The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshimaby the Korean Government*
Yoshiko Yamasaki
Abstract
With respect to Takeshima ,the ROK has asserted that (i) Dokdo (the Korean namefor Takeshima) was the first Korean territor y to fall victim to the Japanese aggression
against Korea, (ii) Because it was not a signator y to the Peace Treaty, the ROK was
unable to receive any benefits or assurances with regard to the issue of territorial rights
over “Dokdo;”, (iii) Up until the mid-1950s the United States strongly supported Japanʼs
position on Takeshima as a result of Japanʼs vigorous diplomacy toward the United States.
This research paper aims to critically examine the legitimacy of the ROKʼs assertions. The
author examined ROK and US government documents including those the author has foundand concluded that the ROK government has invented historical basis for its claims byconcealing a part of the documents that are inconvenient for them.

IntroductionIn recent years, newly acquired and released diplomatic documents have provided the basis
for numerous studies on the territorial dispute over the islets known as Takeshima thatflared up after the end of World War II and continued during the negotiations for the San
Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and the talks for normalizing ties between Japan and theRepublic of Korea (ROK) in 1965. Among the documents acquired and released by ROK-basedorganizations and researchers in particular, many have provided information regarding previously
unclear matters. Particularly noteworthy is Note Verbale (No. 187), sent by the US Embassy in
the ROK to the ROKʼs Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 4, 1952. It constituted an official
re-iteration of the US position, invoking a letter from Dean Rusk, the United States Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.1 The letter was sent from Dean Rusk to Yang You-chan,
Ambassador of Korea to the United States, in August 10, 1951, about a month before the signingof the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The letter rejected a request of the ROK government to have
Takeshima renounced by Japan under the Peace Treaty because the island “had been under thejurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan” and “did not appear
ever before to have been claimed by Korea.” Note Verbale (No. 187) was sent in response to the
ROK governmentʼs protest against an incident in September 1952 in which the US armed forces
conducted bombing training using Takeshima as a target, thereby endangering people from
Ulleungdo (a larger island to the west-northwest about 88 km away from Takeshima) who werereportedly fishing nearby.
A review of research, analysis, and asser tions made by the government, researchers,*
1This article was originally published as 山﨑佳子「韓国政府による竹島領有根拠の創作」竹島問題研究会『第 2 期「竹島問題に関する調査研究」最終報告書』島根県、2012年、61-78頁.
United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) (RG59) Lot 54 D422, “Japanese
Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles”, Box 8, Korea (in English). The content of this letter was firstmade public in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Vol.6, Part 1, 1951, p. 1203, Footnote 3,
issued in 1977 and made publicly available in April 1978.

48
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

and media in the ROK reveals that their main assertions are (i) Dokdo (the Korean name for
Takeshima, known in English as “Liancourt Rocks”) was the first Korean territory to fall victim
to the Japanese aggression against Korea; upon the liberation of Korea, it returned to its country.
It is a symbol of Koreaʼs independence; historically it was Korean territory but it was seized by
Japan and returned to the ROK when Japan was defeated;”2 (ii) Because it was not a signatory
to the Peace Treaty, the ROK was unable to receive any benefits or assurances with regard toissues including the issue of territorial rights over “Dokdo;”3 and (iii) Up until the mid-1950s theUnited States strongly supported Japanʼs position on Takeshima as a result of Japanʼs vigorous
diplomacy toward the United States and lobbying by Japanophiles such as William J. Sebald, who
was US Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), head of the
Diplomatic Section of SCAP, and chairman and member of the Allied Council for Japan,4 but later
switched to a neutral position.
The second session of Shimane Prefectural Governmentʼs Takeshima Issue Research Groupalso focused on the post-war territorial dispute over Takeshima and studied documents that it
acquired that were related to the dispute. The documents show that there is no basis for the
Korean assertions.
This research paper aims to critically examine the legitimacy of the ROK ʼ s asser tions
by presenting new documents in addition to those already discussed in existing research toreconstruct the circumstances that led to Takeshima being omitted from the list of islands to berenounced by Japan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Detailed examination of assertion (i)in particular highlights the process by which, despite a lack of clear historical evidence, the postwar government of the ROK asserted that Takeshima was historically the ROKʼs territory andbrought it inside the Syngman Rhee line, then distorted official letters and statements from theUnited States describing Takeshima as Japanese territory in order to fabricate new “evidence.”(1) Pre-World War II—The Origins of the Territorial Dispute over Takeshima

At a routine press conference on August 12, 2011, the ROKʼs minister of foreign affairs and trade,
Kim Sung-hwan, alleged that Dokdo was the first victim of Japanʼs aggression against Korea, andthat upon the liberation of Korea, Dokdo had returned to its countryʼs embrace. It was indeed
the symbol of Korean independence, he claimed, and whoever touched this island should be
prepared to face stubborn strong resistance from all the Korean people. Any attempt by Japan toseize Dokdo would signify the re-invasion of Korea, according to Kim.
Kim was said to be directly quoting an official letter written 57 years earlier by minister forforeign affairs Byun Young-tae.5 Likewise, the ROKʼs Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses the 1943

2

“Why did Kim Sung-hwan bring up Byun Young-taeʼs letter of 57 years ago?,” Joong-ang ilbo (Korea
Joongang daily), online version, August 15, 2011 (in Korean), available at http://article.joinsmsn.com/
news/article/article.asp?total_id=5973972 (as of February 15, 2012).

3

Park Jin-hee, “The Korea-Japan post-war relationship and the San Francisco Peace Treaty,” Korean
Historical Research, No.131, 2005, pp. 3–4 (in Korean).

4Jung Byung-joon, “William J. Sebald and the Dokdo Territorial Dispute”, Korea Focus Vol.13, No. 4,
2006, p. 80 (in English). Jung states that Japan spread inaccurate information and engaged in “intrigue”
without the knowledge of Korea before the creation of the ROK, using Sebald to actively lobby theUnited States in order to have Dokdo recognized as part of Japanʼs territory (p.77).

5

Supra note 2.

49
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

Cairo Declaration regarding territories “which Japan has taken by violence and greed”6 as its
foundation to assert the illegality of Japanʼs claim to ownership. However, no maps or documents
have yet been found to prove categorically that Korea historically recognized Takeshima as its
territory prior to the formal incorporation of Takeshima by Japan in 1905. In order to establishthat Takeshima was “the first victim of Japanʼs aggression against Korea” and Japan had “taken”
the islands, the ROKʼs historical records must clearly show that Takeshima was a territory of the
ROK before it was incorporated into Japanʼs Shimane Prefecture.
However, from the 18th century, when inspectors began to be posted regularly to Ulleungdo,
maps of Korea compiled by the government depicted Usando (alleged by the ROK to be theprevious Korean name for Dokdo) not as Takeshima (Dokdo), but as Chikusho (called “Jukdo”
in the ROK),7 and Takeshima was not included in any of the geographies, pre-modern maps, andannotated charts with coordinates produced from the end of the Kingdom of Joseon until the
Empire of Korea.8 The “Seokdo” referred to in the Empire of Koreaʼs Imperial Edict No. 419 issued
on October 25, 1900 (Seokdo being the old name for Takeshima, according to the government of
the ROK) has never been directly proved to correspond to Dokdo,10 and even in printed materials
written by those not under the sway of the Japanese government, such as Korean independence
campaigners in exile overseas or members of the Korean diaspora living in the United States,

6“(omitted)…in the midst of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), which had been triggered by Japanʼs
imperialistic invasion scheme toward Northeast Asia since the 1890s, disseized Dokdo and incorporated
the islands into the Shimane Prefecture by issuing Shimane Prefecture Public Notice No. 40(1905).
Japanʼs annexation of Dokdo constituted a violation of international law, and cannot be justified under
any circumstances, for it is a clear infringement on the undeniable sovereignty of Korea over the islands
from ancient times to the recent Empire of Korea. More importantly, Japanʼs actions carry no legal
validity under international law.” “Korea was annexed to Japan in 1910 and the colonial rule ended in1945 with Japanʼs defeat in World War II. In 1943, while the war was still being fought, the three AlliedPowers̶the United States, Britain and China̶issued the Cairo Declaration, vowing that Japan would“…be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.” In 1945, when
Korea regained its independence, Dokdo, too, was returned to Korea as a matter of course.” Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Republic of Korea, “Dokdo: Korean Territory̶The Basic Position of the Governmentof the Republic of Korea on Dokdo”, 2008, p. 6–7.

7

Park Chang-seok, Ulleungdo Do-hyeong (Map of Ulleungdo), 1711; “Ulleungdo Jido” (Map of Ulleungdo),
Joseon-jido (Map of Korea), around 1770, etc. (all in Korean). Until then Usando had generally been
depicted to the west of Ulleungdo.

8

Lee Kyu-won, Ul-leung-do-oe-do (Survey map of outer Ulleungdo), 1882; Heul-beop (Homer Hulbert),
Sa-min-pil-ji (Knowledge necessary for all) (Baek Nam-kyu and Lee Myung-sang, Trans.), 1895; Hyun
Chae, Dae-han-ji-ji (Geography of the Korean Empire), 1899; Dae-han-Jeondo (Complete map of Korea),
1899; Dae-han-yeu-ji-do (Map of the Korean Empire), around 1900; Jang Ji-yeon, “Ji-ri-il” (Geography1), Dae-han-ja-gang-hoe-wol-bo (Korean Self-Strengthening Society monthly magazine), No. 3, 1906, pp.
25–28; Jang, Dae-han-sin-ji-ji (A new geography of Korea), 1907, etc. (all in Korean).

9

Even in the ROK, scholars have not been aware of this edict for very long. It was first introduced in Lee
Han-ki, Territory of Korea, Seoul National University Press, 1969, p. 57 (in Korean).

10

Ikeuchi Satoshi, “Takeshima/dokdo to ishijima no hitei mondai: noto” (Is there any island referred to as
Seokdo?) Tekusuto fuchi no kaishakugakuteki kenkyu to kyoiku (HERSETEC), Vol.4, No. 2, 2010, pp. 1–9(in Japanese).

50
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

there is no mention of Takeshima as being a seized territory, as far as I am aware.11
Following a Japanese cabinet decision on January 28, 1905 to incorporate Takeshima into thecountry, and Shimane Prefectureʼs issuance of Notification No. 40 on February 22, Takeshimaʼs
incorporation into Shimane Prefecture was reported in newspapers12 and academic journals on
numerous occasions.13 The year 1905 was also when the Battle of Tsushima took place. On May
28, the battle was decided in the vicinity of Takeshima, so the island and its location came to be
known throughout Japan via official gazettes,14 newspapers,15 and magazines.16
The name Takeshima would naturally have come to the notice of the more than 300 Koreans, 17
including members of legation staff and students, said to be living in Japan in 1905, and theinformation in the Japanese official gazettes was also reported in Korea. 18 However, there isnothing in the historical records to suggest that Koreans appeared to harbor any reservations
with regard to the territorial incorporation of Takeshima into Japan.
In March 1906, a party from Shimane Prefecture stopped off at Ulleungdo as it was going
to inspect Takeshima and informed Sim Heung-Taek, the magistrate of Uldo-gun (the Koreancounty within which Ulleungdo was located), of the incorporation of Takeshima into Shimane
Prefecture. The magistrate filed a report notifying the government of the Empire of Korea about
11

Tae-Baek-Gwang-No, Han-guk-tong-sa (Painful history of Korea), 1915; Park Eun-sik, Han-guk-dok- libun-dong-ji-hyeol-sa (The bloody histor y of the Korean independence movement), 1919–20 (both inKorean). Tae-Baek-Gwang-No was the pen-name of Park Eun-sik, the second president of the Provisional
Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai. The former work put the eastern boundary of Korea
at 130 °50ʼ east longitude, while the latter work records the 1906 incident in which the party from
Shimane Prefecture visited Ulleungdo and reported the news of Takeshimaʼs formal incorporation into
the prefecture as an event that had to with Ulleungdo. Sin-han-min-bo (The new Korea) (San Francisco
02.10.1909–1980) was a newspaper published in San Francisco by North and South Koreans living in the
United States. All these publications had a strongly nationalist bent.

12“Oki no shinto” (Okiʼs new island), San-in shimbun (San-in newspaper), February 24, 1905; “Shogen,”ibid., February 25, 1905; “Oki-no-kuni kyodo no bocho” (Oki boundary expanded), Oki Shimpo (Okinews), No. 16, March 1905, etc. (all in Japanese). Thereafter, the San-in Shimbun continued to carryarticles relating to Takeshima.

13“Teikoku shinryodo takeshima” (The Empireʼs new territory of Takeshima), Chigaku zasshi (Journal of
Geography), Vol.17, No. 4, 1905, p. 282 (in Japanese).

14“Correction,” Of ficial gazette, June 5, 1905 (in Japanese). The initial account of the report of Togo
Heihachiro, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, received bytelegram on the morning of May 29 of the same year, had referred to Liancourt Rocks, but this wascorrected to Takeshima.

15“Riyankorudo iwa” (Liancourt Rocks), Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri newspaper), June 1, 1905; “Tenchi
genko” Niroku Shimbun (Niroku newspaper), June 16, 1905; “Daikaisen no ato (matsue)” (The siteof a great sea battle (Matsue)), Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo Asahi newspaper), June 25, 1905; “Shinsagamimaru to takeshimamaru” (The new Sagami-maru and Takeshima-maru vessels), Tokyo Asahi
Shimbun, August 11, 1905, etc. (all in Japanese).

16

Tayama Katai, “Senji sowa̶riyankorudo iwa” (Collection of Wartime Stories̶Liancourt Rocks),
Nichiro senso jikki (True Record of the Russo-Japanese War, 75th edition, 1905, pp. 115–117; Nozu
Chosui, “Aa takeshima” (Ah, Takeshima), ibid., 76th edition (“Kankoku shashinjo” (Album of Korea),
Shashin gaho rinji zokan (Special illustrated supplement) 25), 1905, p. 35, etc. (both in Japanese).

17

Morita Yoshio, “Zainichi chosenjin shogu no suii to genjo” (Present circumstances and trends in thetreatment of Koreans in Japan), Homu kenshujo homu kenkyu hokokusho (Training Institute of the
Ministry of Justice legal research report), 43rd series, No. 3, 1955, p. 4; Morita, Suji ga kataru zainichikankokujin, chosenjin no rekishi (A history of North and South Koreans in Japan through numericaldata) (new edition), Akashi Shoten, 1996, p. 173 (both in Japanese).

18“Miscellaneous̶Official gazette of the Japanese fleet,” Hwang-sung sin-mun (Hwang-sung newspaper),June 2, 1905, (in Korean).

51
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

the incorporation of Takeshima into Japan (in his report, the magistrate referred to Dokdo “being
under our jurisdiction”), and the government ordered an investigation,19 but there is no evidenceof the Japanese resident-general of Korea subsequently being approached with any inquir yregarding the matter, let alone any protest. The ROK government and researchers who support
its position assert that “Koreaʼs situation was such that it had been deprived of its diplomatic
power and it was therefore not able to lodge any diplomatic protest,”20 but this assertion is notbased on historical records.
The Empire of Korea was at that time frequently lodging protests and taking otheradministrative and diplomatic measures to address tree felling and other acts by Japanese citizens
that had become common on Ulleungdo before 1900. However, right up to the compilation of the
Uldo-gun rule book (Uldogunjeolmok; 1902), in which the Empire of Koreaʼs Ministry of Home
Affairs laid down administrative guidelines for Uldo-gun, and which was discovered in Korea
in 2010, there were no statements indicating that islands such as Takeshima, which was 90 km
away, were included within Koreaʼs area of administration.21 Moreover, there is no evidence thatany measures were taken to deal with fishing by Japanese citizens around Takeshima, which had
most likely already started by 1903, or surveys by the Ministry of the Navy of Japan.22
Moreover, a Japanese diplomatic note of October 1905 records that the Korean minister forforeign affairs, Park Che-soon, protested verbally to Hayashi Gonsuke, Japanʼs minister to Korea,
as well as in a letter to the British minister,23 about the description of Koreaʼs status included in
the treaty for the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Subsequently, in February 1906, a Japanese
resident-general of Korea was appointed, and from March 13 the Council for Improvement of
Korean Administration met every Tuesday, providing a forum for ministers of the Empire of
Koreaʼs State Council to discuss a diverse range of matters including Koreaʼs judicial system withresidents-general such as Ito Hirobumi and Japanese advisors.24 Moreover, the historical recordsof the Empire of Koreaʼs State Council (the Ministry of Home Affairs) include records stating thatinquiries were made to the resident-general and others on the Japanese side with regard to a wide
19

“Special report,” “Directive No. 3,” Gak-gwan-chal-do-geo-re-an (各觀察道去來案), Kyujanggak Archives
of Seoul National University, 奎 17990, 1906 (in Korean). This historical document was first introducedin Shin Yong-ha (1989), “Joseon wangjo eui dokdo ryeongyu wa ilbon jegukjueui eui dokdo chimryak”(Korean dynastyʼs possession of Dokdo and invasion of Dokdo by imperialistic Japan), Han-guk-dok-libun-dong-sa-yeon-gu (Journal of Korean independence movement studies) 3rd series (also in Korean).

20

ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Refutation of the assertion of sovereignty over Dokdo by
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, p. 12 (in Japanese).

21

Daegu Internet News, January 4, 2011 (in Korean), available athttp://www.dginews.co.kr/ArticleView.asp?intNum=23465&ASection=001003 (as of January 14, 2012).

22

JACAR (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records), Ref. C09050402800, Gunkan Tsushima senji
nisshi (Wartime journal of the battleship Tsushima), Vol.5, National Institute for Defense Studies (inJapanese).

23“Dai 384-go nichiei domei joyakuchu kankoku ni kansuru kitei ni tsuki kan gaibudaijin yori eikoku
koshi ni kogi no ken” (No. 384 The Korean foreign ministerʼs protest to the British minister regarding
provisions relating to Korea in the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty), Nikkan kyoyaku teiketsu narabini
tokanfu secchi no ken fu zaikan kakkoku koshikan teppai no ken (Conclusion of the Japan-Korea Treaty
and appointment of the Japanese resident-general of Korea & removal of countriesʼ legations in Korea),
October 17, 1905 in Gaimusho—Nihon gaikobunsho dijitaru akaibu, (Ministr y of Foreign Affairsof Japan̶Digital Archive of the Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy) Vol.38, Part 1, 1905 (inJapanese).

24

JACAR, Ref. A04017269100, Tankosho—Kankoku shisei kaizen ni kansuru kyogikai yoryo hikki— kankoku
genro no ito tokan shotaikai sekijo danwa yoryo (Monograph̶Notes on key points from the Council
for Improvement of Korean Administration̶Key points of discussions at banquet of Korean elder
statesmen attended by resident-general Ito (National Archives of Japan) (in Japanese).

52
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

range of matters that came up involving the Japanese. Particularly notable was the fact that the
Empire of Korea made inquiries to the resident-general about a suspected transaction of land ata coastal area in Jukbyeon, Uljin-gun. In December 1905, the Korean minister of internal affairs,
Lee Ji-yong, suspected that a Japanese citizen had illegally obtained land on the former site of theJapanese Navyʼs watchtower. He reported the suspected transaction to Park Che-soon, who wasby then prime minister, and unlike Takeshima, Park made an inquiry to the resident-general. As aresult, Park received a response that no land transaction had taken place, and in April of the same
year Lee received a report to that effect.25
In July 1906, after the incorporation of Takeshima into Japan, when Ikeda Juzaburo, chiefof the Administrative Bureau of Communications of the Japanese resident-general, inquired
about the islands belonging to the county of Uldo-gun and the date when the county office wasestablished, the official response of the Empire of Korea was: “The islands under that countyʼsjurisdiction are Jukdo and Seokdo, and the county extends 60 ri (approximately 24 km) from east
to west and 40 ri (approximately 16 km) from north to south, totaling over 200 ri.(approximately
80 km)” Thus the response excluded Takeshima, at a distance of 90 km from Ulleungdo, from thearea included in Uldo-gun.26 Yet, if one follows the ROK governmentʼs subsequent assertion that
Takeshima was originally under Korean jurisdiction, the Uldo-gun magistrate Sim Heung-Taekwould have committed a blunder by overlooking the incorporation of Takeshima into Japan ʼs
Shimane Prefecture for more than a year. However, there was no evidence that he suffered any
kind of punishment by the Korean central government, and what is more, he continued to receive
pay raises and promotions steadily thereafter.27
In light of these facts, it would be most natural to infer that the investigation by thegovernment of the Empire of Korea, after it had received a report from the magistrate referring
to “Dokdo… being under our jurisdiction,” revealed that Dokdo was neither an alternative namefor Ulleungdo, nor was it Chikusho (Jukdo), which was 2 km off the east coast of Ulleungdo, nor
was it any of the islands or reefs in the waters around Ulleungdo. It was, rather, an island outside
the Empire of Koreaʼs territory that had never before appeared in any maps of Korea. Thus thecentral government must have noticed the report by the local official was mistaken in saying
Dokdo was an island “under our jurisdiction,” and it did not lodge any protest.
This awareness about Takeshima being outside Korea is also evident from the petition of the
Korean minister of internal affairs, Lee Geon-ha, for Imperial Edict No. 41 of 1900, which raised
the status of Ulleungdo to a gun (county). He stipulated an area that excluded Dokdo from the25

Of ficial documents of the Ministry of Internal Af fairs, Vol.1, Februar y 26, 1906 in Inquiry No. 3,(Kyujanggak Archives of Seoul National University, 奎 17768), and State Council Inquiry No. 56, April
17, 1906. These documents were introduced in Shin Yong-ha, “The Japanese Empireʼs attempt to annex
Dokdo during 1904–1905 and criticism thereof”, Research on the history of the Korean independence
movement, 11th series, Institute of Korean Independence Movement Studies, Independence Hall of
Korea, 1996 (all in Korean).

26“Facts on arrangement of Uldo County,” Hwang-sung-sin-mun (Hwangsung newspaper), July 13, 1906
(in Korean); this document was discovered by Sugino Yomei; “Ishijima=Dokdo setsu hitei no kijutsu
mitsukaru” (Description negating the theory that Seokdo corresponds to Dokdo discovered), San-in
Chuo Shimpo (San-in Chuo News), February 22, 2008 (in Japanese); “Ikedaʼs official letter,” Dae-hanmae-il-sin-bo (The Korea daily news), July 13, 1906 (in Korean).

27

Sim Heung-Taek was appointed to the post of Uldo-gun magistrate and sonin (senior official) of the 6th
rank on January 26, 1903 (Dae-han-je-guk-gwan-bo (Official gazette of the Empire of Korea), January
29, 1903) and was promoted to the post of Hoengseong-gun magistrate and sonin (senior official) of the
3rd rank on March 13, 1907 (ibid., March 15, 1907). Furthermore, on October 1, 1906 he received apay increase to wage grade five (ibid., October 13, 1906), and a further increase to wage grade four on
March 14, 1907 (ibid., March 27, 1907). I was informed about this document and related information by
Matsuzawa Kanji.

53
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

new Uldo-gun, saying “the area where the islands are located should be about 80 ri in length and50 ri in width.” The name Dokdo that first appeared as the written name for Takeshima in themagistrateʼs report had not existed in any Korean records until then, and despite the fact thatnewspapers and other media had carried stories on the magistrateʼs report and the directive fromthe Empire of Koreaʼs Ministry of Home Affairs,28 there were no Korean references to Dokdo
immediately afterwards. Even after Korea was annexed by Japan, the issue of territorial rights
was raised with regard to another island, Tsushima,29 but in the records relating to the issue of
Ulleungdoʼs ownership,30 there is nothing referring to Takeshima. This is further underlinedby the fact that even among independence campaigners and members of the Korean diaspora
living in the United States, there were no Koreans who asserted Koreaʼs territorial rights overTakeshima. As the above account shows, the Korean historical records found to date contain noevidence that Korea officially owned Takeshima in 1905 or earlier. When the ROK government
claims that Takeshima was “the first victim of Japanʼs aggression against Korea,” or that Japan
took Takeshima “by violence and greed” or “invaded” the island, it is therefore alleging actions
that were by definition impossible.
(2) From the End of World War II to the Signing of the Peace Treaty

So, is it true to say that “upon the liberation of Korea, Dokdo returned to its countryʼs embrace”?
In fact, even during the period of US military administration immediately after the war, when
Korea was “liberated” from Japanese rule, Takeshima was still not depicted in Korean maps

28

“Mu-byeon-bu-yu” (無変不有), Dae-han-mae-il-sin-mun (The Korea daily newspaper), May 1, 1906and “Ur-sui-bo -go-ne-bu”(鬱倅報告内部), the Hwang-sung-sin-mun (Hwangsung newspaper), May9, 1906 had stories on Simʼs report and the content of the directive by the ministry of internal affairs,
but the accounts show no accurate understanding of the location of “Dokdo” or the fact that it was an
uninhabited island. Hwang Hyunʼs O-ha-gi-mun (梧下記聞) and Mae-cheon-ya-rok (梅泉野録) (Vol. 5,
April 5, 1906) (both 1906) also have stories on the articles carried in the Hwang-sung-sin-mun, but thesame limitations apply (all sources in Korean).

29“The appeal of an isolated island̶Visits to Tsushima Island (5)̶Tsushima Island definitely Korean
territory in ancient times,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), August 7, 1926 (in Korean). Moreover,according to Morita Yoshio, Syngman Rhee described the return of Tsushima Island as one aspect of
the Korean provisional governmentʼs policy toward Japan in his letter of November 1942 to Victor Chitsai Hoo (胡 世沢), vice-minister for foreign affairs of the government of the Republic of China (Morita
Yoshio, “Nikkan kankei” (Japan-Korea Relations), edited by Yoshizawa Seijiro, Nihon gaikoshi dai 28kan— Kowago no gaiko 1—tai rekkoku kankei (jo) ((Diplomatic history of Japan) Vol. 28̶Diplomacy
after peace 1̶Relations with other nations (first part)), Kajima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1973, p. 23.

30

There were many articles that referred to territorial disputes with Japan during Ulleungdoʼs history: Lee
Eul, “Ul-leung-do-tam-bang-gi” (Ulleungdo report), Gae-Byeok (開闢) No. 41, 1923; Lee Yoon-jae, “Themarvelous An Yong-bok̶ Korean diplomatic issues of two hundred years ago, focusing on Ulleungdo,”
Dong-gwang (Eastern Light), No. 1 & No. 2, 1926; “Island pilgrimage toward Ulleungdo (6)̶Lush
forests on every cliff, just like an enchanted land at sea,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), September
6, 1928; Su-chun-san-in, “An Yong-bok̶The pleasant hero of the sea who won back Ulleungdo with his
eloquence,” Byeol-Gun-Gon (別乾坤) No. 65, 1933; Chwi Un-saeng (翠雲生), “Seol-hwan Ul-leung-dobi-sa” (Seol-hwa (雪禍)̶A secret history of Ulleungdo), Byeol- Gun-Gon (別乾坤), No. 70, 1934, etc.
(all in Korean). Most of these articles alleged that Ulleungdo had come close to being seized by Japan,
but Korea had managed to take the island back; however, there was no mention of the present-day
Takeshima.

54
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

and documents.31 It was not included within the eastern limit of Korean territory specified in
geography textbooks and other reference works of the period.32 Indeed, Korean textbooks andmaps during the US military administration set Ulleungdo as the countryʼs eastern limit, placing
Takeshima outside national territory.33
This lack of awareness of Takeshima ended in the summer of 1947, when the citizens of
Ulleungdo complained to the military government in North Gyeongsang Province that Japanesecitizens had traveled to Takeshima and asserted ownership rights over the island. This was
the beginning of the Takeshima issue in the ROK after World War II.34 Subsequently, a rangeof research was conducted within the ROK,35 including surveys by the Corea Alpine Club, but
historical evidence for Korean ownership of Takeshima remained inconclusive. Up to 1952, theyear the peace treaty went into effect, the ROK identified Sambongdo, which was another namefor Ulleungdo, as the old name for Takeshima,36 and the key current assertion that the islandreferred to as Usando in pre-modern maps and documents is the modern-day Takeshima did notappear until 1953, after the territorial dispute had flared up.37
On June 8, 1948 an incident occurred in which a large number of Korean fishermen who had
landed on Takeshima were killed or injured by bombing conducted by the armed forces of theUnited States. The US forces apologized and paid compensation to the victims and their families,
and subsequently, the ROK used this incident as grounds to assert that the United States hadrecognized the ROKʼs ownership of Takeshima. According to reports at that time, the ROK
claimed that Takeshima was the ROKʼs territory for a number of reasons, including (i) assertions
to the effect that Takeshima had been called Sambongdo since ancient times, (ii) assertions
to the effect that in the local dialect, the name Dolseom (Seokdo) had changed to Dokseom(Dokdo), and (iii) the victims of the bombing were Korean citizens and the US forces had dealt
with the ROK to resolve the matter.38 However, the key assertions of the ROK government duringnegotiations with the United States over reparations immediately after the signing of the peace
treaty were that Takeshima had historically been under Korean jurisdiction and comprised islets
31

Kim Jin-bok, Complete Map of Korea, Joong-ang Publishing, 1946; (in Korean), etc. According to Jung
Byung-jun in “The Post-Liberation ROKʼs Awareness of Dokdo and Policy Toward It (1945– 51)”,
Journal of Northeast Asian History 5-2, 2008, p. 3 (in English), the first map issued in hangul (the Koreanalphabetic script) after liberation was the Map Attached to the Geography of Korea published by theinterim governmentʼs printing office and edited by the education ministryʼs editorial office. He statesthat he was not able to view the map itself, but it is very likely that Dokdo was not included in it.

32

Jung Hong-heon et al., Jo-seon-ji-ri (Geography of Korea), Jeong-eum-sa, 1946, etc. (in Korean).

33

Supra notes 15 and 16, No Do-yang, Jung-deung-guk-to-ji-ri-bu-do (National geographic student atlas
for middle school), Mun-u-sa, 1947; Choi Nam-sun, Jo-seon-sang-sik-mun-dap (Questions and answers
regarding common knowledge of Korea), 1947; Choi, Jo-seon-sang-sik (Common knowledge of Korea),
1948, etc. (all in Korean).

34

Supra note 31 (Jung, 2008), pp. 3–5.

35

One typical example of such research is Shin Seok-ho, “On where Dokdo belongs”, Sa-hae, first issue,
1948 (in Korean).

36

Song Seok-ha, “Seeking the ancient, historic site of Ulleungdo,” Guk-je-bo-do (International Report),
Januar y 1948, Part 3, No. 1 (new yearʼs issue; in Korean), etc. In the section on the “UlleungdoJaeng-gye” (Ulleungdo dispute) in his set of books entitled Chun-gwan-ji (春官志) (1745), which was
a compilation of the records of the ministr y of rites (the governmental department charged with
diplomacy and protocol), Lee Maeng-hyu stated that Sam-bong-do was Ulleungdo.

37

Fujii Kenji, “Takeshima mondai ni okeru kankoku no shucho no keisei” (The shaping of the ROKʼs
position on the Takeshima issue), Shimane-ken [dai-ni-ki] Takeshima Mondai Kenkyukai Saishu
Hokoku-sho (Final report of the Shimane Prefectural Government Takeshima Issue Research Group[second session]), 2012, pp. 52–53 (in Japanese).

38

Supra note 31 (Jung, 2008), pp. 18–21.

55
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Governmentthat “belonged to” Ulleungdo, that in 1905 Japan had “seized” Takeshima for the purposes of
the Russo-Japanese War, and that Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note
(SCAPIN) 1033, addressed to Japan, had placed Takeshima in the “Korean fishing zone.”39
SCAPIN 1033 demarcated the boundary within which Japanese fishing boats could operate.
In accordance with the “MacArthur line,” Japanese vessels were prohibited from approaching or
landing on Takeshima, but waters outside the line (i.e. on the Korean side) were not designatedas an area in which Korean fishing boats could operate exclusively, and the line did not lay
down stipulations on territor y. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was
not authorized to transfer territory, and the fifth paragraph of SCAPIN 1033 specified that “[t]he present authorization is not an expression of allied policy relative to ultimate determinationof national jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned or in
any other area.” This statement was backed up by the August 1947 activity report issued by the
US armed forces administration40 and the November 27, 1952 letter to the US Embassy in Korea
from the US Army Forces, Far East41 (communicated as the opinion of Mark Clark, commanding
general, US Army Forces, Far East and commander in chief, UN Command). Both of these
documents stated that SCAPIN 1033 did not lay down stipulations on territory.
In 1951 the ROK government asserted its basis for the ownership of Takeshima by citing
SCAPIN 677,42 which excluded Takeshima from the scope of Japanese administrative authority.
However, the sixth paragraph of this instruction note stated that “[n]othing in this directive
shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of theminor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.” Furthermore, the fact that
this instruction note bears no relation to territorial rights over Takeshima is indicated by thefact that on February 13, 1946, the officer in charge of the Government Section at the General
Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) replied to an inquir y by a liaison officer of theJapanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “the directive relating to administrative separation was
issued merely for the administrative convenience of the Allied Powers and it had nothing to dowith the territorial issue, which should be decided by means of a peace treaty to be concluded at
a later date.”43 Moreover, the article reporting SCAPIN 677 in The Dong-a Ilbo (East Asia Daily),then the leading Korean newspaper, did not mention that Takeshima had been specifically cited39

Supra Note 37, p. 53.

40

NARA (RG331), GHQ/SCAP Records, United States Army Forces in Korea, No. 1, Aug. 1947 (U.S.
Army Military Government̶South Korea Interim Government activities; in English). According tothis report, “Formerly belonging to Japan, a recent occupation directive which drew an arbitrary line
demarcating Japanese and Korean fishing waters placed Tok-to within the Korean zone. Final dispositionof the islandsʼ jurisdiction awaits the peace treaty.” However, the US armed forces administration in
Korea was misunderstanding the nature of the MacArthur line (M line) when it described the seas thatlay outside the M line from the Japanese point of view as Korean fishing waters. The M line was drawn
up under the exclusive authority of SCAP and was supposed to be beyond any interference by othercountries (Fujii Kenji, “Kankoku no kaiyo ninshiki̶Ri shoban rain mondai o chushin ni” (Maritime
perceptions of South Korea̶Centered on the Syngman Rhee line problem), Kankoku Kenkyu Senta
nenpo (Annual report, the Research Center for Korean Studies), 2011, p. 55 (in Japanese).

41

NARA (RG84), “Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State,” Entry 2846, Korea, Seoul
Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–55, Box 12 (in English).

42

Supra note 37, p. 53.

43

Public documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “2. Gyosei no bunri ni kansuru shireibu
gawa to no kaidan” (2. Talks with SCAP regarding administrative separation), Kyu Nihongaichi jokyo
zakken (Miscellaneous matters relating to circumstances in former Japanese territories outside Japan) (inJapanese).

56
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasakiin the instruction note;44 Takeshima thus was clearly of no concern to Korean people at that time.
Subsequently, on July 6, 1951, SCAPIN 2160 designated Takeshima as a bombing range, andJapanʼs government was informed of this designation.45
Meanwhile, on November 21, 1945, the Japanese government established the ResearchCommittee on Peace Treaty Issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and started preparing
for the eventual signing of the treaty. The committee prepared seven booklets of documents
regarding territorial issues, which it submitted to the United States. Included among thesewas a document entitled “Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part IV. Minor Islands in the
Pacific, Minor Islands in the Japan Sea” (June 1947), which cited the two islands of Takeshima
and Ulleungdo in the Sea of Japan, describing their geographies, histories, and industries. The
document stated that Korea could not assert its territorial rights over Takeshima because, unlike
Ulleungdo, “Liancourt Rocks” had no Korean name and did not appear on any maps drawn up in
Korea. On the last page of the booklet, a map by Nagakubo Sekisui (Revised Complete Map ofJapanese Lands and Roads) was attached. In 1946 the election regulations for the lower house of
the Japanese Diet (the national legislature) designated “Takeshima within Goka Village under the
Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture” as an area for the purposes of elections (Imperial
Ordinance No. 97),46 and in the same year, Japanʼs Ministry of Commerce and Industry registeredprospecting rights for two Japanese citizens, including a person named Hidaka Fusaichi, to mine
resources such as silver, copper, and iron sulfide.47
As it dealt with the aftermath of World War II, the South Korean government at the time was
focusing on issues relating to the return of national assets and demands for reparations fromJapan; its demands in terms of territorial issues centered on frequent demands for the “return”
of the island of Tsushima, rather than Takeshima. On January 23, 1948, 60 members of South
Koreaʼs interim legislature signed and submitted a “petition for the return of Tsushima Island,”48
and in a session of the National Assembly on February 17, the lawmakers proposed requesting
the return of Tsushima Island at the peace conference with Japan.49 In a press conference on
August 17, 1948, immediately after the new government of the ROK was established, President

44“Reduced Japanese territory̶Only the mainland remains as the country is torn apart,” The Dong-a ilbo
(East Asia daily), February 5, 1946 (in Korean).

45

On March 22, 1951, the US Pacific Air Force Headquar ters drew up the Korean Air Defense
Identification Zone (KADIZ) to include Takeshima, and on June 20 the second-in-command of theEighth United States Army (EUSA) asked the ROK government for permission to use Takeshima asa bombing range. The ROKʼs view is that this action by the US armed forces constitutes proof that theUnited States recognized Takeshima as Korean territory. However, the US forces had no authority todetermine territorial boundaries, and as stated in the aforementioned activity report by the US armed
forces administration, they assumed that territorial boundaries would be defined in the subsequent
peace treaty.

46

JACAR, Ref. A04017805000, “Showa niju nen chokurei dai nana hyaku nana go (Shugiingiin senkyo hoshikorei chu kaisei no ken)” (1945 Imperial ordinance No. 707 (Amendment of enforcement ordinancefor election law of the members of the House of Representatives)), Original with imperial signatureand seal; “Showa nujuichi nen chokurei dai kyuju nana go” (1946 Imperial ordinance no.97) (National
Archives of Japan; both in Japanese).

47

March 5, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Sangiin gaimu, homu rengo iinkai kaigiroku” (Minutes of theForeign and Legal Affairs Commission of the House of Councillors), No. 1 (in Japanese).

48“Tsushima Island was originally Korean territor y̶Should its return be demanded in the peace
conference with Japan?” Seoul-sin-mun (Seoul newspaper), January 25, 1948 (in Korean).

49“Proposal to request the return of Tsushima Island,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), February 19,
1948 (in Korean).

57
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

Syngman Rhee stated that “Tsushima is Korean territory.”50 On September 10 of the same year,
a South Korean presidential envoy held a press conference in Tokyo, where he proposed that
Tsushima be made part of the ROK.51 On January 7, 1949, Rhee strongly asserted his countryʼs
territorial rights over Tsushima, saying in his new yearʼs press conference that “Tsushima should
be returned.”52 On August 5, 1948, members of a private organization in the ROK called thePatriotic Old Menʼs Association sent a petition to Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers, in which they called for the return of Dokdo and Parangdo, as well as
Tsushima, to the ROK.53
These events demonstrate that there was no evidence the South Korean government
recognized Takeshima as part of its own countr yʼs territor y immediately after World War II,
and it was only after an incident relating to territorial rights occurred in the summer of 1947
that it became aware of the existence of “Dokdo” for the first time. Moreover, Japan had clearly
indicated the historical basis for its sovereignty over Takeshima to the Allied Powers early on,
whereas Korea, which continually insisted on the return of Tsushima from Japan, failed to givea clear historical basis for ownership of Takeshima̶an island which did not appear on any of
its own maps̶instead relying mainly on SCAPʼs directives to provide the basis for its territorial
claims. Thus the ROKʼs assertion that “upon the liberation of Korea, Dokdo came back to its
countryʼs embrace” does not hold true either.

(3) Preparation of the peace treaty draft and the ROK government’s actions

The peace treaty draft went through several rounds of revisions,54 after which the US draft dated
March 23, 1951, was passed on to the ROK government. The ROK government then sent a
letter dated April 26 requesting amendments to the draft.55 These included a request to specify
Tsushima as ROK territory, but there was no mention of Takeshima, and the activities log of
the Committee to Investigate Peace with Japan established by the South Korean diplomatic
mission in Japan made no mention of Takeshima in connection with any territorial issue.56 The
islets were also not mentioned in the opinions presented by various countries with regard to
Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the joint US-UK peace treaty draft of May 3 (which excluded the ROKʼs
50“Tsushima no katsujo̶Ri daitor yo yokyu” (President Rhee to demand that Tsushima is ceded),
Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri newspaper), August 19, 1948. The Asahi Shimbun (Asahi newspaper) articleof August 19, 1948, “Tsushima no henkan̶Ri daitoryo yokyu” (President Rhee to demand return of
Tsushima), reported that on August 18 Rhee responded to a question by an AP reporter, saying that hewould demand the return of Tsushima.

51“Tsushima Island was Korean territory 300 years ago: Its return to the ROK is reasonable in terms ofnational defense,” Kyung-hyang-sin-mun (Kyunghyang newspaper), September 12, 1948 (in Korean).

52“Plans for participation in peace conference with Japan̶ President Rhee states in new year press
conference that he will demand the return of Tsushima Island,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily),
January 8, 1949 (in Korean).

53“Request for Arrangement of Lands Between Korea and Japan” (Records of the U.S. Departmentof State relating to the internal affairs of Japan, 1945–1949: Department of State decimal file 894; inEnglish).

54

Tsukamoto Takashi, “Heiwa joyaku to takeshima (sairon)” (The Peace Treaty and Takeshima(revisited)), Refarensu (The Reference), No. 518 (March edition), National Diet Library, 1994, pp. 31–56(in Japanese).

55

Dae-han-min-guk-sa-ja-ryo-jip 30, Rhee Syng-man Gwan-gye-seo-han-ja-ryo-jip 3 (Documents on thehistory of the ROK 30̶Letters relating to Syngman Rhee 3), National Institute of Korean History, 1951,
pp. 233–236 (in Korean).

56

Nam, Kijeong, “saenpeulansiseuko pyeonghwajoyag han-ilgwangye -ʻgwandaehan pyeonghwaʼ wanaengjeon-ui sang-gwanseong– (Taking Diplomacy Seriously: Japan and Korea on the Road to theTreaty of Peace with Japan),” Journal of Northeast Asian History, Vol. 22, 2008 (in Korean), pp.63- 64.

58
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

request regarding Tsushima). Subsequently, on July 9, the revised US-UK draft dated June 14
was presented to South Korea via Yang You-chan, the ROK ambassador to the United States. As
the request for Tsushima had been rejected immediately by the United States, on July 19 the
ROK agreed to withdraw its request on Tsushima, but sent a letter asking that Takeshima andParangdo instead be deemed to belong to Korea.57 President Rhee sent a letter dated August 3 toambassador Yang expressing fury that the request for Tsushima had been rejected.58 Yet there
was nothing in the eight-page letter referring to Takeshima. Thereafter, the opinions of various
countries relating to the US-UK joint draft were compiled in the “Treaty Changes” document
dated August 7, and the ROKʼs requests for Takeshima and Parangdo were included in Article
2, Paragraph a.59 However, other countriesʼ opinions with regard to the paragraph were notrecorded.
In talks on July 19, the ROK requested John Foster Dulles to have Takeshima and Parangdo
specified as territories to be renounced by Japan in the peace treaty. Dulles replied that provided
there were historical justifications for the requests, there would be no problems. However, aninternal investigation conducted by the State Department showed that the ROK had no historicalbasis for its requests. Robert A. Fearey of the US Embassy in Japan wrote a letter dated August 3
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, John M. Allison, informing him that S.W.
Boggs, the Department of Stateʼs geographer, had “tried all resources in Washington, but had
been unable to identify Dokdo (Takeshima) and Parangdo”. Fearey said he also “asked the South
Korean Embassy and they told him they believed Dokdo was near Ulleungdo, or Takeshima Rock,and suspected that Parangdo was too. Apparently, he said, that was all they could learn, shortof sending a cable to Muccio.”60 In response, on August 7, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson
57

Supra note 54. The ROK government currently asserts its territorial rights based on the reasoning that
Takeshima is a satellite island that is an extension of Ulleungdo, but this letter indicates that there wasno such recognition. Prior to this, a letter from S.W. Boggs of the Department of Stateʼs Geographical
Office to Robert A. Fearey dated July 16, 1951, stated “If it is decided to give them [the Liancourt
Rocks/Takeshima] to Korea, it would be necessary only to add ʻand Liancourt Rocksʼ at the end of Art.
2, par. (a).” This again makes it clear that Takeshima was treated as Japanese territory in the peace
treaty (NARA [RG59], Department of State, Decimal File 1950–54, 694.001/7-1351; in English), and thepreamble to the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea signed in 1965 also
invokes the peace treaty provisions.

58

Supra note 55, pp. 330–331.

59

NARA (RG59) Records of the Bureau of Public Af fairs, Records Relating to the Japanese Peace
Treaties, 1946–1952, Lot 78D173, Box 2 (in English). In recent years there have been comments postedon the Internet to the effect that the Rusk letter lacks force because it was not disclosed to the Allies
and the Japanese government at the time, and because Secretary of State Dulles wrote in an internal
memorandum a couple of years later that the US view regarding Takeshima was simply that of one ofmany signatories to the treaty. However, the Rusk letter was a diplomatic document exchanged between
the US and the ROK in the process of drafting the peace treaty and it serves as a supplementary meansof interpreting the treaty, attesting to the course of events by which Takeshima came to be regarded
as Japanese territor y as a result of the two governments discussing the issue of the attribution of
Takeshima. As such, it was not the type of document that would usually have been made available tothird parties, let alone one for which the issue of validity or invalidity was applicable. Bearing in mind,
moreover, that drafts of the treaty were sent to the relevant countries other than the United States andthat the treaty was drafted, agreed to and signed after the opinions of the countries were incorporated,
it is clear that the assertions about the letterʼs lack of validity are not true. It is also significant that the1965 preamble to the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea invokes therelevant peace treaty provisions.

60

NARA Confidential U.S. Lot 58 D118 and D637, Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Japan
Subject Files, 1947–1956, Reel 39 (in English). “Muccio” refers to John J. Muccio, the US ambassador in
the ROKʼs Busan (then known as Pusan).

59
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

notified Muccio that “Neither our geographers nor [the] South Korean Embassy have been able
locate Dokdo and Parangdo Islands. Therefore unless we hear immediately [we] cannot consider
this South Korean proposal to confirm their sovereignty over these islands.”61 The following day
the US was informed of Takeshimaʼs coordinates (latitude and longitude), and at the same time,
the US was notified that the ROK government had withdrawn its demand for Parangdo. As aresult of this course of events, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk,
formally notified Ambassador Yang on August 10 of the US view that Takeshima was Japanese
territory, stating (in the Rusk letter) that Takeshima had not been claimed by Korea as its own
territory prior to 1905. Subsequently, on August 16, Yang and Rusk held talks, but no opinions
relating to Takeshima were recorded.62
Thus, up until July 19, 1951, there was no evidence that the ROK government had made any
official assertions of territorial rights over Takeshima directed toward third parties. Moreover,the peace treaty was signed without any of the other countries involved raising any objection to
the fact that Takeshima was excluded from the territories to be renounced by Japan. However,
perhaps in an attempt to avoid US intervention in a dispute between the ROK and Japan, the Rusk
letter notifying the official view of the United States was not made public until 1978. As a result,
therefore, the letter failed to prevent the ROKʼs illegal occupation of Takeshima and perpetuatedthe cause of conflict thereafter.
The only historical document of this period indicating the Japanese governmentʼs assertions
with regard to sovereignty over Takeshima is entitled “Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper,
Part IV. Minor Islands in the Pacific, Minor Islands in the Japan Sea,” and no records have beenfound to suggest that Japan actively lobbied the Allied Powers. As demonstrated by a seriesof US Department of State documents, the South Korean government asserted its territorial
rights over not only Tsushima, but also over Takeshima when the treaty was being drafted. And
despite the fact that the ROK was given an opportunity to explain the historical evidence for its
ownership of Dokdo (Takeshima), which did not appear on any of its maps, it failed to do so.
These, therefore, are the likely reasons why Takeshima was regarded as Japanese territory in thepeace treaty. Accordingly, the ROKʼs second and third assertions as described in this research
paperʼs introduction are also incorrect in the sense that, with regard to the second assertion, theROK was given several opportunities to make comments on drafts of the peace treaty despite thefact that it was not a signatory to the treaty. With respect to the third assertion, the US declined
to support the South Korean claim over Dokdo not because of Japanese lobbying, but because
South Korea could not provide historical evidence for its claim.
Having had both its ownership of Takeshima and the continuing existence of the MacArthurline rejected during the drafting of the peace treaty, the ROK government decided on the day
before the treatyʼs signing to establish a “fisheries protection zone.” A vast expanse of the Sea
of Japan that was not a major fishing area, including Takeshima, was added to a “fisheries
jurisdiction zone” that had been created by the ROKʼs Ministry of Commerce and Industry.63 That“fisheries jurisdiction zone” had added Socotra Rock (a submerged rock that the ROK asserted
was Parangdo, located in a valuable fishing area in the Yellow Sea) to the area marked out by61

Supra note 55, p. 110.

62

For more details on the series of events, see supra note 54.

63

The actions taken within the ROK government at the time are analyzed in detail in Fujii Kenji, “Rishoban rain senpu e no katei ni kansuru kenkyu” (Research on the process leading to proclamation of
the Syngman Rhee line), Chosen gakuho (Journal of the Academic Association of Koreanology in Japan),Vol. 185; 2002, and Fujii, “Ri shoban rain sengen to kankoku seifu” (The declaration of the Syngman
Rhee line and the ROK government), Dai-ni-ki Takeshima Mondai ni Kansuru Chosa Kenkyu Saishu
Hokoku-sho (Final Report of the Research Survey on the Takeshima Issue (second session)), Shimane
Prefecture, 2011 (both in Japanese).

60
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

the MacArthur line and the “fisheries protection zone” was even wider, adding vast areas of the
Sea of Japan that included Takeshima to the “fisheries jurisdiction zone.” Kim Dong-jo, leader of
the Government Affairs Bureau in the ROKʼs Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recalls that the reason
they included Takeshima within the Syngman Rhee line despite opposition from some quarters
was that the ROK had become convinced it was necessary to create a precedent for exercising
sovereignty.64
As described above, a mere two months before the signing of the peace treaty, the ROK
demanded that Takeshima, rather than Tsushima, be specified as one of the islands tobe renounced by Japan. However, the ROK was unable to respond to inquiries regarding
Takeshimaʼs exact location and a clear historical basis for its sovereignty over the islets, and its
demand was consequently rejected by the United States. Then, immediately before the peace
treaty was signed, the ROKʼs Ministr y of Foreign Affairs attempted to expand the countr y ʼsterritory by making preparations to incorporate Takeshima into South Korea by force, under thepretext of protecting fisheries.

(4) Actions after the signing of the peace treaty and the ROK’s tricks
The seizure and detention of Japanese fishing boats by the ROK that had star ted in 1947
took place even more frequently after the Syngman Rhee line was declared, while the ROKʼsgovernment maintained an uncompromising stance with regard to Takeshima, and started toconstruct an after-the-fact basis for its actions to make up for the lack of historical evidence todefend its positions.
On September 21, 1951, following the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September
8, the ROKʼs foreign minister, Byun Young-tae, again contacted Ambassador Muccio to assert
South Koreaʼs ownership of Takeshima.65 The “definitive” grounds Byun gave for his argument
were largely based on SCAPIN 677, followed by the fact that Takeshima had been placed on“the Korean side” of the MacArthur line, and also the fact that after the bombing incident by the
US military aircraft over Takeshima in 1948, the US armed forces had apologized to the Korean
victims. Byun also alleged that substantial documented evidence existed to demonstrate that
Takeshima had been Korean territory for several hundred years before it was “surreptitiously
incorporated into Japan” in 1905. However, in a letter dated October 3 from the US Embassy in the
ROKʼs Busan to the Department of State, the embassy official who dealt with the matter wrote,“the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not possess a compilation of such ʻevidenceʼ at this time.
Although it was pointed out to the Minister that the Embassy would welcome the submission ofsuch ʻevidenceʼ for transmittal to the Department, it appears doubtful that such information will
be forthcoming.” Subsequently, in the preparatory discussions held from October 20, 1951 prior
to ROK-Japan diplomatic normalization talks, the ROKʼs proposal to replace the MacArthur linewith an alternative zone excluding Japanese fishing boats from international waters was rejected.
In a special committee meeting of Japanʼs House of Representatives on October 22, Kusaba
Ryuen, the parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs, who served as plenipotentiary advisor
for the Japanese delegation to the San Francisco peace conference, expressed the opinion that thepeace treaty clearly confirmed Takeshima as Japanese territory. Spurred by his words, an Asahi
Shimbun newspaper reporter went ashore on Takeshima and wrote an article for the newspaper
64

Kim Dong-jo, Hoe-sang-30-nyeon Han-il-hoe-dam (30 Years of ROK-Japan talks recollected), Joong-angilbo-sa, Seoul, 1986, p. 16 (in Korean), translated into Japanese by Hayashi Takehiko, “Kan-nichi no
wakai̶Nikkan kosho 14 nen no kiroku” (Reconciliation between the ROK and Japan̶A record of 14
years of Korea-Japan negotiations), Simul Press, 1993, p. 11.

65

Dok-do-ja-ryo― Mi-guk-pyeon 巻 2 (Dokdo documents̶The United States, Vol. 2), National Institute of
Korean History, 2008, p. 110 (in Korean and English).

61
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

dated November 24.66 The ROK government issued a condemnation following the article, but the
grounds it gave for Korean ownership were SCAPIN 677 and the fact that the governor of the
ROKʼs Gyeongsang Province had built a memorial monument to the 1948 bombing incident.67
Then on January 18, 1952, the ROK declared the creation of the Syngman Rhee line. Theline excluded Japanese fishing boats from valuable fishing areas in the East China Sea and the
Yellow Sea, while at the same time asserting South Koreaʼs sovereignty over an extensive area ofinternational waters included within the line and also designating Takeshima and Socotra Rock as
ROK territory. By declaring the line, the ROK asserted its intention to maintain and exercise its
national sovereignty, as well as its fisheries jurisdiction rights by placing the marine products andfisheries industries under the control of the government in order to preserve natural resources.68
In response, the Japanese protested by sending a Note Verbale dated Januar y 28, 1952,
indicating their concern about the illegality of the Syngman Rhee line and the occupationof Takeshima. The United States also sent a letter on Februar y 11, expressing considerable
concern about the ROK wielding administrative authority over an extensive area of international
waters.69 On February 12, the ROK government issued a Note Verbale rebutting the Japanese
governmentʼs concerns, but with regard to Takeshima it made only a brief assertion of its
territorial rights based on SCAPIN 677 and the MacArthur line. On April 25 of the same year,
three days before the peace treaty went into effect, the MacArthur line was abolished, andon the same day the Japanese government issued a rebuttal to the ROK government ʼs Note
Verbale. However, the ROK government was unable to respond to the rebuttal with any clear
indication of the historical basis for claiming Korean sovereignty over Takeshima. On May 20,
the Shimane prefectural government submitted a petition to Japanʼs minister for foreign affairs
and the minister for agriculture and forestry asking for Takeshima, which it described as within
the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture, to be excluded from useby the US armed forces in Japan as a bombing range.70 However, on July 26, 1952, pursuant to an
66“Nihon ni kaeru mujin no takeshima̶Kuhaku junen no shima no zenyo o saguru” (The uninhabited
Takeshima returns to Japan̶Exploring 10 blank years in the islandʼs full stor y), Asahi Shimbun(Asahi newspaper), November 24, 1951. For more details, see Terao Munefuyu, “Hi wa tsuketa kedo̶
Takeshima shuzai hoi” (I lit it: Supplement to Takeshima reporting), Asahi Shimbun Osaka head officelocal news section, ed., Osaka Shakai-bu Sengo Nijunen-shi Nakanoshima San- chome San-banchi (Osaka
local news section history of the 20 years after the war, Nakanoshima 3- chome, 3-banchi), 1966, pp.
168–175 (both articles in Japanese).

67“November 26, 1951, Comments on Dokdo by Chief of Public Relations Lee,” Gwang-bok-30-nyeon Jungyo-ja-ryo-jip Wol-gan-jung-ang 1-wol-ho Byeol-chaek-gi-rok (30 years since liberation: Key documents,
Monthly Joongang, Januar y edition, supplementar y volume of records), Joong-ang-ilbo-sa, Seoul,
January 1975, p. 140 (in Korean).

68

Fujii Kenji, “Kankoku no kaiyo ninshiki̶Ri shoban rain mondai o chushin ni” (Maritime perceptionsof South Korea, centering on the Syngman Rhee line problem), Kankoku Kenkyu Senta nenpo (Annual
report, the Research Center for Korean Studies), 2011, p. 58 (in Japanese). Socotra Rock is a submerged
rock located southwest of Jeju Island in the East China Sea. At the time the Syngman Rhee line was
declared, the ROK government called this submerged rock Parangdo and asserted that it was Korean
territor y. The ROK has now named it Ieodo and built a maritime research station there. This has
resulted in friction with China, which calls it the Suyan Rock.

69“Issues associated with the proclamation of the peace line 1953–55” (Documents of the ROK relating to
the Japan-ROK talks), 0119–0122 コマ (in Korean).

70

Sugihara Takashi, “Zoku takeshima no gyogyoken no hensen ni tsuite̶okinoshima gyogyo
kyodokumiai rengokai no doko o chushin ni” (Regarding the changes in fishing rights aroundTakeshima, Part 2̶Centered on movements of the Okinoshima Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives),
Shimane Prefecture Web Takeshima Issue Research (in Japanese), available at
http://www.pref.shimane.lg.jp/admin/pref/takeshima/web-takeshima/takeshima04/ takeshima04-1/
takeshima04-230701.html (as of February 16, 2012).

62
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

administrative agreement between the United States and Japan, Takeshima was re-designatedas one of the marine exercise and training zones to be provided to the US forces in Japan by theJapanese nation.71
On September 15, 1952, an incident occurred whereby some people from Ulleungdo who werefishing around Takeshima narrowly escaped injury by a US bomber conducting exercises overthe islets. At the time, the second Ulleungdo/Dokdo academic survey team sponsored by theCorea Alpine Club was staying in Ulleungdo to conduct a survey. The team reported the incident
to the ROK government on September 20, and on November 10 the ROK government issued aprotest to the US Embassy in Busan alleging that the bombing had targeted “ROK territory.”72
The correspondence between the US Embassy and the Department of State relating toterritorial sovereignty over Takeshima in relation to this incident is explained in the final
report of the first session of the Research Survey on the Takeshima Issue.73 The exchange ofmessages indicates that the content of the Rusk letter of August 10, 1951 (i.e., the US position
that Takeshima was Japanese territory) had been communicated to US diplomats in overseas
diplomatic missions, and had been notified to the ROK government for a second time on
December 4. The original text of the Note Verbale of December 4, 1952, written by the US
Embassy in reply to the ROK governmentʼs protest, was not available when the final report of theresearch studyʼs first session was compiled. However, the author has obtained Note Verbale No.
187, which was a US reply to the ROK governmentʼs protest. The Note Verbale focused on theclaim in the ROK governmentʼs protest that Takeshima was ROK territory and stated that the
US position remained as described in the Rusk letter of August 10, 1951. The Note Verbale wasrepeating the official view of the United States that Takeshima was Japanese territory.74

71

For more details, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/takeshima/g_beigun.html (as of February 16, 2012; in Japanese).
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html (in English)

72

ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government Affairs Bureau, Dok-do-mun-je-gae-ron (“Introduction to
the Dokdo Issue”), Annex 5 (in Korean and English), 1955.

73

Tsukamoto Takashi, “Takeshima ryoyuken funso ni kanren suru beikoku kokumusho bunsho (tsuiho)”(Documents of the US Department of State relating to the Takeshima territorial dispute (addendum)),Takeshima Issue Research Group, Takeshima mondai ni kansuru chosa kenkyu saishu hokokusho (Final
Report of the Research Survey on the Takeshima Issue), 2007, pp. 79–89 (in Japanese).

74

Supra note 65, p. 255.

63
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

Fig. 1 Note Verbale No. 187 from the Embassy of the United States of America
to the ROK government, December 4, 1952*
No. 187
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the latterʼs note of November 10, 1952 statingthat a single engined airplane described as being under the command of the United States
Forces in the Far East dropped bombs on Dokdo Island on September 15, 1952. The Embassy
is advised that the limited amount of information provided in the Ministryʼs note as well as
the very long time which has elapsed since the incident is said to have taken place makeit virtually impossible for the United Nations Command to determine the facts in the case.
Preparations have, however, been expedited to dispense with the use of Dokdo Island as abombing range.
The Embassy has taken note of the statement contained in the Ministryʼs Note that “Dokdo
Island (Liancourt Rocks).is a part of the territory of the Republic of Korea”. The United States
Governmentʼs understanding of the territorial status of this island was stated in Assistant
Secretary of State Dean Ruskʼs letter to the Korean Ambassador in Washington dated August
10, 1951.
American Embassy,
Pusan, December 4, 1952*

National Archives of the Unites States, RG84,Entr y 2846, Record of Foreign Ser vice Posts of the
Department of States, Korea, Seoul Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953-1955, box12

64
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

65
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

This Note Verbale was included as an annex to the book entitled Introduction to the Dokdo
Issue published by the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government Affairs Bureau in 1955.75 It
was used as a basis to argue that since the US armed forces had responded to the ROKʼs protest
by deciding that Takeshima would no longer be a bombing range, the US had recognized that
Takeshima was ROK territory. Kim Dong-jo, leader of the Government Affairs Bureau in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained in the preface to Introduction to the Dokdo Issue that thebookʼs purpose was not to notify the general public of the Dokdo issue, but to enable the headsof diplomatic missions overseas to correctly understand the matter and to provide them withinformation necessary to counter the unwarranted propaganda of the Japanese̶a purpose forwhich he hoped the book would be frequently put to use. Shockingly, however, the book omitted
the section of the Note Verbale that reaffirmed the Rusk letter, thereby concealing the fact that
the US considered Takeshima to be Japanese territory not only from ROK citizens, but also fromthe ROKʼs own diplomats.76

75

Supra note 72, Annex 6.

76This falsification was first pointed out on Gerry Beversʼ blog (in English), available at
http://dokdo-or-takeshima.blogspot.com/2011/08/1955-introduction-to-dokdo-issue-rok.html (as ofFebruary 16, 2012).

66
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

Fig. 2 Note No. 187 from the United States Embassy to the ROK government,
December 4, 1952, as it appeared in the Ministr y of Foreign Af fairs
Government Affairs Bureau Introduction to the Dokdo Issue (1955). The
final paragraph reaffirming the letter from Rusk has been abbreviated to“etc.”

67
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

Meanwhile, E. Allan Lightner, Jr., the charge dʼaffaires ad interim of the US Embassy in
Korea, made inquiries to establish the facts about the bombing following the ROK governmentʼs
protest. He received a reply from a representative on behalf of the commander-in-chief of United
Nations Command, Mark W. Clark, stating that, although they had been unable to confirm thefacts regarding the bombing, if the use of Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima) as a bombing range
were to be suspended, the ROK as well as other interested agencies would be notified, but thatquestions of territorial sovereignty were beyond the scope of SCAPʼs authority.77 The letter also
pointed out that SCAPIN 1033, relating to fisheries, had specified that “it was not to be construed
as an expression of Allied policy relative to the ultimate determination of national jurisdiction,international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned.” Lightner replied enclosing theDecember 4 notification to the ROK government,78 urging that attention be paid to the section
invoking the content of the Rusk letter.
On December 13, 1952, the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) decided to revoke thedesignation of Takeshima as a bombing range, and the US Embassies in Japan and the ROK
deliberated with the commanding general of the Korean Communications Zone (KComZ),
Thomas W. Herren, about whether they should notify the ROK of this revocation.79 On January
20, 1953, Herren notified the ROKʼs minister for foreign affairs that Takeshima would no longer
be used as a bombing range,80 but despite the fact that the Note Verbale of December 4 clearly
notified the ROK government that the United States recognized Takeshima as Japanese territory,
the December 4 memo was appended as documentary material to a publication compiled for
the ROK governmentʼs embassy officials to use as grounds to assert the ROKʼs ownershipof Takeshima. 81 Furthermore, the Note Verbale had been falsified by omitting the section
reiterating the Rusk letter to give the impression that the United States had acknowledged the
ROKʼs ownership of Takeshima and revoked the designation of Takeshima as a bombing range
as a result of the ROK government ʼs protests and demands. Its inclusion in the publication
was intended as evidence that the United States had acknowledged the ROKʼs ownership ofTakeshima.
Subsequently, on February 4, 1953, there was an incident in which the Japanese Dai Ichi
Daihomaru fishing boat was fired at by the ROK navy in international waters near Jeju Island,
resulting in the death of its chief fisherman. 82 On Februar y 13, the Japanese government
protested by sending a Note Verbale to the ROK legation, and on Februar y 18, it demanded
compensation and measures to prevent a reoccurrence83. On Februar y 23, after the incident
was taken up in the Japanese Diet, the ROK presidential secretariat sent a letter to the Japanese
government stating that the ROK had established “a line of sovereignty for the sake of peace”

77

Supra note 65, p. 251.

78

Supra note 65, p. 252.

79

Supra note 65, pp. 262–264.

80

Supra note 72, Annex 7.

81

Supra note 72.

82

February 23, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Suisan, homu, gaimu iinkai rengo shinsakai kaigiroku” (Minutesof the Joint Review Board for the Fisheries, Judicial Affairs, and Foreign Affairs Committees), no. 1 (inJapanese).

83

Februar y 25, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Gaimu iinkai kaigiroku” (Minutes of the Foreign Af fairs
Committee), No. 20 (in Japanese).

68
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

called the Syngman Rhee Line.84 This was followed on February 24 by an announcement of “thetruth about the incident” by the ROK Government Information Agency,85 and on February 26, an
official at the ROKʼs Home Affairs Ministry released a statement about the incident.86 Tensions
were building between Japan and the ROK, and it was within this context that, on Februar y27, newspapers reported that the ROK Defense Ministry had issued a statement alleging thatthe commander of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), General Otto Paul Weyland, had sent the
Ministry a letter acknowledging Takeshima as ROK territory,87 and this became a major issue
in Japan.88 On March 3, Ellis O. Briggs, the US ambassador to Korea, filed a report with theState Department saying that he hoped any future communications relating to Dokdo would betransmitted through the Embassy, thus ensuring there could be no distortion of the US position
that the islets were not subject to Korean jurisdiction. He added that the Embassy had not
obtained an original copy of the ROK defense ministerʼs statement, but it was clear that the ROK
government (or at least certain elements within it) had distorted the meaning of any such notefrom Weyland to suit its own purposes.89 On March 5 (or 4), the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs asked the US Embassy about whether Weyland had actually acknowledged Takeshima
as ROK territory,90 and the Japanese Diet also held deliberations on the matter.91 On March 12,
Secretary of State Dulles sent notification to the US Embassies in both Japan and the ROK thatthe Department of State and the Department of Defense had conducted thorough investigations,but they were unable to discover Weylandʼs letter. He also indicated that the Department of State
would maintain its position as outlined in Note No. 365 to Busan and Note No. 1360 to Tokyo,
both dated November 26. In future, he said, any formal statements affirming or denying thematter would need to be reviewed before being made public.92 Note No. 365 to Busan states thatthe reiteration of the Rusk letter serves only to repeat the existing position of the United States,
so it distances the United States from the dispute and might dissuade the ROK from introducing
a “gratuitous ” issue into Japan-ROK negotiations that have already fallen into considerable
difficulties.93 In the end, the ROK government never offered the Weyland letter as evidence of84“Sovereignty line demarcated for the sake of peace̶ Letter to Japanese representative from presidential
secretariat on Japanese fisherman incident,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), February 26, 1953 (inKorean).

85“The truth about the Daihomaru incident̶Announcement by the Government Information Agency,”
The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), February 25, 1953 (in Korean).

86“Reinforcement of maritime security unavoidable̶ Home Affairs Ministr y official Jin̶Comments
relating to ROK-Japan dispute over Japanese fisherman incident,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily),
February 27, 1953 (in Korean).

87“Takeshima ryoyu o kakunin̶kankoku kokubobu de seimei” (Ownership of Takeshima confirmed̶
ROK Defense Ministr y issues statement), Mainichi Shimbun (Mainichi newspaper), Februar y 28,
1953 (in Japanese); “Fears of Dokdo fishermen dispelled̶US forces guarantee end of aerial bombing
exercises,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), February 28, 1953 (in Korean), etc.

88

Februar y 28, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Shugiin gaimu iinkai kaigiroku” (Minutes of the House ofRepresentatives Foreign Affairs Committee), no. 21 (in Japanese).

89

Supra note 65, pp. 272–273.

90

Supra note 65, p. 279.

91

March 5, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Sangiin gaimu, homu iinkai rengo shinsakai kaigiroku” (House ofCouncillors̶Minutes of the Joint Review Board for the Foreign and Legal Affairs Committees), no. 1 (inJapanese).

92

Supra note 65, p. 285.

93

Supra note 65, p. 250. It can be inferred from the content that Note no. 187 was modelled on this.

69
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

territorial rights94 and consequently it is assumed that the letter was a falsification by the ROK
Defense Ministry.
On March 19, 1953, it was agreed at the Japan-US Joint Committeeʼs Marine Subcommitteethat the bombing training area at Takeshima would be eliminated, and following approval by theJapan-US Joint Committee, Takeshima was formally removed from the exercise zone.95 But it does
not follow that the United States and its armed forces acknowledged that Takeshima was Korean
territory as a result of the agreement in the Subcommittee, as has been argued by the ROK. It
is evident that the US government was treating Takeshima as Japanese territory. Subsequently,
a letter from R. B. Finn of the US Embassy in Japan to William Leonhart, First Secretary of the
US Embassy in the ROK,96 suggested that when the time was right, the US government might
consider issuing a statement to clarify the fact that, according to the US interpretation of thepeace treaty, sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks remained with Japan. The letter is believed tohave been written in April 1953.97
As outlined above, therefore, the ROK government, having been denied sovereignty overTakeshima under the peace treaty, used the Syngman Rhee line to forcefully incorporate
Takeshima into its own territory just before the ROK-Japan diplomatic normalization talks were
to be held and the peace treaty was to enter into effect. Then it attempted to gloss over its illegal
action by concealing a part of an official US document to twist the truth, and may even havegone so far as to distort the words of a high-ranking US military officer to provide a basis for its
assertion that the United States had recognized the ROKʼs territorial rights over Takeshima.
In September 1953, the ROK government sent a Note Verbale to the Japanese government
stating for the first time the historical basis for Takeshima to be considered as ROK territory.
However, the legitimacy of that alleged historical basis has already been empirically denied for anumber of reasons, including the claim that the present-day Takeshima was identified as Usando,
an island that appeared on old maps of Korea. The Note Verbale was therefore just anotherattempt by the ROK government to fabricate a historical basis for its claims.
94

Supra note 72.

95

According to Naito Seichu, the revocation of Takeshimaʼs designation as a bombing range within lessthan one year was in response to the protest by the ROK government, which knew that the JapanUS Joint Committee had made the designation. In other words, it was based on the official letter sentby the ROK government on February 27, 1953, demanding that the designation be revoked (Naito,
Takeshima=Dokdo mondai nyumon—Nihon gaimusho “Takeshima” hihan (Territorial issue between
Japan and Korea; case of Takeshima/Dokdo: A critique of the “10 issues of Takeshima” published by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), Shinkansha, 2008, p. 53 (in Japanese)). Naito also says thatfor this reason the ROK government sent a letter demanding measures to prevent reoccurrence of theincident to the US ambassador in the ROK on November 10, and after receiving notice on December 24
from the commanding general of the US Army Forces Far East that there would be no more bombing
exercises around Dokdo, the ROK-US Joint Committee decided on March 19, 1953 to revoke its status
as an exercise area. Naito therefore concludes that the course of events indicates that this series ofmeasures was taken based on recognition by the US armed forces in the ROK that Dokdo was ROK
territory (ibid., p. 54). However, I was not able to locate records confirming that a meeting of the ROKUS Joint Committee was held on that date (for details refer to the answer to the third question in theopinions on the Takeshima issue for Dec. 2009 and Jan. 2010 in Shimane Prefecture Web Takeshima
Issue Research (in Japanese), available at
http://www.pref.shimane.lg.jp/soumu/web-takeshima/takeshima08/2007/record200912.html
Note that I was also not able to locate the official letter sent by the ROK government on February 27,
1953, or the notice of December 24, 1952.

96

Supra note 31 (Jung, 2008).

97

NARA (RG 84) Memorandum by R. B. Finn to Leonhart, Japan, Tokyo Embassy, Classified General
Records 1952-63, Box 23, folder 322.1 (in English).

70
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

Conclusion

The ROK government asserts that “Dokdo is a historic land that was invaded in the process ofJapanʼs imperialist invasion of the Korean peninsula, but then recovered.”98 This assertion comesfrom the “official letter of 57 years earlier” written by minister for foreign affairs Byun Youngtae that was cited earlier in this paper, which is thought to be the basis for the Note Verbale
sent by the ROK government on October 28, 1954.99 However, as this study has demonstrated,sensationalist comments, such as this, that incite nationalism run counter to the facts of thematter. Nonetheless, the ROK government has for more than 60 years repeatedly incited antiJapanese sentiment among its citizens and stirred up public opinion for political purposes, or toput diplomatic pressure on Japan.
After World War II, the ROK shocked Japan by petitioning the United States to demand the100“return” of Tsushima, an inherent part of Japanese territory. Although the ROK made anotherformal demand on Tsushima just before the peace treaty was signed, it was denied by theUnited States. The ROK then immediately asserted territorial rights over Takeshima instead,and despite lacking any basis in the form of geographical or historical documents, it adopted theunquestioning belief that Takeshima was its own territory and demanded that Takeshima be
specified in the peace treaty alongside Ulleungdo as one of the islands Japan would renounce.
With inadequate historical documents or knowledge relating to the island, however, the ROK was
unable to secure US support, and instead ended up prompting the decision to make Takeshima
Japanese territor y under the peace treaty. The ROK then used force to occupy Takeshima
illegally̶still without any legal basis̶thereby creating a future source of trouble between South
Korea and Japan. Furthermore, as this research paper has demonstrated, the ROK did not present
documents as they were, but knowingly falsified them prior to inclusion in official publications.
The ROK may have distorted or stretched the meaning of the words of a high-ranking US military
officer in an attempt to create new evidence for Korean ownership of Takeshima. Consequently,
for nearly 60 years, researchers in the ROK were forced to conduct studies and write research
papers based on erroneous information,101 thus depriving South Korean citizens of their right toknow the truth.
98

ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Refutation of the assertion of territorial rights over Dokdo by
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008 (in Japanese).

99

Hyun Dae-song maintains that the minister for foreign affairs, Byun Young-tae, also refuted Japanʼsassertion of territorial rights over Dokdo in comments made in September 1954. His comment indicated“a heroic resolve to fight to the last in defense of Dokdo.” (Hyun, The Birth of Territorial Nationalism:
The Politics of the Dokdo/Takeshima Issue), 2006, p. 278 (in English)).

100“Tsushima henkan wa gensoku ni kaesu” (The return of Tsushima goes against fundamental principles),Asahi Shimbun (Asahi newspaper), August 28, 1948 (in Japanese). In recent years there have beenreports of the discovery of historical documents indicating that the official responsible for the matterat the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time was considering measures to counter the ROKʼs
demand, in addition to reports of testimony by archaeologists (“Tsushima wa kankokur yo ni taio:
shiryo hakken” (Dealing with the assertion that Tsushima is ROK territory: Documents discovered),
NHK Nyusu (NHK News), July 3, 2008; “Kuni o tadorite̶kokkyo to ryodo no kokogaku, daini-bu (2)̶Tsukushiboko nihon wo urazuke” (Tracing the nation̶the archaeology of borders and territories, Part2 (2)̶Tsukushiboko (ancient bronze pikes) provide evidence for Japanese territory), Sankei Shimbun(Sankei newspaper), May 5, 2011.

101

Kim Myung-ki, “A critique of Paragraph 3 of the items relating to the peace treaty with Japan in the “10issues of Takeshima” published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,” Dok-do-yeon-gu (Dokdo
Research), 2009 fall issue (No. 7), 2009, pp. 62–70 (in Korean). In this article, Kim states that following
the response from the US Department of State, the official intent of the United States was to view Dokdo
as ROK territory, “as shown below (in the Annex).” He then quotes Annex 6 of Dok-do-mun-je-gae-ron (theIntroduction to the Dokdo Issue), which omitted the section relating to the Rusk letter.

71
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

The Invention of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshima by the Korean Government

However, fewer and fewer people are asserting that the United States discontinued useof Takeshima as a bombing exercise site and recognized the ROKʼs ownership of the island
in response to the ROKʼs protest. In recent years, even some South Korean researchers arerecognizing Usando in the old maps as Chikusho (called “Jukdo” in the ROK),102 and we arealso seeing researchers who, after analyzing official US documents and the ROKʼs historical
documents from when the country was ruled by the US military after World War II, acknowledge
that the ROK had only a tenuous awareness of Takeshima.
There have been other developments. In September 2011, the ROKʼs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade invited a judge who had written a novel imagining that the Takeshima issue had beenreferred to the International Court of Justice to join the ministry,103 and requested budget funds
for researching litigation and preparing English-language documents.104 After the discover yin 2010 of the Uldo-gun rule book, there was a separate announcement about the unearthingof some questions and answer sheets for the civil ser vice exam known as gwageo that wasadministered during the Joseon Dynasty. The test materials, which were discovered as thisresearch paper was being written, asked candidates about measures to deal with the Ulleungdo
Dispute that occurred during the reign of King Sukjong.105 If one reads the texts released, neither
the questions nor the answers include any information about Takeshima, and only Ulleungdo ismentioned in connection with the borders of the Kingdom of Joseon and the subsequent Empireof Korea, as well as in territorial disputes with Japan. If anything, the texts that were made public
seem to show that Koreaʼs central government, regional officials, and the intellectuals of the day
did not recognize the countryʼs boundaries to extend as far as Takeshima. We can only hope thatthe results of further document collection and empirical research on the part of the ROK will bemade available.
Japanʼs yearly budget for Takeshima is less than 50 million yen, including the budgets for both
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Shimane Prefecture. The ROK, on the other hand, expends
an enormous budget equivalent to more than 5 billion yen annually. Even greater sums willsoon be required. It has been reported that there are plans to refurbish accommodations on theislets and to construct sightseeing facilities that will enable visitors to observe a local maritime
research station and get views of the sea. Plans are also reportedly being drawn up for facilities
such as a quay where 5,000-ton class vessels can berth. Meanwhile, the Japanese government
constantly files protests, and while these types of actions by the ROK do not result in Takeshima
becoming ROK territory, there is a concern that the ROK may make headway in establishing defacto occupation of the island. Japan therefore needs to respond properly. As explained previously,
102

Oh Sang-hak, (The change in perception of Ulleungdo and Dokdo represented in maps of the Joseon
Dynasty), Mun-hwa-yeok-sa-ji-ri (Journal of cultural and historical geography), Part 18, No. 1, 2006, p.
92; Kim Hwa-kyung, (Research on perception of Dokdo as it appeared in old Korean maps), Dok- doyeong-yu-gwon-hwak-lib-eul-wi-han-yeon-gu (Research to establish territorial rights over Dokdo), edited
by Yeungnam University Dokdo Research Institute, 2010, p. 25 (both in Korean), etc.

103

“Dokdo horitsu shimonkan ni hanji ninmei̶Gemba gaisho no hatsugen, ikan̶kankoku”, (Judgeappointed as Dokdo legal advisor y attorney; ROK expresses regrets over Japan foreign minister
Gembaʼs statement) (in Japanese), Jiji Tsushin (Jiji Press; online version), September 6, 2011, available
at http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201109/2011090600633 (as of February 15, 2012).

104“Kankoku seifu, rainen no dokdo kanren gaiko yosan ni go-oku won o tonyu” (ROK government
allocates 500 million won in next yearʼs Dokdo-related diplomatic budget), Joong-ang ilbo (Korea
Joongang daily), Japanese-language online version, October 17, 2011 (in Japanese), available athttp://japanese.joins.com/article/671/144671.html (as of February 15, 2012).

105

Daegu District Bar Association website, “Dokdo Committee discovers historical documents relating to
Dokdo” (in Korean), available athttp://www.daegubar.or.kr/index.php?status=menu5&code=01&no=420 (as of February 16, 2012).

72
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018

Yoshiko Yamasaki

what the ROK is doing is illegally occupying Takeshima without any evidence that is backed upby historical documents. However, as the number of researchers and government officials in the
ROK who use historical documents as a basis for discussions is increasing, it is to be hoped that
more people will see through their governmentʼs tricks and express their concerns about taxes
being squandered.
When Shimane Prefecture established local regulations for Takeshima Day in 2005, many
people voiced their concerns about the impact of the measure on Japan-ROK relations, and there
was a temporary deterioration in how the citizens of the ROK viewed Japan. As the empiricalresearch of Shimane Prefectureʼs Takeshima Issue Research Group proceeded, the loud andemotional reaction in South Korea tapered off, and there have been some attempts at conducting
empirical research on the subject in the ROK. Meanwhile, there also seems to be a shift in South
Korea toward lobbying the Japanese political world106 and academic circles.107 The people ofJapan need to be aware that territory that is inherently Japanese, Takeshima, has been occupied,and that Japanʼs sovereignty continues to be violated. The Japanese government needs to makeeven greater efforts to resolve the issue peacefully by investing funds in empirical research andactivities to inform the public.

106“Possibility of Dokdo being misused politically because Japanʼs Democratic Party administration isweak̶Interview with Northeast Asian History Foundation,” Jugan Chosun (Weekly chosun), No. 2136,
2010, pp. 22–23 (in Korean).

107

Kyoto Sangyo University Institute for World Affairs, ROK and Northeast Asia history foundation, Joint
academic seminar, “Kagami no naka no jiko ninshiki̶nihon to kankoku no rekishi, bunka, mirai” (Selfperception in the mirror̶The histories, cultures, and futures of Japan and the ROK), (October 9–10,
2010) (in Japanese).

73
Japan Review Vol.2 No.3 Winter 2018