History and Memory Issues

History and Memory Issues: A Comparative Study of The
Treatment of The Colonial Period in France And Japan
Valérie Niquet *Abstract
Japan and France share similar experiences as former colonial powers. Both are confronted
with the similar kinds of complex issues concerning histor y, education, and also sharememories of conflict with their former colonized countries.
However, whereas heated debates on these issues are accepted as “normal” in France, there
is little understanding of the similarities with Japan, maintained in its status of extreme“otherness”; and an uncritical acceptance of mainstream positions dominated by the PRCʼsofficial discourse. This paperʼs objective is to analyze that difference of attitude regarding
Japan and France “historical culpability”, and better understand its motivation, that play animportant role in the perception of Japan 70 years after the end of the second world war.

IntroductionAs former colonial powers, France and Japan do face similar historical and memorial
issues concerning colonization and the wars carried out by Paris and Tokyo inNorth Africa, Indochina, the Korean peninsula or China. In the case of France, therelationship with Algeria remains complex, and affects the treatment of the colonial
period and decolonization, as well as the debates surrounding this treatment. In the case of Japan,
70 years after the end of the Second World War and the end of Japanese colonization in Asia, theissue is paradoxically becoming increasingly important in the People's Republic of China (PRC)
and in Korea, for different reasons that we will analyze.
In spite of that similarity however, the position of many Western analysts or political actors
regarding todayʼs Japan remains often partial, and the legitimacy of the debates that also exist
in the archipelago on the questions of histor y and memor y - ver y similar to those that havedeveloped in France since the introduction of memorial laws at the beginning of the 1990s - isrejected.1
It is also striking to note that, on very specific subjects, such as the comfort women issue
in Asia, and the military prostitution (bordels militaires de campagne or BMC) organized by* Valérie Niquet is the head of the Asia Department at Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Senior
Visiting Fellow, the Japan Institute of International Affairs
1

For instance, in 2015, the Open Letter in Support of Historians in Japan “to express our unity with themany courageous historians in Japan seeking an accurate and just history of World War II” on https://networks.h-net .org / system / files / Contributed-files / japan-scholars-statement-2015.5.4-eng_0.
pdf . The same historians did not express the same support for the “courageous historians in the PRC
or in Korea” who try to work on the same issues but do not blindly follow the official position of theirgovernments.

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the army in French colonies or elsewhere, there is a constant determination to establish afundamental distinction between two practices that are, indeed, very similar. Yet it is in France,
rather than in Japan, that a certain romanticism of the colonial period has been preserved, if one
thinks of movies like “Pépé le Moko”, or songs like “Ma tonkinoise” or “La fille du Bédouin”, thatremain even today objects of amusement rather than of condemnation.2
The question, therefore, is to understand why there is this difference of attitude that makes
Japan a more “guilty” culprit, condemned to an eternal ostracism. The issue of apologies, andthe difficulties in accepting the reality of the abuses committed in China and South Korea by theImperial Army, is often mentioned. We shall see however that, if these issues are legitimate, they
are also not specific to Japan. On the other hand, the questions raised by the often-indiscriminate
acceptance of the theses disseminated by the PRC or by some actors in South Korean society,are seldom confronted, in spite of the fact that in both these countries, to different degrees, theproduction of historical discourse remains under the exclusive control of political authorities.3
One can also conceive that, to former colonial powers such as France, but also the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands or even the United States, there is a comfort in having in Japan a“guiltier”, and moreover a non-Western and “exotic” culprit, which relativizes these countriesʼ own
experiences as colonial oppressors, despite very similar experiences.
France and Japan were also confronted, after 1945 for Japan and after the end of the Algerian
war for France, to the same imperative of national reconciliation, which justified the occultationof the memory of the most controversial historical episodes. The objective was to rebuild thenation and the legitimacy of the powers in place, in the context of the Cold War, by “ignoring” thepast. In France, the purpose of the Amnesty Act of 1968, was indeed to prohibit any search forresponsibility for the abuses committed during the Algerian war, in the name of reconciliation andthe unity of the nation. 4

The Controversies about Memorial Laws in France

France has adopted, since the early 1990s, four “memorial” laws. 5 The first one, the Gayssot
Act in 1990 provides for the punishment of those who deny the existence of crimes against
humanity and genocide. The objective of the Gayssot Act was to provide the legal means tocontrol a burgeoning negationist movement that denied the existence of concentration camps
and genocide. Later, the 2001 Taubira Act stated that “the French Republic recognizes thatthe transatlantic slave trade as well as in the Indian Ocean from the 15th century onwards, andslavery, constitute a crime against humanity”. The law also called for “educational and research
programs to give the slave trade and slavery the place they deserve”.
When the memorial laws were adopted, that were supposed to address a lack of interest inthese issues, a counter-argument emerged to denounce the popular belief that colonial history
2“Pépé le Moko”, Julien Duvivier, 1937 ; “Ma petite tonkinoise”, 1906 ; “La fille du Bédouin”, 1927.

3

The question of historical taboos in the PRC, where the regime is responsible for over 35 million deaths
since 1949, rarely comes up in Western countries. Similarly, no statue commemorating the martyrdomof “comfort women” has been erected in front of the United States Embassy in Seoul, in spite of thefact that prostitution of Korean women at the service of American soldiers was authorized and officiallyorganized after the Korean War until the 1980s. See Katherine Moon, Sex Among Allies 1960-1980,
Military Prostitution in US-Korea Relations, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997.

4

Loi n°68-697 du 31 juillet 1968 portant amnistie, JORF, O2 août 1968, p. 7521, on https://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000693181 , the same pattern occurred in France
after the second world war, with a long period of obliteration of the French State and administration
collaboration and responsibility in the genocide.

5

The four memorial laws are: the Gayssot Act of July 13, 1990, the Armenian Genocide Recognition Act ofJanuary 29, 2001, the Taubira Act of May 21, 2001 and the Mekachera Act of February 23, 2005.

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remained taboo. In fact, particularly since the 1980s, there was an abundance of production on
French colonial history, including its most controversial aspects such as the use of torture during
the Algerian War.6 The most famous work of Henri Alleg on the torture in Algeria had been
widely circulated since its publication in 1958 in spite of its official interdiction, and the book by
Yves Courrière on the history of the Algerian War was published in 1968, less than six years after
the end of the war. 7
The debate around these memorial laws in France also focused on the relations between
historical research and political and moral standards. The purpose of the memorial laws, andmore particularly of the Taubira Act, was to officially recognize the culpability of France asa colonial and slave countr y, but even more to repent for the difficult integration of migrant
populations into French society since the end of the Algerian War. One of the issues raised by the
Taubira Act in the debate that followed its adoption was that, by mentioning the temporal limitof the 15th century, it focused exclusively on French or Western culpability and excluded intraAfrican slave trade and the role of Arab traffickers from its field of condemnation. 8
A connection can indeed be established between the adoption of these memorial laws andcontemporary social and political issues in France, where a large migrant community of Africanor North African origin who are still confronted with integration difficulties despite becoming
French nationals, do exist. 9 The vote-seeking dimension of the initiative - which has long
benefited political parties on the left side of the political spectrum - obviously played a role in
the promotion of these memorial laws. 10 This motivation is not significant in Japan, where thedemography of descendants from former colonized populations is very different.11

The Influence of Liberal Histor y in Japan
In Japan, the questions of histor y and memor y, and the teaching of the colonial period andthe Second World War, have also been influenced by the post-World War II democratization
movement, with the adoption of the Fundamental Law of Education in 1947. From the 1960s, theinfluence of progressive journalists and historians and of teachersʼ unions, hostile to the UnitedStates and to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that dominated post-war political life, graduallybecame predominant. The issues of education, of the authorization of textbooks, and of thememory of the colonial period and of the Second World War in Asia, thus also became part of aninternal political struggle involving the Japan Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Partyin the context of an ideologically virulent Cold War in Asia.
It was in Japan, therefore, that these issues were raised, far before they became significant
6

Romain Bertrand, Mémoires d’Empire, la controverse autour du fait colonial, Editions du Croquant,Broissieux, 2006 et Romain Bertrand, Jean Chesneaux, Michel Jiraud, Thomas Loué, « Les temps dela mémoire coloniale entre production dʼun savoir scientifique et espace public de la controverse »,Temporalités, 5.2006.

7

Henri Alleg, La question, Editions de Minuit, Paris 1958 ; Yves Courrière, La guerre d’Algérie, Volume 1,
1954-1957, Volume 2, 1957-1962, Fayard, Paris, 2001 (reprint) ; Les débats autour de la guerre d’Algérie à
travers le journal le Monde, Maîtrise dʼhistoire contemporaine, Université de Bordeaux III, 2001.

8

Gilles Manceron, « Sur quelle base aborder le débat sur la loi, la mémoire et lʼhistoire? », Tracées, 092009 sur http://traces.revues.org

9

In 2005, urban riots erupted in French suburbs with a large population of migrant origin. The same year,
the movement “Les indigènes de la République” was also launched. See Romain Bertrand, op.cit.

10

In 2012, François Hollande won 86% of the Muslim vote. Le vote des musulmans à l’élection présidentielle,
IFOP, sur http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/482-1-document_file.pdf

11

The number of Zainichi Koreans in Japan is about 800,000, whereas in France, the number of migrantsof Muslim origin is estimated to represent almost 10% of the population. Most of them have dual
nationality and the right to vote.

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issues in China or in Korea. In the 1970s, Honda Katsuichi, a journalist with the Asahi Shimbun,
visited China and published a series of articles on Japan's war crimes. Similarly, in the 1980s and1990s, the Asahi Shimbun regularly referred to the “testimony” of Seiji Yoshida on his “hunts for
comfort women” before retracting in 2014 all stories quoting this “testimony” that happened to befabricated. 12
Actually, the Japanese government fell in line with the movement and, in 1982, after aprotest from Beijing regarding possible amendment of the vocabular y used in textbooks toqualify the Japanese offensive in China in 1937, the Japanese government adopted a “Respect forneighbouring countries” (近隣諸国条項 kinrin shokoku joukou) clause, still in force today, which
requires textbook authors to take into account the feelings of neighbouring Asian countries onhistorical issues. 13
Contrary to popular belief, numerous works have been published in Japan on controversial
issues, as early as the 1960s, on the colonial period and the Second World War. For instance, 21
articles on the sole issue of “comfort women” (慰安婦 ianfu) were published in Japan before 1988,
while during the same period, only one article was published on this issue in the Republic ofKorea (South Korea). 14

The Debate in France and in Japan on the Rights of the Historian
Indeed, confronted with the same type of memorial issues, France and Japan have also
experienced the same controversies concerning the control of historical narrative at the serviceof political or strategic considerations.
In France, one of the consequences of the adoption of the memorial laws has been thecreation in 2005 of the movement “Liberté pour lʼhistoire”, following an open letter published in
the newspaper Libération on December 13, 2005.15 A wide debate also developed in the media
on the concept of “national history”. For the association “Liberté pour lʼhistoire”, opposed tomemorial laws and the intervention of the Parliament in the work of historians, whose countermodel was that of the control of the historical narrative in the Soviet Union and more generally intotalitarian regimes, “Historians cannot accept any limitations to their research”. The “Comité devigilance face aux usages publics de lʼhistoire”, established in 2005 by Gérard Noiriel, an historianworking on immigration in France, also disputes the use of history for political objectives. 16
Moreover, the Mekachera Act of Februar y 23, 2005, was also a reaction against priormemorial laws, perceived as negative for the construction of a more positive national narrativethat could play a role in facilitating the integration of migrant-origin populations.
In other words, France also developed its own debate on the “masochistic characteristic”
of histor y teaching in high schools. The Mekachera Act called for high school programs to“also present the positive role of colonization”, deploring the fact that school curricula did not
12

Reiji Yoshida, “Asahi Shimbun Admits Errors in Past ʻComfort Womenʼ Stories”, Japan Times, August 5,
2014.

13

Ibid. Beijing had protested against the change, reported by the Asahi Shimbun, of the term “invasion”(侵略 shinryaku) to that of “advance” (進出 shinshutsu) to describe the entry of Japanese troops into
North China in 1937. The Asahi Shimbun later acknowledged that the report was wrong. The Japanese
government, however, has maintained the clause on “Respect for neighboring countries in Asia on
history issues.”

14

Jungmin Seo, “Politics of Memory in Korea and China, Remembering the Comfort Women and the
Nanjing Massacre,” New Political Science, vol. 30, No. 3, September 2008.

15« Liberté pour lʼHistoire, une pétition pour lʼabrogation des articles de loi contraignant la recherche
et lʼenseignement de cette discipline », Libération, 13-12-2005, on http://www.liberation.fr/
societe/2005/12/13/liberte-pour-l-histoire_541669 .

16“Comité de vigilance face aux usages publics de lʼHistoire”, http://cvuh.blogspot.jp/ .

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recognize the positive role of the French presence overseas, particularly in North Africa. 17 In
2008, at the annual conference Les Rendez-vous de l’Histoire de Blois, the historian Pierre Noraalso denounced “the discourses of repentance and contrition based on 2000 years of Christianguilt and the systematic disqualification of France”. 18
More recently, in a radio program devoted to historical questions and Baccalaureate
preparation for high school students, a historian corrected the term “crime against humanity”
to qualify the Algerian War, reclassifying it as a “war crime”. 19 During the electoral campaign
for the 2017 presidential election, the same use of the term “crime against humanity” applied to
the Algerian War by the candidate Emmanuel Macron on the occasion of a visit to Algiers also
aroused much criticism.
It is this same type of debate on the most controversial historical issues, expressed in almost
the same terms, neither more nor less revisionist than in France, and confronted by the same
criticisms, that also exists in today ʼs Japan, be it the denunciation of a “masochistic view ofhistory”, or the lobbying actions of the Nihon Kaigi (日本会議), that militates for a more “positive”
presentation of Japanʼs role in history textbooks.
On another level, Tokyo, like Paris, faces the same criticism concerning the use of archives
and the same rejection by former victims of the concept of “objectivity” applied to issues suchas the slave trade, the colonial period, the exactions committed during the Second World War in
Asia, and the wars of decolonization. In France, movements like “Les indigènes de la République”
reject the validity of this concept of objectivity. The Taubira Act on the slave trade also encourages
the use of oral sources collected in Africa to “balance” written sources in European archives. In
Asia, Chinese historians denounce joint history committees focused on the analysis of archives,
and the positivist concept of “Rankean”. 20 According to these historians, the opening of archives
encouraged by the Japanese government qualifies as “ archival hegemony ” , and does notcompensate for the alleged silence on “alternative narratives”. Positivism is thus denounced as ameans of perpetuating historical injustice and avoiding the ethical and political nature of history
problems. 21

Treatment of the Colonial Past in French and Japanese High School Histor yCurriculaWith regard to Japan, the controversy over the teaching of the colonial past and the Second
World War focused on the authorization, in 2005, of a new history textbook that lacked historical
rigor and reduced the importance dedicated to the most controversial episodes like the Nanking
Massacre. 22 However, this textbook has been adopted by less than 1% of secondary schools, and17

Gilles Manceron, op.cit.

18

Ibid.

19

La Fabrique de l’Histoire, 8-05-2017, France culture.

20“Rankean” comes from the name of the German historian Leopold von Ranke whose works on “historicalobjectivity” were introduced in Japan in 1869. Hai Guo, “The Use and Abuse of Rankean Positivism in
the Sino-Japanese History Problem, the Japan-China Joint History Research as a Case Study”, EastAsian Workshop Net Research Center for East Asian Studies, Madrid, 21-04 -2017.

21

Ibid.

22

新しい歴史教科書 (Atarashii rekishi kyoukasho, New History of Japan ), Jiyusha, 2015 (reprint).

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it is very far from characteristic of the mainstream of history teaching in Japan. 23
In fact, the teaching of the colonial period and the Second World War in Japan, including its
most dramatic dimensions, developed as early as the late 1970s, before this type of subject was
introduced in French textbooks. The different organization of history teaching in Japan and inFrance makes comparisons difficult, particularly in terms of the volume devoted to each historicalperiod but - within the limits of the programs - these issues, including the mention of “comfort
women”, have been covered in Japan for several decades. In the 1980s, all history textbooks
mentioned the massacre of civilians by the Imperial Army in Nanjing. Differences concerned thenumber of victims, some textbooks following the official claims of the PRC, others choosing tomention the uncertainties and divergences that persist between historians on this issue. 24
In France, history programs are devised at the level of the Ministry of Education and involve
several external parties, such as teachers' unions, associations of historians, and advocacy
groups. The school curriculum thus constitutes a very important political and symbolic issue.
25
Until the early 1980s, the history curriculum published in 1957, whose chronology stopped in
1945, remained in place. 26 The Algerian War did not become part of history programs before
1983. As a result, according to a survey conducted in 1980, middle school students had “neverheard of the war in Algeria.” 27 However, the importance of the Algerian War in history programs
increased considerably and, since the reform of 2015, the Algerian War can also be considered a
subject for the Baccalaureate, which was not the case before. 28
This growing importance attributed to the teaching of the Algerian War in France can partly
be explained by the ambition to adapt the teaching of history to the changes in middle and highschool demographics since the beginning of the 1980s. The need to adjust to a new electoralsociology, and adapt the “memory issues” to classes with a very high proportion of students
whose parents came from North Africa, played a role in this evolution. In a report to the Ministryof National Education published in 1983, René Girault suggests that the Ministry “tackle thisdelicate problem, in order to adapt to a growing number of pupils from immigrant families”. 29
According to the historian Pierre Nora, “the public education system found in repentance a new23

Tan Weilu, The Forgotten History: The Book Controversy and Sino-Japanese Relations, Bachelor of Arts,
University of Pittsburgh, 2009. In Japan, the choice of textbooks is based on a system of authorization
ex post by the Ministry of Education. The guidelines mention that “all children must be taught about
Japanʼs historical relationship with its Asian neighbors and the catastrophic damages caused by WorldWar II to humanity at large”. The focus is on the pacifist orientation of Japan after the war. In France, theMinistry of Education publishes a priori very detailed outline programs that authors of history books
and publishing houses must follow. The Ministry also influences the writing of history books throughthe choice of possible subjects of examinations for the Baccalaureate. The Algerian War became apossible subject in 2015.

24

Chien-Peng Chung, op.cit.

25

Patricia Legris, « Les programmes dʼhistoire en France : la construction progressive dʼune citoyenneté
plurielle (1980-2010) », Histoire de l’éducation, 126-2010.

26« Programme dʼhistoire de lʼenseignement du second degré, arrêté du 19 juillet 1957 », JORF, 30 juillet
1957. Evelyne Héry, Un siècle de leçons d’histoire 1870-1970, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1999.

27

Philippe Salson, op.cit.

28

La fabrique de l’Histoire, op.cit. For instance, the violent repression that left 8 people dead and hundredsof wounded during a demonstration organized by the Communist Party against the Algerian War at
the Charonne metro station in 1962 is now one of the main teaching points on the Algerian War in highschools.

29

René Girault, L’histoire et la géographie en question, rapport au ministère de l’éducation nationale,Service dʼinformation du Ministère de lʼéducation nationale, Paris, 1983.

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mission”. 30
But if the Algerian War is now taught in France, and taught in a more and more thorough way
because of the ambition to meet the alleged expectations of this new population of immigrant
origin, the memor y issues related to controversial subjects were not easily managed. The
denomination of “Algerian War” for instance is ver y recent. Until a decision by the National
Assembly in 1999, despite the fact that the war mobilized more than 250,000 men, the official
denomination remained “law enforcement operations”. 31
Concerning the exactions committed during the Algerian War, the Act of December 3, 1979
on the opening of archives stipulates that “the national archives concerning private life, national
defense and State security will not be opened for 60 years ”, thus impeding for an extended period
historical research based on archives on one of the most controversial periods in the colonial
history of France. 32
On May 8, 1945, the day of the liberation of France, a demonstration denounced as
an “insurrection” by Paris took place in Algeria, in the city of Setif. The repression of thisdemonstration produced several thousand, or tens of thousands, of victims, depending on
the sources. According to a resolution adopted by the Paris Council in 2015, the victims were33
“arrested, tortured and executed summarily”. Despite the importance of the event, however, it
was only in 2015 that, for the first time, a French minister visited Algeria to “honor the victims of
the Setif massacre, on behalf of the Franco-Algerian friendship ”. 34
This commemoration, and the treatment of the Setif massacre, has given rise to critics very
similar to those that can be found in Japan on the most controversial historical issues. Movementsof veterans of the Algerian War and historians have denounced the exaggerated figures ofvictims endorsed by the Algerian authorities, and Laurent Wauquiez, Secretary General of the
UMP, criticized a system of “one-way repentance” and deplored the loss of “national pride” in thetreatment of history in France. These positions have provoked debates, but they have not beensystematically condemned in the name of anti-revisionism, as some Japanese debates on the same
issues and the teaching of history can be.
The Comfort Women Issue in Korea and Militar y Prostitution in Colonial France: a
Significant Difference in Treatment
The issue of military prostitution, particularly in times of war, is another example of the differencein treatment between Japan and France. In Japan, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono's statement on
comfort women, which has not been abandoned, serves as a basis for the teaching of this subject
that remains controversial but is not taboo. 35
In France, on the other hand, the question of militar y prostitution (bordels militaires decampagne or BMC) is not mentioned in school textbooks, although they constituted an important
30

Gilles Manceron, op.cit.

31

Philippe Salson, op.cit.

32

The usual period is 30 years. Loi du 3 décembre 1979, décret 79-1038 in Philippe Salson, op.cit.

33« Massacre de Sétif, lʼautre face du 8 mai 1945 », Le Figaro.fr, 07-05-2015. According to official Algeriansources (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) more than 45,000 people were killed; according to Frenchsources, the number of victims was 3000 to 8000, and the killing of about hundred French nationals is
also mentioned.

34« Un ministre français rend hommage aux victimes du massacre de Sétif », Le Point.fr, 19-04-2015.

35

慰安婦関係調査結果発表に関する河野内閣官房長官談話 (Ianfu kankei chōsa kekka happyō nikansuru Kōno Naikaku Kanbō Chōkan danwa, Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono about theresults of the investigation into the “comfort women” ), http: //www.mofa .go.jp / mofaj / area / taisen/ kono.html , 04-08-1993.

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Valérie Niquetelement of France's colonial policy. 36 Contrary to the claims of a group of Western historians
who denounce the “specific nature” of the Japanese system because of its “large scale, systematicmanagement under the military, and its exploitation of young, poor and vulnerable women inareas colonized or occupied by Japan”, the organization of these “comfort stations” were very
similar in France, including the involvement of the army. 37
In the French colonies, the system subsisted into the 1960s, although officially the Marthe
Richard law had banned brothels in France as early as 1946. 38 Local women were enrolled in
the BMC in the colonies. A kind of public ser vice delegation was granted by the militar y to
local brothel keepers, in charge of the recruitment of prostitutes, many of them very young andvulnerable, the objective being to impose medical controls to fight the transmission of venereal
diseases. 39 These women then followed the troops, and the colonial armies stipulated regulations
and specific rates. 40
The same phenomenon also existed in the Republic of Korea after the Korean War where,
despite the official prohibition of prostitution after 1945, a system of comfort stations had also
been established near US bases. In January 2017, a court in Seoul acknowledged that “somewomen were trafficked but it is impossible to conclude that the victims did not engage in theirown free will”, a decision that recalls the Japanese government's position on comfort women. 41
It is true that one can observe a cross-movement that sees difficult issues such as the Algerian
War taking a larger place in the secondary education curriculum in France since the late 1980s,
while at the same time the analogous place of World War II in Japan has generally diminished.
However, France and Japan do face similar problems in the treatment of painful and controversial
historical subjects. In spite of these similarities, there is nevertheless a very important difference
between the French situation, where debates are permitted, and where the independent work ofhistorians is recognized as legitimate, and Japan, where debates on the freedom of the historian
are called into question, with a hostile position of denouncing the “rise of nationalism” and“revisionism” of the Japanese authorities having been fairly systematically adopted in Westerncountries as well as in the PRC and in Korea.
This difference in treatment can be explained in part by the sometime clumsiness of thecommunication policy of the Japanese authorities. However, it can also be explained by alack of real knowledge of the history of Asia in general, and of Japan in particular, in Westerncountries. Japan is therefore perceived as a distant and fantasized object, allowing the expressionof judgements disconnected from reality. Nevertheless, this difference in treatment is mostly
36

Mustapha El Qadéry, « Femmes de bordels militaires de campagne, les BMC de lʼarmée colonialefrançaise au Maroc » in M. Peraldi, Des femmes sur les routes, sur http://www.gremmo.mom.fr/pdf/
conf1/El_Qadery02.pdf .

37

Open Letter in Support of Historians of Japan, on https://networks.h-net.org/system/files/contributedfiles/japan-scholars-statement-2015.5.4-eng_0.pdf

38

France did not sign the December 2, 1949 “Convention of the United Nations for the Suppression of
Human Trafficking and Prostitution” until 1960 because of the continuation of military prostitution in its
colonies. Japan signed the Convention in 1958.

39

Jean-Marc Binot, Le repos des guerriers, les BMC pendant la guerre d’Indochine, Fayard, Paris, 2014.

40

Mustapha El Qadery, op.cit.

41

Jeff Kingston, “Comfort Women in South Korea Who Serviced US Forces Seek Justice”, Japan Times,
04-03-2017; Sara Soh, The Comfort Women, Sexual Violence in Post-Colonial Memory years in Korea andJapan, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2009. In the case of Korea, the issue was complicated by
the collaboration of Korean elites during the colonization period, and the participation of local brothel
keepers or “private interests” in the recruitment of “comfort women”; see Jungmin Seo, “Politics ofMemory in Korea and in China: Remembering the Comfort Women and the Nanjing Massacre,” New
Political Science, vol. 30, No. 3, September 2008.

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explained by the important differences in the political-strategic context between France andJapan.

The Weight of Histor y Between France and Algeria, and among the PRC, Korea
and Japan
The question of the use of histor y for political motives is ver y present in Algeria, where theAlgerian War and the anti-colonial struggle are an integral part of the strategy of legitimacy of
the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale). The constant reminder of a difficult past has also been
integrated into Algeria's negotiating strategy with regard to France. 42
But if the Algerian authorities may be tempted to build their legitimacy and increase theirleverage against the former colonial power by mobilizing the memory of war and past exactions,
the weight of Algeria - and its influence - on the international scene remains limited.
In the case of Japan, the situation differs greatly with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and thePeople's Republic of China (PRC), two powers that - for different reasons - have transformed
historical issues and anti-Japanese nationalism into a fundamental element of their strategies for
legitimacy and influence.
The case of Korea approximates to some extent the case of Algeria in its relationship withFrance, and history as a motivation is basically related to internal politics. History became thecentral field of political struggle in Korea in the context of the transition to democracy in thelate 1980s. 43 It is from this time that the issue of comfort women took on a growing importance.
The new freedom of speech and the rise of feminism and liberal political parties were importantfactors in this evolution.
The issue of comfort women in Korea thus played an important role in building a new politicaland national identity against the military dictatorship and the elites who collaborated with theJapanese colonial authorities and remained in place after 1945. The Korean Council for the
Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan, established in 1990, also played an important role inobstructing any questioning of the official position on the question of comfort women as “sexual
slaves of the Imperial Army”. In particular, any analysis that tried to take into account the positionof women in Korean society, and the role of Korean “private actors” in recruiting prostitutes for
the Japanese forces, could be condemned.44
In the case of the PRC, there is a double dimension. The first is related to the internal
legitimacy of the Communist Party after 1989, with the establishment of patriotic education
campaigns in 1991, and the emergence of a new nationalism with a strong anti-Japanesecomponent during the 1990s.
The second dimension is strategic and its objective remains to prohibit the return of Japanas a normal and legitimate power on the international scene. This second dimension has aninternational propaganda dimension that strongly influences perceptions of Japan, particularly in
the West.45
42

For instance, according to an agreement signed in 1982, France accepted to pay for Algerian gas at a
price more than 25% above the world market price. Regarding visas, residency visas and work permits
have been required for Algerian nationals since 1994, but no accommodation certificate of conformity isrequired for members of their immediate families, unlike other nationalities.

43

Jungmin Seo, op.cit.

44

Ibid.

45

In Asia, including in countries that suffered from Japanese colonization (Taiwan) or occupation during
the war (South-East Asia), the perception of Japan is today extremely positive. As in the case of
relations between France and West Germany during the Cold War, this positive appreciation can also be
explained by a common strategic preoccupation regarding the increasing assertiveness of the PRC in
the region.

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Valérie Niquet

One of the main objectives of the propaganda apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party
is therefore to prohibit any right to historical research for Japan. For example, an “Association
for the Safeguarding of Historical Facts” has been established by a Chinese national in the
United States that claims to “seek apologies, more compensation and to petition against Japanʼs
attempt to join the UNSC”. 46 It should be noted also that, in 2005, the first massive anti-Japanesedemonstrations in China, officially justified by popular indignation after the authorization of a
new history textbook by Tokyo, were in fact related to the proposed reform of the UN Security
Council that could have opened the possibility for countries such as Japan, India or Germany tobe accepted as permanent members. The PRC rejected absolutely that perspective, not on moral
grounds but because it would have balanced the influence of Beijing on the international scene asa “global power”. For the Chinese regime, history is thus very directly an instrument integrated
into a multidimensional strategy that does not leave room for reconciliation and forgiveness witha former enemy whose main value, for the Chinese regime, resides in that status.
This prohibition of the right to history for Japan is thus also based on the fact that, for the
Chinese leadership, control of history and the rejection of any historical debates is also a toolin the context of the balance of power with Tokyo. In that specific strategic context, the Nanjing
Massacre became an issue quite recently in the PRC, and it is fully related to the emergence ofanti-Japanese nationalism since the 1990s. In 1937, Nanjing was the capital of the Kuomintang
nationalist regime, illegitimate in the eyes of the Communist Party. Thus, the Nanjing Massacre
is not mentioned in any of Mao Zedong's writings. On the contrar y, Mao Zedong rejoiced at
his meeting with Premier Tanaka in 1972 about the Sino-Japanese War, which had allowed theCommunist Party to take power in 1949.
Since the 1990s, however, a new “commemorative” movement has emerged in the PRC,
accompanied by the construction or renovation of museums devoted to the “war of resistanceagainst Japan”. But this multiplication of memorials, specifically directed against Japan, and theconstant reminder of the war on Chinese TV, also aims to compensate for the taboos that remainin place concerning the historical tragedies caused by the Chinese Communist Party since1949. 47In the case of the Nanjing Massacre, the claim to the exclusive control of history by the PRC
is expressed through the interdiction on discussing the official figure of the number of victims,
300,000, engraved in eleven languages at the entrance of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial
restored in 2007. No historical research on the nature and scope of the massacre is allowed,
and the work of non-Chinese historians adopting a more scientific perspective is systematicallydenounced. 48

Conclusion
Memory issues are common to all colonial powers who have committed abuses in controlled
territories. This is particularly the case in France and in Japan, confronted with complex issues
that affect the very identity of the nation. We find in both cases the same difficulty in addressing
certain issues, the same necessity to shed light on the past, the same issues concerning education
but also the same debates about the legitimacy of the growing weight of historical memories and46

Chang Jun, “Ding Yuan: Safeguarding Historical Truth”, China Daily 24-10-2014.

47

According to conservative figures, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in China caused
more than 35 million deaths. See, Frank Dikötterʼs trilogy: The Tragedy of Liberation, 2013, Mao’s Great
Famine, 2010, and The Cultural Revolution, 2016.

48

Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism, Pride, Politics and Diplomacy, University of California
Press, Berkeley, 2004.

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History and Memory Issues

repentance.
However, if in the case of France these debates are considered legitimate, in the case ofJapan, questioning of the of ficial Chinese or Korean postures is immediately condemned
as a manifestation of historical revisionism. While in France, the manipulation of histor y byundemocratic regimes such as that in Algeria is an object of criticism, in Japan's case, the positionof the Chinese authorities on historical issues, and the systematic denunciation of “Japanesenationalism”, are often accepted without hesitation, in spite of the fact that the motivations of
the Chinese regime are in reality related to issues of legitimacy and the contemporary strategicbalance of power much more than to history.
The German example, and that of Franco-German reconciliation, is often mentioned. However,
if reconciliation has been possible between France and Germany, it has been both because of thestrategic context of the Cold War, and because of the desire of Paris to achieve this reconciliation.
Actually, the Franco-German reconciliation and the famous de Gaulle-Adenauer meeting in 1958
happened long before any process of repentance in West Germany.49
In Asia, only a fundamental change in what constitutes the foundations of the political system
in China - and probably in Korea - could allow the emergence of a more consensual and balanced
dialogue on histor y. If this development does not occur, if Japanʼs position is systematicallycriticized and misunderstood by its Western allies, one can only fear that, in response to constantChinese pressure, a hostile and more radical reaction could also develop in the Japanese public
and some political constituencies.

49

Discussion of the Nazi past in West Germany, and of the role of former Nazi officials, including those
involved in the “Final Solution”, did not began before the end of the 1970s.

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