Territorial Revisionism via Belt and Road Initiative:
Implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on South Asia’s Conventional Deterrence

Territorial Revisionism via Belt and Road Initiative:
Implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on
South Asia’s Conventional Deterrence
Monika Chansoria*

Abstract

The fluctuating strategic environment in Southern Asia is witnessing enhanced
interactivity between politico-military-strategic and operational issues, by virtueof many projects. This includes, most prominently, the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC)―a part of Chinaʼs grand project, the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI), which seeks to consolidate the China-Pakistan strategic relationship. As far
as regional geo-strategic calculations are concerned, the CPEC has emerged asa vital lynchpin among the variables of deterrence that India will seemingly haveto cater to, ranging from conventional deterrence in the Indo-China border areas,
to campaign planning for developing flexible deterrent operations (including joint
operational planning). India is facing the growing complexity and pressure as
it strives to ensure continuing and survivable deterrence at varying levels. The
presence of China and Pakistan is becoming progressively compelling in so far asplanning and achieving deterrence at operational levels is concerned. Recurring
Chinese transgressions in the border areas in Indiaʼs north-eastern and western
theatre could well be part of a plausible militar y strategy to keep both fronts
tactically active and build up tactical pressure on the Indian Armed Forces―
thereby placing the existing conventional deterrence equations in South Asia underconsiderable strain. In wake of the violent clashes between the Chinese and Indianarmies on 15–16 June 2020 in Indiaʼs eastern Ladakh sector that caused casualties
for the first time in nearly 45 years, Indiaʼs shift from a dissuasive deterrence
posture, to one of credible deterrence is gaining traction.

T

he foundation of conventional deterrence theor y espoused by John Mearsheimer
hypothesized that war is most likely to break out during a crisis when the aggressor
firms up on belief and capability by means of which, he is sure to achieve rapid resultsin terms of a victory or decisive outcomes in its favor. In the chain of crises events,
deterrence is most likely to fail if a potential attacker thinks that it is possible to win a quick anddecisive victory.1 Mearsheimer states that conventional deterrence is a subset of deterrence thatseeks to prevent the outbreak of conflict during a crisis by maintaining the ability to deny an
opponent its goals on the battlefield through the use of conventional forces.2*

Dr. Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow (non-resident) at The Japan Institute of International Affairs,
Tokyo.

1

For an extensive discussion on conventional deterrence see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional
Deterrence, Chapter 2, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

2

Conventional deterrence described by John J. Mearsheimer, p. 15.

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The fluctuating strategic environment in Southern Asia is witnessing enhanced interactivity
between politico-militar y-strategic and operational issues, by virtue of many projects. This
includes, most prominently, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)―a part of Chinaʼs
grand project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to consolidate the China-Pakistan
strategic relationship.3 The BRI comprises of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Route, thereby aiming to connect Asia with Europe and Africa by means of awidespread infrastructure network along the routes of the ancient Silk Road. The Silk Road
Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic)
so as to link China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia andthe Indian Ocean. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Route stretches from Chinaʼs coast to Europe
through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean on one route, and from Chinaʼs coast throughthe South China Sea to the South Pacific on the other.

Conventional Deterrence and the Southern Asian Milieu
The CPEC project running through Pakistan in a linear fashion was launched in 2015 with theobjective of linking northwestern China to southern Pakistanʼs Arabian Sea coastline througha network of roads, railways, and pipelines. Pakistanʼs Ministry of Planning, Development andReform confirmed that construction of 650 km-long road linking the port city of Gwadar in
Baluchistan to Sorab (a main town in the province). This road will link Gwadar with Quetta (theprovincial capital of Baluchistan). The rest of the western route will link Gwadar with the Chinesecity of Kashgar through Baluchistan and the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province,
covering a total distance of 2,517 km.4 Pakistanʼs Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform
describes the CPEC as “a framework of regional connectivity... enhancement of geographicallinkages having improved road, rail and air transportation system... a journey towards economic
regionalization in the globalized world.”5
As far as regional geo-strategic calculations are concerned, the CPEC has emerged as avital lynchpin among the variables of deterrence that India will seemingly have to cater to,
ranging from conventional deterrence in the Indo-China border areas, to campaign planning fordeveloping flexible deterrent operations (including joint operational planning). India is facing thegrowing complexity and pressure as it strives to ensure continuing and survivable deterrence atvarying levels. The presence of China and Pakistan is becoming progressively compelling in so
far as planning and achieving deterrence at operational levels is concerned. All this comes in the
midst of a looming question―in a potential conflict/war scenario between India and Pakistan,would China open up a second front, even if it were to be restricted to a limited zone? Recurring
Chinese transgressions in the border areas in Indiaʼs northeastern and western theatre could wellbe part of a plausible military strategy to keep both fronts tactically active and build up tacticalpressure on the Indian Armed Forces―thereby placing the existing conventional deterrence
equations in South Asia under considerable strain. Not surprisingly, Indiaʼs shift from a dissuasive
deterrence posture, to one of credible deterrence is gaining traction.
The spate of developments in Indiaʼs western theatre with Pakistan and eastern theatre with
China has added newer variables to the regional deterrence milieu. The deterrence relationship3

For related references see, Daniel S. Markey and James West, “Behind Chinaʼs Gambit in Pakistan,”
Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2016; also see, Daniel S. Markey and T.C.A. Raghavan, “TheChina-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Discussion at Carnegie India, July 2, 2016, available at http://
carnegieindia.org/2016/07/02/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-event-5328

4

As cited in a Xinhua news agency report, “Pakistan says works on key route of CPEC under way,”
October 9, 2015.

5

For more details see the CPEC Secretariat, Ministr y of Planning, Development and Reform, PakSecretariat, Islamabad, Pakistan, available at http://cpec.gov.pk/introduction/1

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Territorial Revisionism via Belt and Road Initiative:
Implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on South Asia’s Conventional Deterrence

between India and Pakistan has proven to be conventionally complex. In contrast, the deterrence
relationship between China and India remains hard to be described in tangible terms at present
and, therefore, far more difficult to evaluate in terms of stability/instability.6 Both China and India
are aware that the other would be no “pushover” militarily and that clear deterrent signals (bothconventional and nuclear) operate both ways.7 Amid the above two equations, the politico-militaryequation between Pakistan and China can best be described as strategically complimentary. In
the cases of both, China and Pakistan, the role of the military in the affairs of the state remains
vital. The authoritarian political-military partnership is found predominantly in communist states
or countries with authoritarian political control. Power is concentrated in a single party, or in
an individual, or group of people, who dominate the political system – as in China, where thePeopleʼs Liberation Army (PLA) represents instruments of power, coercion and extraction, argues
Ayesha Siddiqa.8 Chinaʼs civil-military relations have rendered it a “political party-authoritarian
military partnership” structure. In case of Pakistan, the military has assumed deep involvementin the politics of the state, at the cost of dominating all other institutions.9
With India, China shares a relationship of constrained cooperation. 10 This description issignificant while raising the question ―will China play a pivotal role in preventing the total
breakdown of status quo during any future military crises in the region? More so, since, China
has a direct stake in the stability of deterrence in South Asia. The Chinese policy towards South
Asiaʼs deterrence today appears to be guided by its primary consideration―to “prevent South
Asia from any possibility of conflict escalation.”11 China has high stakes in ensuring that the IndiaPakistan deterrence stays operational and potent, given, what appears that any debate on nuclear
weaponsʼ usage could draw/impact upon Chinaʼs own stability. This was clearly visible in many
Chinese commentaries that have emphasized the threat to stability of the entire region, of which,
China too, is an integral part.12 Since the outbreak of the Kargil conflict, China has increasingly
been aware of the danger of a potential large-scale conflict that would deal a severe blow to
Chinaʼs strategic goal of maintaining a stable periphery.13
These interdependent variables render South Asian deterrence to be at a far more criticalstage. A possible deterrence model for extended Southern Asia, keeping in mind all three primary
players, i.e., India, Pakistan, and China, could be based on opacity on the ground. Propelling an
informed debate is deterrence by generating credible and unidentifiable ambiguity about the
expected response, which is deftly matched by a certain transparency of intentions and capability,
as deterrence theor y assumes. However, the triangular and unequal equation, respectively,
6

WPS Sidhu, “Operation Vijay and Operation Parakram: The Victory of Theory?” in E. Sridharan, ed.,The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, (New Delhi:
Routledge, 2007) p. 209.

7

K Sundarji, Vision 2100: A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd,
2003) p. 81.

8

Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc. – Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, (London: Pluto Press, 2007) p. 41.

9Ibid., p. 37.

10

For more on the Indian and Chinese relationship being one of “constrained cooperation” see, Monika
Chansoria, “India and China: Constrained Cooperation,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, vol. 6, no. 3,
July-September 2011, pp. 327–336; also see, Monika Chansoria, “India-China Border Agreement: Much
Ado about Nothing,” Foreign Policy, January 13, 2014.

11

Zhang Guihong, “US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its implications for
China: A Chinese Perspective,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 27, no. 2, 2003, pp. 145–71.

12

Shao Zongwei, “Call for Talks to End Fight,” China Daily, June 30, 1999, p. 1; also see, Jin Zeqing, “WarNever Ends Disputes,” China Daily, June 5, 1999, p. 4.

13

The authorʼs meeting and interaction in Shanghai in 2012 with Zhao Gancheng Director of South Asia
Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Shanghai, China.

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among China, Pakistan, and India, makes mutual understanding of their respective deterrence far
more challenging.14
While deliberating upon the conceptual and operational aspects of Indiaʼs national strategic
doctrine, former Air Commodore, Jasjit Singh, maintained that Indiaʼs future military capabilities
would need to be situated in the strategic framework of an appropriate politico-military doctrine
based on national aspirations―with the prevention of war, and removal of threat of war, becoming
important constituents in the said framework. Thus, deterrence would have to be a central
factor in the doctrine, while détente (at the ideal level) and peaceful co-existence (as the optimum
framework) are pursued vigorously in a sustained way.15 Therefore, the primary strategic doctrine
for India in the coming two decades (i.e., until 2025) would be prevention of war, whether that
war is conventional or sub-conventional, regular or irregular, full-scale or limited. This requires
adequate and credible deterrent capabilities―and, if deterrence fails, then to prosecute the war,
conclude it, and disengage with maximum advantage to Indiaʼs national interests at minimum
costs, in the shortest possible time.16
Deterrence, therefore, has been the central pillar of Indiaʼs defense strategy playing a majorrole in preventing war, as well as, in fighting a limited war, which could lead to success in theevent of deterrence failure. While all components of militar y power are capable of providing
deterrence through denial, the real challenge for defense strategy is the method of applicationof militar y power to achieve the desired levels of success militarily, and consequent politicaladvantage. All along, the focus has to be keeping the war below a rationally credible scenario
of nuclear weaponsʼ use.17 China remains integral to the changing realities of the South Asiandeterrence framework. Given Chinaʼs centrality to the evolution and nature of the India-Pakistan
deterrence relationship, the Southern Asian framework―consisting China, India and Pakistan
will gradually replace the narrow South Asian (or India-Pakistan) framework of analysis, as thethree states, are evolving a deterrence architecture that is three-sided.18

Historical Connect in South Asia’s Territorial Disputes
Military strategists, classically, have at least three considerations in adopting a strategy for a war,or, military campaign. These include political objectives, opportunities, and constraints; conflictwith the hostile forces; and the effect of physical features.19 A most-suited reference could be thelimited war between India and Pakistan in Kargil in 1999. Among the many lessons that emerged
from the Kargil war for India, the most significant one was that although the chances of a fullscale conventional war between India and Pakistan were bleak, however, as long as there are
territorial disputes rooted in history―a continued proxy war (by Pakistan), or a limited borderwar (with China), cannot be ruled out entirely. The patrolling and other activities of the Chinese
PLA on Indiaʼs northern border during the Kargil war have been chronicled by General VP
Malik, who was the Chief of Indiaʼs Army Staff during the conflict. Malik narrates in Kargil:
14

For more details see Michael Quinlan, “How robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence,” Survival, vol. 42, no. 4,
2000/01, p. 146.

15

Views articulated by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Retd) during many conversations with the author;
for similar arguments see, Jasjit Singh, “Army 2020: Synchronizing Militar y Power with National
Aspirations,” in Vijay Oberoi, ed., Army 2020: Shape, Size, Structure and General Doctrine for Emerging
Challenges, (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2005).

16

Ibid.

17

Ibid.

18

Sidhu, n. 6, pp. 305–06.

19

For more see, Archer Jones, Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach, (Westport, Conn:
Praeger, 1996) p. 197.

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From Surprise to Victory, how the Joint Intelligence Committeeʼs (JIC) April 1999 review had
predicted that the long-standing cooperation among China, North Korea, and Pakistan was likely
to continue. Among the many tasks for the military, the immediate ones included maintaining
alertness on the border with China.20
Long-standing territorial and boundary disputes do not exist just between India and Pakistan,
but also between China and India. Following the war with India in 1962, China negotiated andobtained a boundary settlement on the Karakorams with Pakistan. This settlement was finalized in
March 1963, and with it, China obtained for itself, a new boundary. China secured the Shaksgam
Valley and this pushed the Chinese territor y further south towards Jammu & Kashmir. In
hindsight, it would seem that the Chinese were willing to be involved in negotiating for territory21
as part of their larger South Asia strategy. In fact, the remarks of Pakistanʼs former Chief of Army
Staff, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, on the impact of the Siachen conflict on Pakistan, point towards suchcomplicity when he stated, “India had foiled Pakistanʼs attempts to have a common border with its
ally China... (For which) Pakistan had in the past ceded territory in Karakoram to China, in orderto realize this objective.”22 The prominence of geopolitics in the policy chosen by a state, and thestrategy it adopts to obtain those policy objectives, cannot be minimized. The actions of Chinaand Pakistan in the Karakorams illustrate this precisely. The actions also depict how political
exploitation of geographic realities for security demands skill, and a long-term perspective.23 The
CPEC, discussed in the subsequent section of this paper comes off as the latest variant of thelong-standing China-Pakistan partnership and collusion.
During the Kargil conflict, the Chinese PLA had enhanced its level of activity and presencealong the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh and opposite Arunachal Pradesh―indicating ademonstrative posture. Reports in 1999 indicated deployment of additional PLA troops opposite
Arunachal Pradesh, and major Chinese patrolling activities at Demchok in eastern Ladakh;
Trig Heights in Ladakh; Pangong Tso (in Ladakh); and Chantze (in the West Kameng districtof the north-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh). In his memoirs, Malik defines how theIndian army had, in fact, received intelligence reports that the PLAʼs director in the Departmentof Armament (handling the conventional weapons and equipment of the Chinese Army) visited
Islamabad during the time of the Kargil conflict to help the Pakistan Army overcome its critical
deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.24
India traditionally adopted a strategy of conventional deterrence, based on strong offensive
capability vis-à-vis Pakistan, and dissuasive deterrence vis-à-vis China―supported by limited outof-area projection capability for the security of Indiaʼs far flung island territories. Indiaʼs longterm aim is to build capabilities and gain decisive competitive advantage in core areas of thespectrum of conflict.25 Succinctly describing conventional deterrence, General K Sundarji, former
Indian Army Chief (1986–1988) articulated that it consisted of two components: 1) a defensive
posture that dissuades; and 2) a counter-offensive capability, which deters. A viable defensive
posture, should, therefore, consist of strong defenses that are capable of extracting a high pricebefore the aggressor achieves the almost inevitable penetration at points of its choice. A strong
and credible conventional counter-offensive capability capable of inflicting heavy losses on the20

VP Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2006) p. 139.

21

Y.Y.I Vertzberger, China’s Southwestern Strategy: Encirclement and Counterencirclement (New York:
Praeger, 1985); also see, VR Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict Without End, (New Delhi: Penguin Books India(P) Ltd, 2002) pp. 24–25.

22

As cited in, “Keeping Pakistan Army out of Politics,” The Times of India, September 18, 1989.

23

Raghavan, n. 21, pp. 27–28.

24

Malik, n. 20.

25

Jasjit Singh, n. 15, pp. 108–113.

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aggressor remains ideal. This threat of a riposte is likely to deter the aggressor from trying tochange the status quo. Dissuasion alone, argue many, will not do without deterrence.26 Indiaʼsmilitary strategy for 2020 should possess credible deterrence at the conventional level, given thatconventional warfare places a premium on dispersion, mobility and the ability to regroup anddisperse rapidly. While wars are likely to be of shorter duration, they will be intense with heavy
casualty rates and attrition of men and material.27

CPEC and BRI:The Depth and Correlation of Geopolitics, Policy Objectives, and Strategy

According to the Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14, “...gigantic collaboration extended by the
Chinese government in construction of infrastructure projects like the China-Pak Economic
Corridor and High Priority Early Harvest Projects will pave the way for multi-dimensional socioeconomic and geo-political benefits to both the countries.” 28 CPECʼs framework enhancing
geographical linkages with improved road, rail, and air transportation system29 and frequent
joint military exercises, such as well-advertised joint patrolling is likely to impact the operational
military realities in the region substantially. The joint exercise undertaken by the frontier defense
regiment of the PLA and Pakistanʼs border police along the stretch of the border connecting
Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir and Xinjiang in July 2016 remain of particular concern from an Indian
standpoint.30
The CPEC starts from Kashgar in China and subsequently passed through the 1,300 km-long
Karakoram Highway (National Highway 35/N35), with 887 km falling in Pakistan and 413 km in
China. Its endpoint is the Chinese-funded Gwadar Port (south of Baluchistan) in the Arabian Sea.
China has invested in construction of breakwaters, dredging of berthing areas and channels, andoverall infrastructure development of the Gwadar Port.
The Governments of Pakistan and China began construction of the Karakoram Highway
comprising 85 bridges in early 1959. It was opened to the public two decades later in 1979,
connecting the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China and Gilgit–Baltistan, across the
Karakoram mountain range, through the Khunjerab Pass.31 In the midst, Pakistan established theFrontier Works Organization (FWO) in 1966 to construct the initially 805 km-long Karakoram
Highway. Even after the completion of the Karakoram Highway, the organization was notdisbanded. The new all-weather road, i.e., Karakoram Highway, connecting Rawalpindi/
Islamabad with Chinaʼs Xinjiang Province runs through what Pakistan calls the “Northern Areas.”
26

Sundarji, n. 7, p. 154; for related readings and references on deterrence and debate on changing ofstatus quo, see, Eric Heginbotham and Jacob L. Heim, “Deterring without Dominance: Discouraging
Chinese Adventurism under Austerity,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 2015, pp.
185–199 and Keith L. Shimko, International Relations: Perspectives, Controversies and Readings (Fourth
Edition) (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Publication, 2011), pp. 69–74.

27

As articulated by former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (Eastern Command) Lt Gen KS Brar,and former Director General (Military Operations) Lt Gen VK Singh, cited in Oberoi, ed., n. 15, pp. 33,
68.

28

Transport and Communications, Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14, Ministry of Finance, Governmentof Pakistan, available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_14/13_Transport_and_coms.pdf p.
215

29

Pakistan governmentʼs official information release on the CPEC available at http://cpec.gov.pk/
introduction/1

30“Joint patrol along China-Pakistan border,” People’s Daily Online, July 21, 2016; also see, Monika
Chansoria, “China not neutral on Kashmir, anymore,” The Sunday Guardian, August 13, 2016.

31

Details of the Karakoram Highway, as stated by the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National
Heritage, Government of Pakistan.

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Territorial Revisionism via Belt and Road Initiative:
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According to Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation, the 805 km dual-carriage metaled roadstarts from Havelian 100 km from Islamabad and winds through Abbottabad–Mansehra–Thakot–
Besham–Pattan–Sazin–Ghils–Gilgit–Hunza to the Chinese Frontier across the 4,733 meter highKhunjerab Pass.32
In 2006, the Pakistan Highway Administration and Chinaʼs State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission (SASAC) agreed to widen the highway from 10 to 30 meters andupgrade it to make it accessible by motor vehicles during extreme weather conditions.33 This waslater confirmed in a January 2016 documentary that ran on China Network Television (CNTV)―a national web-based TV broadcaster. In the broadcast, Ye Chenyin, general manager, China Road
and Bridge Corporation stated:
The Karakoram Highway is often seen as a symbol of the Sino-Pakistani friendship ... built in
the 1960... with 24 main bridges, 70 small bridges, and more than 1,700 culverts...In 2008, theChina Road and Bridge Corporation began KKHʼs extension... The Karakoram Highway linechange project was completed after five years of hardships...34
The widening of the strategic roads by three times its initial specifications indicates that it iscustomized for rapid and smooth movement of heavy military machinery, troops, and material.
The network of Pakistanʼs National Highway Authority (NHA) comprises 39 national highways,
motorways, expressway, and strategic roads. Among all the ongoing projects of the NHA, priority
is given to the re-alignment of the Karakoram Highway at Attabad.35 Further, the completed
projects also include the Raikot–Khunjerab section (335 km) of the Karakoram Highway. The
Pakistan Economic Survey 2013–14 listed “prioritized infrastructure projects” in collaboration
with China, which included improvement/up-gradation of the Karakoram Highway (Phase-II)from Raikot to Islamabad (487 km) through credit financing.36
In addition, the ongoing China-Pakistan Optical Fiber Cable (OFC) project is scheduled forcompletion in 2017. According to Pakistanʼs official information release, the CPEC Fiber Optic
Project in Gilgit–Baltistan runs 466.584 km (making for 56.7 percent) of the total length 820 km
between Khunjerab and Rawalpindi.37 The OFC network provides a quantum jump in Chineseand Pakistani military capacities in order to connect ground-surveillance to their command-andcontrol. The OFC project allows for sharing information in a secure manner. The advantages of
OFC include:1) Tremendous capacity to carry digital data (including satellite imagery data)
2) OFC can be dug deep underground in the war zone area and, therefore, no amount of
32

More details on the Karakoram Highway, as per Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation, available
at http://www.tourism.gov.pk/northern_areas.html

33

For more details see, Vijay Sakhuja, “The Karakoram Corridor: Chinaʼs Transportation Network inPakistan,” China Brief, vol. 10, no. 20, October 8, 2010.

34

CNTV report, “Karakoram Highway benefits Pakistan remote area,” cited in Xinhua News, January 18,
2016.

35

For more on the Karakoram Highway see, “China-Pak relations: Sweeter than honey?” The Pioneer,
March 29, 2014; also see, Peerzada Ashiq, “China has established its presence across PoK,” The Hindu,
September 3, 2015.

36

As per Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms; also see, Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14 on
Transport and Communications, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, available at http://www.
finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_14/13_Transport_and_coms.pdf pp. 196–99.

37

For more on Pakistan governmentʼs official information release on the CPEC, see, http://cpec.gov.pk/
map-single/3

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artillery shelling can interrupt/disrupt the smooth flow of information
3) Since OFC does not emit any electronic signals, itʼs not likely to be prone to any jammingor electro-magnetic interference; and
4) End-to-end connectivity provides multiple options to connect large number of surveillance,
display, steep-up, and transmitting/receiving devices.
Additionally, it is known that all Chinese PLA Air Force units present in the Tibet Autonomous
Region are connected by satellite communication and that fiber optic communication is being
steadily extended towards military installations along the Indian borders, with military regions
being inter-connected through secure communications. This in turn ensures enhanced realtime command and control.38 On the eastern front, Indiaʼs strategic situation remain grave with
Chinaʼs increasing military presence and capabilities in Tibet that adjoin the eastern sector ofIndiaʼs borders. Moreover, projects funded by China in the Gilgit–Baltistan region, which include
construction of dams, bridges, roads (including the construction, maintenance and expansionof the Karakoram Highway, with military specifications), along with an estimated 7,000–11,000
soldiers of the Chinese PLA Construction Corps reportedly deployed in the Gilgit–Baltistan
region of Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir, make a “two-front war” scenario for India not unimaginable.
The Chinese foothold in the Gilgit–Baltistan region provides a credible backdrop for China toensure Pakistanʼs security―given its critical stakes inside Pakistanʼs territory.
India has officially raised objections to a specific section of the CPEC since Chinaʼs growing
connectivity with Pakistan is being linked through the illegally occupied territory of the IndianState of Jammu & Kashmir. This objection by India has been placed on record in the 200809 Annual Report (declassified) of the Ministry of Defence (submitted in the Upper House of
the Parliament, Rajya Sabha) and states, “... enhancing connectivity with Pakistan through theterritory of Jammu & Kashmir, illegally occupied by China and Pakistan will have direct military
implications for India.” Further, commenting on the China-Pakistan relationship, Indiaʼs Ministryof Defence stated the following on record:
Chinaʼs stated objectives, in [the] White Paper, of developing strategic missile and spacebased assets and of rapidly enhancing its blue-water navy to conduct operations in distantwaters, as well as the systematic upgrading of infrastructure, reconnaissance and surveillance,
quick response and operational capabilities in the border areas, will have an effect on theoverall military environment in the neighborhood of India... [Chinaʼs] military assistance andcooperation with Pakistan and other countries in our neighborhood, as well as the possibilityof enhancing connectivity with Pakistan through the territory of Jammu & Kashmir, illegally
occupied by China and Pakistan and with other countries will also have direct militar y
implications for India. India will engage China to seek greater transparency and openness in
its defense policy and posture, while taking all necessary measures to protect the national
security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of India.39
Infrastr ucture build-up facilitates the rapid deployment of integrated forces and theconcentration of field formations in comparatively shorter time-frames and, consequently, overshorter warning periods. The overall conventional operational capability of the Chinese andPakistan army will directly impact conventional deterrence in the strategic context amid theemerging spectrum of conflict, which is becoming far more asymmetric and which, requires
38

Monika Chansoria, “Chinaʼs Infrastructure Development in Tibet: Evaluating Trendlines,” Manekshaw
Paper, no. 32, 2011, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, p. 31.

39

Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2008-09, p. 6.

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a range of capabilities. By deciding to construct major civil, energy and military infrastructure
projects in the CPEC, which runs through Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir and Gilgit–Baltistan, Indiaʼsstrategic-security context faces the collusive presence and challenge of China and Pakistan. The
environment is edging past the existing deterrence setting, especially under the nuclear shadow.

Conclusion
Given the latest upgrades to the CPEC and developments in the wake of its expansion, thepossibility of China securing its investments and trade routes constructed in Pakistan-occupiedKashmir has increased. Growing Chinese stakes by virtue of heavy economic investments andpresence of Chinese personnel (civilian workers, paramilitary and Construction Corps of thePLA) makes Beijing as a vital player in the conventional deterrence situation in South Asia. The
latter might not remain virtuously “neutral” in the quintessential sense, both diplomatically, andmilitarily, in the event of a limited or protracted India-Pakistan conflict in the near or, distantfuture.
South Asiaʼs conventional military balance needs to be viewed from a prism that highlights
the collusive nature of Chinaʼs security partnership with Pakistan and its impending military
portends. The CPEC has played a vital role in strengthening the strategic alliance between
Pakistan and China, not merely in economic terms, but more so, in militar y terms, thereby
placing pressure on the existential conventional deterrence status in South Asia. The spectrumof threat in South Asia is becoming far more complicating and challenging for India―especiallywhen it comes to maintaining a balance of power owing substantially to the China-Pakistan
equation today.

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Japan Review Vol.3 No.3-4 Winter / Spring 2020