FROM BAD TO WORSEElectoral Integrity in Cambodia

2024
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CONTENTS
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................................................................... IV
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................................................................................. V
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................... VI
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................... 1
1a. Methodology .................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
1b. Electoral Integrity ....................................................................................................................................................................... 1
1c. International Standards............................................................................................................................................................ 2
2. Cambodia’s Electoral Laws ........................................................................................................................................ 7
2a. Constitution Provisions ............................................................................................................................................................ 7
2b. Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly..................................................................................... 8
2c. Law on Political Parties ............................................................................................................................................................ 9
2d. Law on the Organisation and Functioning of the National Election Committee ......................................... 10
3. Electoral Integrity Issues From 1993 To 2023 ................................................................................................ 12
3a. Electoral Integrity Since 1993 ............................................................................................................................................ 12
3b. The 2023 General Election .................................................................................................................................................. 19
3c. Shift in Electoral Integrity Issues ...................................................................................................................................... 27
4. Recommendations ...................................................................................................................................................... 28
5. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................................... 30
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 31
Annex ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 38

ABBREVIATIONS
CamboJACCIM
CLPCOMFREL
CNRP
COVID-19
CPP
CSO
CTN
FUNCINPEC
HRD
ICCPR
IPU
ISP
INGO
JANIC
LEMNA
LOFNEC
MPTC
NDI
NEC
NGO
NHRI
NIG
OHCHR
SR
SRP
SRSG
TVK
UN
UDHR
UNTAC
UPR
VOD

Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association
Cambodian Center for Independent Media
Candlelight Party
Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia
Cambodia National Rescue Party
Coronavirus Disease 2019
Civil Society Organisation
Cambodian Television Network
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative
Cambodia
Human Rights DefenderInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Inter-Parliamentary Union
Internet Service Provider
International Non-Governmental Organisation
Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation
Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly
Law on the Organization and Functioning of the National Election Committee
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
National Democratic InstituteNational Election Committee
Non-Governmental Organisation
National Human Rights Institution
National Internet Gateway
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Special Rapporteur
Sam Rainsy Party
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia
National Television of Cambodia
United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
Universal Periodic Review
Voice of Democracy

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8Results of the General Election of 1993
Results of the General Election of 1998
Results of the General Election of 2003
Results of the General Election of 2008
Results of the General Election of 2013
Results of the General Election of 2018
Free and Fair Elections Indices Between 1993 and 2023
Results of the General Election of 2023

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 2023 general election in Cambodia points to a worsening trend in electoral integrity. Since the first
democratic elections in 1993, the integrity index has decreased from 2.99 to 0.55 on a scale ranging
from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates a complete absence of fairness and freedom in elections (V-Dem, 2024).
The continued erosion of electoral integrity over successive elections is attributed to the presence ofelectoral violence, the shutting down of independent media outlets, increased difficulties for
opposition parties to contest elections, and a misalignment between the national legal framework andinternational election standards. Collectively, these conditions have undermined international
rankings in global indices.
However, the international community and local actors are also responsible for ensuring election
integrity and therefore must also be held accountable for the current state of affairs. Their minimal
efforts to address shortcomings in electoral integrity have perpetuated the existing challenges. A
combination of diplomatic considerations, including foreign governments' interests in maintaining
positive relations with the Cambodian government, and fears that advocating for free and fair elections
might strain relations and push Cambodia closer to China, along with concerns about potential
political and legal repercussions, has contributed to the persistence of these challenges.
Data from the UN, INGOs, CSOs, and local and international news reports, as well as inputs from 5
experts on Cambodian politics, point to five key electoral integrity issues that have bogged Cambodia
since 1993. Firstly, while instances of electoral harassment have decreased, incidents during the 2023
elections show the issue persists, threatening electoral integrity. Secondly, independent media faceprolonged challenges, leading to eventual shutdowns rather than temporary control during elections.
Thirdly, legal and administrative obstacles hinder opposition parties, diminishing their capacity tocompete fairly. Fourthly, efforts to undermine opposition have evolved into a sustained threat,reflecting a systemic approach to neutralize their influence. Lastly, international reticence oncompromised electoral integrity aims to maintain diplomatic stability, downplaying concerns to avoid
tensions with Cambodia.
In 2023, global indices measuring free and fair elections, such as V-Dem, confirmed a significant
deterioration in electoral integrity in Cambodia. A combination of the harassment of opposing
candidates, the hard shutdown of several independent media outlets, and the use of registration
provisions to disqualify the participation of the Candlelight Party has led many to question thelegitimacy of elections devoid of genuine competition. The marked hesitation by the international
community to call out the lapses of electoral integrity in the run-up to the elections but choosing
instead to issue statements after the fact, allowed electoral integrity-harming actions to be taken
unchecked in the run-up to the elections. Finally, unlike in previous election cycles, harassment of thepolitical opposition continues beyond the election period through the filing of defamation lawsuits thatstand to bankrupt the defendants through hefty liable claims. Collectively, these perpetuate
democratic regression in Cambodia.
The report concludes by offering policy recommendations for relevant actors, highlighting theimportance of a multi-stakeholder approach to improve electoral integrity in Cambodia. The UN should
increase its efforts so that all relevant actors can start implementing the recommendations made by theinternational community regarding free and fair elections. Therefore, the international community
should maintain and increase, if appropriate, its engagement with local CSOs to document instancesof weak electoral integrity and use UN mechanisms to report them. The government should seek moreassistance from the UN to discuss how to better implement the recommendations made by theinternational community. Given the knowledge they have at a grassroots level, local CSOs should
continue monitoring cases of weak electoral integrity and cooperate with INGOs to report these
instances. Finally, technology companies are also key actors in strengthening electoral integrity andthey should not take down online content at the request of the government without strong evidence,and should also publish transparency reports with all requests to remove online content.
While weak electoral integrity has long been a problem in Cambodia, addressing these issues requires
a collective effort and commitment from a wide range of actors.

Introduction

1. Introduction
Since the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991, Cambodia has held seven general elections.
However, submissions to UN human rights mechanisms and independent election observation reports
consistently highlight electoral integrity issues over the last three decades. This report focuses on
Cambodia's electoral cycles and shows that integrity in the 2023 elections has worsened compared toprevious years. It traces these issues back to the 1993 general elections and identifies electoral
violence, the shutdown of independent media outlets, and a mismatch between the national electoral
laws and the standards set by the international community as the key issues that have contributed to
weak electoral integrity.

1a. Methodology
Research for this report consisted of three stages:
First, the research team at the Asia Centre undertook a desk review of primary and secondary sources,
which included UN Special Procedures reports, legal documents
Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly election observation reports by INGOs andlocal CSOs, and news reports on elections in Cambodia. The review enabled the team to frame theresearch topic, specify its scope, and identify the gaps this report would address.
Second, the team obtained primary data by conducting five online interviews with experts in
Cambodian politics between December 2023 and March 2024. The input provided by these experts
was used to address the knowledge gaps from desk research, validate the findings, and elaborate thepolicy recommendations.
In the third and final stage, the team at the Asia Centre internally reviewed the draft report. Thereafter,
and where appropriate, the necessary amendments were made before finalising the report.

1b. Electoral Integrity
Electoral integrity revolves around guaranteeing the fairness and legitimacy of the complete electoral
process, encompassing the pre-election period, campaign, election day, and post-election (Garnett etal., 2023). Free and fair elections, which constitute the essence of electoral integrity, are crucial as they
foster trust in government, ensure the inclusion of every voice, and facilitate peaceful transitions of
power. This, in turn, contributes to stability, development, and the promotion of human rights,
establishing electoral integrity as a cornerstone of a robust democracy.
In ensuring electoral integrity, key concepts such as deliberation play a crucial role in fostering fair,transparent, and democratic processes, such as the free exchange of ideas, viewpoints, and arguments(Parry, 2021). Ensuring sufficient opportunities for deliberation is crucial as it allows voters access to awide range of perspectives, empowering them to make well-informed decisions. This necessitatescreating platforms for public discourse, organising debates, and promoting dialogue among citizens,candidates, and stakeholders. Meaningful engagement in deliberation not only strengthens thecredibility of electoral results but also cultivates a sense of civic involvement and duty amongindividuals.
1Introduction
Equality of contestation emphasises the notion that all candidates and political parties should compete
on a level playing field. This principle seeks to prevent unfair advantages or undue influence that may
skew electoral outcomes. It entails ensuring that electoral laws and regulations are applied consistently
and impartially, regardless of political affiliations. Additionally, it involves mechanisms to address
issues such as campaign finance transparency, access to media coverage, and restrictions on political
advertising (Sarah, 2011). By upholding equality of contestation, electoral systems can mitigate the riskof domination by powerful interests and promote genuine competition among candidates.
Therefore, in this context, effective electoral management delivery is essential for the smooth andcredible conduct of elections. This involves the impartial administration of electoral processes, fromvoter registration to ballot counting and results announcement. Electoral management bodies play acentral role in ensuring that elections are conducted fairly, transparently, and efficiently. Key aspectsof electoral management delivery include the establishment of clear procedures, the training ofelection officials, the deployment of appropriate technology, and the implementation of safeguards toprevent fraud or manipulation (The Carter Center, 2021). By upholding high standards of electoral
management delivery, authorities can instil confidence in the electoral process and uphold its integrity.
Electoral integrity hinges on the principle of equality of participation, which asserts that all eligible
citizens should have equal opportunities to engage in the electoral process (Thalin, 2024). This
encompasses aspects such as voter registration procedures, accessibility of polling stations, andmeasures to accommodate diverse populations, including marginalised communities and persons
with disabilities. Ensuring broad participation not only strengthens the legitimacy of election outcomesbut also fosters social cohesion and democratic citizenship.
Central to electoral integrity is the certainty of the rules of the game the assurance that electoral laws,
regulations, and procedures are clear, consistent, and applied predictably. Uncertainty or ambiguity
regarding electoral rules can undermine public trust and create opportunities for manipulation or
disputes (Figueroa, 2016). Therefore, it is essential to establish robust legal frameworks that define
electoral procedures, delineate the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, and establish
mechanisms for resolving disputes or irregularities. Moreover, electoral rules should be subject topublic scrutiny and review to ensure their fairness and relevance in evolving political contexts.

1c. International Standards
Numerous international human rights frameworks include legal provisions intended to strengthen
electoral integrity. Governments and electoral bodies must adhere to the rights delineated in theseframeworks, thereby reinforcing electoral integrity and advancing democratic governance.
Conversely, any breaches of these rights pose a risk of undermining the legitimacy of elections anddiminishing public trust in the democratic process.

2

Introduction
As a foundational document in the field of human rights, adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights outlines fundamental human rights andfreedoms to be universally protected, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, religion, or any other status.
Within this framework, Article 21(3) of the UDHR underscores the principle that political authority
people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic andgenuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), an international organisation of national parliaments, aims topromote democratic governance, accountability, and cooperation among its members. Its Declaration
on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections (1994) outlines key principles for ensuring fairness in electoral
procedures, with Articles 2, 3, and 4 being particularly significant.
Article 2 hinges on the principle of equality of participation or inclusivity. It ensures that every adultcitizen has the right to vote in elections without discrimination and has access to fair voter registration
procedures, highlighting that no citizen shall be denied the right to vote or registration except by lawbased criteria consistent with international obligations. Those denied voting rights have the right toappeal for review and correction of errors. Equal access to polling stations and the right to vote withequal weight and in secret are guaranteed.
The opportunities for deliberation and exchange of viewpoints are enshrined in Article 3(3), citing thateveryone has the right to express their political opinions freely, without interference, and to seek,
receive, and share information to make informed choices, both individually and collectively. Section 4of the same Article mentions the role of the media in such a process of deliberation to exchange ideas
ualopportunity of access to the media, particularly the mass communications media, to put forward their

Furthermore, Article 3 also focuses on the safety and security of all, from voters to contestants inelections. Put differently, it underscores the lack of violence as a fundamental principle of strong
electoral integrity. It states that candidates are entitled to security for their lives and property, while
individuals and political parties have the right to legal protection and remedies for any infringementson political and electoral rights. Additionally, candidates and parties must refrain from engaging inviolence, respect the rights and freedoms of others, and accept the outcome of free and fair elections
as part of their civic responsibilities.
Electoral integrity requires an impartial administration of electoral processes, normally throughimpartial electoral commissions. This principle is covered under Article 4(2), stressing the importanceof balanced electoral management bodies. It states tha
institutional steps to ensure the progressive achievement and consolidation of democratic goals,
including through the establishment of a neutral, impartial or balanced mechanism for the
management of election

rights of all individuals within their jurisdiction, including during electoral periods. This entails ensuring
the freedom of movement, assembly, association, and expression, particularly in the context of politicalrallies and meetings. By upholding these fundamental rights, states can facilitate a fair and inclusive3

Introduction
electoral process that allows citizens to participate actively and express their political views without
fear of reprisal or restriction.
In addition to the Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, international human rights
frameworks such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), ratified by
Cambodia, contain provisions aimed at fostering conditions conducive to free and fair elections.
Beyond the Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, other international human rights
frameworks like the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1966 which Cambodia has signed and ratified also contain several articles
aimed at cultivating an environment favourable to free and fair elections.
Freedom of expression, vital for electoral integrity, is enshrined in Article 19, allowing individuals to
express their opinions, discuss political matters, and access information freely, contributing to an
informed electorate.

effective political campaigns, public debates, and the expression of diverse political opinions. This is a
key article since a vibrant and unrestricted public discourse contributes to the integrity of the electoral
process.

which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the freeThis article is important in two ways. On the one hand, it enshrines
of expression under Article 19, highlighting that voting in elections is a manifestation of freedom ofspeech.
Despite provisions in the IPU and ICCPR, concerns about electoral integrity in Cambodia haveconsistently been communicated to the Cambodian government through various United Nations
human rights mechanisms, including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process. Recommendations
have primarily focused on safeguarding freedom of expression, especially in digital and media realms,
and the necessity to enhance electoral laws to ensure a level playing field conducive to politicalpluralism, enabling all candidates to contest elections without harassment.
During the first Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycle (2008-2012) (UNHRC, 2010), Cambodia received
recommendations concerning its electoral process, emphasising the need to fortify its electoral
framework and safeguard the rights of all citizens to participate freely and fairly in democracy.
Specifically, it was urged to uphold freedom of expression and opinion, particularly for opposition
members, crucial for fostering an environment where diverse voices can contribute without fear of
reprisal, essential for democratic processes.
Additionally, Cambodia was advised to develop a comprehensive action plan to ensure unrestricted
access to electronic media and liberalise ownership rules, thereby promoting a more inclusive media
landscape. Lastly, there was a call for Cambodia to take concrete steps toward fully implementing
election regulations in the future, underscoring the importance of fair and transparent electoral
processes in upholding democratic principles. These recommendations received "support" from theCambodian government.

4

Introduction
During the second Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycle (2012-2016) (UNHRC, 2014), Cambodia
received recommendations aimed at improving its electoral processes and fostering a more inclusive
political environment. Firstly, it was urged to ensure equal access to the media for all candidates toprevent voter manipulation and encourage political dialogue.
There was also a call for constructive dialogue among political parties to address concerns from pastelections and implement necessary reforms promptly. Cambodia was advised to enact legislation
protecting the rights of political parties, labour unions, and civil society groups to freely express
themselves and assemble peacefully, ensuring demonstrations occur without intimidation orexcessive force. Key electoral reforms suggested included enhancing voter registration systems,
ensuring media access equality, and preserving the independence of the National Election Committee.
Moreover, Cambodia was encouraged to adopt and implement electoral reform recommendations
from the Special Rapporteur on Cambodia, strengthen its legal framework surrounding elections, andaddress shortcomings identified by various stakeholders. Notably, there was an emphasis on
developing an action plan to align Internet laws with freedom of expression principles, facilitating freeaccess to electronic media and allowing bloggers, journalists, and NGOs to promote and protect
human rights. These recommendations collectively underscore the imperative for Cambodia toundertake significant electoral reforms to uphold democratic principles and ensure credible, fair

During the third Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycle (2017-2021) (UNHRC, 2019), Cambodia wasconfronted with numerous recommendations aimed at promoting democratic principles, protecting
human rights, and ensuring fair and inclusive electoral processes. Central to these recommendations
was the call to re-establish the opposition party, specifically the Cambodian National Rescue Party(CNRP), and reinstate its members, emphasising the importance of political pluralism and opposition
participation in the democratic process. The need to strengthen democratic participation was
highlighted, urging Cambodia to guarantee media independence, create a safe environment for civilsociety and trade unions, and ensure the full participation of opposition parties in upcoming elections.
Furthermore, there were calls to cease harassment and arbitrary interference with political opposition,
human rights defenders, and activists, urging amendments to laws limiting freedom of association andassembly. Recommendations included immediate reinstatement of opposition members' rights andrelease of arbitrarily detained individuals, such as Kem Sokha, as well as protection for journalists andactivists from harassment and physical attacks. Cambodia was encouraged to align its laws withinternational human rights obligations, including those related to freedom of expression andassociation, and to repeal or amend legislation deemed restrictive or arbitrary.
Additionally, adherence to international standards on the independence of institutions, particularly the
judiciary and National Election Commission, was stressed to ensure free, fair, and transparent electoral
processes. These recommendations underscore the urgent need for Cambodia to uphold democratic
principles, protect human rights, and create conditions for genuine multiparty democracy and fairelections in the country.

in highlighting weak electoral integrity in Cambodia (OHCHR, 2018a, 2018b, 2023a). Despite
improvements in election conduct since the 1990s, past special procedure mandate holders haveconsistently highlighted persistent concerns. Key among these concerns are issues related to freedomof expression, with instances of pressure, threats, and intimidation against political activists, particularly
during campaign periods and the run-up to voting days. This is particularly relevant because it5

Introduction
produces a chilling effect among people, with many Cambodians resorting to self-censorship due tofear of reprisals for supporting opposition political parties.
Additionally, inequities in media access and control among political parties have been observed,
essential for all people to
make informed political choices during elections. Concerns have also been raised regarding themisuse of state resources by political parties during campaigning, shortcomings in the National
Assembly's protection of freedom of speech, and limited opportunities for opposition parliamentarians
to effectively debate bills. These issues underscore persistent challenges to electoral integrity andhuman rights in Cambodia.
Observations and recommendations put forth by UN Special Rapporteurs often face criticism, withdetractors accusing the experts of bias and influence from opposition members (OHCHR, 2022). Critics
often attribute the lack of adherence to international standards to Cambodia's "national particularities,"
citing progress in socio-economic development and a preference for a rule-by-law approach over therule of law (Chheng, 2018). During the tenure of SRSG Yash Ghai (2005 2008), personal attacks wereused to undermine the credibility of UN rights mechanisms. These attacks ranged from insults andracist remarks to accusations of ulterior motives, culminating in a formal request from the Cambodian
government to terminate the mandate presented to the Human Rights Council (Smyth, 2014).

international observation, the next chapter reviews domestic legislation that influences the electoral
regime in Cambodia. These include the Constitution, the Law on the Election of Members of the
National Assembly, the Law on Political Parties, and the Law on the Organisation and Functioning of
the National Election Committee.

62. Cambodia’s Electoral Laws
While elements that constitute electoral integrity are part of international human rights law to which
Cambodia is a party, the codification of those principles in local laws is not aligned with theinternational standards or is too vaguely worded to effect free and fair elections in Cambodia. Overtime, these legislations have also been subject to various amendments that make them more
conducive to a one-party system in the country.

2a. Constitution Provisions
The Cambodian Constitution (1993) facilitated the country's transition to democracy and promoted apeaceful reconstruction following years of political instability and violence. It serves as a cornerstone
in recognising and emphasising people's fundamental right to participate in free and fair elections andthe importance of ensuring the integrity of such electoral processes. As Article 51 states,
the Kingdom of Cambodia adopts a policy of liberal democracy and pluralism. The
Cambodian people are the masters of their own country. All powers belong to thepeople. The people exercise these powers through the National Assembly, Senate,
Royal Government and the Judiciary (Article 51).
The constitution includes articles that, although not explicitly mentioning elections, are crucial for a
democratic system centred on multi-party elections. For example, Article 1 implies the significance of amulti-party system that upholds people's civic freedoms by stating that "Cambodia is a Kingdom witha King who shall rule according to the Constitution and to the principles of liberal democracy andpluralism [emphasis added]."
Article 31 emphasises the imperative of upholding human rights, as outlined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) see section 1c emphasising that political power
originates from the consent of the governed, which is manifested through open and equitable electoral
processes.
Other constitutional provisions concern elections directly. The right to vote articulated in Article 34 of
the Constitution, is to be accessible to all Khmer citizens aged eighteen and above. However, the samee rights to vote and the rights to stand as candidates in
elucidated further below.
To ensure the integrity of free and fair elections, Article 41 of the Constitution safeguards various civic

7

rights should not be used to compromise the dignity of others or disrupt societal norms, public order,and national security, allowing for certain restrictions.

regulated by law.
Since its creation in 1993, 10 amendments have been made to the Constitution over the years. Suchtwo most recent amendments of 2021 and 2022 exemplify this.
In 2021, a series of constitutional amendments
field with a series of changes that minimised the role of the main opposition party CNRP, targeting Sam
Rainsy and other top members of the opposition. These changes, affecting Articles 19, 82, 106, 119,and 137 of the Constitution, as well as Articles 3 and 4 of the Additional Constitutional Law, forbid
individuals with dual or multiple citizenships from holding key positions like Prime Minister or Presidentof the National Assembly, Senate, or Constitutional Council (Lawrence, 2022). For instance, Sam
Rainsy, former leader of the CNRP, holds Cambodian and French nationalities, while Mou Sochhua,
former vice-president of the CNRP, married a non-Cambodian citizen.
The latest constitutional amendment, from 2022, is detrimental to electoral integrity since it dilutes therole of elections by making it more difficult to keep elected through an uneven electoral playing field,
as explained above government officials accountable. Amendments to Article 98 now require ahigher threshold in the National Assembly to initiate a vote for removing a government, with one-thirdof the house's members needed to make such a request, compared to the previous requirement of 30
MPs. Changes to Article 119 and Additional Constitutional Law Article 4 alter the government
formation process, shifting the responsibility of proposing a new Prime Minister to the party with themost seats. This shows the decline of electoral integrity in the aftermath of elections (Ibid).
These constitutional amendments have contributed to the erosion of electoral integrity, particularly
through the potential diminishment of legislative power that affects, primarily, minority parties.
Amendments restricting coalition governments to the party with the majority of seats could hamper
smaller parties' ability to collaborate and challenge the longstanding dominance of the ruling party
CPP. Furthermore, these changes are mechanisms for the ruling party to consolidate its power. Utilisinglegal means targeting associations, NGOs, trade unions, and political entities, opposition forces havebeen weakened, culminating in the dissolution of the main opposition party, the CNRP, in 2017. With
key opposition figures facing legal actions or being forced into exile, the ruling party's control seems
increasingly entrenched, exacerbating concerns about electoral fairness.

2b. Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly
The Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA) (1997) governs the National
Assembly election process and plays a pivotal role in shaping electoral integrity, aiming to establish aframework that ensures transparency, fairness, and inclusivity. Article 1 sets the tone by emphasising
the importance of clear procedures and guidelines to govern the electoral process, promoting
transparency and consistency.
Meanwhile, Article 5 delves into the foundational principles that underpin the electoral process, suchas universal suffrage, free and fair voting, and the use of proportional representation. These principles
8

not only uphold democratic ideals but also foster inclusivity by ensuring that all voices are heard andrepresented in the legislative body.
Article 7 further enhances electoral integrity by emphasising the active participation of political parties
through the appointment of representatives known as political party agents. These agents serve as
watchdogs during the electoral process, contributing to transparency and accountability by observing
election proceedings and participating in ballot counting.
However, while these measures aim to promote fairness, Article 23 raises concerns regarding
inclusivity by limiting candidacy to Cambodian-born individuals, potentially excluding naturalised
citizens from participating in the electoral process. Moreover, Article 46 outlines the criteria for voter
eligibility, setting clear guidelines to ensure that only eligible citizens have the right to vote. This helps
safeguard against potential manipulation of the electoral process by restricting voting rights toqualified individuals with a stake in the country's future.
Article 71 ensures fair and ethical conduct in political activities by prohibiting threats, intimidation, orviolence against citizens, political entities, or candidates. It also bars incitement to engage in abusive
or violent actions. Additionally, it prohibits insults or verbal remarks against candidates or theirsupporters and actions aimed at influencing votes through threats or incentives. Furthermore, it
addresses electoral bribery by prohibiting the provision of cash or incentives in exchange for votes.
Furthermore, Article 74 underscores the importance of adherence to election law and democratic
principles, providing a mechanism for addressing disputes and complaints through establishedprocedures overseen by the National Election Committee and the Constitutional Council. However,
Articles 84 and 85 introduce potential challenges to electoral integrity by imposing restrictions oncertain political activities by foreigners and organisations, raising concerns about the impact on
freedom of expression and assembly.
In 2023, just before the election, amendments to LEMNA were introduced (ODC, 2023), barring
candidates who failed to vote in the last two elections from running for office and penalising thoseadvocating for a vote boycott or nullification (Ros, 2023). This has been labelled as a tactic to sideline
political rivals, coinciding with the disqualification of the main opposition party, Candlelight Party(CLP), from the elections of 2023 due to registration issues. The amendments were swiftly approvedby the National Assembly with minimal debate, where all 111 lawmakers present were affiliated with
the Cambodian People's Party (Cheang, 2023).

2c. Law on Political Parties
The Cambodian Law on Political Parties, enacted in 1997, formalises the procedures and requirementsfor political party establishment, registration, and activities (Article 1).
First and foremost, the Law on Political Parties emphasises the principle of equality among politicalparties in Cambodia, which should result in strong
parties shall be entitled to the same rights, and privileges and shall receive equal treatment from the

Article 5 places a strong emphasis on the freedom of choice for every Khmer citizen to engage in any
political party without coercion. It serves as a protective measure, ensuring that individuals cannot be
deprived of their civil, political, or professional rights based on their affiliation with a particular politicalparty. This provision aims to safeguard individual freedoms and rights in the political sphere.
9Under Article 12, Khmer citizens, provided they are at least 18 years old and possess civil rights, havethe freedom to join political parties as members. This provision recognises the significance ofindividual agency and participation in political processes, emphasising inclusivity and democratic
engagement.
Article 34 outlines stringent criteria for the dissolution of political parties, setting a high threshold. It
asserts that no authority is permitted to dissolve a political party unless there is a clear declaration of
bankruptcy through a final court judgment or appeal. This provision ensures that the dissolution
process is judicious and contingent on established legal standards, adding a layer of accountability to
the regulatory framework for political parties.
In 2017, several articles of this law were subjected to amendments threatening electoral integrity(OHCHR, 2018c). The revision to Article 48, requiring a party to fill a vacant leadership position within
90 days, alongside a new amendment stating that parties will dissolve if their leaders are convicted ofdomestic crimes, was viewed as targeting the former opposition party, the CNRP. This legal change
prompted Sam Rainsy, former CNRP president, to step down in February 2017, due to numerous
pending cases against him in Cambodia and his exile since 2015.
Additionally, the amendment to Article 44 new (2) grants the Supreme Court authority to dissolve any
party deemed to cause division, undermine democracy, jeopardise state security, foster unrest, or be
influenced by foreign entities. It also allows for a five-year ban on political leaders from disbanded
parties engaging in politics (RFA, 2017).

2d. Law on the Organisation and Functioning of the National Election Committee
The Law on the Organisation and Functioning of the National Election Committee (LOFNEC), enacted
in 2015, serves to delineate the responsibilities and functions of Cambodia's National Election
Committee (NEC) in overseeing elections. As an independent body (NEC, n.d.), the NEC holds thepivotal role of managing and supervising the electoral process. Its duties encompass a wide array oftasks aimed at ensuring the fairness, transparency, and integrity of elections. These include
implementing electoral laws, regulations, and procedures, facilitating voter and candidate registration,
as well as resolving electoral disputes. Operating within the framework of the Constitution andpertinent legislation, the NEC is dedicated to upholding the fundamental principles of free andequitable elections (Ibid).
Article 6 establishes the eligibility and requirements of election commissioners. However, the selection
process is aligned with international standards, where a selection committee composed of experts in
respective professions relevant to the election process would be set up to find ideal candidates to fill
the role. Rather, the law allows political parties to directly recruit candidates. On another note, the same
Article states that the Chair and Vice Chair would be appointed by the King, but does not specify theprocess.
Articles 9, 10 and 11 (dismissal, accountability and replacement of Chair, Vice Chair andcommissioners) under the LOFNEC allow the ruling party that controls the National Assembly to
influence dismissing and replacing election commissioners. Article 9 outlines possible conditions

to abuse if the government can marshall enough ministers to pass such a verdict. Article 10 states that
the Chair, Vice Chair and commissioners are accountable to the National Assembly and it is the10prerogative of the latter to dismiss them. Article 11 stipulates that if the Chair, Vice Chair andcommissioners lose their tenures, the National Assembly will coordinate with political parties to fill inthe vacant seat in five days.
The LOFNEC faces a similar problem to the LEMNA as it lacks a preamble on the definition of the terms
used under the law, which can compromise electoral integrity as it leaves interpretation andimplementation of the law to the incumbent government and public authorities.
The NEC is responsible for releasing updated Regulations and Procedures for the National Election.
These regulations are revised with each election, covering various aspects such as the managementof elected members in the National Assembly, the registration of political parties, financial procedures,
remedies for issues, and monitoring roles.
Ahead of the 2023 national election, the National Election Committee (NEC) has issued comprehensive
regulations and procedures. These guidelines, spanning 438 pages with 10 chapters and nine
annexes, detail the upcoming parliamentary election scheduled for July 2023 (NEC, 2023). The
regulations impose bans on activities such as voter intimidation, violence, and personal attacks on
candidates. Additionally, they prohibit the coercion of voters, exchange of gifts for votes, anddisruption of campaign events or voting procedures. Each party is allowed one political agent inside
the election room, with reserved members observing from outside. Unauthorised access to election
offices is strictly prohibited. The regulations also forbid the use of government-related licence plates
for campaign activities and the use of loudspeakers that may disrupt other parties. Destruction of
opposing party materials and improper placement of campaign banners are also banned.
In response to recommendations from civil election observer groups, certain measures have been
implemented, including provisions for observing voter registration preparations and ensuringtransparency during ballot counting. However, groups representing the opposing party haveexpressed disappointment, citing concerns that the committee's membership consists solely ofmembers from the ruling party (Sarath, 2022). They argue that not all of their suggestions were taken
into account (Reuy, 2023).
In essence, guarantees of electoral integrity are provided for under the Constitution, LEMNA and
LOFNEC, but the lack of a preamble on the definition of the terms used under each of these two laws
has compromised its intended implementation. In effect, the LEMNA and LOFNEC become vague andcould be subject to arbitrary interpretation, which could eventually lead to potential abuse. LOFNEC,
in particular, is not aligned with international standards and does not constitute an independent bodyand provide oversight for the administration of elections in Cambodia. The next section will analyse theimpact of these legal frameworks on the latest election in Cambodia.

11Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023

3. Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
Since the first electoral cycle in 1993, reports from international organisations, INGOs, and local CSOs
consistently highlight ongoing challenges with electoral integrity, particularly exacerbated during the2023 general elections. Notably, there is a discernible pattern of limited tolerance from the ruling party
CPP towards opposition forces, encompassing opposition parties and media. While physical violence
was prevalent in the 1990s, its incidence has decreased over time. However, the legal framework, asdetailed in Chapter 2, has undergone systematic amendments aimed at undermining electoral
integrity and solidifying the political dominance of the CPP.

3a. Electoral Integrity Since 1993
-party system where all parties
and contenders have the same opportunities. However, all electoral cycles since 1993 have beencharacterised by weak electoral integrity and the consequent political hegemony of the CPP.
Table 1: Results of the General Elections of 1993 (Nohlen et al., 2001)

Votes

Share of Votes (%)

Seats in the
National Assembly

FUNCINPEC

1,824,188

45.47

58

Cambodian People's Party

1,533,471

38.23

51

Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party

152,764

3.81

10

Liberal Democratic Party

62,6981.56

0

MOULINAKA

55,107

1.37

1

Khmer Neutral Party

48,113

1.20

0

Party

12

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
Table 2: Results of the General Elections of 1998 (Nohlen et al., 2001)

Votes

Share of Votes (%)

Seats in the
National Assembly

2,030,790

41.42

64

FUNCINPEC

1,554,405

31.71

43

Sam Rainsy Party

699,665

14.27

15

Khmer Democratic Party

90,0001.84

0Cambodian National Sustaining Party

71,0931.45

02,030,790

41.42

64

Party

Table 3: Results of the General Elections of 2003 (Nohlen et al., 2001)

Votes

Share of Votes (%)

Seats in the
National Assembly

Cambodian People's Party

2,447,259

47.35

73

FUNCINPEC

1,072,313

20.75

26

Sam Rainsy Party

1,130,423

21.87

24

Khmer Democratic Party

95,9271.86

0

The Rice Party

76,086

1.47

0

Party

Table 4: Results of the General Elections of 2008 (COMFREL, 2008)

Votes

Share of Votes (%)

Seats in the
National Assembly

Cambodian People's Party

3,492,374

58.11

90

Sam Rainsy Party

1,316,714

22.91

26

Human Rights Party

397,816

6.62

3

Norodom Ranariddh Party

337,943

5.62

2

FUNCINPEC

303,764

5.05

2

Party

13

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
Table 5: Results of the General Elections of 2013 (COMFREL, 2013)

Votes

Share of Votes (%)

Seats in the
National Assembly

Cambodian People's Party

3,235,969

48.83

68

Cambodia National Rescue Party

2,946,176

44.46

55

FUNCINPEC

242,413

3.66

0League for Democracy Party

68,3891.03

0Khmer Anti-Poverty Party

43,222

0.65

0

Party

Table 6: Results of the General Elections of 2018 (NEC, 2018)

Votes

Share of Votes (%)

Seats in the
National Assembly

Cambodian People's Party

4,889,113

76.85

125

FUNCINPEC

374,5105.89

0League for Democracy Party

309,364

4.86

0Khmer Will Party

212,869

3.35

0Khmer National United Party

99,377

1.56

0

Party

General Election of 1993
In 1993, the first post-Paris Peace Agreement election occurred under the supervision of the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative(CPP) claimed second place with 38.23% (Branigin, 1993). Despite their loss, the CPP refused to accept
fair elections, particularly regarding result acceptance. The potential for civil strife was narrowly
averted when UNTAC and FUNCINPEC agreed to a co-premiership, with Norodom Ranariddh and Hun
Sen as co-prime ministers (Osborne, 2018).
After the 1993 elections, a FUNCINPEC-CPP coalition disintegrated within three years. Tensions arose
in March 1996 when back-then First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh sought a more equitable
power balance, leading to armed clashes later in 1996 and widespread conflicts in 1997 between
troops loyal to each leader across multiple provinces (Peou, 2018). The political struggles persisted
forcibly remove his political counterpart. This action resulted in an armed conflict in Phnom Penh,culminating in the defeat of the Royalist Army. Allegedly, during this event, CPP forces carried out

14

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
summary executions, causing the deaths of 41 to 60 individuals, including FUNCINPEC members andministers (Peou, 1997).
Leading up to the 1998 election, violence against FUNCINPEC members instilled widespread fear,
causing many to flee and live in exile (Bjornlund and Manikas, 1998). As a result of such political
upheaval, the CPP had unhindered campaigning opportunities, with limited media coverage granted
to opposition candidates throughout the election period, hindering their ability to connect with theelectorate (Ibid). For instance, lower-level FUNCINPEC officials faced violence and intimidation whenattempting to engage with villagers and grassroots networks in Takeo, Prey Veng, and Kampot
provinces (Human Rights Watch, 1998). A politician who was interviewed during the drafting of thisreport explained that violence was notable in the months preceding the elections. This way, thegovernment could intimidate the opposition while allowing it to breathe in non-electoral periods.
characterised by violence and various types ofphysical intimidation, but it always occurred before the six months leading up to anelection. Once the election is over, there is a respite; you have a couple of years
without intimidation, allowing the oppos
In this context, the 1998 election process contradicted the IPU's criteria for free and fair elections,specifically violating Article 3, Clause 4 (ensuring the ability to campaign on an equal basis and equal
access to the media), Article 3, Clause 5 (ensuring the security of candidates), and Article 3, Clause 9(ensuring the absence of coercion and violence).
This departure from the IPU's international standards, notably Article 3, clause 5 (ensuring candidates'
security) and Article 3, clause 9 (promoting non-violence), underscores the considerable challenges inmaintaining a secure and peaceful electoral environment during that time.
The CPP obtained victory with 41.4% of the votes, gaining 64 seats out of 122 in the National Assembly.
FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) obtained 31.7% (43 seats) and 14.3% (15 seats) of thevotes, respectively. Alleging election irregularities, both FUNCINPEC and SRP rejected the results,
organising demonstrations and marches that persisted for several months. The government
responded with violence, resulting in at least dozens of deaths (U.S. Department of State, 1999).
It is also noteworthy that in 1997, one year before the elections, the National Assembly adopted the'highest average' formula, also called the Jefferson or d'Hondt formula, in the 1997 Election Law,
instead of the 'greatest remainder' formula for handling leftover votes (KII4). This change potentiallyfavours larger parties, occasionally granting them seats disproportionately compared to smaller
parties. Interestingly, no objections were raised by any party when this system was implemented,
suggesting that the implications of this change might not have been fully understood at the time
(Gallup, 2002).

General Election of 1998
Leading up to the 1998 election, violence against FUNCINPEC members instilled widespread fear,
causing many to flee and live in exile (Bjornlund and Manikas, 1998). As a result of such political
upheaval, the CPP had unhindered campaigning opportunities, with limited media coverage granted
to opposition candidates throughout the election period, hindering their ability to connect with theelectorate (Ibid). For instance, lower-level FUNCINPEC officials faced violence and intimidation whenattempting to engage with villagers and grassroots networks in Takeo, Prey Veng, and Kampot
provinces (Human Rights Watch, 1998). A politician who was interviewed during the drafting of this15

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
report explained that violence was notable in the months preceding the elections. This way, thegovernment could intimidate the opposition while allowing it to breathe in non-electoral periods.

physical intimidation, but it always occurred before the six months leading up to anelection. Once the election is over, there is a respite; you have a couple of years
wit
In this context, the 1998 election process contradicted the IPU's criteria for free and fair elections,specifically violating Article 3, Clause 4 (ensuring the ability to campaign on an equal basis and equal
access to the media), Article 3, Clause 5 (ensuring the security of candidates), and Article 3, Clause 9(ensuring the absence of coercion and violence).
This departure from the IPU's international standards, notably Article 3, clause 5 (ensuring candidates'
security) and Article 3, clause 9 (promoting non-violence), underscores the considerable challenges inmaintaining a secure and peaceful electoral environment during that time.
The CPP obtained victory with 41.4% of the votes, gaining 64 seats out of 122 in the National Assembly.
FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) obtained 31.7% (43 seats) and 14.3% (15 seats) of thevotes, respectively. Alleging election irregularities, both FUNCINPEC and SRP rejected the results,
organising demonstrations and marches that persisted for several months. The government
responded with violence, resulting in at least dozens of deaths (U.S. Department of State, 1999).
It is also noteworthy that in 1997, one year before the elections, the National Assembly adopted the'highest average' formula, also called the Jefferson or d'Hondt formula, in the 1997 Election Law,
instead of the 'greatest remainder' formula for handling leftover votes (KII4). This change potentiallyfavours larger parties, occasionally granting them seats disproportionately compared to smaller
parties. Interestingly, no objections were raised by any party when this system was implemented,
suggesting that the implications of this change might not have been fully understood at the time
(Gallup, 2002).

General Election of 2003
In the 2003 general election, the CPP won with 47.5% of the votes (73 seats), falling short of the twothirds majority needed to elect the prime minister. FUNCINPEC and SRP, with 20.75% (26 seats) and21.87% (24 seats) respectively, boycotted parliament, preventing Hun Sen from becoming prime
minister. Both parties rejected the official results, claiming that the elections had not been free or fair
(ABC News, 2003). A personal feud among the parties and CPP opposition to including SRP in a
coalition government delayed the formation of a new government for a year. In June 2004, FUNCINPEC
and CPP reached an agreement. FUNCINPEC secured an increased share of ministerial positions, while
CPP, with Hun Sen as prime minister, led the new government (BBC News, 2004).
From February 2002 to polling day, at least 12 activists and opposition supporters were killed (Human
Rights Watch, 2003). The CPP allegedly coerced cooperation in Takeo province, threatening denial of
marriage administration or land confiscation through local village chiefs (ANFREL, 2003). Similar
incidents were reported in Siem Reap and Kampong Cham. Media access showed disproportionate
favouritism towards the CPP; EU-supported monitoring revealed that TVK allocated 65% of airtime togovernment news, 22% to CPP, 3% to FUNCINPEC, and none to the SRP a month before the election(ibid). These conditions violated IPU's standards on free and fair elections, specifically Article 3, clause
4 (equal campaign basis and media access) and Article 3, clause 9 (absence of coercion and violence).
16

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023

General Election of 2008
In the 2008 general election, the CPP secured 58.1% of the votes, winning 90 seats out of 123 seats inthe lower house (COMFREL, 2008). Internal strife within FUNCINPEC and conflicts between
FUNCINPEC and SRP led to the fragmentation of the opposition forces (Samean, 2006; Sokheng,2007). As a result, FUNCINPEC performed poorly with only 5% of the votes and 2 seats. The SRP
remained a stronger contender, winning 21.9% of the votes and securing 26 seats (COMFREL, 2008).
The remaining seats were divided among factions that broke away from FUNCINPEC: Human Rights
Party (3 seats) and Norodom Ranariddh Party (2 seats).
In the 2008 election, reduced violence was attributed to the CPP offering high-paying advisory roles todefecting senior SRP members (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Despite this, a drive-by shooting inPhnom Penh led to the death of Khim Sambo, an 'opposition journalist' associated with the SRPaffiliated newspaper Moneaksekar Khmer. However, electoral integrity was still at risk. In May 2008,
Angkor Ratha radio was closed for broadcasting opposition programs without government approval(RFA, 2008). Simultaneously, Dam Sith, the editor of Moneaksekar Khmer and an SRP candidate, faced
charges related to the paper's report on the alleged role of the foreign minister during the Khmer Rouge
regime (Ibid). From May 2017 to May 2018, COMFREL reported that TVK dedicated 85% of its political
coverage to the government's activities, with 84% of its airtime focused on the CPP when covering
political parties. FUNCINPEC and SRP received only 10% and 6%, respectively (ANFREL, 2008). These
actions constituted clear violations of IPU's standards: Article 3, clause 4 (equal campaign basis andmedia access) and Article 3, clause 9 (absence of coercion and violence).

General Election of 2013
The 2013 general election represented the first significant challenge to Hun Sen's CPP since 1998.
While the CPP secured victory, its popularity decreased to 48.8% of the total votes, resulting in a
reduction of seats to 68. Simultaneously, the opposition parties successfully consolidated andimproved their standing. The merger of the SRP and the HRP led to the formation of the Cambodian
National Rescue Party (CNRP), securing second place with 44.4% of the vote shares and 55 seats (RFA,2013).
During the election period, despite a reduction in serious political violence compared to the previous
election, members of the CNRP faced continued intimidation and threats, including 5 cases of death
threats and 56 arrest threats (COMFREL, 2013). These incidents violated Article 3, clause 9 (absence of-owned media, particularly TVK,
showed improvement in unbiased reporting and balanced coverage of political parties, allocating
19.5% of airtime to the CPP, 15.3% to the CNRP, and 12.4% to FUNCINPEC (ibid). However, that was not
the case for private media outlets. For instance, CTN and Bayon TV, linked with the CPP, allocated 75%
and 87% of their airtime to the CPP, while dedicating 19.7% and 11.4% to the CNRP, respectively (ibid).
elections.

17Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023

General Election of 2018
In the run-up to the 2018 general election, violations of IPU's electoral integrity principles, such as theabsence of violence and intimidation, candidate security, and equal campaign opportunities,
persisted. In response to challenges and declining popularity, Prime Minister Hun Sen strengthened
his hold on power to secure the CPP's uncontested rule. Beginning with the CNRP in 2017, theSupreme Court dissolved the party, alleging foreign support for government overthrow (Boyle, 2017).
Harassment and prosecution of civil society and media escalated, including the closure of Mother
Nature (David, 2017
registration status (NDI, 2017). Accusations of tax evasion against Cambodia Daily and Phnom Penh
Post led to immediate hefty tax bills, prompting business closures and compromising editorial
independence (Ellis-Petersen, 2018). This political manoeuvre eliminated the primary threat to Hun
Sen's rule, resulting in the CPP winning all 125 parliamentary seats in the 2018 general election (AsiaCentre, 2021). Against this backdrop, the CPP secured all 125 seats in the National Assembly with
76.8% of the total votes.
In the 2023 general election, the CPP secured a landslide victory gaining 120 seats out of 125 with
82.3% of total votes counted (Khmer Times, 2023a). Those elections were characterised by thedisqualification of the main opposition party, the Candlelight Party (CLP) a detailed analysis of the2023 elections is provided in Chapter 3. Although elections were multi-party, opposition parties had
virtually no chance to contest the dominance of the ruling party.
International free and fair elections indices have captured a consistent lack of electoral integrity since
the first elections in 1993 after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991:
Table 7: Free and Fair Elections Indices Between 1993 and 2018 (V-Dem, 2023)
GeneralElection

Index(0=lowest; 4=highest)

1993

2.98

1998

2.06

2003

2.22

2008

2.03

2013

2.08

2018

0.86

Data in Table 1 shows two things. First, except for the first elections in 1993, electoral integrity in
Cambodia since the Paris Peace Agreements has been rather limited or, according to V-Dem,there was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were alsosignificant irregularities that called into question the legitimacy of the outcomes. Second, in theaftermath of the elections in 2013
first time the quality of elections decreased sharply.

18

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
Furthermore, data from the Perception of Electoral Integrity index suggests a similar trend from 2012
to 2022 as Cambodia scores 29 out of 100 on average, measuring the quality of national elections
against thresholds such as electoral laws and procedures, media coverage and electoral authorities(Garnett et al., 2023).
Cambodia's compromised electoral integrity has drawn attention from the international community,
leading to its utilisation of UN human rights mechanisms to address the country's limitations in
conducting free and fair elections, as detailed in the subsequent section.

3b. The 2023 General Election
The Run-up to the 2023 Elections
In the months leading up to polling day, numerous incidents were reported that threatened the overall
quality of the election. As polling day approached, instances of violence were reported, and the primary
opposition party, the Candlelight Party (CLP) was barred from participation in the elections for nothaving the right paperwork (Strangio, 2023). Additionally, the independence of the NEC remained asubject of doubt, and media outlets attempting to hold government officials and policies accountable
faced the risk of closure.
Although violent incidents against contenders and the general public were low compared to theincidents reported in the context of the elections in the 1990s, several instances of violence in thecontext of the general election of 2023 were reported, including attacks on the Candlelight Party (CLP)
ahead of the elections (Freedom House, 2022; Sothyroth & Sea, 2023). In July 2022, a CLP official, Nol
Pongthearith, was assaulted by an unknown motorist (Sopheap, 2022), adding to previous incidents
in 2020 when he was beaten and subsequently fled the country due to government criticism (APHR,
2020
using to film officers interrogating his VOD peers (RSF, 2022).
In addition to physical violence, cases of intimidation and verbal threats were not uncommon during
the electoral period. For instance, thenmembers and their supporters in a Facebook live session
recommend suspending his account for six months in June 2023 (Turton, 2023). Additionally, hethreatened legal and physical action against CLP leaders who criticised the ruling party (Sothyroth &Sea, 2023). Cases of intimidation against electoral observers were also reported. At least two key
members of COMFREL and its affiliates stated they received verbal threats from unknown individuals
while commuting to work on motorcycles, underscoring the dangers encountered by individuals
engaged in election monitoring activities (ANFREL, 2023). These incidents perpetuated the use of
threats, intimidation, and violence throughout the election, directly contravening Article 3, clause 9 of
the IPU standards.
Another factor contributing to the erosion of opportunities for reinforcing electoral integrity was thesustained maintenance of an uneven political playing field disproportionately favouring thegovernment. This disparity significantly restricted the opportunities for opposition parties to emerge asrobust contenders for office.

19

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
This uneven playing field stems, partly, from the National Election Commission (NEC), which oversees
national elections, to ensure fairness and transparency. According to Article 150 of the Constitution,
primary authority responsible for organising,regulating, and administering elections in the country. Its fundamental objective is to uphold theprinciples of liberal and multiEstablished in 1998, it manages voter registration, defines constituencies, enforces electoral laws, andannounces results.
However, despite its crucial[...]emphasised modalities that appear to have discriminated against one or more of the country's main
OHCHR, 2023b).

Prime Minister has his hand in the daily management or decision-making of the NEC

The NEC, comprising nine members per Article 151 of the Constitution and Article 4 of the Law on the
Organisation and Functioning of the National Election Committee (LOFNEC), undergoes a selection
process where four members are chosen by the ruling parties, four by opposition parties with seats in
the National Assembly, and one selected through consensus among all parties in the National
Assembly.
The dissolution of the CNRP in 2017 had a notable impact on the NEC's composition. Afterwards, threeout of four NEC members nominated by the CNRP resigned, replaced by individuals affiliated with theruling CPP and other parties. This included figures like Nuth Sokhom, formerly of FUNCINPEC; Hel
Sarath, associated with the Cambodian Nationality Party; and Dim Sovannarom, linked to the CPP. Hing
Thirith, the remaining CNRP nominee, retained his position. In 2021, Prach Chan, a senior CPP member
and former provincial governor, became the NEC chair appointed by the National Assembly.
Other NEC members, such as Mean Satik, Duch Sorn, and Em Sophath, have CPP ties, while Hang
Puthea, previously with NICFEC, was selected by both ruling and opposition parties. This composition
raises concerns among local stakeholders, who perceive bias towards the ruling CPP, with seven outof nine members affiliated with the party. The lack of representation from credible opposition parties
fuels debates about the nomination process's inclusivity (ANFREL, 2023).
Against this backdrop, the effectiveness of the NEC in ensuring electoral integrity in Cambodia has
been questioned since seven out of nine members are linked to the CPP. This raises the question ofwhether this mechanism can act impartially and in an unbiased manner. In May 2023, the NEC refused
to register the Candlelight Party for the upcoming general elections in July 2023, citing a failure to
submit original registration documents to the Ministry of Interior. This decision was made despite theCandlelight Party being permitted to participate in the 2022 commune elections with the same
documentation. In response, the Candlelight Party appealed the NEC's ruling to the Constitutional
Council. However, on May 25, 2023, the Council unanimously upheld the NEC's disqualification of theparty. Notably, the Constitutional Council, composed of nine members, five of whom are part of the
CPP Central Committee, had the final authority on the matter (FIDH, 2023).
The NEC was instrumental in barring the strongest opposition party, the Candlelight Party (CLP) fromcontesting the elections in 2023. Leading up to the voting day, efforts were made by the opposition
and former members of the dissolved Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) to regroup under the
CLP. However, the NEC hindered their attempts by disqualifying the CLP two months before the20Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
election, citing issues with the documentation process (Leang, 2023). Despite facing internationalcondemnation, the NEC maintained that no rules were altered in the lead-up to the election andemphasised that all political parties were required to submit original documents for registration to the
Ministry of Interior (NEC, 2023). This action, influenced by the Law on the Organization andFunctioning of the NEC (LOFNEC), which conditions the functions and independence (or lack thereof), anindependent and impartial authority should determine electoral complaints promptly and effectively.
Leading up to the elections, media outlets that voiced criticism against public officials and covered orgave publicity to opposition parties faced closures. Five months before the election, Voice Of
Democracy (VOD) was forcibly shut down following a report accusing Hun Manet of exceeding his
powers by authorising aid to Turkey on behalf of then-Prime Minister Hun Sen after a tragic earthquake(Brook and Rathana, 2023). After the closure of VOD, the Telecommunication Regulator Cambodia(TRC) took measures to block access to its news sites (Freedom House, 2023). In 2021, the Ministry ofInformation (MoI) revoked K01 TV's licence for criticising the government's handling of the COVID-19
pandemic (ibid). Government rebuke extended to social media platforms as well.
The Cambodian government also ordered internet providers to block several media outlets, including
the Cambodia Daily, and Radio Free Asia. The government claimed that these outlets spreadmisinformation and failed to meet licensing requirements. Yet, media advocates say these measures
were an attempt to censor critical voices ahead of the election (Kelliher, 2023a).
A new database called Kamnotra was also blocked. It was created by the Cambodian Center for
Independent Media (CCIM) and compiles public information about Cambodian government officials
and businesses to ensure accessibility, clarity, and searchability for individuals in both Khmer andEnglish. Additionally, it offers context and analysis when relevant (Kamnotra, 2023). The government
claims that Kamnotra is not a news organisation and does not have a licence. Media advocates say theblocks are part of a wider crackdown on freedom of expression in Cambodia (Kelliher, 2023).

Polling Day: a CPP Landslide Victory Without Major Incidents Reported
The general elections of 2023 took place on 23 July 2023. Like previous elections, the voter turnout
was above 80%, at 84.58% the highest in the past two decades with 8.2 million out of 9.7 million
eligible voters participating (Al Jazeera, 2023; Hutt, 2023; Raksa and Yutharo, 2023).
As the table below shows, Hun Sen and the CPP secured 120 of the 125 parliamentary seats in the
National Assembly, with the remaining five going to FUNCINPEC candidates. According to the NEC, nomajor violent incidents were reported during polling stations in 2023 (Sochan, 2023).
Table 8: Results of the General Elections of 2023 (NEC, 2023)

Votes

Share of Votes (%)

Seats in the
National Assembly

Cambodian People's Party

6,398,311

82.30

120

FUNCINPEC

716,490

9.22

5Khmer National United Party

134,285

1.73

0

Party

21

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
Party

Votes

Share of Votes (%)

Seats in the
National Assembly

Cambodian Youth Party

97,412

1.25

0Dharmacracy Party

84,0301.08

0Cambodia Indigenous Peoples
Democracy Party

52,8170.68

0Khmer Anti-Poverty Party

40,0960.52

0Khmer United Party

36,5260.47

0Grassroots Democratic Party

35,4160.46

0Khmer Economic Development Party

26,0930.34

0Ekpheap Cheat Khmer Party

25,261

0.32

0Cambodian Nationality Party

23,1970.30

0Women for Women Party

22,8430.29

0Khmer Conservative Party

20,9680.27

0Beehive Social Democratic Party

20,2100.26

0People Purpose Party

13,8310.18

0Democracy Power Party

13,7040.18

0Farmer's Party

12,7860.16

0The concerns about the quality of elections in Cambodia have been prominently voiced, with evidence
suggesting that the 2023 elections are perceived as the least free and fair, prompting scepticism
among many Cambodians about the significance of participating in elections of such low quality.
In Cambodia, the term "ampil ampik" in the Khmer language refers to smaller political parties thatemerge shortly before an election and then quickly fade although this is not the case with the
FUNCINPEC, which was established in 1981. These parties are frequently introduced as part of astrategy to preserve the illusion of electoral competition, thereby creating a facade of a multi-party
democracy. However, behind this facade lies a political landscape overwhelmingly dominated by one
party, leaving minimal space for opposition parties to effectively compete (Wallace, 2018).
In a news report published the day before voting day (Kelliher, 2023b), a 45-year-old street food vendor
questioned the value of voting when there is only one party, likening it to a pointless endeavour without
genuine competition. Such sentiments were also shared by a 23-year-old working for a nongovernmental organisation, who expressed that he sees no point in travelling back to his hometown tovote as he already anticipates the predetermined outcome.
Some respondents conveyed feelings of apathy towards the election. However, they also noted thatpressure from relatives and local authorities in their villages played a significant role in their decision tovote. One of them explained the following:
22

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023

My mother called me several times, urging me to travel 200 km from the city to ourvillage to vote. Additionally, the village chief's assistant visited our home, asking
whether my brother, sister and I would come to vote. In our village, there were people
observing who would vote, including members of political parties, and they could tell

Even some supporters of the ruling party acknowledged that the electoral process has become an
empty formality, raising concerns about Cambodia's international image and the country's
governance. A 35-year-old member of a ministry acknowledged the importance of having an
opposition party in a democratic country but admitted that such discussions were not taking place
within his ministry. Despite recognising the role of the opposition as a check on the government, herevealed that his decision to vote on election day was influenced by the ministry's directives,
highlighting potential challenges to the genuine democratic process in Cambodia (ibid).

Post-electoral LandscapeTwo elements characterise the aftermath of elections in 2024: the continuous harassment against
political opposition even after elections and the quasi-silence of the international community in theface of weakening electoral integrity.
One respondent (KII4) explained that although instances of physical violence have decreased over theyears as evidenced previously in this report some cases of such violence still occur. However,
nowadays, examples of intolerance towards opposition forces occur systematically not only leading
up to election day. He elaborated on this by stating that
not as effective anymore. People started to experience judicial harassment andimprisonment instead. Many individuals no longer fear going to prison because they
may only stay there for two to four years before being released. Now, the strategy has
shifted towards defamation and financial ruin. This new approach has a broader
impact, affecting not just the individual but also their family, including children andgrandchildren. Consequently, it is perceived as more effective than physical

For instance, in February 2024, lawyers representing Cambodia's ruling party initiated legal action by
filing a lawsuit against a prominent human rights activist, accusing him of defamation and demanding$500,000 in damages. The lawsuit alleged that the activist tarnished the reputation of the ruling party
during an interview, asserting that the CPP has wielded its influence over the courts to exert pressure
on its political adversaries (The Diplomat, 2024).
The second notable point is the limited action of the international community in condemning theerosion of electoral integrity. Following the CPP's declaration of a "landslide" victory in the elections,international reactions were divided. Some simply emphasised the weak electoral integrity with written
statements, while others endorsed the CPP's victory.
Most Western democratic countries, such as Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom,
issued statements expressing regret at Cambodia's lack of electoral integrity, namely thedisqualification of the Candlelight Party and the pressure on civil society and independent media
23

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
(Vicheika, 2023). The EU and France went slightly further to call for the release of opposition members
under detention (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2023; EU, 2023).
The EU delegation to Cambodia also issued a press release the day after the election expressing similar
where the opposition, civil society and the media were unable to function effectively without
ibid.).

environment, which left Cambodian voters with little space to express dissent and without a genuine
Kem Sokha had severely hindered free and fair elections (Federal Foreign Office, 2023).
On the voting day, the US Embassy in Cambodia issued a press statement expressing its concern about
the poor standards of the elections.
The United States is troubled that the July 23 Cambodian national elections wereneither free nor fair. Ahead of the elections, Cambodian authorities engaged in apattern of threats and harassment against the political opposition, media, and civilsocietyinternational obligations. These actions denied the Cambodian people a voice and achoice in determining the future of their country (Department of State, 2023).
The United States declared that the election was not free nor fair, imposing visa bans on individuals
believed to undermine democracy and paused US$ 18 million assistance programs (The Daily Star,2023). However, two months later in September 2023, the foreign aid cut was reversed, raising doubts
Meyn and Noy, 2023).
On the other hand, Cambodia received congratulations from various ASEAN leaders following theelectoral victory. General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), Nguyen Phu Trong,extended his congratulations to Hun Sen for the success of the CPP in the 7th National AssemblyElection. Additionally, President Thongloun Sisoulith of Laos expressed his delight and offered sincere
congratulations and best wishes to Hun Sen in a letter sent a few days after the elections. Furthermore,
Wan Muhammad-Noor Matha, Speaker of the Thai National Assembly, congratulated the CPP on its
landslide victory in the National Election, as reported on the party's website (Koemsoeun, 2023).
Beyond ASEAN, China and Russia downplayed the lack of electoral integrity, emphasising economic
development and strengthening bilateral cooperation. China congratulated the CPP and Prime
Khmer Times,
2023b). It also expressed a willingness to strengthen bilateral relations and cooperation. Similarly,
Russia congratulated Cambodia on the successful administration of the general election and reiterated
its intention to tighten the relationship and cooperation between the two countries (Khmer Times,
2023c).
Informants explained that many Western countries want to maintain engagement with Cambodia,
despite concerns about weak electoral integrity, driven primarily by self-interest, so that they wouldn't
lose influence in the country and region (KII4), particularly regarding investments and foreign policy,
even at the expense of promoting good governance. Noticed from Prime Minister Hun Manet's early24Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023
foreign trips and meetings with international delegates, some such as the EU, France, and Japan
expressed a desire to re-engage with Cambodia, hoping for a new direction away from the authoritarianrule of his predecessor. Cambodia's chairmanship of ASEAN last year and its participation in the EUASEAN summit in Brussels improved relations with the West. While Brussels is unlikely to revoke tradeprivileges further, it remains cautious, awaiting signs of closer ties with the West under new leadership.
Cambodia is also undergoing a significant generational shift in its political landscape, with theretirement of the 1980s political generation making way for a new cohort. Whether these changes willlead to meaningful political shifts remains uncertain (Deutsche Welle, 2023). A worker for an INGO
explained how Cambodia carefully embraces the agendas of Western nations:Western countries. Initially, there was scepticism, especially considering a decline
during the transition period. However, recent events have altered perceptions
significantly. A recent visit to Europe garnered substantial praise from leaders like
Macron and other European counterparts, as well as from the U.S. government. As aresult, there's a tendency to view Cambodia's leader as already assuming a leadershiprole, largely due to his support for various agendas. Notably, he has backed Ukraine
and condemned Russia in the Ukraine-Russia conflict, as well as supported initiatives
like COP28 and all COP meetings. Cambodia is increasingly seen as a forwardthinking and supportive partner aligning with Western and EU agendas. The
country's commitment to humanitarian causes and its proactive stance on global
crises are seen as unwavering, earning widespread endorsement (KII1).
Similarly, a representative from the media sector explained that

responding to demands from civil society and pro-Candlelight Party activists. What
the activists want is a clear stance from those diplomats regarding the election andthe formation of a new government [...]. However, from the diplomats' perspective,
they want to maintain a position that allows them to continue their engagement with

These interactions might explain their silence or lack of action regarding the lack of electoral integrityin the 2023 general election. Investment and development assistance were the main discussion points
throughout these foreign meetings, while democracy and human rights became less important (Raksa,
2024). France and Japan, for example, pledged new trenches of foreign aid valuing US$ 217 million
and US$ 30 million, respectively, while democracy promotion or respect for human rights was notpressed forward by the two countries (Chheng, 2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023).
Additionally, some informants underscored the observed trend of international actors maintaining
quasi-silence on sensitive matters such as electoral integrity. This strategic approach may stem from adesire to avoid antagonising the Cambodian government, potentially leading to a shift in alignment
towards China, which already holds significant sway as Cambodia's foremost ally (KII2, 3, 4). The
reluctance to address contentious issues could be interpreted as a calculated move aimed atpreserving diplomatic relationships and safeguarding economic interests. By refraining from openly
seeking to keep the government accountable, these international actors may seek to maintain adelicate balance, prioritising stability and economic cooperation over the promotion of democratic
principles. However, this cautious stance raises questions about the long-term implications forgovernance and human rights in Cambodia, as well as the broader geopolitical dynamics in the region.

25

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023

Women in Politics in Cambodia
Women are increasingly having a less relevant role in the politics of Cambodia. Data show that the
number of women has remained low since the first legislature and in decline since the early 2000s.
Women Representatives in the National Assembly (NA) in Cambodia (1993

2023)

Year

Number of NA Seats

Number of NA Seats
held by Women% of NA Seats
held by Women

1993

83

6
(NAC,1993; ADB, 2004)

7%

1998

120

12
(NAC,1998)10%(+3 percentage points)

2003

123

15
(ADB, 2004)12%(+2 percentage points)

2008

123

26
(Comfrel, 2009)21%(+9 percentage points)

2013

123

25
(NAC,2013; Comfrel, 2015)20%(-1 percentage point)

2018

125

25
(Comfrel, 2018)20%(no change)

2023

125

16
(Khmer Times, 2023; NAC, 2023)

13%(-7 percentage point)

Further to that, data also shows that a large majority of these women are from the CPP and, since 2018,
no women representatives from other parties have had seats in the National Assembly.
Political Parties of Women Representatives in the National Assembly in Cambodia (1993

26

Year

Political Party

Number of NA Seats
held by Women

1993

CPP
FUNCINPEC

3
3

1998

CPP
FUNCINPEC
SRP

8
3
1

2003

CPP
FUNCINPEC
SRP

8
4
3

2008

CPP
SRP

20
5

2013

CPP
CNRP

18
7

2018

CPP

25

2023

CPP

16

2023)

Electoral Integrity Issues from 1993 to 2023

3c. Shift in Electoral Integrity Issues
As highlighted in Chapter 1, Cambodia has consistently grappled with weak electoral integrity
throughout its electoral cycles since the 1993 elections. The most recent general election in 2023
followed this pattern, displaying significant issues that undermined the fairness of the electoral
process. However, an examination of electoral cycles spanning from 1993 onwards reveals a notableevolution in the nature of electoral integrity challenges in Cambodia. This shift can be delineatedthrough five key points.
First, there has been a decrease in instances of electoral harassment and violence against members of
opposition parties over time. However, it is crucial to note that such cases still happen, as evidenced
by incidents during the 2023 elections. So while there has been improvement, the issue has not been
resolved and is still threatening to weaken electoral integrity.
Second, the management of content within independent media outlets has undergone a notabletransformation, transitioning from periods of heightened control typically observed during elections toa more consequential outcome: eventual shutdowns. This shift signifies a departure from mere
temporary exertions of influence during electoral cycles to a systemic trend wherein independent
media entities face prolonged challenges culminating in the cessation of operations.
Third, there has been an observable increase in the utilisation of legal and administrative frameworks
aimed at impeding the ability of opposition parties to effectively participate in free and fair electoral
processes. This trend can be observed in a seri
way that creates substantial obstacles for opposition entities, thereby diminishing their capacity tocompete on an equitable footing within the democratic framework.
Fourth, there has been a discernible escalation in endeavours aimed at undermining opposition forces,
transitioning from actions primarily concentrated in the pre-election period to a sustained andenduring threat. This evolution underscores a strategic shift towards perpetuating a continuous stateof vulnerability for opposition entities, reflecting a systemic approach to neutralising their influenceand efficacy within the political landscape and, most crucially, in elections.
Fifth, there has been a noteworthy reticence within the international community regarding the issue ofcompromised electoral integrity, ostensibly driven by a desire to avoid pushing the Cambodian
government and potentially steering it closer to aligning with China. This quasi-silence underscores a
diplomatic balancing act, whereby concerns over electoral fairness are muted to mitigate diplomatic
tensions and maintain geopolitical stability in the region.

27

Recommendations

4. Recommendations
The Paris Peace Agreements of 1991 marked a significant milestone in Cambodia's political journey,transitioning from decades of non-democratic rule. Central to this new era were free and fair elections,
essential for democratisation. However, despite initial strides, the quality of elections has remained
weak since 1993, exacerbated in the 2023 elections. In response, this report offers policy
recommendations for both international and local stakeholders to enhance the periodicity and fairnessof elections.
The United Nations should●

Sustain the oversight of electoral integrity by leveraging the documentation submitted during
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycles and incorporating insights from the Special
Rapporteur's (SR) efforts.

●

Increase its advocacy efforts for member states to adopt the recommendations put forth insubmissions to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and those suggested by the Special
Rapporteur. Specifically, the UN should focus on ensuring that electoral laws in Cambodia
adhere to international standards and are effectively implemented.

●

Establish new budget lines for the creation and implementation of electoral monitoring
programmes, thus contributing to building capacity among civil society organisations to report
on electoral irregularities.

The International Community should●

Strengthen its cooperation with local CSOs in Cambodia to collect input on electoral integrity
violations and report them using international human rights mechanisms, particularly those of
the UN like the UPR and SR.

●

International government organisations and foreign countries should continue sending
electoral observers to monitor and report on any practices that may jeopardise electoral
integrity. Countries that have ceased sending observers should reconsider this decision,
ensuring a consistent and vigilant oversight of electoral processes.

●

Foreign governments should cooperate with local electoral organisations.

The Royal Government of Cambodia should●

Seek assistance from the UN and the broader international community to implement therecommendations from UPR submissions and reports from the SR.

●

Identify innovative strategies to bridge the gap between the practical implementation ofelectoral laws and the standards established by the international community that can foster anenvironment conducive to improvements in electoral integrity.

●

Amend vaguely worded electoral laws to reduce susceptibility to various interpretations,
thereby strengthening electoral integrity.

28

Recommendations
Civil Society Organisations should●

Keep monitoring and documenting instances of electoral irregularities and report them using
UN human rights mechanisms.

●

Create public awareness of issues related to electoral integrity by engaging more directly withdifferent communities and creating educational programmes to deliver political literacy to thepeople.

Technology companies should●

Conduct a comprehensive review of community standards to prioritise the amplification of civilsociety voices that call out lapsus in public policies, while refusing to block or remove accounts
of individuals and organisations that call for government accountability.

●

Consistently publicise comprehensive transparency reports that detail government requests
for content removal and blocking access, as well as instances of state-supported information
operations, ensuring continued openness and accountability.

29

Conclusion

5. Conclusion
Cambodia has grappled with electoral integrity issues since its first democratic elections in 1993.
These challenges have impeded the optimal development of the democratic system established withthe assistance of the UN in 1991 through the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements. In the latest
electoral cycle for forming a new government in July 2023, instances of violations of electoral integrityin the lead-up to the voting day and the aftermath of elections were also reported. These challenges
underscore the persistent nature of such issues and suggest a worsening trend that will persist, leading
to further consolidation of a one-party state unless the international and local community takes
immediate action.
As Cambodia approaches the one-year mark since the CPP's victory in the July 2023 general election,
the country's longstanding issue of weak electoral integrity continues to aid the ruling party insolidifying its political control. This trend comes at the expense of fair and open elections that would
allow opposition parties a genuine chance to compete. Following the 2023 elections, two significant
events have unfolded, both directly linked to the deteriorating electoral integrity.
Firstly, there has been a notable rise in dynastic politics, exemplified by the seamless transfer of powerfrom former Prime Minister Hun Sen to his son, Hun Manet, in August 2023. The dynamics of thispolitical succession warrant examination from two perspectives. On one hand, the decline in electoral
integrity, partly attributed to a weakened opposition, has facilitated the CPP's ability to establish apolitical dynasty centred around the Hun family. On the other hand, Hun Sen and his allies within theparty have adeptly managed potential internal conflicts by allowing senior government officials to passon their positions to their offspring. This strategy ensures party stability but also contributes to theconsolidation of dynastic politics, not only within the Hun family but also among other senior officials.
Secondly, on 25 February 2023, the CPP solidified its dominance with yet another overwhelming
electoral triumph, this time in the Senate, just seven months after the general election. Securing 55 outof the 58 contested seats, the CPP's victory in the Senate is pivotal for Cambodia's political landscape.
The Senate, comprised of 62 members, sees two appointments by King Norodom Sihamoni and twoby the National Assembly, serving as the lower house of Parliament.
This victory further strengthens the CPP's grip on power and the consolidation of a one-party state. The
outcome of the Senate election sets the stage for Hun Sen, the CPP's president, to assume thepresidency of the upper house. This move grants him an official governmental position after stepping
down in August 2023 to pave the way for his son's ascension to Cambodia's premiership. While the
Senate primarily carries out ceremonial functions, such as ratifying measures passed by the National
Assembly, its President plays a crucial role, especially in the absence of the king, effectively acting as
the head of state.
In essence, one year after the latest general election, weak electoral integrity keeps strengthening therole of the ruling party CPP in the National Assembly and the Senate. The months that followed theelections of 2023 have also shown the need for the international community to take proactive steps inaddressing the weakened state of electoral integrity rather than remaining primarily passive. This
necessitates adopting a multi-stakeholder approach to steer away from the current trajectory ofdeterioration. Such an approach can be the starting point offers of a viable pathway for progress,
transitioning the situation from a downward spiral to a path of improvement.

30

Conclusion

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Conclusion
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35

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Diplomat, at: https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/cambodias-main-opposition-party-barred-from-julyelection/

Diplomat, at: https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/cambodias-former-pm-sues-rights-activist-fordefamation/

at: https://www.idea.int/news/gender-equality-driver-and-objective-electoral-integrity.

https://eos.cartercenter.org/parts/8
36

Conclusion
https://www.thedailystar.net/business/global-economy/south-east-asia/news/us-slap-cambodia-visarestrictions-aid-cuts-3377601

at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Hun-Sen-s-Cambodia/Cambodian-PM-Hun-Sen-deletesFacebook-page-after-criticism
https://www.ohchr.org/en/humanrights/universal-declaration/translations/english

https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/libdocs/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session6/KH/A_HRC_13_4_KHM_E.pdf

https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g14/127/27/pdf/g1412727.pdf?token=aOzRfpkYa7XB86G
XOh&fe=true

https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/098/90/pdf/g1909890.pdf?token=EbzRXH5GR30R21
JDRF&fe=true

Department of State, at: https://19972001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/cambodia.html

https://kh.usembassy.gov/pressstatement-by-department-spokesperson-matthew-miller-on-national-elections-in-cambodia/

at: https://www.voanews.com/a/china-welcomes-cambodia-s-election-results-amid-western-rebukes/7201714.html

York Times, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/world/asia/cambodia-election-hun-sen.html

37

Conclusion

ANNEX
List of KII Respondents
Code

38

Background

KII1

Independent consultant and policy advisor

KII2

Journalist

KII3

Human right lawyer

KII4

Politician

KII5

Leader of a local NGO