Relations between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific Age —Transcending the Quad Framework—

Relations between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific Age―Transcending the Quad Framework―*
Takenori Horimoto**
Abstract
Japanese people apparently share an affinity with India for several reasons, one being its
history as the cradle of Buddhism. Based on this affinity, Japan-India relations grew steadilycloser and stronger through the Meiji era and thereafter. This trend grew even more
pronounced in the post–Cold War period. If the 1990s marked a preparatory phase, thenthe 2000s were a transitional phase while the 2010s have brought a huge leap forward. Oneof the more prominent trends through the 2010s was that bilateral relations evolved from apurely bilateral relationship and assumed importance within a broader, multilateral context.
The combination of the relative decline of US power and the rapid ascension of China andIndia is among the factors that contributed to such transformation. The emergence of the
Indo-Pacific as a cross-regional concept may be cited as yet another factor and one thatinterlinks with these trends.
In this paper, I present a general review of Japan-India relations in recent years together
with an analysis and study of trends of countries concerned on the concept of the IndoPacific, Indiaʼs striving for major-power status, and the quadrilateral framework between
Japan, the US, India, and Australia (“the Quad”). To summarize my conclusions here,
although the future direction of Japan-India ties will undoubtedly develop through their
responses to China, it is also necessar y to creatively build a for ward-looking regionalframework while keeping future developments in mind beyond the Quad.

IntroductionJapanese people apparently share an affinity with India for several reasons, one being its
history as the cradle of Buddhism. In October 2017, the Kabukiza Theater in Tokyo gave a
performance of the War Chronicles of Mahabharata, one of the worldʼs three greatest epics
and a tale that provides a glimpse into views on human nature and the universe that differ
from those in the West. That could be why the theater tickets were sold out for consecutive days.
Based on this affinity, Japan-India relations grew steadily closer and stronger through the
Meiji era and thereafter.1 This trend grew even more pronounced in the post–Cold War period. If
the 1990s marked an preparatory phase, then the 2000s were a transitional phase while the 2010s
have brought a huge leap forward. One of the more prominent trends through the 2010s was thatbilateral relations evolved from a purely bilateral relationship and assumed importance within abroader, multilateral context. The combination of the relative decline of US power and the rapid* This essay was originally published on Kokusai Mondai [International Affairs], No.669, March 2018.
** Takenori Horimoto (Ph.D.) is currently Visiting Professor of Gifu Womenʼs University and Senior
Fellow of Center for Contemporar y Indian Studies of JIA after ser ving as Professor of Shobi Univ
Graduate School, Project Professor of Kyoto University Graduate School, Visiting Professor of Open
University of Japan and Takushoku University Graduate School.

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ascension of China and India is among the factors that contributed to such transformation. The
emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a cross-regional concept may be cited as yet another factor and
one that interlinks with these trends.
In this paper, I present a general review of Japan-India relations in recent years2 together withan analysis and study of trends of countries concerned on the concept of the Indo-Pacific, Indiaʼs
striving for major-power status, and the quadrilateral framework between Japan, the US, India,
and Australia (“the Quad”). To summarize my conclusions here, although the future direction ofJapan-India ties will undoubtedly develop through their responses to China, it is also necessary
to creatively build a forward-looking regional framework while keeping future developments inmind beyond the Quad.

1. The transitional phase in Japan-India relations: Factors fueling closer ties
since the 2000s
Although Japan-India relations had steadily improved following the Cold War, they suffered anabrupt setback when India conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1998.3 As a country that had
centered its foreign policy on the abolition of nuclear weapons, Japan was unable to show any
tolerance for these new nuclear tests. This period may be described as a preparator y phaseduring which the two countries sought to re-establish their bilateral relationship.

1.1 The advancement of economic ties between Japan and India
It was the 2000s and thereafter when the two countries clearly improved the bilateral relations.
From a birds-eye perspective, their bilateral economic ties were the first driving force of thatdevelopment. The Indian economy demonstrated steady gains backed by liberalization policies
implemented since 1991, and eventually achieved average annual growth of 7.4 percent4 throughthe first decade of the 21st century. In 1993, India unveiled its Look East policy5 and on that basis
began working to cultivate stronger economic ties with the countries of East and Southeast Asia.
By contrast, Japan in the early 2000s found itself confronted by the necessity of averting
certain “China risks.” More specifically, by 2004 the scale of bilateral trade between Japan and
China had reached 22 trillion yen, surpassing the 20 trillion yen in trade between Japan and theUnited States, thus making China Japanʼs largest trading partner. However, around this same
period, a series of large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations and riots broke out across China.
As one outcome, India began to appear ideal as a new market for Japan. In 2003, India displaced
China as the largest recipient of yen loans. Official development assistance (ODA) functioned as a6“connector” to strengthened Japan-India ties.

1.2 Improved ties between India and the US
The second factor behind better Japan-India relations was the improvement of India-US relations.
Over approximately seven decades following the Independence in 1947, Indiaʼs foreign policy had
been characterized by a history of trial-and-error in how to position the US in its foreign policy
and how to cultivate ties with it on that basis.7 In fact, it would not be an overstatement to describe
Indiaʼs foreign policy through that period in terms of the history of its relationship with the US.
Although India-US ties began improving in the 1990s, they suffered a setback following Indiaʼsnuclear tests in 1998. Then US President Bill Clintonʼs visit to India in March 2000, the first-evervisit by a US President since Carterʼs 22 years earlier, impetus for improved relations emerged
and continued to grow after the George W. Bush administration came to power in 2001.
As a country that had made the Japan-US alliance the backbone of its own foreign policy,
Japan viewed the advancement of Indiaʼs relationship with the US as an opportunity to improve its
relations with India. During the Cold War era, India pursued a foreign policy stance centered on
nonalignment together with the continuation of its alliance with the Soviet Union, and thus had
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little if any latitude for improved relations with the US. At that time, Delhiʼs limited relations with
Washington exerted a negative impact on its relations with Tokyo. During a stay in New Delhi in
November 2017, I was told by an Indian expert of international politics that “following the Second
World War, Japanese foreign policy has been interlocked with the Japan-US alliance; during theCold War, it was anti-communist, but since the end of the Cold War, it has been anti-China.” That
perspective may carry an element of truth. In any case, we cannot deny the fact that Japan-India
ties have advanced in tandem with the improvement in India-US relations.
Up until the 1990s, Indiaʼs foreign policy frequently reflected a pro-Soviet, and later, proRussian, stance, but under went changes that eventually gave it an increasingly pro-US
complexion over time. For example, Rajesh Rajagopalan professor of Jawaharlal Nehre University
in international politics known for past skepticism regarding closer India-US ties, asserts that
establishing stronger relations with the US is currently the only effective strategic option
available to India that will help it protect its interests and ensure its security.8

2. China’s expansion into the Indo-Pacific and Japan-India relations
2.1 China’s expansion into the Indo-Pacific
China counts as a third factor that has fostered closer ties between Japan and India. To put this
into better perspective, China since the 2000s has developed into a major economic and military
power and pursued an assertive foreign policy. These trends have had the effect of encouraging
closer Japan-India ties, which in turn have been reinforced by the Indo-Pacific as a geopoliticalarea.
To elaborate, the Asia-Pacific or Asia as a whole were for an a pretty long period theprincipal regions of interest to Japanese foreign policy.9 However, in the mid-2000s China began
implementing an Indian Ocean sea lane strategy that others have labeled the “String of Pearls”
strategy.10 Further, in 2010 it surpassed Japan to become the worldʼs second-largest economy interms of gross domestic product (GDP) and pursued aggressive maritime military policies inthe East and South China Seas. Not only that, but beginning in 2013 it also began expanding its
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI comprises a series of port and harbor infrastructure projects
across the Indian Ocean rim including includes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
project.
Consequently, it was not possible for India to view China ʼs activities in the international
arena as someone elseʼs problem. Sushma Swaraj was the Minister of External Affairs for thegovernment of Prime Minister Narendra Modi assumed office in May 2014. At a conference ofheads of Indian diplomatic missions abroad that assembled in August that year, she called forthe implementation of measures in line with the Act East policy that would move India frommerely “looking” to “acting”. After the Modi government came into power, the Indo-Pacific foundincreasingly frequent use within in the Indian strategic community as a policy-based regional
concept; furthermore, this concept carries certain strategic implications.

2.2 A new phase in the strategic relationship between Japan and India
India demonstrated an awareness that resonates with the Indo-Pacific strategy crafted by Japanand began engaging in external actions on that basis. For that reason, it seems safe to conclude
that Japan and India are capable of pursuing joint actions involving the Indo-Pacific. In fact, since
the start of the 2000s, relations between the two countries have been accented by the launchof numerous regular meetings and the conclusion of various agreements. After Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi paid a state visit to India in 2005, the two countries began holding reciprocal
state visits by their prime ministers ever y two years. Additionally, in 2006 the Japan-India
relationship was elevated to a Global and Strategic Partnership. While these steps had several
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business and trade-related objectives, among them the implementation of a Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 201111 and the holding of the first Cabinet-levelbusiness dialogue the following year, they were primarily concerned with strategic and securityoriented issues.12 To summarize, responding to an ascendant China was their main objective.
Sanjaya Baru, journalist, who served as media advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,
has noted that during the second term of India National Congress (INC) government led bySingh (2009 to 2014), its major diplomatic achievement was the closer bilateral relations between
India and Japan.13 Those accomplishments coincided with the birth of the second government of
Shinzo Abe (from 2012), who had championed treating the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single
geopolitical unit.

3. The Indo-Pacific and India’s foreign policy foundations
3.1 India, a countr y striving for major-power status
The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi also
factored significantly behind the increasingly close-knit ties between Japan and India. With
its victory in the 2014 general election, the BJP forced the INC out and assumed the reins ofgovernment. Backed by an aggressive Hindu nationalist platform, the BJP made the “Shreshtha
Bharat” initiative the centerpiece of its public commitment. In English, the Hindi “Shreshtha”
roughly translates as excellence (whereas “Bharat” refers to “India”).
In effect, the BJP demonstrated that it would seek to transform India into a major power. Thisobjective was further highlighted during a conference of Indian heads of diplomatic missions
abroad in New Delhi in February 2015, about nine months after the inauguration of the new Modi
government. Modi called on Indian ambassadors worldwide to help India move beyond purely
upholding the balance of power and instead assume a leading role in world affairs. The drive tofulfill this role was widely accepted as a natural extension of the BJPʼs “Shreshtha Bharat” election
pledge.
However, subsequent remarks made on July 20, 2015 by Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam
Jaishankar had the effect of bringing Indiaʼs quest for major-power status squarely into the
public spotlight. In a lecture address delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) in Singapore, the foreign secretary stated in a nutshell India aspires to become a leading
power rather than just a balancing power. A “leading power” can also be interpreted as meaning a“dominant state.” Here, it may be best understood simply as referring to a “major power” or “great
power.” Foreign Secretary Jaishankarʼs words essentially built on Modiʼs remarks and shed lighton their true meaning.
The declaration of intent to seek major-power status signified a crucial turning point in Indian
diplomacy. Although foreign policy under the INC government also revealed Indiaʼs interest in
becoming a leading power, it was distinguished by an emphasis on ensuring “strategic autonomy.”
The key points in Nonalignment 2.0,14 a semi-official policy paper released in 2012 by the Centre
for Policy Research, a private think tank, stood as a representative example of this stance.

3.2 The strategic framework for current Indian diplomacy
The strategic matrix shown in Table 1 images the structural compositions of Indian foreign policy
aiming to achieve major-power status, in other words, its foreign policy platform since the mid2010s. If summarized, the key point of Indian diplomacy as pursued by the Modi administration
can be categorized in three levels: global, regional (Indo-Pacific), and local (South Asia).
At the global level, India cooperates with China and Russia to foster the creation of amultipolar international order as the early stages of its quest for major-power status. As a parallel
endeavor, it also engages in efforts to boost its own national prosperity and military strength. At
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the regional (Indo-Pacific) level, however, it endeavors to develop a larger presence and evolve
into a maritime power and advance its Act East policies in the political and economic spheres
through cooperation with Japan, the United States, and Australia. Politics at the local level (SouthAsia) will comprise a subset of regional level and try to secure its hegemonistic position. At thisTable 1. India’s Strategic Foreign Policy Matrix
Goals ( 〇 ), Measures (–), Future Objectives (*)
Global level〇 Multipolarization of the international system (revisionist orientation),strengthening national wealth and military power– Cooperation with China and Russia (BRICS of Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa summits, Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO],
Russia-India-China [RIC] foreign ministersʼ meetings)– Acquisition of permanent member status on UN Security Council– Military buildup (with sustained nuclear capability)– Development of diplomatic infrastructure (such as forming strategic
partnerships, etc.)* Achievement of major-power status with acquiring capacity for building
the international order

Regional level(Indo-Pacific,
etc.)[Asia & Western Pacific]〇 Strengthened presence and status as maritime power– Cooperation within Quadrilateral framework (Japan, US, Australia, India)(steps to counter China)– Advancement of political and economic now Act East policies,
cooperation with ASEAN economies, etc.
[Middle East, Indian Ocean]〇 Establishment of superiority– Actions to counter China-Pakistan axis including BRI– Promote regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean– Cooperation with countries in Middle East and East Africa (harnessing
Indian migrant resources and securing access to energy resources)* Major-power status in the Indo-Pacific(Additionally, since the mid-2010s India has been moving forward with its
International North-South Transport Corridor plan. The goal is to build amulti-modal cargo shipping network of sea-, rail-, and road-based corridors
connecting India [Mumbai], with Iran [Chabahar Port], Azerbaijan, andRussia.)Local level(South Asia)〇 Achivement of hegemonic status (with orientation toward statusquoism)– Steps to counter China-Pakistan axis
– Economic integration of South Asia
* Establishment of hegemony(Source) Takenori Horimoto, “Explaining Indiaʼs Foreign Policy: From Dream to Realization ofMajor Power,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 17, Issue 3 (September2017)〈https://academic.oup.com/irap/article/doi/10.1093/irap/〉
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Takenori Horimotolevel, India is currently concentrating its efforts to counter China.15, 16 Due to this complexity ofdifferent sets of policies at different levels, from Japanʼs perspective, India appears to be pursuing
an inconsistent foreign policy that blends coordination with China and Russia on the one handwith cooperation with Japan and the US on the other.

4. The Quadrilateral framework (“the Quad”) in the Indo-Pacific
As long as the Indo-Pacific occupies a pivotal position in Chinese foreign policy, an atmosphereof serious apprehension will compel India to respond. That concern has been given symbolic
expression by the Indian Navy. A document on naval strategy (Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian
Maritime Security Strategy)17 released in 2015 was the first official publication to formally referto the Indo-Pacific, and as such, presented areas of interest broader in scope than a similar
document (Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Strategy) released in 2007. That being thecase, one question is how India plans to engage with Japan, the US, and Australia. Although thatquestion was not covered in the 2015 document, Gurpreet S. Khurana, an expert on militaryaffairs in the Indo-Pacific has illustrated the issue in Fig. 1. In other words, to counter China in

Fig. 1. Maritime Areas of Interest to India

India

Western Paciﬁc

Area of primary interest

Indian Ocean

Area of secondary interest(Source) Gurpreet S. Khurana, “India ʼs Maritime Strategy: Context and Subtext, ” Maritime
Affairs: Journal of The National Maritime Foundation of India, April 19, 2017 (http://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09733159.2017.1309747).
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the Indo-Pacific, military cooperation between Japan, the US, Australia, and India will be a must.
The Indo-Pacific is a pivotal part of Chinaʼs BRI and is also the most important oceanic region
to India (especially the Indian Ocean). As such, it is destined to become a theater for rivalry
between these two countries.18 India has achieved rapid gains in national power in recent years.
One example is its GDP, which in 2018 was ranked seventh-largest in the world, up from 12th in2006.19 Another example is defense spending, in which India was ranked fourth worldwide in 2018,
surpassing Japanʼs ninth-place ranking.20 Nonetheless, India still trails far behind China, which iscurrently ranked second in terms of both GDP and defense spending. Given these statistics, India
will face the necessity of joining hands with other countries. The quadrilateral framework (“theQuad”) and closer ties with Japan will be the principal countermeasures to that end.
This will not be the first time India has sought multilateral cooperation. It has continued topursue cooperation and diplomacy with other countries since gaining its independence in 1947. Asa country, India is usually associated with the nonaligned movement. While that impression is not
off the mark, it is only half the truth. The other half is that India has also pursued alliances andpartnerships with other countries. In effect, up through the 1960s, Indian diplomacy was shapedby a policy of nonalignment and oriented toward cooperation with other nonaligned countries.
Through the next two decades the 1970s and 1980s India aligned itself with the Soviet bloc.

4.1 The Quad in the mid-2000s

Moving from the preparatory phase in its foreign policy through the 1990s,21 India in the early
2000s once again turned to partnerships and diplomacy in response to the aggressive foreign
policy of a rapidly ascendant China. As one consequence, it was compelled to participate in the
Quad. From a different vantage point, at least in terms of countering Chinese policies throughthe 2000s and thereafter, Japan, the US, Australia, and India applied a mixture of engagement andhedging policies, albeit marked by varying degrees of intensity. The Quad framework itself was aclassic hedging policy.
In the mid-2000s, Japan, the US, and Australia began intensifying their efforts in engagementwith one another for the Quad framework with participation by India. During the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) leadersʼ summit that convened in Sydney in September 2007,
Japan, the US, and Australia held their first top-level trilateral meeting. Quoting a JapaneseForeign Ministry press officer in its September 7 edition, one Indian newspaper22 reported thatIndia had been asked to participate in the meeting as a country with a shared interest in theideals of liberalism and democracy. Japanʼs 2007 White Paper on Defense (July 2007) also citedstrengthened cooperation with Australia and India and called for policies that would help curb
the growing prominence of China and North Korea in the military dimension and ensure a morestable balance of security at the regional level through strengthened collaboration by Australia
and India on matters of security.
Additionally, in August 2007 the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
published The US-Japan-India Report in collaboration with the Japan Institute of International
Affairs and the Confederation of Indian Industry. Underlining the importance to the US, Japan,
and India of protecting their shared values and sustaining an open and stable international
system, this report recommended strengthened trilateral cooperation (along with Australia) in
the security, energy, environmental, and economic fields.23 Although described as something thatshould not be construed as “targeting China” per se, the plan nevertheless resembled aspects of
the Quad, which comprised hedging policies aimed at China.
As an outcome of this report, India decided to participate in the Quad. In September 2007,
five countries of the US, Japan, India, Australia, and Singapore conducted Malabar 07-2, a joint
naval exercise in Bay of Bengal. The scope of this exercise extended from the central region of
the Bay of Bengal to the vicinity of the Coco Islands in Myanmar territorial waters (where China
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was noted in India to have stationed meteorological monitoring facilities). Malabar 07-2 was alarge-scale undertaking that mobilized approx. 20,000 naval personnel, 28 ships, and 150 aircraft;
its implementation as a multilateral exercise was the key feature that distinguished it from past
Malabar exercises by India and the US.
The countries that participated in Malabar 07-2 insisted that the exercise was primarily aimed
at boosting the interoperability of their naval forces and stressed that it was not intended toestablish an “axis of democracy” in the Asia-Pacific to contain China.24 However, the Kyodo News
agency was arguably closer to the mark with its assessment that it was aimed at strengthening
cooperation by participating countries in protecting the sea lanes for oil tankers and other cargotraffic from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific. Kyodo reported that “such objectives also reflecta conscious interest in curbing efforts by China to provide aid to Indian Ocean basin countries
and expand its network for military cooperation and that Japan considers the exercises to be
an integral element of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Japan, the US, India, andAustralia, as proposed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.”25
The Quad drew harsh criticism from China. Furthermore, following the political exit of its
main proponents, namely, US President George W. Bush, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Howardʼs successor, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
(December 2007 to June 2010), implemented policies that put stronger emphasis on ties with
China. Rudd also was not supportive of the Quad and thus terminated Australiaʼs involvement,leaving the Quad to die out spontaneously. However, the Quad lived on as a series of bilateralpolicy hedges against China: Specifically, these were the New Framework for the US-India
Defense Relationship (2005), the India-Australia Memorandum of Understanding on Defense(2006) and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (2009), and the Joint Declaration on
Security Cooperation between Japan and India (2008), for Japan, the first such arrangement witha country other than the US or Australia.
Although the Quad was shelved, Japanʼs gradually strengthening security ties with Australia
and India along with the Japan-US alliance nevertheless sent a signal that a new security order
was taking shape in Asia.26 In short, the Quad may be better understood in terms of its association
with the Indo-Pacific, a new regional designation that emerged in the 2000s.

4.2 Efforts to promote the Quad by Japan, the US, and Australia in the 2010s
With that historical backdrop, on November 12, 2017 senior officials for diplomatic authorities
in Japan, the US, Australia, and India met on the occasion of the ASEAN summit in Manila. They
“discussed measures to ensure a free and open international order based on the rule of law
in the Indo-Pacific” and “affirmed their commitment to continuing discussions and deepening
cooperation based on shared values and principles” (“Australia-Japan-India-US Consultations on
the Indo-Pacific,” a November 12, 2017 press release on the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
website).27
These four-way consultations by diplomatic authorities represented a substantive firststep toward implementation of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy championed by Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD
VI) that assembled in Kenya in August 2016.28 Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Kono
proposed the creation of a new quadrilateral framework at the August 2017 gathering of foreign
ministers for the seventh Japan-US-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in Manila, and again
on the occasion of the Japan-US-India Trilateral Foreign Ministersʼ Meeting in New York.29 Kono
articulated his views on creating a summit-level quadrilateral strategic dialogue again on October25, 2017.30 During their November 2017 summit meeting in Japan, US President Donald Trump
and Prime Minister Abe were in agreement on the Indo-Pacific strategy.
This latest Quad proposal presents Japan in a cheerleading role and appears to have won
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support from the US for a transition from diplomacy centered around the US and China to a
new framework that allows them to use relationship with India as a diplomatic card. During the
Obama administration, the US advanced an Asia policy that paired the Trans-Pacific Partnership(TPP) in the economic and trade spheres with a policy of strategic rebalancing to the Indo-Pacificor Asia. However, under the “America First” policies of President Trump, the US withdrew fromthe TPP. As a consequence, during his November 2017 tour of Asia, President Trump arguably
had little choice other than to join the Indo-Pacific strategy championed by Japan. In Washington
on October 18, 2017, prior to the state visit to Asia, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson clarified
his views regarding security cooperation by Japan, the US, India, and Australia.31
T. J. Pempel (University of California) has summarized the first year of Trumpʼs administration
as an exercise in “democratic destruction and Asian absenteeism.”32 Also, immediately prior to histour of Asia, Trump and his national security advisor, H.R. McMaster, reportedly began using theterm “Indo-Pacific” with increased frequency.33
In the National Security Strategy that it released in December 2017, the US government
revealed a sense of alarm toward China and Russia, and criticized China as a country that “seeks
to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region” and “expand the reaches of its state-driven
economic model.”34 It noted that the United States “welcomes Indiaʼs emergence as a leading
global power and stronger strategic and defense partner,” and added that it “will seek to increase
quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.”35
However, not all changes to US policy on Asia are attributable to the arrival of President
Trump. On the importance of Japan and China to the US, Sheila Smith, a leading scholar in
the field of Japan studies, points out that building cooperative ties with China while avoiding
harm to the close relationship between Japan and the US is the biggest challenge that US
policymakers face.36 Given the implications of that perspective, the Quad is at present probably anappropriate framework for consultations at the diplomatic level. The American political scientist
John Mearsheimer notes that a behind-the-scenes approach that places most of the burden ofcontaining China on neighboring countries is the best strategy for the US as a country with a richhistory as an “offshore balancer.”37
New perspectives have also been tendered on the role of US Forces in Japan. For example,
Mikio Haruna, a journalist who has examined released US diplomatic documents with confidential
content, states that the reality of the Japan-US alliance, that is, the US forces stationed in Japan,
are not there to defend Japan but rather to provide for the strategic defense of South Korea,
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, and concludes that military logistics are their main mission.38
Published in November 2017, Australiaʼ s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper39 repeatedly
discusses the Indo-Pacific. In Chapter 3 (A stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific),40 the white paper
notes, “Our alliance with the United States is central to Australiaʼs security and sits at the core of
our strategic and defense planning.” On that understanding, it follows up by stressing the central
roles of the US and China in the Indo-Pacific and cites Japan, Indonesia, India, and South Korea
as partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Another white paper (Australia in the Asian Century) 41
released by the Australian government in 2012 only mentions the Indo-Pacific in three places.
Within the sphere of foreign trade, Australia is heavily dependent on China. In 2016, exports
to China were valued at US$94.0 billion, making China the top destination market for Australian
goods. (Japan was the second-largest market, valued at US$39.0 billion, while the US camein third place, at US$21.0 billion.) China was also the largest source of Australian imports, at
US$62.0 billion in value (followed by the US at US$44.0 billion and Japan in third place at US$23.0
billion).42 Moreover, Chinaʼs powers of influence over Australiaʼs internal affairs have grown
more serious in recent years.43 In effect, Australia has established economic ties with China thatcompare with its ties to ASEAN, a situation that in strategic terms has compromised its ability tocope even as a member of the Quad.
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4.3 Mixed views toward the Quad

Scholars in the US have expressed doubts about the reincarnation of the Quad as version 2.0.44
It is true that on his visit to India in September 2017, Prime Minister Abe coordinated views with
Prime Minister Modi on maritime security and agreed on the subject of curbing Chinaʼs advances
into the region. Despite reaching an agreement to “continue the discussions,” the November
2017 conference of diplomatic authorities for the four Quad countries did not set a clear timetable
for the next round. Further, participation in the discussions has been limited to officers at thebureau-head level. Presumably, India will hold the key that determines whether the meetings are
upgraded to the foreign-minister level. In effect, it is as if Japan, the US, Australia, and India do
not share equal levels of commitment to the Quad.
Comparable precedents exist. Prior to the start of these quadrilateral discussions, twotrilateral conferences had been held: one involving Japan, the US, and India, and the other
involving Japan, India, and Australia. The Conference involving Japan, the US, and India waslaunched in December 2011 after participation had been downgraded to the bureau-head levelfrom its initially planned foreign-minister level. This (bureau-head level) trilateral conference
convened eight times until its conclusion in 2016. The first foreign-minister level meeting washeld in 2015. In effect, India was integrated into the existing Japan-US framework. 45 The firstmeeting of the other trilateral conference with the participation of foreign secretaries from Japan,
Australia, and India was held in 2015 and concluded with its third meeting in 2017.
Indiaʼs China-oriented foreign policy was one reason that factored strongly behind its lack ofenthusiasm for the Quad. When the Modi government came into power, Sandy Gordon, an expert
on South Asia (Australian National University), predicted: “That realisation may not stop the Modi
government attempting to ʻplay both ends against the middle,ʼ especially since this approachhas been a classic feature of Indian foreign policy for many decades. Under this scenario, India
would seek the best deal it can from China, both economically and in terms of a possible border
settlement, while attempting to maintain its hedge against a possible difficult rise of China withpowers such as the US and Japan.”46
Former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has suggested India need not choose between
either Japan or China as a partner; it can cooperate with Japan on China policy and in otherareas where they have a shared interest, and with China in areas that deliver mutual benefits.47
Furthermore, even if India saw value in working together with Japan and the US, it may havelacked motivation to team up with Australia.48
In its September 26, 2017 issue, the Japanese edition of Newsweek magazine ran a special
feature titled “Indo no kyozou” (“an Indian giant elephant”), which noted in effect, “while Japan
looks to India as a partner to help contain China,” India does not yet actually have enough power
to compete with China nor is it necessarily pro-West or anti-China. While India would prefer tofollow an independent approach to China, collaborating only with Japan will still not be sufficient.
That is presumably why it will be compelled to rely on the Quad framework as well.
As indicated earlier in Fig. 1, at the regional level, the Indian Ocean counts as the primary
battleground for Indian diplomacy at this time. China, moreover, will be Indiaʼs main counterpart
in that engagement. Given that India is pursuing a two-pronged policy49 of both engagement andhedging with respect to China, Quad discussions involving the diplomatic authorities are a viable
and realistic option for diplomacy at this stage.
On closer examination, India could utilize the Quad as a mechanism to curb Chinaʼs ambitions
and respond to its criticism of the Quad through exchanges at the working level, not at thehead-of-state or foreign-minister levels. Of course, as a formal participant in the summit-level
conferences of SCO and the BRICS (five emerging national economies) summits, India is also
prepared to seek elevated Quad status at any time. Moreover, the foreign ministers of Russia,
India, and China (RIC) have met regularly since 2002, and convened their 15th meeting in India
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Relations between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific Age —Transcending the Quad Framework—in December 2017.
Moreover, India and China has established the meeting of the Special Representatives of thetwo countries in 2003 and its 22nd meeting between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and StateCouncilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held in December 2019. Also, Prime Minister Modi
emphasized “inclusive” nature of the Indo-Pacific at his keynote address at Shangri La Dialogue
in June 2018. He might have intended to tell China “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” to signify
its inclusive nature and not excluding China. Basically, India would like to keep stable relations
with China.
India has pursued a balancing act with China and Russia on the one hand and Japan andthe US on the other. From another angle, India may be viewed as a country that has engaged
in cooperation with Japan and the US in the Indian Ocean and with China and Russia on theEurasian continent. As one element of its continental strategy, India has been working to put
into motion its International North-South Transport Corridor plan, an undertaking that will
establish improved sea, rail, and road connections for cargo flows between India (Mumbai), Iran,
Azerbaijan, and Russia (Table 1).

4.4 China’s apprehensions about the Quad
China categorically rejected the Quad when it first materialized in 2007 and deemed themultilateral Japan-US-India, US-Australia-India, and Japan-US-Australia-India frameworks aspolicies aimed at encircling China.50 It has reacted to the latest incarnation of the Quad in muchthe same way. For example, Chinese experts have warned that the four-way dialogue signifies
an effort to contain China and that it will stymie regional development.51 Additionally, as analternative to rebalancing policies in the Asia-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific strategy has been viewed as
an undertaking with the objective of disrupting the BRI but that is destined to fail.52
The Quad, moreover, has been described as an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).53 During a press conference on November 13, 2017, Geng Shuang, Deputy
Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministryʼs Information Department, hinted at Chinaʼs misgivings
about the Quad with his emphasis that it should be a framework that encourages cooperation by
all relevant countries, not a mechanism for exclusion.54 In fact, representatives of the Quad havebeen upgraded from the bureau-head level to foreign minister level for the first time in September
2019 at the New York meeting during the United Nations General Assembly.

5. Future prospects
Geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific have shifted the focus to the question of how todeal with China. China has rallied from a history of humiliation that stretches back to the Opium
Wars and now aspires to achieve the “Chinese dream” through a grand resurgence of the Chinese
people.55 In other words, one could argue that China is striving to wrest hegemonic dominance inthis region from the US and establish a China-centric international order. In a sense, it appears to
be in the process of acquiring the capacity to build a new international order and establish itself
as the rule-maker.
Since the start of the twenty-first century, the situation in the Indo-Pacific has been marked by
the growing national power of China and the relative decline of the US, which has been losing its
capacity to keep China in check.56
Under such development, as a strategic framework in the Indo-Pacific for Japan, the US,
Australia, and India, the Quad has been brought into existence to counter these trends. Neither
Japan nor India are capable of halting Chinaʼs growing influence on their own, nor can they relyon the US. They have no choice but to turn to “minilateral” cooperative mechanisms that occupy
an intermediate position somewhere between the bilateral and multilateral approaches. Unlike
Europe, Asia does not yet have any well-established economic or security frameworks. The
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implication is that the Quad will serve as an inescapable regional mechanism for the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for East Asia or the East Asian Community. Since
the RCEP is one of the main components of Japanʼs, Indo-Pacific policy along with the Quad,
Indiaʼs withrawal from it said in Novmber 2019 would be the big misculculation for Japan.
India has aspirations of major-power status. For now, however, strategies based on partnering
mechanisms are its only option. The Japan-US alliance was the single largest infrastructural
cornerstone of Japanʼs foreign policy. However, Japanʼs dependence on the US appears to besoftening. Given these conditions, ties between Japan and the India will continue to grow closer
and develop even further.57 The US cannot be described as an ally that Japan can always rely on
100 percent; India, however, is in a position to complement that relationship. India actually faces asimilar situation, itself. After the Cold War, Russia harnessed its semi-alliance functions to provide
backing for Indian efforts in diplomacy.
However, since the mid-2010s, Russiaʼs leanings toward China have grown more pronounced.
Moreover, ties between China and Pakistan have rapidly grown much closer as an outcomeof the CPEC project and also in reaction to the cooling trend in US-Pakistan ties. Given thesedevelopments, Japan is a welcome presence in Indiaʼs eyes.58
That said, as is commonly the case with close bilateral ties, the relationship between
Japan and India may be described as a marriage of convenience because Japan is pursuingpolicies to sustain the status quo while India has future aspirations of becoming a major power.
Consequently, one cannot discount the possibility of disparities arising between Japan and India
in terms of awareness or within the context of policy implementation. Although such disparities
have not seriously harmed their bilateral relations up to now, major problems could emerge in the
future.
The US, Japan, China, Australia, and Indonesia to say the least of India are all countries withsignificant powers of influence in the Indo-Pacific. Although their current administrations are
already positioned or seen likely to retain the reins of government. Modi government continues
in its second term by its ruling party, Bharatiya Janata Party has won the landslide victory in
April–May 2019 general election. Therefore, Indiaʼs Indo-Pacific policy is able to understand interms of its continuity.
Although not discussed in this paper, the Nor th Korea issue will be a major factor for
uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific. Relations between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific will continue
to face these uncertainties as well as a set of unpredictable conditions in the years ahead.
A sense of mutual affinity is at the root of the relationship between Japan and India, andthat foundation is not going to be shaken. That said, Japan-India ties have transitioned from alimited bilateral relationship to a bilateral relationship with a cross-regional emphasis, and that
relationship can be expected to develop a more-realistic political and economic dimension. Japanneeds to move beyond the RCEP and TPP frameworks in the economic arena and the Quad in
the strategic arena and act as quickly as possible to build an inclusive multilateral framework
by expanding and strengthening the East Asian Community and welcomes the participation ofChina. Japan and India are both entering an era that will call on them to fulfill their commitments
to broader Asia and the global community.59 In the process, they will face the necessity oflooking beyond their mutually complementary bilateral relationship and recognizing it as a newinternational asset to the Indo-Pacific at large.60(January 13, 2018. Updated on February 27, 2020)

Notes

1. For fur ther details, see Takenori Horimoto, “ Japan and India – a review of histor y withthoughts on the future,” Chapter 4 in India, the Giant Elephant Going Global (in Japanese),
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Iwanami Shoten, 2007.
2. For recent trends in the Japan-India relationship, see Takenori Horimoto editor, Introduction
to Contemporary Japan-India Relations (in Japanese), University of Tokyo Press, 2017. This
contains an in-depth study of trends in three fields: politics, economics, and foreign policy.
3. Kazutoshi Tamari, “Turn to Cooperation on Nuclear Issues,” Chapter 10 in Horimoto, supra
Note 2.
4. Etsuro Ishigami and Takahiro Satou ed., Economic of Contemporary India and South Asia (inJapanese), Minerva Shobo, 2011, p. 23.
5. According to former Indian Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar, the “Look East policy” phrase
was first used by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to add extra significance to his first state visit
to South Korea in 1993. (Salman Haidar, “Chapter 3. Look East,” in Amar Nath Ram, editor. Two
Decades of India’s Look East Policy, Manohar, 2012, p. 53）. Incidentally, “Look East” initially
had a strong economic-policy flavor but since the year 2000 it appears to have been converted
into a basic policy for East and Southeast Asia with security-oriented content. Note also that
Raja Mohan dates the first usage of the expression to 1992 based on a speech given by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh (on March 18, 2006).（C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: SinoIndia Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, p. 94.)
6. Purnendra Jain, “Twin Peaks: Japanʼs Economic Aid to India in the 1950s and 2010s,” JICA-R1
Working Paper, No. 139（February 2017）, p. 21, JICA Research Institute.〈https://www.jica.
go.jp/jica-ri/ja/publication/workingpaper/l75nbg0000054l3s-att/JICA-RI_WP_No.139.pdf#sear
ch=%27Purnendra+Jain+JICA%27〉
7. Takenori Horimoto, India in transition to the third Major power (in Japanese), Iwanami Shoten,
2015, p. 36.
8. Rajesh Rajagopalan, India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia, Carnegie
India, September 14, 2017.〈http://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choiceschina-and-balance-of-power-in-asia-pub-73108〉
9. Purnendra Jain, “Japan-India Relations in a New Geo-strategic Environment of the Indo-PacificEra,” Chapter 11 in Horimoto, supra Note 2. Also, Purnendra Jain and Takenori Horimoto,“Japan and the Indo-Pacific,” in Priya Chacko editor, New Regional Geopolitics in the IndoPacific, Routledge, 2016.
10. “China builds up strategic sea lanes,” The Washington Times, Januar y 17, 2005.〈https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jan/17/20050117-115550-1929r/ 〉Kondapalli, anIndian expert on China, pointed out, “It is only since 2005 that China started considering
relations with India ʻstrategicʼ in nature.” (S. Kondapalli “Chinaʼs Foreign Policy and IndoJapan Relations,” in T. Horimoto and L. Varma (eds), India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia,
Manohar, 2013, pp.63-91.) This is not a coincidence.
11. Makoto Kojima, “Emergence of Indian Economy and New Phase of Japan-India Relations,”
Chapter 9 in Horimoto, supra Note 2.

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12. Horimoto, supra Note 7, p. 109 (Table 3-1).
13. Sanjaya Baru, The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh,
Viking, 2014, p. 170.
14. NONALIGNMENT 2.0: A FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY FOR INDIA IN THE
TWENTY FIRST CENTURY, Centre for Policy Research. 〈 http://www.cprindia.org/
workingpapers/3844-nonalignment-20-foreign-and-strategic-policy-india-twenty-first-century〉
15. For details, see “Indian Diplomacy today–strategic Frameworks,” Chapter 1.3 in Horimoto,supra Note 7.
16. Takenori Horimoto, “Modiʼs Foreign Policy in the 3rd year” (in Japanese) in Contemporary
India Forum Quarterly Review, No. 30, Summer 2016.〈https://www.japan-india.com/forum/2
d0305059bb96690755a48af9f477b2490b75a18〉
17. https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_
Document_25Jan16.pdf# search=%27Ensuring+Secure+Seas%3A+India%E2%80%99s+Maritime+
Strategy%27
18. Emi Mifune, “CPEC and India in Chinese Belt & Road Initiative,” in Contemporary India
Forum Quarterly Review, No. 35, Autumn 2017.〈https://www.japan-india.com/forum/c7fa40e
344ca2e3fe672de88fd16e622ce84f61a〉
19. World Bank, World Development Indicators database, 2007 and 2018.
20. SIPRI Fact Sheet April 2019, p.2〈https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/sipri-fact-sheets/
trends-world-military-expenditure-2018〉
21. Toru Ito, “Japanʼs Marginalization in Indiaʼs Foreign Policy,” Chapter 4 in Horimoto, supra
Note 2. Ito provides an astute analysis of the 1990s from a “lost decade” perspective.
22. The Economic Times, September 7, 2007.
23. Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S.-JAPAN-INDIA REPORT, August 16. 2007.
24. Indian Express, September 4, 2007.
25. Kyodo News, September 4, 2007.
26. Interview with Professor P. (Canberra, Australia, September 13, 2012).
27. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_005249.html
28. An address (on “Challenges and Prospects in the Indo-Pacific Region̶in the Context of the
India-Japan Relationship”) given in New Delhi on November 2, 2017 by Kenji Hiramatsu, theJapanese Ambassador to India, clearly lays out the views of the Japanese government.〈http://
www. in.emb-japan.go.jp/Japan-India-Relations/20171102_Hiramatsu_speech_USI.pdf〉

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29. “ Pursuing the ʻ Indo-Pacific Strategyʼ for a stronger par tnership between Japan-US andAustralia-India” (in Japanese), The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 5, 2017.
30. Nihon Keizai Shimbun article, October 26, 2017.
31. The Japan Times, October 20, 2017.
32. T. J. Pempel, “Trumpʼs democratic destruction and Asian absenteeism,” East Asia Forum,
December 30, 2017.〈 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/12/30/trumps-democraticdestruction-and-asian-absenteeism/〉
33. The Japan Times, November 4, 2017.
34. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p.
25.
35. Ibid., p .46.
36. Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and A Rising China, Columbia
University Press, 2015, p. 260.
37. John J. Mearsheimer (Masashi Okuyama, translation), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
updated edition. Gogatsu Shobo, 2014, p. 511.
38. Mikio Haruna, Masked Japan-US Alliance–Truths Revealed in Declassified US DiplomaticDocuments (in Japanese), Bunshun Shinsho, 2015, p. 249.
39. Government of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, November 23, 2017.
40. Ibid., pp. 37–42.
41. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/australia_in_the_asian_century_white_
paper.pdf#search=%27Australia+in+the+Asian+Century%27
42. Government of Australia, op. cit., p. 50.
43. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Australia, New Zealand Face Chinaʼs Influence,” Asia Unbound, Council
on Foreign Relations, December 13, 2017.〈https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/australia-newzealand-face-chinas-influence?sp_ mid=55564822&sp_rid=〉
44. Tanvi Madan, “Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ʻQuadʼ,” War on the Rocks, November 16, 2017.
〈https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/〉
45. Mari Izuyama, “India, Japan and Global/Regional Order Making,” Chapter 7 in Horimoto,supra Note 2, pp. 159–165.
46. Sandy Gordon, “Will China ʼwedgeʼ India and the US?,” South Asia Masala, June 5, 2014.
〈http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/southasiamasala/2014/06/05/will-china-wedge-indiaand-the-us/〉
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47. Kanwal Sibal, “Balancing act: Strategic ties with both Japan, China possible,” The Hindustan
Times（paper edition）, September 3, 2014.
48. Takenori Horimoto, “Australiaʼs new Asian diplomacy–India and ASEAN” (in Japanese), in
Policy Proposal Research (March 2013), Institute of Developing Economies.〈http://www.ide.
go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/Seisaku/1303_horimoto.html〉
From the administration of Bob Hawke (1983–1991) up to Tony Abbott in 2014, Australianprime ministers made visits to India a total of seven times but Australia received no visits fromany Indian prime minister during that same time frame. Following the visit by Prime Minister
Abbott, Indian Prime Minister Modi made a visit to Australia in 2014, the first by an Indianhead of state in 28 years.
49. For fur ther details, see “ Ambivalent Relationship of India and China: Cooperation andCaution,” Chapter 3 in Horimoto, supra Note 7.
50. John Garver & Fei-Ling Wang, “Chinaʼs Anti-encirclement Struggle,” Asian Security, Vol. 6,
No. 3（2010）, p. 258.
51. Lian Degui, “Four-way talks meant to contain China miss regional development demand,”Global Times, October 31, 2017.〈http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1072877.shtml〉
52. Liang Fang, “Indo-Pacific strategy will likely share the same fate as rebalance to Asia-Pacific,”
Global Times, December 3, 2017.〈http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1078470.shtml〉
53. Li Yang, “Australia rejoining Quad will not advance regional prosperity, unity,” Global Times,
November 15, 2017.〈http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1075382.shtml〉
54. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 14, 2017.
55. Emi Mifune, China’s diplomatic strategy and its underlying foundations (in Japanese),
Kodansha, 2016, p. 31.
56. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd notes that President Donald Trumpʼs decision
to pull the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, coupled with expanded economic inroads
by China into the region, have diluted Americaʼs economic presence in the eyes of most AsiaPacific countries.（Kevin Rudd, “The Trumping of Asia,” The Strategist, December 11, 2017.
〈https://www.aspistrategist.org. au/the-trumping-of-asia/〉）57. Satoru Nagao, “Japan-India relations, the start of a true alliance” (in Japanese), Nikkei Business
Online, October 13, 2017.〈http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/atcl/opinion/15/261283/10120001
1/?P=2〉
58. Takenori Horimoto, “Indo-China Rivalry on Connectivity in South Asia” in Contemporary India
Forum Quarterly Review, No. 35, Autumn 2017.〈https://www.japan-india.com/files/view/articles_files_pdf_public/src/c7fa40e344ca2e3fe672de88fd16e622ce84f61a.pdf〉
59. Chiharu Takenaka, “Creative Possibility of Japan-India Relations in the Period of Global Power
Transition,” Chapter 13 in Horimoto, editor, Ibid., 2017.

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60. Takenori Horimoto, “Strategic Convergence of Japan-India Relations and Chinaʼs Emergence,”
Chapter 1 in Horimoto Takenori & Lalima Varma eds., India-Japan Relations in Emerging
Asia, Manohar, 2013, pp. 35–36.

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