Sumio Hatano

The Building of the Meiji State and Constitutional Government
Sumio Hatano*

Abstract
Was the Meiji Restoration a “Revolution” in a modern world? If so, what kind of revolution
was it? These questions have been debated to this day. Revolutions since the beginning of
the nineteenth century have usually signified the abolition of monarchies, and monarchs
have generally been unable to voluntarily implement fundamental social reforms. However,in the case of Japan, restored imperial rule (government by the imperial court) served as
the axis for modern reforms when the new government opened up Japan, immediately
implemented modern reforms, and built a centralized constitutional state. Such a turn of
events is uncommon in world history. While the Japanese parliamentary system, which isat the core of the countryʼs constitutional system, risked collapse on several occasions, it
has remained intact to this day. Instead of a discussion of whether the Meiji Restoration
was a revolution, this paper focuses on why a constitutional system of government̶parliamentarism̶was adopted as one of the outcomes of that “revolution” and took hold inJapan, and discusses the operational features it had.

Was the Meiji Restoration a “Revolution?”W

as the Meiji Restoration a “Revolution” in a modern world? If so, what kind of
revolution was it? These questions have been debated to this day. What weknow for certain is that, even if we agreed that the Restoration was a revolution
accompanied by civil wars, the number of victims it claimed was small. The Boshin
War that preceded the Restoration claimed 8,200 lives and the Satsuma Rebellion that followed
it claimed 12,000 victims. Including executions, the total number of deaths was still fewer than
30,000. By contrast, the victims of the French Revolution numbered more than 1 million if we
include the Napoleonic Wars, and the Russian and Chinese Revolutions claimed even more lives.
Likewise, if we look at the change of political system, the birth of the new government
through the overthrowing of the Bakufu (shognate) system and the return to monarchical rule(the imperial court) was a coup dʼétat that restored imperial rule, but this process of creating
a government cannot be termed a revolution. However, if we are to understand the sonnō jōimovement (“revere the emperor, expel the barbarians”) in the wake of Commodore Matthew
Perr y ʼ s Expedition as a sustained movement calling for the establishment of an emperorcentered unified government and independence from foreign interference, then we may call the
Restoration a “nationalist revolution” (Kitaoka 2011, 32–33).
At the same time, some years after the restoration of imperial rule, a social transformation
appropriate to a modern revolution took place. The transformation entailed reforms beginningwith the abolition of feudal domains and the establishment of prefectures in 1871, as well as the*

Sumio Hatano is the chief editor of Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy published by Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan. He is also Director-General of Japan Center for Asian Historical Records.

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The Building of the Meiji State and Constitutional Government

penetration of the effects felt throughout society. In particular, the introduction of conscription,
which aimed to build militar y power on a broad popular base, came as a major shock. The
governmentʼs order concerning conscription at the end of 1872 squarely rejected the raison dʼêtreof the traditional samurai warrior class and extolled the “equality of all people.” In early-modern
Japan, all people belonged to a social group and it was almost impossible to move between
groups. This framework was removed, individuals came to possess equal rights, and people
were left to compete with each other. The exception was the peerage, consisting of former feudallords and court nobility. In 1876, in the wake of a ban prohibiting samurai from carrying swords,
hereditary pension bonds were issued and stipend payments were discontinued. This measure
allowed the government to cut expenditures by a third. For the lower-class samurai, said tonumber 2.5 million when including their families, the discontinuation of stipends, the dismantlingof the system that sustained their status, and the elimination of warrior privileges were major
blows (Mitani 2012, 4–10; Sansom 1966, 77).
Reforms such as the dismantling of status systems and the redistribution of rights createdmany sources of capable personnel and imparted dynamism to the process of state formationin modern Japan. On the other hand, why were these far-reaching social changes in the form oflarge-scale social liberalization and removal of privileges accepted, especially by the dominantsamurai class, without much resistance? It is true that some warrior clans rebelled, but therebellions were not on a scale that caused massive casualties.
We cannot interpret the acceptance of change as the realization of the will of a conqueror
who sought to impose democracy following defeat in a war against a foreign enemy, as was thecase during the US occupation of Japan after the Second World War. The opening of Japan in thebakumatsu period during the final years of the Tokugawa shogunate was not the result of a war
with a foreign power, but the result of treaty negotiations. If that is the case, we still do not havean adequate explanation for why major changes such as the collapse and reorganization of thestatus system happened (Mitani 2012, 1–20, 84–92).
This paper is not a discussion of whether the Meiji Restoration was a revolution. It focuseson why a constitutional system of government̶parliamentarism̶was adopted as one of theoutcomes of that “revolution” and took hold in Japan, and discusses the operational features
it had. The Ottoman Empire was the first non-Western countr y to introduce constitutional
form of government, but the first Turkish constitution was short-lived. Yet, while the Japaneseparliamentary system, which is at the core of the countryʼs constitutional system, risked collapse
on several occasions, it has remained intact to this day. Exploring the significance of the systemʼssurvival is a project that seeks to uncover the historical characteristics of Japanʼs state-building.
Revolutions since the beginning of the nineteenth century have usually signified the abolitionof monarchies, and monarchs have generally been unable to voluntarily implement fundamentalsocial reforms. However, in the case of Japan, restored imperial rule (government by the imperial
court) served as the axis for modern reforms. To many, the “return to imperial rule” meant goingback to Japanʼs Edo-period seclusion. Yet on the contrary, the new government opened up Japan,
immediately implemented modern reforms, and built a centralized constitutional state.
Such a turn of events is uncommon in world history and is not easily understood, but I would
like to focus on two historical factors. I first examine the characteristics of the early-modern
political structure that preceded the Meiji Restoration. In other words, this is a search forconditions of modernization in the political structure of early-modern Japan. My second focus is
the Western powersʼ demands for the opening of Japan, what we can call the “Western shock.”
As is well-known, China and Korea were likewise directly exposed to the Western shock in thenineteenth century. However, all three nations ended up walking their own path. This had to dowith each countryʼs early-modern political structure, so I will start by briefly discussing this topic
using existing research.
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Political Development in East Asia
In the 1960s, when the comparative study of modernization was popular, a theory of Japanese
exceptionalism was proposed, arguing that Japanʼs modernization was possible because it was the
only country in Asia to have experienced feudalism. Subsequently, this type of research receded,
and researchers shifted their focus to looking for the conditions that enabled each East Asian
countryʼs political development during its early-modern history.
One study argues that Chinese dynasties since the Song absorbed the military strength ofregional powers and transferred the governance of territories from landowners to bureaucrats
who were recruited through imperial civil service examinations. In line with the conditions ofChinaʼs economy, a simple state organization was formed where the emperor was in direct controlof the land and people. Confucianism (Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism) later spread across East Asia
as the preeminent doctrine for operating such a system (Miyajima 2004). Korea was the classic
example of this kind of East Asian early-modern state.
The centralized systems of China and Korea, legitimized by Neo-Confucianism and supported
by a civil service bureaucracy recruited through competitive exams, were difficult to destroy,
both from within and from without. By contrast, the reception of Neo-Confucianism in Japan wasincomplete and there was no Neo-Confucian civil service. Japan was governed by hereditary
warriors rather than civil officials and so was passive in its reception of Neo-Confucianism, theopposite of Korea where it was wholeheartedly embraced (Miyajima 2004, Mitani 2012, 253–257).
Western civilization was imported into China and Korea as well, but in China ʼs case, thebureaucrat class that made up the core of the political structure did not actively seek to study
Western science. In Koreaʼs case, there were bureaucrats who showed an interest in Westernscience, but they were eliminated during the political strife of the early nineteenth century. In
Japan, Christianity was indeed considered taboo, but Japanese were tolerant of Western culture.
In China and Korea, the intellectuals discouraged Western culture, but early-modern Japan
actively studied the West and spread the acquired knowledge. Japanese intellectualsʼ interestin the natural sciences made them receptive to modernization and built the foundation forunderstanding industrial technology (Sato 1992, Mitani 2012).
This analysis focusing on the bureaucratic system based on Confucianism and civil service
examinations was suggested by Sato (1979). Sato went further, saying that Kokugaku (National/
Native Learning) and other innovative schools of thought rapidly rose to eminence because noteven the type of Confucianism sponsored by the Bakufu ever became established as orthodoxy
in Japan. Put differently, he argued that the countryʼs intelligentsia enjoyed greater intellectual
freedom and had a more open attitude toward Western civilization, compared with theircounterparts in neighboring Asian countries.
Moreover, Sato argued that while the Bakufu was powerful in the governance structure of
Edo-period Japan, its legitimacy depended on the imperial court, and governing was largely
delegated to the domains. This multidimensional political system of more than 250 relatively
independent rival domains made the swift mobilization of people on a national scale impossible,
making it difficult to deal with foreign threats in the short term. However, the possibility ofchange is greater in a multidimensional system, which increases the ability to adapt to crises in
the long term.
The leadership of each domain strongly identified with their domains, were keenly interested
in the economic development of their own domain, and were free from the anti-commercialismof Confucianism. In some of the domains that experienced significant economic development,
society was highly sophisticated and administrative needs grew, which promoted the developmentof bureaucratic organization and improved the peopleʼs literacy and numeracy (reading, writing,arithmetic). On the other hand, during the bakumatsu period, the formation of nationwide
networks for goods and information fostered a sense of national unity (Sato 1992).
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The Building of the Meiji State and Constitutional Government

Summarizing the above, in terms of the initial conditions needed for commencing
modernization, early-modern Japan was in a better position than China or Korea. It is difficult toconnect each of these factors in causal relationships to the introduction of constitutional forms ofgovernment, which is the aim of this essay, but we can see that a favorable environment for the
reception of Western constitutionalism had been formed.
Making one further addition, I would argue that an important condition for a functioning
constitutional system is that people are trained in equal and free debate, with public opinion being
formed on the basis of debate. Society in early-modern Japan was organized based on the social
status of people, but at the same time, there was room for discussion that transcended the lines
of social status (Mitani 2017). For example, the Shoheizaka Academy (founded 1797), which wasunder Bakufu protection, was opened up to teachers and students from domains across Japan,
rather than just Bakufu retainers. The Academy taught not only Confucianism but the humanities,
geography, and other subjects as well. Graduates went on to build a network that transcendedsocial status and domanial affiliation (Makabe 2007). These activities supported the introductionof parliamentary politics.

Foreign Crisis and the Emergence of the Consultative System of Governing inJapan
It is too simplistic to say that the sudden exposure to the West laid down the initial conditions
for political modernization in early-modern Japan, which in turn led to a constitutional system ofgovernment. It is true that the conditions for modernization were steadily developing in earlymodern Japan, but reforms for enabling modern political systems were not making progress.
This gap was allowed to be remained by the long peace sustained by a policy of seclusion.
The national seclusion policy served as a defense against foreign threats, but it also hindered
the development of political society and social mobility. The Bakufuʼs clever conciliatory measuresvis-à-vis the Daimyo (feudal lords) nipped their opposition in the bud. Edo and Osaka merchants
were gaining economic strength as commerce developed, but they did not seek independence
from the Bakufu. In a context of national seclusion, trade partners were not to be found abroad, so
the merchants had nowhere to turn but to the domestic warrior class. In this way, there existed
no new political power that could replace the authority of the Bakufu until the bakumatsu period(Sato 1992, 72–73).
At the same time, early-modern Japan was a highly integrated society, so the appearance ofpowerful external enemies strengthened that societyʼs identification with a shared destiny thattranscended region and social status, and created an urge for solidarity to resist external enemies.
The foreign crisis that tested the system was the arrival of Perryʼs fleet.
Satsuma, Choshu, and other influential domains known as yūhan strongly demanded the
Bakufu relax measures including the sankin kōtai policy of forcing feudal lords to alternate where
they lived between their domain and the capital of Edo. The yūhan further urged the Bakufu to
pay closer attention to the opinions of all of the domains, so as to strengthen national unity. At
the same time, the Bakufu not only instructed the domains to assist the strengthening of coastal
defenses around the time of Perryʼs arrival; the Bakufu also asked the domains for their opinions
about opening the country, despite their status as outsiders in the Bakufuʼs policymaking process.
This served to expand the Bakufuʼs consultative tradition through the formation of public opinion
by debate. The Bakufu used consultative mechanisms involving elders (rōjū) and other close
associates to aid the shogunʼs decision-making, and this was selected as the political strategy for
dealing with the foreign crisis (Mitani 2017, 61–62).
The consultative system had two aims. It aimed to reflect the opinions of feudal lords (daimyo)
in Bakufu administration, as well as allowing political groups to check one another by preventing
any particular group from accumulating too much power. Neither was in anticipation of a future
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Sumio Hatano

parliamentary system, but the latter aim of limiting power was regarded as especially important.
In order to realize impartial politics, it is necessary to place restraints on the exercise of power.
The idea that a constitution and a parliament can create checks on power was also adopted
by Kato Hiroyuki and Fukuzawa Yukichi, who studied Western constitutionalism. They saw
constitutionalism as characterized by the idea of placing limits on the person or persons who aresovereign̶be they a monarch or the people as a whole. (Sugawara 2014)
The Bakufu repeatedly emphasized “national unity” in the face of foreign crisis and lent an
ear to the domainsʼ opinions, but was wary of the political emergence of the yūhan and became
extremely passive when it came to their participation in Bakufu administration. The fact thatthe Bakufu changed its seclusion policy yet was passive with regard to regime change for thesake of national unity caused the yūhan to distrust the Bakufuʼs leadership and undermined thelegitimacy of the Bakufu (Sato 1992, 84).
This was made strikingly obvious by the issue of the imperial approval of the treaties ofcommerce. In 1858, the Bakufu sought to prevent criticism from the yūhan and weather its crisisof legitimacy by trying to obtain imperial approval for five treaties of commerce. However, theimperial court refused to grant its approval out of fear of opening the country to foreigners ̶amove that further weakened the Bakufuʼs leadership.
Despite the Bakufuʼs loss of authority, there existed no powerful political group to take its
place. The court had strengthened its authority to rival that of the Bakufu but was otherwise
weak in power politics, while even the stronger domains were incapable of overwhelming otherson their own. Furthermore, there were conflicting opinions among yūhan on issues such as
expelling foreigners and opening the country to the world, making it difficult for the yūhan toform a federation of domains. In spite of such turmoil, Japan did not descend into a major civil
war or domestic conflict. That is because the sense of foreign crisis served to suppress suchdevelopments.

The Centralization of Power and Political Participation

The sense of foreign crisis in the wake of Perryʼs arrival was shared by both the Bakufu, which
had no way of dealing with the foreign pressure without daimyo cooperation, and the daimyo,
who suppressed their challenge to the Bakufu system in the face of foreign pressure. The civil
war between the new government and the old Bakufu forces was gradually wound down by thetwo antagonists, thereby avoiding a lengthening of the conflict and foreign intervention. The
objective of the anti-Bakufu movement had less to do with breaking down the old order and wasmore aimed toward overcoming political opposition to allow for a unified response to the foreign
crisis. The anti-Bakufu movement moved to position the emperor as a figure with authority that
surpassed that wielded by the Bakufu, consolidate various groups under that authority, andinstitute reforms. The result was the declaration of the restoration of imperial rule in January
1868.
The declaration of the restoration of imperial rule was a statement that the new government
would take the Bakufuʼs place and would govern the country in the emperorʼs name. The new
Meiji government quickly sought other countriesʼ approval of its legitimacy and simultaneously
announced domestically that its first foreign policy would be to engage with other countries inaccordance with international law (February 1868). When the new court-centered government
was established with the declaration of the restoration of imperial rule, many people wereastonished as they had believed the new government would return to a policy of expelling
foreigners and national seclusion.
The declaration of the restoration of imperial rule followed the reform principle of kōgi, oftentranslated as “public opinion.” The principle of kōgi signified that influential daimyo would takepart in politics through debate. Both the pro-Bakufu camp (the Tokugawas) and the anti-Bakufu
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forces that sought to make the imperial court the center of politics (Satsuma and Choshu) agreed
that the court should not play an active role in conducting politics, but that there was a need forpolitics to be conducted through kōgi by including the participation of the daimyo (Suzuki 2002).
The pro- and anti-Bakufu forces agreed that future political power, whatever its form, must be
based on the principle of kōgi (Mitani 2017, 64–65).
Furthermore, as the new government required the support of many domains for the sakeof domestic stability, the emperor summoned nobles and lords in March 1868 to announce
the Charter Oath as the new stateʼs basic policy for national administration. The first clausedeclared that “Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided bypublic opinion.” The intention of the oath was to reject despotism in politics and expand politicalparticipation, to build a society in which individuals could exercise their talents, and to acquire
knowledge by joining the ranks of the international community, especially developed countries,
without adhering to old customs. The imperial notice promulgated at the same time as theCharter Oath explained the aim of the restoration with reference to the international situation,saying that a continuation of the bakufu regime would have incurred the disdain of foreign states
and brought about disadvantages, making it necessar y for the emperor to take control overpolitics in order to confront the Western powers. The oath was signed by roughly 500 nobles andchief retainers from various domains (Suzuki 2002, 12–22).
Next, a statement known as the Document of the Form of Government was promulgated inJune. A political body called the Grand Council of State, modeled after the traditional politicalorganization of the imperial court, was created. Basic governance mechanisms and procedures,
including the centralization of power in the Grand Council, the separation of powers, and theelection of officials, were established. The intent was to distribute authority within the GrandCouncil of State, even as power was being centralized there, in an effort to avoid giving too much
power to any single figure. However, while decision-making authority was mainly vested in thelegislative body (Giseikan), the authority and role of the organization corresponding to the lower
house of parliament (Kakyoku) was severely limited. The Kakyoku was abolished after threemonths. Yet, the failure of the Kakyoku did not eliminate the need for the formation of public
opinion. A body for conducting debate continued to be maintained, under different names such as
Kaigisho and Shūgi’in (Mitani, 2012).
In the initial years of the Meiji period, what was called the parliament was nothing morethan an assembly for lords where domain representatives gathered to discuss their views on
the government. The assembly was transformed into a parliament that functioned as a corecomponent of the constitutional system only after a series of reforms that followed the abolition of
domains and establishment of prefectures in 1871, as well as through knowledge gained from theexperience of leaders who visited the West̶in particular the Iwakura Mission of 1871–1873.
In particular, the elimination of domains as independent administrative units transformed
the domains into prefectures that were directly controlled by the new government. This not
only facilitated rapid progress toward the creation of a centralized state, but also expanded thepotential of the parliamentary system as a space for forming public opinion on a national scale.

Visions for a Constitutional System

The nineteenth century was a time when the concepts of the nation state and nationalism̶the
products of Western modernity̶began circulating throughout the international community. The
objectives of the Mission were to learn from Western civilization, decide on the stateʼs policy forsystem reform, and lay down the groundwork for revising the treaties that Japan had been forced
to sign. Kume Kunitake, who left a detailed record of the mission, visited Belgium and wrote,“A nation that lacks an autonomous populace will see its power wane, and it will be difficult tomaintain that nation.” The challenge of a civilized nation is to develop its peopleʼs patriotism and16
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nationalism, and Kume viewed the constitution as the tool for fostering such feelings. This focus
on Western civilization was shared by all leaders in the mission (Takii 2003, 60–61).
In July 1873, Kido Takayoshi, who returned home ahead of the rest of the Iwakura Mission,
submitted a memorandum to the emperor, arguing that it was imperative to expand the Charter
Oath and establish a constitution. Securing the independence, wealth, and power of the state
was possible only by mobilizing the people under the sovereign. He argued for the need ofimperial rule and strong leadership by the emperor-led government through the establishmentof a constitution. Kido opposed the “ conquer Korea argument” (seikanron) by prioritizing
domestic reform, and did so in line with his plan for constitutional reform. Kido initially advocatedan autocracy, but his ideal was a constitutional monarchy coupled with a growth in national
consciousness.
Kidoʼs vision of the constitutional system almost exactly matched Okubo Toshimichiʼs idea of
constitutional government. In the memorandum he wrote in 1873 after returning to Japan, Okubo
presented three types of government that would allow for the centralization of power. These were
1) an autocracy with a constitution, 2) constitutional popular “co-governance” (democracy), and3) “co-governance” by the monarch and the people (constitutional monarchy). He argued that ofthese, type 3) was the most suitable for Japan to stimulate the peopleʼs political participation. Type1) was not advisable for Japan as it was only possible when the people are ignorant and cannot
be otherwise governed. Type 2) was ideal but was only possible in a country such as the UnitedStates where the people had freed themselves from tradition. The second choice also came withthe risk of intensifying factional antagonism and political chaos, which could lead to tyranny. This
made constitutional monarchy desirable, but the Japanese population was not enlightened enoughto manage the workings of a constitution on their own. Thus, they had no choice but to create apolitical system using the emperorʼs authority until political structures were developed enough tofacilitate a constitutional monarchy (Sato 1992, 179–206). After suppressing the Satsuma Rebellion
led by Saigo Takamori, Okubo attempted to create a regional administratorsʼ assembly (assembly
consisting of governors) in preparation for the opening of the parliament (Mitani 2012, 160–161)
before he was assassinated in 1878.
In this way, the leaders of the new government envisioned a constitutional monarchy that was
based on the introduction of a parliamentary system as the political system best suited to Japan,
and began working toward establishing a constitution. The biggest issue in the debates about aconstitution was how much power the parliament should have. In other words, the question was
about how they could secure the peopleʼs participation, which was needed in a constitutional
system of government.

Debates on Constitutional Government
Kato Hiroyuki (1867) was likely the first to introduce the Japanese term rikken seitai as a concept
corresponding to constitutional government. In 1875, the proclamation of the Imperial Edict on
Gradual Constitutional Government caused the concept to quickly take root, and the movement
calling for the opening of a parliament gained momentum. However, the nature and power of theparliament at the heart of the constitutional government were subject to various interpretations.
Amid such developments, the memorandum submitted to the government by Okuma
Shigenobu at the end of 1879 positioned political par ties at the center of constitutional
government. Until Okuma ʼ s memorandum, political par ties had not been considered in
discussions about constitutional government, so this triggered debate. The memorandum was
one of the causes of the 1881 Political Crisis, but it also created an irreversible momentum toward
constitutional government in modern Japan (Suetake 2011, 30–33).
Okumaʼs concept of a constitutional government called for the leader of a party gaining aparliamentary majority to be given both legislative and executive power. If no majority is gained,
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The Building of the Meiji State and Constitutional Governmenta leader or political leader from another party should be picked and the government replaced,according to Okuma. Inoue Kowashi criticized this practice adopted by British-style party cabinet
systems of placing legislative and executive power in the parliament, noting that the cabinet
in Prussia was the sovereignʼs cabinet and not the partiesʼ cabinet. Inoue also argued that the
government should be the sovereignʼs government and not the parliamentʼs government, meaningthat the government exists outside the influence of the political parties. Inoue emphasized that
the Prussian king was not swayed by the parties but is a figure who governs within the scope ofthe constitution, and proposed to Iwakura Tomomi that a Prussian-like monarchy was the form ofgovernment Imperial Japan ought to choose.
Inoue was opposed by Okuma as well as by Fukuzawa Yukichi. Fukuzawa held that theevolution of civilization cultivates a “progressive spirit” yet also creates friction in society, andcame to advocate the party cabinet system as a political system capable of absorbing such
friction and antagonism. At the same time, Fukuzawa expected the emperor to fulfill a functionof “capturing the spirit of the Japanese people” by withdrawing from governance and removing
himself from political conflict (Suetake 2011, 34–38).
However, Inoue was vehemently opposed to placing the emperor in such a symbolic positionof reigning without ruling. He argued that as Japan headed toward the adoption of a constitutional
system, the countr y ought to maintain the distinctive feature of imperial governance̶directrule̶that is, the emperor ruling the nation in person. Inoue repeatedly explained the benefits of
the Prussian system to Ito Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru. Japan thus began heading in the directionof a Prussian-style constitutional monarchy as a model for its political system. The opening ofparliament was promised to take place in 1890, and both the government and the private sector
started to prepare for the event. Many political parties were born in the 1880s, but they were all
short-lived. The significance of the parties within the constitutional system was not understood
until after the establishment of the Meiji Constitution (Suetake 2011, 40–62).

The Significance of the Separation of Powers
A Prussian-style constitution gave stronger authority to the executive than a British-style
constitution, making the choice of who should be in charge of administration a significant
question. It became important to establish an executive branch that could withstand criticism
from the parliament, and which possessed greater legitimacy than parliament. Ito Hirobumi took
on the role of creating such an executive.
In 1883, upon his return from Europe, where he had studied the continentʼs constitutions,
Ito began working to create Japanʼs imperial house and peerage systems. The enactment of theImperial Household Law sought to protect the imperial house from parliamentar y influence.
Work on a peerage system was a prerequisite for the establishment of the House of Peers.
These steps were taken in pursuit of the national goal of creating a nation on par with Europeanmonarchies. In 1885, when Ito became prime minister, he created a cabinet system andstrengthened its executive power. The cabinet system implemented a strict separation between
the imperial house and the government. On the one hand, this system relieved the emperor ofany political responsibility, but it also allowed the cabinet to administer the country regardless ofthe emperorʼs wishes.
However, opposition from Inoue Kowashi, who feared that the strengthening of the cabinet
would threaten the emperorʼs sovereignty, prevented the Meiji Constitution from containing any
references to the cabinetʼs position and authority or even its existence. There was another factor
hindering the emergence of a strong cabinet. It was the introduction of an advanced separation of
powers in the structure of the Meiji Constitution (Mitani 2017).
The separation of powers had been a central part of the Meiji governmentʼs constitutionalist
vision since the declaration of the restoration of imperial rule. The restoration of imperial rule18
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Sumio Hatanomeant recovering the emperorʼs authority and making imperial governance the cornerstoneof the state. Imperial governance did not mean the revival of the Bakufuʼs absolute power, andthe imperial system needed a mechanism for eliminating absolute power. The separation of
powers was thought to be an effective means of curbing power. The separation of power that was
realized through the practices of the Bakufuʼs consultative system was a political strategy that
had been selected to deal with the foreign crisis of the mid-19th century. The consultative systemof aggregating diverse opinions through discussions among the elders functioned to prevent
power from being concentrated in any one political group. The system had sought to enable
the Tokugawa shogunate to exercise leadership in an environment of greater administrative
specialization that had been created with the establishment of national Bakufu rule (Mitani 2017,
42–44, 67–68).
The Bakufuʼs consultative system was in a broad sense a way of forming “public opinion.”
This evolved into the “public opinion government” at the core of the new Meiji governmentʼsvision of the constitutional state. The principle of “public opinion,” as embodied in the conceptof kōgi, contained within it the seeds of two ideas: parliamentarism and the separation of powers.
The notion of kōgi gave legitimacy to imperial governance, acted to effectively stimulate popular
dynamism, and helped establish the first operational constitutional monarchy in Asia.
If we take the principle of constitutional government to mean placing checks on power using
rules, and expanding popular political participation through parliament, then we can agree thatthe idea of public opinion had its origins in the concept of kōgi̶used by the Bakufu in politicalmanagement.

The Emperor System and Constitutionalism
There are two ways of understanding the Meiji Constitution. One is to interpret it as a set ofbasic governing principles in accordance with Western constitutionalism. This revolves aroundan interpretation of the Meiji Constitution as lex scripta, or written law. It acknowledges that theestablishment of a constitution was a prerequisite to entering the West-centered international
community of the nineteenth century on equal terms. The other way of interpreting the Meiji
Constitution is to focus on the unwritten rules and customs that regulated the state systemalongside the explicit text of the constitution, as well as their historical background. In fact, theMeiji Constitution was not unrelated to the basic rules of the past state system in Japan, including
the ritsuryō legal system and the Bakufu–domain system, and its text alone was not sufficient tocope with various matters of statecraft.
With regard to the latter understanding, the view of the emperor as a superior being whose
status did not have to be put in writing, or as transcending the constitution, had a major influenceon how the constitution was managed and interpreted. As explained in the constitution ʼ scommentary (kenpō gikai), the emperorʼs position in the Meiji Constitution did not start with theestablishment of the constitution, and was seen as originating in the “native national polity.” Theconcept of kokutai, often translated as the “national polity,” has been interpreted in various ways,
but in the Meiji Constitution, Japan was seen as a state governed since antiquity by the emperor,
whose continuity was emphasized. However, while the emperorʼs legitimacy was supported by all
forms of authority and power throughout Japanʼs long history, it had been common practice forthe emperor to entrust the actual exercise of power to the political system of the era. Unlike theWest, the emperor had almost never ruled as an absolute monarch.
In the West, constitutional systems of government generally developed from absolutemonarchies. The concept of an absolute monarchy did not exist in Japan, so it was not possible
to introduce constitutional systems of government without first creating something resemblingan absolute monarch. Thus, when establishing the Meiji Constitution, the documentʼs drafters
created a theoretical construct that assumed the existence of the emperor as an absolute
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The Building of the Meiji State and Constitutional Government

monarch and held that the emperor voluntarily limited his own absolute power. As such, theMeiji Constitution provided for the emperorʼs supreme authority, but it also limited the exerciseof that authority in accordance with advice from supporting government institutions. In this way,the emperorʼs position in the Meiji Constitution was interpreted as possessing the dimensions ofboth a constitutional and absolute monarch (Kitaoka 2010, 76–77). If the aspects of an absolutemonarch were emphasized, the emperor would literally rule as a sovereign and bear the
responsibility of all decisions made (the imperial sovereignty doctrine). By contrast, emphasizing
the aspects of a constitutional monarch would highlight the functions of parliament and cabinet as
the emperorʼs advisory bodies.
In this way, the constitutional theory behind the Meiji Constitution combined the ideas ofthose who interpreted the constitution through the concept of imperial sovereignty, as expoundedon by scholars such as Hozumi Yatsuka, and those who espoused a stance emphasizing theparliament. The doctrine of imperial sovereignty fundamentally rejected parliamentarism andparty politics. In the 1930s, the doctrine received over whelming support from government
officials and military authorities who valued administrative expertise and consistency in policy.
However, even when the military began to assert itself in politics, the parliament was far frompowerless. As previously discussed, one factor that helped sustain parliamentarism was the factthat the ideology and customs of kōgi, which stressed the importance of free debate that went
beyond the boundaries of social status during the Bakufu era, were never rejected.
Another factor goes back to Fukuzawa Yukichiʼs On the Imperial Household (1882), which
separated the emperor from politics and made him the nationʼs spiritual and moral center (Suetake
2011, 38–40). This idea was adopted and carried forward by Minobe Tatsukichi and others, andthe fact that it did not lose its legitimacy as one of many interpretations of kokutai can be said tohave acted as a breakwater protecting constitutionalism from the doctrine of absolute imperial
sovereignty. Moreover, the traditional idea that the emperor and the people had never been
adversaries throughout history, but rather had worked together in the management of the state ina cooperative relationship, as well as concepts such as wachū kyodō (harmonious cooperation) andkunmin kyōchi (joint rule by the monarch and the people) provided support for the factors that
helped sustain parliamentarianism.
Japanese constitutionalism sought to come to terms with the limitations of the doctrine ofseparation of powers through struggle. The relationship between the emperor, the parliament,
and the cabinet was shaped by the interaction between the political interpretation of theconstitution held by the government of the day and the ideals of those who drew up theconstitution. For example, Ito Hirobumi sought to limit the power of the parliament when drafting
the constitution, but was not seeking to reject parliament or political parties. The constitutional
politics envisioned by Ito consisted of harmonious interactions between the three agencies ofthe sovereign, the parliament, and the administration. In particular, he regarded as crucial thecollaboration between the government and the parliament based on an independent executive
branch (Takii 2003, 116–118).
The legislative and executive branches were theoretically able to exercise their own authority
in accordance with the separation of powers, but a complete separation between the legislativeand executive branches was never possible. Successive governments have continued to worry
about how to regulate the branches and facilitate their cooperation. Modern-day systems ofgovernance still face the exact same problem.

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Japan Review Vol.2 No.2 Fall 2018

Sumio Hatano

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