The Racial Equality Proposal and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Racial Equality Proposal and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs*
Ryoichi Tobe**
Abstract
Who came up with the idea for the racial equality proposal, and what was its objective? It is
often said that although the idea was originally based on principle, it later became entangledwith real-life political interests owing to the immigration issue. Ultimately, according to thisinterpretation, it became an issue of national pride. Once Japan had put forward the proposal
it became difficult to back down, and there was the worry that it would earn the disdain ofsurrounding countries, particularly China. But looking over these materials again for thispresentation, I have come to think that in fact it was always the intention that this proposal
should contribute to solving the immigration problem. I do not think this was incorporated
along the way as a reaction to realpolitik interests. At the same time, the theoreticalobjective based on principle was something that the Japanese side pursued consistently
throughout, even if it did not outweigh the practical concerns over the immigration issue.
The idea that the national prestige became an important concern in the final stages is not,I think, something that is supported by the documentar y materials. This presentation
discusses how the idea for the racial equality proposal evolved, organizing the discussion
around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

T

he questions I want to discuss today are: Who came up with the idea for the racialequality proposal, and what was its objective? I want to organize my discussion aroundthe Ministr y of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Professor Nakanishi has already spoken
about the political circumstances related to this issue in Japan, so I would like to add
my own remarks as supplementar y information that will perhaps complement what we havealready heard on the subject.1

1. The Originator: Whose Idea Was It?
The Ministr y of Foreign Affairs launched a Peace Preparation Committee in October 1915,
around one year after the start of World War I. The committee compiled a report a year later, atthe end of 1916. Of course, US President Wilson had not yet issued his Fourteen Points, and there
was no discussion about a possible racial equality proposal at this stage. Presumably discussions
took place within the ministry after Wilsonʼs Fourteen Points were announced in January 1918,
but we know little about the content of these discussions, assuming they took place. We cansurmise that serious deliberations began in earnest around October the same year, after Germany*

This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Commemorating theCentennial Anniversary of Japanʼs Racial Equality Proposal―Remaking the International Order after
the WWI―” held by JIIA on November 2, 2019.

** Ryoichi Tobe is Professor Emeritus of National Defense Academy (NDA) and of International ResearchCenter for Japanese Studies.
1

For more details on the keynote speech of Professor Nakanishi, see, Nakanishi Hiroshi, “Japan at theParis Peace Conference,” Japan Review 3. 3-4 (Winter / Spring 2020), pp. 1–8.

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Ryoichi Tobe

accepted the Fourteen Points and arranged a ceasefire.
In Japan, there had been a change of government not long before this, with a new cabinet led
by Hara Takashi replacing Terauchi Masatake at the end of September. A month and a half later,
Minister for Foreign Affairs Uchida Yasuya presented a government opinion on the Fourteen
Points at the Diplomatic Advisory Council. This comprised five items, one of which related to the
League of Nations. This is labeled as Document 1 in the References. In fact, this was submitted on
November 13, and on the very same day, the Second Peace Preparation Committee was launchedinside the Foreign Ministry. It seems likely that this government opinion was not formulated atmeetings of the Peace Preparation Committee within the ministry.
This document is frequently quoted in studies of the period. It suggests a clear connection
between the racial equality proposal and the question of joining the League of Nations. The
League of Nations was the hardest of Wilsonʼ s Four teen Points to understand. When andwhere did research and discussions about the League of Nations begin within the context ofWilsonʼs Fourteen Points, and how were these brought together in the form of this document?
Unfortunately, the truth is that we do not really know. Who was in charge of the matter within theministry? Foreign Minister Uchida, Prime Minister Hara, or someone else altogether? Shidehara
Kijūrō, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, was responsible for issues relating to the peace, so it ispossible that he took the lead in discussions, but the reality is that we do not really know for sure.

2. Objective (For What Purpose?)(1) The Three Main Directions for Peace Talks
Events developed and preparations got underway for the peace conference in Paris. In December,
Japan ʼ s Foreign Minister Uchida issued guidelines on the government ʼ s basic policy to adelegation of plenipotentiaries to the peace conference. This is Document 2 in the References. In
it, the conditions for the peace negotiations were divided into three groups: first, issues on which
Japan had its own interests, second, issues where Japan did not have any interests, and third,
issues on which it shared interests with other countries. The document said: “… regarding the
proposals put forward by the President of the United States, our policy will be decided according
to Appendix No. 3.” This was a government opinion on the Fourteen Points, part of which you
have as Document 1. In other words, the document that Uchida had submitted to the Diplomatic
Advisor y Council ended up being incorporated more or less verbatim into the governmentʼs
policy guidelines.
As you will see if you look again at Document 1, the government wanted to put off thequestion of establishing the League of Nations for the time being and leave as a topic to beaddressed in the future. But there was the possibility that it might be approved immediately, andin that case Japan would have no choice but to take part. If that happened, Japan was to work to
gain appropriate guarantees to eradicate disadvantages arising from racial prejudice.
On the face of that, perhaps Japan could have been satisfied with the situation: after the peace
conference started, Japan was one of the Big Five powers, and was guaranteed―at least formally―a position of equality together with Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy. And infact, when Japan argued on behalf of the racial equality proposal, some people did respond bypointing out that Japan was being treated equally as a major power at the peace conference, andwasnʼt that enough?

(2) Makino’s Negotiations

The de facto head of Japanʼs delegation of plenipotentiaries at the peace conference was Makino
Nobuaki, although he was officially second-in-charge. As Professor Nakanishi touched on in histalk earlier, Makino tried to increase the chances of getting the racial equality proposal adopted
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The Racial Equality Proposal and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

as part of the Covenant of the League of Nations by tr ying to persuade Edward House, thepresidential advisor who was sometimes described as the brains of the president. He discussed
this approach in his memoirs. Excerpt can be found in the References (Document 3).
Makinoʼs memoirs were published after the war. This part was added later, reprinted intactfrom his older book that had been written before the war. Reading it now, one is struck by the lofty
ideals. What is particularly interesting perhaps is that in his attempt to persuade House to backJapanʼs proposal, he draws on the idea of what we would now recognize as the logic of collective
security. The logic of his argument was that it was unthinkable for a country experiencing racial
discrimination to have to shoulder the burden of a military commitment to other member nations
while being the victim of racial discrimination itself. In terms of the diplomatic record, this is not
sufficient evidence to conclude that Makino actually did say this to House. But Makino did use
the argument of collective security in his addresses to the Commission on the League of Nations
and at the plenary session of the peace conference, albeit in slightly vaguer terms, to argue on
behalf of Japanʼs racial equality proposal.
House acknowledged what Makino said about wanting to incorporate a racial equality clauseinto the Covenant of the League of Nations. As we saw in Professor Nakanishiʼs PowerPoint
presentation earlier, House suggested that Makino should remove from the idea he had presented
those aspects relating to the immigration issue. Following this, the Japanese government
presented to the Commission on the League of Nations a draft proposal, which you can see inDocument 4. The wording differs somewhat from that suggested to House. At least the way I readit, however, some of the nuances relating to immigration still can be discerned in this version of
the document.
Yoshida Shigeru, who also accompanied the mission, wrote in his memoirs in later years
that Makino had experienced great difficulties during his time as foreign minister owing toactions taken to exclude Japanese immigrants from California. This is something that Professor
Nakanishi touched on in his presentation. Yoshida speculates that this experience may have lainat the root of what led Makino to write this proposal the way he did. Also, as we heard earlier,there were petitions from people within the countr y and overseas, particularly from groups
representing immigrant interests, and this too may have had an influence.
Again, if we think about this without our usual preconceptions, is it likely that this draft
proposal for inclusion in the covenant of the League came directly from the government opinion
laid out in Document 1 in the References? I keep referring back to Professor Nakanishi ʼ spresentation―once again, it is possible that this relates to something that was discussed at the
Diplomatic Advisory Council. We do not know who was responsible for the draft. It does notseem to have been included in the policy guidance from the ministry. It seems likely that Makino
or someone close to him wrote it. Since there is no evidence that the government opposed thedraft when it received this report, I think it is safe to conclude that this was a kind of unspoken
understanding in the Japanese government at the time.
Another interesting point is that Makino and the other Japanese plenipotentiaries did not try
to obtain the support of smaller or less powerful countries to make the racial equality proposala reality. They also did not do anything through the mass media. It might be more accurate tosay that they did not do anything very proactive at all. Their efforts were focused on gaining theunderstanding of the major powers. A little later I think we will hear from Professor Kawashima
about the response to the proposal in China.2 Essentially, Japan seems to have avoided making
any overtures to China or any of the lesser powers. It is enough to make you suspect that they
deliberately avoided making efforts in this direction because they felt it would only make matters2

For more details, see, Kawashima Shin, “Chinese and Taiwanese Perspectives on Japanʼs Racial Equality
Proposal,” Japan Review 3. 3-4 (Winter / Spring 2020), pp. 1–10.

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more complicated and more difficult in the long run if they did.

(3) Withdrawal (Abandoning the Proposal)

As you know, Japanʼs attempt to have a racial equality clause included in the League of Nations
covenant ultimately ended in failure. Japan later tried to have the essence of the proposal(Document 5 in the References) included in the preamble of the covenant, but this was not a
success either, as we heard in the explanation from Professor Nakanishi.
The question then naturally arose: What should be done about this? The question seems
to have prompted fierce debate within the delegation of plenipotentiaries. We know this froman account (Document 6 in the References) in the memoirs of Kimura Eiichi. Iʼm quoting thisat secondhand from another source, but itʼs quite interesting so I decided to include it anyway.
Kimura Eiichi was also a member of the Peace Preparation Committee within the Foreign
Ministry I mentioned earlier, and served as deputy secretary within the delegation.
It is hard to grasp just by reading it once, but I think probably the sense of it was this. He
seems to be saying that since the attempt to get the proposal included in the preamble was
unsuccessful, there was a suggestion that Japan should try again later at a plenary session of theallied nations, or formally the plenary session of the preliminary peace conference. The idea wasto try again to get at least the essence of the proposal included in the preamble to the covenant of
the League when the preliminary peace conference was held. And when this was not a success,he recalls, there were some people who thought that Japan should reexamine its intentions andput off joining the League.
An opposing argument seems to have emerged from the younger contingent within the group,
the younger diplomats and accompanying personnel. These people argued that the wordingof the proposal for inclusion in the preamble was sufficiently ambiguous and compromised
already. They argued that Japan should abandon ineffectual measures to rehash the issue andresubmit the proposal only to see it rebuffed again. Instead, they said, Japan should move
forward positively, join the League and propose the issue in the future from within the League.
In response to this opposition, the head of the mission Saionji Kinmochi and his deputy Makino
Nobuaki abandoned the idea of resubmitting the proposal at the plenary session of the peace
conference.
Unfortunately, we do not have supplementary evidence to support this anecdote, so we cannot
be sure to what extent it is factually correct. But if we look at what happened later, elements
emerge that match with the account at least to a certain extent. For example, Makino did givea speech at the plenar y session, expressing regret that the racial equality proposal had notbeen approved. In that speech, however, he did not use the phrasing of Document 5, originallyproposed for inclusion in the preamble and criticized from within the delegation for beingvague and conciliatory. Instead, he again used the wording from Document 4, which Japan hadoriginally tried to get incorporated into the main body of the League of Nations covenant. The
governmentʼs instructions also seem to suggest that the draft proposal put forward for inclusionin the preamble had been a little vague.
The prime minister when the proposal failed to get passed was Hara Takashi; his decision canbe found in Document 7 in the References. This document is often quoted, and will be familiar to
many of you. His decision, essentially, was that the situation was not likely to become any worse
than it had been up until now, and that the issue was not worth leaving the League of Nations
over.

3. Next Actions
What happened on the issue after that? Document 8 was presumably written either immediately
after the peace conference or perhaps during it, although it is unclear exactly when that was,15
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The Racial Equality Proposal and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

since the document is undated.
It is a handwritten document that explains the decision that Japan should indeed join the
League of Nations. It says that although the position with regard to racially discriminator ytreatment is sufficiently dangerous today, this tendency would only get worse if Japan did not join
the League of Nations. The connection with the immigration issue comes out strongly again here.
On this failure of the racial equality proposal, or at least the failure to turn it into a reality, it
is often said that although the idea was originally based on principle, it later became entangledwith real-life political interests owing to the immigration issue. Ultimately, according to thisinterpretation, it became an issue of national pride. Once Japan had put forward the proposal,
it became difficult to back down, and there was the worr y that it would earn the disdain ofsurrounding countries, particularly China.
But looking over these materials again for this presentation, I have come to think that in fact it
was always the intention that this proposal should contribute to solving the immigration problem.
I do not think this was incorporated along the way as a reaction to realpolitik interests.
At the same time, the theoretical objective based on principle was something that the Japaneseside pursued consistently throughout, even if it did not outweigh the practical concerns over theimmigration issue. The idea that the national prestige became an important concern in the final
stages is not, I think, something that is supported by the documentary materials.
Of course, as the account in Kimura Eiichiʼs memoirs makes clear, even after abandoning theplan to make the racial equality proposal a reality at the peace conference, the idea of trying again
in the future after joining the League continued to survive, at least among the younger diplomats
at the Foreign Ministry. Makino too, as I have said, made clear Japanʼs intention to raise the issue
again during his speech at the plenary session of the peace conference. In fact, in the lead-up to
the first General Assembly of the League of Nations, the Foreign Ministry did start preparations
for that direction, but ultimately decided to scrap its plans to raise the issue. It is not clear what
the reason was for this. And I am afraid I am not sure whether the Japanese delegation everraised the issue again at the League of Nations. This is a subject that requires further research.
In the famous “Emperorʼs Monologue,” a transcript of spoken memoirs by the Shōwa Emperor(Hirohito) about World War II, the emperor said that the failure of the racial equality proposal at
the Paris Peace Conference was one of the ultimate underlying reasons for the Greater East Asian
War. But in the memoirs and other writings we have by diplomats and those who took part in theconference, there are surprisingly few references to this issue. Following the failure at the peace
conference, young diplomats within the Foreign Ministry formed a group calling for reforms
within the ministry. But these reforms focused on the organization itself, and apparently came toan end without ever tackling the question of how the racial equality proposal should be handled in
the future. There is more I could say, and much more work that needs to be done on the subject,
but that is where I will leave things for today.

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References
1. Opinion of the Imperial Government on President Wilson’s Fourteen Points(presented by Foreign Minister Uchida at the Diplomatic Advisory Council on November 13,
1918)
［...］
7. Concerning the League of Nations, which is one of the most important issues, the Imperial
Government approves its ultimate purpose. However, the fact that racial prejudice has not yet
been extinguished among nations means that, depending on the means employed to achieve
the Leagueʼs goals, the possibility exists that its establishment will be gravely disadvantageous
to the empire... . Therefore, it is considered advisable to work to delay agreement on aconcrete proposal, limiting the scope of discussions to agreeing a draft of general aspiration,and leaving the question of how this will be implemented as an outstanding problem, with aproposal to be discussed at an appropriate future opportunity following careful considerationby the nations. However, in the event that the League of Nations does come into being, it
would be unwise for Japan to be isolated outside it. If it appears that a concrete proposal for
its establishment is likely to be approved, Japan should work to devise a suitable strategy toensure as much as circumstances allow the elimination of the disadvantages arising fromracial prejudice.

2. Three Major Policy Directions for the Peace Talks (sent from Foreign Minister
Uchida to Ambassador Chinda in London on December 26, 1918)

First: Peace conditions where the empire possesses interests independently from the alliedcountries.［...］Second: Peace conditions where the empire does not possess direct interests.［...］Third: Peace conditions where the empire has interests in common with the allies.
On peace conditions where the empire has interests in common with the allied countries,
and regarding the proposals put forward by the President of the United States, our policy will
be decided according to Appendix No. 3; on all other issues, we should watch carefully thegeneral tendency of negotiations and work in step with the other allied countries.

3. Makino Nobuaki, Memoirs (Chūkō Bunko edition, “On the Paris Peace Conference,”

originally published in Shō tō kandan)

We argued that given the founding spirit of the League of Nations, and with a view to its
healthy development in the future, it would be difficult to secure widespread trust unless it
were built on a foundation of racial equality. If following an invasion of one country by anotherthe covenant required signatory countries to come together to repel an invasion, this would
potentially require nations to use military force to defend the invaded country. This would
involve a heavy burden indeed for countries that were subject to racial discrimination, andin the case of joint military operations, might even mean that a country would be required
to step in as an ally to even a country that was discriminating against it racially. As thingsstood, it would be difficult for a country that was being discriminated against to make militarysacrifices in the cause of aiding the League, and we therefore submitted a proposal arguing
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The Racial Equality Proposal and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

that it was only natural to recognize racial equality, at least in principle.

4. Racial Equality Proposal Draft (presented by Japan to the Commission on the League of
Nations on February 13, 1919)

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting
Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the
League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in
fact, on account of their race or nationality.

5. Draft Proposal for Insertion in Preamble (prepared by Japan on April 11, 1919)
by the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals

6. Kimura Eiichi, Sekai taisen to Gaiko [The World War and Diplomacy], (quoted

from Matsuoka Yō suke: sono hito to shō gai)

Although the Commission on the League of Nations had initially approved the proposal by amajority, at a meeting the following day the situation changed and a majority voted against the
proposal. A nighttime meeting of the plenipotentiaries was immediately called, and opinion
settled into two adamantly opposed groups, between a hardline faction who insisted thatJapan should refuse to join the League or use a refusal to sign a treaty as a bargaining-chip,
if the racial equality proposal were rejected, and opposing them another group who argued
that it was unthinkable for Japan to bear sole responsibility for a failure to make the League of
Nations a reality for the sake of a compromised and perfunctory insistence on racial issues. In
addition, the group of young diplomats felt that pushing ahead with a compromised proposalof this kind would only damage Japanʼs interests without bringing any advantages, and that
therefore Japan should declare its readiness before the world to swallow its pride and abandon
the issue for now out of a wish to see the League of Nations become a reality, while leavingroom for the possibility of proposing a more thorough-going, purer racial equality clause on
another occasion in the future. Opinion divided between the older and the younger membersof the delegation, and it seemed impossible to see how any decision could ever be arrived at.
Then Prince Saionji, who had been listening in silence all this time, suddenly turned to Baron
Makino and said suggestively:“Makino-san, is it not the case sometimes in go that one can have the better strategy but stilllose the game.” Suddenly Makino, who until now had been listening thoughtfully, spoke up,saying: “Kimura-san, I want you to write up a clear explanation of the case for giving up the
racial issue. And Matsuoka-san, write a statement in English for me to deliver before thecommittee tomorrow.” And with these straightforward orders the matter was decided in an
instant.

7. The Diary of Hara Takashi (dated March 30, 1919)
Itō and the others agreed that this issue was not sufficient for us to withdraw from the Leagueof Nations, and that as a result even if we did not press ahead with our proposal, the situation
was unlikely to become worse than it is at present. Therefore, if we could maintain our face,that would be acceptable.

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8. Report on the League of Nations Problem (Conclusion) (Position of the
Empire’s Plenipotentiaries with Regard to the Problem)［...］
3. Seeing that the problem of racially discriminatory treatment is already on a dangerous
tendency today, the empire must expect that being isolated outside the League of Nations
would only make this tendency even worse than it is at present... .

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