ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE AND LABORPOLICY IN]Ⅵ EXIC0 1940‑1970
恒 川 恵 市
Kenchi Tsunekawa*

Sπ ππα/yThe labor policy of the Me対 can State has been deeply affected by twonecesslties, one econonlic and the other political, which are not always
compatible.

The policy fOr import一 substituting industrialization of the pllexican
State was based on forced savings through inflation before rnid‑1950/s. If
economic logic was followed,real wages must be kept low. After the lrlid―
1950も ,the industrialization policy turned to one based on voluntary sa宙 ngs.

Real wages,therefore,would be a1lowed to rise. However,since external
dependence was deepened as the import¨ substituting industrialization reached
the advanced stage,

appropriate'' social environment must be secured forforeign investors.

The econonlic logic seems to have prevailed during the period of the
fOrced― saving policy. Real wages were kept considerably low and radicals′

resistence was forcefully put down. In contrast, in the early years of thev01untary― sa宙 ng policy,the econo■ uc logic could Only partially dictate thelabor policy Of the Me対 can government.Although real wages rapidly re‐covered after the inid‑1950′ s,labor unions strengthened their inilitant acti‐

vities and contributed to worsening the investlllent environment。

* 東京大学教養学部 (政 治学)「rhis is66

Economic Dependence and Labor Policy

largely attributable to the fact that the capacity of the State to control labororganizations was weakened because of various political factors such as intra-

elite rivalry, the necessity to reproduce legitimacy of the regime and thepresidential change. For these political reasons, the Mexican State could not

fully realize the economic necessities stemming fiom the increasing dependence upon foreign capital, at least for some time in the latter half of theL950's and in the first half of the 1960's.

I. Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to examine how economic considerations
arising from external dependence influenced the labor policy of the Mexican
State during the period between 1940 and 1970.

Many authors agree that the ruling elite in Mexico, as the would-be
heir to the Revolution, has held several policy goals which cannot be maximized simultaneously, at least in the short run. The incompatibility among

State goals became conspicuous in the 1940's when the ruling elite chose"industrialization" as the principal goal of the Revolution.l
F. Brandenburg argues that the immediate objective of the ruling elite,
which he calls the "Revolutionary Family", is to industrialize and commercialize the country while defense of labor rights and income redistribution
are long-range goals that can be sacrificed in the short run.2 Anderson andCockroft also write that a compromise has been necessary between the goalof industrialization and that of public welfare.3 The incompatibility of "economic nationalism" and "social justice" is also observed by Alejo Lopez.

The former is the objective of making the national economy grow andmodernize as quickly as possible while the latter is concerned with a politicalimperative of maintaining legitimacy of the political regime.+ According toRichard Miller, there are two conflicting "roles" even within the labor
movement. On the one hand, "national-purpose unionism" preaches thenecessity of national industrialization, for the sake of which self-restraints) 7 v7 .t t) )1ffift++F-l982

67

on wage and related economic demands should be accepted and the use of
the strike and related economic pressures should be avoided. On the other

hand, "job-centered unionism" emphasizes the struggle for better wages
and related economic benefits through the use of the strike and other economic pressures.s

If these arguments are correct, we can hypothesize that the labor policyof the Mexican State is deeply affected by two necessities which are notalways compatible. On the one hand, a rapid industrialization has been
perceived by the ruling elite as the necessary strategy for national economic

development. Capital formation and other purposes related to industrializa-tion will demand sacrifices on the part of labor. On the other hand, thegoverning elite must maintain political legitimacy as the heir to the Revolu-tion by allowing redistribution of benefits among workers and by granting
greater freedom for union activities.

However, we cannot assume from the beginning that Mexican labor
unions behave as they are dictated by the State. In this essay, the behaviorof the labor unions during the period between 1940 and 1970 will be elucidated first. Then, the nature of industrialization in Mexico and its relations

with the labor behavior will be examined. This examination will revealthat the economic necessities of the State are only partially reflected in thelabor behavior. In order to explain their behavior, we need to proceed to a
discussion on political necessities of the State and their impact on the labor

movement.

I.

Behavior of Labor unions Between 1940 and 1970
Two types of data, quantitative and descriptive, are used here for theexamination of the labor behavior in the post-Cd.rdenas era. We obtained

the quantitative data from two sources. One source, Anuario Estadi,stico delos Estados Unidos Mexicanos published annually by the National Statistics

Rureau (Direccidn General de Estadisticas), provides data on the activities

Economic Dependence and Labor Policyof labor unions under both federal and state jurisdictions. Another source,

the Ministry-of-Labor's annual Memoria de Labores contains the data gathered only by the federal labor authorities.o

The table below shows the number of ,strikes and of resolved conflicts
in the form of the annual average for every five-year period after L940. As"
an indicator of labor activities, "registered conflicts" would be more appropriate than "resolved conflicts." Unfortunately, complete data on t'registeredconflicts" are not available. It is, therefore, unavoidable for us to use the.
data on "resolved conflicts" as a substitute.
Table 1 Number of Strikes and Resolved Conflicts 1941-1969: Annual
Average and Labor Militancy
Av∝age Numb∝NatiOnal
Total

ごS k∝ * A理 鵠品電鵠 i:L

FederalNational Federal
Jurisdiction Total Jurisdiction

Labor Militancy

1941‑45198

64

14,890

6,257

High

46‑50

119

27

10,363

4,113
5,743

Low
LOw

51‑55

130

19

11,604

56‑60

320

20

13,508

5,931

61‑65

254

37

12,781

4,610

High
High

66‑69

118

50

9,334

3,520

Low

r. We added an adjustment to the raw data in order to avoid overvaluing labor militancy in the years in which a large number of textile firms were closed down by
strikes. For example, out of 766 strikes recorded in Anuario Estadtstico for the year1943, 559 occurred in the textile industry. Since the six subsectors of the textileindustry are governed by the subsector-wide base-contracts (contrato /ey), almost
all firms in each subsector are involved in labor-management negotiation and in
the strike if the negotiation fails. Therefore, it is misleading to add all of the 559.
strikes to the sum of other strikes. We lack information on the number of individual conflicts in the textile industry and on the number of subsectors of the industry that were involved in strikes. However, we judge that it is more appropriate to treat the 559 strikes as 1 (industry-wide) strike than to use the number'
559 without adjustment The same adjustment was added to the raw data for the"follou'ing years: 1944, 1958, 1962 and 1963.
Sources : Direccidn General de Estadisticas, Anuari.o Estadi.stico de los Estados [Jnidos"
Mexicanos (varios aflos).
Secretaria de Trabajo y Previsidn Social, Memor'ia de Labores (varios aflos)-j 7 v7 i 't) rtffin++&1982

69

Each of the four indicators in Table l- shows more or less the same

trend in the labor behavior between 1941 and 1969. In the first half of the
1940's, labor unions were relatively active in causing a large number of'conflicts and strikes. Their behavior became less militant in the following
ten years. In the second half of the 1950's, however, three of the four indicators show an increase in militant behavior by labor unions although one

indicator (strikes under the federal jurisdiction) implies a low level of labor,activity during the same period. This discrepancy seems to be largely attrilbutable to the way of counting the number of strikes in 1958 and 1959. In

these years, many wildcat strikes occurred in such industries as telephone:services, national railways and petroleum refineries. Wildcat strikes are

not legal in Mexico. So, the editors of the Memoria de Labores apparently.did not count these wildcat strikes in their calculation of the number of'strikes.

The militancy of labor unions measured by the number of strikes and'conflicts shows a downward trend in the L960's except for, again, thenumber of strikes under the federal jurisdiction. This can be explained by
the expanded coverage over new industries by the federal labor authorities.z

In order to supplement the quantitative information, historical data will
be consulted here. Various studies of labor movement in Mexico suggestthat there were three peaks of labor militancy during this period.
The first peak reportedly came between t947 and 1950. In this period,
the Miguel AlemAn Administration, with the cooperation of the leadershipof the CTM (Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de M6xico), tried to oust radical union leaders from large national unions such as the Railroad Workers
IJnion, the Petroleum Workers Union and the Miners and Metallurgical-Workers Union and to replace them with more moderate ones. Radicals inthese unions strongly resisted this policy but were finally defeated.s

The second peak of the labor movement in Mexico came in L954.
Facing the inflation precipitated by the devaluation of the peso in April

70

Economic Dependence and Labor P01icy

1954, the CTh/1 decided tO demand a 24 percent acros―the― board

wage

increase instead of 10 percent suggested by President Ruiz Cortines andissued a threat of a general strike.This strike,hOwever,did not inaterialize

since the CTM leadership decided to cOmpromise by scaling down its
demand.Only a part of the uniOns be10nging to the textile industry andthe lnovie― making industry went on strike as scheduled.9

The third peak of the labOr inOvement came in 1958 and 1959.In theseyears, radical elements regained cOntrol over sOme large national uniOnssuch as the]Railroad Workers UniOn and the TelephOne WOrkers Union
and Over some important locals of other natiOnal unions such as the Petro―leum Workers union and the Teachers UniOn.In many cases,this shift inlabor leadership was accompanied by a series of wlldcat strikes. ′rhe resur―
gence of the radical influence among rank―and̲file wOrkers was so greatthat the moderate CTL/1 was forced tO demand another across―the― board

wage increase of 25 percent for its affiliates with a threat of a general strikein August 1958 although it held back again a few inOnthslater.The radicals′′

hegemOny in the labOr mOvement,however,did not last 10ng。

rhe L6pez

A/1ateos AdllninistratiOn, mobilizing trooPs in some cases, put down theradical movement and returned the leadership of the natiOnal uniOns tOmoderate leaders.10
Since that time until 1972,MexicO saw a low level of union activity inspite of the 1964/1965 doctors′

strike and the 1968 student revolt. ThesemOvements Of yOung intellectuals failed in getting industrial workers inv01‑
ved for their cause。 11

1t is now clear that the statistical data and their descriptive counterparts.
do not necessarily COincide with each other with regard tO the labor inilitan‐cy in Mexico. Although the quantitative data indicate that the labor
unions were relatively active in the first half of the 1940も, descriptive datadO nOt.In contrast,labor movement was relatively calm between 1945 and1955 according to the quantitatiVe data while the descriptive Ones record

,7 v7 )t t) r1ffift+W1982

7l

two peaks of labor militancy during this period. However, in the second
half of the 1950's, both quantitative and descriptive data indicate highly
active labor behavior. Finally, the statistical data {or the L960's show adownward trend in the militancy of labor movement while the descriptive
data indicate a low level of labor activity throughout the 1960's.

The reasons why the statistical and descriptive data do not always coincide will be elucidated in the following sections.

ru. Industrialization, Dependence and Labor Behavior
Rend Villarreal, in analyzing the process of industrialization between
1939 and 7970, divided the process into three different phases. Between
1939 and 1950, the industrialization was based primarily on the importsubstitution of consumer goods. The period between 1950 and 1,958 is theone of transition in which the pace of import substitution sharply dropped
although the pace of industrialization itself continued to be high.tz The
period between 1959 and 1970 is called, by Rend Villarreal, an "advanced
stage" of import substitution in which the production of intermediate andcapital goods expanded at a higher pace.l3

The changes in the import structure shown in Table 2 support Villarreal's observation of the import-substitution process in Mexico. According

to this table, the relative importance of the consumer-good imports dropped

from 23. 9 percent to 15.8 percent between 1940 and 1950. The relative
share of the import of "metallic and non-metallic materials and products"
and "transportation machinery and equipment" also decreased in the 1940's
but their share increased again in the following decade. The decline of theshare of the consumer-good imports continued in the 1950's although at a

slower pace. In this decade, "construction materials" and "agricultural
machinery and equipment" started to decrease their share. The relative
share of consumer-good imports was constant in the 1960's while "transportation machinery and equipment","construction materials" and"agricultural

72

Economic Dependence and Labor Policy

machinery and equipment" lost their shares.
Table 2 Structure of Import by Items 1940-1969 (Percent)
1940* 1945* 1950

Non-durable Consumer Goodsa)** 13.8

11.4

8,3

‑

9.6

Durable Consumer Goods(2)*** ―(1) 10。 1

10.3 7.5

‑

8.0

1955

1960

5,8

6.3

8.4 5。 1

6.5

6.5

一
(2)
(1) 2.6(2)
一

2.7 4。 2‑

4.4

7.9 4.2

Metallic & Non-metallic

(1)

38.3

39.6

37.3

Materials and Products
Construction Materials

一(2)(1) 6.3
一(2)(1) 3.4
一(2)(1) 13.8
一(2)(1) 7.1(2)
一Agricultural Machinery andEquipment

Industrial Machinery andEquipment
Transportation Machinery andEquipment*

1969

7.0 6.6
7.0 6.3
8.5 5.5

Fuels

42.0

1965

7.9

4.1

2.3 3.5

44.5‑‑ 41.7 37.2 40.7
7 7.8 5.9 4.4

43.7

・
‑

1.8 1.7

40.8

5。

7.3
3.5 4.7

‑ 4.4
23.7

5.9 5.0
5.0 3.2
5.0 3.8

3.3 2.6

23.2

22.7

24.1

‑ 21.0

22.7

24.8

31.3

32.8

7 7.5
7 9.9

5.2

5。 8

3.9 4.6

‑

2.9

5。

5。

Details for the years 1940 and 1945 do not add exactly to 100 percent, mainly
because an "unclassified" category of less than 1 percent is here omitted** Based on import values at 1955 prices*'F{< Based on import values at current prices
Sources : (t) 1940, 45 Rafael Izquierdo, "Protectionism in Mexico" in Pubtic Policy

and Priaate Enterprise in Mexico, ed. Raymond Vernon(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964): 246.
1950-1960 UN-ECLA, Bolet{,n Estadtstico de Am,6rica Latina Vol. 1,

No. 2 (August 1964).

(z) 1950-1969 UN-ECLA, Boletin Estadtstico de AmLrica Lati,na Vol. 8,
No. I (March l97l).
In the meanwhile, Ortiz Mena divided the process of industrializationin Mexico into two periods in terms of the mode of capital formation.la
Before the mid-1950's, the capital formation {or the industrialization wasmade by forced savings through inflation. Since both saving rates and themarginal propensity to save were low in this period,rs the government
had to cover the budget deficit by simply issuing primary money.r6 The

73

ラテ ンア メ リカ研 究 年 報 1982

resulting expansion of money supply without a parallel increase of produc-tion, coupled with the merchandise shortage during the war time, brought
about serious inflation in Mexico. The rise of domestic prices as well as thedeferred demand for imports during the war time could not but lead to anincrease of imports after the war and cause a serious trade deficit. In order

to cope with this probiem, the Mexican government took several measures

to curtail imports: tarif.f. raises, the adoption of ad valorem rate and theintroduction of an import licencing system in 1947, and a 78 percent deva-

luation of the peso between 1948 and 1949.12 Although these measures torestrict imports contributed to stimulating the import-substituting industrialization, they brought about an increase in the domestic-price level. Another cycle of inflaion-trade gap-import restrictions was repeated,Ieading to
the devaluation in 1954. During this period of inflation, no serious pricecontrol was attempted. One of the net results was a transfer of income fromlabor to capital as shown in the following table.
Table 3 Labor'Wage, Cost of Living and Share of Labor in National Incomet Wi佑

yage漱 電響鷺
話≒
:ttttゞ 聯棚 卵
認静**
憮量
l鮒 鶴
(percent)(1940=100) (pesos)(pesos)

1940

27.41

100.0

27.41

45

46.94

211.7

22.17

42.0

50

81.07

353.5

22.93

42.9

55

126.88

544,6

23.30

44.9

60

197.07

723.9

27.22

49.7

65

277.40793.9

34。

359.15

943.7

38.06

70
Sources

94

52.1

51。

3

: x DGE. Estadisti.cade Trabajo'y Salarios Industriales (varios aflos).
** NAFINSA, La econornta meri.cana en cifras (M6xico: NAFINSA,
1978): Cuadro 6.3.

*** NAFINSA, La politica industri.al en eI desarrollo econdmi.co de Mirico(M6xico: NAFINSA, 1971): 86.

After 1955, the government changed its economic policy to one basedon voluntary savings and exchange-rate stability. The development of pri-

74

Economic Dependence and Labor Policy

vate financial institutions made it possible for the governmenr ro cover alarge part of its budget deficit with domestic credits. The rest of the necessary funds became available through introduction of foreign public loans.

On the other hand, the inflow of foreign private capital became conspicuous during the second half of the Miguel Alem6n Administration(1g49-1952) as shown in Table 4 below. Various fiscal incentives, helped by theslowing-down of inflation and the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate,further attracted foreign private investors after 1955.18 In !962,19.6 percent

of total manufacturing production in Mexico came from the enterprises
with foreign-capital participation. The share of these foreign firms in the
production of chemical products, machineries and nonmetallic/metallic
products were respectively 60.7,48. 1 and 20.3 percent while they produced

only 3.0 percent o{ textile products and 8.6 percent of food/beverage/tobacco.le This indicates that foreign private capital came to play a more impor-tant role as the import-substituting industrialization proceeded to the "advanced stage."

Table 4 Current Balance Deficit and Foreign Capital Import(Millions of US Dollars)
Current Balance

Deficit

1941‑43

Foreign Direct

Investment

Foreign Long-Term Loansto Public Sector (Net)

53.0

8.2

70.3

38.8

124.1

79.7

46.9

176.5

155.8

67.4

112.5

211.6

130.9

1956‑58

599.5

273.9

264.6

1959‑61

626.3

227.0

452.5

1962‑64

489.1

283.4

685.6

1965‑671116.8

350.3

267.7

1968‑702050.8

513.3

848.8

1944‑46(93.2)*
105.2

1947‑49
1950‑52
1953‑55

r. Surplus.
Source : NAFINSA,
Cuadro 7. 1.

La economi,a mexicana en c'ifras (M6xico: NAFINSA, 1978):ラテ ンアメ リカ研究年報 1982

75

Furthermore, Table 4 shows that foreign resources, both public andprivate, were also needed to cover current balance deficits which were pri‐marily attributable to the expansion of the import of raw materials, inter‐mediate products and capital goods for import一 substituting industriahzationⅢ

As discussed above,the Mexican State promoted an import― substituting
industrialization based on forced savings before the mid‑1950′

s. For thispurpose, workers'income had to be kept lowo After the llllid‑1950′s, theindustrialization policy of the State changed to one based ott voluntarysavings but with increasing dependence on foreign capital. Foreign enter―
prises,with a strong tendency to operate in capital―

intensive industries, areready to offer relatively high wages to their workers.However, no foreign
entrepreneurs are willing to bring their capital into the countries wherelabor uniOns easily go on strike and frequently interrupt normal productive
operations. An ̀̀appropriate" political and social environment must be se‐cured,

The following tab19 shows the periodization of the industrialization
process discussed above together with the changes in real wages and thelabor militancy measured by statistical data. It is easily discerned in thetable that the real wages were kept considerably low during the period ofthe
forced一 saving policy. They dropped sharply in the first half of the 1940′sand barely recovered in the following decadeo Workers'discontent with thedrastic decrease of their income was reflected in the high level of conflicts

and Strikes. However, this expression of labor discontent was rather aspontaneous inove without systematic leadership to affect the government
econolnic Policy.「 raking advantage of the crisis feeling caused by the war,

President Avila CamachO succeeded in concluding a pact with major labororganizations in June 1942, according to which he was empowered to force
arbitration in the case of serious labor disputes.20

1n the f61lowing ten years, the number of cOnflicts and strikes was
small in spite of the fact that workers had to endure a 10w level of income.

76

Economic Dependence and Labor policy

Table 5 Characteristics of Industrization, Real Wage and Labor Militancy
Mode of Capital

Phase ofIndustrialization
1940

of

High

Consumer Goods

Low

Transition

Import Substitutiono{Intermediate and

IJ970,SourcesLowthrough

Inflation

Voluntary Savings

1965

Labor

Militancy**

Forced Savings

1950

1960

in RealImport Substitution

1945

1955

I Changes

Formation I Wages*(9d)Capital Goods

16.8

and

Increasing
Dependence on

Foreign CapitalLow: * Table 3, Column 3*{€ Table 1, Column 5This was partly due to the shift of hegemonic ideology within major labor'centers from socialism to nationalism. This latter ideology endorsed, instead'of class struggle, a national industrialization under the cooperation withnational entrepreneurs.zl President Miguel AlemAn took advantage of thisshift and succeeded in securing the cooperation of the CTM leadership for
his industrialization policy. As a result, the CTM changed its central slogan

in March 1947 from "for a classless society" to "for economic emancipation'of Mexico."Zz Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, the Aleman
Administration crushed the radicals' resistence against his policy by coope-rating closely with the CTM leadership.

As a whole, the economic necessity of the state seems to have prevailed during the period of the forced saving policy.

In the mid-1950's, the government economic policy changed. to the one
based on voluntary savings and a greater introduction of foreign capital.

Accordingly, workers' real wages were allowed to start recovering as shown

jn Table 5. In spite of the higher income, however, workers showed higher

77v7r0fiffift+wl982

77

militancy in the second half of the 1950's and in the first half of the 1960'sThis is exactly the period in which Mexico's dependence on foreign capital.
was deepened. Still, workers were allowed to be more active, which was

detrimental to the economic necessity of the State. In order to explain this.
seeming contradiction, we have to examine political {actors behind State'

behavior.

IV. Political Factors and Labor Behavior
Under the Ruiz Cortines Administration, State control over labor orga-

nizations was weakened by several political factors: Intra-elite rivalry,erosion of legitimacy and presidential change.

Although presidential reelection is prohibited in Mexico, the leaving'
president continues to hold influence among government officials for some"time. The new president usually has to start his term with a large numberof personnel appointed by his predecessor. Under the tutelage of the expresident, they continue to occupy high positions in the {ederal and state
governments and in the ruling party. The new president can only graduallyconsolidate his position in the government using the huge legal authorities
empowered to him in the political system of Mexico.

When Ruiz Cortines took the presidency in December 1952, he wasalarmed by the lowering popularity of the government party as could beobserved by the result of the presidential election in 1952. In 1940, the PRI

candidate (Avila CAmacho) obtained 93.9 percent of total votes while Ruiz.

Cortines collected only 74.3 percent for himself in 1952.23 Therefore,
Ruiz Cortines tried to recover the popularity of the ruling party which

had largely deteriorated during the highly authoritarian and corruptionridden administration of Miguel Alem6n's.

This attempt, however, faced a strong resistence on the part of Alemd.n's followers who were still in the government. In order to hold this,resistence in check, Ruiz Cortines needed to rely upon anti-Alem6n forces.

78

Economic Dependence and Labor Policy

Among labor otganizations, he found these forces in the CROC (Confederaci6n Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos), which had been foundedin April L952 by forrner radical leaders coopted by the government
during the period of the government offensive against the radical labor
movement between 1947 and 1950. The Alemdn Administration supported
the foundation of this new labor center as a means of depriving the UGO-

CM (Unidn General de Obreros y Campesinos de M6xico), a more radicalorganization led by Lombardo Toledano, of political influence. Ruiz Cortines tried to use the CROC not against the already weakened UGOCM but.against the CTM whose leadership held a strong pro-AlemAn position.zr

In this political context, we can understand why the CTM, not the

CRoc, issued the threat of a general strike in 1954. It was a part of CTM'sefforts to demonstrate its power before unsympathetic Ruiz Cortines.

This intra-elite rivalry, precipitated by the erosion of legitimacy of theruling PRI, contributed to weakening the State's ability of controlling thelabor movement as a whole.

The average annual number of strikes and conflicts was recalculated
for each presidential term and is presented in Table 6. This table clearly
indicates that the annual average of strikes during Ruiz Cortines'presidency
was almost double that of Miguel Alern6n's term. The resurgence of labor

militancy culminated in the radical labor movement of 1958 and 1959. The
fact that 1958 was the year of the presidential change further lowered the.control capacity of the State.

There is an influential argument that the Mexican State is relatively
vulnerable during periods of presidential change.zs The leaving president
hesitates to use coercive rneasures for policy implementation in this period.

This is because he does not want to lose his personal reputation as a popular
politician and also he is obliged to defend the image of the ruling party as^an instrument of social revolution and thereby obtain as many votes as

possible for the incoming president. In a country such as Mexico where aラテ ンアメ リカ研究年報 1982

Table 6 Number of Strikes and Resolved Conflicts During Each Presidency:
Annual Average
Perlod*1941‑46
1947‑52

hme of Prd斌

柵Avila Camacho
Miguel Alemin

礼げ

柵

驚

輔

鳴

199

14,263

108

10,257

1953‑58

Ruiz Cortines

207

12,946

1959‑64

L6pez Mateos

327

14,140*ホ *1965‑70E)iaz Ordaz

107†

8,9571ギr,

The presidential term in Mexico starts, for example, in December 1940 and ends**

We added an adjustment to raw data in compiling this table. On this adjustment,
refer to the note to Table 1.

in November 1946.

+{.* Average for five years 1959-63.

t

Average for five years 1965-69.

Sources : The same materials used to compile Table 1.

dominant party system exists, the political elite tends to believe that theofficial candidate for the presidency must obtain more than a majority ofthe votes, 80 or 90 percent if possible. Otherwise, the ruling party may
face a dangerous situation in which anti-governmental forces are encouraged to strengthen their efforts to replace the dominant party system with amore competitive one. A stable monopoly of State po\Mer and bureaucratic
positions is also an important factor in maintaining the unity among thepolitical elite. When workers become aware of this vulnerability of the
Mexican State, they may become more responsive to mobilization efforts
made by radical leaders during the year of presidential change. Such was

the case in 1958.

In the 1958 presidential election, the official candidate, L6pz Mateos,
obtained 90.4 percent of total votes. However, due to extremely low voter

turn-out, the total share of support by the adult population was as low as
the one for his predecessor.zo Therefore, the Lopez Mateos Administration
maintained a policy of re-creating legitimacy for the PRI regime. In other80

Economic Dependence and Labor Policy

words, he showed a considerable tolerance toward labor activities, which
was reflected in the large number of strikes and conflicts during his presi-

dential term.
Even though it is true that Ldpez Mateos did not hesitate to use coercive measures to put down excessively radical movements such as railroad

workers'strike in 1959, his relaxed attitude toward labor unions, coupledwith his appeasement policy toward Cuba,zz was significant enough toworsen the investment environment, thus leading to a situation whereby
the amount of foreign direct investment remained smaller during the firsthalf of his administration than in the previous three years. (Table 4)
Under the followingDiaz Ordaz government, economic considerationsof the State again predominated. Diaz Ordaz was highly intolerant towardautonomous mass movements as seen in his treatment of doctors' strike in1965 and the student movement in 1968. In the relatively tranquil social

environment, the import-substituting industrialization progressed rapidly,in which foreign capital came to play an increasingly important role. In
1970, 69.0 percent of chemical products and 60. 1 percent of machineries
were manufactured by foreign firmszs

The relative permissiveness of each Administration toward labor movement no doubt strongly influenced labor behavior. This is not to say thatthe economic conditions of workers did not influence their behavior. The
sharp drop in real wages in the first half of the 1940's raised inquietude

among workers. This explains the relatively large number of strikes that
occurred during this period in spite of the State-labor pact of June 7942 bywhich major labor cente$ plefued to avoid strikes so that the State could
concentrate its energy on the war efforts. One of the goals of the labor
movement of 1958 and 1.959 was also to demand better economic remunerations.2e

Although the economic conditions of Mexican workers started to recover in the 1950's, there was much to hope for since their standard of living

i7Y7r\rtffift+wlqg?

81

was still low in absolute terms. However, economic conditions themselves

did not automatically bring about a militant labor movement. For this tooccur, workers needed political space for freer actions. As discussed above,it was provided by intra-elite rivalry, the State's attempt to reproduce legitimacy and presidential change.

V. Conclusion
The major conclusion of this essay is that the economic necessity stemming from external dependence did not always prevail as a determinant oflabor policy for the Mexican State.

I

When import-substituting industrialization was based on forced savings
inside Mexico, labor wages needed to be kept low. Any resistence against
such policy on the part of labor unions was not tolerated. After the indus'

trialization policy changed to one based on voluntary savings in the mid1950's, the restraint on labor wages was largely removed. However, since

the advanced stage of import-substituting industrialization needed the cooperation of foreign investors, the Mexican State was required to offer an"appropriate" investment environment for them by keeping labor unions
quiet.

During the period of the forced-saving policy, the State's economic
considerations were faithfully reflected in its labor policy. However, in thefollowing period of increasing external dependence, the economic necessityof the State did not dictate its labor policy due to various political factors.

The necessity to create legitimacy for the PRI regime and the intra-elite

rivalry lowered the capacity of the Ruiz Cortines government to control
labor behavior. Radical labor groups, helped by this weakened control capa-

city of the State, increased their influence among workers. Their activities
became especially militant in 1958, the year of presidential change in which

the control capacity of the government was further curtailed. Only under

the Diaz Ordaz Administration were the economic considerations of the

82

Economic Dependence and Labor Policy

State fully reflected in its labor policy.

This study also revealed that the Achilles' heel of the seemingly stable
PRI regime lies in the legitimation of the regime itself. Since the realizationof "social justice" is an important source of the legitimacy of the regime,
there always exists the possibility that the State's capacity to control massorganizations is eroded by the State itself.
On the other hand,the increase of wages did not reduce Mexican work-

ers'latent tendency to respond to radicals' mobilization efforts to breakthe yoke of the State. Whenever workers' rebellion comes together withthe diminution of the control capacity of the State, the PRI regime must
face a dangerous situation in which political stability declines sharply as it

occurred in 1958 and 1959. The same combination o{ the two conditions
occurred again during the Echeverria Administration although the exami-

nation of this latter case is beyond the scope of this essay.
NOTES :

1. Sanford A. Mosk, Industrial Reaolution in Mexico (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1950): 61-62. James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Reuolution, revised

edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1920): 82-84.

2. Frank Brandenburgh, The Making of Modern Merico (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964): 16.

3. Bo Anderson and James Cockroft, "Control and Codptation in Mexican Politics,"
International Journal of Comparati.ae Sociology 7 (March 1966): 15.

4. Francisco Javier Alejo L6pez, "La estrategia del desarrollo econdmico de M6xico
en 1920-1970" (Tesis profesional, UNAM-ENE, 1969): 39-40.

5. Richard Ulric Miller, "The Role of Labor Organizations in a Developing Country: The case of Mexico" (Ph. D. dissertation, cornell university, 1966) : 9.

6. These data are full of insufficiencies as time-series data. Since the reelection of
the president is constitutionally prohibited in Mexico, the government staff arealmost completely reshuffied every six years. The editorial policy of various government publications also changes, which frequently makes it impossible for us toobtain time-series data on the same variables. For example, although we have dataon the number of strikes for the period between 1940 and 1963, both Anuario Estadistico and Memoria de Labores fail in providing information on the same variablei 7 v7 .* , )1Wft+WL982

83

for the period after 1964 except for 1967 arrd1970/71. Moreover, some data books
use the calender year for compiling data but some others do not. Reliability of thedata is another problem. For example, although both Anuari.o Estadi'stico and Me'

moria de Labores contain the data on the number of strikes, we are not quite surewhether these data include all strikes initiated by workers or only the strikes de'clared "existente" by the labor authorities. Direcci6n General de Estadisticas, Anua'rio Estadtst,ico de los EE UU Mericanos (M6xico, varios aflos). Secretaria de Tra'
bajo y Previsidn Social, Memoria de Labores (M6xico, varios aflos).

7.

When the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board was established f or the
first time int927, railroads and other transportation services, communication servicies, mining, petroleum industry, electric-power industry and textile industry wereplaced under its jurisdiction. The federal jurisdiction was expanded in 1942 to cover

the movie-making industry, enterprises operating with concessions or contracts ofthe federal government and the enterprises controlled directly or in decentralized
forms by the federal government. This jurisdiction further expanded in 1962 tocover the petrochemical industry, nretallurgical industry, iron and steel industry
and cement industry. Resefi.a Laboral(enero de 1975) :8-t2.Ibi,d. (febrero de 1975) :12-15.

8. Miller, op. cit.: 702-L04 and 141-43. Michael D. Everett, "The Role of the
Mexican Trade lJnions, 1950-1963" (Ph. D. dissertation, Washington lJniversity,1967): 52-56.

9. Everett, ibid.: 126-27. Olga Pellicer de Brody y Jos6 Luis Reyan, Historia de laReuolucitn Mexicana 22 (M6xico: El Colegio de M6xico, 1978) : 91-102.

L0. Brody y Reyna, ibi,d.: Ch.IY.
11. Evelyn Stevens, Protest and Response in Merico (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT
Press, 1974): Chs. 5 and 6. Ricardo Pozas Horcasitas, "El movimiento m6dico en

M6xico 1964-1965," Cuadernos Poltti.cos 11 (enero-marzo de 1977): 57-70,

12. The average annual growth of manufacturing production was 6. 5 percent between
1941 and 1949. The growth rate increased to 7.5 percent between 1950 and 1958;
9. 1 percent between 1959 and 1970. NAFINSA, La economia mexicana en cifras(M6xico: NAFINSA, 1978): Cuadro 2. 5.

L3. Ren6 Villarreal, "External Disequilibrium and Growth Without Development:
The Import Substitution Model. The Mexican Experience (1929-1975)" (Ph. D.
dissertation, Yale lJniversity, 1976) : Ch. 2.

74. Antonio Ortiz Mena, Desarrollo estabilizador: una. d1cada de estrategia econimica
en Mdxico (M6xico, 1969).

84

Economic Dependence and Labor Policy

15. The saving rate (the share of savings in total national income) was 10 percentin 1935 and 13.4 percent in 1956. The marginal propensity of saving was 0. 10 in
7951/53. NAFINSA, La bolttica industrial en eI desarrollo econ|mico de Mtxi.co(Mdxico: NAFINSA, 1971): 298-99. Ortiz Mena, ibid.: ll.

16. The following measures were also used to raise money for industrialization: (t)'Raising of income tax imposed on corporations and individuals. (The share ofincome tax in total revenues almost doubled during the Avila Cdmacho Administra-tion); (z) Introduction of a "selective credit control" by the Banco de M6xico in
the first half of the 1940/s, by which private financial institutions were obliged touse a certain percentage of their resources for productive investment. NAFINSA.
op, cit.: 303. NAFINSA, La economla mericana: Cuadros G. 28 and 6.29.

t7. NAFINSA, La poli,tica industrial: 130-31 and 136.
18. For example, the Law for Promoting New and Necessary lndustries promulgatedin 1955 granted varieties of tax exemptions to various manufacturing firms. In'
1958, the Ministry of Finance was empowered to grant up to 100 percent exemptionrof distributable-profit tax whenever the profits were reinvested. Moreover, special
decrees or laws gave to some individual industries specific fiscal incentives andimport priority in exchange for certain obligations such as the compulsory use of
Mexican-made materials and the participation of Mexican capital in the enterprisesIn the meanwhile, the government increasingly relied on the licensing system insteadof tariffs to control expanding imports. Furthermore, the government used thesepolicy instruments to make industrialists refrain from raising prices. Price stability,
labor's recovery of its share of national income, higher pace of industrialization led
by domestic and foreigtr entrepreneurs, growing fiscal sacrifices and public-sector
indebtedness were major results of the industrialization policy in thisperiod. NAF*

INSA, op. cit.: 153, L7+-75, 198 and 225. Rafael Izquierdo, "Protectionism in
Mexico" in Public Policy and. Priaate Enterprise in Mexico, ed. Raymond Vernon(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964) : 283-85. Alexander Bohrischy Wolfgang Konig, La folttica mexicana sobre inuersi1n extranjera (M6xico: El
Colegio de M6xico, 1968): 35.

19. Bernardo Seprilveda y Antonio Chumacero, La inuersi|n extranjera en Mixica(Mdxico; Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 19ZB): Ap6ndice Estadistico, Cuadro 15.

20. Luis Medina, Histori.a de la Reuoluci|n Mericana 18(M€xico: El Colegio de M6xico, 1978): 305.

21. In April 1945, the CTM, under the government encouragement, concluded a pacLof cooperation with the Confederacidn Nacional de Industrias de Transformaci6n.

17 t7 .i rtffift+w1982'

85

Ibid.: 327-30.

22- Jos6 Luis Reyna y Marcelo Miquet, "Introducci6n a la historia de las organizaciones obreras en M6xico: 1912-1966" in Tres estudios sobre el mouimiento obreroen Mixico(M6xico: El Colegio de M6xico, 1976): 56.

23. Peter H. Smith, Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century
Mexico(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1979): 55.

24. Everett, op, cit.: 168. Robert Scott, Mexican Gouernment in Transitiaz, revised
edition(Urbana: IJniversity of lllinois Press, 1971) : 207-208.

25. Scott, ibid.: 20L.
.26. See Note 23.
27. Arthur K. Smith, "Mexico and the Cuban Revolution: Foreign Policy-Making
in Mexico Under President Adolfo Lopez Mateos" (Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell
IJniversity, 1970) : 129-44.

28. See Note 19.
29. Railroad workers' movement started as a movement for demanding higher wages.
Brody y Reyna, oP. ci,t.: 173,