David Santoro

Three futures for the Korean PeninsulaDavid SantoroNorth Korea has recently crossed important technological thresholds in its nuclearweapon development program and has now (almost) achieved the capability to strike
the US homeland with nuclear-tipped missiles, putting American cities at risk andcomplicating Washingtonʼs ability to defend its South Korean and Japanese allies. In
response, the White House has conducted a “maximum-pressure” campaign characterized by thestrengthening of sanctions and the adoption of a more assertive deterrence posture to compel
Pyongyang to disarm. Some US officials have also considered using force. Of late, however,following a bold diplomatic initiative led by South Korean President Moon Jae-in during theWinter Olympics in Pyeongchang, and in an unprecedented turn of events, US President Donald
Trump has agreed to meet with North Koreaʼs Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un sometime before
the end of May.
This paper does not discuss the possible or probable outcomes of the potential upcoming
Trump-Kim meeting, nor does it address what might happen next. Rather, it looks over thehorizon and asks what comes after the longstanding standoff with North Korea ends once
and for all. The paper assumes that, sooner or later, and with North Koreaʼs nuclear-weapon
program being a catalyst either directly or indirectly, major change is unavoidable on the Korean
Peninsula. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to unpack what that major change might be,
how it could take place, and what it would mean. In other words, this paper mulls over what
the next stage of enduring stability might be for the Korean Peninsula, which has been divided
between North and South since the end of the Second World War, with the two Koreas technicallyat war since the Korean War broke out in 1950.1
This is an important exercise because, as Henry Kissinger stated shortly after Russia annexed
Crimea in 2014 amid growing unrest across southern and eastern Ukraine, “the test of policy
is how it ends, not how it begins.”2 Kissingerʼs argument was that, to settle the Ukraine crisis,
the United States and the West should start with a reflection on where they want to go, not on
what their next move should be. Put simply, he stressed that asking “how does the crisis end?”
mattered more than asking “what do we do next?”
How, then, does the current standoff with North Korea end? Or more accurately, whatcomes after? This paper discusses three possible and diametrically different futures: one where
the Korean Peninsula is reunified under Seoulʼs leadership, one where it is reunified under
Pyongyangʼs leadership, and one where there is peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas,
as a first step toward concerted reunification. Not surprisingly, the conditions for, and pathways
to, each future differ significantly, as do the outlook and prospects for enduring stability on the
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia more generally.
1

The Korean War ended with an armistice agreement in 1953. The armistice restored much of theboundaries between North and South Korea established after the Second World War. No peace treaty
was signed, however.

2

Henry Kissinger, “Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end,” Washington Post,
March 5, 2014.

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Three futures for the Korean Peninsula

Future #1: A reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s leadership

One possible future is a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoulʼs leadership. That suggests
a takeover of North Korea by South Korea, assisted by the United States, and reunification on
Seoul’s terms, which would translate into a South Korean (and US) win against North Korea.
Reaching that future assumes that China and Russia, despite strong concerns, and possibly
following coordination efforts by the United States and South Korea, would calculate that it was intheir interests to accept or acquiesce to such a development. China, which intervened on North
Koreaʼs behalf during the Korean War, has a stake in its survival for ideological and especiallygeopolitical reasons: Beijing does not want a reunified Korea led by Seoul with (presumably) a US
military presence on its borders, nor does it not want an influx of North Korean refugees, which
is likely to occur following Pyongyangʼs fall. Russia, too, has ties with North Korea dating fromthe Soviet years and a similar geopolitical stake, albeit at a less importance than that of China, in
its survival.
What are the pathways to such a future? There are two: force or absorption. Reunification by
force could happen following retaliation to North Korean aggression. Pyongyang has conductednumerous provocations and sometimes outright aggressions against South Korea.3 With a moresophisticated nuclear arsenal, Pyongyang may become more aggressive, calculating that its ability
to strike the United States with nuclear-tipped missiles would break the US-South Korean allianceand deter Washington from responding. Seoul and Washington may respond nonetheless and,in coordination with Tokyo, which provides a critical base of support for US forces on Japanese
territory during a conflict with Pyongyang, decide to defeat North Korea completely and reunify
the Peninsula.
Reunification by force could also happen following a preventive attack against North Korea,
which Washington would lead, presumably with consent from Seoul and in coordination with
Tokyo, and presumably over the deadlock surrounding North Koreaʼs nuclear-weapon program.
As Pyongyang is becoming capable of striking American cities with nuclear-tipped missiles,
Washington has been considering disarming it preventively in recent months.4 If Washington did
so, that could lead to a broader conflict and to North Koreaʼs elimination and reunification of thePeninsula under Seoul.
Another pathway is reunification by absorption, following a collapse of the North Korean
regime. Such a collapse could be indigenous. Pyongyang could fall on its own due to economic
troubles or political infighting. Kim Jong-unʼs recent purges suggest that there are enemies of theregime who one day could spark a revolution and plunge the country into chaos, leading to its
absorption by South Korea.5 Alternatively, North Koreaʼs collapse could be fomented by Seoul andWashington in an overt or covert destabilization campaign, which would add to current sanctions.
What are the outlook and prospects for enduring stability in such a future? Much would
depend on the road taken to get there̶the pathway. In theory, if reunification resulted froman aggression by Pyongyang or its indigenous collapse, it would be regarded as legitimate,both by the South Korean, American, and Japanese publics, and internationally. Assuming theirinterests were safeguarded, China and Russia would have a hard time arguing that the decision
to reunify were illegitimate. So would others. The use of nuclear weapons or other weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) by Pyongyang, or by elements of the regime in the event of a collapse,
would reinforce the idea that the US-South Korean decision to intervene was correct. If, however,3

For a summary of North Korean provocations: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/databases/

4Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, “White House Wants Pentagon to Offer More Options on North
Korea,” New York Times, Feb. 1, 2018.

5

Elizabeth Shim, “Kim Jong Un has purged, executed more than 300 people, spy agency says,” UPI, Dec.
28, 2016.

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reunification took place after preventive attacks or a destabilization campaign against Pyongyang,
there would be criticisms from the South Korean, American, and Japanese publics, especially ifthat led to nuclear or WMD use by North Korea. China, Russia, and many others would denounce
the decision. Some could refuse to engage with the reunified Peninsula and the United States
would be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a predatory power.
The outlook and prospects for stability would also depend on the scope and scale of the
problems that Seoul (and Washington) would face post-takeover. Four problem areas stand out.
First is the death and destruction toll, which could be limited but could also be massive, especiallyin the event of nuclear use. Second is the humanitarian crisis and refugee problem in the north,which could be overwhelming. Third is North Koreaʼs WMD arsenal, which would need to be
neutralized; most experts have assessed that this would be challenging.6 Fourth is the task ofintegrating the two Koreas politically and economically, which could range from smooth to painful
but, if past (read: German or Vietnamese) experiences are any guide, is likely to be difficult, andcostly.7
Accordingly, the outlook and prospects for stability would depend as much on the scope andscale of these problems as on the decisions Seoul and Washington make to address them, and,relatedly, their ability to gain support and assistance from other states, notably from Northeast
Asia. That means Seoul and Washington would be well-ser ved to take Chinese and Russianinterests into consideration by, for instance, guaranteeing that US militar y presence would
neither increase nor be permanently stationed in the former North Korean geographical space.
Failure to do so, or a decision by Seoul to keep North Koreaʼs WMD arsenal, for instance, would
likely complicate the outlook and prospects for enduring stability.
Japan, too, would want Pyongyangʼs WMD arsenal to disappear and it would probably also
require special assurances from Washington (and Seoul). This is because Tokyo, on the one hand,
would welcome the elimination of the North Korean nuclear threat and see reunification of thePeninsula as an opportunity to resolve the abductee issue and open new economic opportunities
for Japanese businesses, yet on the other, it would be concerned that, down the line, a reunified
Korea under Seoul could become a strong economic competitor or, worse, that it end up siding
closer to China (and Russia).

Future #2: A reunified Korean Peninsula under Pyongyang’s leadership

Another possible future is a reunified Korean Peninsula under Pyongyangʼs leadership. Thatsecond future is the mirror image of the first. It suggests a takeover of South Korea by North
Korea and reunification on Pyongyang’s terms, which would translate into a North Korean win
against South Korea and the United States. Reaching that future assumes that Washington would
be either defeated in defending its South Korean ally or that, for strategic or domestic reasons,
it would calculate that it was in its interests not to intervene and, instead, accept or acquiesce tosuch a development, despite its defense commitments to Seoul. The US-South Korea alliance,
which include the presence of nearly 29,000 US military personnel in South Korea, has been inplace since the end of the Second World War to deter North Korean aggression (and was part of
the US network of alliances designed to ring the Soviet threat during the Cold War).
What are the pathways to such a future? As in the previous scenario, the two pathways areforce or absorption. In theory, reunification by force could happen following a US (and South
Korean) attack on Pyongyang. If it managed to counter the offensive and compel Washington(and Seoul) to back down and concede defeat by, for instance, conducting limited nuclear use,
6

Dan Lamothe and Carol Morello, “Securing North Korean nuclear sites would require a groundinvasion, Pentagon says,” Washington Post, Nov. 4, 2017.

7

Subin Kim, “Korean unification costs would exceed $2.7 trillion: Researcher,” NK News, March 6, 2015.

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Three futures for the Korean Peninsula

Pyongyang could push its luck, strike key targets in South Korea, and take it over militarily,
bringing the Peninsula under its control.8
Reunification by force could also happen after an attack by North Korea against South Korea.
Pyongyang could get away with striking, invading, and taking over the South if Washington
calculated that its interests were better served by inaction rather than by risking that Seattle or
Los Angeles be struck by North Korean nuclear-capable missiles if it acted.
Another pathway is reunification by absorption, following a collapse of the South Korean
regime. While considerably less likely than Pyongyangʼs fall, Seoulʼs fall cannot and should not
be dismissed. Such a collapse could be indigenous. Democracy, which is still new and has been
traditionally fragile in South Korea, could break down, plunge the country into disarray, and give
Pyongyang an opportunity to reunify the Peninsula. Alternatively, Pyongyang could foment thecollapse of South Korean democracy in an overt or covert destabilization campaign.
What are the outlook and prospects for enduring stability in a future where the Korean
Peninsula is reunified under Pyongyang? In that scenario as in the first, much would depend on
the pathway. In theory, if reunification resulted from an attack by Washington (and Seoul) or froman indigenous collapse of the South Korean regime, it could be regarded as legitimate. China andRussia, which would welcome the ousting of the United States from the Korean Peninsula, could
see it that way. Many others̶especially Japan̶would not, however, because North Korea is̶
and always has been̶considered a rogue state that engages in illegal activities, notably WMDdevelopment and proliferation. Relatedly, if Pyongyang resorted to nuclear/WMD use, the odds
are that it would receive a considerable share of the blame. Meanwhile, if reunification took placefollowing a preventive attack or a destabilizing campaign by Pyongyang against Seoul, there
would be an international outcry, especially if these attacks included nuclear or WMD use. China,
Russia, Japan, and many others in the international community would denounce the decision andmany would refuse to engage with the newly reunified Peninsula.
As in the first scenario, the outlook and prospects for the newly reunified Korea would dependon the scope and scale of the problems that Pyongyang would face in post-takeover. Except for
the neutralization of a WMD arsenal, Pyongyang would be confronted with the same problem
areas as Seoul and Washington if the situation was reversed: the death and destruction toll, ahumanitarian crisis, and the task of integrating the two Koreas politically and economically. The
magnitude of these problems is likely to be higher, however, because Pyongyang, being both
weaker than Seoul and heavily militarized, is more likely to resort to higher levels of violence
to reunify the Peninsula. In the event of a takeover of the Peninsula by Pyongyang, therefore,
the death and destruction toll is likely to be high and the humanitarian crisis severe. Moreover,leading the integration of the two Koreas is likely to be extremely challenging for Pyongyang,given how backward the North is in comparison to the South.
Accordingly, the outlook and prospects for enduring stability in that scenario would dependon Pyongyangʼs ability to gain support and assistance from China and Russia, not only to manage
the problem areas just mentioned, but also to keep other powers at bay. That means Pyongyang
would need to make nice, and possibly conclude special assistance and defense arrangements,
with Beijing and Moscow.
In these circumstances, Tokyo would find itself alone in a highly hostile environment andwould, for good reasons, fear an attack or an invasion. While that may drive them to seek a tighter
deterrence relationship with the United States, Japanese officials could be tempted to resort toself-help and develop an independent nuclear arsenal, especially given that Washington would
have just demonstrated its inability (or unwillingness) to prevent Pyongyang from defeating the
8

John K. Warden, “Nor th Koreaʼs Nuclear Posture̶An Evolving Challenge for US Deterrence,”
Proliferation Papers, No. 58, March 2017.

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South (a US ally) and taking over the Korean Peninsula.

Future #3: Peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas
A third possible future is peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. That suggests thedevelopment of good relations and a modus vivendi between North and South Korea throughthe establishment of a federation or confederation on the Peninsula, ideally as a first step toward
concerted reunification. Reaching that future would translate into a win-win for Pyongyang
and Seoul (and could result from an attempt by both capitals, and potentially others, to resolve
the deadlock surrounding North Koreaʼs nuclear-weapon program). It assumes that the North
Korean and South Korean governments (and public opinion in the South) undertake profoundchanges in attitudes and beliefs about each other and that they overcome and forgo the traditional
zero-sum thinking they have held since the 1950s. Another assumption is that major powers,
notably the United States and China, give North and South Korea space to engage in such areconciliation.
Such a scenario clashes significantly with the current realities of the Korean Peninsula. Seoul
and Pyongyang are all too familiar with the idea and its logic, however. The South and North
Korean leaders first subscribed to it in the “July 4 Joint Communiqué” of 1972. Subsequently,
other measures paralleling or extending the rationale behind this accord include the 1991
“Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation, and Exchange Between North andSouth,” the 1992 “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula,” and the “June 15 North-South Joint Declaration” of 2000. Reference to thegoal of establishing peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas also appears in multilateral
documents, such as the “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks” of 2005.
What are the pathways to such a future? There is only one: negotiations. The emergence of amodus vivendi between the two Koreas, and a fortiori of concerted reunification of the Peninsula,can only be achieved through slow, incremental change and, therefore, a sustained and in-depth
dialogue and negotiation process. Therefore, while peaceful coexistence may be one of the nextstages of enduring stability on the Korean Peninsula, it is likely to take a long time to get there,
and in any case longer than the scenarios envisioned in the two previous sections.
The outlook and prospects for enduring stability of a future characterized by the peacefulcoexistence of the two Koreas would depend on the general and specific requirements of thearrangement concluded by Pyongyang and Seoul (and the norms that govern bilateral political
relations at the time). For instance, would that arrangement exist in the form of a confederation
or a looser type of federation? Traditionally, South Korea has preferred the former, while North
Korea has favored the latter.9 Moreover, would Pyongyang and Seoul have reunification be as agoal? In other words, would they regard peaceful coexistence as an end-state or a stepping stone
to achieve a reunified Korea? While North and South Korean proposals for reconciliation havealways included reunification of the Peninsula as a goal, and while any future arrangement islikely to do the same, there is no longer any guarantee that it does or that reunification throughnegotiations would be achievable in the foreseeable future given how much the two Koreas havedrifted apart, especially over the past two and a half decades.
Notwithstanding these important considerations, enduring stability of a Pyongyang-Seoulmodus vivendi would depend on several factors. First is the willingness of the two governments
to accept and treat each other as equal legal entities and trusting partners over the long term,
especially given that disagreements on both major or minor bilateral issues are likely to occur as
negotiations advance. Second, if reunification were a goal, enduring stability would depend on
9

Namkoong Young, “Similarities and Dissimilarities: The Inter-Korean Summit and Unification
Formulae,” East Asian Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 59-80.

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the ability of the two governments to find agreement on a specific “formula” or “comprehensive
institutional structure” to reunify the Peninsula and to conduct dialogue and take concrete actions
to advance political, economic, social, cultural, and even military integration to get there. Third,
because under no circumstances could there be peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas
without the replacement of the 1953 armistice agreement signed between the United States (ashead of the United Nations Forces), China, and North Korea by a permanent peace treaty, respect
by Pyongyang and Seoul for the letter and spirit of that treaty would be paramount. Practically,that suggests there would need to be, among other things, implementation of inter-Korean
confidence-building measures and major threat reduction activities, agreement from Pyongyang
to constrain and eventually rollback its nuclear/WMD arsenal, and, relatedly, a reassessmentof the purpose, scope, and scale (and perhaps even utility) of, on the one hand, the US-South
Korea alliance, the United Nations Command, the Combined Forces Command, and othersubcommands and, on the other, North Koreaʼs military arrangements with China (and Russia).
The bottom line is that, to succeed over the long term, peaceful coexistence between the two
Koreas would require a fundamental transformation of current inter-Korean strategic and political
relations and the associated relations that Pyongyang and Seoul have with major powers, notably
the United States and China. Tokyo, in that scenario, would likely find itself in a situation close
to the one described in the first̶a reunified Peninsula under Seoulʼs leadership. In theory, Japanese officials would welcome the development of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas
if that meant that the North were no longer a threat (and that its WMD arsenal were eliminated)
and that the abductee issue could be resolved and Japanese businesses could have new opportunities on the Peninsula. Yet Japanese officials would also fear that the two Koreas become astrong economic force that would ultimately compete with Tokyo or, worse, that both increasingly
gravitate closer to China over time.

Conclusions
The three scenarios described in this paper are in no way the only possible outcomes for the nextstage of enduring stability on the Korean Peninsula. Many others can and should be envisioned.
Nevertheless, a takeover of the Peninsula by South Korea (and the United States), a takeoverby North Korea, and the advent of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas as a first step
toward reunification appear to cover the broad spectrum of possibilities.
This paper has provided only a brief description of each scenario, as a starting point. Morework is needed to flesh out the benefits, risks, and costs of each, as well as the potential variations
in development. This is an essential initiative because it will help policymakers decide what theyshould do today to reach the most desirable outcome, and avoid the worst.

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