History and Memory Issues in Europe and Asia: Acknowledging Similarities for a Better Understanding of Contemporary Tensions

History and Memory Issues in Europe and Asia: Acknowledging
Similarities for a Better Understanding of Contemporary Tensions
Valérie Niquet
Senior Visiting Fellow, JIIA

I

n 1989, Francis Fukuyama wrote his famous essay “The End of Histor y? ” Since thenhowever, histor y and memor y issues have become more important and have acquireda greater sense of urgency. These issues have become major matters of debate when
examining the critical question of the use of history and the role of memory in post-colonial
identity constructions and contemporary power games, with a strong linkage between internal
politics and external strategies.

Similar Debates, Different Factors
In France: Between the Necessar y Acceptance of Past Deeds and the Rejectionof Non-Debatable Narratives

In Europe, two perspectives must be distinguished concerning the debates on history. The firstone is that of intra-European relations, defined by centuries of conflicts and massacres. The
two world wars of the twentieth century, with their aberrant ideologies and the mass targetingof civilian populations culminating in racial extermination marked̶until today̶the pinnacleof such a violent history. This traumatic experience also led to a determination to avoid futurewars and to erase all sources of tensions, including history. The second dimension is that of thecolonial past of European powers, and the relatively recent recognition of the need to take thispast into account, in relation to migration and identity issues.
This debate is particularly significant in France, where more than 80% of the immigrant
population comes from former colonies in the Maghreb, with the highest number from Algeria
where the decolonization was the most traumatic on both sides. This situation raises the questionof reconciliation in much more complex terms than with Germany, the usual model invoked.
In the French case, the debate is focused not just on difficult issues related to a controversialcolonial past and decolonization process, but also on integration and identity-building among
second or third-generation immigrants.
The growing attention given to former victimsʼ narratives and claims emerged from both
the reality of the colonial past and from contemporary social tensions, while at the same time
becoming an important element of these tensions.
The use of history by some groups to assert their identity and increase their influence also
poses a challenge for the historian, who may be asked to “clarify” his position on the basis ofmoral grounds rather than historical research. The adoption of “memorial laws” by the French
Parliament was a direct consequence of these debates and was intended to impose an official
version of histor y, in order to acknowledge past wrongs in the name of ver y contemporar ypolitical and social issues.
Perfect objectivity in history is illusory, but historical research is based on facts and archival
work. Historical research can be used to support memory claims, but it also exists to avoid thepossibility of completely distorting histor y. However, in many countries, histor y, more thanscience, has been for years the source of national narratives. It remains, in undemocratic orfragile countries with a poor sense of legitimacy, an instrument at the service of internal politics
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and external strategies.

In Asia: A Focus on Japan Based on Strategic Rivalries

In Asia, similar issues related to history do exist, but the debate is more focused on the role ofJapan as a colonial power and an aggressor during the Second World War, and far less on thelegacies of this colonial past in contemporary Japanese society. The internal political dimensionof the debate in Japan, despite the strong presence of a Korean and Chinese minority, is far lesssignificant than in Europe, where factors such as demography and economic difficulties areomnipresent.1
In the Asia-Pacific, the strategic dimension remains the dominant factor. The reactivation oftensions linked to history is a sign of more profound rivalries in an unstable strategic framework.
Questions of history are directly related to contemporary international relations. For the Peopleʼs
Republic of China (PRC), one of the major powers in the region, historical issues constitute an
essential instrument for asserting its ambitions based on “historical claims,” nourishing strategiccompetition, and increasing ideological legitimacy.
At the military strategy level, historical issues for the PRC are also a significant element of
its offensive “information war” that can be particularly effective to degrade the image of Japanamong other democracies.
Controversial historical issues in former colonial powers in Europe are not that different fromthe situation in Asia, where Japan followed the colonial and imperial models of Western powers
after the Meiji Restoration.2 However, a lack of knowledge of the Asian context among historians,
politicians and media in Europe, and the lack of awareness of the strong similarities among the
behaviors of former colonial powers̶be it Imperial Japan, the British Empire or the French
Republic̶make it more difficult to understand the logic behind the official narratives used bysome countries to achieve purposes not related to history.
Despite the European experience of the Cold War and the propaganda war with the Soviet
Union and its allies, the similarities are not understood, and it is still often the Chinese - or Korean- narratives that prevail, failing to maintain a critical distance, that should not be confused with adenial of historical crimes.
Japanʼs ties with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy during the war, a lack of knowledge of postwar developments in Japan (apart from its close alliance with the United States, which was
also used during the Cold War to build images of resurgent militarism) and the sometimes
awkwardness of Japanese public diplomacy on sensitive issues explain this state of affairs.

Complexity versus Oversimplification

However, ignorance is mutual. In Asia, the idealized model of Franco-German reconciliation
remains the primary reference, when in fact it is probably the least relevant and ill-adapted to thecurrent tensions that have emerged around the role of China in East Asia.
The common point of history and memory issues in Europe and Asia is their complexity. The
main challenge for Europe looking at Asia, as well as Asia observing the “European model,” is tobe aware of this complexity.
At first sight, historical issues related to colonialism and imperialism only concern theEuropean powers and Japan. However, the first layer of complexity lies in the fact that colonizationand issues related to it could be perceived differently according to the situation of the countries
1

The proportion of foreigners in Japan, including second or third-generation Koreans, is less than 2%;
whereas in some European countries, including France, the percentage is above 10%. The figure does
not include French nationals whose parents are of immigrant origin.

2

The Meiji Restoration began in 1868.

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History and Memory Issues in Europe and Asia: Acknowledging Similarities for a Better Understanding of Contemporary Tensions

concerned. Thus, in Southeast Asia, the Japanese colonizer sometimes initially appeared as
an “emancipator” with respect to Western colonial powers, helping to build or revive national
identities. At a more uncomfortable level, the case of elite collaboration with colonial powers is
another factor that still resonates today, particularly in countries such as South Korea.
However, complexity also results from the fact that other actors come into play, who are lessmentioned despite the significant influence they still play in contemporary international relations.
In Asia, this is the case of China, whose slogan of “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” ( 中国民族大复兴 ) evolved in direct reference to the “century of humiliatio” ( 百年国耻 ) that China
suffered from the first Opium war to the communist victory in 1949. However, this slogan also
relates to the ambition of todayʼs Chinese regime to re-establish China as the leading powerin East Asia, using ancient concepts such as 天下 (all under Heaven), 大国小国 (big and small
powers) or 和 谐 (harmony) as ways to achieve that ambition. Meanwhile, China denies any
expansionism on its part, despite the fact that its contemporary territorial claims and definitionof “core interests” ( 核心的利益 ) are an expansion of what was considered to constitute “China
proper”, based on the last Qing Manchu dynastyʼs claims to control Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia.
Outside of China, Vietnam suf fered French colonization, but the memor y of Chinese
domination over North Vietnam, which extended from 111 to 938 and then briefly again under
the Ming Dynasty, remains present today. Similarly, in Korea, the Manchu protectorate, under theso-called “tributary” system, remained in place from the seventeenth century until the Chinese
defeat during the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, which ended with the signing of the Treatyof Shimonoseki that liberated Korea from the Qing control.3

The Role of Witnesses in Asia and Europe: A Question of Legitimacy-Building

Another level of complexity comes from the role played by witnesses in contemporary historicaltensions. The legitimacy of witnesses in histor y comes from the European model, in which
testimony of Holocaust survivors that was initially not fully recognized, particularly in France,
became essential in fighting the influence of anti-Semitic Holocaust deniers who became more
vocal during the 1980s and 1990s.
However, in the Asian context, and this is a complex issue, some witnessesʼ initiatives, while
seeking legitimacy in the European model and references to the Shoah, were less related to
the need to testify about the past than to the role played by organizations initiated or influenced
by states or political movements. As shown in some famous cases, these witnesses became̶
consciously or not̶the players in a game that, in Asia, encompasses much more than historicalissues.
This was the case in Japan with soldiers of the former Imperial army whose testimonies,
sometimes reconstructed, were taken up by the liberal press and the pacifist movements in thecontext of the Cold War.4 The same is true of the “comfort women,” who, for some of them, taking
into account their undeniable sufferings as sexually exploited women, have also become militant
actors in a cause directly related to contemporary political issues, particularly in South Korea.
In these cases, the complexity of the issues at stake is magnified by the strategy of states that
control historical narratives so that they contribute to the legitimacy of the political regime andprevent any questioning of the official line.
At another level, and regardless of the country, the decision to open archives and make themavailable is never totally neutral, and is also part of political or geopolitical objectives that can
3

Korea then became prey of Russian and then Japanese ambitions and influence, leading to the 1905
Russo-Japanese war.

4

This is for instance the case of Seiji Yoshida, a former soldier of the Imperial army, who testified how
he abducted dozens of women in Jeju, Korea. The information was published by the Asahi Shimbun in
1982, and then retracted in 2014 after Yoshida admitted that he had fabricated it.

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evolve in time. After the First World War, the opening of diplomatic archives by the Allied Powers
was intended to demonstrate their lack of responsibility in starting the war. Territorial issues in
Asia are also the subject of archival confrontations involving contemporary state entities as well
as former colonial powers.

Political Regime and Political Will: The Conditions for Reconciliation
Despite the complexity of the issues at stake, a few factors do play a major role in thereconciliation process. The first factor, whatever the historical facts, is the democratic nature of
the political system in place and its degree of openness. A high degree of freedom of access tosources for both domestic and foreign historians, free debate, and limited political interferencein historical debates are conditions that facilitate reconciliation and the sincere and long term
recognition of a former adversaryʼs “repentance”. In democracies, the desire for reconciliation asa basis for positive international relations, an awareness of the risks of manipulating history, as
well as the existence of check and balances, create conditions for a dialogue that can lead to theelaboration of a shared history.
In non-democratic states, renouncing the instrumentalization of history can also be a tacticalchoice, ser ving broader issues. This is the case of China where, in the 1970s, Mao Zedong
and then Deng Xiaoping chose not to raise the issue of past historical tensions to reach a rapid
agreement with Japan. The political context in the PRC at that time, as well as the Sino-Soviet
conflict, played a role in that decision. For the communist regime, issues such as the “Nanking
Massacre,” which took place in the capital of the nationalist government during the war, were
not relevant and did not fit into a narrative where the communist party was presented as the sole
active combatant against Japan.
In other situations, as in the case of Eastern European countries eager to join the European
Union after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the evolution of historical research in the directionof greater transparency and objectivity̶on very sensitive issues such as antisemitism̶was also
intended to demonstrate the democratic evolution of these states and justify their candidacies.
The geopolitical situation is therefore another essential factor, including in Europe, whichmakes it possible to manage past conflicts, sometimes at the cost of dealing in depth with memory
issues and taking the risk of reopening old wounds at the civil society level. Reconciliation forpolitical and geopolitical reasons, such as the Franco-German rapprochement, is a good exampleof that will to “forgive” at the cost of neglecting the clarification of tensions inside both societies.
Thus, in the treatment of the First World War in histor y textbooks, the conflict is presented
as a shared tragedy, with less attention to responsibilities, and the stress is increasingly on
the common fate of soldiers on both sides. The “imperative of oblivion” between France andGermany, “hereditary enemies” since 1870, was the dominant factor until the 1970s. This was at
the cost of overlooking more troublesome issues such as collaboration, antisemitism and the roleof France in the implementation of Nazi racial policy, as well as the fact that reconciliation was
initiated at a time when civil society and political elites in Germany had not yet come to grips withthe past. An American historian, Robert Paxton, with his book Vichy France: Old Guard and New
Order 1940-1944 published in 1972, was the person who opened the debate on the factors thatwere left out of the process of Franco-German reconciliation.

The Strategic Factor
The strategic factor has been the second element at the heart of the choice between a willingness
to forget and a desire to reactivate conflicts and memor y issues. During the Cold War,incorporation into the Eastern or Western bloc based on geographical location was crucial in theway history and memory issues were managed.
West Germany benefited rapidly from the Cold War, which made it a vital ally in the heart
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History and Memory Issues in Europe and Asia: Acknowledging Similarities for a Better Understanding of Contemporary Tensionsof Europe against the Soviet bloc. It was also the case of Japan, which went from the status ofenemy to being the closest ally of the United States. These global strategic incentives have played
an essential part in the success of the reconciliation process between Germany and France, as
well as between Japan and the United States. However, in the case of Germany, the process ofEuropean reconstruction also played a significant role in favor of reintegrating Germany as alegitimate state and ally.
In Asia, the fact that Japan was closely integrated into the US-led system of bilateral alliances
to counter the expansion and influence of communism in the region also made it possible to sign
a peace treaty in 1952 with the Republic of China in Taiwan that did not mandate the payment of
reparations. For President Chiang Kai-shek, the main issue was also strategic, and this issue isstill present today.
On questions related to how Taiwan perceives Japan and how Japan perceives Taiwan,
historical issues, such as for instance the question of “comfort women,” can resurface in a lowkey way, but such issues are essentially, on the Taiwanese side, a marker of the will to belong
and relate to “China.” In Taiwan, a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, the question of identity
and conflicting memories is at the heart of contemporar y political issues between the KMT(Kuomintang) and the pro-independence DPP (Democratic Progressive Party). Taiwanese
identity has also been built with a positive attitude to Japan and a strongly negative stance toward
mainland China. This is because political leadership coming from the continent imposed, from1945 to the democratization process of the 1980s, a strict political control over the island and any
autonomy aspirations or cultural differenciation.
Moreover, in Taiwan, the memory of the February 28 “incident” in 1947, which is estimatedto have claimed the lives of between 10,000 and 30,000 people after the mainland republican army
took control of the island, remains much more vivid than Japanʼs war crimes. Today, it is also thesharing of common democratic values that is at the heart of relations between Taiwan and Japan,
often described as a model of “positive reconciliation” in Asia.
In this context, the end of the Cold War did not play the same role in Europe and Asia. In
Western and Eastern Europe, it opened the way to reconciliation, as was the case between Poland
and Germany, while at the same time reopening questions of history inside the former Eastern
bloc that were long left unanswered by the strategic and ideological constraints of the Cold War.5
The consequences have not been the same in Asia. In that region, two elements were at play. The
Sino-Soviet conflict that erupted in 1960 and Beijingʼs perception of the Soviet Union as the mainthreat were the decisive factors that led to Chinaʼs rapprochement in the early 1970s with theUnited States and Japan.
The end of the Cold War, followed by the end of the Soviet Union, have, on the contrary, led
to a resumption of tensions with Japan. Since the mid-1990s, the “China factor” plays a major role.
The Chinese regime increasingly used Japan as a “target” in its nationalist eduction campaigns,
in the context of a growing ideological insecurities and the consecutive desire to assert itself
as the leading power in Asia. This change of posture on the part of China has led to the reinstrumentalization of historical issues and the recent increase in memorial commemorations and“Japanese war crime” museums.
The case of South Korea is, however, atypical. Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea)
were allies of the United States during the Cold War and still remain US allies. The two countries
share strong common strategic interests. However, political evolution in South Korea after the
democratization of 1987 has played a significant role in elevating tensions concerning historicalissues with Japan. The incentive to cultivate anti-Japanese sentiments is present on both sides of
5

The case of the Katyn massacre of Poland Military and civilian elites by Soviet troops is a major exampleof these tensions long denied by the regimes in place.

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the political spectrum in South Korea.
Conser vative par ties, marred by the collaboration of elites with Imperial Japan duringcolonization, must demonstrate their nationalist credentials.6 For the opposition, anti-Japanesenationalism also ser ves to strengthen its legitimacy against conser vative. In both cases, thedenunciation of Japan also helps to build a sense of national unity and belonging in a divided
peninsula.
However, in other parts of Asia such as South-East Asia, the emergence of a perceived
growing threat from China is a major factor that explains the easing of tensions stemming fromthe Second World War. A desire to counterbalance an increasingly assertive China is contributing
to greater expectations vis-à-vis Japan, including on security questions. This is notably the caseof Vietnam, which, despite the proximity of its political regime with the PRC, has moved closer toTokyo and Washington.

The Cause of Failure: What Makes Reconciliation Impossible
Paradoxically, the more the Second World War and the Cold War fade into the past, the more
historical issues seem to regain importance. On one side, the democratic characteristics of a stateargue in favor of reconciliation, but they can also open the doors to the reemergence of tensions
that may be rooted in some segments of civil societies.
In the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, after an initial quiet period related tothe desire to join the European Union, greater freedom of speech has set off disturbing debatesaround the notion of equal victimhood, which equates the suffering of local populations in
the Second World War with the misery unleased in the eradication of long-established Jewish
communities.
As demonstrated by the case of South Korea, despite common strategic interests, thecombination of political liberalization and nationalism in a recently democratized political system
can become a negative factor for reconciliation. In democratic countries, the rapid expansion ofsocial media and the internet also plays a role.
Processes of reconciliation implemented from the top, such as the establishment of diplomatic
relations in 1965 between Japan and South Korea, as well as the 2015 final agreement on the“comfort women” issue signed between President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,can be challenged for domestic political reasons, despite their positive strategic motives.
In France, positions on anti-colonialism and the Algerian war have long been strong markers
of division between left and right. Any intermediate position, such as that of the writer Albert
Camus, that takes into account the fate of people whose families had been living in Frenchcolonies for generations, or that of the harkis who fought along French troops and who wereabandoned to violent reprisals after independence, has long been rejected. The concepts of “mutual
contribution” and diversity, which are constantly referred to in an increasingly diverse France,
have little legitimacy in post-colonial societies, particularly in Algeria, where resentment against
the former colonial “ruler” still constitutes an essential element of the regimeʼs legitimacy.
Furthermore, in France, history and memory issues related to the countryʼs colonial past
have become important factors in domestic politics. How to teach history, with the controversial
adoption of “memorial laws,” is an object of political debate related to the integration of people ofimmigrant origin into society and questioning of the French model of assimilation.
In European societies, the collapse of political ideologies has also made the search for identity
based on the denunciations of past crimes such as slavery and colonization a critical element of

6

For instance, General Park Chung-hee, father of former president Park Geun-hye (who was impeachedin 2016), was an officer in the Japanese Imperial army during the war.

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History and Memory Issues in Europe and Asia: Acknowledging Similarities for a Better Understanding of Contemporary Tensions

new “memory wars” that fuel resentments within some segments of the immigrant population.7

Asymmetr y and “Resentment-Nationalism”
Another factor impeding reconciliation, often related to ideological divisions and the lack of
democracy, is power asymmetry between formerly “dominant” and “dominated” states.
This is particularly the case between Algeria and France, Poland and Germany, Poland
and Russia, Korea and Japan, and China and Japan. “Resentment-Nationalism,” whose focus
is to “wash out” past and present “humiliations,” and is at the heart of some regimesʼ survival
strategies, as in the Peopleʼs Republic of China since the mid-1990s, is a factor that hinders longterm reconciliation. This type of discourse discourages debate on controversial issues that could
challenge, or diverge from, the official line.
At the bilateral level between Beijing and Tokyo, the return of Japan as a “normal” power in
Asia, which could upset a strategic balance favorable to Beijingʼs interests, is denied in the nameof past abuses and the negation of Japanʼs political choices and evolution since 1945.
The challenge for the targeted states is to maintain a balance while not appearing to be
indifferent or revisionist, as both attitudes can have negative consequences for the global image
and strategic interests of the that state.
Thus, in reaction to the erection of “comfort women” statues in the United States, Japan̶
whose main strength and influence reside in the democratic and open characteristics of its
political system and society̶has sometimes be tempted to over-react in ways that may have led
to negative consequences. The lack of knowledge of the real issues at stake, and of the similarities
between what all former colonial powers (in Europe and Asia) did, can only exacerbate thesenegative consequences, which underscores the need for finely-tuned communication.

Conclusion

In many cases, histor y itself is not the real issue or factor that prevents a long-term processof stable reconciliation. Rather, it is the utilization, according to the strategic priorities of the
moment, of issues of history by some states or interest groups that undermines reconciliation.
The decision to commemorate specific past events, such as the Vel dʼHiv roundup of the Jewish
population in France in 1942, the violent repression of demonstrations in Sétif, Algeria in 1945,
or, in the case of China, the Nanjing Massacre, is made by the powers in place to give strong
signals not just to their own public, but to specifically targeted countries and to the international
community as a whole.
The very idea of stable reconciliation is almost impossible without a political transformationthat modifies paradigms of legitimacy. But paradoxically, in the most controlled societies, it isat the level of civil society that forgiveness can exist, in spite of and in opposition to an official
narrative that puts the stress on past grievances. The growing number of Chinese tourists
and students in Japan, the importance of Algerian emigration in France, and strong culturalinteractions between South Korea and Japan are positive examples.
Reconciliation is thus possible, in spite of lingering historical issues. However, for a longterm and non-controversial reconciliation among nations, a series of conditions must be met.
Foremost of them are the establishment of democratic characteristics and the sharing of strong
common strategic interests. It is therefore problematic to speak of an ideal universal model ofreconciliation when these conditions are not met, as is the case today in Asia. Even in Europe,
where this model is based on robust democracies and a strong ambition to achieve peace andreconciliation on the continent, it remains fragile, as the rise of populism has demonstrated.
7

However, the low level of activism of the Korean community living in Japan on contentious issues like
“comfort women” must be noted.

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