The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific:
Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia*
Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins**
Abstract
The governments of Japan and the United States have firmly adopted the notion of a “Freeand Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) at the heart of their regional foreign policies. The FOIP
initiative has now energized other regional allies and partners of these two leading states
as they search for ways to respond to and contribute to the FOIP. As self-styled “middle
powers,” Canada and Australia have been no exception. This article explores the potential
roles to be played by Ottawa and Canberra, both individually, and in tandem, with regards tomatters such as respect for national sovereignty, peaceful conflict resolution, free and open
trading practices, and the maintenance of international laws and norms. The article reveals
that while both Canada and Australia both effectively support the FOIP, Canberra has been
more proactive in turning its rhetoric into actions by means of a dedicated “Step Up” policyin the crucial South Pacific sub-region, as well as noteworthy efforts to enhance its own
capabilities in line with American alliance expectations. It concludes that Washingtonʼs needfor capable and willing allies will grow further, and that both countries are well-positioned
to contribute further to the FOIP in multifarious ways, both as allies, and potentially as in abilateral capacity, should the opportunity arise.

The Indo-Pacific, as a geographic concept that connects the vast oceans of the Pacificand the Indian along with the states in between, is not a new idea. Indeed, the idea ofa broader geographic region―rather than more traditional subsets such as East Asia,
South Asia, or the more expansive Asia-Pacific―has been used for more than a decadeby scholars and practitioners in the region. An Indian naval captain began using the concept ingeopolitical terms more than a decade ago, but the terminology has not been limited to scholars
in Delhi. Japanʼs Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, back during his first stint as Prime Minister in 2007,
spoke to Indiaʼs parliament about his countryʼs vision for the Indo-Pacific noting a “confluenceof the two seas”1 and pressed for a need to transcend beyond traditional frameworks that often
separated or minimized the geopolitical connections between South Asian and the Indian Ocean*

This article is based off a range of discussions, meetings and presentations that the authors had
during an academic outreach trip to California in May 2019. The authors engaged with a number ofscholars, officials and policy makers on the Indo-Pacific and the role of middle powers, such as Canada
and Australia. Some of these stakeholders included: the RAND Corporation, the Milken Institute, theKorean Consulate in Los Angeles, the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles, the Middlebury Institute ofInternational Studies at Monterey, the Japan Society of Northern California and Stanford University.

** Jonathan Berkshire Miller is a Tokyo-based Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs
and a Distinguished Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada.
Thomas S. Wilkins is a Senior Fellow at the Japan at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and a
Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of Sydney, Australia.
1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Confluence of the Two Seas: Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe,
Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,” August 2007.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html

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Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins

region with that of East Asia and the Pacific.
But, while not new, the Indo-Pacific framing has been quickly gaining currency by actors
in the region, with Japan and the United States declaring Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)
strategies or visions, in addition to other regional approaches by India, Australia and Indonesia.
According to Washington, in a recent Report released by the Department of Defense (DOD),
the FOIP is based upon the principles of (i) respect for sovereign independence, (ii) peacefulresolution of disputes, (iii) free, fair and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent
agreements, and connectivity, and (iv) adherence to international rules and norms, (including
those of freedom of navigation and overflight).2
The United States emphasized the importance of this change by renaming its former US
Pacific Command―military headquarters for the region based in Hawaii―to the US Indo-PacificCommand last year.3 The concept has also sparked interest of like-minded states in Europe―
both France and the United Kingdom demonstrating a keen interest in promoting their own
engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Earlier this year, the French aircraft carrier―the Charles deGaulle―set course for its journey from the Mediterranean Sea to Singapore, traversing throughthe Indian Ocean region and working with regional partners on its way. The British have also
made similar deployments in recent years. Last year, the Royal Navy dispatched three ships thattraversed the South China Sea alongside a contingent from Franceʼs navy. During the trip, theUK vessels conducted a freedom of navigation patrol in the waters near the Paracel Islands in thedisputed South China Sea.4
To be sure, the Indo-Pacific is facing a host of shared security challenges, from maritime
piracy and crime, to heated territorial disputes and a pressing need to enhance regional capacity
and readiness for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to mitigate the impact of natural
disasters. In the vast maritime space of the region―stretching from East Africa to the Pacificisland chains―the foundations of regional commerce and security are secured through thefreedom of navigation and secure Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS). These areas are crucial
for all states in the region―including middle powers such as Canada and Australia ―as they
are both deeply invested in secure supply chains through its economic integration with theComprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
There is great economic opportunity in the region for both Canada and Australia with large
economies and diverse fast-paced growth in many middle-size economies. That said, alongside
this economic growth is a large demand for infrastructure development in the region―with the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimating that there is a need for more than $25 trillion in
infrastructure by 2030.5 To fill this void, several regional powers have the ability to work withstates in the region for a sustainable way forward based on fair-lending, transparent institutions
and long-term growth. This is an area that middle powers, such as Canada and Australia, canjoin other states―such as the US, Japan, and states from Europe―to push forward on and makeunique contributions.
2

US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a
Networked Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 4. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/
DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF

3

US Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Holds Change of Command Ceremony,” May2018. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1535776/us-indo-pacificcommand-holds-change-of-command-ceremony/4

Tim Kelly, “British Navy warship sails near South China Sea islands, angering Beijing,” Reuters,
September 6, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/ar ticle/us-britain-china-southchinasea-exclusive/
exclusive-british-navy-warship-sails-near-south-china-sea-islands-angering-beijing-idUSKCN1LM017

5

Asian Development Bank, “Meeting Asiaʼs Infrastructure Needs,” February 2017. https://www.adb.
org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs

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The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

Yet, alongside these economic opportunities are a number of key challenges to the rules andorder in the region that have underpinned security and prosperity for the littoral states. China
continues to favour coercive actions rather than adherence to international law with regard to its
salami-slicing tactics in the South China and East China Seas.6 These concerns in the maritime
realm are not limited to the East and South China Seas. In the Indian Ocean region, there has
been a build-up of Chinese infrastructure development in critical areas such as deep ports in Sri
Lanka and Pakistan. These moves continue to draw anxiety from states in the region, who arewary of Chinaʼs long-term geopolitical motivations through its signature Belt and Road Initiative(BRI).

Canada’s Approach to the Free and Open Indo-PacificCanada has shown an interest in being more engaged in the Indo-Pacific region. During the visitof Japanʼs Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Ottawa in late April, Canadian Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau noted a “shared vision for maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region based on therule of law.”7 The statement was Canadaʼs first high-level endorsement of the importance of IndoPacific strategies, of which many key regional players like the US, Japan, Australia, India andIndonesia have already adopted. But, while the visit with Japan was the first upfront embraceof the Indo-Pacific concept, Ottawa has in fact already outlined its shared views on the region
through its joint statement with India last year―where the two sides agreed to “reaffirm theimportance of lawful commerce and the freedom of navigation and over-flight throughout the
Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with international law.”8
Despite this, however, Canada has been hesitant to embrace the FOIP concept. The traditionallens for Ottawa to look at engagement has been through the Asia-Pacific framing―defining theregion largely through our experience in the multilateral architecture such as the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the trade side, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Regional Forum on the political-security side. Canada was a founding member of APEC
in 1990 and has been a dialogue partner in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its formationin 1994. Aside from these two main vehicles, Canada has been active in the international
development space over the years through and is a member of the Asian Development Bank,and more recently joined―while not before considerable internal debate―the Chinese-led AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2017.9
This multilateral underpinning is of course complemented by a range of diverse bilateralrelations in the region, with different opportunities and challenges. China and Japan― thesecond and third largest economies―are the two most critical relationships in terms of tradevalue, but there are growing relationships with a host of other partners in the region too ―including South Korea (with which Canada inked a Free Trade Agreement in 2014), Taiwan,
6

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters
Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japanʼs Response - Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government
and Other Vessels into Japanʼs Ter ritorial Sea,” June 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
page23e_000021.html

7

Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister of Canada Announces Closer Cooperation with Japan,” April
2019. https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2019/04/28/prime-minister-canada-announces-closer-collaborationjapan

8

Prime Minister of Canada, “India-Canada Joint Statement: Partnership for Security and Growth,”
Februar y 2018. https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/02/23/india-canada-joint-statement-partnershipsecurity-and-growth9

Philip Calvert, “Canadaʼs Move to Join the AIIB is Smart Politics and Economics,” Nikkei Asian Review,
September to 2016. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Philip-Calvert-Canada-s-move-to-join-the-AIIB-issmart-politics-and-economics

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India and the individual member states of ASEAN. Underscoring these growing relationships―
at least in economic terms―is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-PacificPartnership, a mega-regional free trade pact that Canada ratified, along with 10 other states in theregion, last year.10
But yet, despite a long history of engagement, the consistency of Canadaʼs role often appears
unmoored and not fully aligned with our interests and stakes in the significant geopolitical shifts
taking place in the region. A frequent critique from stakeholders and officials in the region isthat Canada must make a more consistent and comprehensive approach that demonstrates aninvestment of time and capital that goes beyond merely trade and investment. Specifically, there
is a need and desire―at least from most states―for a strong Canadian voice on political-security
developments in the region, be it on maritime security, nuclear non-proliferation or humanitarianassistance and disaster relief (HADR). This is where the tenets, rules and values that form
the basis of the emerging growth of Indo-Pacific frameworks will help Canada better serve its
interests and promote its role.

The role for Canada in the Indo-Pacific

In June 2019, Canada ʼ s Defense Minister Harjit Sajjan visited the Shangri-La Dialogue in
Singapore for the fourth consecutive year. The Dialogue, hosted under the stewardship of theInternational Institute of Strategic Studies in the UK, is the premier security and defense summit
in Asia and has become a “must-attend” event for officials, policy makers and scholars focusedon the regionʼs wide range of emerging security issues―of which strategic competition between
the United States and China is top of mind in recent years. Immediately following the Shangri-La
Dialogue, Sajjan visited Japan for an important bilateral visit which was hosted by Japanʼs Defense
Minister Takeshi Iwaya. During Sajjanʼs visit, Canada and Japan agreed to work cooperatively toadvance a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”11 Indeed, when thinking about Canadaʼs engagement in
the region, our relations with Japan must be first of mind.
As Canadaʼs looks to reorient its defense posture to be more active in the Indo-Pacific, Japan
should be the logical cornerstone of such efforts. During the visit of Sajjan to Tokyo in June,
Canada and Japan underscored the importance of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement(ACSA) signed last year. This agreement will strengthen cooperation between the CanadianArmed Forces (CAF) and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and will allow both countries to makeefficient use of each otherʼs military equipment during operations and exercises in Canada, Japanand other locations. The agreement will also advance cooperation between the two countries
in response to humanitarian and disaster crises, peacekeeping initiatives, and allow greatercollaboration with third-partners, including the US.12
In addition to the ACSA agreement, both sides are moving towards greater interoperability
between their militaries with a growth in joint exercises and high-level exchanges. In 2017, thetwo sides commenced bilateral naval drills dubbed “Kaedex” (“kaede” meaning maple leaf inJapanese) and the Canadian navy also participated as a trilateral participant last year in the US10

Global Affairs Canada, “CPTPP Explainer,” June 2019. https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.aspx?lang=eng

11

Department of National Defence of Canada, “Joint Statement of the Ministry of Defense of Japan andthe Department of National Defence of Canada on Defense Cooperation,” June 2019. https://www.
canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2019/06/joint-statement-of-the-ministry-of-defenseof-japan-and-the-department-of-national-defence-of-canada-on-defense-cooperation.html

12

Global Af fairs Canada, “Canada and Japan sign Acquisition and Cross-Ser vicing Agreement tostrengthen military cooperation,” April 2018. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/04/
canada-and-japan-sign-acquisition-and-cross-ser vicing-agreement-to-strengthen-militar y-cooperation.
html

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The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

Japan “Keen Sword” naval exercises. Canada has also been working with Japan, and other allies
in the Five Eyes intelligence network, to help monitor and disrupt attempts by North Korea toevade sanctions over its nuclear and missiles programs―through surveillance of ship-to-shiptransfers in the East China Sea.13 Moreover, in 2018 Canadian General Wayne Eyre was appointed
as Deputy Commander of the UN Command on the Korean Peninsula―marking the first time a
non-US general assumed the role.
But there are more steps to go in this nascent security relationship. This past April, during thevisit of Japanʼs Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Ottawa, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made thefirst high-level Canadian endorsement of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”―a vision that is sharedby other like-minded states, such as the US, Australia and Japan. This vision fundamentallyrests on the maintenance of a rules-based international order premised on common norms,
laws and practices, with an aim at reducing the potential for conflict and promoting sustainable
development. This of course draws a stark contrast to Chinaʼs increasingly hostile posture in theregion, marked by its militarization of man-made islands in the South China Sea and its unfair
and non-transparent lending practices through its Belt and Road Initiative. Not to mention its
coercive attempts―through the arbitrary detention of two of our citizens and sealing off much of
the market for our exporters of canola and soybeans―to force Canada to relent on the sensitive
extradition case of Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou. Going forward Canada should
continue to enhance our ties with Japan―a natural partner in the region―and other key middle
powers such as Australia, states in ASEAN and South Korea, to work closely and pursue ourinterests in the Indo-Pacific.
How can Canada become more involved in the emerging Indo-Pacific framework? First,
Canada must assertively and unapologetically promote its interests and values in the region―
most of which align closely to its key partners there such as the US, Japan, Australia, and member
states in ASEAN. For example, if one closely inspects the FOIP policies by Washington andTokyo, they will find more convergence than divergence with regard to Canadian interests. The
US strategy stresses the need to “promote transparency, openness, rule of law, and the protectionof human rights and fundamental freedom.”14 Tokyo meanwhile stresses the importance ofpeace and stability in the region through common rules, open investment and the provisionof international public goods. Most would agree these are rules and norms the Canada also
subscribes too. A corollary to this is that greater engagement with the Indo-Pacific would help
us further national areas of excellence desperately need in the regionʼs approach to preventive
diplomacy, such as women, peace and security.
Second, Canada can manage both an ef fective and pragmatic relationship with China,
and simultaneously enhance its engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing may bewary of the framing of Indo-Pacific, because of its tense relations with Washington under the
Trump administration, but it would be incorrect to label the different national approaches as acontainment strategy aimed at China. Rather than alliance-politics, this is a loose grouping of likeminded and progressive states that are standing up for a prosperous and stable region that follows
rules and maintains a sustainable trajectory―not to benefit one, but for the region as a whole.
This is something Canada should stand up for, and it should not let its recent bilateral difficulties
with Beijing distract it from the larger strategic dynamics playing out in the region.
Finally, just as engaging China and the Indo-Pacific framework are not mutually exclusive, so
are the fundamentals of our existing engagements in the region. Ottawa will continue to be a key
13

Depar tment of National Defence, “Operation NEON,” June 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/
department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operationneon.html

14

US Department of State, “Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region,” November 2018. https://www.state.gov/advancing-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-region/

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part of APEC, the ARF, ADB and other multilateral fora―with ASEAN at the core―but it need
not pursue this road in isolation from cooperation that makes sense with regional partners andallies.

Australia’s Indo-Pacific Vision

The first thing to note with regard to Australiaʼs approach to the FOIP is the nomenclature
employed. Canberra has not officially adopted the moniker “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” likeits American and Japanese partners to badge its regional strategy, with the cognate term “open,
inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific” featuring instead in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.15
Some variations on the term naturally appear in surrounding discourses―“a free, open, inclusive
and prosperous Indo-Pacific” has been used in joint statements with the US and Japan―but thisslight distinction does not amount to any tangible difference from the core precepts of the FOIP
(described in the introduction).
So, what form does Canberraʼs participation in the FOIP take, in the context of a broader
Australian Indo-Pacific strategy (IPs)? There is no one specific policy document or declarationthat embodies Australiaʼs IPs, but rather it is represents a compound of individual and joint
policies and initiatives which sync with the FOIP concept. In this short briefing it is useful to
unpack its ideological, security and economic dimensions, all of which are intertwined.
Behind the Australian “vision” of an “Indo-Pacific Century,” destined to bring regional andnational prosperity, there are three premises.16 First among these is the “relocation” of Australiaʼsstrategic frame of reference to the newly identified “Indo-Pacific” region itself. The recent
Defence and Foreign Policy White papers codified a shift in the locus and scope of regional
interaction to the “Indo-Pacific” as geopolitical construct. Influential Australian figures had longadvocated for a refocusing on the Indo-Pacific, aside from the extant “Asia Pacific,” as recognition
not only of Indiaʼs rise to economic and strategic prominence, but as a better reflection of theactual region Australia itself inhabits at the intersection of these two great Oceans.17
Second is the oft-repeated government commitment to a “Rules-based International Order”(RBO) which the FOIP strongly advocates. This has long been an identifiable theme for a“middle power” country like Australia, which, based solely upon its own national capabilities,
cannot afford to engage in a no-holds barred struggle of power politics, but rather seeks a “liberalinternationalist” posture which emphasizes international norms and institutions, sovereignty,
rule-of-law, non-coercion and all-round “good international citizenship.”18 The RBO concept has
become an increasingly prolific mantra in Canberraʼs policy declarations as the best method
to achieve regional stability and prosperity. Not so implicit in the RBO concept is a resistanceto Chinese revisionist attempts to expand its strategic space and influence across the region
in ways viewed as detrimental to the existing order, as evidenced through the BRI, Shanghai
Cooperation organisation, and AIIB, for example. Instead, Australia alongside its close US andJapanese partners seeks to provide an alternative to a future regional order dominated by China
in contradiction with these liberal internationalist principles.
Third, participation in FOIP-related activities is grounded in Australiaʼs deep attachment to15

Australian Government, “Overview,” in 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Barton ACT: Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), pp. 1–10.

16

Cameron Hill, “Australia in the ʼIndo-Pacificʼ Century: Rewards, Risks, Relationships,” in Parliamentary
Library Briefing Book (Canberra ACT: Parliamentary Library, 2013), pp. 144–145.

17

Rory Medcalf, “In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australiaʼs New Strategic Map,” Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs, 68:4 (2014), pp. 470–483.

18

Allan Gyngell, Fear of Abandonment : Australia in the World since 1942 (Carlton, Vic.: La Trobe
University Press, 2017).

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American regional primacy. Australia―like Japan and many others―sees its bilateral security
alliance with the US anchored in the broader “hub-and-spokes” network, and its close Special
Strategic Partnership with Japan, as the best way to uphold or enforce the RBO and secure the
Indo-Pacific in accord with its national interests. In correspondence with the recently released
American Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which outlines replacement US grand strategy for the
Pivot, Canberra is seeking deeper partnerships with Japan, India, and key SEA states in a bid to
uphold the RBO semi-independently and collectively, alongside the central role expected of the
US.19

Security Considerations for Australia

The primary drivers behind Australiaʼs interest in the FOIP are security concerns. While broader“Non-Traditional Security” (NTS) issues remain prominent in Australian thinking, for example:
terrorism, irregular populations movements, climate change, or financial or humanitarian crises,
it is the newly arrived era of great power competition that most vexes strategic planners in
Canberra. Based upon its growing economic and strategic weight in the region, China has moved
from “biding its time and hiding its capabilities” to a newfound policy of “assertiveness” pushingout its strategic space and regional influence by a variety of means that have set alarm bells
ringing in Canberra as portents of a “new Cold War.”
Chinese militarisation of the contested South China Sea (in violation of international law andprior agreements with the US), the use of economic coercion against Canada, Japan and South
Korea, among others, and its attempts to establish a regional foothold in Australiaʼs “patch” of
the South Pacific have shifted perceptions in Canberra. But in addition to these demonstrationsof Chinese “sharp power,” nothing so upset the political equilibrium in Canberra as much as
the recent revelation of the extent of Chinese espionage and “influence operations” discovered
inside Australia itself.20 On this basis, Australia has tightened its security measures and readily
complied with US wishes to ban the Chinese state-owned telecom giant Huawei from providing its
5G network, drawing economic retaliation―an interruption in coal imports―from Beijing.
Indeed, the Chinese challenge is seen across the Indo-Pacific region, and which the FOIP
concept seeks to address. It includes the use of economic statecraft to achieve strategic gains aswell as “hybrid” techniques to challenge the strategic situation on the ground―or more appositely―on the sea. By seeking to exploit “gray zone areas” in the maritime space, for example theuse of fishing fleets and maritime militias to harass competitor states in disputed territories in
the South China and East China Seas, Beijing is seeking to break out of the confines of its socalled series of “island chains” and ultimately extend a degree of control over key maritime
trade arteries. The security of these SLOCS, and the rights of free navigation and overflightin international waters are increasingly challenged by naval and air intrusions, and patrols
attempting to assert Chinese sovereignty. The controversial Freedom of Navigation Operations(FONOPS) conducted by the US Navy consistently meet harassment from Chinese forces. This
strikes at the heart of the FOIP and RBO concepts that Australia seeks to defend and exemplify
Chinese attempts to revise the regional order to its preference. Australia has sought to augment
its regional naval presence through Indo-Pacific Endeavour―a task force engaging in a series ofengagement activities and military training exercises during port visits―in addition to low profile
maritime patrol and surveillance activities Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca and South China Sea
under Operation Gateway.
19

US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a
Networked Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 4. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/
DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF

20John Garnaut, “Australiaʼs China Reset,” The Monthly, August 2018.

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Australia is also backing the FOIP with hard power through a sustained program to improveits defence capabilities with a projected defence budget increase of 2% of GDP, (currently AUD$36.4bill. for 2018).21 It is seeking to augment existing capabilities, which are being ever-more
attuned to combined operations with the US (and potentially Japan) and acquiring new ones.
Chief among these is the future submarine project which will double the its flotilla by 2030,
giving it some of the most potent undersea naval capabilities. In addition, it seeks to increase its
reconnaissance capabilities to enforce Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the vast Oceanic
spaces to the north of the Australian continent through acquisition of US hardware such as the
8A Poseidon maritime surveillance/response aircraft and MQ-4C Triton UAV.
Australia is also upgrading its 70-year-old defence alliance with the US.22 Under the US
Force Posture Initiatives in Northern Australia, agreement has been made as early as 2016 tostation a US Marine Task Force in Darwin, while defence, intelligence and military ties haveall been strengthened. The 2018 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN)
consultations listed a prolific range of areas for cooperation including upholding the rules-based
international order (through the FOIP), coordination against foreign domestic interference,
regional maritime capacity-building, economic and infrastructure support, space, cyber andenergy security issues, missile defence, counter terrorism, and a stronger role for the Trilateral
Strategic Dialogue (TSD) with Japan.23
Plans have also been unveiled to establish a joint naval base with the US at Lombrum on
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (PNG).24 As the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper affirms―
25“Our alliance with the United States is central to Australiaʼs approach to the Indo-Pacific.” Andadditionally, Australia has sought to keep advancing its security relations with Japan throughits decade-old Strategic Partnership with Tokyo, another advocate of FOIP and the RBO.26 This
process is unified with the US through means of the reinvigorated Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
process just mentioned.
Furthermore, Australia is seeking to extend this into a Quadrilateral process―the “Quad”―
with New Delhi in order to gain Indiaʼs adherence to the overall FOIP vision as part of its Indocentric strategy. However, much confusion reigns as to the exact relationship between the Quadand the FOIP that has hindered the understanding of both (as I have illustrated elsewhere), but
in particular it seems that Quad members are divided over their interpretation of how “inclusive”
the latter is to be presented.27 Whilst, all parties have stressed that FOIP is open to all that abide
by its principles, in reality it is a values-loaded concept―perhaps with the intent of “socialising”
China (in echoes of the earlier “responsible stakeholder” notion). Indeed, since the Quadpartners are all democratic states, and the FOIP itself inherently represents an alternative to the21

Australian Government, Depar tment of Defence, “A Safer Australia - Budget 2018–19 Defence
Overview,” May 8, 2018. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au [Accessed March 3, 2019]22

Thomas Wilkins, “Re-assessing Australiaʼs Intra-Alliance Bargaining Power in the Age of Trump,”
Security Challenges [Forthcoming].

23

Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “2018 Australia-U.S. Ministerial
Consultations (AUSMIN),” July 24, 2018. https://dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/2018-ausmin.aspx[Accessed March 1, 2019]24

Joanne Wallis, “Australia Steps Up Its Pacific Pivot,” East Asia Forum, October 20, 2018. http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2018/10/20/australia-steps-up-its-pacific-pivot

25

Australian Government, “Overview,” in 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Barton ACT: Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), 4.

26

Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and Japan Facing ʼDisruptiveʼ Challenges to the Rules Based Order in the
Indo-Pacific,” Policy Brief, September 26, 2018.

27

Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and the ʼIndo Pacificʼ Concept―Disambiguating the ʼIdeaʼ and the ʼRegionʼ
from Quadrilateral ʼStrategyʼ,” Policy Brief, July 19, 2018.

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Chinese-led regional order, there is a large contradiction in this proposition.
Lastly, Australia has been keen to attract additional adherents to the broad FOIP vision, boththrough other enhanced security partnerships, such as with Singapore, but also through the“Quad-plus” process that brings extra-regional powers such as France and the UK into the FOIP
enterprise (noted in the introduction). The final layer of this cooperation is the desire to maintaina place for ASEAN in the FOIP vision―Canberra has been quick to reassure members that
“ASEAN centrality” will not be undermined, but polls among South East Asia experts indicate
a great degree of scepticism over the FOIP.28 Indonesia, Australiaʼs emerging neighbour to thenorth has made attempts to frame its own IPs (the “global maritime fulcrum”), but appears tepid
towards the FOIP itself.
Yet there limits to Canberraʼs willingness to support and enforce the FOIP and US primacy indefiance of Beijing, especially if it emerges as a “hard-balancing” or “containment” mechanism.
It is well known that not only is the PRC by far Australiaʼs biggest trading partner, upon whom
continued prosperity is assumed to depend, but the possibility that the US may gradually
withdraw from the region and leave China as regional hegemon also raise the “shadow of the
future” in Australian calculations.29 Indeed, the current US Administration has sent mixed signals
as to its engagement with the region. On the one hand Trumpʼs disparagement of allies, tradedisruptions, withdrawal from TPP, and disregard for the liberal international order have seriously
undercut Australiaʼ s position. Yet, more recent championship of the FOIP combined withdetermined efforts to push back against Chinese challenges are more positive signals, welcomedin Canberra. Nevertheless, Medcalf argues “Australiaʼs preference is for a U.S. response to Chinathat competes rather than confronts, that deters rather than provokes.”30

Economic Drivers
To be effective and appealing to regional interlocutor states across the Indo-pacific, and tocompete with the economic challenges raised by China, Australiaʼs de facto participation in
the FOIP also has a strong economic component. Given the maritime/security emphasis that
the FOIP has acquired, it is important to note the economic aspects in which Australia is aparticipant, seeking to tap into emerging markets and benefit from the “blue water economy”
concept.31 Integral to the FOIP vision is the desire to promote increased regional connectivity
through free-market, transparent and high-quality programs that will meet the regionʼs growing
infrastructure needs. In this respect it again runs counter to Chinese methods that have been
criticized for being opaque, corrupt, bringing few local employment benefits, and entrapping aid
beneficiaries with unsustainable debt for projects of questionable viability (“debt-trap diplomacy”).
The antithesis of the FOIP.
Australiaʼs economic centre of gravity has shifted over the past two decades towards its
Western Indian-Ocean-facing and Northern coasts as result of its massive minerals exports trade
Australia itself is a major trading partner with South East Asia, the Pacific Island Countries (PICS),

28

Tang Siew Mun (et al.), The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak
Institute, 2019).

29

Hugh White, Without America: Australia in the New Asia (Carlton: Black Inc., 2017).

30

Rory Medcalf, “Toward a Shared Alliance Strategy in a Contested Indo-Pacific: A View from Australia,”
The National Bureau of Asian Research, May 21, 2019. https://www.nbr.org/publication/toward-ashared-alliance-strategy-in-a-contested-indo-pacific-a-view-from-australia

31

The World Bank, “What is the Blue Economy?” June 6, 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
infographic/2017/06/06/blue-economy

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Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Thomas Wilkins

and seeks to expand its opportunities with India (as detailed in the recent Varghese report). 32
Ideally, the FOIP would have also included the economic showpiece of the TPP, but since
the US withdrawal this has left a gaping hole in US geo-economic influence that has yet to beconvincingly filled. That Australia along with Japan has championed the CPTTP in the absenceof Washingtonʼs leadership testifies to the importance these secondary powers ascribe to theeconomic dimension of regional order. On a smaller scale, Australia has joined its TSD partners
in a Trilateral Investment Fund ($133mill.) designed to offer economic assistance with pressing
regional infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific.
In terms of development, Australia is taking a prominent role, with high levels of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) targeted towards South East Asia (especially Indonesia)
and the PICS. Though Australia provides some assistance to Africa and other Indian Ocean
Rim countries the locus is clearly in these two former regions of key strategic importance toCanberra. Indeed, the Pacific Islands may be the best example of the FOIP in action for Australia
as part of its contiguous Pacific “Step-up.”33 A new Office of the Pacific has been establishedin Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), to coordinate the promotion of good
governance, development, and maritime capacity-building (such as the provision of patrol boats),
with a $2bill. AUD now allocated to an infrastructure financing facility.34 To this purpose, Australia
has also partnered with the US and others to build an electrical grid for PNG.35 The Step-Up
policy is strategic as much as economic, as it seeks to counterbalance the massive increase ofChinese economic influence in the region which threatens to render such states as vulnerable tountoward political influence. Australian strategists are concerned that if China provides criticalinfrastructure to these countries, they will be vulnerable to subversion or subjection by Beijing(with the bugging of the Organisation of African Unity by China being a case in point). Australia
is worried that if economically and financially unviable commitments are entered into with China,
Canberra will be left to deal with the socio-economic and security fall-out of these fragile states on
its doorstep.

Time for Middle Powers in the Indo-Pacific
In sum, it is clear that there is ample space and demand for complementary middle powers, suchas Canada and Australia, to assist―and in some cases provide like-minded alternatives―to US
influence and assistance in the Indo-Pacific. Throughout our discussions with US stakeholders, it
was also made clear that the US not only welcomes this engagement but also expects it. Indeed,
the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report highlights how allies such as Canada and Australia can “play a
critical role in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.”36 In light of growing US uncertainty andcredibility in the region, and rising Chinese assertiveness―the role of Canada and Australia canhelp underscore the rules-based order and bolster the need for sustainable investment and open
32

Peter N Varghese AO, A Report to the Australian Government: An India Economic Strategy to 2035―
Navigating from Potential to Delivery (Barton ACT: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2018).
https://dfat.gov.au/geo/india/ies/index.html

33

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Stepping Up Australiaʼs Pacific Engagement.” https://dfat.
gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement [Accessed March 10, 2019]34

James Batley, “Australiaʼs New Pacific Czar,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, January 30, 2019. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-new-pacific-czar [Accessed March 1, 2019]35

Stephen Dziedzic, “Australia Joins Multinational Bid to Improve Papua New Guineaʼs Energy
Infrastructure,” November 18, 2018. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-18/australia-jointsmultinational-effort-to-improve-png-energy/10508614

36

US Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting
a Networked Region,” June 1, 2019, p. 42. https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF

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The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia

trade. This discussion of the ways in which Australia and Canada have sought to respond to theFOIP vision, as championed by Japan and the US, is indicative of the actual and potential rolesuch that self-styled middle powers can play in upholding the regional international order against
revisionist challenges, by doing their part.
Yet, as middle powers with relatively limited capabilities compared with leading FOIP statessuch as the US and Japan, it may be worth Ottawa and Canberra engaging in renewed bilateral
cooperation to explore how they can jointly coordinate their approach to the FOIP and perhaps
pool their capabilities more effectively as they have done so successfully in the past, in initiatives
such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and through otherareas including disrupting people smuggling and organized crime in SEA. Potentially fruitful
avenues of joint cooperation to explore could include HADR, joint naval exercises, MDA andODA/capacity-building, among others. In conclusion, this is a prime opportunity for solidarity
between these two middle powers to leverage their joint reputation for multilateralism, norm
entrepreneurship and all-round reputation for “good international citizenship” to play a larger rolein the Indo-Pacific affairs.

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