法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

Now There is No Government:
Rampok of 1942 in Indonesia

YAMAMOTO Nobuto1）
Introduction
A Wartime Regime at Risk
Rampok Reconsidered
How Did Rampok Happen?
Rampokkers and Victims
TimingNo Authority
Concluding Remarks

Introduction
In the face of a collapse of established power and authority within a colonial
setting, especially during periods of profound historical transition, how did
individuals respond? When confronted with unforeseen circumstances leading tosuch collapse, individuals often found themselves disoriented. However, if they
were aware that such a collapse was imminent, what consequences did they
anticipate? This became a poignant reality for the populace of Indonesia in the2）early months of 1942.

1） From April to July 2023, I had the privilege of being a researcher at the NIOD Institutefor War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies (NIOD Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en
Genocidestudies), Amsterdam, the Netherlands. I express my sincere gratitude to Hinke
Piersma and Peter Keppy for their warm companionship during my stay. On 6 July, I had
the opportunity to present my ideas at NIODʼs coffee lecture series (koffielezing). I am
thankful to Elizabeth Chandra and Joss Wibisono for their valuable comments andsuggestions. This article presents preliminary research results supported by the JSPS (theJapan Society for the Promotion of Science) Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research(KAKENHI) (C), Grant Number: JP21K12392.
(1)130Now There is No Government

In the waning days of the Netherlands Indies colonial government in 1942,
unforeseen social disorders ensued following Japanese attacks and landings invarious parts of the archipelago. On 9 January 1942, one month after theoutbreak of the Asia-Pacific war, Japanese forces commenced bombing Tarakan
in Northern Borneo.

3）This news reverberated throughout the Indonesian

populace, inducing feelings of anxiety, fear, insecurity, and helplessness. The
realization that Indonesia was now a war zone compelled the people to grapple
with a sense of urgency, prompting them to respond to the unfolding crisis.
Since the late 1930s, regardless of their race, inhabitants in Indonesia were4）

well-informed about the war situation developing in Europe and Asia.

The

consistent intake of news via newspapers and radio broadcasts, particularly
amidst the onset of Japanese troop bombings across the archipelago in January
1942, significantly influenced the collective perception that an invasion ofIndonesia by Japan was imminent―it was merely a matter of time. The anxiety
among the populace intensified day by day. By the end of February 1942,
however, local newspapers, unless they adopted a pro-Japanese stance, ceased
publication due to the Japanese military invasion and subsequent control ofmajor cities in Indonesia, compounded by shortages in paper supply. The
occupation by Japanese forces profoundly impacted media outlets, leading totheir closure and likely contributing to a vacuum in news dissemination. This
event marked a significant disruption in the dissemination of information
during that period. The absence of news about war developments throughtraditional media outlets increased the challenges faced by the local populationin accessing information during this tumultuous time. Consequently, they had torely on rumors and stories that passed from other places to comprehend the2） In this article, to illustrate the evolving political landscape during the transition fromcolonial rule to the Japanese occupation and beyond, I use the term “Indonesia” to denotethe geographical entity, “Indonesian(s)” for the indigenous people in Indonesia, and“Indies” to refer to the colonial government and regime until 8 March 1942.
3） “Tarakan diserang 3 bomber Djepang”. Pemandangan, 10 Januari 1942. This article
mentions four islands in the Indonesian archipelago: Borneo, Celebes, Java, and Sumatra,presented in a structured order.
4） William H. Frederick. Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution.
Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989, pp. 85-89.
129(2)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

situation.
The news of the arrival of Japanese forces sparked widespread social
disruptions, acts of violence, and looting, contributing to a complex andtumultuous situation. Among those affected were Europeans, primarily Dutch
officials, businesspeople, and their families, as well as the ethnic Chinese
community, who faced the dilemma of whether to stay or evacuate. This
dilemma underscores the intricate decisions individuals had to make in response
to geopolitical developments. The evacuation of Europeans, in particular,
seeking perceived safer locations in Java or even fleeing to Australia, created asense of an authority vacuum among Indonesians. However, the evacuation
process was fraught with challenges, and some Europeans experienced andwitnessed instances of looting and violence during this turbulent period. The
timing of this social upheaval varied across regions; while some areas
experienced unrest in February 1942, in others, it was predominantly observedin March, with certain instances extending into April.
Contemporary local newspapers in the Malay language reported social
disroders, using the Malay word rampok to describe various instances ofcriminal activities, including looting and violence. Rampok became aphenomenon across different regions of Indonesia, affecting cities, towns, andrural areas. For instance, the Batavia-based daily newspaper Pemandangan
extensively used the term rampok in its 17 March 1942 issue, employing it 20
times in a single article.

5）

Given the war situation, however, the reconstructionof specific incidents of rampok during that time can indeed be challenging.
The disruption in local newspapers and the limitations on information flow
due to the occupation further complicate the historical record. The newspapers,
5） Pemandangan was started by a conservative and opportunistic journalist Saeroen in
Batavia on 8 April 1933. It was considered a nationalist, conservative, pro-Japanese daily,
and enjoyed a good relationship with leading Indonesian “national” figures such as Dr.
Soetomo, Mohammad Hoesni Thamrin, Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, H. A. Salim, andParada Harahap. Since it had pro-Japanese stance, on 17 May 1940 it was forced to stop
publishing for a week by the Indies government. After that, Pemandangan continued tocirculate its newspaper even during the Japanese occupation period. About Parindraʼsactivity, see Susan Abeyasekere. One Hand Clapping: Indonesian Nationalists and theDutch, 1939-1942. Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976.
(3)128

Now There is No Government
6）such as Sin Sin Po, Kung Yung Pao,

7）

Berita Oetama,

and Pemandangan,provided some insight into the occurrences of rampok, albeit in a limited andcontrolled manner as they were Japanese-authorized. These newspapers
frequently reported on incidents, especially in West Java, either in-depth or as
straight news. But their coverage was often limited and one-sided. To gain amore comprehensive understanding of the rampok phenomenon during thisperiod, I turned to the NIOD archives, which house crucial documents andabundant testimonies. These documents include personal accounts, official
reports, and other primary sources that illuminate the experiences of individuals
and communities in the early months of 1942.
To grasp the essence of rampok, this article directs its attention to thepolitical context, examining the political frameworks and their evolution inIndonesia during a pivotal era shaped by the unfolding events of World War II.
I introduce two analytical concepts: the wartime regime and the vacuum of
power and authority.
The concept of a wartime regime constitutes a fundamental analytical
6） Chinese language newspapers such as Sin Sin Po and Kung Yung Pao were allowed to
publish daily newspapers even in March 1942. They reported on lootings and vandalism
by using Chinese characters for these terms instead of the Malay word. Some backgroundexplanation is necessary for the Chinese language newspapers at the outset of theJapanese occupation in Java. In March 1942, the Japanese military seized nearly all
Chinese-language newspapers as it entered major cities in Java. Sin Po, a prominent
Chinese language newspaper in Batavia, was chosen for Japanese propaganda directed at
the Chinese-speaking/reading audience. They changed its name to Sin Sin Po on 10
March 1942, and later to Kung Yung Pao on 26 March.
In documenting rampok incidents targeting Chinese individuals in West Java,
including those who had fled from Singapore, Twang Peck Yang relies on Kung Yung Pao[sic] about his examples before 26 March, but they were published in Sin Sin Po. Twang
Peck Yang. The Chinese Business Élite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence
1940-1950. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 70-74. About six months
later, on 1 September 1942, the Malay version of Kung Yung Pao began publication for
Malay-speaking/reading Chinese audiences, changing its name from Hong Po. This
provides a concise overview of the media landscape and its transformations during thishistorical period. For a more detailed history and contents of Kung Yung Pao, see Tsuda
Koji. Kung Yung Pao, The Only Daily Newspaper for the Ethnic Chinese in Java during
Japanese Occupation: An Overview. 2020.
127(4)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

framework. A wartime regime refers to the governmental structure, laws,
policies, and measures implemented during a period of armed conflict or war.
Within each wartime regime, there is a distinct delineation of a perceived
adversary, achieved through the mobilization of society and the militarizationof its population for defense and war efforts. These regimes often involve
significant shifts in governance, with increased centralization of power,
restrictions on civil liberties, imposition of martial law, censorship, andallocation of resources towards the war effort. Wartime regimes may also
include measures such as conscription, rationing, curfews, and heightened
security measures to ensure national security and control. The extent and natureof wartime regimes can vary greatly depending on the specific circumstances of
the conflict and the goals of the governing authority.
The wartime conditions prevailing in Europe and Asia presented
extraordinary political circumstances for both the Netherlands and Indonesia.
Commencing in 1939 with the outbreak of the war in Europe, the Netherlands
found itself in conflict with Germany, while the Indies faced the looming threat
8）of Japanese invasion from the early 1930s.

The political landscape across theIndonesian archipelago underwent significant changes between 1940 and 1942,
7） Berita Oetama was the official organ of the Great Indonesia Party (Partai Indonesia
Raya or Parindra), a political party founded in Soerakarta, Central Java, in December
1935 by Dr. Soetomo, along with other senior figures, including Mohammad Hoesni
Thamrin, Sorsanto Tirtoprodjo, Soekarjo Wirjopranoto, and Woerjaningrat. This party
became the largest Indonesian political party and a major participant in the Volksraad,the Dutch-controlled Peopleʼs Council. However, on 20 May 1942, the Japanese authority
dissolved the party and despite its pro-Japan stance, the newspaper Berita Oetama wasshut down. Nevertheless, some editorial staff and reporters continued their work at a newpaper called Asia Raya. This reflects a common occurrence during the Japanese
occupation of Indonesia, where media outlets with favorable views towards Japan, despite
being subject to numerical restrictions, were allowed to continue under new names or withsome changes. Regarding the onset of the Japanese occupation in Java, see Harry J.
Benda. “The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java”. The Far Eastern Quarterly
15(4), 1956, pp. 551-553.
8） The Indies government closely monitored and expressed concern regarding Japaneseactivities in the archipelago as well as in the region. For further insights, see Nobuto
Yamamoto. Censorship in Colonial Indonesia. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019, pp. 205-226.
(5)126

Now There is No Governmenttransitioning from the Indies civil regime to the Indies military regime, andeventually to the Japanese military regime. Both of these subsequent regimes
constituted wartime administrations formed during the period of conflict. The
transition of power to a wartime regime disrupts the existing socio-politicalorder and may engender an environment conducive to various forms of violence,
including instances such as rampok. Such transitions inevitably give rise tosignificant societal tensions, particularly during periods of power shift.
The second concept pertains to the vacuum of power and authority. For the
purpose of this discussion, power is understood as the overarching capacity to
influence others, while authority refers to a specific form of power
acknowledged as legitimate, often associated with formal or traditional
positions within social hierarchies. Whereas power may be exercised throughdiverse methods, authority hinges on perceived legitimacy and acceptance by
those under its jurisdiction. When established systems of authority falter or are
disrupted, a power vacuum can emerge, leaving communities vulnerable to9）various criminal activities, including looting and violence.

Envisaging a smooth transition between different wartime regimes presents
considerable challenges, as the danger lies in the potential vacuum of power andauthority during such transitions, which can destabilize both national and local
power structures. This susceptibility may be exploited by certain individuals orgroups for personal gain, disregarding public welfare and order. The existenceof a vacuum of power and authority during transitions underscores thelikelihood of social upheaval and opportunistic behavior in the absence of astable power framework. This concept offers a pertinent and insightful
framework for comprehending the phenomenon of rampok, particularly within
the context of wartime. By focusing on this concept, critical inquiries centeraround the timing and manner in which the local population perceives andinterprets the vacuum of power and authority. The article suggests that incertain locations and circumstances, this vacuum may precipitate unforeseen9） My understanding of power, authority, and violence is shaped by Hannah Arendtʼsseminal work, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, 1970). Within this text, Arendt offers anuanced exploration of the concepts, elucidating distinctions between power, strength,
force, authority, and violence.
125(6)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

social violence, thereby highlighting the complex dynamics and risks inherent inpolitical transitions amidst wartime regimes in Indonesia.
In the wartime political context, rampok should be regarded not merely as acriminal activity, but also as a manifestation of violence that encompasses
psychological, deprivation, structural, and systemic dimensions, reflecting amore comprehensive and nuanced understanding. This expanded perspective
acknowledges the societal implications of rampok, considering not only its
physical actions but also its psychological ramifications and potential voluntaryelements. The suggestion that rampok may involve ordinary individuals in
spontaneous acts, as later discussed, rather than being solely the domain oforganized criminal entities, adds complexity to its comprehension. This
viewpoint underscores the broader socio-political contexts within which rampok
unfolds.
The article seeks to investigate the circumstances surrounding when, where,
and how rampok occurred, examining both the perpetrators of rampok andthose impacted by it. This initial endeavor to reconstruct and comprehend thesocial history of rampok in 1942 is pivotal for elucidating the dynamics andconditions surrounding this form of violence. By delving into the social context,
the article aims to offer insights into the motivations, reactions, andconsequences of rampok during a period characterized by significant political
upheaval and disruptions.

A Wartime Regime at Risk
The geopolitical dynamics of the early 1940s exerted a profound impact on
Indonesia, as concurrent developments in both Europe and Asia exerted
influence on the region. To comprehend the extraordinary circumstances faced
by Indonesia during this period, this section offers a concise overview of thepolitical and military landscape in the country. This era witnessed pivotal
changes for Indonesia and the Netherlands across political, economic, andsocial domains, heralding a transformative phase. Regardless of race or
nationality, the populace of Indonesia experienced what can be termed the “neworder” during this time. This term encapsulates the sweeping political, economic,(7)124

Now There is No Government
10）

and social transformations that unfolded in the region.

The period marked a significant transformation for Indonesia, transitioning
from a civil colonial regime to a military regime. The key events that led to thisshift include the occupation of the Netherlands by Nazi Germany on 10 May
1940 forcing the Dutch government into exile in London. With the war in
Europe posing a visible threat to its colonies, the Netherlands had to adapt its
governance structure. In response to these challenges, the Netherlands
transferred authority over the colony from The Hague to the Governor-Generalin Batavia of the Indies. This move elevated the Governor-General to the highest
civil and military authority. Subsequently, on 14 May 1940, Governor-General
Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer declared martial law in the Indies
following the surrender of the Netherlands to Germany. This declaration
marked the end of civilian control, signifying a shift to military governance inIndonesia. The institution of martial law marked a significant departure fromprevious governance structures. The Indies now entered a wartime regime,
anticipating the potential invasion of Japanese forces. This complex historical
backdrop underscores the multifaceted challenges faced by Indonesia during
11）

this transformative period.

The preparations carried out by the Indies government in anticipation of
the impending war offer valuable insights into the administrative adjustments
required by the evolving circumstances. A notable aspect of these preparations,owing to the shortage of military and police forces, entailed the reconfigurationof the roles of civil servants, especially those within the Interior Administration
Department, known as the Binnenlands Bestuur (BB). The BB served as apivotal governmental institution in the Indies, acting as a link between theEuropean regional administration ― where indigenous chiefs could also be
appointed―and the indigenous population. At the regional and local levels,
10） For a concise overview of the period, see Henk Shultz Nordholt en Harry Poeze.
Merdeka: De strip dome de Indonesische onafhankelijkheid en de ongewisse optimist van deRepubliek 1945-1950. Zutphen: Warburg Pers, 2022, pp. 47-49.
11） The list of organizations established for war preparation appears in NIOD, IndischeCollectie, “1118 Indië als geallieerde bondgenoot; Nieuwe Instellingen en Maatregelen
1940-1942, 1942”.
123(8)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

indigenous chiefs were primarily employed within the BB structure. Following
11 May 1940, the BB underwent a reorganization framed within the context of“national” defense while still carrying out its routine administrative functions.
The restructured BB faced new and expansive responsibilities, extending beyond
its traditional duties. Personnel associated with the BB were tasked withfollowing military trains, initiating the construction of airfields and emergency
landing fields, building roads for military vehicles, and mobilizing the local
populace. Despite these expanded roles, it appeared that the BB was confronted
with an overwhelming array of new tasks, indicating the challenges posed by theheightened demands of wartime preparations on the existing administrative12）

structures.

The wartime preparations extended beyond the reformation of the BB,
leading to the establishment of new organizations aimed at mobilizing civilians
in Indonesia. In August 1940, the Volunteer Exercise Corps (Vrijwillige
Oefencorpsen) was initiated, and subsequently, the City and Country Guards
13）(Stad- en Landwachter) emerged from this initial framework.

The Volunteer

Exercise Corps served as a platform for individuals seeking military training,
conducting practice sessions once or twice a week. As the military reserve began
regular call-ups, the City and Country Guards were formed, consisting ofindividuals in the emergency formation of their offices and therefore exempt
from military service. Their primary role during wartime was to uphold local
peace, order, and security. Notably, both Dutch and non-Dutch citizens,
including Chinese and Indonesian individuals, were allowed to volunteer for theCity and Country Guards. Beyond urban areas, Land Guards (Landwachten)
were often organized by companies themselves, irrespective of the ownerʼs race.
The Department of War supplied arms to all these organizations.

14）

However,

despite these efforts, the City and Country Guards were hastily set up andorganized, lacking comprehensive training and preparation for the impending
wartime situations. This lack of readiness posed a significant challenge for these12） G.C. Zijlmans. “De Indische Bestuursdienst 1940-1942.” In G. Teitler ed. De val de
Nederlands-Indie. Amsterdam: De Betaafsche Leeuw, 1982, pp. 24-42.
13） Ibid., pp. 6-7.
(9)122

Now There is No Governmentorganizations as they navigated the complexities of the evolving war
15）

landscape.

The mobilization efforts extended to women in Indonesia, exemplified by
the establishment of the Committee for Women in Mobilization Time (Comité
Oorlogsarbeid Vrouwen In Mobilisatietjid, C.O.V.I.M.). This organization operated

throughout Indonesia, conducting organized courses aimed at educating womenof all backgrounds for various roles during wartime. The courses provided
practical training in essential skills, including first aid and cookery, with a focus
on cooking in large quantities. Additionally, women were instructed on
substituting local foodstuffs for imported items, a practice that later proved
crucial during the occupation. The organization also engaged in large-scale
production of knitting and woolen articles for England. The C.O.V.I.M. played
a multifaceted role by publishing several brochures and later extending its
involvement to address issues related to refugees, housing, childcare, and more.
This comprehensive approach reflected the organizationʼs commitment tosupporting and mobilizing women for diverse roles during the wartime
14） NIOD, 400 Indische Collectie, “1118 Indië als geallieerde bondgenoot; Nieuwe
Instellingen en Maatregelen 1940-1942, 1942”. The differential treatment of European
City and Country Guardsmen during the Japanese invasion of Java indicates thecomplexity of the occupation dynamics. In Batavia and Semarang, the Japanese militaryconsidered the European City and Country Guardsmen as military units, resulting intheir internment. However, in Soerabaja, a different approach was taken. The City andCountry Guardsmen in Soerabaja were subject to distinct treatment, reflecting the varied
policies or strategies employed by the Japanese military in different regions. Suchdiscrepancies in the treatment of European guardsmen during the Japanese invasion
underscore the multifaceted nature of wartime decisions and actions, influenced by local
circumstances, military considerations, and broader strategic goals. The nuances in thetreatment of specific groups during the occupation further emphasize the complex
dynamics of the wartime period in Java.
15） In December 1943, A.J.A.C. Nooteboom submitted a nearly 300-page long report
entitled Vier oorlogsjaren op Java and critically reviewed how poorly the Indies
government prepared for the war in Java. NIOD, 400 Indische Collectie, “3181
Nooteboom, A.J.A.C., reserveofficier, Tjililintjing, Tangerang, Tjitjoeroeg: Tjilatjap:
We s t - Jav a ( + o o r l og s vo o r b e r e i d i n g , s t a d sw a c h t , l a n dw a c h t , l a n d s t o r m ;krijgsgevangenkampen: Soekaboemi); bersiap: opvangkampen: Banjoebiroe (MiddenJava)”.
121(10)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）
16）

period.

The events surrounding 8 December 1941 unfolded with Japanʼs attack on
Pearl Harbor, prompting the Netherlands, as part of the Allied nations, todeclare war against Japan. The Dutch-exiled government expected to receive
military support from its allies, including the US, the UK, and Australia, todefend Indonesia. Following the declaration of war, the BB was promptly tasked
with strategic actions. This included the demolition of strategically locatedkampongs (villages) and the destruction of crucial items such as oil, rubber, arms
and ammunition supplies, means of transport, and radio communication
facilities. These preemptive measures were aimed at impeding the Japanesemilitaryʼs advance and limiting their access to vital resources. However, theJapanese military proved to be highly formidable, advancing southward at apace that exceeded the expectations of the Dutch and the Allied Forces.

17）

As

the Japanese approached Java and Sumatra in March 1942, administrative
officers received orders to destroy secret archives, codes, and topography maps
to prevent their falling into enemy hands. These defensive measures underscoredthe challenges faced by the Dutch and their allies in responding to the swift and18）

unexpected military advancements of the Japanese forces in the region.

Indeed, the early months of 1942 witnessed a swift and coordinatedJapanese military advance through various parts of Indonesia. The speed andefficiency of their campaign had significant implications for the region, leading16） NIOD, Indische Collectie, “1118 Indië als geallieerde bondgenoot; Nieuwe Instellingen
en Maatregelen 1940-1942, 1942”.
17） The intelligence failure and underestimation of the Japanese militaryʼs capabilities andstrategies by the Allies were significant factors in the events of that period. The Allies had
anticipated that the Japanese military would reach Indonesia around May 1942, but theactual speed and effectiveness of the Japanese advance surpassed these expectations. This
miscalculation can be attributed to various factors, including the swift and coordinatednature of the Japanese militaryʼs actions, their effective strategies, and perhaps a lack of
accurate intelligence on the Japanese forces. The Alliesʼ failure to accurately assess thesituation contributed to the challenges they faced in responding to the Japanese advance,
highlighting the complex nature of intelligence and strategic planning during times ofwar.
18） Zijlmans, “De Indische Bestuursdienst”, op.cit., pp. 11-12.
(11)120

Now There is No Government

to the occupation of multiple territories and administrative posts. The invasion
to Indonesia began with simultaneous attacks on Tarakan in northern Borneo
and Manado in North Celebes on 11 January 1942. In Tarakan, the Dutch
Indies military surrendered to the Japanese two days later. The Japanesemilitaryʼs momentum continued as they reached Balikpapan in East Borneo on
24 January and Bandjarmasin in South Borneo on 10 February. In Sumatra, theJapanese attacked Palembang on 14 February and successfully conquered it thefollowing day. Consequently, by January 1942, the Japanese military had alreadyoccupied administrative posts in East and South Borneo and North Celebes.
This was followed by their presence in Sumatra and Java in February or March
1942, with some areas in the eastern parts of Indonesia being occupied as late as
mid-1942. The rapid and effective military campaign by the Japanese forces
during this period had profound consequences for the Indies, leading to theoccupation of various regions and administrative posts across the archipelago.
The unfolding events in February and March 1942 marked a challenging
and decisive period for the Indies government in the face of the advancing
Japanese forces. By 15 February 1942, Japanese bombers were targeting thecapital in Batavia, prompting the evacuation of government functions andofficials to Bandoeng. This relocation reflected the intensification of the war
situation and the increasing threat to key administrative centers. The
culmination of challenges for the Indies government came with the Battle of theJava Sea, which commenced on 27 February. The American-British-DutchAustralian naval command attempted to halt the Japanese invasion of Java.
However, the battle extended until 12 March, ultimately resulting in the defeatof the Allied forces. The formal surrender took place at the Japaneseheadquarters in Bandoeng. These events marked the end of organized resistanceby the Allied forces in Indonesia, and the Japanese occupation of Java became a19）significant chapter in the broader context of the Asia-Pacific War.

Meanwhile, on 5 March, Batavia surrendered to the Japanese military and19） For a detailed description of the development of the Battle of the Java Sea, see P. C.
Boer. The Loss of Java: The Final Battles for the Possession of Java Fought by Allied Air,
Naval and Land Forces in the Period of 18 February–7 March 1942. Singapore: NUS Press,2011.
119(12)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

was declared an “open city”. This designation meant that the city would not be
defended, allowing for the occupation to proceed without resistance. The newsof the surrender and the transformation of Batavia into an “open city” had aprofound impact on the residents. One Dutch individual, upon hearing the news,
expressed a sense of disbelief and the feeling that “everything was finished”,

20）

yet unable to fully comprehend the future. The quietness that settled over
Batavia, as observed by a returning resident, likely reflected the profoundchanges and uncertainties that the city was facing under Japanese occupation.
Three days later, on 8 March, the Indies government had already acceptedJapanʼs demands for an unconditional surrender of the archipelago to theJapanese military. The following day, Governor-General Tjarda van
Starkenborgh Stachouwer was taken captive by the Japanese, marking asymbolic moment in the transfer of authority and the commencement of theJapanese occupation of Indonesia.
The Japanese occupation of Indonesia marked a significant transition,
introducing a new wartime regime. However, establishing a new order andadministration in the occupied territories was a complex process that required
time and effort on the part of the Japanese authorities. The restructuring ofadministrations and the reshaping of society were multifaceted tasks thatencompassed various aspects of governance, economy, and social structures.
The Japanese sought to assert control over the territories they occupied,
implementing changes that aligned with their wartime objectives. This involved
reorganizing existing administrative structures, imposing new policies, andsometimes integrating local institutions into the occupiersʼ framework. The
challenges faced by the Japanese in reorganizing and reshaping the occupied
territories included resistance from local populations, logistical difficulties, and21）

the need to adapt to the diverse socio-cultural landscape of Indonesia.

As aresult, the process of establishing a new order and administration unfolded overtime, with varying degrees of success in different regions.

20） NIOD, 400 Indische Collectie, “4593 Java. Report of Mr. Van Eeghen: ʻExperiences
during the first months of occupation on Javaʼ, 1945”.
(13)118

Now There is No Government

Rampok Reconsidered
It is noteworthy that the term rampok is often used in studies related to the22）

Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949).

Peter Keppyʼs 2010 work, The Politics ofRedress: War Damage Compensation and Restitution in Indonesia and thePhilippines, 1940-1957,

23）

serves as a contemporary example, employing theterm multiple times. This indicates the enduring relevance and utility of theconcept of rampok in academic discourse, enabling researchers to articulate andanalyze specific facets of the social and political dynamics of the period. The
consistent usage of the term across various studies underscores its importance inencapsulating particular aspects of historical events and social phenomena inIndonesia.
Robert Cribbʼs study, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s
Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949 published in 1991,

24）

is a

21） A significant number of soldiers from the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army
(KNIL) went underground and organized resistance movements against the Japanese
during the occupation of Indonesia. These resistance efforts were part of a broader
network of anti-Japanese resistance activities that sought to resist and undermine theoccupiers. The resistance movements operated covertly, engaging in activities such as
intelligence gathering, sabotage, and providing support to Allied forces. These efforts
aimed to resist Japanese rule and contribute to the eventual liberation of Indonesia. The
members of these resistance groups faced significant risks, as Japanese authorities wereruthless in suppressing dissent. Despite the challenges, these acts of resistancedemonstrated the determination and courage of individuals who opposed the occupationand sought to contribute to the larger Allied war effort. The resistance movements inIndonesia played a role in shaping the postwar narrative and contributed to the eventual
restoration of Dutch colonial rule in the region. The stories of these resistance fighters
are an important part of the complex history of the Asia-Pacific War in Southeast Asia.
For instance, NIOD, Indische Collectie, “908 Rapport “Het Ondergrondsch Verzet in
Nederlands-Indië” van J.L. de Voogt, samengesteld in opdracht van Generaal S.H.
Spoor”; “4183 Typescript door MM Hegener, Verslag van het onderzoek op Sulawesi naar
de KNIL-Guerrilla aldaar van maar tot augustus 1942”.
22） For instance, Else Ensering. “Banten in Times of Revolution”. Archipel 50(1), 1995,
pp. 131-163.
23） Peter Keppy. The Politics of Redress: War Damage Compensation and Restitution inIndonesia and the Philippines, 1940-1957. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010.
117(14)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

standard reference to rampok. His analysis connects rampok to bosses and gangs
in and around Batavia during the Indonesian Revolution. Connecting rampok to
powerful figures operating in the surroundings of Batavia sheds light on the roleof bosses and gangs outside formal structures of authority. This analysis
extends to the coordination of labor and product supply and connections withvarious actors, emphasizing the networked nature of rampok. His perspective
implies that the Indies authority viewed rampok as connected to criminal
activity. His analysis adopts a social structural approach, suggesting that rampok
can occur at any time, not solely during periods of upheaval or chaos. Cribbemphasizes the role of bosses and gangs, particularly their use of undergroundnetworks, in the perpetration of rampok. This social structural analysis implies
that certain conditions or elements within the social structure may contribute tothe occurrence of rampok beyond specific historical events.

25）

It appears toprovide a framework for understanding the social structural aspects of rampok
within the broader context of Indonesian history.
The term rampok in Indonesian studies is a convenient word that refers to
the act of looting during times of chaos. It involves targeting properties andowners with the intent to acquire valuables or resources amid turbulent
conditions. In English looting is somehow different from robbery andvandalism. Robbery typically occurs in normal times and involves the act ofstealing from individuals directly, often with the use of force or threat, while
vandalism involves the intentional destruction of property without necessarily
aiming to harm individuals. Examples of rampok in 1942 Indonesia canencompass acts that align with the definitions of robbery and vandalism, in
addition to looting. Rampok, in the context of historical events, may encapsulate24） Robert Cribb. Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and theIndonesian Revolution 1945-1949. North Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991.
25） A book chapter by Henk Schulte Nordholt and Margareet van Till echoes Cribbʼsunderstanding of rampok. They argue that Batavia and its surrounding areas experienced
local violence since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and such violence
was facilitated by the colonial state ceding some spaces for “criminals”. Henk Shulte
Nordholt and Margareet van Till. “Colonial Criminals in Java, 1870-1910”. In Vincente L.
Rafael. ed. Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam.
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1999, pp. 47-60.
(15)116

Now There is No Government

a range of actions that involve stealing, damaging property, and potentiallythreatening or harming individuals. Given this broader understanding, rampok
can be interpreted to encompass various forms of disorderly and criminal
behavior during the chaotic period in 1942 Indonesia. The term becomes acomprehensive descriptor for actions that involve the unauthorized acquisitionof valuables, destruction of property, and potentially violent or coercive
elements.
Therefore, I use the term rampok in the context of 1942, which is somehow
different from examples on which Cribb relies for his historical study. His social
structural explanations of rampok, derived from cases in Java, raise a concern
about its applicability to the Outer Islands. Theoretically, the multifaceted
causes of rampok may vary across different regions in Indonesia. The
universality of the term rampok in Indonesia, historically and contemporarily,
highlights the need for alternative explanations that consider diverse historicalcontexts. It also reinforces the necessity of exploring regional variations andunderstanding the specific contexts in which rampok occurs across Indonesia.
The observation from the NIOD collection that many examples of rampok
were initiated not by the military but by mostly civilian Indonesians underscores
the diverse nature of the perpetration of violence during this period. This kindof historical documentation serves as a crucial resource for understanding themultifaceted nature of social and political dynamics during times of upheaval. It
contributes to a more nuanced and comprehensive view of the impact ofhistorical events on the lives of individuals and communities in Indonesia
during the 1940s. The fact that these instances of violence and rampok occurred
across different racial groups highlights that the impact of such events was
widespread, affecting the inhabitants of Indonesia regardless of their race. The
experience of violence, anxiety, and fear paints a vivid picture of the tumultuousand challenging conditions faced by the population during this historical period.
In the context of 1942 Dutch documents and testimonies by Dutch people
who experienced chaotic situations also use the Malay term rampok and its
Dutch variations, like rampokkers (looters, robbers) , rampokken (robberies) ,rampokkerij (robbery) , rampokpartijen (robbing party, robbery affairs) ,26）

rampokbenden (robber gangs), rampokzaken (robbery affairs).
115(16)Those same words

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

appeared in documentation in the revolutionary period as well. In 1942, notonly bosses and gangs but also ordinary people took part in rampok.
Additionally, due to the prevalence of rampok incidents in 1942 across various
cities, towns, and regions, some Dutch established anti-rampok organizations(known as anti-rampok organisatie or anti-rampok vereeniging) and armed themselves

against rampokkers. When the Japanese occupation started, they were supposed
to surrender all their weapons. But when their weapons were found, they always
had excuses, saying that they were necessary for defending themselves against
rampokkers.

27）

This highlights the extent of social chaos during the period of

power transition.
The question of what factors influenced individuals to think and act incertain ways during the period of the Japanese invasion of major cities inIndonesia in 1942 is undoubtedly complex and multifaceted. Understanding the
motivations behind peopleʼs actions during this time requires consideration ofvarious historical, social, and psychological factors. This leads to revisiting what
rampok looked like in 1942.

How Did Rampok Happen?
In 1942, numerous rampok incidents occurred. The NIOD archives house a26） For instance, a Dutch dictionary, Indisch Lexion, which shows Indies words in Dutch
literature, carries rampok related words. P. Mingaars, J. Heij, and P. Posthumus. Indisch
Lexicon: Indische woorden in de Nederlandse literatuur. Leiden: Brill, 2005, pp. 461-462.
There is an intriguing development regarding the term rampok. It has been
assimilated into Dutch (the Netherlands) and Afrikaans (South Africa) vocabulary sinceWorld War II. In the Netherlands, a notable example is the popular comic series
Rampokan: Java (1998) and Rampokan: Celebes (2004) by Peter Van Dongen, which
explores themes related to rampok in Java and Celebes in 1946. In the case of Afrikaans,the variation rampokker has become common. An example provided is a comic titled Cor
Dirks. Die Uile En Die Rampokkers published in Pretoria in 1950. The term rampok
traveled from Indonesia to South Africa through the Netherlands, and it has taken root inboth languages at a contemporary time. This illustrates the cross-cultural influence of theterm, as it moved beyond its original linguistic and geographical context, becoming
incorporated into the vocabulary of other languages and cultures.
27） NIOD, 400 Indische Collectie, “970 T” and “973 W”.
(17)114

Now There is No Government

wealth of invaluable contemporary documents and post-war testimonies,
providing insights into the diverse types of rampok that transpired acrossvarious locations in Indonesia from February to April 1942. This section of thearticle aims to highlight and briefly introduce a selection of representative
examples of rampok.
Ricardoʼs Report
In the NIOD archives, there is a specific document from October 1942 titled“Rampok”, presumably submitted to the Japanese authorities. This document
focuses on providing examples of rampok incidents in West Java. The author, C.
Ricardo, was a European executive associated with the Jacoberg trading
28）

company (Jacobson van den Berg & Co.).

Amid the Japanese occupation in

1942, he had the privilege of undertaking a business trip to West Java. Hisjourney included visits to locations such as Maoek, Tangerang, Batavia, andPriangan, and besides his business, he collected stories of rampok incidents
during his trip. His detailed report on rampok provides valuable insights into thenature and context of these incidents during the Japanese occupation ofIndonesia.
The rampok examples he documented took place in the first half of 1942
during the Japanese occupation. The context suggests that these incidents
occurred as early as late February, and most likely extended into March, andpossibly even April. Ricardo acknowledges various interpretations of the term
rampok in the Indonesian context, such as to attack something or someone inlarge numbers, to go on a robbery in gangs, and the euphemistic translation ofprivateer and freebooter. Perpetrators of rampok, referred to as rampokkers, arecharacterized by malevolent behavior, organized group structures, and thebrazen looting and vandalism of residences and businesses without
apprehension.
Ricardoʼs observations about rampok provide a nuanced perspective on the28） NIOD, 400 Indische Collectie, “4616 Verslag van C. Ricardo: ʻRampokʼ, over de aard
van het rampokken in verschillende plaatsen in West-Java in maart 1942, 1942” [hereafter,
Ricardo, “Rampok”].
113(18)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

phenomenon, highlighting both its organized and spontaneous aspects. One of
his notable observations is the difficulty in prosecuting rampokkers, as few
29）

witnesses come forward, and fear of retaliation looms large.

This suggests a

pervasive atmosphere of impunity surrounding rampok incidents. Moreover,Ricardo likens the spread of rampok to that of a “contagious disease”
30）(besmettelijke ziekte),suggesting that it can manifest both as orchestrated

criminal endeavors led by seasoned “professionals” (professioneele rampokkers)

31）

and as impromptu actions involving ordinary individuals. This dual nature
implies a complex dynamic underlying the phenomenon, which contrasts with
Cribbʼs portrayal in his book. Cribb may present rampok primarily as organizedcriminal activity, overlooking its potential spontaneous occurrences involving
non-professional perpetrators. Thus, Ricardoʼs interpretation offers a broader
understanding of rampok, encompassing its multifaceted nature and shedding
light on its societal implications beyond conventional criminal frameworks.
With Ricardoʼs description of rampok in mind, the subsequent section,
which examines four instances of rampok―two sourced from testimonies in the
NIOD archives and two documented by Ricardo himself ― hopes to offer
insights into the diverse characteristics and occurrences of rampok during
February and March of 1942. These examples serve to contextualize the various
forms and contexts in which rampok occurred, thereby enriching ourunderstanding of its dynamics and societal impact during this pivotal historicalperiod.
Example 1: Off-Kandangan, South Borneo
The first example is derived from the testimony testimony from a “European”
survivorʼs point of view about violence in South Borneo. The specific realities of29） Ricardo, “Rampok”, p. 1. From the late March, however, the Japanese authority
regarded rampokkers as criminals and threatened them punish even death sentences.
“Pertemoean diantara pempinan-pimpinan Tionghoa dan Kolonel Nakajima:
Pendoedoek Tionghoa haroes insjaf bahwa “Asia ada boeat bangsa Asia”: Perampokperampok akan mendapat hoekoeman mati!” Pemandangan, 20 March 1942, p. 3.
30） Ricardo, “Rampok”, p. 1.
31） Ricardo, “Rampok”, p. 2.
(19)112

Now There is No Government

Borneo during this period differed from Java. The Japanese invasion of Borneo
began on 10 January 1942, starting in the northern part of the island. At thattime, Borneo was divided into two colonies: the northern part was under British
rule, while the southern part was under Dutch jurisdiction. The Japanese were
not concerned with such juridical divisions, successfully conquered the northernpart by mid-January, and proceeded to advance further into the southern partof Borneo.
The testimony about rampok was given by Mrs. Widow Pereira Aminah,
who was Indonesian and married to a Dutchman, who was the officer of the32）

Tax Office in a small town called Kandangan.

She and her husband lived

there, some 100 km northeast of Bandjarmasin. The only way to travel long
distances in South Borneo was to take a boat on the river. When the news
reached that the Japanese had landed in Borneo and were even advancing to thetown of Kandangan, they hastily fled. Together with their friends, they left
Kandangan at the beginning of February 1942 by boat. They planned to go via
Negara (80 km from Kandangan) to Moeara Moening (plus 35 km), intending tohide there. On the way, however, they were overpowered by our boat feeders,
33）

who tried to rob their money, foodstuff, etc.

Fortunately, the European men

on the boat fought back and defended themselves, resulting in severe injuries.
One of the boat operators was killed, while the others fled the scene.
This narrative illustrates that when Dutch individuals attempted to escapefrom relatively isolated locations in Borneo, they had to depend on local
residents to operate the boats. It was the only viable option for the Dutch. The
individuals operating the boats possessed sufficient knowledge that the Dutch
carried valuable and essential items under the circumstances. Upon the Dutch
boarding the boats, local operators saw it as an opportunity to take action for
their own benefit. However, they underestimated the resistance, leading to afailed attempt. I suspect that this was not an isolated incident but must haveoccurred in many places during the tumultuous period.
32） A testimony by Mrs. Pereira Aminah in Banjarmasin in October 1947 in NIOD, 400
Indische Collectie, “865 Pereira-Aminah”.
33） “Onderweg bedoeling hadden de door ons medegenomen voedingamiddelen geld, enz.
te rampokken”, Ibid.
111(20)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

Example 2: Soember, East JavaThe second example is based on the testimony of Joh. Hoek, a Dutch private
citizen presumably associated with the Land Guard. In early March 1942, hisunit engaged in guerrilla warfare against Japanese troops in and around
Soerabaja, East Java. The unit was constantly on the move, encountering
Japanese forces one day and being surrounded by Indonesian gangs the next,
eventually leading to them surrendering their weapons.
On 7 March, they arrived at the Soember-Djai Plantation (about 130km
from Soerabaja), where rampok had occurred. The following day, during a patrol

around the plantation, they apprehended the leader of the looters, who turned
out to be the plantationʼs driver Ardjo. In the afternoon of that day, the message
from the Japanese arrived from Djombang through an Indo-European resident
who had been appointed provisional resident. The order was to surrender theweapons and ammunition present there, with a few rifles and revolvers being
34）

excluded for defense against the rampokkers.

This episode reveals the emergence of an unexpected rampok leader withina plantation, shedding light on the dynamics of the situation. While specificdetails are not provided, it is reasonable to infer that the rampokkers attacked
and looted the company facilities. Plantations were commonly situated in rural
areas, each operating factories dedicated to specific items and often forming a
distinctive community akin to a small town. Within this environment, residents,
including owners, their families, and laborers, could comfortably reside, fostering
a close-knit familiarity among them.

35）

The company driver seemed to occupy afavorable position for acquiring information about the ongoings in theplantation and exploited it when the Land Guard did not function efficiently.
However, it is surprising to learn that the company driver was able to mobilize
and organize the looters, prompting them to take action.

34） NIOD, 400 Indische Collectie, “387 H”.
35） To understand the plantation life, see Peter Post and May Ling Thio. The Kwee Familyof Ciledug: Family, Status, and Modernity in Colonial Java. Volendam: LM Publishers,
2019. The book offers a detailed exploration of plantation life, with a focus on a Chinese
Peranakan family (those born and raised in Java).
(21)110

Now There is No Government

Example 3: Serang, Banten, West Java
The third example is based on Ricardoʼs account of a looting incident in Serang.
Located 90 km from Batavia, Serang was labelled as “The capital of the rampok
36）area” (De hoofstad van het rampokgebied).

This description sheds light on theseverity of rampok incidents in that location. The specific account of a looting
incident at Hotel “Vos” in Serang provides a poignant narrative.
The incident happened a day before the Japanese entered the town. Five
individuals, described as “friendly” (vriendschappelijk) hajis,

37）

visited Hotel “Vos”

and assured the manager, Mr. Vos (presumably of Dutch origin), that they would
take care of him. Because of his familiarity with them, he placed trust in theirintentions. The manager was directed to go to the back of the hotel for safety.
As he moved, he noticed a silent crowd of local Bantam people (Bantammers)
outside the hotel, seemingly acting as spectators. Once the manager reached theback, he heard a commotion, and upon hastily returning to the hotel, he foundthat everything had been torn down and taken. The looting occurred swiftly,
leaving the once beautiful hotel in complete ruins. The witness asserts that thefive hajis initiated the looting, indicating a premeditated and organized aspectof the incident. The managerʼs inability to intervene or prevent the looting
emphasized the rapid and chaotic nature of the event. Despite the managerʼs
attempt to seek safety, the hotel was swiftly ravaged, leaving him helpless in the38）

face of the looters.

This account vividly portrays the impact of rampok on businesses andindividuals. The involvement of individuals known to the manager adds a layerof betrayal to the narrative. For the manager, the betrayal and looting happened
unexpectedly. However, hajis had meticulously planned the attack and mobilized
local people who swiftly looted the hotel.
Example 4: Bekasi, East of Batavia
The fourth tragic account by Ricardo titled “The drama of the kongsi house”
36） Ricardo, “Rampok”, p. 6.
37） A haji is a Muslim who has undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca, and in many Muslim
societies, the term serves as an honorific title for a respected individual.
38） Ricardo, “Rampok”, pp. 6-7.
109(22)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）(Het drama van het kongsi-huis)

39）

in Bekasi reveals a harrowing episode ofresistance against rampokkers. The incident took place in Bekasi, located 20 km
from Batavia. Rampokkers, fully aware of the impending Japanese troopsʼ
arrival, targeted a Chinese kongsi house with 300 accomplices. The Chinese
manager, anticipating an attack, saw numerous gangs nearby and preparedfirearms in the hope of defending his firm. There was a slight hope that if they
could hold off the rampokkers, the Japanese soldiers might intervene to stop theviolence. The firm successfully defended itself on the first day when gangs
attacked.
However, on the second day, the gangs returned with more people andweapons, making it increasingly difficult for the firm to defend itself. Faced withoverwhelming odds, the manager was forced to make difficult decisions. In a
desperate attempt to prevent further humiliation and destruction, the manager
decided to burn and destroy valuables, money, and jewelry. As time ran out andthe rampokkers approached with axes, the manager, unwilling to facehumiliation, made the heartbreaking decision to kill his family and himself.
Rampokkers eventually broke into the house, causing chaos and mutilating thecorpses of Chinese men, women, and children. The house was set on fire, andafter looting, the rampokkers left, leaving devastation in their wake.

40）

This incident was highly sensational, attracting attention not only from
Ricardo but also from local newspapers in nearby Batavia as early as late41）

March.

According to the newspaper Pemandangan, the Chinese businessman
42）

involved was named Lie Boeng Kim.

This tragic episode vividly illustrates theextreme measures some individuals took in response to ruthless rampok attacks.
The desperation, loss, and violence depicted in this narrative underscore the39） Ricardo, “Rampok”, pp. 4-6. The term kongsi, originating from the Hokkien dialect,translates to company. It is frequently understood as referring to Chinese socialorganizations or partnerships.
40） Ibid., pp. 4-5.
41） “Karena Ketakoetan, Esteri, Anak dan Tjoetjoe Ditembak Sendiri dan Dibakar:
Drama jang menjedihkan”. Berita Oemoem, 27 March 1942.
42） Another newspaper, Pemandangan, also touched upon this case. Pembantoe A. Kh.
“Djakarta-Poerwakarta dalam 2 hari: Kedjadian disana sini”. Pemandangan, 3 April 1942,
p. 4.
(23)108

Now There is No Government

devastating impact of rampok, as documented in the newspapers.

Rampokkers and Victims
Drawing from the examples of rampok in Borneo and Java presented in theprevious section, it is evident that rampok leaders and initiators did not
randomly target the Chinese and/or Europeans, nor did they loot places andhouses arbitrarily. Instead, they had specific individuals or locations in mind,
carefully planning and organizing their attacks in advance. Utilizing local
networks and information, they were well-acquainted with their potential targets
and patiently awaited the opportune moment to carry out their attacks. Now,
the question arises: Who were the rampokkers?
Rampok did not erupt suddenly without prior indications. Typically,
rampok incidents involved locally rooted leaders or initiators, indicating that
their actions were confined within their own territory or community.
Rampokkers operated as organized groups, engaging in looting and vandalism,as Ricardo documented. These leaders often belonged to local gangs or held
positions of influence within various local networks. They could beacquaintances, neighbors, or individuals trusted by the community. Someleaders even assumed religious roles. In the Serang example highlighted by
Ricardo, the initiators were hajis, known for their kindness and recognized by
the hotel owner.
Leadership roles were diverse, ranging from local figures relied upon by
Europeans for evacuations to seemingly ordinary individuals, such as boatmen
attempting a robbery in Mrs. Pereira Aminahʼs example. Some leaders had
employment with European companies, like the driver in Soember who turned
out to be a rampok leader attacking and looting European businesses. Anyone
with information, friends, or a network that could aid their plans or ambitions
could become a rampok leader.
The four examples of rampok from the previous section highlight thediversity of individuals engaged in rampok during wartime. The fact that those
involved in rampok include boat operators, company drivers, religiously
respected figures such as hajis who were close acquaintances, and gangs
107(24)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

underscores the complexity and varied nature of these actions. This diversity
suggests that the motivations and circumstances leading to such attacks can be
multifaceted, involving individuals from different backgrounds and roles insociety. During wartime, rampokkers can encompass a broader range ofindividuals and exhibit more spontaneous characteristics.
Then, the next question turns to who the rampok victims were. Notably, allrampokkers were Indonesians, with Europeans and Chinese being the primarytargets in both urban and rural areas. The race of the victims was often
documented in instances of robbery and looting, leading to the tempting
assumption that rampokkers selected targets based on race. This assumption
arises because NIOD documents and testimonies were primarily based on thevoices of victims including some spectators. They documented mainly victimsʼ
stories rather than the perspective of the rampokkers. Documents andtestimonies written and spoken in Dutch were intended for a Dutch audience
who perceived Indonesians as rampokkers attacking them. It is tempting tothink that race was a major factor influencing the selection of targets. This
understanding, in itself, is not surprising.
Having said that, I have a different interpretation after delving into various
documents and materials. The examples above reveal a deliberate approach totarget selection, suggesting that rampokkers did not choose randomly; instead,they possessed specific information about their victims. This information
enabled them to meticulously plan the timing and execution of their attacks. It
is hard to imagine that rampokkers would exclude fellow Indonesians withpossessions from their targets while selectively focusing on European andChinese victims. This raises the question of the criteria used in selecting
potential targets.
To explore this question, contemporary Malay language newspapers,
primarily targeting Indonesian readers, help reconstruct the image of potential
targets of rampok. Local newspapers did report rampok incidents from time totime. Examples of rampok I have encountered so far happened mainly in West
Java. One report carried a witness statement: “It does not matter, whatever race

43）of those inhabitants” (Tidak perdoeli, pendoedoek itoe bangsa apa djoega) .

However, there was a distinct difference in how they described the victims; they(25)106

Now There is No Government
44）

were not mentioned as Indonesians.

Instead, the victims were described interms of their occupation, such as peasants (petani) and goat farmers (pedagang
45）

kambing).

In reality, therefore, individuals of any race, including Indonesians, became
victims if they possessed anything―be it food supplies, radios, automobiles,
etc.

46）

This demonstrates that race did not play a significant role for rampokkers

when selecting their targets. It is safe to say that the victims of rampok
encompassed individuals of various races who became targets due to their rolesin the colonial regime, involvement in private small- or medium-sized businesses,
or possession of valuable items. Their power, authority, or wealth represented
their class in the eyes of rampokkers, and the visibility of their class determined
their fate during this turbulent period. Simultaneously, it is essential to note that
rampok did not happen everywhere, despite the existence of class factors
throughout Indonesia. There must be some reasons why rampok did not occur
in some cities or towns; this question remains to be explored in the future. For
the time being, it is reasonable to assume that the class factor played adetermining role in selecting potential victims in specific circumstances.

TimingHow did the rampok leaders determine the timing of their attacks? Testimonies
from Borneoʼs experience uncover that, as the conflicts between the Japaneseand the Allied military intensified in January 1942 and Japanese troops landedin the northern part of Borneo in February, Europeans began evacuating fromtheir hometowns to major cities. What were the news and information conveyed
during this period?
The news related to the Japanese troops sent mixed messages to theresidents. It did not have to bring the facts, but it could also include rumors. It43） “Perampasan kerbau”, Berita Oemoem, 9 April 1942.
44） When referring to Chinese residents, local newspapers did not specify their ethnicity
but rather simply mentioned their names.
45） “Perampasan kerbau”, Berita Oemoem, 9 April 1942.
46） “Perampasan kerbau”, Berita Oemoem, 9 April 1942.
105(26)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

brought anxiety and uncertainty to the future. Then one should reconsider themeaning of the news, saying that the Japanese troops landed in Indonesia. It is
undoubtful that the news terrified the inhabitants, in particular the Dutch
nationals because the Netherlands was at war with Japan. The Japanese militarymight take them as enemies, and one never knew what would happen to them if
the Japanese military arrived in their cities and towns. Understandably,
European women and children began to evacuate to safer places in January andFebruary. Under the Indies military regime, KNIL, the BB, the Volunteer
Exercise Corps, and the Land Guards were all alerted to the Japanese invasion.
As the wartime situation deteriorated in Indonesia, as mentioned earlier,the BB, along with the Demolition Corps, received orders to demolishstrategically located kampongs and destroy items such as oil, rubber, arms,
ammunition supplies, means of transport, and radio communication equipment.
By mid-February, all national government functions and other government
officials had been evacuated to Bandoeng. With the communication network
disrupted and the central government moved to Bandoeng, local government
authorities gradually became dysfunctional. Dutch local authorities werepreoccupied with preparations to vacate their posts and abandon cities andtowns.
As Europeans and officials prepared for the imminent Japanese attacks andevacuated to various places in Indonesia, panic ensued among the local
population, leading to chaos in many cities and towns. This occurred before theJapanese arrival at these locations, marking the beginning of rampok. Not only
rampokkers in this activity, but all residents in Indonesia could sense theimpending breakdown of colonial power and authority. It did not matter
whether local newspapers carried the news; the desperate circumstances werevisible to everyone. This led to an extraordinary situation where organizedgroups of rampokkers looted houses, buildings, and shops. In another instance,
people simply appropriated goods left behind by departing Europeans, as if they
had the right to do so.
This raises the final question of the article: How did rampokkers andordinary residents perceive the atmosphere in Indonesia from February throughApril 1942?
(27)104

Now There is No Government

No Authority
The early months of 1942 marked the period of Japanese occupation inIndonesia during World War II. Japanese forces had invaded and gained controlof major cities, leading to significant changes in governance and daily life. The
Japanese invasion and occupation brought about uncertainty, fear, and a senseof upheaval. However, the power transition did not occur overnight; instead, it
unfolded gradually over time. The period between the collapse of the Dutchcolonial administration and the establishment of the Japanese military regime
was marked by a vacuum of authority and a significant shift in power structures.
This created a period of social and political instability. Many Europeans,anticipating Japanese occupation, evacuated major cities. This evacuation, as
mentioned earlier, might have contributed to a sense of a power vacuum. For
rampokkers, the chaotic conditions during wartime presented opportunities forlooting and criminal activities. The breakdown of established authority
structures could have emboldened some individuals to engage in such actions.
Ordinary residents likely experienced a mix of fear, uncertainty, and thechallenges associated with adapting to the new wartime reality. Economic
hardships, disruptions in daily life, and the overall atmosphere of war would
have contributed to a complex set of emotions among the general population.
The people recognized the emergence of “a vacuum of authority” (een47）

gezagsvacuüm)

and, in response, felt less obligated to adhere to the prior social

and legal order and authorities. With the Indies authorities seemingly unable toprotect Indonesia, locals believed they had to navigate the impending,unpredictable, and unstable situations on their own. In the absence ofrecognized authorities, the act of rampok seemed to lack legal categorization asa criminal activity. Consequently, it appears that no authorities could effectively
intervene to prevent or halt rampok. The question of legitimate authorities thus
became a pressing concern for Indonesians, forcing them to contemplate their47） “Doch er bleek geen Jap aanwezig te zijn. Wel was de bevolking, door het ontstaanvan een gezagsvacuum, aan het rampokken geslagen” in NIOD, 400 Indische Collectie,“997 Aug-W (146-165)”.
103(28)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

course of action in the face of this new reality. Ricardoʼs report on rampok
vividly captures the sentiments of the people during such incidents.
In all cases of robbery and looting, numbering in the thousands, the police
were far from sight.
It soon became evident that even government institutions, of which we only
mention the pawnshops, were not spared from the visits of rampokkers.
The motto of the criminals was: ʻWho will stop me now that there is nogovernment?ʼ.
[original text]
In alle gevallen van roof en plundering, duizenden in getal, was de politie
verre te zoeken.
Dat ook de gouvernementsinstellingen, waarvan wij alleen maar depandhuizen, niet vrij bleven van het bezoek van rampokkers, bleek weldra.
De leuze der boeven was: “Wie zal me wat doen, nu er geen gouvernement48）

meer is”.

This account reveals that the police were spectators from the distance when
rampok occurred and thousands of buildings and shops were robbed and looted.
Neither power nor authority was effective. The account mentions the slogan
among rampokkers, reflecting a significant aspect of the prevailing mindset
during that time. The slogan, “Who will stop me now that there is nogovernment?”, underscores the belief among rampokkers that the absence of agoverning authority provided them with a sense of impunity and freedom to act
without consequences.
The awareness of this consciousness and atmosphere was not merely atransient phenomenon; rather, it persisted and underwent revision following
Indonesiaʼs proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945, which was
succeeded by the Indonesian Revolution until 1949. Amid the revolution period,in 1947, Indonesian author G. Pakpahan reflected on the chaotic political and48） Ricardo, “Rampok”, p. 13.
(29)102

Now There is No Governmentsocial circumstances of 1942. Pakpahanʼs observations about the period before
and during the Japanese occupation provide not only an Indonesian perspectiveon that time but also shed light on how they remembered their history. His
documentation, originally written in Indonesian, was translated into Dutch by49）

the Dutch scholar R. de Bruinand published as a single package. Pakpahan

recalled a time of turbulence, as there was ultimately no government in the earlymonths of 1942:
Because the old government at that time had lost its power (although still
obligated to maintain security) and the new government had not yet arrived

or had not prioritized security, the rough sentiments within the people were
free to overflow and rampage unrestrainedly as they pleased.
[original text]
Oleh karena pemerintah lama pada waktoe itoe telah kehilangankekoasaanja (walaupoen masih diwadjibkan mendjaga keamanan) dan
pemerintah baroe belom tiba atau belom memperdoelikan keamanan,
maka bebaslah perasaan kasar jang ada dalam manoesia itoe oentoek
50）

meloeap dan meradjalela dengan sepoeas-poeasnja.

The breakdown of the colonial government and the vacuum of authority
created a situation where individuals, including rampokkers, perceived a lack ofinstitutional control and punishment. This perception likely emboldened themto engage in looting, vandalism, and other criminal activities, as they felt there
were no consequences for their actions. This quotation encapsulates the anarchic
conditions that emerged during the wartime regime transition, where the49） Unfortunately, there is currently no available information about Pakpahan. However,given that his documentation was directly translated into Dutch, I assume that he worked
closely with Dutch authorities in the 1940s. The Dutch translator, R. de Bruin, was a
researcher at the Indies Section of the National Institute for War Documentation in
Amsterdam, founded in May 1945.
50） NIOD, Indische Collectie, “1394 1261 dagen onder de stralen van de Rijzende Zon,
manuscript van G. Pakpahan, 1947”.
101(30)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

absence of a functioning government led to a sense of lawlessness andopportunism. It reflects the understanding that, in the absence of a governing
structure, individuals might act without restraint, believing they could act with
impunity.
The sense of freedom and sovereignty among rampokkers contributed tothe development of insecurity and anxiety in communities where hundreds or
thousands of ordinary individuals ― Indonesians, Chinese, and Europeans
alike―lived side by side. Various individuals coped with this fear in different
ways, reflecting diverse perceptions of the unfolding events. The collapse of the
Dutch colonial order was one aspect, and the impending Japanese militaryoccupation was another. No one could anticipate the significant shift in thepolitical landscape that the arrival of Japanese forces might bring or what theoccupation might entail for ordinary lives and societal structures. Some
individuals were hopeful about the arrival of Japanese troops, anticipating that
their presence could help restore social order. This suggests a level ofdesperation and a perception that the Japanese military might bring stability to
the chaotic situation caused by rampokkers. Others feared the uncertainty
associated with the Japanese occupation. These contrasting reactions
demonstrate the complex emotions and responses of the population in the faceof socio-political upheaval.
By the end of March 1942, the social mood of “Now is a time of change”(Masa sekarang ialah masa peroebahan)

51）

had spread throughout Indonesia.

Hopes and fears, freedom and uncertainty, sovereignty and anxiety coexisted
among the people. Commencing from mid-March 1942, the Japanese militaryoccupation government, constituting yet another wartime regime, initiatedefforts to reinstate social order and assert its governance within the archipelago.
The social disorder and fear created by rampokkers started to be brought undercontrol, dissipating the climate of uncertainty and anxiety among the
population.

52）

Some Indonesian intellectuals even hoped that the incoming
53）

Japanese occupation would be brief,reflecting a perceived sense of freedom51） Ar. Mustyka Hanafi. “Ir. Soekarno dan Drs. Moh. Hatta”. Pemandangan, 3 April
1942.
(31)100

Now There is No Governmentand sovereignty for certain individuals. The sense of newfound freedom andsovereignty might have contributed to the criticism and dismantling of political,
economic, and social establishments. It had the potential to spark a social
revolution but failed to materialize due to the establishment of the newly formed
and more restrictive wartime regime. Within this wartime regime, which relied
upon and reinstated locally entrenched traditional and administrative
authorities, the communal perception of freedom and sovereignty underwent
restriction and transformation into mobilizational power orchestrated by the54）

government.

The persistent inquiry persisted: how would this newfound senseof freedom and sovereignty endure within the framework of the emerging
55）

authority?

52） As previously discussed, the Japanese wartime regime faced challenges in establishinggovernance across the archipelago. During this period of transition, rampok incidents
occurred intermittently, prompting former KNIL officers to defend the communities towhich they belonged using armed forces. The Japanese authorities permitted suchdefensive actions and penalized rampok perpetrators upon capture.
53） Indonesian nationalists and intellectuals resonated with this sentiment. In April 1942,
while imprisoned in Tjipanas, West Java, Soetan Sjahrir wrote a note in Dutch about the
future of an independent Indonesia. He held onto the hope that the Japanese occupation
was an interlude (intermezzo) on the road to independence. NIOD, Indische Collectie,“4735 Aantekeningen van Soetan Sjahrir uit april 1942 over het verwezenlijken van een
zelfstandig Indonesië, 1942”.
54） George McT. Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1952, pp. 101-133; Benda. “The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupationof Java” op.cit.; Benedict Richard OʼGorman Anderson. Java in a Time of Revolution:
Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972; B.R. OʼG.
Anderson. “Japan: ʻThe Light of Asiaʼ”. In Josef Silverstein. ed. Southeast Asia in WorldWar II: Four Essays. Monograph Series No. 7, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University,
1966, pp. 332-369; Frederick, Visions and Heat, op.cit., pp. 81-181; David Jenkins. Young
Soeharto: The Making of a Solider, 1921-1945. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute,2021, pp. 173-303.
55） I intend to elaborate on the concepts of freedom (kebebasan) and sovereignty(kedaoelatan) within the context of 1942 Indonesia in the forthcoming article.
99(32)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

Concluding Remarks
The article offers a dual-tiered argument regarding the phenomenon of rampok
during February and March 1942, providing fresh insights into the intricatesocial dynamics characterizing transitions between wartime regimes. The
primary argument, grounded in the concept of wartime regime, serves as aplausible analytical framework, emphasizing the challenges inherent intransitioning from one wartime regime to another. It posits that social disorderand unrest arose from the power shift between two wartime regimes. This
perspective illuminates the political backdrop and socio-political circumstances
contributing to chaotic conditions and a breakdown of social order during thetransition period. Acknowledging the non-uniform occurrence of rampok acrossIndonesia adds complexity to the historical narrative, prompting crucial
inquiries into the factors influencing its presence or absence in different regions.
The adoption of a multidimensional approach fosters a comprehensive
understanding of the intricate dynamics that characterize the transition between
wartime regimes in Indonesia.
This leads to the second focal point of the article: the vacuum of power andauthority creating an opportunity and motivation for local communities toengage in rampok. The argument suggests that, due to the absence of power andauthority, rampok leaders and instigators exploited the situation, targeting andassaulting figures of authority and wealth protected by the colonial structure.
This underscores the historical and structural factors shaping the targets anddynamics of rampok. Subsequently, the analysis delves into the factors
propelling collective action and examines how individuals articulated their
instincts, contingent upon the availability of pertinent documents. A thoroughexploration of local grievances, power dynamics, and community relationships
will contribute to a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted nature of
rampok during this historical period.
The article posits, in a deductive manner, that the events of 1942 evolved
into socially collective memories, resurfacing in diverse forms upon the
conclusion of the Japanese occupation in August 1945. Not extensively exploredin the existing literature on the Indonesian Revolution,

56）

this article endeavors(33)98

Now There is No Government

to provide a novel perspective to the historical narrative by highlighting theenduring impact of these events on collective memory. While the current
literature acknowledges the mobilization and militarization efforts by theJapanese military regime during the occupation, this article tentatively proposesthat the heightened violence in 1945 and thereafter mirrored the events of 1942
and was further intensified by the Japanese regimeʼs mobilization andmilitarization of society. This exacerbation, combined with pre-existing social
cleavages dating back to the Dutch colonial period, may have played asignificant role in fomenting a social revolution in parts of Sumatra and Java, as
well as triggering violent outbreaks with distinct class characteristics acrossvarious regions of Indonesia during the Indonesian Revolution period. The
nature of violence in 1940s Indonesia remains an open question for researchers
to explore.

56） Presented below is a chronological list of noteworthy studies on the Indonesian
Revolution. Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. op.cit., pp. 180-181, 305;
Benedict Richard OʼGorman Anderson. Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation andResistance, 1944-1946. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972; Anderson. “Japan”. op.cit.;
Anthony Reid. The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945–1950. Hawthorn: Longmans
Australia, 1974; Frederick, Visions and Heat, op.cit.; Anton Lucas. One Soul, One
Struggle: Region and Revolution in Indonesia. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991; William H.
Frederick. “Shadows of an Unseen Hand: Some Patterns of Violence in the Indonesian
Revolution, 1945-1949”. In Freek Colombijn and J. Th. Lindblad. eds. Roots of Violencein Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002,
pp. 143-172; Journal of Genocide Studies, Volume 14, Issue 3-4, 2012 (a special issue about
violence during the Indonesian Revolution); Ravando. “Now is the Time to Kill All
Chinese!”: Social Revolution and the Massacre of Chinese in Tangerang, 1945-1946. MA
Thesis, Leiden University, 2014; Tedi Kholiludin, Prahara Tionghoa: Etnis Tionghoa dan
Peristiwa “Gedoran Cina” di Caracas-Cilimus, Kuningan tahun 1947. Semarang: Lembaga
Studi Sosial dan Agama Press, 2018; Kevin W. Fogg. Indonesia’s Islamic Revolution.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020; FX Harsono. “From the Oppressed
towards a Dark History”. In Elly Kent, Virginia Hooker, and Caroline Turner. eds. Living
Art: Indonesian Artists Engage Politics, Society and History. Canberra: ANU Press, 2023,
pp. 295-305.
Recent years have seen a new direction in the study of the Indonesian Revolution,
97(34)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

References* Archives
Indische Collectie. NIOD Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
* Primary Sources
Berita Oemoem, March-April 1942.
Kung Yung Pao, March-April 1942.
Pemandangan, December 1941-April 1942.
Sin Sin Po, March 1942.
* Secondary Sources
Abeyasekere, Susan. One Hand Clapping: Indonesian Nationalists and the Dutch, 19391942. Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976.
Anderson, B.R. OʼG. “Japan: ʻThe Light of Asiaʼ”. In Josef Silverstein. ed. Southeast
specifically focusing on the perspective of violence. A representative example is a history
series titled “Onafhankelijkheid, Dekolonisatie, Geweld en Oorlog in Indonesië 19451950” (Independence, Decolonization, Violence and War in Indonesia 1945-1950)
published from Amsterdam University Press. This series is the result of a collaborative
research program involving three Dutch research institutes: the Royal Netherlands
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), the Netherlands Institutefor Military History (NIMH), and the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide
Studies. The series, which includes contributions from both Dutch and Indonesian
researchers, places a significant emphasis on the war circumstances during the Indonesian
War of Independence (https://www.aup.nl/en/series/onafhankelijkheid-dekolonisatiegeweld-en-oorlog-in-indonesie-1945-1950, accessed 3 January 2024). The central question
explored in the series is the dynamics of the events surrounding the violence that occurred
during this period. Notably, Indonesian scholars involved in the research program haverejected the use of the term “decolonization” because it is perceived to carry a Dutchcentric perspective of history. This shift in perspective and collaboration between Dutch
and Indonesian scholars indicates an effort to present a more nuanced and inclusive
understanding of the historical events during the Indonesian revolution. For instance,
Bambang Purwanto, Roel Frakking, Abdul Wahid, Gerry van Klinken, Martijn Eickhoff,
Yulianti, and Ireen Hogenboom. eds. Revolutionary Worlds: Local Perspectives andDynamics during the Indonesian Independence War, 1945-1949. Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 2023.
(35)96

Now There is No Government

Asia in World War II: Four Essays. Monograph Series No. 7, Southeast Asia
Studies, Yale University, 1966, pp. 13-51.
Anderson, Benedict Richard OʼGorman. Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation andResistance, 1944-1946. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.
Arendt, Hannah. On Violence. New York: Harcourt, 1970.
Benda, Harry J. “The Beginnings of the Japanese Occupation of Java”. The Far Eastern
Quarterly 15(4), 1956, pp. 541-560.
Boer, P. C. The Loss of Java: The Final Battles for the Possession of Java Fought by
Allied Air, Naval and Land Forces in the Period of 18 February–7 March 1942.
Singapore: NUS Press, 2011.
Cribb, Robert. Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and theIndonesian Revolution 1945-1949. North Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991.
Dirks, Cor. Die Uile En Die Rampokkers. Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 1950.
Else Ensering. “Banten in Times of Revolution”. Archipel 50(1), 1995, pp. 131-163.
Fogg, Kevin W. Indonesia’s Islamic Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2020.
Frederick, William. Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution.
Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989.
Frederick, William H. “Shadows of an Unseen Hand: Some Patterns of Violence in theIndonesian Revolution, 1945-1949”. In Freek Colombijn and J. Th. Lindblad. eds.
Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective.
Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002, pp. 143-172.
Harsono, FX. “From the Oppressed towards a Dark History”. In Elly Kent, Virginia
Hooker, and Caroline Turner. eds. Living Art: Indonesian Artists Engage Politics,
Society and History. Canberra: ANU Press, 2023, pp. 295-305.
Jenkins, David. Young Soeharto: The Making of a Solider, 1921-1945. Singapore:
ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021.
Journal of Genocide Studies, Volume 14, Issue 3-4, 2012.
Kahin, George McT. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1952.
Keppy, Peter. The Politics of Redress: War Damage Compensation and Restitution inIndonesia and the Philippines, 1940-1957. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010.
Kholiludin, Tedi. Prahara Tionghoa: Etnis Tionghoa dan Peristiwa “Gedoran Cina” di95(36)

法学研究 97 巻 6 号（2024：6）

Caracas-Cilimus, Kuningan tahun 1947. Semarang: Lembaga Studi Sosial dan
Agama Press, 2018.
Lucas, Anton. One Soul, One Struggle: Region and Revolution in Indonesia. Sydney:
Allen and Unwin, 1991.
Mingaars, P., J. Heij, and P. Posthumus. Indisch Lexicon: Indische woorden in de
Nederlandse literatuur. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
Nordholt, Henk Shulte and Margareet van Till. “Colonial Criminals in Java, 18701910”. In Vincente L. Rafael. ed. Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, thePhilippines, and Colonial Vietnam. Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University,
1999, pp. 47-60.
Nordholt, Henk Shultz en Harry Poeze. Merdeka: De strip dome de Indonesische
onafhankelijkheid en de ongewisse optimist van de Republiek 1945-1950. Zutphen:
Warburg Pers, 2022.
Post, Peter and May Ling Thio. The Kwee Family of Ciledug: Family, Status, andModernity in Colonial Java. Volendam: LM Publishers, 2019.
Purwanto, Bambang, Roel Frakking, Abdul Wahid, Gerry van Klinken, Martijn
Eickhoff, Yulianti, and Ireen Hogenboom. eds. Revolutionary Worlds: Local
Perspectives and Dynamics during the Indonesian Independence War, 1945-1949.
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2023.
Ravando. “Now is the Time to Kill All Chinese!”: Social Revolution and the Massacre ofChinese in Tangerang, 1945-1946. MA Thesis, Leiden University, 2014.
Reid, Anthony. The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945–1950. Hawthorn: Longmans
Australia, 1974.
Tsuda, Koji. Kung Yung Pao, The Only Daily Newspaper for the Ethnic Chinese in Javaduring Japanese Occupation: An Overview. 2020. (https://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/
biblioplaza/en/F_00127.html, accessed on 30 June 2023)
Twang Peck Yang. The Chinese Business Élite in Indonesia and the Transition to
Independence 1940-1950. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Van Dongen, Peter. Rampokan: Java. Amsterdam: Oog & Blik, 1998.
Van Dongen, Peter. Rampokan: Celebes. Amsterdam: Oog & Blik, 2004.
Yamamoto, Nobuto. Censorship in Colonial Indonesia. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019.
Zijlmans, G.C. “De Indische Bestuursdienst 1940-1942”. In G. Teitler. ed. De val de
Nederlands-Indie. Amsterdam: De Betaafsche Leeuw, 1982, pp. 24-42.
(37)94