January 2019

Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces,
2019 to 2028

The Congressional Budget Office is required by law toproject the 10-year costs of nuclear forces every two
years. This report contains CBO’s projections for theperiod from 2019 to 2028.

• If carried out, the plans for nuclear forces delineatedin the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) and theDepartment of Energy’s (DOE’s) fiscal year 2019budget requests would cost a total of $494 billion
over the 2019–2028 period, for an average of justunder $50 billion a year, CBO estimates.

• The current 10-year total is 23 percent higher than

CBO’s 2017 estimate of the 10-year costs of nuclear
forces, $400 billion over the 2017–2026 period.

• About $51 billion (or 55 percent) of the $94 billion

increase in that total arises because the 10-year period
covered by the current estimate begins and ends
two years later than the period covered by the 2017
estimate. Thus, the period now includes two later(and more expensive) years of development in nuclear
modernization programs. Also, costs in those twolater years reflect 10 years of economywide inflation
relative to the two years that drop out of the previous
10-year projection; that factor (in the absence of any
changes to programs) accounts for about one-fourthof the $51 billion increase.

• About $37 billion (or 39 percent) of the $94 billion increase is projected to occur from 2019 to2026—the eight years included in both this estimate and the 2017 estimate. That increase stems
mainly from new modernization programs andweapons and more concrete plans for nuclear
command-and-control systems.1

Background

Nuclear weapons have been an important component of
U.S. national security since they were developed during
World War II. During the Cold War, nuclear forceswere central to U.S. defense policy, and a large arsenal
was built. Since that time, nuclear forces have figured
less prominently in defense policy than conventional
forces have, and the United States has not built any new
nuclear weapons or delivery systems for many years.
The nation’s current nuclear forces are reaching theend of their service life. Those forces consist of submarines that launch ballistic missiles (SSBNs), land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range
bomber aircraft, shorter-range tactical aircraft carrying
bombs, and the nuclear warheads that those delivery
systems carry. Over the next two decades, essentially allof those components of nuclear forces will have to berefurbished or replaced with new systems if the UnitedStates is to continue fielding those capabilities.

1. The remaining 6 percent of the $94 billion increase is in CBO’s
estimate of likely cost growth beyond budgeted amounts.

Notes: Unless this report indicates otherwise, all of the years referred to are federal fiscal years, which run from October 1 to
September 30 and are designated by the calendar year in which they end. Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals
because of rounding. In this report, “cost” refers to budget authority, the amount that would need to be appropriated to implement the Administration’s plans.

2 Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

In February 2018, the Department of Defense released
its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a report that laid out
the current Administration’s plans for nuclear strategy and force structure (see Box 1 on page 4). To
a large degree, the report represents a continuation of
the nuclear posture of the previous Administration,
including continuing all major modernization programs.
However, the report also proposes the development ofseveral new nuclear capabilities, which have been thesubject of some debate. Over the coming years, theCongress will need to make decisions about what nuclear
forces the United States should field in the future andthus about the extent to which the nation will pursue theAdministration’s nuclear modernization plans.
To help the Congress make such decisions, theNational Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013
(Public Law 112‑239) required CBO to estimate the10-year costs of operating, maintaining, and modernizing U.S. nuclear forces. In response, CBO published
Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to 2023.2
Then the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) required CBO to update that
estimate every two years. This report is the third such
update.3 In addition, in October 2017, CBO publishedan estimate of the 30-year costs of nuclear forces under
existing plans and under various approaches for managing the costs of modernization.4

CBO’s Projections of the Costs of
U.S. Nuclear Forces Through 2028

Over the 2019–2028 period, the plans for nuclear forces
specified in DoD’s and DOE’s 2019 budget requests
and in the current NPR would cost a total of $494 billion, CBO estimates (see Table 1). CBO projects that$432 billion of that total would be needed to implement the Administration’s 2019 plans as DoD and
DOE have laid them out—provided those plans did
not change or experience any cost growth or schedule
2. Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear
Forces, 2014 to 2023 (December 2013), www.cbo.gov/
publication/44968.
3. The others are Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs
of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2026 (February 2017),
www.cbo.gov/publication/52401, and Projected Costs of U.S.
Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024 (January 2015), www.cbo.gov/
publication/49870.
4. Congressional Budget Office, Approaches for Managing theCosts of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046 (October 2017),
www.cbo.gov/publication/53211.

January 2019

delays. The remaining $62 billion of the 10-year total
represents CBO’s estimate of additional costs that would
be incurred over the 2019–2028 period if the costs ofnuclear programs exceeded planned amounts at roughly
the same rates at which costs for similar programs havegrown in the past.
The $432 billion would fund the following items:• Strategic nuclear delivery systems and weapons($234 billion). This category consists of DoD’s funding for strategic nuclear delivery systems (the three
types of systems that can deliver long-range nuclear
weapons—SSBNs, ICBMs, and long-range bombers),
DOE’s funding for activities related to the warheads
used by those systems, and DOE’s funding for the
nuclear reactors that power SSBNs.

• Tactical nuclear delivery systems and weapons($15 billion). This category consists of DoD’s
funding for tactical aircraft that can deliver nuclear
weapons over shorter ranges; DOE’s funding foractivities related to the warheads that those aircraft
carry; funding for a new submarine-launched nuclear
cruise missile (SLCM), as called for in the 2018 NPR;
and funding for a warhead for that missile to carry.

• DOE’s nuclear weapons laboratories and theirsupporting activities ($106 billion). This category
consists of funding for activities at nuclear weapons
laboratories and production facilities that are not
attributable directly to a specific type of warhead butthat are related to maintaining current and future
stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

• DoD’s command, control, communications, andearly-warning systems ($77 billion). These systems
allow operators to communicate with nuclear forces,
issue commands that control their use, detect incoming attacks, and rule out false alarms.

Projected annual budgets for all of those programs
together rise steadily from $33.6 billion to $53.5 billion
over the next decade, CBO estimates, increasing by
roughly 60 percent between 2019 and 2028.5

5. For more details about annual costs, see the supplemental data
posted with this report on CBO’s website at www.cbo.gov/
publication/54914.

January 2019

Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

Table 1 .

Projected Costs of Nuclear Forces, by Department and Function
Billions of Dollars
Total,
2019–2028

2019
DoD

DOE

Total

DoD

DOE

Total

8.5
2.6
3.2
1.4
15.8

1.3
0.2
1.2
n.a.
2.6

9.8
2.8
4.4
1.4
18.4

96
56
38
16
207

11
5
11
n.a.
27

107
61
49
16
234

Tactical nuclear delivery systems and weapons

0.2

0.4

0.7

8

8

15

Nuclear weapons laboratories and supporting activities
Stockpile services
Facilities and infrastructure
Other stewardship and support activitiesc
Subtotal

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

2.1
3.0
3.6
8.7

2.1
3.0
3.6
8.7

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

24
41
41
106

24
41
41
106

Subtotal, Nuclear Delivery Systems and Weapons

16.0

11.8

27.7

214

141

355

Command, control, communications, and early-warning systems
Command and control
Communications
Early warning

1.4
2.3
2.2

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

1.4
2.3
2.2

19
23
34

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

19
23
34

Subtotal, Command, Control, Communications, and Early-Warning Systems

5.8

n.a.

5.8

77

n.a.

77

Total Budgeted Amounts for Nuclear Forces

21.8

11.8

33.6

291

141

432

CBO’s Estimates of Additional Costs Based on Historical Cost Growth

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

35

27

62

Total Estimated Cost of Nuclear Forces

21.8

11.8

33.6

326

168

494

CBO’s Projections of Budgeted Amounts for Nuclear Forces
Nuclear delivery systems and weapons
Strategic nuclear delivery systems and weapons
Ballistic missile submarines
Intercontinental ballistic missiles
Bombers
Other nuclear activitiesb
Subtotala

Source: Congressional Budget Office, using data from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
DoD = Department of Defense; DOE = Department of Energy; n.a. = not applicable.
a. These budgeted amounts do not reflect independent estimates by CBO of the costs of U.S. nuclear forces. Instead, this category is based on CBO’s
analysis of DoD’s and DOE’s budget proposals and accompanying documents, as well as on CBO’s projections of those budget figures beyond thenext five years under the assumption that programs proceed as described in budget documentation. The category also includes several programs forwhich plans are still being formulated. In those cases, CBO based its estimate on historical costs of analogous programs.
b. This category includes nuclear-related research and operations support activities by DoD that CBO could not associate with a specific type of delivery
system or weapon.
c. This category includes security forces, transportation of nuclear materials and weapons, and scientific research and high-performance computing to
improve understanding of nuclear explosions. This category also includes $400 million in 2019 and $5 billion over the 2019–2028 period for federalsalaries and expenses.

CBO’s projections are not meant to predict DoD’s andDOE’s future budgets, because Administrations typicallychange plans from year to year. Rather, the projections
serve to extend the cost estimates that underlie theAdministration’s 2019 budget submission, provided that
there are no changes in the planned size and compositionof the nuclear forces or in the type, quantity, and schedule of weapons development programs.
CBO’s projections for individual programs reflect theassumption that DoD’s and DOE’s plans will be executed successfully and on budget. In other words, those3

4 Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

January 2019

Box 1 .

The Effects of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review on the Projected Costs of Nuclear Forces
In February 2018, the Department of Defense (DoD) published
its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).1 Each of the post–Cold War
Administrations, beginning with the Clinton Administration,
has published such a review to summarize its policies about
nuclear weapons and the forces that would be needed to
execute those policies. While the current Administration’s NPRemphasized the increasing importance of nuclear weapons in a
“return to Great Power competition,” the forces that it recommended were largely the same as those recommended by theprevious Administration’s NPR, which was published in 2010.
However, the 2018 NPR called for three increases in nuclear
capability that could, if implemented, make the costs of nuclear
forces about $17 billion higher over the next 10 years thanthey would have been otherwise (although that estimate isvery uncertain). The three increases are a nuclear warhead
with relatively low explosive yield to be carried on submarinelaunched ballistic missiles; a new sea-launched nuclear cruise
missile (SLCM); and an increase in U.S. capacity to produce
plutonium pits.2 Those capabilities would affect the costs ofnuclear forces to varying degrees.
1.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (February 2018),
https://go.usa.gov/xEcng.

2.

A pit is a hollow shell of fissile material, such as plutonium, at the coreof a modern nuclear weapon. Detonation of the weapon begins with the
implosion of the pit.

A New Nuclear Warhead for Submarine-Launched Missiles
To implement the first of those new capabilities, the Department of Energy (DOE) would produce a small number of lowyield versions of the W76 warhead, designated the W76-2, fordeployment on submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It would
cost $65 million for DOE to develop and produce that capability
and about $50 million for DoD to make the changes necessary
to use it on its submarines, according to the two departments.
A New Sea-Launched Nuclear Cruise Missile
To implement the NPR’s call for a new SLCM, DoD will analyze alternatives to determine how best to proceed. Because
the plans are still being formulated, there is a great deal of
uncertainty about the cost of fielding that capability. However,
the NPR also called for reducing costs by taking advantageof existing technologies and capabilities. For this estimate,
the Congressional Budget Office assumed that the new
SLCM would draw heavily from the design of the Long-Range
Standoff Weapon (LRSO)—a new nuclear cruise missile that the
Air Force is developing for bomber aircraft—and its warhead.
Using that approach, CBO assumed that the SLCM’s total development costs would be 50 percent less than the LRSO’s andthat unit production costs would be the same. CBO’s estimate
includes about $9 billion from 2019 to 2028 for the new SLCM
and its warhead, although that estimate is very uncertain. That
total does not include any costs for production after 2028 (ifContinued

projections are based on the Administration’s estimatesand do not incorporate any cost growth beyond thefunding levels planned by the two departments or anyschedule delays. However, because programs often
cost more than originally planned, CBO has incorporated cost growth into its overall estimate of the costs ofnuclear forces. Overall, CBO estimates a total of $62 billion in cost growth beyond budgeted amounts over the
10-year period. When that cost growth is included,
estimated annual costs rise from $33.6 billion in 2019 toabout $63 billion in 2028, an increase of roughly 90 percent over that period.6

6. For 2019, the first year of the estimate, CBO’s model includes nocost growth beyond budgeted amounts.

Nuclear forces account for roughly 6 percent of the total
10-year cost of the plans for national defense outlined in
the President’s 2019 budget submission, CBO estimates.7 On an annual basis, that percentage is projected
to rise from about 5 percent in 2019 to about 7 percent
in 2028. Those percentages are roughly the same as theones that CBO estimated for the 2017–2026 period:
Although the 10-year costs of nuclear forces are higher
in this estimate than in the previous estimate, the total
estimated costs of national defense have also increased atabout the same rate.
7. That estimate is based on CBO’s analysis of information in
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense(Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2019
(April 2018), p. 18, Table 1-11, https://go.usa.gov/xEDVX (PDF,
8.1 MB).

January 2019

Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

Box 1.

Continued

The Effects of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review on the Projected Costs of Nuclear Forces
necessary), integrating the SLCM onto submarines or surface
ships, or any associated operations or security costs.
Expanded Capacity to Produce Plutonium Pits
To implement the third increase in capability called for in the
NPR, DOE plans to boost its production capacity so that it can
produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030; previous
plans called for the capacity to produce 50 to 80 pits. DOE
plans to expand its existing and planned production facilities
at Los Alamos, New Mexico, and also to begin production at
a second site by adapting a partially built facility at SavannahRiver, South Carolina, that had been originally intended foranother purpose. CBO’s estimate includes about $9 billion from2019 to 2028 for expanded pit production capacity, althoughthat estimate is very uncertain.
Other Policies in the NPR
In addition, the 2018 NPR made several policy statements that
could make nuclear forces cost more than CBO has estimatedin this report. First, the NPR said that the B83 nuclear bomb,which previously had been scheduled to be retired, would
instead be retained until a “suitable replacement” was identified. The B83, the last U.S. nuclear weapon with an explosive
yield of more than a megaton, is the most powerful weapon
in the arsenal.3 The NPR is not specific about the nature of a3.

suitable replacement. But if the Administration determines thata new nuclear weapon is needed or that the B83 requires alife-extension program, new costs would be incurred, probably
within the next 10 years and also later.
Second, the NPR stated that the United States would develop aground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile that does
not carry a nuclear weapon in response to Russia’s violationof the terms of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty.
(That treaty allows ground-launched intermediate-range
missiles for both nuclear and conventional missions to be
developed but not flight-tested or deployed.) However, after
the NPR was released, the Administration announced its intention to withdraw from the treaty. The Administration has notindicated that it will develop a new nuclear-capable ballistic
missile after withdrawing from the treaty, but if it decided tobuild such a weapon, that decision would lead to additionalcosts for nuclear activities, potentially within the next 10 years
and later as well.
Finally, the NPR indicated that DoD would build a minimum of
12 new nuclear ballistic missile submarines, whereas earlier
plans had called for ending construction at 12. If more than 12
submarines are built, costs for nuclear activities will increase in
the long run but not within the next 10 years (because the 12th
submarine is not slated to be authorized until 2035).

A megaton is equivalent to 1 million tons (2 billion pounds) of TNT.

Basis of CBO’s Updated Estimates

CBO’s total estimate in this report consists of the costs offielding, operating, maintaining, and modernizing U.S.
nuclear forces. CBO prepared the report using the same
approach that it used in its original 2013 report, considering only costs that the agency identified as directly
associated with the nuclear mission.8 Unlike estimatesby some other analysts, CBO’s estimate does not include
a prorated share of the military services’ and DoD’s
overhead and support costs that are not specific to the
nuclear mission—although such costs could change if
DoD made significant changes in the size of its nuclear
forces.
8. For more details about nuclear programs and CBO’s approachto estimating costs, see Congressional Budget Office, Projected
Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to 2023 (December 2013),
www.cbo.gov/publication/44968.

Besides the costs directly attributable to fielding nuclear
forces, some published estimates of the total costs ofnuclear weapons account for the costs of several related
activities. Examples include the costs of addressing thenuclear legacy of the Cold War (such as dismantling
retired nuclear weapons and cleaning up environmental
contamination from past activities at nuclear facilities);
the costs of reducing the threat from other countries’
nuclear weapons (including U.S. efforts to halt proliferation, comply with arms control treaties, and verify othercountries’ compliance with treaties); and the costs ofdeveloping and maintaining active defenses against othercountries’ nuclear weapons (primarily ballistic missiles).
CBO has not updated its estimate of those costs, which
was published in 2013, and such costs are not includedin this report.

5

6

Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

For this update, CBO analyzed DoD’s and DOE’s
2019 budget requests and their associated justification
documents, which include the amounts that they haveplanned for the next five years. To produce 10-year
estimates, CBO identified the budget lines for programs
related to nuclear forces and extended them beyond thefive-year period by examining the departments’ longrange plans for each program. For replacement systems
that are in the early stages of development during the
2019–2028 period but that are not yet fully reflected in
the departments’ budgets (such as a new ICBM and a
new cruise missile), CBO estimated costs by reviewing
the actual costs for analogous systems that have alreadybeen built and the schedules that would be necessary
to produce systems as promptly as needed to maintaininventories at the levels planned in the 2019 budget
requests. The methods used to perform most of thoseestimates of costs are the same ones that CBO used in its
earlier estimate of the 30-year costs of nuclear forces andare described in detail in that report.9
For programs that have been introduced since that
document was published, CBO took the same generalapproach, using historical analogues on which to baseestimated costs. In particular, CBO assumed that DoD
would field a new SLCM as directed in the NPR andthat the design would draw from the development of
a different missile—a new air-launched cruise missile
called the Long-Range Standoff Weapon and referred toas the LRSO—and its associated warhead. Specifically,
CBO assumed that development costs for the SLCM
would be half of the estimated total development costsof the LRSO and that the unit production costs of thetwo weapons would be the same. In the same way, CBO
assumed that the SLCM’s warhead would be similar to
the LRSO’s W80-4 warhead and projected that it would
cost half as much to develop and have the same unit
production costs. Overall, CBO’s estimate of the costs of
the SLCM and its warhead—about $9 billion over theperiod from 2019 to 2028—is highly uncertain; in fact,
it is still not clear whether the program will be pursued atall, and if so, what the design and development schedule
will be. CBO did not include in its estimates any costs ofintegrating the SLCM onto submarines or surface ships;
most of those costs would presumably occur after 2028.

9. See Congressional Budget Office, Approaches for Managing theCosts of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2046 (October 2017),
Appendix A, www.cbo.gov/publication/53211.

January 2019

CBO’s estimate of the costs of another new program, thereplacement of the engines on the B-52 bomber aircraft,is based on the actual costs of replacing aircraft engines
in the past as well as on statements by the Air Force. The
costs of that effort over the 2019–2028 period contributeabout $1 billion to CBO’s estimate of the total costs ofnuclear forces.10
To project personnel costs and the costs of operation andmaintenance activities from 2024 to 2028, CBO beganwith the levels of operation and maintenance activities
and the number of military personnel planned for 2023
and projected that those levels would remain the samefor the last five years of the period. CBO projects thatthe cost to maintain those levels will grow slightly fasterthan inflation, a projection that is based on DoD’s pastexperience.
To arrive at an estimate of overall cost growth, CBO
used two different approaches. For some major modernization programs, CBO used the cost estimates thatit developed as part of its 2017 estimate of the 30-year
costs of nuclear forces to estimate how much costs
might rise above DoD’s current projected budgets for
those programs.11 For all other programs and activities,
CBO estimated cost growth for the four categories ofcosts (research and development, procurement, military
personnel, and operation and maintenance) as a whole,rather than program by program, on the basis of experience with DoD’s and DOE’s programs.12

Changes in Estimated Costs

The estimate of $494 billion in total costs for nuclear
forces over the 2019–2028 period is $94 billion, or 23
percent, more than CBO’s February 2017 estimate of
10. Bombers are used both for nuclear and for conventional missions.
In these 10-year estimates, CBO attributes 25 percent of the costsof the B-52 bomber and the new B-21 bomber to the nuclear
mission and 75 percent to the conventional mission. Therefore,
only 25 percent of the cost of replacing the engines on the B-52
(which CBO estimates would total $6 billion through 2028) is
included in this estimate.
11. For details about those estimates, see Congressional Budget
Office, Approaches for Managing the Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces,
2017 to 2046 (October 2017), Appendix A, www.cbo.gov/
publication/53211.
12. For more details about CBO’s approach to estimating cost
growth, see Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of
U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to 2023 (December 2013), p. 18,
www.cbo.gov/publication/44968.

January 2019

Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

Table 2 .

Differences in 10-Year Costs Between CBO’s Current and Previous Projections of theCosts of Nuclear Forces
Billions of Dollars
10-Year Costs
DoD

DOE

Total

267

134

400

16
16
4
3
1
n.a.
19

1
2
2
n.a.
5
19
n.a.

17
18
6
3
6
19
19

59

29

88

*

5

6

59

34

94

326

168

494

CBO’s Previous Projection
Total Estimated Costs, 2017 to 2026

Difference in 10-Year Total (Current projection minus previous projection)a
CBO’s Projections of Budgeted Amounts for Nuclear Forcesb
Nuclear delivery systems and weapons
Ballistic missile submarines
Intercontinental ballistic missiles
Bombers
Other DoD nuclear activitiesc
Tactical nuclear delivery systems and weapons
Nuclear weapons laboratories and supporting activities
Command, control, communications, and early-warning systems
Subtotal, CBO’s Projections of Budgeted Amounts for Nuclear Forces
CBO’s Estimates of Additional Costs Based on Historical Cost Growth
Total Difference
CBO’s Current Projection
Total Estimated Costs, 2019 to 2028

Source: Congressional Budget Office, using data from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
DoD = Department of Defense; DOE = Department of Energy; n.a. = not applicable; * = less than $500 million.
a. A positive amount indicates that the current projection is greater than the previous one, which was published in Congressional Budget Office,Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2026 (February 2017), www.cbo.gov/publication/52401.
b. These budgeted amounts do not reflect independent estimates by CBO of the costs of U.S. nuclear forces. Instead, this category is based on CBO’s
analysis of DoD’s and DOE’s budget proposals and accompanying documents, as well as on CBO’s projections of those budget figures beyond thenext five years under the assumption that programs proceed as described in budget documentation. The category also includes several programs forwhich plans are still being formulated. In those cases, CBO based its estimate on historical costs of analogous programs.
c. This category includes nuclear-related research and operations support activities by DoD that CBO could not associate with a specific type of delivery
system or weapon.

$400 billion over the 2017–2026 period (see Table 2).
The percentage increases are similar for DoD and DOE:
DoD’s costs are projected to total $326 billion, or
22 percent more than the $267 billion that CBO estimated in 2017, and DOE’s costs are projected to total$168 billion, or 25 percent more than the $134 billion
that CBO estimated in 2017.
The higher estimates in this report do not all signal anincrease in programs’ total lifetime costs. For example,
about 55 percent (or $51 billion) of the $94 billion

difference between CBO’s current and 2017 estimatesoccurs because the current projections cover a 10-year
period that starts and ends two years later than the
period covered by the 2017 estimate. Therefore, in thelatest estimate, new programs are two years further alongin the process of ramping up development, and someare entering the production phase—both of which tend
to be characterized by higher annual costs. Also, costsin those two later years reflect 10 years of economywide
inflation relative to the two years that drop out of the
10-year projection; that factor (in the absence of any

78 Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

changes to programs) accounts for about one-fourth of
the $51 billion increase.
An additional 39 percent (or about $37 billion) of thedifference between CBO’s current and previous projections involves the eight years in which the projections
overlap (see Box 2). Differences in estimates for those
years stem from a number of factors:• Some modernization plans, particularly for new

command-and-control aircraft and for satellite systems that support nuclear forces, have become better
defined since 2017, leading to higher estimates;• Some new modernization efforts have been intro-

duced, including installing new engines on B-52
bombers and developing a new reentry vehicle forthe new ICBM being produced in the Ground-Based
Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program; and• Some new weapons and support capabilities, spe-cifically an increased capacity for DoE to produce
plutonium pits, were introduced in the 2018 NPR(see Box 1 on page 4).13

The remaining 6 percent (or about $6 billion) of the$94 billion increase in CBO’s 10-year projections occurs
in CBO’s estimate of likely cost growth beyond budgeted amounts. The estimate of cost growth applies tothe full 10-year period, and the difference between thecurrent and previous estimates cannot reliably be divided
between the overlapping and nonoverlapping years.
The largest contributions to the $94 billion increase arehigher costs for nuclear delivery systems and weapons,
including costs for weapons laboratories and supporting
activities. Projected costs for command, control, communications, and early-warning systems have also increased
substantially. And CBO’s projection of cost growth over
10 years is somewhat higher than it was in 2017.
13.	A pit is a hollow shell of fissile material, such as plutonium, at
the core of a modern nuclear weapon. Detonation of the weapon
begins with the implosion of the pit. Like producing several othercomponents of a nuclear weapon, producing pits entails extensive
processing of very hazardous material, which typically requires
a specialized facility. The various components are then collected
and assembled into a complete nuclear weapon in a separate
facility dedicated to that purpose.

January 2019

Nuclear Delivery Systems and Weapons
By CBO’s estimate, the amounts needed to implement
the Administration’s 2019 plans for nuclear systems
and weapons (provided those plans did not change orexperience any cost growth or schedule delays) would
total $355 billion over 10 years, $69 billion more thanthe $286 billion that CBO estimated in 2017. The main
reason for that rise is that modernization plans are further along in development. In addition, plans for some
programs have become clearer or have changed since thedepartments’ budget requests for 2017.

Ballistic Missile Submarines. Budgeted amounts for
SSBNs would total $107 billion over 10 years, CBO
projects. That total is about $17 billion more than the2017 estimate (see Table 2). Most of that amount would
be for DoD’s SSBN programs, which are projected tocost $96 billion over the next decade, about $16 billion
more than CBO’s 2017 estimate.
Almost all of the increase results from the fact that thecurrent estimate extends through 2028 rather than
2026. Under the plans in DoD’s 2019 budget request,
the program for developing a new SSBN will havecompleted the design phase and be nearing the halfway
point of production by 2028. In that year, the fifth
new submarine (of 12 total) is expected to be authorized, and the four submarines that had been authorized
previously would be under construction. The program
would then be entering a plateau in the construction
effort that would extend for nearly a decade after 2028;
whereas authorization of the first two submarines would
be spread over five years, plans call for a new one to beauthorized every year from 2026 through 2035. Anotherhigh-profile, although fairly low-cost, effort is outfitting SSBNs with a nuclear warhead with a relatively
low explosive yield.14 That effort is expected to result in
about $50 million in new costs for the Navy to implement the capability aboard the submarines.
DOE’s share of the amounts budgeted for SSBNs would
be $11 billion over 10 years, CBO projects, $1 billion
more than the 2017 estimate. That net increase results
14. The precise yield of the new warhead has not been specified.
However, low-yield nuclear warheads carried by U.S. bomber
aircraft have explosive yields as low as 0.3 kilotons, according
to unclassified sources, which is equivalent to 600,000 poundsof dynamite. The nuclear warheads currently carried on SSBNs
have 100-kiloton and 450-kiloton explosive yields, according to
unclassified sources.

January 2019from offsetting factors: Some efforts (specifically, lifeextension programs for the W76 and W88 warheads) areprojected to finish, pushing the estimate of total costs
down, whereas the costs of others are increasing as programs begin or move further into development (such as
programs to develop interoperable warheads called IW-1
and IW-2).15 The new effort to produce a warhead with arelatively low explosive yield for SSBNs would add about$65 million to DOE’s SSBN-related costs, according to
DOE’s statements.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The amounts budgeted for ICBMs would total $61 billion over 10 years,
CBO projects, about $18 billion more than the 2017
estimate. Of that total, about $56 billion would go to
DoD and about $5 billion would go to DOE.
Most of the increase in DoD’s share of the costs resultsfrom a ramp-up in the costs of development and early
production of a new ICBM, the missile portion of the
GBSD program. When making this estimate, CBO
assumed that production would begin in 2026 andcontinue into the 2030s. The increase in this estimateof the costs of the GBSD missile is mostly the resultof the time period’s starting and ending two years later
than the period used for the 2017 estimate. Similarly,
the ramp-up of an effort to refurbish the ICBM silos
and communications infrastructure has contributed
to an increase in DoD’s projected ICBM costs over
10 years. However, some of the increase in this category
is the result of an increase in DoD’s estimate for the
total development cost of the GBSD program. Other
major contributors to the increase are a new program todevelop a reentry vehicle to house the nuclear warheads
on the GBSD and higher projected operating costs for
the Minuteman III (the current-generation ICBM).
DOE’s ICBM costs are projected to be about $2 billion
higher over the next 10 years than CBO estimated in2017. The main reason is that two more years of the
programs to develop the IW-1 and IW-2 interoperable
warheads occur within the 10-year estimation period.
15. Interoperable warheads will incorporate a novel approachthat will allow them to be used on both ground-based andsubmarine-based ballistic missiles. In the NPR and some recent
DOE documents, however, the IW-1 is referred to as the “W78replacement” (the W78 is a warhead for ICBMs), and its potential
use on SSBNs is described as a subject for research. For thisestimate, CBO has continued to split IW-1 costs evenly between
the ICBM and SSBN categories, as it did in previous analyses.

Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

Bombers. Under the plans in the departments’ 2019budget request, the amounts budgeted for the bomber
portion of nuclear forces would total $49 billion over
10 years, CBO projects, about $6 billion more than
CBO’s 2017 estimate. Of that total, $38 billion would
go to DoD ($4 billion more than CBO estimated in2017), and $11 billion would go to DOE ($2 billion
more than CBO estimated in 2017).16
The increase in DoD’s costs in this area reflects a combination of several effects. CBO’s current estimate includes
two more years of production for the LRSO cruise
missile and the B-21 bomber than the 2017 estimate did(production is slated to begin in the mid-2020s for both
systems). Also, the current estimate accounts for a newmodernization program that will replace the engines on
B-52 bombers and for increases in the cost of sustaining
B-52 bombers and the current-generation nuclear cruise
missile. Those increases are partially offset by a decreasein the cost of sustaining B-2 bombers; in 2018, the Air
Force announced that it would retire the B-2 fleet in
the early 2030s, about 20 years earlier than previously
planned. On the DOE side, most of the increase in costs
is for extending the life of the W80-4 warhead, bothbecause that effort is now two years further along andbecause DOE has increased its estimate of the program’s
overall cost.
Other DoD Nuclear Activities. This category, which
includes various DoD support activities for strategic
nuclear forces that CBO was not able to associate witha particular weapon system, would total $16 billion
over 10 years, about $3 billion more than CBO’s 2017
estimate. That increase is mostly for a new Air Force
program, called Acquisition Workforce–Nuclear Systems,
which realigns costs for program management andrelated support from the programs for individual weapon
systems to a combined effort in order to allow those
support costs to be tracked more directly. The apparent
increase therefore represents a recategorization of costs
rather than an overall increase.
16. Bombers are used both for nuclear and for conventional missions.
In these 10-year estimates, CBO attributes 25 percent of the costsof the B-52 bomber and the new B-21 bomber to the nuclear
mission and 75 percent to the conventional mission. For the B-2
bomber and nuclear-capable cruise missiles, by contrast, CBO
attributes all costs to nuclear missions. If the full cost of B-52 andB-21 bombers was included, the costs of bombers would total$104 billion over 10 years, and the total costs of nuclear forces
would be $559 billion.

910 Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

January 2019

Box 2.

Differences Between CBO’s Current and Previous Estimates During Years of Overlap
One of the goals of updating this report every two years is toassess the budgetary effects of changes in plans for nuclear
forces, or in the execution of those plans, since the previous
report was published. The most direct method of doing that is
to compare estimates only during the eight years in which thetwo reports overlap (see the table). That approach highlights

differences between estimates that are the result of changes
in plans by largely removing the effects of the natural ramp-up
of activity typical of weapons development programs and theeffects of economywide inflation in prices. Unless they areoffset by cost reductions after 2028, the changes in plans arelikely to increase the long-term costs of nuclear forces.

Differences in 8-Year Costs Between CBO’s Current and Previous Projections of the Costs of Nuclear Forces(During the overlapping years, 2019–2026)
Billions of Dollars
8-Year Costs
DoD

DOE

Total

92

288

1
4
1
2
0
n.a.
11

1
0
2
n.a.
4
10
n.a.

2
4
2
2
4
10
11

19

18

37

215

110

325

CBO’s Previous Projection
Total Estimated Costs, 2019 to 2026a
196
Difference in 8-Year Total (Current projection minus previous projection)b
CBO’s Projections of Budgeted Amounts for Nuclear Forcesc
Nuclear delivery systems and weapons
Ballistic missile submarines
Intercontinental ballistic missiles
Bombers
Other DoD nuclear activitiesd
Tactical nuclear delivery systems and weapons
Nuclear weapons laboratories and supporting activities
Command, control, communications, and early-warning systems
Total Difference
CBO’s Current Projection
Total Estimated Costs, 2019 to 2026a

Source: Congressional Budget Office, using data from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
This table does not include CBO’s estimate of cost growth beyond budgeted amounts. The estimate of cost growth applies to the full 10-year
period, and the difference between the current and previous estimates cannot reliably be divided into the overlapping and nonoverlapping years.
DoD = Department of Defense; DOE = Department of Energy; n.a. = not applicable.
a. Total does not include additional costs based on historical cost growth.
b. A positive amount indicates that the current projection is greater than the previous one, which was published in Congressional Budget
Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2026 (February 2017), www.cbo.gov/publication/52401.
c. These budgeted amounts do not reflect independent estimates by CBO of the costs of U.S. nuclear forces. Instead, this category is basedon CBO’s analysis of DoD’s and DOE’s budget proposals and accompanying documents, as well as on CBO’s projections of those budget
figures beyond the next five years under the assumption that programs proceed as described in budget documentation. The category
also includes several programs for which plans are still being formulated. In those cases, CBO based its estimate on historical costs ofanalogous programs.
d. This category includes nuclear-related research and operations support activities by DoD that CBO could not associate with a specific typeof delivery system or weapon.

Continued

January 2019

Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

Box 2.

Continued

Differences Between CBO’s Current and Previous Estimates During Years of Overlap
The cost categories with the largest differences in projectedbudgets during the overlapping years (excluding cost growth
beyond budgeted amounts) are command, control, communications, and early-warning systems of the Department of
Defense (an $11 billion increase) and nuclear weapons laboratories and supporting activities of the Department of Energy

Tactical Nuclear Delivery Systems and Weapons. CBO
estimates that tactical nuclear capability would cost
$15 billion over the next 10 years, about $6 billion
more than CBO’s 2017 estimate. That $15 billion total
would be almost evenly split between DoD and DOE.
The increase is almost all the result of the projecteddevelopment and fielding costs of the new sea-launched
nuclear cruise missile that was called for in the 2018
NPR. The technical specifications of that missile, andwhether it will be carried on surface ships, submarines,
or both, are under review. For the purpose of this estimate, CBO assumed that the new cruise missile and its
warhead would be derived from ongoing development of
the LRSO.
Nuclear Weapons Laboratories and Supporting
Activities. The amounts that DOE budgets for its
nuclear weapons laboratories and supporting activities
would total $106 billion over 10 years, CBO projects,$19 billion more than the 2017 estimate. Nearly allcomponents of the laboratories’ costs have increased inrelation to the previous estimate. One large contributor to the increase is that DOE has made its plans forplutonium pit production clearer. In the 2018 NPR,
the Administration stated a goal of producing at least
80 pits per year by 2030, an increase over the goals statedin the previous plan (see Box 1 on page 4). Also
increasing projected costs are an effort to catch up on
deferred maintenance at DOE facilities (many of whichdate to the original nuclear weapons development effort
in World War II) and increased production of strategic
materials.17

17. Such materials include uranium, plutonium, tritium, andlithium.

(a $10 billion increase). There are smaller increases in the
categories for tactical weapons and intercontinental ballistic
missiles. The changes in programs that led to those increases
in the Congressional Budget Office’s estimates are described
elsewhere in this report.

Command, Control, Communications, and EarlyWarning Systems
The amounts that DoD budgets for nuclear command,
control, communications, and early-warning systems
would total $77 billion over 10 years, CBO projects,
about $19 billion more than the 2017 estimate. That
increase is driven largely by changes to modernization
programs, specifically the development and purchase of
a new fleet to replace the National Airborne Operations
Center (NAOC) aircraft and new concepts for earlywarning satellites and communications satellites used by
nuclear forces. For the NAOC program, DoD’s 2019budget calls for combining plans for NAOC aircraft withplans for other nuclear command-and-control aircraft
and producing a single fleet of similar aircraft, called
Survivable Airborne Operations Center aircraft; thatapproach would produce more new aircraft than were
included in CBO’s 2017 estimate. For the satellite programs, DoD plans to replace the Space-Based Infrared
System, which detects missile launches by adversaries,
with the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infraredsystem, along with a new ground system for communicating with those satellites. In addition, DoD intends
to replace the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
communications satellites, which allow communication
among nuclear forces, with new satellites called Evolved
Strategic SATCOM.18 For all of those programs, plans
are still being formulated, so there is substantial uncertainty in CBO’s cost estimates.

18. DoD’s plan for the evolution of satellite communications using
protected frequencies will also include satellites and services tocommunicate with conventional forces; the costs of those systems
are not included in this estimate.

11

12 Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028

Additional Costs Based on Historical Cost Growth
Weapons programs frequently cost more than originally budgeted. If nuclear programs exceeded planned
amounts at roughly the same rates that costs for similar
programs have grown in the past, they would cost an
additional $62 billion over the next 10 years, $6 billion
more than the cost growth that CBO estimated in 2017.
Nearly all of that increase is in DOE’s share of the costsof nuclear forces, mainly because DOE’s plans include
increased efforts to extend the service lives of warheads
and to build new facilities. Historically, those types ofefforts have been particularly susceptible to cost growth.

January 2019

This Congressional Budget Office report was prepared in response to a requirement in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.
Previous editions are available at https://go.usa.gov/
xEbkJ. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to provide
objective, impartial analysis, the report makes norecommendations.
Michael Bennett prepared the report with guidancefrom David Mosher. Raymond Hall collaborated
on the cost estimates in the report with guidancefrom David Newman. Carla Tighe Murray factchecked the report.
Jeffrey Kling and Robert Sunshine reviewed
the report. Benjamin Plotinsky edited it, andJorge Salazar prepared it for publication. An
electronic version is available on CBO’s website(www.cbo.gov/publication/54914).
CBO continually seeks feedback to make its workas useful as possible. Please send any feedback tocommunications@cbo.gov.

Keith Hall
Director