When the Time is Ripe:
Hong Kong’s FutureTai-lok Lui

Professor of Hong Kong Studies,
The Education University of Hong Kong

“Prime Minister’s Visit to Peking: Speeches.” Visit by Margaret Thatcher, UK Prime Minister, to Beijing for signing of the Joint Declaration.
January 1-December, 1984.

In hindsight, Governor MacLehose’s visit to China in1979 (see FCO 40/1050) is almost an inevitable partof the evolution of Hong Kong’s political transition
from being a British colony to its return to China asa Special Administrative Region (SAR). When theGovernor received an informal invitation from theHong Kong office director of the New China NewsAgency in December 1978 (later formally in the nameof Li Qiang, Minister of Foreign Trade of the People’s
Republic of China [PRC]), he sought guidance fromLondon. The outcome of the deliberations at theFCO was accepting the invitation and taking theopportunity to raise the question concerning landleases in the New Territories. The strategy was toconvert the expiry date of the leases into an openended phrase like “as long as Britain administered
the New Territories” so that the 1997 deadline wasblurred.
After meeting Deng Xiaoping, MacLehose broughthome the message that the investors should“put their hearts at ease.” But during the brief
conversation (for a summary, see FCO 40/1059),
which lasted for an hour, Deng clearly stated, “Anysolution of the status (of the New Territories) would
have as its prerequisite that Hong Kong was part ofChina.” Upon that political stance, he commented
on the governor’s suggestion: “it would be best to
avoid wording which mentioned continuing Britishadministration.” Without spelling out the details,
Deng further elaborated his view of “China’s longterm policy to regard Hong Kong as a special case”
so that “it [Hong Kong] would be continuing with acapitalist system, while China was continuing witha socialist system.” It is quite clear that at that point
in time, Beijing had not yet formulated its overall
strategy to resolve Hong Kong’s political status. But
Britain did pose a question that just some kind ofgeneral assurance from China would not be adequate
to address emerging queries about Hong Kong’s
political status and, concomitantly, its socioeconomic
and legal frameworks for doing business in the colony
as 1997 drew closer. How to ensure the validity ofcontracts and lending beyond 1997 would be a matterof concern for local and international businesses
in the colony. It seemed that neither London nor
Beijing were fully prepared for going into an extended
negotiation then. But, in a way, an agenda and a stage
had been set up for the formal talks on Hong Kong’s

political future in 1982.
It is important to contextualise the subsequentSino-British negotiations over Hong Kong’s future
in a longer and broader context, reckoning that thequestion about the colony’s status repeatedly popped
up in different circumstances. Before the Second

Record of a conversation between Sir Murray MacLehose and Deng Xiaopingon 29 March 1979 (FCO 40/1059/164)

World War ended, the USA switched from supporting
the Chinese Nationalist government to resuming its
claim over Hong Kong to allow the British to restore
its colonial rule when the Japanese surrenderedin 1945. Political uncertainty arose in 1949 when
the Communists’ victory seemed unstoppable,and given their emphasis on national integrity andnation-building, they were likely to find Hong Kong’s
colonial status intolerable. However, the People’s
Army made no further advances after taking controlof the southern provinces. The newly established
PRC seemed more eager to focus on internal nationbuilding matters than engaging with countries like theUSA and UK. In an international political environment

hostile to the spread of communism, such restraints
on the Chinese side were outcomes of Beijing’s
political pragmatism. Later, the Beijing leadershipworked out the rationale for maintaining Hong
Kong’s status quo. The approach was summarised
as “long-term consideration and full utilisation” (長期打算，充份利用). Hong Kong was a source ofeconomic benefits and also a “window” for the PRC tomaintain contact outside the Soviet bloc. Even during
the Cultural Revolution, when radicalism prevailed,Beijing’s leaders remained cautious in managing
Hong Kong affairs.
Beijing’s pragmatic approach was seen by the British
in a different light. The British did not rule out thepossibility of an attack from China. In the event ofa direct attack or internal unrest provoked by theCommunists, given the scale of the British garrisonin the colony, Hong Kong was hardly defensible.
But then, the Hong Kong question was always
shaped by political calculations (most importantly,
its significance to the containment of communism
during the Cold War; yet sometimes economic
considerations were also relevant given the colony’s
sizeable sterling reserve) and manoeuvring ininternational politics. In the 1950s, Britain was eager
to seek help from the USA to defend Hong Kongwhen such a situation arose. It even succeededin convincing President Eisenhower to agree toestablish an Anglo-American Working Group on
Hong Kong. This shortlived working group wasdiscontinued in the late 1950s when a UK-USA joint
effort to defend Hong Kong became inconceivable.
The disengagement of the USA from playing a directrole in defending Hong Kong continued to be theaccepted approach for the USA in the 1960s. Fromthen onwards, the indefensibility of Hong Kong wasvery much a basic assumption in conceiving thecolony’s political future.
Meanwhile, British rule in Hong Kong became
an issue of concern in the early 1960s. The
United Nations set up a Special Committee on
Decolonisation, and Britain and its colonies would
inevitably be the focus of attention. Though theemphasis fell on territories other than Hong Kong, itwould still be a source of embarrassment. When theUSSR criticized China in 1963, as hostility between
these two socialist countries intensified, about thelatter’s tolerance of colonial rule in Hong Kong andMacao, Britain was conscious of how such arguments
would spill over and touch on its nerves. And it wasrelieved when a statement appeared in People’sDaily, indicating that Beijing had no intentions ofchanging the status quo. But this reinstatement ofChina’s pragmatic approach was soon disturbed by
the outbreak of riots led by the local communists in1967. Again, uncertainty arose, and an evacuation
plan (FCO 40/92, 40/93) was worked out after
witnessing the escalation of conflict in the colony.
The Labour Government in the UK pondered on theHong Kong question, seeing how the colony would
burden London. Yet, at a time when China was

Cover page of Long Term Study: Hong Kong (FCO 40/158)

undergoing political radicalism during the CulturalRevolution, the environment was not favourable for
diplomatic negotiation.
Britain began drafting a paper on a long term studyof Hong Kong (FCO 40/158, 40/159, 40/160). With achanging political environment and atmosphere in
the background (e.g., anti-British demonstrations inBeijing), the study’s analysis, mood, and tone alsochanged during the course of internal discussion anddeliberation. But increasingly, London had moved
towards a position of preparing itself for a limited
range of options for handling the colony’s politicalfuture. First, it was simply to put the question aside
because not much could be done. Second, it was tomanage a voluntary withdrawal, but this would likely
face objections from Beijing. Third, Britain initiated adiscussion with Beijing when the right moment arose.
However, the outcome, whether this would mean theBritish eventually withdrew orderly or the Chinese
allowed for the continuation of the British presence
after 1997, was by no means obvious. Britain
reckoned that informally flagging their concerns toChina under a suitable political climate might well be
an appropriate course of action.
It would surely be an overstatement that London
had long worked out a plan for how to handle Hong
Kong’s political future. Its position, approach, andstrategy kept evolving as the Sino-British relationshipunfolded, the domestic environment in the colonychanged, and the broader contexts of geopolitics
and international relations in the Pacific region werereconstituted. To some extent, both parties, Beijingand London, were ready to discuss the Hong Kongquestion only when the time was ripe. However, they
did not necessarily assess the situation from thesame perspective and look at the issues at stake withsimilar concerns. While Beijing seemed to find theirwords of broad and general reassurance enoughto ensure business as usual in Hong Kong, London
believed they were insufficient to maintain popularconfidence as Hong Kong society stepped into the1980s. So, it was not an accident when Governor
MacLehose brought up the issue of land leases in theNew Territories in his meeting with Chinese leadersin Beijing. Nor was it a hasty move without priordeep deliberations. But once the British took up thesubject and placed it onto the diplomatic agenda,
the discussion had its own momentum. The restis history.
Was Governor MacLehose’s visit in 1979 theappropriate moment to raise the question? It looked
like a suitable moment for the British to push fora deal for the Hong Kong question then. Still, inthe early stage of recovering from the pains of theCultural Revolution, China was eager to enlist Hong
Kong’s support for its economic reform and the FourModernisation drive. The latter could assume the roleof a “window” to the world economy, an interface forimporting technical and management know-how, anda source of capital and investment to promote new
economic initiatives. At the same time, as feverish
Maoist radicalism faded, a pragmatic leadership wastaking control in Beijing. Such conditions, which wereunavailable previously, gave London some leverage indiscussing Hong Kong’s future.

Cover page of Long Term Study: Hong Kong (FCO 40/158)

It was suggested that not very long after the meeting
between MacLehose and Deng, with the British
continuing to raise questions concerning the colony’s
political status, China started its preparations in early
1982 for a plan for Hong Kong’s future too. Drawing
insights from Marshal Ye Jiangying’s nine principles
for working out a policy of reunifying Taiwan, Dengdeveloped his preliminary framework for resuming
sovereignty over Hong Kong after 1997 while
maintaining its stability and prosperity. The stage
was set for more serious exchanges when the British
Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, visited Beijing in 1982.
As we know now, the discussion and negotiation

processes between Britain and China were by no means straightforward. There were twists and turns before
the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984. The outcome was that on 1 July 1997,
Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region under China’s sovereignty. While this put an end to thediscussion of the British having any role in Hong Kong after its return to China, arguments continued as finer
details of the political, economic, and social framework of the future SAR were subjects of diverse interestsand contending interpretations. The student movements in China in 1989 and their political aftermaths greatly
impacted Hong Kong society. They also posed new challenges to Sino-British diplomatic relations. Underlying
differences and conflicts surfaced. They, in turn, affected Hong Kong’s political transition. The course of thepolitical transition was sometimes a rough ride. But the direction was moving towards setting up the SAR
within the framework prescribed by the Basic Law. The undergirding principle of administering the SAR was“One Country, Two Systems”, with the assurance that “The socialist system and policies shall not be practisedin the Hong Kong SAR, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years”(Article 5 of The Basic Law). It was further elaborated that “The Hong Kong SAR shall be a local administrative
region of the PRC, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People’sGovernment” (Article 12).
It is interesting to observe that prior to the assumption of his governorship in November, MacLehose joined
the discussion of a long term study of Hong Kong and expressed his view on the colony’s future. He wrote on
27 October 1971: “I do not dissent at all from the conclusion that we should negotiate, at the right time, for thebest terms that we can get, not even excluding renewal of the Lease. For my part I think it likely that the best
we could hope for would be some form of special status for Hong Kong under which sovereignty would returnto China, but Hong Kong might be defined as a special administrative district to be managed in a way that would
facilitate the continued residence of foreigners.” (FCO 40/331) On this note, perhaps both London and Beijing
always saw Hong Kong as having a special status. The point was how to find the space to allow Hong Kong tocontinue to be unique and special.