Chinese and Taiwanese Perspectives on Japan’s Racial Equality Proposal

Chinese and Taiwanese Perspectives
on Japan’s Racial Equality Proposal*
Shin Kawashima**
Abstract

The issues of racial equality and the eradication of racial discrimination, raised by
Japan, became major points of discussion at the Paris Peace Conference. But racialequality was not a particularly important topic for China because China had otherpriorities. It was interested in regaining its own possessions and sovereign interests,
and in finding a solution to the problem of Shandong in the Twenty-One Demands.
China used its approval of the racial equality proposal when it was submitted for thesecond time as a tool to ensure that the bare minimum of its relationship with Japan
would be maintained. Giving its approval to the proposal was a way of showing that
although China was highly critical of Japan and skeptical of its intentions, it did notintend to risk an all-out confrontation and a total breach of relations. Across Chinesesociety, most people were extremely critical of Japanʼs actions and saw its efforts on
race as fundamentally connected to Japanese Pan-Asianism.
On the other hand, in Taiwan, the racial equality proposal was viewed within thecontext of the policies of assimilation and equality. There were some people, bothwithin Japan and Taiwan, who argued that Japan should put its house in order
before raising the issue of racial equality or the eradication of racial prejudicewith the world. Nevertheless, it did not necessarily mean that the racial equality
proposal was at the forefront of what intellectuals were discussing in Taiwan, orthat it was part of what inspired them to organize a petition movement to establish a
Taiwanese parliament or to debate educational problems.

Comparing and Contrasting China and JapanW

e have heard discussions from the Japanese perspective about the countryʼs racialequality proposal. Now the question is, how did the Chinese government andsociety view the proposal submitted by Japan? How did the issue fit into Chinaʼs
perceptions of histor y? As well as mainland China, I also want to discuss how
Taiwan viewed the proposal. Let me begin by outlining a few background points.
First, it is important to remember that immigration and race had been prominent issues in
China for a long time, beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act passed into law by the UnitedStates in 1882. The Act was renewed at ten-year inter vals, in 1892 and 1902. The renewal in1902 came amidst widespread fear of China in the United States, as evidenced by Yellow Peril*This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Commemorating theCentennial Anniversary of Japanʼs Racial Equality Proposal―Remaking the International Order after
the WWI―” held by JIIA on November 2, 2019.

** Shin Kawashima is the professor of the Department of International Relations, the Graduate School ofArts & Sciences, the University of Tokyo.

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xenophobia, and provoked protests in China and among Chinese students abroad.
At the time, most Chinese immigrants to the United States were Cantonese. The Cantonesein America suffered prejudice and discrimination of various kinds, and this triggered widespreadanger among Chinese, including those who were not from Canton. Examples include an incidentof suicide by self-immolation in front of the US consulate in Shanghai and a protest movement
among Chinese students in Tokyo. The protests went far beyond Canton and involved many
people who were not Cantonese. It can be argued that the protestors ʼ identity as Chinese
nationals, regardless of their local origin, led to such acts.
Previous discussions on immigration and discrimination had focused on nationalism andparticularly on the idea of China, rather than on a universal idea of race or ethnicity. When it cameto the racial equality proposal put forward by Japan in response to policies that excluded Japaneseimmigration to the United States, the Chinese response was that China was already familiar
with these issues from its own experience, which went back much further than Japanʼs. People
in China saw things from a slightly different perspective. The way they saw it, the Japanese
had enjoyed special dispensation by being permitted into the United States until recently, while
Chinese workers had been excluded for decades by this stage.
The second point that should be noted is that China and Japan had different perspectives
about World War I. China was initially neutral in the conflict. This was not only because China
lacked the strength to take part as an active combatant, but also because troops from most of the
major powers were stationed in China. This meant that if China became a combatant, it would be
faced with a situation in which troops from both sides, already present within Chinese territory,
would start fighting each other. Or worse, China would have to fight a war against foreign troops
within its own country. German forces were in Qingdao, and the British had troops in Weihaiwei.
This meant that whichever side China chose, it would be forced to fight within its own borders.
Chinese territor y could easily have become a new front in the war. These were some of thefactors that encouraged China to refrain from taking sides.
Japan honored its treaty commitments with Britain by entering the war on the British side. An
Anglo-Japanese force occupied the German base in Qingdao and all of Shandong. The German
garrison and elements of the Austro-Hungarian military at the base were almost totally destroyed.
After the Siege of Qingdao, there were now almost no armed forces from the German side left
in China. Japan supported China entering the war even though it had been originally reluctant.
From 1917, the United States started to push China quite hard to enter the conflict. So a debate
started within China, on the question of whether the countr y should get involved. In 1917,
momentum started to build for China to join the war. At the time, Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen) was
opposed to any Chinese involvement―or at least, did not argue in favor of getting involved.
China ended up joining the Allied Powers in the war. But before doing so, it issued someconditions. These included a moratorium on reparation payments for the Boxer Rebellion anda commitment not to send troops to Europe or anywhere else. So China was free from theobligation to send troops, and Premier Tuan Chi-jui (Duan Qirui) was able to get assistance fromJapan when China joined the conflict. The Japanese aid enabled him not only to reunite China
but also to strengthen his countryʼs armed forces and reclaim Outer Mongolia, which had been
under Russian influence. China sent troops to Ulaanbaatar, and also took part in the Siberianintervention. Eventually, China emerged from the war on the winning side. Germany and Austria
held concessions in Tientsin and in Hankow as well, and by joining the war, China not only
terminated reparation payments to Germany and Austria for the Boxer Rebellion, but also wasable to reclaim these concessions.
While China emerged on the victorious side at the end, the important point was the TwentyOne Demands that were presented on January 18, 1915 to Chinaʼs Yuan Shih-kai (Yuan Shikai)

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Chinese and Taiwanese Perspectives on Japan’s Racial Equality Proposal

by Japanʼs minister to China, Hioki Eki, as Professor Nakanishi Hiroshi mentioned earlier.1
Considerable debate remains about the true aim of these demands. It seems likely that Japanʼsbiggest priority was its interests in South Manchuria, though its interests in Shandong were also
important, as well as Group Five of the Demands.
China perceived Group Five to be a Japanese negotiating tool and steadfastly refused
to negotiate. China was aware that Japan was ultimately seeking to secure its interests in
Manchuria. The Chinese side knew that it might have to compromise and give in on Manchuria.
China acceded to the demands related to Manchuria and at the last moment also gave way on
Qingdao, while succeeding in getting Group Five of the demands removed. Japan added several
more articles to make a total of 26 in its ultimatum to China, and on May 9, China agreed to theJapanese terms. In late May, treaties based on the 26 demands were signed by the two countries.
The agreements are known in China as the Treaties of the Fourth Year of the Republic.
While China had some success in pushing back against the Japanese demands, these events
stirred strong reactions in the countr y. Around 1915, feelings were running extremely highagainst Japan. While the May Fourth Movement arose in 1919, after the end of World War I,
anti-Japanese perceptions in China had begun to significantly harden right after the start of theconflict. Although Yuan Shih-kai endured criticism for seemingly having caved into Japanesepressure, with the rise of a Chinese ethnic and national consciousness, Japan was perceived as aninvader to many people.
In Japan, the governments of Okuma Shigenobu and Terauchi Masatake knew that antiJapanese sentiment was worsening in China. It was precisely for this reason that Japan sent
assistance to Tuan Chi-jui in an attempt to improve Sino-Japanese relations. Even though the Tuan
Chi-jui government did depend on Japan, Chinese society started to take an increasingly criticalview toward Japan, and Japan could not reverse this trend. The deterioration in the relationshipled to fallout such as the May Fourth Movement. Unless you understand these developments, it is
impossible to understand why China was never likely to go along with Japanʼs proposal for racialequality, or any approaches from Japan to join a movement to eradicate racial discrimination.
It is vital to understand that the Twenty-One Demands mark a watershed transition in thehistor y of Sino-Japanese relations, a change even bigger than the First Sino-Japanese War.
For example, people who had studied in Japan were made to feel embarrassed, and within the
Chinese diplomatic corps, the so-called “Japan school” was exposed to ridicule and criticism
before the start of the Paris Peace Conference. Symbolic of this was the famous secret exchange
of notes between Chinese Foreign Minister Lou Tseng-Tsiang (Lu Zhengxiang) and the Japanese
government. The incident demonstrated that in the lead-up to the Paris Peace Conference, theJapan school had lost much of its influence in Chinese diplomacy. It is important to understandthis background before discussing our main subject.

The Response of the Chinese Government and Society to the Racial Equality
Proposal; Historical Perceptions
The Racial Equality Proposal and Pan-Asianism
What was the response to the racial equality proposal in China at the time? How does the proposal
relate to the awareness of historical issues in China?
Not much research has been done on the proposal in China. I have written a little on thesubject myself, but because Chinese diplomatic papers do not contain much on the topic atpresent there has not been any deep research on the proposal. We can find discussion and debate
1

For more detail, see, Nakanishi Hiroshi, “Japan at the Paris Peace Conference,” Japan Review 3. 3-4(Winter / Spring 2020), pp. 1–8

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in the media of the time, of course. It is possible to engage in research based on such discussion
and debate, but such research may be fragmentary or lead to only tentative findings.
The norm in most Chinese-language scholarship is to understand the racial equality proposal
through the prism of Pan-Asianism. This provides a paradigm for research. Since Japan ultimately
drew connections to Pan-Asianism in its racial equality proposal, it has become common tounderstand the proposal as a steppingstone to the development of what became a Japanese
strategy of Pan-Asianism.
Chinaʼs understanding of Pan-Asianism is generally negative in general, unlike in Japan,
where attention is paid to the different stages of the development of Pan-Asianism. Japanesescholars tend to differentiate the phases Pan-Asianism went through. They see quite a lot ofvariation over time among individuals in their interpretation of the concept as well. For example,
Konoe Fumimaroʼs essay published in 1918 that called for the elimination of racial discrimination
was an early example of Pan-Asian thinking. In research on Chinese history in China, there is atendency to look at concepts made up of different events and individuals from a holistic or generalperspective.
The Paris Peace Conference and the Chinese Response
There was a major argument among the five Chinese plenipotentiaries about who would
represent their country at the Conference. In the end, as is well known, it was decided that Lou
Tseng-Tsiang and Koo, Wellington (Gu Weijun) would be Chinaʼs representatives. Wang, C.T.
(Wang Zhengting) and the rest lost out.
In his memoirs, Koo wrote, “When [Baron] Makino [Nobuaki] of the Japanese delegation
raised the issue of racial discrimination, he looked in my direction. But I remained silent anddid not respond.” That is to say, Koo did not react at all, not even with a nod of his head. In
other words, he did not disagree with the proposal either. Of course, there is no reason why
he would have been opposed to the content of the proposal, or to the idea of opposing racial
discrimination. Japanʼs sponsorship of the proposal was what China found difficult to accept. So
when the proposal was put forward in February 1919, Koo refrained from committing himself toa response. In April, he decided to lend his support after changes were made to the content of the
proposal. The vote count was 11 in favor of the proposal and 6 against, and the Republic of China
came around to supporting the motion. This was done to signify that although it was not pleased
with the motion, China could not oppose the proposal on principle. Japan had two votes, and theRepublic of China represented one-eleventh of the votes in favor of Japanʼs proposal.
The aims of the Republic of China at the Paris Peace Conference were to resolve the disputes
over possessions and foreign interests in the Shandong Peninsula, to find a solution to theTwenty-One Demands problem, and to achieve a comprehensive resolution of the unequal
treaties. As is well known, China ended up not signing the Treaty of Versailles. Chinaʼs refusal
to sign the Treaty was not prompted by the May Fourth Movement. The decision not to sign theTreaty was initially made in the latter half of April 1919, before the May Fourth Movement. In fact,
as a result of the Movement, the government in Peking (Beijing) instructed its plenipotentiaries
to sign the Versailles Treaty. But the plenipotentiaries in Versailles refused.
The chief sticking point was the idea that Germanyʼs former possessions in Shandong were to
go to Japan. The complications did not end there. The situation was difficult because China knewthat unless it signed the Treaty, China would not be able to join the League of Nations. Article
One of the Treaty declared that the “original Members of the League of Nations shall be thoseof the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those otherStates named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant.” One interesting
aspect here is that in Japan, there was apparently discussion about possibly not joining the
League if the problems surrounding the racial equality proposal could not be cleared. But there
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was no similar debate in China. China was extremely eager to enter the League, whatever it took.
From the Chinese perspective, the founding of the League of Nations was seen as acontinuation of international movements that dated back to the Hague Peace Conferences heldin 1899 and 1907. China saw joining the League as an extremely important step for increasing its
international prestige. By becoming a founding member of this group, and as one of the victorious
powers, the League offered an opportunity for China to project itself on the international stage
and boost its prestige as a nation. The influence of Wilsonianism also led many people to dream of
the world-changing potential of the League of Nations, and expectations were high within Chinesesociety that the Chinese peopleʼs aspirations for a fairer system of international justice would be
realized under the League.
Koo and the other young diplomats who attended the Paris Peace Conference soon realizedthat these ideals would not be easily realized. Originally, they had great expectations of Woodrow
Wilson, and Wilson himself was extremely friendly toward the Republic of China. Secretary ofState Robert Lansing and other members of Wilsonʼs brain trust were also well-disposed to China,
leading to hopes that China would succeed in getting its demands approved at the Conference.
But these hopes were to be dashed. It is likely that the Chinese delegation understood thatgetting all of its demands accepted would probably be difficult, but decided to make joining the
League its top priority.
Before the question of the Versailles Treaty came to a head, a similar clause was inserted
into Article One of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, signed between the victorious powers
and Austria, stating that the signatory countries would be considered founding members of the
League of Nations. China was delighted to understand that it would be able to join the League
by signing the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, and this led to its decision not to sign the
Versailles Treaty with Germany in June 1919. By signing the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye,
China became a founding member of the League of Nations and a party to the negotiations on theCovenant of the League. It was during the voting that arose as part of those negotiations that theevents about the racial equality proposal described earlier by Professor Nakanishi transpired.
The League of Nations and China
Even after becoming a League member, China continued to be active on a number of fronts.
The thing it was most insistent on was that China should become a non-permanent memberof the Leagueʼs Council. China proposed that the members of the Council should be selected
on a geographical basis to represent the different regions of the world, such as Europe, SouthAmerica, and Asia. Because the Covenant of the League of Nations had no stipulations about thegeographical composition of the Council, China would raise this issue at every election, and takeon the role of representing Asia. Since Japan was already a permanent member, there were notmany other Asian countries left over: China, Siam (Thailand), and Persia. This meant that thelikelihood that China would be selected was high. China managed to become a non-permanent
Council member on several occasions.
Another matter concerned payments of contributions to the League. China initially proposed
shouldering a financial burden commensurate with that of Japan, in other words on the levelof a permanent member of the Council. This was based on the logic that payments should be
proportional to population; since Chinaʼs population was so large, it should pay for a larger partof the Leagueʼs expenses. Chinaʼs aim was to expand its influence by volunteering to shoulder alarge part of the financial costs in this way.
But at the end of 1922, the Republic of China became more or less bankrupt. One of thereasons was the end of the five-year moratorium that started in late 1917 on Chinese indemnity
payments for the Boxer Rebellion. The moratorium was one of the conditions offered by the
Allied Powers as an incentive to urge China to take part in World War I. Of course, once China
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declared war on Germany, its payments to that countr y would no longer be applicable. The
payments to Germany were the largest of any of the indemnities China was compelled to pay.
This was because of the death of the German minister to China, Clemens von Ketteler during
the uprising. But the payments to other countries were also large. By joining the war, China
escaped having to make payments to Germany and Austria, and payments to Japan, Great Britain,
France, and the United States would be suspended for five years. The prospect of a moratorium
on reparations was one of the major factors that induced China to become involved in the war.
When the moratorium expired five years later at the end of 1922, Chinaʼs government financescollapsed, and it became impossible for it to pay the large indemnities it owed the Allied Powers.
This led to a further erosion of trust in China.
The Racial Equality Proposal and Sino-Japanese Relations
The question of racial equality was not seen as particularly important from Chinaʼs perspective.
Nevertheless, the racial equality proposal does come up time to time in the history of relations
between China and Japan. For example, there is a record of questions and answers between
Obata Yukichi, the Japanese minister in Peking, and Chinese Foreign Minister Yen, W. W. (Yan
Huiqing) on December 15, 1920. In a passage where China says it cooperates with Japan, theproposal is mentioned, Yen says “Japan made the proposal, and China supported it.” The proposal
often comes up in this kind of context, as an example of cooperation between the two countries.
So even if the proposal was not a particularly important diplomatic issue between the countries,
Chinaʼs support for Japanʼs second attempt to submit its proposal is cited as evidence of bilateral
cooperation on the diplomatic level.
There was considerable animosity toward Japan in some quar ters in China. But par tly
because of the slightly more moderate approach that Japanʼs Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro
adopted in his countryʼs China policy, there were still elements of a more conciliatory attitude in
diplomacy on both sides, as seen in this type of language.
The Racial Equality Proposal and Pan-Asianism
At a different level, that of society, people in China continued to be skeptical and critical of theopinions put forward on racial equality by Japan. We heard earlier about Chen Duxiu, one of
the founding members of Chinaʼs Communist Party. Li Dazhao, a colleague of Chen, was also
sensitive to Japanʼs Pan-Asian discourse, as can be seen in Liʼs piece on “Greater Asianism and
New Asianism” that was published in 1919 in the Guomin magazine.2 Li insisted that the ideas put
forward by Japan on Asia were based on putting Japanʼs own interests first. Of course, he wasnʼttalking specifically about racial equality, but nevertheless his skepticism about Japanʼs Pan-Asianrhetoric was clear.
This kind of discourse frequently appeared in newspapers and other forums for debate inShanghai and other cities. The notion of racial equality and the idea of “same script, same race”
even now can be heard in the discourse on Sino-Japanese relations. An article in the Shen Bao
newspaper dated July 24, 1926 argued that “Japan was using a pretense of friendship as a tool
to deceive and demean China.” So any mention of “same race” in the context of Sino-Japaneserelations was met with some skepticism in China.
The speech on Pan-Asianism delivered by Sun Wen in 1924 is extremely well known in Japan.
At the end of the speech, Sun Wen talks about a conflict between “the rule of right and rule ofmight,” and asks whether Japan will “be the hawk of the Western civilization of the rule of might,or the tower of strength of the Orient.” But these words did not appear in the Japanese text of2

Li Dazhao ( 李大釗 ), “Da Yaxiya zhuyi yu xin Yaxiya zhuyi ( 大亜細亜主義与新亜細亜主義 ) “[Greater
Asianism and New Asianism]”,” Guomin 1.2 (February 1, 1919). Also see, Li Dazhao Xuanji ( 李大釗全集 ) [Selected Writings of Li Dazhao] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1959), p. 127.

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the speech. They were added later when the speech was printed in Chinese in the Minguo ribao
newspaper. So a little more caution is needed in how we look at and interpret the words of Sun
Wen.
In China, this strong distrust of Japanese Pan-Asianism started around the end of the 1910s,
and the discourse on racial equality or racial solidarity tended to be understood in this context
of distrust. But within diplomatic circles, Chinaʼs support for Japanʼs second attempt to pass its
racial equality proposal in 1919 was sometimes invoked as a symbol of cooperation between thetwo countries.
Japan and China at Cross Purposes over Anti-Japanese Immigration Laws
I would like to raise another impor tant point concerning immigration. As Japanʼ s conflictdeepened with the United States over legislation that excluded Japanese immigrants, the Chineseside took a detached and often critical view of Japanʼs actions. Just because Japan and China wereon the receiving end of the same treatment did not mean that the two countries became friends.
The truth was rather the opposite. A significant factor explaining why Japan was so offended by
the United States policy, in addition to the race issue, was a sense of outrage at the idea that theJapanese should receive the same treatment as the Chinese, whom many people in Japan tended
to look down on and disparage. Hirobe Izumi discusses this in his book Japanese Pride, American
Prejudice.3 The restrictions imposed on Japanese migrants in 1924 by the United States werebasically the same as the treatment given to Chinese people since 1882. Naturally, many Chinese
people were upset by this kind of Japanese thinking, and it is not surprising that Chinaʼs stanceagainst Japan hardened in response. The Immigration Act of 1924 might have brought about ashift in Japan-China relations, since immigrants from Japan and China were now being treated thesame. But in fact, we see that the reverse was true.
Similar examples of lost opportunities for improving ties can be seen in a number of otherareas. Immediately after the Great Kanto Earthquake that struck the greater Tokyo area on
September 1, 1923, the Chinese expressed a great deal of sympathy over the disaster. But in thechaos and lawlessness that followed the tremors, more than 400 Chinese people were massacredin Japan. When news of these deaths reached China, it caused a backlash and put an end to any
chance that the disaster might be used as an opportunity to improve relations between the twocountries.

The Empire of Japan’s Racial Equality Proposal from the Perspective of its
Colonies
Let us turn to Taiwan. We heard earlier about the Japanese journalist Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, whoquestioned how Japan could discriminate against other ethnic groups for the sake of its own
national survival. People did not object to Japanʼs raising the problem of race in the international
community. But at the same time, using logic that was similar to Kiyosawaʼ s, they asked
questions about the situation within the Japanese empire. Was Japan trying to suggest that racial
discrimination was not an issue within its own empire? Around the time of the government ofHara Takashi in Japan, and particularly when Den Kenjiro was Governor-General of Taiwan, there
was a steady shift toward a policy of bringing Taiwanese systems more closely in line with thosein place in Japan. A specific example of this was in education. Under the Taiwan Education Act,
which was codified in January 1919 and put into effect in April that year, enthusiasm for education
surged, including among the Taiwanese.
3

Hirobe Izumi, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). For
Japanese language publication, see 廣部泉 ,『人種戦争という寓話』（名古屋大学出版会、2017）.

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At the same time, the basic policy of separating Japanese from the mainland who lived in
Taiwan from the native Taiwanese, which was called naitaibunri, still continued. In response, amovement started among the young elite, who were the writers and audience of a magazine called
Taiwan Seinen ( 台湾青年 /Taiwan youth), which was launched in 1920, calling for assimilationand equality. There were some moves in favor of independence too, but by and large the focus
was on campaigning for assimilation and greater equality.
Although Taiwan became a Japanese possession in 1895, Taiwan and mainland Japan wereadministered separately in legal terms, as illustrated by the Law Relating to Laws and Ordinances
to Be Enforced in Taiwan (Six and Three Law). By World War I, as part of the growing tendency
to bring the two systems closer together, we start to see movements in Taiwanese society.
Numerous texts exist on the subject. Lin Seisen, who wrote a piece for Taiwan Seinencalled “What We Want of Japanese in Taiwan” in August 1920, said that regardless of how harda person from Taiwan worked, he would be consigned to the bottom rungs of society.4 “Even if
he may have talent to surpass the world and skills that surpass those of the ordinary crowd, thedepressing fate of a person from this island will be always to occupy the lowest level of society,”
Lin wrote. Greater access to educational opportunities tended to increase the frequency withwhich people expressed feelings such as this. This was true in government bureaucracies andalso in the professions.
Another famous example is the piece contributed by Sai Baika called “ Our View ofAssimilation” for Taiwan Seinen in August 1920.5 “Merely having a small understanding ofpractical concerns is of no use except to work in slavish service at a low level. Under such asituation, I cannot be anything but hopeless about realizing the aimed assimilation” Sai wrote,in expressing his disappointment at Japanʼs assimilation policies. Shimada Saburo wrote an item
for the October 1920 edition of the same magazine called “On the Issue of Harmony between
Japanese and Taiwanese.”6 “If the Japanese intend to spread this idea around the world, theyshould practice racial equality at home first, and then announce what they have achieved and callon the rest of the world to follow; only then will the argument carry any persuasive proof behindit,” said Shimada. In other words, Japan should put its ideas into practice at home first and only
then start to preach to the rest of the world.
While there was considerable discussion in Taiwan on educational issues, the question of
racial equality was not a major topic of debate in the Taiwanese media, or in Taiwan Seinen. The
focus in the local media tended to be questions of equality with the mainland Japan, especiallywith regard to education.
An unusual case occurred when an article was carried in the Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpo on
December 9, 1920 with the title “On Not Submitting the Race Proposal.”7 This was to do with thereport that Japan had decided not to submit the proposal. Although the piece was only a reprint ofan article that had originally appeared in the Osaka Asahi Shimbun, the article said:
The speech by Ambassador Ishii [Kikujiro] is attracting attention for having broken thesilence of the Japanese delegation at the General Assembly of the League of Nations. . . . This4

Lin Seisen ( 林濟川 ), “Zai tai naichijin ni nozomu ( 在台内地人に望む ) [What We Want of Japanese in
Taiwan],” Taiwan Seinen 1,2 (August 1920).

5

Sai Baika ( 蔡培火 ), “Gojin no dokakan ( 吾人の同化観 ) [Our View of Assimilation],” Taiwan Seinen 1,2(August 1920).

6

Shimada Saburo ( 島田三郎 ), “Naitai yuwa no konpon mondai ( 内台融和の根本問題 ) [On the Issue ofHarmony between Japanese and Taiwanese],” Taiwan Seinen 1,4 (October 1920).

7“Jiron Ippan: Jinshuan Futeishutsu ( 時 論 一 斑 : 人 種 案 不 提 出 ) [On Not Submitting the Race
Proposal],” Taiwan NichiNichi Shimpo, December 9, 1920.

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reference to the race proposal was perhaps unavoidable given the sequence of events sincelast year, but if Japanʼs representatives are really determined to raise the subject, surely it
would be better to do so with “clean hands,” so to speak, having implemented racial equality
within Japan; one would wish at least that Viscount Ishii might have noticed the logicalcontradiction that necessarily arises if this is not the case.
To summarize, people in Taiwan did not generally treat racial equality as a major issue. The
subject did come up in smaller ways, often in connection with education or some other problem
with Japanese rule in Taiwan, but the main points of concern in public debate were generally
related to achieving assimilation and equality between mainland Japanese and Taiwanese.
The Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpo was essentially a Japanese-language newspaper for Taiwan,
and was read by many Japanese residents in Taiwan. If we ask ourselves to what extent theJapanese living in Taiwan were concerned with the question of racial equality, it may be that they
were not that interested. When the Japanese in Taiwan thought about how they were seen by
the local population, to what extent were they aware that the racial equality question could comeback to bite them? This is an important question to ask. Since the subject was raised infrequently
in the Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpo, it is likely that either people simply lacked awareness of theissue, or discussion of the subject was avoided. It is difficult to evaluate what does not remain in
the written record, but since some articles like this reprint do exist, my view is that the relative
paucity of such pieces is probably not caused by a simple lack of awareness.

Conclusion
We have seen that Japan raised the issues of racial equality and the eradication of racial
discrimination at the Paris Peace Conference, and the subjects became major points ofdiscussion. But racial equality was not a particularly important topic for China, if we look at itfrom the perspective of why the Republic of China took part in World War I, what it was looking
for at the Paris Peace Conference, and what it expected from the League of Nations. China hadother priorities. It was interested in regaining its own possessions and sovereign interests, and infinding a solution to the problem of Shandong in the Twenty-One Demands.
One way of viewing Chinaʼs actions is to conclude that it used its approval of the racial equality
proposal when it was submitted for the second time as a tool to ensure that the bare minimum of
its relationship with Japan would be maintained. Giving its approval to the proposal was a way ofshowing that although China was highly critical of Japan and skeptical of its intentions, it did notintend to risk an all-out confrontation and a total breach of relations.
Across Chinese society, most people were extremely critical of Japan ʼs actions and saw
its ef for ts on race as fundamentally connected to Japanese Pan-Asianism. On the issue of
immigration, China had long received basically the same treatment, and the more Japan protested
about being treated the same way as the Chinese, the more likely it was that China would lookaskance at Japanʼs moves.
Professor Nakanishi spoke earlier about the United Nations and the UN Charter and touchedon the fact that China raised issues of race and religion and other matters in the Charter. This
reflects the position of China at the time when the United Nations was being formed. China
declared war on Japan on December 9, 1941, and in January 1942, became one of the four major
Allied powers. When the United Nations was being formed in 1944 and 1945, through a seriesof conferences from Dumbarton Oaks to San Francisco, China was responsible for submitting
numerous suggestions that were incorporated into the UN Charter. Among the suggestions madeby China was the idea that non-permanent members of the Security Council should be selected byregion, with members to represent Asia and the other regions of the world. China also submitted
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Shin Kawashima

a number of other proposals, including one on racial equality. You could say that China made thecontent of the original racial equality proposal a reality in the UN Charter, in Japanʼs place.
Of course, when we discuss China in this period, we are talking about a time when Chiang Kaishek (Jiang Jieshi) traveled to India in 1942 and 1943. This is when Chiang Kai-shek was trying
to position China as the leader of Asia. Ultimately, he had to flee to Taiwan and lost his position,
but in 1943, at the Cairo Conference, and as late as 1944 and 1945, Chiang Kai-shek believed that
he would be the leader of Asia after the end of World War II. Chiang Kai-shek took quite seriously
the question of how to think about Asia and what Asia meant. In this context, it is easy enough tounderstand why China put forward proposals regarding racial equality and representation for an
Asian bloc during the drafting of the UN Charter in 1944 and 1945.
In Taiwan, the racial equality proposal was viewed within the context of the policies of the
Hara government and Den Kenjiro, as well as the policies of assimilation and equality. But there
were already some people in Japan, who argued that if Japan was going to make proposals about
racial equality or the eradication of racial prejudice, it would be better to put its own house inorder before preaching to the world.
Similar things were said within Taiwan as well. This does not necessarily mean that the
racial equality proposal was at the forefront of what intellectuals were discussing in Taiwan, orthat it was part of what inspired them to organize a petition movement to establish a Taiwaneseparliament or to debate educational problems.

Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Mr. Ryuki Nitta, Junior Researcher at the Organization for Regional andInter-regional Studies, Waseda University, for his advice and support on this article.

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