The Samurai Bond of Loyalty:
Transition from Blood Ties through Self-Interested
Allegiance to Absolute Devotion
Maria Paola CULEDDU*

1

Foreword

The Japanese people have always greeted foreign influences with great
enthusiasm. In the first centuries AD the massive introduction of Chinese
civilization deeply affected all aspects of Japanese culture. Writing, religion,architecture and arts, court titles and rank systems all experienced great
development. Administrative, bureaucratic, and legal institutions from thecontinent were all used as models by the Japanese state during this time.
Later, cultural interaction occurred with other Asian countries, but predominantly with China and Korea. During the middle of the sixteenth century, aship of Portuguese merchants was wrecked on Tanegashima Island.
Subsequently, Western traders and missionaries brought not only technological innovations such as firearms, but also ideologies and spiritual ideas suchas the Christian religion.
In spite of their remarkable capacity for adaptation, the Japanese people
have never compromised on the elements specific to their cultural background. An example of this phenomenon is the unquestioned sanctity anddivinity of the Emperor—strongly connected with the Shintō religion—which
remained a steady and unchanged feature until modern times. Chinese civilization was acknowledged for its excellence, however.
Genealogy has always been regarded highly by the Japanese people. Whilst
the Chinese state examination system and the theoretical possibility of thelower classes aspiring to better social conditions had no equivalent in Japan(except for inferior appointments), the hierarchical social structure offered by
Confucianism was undoubtedly an essential ideological basis for the establishment of Japanese political power. Titles and higher offices were always
exclusive to both civil and military nobles.

	  * Ph.D., Sapienza University, Rome

62

Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 4 2013

By analyzing historical events, ancient written works, and the spiritualand philosophical roots of Japanese civilization, the importance of blood ties
and hierarchy in the legitimization of political power throughout Japanese
history becomes clear.
After a brief note on ancient Japan, this paper deals with the Japanesewarrior class. From blood ties to the abstract concept of absolute devotion to
the lord, duty always was the keystone of samurai thought. While some
aspects are connected with Confucian teachings, others are typicallyJapanese.

2

Uji clans and antecedents of the Japanese medieval era: blood ties
as fundamental to the warrior group

At the time of the Uji clans, during the Yayoi and Kofun periods, social
prestige derived from descent from a tutelary deity and from family ties withthe head of an Uji. As interaction among villages increased, and when the
Yamato clan came to rule, the Uji increased their own prestige by having
women of their clan marry members of the imperial Uji.
Development of the shōen estates during the Nara and Heian periods
enabled the imperial and aristocratic clans to continue living in great luxury
at the top of society even during periods of political laxity, when centralized
power declined and authorities faced civil unrest. The imperial court wasforced to charge buke (aristocratic warrior clan) leaders with the responsibilityof suppressing rebellions in the provinces. These rebellions were instigated byother buke leaders, a situation that persisted until important warrior lords
themselves took power at the end of the twelfth century.
In the eighth century warrior families in the provinces began to gather ingroups under the leadership of clan heads of buke families. Groups of warriors
usually included the sons of the lord, his brothers and relatives, members ofside branches, and also some men not connected with the lord by blood ties,
such as followers or servants. As for the internal hierarchy of the clan, the ie
no ko (literally “sons of the household”), i.e. blood relatives, were ranked
below the lord. They were followed by the kenin (vassals), who were not relatives, but treated as if they were; the rōtō (employees or servants), who served
the lord in times of peace and followed him into war; and the genin (subordinates), or shoju (followers, squires, stablemen, and farmers), who took care ofhorses, equipment, and food. Loyalty to the lord was rewarded with material
benefits: his men lived in his house and received war chests and the land
taken from the enemy after a battle.
Loyalty bonds were essential within the group. Personal ties, not formalized by official ceremony, were deep and indissoluble and were restricted to
the lord. Loyalty to the lord was so extreme that the warrior was even willing

The Samurai Bond of Loyalty

63

to give his own life for the lord. Courage and honor (family reputation) were
the guiding values of a warrior, while cowardice led to a dishonor only death
could erase. An honorable death was seen as a warrior’s natural destiny, andwas idealistically accepted and pursued as the culmination of a life spent inservice to the lord.
In the tenth and eleventh centuries, as social unrest and disorder increasedin the provinces, the warrior class became more and more involved in politics, taking on the highest positions in the provincial government. Leaders still
belonged to the buke, which were branch families of the kuge (aristocratic
class). Therefore, political power was strictly connected with genealogy (i.e.
aristocratic lineage).
Later, perennial internal disorder led to local peacekeeping activity being
assumed by local warriors who became officials of district or provincial
governments. To increase the influence and power of their families, they
eventually started holding office through inheritance.
Meanwhile, some regional alliances of local warrior groups were formed
when nobles were called on by the imperial court to quell rebellions by local
bands of warriors that had become too powerful and were unwilling tosubmit to central authority. The chiefs of these regional alliances were ofaristocratic origins as well.
In conclusion, until the twelfth century, ideological conflicts between thearistocracy and those who ruled did not occur, as the latter continued to serve
the interests of court nobles. The Taira and Minamoto, the powerful warrior
clans that were involved in political life at the turn of the century, wereconnected with the imperial family just as were the court nobles. Like local
warriors in the provinces, they followed the “Way of the horse and bow.”
They regarded dying in battle as the highest honor; family reputation was ofsupreme consideration. Each clan’s banner was carried into battle to assert thefamily name and to show prowess in the face of danger and death.

3

Kamakura Shogunate

The formation of political power at local and later regional levels gradually led to the establishment of a military government based in Kamakura(known as the Bakufu or Shogunate) by 1192. The regional power of
Minamoto Yoritomo (1142–1199) was based on a network of personal ties
that originally had no national validity. Actually, the loyalty bond between
Yoritomo and his vassals required no legitimacy from above. By the end of1190 Yoritomo had obtained imperial approval for the appointment of his
go-kenin as shugo (military provincial administrators) and jitō (estate
managers). Later, when he was appointed Shōgun, Yoritomo modeled thepatriarchal structure of the new government on ancient clan organization and64

Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 4 2013superposition of the private and public spheres. Once the new government
was established, shugo and jitō were officially placed under the Shōgun, bothby virtue of their personal bonds with Yoritomo and because they submitted
to public authority. In fact, their appointments were now legitimized at anational level.
Yoritomo strove to limit the number of go-kenin and to grant them elite
status. The go-kenin swore allegiance to him and were often accepted amongst
their followers through a process of adoption or marriage. Family ties withthe head of the clan were more important than appointments. Collapse of thecentralized power of the Hōjō clan took place over many years due to theweakening of family ties and to the partitioning of the private lands of the
go-kenin into lots assigned posthumously to their heirs.
Nevertheless, supreme legitimacy was attained through family ties withthe kuge.1 These were still very strong in the Minamoto era. Thus, even if
Kamakura officials gradually became more powerful in shōen internal affairs,such as dispute resolutions or tax collection, they did not replace imperial
government officials but were appointed to the same posts and collaborated
with them for some time. The Bakufu did not abolish most of the privileges
and institutions of court nobles, but attempted gradually to limit their influence. The court was both a direct and indirect source of legitimacy since
Shōgun were appointed by the Emperor and common ancestors had a divine
origin.
Warriors were the new holders of political power; they began to feel theneed to explain the reasons for, and to justify, their supremacy. In gunki
monogatari (war tales), values such as the ability to administer land and topossess political expertise and knowledge of diplomacy were much lessimportant than the art of the sword and samurai virtues. A few years after theend of the wars that led to the establishment of the Shogunate, the heroismand deeds of courageous warriors were recorded in the war tales, together
with a strong sense of awareness of the brevity of life and of respect for the
clan’s name.
Political, economic,2 military, and religious changes led to new social
conditions under which a new segment of society came to threaten the estab1 Ties between the military aristocracy and court nobles were very strong. As an
example, when Yoritomo’s second son, Sanetomo, was assassinated in 1219,
the Minamoto line ran out. The Hōjō regents held power, but in 1225 a kuge
was appointed Shōgun for the first time. This was Kujō Yoritsune (1218–56),
who was related to the Fujiwara and Minamoto families.
2 Emergence of warriors on the political scene contributed to economic development. Shugo, jitō, and go-kenin were sent all over the country and created awide class of consumers.

The Samurai Bond of Loyalty

65

lished order. The rise of political participation at a lower level reflected not
only the indifference of absentee landlords to land administration (later
devolving into inability), but once again, to the spread of Chinese civilization.
A renewed Buddhism3 offered new ways to access truth and to explain andlegitimize contemporary events and changes. Buddhism, which was a sophisticated and aristocratic religion in the classic periods, became accessible tothe common people (e.g. Pure Land, Zen, and Nichiren Buddhism), throughsimplified thought and minimized rituals. At a philosophical level, pluralism
in ideas spread; instead of pursuing an overarching framework of doctrines,
sects proliferated. The elaborate rituals and complex doctrines of classic
Buddhism and the exclusivity of the Tendai and Shingon schools, which
discredited themselves by being involved in political and military affairs,
hardly suited the needs of the bushi. Therefore, during the Kamakura period,
the latter adopted Zen Buddhism, which was congenial to a lifestyle based on
discipline and self-control. To practice Zen meditation and follow Zen
Buddhist principles, higher education and wealth were unnecessary, but
mental vitality and strong willpower were. This was believed to enable
reaching the innermost depths of the soul/mind to find truth, and to transform
it into action. With Zen Buddhism, the samurai found a source of legitimacy
for and within their actions.

4Ashikaga Shogunate and the Sengoku era: alliances and betrayals

Soon after Yoritomo died members of the Hōjō clan became regents. Somegenerations later the bond of loyalty between the Bakufu and the vassals
started to weaken. This was due to a number of reasons, such as division ofland, increasing complexity of institutions, the emergence of new warrior
clans, the appearance of many samurai of humble origins on the politicalscene, and particularly to regent government policy. The Hōjō actuallyfavored the appointment of family members. Owing to poor administration,
the Kamakura Bakufu was still indebted to many warrior families and priests,
having been unable to pay them for their military and spiritual help during theinvasion attempts of the Mongols in 1274 and 1281. Ultimately the Hōjō
were unable to resist Emperor Go-Daigo’s takeover of power, known as the
Kenmu Restoration (1333–1336), which caused the end of the first shogu3 The spread of Buddhism had considerable political and economic consequences.
Schools run by Buddhist temples offered mathematics, religious, and moral
education to many warriors and monks who needed a minimum of culture tofulfil their duties, and to merchants and village heads who needed to be able
to read and write to run administrative affairs. Moreover, Zen (Chan) monks
from China actively participated in trade by providing Japanese markets withproducts such as swords and luxury goods for the emergent warrior class.

66

nate.

Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 4 2013

The Ashikaga Shōgun were unable to improve the situation. Like theMinamoto they tried to combine public authority and personal loyalty bonds
by appointing their vassals as governors and officials. The Shōgun forced
them to reside in Kyoto, the imperial capital, where they themselves lived,
thus enabling the Shōgun to have more control over their actions. For over a
century their power was based on a fragile alliance with the shugo, who
tended to run provincial land autonomously and had no interest in overthrowing the Ashikaga since they served as a source of legitimacy.
The breaking point came with the Ōnin War (1467–1477). As the war
spread throughout the country, it led to total decentralization and a shift ofauthority towards the local élite. While it was impossible for court nobles toattain power, families of the shugo and powerful clans fought for survival,land, and power in the provinces. This was achieved by making and breaking
up alliances and supporting opposite imperial lines based on personal advantage, and by accepting local warriors among their bands. Meanwhile, many
local squires rebelled against the shugo and appeared upon the political scene.
Although they were subject to the authority of government officials, they had
no personal ties to them, nor did they take an oath of allegiance. They
created semi-independent fiefdoms and enlarged them at the expense of theirneighbors. This process was called gekokujō (“the low overcomes the high”).
Foot soldiers became essential, with palisades and castles becoming
commonplace. In the sixteenth century, castle towns were built, protected byramparts and moats and surrounded by vassals’ residences.
The gunki monogatari written in this period tell in a vigorous manner
samurai ambition for power in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They arefull of praise for military success and courage on the battlefield. They are
similar to epic poems, yet differ from the first warrior tales in that no special
attention is given to social status or noble origins. Success in battle alone
gave moral sanction to samurai conduct, including actions that would now be
considered betrayal.
Ambition for power and volte-faces became the norm. The Zen monk
Takuan Sōhō’s (1573–1645) words on loyalty to the lord were useful at thistime. Takuan wrote in the Reiroshū that to a samurai, the lord is shijū ichinin,“the same from the beginning to the end,” meaning that although he serves
different lords, the idea of “lord” exists in the samurai’s mind, and is not tied
to a specific individual.
Moreover, the sense of duty to one’s lord (giri) went beyond loyalty (chū)
to the Shōgun, which was politically non-existent or not even considered.
Ruth Benedict in The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) wrote about adaimyō in the twelfth century who was ordered by a Minamoto shōgun toThe Samurai Bond of Loyalty

67

hand over an enemy lord whom he had granted asylum. The daimyō repliedwith a letter in which he expressed his indignation over the offence against
his giri duty. He added that public affairs did not depend on him, but that giri
between men of honor was an eternal and indisputable truth. He therefore
refused to be disloyal to his friends.
In the sixteenth century a number of opposing parties entered the field.
More solid defensive structures were built to defend against newly introduced
weapons such as firearms. Many peasants were employed by daimyō to form
armies of tens of thousands of temporary soldiers. The relationship between
the lord and vassal changed. It was now based on personal investiture and on
an oath of allegiance more than on family ties. In this period of political fragmentation, boundless ambitions flourished and a rich peasant or merchantcould become a samurai.
With the gradual weakening of kinship ties, which involved allegiances
not based on chū, written laws having official significance became necessary
to formalize the relationship between lord and vassal. While defending thelords against restrictions from the government, legal codes provided legitimacy to the daimyo, who themselves had to respect them. Therefore thesecodes ensured that the lord would not be considered a dictator who exercised
power by virtue of his military strength, but a defender of the establishedorder.
In the Sengoku period the local power structure shifted from a kinship to
an institutionalized level. The lords at war (sengoku daimyō) became local
lords (shōhoku daimyō) who had absolute authority within their domains. By
the end of the sixteenth century they had become pre-modern lords (kinsei
daimyō). At the same time, samurai were forced to move from the fields andlive in castle towns, despite resistance from minor samurai who were engaged
in agriculture in peacetime (jizamurai). During the last decades of thesixteenth century daimyō tried to increase their power by adopting directions
from the Shogunate in their domains, such as conducting censuses on population, weapons, land, and economic resources. Measures were taken to tie
peasants to the land. Separated from the rest of the population, vassals were
given salaries rather than fiefdoms, were expected to follow laws concerning
their military forces, and were more strictly controlled. Since they wereplaced in the position of being unable to forge strong ties with their men, theoccurrence of armed uprisings was partly prevented.
Many military households, including those created during the Sengoku
period, established solid fiefdoms. Only a few were from shugo families; themajority were from medium and low level samurai. The gunki monogatari of
this period celebrated acclaim derived from action and success. Nonetheless,the buke families of ancient origin always looked at “newcomers” with suspi-

68

Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 4 2013

cion, which is why sometimes a family came to “discover” its ancient buke
origins.

5

Unification of Japan and the Tokugawa Shogunate:a legitimacy issue and the sublimation of loyalty

Lineage was an obstacle to Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi.
Though they became the most powerful men in the country they did notdescend from the Minamoto clan and therefore could not be appointed
Shōgun. In need of legitimacy, they both boasted of their descent from otherlines of the imperial family. But this was not enough. Oda received the mostimportant appointments within the court nobility, but after rejecting them all
he used the concept of tenkafubu (dominate the world through weapons) tocreate an autonomous legitimacy for his power. Toyotomi had very humble
origins, since he came from a peasant family. His rise to power was enabled
by his adoption by Konoe Sakihisa (1538–1612), who descended from
Fujiwara Michinaga (966–1027) through appointments within the nobility. He
also became imperial regent (kanpaku) through descent from the Toyotomi
family. Vassals swore allegiance in 1588 by the Jurakutei oath. To prevent
others from following his path and emulate his incredible rise to power, heordered the separation of samurai and peasants and disarmed the latter
through the sword hunt (katanagari).
Tokugawa Ieyasu, in contrast, boasted of descent from the Minamoto clan,
asserting that he was related to Nitta Yoshisada (1301–1338), the warrior
leader who destroyed the Hōjō. Therefore, he had no reason to aim atappointments within the court nobility and found legitimacy within the
shogunal institution itself. After he was appointed Shōgun he imposed lawsthat gained official significance. Vassals swore allegiance at Nijō Castle in1611. Oaths of allegiance to Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu had
official significance; they ended the relationship between the Shōgun and his
vassals based on personal bonds. Legal codes in the Sengoku period, and laws
and oaths in the Tokugawa period served as evidence of the existence ofdaimyō authority and were also a source of legitimacy.
Ieyasu’s political establishment was based on a rigid bureaucratic structure
rather than on personal relationships between the Shōgun and his daimyō.
Marriage and adoption policies were implemented to ensure the endurance ofclans, and their “right” to run the country. Other measures were undertakenby the Shogunate in order to ensure daimyō loyalty to the Shōgun and toprevent them from making “dangerous” alliances or becoming too powerful.
Firstly, the Tokugawa shogunate accepted clans that submitted to the
Shogunate structure(tozama, the “non-Tokugawa” or “outside” daimyō), andallowed sub-government autonomy in fiefdoms (han), whilst at a national level

The Samurai Bond of Loyalty

69

they only appointed traditional vassals (fudai) to positions related to the
Shogunate. Secondly, Laws for the Military Houses (buke shohatto) were
issued from 1615 to provide instructions to daimyō on their lifestyles andduties. Thirdly, standardized practices, such as the “alternate residence”
system (sankin-kōtai), were adopted to allow better control over daimyō andto set limits on their incomes by forcing them to use some of their economic
resources for the journey to Edo and back to the fiefdom, for the second residence, and for services to the Shōgun.
During the Tokugawa period the values associated with “the Way of theWarrior” (Bushidō) were formalized and a sense of unselfish duty was emphasized. The philosopher and military strategist Yamaga Sokō (1622–1685),
alongside other scholars, drew upon elements from Confucianism, Buddhism,
and Shintoism in order to create a philosophy that supported Bushidō andcreate legitimacy for the warriors’ supremacy over the population. Since noneof the Tokugawa shōgun could achieve the same great military deeds as
Ieyasu, he was deified so as to legitimate the office of his heirs.
At a lower level the bond between the daimyō and his samurai within thefiefdom was less personal than before. Since daimyō were appointed by the
Shōgun there were no kinship ties with his men. Moreover, the sankin-kōtai
system was an obstacle itself, because it kept the daimyō and his family
permanently away from the fiefdom and its population. This was true intheory. Actually, the samurai, being confined to their fiefdoms, often developed a very deep affection for their daimyō. An oath of allegiance became aformal act, though it was still sincerely felt. A famous example of thisextreme sense of loyalty is found in Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s (1659–1721)
Hagakure (The Book of the Samurai), in which the author expresses a strong
gratitude for the opportunity to devote his entire life to his lord. The stage
play Chūshingura is another well-known example of this unreserved devotion.
It deals with the true story of forty-seven rōnin who avenge their lord when
he was forced to commit suicide after reacting to an injustice.

6

The Bakumatsu period and national bushidō in the Meiji:
the Emperor as unique lord

During the Bakumatsu period the Shōgun lost the support of many daimyō,
who accused him of being unable to accomplish his mission to protect Japan
from Westerners. Their support of the restoration of the Emperor’s politicalsupremacy was, of course, due to their ambition to gain power as well, and toactively participate in the politics of the country. Internal disorders included
feuds aimed at destroying the Shogunate (this was especially true of theSatsuma and Chōshū clans), along with the incursion of foreign ships andresidents. At the end of the civil war Yoshinobu (1837–1913), the fifteenth

70

Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 4 2013and last Tokugawa Shōgun, delivered the Shogunal capital Edo into the handsof the Emperor’s partisans. Imperial power (Ōsei fukko) was re-established in
January 1868. During the Meiji restoration (Meiji ishin), Japan rapidly becamea modern country, politically, economically, and militarily. However, modernization came at a cost. A sacrifice was asked of the samurai, too, and with thesocial reform of 1872 they lost their privileged status.
Nonetheless, many warrior family members maintained continuity inregional administration and through employment in business activities that
contributed to the persistence of some of the principles of the warrior tradition. Moreover, the latter were “adopted” by the government at a national
level in order to increase the sense of loyalty to the lord. The contemporary
lord was personified in a society renewed, in the company employer, or in theoffice boss, or the village head, but ultimately in the Emperor. The Japanesesovereign was actually to be considered a god on earth and the source ofprotection for all Japanese. A distance was put between him and his subjects
because of his quality of being divine, so that it was impossible for common
people to even know what his face looked like. However, in contrast with hisrole in the Tokugawa era, he was to be remembered by each individual at all
times. The Meiji oligarchy’s purpose in creating an ideology that supported
government policies of national modernization and strengthening was toensure that Japanese subjects carried out their duties with utmost effort andlived with the consciousness that sacrificing action and life to the Emperor
was good. At the end of the Meiji era examples of extreme devotion to theEmperor were no less meaningful than those we find in the Shogunate period.
The well-known seppuku of General Nogi Maresuke (1849–1912), and of his
wife, who sacrificed her life soon after him by committing jigai at the deathof the Meiji Emperor, are certainly examples of this.
Samurai revolts against the new social establishment and loss of traditional
values due to modernization (westernization) occurred in the first years of the
Meiji era. However, it is interesting to note that some of the revolts wereexpressly conducted in the name of the Emperor.

7

Conclusion
Loyalty to the lord: an external value or of indigenous origin?

From their origin to their later manifestation in the Meiji era, warriors
maintained a sense of allegiance to the lord that was central and somehow
compulsory, a duty inwardly felt. Loyalty to the lord, and the blood ties thatwere closely related to it, were considered of great “value.” In the distant pastheroic deeds determined merit and glory. Merit itself was transmitted to heirs
through blood lines as an inner quality. In times of disorder and war, when
low level warriors managed to impose themselves on the political scene (e.g.

The Samurai Bond of Loyalty

71

Sengoku jidai), there was great need for blood-legitimacy. The importance ofthe hierarchical order in Japanese society finds its origins in the distant past
(Yayoi era, ca. 300 B.C.–ca. 300 A.D.). Undeniably, Chinese Confucianism
lent support to the Japanese system of social relationships, especially when
the latter were particularly rigid. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, forexample, the mibunsei status system of Neo-Confucian inspiration legitimized
the prohibition to change status.
However, in the “peaceful” Tokugawa era the supremacy of the samurai
was questioned owing to the dissatisfaction of other classes with being dominated by an oppressive class that had lost its natural warring role. Discussions
on Confucianism took place throughout this period. During the sixteenth andseventeenth centuries such discussions examined the legitimation of the neworder dictated by the Tokugawa, and later the legitimation of the warriors’
domination over Japanese society. The Shogunate especially emphasized Chu
Hsi’s orthodox Neo-Confucianism regulating the relationship between thesovereign and the subject. However, at the end of the seventeenth century
some philosophers began referring to the Ōyomei school of heterodox
Neo-Confucianism that emphasized interiority, mind, and intuition. Ogyū
Sorai (1666–1728) and Ishida Baigan (1685–1744) were the two main figuresin this debate. Other intellectuals, such as Yamaga Sokō and Hirata Atsutane(1776–1843) tried to bridge the gap between the samurai ideal and reality inorder to allow the warrior to claim a prestige that derived from righteous andnoble behavior. The way to this ideal was through the purity of the indigenous tradition. Warriors in the Tokugawa era were actually encouraged tofollow ancient samurai virtues to gain self-legitimizing power.
In the Meiji era devotion to the Emperor, promoted and imposed by thegovernment oligarchy, reproduced at a national level the samurai sense of
loyalty toward their daimyō at a local level. While this ideal was necessary tojustify the acts of rebellious daimyō against the Shogunate during the
Bakumatsu period, it became a national ideological structure glorifying theuniqueness of the Japanese imperial system, people, and country.
More than half a century ago, Ruth Benedict pointed out (1946) the twoterms that express Japanese ideas of duty, gimu and giri. The first derives fromgratitude for being born in this world (cfr. Confucianism and Buddhism); thesecond from a series of feelings, ranging from gratitude for a favor received
to a dishonor to avenge. Giri necessarily requires the return of a debt (on) inorder to restore equilibrium. Within the warrior class duty was towards
parents, name (clan) and, above all, the lord. Until the Tokugawa era, asamurai had a duty towards his daimyō for giving him employment, i.e. ameans to earn a living for his family. Takuan Sōhō expresses this concept
with the following words:

72

Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 4 2013[…] from the time one has been taken into a daimyo’s service, of theclothes on his back, the sword he wears at his side, his footgear, his
palanquin, his horse and all of his materiel, there is no single item thatis not due to the favor of his lord. Family, wife, child and his own
retainers—all of them and their relations—not one can be said not toreceive the lord’s favor. Having these favors well impressed on his mind,
a man will face his lord’s opponents on the battlefield and cast away his
one life. This is dying for right-mindedness. This is not for the sake of
one’s name. Nor for gaining fame, a stipend and a fief. Receiving afavor and returning a favor—the sincerity of the core of the mind
consists solely of this. (Reiroshū, translation by W. Scott Wilson 1987:22)
In conclusion, the heart of the discourse may be found in the quality of
being “natural” in the sense of loyalty to the lord, as was true for blood ties
and divinity of the Emperor and the country. This quality corresponds tobeing autochthonous. Attempts were made to generalize and universalize duty
towards the lord in periods of disorder (convenient loyalty or treachery) andthe Tokugawa era (service to the lord’s successor after the lord’s death,keeping in mind the idea of the lord). Nonetheless, loyalty in Japan appears
to possess an inner quality that is necessarily directed to one particular individual. This naturally led, in the Meiji era, to the whole population being seen
as indebted to the Emperor. Though the influence of philosophical and social
systems of Chinese origin is undeniable in Japanese society and the warrior
class,4 one is tempted to analyze how deeply Japanese intellectuals andsamurai considered this influence. How they tried to limit Chinese influence
to a corroboration of values already existing in Japanese society, as can beseen in the strong tendency already extant in the Tokugawa era to consider
the country and features of Japan, will be the subject of further study.

4 Daimyō were instructed to study Chinese works on strategy. These instructions
are found in the Shogunate Buke Shohatto and in private letters (wills) of
daimyō to their heirs. Cfr. Itakura Shigenori