Uncertainty and the Political Construction of the EU-Japan Diplomatic Dialogue: The Cold War Years and the New Scenario

Uncertainty and the Political Construction of the EU-Japan
Diplomatic Dialogue:
The Cold War Years and the New Scenario*
Oliviero Frattolillo**

Abstract
As a historian more than a political analyst who deals with East Asia and particularly withJapan in the modern era, I have focused my attention in this paper on the constructionof Europe-Japan relations especially during the Cold War years. The effects of the eventsoccurred in those years are still evident today in the relations between the two parties.
This is particularly noticeable within the pure dimension of the historical interconnections
from the diplomatic point of view, despite the increasing relevance of the relations on theeconomic and trade level, for example with the Japan-European Partnership Agreement(EPA), which draws the attention of a number of analysts world-wide.

The path of low diplomacy (1952-1989)

Modern relations between Japan and Europe have constantly been inscribed into ahistorical narrative that confirmed the absolute pre-eminence of mutual indifference
on a diplomatic level, due especially to Japan ʼ s oppor tunistic or str ucturalindifference about high politics discourse, that derived from the Yoshida Doctrine.
This is an image that has often been constructed without being interpreted in the Japanesecontext, or, according to Carol Gluck, “without bringing the outside in”. In her own words: “InJapanese eyes, the world sometimes loomed larger in the gazing imagination when it was mostabsent in the environment of action.”1 The external world exerted a strong influence in Japanʼsdomestic history as a country that once belonged to a pre-existing order (the Chinese order) thatwas very far removed from the peculiarities of the Westphalian system. So, while occurrences inthe European political landscape became experience, they were moulded into history for Japan,
which reacted accordingly. So we may see the story as a whole as well as the reverse side of it andthe plot that therefore structured the interactions between the two actors derived from a specificreading of events in both political spaces. Only by I think, correlating the images and perceptionsof Japanese histor y and the European context can we bridge these other wise apparently
unconnected behaviors and elevate their interactions to the status of historical narrative.
A number of themes and dimensions – historical, economic and strategic - are involved in its
foreign policy with Europe. Furthermore, the role of the US, and more specifically, the evolving
This article is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium “Japan and the World in
the 20th Century” held by JIIA on 29 March, 2018.
** Oliviero Frattolillo is an Associate Professor at the Department of Politics of Roma Tre University,
specializing in Japanese modern history and international politics.
1
C. Gluck, ʻPatterns of the Past: Themes in Japanese Historyʼ, C. Gluck, A.T. Embree (eds.), Asia in
Western and World History, New York: East Gate Book, 1997, p. 759.
*

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Oliviero Frattolillo

post-war relationship between Tokyo and Washington conditioned and encouraged Japan to seeka circumscribed low-profile diplomatic approach to Europe. To make sense of this, it is necessary
to employ a deductive analytical framework that I think takes into account the wider and deeper
political trends occurring in Japan and clearly conditioned its engagement with Europe.
Inoguchi Takahashi had proposed an understanding of Japan ʼ s historical models orperceptions as “free rider” in economic and security terms, “challenger” in trade terms andas “ suppor ter ” of international economic and political structures.2 It is the coexistence of
these models that represented an enigma to Europe. This inconvenient apposition continued
throughout almost the entire Cold War era, although the image of Japan as a supportive as well ascompetitive member of the international community was growing, was ascending.
These perceptions seem to conciliate, in some way, those provided by Christopher Hughes,in accordance with whom, throughout the history of its interaction with Europe, Japan assumed
three different images in the eyes of its counterpart, gradually switching over from “peril” during
the 60s, to “partner” during the 1980s, and finally to participant during the 1990s and onwards.3
The alternation of these phases which is accompanied by multiple identities and various mutual
perceptions was the product of internal and external historical instances referable to both actors.
And the correlation between European and Japanese experience is not only an epistemologicalstance but was actually applied for and built into Japanese discourses and practices in order tolegitimize the implementation of a Japanese horizontal political community in relation to a notmerely America-centered West. So as long as what Harry Harootunian defined “Americaʼs Japan”
has deeply moulded the image that the country had of itself, Japanʼs interaction with Europe has
been jeopardized in several ways.4
According, for example, to Carl Gluck, Japan seemed to be in some way hostage of its own
post- war history, mainly through the relationship with the US. In her own words, “most countries
ceased, stopped to speak of themselves as post-war in the domestic sense by the late 50s andbecame instead “contemporary”. Japanʼs long post-war was as distinctive as it was anachronistic.5
So as stressed by Iwabuchi Kōichi, in the post-war years, Japanʼs attention was turned to its
cultural relation with the West, effectively with the US as its most significant cultural “other”
against which Japanese national identity has been constructed.6
If we look back on the Japanese history of the past 50 years, it would seem that Japan, in along-term perspective, successfully managed a series of issues relating to its interactions with
Europe by adopting a low-profile approach. During the first half of the Cold War, Japan was
criticized for its supposedly single-minded focus on economic expansion, so that in France, thepublic image of Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato reductively became that of a transistor
salesman. Nevertheless by the 1970s, Europe started to look at Japan to help manage an economy
ever more interdependent on the world stage, while during the 1980s, the country had alreadybecome a European partner on a political and partly strategic level.
Japanʼs ability to successfully overcome the diplomatic or political impasse with the European
2

Inoguchi T., ʻTinkering Every 15 Years: A New Major Turn in Japanʼs Foreign policy?ʼ, Japan Spotlight:
Economic, Culture & History, vol. 23, 2004, pp. 38-39.

3

C.W. Hughes, “Japan in Europe: Asian and European Perspectives”, in G.D. Hook, H. Hasegawa (eds.),
The Political Economy of Japanese Globalization, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 56-69.

4

D.H. Harootunian, ʻAmericaʼs Japan/Japanʼs Japanʼ, in Miyoshi M., H.D. Harootunian (eds.), Japan in
the World, Durham: Duke University Press, 1993, pp. 196-221.

5

C. Gluck, ʻThe Past in the Presentʼ, in A. Gordon (ed.), Postwar Japan as History, Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1993, p. 93.

6

Iwabuchi K., Recentering Globalization. Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism, Durham: Duke
University Press, 2002, p. 9.

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Uncertainty and the Political Construction of the EU-Japan Diplomatic Dialogue: The Cold War Years and the New Scenario

counterpart during the post-war decades evidently lies in its attitude to implement pragmaticchanges in its foreign policy. Such changes occurred within a liberal framework that sought toreconcile Japanʼs growing involvement in the international economy with a gradual engagementof the country on regional and global security issues.
That we can say that throughout the 1950s, the international situation remained marked bya high level of ideological tension. In the US a great debate was in progress regarding the new
ideology of national security that did not lessen the worries of those who felt the need to deter
Soviets without turning the country into a garrison state.7 And this is why the main objective of
the US was to make Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”8 and ally in the containment action
and a means of reassuring Asian neighbors against the onset of new pro-militarist tendencies.
So, although diplomatic contacts with various European states embassies were resumed, formost of the 50s, relations with Europe were marked by a growing distrust of Japan, enhanced by
its intensifying trade frictions with the US.
And it is important to remember that a long trip undertaken by Prime Minister Yoshida
Shigeru in 1954 brought him to Europe earlier than the US. Many Japanese said that this was
Yoshidaʼs hanamichi, or “great departure”,9 and some European countries such as the United
Kingdom, France, Holland and Germany were concerned about the threats that the Japanese
textile industry could represent for their own industries. And there was considerable resistanceto its entry into the GATT in 1955, although the Americans pushed for it.
Nor did Tokyo not show any greater enthusiasm in 1957 when it welcomed the news that theTreaty of Rome has been signed, establishing the European Economic Community. So without
underestimating the profound implications that caused the special relationship with Washington,
it is undeniable that Europeans perceived Japan as a “peril”, a threatening presence to theeconomic vitality of individual European states and to the unity itself of Europe.10 The strong
competition caused by Japanese multinationals in European markets was compounded by theirtendency to create tensions between the various member states. As also noted by Christopher
Dent, the Japanese were convinced that “ the countr y ʼ s interests would be best ser ved by
exploiting European disunity and challenging the rationale of Europeʼs discriminator y trade
policies”.11
The 1962 diplomatic and trade offensive in Europe initiated by Ikeda, together with the mostimportant representatives of the Keidanren, was conceived in these terms, and this new phasecoincided with, and at the same time has produced a new course in its political relations with theWest. By now, Japan was, alongside with the US and Western Europe, one of the three pillarsof the free world.12 Ikeda was aware that in order to stabilize the domestic political situation,
by putting down the turmoil of the Leftist forces and reducing the countr yʼs dependence on
Washington, Tokyo must continue to pursue a line of close cooperation and friendly diplomacy

7

M. Hogan, A Cross of Iron. Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 24.

8

R.J. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and Technological Transformation of Japan,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1994, p. 132.

9

K. Miyazawa, R.D. Eldridge, Secret Talks Between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa
Kiichi 1949-1954, UK: Lexington, 2007, p. 134.

10

C.W. Hughes, ʻJapan in Europeʼ, in G.D. Hook, H. Hasegawa (eds.), The Political Economy of Japanese
Globalization, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 56-69.

11

C.M. Dent, The European Union and East Asia, London: Routledge, 1999, p. 87.

12

M. Iokibe, Sengo Nihon gaikō-shi, Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2006, pp. 116-117.

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Oliviero Frattolillo

with both the US and Europe.13 However, at that time, this vision was not shared by either
the White House or the European powers. It was an impossible project to achieve since,
understandably, Washington would not favour a process that allowed Japan to break away fromthe exclusive US strategic orbit. And at this point, it is easy to imagine how, in this new decade,Japan–Europe relations continued to be dominated by trade disputes.
On the other hand, at this historical moment, even the US decided to accord secondar yimportance to Europe. And during a visit to China in February 1973, Henry Kissinger told Zhou
Enlai and Mao Zedong that the Europeans “cannot do anything anyway. They are basicallyirrelevant”.14 On 26 September, Tanaka began a lengthy trip to Europe that took him to Paris,
Bonn and London, the first time for a Japanese official since Ikeda in 1962.
And Japanese politicians seemed to show a cer tain carelessness in relation to theircounterparts, and were mainly concerned with reconstructing their diplomatic and commercial
relations with China and the countries of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Europe perceived
Japan as arrogant, citing its protectionism and reluctance to respond to European complaints. In
Bert Edströmʼs words: “Despite the Tanaka governmentʼs interest in establishing close ties with
Western Europe, there was something of a gap between the rhetoric of cooperating with Europe
and the actual policy pursued by the government”.15
During the 1980s, Japanese–European relations began to take on more political depth. In
European common perception, Japan was transformed from “peril” to “partner” as the result of
the countryʼs first experience of political maturity in conjunction with awareness on the part of theEuropeans that they were interfacing with an actor capable of working in partnership with bothindividual member states and Brussels. So, since the end of World War II and well into the 80s,
relations between Japan and Europe have been characterized by a coldness in terms of diplomatic
dialogue, alternated with trade disputes.
Cold War geopolitics made a decisive contribution in depriving Japan of an ef fective,
independent foreign policy, and most of its choices in international security matters tended todepend on decisions made in Washington.

The new diplomatic scenario
Following the end of the Cold War in Asia, the new debate within leading Japanese circles wascentered on the need for Tokyo to frame its foreign policy within a new doctrine. Although the
Yoshida Doctrine delegated national security to the US and included economism among its
primary goals, Japan was able to conceptualize a vision of soft security with aims that were widely
shared by the US.
Especially after the signing of the EU-Japan Action Plan in 2001, Tokyo and Brussels initiateda fruitful and multilateral cooperation, as shown by their involvement in projects in countries
afflicted by instability and security problems. So first of all it will be fully legitimate, and indeed
13

During this period Japanese domestic politics were going through a critical phase, in part due tothe 1960 general elections; this also affected the countryʼs relations with the PRC. First, one shouldtake into account what was happening within the JSP, which had always encouraged rapprochementwith Peking. Eda Saburō, general secretary of the JSP, rejected what was stated in Asanumaʼs 1958
declaration, declaring instead that Japan would continue to pursue a policy of close collaboration with
the U.S. His words garnered Chinese hostility, and Sasaki Kōzō (a member of the extremist wing)
was preferred to Eda. In January 1962, Suzuki Mosaburō, former president of the JSP, visited China toreaffirm Asanumaʼs declaration, stating that the underlying cause of the absence of Japan-China official
diplomatic relations was due to American imperialism as well as Ikeda administration.

14

Quoted in R. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger. Partners in Power, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 466. See
also H. Kissinger, White House Years, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011.

15

B. Edström, The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions, Richmond Surrey: Curzon, 2000, p. 219.

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Uncertainty and the Political Construction of the EU-Japan Diplomatic Dialogue: The Cold War Years and the New Scenario

helpful, to question how the EU is perceived in Japan, and whether or not Tokyo considers
Brussels to be a leading player in foreign policy and global security. And the short answers tothese questions are most likely “positively” and to what extent and within what limits respectively?
On the negative side, common knowledge regarding the EU is still very scarce in Japan. It
rarely makes the front-page news, and only a relatively small number of Japanese scholars andpoliticians understand and are interested in how Brussels works. However, this phenomenon
seems to be undergoing gradual changes in Japan, with a growing number of universities offeringcourses in European Studies, the rise of specialized research institutes, the flux of Japanesescholars studying and teaching in Europe, which is constantly increasing, and young people
involved in international exchange programs.16
Since the late 80s, and especially after the adoption of the Hague Declaration in 1991, a
specific “EU factor” began to influence all the political relations between Japan and Europe,
although the former continued to reinforce its bilateral ties with individual European states.
However, while Japan and the EU have jointly promoted the idea of a comprehensive reform of
the United Nations, there has never been a common EU–Japan position on the content of thisreform.17 Partly because of the complexity of EU decision-making process, and partly because ofa lack of understanding of how responsibility is distributed between the EUʼs institutions and its
members, Japanese policy makers still seem uncertain about the true force of Brusselsʼ weighton the world stage, on which important decisions that affect Japan are taken by each member
State and adopted by the Union as a whole. The failure of the referenda on the EU Constitutional
Treaty in the Netherlands and France in 2005 were taken by Japanese politicians as a sign that
EU integration has limitations and that Tokyo must continue to deal with both the national
governments and Brussels in order to “get the most out of Europe”.
The logical approach adopted by Japan in expanding its relations with the EU after the endof the Cold War was to “diversify” its international relations and security policies, which until
then had been almost entirely defined within the framework of its bilateral alliance with the US.18
Japan believed that privileged relations with the EU would redress the balance of its international
diplomacy, making it less vulnerable to accusations that its regional, foreign and security policies
needed to be checked, or even “approved” by Washington. In November 2002, a report from the“Task Force on Foreign Relations” - a body established to advise former prime minister Koizumi identified the EU as a “strong partner” in certain areas of cooperation. As stressed by the report,
in a new world order, Japan needs to have a partner in relation to every single issue. Europe could
be construed as a rational choice of partner for some topics. The Task Force also warned that it
would be necessary for Japan to choose between dealing with the EU or with individual European
countries on a bilateral level, on a case-by-case basis. This is indicative of Japanʼs desire to be surethat it can continue to interact with single EU members when it best suits its own interests.
16

See U. Niemann, ʻThe Dynamics of People-to-People Exchanges Between Asia and Europeʼ
Chulalongkorn University Journal of European Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, July-December 2001, pp. 28-34;
P. Lim, ʻBeyond Economic Cooperation: Prospects for Mutual Social, Cultural and Educational Tiesʼ,in The 3rd Seoul ASEM and Asia-Europe Relations, Seoul: Korean Society for Contemporary European
Studies, 2000, pp. 109-133; N. Chaban, M. Holland (eds.), The European Union and the Asia-Pacific.
Media, Public and Elite Perceptions of the EU, London: Routledge, 2008; N. Chaban, M. Holland, P.
Ryan (eds.), The EU Through the Eyes of Asia. New Cases, New Findings, vol. II, Singapore: World
Scientific, 2009. For a detailed historical overview on the subject, starting from the 1970s, see Iwasa T.,
West European Academic Images and Stereotypes of Japan Since the 1970s, Doctoral thesis, Florence:
European University Institute, Department of History and Civilization, 2007.

17

See Nakanishi T., Naze Yōroppa to te wo musubu no ka. Nichi-Ō shinjidai no sentaku, Tokyo: Bensei
shuppan, 1996.

18

See Funabashi Y., China-Japan-US: managing the trilateral relationship, Tokyo: JCIE, 1998.

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Oliviero Frattolillo

Despite the growing importance of the EU in foreign policy and global security, the MOFA
still provides substantial human and financial resources for departments dealing with Asia andUS, rather than Europe. In addition, because of the division of labour within the ministry (andalso taking into account the competition between the inter-ministerial bureaucrats dealing witheconomic, political and security matters) Tokyo cannot lay claim to a single coherent strategy
concerning the EU.19
From the Japanese point of view, the EU can contribute very little, if at all, to the country ʼssecurity given both the close defence ties existing between Washington and Tokyo and East
Asiaʼs security environment, still fragile. It would seem it is a commonly held belief in Japanthat any initiative to cooperate with the EU in the field of security can only be complementary
to its military relationship with the US, which focuses on hard security whereas the JapaneseEuropean cooperation on security issues emphasizes its non-military aspects. The effectivenessand outcomes of all joint efforts aimed at contributing to global peace and stability therefore
inevitably depend on Japanʼs ability to successfully implement the two approaches together. Overthe past decade, Brussels and Tokyo have participated in many joint initiatives and established aform of dialogue that has focused on many issues, as mentioned above. However, the EU-Japan
cooperation on nuclear disarmament lacks credibility given that Japan continues to enjoy theprotection of the US nuclear umbrella, while in Europe it is not seen as a priority, and indeed it
might be said that it is not even an option for at least two member states (the UK and France).
After the North Korean nuclear test carried out in October 2006, some prominent membersof the LDP indicated that a nuclear-armed North Korea could turn on Japan again in a debate overthe development of nuclear deterrents. In September 2005, the EU and Japan launched a “strategic
dialogue on security in Asia” in which they discussed issues of regional security in Asia at regularinstitutional meetings. Between 2004 and 2005, both Japan and the US were concerned that the
EU would lift the embargo on China and resume its weapons and military technology exports
to the country, thus helping Peking in its efforts to modernize its armed forces. Both countries
complained – officially, as well as unofficially - that Brussels did not seem to be sufficiently awareof the possible impact of EU policies towards China, and suggested that these and other questions
should be periodically addressed by the EU, the US and Japan on a bilateral basis.
We should perhaps question whether ʻstrategic dialogueʼ between the EU and Japan has alogic sense beyond the discussions over the embargo, and whether there are enough strategic
issues of common interest in Asia to form the basis of a discussion. North Korea and its nuclear
programme is certainly one of these problems. Disagreements on political issues between the EU
and Japan are extremely rare. The non-military security cooperation between the two parties, thejoint support for the ICC and the signing of numerous protocols for disarmament demonstrate
the similarity of both actorsʼ approaches to international security and non-proliferation.
However, while Japan and the EU have jointly promoted the idea of a comprehensive reformof the United Nations, there has never been a common EU-Japan position on the content of thisreform.On the other hand, this should not be surprising given that Japan and Germany, one of
the most important EU member states, were primarily focused on obtaining a permanent seat on
the UN Security Council. The absence of concrete action that would make stronger the politicaland security relations beyond the current level suggests that the timeframe of the EU–Japan Joint
Action Plan will remain relatively slow, or “without surprises”, in the coming years.
This is easily understandable given the priorities of the EU foreign policy agenda, on the
one hand, and Japanʼs security ties with the US, on the other. However, it should be noted that,in Japan, the perception of the EU as a player in foreign policy and security is, to some extent,
improving. Its past contributions to security in Asia marked it out as a potentially important
19

See J. Gilson, Japan and the European Union, London: MacMillan, 2000.

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Uncertainty and the Political Construction of the EU-Japan Diplomatic Dialogue: The Cold War Years and the New Scenario

and constructive partner for Asia and for Japan itself. So the progress made to date in terms ofcombining resources and coordinating policies relating to conflict prevention and peace building
is not negligible. However, as the two parties did for the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)
which is recently entered into force, Brussels and Tokyo could certainly stand to do more also on
the political level.

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