New Diplomacy Compass
Crossing Borders, Demystifying JapanJanuary 2022

The history and dualistic positionof Japanese leadership towards a world
without nuclear weapons
Miyako Kurosaki
Research coordinator
Hiroshima Organization for Global Peace (HOPe)

The international security environment has deteriorated in recent years. The confrontation between the United States
and Russia continues and is expanding to new domains including cyberspace and outer space. Growing tension
between the US and China is directly impacting security in Northeast Asia. Moreover, dialogues and efforts fornuclear disarmament are stalemated. The world yearns to reduce the risk of nuclear war and for tangible efforts
towards nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
Japan has enormous potential to lead these efforts toward the elimination of nuclear weapons because it has thedualistic position of being both a victim of nuclear weapons and a nuclear umbrella state. This history of suffering
the consequences of nuclear weapons and a position under the US nuclear umbrella place four responsibilities on
Japan; international responsibility to share the historic experience to the world, domestic responsibility to respond to
public anti-nuclear sentiment, responsibility as a non-nuclear weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to pursue elimination, and responsibility as a state under the nuclear umbrella toencourage the nuclear weapon states’ efforts for nuclear disarmament and eventual elimination. Japan’s true
leadership in this field can be found through addressing all these responsibilities.

International Shared Lessons and Domestic Anti- Nuclear Voices
Japan has a unique and strong voice on nuclear issues because it suffered the consequences of nuclear weapons threetimes – in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and with the Lucky Dragon incident following a US nuclear weapons test. Thewell-known and fundamental lessons from these experiences should be shared not only in Japan but also across theworld. That is both an international and a domestic responsibility for Japan.
In August of 1945, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed about 210,000 people by the end of theyear without discrimination between citizens and soldiers. Survivors, called Hibakusha, have suffered from radiation
effects and social discrimination. They and their children constantly worried about the trans-generational genetic
effects of radiation. The intellectual development and physical health of some Infant survivors exposed to radiationin utero were severely impacted. The two atomic bombings demonstrated the inhumanity of nuclear weapons andtheir devastating consequences for human civilization.

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Crossing Borders, Demystifying JapanThe third experience occurred because of the US nuclear test at Bikini atoll in the Marshall Islands in 1954. TheJapanese fishing vessel, Lucky Dragon No.5, and its 23 crewmembers were exposed to the radioactive fall-out fromthe test. The entire crew had radioactive symptoms and the chief radio operator died. The catch of not only theLucky Dragon but also hundreds of fishing vessels from the region was contaminated by radiation and discarded.1
The Japanese public faced a fatal threat of radiation, again, from nuclear testing in the distance. These undesired
experiences in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and of the Lucky Dragon provided robust and concrete evidence of thecatastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons.
The Lucky Dragon incident triggered public anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan that continues to this day. It started
with a grassroots signature campaign against atomic and hydrogen weapons initiated by wives and mothers inTokyo who worried food contamination from radiation was a real threat to the lives of their families and children. Itgrew into a national movement that gathered 32 million signatures within 18 months after the incident. The number
was about one-third of the total population and half of the working population at the time.2 The Japanese
government reflects this public sentiment in its nuclear policy. In 1967 it decided to adopt the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles prohibiting the possession, production, and introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. The
principles were adopted by the Diet (Japan’s legislature) in 1971. Japan also joined the NPT as a non-nuclear
weapon state in 1976. This strong opposition to nuclear weapons is still shared widely among the Japanese
population even today. Participants in opinion polls consistently show 70 to 80% support for the abolition ofnuclear weapons.3

Feasible Ways to LeadAlthough the Japanese government considers itself as a bridge builder between nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states, the world is skeptical. Japan explicitly opposes signing the Treaty on the Prohibition ofNuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force in January of 2021. The treaty focuses on the humanitarianconsequences of nuclear weapons and bans member states from possessing, using, threatening to use, testing,producing, stockpiling, and transferring nuclear weapons. Even though the Japanese government supports the goalof a world free from nuclear weapons, it underlines nuclear deterrence is needed for Japan’s security in the current
security environment in Northeast Asia.
The Japanese government also interfered with a nuclear weapon state attempting to reduce the risk of nuclear
weapons, including their accidental and inadvertent use. When the Obama administration considered adopting anuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy; a policy declaring the United States would not use nuclear weapon first,
Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, and other Japanese government officials, opposed the policy. Reportedly,
these officials were concerned a US NFU policy would weaken the US nuclear umbrella and deterrence against
North Korea and China.
To perform a substantive leadership role in nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,
Japan needs to leverage its dualistic position as a victim of nuclear weapons and a state under the US nuclear
extended deterrence. The TPNW and the NFU policy are two tools that would not only enhance efforts towards thegoal of elimination, but also reduce the risk of current nuclear weapons policies at a time of heightened regional
tensions. Both provide a means for nuclear weapons states to implement disarmament efforts that are beneficial for
Japan’s security.

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Crossing Borders, Demystifying JapanThe TPNW is built on the lessons learned from Japan’s experience of the humanitarian consequences of nuclearweapons. It makes sense that 75% of the Japanese public support the TPNW and are asking the Japanese
government to sign and ratify it.4 The TPNW is a legitimate vehicle for Japan to exercise its leadership. Japan’s
participation in shaping the discussion on the implementation of the treaty would be a meaningful way for it tomake a tangible contribution towards a nuclear weapon free world. Despite the lessons from the history and thepublic support, the Japanese government refuses to sign and ratify the TPNW because it believes US nuclear
deterrence is crucial for Japan’ security under a deteriorating security environment. But there is an intermediate way
to take part in the discussions on the treaty as an observer. Under the circumstance of increasing regional tension,some level of Japanese participation in the TPNW would send a positive signal of concern about nuclear risk.
An NFU policy would improve prospects for progress in nuclear disarmament and increase Japan’s security. A US
declaration it would never use nuclear weapons first would reduce the risk of misperceptions and miscalculations
that can lead to accidental or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, a no first use policy would not weaken
the nuclear umbrella, since it is based on the promise of US retaliation from a nuclear attack, not on the threat offirst use. Japan has tried to boost its ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability with the hope it might protect Japanfrom China and North Korea. Under the nuclear umbrella, Japanese BMD capability provides additional defense forUS forces in Japan. However, missile defense has the contradictory capacity to erode an adversary’s sense ofsecurity by weakening the deterrent effect of its nuclear forces. As the confrontation between the United States andChina continues to get worse, a US NFU declaration would reduce misperceptions and the pressure on China toincrease the size of its nuclear arsenal or move to a launch on warning policy.
The world is facing the twin challenge of a breakdown of nuclear disarmament talks between nuclear weapons
states and a stalemate in the dialogue between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Even in
today’s deteriorating security environment, Japan, because of its dualistic position, is uniquely qualified to fill thegap between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states and help them both take tangible steps toward a
nuclear weapon free world.

*This article is the personal opinion of the author and does not represent the view of the organization.

1 Glenn D. Hook, "Evolution of the anti-nuclear discourse in Japan," Current Research on Peace and Violence 10, no. 1(1987): 32-43. Yaizu City, Daigo Fukuryu Maru Kona 第五福竜丸コーナー [Lucky Dragon No.5 Section] (accessedJuly 25, 2021); accessed from https://www.city.yaizu.lg.jp/rekimin/kannai/index05.html ;Daigo Fukuryu Maru Exhibition
Hall, Daigo Fukuryu Maru Toha 第五福竜丸とは [About Lucky Dragon No.5] (accessed July 25, 2021); accessed fromhttp://d5f.org/about.
2 Hook, Ibid. Eriko Maruhama, “The Bravo Test and the Citizen Petitions for the Nuclear Test Ban: Reflections after 60Years (Special Feature: Reconsidering the Castle Bravo Incident),” Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, no. 2 (2015): 4775. Accessed July 25, 2021. Available from http://harp.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/hiroshima-cu/metadata/12248.

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Crossing Borders, Demystifying Japan

3 NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, “Genbaku Toka Kara 70 Nen Usureru Kioku, Dou Katari Tsugu 原爆投下から70年 薄れる記憶、どう語り継ぐ,” [70 Years after the Atomic Bombings How Can We Prevent Their
Memory From Fading and Convey It to Next Generations], The NHK Monthly Report on Broadcast Research 65,no.11(2015): 2-15. Accessed July 25, 2021. Available from 20151101_5.pdf (nhk.or.jp) . NHK, Nichibei Yoron Chosa日米世論調査, [Japan-US Opinion Poll] (accessed July 25, 2021); accessed fromhttps://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/45th_president/articles/2018-0104-00.html. And, NHK, Amerika Jin Yaku 7 Wari
“Kaku Heiki Wa Hitsuyo Nai” アメリカ人約7割「核兵器は必要ない」[70% of US Participants Say “NuclearWeapon is needed”] (accessed July 25, 2021); accessed from https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/statement/42800.html.
4 Jonathon Baron, Rebecca Davis Gibbons, and Stephen Herzog, “Japanese Public Opinion, Political Persuasion, and theTreaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 3:2 (2020): 299-309. DOI:
10.1080/25751654.2020.1834961.

Miyako Kurosaki
Research coordinator at the Hiroshima Organization for Global Peace (HOPe). She holds a Master's degree fromthe Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in the United States. She was a reporter for Kyodo News and a research
consultant for the Union of Concerned Scientists before assuming her current position.

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