Monika Chansoria

Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific:
Synergizing Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean,
East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacific
Monika Chansoria *Abstract
Given the concept of a broader Asia that is fast transcending geographical boundaries andlines, the emerging proximities render the prospects for collective and cooperative regional
security mechanisms, more deliverable than ever before. With the notion of the greater
Indo-Pacific beginning to eclipse the limited spheres of influence of the Indian Ocean,
East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacific, regional players are expected
to make prudent choices, whilst pursuing a sovereign foreign policy path that best suits
their national security interests. Indubitably, greater onus shall lie on the regional liberal
democracies that have perennially demonstrated respect for the rule of internationallaw, norms, and agreements and showcase their strategic sagacity in the emerging
scenario developing in the Indo-Pacific. This paper intends to outline the pragmatist policy
approach to be undertaken by India, Japan, Australia and the US towards a cooperative andconsultative working framework to address common threats and challenges to regional
peace and stability.

Collective Security, conceptually, provides rationality for international organizations tomaintain and uphold international peace and stability.1 Immanuel Kant presented thisidea in his book Perpetual Peace towards the end of the 18th century, in which he stated,
2“The law of nations will be based on one federation of free states”. Making cooperative
security a major mode of interaction in the international system demands that states build a
range of capabilities to implement international agreements, address transnational threats, andprevent or resolve conflicts.3 Impediments to enhanced cooperative security involve differencesin perceptions of key actors. However, it is statesʼ perceptions of multiple security threats which
could make them more reluctant to pursue cooperative security.4
Since the end of the Cold War, the term cooperative security became a catch–phrase usedgenerally to describe a more peaceful approach to security through increased international
cooperation. The cooperative security model embraced four concentric and mutually reinforcing*

Dr. Monika Chansoria presently is a Senior Visiting Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA), Tokyo. Besides, she is Senior Fellow and Head of the China-study program at the Centre forLand Warfare Studies, New Delhi. Her most recently authored book (2017) is titled China, Japan, andSenkaku Islands: Conflict in the East China Sea amid an American Shadow.

1

Stefan Aleksovski, et al., “Collective Security – The Role of International Organizations: Implications inInternational Security Order,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 5, no. 27, December 2014.

2

Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93-130.

3

Michael Moodie, “Cooperative Security: Implications for National Security and International Relations,”
Occasional Paper/14, Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, January 2000.

4

Ibid.

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Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific:
Synergizing Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacific“rings of security”: Individual Security, Collective Security, Collective Defense, and Promoting
Stability.5 What gained primacy among these was the traditional aspect of collective security– defending the integrity of member states. In 1992, American strategists ̶ Ashton Carter,
William Perr y, and John Steinbruner spoke about cooperative security in terms of providing
new avenues toward world peace, and said, “Organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear
stability, and containment embodied the aspirations of the cold war ... Cooperative Security is thecorresponding principle for international security in the post–cold war era.”6 Two years later, in
1994, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described cooperative security as tending“ ... to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence,transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather
than unilateralism.”7
In the contemporary and evolving understanding of cooperative security, promotion of stability
outside the boundaries of the states has been regarded as an integral component that constitutes
the cooperative security system. Cooperative Security can be described as a “strategic system,”as it does not easily fit the generic accepted definition of a “strategy” which has been describedas “the integrated application of means to achieve desired ends.”8 The word “system” implies thatthe concept cannot be fully realized in abstract, and should be based on existing or newly-created,
and resilient institutions.9 The starting point for cooperative security would be creation of a strong
normative base.10 New age collective security can be inferred as an understanding/commitment
among groups of nations with commonality of interests and values to protect the security interestsof the individual members within their joint spheres of interest. This, to a large extent, applies toliberal democracies that demonstrate a respect for the rule of international law.11
The term “collective security” has been cited as a principle of the United Nations, and the
League of Nations and can be seen in reference to getting triggered when a threatened nation,
exercising its inherent right of collective self-defense, can call on others for help.12 The ʻringʼof maintaining peace embodies the concept of collective security, per se, i.e., protection fromthreats and aggression. The cooperative security system is seen to be proactive and prepared toengage in collective diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military action in areas outside theircommon space which may threaten their own security and stability. Commenting on ʻstatus quoʼas a concept, Hans Morgenthau opined, “The policy of the status quo aims at the maintenance ofthe distribution of power as it exists at a particular moment in history.”13 As few nations become
ever more revisionist, expansionist, and combative, the essential tenets of new age cooperative
security, i.e., to reduce the risk of war [or conflict] which are not directed towards a specific5Richard Cohen, “Cooperative Security: From Individual Security to International Stability” in Richard
Cohen and Michael Mihalka, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, The MarshallCenter Papers, no. 3, The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2001.

6

Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security,(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press) 1993.

7

Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intra–State Conflict,” Foreign Policy, no. 96, Fall 1994.

8

Cohen, n. 5.

9

Ibid.

10

Moodie, n. 3.

11Aleksovski, et al., n. 1.

12Speech by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine K. Albright, Transcript,
Building a Collective Security System (US Department of State Dispatch, May 10, 1993.).

13

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p. 46.

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Monika Chansoria

country or coalition of countries14 shall be sought after. In order to develop the spirit of a common
future, and promotion of stability, the system of cooperative security should seek for democratic
countries to cooperate mutually for regional peace and security. The future success of cooperative
security will hinge upon common systems, institutions and values that foster a sense of security
based on global rules and commons.

Maritime Security and Stability in the Indo-Pacific: Charting a Sovereign Path
The term Indo-Pacific depicts centrality vis-à-vis approaches that regional nations seem tobe adopting toward security competition/cooperation in maritime Asia. In fact, the proactiverole and official policy positions adopted by major stakeholders in the region clearly reflects
the primacy of the Indo-Pacific. These include the United States ʼ “Rebalance/Pivot to Asia”,
Chinaʼs “Maritime Silk Route Initiative”, Japanʼs “Confluence of the Two Seas”, Indiaʼs “Act East
Policy”, and Australiaʼs official embrace of the term Indo-Pacific in most policy documents andpronouncements. Maritime security, safety and cooperation within ocean spaces and its linkages
to forging closer foreign policy ties between nations sharing converging ideals is well recognized.
For that matter, numerous policy statements coming from Japan have indicated that security
issues in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South China Sea, and East China Sea cannot be treatedseparately, or, as stand-alone issues alone.
The strategic realities have become far more pertinent, given the rising centrality of the IndoPacific to regional security and stability. The renewed focus of Indiaʼs active engagement in theregion within the ambit of its “Act East” policy initiative compliments Japanʼs “Free and Open
Indo-Pacific Strategy”. Both these policy initiatives seek to nurture an open and transparent IndoPacific maritime zone as part of a broader Asia. This concept of a broader Asia is fast transcending
geographical boundaries, with the Pacific and Indian Oceansʼ mergence becoming far more
pronounced and evident. These emerging proximities render the prospects for collective andcooperative regional security mechanisms, more deliverable than ever before. Commensuratewith the ʻAct Eastʼ policy announcement and consequent re-orientation of Indiaʼs strategic focus,
establishing security norms and rules across the stretch of the Indo-Pacific region will be a vital
objective for both India, and Japan. The two nations today, depict strong and united leadershipwith a determination to persevere, by virtue of sharing basic freedoms and democratic values.
Given the post-war identity as a state unconstrained by great-power relationships, Indiaʼs broader
approach resonates and dovetails neatly with the omnidirectional pragmatism15 of the combinedleadership of Prime Ministers, Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi.
At its heart, a strategic system can be understood as a set of geopolitical power relationships
among nations where major changes in one part of the system affect what happens in the otherpar ts. 16 The contemporar y Indo-Pacific means recognizing the accelerating economic andsecurity connections between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean region in creating asingle strategic system. The 2013 Australian Defense White Paper defines Southeast Asia as

14

Aleksovski, et al., n. 1.

15John Nilsson-Wright, “Creative Minilateralism in a Changing Asia: Oppor tunities for Security
Convergence and Cooperation between Australia, India and Japan,” Asia Programme, Chatham House(The Royal Institute of International Affairs) July 2017.

16

Rory Medcalf, “The evolving security order in the Indo-Pacific Professor,” in David Brewster, ed., IndoPacific Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation, National Security College Crawford School of
Public Policy ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, The Australian National University, July 2016; also see,
Rory Medcalf, ʻThe Indo-Pacific: Whatʼs in a Name?ʼ The American Interest, vol. 9, no. 2, Nov/Dec 2013,
pp. 58-66.

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Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific:
Synergizing Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacificthe ʻgeographic centerʼ of the Indo-Pacific.17 The Indo-Pacific system is defined in part by thegeographically expanding interests and reach of rising big powers, i.e., China, and the continued
strategic role and presence of the United States, in both, the Pacific and Indian Oceans. A
major driver of the interconnection between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, economically andstrategically, has been the extension of Chinese interests and presence, south and west across theseas.18
Symbolizing acknowledgment of the economic and strategic dependence on developments
across a much wider maritime region, Indo-Pacific prioritizes allocation of resources, security
partners, membership and agendas of regional diplomatic and security institutions.19 This alsosuggests that the Indo-Pacific region will remain central in achieving its foreign policy objectives,
whilst also underscoring that the histor y, geo-economics, geopolitics and strategic cultures
amongst major players represents a fundamental clash of interests that would pose as a major
obstacle to their co-existence.20
The historical patterns of commercial, cultural and strategic interaction suggests that theartificial division of maritime Asia into East Asia and South Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific,
was something of a post-1945 anomaly, not a permanent state of affairs.21 With around 15.5 million
barrels (i.e., 2/3rds of global oil shipments) passing through the Gulf of Hormuz, more than 40
percent of the global seaborne bulk cargo trade passing through the Strait of Malacca, and, 11
million barrels of oil passing through the Malacca and Singapore Straits, the regionʼs significanceand vitality can be judged by the statistics themselves. By 2030, the Indo-Pacific is expected toaccount for 21 of the top 25 sea and air trade routes. According to predictions, by 2050, half of theworldʼs top 20 economies will belong to the Indo-Pacific region.22
Other select indicators underscoring the dramatic shift in power relativities is China thatis predicted to overtake the United States by 2030 as the world ʼs largest economy in market
exchange rate terms; and India, expected to become the worldʼs third largest economy in US
dollar terms by 2030. Further, The Economist predicts that by 2050, Indonesia will leap frombeing the 16th largest economy into the top 10 economies; Vietnam may become one of the fastest
growing large economies; and; established economies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia
will likely drop in relative GDP rankings. Thus, the Indian Ocean doubling up as a geopoliticaland geo-economic nerve center remains critical to the regional construct, and its primacy. To
a large extent, the Indian Ocean has significantly replaced the Atlantic in order to become theworldʼs busiest and strategically most significant trade corridor.23 Consequently, the major
economies of East Asia have acute dependence on the oil imports across the Indian Ocean from
the Middle East and Africa. The region can be labeled as the artery carrying the resources that
17

Commonwealth of Australia, Defense White Paper 2013, p. 69, available at http://www.defence.gov.au/
whitepaper/201318

Medcalf, n. 16.

19

Rory Medcalf, “Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific,” The Asan Forum, June 26, 2015,
available at http://www.theasanforum.org/reimagining-asia-from-asia-pacific-toindo-pacific/

20

For a detailed debate on India-China relations, see Mohan J. Malik, China and India: Great Power
Rivals, (First Forum Press, Boulder, 2011) p. 9.

21

Medcalf, n. 16.

22

Speech by Australian Minister for Defence, Kevin Andrews, “Australiaʼs Defence Policy and Relationshipwith India,” September 2, 2015, available at https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/kevinandrews/speeches/minister-defence-australias-defence-policy-and-relationship-india

23

Justin Jones, “Submarines and Maritime Strategy – Part 1,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, Januar y 29, 2013; and see Commonwealth of Australia, Defense White Paper 2013, p. 13,
available at http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013

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Monika Chansoria

fuel the growth of regional economies. However, dependence of this nature can simultaneously
take shape of becoming a strategic vulnerability that could well influence regional partnershipbuilding and diplomatic relations.

Theor y of Liberal Institutionalism and Confidence-Building Measures
There is a need for regional players in the Indo-Pacific to promote security cooperation in a free
and flexible way. Confidence-building through exchanging official dialogue and information
sharing, and consultative frameworks are among the broad generic characterization of confidencebuilding measures (CBMs) being a set of unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral procedural actions
that primarily are put in place to decrease military tensions. Consultative mechanisms include
pre-notification requirements and joint military exercises. CBMs serve as an effective tool tomake a breakthrough towards the larger goal of maintaining stability and conflict resolution.
CBMs, thus, are not necessarily an end in themselves, but rather useful steps to negotiate andimplement processes that could help in securing conditions of stability and preser vation of
status quo in a limited or extended sphere. CBMs, defense cooperation and military engagement
can be clubbed under the liberal institutionalist school, arguing that international cooperation
is not only possible, but also highly desirable, since it reduces transaction costs and makes
interstate relations more predictable. Institutional liberalism, or liberal institutionalism, claims
that international institutions and organizations have aided the possibility of cooperation between
states.24 In this reference, CBMs have emerged as an attractive option because they are low-costand low-risk activities.25 Besides, they can be implemented with limited resources and calculatedrisks. As CBMs are usually reciprocal in nature, they display goodwill26 that will reflect regionally.

Growing Centrality of the Indo-Pacific and Emerging Challenges
Back in 1967, the Australian National University held a conference on the theme, India, Japan,
Australia: Partners in Asia? The conference delegates thought ʻthe future in would be determinedby how China behaved, and how others behaved towards Chinaʼ and were concerned about
Washingtonʼs actions in the region and securing lasting economic growth.27 Fifty years on, thenotion of enhanced cooperation between Australia, India and Japan is back, driven once moreby the challenges posed by Beijing.28 The Indo-Pacific region is undergoing a prolonged anddramatic period of flux and transformation bringing in its own set of opportunities and challenges,
which require flexible and swift mechanisms for cooperation to manage change in the region.29
More than anything else, it perhaps is uncertainty that is becoming the defining feature of
the region with predictions that by 2020, the combined military budgets within the Indo-Pacificwill exceed $600 billion, matching military spending in North America for the first time ever.
The Indo-Pacific is expected to drive 60 per cent of the global increase in defense acquisition,
research and development with 19 countries in the region accounting for one third of global
24

Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security,
vol. 20, no. 1. p. 39.

25

Simon JA Mason, and Matthias Siegfried, “Confidence Building Measures in Peace Processes,” inManaging Peace Processes: Process Related Questions—A Handbook for AU Practitioners, vol. 1, African
Union and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013, pp. 57-77.

26

Ibid.

27

Ian Hall, “The Australia–India–Japan trilateral: converging interests… and converging perceptions?” The
Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 17, 2017.

28

Ibid.

29

Transcript, “Indo-Pacific Security Paradigm- Australiaʼs Choices,” Australian High Commissioner to
India's Address, National Defence College, New Delhi, May 8, 2017.

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Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific:
Synergizing Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacificdefense budgets by 2020.30 A prominent projection is that of Chinaʼs likelihood of building 30 new
submarines and another new aircraft carrier.31 These in turn, can be interpreted as vital indicatorsof Beijingʼs strategic priorities that lean towards the entire Indo-Pacific region per se. Beijingʼsmaritime priorities are not likely to remain limited to the “near seas” off Chinaʼs eastern seaboard.
Recall the 2015 Defense White Paper which suggested China not necessarily remaining confined
to East Asian waters, adding the role of “open seas protection” to the PLA Navyʼs existing taskof “offshore waters defense”. Additionally, the Chinese terminology of turning to the “far seas”
is increasingly apparent in the South China Sea stretching till the Indian Ocean with instancesof repeated deployments in the recent past. Not surprisingly, regional concerns are mounting
regarding the rise of China, the direction and intent of which, continues to remain ambiguous.
All of this is to say that there are numerous challenges at a time of great transition in statesʼ
economic activity, strategic weight and international ambitions. Crises and transnational issues
donʼt respect the boundaries of traditional groupings or stay neatly in a single region.32 Therefore,
smaller group diplomacy / ʻminilateralismʼ will matter more over time in the Indo-Pacific because
every strategic issue that the region is confronted with, is different and will engage different
countries in different combinations.33
Teng Jianqun, Director of the Depar tment for American Studies at China Institute ofInternational Studies, presents the case for an understanding of Chinaʼs maritime policy which
requires at least two approaches: a historical one and a ʻrealisticʼ one (i.e. an approach thatcombines interests and pragmatism). For centuries, there has been a debate in China whether
the country should ʻgo to seaʼ or should ʻremain on the continentʼ. This essentially implies theʻblueʼ vs ʻyellowʼ civilization argument. Teng highlights that China eventually would become astrong maritime power, when former President Hu Jintao told the National Congress, “We should
enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, develop the marine economy, protect themarine ecological environment, resolutely safeguard Chinaʼs maritime rights and interests, andbuild China into a maritime power.”34 According to the Chinese perspective, the maritime policyof China today, hinges on sovereignty issues and protection of its maritime interests and rights.
After China adjusted its maritime policy under the current leadership of President Xi Jinping, themajor transformation visible today is that of China placing security and sovereignty right on topof its foreign policy agenda.35 Teng further asserts that “no matter whether they like it or not, theUnited States and other countries should have a new vision towards China ... The reason for sucha change is simple: this is not an era of spheres of influence.”36
In the above reference, to an extent, it is the expansion of Chinaʼs interests, diplomacy andstrategic reach especially into the Indian Ocean that defines the Indo-Pacific most of all. It isnotable that Chinaʼs own overarching geo-economicsʼ thrust since 2013 – with the Belt and Road
initiative – includes an ambition to extend China-centric infrastructure and strategic partnerships
into and through the Indian Ocean. The PRCʼs preference for combining military intimidation andstealth economic infiltration in redrawing borders and rewriting history is visible the world over,with its nearly uniform policy of injecting investments and reaping disproportionate economic
30

For more details see, Deloitte Global Defense Outlook 2016, Shifting Postures and Emerging Fault Lines.

31

Ibid.

32

Transcript, n. 29.

33

Ibid.

34

President Hu Jintao, Report to the 18th National Congress, Chinese Communist Party, November 8,
2012.

35

Teng Jianqun, “Understanding Chinaʼs Maritime Policy: 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” in Brewstered., n. 16.

36

Ibid.

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and strategic benefits out of it.37 Strikingly reminiscent of mercantilism, this protracted endeavor
led to a steep rise in Beijingʼs capacity to invest further and hold unprecedented foreign exchange
reserves. The mercantilist policy approach adopted by Beijing can be credited for it becoming
a global economic powerhouse that is launching strategic ambitions well beyond its immediate
territory and shores.38
China ʼ s much pronounced Maritime Silk Road strategy initiative needs to be read in
conjunction with the cumulative maritime activity of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and its mounting
forays into the Indian Ocean ̶ the third-largest water body in the world. The expanding strategic
naval footprint in the Indian Ocean by means of acquiring more maritime bases and berthingfacilities is a core pillar of Chinaʼs ports policy. The PLA Navy could well build as many as 18
overseas naval military bases in the greater Indian Ocean area39. The long shadow of Chinaʼs
ports policy in the Indian Ocean being currently driven and characterized by both, state- andprivate-sponsored “infrastructure investment” foretells strategic ramifications militarily, as thesefacilities shall end up becoming communication and surveillance facilities, in addition to being
repair and replenishment centers for the Chinese Navy. This underscores the intransigent courseof Beijingʼs influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.40 Palpably, Rory Medcalf terms the
Maritime Silk Road as the ʻIndo-Pacific with Chinese characteristicsʼ.41

Indo-Japan Defense Framework
As far as India is concerned, its resolute posture and approach highlights the growing
convergence of political, economic and security interests with stakeholders in the Indo-Pacificand Indian Ocean Regions that remain critical to Indiaʼs strategic objectives. The momentum atwhich the Indo-Pacific has assumed focus in New Delhiʼs strategic thinking is unmistakable, bothcharacteristically and substantively. And Japan, surely, remains among the key frontal pivots ofthis focus. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian PM Narendra Modi have long beenin agreement to secure stability in the Indo-Pacific region, which remains indispensable to Tokyo
and New Delhiʼs national security. Indiaʼs growing regional standing has influenced its integration
with key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region. Re-orientation of Indiaʼs strategic focus from a“Look East” to an “Act East” policy, finds manifestation in the ensuing approach, by and large,
towards the Indo-Pacific. What seems more pronounced is that New Delhi is likely to continue
to pursue a sovereign foreign policy path and undertake decisions that best suit its national
security interests in light of the hard-power priorities of naval modernization by nations in theregion. Recall an Indian Defence Ministry statement five years ago, which argued, “As risingnations ... become more powerful, emerging risks require greater attention ... India remains
conscious and watchful of the implications of Chinaʼs militar y profile in the immediate and37

Monika Chansoria, “In Africa, it is China vs India and Japan,” The Sunday Guardian, July 8, 2017.

38

Ibid.

39

According to reports in the Chinese media, Walvis Bay will be one of 18 naval bases that will beestablished in various regions; this has been cited in The Namibian, “Chinese naval base for Walvis Bay,”
November 19, 2014, available at https://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=130693&page=archiveread ; also see, China Daily Mail, “China to build 18 naval bases in the Indian Ocean,” November 22,
2014, available at https://chinadailymail.com/2014/11/22/china-to-build-18-naval-bases-in-indianocean/ ; and see, Kwame A. Insaidoo, China: The New Imperialists & Neo-Colonialists in Africa? (Author
House Publishers, 2016); also see, Monika Chansoria, “China eyes 18 overseas naval bases,” The
Sunday Guardian, August 15, 2015, available at http://www.sundayguardian.com/analysis/china-eyes18-overseas-naval-bases

40

Monika Chansoria, “China eyes 18 overseas naval bases,” The Sunday Guardian, August 15, 2015.

41

Medcalf, n. 19.

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Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific:
Synergizing Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacificextended neighborhood.”42 Besides, in a public interaction during his 2014 Tokyo official visit,
Prime Minister Modi remarked on the presence of 18th century ʻexpansionist mindsetʼ amongcertain regional actors – that of encroaching upon other countries, intruding in othersʼ waters,
and capturing territory. This was widely interpreted as an oblique reference to Chinaʼs recent andrecurring actions in the East China Sea and South China Sea.
The September 2014 Tokyo Declaration on the Special Strategic and Global Partnership
acknowledged converging global interests and critical maritime inter-connections between
India and Japan. It was in this declaration that both sides attached special importance to theregularization of bilateral maritime exercises as well as Japanʼs continued participation in the
India-US Malabar series of naval exercises. Speaking many years back while addressing theIndian Parliament in August 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe averred, “ ... a strong India is in
the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.” The role of India
and Japan for stability, prosperity and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region by means of the “ActEast Policy,” and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” shall further be consolidated throughbilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation mechanisms. The entry into forceof the two Defense Framework Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment
and Technology and concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Militar y
Information was considered a welcome move. Japanʼs readiness to provide its state-of-the-art
defense platform, US-2 amphibian aircraft is a key development and shall be an important bilateral
security benchmark.
Further, the defense engagement needs to be expanded through greater two-way collaborationand technology cooperation, co-development and co-production, by expediting discussions
for determining specific items through the Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment andTechnology Cooperation.43 Former Japanese Vice-Minister of Defense, Masanori Nishi has
pointed out that Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) deployment has significant
reliance on Indian logistical support that would provide more opportunities for Japanese vessels
to visit Indian ports during voyages across the Indian Ocean. Nishi opines that Japan could
play an active role in stabilizing the Indian Ocean and reinforcing a rules-based order in areas
including: 1) Engagement with key Bay of Bengal states such as Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka through investments in infrastructure and capability-building; 2) Support for emerging
regional institutions in the Indian Ocean such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian
Ocean Naval Symposium; 3) Maritime capacity-building among Indian Ocean island states andother developing states in the Indian Ocean, with a focus on blue economy; and 4) Enhanced role
for the Japanese Coast Guard.44
This emergent realpolitik reflected yet again in the November 2016 joint statement between
Prime Ministers Abe and Modi that highlights safeguarding global commons in the maritime,
space and cyber domains. Tokyo and New Delhi remain committed to respecting freedomof navigation and over flight, and unimpeded lawful commerce, based on the principles ofinternational law, as reflected notably in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS), which establishes the international legal order of the seas and oceans. In this context,
all parties need to resolve disputes through peaceful means without resorting to threat or use offorce and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities, and avoid unilateral actions that raise
42

Indian Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2011-2012, Government of India, 2012, available at http://india.gov.in/outerwin.php?id=http://mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html pp. 6-9.

43

Japan-India Joint Statement, November 11, 2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo; also see, Annual
Report 2015-16 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

44

Masanori Nishi, “The role of Japan in Indian Ocean security: A Japanese perspective,” in Brewster, ed., n.
16.

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Monika Chansoria

tensions. Japan and India are in agreement that effective implementation of the 2002 Declarationon the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and early conclusion of the negotiations toestablish a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea in accordance with universally recognizedprinciples of international law. What featured prominently in the Japan-India Joint Statement
was underscoring the UNCLOS, freedom of navigation and over flight and unimpeded lawfulcommerce in international waters. The ongoing strategic upheaval in the South China Sea caused
by unilateral actions such as massive land reclamation of submerged reefs, and militarizationof that converted land has notched up regional tensions, and the criticality of the sea lanes ofcommunication, that underpin vitality of seeking to ensure continuing stability in the Indo-Pacific.
This resonates well with the larger goal of cooperative security – which is not the creation ofstability at any price.45
During the latest India-Japan Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue, held in September 2017,exchanges between Japan Ground Self Defence Force and the Indian Army were agreed upon,
especially to develop counter-terrorism as a key area of common interest. In the context ofenhanced co-operation between the two ground forces, it was decided to explore a joint field
exercise in the field of counter-terrorism between the Indian Army and the JGSDF in 2018. In
the maritime realm, the success of Japan-India-US Trilateral Maritime Exercise Malabar 2017
held in July was welcomed and Japan expressed its intention to have state-of-the-art Japanese
assets including P-1 to participate in the Malabar 2018. The two sides shall also consider inclusionof Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) training to expand cooperation and pursue exchanges andtraining by ASW aviation units such as P-3C. The Japanese side proposed inviting the Indian Navyto mine-countermeasures training held by the JMSDF.46 The two countries agreed to encourage
equipment collaboration including defense and dual-use technologies and identified specificareas of collaboration in the field of defense equipment and technology cooperation, includingcommencing technical discussions for research collaboration in the areas of unmanned groundvehicles and robotics.47

Consultative Trilateral Mechanisms and Joint Maritime Maneuvers in the IndoPacific
The steady upward trajector y in formal and informal cooperation between India, Japan, andAustralia has been shaped by economic complementarity, as well as by political fundamentals
such as the tradition of supporting the rule of law and international norms, including respect
for state sovereignty and multilateral cooperation, democratic governance [in that, them being
functioning liberal democracies] and multilateralism.48 In addition to their geography, eachcountry is strongly embedded in the Asian region in terms of history and contemporary interests,
but equally, each has a national identity that incorporates an extra-regional identity.49
With the “Indo-Pacific Region” featuring prominently in the very title of the 2025 joint visionstatement between India and Japan, the writing on the wall is apparent. A vital demonstrationof Indiaʼs growing maritime focus extending beyond the Indian Ocean comes with Japanʼ sparticipation in the trilateral maritime exercise [Malabar] between India, US and Japan. The
bilateral Indo-US Malabar naval maneuvers got a boost in 2014, after being upgraded to a trilateral
45

Moodie, n. 3.

46

For more details see, Joint Press Statement on India-Japan Annual Defence Ministerial Dialogue, Press
Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, September 6, 2017, available at http://
pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=170560

47

Ibid.

48

Nilsson-Wright, n. 15.

49

Ibid.

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Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific:
Synergizing Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacificinitiative, this time including the Japanese navy. Since 2014, Exercise Malabar has involved thenavies of India, and the United States, along with Japanʼs Maritime Self-Defense Forces. The
trilateral exercises held in 2014, 2015, 2016, and most recently in 2017, have witnessed greaterinter-operability and integration between the three navies. With the involvement of three aircraft
carriers, the 2017 Malabar naval initiative was by far the biggest, since this exercise was firstlaunched in 1992. Common political values, principles, democratic systems and convergence onregional and world views, renders the Malabar exercises carrying a political message that seeks
to convey India, US and Japanʼs orientation towards the future of security in maritime Indo-Pacific.
A priority area for trilateral cooperation lies in intelligence, sur veillance and reconnaissance(ISR) to improve maritime domain awareness, and expanding nascent links between therespective Coast Guards of these nations. The vastness of distances across the Indian Ocean
makes tracking of vessels and aircrafts a difficult task, which is beyond the resources of a single
country.50 To increase involvement in the existing maritime surveillance systems, such as the
Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAPP), Secretary General of the Japan Institutefor National Fundamentals, Seiji Kurosawa, suggests setting up a new maritime sur veillanceframework in which Indo-Japanese armed forces can assume a leading role.51 Prioritizing creationof a continuous surveillance system, and expanding the scope of the multilateral Malabar naval
maneuvers by expanding Japanʼs defense role and capability and anti-submarine warfare drills are
the next vital steps in the way forward.
To an extent, a shared experience of having operated in the shadow of great-power politics,
often in a subordinate or supporting role to more influential actors has helped in facilitating
this trilateral cooperation.52 A report by the United States Studies Centre titled Australia, India
and the United States: The Challenge of Forging New Alignments in the Indo-Pacific argues that
Canberra must promote a trilateral security relationship with Washington and Delhi, focusedon the Indian Ocean. The idea of an Indo-Pacific ʻstrategic arcʼ reinforces Indiaʼs role as a key
regional partner that could eventually rank alongside Australiaʼs traditional partners in the Asia
Pacific.53 The Japan-India-US Foreign Ministersʼ Trilateral Dialogue as well as the inaugural
Japan-India-Australia Trilateral Dialogue strongly echoes the twin themes of regional connectivity
and maritime security. These trilateral dialogue mechanisms will contribute to a balanced, open,
inclusive, stable, transparent and rules-based economic, political and security architecture in the
Indo-Pacific region.54 The recurring strains on durability of the regional and international ordermake it more incumbent upon India, Japan, and Australia to develop new forms of cooperation to
hedge against uncertainty, consolidate and widen their existing bilateral partnerships, and explore
new opportunities for trilateral cooperation.55 This ʻcreative minilateralismʼ as John Nilsson-Wrightstates, could best be put into practice in case of the Malabar naval exercises along with the US.
As key regional stakeholders, Tokyo, Canberra and New Delhi should look towards capitalizingon the positive momentum of their strategic and defense relationship, deepening engagement
and increasing consistency and complexity of activities. For India to consolidate its position in
50

David Brewster, “Security in the Indo-Pacific Needs Indiaʼs Helping Hand,” The Wire, September 5,
2016.

51

Seiji Kurosawa, “Challenges in Maintaining the Rules-based Maritime Order in the Indo-Pacific,” JapanIndia Bilateral Dialogue, May 23, 2017, available at http://en.jinf.jp/news/archives/4898

52

Ibid.

53

Brewster, n. 50.

54

As cited by the Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Prime Minister's Office, November 11,
2016.

55

Nilsson-Wright, n. 15.

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Monika Chansoria

the Indo-Pacific, Japan and Australia for sure, will have to find greater prominence, both at thebilateral and multilateral levels. Multilaterally, India, Australia and Japan, notwithstanding theirvery substantive differences in population and economic power56, share an identity informallydefined as ʻmiddle powersʼ. This identity is less rooted in raw, quantifiable expressions of global
and/or regional influence, but more in a common preference for pragmatic decision-making,rejection of doctrinaire policymaking, and support for humanitarian and non-traditional security
cooperation, including a commitment to constructive dispute management and mediation.57
The Third Japan-Australia-India Trilateral Dialogue was held in Canberra in April 2017 toexchanging views on wide ranging issues including regional affairs in the Indo-Pacific and more
specifically on Japan-Australia-India trilateral cooperation. The trilateral arrangement (JapanAustralia-India) will prove to being among the most significant vehicle for shoring up regional
stability, norms and institutions. Expanding cooperation among the partners and synchronizing
capacity building efforts and outreach across the region shall remain future steps that thetrilateral can take to bolster the regional order. A rules-based order should be upheld, but soshould processes, by means of which, all get a say in suggesting how those rules should be set.
Beijing cannot be allowed to undermine a rules-based order, by seeking to replace ʻrule of lawʼand enforce ʻrule of forceʼ. Upholding values of liberalism and democracy should be the ultimate
objectives of the trilateral mechanisms. Perhaps the most vital area where the rule of law needs
to be enforced at present is in the maritime realm – i.e., in maintaining a rule-based maritime
order.58
Co-opting Japan as a permanent member of the Malabar Trilateral Initiative and Indiaʼsaccreditation of its Ambassador to a separate and dedicated diplomatic mission at the ASEAN
are manifestations of Delhiʼs intent. Moreover, India and Japan remain committed to strengthen
the East Asia Summit (EAS) and make it a more dynamic proactive process and platform to
discuss regional political, economic and security issues. New Delhi and Tokyo also are working
towards convening the EAS Ambassadorsʼ meeting in Jakarta and establishment of the EAS Unit
within the ASEAN Secretariat. Maritime cooperation and regional connectivity within the EAS
framework needs to be enhanced further. This only highlights the significance and vitality ofregional architecture through ASEAN-led fora such as ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense
Ministersʼ Meeting Plus, Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum and their coordination to tackle
global and regional challenges including maritime security.59
Corresponding with the “Act East” policy approach and course, the regular dispatch ofwarships, including frontline destroyers and stealth frigates on long overseas deployment to
the Indian Ocean and South China Sea verify Indiaʼs renewed maritime intent.60 The noticeable
presence of the Indian flag on these strategically vital points, reiterates that New Delhi is fully
cognizant of the ongoing movements in its strategic backyard, being a major stakeholder there,
and is all set to emerge as a geared up player on the scene, and not a reluctant one. Given its
7,500 km coastline, 1,200 islands and 2.4 million sq km exclusive economic zone (EEZ), Indiaʼsreorientation and demonstration of being a consistent security partner for the region highlights
56

Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP (2015), The World in 2050. Will the shift in global economic power
continue? p. 3, available at https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050february-2015.pdf

57

T. Wilkins, “Australia and middle power approaches to Asia Pacific regionalism,” Australian Journal of
Political Science, vol. 52, n. 1, 2017.

58

Hall, n. 27.

59

Japan-India Joint Statement, November 11, 2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo; also see, Annual
Report 2015-16 Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

60

Annual Report 2016-17, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

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Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific:
Synergizing Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacificits maritime interests and stakes in the larger Indo-Pacific. Notably, Indiaʼs first Tri-Ser viceAndaman and Nicobar Command in the southeast corner of the bay – lies just 90 miles (145kilometers) from Indonesiaʼs Aceh Province, bordering the strategically vital Strait of Malacca.
The Indo-Japanese-US equation should work towards integrating Australia in the existing
Malabar Trilateral and upgrade it to a Quadrilateral Initiative. The term Indo-Pacific brings India, Japan, Australia and the US into the strategic frame of regional interests, stakes, and reflects
greater institutional involvement. It is well accepted that policy dialogue works best when supported by practical cooperation including the existing bilateral frameworks for security cooperation that should be discussed and promoted to trilateral and quadrilateral initiatives to create aregional order that is flexible, resilient and vital to secure a collective future.61 Australia is alreadyseeking to join this grouping, where it has previously held non-permanent membership. During
a visit to Tokyo in April 2017, Australian Defense Minister, Marise Payne publicly acknowledged
Canberraʼs desire to join the naval maneuvers stating, “Australia is very interested in a quadrilateral engagement with India, Japan and the United States.”62 As the strategic games unfold in theregion, incorporating Australia will prove to being an invaluable asset, and India, US, and Japan
should not hand over a quasi-walkover to nations which are attempting to alter/change the existing status quo in the region, be it in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, or the Himalayanborderlands. It has been confirmed that India will be participating in Australiaʼs multi-lateral air
Exercise Pitch Black in northern Australia in 2018, and Australiaʼs request of participating in themultilateral Malabar maritime exercise to be undertaken by India, Japan, and the United States,
should positively be accepted at the next available opportunity.
The ominous shadow of China has been looming large on the “Quad” since 2007 when
Australiaʼs then government led by Kevin Rudd took the call of withdrawing from the exercises
and accompanying security talks following negative feelers received from Beijing. Today, adecade later, the situation can result differently by means of prudent and futuristic scenariobased thinking and approach. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbullʼs government has
been known to throw its support behind a Japanese initiative to re-establish a security dialogue
between the US, India, Japan and Australia. This underscores that an Indo-Pacific security
structure might just be evolving in reference to another such strengthening equation – namely
between China and Russia. The 2016 Joint Sea naval exercise conducted by Russia and China
was interpreted as maritime signaling by Beijing and Moscow that involved PLAʼs Nanhai Fleet
and was Chinaʼs biggest naval drill with Russia. Also, it was the first time that Russian andChinese naval contingents met for combat drills in the South China Sea, shortly following the
pronouncement of the verdict by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, on the South
China Sea Arbitration initiated by The Philippines. The Russian Navy has co-opted China as a ʻcore
partnerʼ in its new maritime doctrine, indicating shifting realignments in the regional balance ofmaritime politics.

Conclusion
In the above setting, managing Chinaʼs rise shall remain the foremost challenging task forstakeholders. Although, the Peopleʼs Republic of China is more integrated into, and supposedly
more cooperative with global political and economic systems than ever before in its histor y,
growing uneasiness in the Indo-Pacific region are indicators of Chinaʼs increasing economic

61

Transcript, n. 29.

62

Minister for Foreign Affairs statement, Transcript released by the Australian Embassy, Tokyo, April 20,
2017.

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Monika Chansoria

and military power, and lack of Chinaʼs adherence to regional and international norms.63 The
region, by and large, views the problem of Chinaʼs rising power as a root source of instability
in the greater Indo-Pacific region. With a rising regional and global footprint, coupled with astrategic outreach that is being backed by a strong and robust militar y characterized by the
Chinese leadership as being essential in achieving great power status, China today is far more
focused and adept at supporting missions beyond its immediate periphery. This includes power
projection, development and focus of Chinaʼs naval capabilities for long-range naval deployments.
Issues pertaining the South China Sea including land reclamation, landing civilian aircraft andmilitary transport aircraft, and the continued constructions at Chinaʼs military outposts in thisregion shall definitely be the highlight among numerous tensions. Besides, investments in ports
across various locations in the Indo-Pacific stretching from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean
Region have critical strategic ramifications that shall likely shuffle security alignments regionally.
All these coupled with pure military strategies such as anti-access/area-denial capabilities, longrange precision strikes, and surface and undersea operations, will render tensions across the
Indo-Pacific to only rise further.
What seems more and more apparent and ostensible, is Chinaʼs management of leveraging its
growing economic and military power to assert over sovereignty claims with repeated attempts
to change or alter the existing status quo, below the threshold of actual conflict, and bid to create
a new/fresh status quo situation – be it over features in the East China Sea, South China Sea, orover the Himalayan borderlands. By means of balancing and mobilizing economic, technological,
and human resources to translate into military/strategic power64, Chinaʼs domestic politics, has
witnessed pressure on the central government to craft a strong Chinese national identity.
Based on the above geo-strategic graph of events, the Indo-Pacific, calls for enhanced security
cooperation between regional democracies, i.e., India, Japan and Australia. Ensuring that dialogue
participation will remain the lynchpin for mapping out a shared vision for a futuristic Indo-Pacificstrategy, the trilateral must work together to build the political, economic and military capacity ofregional states to retain and exercise their autonomy, defend their interests and identify common
regional security challenges that straddle a geographic space extending from the Indian Ocean to
the Pacific Ocean, and incorporate risks in South, Southeast and Northeast Asia.
Cooperative security shall only be realized when nations develop a sense of a common future,
based upon shared political systems, forms of representation and governance, institutions andvalues that foster a sense of a security based on global commons and rules. Regular militaryand political dialogue, confidence-building and deterrence-enhancing regional exercises will be
crucial in offsetting traditional security threats and challenges. Maritime security and stability
in the Indo-Pacific can be rendered more effective with converging themes in the realms ofmaritime security and cooperation. These will constitute to being the benchmark in identifying
potential challenges in the Indo-Pacific that remain common to major players. Also, it will be
critical in analyzing gaps in the corresponding domestic and regional policy frameworks. Growing
symmetry in defense cooperation will help creating stronger capabilities to deal with common
maritime threats and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region – through enhanced disaster response
and mitigation capacities. Exploring and emphasizing the potential arenas of maritime stability
and security between India and Japan amid the respective triangular equations, i.e., India-JapanUS, and Japan-Australia-India, will be the major regional equations that shall determine thebalance of power and future roadmap of Indo-Pacific security and stability.

63

Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security, vol. 27, no. 4, Spring 2003,
pp. 5-56.

64

Ibid.

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