Hong Kong: From a British Colony to a
Global Chinese City
Chi-kwan Mark

Senior Lecturer in International History
Royal Holloway University of London
Image – A map showing the boundary between Hong Kong and Fu Shing Commune of Kwantung Province. Reports by Special Branch of Royal Hong Kong
Police. January 1-December 31, 1974. MS Commonwealth Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Hong Kong Departments: Registered Files,
Hong Kong, British Honduras, British Indian Ocean Territories and the Seychelles FCO 40/548. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom)Industrialisation and Economic
Development
Since 1842, Hong Kong had served as a

Hong Kong: From a British
Colony to a Global Chinese City

primary node for the flow of goods,

Between the 1960s and the mid-1990s,

people, and ideas between China and theHong Kong underwent a period of rapid

rest of the world. Hong Kong’s role as antransformation. From a British Crown

entrepôt for the China trade was, however,Colony whose economy started to take off,

disrupted by Japanese aggression during

Hong Kong became a ‘global city’ that

the Second World War, and then by thereverted to Chinese sovereignty on 1 July

Chinese Civil War and the subsequent

1997. The Gale digital archive collection ofCold War between Communist China andFCO 40 files and FCO 21 files relating to

the United States. The imposition ofHong Kong—China and the Modern World:

United States and United Nations

Hong Kong, Britain, and China Part 2, 1965-

embargoes on China as a result of the

1993—is a rich resource for the study of

1950-53 Korean War, together withnot only the city’s past but also the

China’s economic reorientation towards

histories of the British Empire,

the Soviet bloc, significantly affected Hong

Communist China, and the global

Kong’s entrepôt trade. The tradeeconomy. It covers events andembargoes on China propelled Hong Kongdevelopments, such as the 1967 leftist

to the path of industrialisation, a process

riots, Hong Kong’s textile exports amidthat had started in the 1930s and was

Britain’s entry into the European

intensified by the influx of Shanghai

Economic Community (EEC), Governor

entrepreneurs (which re-established their

Murray MacLehose’s economic and social

textile factories in the Colony) andreforms, China’s opening-up and growing

Cantonese refugees (which served as aties with Hong Kong, the Anglo-Chinesecheap labour force) since the late 1940s.

negotiations over Hong Kong’s future, andHong Kong was transformed into an

the development of representative

export-oriented industrial economy, withgovernment during the transitional period.

textiles and garments being its main pillar

This essay provides a snapshot of Hong(and with plastic products and electronics

Kong’s metamorphosis within thegrowing in importance over time). As aframework of four main themes –Crown Colony, Hong Kong enjoyeddevelopment; diplomacy; democratisationpreferential access to the British and(or lack thereof); and decolonisation.

1

Commonwealth markets. But underyears. As a consequence, Hong Kong’s

pressure from the Lancashire textile

textile exports were subject to various

industry, the British government wasdegrees of restraint under terms agreed

eager to restrict the influx of Hong Kong’s

bilaterally with the United States, the EEC

textiles and garments. The result was thecountries, and so forth.

1959 agreement between Lancashire andHong Kong industrialists, which required

Successive British governments’ efforts tothe latter to adopt ‘voluntary restrictions’join the EEC in the 1960s created strains onover the exports of textiles and garments

the relationship between the metropole andto Britain. The agreement lasted for three

the Colony.2 Although Hong Kong hoped toyears and was renewed in 1962.1

enjoy associate status within the Community
under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, the Six

Hong Kong also faced protectionism in the(founding members) opposed it on the

United States, its largest export market

grounds that association was notsince 1959. The Americans wanted toappropriate for a dependent territory withrestrict Hong Kong’s textile exports throughwell-developed manufacturing industries.

government-to-government agreement

During the negotiations over Britain’s third

within the framework of the Generalapplication in 1970-72, the Six had

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As areservations about including Hong Kong in

dependent territory could only assume thethe Generalised Preference Scheme, whichrights and obligations of GATT through its

granted tariff concessions to developing

sovereign power, the United Kingdom signed

countries whose cotton textile trade was

two agreements on behalf of Hong Kong –already subjected to quotas under the Long-the 1961 Short-Term Arrangement

Term Arrangement. Hong Kong feared that,

Regarding International Trade in Cotton

after joining the EEC, Britain would support

Textiles and the 1962 Long-Terma Common Commercial Policy. Governor

Arrangement Regarding International Trade

David Trench asked Whitehall bluntly if

in Cotton Textiles. The latter was extended

there was ‘a danger of Hong Kong ceasing toin 1966 and again in 1970 for further four

be a British Colony and becoming instead a

1 For an insider’s perspective by a former trade

2 See FCO 40/81-83, FCO 40/175-176, FCO 40/203-

official of Hong Kong, see Lawrence Mills, Protecting
Free Trade: The Hong Kong Paradox, 1947-97 (HongKong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012).

205, FCO 40/273-274, FCO 40/284-286, FCO 40/377378, and FCO 40/437-438.

2Colony of the Community’.3

bargain with London over such issues as
the maintenance of the British garrison (atAfter Britain’s entry into the EEC on 1

a time when Britain was making defence

January 1973, the loss of privileged accesscuts that culminated in the 1967-68

to the British market turned out not to be

decisions to withdraw from east of Suez)a major economic blow to Hong Kong. By

and sterling reserves (which needed to be

the early 1970s, Hong Kong’s main export

held in London). In November 1967, themarket was the United States, which was

British government’s devaluation ofover three times larger than Britain.

sterling by 14 per cent resulted in a loss of

Besides, Hong Kong had become a£56 million for Hong Kong and a similar

regional and later international financial

devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar

centre. Its foreign exchange market, stock

against the US dollar. But within days, themarket, and gold market were flourishing;Hong Kong government increased by 10

its banking and financial institutions wereper cent the value of the local currency

well established; and the Hong Kong

against the pound. In mid-1968, it secured

government created a light regulatoryfrom London an agreement on exchange

environment to attract foreign capital. The

guarantees for Hong Kong’s sterling

two financial secretaries between 1961

reserves in the event of futureand 1981, John Cowperthwaite and Philipdevaluation.4

Haddon-Cave respectively, used the term
‘positive non-interventionism’ to define

Leftist Riots of 1967

(and justify) a laissez-faire approach.

In 1967, Hong Kong witnessed a far more

Rather than embracing the virtues ofserious threat than the devaluation ofnineteenth-century liberalism, however,sterling – the leftist riots.5 A year ago, an

they preferred selective intervention into

increase in fares on the Star Ferry had

the economy, particularly in the fields ofpropelled a young man to protest and,housing and education. Hong Kong’s

after his arrest by the police, triggered

economic growth since the late 1950s

riots by the youths. Notwithstanding Hongenabled the colonial government toKong’s growing prosperity, many young

3 FCO 40/286.

5 Among the numerous files on the 1967 riots, see

4 Catherine R. Schenk, ‘The Empire Strikes Back:FCO 40/45-54, FCO 40/74-76, FCO 40/105-107, andFCO 40/113-117.

Hong Kong and the Decline of Sterling in the 1960s’,
Economic History Review, 57: 3 (August 2004), 56877.

3

and underprivileged people were alienatedright to reclaim sovereignty when theby government and police corruption,

conditions were ripe – probably in 1997

crowded housing, and poor working

when the New Territories Lease expired.

conditions. In particular, the left wing in

But during the 1967 riots, the Hong Kong

Hong Kong felt marginalised by

and British governments could not takemainstream society. Inspired by thefor granted Beijing’s intentions in view ofChinese Cultural Revolution unleashed by‘power seizure’ by radical rebels on the

Mao Zedong in 1966, on 6 May 1967, themainland.

local leftists seized upon a labour strike at
a plastic flower factory in Kowloon tolaunch their own struggle. On 16 May, they
set up a ‘Committee of All Circles for the
Struggle against Persecution by the
British Authorities in Hong Kong’ to leadwhat would become an eight-month longanti-colonial struggle, characterised bydemonstrations, strikes, border clashes,and random bombing. Behind thecommittee was the Hong Kong branch of
the New China News Agency (NCNA) or
China’s de facto embassy in the territory.
As a matter of fact, Hong Kong had been
living in the shadow of China since 1949.
Although not recognising the three‘unequal treaties’ that governed Hong
Kong’s colonial status, China tolerated the

Telegram from the Office of Acting Governor of Hongcontinuation of British ‘administration’ inKong to the Secretary of State for the CommonwealthHong Kong according to the principle of

Office, July 21, 1967 (FCO 40/54/0020)‘long-term planning and full utilisation’.
During the Cold War, it made use of HongAt first, the Hong Kong government

Kong for gathering intelligence,

adopted firm but non-provocative

conducting propaganda, and earning

measures to restore law and order. But asforeign exchanges, while reserving thethe leftist riots escalated into border4

skirmishes in early July, it conducted

British government, demanding the lifting

more raids against suspected communistof the suspension of the three communist

premises, handed over border patrols tonewspapers and the release of all

the Gurkhas, and arrested and charged‘patriotic journalists’ within forty-eightthe news workers of the NCNA and otherhours. When the demands were ignored,

left-wing press organisations. In handlingon the night of 22 August, the Red Guards

the riots, the colonial governor needed to

broke into the British Chargé Office intake into account the wider picture of

Beijing, burning it to the ground. The

Anglo-Chinese relations. In fact, Hongsacking drove Anglo-Chinese relations toKong was always a matter of diplomacy

their nadir since 1950, creating a ‘hostagefor London and Beijing alike. In China, thecrisis’ in which Britain and China

radical leaders in power and the Red

restricted the movement of each other’s

Guards supported the Hong Kong leftists

nationals in their countries. Beijing linked

through diplomatic protests to the British

the freedom of British diplomats, Grey,

Foreign Office, mass rallies, and hostileand other detained Britons to the releasepropaganda. When, in July, the Hong Kongof Hong Kong prisoners relating to thegovernment arrested Xue Ping, a news

1967 riots.6 All this shows how Hongworker of the local NCNA, for illegal

Kong’s trajectory was closely intertwined

assembly and then sentenced him to two-with the ups and downs in Anglo-Chineseyear imprisonment, Beijing put Anthony

relations.

Grey, the British correspondent of Reuters
in China, under house arrest. In August,Reforms and Decolonisation

the Hong Kong authorities arrested theDuring the 1967 riots, the British

five directors and chief editors of three

government decided to undertake a‘fringe’ communist newspapers forfeasibility study about an emergency

publishing ‘seditious’ articles andevacuation from Hong Kong and a long-suspended the three papers pending legal

term study of British policy towards theproceedings. In response, the Chinese

Colony. Although, by late 1967, the final

Foreign Ministry, influenced by ultra-

suppression of the leftist riots had madeleftism, issued an ‘ultimatum’ to the

any immediate evacuation unnecessary,

6 See Chi-kwan Mark, The Everyday Cold War: Britain
and China, 1950-1972 (London: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2017), chapters 4-5.

5

British officials continued the long-termcommenced formal talks on its future in

study. Completed in March 1969, the final

the 1980s.

draft of the study concluded that Hong
Kong’s future should ‘eventually lie in
China’ and that British objective should beto ‘attempt to negotiate its return, at afavourable opportunity, on the best terms
obtainable for its people and for [British]
material interests there’.7 In essence, thesense of pessimism about Hong Kong wasrooted in the changing relationshipbetween the metropole and the Colony
since the late 1950s. Britain was acutely
aware that Hong Kong was militarily
indefensible (the garrison being
maintained for internal security purposes)
and constitutionally ‘awkward’ (with nochance of self-government, let alone
independence, due to China’s objection).
Hong Kong enjoyed financial andPortrait of Sir Murray MacLehoseadministrative autonomy from London by
setting its own budget and conducting its

Against this backdrop, Murray MacLehoseexternal economic relations. In the early

became the twenty-fifth governor of Hong1970s, Britain’s military withdrawal from

Kong in November 1971. Chosen fromeast of Suez and admission to the EEC

among career diplomats in the Foreign

made Hong Kong an embarrassing

Office rather than from the colonial

political anachronism. In a sense, theservice, MacLehose had the strategic‘long decolonisation’ of Hong Kong had

objective of preparing Hong Kong forstarted well before Britain and China

Anglo-Chinese negotiation over its

7 CAB 134/2945, The National Archives (TNA), Kew,
Surrey, UK. Also see FCO 40/92-93 and FCO 40/158160.

6

political future. He aimed to make Hong

– Keynesian-style welfare state or free-Kong as prosperous, stable, and united as

market economy. Under the influence ofpossible, so that its residents would feelthe Trades Union Congress and left-wingproud of the city they called home andbackbenchers in Parliament, the Labour

thus resent absorption by Communist

governments wanted Hong Kong to, for

China. In other words, MacLehose hoped

example, appoint trade union

to increase Britain’s bargaining power in

representatives to the Legislative Council,

future negotiations with the Chinese

introduce statutory minimum wage, andgovernment.8 But MacLehose also had theincrease public expenditure on social

internal problems of Hong Kong in mind.

welfare. Constrained by the bureaucratic

The 1966 and 1967 riots had highlighted aand business elites, MacLehose could not‘communication gap’ between government

but attach importance to fiscal

and society. Building on the policy

conservatism, low taxation, and above all

initiatives of his predecessor, MacLehosemarket forces (despite selective

strove to foster a sense of local belonging

government intervention). At a politicaland civic responsibility among Hong Konglevel, the disagreement between

residents. Thus, the government

MacLehose and London over social reform

embarked on a massive expansion ofreflected the growing autonomy of Hongpublic housing, free primary and later

Kong at a time when Britain wassecondary education, new towns project,reorienting itself from Empire to Europe

the fight against corruption, and social

after 1973.

reform.
During MacLehose’s governorship, Hong
Nevertheless, MacLehose’s labour

Kong had made significant economic

legislation and political reform fell shortprogress. The 1970s saw the emergenceof the expectations of the British homeof a distinctly local identity among Honggovernment. In essence, the colonial

Kong residents, particularly for the locally

governor and the left-wing Labourborn generation. Such a Hong Kong

governments held different visions of theidentity was closely linked to thebest developmental model for Hong Kongdevelopment of a local popular culture as

8 FCO 40/439-440, FCO 40/547, and FCO 40/642.

Golden Era of MacLehose and the Dynamics ofSocial Reforms’, China Information, 24: 3 (2010),
249-72.

Also see Ray Yep and Tai-Lok Lui, ‘Revisiting the7manifested in films, music, and televisionsound China out about Hong Kong’s

shows. In the late 1970s, the renewed

political future, albeit indirectly. At the

influx of illegal immigrants from China

invitation of the Chinese Minister ofcaused Hongkongers to define their

Foreign Trade (who had previously visitedidentity by differentiating themselves from

Hong Kong to explore the latter’s possible

mainlanders. Their imaginary notion ofcontribution to China’s modernisation),‘we’ versus ‘they’ was reinforced by the

MacLehose visited Beijing in late Marchgovernment’s decision, in October 1980, to

1979. On 29 March, MacLehose wasend the ‘touch base’ policy (introduced in

granted an interview by Deng Xiaoping,1974), whereby illegal Chinese immigrants

who seized the initiative by raising the

who had joined their families and foundHong Kong question. Deng asserted that

employment were allowed to stay in Hong‘sovereignty over Hong Kong belonged toKong instead of being repatriated to the

China’ but China would respect Hongmainland.9

Kong’s ‘special status’. MacLehose
underscored the immediate problem of

Negotiations on the Future of Hong Kong

individual land leases in the New

By 1979, the business community became

Territories, but failed to convince Deng ofincreasingly concerned about the gradualallowing the Hong Kong government torundown of land leases in the New

grant new leases beyond 1997. Deng

Territories, which would expire three days

simply asked the governor to tell investors

before 1 July 1997 (the date of the expiry

to ‘put their hearts at ease’.11of the 1898 New Territories Lease itself).

By that time, Deng’s priority of national

The inability of the Hong Kong government

unification was not Hong Kong, but

to grant new land leases lasting beyond

Taiwan. It is thus unsurprising that Deng

1997 would deter major new investment.10

rebuffed MacLehose’s suggestions about

If the approach of 1997 created a crisis ofextending land leases and, by implication,

confidence, the coming to power of Deng

British administration in Hong Kong.

Xiaoping, who inaugurated a policy ofreform and opening up in late 1978,

During her visit to China in September

provided an opportunity for the British to

1982, British Prime Minister Margaret

9 FCO 40/1005-1007, FCO 40/1114-1117, and FCO

10 FCO 40/1058-1061.

40/1200-1206.

11 FCO 21/1736 and FCO 40/1050-1051.

8

Thatcher raised the question of Hongtalks. The British chief negotiator, Percy

Kong with Deng Xiaoping.12

Cradock, who was pragmatic and eager to

Notwithstanding the Hong Kong

avoid confrontation with China, resisted

governor’s contribution to the formulation

for some nine months. During the secondof negotiating strategy in London andphase of negotiations that began in July

Thatcher’s eagerness to consult the

1983, the British initially aimed at

Unofficial Members of Hong Kong’s

exchanging sovereignty for continuing

Executive Council and Legislative Council,

administration. But the Chinese saw theHong Kong’s future would be determined

two issues as indivisible. Deng Xiaoping

by the secret diplomacy of Britain andwarned that, if no agreement was reached

China. Beijing opposed vehemently the

by September 1984, China would

participation of Hong Kong people in theunilaterally announce its plan for Hong

diplomatic talks or the creation of a ‘three

Kong on the basis of the concept of ‘one

legged stool’. During his meeting withcountry, two systems’. With the two sides

Thatcher, Deng made it plain that China

at loggerheads, the crisis of confidence

would resume both sovereignty andintensified in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong

administration over the whole of Hongdollar plunged to a new low after theKong in 1997. With her conviction in free-

fourth round, prompting the Hong Kong

market capitalism, Thatcher was reluctant

government to introduce a system of

to hand over a prosperous and capitalist

pegging with the US dollar in Octobercity to the Chinese Communists. Anglo-

1983. By the year’s end, Cradock finallyChinese negotiation over Hong Kong’s

convinced Thatcher to concede the issue

future commenced shortly afterof administration to China. Thereafter, theThatcher’s visit, and would last for two

British objective shifted towards

years..13 The first phase of negotiations,

negotiating a high degree of autonomy andfrom October 1982 to June 1983, focused

continuity for Hong Kong with a view to

on China’s insistence that Britain should

minimising the risk of Beijing’s

acknowledge Chinese sovereignty overinterference in Hong Kong’s affairs after

Hong Kong before the start of substantial

1997.

12 FCO 40/1438-1442, FCO 40/1446-1453, and FCO(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2023).
Also see FCO 40/1546-1564, FCO 40/1612, FCO
40/1663-1667, and FCO 40/1673.

40/1465.
13 See Chi-kwan Mark, Decolonisation in the Age of
Globalisation: Britain, China, and Hong Kong, 1979-89

9

The fifteen rounds of talks during 1984

Hong Kong would revert to Chineseremained tough, though. The two sides

sovereignty on 1 July 1997; it would

disagreed over such issues as

become a Special Administrative Region

constitutional development, the stationing

with a high degree of autonomy, except forof Chinese troops after 1997, thedefence and foreign affairs; and Hongestablishment of a joint commission to

Kong’s capitalist system and way of life

manage transitional matters, andwould remain unchanged for 50 years

nationality. The Unofficial Members ofunder the ‘one country, two systems’. Now

Hong Kong’s Executive Council, led bythat Hong Kong had become in effect a

Sze-yuen Chung, were particularly‘global city’ with close economic ties with

unhappy with what they saw as thethe outside world, Thatcher hoped thatThatcher government’s constant retreat

decolonisation would allow Hong Kong’s

from its previously held positions. The

capitalism to continue to flourish after

passage of the 1981 British Nationality

1997.

Act, which denied a right of abode in the
United Kingdom to Hong Kong’s British

Democratisation and the Basic Law

subjects (who indeed had lost an

The decolonisation of Hong Kong went

automatic right as early as 1962),14 washand in hand with the process ofstill fresh in their mind. In mid-April 1984,

democratisation. Indeed, even before theForeign Secretary Geoffrey Howe visitedconclusion of the Joint Declaration, theHong Kong to announce that it would ‘not

British had decided to speed up thebe realistic’ to think of continued British

development of representative

administration in Hong Kong after 1997.15

government in Hong Kong by publishing a
consultative Green Paper in July 1984 andNot until late September did the British

in November the White Paper proposing

and Chinese chief negotiators initiate theindirect elections in the Legislative

draft of an agreement. On 19 December, in

Council.17 After 1945, the British had

Beijing Thatcher and Premier Zhao Ziyang

contemplated but decided against politicalsigned the Sino-British Joint Declaration

reform in Hong Kong due to a host ofon the future of Hong Kong.16 Accordingly,

factors: China’s opposition to

14 FCO 40/1330-1337 and FCO 40/1490-1495.

16 FCO 40/1770-1773.

15 PREM 19/1264, TNA.

17 FCO 40/1635-1639.

10democratisation, which was seen as aduring the transitional period, the Chinese

prelude to Hong Kong’s independence; thegovernment commenced the drafting ofperceived political apathy of Hong Kong

the Basic Law, the mini-constitution forpeople; and the colonial authorities’

post-1997 Hong Kong, on the basis of theemphasis on co-option of Chinese elites

Sino-British Joint Declaration.19 A Basic

into an extended network of advisory

Law Drafting Committee, consisting of

bodies. Nonetheless, with the emergence

thirty-six mainland members and twenty-of the 1997 question and of an affluent

three Hong Kong members, was formed.

middle class in the 1980s, more and more

Besides, a Basic Law Consultative

Hongkongers were drawn into political

Committee, comprising 180 members

debates and established political groups

from Hong Kong, was set up to collect

like the Meeting Point. (Indeed, during the

local opinion. The Sino-British Joint

1970s, university students, pressure

Declaration had only vague references togroups, and elected Urban Councillors

democracy, with the nature of the

had been actively involved in various social

franchise unspecified. According to its

and political agitation, such as theannex one, the legislature should bemovement for recognition of Chinese as

constituted by ‘elections’, which could

the official language.) On 26 September

mean direct, indirect, or functional

1985, Hong Kong’s first-ever indirectelection. As a result, the pro-business andelections in the expanded fifty-six-seatpro-democracy members of the Basic Law

Legislative Council were held, including

Drafting Committee had vigorous debates

twelve seats returned by electoral college

about the scope and pace ofconstituencies (consisting of directly

democratisation in Hong Kong. Above all,elected representatives at the District

China did not want the British to develop

Board and the Urban Council) and anotherrepresentative government in Hong Kong

twelve seats by nine functional

before the promulgation of the Basic Law.

constituencies (such as the commercial,

Xu Jiatun, director of the Hong Kong

industrial, and labour).18

branch of the NCNA, warned of ‘a

While the British were developing

tendency to deviate’ from the Joint

representative government in Hong Kong

Declaration.20 He saw the need for

18 FCO 40/1792-1798.

20 FCO 40/1814.

19 FCO 40/1868-1871.

11

‘convergence’ between the review offourth terms of the council. The first three

representative government and theterms of the chief executive would be

drafting of the Basic Law, between theselected by an Election Committee, with apre-1997 and post-1997 politicalreview conducted in 2011.23 What

structures. During diplomatic exchanges

happened in China in the following

with the British, the Chinese hinted that ifmonths, however, threatened to derail the

direct elections were not introduced in thedrafting of the Basic Law and indeed theLegislative Council until after thehandover of Hong Kong.24 The Beijing

promulgation of the Basic Law, theevents renewed the crisis of confidence inChinese government would not oppose

Hong Kong, and the fight for democracy byappropriate provision for them in theits residents. The Executive andBasic Law.21 As a result of this ‘secret

Legislative Councils unanimously agreed

understanding’ between Britain andthat the number of directly elected seats

China, the Hong Kong government

in the Legislative Council should beconcluded that direct elections would not

doubled, from ten to twenty, in 1991, andbe introduced in 1988 (on the grounds ofshould reach 50 per cent of the council bylack of majority support after public

1997. Democrats called for half of theconsultation), but in 1991 for ten seats inlegislative seats to be directly elected in

geographically based constituencies.22

1991, and universal suffrage for the wholehouse by 1995. In London, the Thatcher

On 21 February 1989, China’s National

government decided to ‘[move] rapidly toPeople’s Congress published the draft

establish representative government

Basic Law for comments by the people ofbased on direct elections, so that such

Hong Kong. The democratisation of Hongrepresentative government would be inKong would be based on the ‘principle ofplace by 1997 and harder for the Chinese

gradual and orderly progress’, in that

authorities to destroy’.25

about fifteen members of the Legislative
Council would be directly elected in 1997,
a proportion that would be increased
gradually to 50 per cent by the third and
21 PREM 19/2727, TNA.

24 See FCO 40/2668-2671, FCO 40/2697, FCO

22 FCO 40/2396-2401.

40/2699-2701, and FCO 40/2797.
25 PREM 19/2728, TNA.

23 FCO 40/2636, FCO 40/2639, and FCO 40/2643.

12

Accordingly, up to 50,000 heads ofhousehold could apply for full British
citizenship without the need to leave HongKong.26

After the Beijing events of 1989, China’s
attitude towards Hong Kong’s
democratisation hardened. Beijing fearedthat Hong Kong would be used as a baseto ‘subvert’ the Chinese government, andDraft reply to Parliamentary Question on the eligibility

that, by calling for a faster pace ofof Hong Kong citizens for British citizenship, January

democratisation, Britain was trying to

10, 1990 (FCO40/3157/0022)‘internationalise’ the Hong Kongquestion.27 Eventually, the deadlock overTo reassure the Hong Kong people,

Hong Kong’s democracy was broken after

Foreign Secretary Howe visited thethe exchange of seven communications

territory between 2 and 4 July. He spoke ofbetween Chinese Foreign Minister Qian

accelerating the pace of democratisation,

Qichen and his British counterpart,while revealing that Britain would

Douglas Hurd, between 18 January and 12

introduce a Bill of Rights for Hong Kong

February 1990. China agreed that the(eventually enacted in June 1991). But

Legislative Council would have eighteen

Howe made it plain that it was impossible(rather than ten) directly elected seats infor Britain to grant a right of abode to1991 and twenty in 1997, with the number

more than three million Hongkongers

steadily increased thereafter. Meanwhile,

holding British passports. Instead, after

the British and Chinese agreed on the so-lengthy discussions in London, thecalled ‘through train’ arrangement for

Thatcher government announced inLegislative councillors elected in 1995,

December a ‘selection scheme’, which

who, after satisfying certain requirements,

aimed to ‘persuade key people to remain

could serve a full four-year term untilin Hong Kong not to bring them to Britain’.

1999. On 4 April, the National People’s

26 CAB 128/94, TNA. Also see FCO 40/3124-3132,

27 FCO 40/2672-2673.

FCO 40/3144, FCO 40/3147, FCO 40/3156-3158, andFCO 40/3160.

13

Congress promulgated the Basic Law. The

and his proposals for political reforms incomposition of the Legislative Council

1993-4, created another political storm incorresponded with the latest exchanges

Sino-British relations.30 Believing that the

between Hurd and Qian. The first chief

Hong Kong people deserved greater

executive would be selected by a broadly

democracy and working within the ‘grey

representative Selection Committee, but

areas’ in the Basic Law, Patten proposedthe ‘ultimate aim’ was selection by

to raise the number of directly elected‘universal suffrage’.28

Legislative Council seats from eighteen to
twenty in 1995, widen the electoral base of

Besides the issue of Hong Kong’s

the functional constituencies by replacing

democratisation, the British decision tocorporate voting with individual voting,build a new airport and its related

and abolish all appointed seats in theinfrastructure in response to theMunicipal Councils and the District

confidence crisis was another source ofBoards. Beijing criticised Patten forconflict between Britain and China.29

violating the Joint Declaration and the

Beijing was antagonised by the lack of

Basic Law, while reminding him of theprior consultation by London, while1990 exchanges between Qian and Hurd

worrying that the construction of an

about the composition of the Legislative

expensive airport would exhaust HongCouncil. In 1993, British and Chinese

Kong’s foreign reserves. The dispute wasdiplomats engaged in seventeen rounds ofresolved only after a year of Anglo-

negotiations to resolve the dispute, but toChinese discussions. In September 1991,

no avail. Patten went ahead with his

Prime Minister John Major came toproposals (with some modification), andBeijing to sign with Premier Li Peng theelections for the Legislative Council duly

Memorandum of Understanding on the

took place in 1995.

airport project.
For its part, China sought to build a ‘second
The arrival of Chris Patten as Hong Kong's

stove’, which would replace the politicallast colonial governor in October 1992,

institutions created under Patten’s reforms

28 FCO 40/2856 and FCO 40/2861-2863.

FCO 40/3640, FCO 40/3779-3788, FCO 40/39363939, and FCO 40/3998-4000. On Chris Patten’s own
recollection, see The Hong Kong Diaries (London:
Allen Lane, 2022).

29 FCO 40/3058-3065, FCO 40/3235-3240, FCO
40/3246, and FCO 40/3254-3262.
30 FCO 40/3478-3479, FCO 40/3564-3569, FCO
40/3576-3580, FCO 40/3625-3626, FCO 40/3628,

14after 1997. In early 1996, the Hong Kong
Preparatory Committee was established tochoose a provisional Legislative Council, tobe inaugurated after the Hong Kong
handover. In December, Tung Chee-hwa, thepro-Beijing businessman, was appointed as
the first Chief Executive of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. The stage
was set for Hong Kong’s retrocession to
China on 1 July 1997.

15