Emergence of “State-Centrism” in Cyberspace

Emergence of “State-Centrism” in Cyberspace*
Takahisa Kawaguchi**

Abstract

There was a time when cyberspace was regarded as a utopia. The emergence ofcyberspace centered on the Internet and the expansion and deepening of digitalspace were expected to greatly change the established system of sovereignstates. Because cyberspace was to have no national boundaries, it would relativize
the power of sovereign states and lead to a decrease in international conflicts.
Today, however, as there are clear national boundaries in the “flow” and “stock”
of digital information, it is sovereign states that have the most sophisticated cybercapabilities, and the major powers are engaged in conflict in cyberspace andregarding cybersecurity. The ongoing conflict between the US and China overtechnological superiority and the dispute regarding Russian interference in US
elections are problems borne from the expansion and deepening of cyberspace.
“State-centrism” is expanding in cyberspace in the sense that sovereign states
exercise power centered on their national security and strategic competition.

C

Introduction

yberspace―that is, networks to transmit, exchange, and share digital information―is continuing to expand.1 In this process, cyberspace has penetrated every aspect ofsociety and daily life, and brought about changes in communications, industries, theformation of social consensus, and all other fields.
Then, what types of changes is the expansion and deepening of cyberspace causing in
global politics and international relations? How should we grasp global politics and international
relations in cyberspace?
In its earliest stages, cyberspace was perceived as a utopia; because cyberspace was to haveno national boundaries, it would relativize the power of sovereign states and lead to a decrease
in international disputes. Today, however, there are clear national boundaries in digital space, it
is sovereign states that have the most sophisticated cyber capabilities, and the major powers areengaged in conflict in cyberspace and also regarding cybersecurity. The ongoing conflict between
the US and China over technological superiority and the dispute regarding Russian interferencein US elections are both confrontations that emerged because of the expansion and deepening ofcyberspace.
In the sense that sovereign states exercise power centered on security issues and disputes*

This essay was originally published on Kokusai Mondai [International Affairs], No.683 (Jul.-Aug. 2019).

** Takahisa Kawaguchi is Principal Researcher at Research Institute for Strategic and Political Risks,
Tokio Marine & Nichido Risk Consulting Co., Ltd.
1Regarding the deepening and expansion of cyberspace, see Takahisa Kawaguchi, “Kawariyuku saiba
kukan de no senso” [Changing war in cyberspace], in “Gijutsu” ga kaeru senso to heiwa [War and peacebeing changed by “technology”], ed. Narushige Michishita (Fuyo Shobo Shuppan, 2018), pp. 27–39.

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between major powers sometimes arise, “state-centrism” is emerging in cyberspace. Cyberspace“is moving from its halcyon days as an ungoverned stateless commons with only technicalsupervision into a geopolitical arena of intense complexity.”2
Such conditions may be called “a reversion to the world of classical realism.”3 In the world
view of classical realism, the most influential actor is the sovereign state, and the state acts tosurvive and maximize its power. The most important issue is national security, and international
politics is regarded as a power struggle.4
This does not apply only to cyberspace. The present international environment has been
described as “the revenge of geography” (Robert D. Kaplan) and “a revival of Westphaliansovereignty” (Ian Bremmer): a world where the power game among sovereign states is being
fully pursued.
This paper first summarizes cyberspace as a utopia, notes the misunderstandings and realities
regarding national boundaries, power, and disputes in cyberspace, and lastly describes ongoing
disputes in cyberspace among the major powers.

1. Cyberspace as a Utopia
There was a time when cyberspace was grasped as a utopia.
This cyberspace is comprised, at the very least, of (1) the Internet, (2) closed networks thatare not connected to the Internet, and (3) computer terminals, servers, storage media, and otherelectronic devices that are (or can be) connected to the Internet and these other networks.
The Internet is the core element comprising cyberspace, but its history spans half a century
at most (ARPANET, which is the predecessor to the Internet, established packet-switching links
in 1969). The history of commercial use of the Internet is just 30 years long, and during that time
cyberspace has transformed into a backbone supporting social infrastructure, home electronic
devices, and the realm of speech.
It has been noted that the Internet was developed by the US Department of Defense, but thatis not an accurate description. While the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA; renamed
later the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA]) certainly did have a majorrole in the development of the Internet, the operation of ARPANET was actually initiated byresearchers at four universities centered on the west coast of the US.
The design concept for the Internet characterized as “ autonomous, ” “ distributed, ” and5“collaborative” differed from traditional rule by government. The emergence of cyberspacecentered on the Internet, which has no national boundaries or central authority, demanded a
re-evaluation of the roles of state and of government. John Perr y Barlow, the founder of theElectronic Frontier Foundation, criticized legislation to regulate the Internet in the US (theCommunications Decency Act) and published “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”
on February 8, 1996. Barlow argued that cyberspace is a sovereign space where governments
2

Parag Khanna, Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization, (New York: Random House,2016), p.331.

3

Jun Osawa, “The Reversion of Cyberspace to the World of Classical Realism,” Japan SPOTLIGHT (May/
June 2018), pp. 22–24.

4Anthony J. S. Craig and Brandon Valeriano, “Realism and Cyber Conflict: Security in the Digital Age,”in Davide Orsi, J. R. Avgustin, and Max Nurnus eds., Realism in Practice: An Appraisal (Bristol:
E-International Relations, 2018), pp. 85–101. However, while militar y power is emphasized as aconstituent factor of power in classical realism, that characteristic does not apply in cyberspace.

5Motohiro Tsuchiya, “Saiba supesu no gabanansu” [Governance of cyberspace], in Gurobaru komonzu
ni okeru nichibei domei no atarashii kadai [Rising challenges for the Japan-U.S. alliance in the global
commons], analysis report under the Japan Institute of International Affairsʼ fiscal 2013 investigation
and research project on diplomacy and security for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (March 2014).

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Emergence of “State-Centrism” in Cyberspace

could not interfere.
Subsequently, Richard Barbrook noted that the development of the Internet and its culture
have a temporal and geographical bias. He stressed that the Internet was created on the west
coast of the US during the 1960s, and this bias is characterized by “the Californian ideology”
of optimism toward the future, belief in the ability to solve problems using technology, and thecounterculture.6 This geographical and temporal background made cyberspace “utopian.” Incyberspace, there were to be no national boundaries, the state would be relativized, and hence
there would be no international disputes. Even if there were cybercrimes, technology would
resolve all the issues.
In addition, the expansion of cyberspace was in line with the trend toward globalization
following the end of the Cold War. In the “flattened world” depicted by Thomas Friedman, notonly enterprises but also individuals participate in global competition, and the state is relativized.
Many of the factors that cause this flattening̶including telecommunications technologies,
general-use office software, and remote access̶are related to the expansion of cyberspace.7

2. The “Hype” regarding Cyberspace and International Politics

However, the viewpoint of cyberspace as a “utopia” must be said to have been based on a lack ofunderstanding and exaggerated premises regarding cyberspace and international politics: that is,
it was based on “hype.”(1) Are there no boundaries in cyberspace?
The first “hype” is that there are no national boundaries in cyberspace. It is certainly true that
digital information flies back and forth across national boundaries. Companies disperse theirdata centers all over the world, and users can utilize cloud services from anywhere on earth. The
victims of cyberattacks, the servers that send attack orders, the transit points, the actual originsof the attacks, and the nationalities of the attackers all transcend national boundaries.
Nevertheless, each nation claims sovereignty and territoriality in cyberspace (or parts
thereof), and in fact the “flow” and “stock” of digital information is being restrained by nationalboundaries.
As for the “flow,” the fragmentation and Balkanization of the Internet is advancing. This is also
called the “splinternet” in the sense that the original single Internet has become split.
Chinaʼs Golden Shield Internet information censorship and blocking system constitutes acyber Great Wall rising between the domestic Chinese and global Internets. Internet users have
utilized the encryption technology of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to avert censorship andblocking by the authorities, but regulations on the use of VPNs have been reinforced since 2017.
In May 2019, legislation was passed which makes it possible to cut off the Internet in Russia(Runet) from overseas. The Russian government asserts that this legislation is to protect the
Runet from overseas cyberattacks and otherwise secure its continuity.
According to the report “Freedom on the Net” published by the US think tank Freedom
House, a growing number of countries are imposing restrictions on user access and contents.
Eric Schmidt, director of Alphabet, the holding company for Google has expressed concerns that
if such regulations advance, then the global Internet may be transformed into a connected series

6

Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron, “The Californian Ideology,” Science as Culture, Vol. 6, No. 1(January 1996), pp. 44–72.

7

Thomas Friedman, Furattoka suru sekai: Keizai no daitenkan to ningen no mirai, trans. Iwan Fushimi(Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 2006). Originally published as The World is Flat: A Brief History of theTwenty-First Century.

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Takahisa Kawaguchiof nation-state networks.8
The regulation of “stock,” that is, of where information will be stored, is also clear. According
to one survey, countries are prohibiting the transfer of financial and settlement data, personaldata, communications data, corporate confidential information, and various other data outside of
their borders.9
This issue is not a simple structure of opposition between liberalism and authoritarianism (asdiscussed below). The Europe Union and Brazil, for example, prohibit the transfer of personal
data outside their territories in order to protect privacy. China, Vietnam, and other countries
require foreign enterprises conducting business in their countries to locate servers that store
communications data, logs (records), and other important confidential information domestically,
mostly for security, law enforcement, and the promotion of domestic industry. While the purposesfor obstructing data transfer var y from countr y to countr y, this trend is referred to as “datalocalization.”Why can the state exercise sovereignty and territoriality in cyberspace (or parts thereof)?
This is because cyberspace depends on physical infrastructure, and most physical infrastructure
depends on territory and territorial seas. Digital information is stored on servers and at data
centers, which exist within the soil of some countr y (recently, it is also being considered tolocate data centers in territorial seas). More than 99% of international telecommunications on theInternet is via undersea cables which connect to land at the coastline of each country. Undersea
cables themselves are laid on the seabed in international waters and are frequently jointly owned
by companies in multiple countries, but their landing points and terrestrial sections at least lie
within the territory of one country or another.
These obser vations are by no means new. Already in 2006, Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu
argued it is an illusion that cyberspace has no national boundaries, and noted that the stateʼsmandator y power functions in cyberspace. 10 The fact that cyberspace depends on physicalinfrastructure is the basis whereby states exert (or can exert) sovereignty and territoriality incyberspace; cyberspace fragmentation and data localization are the results of the exercise of state
power.
(2) Is the power of the sovereign state relativized in cyberspace?
The second “hype” is that the power of the sovereign state is relativized in cyberspace. The stateʼsmonopoly on information and technology is destroyed, with individuals, enterprises, criminals,
and terrorists all gaining power. Joseph Nye calls this development the “diffusion of power.” Heargues that the asymmetry of power between states and non-state actors is shrinking from theadvance of technology.11
The combined sales of Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple (GAFA) total more than ¥70
trillion, surpassing the annual tax revenues of Japan, which is the worldʼs third largest economy.12
It is private-sector enterprises that operate the Internet and cyberspace.
8

Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, Daigo no kenryoku: Google ni wa mieteiru mirai, trans. Yuko Sakurai(Diamond-sha, 2014), p.129. Originally published as The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of
People, Nations and Business.

9

Nigel Cor y, “Cross-Border Data Flows: Where Are the Barriers, and What Do They Cost?” The
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (May 2017).

10Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006). Wu is famous for coining the term “network neutrality.”

11

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Cyber Power, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University(May 2010).

12“Bocho GAFA: Kokka ga gyakushu (bundan no sakini)” [Expanded GAFA: State counterattacks (after
the division)], Nihon Keizai Shimbun (March 10, 2019).

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Emergence of “State-Centrism” in Cyberspace

Cyberattacks are not the exclusive pur view of nation states: they can be carried out bycriminals, terrorists, and ultimately by individuals. By using encrypted messaging applications
such as Signal and the encrypted network technology Tor, telecommunications contents andconnection routes can be concealed, averting government surveillance (or so it is believed).
However, it is sovereign states which hold the most refined cyber capabilities, and looking
back over the past 10 years, states were involved in most of the cyberattacks that had the greatest
impact. It is highly likely that there was state involvement in Stuxnet (2010) which destroyed
centrifuges at Iranian nuclear facilities, wide-ranging power outages in Ukraine (2015, 2016),
interference in the US presidential election (2016), and the global spread of the ransomware
WannaCry and NotPetya (2017), as well as the cyberattacks and big data collection that targeted
the Japan Pension Service (2015),13 the US Office of Personnel Management (2015), a leading US
hotel chain (2018), and the Singapore governmentʼs medical database (2018).
Richard Bejtlich, who worked as the chief security officer at the US cybersecurity company
Mandiant, notes that signal intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities are “one of the differentiators
between nation state groups and other hacking units” in cyberspace. SIGINT capabilities that canintercept a large volume of Internet communications are an asset held only by nation states.14
Law enforcement is also a feature held only by the state. Under the Clarifying Lawful Overseas
Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, Washington can access data held by enterprises across nationalboundaries, and under the Cybersecurity Law, Beijing can access information stored on servers
inside mainland China. GAFA and other enterprises “stock” massive data, but the sovereign state
has superiority from the standpoint of “access” to data.15
While the asymmetry of power between states and non-state actors in cyberspace is certainly
narrowing, the superiority of the sovereign state in sophisticated and continuous cyberattacks,
data access, and other fields should not be overlooked.
(3) Does the expansion and deepening of cyberspace decrease international conflicts?
The third “hype ” is that the expansion and deepening of cyberspace reduces international
disputes. There are a few arguments regarding this point. One is that information technology
itself will analyze social dynamics and the causes of disputes, predict the escalation of violence,and be helpful at times in conflict resolution and peace building. In a discussion with UN Assistant
Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jane Holl Lute, Vint Cerf, who is recognized as
one of the fathers of the Internet, suggested the potential contribution of technology because
insight into the origins of conflicts is essential for conflict resolution.16
Another argument is that the expansion and deepening of cyberspace and the spread of
the Internet in particular will promote the democratization of society and that if the number of
democratic states increases, then wars will decrease. While this paper does not address the pros
13

Although the government of Japan has not attributed the attacker in the Japan Pension Service case,according to the Macnica Networks report, itʼs obvious that the source of the attack was somewhere
inside China. Macnica Networks, Hyoteki gata kogeki no jittai to taisaku apurochi: Nihon wo osottadaikibo na saiba supai katsudo no jittai chosa [Advanced Persistent Threat: A Survey of Large-Scale
Cyber Spy Activities against Japan], 1st ed. (June 2016).

14

Richard Bejtlich (@taosecurity), tweets at 00:50, October 5, 2018.

15

However, there is also the opinion that big-tech companies have superiority in “access” as well. For
example, the US government probably does not have a full grasp of what types of data are being
collected and stored by enterprises and where the data are located. Without that information, thedata cannot be accessed. This was noted by Koichiro Komiyama of the Japan Computer Emergency
Response Team Coordination Center (May 7, 2019).

16

Laura Ralston, “Can the Internet Solve Conflict?” The World Bank Blog (August 10, 2014); “Entrepreneurs
Hunt for ʻPeace Techʼ to Defuse Conflict,” United States Institute of Peace (September 24, 2014).

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Takahisa Kawaguchi

and cons of the democratic peace theory, even if one hypothetically accepts that wars do notbreak out among democratic states, it is questionable that the spread of the Internet advances
democratization.
The Internet and other technologies do not always resolve conflicts and do not necessarily
democratize society. That is because technologies are value neutral. In areas that seek freedom
and democracy, they become tools for their pursuit, but authoritarian governments use theInternet and other information technologies as means for social control. 17 China ʼ s facialrecognition and tracking technologies which it uses domestically and exports to European andother countries and its Social Credit System are typical examples. The Internet and related
information technologies can be used as means of conflict resolution, but they can also be used
to incite conflict and for mobilization, as demonstrated by the use of websites and social media by
the “Islamic State” extreme terrorist organization to instigate terrorism in foreign countries andrecruit “foreign fighters.” How the expansion and deepening of cyberspace reduces international
disputes is merely one aspect of the technology.

3. Great Power Competition in Cyberspace
Today, sovereignty and territoriality are being claimed even in cyberspace, and sovereign states
are maintaining superior power in that realm. The expansion and deepening of cyberspace is
not necessarily decreasing international conflicts, and is actually sparking new disputes in somecases.
(1) The US-China dispute regarding 5G and trade secrets
The US and China are presently in conflicts regarding cybersecurity issues. Specifically, these
are the issue of excluding Chinese enterprises from the construction and operation of the fifth
generation mobile telecommunications system (5G)̶which is characterized by high speed andlarge capacity, low latency, and multi-connectivity̶and the issue of the theft of trade secrets,
intellectual property, and other assets of private enterprises via cyberattacks, etc. The US positionis that the problems are (1) the Chinese government is collecting confidential information via
Chinese enterprises, and (2) the Chinese government is engaged in cyberattacks targeting US
private-sector enterprises. Moreover, the targets of cyberattacks by the Chinese government tosteal confidential information overlap with Chinaʼs “strategic emerging industries” (12th Five-YearPlan) and “10 key industries” (Made in China 2025).18
In 2018, the Donald Trump administration began to criticize Beijing, claiming that China wasconducting ongoing cyberattacks on US private-sector enterprises. On October 4, Vice President
Mike Pence criticized Beijing from start to finish in a nearly hour-long speech at the Hudson
Institute. In addition to cyberattacks, Penceʼs speech covered a wide range of topics including
election meddling, religious oppression, land reclamation in the South China Sea, and overseas
investment that lacks transparency.
Throughout 2018, US authorities filed charges against officers of Chinaʼs Ministry of State
Security (MSS) and regional organizations under the MSS, the hacking group “APT10” which is
linked to the MSS, and other Chinese enterprises and entities one after another for stealing trade
secrets and intellectual property from US enterprises.
On Januar y 28, 2019, the US Department of Justice announced charges against Huawei
Device and its US subsidiary. The two firms were suspected of stealing trade secrets related to17

Ian Bremmer, “Democracy in Cyberspace: What Information Technology Can and Cannot Do,” Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6 (November/December 2010), pp. 86–92.

18

Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, Februar y 2013; Operation Cloud
Hopper: Exposing a Systematic Hacking Operation with an Unprecedented Web of Global Victims, PwC &BAE Systems (April 2017).

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Emergence of “State-Centrism” in Cyberspace

the quality testing robot Tappy owned by T-Mobile US, which is the US subsidiary of a leading
German telecommunications firm. On that same day, in a separate case, the Department ofJustice announced charges related to sanctions on Iran against Huawei Technologies, its Chief
Financial Officer and Deputy Chairwoman Meng Wanzhou, Huawei Deviceʼs US subsidiary, andSkycom Tech.
But what gave an even greater shock than Penceʼs speech or the criminal charges was
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which was passed into law with
President Trumpʼs signature on August 13, 2018. Section 889 of this Act excluded specified
Chinese enterprises. Specifically, it excluded from US government procurement (1) specified
Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturers, (2) finished products assembled fromcomponents manufactured by these companies, and (3) companies using products manufacturedby these companies. The five Chinese companies specified were Huawei Technologies, ZTE, theworldʼs largest surveillance camera manufacturer Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, theleading facial recognition technology manufacturer Dahua Technology, and the leading mobile
radio systems firm Hytera Communications. With the exclusion of these enterprises from US
government procurement, many corporations will be forced to greatly revise their supply chains.
Furthermore, Washington expanded the powers of the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS) to review and regulate the foreign investments in the US more broadly
than in the past.
Beijing criticized these responses by Washington as baseless. At the Mobile World Congress
held in Barcelona in February 2019, Huawei Technologies Rotating CEO Guo Ping criticized
the US. Borrowing from the famous lines about the magical mirror in the fair y tale SnowWhite, Guo said, “Prism, prism on the wall, who is the most trustworthy of them all? It is a very
important question and if you donʼt answer that, you can go and ask Edward Snowden.” PRISM
is a surveillance program operated by the US National Security Agency (NSA) that was disclosed
illegally by Snowden whereby NSA employees can search and collect metadata (data pertaining
to data) from the Web mail and other services of US Internet companies.
The conflict between the US and China in 5G construction and procurement is deeply rooted.
The National Intelligence Law of the Peopleʼs Republic of China (in effect from June 28, 2017)̶
which stipulates in Article 7 that any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperatewith the state intelligence work in accordance with the law, and keep the secrets of the national
intelligence work known to the public19̶is believed to be one reason for the concerns heldby Washington and its allies regarding Beijing. Vice President Penceʼs speech at the Munich
Security Conference (February 16, 2019) explicitly and the Australian governmentʼs decision on
5G procurement policy (August 23, 2018) implicitly showed deep concerns regarding Beijingʼsaccess to confidential information via Chinese enterprises.
However, it is overly simplistic to say that Washingtonʼs response changed because of Chinaʼs
National Intelligence Law. Information theft by Chinese entities is not a problem that suddenly
arose after the start of the Trump administration. There was bipartisan support in the US
Congress for making a strong response to Beijing and the alarm had already been sounded backin 2012.20
The US-China cybersecurity problem which emerged from 2013 is the background to the19

Shigako Okamura, “Chugoku no kokka joho ho” [National Intelligence Law of China], Gaikoku no rippo[Foreign legislation], no. 274 (December 2017), pp. 64–75.

20

The October 8, 2012 report by the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee onIntelligence warns that the equipment provided by Huawei Technologies and ZTE poses a national
security risk to the US, and that the US government should not use equipment from either of thesecompanies.

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exclusion of Chinese enterprises over 5G.21 This issue is that a government steals trade secrets
and intellectual property from foreign private companies for the purpose of gaining commercial
advantages. In September 2015, Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping agreed “that neither
countr yʼs government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual
property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent ofproviding competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”22
Thereafter, however, cyberattacks from China targeting US enterprises did not decline. From
the US side, this remains an unresolved issue despite the September 2015 agreement, that is,
despite the commitment expressed by President Xi.
(2) The US-Russia dispute regarding elections and democracy
A dispute in cyberspace has also emerged between Washington and Moscow. US-Russian
relations had grown tense over the Ukraine crisis (2014–), the Russian intervention in Syria (2015),
the use of a Novichok nerve agent in the UK (2018), and other issues, but these were conflicts
that occurred in American allies or third countries. It was the Russian interference in the 2016 US
presidential election that directly harmed present US-Russian relations and occurred on American
soil.
The Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election can be broadly divided into
three methods: (1) the theft and strategic disclosure of confidential information regarding
candidates and political parties via cyberspace, (2) the distribution of false information andpolitical advertising on social media and other channels, and (3) disruptive cyberattacks on voting
and other election infrastructure.23 Incidentally, suspicions of collusion between the Russian
government and the Trump camp were not confirmed in the investigative report by special
counsel Robert Mueller (March 2019).
The report (declassified version) by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence(ODNI) stated, “We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russiaʼs goals were to undermine public faith in the
US democratic process, denigrate Secretar y Clinton, and harm her electability and potential
presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference
for President-elect Trump. We have high confidence in these judgments” based on classified
information and open source information.24 Furthermore, the governments of the UK, Australia,
the Netherlands, and Canada all concluded that the Russian government was responsible for the
cyberattacks against Clintonʼs campaign and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 2016.

21

For details, see Takahisa Kawaguchi, “Saiba sekyuriti wo meguru beichu tairitsu: Chiseigaku risuku ni
kigyo wa do taiji subekika” [US-China confrontation over cybersecurity: How should enterprises handle
geopolitical risk?], Risuku manejimento today [Risk management today], no. 113 (March 2019), pp. 4–8.

22

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinpingʼs State Visit to theUnited States” (September 25, 2015).

23

For details, see Takahisa Kawaguchi and Motohiro Tsuchiya, Gendai no senkyo kainyu to nihon
deno sonae: Saiba kogeki to SNS jo no eikyo kosaku ga kaeru senkyo kainyu [Contemporary election
interference and our preparedness in Japan: The impact of cyber attacks and influence operations onsocial networks], Tokio Marine & Nichido Risk Consulting (January 28, 2019), appendixes 1 and 2,
http://www.tokiorisk.co.jp/service/politics/rispr/pdf/pdf-rispr-01.pdf.

24“Background to ʻAssessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Electionsʼ: The Analytic
Process and Cyber Incident Attribution,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence (January 6,2017), p. ii.

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Thereafter, three indictments25 charged the Main Directorate of the General Staff of theArmed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU), its cyber espionage group Fancy Bear (alsoknown as APT28), the Internet Research Agency (IRA), which is a company located in SaintPetersburg, and other organizations and individuals, and they were subjected to economic
sanctions by the US Department of the Treasury.
Among the acts of interference in the 2016 US presidential election, the Obama administration
was aware of the cyberattacks on Democratic Party organs and election infrastructure from a
relatively early stage during the presidential campaign. However, the awareness of the threat ofthe distribution of political propaganda and disinformation via Russian media outlets (RT, Sputnik,etc.) and via social media during the campaign was insufficient.26
As Facebook, Twitter, and other social media came to be recognized as venues for electoral
activities and consensus formation, intentional obstruction and manipulation of elections on social
media and other platforms by foreign governments were positioned as a national security issue.
This situation is named “LikeWar” by P. W. Singer.27 What Russia hacked was not only Democratic
Party organs and election infrastructure but also the sentiment and voting behavior of theAmerican citizen, and ultimately their democracy.
Following the 2016 US presidential election, inter ference by foreign governments was
confirmed in the November 2018 US mid-term elections as well. The US intelligence community
investigated interference in the mid-term elections based on Executive Order 13848. They
concluded that while they were unable to confirm “any compromise of our nation ʼs election
infrastructure that would have prevented voting, changed vote counts, or disrupted the ability
to tally votes,” they did confirm that “Russia, and other foreign countries, including China andIran, conducted influence activities and messaging campaigns.”28 These influence operations are
becoming the “new normal.”(3) US-Europe confrontation
The axes of confrontation in cyberspace run not only between the open liberal societies andclosed autocratic societies. While the US and European countries fundamentally share thesame standpoints regarding cybersecurity, they are in confrontation in several fields. Alec Ross,
who served as the principal Internet policy advisor for the Department of State in the Obamaadministration, said that while “the great struggles of the 20th century were between left andright, the conflict of the 21st century will be between open and closed.”29 The US and Europe arein conflict with different positions on “open” and “closed,” depending on the field.
25

U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Virginia, Indictment, Case 1:18-MJ-464 (September 28, 2018);
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Indictment, Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF (Februar y 16,2018); U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Indictment, Case 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ (July 13,2018).

26

For example, while election interference by Russia was first publicly mentioned at the October 7, 2016
joint press conference by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and Secretary of Homeland
Security Jeh Johnson, this only referred to cyberattacks on the Democratic Party organs and election
infrastructure. For details, see Kawaguchi and Tsuchiya, Op. Cit., appendixes.

27

P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media (New York: Eamon
Dolan / Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018).

28

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “DNI Coats Statement on the Intelligence Communityʼs
Response to Executive Order 13848 on Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference
in a United States Election” (December 21, 2018).

29

Will Englund, “Russia hears an argument for Web freedom,” The Washington Post (October 28, 2011).
However, what Ross had in mind was the opposition between open societies such as in Europe and the
US and the closed societies of China, Russia, etc.

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Takahisa Kawaguchi

The US and Europe, and Japan as well, are in agreement that the existing internationallaw applies in cyberspace. They have confirmed that stance at the United Nations Group ofGovernmental Experts (GGE) and at the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrialized nations, andin bilateral and multilateral agreements.
However, the US and Europe have clear differences regarding the regulation of personal data.
In light of the collection of vast amounts of personal data by Facebook, Google, and other platform
companies and the sur veillance programs whose existence was revealed illegally by Edward
Snowden, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entered into force in May 2018. In
this regard, it would be appropriate to say that the EU, which prohibits the transfer of personal
data to outside the region in principle, is “closed,” while the US, which has no such restriction, is
30“open.”
What is more, the US has warned its European allies that it will no longer be able to shareclassified information with them if they allow Huawei Technologies to participate in their 5G
procurement activities. Regarding this issue of excluding Chinese enterprises from 5G, while the
US has designated specific Chinese companies, the UKʼs policy is apparently that the risk canbe acceptable and managed even if Chinese firms participate. More precisely, the UK seems toconsider that because the security of 5G cannot be ensured by excluding certain companies, acombination of various methods such as monitoring and countermeasures is effective. Here, we
can see an axis of opposition between a “closed” US and an “open” Europe.
Of course, “open” does not always mean “good.” In national security and other fields, there arecases where “closed” is appropriate.

Conclusion
There was a time when the appearance of cyberspace centered on the Internet, and the expansion
and deepening of cyberspace, were expected to greatly change the established system ofsovereign states. However, cyberspace proved to be no great exception to the existing sovereignstate system from the perspectives of national boundaries, asymmetry of power, and international
disputes in cyberspace. The emerging disputes between major powers are disputes regarding thetheft of confidential information in cyberspace and interference in elections via cyberspace: they
are problems arising from the expansion and deepening of cyberspace.
“State-centrism” is expanding in cyberspace in the sense that sovereign states exercise
power centered on their national security, and there are cases where disputes and confrontations
between major powers are occurring.

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But the state of California, where many US information technology companies are located, passed theCalifornia Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, which takes effect from January 2020. Moreover, there are
frequent discussions regarding a comprehensive privacy bill at the federal law level.

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