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Japan’s Plutonium Policy: Lost in the Dark
Tatsujiro Suzuki
Vice Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), Nagasaki University

1. Summary
This paper shares five points. First of all, reprocessing is at the very base of Japan’s energy and nuclear policy,
and this has not changed for sixty years. However, although it was said that all spent fuel will be processed, inreality only one third has been, and only 7% (4 tons) of total plutonium recovered (~50 tons) has been used.
As a result, about 46 tons of plutonium is in stock, a huge surplus. This also means that what was planned to
be used in Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR), taken as the precondition, is not happening. The reasons for claiming

the need for reprocessing have now changed, instead stating volume and toxicity reduction. Yet thesearguments are not based on any sound scientific foundation. Therefore, there is no reason to rush into
reprocessing.
As stated very broadly, what is most important at the moment is to pursue dry cask interim storage, and alsoto look at this as a priority within Japanese policy. In conclusion, this paper will refer to international security
related issues. There are more than 530 tons of plutonium around the world, and how we reduce this is very

connected to the nuclear fuel cycle. We need to make sure that plutonium is also seen as a security issue.
There is a need to put forward new international norms, and here, Japan can take leadership.

2. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy in Japan: Historic Perspective
One of the large turning points for Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle was in 1977, when US President Carter’s nonproliferation policy called for indefinite postponement of commercial reprocessing. This policy had big

impact on Japan, and finally resulted in limited operations of the Tokai reprocessing plant. In Europe, there
was also some sort of conflict or tension against this US policy. It has become somewhat of a trauma for theJapanese nuclear community. In a way, from the Japanese perspective the anti-reprocessing group in the US
obstruct reprocessing in Japan. This kind of perception and trauma was sustained in their minds, and actually
had impacts later on as well. Because of very strong opposition from Japan, similar perception remains in theUS side also, leading to perhaps a sense that you should not speak up too strongly about this issue against
Japan. After ten years of tough negotiation, the US and Japan revised the bilateral Cooperation Agreement,

giving the so-called 30 year advance consent on reprocessing to Japan. In the meantime, the agreement wasreached to build nuclear fuel cycle facilities in Rokkasho village, Aomori prefecture. The revised agreement
was automatically renewed in 1998. The 1995 accident at Monju, and also the 2005 new JAEC policy
framework, provided the first big chance to stop Rokkasho reprocessing plant in Japan. Yet unfortunately thepolicy was continued, and Rokkasho plant started hot-test operation.

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The next big chance was in 2011 following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster under theDemocratic Party of Japan(DPJ) Government. I was within the government at that time. There was acomplete review of nuclear energy policy, including nuclear fuel policy. However, the policy to reprocess all
spent fuel policy was not changed. In 2018, when US-Japan bilateral agreement was about to be renewed,
there was a lot of quiet pressure on Japan from the US. The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC)
announced that it would “reduce its plutonium stockpile, or not have any further increases”. This policy wasincluded in the new National Energy Plan, adopted by a Cabinet decision as well, and thus we hope will havequite an impact on future reprocessing.

3. Collapsed Dream: Fast Breed Reactors and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
The dream of the FBRs of course collapsed, as shown in the graphs shared by Dr. Frank von Hippel (Figure1). On the left, we can see the projection in the US as of 1974. expecting that nuclear power will grow up to2,500 GWeby 2010. The black line (less than 100 GWe) is the actual capacity in the US. The reality is clearlycompletely different, as a global situation, including in Japan. In 1985, Japan said that it would have 100
gigawatts by 2050. However, the reality here is also very different. There was also an expectation that inorder FBRs to be commercially viable, the price of uranium should rise, and reprocessing cost should decline.
However, we can see that the reality that uranium price has declined, while reprocessing cost has sharply
increased. There are therefore no economic grounds for commercialization of nuclear fuel cycle.

Figure1 Collapsed Dream: FBR and Nuclear Fuel Cycle

4. Commercialization of FBR is fading away…
In Japan, the JAEC’s long-term plans for commercialization of FBRs were more and more delayed as time
passed . At first, the commercialization goal was set by the mid-1970s, and of course this became later andlater. In 1987, it was said that LWRs would be “a main power source for the foreseeable future,” in 2000,
FBRs became a “future energy source.” In 2015 no concrete goal was even given, and it was stated as “thelatter half of the 21st century,” showing how this commercialization goal became weaker and weaker,
actually disappearing even within the JAEC itself. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
Energy Agency’s graphs of nuclear fuel cycle (Figure 2) used to show both LWRs and FBRs cycles together,saying that both cycles are necessary, but this has now stopped. As a result, as the FBR commercialization ismore and more delayed, nuclear fuel cycle became less realistic just with the LWRs only, then MOX spent
nuclear fuel has to be 'just disposed of’ as nuclear waste. However, direct disposal of spent fuel is not actually

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Figure2 Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Collapsed Dream

allowed under the current Japanese reprocessing policy. There was also a change in the law regarding
reprocessing in 2016, meaning that operators have to cover the costs of reprocessing of all spent fuels,including MOX fabrication as well, which has led to this surplus of plutonium stocks.

5. Rationales for Nuclear Fuel cycle: Volume and Toxicity Reduction of nuclear waste argued byMETIIn Japan, METI is also now arguing new rationales for reprocessing, which are the reduction of volume andtoxicity of high level nuclear waste. They do acknowledge that the cost of reprocessing is high, but only thelowest figures are shown (Table 1, Table 2).

Table1 Rationales for Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Volume and Toxicity Reduction of nuclear waste argued by METI

Table2 Reprocessing cost twice as much as direct disposal, additional cost is about ～￥200B/year

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JAEC did compare the costs, and this table shows cost for reprocessing is about double of direct disposal. Inaddition, total estimated costs of both policies were compared within just the limited period of calculations up
to 2030. The result was 18 versus 14 trillion yen, so a cost difference of 4 trillion yen. That would mean thedifference of around 200 billion yen per year. However looking at the figures from China, this could be evenmore. This was somewhat of a conservative estimate, but these annual additional costs would be necessary
with reprocessing.
As for the reduction of volume,it can be argued that FBR cycle produces much less waste volume than LWR

once-through cycle. But volume reduction is not so significant if we compare once-through cycle withLWR/MOX recycle as we need to add MOX spent fuel as a nuclear waste. In addition, waste volume from
LWR/MOX recycle could be larger than once-through cycle as we need to add low-level waste from
reprocessing (Figure 3). As for the toxicity reduction, there is quite a misleading argument that toxicity
reduction is risk reduction. There is a very small footnote under this widely used graph saying that the barriers
to reduce risk are not considered here, but most people would not actually notice or realize this (Figure 4).

Figure3 Not much different, if waste from reprocessing is added (Direct disposal vs. MOX recycle)

Figure4 Misleading argument: Toxicity Reduction is not Risk Reduction

When I explain this to different parliament members, I use this example demonstrating risk, asking which ismore dangerous: two tigers in a cage or one outside? (Figure 5) . Reprocessing is taking something which iskept in a cage outside, and letting it loose on the surface. This is the difference between toxicity and risk. The
previous graph only shows how long it takes to have less tigers, but not the difference between what it
actually means to take the tigers out of the cage, which of course increases the risks.

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Figure5 Toxicity (potential hazard) vs. Risk (exposed danger)

When we look at the actual OECD figures (Table 3) on the risk(radiation exposure) reduction, first frommining and refining, we can see radiation exposure ofonce-through is higher than that of reprocessing as thelatter requires less uranium. But if we look at reprocessing, and storage after separating the plutonium, theradiation exposure of recycling is much higher than once-through. This diagram was righly considered at theJAEC discussions then, leading to their conclusion that there is no merit or actual improvement ofreprocessing in terms of risk reduction, but this has not yet come out in any METI information.

Table3 Risk(dose estimate) comparison

6. Why can’t reprocessing be stopped?
So why can’t reprocessing be stopped? One of the reasons always given is that there is no capacity for spent
fuel storage. An additional reason is the promise made by the utility to the local community, and the third
reason is that the parties who cancel the project would have to bear the cost and they would have to go andapologize to Aomori prefecture. Nobody is willing to make that decision to take a huge financial risk which isin the order of trillions of yens.
Another reason is security issues. Some argue that having reprocessing capacity and plutonium can provide
potential “latent nuclear deterrence” capability which is another reason not to stop reprocessing. Personally, I
would like to emphasize the last point. In Japan, there is no independent oversight organization. This is themost important point for democratic system. The real victims of continuing nuclear fuel cycle would be thecitizens, and the international community. Non-governmental oversight organizations can play important role,
but their influence could be limited. I believe such independent oversight organization established by either
the government or the Diet is critically important.

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7. Risk of Spent Fuel Pool Storage vs Dry Cask Storage
Let us look also at the risks of spent fuel storage. This is a photograph (Figure 6) of Unit 4 at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, where hydrogen explosion occurred. At that time, there was a great concern that
there would be no water left. Fortunately, there was water, but of course, if the water had been completelygone, there would have been a great risk. Therefore the safer method is dry cask storage. This photograph,also from the Fukushima Daiichi site, shows that while the building of storage facility itself was damaged by
the Tsunami, the spent fuel was safe within the dry cask storage. Dry cask storage is air-cooled and does not

require electricity, and thus power loss does not affect the safety at all.

Figure6 Risk of Spent Fuel Pool Storage vs. Dry Cask Storage

Looking also at global plutonium stockpile trends, we can see that the amount for military use has reached its
peak, but there has been a huge increase in civilian plutonium (Figure 7). Country by country chart (Figure 8)

shows that, the UK, Russia, France, all of them are nuclear weapon states, and then also Japan have almost allof the global civilian plutonium. As mentioned today, China is coming into this, and we may see an increase
there. Germany and other countries which conducted reprocessing in the past used to have some civilian
plutonium, but barely none by now. It is mostly held by these four countries. So, like in the UK, if we canstop reprocessing in Russia, Japan, France, and possibly China, we will see a reduction in civilian plutonium
stockpiles overall.

Figure7 Civilian plutonium is increasing most8. Recommendations
A study group established by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation recently made several recommendations forJapan, and emphasized the role Japan can play in proposing new international norms for plutonium

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Figure8 France, Japan, Russia and the UK are the four largest plutonium owner in the world(May be China is coming）

management. Five main recommendations were the following. First, Japan can define “excess” plutonium
which Japan cannot use for a foreseeable future, and put it under the custody of the International Atomic

Energy Agency as a way to deal with various international concerns. Second, Japan can recommend recent
JAEC’s policy to decrease or not to have any increase in stocks as a new norm to be adopted by theinternational plutonium management guidelines(INFCIRC/549). Third, Japan can set up international forum
to facilitate international cooperation toward actual reduction of existing stocks. Fourth, Japan should give
first priority to dry cask storage for spent fuel management. In addition, as mentioned, it suggested having anindependent, third-party agency involved in assessing options for the nuclear fuel cycle. Finally, it proposesthat Japan play a leading role in globally promoting new international norms for plutonium.

Tatsujiro Suzuki
Born in 1951. Before joining RECNA, he was a Vice Chairman of Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC)
from January 2010 to March 2014. He is a member of Advisory Board of Parliament’s Special Committee on
Nuclear Energy, a Council Member of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, co-chair ofInternational Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) and a Board member of Asia Pacific Leadership Networkfor Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN). He has a PhD in nuclear engineering from theUniversity of Tokyo.

※This paper is based on the author’s presentation at the international symposium “Growing Plutonium
Stockpiles and the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant: Reality of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Security in East Asia” ,Dec. 18-19, 2021. The views expressed here are those of the author.

※This project is supported by a grant from “act beyond trust” (abt) .

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