Conference Papers

The Dialogue with the WorldThe International Order in Europe and Asia-Pacificafter the Ukraine Crisis and Japan's Course of Action

November, 25, 2016
Tokyo, Japan

Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

Co-Sponsored by
The Institute of World Policy (IWP)The Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center (BSC)The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)Table of Contents
1. Program............................................................................................................... 1
2．Biographies of the Panelists ................................................................................ 3
3．Presentation Papers............................................................................................. 6
Session I: The Ukraine Crisis from the European Perspective
Leonid LITRA, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Policy (Ukraine) .................................... 6
SUEZAWA Megumi, Associate Professor, Heisei International University ....................................... 7
Daria KHASPEKOVA, Research Fellow, Russian International Affairs Council (Russia) ................ 8
Joerg FORBRIG, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund (Germany) ......................... 9

Session II: What the Ukraine Crisis Means to the Asia-PacificRobert NURICK, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security,
Atlantic Council (U.S.) ..................................................................................................................... 11
HAMAMOTO Ryoichi, Professor, Akita International University ................................................... 14
PAN Zhongqi, Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs,
Fudan University (China) ................................................................................................................ 15
SAITO Motohide, Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of Policy and Cultural Studies,
Chuo University ............................................................................................................................... 17

4．Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations ............................... 19(1) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) .................................................................................................. 19(2) The Institute of World Policy (IWP) ................................................................................................ 20(3) The Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center (BSC) ..................................................................... 21(4) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) ......................................................................... 22

1. Program
世界との対話The Dialogue with the World---------------------------------------------------------------------------------「ウクライナ危機後の欧州・アジア太平洋国際秩序と日本」

The International Order in Europe and Asia-Pacificafter the Ukraine Crisis and Japan's Course of Action
主催／Sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム／The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
2016 年 11 月 25 日／November 25, 2016
アイビーホール「サフラン」／"Saffron," Ivy Hall
共催／Co-sponsored by
ウクライナ世界政策研究所／The Institute of World Policy (IWP)
米国大西洋協議会／The Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center (BSC)
公益財団法人日本国際フォーラム／The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

開会挨拶 ／ Opening Remarks

13:00-13:10
開会挨拶（5 分間）

Opening Remark (5 min.)伊藤憲一

グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人／日本国際フォーラム理事長

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, GFJ / President, JFIR

セッションⅠ／ Session I

13:10-14:45

欧州からみたウクライナ危機“The Ukraine Crisis from the European Perspective”

議長

六鹿

報告 A （8 分間）

レオニード・リトラ 世界政策研究所上級研究員（ウクライナ）

報告 B （8 分間）

末澤

報告 C （8 分間）

ダリヤ・ハスペコヴァ ロシア外交問題評議会研究員（ロシア）

報告 D （8 分間）

イエルク・フォルブリック ジャーマン・マーシャル基金シニア・トランスアトランティ
ック・フェロー（ドイツ）

Chairperson
Lead Discussant A (8min.)Lead Discussant B (8min.)Lead Discussant C (8min.)Lead Discussant D (8min.)

茂夫

グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人／静岡県立大学教授

MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Academic Governor, GFJ / Professor, University of Shizuoka
Leonid LITRA, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Policy (Ukraine)
恵美

平成国際大学准教授

SUEZAWA Megumi, Associate Professor, Heisei International University
Daria KHASPEKOVA, Research Fellow, Russian International Affairs Council (Russia)

Joerg FORBRIG, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund (Germany)

自由討議 （60 分間）

出席者全員

14:45-14:55

休憩／BreakFree Discussions (60 min.)All Participants

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セッションⅡ／ Session Ⅱ
14:55-16:30

ウクライナ危機がアジア太平洋地域へ及ぼした影響“What the Ukraine Crisis Means to the Asia-Pacific”

議長

伊藤

報告 A （8 分間）

ロバート・ニューリック 大西洋協議会ブレント・スコウクロフト国際安全保障センター上級研究員（米国）

報告 B （8 分間）

濱本良一

国際教養大学教授

潘忠岐

復旦大学国際関係・公共行政学院教授（中国）斎藤

元秀

中央大学政策文化総合研究所客員研究員

Chairperson

Lead Discussant A (8min.)Lead Discussant B (8min.)
報告 C （8 分間）

Lead Discussant C (8min.)
報告 D （8 分間）

剛

グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人／明治大学教授

ITO Go, Academic Governor, GFJ / Professor, Meiji University

Robert NURICK, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security,
Atlantic Council (U.S.)
HAMAMOTO Ryoichi, Professor, Akita International University
PAN Zhongqi, Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs,
Fudan University (China)

Lead Discussant D (8min.)

SAITO Motohide, Visiting Research Fellow, The Institute of Policy and Cultural Studies, Chuo
University

自由討議 （60 分間）

出席者全員

Free Discussions (60 min.)All Participants

総括セッション／ Wrap-up Session
16:30-16:50
総括（20 分間）

Wrap-up (20 min.)

欧州とアジア太平洋の安全保障リンケージおよび日本外交への示唆"Europe-Asia Pacific Security Linkage and Japan's Course of Action"
六鹿茂夫

グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人／静岡県立大学教授

MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Academic Governor, GFJ / Professor, University of Shizuoka[NOTE］日本語・英語同時通訳付き／ English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

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2. Biographies of the Panelists【Overseas Side】
Leonid LITRA

Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Policy (Ukraine)

Mr. LITRA served as Deputy Director at the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”

in Chisinau (Moldova) where he is now an Associate Fellow. In 2011, he was part of the expert teamcarrying out the Strategic Conflict Assessment of the Transnistrian conflict for the European Commission.
He has co-authored many publications on democratization of the post-Soviet area, European integration andfrozen conflicts. He is also part of the core team for preparing the “European Integration Index for Eastern
Partnership Countries” (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016), the Visa Liberalization Index of the Eastern
Partnership Countries and a regular contributor to the Nations in Transit Report of the Freedom House andcontributor to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. He was a Carnegie Research Fellow at Yale
University (United States) and holds a master degree from the European Institute of High International
Studies in Nice (France) in International Relations and European Studies.

Daria KHASPEKOVA

Research Fellow, Russian International Affairs Council (Russia)

Received B.A. in political science and M.A. in journalism from the Moscow State University of International
Relations in 2012. Having served RIAC since then, she now coordinates RIAC’s projects on Russia-CEE
countries, engages herself to various educational programs at RIAC, and administers the website of the
RIAC as Chief Editor. Her major areas of study include Russia’s foreign policy and relations with Ukraine,
Belarus, and Central / Eastern Europe. In particular, she is currently conducting a research on national
identity in Ukraine and its influence on Russia-Ukraine relations.

Joerg FORBRIG

Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Director, Fund for Belarus
Democracy, German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)

Dr. Joerg FORBRIG focuses his analytical and policy work on Europe's East broadly, including the newmember countries of the European Union, the EU's Eastern neighborhood and Russia. He also leads GMF
efforts to assist civil society in Belarus. Prior to joining GMF in 2002, FORBRIG worked as a Robert Bosch
Foundation fellow at the Center for International Relations in Warsaw, Poland. He has been publishedwidely on democracy, civil society, and Central and Eastern European affairs, including the books
Reclaiming Democracy (2007), Prospects for Democracy in Belarus (2006), and Revisiting Youth Political
Participation (2005). He is also a regular contributor to major international media, including recent op-eds
in Politico, CNN, EU Observer, and elsewhere. FORBRIG has studied political science, sociology, andEastern European affairs at universities in Germany, Poland, and Hungary. He holds a Ph.D. in social andpolitical sciences from the European University Institute in Florence and a master’s in political science fromCentral European University in Budapest.

Robert NURICK

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security, Atlantic Council (U.S.)

Prior to his appointment at the Council, Mr. NURICK was a senior fellow in the Washington, D.C. office of
the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He
worked as director of the Carnegie Moscow Center (2001-2003), senior political scientist (1985-2001),
associate corporate research manager for international policy (1994-1995), and manager of foundation
programs (1995-1999) at RAND in California and Washington, D.C., and also worked as associate director3

of the RAND / UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior (1985-1988) and associate
director of the National Security Strategies Program in RAND's Project Air Force (1991-1992). Before
joining RAND, he was the assistant director and director of studies at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) in London (1981-1985), special assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs (1977-1978), and principal action officer for theater
nuclear forces and SALT in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1978-1981). His principal researchinterests are focused on the interrelationships between domestic politics and security policies in Russia,
Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Central Asia; on NATO reform and its impact on evolving security
arrangements in Europe.

PAN Zhongqi

Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs,
Fudan University (China)

Received a Ph.D. in IR from the Fudan University in 1999. His focus of research includes IR theory, China
and international system, China’s foreign policy and strategy, China-US and China-EU relations, etc. He is
the author of A Theoretical Interpretation of International Politics (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing
House, 2015), From Following the Shi to Shaping the Shi: China’s International Orientation and Strategy(Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2012), World Order: Structure, Mechanisms, and Models (Shanghai:
Shanghai Publishing House, 2004). He was seconded by China’s Foreign Ministry as a First Secretary at
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Communities in 2008-2009. He was a research
fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (2000-2005), a Fulbright Visiting Research Scholar
to University of California, San Diego (2012-13), and visiting scholar to Lund University (2006), theFairbank Center at Harvard University (2004), the Henry Stimson Center (2001), and the University ofTokyo (1999-2000). He concurrently serves as Chair of the Department of Diplomacy at the School ofInternational Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University.

ITO Kenichi【Japanese Side】
Chairman & President, GFJ / President, JFIR

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at GSAS of
Harvard University. Served in Japanese Embassies in Moscow, Manila and Washington and also as
Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then he served as Tokyo Representative of CSIS
(1980-1987) and professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). He has been
President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) since it was founded in 1987 and now
concurrently serves as Chairman of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). He is Professor Emeritus
and holds Honorary Doctorate in International Relations.

MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo

Academic Governor, GFJ / Professor, University of Shizuoka

Graduated from Sophia University (Tokyo) in 1976. Received M.A. in International Relations from Sophia
University in 1978 and Ph.D. in Law from University of Bucharest in 1985. Served as Visiting Fellow(Robert Schuman Fellow) at the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political
Science(2000.7~2001.3), and Director of the Wider Europe Research Center(2008~present) at University of
Shizuoka. Studies international politics, focusing on the Wider Europe.

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SUEZAWA Megumi

Associate Professor, Heisei International University

Received her M.A. from the Graduate School of Political Science, Tokai University, in 1990. Studied at
Graduate School of International law, Moscow State University, from 1988 to 1989 and from 1990 to 1991.
Graduated from the doctorate program of the Graduate School of Political Science, Tokai University, in
1993. Served as Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) from 1995-2002.
Concurrently serves as Lecturer at Sophia University since 2004. Published such articles as The CIS:
Restructuring of Former Soviet Space, (TABATA Shinichiro and SUEZAWA Megumi, eds., Kokusai Shoin,2004), “Russia and Europe: Policy toward the EU / NATO Enlargement,” International Politics in Europe,(Iwanami Shoten, 2003).

ITO GoAcademic Governor, GFJ / Professor, Meiji University

Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies,
University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed thecurrent position in 2006. Also served as Visiting Professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica (Taiwan),
Bristol University(Britain), Australian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct
Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as AdjunctResearcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone
Yasuhiro Award in 2006. Concurrently serves as Superior Research Fellow, JFIR.

HAMAMOTO Ryoichi

Professor, Akita International University

Graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Served the Yomiuri Shimbun as a correspondent toJakarta (1985-1987), Shanghai (1987-1988), and Beijing (1988-1990), Chief of Hong Kong Bureau(1993-1997), Chief of General Bureau of China (2001-2004), Lecturer at the Graduate School of Journalism,
University of California, Berkeley (2007), Senior Research Fellow, the Yomiuri Research Institute(2004-2008), Editorial Writer of the Yomiuri Shimbun (2008-2011). Since 2012, AIU Professor.

SAITO Motohide

Visiting Research Fellow, The Institute of Policy and Cultural
Studies, Chuo University

Graduated from the doctoral program of Graduate School of Law, Keio University, in 1977. Studied as a
Fulbright student at Columbia University from 1977 and received Ph.D. in international relations in 1986.
Served as Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Kyorin University (1986-1994), and asProfessor since 2004. Meanwhile, also served as Visiting Professor at Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido
University, and as Lecturer at a Graduate School of Keio University. Published such articles as Russia’s
Foreign Policy (Keiso Shobo, 2004) and Russia’s Policy toward Japan (provisionally titled) (Keio
University Press, forthcoming in 2017).

(In order of appearance)

53. Presentation Papers
Session I: The Ukraine Crisis from the European Perspective
Leonid LITRA
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Policy (Ukraine)
From the very beginning I would like to underline that the word “crisis” does not describe correctly
what happens in Ukraine. Indeed, there was a domestic political crisis back in 2013 that lasted until early 2014.
In parallel, there was a second crisis related to economic situation. In 2013 there was no economic growth (0%),
while in 2014 the contraction was 6.6%, in 2015 was 9.9% and in 2016 there is an expectation of a modest
economic growth (about 1.6%). Therefore, when speaking about illegal annexation of Crimea and the war in the
East of Ukraine, one should refer to it as the Russian aggression.
Now please allow me to go point by point with remarks on the issues on which I was asked to speak:

A: Significance of the Ukraine “Crisis” as seen from the Ukrainian as well as
global perspectives:
The collapse of the system of international law and norms.
The Russian aggression on Ukraine was/is exploring the weakness of the Ukrainian state institutions
and high level of corruption.
It also symbolizes the crisis of the Russian leadership – the Russia soft power failed and therefore
Kremlin resorted to the use of hard power.
Russian leadership was too obsessed with the Maidan in Ukraine because it is afraid of a successful
outcome of the Revolution of Dignity.

B: Ukraine's policy to settle the “Crisis”
Kyiv’s policy is to reintegrate illegally occupied territories back into the legal system of Ukraine, but not
at any price.
Ukraine approach is to have a clear sequencing is Minsk implementation that would lead to asustainable conflict settlement – “security first” approach, then implementation of the political agenda.
The process of devolution of power should not impact of the functionality of Ukraine as a state.

C: What is expected of the international community to deal with the “Crisis” from the
Ukrainian perspective
It is important to have a principled joint position over the illegalities that were/are taking place from theside of Russia – i.e. not accept unilateral change of rules.
6

Provide support to Ukraine in order to resist the military, economic, diplomatic and other types ofpressure.
Continuation of the policy of sanctions in order to deter Russia from further escalation.

D: Geopolitical linkage, if any, between the “Crisis” and ongoing issues in theSouth China Sea
There is no a direct link between Russian aggression in Ukraine and the “ongoing issues” in the South
China Sea.
The indirect linkage is that the weak reaction of US to the Russian aggression in Ukraine (and otherparts of the world) was encouraging revision of activation of international disputes.
Ukraine is using the example and the experience of Arbitration on South China Sea.

SUEZAWA Megumi
Associate Professor, Heisei International University
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has faced a number of difficulties, among which
denuclearization, economic stagnation, and dispute over Crimea were especially critical issues in 1990s.
Following such significant turmoil, the democratic movement reached its peak in the early 2000s.
The Crimean problem seemed to be settled when Simferopol accepted the new constitution that
described the peninsula as an integral part of Ukraine. However, this turned out not to actually be the case.
Since the Maidan Revolution began to protest the cancellation of the signing of the EU Association
Agreement, the Ukraine Crisis is often analyzed in the context of foreign relations. However, my main focus hereis the internal factors behind the crisis, such as: Why did a peaceful demonstration develop into bloodshedturmoil? What enabled Crimea and Russia to achieve their goal in 2014, while it was not possible in the 1990s?
And, what has been changed and what has not been changed during this time period?
The Minsk Agreement is in deadlock because of domestic resistance, not by pressure from Russia.
President Poroshenko’s calls to fight for the fatherland sounds hollow to younger citizens, and the government’s
handling of internal affairs is not fully approved by voters. If Poroshenko will fail to accomplish the Minsk
Agreement and domestic reform, he will lose trust from all sides.
Foreign commitment has limitations regarding drastic change of a country’s society and the mindset ofits people. Regardless of whom the US president may be, as in the words of Mikheil Saakashvili, “The best
Ukraine can do now is to reform and become self-reliant." With this in mind, it will be clear for both Japan andEurope how to become an equal partner.

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Daria KHASPEKOVA
Research Fellow, Russian International Affairs Council (Russia)
1. The Ukrainian crisis has drastically undermined trust between Russia and Western countries. Once again inhistory Europe is divided into the West and Russia giving many experts reason to speak about the new cold
war. Many blame Russia for its violating the basis of euro-atlantic security.
2. Yet, the crisis we are witnessing today wasn’t provoked by “Putin’s aggressive policy on Ukraine”, orRussia’s inconsiderate imperial ambitions, however dubious Russia’s role might seem.
3. The roots of the conflict lie in flaws remaining after the collapse of bipolar world. Firstly, we are witnessing
the crisis of national identity on post-soviet space. The turmoil in Ukraine didn’t start with Russia’sinterference - though Moscow’s role is ambiguous - it started long before the Crimea or DNR.
4. Before the Ukrainian crisis arose both Russia and Western countries spoke about ‘being partners’, while inreality we never overcame the win-lose logic of the cold war. The four common spaces were never created.
The visa-free regime was not introduced. The reasons are numerous – Russia lacked will to join the West,but there wasn’t enough effort from our Western partners as well. Because we didn’t have – and still don’t
have – trust in each other.
5. Russia, being a European state supporting European values hasn’t become one of European countries. It
still regards euro-atlantic security policy as a threat to its national interests and even its existence. Now theflaws of the world order are becoming increasingly obvious. The split between Russia and the West is
becoming wider. It is hard to speak of ‘reconciliation’ with NATO launching new military bases in Eastern
Europe. The relations are unlikely to change in the near future.
6. While the decision to ‘build a wall’ – like some of European leaders have already suggested – may seem
psychologically comfortable and logical in the situation, it is irrational and will inevitably lead to further
risks.
7. Yet, it would be wishful thinking to suggest and expect that Russia and the West will work on building
euro-atlantic security side by side. That has already proved inefficient in Ukraine – the Minsk agreements
or other peace initiatives do not work.
8. Today both Russia and the West see the resolution of the crisis in the collapse of its foe. Though thesituation is changing, it doesn’t change fast enough. The West hopes for the fall of Putin’s regime and forliberal forces coming to power in Russia. Russia expects Ukrainian to change thus settling the conflict.
Moreover, Russia is aware of all the problems that the EU faces.
9. This is the win-lose logic in action. But if we go on like that everyone will lose. One cannot thrive
surrounded by fragile entities.
810. The relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West are never going to be the same. However, it doesn’tmean we have to cut each other off. We can and we have to cut losses. We have to keep business andcivilian contacts. Keep doing business. Keep exchanging students. Keep solving common problems.
One of the problems we could solve together is the migration issue. Europe cannot build a wall from
immigrants, nor can Russia. This is a common European threat that both Russia and the West could address
together.

Joerg FORBRIG
Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund (Germany)
Russia and the West: from alleged partnership to systemic antagonism
1. The Ukraine crisis is effectively a Russia crisis. It is a symptom of a principal shift on the part of Russia– both in the way it functions internally and how it behaves externally.
2. This shift has been in the making for a decade but the West, and Europe in particular, has been slow tograsp how Russia was changing, even if:
a. It was first made explicit by President Putin at the Munich Security Conference in 2007
b. It translated into military action in Georgia in 2008
c. It has become a comprehensive doctrine since 2012
3. In Russia, the central mechanics of power has been transformed over the last years: away from a
redistribution-based authoritarianism to a mobilization-based autocracy.
a. Social contract in the 2000s was political acquiescence in exchange for prosperityb. Based on high revenues from oil and gas exportsc. Unsustainable with the end of the resource super cycle
4. The central vehicle for mobilization is a declared historical mission to restore Russia’s place and role in
the world. This primarily means to directly challenge the post-Cold War status quo.
a. Consciously taps post-Soviet, or better post-imperial sentiments and grievancesb. Reflects a classical shift to symbolic politics and an externalization of responsibility
5. Confrontation with the West, directly and by proxy, has become systemic. It is the central driver for
Russian policy; it is the sole generator of legitimacy for the powers-that-be in Russia.
6. This means that a grand bargain, a broad accommodation between Russia and the West is impossible.
a. Russia defines itself in instrumental contradistinction from the Westb. Bargain would be a partial surrender, for Russia as much as the West9

c. Individual areas of conflict can only be frozen but not resolved substantially
7. This broad confrontation plays out on several levels:
a. As a claim for an exclusive sphere of influence (e.g. the wars in Ukraine, Georgia)
b. In form of Russia injecting itself into conflicts globally (e.g. Syria)
c. Through blockade of international organizations (e.g. UN, OSCE)
d. In testing and undermining Western institutions, especially NATO and the EUe. By way of directly interfering with the domestic politics of any Western democracy
8. On all these levels, Russia constantly seeks confrontation. Conflicts can be in succession or
simultaneous but overall, external conflict has to be permanent to sustain mobilization in Russia itself.
a. Well illustrated by the Crimea – Eastern Ukraine – Syria sequenceb. Permanent question for the West: which is the next theatre of conflict Russia will pick?
9. Internally, Russia is systematically transformed into a war-time society. It:
a. streamlines – effectively personalizes – the power structure and personnel
b. militarizes society – propaganda, education, social control
c. modernizes the army and security apparatus
d. centralizes state control over the economy
e. shifts budget priorities from social welfare to state security and defense
10. Although this comparison is much debated, the situation is akin to the Cold War:a. Russia portrays itself as the vanguard of a new world orderb. It seeks to build anti-Western alliancesc. It employs the same variety of destructive means (incl. hybrid warfare)d. It sees a chance of winning this contest (as in the early stages of the Cold War)11. This comparison also indicates the likely duration of this new antagonism between Russia and the West.
It is probably not a matter of years but of decades.

10Session II: What the Ukraine Crisis Means to the Asia-PacificRobert NURICK
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International
Security, Atlantic Council (U.S.)
The Implications of the Ukraine Crisis: An American Perspective
I have been asked to address four general issues: the significance of the Ukraine crisis, as seen in
Washington; U.S. policy to cope with this crisis; what the U.S. expects from the international community; andgeopolitical linkages to other issues, especially in East Asia. The answers to the first two sets of questions are by
now quite clear. In light of the recent U.S. presidential election, however, the third and especially the fourth are
now somewhat harder to judge. The uncertainty generated by the comments to date of Mr. Trump and his teamis the source of considerable concern both among the policy community in Washington and abroad.
Russian actions in and around Ukraine have had a major impact on the Washington policy community,
both in and outside government: European defense, NATO, and Russia are all back at the center of the U.S.
policy agenda. The crisis and its aftermath are widely seen as not only as a serious geopolitical challenge, but
as reflecting a basis clash of values—one which can be managed but is unlikely to disappear as long as Mr.
Putin is in power. There are several key dimensions:
NATO has returned from an earlier focus on out-of-area activities to the credibility of the alliance’s
Article V: the requirements of European deterrence and defense are again central to NATO militaryplanning.
Particular attention is being paid to the alliance’s potentially most vulnerable members—the Baltic
states.
In light of provocative Russia rhetoric and potentially dangerous behavior, there is also concern about
and attention to the possibility of a crisis along Russia’s borders with its Nordic and Baltic neighbors.
The crisis has also had a significant impact upon the security perspectives of Finland and Sweden:
though neither looks likely to apply for NATO membership soon, both are deepening defense
cooperation with each other, bilaterally with the US, and collectively with NATO.
Putin’s Russia is now seen as essentially a revisionist power with respect to the existing security
arrangements in Europe, seeking to weaken the EU and NATO, to produce weak and deferential
governments in its neighborhood, and to gain at least tacit Western acceptance of a sphere of “special
interests” in the region.

11

The U.S. policy response to date has had several basic components: bolstering NATO, punishingRussia, and supporting Ukraine:
Bolstering NATO has been the immediate priority. The U.S. has significantly increased both politicalattention and budgetary allocations (including a tripling of the funding for the “European Reassurance
Initiative”), and has worked with allies to produce relevant decisions at the 2014 (Wales) and 2016
(Warsaw) NATO summits, with particular emphasis on “presence” in NATO’s east. These include:o Deployment of multinational battalions in each of the three Baltic states, and Poland, to be inplace by May 1917. The U.S. will provide the “framework force” for the battalion in Poland.
o Deployment of elements from a U.S. aviation brigade and an air combat brigade to Europe thiswinter, on a rotational basis.
o A major increase in the size of the NATO Response Force (to about 40,000), and the creation of
a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (“Spearhead Force”).
o Prepositioning of equipment and war-fighting stocks for the VJTF and for European andAmerican follow-on forces.
o Increased emphasis on and planning for realistic intra-alliance, multinational exercises.
The principal element of policies intended to impose costs on Russia has been economic sanctions,
imposed in coordination with the EU. These have been directed at limiting certain Western financial
flows to Russia (e.g., defense and energy technologies), as well as at some Russian officials responsiblefor Ukraine policy. The sanctions have not so far had evident impact on Russia behavior, but it is hopedthat the financial costs will over time impose increasingly difficult policy choices for the Kremlin, andthat in the meantime they send an important message of transatlantic solidarity. Preserving the
sanctions has thus been a major priority for the Obama administration.
o The US, with NATO, has also cut off some contacts with Russian officials, suspending meetingsof the NATO-Russia Council and some bilateral US-Russia military-to-military contacts. In lightof the deteriorating security environment with Russia, however, there is increasing sentimentsthat these contacts, carefully organized, should be renewed.
o The Obama administration has also sought to emphasize that if would be happy to resumeconstructive relations, if the Kremlin comes to its senses and changes its behavior in and aroundUkraine.
The administration has thus emphasized that it seeks a sustainable outcome in Ukraine—one consistent
with international law and acceptable to Ukraine itself. It has thus said that it will not accept thelegitimacy of Russia’s incorporation of Crimea, and has called for Russia to withdraw its forces in andsupport for the anti-Ukraine units in the Donbas. Its immediate focus has been on the implementation of
Minsk II.
o Rhetoric aside, the administration has clearly looked to major European powers to take the lead.
Thus the “Normandy format,” meant to oversee the implementation of Minsk, does not include
the U.S. There have been increasing calls in Washington, including among some in Congress,
for more active and direct American engagement.
o Along with several European allies, the U.S. has provided training and related assistance insupport of Ukraine’s defense sector. The administration has however refused to provide
12so-called “lethal aid,” fearing escalation of the conflict there. This too has become acontroversial issue among parts of the policy community in Washington.
The U.S. administration has been quite clear about what it hopes for from the international community:
In NATO, it has pressed for increased levels of defense spending, to reach at least the target of 2% ofGDP, both to enhance alliance military capabilities and, not least, to convey a political message to
Russia and the U.S. Congress that the alliance and its individual members are serious. Key however isactive and demonstrable allied contributions to the enhancement of NATO’s deterrence and defense
posture, and in particular to the implementation of the initiatives agreed at the Wales and Warsaw
summits.
o As a corollary, the U.S. expects the allies to fulfill their Article III obligations, entailing national
responsibilities for self-defense. This applies in particular to the Baltic states. As small countries,
they cannot be expected to prevent or defeat a Russian military incursion. But homeland defense
initiatives can potentially delay, complicate and raise the costs of such an incursion. Relevant
initiatives are in fact now underway in all three states.
Outside of NATO, the key political priority for the administration in Europe has been to preservetrans-Atlantic unity on sanctions, understanding that these produce higher costs for some European
countries than for the U.S. itself. The administration also has welcomed and supports enhanced defense
cooperation with Sweden and Finland.
Internationally, the administration has wanted clear political support for a tough line on Russia(including, for example, at the UN), as well as engagement on sanctions.
o There is recognition that some key allies have complicated interests at stake in their relations
with Russia, and thus will seek Russian cooperation in support of those interests. This includes,for example, both Japan’s hope to arrive at a negotiated solution to the Northern Territories
issue (thus making a peace treaty possible at long last), and the interests of both Japan andSouth Korea in possible Russian help to induce Chinese pressure on North Korea. The
administration clearly hopes, however, that pursuit of these interests will not come at theexpense of issues of particular concern, especially the preservation of unity on sanctions.
Most analysts believe that the incoming Trump administration will continue to expect—and indeed mayplace even greater emphasis on—enhanced allied contributions to deterrence and defense in Europe.
Less clear, however, is the position it will take, and in particular the priority it will assign, to othermatters.
o Some of Mr. Trump’s comments have suggested that he may be ready to abandon the sanctions
policy, if an acceptable deal can be struck with the Kremlin. Until such a deal is struck he can be
expected to desire continued allied support, if only as negotiating leverage, but what kind of
arrangement he may pursue with Russia, and on what terms, is uncertain.
Although much of the Asian security agenda has its own history and will continue to be driven by
pre-existing national perspectives and interests, there do seem to be some important linkages between the
Ukraine crisis and some key issues for American policy and engagement in East Asia. How these linkages willaffect policy choices would raise complex questions for a Clinton administration, and will do so for Mr. Trump
13and his colleagues.
At the most general level, and arguably of most fundamental importance, has to do with the U.S.
commitment to a rules-based international order. In the American view, Putin has violated this order inEurope; for many, China threatens it in Asia. Some of Mr. Trump’s comments suggest that he will take a
tough line with China, at least on economic and trade issues; how he will approach security and defensein the region is again uncertaino For example, how will he balance a tough approach on trade with the long-standing hope that
China can be induced to exert more leverage on North Korea? This is an issue that many in DC,
including potential members of the Trump administration, view as the likely critical problem on
the U.S. regional agenda. Will he seek Russian support in this regard?
o Some of Mr. Trump’s campaign comments were very critical of Chinese military activities in theregion, including in particular their territorial claims and related construction activities in the
East and South China seas. Since the election he has made pledges to the leaders of Japan,
South Korea and Australia that he will make good on existing U.S. commitments to their defense.
Few observers in Washington doubt that he means it, and that the U.S is highly unlikely to pullback from Asia in general. But what this will entail in practice has become the subject of somedebate, especially since he has also implied a strong preference for a less interventionist
American foreign policy, and has stressed the need for regional powers—in Europe as well as
Asia—to shoulder a greater burden for security in their neighborhoods.

HAMAMOTO Ryoichi
Professor, Akita International University
From the perspective of China and Taiwan
China was reluctant to declare its official stance on Crimea, preferring to keep silent. This is in part
because China opposes any form of referendum, especially in a time when it is facing a possibility of areferendum in Taiwan. China therefore, could not support the referendum by Crimea in 2014, but at the same
could not oppose to Russia’s decision either. However, China was also eager to take sides with the West in
opposing Russia’s annexation of Crimea as one of permanent members of the UN Security Council. China did
not wish to be an enemy of Russia either, making them silent on the issue.
China enjoyed some diplomatic leverage in central Asia against Russia since the Crimean crisis.
Russia facing economic sanction from EU and US with Japan, seemed to have no other option but to depend on
China. China also regards the area important in the context of the One Belt and One Road (OBOR) Initiative
launched in 2013.

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China’s President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Putin in 2015 and agreed to take a friendly
attitude towards each other. Chinese OBOR Initiative and Russia’s Eurasia Economic Union (EEU)’s coverage
is somewhat overlapping in Central Asia countries such as Kazakhstan, but both leaders agreed to adjust theirmutual interests in the region.
Political scenery could change gradually as the Trump administration begins its foreign policy next
year. In some cases, the relationship between Russia and China might pull back to the situation before the 2014
Crimean Crisis as US President-elect Trump tries to improve its relation with Putin’s Russia, based upon his
pledge during the presidential campaign. Putin might not feel the necessity to promote its relation with China.
In Taiwan, both pro-independence and pro-China people seem to share the feeling that Crimean Crisis
is giving some influence in East Asia. This is because the Crimean crisis reminds them of a possibility of changeof the status-quo by a big power. This is the exact kind of danger Taiwan faces since 1949 from mainland China.
Pro-independence people are more sympathetic and associate more with the Crimean Crisis than the
pro-China people. Anti-China feeling mounted in the spring of 2014, leading to what is called the “Sunflower
Movement” which lasted for 24 days. A group of young Taiwanese students occupied the Legislative Yuan,
demanding the suspension of a legal procedure allowing more Chinese service sector business entering into
Taiwan.

PAN Zhongqi
Professor, School of International Relations and Public Affairs,
Fudan University (China)
What the Ukraine Crisis Means to the Asia-Pacific:
A Chinese PerspectiveFirst, the Crisis of Ukraine poses two dilemmas to China. One is about its non-interference principle,
which has been made contradictory to its another foreign policy principle of strategic partnership. According to
the first principle, China should oppose Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But according to the second principle,
China should support Russia’s approach in dealing with the Ukraine Crisis. So China has to take a low key
approach to the crisis itself. As Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang stated, “We uphold theprinciple of non-interference in others’ internal affairs and respect international law and widely recognizednorms governing international relations. Meanwhile we take into account the historical facts and realistic
complexity of the Ukrainian issue.” Another dilemma that China faces is its difficult position it has to takebetween Russia and the US. For most Chinese, the Ukraine Crisis is a crisis between Russia and the US, a kindof renewal of the Cold War. The memory of the Cold War, in which China was pushed around by thecompetition of the two superpowers, reminds China to simply stay afar from the crisis. This explains why China
abstained in the UN Security Council when both Russia and the US solicited China’s support for their respective
positions on the Crimean referendum. So China voiced its concerns of the continuous escalation of violent
conflicts in Ukraine and called on all relevant parties to deescalate by political talks and reconciliation.
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Second, the Crisis of Ukraine has a dividing effect on international relations in the Asia-Pacific region.
In the UN Security Council, on the resolution to deny the validity of the referendum on the status of Crimea,
Japan and South Korea voted in support of, while India and China abstained. India, as China, faces a similar
dilemma of choice between solidarity with Moscow and relations with the West. While India apparently tilts
toward Russia in the Ukraine crisis, it does not want to go too far to risk its significantly improved relations with
the US and major European countries. Japan and South Korea have to side with the US as its allies in the
Ukraine Crisis, even though they all have their own concern vis-à-vis Russia that might be not consistent withthat of the US. For example, Japan wants to solve its territorial disputes with Russia and South Korea needs
Russia to cooperate in the process of the denuclearization of North Korea and the reunification of the Korean
peninsula. Also, when Russia expands its engagement in the Asia-Pacific, in particular with its renewed interestin the energy market of this region, a divide among those major energy consumers may go further deteriorated.
Third, the Crisis of Ukraine may complicate the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.
Probably, for whatever reasons, North Korea is determined to have nuclear weapons. But the Ukraine Crisis
may further solidify its such determination if Pyongyang believes that it is just because Ukraine renounced its
nuclear arsenal in 1994 that has led to its loss of territory. Even though other nuclear powers, including Russia,
have made a commitment of security guarantee in exchange for Ukrainian denuclearization, such commitment is
simply not trustworthy at all. For North Korea, it would be disastrous whenever facing a similar situation as in
the Ukraine Crisis if it does not continue to hold on to its nuclear weapons. If Kim Jung-un thinks that a nuclear
North Korea is not a choice but a necessity, it will definitely make it more difficult to dissolve the nuclear
program in North Korea, and in other potential nuclear seeking countries as well.
Forth, the Crisis of Ukraine will not make the US to drag its feet in its “pivot to Asia” strategy. Whilesome international observers may doubt about the Obama administration’s “rebalance” policy, the Chinese do
not think the US will shift its center of gravity back to Europe. The Ukraine crisis shows that the US does notwant a full-scale confrontation with Russia as it did vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War period.
While both the US and Russia strengthen their presence and engagement in the Asia-Pacific, their confrontation
may be played out in this region, notwithstanding the crisis in somewhere else. Even during the Ukraine Crisis,
the US dose not reduce its involvement in the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes.
Fifth, the Ukraine-type crisis may not happen in the Asia-Pacific, but a careful management of several
flash points is needed. Chinese believe two main reasons resulted in the Ukraine Crisis. First, internal instability.
Before the crisis, Ukraine was already on the brink of debt default and bankruptcy. Its economic over-relianceon Russia is its soft underbelly that has been taken advantage of by Western countries to promote regime change
in Ukraine. Second, external interference. The US and Western European countries have pushed Ukraine toomuch to join NATO and the EU in order to further isolate Russia. It is no doubt that China worries about the
ripple effect of the Crimea annexation. But China is not Ukraine. China is more stable internally and stronger towithstand foreign interference externally. So the Chinese do not believe a Ukraine-type crisis may happen in
their country, notwithstanding the separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. But China does
concerns foreign interference. So China really hopes and always calls on all relevant parties to play aconstructive role in easing flash points in its home regions, be Taiwan or maritime disputes in the China seas.
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SAITO Motohide
Visiting Research Fellow,
Institute of Policy and Cultural Studies, Chuo University
Russia’s Stance on the Emerging International Order in the Asia-Pacificand the Prospects for the Japan-Russia Rapprochement
As Bilahari Kausikan, Ambassador-at-Large at Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues, theworld order is becoming more uncertain. And events are unfolding at an accelerating pace and with greaterthan usual unpredictability. Despite the U.S-.led international economic sanctions against Russia and Russia’s
financial problems, President Vladimir Putin is pursuing assertive diplomacy to convert the US- dominatedinternational system into the multipolar world. He publicly states that Russia is seeking to create the Yalta II
System, in which the U.S., Russia, China, among others, are the key players of world politics. It is true that
Russia and China share the common goal to put an end to the US-dominated unipolar world. However, unlike
Moscow, Beijing aims to construct bipolarity dominated by the U.S. and China.
For Russia, the election of Donald Tramp as the next U.S. president is a pleasant surprise. Russians
welcomes Mr. Trump's victory, because he is critical of U.S.-led economic sanctions against Russia. However,
Moscow considers the lift-up of the economic sanctions will take time in view of the prevailing mood in the U.S.
Congress in favor of its continuation. In addition, Moscow is wary of President-elect Trump’s unpredictability.
As to the security system in the Asia–Pacific region, Russia supports China’s President Xi Jinping’s
proposal to construct a collective security system in Asia, in which only the Asians are entitled to settle problems
in the region. Xi Jinping’s aims to eliminate the U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific. However, in reality Moscow
is concerned with the emergence of the hegemonic system dominated by China. It is noteworthy that in contrast
to its policy in Europe and the Middle East, Russia’s stance is basically a status quo-oriented. This should not
be taken to deny Moscow’s recent moves supportive of Chinese ambitions to advance its maritime interests in
the South Chinese Sea. Russia approves Chinese moves with a view to limiting U.S. influence in South East Asia.
As for Moscow’s policy toward Japan, in June 2016 President Putin changed his policy of excessively
depending on China in view of China’s inability to extend large-scale economic assistance to Russia due to theslowdown of its economic growth. Thereafter, while maintaining the strategic partnership with China, Russia
has been overreaching Japan and India to obtain economic dividends as well as to keep the rise of a strong
China in check.
President Putin welcomed Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “new approach” to Russia revealed at the May
2016 Sochi summit talks. Since then the bilateral relations between Tokyo and Moscow have been seemingly
improving rapidly. In early September at the Eastern Economic Summit in Vladivostok, President Putin agreed
to pay an official visit to Japan on December 15 for the summit talks for the first time after an absence of elevenyears. Will a breakthrough in the Northern Territories dispute be achieved?
17

Although a series of agreements on economic cooperation will surely be signed, the prospects for thesettlement of the long-standing territorial issue seem to be quite slim: Russia refuses to conduct negotiations on
the Northern Territories. According to the public opinion survey conducted by the Levada Center in August in
Russia, only 8 % of the respondents supported the two island fist return approach. There is little sign that Mr.
Putin is minded to return any territory to Japan at all due to the upsurge of nationalism in Russia after theincorporation of Crimea. Regrettably for the Japanese, the Yalta Agreement, confidentially signed by Joseph
Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill on the closing day of the Second World War, is still effective in
the Japan-Russia relations.
It should be also noted that right after the above-mentioned Abe-Putin summit talks in Vladivostok,
Russia and China conducted large-scale joint naval exercises for the first time in the South China Sea. In
addition, China has expressed its willingness to help Russia to develop Russia’s Far East. Most importantly,
Russia still considers China its number one partner.
As to the U.S. factor, it has been unquestionably influential in the Japan-Russia relations. However,President-elect Donald Trump will not openly oppose the Japan-Russia rapprochement, precisely because hehopes to deter the advent of a strong China.
Brief remarks should be mentioned on Quite Chinese President Xi Zinping’s recent call for concerted
efforts by China and Russia to establish a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) in Lima, Peru. The callcame amid a protectionist mood after the U.S. presidential election victory of Trump critical of the Trans-PacificPartnership (TPP). Japan needs to carefully conduct its own independent foreign policy, paying attention to theemerging international order in the Asia-Pacific.

18

4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations(1) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Objectives and History

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) originates from the Japan Chapter of the Quadrangular Forum(QF), which was established in 1982 in Washington to serve as an informal promoter of the exchange ofpolicy-oriented views and opinions among Japan, US, Europe, and Canada. As the Cold War ended and its
aftermath faded away, QF ceased its activity in 1996. The Japan Chapter of QF survived the vicissitudes anddeveloped into the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) as an independent institution of Japan for international
intellectual exchanges. Since then, GFJ has been active as a hub for international exchanges with the global
intellectual community at large.

Organization

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membershiporganization in Japan. Business Member, Political Member, and Academic Member support its activities as
Governors and Members. The Secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations. GFJ iscurrently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO Kenichi as Chairman and President, and
WATANABE Mayu as Vice President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the 2Governors, TOYODA Shoichiro and MOGI Yuzaburo; 16 Political Members including the 4 Governors,
ASAO Keiichiro, KAKIZAWA Mito, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 90 Academic Members
including the 3 Governors, ITO Go, SHIMADA Haruo and MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo.

Activities(1) e-forum “Giron-Hyakushutsu (Hundred Views in Full Perspective)” operated on the website of GFJ(2) Monthly held meetings of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” and “Diplomatic Roundtable”(3) PR and Enlightenment through publication of “Bulletin,” the website, mail magazine, etc.
(4) “International Dialogues” convened 3 to 4 times a year on policy-oriented issues with counterparts
invited from various parts of the world. Recent International Dialogues are as follows:
Years andMonths
Nov.

2016

2015

ThemesCounterparts

Jul.

The Dialogue with the World “The International Order in Europe andAsia-Pacific after the Ukraine Crisis and Japan's Course of Action”
Japan-China-ROK Dialogue “Japan-China-ROK Relations in the
Global Perspective”
Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue “International Order in the 21st Century
and the Security of Maritime Asia”

Mar.

Japan-U.S. Dialogue “Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Turbulent
Time of Transition: Sustaining an Open, Rules-based Global Order”

Dec.

Japan-East Asia Dialogue “A New Horizon of Regional Cooperation in
East Asia – Overcoming the Age of Complex Risk”

Sep.

Japan-China Dialogue “Toward a Future-Oriented Relationship”

Jul.

The Second Japan-GUAM Dialogue “the Japan-GUAM Relationship in
the Changing world”
Central Asia + Japan Symposium

Sep.

Mar.

Japan-U.S. Dialogue “Alliance in a New Defense Guideline Era”
Feb.

Japan-East Asia Dialogue “What Should We Do toward Reliable
International Relations in Asia?”

Contact

The Institute of World Policy (IWP)The Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center(BSC)
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)
Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA) / Meiji
Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS) /Western Sydney University (Australia)
Institute for National Strategic Studies(INSS),
National Defense University (NDU) (U.S.)
East Asian Institute, National University ofSingapore (EAI) (Singapore) / International
Relations Department, University of Indonesia(Indonesia)
China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations (CICIR) (China)
GUAM-Organization for Democracy andEconomic Development
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan / theGraduate Program on Human Security of the
University of Tokyo / the Japan Times
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS),
National Defense University (NDU) (U.S.) /School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University(China) / the Albert Del Rosario Institute forStrategic and International Studies (ADR-ISIS)(the Philippines)

Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3584-2193 FAX: +81-3-3505-4406 E-mail: gfj@gfj.jp URL: http://www.gfj.jp/j/19

(2) The Institute of World Policy (IWP)
About IWP
The Institute of World Policy (IWP) has been established at the end of 2009 as a civil non-profit
organization, an independent think tank. During 2010-2016, the IWP managed to gain trust andacknowledgement among not only Ukrainian experts and decision-makers, but also the foreign expert
community. The IWP became a distinctive actor among think tanks by offering quality analytical product on theissues of Ukraine’s foreign policy and regional security combined with active and effective efforts in promoting
policy change (advocacy campaigns).

MissionThe mission of the IWP is to develop analytical research and implement project activities in order topromote European standards and practices inside Ukraine, as well as to increase support of the foreign opinion
leaders, EU and NATO officials for the European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine. In order toimplement this mission, the IWP develops analytical materials and conducts public events in two strategic areas:
European integration and regional security.

Target Groups
Average Ukrainians. We are targeting at least half of the citizens of Ukraine who aspire for European
integration, and therefore require information related to this topic.
Ukrainian opinion leaders and government officials. Diplomats, journalists, political scientists,lawmakers who are influencing prioritization and implementation of the issues related to European
integration.
Opinion leaders and key officials from the key EU and NATO member states and global and regional
powers. A special accent is made on journalists, political scientists, parliamentarians, and government
officials. The intensity of the reforms in Ukraine depends on their support and conditionality policy.
Donors and partners. The organizations and individuals willing to aid the mission and vision of theInstitute of World Policy with their resources (financial and/or human).
Businessmen. The entrepreneurs interested in Europeanization and sharing the mission and values of theInstitute of World Policy.

Contact
Esplanadna st, 32v, Kyiv, 01001, Ukraine
Tel: +380 44 374 03 11
Director: Alyona GetmanchukE-mail: info@iwp.org.ua

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(3) The Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center (BSC)The Atlantic Council promotes constructive leadership and engagement in international affairs basedon the Atlantic Community's central role in meeting global challenges. The Council provides an essential forum
for navigating the dramatic economic and political changes defining the twenty-first century by informing andgalvanizing its uniquely influential network of global leaders.
The Atlantic Council's flagship International Security Program was relaunched as the Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security in September 2012. The transatlantic partnership remains at the core of the
Scowcroft Center's analysis of how global trends and emerging security challenges will impact the United States,
its allies, and global partners. The Scowcroft Center aims to produce cutting-edge analyses and to develop
strategies for how the United States can best work with like-minded countries to shape the future.
The Scowcroft Center works collaboratively with the Council's other regional and functional programs
and centers to produce multi-disciplinary analyses. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft's legacy ofservice and embodies his ethos of non-partisan commitment to the cause of international security, support for
U.S. international leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and legacy of mentorship to the next
generation of leaders.
The Scowcroft Center is taking initiatives in 7 areas, each addressing various subjects within, as follows:
Strategy Initiative: America’s Role in the World, Strategy Lab, Global Strategy Forum
Transatlantic Security Initiative: Missile Defense, NATO in an Era of Global Competition, Smarter
Alliance Initiative, NATO Global Partnerships, Russian-American Dialogue on Mutually Assured Stability,
Transatlantic Initiative on Nordic-Baltic Security, NATO Forum
Cyber Statecraft Initiative: Cyber 9/12, Cyber Risk Aggregation, History of Cyber Conflict, Series on
Governance and Cybersecurity
Strategic Foresight Initiative: A Transatlantic Partnership for the Global Future, Emerging Technologies
and Society, Urban World 2030, US-China Joint Assessment Project
Emerging Defense Challenges Initiative: Defense Strategists Forum, Defense Industrial Policy Series,
Captains of Industry Series, Commanders Series
Asia Security Initiative: Cross Straits Series, Strengthening US Extended Deterrence in East Asia
Middle East Peace and Security Initiative: Strategic Dialogue for a Renewed US-Gulf Partnership,
Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue, Task Force on Reforming US Defense Cooperation with North Africa's
Transitioning Democracies

Contact

1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20005 USA
Tel: 202.778.4952
Fax: 202.463.7241
URL: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/brent-scowcroft-center21

(4) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit,
independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy
and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its
members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy.
Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, theviews expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the
responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign themalone.
The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo,
Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political,
and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international
affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR wasreincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister inrecognition of its achievements.
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2)associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the“Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of
supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge ofthe management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.
■Board of Trustees
ARIMA Tatsuo
HAKAMADA Shigeki
HATTORI Yasuo
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
INOUE Akiyoshi
ISHIGAKI Yasuji
ITO Tsuyoshi
KOIKE Yuriko
KUROYANAGI Nobuo

OHYA EikoSAKAMOTO Masahiro
SATO Ken
WATANABE Toshio
YAMAGUCHI Norio■Board of Directors
IMAI Takashi
ITO Kenichi
WATANABE Mayu
HANDA Haruhisa
KAMIYA Matake
MORIMOTO Satoshi
SHIMADA Haruo
TAKUBO Tadae■Auditors
NAITOH Masahisa
WATANABE Kenichi

ChairmanPresident
Executive Director
Director
Director
Director
Director
Director

The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum”“Research Programs,” “International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,”“Diplomatic Roundtable,” “Foreign Policy Luncheon,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars ofactivities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom”(http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public,
functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles
posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Foramu”
in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners aretranslated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR
Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” isdelivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

Contact

Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3584-2190 FAX: +81-3-3589-5120 E-mail: jfir@jfir.or.jp URL: http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/22

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/[This “Dialogue” is administered by the Secretariat of The Global Forum of Japan]

6