3

3

March 2011

The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology began in 2007
the Global COE (Center of Excellence) Program with the primary aim of developing
creative human resources to lead the world and internationally competitive universities in Japan. The Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) of the
Graduate School of Asia-Paciﬁc Studies, Waseda University is one of the twelve sites ininterdisciplinary, combined, and new ﬁelds selected from among numerous applicants
throughout the country.
The Global COE program at GIARI has two aims: to develop competent professionals who will contribute to regional cooperation and consolidation, and to build a
center for this purpose. The program has three areas of study: (1) political integrationand identity; (2) economic integration and sustainability; and (3) social integration andnetwork, and the three areas are organically interconnected. The program is buildinga theoretical framework for regional governance, allowing Ph.D. candidates to participate in different projects to develop multidimensional and comprehensive perspectives,and has already produced many results in this endeavor. The program also encourages
research and other activities to create strong networks with other institutions of higher
learning in the region and also to collaborate with government agencies, public organizations, and NGOs in order to build a world-class research center at Waseda University.

Managing Editor

Tsuneo Akaha

Director, Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Senior Fellow, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI)

Associate Editor

Sachiko Hirakawa

Junior Researcher, Waseda University Institute of Asia-Paciﬁc Studies
Assistant Professor, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI)

Editorial AssistantMitsuko Akaha

Assistant Language Teacher, The Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme (Iiyama, Nagano, Japan)

Shoko Miyano

Ph. D. Candidate, Graduate School of Letters, Arts and Sciences, Waseda University

Editorial Board
Satoshi Amako Chairperson

GIARI Project Leader; Professor,
Graduate School of Asia-PacificStudies, Waseda University

Shujiro Urata

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Shunji Matsuoka

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Kazuo Kuroda

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Hatsue Shinohara

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki

Tran Van Tho

Professor, School of Education,
Waseda University

Takashi Terada

Michio Yamaoka

Professor, Organization for AsianStudies, Waseda University

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Mitsuhide Shiraki

Kazuhiko Yokota

Naoyuki Umemori

Tomoko Ako

P r o f e s s o r, G r a d u a t e S c h o o l o f
Economics, Waseda University
Professor, Graduate School of Political
Science, Waseda University

Ken'ichi Akao

Professor, Graduate School of Social
Science, Waseda University

Koichiro Kudo

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

D i r e c t o r, D i s e a s e C o n t r o l a n dPrevention Center, National Center for
Grobal Health and Medicine

Yukiko Fukagawa

Yasushi Katsuma

P r o f e s s o r, G r a d u a t e S c h o o l o f
Economics, Waseda University

Rumi Aoyama

Professor, Graduate School of Social
Science, Waseda University

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

A s s o c i a t e P r o f e s s o r, S c h o o l o f
Commerce, Waseda University
A s s o c i a t e P r o f e s s o r, S c h o o l o f
International Liberal Studies, Waseda
University

Vol. 3

Published by
Waseda University Global COE Program
Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI)
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University
Global COE Office
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TOKYO 169-0051, JAPAN
Tel: 81-3-5286-2168 Fax: 81-3-5286-2169
http://www.waseda-giari.jp
March 15, 2011
©2011 Waseda University Global COE Program, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI)
All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means,electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval
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Printed by Noto Printing Corporation
ISBN 978-4-904618-09-7

Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University
Global COE Office
Nishi-Waseda Bldg. 5F#507,1-21-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku,
TOKYO 169-0051, JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-5286-2168 Fax: +81-3-5286-2169

Published by
Waseda University Global COE Program
Global Institute for Asian Regional
Integration (GIARI)

Contents
Editor’s Note

Tsuneo Akaha

Contributors

iiiiJapan’s FTAs as Tools for Achieving Companies’ Commercial Interests: Do Japanese Corporations
Need a Region-Wide Trade Liberalization Treaty?
Anna Jerzewska

1Comparing Regional Integration in East Asia/Southeast Asia and Central Asia
Chinara Esengul

18

Remembering or Overcoming the Past?: “History Politics,” Asian Identity and Visions of an East
Asian Community
Torsten Weber

39

The History of the “History Problem”: Historical Recognition between Japan and Neighboring
Asian Countries
Kinuyo Kawaji

56

Human Rights and Culture in the Asian Region
Elisa Nesossi

76

Lingua Francas in Higher Education in Northeast Asia and ASEAN Countries: Implications for
Regional Cooperation on Languages
Sae Shimauchi

88

Book Review Essays
Apirat Petchsiri, José Luis de Sales Marques and William Roth, eds., Promoting Human Rights
in Asia and Europe: The Role of Regional Integration, Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Publishing
House, 2009.
Miki Honda

103

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., Non-Western International Relations Theory—Perspectives on and beyond Asia, London and New York: Routledge, 2010.
Seiko Mimaki

112

Editor’s Note
Tsuneo Akaha
As in the previous two issues published in 2009 and 2010, the current issue of AsianRegional Integration Review includes research reports by young scholars who have recently received a PhD or are currently pursuing a PhD, all with a focus on topics directly
related to Asian regional integration. They all presented earlier versions of the articles
included here at the Summer Institute on Regional Integration organized by the Global
Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI), Waseda University in August 2010. The
current issue also includes reviews of two recent books on Asian regional integration.
This issue exemplifies the multidisciplinary nature of Asian regional integration
studies as an academic field, with the six research reports anchored in economics, political science, history, and education. These articles also represent a diversity of theoreticalunderpinnings and methodologies. Their topics are of interest to academic circles, policy
organizations, and business communities, and address questions about the utility of free
trade agreements for Japanese corporations; the relevance of regional integration in East
Asia/Southeast Asia for Central Asia; the role of history politics in shaping Japan’s relations with China and other neighboring countries; the use of culture-based arguments inthe discourse on human rights in Asia; and the role of English versus national languages
in promoting the increasingly internationalized higher education system in the region.
The two book reviews introduce two anthologies representing empirical research andtheoretical discourse by both junior and senior scholars in the field. The first review discusses the pattern of human rights promotion in Asia and Europe, highlighting the implications of the “ASEAN way” for a future human rights regime in Asia and the complex
and even conflicted process of human rights regime development in Europe. The second
book review critically examines the desirability and feasibility of the development of
non-Western International Relations Theory in Asia. If this issue stimulates the reader’sinterest in exploring new avenues of research and new directions of discourse on regional
integration in Asia and beyond, its purpose will have been well served.
As Managing Editor, I extend my gratitude to everyone who was involved in the
preparation of this issue for publication, including Sachiko Hirakawa (Associate Editor),
Mitsuko Akaha (Editorial Assistant), Shoko Miyano (Editorial Assistant), and Atsuko
Tsuriya (GIARI).
i

Contributors
Chinara Esengul

Assistant Professor, Ph.D. Candidate, School of International Relations, Kyrgyz National University

Miki Honda

Assistant Professor, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan Lecturer, Kawamura Gakuen
Woman’s University, Japan

Anna Jerzewska

Ph.D. Candidate, University of Leeds, White Rose East Asia Centre, United Kingdom

Kinuyo Kawaji

Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Political Science, Waseda University, Japan
Research Fellow, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration, Waseda University, Japan

Seiko Mimaki

Research Associate, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan

Elisa Nesossi

Senior Teaching Fellow, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London

Sae Shimauchi

Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan
Research Fellow, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration, Waseda University, Japan

Torsten Weber

Research Associate, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Jacobs University, Bremen, Germany
Ph.D. Candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies, Heidelberg University, Germanyiii

Japan’s FTAs as Tools for Achieving Companies’ Commercial Interests:
Do Japanese Corporations Need a Region-Wide Trade Liberalization
Treaty?

Anna Jerzewska

Abstract
Since the 1950s and 60s, Japanese companies have been shifting their manufacturing operations overseas. As the private sector invested more and more abroad and became dependent on
the production base in East Asia, it became evident that some sort of formal agreement was needed to stabilize the situation in the FDI-host countries and consolidate the internationalization of
production networks. Japanese bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) were utilized for this purpose. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has often stated that FTAs have beendeveloped as a tool for securing firms’ commercial interests. They have been a part of a broader
policy of supporting rapid industrialization and economic growth since the Yoshida Doctrine.
Japan has signed several bilateral FTAs as well as a semi-regional one with ASEAN and is currently participating in three coexisting frameworks with regional economic integration agendas,
which include fostering of a region-wide FTA. This study focuses on the use of FTAs by Japanese
corporations – FTAs’ main clients – to date. It asks, what strategic commercial objectives do different types of existing FTAs (bilateral, semi-regional) fulfill for Japanese corporations, mainlyin the electronics and machinery sectors, and how successful are they in performing this role?
What additional value-added benefits could the planned region-wide FTA bring? In other words,
do Japanese corporations need a region-wide FTA, or do the bilateral agreements and the semiregional one provide a sufficient response to the firms’ foreign commercial goals? I discuss theinter-constitutive nature of the value-added benefits of different levels of Japan’ s FTAs. Bothtrade theory and econometric studies of FTAs point to the conclusion that bilateral FTAs are asecond-best option to semi-regional agreements, which, in turn, are less welfare enhancing thanis regional or global multilateral liberalization. Despite that, this study finds that there is little
support among Japanese MNCs in the electronics and machinery sector for a region-wide FTA.
Research underpinning this analysis is based on a series of interviews with Japanese MNCs, governmental officials and analysts conducted by the author in Tokyo between 2009 and 2010.

1. Introduction
The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has often stated that free trade agreements (FTAs) have been developed as a tool for securing firms’ commercial interests. Japan has
signed several bilateral FTAs as well as a semi-regional one with ASEAN and is currently participating in three coexisting frameworks with a regional economic integration agenda, which includes the fostering of a region-wide FTA. The study focuses on the use of free trade agreements
by Japanese corporations – FTAs’ main clients – to date. It asks, what strategic commercial
objectives do different types of existing FTAs fulfill for the Japanese corporations, and how successful are they in performing this role? What additional value-added benefits could the planned
region-wide FTA bring? In other words, do Japanese corporations need a region-wide FTA, or1

do the bilateral agreements and the semi-regional one provide a sufficient enough response to
the firms’ foreign commercial goals? Research underpinning this analysis is based on a series ofinterviews with Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs), government officials and analysts,
conducted by the author in Tokyo between 2009 and 2010. It is a part of a broader research project to analyze the complex interaction between various levels of factors influencing the preferences of Japan’ s main actors regarding a region-wide FTA. The research argues that these main
actors’ preferences are central to the process of FTA policy formation. Based on Aggarwal ’ s
1framework it appears that political and diplomatic efforts are required for a country to sign a
new FTA or to harmonize the existing ones. There have to be enough aggregated, expected gains
2
from the outcome to provide sufficient incentive for signing of a treaty. Therefore, the research
focuses on the preferences, understood as the optimal, desired outcome, of the main groups ofactors. The understanding behind this methodology is that in order for an FTA to be signed, proliberalization preferences within the country must exceed anti-liberalization ones. In this study,
I focus on one group of actors – the private sector, namely the Japanese MNCs, from the electronics and machinery industries, primarily. This limitation results from the fact that preferences
regarding FTAs differ greatly between sectors, making it impossible to define interests of the private sector as a whole. The two selected sectors had vested interests in the formation of an FTA
network in East Asia, given the location of their production facilities and the importance of tradein parts and components for their operations.
3
The present study fits within the ‘multilateralizing bilateralism’ debate, which focuses on
the issue of harmonization and consolidation of FTAs; this union would mean a progression frombilateral agreements to a semi-regional one (ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership) and, perhaps, a multilateral, region-wide treaty in the future. To this aim, I establish what
the companies’ preferences for different types of FTAs were in order to explain Japan’ s overlapping trade treaties with ASEAN members. Then, I look at current preferences for a region-wideagreement in Asia to assess how much support there is for such a treaty, and to understand why,
despite Japan’ s participation in several regional economic integration schemes, there is little
progress in this regard. As Japan’ s MNCs were often referred to as the main supporters of Ja4
pan’ s FTAs, their preferences are an important factor that may tip the scale of domestic support.
Trade theory states that the more countries participate in an FTA, the more economic gains
it is likely to bring. The gravity model has been used to research the desirability of different variants of an East Asian FTA, such as an ASEAN+3 FTA, an ASEAN+6 FTA and so on. A wider regional agreement would potentially bring higher economic gains for all members. An ASEAN+3
FTA would have a bigger trade creation effect than a similar agreement between Japan, China
5and South Korea, though it would, in turn, be less profitable than ASEAN+6. Both trade theory
and econometric studies of FTAs conclude that bilateral FTAs are a second-best option to semiregional agreements, which, in turn, are less welfare enhancing than regional or global multilateral liberalization. The size of benefits from trade treaties for a given economy depends on several
factors, out of which the scope and depth of the agreement is not the least important. Even if we
assume modest benefits from trade liberalization, according to this reasoning, the private sector
should profit from establishing a region-wide FTA in East Asia. Still, this study finds that there islittle support among companies in the electronics and machinery sectors for a region-wide FTA.
This lack is caused by the type of production organization the Japanese multinational companies
use, and by the market-led economic integration in East Asia. This article presents the added benefits of Japan’ s bilateral FTAs, and those of the agreement with ASEAN, from the private sector’ s perspective. It explains why the companies are more interested in deepening liberalization
under the bilateral treaties than in increasing efforts for a region-wide agreement. Parts two, threeand four of this article present the impact of tariff liberalization under FTAs in East Asia on Japanese MNCs. Part five analyzes the current interest in a region-wide agreement.
22. Emergence of Vertically Integrated Production Networks and the Impact of the ASEAN
FTA (AFTA)
East Asia has been an increasingly important market for Japanese companies over the last
several decades. As Japan is a developed economy with an ageing society, the companies would
6
struggle to survive on the local market alone. Japanese companies started investing in moving
their production networks to other countries in the 1950s and 1960s. The Plaza Accord of September 1985 reinforced this process. It was the turning point for Japan, commencing the shift
from a multilateral approach to liberalization, based on the WTO, to a multi-track one in the late
1990s, whereby the country pursued FTAs parallel to the WTO negotiations. After the Plaza Accord and the realignment of Yen to the US dollar, the dollar depreciated against the appreciating
Yen, making Japanese products expensive on the US market. Continuing to manufacture all products within Japan was no longer profitable for many, especially labor-intensive industries. Although Japanese companies, even today, prefer to manufacture core parts and components within
Japan, they have continued to move production bases outside the country. This shift was first
directed to the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) – Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore
and Taiwan – and then to the ASEAN countries. A large number of the investing companies werein the electronic and electrical appliance sectors as well as machinery and automobile sectors.
Japan’ s core foreign economic goal, at the time, was to consolidate the situation after the Plaza
Accord. As the private sector invested more and more abroad and became dependent on the production base in East Asia, it became evident that some sort of formal agreement was needed tostabilize the situation in the foreign direct investment (FDI)-host countries, and to consolidate theinternationalization of the production networks. Such agreement would aim to preserve the statusquo.
The years 1999 and 2000 brought a change in Japan’ s policy towards trade agreements, asmany countries in the region were starting to think about bilateral FTAs, and China proposed atreaty to ASEAN in 2000. China’ s FTA proposal to ASEAN was the main trigger for Japan’ s
shift to bilateral FTAs, but because so much of the groundwork had already been done, Japan7
was able to change its policy quickly. The Japanese production networks established in the
ASEAN countries were then extended to China in the late 1990s. The core of this network shiftedto Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in the following years. This spread further influenced companies’ interest in the region. After securing the country’ s first FTA with Singapore, the Japanese
government had a clear idea of what could help MNCs’ operations – an agreement with ASEAN
countries. As Japan’ s production network is located in East Asia, an FTA with ASEAN members
would help business operations there. Thailand’ s average MFN tariff was 8.2 percent, which
8
made importing parts and components expensive for Japanese companies. However, instead ofnegotiating an FTA with ASEAN as China and Korea did, Japan started by negotiating bilateralagreements with several ASEAN members first. This was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA)
9
preference, as it wanted to use bilateral agreements as a tool for strengthening bilateral relations.
Additionally, this strategy allowed Japan to avoid the situation where ASEAN member countries
could block its demands during FTA negotiations; it had more bargaining power in bilateral negotiations.
When Japanese companies shifted their production to East Asia, they established verticallyintegrated production networks. This phenomenon, also known as internationalization of production, production fragmentation or production sharing, occurs when companies move their laborintensive stages of production abroad to less developed countries while the capital-intensive stages are carried through at home, where parts or intermediate goods are further processed. Hence,
manufacturing stages occur in the most cost-efficient locations. In East Asia, the intra-industry
trade in parts and components, related to production fragmentation, has not only increased the3overall volume of intraregional trade, but it has also strengthened regional interdependence.
Production sharing spread in the region due to ‘the region’ s wide range of development levels,
10strong intraregional links, and capacity for organizational and technological change.’

Figure 1

Source: AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author’ stranslation)

Figure 1 presents the situation in East Asia before 1992 from the perspective of Japan’ s MNCs
with a vertically integrated production network. In the 1990s, a Japanese company operating aparts production facility (D) and an assembly site in ASEAN had to pay tariffs at universal rates(most favorite nation tariff – MFN), while exporting parts and components from Japan to the respective factories. Similarly, MFN tariffs had to be paid when exporting a part from one ASEAN
member country to another (D), when obtaining additional parts originating in ASEAN (I), andwhen exporting the finished good to the ASEAN market (G). In this figure, the dotted line represents parts, components and intermediates. The solid line represents trade in finished goods.

4Figure 2

Source: AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author’ stranslation)

Figure 2 represents how the 1992 signing of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) affected
the production networks of Japanese MNCs. AFTA allowed the assembling site to import partsand components from other ASEAN member states (I) without paying tariffs. As the agreement
set a 40 percent minimum local content rule of origin (RoO) for the good to be traded under preferential tariffs, any product exceeding this amount was still exported from a parts production facility (D) and assembly site under the MFN tariff.

3. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
Japanese companies started supporting FTAs due to the increasing competition in the Asianmarkets. Bilateral FTAs offer Japanese multinational firms many benefits. For instance, they protect companies from the competition of other countries entering the same market. Companies areable to import parts and machinery from Japan to the FTA partner country, where their production
facilities are located, under reduced tariffs. This deal is mainly the case for ASEAN members,
which provide Japanese MNCs with resources and intermediates. Manger argues that “Japanesefirms with vertically integrated operations in the host country emerge as key supporters of FTAs,
11
in particular when their profits are under threat from FTAs signed by other countries.” Verticallyintegrated multinationals have production facilities, as well as parts and components suppliers,
in different countries. The removal of tariffs under an FTA facilitates the movement of parts andmaterials between production and assembling facilities, and also the sale of the final good. Additionally, companies lower their costs and increase returns on investments. Therefore, Japan’ s
subsidiaries in host countries made their support for bilateral free trade agreements known to the
local and Japanese governments. Blechinger and Legewie state that “regional cooperation was
mainly promoted by multinational firms interested in building up a horizontal division of labour5with regional production and sales networks to connect their various overseas activities on a
12
more efficient regional scale.” The proliferation of bilateral or preferential trade agreements,
worldwide and in the region, is one of the reasons behind Japan’ s pursuit of FTAs, as explainedby Baldwin’ s domino theory and the competitive liberalization theory (Baldwin 2004; Bergsten
1994; Dobson 2001). It implies that the proliferation of FTAs in a region causes other countries
to sign further trade agreements to offset the trade diversion effects of those already in existence.
In other words: FTAs beget further FTAs. In particular, the agreements signed by the US, China,
and recently, Korea, are of great concern to Japan’ s private sector. Currently, the FTA between
the EU and South Korea worries Japan. The EU tariffs are considerably high, especially on elec13
trical appliances, with a maximum tariff of 14 percent. On the other hand, the EU is also negotiating an agreement with ASEAN and India. An EU-ASEAN FTA would be good for Japan as thecountry’ s production base is located mainly in the ASEAN region.
The private sector also profits from the type of FTAs Japan is signing. Japan names its FTAs
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), given the inclusion of some elements and various
provisions aiming at the harmonization of regulations and economic cooperation. They are, so
called, ‘broad band’ agreements. ‘Broad band FTA’ is a generic name for FTAs including comprehensive commitments to liberalization of non-tariff barriers to trade. They can include various
provisions ranging from eliminating technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and enforcing rules on
intellectual property rights (IPR) and government procurement, to overseeing competition policy
and investment measures. They are also concerned with issues such as labor and environment, as
well as various forms of further cooperation. Broad band FTAs include ‘deep’ integration mea14
sures, meaning that they remove not only border barriers, but also beyond-the-border measures.
They can include provisions on: transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, investment, competition policy, cooperation in environmental issues, IT, or labor standards. This
type of FTA is directly aimed at certain companies’ interests, particularly in the manufacturingsector. For them, tariff reduction is still important, despite the falling of MFN rates, but a strong
focus is also placed on how FTAs can further improve operations of production networks andsecure Japanese investments in East Asian markets. Therefore, the country’ s FTAs focus on elements that help to achieve that, such as: trade facilitation, investment protection or facilitation,
economic cooperation, and international financial policy cooperation. Improving the businessenvironment in partner countries and influencing the East Asian states to introduce necessary re15
forms is an important motivation for Japan.
In many cases, FTAs function as a defensive tool; they are signed as a result of domesticpressure from the private sector, namely by companies in a disadvantaged position due to tradetreaties signed by other countries. For example, following the implementation of NAFTA and thesignature of the Mexico-EU Free Trade Agreement, Japanese manufacturers found themselvesin a disadvantaged position on the Mexican market. They had an incentive to lobby the government to negotiate a similar treaty that would provide them with equal market access. Whereas
their American and European counterparts enjoyed preferential access, Japanese MNCs, among
the OECD members, were the only ones to pay high customs duties on automobiles in Mexico.
16
At the time, Mexico’ s tariffs averaged 16 percent and tariffs on automobiles were 50 percent.
NAFTA members exported automobiles to Mexico duty-free, while the EU countries paid 10 percent tariffs. The Japanese automobile sector demonstrated its losses and asked the government tosign an FTA. It was not the only sector that lobbied for the establishment of this treaty. Mexico
grants a preferential status in government procurement to its FTA partners. This setup prevented
Japanese companies in the electronics sector, among other companies, from selling power gener17
ation equipment and hospital-use medical equipment to that country. For example, X-ray medi18
cal equipment exported to Mexico was subjected to a 40 percent customs duty.
As explained earlier, the companies’ preferences regarding bilateral FTAs differ from sector6to sector. They can also differ substantially within the sectors, depending on how much a given
company has invested and operates in the prospective FTA partner country. The ‘big three’ ofJapanese auto companies, Toyota, Nissan and Honda, have already had operations in Mexico andenjoyed a tariff-free quota on imports. This tariff-free quota was available under a Mexican government’ s provision, whereby it “allowed for duty-free imports of finished vehicles, equivalent to19
10 percent of their local production, for foreign assemblers in Mexico.” Those companies had
an advantage over other Japanese automakers such as Suzuki or Mazda, which had to pay hightaxes in order to penetrate the Mexican market and had no export quota. Hence, the ‘big three’companies did not strongly support the Japan-Mexico FTA. The preferences of automobile companies differed also in the case of the Japan-Malaysia FTA. Malaysia implemented high tariffs
on cars and supported its domestic auto industry with subsidies and a national car policy. One of
the two dominant Malaysian producers, Perodua, cooperated with Japanese automobile company
20
Daihatsu Motor in a joint venture. Daihatsu provided a substantial amount of technology andsent staff members to cooperate with the national brand. The company enjoyed high tariff protection that gave it an advantage on the Malaysian market. Therefore, it was against the JapanMalaysia FTA. A similar situation is taking place in India, where Suzuki produces automobiles
for the local market through a Maruti Suzuki joint venture; here, Suzuki holds over 50 percent of
stakes. As India implements high tariffs on cars, an India-Japan FTA would have a negative impact on Suzuki’ s operations in the country.
According to Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) statistics, out of all its bilateral
21
FTAs, Japan uses the agreement with Thailand and Malaysia the most. These countries are hubs
for Japanese companies’ production in the region. Japan-Thailand and Japan-Malaysia Economic
22
Partnership Agreements are followed by AFTA, which is heavily utilized by Japanese MNCs
for obtaining parts and components as well as selling finished goods to other ASEAN countries.
Given the location of those companies’ production bases, FTAs between third parties often playa crucial role. This trend is particularly true in case of the electronics sector, in which most products are produced in East Asia, and hence, there are few finished goods to export from Japan. A
great majority of the industry’ s finished goods, still manufactured in Japan, are on the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) product list and are therefore exported duty-free. Thanks to
ITA, companies import parts and components to their production sites in ASEAN states without
customs duties. With no products to export and no customs duties to pay, the impact of an FTA
is limited at best. Industries such as automobile, chemical and apparel still manufacture a part of23
their goods in Japan and so use Japan’ s FTAs. A substantial number of companies in the electronics industry use AFTA to obtain parts and sell goods to ASEAN. For example, one of Japan’ sleading multinational companies in the electronics sector produces many of its goods in Thai24
land, to which it imports parts from other ASEAN countries under AFTA. A few parts are also
imported from Japan under the Japan-Thailand FTA (JTEPA), or from China and Korea under
their respective FTAs with ASEAN. Finished goods are exported from Thailand to other ASEAN
countries under AFTA and to third parties under, for example, the ASEAN-India FTA. Hence,
Japanese companies use many FTAs of which Japan is not necessarily a member. Japanese automobile companies manufacture their products for Indian and Australian markets in Thailand.
Both of these countries are large and important markets. The increase in the volume of automobile exports from Thailand to Australia is strongly related to sales of cars made in Thailand by
25
Japanese companies, such as Honda and Toyota. A substantial amount of Suzuki’ s production
is located in India through Maruti Suzuki. Thailand-Australia and Thailand-India FTAs are heavily utilized by Japanese companies both in the electronics and automobile sectors. For example,
representatives of Japan’ s private sector located in Thailand communicated closely with the Thai
26
government, expressing their preferences regarding a free trade agreement with India. As aresult, 82 products, selected for the Early Harvest Program between Thailand and India (84 Har7

monized Commodity Description and Coding System subheading categories), included parts for
televisions, air conditioners and gear boxes – goods produced by Japanese companies in Thailand.

Figure 3

Source: AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author’ stranslation)

Figure 3 shows the impact of tariff reductions only. Of course, Japan’ s bilateral FTAs are comprehensive agreements and the broad band FTA provisions within them are the main source ofcompanies’ benefits, as was explained earlier. After signing bilateral agreements with ASEAN
members, companies with vertically integrated production networks were able to import parts
and intermediates from Japan to the parts factory (D) and the assembling site. However, they
still needed to pay the MFN tariff when trading goods exceeding 40 percent local content within
ASEAN.

4. ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP)
After the signing of bilateral agreements with ASEAN members, what was the incentive forsigning a semi-regional FTA with ASEAN as a group? And why were the bilateral agreements
kept after AJCEP was reached? For the countries with which Japan already had a bilateral FTA,
companies could choose under which agreement they wanted to trade. An exporter wishing tosell products to Thailand may compare the tariff rates for that good between the MFN tariff, theJapan-Thailand FTA, and the Japan-ASEAN FTA and simply choose the lowest one. Keeping
the bilateral FTAs while implementing AJCEP was discussed with members of the private sector, who stated that they were used to utilizing particular provisions of the existing treaties. As
companies are used to utilizing particular parts of bilateral treaties and their areas of operation8

are quite narrow, the coexistence of the two types of agreements, from their perspective, does not27
pose a problem.
The objectives of bilateral and semi-regional agreements are somewhat different. Bilateral
FTAs with ASEAN members often offer deeper tariff concessions than AJCEP, as well as someWTO-plus provisions. AJCEP is an agreement on goods only. Additionally, the tariff reduction
schedules in AJCEP were incorporated from bilateral agreements with particular countries. Thismeans that AJCEP does not have a common implementation schedule. As the bilateral agreements were signed earlier, their implementation schedules started earlier and hence, the current
tariffs are often lower, even if the liberalization schedule is the same for both agreements. If
under JTEPA Thailand was allowed to liberalize a tariff for a product over 10 years, under thesemi-regional agreement (AJCEPA), the phase-in schedules were, in most cases, set for the same28
amount of time. However, in the case of Malaysia and Singapore, bilateral agreements went
into effect in 2006, two years before AJCEPA. For Thailand, this gap is one year. On the other
hand, for some goods, such as textiles, AJCEP is more profitable for Japanese companies as it introduces immediate tariff elimination. The treaty also covers all ASEAN countries, including theleast developed ones (Myanmar, Brunei and Cambodia). In a way, it could be conceptualized as
the lowest common denominator in terms of trade liberalization between Japan and the Associa29
tion’ s members. It was politically important to have an agreement with all ASEAN countries.
An agreement with Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore (the ASEAN 5)
and perhaps Vietnam was important for companies in the discussed sectors. The other four coun30
tries were attractive FTA partners from the perspective of textile and apparel industries.
Rules of origin (RoO) determine the origin of a given good, preventing third parties (nonmembers) from using preferential tariffs. Their existence has a big impact on Japanese MNCs’
operations. As one of the non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, RoO can limit the company’ s ability to use FTAs. AJCEP simplifies the rules of origin by allowing companies to choose between
VC and CTC rules. The VC rule of origin is based on a minimum local value-added content. Thechange in tariff classification (CTC) rule of origin requires a change of heading level under the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), an international classification
system under World Customs Organization (WCO) that describes goods and products. This typeof provision, known as co-equal RoO, is now becoming a standard in the region. According to
31
recent studies, it is the preferred solution for most Japanese companies. First, Japan introduced
such criteria for several product lines in ASEAN-Japan and bilateral FTAs, with those between
32
33
Japan and Malaysia or Thailand as examples. Then, ASEAN-Korea and ASEAN-Australia34
New Zealand FTAs, and even ASEAN itself, adopted that system. AANZFTA uses co-equal
35
approach on approximately 83 percent of all tariff sub-headings. Extending co-equal rule could
offset the negative aspects of overlapping agreements and allow for the harmonization of RoOs
in the future. When all FTA members use the same type of rules of origin, diagonal cumulation ispossible as it was done in the case of the Pan-European Cumulation System from 1997 (PECS).
It allows for cumulation of added value in all member countries when determining the origin of agiven product. Materials originating in one member country are treated as local in other countries
within the FTA. The product does not change origin once it enters the FTA territory. Diagonal cumulation creates a sort of ‘RoO custom union’ with common external rules of origin.
Cumulation of rules of origin is one of the most important features of AJCEP. Co-equal rule36
in the ASEAN-Japan FTA enabled companies to use parts and components of any origin. They
can now produce in Thailand using Korean parts under the ASEAN-Thailand FTA and export thefinished product to other ASEAN countries duty-free under the AJCEPA, even if Korean parts
constitute more than 40 percent of the finished good. A multinational company wishing to export
parts and components to its subsidy or production site in ASEAN would use a bilateral agreement. AJCEPA, with the CTC rule, is more profitable for exporting the finished good to another
9ASEAN member. This change is significant for many industries, especially those where the prices of products are similar and even small changes in tariff rates can decide who has the comparative advantage. For most sectors, the Japan-ASEAN FTA had little meaning in terms of tariff liberalization. Its value added lay in the possibility of cumulation. However, this potential for profit
is utilized only by a few Japanese MNCs, who have vertically integrated production networks in
37
ASEAN. Therefore, the private sector, as a whole, did not strongly support AJCEP.
The electronics sector provides a good example of how an FTA with ASEAN is significant.
The production bases of electronics companies are located mostly outside Japan and they often manufacture only a handful of products at home. Japanese TV manufacturers, for example,
38
have production sites in ASEAN member countries. A company producing an LCD TV within
ASEAN imports the LCD flat panel from, for example, Japan, Korea, Taiwan or China, where
they are produced. The panel in itself constitutes almost 60 or 70 percent of the final product’ s
price, and in order to comply with AFTA, to be sold within ASEAN duty-free, the product shouldhave a minimum of 40 percent local content. Japanese companies, though, import panels fromoutside ASEAN; this fact, given the value of the LCD panels, clearly means that the 40 percent
local content requirement was not met. Having only the bilateral agreements with ASEAN members, Japanese companies would have benefited from importing the panel to ASEAN from Japan,
Korea or China – which would have been duty-free under the ITA – and then sold the finishedgood locally under the bilateral FTAs. However, due to AFTA regulations dealing with export toother ASEAN countries, the MFN tariff had to be paid. At the same time, Korea signed an FTA
with ASEAN, enabling it to export Korean LCD panels from one ASEAN country to another.
Therefore, LCD panels produced in Japan lost their competitive advantage. So, in order to retain
competitive advantage of panels and other high value added parts and components, Japanesecompanies from this sector strongly urged the government to sign a similar agreement.

Figure 4

Source: AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.
meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author’ stranslation)

10

Figure 4 presents the impact of cumulation of RoO under the AJCEP. The ASEAN-Japan treaty
liberalized trade in goods only, and there were no additional broad band provisions. A company
with a vertically integrated production network was now able to trade both intermediates and thefinished good within ASEAN under no tariffs, even if the finished product fell below 40 percent
local ASEAN content.
There are additional reasons for implementing co-equal rule in AJCEP. For industries using
a specific production process and technology, such as the chemical industry, CTC rule of origin
is often impossible to apply. On the other hand, rules of origin based solely on the VC can be
restrictive and difficult to comply with. An automobile is comprised of around 30 thousand partsand components which makes applying the local content rule of origin difficult. Big companies
purchase parts from several to several hundreds of vendors and local suppliers, who often havelittle knowledge of rules of origin requirements. The company, on the other hand, requires a certificate to prove the origin of a given good. If the supplier refuses to issue a certificate, the buyers
cannot buy the parts.
In 2010, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) consolidated the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) and ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) provisions, whichwere in force since 1992. The change, made after the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic
Partnership was enacted, greatly diminished the benefits of the AJCEP agreement. Many Japanese MNCs, in the discussed sectors, no longer needed AJCEP, as they could profit from cumulation under AFTA. Companies tend to use bilateral FTAs, as they offer deeper concessions forexporting parts, components or finished goods from Japan to facilities in ASEAN countries. In
order to further export products to other ASEAN members, they can use either AJCEP or ATIGA.
Using ATIGA has an advantage for many companies. Japanese companies have been using theagreement since it went into effect, and hence, they are familiar with its provisions and function39
ing. The number of companies using AJCEP is very low. This statement has been confirmed by
the interviewed companies.

5. Region-wide Agreement and the Importance of Trade Facilitation
In December 2004, Japan’ s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) published a document entitled “Basic Policy Towards Further Promotion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).”This document presents Japan’ s strategy towards FTAs in East Asia: “EPAs contribute to the creation of international environment further beneficial to our country from the politically and diplomatically strategic points through, among others, fostering the establishment of an East Asian
40
community.” A region-wide FTA would be the first and crucial step on this path. Japan stated
its support for such initiative on many occasions and is currently participating in three coexisting
frameworks with regional economic integration agendas, which include fostering of a regional
FTA: ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN+3); ASEAN plus China, Japan,
South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand (ASEAN+6); and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). How do the FTAs’ main clients – multinational corporations – see the prospects of a region-wide FTA? Is there a need for a further trade treaty?
The signing of the ASEAN-Japan FTA and the changing of rules under AFTA allowed
companies to profit from cumulation between their sales and manufacturing facilities in member countries and headquarters in Japan. Additionally, the expanding FTA network offers them
indirect access to other foreign markets. Under the current circumstances, the companies haveworked out a way to maximize their profits and avoid paying tariffs where possible. They havefound the best localization for their production and assembly facilities. As shown in Figure 4, the11cumulation of RoO under AJCEP, together with comprehensive, broad band provisions under bilateral FTAs, significantly dulled the issue of tariffs in East Asia. Of course, there are other matters of importance for Japanese industry, such as access to the Indian or Australian markets andinclusion of Taiwan in the FTA network. There are also other types of governmental incentive
schemes that further complicate the spaghetti bowl effect in East Asia, and also factor into companies’ choices of production location. For example, Thailand has introduced the eco-car incentives scheme for companies manufacturing green cars within the country. Under this program, theThailand Board of Investment offers corporate income tax exemption for 8 years and duty-free
importation of machinery for qualifying projects. In addition, the Finance Ministry offers further tax incentives. In order to qualify for the eco-car incentive scheme an auto-maker company
needs to meet certain requirements: meet environmental standards, fulfill the minimum investment value, and be able to produce over 100,000 automotive units per year after five years fromthe beginning of the project. Furthermore, the company should manufacture certain key parts
and assemble the car in Thailand. Nissan Motor Corporation was the first company to produce an
eco-car under this scheme. Mitsubishi Motor, Toyota Motor and Honda Motor are among othercompanies interested in producing the eco-car in Thailand. The existence of such government
incentive schemes, on top of preferential provisions under various FTAs, further complicates thesituation in East Asia. The companies try to choose the best possible location for their production
and assembly facilities amid a complex network of tariff reductions and various other regulations.
Keeping all of the above in mind, for the Japanese companies, the issues of investment liberalization and trade facilitation are becoming increasingly significant aspects of regional economic integration. Deep liberalization provisions have the potential to improve Japanese MNCs’
operations in East Asia. Japan would like to see further integration with ASEAN, but to the41
extent that it would exceed tariff reduction and include provisions on trade facilitation. Within
existing FTAs, Japan usually sets up a bilateral committee aiming to facilitate development of
the business environment and improvement of investment regulations. Its goal is to harmonize
procedures as much as possible within the existing treaty. For example, Article 14 of the JapanMalaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA) speaks of establishing a Sub-Committee on
Improvement of Business Environment. Companies located in Malaysia can voice their concerns
regarding local regulations to liaison offices of the Sub-Committee. The complaints are thenpassed to the Joint Committee under JMEPA and, if needed, are forwarded to the relevant ministry to ensure better functioning of the agreement.
One element that the Japanese companies would like to see included in prospective free42
trade agreements is further liberalization of investment. Apart from agreements with ASEAN
and Vietnam, all of Japan’ s FTAs include an investment chapter; this mainly entails provisions
related to investment treatment: national treatment and MFN treatment, as well as performancerequirements and state vs. investor dispute settlement provisions. Japanese companies in the discussed sectors have already widely invested in ASEAN countries and would now like to see theremoval of remaining barriers to investment. Investment liberalization achieved under an FTA orbilateral investment treaty (BIT) can bring several benefits. However, for many, especially developing countries, investment liberalization is a sensitive area. Given its operations in ASEAN
countries, the Japanese private sector would welcome the removal of regulatory hurdles to investment. This means introducing investment liberalization provisions – for example, deregulation
or removal of limitations on foreign investment – which may mean prohibiting foreign investors
43
from engaging in a joint venture.
The simplification of procedures and standards is another important part of trade facilitation provisions. In this respect, the reduction of lead time is deemed most crucial from the private sector’ s perspective. Lead time is the time from when the decision to start the production is12made, to when the final good is completed and reaches its destination. It includes elements suchas ordering of the product, procuring of parts, assembly, transportation, custom clearance, and/or safety checks. Lead time can be measured in days depending on the type of product. In traditional manufacturing networks, Japanese companies had a well-established pyramid structure of
suppliers. Each big company had a group of permanent subcontractors who sold them parts andcomponents purchased from the third level of producers, forming vertical distribution networks.
As this type of arrangement continued for many years, companies knew what to expect and leadtime was short. However, this consistency ended when parts of the production networks weremoved to East Asia. Lead time depends on the RoO and regulations of the country from which
the parts are procured, and from that where the assembly site is located. Therefore, the MNCs
started to pay more attention to the issues of supply chains logistics and efficiency. Procurementof parts is an important factor behind the total lead time. Further, lead time is influenced by tariffs
as well as RoOs and regulations between the country that sells and the country that buys a part.
For example, an interviewed company manufacturing electronic goods has a lead time of about
88 days in order to produce a certain model for a given market. That means that if it wants to sell
the product in December, it needs to start to work in October. If during this time the company or
the customer wants to change or cancel their orders, adjustments cannot be made before the 88
days. If the goods are no longer required, they need to be stocked, which implies additional costs.
Reducing lead time makes the production process more flexible and adaptable.

Table 1: Lead Time
Total Lead
Time

Planning andOrdering

Parts
Procurement

ChecksTransport to the
Assembly Site

Manufacturing

Existing: 88

20

30-60

2

1

5

Desired: 46.5

10

30

0.5

1

5

Source: Research interview with business representative, MNC in electric and electronic sector, May 2010,
Tokyo.

In this example, production takes only five out of 88 days. The procurement of parts is the longest stage. The company has little control over this process as it includes transport and borderclearance. If a company is procuring parts from different countries, their delivery times usuallydiffer. The final lead time depends on the last delivery date. Transportation and custom clearance
stages cannot be accurately calculated beforehand as it depends greatly on the customs officer
and other external conditions. Traffic in the port might hold up the vessel for a number of days.
If the customs officer is not sure whether the exported parts require duties, or the description of
the shipped product is unclear, the border clearance procedure may easily be extended several
44
days. The producer might need to provide additional, detailed information. Alternatively, thecustoms officer may wish to conduct random openings and checks of the cargo. In such a case,the company may provide a bank guarantee to pay duties for one to three months; this means thatthe company authorizes the bank to set aside the amount of money that may be required if the
product is taxable, and further, it aids in the answering of questions posed by the customs officers
in exchange for the immediate release of held goods. This, however, is not a real solution to the
problem. Moreover, in case of large investments, setting aside such funds is problematic for thecompany. According to one of Japan’ s top MNCs, from the heavy industry and machinery sector, in terms of medium technology products (like parts and components, for example), even the13naming of the product in the invoice and packing list may change the duration of customs pro45
cedures. If a part is called, for instance, “steam turbine component” it will most likely pass theborder quicker. On the other hand, if it is called “piping” or “tubing,” the insufficient information
might cause additional inquiry.
Apart from customs clearance, the transportation of parts is another stage of parts procurement, during which process a region-wide FTA could help reduce lead time. Under existing FTAs
in East Asia, spare parts can be imported duty free if they are shipped on the same vessel as the46
finished good. If shipped separately, every part requires a certificate of origin. This regulation
was formed because the business of spare parts is very profitable and importers wish to control
their trade. Therefore, they lobby the government to introduce appropriate provisions. If spareparts are sold by an authorized service parts distributor or service point, the profit is kept within
the same company. Unaffiliated parts vendors reduce companies’ profit. On the other hand, suchprocedures lengthen lead time. Therefore, some big companies oppose this rule. One of the interviewed MNCs claimed that even if parts are sold by an authorized service center, the company
uses mainly local, small service points, and therefore does not make profit from selling spareparts. It would like to be able to make a list of parts registered in advance to export freely, even
if they are to be sold separately. At the moment, the CTC rule of origin is applied to spare parts.
The companies would prefer either 40 percent VC or elimination of duties for parts. As thoseexternal factors are not directly related to the quality of the finished good, MNCs would prefer toreduce this stage. Others, such as safety checks or testing, cannot be shortened. Companies’ main
preference, and a possible incentive for a wider and bigger FTA, would be an opportunity to procure parts more quickly and with no cost. The current FTA network allows companies to lower
the costs relating to tariffs. Over time, however, FTAs’ ability to reduce lead time has become thekey interest of many companies.

6. Conclusion
Japanese companies established extensive production networks in East Asia long before thecountry signed its first FTA with Singapore in 2002. They paid MFN import duties, or in somecases, enjoyed special investment incentive schemes offered by ASEAN governments. When
AFTA was signed, companies could trade under reduced tariffs within ASEAN, but imports
from Japan were still subject to the MFN rate. Bilateral FTAs allowed MNCs located in ASEAN
to import semi-finished products from Japan, but the finished goods could not move freely
within AFTA. The ASEAN-Japan FTA allowed for cumulation to be applied between Japan and
ASEAN. What Japanese companies expect from further trade liberalization in the region is notprimarily reduction of tariffs, but improvement of business environment, trade facilitation andservices liberalization. While existing FTAs are important for procuring parts without duties,
provisions enhancing the business environment would further improve MNCs’ operations in East
Asia. An ideal solution, although inconceivable in the short term, would be a one-market scenario
with no duty and no customs clearance. For Japanese companies, whether improvement of thebusiness environment will take place under the existing FTAs, a region-wide one with Japan’ s
participation, under third party FTAs, or under the WTO’ s negotiations, there is little difference.
Trade theory states that the bigger the FTA, the more economic gains it brings. Hence, putting aside political considerations, a wider FTA should bring bigger economic results. In Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific, Aggarwal writes:
Each of these agreement types derives its advantages and disadvantages from tradeoffs between political and economic efficiency. For example, agreements among few states develop
14easily, but implicitly involve welfare losses due to trade diversion and marginalization of
weaker countries. Conversely, larger agreements maximize economies of scale by expanding
markets, promoting broad-based trade liberalization, and enabling global integration, but
47
demand more political effort to negotiate.
While negotiating a multilateral FTA, even one that does not include deeper liberalization issues, a state has little control over the negotiation process. Negotiating and finding a compromiseamong several members is an additional difficulty. The higher the number of members of an
FTA, and the more difficult it is to reach a compromise on conflicting issues, the more politicaleffort is required on the side of each negotiating state. Additionally, differences of development
need to be considered. Taking an example from Japan’ s FTAs, it can easily be seen that the bilateral FTAs offer much deeper liberalization and are a ‘broad band’ type of treaties. The AJCEP, on
the other hand, includes all members of the Association, but is limited to liberalization of goods
only. There is a clear difference in terms of the scope of liberalization between the two types ofagreements. For Japanese companies, it is that difference that causes them to be cautious abouta region-wide FTA. The Deputy Director of the International Economic Research Division at
JETRO confirms that companies would prefer to see an improvement of the existing agreements48
to an establishment of a region-wide one. This preference is due to the expectation that such an
FTA will be difficult to negotiate, and a high number of members may cause it to be the “lowest
common denominator” FTA. Such agreement would not improve the business environment in theregion and would not include provisions leading to the reduction of lead time. Therefore, for Japanese companies in the discussed sectors, there is little value added in a region-wide FTA. Thereis also no common preference regarding which of the three coexisting schemes would be the best
option. Having no particular direct interest in such a treaty, the MNCs are cautious in expressing
their interest and do not lobby the government to increase efforts in this respect. Instead, there isa preference for strengthening the deep liberalization provisions and enhancing the implementation of the existing agreements. Given the internationalization of Japanese production networks
and the level of regional interdependence, it is not the size of the agreement that companies areconcerned about, but the scope and depth of liberalization.
Analyzing the business sector’ s preferences for FTAs can provide useful conclusions regarding the benefits and options for further regional economic integration. Furthermore, it canhelp determine which regional framework would be a suitable base for a prospective wider tradeliberalization treaty. This study reflects on the interest of Japanese companies in different levelsof FTAs, based on research done within the electronics and machinery industries. Both of those
sectors are among those with the highest share of value of exports to East Asian states. Still, as
companies’ interest in trade treaties depends greatly on production and trade patterns, further research is needed within other sectors of the manufacturing industry. For example, the chemical or
textile industry’ s products are subject to different production processes and rules of origin thanelectronic equipment or vehicles (i.e., two step-rules of origin for textile industry).

Notes
1

2

15

Vinod K. Aggarwal, “Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal and
Shujiro Urata, eds., Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific, Origins, Evolution and Implications, Contemporary Political Economy Series, New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 3-26.
Other factors such as political representation and the political system are not discussed in this study.

For example, Richard Baldwin, “Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on
the Path to Global Free Trade,” The World Economy (2006), http://hei.unige.ch/~baldwin/PapersBooks/
multilateralism.pdf; Richard Baldwin, Simon Evenett and Patrick Low, “Beyond Tariffs: Multilaterising Deeper RTA Commitments,” paper presented at the Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism,
sponsored and organized by WTO - HEI, co-organized by the Centre for Economic Policy Research(CEPR), September 10-12, 2007, Geneva, Switzerland, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_
e/con_sep07_e/baldwin_evenett_low_e.pdf; Antoni Estevadeordal, Jeremy Harris and Kati Suominen,“Multilateralizing Preferential Rules of Origin around the World,” paper presented at the Conference on
Multilateralising Regionalism, sponsored and organized by WTO – HEI, co-organized by the Centre for
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), September 10-12, 2007, Geneva, Switzerland, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/region_e/con_sep07_e/estevadeordal_harris_suominen_e.pdf; Carsten Fink and Marion
Jansen, “Services Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Stumbling or Building Blocks for Multilateral Liberalization?” paper presented at the Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism, sponsoredand organized by WTO – HEI, co-organized by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), September 10-12, 2007, Geneva, Switzerland, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/con_sep07_e/
fink_jansen_e.pdf; and Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements
Undermine Free Trade, Oxford University Press, 2008.
4 Mark Manger, “Competition and Bilateralism in Trade Policy: The Case of Japan’ s Free Trade Agreements,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 5 (2005), pp. 804-828.
5 For example: Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, “ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6: Which Way Forward?” paper presented at the Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism, sponsored and organized
by WTO–HEI, co-organized by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), September 10-12,
2007, Geneva, Switzerland, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ region_e/con_sep07_e/kawai_wignaraja_e.pdf (accessed January 2009); see also Shujiro Urata and Kozo Kiyota, “The Impacts of an East
Asia FTA on Foreign Trade in East Asia,” NBER Working Papers 10173 (2003), National Bureau of
Economic Research; and Zhang Yunling, “Towards an East Asia FTA: Modality and Road Map,” reportby Joint Expert Group for Feasibility Study on EAFTA, ASEAN, Jakarta, 2006.
6 Author interview with Japan Study Group on the Japan-Korea FTA coordinator, Hitotsubashi University
analyst, January 2009, Tokyo.
7 Author interview with METI official, FTA Affairs, Economic Partnership Division, February 2009,
Tokyo.
8 Rates for 2007, World Tariff Profiles, Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, The Asian Noodle
Bowl: Is It Serious? Paper presented at the ADBI Conference on FTA Impact, January 26, 2009, Tokyo.
Asian Development Bank Institute Working Papers, No. 136, April 2009, p. 5.
9 Author interview with METI official, FTA Affairs, Economic Partnership Division, February 2009,
Tokyo.
10 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Emerging Asian Regionalism, Partnership for Shared Prosperity,
Philippines: ADB, 2008, p. 18.
11 Manger, p. 805.
12 Verena Blechinger and Jochen Legewie, “Action and Reaction, Direct and Indirect Leadership: Reevaluating Japan’ s Role in Asian Regional Cooperation,” in Verena Blechinger and Jochen Legewie,
eds., Facing Asia – Japan’s Role in the Political and Economic Dynamism of Regional Cooperation,
Band 24, DIJ Deutsches Institut fur Japanstudien, 2000, pp. 297-325.
13 JETRO, White Paper, 2008, p. 3.
14 Peter Lloyd, “Deep Integration in Regional Trading Agreements,” in Tran Van Hoa and Charles Harvie,eds., Regional Trade Agreements in Asia, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2008, p. 16.
15 Author interview with Japan Study Group on the Japan-Korea FTA coordinator, Hitotsubashi University
analyst, January 2009, Tokyo.
16 John Ravenhill, “The Study of Global Political Economy,” in John Ravenhill ed., Global Political
Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 3-27, 130.
17 Akira Kotera, Accurate Understanding of FTAs is Essential! - In Response to Breakup of WTO Ministerial Talks in Cancun, RIETI Column 0077, November 18, 2003, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/
a01_0106.html (accessed May 20, 2009).
18 Author interview with business representative, MNC in electric and electronic sector, February 2009,
Tokyo.

316

Mireya Solis and Saori N. Katada, “The Japan-Mexico FTA: A Cross-Regional Step in Japan’ s New
Trade Regionalism,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2 (2007), p. 287.
20 Author interview with the Director-General, Manufacturing Industries Policy Bureau, METI, June
2010.
21 Daisuke Hiratsuka, Ikumo Isono and Hitoshi Sato, Findings from Japan Enterprise Survey of the Impact
of FTAs: Escaping from FTA Trap and Spaghetti Bowl Problem, Paper presented at the ADBI Conference on FTA Impact, January 26, 2009, Tokyo.
22 Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT).
23 While the electric industry produces the same type of product for all markets, the auto industry also
makes different models in different countries – production for the local market.
24 Author interview with business representative, MNC in electric and electronic sector, February 2009,
Tokyo.
25 Author interview with JETRO official, February 2009, Tokyo.
26 Author interview with JETRO official, Deputy Director, International Economic Research Division,
April 2010, Tokyo.
27 Author interview with Chiba University analyst, International Economics, April 2010, Tokyo.
28 FTAs entry into force: with ASEAN, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, 2008; with Thailand, 2007;
with Singapore and Malaysia, 2006.
29 Author interview with Institute of Asian Studies analyst, Asia University, May 2010, Tokyo, and author
interview with METI official, FTA Affairs, Economic Partnership Division, February 2009, Tokyo.
30 Author interview with former METI official, negotiator of Japan-Philippines and Japan-Malaysia FTA,May 2010, Tokyo.
31 Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignarajal, “The Asian Noodle Bowl: Is It Serious?,” paper presented
at the ADBI Conference on FTA Impact, January 26, 2009, Tokyo; Asian Development Bank InstituteWorking Papers, No. 136, April 2009; and Daisuke Hiratsuka, Ikumo Isono and Hitoshi Sato, “Findings from Japan Enterprise Survey of the Impact of FTAs: Escaping from FTA Trap and Spaghetti Bowl
Problem,” paper presented at the ADBI Conference on FTA Impact, January 26, 2009, Tokyo.
32 CTC on the sub-heading level, HS 6 digits.
33 CTC on the heading level.
34 Author interview with METI official, FTA Affairs, Economic Partnership Division, February 2009,
Tokyo.
35 Primer on Rules of Origin - ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, October 2009, p. 5.
36 Author interview with business representative, MNC in electronics sector, February 2009, Tokyo.
37 Author interview with the Director-General, Manufacturing Industries Policy Bureau, METI, June2010.
38 Author interview with business representative, MNC in electronics sector, February 2009, Tokyo.
39 Author interview with Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry official, May 2010, Tokyo.
40 MOFA, Basic Policy Towards Further Promotion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), approved by the Council of Ministers on the Promotion of Economic Partnership on December 21, 2004,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ economy/fta/policy0412.html (accessed May 20, 2009).
41 Research interview with Director-General for Manufacturing Industries Policy, METI, June 2010,
Tokyo.
42 Author interview with Director-General for Manufacturing Industries Policy, METI, June 2010, Tokyo.
43 Author interview with Deputy Executive Director, APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), June
2010, Tokyo.
44 Author interview with business representative, MNC in heavy industry and machinery sector, May
2010, Tokyo.
45 Ibid.
46 Author interview with business representative, MNC in electronics sector, May 2010, Tokyo.
47 Aggarwal, p. 4.
48 Author interview, April 2010, Tokyo.
19

17

Comparing Regional Integration in East Asia/Southeast Asia and Central
Asia

Chinara Esengul“Cognition comes through comparison.”
A Russian proverb
Abstract
Central Asia?! For many scholars, policy-makers and the general public in different partsof the world, Central Asia remains an unknown region. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union
in the early 1990s, Central Asia emerged as a separate region comprising five newly independent
1
states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This study aims topresent regional integration efforts in Central Asia by comparing them with integration processes and schemes in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Such a comparative analysis allows for insightful reflections on the cases of Asian regional integration, and shows there is much to learn about
and from regional integration experiences in Asia. The first part of the paper compares regional
trends and features and the second part discusses key factors to explain differences and similarities between the regions and their regional integration efforts. The study is a descriptive analysis
comparing the internal dynamics and external forces that drive the integrative realities and potentials in these two regions.

1. Introduction
There are many academic works on trends and characteristics of regionalism and various
aspects of regional integration efforts in different parts of the world. After the successful European integration, regionalism has become an important topic of discussion among academics
and policy-makers around the world. Regional processes and projects in Europe, the Americas,
Africa and Asia are widely discussed and comprehensively analyzed. The topic of Central Asian
regionalism emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Yet, regional processes andintegration efforts in this part of the world remain under-researched, especially when compared2
with other regions of the world.
Central Asia presents many challenging questions and issues for integration studies. For
instance, as far as the identity dimension of regional integration is concerned, there are suchquestions as: where does Central Asia belong? Is it part of Asia? If yes, what are the indicators?
Generally, what can we call Asia? Where does it start and where does it end? Some believe that
norms, values and politics–not geography–differentiate West from East, Europe from Asia. “The3
West is about values and politics, not about geography.” At the same time, most Central Asians
look like typical Asians. Does that imply that the commonality of appearance is a result of thecommon historical and geographical realities and challenges? Perhaps appearance may be misleading, and the historical experience of being a part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union
has impacted Central Asia in a very unique and profound way.
This paper does not attempt to engage in the identity or history discourse; the preceding18

lines are included only to highlight the importance of identity, i.e., to have a clear picture of thecriteria which define the borders between Asia and non-Asia, especially when it comes to modelsof regionalism.
Central Asia needs to develop a model of regional integration. At the global level, European
integration is perceived to be the model. However, the regional integration practices in East Asia
and Southeast Asia have presented a different form of regional integration. The East Asian/Southeast Asian experience and practices could be instructive for Central Asia. This is not to say thatCentral Asia is a part of Asia and has to orient itself eastwards, nor is it to imply that “asianizationof Central Asia” is taking place or should take place. However, there are no reasons to deny thatpossibility, either.
The purpose of the present study is to identify differences and similarities in the variety ofpatterns of regionalism in Central, East, and Southeast Asia. The European integration scheme isoften called “institution-driven,” while East Asian regionalism is generally described as “marketdriven.” Regionalism in Southeast Asia and East Asia shows that “it is possible to have high4levels of cooperation with low levels of institutionalization.” There are some other significant
features of Asian regionalism which make it different from other cases of regionalism.
Within this paper regional cooperation, regional integration and regionalism are used as in5
terchangeable concepts, defined generally as a “set of policies whereby state and non-state actors
6
cooperate and coordinate strategies within a given region.” As for the concept of “regionalization,” this analysis employs the definition given by Paul Evans as an “expression of increased
7commercial and human transactions in a defined geographical space.” The concept of “region”
is also a very loose notion. This study takes the view that regions can be constructed and reconstructed. The notion of “region” is meant to outline a certain group of countries which areunited by common interests, threats or vision. The fundamental point to note about regions is thelogic of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. That is, the concept of “region” creates “outsiders” and“insiders,” and as such, it may not be helpful or “suitable as dominant membership criterion”8 fora regional institution. Today, the geographical understanding of regions does not necessarily correspond with their political margins; certain political and economic considerations may draw up
different memberships irrespective of geographical borders.
The present study is organized around two case studies: Central Asia and the broader postSoviet space, and East Asia including the sub-region of Southeast Asia. The case selection for
a comparison is based on several important assumptions. First, the regions under consideration
are regions from a geographic viewpoint but also enjoy a considerable degree of socio-cultural,
economic and political cohesion. Secondly, all regions in one way or another face common challenges, parallel issues and similar problems, although they find themselves in different stages ofstate and market development. Moreover, the Central Asian and the East Asian cases examined
here are both about “Asian” regional integration.
Obviously, Central Asian regional integration can be compared with what has been taking
place in other parts of the world. A comparison could be made with the regionalism experiencein the Americas, Africa, Middle East, South Asia, Europe, East Asia, or any other region. The
primary difference of Central Asian states and the region as such is that Central Asia finds itself
in its early formative years, unlike most of the other regions. Having said this, it is important tonote that this comparative study will have meaning when it is possible to disregard, to a certain
extent, the time factor, and look at the contextual factors and realities of the regions in order to
identify differences and similarities. It should not be forgotten that this paper does not aim tocompare parallel processes in the two regions.
More specifically, the present study will examine the Southeast Asian regional integration
experience and integration processes in the broader region of East Asia and compare it with the
emerging efforts at integration in Central Asia. For this purpose, available official, academic and19

scholarly materials were reviewed. Several insightful interviews with leading experts and scholars on regional integration were conducted; interviews on East Asian and Southeast Asian regionalism were conducted among scholars residing in Japan, and interviews relating to Central Asian
regionalism were conducted among scholars residing in Kyrgyzstan.
Theoretically, the study is conducted within the framework of the dominant approaches inInternational Relations: realist, liberalist, constructivist and “domestic structure” (domestic power
relationships and state-society relations). It shares the view presented by proponents of analytical9eclecticism that there is a “need to build bridges between multiple analytical perspectives.” Thecomplexity of the post-Soviet realities of Central Asia and the need to understand and explainthese realities in the most efficient way does not allow presuming the superiority of one particular theoretical tradition. Central Asian countries at the same time need to focus on building theirnation-states and have to find their niche in the rapidly regionalizing and globalizing neoliberal
world. Moreover, it is important for them to improve their governance system and state-society
relations, especially taking into account that these new, smaller countries of Central Asia had
never experienced independent nationhood and statehood before. They need to construct their nation-states, to engage in social engineering to certain extent. These imperatives and the developments resulting from them in this region lend themselves to an analytical framework that is flexible enough to incorporate both state- and civil society-oriented factors, both traditional national
security and nontraditional security interests and concerns, and both domestically and externallydriven processes; hence the eclectic approach of this analysis. The primary levels of analysis are
sub-regional and regional; national and global levels are employed throughout the discussion of
external and internal factors affecting regionalism. The paper consists of two parts. In the firstand principal part of the paper, regional trends and features will be outlined and compared, andthe second part will discuss key factors to explain the differences and similarities between the regions and their regional integration efforts.

2. Locating and Defining Regions(1) Post-Soviet Space/Central Asia
The post-Soviet space or region refers to the 15 former Soviet republics. Generally, thespace can be divided into five groupings. Each grouping is characterized by the commonality ofgeographical, socio-cultural and historical factors and specific relations with Russia. They include:• Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania);• Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine);• Transcaucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia);• Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan);• Eurasia (Russia).
This structuring of the post-Soviet space is helpful for analysis of post-Soviet regional cooperation and integration processes; however, interestingly enough, there is not even one regional organization which strictly corresponds to the groupings’ makeup as such.
Central Asia is located in the heart of the Eurasian continent, and is widely recognized as aregion at the crossroads of civilizations (Western/Christian, Islamic, Chinese, etc.). As mentioned
above, since 1993, Central Asia has been defined as a group of five states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Previously, during the Soviet period, the region
was called Middle Asia and Kazakhstan (Srednaya Azia i Kazakhstan). Some basic information
about the five states is provided in Table 1 of Appendix I.

20

(2) East Asia/Southeast Asia
East Asia is a vast region, and when it comes to analyzing regional cooperation in East Asia,
it is necessary to differentiate between such areas as Northeast Asia (China, Japan, the Korean
peninsula, Taiwan, Mongolia and the Russian Far East), Southeast Asia (the ten ASEAN mem10
ber-states), and East Asia (ASEAN+3 and some countries of Northeast Asia or Asia Pacific).
The combination of political and geographical definitions of Southeast Asia results in a totalof 11 states, 10 of which are member-states of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).
The eleven states are Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and East Timor (not a member of ASEAN). Basic information on
East Asian and Southeast Asian states is provided in Table 2 of Appendix II.

3. Overview of Regional Integration in East Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia
(1) A Success Story
Southeast Asian regionalism is a case of sub-regionalism in relation to East Asian regionalism. The role of Northeast Asian states–especially Japan in the early stages of cooperation and
China later on–has been critical to the development of Southeast Asian regionalism. The regional
processes in Southeast Asia and generally in East Asia are closely interrelated. Nowadays, when
East Asian regionalism concentrates on the ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit (ASEAN+6)
formats, the role of ASEAN seems to be as one of the decisive factors shaping East Asian cooperation.
ASEAN was established in 1967, when five of the pro-western states in Southeast Asia
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) decided to create an intergovernmental organization. Back then, they did not have much in common beyond problems andthreats. Similar to the current states of Central Asia, the founding states of ASEAN “disputed
territorial and ethnic issues with each other, and there were no common factors promoting re11
gional cooperation, other than their mutually shared anti-communist stance.” In this view, twoimportant features of ASEAN must be highlighted: the principle of non-intervention, and the arrangement for a dialogue with any and all external powers. Mutual respect of each other’ s sovereignty and the ability to create a dialogue platform with external powers have made it possible totalk about the success of regional cooperation efforts in Southeast Asia. “As ASEAN developed
a habit of dialogue that led to an evolution of healthy intra-regional diplomatic ties in the nextstage of development, ASEAN also started to strengthen ties by establishing regular dialogues
12with external partners such as the US, the EEC, Japan, etc.” It is conceivable that the latecomers to ASEAN would not have joined the grouping, and the number of ASEAN states would nothave reached ten in 1999 if it had not been for the first-order criterion providing for the non13
intervention into the internal affairs of each other. The second condition was also critical for the
success of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The “ASEAN way” is often mentioned as aready answer for explaining ASEAN achievements. Relevant to the context of Central Asia, themagic of the “ASEAN way” appears to be in the ability of ASEAN states to take “a collective ne14
gotiation approach aligning member states’ requirements.” The result of the dialogue platform
and ASEAN conferences is evident in the proliferation of regional integration organizations with
ASEAN as the core actor. These organizations include the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum (APEC, established in 1989), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), the Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM, 1996), ASEAN+3 (1997) and the East Asia Summit (EAS, 2005). Figure 1 lists
the ASEAN States and Dialogue Partners, and displays the scheme of regional integration frameworks in East Asia (see Appendix III).

21

(2) Not Yet a Success Story
With the collapse of the Soviet state, a number of regional organizations have emerged in
the post-Soviet space aimed at providing different formats for inter-state cooperation, which arequite compelling for the land-locked countries of Central Asia. The first organization was theCommonwealth of Independent States established in 1991, which signified above all the collapseof the Soviet Union and the need for facilitating the disintegration of the former Soviet republics
and their re-integration into newly defined bases. The case of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) clearly shows the post-Soviet realities–the parallel processes of disintegration andintegration. This reshaping is a fundamental, specific characteristic of the post-Soviet regional
process.
Another important point to make about regionalism in Central Asia is the absence of a regional institution that unites only the Central Asian states. There have been several attempts tocreate a Central Asian Union or Central Asian Cooperation Organization, but one has yet to be
successful. If we follow the logic that “the first reaction usually appears to be the right one,”
Central Asian states reacted naturally (in terms of identity and survival) in the very beginning–
immediately after the collapse of the USSR–when on December 8, 1991, the Soviet Union was
dissolved and the Commonwealth of Independent States was established by the leaders of Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus with the signing of the Belavezha Accords. The five leaders of the Central
Asian states met in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, on December 13, 1991, and discussed
the new political situation and their collective approach to the newly created CIS. The decision
was to create an ad hoc Central Asian Commonwealth and negotiate with the Slavic states of
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on behalf of the Central Asian states to join CIS as equal and founding member states. Later, Central Asian regional cooperation continued as a series of summits inthe early to mid-1990s. “These included the January 1993 Tashkent Summit with a Protocol ofFive Central Asian States on a Common Market, in which the decision was made on naming theregion as Central Asia; the January 1994 Tashkent Summit, with the creation of the Central Asian
Common Economic Space (CES); the April 1994 Cholpon-Ata summit, with agreements on cooperation in various fields; the July 1994 Almaty meeting aimed at building a comprehensive
economic and defense union; the creation of a Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development (CABCD) in Bishkek in August 1994; and the approval of a five-year integration plan dur15
ing the April 1995 Bishkek summit.”
16
When Tajikistan re-joined the Central Asian Economic Union in 1998, the “Central Asian
Union” was renamed “Central Asian Economic Cooperation” as it recognized the inability toreach the ambitious goal of a Union. In 2002, the organization was renamed once again the“Central Asian Cooperation Organization” (CACO). In 2004 Russia decided to join CACO, andin 2005 CACO merged with the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), signifying the suspension of the Central Asian integration idea. After that, President Nazarbaev of
Kazakhstan tried to revive the idea of re-establishing the Central Asian Union in April 2007, but
only Kyrgyzstan expressed its support while the other states of Central Asia remained skeptical.
How can we understand such skepticism? Some scholars argue that this skepticism is a result of
these factors:• Escalating intra-regional disputes over non-demarcated inter-state borders and transnational water resources management;• Ethnic tensions rooted in pre-Soviet and Soviet periods, such as those that led to the violent clash between Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010;• The disruptive geopolitical impact of major external powers such as Russia, China andthe USA;• The inability to share a common history, as in the case of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in its
dispute over the Samarkand and Bukhara, and the absence of direct flights between Tash22

kent and Dushanbe;• Regional leadership competition between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan;• Perhaps the most important limiting factor, the divergent political-economic paths andstrategies adopted by each of the regional states, leading them into different directions
17and destinations.
Kazakhstan is becoming positively different from the other Central Asian states in termsof its economic performance. In Table 1, the GDP per capita of Kazakhstan is at least 5-6 times
higher than that of the other Central Asian states. The large territory of Kazakhstan enjoys a vast
store of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, is effectively managed by proper internal economic reforms, and within the past decade, balanced foreign economic policies have resulted in
obvious economic success. The country’ s outstanding economic performance has led them into
the position of regional leader in Central Asia, and most of the external powers recognize Kazakhstan’ s leading role. Evidence of this acknowledgment is shown in Kazakhstan’ s ascendancy
to chairmanship in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010.
Uzbekistan perceives all integration initiatives with suspicion even though it realizes economic benefits and gains that cooperation bring. Without Uzbekistan all regional projects failsince Uzbekistan’ s location is strategic and central to the region. It seems that Uzbekistan is not
yet ready to accept Kazakhstan’ s regional leadership role, although it is becoming an objective
reality.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have similar economic problems and resources. Both countries
are upstream countries and share a similar position on the regional water resources management
question. Tajikistan has experienced civil war, while Kyrgyzstan has experienced two political
upheavals during the last 10 years. In terms of foreign policy–especially concerning integration–
Kyrgyzstan has always been supportive and pro-integrationist. Tajikistan wishes to integrate
more with Iran and Afghanistan as it is the only Persian speaking nation in Central Asia.
Turkmenistan is a self-sufficient state economically, and has been acting in accordance with18
the declared ‘positive neutrality,’ which “prevented any meaningful cooperation by Turkmeni19
stan within regional and supra-regional arrangements.”
Thus, the situation in Central Asia is quite complicated. Central Asian regionalism is underdeveloped to the extent that it is not realistic to talk about the existence of regionalism; there
are only the efforts to create regionalism. Yet, one has to avoid an oversimplification of the regional integration processes in Central Asia that simply states that regionalism in Central Asia
has failed. Regionalism is not only about regional politics and policies but also about internal andexternal dynamics which evolve and change.

4. The Role of External Powers(1) Story of a Not-Yet Benign External Power
A prominent feature of post-Soviet integration is the issue of regional leadership or hegemony by Russia. Due to the historical domination of Russia over Central Asian lands for moreththan a century (since the middle of the 19 century until 1991) and the civilizational importanceof the Russians and the Russian language in the development of Central Asian societies andstates, the interrelationship of Russia and the Central Asian states is extraordinarily importantand complicated. Russia still feels responsible for the region, especially in view of the numerous
ethnic Russians living in the region. Russia’ s leading role in such regional organizations as theCommonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), theEurasian Economic Community (EEC) and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
23

where Russia’ s leadership is balanced with China, is unquestionable.
The post-Soviet states, which were not happy with Russia’ s politics and policies within the
post-Soviet realities, considered them “neo-imperialistic” when they established the regional organization GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova) in 1997. The reasons behind theestablishment of GUAM involved the territorial and economic disputes with Russia, and alleged20
ly the unofficial support of the United States in establishing an anti-Russian regional institution.
Uzbekistan, noticeably the most “nationalistic” state in Central Asia, which had a special andclose relationship with the United States until the tragic Andijan event in May 2005, also joined
GUAM in the period of 1999-2005, renaming it GUUAM. Uzbekistan’ s anti-Russian sentiment
was evident throughout its history at both the elite and public levels. Independent Uzbekistan
was straightforward in its interest in “pushing Russia out of the region” and President Karimovof Uzbekistan accused his Central Asian colleagues (except Niyazov of Turkmenistan) of being
21
unjustifiably close to Russia. At the same time, the smaller states of Central Asia such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan consider the partnership with Russia as strategic and primary, especiallyin security issues. The April 2010 political overthrow of the Bakiev regime in Kyrgyzstan andthe resulting political and social instability in the country showed the dependence of Kyrgyzstan
on Russia both in terms of its mental orientation and for material support. Some claim that Rus22
sia played a role in the April events in Kyrgyzstan. The bloody ethnic conflict in June 2010 inthe south of the country resulting from the extremely unstable and uncertain political situation
pushed the interim government of Kyrgyzstan to seek Russia’ s military assistance for the man23
agement of its conflict in the south. Finally, Russia decided to act through CSTO by providing
technical assistance but offered neither military involvement with the CSTO peacekeeping troops
nor a supply of weapons, since according to the CSTO statute it has no right to be involved in the24internal conflicts of the member states.
The above cases show that Russia is viewed by some Central Asian states as the only “security manager” in the region, and Russia in turn gives strong incentives to be viewed as such. The
positive and negative meanings of Russia’ s being the “security manager” in the region have certain implications for regional cooperation in Central Asia and its impact will depend on the leaders and leadership policies of Russia. As rightly argued by Robert Keohane, “hegemony is less25
important for the continuation of cooperation, once begun, than for its creation.” The scheme ofmultilayered structures within the regional institutions of the post-Soviet arena shown in Appendix IV indicates that Russia is present in all regional organizations, along with the participationof the Central Asian states, excepting the Economic Cooperation Organization. If scholars andpoliticians state that regional cooperation in Central Asia is unsuccessful and underdeveloped, it
has something to do not only with the limited political will and capacity for cooperation of theregional states but also with the leading actor’ s political will (or lack thereof) to push for meaningful cooperation.
(2) Story of a Benign External PowerJapan is perceived very differently in Southeast Asia and East Asia. From one side, Japan’ srole in the economic success of most Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian states is undeniable.
The Japanese origin of MNCs’ (multinational corporations) activities as well as FDI (foreign direct investment), and ODA (official development assistance), as well as the technology transfer
26
to these regions were crucial for the development of Southeast Asia and East Asia. At the sametime, the historical memories of the militarist Japan are still alive in China, in the Korean peninsula and in some countries of Southeast Asia. These memories add “complexity to the discussionof Japan as a future initiator of policy change and as a dominant actor in its regional organiza27
tion.”
When discussing the regional leadership role of Japan in East Asia, one also has to consider
24the politics and policies of the United States, the super power with long-lasting interests and leverage in the region. The close security, political and economic relations between Japan and theUnites States created conditions for effective regional cooperation. On the other hand, as Katzenstein argues, the attitude of the United States towards regional integration in Asia was not supportive of multilateralism. “After 1945 the United States enshrined the principle of bilateralism
28
in its dealings with Japan and other Asian states.” At the same time, this firmly established bilateral approach with regard to the security alliance between the United States and Japan allowed
29
Tokyo to concentrate on economic development rather than worry about its security.
Normative and institutional approaches indicate the leading contribution of Japan to East
Asian regionalism. Terada convincingly argues that Japan is “responsible for three normative
30
transformations” in the process of evolution of Asian regionalism. First, the gradual involvement of the Japanese government with regard to the bottom-up logic of regional economic
cooperation in East Asia makes it different from regionalism in Europe, North America, Latin
America, Africa and even Southeast Asia. The governmental institutions were not involved in
the initial stages of establishing regional economic institutions. The non-governmental approachthrough activities of PAFTAD (Pacific Trade and Development) and PBEC (Pacific Basin Economic Council) and then of PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, a quasi-governmental regional institution), worked well enough “in building the sense of shared interests and mutual
31
trust necessary for establishing an intergovernmental regional body such as APEC.” Thus, one
can observe a different–Asian–approach in preparing a regional institution (APEC) that later
functioned in a non-binding manner, unlike typical western regional institutions. The interests of
ASEAN and other Asian states and of the developed member states of APEC were properly facilitated by Japan.
Second, there was a gradual shift of purpose from economic cooperation to trade liberalization, in which Japan played an important, if not always a leading role. More developed membersof APEC were pushing forward trade liberalization initiatives, while ASEAN countries wereinterested in developing cooperation. Here, the broadminded and progressive position of Japanwas significant. APEC was able to follow its non-discriminatory approach in trading as desiredby most of the ASEAN and APEC countries. Japan shifted its approach toward establishing a
multilayered trade policy through FTAs in a timely and balanced manner, which resulted in the
ASEAN+3 becoming the primary format for advancing Japan-ASEAN and East Asian FTAs andencouraging competition in FTA strategies between Japan and China.
Third, open membership was then considered. After the Asian financial crisis, Japan reevaluated its position towards East Asian cooperation. When Japan proposed in 1997 to establish
an Asian Monetary Fund, the United States vigorously opposed this initiative since it was clearly
downplaying the role of the IMF. The skillful policies of Japan developed to balance the interests of the United States through APEC and at the same time to advance East Asian regionalism
through the visions of the East Asia Summit and East Asian Community are worthy of admiration.
Japan was able to make all of these transformations not only owing to its progressive leaders’ ability to suggest non-governmental and governmental approaches as needed in order toencourage proper focus on ‘regionalization,’ but also because of Japan’ s recognition and accommodation of the unmistakable influence of the United States. The United States wanted to see
China’ s growing power in Asia adequately balanced by strong Japanese leadership in both Southeast Asia and East Asia, while observing that ASEAN leaders make right conclusions/preferences
32
when the timing was right. Japan shared the concern over China’ s growing power and influence
in regional political and economic affairs. Japan’ s adept approach to regional affairs is also evident in its promotion of ASEAN+6, which includes the ASEAN+3 countries and India, Australia
and New Zealand, which would have the effect of defusing China’ s influence in these regional25

frameworks. Most recently, Tokyo has expressed its interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partner33
ship (TPP).

5. Key Factors Accounting for Regional Similarities and Differences
This part of the paper identifies factors which explain the differences and similarities in
the regional cooperation/integration patterns in East Asia/Southeast Asia and Central Asia. It isan absolute truism that these regions are different; clearly there is no need to compare identicalentities. The question to start with is then: why should we compare these regions? What goodreasons exist for these comparisons? First of all, there are claims by Asian leaders, in referring to
the regionalism in Southeast Asia and the wider region of Asia-Pacific, that they have developed
34
a distinctive model of cooperation that is different from the European model. In this view, it
would be instructive to see whether there are practices and policies in East Asian/Southeast Asian
regionalism schemes that can be emulated in Central Asia. Another reason for regional comparison is to see whether there are objective historical and civilizational grounds to adapt certain features of the Asian regionalism model to the case of Central Asian regionalism.
(1) Differences: Contextual Conditions
The geographic location and the demographic potential of the regions are different. Central
Asia is a landlocked region, while most of the Southeast Asian states have access to the sea. The
scale of population and hence capacities of each state and their markets are also different.
Another visible factor for the difference between the regions is historical, that is, their “preindependence experiences.” For Central Asia, their pre-independence experience is the “Soviet
experience”; for East Asia, the experience is of being on the periphery of a capitalistic world.
Central Asia was an integral part of the Soviet Union– “the great integration project”–that eventually failed. Central Asia was integrated into the USSR by force and was finally disintegrated by“chance” (meaning that Central Asia did not fight for its independence and independence came tothem unexpectedly). Hence, the logic of the relationship in post-Soviet Central Asia is as follows:
integration during Soviet times and disintegration/re-integration within post-Soviet times. East
Asian nations, on the other hand, never experienced integration within a joint state and started
building their nations and states in the post-colonial context. The post-Soviet reality is partiallypost-colonial at least from the perspectives of Central Asia since it contained the center-periphery
relations. But it also concerned the collapse of the single state–the Soviet Union–while mostother colonizing countries such as Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands continued to exist.
Japan, too, was a colonizer and an imperial power before and during the Second World War visà-vis its Asian neighbors, but it never absorbed them into one state system, nor did it collapse asa state after its defeat in the war.
Another obvious difference is the extent of marketization in the two regions. East Asian
countries developed in the context of colonial capitalism and a post-colonial capitalist economy,
while Central Asian countries started discovering the market economy and democracy only after
1991. In addition, not all of the Central Asian countries quickly embraced the opportunities of the
newly discovered liberal political economy. They continued and still continue to live under the
deep ideological and structural effects of communism and the planned economy system forced
upon them during the Soviet period. The point here is not so much a time factor but the structuraland contextual conditions that existed when the marketization process began in these two regions.

26

(2) Differences: Geopolitics
The geopolitics of regionalism is an external factor, i.e., an independent variable in the formulation of regionalism, and cannot be shaped by the will and capacity of the regional states. The
geopolitical situations in these regions show significant differences.
First, Russian-US relations in Central Asia are dramatically different from Japanese-US relations in East Asia. In contrast to the robust and evolving Japan-US alliance, the long-lasting antagonism between Russia and the United States has become a kind of political truism. Nowadays,
it is hopeless to wait for a partnership between Russia and the United States which would encourage development and prosperity in the Central Asian region, taking into account disagreements
between these states that exist at the global level in all possible aspects, political, economic,
military, energy, etc. In the long run, the substance and logic of US-Russian relations may change
because of the radical changes we see in the positions of the Islamic world and the rapidly developing China.
Second, the United States does not really support regionalism in Central Asia since almost
all of the regional institutions operating in the post-Soviet space (except perhaps the Economic
Cooperation Organization and OSCE) have either an alleged pro-Russian or anti-American character, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the beginning of the post-Cold War era,
the United States knew very little about Central Asia even to have a position towards emerging
regional integration initiatives. In the early stages of discovering Central Asia, the Unites States
preferred a bilateral approach. Later in 2005-2006, Washington proposed the idea of a “Greater
35
Central Asia,” which was associated with another project initiated in 2004 by the United States–
the “Greater Middle East” project. The idea was to provide an alternative to Central Asian states
and turn their foreign policy vectors towards the southern horizon by considering the five Central
Asian states and Afghanistan as one political/military and economic region.
Third, China identifies itself as a clearly East Asian nation and state, although theoretical and conceptual speculation abounds that China has ambitions to serve as a bridge between
Southeast Asia/East Asia and Central Asia. This bridge would act to propagate Asian regionalism
at the continental level where China would play a central role. At present, however, the role andplace of China in Southeast Asia/East Asia and Central Asia seems to be different. In East andSoutheast Asia, China has been competing with Japan for regional leadership. China is considered an internal regional state in East Asia, while for Central Asians China remains an alien andunknown power that is gradually engaging itself into the region–most notably in economic terms.
China and Russia, through activities within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, pursue theirregional and global interests in the post-Soviet space, which in most parts appear to be anti-Western or anti-American. At the same time, China’ s power in Southeast Asia and East Asia is being
counterbalanced by the individual or concerted actions of Japan and the United States.
Fourth, as mentioned above, the role of major external powers and their intentions towards
a region are critical to encourage or limit regionalism in the region. Japan’ s decision to cooperate with ASEAN with huge economic resources was a very important factor for the success of
ASEAN. Japan was genuinely interested in Southeast Asia for diplomatic and economic reasons.
Southeast Asian countries needed Japan’ s economic assistance. In Manila in 1977 Prime Minister of Japan Fukuda announced that “Japan was ready to help promote peaceful coexistenceof the ASEAN and Indochinese countries, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) money
36
would be used to induce cooperation.” The same kind of positive initiative could be proposedby Russia in Central Asia, since there are similar kinds of preconditions and expectations. In theimmediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’ s collapse, Russia was weak while undergoing difficulties and challenges of the Soviet disintegration similar to other former Soviet republics. Within
the last decade Russia has been gaining its economic and political strength, and today Russia positions itself as one of the major powers not only in the post-Soviet region but worldwide. Mos27

cow’ s July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept resounds with Russia’ s perceived resurgence in bothglobal aspirations and responsibilities near and abroad. The FPC asserts a “real capacity to play awell-deserved role globally” as one of the “influential centers in the modern world.” One of Russia’ s chief foreign policy objectives, per the FPC, is “to promote good neighborly relations withbordering States, to assist in eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension and conflicts in the re37
gions adjacent to the Russian Federation . . . and to prevent emergence of the new ones.” At thesame time, for Russia the former Soviet Union’ s space is much more important than other world
regions, not only because there is a growing interest and presence of other major powers in theregion, but because, first and foremost, Russia shares many historical, security, economic and social ties with Central Asian countries and societies. These ties can be a good ground for the mutual development and cooperation on projects with the leading role of Russia manifested throughbilateral relations, as well as multilateralism of existing regional institutions. Moscow’ s will andability is yet to be tested.
(3) A Puzzling Factor
The main difference between Central Asia and Southeast Asia is the existence of ASEAN
in Southeast Asia and the absence of such a purely regional organization in Central Asia. Thereis no regional institution which includes only Central Asian states even though there have been
attempts to create one. Such attempts have not been successful, nor are they likely to be successful in the foreseeable future, mainly because of the difficulties between the states, accompanied
by disruptive external impacts. In other words, Central Asia does not act as a distinct actor in theworld and in the region’ s international relations, while Southeast Asia through ASEAN enjoys
just such a representation. There is a view that the current Central Asian region is an object ofworld politics, rather than a subject. The lack of success despite efforts made to create a purely
Central Asian regional cooperation framework is truly a puzzling reality.
There are challenges, risks, and problems in the region which have a transnational character,and it requires a consolidated regional approach to address them. On April 9, 2007, in his attempt
to revive the idea of Central Asian integration, President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan stated that “hefails to understand why there is no Central Asian Union, because it is beneficial not only in terms
38
of economic benefits but first of all in terms of providing security.” Indeed, it is puzzling why aterritory of 60 million people, with complementary economies, a common language, a reasonably
efficient transport and transit infrastructure, sufficient energy resources, and common historicaland cultural traits cannot integrate within a single regional framework.
(4) Further Differences: Institutionalization
The number and the nature of existing regional institutions in the post-Soviet space result
mainly from the European model-oriented regional processes. The logic is top-down, where
governments play the leading role. In Southeast and East Asia, as argued earlier, regionalism has
been primarily market-driven. The government policies that created favorable conditions for thedevelopment of intraregional economic trade and cooperation have been a necessary but not sufficient action in the development of regionalism in Southeast and East Asia. The Customs Unionof Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan which began functioning in January 2010 definitely can beconsidered a step towards Eurasian Economic Community integration. It signifies a European
type of economic cooperation rather than an Asian type; the latter relies mainly on bilateral andmultilateral FTAs. At the same time, the establishment of the Customs Union which is designed
to integrate the most developed economies in the post-Soviet space clearly shows the tendency tounder-appreciate the interests of the less-developed states in the region. In the case of ASEAN,
the principle to proceed at the pace of the slowest of its members has been an effective instrument in the region-building process. At that, it should not be forgotten that ASEAN has suc28

ceeded economically, but politically remains weak in terms of institutionalization and normative
formal integration.
It is fair to argue that everything has an opposite, i.e., the other side of the coin. The key
factors identified above which explain existing differences between the two regional cases at thesame time allow for contrasting conclusions. The remaining sections help to explain the existing
similarities in the logic and trends of the two regional cases.
(5) Similarities: Nation-Building Rather than Region-Building
The important similarity which is rooted in the context of regional integration processes isthe pre-occupation with nation-building processes rather than region-building, unlike the case ofEurope in the early stages of its regionalism. As noted by Yeo Lay Hwee,“sovereignty in severalof these Southeast Asian states was hard-earned and the internal diversities within each of themember states made nation-building and not region-building the most important task for the post39
colonial leaders.” Similar processes have been taking place in Central Asia. With the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the newly created states of Central Asia have started exploring independence
in the post-Soviet realities, and have been preoccupied with the state and nation building process.
As known from the theory and practice of nation-building and state-building, these processes are40
highly influenced and constrained by the ethnic diversity of a state. All Central Asian countries
have been ethnically heterogeneous for centuries–a factor which was largely irrelevant during
the Soviet Union but has grown in significance in the post-Soviet period. As rightly summarized
by John Glenn, “nation-building during the soviet era can be characterized by the following concepts ‘flourishing (ratsvet), coming together (sblizhenie) and final fusion (sliyanie) of the nations
into a new historical community of Soviet people (Sovetskii narod)’ along with the idea of build41
ing a single soviet socialist state.” Such social engineering projects were supposed to be accomplished through the realization of “national delimitation” policy in the mid-1930s and resulted in
the “creation of titular ethno-national republics with their ‘artificial’ borders including nontitular
42
minority peoples.” Thus, the issue of ethnic minorities emerged in Central Asia and remained alatent social problem with a high conflict potential. The latent inter-ethnic tensions have become
acute and visible already, as in the conflict in Osh of Kyrgyzstan in 1990, and manifested again in
the bloody June 2010 event in the south of Kyrgyzstan.
A similar ethnically diverse situation was present in Southeast Asia since independence
and even during the period of ASEAN formation through today. In the earlier years, “the newly
independent member states were new political entities with ‘weak’ state structures” that lacked
a close congruence between ethnic groups and territorial boundaries, and sustained, also, “an43equally problematic lack of strong regime legitimacy.”(6) Similarities: Authoritarian Regimes
As the ‘puzzling factor’ mentioned above suggests, the absence of an ASEAN type organization for Central Asia and the nature of regimes in both regions are similar at least in their earlystages of regionalism development. As Amitav Acharya suggests, “ASEAN’ s primary concern
44
has been with regime survival,” and ASEAN continues to play a role in maintaining “strong au45
thoritarian states.” This similarity is indicated not to suggest that Central Asian leaders must develop a genuine Central Asian regional institution for protecting their own regimes, but to stressthat the impetus for integration should come from within the country, and the motivation of leaders is decisive especially within the realities of their authoritarian states. The Akaev and Bakiev
regimes of Kyrgyzstan showed that leaders might pursue regime or personal interests that support
neither national nor regional interests.

29

(7) Similarities: The Multilayered Structure of Regional Institutions
Another similarity between the two regions as shown in the appendices is the existence of amultilayered structure of regional institutions. This similarity is important as an indicator of thetendency to have a variety of regional organizations for accommodating differences in the priorities and interests of the regional states and external powers. The study conducted by the AsianDevelopment Bank on Asian regionalism finds that “cooperation is likely to evolve gradually,
with different groups of countries progressing at varying speeds, using several frameworks and46
forums to address subsets of policy interests.” Indeed, the emergence of some regional institutions in the post-Soviet space is explained by the necessity to have a narrow group of countries
which are interested in stronger security or economic cooperation. Evidence to this is the appearance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) out of the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Those countries interested in closer security cooperation joined the CSTO while those interested in closer
economic relations became members of the EEC. However, the absence of an exclusively regional organization in Central Asia, similar to ASEAN in Southeast Asia, downplays the importanceof the multilayered structure in the post-Soviet space for Central Asian states, since they remain
vulnerable “to internal threats aggravated by external predators taking advantage of a conflict47
ridden regional environment.” There is a strong and urgent need for Central Asian countries tonegotiate between each other and adopt and specify a set of norms for intra-regional relations.
(8) Similarities: Strategic Imperatives vis-à-vis External Powers
There are some parallels in the historical evolution of Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Byth
the 19 century, the Western colonial powers had come to dominate Southeast Asia and their influence became a barrier to the development of any kind of regional identification or sentiment.
th
The Russian Empire came to Central Asia in the mid-19 century to dominate the region, important for its strategic location and available resources in the context of the “Great Game” between
the British and Russian Empires. During the Cold War period, after gaining independence, Southeast Asia remained an unstable and volatile region in the context of rivalry between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union “as well as a battlefield in the conflict between China and the Soviet
48
Union.” The lessons from colonial oppression informed the way Southeast Asian states viewed
the regional environment and so they decided to form a united front against external forces politically and ideologically. As Narine argues, the suspicions of the Southeast Asian states in the fieldof international relations, as well as the perception of external threat, have played a critical role49
in the shaping of regionalism in Southeast Asia since the colonial period. Similar to the case ofSoutheast Asian countries, which succeeded in managing their relations with the United States,
Japan and China, Central Asian countries need to learn how to negotiate their relations with the
major external powers such as China, the United States and Russia.

6. Conclusion: Lessons for Central Asian Regionalism
Briefly summarizing the above discussion, one can say that the comparison between the tworegions has highlighted some commonalities and differences. Some observable commonalities relate to common challenges, while differences relate to how these challenges are being addressed,
irrespective of the objective, especially given the differences in geography and demography.
The preliminary findings of the study imply that the experience of Southeast Asian regionalism can have relevance to the emerging Central Asian regionalism. It could be instructive indeveloping a Central Asian model of integration especially taking into account the common
grounds in the starting conditions–the priority of nation-building over region-building, the au30

thoritarian nature of the regimes in question, and the availability of various regional institutions
for negotiating relations with external powers.
One of the important virtues that can be learned from Southeast Asian regionalism is a kind“of pragmatism in the ASEAN way.” It is the ability to be practical and functional, even though
not always in a formal and institutionalized way, and remaining so even when displeased withothers. It is very important to be aware of and to visualize the necessity to cooperate, and to realize the benefits such cooperation can bring. Early in Southeast Asia’ s development, as well aslater in Central Asia, the sovereignty issue was fundamental; both regions had been preoccupiedby the task of nation-building and were often led by authoritarian leaders. But authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia were able to arrive at a common ground and find ways for cooperation
for the sake of remaining in the office and maintaining legitimacy by means of good governancetargeted at economic development. Most of the Central Asian regimes are willing to retain powerat the expense of creating a “client” society and a corrupt system of governance, both of which
seriously hinder the development of each and all member states in the region.
In East Asia and in the post-Soviet arena, multilayered structures of regional integration
have already been constructed: in East Asia these are the Mekong Delta, ASEAN, ASEAN+3,
ASEAN+6, the East Asia Summit, and APEC; and in Central Asia, the Eurasian Economic Community-Customs Union, CSTO, OEC, SCO and CIS. To make the regional architecture work in
Southeast Asia and East Asia, the role of Japan was essential; for the integration projects in the
post-Soviet arena, a leadership role is yet to be played by Russia.
During the Soviet Union era, Central Asia was oriented towards the north and the west
while the southern and eastern directions remained closed. With the end of the Cold War and thedissolution of the Soviet Union, the new states of Central Asia have received a historical chance
to reach independence, to define their future with regard to international relations, and to exercise their own sovereignty. Today, there is no ‘iron wall,’ and no Cold War; the world of today is
one of globalization and open borders, including the formerly closed areas to the east (China andEast Asia) and south (South Asia). New options are now open, and new dimensions for cooperation are available. But included in these options is the possibility that without strong cooperation
among the Central Asian states, the formerly closed countries of China and India may wish toforce their ways into this new Central Asian region. Central Asia has been given an opportunity
to return to itself and act according to its nature, if done with a sense of urgency. But, in order todo this, it must unite, for only through regional cooperation can Central Asia finalize the post-Soviet disintegration and further advance its regional re-integration. Petty differences need to be set
aside, for small, independent countries with valuable resources but too little security will likely
not last long in the neighboring yards of increasingly powerful, heavily populated countries looking for space.

Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to GIARI of Waseda University for the opportunity to join the Summer Institute of GIARI on Asian regionalism in August 2010, and to the Academic Fellowship
Program of the Open Society Institute for their financial support for the author’ s research trip toJapan in May 2010, which enabled her to develop this study.

31

APPENDICES
Appendix I:
Table 1: Basic Information on Central Asian States
Government typeGDP per capita (2009est, in US dollars)

15,460,484

Authoritarian presidential rule

11,800199,951

5,508,626

Fledgling parliamentary republic

2,100

Uzbekistan

447,400

27,865,738

Authoritarian presidential rule

2,800

Tajikistan

143,100

7,487,489

Republic

1,800

Turkmenistan

488,100

4,940,916

Authoritarian presidential rule

6,900

2,935,637

61,263,253

Authoritarian presidential rule

Average GDP per
capita: 5,080

Country

Territory (sq km)

Kazakhstan

2,724,900

Kyrgyzstan

Total

Population(July 2010 est.)

Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed July 12, 2010)32

Appendix II:
Table 2: Basic Information on Southeast Asian and East Asian States
Country

Territory (sq km)

Population(July 2010 est.)

Government typeGDP per capita (2009est, in US dollars)

ASEAN states
Thailand

513,120

66,404,688

ConstitutionalmonarchyBurma

676,578

53,414,374

Military regime

1,100

Brunei

5,765

395,027

Constitutionalsultanate

50,100

Cambodia

181,035

14,753,320

Multiparty
democracy undera constitutionalmonarchy

1,900

Indonesia

1,904,569

242,968,342

Republic

4,000

Laos

236,800

6,993,767

Communist state

2,100

Malaysia

329,847

26,160,256

Constitutionalmonarchy

14,800Philippines

300,000

99,900,177

Republic

3,300

Singapore

697

4,701,069

Parliamentary
republic

50,300Vietnam

331,210

89,571,130

Communist state

2,900

4,479,621

605,262,150

Sub-total for
ASEAN

8,100

Average: 13,860

East Asian StatesJapan

377,915

126,804,433

Parliamentary
government witha constitutionalmonarchy

32,600South Korea

99,72048,636,068

Republic

28,000China

9,596,961

1,330,141,295

Communist state

6,600

Sub-total:

10,074,596

1,505,581,796

Average: 22,400

Total for APT

14,554,217

2,110,843,946

Average: 18,130

Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed July 12, 2010)33

Appendix III: ASEAN States and Dialogue Partners

Source: Koichi Sato, “The ASEAN Regime: Its Implications for East Asia Cooperation–A Japanese View,” inTamio Nakamura, ed., The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective, Instituteof Social Science Research Series, No. 24, University of Tokyo, 2007, p. 22. (Reproduced by permission of Dr. Koichi Sato)
Updates to Figure 1 as of November 1, 2010:- ASEM includes Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, ASEAN Secretariat, Australia,
New Zealand and Russia.
- EAS expects Russia and the United States to become regular members in 2011 (decided at the Summit
held in Hanoi on October 30, 2010).
- ARF includes Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

34

Appendix IV: The Multilayered Structure of Regional Institutions in the Post-Soviet Space

Note: Uzbekistan suspended its membership at the Eurasian Economic Community in November 2008.
Source: Author

35

Notes
The term “Central Asia” was introduced into the political discourse in 1993 at the Tashkent Summit offive states.
2 Only few academic works are dedicated to the issue of Central Asian regionalism. These are Marta
Brill Olcott, Anders Aslund and Sherman W. Garnett, Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and theCommonwealth of Independent States, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1999; Robert M. Cutler, “Integration within and without the CIS,” Association for the Study of Nationalities Monthly. Analysis of Current Events, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1997); Irina Kobrinskaya, “The CIS in Russian
Foreign Policy: Causes and Effects,” in Hanna Smith, ed., Russia and Its Foreign Policy Influences,
Interests and Issues, Helsinki: Alexantri Institute Helsinki, 2005; Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends:
Russia and the Former Soviet South, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997; and Mark
Webber and Richard Sakwa, “The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation andSurvival,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1999), pp. 379-415.
3 Henry Plater-Zyber (CSRC, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom), “How the So Called West Sees
So Called Central Asia,” in Alexandr Knyazev, ed., Cooperation and Integration Projects for Central
Asia: Comparative Analysis, Opportunities and Prospects, Conference Materials of June 26-28, 2007
Khudjand, Bishkek: Printhouse, 2007, pp. 69-73.
4 Paul Evans, “Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian
Institutional Identity,” in T.J. Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 195-215.
5 While acknowledging the differences between these concepts, this paper emphasizes the common rootof regional cooperation and integration as parts of regionalism where the most important points are thecooperation and integration spirit, trends, acts and vision, i.e., the cooperative and integrative nature of
regional processes irrespective of the extent of their development.
6 Chinara Esengul, Politics of Regionalism in Central Asia, Bishkek: Publishing House “Kyrgyz Diplomatic Service,” 2009, p. 21.
7 Evans, p. 196.
8 Takashi Terada, “Japan and the Evolution of Asian Regionalism: Responsible for Three Normative Transformations,” GIARI Working Paper, December 2007, p. 4.
9 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical
Eclecticism,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), p. 183.
10 Keiichi Tsunekawa, “Why So Many Maps There? Japan and Regional Cooperation,” in Pempel, ed., p.
103.
11 Koichi Sato, “The ASEAN Regime: Its Implications for East Asia Cooperation: A Japanese View,” inTamio Nakamura, ed., The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective, Institute ofSocial Science Research Series, No. 24, University of Tokyo, 2007, p. 21.
12 Yeo Lay Hwee, “The Everlasting Love for Comparison: Reflections on EU’s and ASEAN’s Integration,”
Working Papers of EU Entre in Singapore,
http://www.eucentre.sg/articles/37/downloads/WorkingPaper-EUAsiaIntegration-2009-08-01.pdf (accessed September 26, 2010).
13 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 1976, Article 2.
14 Sato, p. 21.
15 Timur Dadabaev, “Central Asian Regional Integration: Between Reality and Myth,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, May 2, 2007, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4604 (accessed July 10, 2010).
16 Starting 1994 Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were not members of Central Asian Union.
17 Stina Torjesen, Understanding Regional Cooperation in Central Asia, 1991–2004, University of Oxford Department of Politics and International Relations, July 2007; available at http://english.nupi.no/
Publications/Books-and-reports/2008/Understanding-regional-co-operation-in-Central-Asia-1991-2004(accessed May 25, 2010).
18 Officially declared on December 12, 1995.
19 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 40.
1

36

Heidemaria Gürer (Roving Ambassador, Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Forms of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_wg_ftc_20.pdf (accessed
July13, 2010).
21 Esengul, pp. 120-121.
22 Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Fingerprints in Kyrgyzstan’s Storm,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst,
April 14, 2010, http://www.cacianalyst.org (accessed July 14, 2010).
23 “Kyrgyzstan Seeks Russian Help to Quell Unrest,” New York Times online, June 13, 2010 http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/06/13/world/asia/13kyrgyz.html?_r=1 (accessed July 14, 2010).
24 “Ethnic Problems Blamed for Kyrgyzstan Violence,” Swiss News, World Wide, http://www.swissinfo.ch/
eng/politics/foreign_affairs/Ethnic_problems_blamed_for_Kyrgyzstan_violence.html?cid=9099226 (accessed July 16, 2010).
25 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 12.
26 Shujiro Urata, “Competitive Regionalism in East Asia: An Economic Analysis,” GIARI Working Paper,
December 2007.
27 Rosemary Foot, “Regionalism in Pacific Asia,” in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995, p. 233.
28 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Regionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 31, No.
2 (1996), pp. 123-159.
29 Author interview, Tokyo, May 19, 2010. See also Tsuneo Akaha, “Northeast Asian Regionalism: Lessons
from Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia,” Global Economic Review, Vol. 28, No. 2(1999), p. 35.
30 Terada, p. 4.
31 Ibid., pp. 9-14.
32 For more about the US role in managing the regional leadership issue in East Asia, see Tsunekawa, pp.
107-115.
33 Japan Times online, January 15, 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20110115a1.html (accessed January 16, 2011). The agreement began as a free-trade agreement among Brunei, Chile, New
Zealand, and Singapore, but the United States, Australia, and other countries expressed interest in joining
the framework. The pact requires the elimination of all tariffs, including on agricultural products. With
the United States expected to join the TPPA in November 2011, Japan was under tremendous pressure tojoin it as well, although agricultural producers and their political supporters were mounting fierce opposition. Japan Times online, January 16, 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110116x1. html
(accessed January 16, 2011).
34 See Hwee for more details.
35 Frederik Starr, “A Greater Central Asia: Partnership for Afghanistan and Its Neighbors,” Silk Road Paper, March, 2005, Silk Road Studies Program, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Washington, D.C., http://
www.stimson.org/newcentury/pdf/Strategy.pdf (accessed May 25, 2010).
36 Tsunekawa, p. 109.
37 “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” July 12, 2008, http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/
docs/2008/07/204750.shtml (accessed May 25, 2010).
38 Nursultan A. Nazarbaev, Eurasian Union: Ideas, Practice and Prospects, 1994-1997, Moscow: Foundation on Social and Political Studies Development, 1997, p. 31. (Translated from the Russian: Nazarbaev
N.A., Evraziyskiy Soyuz: idei, praktika, perspektivy, 1994—1997, M: Fond sodeystvia razvitiyu socialnyh i politicheskih nauk, 1997, s. 31.)39 Hwee, op. cit.
40 For more on theory and practice of nation-building in the former Soviet Union, see for instance, Christopher Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, eds., Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions
and Conflict, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001; Airat Aklaev, Democratization and Ethnic Peace:
Patterns of Ethno-political Crisis Management in Post-Soviet Settings, Farnham, England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 1999; Graham Smith, Vivien Law, Andres Wilson, Annette Bohr and Edward Alworth, Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998.
41 John Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999; cited in Munara
Omuralieva, “Kyrgyz Leadership and Ethnopolitics before and after the Tulip Revolution: The Changed
20

37Position of Ethnic Russians and Uzbeks,” Central European University, Department of Political Science,
Master thesis, 2008, p. 23.
42 Esengul, p. 48.
43 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 2001, pp.
57-58.
44 Amitav Acharya, “Southeast Asia’s Democratic Movement,” Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1999), pp.
418-432.
45 Johan Saravanamuttu, “Emergent Civil Society in ASEAN: Antinomies of Discourse and Practice,” inAmitav Acharya, B. Michael Frolic and Richard Stubbs, eds., Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society in South East Asia, Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 2001, p. 93.
46 Chapter 1 of the ADB study “Why Asian Regionalism?” p. 19, http://aric.adb.org/ emergingasianregionalism/pdfs/Final_ear_chapters/chapter%201.pdf (accessed October 1, 2010).
47 Foot, p.23
48 Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2002, pp. 9-10.
49 Ibid., p. 10.

38

Remembering or Overcoming the Past?: “History Politics,” Asian
Identity and Visions of an East Asian Community

Torsten Weber

Abstract
The East Asian region is at the center of debates on Asian integration. It is often viewed as
the core and engine for further political integration. It also serves as the main potential source ofan Asian identity. In fact, many political and research initiatives by governments (East Asia Vision
Group, East Asia Study Group), as well as non-governmental organizations (Korean East Asia
Foundation, Chinese-led Network of East Asian Think Tanks, Japanese Council on East Asian
Community, etc.), have focused on this region, with attention awarded mainly to Japan, China, andSouth Korea in Northeast Asia and, to a lesser degree, the Southeast Asian countries of ASEAN.
Yet, East Asia is also a region of fierce competition for regional leadership, particularly between
China and Japan, and continuing nationalist ambitions impede the formation of an integrated political body and a shared Asian identity. History, or more precisely, the political usage of history,
has been identified as a major limitation to these integrative and formative processes. “History
politics” appear to obstruct the creation of a transnational consciousness which is deemed necessary to strengthen Asia, both vis-à-vis other world regions, and against rivaling nationalisms
within Asia.
Against this background, this article examines the current state of “history politics” throughan analysis of the activities and publications of government representatives (“track 1 diplomacy”) and foreign policy related think tanks (“track 2 diplomacy”) from Japan, China, and South
Korea that exert a major influence on public debate and political decision-making domesticallyand across Asia. A particular focus is placed on how the past is employed as “political currency” (Heisler) in the triangular relationship between history, integration, and identity. The article
thereby addresses the wider, and potentially positive, implications of East Asia’ s contested past forthe debate on further political integration in Asia and the formation of an Asian identity.

1. Introduction
Any observer of East Asian politics and society will be aware of the role history plays in
any aspect of the contemporary bi- and multi-lateral relations as well as in the respective domestic political spheres in that region. Both in the context of actual history-related topics, suchas war guilt and compensation, textbook controversies, or territorial disputes, and with regard toless directly history-related issues, such as economic or strategic cooperation, history has become
an omnipresent parameter in contemporary discourse and practice that has prominently surfacedon numerous occasions in the past decade. In some aspects historical arguments have become socentral and forceful that the disputes between and among various state and civil society actors
in China, Japan, and South Korea–and sometimes other countries, such as Russia and the USA–1
have come to be called as “East Asian ‘history wars’. ” Particularly between China and Japan,
the intensifying political, economic, and strategic rivalry, together with the unresolved historicallegacy, continues to overshadow the relations between both countries and peoples.
This contemporary rivalry and historical legacy has been identified as a main obstacle in39

the various processes of regional integration. Fierce competition for regional leadership and continuing nationalist ambitions impede the formation of an integrated political body and a shared
2
Asian identity. The creation of a transnational consciousness, however, is deemed necessary to3strengthen Asia both vis-à-vis other world regions and against rivaling nationalisms within. Regional identity formation therefore constitutes a vital and essential part of the process of regional
integration while both are conditioned by the way the past is remembered or forgotten in these4
processes.

2. National Precedent, European Precedent: History, Integration and Identity
In his famous essay on the nation and national identity, Ernest Renan (1823-1892) identified two fundamental principles constituting the nation: (1) “the possession in common of a rich
5
legacy of remembrances,” and (2) “the actual consent, the desire to live together.” While thelatter represents the essence of Renan’ s well-known voluntaristic conception of the nation (“aneveryday plebiscite”), the former stresses the role of history in the processes of national integration and identity formation. In fact, Renan puts great emphasis on the role of the past, which heviews as a positive model for the present and future will of the community “to continue to value
the heritage which all hold in common.” He evokes the “common glories in the past,” “a heritageof glory,” and “heroic past” as the historical basis for the unity of one people, but also concedesthat “common suffering” is a greater force of integration and identity than shared happiness. Importantly, he refers to “common suffering” and “having suffered together” (my emphasis).
ththst
If we transfer Renan’ s analysis of the 19 century’ s nation to the 20 and 21 centuries’
6
region, we could probably agree with his present- and future-oriented voluntaristic conceptionof communal life. Without the will to implement regional integration (regional institutions, etc.)
on the level of political decision-making, and without the will to identify, to at least some degree,with this regional framework on the popular level—that is, in Renan’ s words, without the “desire”(from above) and the “approval” (from below)—neither integration nor identity formation may
work. The role of the past, however, appears to be strikingly different in the case of the region
when compared to the nation. Neither in the European nor in the Asian case can regional identity
convincingly resort to “common glories in the past” or to having “accomplished great things together.” On the contrary, if the nation’ s experience was “having suffered together,” the region’ s
experience may more appropriately be defined as having suffered at the hands of one another.
Regional identity formation, therefore, appears a much more complicated process than national
identity formation because the positive role of the past as one “essential condition for being anation” (Renan) cannot easily be invoked in the case of the region. The historical dimension in
the essential condition for being a region is not that of remembrances of the glorious past but theovercoming of past enmities and divisions.
In 1973, the then nine member states of the European Community formulated a Declaration
on European Identity which explicitly addressed this historical dimension of the European project of regional integration. In addition to listing “common values and principles” (representative
democracy, rule of law, social justice, human rights) as “fundamental elements of the European
identity,” it stated:
The Nine European States might have been pushed towards disunity by their history and by
selfishly defending misjudged interests. But they have overcome their past enmities and havedecided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization
7
which they have in common.

40

This declaration openly acknowledges that a European identity cannot resort to “common
glories of the past” but, on the contrary, gains its historical essence from having overcome previous divisions and past enmities. Still, in 2004, in the preamble of the EU Constitution, the appeal
to unity in the present and to a “common destiny” was complemented by an explicit reference toenmities of the past:
While remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe
are determined to transcend their ancient divisions, and, united in an ever closer fashion, to8
forge a common destiny.
As Fabrice Larat has demonstrated, these references are representative of numerous attempts“to root European integration in the fertile, yet contaminated soil of European history.”9 Indeed,history portrayed as an anti-regional force that had unnaturally pushed the Europeans apart (the“misjudged interests” appear to be a consequence rather than a reason) constitutes a vital part in
the attempt at creating and propagating a regional, European identity. It serves as an importantpillar in the justification of the present project of regional integration and as a source of regional
identity formation.
How can we make sense of the way history is used or abused in official political discourse
on regional integration? And how does the instrumentalization of history as a political tool work?
Within the framework of “the politics of history,” Martin O. Heisler has introduced the metaphorof “the political currency of the past” in order to analyze “the present uses of the past for politi10
cal ends,” as in the above-quoted official EU or EC declarations. By ‘the currency of the past,’
Heisler refers (1) to the omnipresence of the past, “its pervasiveness and intrusiveness,” in thesense that “it is current,” and (2) to history as a medium of exchange that, like real money, may
be converted into different forms of capital, mostly moral capital, but also with economic andfinancial benefits (reparation payments, development aid, creation of foundations, etc). In order to profit most from the political currency of the past, attempts must be made to “control its
framing, storytelling, and interpretations, and to shape public or collective memories for current
11
partisan, factional, national, or ideological advantage.” For the Sino-Japanese context, Yinan He
has demonstrated that “ruling elites” are particularly influential in “the intentional manipulation
12of history…, or national mythmaking, for instrumental purposes.” This “elite mythmaking,” sheargues, involves “distorting of historical facts” but also includes the intentional–and often only
temporary–neglecting of controversial historical issues. (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1
History as a Parameter in the Processes of (Regional) Integration and (Regional) Identity Formation(Regional) Integration(Regional) Identity
History

past, memory, historiography

The significance of this instrumentalization of the past in projects for regionalism has thus
far been studied best in the European context. While proponents of forging a European identity
have emphasized the role of the past in the promotion of permanent peace, stabilization, andreconciliation in a previously war-torn conglomerate of nations and peoples, critics have deconstructed official, top-down European discourse as “a political idea and mobilizing metaphor,”
13
or even “an ideology,” with “subtexts of racial and cultural chauvinism.” As with all collective
41

identities, regional identities combine eclectic and relational elements. But due to the great diversity of possible sources of identity in the case of the supranational region, the degree of eclecticism exceeds that of national identities to a considerable extent. As Aleida Assmann has pointed
out, the problem with eclectic identity formation in Europe is that “we emphasize humanistic
14
values but when thinking of Europe we must not forget Auschwitz and Bosnia.” No less problematic is the process of relational identity formation which usually relies on “xenostereotypes”
derived from “autostereotypes” (or vice versa) in order to “other” other parts and regions of the15
world. This “othering” rarely takes the form of an encounter of difference driven by neutrality
or curiosity; more often, at least implicitly, it appears as a process of self-ascribed superiority andrelegated inferiority.

3. The Politics of History in the Discourse on East Asian Integration
The above-outlined considerations regarding the role of history as a source and means of legitimization (and critique) of regional integration and identity can be well observed in contemporary discourse on Asian integration in general, and on the creation of an East Asian Community(EAC), in particular.
In the past decade, particularly after the first ASEAN+3 summit in 1997 and the subsequentestablishment of the East Asia Vision Group (1997) and East Asia Study Group (2001), discourse
on Asian integration has been thriving. While the Southeast Asian countries of ASEAN constitute an important part of many conceptions of Asian integration, they are clearly dwarfed by therole of “the Northeast Asian Three,” comprised of the People’ s Republic of China, South Korea,
and Japan. There is wide agreement among scholars and politicians alike that without the joint
support of the political and economic powerhouses of China and Japan, the process of political16
integration will be abortive. Yet, as briefly outlined above, the mutual relations between thethree countries–and between China and Japan in particular–are tense, and sparking nationalisms
17
continue to fuel the immense rivalry in this region. Most conflicts have historical roots (territorial disputes, naming) or concern the treatment of history in contemporary society (textbook
problems, apology policy). These debates have taken a central place in political discourse and diplomacy over the past decade and reached their peak in the violent anti-Japanese demonstrationsin China in spring 2005, triggered by Chinese protests against Japanese history textbooks, andfurther fuelled by the visits of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirô and his cabinet members to thecontroversial Yasukuni Shrine.
Partly in reaction to the escalation of Sino-Japanese history disputes, various private andsemi-official initiatives were founded to deal with the so-called history problem. Scholars from
China, Korea, and Japan, many of them historians, worked on bilateral or trilateral history research groups, engaged in history dialogues with their Asian counterparts. They produced reports,
18
articles, and a popular tri-national history textbook. In this context, the past–problematized ashistory and memory–attained a larger presence in public consciousness than it had previously; itspresence has become more prominent in daily life.
Most, if not all, of these private projects and civil society initiatives bear a clear politicaldimension, too. They have a political agenda and their occupation with history can be character19
ized, as least partly, as “partisanship.” However, with regard to their status, their limited meansof implementation and influence, as well as the depth of analysis they reach, show that theyclearly differ from official and semi-official participants in this discourse. Therefore, it has beensuggested to subsume such activities more appropriately under the category of “memory culture”(Erinnerungskultur) which denotes the bottom-up cultivation, led by civil society actors, of histo20
ry and historical knowledge for the wider public. “History politics,” on the other hand, denotes42the top-down and politically intended homogenization of history and memory to forge a collective identity based on a homogeneous historical consciousness. The dividing lines between both
may sometimes be blurred and not even the best-intended projects of cultivation of “memory culture” can ever be objective. In general, however, most bottom-up initiatives lack the backgroundand means to disseminate their work to the degree of their top-down counterparts.
Following this distinction, roughly three levels of actors or “tracks” can be distinguishedin this discourse, namely (1) political decision-makers (government representatives and leading
officials) as so-called track 1 diplomacy; (2) private initiatives with none or no notable financial
or political links to government authorities (track 3); and (3) think tanks on the in-between level(track 2). Due to their personal and financial links, as well as their realm of influence, the latter isnormally more closely linked to official discourse than to private initiatives. The following casestudies will focus on contributions to this discourse by political decision-makers and think tanks,i.e., roughly, the scope of actors that Yinan He refers to as “ruling elites” (though I propose awider understanding of “ruling elites” in the sense that they also include “oppositional elites”), in
consideration of their impact on (oppositional) published opinion.

4. “History Politics” in Official Discourse on Asian Integration and Identity in China andJapan(1) Hatoyama’ s Advocacy of an East Asian Community
In Japan, public political discourse on Asian integration in its affirmative has taken on a new
dynamic after the end of Koizumi’ s premiership in 2006, and in particular, after the election of
the new DPJ-led coalition government in 2009. In fact, the creation of an East Asian Community(Higashi Ajia Kyôdôtai no kôchiku) was a central item on the political agenda of Prime Minister
21
Hatoyama Yukio and it was also an explicit part of the DPJ’ s election manifesto in 2009. After
his election, Hatoyama even proposed East Asian regional integration as one of the core themes
22of his “political philosophy.”
In his elaborations on a future EAC, Hatoyama indirectly likened himself to Count Richard
23
Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Pan-European movement in the 1920s. At the high timeof nationalism, Italian fascism, and Soviet communism, Coudenhove-Kalergi’ s proposal of European unity, of course, was rather illusionary. Despite the existence of some other inter-war proposals for European collaboration and integration, such as the Briand Plan of 1929/1930, notableregional integration in Europe only started in the 1950s, after the horrendous experience of theSecond World War. Hatoyama’ s references to Coudenhove-Kalergi are twofold. First, they link
his “political philosophy” to his grandfather, Hatoyama Ichirô, himself a Japanese prime ministerin the 1950s and translator of one of Coudenhove-Kalergi’ s books. Following Hatoyama (senior),
Hatoyama (junior) redefines one of Coudenhove-Kalergi’ s political key concepts, “fraternity”(yûai), as “the principle of independence and coexistence.” Second and interlinked, Hatoyama’ sreferences to Coudenhove-Kalergi allow him to discuss the project of regional integration, namely that of East Asia, in relation to that of Europe and as the realization of his conception of “fraternity.” As Hatoyama puts it,
another national goal that emerges from the concept of fraternity (yûai) is the creation ofan East Asian community (Higashi Ajia Kyôdôtai). […] Unquestionably, the Japan-US relationship is an important pillar of our diplomacy. However, at the same time, we must notforget our identity as a nation located in Asia. I believe that the East Asian region, whichis showing increasing vitality in its economic growth and even closer mutual ties, must berecognized as Japan's basic sphere of being (waga kuni ga ikite iku kihon tekina seikatsu
43kûkan).

24

Here, Hatoyama portrays East Asian regional integration as an instance of the realization of fraternity, the assumed underlying principle of European integration. In addition, he explicitly links
regional integration to the question of the formation of an Asian identity, by calling attention to
the further development of Japan’ s traditionally neglected consciousness of being a part of Asia.
Hatoyama’ s conception of an Asian identity will be addressed in more detail below.
The creation of an East Asian Community in 2010 may not be quite as utopian or illusionary as the pan-European project in the 1920s. After all, a number of steps into the direction ofregional integration in East Asia have already been taken, most notably, on the political level, theestablishment of ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit. Also, Hatoyama’ s call for “the creationof an East Asian Community” is not the first such proposal from a leading politician in East Asia.
Since the 1990s and increasingly after 2000, politicians as Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir(East Asian Economic Group, East Asian Economic Caucus), Korean President Kim Dae-jungand even Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, have made official affirmative statements. Recognizing, however, that (too) little has been achieved since then, Hatoyama referred to the combined
argument of history and the European model to appeal to the Japanese and other Asians to realize
the “utopian dream” of regional integration.
I would like to conclude by quoting the words of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the father ofthe EU, written 85 years ago, when he published Pan-Europa: ‘All great historical ideas
started as a utopian dream and ended with reality.’ And, ‘whether a particular idea remains
as a utopian dream or it can become reality depends on the number of people who believe in25
the ideal and their ability to act upon it.
In the conclusion offered by Hatoyama, he once again portrays the history of European integration as a model for Asian integration. Interestingly, he employs this spatial rather than temporal
analogy to push the general public and political decision-makers towards a pro-East Asian stance.
By doing so, he avoids having to address the negative legacies of concepts of Asian integration–negative legacies, at least for the Japanese audience, because they would either refer to the traditional Sinocentric tributary order in Asia or to Japan’ s own imperialist project of regional order inthe first half of the 20th century (“Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”). In addition to his neglect of historical conceptions of Asian regionalism and regional identity, Hatoyama also ignores
the historical development of the European integration process between Codenhouve-Kalergi’ s
pan-European movement of the 1920s and the start of the actual integration process in the 1950s.
The instigation of the latter was not aided by the former, but happened, rather, despite it; it wascompletely independent from Codenhouve-Kalergi’ s visions of European unity.26 In other words,
Hatoyama implies a possible historical analogy between the processes of European and Asian integration on grounds of historical actors and ideas that were largely irrelevant to the formation ofa united Europe.
Avoidance of the Asian historical context and elevating the European idea to the ranks of amodel for Asian integration, however, are two strategies that cannot be transferred to the framework of Asian identity formation. Not surprisingly, history and “the West” therefore take onquite a different role in Hatoyama’ s conception of an Asian identity. In one of his last speeches
as Prime Minister, Hatoyama addressed issues of East Asian characteristics and identity which
revealed a number of inconsistencies compared to his previous elaboration on political integra27
tion.
First, although he had portrayed the history of European integration positively, he now criticizes the “Western dualism” of perceiving the world in a self-other, dichotomous manner. Obvi44

ously, this statement is contradictory in itself, as Hatoyama himself, as an Asian who assumedly
does not share this “Western” trait, employs a dualistic distinction between people from the West
and Asians. As Assmann had noted, these relational factors, such as the Europe-Asia or WestEast distinction, inform attempts at regional identity formation to a large extent. More generally,such dualistic thinking is prone to oversimplifications on both the side of the “Self” (autostereotypes) and the “Other” (xenostereotypes), as in Hatoyama’ s statement on the assumed difference
between the culturally and religiously diverse East Asia, on the one side, and an assumedly homogenous Europe on the other side.
Second, Hatoyama’ s historical rationale for shaping a common East Asian identity is much
more Asia-centric than his previous appeals to the project of Asian integration. Similarly to thepassages from the EU Constitution and the EC Declaration of the European Identity, Hatoyama
concedes the negative dimension of Asian history:
I firmly believe that we must not repeat the unfortunate history of the past hundred years(hyaku nen no fukô na rekishi) in which the seas of East Asia were made into seas of con28
flict.
andI believe now is the time to overcome the past that turned our seas into seas of dispute andto set off on a voyage to weave a history of prosperity in which we coexist in a sea of fertile
29
abundance and a sea of fraternity.
Hatoyama, however, does not limit his excursus of the modern period of Asian history to “theunfortunate history” that must be “overcome.” Instead, as Renan had postulated for the nation,
Hatoyama manages to identify a historical period that may indeed serve as Asia’ s own “heroic
past.”
If we trace history back still further in units of several hundreds or thousands of years, we
see that these seas have also yielded prolific rewards, transmitting knowledge and skills andfostering the development of rich cultures in East Asia by facilitating human exchanges.
The sea did not create differences in language or antagonism among religions; instead it
blended such differences and served as the foundation for mutual development. Had this notbeen so, we would not have so many people living in this region with an awareness of themselves as Asians (Ajiajin toshite no jikaku) […] Whether viewed from the history of Japan at
the far eastern edge of Asia or from the other countries of East Asia, East Asia is a fusion of30
cultures (bunka teki yûgôtai).
By evoking an assumed golden age of peaceful coexistence and exchange in the distant past,
Hatoyama manages to put the modern period of nationalist antagonism, conflict, and war into
perspective. This implies that Asian history itself can serve as a model for the projects of further
regional integration and regional identity formation. However, the shortcomings of such explanations are blatant: neither did people living in Asia possess an awareness of being Asian before themodern period introduced and spread the concept of “Asia” in the region, nor was pre-modern
Asian history free of violent antagonisms and rivalries, major disputes and wars. Only the abovequoted simplifications allow for a portrayal of the past as a history of fortune rather than ofsuffering and misfortune. The past of the supranational region, more frequently employed as
negative political currency, in Hatoyama’ s conception, is designed to serve as a positive politicalcurrency which may be converted into public pro-Asian sentiments and agreement to the project45

of building an East Asian Community, the ultimate aim of Hatoyama’ s political vision.
(2) Chinese Affirmations of New East Asian Regionalism
Interestingly, a comparable review of history has recently been employed in a similar context in official Chinese political discourse. Previously dismissed as the re-enactment of Japaneseimperialist policy, Asian integration and discourse on regional identity has gained more importance in China during the past decade. With its increasing weight on the stage of world economy
and politics, China has not only become more pro-active in these projects but also explicitly selfassertive. A leading official voice in this debate is the diplomat Wang Yi, the current director of
the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC’ s State Council and a former vice foreign minister (200131
2004) and Chinese ambassador to Japan (2004-2007). On frequent occasions, Wang has affirmed his positive stance towards Asian integration and Asian identity and–importantly–has not
only done so towards foreign, in particular Japanese, audiences; he also acts as the Chinese mas32
termind of pro-Asianist thought at home.
While Wang has refrained from formulating a concrete aim in regards to the creation of
an EAC, his affirmation of the project of developing a “collective Asian consciousness” and offurther cooperation and interaction in Asia is beyond doubt. In Wang’ s conception of Asian integration, history takes an even more prominent position than in Hatoyama’ s, but their rationales
are quite similar. Like Hatoyama, Wang refers to an assumed golden age of Asia as the historicalfundament of recent trends of integration and collective identity formation.
For a long period, Asia stood at the forefront of history and made some distinguished contributions to the human race. Among the four great ancient civilizations of the world, three
are in Asia: China, India, and old Babylon. The three great religions of the world, Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam, all have their origins in Asia. Asia’ s classical Eastern philosophy continues to inspire human thought, and a number of outstanding inventions by Asians
have influenced the progress of global civilization. Also, for a long time Asia was leading
the world economy. […] At the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the West, Asia ac33
counted for two thirds of the world’ s GDP.
As Hatoyama, Wang employs the terms “Asia” and “Asians” without consideration of theiranachronistic nature. How could “Asia” have led human or world history if there were neither
Asian institutions nor any consciousness of being “Asian” or being part of a region that would,
only in the distant future, be called “Asia”? As Larat has criticized in the context of similar narratives of Europe’ s past, the existence and unity of the region here are presupposed as a “natural
34
entity.”Following this golden age, Wang attributes Asia’ s decline to its self-seclusion and the subsequent invasion by the Western powers as well as to internal dispute. With Japan’ s expansion intothAsia from the late 19 century onwards, the Asianist project began to lose credibility as it served
the “invasion and monopolization of Asia” at the hands of the Japanese. Assuming a “learningfrom past mistakes” manner, Wang scrutinizes the reasons for the failure of both pre- and postst
war Asianist projects to suggest how Asian integration should be pursued in the 21 century. As
prerequisites and methods, Wang proposes: an economically and politically strong China; a carefully considered master plan; gradual implementation without haste; stable environment and material base throughout Asia; proper coordination between the major players; a leading force. The
result of this development would be, according to Wang, open regionalism (kaifang de diquzhuyi)
based on cooperation (hezuo) and harmony (hexie).
Interestingly, Wang’ s “new Asianist” perspective on Asian integration is shared by many
historians in China who have labeled the renaissance of Asian regionalist plans “New Classical
46

35
36
Asianism” (Wang Ping) or “New East Asian Regionalism” (Zhang Yunling). In these narratives, the historical precedents of Japan-driven Asianism are partially revaluated and rehabilitated, but the re-invention of Asian history as an object of study in general and the positive
evaluation of Asian regional integration in particular is mainly centered on Chinese historical
37
conceptions of Asian unity, such as Li Dazhao’ s, Sun Yatsen’ s, Mao Zedong’ s or Zhou Enlai’ s.
Although recent Chinese scholarship and public discourse on Asian history has become morenuanced, a strict dividing line between China’ s assumed positive contributions and Japan’ s assumed negative contributions regarding Asia’ s modern history–together with the respective implications for the contemporary project of Asian integration and identity formation–still prevail.
This explicit national compartmentalization of an assumedly regional history constitutes a notable difference from the mainstream of discourse on European integration in Europe.
Similar to Hatoyama’ s analysis on an Asian identity, Chinese top-down discourse on regional integration also emphasizes (1) the significance of identity formation for the progress of economic and political integration and (2) relational arguments in the construction of such an identity. In this context, Wu Jianmin, President of China Foreign Affairs University and Vice Presidentof the Committee for Foreign Affairs under the National Committee of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference, has rejected the often assumed lack of a common basis for an
East Asian identity because of “too extreme differences regarding Asian cultures (Yazhou wenhua
38
chayi taida)” and different stages of economic development. According to Wu, the degree ofdifference regarding common values and identity does not differ from that within the European
Union. As a specific and unique Asian characteristic–that to some degree resembles Hatoyama“holism” (as opposed to “Western dualism”)–Wu proposes “communal comfort” (shushi du,literally “degree of feeling comfortable”). By this, Wu means that in situations that make otherpeople or countries feel uncomfortable, decisions will be postponed until everyone reaches thedegree of feeling comfortable with the result or new situation; in this way tough decisions thatsplit groups or lead to confrontations within one group would be avoided. “In my work of many
years at the United Nations, in Europe, and in America,” Wu explains, “I have learnt that in theWestern world (Xifang shijie) there is no such thing as ‘communal comfort.’” In a nutshell Wu
presents the common rationale of referencing the EU or “the West” in discourse on East Asian
integration and Asian identity formation. Regarding integration, East Asia may achieve what
the EU has achieved because the criteria for successful integration are not dissimilar; regarding
identity, however, both “entities” are mutually so heterogeneous that shared values can easily bederived for both the Self and the Other.

5. “History Politics” in Semi-official Discourse on Asian Integration and Identity in Korea
and Japan
The reluctance of some historians to engage in the field of contemporary history may in partbe due to the opinion that speeches and publications by politicians and officials still in office or
seeking offices are irrelevant. While contemporary historians certainly have to engage with thesematerials with all due care, one should not underestimate the richness and influence of many ofthese sources. This stature is partly due to the speakers’ close linkages with political think tanks
that work at the hinge of scholarship and journalism on the one side and government and administration on the other. Similar to industry lobbyists, think tanks aim at influencing politicaldecision-makers at all levels and, in the context of history issues, they often serve as a filter of39
scholarly output for informing and influencing politicians and bureaucrats.
With the increasing activities in matters of Asian integration since the beginning of the newmillennium, think tanks in different countries that explicitly deal with the project of East Asian47

integration have started to emerge. These include the Japanese Council on East Asian Community (2004), the Korean East Asia Foundation (2005) and the North East Asia History Foundation(2006).
(1) The Korean North East Asia History Foundation (NEAH)
As the name suggests, the Korean North East Asia History Foundation (NEAH) most explicitly deals with history problems in the region. The NEAH was founded in 2006 “with thegoal of establishing a basis for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia by confronting distortions
40of history that have caused considerable anguish in this region.” It was initially headed by Kim
Yong-deok and is now led by Chung Jae-jeong, both professors of Korean history. Apart from ageneral research department, it has established a separate research institute dedicated to researchon the island of Dokdo (called “Takeshima” in Japan), whose territorial possession is disputed
between Japan and Korea. Despite its naming as a research institute, its political character ismore than obvious as it predefines its aim as “enhancing Korea’ s territorial rights to Dokdo.” In
its own words, NEAH seeks to promote “the correct understanding of history” through research
projects and the publication of research results. Explicitly it also links the necessity of possessing
a “correct” and “shared understanding of history” to the political project of integration and identity formation.
As regionalism intensifies across the globe, the importance of exchange and cooperationis also growing for Northeast Asian nations. Nevertheless, unresolved historical and territorial issues are obstacles to the region’ s trust-building efforts. The Foundation strives todiagnose the precise causes of the region’ s historical and territorial disputes and prescribe
appropriate responses and strategies. We are steadfast in our efforts to expand historical dialogues to foster mutual understanding and growth in Northeast Asia. The Foundation willcontinue to spare no effort to protect historical and territorial sovereignty, advance a sharedunderstanding of history for mutual development, and build a Northeast Asian regional
41
community that pursues peace and prosperity.
Obviously, one of the foundation’ s aims is to provide rhetoric and political ammunition to representatives of Korean national interests in the various bilateral history disputes as well as in
the discourse on regional integration and identity formation. Interestingly, the topics chosen forresearch and debate by the foundation are those that have been at the center of the “East Asian‘History Wars’,” such as the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute, the status of Yasukuni Shrine,
the naming of the East Sea, and the postwar reparation system. They are rather unlikely to be resolved in the near future and because they are less concerned with history, these political disputes
can hardly serve as examples of creating “correct” and “shared” understandings of history. Also,in the larger picture of Asian history as portrayed, for example, by Wang Yi, these issues are relatively marginal. Consequently, the foundation’ s focus on history and the use of history appear arather strategic focus that–in view of Korea’ s historical victimization at the hands of both Japanand China–guarantees a constant surplus of morale capital through the political currency of his42
tory. The general stance of NEAH therefore is one that stresses “Korean pride,” a form of Korean nationalism that enables Korea to emerge and act from a position of national strength in theinternational arena and that, consequently, takes a negative view towards the creation of an EAC.
The “history research” undertaken by the foundation is more likely to provide Korean critics ofregional integration with political currency than it will recruit proponents of Asian integration
through the creation of a common historical consciousness. On the contrary, the NEAH facilitates
the increasing influence of negative “history politics” in the discourse on the EAC throughout theregion.
48

(2) The Korean East Asia Foundation (KEAF)
The Korean East Asia Foundation, founded in Seoul in 2005, takes a more de-nationalized
43
stance and sees itself as “a truly trans-regional organization.” Through its activities and publications, it functions more as a platform “playing a midwifery role of shaping collective wisdom,”in its own words, than an institutionalized think tank. Its role therefore is similar to that of the44
Australian East Asia Forum (AEAF), which also serves as a platform or forum for researchers,
politicians, and other think tanks to articulate and discuss opinions and policies pertaining to East
Asia as a region in general, and regional integration in particular. Nevertheless, the studies produced, published, and sponsored by the KEAF or through KEAF-affiliation are as much Koreacentered as the AEAF’ s focus lies on Australia’ s links and role in the process of East Asian integration and identity formation. In addition, through the KEAF-sponsored Council on East Asian
Affairs (CEAA), “devoted to common causes in East Asia,” the foundation transcends the merefunction of providing a forum for debate but possesses its own think tank as an instrument of
45
agenda-setting.
Nevertheless, the KEAF takes a much more constructive stance towards regional integrationand the formation of a regional identity than the NEAH. Among its aims it lists “contributing to
the formation of an East Asian community by enhancing mutual understanding and trust among
countries and peoples in the region” (KEAF), and contributing to a “common regional identity inEast Asia” (CEAA). One important tool for the promotion of these goals is the English-language
journal Global Asia published as a quarterly since 2006. It is no coincidence that its first issuechose “the future of East Asian regionalism” as its cover story, which, among others, featured
articles by the former Korean President Kim Dae-jung, the former Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad, and the former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. In his essay,
Kim himself unmasked the political usage of history in contemporary discourse and practice ofregional integration in East Asia. He criticized that “the complicated and often tense relationships
between Korea, China and Japan over historical issues have combined with domestic political in46
terests to stir up nationalism, undermining the atmosphere of cooperation in the region.”In the following issue, Global Asia even took up history and “history politics” as the topic
of its cover story (“Barbs of Nationalism: How Asia Can Reconcile its History”), and its editorin-chief, Chung-in Moon (together with Suh Seung-won) contributed an extensive article on the“Burdens of the Past: Overcoming History, the Politics of Identity and Nationalism in Asia.”47
Moon and Suh argue that “building a collective identity” constitutes an important element in“shaping and sustaining a regional order. ” As collective identity draws much on collective
memory, however, overcoming “the fractured pain of the past” must be seen as a prerequisite to48
regional integration. While Moon and Suh criticize the usage of history by some politicians–“to pursue parochial nationalism at the expense of regional cooperation”–as “a Faustian bargain
with the forces of the past,” they, too, readily employ mainly negative references to the modern
past to justify their pro-integrative stance. In their analysis, the historical existence of “Northeast
thAsia” as an entity of some sort is presumed since the 7 century. Although they admit that regional order underwent major transformations in the following 14 centuries–from China-centeredhegemony, Japanese imperial order, the Cold War bipolar system to the post-Cold War era–East
Asia’ s presumed natural entity is never questioned. Rather, they argue that the concrete realization of regional order was flawed in all of these four historical regimes because of their domination by “great power politics.” Therefore, while the meta-narrative of historical unity remains unchallenged, on the micro-level, history serves as a negative example; it is the burden that needs tobe shouldered and the past that needs to be overcome in order to achieve “transnational solidar49
ity” and “a new regional identity of co-existence, harmony, and cooperation.” The narrative ofregional integration, therefore, becomes as teleological as previous narratives of national integra49

tion, national identity formation, and the state building process. Moon and Suh finally prescribe,[D]espite bitter historical memories of domination and subjugation, Northeast Asia sharesa common cultural and historical heritage that should be emphasized more than contentious
50
past insults.
As opposed to the NEAH, the KEAF appears to be less interested in explicit debates about thesufferings of the past and the creation and preservation of a collective memory based on conflictand negative perceptions of other Asians. The KEAF’ s political currency of the past is not therivalry of the more recent past but the assumed commonality of Asians in the pre-modern era.
(3) The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)
The most prominent Japanese think tank on Asian integration, the Council on East Asian
Community (CEAC), takes a rather unique position in this discourse. While the CEAC acknowledges the importance of regional integration, particularly in the economic sphere, it explicitly
rejects the aim of promoting an East Asian Community. Its self-declared aim is “not to promote,but to study the concept of an East Asian Community” and “to pursue what the strategic response
51
of Japan should be.” The Council was inaugurated in 2004 as “an all-Japan intellectual platform
covering business, government, and academic leaders,” and is as Japan-centered as the NEAH is
Korea-centered. It is led by its president Itô Kenichi, a professor of International Politics and former director at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The CEAC’ s focus on Japan also determines its temporal and spatial historical consciousness vis-à-vis the issues of regional integration and identity formation. Rather than Japan-in-Asia
and macro-historical approaches, the CEAC prefers to discuss Japan’ s role in “the international
community” in the post-WWII context. It sees the most appropriate historical model in Japan’ s
economic success in the 1960s and 1970s when “Japan began to assume its status as leader inthe global community.” As Japan’ s strategies in this context are summarized as having “generally achieved success,” with the attitude that “with few exceptions, the Japanese are liked and52
admired worldwide,” attempts at revising this order are viewed skeptically. This critical view,on the other hand, facilitates a discussion of the existence, definition, and demarcations of Asia
which most other contributors to this debate fail to address.
In fact, it is rather difficult to consider ‘East Asia’ as a regional concept. At any rate, it is afact that there is not even an agreement on ‘Asia’ as a geographical division. When it comesto considering a common ‘Asia’ within the framework that includes identity, such as ‘cultural
53
bloc,’ ‘religious bloc’ or ‘political bloc’ the concept becomes even more ambiguous.
Instead of presupposing a historical entity called Asia, the CEAC emphasizes the diversity ofgeographical conceptions within Asia and Asia’ s cultural and religious diversity. Consequently,
it dismisses attempts at defining an East Asian identity prematurely. If regionalism in East Asia
is to include the United States and/or Australia, neither Wang’ s Confucianism nor Hatoyama’ s
dichotomous approach (Western dualism, Asian holism) may work as a fundament for an Asian
identity. And if concepts of a unified “Asian” history or “Asian” culture are de-emphasized forthe sake of diversity, any attempts at defining an “Asian” identity that embraces, in the literalmeaning of the term, sameness, are deemed to fail. As the CEAC prefers to perceive Asia or East
Asia historically as not having constituted an entity, references to an assumed glorious past or
golden age are neither necessary nor possible. Instead, even the more distant past serves as proofof Asia’ s diversity, not unity. According to the CEAC, two fundamentally different cultures together with corresponding political and social orders co-existed in pre-modern Asia, namely East50

54

Asian ancestor worship societies and Southeast Asian transmigration societies. In the modern
period, the differing degrees of modernization and Westernization at different times throughout
Asia further aggravated the cultural, political, and economic gap between the countries in theregion before the Cold War further diversified East Asia by its strict ideological divide between
East and West, socialism and capitalism. In short, according to the CEAC, history may serve to
explain why the region is as diverse as it is, but it certainly will not serve well as an argument for
East Asia as a natural entity, or for the eventual aims of integration and unity of the East Asian
region.

6. Conclusion
Focusing on the recent political discourse on East Asian regional integration and the formation of a regional identity in East Asia, this article has examined how and why history is
employed in justification or rejection of certain conceptions of regional integration and identity
formation. Taking the examples of leading politicians and officials from Japan and China, andthink tanks from Korea and Japan, this paper has demonstrated the special relevance of historicalarguments in contemporary discourse on regional integration in East Asia, a region that is characterized by notable political, economic, cultural, and social differences and imbalances.
Following European scholarship on the role of history in the process of European integration, this paper has suggested we define the employment of historical references for political ends
and the construction of assumed historical analogies together as “history politics.” Within thisframework, it has adopted Heisler’ s metaphor of “the political currency of the past” to analyze
the context and intentions that inform the respective historical references.
As the main and recurrent referential points in history, this paper has identified: the negative
portrayal of the more recent past which must be sought to overcome; a golden age of Asian coprosperity in the pre-modern era; the positive model of European integration; and the presupposition of the existence of “Asia.” In general, the distant past or pre-modern history as pre-national
history portrays Asia, however defined, as a natural, given entity; modern history as national
history, by contrast, is viewed as a history of conflict, dispute, unnatural separations, divisions;future history is envisioned as regional history (or a return to the assumed natural unity). But history not only works as a means of justification and/or rejection of political integration and identity formation. It also serves as the rationale for prescriptions for the present according to which
the common glories of the Golden Age ought to be remembered while the enmities of the past
must be overcome or de-emphasized.
The past, as a consequence, is omnipresent in today’ s discourse, and it is often present as“political currency.” This depiction is quite similar to the way the nation was historically constructed, invented and imagined, and also to how the region is constructed, invented, imagined,
and frequently portrayed as the telos of historical development. In this process, Europe can bothserve as a model (namely for integration) and as the “Other” (namely with regard to identity formation). (See figure 2)

51

Figure 2: Towards a Systematization of “History Politics” in Track I and II Affirmative Discourse on
East Asian Integration and Asian Idetity Formation“distant past”

modern period

regional integraon: goal of historicaldevelopment; return to natural enty

Instrumentalizaonof the past“common glories ofthe past,” Golden Age

Disunity, enmity,
rivalry, distorons“polical currencyof the past”

Prescripon:
Prescripon:

Remembrance(Europe as “Other”)

Overcoming(Europe as “model”)

It is not the aim of this paper to simply uncover and deplore the often inaccurate usage ofhistory for political ends. Rather, it seeks to call attention to the fact that history is instrumentalized in contemporary discourse on East Asian regional integration and Asian identity formation.
In particular, it has sought to examine the ways history is employed in political discourse andfor which political ends. It has also revealed some similarities between the way history has beenused in the past as justification for nationalism and the contemporary usage for the promotion ofvarious conceptions of regionalist projects. I contend that an awareness of the political usage ofhistory for the goals of regional integration and identity formation is important in order to be able
to question the rationale of both affirmative and dismissive argumentation that informs this political discourse.
If nations have relied on “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm/Ranger) and “imagined communities” (Anderson) in their processes of regional integration and identity formation, it shall be no
surprise that on an even more abstract level, like that of supranational regions, encounters withhistory take place in the constant presence of imaginations and inventions. This caveat does notmean to imply that the project of regional integration should be abandoned. On the contrary, any
analysis of the usage of historical concepts of commonality for the political end of integration inpreviously war-torn regions must acknowledge the potentially positive effect of such discourse
and activities. But if we can indeed learn from history we may be well advised to consider learning some lessons for the future of regionalism from the history of nationalism. While idealism tosome extent may be necessary to achieve long-term political goals, a pragmatic attitude towards
such goals may help to prevent the abuse of political ideas for ideological purposes. As Ernest
Renan had prophesied more than one hundred years ago:
Nations are not something eternal. They have begun, they will end. They will be replaced, in
55
all probability, by a European confederation.
What Renan predicted for Europe may become real also for Asia, and what applies to the fate ofnations may also be true for the future of regions.

52

Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) at Waseda University for its financial support in my participation at the Summer Institute on Asian Regional Integration 2010. I also thank the participants of the Institute for the stimulating presentations anddiscussions and, in particular, Professor Dennis McNamara and Professor Jun-Hyeok Kwak fortheir constructive feedback on my presentation. Research for this article was supported in part bya research grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).

Notes
An Yonson, “Kyôyû sareta Kôkuri no Rekishi to Bunka Isan o Meguru Ronsô” (The dispute on the joint
history and cultural legacy of Koguryo), in Kondô Takahiro, ed., Higashi Ajia no Rekishi Seisaku. Nicchûkan Taiwa to Rekishi Ninshiki (History policy in East Asia. Conversations between Japan, China andKorea and historical consciousness), Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2008, pp. 44-67.
2 Zhang Yunling, “Emerging New East Asian Regionalism,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005),
pp. 55-63, and Takashi Terada, “Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan–China Power
Struggles,” Japanese Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006), pp. 5-17.
3 Amako Satoshi, “Higashi Ajia Kyôdôtai. Reisei ni, Honkakuteki na Kôsô o ” (East Asian community.
Let’s think of a real plan in a cool-headed way), Asahi Shimbun, January 19, 2009.
4 Yinan He, “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950–2006,” History & Memory, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2007), pp. 43-74.
5 For all quotes from Renan, see Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (What is a nation?) (1882), inJohn Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., Nationalism, Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994, pp. 17-18.
6 The term “region” in this paper denotes a geographical area on the supranational level. Following Hix,
the term “‘regional integration’ refers to the process whereby sovereign nation-states voluntarily establish common institutions for collective governance.” Simultaneously, “regional identity” refers to the(partial) self-identification with a region on the supranational, not sub-national level. See S.J. Hix, “Regional Integration,” in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, eds., International Encyclopedia of the Social& Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 2001, p. 12922.
7 European Commission, “Declaration on European Identity,” (Copenhagen, December 14, 1973), Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 12, p. 118, http://www.ena.lu/declaration_european_identity_
copenhagen_14_december_1973-2-6180 (accessed July 19, 2010).
8 “Provisional Consolidated Version of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (Brussels,
June 25, 2004), Conference of the representatives of the governments of the member states, p. 12.
9 Fabrice Larat, “Vergegenwärtigung von Geschichte und Interpretation der Vergangenheit: Zur Legitimation der europäischen Integration” (Presenting history and the interpretation of the past. On legitimatizing European integration) in Matthias Schöning and Stefan Seidendorf, eds., Reichweiten der Verständigung. Intellektuellendiskurse zwischen Nation und Europa (Scopes of accomodation. intellectual
debates between the nation and Europe), Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag, 2006, pp. 240-262.
10 Martin O. Heisler, “The Political Currency of the Past: History, Memory and Identity,” The ANNALS of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 2008), Vol. 617, No.1, pp.16 and 17.
11 Ibid., p. 17.
12 He, p. 44.
13 Bo Stråth, “A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept,” European Journal of Social
Theory, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2002), p. 388.
14 Aleida Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik (Thelong shadow of the past. Memory culture and history politics), München: C.H. Beck, 2006, p. 252.
15 Stråth, pp. 395-396.
16 See, for example, Zhang Yunling, “Emerging New East Asian Regionalism,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol.
12, No. 1 (2005), pp. 55-63, and Byung-Joon Ahn, “The Rise of China and the Future of East Asian In1

53tegration,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2004), pp. 18-35.
Takashi Terada, “Forming an East Asian Community: A Site for Japan–China Power Struggles,” Japanese Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006), pp. 5-17.
18 On some of these initiatives, see, for example, Nicola Spakowski, “Regionalismus und historische Identität - Transnationale Dialoge zur Geschichte Nord-/Ost-/Asiens seit den 1990er Jahren” (Regionalism
and historical identity. Transnational dialogues on the history of North-/East-/Asia since the 1990s), in
Marc Frey and Nicola Spakowski, eds., Comparativ, Vol. 18, No. 6 (2008), pp. 69-87.
19 Howard Zinn, The Politics of History, 2nd ed., Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990, p.
xvii.
20 Assmann, p. 274.
21 Minshuto, ed., Minshutô Seiken Seisaku Manifesuto (Policy manifesto for a DPJ government), Tokyo,
2009.
22 Hatoyama Yukio, “Watakushi no Seiji Tetsugaku” (My political philosophy), Voice, September 2009,
pp. 132-141, http:// www.hatoyama.gr.jp/masscomm/090810.html (accessed July 19, 2010).
23 On Coudenhove-Kalergi, see Vanessa Conze, “Leitbild Paneuropa?” in Jürgen Elvert and Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora, eds., Leitbild Europa?, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2009, pp. 119-125.
24 Hatoyama, p. 139.
25 Ibid., p. 141.
26 Vanessa Conze, “Leitbild Paneuropa?” in Jürgen Elvert and Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora, eds., Leitbild Europa?, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2009, p. 125.
27 Hatoyama Yukio, Speech on the Occasion of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Future ofAsia, (May 20, 2010), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/201005/20speech.html (accessed
July 19, 2010).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 On Wang and his conception of Asian integration, see Torsten Weber, “Wang Yi: ‘Neo-Asianism’ in
21st Century China,” in Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman, eds., Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History 1860-2010, Vol. 2, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011, pp. 359-370 (forthcoming).
32 See, for example, Wang Yi, “Ajia Chi iki Kyōryoku to Chū-Nichi Kankei” (Asian regional cooperationand Sino-Japanese relations), (January 12, 2005), http://www.china-embassy.or.jp/jpn/sgxx/t181154.htm(accessed July 19, 2010) and Wang Yi, “Ajia no Shōrai oyobi Nicchū Ryōkoku no Yakuwari,” (Asia’s
future and the role of Japan and China) (May 9, 2006), http://jp.chineseembassy.org/jpn/sgxx/t282546.
htm (accessed July 19, 2010). Note that the quotes below are taken from an essay by Wang publishedin Chinese and directed at the Chinese audience in the semi-official Chinese diplomatic journal Waijiao
Pinglun (foreign affairs).
33 Wang Yi, “Sikao Ershiyi shiji de Xin Yazhou zhuyi” (Considering neo-Asianism in the twenty-first century), Waijiao Pinglun (Foreign Affairs), No. 89 (June 2006), pp. 6-10. For an English translation, see
Weber (forthcoming).
34 Larat, p. 246.
35 Wang Ping, Jindai Riben de Yaxiya zhuyi (Modern Japanese Asianism), Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan,
2004.
36 Zhang Yunling, “Emerging New East Asian Regionalism,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005),
pp. 55-63.
37 See Wang Yi; Zhang Yunling; and Wang Ping.
38 Wu Jianmin, “Dongya texing zhengzai xingcheng” (The present formation of East Asia’s characteristics), Renmin Ribao (haiwai ban) (People’s Daily. Foreign Edition), November 15, 2005, http://news.
xinhuanet.com/world/2005-11/15/content_3781172.htm (accessed July 19, 2010).
39 For the functions and a typology of think tanks in general, see James McGann, Think Tanks and Policy
Advice in The US, Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2005, pp. 3-8.
40 A Window to the Future of Northeast Asia, Northeast Asia History Foundation, eds., Seoul, 2009. http://
english.historyfoundation.or.kr/?sub_num=9 (accessed July 19, 2010).
41 Chung Jae-jeong, “President’s Message,” http://english.historyfoundation.or.kr/?sub_num=119 (accessed July 19, 2010)
42 Kim Yong-deok, “History, Nationalism and Internationalism,” Global Asia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2007),
1754

p. 30.
“Mission,” http://www.keaf.org/l.php?c=e5 (accessed July 19, 2010).
44 East Asia Forum, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/about/ (accessed July 19, 2010).
45 “Mission,” http://www.keaf.org/l.php?c=e46 (accessed July 19, 2010).
46 Kim Dae-jung, “ Regionalism in the Age of Asia, ” Global Asia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2006), http://
globalasia.org/Back_Issues/Volume_1_Number_1_Fall_2006/Regionalism_in_the_Age_of_Asia.html(accessed July 19, 2010).
47 Chung-in Moon and Seung-won Suh, “Burdens of the Past: Overcoming History, the Politics of Identity
and Nationalism in Asia,” Global Asia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 32-48.
48 Ibid., p. 34.
49 Ibid., p. 48.
50 Ibid., p. 48.
51 “The Definition of an East Asian Community, ” http://www.ceac.jp/e/index.html (accessed July 19,2010).
52 “Policy Report ‘The State of the Concept of East Asian Community and Japan’s Strategic Response
Thereto’,” CEAC, ed., Tokyo, 2005, p. 3.
53 “Higashi Ajia towa: Rekishi no Naka kara Wakugumi Taidô” (What is East Asia? Indications of aframework from history), Tenbô: Higashi Ajia Kyôdôtai (Outlook: East Asian community), CEAC, ed.,No. 2, 2004. http://www.ceac.jp/j/survey/survey002.html (accessed July 19, 2010).
54 “Seisaku Hôkokusho ‘Higashi Ajia Kyôdôtai Kôsô no Genjô, Haikei to Nihon no Kokka Senryaku’,”(Policy report ‘The present condition and background of the plan for an East Asian community and Japan’s national strategy), CEAC, ed., Tokyo, 2005, pp. 12-13.
55 Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (What is a nation?) (1882), in John Hutchinson and Anthony
D. Smith, eds., Nationalism, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 17-18.
43

55

The History of the “History Problem”: Historical Recognition between
Japan and Neighboring Asian Countries

Kinuyo Kawaji

Abstract
Today’ s simultaneous trends of “globalization” and “regionalization” paradoxically intensify nationalistic conflict in Northeast Asia, especially over history issues. After the division of
the region into nation-states under the Cold War system, each nation developed its own versionof national history. In the context of globalization, information flows between these nations withever-greater speed, which gives rise to the possibility of both dialogue and controversy. The issueof history is a factor of instability in Northeast Asia, especially between Japan, Korea and China.
Mutual distrust is deeply rooted in memories of war and imperialism. This paper takes up the“history problem” in contemporary Northeast Asia. It does not try to set straight “what actually
happened” in the past, but considers why this history problem remains unresolved, and why it appears as a clash between nationalisms.
The memories of the past war constitute contemporary national identities, but the treatmentof these memories has a specific history. The article considers how in the immediate postwar
global order, defined by the Cold War, Japan substituted war reparations with alternative formsof economic assistance that avoided a resolution of the history issue with Korea and China, andhow that frozen set of relations in Asia thawed as the global order shifted again after 1989. Whileinter-government talks have sought to construct friendly relationships with future-oriented strategies, some conservative politicians – particularly in Japan – have tried to increase national integration by emphasizing patriotic school curricula. This tendency has resulted in history textbook
controversies within Japan and between Japan and its neighbors, which also give rise to the needfor transnational dialogue. The controversies, through reflecting on knowledge of the past – orpasts – , hint at the future actions that must be taken to commence historical reconciliation andcommunity building in Northeast Asia.

1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, relations between Northeast Asian countries have been deepening rapidly,
while nationalistic clashes between them have also intensified. In particular, the “history problem” related to the region’ s tumultuous twentieth century has become one of the most serious
obstacles to the building of intimate diplomatic ties between Japan, South Korea and China. Although some dismiss the past as meaningless or harmful for the future of an Asian community,
without addressing the causes of deeply rooted mutual distrust the formation of a regional community remains difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, how and what kind of past is recognizeddetermines what kind of future will be constructed. Northeast Asian countries have a history
characterized not only by conflicts, but also by interdependence. The history of the Second World
War in Asia is often projected onto the present and the problems of the present are often projected onto the past. Understanding the differences and controversies of historical recognition helps
us to understand the problems of contemporary politics and to envisage a better future that would56

overcome past conflicts.
The purpose of this article is not only to reveal the conflicting issues and differences in historical recognition, which might merely reproduce racial prejudice as well as mutual distrust, butalso to examine the background in which clashing nationalisms originated. This background includes the rise of the modern nation-state, the history of Japanese imperialism, the postwar Cold
War system and its collapse, as well as subsequent processes of regionalization under the influence of globalization. The memories of physical and mental pain must be remembered so they
will not be reproduced. Postwar compensation cannot heal this pain, but it could contribute to thebuilding of justice of rule in the public sphere, and to learning from past crimes. The answer tothe question of the history problem requires a stop to the chain of hatred that stems from historical conflicts, and depends upon constructive approaches to reconciliation. In addition, this article
suggests that the historical controversies can lead to a mutual understanding of differences andultimately a more open public arena in which more people may have the freedom to participate.
Therefore, this article provides an overview of the differences in historical recognition in theregion in order to more clearly consider the factors underlying the controversies and the issues
to address. It will discuss the differences among nations using the opinions of intellectuals andthe public found in recent survey data. First, it will put the contemporary history problem in thehistorical context of Northeast Asia and review the way in which the Japanese government dealt
with war reparation under the Cold War system. It will then show how this relates to the generalview of history in postwar Japan, and consider the influence of history education on public opinions in reference to the history textbook controversies between Japan and its neighbors. After
discussing the differences and controversies in historiography which led to clashing nationalisms
as well as attempts at dialogue among Northeast Asian countries, the study will explore the possibility of historical reconciliation and community building in Northeast Asia.
Modern Northeast Asia was shaped by the expansion of empire, colonization, aggressive
war, and the resistance against it. “Northeast Asia” in this study includes the People’ s Republicof China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Democratic
People’ s Republic of Korea (North Korea), and Japan. Because the information on Taiwan andNorth Korea is limited in Japan, and because China, South Korea, and Japan are most involvedin the problem arising from conflicting national histories, this analysis will focus on Japanese attitudes toward the history problem and on interactions between Japan and China, and Japan andSouth Korea, using joint opinion polls such as the Asia-Vision Survey on college students’ attitudes conducted by the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) of the Waseda
University Global COE Program in 2009, the joint opinion polls involving China, South Korea
and Japan conducted by Asahi Shimbun in 2005, and the Japan-China joint opinion polls conducted by the Genron NPO during the years 2005-2007.
The subject of the history problem is the nation. This study uses the definition of the nation as outlined by Ernest Renan, the famous nationalist and philosopher. In the late nineteenth
century, he described the nation as a modern project based on a select memory of the past. He
belonged to the first generation of the nation-state system, and explored the emergence of theearly nation-state in France. He answered the question “What is a Nation?” in his lecture at the
Sorbonne in 1882 as follows:A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that
one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent,1
the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life.
According to Renan, a nation is built of the solidarity between a group of people who con57

sent to forget past conflicts within the nation in-group and share a sense of mutual past suffering,a desire for present lives lived in common, and for a common future destiny. A nation is based ona “daily plebiscite.”
Northeast Asian people now share the past within the units of separate nations, which makes
the present history problem appear as a clash between nationalisms. The past that forms theircommon identity is constructed and reconstructed for a future, large-scale solidarity. If the past
could be shared among Northeast Asian people, on an even larger scale, it would then be possible
to envision constructing a greater regional community.

2. The “History Problem”
As transnational relations have developed with the expansion of the global market since thecollapse of the Cold War system, conflicts between nations have intensified. The influence of theprocesses of “globalization,” economic openness, and cultural exchange has gradually increased
among Northeast Asian countries, and the history problem has also became an important issue
and factor of instability in the region. Of course, history problems are universal issues, rooted instruggles for human rights against violence and discrimination, originating in state power especially during times of war. Today’ s accusations of the Japanese state, attributing to it various war
2crimes, such as the exploitation of “[war] comfort women” and forced labor during the Second
World War, are also based on universal ideas of “crime against peace” and “crime against humanity.” This humanitarian movement is a consequence of democratization in Northeast Asian countries.
At the same time, the reason why the contemporary history problem in Northeast Asia appears as a clash of nationalisms is that this region has long been divided. First, nations in theregion were separated into empires and colonies, and later into nation-states under the postwar
East-West division of the world. These divisions have inhibited reconciliation up to the presentday.
After the end of Japanese colonial rule and war of aggression, both Korea and China, as
countries emerging from a colonial past, adopted an orthodox ideology of national history basedon their peoples’ resistance to Japanese imperialism and the subsequent achievement of independence through these struggles. Japan had indoctrinated its imperial subjects in the period leading up to and during the war with imperial history centered on the ancient myth of the Emperor,
which justified Japanese imperial rule as the extension of the Emperor system. In the postwar
period, national history was reconstructed to be consistent with universal values of modernity,
democracy, and pacifism. This reshaping was an attempt to reject what was seen as the premod3
ern, underdeveloped social structure of Japan that had led to militarism. The typical case of thisnational postwar pacifism is the remembrance of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, in which Japanese citizens suffered as victims. The postwar goal of pacifism wasachieved by stressing defeat, and was politically secured by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperationand Security between the United States and Japan under the Cold War system. Under this treaty
the American military presence both protected Japan and controlled Japanese military activity,
functioning as a stabilizer in the region. Japanese people memorialized their sufferings, as wellas the wartime poverty and the pervasive culture of violence perpetrated in Japan, through individual Japanese citizens who were seen as “unpatriotic” (非国民), members of the military, local
communities, and schools. The postwar emphasis on their own experience inside Japan effaced
any consciousness of the aggression other Asian countries had experienced at the hand of Japan.
Hence many Japanese people cannot understand why neighboring countries still actively
blame Japan, even after agreements on war reparation were concluded and feelings of remorse58were expressed several times at the government level. Some people simplistically ascribe anti-Japan movements in Korea and China to excessive “national sentiments” (民族感情), which would
be ingrained by dictatorships through state-imposed curricula of self-centered national history.
4
For example, according to the Asia-Vision Survey, 20% of Japanese college students think“the biggest obstacles to the development of Asian countries’ relationships” is “differences ofhistorical recognition,” and 19% think it is “national sentiments,” rather than economic, social, or
cultural differences (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Views on Obstacles to the Development of Asian Countries’ Relationships

Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009.

To counter this trend in popular sentiment, Japan-China and Japan-South Korea joint history research groups have been trying to find the objective “facts” in order to make up for thediscrepancies in historical recognition and to promote reconciliation through “sober” intellectual
5
dialogue. For example, the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee was launched afteranti-Japan demonstrations occurred in China in 2005, and an agreement on joint history researchby both Japanese and Chinese intellectuals was reached at the subsequent Japan-China Summit
Meeting in 2006.
The chairman of the Japanese side of the Committee, Shin’ ichi Kitaoka, on the mission of59

the research, said, “The history problem must be separated from politics. If the history problem
arises, its discussion should be left to scholars while political economic partnerships shouldn’ t
6retrograde.” Kitaoka is also a policy member of the Japan-ROK (South Korea) Joint History Research Committee.
In spite of this goal of “mitigating conflicting sentiments over the history problem, and theattempts at increasing exchange and peaceful partnership between the two countries by revealing historical facts and interchanging opinions on the historical recognitions through researchers’
7
sober studies,” the 2010 report of the Japan-China Joint History Research resulted not in a jointstatement but in a disjointed report. Unable to agree on the number of victims in the Nanking
Massacre, for example, the report recorded both Chinese estimates (more than 300,000) andthose of the Japanese (20,000-200,000), even though the Japanese side acknowledged that Japanwas responsible for this atrocity. This lingering discrepancy in the area of quantitative knowledge
is a reminder that “facts” are not neutral.
Of course historical records have their limitations. At the end of the war, many official documents were burned. Oral history is also limited, since few people concerned are still alive today.
In the contemporary situation, the issue is no longer that the generation with wartime experiencewon’ t speak out, but that those with no personal experience are grappling with historical recognition. Apart from non-political, pure “objective” matters of historiography, another factor of cognitive differences relating to politics should be considered here. Immanuel Wallerstein explainspolitics of “pastness” as follows:
Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways they might
not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. Pastness is a central
element in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation. Pastness therefore is preeminently a moral phenomenon, therefore a political phenomenon, always a contemporary
phenomenon…Since the real world is constantly changing…Ergo, the content of pastness
8
necessarily constantly changes.
In postwar Northeast Asia, authoritarian governments, including the Japanese government
9
under the LDP’ s dominance, were also seen as a kind of authoritarianism–exploited memoriesof the dark past to legitimate their own rule. These governments, under the auspices of the Cold
War policies of the United States, promised their citizens modernization, focusing on economic
growth rather than on democratic participation. Real democratic participation was replaced byeconomic nationalism, which boasted economic growth and granted the people economic income
and social welfare in exchange for a voice in policy.

3. The Process of War Reparation
Japan’ s approach to war reparation from immediately postwar until recently was strongly
determined by the Cold War system under which the history problem was frozen. With the collapse of the bipolar system, this problem began to thaw, resulting in the current conflicts. Under
the Cold War, open dialogue between Japan and its neighboring countries was not permitted, but
post-1989, dialogue has been possible and has led to both conflict and the possibility of reconciliation. Understanding this postwar political situation helps us understand the persistence of thewartime history problem.
The outbreak of the Korean War just five years after the conclusion of WWII turned theCold War in East Asia into hot war. In the context of United States strategy at the time, Japanneeded to be the “bulwark against communism” in the region. Allied Forces occupying Japan60

in the immediate postwar years shifted from an emphasis on democratization to a policy of rearmament and economic independence. This “reverse course” resulted in a Japanese version of
McCarthyism–a “red purge” of Communist Party officials from public office–and the release ofpreviously purged war criminals, militarists, and ultra-nationalists. To facilitate the incorporationof Japan into the Western Bloc, the priority of Western countries–led by the U.S.–was Japan’ s
10
economic recovery, at the expense of working through war reparations.
The Japanese government led by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida dismissed demands fromthose on the Left to sign an overall peace treaty with all of the countries in Asia, including Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The terms of the treaty would have given
Japan sovereignty, “territorial integrity” and reduced its responsibility for making war reparations
to facilitate Japan’ s economic recovery. Instead Yoshida favored a treaty of mutual cooperation
between the U.S. and Japan, which guaranteed a significant American military presence in Japan,
and therefore in East Asia. This military presence, together with the subsequently establishedJapanese Self-Defense Forces, was ostensibly to safeguard Japan’ s “unarmed peace,” and placed
Japan firmly in the Western Bloc.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan were signed by 48
nations in 1951, and American Cold War strategy exempted Japan from most reparation responsibilities. Allied countries that had been attacked or occupied by Japan–Laos, Cambodia, Australia,
the Netherlands (the metropole of Indonesia), the U.K. (Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia),
and the U.S. (the mandatory of Micronesia)–renounced the right to claim war reparations. However, some Asian governments that had been colonial subjects and former colonies of Imperial
Japan–North Korea, South Korea and the Republic of China (the present Taiwan)–were excluded
from these discussions. The People’ s Republic of China, India, Burma (the present Myanmar),Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (the present Czech Republic andSlovakia) were also absent. After this, however, India, the Republic of China, and the People’ s
Republic of China renounced their claim for war reparations by signing bilateral treaties withJapan in 1952. The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of thePeople’ s Republic of China was also subsequently signed in 1972, invalidating the former SinoJapanese Peace Treaty. Instead of war reparations, Japan extended Chinese support for economic
development. The Official Development Assistance (ODA) was a form of reparations from Japan
to China, but Japan did not compensate for the suffering of war victims in China.
Japan compensated through bilateral agreements based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty inthe case of the Philippines, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Vietnam, Burma, and Indonesia. For countries that had renounced any claim for reparation–Laos,
Cambodia, Burma, Singapore, Malaysia and Micronesia–Japan also concluded a bilateral treatyof economic cooperation. The grants and soft loans Japan provided to honor these treaties went
under the name of economic assistance rather than war reparation. With regards to Thailand,
Mongolia and European countries, Japan concluded agreements addressing rights to claim war
reparation and provided economic assistance as postwar compensation.
All of these promises to Japan’ s neighbors were made in the Cold War atmosphere thatdescended upon East Asia at the conclusion of WWII. In this global situation, the Allied Powers were particularly concerned with reinvigorating Japan’ s economic standing to create a solid
capitalist ally in East Asia. Most of the reparations, then, became conditional loans, which functioned to assist Japan’ s economic advancement. The expansion of Japan’ s economy into Southeast Asia evoked the spread of prewar and wartime Japanese imperialism. Furthermore, these
postwar strategies were largely planned and implemented by the very same economic bureaucrats
and company managers who had served Imperial Japan, and many feared it was a revival of the“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”11 Progressive intellectuals in Japan often criticized,
and some of them continue to criticize, this character of Japan’ s compensation.
61

In the case of South Korea, which had a particularly fraught postcolonial relationship withJapan, Japan concluded a treaty in 1965 to provide grants and soft loans as compensation for its
35-year imperial rule of the Korean Peninsula. This “compensation,” however, addressed postwar economic development in South Korea, but not the misery of those who were victims of
war under Japanese colonial rule. Both Japanese and South Korean governments put economic
development before the resolution of their shared history problem. Because of this neglect, historical controversies between the two nations, such as that over the legality of the Japan-Korea
Annexation Treaty of 1910, continue. Also, although there was an official recognition by the Jap12
anese government of legal responsibility for war reparation based on the 1965 treaty, the issueof compensation for individual victims such as forced laborers and “comfort women” remains
unresolved. Because the victims were forced into silence by the developmental dictatorship in
postwar South Korea, only more recently–since the process of democratization began in the late1980s–have they begun to dare accusing the Japanese state of war crimes. Only in the 1990s, af13
ter the demise of the “1955 system” and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’ s long-time rule inJapan did the Japanese government begin to respond to these concerns.
In the course of the geopolitical transformation from the Cold War division of Eastern andWestern Bloc to a cross-border market system with gradual liberalization and multi-polarization,international relations in Northeast Asia have become very close. In response to this trend, attempts have appeared to move history education beyond national history and to embrace a transnational perspective. In Japan, and to some extent in China, these efforts have influenced thewriting of history textbooks.
Diplomatic talks between nations in Northeast Asia tend to avoid history issues and attempt14
instead to strengthen partnerships with future-oriented strategies. To this end, Northeast Asian
governments try to promote economic and cultural relations. Included in these efforts is the promotion of apolitical joint history research among two or three nations. Many intellectuals respond15
to this trend, and strive toward sharing universal ideas in the global system. For example, theproject “Japan-China Intellectual Community” was launched to promote cross-border intellectual
16exchanges during 1997-2003. Chinese historian Liu Jie points out that from the 1990s “multipolarization of history studies” has developed in China, making free research possible and contributing to diversification of the views of history, not necessarily subject to state power. According
to Liu Jie the project reflected these trends and was set up as a non-official attempt to construct a
common space where “public intellectuals” in East Asia could exchange their opinions freely and17
think beyond national borders.
In general, however, the more globalized knowledge and power are, the wider the gaps
between the intellectual elite and the common people. School education plays a central role inshaping people’ s worldviews, and the history of prewar Asia also demonstrates that the budding
cosmopolitanism of the elite stood in stark contrast to the nationalism of the masses. When thesocial tensions caused by this gap increase, it can intensify anti-foreign nationalism and chauvinism in society at large. This case shows that nationalistic resentment can be an unintended resultof patriotic national education.
In recent years, Japanese educational trends exhibit this push toward patriotism. For example, the 1999 Law Regarding the National Flag and Anthem can be seen as an index of neoconservative nationalism, since it revives the prewar practice of displaying the national flag andplaying the national anthem, even though students are not forced to salute the flag or sing theanthem. Japan’ s national flag and anthem were symbols of the rule of the Empire of Japan. Thesesymbols revive the memories of Japan’ s war of aggression and its colonial rule, and make neighboring Asian people nervous that Japan may return to prewar militarism, or that there may be arevival of the sense of racial superiority that was prevalent during that period. Even at sporting
events, such as the 2004 AFC Asian Cup held in China, the sight of Japanese supporters singing
62

the national anthem and flying the national flag has the potential to evoke sensitivity and hostility in many neighboring Asians. Also, the influence of mass media on popular sentiment cannot
be ignored. The deeply rooted memories of the past war are susceptible to breaking out when18
prompted by sensational mass media coverage.
The recent rise of neo-nationalism as a reaction against globalization and social unrest indicates domestic society and national integration in crisis in Japan, South Korea, and China. In
Japan, the Fundamental Law of Education was amended in 2006 for the first time since its establishment in 1947. It adds as the objective of education "to nurture an attitude...to love our coun19
try and our home," which is known as the “Patriotism Clause.” Seemingly anachronistic, thismove is a reaction within Japan to the globalization of history studies, and a response to Korean
and Chinese voices criticizing Japanese wartime policy. Education in all three nations becomes abattlefield, in which nothing less than national identity is at stake. According to the results of the
Asia-Vision Survey, more than half of Japanese college students get their knowledge about other
Asian countries from their school education (see Figure 2). Therefore, the next section takes into
account how school education influences people’ s understanding of history in Japan, as well as
in South Korea and China.
Figure 2: Main Sources of Knowledge about Other Asian Countries

Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009.

63

4. History Education and Politics
Louis Althusser, examining ideology, determined the school as one of the fundamental ideo20
logical state apparatuses to reproduce a capitalist social system. Ernest Gellner analyzes the nation-state as a prerequisite for the establishment of the capitalist system, which demands homo21
geneous labor power cultivated by the state’ s general education. School education, especiallythe knowledge of history, is the basic common knowledge meant to produce and reproduce a nation. National integration is also a precondition for the free functioning of global markets. Thesesimultaneous trends toward national integration and international interactions raise the possibilityof nationalistic clashes. The conflicts between national histories among Northeast Asian countries
show this dynamic. In this region, national memories about the war linger, and are influenced byviews that emphasize self-victimization.
In Northeast Asia, Japanese history textbooks have caught the public’ s attention. School education is often used as a political tool, wielded to construct and reconstruct national identity. As
such, the Japanese history textbook controversy is suitable to serve as a case to understand thesecontemporary identity politics.
The Japanese constitution guarantees academic freedom. Every scholar enjoys the right toresearch independent of state power, and universities ostensibly remain autonomous. Schoolteachers can also teach students with their own supplemental teaching materials under the prin22
ciple of the local self-government. The primary textbook, however, must be authorized by the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. This so-called textbook authorization system is virtually state censorship.
The contents of these official history textbooks, authorized by a government ministry, areassumed to correspond to official statements made in the international context. One expects them
to be created with respect paid especially to Japan’ s neighboring countries, and their relationshipto Japanese imperial history. When the Ministry of Education demanded a rewrite of the term
used for the Japanese Army’ s incursion in Northern China from “invaded” (侵略) to “advanced
into” (進行), Japanese history textbooks became a diplomatic issue. After receiving the Chinese
government’ s protest against this edit, the Ministry of Education adopted a new authorization
criterion, the so-called “Neighboring Country Clause.” It declared, “Textbooks ought to show understanding and seek international harmony in their treatment of modern and contemporary historical events involving neighboring Asian countries.” By virtue of this clause and to respond to
the anti-Japan demonstrations in South Korea in 1992 sparked by the testimony of former Korean“comfort women,” a description of “(war) comfort women” appeared in most history textbooks.
The “comfort women” issue manifested itself as Korean nationalism, but it also raised transnational concerns voiced by the United Nations Commissions of Human Rights (UNCHR) andvarious civic groups. The Japanese government was forced to apologize and disclose the resultsof their investigations into the alleged, coercive mobilization of Asian women as “comfort women,” or prostitutes for Japanese soldiers during the war years. Finally Chief Cabinet Secretary
Yohei Kono acknowledged the facts about the coercion and wretched living conditions of “comfort
23
women,” and the army’ s involvement in this system. He issued an apology in 1993.
On the fiftieth anniversary of the war’ s end, Prime Minister Tomi’ ichi Murayama issued astatement in which he expressed “feelings of deep remorse” and “a heartfelt apology” for Japa24
nese “colonial rule and aggression.” This declaration set a precedent, which has been followedby successive cabinets whenever the history problem comes up and Japan’ s relations with neighboring South Korea and China deteriorate.
In a sense, the statement is a product of democratization. With the collapse of the longtime
LDP-controlled regime, Murayama–the head of the Japan Socialist Party–formed a coalition
cabinet in 1994. The Japan Socialist Party, which subsequently changed its name to the Social
64

Democratic Party, had adopted policies designed for the protection of the postwar constitution,pacifism, and opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Therefore, the political rise of theJapan Socialist Party meant an increased diplomatic effort to enhance peaceful relations with
Northeast Asian countries, especially with China. Although the Japanese political left is assumed
to be “progressive,” it also retains a “conservative” element: its policy of protecting the Constitution, which remains the ideal manifestation of “emancipation” from a dark past of the oppression
25
of individual freedom. The postwar constitution of Japan signifies the negation of the past of
militarism, imperialism, and “fascism”–even if the terms used to describe Japan’ s war crimes re26
fer to militarism rather than a political system of fascism –and expresses the will of the Japanesepeople to construct a free and peaceful society in the future by overcoming the past.
History is reflexive knowledge that enables us to imagine the future as a process of “progress”
27
or “recession.” What kind of past we try to address decides what kind of future we can build.
The approaches to issues of war responsibility among Northeast Asian countries are not only
“diplomatic cards” used to extend friendship or apply pressure but also to signal the direction inwhich the countries may progress cooperatively. Having suffered from Japan’ s imperialism, other Northeast Asian countries retain a deep mistrust of Japan. Therefore they continue to demandsincere remorse and apology, especially in light of the various reactionary movements that also
continue to rise in Japan.
According to the opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in response to anti-Japaneseprotests in China in 2005, nearly half of Chinese (48%) and South Koreans (43%) thought thatJapan’ s apology was the most effective means to resolve the history problem. Japanese people,
however, thought it would be exchange–cultural, economic, and political–(29%) rather than apology (13%) (see Figure 3). Japanese people might wish to forget the loathsome wartime past. This
seems to be a factor of difference and an obstacle to coming to a mutual recognition of history.
Postwar generations seem to have little consciousness about history, and therefore little sense of
responsibility for the past and for how it might influence the future. This is quasi-realism: theysee only the very transient present, but cannot actually contemplate the future and its relation to
the past.

65

Figure 3: Views on the Most Effective Way to Resolve the History Problem

Source: Asahi Shimbun, April 27, 2005.

Contrary to the general image this constructs, however, Japanese youth are not necessarily
indifferent when it comes to the history problem. According to the results of the Asia-Vision Survey in 2009, about 80% of Japanese college students do care about this issue (see Figure 4).
According to the results of a three-year survey (2005-2007) conducted by the Genron NPO
in China and Japan on the question of whether the history problem could be resolved by deepening relations between the two nations, we see that Japanese were more pessimistic than Chinese(only about 26% of Japanese respondents in 2005, 27% in 2006 and 30% in 2007 thought that
resolution was possible). In contrast, Chinese people seemed significantly more optimistic for
the future (about 51%, 50% and 52% respectively). In Japan, a significant group of respondents
indicated that even if relations deepened, the history problem would not be resolved (about 30%,
36% and 33% of Japanese, compared with about 11%, 14% and 23% of Chinese in the three
years respectively), but that at least, the bilateral relations could not deepen without the resolution of the history problem (about 23%, 22%, 22% of Japanese, compared with about 26%, 32%,
20% of Chinese) (see Figure 5). Even after the anti-Japanese protests intensified in China in
2005, these tendencies changed very little.

66

Figure 4: The Importance of the History Problem

Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009.

These opinions influence the Japanese government’ s attempts at resolving the history problem and develop friendly relations with the neighboring countries. Several differences remain,
however, between the various levels of government and public opinion. Intellectuals both within
and without Japan also have their own assessments.

67

Figure 5. Views on Japan-China Relations and the History Problem

Source: Created by author from data in Genron NPO, The 3rd Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll in 2007.

68

5. Historiography and Controversies over the Recognition of History
The Murayama government, in addition to a general apology, specifically addressed the issue of “comfort women” and supported the foundation of the Asian Women’ s Fund. This fundcollected private funds from Japanese people and donated it as “money of compensation” (償い金) to former “comfort women” in Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, etc. from 1995-2007.
Some women’ s human rights groups, the Korean government and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights criticized the fund for its “private nature.” They alleged that the “comfort women” system was a war crime and a “crime against humanity” and the Japanese government should accept its legal responsibility and apologize for it by providing state compensation
28
for the victims and also by promoting education about the issue in Japan. This criticism was reflected in the refusal by some former “comfort women” to accept the “money of compensation.”On the side of Japan, there were some reasons why the Japanese government avoided taking legal responsibility for the issue. If the Japanese government had accepted legal responsibility, thegovernment would have had to extend the same treatment to other individuals who might haveclaims against the government, such as Japanese orphans who were left behind in China when
Japan withdrew from China in the waning days of the war, and Japanese prisoners of war in theSoviet Union, who were forced to do hard labor in Siberia, many of them even long after Japan’ ssurrender and many also dying while in incarceration. Therefore, before examining whether theJapanese army and government had coerced women to work in “comfort stations,” and before acknowledging this activity as a crime, the Japanese government tried to resolve the issue throughprivate “money of compensation.” Paradoxically, this action prompted attacks by both rightwing
nationalists in Japan who denied Japan’ s war responsibility and by leftwing liberals who criti29
cized the “private” nature of the fund.
With the rise of reactionary movements led by nationalist politicians of the right-wing LDP
after Murayama’ s statement in 1995, policy on this issue began to shift. In connection with agroup dedicated to reforming Japanese textbooks, they attacked the “masochistic view of history” that saw Japan as an evil aggressive state, and criticized what they saw as “servile” apology
diplomacy in the postwar era. According to their argument, the historical records were seen as
30
inadequate to prove that the Japanese army forced women in colonies to work as sex slaves. As
a result, the description of this issue disappeared from Japanese history textbooks in 2000.
This dramatic elimination of the “comfort women” issue from textbooks due to a lack ofwritten historical records exemplifies how positivist claims about the lack of “evidence” havebeen used by revisionist historians to assert that the admission of Japanese responsibility in the
comfort women issue is not based on “historical facts.” Reactionary politicians who wish todeny or reject any claims of Japanese responsibility have fully exploited the positivism among
these historians.
The group responsible for this move, The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform,
was formed in 1996 by scholars gathering around the title “The Association for Advancement of
an Unbiased View of History.” Its textbook, the New History Textbook, was approved by the Ministry of Education in 2001, and was used by only 0.039% of schools in 2001, but the adoption
rate rose to 1.7% in 2009. While these percentages remain small, the textbook authors’ view ofhistory has been authorized and officially approved. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this textbook caused
controversies in Japan, China and South Korea. The New History Textbook introduces many
myths that were used to instill patriotism into the subjects of the Japanese Empire and it makes
the history of the war short and ambiguous to diminish Japan’ s war responsibility and emphasize
the nation’ s prewar history. Hence, the textbook authors’ view of history is criticized as “historical31
revisionism,” and also as representing the revival of the prewar view of the Emperor’ s state history or “neo-nationalism.”69

However, the authors of this textbook are not necessarily anti-Asia, as they do raise the32
emancipatory aspects of Japan’ s role in the “Greater East Asia War” in which Japan assisted
Asian colonies in achieving independence from the West. However, their affirmation of the war
has caused protest in China and Korea, since it ignores the suffering these nations endured ascolonies to the Japanese Empire. Straying further from an explicitly anti-Asia stance, the history
textbook continues to express anti-U.S. sentiments. The proponents argue today ’ s Japan faces
a crisis of the loss of an “independent mind.” This sentiment adopts the tone of Yukichi Fukuzawa, an influential exponent of Japan’ s modernization in the earlier Meiji period. Arguing that
the Japanese lost their self-confidence as a result of the U.S. postwar occupation policies andJapan’ s meek submission to them, they are anxious about Japan’ s future in the competitive globalized world where protection by the U.S. is not as pronounced as during the Cold War. Their
view of history is not simply a restoration to the prewar mythical past. They attempt to address
the problems of the present world with solutions that differ from postwar democracy and pacifism. Indeed, according to them, under the Cold War structure, postwar democracy and pacifism–
ostensibly universal ideals–took the form of isolated particularisms. For example, the ideal of“peace” often took the form of demanding Japan’ s disengagement from global conflicts, rather
33
than insisting on global peace. Furthermore, the modernization theory that undergirded American policy in the immediate postwar years supposed that any particular “backward” country
could progress to a universal modernity, which was posited as an abstract Western model; further,34
it assumed that particularities of national character could serve or hinder modernization.
This development model of nation-states has undergone a thorough critique in recent years
on the basis of growing cross-border movements and transnational relations. On the one hand,when the nation-state system began to be shaken by the liberalization trends around the world in
the 1990s, history studies began to take on the task of deconstructing nationalism by illuminating
its imaginary nature and the oppressiveness of the nation-state. On the other hand, globalization
began to threaten people’ s sense of stability, shake their pride in their nation’ s economic growthand prosperity, and unsettle their identity based on economic development. This instability has
given rise to xenophobia and exclusivist nationalist movements. One consequence of these trends
has been the emergence of so-called “neo-nationalism” that contains both the “cosmopolitan”
tendencies of globalization and strong attitudes toward the anti-Japanese nationalism in theneighboring countries, which ironically has been the result of the growing cross-border exchanges of opinions. As an exponent of “neo-nationalism,” the Japanese Society for History Textbook
Reform takes on the recent critique of the nation-state and reaffirms the nation-state while attempting to reconstruct Japanese nationalism. The attempt to intensify national integration is areaction to the negative aspects of globalization. Moreover, the authors of the New History Textbook and other nationalists profess that their aim is to reverse the “postwar historiography” andthe “postwar regime.”
Indeed, in this author’ s view, postwar historiography in Japan was too inclined to positivism, and a fixation on the “object” of study. As a result, the contents of history education becamea dry, meaningless enumeration of the facts and rote learning to prepare students for gruelingexaminations. Students of this system cannot understand the real meaning of history and how it
relates to them. To cope with this shortcoming in education, conservatives in particular invoke
ethics and patriotism. Moreover, positivism cannot avoid the process by which neutral, objective
studies are used to certify dominant power and thought. Postwar historiography has reconstructednational history on the basis of democracy and pacifism authorized by the Constitution and thepresupposed nation-state system. Today, as constructivism attempts to replace positivism, theemphasis is on narrating memories from various points of view. It is inevitable that all historians
have their own sets of values, which inform their perspectives and approaches to historical facts.
History is a kind of personal story. This does not mean that everyone is free to discriminate or70harbor prejudices. Despite their ideas of “unbiased view of history” and “freedom,” the JapaneseSociety for History Textbook Reform cannot open up new horizons, as long as it remains fixatedon what it sees as a lack of Japanese self-esteem and self-awareness. Their own failure or refusal
to recognize and come to terms with Japan’ s imperial past marks them as particularly lacking inhistorical self-awareness.
In the contemporary milieu in Japan, historical positivism plays a reactionary role, and constructivist versions of history can exploit this. For example, the New History Textbook reduced
the Nanking Massacre to a quantitative issue, arguing that historical records were limited. Yuzo
Mizoguchi points out accurately that this emphasis on the uncertainty of numbers transforms theexistence of the fact itself into an uncertainty; it tries to make the historical fact appear as an “il35lusion.” This quasi-positivism based on selective “facts” has many biases in affirming prewar
36
Japan.
Some people have the idea that revealing the historical “truth” will lead to the resolution of
the history problem, and this is often the hope of joint history research. However, revealing the“truth” also opens old wounds and intensifies conflicts over what constitutes “truth,” as demonstrated by the history textbook controversies. In other words, dialogue about history has thepotential to lead into a vicious cycle, or, the opposite, to reconciliation. For example, common
educational materials on history for Japan, South Korea, and China, named History to Open the
Future, published in 2005, attempted a transnational response to the history textbook controversies and tried to create a shared historical recognition among the three nations. It is said that this
dialogue was not necessarily attempting to compose a complete shared history at this point, butrather, it aspired to the more modest and attainable goal of discussing the differences of recogni37
tion among the three countries. Following this strategy, Hiroshi Mitani suggests that historians
should begin by sharing issues, rather than sharing conclusions. A step in the right direction is38
simply noticing where memories diverge, and the origins of this divergence. If joint studies go
well, reconciliation could–little by little–become a possibility. Whether we can share a vision of
the history and reconcile depends on the people’ s will to pursue a common future.

6. Instead of a Conclusion
In this article, I have shown that the history problem is a present political issue. The issue isessentially about nationalistic clashes based on national histories, and it certainly requires a transnational resolution.
Prewar imperialism had divided Northeast Asia into empires and colonies, which intensified
the clash of nationalisms within the region, and, after Japan’ s defeat and decolonization of theother countries, the Cold War divided Northeast Asian countries into separate ideological camps
and consolidated the nation-states of Japan and Korea (although Korea then was divided througha civil war). The lasting divisions of this region cast a shadow on today’ s situation in the form ofa chasm of historical recognitions. Therefore, the resolution of the history problem, including thepostwar compensation of victims and reconciliation, remains incomplete.
However, the controversies over history have shown the need for dialogue across borders.
While it is true that dialogue can degenerate into a vicious circle of conflicting nationalisms,
without it no reconciliation is possible. Even with government compensation of war victims,
there is no certainty that compensation alone would heal the pain, or allow victims to find a way
39
to forgive. Overcoming the past might be, as Hannah Arendt said, impossible. Nevertheless,
we must consider how to work through the past to forge a path to the future. It might take a longtime. We cannot categorically say that forgetting and oblivion is a sin by arguing that reflecting
upon history makes for a better future. As Nietzsche argues, forgetting is a virtue, since forgive71

40

ness is not easy, and ressentiment is difficult to bear. Nevertheless, it was the one-sided forgetting on the part of Japan that deteriorated Northeast Asian relations. Rather than the freedom toforget, perhaps it is the freedom to remember and take responsibility for the past that will liberate
the future of Northeast Asia.
Reflections on, and apologies for, past transgressions are a requisite for mutual trust and coexistence in any region, and this is especially so for Northeast Asia, in which the movement ofpeople and ideas is increasing. In this context, a resolution would not in itself be an end, but a
way to begin a community built on the past.

Notes
Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” Lecture at Sorbonne, March 11, 1882 (Japanese translation: Tetsu
Ukai, trans., Kokumin towa Nani ka, Tokyo: Kawaideshoboshinsha, 1997, p. 62). This article is available
at http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/e_renan.html (accessed June 10, 2010).
2 “Comfort women” (慰安婦 or 従軍慰安婦) is the euphemism for women working in military brothels,
especially those who were forced into prostitution by the Japanese military during the Second World
War.
3 The prominent opinion leader of postwar democracy in Japan, Masao Maruyama, formulated this predominant view. See Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, London:
Oxford University Press, 1963. For the expanded edition of the book in Japanese, see Gendai Seiji no
Shiso to Kodo (Thought and behavior in modern politics), Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964.
4 The Asia-Vision Survey is an opinion survey of students at Asian universities and graduate schools, conducted by the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) in the Waseda University Global
COE Program. The survey took place at 31 Japanese universities in 2009 and collected responses from1,725 students. For results and the report, see: http://www.waseda-giari.jp/sysimg/imgs/ 20100330_asia_
vision_report.pdf (accessed March 30, 2010).
5 For example, after the agreement on joint history research by Japanese and Chinese intellectuals at theJapan-China Summit Meeting in 2006, the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee was created.
6 Kitaoka’ s statement is published in The Japan Forum on International Relations Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 4(Fall 2002), http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/bulletin/j-bulletin36/bulletin.htm (accessed June 10, 2010).
7 The Japan-China Joint History Research Committee, The First “Japan-China Joint History Research”
Report, January 31, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/rekishi_kk.html (accessed January
31, 2010).
8 Immanuel Wallerstein, “Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism and Ethnicity,” in Etienne
Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class, London: Verso, 1991, p. 78.
9 On this determination of party system, see Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework
for Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976 (Japanese translation: Norio Okazawa and
Hideyuki Kawano, trans., Gendai Seitogaku: Seito Shisutemu Ron no Bunseki Wakugumi, Tokyo: Wasedadaigaku Shuppanbu, 2000).
10 One of the reasons given for the decision to alleviate Japan’ s postwar war reparation burden was the lesson drawn from the economic situation in the post-WWI German Weimar Republic, in which economic
recovery was never achieved, and further, it led to the rise of fascism within Germany.
11 When Japanese companies began to transfer their production bases to Southeast Asia and China, andAsian economic networks developed dramatically, English-language studies on Japan tended to transform their concerns from Japan’ s history of modernization, which served as a rationalization of theWestern policy of liberalism, to “Japan’ s wartime Empire.” Some historians of Asian Studies might see
today’ s phenomenon of regionalization in Asia as a revival of imperialism. See Peter Duus, “Japan’ s
Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds.,
The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. xi-xlvii;
Peter Duus, “Imperialism Without Colonies: The Vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Zone,”
Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 54-72 (Japanese translation: Fujiwara Ki’ ichi,
trans., “Shokuminchi Naki Teikokushugi,” Shiso, No. 814 (April 1992), pp. 105-121); Sven Saaler, “Pan172

Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire,”in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, eds., Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, London and
New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 1-18; and Prasenjit Duara, “The New Imperialism and the Post-Colonial
Developmental State: Manchukuo in Comparative Perspective,” Japan Focus (February 2010), http://
www.japanfocus.org/ articles/print_article/1715 (accessed March 10, 2010).
12 For the official understanding about the history problem including war reparations, see the homepage ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html (accessed June
10, 2010). About the official release of the amount of the war reparation, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/
mofaj/ area/taisen/qa/shiryo/pdfs/shiryo_07.pdf (accessed June 10, 2010).
13 The term “1955 system” was first used by political theorist Jun’ nosuke Masumi. See Jun’ nosuke Masumi, “Senkyuhyaku-gojugonen no Seiji Taisei” (The 1955 political system), Shiso, No. 480 (June 1964).
Generally, the “1955 system” refers to the two-party system established in 1955, which was constitutedby the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the leftist Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). Although various factions and smaller parties coalesced into the conservative right or the progressive left,
the proportion of LDP to JSP members elected to the Diet was two to one and the dominance of the LDP
lasted for about forty years. However, the conservative party could not hold more than two-thirds of theseats in the parliament that were needed to approve constitutional amendments. In this sense, the “1955system” meant a quasi-democracy and a liberal political system based on the balance of power between
the conservatives and progressives.
14 For example, the “Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century” of 1998 pledged a “common determination to raise to a higher
dimension the close, friendly, and cooperative relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea whichhave been built since the normalization of their relations in 1965 so as to build a new Japan-Republic ofKorea partnership towards the twenty-first century.” See also: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/
korea/joint9810.html (accessed March 30, 2010). Although this declaration was realized after democratization in South Korea, it inherited the interpretation of the agreement on war reparations and the suspension of the history problem from the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic ofKorea.
15 On this social structure and thought in pre-war Japan, see Osamu Kuno and Shunsuke Tsurumi, Gendai
Nihon no Shiso: Sono Itsutsu no Uzu (Modern Japanese thought: Its five swirls), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten,
1956.
16 Sun Ge, one of the coordinators of this project, argued that intellectuals seek only the objective factsof history, and they cannot allow for “sentimental memory.” He attempted to distinguish “sentimental
memory” from narrow-minded nationalism, but the difference remains difficult to discern. On Sun Ge’ sargument, see Sun Ge, Ajia wo Kataru Koto no Jirenma: Chi no Kyodo Kukan wo Motomete (Dilemmain discussing Asia: In search of a common intellectual space), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2002. Concerning this project, see Teru Shimamura, “‘Igokochi no Warusa’ ni Chokumensuru to Iukoto” (On being
thrust into an uncomfortable position), Yoichi Komori et al., eds., Higashiajia Rekishi Ninshiki Ronsho
no Metahisutori: Kan’ nichi Rentai Nijuichi no Kokoromi (The meta-history of the history recognition
controversies in East Asia: Twenty-first attempts at Korea-Japan solidarity), Tokyo: Seikyusha, 2008, pp.
28-43.
17 Liu Jie, “Higashi Ajia Rekishi Ninshiki eno Chosen” (A challenge toward East Asia history recognition),
Jun Nishikawa and Ken’ ichiro Hirano, eds., Kokusai Ido to Shakai Henyo (International mobility andsocial transformation), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2007.
18 In light of the Chinese anti-Japanese protests in 2005, opinion polls about historical recognition between
China and Japan were conducted. Examining one of these surveys, some people attributed the antiJapanese “sentiments” or “self-conscious” nationalism to the influence of the mass media. See Narumi
Yoshimoto and Shigeto Sonoda, “Chugokujin Daigakusei ni Mirareru Nashonarizumu Ishiki to Rekishininshikimondai ni Taisuru Taido: 2007 nen Hukutan Daigaku Chosa no Bunseki Kekka kara (Consciousness of nationalism and attitudes toward the history recognition issue among Chinese university students:
From the analysis of a 2007 Fudan University survey),” GIARI Working Paper, March 2008. Needlessto say, mid-20th century sociology devoted itself to the elucidation of a mass society where individuals
were no longer independent but were moved by new socio-economic powers such as the mass media.
For example, see Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom, New York: Avon Books, 1941 (Japanese translation: Rokuro Hidaka, trans., Jiyu kara no Toso, Tokyo: Sogensha, 1951), and David Riesman, The Lonely
Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961 (Japa73

nese translation: Hidetoshi Kato, trans., Kodokuna Gunshu, Tokyo: Misuzushobo, 1965).
On the articles of the revision of the Fundamental Education Law, see: http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/
houan/kakutei/06121913/06121913/001.pdf (accessed June 10, 2006).
20 Louis Althusser, Sur la Reproduction (On reproduction), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995
(Japanese translation: Nagao Nishikawa, trans., Saiseisan ni Tsuite, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005).
21 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983 (Japanese translation: Takashi Kato,trans, Minzoku to Nashonarizumu, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2000).
22 Public elementary schools and public junior high schools must use the textbook that their school district
adopts, based on the decision of the local education board. On the other hand, high schools, national
schools, and private schools can choose the textbooks they will use at the school, based on the preferenceof the teacher using the textbook. Under the textbook authorization system, a movement to advocate theuse of the New History Textbook appeared, and indicates political intervention in education. Concerning
this issue, see Yoichi Komori, Yoshikazu Sakamoto and Yoshio Yasumaru, eds., Rekishi Kyokasho Nani
ga Mondai ka: Tettei Kensho Q&A (What is at stake with the history textbook? A thorough examination
Q&A), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2001, pp. 126-131.
23 On “the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the results of the study on the issue of‘comfort women’,” see: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html (accessed March 30,2010). As for the relationship of the history recognition controversies to the “comfort women” issue, see
Shin’ ichi Arai, “‘Ushinawareta Junen’ to Rekishininshiki Mondai” (The lost decade and the issue of history recognition) in Yoichi Funabashi, ed., Ima Rekishi Mondai ni Do Torikumuka (How to deal with thehistory issue now), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2001, pp. 42-54.
24 “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama ‘On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’ s
end’ (15 August 1995),” http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html (accessed
March 30, 2010).
25 In recent years, arguments over constitutional reform intensified, especially among politicians in the LDP
who adopt the viewpoint that the postwar constitution is an “imposed constitution.” However, this argument ignores the fact that the contents of the Constitution contain universal ideas generally recognizedin the international community. Also, it effaces the history in which it was constructed through the collaboration of SCAP members and Japanese politicians who adopted it in exchange for preservation of theEmperor system. The general population also received the new Constitution as the promise of emancipation. See John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York: W. W. Norton & Co. / New Press, 1999 (Japanese translation: Yoichi Miura and Tada’ aki Takasugi, trans., Haiboku
wo Dakishimete: Dai Niji Taisengo no Nihonjin, Vol. 1 and 2, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2004), and Shoichi
Koseki, Nihonkoku Kenpo no Tanjo (The birth of the Japanese constitution), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten,
2009. The direction of postwar pacifism and democracy was determined by a prewar communist idea thatJapanese society harbored a semi-feudal structure and militarism that had to be overcome by a modern
democratic revolution. This is the so-called 1932 Thesis.
26 Takeo Sato points out that in Japan, “war” was problematized as the loser’ s responsibility. This differsfrom the situation in postwar Germany, in which the past “system” of Nazi Germany became the problematized object that was addressed. According to Sato, the reason why Japan was inclined to “reparation” (unlike Germany, which addressed mostly “compensation”) is that Japan treated reparation in termsof the pre-World War I recognition concerning the responsibility of the loser for the outbreak of war. See
Takeo Sato, “Nihon no Sengohosho Mondai Kaiketsu eno Teigen” (A proposal for the resolution of the
postwar reparation issue) in Yoichi Funabashi, ed., pp. 57, 65. Indeed, the consciousness of “losing” isstrong in Japan, which has resulted in reactionary attitudes, such as the negation of war crimes and theTokyo War Crimes Tribunal as a winner’ s judgment, an affirmation of prewar Japan, and urges to keep
an independent self-defense force. However, it has also been noted that Japan’ s war crimes can be understood in terms of interwar ideas, the illegality of war and of moral obligations to injustice and illegal
actions.
27 Concerning reflexive knowledge, see Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1994 (Japanese translation: Kiyobumi Matsuo et al., trans., Saikiteki
Kindaika: Kindai ni okeru Seiji Dento Biteki Genri, Tokyo: Jiritsushobo, 1997).
28 For example, in 1998 Gay J. McDougall reported to the United Nations Commission on Human Rightsthat Japan’ s “comfort women” program during World War II was sexual slavery and systematic rape inviolation of human rights. The report advised that the Japanese government was liable for the “comfort
19

74

women” system as a “crime against humanity.” In 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council also
demanded that the Japanese government accept legal responsibility and apologize unreservedly for the“comfort women” system by compensation for victims and also by conducting education about the issue. The violence against “comfort women” could be regarded as sexual violence from the viewpoint ofgender, which is a modern concept. Indeed, “humanity” has often been used as a “diplomatic card” topressure countries and justify the hegemonic rule of an empire. However, it should be noted that “humanity” is the ultimate platform for appeal to reason against international or supra-national violence.
29 For the “Asian Women’ s Fund” and the opposition to it, see Haruki Wada, “Ajia Josei Kikin Mondai to
Chishikijin no Sekinin” (The Asian Women’ s Fund and intellectuals’ responsibility), in Yoichi Komori etal., eds., pp. 133-153.
30 On this rightwing argument from the viewpoint of interaction between the Japanese nationalist discourse
and the Chinese and Korean criticisms of Japan, see Tsuneo Akaha, “The Nationalist Discourse in Contemporary Japan: The Role of China and Korea in the Last Decade,” Pacific Focus, Vol. 33, No. 2 (August 2008), pp. 156-188.
31 Tetsuya Takahashi, Rekishi Shusei Shugi (Revisionist history), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2001.
32 The term “Greater East Asia War” was officially defined by Japanese wartime government after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This term implied that Japan did not intend to invade Asia but to liberate
Asia from Western colonization and to construct the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”; using
the term “Greater East Asia War” entails the affirmation and glorification of war on the side of Japan
from wartime to the present. Because of these connotations, under the Press Code issued by the SCAP
to censor the Japanese news media, the use of the term “Greater East Asia War” was banned during theoccupation. After the occupation ended, some former Asianists like Husao Hayashi used the term andaffirmed the goal of the “Greater East Asia War.” However, the more generally used term for the war inJapan has been the “Pacific War” or the “Second World War.” The term “Greater East Asia War” is usedwith an affirmative nuance in the contemporary nationalist discourse, e.g., in the New History Textbook,by disregarding the negative aspects of the war.
33 Concerning the interdependence of particularism and universalism in the nation-state system, see Naoki
Sakai, foreword by Meaghan Morris, Translation and Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nationalism,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997 (Japanese translation: Nihon Shiso to iu Mondai:
Hon’ yaku to Shutai, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1997), and Naoki Sakai, Brett de Bary and Toshio Iyotani,eds., Nashonariti no Datsukochiku (Deconstructing nationalism), Tokyo: Kashiwashobo, 1996.
34 For an inclusive review of postwar Japan studies, including modernization theory, see John Dower, Umemori Naoyuki, trans., “Nihon o Hakaru: Eigoken ni okeru Nihon Kenkyū no Rekishi Jojutsu” (Weighing
Japan: Historical narratives in English-language studies of Japan), Shis , No. 855-856 (September and October 1995); and Sheldon Garon, “Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus
on State-Society Relations,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2 (May 1994), pp. 346-350.
35 Yuzo Mizoguchi, “Chugokuan no Mondaiten wa Nanika” (What is the problem with the views on China?), in Komori et al., pp. 35-36.
36 The same observation is applicable to the work of the popular novelist Ryotaro Shiba. As an example, oneof his novels, Saka no Ue no Kumo, affirms the Russo-Japanese War, which enabled Japan to annex the
Korean peninsula. See Ryotaro Shiba, Saka no Ue no Kumo (Clouds above the slope), Vols. 1-8, Tokyo:
Bungeishunju, 1999. In Japanese textbooks, this war was, implicitly or explicitly, treated as an imperialist war, resulting in the gain of a new territory as war reparations and enabling the colonization of Korea.
The reading of novels has declined in recent years, but Shiba’ s novels are eagerly read by some powerful people such as politicians, company managers, researchers and students. Moreover, these novels aredramatized for TV broadcasting and made into movies.
37 Liu, pp. 52-54.
38 Hiroshi Mitani, “Mirai no Tame no Rekishi Taiwa” (Dialogue on history for the future), in Hiroshi Mitani
and Kim Tae-Chang, eds., Higashiajia Rekishi Taiwa: Kokkyo to Sedai o Koete (Dialogue on East Asian
history: Transcending national boundaries and generations), Tokyo: Tokyodaigaku Shuppankai, 2007,
pp.13-14.
39 Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968 (Japanese translation:
Hitoshi Abe, trans., Kurai Jidai no Hitobito, Tokyo: Chikumashobo, 2005).
40 Friedrich Nietzsche and Jinjo Kiba, trans., Dotoku no Keihu, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2006, pp. 37-40, 6264. The English version, On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by Iran Johnston is available at http://
records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/Nietzsche/genealogytofc.htm (accessed June 10, 2010).
75

Human Rights and Culture in the Asian Region

Elisa Nesossi

Abstract
Numerous attempts to create a regional human rights system in Asia have proven unsuccessful, and human rights are still intended as an ideal principle. Nevertheless, the last two decades
witnessed a proliferation of “human rights talk” at both the regional and national levels.
This article offers an interpretation about past and current official human rights talks at theregional level in Asia and considers the reasons for privileging a specific conception of humanrights over other competing visions. In addition, it assesses the impact that the human rights visions articulated in Asian talks have upon the creation of a regional human rights system. This
article gives particular attention to the official talks on human rights at the regional level, considering how the relationship between rights and culture is conceptualized.
On the whole, the article demonstrates how the utilization of culture as a concept in talks
about rights in the last thirty years has changed only partially, indicating different but equally
opportunistic approaches to the concept of human rights.

1. Introduction
Human rights regionalism is a relevant reality in the overall architecture of the international
protection of human rights. Since the concept’s first appearance in Chapter VIII of the UN Char1
ter, human rights regionalism has become more than a mere concession for the maintenance ofpeace or a theoretical possibility for the pacific settlement of disputes. According to the proponents of regionalism in the contemporary legal arena, “United Nations and regional institutions
need one another and should continue to work closely in addressing regional issues as well as
2international issues.” Only a meaningful division of labor between global, regional and domestic
systems could produce a valuable response to human rights violations. Indeed, in virtue of theirflexibility, regional systems may combine an immediate response to specific problems with long3
term strategies.
In the overall architecture of the international human rights law, regional institutions are
structurally in an intermediate position. This intermediate institutional level has never been intended to be a substitute for either the international structure or the domestic one; rather, this system has been devised to complement and supplement the structure in place. It is indeed subsidiary to domestic instruments whenever national governments have violated human rights or their4
remedies have failed. Moreover, it is complementary to the UN system; the latter lacks the internal co-ordination and efficacious instruments for investigating and redressing human rights violations at the national level. Proponents of human rights regionalism assert that in virtue of theirintermediate position, regional systems are able to include both the core setting of basic rights aswell as many regional and domestic particularities, thus enhancing a non-absolutist conception ofuniversality.
In contrast to the other world regions, Asia does not have a regional human rights system
5
based upon regional human rights documents and institutions such as courts or commissions.
In the last fifty years, numerous attempts have been made to create regional or sub-regional hu76

man rights mechanisms in Asia. Since the 1960s, UN-sponsored seminars in the Asia-Pacifichave been following one another, bringing together government representatives, regional NGOs,
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) and UN agencies to explore possibilities of devel6
oping regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights. Historical andmore recent attempts include a number of seminars, conferences, and fifteen regional workshops
organized by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) South Asia
7
Office, which have discussed regional technical cooperation for the establishment of regionaland sub-regional human rights mechanisms. Four priority pillars of cooperation have been estab8
9lished – national human rights action plans (NHRAP), human rights education, NHRI and the10right to development and economic, social and cultural rights – and states have sought to gradu11
ally undertake related activities. Domestic actions are reviewed periodically during regional
workshops.
The initiatives undertaken preliminarily addressed the need for regional arrangements, but
the overall lack of any meaningful developments limited thier significance. Even the 2007 ASEAN Charter, designed “to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law
and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” provides a very hesitant
approach to human rights. George Yeo, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, provided an assessment of
the Charter by saying, “I’m not sure whether it will have teeth but it will have a tongue. It will
12
certainly have moral influence, if nothing else.” Similarly, the Singaporean Second Foreign
Minister, Raymond Lim, argued that the ASEAN Human Rights Commission, as defined in the13
Charter, “will likely be consultative rather than prescriptive.”To this day, the quest for a regional mechanism has not died down and still represents anongoing appeal for many human rights practitioners around Asia. These practitioners look at thisgoal as the only concrete option to provide justice where national institutions are unable or un14
willing to offer it.
This article offers an interpretation about past and current human rights talks at the regional
level in Asia and considers the reasons for privileging a specific conception of human rights
over other competing visions. Additionally, it assesses the impact that the human rights visions
articulated in Asian talks have upon the creation of a regional human rights system. Moreover,
the article gives particular attention to the official talks on human rights at the regional level,
considering how the relationship between rights and culture is conceptualized. On the whole, it
demonstrates how the concept of culture, as it has been utilized in talks about rights in the last
thirty years, has changed only partially, indicating different but equally opportunistic approaches
to conceptualizing human rights.
Human rights represent important catalysts in the overall process of regional integration, as
they significantly promote social and institutional integration by codifying social behavior anddeepening the sense of regional community and solidarity. Indeed, the relationship between culture and rights is an important one and deserves an accurate analysis in the context of regional
integration in Asia. The first story told by this article regarding the relationship between humanrights and culture in Asia is that of opposition; the two concepts live here in a closed and static
image of culture that hampers the creation of a human rights system. Thus, this narrative paradoxically presents Asian culture as outwardly unified, but internally so diverse as to obstruct social integration at the regional level. The second story talks about changes in understanding about
culture – now intended as an open and dynamic concept – which has developed from the processof globalization; further, it explains the effects of an emerging “human rights culture” which maylead to gradual socio-cultural integration in the region.
The paper is organized in three main sections. The first section offers a brief overview of thecontested relationship between human rights and culture, as it has been conceptualized by anthropologists in the last decades. The second part assesses the way human rights have been discussed
77

in Asia, particularly in the context of the ASEAN group of nations. Particular attention is given
to the relationship between human rights and culture and the way it has evolved in the last twenty
years. The third and concluding part of the article considers the impact of ASEAN approaches tohuman rights and culture on the realization of human rights regionalism.
On the whole, the article represents a significant contribution to the literature on regional
integration, as it discusses one highly contentious area in the general discourse on regionalism
and integration. Differently from the existing literature on human rights and regionalism, whichmainly considers legal, political or international relations perspectives, this article provides aninterpretive approach to discourses about human rights and culture in Asia that may shed light on
the inherent dynamics of social and institutional integration.

2. Human Rights and Culture: A Contested Relationship
Neither rights nor culture are easily definable concepts and, over time, views and definitions
have transformed, sometimes complementing each other, sometimes conflicting or overlapping.
Approaches toward rights are often the result of historically grounded cultural conceptions.
The instrumental use of both the concepts for political purposes has indeed generated confusion about definitions, as well as skepticism about the substantive value of human rights. According to Twining, in order to provide a fair definition of rights, it is important “to maintainbroad distinctions between human rights talk as forms of political rhetoric, of legal expositions
15
and argument, and as moral discourses.” Thus, in General Jurisprudence, Twining offers a critical overview of the main conceptions of human rights that have developed in the last fifty years,
framed within specific historical backgrounds, and he unravels five major conceptualizations of
the term “human rights.” These are: human rights as a legal regime, as substantive moral theories, as discourses, as political ideas and practice and as Western colonial and neo-colonial ideol16
ogy.
The relationship between human rights and culture has often been an area of contention.
During the 1990s, an essentialized understanding of culture shaped the universalism-relativism
debate, which opposed global standards of social justice and respect for global practices. While
supporters of universalism argued that human rights principles should apply indiscriminately to
17
all cultures, relativists asserted the importance of cultural differences over universal standards.
Underlying the universalism-cultural relativism debate was the substantive moral understanding of human rights as a set of universal moral principles applicable to all people at all
times, and everywhere, irrespective of beliefs and cultures. Such a view – grounded in European
religious and philosophical thinking dating back to the Greeks and the Romans – was based on
the belief of a universal human ontology and the idea that human rights were embedded in original values shared by all human beings because of their common nature.
To oppose the argument on the universality of human rights values, relativists used a broadly
defined concept of culture indicating a coherent, uniform and timeless whole in the meaning systems of a given group. In order to mark a distinction between universal and local values, culture
18
became a reified, essentialized and homogenous entity, drawing definite boundaries between the“Us” and the “Others.”19
Both the instrumental use of the rhetoric of culture to legitimize claims of power and thestrengthening of the process of globalization led theorists to question the universalism-relativism
debate. Indeed, although it was still acceptable during the 1990s to use earlier European anthropological conceptions that maintain that culture is integrated, harmonious, consensual andbounded, in the new century, these views are considered largely obsolete.
New conceptions of culture have emerged and the concept has started to take the form of a78

20

hybrid and porous entity that may promote change and develop. As argued by Merry:In the last two decades, world system theory has criticized the model of society as an isolated ‘billiard ball’ within global economic and cultural processes (Wolf 1982)…Culture
is now understood as historically produced rather than static; unbounded rather thanbounded and integrated; contested rather than consensual; incorporated within structures of power such as the construction of hegemony; rooted in practices and symbols,
habits, patterns …and negotiated and constructed through human action rather than su21
perorganic forces.
With the new century, the “rights versus culture perspective” has shifted toward a “human rights
culture perspective” in which human rights have progressively become part of the cultural discourses at various levels – transnationally, nationally and locally. Thus, beside a legalist approach
toward rights, two other main perspectives prevail; that is, human rights as globally circulating
discourses, and human rights as local experiences of communities in struggle.
Amartya Sen, for example, argues that the survivability of human rights does not depend
upon grounded moral theories, but upon rights’ claims in open discussions both within and across22societies. Accordingly, “‘rights talk’ is a form of discourse with varied and changing content,
which provides a framework for argument, negotiation, interpretation and articulating or making
23
claims.” Others, like Baxi and Rajaghopal, have developed “subaltern perspectives” of humanrights, according to which human rights are not based on moral or legal principles but emerge directly from local struggles against poverty and injustice.
Anthropologists like Merry have also started to look at different cultural sites where international or regional elites conceptualized and translated rights into international legal standards.
UN meetings have become the subject of study, being “shaped by a culture of transnational modernity, one that specifies procedures for collaborative decision-making, conceptions of global
social justice…Its [human rights laws] documents create new cultural frameworks for conceptu24
alizing social justice.”

3. The Asian Approaches to Human Rights and Culture
The fact that Asia is lacking a regional human rights system made of commissions, courtsand foundational legal standards does not mean that the concept of human rights has not influenced regional practices and discourses, or that the region is completely silent in this respect. In
Asia, as in other parts of the world, different perspectives about culture and rights have been informing both individual and collective discourses.
This section of the article looks at the approach toward human rights and culture adopted
by Asian decision-makers in the last three decades and assesses its impact upon the tentative creation of an Asian regional human rights system.
(1) Culture Versus Rights
During the 1990s, Asian leaders rejected human rights by claiming to be defending culture.
The Asian debate over human rights set “Asian values” against universal human rights, asserting Asia’s cultural uniqueness and the inappropriateness of human rights in the regional context.
The “Asian values” argument that emerged after the 1993 Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights
denied the universal applicability of human rights, rejected civil and political rights as being
specifically Western and culturally inadequate for the Asian communitarian context, and stressed
the primacy of economic development over civil and political rights. The Declaration asserts that79

“while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic
and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national25
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”
26
Mainly promoted by elites from Singapore and Malaysia, the “Asian values” discourse asserted that Western liberal democratic values are inapplicable in the Asian context; the discussion
characterized such values as a Western imposition conflicting with the indigenous values of Asia,
detrimental to Asian economic development. Assuming a unifying cultural mantle for Asia, the“Asian values” proponents argued for the idea of Asian cultural uniqueness based on Confucian
and communitarian roots. However, the fact that the highly westernized elites of Singapore andIndonesia welcomed industrialization and its consequences made the rejection of human rights in27
the name of “Asian values” highly suspicious.
The 1997 “ASEAN-Vision 2020” – a clear expression of its times – did not make any reference to human rights, but mentioned the importance of social justice and the rule of law. In the
document, ASEAN leaders envisioned “the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN
community conscious of its ties with history, aware of its cultural heritage, and bound by a com28
mon regional identity.”
Various Asian and Western scholars have already discussed at length the fallacious approachtaken in the “Asian values” debate. Thus, it is clear that the “Asian values” debate prompted
some focused reflection on the moral value of human rights and the concept of culture. The factthat human rights were perceived as a neo-colonial imposition by Western countries raised skepticism toward the morality of the concept itself. As relativists, Asian leaders implicitly supported
the view that “there can be no essential characteristics of human nature or human rights, which
29
exist outside of discourse, history, context or agency,” and that human rights are socially con30
structed concepts to impose political power, hegemony.
Without questioning whether human rights could be grounded only on Western concepts ofnatural law, individualism and liberalism, or if they could be adapted to local circumstances, theproponents of the “Asian values” debate rejected the concept of human rights tout court, raisinglocal culture against any claims of universalism in human rights. The extreme cultural relativism
proposed by the Asian leaders was based on a static and closed idea of culture, which implicitly
served legitimacy and power purposes. This “essentialist view of culture” echoed Romantic na31
tionalism, an approach that conceived “diversity as a problem to be solved” and impeded new
and alien ideas from being absorbed or reshaped, making intercultural dialogue extremely difficult. The “Asian values” debate used culture as a rhetorical object. Those who recognized humanrights were seen to deny and reject the Asian culture. Conversely, those who considered the valueof culture as supreme were seen to override the pursuit of universal human rights.
The 1997-1998 Asian economic meltdown seriously affected Asian confidence in economic
development, and brought the public debate on “Asian values” to an end. Nevertheless, a numberof scholars admit that the debate is still highly salient now, and continues to be important when32
considering human rights approaches in individual Asian countries. Yet, “although the Asianvalues argument is less often articulated now, it represents one of many ways that leaders assertthat human rights violate the fundamental cultural principles of a nation or a religion and there33
fore cannot be adopted.”
Even though the concept “Asian value” seems overly anachronistic now, it must still be admitted that it did carry weight enough to have stimulated sustained reflections both in Asia and inWestern countries about the significance of culture when constructing a normative moral order;
furthermore, it questioned the assumption that human rights truly represent “the best medium for34
cross-cultural discourse and dialogue” within diverse systems of justice. The next section of thearticle shows whether, and in what ways, the relationship between culture and rights has been reshaped in current official approaches to human rights in the ASEAN context.
80Because of the developments and the sustained discussions on human rights in ASEAN,
this sub-region represents an interesting and comparatively simpler laboratory for elucidating themain characteristics of the relationship between human rights and culture in the whole Asian region. Indeed, the ASEAN case may be intended as illustrative of the challenges facing Asia moregenerally.
(2) Human Rights as a Cultural Process?
Since the late 1990s, human rights issues have been discussed in a more open and frank35
manner. While roundtable discussions and meetings at the regional and sub-regional levels seemnot to have been particularly effective in producing practical results, they have nonetheless been
important for reiterating on a periodical basis the need to foster the creation of regional and sub36
regional human rights mechanisms; in addition, on a broader scale, they have been useful forunderstanding the regional nuances of human rights talks by legal and political elites and institutions. Not only have the meetings set priorities for action, but they have also contributed to shaping the regional discourses on human rights, and to consolidating common positions within the37larger Asian context. Official human rights meetings at the regional and sub-regional levels are
representative of the local, regional and the globally circulating human rights culture.
Even without producing tangible results, the various meetings dedicated to human rights
in ASEAN demonstrate that the resistant approach toward human rights that characterized the1990s has shifted toward forms of acceptance concerning the concept of rights. Katsumata argues
that:
In the global community of modern states today, its core members, the advanced industrialized democracies, are championing a set of liberal reforms, thereby creating a social environment which defines human rights as an element of legitimacy in this community….In
such circumstances the ASEAN members have ‘mimetically’ been adopting the norms of human rights which is championed by the advanced and industrialized democracies motivated38
by their desire to be identified as advanced and legitimate.
While “mimetic acceptance” does not indicate a substantial change in approach toward the concept of human rights, it shows that human rights discourses cannot be totally avoided; they havebeen progressively entrenched in the culture of the region and have thusly formed an importantpart of a wider global rights culture. The formal commitment to participate in the international
community – already expressed in the 1997 “ASEAN-Vision 2020” and the “Hanoi Plan of Ac39tion” – translates into an obligation to heed human rights.
Indeed, Asian countries are responding to what they once considered Western hegemonic
discourses by using their same language; that is, they are using human rights discourses to frame
their arguments and articulate their claims both regionally and internationally. In adopting thelanguage of rights, Asian countries formally commit themselves to “the dominant mode of moral
40
engagement in an interconnected, uncertain and rapidly changing world.”
However, this commitment does not mean that human rights are talked about in Asia because of an ideological adherence or legal commitment to the concept; but because Asia is anactor in the global arena, it must participate in a global culture where human rights play a significant role. Indeed, the “step by step, constructive and consultative approach” which informs thecommitment to human rights in all the major ASEAN human rights documents, and the related
lack of urgency for the creation of stable institutions and legal mechanisms for the promotion
and protection of human rights, “raises the suspicion that the UN annual workshops are means
for states to avoid establishing any such permanent arrangements under the pretext of appearing
41
committed to the ideal.”81

Official elites approach human rights as ideals, the objects of expectations, which they may
then discuss. Dato Param Coomaraswamy aptly expressed this perspective in the Welcome Remarks to the 8th Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, when he explained that “our [ASEAN’s] chosen approach has always been engagement and so we welcome
this opportunity to again meet with all of you and talk, openly and frankly, about what we can
42
expect and what we should strive for, given the situation at hand.” In a similar fashion, after
the creation of the ASEAN inter-governmental commission on human rights, the ASEAN headsof state applauded the new organ not by steadily supporting its action, but by mildly expressing“confidence that ASEAN cooperation on human rights will continue to evolve and develop.”43
The fact that human rights are discussed at the regional level with little visible effort totranslate talks into practice indicates the difficulties inherent in the process of regional, or even
sub-regional consensus building upon concepts like human rights and social justice. The creationof a transnational consensus means that a compromise must be reached – across differences inideology, political and cultural practices – that in such “a diverse cultural context,” as expressedin the ASEAN Charter, is quite difficult to achieve.
While human rights are accepted as a matter of principle, no concrete attempt to make themregionally specific has been made yet. The creation of regional courts and commissions, for example, would represent a fundamental step in making human rights claims possible since, without courts, the meaning, content and scope of human rights remain utterly vague. Talks aboutrights are fundamental, though void and meaningless if not concretized in legal practice. As it
has been demonstrated in other regional contexts, the existence of regional standards and courts
would represent promising avenues to improve national legal systems and raise the quality andsophistication of domestic human rights litigation.
For example, after Brazil’s ratification of the American Convention of Human Rights in
1992, the regional human rights system became a powerful tool in the hand of Brazilian activist
44
lawyers who started to engage in rather aggressive domestic human rights litigation. Eastern
European countries have followed a similar path after their accession to the European Conven45
tion on Human Rights.
Admittedly, the creation of a regional legal regime would indicate a genuine step forward in
the human rights cause in Asia, but it would bring significant challenges to the national interests
and the political status quo in various states. Challenges would come both from within and fromoutside the domestic borders of the various states.
First, the creation of regional legal instruments would defy the principle of non-interference
at its very core. Individual states would have to be externally accountable, at least regionally, forthe abuses against their citizens, and would have to put in place domestic mechanisms for theenforcement of human rights principles. Regional courts would decide upon cases involving individual states and their citizens, and states would be compelled to enforce the decisions taken byjudges often speaking a foreign language. Specifically, at the regional level, this would also leadto the creation of legal mechanisms and institutions incorporating Asian approaches to humanrights, and, at the national level, it would request the implementation of new legal instruments or
the reform of existing laws – all changes associated with significant economic costs and humanresources involvement.
Secondly, the attempt toward “regionalization” of international principles would lead to asignificant self-reflection upon regionally specific cultural perspectives and practices that must bethen “legalized” in human rights documents. In order to put in place a human rights legal regime
reflective of the cultural context from which it has emerged, Asian leaders would need to clearly
define the meaning of Asian culture and its relation with rights.
Indeed, based on the assumptions that “law is the result of local knowledge, not placelessprinciples,” and that the “law is constructive of social life and not reflective, or…not just reflec82

46
tive,” it is believed that the adoption of a human rights law would inevitably prompt a more sustained reflection of local needs in relation to wider global and regional contexts. The creation ofa human rights regime will not only be reflective of social life discourses, but it would also create
new expectations and possibilities for different social actors located at the regional or domestic
level.
To limit human rights discourses to political statements rather than legal commitments represents, first, an attempt to discourage a “bottom up” approach towards human rights – an approach based upon the active involvement of civil society – and secondly, an attempt to limit the
emergence of a culture of rights which may oppose the political status quo. The language of legal
rights is a powerful and threatening one, which, once entrenched in culture, may become part oflocal communities’ approaches to reality and can, rephrasing Twining, “stimulate and enlarge
47
moral imagination.” Political struggles in the name of rights are becoming increasingly com48
mon even in most conservative political regimes, like China, for example, and demonstrate thepower of the language of rights, a power which may inevitably create anxieties among regional
elites. Indeed, with respect to practices, the pursuit of human rights requires people to become
involved in specific political and legal processes, perhaps not ideal when trying to promote peaceand security in the region.

4. Conclusion
This article is a very modest attempt to delve into the complex relationship between rights
and culture in a specific regional context, and to show the latent tensions inherent between thetwo concepts. The cases of Asia and ASEAN in particular represent an interesting laboratory forthis specific study.
The article demonstrates that both the “Asian values” debate and contemporary approaches
toward human rights are both born from very specific historical circumstances. The “Asian values” debate represented the exemplification of a romantic understanding of culture, intended as astatic, homogeneous, coherent and consensual entity. In view of their recent colonial past, Asian
countries, in an apparently contradictory move, deliberately adopted a markedly Western approach to culture to resist the neo-colonial imposition of liberal values.
The contemporary approach toward human rights represents a more complex and sophisticated reaction to Western concepts, and as such is much more difficult to decipher. Asian elites
do not talk anymore about an anachronistic dichotomy between rights and culture, but they do
accept to be a part of a global human rights culture that pretends to accept plurality and diversity.
Again, they speak the language that Western countries may easily understand. However, simply
by committing to the ideal of rights and playing a waiting game in their practice, they do not offer any substantive and regionally specific contributions to the circulating culture of rights; rather,
they simply act as spectators. While a circulating human rights culture alone may be able to trigger regional solidarity and solidify values promotable at the regional level, it may hardly promote
integration as such. Only the creation of legal institutions codifying regional human rights behavior might lay the foundation for integrating and facilitating integration agreements. Integration
would strengthen human rights institutions and solidify the meaning of a human rights culture in
the region.

83

Notes
1

2

3
4

5

6

7

8

Charter of the United Nations, adopted June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945, as amendedby General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII) December 17, 1963, entered into force August 31, 1965
(557UNTS 143); 2101 of December 1965, entered into force June 12, 1968 (638 UNTS 308); and 2847
(XXVI) of December 20, 1971, entered into force September 24, 1973 (892 UNTS 119). See http://
www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml (accessed July 16, 2010).
Bernard Ramcharan, “Complementarity between Universal and Regional Organizations/ Perspectives
from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,” Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 8 (2000),
p. 324.
Abdullahi An-Na’im, “Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional Perspective,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2001), pp. 701-732.
The primary responsibility for the protection of human rights in a country lies within the governmentof that country. As a consequence, one of the most notably stringent among the admissibility criteria tofile a case before a regional court is the “exhaustion of national remedies.” See Art. 2 and Art. 5(2)(b)of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; Art. 35 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Art. 46 of
the American Convention of Human Rights; Art. 50, Art. 56 (5) of the African Charter on Human andPeople’s Rights; and Art. 6 (2) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on
the Establishment of an African Court.
The other three world regions – Africa, America and Europe – have created regional human rights arrangements based on the work of courts and commissions acting within the framework of regional
treaties and various legal standards. In Europe, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights is themain European regional instrument for the protection of human rights created by the Council of Europe.
The European Court of Human Rights is the main institutional organ responsible for protection against
violations of the rights inscribed in the 1950 Convention. In the African context, the 1986 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights – the main human rights treaty in the region – is the formulation of
the Organization of African Unity. An African Court on Human and People’s Rights came into being in
2004. In the American region, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights is the main regional
instrument for the protection of human rights. Compliance is overseen by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both organs of the Organizationof American States.
The 1981 General Assembly Resolution 36/154 requested the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) to facilitate the dialogue among Asian member states on adequate arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in the region.
A “Seminar on Human Rights in Developing Countries” was held in 1964, and a “Southeast Asia andPacific Conference of Jurists” was held in 1965; resolutions on a human rights regional body in Asia
were consecutively adopted by the General Assembly of the UN starting from the late 1970s. The “Colombo Seminar on Human Rights” was held in 1982 to discuss the need for an Asian Human Rights
Commission. After that, workshops on regional cooperation for the promotion and protection of humanrights further explored possibilities for Asian human rights regionalism. Workshops were held in Manila
in 1990, Jakarta in 1993, Seoul in 1994, Kathmandu in 1996, Amman in 1997, Teheran in 1998, New
Delhi in 1999, Beijing in 2000, Bangkok in 2001, Beirut in 2002, Islamabad in 2003, Doha in 2004,
Beijing in 2005, Bali in 2007 and Bangkok in 2010. A summary of the main issues discussed during
these regional workshops may be found at: http://bangkok.ohchr.org/news/events/asia-pacific-regionalframework-workshop-2010/files/introduction_key_documents_annual_meetings.pdf (accessed July 16,2010).
Recommendations for the creation of NHRAP stem back from the World Conference on Human Rights
held in Vienna in 1993. The Conference made two specific recommendations concerning national human rights action plans: first, each state should draw up a national human rights action plan identifying
steps for improving the promotion and protection of human rights; secondly, the UN would establish acomprehensive program to help states implementing the plans. See General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. A/CONF.157/23, July 12, 1993, http://www.unhchr.ch/ huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en (accessed July 16, 2010).

84

The normative instrument for the NHRI are the Paris Principles, so called because they were adopted
in Paris in 1991 at an international workshop organized by NHRIs. The Principles provide that NHRIs
should be established in national constitutions or other legal documents that set out their role, powers
and mandate. Accordingly, NHRIs should make recommendations to governments on a broad rangeof human rights related issues. For the Paris Principles, see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/paris
principles.htm. (accessed July 16, 2010). On the NHRI in the Asia-Pacific region, see Brian Burdekin,
National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2007.
10 The Framework for Regional Technical Cooperation in the Asia and Pacific Region was adopted by participants to the sixth workshop held in Tehran in 1998.
11 During the third workshop held in Seoul in 1994, participants agreed to adopt a “step by step,” “building
block” approach to the creation of regional arrangements.
12 Quotes in “Historic ASEAN charter lacks teeth,” The Australian, http://www.theaustralian. com.au/
news/historic-asean-charter-lacks-teeth/story-e6frg6t6-1111114913802 (accessed July 16, 2010).
13 Quoted in “Human Rights Body Consultative, ” The Straits Times, http://www.yawningbread. org/
arch_2007/yax-787.htm (accessed July 16, 2010).
14 Sou Chiam, “Asia’s Experience in the Quest for a Regional Human Rights Mechanism,” Victoria University Wellington Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 (June 2009), p. 128.
15 William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 177.
16 Twining, op. cit.
17 This study will not go deeply into the debate on universal conceptions of human rights versus cultural
relativism, which have already been widely debated in a variety of studies. Even after the 1993 Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action – a formal agreement on the universality of human rights – international seminars, conferences and publications have continued to address the dichotomy universality/
cultural relativism. See Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Human Rights: New Perspectives, New
Realities, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Scholars have also developed and supported
ideas of “thin” and “thick” accounts of human rights, and theory of weak and strong cultural relativism. See Michael Freeman, “Universal Human Rights and Particular Culture,” in Michael Jacobsen and
Ole Brunn, eds., Human Rights and Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000; Joseph Chan, “Thick and Thin Account of Human
Rights: Lessons from the Asian Values Debate,” in Michael Jacobsen and Ole Brunn eds., op. cit.; Jack
Donnelly, “Cultural Relativism and Human Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1984), pp.
400-419; Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. For a critical view, see Fernando R. Teson, “International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism,” Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1985), pp. 869-898; Amartya Sen, “Universal Truths: Human
Rights and the Westernizing Illusion,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 20 (1998), p. 40.
18 Berger and Luckeman defined “reification” as “the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were
things, that is, … the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something otherthat human products – such as facts of nature…” Kapferer considers “reification of culture” as the process of “the production of culture as an object in itself.” See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmannn,
The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Penguin, 1967;
Bruce Kapferer, Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance and Political Culture in Sri
Lanka and Australia, London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988.
19 Roger Martin Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective, Fort Worth, Texas andLondon: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998.
20 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights & Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006, p. 9.
21 Sally Engle Merry, “Changing Rights, Changing Culture,” in Jane Cowan, Marié-Bénédicte Dembour
and Richard A. Wilson, eds., Culture and Rights. Anthropological Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001, p. 41.
22 Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 4(2004), p. 315.
23 Twining, p. 175.
24 Merry, Human Rights & Gender Violence, p. 16.
985

The Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights adopted April 7, 1993, UN Doc A/Conf.157/ASRM/8-A/CONF.157/PC/59(1993):3:8), http://law.hku. hk/
lawgovtsociety/Bangkok%20Declaration.htm (accessed July 16, 2010).
26 Mathathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew, prime ministers of Malaysia and Singapore, respectively, werestrong advocates of the Asian values.
27 Jane Cowan, Marié-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson, “Introduction,” in Jane Cowan, MariéBénédicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson, eds., p. 7.
28 “ASEAN Vision 2020,” http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm (accessed July 16, 2010).
29 Richard A. Wilson, “Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction,” in Richard A. Wilson, ed.,Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives, London: Pluto Press, 1997, p. 5.
30 Very similar views are shared by other human rights theorists around the world, including, for example,
Richard A. Wilson, Jack Donnelly and Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously,
London: Duckworth, 1977; Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.
31 Jane Cowan, Marié-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson, p. 3.
32 Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury, eds., Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian Values
Debate, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.
33 Merry, Human Rights & Gender Violence, p.14.
34 Twining, p. 179.
35 Hiro Katsumata, “ASEAN and Human Rights: Resisting Western Pressure or Emulating the West?” The
Pacific Review, Vol. 22, No. 5 (2009), p. 622.
36 An interesting result of these discussions among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has been the creation of the Asian Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights(AICHR) in October 2009. Details on the AICHR may be found on the official website of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, http://www.aseansec.org/22769.htm (accessed July 16, 2010).
37 Abul Hasnat Monjurul Kabir, “Establishing National Human Rights Commissions in South Asia: A
Critical Analysis of the Processes and the Prospects,” Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and theLaw, Vol. 2, No.1 (2001), p. 53.
38 Katsumata, p. 625.
39 At the 1997 “ASEAN-Vision 2020,” it was said: “We see an outward-looking ASEAN playing a pivotal
role in the international fora, and advancing ASEAN common interest.” Similar commitment was expressed in the late 1990s in the Hanoi plan of action, meant: “to promote ASEAN’s standing in the international community and strengthen confidence in ASEAN as an ideal place for investment, trade andtourism.”
40 Talal Asad, “On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment,” in Richard A. Wilson, ed., p.
128.
41 Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, “Establishing a Regional Human Rights Mechanism for the AsiaPacific Region. Report of the Asia Pacific Human Rights Network. Bangkok, February 2004,” AsiaPacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2004), p. 83.
42 Emphasis added by the Author. For an extract of the Welcome Remarks by Dato Param Coomaraswamy
at the 8th Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, see http://www.aseanhrmech.org/downloads/Dato%20Param%20Cumaraswamy.pdf (accessed July 16, 2010).
43 Cha-Am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. See http://
www.aseansec.org/documents/Declaration-AICHR.pdf (accessed July 16, 2010).
44 See Raymond A. Atuguba, “Human Rights and the Limits of Public Interest Law: Ghana’s Reaction toa Messy World Phenomenon,” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1(Spring 2008), pp. 97-128; Oscar Vilhena Vieira, “Public Interest Law: A Brazilian Perspective,” UCLA
Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 2008), pp. 219-262.
45 Edwin Rekosh, “Constructing Public Interest Law: Transnational Collaboration and Exchange in Central and Eastern Europe,” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring2008), pp. 55-96.
46 Clifford Geertz, “Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective,” in Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge, New York: Basic Books, 1983.
47 Twining, op. cit.
48 According to official statistics, in 2005 alone there were 87,000 protests around China. Most of the pro25

86

testors claimed a violation of their rights. See Tracy Quek, “China Riots Won’t Lead to Rebellion,” The
Straits Times, February 12, 2009, http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?sec=1&id=3903 (accessed July16, 2010).

87

Lingua Francas in Higher Education in Northeast Asia and ASEANCountries: Implications for Regional Cooperation on Languages

Sae Shimauchi

Abstract
This research aims to analyze the issues and challenges of language as a medium of instruction in institutions of higher education in East Asian countries in the context of student mobility
and internationalization of higher education. It also explores the possibility of forging regional
cooperation among Northeast Asian and ASEAN countries. In the age of globalization, we arefacing the challenge of coexistence between national languages and with English as the medium
of instruction in institutions of higher education. Language as a medium of instruction is a driving force for student mobility within this region, students’ motivation for learning and upward
social mobility. Instructional language is also tied to the raising of cultural awareness and may
also influence the creation of regional identity. That is, language is not just a tool for education but it also may have a huge impact on the people of East Asia in terms of facilitating crosscultural experiences and creating a future regional identity through regional cooperation andintegration.
This study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of globalization on language issues, such as the dominant role of English in each country’ s approach to the internationalization of higher education. The article also looks at the experience of the European Union
and ASEAN as regional collaboration models, with a main focus on the two organizations’ positions on English and multilingualism in regional dialogue and policy harmonization, i.e., therelationship between English and other languages, in their respective regions. Thirdly, the focusof the discussion shifts to the issue of language in Northeast Asian countries such as Japan,
South Korea and China. The comparison with the EU and ASEAN cases allows us to offer someobservations about the specific situation of language as a medium of instruction in higher education and the trends in student mobility and language policy in Northeast Asia. It is hypothesizedthat language as a medium of instruction impacts students’ motivation to learn, seek mutual
understanding and secure social mobility and future careers, as well as their views of the countries in which they choose to study.
Finally, this research is an attempt to highlight the implications for dialogue and regional
cooperation toward the development of a regional language framework as an element of East
Asian regional integration.

1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the current issues of language as a medium of instruction in the context of internationalization in higher education in Japan, South Korea, China and ASEAN, as they
are key actors in East Asia. Against the backdrop of deepening globalization, the three Northeast
Asian countries and ASEAN countries held an East Asian Summit in 2005 with the aim, among
others, to establish a practical framework for cooperation, alongside the process of internation88

1

alization, in higher education for future East Asian integration. In the dialogue at the East Asian
Summit from 2005 to 2010, the importance of cooperation and the establishment of a regional
2
framework in higher education between ASEAN+3 countries has been well emphasized. Therefore, in this paper, “East Asia” refers to 13 countries: 10 ASEAN member countries, excluding
East Timor, plus Japan, South Korea and China. In the East Asian region, the political, economic
and cultural diversity that exists is a treasure but also an obstacle to regional cooperation. Unlike
the European Union, East Asia does not yet have an institutional framework for regional integration, nor does it have a shared regional identity and norms to support the integration. However,3
people are witnessing increasing student mobility within East Asia. This so-called “de-facto”
integration can be seen especially in the educational field.
Internationalization in higher education has many dimensions. As Knight defined it, internationalization of higher education can be an aim in itself wherein an international, intercultural,or global dimension is incorporated into the purpose, functions or delivery of postsecondary edu4
cation. For example, leading universities around the world are now introducing international/transnational education programs and are expanding agreements for exchanging students among
higher education institutions. Moreover, in the discussion of WTO and GATS (General Agree5
ment on Trade in Services), higher education has become an export commodity. Today, flows ofinternational students represent important economic benefits and countries are eager to develop
programs to attract more international students to their institutions.
6
The ASEAN countries established an ASEAN University Network (AUN) in 1995. AUN
aims to strengthen the existing network of cooperation and promote collaborative programs. AUN
now consists of 26 leading universities from all of the member nations of ASEAN. In Japan,
China and Korea, “Campus Asia” was launched to promote exchange and cooperation among
universities, representing the first trilateral cooperative venture in higher education between
7them. These regional frameworks of cooperation have been developed to enhance regional student mobility and also to respond to the current growing flow of students in East Asian countries.
Traditionally, the flow of international students from Asia was vertical, toward more advanced
Western countries in what Altbach has described as the “Core-Periphery” structure in higher edu8
cation. The vertical flow of international students has yet to become a lateral and horizontal pattern of mobility within East Asia. According to Trow’ s model, higher education is moving from9
an elite-type model towards a massification and universal type of higher education. East Asia is
not an exception. Gross enrollment rates in higher education in East Asia have reached 98% in
10South Korea, 58% in Japan, 23% in China, 45% in Thailand and 35% in Malaysia. With thesehigh enrollment rates, studying abroad is now more accessible to the general public.
In the age of mass and universal types of higher education in East Asia, the role of higher
education for attracting and accommodating globalized human resources has become more andmore important as a source of national benefits and for gaining international competitiveness.
Internationalization of higher education has become a crucial strategy for each country with
11
political, economic, academic and sociocultural rationales. According to Knight, English, as a
medium of education, has become an important tool in increasing the number of incoming students and in promoting the internationalization of education in any country, and East Asia is no
exception. Every international student confronts the issue of language as a medium of instruction
in deciding where to go for a study-abroad experience. Students tend to choose their destination
country based on the language in which they will study, taking into consideration how they canenhance their language proficiency, which they think is important for their future careers. Competency in the English language is an important qualification for university students in many
countries since it is a tool of empowerment that can improve their socioeconomic status in manycases. Therefore, it is important to look at how the countries of the region deal with the issue of
language as a medium of instruction, how they balance the international language and national
89

language, and how they manage the strategy of internationalization in higher education in termsof languages.

2. Triangulation: A Feature of East Asia, Languages and Higher Education
The purpose of this section is to identify the distinct features of languages and language
issues in the region and examine why some issues, which have been debated elsewhere in theworld, have not been discussed in East Asia.
In East Asia, when we discuss language issues, we are always confronted by the historical and political background of the region. However, the language issues are inevitable and aresomething we must face on a daily basis since language is the core element of people’ s communication and solidarity in a society. In comparison with the European Union, which has estab12
lished a regional policy for languages such as “plurilinguaism,” East Asia has two distinguishing aspects we need to consider in discussing language issues in the regional context.
The first aspect relates to the diversity of the region. East Asia is characterized by diversity
in many aspects: culture (including religion and language), politics, economy, geography, and theenvironment. These aspects of diversity are an important asset of this region. Its languages are especially important, as they are the primary means of communication and constitute an importantpart of each culture and its people’ s pride. In terms of linguistic diversity, there are almost 7,000
13languages in the world, and 25% of them are found in the thirteen countries of East Asia. In addition, nine of the regional countries are home to more than 50 languages each: 726 languages
in Indonesia, 293 in China and 175 in the Philippines. In contrast, there is not a single country inEurope that has more than 50 languages within it. Therefore, we can say that East Asia has more
linguistic diversity than Europe. For the countries that contain various small languages, language
policy is a somewhat sensitive issue and is closely related to the unity of the people. In the context of East Asia, we can say that language policy is a matter of importance for national sovereignty and is also associated with national educational policy, which should be free of interference by other nations. Therefore, even when East Asian countries have discussed and developed
various kinds of regional cooperative frameworks in education, especially in higher education, in
recent years, there has been little discussion on regional cooperation in language issues.
Secondly, a language is not just a tool for learning. Many East Asian countries experienced
educational imperialism and cultural, social and linguistic assimilation in the colonial period during the 19th and 20th centuries. Then, a language was not just a means of communication; it wasalso an instrument of command and control over the country under imperialism, used to influence
the occupied people into complying with the dominant power and to embed the colonial power’ sknowledge and academic system in the colonized country. After gaining independence from thecolonial powers such as England, France and Japan, many East Asian countries struggled to establish governance and self-determination and to achieve national unification. Language policy is
one of the fundamental requirements for a new government to unify its citizens, establish nationstates and develop a stronger national identity. So, these countries consider language issues tobe a matter of national sovereignty with which outsiders should not interfere. Given this background, East Asia is lagging behind other regions, such as Europe, in the development of a policyof harmonization to achieve common objectives and deal with common language issues, including the role of languages.
Meanwhile, the regional language policy suggested by this study concerns itself with a morefeasible field for future regional cooperation compared to other language-related areas, such as
language rights and preservation of minority languages in East Asia. A student’ s linguistic proficiency in higher education can be an additional asset that complements, not replaces, his/her90

proficiency in his/her mother tongue or other languages related to his/her identity. In this author’ sview, therefore, it is possible and proper to consider how the East Asian community might discuss and deal with language issues, especially the role of language as a medium of instruction inhigher education in this region in the context of regional cooperation.
The languages that can be acquired through education, work and increasing mobility are theones people would choose. Students in higher education in East Asia are now moving around theworld through international collaborative frameworks and international programs that are proliferating in East Asian higher education. Students start to acquire and improve their new languages
through the instruction they receive in higher education and through social communication in
14
destination countries. In addition, the middle class in Asian countries will grow in the future
and, as we noted earlier, gross enrollment rates in higher education are already getting higher.
Now, in the age of globalization, we witness increasing use of English in the international arena
including higher education and communication among international students. English and its expanding power is also an important issue we need to discuss in the context of East Asian higher
education.

3. Language as a Medium of Instruction in Higher Education: Theoretical Frameworks
Traditionally, international students from East Asia studied abroad in Western countries. P.G.
Altbach characterized Asian universities as imported models of Western universities and pointed
15
to their post-colonial structure. In the age of globalization, however, we are witnessing greaterinternational student mobility within East Asia. Jane Knight has pointed out that an unexpected16
result of globalization is the growing importance of regions. In East Asia, we are witnessing
burgeoning student mobility, international cooperation and institutional networks in higher education. In this phenomenon of "regionalization" many countries are attempting to establish themselves as a regional educational hub “to capitalize on the growing demand for higher educationfrom Asian countries and the desire to increase their competitiveness in research and technol17
ogy.” In addition, many elite universities in East Asia have recently appeared in world rankingsand seem to be gaining international competitiveness. At the same time, most higher education
institutions in the region seek to attract more international students through so-called “international programs,” which enable international students to study in English without knowing the
local language or languages of the destination country. English has acted as a driving force forstudents in East Asia.
According to David Crystal, English has already become the lingua franca in East Asia inpolitical dialogue, civil society and university life, and for university students it is now a key
18
19
incentive to study abroad. Crystal is a positive promoter of “New Englishes” and favors thefurther expansion of the role of English in global communication. He acknowledges that the history of a global language can be traced through the successful expansion of military, political andeconomic power, such as British imperial power and the current dominance of U.S. power, but
he argues that English is no longer associated with the political authority it once held. According to him, English is a “neutral” tool for communication that can facilitate regional cooperationand social integration. He also maintains, “[I]t is inevitable that a global language will eventually come to be used by more people than any other language. English has already reached this20
stage.” Crystal sums up, “English is playing a central role in empowering the subjugated and21
marginalized, and eroding the division between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’.”
In contrast, Robert Phillipson points to the possible linguistic divide among East Asian
citizens. According to him, learning to use English as an international language has served theinterests of English speaking countries and countries which host international students, and, as a91

consequence, the process has perpetuated the North-South gap and exploitation. English has also22
brought a linguistic disparity between elite and non-elite inside each country. He observes thataccess to the dominant language (English) is very unequally distributed and, consequently, a linguistic divide within a country can be a major concern and challenge for the government and this23
calls for intense discussion.
Phillipson agrees with Crystal on the point that English is now entrenched worldwide, asa result of British colonialism, international interdependence and ‘revolutions’ in technology,transport, communications and commerce. However, the difference between these two scholars isthat Phillipson sees the dominant role of English in the context of power relations, as English is
the language of the United States, the major economic, political and military force in the contemporary world. His working definition of English Imperialism is that “the dominance of English
is asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and24
cultural inequalities between English and other languages.” He also asserts that “in the earlycolonial phase of imperialism, the elites in the Periphery consisted of the colonizers themselves,
whether as settlers or administrators. In present day neo-colonialism, the elites are to a large
extent indigenous, but most of them have strong links with Centre. Many of them have been
educated in Centre countries and/or through the medium of the Centre language and old colonial
25
language.” According to Phillipson, English is used widely to maintain and further expand supranational and international links; English linguistic imperialism operates globally as a key me26
dium of Center-Periphery relations.
Phillipson’ s argument is based on the Core-Periphery theory, according to which dominantnation-states reign over the countries in the Periphery. The unequal power relationship exists because the Core countries possess much greater structural resources, including higher education
institutions – specifically universities and academic publishers – than countries in the Periphery.
Gramsci’ s theory can also explain the language issue in higher education in East Asia. His
writings have influenced many scholars and there are many interpretations and applications of
his theory of hegemony and language. According to Peter Ives, for example, English is a requisite for upward social mobility and attainment of privileged positions in society. Therefore, notonly elites but also the general public who understand that the language provides the access andopportunity to power, capital and resources “spontaneously” choose English as their medium oflearning in higher education. Cultural invasion is directly tied to individuals’ “spontaneous” desire and takes place through mass media, the Internet, international mobility and flow of human27
resources and student exchange. This “spontaneousity” is a very important analytical concept
to understand student gravitation toward English in East Asia. The expansion of English is surely
influenced by the internationalization of higher education and reflects the strategy used by governments and educational institutions that expect to gain economic benefits from increasing theirstudent population. However, the growing population of students studying in English is actually
driven by the individual students’ desire to gain competence in the global language in the process
Gramsci called “spontaneousity.”
Therefore, we must try to understand what role lingua franca plays in higher education in
East Asia from individual students’ perspectives and how the language they choose promotes regional integration.

4. Lessons from the EU Experience
Economic and political integration in the East Asian region is years behind EU integration.
In terms of regionalization in higher education and student mobility in East Asia, this author believes there is much to be learned from the experience and the philosophical background of the92

EU policy.
In Europe, despite the successful integration process in the fields of trade, economy, finance28
and law, there seems to be resistance to cultural integration. European countries have maintained the belief that the cultural and linguistic pluralism that exists among them is a part of their
historical heritage and is an important asset to be preserved. Confronted with language issues,
such as the triangular structure of global language (English), national language (official languagein each nation), and regional or local language, in the process of regional integration, the EU has
developed three important norms and frameworks for regional coordination and cooperation.
The first element is the LINGUA plan and SOCRATES program. The original purpose of
the LINGUA plan was to facilitate regional mobility of the labor force through the enhancementof workers’ foreign language competency while preserving the existing linguistic diversity inthe region. Along with the regional higher education policy known as the Erasmus program, the29
LINGUA plan was integrated into the SOCRATES program in 1995. The SOCRATES programis designed to facilitate intercultural interaction and cross-border mobility of students in Europe.
Europe, as one region, has set clear objectives in its educational policy to support study abroadand student mobility. The SOCRATES program also contributes to the enhancement of mutual
understanding by giving students the opportunity to learn foreign languages and experience foreign cultures. The EU’ s program locates the regional language policy (i.e., the LINGUA plan)
within the higher education policy (the SOCRATES program), both committed to the deepeningof mutual understanding.
The second element is the original norms of “plurilingual” education for European residents.
“Plurilingualism” was advanced by the language policy division of the Council of Europe. The
core idea is that every EU citizen is expected to command two foreign languages besides her/30
his own mother tongue. Since language proficiency is considered an important basis for knowl31
edge-based societies, emphasis on foreign language acquisition has grown. To supplement theplurilingual education policy, the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages
has been introduced as a guideline for assessing and monitoring foreign language acquisition
with the aim of facilitating intercultural interaction and the cross-border mobility of students and32
workers in Europe. Within this framework an implementing scheme called “European Language
Portfolio” (ELP) has been developed, according to which students can evaluate their language
proficiency and progress in their foreign language learning. These collaborative frameworks on
the practical and ideational levels help EU countries share plurilingual education as a common
experience.
Lastly, the establishment of the “European Year of Languages” is a symbolic expression of
the commitment of the EU members to the promotion of language learning as an important element of regional integration. To encourage language learning by all persons residing in Europe,
enhance the recognition of multilingualism and raise awareness of the linguistic and cultural diversity in the European Union, many policy measures have been established, including some de33
signed to preserve the languages of minority and immigrant communities. Regarding the EU’ semphasis on multilingualism, questions are often raised about the definition of multilingualism
and the scope of activities to be undertaken to preserve the region’ s linguistic diversity. Multilingualism in EU operations stands for its cultural wealth but it also entails a huge burden in termsof financial and human resource commitment.
Implementation of multilingual or plurilingual education policy might be beneficial to East
Asian countries in preserving the region’ s linguistic diversity and respect of the differences, but
it would also impose a huge financial burden. East Asian countries would need to allocate hugebudgets to carry out such a policy, and it would not be realistic. However, the European experience suggests that we need to promote discussions about regional cooperation in language policy
among East Asian countries both at the government and institutional levels, and in both practical93

and philosophical terms. As we will discuss in detail in the following pages, the laissez-faire liberalism in language expansion would lead to the dominance of English in East Asia.

5. English as the Lingua Franca in ASEAN Countries(1) The Limitation of Multilingualism
In the EU case, the more official EU languages exist, the more challenges arise. Multilingual situations require more human resources and financial burdens than monolingual situations.
ASEAN, whose economic size is smaller than EU, has difficulty setting up every national language of the ASEAN countries as an official language and employing translators and interpreters in international conferences. Moreover, in the 27 countries in the EU, more than 95% of EU
citizens are speaking in their official languages that the EU has established. On the other hand,
ASEAN has more linguistic diversity so that even if they chose the dominant languages in eachnation, they would not be the first languages for the majority of ASEAN citizens. So, it is not realistic to implement multilingual dialogue at a regional level as in the EU.
ASEAN member countries have held dialogues about regional cooperation in the context
of ASEAN integration. The first statement on the language issue appeared in the “Vientiane Ac34
tion Program” issued at the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos in 2004. Article 3.4 of the
Action Program, “Promoting an ASEAN Identity,” refers to the agreement to ”mainstream thepromotion of ASEAN awareness and regional identity in national communications plans andeducational curricula, people-to-people contact including through arts, tourism and sports, especially among the youth, and the promotion of ASEAN languages [sic] learning through scholar35
ships and exchanges of linguists.” This Action Program emphasized the significance of regional
identity for the ASEAN citizens and recognized ASEAN languages as an essential element of36
boosting common identity. Agreement among the ASEAN countries on pursuing common objectives is a recent development and they still face difficulties in carrying out the regional policyin this area at a practical level. ASEAN is a region with many ethnic communities and languages,
and how to define “ASEAN languages” (whether to include only official/national languages orminority languages as well), and how to balance English as the de-facto common language indialogues at government, market and civic levels still remain important questions.
English has become the dominant language in ASEAN. Already in 2007, Article 34 of the37
ASEAN Charter stated, “the working language of ASEAN shall be English.” As Kirkpatrick observes, English is functioning as the lingua franca in ASEAN in various forms for communicative
38
strategies. In higher education, the ASEAN University Network (AUN) was founded in 1995 by
ASEAN member states and is currently composed of 26 leading universities and colleges fromall ASEAN states. The purpose of AUN is to promote human resource development in higher education in ASEAN, and it cooperates with ASEAN dialogue partners including Japan, Korea andChina; additionally, most of the programs that facilitate student mobility and enhance academic
39
exchanges are conducted in English.
In the next section, we will look at the cases of Malaysia and Thailand. Both countries are
now trying to become educational hubs in the ASEAN region and are actively internationalizing
their higher education systems. They have different historical backgrounds, including that of theestablishment of higher education and language as a medium of instruction in universities, butthese cases illustrate how the language issue in higher education is handled.
(2) Malaysia: Transnational Programs and Issues
Until the 1980s, the Malaysian government focused on the role of education for national
40
unification and the formation of national identity. With globalization gathering momentum, the94strengthening of international competitiveness and fostering of global human resources became
international trends; hence Malaysia was faced with the need for policy reform. Malaysia has
been well known as a country with a large number of its students studying abroad, and its brain
drain issue has become quite serious since the 1990s. In response, the country has actively promoted English as a medium of instruction, instead of Malay.
According to Sugimura, Malaysia has taken this strategy for two reasons. First, education
with Malay as a medium of instruction has caused a decline in students’ linguistic performanceof English, in the country. Secondly, education in Malay has proven inadequate to follow international academic trends. To enhance its international competitiveness, Malaysia has recognized41
the necessity of educating its students in English. The reintroduction of English in the Malaysian education system after the British imperial period shows the recognition of English as an international language. Even though Malay is used by the majority of Malaysian citizens, it cannot
replace English, which enables them to access the international academic world.
The Malaysian higher education system is also well known for its “transnational programs.”
These programs are conducted in cooperation with overseas higher education institutions withEnglish as the medium of instruction. Transnational programs have been developed in responseto the increasing demand for higher education and liberalization of education as a service. Malaysia is now eager to expand its higher education system into the global market in order to attract more international students from the neighboring countries and to become an “educationalhub” in the region. Malaysia has been sending many of its students to English speaking countries
such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and has also been receiving an
increasing number of international students from the neighboring ASEAN countries, as well as
42
Northeast countries such as China and South Korea. Malaysia is proud to have various types oftransnational programs enabling students to study in English with lower academic fees than theircounterparts in English speaking countries.
These types of transnational programs represent a new type of study abroad experience.
Some higher education institutions in Malaysia provide various types of international programsand transcend national borders. English as a medium of instruction in these transnational programs provides a broader opportunity for those who are willing to study abroad and enables Malaysia to receive international students instead of just sending their students.
(3) Thailand: Strategies toward Becoming an “Educational Hub”
Thailand has kicked “internationalization of higher education” into high gear with a longterm higher education policy that started in 1990 and has provided “international programs”
taught in English. The beneficiaries of these programs are mainly local Thai students. Thai institutions of higher education also actively accept students from overseas and cooperate with theircounterparts abroad. As in the Malaysian case, the Thai government also aims to be an “educa43
tional hub” through a campaign to accept 50,000 international students by 2011.
An example of a Thai international program can be seen at Chulalongkorn University, theleading national university in the country. It started offering a BALAC (Bachelor of Arts Pro44
gram in Language and Culture) in 2008. This program requires both students and administrators
to use English as a common language and students are able to choose from a wide range of languages offered through the Faculty of Arts, including such Eastern languages as Chinese, Japanese and Korean, and Western languages such as French, German, Spanish, Italian and Russian.
However, no ASEAN languages, such as Malay or Filipino, are included in this program. The
director of the BALAC program states that the reason this program does not offer any regional
language is that there is no demand from the students’ side to learn any ASEAN languages since45
English is already commonly used in interactions among ASEAN countries and people. He adds
that languages such as French, Japanese and Korean are popular among their students due to their95

attraction to the cultures associated with those languages.
This kind of international program in Thailand has targeted both local Thai students andinternational students from the surrounding countries whose families are temporarily living in
Thailand. Programs in English enable the students to study in a common language that is widelyused internationally, and also offer them more access financially and geographically.
(4) English as the Lingua Franca in ASEANAs Sugimura points out, study abroad has different aspects: one is the aspect of international
cultural exchange and mutual understanding among international students and local people in thehost countries. Another aspect is the political and economic role of national strategies to compete
46
for human capital and greater international presence. In the cases of Malaysia and Thailand,
the latter aspect can be seen through the use of English as a medium of instruction. However,
it is difficult to assess the former dimension, which is the facilitation of mutual understanding
and cultural exchange. International programs with English as the medium of instruction haveobviously opened the door for international students to study in non-English speaking countries.
However, the sociocultural impact is still not clearly conceptualized by stakeholders in those programs.

6. English as an International Language and National Languages as Alternatives(1) China
China is promoting the study of the Chinese language to increase the number of international students coming to China. In the process of promoting internationalization in higher education,
China has strategically established Confucius Institutes at overseas higher education institutions
47
in conjunction with the promotion of international economic and trade relations. Confucius Institutes represent efforts to project Chinese soft power. They are sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Education for the purpose of teaching and expanding the Chinese language and culture, as
well as for enhancing intercultural understanding. The first Confucius Institute was established inSeoul in 2004, and the number of Confucius Institutes has increased very rapidly in higher education institutions all over the world. There were almost 300 institutes in 88 countries as of the48
end of 2009. Chinese soft power has been applied to the “nationalization” of higher education atforeign universities.
This project is a new model of language policy by one country that is tied to higher education institutions. Confucius Institutes are flexible and can adapt to overseas higher education
institutions with different organizational structures and financial support systems. However, China’ s very active export of its national language and culture and the rapid increase in the numberof Confucius Institutes around the world have brought about negative reactions and criticisms.
Yang has insisted that Confucius Institutes are “the most systematically planned soft power poli49
cy so far.” Since Confucius Institutes are tightly connected with overseas higher education, theChinese strategy to promote their national language can be interpreted as a nationalist campaign
50
and as a political strategy rather than a cultural and academic strategy.
(2) South Korea
The English education boom that has been seen in South Korea in the last decade reflects
the Koreans’ special interest in English as a global language. It is worthwhile to note that South
Korea depends on trade for 92% of its GDP. The international emphasis of Korean corporations
explains why many internationally well known companies in South Korea require their new employees to have TOEIC (English proficiency test) scores higher than 900. English is now not only96

51

a requirement for new employees but also a condition for graduation from universities. Moreover, South Korea incorporated English language education into the primary school curriculumin 1997. The boom in learning English among the Korean people is called “English fever.” Many
parents are willing to have their children study English at an early educational stage and private
English teaching institutes have proliferated rapidly, especially in the urban areas of the country.
Studying abroad in English speaking countries, including the Philippines as a cheap destination,
has also become popular among the relatively high economic status families, even for primary
52
school children.
Some high schools in South Korea have also started using English as a medium of instruction. The Korean Minjok Leadership Academy was established in 1996 “to provide academic
tools necessary to achieve the highest levels of excellence and leadership,” “to contribute
positively to the welfare of Korea” and “to contribute a major share to the progress of the world
53
community.” Most of the teachers in the Academy received PhDs from universities in English
speaking countries and the Academy’ s graduates tend to pursue studies in leading universities in
the United States and top universities in South Korea.
“English fever” can be seen not only among the elite students but also among those studying
in Japanese universities and colleges. According to this author’ s interviews with Korean students
in Tokyo, some plan to take advantage of their universities’ student exchange programs and go
to the United States, for example, to pursue further studies in English. This desire illustrates
that Korean students are keen to have high levels of English proficiency even though they are
54
studying in Japan and have attained advanced levels of Japanese language proficiency. To them,English is indispensable both in education and in career pursuits.
Similar to the Confucius Institutes which aim to promote a national language, Korean
Cultural Institutes incorporated Korean language institutes as “King Sejong Institutes,” and they55
plan to expand up to 150 locations around the world by 2015. The King Sejong Institutes havealso been established in cooperation with overseas higher education institutions so that people
find them similar to the Confucius Institutes set up by the Chinese government. The number ofKing Sejong Institutes has started to expand as recently as 2009 and their impacts have not yet
been reported, but it is worthwhile to follow how they will expand.
As seen above, in contrast to the English fever that grew voluntarily and spontaneously
in Korean society, the King Sejong Institutes represent a national policy designed to promote
Korea’ s national language to the world. This can be related to the development of nationalism
in Korea. Nationalism in Korea expressed itself in the promotion of the Korean language during
the period of Japanese imperialism before World War II. Korean nationalism was also evident in
the official language promotion for national unification by the newly independent government inpostwar Korea. In the age of globalization, however, strong promotion of languages is seen bothin the spread of English as an international language and in the promotion of the Korean language as a national language.
(3) Japan
56
In 2007, The Japanese government published the “Asian Gateway Initiative,” emphasizing
the importance of attracting and fostering international human resources in the country and forJapan to become a hub for human networks. Japan also recognized the need to internationalize
higher education in the country as part of a national strategy to define Japan as an integral partof Asia. In 2008, the former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda pledged to pursue an Asian version of
the Erasmus Plan. In 2010, the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and China agreed to hold a symposium on “Campus Asia” to facilitate academic exchange and student mobility among the three57
countries at the higher education level. Japan seems to be supportive of regional cooperation
among the ASEAN+3 countries.
97

While South Korea and China have adopted language policies promoting their national
languages to the world especially in the context of overseas higher education, Japan seems to be
reticent about adopting a national language policy. One reason for this may very well be that thenation has the negative historical legacy of educational imperialism in Asia during its imperialist period. If the Japanese government establishes active language and cultural institutes similar
to the Confucius Institutes or the King Sejong Institutes, reaction from former colonial countries
will be very negative and damaging to Japan’ s image.
The Japan Foundation is a government-affiliated organization that supports Japanese language and cultural education overseas, but it does not seek close institutional collaboration withhigher education institutions abroad; in this sense, it differs from the Confucius Institutes or
the King Sejong Institutes. While the number of people studying the Japanese language has increased, especially in Asian countries (80% of them in East Asia and Southeast Asia), students inhigher education institutions studying Japanese represent around 25% of all Japanese language
58
learners. A review of Japanese language education published by the Japan Foundation contains
various kinds of research around Japanese language education, but the focus of most research islimited to micro perspectives such as classroom practices, curriculum and evaluation systems and59
so on. Macro perspectives on Japanese language policy cannot be found in the projects sponsored by the Japan Foundation.

7. Conclusion: Implications
Globalization has brought English to East Asia as the dominant language in international
discourse. English has become an indispensable language, the lingua franca in academic, eco60
nomic and political lives in the region. English is also the linguistic promoter of the “regional61
ization” of higher education in East Asia. We are witnessing different reactions to this phenomenon among the East Asian countries. We see in the Korean, Japanese and Chinese cases thateach government is showing its own vision for fostering the competence of its students who are
proficient in English to compete in the global market; at the same time, their visions for arresting
the decline of their own national languages differ as well. The perceived imbalance between national languages and the global/international language is a common challenge in East Asia, as itis elsewhere in the world.
The cooperative process of language policy formulation for the region as a whole is not
only an issue for ASEAN; it is also a key question for Japan, South Korea and China. Due to thegrowing interdependence in the East Asian region, dialogue between the ASEAN countries andtheir Northeast Asian partners about regional cooperation in general has continued during the62last decade, and now, they need to decide how to ensure policy harmonization in many areas,
including educational cooperation and regional language policy. In order to facilitate student
mobility and academic exchanges and to foster regional citizens’ ability to contribute to the future development of an East Asian community, it is necessary to establish a regional cooperative
scheme in higher education and languages as a medium of instruction.
Looking at the internationalization of higher education in East Asia, it is very clear that
English has become the lingua franca in higher education within the region. We have also seenthat there are different interpretations regarding English as a global language. It is not sufficient
simply to criticize the current dominance of English as a lingua franca; we also need to ask ourselves whether the dominance of English as a global language is beneficial for deepening mutual
understanding and promoting regional integration in East Asia. The presupposition which defines
English as the de facto lingua franca may neglect the reality of multilingual coexistence in East
Asia, overlook the rights and interests of the people who do not have access to English, and ob98

scure the reasons and methods by which this inequality was created. The disparity between theelite who have an advanced command of English and the non-elite who do not benefit from theinternationalization of higher education is growing wider and wider. Since English is seen as theprincipal language of instruction in higher education, programs that had been conducted in national languages are being replaced by English, as can be seen in many cases mentioned in thisarticle. This division is a negative aspect of the global expansion of English.
The recognition of the dominant role of English as the lingua franca and the internationalization of higher education based on that acknowledgement neglect the fact that one of the treasures of the East Asian region is cultural diversity. Since culture and language are intertwined,language learning and practice will definitely contribute to mutual understanding between peoples and countries with different cultures. In the process of regional integration, the European
Union decided to have a clear vision for language policy in the region as a whole, and the policy
is known as “plurilingualism.” In contrast, East Asian countries have scarcely had any discussion
about a framework for language policy in the context of regional cooperation in higher education.
On the contrary, in this region, especially in Northeast Asian countries, language policy takes ona strictly nationalistic hue, and language issues tend to be framed in nationalistic terms, as wehave seen through the examples of the Confucius Institutes and the King Sejong Institutes.
The issues of language as a medium of instruction in higher education and as a catalyst for
student mobility are obviously interrelated. Because of the globalization process and the associ63
ated focus on one dominant language, many minority languages are in danger of disappearing,and even national languages appear to be losing their power in each regional country’ s effort tofacilitate international student mobility. Language issues as they relate to the internationalizationof higher education have been taken up only at the national level; they have escaped attention at
the regional level. Language policy issues are raised only in the context of national sovereignty
and sensitive political issues in East Asian countries. As a result, international cooperation in education within the East Asian region, especially regarding language issues, is rarely a topic even in
the context of higher education. To remedy the situation, we need to bring up language issues inour discussion of regional integration, with particular attention to advancing regional cooperationin higher education and regional language policy at both the practical and the ideational level.

Notes
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8

99

Chairman’s statement at the East Asia Summit (EAS), October 30, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/eas/pdfs/state101030.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), The East Asia Summit, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/
area/eas/index.html (accessed January 15, 2011).
Kazuo Kuroda, “Possibilities and Challenges in Constructing a New Regional Collaborative Educational Framework in Asia,” GIARI Working Paper, June 2009.
Jane Knight, “Updating the Definition of Internationalization,” International Higher Education, No. 33(Fall 2003), pp. 2-3.
Akira Ninomiya, “Ajia Getowei Senryaku Kaigi ga Egaku Ryugakusei Senryaku to UMAP no Yakuwari: Ikinai Ryugaku Koryu Keikaku no Kanosei wo Chushin to Shite” (International student strategy
and the role of UMAP drawn by Asia Gateway Strategy Conference: With a focus on the possibility ofa study-abroad exchange plan within the region), Ajia Kenkyu (Asian studies), Vol. 54, No. 4 (October2008), p. 60.
ASEAN University Network, http://www.aun-sec.org/ (accessed December 27, 2010).
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, “‘Campus Asia’ Launched,” http://
www.mext.go.jp/english/koutou/1292773.htm (accessed December 27, 2010).
Phillip G. Altbach and V. Selvaratnam, Ajia no Daigaku Juzoku kara Jiritsu e (Asian universities: From

dependency to autonomy), Tokyo: Tamagawadaigaku Shuppanbu, 1993.
Martin Trow, Kogakureki Shakai no Daigaku (Universities in high academic career-based society), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1976; and Martin Trow, Kodo Joho Shakai no Daigaku (Universities
in advanced information society), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2000.
10 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Global Education Digest 2010, Comparing Education Statistics acrossthe World, http://www.ifap.ru/library/book482.pdf (accessed December 10, 2010).
11 Jane Knight, “Internationalization of Higher Education,” Quality and Internationalization in Higher
Education, Paris: OECD, 1999, pp.13-28.
12 Commission of the European Communities, “The Implementation and Results of the European Year of
Languages 2001,” COM (2002) 597 final, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ education_culture/evalreports/languages/2002/eyl2001/EYL2001xpCOM_en.pdf (accessed January 7, 2010).
13 Ethnologue, Languages of the World (web version), SIL International (16th ed.), http://www.ethnologue.
com/web.asp (accessed 15 January, 2011). According to SIL (Summer Institute of Linguistics, UnitedStates), there are 6,909 languages in the world, and 1,784 of them are in the East Asian region (ASEAN
countries, Japan, South Korea and China). These numbers include sign languages, and a few languages
have no speakers.
14 Peter Schwartz and Peter Leyden, The Long Boom: A Vision For The Coming Age of Prosperity, New
York: Basic Books, 2000, p. 126
15 Philip G. Altbach and Toru Umakoshi, Asian Universities: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary
Challenges, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2004.
16 Jane Knight, Higher Education in Turmoil: The Changing World of Internationalization, Rotterdam/
Taipei: Sense Publishers, 2008.
17 Ibid., p. 5.
18 David Crystal, English as a Global Language, Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
19 The English language is going to be influenced by those who speak it as a second or foreign language,
so regional national varieties of English are increasingly being used with prestige on the international
scene (Crystal, pp. 172-173).
20 Crystal, p. 6.
21 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
22 Robert Phillipson, Linguistic Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 47.
25 Ibid., p. 52.
26 Ibid., pp. 52-56.
27 Peter Ives, Language & Hegemony in Gramsci, London: Pluto Press, 2004.
28 Hidashi Judit, “How to Maintain Identity within the Integration Process in EU?” Ibunka Communication Kenkyu, Vol. 16 (2004), p. 47.
29 The Council of Europe, Higher Education and Research, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/default_EN.asp? (accessed January 15, 2011).
30 The Council of Europe, Language Policy Division, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/ linguistic/Default_en.asp(accessed January 15, 2011).
31 Mizue Yuzurihara, “EU no Tagengoshugi to Gengo Kyoiku Seisaku” (Multilingualism and language
education policy in EU), in Toshiro Tanaka, Katsuhiro Shoji and Masae Asami, eds., EU no Gabanansu
to Seisaku Kettei (Governance and policy formation in EU), Tokyo: Keio Daigaku Shuppankai, 2009,
pp. 39-60.
32 Judit, p. 47.
33 The Implementation and Results of the European Year of Languages 2001, COM (2002) 597 final,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/evalreports/languages/2002/eyl2001/EYL2001xpCOM_
en.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011).
34 ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity, “Vientiane Action Programme,” http://www.asean biodiversity.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=101 (accessed January 15, 2011).
35 “Vientiane Action Programme,” http://www.aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN% 20Summit.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011).
36 Megumi Sakamoto, “ASEAN Ikinai ni okeru ‘Gengo Ken’ no Ninshiki to Gengo Seisaku ni Tsuite,”

9100

(Recognition of the “right to a language” and language policy in the ASEAN region), Fukushima
Daigaku Chiiki Sozo, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2005), pp. 30-31.
37 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, http://www.aseansec.org/ 21069.pdf (accessed
January 6, 2011).
38 Andy Kirkpatrick, “English as the Official Working Language of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN): Features and Strategies,” English Today 94, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2008), pp. 27-34.
39 ASEAN University Network, http://www.aun-sec.org/ (accessed January 6, 2011).
40 Miki Sugimura, “Ajia ni okeru Ryugakusei Seisaku to Ryugakusei Ido” (International student policy
and student mobility in Asia), Ajia Kenkyu (Asian studies), Vol. 54, No. 4 (October 2008), pp. 10-25.
41 Ibid.
42 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, op. cit.
43 Takao Kamibeppu, “Asia Taiheiyo ni okeru Daigakukan no Koryu no Kakudai,” (Expansion of cooperation among universities in Asia-Pacific), in Saishu Hokokusho Heisei 20 nendo Monbukagaku-sho Sendoteki Daigakukaikaku Suishin Itaku Jigyo (Final report 2008. Ministry of Education leading university
reform promotion commissioned project), 2009.
44 Bachelor of Arts Program in Language and Culture, Chulalongkorn University, http://www.arts.chula.
ac.th/~balac/index.html (accessed January 7, 2011).
45 “ Educational Good Practice Symposium: International Development of Higher Education in thest
21 Century–English Connecting Global Campuses, Part 3,” oral presentation by Dr. Chotiudopant
Suradech, Director of BALAC Program, Chulalongkorn University, organized by the School of LiberalStudies, Waseda University, November 13, 2010.
46 Sugimura, op. cit.
47 For information on the Confucius Institutes, see “About Confucius Institutes,” at http://english.hanban.
org/ (accessed January 7, 2011).
48 “About Confucius Institutes,” http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm (accessed January 7, 2011).
49 Rui Yang, “Soft Power and Higher Education: An Examination of China’s Confucius Institutes,” Globalization, Societies and Education, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2010), p. 235.
50 Sankei Web News, “Rapid Increase of Chinese Language Education Institutes in Thailand,” January 25,
2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/asia/090125/ asi0901251821001-n1.htm (accessed July 1, 2009).
51 AERA English, December 2010, Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan, pp.12-27.
52 Sae Shimauchi, “International Student Policy in South Korea,” in Report of Research Survey on Laborand Economic Policy Focusing on Capacity Development of International Students Overseas, Benesse
Cooperation and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2009, pp. 112-163.
53 Korean Minjok Leadership Academy, www.minjok.hs.kr (accessed January 8, 2011).
54 The interviews were done in 2010 with five Korean undergraduate students who were studying at Waseda University. Among them, two female students had studied abroad (two in the United States and one
in the United Kingdom) and two male students had just returned to study after military service in South
Korea. All five students were enrolled in Waseda University as international students and taking courses
taught in Japanese. All of them had good command of academic Japanese but they said they needed to
study English because otherwise it would be difficult to get a job back in South Korea.
55 JoongAng Ilbo, October 5, 2009, http://japanese.joins.com/article/article.php?aid= 121188&servcode=400&sectcode=400 (accessed January 8, 2011).
56 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Council for Asian Gateway Initiative,” http://www.kantei.
go.jp/foreign/gateway/index_e.html (accessed 8 January 8, 2011).
57 Gaimusho (MOFA), “Summary of Japan-Korea-China Summit, 30 May, 2010,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/
mofaj/area/jck/summit2010/gaiyo_1005.html (accessed January 8, 2011).
58 Japan Foundation, 2009 Kaigai Nihongo Kyoiku Kikan Chosa (A survey of Japanese language education institutions overseas, 2009), http://www.jpf.go.jp/j/japanese/survey/result/dl/news_2009_01.pdf(accessed January 15, 2011).
59 Japan Foundation, Nihongo Kyoiku Kiyo (Review of Japanese language education), http://www.jpf.
go.jp/j/japanese/survey/bulletin/index.html (accessed January 15, 2011).
60 Robert Phillipson, Linguistic Imperialism Continued, London: Routledge, 2010.
61 Jane Knight, Higher Education in Turmoil: The Changing World of Internationalization, Rotterdam/
Taipei: Sense Publishers, 2008.
62 MOFA, “East Asia Summit,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/eas/index.html (accessed January

101

63

15, 2011).
Tove Skutnab-Kangas, Linguistic Genocide in Education—or Worldwide Diversity and Human Rights?
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000.

102

Apirat Petchsiri, José Luis de Sales Marques and William Roth, eds.,
Promoting Human Rights in Asia and Europe: The Role of Regional
Integration, Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Publishing House, 2009.

Miki Honda

1. Introduction
In its newly launched charter, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), under1
its motto “One Vision, One Identity, and One Caring and Sharing Community,” envisions itself
some four decades after its creation in 1967. With the introduction of the new charter in November 2007, ASEAN hopes to accelerate its integration by putting it on a similar legal footing to theEuropean Union, making it, in the words of the Association’ s Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan,“more rules-based and more people-oriented.”2
The Charter enumerates ASEAN’ s purposes and principles and establishes formal rights andexpectations of the member states, but the Association’ s reluctance to act on its own rules may
be the greatest obstacle to realizing its long-term goal of establishing EU-style unification. Most
observers are concerned that the ASEAN policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs ofmember states continues to serve as an excuse to do little in the face of human rights violations.
Through a highly controversial process, ASEAN foreign ministers created a High Level
3
Panel in 2008 and a year later the member states at last agreed on the terms for the human rights
4
body stipulated in the charter, to be known as the Asian International Commission on Human
5
Rights (AICHR). However, no one is sure what effect the AICHR will have on the ongoing human rights abuses in the region.
Promoting Human Rights in Asia and Europe: The Role of Regional Integration explores
the relations between regional integration and human rights in Asia through a comparison withthose in Europe. Two questions are raised in this volume: Whether there exists a relationshipbetween the efforts at regional integration and the implementation of human rights; and whether,in comparison with the expansion of the promotion of human rights in the European Union bothinternally and externally, the cause of human rights would necessarily be advanced if regional
integration were to occur in Asia.
This book is unique in three respects. Firstly, it attempts to see whether there is a relationship of some form between different degrees of regional integration and degrees of respect forhuman rights values by the parties involved in the process of integration. While Europe is generally regarded as a promoter of norms, namely democracy and human rights, Asia is often regarded as a more despotic region. Yet the integration in the modern context is a world phenomenon,
and both Asia and Europe are now experiencing it. Secondly, the views presented by the contributors to this book are multidisciplinary in nature, from those of economics and political science,to law and jurisprudence. Thirdly, the contents of this book present contributions from scholars
at a wide range of career stages, from distinguished professors to young scholars, the more seniorscholars including Ali M. El-Agraa, a prominent economist, and Vitit Muntarbhorn, a professorof law at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.
This volume is the eighth in the EU-Network of European Studies Centres in Asia ’ s(NESCA) Research Dialogue Book Series, representing the results of the EU-NESCA joint research agenda. The project comprises four European and five Asian universities: Justus-Liebig103

University Giessen in Germany, the Institute of European Studies at Free University of Brussels
in Belgium; Fondation Nationale des Science Politiques in Paris; the University of Warwick in
the UK; the Institute of European Studies in Macao, China; the Centre of European Studies atFudan University in Shanghai; Korea University in Korea; the Interdisciplinary Department ofEuropean Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok; and the National Centre for Researchon Europe at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. The EU-NESCA project, launched in
2006, aims at widening and deepening the research cooperation between the European researcharea, NESCA, and the European Studies associations in Asia.

2. Chapters on “Regionalism and Human Rights”
Part I of this book discusses the relations between regionalism and human rights from theperspective of political science. The first chapter, “Regional Integration and Human Rights: European-Asian Reflections,” is written by Muntarbhorn, who has served as the UN Special Rapporteur on child prostitution, child pornography, and the sale of children, and also as Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’ s Republic of Korea (North
Korea). Muntarbhorn innovatively discusses ten separate “entry points” for promoting regional
integration in Asia with a bearing on human rights. The author gives readers a clear perspective
on how to relate the issues of regional integration and human rights. The author proposes several
considerations, among which the following are the most outstanding in this reviewer’ s opinion.
First, Muntarbhorn traces the stages of development of human rights initiatives at a regional
level. In Europe there is an intergovernmental regional human rights system, including the European Convention on Human Rights and its various protocols, and the system provides directaccess and remedies to individuals who seek to overturn state actions that they believe breach
their human rights under the Convention. Asia-Pacific, on the other hand, has seen some initiatives at a more modest level, such as a regional network of national human rights commissions.
Second, on the question of whether it is realistic to promote human rights through an economic
and political integration organization, Muntarbhorn observes that the integration of some humanrights elements into a regional economic entity is already evident in the EU. In Asia, ASEAN
and its Charter refer to human rights but, according to the author, the agenda there is more economics and politics than human rights. Third, as for the kinds of rights that should be included
in an integration scheme, Muntarbhorn says that universal human rights standards based on theindivisibility of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights should be included. However, Muntarbhorn says there may be a degree of ambivalence at the regional level. Asian states
tend to prefer economic, social and cultural rights to civil and political rights and they also liketo advocate broad state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairsof the state. Fourth, as far as a monitoring mechanism of human rights is concerned, the author
tells us that both the EU and the European Convention have various mechanisms for dealing
with the issue. Importantly, both systems have courts which are the ultimate arbiters. In Asia, theASEAN human rights body has just been formed but there will definitely be no regional court in
the near future. Muntarbhorn concludes that while the negative situation remains concerning theimplementation of human rights standards and norms, regional integration can help promote andprotect human rights. A key challenge, he suggests, is to ensure that no one and no entity has amonopoly of power.
The next chapter, “Economic Rights and Regional Integration,” is written by Ali M. ElAgraa, a professor of International Economics, International Economic Integration, and EU
Studies in the Faculty of Commerce at Fukuoka University in Japan. Concerning the relations
between regionalism and economic rights, El-Agraa explicitly asserts that economic rights have104

nothing to do with regional integration because regional integration is governed by WTO’ s
Article XXIV, which does not mention either economic rights or human rights. According to
El-Agraa, the EU is the only regional integration scheme that has been endeavoring to give
economic rights a legally-binding basis, though this will not happen even when the Lisbon Trea6
ty has been ratified. And even then, the enactment would not be embracive as long as Poland andthe UK continue to exercise their rights to opt-out, thus rendering the term “regional integration”
somewhat meaningless within this context. However, the author says that this should not distractfrom the fact that the EU has been able to make progress on human rights in some areas.
This conclusion, El-Agraa says, has relevance to ASEAN since it is the only other schemeof regional integration in the world that has incorporated human rights in its recently adopted
Charter. However, El-Agraa argues that everything concerning human rights in ASEAN is not
only left hanging in the air, but is also conditional on the ratification of the Charter. The author
observes that ASEAN has just one item, Article 1.6, with regard to economic rights. The Article
includes, “To alleviate poverty and narrow the development gap within ASEAN through mutual
assistance and cooperation.” But, El-Agraa points out, what form the assistance should take, thenature of the cooperation, and how this should be enforced, are not specified.
The chapter “Cultural Relativism and Human Rights” by Andreas Vasilache, an associate
professor at the University of Bielefeld in Germany, considers whether it is possible to theoretically deduce the existence of intercultural values, and thus, to theoretically prove the universal,
intercultural validity of human rights; this claim would contrast the view among many that human rights are a Western product that do not fit into the systems of non-Western civilizations,Asia, Africa or Islam. Vasilache argues that it is necessary to make a distinction between politicaland ethical particularism on the one hand, and epistemic cultural relativism on the other, and thata sophisticated relativistic attitude leads in no way to the particularism of basic values and rights,
but provides the most conclusive basis for the intercultural legitimization of essential values andhuman rights. The author examines the preconditions and the very basis of any implementationof human rights, and thus restricts herself to the discussion of the epistemological and methodological possibility for deducing and theoretically validating the existence of certain intercultural
basic values and human rights. Vasilache concludes that the existence of very basic universal
rights can be stated and insisted on without challenging cultural relativism; rather, it is necessary
to recognize that cultural formations and civilizations are particular formations with a strong legitimate claim to contextual and relative validity.
Part I concludes with a political science analysis, “A Tool for Regional Integration: Supranational Courts in Europe and the Protection of Human Rights,” by Laurent Scheeck, a lecturer at
the Institute of European Studies, Free University of Brussels. Scheeck takes an in-depth look at
the remarkable interrelationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECourtHR). Scheeck argues that supranational courts have developed
a common supranational “jurisprudential human rights screen” to supersede national and private
actors. Scheeck characterizes the European human rights system by two features. First, the European Union (EU) as such suffers from a rather severe human rights deficit, which is in sharp
contrast to its discourse on the universalism of human rights. Second, human rights have always
been supported by a set of powerful pro-European actors, not only to protect rights at or from thesupranational level and thereby reinforce the power of supranational institutions, but also to promote the deepening of integration through the “constitutionalizing power of rights.”
Scheeck says the European courts’ increasingly nested linkage has given rise to new formsof supranational judicial diplomacy between judicial actors of the ECJ and the ECourtHR, andthis activity has had a deep impact on law as well as policymaking. With regard to the relations
between networks and hierarchies, these political effects of the relationships between the European courts can also be brought down to two hierarchical dynamics from a socio-political perspec105

tive. The dynamics of conflict, cooperation and competition of the two courts relate to the jurisprudential annexation of the EU to the ECHR, and to the ECJ’ s cooperation and/or resistance tothis dynamic of subordination. They also relate to the simultaneous supranational form of interinstitutional cooperation by which the ECJ and the ECourtHR tend to subject national and private actors to EU law and European human rights law. It thusly appears that, whereas lawyers areindeed increasingly operating in the “network modus,” they are strategically doing so to pursue
hierarchical interests in a transnational space.

3. Chapters on “The Impact of Regional Integration on Human Rights”
Part II begins with a review of the legal history of the European Union. Titled “The EU and
Human Rights: Leading by Example?” the first chapter of this section, written by Andrea Ott,
University Lecturer at Maastricht University in the Netherlands, looks back at the 50 years of
the European integration process with a focus on internal and external aspects of human rights
policy.
European integration has come a long way from a regional trade organization achieving acustoms union and internal market to an organization founded on the “values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities,” as Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty declares. Not
only is the Union built on the principles of equality and human rights internally, but the declaration also makes it clear that the Union’ s mission is to apply these values as guiding principles in
its relations with non-member countries, Otto says.
What looks like a coherent system internally and externally is contradicted by the long andwinding road to the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. Once seen in1999 as a good initiative to bring the citizen closer to the integration project, the adoption of the
EU Fundamental Rights Charter is innovative; namely, it occurred through a convention rather
than an intergovernmental conference of EU member states. The author says, however, that it
also has been a victim of old politics, with major resistance to written human rights catalogs
in the UK, and new resentments in Poland, reflected by the outcome of the Treaty of Lisbon in
December 2007. Notwithstanding the British resistance and the Polish resentments, the EU institutions in the European Parliament on December 12, 2007 proclaimed the Charter revealing
the disconnect from the Treaty of Lisbon both symbolically and legally. While legally binding
for most of the member states, it will not be binding on the UK and Poland. Moreover, all 27
EU members added explanations of their interpretations of the rights stemming from the Charterof Fundamental Rights. Consequently, the Union has been criticized for its inconsistencies withrespect to the protection of human rights worldwide, and especially in its enlargement process
through the addition of new members.
Ott says, looking back at the fifty years of the European integration process, in the last thirty
years, the human rights policy has developed incrementally, both internally and externally, andnot in a coherent fashion. According to the author, this disjointedness was inherent in the modest foundations of the Union as a technocratic entity tasked to establish a customs union andeconomic cooperation among its members. Due to the growing influence of EU law on national
legislation and the efficient implementation of EU law based on legal principles of supremacy
and direct effect, a quick remedy was found by the ECJ to introduce general principles of humanrights law into the Community legal order. But this ad hoc solution was not sufficient for mostof the member states. The EU also discovered that a stronger emphasis on human rights and amore holistic approach to human rights policy would contribute to the much needed infusion oflegitimacy to this entity. Ott says the Treaty of Lisbon can be praised for finally achieving its two106

long-term aims, a legally binding document codifying a set of fundamental human rights, and alegal basis for a future accession to the ECHR. In the author’ s view, however, the latter objective
might be a double-edged sword. The ECHR could acquire two different legal standings, namely
one via the supremacy of EU law over national law, and the other as an international agreementthat has already been a part of national legal systems for many years, though not very consistently across the 27 member states with regard to human rights violations. In addition, situations
could arise where it would be rather difficult to define the actor, as would be the case if actions
were taken on the intergovernmental level, or if legal instruments that left a certain amount of
discretion were implemented , as in the case of directives. And lastly, it needs to be noted that theagreement and the organization pursue different aims and objectives. The agreement is specifically for human rights protection, while the EU needs to balance different aims and interests. It
needs to be carefully assessed whether the ECHR accession is of added value or if it leads to further legal problems in light of the special supranational legal order of the Union and the complex
division of competences between the EU and its member states. Ott concludes that, with humanrights standards in Europe becoming more homogenous, and cooperation models between highest courts finally advocated, the coexistence between courts on international, supranational andnational levels serves the different aims of the entities involved and can contribute to a more coherent protection of human rights in the region.
The next chapter, “The Impact of European Political Integration on the Member States’ Human Rights Policies Towards China,” is written by Giuseppe Balducci, Academic and Research
Assistant at the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department of the College ofEurope. The author uses fieldwork to offer fascinating new insights into the impact of European
political integration on the foreign policies of the EU member states. The EU has emerged internationally as a promoter of norms, namely democracy and human rights. However, this chapter
maintains that there is no such thing as a normative power Europe without a coherent, consistentand coordinated overall European normative foreign policy. This article, therefore, attempts totest the existence of a European normative foreign policy by applying the EU’ s assumed normative influence on its member states’ foreign policies to the case of China.
Balducci tests the hypothesis that the EU plays an important role not just in promotinginternational norms outside its borders but also in shaping its member states’ foreign policies
through a comparative analysis of the EU and its member states’ human rights policies towards
China. The author picks up four member states–Germany, Sweden, France and the UK. Balducci
explains his reasons for choosing the four states as follows: Germany was the first European
country to include political conditionality in its relations with developing countries; Sweden is
the largest donor in relative terms in the field of human rights and democracy and it epitomizes
the Nordic approach to such issues; France has a foreign policy which resonates only in a limited
way with the new international human rights and rule of law concerns and can be considered as
an example of a Mediterranean approach; the UK has external relations with developing countries which have been characterized by Tony Blair’ s ethical approach to the inception of theLabor Party’ s government. Balducci analyzes the four EU member states’ human rights policies towards China and the interactions among them in the following four case studies groupedaround two dimensions: (1) the human rights dialogue at the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights (UNHCR) and the arms embargo against China, which fall within the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) dimension, and (2) the negotiations for China’ s accession to
WTO and human rights projects on the ground, which fall within the European Community (EC)dimension. In the case of the UNHCR, the EU followed the practice of tabling resolutions criticalof China since 1990. The EU-China bilateral human rights dialogue was suspended after the 1995
UNHCR resolution criticizing China. However, France and Germany pushed for a constructive
dialogue with China at the EU level, against the Nordic countries’ opposition. The UK position,107

on the other hand, swayed between the non-committal stance of Germany and France and theethical approach of the Nordic countries. The coordination meeting was held but no consensus
was found. In the case of the UNHCR, the fear of losing commercial deals with China played a
big role in the calculations of all EU member states that were initially opposed to the abandoning of the UNHCR resolution. This case, Balducci says, seems to deny the normative influenceexerted by the EU on its member states. Since member states belong to the EU, the fear of losing
market access in China was greater.
Also, for the arms embargo on China, there was discrepancy between the Franco-German
stance and the Nordic countries’ position. With the initiative of Germany and France, a resolution
calling for the lifting of the embargo was close to being adopted in 2003 despite the Nordic countries’ objection, but was killed because of strong pressures from the United States. In this case, itwould appear plausible to attribute the failure to the fear of being left alone by the other member
states against the ire of an influential international actor, the United States. Rather than an ethicalforeign policy choice, it was one of “hedging foreign policy,” the author asserts.
The case of the WTO is different from either of the previous two cases. As far as SinoEuropean economic interactions were concerned, the tensions between member states in theCouncil and the European Commission negatively affected the formulation of a coherent and responsive policy toward the negotiation of China’ s accession to the WTO. This result was due tothe divergent policies between China and the EU member countries. Their differences stemmed
from their historical legacies and differing economic ties with China. The dissimilarities between
the various approaches toward China and the consequent clash between the Commission and theCouncil might therefore help explain certain inconsistencies in the European negotiation with
China. Similarly, it can be inferred that the Commission’ s lack of comprehensive authority tonegotiate multilateral trade deals with a single voice has hindered the Commission’ s bargaining
power as well as other issues such as human rights. During WTO negotiations little concern was
raised over human rights. In the final five years of negotiations for China’ s WTO accession, no
member states in the Council put forward the idea that China’ s entry should be linked with respect of human rights, and more specifically labor rights, as has been requested by the European
Parliaments, Trade Union lobbies and European NGOs. The unanimity reached at the WTO level,
where no member states put forward any proposal to link human rights and trade, could be explained by the member states’ attitude of leaving the human rights confrontation to the EC whenit comes to dealing with trade.
At the intergovernmental CFSP level, when it comes to high politics normative decisionon the occasions of the UNHCR and bilateral material sanctions, Balducci finds that member
states are influenced by their membership in the EU but the influence has no normative character.
Rather, according to the author, the EU membership creates strong disincentives to follow independent policies. At the supranational EC level, the author highlights the tendency of member
states to leave the EC to deal with controversial issues, thus freeing their hands to pursue theirmercantilist policies. However, when it comes to trade relations it is shown that the EC has noreal power to link normative issues with trade, thus leading to an utterly non-normative approach.
Balducci concludes that the EU is not categorized as a normative power and it qualifies rather as “anormative paradox.” No coordination, coherence or consistency is found between the EU normative attempts and those of its member states towards China.
In “Normative Power or Hegemony? The EU’ s Human Rights Transmission to Africa,”
Jian Junbo, Lecturer and Researcher at Fudan University in China, explores how the EU’ s human rights policies can be transmitted to Africa. Jian regards the EU as a normative power rather
than a hegemonic power in comparison with the United States. Jian says the EU integration is not
only a process of internal homogenization and consolidation but also an expansion of norms internationally. And in the process of expansion of normative power to the world, human rights are108

a core value for the EU as important as democracy, good governance, rule of law and so forth.
However, human rights transmission to Africa is not easy. Jian points out that two challenges
have always existed or emerged in the context of globalization. The first challenge involves thecultural differences between Europe and Africa, and the second challenge stems from worldcompetition of soft power in which the most important competitive counterpart for Europe is theUnited States. Additionally, with more people coming to Africa, there is more capital and investment flowing into the continent from emerging industrialized countries. Generally, Jian states,international hegemony has three dimensions: cultural domination, coercion if necessary andmaintaining domination as the final objective. With regards to the human rights transmission to
Africa, on the one hand the EU recognizes itself as the early and successful practitioner of universal values and as the would-be director of protection and promotion of human rights in Africa;
this one-way transmission of human rights is consistent with the character of hegemony. On theother hand, external expansion of normative power can be regarded as a coercive approach. In
conclusion, Jian says the normative-power EU is dreaming of international hegemony by culturaltransmission to non-EU countries in order to enhance its influence in the international community. But Jian believes the EU will be challenged by more competitive powers emerging fromother regions, in which Africa and other countries have more chances to accept what they favorand enhance their own cultural statuses in international society.
The last chapter in Part II, “Gender Issues in the EU and China: A Comparative Perspective,” is written by Yang Na, a PhD candidate of International Relations at Nankai University in
Tianjin, China. The author compares the progress on gender equality in the European Union and
China. After reviewing the evolution of EU gender policy over 30 years, Yang details the genderissues in China from the perspectives of education, law and policy measures to improve the situation, paying special attention to the differences in gender equality between cities and rural areasin the country. Yang finds some similarities between China and the EU on gender issues andidentifies huge differences in social models both among EU member states and in China, as wellas big differences between cities and rural areas in China. One big difference the author notes isthat the EU members, candidate states and civil societies can communicate well with each otherto improve the status of women, and they have a special committee in the European Parliamentdealing with women’ s issues including the Committee on Women’ s Rights and Equal Opportunities, an equal opportunities consultation committee in the EU Commission, whereas China does
not have such forums. Yang stresses the need to create some institutions to increase communication between the central government and regional governments, and between governments andcitizens in China. Yang concludes that China has an advantage over the EU because China has astrong central government, so it is relatively easy for the Chinese government to create a specificsector as a bridge between civil society and policy makers, necessary to realize gender equality,
make policies fit for women’ s conditions, and improve the relief procedure and institutions on
employment discrimination. But, it is hard for the EU to do that, Yang says. All that EU member
states can do is to try to make common gender policies at the Union level and, at the same time,
make specific policies on their own according to their different situations.

4. Conclusion
This book is a product of the series of workshops held by the EU-NESCA joint researchmembers. In this volume, distinguished scholars provide young scholars with a chance to write
articles. The quality of the papers varies, but the group, with diverse academic backgrounds ranging from political science and economics to history and law, succeeds in exploring the relations
between the efforts at regional integration and the implementation of human rights. In the first109

part of the book, more senior scholars from Europe and Asia present their theoretical views on
regional integration and human rights, and in the second part, younger scholars offer more critical case-based analyses.
The book offers some answers to its main question of whether there exists a relationshipbetween the efforts at regional integration and the implementation of human rights. In this reviewer’ s opinion, although negative situations remain concerning the implementation of humanrights standards and norms, regional integration can help strengthen human rights and integration
together, and regional integration can in turn be deepened if it involves the human rights dimension and helps to enhance the sense of regional community, greater legitimacy and social commitment.
As we survey the cases in Europe, Asia and Africa, we see that regional integration inevitably results in actions that have consequences for the realization of human rights in the countries
that make up each region. It is obvious, however, that regional integration in Europe, Asia andAfrica is proceeding in its own way, at its own pace, and under different circumstances in eachregion, with its unique mix of cultural, historical, social, economic and political backgrounds.
We cannot easily compare the integration processes in the different regions by using one theory
or one measure. Each region faces its own human rights issues at each level of integration that itreaches.
On the European front, the integration of some human rights elements into a regional economic entity such as the EU is already evident, as is seen in its incorporation of the Charter ofFundamental Rights, its recognition of the European Convention, and its future accession to thelatter. In Asia, however, the process is more complex at this point. ASEAN has been referring
increasingly to human rights, at least in its rhetoric, and has recently set up a human rights body,
AICHR. The ASEAN Charter refers to human rights in its preamble and in its various sections.
Yet, one should not be disingenuous about the political context behind all of this. As Muntarbhorn points out, democracy is linked to human rights in the European context–such as the precondition that only democratic countries are allowed to join the EU–but there is no such stipulation
for ASEAN, and this absence has implications for the implementation of human rights.
The Asian region is arguably too large and too heterogeneous to have one inter-governmental human rights system for the entire geographic space. The only human rights treaty of a rather
broad geographic scale is the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which covers West Asian countries.
At a more modest level, some initiatives are found in Asia, e.g., anti-trafficking treaties and childwelfare arrangements ratified by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and the
Declaration on the Rights of Migrant Workers adopted by ASEAN. The way ahead for Asia may
be to explore further smaller scale efforts for specific issues.
As for a monitoring system for human rights implementation, Europe already has supranational judicial diplomacy between judicial actors of the ECJ and the ECourtHR, which has a deep
impact on law and policymaking in the region, but Asia has not reached the stage to create such asystem.
It is uncertain whether Asian countries can set up a regional court similar to the European
courts, or a commission or committee with the power to advise or adjudicate. It is even uncertain
whether Asia will see the emergence of a channel for individuals to present cases against a stateor an institution for its human rights abuse. The only international channel available for Asianpeople currently is found at the UN. UN human rights treaties and mechanisms open doors tocomplaints by individuals.
As regional integration deepens in the future, there will be demands for additional humanrights treaties and mechanisms, and if necessary, member states will accordingly explore ways
to establish appropriate measures. However, if regional integration in Asia reaches a very deeplevel, paradoxically it may become harder to enforce human rights in member states. Sovereign110states acting on their own can more easily legislate for human rights. The issue of national sovereignty versus the rights of individual citizens will emerge at some future point. There needs to befurther development of legal systems, mature discussion and careful research on the ways to use
collective sovereignty of nations for human rights purposes. We need to continue to monitor the
future evolution of the relationship between the efforts toward regional integration and the implementation of human rights.

Notes
1
2

3

4
5

6

This “motto” of ASEAN is mentioned both in the Preamble to the ASEAN Charter and in Article 36.
Address by ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan on “Possible Cooperation between ASEAN andth
ALA,” at the 10 ASEAN Law Association (ALA) General Assembly in Hanoi, Vietnam, October 15,
2009. The address is available at http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/10GAdocs/speech3.pdf (accessed
January 27, 2011).
Terms of Reference for the High Level Panel on an ASEAN Human Rights Body were approved by thest
41 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on July 21, 2008. See http://www.aseansec.org/HLP-TOR.pdf (accessed January 27, 2011). The High Level Panel was created by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meetingin 2008 in the process of consulting people in the ASEAN member-states on the “powers and functions”
of this human rights body. It held meetings with members of the civil society and other sectors in Singapore in July 2008, Thailand in August 2008 and the Philippines in September 2008.
In accordance with Article 41 of the ASEAN Charter, the Terms of Reference of the ASEAN humanrights body were approved by the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on July 21, 2008.
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was launched during theASEAN Summit in July 2009. For further information, visit http://www.aseansec.org/22769.htm (accessed January 27, 2011).
Lisbon Treaty, Official Journal of the European Union, C 306, Vol. 50 (December 17, 2007).

111

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., Non-Western International
Relations Theory—Perspectives on and beyond Asia, London and New
York: Routledge, 2010.

Seiko Mimaki

1. Introduction
In his seminal article in 1977, “An American Science: International Relations,” Stanley
Hoffmann wrote that International Relations Theory, born and raised in America, is “too close
to the fire,” and so “needs triple distance.” The discipline, according to Hoffmann, should moveaway from the contemporary world towards the past, from the perspective of a superpower toward that of the weak and the revolutionary; from the glide into policy science, it should relocate
itself to that steep ascent toward the peaks of traditional political philosophy and the questions it
1raises.
Since then we have witnessed Critical IR Theory in full bloom. According to Critical IR
theorists, knowledge cannot be value-free. As Robert W. Cox pointed out, theory is always forsomeone and for some purpose. Of course, theory can be sophisticated so as to transcend its
own perspective, but the standpoint of the original proponent of a theory is always contained
somehow within it. Moreover, positivist theorists in an hegemonic country tend to legitimize thepolitical and social structure of the world in which their country enjoys its dominant status, byusing their theoretical knowledge. That is why we need “critical” theory, which is differentiatedfrom traditional “problem-solving” theory. While the latter focuses on understanding the presentinternational order, the former has a normative concern with social changes and human emanci2
pation.
Critical IR theorists have made much progress in revealing how traditional IR theories, especially Realists’ state-centric analyses, contributed to perpetuating and reinforcing the existing
American hegemonic order, and to expanding the scope of IR Theory beyond the level of thenation state to encompass the whole of humanity. Many voices that had long been marginalized
within the IR community have gradually come to be heard by their mainstream counterparts.
Many IR specialists have become increasingly aware of the America-centric character of IR Theory and have endeavored to reconstruct the field as a non-American enterprise. More attention
has been paid to various indigenous intellectual traditions of non-American IR communities.
Critical IR theorists have gained ground in Western IR communities, as is evident in the3
growth of British IR theory, continental IR theory, and Commonwealth IR theory. Although4
some scholars have referred to non-Western thoughts as a possible source of IR theory, most of
their attention has been on the writings of critical thinkers of European heritage, such as Kant,
Hegel, Marx, Gramsci, Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas. As a result, while they have beensuccessful in discovering the possibility of de-Americanizing the IR field, the Critical IR theorists have not been able to reveal the West-centric bias in the field sufficiently.
Overcoming West-centric IR is not just an academic problem. It is becoming necessary for
those of us in the non-Western world. In the 21st century, non-Western countries have increased
their influence, and the gap between the current West-centric IR Theory and the realities of theworld has become a serious problem. We are now in urgent need to properly reflect non-Westernvoices and perspectives in the IR Theory debate and to construct truly global IR theories for ana112

lyzing and understanding the dynamics of the world in which we live.
Therein lie the novelty and significance of the book reviewed here. Citing Robert Cox’ sargument, “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose,” the editors of this collective
work assert that the mainstream IR theories, including Critical IR theories, are presented as universal theories but speak for the West, thusly perpetuating its power, prosperity, and influence.
The central goal of this book is to challenge the Western domination from outside the West by introducing non-Western IR traditions to the Western IR audience; all the while, it encourages nonWesterners to contribute to the IR Theory debate in proportion to the degree to which they are
involved in their practice. Including case studies on Chinese, Japanese, South Korean, Southeast
Asian, Indian and Islamic indigenous IR, this book challenges the current West-centered IR field.
In the volume’ s introductory chapter, “Why is there no non-Western international relations
theory?” Acharya and Buzan argue that IR scholars should pay more attention to the non-Western
IR tradition and its theoretical possibilities because “Western IRT [IR Theory] is both too narrow
in its source and too dominant in its influence to be good for the health of the wider project tounderstand the social world in which we live” (p. 2). An original aspect of the book is that every
contributor tries to identify distinctive Asian patterns, whereas previous theoretical works on
Asia have been concerned with just “testing” Western IR theories on Asia. Acharya and Buzan
pose five possible reasons for the absence of non-Western IR Theory: (1) Western IR Theory has
discovered the right path to understanding IR; (2) Western IR Theory has acquired an hegemonicstatus in the Gramscian sense; (3) non-Western IR theories do exist, but are hidden; (4) local
conditions discriminate against the production of IR theory; and (5) the West has had a big headstart, and what we are seeing is a period of catching up. These five hypotheses are then exploredin the following case study chapters and mainly in the concluding chapter, which is written by
the two editors.

2. Case Study Chapters
The book then presents seven case-study chapters. The second chapter (the first case study)
is “Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?” written by Yaqin Qin. According
to Qin, the main reason why Chinese IR Theory is absent is the traditional worldview in China,
which lacks an awareness of “international-ness.” The traditional Chinese worldview, called
Tianxia (All-under-Heaven), was firmly based on the Confucian concept about the universe. In
this worldview, there was no defined entity with a finite boundary, nor were there related concepts such as sovereignty and territorial integrity. This worldview was practiced in the tributarysystem, which endured from 221BC to the early 1880s. This system was an unequal and quasi-international system, wherein China was the sole, dominant actor maintaining stability and providing an international system for interaction among states. In this system, there was no legal equality among the constituent units and therefore there were no “like units” as neo-realists would
assume. The situation changed after the Opium War (1841), and the traditional tributary system
was defeated and replaced by the Westphalian system. Chinese intellectuals began to gain anawareness of Western modernity and regarded the West as the only teacher from whom to learn.
They did not have much interest in creating a distinct Chinese IR school. However, Qin seems
confident about creating a distinctive Chinese school of IR Theory in the future by using potentially rich sources, such as the traditional Tianxia worldview, the revolutionary thinking which
has been a main driving force of Chinese modernization since 1898 and the reformist thinking
beginning in the late 1970s that has brought about great economic development and social transformation in China.
“Why are there no non-Western theories of international relations? The case of Japan” by113

Takashi Inoguchi reflects on the development of IR study in Japan and looks for elements thatwould be useful for the future development of Japanese IR Theory. First, Inoguchi asks, “[A]re there any theories of international relations in Japan?” His answer is a “qualified yes.” As an
example, the author observes that “flying geese pattern” regional integration theory can be seen
as a positivist middle-range theory. In the normative domain, Inoguchi mentions that Japan has
developed a kind of “proto-constructivist” theory of identity formation. Yet, his overall assessment of Japan’ s past theoretical advance is negative. According to Inoguchi, the international
environment surrounding Japan did not leave much room for Japan to develop its own way ofconceptualizing the world. In the interwar period, Japan was a failed challenger to American hegemony and in the post-war period, Japan has been embedded in the global governance systemdominated by the United States. Moreover, the relatively weak academic tradition of positivistic
hypothesis testing in social sciences and a relatively strong tradition of descriptive work in the
country has also discouraged the development of distinctive Japanese IR Theory. According to
Inoguchi, current Japanese IR studies are characterized by four major intellectual currents: staatslehre, historicism, Marxism and positivism. Even today these four traditions coexist quite amicably without significant efforts toward integration. Due to the situation described by Inoguchi as“diversity without disciplinary integration,” the Japanese IR community has been in an isolated
position from the world IR communities, even from the IR communities in the neighboring countries, Korea, Taiwan and China. Inoguchi introduces the proto-theoretical arguments of the three
distinguished thinkers in wartime Japan—Nishida Kitaro, an innate constructivist; Tabata Shigejiro, a popular sovereignty theorist of international law; and Hirano Yoshitaro, a Marxist theoristof regional integration—suggesting that they would have a universal audience if translated into
English. Inoguchi concludes that if IR theories are understood as narrowly American-style positivistic theories, there are no Japanese IR theories, but if IR theories also include constructivists,
normative theories, and legal theories, then there are Japanese IR theories.
“Why is there no non-Western international theory? Reflections on and from Korea,” written by Chaesung Chun, analyzes the reason for the relative underdevelopment of IR theorizing in
Korea. Korea had long been deprived of opportunities to develop its own IR Theory. Traditionally, Korean scholars, mostly Confucian philosophers, lived in the Sino-centric tributary system.
Then, Korea suffered under Western imperialist powers, followed by Japanese colonial rule. Soon
after the foundation of the South Korean government in 1948, the Cold War environment placed
the Korean IR community under the strong influence of American academia, which was dominated by political realism. After “importing final products” in the 1950s and 1960s, however,
Korean scholars gradually turned to the task of adapting the Western theories to explaining South
Korea’ s international realities. With the end of Cold War, the American influence faded, and thecall for Korean IR Theory became louder. Chun, while admitting that Western IR theories, especially realism and security studies, have been helpful in explaining the international relations
surrounding South Korea, still stresses that many assumptions underlying Western theories cannot be uniformly applied to the international relations of Northeast Asia, which is characterizedby multiple organizing principles of international relations and overlapping political identities.
Chun concludes that the central challenge for a postmodern IR project is to comprehend different
stages and logics in different regions within coherent theoretical frameworks, and this is the maintask for non-Western academia.
The fifth chapter, “Re-imagining IR in India,” is written by Navnita Chadha Behera. Interestingly, this chapter begins by criticizing Indian scholars’ attempts at creating an indigenous, Indian IR school to catch up with Western IR communities. She warns that even if they were to succeed in creating an Indian school of IR, it would at best earn a small, compartmentalized spacewithin the master narrative of the Western-dominated IR field. She suggests that, instead, Indianscholars should “re-image” IR itself toward a post-Western IR Theory. As the first step toward114

this goal, she proposes a reconsideration of the three sets of givens in which Indian IR scholars
have been embedded: infallibility of the Indian state modeled after the Westphalian nation state,
thorough internalization of the philosophy of political realism, and positive faith in the wisdomof modernity. She cites Gayatri Spivak’ s famous sentence, “what is important in a work is what
it does not say…This is not the same as a careless notation [but] what it refuses to say,” and calls
the reader’ s attention to the “silence” of traditional Indian IR communities. Traditional IR theorists in India have seldom paid attention to India’ s own heritages as a source of knowledge creation for new IR Theory. In the Indian IR communities, the attempts to conceptualize nationalism
by India’ s leading figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore
were all but forgotten because they were regarded as irrelevant to the rational, scientific andmodern world of IR. Even Kautilya’ s realist political philosophy, which predated Hobbes’ “stateof nature” and Machiavelli’ s Prince, has never been a serious concern for Indian IR scholars.
Behera emphasizes that the Indian IR communities cannot produce a non-Western IR Theory as
long as they continue to fight the intellectual battle with the West on a “turf chosen by the West,
with tools designed and provided by the West and rules-of-game set by the West.”“Southeast Asia: Theory between modernization and tradition,” by Alan Chong examines
the absence of non-Western IR Theory in Southeast Asia. He points out that modernization, as
the culmination of the region-wide processes of colonialism and nationalism, has been one of thebiggest impediments to non-Western IR theorizing in Southeast Asia. Due to the strong belief inmodernization, both Western scholarship on Southeast Asia and post-1945 indigenous scholarship have dismissed many indigenous sources as invalid for the modern scientific age. Mainstream Western observers of the region have explained Southeast Asian states as prone to conflictbecause they are insufficiently modernized along Westphalian lines, and staunch realists havepresented pessimistic views of Southeast Asian regionalism. Such discourse of modernizationrealism has long penetrated Southeast Asian IR scholarship. Chong warns that if Southeast AsianIR scholarship continues to delude itself within the discourse of modernization-realism, it will
never be able to offer innovative Asian ideas. He concludes the chapter by introducing various attempts at transitional and hybrid theorizing as a new enterprise to develop non-Western theoretical perspectives.
The next, seventh chapter is entitled “Perceiving Indonesian approaches to international relations theory,” and is written by Leonard C. Sebastian and Irman G. Lanti. Their central contention is that Indonesia may provide a useful exploratory study into non-Western theories that could
be both innovative and emancipatory. The authors admit that because of weak institutional structures in Indonesian IR departments and a lack of physical resources and proper funding, there isno significant effort to develop an Indonesian IR Theory. Yet the authors are confident there is a
wealth of indigenous sources that IR scholars can use for theorizing. The authors pay special attention to the politico-cultural traits of the various indigenous ethnic groups such as the Javanese,the largest ethnic group, and the Seberang communities, which have a more individualistic political culture than the Javanese. When the Javanese try to influence people, they prefer the powerof “personal charisma” to the Western “power through the barrel of a gun.” The Javanese would
likely approach a difference of opinion by efforts to find a middle ground while the Seberangwould likely approach the same situation by recognizing the differences. Especially, the Javanesepolitical culture deeply affects Indonesian leaders’ political behavior and their foreign policy. For
example, in Suharto’ s support of the so-called “ASEAN way,” we can see the influence of theJavanese conception of attaching great importance to harmony and solving differences throughclosed-door discussions away from the public eye. The authors conclude that the Western IR approach focusing on solely rationalist explanations or solely constructivist explanations may not
capture the essence of Indonesian IR thinking, which is greatly influenced by the country’ s indigenous traditions.
115

“International relations theory and the Islamic worldview” is written by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. Her central contention is that Islam, which she defines not as a region but as a culturereligion-identity-worldview, recognizes and theorizes about the world sharply different from theWest. Tadjbakhsh asserts that the nature of Islamic IR Theory is “decidedly normative,” which isbased not on empirical observations of behaviors or predictions of what behaviors would be, but
on how institutions reflect the essence of an idea, a norm, and a morality. For Islam, the state is
not an end in itself, but is, rather, a means towards securing an Islamic “good life” and spreading
Islamic values. While power/capability is the driving force in realism and neorealism, Islamic
theory relies on social cohesion and a social unity for progress towards a moral good. The mosttypical contrast between Islamic IR Theory and Western IR Theory revolves around the idea ofpeace. In Islamic tradition, justice is the ultimate ethical impetus and peace should be based onjustice. This concept of peace is clearly at odds with the realists’ dictum that order should precede justice. Though Western IR theories have internalized the Enlightenment norms of secularization and rationality and seriously neglected the ideational factors such as religion, culture andidentity, these ideational factors are critically important to understand Islamic international relations. Contrary to the Westphalian model, in the Middle East strong sub-state and powerful superstate identities always compete with the state for loyalty. Islamic states are always in dilemma
between the aim of the state to survive in the international arena and the aim of Islam to maintaindomestic legitimacy. Tadjbakhsh concludes that Islamic IR Theory does exist, but it is not always
put into practice because of the ultimate tension between the “raison of state” and the “raison ofIslam.”

3. Theoretical Chapters
In the ninth chapter, “World history and the development of non-Western international relations theory,” Buzan and Richard Little stress the importance of bringing more historical world
perspectives into IR Theory. IR theorists and world historians are still alienated from each otherdespite the importance of developing synergistic relationships between their two fields. Why?
The authors point to the IR theorists’ deep-rooted Eurocentrism. World historians are rapidly
moving away from a Eurocentric perspective. There is increasing interest in comparative method,or in Pomeranz’ s words, the principle of “reciprocal comparison,” which entails “viewing bothsides of the comparison as deviation when seen through the expectation of the other, rather thanleaving one as always the norm.” In the field of world history, there is also growing attention to“connected history,” which questions the established boundaries and the established notion of
periodization. By contrast, most IR theorists are still locked into a Eurocentric framework. They
do not have much interest in theorizing about the emergence and expansion of a global international system/society. Neorealists and neoliberals take the existence of such a system/society as
given. Constructivists have begun investigating the evolution of the European international system/society, but they have yet to develop a global take on this issue. Even the English School,
which has a clear awareness of comparative and world historical perspectives on the study ofinternational relations, has not found a way out of Eurocentrism. For example, Hedley Bull andAdam Watson’ s The Expansion of International Society (1984), which deals with the question of
global connections, presupposes that the basic features of the contemporary international politicalstructure have been inherited from Europe. They even insist that “it was in fact Europe and not
America, Asia or Africa that first dominated and, in so doing, unified the world; it is not our perspective but the historical record itself that can be called Eurocentric.” Problematically, many IR
theorists would accept this argument. The authors insist that in order to develop a more nuanced
understanding of a global international society, IR theorists should bring more world historical116

perspectives into IR Theory, and move away from the assumption that the history of modern Europe has encompassed quintessential elements of international relations. They conclude the chapter by stressing that non-Western IR theorists should have a crucial role to play in this challenge.
The concluding chapter, “On the possibility of a non-Western international relations theory,”
is written by Acharya and Buzan. Here the authors answer the five main questions posed in theirintroductory chapter, and offer their assessment of the prospect for building non-Western IR
Theory in the future. About the first possible reason of the absence of non-Western IR Theory—that Western IR Theory has discovered the right path to understanding IR—the authors assert that
Western IR Theory is not always the “right path” to understanding non-Western international relations, and as such, it is challengeable. On the second hypothesis—that Western IR Theory has
acquired a hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense—they admit that the hegemonic standing ofWestern IR theory is one of the core reasons for the absence of non-Western IR theory in Asia.
They also confirm the third and fourth hypotheses that non-Western IR theories do exist but are
hidden, and that local conditions discriminate against the production of IR theory. They emphasize that in order to fully explore the “hidden” non-Western IR theories, it would be necessary to
improve the unsatisfactory academic situations surrounding non-Western IR scholars. They thenadmit the validity of the fifth hypothesis, that the West has had a big head start, and what we areseeing is a period of catching up, though they also emphasize that Asia is not in a mere copying
mode and there is plenty of room for divergent development.
After verifying the five hypotheses, the editors confirm that the current Western-centric IR
Theory does not capture the needs and conditions in Asia adequately, and therefore, it will definitely be necessary to develop non-Western IR Theory. Overall, the editors are optimistic about
the future development of non-Western IR theories. Certainly it would be an exaggeration to
say that a fully-fledged Asian or non-Western IR Theory will emerge soon, but there are plentyof pre-theoretical resources in the non-Western world, including classical traditions, thinking
and foreign policies of leaders, and works of scholars. Moreover, there are various paths to developing non-Western IR Theory. The editors emphasize that the development of non-Western
IR Theory need not be a matter of projecting pure indigenous ideas, nor should it be a matter ofwholesale adoption/borrowing of foreign ones. It can also proceed through mutual adaptation orcontextualization of Western ideas, in a process that Acharya calls “constitutive localization.”
The reader sees the IR Theory debate broadened in a constructive direction toward a truly global
IR Theory.

4. Conclusion
Since the 1980s, a significant number of critical IR works have posed serious questions
about the America-centric nature of mainstream IR Theory. However, this book is novel in its
attention to the more deep-rooted problem, that is, the West-centric nature of IR Theory, whicheven distinguished critical IR works could not properly reveal. However, considering the fact that
this book is virtually the first major attempt to discover and construct non-Western IR Theory, we
may suggest some points for further development.
First, although all of the contributors agree that it is necessary to discover and construct nonWestern IR Theory, they do not agree on what kind of non-Western theory should be built. Some
contributors focus on the possibilities of non-Western “problem-solving” theory, which could address and explain various problems in Asia more properly than Western IR theories, while others
seek a non-Western “critical” theory for the purpose of bringing emancipation to non-Western
peoples whose voices have been denied by Western discursive power. In this reviewer’ s view, theproposition about the various possibilities for non-Western “problem-solving” theory is more de117

veloped than that about the call for non-Western “critical” theory.
Second, we should ask whether efforts to create an indigenous IR school, such as a Chinese
IR school, a Japanese IR school or an Islamic IR school make sense as a critique of Western5
hegemonic IR Theory. The search for an indigenous IR Theory does not necessarily include a
counter-hegemonic project. Rather, in some cases, it may serve as a justification of hegemony.
For example, the recent calls for a distinctively Chinese IR school coincide with the rise of Chinese power in the 21st century. In some cases China’ s traditional concepts, such as Tianxia (Allunder-Heaven), have been used to justify China’ s hierarchical empire rather than to achieve a6
post-hegemonic order. Among all the contributors, with thanks, perhaps, to the strong academic
tradition of subaltern studies and post-colonial studies in India, Behera is most clearly aware ofthis danger. She warns that creating an Indian IR school is not a real solution to the Westerndominated IR Theory, saying that such an attempt would at best earn some space for Indianscholars within the existing IR framework but never contribute to building a new non-hegemonicsite of knowledge where different traditions of the IR field all over the world can engage in ahealthy dialogue and co-exist. Acharya and Buzan stress that “the likely role of non-Western IRT
is to change the balance of power within the debates, and in so doing change the priorities, perspective and interests that those debates embody” (p. 236). However, in the reviewer’ s opinion,
the greatest possibilities for non-Western IR Theory may not lie in bringing about changes within
the existing IR, but in creating a new post-Western, anti-hegemonic IR Theory.
Finally, if non-Western IR scholars are to seek a post-Western IR Theory, one of their mostimportant tasks will be the theorization of the colonialist and racist hierarchy that endured as thedominant factor of international relations in past centuries. The so-called “Westphalian straitjacket,” which treats international relations as a closed system of “like units,” has made us blindto the simple historical fact that the society of nations was not a society of equals, but a societyof unequals until African independence in the mid-1960s. Even after the international order isformally decolonized, de facto colonialism and racism are never things of the past. Yet, Western
IR theorists have largely been silent on the problem of Western imperialism and racism despite
7
their huge impact on non-Western peoples. Even Critical IR theorists, whose main goal is humanemancipation, have not adequately addressed the anti-colonial struggles and anti-racist struggles
8
that took place all over the world in the 20th century. Today, Western IR theorists are increasingly aware that the development of the IR field has become entwined with Western imperialism in9
the real world, but non-Western IR scholars can definitely play a role in extending the emancipatory project to the deprived peoples in the non-Western world and in opening up the possibilities
for post-colonial and post-racist Critical IR Theory.

Notes
1
2

3

Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science−International Relations,” Daedalus, Vol. 106, No. 3(Summer 1977), pp. 41-60.
Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1981), pp. 126-155. For an overview of the core arguments of Critical IR
Theory, see Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White, “Still Critical after All These Years? The Past,
Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations,” Review of International Studies, Vol.
33 (July 2007), Special Issue— Critical International Relations Theory after 25 Years, pp. 3-24.
See, for example, Steve Smith, ed., International Relations: British and American Perspectives, Oxford:
Blackwell, 1985; Robert Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis, International Relations—Still an American Social Science: Toward Diversity in International Thought, Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2001; Knud Erik Jørgensen, “Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret,” European Jour-

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5

6
7

8

9

nal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 9-42; Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny
Brems Knudsen, eds., International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Schools, Destinations, London:
Routledge, 2006; and Timothy Shaw and Lucian M. Ashworth, “Commonwealth Perspectives on International Relations,” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5 (September 2010), pp. 1149-1165.
For example, Robert W. Cox, “Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,” in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches toWorld Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
This point is also developed by Ching-Chang Chen’ s excellent review of this book: Chen, “The Absence of Non-Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,
Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 1-23.
William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?” International Studies Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December, 2008), pp. 749-761.
Robert Vitalis, “The Grateful and Genours Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations,” Millenium, Vol. 29, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 331-356; Branwen Gruffydd Jones,
Decolonizing International Relations, London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.
John M. Hobson, “Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond
Westphalian towards a Post-Racist Critical IR,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 33, Special Issues(July 2007), pp. 91-116.
David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International
Relations, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.

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The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology began in 2007
the Global COE (Center of Excellence) Program with the primary aim of developing
creative human resources to lead the world and internationally competitive universities in Japan. The Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) of the
Graduate School of Asia-Paciﬁc Studies, Waseda University is one of the twelve sites ininterdisciplinary, combined, and new ﬁelds selected from among numerous applicants
throughout the country.
The Global COE program at GIARI has two aims: to develop competent professionals who will contribute to regional cooperation and consolidation, and to build a
center for this purpose. The program has three areas of study: (1) political integrationand identity; (2) economic integration and sustainability; and (3) social integration andnetwork, and the three areas are organically interconnected. The program is buildinga theoretical framework for regional governance, allowing Ph.D. candidates to participate in different projects to develop multidimensional and comprehensive perspectives,and has already produced many results in this endeavor. The program also encourages
research and other activities to create strong networks with other institutions of higher
learning in the region and also to collaborate with government agencies, public organizations, and NGOs in order to build a world-class research center at Waseda University.

Managing Editor

Tsuneo Akaha

Director, Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Senior Fellow, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI)

Associate Editor

Sachiko Hirakawa

Junior Researcher, Waseda University Institute of Asia-Paciﬁc Studies
Assistant Professor, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI)

Editorial AssistantMitsuko Akaha

Assistant Language Teacher, The Japan Exchange and Teaching Programme (Iiyama, Nagano, Japan)

Shoko Miyano

Ph. D. Candidate, Graduate School of Letters, Arts and Sciences, Waseda University

Editorial Board
Satoshi Amako Chairperson

GIARI Project Leader; Professor,
Graduate School of Asia-PacificStudies, Waseda University

Shujiro Urata

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Shunji Matsuoka

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Kazuo Kuroda

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Hatsue Shinohara

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki

Tran Van Tho

Professor, School of Education,
Waseda University

Takashi Terada

Michio Yamaoka

Professor, Organization for AsianStudies, Waseda University

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

Mitsuhide Shiraki

Kazuhiko Yokota

Naoyuki Umemori

Tomoko Ako

P r o f e s s o r, G r a d u a t e S c h o o l o f
Economics, Waseda University
Professor, Graduate School of Political
Science, Waseda University

Ken'ichi Akao

Professor, Graduate School of Social
Science, Waseda University

Koichiro Kudo

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

D i r e c t o r, D i s e a s e C o n t r o l a n dPrevention Center, National Center for
Grobal Health and Medicine

Yukiko Fukagawa

Yasushi Katsuma

P r o f e s s o r, G r a d u a t e S c h o o l o f
Economics, Waseda University

Rumi Aoyama

Professor, Graduate School of Social
Science, Waseda University

Professor, Graduate School of AsiaPaciﬁc Studies, Waseda University

A s s o c i a t e P r o f e s s o r, S c h o o l o f
Commerce, Waseda University
A s s o c i a t e P r o f e s s o r, S c h o o l o f
International Liberal Studies, Waseda
University

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March 2011