The Japan-U.S. Dialogue
China Risks and China Opportunities― Implications for the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” ―Conference Papers

March 2, 2018
Tokyo, Japan

Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Co-Sponsored byCarnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP)
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

Rules of Proceedings
Keynote Speech: 15 minutes
Presentations: 10 minutes
Allocated time is 15 minutes for a keynote speech and 10 minutes for a presentation.
One of the staff members will ring a bell to let you know the remaining time.
The first bell------------------1 minute remaining for your presentation

The second bell--------------The end of your presentation

Comments in Free Discussions: 2 minutes
Allocated time for a comment is 2 minutes.
One of the staff members will ring a bell to let you know the remaining time.
The first bell------------------1 minute remaining for your comment

The second bell--------------The end of your commentThank you for your cooperation.

Table of Contents

1. Program .................................................................................................................. 1
2. Biographies of the Panelists ................................................................................. 3
3. Presentation Papers ............................................................................................... 6
Session I: China’s Strategy and Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region ....................................... 6
KAWASHIMA Shin ................................................................................................................................. 6
Michael SWAINE ................................................................................................................................... 12
IIDA Masafumi ...................................................................................................................................... 17
Mira RAPP-HOOPER ............................................................................................................................ 18
ITO Asei .................................................................................................................................................. 21

Session II: How Should Japan and the United States Respond? ........................................ 22
Evans REVERE ....................................................................................................................................... 22
HOSOYA Yuichi ..................................................................................................................................... 24
James SCHOFF ....................................................................................................................................... 25
OBA Mie .................................................................................................................................................. 31
Nicolas SZECHENYI ............................................................................................................................. 32

4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations .......................... 34(1) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) ....................................................................................... 34(2) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) .................................................... 35(3) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) ........................................................ 36

1. Program
日米対話／The Japan-U.S. Dialogue

チャイナ・リスクとチャイナ・オポチュニティ―「自由で開かれたインド太平洋戦略」へのインプリケーション―

China Risks and China Opportunities--Implications for the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy-2018 年 3 月 2 日／March 2, 2018
国際文化会館「講堂」／”Lecture Hall,” International House of Japan
主催／Sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム／The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
共催／Co-sponsored by
米カーネギー国際平和財団／Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP)
公益財団法人日本国際フォーラム／The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
開会挨拶／Opening Remarks
14:00-14:10

開会挨拶（５分間）

渡辺

繭

GFJ 執行世話人／JFIR 専務理事

Opening Remarks (5 min.)WATANABE Mayu, President, GFJ / Senior Executive Director, JFIR

セッションⅠ／Session I
14:10-15:55

インド太平洋地域における中国の戦略と政策
China’s Strategy and Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region

議長

神谷

万丈 防衛大学校教授／GFJ 有識者世話人／JFIR 理事・上席研究員

KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Academic Governor, GFJ /Chairperson
Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

基調講演（15 分間）

川島真

東京大学教授Keynote Speech (15 min.)KAWASHIMA Shin, Professor, the University of Tokyo

報告 A（10 分間）

マイケル・スウェイン

Paper Presenter A (10 min.)Michael SWAINE, Senior Fellow, CEIP

報告 B（10 分間）

飯田

Paper Presenter B (10 min.)IIDA Masafumi, Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies

報告 C（10 分間）

ミラ・ラップ－フーパー

Paper Presenter C (10 min.)Mira RAPP-HOOPER, Senior Research Scholar in Law, Yale Law School

報告 D（10 分間）

伊藤

Paper Presenter D (10 min.)ITO Asei, Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo

自由討議（50 分）

出席者全員

Free Discussion (50 min.)All Participants

カーネギー国際平和財団上級研究員

将史 防衛研究所主任研究官
イェール大学法科大学院上級研究員

亜聖 東京大学准教授

休憩／Break

15:55-16:15

1

セッションⅡ／Session II
16:15-17:50

日米はいかに対応すべきか？
How Should Japan and the United States Respond?

議長

神谷

万丈 防衛大学校教授／GFJ 有識者世話人／JFIR 理事・上席研究員

KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Academic Governor, GFJ /Chairperson
Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

基調講演（15 分間）

エヴァンス・リヴィア

オルブライト・ストンブリッジ・グループ上級顧問

Keynote Speech (15 min.)Evans REVERE, Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group

報告 A（10 分間）

細谷

Paper Presenter A (10 min.)HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University

報告 B（10 分間）

ジェームズ・ショフ

Paper Presenter B (10 min.)James SCHOFF, Senior Fellow, CEIP

報告 C（10 分間）

大庭

Paper Presenter C (10 min.)

OBA Mie, Professor, Tokyo University of Science

報告 D（10 分間）

ニコラス・セーチェーニ

Paper Presenter D (10 min.)Nicholas SZECHENYI, Deputy Director, Japan Chair, CSIS

自由討議（40 分）

出席者全員

Free Discussion (40 min.)All Participants

雄一 慶応義塾大学教授
カーネギー国際平和財団上級研究員

三枝 東京理科大学教授
米戦略国際問題研究所日本部副部長

総括セッション／Wrap-up Session
17:50-18:00

ジェームズ・ショフ
総括 （10 分間）

カーネギー国際平和財団上級研究員

James SCHOFF, Senior Fellow, CEIP

神谷

万丈 防衛大学校教授／GFJ 有識者世話人／JFIR 理事・上席研究員

Wrap-up (10 min.)KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Academic Governor, GFJ / Director
and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR[NOTE] 日本語・英語同時通訳付き／English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided.

22. Biographies of the Panelists【U.S. Side】
Michael SWAINE

Senior Fellow, CEIP

Michael SWAINE is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent
American analysts in Chinese security studies. Formerly a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, Swaine is a
specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations. He has
authored and edited more than a dozen books and monographs and many journal articles and book chapters in theseareas, directs several security-related projects with Chinese partners, and advises the U.S. government on Asian security
issues. He received his doctorate in government from Harvard University.

Mira RAPP-HOOPER

Senior Research Scholar in Law, Yale Law School

Mira RAPP-HOOPER is a Senior Research Scholar in Law at Yale Law School, as well as a Senior Fellow at Yale’s Paul Tsai
China Center. She studies and writes on US-China relations and national security issues in Asia. Dr. RAPP-HOOPER wasformerly a Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a
Fellow with the CSIS Asia Program, and the Director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. She was also a
Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. RAPP-HOOPER’s academic writings haveappeared in Political Science Quarterly, Security Studies, and Survival. Her policy writings have appeared in The National
Interest, Foreign Affairs, and The Washington Quarterly, and her analysis has been featured in The New York Times, The
Washington Post, and on NPR, MSNBC, and the BBC. Dr. RAPP-HOOPER was the Asia Policy Coordinator for the 2016
Hillary Clinton presidential campaign. She is a David Rockefeller Fellow of the Trilateral Commission, an associate editor
with the International Security Studies Forum, and a senior editor at War on the Rocks. She holds a B.A. in history from
Stanford University and an M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University.

Evans REVERE

Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group

Evans REVERE is a Senior Advisor at the Albright Stonebridge Group. He is also Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings,
where he focuses on the Korean Peninsula. During a distinguished career as one of the U.S. Department of State’s top Asia
hands, he served as Acting Assistant Secretary and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs. His diplomatic career included service at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and also in China, Taiwan, and Japan. Hiscommentary on North Korea and on Asian affairs is highly sought after by leading media outlets in the United States, Asia,
and Europe. Mr. REVERE is a graduate of Princeton University, a U.S. Air Force veteran, and a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations. He is fluent in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.

James SCHOFF

Senior Fellow, CEIP

James SCHOFF is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on U.S.-Japan
relations and regional engagement, Japanese security policy, and the private sector’s role in Japanese policymaking. He
previously served as senior adviser for East Asia policy at the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and as director of
Asia Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA). Prior to IFPA, he was program officer in charge ofpolicy studies at the United States-Japan Foundation, following six years living in Japan and other parts of Asia working
in the fields of business, education, and journalism. SCHOFF’s publications include Uncommon Alliance for the Common
Good: The United States and Japan after the Cold War (Carnegie, 2017) and “What Myanmar Means for the U.S.-Japan
Alliance,” (Carnegie, 2014).

Nicholas SZECHENYI

Deputy Director, Japan Chair, CSIS

Nicholas SZECHENYI is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS). His research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and U.S. strategy in Asia. Prior to joining CSIS in
2005, he was a news producer for Fuji Television where he covered domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy in Asia. He
holds an M.A. in international economics and Japan studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. in Asian studies from Connecticut College.
(In order of appearance)3

【Japanese Side】
WATANABE Mayu

President, GFJ / Senior Executive Director, JFIR

Graduated from Chiba University. Received M.A. in Education from the Graduate School of the University of Tokyo in
1997. Joined the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) in 2000 and appointed to Senior Research Fellow in 2007,
during which period she specialized in global human resource development and public diplomacy. Appointed to
Executive Director in 2011 and assumed the current position since 2017. Concurrently serving as Acting Vice-President of
the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).

KAMIYA Matake

Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Academic Governor, GFJ /Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIRKAMIYA Matake is concurrently adjunct research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Member of theBoard of Directors of the Japan Association for International Security. . He served as Distinguished Research Fellow at theCentre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, during 1994-1995, and and as editor-in-chief of Discuss Japan - Japan Foreign
Policy Forum from 2013 to 2016. He has published extensively on international relations, Asia-Pacific security, U.S.-Japansecurity relations, and Japanese foreign and security policies including Japan’s non-nuclear policy. He is co-editor of
Introduction to Security Studies, 4th edition, (Aki-shobo, 2009), the most widely read textbook on security studies in Japan(Chinese and Korean translations have been published). His English-language publications include "The U.S.-Japan
Alliance: Enhancer or Brake on Japan’s power?" (Japan’s World Power, Routledge, 2017), “Strong, but Worrying: The
U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Trump Era” (The National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 2017), “Realistic Proactivism:
Japanese Attitudes Toward Global Zero” (Stimson Center, 2009), and articles in The Washington Quarterly and Arms
Control Today among others. He is a graduate of the University of Tokyo, and Columbia University (as a Fulbright
grantee).

KAWASHIMA Shin

Professor, the University of TokyoKAWASHIMA Shin is the professor of the Department of International Relations, the Graduate School of Arts & Sciences,
the University of Tokyo. He teaches the history of international relations in East Asia at Komaba Campus. He was
educated at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (B.A.1992) and the University of Tokyo (Oriental history, M.A., 1992
and Ph.D, 2000). He taught at Hokkaido University’s Department of Politics, Faculty of Law during 1998-2006 before
moving to the University of Tokyo in 2006. He served as a visiting scholar at the Academia Sinica in Taipei (Institute ofModern History, 1995-96), the Beijing Center for Japanese Studies (vice director, 2000-2001), National Chengchi University
in Taipei (department of history, 2005) and Beijing University (department of history, 2005), and Awarded Japan Scholar at
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2009). He has studied Chinese diplomatic history based on Chinese
diplomatic archives. His first book, the Formation of Chinese Modern Diplomacy (Nagoya University Press, 2004), wasawarded the Suntory Academic Prize in 2004.

IIDA Masafumi

Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies

IIDA Masafumi holds a B.A. in Policy Management and M.A. in Media and Governance from Keio University, in addition
to an M.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University. He has held various positions within NIDS, and most recently
was assigned as Senior Staff to the Defense Policy Bureau within the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD). Additionally,
he has completed a term as a Visiting Scholar with the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University in 2010 andwith the China Maritime Studies Institute at U.S. Naval War College in 2014. Professor Iida has focused his research
primarily on China’s foreign and security policies and in particular, the growing maritime implications of this relationshipwithin East Asia.

ITO Asei

Associate Professor, the University of TokyoITO Asei is associate professor at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. He obtained PhD in Economics from
Graduate school of Economics, University of Keio, Japan. His research covers the Chinese industrial development, China’s
outward FDI activities, and innovation in China and Asia. He is the author of Industrial Clusters in Contemporary China:“The Workshop of the World” and A Bottom-up Economic Development (the University of Nagoya Press, 2015, inJapanese) and China Unmanned Aerial System Industry Report 2017: An emerging industry from an emerging economy(the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, in Japanese), and one of co-editors of China’s Outward Foreign Direct
Investment Data (University of Tokyo, 2014, in English) and Understanding Contemporary China: Lecture Series at the
University of Tokyo (University of Tokyo Press, 2014, in Japanese).

4

HOSOYA Yuichi

Professor, Keio University

Received his M.I.S. from the University of Birmingham and Ph.D. from Keio University. He is also Senior Researcher at
Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and at the Tokyo Foundation (TKFD). Served as Visiting Professor andJapan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009–10), Visiting Fellow at Princeton University (2008–2009). His research interests
include the postwar international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international
security. He was a member of Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (2013-14),
and a member of Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities (2013), in which capacity
he assisted to draft Japan’s first National Security Strategy.

OBA Mie

Professor, Tokyo University of Science

Graduated from International Christian University in 1991. Received M.A. in 1994 and Ph.D. in 2002 from the Universityof Tokyo. Served as Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at Nanyang Technological
University in Singapore (2004), Academic Associate, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Harvard University (2006-2007),and Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Science (2007-2014) before assuming current position in 2014．Her major isInternational Relations and the politics in Asia-Pacific. Her current research interests include the development ofregionalism in this region as well as theories of regional integration and regionalism.
(In order of appearance)

53. Presentation Papers
Session I: China's Strategy and Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region

Keynote Speech
Chinese Strategy and Regional Order
KAWASHIMA Shin
Professor, the University of Tokyo

6

(Continued from the previous page)7

(Continued from the previous page)8

(Continued from the previous page)9

(Continued from the previous page)10

(Continued from the previous page)

[END]

11

Presentation A

China Risk and China Opportunity
China’s Strategy and Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region
Michael SWAINE
Senior Fellow, CEIP
China, the US and the Global Order: What Order?
The U.S. Trump Administration has recently issued statements and strategy documents that for the firsttime define China as a “predatory” and “revisionist” power that is directly seeking to replace the existing “freeworld order” with a “repressive world order.”This supposed fundamental threat to Western values and interests is only vaguely defined at best, withreferences made here and there to threats to: the rules-based international order, the sovereignty of smaller
powers, predatory economic practices, universal political values, and free access to the maritime global commons.
Nowhere is a serious effort made in these policy sources to define what a “free world order” consists ofspecifically, much less to provide substantive, fact-based evidence of China’s categorical violation of that order as
a whole, as alleged.
In fact, one can take issue with the notion that a clearly understood “free world order” or “liberalinternational order” actually exists as a coherent entity.

Observers in different countries define it in various

ways, according to their frame of reference and priorities.

Also, observers disagree significantly over what

constitutes a clear violation of key elements of such an order.
These differences relate in part to the basic question of whether and to what degree any such order exists
independently of the major powers that played the largest role in creating its supposed norms.

If the global

order only derives from the views of those powers, then presumably only they can define its rules and bydefinition are incapable of violating it, a clearly preposterous stance.
In fact, the US can itself be shown to be in violation of or opposed to some elements of what many might
consider to be part of the LIO, e.g., The International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, theapplication of political and economic sanctions and trade barriers in apparent violation of the WTO and the UN
system, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 without UN authorization, and certain maritime claims in the South Pacificin apparent violation of UNCLOS.

And Congressional opposition, on sovereignty grounds, to a range of humanrights or arms control related agreements has led to cases where the US signs agreements but then does not ratify
them.

UNCLOS is a perfect example.

12

(Continued from the previous page)
At the same time, the US can also be seen to agree with China on specific elements of what many would
consider to be the core of the current global order, e.g., the central

importance of sovereignty in developing

regimes and norms, economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO (before Trump), some key
WMD counter-proliferation regimes (NPT, CTBT), and (again before Trump) the climate change regime. And both
Washington and Beijing opposed the recently concluded Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that was
supported by over 60% of the UNGA members.
In addition, China is a strong defender of the UN Security Council system, alongside the U.S.

And ithas also become more active in PKO at the request of the UN, even to the point of deploying combat forces for the
first time.
In addition to these complexities, there is the issue of what exactly “revisionism” means.

Whereas the

Trump Administration seems to vaguely focus its attention on China’s supposed revisions or violations of norms(such as free trade, freedom from coercion, freedom of maritime navigation, and various political freedoms), in
fact an arguably more critical area of supposed revisionism (as a potential war or peace issue) involves changes inthe basic US-centered distribution of power, especially in Asia.

Perhaps this is the “order” that is most at risk ofbeing revised by Beijing.
The Real Issue: Five Security and Economic Challenges
Taking all this into consideration, it is vastly more accurate to refer to a stronger China potentially or
actually challenging specific US/Western preferred norms, processes, and power relationships in Asia, not an
across-the-board clash of coherent “orders” per se.

From this more focused, definable perspective, the specificpotential risks presented by China’s strategy and policies in the Indo-Pacific can be boiled down into five mainareas:First, escalating political-military crises and possible armed conflict between the US and its allies andChina over several specific security-related issues: Taiwan, Korea, maritime disputes involving China and U.S.
allies, and US/allied and Chinese military (primarily naval) ISR operations and exercises in the W. Pacific.
These contentious issues, almost all of which involve uncompromising, zero-sum sovereignty claims
associated with regime legitimacy and domestic political fortunes, could trigger crises as a result of a direct use offorce, coercion or intimidation in violation of the UN Charter, compounded by miscalculations of intent andpurpose due to poor communication and inept crisis management skills.

Based on past evidence, both China

and the U.S. and its allies could conceivably make such mistakes, especially as China’s military capabilities in Asia
increase relative to those of the U.S, and Japan, thereby increasing the possibility of overreach by Beijing andoverreaction by Washington.

Most concern at present is focused on Beijing, however, due primarily to its

significantly expanded military and non-military presence and more assertive stance in the South China Sea (SCS)
and the East China Sea (ECS).

China has repeatedly indicated that it is committed to the peaceful resolution via

bilateral negotiation of any disputes in the above two regions.

But it has also clearly sought via the use of

military and para-military assets in both areas to create a situation more favorable to its stance, thus increasing thechance of crisis and conflict.

13

(Continued from the previous page)
Second, attempts by China to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation across the region, but
especially in the SCS and ECS.

This is a very finite issue, which could presumably be identified rather clearly.

And the evidence, based on policy statements and actions, as well as commercial activities to date, indicates that
Beijing has neither the incentive nor the apparent desire to obstruct such navigation.

This is thus a purely

speculative concern based on exceedingly vague suspicions about changes in future Chinese views.

The real

issue involves the possible obstruction of foreign military access into disputed areas controlled by China.

Here,

Beijing at times applies an interpretation of international law shared by many other coastal states, while the U.S.
and most Western nations apply a more dominant counter-interpretation.

These divisions do not reflect

differences between “free” and “repressive” orders. It also, however, at times acts to inhibit or obstruct theactivities of foreign militaries entirely independent of any clear legal argument, based on purported risks tomaritime safety.
Third, intended or unintended efforts to weaken the use of generally accepted international legal
procedures for defining maritime jurisdiction (as per UNCLOS).

This issue area, again relating primarily to

Chinese sovereignty claims in the ECS and SCS, arguably provides the greatest evidence of Chinese violations oflegal norms and processes.

China has made exceedingly vague claims regarding its authority over various

waters in the SCS while acting as if it enjoys preferential or sovereign control in places.

It has also explicitly

rejected the decisions of a PCA recently convened to rule on the application of UNCLOS statutes to land featuresin the SCS, created artificial islands in disputed areas (some in violation of the PCA ruling), and has for the firsttime used military and para-military assets to assert its sovereignty claims in the ECS, albeit allegedly in response
to Japanese actions.

These all increase the potential for crises and conflict. Whether China’s rejection of legal

rulings on this matter will create precedents that could weaken international law in general or UNCLOS inparticular, however, is a matter of debate.

Much will depend on whether China (and other countries?) rejects

additional legal procedures and rulings.

But regardless, additional legal decisions or a greater affirmation of

accepted legal procedures will almost certainly not alone prevent such future actions, much less resolve thepresent issue.
Fourth, trade wars triggered by punitive tariff barriers and other economic measures.

This is a very

complex issue, involving potential and actual violations of existing economic practices and regimes.

In general,

China has observed WTO procedures in resolving trade disputes, and has often won such disputes.

At the sametime, it is apparently employing non-WTO compliant policies and practices in the trade and investment area.
And it is showing signs of exerting political controls in commercial areas more assertively than in the past.

At

the same time, the USG under Trump is threatening to employ likely non-WTO compliant punitive trade andinvestment policies to China, using extremely weak national security arguments and a completely illogicalinterpretation of the danger of trade imbalances.

In other words, both sides are likely contributing significantly

to the potential for mutually destructive economic actions.

Trumpist arguments that China is pursuing“predatory” mercantilist economic policies, reflected in the activities of the BRI, the AIIB, and other Chinese
initiatives, are largely made in the absence of substantive evidence.
than reality.

14

At this point, they are more political rhetoric(Continued from the previous page)
Fifth, the creation of exclusive or privileged political, ideological, and/or economic relationships
between China and other regional states that threaten the prosperity and political stability of the US and U.S.
allies and friends.

This concern is almost entirely theoretical at present.

It largely employs as evidenceoccasional remarks made by Chinese leaders taken out of context and in some cases subsequently clarified orcorrected, e.g., “Asia for the Asians” and China as an “example for other developing countries”.

It also employs

speculations about the supposed “real” intent of Chinese initiatives such as the BRI, etc., and the assumed future
evolution of Chinese trade policies toward ever greater levels of mercantilism, all largely unproven.
and why China would act in the future to create such relationships is usually left unstated.

Exactly how

None of this is to saythat China would never attempt to create the sort of dominant, ideology-based coalition of Asian states that the
Trump Administration now explicitly advocates in the guise of the so-called Quad of democratic Asian nations(U.S., Japan, India, and Australia).

But if it does, it will probably be more in response to U.S. actions than as aresult of its own initiative.
Turning Risks Into Opportunities?
As the above list indicates, the major actual and potential risks that China poses for the U.S./Japan
alliance are relatively finite (albeit serious) and often result from an interactive process between Beijing andWashington, Tokyo, and others.

Some risks are largely theoretical, based more on speculation than substance.

Moreover, all of the above risks exist within a larger framework or environment marked by several positive
features:a common focus on sustaining peace and prosperity in the region through trade, investment, and thenon-violent negotiation of differences; the related absence of any desire to seize the territory of other states inorder to maintain economic growth; ongoing efforts to enhance regional cooperation and deepen regional
integration (despite the obstacles presented by the Trump Administration) through longstanding and recent fora
and structures, such as APEC, EAS, TPP+11, and RCEP; and a recognition of the need for all states to cooperate inorder to address an array of common transnational threats, from climate change to WMD proliferation andpandemics.
These factors suggest that opportunities exist for reducing the likelihood of the above crises, formanaging effectively any crises that do erupt, and for building a stronger foundation for moving the region, andthe U.S.-Japan alliance, in a more positive direction.
Despite growing mutual suspicion and some animosity and threat mongering by both sides, China andJapan have strong incentives to improve their overall relationship and reduce the volatility of their sovereignty
dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

This derives largely from their deep economic interdependence andneed for peace, and the greater strategic maneuvering room for both capitals that would arguably result from
Tokyo moving closer to Beijing by separating itself from the highly adversarial stance toward China now adopted
by the Trump Administration.

Although Tokyo and Beijing have recently moved to improve relations, much

more could be done.

15(Continued from the previous page)
But perhaps the greatest opportunity for reducing risks and improving the climate in Northeast Asia liesin the development of a clearer consensus between the United States and Japan, and eventually between thealliance and China, regarding the future power distribution and disposition of volatile issues across the region.
As I have written elsewhere, long-tem stability in the Western Pacific (and the larger Indo-Pacific region) will
depend on the creation of a stable version of the rough balance of power between China and the US and its allies
that will almost inevitably emerge in the years ahead. As indicated above, such a balance will increase thepropensity for miscalculation on both sides, thus raising the likelihood of future crises and even conflicts overTaiwan, maritime disputes, and other regional issues.
One can hope to muddle through this situation by trying to maintain effective militarycounter-measures (a process also known as arms racing) while strengthening confidence-building and crisis
management activities of various sorts and trusting that deeper economic integration will reduce the incentives
for serious conflict.

But history suggests that this is unlikely to produce the enduring level of predictability andrestraint necessary to maintain regional stability.

A more promising (albeit difficult to implement) set of actions

would involve more proactive efforts to transition toward a mutually acceptable, denial-oriented defensive force
posture on both sides, along with a set of reassuring understandings on the region’s most volatile issues, from
Korea to the South China Sea.
Unfortunately, present negative policy trends in the US, China, and Japan do not offer much reason for
confidence that such actions will occur.

All three countries, led now most prominently and aggressively by the

Trump Administration, are adopting a zero-sum mindset and strategic approach that will fuel offensive arms
racing while reducing any incentives for developing mutual understandings.

In my view, it is up to policy

analysts, former officials, and scholars to present the case for a stable balance of power in Asia.

And Japan could

arguably provide the best environment for fostering such a view among these elites, given its strong pro-peace
sentiment, support for limited, defensive-oriented armed forces, and lack of hegemonic ambition.

Indeed,without Japan’s active advocacy, it is unlikely that U.S. officials would even contemplate efforts to build a stablebalance in Asia.

And without U.S. movement, it is almost certain that Beijing will resist supporting such a

concept.
[END]

16

Presentation B
China’s Strategy and Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region
IIDA Masafumi
Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies
CCP’s Strategic Objectives
Establishing a great modern socialist country
・Great country: predominant international position
・Modern country: sustainable economic development
・Socialist country: continuous one party dictatorship by the CCP
Direction of external policies
・Rejecting democratic values:
Revision of liberal international order, “a community with a shared future for mankind,” “a newform of international relations” etc.
・Opening up economy:
Promoting free trade and globalization, BRI
・Building formidable military:
Organizational reform for wining informationized local wars, strengthening power projection,
space and cyber capabilities
China’s Military Activities in the IPR
Active operations around Japanese territories
・PLAN warships getting closer to the Senkakus, increasing flights of PLAAF aircraft in ECS, bombers
operations in Japan Sea and WP, frequent exercise around Taiwan
・Stronger claim over Senkakus, pressure on SDF & USFJ, preparation for Taiwan conflict
Strengthened military presence in Southeast Asia
・Militarization of the Spratly Islands, amphibious exercises, combat patrol by bombers, exercise by carrier
strike group, deployment of SSBN
・Control of Spratlys, area denial against USF, basis for expansion to Indo-Pacific Ocean
Higher operational capabilities in the Western Pacific・Frequent naval exercise, long-range flight by strategic bombers, possible joint exercise by Navy and Air
Force, diversified routes into WP, deployment of ASBM
・A2/AD capabilities against USF
Advancement into Indian Ocean
・Continuous participation in anti-piracy operations, military base in Djibouti, enhancing port accesses,
dispatching submarines
・Secured SLOCs in Indian Ocean, military pressure on India
[END]

17

Presentation C
China’s Approach to the International Order
Mira RAPP-HOOPER
Senior Research Scholar in Law, Yale Law School
Introduction
In recent months, especially with publication of Trump Admin’s NSS and NDS, it has become common
parlance to state that great power competition again defines international politics and that a risen China ischallenging the liberal international order, especially in Asia
Argument
If the United States and Japan want to craft a thoughtful strategic response to China we must
understand what the international order is and isn’t, how China’s international strategy interacts with it, andwhere opportunities exist for the allies. I will start by defining the liberal international order, explain why weshould expect that China’s rise will result in some changes to existing rules and regimes, offer a framework for
how we might think about China’s strategy for the international order, and conclude with what that tells us about
how United States and Japan might respond.
The Liberal International Order and China’s Rise・International political order refers to the governing arrangements among states that establish fundamental rules,
principles, and institutions
・Because they are constructed by sovereign states, arrangements have always been transitory
・Throughout history, order has most commonly broken down through major wars, and new orders after
settlement, as states seek to create new rules based on new power configurations.
・We associate major changes to the international order with violence between great powers
・The “liberal international order” is one type of order, with foundational principles drawn from Woodrow
Wilson, extended and institutionalized after WWII
・Principles: pacifying role of global trade, interstate arrangements to prevent the use of force, seeks aninternational system based on cooperation for mutual gain・Institutions can reinforce cooperation over time, democracies are aptly suited to lead
・UN, Bretton Woods, additional layers added over time; Extended to Asia in the 1960s and 70s
・China benefitted; order experienced crises; Appeared to triumph after collapse of USSR
・The post-1945 liberal international order was never a monolithic or crystalline structure
・It was a pragmatic project to create the infrastructure to make sustained cooperation possible, and to mitigate themost dangerous forms of economic and security competition.
・International order is always a function of the powers who created it
・It holds that a new major superpower would seek to adjust that order to reflect its interests
・When we simplify the debate over China’s rise to Thucydides Trap, questions of whether US-China conflict isinevitable, suggest that international order is a single structure to be broken, we miss the entire domain ofpeaceful international change.

18

(Continued from the previous page)
Question
Where and how does China seek to adjust the international order, and are those changes inimical to US,
Japanese, and other regional interests?
We must look at China’s engagement with different parts of global and regional order to identify where
it is really challenging and how the US and Japan might respond
China’s Approaches to International Order

GlobalEconomic

Security

Reformist Participant

Increasing Contributor

WTO

UN peacekeeping, sanctions

IMF

Climate change

G20
Regional

Entrepreneur

Challenger/spoiler

BRICS BankUNCLOS/Maritime claims

AIIB

North Korea

Belt and RoadTABLE 1- CHINA’S APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Global level: China tends to uphold rules and norms
・Economic: pushed for IMF and G20 reform, challenges WTO through mastery of rules
・Security: has increased its funding of UN, peacekeeping, leads on climate change
Regional level: Push back or seek change
・Economic: undeniable entrepreneurship, new economic and development institutions Chinese rules andstandards; domestic economic benefits, strategic advantages
・Security: China’s interpretation of UNCLOS, island building, nonparticipation in PCA, all at odds withinternational law, including LOS as viewed by most of the world; island bases will allow Beijing to project
power 1k miles from its shores, obstruct military FON; Beijing increasingly sees DPRK as liability, but has not
yet meaningfully changed its strategy to prioritize regional security over stability in Pyongyang

19

(Continued from the previous page)
U.S.-Japan Strategy
・Should be as variegated as Chinese participation
・Regional Security- CLOSER COORDINATION WITHIN EXISTING STRUCTURES- Area where competition is most likely to be zero-sum- U.S.-Japan alliance, networking with other like-minded partners (Australia, India) to uphold LOS in SCS- Prepare long-term containment/deterrence regime for DPRK, strengthen PSI・Regional Economics- NEW STRATEGY NEEDED- U.S. strategy is entirely lacking; Japan more proactive- Craft alliance strategy that is not zero-sum- Identify liabilities; provide aid to target countries
・Ungoverned space- Move to develop rules and norms on AI, cyber
[END]

20

Presentation D
Comments on "China's Strategy and Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region"
ITO Asei
Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo

1. China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Contents, Rationale, and Implementation
1) Contents
Connectivity based on infrastructure, Trade and investment facilitations, Monetary cooperation, andpolicy coordination/cultural exchange
2) Disaggregating BRI
Land/Sea, Economics/Politics, Domestic/International, Physical/Digital, Zero-sum/Plus-sum,
Institutional/non-Institutional
3) Implementation
According to official stat, China’s outward investment in 2017 was 120 billion USD, declined by 29.4 %compare to previous year
“BRI related investments” in 59 countries was 14.4 billion USD, increased by 3.5%, accounted for 12% of
total outward investment in 20174) Digital expansion of Chinese firms in Indo-Pacific region

2. Japan’s response
1) With regard to BRIJapanese Gov shifted stance from disregard to conditional and selective engagement.
Note that, there is no institutional cooperation framework or joint-document yet
2) Mainstream of Japan’s policy
TPP, Japan-EU EPA, and Indo-Pacific Strategy
Indo-Pacific region covers emerging economies such as South East Asia, India, and Africa
3) Potential of “Quad + ASEAN” cooperation
It potentially can expand “East Asian Production Network” to “Indo-Pacific (or Asia-Africa) Production
Network” based on market force. Role of ASEAN-India FTA and beyond.

[END]

21

Session II: How Should Japan and the United States Respond?

Keynote Speech

China’s Strategy and Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region: How Should theUnited States and Japan Respond?
Evans REVERE
Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group
Changing Regional Dynamics
・The U.S. and Japan are concerned that power dynamics in Asia and the Indo-Pacific region are shifting as aresult of China’s rise.
・China is in the ascendant.
- Growing economic power means increased military expenditures, greater power projection capacity,
more robust naval and air patrols, and improved PLA war-fighting capability.
- Beijing is staking out assertive positions on territorial issues in the South China Sea and East China Sea;
creating land in the South China Sea and militarizing it; testing Taiwan’s defenses; and challenging
Japan in the Senkakus.
- The PRC is raising its global economic profile. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has helped Beijing
develop new markets, promote the Chinese economic model, and expand its “soft power.”- As a rising and increasingly dominant economic actor, China naturally expects to have an influential
voice in setting the rules when it comes to trade.
Whither China?
・China’s growth, uncertain ambitions, and lack of transparency are major challenges.
・Nevertheless, Washington and Tokyo are committed to maintaining positive, productive, and transparent
ties with China.
・But China’s policies and behavior suggest future relations with the PRC will be complicated.
・There are strong doubts about Beijing’s commitment to the open, rules-based international order that theUnited States and Japan support.
・China’s industrial policies favor indigenous innovation and are geared to ensure a major role for the state –and the Party.
・Theft of intellectual property continues to be a problem. The U.S. business community is no longer the major
cheerleader for U.S.-China relations that it once was.

22

(Continued from the previous page)
・China’s political development is a major concern.
- Authoritarianism is growing.
increasing.

Centralization of decision-making in the hands of China’s leader is

The end of term limits for President Xi Jinping is an ominous sign.

- The crackdown on human rights advocates, lawyers, women’s groups, environmentalists, and labororganizations continues.

These trends suggest that the order China seeks to impose in connection

with its rise will be both illiberal and problematic.
The Response
・Responding to China’s challenge by relying on confrontation, trade wars, sanctions, and military steps will
exacerbate tensions.
・A better approach involves exercising vigilance and vigorously defending and promoting the principles ofthe liberal, open, rules-based system that the U.S. and Japan have traditionally advocated.
・Simultaneously, we should press the PRC to act constructively and responsibly, shape Beijing’s choices,criticize those practices we find objectionable, and seek areas of common interest.
・China must understand our concerns and our red lines.
・We should be clear about those principles we will defend, including the importance of open sea-lanes.
・The United States and Japan should work with like-minded countries to strengthen the institutions that help
preserve and promote our principles and interests.
・Institutions that promote democracy, free trade, open sea-lanes, the rule of law, Internet freedom, andhuman rights must be key priorities.
・American leadership is essential.
- But Washington’s rhetoric and actions have raised questions about its commitment to multilateral
cooperation, alliances, and even regional leadership.
- The U.S. withdrawal from the TPP and the Paris Climate Accord sent the worst possible message toallies, partners, and adversaries.
- Thus far, Washington’s promotion of an “Indo-Pacific strategy” is a slogan in search of a strategy.
・Japan, which has promoted such a concept in recent years, can and should play an important role inshaping a viable Indo-Pacific strategy.
・Don’t underestimate the value of Japan’s voice.

And don’t underestimate Washington’s need to hear thatvoice.
[END]

23

Presentation A
Japan’s Initiative to Provide both Leadership and Vision:
Japan’s Strategy in a Time of the US-China Rivalry
HOSOYA Yuichi
Professor, Keio University

Japan's Initiative in Maintaining Liberal International Order・Japan’s government under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recognizes that Japan needs to fulfill the gap
caused by American retreat from its leadership role in sustaining liberal international order as
symbolized by its rejection of the TPP.

Japan's Partial Support for China's Belt and Road Initiative・Japan’s strategy is not intending to deny China’s vision of the “One Belt One Road” Initiative, but tosupplement and to present an alternative vision of order to the region. This position is basicallywelcomed by Chinese government, and it makes the current Sino-Japanese relationship better thanprevious years.
Foreign Minister Taro Kono's Statement on Chinese Rise:"The international order is shaking. The foremost challenge we are facing is North
Korea's nuclear and missile threat. … The second challenge is how to cope with an
emerging China. Chinese economic growth has provided opportunities to the world.
At the same time, as symbolized by the construction of aircraft carrier, China isboosting its military capacity in a rapid and non-transparent manner based on its
economic power, and is flexing its muscle around the world.

Under suchcircumstances, the big issue now is how to secure the global strategic balance."
Japan's Leadership in Presenting three principles of the International Community
・Foreign Minister Kono argued that "there are three principles the international community needs touphold"; the first principle is respect for international laws and rules; the second principle is respectfor diversity; the third principle is respect for freedom and openness.
・Kone also said that "Japan should play an even bigger role together with like-minded countries in order
to uphold these three principles.

More Cooperation in the Sino-Japanese Relations
・Japan's government under Prime Minister Abe now inclines to be more cooperative with China than
before, as the two government celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendshipbetween Japan and China.
[END]

24

Presentation B
How Should Japan and the United States Respond: The Security Dimension
James SCHOFF
Senior Fellow, CEIP

As has been touched on today, the United States is reorienting its policies towards China in ways that assume more
intense competition and long-term rivalry, extending across the military, economic, and diplomatic areas. In the UnitedStates (especially Washington) we hear increasing worries about China’s unfair trade practices, its predatory investments
and acquisitions in America, and its efforts to influence public opinion and policy makers.

I must admit that I have mixed feelings about this development, because I remember in the 1990s experiencing somesimilar dynamics involving Japan. The United States government and public at times overreacted to the Japanese
economic challenge. We assumed adversarial national intentions of Japan that were exaggerated. Thank goodness wewere allies and had a long friendship with many internal advocates, who could help us get through that tough politicaland diplomatic period. Some common sense and the passage of time generally fixed this problem. So, with China, I think
it is important not to overreact and possibly accelerate a vicious cycle of zero-sum competition.

However, the situation is more challenging with China for various reasons, and one big reason is the military dimension.
Security issues are politically sensitive (can’t be seen as weak), the stakes are high, and effective responses to militarychallenges require a relatively long lead time. This is a particularly important year as Japan revises its National Defense
Program Guideline and Mid-Term Defense Plan, and as the Trump administration rolls out a new National Defense
Strategy and benefits from defense budget growth.

The alliance defense and deterrence posture has to respond to China’s growing capabilities to some degree. In addition tothis, we will be taking appropriate measures vis-à-vis North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threat, and many of
those steps (such as new missile defense investments, possible counterattack capability in Japan, stepped-up
anti-submarine warfare cooperation, etc.) will be interpreted by Beijing as meant for China. We have to protect
ourselves, but we have to be careful, because the potential for a costly security dilemma is growing.

Strengthening the alliance defense and deterrence posture vis-à-vis China should be designed to respond to two different
levels of Chinese pressure: on the low end and on the high end. The low end refers to Chinese military coercion and its
own form of hybrid warfare, primarily at sea but also in cyberspace, espionage, and possibly in outer space eventually.
For the “defense of Japan” at this low end, Japan has a lead role, with American support. Japan’s 2015 security
legislation and our revised Defense Guidelines give us more opportunities to cooperate in these areas. At this level, it ismost important to take advantage of the mission integration options made possible by the 2015 legislation and revised
Defense Guidelines.


Under the revised Guidelines, notably, we have flexibility of when we work together, especially in peacetime, whichmeans we can practice on a regular basis and prepare for low-end challenges.

Also, the Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) component—and how it connects to planning,targeting, tasking, maritime security, etc.—is a consistent theme, and I group some of these items together becauseof their “networked” potential (e.g., missile defense, maritime security, etc.). I think these are priority areas for
improvement in our combined effort, which can help deter coercive Chinese action in East China Sea.

25

(Continued from the previous page)The high end of defense and deterrence vis-à-vis China is fortunately less of an immediate concern, because the allied
position is strong, and because I don’t think Beijing has much interest in directly challenging the alliance militarily.
Still, some sort of state-to-state conflict involving North Korea or Taiwan could (in theory) push us unintentionally into ahigh-end military confrontation with China, and a good way to prevent that from happening is to maintain our strength.
In the short term, the recent budget agreement in Washington is good news for substantial, predictable U.S. defense
spending, but it is important to focus on how we make decisions and share information within the alliance, and how we
can promote more “joint” operations within Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, so that our alliance cooperation is moreseamless. This was a lesson we learned from the March 11 earthquake/tsunami disaster in Japan.

Before I move onto some specific observations and recommendations, let me share some general ideas about vital
components of effective command (not my own formula, but I thought it useful). If we think about these components ina bilateral/US-Japan context and apply them to certain alliance missions, it helps us visualize our near-term priorities.
I think the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) is a critical tool to help us get this right, particularly the firstand fourth factor (authority and situational understanding), and to some extent the second (communication).



The Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) can also assist with situational understanding.

Communication and situational awareness are closely linked to what we traditionally think of with regard to“jointness” and interoperability, all with the aim of accomplishing specific missions. There is a technology aspect,
but it’s also culture, policies & practice.

I assume we will be doing alliance security cooperation in a “supporting-to-supported” relationship, but we will havedifferent roles depending on whether we’re talking about a low-end (probably Japan lead) or high-end contingency(when Japan supports the U.S.).

Let me move onto some more specific issues. I’ve included a graphic from MOD’s FY2018 budget request, and I choose
it not so much to get into the details of C3I upgrades, but because I think the image helps explain the challenge that Japan
faces.



Chinese pressure in the East China Sea and the 3.11/Fukushima crisis have pushed Japan to improve its own internal
jointness and interoperability [e.g., incompatible communications systems between services (even multiple generationsof systems w/in one service), difficulty to provide targeting data from the MSDF to the GSDF for coastal cruise missiles,
and such]. Japan is taking steps to address this (and has had some success), but we should understand the magnitude ofthis challenge. Deciding how to address these challenges is difficult politically (various needs/perceived winners andlosers) and financially. Layering interoperability with U.S. forces (and perhaps other U.S. allies) makes this evenharder, but it should be our goal.



We have to take advantage of good opportunities when they arise, because I am anticipating a need for more frequent,faster, higher classified levels of information exchange. Japanese Global Hawks or E-2D surveillance aircraft, forexample, should be able to share information easily with U.S. forces, when desired, and vice-versa (for remote island
defense or a North Korean contingency). Japan is now building its architecture for Global Hawk Tasking, Collections,
Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TCPED)—essentially the Global Hawk data processing center—and weshould be thinking now about how that information can be shared with the U.S., and how relevant U.S. data can beshared with Japan. This should be driven by the missions we prioritize for some kind of combined or integrated
operations (particular ISR, ASW, asset protection, amphibious operations, and the like).

26

(Continued from the previous page)

My final slide summarizes some steps for the allies to consider with regard to strengthening their defense and deterrence
posture vis-à-vis China in the low end and high end, now and for the future.


Network alliance management and refine joint requirements (e.g., link Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) to Roles,
Missions, Capabilities (RMC) to the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)

Better leverage existing defense systems & invest in joint/ interoperable communication & situational awarenesscapabilityExpand personnel exchanges and use of higher-rank liaison officers at PACOM, for example

Build up Japan’s information security infrastructure to enhance information sharing and technical exchange (thisincludes a national background investigation regime, a career track for security professionals, a classified court
system…all of which can help the Japanese government and key private sector companies share vital classified
information with the U.S. and other partner nations)

Expand allied science & technology cooperation in some key strategic areas (e.g., AI, quantum computing, space)27

(Continued from the previous page)

[END]
28

(Continued from the previous page)

29
[END]

(Continued from the previous page)

[END]

30
[END]

Presentation C
Japan’s approach toward Southeast Asia in constructing new regional order
OBA Mie
Professor, Tokyo University of Science
The Japanese government considers the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member
countries to be partners in promoting a stable and desirable regional order in East Asia. In December 2013,
which constitutes the early era of Abe administration, the National Security Strategy stipulated that “Japan will
strengthen cooperative relations with countries with which it shares universal values and strategic interests,” suchas “the countries of ASEAN.” In general, the members of the Japanese policy-making circle have shared the
expectation that ASEAN countries are “good partners of Japan” until now, and they also expect that thesecountries, with some exceptions like Cambodia, would stand with Japan and the United States against the
expansion of China’s presence in the region. In other words, from the Japanese point of view, strengthening thecountry’s cooperation with the ASEAN is an important measure to cope with “China risk.”
However, the perceptions of ASEAN member countries regarding China are very complicated. On the
one hand, these countries welcome China’s proactive economic strategy, including the establishment of the AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank and promotion of the One Belt One Road initiative. The countries require
China’s economic assistance and investment to facilitate their own economic development, which is one of theircritical national interests.
Particularly, in Asia, infrastructure development requires huge investment.
According to the estimations of the Asian Development Bank in its report titled “Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure
Needs 2017,” developing Asia should invest $26 trillion during the 15-year period from 2016 to 2030, or $1.7
trillion per year. Hence, China’s decision to invest a significant amount of money in infrastructure developmentin Asia meets the demands of the ASEAN side.
On the other hand, the policy-makers of ASEAN member countries are worried about the countries’
excessive dependence on China. For ASEAN countries, keeping their sovereignty and independence intact is
crucial. They are aware that the economic policies and political aims of China are intertwined, and theirexcessive dependence on China might penetrate their independence as sovereign states. Since the policy-making
circles of ASEAN member countries know about “Sri Lanka’s case”, they understand that they must takemeasures to avoid the country’s destiny.
Japan must understand the aforementioned ambivalent perception of the ASEAN regarding China. In
addition, Japan should attempt to provide another choice of support and assistance in ensuring the stability andprosperity of Asia, using which the ASEAN can avoid its excessive dependence on China. However, this does
not mean that Japan should compete with China in Southeast Asia. Considering the gap of amount of financial
resources between Japan and China, the former should promote both individual support and collaboration withthe latter to provide economic assistance to Southeast Asia. If it really includes collaboration with China, theIndo-Pacific Strategy will meet the interests of ASEAN countries.
In many ASEAN countries, issues pertaining to democracy and human rights are increasing. Although
the blueprint of the ASEAN Political Security Community envisages that the ASEAN community should promote
democratization and the protection of human rights, the level of them in the member countries is not sufficient.
In addition, some countries, such as Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Philippines, seem to be regressing interms of the promotion of such values. Moreover, it is noted that China promotes such a trend to some extent by
providing a “model” that indicates how a country can develop without democratization. Although Japan should
adopt a flexible and sensitive approach toward domestic political situations of ASEAN countries, it should
simultaneously formulate a long-term strategy to support the establishment of a democratic and durable regional
community in Southeast Asia.
[END]

31

Presentation D
China Risks and China Opportunities:
Implications for the “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific Strategy
Nicolas SZECHENYI
Deputy Director, Japan Chair, CSISThe fundamental strategic challenge for the United States in Asia is to engage a rising China while maintaining a balance ofpower favorable to the United States and its allies. A vibrant U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to implementing an approach thatrecognizes both a desire for stable relations based on broad economic interdependence with China, and the need for enhanced
defense capabilities due to uncertainties about China’s long-term military ambitions. How should Japan and the United States
manage the risks and opportunities associated with China’s rise, and is there potential for strategic alignment under the “Freeand Open Indo-Pacific” construct?
Snapshot of Trump Administration Approach Declaratory Policy (National Security Strategy/National Defense Strategy)o Strategic competition with Chinao Embrace of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy
o Commitment to increase defense spending and enhance interoperability with allies
 Diplomacy
o Seeking cooperative Trump-Xi relationshipo Viewing U.S.-China relations through two lenses: North Korea and trade Economyo Use of U.S. law to combat China’s unfair trade practiceso Potential for increased tension in U.S.-China economic relations?
Snapshot of Abe Government Approach Defenseo Enhance Japan’s defense capabilities
o Strengthen U.S.-Japan alliance and cooperation with other regional partners
 Diplomacy
o High-level diplomacy to commemorate 40th anniversary of Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendshipo Desire to realize mutual state visits and signal stability Economyo Participation in One Belt, One Road initiative32

(Continued from the previous page)

Some Alliance Imperatives
 Bilateral defense cooperation (addressed in detail by Mr. Schoff) Networkingo Defense cooperation with ROK, AUS, INDIA
 To enhance Interoperabilityo The “Quad”
 To develop common approaches to Chinao Diplomacy with Southeast Asian countries
 Both bilaterally and in regional institutions
 Regional Economic Architectureo TPP 11
 How to keep U.S. engaged on rules and norms for tradeo Infrastructure development
 OBOR vs. alternative approacheso APEC Venue to explore avenues of cooperation with China
 Democracy/Human Rights
o Critical if common strategic objective is to maintain the rules-based international order
U.S.-Japan Strategic Alignment?
 A joint “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy is arguably a long-term project that will evolve in stages, the firstof which is to develop a common understanding of the challenges posed by China’s rise Two questions:o U.S. policy towards China
 What are the implications of the U.S. emphasis on strategic competition?
 Risks: Potential for increased tensions
 Opportunities: More open and honest dialogue about the challenges posed by China’s
behavioro Rules and norms
 To what extent will strategic interests converge on the normative aspects of regional strategy?
 How to sustain a shared commitment to the principles that should undergird therules-based international order
[END]

33

4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations(1) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Objectives and History
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) originates from the Japan Chapter of the Quadrangular Forum (QF), which wasestablished in 1982 in Washington to serve as an informal promoter of the exchange of policy-oriented views andopinions among Japan, US, Europe, and Canada. As the Cold War ended and its aftermath faded away, QF ceased its
activity in 1996. The Japan Chapter of QF survived the vicissitudes and developed into the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
as an independent institution of Japan for international intellectual exchanges. Since then, GFJ has been active as a hub
for international exchanges with the global intellectual community at large.
Organization
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in
Japan. Business Member, Political Member, and Academic Member support its activities as Governors and Members.
The Secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations. GFJ is currently headed by ITO Kenichi as
Chairman, WATANABE Mayu as President, and TAKAHATA Yohei as Vice President and Executive Secretary. The
membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the 4 Governors, TOYODA Shoichiro, MOGI Yuzaburo,
ISHIKAWA Hiroshi, and YAGUCHI Toshikazu; 10 Political Members including the 5 Governors, KAKIZAWA Mito,
KOIKE Yuriko, SUEMATSU Yoshinori, SUZUKI Keisuke, and FUNADA Hajime; and 56 Academic Members including
the 3 Governors, ITO Go, KAMIYA Matake, and TAKAHARA Akio.
Activities(1) e-forum “Giron-Hyakushutsu (Hundred Views in Full Perspective)” operated on the website of GFJ(2) Monthly held meetings of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” and “Diplomatic Roundtable”(3) PR and Enlightenment through publication of “Bulletin,” the website, mail magazine, etc.
(4) “International Dialogues” convened 3 to 4 times a year on policy-oriented issues with counterparts invited fromvarious parts of the world. Recent International Dialogues are as follows:
Years and
ThemesCounterparts
Months
2018

Mar.
Feb.

2017

Aug.
Jun.

Mar.
Feb.

Nov.

2016

Sep.
Jul.

Mar.

Japan-U.S. Dialogue “China Risks and China Opportunities –Implications for the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ –”The Dialogue with the World “Eurasia 2025”“Central Asia + Japan” Dialogue “Prospects on the Current
and Future Japan-Central Asia Relations
Japan-ASEAN Dialogue “Changing Regional Order in the
Asia Pacific and Japan-ASEAN Cooperation”

Japan-U.S. Dialogue “The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the
Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?"
Japan-China Dialogue “Prospect of Japan-China Cooperationin Aging Society”
The Dialogue with the World “The International Order inEurope and Asia-Pacific after the Ukraine Crisis and Japan's
Course of Action”
Japan-China-ROK Dialogue “Japan-China-ROK Relations in
the Global Perspective”
Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue “International Order in the 21stCentury and the Security of Maritime Asia”

Japan-U.S. Dialogue “Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a
Turbulent Time of Transition: Sustaining an Open, Rules-based
Global Order”

Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (CEIP) (U.S.)
The French Institute for International andStrategic Affairs (IRIS) (France)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of JapanThe S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS) (Singapore), Nanyang
Technological University / The Universityof Social Sciences and Humanities,
Vietnam National University(VNU-USSH) (Vietnam)
Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University (INSS) (U.S.)
Shanghai International Studies University/ Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences /Fudan University (China)
The Institute of World Policy (IWP)(Ukraine) / The Atlantic Council's Brent
Scowcroft Center (BSC) (U.S.)
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)
Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA) /Meiji Institute of International Policy
Studies (MIIPS) / Western Sydney
University (Australia)
Institute for National Strategic
Studies(INSS) (U.S.)

Contact
Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3584-2193 FAX: +81-3-3505-4406 E-mail: gfj@gfj.jp URL: http://www.gfj.jp/j/34

(2) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP)
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a unique global network of policy research centers in
Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, India, and the United States. Our mission, dating back more than acentury, is to advance peace through analysis and development of fresh policy ideas and direct engagement
and collaboration with decisionmakers in government, business, and civil society. Working together, ourcenters bring the inestimable benefit of multiple national viewpoints to bilateral, regional, and global issues.

In 2006, Carnegie launched a revolutionary plan to build the first global think tank. Since then it has
transformed a hundred-year-old American institution into one well-equipped for the challenges of a
globalized world. Today, Carnegie has research centers in Beijing, Beirut, Brussels, Moscow, New Delhi, andWashington. The network is supervised by an international board of trustees, and its research activities areoverseen by a global management group.

The scholars of each center are drawn from the region and write in the local languages, while collaboratingclosely with colleagues across the world. The result provides capitals and global institutions with a deeper
understanding of the circumstances shaping policy choices worldwide as well as a flow of new approaches topolicy problems.

Contact
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036-2103
Phone: 202 483 7600

Fax: 202 483 184035

(3) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, andnon-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations.
The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only toanalyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate
policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way
those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of thosemembers of the Forum who sign them alone.
The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro,
Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan,
recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from thegovernment was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest
foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.
JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, and(3) individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body,which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” isan executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.
■Board of Trustees■Board of Directors

ARIMA Tatsuo

OHYA EikoITO Kenichi

Chairman

HAKAMADA Shigeki

SAKAMOTO Masahiro

WATANABE Mayu

Senior Executive Director

HATTORI Yasuo

SATO Ken

HANDA Haruhisa

Director

HIRONAKA Wakako

WATANABE Toshio

KAMIYA Matake

Director

HIRONO Ryokichi

YAMAGUCHI Norio

MORIMOTO Satoshi

Director

TAKUBO Tadae

Director

INOUE Akiyoshi
ISHIGAKI Yasuji
ITO Tsuyoshi■Auditors

KOIKE Yuriko

NAITOH Masahisa

KUROYANAGI Nobuo

WATANABE Kenichi

The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum” “Research Programs,”“International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Diplomatic Roundtable,” “Foreign
Policy Luncheon,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum:
Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The “e-Forum,” whichstarted on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy andinternational affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga
Nihon Kokusai Foramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners
are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR
Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is deliveredbimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.
Contact
Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3584-2190

FAX: +81-3-3589-5120

E-mail: jfir@jfir.or.jp

36

URL: http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/

NOTE

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193[Fax] +81-3-3505-4406[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] http://www.gfj.jp/[This “Dialogue” is administered by the Secretariat of The Global Forum of Japan]

8