Policy Brief
May 2024
Task Force 2: Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development

Energizing the Future: A Holistic Approach
to Global Sustainability
Jitendra Roychoudhury, Principal Fellow, King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center(KAPSARC), Saudi Arabia
Dina Azhgaliyeva, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Japan
Emre Hatipoglu, Associate Professor of International Relations, KAPSARC School of Public Policy(KSPP), Saudi Arabia
Filippo Aloisi de Larderel, Universitá Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Italy
Marie Petitet, Senior Fellow, King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center (KAPSARC),
Saudi Arabia
Davide Ponti, Sciences Po & Universitá Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Italy

Abstract
The global shift to sustainable energy demands a comprehensive policy approach for anequitable transition, ensuring energy security and addressing rising energy needs. The G7’surgency to phase out unabated coal-based power plants globally requires crucial financing of
their retirement through transition financing mechanisms similar to the Just Energy Transition
Partnerships and Energy Transition Mechanism . At the same time, challenges persist with theTask Force 2 Policy Brief

reliability of solar and wind energy due to their intermittency. In addition, dependency onlimited geographies supplying renewable energy technologies highlights vulnerabilities incritical mineral supply chains. The G7 faces complexity in ensuring global energy security amidst
enhanced geopolitical risks. However, with the implementation of the proposed solutions, there
is a potential for significant positive change. Energy demand growth due to population growth,
improvements in energy access, electrification, new technologies, and income growth rises
ever higher despite gains from energy efficiency. This policy brief proposes solutions, including
financing the retirement of unabated coal-fired power plants, incentivizing local content-basedenergy technology manufacturing, diversifying technology providers, and increasing electricity
trading by developing common principles for electricity trading to support G7’s goals andextending these benefits globally.

The challenge
The continuous advancement towards a sustainable energy future on a global scale requires acomprehensive policy approach to navigate the changing landscape of achieving an (i) equitabletransition, (ii) ensuring energy security, (iii) meeting growing energy demand, (iv) reliability and(v) affordability. Addressing these five aspects is critical to ensuring a sustainable energy future.
Recent events (e.g., the war in Ukraine) have illustrated that failure to address these issues will
mean an increase in unabated fossil fuel usage, negating the progress toward greenhouse gas
emissions reductions globally.
The G7 has emphasized expediting the phase-out of domestic unabated coal-based power
generation, underlining the critical financing requirement to replace current such facilities with
low-carbon options (Dlouhy 2023). Despite significant cost reductions in solar and wind energy,
inherent intermittencies could impact their reliability. Addressing these challenges effectively
requires grid integrative technologies such as energy storage, a capacity-enhanced network oftransmission lines, and enhanced grid connectivity (Lin 2023; Oliva H. 2022). Additionally, crossborder electricity interconnections could offer a more sustainable and cost-effective alternative
to energy storage and utility-level solutions, enabling the continuous flow of electrons andhelping reduce the demand for storage (Haji Bashi et al. 2022; Katz and Cochran 2015; Thukral
et al. 2017; Abrell and Rausch 2016). Such a system of cross-border transmission corridors andelectricity trading can enhance efficiency and sustainability in the energy sector while enabling
the cost-effective retirement of unabated coal-fired power plants (Alam 2023; IRADe 2022; MIT
Energy Initiative 2011; Bahar and Sauvage 2013).
The G7’s commitment to achieving a green transition highlights the challenges in guaranteeing
energy security concerning the security of energy supply and the security of energy technologies
and their manufacturing processes (G7 2023b). Nations, notably those rich in fossil fuelresources, are transitioning from energy self-sufficiency to reliance on imported energy transition2

Energizing the Future: A Holistic Approach to Global Sustainability

technologies like solar PV, wind turbines, and batteries. This shift poses different challenges
to energy security, as well as employment. The G7’s heavy reliance on single geographies forrenewable energy technologies demonstrates the drawbacks of the potential coercive influenceof concentrating critical mineral mining, processing, and refining in specific geographicalregions (Lee 2023). These technological and resource dependencies leave the G7 vulnerable togeopolitical impacts, some immediate, as observed during the Ukrainian conflict and Europe’s
reliance on Russian energy supply, and some long-term, as can be observed in disruption in
supplies of titanium and other minerals (G7 2023c). To foster the energy transition, it is crucial toalleviate concerns about energy security and promote local content development, thus ensuring
both energy security and local jobs.
These issues of ensuring a stable energy transition while ensuring a just transition and energy
security are further exacerbated by the growth of electrification as a part of the energy transition.
As society increasingly leans on digitalization and automation, future electricity needs will risesignificantly despite potential gains that can accrue from energy efficiency, digitalization, andautomation. This highlights the need for energy policies to proactively adapt to these technologies’
evolving energy demands.

The role of G7“We, the leaders of the G7, are acting and enhancing cooperation to address the climate crisis
and accelerate the global clean energy transition to reach net zero emissions by 2050 at thelatest.” (G7 2023b)
The G7 must acknowledge the need for a holistic policy approach that addresses the intertwined
dynamics of the energy transition, energy security, and energy demand growth while emphasizing
the need to balance them. The G7 must support financing the retirements of legacy coal-fired
power plants, ensuring higher self-sufficiency in renewable energy and energy transition
technologies through incentivizing local manufacturing and diversifying technology providers to
reduce dependencies. It is also essential to address the issue of future energy demand growth
due to improvements in energy access, population growth, electrification and automation, andthe increasing development and incorporation of new technologies in our daily lives (whileconsidering the overall additional energy demand growth from urbanization, population growth,and increase in economic prosperity and other drivers). Against this backdrop, increased
reliance on renewable energy creates many challenges relating to intermittency, transmission,
grid reliability, and other aspects. Cross-border electricity trading can help ease several of thesechallenges but will require updated regulations for grid governance and market structures toenable the flow of clean electricity.

3

Task Force 2 Policy Brief

G7 countries, already overexposed to imports from a single country regarding the supply of rareearth elements (REEs) needed to exploit renewable energy resources like solar and hydroelectricenergy, run the risk of increasing this dependence even more (Baskaran, 2024). The People’s
Republic of China dominates the world market of REE, processing 90 per cent of the world’s
REEs (China Power 2021). Despite the positive welfare implications of comparative advantage,
the G7 has already expressed concerns about the lack of geographical diversification in REEprocessing and manufacturing supply chains and its willingness to reduce over-dependence on
the supply of critical materials (White House 2022).
The G7 could focus on enhancing technical and industrial capabilities within the G7 member
countries and integrate other partner member states, i.e., African and Asian countries, to explore,
extract, and exploit such critical minerals to increase its manufacturing of such materials. Recent
initiatives by the G7, like the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals and the G7 Clean Energy
Economy Action Plan, constitute solid foundations for building such capacity (G7 2023a; G72023b).
The Green Transition also represents a threat for G7 countries through an indirect channel
mediated by the socio-economic disruption it can bring about in the traditional energy sectorsof such countries. The said disruption frequently manifests itself as the job destruction impliedby the phasing out of fossil fuels-related legacy industries, which can, in turn, ignite social unrest,
thereby fostering national resentment and populism (Atkins 2022; Çevik 2024; Barrett 2022;
Patterson 2023; Lockwood 2018).
Such a rise in resentment and populism appears to be a recurring pattern in almost all G7
countries with widespread observations. One cannot avoid tracing parallelism between the
decline of jobs in local non-renewable energy sectors and the rise in imports of renewableenergy technology solutions and cheaply manufactured, imported goods, negatively impacting
local manufacturing sectors (Autor et al. 2013; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Autor et al. 2016).
Job destruction risks targeting both indiscriminately, as both typically represent blue-collar
sectors. Indeed, partisan and populist support has been associated with a willingness to pay tosave fossil fuel jobs, highlighting nostalgia and a sense of belonging to a local community basedon coal-related jobs (Mayer 2022; Hielscher et al. 2022). Another aspect is the disruption andsubsequent deterioration of socio-economic welfare mechanisms (often primarily driven byincreased energy prices) related to increased social unrest (Belaïd 2022).
Several studies have highlighted the impact of economic globalization on the local manufacturingsector and related it to social unrest, as represented by populist votes, in other G7 countries(Colantone and Stanig 2018a). These studies have also highlighted the challenges that the local
labour market faces in competing, with lack of adequate training and skill development having
been highlighted as a significant factor leading to the declining competitive spirit, leading todislocation of local industries to other regions and negatively impacting jobs and livelihoods
4Energizing the Future: A Holistic Approach to Global Sustainability(Colantone and Stanig 2018b). Similar patterns of “globalization-induced community loss” could
quickly reproduce more widely if G7 countries don’t implement suitable welfare mechanisms(Siddiqui 2021). Finally, it is essential to note that fiscal responses to these challenges carry
the potential to create rifts within the G7, such as tensions that arose between the EU and theUnited States about the relocation of firms from Europe to the United States as a result of theInflation Reduction Act incentives and subsidies. The G7 must know of such challenges and work
diligently to address the multiple stakeholders’ requirements.

Recommendations to the G7
G7 countries (excluding Japan) aim to decarbonize their electricity sectors by 2035 fully. This policy
brief intends to guide the G7 on what support will be needed to implement its decarbonization
targets, what financing mechanisms are available, and to incentivize other countries to join thisambitious target. The G7 should become an example to other countries regarding mechanisms
to foster the energy transition, e.g., with the phase-out of coal power plants so that developing
countries can develop similar ambitious targets. Our policy suggestions below focus on an
inclusive approach toward meeting the challenges that the energy transition has imposed.
1) Support just transition by providing transition finance for sustainable development indeveloping countries and ensure fund allocation for social justice in g7 countries. “Sustainablefinance is about financing both what is already environment-friendly today (green finance) andwhat is transitioning to environment-friendly performance levels over time (transition finance)”(European Commission DG Finance 2024).
While green finance is more accessible (because many investors have committed to investing ingreen finance), transition finance,1 while necessary for countries, especially developing countries,
is more limited. For example, green finance taxonomy usually exclude funding fossil fuel-fired
power plants, limiting access to finance for decarbonizing fossil fuel-powered plants (CICERO
2023; Iain and Deb 2023; Polzin and Sanders 2020).
“Transition finance is urgently needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% and ourenvironmental impact by 2030. It is often needed by companies that want to become sustainable
but need to do so in steps over time – in other words, companies with different starting points
that want to finance their journey towards a sustainable future” (European Commission DG
Finance 2024).

Transition finance refers to financial instruments and investments that support the transition to a moresustainable, low-carbon economy by decarbonizing hard-to-abate sectors like transport, power, steel, and industry(McCrossan 2024).
1

5

Task Force 2 Policy Brief

Recognizing the above, a few funding sources exist for transition finance in developing countries,
namely, the existing financing mechanisms, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-led
Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM) and the Just Energy Transition Program (JETP) by theInternational Partners Group (IPG),2 and the international carbon market, are focused onfunding energy transition in developing countries. For example, ETM mobilizes funds fromdifferent sources (governments, multilateral banks, private) to retire coal-based power plant onan earlier schedule with proceeds for low-carbon energy. Developing countries joining ETM so
far include Viet Nam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. Developing countries
joining JETP so far include South Africa, Indonesia, Senegal, Viet Nam, and Kazakhstan. Theenergy transition is expected to bring global benefits (reducing global GHG emissions and rising
global temperature) and local benefits such as cleaner air (with additional benefits including
health), green jobs, and energy security. Ensuring that energy transition is ‘just’ is highlighted andrecognized. We propose that the G7 highlight this aspect in international forums and provide
more transition funds.
This policy brief calls for social justice funding of the Just Transition Fund (JTF) in the EU, providing
support to local communities and vulnerable groups negatively impacted by the green transitionand establishing similar financing mechanisms in Japan, Canada, and the United States. Primaryemphasis should be put on the funds’ willingness to help workers reskill themselves, facing job
replacement endemic to the phase-out of fossil fuels. These policies should also be coupledwith effective communication campaigns in respective countries and regions to help educate
the population about the benefits of the energy transition and ensure that the transition is an
inclusive and equitable opportunity. The G7, working with the EU, should take advantage of theinternational institutional frameworks that the EU has created, shaping them to adapt to current
challenges.
2) Focus on enhancing energy security frameworks with policies for energy and resource selfsufficiency, green jobs, and local content development in G7 countries. Energy transition could
negatively affect some vulnerable groups leading to unemployment and income loss. Green job
creation is necessary for just energy transition. Aligned with the pertinent challenge for the G7
as previously discussed, this policy brief advocates for increased energy self-sufficiency. On the
one hand, this would imply renouncing cheap, efficient, and readily available green energy supply
chain technologies, but on the other, it would bolster national security levels and green jobs. Sucha strategy aims to prevent overreliance on non-aligned energy suppliers, particularly during theimplementation of the Green Transition. In any case, energy self-sufficiency should be obtainedwith due attention to transition deadlines to not hamper the timely achievement of common
targets, such as the ones outlined by the Paris Agreement, and during G7 ministerial meetings

The International Partners Group (IPG), comprising the European Union, the UK, the US, Japan, Germany, France,
Italy, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, aims to assist emerging economies in achieving a fair transition to low-carbon
energy sources, emphasizing equity as a central principle (EGA 2023).
2

6

Energizing the Future: A Holistic Approach to Global Sustainability

on climate energy and the environment. Moreover, self-sufficiency should complement and notentirely substitute the G7’s energetic provision.
Firstly, the G7 industrial policy should incentivize their domestic renewable energy sectors to be
more efficient and lower their production costs to be competitive globally. This would promote
in-house production of energy transition technologies (such as solar PV, wind turbines, batteries,etc.), reducing the dependence on overseas suppliers. Reliance on overseas supplies could
lead to declining local technology R&D and manufacturing scale (Azhgaliyeva et al. 2023). One
way would be to implement a more compelling onshoring strategy by enhancing local mineral
extraction and processing (subject to availability and development and extraction of mineral
resources and related industrial processing capacity), leveraging the collaborative opportunities
that the Minerals Security Partnership and other similar G7 member countries’ critical mineralsfocused collaborative frameworks have generated (US Dept of State 2024; USA et al. 2024).
Alongside the incentives for domestic production of renewable technologies, G7 countries
should also focus on enhancing funding for recycling and incorporate local content policies that
promote a circular economy from the design phase itself, promoting recycling. This is especiallytrue considering the need for more REE endowment exploration, extraction, and processing in
G7 countries.
Diversifying external renewable technology and mineral providers by leveraging and enhancing
existing collaborative frameworks, which enable G7 member countries to partner with aligned
countries and global partners, can also help improve national security. This should be seen as an
economic investment, negating any potential geopolitical impacts of focusing on a single country
to jeopardize G7’s supply of critical materials.
3) Develop a global, inclusive, and comprehensive regulatory policy framework to help navigate
the complexities of cross border electricity trading. Globally, the world trades in a significant
amount of energy. Figure 1 below illustrates that the electricity trading share is comparatively
small compared to other energy sources. G7 countries and the European Union, with 4.4 percent and 5.2 per cent, have a higher share of electricity traded than the world average of 2.1 percent (Gökçe and Hatipoglu 2022). With extensive experience developing business and regulatorymodels and institutional frameworks for trading electricity, the G7 is well-placed to lead theworld to an electrified future.
The G7 should prepare to develop frameworks to help shape the regulations covering global
cross-border electricity trading. As electricity trading increases globally, bilateral negotiations
between trading nations must be harmonized through a joint framework agreement coveringsuch engagements. Singapore and Australia have demonstrated the broad contours of such aframework through the “Ten Principles to Guide the Development of Cross-border Electricity
Trade.” The G7 should develop such principles that are applicable globally, helping accelerate7

Task Force 2 Policy Briefcross-border electricity trading (Australian Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2024). This canbe further supported by encouraging cross-border electricity trading. In geographies like theEuropean Union, mandates and targets have been set to promote and regulate cross-borderelectricity trade. These mandates aim to enhance energy security, promote renewable energy
integration, and create a more interconnected and efficient electricity market. Mandates,
such as the Electricity Interconnection Targets, set specific goals for cross-border electricity
interconnections between member states (European Council 2014; European Commission
Expert Group 2017). The EU, for instance, has set targets to achieve at least 15 per cent electricity
interconnection by 2030. This means that 15 per cent of the electricity consumed in each member
state should be capable of being exchanged between member states (European Commission
DG Energy 2024). EU member states develop National Energy and Climate Plans (NECP)
outlining how they will contribute to the overall EU targets, including cross-border electricity
interconnection targets. These plans detail each country’s actions to increase interconnections
with neighbouring countries. Such mechanisms and Projects of Common Interest (PCI) in the EU
are crucial to an infrastructural push enabling cross-border electricity trading.
Figure 1 | Shares of traded energy (2022)

Source: Global Energy Relations Dataset (Gökçe and Hatipoglu 2022).

The G7 should focus on developing global institutions funded by the G7 member countries, similar
to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), which provides grants to support the developmentof high-priority infrastructure, including energy infrastructure like interconnectors. Given its
extensive leadership on cross-border electricity trading and the development of regulations
and market rules for seamless cross-border electricity trade, the G7 is well placed to focus ondeveloping such rules and institutions globally. A developmental and regulatory frameworkprogressing towards a globally harmonized electricity trading framework will help generate aplatform for the multiple stakeholders involved to engage in productive dialogue and create
8Energizing the Future: A Holistic Approach to Global Sustainability

policy solutions and prescriptions to enhance electricity trading.
In addition to financing grid interconnection projects, harmonized market rules are crucial
when implementing market coupling. Once the grid infrastructure is in place, market couplingis commonly used to integrate different national electricity markets to maximize cross-border
trading efficiency and promote fair competition. The G7 can push for more harmonization ofelectricity market rules through stakeholder engagement globally.
By focusing on these aspects – mandates, funding mechanisms, and regulatory harmonization –regions can facilitate increased cross-border electricity trade, leading to a more integrated andefficient energy market. This can help in reducing the development of cross-border electricity
trading over much larger geographical areas, ensuring that the deployment of renewable energy
resources and their integration into a vast cross-border electricity grid helps address issuesof energy security and enables the benefits of cheap renewable energy to be integrated into atransitioning energy mix with minimum disruptions.

References
Abrell, Jan, and Rausch, Sebastian. 2016. Cross-country electricity trade, renewable energy
and European transmission infrastructure policy. Journal of Environmental Economics andManagement 79: 87-113, DOI 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.04.001. https://globalchange.mit.edu/
sites/default/files/MITJPSPGC_Reprint_16-9.pdf
Alam, Shafiqul. 2023. Energy cooperation: Cross-border trade among BBIN countries offers mutual
benefits. PowerLine South Asia 5(1): 50-51. https://cloud.3dissue.com/51522/52022/232543/
PLSA30February23/index.html
Atkins, Ed. 2022. ‘Bigger than Brexit’: Exploring right-wing populism and net-zero policies in
the United Kingdom. Energy Research & Social Science 90: 102681. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
erss.2022.102681
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2024. Ten principles to guide thedevelopment of cross-border electricity trade. https://www.dfat.gov.au/node/153659
Autor, David H., Dorn, David, and Hanson, Gordon H. 2013. The China syndrome: Local labormarket effects of import competition in the United States. American Economic Review 103(6):2121-2168. http://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2121
Autor, David H., Dorn, David, and Hanson, Gordon H. 2016. The China shock: Learning fromlabor market adjustment to large changes in trade. Annual Review of Economics 8: 205-240.
9

Task Force 2 Policy Brief

https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015041
Azhgaliyeva, Dina, Beirne, John, and Mishra, Ranjeeta. 2023. What matters for private investment
in renewable energy?. Climate Policy 23(1): 71-87. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2022.2
069664Bahar, Heymi, and Sauvage, Jehan. 2013. Cross-border trade in electricity and the developmentof renewables-based electric power: Lessons from Europe. OECD Trade and Environment
Working Papers 2013/02. https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4869cdwnzr-en
Barrett, Philip. 2022. Social unrest is rising, adding to risks for global economy. IMF Blog 20 May.
https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/05/20/social-unrest-is-rising-adding-to-risks-forglobal-economy
Baskaran, Gracelin. 2024. What China’s ban on rare earths processing technology exports means.
CSIS Commentaries 8 January. https://www.csis.org/node/108808
Belaïd, Fateh. 2022. Implications of poorly designed climate policy on energy poverty: Global
reflections on the current surge in energy prices. Energy Research & Social Science 92: 102790.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102790
Belaïd, Fateh, et al. 2023. Implications of climate policy on energy poverty. KAPSARC Submissions
to the Global Stocktake. https://unfccc.int/documents/627748
Çevik, Mehmet Hasim. 2024. Domestic fossil fuel reserves help determine right-wing populist
positions on green policies. The Loop 14 March. https://theloop.ecpr.eu/?p=16405
China Power. 2021. Does China pose a threat to global rare earth supply chains? https://wp.me/
p8Side-1Gi
CICERO Shades of Green. 2023. International Finance Corporation green bond second opinion.
https://www.ifc.org/content/dam/ifc/doc/2023/IFC-SPO-CICERO-Green-Final.pdf
Colantone, Italo, and Stanig, Piero. 2018a. Global competition and Brexit. American Political
Science Review 112: 201-218. https://doi.org10.1017/S0003055417000685
Colantone, Italo, and Stanig, Piero. 2018b. The trade origins of economic nationalism: Importcompetition and voting behavior in Western Europe. American Journal of Political Science 62(4):936-953. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12358

10

Energizing the Future: A Holistic Approach to Global Sustainability

Dlouhy, Jennifer A. 2023. G-7 nations tussle over bid to phase out coal power by 2030. Bloomberg
10 April. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-10/g-7-nations-tussle-over-bidto-phase-out-coal-power-by-2030
EGA-Edelman Global Advisory. 2023. Five facts to know: Just Energy Transition Partnerships.
EGA Insights 10 May. https://www.edelmanglobaladvisory.com/node/15361
European Commission DG Energy. 2024. Electricity interconnection targets. https://energy.
ec.europa.eu/node/5519_en
European Commission DG Finance. 2024. Overview of sustainable finance. https://finance.
ec.europa.eu/node/1137_en
European Commission Expert Group on electricity interconnection targets. 2017. Towards asustainable and integrated Europe. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2017-11/report_
of_the_commission_expert_group_on_electricity_interconnection_targets_0.pdf
European Council. 2014. Conclusions of the European Council of 23-24 October 2014. http://
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-169-2014-INIT/en/pdf
G7. 2023a. Five-point plan for critical minerals security: Annex to the Climate, Energy andEnvironment Ministers’ Communiqué. https://www.meti.go.jp/information/g7hirosima/energy/
pdf/Annex005.pdf
G7. 2023b. G7 clean energy economy action plan. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/64502/g7-clean-energy-economy-action-plan.pdf
G7. 2023c. G7 leaders’ statement on economic resilience and economic security. https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/media/64501/g7-statement-on-economic-resilience-and-economicsecurity.pdf
Gökçe, Osman Zeki, and Hatipoglu, Emre. 2022. Documenting energy flows between states: The
Global Energy Relations Dataset (GERD), 1978–2014. International Interactions 48(3): 492519. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2045286
Haji Bashi, Mazaher, De Tommasi, Luciano, and Lyons, Padraig. 2022. Electricity market
integration of utility-scale battery energy storage units in Ireland, the status and future
regulatory frameworks. Journal of Energy Storage 55(A): 105442. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
est.2022.105442

11

Task Force 2 Policy Brief

Hielscher, Sabine, Wittmayer, Julia M., and Dańkowska, Alicja. 2022. Social movements in energy
transitions: The politics of fossil fuel energy pathways in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands
and Poland. The Extractive Industries and Society 10: 101073. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
exis.2022.101073
Inglehart, Ronald F., and Norris, Pippa. 2016. Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic
have-nots and cultural backlash. HKS Working Papers RWP16-026. https://www.hks.harvard.
edu/publications/trump-brexit-and-rise-populism-economic-have-nots-and-cultural-backlash
IRADe-Integrated Research and Action for Development. 2022. Role of cross border electricity
trade in enabling the renewable energy deployment & integration in India/South Asia region.
https://irade.org/Final%20report%20of%20study_NSB%20India.pdf
Jain, Gautam, and Deb, Kaushik. 2023. India integrates green bonds into its decarbonization
strategy. Energy Explained 30 March. https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/?p=16072
Katz, Jennifer, and Cochran, Jaquelin. 2015. Integrating variable renewable energy into the grid:
Key issues. Greening the Grid. https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/63033.pdf
Lee, Bernice. 2023. Why we need global cooperation on critical mineral supplies. World Economic
Forum.
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/12/why-we-need-global-cooperation-oncritical-mineral-supplies
Lin, Boqiang, and Huang, Chenchen. 2023. Promoting variable renewable energy integration:
The moderating effect of digitalization. Applied Energy 337: 100891. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
apenergy.2023.120891
Lockwood, Matthew. 2018. Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: Exploring thelinkages. Environmental Politics 27(4): 712-732. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.145
8411
Mayer, Adam. 2022. More than just jobs: Understanding what drives support for a declining
coal industry. The Extractive Industries and Society 9: 101038. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
exis.2021.101038
McCrossan, Nico. 2024. What is transition finance, and why it matters. GreenBiz 24 January.
https://www.greenbiz.com/node/123232
MIT Energy Initiative. 2011. Managing large-scale penetration of intermittent renewables.
https://energy.mit.edu/?p=5204

12

Energizing the Future: A Holistic Approach to Global Sustainability

Oliva H., Sebastián, et al. 2022. Impact of increasing transmission capacity for a massive
integration of renewable energy on the energy and environmental value of distributed
generation. Renewable Energy 183: 524-534. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2021.11.025
Patterson, James J. 2023. Backlash to climate policy. Global Environmental Politics 23(1): 68-90.
https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00684
Polzin, Friedemann, and Sanders, Mark. 2020. How to finance the transition to low-carbon
energy in Europe? Energy Policy 147: 111863. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111863
Siddiqui, Ismail. 2021. The dialectic of globalization: Far-right populism in Western Europe.
SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3897185
Thukral, Kapil, Wijayatunga, Priyantha ,and Yoneoka, Susumu. 2017. Increasing penetration ofvariable renewable energy: Lessons for Asia and the Pacific. ADB Working Papers 1. https://www.
adb.org/sites/default/files/evaluation-document/382641/files/ied-wp-variable-renewableenergy_6.pdf
US Department of State. 2024. Minerals Security Partnership. https://www.state.gov/mineralssecurity-partnership
USA, et al. 2024. Joint statement of the Minerals Security Partnership. https://www.state.gov/
joint-statement-of-the-minerals-security-partnershipWhite House. 2022. Fact sheet: The United States continues to strengthen cooperation with
G7 on 21st century challenges, including those posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/28/fact-sheetthe-united-states-continues-to-strengthen-cooperation-with-g7-on-21st-century-challengesincluding-those-posed-by-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc

About Think7
Think7 (T7) is the official think tank engagement group of the Group of 7 (G7). It provides
research-based policy recommendations for G7 countries and partners. The Istituto AffariInternazionali (IAI) and Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) are the co-chairs of
T7 under Italy’s 2024 G7 presidency.
13