APAN

Vol.3 No.1
Summer 2019ISSN 2433-4456

REVIEW

Asia and Europe: One Hundred Yearsfrom the Paris Peace Conference
One Hundred Years after the Paris Peace
Conference: A Welcomed Change in Mutual
Perceptions
Valérie Niquet

Japan at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919:
A Centennial Reﬂection
Naoko Shimazu

The Wilsonian Vision for a New Liberal
International Order: Symbolic Diplomacy
at the Paris Peace Conference
Naoko Shimazu

Hundredth Anniversary of the Treaty of
Versailles: Meanings and Implications
Kerry Brown

The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International
Order: 1919-2019
Yuichi Hosoya

Restructuring the Maritime Order
Shigeki Sakamoto
THE J A P A N
I NS T I T UTE O F
IN T E R NA TI O NA L
A F FA I R S

The Obligation of Self-Restraint in Undelimited
Maritime Areas
Kentaro Nishimoto

The Present and Future of Multilateralism andExpectations for Japan
Izumi Nakamitsu

The Role for Middle Powers in the Free andOpen Indo-Paciﬁc: Looking at Opportunities
for Canada and Australia
Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins

The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), founded in 1959, is an independent nonpartisan
policy thinktank specializing in foreign affairs and security policy. On top of a wide range of
research programs, the institute promotes dialogues and joint studies with other institutions
and experts at home and abroad, and makes foreign policy proposals to the government, anddisseminates information on international relations to the public. The institute, together with alarge network of affiliated scholars, aims to serve as an indispensable resource on international
affairs in a complex world.

Publisher : Kenichiro Sasae, President, JIIA
Editor in Chief : Shu Nakagawa, Director of Research Coordination, JIIAThe opinions expressed in the articles in Japan Review do not necessarily reflect the opinions
or positions of the Japan Institute of International Affairs. No article or any part thereof may be
reproduced without the express permission of JIIA.

Annual subscription(four issues):¥4,000 in Japan; US$40.00 overseas.
Please note that delivery fee is not included.

For subscription and any other inquiries, please write to:
Japan Review, the Japan Institute of International Affairs,
3rd Floor Toranomon Mitsui Building, 3-8-1 Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo Japan 100-0013

ISSN 2433-4456

Published by the Japan Institute of International Affairs
Designed and Printed in Japan by Taiheisha.Ltd

APAN

Vol.3 No.1
Summer 2019

REVIEW

Asia and Europe: One Hundred Years fromthe Paris Peace Conference

1 One Hundred Years after the Paris Peace Conference: A Welcomed Change in
Mutual Perceptions �����������������������������04

Valérie Niquet
Valérie Niquet, Phd (Sorbonne University) is Head of the Asia department at FRS (Fondation
pour la recherche stratégique), a senior fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs(JIIA) and a lecturer at Keio University (Tokyo) on Sino-Japanese relations. She has publishedextensively on Strategic issues in Asia, Japanʼs foreign policy as well as the evolutions of theChinese political system. Valérie Niquet is also a consultant for the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Center for analysis, prevision and strategy (CAPS). Her latest publications include La
puissance chinoise en 100 questions, Tallandier, 2017. Her latest media contributions include
AFP, Le Monde, The Diplomat, the Japan Times as well as radio programs such as RadioFrance Internationale, France Culture or the Voice of America. Valérie Niquet is Chevaier delʼordre national du mérite.

2 Japan at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: A Centennial Reﬂection����08
Naoko Shimazu

3 T he Wilsonian Vision for a New Liberal International Order: Symbolic
Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference ������������������12

Naoko Shimazu
Naoko Shimazu DPhil (Oxon), FRHist.S, is Professor of Humanities (History) and Associate
Dean of Faculty at Yale-NUS College, and Professor at the Asia Research Institute, National
University of Singapore. Her current major work is a monograph, “Diplomacy as Theatre:
The Bandung Conference and the Making of the Third World.” She has published widely on
the cultural history of global diplomacy, notably in Diplomatica, Modern Asian Studies andPolitical Geography. Her major publications include Imagining Japan in Post-war East Asia (coeditor, Routledge, 2013), Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War(Cambridge University Press, 2009), Nationalisms in Japan (editor, Routledge, 2006), Japan,
Race and Equality: Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (Routledge, 1998).

1

4 Hundredth Anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles: Meanings and Implications���������������������������������������17
Kerry Brown
Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at KingʼsCollege, London. From 2012 to 2015 he was Professor of Chinese Politics and Director of the
China Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, Australia. Prior to this he worked at Chatham
House from 2006 to 2012, as Senior Fellow and then Head of the Asia Programme. From 1998
to 2005 he worked at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as First Secretary at the
British Embassy in Beijing, and then as Head of the Indonesia, Philippine and East Timor
Section. He lived in the Inner Mongolia region of China from 1994 to 1996. He has a Master ofArts from Cambridge University, a Post Graduate Diploma in Mandarin Chinese (Distinction)from Thames Valley University, London, and a Ph D in Chinese politics and language from
Leeds University.
Professor Brown directed the Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN) giving
policy advice to the European External Action Ser vice between 2011 and 2014. He is theauthor of over ten books on modern Chinese politics, history and language, the most recentof which are The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (2014), What’s Wrongwith Diplomacy: The Case of the UK and China (2015) and the Berkshire Dictionary of Chinese
Biography (in Four Volumes- 2014-2015). His ʻChinaʼs CEO: Xi Jinpingʼ was published in 2016.
ʻChinaʼs World: What Does China Wantʼ was published in August 2017, and ʻChinaʼs Dreams:
The Culture of the Communist Party and the Secret Sources of Its Powerʼ (Polity: Cambridge)
in 2018.

5 The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order: 1919–2019 ������21

Yuichi Hosoya
Yuichi Hosoya is Professor of international politics at Keio University in Tokyo. He was amember of the Advisor y Board for Japanʼs National Security Council (NSC) (2014-16) and
was a member of several Prime Ministerʼs advisory panels on national security. He studiedinternational politics at Rikkyo University (BA), the University of Birmingham (MIS), andKeio University (PhD). He was a visiting professor and Japan Chair (2009–2010) at SciencesPo in Paris (Institut dʼÉtudes Politiques), and a visiting fellow (Fulbright Fellow, 2008–2009)at Princeton University. His research interests include postwar international history, British
diplomatic histor y, Japanese foreign and security policy, and contemporar y East Asianinternational security. He has a number of publications, and those in English include Security
Politics in Japan: Legislation for a New Security Environment (Tokyo: JPIC, 2019). He also gives
comments in both Japanese and major global newspapers such as the New York Times and Le
Monde.

6 Restructuring the Maritime Order����������������������24

Shigeki Sakamoto
Shigeki Sakamoto is a professor in the Faculty of Law Department Law at Doshisha University.
Professor Emeritus of Kobe University. Doctor of Laws (Kobe University, dissertation: Theory
and Practice of the Law of Treaties). Former Member of the Advisory Committee of the UN
Human Rights Council (2008–2013), President of the Japanese Society of International Law(2014–2016), President of the Japanese Association of International Human Rights (2006–2009).
He ser ved as an Advocate for the Government of Japan in “Southern Bluefin Tuna” Case
(Australia and NZ v. Japan) under UNCLOS Part XV.

2

7 The Obligation of Self-Restraint in Undelimited Maritime Areas ������28

Kentaro Nishimoto
Kentaro Nishimoto is Professor of International Law at the School of Law, Tohoku University,
Japan, where he is also Vice Dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy. He received his
Ph.D. in Law from the University of Tokyo with the thesis “Territoriality and Functionality in
the Historical Evolution of the Law of the Sea.” His research focuses on the international lawof the sea, including issues such as the history of the law of the sea, sustainable developmentof ocean resources and the settlement of maritime disputes. His recent publications in English
include a contribution to Alexander Proelß (ed.), The United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea: A Commentary (Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2017). He is currently Advisor to the Japanesedelegation to the intergovernmental conference on marine biodiversity of areas beyond national
jurisdiction (BBNJ).

8 The Present and Future of Multilateralism and Expectations for Japan���39

Izumi Nakamitsu
Izumi Nakamitsu is United Nations Under-Secretar y-General and High Representativefor Disarmament Af fairs. She assumed her position as Under-Secretar y-General andHigh Representative for Disarmament Affairs on 1 May 2017. Prior to taking on this post,
Ms. Nakamitsu ser ved as Assistant Administrator of the Crisis Response Unit at the UN
Development Programme since 2014.
She has many years of experience within and outside the UN system, most recently as Special
Adviser Ad Interim on Follow-up to the Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees
and Migrants between 2016 and 2017. She was previously Director of the Asia and the Middle
East Division of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations between 2012 and 2014, andDirector of the Departmentʼs Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, from 2008 to 2012.
Born in 1963, Ms. Nakamitsu holds a Master of Science degree in Foreign Ser vice from
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and a Bachelor of Law degree from Waseda
University in Tokyo.
She is married and has two daughters.

9 The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Paciﬁc: Looking at
Opportunities for Canada and Australia�������������������44

Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is a Tokyo-based Senior Fellow at The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs. He is also a Distinguished Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Foundation of
Canada and regularly contributes to a range of media, journals and magazines on East Asian
security matters. Follow him on Twitter @jbmllr
Thomas S. Wilkins is currently a Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs inTokyo. He is normally based as a Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University ofSydney, Australia. He specializes in security issues in the Asia Pacific region and has publishedon this subject in journals such as Review of International Studies, International Relations of
the Asia Pacific and the Australian Journal of International Affairs, among others.

3One Hundred Years after the Paris Peace Conference: A Welcomed Change in Mutual Perceptions

One Hundred Years after the Paris Peace Conference:
A Welcomed Change in Mutual Perceptions*
Valérie Niquet**
Abstract
The First world war and its sequels had long term consequences at the global level,
including in Asia and its perception in the world. The Versailles Treaty established thepremices of a value-based liberal international system. For the first time, a non-European
nation, Japan, fully participated and played a major diplomatic role in the debates andnegotiations of the peace conference. However, the Western centric dimension of the Paris
Peace Conference and the Versailles Treaty as well as the opposition of the United States
to racial equality clause also resulted in frustrations and future strategic instability related
to the refusal of Western nations to fully integrate Japan, one of the allies, as an equal andlegitimate power in the new concert of nations.

Western historiography has long neglected the importance of the Versailles Treaty
for Asia. When there was an expression of interest, it was often exclusively focusedon the consequences for China, including the issue of the 21 Demands made byTokyo to the Chinese authorities of the time and the emergence of an anti-Japanesenationalism with the May 4th Movement in 1919.
In Asia itself, the focus was at the time also very much on the disillusions, both in China
and in Korea, but also in Japan, that followed the settlement of the Versailles Treaty and theestablishment of the League of Nations.
However, the Versailles Treaty signed on June 28, 1919 also played a significant role in theconstitution of a new international order, based on liberal values, and the establishment of aninternational organization to solve international relations issues, in which Japan had initiallyfully participated. It was also the first time that, in a departure from the traditionally exclusively
Eurocentric posture of the Great powers, Asian powers became full actors of the global
international system.

Different perceptions of the Versailles Treaty in Europe and in JapanOne hundred years after that event, the interest expressed in Japan for the Versailles Treaty,
however, has been growing and is particularly significant in a contemporar y context where
the international liberal order is under threat. For Japanese analysts today, the participation ofJapan in the Paris Peace Conference constitutes the first manifestation of Tokyoʼs engagement
alongside the powers that defend multilateralism and a liberal international order threatened by
the temptation of some states to use coercion to change the status quo as well as by the rise of
populism and temptations of isolationism in Western democracies.
*

The Basis of this Policy Brief is a Conference organized in Paris by JIIA-JIC and FRS, on January 28,
2019 on “Asia and Europe from the Versailles Treaty to the Present.”** Valérie Niquet is Senior Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Head of the
Asia program at Foundation for Strategic Research.

4
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Valérie Niquet

However, one cannot but note the differences in the assessments of the consequences of theTreaty in Europe and Asia. In Europe, among politicians as well as historians, the analysis of theconsequences of the Versailles Treaty is more negative.1 For most of these analysts, the Versailles
Treaty bore the germ of the Second World War. The will to “punish” Germany as the only
responsible actor for the war, the financial demands, followed by French occupation of the Ruhrin 1923 contributed to the emergence of Nazism and the rise of Hitler. The League of Nations
is often criticized by some for its intrinsic weaknesses, while, for others, it is the “idealism” thatpresided over the Paris Peace Conference, and particularly the issue of “punishing” the defeatednations as “culprits” of the war that led to lingering enmities and tensions.
In Japan, the only non-Western power among the signatories, however, the rediscovery of the
Versailles Treaty and the significant role played by Japanese diplomats at the time, is an essential
element of contemporary historiography. It shows that, as early as the 1920s, Japan could assert
itself as a legitimate actor of the post-First World War concert of nations.
However, the deficit of understanding of the international role of Japan under the Taisho
Democracy (1912–1926), including its role as one of the signatories of the Versailles Treaty andits participation―contrary to the United States who never ratified the Treaty―in the League of
Nations, still dominates European historiography. This lack of knowledge weighs not only on past
appreciations but also on the understanding of contemporary issues and possible cooperation
between Europe and Japan. It results from an analysis of the building process of the international
system after the First World War that remained almost exclusively Western-centric.

The importance of the Versailles Treaty for Japan and the ambiguity of Western
powersJapan was a critical player at the Paris Peace Conference, after taking control, as a legitimate
actor alongside the Allies, of Germanyʼs concessions in the Shandong Peninsula in China and thePacific Islands that were part of the German Empire in the Pacific.
Concerning Asia, the Versailles Treaty is often considered through its most damaging
consequences that led to growing tensions with China. However, that approach is an anachronism
and Japanʼs position at the time, differed little from that of the other great powers, whose primaryobjective was also in preserving their own interests in Asia, and especially in China.
The United States, in particular, initially fully supported Japanese claims on the Shandong
Peninsula, as well as the mandate given to Tokyo on the Pacific Islands under the control of
the League of Nations. Nonetheless, when Japanese demands on Shandong were subsequently
rejected, it was mainly because they contravened the interests of other Western powers present
in China, worried by the emergence of a new competitor in the region.
Despite these limitations, the Versailles Treaty marked for the first time the entr y of an
Asian actor in the diplomatic concert hitherto monopolized by the European powers. Japanʼsparticipation in the Paris Peace Conference constituted a paradigm shift with the first steps of a
globalization process that still expands to our days.
However, from the ver y beginning, this globalization, which was based on the concept ofuniversal values, was tainted with limits that became the source of future frustrations.
The first and most important of these limits was the refusal by some Western powers, andmore specifically by the United States in spite of the principles defended by President Wilson,
to accept the amendment of article 21 of the constitution of the League of Nations imposing
the principle of racial equality proposed by Japan and supported by China. The rejection of theamendment, defended by France, was particularly damaging as it had received a majority of1

Georges-Henri Soutou, La grande illusion, quand la France perdait la paix, 1914-1920, Paris, Tallandier,
2015.

5Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

One Hundred Years after the Paris Peace Conference: A Welcomed Change in Mutual Perceptions

votes.
Similarly, while in Europe, the Washington Conference of 1923 is still perceived as the firststep towards arms control mechanisms, for Japan it translated into the will of the United States
and Britain to deny the legitimacy of Japanese positions and to contain the development of Tokyo
naval capacities.2
In both cases, it was the very principle of common values and equal rights that had beenencouraged and at the same time ignored by Western powers. However, despite these initial
failures, the question of common values remains critical for the international community despite
the evolutions of great power relationships and political systems since the Second World War andthe end of the Cold War.

The contemporar y relevance of the issues raised at the Paris Peace Conference
In Asia today, the challenge of ideological bi-polarization, amplified by the increased overall
power of the Peopleʼs Republic of China, remains an essential part of the strategic calculus of
democracies. On one side there is a qualified system of liberal democracies, attached to a set ofprinciples based on the attachment to the universality of specific values, the rules of internationallaw and the rejection of the use of force to change the status quo; on the other side authoritariansystems reject these principles of universality and common values. In that context, it is worth
remembering that, contrary to the expectations raised by the theories of the end of history 30
years ago, these fundamental issues―and these constraints―are still relevant and cannot beignored in Europe, despite the geographical distance that separates the two continents.
Moreover, the lessons of the Versailles Treaty are also pertinent when addressing the issues
of appeasement and pacifism. The First World War, its destructions and its industrial-size numberof victims opened the way to pacifism and the temptation of appeasement at any cost. This also
led to the Munich Conference, the annexation of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia by theThird Reich and the emergence of an uncontrollable German power, animated by a desire forrevenge and ready to destroy the post-First World War status quo. In Asia today, the situation isless dramatic than in 1938. However, the fear of being involved in any conflict and the temptationof disengagement or appeasement could also lead to more severe tensions resulting frommiscalculations on the part of certain powers, also driven by a revanchist posture and a desire for“reparation.”
To answer these threats, taking into account the ideological dimension of the shared values
that underlie the liberal world order, we witness the emergence of new concepts. These concepts
must be inclusive and open to all States and entities that support these universal values.

The need for a value-based order and new concepts

This is the case with the concept of “free and open Indo-Pacific,” which establishes a bridge
between Asia and Europe, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and is also an answer tothe more grandiose projects of the Belt and Road Initiative whose objective―beyond economic
interests―is to be used as an instrument of Chinaʼs great power policy in its region and beyond.
There again, histor y, with references to the Chinese traditional tributar y system, as well as
contemporary international strategy, is at the almost exclusive service of a policy whose first andmost important goal is to preserve a regime in needs of legitimacy.
However, this “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept also poses several challenges, that are also
opportunities for cooperation. The first of these challenges is that of inclusiveness.
The inclusion of Europe―despite its limitations―is necessary, not only because this it isin Europe that the universal values that establish the liberal order emerged, but also because
2

Pierre Grosser, L’histoire du monde se fait en Asie, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2017.

6
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Valérie Niquet

Europe possesses, by itself and through some of its States, capabilities that go far beyond “softpower.”The inclusion of all States bordering the Indian Ocean, from South East Asia to South Asiaand the shores of Africa, is also a necessity. These territories, particularly in Africa, open newprospects for external powers looking for economic opportunities, easy access to resources but
also a source of support for the ideological battles fought in international institutions for thecontrol of globalization and the imposition of a set of new norms challenging the liberal order.
However, for a country like Japan―in cooperation with other partners―these challenges arealso an opportunity. It is the opportunity to play a more significant and more active role, on thebasis of common values, in favor of a more balanced model of development. This is what would
constitute the first element of long-term stability, especially in Africa.
This opportunity also supposes a capacity for opening up, including opening up to newpartnerships, as is already the case with countries like France. Japan has a strategic partnershipwith France, based on the sharing of common values and fueled by a yearly 2 + 2 dialogue
between foreign and defense ministers of both countries. Beyond France and the United
Kingdom, in 2018, the European Union and Japan have also signed a strategic partnership,
alongside a free trade agreement, which also expands Tokyoʼs margin of manoeuver.
This, of course, does not question the preeminence and the essential role played by theUnited States, Japanʼs most important security partner since the 1950s. However, as at the time of
the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, the United States seems to be again tempted byisolationism and an “America First” posture. This posture can be particularly uncomfortable for
its allies, even if we can be confident that this would not withstand a direct and immediate threat
to the United States interests or those of their allies, particularly in Asia.
The principle of “openness” also applies to Japan, with all the risks of uneasiness it caninvolve. It is precisely the strength of democracies, on the domestic as well as on the international
scene, to be able to accept and feed on the debates they may involve. It is at this price that real
partnerships, based on mutual understanding, can be put in place. In the case of Japan, thesepartnerships can also be based on the fact that Tokyo remains the only power in Asia to havefollowed, from the end of the nineteenth century to the present day, a path very similar to that ofits European partners.

7
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Japan at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: A Centennial Reflection

Japan at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919:
A Centennial Reflection*
Naoko Shimazu**
Abstract
The military engagements during the First World War earned Japan a seat as a victor at
the Paris Peace Conference, as the fifth great power, after the United States (as the firstsuperpower), Britain, France, and Italy. At the peace conference, Japan made three peacedemands. The first two were territorial in nature. The racial equality proposal—the third
Japanese peace term―became the most hotly debated peace topic in Japanese public debate
during the peace conference in 1919. What is important to remember is that racial politics
played a significant part in some of the politico-military calculations made by the Allied
powers. The Japanese sensitivity to what they regarded as discriminatory treatment of Japanand Japanese nationals surfaced as a formal peace term at the Paris Peace Conference,and became known as the racial equality proposal. In reflecting on the issues raised by theJapanese at the Paris Peace Conference on its centenary, one is struck by the continuity interms of the issues that matter―such as racial politics and immigration―in international
relations today. Moreover, the continued relevance also of the nation-state as the basic unitof international relations in the early twenty-first century global affairs remains strong, inspite of the rapid increase in many non-state actors. No doubt, we continue to deepen our
historical understanding of the Paris Peace Conference, hopefully, in ways which may nothave been imaginable hitherto.

T

his year marks the centenar y of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and this
symposium is one of the events to commemorate the occasion in France. This shortpiece revisits the Japanese peace conference policy in the light of its involvement in
the First world War.
During the First World War, Japan was engaged in three main military expeditions. First,
Japan declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914, which resulted in the joint expedition withthe local British force to occupy the German concessions on the Shandong Peninsula, to capture
Qingdao where the German East Asiatic Squadron, the largest concentration of German navy
outside of Europe, was based.1 The Jiaozhou (Kiaochow) Bay by 1909 had become the second
largest commercial port in China after Tianjin. In this battle, Japan mobilised nearly 52,000 troops,*

This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Asia and Europe fromthe Versailles Treaty to the Present: The Legacies of Post War-Endings and Peace-making between
Constraints and Forward Looking” held by JIIA and FRS (Foundation for Strategic Research)on Jan. 28,
2019.

** Naoko Shimazu DPhil (Oxon), FRHist.S, is Professor of Humanities (Histor y) and Associate Deanof Faculty at Yale-NUS College, and Professor at the Asia Research Institute, National University ofSingapore.
1

Hew Strachan, The First World War, Vol.I: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 447.

8Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Naoko Shimazu

Britain 870 troops, in addition to about 450 Indian troops.2 Although it may have appeared like aneat little manoeuvring to gain a foothold in China on the peninsula in proximity to Tianjin and
Beijing, the Japanese move backfired later at the peace conference when Japanʼs successful claim
to have the German rights in Shandong transferred to Japan, caused a diplomatic furore with theUnited States and China. This came as a complete surprise to the Japanese who expected thetransfer to be conferred without a question based on the secret agreements signed with Britain,
France, Italy and Russia before the Chinese entered war in August 1917. Ultimately China refused
to sign the treaty, and this whole episode ignites the May Fourth Movement in China. In the end,
Japan had agreed to return Shandong to China at the Washington Conferences of 1921–1922.3
The second military expedition pertained to the Japanese occupation of the German islands
in Micronesia (Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas) the north of the equator, which the Japanese
Second South Seas Squadron had managed to complete by 14 October 1914. The outbreak of thewar had set off a mini-scramble for German territories in the Pacific―and in this New Zealand
had led the way by occupying Samoa by 30 August, followed by the Australian occupation ofGerman New Guinea and the Solomon Islands by 15 September. On the surface, the Japaneseconquest of the Micronesian Islands might have come across as a costly enterprise, whichprimarily helped to boost Japanʼs fragile ego as the newest great power, a belated Japanese bid
for the late nineteenth-century Western scramble for the Pacific of the late 1890s. Nevertheless,from the geopolitical point of view, the success of this naval expedition could be considered as themost significant gain by Japan during the war, because it helped to substantiate the geopoliticalimaginations of Japanʼs future as a significant Pacific power, in the way that Japanʼs previous
imperial wars had not been able to do. The occupation of the Micronesian Islands, given as class“C” mandates at the Paris Peace Conference, had turned the Japanese presence in the Central
Pacific as a semi-permanent geopolitical reality. If one looks as the map of the Asia-Pacific, one cansee the “Arc” of the Japanese empire coming substantially down into the Central Pacific, stopping
just at the equator, above Papua New Guinea. It does not require a great leap of imagination to seethat the perimeter defence of Japanʼs wartime empire in the first one hundred days after the Pearl
Harbor, followed that same “Arc” except that it was expanded by being pushed landwards into theSoutheast Asian territories of the British, French and Dutch colonial empires.
Moreover, our understanding of the significance of the Japanese occupation of Micronesia
is enhanced through adopting a global historical perspective. In Japanese historiography, theJapanese occupation of the Micronesian islands is generally treated as a minor colonial issue
relative to the larger Taiwan, Korea and the Liaodong Peninsula, with the exception of naval
histor y. Recent scholarship has focused on Micronesia as part of Japan ʼs League of Nations
diplomacy.4 What may have appeared to be a symbolic expansion into the southern Pacific fromthe Japanese perspective, came to assume much graver practical implications for the British
Dominions, and the defence of the British Empire in the post-1919 world.5 According to theAustralian House of Representatives debate on the peace treaty in September 1919: “Australia hastaken its frontiers northward to Rabaul, but the frontiers of Japan has been brought southward
2

Yamamuro Shinʼichi, Fukugosenso to soryokusen no danso: Nihon ni totteno daiichiji sekai taisen (Kyoto:
Jinbun shoin, 2011), 57.

3

Bruce A. Elleman, Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question (New York: M. E.
Sharpe, 2002) sheds new light on the complex issue of the Shandong Question, which questions theorthodox interpretation of the “wronged China” view.

4

Tōmatsu Haruo, Nihon teikoku to inin t chi: Nany gunt o meguru kokusai seiji, 1914-1947 (Nagoya:
Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2011).

5

For instance, Hew Strachan, The First World War, Vol.1: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), 481-483.

9
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Japan at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: A Centennial Reflection

3,000 miles to the equator, until their front door and our backdoor almost adjoin.”6 Arguably,
therefore, the significance of the Japanese naval expansion southward was felt most keenly, notby the Japanese themselves, but Australia and New Zealand whose heightened sense of threat
contributed to hardening the perception of Japanʼs new role as a Pacific power.7 Ultimately, theJapanese expansion into the Pacific during the First World War can be regarded as setting out apreliminary “blueprint” for what later became the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
The third militar y expedition was politically and diplomatically the most fraught, on thequestion of a joint Allied expedition to Siberia in 1918. Japan had been asked to send 7,000 troops
to make up the Allied intervention, and responded to it by mobilizing 73,000 troops. The Japanese
decision took place under a hawkish prime minister, General Terauchi, whose government falled
due to the Rice Riots of 1918, only to be replaced by the moderate, pro-Western prime minister,Takashi Hara. (The Japanese navy also sent warships to the Mediterranean to defend Allied
shipping in 1917.) The Siberian troop deployment, like the Shandong occupation, became a thornin the Allied camp.
The militar y engagements above earned Japan a seat as a victor at the Paris Peace
Conference, as the fifth great power, after the United States (as the first superpower), Britain,
France, and Italy in that order of hierarchy of great powers. The story of Japanʼs participation at
the peace conference underlines difficulties the Japanese faced in having to operate for the firsttime as a major power in a multilateral framework of international diplomacy.
At the peace conference, Japan made three peace demands. The first two were territorial
in nature, emanating from the military victories made against the former German concessions
and territories held in Shandong and the Central Pacific. The Japanese government had signed
a series of secret treaties in 1917 with the key states to secure these territories, and hence, wastaken aback when the question of the retrocession of Shandong to China was raised at the peace
conference. In some sense, the cost to Japan for obtaining Shandong at Paris, albeit temporarily,
was the racial equality proposal―the third Japanese peace term, which became the most hotly
debated peace topic in Japanese public debate during the peace conference in 1919. The failureof the racial equality proposal became symbolic of the failure or the weakness of Japanese peace
diplomacy, and incurred a substantial cost to the Foreign Ministry in terms of its reputation.
Strictly speaking, however, foreign policy decision-making was not made in the Foreign Ministryat the time as it had been taken over by a transcendental body called the Diplomatic Advisory
Council, in which the Foreign Ministry officials played a relatively minor role.
What is important to remember is that racial politics played a significant part in some ofthe politico-military calculations made by the Allied powers. Japan as the only non-white great
power on the Allied side, was distrusted in particular by the United States. Racial tensions
particularly between Japan and the United States reached its peak in 1913 with the passing of the
Californian Alien Land Law. In fact, the tension was such that President Wilson had discussedwith the cabinet the mobilisation of the fleet in the Pacific in preparation for a possible conflictagainst Japan.8 Although Britain had to contend with anti-Japanese sentiment expressed by its
Dominions, especially Australia, it did not overshadow the British military decisions vis-à-vis theJapanese during the First World War. In fact, Britain was often put in an awkward position having
to appease the stringent anti-Japanese sentiment held by the Americans which derived not only
6

“Between the wars,” Chapter 1, http://static.awm.gov.au/images/collection/pdf/RCDIG1070314--1-.
PDF, accessed 5 January 2014.

7

Neville Meaney, Australia and World Crisis, 1914-1923: A History of Australian Defence and Foreign
Policy 1901-23: Volume 2 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2009).

8

Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London: Routledge,
1998), 76. This book still stands as the most comprehensive treatment of Japanʼs participation at theParis Peace Conference, and in particular, the racial equality proposal, to date.

10
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Naoko Shimazu

from their distrust of the Japanese, but also from their support of the newly found “Young China.”
Moreover, the highly expansionist Twenty-One Demands of 1915 which attempted to turn China
into a semi-colony of Japan, had exacerbated the bad will which had already existed between
Japan and the United States. Therefore, even with regards to the Siberian inter vention, theAmerican opposition to the Japanese troop deployment which had been pressed by both Britain
and France, was not only due to geopolitical concerns, namely that the Japanese troops might use
this as a pretext to station troops in the region east of Lake Baikal. But, I have argued elsewherethat “the American government was principally concerned about the effects of Japanese troop
deployment on American domestic opinion ” seeing that it had been deeply sensitised withthe anti-Japanese immigration policy as well as by the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 against
China.9 Sir William Wiseman summed up the underlying American sentiment: “The American
hatred of all yellow races is thinly, if at all, disguised. Any thought of the yellows being brought
in to redress the balance of the whites is repugnant to them, especially when it may involve theconsequent loss of commercial advantages in the new and lucrative mark of East Russia.”10 In fact,
the Japanese sensitivity to what they regarded as discriminatory treatment of Japan and Japanesenationals surfaced as a formal peace term at the Paris Peace Conference, and became known as
the racial equality proposal as mentioned above.
In reflecting on the issues raised by the Japanese at the Paris Peace Conference on its
centenar y, one is struck by the continuity in terms of the issues that matter in international
relations today. Particularly, the relevance of issues such as racial politics, and immigration, isstriking, to say the least. Moreover, the continued relevance also of the nation-state as the basic
unit of international relations in the early twenty-first century global affairs remains strong, inspite of the rapid increase in many non-state actors. In any case, the centennial years have givenrise to a swathe of new scholarship and the dominant trend can be defined as the “global turn.”And, in these new globally-led narratives, the Japanese participation as one of the great powers
plays a prominent role in anchoring the globality of the war itself. And, with this global turn, we
begin to see exciting new historical insights unravelling in the centenary of the peace conference,such as Japanʼs involvement in the Catholic network of informal diplomacy. 11 No doubt, we
continue to deepen our historical understanding of the Paris Peace Conference, hopefully, in ways
which may not have been imaginable hitherto.

9

There is a notable new research on the topic of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 by Naraoka Sochi,
Taika niju-ikkajo yokyu to wa nani dattanoka: Daiichiji sekai taisen to nicchu tairitsu no genten (Nagoya:
Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2015).

10

As quoted in Shimazu, Japan, 109.

11

Patrick Houlihanʼs unpublished paper “The Other Admiral Yamamoto: Catholic Globalism at the Paris
Peace Conference of 1919,” presented at an international conference on The Paris Peace Conference
and the Challenge of a New World Order, German Historical Institute, Paris, June 2019.

11
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Wilsonian Vision for a New Liberal International Order: Symbolic Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference

The Wilsonian Vision for a New Liberal International Order:
Symbolic Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference*
Naoko Shimazu**
Abstract
When the Allied Powers gathered in Paris in the first half of 1919, to discuss the peaceterms, President Woodrow Wilson was welcomed as “a prophet,” “a saviour,” who cameto rescue Europe from the ravages of the war, promising a brave new world where there
would be an equitable international order to engender peace for all peoples. The Paris
Peace Conference represented the climax of the American war propaganda campaign as
the First World War was fought in the media as well as in the trenches. Wilsonian liberalism
as it became known, was a paradoxical mix of visionary idealism and political pragmatism.
The ʻsaviourʼ himself began to recognise his mortality and realise the limits of his ideals
during the Paris Peace Conference. Yet images of diplomacy constructed largely by the
media during the Paris Peace Conference tended to inform contemporar y perceptionsof the success of peace conference diplomacy at Paris. To this end, ʻpublic diplomacyʼ
constituted an integral aspect of peace conference diplomacy. In the end, Wilson himself
faced a personal defeat in his own country which had failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.
Nonetheless, the international order or the League of Nations which was born out of hisbrand of idealism survived its difficult birth, and ventured to live a short but eventful life.

It is opportune to reconsider the liberal international order of the interwar period, as weface the centenary of the end of the First World War. When the Allied Powers gathered
in Paris in the first half of 1919, to discuss the peace terms, President Woodrow Wilson
was welcomed as “a prophet,” “a saviour,” who came to rescue Europe from the ravagesof the war, promising a brave new world where there would be an equitable international orderto engender peace for all peoples. Some of the top brass in the American delegation worried thathis personal presence in Paris would break the sacred halo with which he had to come to be
regarded by some of the people.
Wilsonian liberalism as it became known, was a paradoxical mix of visionary idealism andpolitical pragmatism. The “saviour” himself began to recognise his mortality and realise the limitsof his ideals during the Paris Peace Conference. In the end, Wilson himself faced a personal
defeat in his own country which had failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Nonetheless, theinternational order or the League of Nations which was born out of his brand of idealism survived
its difficult birth, and ventured to live a short but eventful life.
In this presentation, Iʼm going to focus on the symbolic diplomacy of Wilsonʼs at the Paris
Peace Conference because it helps us shed an alternative light on Wilson and what “he” and his
This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Japan and the World in
the 20th Century” held by JIIA on March 29, 2018.
** Naoko Shimazu DPhil (Oxon), FRHist.S, is Professor of Humanities (Histor y) and Associate Deanof Faculty at Yale-NUS College, and Professor at the Asia Research Institute, National University ofSingapore.
*

12
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Naoko Shimazu

vision for a new world might have represented at Paris Peace Conference.1
Let us begin with a quotation from the New York Times on December 16, 1918
“It is far worse than when the Czar of Russia visited Paris―you would think every Parisian
had determined not to rest happy until he had a close personal view of President Wilson.” The
speaker was a veteran gendarme attached to the force guarding the entrances of the Rue deMonceau, where Prince Muratʼs house is situated, from the overcurious crowds.... Somehow
the news had spread yesterday... that the president had been to church and would return at
about noon. The result was an enthusiastic gathering before the police barriers―hundredsof people, quiet and well-behaved, in their Sunday clothes, but resolved not to leave the spot
before the President had passed.... Suddenly, the boy on the outskirts of the crowd cried: “Levoila!” as a limousine turned a corner. Hats came off, flags and handkerchiefs were waved,
and the air rang with shouts of “Vive Wilson! Vive le President!” Smiling with unaffected
pleasure, the members of the Presidential party passed through the hedge of spectators
down the street.... Not the least striking feature of the Presidentʼs popularity is Parisians havelearned how to cheer in order to greet him properly.... There has been another change in thecity during the last few weeks. Paris is recovering its old gayety.... Now with illuminations in
Wilsonʼs honor, confetti have reappeared on the boulevards, until the pavements are covered
with the bright-hued jetsam.
The above reporting tells us many things: the symbolic linking of Wilson with the French
aristocracy, heroic stature of Wilson amongst Parisians, and added to this was the smugness
evident that even the French have had to change their old ways and learn to do things in an
American way in order to please the president. Indeed, the media covered Wilsonʼs activities
with a paparazzi-like zealousness―such as Wilson was seen at the races, Wilson was seen on his
daily round of motoring in the Bois de Boulogne, and so on. The amount of media attention that
Wilson attracted was a reflection, at one level, of how the world was changing and how Wilson
was seen to symbolise the new configuration of power in international relations that placed theUnited States at its helm.2 Most of all, the piece is an excellent example of how effectively theAmerican propaganda machine was working in Paris―in presenting Wilson and the influence of
the US in Europe, by appealing to popular penchant for heroic figures. Arguably, the Paris Peace
Conference represented the climax of the American war propaganda campaign as the First World
War was fought in the media as well as in the trenches.3
What I attempt in this brief presentation is to suggest the importance of the symbolic in
diplomacy; or more precisely, how images of diplomacy as constructed largely by the media
during the Paris Peace Conference tended to inform contemporary perceptions of the successof peace conference diplomacy at Paris.4 To this end, “public diplomacy” constituted an integral
1

For the fuller treatment of the topic, refer to my ʻA Cultural History of Diplomacy: Reassessing theJapanese “Performance” at the Paris Peace Conferenceʼ, in Urs Matthias Zachmann, ed., Asia after
Versailles: Asian Perspectives on the Paris Peace Conference and the Interwar Order, 1919–33 (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 101–123. I have excerpted a substantial part of this paper from myarticle above.

2

Lloyd C. Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913–1923 (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1984), 6.

3

For an interesting account of American war propaganda, cf. James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words
that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information 1917–1919 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1939).

4

For a fuller treatment of the idea of ʻperformanceʼ in diplomacy, cf. Naoko Shimazu, ʻDiplomacy as
Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955ʼ, Modern Asian Studies, 48:1 (January 2014), 231–4.

13
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Wilsonian Vision for a New Liberal International Order: Symbolic Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference

aspect of peace conference diplomacy.
A brief analysis of the American delegation will provide us with helpful insights into how
the most powerful state in the world saw the workings of symbolic power. Americans were very
aware of the symbolic importance of their representation at the peace conference, and this can beseen in many details of the American presence. Paris was being “liberated” by the Americans, as
the American Mission to Negotiate Peace, with a vast entourage of well over 1,000 staff, occupied
the geographical centre of Paris, taking Hotel Crillon which faced Place de la Concord as its
headquarters. And the above-mentioned mansion of Prince Murat, that is, Wilsonʼs temporary
5“home,” became known as the “Paris White House.” The positioning of Americans in the centreof Paris is significant because it reveals much about their self-perception. What is important toemphasise here is that even the physical positioning of the American headquarters can project
its sense of national power. Moreover, the fact that Wilson was hosted at the mansion of a French
aristocrat was doubly significant if not ironic.
It was reported that the arrival of Wilson as a “saviour” of war-ravaged Europe was symbolic
not only for Americans and Europeans but also for the many oppressed peoples of the world.6
The Italian minister, Francesco Saverio Nitti later wrote of Wilson: “I have seen Wilson come toEurope in 1918 acclaimed as the apostle of the new civilisation and the liberator of the peoples...”An American press photograph of Rue Royale immediately after the passing of Wilsonʼs cavalcade
illustrates the fervour which gripped Paris on his arrival, and acts as a visual testimony to thepress write-up. Even the choice of the location in the photograph that includes the sign of Maximʼswith “Vive Wilson” blazoned across the photograph is significant as the restaurant is synonymouswith Parisian high life.7 Moreover, the entire pictorial composition suggests not only the victorʼsentry into the city but, even a moral victory of the New World over the Old World. The frequent
biblical allegor y used to capture popular enthusiasm for Wilson implied that the Americanpresident was represented as an embodiment of “sacred” political values of contemporary times.
One could even argue that traditional notions of monarchical sanctity were being put into use to“legitimise” the political authority of Wilson. In some sense, it was ironic that the Old World had
to rely on the idioms of traditional, monarchical absolutism to privilege the political leader fromthe New World.
The decision taken by Wilson to attend the peace conference was not without its problems.
Wilson was personally ver y keen to come to Paris as he believed that he alone commanded
the moral authority necessar y to create the League of Nations. However, there were thoselike Secretar y of State Robert Lansing, who argued strongly against it on the grounds thathis personal presence would diminish the near-mythical quality of Wilsonian idealism.8 As
the main part of the peace conference lasted the first six months of 1919, there was also the
problem of dual track diplomacy which began to evolve at Paris: the last two months of the peace
conference was characterised by the summit diplomacy of the Big Four where the major politicaldecisions were made (more on this later), and in parallel, “peace conference diplomacy” throughbureaucrats and diplomats who laboriously panned out the details in the special commissions. Not
surprisingly, the lack of diplomatic knowledge by the Big Four led to behind-the-scene criticisms5ʻInterview with President Wilsonʼ, The Times (London), 21 December 1918. 7.

6Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

7

Princeton University Library, Woodrow Wilson Coll., box 42, folder 5.

8Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (London: Constable, 1921), 14; Inga Floto,
Colonel House in Paris: A Study of American Policy at the Paris Peace Conference (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980), 70.

14Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Naoko Shimazu

of the bosses by their diplomats.9 In a political cartoon entitled “Diplomats and the Shadow on
the Blind” featured on 21 December 1918 in The Herald it underlines bureaucratic jealousies felt
by diplomats who must have resented being marginalised by the presence of their top statesmen
who would invariably turn the peace conference into a political pageantry and “hog” the limelight.
Strikingly, it is Wilson himself who was portrayed as a “problem of peace” by diplomats.
What becomes evident is that the role of the media in the new age of “public diplomacy” was ofparamount importance, necessitating state actors to either create their own news agencies and/or to cultivate good working relations with commercial presses. To this end, the United States
government was well ahead of the game, having created the Committee on Public Informationin April 1917 with George Creel as its head. As the work of CPI has been covered in the existing
literature, it will suffice here to emphasise that the successful “packaging” of Wilson underlined
the success of the CPI ʼ s propaganda activities.10 Woodrow Wilson even had his own press
secretary at the peace conference in Ray Stannard Baker. Excessive reliance on press campaigns
was not altogether without its own problems either. The fact that the American delegation was
divided internally resulted from time to time to the dispatching of separate and ill-coordinatedmessages between the offices of Wilson, Colonel House and Robert Lansing.11
Visual images of Wilson in press photographs and newsreels distributed globally came toassume great importance, often becoming the key reference point of the event for the public atlarge. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that “the power of images [worked] as substitutes
for reality.”12 The over-exposure of Wilson resulted in over-expectations―and this meant that his
downfall was so much greater when he failed to deliver the “goods”―national self-determination―to the colonised world.
For one, the rising importance of “public diplomacy” at Paris can be accounted for by thechange in the political environment of the states represented. One of the most impor tantcharacteristics of the Paris Peace Conference, which marked it out from previous peace
conferences such as the Congress of Vienna, was that it was predominantly a gathering of the top
elected representatives of the newly emerging liberal democratic world. In Woodrow Wilsonʼs very
own words, Vienna was “a Congress of ʻbossesʼ” whereas “Versailles...must be a meeting of theservants of the peoples represented by the delegates.”13 By 1919, apart from Japan, all the othergreat powers had universal male suffrage, the oldest being France in 1792 (re-enacted in 1848),
the US in 1869, Britain and Italy in 1918, and Japan in 1925. Added to the fact that the First WorldWar had mobilised and resulted in such an enormous number of casualties, a sense of crisis
pervaded in many Western polities, aggravated by the threat of communism in the Bolshevik
Revolution. As the first total war, the First World War was a paradigm-shifting experience at leastin so far as political accountability was concerned, as popular expectations placed on politicalleaders were much greater than at any other time. Greater media scrutiny of their political leadersin 1919 reflected the changing nature of the relationship between the political elite and the everexpanding electoral body.
9

Curzon to Derby, 2 April and 7 April 1919, FO 608/124, f 6445, National Archives, London.

10

George Creel, Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information, (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of fice, 1920); George Creel, How We Adver tised America: The
First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospelof Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920); Manela, The
Wilsonian Moment, 48–52. 13.

11

I discuss the American delegation and its internal division in my Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial
Equality Proposal of 1919 (London: Routledge, 1998), especially Ch. 6.

12Robert Elwall, Building with Light: The International History of Architectural Photography (London:
Merrell, 2004), 9.

13

ʻInterview with President Wilsonʼ, The Times, 21 December 1918, 17.

15Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Wilsonian Vision for a New Liberal International Order: Symbolic Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference

Therefore, all statesmen at Paris were, to varying degrees, “performing” for the benefit ofdomestic audience back home. In lieu of monarchical pageantry, the public became interested ina new diplomatic pageantry of the grandest kind as it unfolded in Paris, and climaxed symbolicallyin the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles, now filled with politicians and bureaucrats who
were the new ʻroyaltiesʼ in the age of popular democracy.14
Conclusions:
What we can see from the explanations of how Wilson and the US delegation attempted to exert
the symbolic importance of their representation at Paris, in the way Wilson himself was presented
as a media narrative, underlined the significance which American diplomacy attached to theirsymbolic presence at the Peace Conference. In the end, Wilson became too vested with symbolic
power, and his “demise” exposed, partly, an overly ambitious CPIʼs bid to stake out USʼs newly
acquired superpower status.

14

Ursula Stark Urrestarazu, ʻ“Theatrum Europaeum” or: the Presentation of International Identity
Relations at Peace Congressesʼ, working paper presented at the workshop, ʻAnthropology meets IR:
potentials, prospects and pitfallsʼ, 29–30 November 2012, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 25–32.

16
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Kerry Brown

Hundredth Anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles:
Meanings and Implications*
Kerry Brown**
Abstract
The year 2019 marks the centenary of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in Paris. The
First World War, which the Treaty arose from, does not present a palatable and easily
digested set of issues. Despite this, it is worth attending to what the Versailles Treaty
meant, and what lessons might even today be drawn from it. One of the often neglected
aspects of the First World War was that it did involve Asian partners. Japanʼs involvement in
the Versailles Treaty discussions may not have been prominent, but that it was there at all
showed a shift in geopolitical forces. It showed that Japan and Asia had an irrevocable rolein European affairs, rather than it simply being the other way around. The second issue toreflect on when one looks at the meaning of Versailles in the present is how to assess andunderstand alliances, and their advantages and disadvantages. The complex mishmash
of different alliances and treaty obligations across the continent in 1913 has been one of
the issues frequently blamed for what unravelled in 1914. It was probably to this issue
that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe referred when he spoke in 2014 of the dangers of Asia
today duplicating the situation of Europe almost a century before. The Treaty, moreover,addressed issues which continue to have importance today―migration is one such issue,
and that of values is another. In the 21st century, reflecting on the Versailles Treaty signed
a hundred years ago finally allows us to reflect on the journey over the period between thenand now that globalisation has taken. The legacy of Versailles is alive and well.

T

he year 2019 marks the centenary of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in Paris.
It will be a low-key event in Europe. The Treaty is associated with a complex periodof history which is still not properly understood. Whereas the moral and geopoliticalissues that arose from the Second World War a generation later have been more
widely and easily assimilated into public consciousness, the First World War, which the Treaty
arose from, presents a far less palatable and easily digested set of issues. Its origins such as
historian Christopher Clark and others have shown in recent years, were multifarious and hard
to explain in an easily comprehended way.1 We understand better the causes of the European
1939 war. For the 1914–1918 war, the widespread carnage, the often static quality of the conflict,and the ways in which it rose from an intricate and hard to unpick set of alliances and thecommitments they involved make for a far less neat account of history.
Despite this, it is worth attending to what the Versailles Treaty meant, and what lessons might*This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Asia and Europe from theVesuilles Treaty to Present: The Legacies of Post War-Endings and Peace-making between Custrainte
and Forward Looking” held by JIIA and FRS (Foundtion for Strategic Research) on January 28, 2019.

** Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Studies, and Director of the Lau China Institute at Kingʼs College,
London, and Associate Fellow at Chatham House.
1

Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

17
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Hundredth Anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles: Meanings and Implications

even today be drawn from it. At the time, participants like the economist John Maynard Keynes
were rightly critical and sceptical of the sustainability of the Treaty.2 And yet, the settlement had
been entered in good faith, and it gave rise to the era of multilateralism which was, painfully andslowly, to emerge in the following decades, and which lies at the heart of the world we still live in.
One of the often neglected aspects of the First World War was that it did involve Asianpartners. Japan after all was an ally of the British through the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. It
was also one of the key participants of the Versailles meeting itself. The symbolic importanceof this, whatever its actual practical meaning (Japanʼs inheritance of the formerly German
concessions in China was to prove short-lived in their enjoyment, and created a legacy for
Sino-Japanese bilateral relations which stretched over the following decades), is what is worth
attending to today. The peripheral nature of Asia in Western intellectual and cultural life at thetime was striking. Japan had only started to figure as a country to understand and know betteron its own terms after the 1860sʼ Meiji Restoration. It started to matter more as a geopoliticalplayer with the military victories over China in 1895 and Russia a decade later. These events
showed the ways in which Japan had progressed as an industrial, modernising country, and onethat represented a new phenomenon̶Asian modernity. It also illustrated the ways, particularly
through the victory against Russia, that this was able to impact directly on European interestsand had visibility in their worlds.
Japanʼs involvement in the Versailles Treaty discussions may not have been prominent.
But that it was there at all showed a shift in geopolitical forces. An Asian nation was no longer
viewed as passive, and relegated to the sidelines. It was able to take an active part in international
diplomatic discussions. The ways in which Asia had figured almost as a place which existed
simply to passively receive Western attention, be it commercial or political, which had been thecase since the first waves of colonial attention in the 16th and 17th century, were disrupted by
the existence of a Japan which was able to exercise more active agency. And it showed that Japanand Asia had an irrevocable role in European affairs, rather than it simply being the other way
around.
The second issue to reflect on when one looks at the meaning of Versailles in the present is
how to assess and understand alliances, and their advantages and disadvantages. It was probably
to this issue that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe referred when he spoke in 2014 of the dangers ofAsia today duplicating the situation of Europe almost a century before.3 The complex mishmash
of different alliances and treaty obligations across the continent in 1913 has been one of theissues frequently blamed for what unravelled in 1914. Small events, because of the architecture of
obligations and commitments around them, escalated quickly. It is probably for this reason that ahundred years later the region now looks at two very different major powers̶that of the US and
the Peopleʼs Republic of China̶with radically different views of alliances. America, at least until
recently, maintained a strong commitment to perhaps the most extensive set of security and tradealliances across the Asia Pacific but also globally. It enjoys treaty-based arrangements with Japan,
South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand. The predictability this gives is, ofcourse, balanced by the ways in which it ties Washington into obligations that sometimes restrictor curtail its options. It is perhaps for this reason that the presidency of Donald Trump has been
keen to start working outside the framework these provide.
For the Peopleʼs Republic of China, the situation is the opposite. It has only one current
treaty̶that with North Korea, signed in the early 1960s. Otherwise, it operates on a level of2John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe,
1920).

3

See, Abe comments surprise Chinese at Davos, January 23rd 2014, Financial Times, at
https://www.ft.com/video/1d28bc50-ea9f-3b83-b41b-3c001d6c093d

18
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Kerry Brown

informality, disliking the impositions and restrictions placed on it by obligations spelt out intreaties. That does give it great flexibility in the way in which it arranges diplomatic space aroundit, setting up abstract ideas like “strategic partnership.” But it also lays it open to complaints that
it is not a full stakeholder, that it is parasitical on a rules-based system put in place by others, andthat it operates as a free loader. As the worldʼs second largest economy, these are obviously notgood characteristics, and its future as a treaty-averse power has to be questionable.
The Versailles Treaty addressed issues which continue to have importance today, and meanthat it is easier to relate to and understand the world in which this agreement grew. Migrationis one such issue, something that carries the same potency in the domestic affairs of Europe,and now increasingly in Asia. This relates to the ways in which the Treaty reinforced the notionof what it is to be a nation state, and what belonging to such an entity actually meant, in ageographical area where the conceptual history and understanding of this term were not deep.
While an island nation such as Japan understands well the importance of boundaries and had
a stronger and clearer identity, this was less so for a collection of states which were to emerge
through the rest of the century, many of them working off the influence of colonisation and otherforms of external influence. Political scientist, the late Benedict Anderson captured this process
in his term “imagined communities.”4 Unlike in Europe, where from the 1648 Westphalian Treaty,
there had been a stronger sense of what a nation was, and what its political and economic identity
might be, the concept at the heart of this, “sovereignty,” was not one that had properly existed in
Asia, and in particular North East Asia, where the notion of vassal states and tributary relations
flowing from the dominance of imperial Chinese entities had prevailed. Versailles can be seen asa key moment when China at least, or the Republican version of it that existed in 1919, started to
wrestle with this issue. The emergence of a Chinese version of nationalism through the May 4th
Movement which occurred just after the Versailles Treaty as a reaction to some of its stipulations
and of what China was as a modern nation state has been an unfolding story since this era. It has
also reordered the political geography of the region, embedding a more bounded sense of what
the powers, and responsibilities, of nation states are, and what it is to be a member of these.
The other issue that Versailles allows us to contemplate is that of values. It was, after all, a
treaty which was meant to exemplify the victory of one set of values over another̶the facing
down by a free market, laissez-faire set of alliances around Great Britain and its allies against
German militarism and statism. That the Treaty was an attempt to embed these values ininternational practices, whatever its shortcomings, is an important thing to recognise. That
process of how to accommodate very different legal and civil society values in the international
community also continues to this day. With the rise of China it has perhaps grown even moreurgent. Versailles wrestled with an emerging sense of multilateralism, giving birth to the Leagueof Nations which is often seen as the precursor to the United Nations in the 1940s. It also marked
the emergence of the US after the Second World War as a global player again after its years of“splendid isolation.” The one clear lesson one can draw about this whole area from Versailles isthat the issue of values is one of immense complexity, but it cannot be ignored. In 2019, with the
US and China now involved in an increasingly fractious trade war, and the underlying strategiccompetition between the two based on different views of the world order and the principles that
underlie it, the contentiousness about which values in the end prevail, and how very different
visions can co-exist beside each other without conflict has come back with vengeance.
The forces and processes of globalisation and the painful and often tragic route that the global
order today emerged from, involve taking Versaillesʼs contribution into account. Liberal order,
after all, was what the Treaty was meant to defend and embed in a young global system. Over
4

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London :Verso, 1983).

19
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Hundredth Anniversary of the Treaty of Versailles: Meanings and Implications

the ensuing decades, of course, there were many setbacks to that process. But that does notinvalidate the mission that the conference tried to achieve. The language of multilateralism, of
self-determination and of what a liberal order means remains with us.
In many ways it is the legacy of this order that China now stands accused of disrupting. Often
figured as a contester of the status quo, issues are perhaps not so straightfor ward. One canbroadly categorise state actors in their relationship to the global set of largely US-led norms asnorms observers, norms contesters, or norms entrepreneurs. The US and its allies have, at least
until recently, sat in the first group. Russia in recent years, and of course an outside player like
North Korea occupy the second. But for the Peopleʼs Republic things are evidently more complex.
In the years since under President Hu Jintao in the 2000s it was a norms observer through its
successful desire to join multilateral forum like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which it
became part of after a 14-year-long epic of negotiation in 2001. It also remained an importantmember of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. But with the onsetof the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 eroding some of the prowess and prestige of the global
rules-based system in Chinaʼs eyes, it started to move towards a more distinctive posture. In theera of Xi Jinping since 2012 it has been more proactive in trying to create what some have seen as
a parallel order̶a kind of shadow international system, around the Belt and Road Initiative andorganisations it has proactively set up such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
These have served to carve out a world away from the US, where China has more strategic space
and autonomy, and we can see what an order based on Chinese values might look like.
Chinaʼs attitude as a norms entrepreneur shows a pragmatic acceptance that the ability of it torelate to others with its unique political system, and its distinctive geopolitical space and stance,
is not straightforward. Versailles can be seen in some ways as an act of public diplomacy̶anattempt to rectify and address core international issues that had arisen from the First World
War. It occurs in the narrative of attempts to create a liberal, multilateral order. Chinaʼs rise
now contests that̶seeming to usher in an era after the high tide of multilateralism when the
global situation is more complex, and a countr y is emerging that does not sit easily into thestructures that already exist. In the categories of soft and hard power too, China does not slot
easily. Its attempt to address this issue of how to communicate its values to the wider world as
it has become more prominent and a more important player has led to the need to talk of a newconcept̶“sharp” power. This falls somewhere between the already extant categories, something
falling short of overt use of military power, but definitely not soft, persuasive and reassuring
because of the ease with which it is willing to use covert and overt threats and pressure points to
those outside on issues that matter to it, like the South and East China Sea, and Taiwan.
In the 21st century, reflecting on the Versailles Treaty signed a hundred years ago finallyallows us to reflect on the journey over the period between then and now that globalisation has
taken. It has not been an easy path. The narrative of globalisation, however, continues, as muchby necessity as desire. This is something that places restraints and parameters on China too.
Like it or not, the options for its future are to be dominant in a contested global order where it
finds itself exposed, unable to convince partners around it of the attractiveness of its visions fororder and progress, or through inner transformation and a change of attitude in the world around
it able somehow to occupy a more stable, and accepted place. The history for the reasons why
Versailles happened, and what its impact on history was are therefore ones that the PRC needs toreflect on. The fact that the Treaty was also occurring in the year in which the May 4th Movementin China occurred, with its student-led call to promote Mr Science and Mr Democracy, with theunease that this creates in the contemporary country stands as an issue rich in symbolism. In
that respect, at least, the legacy of Versailles is alive and well. It should be better understood andcontextualised, certainly, but it is still there.

20
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Yuichi Hosoya

The Rise and Fall of the
Liberal International Order: 1919–2019*
Yuichi Hosoya **Abstract
Reflecting on 100 years anniversar y of the Paris Peace Conference, we need to focus
on the two connections̶the connection between Asia and Europe, and the connection
between the past and the present. This century beginning in 1919 and ending in 2019 canbe remembered as the rise and fall of the liberal international order. The impact and themeaning of 1945 in this time beginning in 1919 and ending in 2019, as well as the importanceof the legacy of 1945 upon the current international order cannot also be ignored. The
Cold War division is the first phase of the post–Second World War international order, andthe second phase signifies the consolidation of the liberal international order. We are now
seeing emerging challenges caused by the retreat of the belief in the future of the liberal
democracy. In that sense, we are now clearly facing the limits of the liberal international
order, as well as the future of a liberal democratic regime. That is why, much more than
before, European powers such as France and the UK are key for Japan to collaborate in
defending the liberal international order.

T

he year 2019 marks a good opportunity to reflect on 100 years anniversary of the Paris
Peace Conference. First, we need to focus on the two connections̶the connection
between Asia and Europe, and the connection between the past and the present̶1919
and 2019.
Second, we should focus on the importance of the year 1945 as the most important turning point.
This century beginning in 1919 and ending in 2019 can be remembered as the rise and fallof the liberal international order. There are several reasons for reminding of the fall of suchan international order. One of the reasons for this is that the UK, which has the mightiest
military power within the European Union, is now leaving that group. The European Union has
long exemplified the rise of the liberal order that brings both peace and stability in the region.
However, the rise of both nationalism and populism so often weakens the perception thatmultilateral cooperation is essential for the region as well as for the member states. If the UK
leaves the European Union by concluding it is no more relevant for the UK, this would damage
the foundation of the liberal order in Europe.
Likewise, in the end of 2018, President Donald Trump decided to leave UNESCO, one of the
key organizations of the United Nations. It is often reported that President Trump is interested
in retreating from the most important multilateral organizations which the United States belongs
to such as NATO, WTO, or even the United Nations. It does not seem probable that the United*This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Asia and Europe fromthe Versailles Treaty to the Present: the Legacies of Post War–Enging and Peace–Making between
Constraints and For ward Looking” held by JIIA and FRS (Foundation for Strategic Research) on
January 28, 2019.

** Yuichi Hosoya is Professor of International Politics at Keio University, Tokyo.

21
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order: 1919-2019

States government decides to leave these organizations soon, but the United States, particularly
the current administration, is considering seriously that some of these multilateral institutions areharmful for American national interest.
These perception can have an important ramification for the future of the liberal international
order. Thus, it can be argued that the centur y beginning in 1919 and ending in 2019 will be
remembered as the rise and fall of the liberal international order. It is also important to link two
regions, Asia and Europe. The Paris Peace Conference became an important link between thetwo regions, as Japan became one of the five great powers that won the war.
It is also important to remind that both Japan and France played, and are now playing, an
important international role in these two years, namely 1919 and 2019. Both Japan and France
were among the five great powers that created the Paris Peace Treaties. However, Japanʼs rose
was not equal to French one, as France hosted and presided over this great conference.
We also need to remind that a non-European power, Japan, was included in the conference,and began to expand its international influence. In 2019, Japan hosted the G20 Summit meetingin Osaka, and France did likewise the G7 Summit meeting in Biarritz. Japan and France faced
serious challenges, as they needed to prepare for agendas for the future of international order.
If France and Japan can tackle these difficult tasks of responding to the challenges we faceappropriately, we can perhaps enhance and strengthen the current liberal international order.
Then, we need to look at the importance of the year 1945, as well as the importance of thelegacy of 1945 upon the current international order. First, it is important to recognize that there
exist two phases in the post–Second World War international order. The first phase of the post–
Second World War international order relates to the Cold War division. After 1945, we have seen
the division of the world into the two camps̶the Western camp led by the United States, and theCommunist camp, which was mainly controlled by the Soviet Union.
The second phase signifies the consolidation of the liberal international order among Westerncountries. In other words, the meaning of the end of the Cold War is that we no longer see thedivision of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, we have seen the enhancement, and also
enlargement of the liberal international order. In the 1990s, we were quite optimistic about the
future of the liberal international order. We thought that we could continue to see the expansionof the liberal international order. But we were wrong.
In the last ten years, we clearly see the limits and the difficulty of expanding the liberalinternational order, largely because of the rise of authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia.
Both China and Russia are now powerful enough to revise the current international order byusing the threat of their huge military forces. Chinese government has been repeatedly arguingthat the current international order is created by Western powers and China needs to modify it tobe fitted to the current multipolar world.
We are now seeing emerging challenges caused by the retreat of the belief in the futureof the liberal democracy. Many developing countries are attracted by the alternative vision of
governance, the authoritarian regime. They see that authoritarian regime can be effective topromote their own economic growth, as they are fascinated by Chinaʼs rapid economic growth.
These developing countries have also been seeing that liberal democracies are now facing serious
deadlocks in, for example, the United States, the UK, and many other European countries. As
a result, we are now disillusioned by liberal democratic regime. It is natural for those countries
to think that liberal democracy is not the only answer to their future. In that sense, we clearly
see the limits of the future of the liberal international order as well as of the future of a liberal
democratic regime. The year 2019 will possibly be the year in world history when many countries
abandon their strong will to defend them.
There exist several remnants of the Second World War, and these have caused difficult
problems among countries in East Asia. On one hand, Japan and the United States have solved
22Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Yuichi Hosoya

and settled difficult problems at the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951. However, on theother hand, some of the major powers, such as the Soviet Union and China, did not sign theTreaty. South Korea also was not a participating county in the Peace Conference.
As these countries did not join in the postwar settlement in San Francisco, they tend to
consider that the San Francisco system brought justice to them. After the San Francisco Peace
Conference, Japan needed to negotiate individually with these countries. In 1965, Japan concluded
the Treaty on Basic Relations with the Republic of Korea. In 1978, Japan concluded the Treatyof Peace and Friendship with the Peopleʼs Republic of China. On the other hand, the Japanese
government is yet to conclude a peace treaty with the Russian government because the treaty is
still needed to be drafted.
These are the remnants of the Second World War, and they make Japanʼs political relationships
with these countries difficult. The San Francisco Peace Conference was just a partial settlementof the Second World War in Asia, and still, Japan needs to tackle some of these questions whicharise from the difficulty of the remnants of the Second World War.
In the end, it would be valuable to look at the prospect of defending the liberal international
order. Japanʼs historical experience is quite indicative, as Japan has experienced both authoritarianregime and liberal democracy in the last century. In the 1930s, Japan became a challenger to theinternational order. But after 1945, Japan has been trying to become a defender of the liberalinternational order. In the latter 1940s and the 1950s, Japan was not powerful enough to defend
the liberal international order.
However, after the end of the Cold War, Japanese government has been always aware thatJapan can no longer remain a free-rider in the international community. Japan had been number
two economy in the world until China occupied that place in 2010. Today Japan is number
three economy in the world after the United States and China. As the US and China tend toact unilaterally, Japan becomes one of the major powers that respect and defend the liberalinternational order.
The largest problem that we face is that our alliance partner, the United States, is now muchless interested in defending the liberal international order than before. That is why European
powers such as France and the UK become major partners for Japan who are willing to defend
the liberal international order. That would be the main reason why we have seen the rapid
development in the security cooperation between Japan and France, and also Japan and the UK.
This year marks the beginning of Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and Strategic
Par tnership Agreement (SPA) between Japan and the European Union. These for ward–
looking developments can best be understood as an important cornerstone to defend the liberalinternational order.

23
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Restructuring the Maritime Order

Restructuring the Maritime Order*
Shigeki Sakamoto**

Abstract
International maritime order which in recent years has been underpinned by the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been the foundation of the global peace
and prosperity for the last centuries. Due to the rise of emerging maritime powers, suchas China, and the expansion of maritime issues, however, the maritime order is currently
under various challenges. This paper explores the new challenges existing on the tension
between China and the Philippines, due to Chinaʼs extraordinary demands in the South
China Sea and dispute settlement mechanisms and the roles and jurisdiction of UNCLOS inbiodiversity and sustainable use of resources. While the paper points out some limitationsof the existing order, it also argues the importance of sustaining the existing maritime order
based on UNCLOS with bringing out necessary reforms.

1. New challenges confronting the law of the sea

For centuries, the maritime order governing the worldʼs oceans, which cover 70% of theearthʼs surface, consisted of a dual structure, divided between the narrow bands ofterritorial waters deemed necessary for the security of coastal states and the vast highseas beyond, which all countries were free to navigate and use as they saw fit. The lawof the sea, which codifies this order, is one of the oldest fields of international law.
Freedom of navigation on the high seas for maritime trades was understood to be in thegeneral interest of international community. Accordingly, the pirates who threatened this common
good were regarded as “enemies of mankind” (hostis humani generis). As early as the seventeenth
century, piracy was defined as an offense of “universal jurisdiction,” punishable at the discretionof each state. More recently, however, international human rights law, which has developed
significantly after World War II, has taken a stand on the enforcement of anti-piracy laws, callingfor suspects to be brought before a judge within 48 hours of the initial detention where possible.
In this way, one of the classic problems addressed by the law of the sea has emerged as a newhuman rights challenge.
Migration issues have led to similar tensions. The law of the sea imposes on ships of allnations a duty to rescue, if possible, any persons in distress whom they encounter at sea. Thisnaturally includes the obligation to transport the distressed persons to a safe place. However,in recent times, a growing number of states have been evading their responsibility to protect
distressed persons if they were found to be undocumented migrants or refugees on overcrowded
boats. They do this by barring the entry of rescue ships into their territorial waters. The reason isthat, once migrants enter a countryʼs territorial water, they fall within the scope of the Convention* This essay was originally published on Kokusai Mondai [International Affairs], No. 674, Sep. 2018** Shigeki Sakamoto is a professor in the Faculty of Law Department Law at Doshisha University.

24
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Shigeki Sakamoto

Relating to the Status of Refugees, which requires contracting states to provide migrants withrefugee hearings and prohibits them from returning refugees to a country in which they could
face persecution (the principle of non-refoulement). With the law of the sea calling for rescue
and protection of persons in distress, and international human rights law demanding that the
distressed personsʼ rights be upheld, these states are responding by attempting to limit the spatial
scope of their duty to protect human life (to their own territories, including territorial waters),
bringing them into conflict with protection of the human rights of the individual. Underlying
many of these new, twenty-first-century challenges, from the Somali piracy crisis to the flood of
refugees from regions destabilized for a long time by the so-called Islamic State, is the failureof national governments̶entrusted with safeguarding the lives, persons, and property of thepeople̶to exercise effective control over their own territories.

2. UNCLOS and its elaboration via case law
Similar tensions surround the exploitation of marine resources in the East and South China Seas.
The Chinese government, having embraced the goal of becoming a “great maritime power,” isdetermined not only to become a major naval power but also to secure their maritime interests.
Having become the worldʼs second largest economy, China needs marine resources to support
its economic development. One focus of this drive is the East China Sea, where China andJapan have yet to agree on the delimitation between their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) andcontinental shelves. Despite the absence of an agreement, China has unilaterally pushed ahead
with development of gas fields in a section of the East China Sea that lies on the Chinese side of
the median line proposed under Japanʼs Act on Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf.
As of this writing, Japan has confirmed the presence of 16 drilling structures in that area.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that the delimitation of the
EEZ and the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts “shall be effectedby agreement on the basis of international law . . . in order to achieve an equitable solution”(Article 74, paragraph 1 and Article 83, paragraph 1). It also requires that parties to a dispute
exercise restraint, stipulating that “pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, thestates concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter
into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not tojeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement” (Article 74, paragraph 3 and Article 83,
paragraph 3). In August 2006, before embarking on its unilateral gas exploration and development
program in the East China Sea, China lodged a declaration with the Secretary General of theUnited Nations, stating that it would not accept the compulsory arbitration process provided forin Part XV of the Convention, Settlement of Disputes, to disputes relating to interpretation orapplication of the provisions in Article 74 and Article 83. In the Guyana-Suriname case awardedon September 17, 2007, under that same arbitration process, the court ruled that unilateral
exploitation of oil and gas reser ves in an undelimited maritime area constituted an action to“jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement” as well as a breach of the obligation to
exercise restraint. In the light of this award, it seems clear that Chinaʼs current activity in the East
China Sea is in violation of UNCLOS.
In January 2013, the Philippines, making use of the aforesaid compulsory arbitration, broughta case against China, known as the South China Sea arbitration. Recognizing that China had opted
out of arbitration on delimitation disputes, the Philippines did not seek a decision establishing themaritime boundary but instead brought an “entitlement dispute.” Specifically, it challenged thelegality of Chinaʼs “nine-dash line” on the grounds that the reefs and low-tide elevations, including
the Spratly Islands, over which China exercised de facto administrative control could not bydefinition have their own territorial waters, EEZs or continental shelves. This approach overcame
jurisdictional obstacles, and on July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled that China has no25
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Restructuring the Maritime Orderhistorical right based on the nine-dash line and was in violation of UNCLOS. In the same case, thearbitral tribunal took on the interpretation of Article 121, which deals with the legal definition of
an island. Whether or not one agrees with the arbitral tribunalʼs interpretation, it does clarify theprovision, which had previously been criticized as “intolerably imprecise” and “a perfect recipe for
confusion and conflict.” In this way, the judicial process is gradually developing and fleshing out
the normative content of UNCLOS.

3. Biodiversity and sustainable use of resources beyond national jurisdiction

As a “living treaty,” UNCLOS also develops and evolves its content through various implementing
agreements elaborated in response to new issues and challenges.
The first UNCLOS “ implementing agreement ” was the 1994 Agreement Relating to
Implementation of Par t XI of the Convention, which established the International Seabed
Authority. The second was the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which elaborated on the
UNCLOS principle of adopting a precautionary approach to the management of straddling andhighly migratory fish stocks, embraced an ecosystem approach to management of those stocks(whose habitats span the artificial boundaries of the 200-mile EEZ), and introduced consistentconservation and management measures straddling in the EEZ and on the high seas. In addition,
an intergovernmental conference established to negotiate a new UNCLOS implementing
agreement was convened in the United Nations in September 2018.
Despite these developments in the twentieth century, the twenty-first century has witnessed
the emergence of challenges that the drafters of UNCLOS never anticipated. One is the
exploitation of marine genetic resources (MGRs). Another is the establishment of marine
protected areas (MPAs).
At present, only a limited number of industrially advanced nations have access to marine
genetic resources and entities capable of utilizing them. This has raised concerns amongdeveloping countries that the principle of freedom of the high seas will be applied to the
exploitation and utilization of MGRs. The developing countries note that the ocean floor and its
resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction are considered part of the common heritage ofhumankind, and they argue that the same should apply to marine organisms dwelling in thoseareas. Accordingly, they argue that, since MGRs from the deep seabed are the common heritageof humankind, any benefits from their use should be distributed fairly and equitably among
members of the international community.
Marine protected areas are not defined under the provisions of UNCLOS. Amid a growing
need for steps to protect the marine environment and its biodiversity, individual countries havebeen taking steps to establish MPAs within their own territorial waters and EEZs, with eachcountry establishing its own definition and regulatory regime in accordance with domestic law.
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity incorporates the concept of protected areas toachieve its objectives, which include not only the conservation of biological diversity but also
the “sustainable use of its components” (Article 1). The International Union for Conservationof Nature has established various categories of protected area, classified according to their
management objectives, and it mentions “ecosystem services” in its definition of MPAs. Japanis promoting its own type of MPA that would maximize the potential role of ecosystem services,with the aim of both protecting and utilizing biological diversity.
On June 19, 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution (69/292) on “development of
an international legally binding instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable
use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.” It calls for international
negotiations to address, together and as a whole, marine genetic resources, including the sharingof benefits; area-based management tools, including marine protected areas; environmental
impact assessments; and capacity building and transfer of marine technology. Thus the UN
26
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Shigeki Sakamoto

campaign began to put together an international agreement on marine biological diversity beyond
areas of national jurisdiction, or BBNJ. The effort began with the formation of a preparatorycommittee, which met four times between March 2016 and July 2017.
In the “non-paper on elements of a draft text” issued at the final meeting of the preparatorycommittee, the committee chair offered an extensive compilation of ideas, proposals, and options
for a new agreement, including a host of matters on which the delegations had failed to reach any
consensus. For example, with respect to the scope of the instrument, there was disagreement as
to whether it should encompass just the seabed beyond national jurisdiction or both the seabedand high seas and whether it should apply only to in-situ MGRs (in their original habitat) or also
to ex-situ resources (such as genetic material stored in gene banks and laboratories) and evenin-silico resources (such as information in databases and resources created through computer
simulations). Even more basically, opinion remains sharply divided as to whether the governing
principle should be freedom of the high seas or the common heritage of humankind.
The first session of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on BBNJ was held on September
4–17, 2018. At that time it was decided that three more sessions would be held by the first half of2020. Prior to the first session, an organizational meeting was held in New York on April 16–18,
2018. Among the top agenda items at this initial meeting was the election of a president. The post
went to Rena Lee of Singapore, Ambassador for Oceans and Law of the Sea Issues and Special
Envoy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had served as facilitator for capacity building andtechnology transfer on the preparatory committee. The delegates also exchanged views on thebest way to structure the IGCʼs deliberations, scheduled to begin the following September. It wasagreed that the president would draft an “aid to discussions” paper in preparation for the firstsession to serve as a starting point for deliberations, but that she would not prepare a “zero draft,”which might have the effect of rushing the negotiations. President Lee subsequently preparedand submitted the Presidentʼs Aid to Discussions (A/CONF.232/2018/3).
Will the international community embark on a major restructuring of the existing maritime
order, embracing the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ as a new common goal of thatorder? Or will it rally around a solution that upholds the existing order, in accordance with the
UN resolution on BBNJ (72/249) adopted on December 24, 2017, which “reaffirms that the workand results of the conference should be fully consistent with the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea”? Only time will tell.
As the foundation of the maritime order, UNCLOS has taken the approach of dividing theoceans into discrete zones to determine the rights and obligations of coastal and inland statesvis-à-vis those waters. It has also created separate regulator y regimes governing navigation,
fishing, resource development, marine conservation, and scientific research. On the high seas,
enforcement of regulations follows the flag state doctrine. Yet UNCLOS itself affirms the needfor unified regulation in its preamble, which states that “the problems of ocean space are closelyinterrelated and need to be considered as a whole.” It was the inability of regional fisher yauthorities to control illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing on the high seas that
led to the conclusion of the Agreement on Port State Measures, which expanded port states ʼjurisdiction over foreign vessels engaged in illegal fishing. Here we see a new attempt to unify
international marine regulation through a coordinated effort to keep illegally caught fish off themarket.
As the IGC proceeds, it will bear close watching to see how the pursuit of new common goals,
namely, the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity, impacts the framework forseparate regulatory regimes and how the existing maritime order is restructured as a result.

27
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Obligation of Self-Restraint in Undelimited Maritime Areas

The Obligation of Self-Restraint
in Undelimited Maritime Areas*
Kentaro Nishimoto**
Abstract
As recent developments between Japan and China in the East China Sea show, unilateral
activities in undelimited maritime areas can give rise to tension. Articles 74(3) and 83(3)of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provide an obligation
for the States concerned not to jeopardize or hamper reaching of the final agreement(“the obligation of self-restraint”). However, the extent to which the obligation prohibits
unilateral activities has been a subject of discussion. This article addresses this issue by
mainly examining the relevant case law of international courts and tribunals. It finds thata consistent standard for distinguishing permissible and impermissible activities is yet
to be developed, but there is a noticeable trend where the obligation of self-restraint isincreasingly viewed as an obligation not limited to refraining from specific types of activities
that could be identified in general and in the abstract. The ar ticle fur ther addresses
questions concerning the appropriate responses to be taken by coastal States in the faceof a violation of the obligation of self-restraint by another State, including whether thecompulsory dispute settlement procedure of UNCLOS could be invoked against a State thathas made an optional exception declaration under Article 298(1)(a) of UNCLOS.

Introduction

China has been accelerating its resource development activities in the East China Sea.
To date, it has built 16 offshore structures near the geographic equidistance line
between Japan and China, on the Chinese side of the line.1 The government of Japan
has expressed regret over Chinaʼs unilateral pursuit of development and has requested
China to cease all unilateral development activities, as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) andthe continental shelf is yet to be delimited between the two States.2 As this situation illustrates,
unilateral activities have frequently given rise to tension, in maritime areas subject to overlapping
claims to EEZs and continental shelves by more than two parties and where the maritime
boundary is yet to be agreed (hereinafter referred to as “undelimited maritime areas”).
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides that, pending
agreement on the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf, “the States concerned, in a spiritof understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangementsof a practical nature and, during the transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching*This essay was originally published on Kokusai Mondai [International Affairs], No. 674, Sep. 2018.

** Kentaro Nishimoto is a professor in the School of Law at Tohoku University.
1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2018 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018), p.
58.

2

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Current Status of China’s Unilateral Development of Natural
Resources in the East China Sea (https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/page3e_000356.html).

28
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Kentaro Nishimotoof the final agreement” (Articles 74(3) and 83(3)). In other words, with respect to undelimited
maritime areas, the States concerned have an obligation to: 1) make ef for ts to enter into
provisional arrangements; and 2) not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement.
The second obligation is often referred to as the “obligation of self-restraint,” as it requires
the States concerned to practice a certain degree of self-restraint in their behavior.3 Unilateral
activities in undelimited maritime areas raise the question of whether they are in breach of theobligation of self-restraint.
It is not a simple matter to determine what kinds of activities constitute a violation of theobligation of self-restraint. For some time, the only precedent in which an international court
or tribunal directly addressed the obligation of self-restraint was the award rendered in 2007
by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS, in the maritime delimitation
dispute between Guyana and Suriname. The subsequent discussion concerning the obligationof self-restraint has revolved around the criteria given in the arbitral award. More recently, theSpecial Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) addressed theobligation of self-restraint in the case concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundar y
between Ghana and Côte dʼIvoire (Provisional Measures Order of 25 April 2015 and Judgmentof 23 September 2017). Focusing mainly on the two cases, this article will examine the issues
regarding the obligation of self-restraint and the measures that could be taken against a breachof the obligation. Because the two cases concerned the development of oil resources, which isalso at issue between Japan and China, this article will focus primarily on the obligation of selfrestraint as it relates to the development of oil and mineral resources.

1. The Obligation of Self-Restraint in International Case Law
There is general consensus that the intent of the obligation of self-restraint in undelimited
maritime areas is not to prohibit all unilateral activities pending delimitation.4 In the first place,the text of Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS envisages certain activities taking place. During
the drafting of the Convention, some States proposed that a moratorium be placed on resource
exploration and development in undelimited maritime areas. However, this proposal was not
accepted, and the present text was eventually adopted.5 The question, therefore, is as follows: ofthe unilateral activities not based on provisional arrangements that are undertaken in undelimited
maritime areas, how do we distinguish activities that constitute a violation of the obligation to
exercise self-restraint from those that do not?

3

It should be noted that the obligation as provided under the Convention is an obligation for Statesconcerned to “make every effort not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.”
Caution is required not to draw any inferences from the term “obligation of self-restraint” itself, which isused in this article as a shorthand and is not a term actually used in the Convention.

4

Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A
Commentary (Martinus Nijhoff, 2002), Vol. II, p. 984; Alexander Proelss (ed.), United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2017), pp. 578–579, 663; Yumi Nishimura,“Nicchū tairikudana no kyōkai kakutei mondai to sono shori hōsaku” [The issue of delimitation of thecontinental shelf between Japan and China and the ways for its resolution], Jurist, No. 1321 (2006), p. 55.

5Youri van Logchem, “The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas,” in Clive H. Schofield
et al. (eds.), The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), pp. 179–181; Akio Morita,“Keisō kaiiki ni okeru katsudō no kokusai hōjō no hyōka―nicchū nikkan kan no shomondai wo tegakari
toshite” [Assessing activities in disputed maritime areas under international law: various issues between
Japan and China, and Japan and South Korea], in Sōji Yamamoto et al. (eds.), Kaij hoan h sei―kaiy hto kokunaih no k saku [The Law and Institutions of Maritime Security: the interaction between the lawof the sea and domestic law] (Sanseidō, 2009), p. 392.

29
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Obligation of Self-Restraint in Undelimited Maritime Areas(1) Guyana/Suriname Case
The dispute between Guyana and Suriname concerned the delimitation of their territorial seas,
EEZs and continental shelves, as well as the development of petroleum resources pending
delimitation. The dispute was referred to an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of
UNCLOS. In the maritime area disputed by the two States, Guyana had granted several privatecompanies permission to engage in oil exploration. One of the companies was CGX Resources
Inc. of Canada, whose oil rig encountered an incident in which it was ordered by the Surinameʼsnavy to leave the area (the “CGX Incident”). Suriname claimed that Guyana had violated theobligation of self-restraint by authorizing exploratory drilling to be undertaken in the disputedarea; Guyana claimed that the conduct of the Surinamese navy was in violation of the sameobligation, and also constituted a threat of force in breach of the Charter of the United Nations.
As a general matter, the Arbitral Tribunal stated that unilateral activities can be undertaken indisputed maritime areas without provisional arrangements, so long as the activities in question do
not have the effect of jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of a final agreement.6 Further, theTribunal adopted the view that activities that cause physical change to the marine environment
are not permitted unless undertaken pursuant to a provisional arrangement, because they would
cause permanent change and ultimately jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement.
Activities that did not result in physical change, on the other hand, were to be generally regarded
permissible.7 Based on this standard, the Arbitral Tribunal decided that Guyanaʼs grantingof explorator y drilling was a violation of the obligation of self-restraint. At the same time, it
concluded that allowing seismic testing did not constitute such a violation in the circumstances athand.8The Arbitral Tribunal stated that the distinction based on physical change to the marine
environment is consistent with the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals on interim
measures.9 In particular, the Arbitral Tribunal cited the decision of the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case. In that case, Greece requested interim
measures ordering Turkey to refrain from exploration activities in the disputed maritime
area.10 The ICJ ultimately declined to indicate interim measures, pointing out that Turkeyʼs
actions did not create a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Greeceʼs for thefollowing three reasons: 1) the seismic exploration did not involve any risk of physical damage
to the seabed; 2) the activity in question was of a transitory character and did not involve theestablishment of installations; and 3) no suggestion had been made that Turkey has engaged inoperations involving actual appropriation or other use of the natural resources in question.11 The
Arbitral Tribunal in the Guyana/Suriname case considered that the standard for issuing interim
measures, which is whether a given activity causes irreparable prejudice to the rights of a party,
is more rigorous than the standard for the obligation of self-restraint, which concerns whether acertain activity jeopardizes or hampers the reaching of a final agreement. Therefore, the Tribunal
considered that the decision of the ICJ based on the test of physical damage is relevant in its
6

Arbitral Award Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration Between Guyana andSuriname, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal (17 September 2007), Reports of International Arbitral Awards,
Vol. XXX, pp. 131–132 (paras. 465–466).

7

Ibid., p. 132 (para. 467).

8

Ibid., p. 137 (paras. 480–481).

9

Ibid., pp. 132–133 (paras. 468–469).

10

Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Order of 11 September 1976, ICJ Reports 1976,
pp. 5–6 (para. 2).

11

Ibid., p. 11 (para. 30); Guyana/Suriname Award, supra note 6, p. 132 (para. 468).

30
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Kentaro Nishimoto

determination of what kinds of activities constitute a violation of the obligation of self-restraint.12
The arbitral award in the Guyana/Suriname case is generally understood to have indicateda cer tain standard, namely, (permanent) physical change to the marine environment, as
permissible limits for unilateral activities in undelimited maritime areas.13 However, some authors
have cautioned against overgeneralization of this standard.14 In particular, it has been pointed
out that even in the context of seismic exploration, the knowledge obtained through exploration
could jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement or cause irreparable harm to thesovereign rights of another party.15 Moreover, the arbitral award itself was not entirely clear about
the scope of unilateral activities that do not violate the obligation of self-restraint. The award
stated that, as a general rule, unilateral activities that do not cause physical change to the marine
environment “generally” would not violate the obligation of self-restraint.16 However, in its moredetailed findings in relation to the facts of case, the Arbitral Tribunal referred to the fact that bothcountries had given permission for seismic exploration to be undertaken, and that no objections
were raised from the other side. It was on this basis that the award reached its conclusion that,“in the circumstances at hand,” unilateral seismic testing did not violate the obligation of selfrestraint.17 It can be observed that the Arbitral Tribunal did not only take into account the natureof the activity, but also the context of the dispute in the undelimited maritime area, including
the attitudes of the States concerned. This may be regarded as only natural, as the obligation ofself-restraint is concerned with the reaching of a final agreement. However, in contrast to thefact that the award included some general standards concerning the obligation of self-restraint
focused on the nature of the activity, it did not articulate a general framework that reflects all theconsiderations that were taken into account.

(2) Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Case

The Ghana/Côte dʼIvoire case involved a dispute regarding the delimitation of their territorialseas, EEZs and continental shelves, and unilateral activities under taken by Ghana in thedisputed maritime area pending delimitation. The dispute was referred to the Special Chamberof ITLOS. Ghana had been conducting oil exploration and exploitation activities on the Ghanaianside of the equidistance line in the dispute maritime area. In regard to Ghanaʼs activities, CôtedʼIvoire requested the Special Chamber to “to declare and adjudge that the activities undertaken
unilaterally by Ghana in the Ivorian maritime area constitute a violation of the obligation not tojeopardize or hamper the conclusion of an agreement, as provided for by article 83, paragraph 3,
12

Ibid., p. 133 (para. 469)

13

Yasuhiko Kagami, “Keisō kaiiki de no katsudō ― gaiana tai surinamu kaiyō kyōkai kakutei jiken”[Activities in disputed maritime areas: case concerning the maritime boundar y between Guyana
and Suriname], in Akira Kotera et al. (eds.), Kokusaih hanrei hyakusen [One Hundred SelectedInternational Law Cases] (2nd edition) (Yūhikaku, 2011), p. 77.

14

British Institute of International Comparative Law (BIICL), Report on the Obligation of States under
Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of UNCLOS in Respect of Undelimited Maritime Areas (BIICL, 2016), pp. 25–
26; David Anderson and Youri van Logchem, “Rights and Obligations in Areas of Overlapping Maritime
Claims,” in S. Jayakumar et al. (eds.), The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea, (Elgar, 2014), p.
220.

15

Kagami, supra note 13, p. 77; Naoya Okuwaki, “Kyōkai mikakutei kaiiki no kankatsuken” [Jurisdictionin undelimited maritime areas], in Shinya Murase and Junʼichi Etō (eds.), Kaiy ky kai kakutei nokokusaih [International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation] (Tōshindō, 2008), p. 173; BIICL,
supra note 14, pp. 25–26; Stephen Fietta, “Guyana/Suriname,” American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 102, No. 1 (2008), pp. 127–128.

16

Guyana/Suriname Award, supra note 6, p. 132 (para. 467).

17

Ibid., p. 137 (para. 481).

31
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Obligation of Self-Restraint in Undelimited Maritime Areasof UNCLOS.”18 In addition, Côte dʼIvoire sought provisional measures that would require Ghana,inter alia, to suspend all existing oil exploration and exploitation activities and to refrain from
granting new permits.19
In response to Côte dʼIvoireʼs request for provisional measures, the Special Chamber declined
to order the suspension of ongoing exploration and exploitation activities, and prescribed an orderprincipally requiring Ghana to ensure that no new drilling takes place.20 The Special Chamber
did accept that Côte dʼIvoireʼs rights to explore and exploit resources were at least plausible,that Ghanaʼs ongoing exploration and exploitation activities would result in a modification of thephysical characteristic of the disputed area, and that acquisition and use of information about
the resources of the disputed area would create a risk of irreversible prejudice to the rights
claimed by Côte dʼIvoire.21 However, the Special Chamber considered that an order suspending
ongoing activities would entail the risk of considerable financial loss and could cause harm to themarine environment. It was therefore considered not appropriate to order the suspension of all
exploration and exploitation activities.22
In its judgment on the merits, the Special Chamber found that Ghanaʼs unilateral exploitation
activities were not in violation of the obligation of self-restraint. Firstly, the judgment noted that
Ghana ultimately complied with the provisional measures order and suspended its activities
in the disputed maritime area.23 It added, however, that it would have been preferable if Ghana
had responded to Côte dʼIvoireʼs request at an earlier stage. Secondly, the judgment pointed outthat Ghana had undertaken activities only in the maritime area that was ultimately attributed
to it, and that Côte dʼIvoire had claimed a violation of Article 83(3) of UNCLOS in the “Ivorian
maritime area.”24 In other words, the judgment attached importance to the fact that Côte dʼIvoire
had claimed a violation of the obligation in the Ivorian maritime area, rather than in the disputed
maritime area. As a result of the maritime delimitation effected by the judgment, it was ultimately
found that Ghana had not carried out activities in Côte dʼIvoireʼs waters, and thus there was no
violation of the obligation of self-restraint within the scope of the submission by Côte dʼIvoire. It
seems that this second point was decisive for the judgment in reaching its conclusion. In effect,
the Special Chamber refrained from making substantive decisions concerning the obligation to
exercise self-restraint in the entire disputed maritime area.25
18

Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Judgment of 23 September 2017, para. 63.

19

Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the
Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Provisional Measures, Order of 25 April 2015, ITLOS Reports
2015, pp. 152–153 (para. 25) (https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-23/case-no-23provisional-measures/).

20

Ibid., p. 166 (para. 108). The Special Chamber indicated provisional measures to the effect that:a) Ghana shall ensure that no new drilling takes place in the disputed area; b) Ghana shall take allnecessary steps to prevent information resulting from its exploration activities in the disputed areafrom being used to the detriment of Côte dʼIvoire; c) Ghana shall monitor all activities conducted byitself or with its authorization to ensure the prevention of serious harm to the maritime environment;d) both parties shall cooperate in taking all necessary measures to prevent serious harm to the marine
environment in the disputed area; and e) both countries shall refrain from any unilateral action thatmight aggravate the dispute.

21

Ibid., pp. 163–164 (paras. 88–96).

22

Ibid., pp. 164–165 (paras. 99–102).

23

Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, Judgment of 23 September 2017, para. 632.

24

Ibid., para. 633.

25

Nuwan Peiris, “Ghana v. Ivory Coast,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 112, No. 1 (2018), p.
92.

32
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Kentaro Nishimoto

Nevertheless, the reference to Ghanaʼs suspension of activities in the judgment deser ves
attention. It is not entirely clear in what sense this fact was given as a reason for the findingthat there was no violation of Article 83(3).26 In any event, however, if the Special Chamber had
followed the standard adopted in the Guyana/Suriname case, the fact that Ghana later suspended
drilling activities that would cause physical change to the marine environment could not haveconstituted a reason supporting its conclusion. To that extent, the judgment in the Ghana/Côte dʼIvoire can be regarded as having adopted a different approach from the one in Guyana/
Suriname. A circumstance particular to the case was the fact that there was a certain accumulationof practice using the equidistance line as the boundary for exploration and exploitation of oil
resources, and that a dispute concerning activities in the Ghanaian side of the equidistance line
had surfaced relatively recently. (However, the argument of Ghana that mutual practice reflected
a tacit agreement between the parties on the maritime boundary was not accepted by the Special
Chamber.)27 The focus on the “suspension” of the activities carried out in the disputed maritime
area and not on factors such as the nature of the activities that were carried out, could be because
consideration was given to the particular context of the dispute between the parties.
Judge Paik appended a separate opinion to the judgment. Judge Paik, while stating thatthe formulation of the submission of Côte dʼIvoire compelled him to support the judgment,
considered the arguments on the obligation of self-restraint in detail.28 According to Judge Paik,
the obligation of self-restraint is a “result-oriented notion,” and the key is whether the action inquestion would have the effect of endangering or impeding the reaching of a final agreement.29
He maintains that, contrary to the approach adopted by the Guyana/Suriname award, what ispermissible under Article 83(1) and what is not cannot be identified in general and in the abstract.
Rather, Judge Paik considers it is necessary to take into account such factors as the type, nature,
location, and the time of acts, as well as the manner in which they are carried out, and to decidein the framework of relations between the State concerned.30 With regard to the case at hand,
he concluded that there was a violation of the obligation of self-restraint by Ghana, as Ghana had
continued to carry out highly invasive activities in the vicinity of the equidistance line, despite
repeated protests by Côte dʼIvoire.31(3) Assessment of the International Case Law
The two cases so far decided by international courts and tribunals, relating to the obligation ofself-restraint, do not necessarily provide clear standards concerning the scope of the obligation.
The Guyana/Suriname case indicated a test of physical change to the marine environment, andits decision that exploratory drilling and exploitation are not to be permitted is considered as

26

For a view that the reasoning is unconvincing, see Nigel Bankes, “ITLOS Judgment in the Maritime
Boundary Dispute between Ghana and Côte dʼIvoire” (http://site.uit.no/jclos/files/2017/10/JCLOSBlog_271017_ITLOS-Judgment-in-the-Maritime-Boundar y-Dispute.pdf). Bankes points out that the
obligation of self-restraint existed before and independently of the provisional measures order, and even
if Ghana could put an end to its continued violation of the obligation of self-restraint by complying withthe order, this does not mean that there was no proven breach before that time.

27

It is also noteworthy that the judgment referred to the issue as whether there was a breach of theobligation of self-restraint “after realizing that that area was also claimed by Côte dʼIvoire.” Ghana/Côted’Ivoire, Judgment of 23 September 2017, para. 631.

28

Ghana/ Côte d’Ivoire, Judgment of 23 September 2017, Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, para. 1.

29

Ibid., para. 6.

30

Ibid., para. 10.

31

Ibid., para. 16.

33
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Obligation of Self-Restraint in Undelimited Maritime Areas

providing important guidance on the matter.32 However, the view that activities that do not cause
physical change are generally permissible has not received support in subsequent discussions
on this issue. It has been suggested in academic literature that a flexible approach taking into
account the context of the relations between the States concerned may be necessary, and that it
may be difficult to establish an absolute standard based on the nature of the activity in question.33
As noted above, the reference to the suspension of existing exploitation activities in the judgmentin the Ghana/Côte dʼIvoire case may be regarded as consistent with this kind of approach. Thatjudgment also emphasized that the obligation of self-restraint is an obligation to make ever yeffort not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement, “in a spirit of understanding
and cooperation.”34 It could be argued that such an understanding of the obligation of selfrestraint also implies that there are certain limits to categorical standards based on the nature of
the activity in question.
The provisional measures order in the Ghana/Côte dʼIvoire case is also indicative of the limitsof the approach, such as in the Guyana/Suriname award, that attempts to identify the scope of theobligation of self-restraint through an analogy with the jurisprudence on provisional measures.
Since unilateral exploitation activities by Ghana resulted in permanent physical change to theseabed, this would be considered a violation of the obligation of self-restraint, if the standard
in Guyana/Suriname was adopted. In light of this, concerns have been raised about the factthat the Special Chamber in the Ghana/Côte dʼIvoire case did not prescribe orders for existing
exploratory drilling and resource exploitations, pointing out that there is a risk of a fait accompli
being accomplished.35 However, it could also be argued that the decision concerning provisional
measures in the Ghana/Côte dʼIvoire case has simply demonstrated that decisions on provisional
measures are made under different circumstances from those on the obligation of self-restraint inundelimited maritime areas. While no fundamental resolution of the situation is anticipated in thenear future with respect to the obligation of self-restraint, provisional measures are prescribed
only taking into account the need to preserve rights and prevent the exacerbation of the dispute
until the judgment on the merits is rendered.36 Thus, it may be time for a reassessment of thestandard adopted in Guyana/Suriname, also from the viewpoint of the reasoning from which it
was deduced.
One issue not addressed in either of these cases is the question of the geographical scope ofthe obligation of self-restraint. In both cases, the States concerned had clear claims regarding
their maritime zones. However, in areas such as the East China Sea, where such clear-cut claims
to maritime areas have not been made, the identification of a disputed area is in itself a difficult
issue. If the obligation of self-restraint is considered applicable to the entire area of overlapping
maritime entitlements, coastal States that make excessive maritime claims may be placed at anadvantage. It has therefore been suggested that defining the geographical scope of the obligationof self-restraint may not be necessary, and that considerations should instead focus on the extent
32

Kazuhiro Nakatani, “Kyōkai mikakutei kaiiki ni okeru ippōteki shigen kaihatsu to buryoku ni yoru
ikaku―gaiana-surinamu chūsai hanketsu wo sankō toshite” [Unilateral resource development and thethreat of force in undelimited maritime areas: A case study of the Guyana/Suriname arbitral award], inShunji Yanai and Shinya Murase (eds.), Kokusaih no jissen―komatsu ichir taishi tsuitou [The Practiceof International Law: in memory of Ambassador Ichirō Komatsu] (Shinzansha, 2015), p. 534.

33

Anderson and Logchem, supra note 14, pp. 206–207; BIICL, supra note 14, pp. 24–25.

34

Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, Judgment of 23 September 2017, paras. 629–630.

35

Yoshifumi Tanaka, “Unilateral Exploration and Exploitation of Natural Resources in Disputed Areas: A
Note on the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order of 25 April 2015 before the Special Chamber of ITLOS,” Ocean
Development and International Law, Vol. 46 (2015), pp.326–327.

36

The separate opinion of Judge Paik in the Ghana/Côte dʼIvoire case also makes this point. Ghana/Côted’Ivoire, Judgment of 23 September 2017, Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, paras. 8–9.

34
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Kentaro Nishimoto

to which a unilateral activity jeopardizes or hampers the reaching of a final agreement.37 However,this issue has not received adequate discussion in academic literature, making it difficult toconsider the application of the obligation of self-restraint in the East China Sea.

2. Responses to Violations of the Obligation of Self-Restraint
In addition to the question of the kinds of unilateral activities that would constitute a violation ofthis obligation, another important question is the scope of permissible responses by a coastal
State against a violation of the obligation of self-restraint by another State. Coastal States are ata risk of being placed at a disadvantage in the ultimate maritime boundary delimitation if they
fail to respond to unilateral activities undertaken by another State, as this may be deemed tacit
acceptance of the maritime claim of the latter. On the other hand, coastal States must ensure that
their own responses do not violate the obligation of self-restraint, if they choose to take certain
measures in response to a violation.

(1) Law Enforcement against Violations of the Obligation of Self-Restraint
In the Guyana/Suriname case, one of the main issues concerned the CGX Incident, in whicha drilling rig operating under permission from Guyana was ordered to leave the area by the
Surinamese navy. The Arbitral Tribunal, in addition to finding that Guyanaʼs grant of permission
for explorator y drilling constituted a violation of the obligation of self-restraint, decided thatthe order to leave issued by the Surinamese navy constituted a threat of force prohibited under
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and also violated the obligation of self-restraint under UNCLOS.38
In finding that Suriname had violated the obligation of self-restraint, the arbitral award specifically
noted that Suriname had other peaceful options to address the issue, including negotiations andthe use of the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.39 The finding by the Arbitral Tribunal
in this case that the order to leave by the Surinamese navy constituted a threat of force in violationof Article 2(4) of the UN Charter has drawn some criticisms, sparking a debate concerning
the conceptual distinction between the use of force in maritime law enforcement and under the
UN Charter.40 In relation to the obligation of self-restraint, it is not clear from the arbitral award
itself whether law enforcement measures that do not constitute the threat or use of force would
be found to constitute a breach, as the finding that Suriname had violated the obligation of selfrestraint in this case was made in connection with the finding on the threat of force.
However, considering that law enforcement activities in undelimited maritime areas canraise tensions between the States concerned, the statement by the arbitral award in the Guyana/
Suriname case that States should resort to peaceful means of dispute settlement should equally
apply to law enforcement activities in general. On the other hand, some adopt the view thatthe obligation of self-restraint should not necessarily prohibit all law enforcement measures,for the reason that it is doubtful whether negotiations and dispute settlement procedures are
sufficient measures to protect the interests of the coastal State after another States actually starts

37

BIICL, supra note 14, pp. 29–31.

38

Guyana/Suriname Award, supra note 6, pp. 126, 138 (paras. 445, 483–484).

39

Ibid., p. 138 (para. 484).

40

Patricia Jimenez Kwast, “Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on theCategorization of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/Suriname Award,” Journal ofConflict and Security Law, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2008), pp. 49–91; Tom Ruys, “The Meaning of ʻForceʼ and theBoundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are ʻMinimalʼ Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2 (4),”American Journal of International Law, Vol. 108, No. 2 (2014), pp. 159–210.

35
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Obligation of Self-Restraint in Undelimited Maritime Areas

conducting unilateral activities.41 This question is linked to the issue of whether it is possible toutilize the compulsory dispute settlement procedure of UNCLOS for a violation of the obligationof self-restraint, which is discussed below. It has also been suggested that even if law enforcement
activities in undelimited maritime areas would in general violate the obligation of self-restraint,
they may be justified as countermeasures against the prior violation of the obligation by anotherState.42 It would seem unequitable for a State to be placed at a disadvantageous position due
to the mutual obligation of self-restraint, while another State engages in unilateral resource
development. Thus, there might be room to consider that, under exceptional circumstances suchas in case of urgency or where there is no other way to preserve its rights, States could respondby certain law enforcement measures without violating the obligation of self-restraint.

(2) The Possible Use of the Compulsor y Dispute Settlement Mechanism
As discussed above, the arbitral award in the Guyana/Suriname case is of the view that an option
for States is to resort to the dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS when disputes arise
in undelimited maritime areas. However, Article 298(1)(a) of the Convention allows States todeclare that they do not accept procedures with respect to “disputes concerning the interpretation
or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations,” and therefore to
remove themselves from the scope of the compulsory dispute settlement procedure for thesekind of disputes. Of Japanʼs neighbors, Russia, the Republic of Korea and China have issued
such declarations with respect to all categories of disputes provided under Article 298(1).43 If
disputes concerning the obligation of self-restraint, which is provided in Article 74(3) and 83(3),are considered to fall within the exception under Article 298(1)(a), disputes with these Statesconcerning a violation of the obligation of self-restraint cannot be brought to the compulsory
dispute settlement procedure under UNCLOS.
One view on this issue is that disputes concerning the obligation of self-restraint do not fallwithin the exception on disputes “relating to sea boundary delimitations,” since the exception
should not be interpreted in an unduly broad manner, considering that the general rule of
UNCLOS is to subject disputes concerning its interpretation and application to the compulsory
dispute settlement procedure.44 However, the fact that Article 298(1)(a) provides an exception
should not necessarily warrant a narrow reading. A better approach is to consider the intended
scope of the exception on the basis of the treaty provision itself.
That being said, the text of Article 298(1)(a), which should provide the starting point forthis discussion, is ambiguous as to its purpose. It is unclear whether the intent was simply toallow exclusion of “disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and83,” with the phrase “relating to sea boundar y delimitations” merely explaining the content
of the referenced articles, or rather, to specifically limit the exclusion to disputes “relating
41

Irini Papanicolopulu, “Enforcement Action in Contested Waters: The Legal Regime,” 6th IHO-IAG
ABLOS Conference, Contentious Issues in UNCLOS―Surely Not?, Monaco, 25–27 October, 2010, p. 4
(https://www.iho.int/mtg_docs/com_wg/ABLOS/ABLOS_Conf6/S7P2-P.pdf)

42

BIICL, supra note 14, p. 116, 172; Sōji Yamamoto, “Kyōkai mikakutei kaiiki ni okeru hōshikkō sōchi
no haikei to genkai” [The Context and Limits to Law Enforcement Measures in Undelimited Maritime
Areas], Kaiy h no shikk to tekiy wo meguru kokusai funs jirei kenky [Case Studies of International
Disputes Concerning the Enforcement and Application of the Law of the Sea] (Kaizyō hoantaisei tyōsakenkyū iinkai hōkokusyo [Report of the Research Committee on the Regime of Maritime Security])(Japan Coast Guard Foundation, 2008), p. 113.

43

Russian Federation: Declaration made upon ratification, Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 34 (1997), p. 9;
Republic of Korea: Declaration pursuant to Article 298, 18 April 2006, Ibid., No. 61 (2006), p. 14; China:
Declaration under Article 298, 25 August 2006, Ibid., No. 62 (2006), p. 14.

44

Nakatani, supra note 32, p. 534.

36
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Kentaro Nishimoto

to sea boundar y delimitations ” within the broader categor y of “ disputes concerning theinterpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83.”45 As a matter of textual interpretation, theformer interpretation seems more straightforward. This was the interpretation adopted in thedecision on competence in the compulsory conciliation proceedings between Timor-Leste andAustralia concerning the Timor Sea in 2016.46 According to this position, disputes concerning
the obligation of self-restraint are not subject to compulsor y dispute settlement procedures,
because disputes concerning paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 which provide the obligation ofself-restraint would clearly fall within “disputes concerning
articles 15, 74 and 83,” which are
excluded by Article 298(1)(a).
However, the decision by the conciliation commission was not suppor ted by detailed
reasoning, and the matter may still be considered open for further discussion. It is understoodthat the reason for having a system of optional exceptions in the first place is that some disputes
were considered politically sensitive to be entrusted to the compulsor y dispute settlement
procedure.47 Article 298(1)(a), in particular, reflects the political and economic importance ofmaritime boundary delimitation, as a process for determining the scope of the power of coastal
States.48 It is possible to argue that this rationale for allowing optional exceptions does not apply
with respect to disputes concerning the obligation of self-restraint, as the dispute would haveno bearing on the standards or methods for boundar y delimitation itself.49 However, it could
alternatively be argued that disputes concerning the obligation of self-restraint cannot always
be considered in complete isolation from the standards and methods for the final maritime
delimitation, as the plausibility of the rights may have to be taken into account in finding a
violation of the obligation of self-restraint.

Conclusions
In academic circles, discussions are still ongoing about the scope of unilateral activities that canbe carried out by coastal States without violating the obligation of self-restraint in undelimited
maritime areas, and the measures that can be taken by coastal States against unilateral activities
that violate the obligation of self-restraint. A consistent standard has not yet been developed in thejurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. The arbitral award in the Guyana/Suriname
case did establish a seemingly clear-cut standard concerning the limits of unilateral activities.
However, the limits to making categorical determinations based on the nature of the activity havecome to be recognized as a result of the subsequent academic debates and the judgment in the45

Van Logchem, supra note 5, p. 195.

46

In the Matter of a Conciliation before a Conciliation Commission Constituted under Annex V to theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Democratic Republic of Timor-Lesteand the Commonwealth of Australia, Decision on Australiaʼs Objections to Competence (19 September2016), paras. 93–97. This case was a compulsory conciliation case under UNCLOS Annex V, which canbe initiated at the request of a party, when a dispute that fall under the optional exception in Article
298(1)(a) “arises subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention and where no agreement withina reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the parties.” On the decision of theconciliation commission on its competence, see Dai Tamada, “Kokuren kaiyōhō jōyaku fuzokusho V
chōtei jiken (higashi chimōru/ōsutoraria) kengen kōben ni kansuru kettei (2016 nen 9 gatsu 19 nichi)”[UNCLOS Annex V conciliation case (Timor-Leste/Australia), Decision on Objections to Competence(19 September 2016)], Kobe h gaku zasshi [Kobe Law Journal], Vol. 66, No. 3–4 (2017), pp. 119–134.

47

Proelss, supra note 4, p. 1921.

48

Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University
Press, 2005), p. 257.

49

Yumi Nishimura, “Kaiyō funsō no kaiketsu tetsuzuki to hō no shihai” [Dispute settlement procedures
concerning maritime disputes and the rule of law], Kokusai Mondai [International Affairs], No. 666(2017), p. 42.

37
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Obligation of Self-Restraint in Undelimited Maritime Areas

more recent Ghana/Côte dʼIvoire case.
In the developments after the Guyana/Suriname case, the obligation of self-restraint isincreasingly viewed as an obligation not limited to refraining from certain specific types ofactivities that could be identified in general and in the abstract. This is a useful point of reference
in examining the current situation in the East China Sea. For example, by restricting its resource
development in the East China Sea to the Chinese side of the equidistance line, China may be
acting in the belief that it is in compliance with the obligation of self-restraint by simply doing so.
However, notwithstanding the possible differences of interpretation concerning the geographicalscope of the obligation of self-restraint, the fact that China has continued to pursue unilateraldevelopment, despite the understanding on joint development that was reached in June 2008,
takes on added significance in the context of Japan-China relations in the East China Sea.50 On theother hand, it is also important for Japan to reassess whether activities conducted on the Japaneseside of the equidistance line would not have the effect of jeopardizing or hampering the reachingof a final agreement based on “the spirit of understanding and cooperation.”
It is dif ficult to provide any concrete conclusions on the prospect of Japan initiatingproceedings against China using the dispute settlement mechanism under UNCLOS, with theclaim that the unilateral resource development activities by China violate the obligation of selfrestraint. As discussed above, precedents and academic discussions on this point are limited,making it difficult to draw any concrete conclusions. However, it would seem that a plausible
case could be made in favor of the interpretation that Ar ticle 298(1)(a) does not exclude
disputes concerning a violation of the obligation of self-restraint from the compulsory disputesettlement procedure. As such, this option should not necessarily be ruled out. On the other
hand, the question of whether invoking the dispute settlement mechanism could contribute to
the resolution of the dispute in reality is an issue that must be seriously considered on its own
merits.51

50

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-China Joint Press Statement Cooperation between Japanand China in the East China Sea” (https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000091726.pdf).

51

On this point, see Nishimura, supra note 49, pp. 41–45.

38
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Izumi Nakamitsu

The Present and Future of Multilateralism andExpectations for Japan*
Izumi Nakamitsu**
Abstract
The international community faces a mounting crisis in multilateralism. The shift bycertain major States in pursuing a “my country first” posture, trending towards nationalism,
and inward-looking foreign policies is not a cause, but a symptom, of the challenges thatmultilateralism is confronting. The basis upon which multilateralism is declining seems
rooted in the loss of hope by citizens who feel their expectations for the post–Cold War
period have been betrayed, and who believe that they have been left behind by the policies
and effects of globalization. To address this difficult issue, it is first necessary to rightfully
acknowledge the outcomes achieved through multilateralism and the rationale of therefore
maintaining the rules-based international order. Secondly, to restore peopleʼs trust, it
is urgent and essential that reforms be made to ensure that multilateral institutions arecapable of effectively addressing and resolving issues that are becoming manifest in the
21st century. And thirdly, it will be vitally important to anticipate trends in major global
reforms and explore more creative ways to engage in multilateral diplomacy. Japan should
be a leader, advocating for the importance of multilateralism at this crucial juncture. To
that end, Japan would be well-advised to extend its powers of assistance and backing to
the discussions now under way on reforms to the United Nations and other multilateral
institutions.

Introduction

S

ince the end of World War II, the international order has been maintained and preserved
by multiple foundations, including, inter alia, the United Nations (UN) system and the
Bretton Woods institutions; various regional organizations and multilateral alliances;multilateral treaties and arrangements addressing specific issues, including the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the regimes and institutions thatsustain them. The principles of “great power unanimity” of the five permanent members of the
UN Security Council, sovereign equality of the UN Member States, non-intervention in internalaffairs, and territorial integrity were all key factors in the multilateral system, which contributed
to maintaining the balance of power and stability between East and West during the Cold War.
With accelerating globalization, the international community in the post–Cold War period hascome to place heightened importance on multilateral frameworks in order to address an array of
global-scale challenges concerning, among others, peace and security, free trade systems, humanrights, public health, humanitarian assistance, climate change, and sustainable development.
* This essay was originally published on Kokusai Mondai [International Affairs], No.678, Jan.-Feb. 2019.
** Izumi Nakamitsu is United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament
Affairs.

39
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Present and Future of Multilateralism and Expectations for Japan

Despite unilateral actions, such as the United States (US) invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Russian
invasion of Crimea in 2014, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and
the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015 seemed to underscore the effectiveness ofmultilateralism in addressing global issues through multilateral negotiations and coordination.
However, in 2018―three years after these major multilateral achievements―the international
community was facing a mounting crisis in multilateralism following both the United Kingdomʼsdecision to withdraw from the European Union as well as the US withdrawals from the Paris
Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Iran nuclear deal, and the UN Human
Rights Council.
It was multilateralism that was the most crucial issue at the high-level meeting of the UN
General Assembly in 2018, which was attended by the heads of state and prime ministers of
126 countries. In stark contrast to US President Donald Trumpʼs rejection of the “ideology ofglobalism” and emphasis on the “doctrine of patriotism,” a number of world leaders expressed
their commitment to UN-centered multilateralism and the rules-based international order,
arguably demonstrating a sense of crisis. However, in the view of the author, the shift by major
Member States to a “my country first” posture and inward-looking foreign policies is not a cause,
but a symptom, of the challenges which multilateralism is confronting.
What are the root causes of these challenges to multilateralism? What is needed for its
revitalization? What form should multilateralism take in the 21st century? And what role is Japan
expected to play? This article will address these questions from the perspective of the UN.

1. Root Causes of the Decline of Multilateralism
To maximally achieve their foreign policy objectives, all sovereign states choose the mostappropriate option from unilateralism, bilateralism, or multilateralism. Generally, a superpoweris likely to pursue its national interests through unilateralism or bilateral diplomacy since theseenable it to over whelm its counterparts. Moreover, medium and small powers tend to seek
opportunities to exercise its diplomatic powers in a multilateral framework to achieve its foreign
policy goals.
When discussing multilateralism, it is imperative to bear in mind that the term itself has alargely normative dimension. John Ruggie, who ser ved under former UN Secretar y-General
Kofi Annan as Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, defined multilateralism as an
institutional model for the coordination of relations among three or more nation-states based on
generalized principles of conduct.1 In the context of the post–Cold War international community,
this “normative” dimension was also manifest as an order based on liberal norms promoted by the
US-led Western countries. The creation of the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
in 1994, the adoption of the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” in 2005, and the establishmentof the UN Human Rights Council in 2006 all illustrate normative rules of behaviour in the post–
Cold War era.
However, in 2012, the situation in Syria exposed the dysfunction of the Security Council―thecore of the UNʼs multilateral system―which gave the impression that cracks had begun to appear
in the foundations of multilateralism in the post–Cold War era. Russian diplomats frequently
argued that Russia would never allow regime change in Syria as the Western countries had donein Iraq or Libya. As is widely known, the US and Russia are still in sharp conflict on Syrian issues,
such as regarding the use of chemical weapons. The US-Russian strategic rivalry has become
reminiscent of the Cold War–era relationship. It has had an impact on issues pertaining to thesituation in Ukraine, reduction and control of nuclear arsenals and other strategic weaponry,1

Ruggie, John G. “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization, Vol. 46,
No. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 561–598.

40
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Izumi Nakamitsu

and cyber security. This has led to the dysfunction of the UN Security Council contravening
the “principle of great power unanimity,” which in turn is a primary cause behind the crisis in
multilateralism. Furthermore, if the US and China fall into the “Thucydides Trap,” the impact, notonly on multilateralism, but on global stability, will be tremendous.2
At the same time, the current decision-making mechanisms of multilateral diplomacy are nolonger as simple as they were during the Cold War era of bipolar confrontation between Eastand West. The world is shifting towards a multipolar system and several regional major powers―no longer emerging powers―have acquired formidable influence and assertiveness. As aconsequence, it has become increasingly difficult to reach an agreement not only within the UN
Security Council but particularly within multilateral fora where decisions are made in consensus.
For instance, the Conference on Disarmament has been deadlocked for over 20 years, and the2005 and 2015 review conferences of the NPT―one of the pillars of the international security
system―failed to adopt a consensus final document on substantive issues.
However, the root cause behind the decline of multilateralism appears to be the loss ofhope by a number of people who feel their expectations for the post-Cold War period have been
betrayed and that they have been left out of the benefits of globalization. In his statement at
the General Assembly in 2018, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres described this senseof hopelessness as a case of “trust deficit disorder.”3 Due in part to the ineffectiveness of the
Security Council, the Syrian civil war has become a protracted conflict, spurring a massive outflow
of refugees. Additionally, migrant flows from, among others, Africaʼs Sahel region and Libya havetriggered a social and political crisis in Europe. While contributing to economic growth worldwide
and reducing the level of extreme poverty by half, the effects of economic globalization havemade a growing number of people feel that conditions of economic disparity and inequality haveactually worsened. A look across the advanced industrial world reveals an intensifying sense of
antipathy towards efforts at international cooperation as well as the open societies and institutions
cultivated by the international community under the banner of multilateralism. This sense ofhopelessness and loss of trust have begun feeding a vicious cycle further eroding multilateralism,
spurring political trends towards populism and exclusionism at the domestic level and giving
expression to inward-looking unilateralist foreign policies at the international level.

2. Multilateral Diplomacy and Multilateralism in the 21st Centur y
Secretary-General Guterres has sounded a warning that tensions reminiscent of the Cold War
have returned in the increasingly complex environment spurred by the shift towards a multipolarworld. He has emphasized the need to revitalize and strengthen the multilateral system forachieving and maintaining world peace and security. Cataclysmic changes caused by climatechange, large-scale refugee and migrant flows, and the “fourth industrial revolution” marked byartificial intelligence (AI) and cyber technologies, which will impact trends affecting not only the
security dimension but practically all areas of society, are global-scale challenges that cannot be
addressed through unilateral or bilateral diplomacy. The following three points are proposed toovercome the current decline of multilateralism and to revitalize and reinforce it.
The first is to rightfully acknowledge the outcomes achieved through multilateralism andto accordingly maintain the rules-based international order. Although not explicitly coveredby provisions of the UN Charter, peacekeeping operations (PKO) devised by members of the2

Allison, Graham, Professor, Har vard University. Destined for War: Can America and China EscapeThucydides’s Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. (“Beichu senso zenya—shinkyu taikoku o shototsu
saseru rekishi no hosoku to kaihi no shinario”) (Japanese translation by Asako Fujiwara, Diamond Inc.,
2017). When a rising power challenges a ruling one, the resulting tension carries a strong risk of war.
Allison describes this as an example of Thucydidesʼs trap, named after the ancient Greek historian.

3

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-09-25/address-73rd-general-assembly

41
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Present and Future of Multilateralism and Expectations for Japan

international community to deal with challenges to peace have prevented conflicts from escalating
and contributed to their resolution. Also, achievements in fields such as public health andeducation would not have been possible without multilateral cooperation. It is essential to reaffirm
that the UN Charter and the various UN institutions, which possess unparalleled legitimacy
attributable to their universality, are actually at the core of these norms and institutions. The
norms of the 21st century should be more than purely elements of an order governing behaviour
between sovereign states; rather, they should be human-centric in their nature and capable ofrecovering the trust of those who feel excluded or left behind. We must send a clear message
explaining why multilateral cooperation is needed now more than ever.
Secondly, to restore peopleʼs trust, it is urgent that reforms be made to ensure that multilateral
institutions are capable of effectively addressing and resolving those issues that are becoming
manifest in the 21st century. It is regrettable that, in the post–Cold War period, the Member
States could not make serious efforts to implement reforms in several areas, such as reforms to
the Security Council. Efforts at UN reform led by Secretary-General Guterres, including to theSecretariat and UN system, should be understood within this broader context. UN institutions
should be capable of preventing and resolving conflicts whenever possible, and they must beable to effectively contribute to refugee relief and the mitigation of economic disparities. To
these ends, UN institutions must not be simply bureaucratic entities, but should possess theintellectual capacity to formulate and present visionary solutions to these difficult tasks. Virtually
all of the issues that the international community now faces are fraught with difficulty and cannot
be addressed or solved by a single organization. The UN has already amassed experience incooperating with the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations in peacekeeping
operations and the mediation of peace accords.4 Still, there needs to be a framework that will
enable multilateral institutions to function even more effectively while coordinating and forming
cooperative partnerships among multilateral organizations. This may be referred to as a form of
networked multilateralism.5
And thirdly, it will be vitally important to anticipate trends in major global reforms andexplore more creative ways to engage in multilateral diplomacy. Dealing with the new challenges,
including the weaponization of AI, will require the constr uction of new norms throughmultilateral diplomacy. It is likely that the formation of norms in the 21st century will require not
only the more traditional international legal instruments such as treaties but also soft norms suchas political declarations and commitments―which are not legally binding but are monitored―
voluntary codes of conduct of private companies and scientists, and industrial standards. Thatbeing the case, new creative multilateral diplomacy should be pursued based on the contributionsof more inclusive, “multi-stakeholder” processes as well as traditional multilateral government
negotiations. With this approach, the “convening power” that the UN wields as a forum for
dialogue and negotiation will presumably increase in importance.

3. The Role Expected of Japan
Since joining the United Nations in 1956, Japan has been committed to a pacifist diplomacy shapedby moderation and has continued to be a respected member of the international community.
4

For example, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a security mission in Afghanistan
led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed a cooperative alliance with the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Currently the African Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM) is actively engaged in Somalia in cooperation with the United Nations Assistance Missionin Somalia (UNSOM), while the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is working inSouth Sudan with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

5

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-11-09/strengthening-multilateralism-and-roleun-remarks-security-council

42
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Izumi Nakamitsu

The soft power it has amassed over this long period and the trust it has earned from theinternational community should not be underestimated. As a country which has led initiatives in
multilateral cooperation in fields ranging from humanitarian and development assistance to peacebuilding and public health, I hope that Japan will be a leader which advocates the importanceof multilateralism at this crucial juncture. To that end, Japan is expected to extend its powersof assistance and backing to the discussions now underway on reforms to the UN and othermultilateral institutions. It would also arguably be worthwhile for Japan to utilize, in full, the trust
it has earned within the international community and play more proactive roles in coordinationand mediation in the interests of other countries. Moreover, I hope that Japan will act as a country
capable of conveying wisdom and vision for the 21st century, connecting civil society, sovereignstates and global society as it did in the past through the promotion of human security and otherimportant policy concepts at the international level. Finally, it should also be noted that in order torealize this in todayʼs world, which is globalizing and flattening at ever accelerating speeds, Japan
itself urgently needs to tackle the tasks of dismantling its seniority system, ensuring diversity,and evolving into a society that enables all citizens to be active participants regardless of age or
gender.

43
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific:
Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia*
Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins**
Abstract
The governments of Japan and the United States have firmly adopted the notion of a “Freeand Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) at the heart of their regional foreign policies. The FOIP
initiative has now energized other regional allies and partners of these two leading states
as they search for ways to respond to and contribute to the FOIP. As self-styled “middle
powers,” Canada and Australia have been no exception. This article explores the potential
roles to be played by Ottawa and Canberra, both individually, and in tandem, with regards tomatters such as respect for national sovereignty, peaceful conflict resolution, free and open
trading practices, and the maintenance of international laws and norms. The article reveals
that while both Canada and Australia both effectively support the FOIP, Canberra has been
more proactive in turning its rhetoric into actions by means of a dedicated “Step Up” policyin the crucial South Pacific sub-region, as well as noteworthy efforts to enhance its own
capabilities in line with American alliance expectations. It concludes that Washingtonʼs needfor capable and willing allies will grow further, and that both countries are well-positioned
to contribute further to the FOIP in multifarious ways, both as allies, and potentially as in abilateral capacity, should the opportunity arise.

The Indo-Pacific, as a geographic concept that connects the vast oceans of the Pacificand the Indian along with the states in between, is not a new idea. Indeed, the idea ofa broader geographic region―rather than more traditional subsets such as East Asia,
South Asia, or the more expansive Asia-Pacific―has been used for more than a decadeby scholars and practitioners in the region. An Indian naval captain began using the concept ingeopolitical terms more than a decade ago, but the terminology has not been limited to scholars
in Delhi. Japanʼs Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, back during his first stint as Prime Minister in 2007,
spoke to Indiaʼs parliament about his countryʼs vision for the Indo-Pacific noting a “confluenceof the two seas”1 and pressed for a need to transcend beyond traditional frameworks that often
separated or minimized the geopolitical connections between South Asian and the Indian Ocean*

This policy brief is based off a range of discussions, meetings and presentations that the authors had
during an academic outreach trip to California in May 2019. The authors engaged with a number ofscholars, officials and policy makers on the Indo-Pacific and the role of middle powers, such as Canada
and Australia. Some of these stakeholders included: the RAND Corporation, the Milken Institute, theKorean Consulate in Los Angeles, the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles, the Middlebury Institute ofInternational Studies at Monterey, the Japan Society of Northern California and Stanford University.

** Jonathan Berkshire Miller is a Tokyo-based Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs
and a Distinguished Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada.
Thomas S. Wilkins is a Senior Fellow at the Japan at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and a
Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of Sydney, Australia.
1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Confluence of the Two Seas: Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe,
Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,” August 2007.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html

44Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins

region with that of East Asia and the Pacific.
But, while not new, the Indo-Pacific framing has been quickly gaining currency by actors
in the region, with Japan and the United States declaring Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)
strategies or visions, in addition to other regional approaches by India, Australia and Indonesia.
According to Washington, in a recent Report released by the Department of Defense (DOD),
the FOIP is based upon the principles of (i) respect for sovereign independence, (ii) peacefulresolution of disputes, (iii) free, fair and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent
agreements, and connectivity, and (iv) adherence to international rules and norms, (including
those of freedom of navigation and overflight).2
The United States emphasized the importance of this change by renaming its former US
Pacific Command―military headquarters for the region based in Hawaii―to the US Indo-PacificCommand last year.3 The concept has also sparked interest of like-minded states in Europe―
both France and the United Kingdom demonstrating a keen interest in promoting their own
engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Earlier this year, the French aircraft carrier―the Charles deGaulle―set course for its journey from the Mediterranean Sea to Singapore, traversing throughthe Indian Ocean region and working with regional partners on its way. The British have also
made similar deployments in recent years. Last year, the Royal Navy dispatched three ships thattraversed the South China Sea alongside a contingent from Franceʼs navy. During the trip, theUK vessels conducted a freedom of navigation patrol in the waters near the Paracel Islands in thedisputed South China Sea.4
To be sure, the Indo-Pacific is facing a host of shared security challenges, from maritime
piracy and crime, to heated territorial disputes and a pressing need to enhance regional capacity
and readiness for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to mitigate the impact of natural
disasters. In the vast maritime space of the region―stretching from East Africa to the Pacificisland chains―the foundations of regional commerce and security are secured through thefreedom of navigation and secure Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS). These areas are crucial
for all states in the region―including middle powers such as Canada and Australia ―as they
are both deeply invested in secure supply chains through its economic integration with theComprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
There is great economic opportunity in the region for both Canada and Australia with large
economies and diverse fast-paced growth in many middle-size economies. That said, alongside
this economic growth is a large demand for infrastructure development in the region―with the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimating that there is a need for more than $25 trillion in
infrastructure by 2030.5 To fill this void, several regional powers have the ability to work withstates in the region for a sustainable way forward based on fair-lending, transparent institutions
and long-term growth. This is an area that middle powers, such as Canada and Australia, canjoin other states―such as the US, Japan, and states from Europe―to push forward on and makeunique contributions.
2

US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a
Networked Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 4. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/
DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF

3

US Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Holds Change of Command Ceremony,” May2018. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1535776/us-indo-pacificcommand-holds-change-of-command-ceremony/4

Tim Kelly, “British Navy warship sails near South China Sea islands, angering Beijing,” Reuters,
September 6, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/ar ticle/us-britain-china-southchinasea-exclusive/
exclusive-british-navy-warship-sails-near-south-china-sea-islands-angering-beijing-idUSKCN1LM017

5

Asian Development Bank, “Meeting Asiaʼs Infrastructure Needs,” February 2017. https://www.adb.
org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs

45
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

Yet, alongside these economic opportunities are a number of key challenges to the rules andorder in the region that have underpinned security and prosperity for the littoral states. China
continues to favour coercive actions rather than adherence to international law with regard to its
salami-slicing tactics in the South China and East China Seas.6 These concerns in the maritime
realm are not limited to the East and South China Seas. In the Indian Ocean region, there has
been a build-up of Chinese infrastructure development in critical areas such as deep ports in Sri
Lanka and Pakistan. These moves continue to draw anxiety from states in the region, who arewary of Chinaʼs long-term geopolitical motivations through its signature Belt and Road Initiative(BRI).

Canada’s Approach to the Free and Open Indo-PacificCanada has shown an interest in being more engaged in the Indo-Pacific region. During the visitof Japanʼs Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Ottawa in late April, Canadian Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau noted a “shared vision for maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region based on therule of law.”7 The statement was Canadaʼs first high-level endorsement of the importance of IndoPacific strategies, of which many key regional players like the US, Japan, Australia, India andIndonesia have already adopted. But, while the visit with Japan was the first upfront embraceof the Indo-Pacific concept, Ottawa has in fact already outlined its shared views on the region
through its joint statement with India last year―where the two sides agreed to “reaffirm theimportance of lawful commerce and the freedom of navigation and over-flight throughout the
Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with international law.”8
Despite this, however, Canada has been hesitant to embrace the FOIP concept. The traditionallens for Ottawa to look at engagement has been through the Asia-Pacific framing―defining theregion largely through our experience in the multilateral architecture such as the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the trade side, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Regional Forum on the political-security side. Canada was a founding member of APEC
in 1990 and has been a dialogue partner in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its formationin 1994. Aside from these two main vehicles, Canada has been active in the international
development space over the years through and is a member of the Asian Development Bank,and more recently joined―while not before considerable internal debate―the Chinese-led AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2017.9
This multilateral underpinning is of course complemented by a range of diverse bilateralrelations in the region, with different opportunities and challenges. China and Japan― thesecond and third largest economies―are the two most critical relationships in terms of tradevalue, but there are growing relationships with a host of other partners in the region too ―including South Korea (with which Canada inked a Free Trade Agreement in 2014), Taiwan,
6

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters
Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japanʼs Response - Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government
and Other Vessels into Japanʼs Ter ritorial Sea,” June 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
page23e_000021.html

7

Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister of Canada Announces Closer Cooperation with Japan,” April
2019. https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2019/04/28/prime-minister-canada-announces-closer-collaborationjapan

8

Prime Minister of Canada, “India-Canada Joint Statement: Partnership for Security and Growth,”
Februar y 2018. https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/02/23/india-canada-joint-statement-partnershipsecurity-and-growth9

Philip Calvert, “Canadaʼs Move to Join the AIIB is Smart Politics and Economics,” Nikkei Asian Review,
September to 2016. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Philip-Calvert-Canada-s-move-to-join-the-AIIB-issmart-politics-and-economics

46
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins

India and the individual member states of ASEAN. Underscoring these growing relationships―
at least in economic terms―is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-PacificPartnership, a mega-regional free trade pact that Canada ratified, along with 10 other states in theregion, last year.10
But yet, despite a long history of engagement, the consistency of Canadaʼs role often appears
unmoored and not fully aligned with our interests and stakes in the significant geopolitical shifts
taking place in the region. A frequent critique from stakeholders and officials in the region isthat Canada must make a more consistent and comprehensive approach that demonstrates aninvestment of time and capital that goes beyond merely trade and investment. Specifically, there
is a need and desire―at least from most states―for a strong Canadian voice on political-security
developments in the region, be it on maritime security, nuclear non-proliferation or humanitarianassistance and disaster relief (HADR). This is where the tenets, rules and values that form
the basis of the emerging growth of Indo-Pacific frameworks will help Canada better serve its
interests and promote its role.

The role for Canada in the Indo-Pacific

In June 2019, Canada ʼ s Defense Minister Harjit Sajjan visited the Shangri-La Dialogue in
Singapore for the fourth consecutive year. The Dialogue, hosted under the stewardship of theInternational Institute of Strategic Studies in the UK, is the premier security and defense summit
in Asia and has become a “must-attend” event for officials, policy makers and scholars focusedon the regionʼs wide range of emerging security issues―of which strategic competition between
the United States and China is top of mind in recent years. Immediately following the Shangri-La
Dialogue, Sajjan visited Japan for an important bilateral visit which was hosted by Japanʼs Defense
Minister Takeshi Iwaya. During Sajjanʼs visit, Canada and Japan agreed to work cooperatively toadvance a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”11 Indeed, when thinking about Canadaʼs engagement in
the region, our relations with Japan must be first of mind.
As Canadaʼs looks to reorient its defense posture to be more active in the Indo-Pacific, Japan
should be the logical cornerstone of such efforts. During the visit of Sajjan to Tokyo in June,
Canada and Japan underscored the importance of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement(ACSA) signed last year. This agreement will strengthen cooperation between the CanadianArmed Forces (CAF) and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and will allow both countries to makeefficient use of each otherʼs military equipment during operations and exercises in Canada, Japanand other locations. The agreement will also advance cooperation between the two countries
in response to humanitarian and disaster crises, peacekeeping initiatives, and allow greatercollaboration with third-partners, including the US.12
In addition to the ACSA agreement, both sides are moving towards greater interoperability
between their militaries with a growth in joint exercises and high-level exchanges. In 2017, thetwo sides commenced bilateral naval drills dubbed “Kaedex” (“kaede” meaning maple leaf inJapanese) and the Canadian navy also participated as a trilateral participant last year in the US10

Global Affairs Canada, “CPTPP Explainer,” June 2019. https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.aspx?lang=eng

11

Department of National Defence of Canada, “Joint Statement of the Ministry of Defense of Japan andthe Department of National Defence of Canada on Defense Cooperation,” June 2019. https://www.
canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2019/06/joint-statement-of-the-ministry-of-defenseof-japan-and-the-department-of-national-defence-of-canada-on-defense-cooperation.html

12

Global Af fairs Canada, “Canada and Japan sign Acquisition and Cross-Ser vicing Agreement tostrengthen military cooperation,” April 2018. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/04/
canada-and-japan-sign-acquisition-and-cross-ser vicing-agreement-to-strengthen-militar y-cooperation.
html

47
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

Japan “Keen Sword” naval exercises. Canada has also been working with Japan, and other allies
in the Five Eyes intelligence network, to help monitor and disrupt attempts by North Korea toevade sanctions over its nuclear and missiles programs―through surveillance of ship-to-shiptransfers in the East China Sea.13 Moreover, in 2018 Canadian General Wayne Eyre was appointed
as Deputy Commander of the UN Command on the Korean Peninsula―marking the first time a
non-US general assumed the role.
But there are more steps to go in this nascent security relationship. This past April, during thevisit of Japanʼs Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Ottawa, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made thefirst high-level Canadian endorsement of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”―a vision that is sharedby other like-minded states, such as the US, Australia and Japan. This vision fundamentallyrests on the maintenance of a rules-based international order premised on common norms,
laws and practices, with an aim at reducing the potential for conflict and promoting sustainable
development. This of course draws a stark contrast to Chinaʼs increasingly hostile posture in theregion, marked by its militarization of man-made islands in the South China Sea and its unfair
and non-transparent lending practices through its Belt and Road Initiative. Not to mention its
coercive attempts―through the arbitrary detention of two of our citizens and sealing off much of
the market for our exporters of canola and soybeans―to force Canada to relent on the sensitive
extradition case of Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou. Going forward Canada should
continue to enhance our ties with Japan―a natural partner in the region―and other key middle
powers such as Australia, states in ASEAN and South Korea, to work closely and pursue ourinterests in the Indo-Pacific.
How can Canada become more involved in the emerging Indo-Pacific framework? First,
Canada must assertively and unapologetically promote its interests and values in the region―
most of which align closely to its key partners there such as the US, Japan, Australia, and member
states in ASEAN. For example, if one closely inspects the FOIP policies by Washington andTokyo, they will find more convergence than divergence with regard to Canadian interests. The
US strategy stresses the need to “promote transparency, openness, rule of law, and the protectionof human rights and fundamental freedom.”14 Tokyo meanwhile stresses the importance ofpeace and stability in the region through common rules, open investment and the provisionof international public goods. Most would agree these are rules and norms the Canada also
subscribes too. A corollary to this is that greater engagement with the Indo-Pacific would help
us further national areas of excellence desperately need in the regionʼs approach to preventive
diplomacy, such as women, peace and security.
Second, Canada can manage both an ef fective and pragmatic relationship with China,
and simultaneously enhance its engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing may bewary of the framing of Indo-Pacific, because of its tense relations with Washington under the
Trump administration, but it would be incorrect to label the different national approaches as acontainment strategy aimed at China. Rather than alliance-politics, this is a loose grouping of likeminded and progressive states that are standing up for a prosperous and stable region that follows
rules and maintains a sustainable trajectory―not to benefit one, but for the region as a whole.
This is something Canada should stand up for, and it should not let its recent bilateral difficulties
with Beijing distract it from the larger strategic dynamics playing out in the region.
Finally, just as engaging China and the Indo-Pacific framework are not mutually exclusive, so
are the fundamentals of our existing engagements in the region. Ottawa will continue to be a key
13

Depar tment of National Defence, “Operation NEON,” June 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/
department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operationneon.html

14

US Department of State, “Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region,” November 2018. https://www.state.gov/advancing-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-region/

48
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins

part of APEC, the ARF, ADB and other multilateral fora―with ASEAN at the core―but it need
not pursue this road in isolation from cooperation that makes sense with regional partners andallies.

Australia’s Indo-Pacific Vision

The first thing to note with regard to Australiaʼs approach to the FOIP is the nomenclature
employed. Canberra has not officially adopted the moniker “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” likeits American and Japanese partners to badge its regional strategy, with the cognate term “open,
inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific” featuring instead in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.15
Some variations on the term naturally appear in surrounding discourses―“a free, open, inclusive
and prosperous Indo-Pacific” has been used in joint statements with the US and Japan―but thisslight distinction does not amount to any tangible difference from the core precepts of the FOIP
(described in the introduction).
So, what form does Canberraʼs participation in the FOIP take, in the context of a broader
Australian Indo-Pacific strategy (IPs)? There is no one specific policy document or declarationthat embodies Australiaʼs IPs, but rather it is represents a compound of individual and joint
policies and initiatives which sync with the FOIP concept. In this short briefing it is useful to
unpack its ideological, security and economic dimensions, all of which are intertwined.
Behind the Australian “vision” of an “Indo-Pacific Century,” destined to bring regional andnational prosperity, there are three premises.16 First among these is the “relocation” of Australiaʼsstrategic frame of reference to the newly identified “Indo-Pacific” region itself. The recent
Defence and Foreign Policy White papers codified a shift in the locus and scope of regional
interaction to the “Indo-Pacific” as geopolitical construct. Influential Australian figures had longadvocated for a refocusing on the Indo-Pacific, aside from the extant “Asia Pacific,” as recognition
not only of Indiaʼs rise to economic and strategic prominence, but as a better reflection of theactual region Australia itself inhabits at the intersection of these two great Oceans.17
Second is the oft-repeated government commitment to a “Rules-based International Order”(RBO) which the FOIP strongly advocates. This has long been an identifiable theme for a“middle power” country like Australia, which, based solely upon its own national capabilities,
cannot afford to engage in a no-holds barred struggle of power politics, but rather seeks a “liberalinternationalist” posture which emphasizes international norms and institutions, sovereignty,
rule-of-law, non-coercion and all-round “good international citizenship.”18 The RBO concept has
become an increasingly prolific mantra in Canberraʼs policy declarations as the best method
to achieve regional stability and prosperity. Not so implicit in the RBO concept is a resistanceto Chinese revisionist attempts to expand its strategic space and influence across the region
in ways viewed as detrimental to the existing order, as evidenced through the BRI, Shanghai
Cooperation organisation, and AIIB, for example. Instead, Australia alongside its close US andJapanese partners seeks to provide an alternative to a future regional order dominated by China
in contradiction with these liberal internationalist principles.
Third, participation in FOIP-related activities is grounded in Australiaʼs deep attachment to15

Australian Government, “Overview,” in 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Barton ACT: Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), pp. 1–10.

16

Cameron Hill, “Australia in the ʼIndo-Pacificʼ Century: Rewards, Risks, Relationships,” in Parliamentary
Library Briefing Book (Canberra ACT: Parliamentary Library, 2013), pp. 144–145.

17

Rory Medcalf, “In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australiaʼs New Strategic Map,” Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs, 68:4 (2014), pp. 470–483.

18

Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment : Australia in the World since 1942 (Carlton, Vic.: La Trobe
University Press, 2017).

49
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

American regional primacy. Australia―like Japan and many others―sees its bilateral security
alliance with the US anchored in the broader “hub-and-spokes” network, and its close Special
Strategic Partnership with Japan, as the best way to uphold or enforce the RBO and secure the
Indo-Pacific in accord with its national interests. In correspondence with the recently released
American Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which outlines replacement US grand strategy for the
Pivot, Canberra is seeking deeper partnerships with Japan, India, and key SEA states in a bid to
uphold the RBO semi-independently and collectively, alongside the central role expected of the
US.19

Security Considerations for Australia

The primary drivers behind Australiaʼs interest in the FOIP are security concerns. While broader“Non-Traditional Security” (NTS) issues remain prominent in Australian thinking, for example:
terrorism, irregular populations movements, climate change, or financial or humanitarian crises,
it is the newly arrived era of great power competition that most vexes strategic planners in
Canberra. Based upon its growing economic and strategic weight in the region, China has moved
from “biding its time and hiding its capabilities” to a newfound policy of “assertiveness” pushingout its strategic space and regional influence by a variety of means that have set alarm bells
ringing in Canberra as portents of a “new Cold War.”
Chinese militarisation of the contested South China Sea (in violation of international law andprior agreements with the US), the use of economic coercion against Canada, Japan and South
Korea, among others, and its attempts to establish a regional foothold in Australiaʼs “patch” of
the South Pacific have shifted perceptions in Canberra. But in addition to these demonstrationsof Chinese “sharp power,” nothing so upset the political equilibrium in Canberra as much as
the recent revelation of the extent of Chinese espionage and “influence operations” discovered
inside Australia itself.20 On this basis, Australia has tightened its security measures and readily
complied with US wishes to ban the Chinese state-owned telecom giant Huawei from providing its
5G network, drawing economic retaliation―an interruption in coal imports―from Beijing.
Indeed, the Chinese challenge is seen across the Indo-Pacific region, and which the FOIP
concept seeks to address. It includes the use of economic statecraft to achieve strategic gains aswell as “hybrid” techniques to challenge the strategic situation on the ground―or more appositely―on the sea. By seeking to exploit “gray zone areas” in the maritime space, for example theuse of fishing fleets and maritime militias to harass competitor states in disputed territories in
the South China and East China Seas, Beijing is seeking to break out of the confines of its socalled series of “island chains” and ultimately extend a degree of control over key maritime
trade arteries. The security of these SLOCS, and the rights of free navigation and overflightin international waters are increasingly challenged by naval and air intrusions, and patrols
attempting to assert Chinese sovereignty. The controversial Freedom of Navigation Operations(FONOPS) conducted by the US Navy consistently meet harassment from Chinese forces. This
strikes at the heart of the FOIP and RBO concepts that Australia seeks to defend and exemplify
Chinese attempts to revise the regional order to its preference. Australia has sought to augment
its regional naval presence through Indo-Pacific Endeavour―a task force engaging in a series ofengagement activities and military training exercises during port visits―in addition to low profile
maritime patrol and surveillance activities Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca and South China Sea
under Operation Gateway.
19

US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a
Networked Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 4. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/
DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF

20John Garnaut, “Australiaʼs China Reset,” The Monthly, August 2018.

50
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins

Australia is also backing the FOIP with hard power through a sustained program to improveits defence capabilities with a projected defence budget increase of 2% of GDP, (currently AUD$36.4bill. for 2018).21 It is seeking to augment existing capabilities, which are being ever-more
attuned to combined operations with the US (and potentially Japan) and acquiring new ones.
Chief among these is the future submarine project which will double the its flotilla by 2030,
giving it some of the most potent undersea naval capabilities. In addition, it seeks to increase its
reconnaissance capabilities to enforce Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the vast Oceanic
spaces to the north of the Australian continent through acquisition of US hardware such as the
8A Poseidon maritime surveillance/response aircraft and MQ-4C Triton UAV.
Australia is also upgrading its 70-year-old defence alliance with the US.22 Under the US
Force Posture Initiatives in Northern Australia, agreement has been made as early as 2016 tostation a US Marine Task Force in Darwin, while defence, intelligence and military ties haveall been strengthened. The 2018 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN)
consultations listed a prolific range of areas for cooperation including upholding the rules-based
international order (through the FOIP), coordination against foreign domestic interference,
regional maritime capacity-building, economic and infrastructure support, space, cyber andenergy security issues, missile defence, counter terrorism, and a stronger role for the Trilateral
Strategic Dialogue (TSD) with Japan.23
Plans have also been unveiled to establish a joint naval base with the US at Lombrum on
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (PNG).24 As the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper affirms―
25“Our alliance with the United States is central to Australiaʼs approach to the Indo-Pacific.” Andadditionally, Australia has sought to keep advancing its security relations with Japan throughits decade-old Strategic Partnership with Tokyo, another advocate of FOIP and the RBO.26 This
process is unified with the US through means of the reinvigorated Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
process just mentioned.
Furthermore, Australia is seeking to extend this into a Quadrilateral process―the “Quad”―
with New Delhi in order to gain Indiaʼs adherence to the overall FOIP vision as part of its Indocentric strategy. However, much confusion reigns as to the exact relationship between the Quadand the FOIP that has hindered the understanding of both (as I have illustrated elsewhere), but
in particular it seems that Quad members are divided over their interpretation of how “inclusive”
the latter is to be presented.27 Whilst, all parties have stressed that FOIP is open to all that abide
by its principles, in reality it is a values-loaded concept―perhaps with the intent of “socialising”
China (in echoes of the earlier “responsible stakeholder” notion). Indeed, since the Quadpartners are all democratic states, and the FOIP itself inherently represents an alternative to the21

Australian Government, Depar tment of Defence, “A Safer Australia - Budget 2018–19 Defence
Overview,” May 8, 2018. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au [Accessed March 3, 2019]22

Thomas Wilkins, “Re-assessing Australiaʼs Intra-Alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump,”
Security Challenges [Forthcoming].

23

Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “2018 Australia-U.S. Ministerial
Consultations (AUSMIN),” July 24, 2018. https://dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/2018-ausmin.aspx[Accessed March 1, 2019]24

Joanne Wallis, “Australia Steps Up Its Pacific Pivot,” East Asia Forum, October 20, 2018. http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2018/10/20/australia-steps-up-its-pacific-pivot

25

Australian Government, “Overview,” in 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Barton ACT: Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), 4.

26

Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and Japan Facing ʼDisruptiveʼ Challenges to the Rules Based Order in the
Indo-Pacific,” Policy Brief, September 26, 2018.

27

Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and the ʼIndo Pacificʼ Concept―Disambiguating the ʼIdeaʼ and the ʼRegionʼ
from Quadrilateral ʼStrategyʼ,” Policy Brief, July 19, 2018.

51
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

Chinese-led regional order, there is a large contradiction in this proposition.
Lastly, Australia has been keen to attract additional adherents to the broad FOIP vision, boththrough other enhanced security partnerships, such as with Singapore, but also through the“Quad-plus” process that brings extra-regional powers such as France and the UK into the FOIP
enterprise (noted in the introduction). The final layer of this cooperation is the desire to maintaina place for ASEAN in the FOIP vision―Canberra has been quick to reassure members that
“ASEAN centrality” will not be undermined, but polls among South East Asia experts indicate
a great degree of scepticism over the FOIP.28 Indonesia, Australiaʼs emerging neighbour to thenorth has made attempts to frame its own IPs (the “global maritime fulcrum”), but appears tepid
towards the FOIP itself.
Yet there limits to Canberraʼs willingness to support and enforce the FOIP and US primacy indefiance of Beijing, especially if it emerges as a “hard-balancing” or “containment” mechanism.
It is well known that not only is the PRC by far Australiaʼs biggest trading partner, upon whom
continued prosperity is assumed to depend, but the possibility that the US may gradually
withdraw from the region and leave China as regional hegemon also raise the “shadow of the
future” in Australian calculations.29 Indeed, the current US Administration has sent mixed signals
as to its engagement with the region. On the one hand Trumpʼs disparagement of allies, tradedisruptions, withdrawal from TPP, and disregard for the liberal international order have seriously
undercut Australiaʼ s position. Yet, more recent championship of the FOIP combined withdetermined efforts to push back against Chinese challenges are more positive signals, welcomedin Canberra. Nevertheless, Medcalf argues “Australiaʼs preference is for a U.S. response to Chinathat competes rather than confronts, that deters rather than provokes.”30

Economic Drivers
To be effective and appealing to regional interlocutor states across the Indo-pacific, and tocompete with the economic challenges raised by China, Australiaʼs de facto participation in
the FOIP also has a strong economic component. Given the maritime/security emphasis that
the FOIP has acquired, it is important to note the economic aspects in which Australia is aparticipant, seeking to tap into emerging markets and benefit from the “blue water economy”
concept.31 Integral to the FOIP vision is the desire to promote increased regional connectivity
through free-market, transparent and high-quality programs that will meet the regionʼs growing
infrastructure needs. In this respect it again runs counter to Chinese methods that have been
criticized for being opaque, corrupt, bringing few local employment benefits, and entrapping aid
beneficiaries with unsustainable debt for projects of questionable viability (“debt-trap diplomacy”).
The antithesis of the FOIP.
Australiaʼs economic centre of gravity has shifted over the past two decades towards its
Western Indian-Ocean-facing and Northern coasts as result of its massive minerals exports trade
Australia itself is a major trading partner with South East Asia, the Pacific Island Countries (PICS),

28

Tang Siew Mun (et al.), The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak
Institute, 2019).

29

Hugh White, Without America: Australia in the New Asia (Carlton: Black Inc., 2017).

30

Rory Medcalf, “Toward a Shared Alliance Strategy in a Contested Indo-Pacific: A View from Australia,”
The National Bureau of Asian Research, May 21, 2019. https://www.nbr.org/publication/toward-ashared-alliance-strategy-in-a-contested-indo-pacific-a-view-from-australia

31

The World Bank, “What is the Blue Economy?” June 6, 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
infographic/2017/06/06/blue-economy

52
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins

and seeks to expand its opportunities with India (as detailed in the recent Varghese report). 32
Ideally, the FOIP would have also included the economic showpiece of the TPP, but since
the US withdrawal this has left a gaping hole in US geo-economic influence that has yet to beconvincingly filled. That Australia along with Japan has championed the CPTTP in the absenceof Washingtonʼs leadership testifies to the importance these secondary powers ascribe to theeconomic dimension of regional order. On a smaller scale, Australia has joined its TSD partners
in a Trilateral Investment Fund ($133mill.) designed to offer economic assistance with pressing
regional infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific.
In terms of development, Australia is taking a prominent role, with high levels of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) targeted towards South East Asia (especially Indonesia)
and the PICS. Though Australia provides some assistance to Africa and other Indian Ocean
Rim countries the locus is clearly in these two former regions of key strategic importance toCanberra. Indeed, the Pacific Islands may be the best example of the FOIP in action for Australia
as part of its contiguous Pacific “Step-up.”33 A new Office of the Pacific has been establishedin Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), to coordinate the promotion of good
governance, development, and maritime capacity-building (such as the provision of patrol boats),
with a $2bill. AUD now allocated to an infrastructure financing facility.34 To this purpose, Australia
has also partnered with the US and others to build an electrical grid for PNG.35 The Step-Up
policy is strategic as much as economic, as it seeks to counterbalance the massive increase ofChinese economic influence in the region which threatens to render such states as vulnerable tountoward political influence. Australian strategists are concerned that if China provides criticalinfrastructure to these countries, they will be vulnerable to subversion or subjection by Beijing(with the bugging of the Organisation of African Unity by China being a case in point). Australia
is worried that if economically and financially unviable commitments are entered into with China,
Canberra will be left to deal with the socio-economic and security fall-out of these fragile states on
its doorstep.

Time for Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific
In sum, it is clear that there is ample space and demand for complementary middle powers, suchas Canada and Australia, to assist―and in some cases provide like-minded alternatives―to US
influence and assistance in the Indo-Pacific. Throughout our discussions with US stakeholders, it
was also made clear that the US not only welcomes this engagement but also expects it. Indeed,
the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report highlights how allies such as Canada and Australia can “play a
critical role in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.”36 In light of growing US uncertainty andcredibility in the region, and rising Chinese assertiveness―the role of Canada and Australia canhelp underscore the rules-based order and bolster the need for sustainable investment and open
32

Peter N Varghese AO, A Report to the Australian Government: An India Economic Strategy to 2035―
Navigating from Potential to Delivery (Barton ACT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018).
https://dfat.gov.au/geo/india/ies/index.html

33

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Stepping Up Australiaʼs Pacific Engagement.” https://dfat.
gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement [Accessed March 10, 2019]34

James Batley, “Australiaʼs New Pacific Czar,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, January 30, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-new-pacific-czar [Accessed March 1, 2019]35

Stephen Dziedzic, “Australia Joins Multinational Bid to Improve Papua New Guineaʼs Energy
Infrastructure,” November 18, 2018. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-18/australia-jointsmultinational-effort-to-improve-png-energy/10508614

36

US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting
a Networked Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 42. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF

53
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

trade. This discussion of the ways in which Australia and Canada have sought to respond to theFOIP vision, as championed by Japan and the US, is indicative of the actual and potential rolesuch that self-styled middle powers can play in upholding the regional international order against
revisionist challenges, by doing their part.
Yet, as middle powers with relatively limited capabilities compared with leading FOIP statessuch as the US and Japan, it may be worth Ottawa and Canberra engaging in renewed bilateral
cooperation to explore how they can jointly coordinate their approach to the FOIP and perhaps
pool their capabilities more effectively as they have done so successfully in the past, in initiatives
such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and through otherareas including disrupting people smuggling and organized crime in SEA. Potentially fruitful
avenues of joint cooperation to explore could include HADR, joint naval exercises, MDA andODA/capacity-building, among others. In conclusion, this is a prime opportunity for solidarity
between these two middle powers to leverage their joint reputation for multilateralism, norm
entrepreneurship and all-round reputation for “good international citizenship” to play a larger rolein the Indo-Pacific affairs.

54
Japan Review Vol.3 No.1 Summer 2019

Upcoming Issue of the

APAN

REVIEW

Volume 3, Number 2 (Fall 2019)

Territory and Maritime Issues
in East Asia and their Origins

Published by the Japan Institute of International Affairs
3rd Floor Toranomon Mitsui Building, 3-8-1 Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku,
Tokyo Japan 100-0013
Te l: +81-3-3503-7261 (International)
Fax: +81-3-3503-7292 (International)More information about the Instituteʼs activities and publications available at: http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/

TH E JA P A N
I N S TI TU TE O F
I N TE R N A TI O N A L
A FFA I R S