Valérie Niquet

China Maritime Strategy Since 2018:
Tactical Appeasement or Strategic Evolution?
Valérie Niquet*
Abstract
Tensions in the South China Sea have not disappeared, although China did not take further
possession of disputed features since 2017. Actually, Chinaʼs position has not changed,
and the appeasement moves towards Japan, hoping for a decoupling between economic
and strategic issues, or towards Southeast Asian nations, are tactical moves. An attempt tolimit the negative consequences on Chinaʼs image and counter the formation of regionaland extra-regional coalitions. At the meantime, faced with recent developments, a debate
has emerged in China, between those who defend Xi Jinpingʼs assertive strategy, andthose who now consider that it has had negative consequences for China. The most likely
scenario in the short term is, therefore, that of stabilization with alternating periods oftensions and appeasement, depending on the reaction of Beijingʼs “adversaries,” first andforemost the United States, to Chinaʼs moves in the South and East China Seas. The risk ofa large-scale military confrontation is unlikely in the current state of the balance of power,
unless the United States chooses to favor an appeasement strategy with the PRC that could
be interpreted in Beijing as a show of weakness or disengagement. This potentially very
destabilizing possibility cannot be completely ruled out. However, by withdrawing fromthe South China Sea, the United States would run the risk of weakening its overall posture,
ultimately compromising its fundamental interests in an area of vital strategic and economic
importance.

The Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC) did not reverse its territorial objectives in theSouth China Sea. It occupies the entire Paracel Archipelago and seven “features,” notrecognized as “islands,” in the Spratly Archipelago. In 2018, it continued filling andbuilding work on the rocks or banks that China controls.1 However, Beijing did notcarry out any new occupation and, at the 31st Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Summit held in Manila in November 2017, it signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
with ASEAN. It also declared its readiness to resume negotiations on the implementation of a
Code of Conduct, initiated without significant real progress in 2013.2
In August 2018, a new proposal for the Code of Conduct, including the protection of themarine environment in the South China Sea, which has been severely degraded by China ʼs*Valérie Niquet is Senior Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Head of the
Asia program at Foundation for Strategic Research.

1

In the Spratly Archipelago, the Peopleʼs Republic of China has occupied Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross
Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef, Johnson Reef, and Subi Reef since 1988 and Mischief Reef since 1995. It
controls access to Scarborough Shoal without having taken the step of a formal occupation, since 2012.
See https://amti.csis.org

2

Carlyle Thayer, “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” SAIS Review ofInternational Affairs, n°2, 2013 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265983542_ASEAN_China_
and_the_Code_of_Conduct_in_the_South_China_Sea

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China Maritime Strategy Since 2018: Tactical Appeasement or Strategic Evolution?

dredging operations was written. However, this draft had many shortcomings. It did not precisely
define the geographical scope of the South China Sea, severely limited the role of external parties,
and specified that the possible signing of a Code of Conduct did not question the territorial claimsof the parties involved.3
These developments, which seemed to play in favor of appeasement in the South China
Sea, are, in part, the positive consequences of the 2016 judgment of the Den Hague Court of
Arbitration, which rejected all Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Indeed, while refusing thevalidity of the Courtʼs conclusions, China chose to stabilize its positions in Southeast Asia, rather
than make further territorial progress. Beijing is also concerned about the strengthening of US
engagement in the South China Sea at a time of tensed relations with Washington. In that context,
Beijingʼs appeasement strategy―including with important neighboring countries such as Japan―
proposals for cooperation on a “maritime silk route,” or attempts to divide ASEAN are part of thesame agenda for the evolution of the PRCʼs regional strategy.
With the Philippines, despite ups and downs, the disputes are far from over. Since President
Duterte came to power in June 2016, Manila has agreed not to address the issue of the decisionof the Den Hague Arbitration Tribunal, which was in favor of the Philippinesʼ claim. President
Duterte implemented an appeasement strategy with China in exchange for pledges of economic
assistance and access to fisheries resources for Filipino fishermen in the areas claimed by the
PRC, including Scarborough Shoal.4 However, in 2019, incidents involving Chinese fishing boats,
coast-guards, or planes around territories claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea did
not cease.5

China has not abandoned its ambitions in the South China Sea
While the PRC adopted a less offensive stance in 2017–2018, it has not abandoned its territorial
claims and strategy to control the South China Sea. China has thus continued to militarize all theterritories, sandbanks, or rocks it occupies with the construction of runways to accommodate its
strategic bombers, the deployment of anti-aircraft capabilities, observation equipment (radars),
and the construction of port infrastructure. 6 In May 2018, for the first time, the first H-6K
strategic bomber, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, operated from Woody Island, in the
Paracel Archipelago. In April of the same year, the first LSM and LAM missiles were deployed on
the backfilled rocks of Subi, Mischief, and Fiery Cross Reef.
This “operationalization” of Chinese controlled features in the Paracels and Spratlys gives
Beijing extended projection capacities, to the southern part of the South China Sea, up to theborders of Indonesia, and the South Pacific. It facilitates naval and air patrols and joint-forces
exercises in the area.
From a strategic point of view, the South China Sea could be transformed into a bastion
for the implementation of an anti-access (A2AD) strategy designed to increase China ʼs room
for maneuver in Asia against the United States. In the event of a real conflict, the defense ofislands far from the mainland, proves illusory. However, in peacetime, for “grey zone” operations
involving fishing flotillas and naval law enforcement coast-guards, Chinese “artificial anchors”
3

Carlyle Thayer, “A Closer Look at the ASEAN-China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct,”
The Diplomat, 03-08-2018.

4

Aries A. Arugay, “The Philippines in 2017: Security Challenges in a Time of Conflict and Change,” on
http://www.nids.mod.go.jp

5

China is blockading Philippine boats from accessing Scarborough and Thomas Shoals. The latest
incident occurred in October 2019, prompting the Ministry of Defense to file a protest.

6

Kerry K. Gershaneck, “Chinaʼs Plan for Conquest of the South Pacific,” 07-09-2018 on http://asiatimes.
com

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Valérie Niquetin the area offer significant opportunities. The filling work and constructions to increase thesurface of Chinaʼs held features also make it possible―even if China acts outside any framework
recognized by international organizations like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS)―for Beijing to try and enforce the principle of its sovereignty over the area.
According to the Global Times, a nationalist newspaper often used to unofficially express
opinions from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, “China has every right to build
everything it believes necessary on its territory in the South China Sea to defend its interestsand security.”7 Beijing officially considers that the filling and militarization operations that werecarried out in 2017 and 2018 are both “reasonable” and legitimate, despite the commitments madeto its Southeast Asian neighbors to negotiate a draft Code of Conduct mentioning non-use offorce.8
Maritime expansion in the South China Sea is also a priority of President Xi Jinping ʼs more
assertive strategy. This was one of the first missions assigned to a “combat ready” Peopleʼs
Liberation Army (PLA), with the development of the Southern Command, which controls Taiwan
and the South China Sea.9 On October 1st 2019, for the 70th anniversary of the PRC, as in 2015
for the commemoration of the end of the war with Japan in 1945, the military parades focused on
missiles. These were the DF-21D, “aircraft killer” in 2015 and the DF-41 ICBM, with a claimed
capacity of multiple warheads, in 2019. Both are deterrent and part of a “communication” strategy
to delay US inter vention in case of a Chinese offensive, at the ser vice of the CCPʼs sur vival
strategy, in the South or East China Sea.
While China, since 2016, has been more cautious, this has not prevented the continuationof tensions in maritime areas wherever possible. This makes it more doubtful that a lasting
solution based on the joint development of resources, which has often been mentioned but neverimplemented, will be found either in the East or South China Sea. With the multiplication ofChinese presence and exercises in the area, involving navy and coast-guard vessels, incidents
have increased, involving regional and extra regional powers and the United States.
In September 2018, a collision was narrowly avoided with an American destroyer, involving
a Chinese coast-guard vessel.10 In June 2019, the Philippine Secretar y of National Defense
protested against the sinking of a Philippine fishing boat by a Chinese coast-guard vessel.11 In the
Taiwan Strait, in the Northern part of the South China Sea, Beijing is also attempting to challenge
the principle of freedom of navigation by intimidating vessels, including French vessels, that do
not respect the PRCʼs unilateral territorial claims.12 Around the Senkaku archipelago, Chinese
incursions never ceased, even if they became “routine,” mobilizing Japanese naval and air patrol
capacities.
Beijing has the largest coast-guard fleet in the world, with more than 200 vessels, including
several new large vessels over 1500 tons. Since December 2018, the coast-guard has also been

7

Zhuang Guotu, Xiamen University, in Zhao Yusha, “Land Reclamation to Expand in South China Sea
Islands,” Global Times, 05-02-2018.

8“China National Marine Data and Information Service Report” in “Chinese Report Says South China Sea
Islands Expanded ʻReasonably,ʼ ” Reuters, 25-12-2017.

9“ ʻPrepare for Warʼ, Xi Jinping Tells Military Region that Monitors South China Sea, Taiwan,” South
China Morning Post, 26-10-2018.

10https://gbtimes.com/naval-incident-between-chinese-and-us-destroyers-in-south-china-sea-causes-morefriction

11“South China Sea Collision Talk Threatens to Rock China Philippines Relations,” Associated Press, 12-062019.

12“Naval incident between France and China,” AFP, 25 April 2019.

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China Maritime Strategy Since 2018: Tactical Appeasement or Strategic Evolution?

placed under the direct authority of the Central Military Commission headed by Xi Jinping.13
An illustration of Beijingʼs “fuzzy” strategy, that restricts the use of PLA navy in order to remainin the framework of “civilian” law enforcement operations, and avoid being accused of “military
aggression.” From 2011 to 2017, 75% of the 53 major incidents that occurred in both the Southand East China Sea, involved coast-guard vessels.14

A constant strategic challenge for the countries of the region

All countries in the region are concerned by a strategic challenge that can be turned “on” or “off”
by the Chinese leadership according to their priorities. In spite of not being officially concernedby China ʼs territorial claims, Indonesia has reaf firmed its commitment to reinforcing theprotection of its maritime sovereignty, particularly concerning fishing rights and―potentially―hydrocarbon resources at the borders of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In 2017, Indonesia
published new maps renaming the South China Sea, where incursions of Chinese vessels had
increased, “North Natuna Sea,” to confirm its sovereignty over the region.15
For Malaysia, a party to territorial claims over part of the South China Sea, the issue isconsidered a major problem both by the political leadership and the armed forces. While Malaysia
used to favor a less confrontational posture with China, the new Malaysian authorities, since there-election of Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir in 2018, have reiterated their opposition to theconcept of a “nine-dash line” claimed by Beijing. They also reasserted their commitment to thelaw of the sea based on UNCLOS and negotiated settlement involving all regional actors, without
use of force or coercion.16
Malaysia also denounces the incursions of Chinese civilian and militar y vessels. These
incursions were reported to have increased by 30% in 2017, to test the Malaysian authoritiesʼ
willingness to react. Since then, they did not cease, sometimes involving dozens of fishing boats.
For Malaysia, the issue of the South China Sea is all the more vital as it divides East Malaysia,
where the States of Sabah and Sarawak are located, and Peninsular Malaysia. China is trying tofavor a bilateral agreement, mobilizing, in particular, the attractiveness of its economic power asin the case of the Philippines, but mistrust persists.17 Far from accepting Chinaʼs offers, Prime
Minister Mahathir chose to renegotiate an infrastructure building agreement signed by his
predecessor.
For its part, the Philippines is still on the front line of confrontations with China in the South
China Sea, although President Duterteʼs election partially changed the situation in relation to
the PRC. The new President has chosen to appease Beijing and try to take advantage of Chinaʼseconomic opportunities. Since his election, there have been many high-level exchanges between
Beijing and Manila, including President Xi Jinpingʼs visit to the Philippines in 2018.
At the same time, the Philippine President, who claims that he cannot forcefully oppose
Chinese demands, particularly around Scarborough Shoal, is also seeking to maintain a balancewith other regional and extra-regional powers, including Australia and Japan. The latter has
provided the Philippines with reformed coast-guard patrol vessels as part of capacity building
cooperation with Manila. Similarly, the links between the Philippines and the United States have
13

Previously, the coast-guard was placed under the authority of the oceanographic safety authority.

14

https://amti.csis.org

15

Gilang Kembara, “Security Outlook of the Asia-Pacific Countries and its implication for the Defence
Sector in: Indonesia” on https://www.nids.mod.go.jp

16

Thomas Daniel, “Key Issues Impacting Malaysiaʼs Security Outlook” on https://www.nids.mod.go.jp

17

Bhavan Jaipragas, “Malaysia Looks to Chinese leadership, but not on South China Sea” on https://www.
scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2168119/malaysia-looks-chinese-leadership-not-south-chinasea

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not been severed. Strengthened since the election of Donald Trump, who does not stress the“human rights” issue, and the involvement of US forces in controlling radical Islamist insurgency
in Mindanao in 2017.18
Another frontline State, Vietnam, places sovereignty issues in the South China Sea against
China at the forefront of its strategic concerns. For Hanoi, the stakes are multidimensional,
involving issues of territorial sovereignty, including Beijing ʼs pressure to ban all drilling or
exploration in areas claimed by the PRC, and Beijing ʼs drilling operations in areas under its
control. In July 2017, Vietnam had to suspend its exploration operations in the Block 136-03
under pressure from China, and in 2019, China conducted its own exploratory operations in areas
claimed by Vietnam.
Beyond territorial issues, the question of the delimitation of EEZs, and free access topotential resources is also essential for a state like Vietnam. Finally, as the Den Hague Tribunal
has demonstrated, global legal issues concerning the law of the sea are also at stake. Like thePhilippines, in the face of coercive actions by the PRC, Vietnam is also pursuing an active policyof strategic balance towards the United States and Japan.19
The issue of EEZ delimitation and access to resources, be it oil, gas, or fishing, is also a major
issue, apart from the protection of territorial sovereignty for Japan. In the East China Sea, Chinaʼs
official claims on EEZ extend up to the shores of Okinawa, including the whole continental shelf.
Japan suspended its exploration activities in the East China Sea, despite Chinaʼs own drilling andaccess to resources across the dividing line between the two EEZs.

Did Chinese developments in the South and East China Seas change the statusquo?
China has mobilized a diversified range of instruments, involving coercion, economic cooperation,
diplomatic pressure and legal warfare, to change the status quo in the South and East China Seas.
If successful, that multilayered strategy could be applied to all areas where Beijing has claims notrecognized by international law. This could also potentially concern areas in the Arctic, where
China imposed its concept of “quasi-Arctic State.”
However, the PRC does not go beyond limits that could raise the risk of an externalinter vention. At the legal level, Beijing tried ― without success ― to impose a maximalist
interpretation of Article 58 of UNCLOS concerning the military activities by foreign vessels on
EEZs.20 China ratified UNCLOS in 1996, but with reservations on special economic zones and thecontinental shelf following its own “maritime law” adopted by the National Assembly in 1998.
At a more global level, Chinaʼs position on the implementation of UNCLOS sheds light on
how Beijing views the international system and the liberal order. While the PRC has signed andratified UNCLOS and does not seem ready to withdraw from it, compliance with the rules initiallyaccepted depends on a constantly shifting balance of power and the interests unilaterally definedby the Chinese authorities themselves.
Similarly, with even weaker legal foundations, China is tr ying to extend the concept of“historical rights” to impose recognition of its claims in the South and East China Seas. These
legal maneuvers are accompanied by filling and construction activities to support Chinese claims
and consolidate its presence. The objective is to impose a “fait accompli,” that could change theposition of Beijingʼs neighbors and the international community.
However, despite these efforts, that also attempt to impose the idea that Chinaʼs strategy and18

Aries A. Arugay, op.cit.

19

Tran Truong Thuy, “Tempering the South China Sea Slow Boil: Expanding Options for Evolving
Disputes,” https://www.nids.mod.go.jp

20

https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm

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China Maritime Strategy Since 2018: Tactical Appeasement or Strategic Evolution?

raise are ineluctable, Beijing has suffered several setbacks. The most important, both legally andin terms of image, is the judgment of the Den Hague Court of Arbitration in 2016. China used
its full economic weight to limit the severity of the EUʼs joint declaration, and the judgment does
not include any mandatory implementation clause. However, all China claims have been rejected
and, since then, while rejecting the very principle of the legitimacy of the Tribunal, Beijing has
limited its use of the concept of “nine-dash line.” Also, the decision was very positively received
in Southeast Asia and Japan, further highlighting the isolation of the PRC on the issue of theSouth China Sea. In Europe, if some countries played a role in toning down the EU declaration,
the image of the PRC has been degraded, and the EUʼs China strategy is far more cautious than it
used to be.21
Above all, the more aggressive strategy followed by Beijing since Xi Jinping came to power,
despite the economic opportunities offered by the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) designed toregain the support of the countries in the region, has in turn triggered a backlash that aim, at
a minimum, to rebalance Chinese power. At the ASEAN level, regional initiatives have been
put in place, which, while not openly targeting Beijing for diplomatic reasons, take into accountChinese progresses in the region. In Indonesia, the document defining the countryʼs new ocean
policy emphasizes maritime defense, in response to new risks related to trafficking and theenvironment. The naval forces are expected to be significantly strengthened with the acquisitionof 90 new vessels, including 42 deep-sea patrol vessels and 12 submarines.22
The evolution is the same in Malaysia, reinforced by the return to power of Prime Minister
Mahathir, who has adopted a less conciliatory stance regarding China. Here too, new resources
to strengthen the capacity of the coast-guard are planned to deal with Chinese incursions.23
In June 2017, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines established trilateral maritime patrols
officially designed to combat piracy in the Sulawesi area, but which also aim to better control
the “maritime borders” of these three States, particularly in the face of incursions by fishingflotillas. Beijing officially protested on behalf of its “historic fishing rights” but could not stop theinitiative.24
In the East China Sea however, the ban on any landing or fishing around the Senkaku islands
implemented by the Japanese authorities for the sake of appeasement, the “routine” activities ofChinese vessels in or at the limit of territorial waters surrounding the islands, or the Japanese
decision not to pursue gas exploration activities, has sometimes been interpreted by Chinese
strategists as a success in imposing a de facto―if not de jure―change of status quo.

Towards the internationalization of the conflict
Above all, while the PRC hoped to be able to contain the management of tensions in theSouth and East China Seas at the bilateral level, more favorable to its interest because of theasymmetry of economic and military power with all its neighbors, we are witnessing an increased
internationalization of the conflict. The reactions, and the opposition to Chinaʼs actions and claims
extend well beyond the regional framework.
In the United States, President Donald Trump tends to advocate the defense of Americaninterests above all else (America First). However, after some considerations, he adopted a much
more hardline position both at the economic and strategic level. Beijing, contrar y to initial“hopes,” had failed to “deliver” both on trade and North Korea, which in part explains the Trumpadministrationʼs change of attitude regarding China.
21

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/eu-china-strategic-outlook-2019-mar-12_en

22

Gilang Kembara, op.cit.

23

Thomas Daniel, op. cit.

24

Idem.

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The incident that occurred in September 2018 between a Chinese vessel and an American
destroyer, followed by other incidents in the South China sea involving the navy and air force,for tified American will to enforce their role as strategic stabilizer in the region, with theresumption of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in waters claimed by Beijing. In
May 2019, the United States sent twice destroyers within the 12 miles limit of Territories claimed
by Beijing, and overflights are increasing.25
In 2018, Washington also decided not to invite Chinese forces to participate in the joint “PacificRim” exercises that had been opened two years earlier as a sign of goodwill. The United States isalso pursuing a strategy of rapprochement with other States in the region facing Chinese actions,first and foremost, Vietnam and the Philippines. Moreover, while not directly linked to thisissue, US trade sanctions against the PRC also contributes to the strategy of pressure exerted on
Beijing.
This strategy is also implemented in coordination with its Japanese ally, which, since theadoption of new, more flexible military export rules in 2014, has been building the capacity ofVietnamʼs and the Philippinesʼ coast-guard fleet and participating in the training of Vietnamese
submariners. More concretely, the adoption of new defense laws in 2015 and 2016 allows, with theright of collective self-defense, the participation of self-defense forces in joint patrols, includingin the South China Sea. In the fall of 2018, Japan sent a submarine to the South China Sea for the
first time.26 In June 2019, an Izumo multi-purpose carrier, the largest ship in the Maritime SelfDefense Force (MSDF), participated in exercises with the United States in the South China Sea.
Japan shares with its neighbors in Southeast Asia the same concerns about Chinaʼs ambitionsin the East or the South China Sea. In 2018, Tokyo adopted new guidelines for defense capacity
development that strengthened its projection capabilities, including the use of Izumo helicopter
carriers as aircraft carriers under certain conditions, and the acquisition of longer-range (300 km)
ballistic missiles based in Okinawa to protect faraway islands.27 During the Shangri-La Dialogue
held in Singapore in 2019, Japan ʼs Defense Minister has been ver y firm on the issue of theSouth and East China Seas, recalling the conclusions of the Den Hague Tribunal. This position
coincides with the French one and is one of the foundations of Paris adhesion to the concept ofFree and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
Though far geographically, the EU, where France plays a leading security role, has also seen
its stance towards China evolve in a less favorable direction. Chinese strategy in the South China
Sea has made a significant contribution to that evolution by challenging fundamental principles,
including the principle of peaceful conflict resolution, to which the EU is particularly committed.
The countries most involved in the region―first and foremost France, which has its territories
in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific―has direct sovereign interests in both oceans and regularly
navigates the South and East China Seas, have adopted a firm stance accompanied by concretemeasures.
In Singapore, in June 2019, the Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, recalled Franceʼscommitment to the principle of freedom of navigation and overflight wherever internationallaw permits. Similarly, President Macronʼs speech in Australia in 2017 and again in 2019, which
mentions Franceʼs active support to the principle of FOIP, is a direct response to Chinaʼs more
assertive maritime strategy. The same applies to the regular passage of French―with UK andEU observers onboard―and British vessels through the South China Sea, challenging warnings
25

Jesse Johnson, “US Sails Massive F-35-Laden Warship in Disputed South China Sea,” Japan Times, 0904-2019.

26

https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Japan-versus-China-in-the-South-China-Sea

27

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/12/17/national/new-defense-guidelines-prioritize-longrange-missiles-defense-japans-outlying-islands/#.XGbt-JNKjaY

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from China in order to uphold the rules of freedom of navigations, including military ships, innon-territorial waters.

Conclusion
Tensions in the South China Sea have not disappeared, although China did not take further
possession of disputed features since 2017. Actually, Chinaʼs position has not changed, and theappeasement moves towards Japan, hoping for a decoupling between economic and strategic
issues, or towards Southeast Asian nations, are tactical moves. An attempt to limit the negative
consequences on China ʼs image and counter the formation of regional and extra-regional
coalitions.28
The fundamental causes of the tensions did not vanish. Concerning resources, beyond energy,
access to fishing grounds is becoming increasingly important and is the cause of a majority ofincidents with other countries.29 Beyond that, the question of power rivalry with the United States
is an essential factor. Despite uncertainties regarding US engagement in Asia, since Donald
Trump came to power, this factor had positive results in checking a more assertive Chinese
strategy, as the PRC constantly takes into account in its calculus the actual balance of power.
For Beijing, the unpredictability of the American President increases the risk of incidents
and requires greater caution. In terms of principles, the stakes for all powers outside the area
are too high in terms of freedom of navigation, respect for the rule of law and the defense of vital
economic interests, for the process of internationalization of the conflict to be checked.
Faced with these developments, a debate has also emerged in China, between those who
defend Xi Jinpingʼs assertive strategy, and those who now consider that it has had negative
consequences for China, confronted with multiple issues from US trade war to the situation in
Hong Kong, and with no means to achieve its ambitions if it faces stiff resistance, particularly
from the United States.
The most likely scenario in the short term is, therefore, that of stabilization with alternating
periods of tensions and appeasement, depending on the reaction of Beijingʼs “adversaries,” firstand foremost the United States, to Chinaʼs moves in the South and East China Seas. The riskof a large-scale military confrontation is unlikely in the current state of the balance of power,
unless the United States chooses to favor an appeasement strategy with the PRC that could beinterpreted in Beijing as a show of weakness or disengagement.
This potentially very destabilizing possibility cannot be completely ruled out. However, by
withdrawing from the South China Sea, the United States would run the risk of weakening its
overall posture, ultimately compromising its fundamental interests in an area of vital strategic andeconomic importance.

28

Monika Chansoria, “Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific: Synergizing Consultative
Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacific” on
https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/japanreview/pdf/JapanReview_Vol1_No2_03_Monika%20Chansoria.pdf

29

Incidents involving China occur in the South and East China Seas but also in the Pacific, off the coast of
Africa and Latin America.

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