three issues mentioned above.
In the following section, the definitions and indicators of fragile states used bymajor donor countries, institutions, and private think tanks are reviewed.
(1) World Bank (WB)
The Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group of the World Bank identifies
approximately 30 poor countries that are experiencing difficulties arising from conflictor that have weak governing capacity and weak institutions as fragile states. As of 2002,
the World Bank specifically defined and categorized these countries as Low-Income
Countries under Stress (LICUS), in view of their weak administrative policies, weak
institutions, and low aid efficiency. Following the joint high-level forum by the UNDP,
WB, EC and OECD-DAC held in 2005, the category was expanded to include thosecountries that faced the risk of conflict and political instability, and the term, “fragile
state”, was adopted in order to harmonize with other donors.

8

The World Bank emphasizes that fragile states are a diverse group. For
analytical purposes, however, the WB defines countries rated 3.2 or less under theCountry Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as fragile states. Countries with a
CPIA of 2.5 or less are classified as “severe countries.” Countries with a CPIA of 2.6 orhigher, but less than 3.0 are grouped together as “core countries,” whereas countries
rated 3.1 or higher, but less than 3.2 are grouped together as “marginal countries”. As of
fiscal 2007, 34 countries and regions were identified in the list. However, the CPIA
ratings are given only on countries financed by the International Development
Association (IDA). As a result, some countries such as North Korea are not included.
The CPIA consists of 16 performance criteria in four areas—economic
management; structural policies; policies for social cohesion and equality; and public
sector management and institutions. These criteria are used as major referenceindicators for deciding the WB’s IDA credit. CPIA ratings are based on judgments by
the Bank’s country team. The CPIA ratings are used by other donor countries and aidorganizations such as DFID and OECD-DAC as reference indicators when making
policy decisions. The African Development Bank (AfDB) includes the CPIA rating as
one of its indicators on which funding is allocated.3 On the other hand, the CPIA
ratings are structured to give high scores to policies that are in line withneoliberalist-oriented market economic thinking such as low tariffs and deregulated
capital inflows which raises some doubts about its objectivity. There is also someconcern about the reliability of CPIA ratings in areas such as gender, labor andenvironmental sustainability where the WB does not have a comparative advantage(Bretton Woods Project 2005).4(2) United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Out of all ODA-related organizations in the US, the USAID is the only organization that
adopts explicit policies for fragile states. The Agency focuses especially on the elementof “crisis” in its approach to state fragility.5 It has adopted a comparatively broad
3

In addition to the CPIA, the AfDB established the Post-Conflict Country Facility (PCCF) as an additional indicatorwhen making funding decisions (in 2004). This has allowed the AfDB to meet its assistance criteria for many
African countries that have experienced conflicts. Burundi and the Republic of Congo, for example, have received
debt reductions through this mechanism.
4
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x-84455
5
Crisis states are defined as “those where the central government is unable or unwilling to assure the provision ofvital services to significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent, andwhere violent conflict is a reality or a great risk.” Vulnerable states are defined as “those unable or unwilling toadequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where
the legitimacy of the government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis”(USAID’s Approach to Fragile States Programming in Africa 2006).

9definition that includes “failing states”, which are vulnerable to crises, “failed states”
that are already in crisis and “recovering states” that are on the way to recovery. In orderto make clear its approach to stabilization, USAID formulates a different aid strategy inresponse to the speed of crisis recovery for each country (USAID 2005). However,
USAID has not made public its list of target countries probably due to concern overpossible political repercussions.6
In 2006 the USAID announced its Fragile States Indicators (FSI) whichmeasures the vulnerability of a state using 33 indicators to analyze the effectiveness andlegitimacy of a government in the areas of the economy, politics, security and society.
However, due to the ambiguous conceptualization of government effectiveness andlegitimacy and the difficulty in collecting data outside areas where the USAID renders
its aid, initiatives to measure and diagnose the vulnerability of a specific state have been
temporarily suspended (Rice and Patrick 2008).
(3) UK Department For International Development (DFID)
DFID’s concept of “fragile states” is primarily based on aggressive poverty reduction
policies promoted during the Blair administration. DFID defines the fragile state as “astate that is unable or unwilling to carry out its basic functions for its people including
the poor.” DFID tentatively identifies 46 countries as fragile states. The 46 countries
consist of the 39 countries that are classified under the fourth and fifth categories of
CPIA from 1999 to 2003 and seven countries that cannot be assessed. The definition
used by DFID focuses on the capacity and will of a government to enforce social
security policies irrespective of whether the country has experienced conflict or not.
Under this definition, Thailand, for instance, is not considered a fragile state eventhough it experiences conflict within its national boundaries because its government
provides sufficient services to the majority of its citizens including the poor. In contrast,
countries such as Guyana are defined as fragile state despite the lack of any conflictbecause its government lacks the capacity to deliver basic services (Brown and Stewart2007).
(4) Organization for Economic Co-operation andAssistance Committee (OECD-DAC)

6

Development—Development

USAID (2005) lists Afghanistan, Sudan, El Salvador and Sierra Leone as “at-risk states” and Indonesia, Macedonia,
Serbia and Mote Negro as crisis states.

10According to the OECD-DAC, “states are fragile when state structures lack the will or
capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development andsafeguarding the security and human rights of their populations” (OECD-DAC 2007a).
Unlike the DFID definition, OECD-DAC includes security as one of the basic functionsof a state. OECD-DAC does not provide an explicit list of fragile states but it focuses on
countries that were either classified in the fourth and fifth quintiles of CPIA as well as
the four countries that were not rated in 2003 CPIA ratings (Afghanistan, Liberia,
Myanmar and East Timor) to monitor aid flow to fragile states. For analytical purpose,
these countries are further categorized into four groups based on their CPIA ratings,
GNI and the needs and level of ODA (Morcos 2005).
(5) Fund for Peace
Since 2005, the Fund for Peace, a Washington-based NPO, publishes the Failed State
Index (FSI) in the journal Foreign Policy as an early warning index of internal conflictand risk of “state failures.” In FSI 2007, 177 countries were ranked. The FSI consists oftwelve instability indicators including demographic pressure, group grievance, uneveneconomic development, economic stagnation, delegitimization of the state, security
apparatus and the intervention of other states. From 1996, the FSI has been evaluating
countries based on the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) developed byProfessor Pauline Baker (president of the Fund and also a member of the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee). A report prepared by the US Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) categorized 20 countries as “alerted zone countries” (Fund for Peace
2007) based on the FY2007 FSI. Despite a limited perspective to internal conflicts, FSI
analysis is broadly used as a reference indicator to assess the relative risk of “state
failure”. In addition, concern over the transparency of the information has also beenraised since the assessment is limited to only those media sources that have been
selected by CAST.
(6) Brookings Institution
Rice and Patrick of the Brookings Institution define weak states as governments thatlack the capacity or will to carry out core functions (politics, economy, security andsocial welfare) and published an Index of State Weakness in 2008 that measure theweakness of a state from the standpoint of efficiency, responsiveness and legitimacy(Rice and Patrick 2008). The index ranks 141 countries including North Korea that the11

WB defines as low-income, low-middle income, and high-middle income countries,
while displaying each country according to a total of 20 indicators in the above fourareas. This index was developed as a comprehensive and well-defined reference tool forpolicymakers. At present, all 20 indicators are weighted equally.

In general, all of the definitions and indicators of fragile states explained above focus onstate effectiveness, i.e., the effectiveness of a governing body, and considers whether
the administrative body of a specific country has the capacity and will to deliver
appropriate social services including security and whether there is legitimacy of
governance, thus recognizing the need for a special assistance modality for countries
outside the development assistance framework for low-income countries.

12

Box 1. Other Debates on the Definition and Indicators of “Fragile States”
European Commission (EU)The EU, under the initiative of the chair country (Portugal), held a public debate that
addressed the fragility of developing countries from July to September 2007. The
report, EC Communications on Situations of Fragility (EC 2007) that was preparedbased on these debates is the first official EU document that focuses on this issue. The
document defines the fragility of a state as characterized by the weakness of governanceand its administrative institutions and the lack of institutional capacity to provide
services. The deciding and permanent factor of a country’s fragility is its power
structure, which is created by specific political, social, economic and historical
processes; and the triggering factors are political instability, ethnic and religious
conflicts, food shortages, smuggling of small weapons, and unemployment among theyouth.
FranceThe French government does not officially use the term, fragile states. According toChâtaigner (2005), an analyst for the Agence Française de Développement, fragile
states are characterized by weak economic performance, the absence of an effective
government with low expectations of achieving MDGs. The extent of fragility can bemeasured by indicators such as the rule of law, governmental authority within national
borders, government treatment of minority groups, and its capacity to deliver basic
services. Châtaigner points out that the approach to so-called fragile states incorporates
the concept of preventive measures, while minimizing the external fragility of a statethrough development policy and intervention by the private sector.
CanadaIn 2006, the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project of Carleton
University developed an index of state fragility at the request of the CanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA) and the Canadian Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (DFATT). The index is an analytical tool that diagnoses
the fragility of a state beyond conventional conflict analysis. It prepares a structural
profile of each country by integrating indicators in six clusters: economy; governance;
security and crime; development of human resources; population; and environment. The
profile is then reviewed from three different angles: authority, legitimacy and the13capacity of the state, and analyzes the relative stability of each state, while respecting
the context of each country. Currently, Carleton University is engaged in research with
CIDA on the index that will allocate assistance for fragile states (Rice and Patrick2008).
Germany
According to the “Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution andPost-conflict Peace Building” announced by the German government in 2004, failed
states and failing states are characterized by the lack of good governance and thegradual collapse of state structures (Cammack et al. 2006).
1-2 List of Fragile States
Presently, there are few donor countries and aid organizations that have publishedspecific classification criteria of fragile states. Since 2005, the World Bank has
published its classification which identifies approximately 30 fragile states based on the
CPIA and DFID has published a list of 46 fragile states based on the WB criteria. Table
1 contains a listing of the top priority and high priority countries (59 countries in total)
according to the UNDP (2003) and a list of the least developed countries (LDCs) (50
countries)7 as identified by the United Nations, in addition to a list of fragile states as
defined by the WB and DFID. For comparison, Table 2 shows a list of fragile states
published by the WB, a few indices of fragile states introduced in the above section, andthe categories of collapsed, failed, failing and weak states created by political scientist,
Rotberg (2003).
A considerable number of countries identified as fragile in each list overlap andan overwhelming number of them are small countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 2,
however, shows that classifications by donors and by each index are not necessarily
identical (this trend is marked in Central Asia, Latin America and CIS countries). In
general, fragile states targeted for assistance are rarely explicitly discussed, but they arenearly the same as those countries that fall into the category of least developed country.
The debate over assistance to fragile states carries additional value for the following two
reasons: First, it sheds light on the need for assistance resources for those countries thatare unable to secure a stable flow of aid funds because of their inability to meet thecriteria for development assistance due to conflicts and governance problems. Second, iturges the international community to establish a new development assistance modalitythat differs from conventional assistance schemes, which gives the debate on assistance7

http//:www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/lde/list.htm (date of access; January 24, 2008)14

to fragile states added significance.
As has been pointed out by many donors including the WB, the circumstancesand challenges faced by fragile states are diverse. A few countries such as Angola,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Papua New Guinea are resource-richcountries, but there are many resource-poor countries such as Burundi and Haiti. The
World Development Indicators 2007 show that from 2000 to 2005 Cambodia andAngola achieved a growth rate of 9~10% on average, whereas Guinea Bissau and Haiti
recorded on average minus growth of 0.5% and Zimbabwe recorded a minus average of
6% during the same period (World Bank 2007a). The Human Development Index (HDI)by UNDP (2007) indicates that many fragile states are categorized as “low humandevelopment countries” (HDI under 0.5). However, a high HDI has been recorded for
Uzbekistan (HDI 0.702) and Tonga (HDI 0.819). Hence, it is generally agreed that
conducting a detailed analysis to formulate an effective assistance strategy for eachfragile state is critical. In response, aid donors have developed a range of conflict
analysis tools, such as the Country at Risk of Instability (CRI) program of the Strategy
Unit of the UK Cabinet Office, Canada’s CIFP Project (see Box 1), and Japan’s
Peacebuilding Needs Assessment (PNA) (to be discussed in Chapter 3).
Many of fragile states are similar in that they all share a high risk of conflict
eruption that is accompanied by markedly weak government functions. For example,
three-quarters of the fragile states identified by the WB are conflict-affected countries(World Bank 2006c). Therefore, conflict-sensitive development assistance and conflict
preventive measures lie at the core of strategies for fragile states. Restoring statefunctions that have collapsed due to conflict, i.e. deciding what state-building measures
should be taken, are major issues. Chapter 4 of this report will examine these issues indetail.

15

Table 1: List of “fragile states” by donors

AfricaEast
Asia
and thePacific

DFID (2005)
Fragile states

UNDP (2003)
Top priority/highpriority countries

UN (2006)
Least Developed
Countries

Core LICUS

xCore LICUSxx

Top priority
High priority
High priority
High priority

x
x
x
x
x

Name of country

WB (2007)
Severe/Core/Marginal/LICUS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

AngolaUgandaEthiopia
Eritrea
Cape Verde
Gabon
Cameroon
GambiaGuineaGuinea Bissau
Kenya
Cote d’Ivoire
ComoroRepublic of Congo

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
52

Sao Tome and Principe

Democratic Republic ofCongo

ZambiaSierra Leone
Djibouti
Zimbabwe
Sudan
Equatorial Guinea
SenegalSomalia
Tanzania
Chad
Central African Republic

Togo
Nigeria
Niger
Burkina Faso
BurundiBenin
Madagascar
MalawiMali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Liberia
RwandaLesothoIndonesia
Cambodia
Kiribati
Samoa
SolomonTuvaluTonga
Vanuatu
Papua New Guinea
Philippines

Severe LICUS
Severe LICUS
Core LICUS
Core LICUS

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Marginal LICUS

x

Marginal LICUS
Core LICUS
Core LICUS

Marginal LICUS
Marginal LICUS
Severe LICUS
Core LICUS

x
x
x
x

Severe LICUS

xCore LICUS
Severe LICUS
Severe LICUS
Marginal LICUS

x
x
x
x
x
x

High priority
High priority
High priority
Top priority
High priority
Top priority
High priority/top priority

Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
High priority
High priority

Core LICUS
xx
Marginal LICUS
Severe LICUS
x

Marginal LICUSxxx

Core LICUS

xCore LICUS
Marginal LICUS
Marginal LICUS

x
x
x

x
x
x

Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
High priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
Top priority
High priority

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
X
x
x
X

High priorityx16

SouthAsia

Central
Asia

Near
East
CentralandSouth
America

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

East Timor
MyanmarMaldives
MongolLaos
Afghanistan
Nepal
BhutanBangladesh
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
Georgia
Tajikistan
Kosovo
Yemen

69
70
71

GuyanaDominica
Haiti

West Bank
district

Core LICUS
Severe LICUS

xx

Core LICUS
Severe LICUS

x
x
x

x
x
High priority/ Top priority

Top priority

x
x
x
x

x

High priority/top priority

x

x
x
x

Top priority

x

x
x
x
x

Core LICUS

Core LICUS
and

Gaza

Severe LICUS

Core LICUS

Source: World Bank (200); DFID (2005), Cammack et al. (2006) and UN (2007)
Note: UNDP (2003) explicitly indicates neither top priority countries nor high priority countries. The
above categorization is taken from the classification by Cammack et al. (2006).

17

Table 2: List of Fragile States and Index of State Weakness by WB; Failed State Index 2007; and Rotberg(2004)
World Bank
Fragile states

Africa(2007)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

AngolaUgandaEthiopia
Eritrea
Cameroon
GambiaGuineaGuinea Bissau
Kenya
Cote d’Ivoire
ComoroRepublic of Congo
Democratic
Republic of Congo

Core countries

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Sao Tome and Principe

Marginal

ZambiaSierra Leone
Djibouti
Zimbabwe
Sudan
Swaziland
Equatorial Guinea
Somalia
Tanzania
Chad
Central African Republic

Togo
Nigeria
Niger
Burkina Faso
BurundiMadagascar
MalawiMali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Liberia
RwandaLesothoCore countries
Marginal
Core countries
Core countries
Severe countries
Severe countries
Core countries
Core countries

Marginal
Marginal
Severe countries
Core countries

Severe countries
Core countries
Severe countries
Severe countries
Marginal

Core countries

Marginal
Severe countries

18

Index of state weakness
Bottom/2nd quintile

Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile

2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
2nd quintile
2nd quintile
2nd quintile
2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile

Fund for Peace
Failed State Index(2007)
Critical/In-danger
countries

Rotberg (2004)
Collapsed/failed/failing/weakstatesFailed statedCriticalCriticalIn danger
CriticalIn danger
In danger
Critical

Failing state

In danger
Critical

Failed stated

In danger

Failed statedCriticalCritical

Failed statedFailed statedCriticalCollapsed state

CriticalCriticalWeak state
Weak state
Weak state
Weak state
Weak state
Weak state
Weak state
Weak state
Weak state
Weak state

CriticalIn danger
In danger
CriticalIn danger

In danger
In danger

Failed statedTable 2: List of Fragile States and Index of State Weakness by WB; Failed State Index 2007; and Rotberg(2004)

East
Asia
and thePacific

South
Asia

CentralAsia
andEuropeNear
East

CentralandSouth
America

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Indonesia
Cambodia
SolomonTonga
Vanuatu
Papua New Guinea
FijiPhilippines
East Timor
Myanmar
Laos
North Korea
Afghanistan
Sri Lanka
Nepal
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Uzbekistan
KyrgyzGeorgia
KosovoTajikistan
Turkmenistan
Belarus
Maldives
Yemen
Iraq
Egypt
Syria
Lebanon

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Ecuador
GuyanaGuatemalaColombia
Dominica
Haiti
Paraguay
BoliviaWest Bank and Gaza
District

World Bank (2007)
Fragile states

Index of state weakness
Bottom/2nd quintile

Marginal
Core countries
Core countries
Marginal
Marginal

2nd quintile
2nd quintile

Core countries
Severe countries
Core countries

2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
Bottom quintile

Fund for Peace
Failed state Index(2007)
Critical/In-danger
countries

Rotberg (2004)
Collapsed/failed/failing/weakstatesFailing state

2nd quintile

Severe countries

Core countries

Weak state
In danger

2nd quintile
Bottom quintile
2nd quintile
2nd quintile
2nd quintile

Weak state
Weak state
Weak state
CriticalCriticalCriticalCriticalIn danger
In danger
CriticalCriticalIn danger

Weak state
Weak state
Failing state
Failed state
Failing state

Weak state
Weak stateCore countries
2nd quintile
2nd quintile

In danger
Weak state
Weak state
Weak state
In danger
CriticalIn danger
In danger
In danger

Failing state

Weak state

Severe countries

Core countries

2nd quintile

In danger

Bottom quintile

Critical

Source: World Bank (2007c), Rice and Patrick (2008), Fund for Peace (2007) and Rotberg (2004)

19

Weak state
Weak state
Weak state
Failing state
Weak state
Weak state
Weak stateChapter 2: Approach to Fragile States by Major Development Assistance Institutions
WB and IMF (Bretton Woods Institutions) started structural adjustment lending in theearly 1980s, which marked the beginning of an interventionist policy that viewed many
governments of developing countries are failing to carry out state functions in regards to
its people. However, there were numerous problems related to conditionalities attachedto these loans and this policy was heavily criticized. As a result, the strategy waschanged during the late 1990s, and poor countries were asked to formulate a Poverty
Reduction Strategy (PRS), and assistance by the international development assistancecommunity was provided according to a countries’ PRS.8
In 1993, Mr. Wolfensohn was inaugurated as the president of the World Bank,and he made governance centered on corruption a major theme in development
strategy.9 Until that time focusing on corruption was a taboo. The 1998 WB reportprovided the international assistance community with an opportunity to review the
relationship between development assistance input and the institutions and policies ofdeveloping countries (World Bank 1998). This report argued that assistance todeveloping countries with inadequate governance institutions and development policies
would yield few results. In response to this report, the WB formulated CPIA to assess
developing countries’ institutions and policies including governance had developed; andthe WB began to allocate IDA fund based on CPIA ratings. The Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) founded in 2003 in the US, followed suit in qualifying countries forfunding using the indicators related to institutions and policies including governance.
Qualifying countries for funding in this way greatly differs from structural adjustment
lending in that the former is ex ante, whereas the latter is ex-post. 10
Military intervention subsequent to the attacks of September 11, 2001
significantly changed the course of development assistance as explained above. Since
the 9-11 attacks, the U.S. government has taken the position that terrorist
countermeasures are vital to its security and foreign policies. Afghanistan and Iraq havebeen regarded as crisis nations and military intervention has been carried out. Initially,
U.S. military intervention appeared to be progressing well, but as the number ofcasualties grew, the movement against military intervention gained force in GreatBritain, the U.S, and other countries. Apart from the question as to whether militaryintervention was appropriate or not, there have been criticisms that the approach to8

Refer to Akiyama, et al. (2003).
Refer to JICA (2007).
10
In ex-ante, the country in question makes a pledge that it will modify its policies in the future as a condition oflending, whereas in ex-post, lending is made only to the countries that have already adopted acceptable policies.
920

fragile states such as Iraq and Afghanistan had tended to be excessively biased towards
military intervention and development effects had been disregarded. 11
In contrast, the U.K. approach towards fragile states is strongly oriented for the
purpose of poverty reduction. The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs) is paramount policy in U.K. development assistance, and for this the UK
believes that continued assistance for states that are unable or unwilling to carry out its
basic functions for its people including the poor is critical DFID 2005).
Professor Collier (Oxford University), the former director of the ResearchGroup of WB who carried out research on fragile states, advocated that conflicts, which
occur easily in countries with undeveloped institutions and policies, can be avoided
before they erupt by providing comprehensive assistance based on policy coherency
among development and other related policy domains, such as security and tradefinance.
To recapitulate the above-mentioned trends in assistance to fragile states overthe past several years, the following factors explain why assistance to these countries
has gained the attention of the international assistance community.
- Since the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001, public outcry supporting thefight against terrorists became vociferous. Thus, measures against international
terrorism became a foremost political concern among the major advanced countries,
which shared a sense of crisis that fragile states were potential hotbeds of terrorism.
- As seen in the case of Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea, intervention is massively
more costly when early measures are not taken. Civil conflicts tend to occur more
readily in fragile states and on average, their cost is estimated to be US$54 billion(Collier and Chauvet 2004). The cost of prevention is estimated to be only a small
portion of this amount.
- Fragile states are home to the majority of the world’s poor, and unless development
assistance is provided, MDGs will not be achieved.
- The problems harbored by fragile states are not confined to within their borders.
Their social, political, and military instability may affect neighboring nations andmay even develop into regional problems.
- The extreme poverty that prevails in these countries is a humanitarian challenge as
well.
- Terrorist activities, illegal immigration, refugees, international crimes and infectious
diseases may lead to social problems in donor countries.
11

This point became a controversial issue in Japan as well in relation to the problem of refueling mission in the
Indian Ocean.

21

In international political and diplomatic circles over the past several years, discussions
have focused on intervention and the approach to assistance in fragile states, including
military intervention. Within the domain of development assistance, OECD-DAC has
played a central role in the discussions.
2-1 OECD-DAC
The OECD report, “Policy Statement on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operationin the Threshold of the 21st Century” published in 1997, paved the way for discussions
that addressed the issue of fragile states in the international assistance community(OECD-DAC 1997). The report argued that war and conflict in developing countries
greatly deter their development and that from a humanitarian point of view as welldonor countries cannot ignore the issue. In 1999, the Berlin communiqué declared that
DAC members should make efforts to prevent internal conflict. In response to thegrowing concern among major donors led by US and UK over issues involving fragile
states, the OECD-DAC Fragile State Group (FSG) was formed at the DAC 2003 HighLevel Meeting. The purpose of the FSG was to enable donors to share their experienceand research on assistance to fragile states.
The Senior Level Forum on Fragile States held in January 2005 in London
drafted the Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in
Fragile States and Situations, which was then adopted by DAC members in the HighLevel Meeting (HLM) held in April 2007. The main points of the principles stipulated
in the statement are summarized as follows (OECD-DAC 2007a).

22

Table 3: Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

THE BASICS

1. Take context as the starting point..
2. Do no harm.

THE ROLE OF 3. Focus on state-building as the central objective.
STATE-BUILDING 4. Prioritize prevention.
&
5. Recognize the links between political, security and
PEACEBUILDING
development objectives.
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stablesocieties.
THE
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different
PRACTICALITIES
contexts.
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between
international actors.
9. Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success achance.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion.
Source: OECD-DAC (2007)

To realize these principles, two task teams were created under the FSG, namely: theWhole-of-Government and Integrated Approach to Fragile States, and State-building in
Fragile States. The former supports the idea that assistance to fragile states must be
pursued based on collaboration among the different departments/ bureaus that oversee adonor government’s military, foreign diplomacy, and development assistance. The teamhas carried out a study on whole-of-government approach experiences from several
DAC members (OECD-DAC 2006a), which includes the case study from Australia,
Belgium, Canada, France, Netherlands and U.K. Although their findings endorsed theneed for donor countries to adopt the whole-of-government approach in their assistanceto fragile states, they also pointed out the difficulty of collaboration between domestic
institutions and other practical roadblocks and challenges.
The main themes of the task team on State-building in Fragile States are as
follows.
① To deepen and share the understanding between donor countries about whatstate-building means for fragile states.
② To deepen understanding of and to share the best practices for integrated assistancefor state-building.
③ To point out the need to change existing donor policies as needed and to propose

23

new tools and methods.
The two task teams recognized that a nation-state cannot be constituted unless thepeople approve its legitimacy, and their discussions took the stance that assistance tofragile states must help establish a legitimate relationship between the recipient
government and its people. The task teams also proposed reexamining donor assistancepolicies that are focused on PRS.
In addition, DAC also carries out research and studies concerning security
reforms, prepares the Security Sector Reform (SSR) handbook (OECD-DAC 2007b),
and since 2005 publishes an annual report containing statistics on the flow of assistanceto fragile states (OECD-DAC 2006b).
2.2 World Bank (WB)/International Development Association (IDA)
The LICUS Initiative that was launched in 2001 under the leadership of Mr.
Wolfensohn, former president of the WB, can be credited with enhancing assistance tofragile states as defined by the WB, i.e. chronically weak-performing countries that are
unable to meet the conditionalities for assistance, unable to achieve sustained growthand development, and unable to move toward poverty reduction. Since then, the total
amount of aid from the WB through IDA has increased markedly (interest-free loans
and IDA subsidies introduced after IDA13/IDA14). The total amount of IDA loans from2003 to 2005 amounted to $4.1 billion (this represents a 67% increase from the $2.5
billion loaned during the period from FY2000 to FY2002) of which 64% went to sevenconflict-ridden countries.12 Combined with the amount of funding from the LICUS
Trust Fund (LICUS TF), which will be discussed later, loans given to LICUS countries
exceeded the total loan amount given to non-LICUS low-income countries (World Bank
IEG 2006). In his speech in October 2007, President Zoellick stated that addressing theissue of post-conflict countries and countries at risk of collapse was one of the major
challenges to an inclusive and sustainable globalization.13
When the LICUS Initiative was instituted in 2001, WB assistance primarily
focused on improving the efficiency of aid to these countries.14 However, in recent
years, in parallel with increasingly active discussions about fragile states,
12

In addition, the loan amount for administrative budgets was $160.1 million (a 55% increase from $104 million in
FY2000-FY2002) of which 34% went to seven conflict-ridden countries.
13
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK;21504730~pasgePK:34370~piPK:42770~theSitePK:4607,00.html
14
The report published by the LICUS Task Force in 2002 identified the following as the core principles of the WB`sassistance strategy for these countries: “staying engaged, anchoring strategies in stronger socio-political analysis,
promoting domestic demand and capacity for positive change, supporting simple and feasible entry-level reforms,
exploring innovative mechanisms for social service delivery, and working closely with other donors.”

24

conflict-affected countries and development led mainly by OECD-DAC, the WB
assistance strategy for fragile states has expanded with emphasis being placed onstate-building and peace building in conflict-affected countries. In 2007, the WB
merged the Fragile States Unit with the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit
(which belonged to the old Sustainable Development Network) to establish the Fragile
and Conflict-Affected Countries Group (OPCFC). This merge reflects the WB’s
recognition of internal conflict and weak administrative institutions as common issues
shared by all fragile states as well as the WB’s aim to address these two issues
comprehensively and with consistency.
The evaluation report published in 2006 by the Independent Evaluation Group(IEG) proposed the following four measures for more effective WB assistance in fragile
states; (1) clarify its areas of strength in its assistance strategy for fragile states, (2)strengthen its internal organization (especially its personnel system), (3) develop special
aid-allocation criteria and (4) implement sustainable reevaluation (World Bank IEG
2006). In particular, (1) questions the relationship between the WB’s contribution inpeace-building and “the principle of non-political nature” as stated in the World Bank’s
Articles of Agreement. In response to this issue, recognizing the roles of the UN andother donors in the fields of humanitarian aid and peace-building, the WB approved apolicy in which its operations are concentrated on economic development that
contributes to sustainable reconstruction (World Bank 2007b), and emphasizes its
stance to improve social systems and governance in order to address the issue of
conflict, which obstructs poverty reduction (World Bank-IDA 2007).
With respect to (2), the WB established the OPCFC as its core in dealing withcountries plagued by conflict or weak administrative institutions. OPCFC coordinates
multiple sectors within the Bank, carries out business investigations and post-conflictneeds analysis, develops and trains the Bank staff, and has been reorganizing the WB’s
internal structure to that end. With regard to its personnel system, it is noteworthy tomention that incentives have been strengthened to facilitate the staffing of qualified
people to fragile states.
Concerning (3), in addition to aid allocation based on IDA`s PBA system,
there is an allocation framework for special assistance to countries in conflict and forcountries where IDA loans are to be resumed. Firstly, there is an assessment based on
Post Conflict Performance Indicators (PCPI) in lieu of a CPIA for post-conflictcountries15 and a special framework was created where IDA loans are provided using
15

As to assistance for post-conflict countries, prior to the start of the LICUS initiative, the Post-Conflict Unit and the
Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) were established in 1997, through which grant aid and technical cooperation were rendered25

these indices as reference indicators for countries with portfolio performances.
Furthermore, of the countries where IDA loans will be resumed following a
prolonged period of suspended assistance, a special framework for loan disbursement
was created for those that did not meet the conditions of a post-conflict country. Thusfar, Haiti and the Central African Republic have received loans through this special
framework. At present, more precise eligibility criteria and assistance allocation
guidelines are being prepared, but concern has been voiced over the rapid input oflarge-scale funds; and the issue of establishing lending methods has to be addressed infuture.
Examples of revenue allocation frameworks for fragile states are LICUS TF
and PCF. They provide restricted grants to non-accrual IDA loan countries.16 OPCFC isin control of these funds and aims to facilitate their integrated management in the
future.17 Table 4 is a list of major target countries and credits of LICUS TF and PCF.
Table 4 Funding Amounts of the LICUS Trust Fund and Post-Conflict Fund to Major Target Countries(in US dollars)
LICUS Trust Fund (Total in Oct. 04~06)
Major target country

Post-Conflict Fund (Total from FY98~05)

Approved amount

Major target country

Approved amount1

Liberia

11,657,170

Somalia

6,607,156

2

Central African Republic

10,790,720

Kosovo5,782,587

3

Haiti

6,868,680

Afghanistan

5,175,000

4Cote d’Ivoire

6,400,000

Democratic Republic of Congo

4,855,000

5

Sudan

5,144,725

Burundi3,993,524

6

Guinea Bissau

1,600,000

Haiti

3,714.519

7

Somalia

1,413,555

Sudan

3,398,160

8

Zimbabwe

1,168,450

East Timor

3,275,483

Total

46,993,469

Total

66,711,253

Source: Inada (2007)

As part of its assistance strategy for fragile states at the implementation level,
the WB classifies those countries into four business models, (1) deterioration, (2)by a donor country. This move was made in response to the need to prevent conflict or its recurrence and to meet
special needs during the reconstruction stage, based on the understanding that many countries targeted for WB(especially IDA) loans have some form of conflict. Specifically, post-conflict countries identified by using a speciallydeveloped conflict analysis method called the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) and implementing an ex-anteappraisal based on the Post-Conflict Performance Rating (PCPR), are how operations in these countries are carriedout.
16
There were seven non-accrual countries in 2007, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, Togo andZimbabwe.
17
http://suteresouces.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/PCF_LICUS_TF_Annual_Report_FY07.pdf

26

post-conflict or political transition, (3) prolonged crisis of impasse and (4) gradualimprovement, and takes measures to meet the respective circumstances of each country(Table 5). A majority of fragile states suffer from a lack of policy formulation capacity,
underdeveloped administrative institutions, lack of administrative capacity, lowcapacity of financial management and lack of policy transparency and accountability.
It is, therefore, difficult for them to formulate Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers(PRSP). Hence, they are requested to prepare a Transitional Results Matrix (TRM),
which is much simpler and captures the needs of each recipient country compared to
PRSP.18
Table 5 Four business models of fragile states and approach to each by the WB
Deterioration

Prolonged crisis of impasse

・Interim Strategy Note (ISN): Focus on portfolio

・ Interim strategy note, focusing

restructuring, limited new financing

operational readiness for re-engagement and providing

・Increased use of CDD reconstruction; restrict new

economic inputs to early peace or reconciliation dialogue.

credits、private sector and NGO

・Small grant-based finance (generally through non-government

・ State capacity and accountability: focus onrecipients)

transparency, dialogue and maintaining institutional

・State capacity and accountability: focus on institutional

capitalanalysis, dialogue and counterpart training.

・Contributing to community level conflict prevention,

・ Use of socio-economic issues （ for restoration ofand to efforts for peacebuilding or governance reform

dialogue/identification of entry points for change）.

on

maintaining

at a national level.
Post-conflict or political transition

Gradual improvement

・Interim strategy note, focusing on rebuilding state・Country Assistance Strategy, focusing on building state

capacity and accountability, and delivering rapid

capacity

visibledevelopment results, etc.

development

results

insupportofandaccountability,

achieving

selective

peacebuilding.

・Moderate IDA allocation

・Exceptional IDA allocation

・Activities to boost domestic reform currents, including

・Joint needs assessment/recovery planning, linking

leadership support, etc.

political, security, economic, and social recovery.
Source: Excerpt from World Bank 200518

The following seven fragile states have formulated PRSP; Cambodia, Chad, Gambia, Georgia, Guinea, Niger andTajikistan (2004). There are five countries that have formulated TRM; East Timor, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan and Central
African Republic (Inada 2005).

27

2-3 United States (US)Historically US foreign assistance has been used for purposes which include its security
concerns and diplomatic efforts. In particular, in the 1950s and 60s US assistance wasused as a way to support its Cold War policies. With the end of the Cold War, themajor purpose of US development assistance policies become ambiguous. However,
the terrorist attacks carried out in 2001 by al-Qāida, which quickly provoked concernsthat fragile states and, in turn, developing countries at large pose serious problems for
US national security. A USAID report published in 2004 methodically argued that alink exists between the collapse of a state and poverty (USAID 2004). Subsequently,
America’s concern over fragile states grew drastically and a very strong inclination for
military intervention emerged in regards to engagement .
One major problem was having more than 50 organizations are involved inoverseas assistance, engagement in fragile states has not necessarily been harmonizedamong departments and agencies within the US administration. In addition to the
executive branch, Congress which has the authority to approve all budgets, also has a
big say in assistance policies. There are more than 40 budgetary items related toforeign assistance and nearly all of them need to be individually approved by theCongress. Congress involvement is not limited to budgetary approval but includes
earmarking (that is setting conditions on the allocations of budgets for specificpurposes).
In 2004 the USA established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC),
which roughly separated aid organizations by functions: MCC renders assistance tocountries where policies and institutions have been somewhat developed, whereas
USAID provides assistance to all other countries. One of the reasons behind thisseparation is to strengthen links between USAID and the Department of State. To put
it another way, the aim of linking USAID to the State Department lies in providing
assistance which in addition to the stated aim of development also incorporates military,
security and diplomatic objectives. This means that the US combines the so-called
3D’s (defense, diplomacy and development) into its foreign assistance. In fact, theTransformation Diplomacy announced by Dr. Rice, Secretary of State, in 2005 stated assuch. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, American security issues form the very core of
the discourse in the US administration. That is to say, the focus of US diplomacy andmilitary policy, which had been shaped by concerns over the former Soviet Union in thepast, has now shifted to developing countries including those that might be hotbeds ofterrorism. Of the 3D’s, however, development policies for fragile states tend to beneglected. According to the HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform28

(2007), the US budget for development assistance is appallingly small compared to its
defense budget.
The USAID published a strategy paper for fragile states in January 2005 in linewith the new assistance policy (USAID 2005). In this paper USAID classifies
problems into security, political, economic and social and gives examples of the types ofassistance provided to vulnerable states within the framework (Table 6).
Table 6: Assistance to vulnerable states by purpose (USAID)

Security

1. Develop and strengthen civilian control of the military.
2. Establish a capable police force (particularly at the community level)
3. Strengthen courts and other forums for resolving disputes.

Political

1. Support reforms within government institutions (particularly, the rule of law, coresocial services, and food security).
2. Support reformers outside government (particularly non-governmental actors
advocating improvements in security, human rights, core services, food security,
natural resource management, and anticorruption).
3. Strengthen oversight institutions, such as legislative and parliamentary committees.
4. Support free and fair elections and encourage formal means of political competitionin other political processes.
5. Encourage private sector/NGO/political party reform alliances (including theperspectives of traditional identity groups).
6. Develop the professionalism of the media, particularly in investigative journalism,and expand access to information.

Economic

1. Foster institutional and policy development that promotes economic growth andeffective management of natural resources.
2. Improve revenue generation/tax systems and expenditure.

Social

1. Reform and build the technical and administrative capacity of those parts of thecivil service responsible for economic management, core services, and food security.
2. Assist the government to ensure the provision of public health and basic education.

Source: USAID (2005)

US assistance to fragile states emphasizes its own security and therefore tends
to be military-related. Target countries likewise tend to be countries in conflict andcountries with potential risks of conflicts. The final objective of assistance lies inpolitical stability and democratization (Patrick 2007). At present its two pillars are themeasures taken against international terrorism and its militaristic engagement in

29

Afghanistan. The Center for Global Development (CGD), a think tank based in
Washington D.C., identifies 52 countries as fragile states. Patrick and Brown (2006)
reported that approximately $5.2 billion, i.e. 40% of the total $13.2 billion US bilateralassistance had been approved for assistance to fragile states for FY2007. However,
50% of the $5.2 billion was directed to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and theremaining 50% ($2.6 billion) was spent addressing HIV/AIDS. The reason is that the
US launched the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and a sum of$15 billion was budgeted for five years from 2003. In May 2007 the plan wasapproved to continue, and an additional amount of $30 billion was appropriated.
PEPFAR target countries are all African countries, and many are also fragile
states. PEPFAR accounts for 63% of the total pie, that is, $1.4 billion out of a total of$2.2 billion that was doubled from FY07 as US assistance for African nations (Patrickand Brown 2006).
Organizational changes were made within the US administration to focus on
security and measures against terrorism. In 2004 the Office of the Coordinator of
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established in the Department of State.
The S/CRS is composed of 35 persons from the Ministry of State, CIA, USAID and theDepartment of Defense. S/CRS facilitates coordination among departments/agencies
when measures are planned to address the issue of fragile states. The Office ofMilitary Affairs was also set up in the USAID to promote harmonization between
USAID and the Department of Defense. In the Department of Defense, the Director of
Foreign Assistance was assigned to enhance coordination between development
assistance and diplomacy. The Director concurrently assumes the Office of the
Administrator of USAID.
The main difficulty these organizations face is that assistance to fragile states
do not normally yield positive results and consequently, assistance to fragile statesreceive poor evaluation. A critical eye is being kept on the performance of suchassistance even more so since 1993 when the Government Results Performance Act of1993 was enacted with the express aim of assessing the outcome of government
activities. However, in many cases general assessment cannot be applied to assistanceto fragile states and separate criteria are established.
A review of US development assistance policy is now under way. The
Congress established the HELP Commission consisting of 20 members, which
published a report (The HELP Commission 2007).
The report made somerecommendations to reform US development assistance including strengthening aid
institutions within the US government to meet fast-changing circumstances around the30

globe in the 21st century. The backdrop for Congress requesting the report is a concern
for fragile states since the 9-11 attacks.
2-4 United Kingdom (UK)The UK has been leading the discourse on aid policies for fragile states in OECD-DAC.
Since the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, the UK integrates the issue of security into
an extensive development agenda. Yet, the overriding priority of its assistance ischaracteristically placed on development rather than its security agenda.
The UK government has not yet established a single consistent definition offragile states. Therefore, DFID adopts the working definition that fragile states are“states where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of
its people including the poor”. It further groups fragile states into the following four
categories.19
・ “Good performers” with capacity and political will to sustain a development
partnership with the international community;
・“Weak but willing” states with limited capacity;
・“Strong but unresponsive” states that may be repressive; and・“Weak-weak” states, where both political will and institutional capacity pose serious
challenges to development.
Twenty-one countries out of 34 low-income countries where DFID implements its
bilateral aid programs are classified as fragile states, and seven countries out of thesixteen African priority countries with which DFID has a Public Service Agreement fallunder its definition of fragile states.20
In January 2005 the UK announced its assistance policy for fragile states andthe UK policy paper, Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States(DFID2005) provides a good indication of what that policy is. In this paper DFID
argues that the UK attaches importance to assistance policy for fragile states for thefollowing reasons (DFID 2005).
① Poverty rates are extremely high in fragile states and the possibility of achieving
MDGs is very low in comparison to other developing countries.
② Fragile states are more likely to be destabilized, and the instability will spread to theregion and eventually around the world.
③ It is much more cost-effective to prevent states from falling into conflict or major
1920Cammack et al. (2006)
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/mdg/aid-effectiveness/fragile-states.asp

31

collapse.
In this policy paper, DFID also puts forward its priority issues for UK policy for fragile
states from 2005 onward. They include a review of aid allocation to fragile states,
more extensive use of a longer-term planning mechanism, policies based on common
analysis of the findings integrated from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office(FCO), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Cabinet Office and other relevant
departments, and focus on the link between humanitarian aid and development aid.
When reviewing aid allocations to fragile states, DFID considers it essentialthat each donor country understands the reasons for fragility and predicts the effect ofassistance. DFID has introduced the “drivers of change” approach, in which
institutional performance works as the key element in understanding the process ofchange and the way in which the poor are influenced. It focuses on formal andinformal rules, power structure, vested interests and incentives under such system, anduntangling the relationships among them.21 As a result of this approach and politicaleconomic analysis, DFID has come to the conclusion that politics lies at the center ofdevelopment and “DFID’s fragile states work is increasingly exploring the role ofpolitics and governance vis-à-vis state fragility.”22
The UK has been making efforts to raise the coherence of its government’s
policies for fragile states through staff changes, economic support and a number ofinter-ministerial measures. The establishment of the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit
(PCRU) within DFID in 2004 is a good example. This Unit is both financed andstaffed jointly by FCO, MOD and DFID, thereby attempting to translate the concept of
the so-called 3Ds (defense, diplomacy and development) into concrete action and also
to strengthen the capacity of the UK government to address the issue of post-conflictstabilization. Another measure meant to harmonize 3Ds is the establishment of the
Nepal Group (in 2003) as an aid coordinating organization for Nepal with one dedicatedAsian Director for the 3Ds. Under the same strategy, meetings are held periodically.
Also, DFID has a Fragile States Team which is a policy coordinating unit within thegovernment.
The above-stated three ministries set up and now manage the Global Conflict
Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool for increasing the UK’scontribution to the prevention and management of conflict. The aim is to integrate the3Ds under one united strategy based on conflict analysis jointly carried out by the three21
22

http://www.gsdrec.org/docs/open/DOC59.pdf
Cammack et al. (cited above)32

ministries. The GCCP is currently engaged in operations through three thematic
strategies, i.e. security-sector reforms (SSR) and small arms and light weapons (SALW)
and UN, and also through twelve regional strategies including Afghanistan and Iraq.
Its yearly budget for FY2006 to 2007 was 74 million pounds.23 More than half of thebudget, however, is used for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under suchcircumstances, some people insist that its focus should be on a conflict-sensitive
development approach or conflict prevention efforts, such as activities in SSR orpeacebuilding. Others maintain that the project approach itself limits the strategic
approach. To support post-conflict reconstruction, security maintenance is essential.
It is extremely important to pursue a coherent strategy which both assists such countries
with reconstruction and takes militaristic measures for security maintenance andrestoration. Such a coherent strategy can be expected to yield a synergistic effect.
On the other hand, the ACPP focuses only on conflict prevention in
Sub-Saharan Africa. An overall approach taken by the UK for conflict prevention in
Africa derives from the next three broad purposes: “1) support the building of African
conflict management capacity, 2) assist with conflict prevention, management andpost-conflict reconstruction in a number of priority sub-regions and country conflicts,
and 3) support pan-African initiatives for security sector reforms, small arms control,
and the measures to address economic and financial causes of conflict.” The Pool’s
objectives and their respective implementation plans are described in the UK
Sub-Saharan Strategy for Conflict Prevention and are revised each year. The ACPP
primarily focuses on the thematic issues – security sector reforms, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR), control of expansion and abuse of small arms,
and economic and financial causes of conflict. Its yearly program budget was 60
million pounds for FY2004. It also oversees all UK expenditures for peace support
activities in Africa including UN activities and other engagements.24
2.5 France
Although the French government has not established any special assistance policies,
organizations and aid schemes for “fragile states,” it has, however, rendereddevelopment assistance for fragile states (in line with traditional French assistancepolicies) as the main tool for its economic and military supremacy in the countries andoverseas territories formerly under French rule. This is particularly the case for Africa;
If France’s contributions to the EU’s European Development Fund for Africa are taken
2324

http://www.fco,gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename-OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c-Page&cid-1091891937471
DFID (2004)33

into account France is still the top donor for Africa, although the US took over the
position in 2000. Unlike other former colonial states, France has been willing tointervene economically and militarily the stabilization of countries and overseas
territories formerly under French rule and remains the sole donor country that maintains
close cooperative relationships in Africa and plays the role as “Africa’s military
police.”25 (Kataoka 2001)
With recognition that police intervention is essential for improving conditions
for a new start in states where the functions of national institutions have been
deteriorating, France dispatches both civilian and military police around the world,
albeit in small numbers, to the Police International Technical Cooperation Service(SCTIP) established in 98 countries (as of 2006). SCTIP was originally set up with theaim of supporting the management of the police organizations and fulfilling somefunctions for the local police in newly emerging countries in the old French territories.
In case of open hostilities, SCTIP has a scheme to dispatch military forces within a few
days. SCTIP is also a participating member of the International Police. Today,
however, SCTIP increasingly works as the liaison and coordination office between the
French police and the police of other countries and extends technical cooperation(knowledge and technology transfer) to its partners. For instance, when tsunamis
struck Southeast Asia, France assumed the role of commander for emergency relief
activities. International cooperation among police organizations also plays a vital partin ensuring the security of France (control of drug trafficking, control of illegal
immigration and measures against crimes, etc.) (J. C. Cady 2006).
As discussed above, France’s development assistance is provided with theintention of supplementing its trade policy and military intervention and there is no
development assistance policy paper addressing medium and long-term strategies, It
seems that a political statement announced by the administration in power has played
the central role to decide the tenor of external assistance of France on each occasion(Daimon 2007). However, the report on the “fight against poverty, inequality andbarrier” published in 2001 by the French government aims to render assistance with abroader scope including economic growth and social inequality alleviation. The report
indicates that France now focuses on better governance, establishment of stable
law-governed states and democratic systems and capacity building specially in Africawith a commitment to structural development issues rather than development assistance.
As a case in point, France is now providing financial aid to the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM) in NEPAD as an effective means to improve governance.
25

http://www.jiia.or.jp/pdf/global_issues/h12_africa/kataoka.pdf

34

Poverty reduction constitutes a major pillar, but it is not regarded as the sole objectiveof French development policy.
In recent years, France seems to be strengthening peacebuilding operations in
response to much heated discussion on the link between conflict and development inOECD-DAC and a growing number of internal violent conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, aformer colony. In 2005 the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) was
set up in the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and instituted a framework toprovide grant aid for post-conflict countries. The Bureau is now also formulating an
assistance implementation policy and action programs concerning assistance for conflict
prevention and reconstruction as well as the criteria to decide aid allocations topost-conflict countries. The Agence Française de Développement (AFD), aid
executive organization of France, has been trying to formulate a “post-conflict aid”
scheme in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (JBIC 2006;
Kudo 2006). This scheme, however, primarily focuses on measures to address issuesof conflict and peace as activities of diplomacy and military affairs only in countries
which had been under French rule in former days. The grand total of assistance forcountries (such as Afghanistan) which have never been placed under French rule iscomparatively small. 26(Daimon 2007)
In regards to multilateral assistance, France as the chair country of the Paris
Club has taken an active position on debt reduction for HIPC countries. In addition, as
one of the more influential EU countries, France has been playing a leading role instrengthening development aid to Africa in particular: for instance, it has recommended
that the EU increase its share of development assistance for Africa, and also proposed
the formulation of a common strategy for aid policy for Africa (adopted in the European
Council Meeting in December 2005). France also projects a strong presence at UN
Security Council, taking a different standpoint from US with regards to diplomacy andmilitary strategy for post-conflict countries.
2-6 UNDP
UNDP identifies a group of countries with low GDP per capita or HDI (humandevelopment index) scores as priority countries and urges donor countries to increase
their engagement with these countries. Consistent with its focus on a human26

In 1998, the aid reform brought about an important shift and began to include English-speaking African nations
and developing countries in the Middle East and Asia in the “Zone de Solidarité Prioritaire (ZSP)” ZSP lists the
major target countries of French bilateral assistance. The current ZSP list, revised in 2002, contains 54 countries.
(The breakdown – 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (out of which 20 are French speaking countries), three (3) inNorth Africa, four (4) in Central and South America, three (3) in Asia , one (1) in Oceania and three (3) in Middle andNear East)35

development agenda, UNDP’s aid policy to countries with weak governance or forpeace-building places an emphasis on human security and capacity development. UNDP
aims to address this challenge by implementing a number of pilot projects and sharing
success cases (Kondo 2003).
As the central issue in achieving MDGs, democratic governance is one of the
major aid sectors supported by the UNDP. In fact, it accounts for 46% of the total sumof UNDP technical assistance (about $1.5 billion) (UNDP 2005). The UNDP,
grounded on the political neutrality of its activities as a UN organization and its
decentralized nature equipped with offices in 106 countries, has been delivering
assistance to promote democratization and decentralization. Under the leadership of
Mr. Gita Welch, the Democratic Governance Group (GDD) was founded in the Bureau
for Development Policy in 2002. The GDD has provided assistance through sevenservice lines (policy support to democratic governance, parliamentary development,
electoral system and processes, justice and human rights, e-governance and access to
information, decentralization and local governance, and public administrative reform
and anti-corruption.) and also to gender issues from a cross-sectional approach andperspective. The GDD also launched the Democratic Governance Practice Network(DGPN) so as to integrate country practice, global practice and lessons learned fromexperiences. In addition, the UNDP has been promoting knowledge networking andresearch led by the Oslo Governance Center (established in 2002) as a think tank in thearea of democratic governance. In addition, the Thematic Trust Fund (TTF) was
founded in 2004 to deal with an increasing number of requests for policy
recommendations and technical assistance in the field of governance.
As for peace-building, under the authorization granted by the UN Security
Council the UNDP has played the central role in overseeing all peace-building
assistance and in coordinating aid among donors. The UNDP`s central role inpeace-building can be seen in countries such as Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan.
The UNDP has played key roles including provisional administration in Cambodia,
public administration and security in East Timor (excluding rehabilitation anddevelopment) and engagement in political processes such as elections in Afghanistan(Daimon 2007).
In the areas of preventing conflict or armed violence and support topost-conflict reconstruction, since 2001 when the Bureau for Crisis Prevention andRecovery (BCPR)27 was newly founded (in fact, reorganized from the Emergency
27

In the definition of BCPR, crisis includes man-made disasters and natural disasters.
section focuses on the former.

36

The discussion in thisResponse Division – ERD), the UNDP has been emphasizing the delivery of assistancefrom a long-term development perspective from the stage of reconstruction (theresolution of the “gap problem”). For instance, as a part of the measures to prevent
conflict or armed violence, the UNDP developed the conflict-related development
analysis (CDA) with assistance from DFID and made it public as a structural factor
analysis tool for conflict. At the core of the UNDP’s support to post-conflictreconstruction lies capacity development (dispatch of experts and technical cooperation)and strengthening partnerships. That is, UNDP has provided assistance for thedevelopment of small-scale infrastructure, support to elections, human resource
development, clearance of landmines, school construction, media development, job
creation, and recovery of small arms in post-conflict countries.
One of the core UNDP operations in regards to reconstruction assistance is in
the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants28.
Based upon what has been learned from its engagement in more than 15 countries, theUN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (IAWG) consisting of the UN DDR-related
sections formulated the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Standards (IDDRS), a DDR Briefing Note to Senior Managers and an Operational
Guide to the IDDRS as UN policy guidelines for planning, promotion andimplementation of DDR in December 2006 under the UNDP initiative. At the sametime, the UNDP Resource Center was founded and offers a web-based system on which
DDR programs by country and related information are available. This system
integrates policy procedures related to DDR which in the past had been different foreach UN organization, and has therefore improved the planning, implementation andevaluation of DDR.

28

According to the “Practice Note on DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants)
prepared by the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, DDR aims to enhance security under thecircumstances immediately after the end of conflict in which neutrality is a must, thereby contributing to a smoothtransfer to the stage of reconstruction and recovery. The UNDP exclusively focuses on the process of “R”(reintegration of ex-combatants).

37

Chapter 3: Japan’s Measures for Fragile States
Although the Japanese government has not internalized the concept of fragile states, nor
has it adopted an explicit policy for engaging fragile states, Japan’s approach to“fragile states” as categorized by the international aid community, is evident primarily
in the way its development aid for governance and peace-building is carried out. The
rationale for Japanese commitment to addressing state fragility is set out in the New
Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter (hereinafter referred to as the ODA
Charter)29 of 2003, which lays out the two major pillars of its basic ODA policies; (1)supporting self-help efforts of developing countries and (2) the human security agenda.
The idea of supporting recipient countries’ self-help efforts is an essential
component of Japan’s ODA philosophy. As articulated in the ODA Charter, theJapanese government highlights the issue of ownership and alignment and addresses
this challenge through capacity- and institution building efforts to nurture economic andsocial infrastructure needed for “good governance”. Building on this principle, Japan,
rather than adopting an explicit list of “fragile states,” maintains a cautious stance in its
use of aid as a tool of economic and political sanctions and has provided continuous
support to so-called fragile states, as is the case of Japan’s aid to Myanmar andUzbekistan.
Embraced as an overall operational framework for Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) since 2004, the human security agenda underlines Japan’scommitment to addressing the various challenges confronted by people living underdifficult situations. According to JICA, aid policies and field operations that reflect“human security30” tries to deliver: (1) human-centered assistance that reaches people,(2) assistance focusing on capacity building of people, and (3) assistance targeting thesustainable development of both the government and local community. Japan places
particular focus on the role of people as key drivers of development, and accordingly,
recognizes the importance of assistance for enhancing the capacity of both thegovernments in question as well as people living under such deprived circumstances.
29

The basic policies of the ODA Charter are (1) supporting self-help efforts of developing countries, (2) perspectiveof “human security,” (3) assurance of fairness, (4) utilization of Japan’s experience and expertise, and (5) partnershipand collaboration with the international community. (MOFA homepage)
30“Human security” is the concept first advocated by UNDP in 1994. Later in 2000, the Commission on Human
Security co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Sen Amartya defines that human security is “to protect the vital core of all
human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment” and to create systems to give people suchopportunities. Makino (2006) correlates the “menace” caused by external risk factors including conflict, terrorism,
crime, violation of human rights, spread of infectious diseases, environmental destruction, economic crisis anddisaster with the “scarcity” caused by the poverty problem in a broad sense such as poverty, famine and the lack of
education, health and medical services. He argues that, by so doing, it will become possible to carry out an
integrated analysis and deliver assistance required by each recipient country.

38

Japan has given a greater emphasis on partnership-based state-building efforts
than on top-down interventionist type operations, although Japanese officials and aid
practitioners are beginning to recognize the increasing need to participate in “upstream”
modalities of aid such as donor harmonization efforts. This is especially the case inaddressing challenges posed by “difficult partners” whose political capacity and/or will
to use aid effectively is limited compared to other developing countries. At the current
moment, however, the Japanese government has not developed a whole-of-government
strategy toward “fragile states” and inter-ministerial coordination between 3Ds is still
limited, partly because of an ongoing internal dispute with regards to the Japanese Self
Defense Force’s stance against UN Peace Keeping Operation.
The following sections will discuss Japan’s approach to “fragile states” within
its conventional development assistance framework focusing on governance andpeace-building support. Specific measures taken by MOFA, JBIC and JICA in regards
to governance and peace-building support will also be examined.
3-1 Assistance for Governance
The Japanese government states in its ODA Charter that strengthening the foundationsof democracy promotes good governance, citizen participation in development, and theprotection of human rights; and therefore has been identified as an important factor inachieving medium to long-term stability and development. Japan takes the stance thataid should be provided from a long-term perspective in the development of a democracy,
which respects basic freedoms and safeguarding human rights, while emphasizing therecipient country’s independence. To achieve this, Japan provides assistance toeliminate corruption, to reform the legal system, to promote administrative efficiency
and transparency, and to improve the administrative capacity of local governments. It
has positioned good governance as a cross-sectional issue in development. Also, the
new ODA medium-term policy positions assistance for policy planning andinstitution-building of developing countries as a priority.
At the operational level, assistance for governance was mentioned for the firsttime in JICA’s 1995 report titled Participatory Development and Good Governance.
The report contends that it is necessary to support “good governance” as essential basic
infrastructure for participatory development (“aid for promoting democratization”)“under any circumstances” existing in the recipient country. Thus, continued
assistance has been provided to improve government infrastructure (democratic politicalsystems, administrative functions, legal systems, and others) for countries facing
problems involving democratization and human rights such as to Viet Nam in the initial39

stage of the Doi-moi administration, as well as Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Cambodia andLaos 31 It should also be noted, however, that the scope of Japan’s activities ingovernance assistance is small in comparison to other donor countries and institutions.
The lack of staff with experiences in governance assistance and undeveloped
implementation systems, and the need to coordinate views with other donor countries
and institutions are issues that need to be addressed in the future.
3-2 Peacebuilding AssistanceIn conjunction with poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and global issues,
Peacebuilding has been categorized as a priority issue in Japan’s ODA. In a speech
given in May 2002, the former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, emphasizedinternational cooperation that incorporated consolidation of peace and state-building.
Following this, “the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace” wasestablished with an objective to comprehensively examine how Japan could contributeto peace in the future (December 2002). In the same year, the government introduced
legislation for the enhanced use of ODA for peace-building purposes, and the swift
dispatch of troops for PKO. It aims to achieve “seamless assistance” by coordinating
diplomatic strategies and cooperating with UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO). The
target of such assistance ranges from countries in need of conflict prevention tocountries in conflict or which have experienced conflict situations.
Japan’s full-scale operations in international cooperation for peace go back to
the 1990s. The success of Japanese mine-clearing troops in the Persian Gulf in 1990
opened the way for the dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for PKO, and in
the following year, the “International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Cooperation Law)
was enacted. 32 Since then, Japan has dispatched personnel to 10 peacekeeping
operations; including those in Cambodia, Mozambique, East Timor and the Golan
Heights, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have participated in PKO (as of March 2008
Japanese SDF were still engaged in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force(UNDOF) on the Golan Heights).
The collapse of the Cold War structure rapidly triggered the outbreak of new
armed conflicts in a number of regions around the world. In response to this situation,
Japan has hosted conferences, namely the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation

31

JICA brings together and systematizes the aid policies and performance in the field of governance in its 2004
report, “JICA’s assistance in the governance field—building democratic institutions, improving administrative
functions, and developing legal systems.”
32
In the same year, the ODA Charter, which can be referred to as the constitution of ODA, was formulated for the
first time.

40and Reconstruction of Cambodia in 1992, the International Conference on the
Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) in 1993, and international conferences on
peacebuilding and reconstruction in East Timor (1999), Afghanistan (2002), Ache,
Indonesia (2002) and Sri Lanka (2003), and has actively contributed to building theframework for peace, reconstruction and development for post-conflict countries. In theInternational Conference on Reconstruction in Iraq held in Madrid, Japan committed $5
billion in assistance ($1.5 billion as grant aid and $3.5 billion as yen loans for humanresource development, rehabilitation aid through international organizations and NGOs,
and debt relief). Recently, the government has been increasing its assistance forconsolidating peace in Africa—Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic ofCongo, Burundi and Sudan (Darfur) (Table 8).
As a cross-regional effort, since 2006 the Japanese government has launched
the Pilot Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding toaddress the increasing international needs for civilian personnel in peacebuiding
operations. Also from June 2006 to December 2008, Japan succeeded Angola tobecome the second-term chair country of the Peacebuilding Commission. To maintainits status as a peaceful nation, this is a good opportunity for Japan to actively present its
concepts and models of assistance to the international community and demonstrate its
strong preference for diplomatic strategies.
Table 8 Assistance to Major Conflict-affected Countries/Regions (disbursement base; US$1 million)
2000

2001

2003

2003

2005

2006

9,768.13

7,457.78

6,692.3

6.334.23

5,917.17

10,406.1

7,313.09

Afghanistan

0.21

0.58

31.7

134.42172.52

71.05

107.42

Cambodia

99.21

120.21

98.58

125.8886.37

100.62106.28

Iraq

0.03

0.02

0.07

3.13

662.073,502.85

780.81

Nepal

99.93

84.39

97.45

60.61

56.43

63.38

41.72

Palestinian autonomous territories

61.15

21.52

12.75

4.46

9.0

5.8

78.23

Sri Lanka

163.68184.72118.94172.26179.53312.91202.73

East Timor

29.07

8.93

5.74

8.93

9.88

33.41

21.83

Democratic Republic of Congo

0.47

0.32

0.85

0.63

48.47

372.26

23.17

Sierra Leone

0.02

0.02

0.09

3.73

0.19

2.09

62.69

0.67

0.69

1.17

1.47

1.55

2.11

42.73

All developing countries

Sudan

2002

33

Source: OECD (2007)

33

OECD stat http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Default.aspx?usercontext=sourceoecd (accessed in March 2008)41

Box 2: Assistance to Afghanistan: Leadership in DDR processes and the Ogata
Initiative
Immediately following the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance toAfghanistan held in Tokyo in January 2002, assistance to Afghanistan has been
implemented in the areas of (1) the peace process, (2) security, and (3) reconstruction.
In particular, Japan took the leading role in providing assistance for the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process of ex-combatants (DDR). The Japanese
government took the reins of leadership in promoting the DDR processes by closely
coordinating with the Afghan government, advanced countries, development
institutions, and international organizations such as UNAMA and UNDA, in an area
where the international community’s cumulative experience was limited at the time, andenabled Japan to gain new experience and learned lessons in assistance targeting
peace-building. The Regional Comprehensive Development Assistance Programme(Ogata Initiative) prepared under the leadership of Ms. Sadako Ogata, (then) special
representative of the Japanese prime minister for assistance to Afghanistan, proposed amechanism to facilitate collaboration among international organizations that previously
tended to carry out their operations separately under different schemes; and this enabled
the seamless transition from humanitarian aid to reconstruction and development. The
assistance model for regional reconstruction proposed by the Ogata Initiative has gained
special attention as a means of providing assistance to states that are vulnerable during
the transition from the emergency phase to the reconstruction and development stages.

3-3 Initiatives Taken by Respective Assistance Executing Institutions
For the effective and efficient implementation of development assistance it is essential
to be consistent throughout the whole process from policymaking and to enforcement.
In 2003, Japan formed a local ODA task force consisting of the Japanese Embassy andthe local offices of ODA executing institutions (JICA and JBIC) in 74 countries (as ofAugust 2007). The aim of the task force was to strengthen both the collaboration
between the legislating and implementing processes of Japan’s assistance policies aswell as Japan’s collaboration with other donors. Each local ODA task force assumes the42tasks of understanding the political, economic, and social conditions of the recipient
countries, their development needs as well as trends in other donor’s aid policies, forformulating country-specific assistance plans, priority agenda, sector plans, programs
and projects that conform to the recipient government and international development
objectives. In addition, the task forces also play a central role in monitoring the overall
progress of assistance and making adjustments to the projects when needed. Thus theprimary work of understanding of the fragility of the state and preparing appropriate
assistance plans and projects has been assigned to the local task force.
The merger between JICA and JBIC is expected to strengthen Japan’s
implementation system as well as the local ODA task force. The following sections will
highlight the development assistance implemented to date by MOFA, JBIC and JICA
for fragile states or countries with vulnerabilities.
3-3-1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Grant aid provided by MOFA is designed to provide assistance to the basic
infrastructure (transportation, electricity, information and communication, medical andhealth services, secure water supply, environment, rural development of agricultural andfishing communities), and human resource development (education and research) of therecipient country. Three main types of grant aid schemes are used in the area ofpeacebuilding and governance: general grant aid projects which comprise half of all
grant aid cooperation,35 humanitarian aid for evacuees or refugees displaced by natural
disasters, civil war or conflicts, and emergency grant aid for democratic elections indeveloping countries and reconstruction and development. For the purpose ofpeacebuilding, grant aid are also provided through: conflict prevention andpeacebuilding grant aid (non-project type grant aid), grassroots grant aid, and humansecurity grant aid, depending on the circumstances. Additionally, two grant schemes
were newly set up to better fit the specific local needs (grant aid for community
empowerment in 2006) and to encourage local companies’ engagement in project
implementation (grant aid for poverty reduction strategy in 2007). These various typesof grant aid schemes are often implemented in collaboration with the technicalcooperation provided by JICA.
Reflecting on recent policies to strengthen assistance measures for Afghanistan
and Iraq, Japan has actively approved projects ranging between fifty million and one
35

These include the followings: project-type grant aid that meets a broad scope of needs for hospitals, schools, road
construction and public transportation vehicles; grant aid for Japan’s NGOs that support grassroots activities
including local public bodies, education and medical organizations and NGOs; non-project type grant aid to assist an
economic reform program and the whole development plan in a given field; and grassroots/human security grant aid.

43

billion yen for road repairs, the construction of water supply facilities and medical andhealth facilities in the Middle and Near East through emergency grant aid and grassroots
and human security grant aid. The amount of grant aid approved for this region in thepast three years accounts for 27% (¥9.17 billion) of the total amount of assistance. In
FY2005, the other top recipient countries for country-specific assistance were
Cambodia (¥1.53 billion, 207 cases) and Columbia (¥1.2 billion, 127 cases).36
For countries with a weak governance capacity, it is particularly important toproperly assess the potential impact caused by aid delivery prior to project
implementation. Proper assessment is needed in areas such as the selection of
construction and installation sites for facilities, the recipient government’s institutional
capacity for sustainable use and maintenance of the facilities provided, and expected
benefits, both direct and indirect. Such impacts should also be monitored for a given
period of time after project completion.
With regard to assistance through multilateral cooperation, by April 2006 Japan
contributed approximately ¥31.5 billion in total to the Trust Fund for Human Security37
established within the UN system in 1993 under the Japan initiative. As of March 2006,
the Fund provided about $204 million (for 149 projects). Section-wise breakdowns are
as follows; $55.25 million for poverty (43 cases), $31.44 million for health (38 cases),
and $24.05 million for refugee countermeasures. By region, Asia accounts for thegreatest portion of Japan’s contributions (approximately $61.11 million for 60 cases),followed by Africa (about $56.54 million for 41 cases), and Europe38 (some $52.48
million for 13 cases) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006).
3-3-2 Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
JBIC’s Medium-Term Strategy for Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations for
FY2005-2007 positions “assistance for global issues and peace-building” as one of its
priority areas and articulates its commitment to assistance for conflict prevention andrecurrence prevention, medium to long-term reconstruction assistance towards theconsolidation of peace, and assistance for neighboring countries of conflict states aimed
at regional stability (JBIC 2005). After JBIC changed its method of writing off yen
loans from conventional Grants Aid for Debt Relief to Debt Forgiveness Grants in 2003,
JBIC has also worked to reduce the debt of many fragile states such as Iraq.

36

http://www.mofa.go.jp/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hyouka/kunibetu/gai/kusanone_h/pdfs/sk05_01_04.pdf
The U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security funds projects implemented by the United Nations organizations (orjointly by U.N. and non-U.N. organizations) that protect people from threats (poverty, environmental destruction,
conflict, landmines, refugee issue, drugs and infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS) and strengthens their capacity.
38
Assistance primarily for Kosovo
37

44

The implementation of yen-loan projects in fragile states is limited (pastexperiences include Sri Lanka, Philippines (Mindanao), Afghanistan and Iraq), since thegovernment policy does not allow new loan provision to countries that have received
debt forgiveness through the HIPC scheme. Yet yen loans can contribute to a morepredictable flow of aid at the phase of reconstruction because they are pledged overmultiple year periods. Based on a careful review on the repayment capacity of therecipient government, the further opportunities for the provision of yen loan combinedwith grant aid and technical cooperation should be explored, especially to Japan’s aid
priority countries (for instance Cambodia and Laos) (Nakao 2005).
One example of a yen loan that contributed to peace-building is JBIC’s rural
economic development and reconstruction project in Sri Lanka in 2003. The project
incorporated the settlement of returning refugees after the restoration of peace andmedium to long-term economic development as its operational objective. For thispurpose, it helped to repair reservoir irrigation facilities in the northern and eastern
provinces, where development has lagged due to the civil war, and assisted a local
municipal vocational training program through micro-financing. Also, the findings fromthe preliminary survey Conflict and Development: Roles of JBIC (JBIC 2003) wasreflected back into the policies of the relevant parties, namely the Sri Lankan
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
In addition to above, JBIC dispatched officers in the aftermath of the conflictsin Afghanistan (2002) and in Iraq (2004). JBIC is also committed to make acontribution to discussions on state-building agenda for fragile states. In January 2007,
it hosted a Seminar “A Comparative Perspective on State-Building in Post-Conflict
Conditions: Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nepal, and Sudan” in Tokyo, inviting Mr. Ashraf
Ghani as keynote speaker39(Fukuda and Kudo 2007).
3-3-3 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
The concept of human security, introduced in 2004 following the reorganization of
JICA, is an approach that highlights the fragility of states in a broader sense, byaddressing the needs for comprehensive measures that bridge a gap between peace anddevelopment and increasing support for countries and regions under difficult
circumstances. 40 JICA does not officially employ the term “fragile states” and has
undertaken assistance measures for these countries through governance support as well39

Mr. Ghami was the chief advisor to the Karzai Provisional Administration and also held the post as the U.N.
advisor in the processes of formulating, coordinating, and implementing the Bonn Agreement. Thus, he was deeply
involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan from the perspectives of both the recipient country and the donor.
40
JICA Website

45

as aid for restoration, development and peace-building in post-conflict settings.
As discussed in section 3-1, Japanese governance assistance primarily targets
the recipient country’s administrative institutions and is characterized by an approachbased on “option-offering” or “collaborative thinking”, with the aim of promoting
spontaneous reforms of a country (JICA 2004). The area of assistance covers a wide
range of activities from restoring and improving basic functions of the state (such as
improved administrative services) to developing policies and measures that are neededfor operating democratic systems and mechanisms (legal reforms, etc.), and seems tohave comparative advantage in institutional improvements and fostering humanresources. Even to the countries where the government’s commitment in promoting
democracy or human rights is still weak, Japan has delivered continuous support
through, rather than “bypassing”, the government in question.
A case in point is the uninterrupted cooperation in the field of law for Asian
nations such as Cambodia and Uzbekistan,41 where a joint team of experts from both
Japan and the partner country was set up to draft laws based on their analysis of thesocial and economic conditions of the country. In Indonesia, JICA has been
implementing the Indonesian National Police Reform Assistance Program since 2001.
With the goal of improving the capacity of the police system, the program provides
assistance for all the keys areas of national security: institution-building, humanresource development, facilities development, and the provision of necessary
equipment.42
As stipulated in the Japan International Cooperation Agency Law, 2003,
assisting during the reconstruction phase is one of the organizational objectives of
JICA.43 JICA Thematic Guidelines on Peace-building Assistance in 2003 (now underrevision) states that target countries for JICA assistance have now been expanded toinclude conflict-prone countries as well as countries in transition from ceasefire to peace,in addition to post-conflict countries (JICA 2003). 44 The Seven areas of JICA
assistance include; (1) reconciliation, (2) governance, (3) restoration of security, (4)41

In Cambodia, the establishment of legal systems has been the top priority issue since the end of the civil war in
1991. JICA extended all-out assistance for drafting the civil law and the civil proceedings law. After the year 2003
when the final draft was completed, assistance has been provided continuously to educate judges. The Civil
Proceedings Law came into force in July 2007. The code of civil procedure will be promulgated and enacted within
this fiscal year.
42
JICA accepted a total of 97 participants in the training course until March 2006, and through grant aid cooperation,
wireless radios and police boxes have been provided in order to strengthen both hard and soft components.
43
Peacebuilding is one of the pillars of a new JICA that will make a start in October 2008.
44
JICA offers its assistance, as a rule, based on three principles, (1) conclusion of ceasefire/peace agreement, (2)commitment of the Japanese government and (3) assurance of security. In recent years, however, it has been ready toprovide assistance to peace-building in countries in a transitional period from ceasefire to peace and to prevent therelapse of conflict (Sri Lanka, Philippines, Mindanao, and Ache, Indonesia).

46social infrastructure development, (5) economic reconstruction, (6) assistance for thesocially vulnerable and (7) emergency aid. In all of these endeavors JICA provides
assistance through the dispatch of experts, assistance in the policy planning process,project implementation, and formulating master plans for grant aid. Undercircumstances where the dispatch of Japanese experts need to be deferred because of
security reasons, JICA seeks to maintain the continuity of its assistance by hosting
training courses for recipient countries in Japan or by working with other donor
countries, aid organizations, NGOs and PKO as needed.
JICA’s Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment (PNA) is a tool for
stakeholder analysis in post-conflict settings, aimed at better incorporation of conflict
prevention perspectives in the project design, implementation, monitoring, andevaluation process. Beginning with Sri Lanka in 2001, by 2006 PNA had been
completed in 22 countries and regions. PNA can serve as a useful means of engagementthat incorporates the principle of “Do no harm.”45 (Box 3.)
Box 3 Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment (PNA)
Behind the development and introduction of PNA lies JICA’s concern that under
unstable local conditions, assistance may aggravate the causes of conflict or may evenworsen the conflict. PNA is designed to minimize this risk as much as possible byidentifying specific needs of countries in conflict based on local context analysis andthen drafting measures for mitigating the causes of conflicts. Introducing PNA canensure assistance is not disproportionately allocated to any specific social group or
region, and does not exclude any particular group, preventing a sense of inequality
between opposing groups. PNA is now used at the project planning and implementation
stages to ensure that JICA projects help alleviate the underlying causes of conflict, suchas disparities between the rich and the poor and unequal opportunities of social
participation.
Although peace-building is a relatively new area of cooperation for JICA, JICA
has accumulated some experience and learned some lessons. For example, based on thelessons learned from reconstruction assistance in Cambodia and East Timor, JICA
employed several measures in Afghanistan to achieve visible outcomes at an early stageof assistance, such as Research in Urgent Development Projects which uses local human45

In principle, PNA is implemented in those countries where (1) JICA has the capacity (regardless of whether there
is a local JICA office) to carry it out and (2) where there is high demand for assistance.

47

resources and greater focus on restoring and improving infrastructure related to roads
and basic human needs (BHN). Also, based on its experience in Afghanistan, JICA
adopted the “Fast Track System” in July 2005 to improve internal implementation
systems and enables the execution of projects more quickly. Aiming at the eliminationof the gap between long-term development assistance and urgent disaster andreconstruction oriented assistance, the system enables peace-building or post-disasterreconstruction projects be launched in 45 days at the earliest through a simplified
planning and implementation process and pooling of staff.46
In addition to country-specific assistance, from February 2006 to March 2007
JICA conducted a research study on assistance to fragile states with weak governance,
titled “Aid strategies and approaches to States with limited capacity to cope with instability
risks (tent)”. The study analyzed assistance policies and strategies of major donors andexamines a framework to assess the risk management capacity of a recipient country.
Since 2007, JICA has also launched a joint research project with UNDP on policy
approaches for conflict prevention in Africa, which included 6 case studies from
Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Mozambique andDarfur.
3-4 Characteristics of Japan’s Assistance: A Comparison with Other Donor Countries
and Organizations
While international debate on aid effectiveness places importance on criteria such as
those used when implementing General Budget Support, jointly formulated sector
programs and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), and has been cautious yet
active in using aid modalities that “bypass” the government systems of recipient country(such as NGOs), Japanese assistance has set a high value on partnership with therecipient country. Accordingly, a greater part of Japanese aid has been delivered
through government institutions. Japan’s official development assistance stance can beseen as being in line with the principles of state-building and alignment as highlighted
in the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations”
by OECD-DAC. Japan thus has a unique role to play in international discussion on
fragile states, where a new model for international aid architecture are currently being
discussed; and for this Japan needs to put its knowledge and experiences in a proper
framework so to be useful to other international development partners.
At the same time, Japan also needs to further examine whether the way it has
46

The projects that have been designated as First Track projects include assistance for the Pakistan earthquake, South
Sudan, Palestine, Philippines and Mindanao.

48

delivered assistance to fragile states has been effective. As has been frequently pointed
out by Daimon and others (2007), areas that have traditionally been left to self-reliance
have begun to be seen as areas requiring proactive assistance, particularly in the cases ofassistance to post-conflict countries. This has been markedly recognized within thecontext of assistance to fragile states with institutions suffering from weak governance.
Japan’s continued assistance to countries facing critical challenges in human rights anddemocratization is characterized by higher aid predictability and thus contributed tothe state-building process of these countries. Conversely, this has often been criticizedas having helped non-democratic governments in power. To what extent is intervention
allowed under the premise of development assistance or humanitarian aid? This
question requires further debate in the future. Japan’s hitherto passive stance inintervention must be reexamined, which in turn requires Japan to articulate the role ofdevelopment assistance in its diplomatic strategy more clearly.

49Chapter 4: Providing Assistance to Fragile States—Challenges and Issues that JapanFaces
How do many fragile states develop politically, economically and socially as a state,
and what sort of assistance is effective to that end? There are no ready answers to thesequestions. These issues are strongly related to the donor countries’ diplomatic andsecurity concerns; accordingly, their aid policies and measures taken differ widely fromone donor to another. More examples include military invasion, policy dialogue, andassistance policies that does so much not take the fragility of recipient countries into
account. The difficulties in assisting countries whose institutions and policies areunderdeveloped are evident in the debate during the 1980s among Bretton Woods
Institutions on structural adjustment lending. Although the policies of Bretton Woods
Institutions have undergone changes over the years from an ex-ante approach (structuraladjustment lending), and then to an ex-post approach (allocation of IDA loans based on
CPIA), an effective assistance policy has yet to be found. This issue has been debatedfor nearly 30 years and examined from economic, political, and sociologicalperspectives; and the causes of the problems have been identified to a certain degree.
Building and/or strengthening of political, economic, and social institution suitable fordevelopment is a prerequisite for economic growth of a state, and this effort would beincomplete without donor’s understanding of the present and past institutions, as well as
the history and context analyses of current situation that exist in fragile states.
One major reason why structural adjustment lending of the Bretton Woods
Institutions did not produce the anticipated outcome may be due to its inadequate
knowledge of the recipient country. Also, quick results tended to be sought without due
considerations to social and political conditions of recipient countries. Such arguments
are made by Gibson, et al (2005). These cast doubts whether the current international
aid structure is suitable for assisting fragile states, or may even deter the development ofa sound state in the long run.
This chapter analyzes problems related to assistance to fragile states andexamines how donors, particularly Japan, should address the issues posed by fragile
states. As stated in Chapter 2 and 3, one difference in the approach taken by Japan andother major donors towards fragile states is that Japan’s approach is pragmatic focusing
on its field of operations and avoiding political intervention. Another key difference isthat other major donors are prepared to intervene militarily whereas Japan has nointention of ever taking military action due to the Japan’s constitutions. However, many
basic problems of fragile states are rooted in their governments, and assistance to these50

states needs to be provided through an improved donor harmonization framework.
Japan needs to examine the possibility of political intervention in its assistance to thesecountries.
4-1 Establishing a Basic Assistance Policy Stance for Fragile States
The analysis in previous chapters highlights that the focus of the international
community’s assistance to fragile states had expanded from economic and social
development to include politics and security. Since 9-11, the international commitment
to “fight terrorism”, led by the U.S. and Europe, has also influenced the trend ininternational assistance policies. In view of the current tenor of the international politics
and the international assistance community, Japan needs to review the possibility of
expanding its approach to fragile states from its conventional development assistancepolicies to a broader framework. In the past, assistance to fragile states was incorporated
into Japan’s conventional development assistance policies, although parties responsiblefor implementing the assistance tended to pay special attention to the “fragility” of therecipient country. In future, Japan needs to clarify its assistance policies to fragile states
if it is to work on alleviating “fragility”, in addition to its hitherto core focus on“development”.
This in turn means that Japan should articulate the direction of Japanese
assistance to fragile states: that include what medium to long term vision Japan has for
those countries and what assistance is needed. The key issue is how to build thelegitimacy of government, which is based on the relationship between a government andits people. Japan needs to make a decision on whether to provide assistance to a country
where the legitimacy of the government is not in place, or when legitimacy exists yet
the government’s capacity or will to improve its institutions and policies are weak. One
option is not to provide assistance to such countries. This, however, would be a difficult
choice if a country in question poses a potential threat to international security or is a
resource-rich country. Deciding how Japan responds to fragile states, is an issue to beaddressed by the entire Japanese government, not by the Japanese development
assistance sector alone. While MOFA and other related government ministries, aid
agencies, research institutes and individual experts can conduct a variety of survey
studies on individual countries, the responsibility of formulating basic assistancepolicies to fragile states lies with the Cabinet. Especially when Japan participates in
PKOs, or when it decides the form in which Japan supports other donors’ militaryintervention, whether political, financial, or material, the government needs to work out
consistent assistance policies based on coordination among the related ministries and51

agencies :what is described by OECD-DAC as the whole-of-government approach. This
would be a challenging endeavor for the Japanese government, judging from the factthat other donors are experiencing difficulty in coordinating their relevant domesticorganizations.
Clear policy stance is necessary, when collaborating with other major donors
and international institutions. This would particularly be the case when the engagement
process involves political issues, the need to collaborate with other donor countries, theU.N. and other international institutions becomes prominent; and this cannot bearchived by executing agency level alone. This issue will be discussed later.
Box 5: Natural resource management in fragile states
Some fragile states are rich in natural resources, such as oil. To a resource poor country
like Japan, diverse factors must be considered when providing assistance to thesecountries. The relationship between natural resources and state fragility has been
discussed, for instance, by Collier (2007). Natural resources have been a complex
strategic issue between industrial and developing countries. It has been reported that
China, for instance, has been aggressively offering assistance to African countries inexchange for natural resources. The securing of natural resources and aid are also
intricately interrelated for the U.S. and Europe. On another front, many resource-richcountries face governance problems and in some cases, assistance funds are illegally
diverted. Therefore aid, as the case may be, may actually aggravate the governanceproblems of a recipient country.
The “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative（EITI)” is an international
initiative concerning natural resources and development. It was proposed by the former
U.K. prime minister, Mr. Blair, in 2002 to establish a framework to secure thetransparency of fund flows in extractive industries. At the G8 Summit held in
Gleneagles in 2005, the EITI was given support and all eight advanced countries
pledged to increase their support to EITI and EITI implementing countries. Presently,
EITI members are small in number, but the future course of this initiative deserves
continued attention.
4-2 Strategy and Policy
Assistance to fragile states needs to be discussed within a framework that is broader
than conventional development assistance policies. Thus, the purpose of the assistance,
its approach, method, implementation system, what minimum objectives must be met,52

relationship between aid and other interventions outside the assistance framework must
be discussed by relevant parties with greater care and attention than in the case ofordinary development assistance. Because of the difficult circumstances thatcharacterize assistance to most fragile states, it is also important to discuss a withdrawal
policy or exit strategies in advance where necessary.
The objectives of aid, as discussed in earlier chapters, is not merely to provide
assistance from a humanitarian perspective or to meet development needs. The
provision of aid and approaches taken may also be based on diplomatic relations
between Japan and the recipient country, economic (including resource dependency) or
geographical concerns. Further, the policies adopted by the U.N., European countries
and especially those of the U.S will have many implications for Japan in deciding its
future approach. Deciding Japan’s position within the dynamics of bilateral andinternational relations requires the collaboration and consensus of the entire Japanese
government as well as aid implementing agencies. To achieve this, the government may
need to demonstrate strong leadership.
In reviewing the measures to be taken and implementation system of assistance,
it is important that Japan identifies its own capacity in terms of human resources,finance and expertise. Where expertise and human resources are lacking, assistance canbe implemented by coordinating with international institutions and other donors, as seenin Japan’s past experiences in peace-building assistance. Based on such precedents, it isrecommended that Japan explores ways to achieve its goals through strategic
partnerships rather than relying on self-contained approaches in its assistance to fragile
states.
In fragile states where social conditions are extremely volatile, the security
situation may rapidly deteriorate and society can dissolve into conflict due to a variety
of factors such as a sudden onset of inflation and a collapse in the political balance ofpower. It is therefore essential that a contingency plan is formulated to secure the safetyof personnel involved in field operations. At times, a decision to pullout may benecessary. Strategic planning for fragile states must incorporate contingencies for suchpossibilities.
Strategies planning should be based on a preliminary study using the expertisefrom the local ODA task force as well as regional researchers who are specialized in therecipient countries and regions, and this may take form in more detailed PNAs for
instance. Given the volatility of social conditions in fragile states, assistance must be
flexible so that changes can be made to reflect the circumstances.
What must be kept in mind in formulating policies and aid strategies for fragile53

states is the recognition that effective assistance requires the multi-faceted engagementby many staff members over a long-term period. Building of sound political andeconomic institutions requires the gradual cultivation of a relationship of trust between
the government and the people. This cannot be achieved merely by holding an election
or developing a legal system: it is critical that donors also provide assistance in the areasof community empowerment especially the poor, the promotion of political education,
nurturing of healthy economic and political activities, cultivating a fair military andpolice organization and strengthening neutral media. This again highlights the needs for
careful analysis on the political, economic and the social institutions of the recipient
country. In view of the time, expense and human resources required to carry out suchanalyses, the number of fragile states in which Japan can play key roles is limited. In
reality, it may not be possible to provide sustainable assistance unless the fragile state ispolitically, economically and geopolitically significant to Japan. For fragile states thatare strategically-important for Japan, MOFA or JICA should assign a personnel for eachcountry who are responsible for overseeing the long-term continuity and coherency of
the assistance policy to the country. For example, this person will play a role similar tothat of a Country Director47 in the World Bank. Such a person could be the head of theJapanese ODA Task Force in recipient country. The decisions on Japanese aid
allocation is made according to the importance that the specific country bears to Japan’snational interest, but is not necessarily examined in the light of recipient’s fragility. It isdue time to reexamine developing countries from the viewpoint of fragile states, andbased on this, each officer in charge of a particular country must pay greater attention to
the country under close coordination with the local ODA task force. In the past, Japan’s
aid system has been divided among MOFA, JICA and JBIC; however, a more coherent
assistance to each country can be expected under the new JICA.
The question of what measures should be taken in case the analytical results ofa country’s policies indicate that those policies are inappropriate for development, is anold, yet a new important issue. To address this challenge, since the 1980s the Bretton
Woods Institutions have attached conditionalities to structural adjustment loans they
provide. This approach has drawn much criticism. Much of the criticism has centered on
the way they “bought up” policy changes, because imposed policy changes would notlead to sustainable development. In response, donors has come to replace their use of
conditionality (which seeks ex-ante commitment by recipient countries to policy
reforms) with ex-post methods where assistance is provided to countries only after
47

The WB Country Director is the chief executive of assistance to one country who is responsible for policy,
implementation and evaluation. In some cases, one person is in charge of multiple countries.

54

institutions and policies have been developed or improved, as applied in the cases ofInternational Development Association (IDA) and the Millennium Challenge Accountin the U.S.
The effective use of conditionality or policy dialogue to seek institutional andpolicy reform in fragile states, whether ex-ante or ex-post, needs to be further explored.
It may be also difficult for the donor country to obtain the domestic support of its own
citizens, unless the aid does not contribute to policy or institutional reforms (including
anti-corruption). For example, U.K.’s aid to Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia was criticizedby NGOs for providing assistance to governments with political problems. Japan
underwent a similar experience when Japanese aid to Indonesia under Suharto
administration was tainted by corruption. Japan has imposed conditionalities on several
countries, as analyzed by Shimomura et al. (1999). The 2003 ODA Charter also states
the need for policy dialogues. Presently, Japanese aid to North Korea is conditioned on
the return of Japanese citizens abducted by that country.
Even in cases where Japan does not use explicit forms of conditionalities, it isimportant that Japan makes its political stance clear about conditionalities posed byother donor(s) under a donor coordination framework. In view of such possible
circumstances, Japan will need to make high-level policy decisions on whether topresent certain conditions to the recipient country independently or in partnership withother countries when assistance and intervention are implemented in fragile states.
Also, Japan’s comparative advantage should be taken into account when
formulating its assistance policy for fragile states. International debate on assistance tofragile states seems to be centered on state-building and security, but the foremost issue
that confronts fragile states is its economy, as maintained by Brainerd and Chollet(2007). The success of Japan’s assistance to Asia stems from its emphasis on thedevelopment of infrastructure that led to the growth of private enterprises, economic
growth and poverty reduction. A major issue in many fragile states is the weakness ofthe private sector, and assistance is needed to foster its growth. Weak private enterprises
lead to overly powerful government authority in politics as well as in the economy that
inhibits democratic state-building. Assistance to foster private enterprises in recipient
countries should be implemented with Japanese cooperation. Although this issue
requires thorough political analysis, there may be a need to shift from the conventional
paradigm of assistance between governments (G to G) to government and private sectorof the donor country to the private sector of the recipient country. Implementing
assistance that concretely and substantially fosters many private companies in fragile
states should be reviewed.

55

4-3 Research and Study
In engaging with fragile states, in-depth studies that examine the existing conditions of
the recipient country as well as its formal and informal relationships with its
neighboring countries should be conducted. It is essential that the knowledge of local
researchers and key figures in the private sector as well as parties related to assistance ismobilized for this study. Building an information network is also vital to collecting
information, in order to make accurate decisions based on an understanding of theever-changing conditions. These networks should consist of a local-level network and a
network of experts from the donor community and major advanced countries.
Successful assistance to fragile states depends on an accurate grasp of movements
within and outside the given state, in addition to the sound analysis and utilization ofcollected information.
It is also vital to sum up the outcome and lessons learned from actual cases ofassistance provided to fragile states in extracting common lessons learned,
conceptualizing, and creating model cases. This research will provide useful clues toeffective assistance as well as information that can be presented and shared with theinternational community.
In light of the fact that the problems faced by each individual fragile state isclosely related to its history, culture and social structure, a broad spectrum ofinterdisciplinary research studies as well as the expertise of development experts areneeded. In the case of conflict-ridden countries or countries vulnerable to conflict,analyzing the impact that assistance may have on the conflict is required, irrespective ofJapan’s direct involvement; and in fact, JICA is already in the process of carrying out
such analyses. For those studies to be useful, strengthened coordination between themand Japan’s overall assistance policy is required.
In Japan, the Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO conducts basic
studies and research on developing countries. There are also a few universities that are
engaged in research activities on the issue, yet these research activities are notsystematically organized. Thus, there is a need to strengthen the bond between aid
agencies and research institutions of both Japan and overseas. Considering the need tocollaborate with many outstanding researchers and research institutions abroad, future
research and studies undertaken by Japan organizations in this field should beundertaken in English.
Although still limited in scope, the donor community attaches importance tosector-level research studies (e.g., Economic and Sector Work: ESW by the WB).
JICA and former JBIC have conducted studies on the issue as well, and collaboration

56

with other assistance related research institutions both in Japan and abroad is important
especially with regard to fragile states. Among other areas of study, Japan has acomparative advantage in building long-term economic development models. Japan’s
experience in Asia has demonstrated the importance of collaborating with its private
sector in fostering private enterprises in the recipient country.
The volume of research studies on fragile states carried out both in Japan andoverseas is enormous. It is important that Japan analyzes these findings and carries out
further studies in areas that are less explored in formulating policies and assistancestrategies for fragile states,. The building of a research system that enables effective andefficient implementation of these activities is a pressing issue.
4-4 Implementation
In view of the complexity of assistance to fragile states and the need for long-term
commitment, creating a system of cooperation between JICA and other government
institutions both domestically and abroad is essential. Since the social, political andeconomic conditions and structures of fragile states must be accurately understood inorder to achieve effective assistance in these countries, long-term assignments for the
person-in-charge of this task is recommended. In addition, experienced staff members,
who are capable of analyzing the political, economic, and social issues and holding
negotiations with other donors and government officers of recipient countries, should
also be assigned. In some cases, assistance may not able to operate directly due tosecurity concern. In such cases, a partnership with NGOs operating in the recipient
country should be considered because NGOs can play a significant role in assistance tofragile states. The key challenge is how to incorporate NGOs within the framework ofdonor harmonization.
Unlike normal development assistance, the outcome of assistance to fragile
states should be evaluated over a longer span of time. Special assessment indicators in
addition to those indicators necessary to assess the progress of the state-building process
may also be needed to measure the extent to which governmental functions have beenstrengthened and the extent to which a government’s relationship with its people has
improved,. Assistance to fragile states is highly susceptible to external factors that are
beyond the control of the donors. Hence, donors should be aware that the unexpected
may occur or the assistance may fail. However, there should not be a fear of failing,
since without failure, innovative assistance will not evolve. Evaluations should also takethis point into consideration.

57

4-5 International Collaboration
The trend that the international community follows regarding assistance to fragile states
must be understood; and promoting collaboration and coordination with other donor
countries as needed is important in the areas of strategies planning, implementation,
study and research. Although collaboration at the policy level has been touted,
collaborative and coordinated action at the practical level is generally difficult toachieve due to the different assistance mechanisms of each assistance institution, as
attested to by past experience. Thus when collaboration is pursued at the practical level,
an inordinate amount of time is frequently spent contacting and coordinating with therelevant countries. Japan will need to be somewhat flexible about its rules concerning
its system of project implementation.
Many other donors have shown a strong interest in assistance to fragile statesand have conducted extensive research and study in this area. Collaboration has been
pursued among many donor countries; and Japan’s ODA task force has collaborated
with other donors on the ground. Coordinated assistance is especially vital within thecontext of assistance to fragile states.
In terms of concrete actions, holding policy debates and exchanging opinions
and information regarding fragile states with OECD-DAC FSG committee as well as
strengthening its collaboration with the IDA of the WB in policy debates and in
implementing assistance should be considered.
Political problems are often involved in assistance to fragile states. Politicalmeasures and military intervention will necessarily come up in discussions especially inthe case of countries in conflict and countries that affect international security. The
World Bank, in line with its Articles of Agreement, does not address political issues.
The influence of the OECD-DAC is limited since its membership does not include
developing countries. Unless the roles of these organizations change considerably, U.N.
organizations and their committees (UNDP, U.N. Peace-building Commission, etc.) will
increase in importance, thereby making it ever more necessary to have collaborative
relationships with such organizations.
Among the various fragile states issues undergoing discussion by theinternational community, the importation of weapons by fragile states is an area where
Japan can take initiative. The Japanese government`s indication of its readiness toactively participate in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) prepared under the leadership ofU.N. is a welcome sign of this initiative. 48 International NGOs are carefully watching48

See the MOFA website http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/att/kenkai.html.

58

how the treaty will develop 49 ; and this gives Japan the opportunity to show its
contribution to fragile states.
4-6 Consideration to the Principle of “Do No Harm”
The OECD-DAC’s Principle for Good International Engagement in Fragile Stateshighlights the importance of “do no harm”. The following is a list of case examples
where assistance may lead to an adverse outcome. Care should be taken to ensure thatthe following situations do not occur during policy formulation and implementation ofassistance to fragile states.
(1) When assistance is offered to an oppressive government, the regime is given
international legitimacy by supporting such a government, even if the assistance isindirect.
(2) When good governance has not been established prior to assistance, assistance canaggravate corruption, hinder the sound development of political systems anddeteriorate the relationship between the government and its people.
(3) When assistance accounts for a large portion of the government’s revenue, thegovernment tends to assume its accountability to the donor society and neglects its
accountability to its citizens, thereby impeding the relationship between thegovernment and its people.
(4) When a donor’s excessive political intervention hinders the development of therecipient country’s capacity to formulate its own policies.
(5) When a massive amount of assistance is provided to a recipient country with a small
economy, the “Dutch disease” occurs (a rapid inflow of a large amount of foreign
currency results in a surge in the value of its currency; as a result, export industries
and import substitution industries are dealt a destructive blow), thereby possibly
hindering the long-term development of its economy.
(6) When the short-term commitment of donors destabilizes the government’s revenue
over the long term.
(7) When a huge amount of materials, data and reports demanded by donors imposes anenormous burden on the recipient government employees, and may even impede
their main work duties. This also applies to cases when donor-driven assistanceactivities that are not suited to the recipient country are carried out.
(8) When a donor hires capable employees of the recipient government at high salaries
thereby creating in essence, a “brain drain.”49

For instance, IANSA, Oxfam, Saferworld (2007)

59

The above cases apply to all developing countries. However, they are particularly
significant for politically and economically fragile states. In regards to items (1) and (2)above which deal with the legitimacy and governance of the recipient country, thepolitical and economic situation of the recipient country are entangled with those of thedonor country, and as a result, the policy’s coherency is an issue. In recent years,
China has been aggressively providing assistance to resource-rich countries in Africa.
Since China is not a member of DAC, its assistance to nations with poor governance has
become an issue. This is an issue that the Japanese government might want to address
and therefore this may be a good time for Japan to examine and prepare to OECD-DAC
an international framework that would include emerging donors.
Past approaches to policy discussions and policy interventions also need to berevisited. The effectiveness of the PRS process for fragile states may also need to bereviewed since the Bretton Woods Institutions were prone to seeking short-term results
through policy interventions without sufficient context analysis in a given country.
Under the conditionalities attached to structural adjustment lending, neoclassicaleconomic arguments tended to be forcefully applied to recipient countries without
sufficient analysis on the specific circumstances of each nation; and this attitude seems
to remain unchanged in the case of PRS. A weakness of the Bretton Woods Institutions
is that once a policy has been adopted, it is continuously applied to all countries as “bestpractices”. This tendency is especially apparent when a prominent scholar is appointed
as an executive, and his/her personal doctrine tends to be applied to all countries. In
addition, as policy discussions over the last several years have placed a greater emphasison an agenda stressing poverty reduction, a long-term vision for economic development
has been blurred in many countries.

60

Conclusions
The 9-11 terrorist attack, military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and a series ofterrorist attacks in Europe and Asia have made fragile states an acute cause for concern
for developed countries and international organizations especially in terms of global
security. Fragile states also have cast significant challenges in international politics
because fragile states face serious development problems such as governance including
legitimacy, conflicts and the unlikely achievement of MDGs.
The problem concerning developing countries whose governments do not haveadequate policies for economic growth and poverty reduction has been on theinternational development community agenda since at least 1980. Structural Adjustment
Lending (SALs) by the Bretton Woods Institutions was criticized, and in response
donors have changed their terms. Terms have changed in the use of conditionality(from ex-ante to ex-post) and then to PRS with a focus on poverty reduction.
Nonetheless, the fundamental problem – how assistance to these states should be
provided – remains to be solved. Meanwhile, research on the relationship between
development and institutions has progressed since about 1990. North and Stiglitz, forinstance, have made it clear that the issue of development is closely interrelated with
political, economic and social institutions, which, in turn are linked to history, culture
and religion. In the field of the political science, volumes of research have been carriedout on the concept of the “collapsed states”.
Major donors’ concern over fragile states is not only related to international
security 1such as terrorism but also intricately related to international crime, natural
resources, illegal migration, refugees, humanitarian challenges and spillover effects toneighboring countries. Many of these concerns shed light on the strong link between
fragile states and the domestic problems of many donor countries.
Against this backdrop, the international development community has been
discussing issues related to fragile states, which may drastically change the course of
the present development assistance paradigm. Fragile state issues may change thepolitical stance of major donors and their approach toward developing countries. For
example, US military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Transformation
Diplomacy announced in 2006 by Secretary Rice are both reminiscent of the Cold War
diplomacy of twenty years ago. During the Cold War era, major developed countries
had provided assistance to developing countries not for the sake of development but
rather as part of their own global strategy. It is now obvious that the development
strategies during the Cold War era caused serious problems in many developing

61

countries such as sustaining poor governance and fragile political institutions. The
same mistakes should not be repeated. By over-emphasizing international security
issues including the eradication of terrorism the concern is that fundamental
development issues such as economic growth and poverty reduction will be neglected.
DAC considers that the harmonization of the 3Ds (defense, diplomacy, development) ofdonors is the key to assisting fragile states, but the last “D”, development, seems to havebeen attached the lowest priority. From a long-term perspective, state-building andpolitical, economic and social-institution building should be given due consideration.
The ongoing debate on fragile states will have a significant impact on overall
development strategies. In the past, the framework of development assistance seems
to have been set for a short period of several years. The problems fragile states faceare intricately interrelated with polity, economy, culture, religion and history. These
problems cannot be alleviated in a short period of time. Hence, it is essential to givecomprehensive, longer-term assistance if such assistance is to address fundamental
political and social institutions. This argument suggests that the same approach
applied to other developing countries may not be effective for fragile states. It also
implies that donors need to develop expertise in economic and political institutions. In
order to render effective assistance to fragile states, donors need to both develop humanresources equipped with the capacity to build and strengthen institutions and also
evaluate their assistance activities over a long period of time. Besides, donors should
recognize that the effort to engage with fragile states often involves confronting politicalproblems, which requires donor governments to make high-level political anddiplomatic decisions.
There is also a possibility that the roles of international organizations may needto undergo changes around this issue. Until now, the Bretton Woods Institutions led
the development issues due in part because they managed a large amount ofdevelopment funds. However, Bretton Woods Institutions’ Articles of Agreement do
not allow them a free hand to intervene in politics. At present, fragile state issues are
discussed mainly at DAC. Yet developing countries are not represented in DAC
because DAC members are comprised of only developed countries. Those factors
suggest necessity of UN organizations to play more important roles in assisting fragile
states.
The issue of fragile states may have a significant impact not only on the current
international aid architecture, but also in the domain of security and diplomacy, andeven on the donor-recipient relationship. Unless Japan contributes more actively ininternational discussions and research activities carried out by international62

organizations such as DAC, consensus on international aid policies will be decided
without Japan having its say which could then limit the scope of Japanese foreignassistance in the future. Discussions on the topic over the last several years by major
donor countries such as UK and US seem to have been too heavily biased towards
security and political institutions. Conversely, Japanese activities in the recent past in
regards to fragile states have focused on peace-building. As discussed by Ishikawa(2006), an integrated development model for fragile states must be developed to address
all the major problems faced by fragile states including economic problems. Reforming
the Bretton Woods Institutions and the United Nations is currently being discussed
internationally, and in all likelihood the issue of fragile states will be put on the agenda
in relation to global security. Japan, which aspires to become a permanent member of
the Security Council and increase its influence in the Bretton Woods Institutions, shouldmake the issue of fragile states a major agenda item and swiftly consider an appropriate
approach to these countries.

63

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