China’s Foreign Policy Objectives and Views on the International Order
Thoughts Based on Xi Jinping’s Speech at the 19th National Congress

China’s Foreign Policy Objectives and Views on theInternational Order
Thoughts Based on Xi Jinping’s Speech at the 19th National
Congress*
Shin Kawashima**
Abstract

In the three-and-a-half-hour-long speech at the 19th National Congress of theCommunist Par ty of China held in the fall of 2017, Xi Jinping por trayed theoutline of the long-term direction that the Chinese Communist Party will takedomestically and internationally until the middle of this centur y. Based on theremarks delivered in the speech, and theories and concepts on foreign policy Xi haspresented previously, this article analyzes Chinaʼs foreign policy objectives and Xiʼsview on the international order. This article also argues the prospects for Chinaʼsforeign policy in some specific areas such as the policies toward the United States,
neighboring countries, the maritime domain, North Korea, Taiwan and Japan.

I

1. End of the Era of Reform and Opening up
t is important to note that the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
held in the fall of 2017 not only ser ved to outline the Chinese Communist Partyʼs longterm direction for regime management, but also indicated that it would mark the start of a“new era.” While the statement constituted no more than a formalistic composition aimed
at conveying the fervor and interpretations of the leadership of the Communist Party, it cannot
be set aside as a mere “composition” because it was promulgated by a party that rules over anation that is not a Western democracy. Thus, the statement must be analyzed and understoodto represent the Chinese Communist Partyʼs “official” statement on its own positions and future
directions.
President Xi Jinpingʼs speech took three and a half hours to deliver and contained a numberof critically important points that differed from the report presented at the previous National
Congress held in 2012. First of all, the report recognized a new principal contradiction facing
Chinese society, which since 1981 had consistently stated, “Production cannot keep pace withthe peopleʼs material demands.” Addressing this principal contradiction had formed the core ofvarious policies of the era of reform and opening up that prioritized economic development. But
in 2017, this was changed to the “contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development
and the peopleʼs ever-growing need for more beautiful and better lives.” This effectively signaled
the end of the era of reform and opening up.
The era of reform and opening up―particularly under the leadership of Jiang Zemin andduring the earlier half of the presidency of Hu Jintao―more or less overlaps with the period of “tao*This essay was originally published on Kokusai Mondai [International Affairs], No.668, Jan.–Feb. 2018.

** Shin Kawashima is the professor of the Department of International Relations, the Graduate School ofArts & Sciences, the University of Tokyo.

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guang yang hui,” roughly translating to “keep a low profile.” In its foreign relations, China focusedon its economy and nurtured cooperative overseas ties in order to attract foreign investments. At
times during this period, China prioritized the economy over issues of national sovereignty andterritory. Adjustments began to be made during the latter years of the Hu Jintao administration as
equal importance was assigned to sovereignty and national security. Moreover, it is notable thatXi Jinping has never used the expression “tao guang yang hui” in his speeches. In this sense, it
can be said that the first changes to be made appeared in the area of foreign policy. In any case,what is clear is that a new era has dawned on China.
In his 2017 speech, Xi Jinping emphasized that the partyʼs leadership would be further
strengthened in the new era. No doubt, it will be up to the party to determine what constitutes“ more beautiful and better lives. ” Fur thermore, it is likely that the scenario for resolving
the problems of economic disparity and environmental challenges that stand in the way ofachieving “more beautiful and better lives” will involve the tightening of internal party control
and reinforcing law enforcement in society. On this point, it is quite possible for an inversionof objectives and methods to occur so that the tightening of internal party control and law
enforcement emerge as immediate objectives.

2. The Goal of Building a Great Modern Socialist Countr y

In attempting to understand Chinaʼs view of the international order, it is important to note thatXi Jinping in his 2017 speech outlined a long-term vision for a new era extending to 2050. During
the first fifteen years―that is between 2020 and 2035―China will strive to build a “modernsocialist country with Chinese characteristics.” The goal of this period is to resolve the various
problems that stand in the way of realizing “more beautiful and better lives.” It is interesting tonote that at this stage, China is not expected to have reached the status of a “great country.” It
can be assumed that “great country” implies standing on par with the United States, which in turnimplies that China anticipates it will take thirty years or longer to catch up with the United States.
It is during the second half of the era―the fifteen years between 2035 and 2050―that China
is expected to emerge as a great country and realize the “great dream of the Chinese people.” Itgoes without saying that the Communist Party would lead the way in building a great country,
thus once again underscoring the legitimacy of the party.
Obser vers paid considerable attention to predictions of who would be appointed to the
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). In particular, it still remains unclear who will be placedin charge of foreign affairs. That being said, newly appointed PSC member Wang Huning is aninternational political scientist, and high-ranking diplomat Yang Jiechi has been elevated to the
Politburo to serve concurrently as the Secretary-General of the Leading Small Group on Foreign
Affairs and Director of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party. Ultimately, theleadership of the party has come to be populated by more individuals with backgrounds in foreign
affairs than in the past.
Moving into its second term, the Xi Jinping administration has maintained the systems ofcollective leadership and mandatory retirement in personnel management. At the same time,members of the Xi Jinping faction dominate not only the Central Committee and the PSC but
also the top regional positions. This can be seen to represent the centralization of power under
Xi. A number of Xiʼs close allies, such as Li Zhanshu and Zhao Leji, have been appointed to the
PSC and are expected to take charge of the national legislature and internal control of the party,
respectively. It would appear that technocrats and practical executive types have been appointed
to ensure effective policy implementation. For Xi Jinping, foreign affairs can provide an excellent
opportunity for displaying the “correctness” of the directions that the Chinese Communist
Party has adopted in governance. On the other hand, this is a form of display that cannot beeasily manipulated or controlled. Over the next five years, or all the way through 2050, it will be
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China’s Foreign Policy Objectives and Views on the International Order
Thoughts Based on Xi Jinping’s Speech at the 19th National Congress

necessary to continue displaying the achievements of foreign relations while coordinating withdomestic propaganda.
The goals identified by Xi Jinping will not be easy to achieve. Given that Chinaʼs labor force
will begin to shrink rapidly in the second half of the 2020s, emerging as a great countr y by
2050 will prove extremely difficult for China. The slogan of “more beautiful and better lives”
sounds good, but the transition to a post-modern society will not be easy in a country that is notdemocratic. Will it be possible to realize “more beautiful and better lives” in a space where there
is no assurance of a diversity of values? Indeed, China is engaged in an immense experiment
whose future outcome is unclear.

3. The Theor y of Chinese-Style International Relations
In his speech, Xi Jinping also referred to foreign policy and the international order that heenvisions. Needless to say, China itself will opt for realistic actions that rely heavily on power.
However, it is important to note that starting around the time of the Hu Jintao administration,
China has been endeavoring to develop a full-fledged Chinese style of international relations, andthese efforts have been sublimated by the Xi Jinping administration into the heading of “a newform of international relations.” Although these have merely been words up until now, they canno longer be ignored when they are being employed to explain Chinaʼs foreign policy and whenpolicies are being implemented within the scope of what these words can explain (even if they do
not go beyond rhetoric and sophistry). In the case of China, inconsistency between words andactions certainly exists. The inconsistencies in Chinaʼs foreign policy are clearly visible when
seen from abroad, but that does not change the fact that a certain level of consistency must be
maintained at home for purposes of domestic politics (and propaganda). For this reason, thegovernment enforces control over the press and regulates the inflow of information from abroad.
“A new form of international relations” differs from the pursuit of international peace andstability as envisioned under the framework of U.S. alliances and the spread of democratic
institutions and practices as anticipated by the advanced democracies. China is particularly
critical of U.S. alliances as being a vestige of the Cold War. What China envisions is the nurturingof win-win relations based on economic ties, which will then gradually develop into partnerships.
Ultimately, China expects that these chains of partnerships will lead to the emergence of a global
community with a shared future for mankind.
This rhetoric appears to cover up and hide the fact that China opts for foreign policy that
relies heavily on power. On the other hand, it is obvious that China is exploiting its economic
superiority as a critical resource in the spheres of politics and diplomacy. It can be readily
appreciated that if China succeeds in realizing its “new form of international relations,” thisachievement would “result” in establishing Chinaʼs superiority in such areas as politics, diplomacy
and national security. For the present, Chinaʼs greatest resource is its economic and financial
might. Considering the various gaps that separate China and the United States, the gap is smallest
in terms of economics, while still dauntingly wide in the areas of military power and technology.
As such, it is easy to understand why China envisions using economics as a lever in pursuinginternational relations.

4. Major Countr y Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics

Chinaʼs foreign policy is explained in the context of “major countr y diplomacy with Chinesecharacteristics.” What this seems to mean is that, as a major developing country, China seeks toplay a leadership role in finally building a global community with a shared destiny for mankind.
China intends to accomplish this, not through a series of alliances as developed by the UnitedStates, but by using its economic power as the key resource. Given that the goal of becoming a“major country” is set to be achieved by 2050, the objective of building a global community with a56
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shared destiny for mankind can be interpreted to be a long-term one.
China views itself as a major developing country (although this expression does not appear in
Xi Jinpingʼs speech). This means that China stands apart from the advanced countries belonging
to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Group of Seven(G7). Probably at some time in the past, China envisioned that it would ultimately join the ranksof these advanced countries. However, it can be argued that Xi Jinping denies this possibility inthe new form of international relations that he has described. But this does not imply that China
completely refutes the present world order or that it intends to challenge all that already exists. It
is for this reason that Xi Jinping has stated on various occasions that China will uphold the global
free trade regime and contribute to maintaining international peace and security.
The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence defined by Mao Zedong and the principle of selfreliance formulated under Deng Xiaoping were carried forward by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
Similarly, Xi Jinping continues to use these two fundamental prescriptions, and it is from them thatpolicies against alliances and promoting the mutual respect for sovereignty and independence arederived. But Chinaʼs self-identity has shifted to where it now sees itself as the global promulgatorof “a new form of international relations.” In this sense, it can be said that a new vitality has beenbreathed into Chinaʼs long-standing principles. On the other hand, certain expressions, such as“tao guang yang hui,” that were adopted and used by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, have fallen into
disuse under Xi Jinping.
The international order as envisioned by China and the direction of its foreign policy face
many serious obstacles and difficulties. It may be easy to criticize the U.S. framework of alliances,
but as seen in the case of Djibouti, bearing the full cost of building and managing military bases
abroad places a huge financial burden on China. As for acquiring the rights to operate ports andother facilities when a host country proves unable to service its debt, it remains unclear to what
extent the international community and host countries are prepared to accept and tolerate thispractice.

5. Relations with the Existing World Order
China is a beneficiary of the organizations and frameworks developed under such systems as
the United Nations and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Moreover, as a country thathas successfully developed in an environment of globalization, China does not seek to negate
the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the global trade regime. To export its products, Chinaneeds the assurance of free international trade, and it is thanks to the assurance of free capital
flows that investments flow to China. Notwithstanding the inconsistencies that remain in place
between the world order and Chinaʼs domestic regulations, it would be mistaken to think that
China is antagonistic toward the existing world order. China refers to the existing US-centricorder as a “world order,” one which it criticizes in part but does not reject entirely, and uses theterm “international order” to describe a UN-centric order it supports that reflects the perspectivesof developing countries.
Nevertheless, two points require special attention. First, it must not be forgotten that China
continues to view itself as a major developing country. From this derives the Chinese belief thatthe existing world order―particularly in the areas of international trade and finance―is thehandiwork of advanced nations of the West and therefore disadvantageous to developing countries
and their interests. It is exactly for this reason that China is anxious to join the ranks of the rulemakers. It therefore actively dispatches its personnel to organizations and venues engaged indeveloping the international order. Through this participation, China aims to make “appropriate”
revisions to existing rules and systems. The second point to bear in mind is that because China
is not a democratic nation in the Western sense, it is possible that its understanding of the same
treaties and systems fundamentally differs from the understanding of the advanced countries. For
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China’s Foreign Policy Objectives and Views on the International Order
Thoughts Based on Xi Jinping’s Speech at the 19th National Congressinstance, its definitions of “freedom,” “safety” and “openness” are at variance with the definitions
current among advanced countries. Maybe it is only natural for differences in definition to exist.
On the other hand, such differences may necessitate adjustments to commonly understood basic
concepts affecting international relations.
For the time being, China as a major countr y can be expected to maintain a cooperative
stance in its diplomatic relations with other major countries. It can also be expected to at least
superficially adopt the same use of words and expressions. As for its relations with developing
countries, China will present itself as a major country representing the developing world and willin this way seek to obtain the support of these nations. In the immediate future, Chinaʼs pursuitof power will be expressed more in East Asia and the regions that lie east of the central areas ofEurasia than in the forums of global governance.

6. The Future of U.S.-China Relations

China assigns singular importance to the United States as the worldʼs most powerful nationand gives the United States special treatment in its foreign policy. Basically, Xi Jinpingʼs speechexhibits a very strong awareness of the United States. While never explicitly naming the UnitedStates in his speech, Xi Jinping lays out the path to becoming a major country with “Chinesecharacteristics” that differs in style to that of the United States. However, it is necessary to notethat by saying that China will catch up to the United States by 2050, Xi Jinping is in effect statingthat China lags behind by thirty years. For this reason, Chinaʼs policies toward the United States
are in a class of their own and consistently differ with policies aimed at other countries. At thesame time, Chinaʼs U.S. policy can be said to reveal the very core of its foreign policy.
The importance of Russia cannot be overlooked when considering Chinese policies toward
the United States. Though the two countries have not forged a comprehensive alliance, Russia
is at all times a “strategic” partner for China and has a critical role to play in keeping the UnitedStates in check with China.
From the perspective of U.S.-China relations, the current situation is unusual. When President
Trump visited China in 2017, he was given the highest possible welcome at the Palace Museumin Beijing. Going a step further, China presented him with a proposal for massive purchases of
U.S. products, although a considerable portion of the purchases had previously been completed.
It seems this has succeeded in preventing, for the time being, a critical deterioration in bilateral
economic friction. Regarding the North Korean problem, the Trump administration has on the
one hand applied pressure on China while on the other hand assigning special importance to therole of China. It is feared that Trump may at some point attempt to use tensions over the Taiwan
Strait as a tool to make a deal with China on North Korea and economic issues.
The situation remains fluid at this point, and it appears that in certain respects the Trumpadministration has yet to finalize its policies toward China and Asia. A case in point is theappointment of personnel to critical posts. There are those who predict that the U.S. bureaucracy
will not be able to implement its Asia policy until 2018. Of course, the possibility of the current
situation continuing for another five years is not nil. The fact of the matter is that the outlook
remains opaque.
What kind of relationship does China desire to have with the United States? The severity of
U.S. policies toward China is not the crux of the issue. More importantly, China is interested in
knowing whether the United States will continue to intervene in world affairs without giving up
its status as the single superpower, or whether it will instead move toward forging cooperative
relations and partnerships with other major countries. For China, it would be preferable for theUnited States to opt for the latter path because this would make it much easier for China to act inEast Asia and the central and eastern regions of Eurasia. While Trumpʼs advocacy of “America
first” may essentially apply to the arena of domestic American politics, it should be noted that
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Shin Kawashimadepending on how the Trump administration chooses to formulate its foreign policy, China may
find itself in an ideal international environment.

7. Regional Order and Relations with Small and Middle Powers
Regardless of the intentions of the United States, the age of America as the single global
superpower is gradually waning. It can be argued that this is why the Obama administration
was so eager to pursue multilateral frameworks in the fields of both national security and theeconomy. In the area of security, Obama sought to strengthen the ties between allies by making
adjustments in the hub-and-spoke security system consisting of a bundling of bilateral security
agreements. In the area of economics, initiatives were undertaken to form a new order as
represented by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This can be viewed as an effort on the partof the United States to involve small and middle powers (whether Japan constitutes a middle
power requires further debate) in building a new order.
As a result of these initiatives, notable progress was made in bilateral security cooperation
between Japan and Australia, Japan and India and others, and steps were taken toward ultimately
forming a network of security agreements. The TPP in turn foreshadowed the emergence of a
new regional economic and trade order. These advances in involving small and middle powers
were based on American leadership rather than on American hegemony. Nevertheless, fromthe Chinese perspective, these may have appeared to be elements of a general scheme for
Chinese containment. In any case, what is important is that the United States stood behindthese frameworks and that the presence of the United States as the worldʼs largest military andeconomic power cannot be overlooked.
The Trump administration today appears to be headed in directions that are at variance withthe policies of the Obama administration. Trump has shown no strong interest in multilateralframeworks, and while he may have mentioned the importance of the “Indo-Pacific,” there isno clear indication of what that entails. Regardless of his final direction, U.S. policies will play a
critical role in determining whether China is able to realize its foreign policy goals.

8. Chinese Leadership in Forming a Regional OrderAs previously noted, the Xi Jinping administration is pursuing a new order in East Asia and thecentral and eastern regions of Eurasia and is exploiting its economic superiority as a vital andstrategic resource in this process. While the experiences of Sri Lanka and Cambodia indicatethat the economic lever can give way to political and security objectives, it is true that in certain
respects small and middle powers find interaction with China to be desirable. It is very likely that
small and middle powers are weighing their own domestic conditions and making their individual
choices while comparing China and the United States or Japan and the United States.
Against this background, China is penetrating all parts of the region while being very upfront
about its own intent in certain respects. At the same time, it is responding to the requests anddesires of counterparties in other respects. It can be said that what was no more than peripheral
diplomacy under the Hu Jintao administration is now being gradually sublimated into a frameworkof coherent policies. In several significant ways, the measures adopted by Xi Jinping differ fromthose previously taken by Hu Jintao.
First of all, Xi Jinping has begun to present a vision for the future regional order. This is
symbolized by Chinaʼs “New Asian Security Concept,” which posits that Asian countries should
be responsible for Asian security and that China will lead the Asian countries in this undertaking.
In the past, Japan and Australia had expressed their thoughts on an Asian order, but China is now
beginning to verbalize related concepts.
Second, it is notable that China itself has started to provide the region with international
public goods. Such initiatives go beyond the construction of ports, railways, expressways and59
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China’s Foreign Policy Objectives and Views on the International Order
Thoughts Based on Xi Jinping’s Speech at the 19th National Congressother elements of transportation infrastructure and have come to include a Renminbi settlement
network and the provision of satellite-based global positioning systems (GPS) services. Looking
to the future, it is possible that political and economic styles will also proliferate in the region as
public goods, such as systems of governance and cashless purchasing methods.
China has not stopped at presenting a vision for the future order and providing a range of
public goods. Specifically, it is using the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation tovisualize the path ahead. In the area of international finance, the Export-Import Bank of China
and the Silk Road Fund are playing an active role in financing infrastructure construction, moreso than the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As previously explained, Chinaʼs vision
for a regional order and the provision of international public goods will at some point in the future
be transformed into power.
Countries of the region have already begun to express their suspicions regarding Chinese
policies. A case in point is the refusal of Indiaʼs Prime Minister Modi to attend the Belt and Road
Forum on the grounds that Chinaʼs construction of railway systems in Pakistan goes beyond
the scope of economic construction and touches on the realm of national security. By regularly
participating in BRICS summits and meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
Prime Minister Modi has shown that he is willing to cooperate with China on economic matterswhile rejecting Chinese initiatives in military and national security areas.
Countries seeking a separation of politics and economics are not rare in this region. On theother hand, China assumes an eventual transition from economics to politics. Herein lies thecontradiction that separates China from the other countries of the region. Will this provide thesmall and middle powers of the region with a cause to unite around? Or will Japan and the UnitedStates be able to formulate concepts and mechanisms that can suppress this transition? These willcertainly emerge as focal questions for the region.

9. Consequences of China’s Maritime Expansion
The Xi Jinping administration is reforming the military with the intent of fielding military forcesthat can be deployed throughout the world. At the same time, China is endeavoring to gain
militar y superiority in the central and eastern regions of Eurasia. However, compared to its
advances in the economic sphere, Chinese initiatives for establishing military superiority in thisregion lag behind. This can be attributed to the deployment of U.S. forces and the presence of U.S.
allies in the region. What China hopes is that the United States will steadily lessen its involvementin the region and weaken its support for allies. At the same time, China will seek to sever the
networks that were beginning to take form among U.S. allies under the Obama administration.
Finally, as a country that has no allies, China will endeavor to find military bases and ports that it
can use in the region.
This begs a critical question. To what degree will the United States remain engaged in the
East China Sea and the South China Sea, and to what degree will it remain interested in theregions that lie between the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean?
There is no doubt that China will continue to strengthen its security policies and maritime
expansion over the long run. But the road ahead will be affected by choices made by the UnitedStates and the responses of peripheral countries. For example, during 2017, China did notnecessarily resort to hardline measures in its maritime strategy. It is true that unusual actions
were observed in the East China Sea where bombers flew over the Nansei Islands to emerge
over the Pacific and head in the direction of the Kii Peninsula. On the other hand, the events that
occurred around the Senkaku Islands in August involving Chinese fishing boats, the China Coast
Guard and naval vessels were relatively muted. In the South China Sea, bases that were alreadyunder construction were expanded and reinforced against the backdrop of cooperative relations
with the Philippines. On the other hand, China refrained from undertaking new projects for the
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Shin Kawashimareclamation and construction of bases in the Scarborough Shoal and elsewhere. This cautious
attitude can be attributed to a couple of factors. First, because U.S. policies remained uncertain,
the situation was considered to be too unpredictable to move forward. Second, as 2017 was ayear of critical personnel appointments in Chinaʼs domestic politics, actions that could lead to
unforeseen outcomes and actions that would incite nationalistic reactions were avoided.
Such issues involving sovereignty and security will pose major obstacles to Chinaʼs efforts to“transform economic superiority into political superiority.” As seen in the previously mentioned
case involving India, if China adopts hardline policies in the areas of national sovereignty, militaryand security, all its talk of win-win relations, partnership and a global community with a shareddestiny for mankind will ring hollow. Until now, countries―including Japan―with outstanding
sovereignty, military and security issues with China were all located in the periphery of China.
However, the same type of problems will crop up in other parts of the world if China moves todeploy its forces globally. By contrast, in the American case, the United States has obtained theconsent of counterparties by entering into alliances. This gives rise to the question of how China
intends to build consensus. Xi Jinping did not fully explain this matter in his speech.

10. The North Korea and Taiwan Problems

By advocating a “new form of international relations” and “major country diplomacy with Chinesecharacteristics,” the Xi Jinping administration has broadly defined the direction of Chinaʼsforeign policy. But what stand immediately before China are the problems of North Korea andthe Taiwan Strait. Established during the Cold War, the 38th parallel and the Taiwan Strait havebeen maintained as borders to the present. The fate of these borders is of extreme significance inconsidering the future of China and East Asia. From the Chinese perspective, the treatment andresolution of these two problems will prove to be a critically important touchstone.
The treatment of the North Korea problem is important for three reasons. First among theseis the geopolitical aspect. Suppose the Korean Peninsula were to be united under South Koreanleadership. China would still benefit greatly if unification were to result in the withdrawal of U.S.
forces stationed in South Korea and the weakening of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. As hinted
by this outcome, support for North Korea is not the sole conclusion that China subscribes to. In
other words, the decisive factor for China is the maintenance of a buffer zone at its border and―if at all possible―the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Needless to say, any scenario involving turmoil in
North Korea and the influx of large numbers of North Korean refugees is undesirable.
Second, the handling of North Korean relations is very likely to provide a highly significant
demonstration of Chinaʼs transition from its traditional diplomacy to a new diplomacy. In thepast, China-North Korea relations were labeled a “blood alliance.” Even today, as this remains
a bond between two socialist nations, bilateral relations are maintained and nurtured by the
Chinese Communist Party and the North Korean Workersʼ Party more so than by the respective
foreign ministries. Because this is such a special and old relationship, China finds it especiallynecessary to bring it under its “new form of international relations” and to resolve any problems
in accordance with its construct of “major countr y diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.”
However, this also will prove to be a difficult challenge to surmount.
The third point is that the Six-Party Talks during the 2000s were particularly important for
China in that they afforded an opportunity for China to exercise leadership and to engage with
the United States in a joint undertaking. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was theprincipal premise of the talks for all of the participating countries, including the United States.
Furthermore, the international community pinned its hopes on China specifically because allcountries recognized that China held the greatest influence over North Korea. What this means isthat China would lose this diplomatic resource if the application of excessive sanctions on North
Korea were to rob it of its influence.
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Turning to Taiwan, China is operating under the assumption that the Taiwan problem will
have been resolved (implying the unification of Taiwan with the mainland) by the time the “Chinese
dream” is realized in 2050. The U.S.-China rapprochement and the end of the Vietnam War
during the 1970s changed the distance separating the United States and Taiwan. Ultimately, theUnited States and China normalized their relations on January 1, 1979, and U.S. forces stationed
in Taiwan were withdrawn. Taiwan frequently is placed on the table when a deal is being forgedin U.S.-China relations, and there are those who point to the possibility of this being repeated in
the current situation. However, for the time being, there are no concrete signs of this happening.
Even if a deal were to be negotiated, it is likely that what the United States could do would be
limited to changes in the sales of weapons to Taiwan as provided under the Taiwan Relations Act.
It should be noted however that any such change in U.S. weapons sales would not immediately
lead to unification.

11. China’s Positions on Japan

Japan stands out as a contradiction in Chinaʼs “new form of international relations.” That is tosay, even if China succeeds in transforming its economic superiority to superiority in the areas ofpolitics and security, that superiority will not be able to fully influence Japan as the worldʼs thirdlargest economy. For China, which continues to criticize alliances centered on the United States,
the Japan-U.S. alliance is one of the most troublesome realities that it faces. For this reason, it canbe said that Japan-China relations will continue to be burdened with certain structural problems,and Japan will remain an unwelcome presence for China as it endeavors to identify new goals
and objectives leading up to 2050. Moreover, the likelihood of China making any concessions on
territorial issues is low.
Nonetheless, as of now, Japan-China relations are relatively good. The year 2017 marked the45th anniversary of the normalization of Japan-China relations, and the following year marks the40th anniversary of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty. While these milestones may
be of some significance, the greatest factor promoting closer relations between the two countries
is the continued unsettled state of U.S. policies. It appears that the two countries are graduallyand strategically drawing closer to each other in an effort to reduce the number of variables thatthey are exposed to in their respective foreign policies. Looking at the situation from a long-term
perspective, if the United States to a certain degree withdraws from the region and makes room
for China to exercise greater influence and leadership, Japan will definitely not be able to maintainits “singular reliance on the United States” and will be forced to seek a new balance with China.
However, the road to improved relations will not be an easy one. Japanese and Chinese
diplomats frequently mention the fourth paragraph of the Japan-China Four Point Agreement
reached in 2014. The wording in question states that the two countries will “gradually” resume
summit talks and dialogue in the political and security fields. Both sides are emphasizing theexpression “gradually” and are cautiously moving forward one step at a time. On the other hand,
it should be pointed out that there is room for the development of new possibilities in bilateralrelations. As previously explained, Xi Jinping altered the principal contradiction the Chinesesociety was facing in his 2017 speech. The contradiction that exists between “more beautiful
and better lives” and “unbalanced and insufficient development” naturally contains a number ofchallenges that include such matters as social security systems, health and medical services andthe environment. New opportunities for Japan-China cooperation may open up if Japan were able
to effectively work with China on these challenges. The previous change in Chinaʼs principal
contradiction was announced in 1981 and was instrumental in pushing the countr y in the
direction of economic development. At the time, Deng Xiaoping identified Japan as the “economics
teacher.” The situation today is completely different from the situation in 1981, but that does
not mean that there are no new possibilities. However, it is unclear to what degree the change
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Shin Kawashima

in the principal domestic contradiction will affect Chinaʼs foreign policy. Similarly, the content
and implications of “a new form of international relations” and “major country diplomacy with
Chinese characteristics” remain unknown. The directions that these concepts take will not only
be determined by Chinaʼs domestic conditions, but more importantly by the actual foreign policythat China implements. Over the coming several years, various opportunities and possibilities
will arise for providing input to these policies. Should Japan be able to work with China during
this critical period, partial changes and improvements in bilateral relations would be possible toachieve.

12. Domestic Factors

Needless to say, Chinaʼs foreign policy is strongly influenced by domestic politics. While thesame can be said for all countries, domestic political developments play a particularly importantrole in the case of China. In contrast to the earlier years of the Hu Jintao administration, the Xi
Jinping administration can be seen to have made an effort to maintain consistency in the “voice”
of its domestic politics and the “voice” of its foreign policy. In this environment, it can be easily
imagined that the logic of domestic affairs may flow over into the external world to be applied toforeign policy. For example, the domestic logic of the “security of the state” is acting to suppress“freedom” inside China, including Hong Kong. This same logic of “security” can become directly
linked to external national security policy. In particular, this tendency can be expected to beconspicuously manifested in Chinese policies toward its neighbors.
In the area of economics, it hardly bears repeating that domestic policies for reforming stateowned enterprises and stimulating the economy will become increasingly linked to the Belt andRoad Initiative. By the same token, domestic financial regulations may come to generate friction
with foreign policy. With regard to society, in such issues as democracy, freedom and humanrights, domestic conditions may become directly linked to foreign policy.
On the other hand, domestic politics also plays an important role in the decision-making
process for foreign policy. Actors from the fields of politics, the military and the party are notthe only ones to affect the direction of foreign policy. Various other domestic entities, includinginterest groups and the central and regional governments, can influence the process. While it
may be tempting to speak of the international order envisioned by “China,” the view differs fromone sector to another. Thus, any examination of Chinaʼs view of the international order and its
own foreign policy must be predicated on a full understanding of the nationʼs internal conditions.

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