Thomas S. Wilkins

Evolving Security Alignments of the Indo-Pacific: The US
Alliances, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and
ASEAN
Thomas S. Wilkins*
Abstract
Strategic analysts and scholars have consistently searched for the best macro-level
intellectual frameworks to capture the security dynamics of the complex Asia/IndoPacific region. Instead of following the common practice of cataloguing and appraising
the wide variety of institutions that comprise the regionʼs so-called “security architecture”(a problematic construct; as will be revealed), this article proposes that the structuraldynamics of the regionʼs security can be better apprehended through the specific concept of“alignment.” From this perspective it is argued that three relatively well-defined alignment“blocs”: the US alliance network, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization strategic
partnership network and the ASEAN security community serve to influence and structure
strategic interactions across the region. By examining the internal composition, purpose,and behaviors of these alignment groupings―and the challenges they each face―we cangain new insights into how the consequent regional security order is produced.

“Alignment” as an ordering principle for understanding the Indo-Pacificsecurity landscapeH

ow to gain analytical purchase on the “big picture” of the extraordinarily complex
security dynamics Indo-Pacific region is one of the greatest challenges faced bystrategic analysts. And while policy-makerʼs attention is understandably captured
by immediate events and pressing issues, this can sometimes come at the expenseof deeper reflection upon the underlying structural drivers of Indo-Pacific security dynamics.
Nevertheless, it is crucially important for long-term strategic planning purposes to delve into thedeeper security “structures” that animate state cooperation and conflict, and which consequently
define and shape the regionʼs security order. Studies with this aim in view usually tend to focus
upon the tangible institutions that constitute the regionʼs so-called “security architecture”; bywhich we mean the institutional security mechanisms that contribute toward security governance,or otherwise superintend individual or collective security to states.
The so-called “ noodle bowl ” of regional agreements, regimes, and institutions in the
Indo-Pacific encompasses ever ything from economic forums such as Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation(APEC), inter-regional meetings, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), andTrack II dialogues such as Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSACP), andever ything in-between, making any attempt to impose some kind of schematic for properly
comprehending this security architecture a daunting task. But in addition to the insurmountablecomplexity of the problem, the “security architecture” notion fails to recognise the inherent
qualitative differentiation between its various constituents, usually lumping together multilateral*Thomas S. Wilkins is a Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and a
Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of Sydney, Australia.

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Evolving Security Alignments of the Indo-Pacific: The US Alliances, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and ASEAN

security dialogue mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or East Asia Summit(EAS), (often referred to as “talk shops”), with formal military alliance pacts that include joint
defence planning, such as the Japan-US Alliance, or ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US). These
examples should on no account be conflated, as the former contain an inclusive range of states,
often working at cross-purposes, whilst striving toward confidence building measures, whereas
the latter represent an exclusive alignment of states working toward mutually shared security anddefence objectives, including joint military planning.
In a bid to disaggregate these two “ unlike ” forms of security architecture, and basedon an extensive pan-regional study undertaken for the monograph Security in Asia Pacific:
The Dynamics of Alignment, this article introduces the notion of “security alignment” as analternative approach toward capturing the structural characteristics of the current Indo-Pacificsecurity environment.1 “Security alignment” refers to a genuine and committed effort by states
to coordinate their security strategies. It will invariably manifest itself in some identifiable
institutional form―whether this be a formal militar y alliance, or another form of exclusive
organization, (including some plurilateral security institutions with exclusive, rather than inclusive
membership). Indeed, while the alliance paradigm of alignment has traditionally been a dominantform, the phenomenon is not confined to these alone, and includes coalitions, ententes, strategic
partnerships and security communities, among others. Naturally, some forms of alignment will betighter and more developed than other looser arrangements: not all alignments take the form of“alliances” (but all alliances are alignments).
The key point is that alignment partners basically subscribe to a common set of security
objectives, coordinate their resources closely toward these, and do not admit “outsiders” to their
exclusive “club,” thus differentiating them from regionʼs multitude inclusive security dialogue
forums (though all alignments, including alliances, are institutionalised). Moreover, when aligned
states act together as holistic “units,” they are frequently in competitive tension with one anotherin terms of their respective security goals (though this does not preclude elements of cooperation,
including by individual member states). Using alignment as a reductionist perspective to allow
us to get behind the vast proliferation of regional institutions and diverse state actors promises tosimplify (reify) our understanding of the larger question of security structures in the Indo-Pacific.
Indeed, the phenomenon itself has traditionally been held as fundamental to the understanding
international politics by an array of seminal scholars in the International Relations discipline. As
prolific alliance scholar George Liska attests: “Alignments are always instrumental in structuring
the state system, sometimes transforming it.”2

The Indo-Pacific security structure: three power centers of alignment
On the basis of these criteria, the US hub-and-spoke (H&S) alliance system, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) strategic partnership, and the ASEAN security community―
but not its extended organs, such as the ARF/EAS―generally fulfil these criteria of alignment(though some caveats appear). At their core, they are all largely exclusive organizations,and each acts as a vehicle to provide security for its membership through coordinated policy
objectives aimed at both internal and external security challenges, even if the institutional formof security cooperation ―alliance, strategic partnership, and security community, differs ineach case. These alignment groupings are different in their nature, purpose, design, internal
dynamics, and external orientations, as will be demonstrated below. Moreover, it is these threealignment groupings that characterise the structural security landscape of the Indo-Pacific1Thomas S. Wilkins, Security in Asia Pacific: The Dynamics of Alignment (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2019).

2

George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1962), p. 12.

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region, with each holds a competing “vision” for the future of regional order. Thus, as exclusivealignments, each of the three stands out as a “pole” of power and attraction, putting forward theirown distinct visions of regional order and seeking adhesion to this among other external states.
On the one hand, we have the Washington-led H&S alignment of maritime liberal democracies in
the Pacific, backed by American military predominance. Standing in contrast to this is the SinoRussian authoritarian compact at the heart of the SCO, backed by Beijingʼs cascade of Eurasian
economic initiatives and institution building, alongside Moscowʼs superpower nuclear arsenal.
Juxtaposed with these two rivalrous blocs are the ASEAN countries seeking to retain their“centrality” in regional security discourses and governance through their expansive institutionaland normative framework (The “ASEAN way”). Together, these three alignments largely define
the security structure of the Indo-Pacific region.
Notably, as each alignment grouping seeks to expand its power and influence over theregional order it has developed “ networks” with external parties, extraneous to their core
membership, and even across other alignments, to further its aims. These networking attempts
could be conceived of as an “H&S plus,” “SCO-plus,” and “ASEAN-plus” configurations. With
these parameters in mind, let us now unpack each of the three alignment groupings that define
the overall structure of the Indo-Pacific security landscape: the US-alliance network, SCO
strategic partnership network, and ASEAN security community network in turn, to probe into
their background, nature, activities, and the challenges they each face going forward. (Notethat the analyses below are merely “snapshots” of these alignments, and the book Security in
Asia Pacific above, may be consulted for fully detailed accounts.) And while it should be notedthat “alliances” such as the US H&S system have typically taken center stage in both academic
and policy analyses, this article seeks to draw attention to the SCO and ASEAN as alternative,
specifically-“non-alliance,” pathways toward security alignment.

The US alliance network
The US hub-and-spokes system of alliances was developed at the time of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty in 1951, with the foundation of the Japan-US alliance and the ANZUS alliance, and USPhilippines Mutual Defence Treaty. This was later extended to alliance pacts with South Korea(1953), Thailand (1954), and Taiwan (1954: now defunct and replaced with Taiwan Relations Act(TRA)). It represents the strongest form of security alignment in the region, founded as it isupon a range of formal military security guarantees, including a commitment to joint defence. As
such, these security alignments closely conform to Robert Osgoodʼs definition of an alliance as“a formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military resources against
a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or toconsider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force in specified circumstances.”3
As Victor Cha has written, at the inception of the H&S Washington preferred a series ofbilateral alliance pacts to a multilateral structure such as NATO, though this preference has now
been eroded as policy-makers have sought to reform the H&S system to meet new challenges
in the 21st Century.4 Today, the H&S alliances are being transformed in line with internal andexternal pressures. Nevertheless, cooperation between “core allies”―Japan and Australia―andthe US has been greatly augmented. Not only have Tokyo and Canberra individually deepened
their alliance relations with the US through deeper military integration and security cooperation
under the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision, but they have also initiated direct bilateral
3

Robert Endicott Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1968), p. 17.

4

Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2016).

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Evolving Security Alignments of the Indo-Pacific: The US Alliances, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and ASEAN

security cooperation by means of their own security alignment, (dubbed a “Special StrategicPartnership”).5 This process is further triangulated through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue(TSD) process between the three allies, arguably adding up to a “virtual trilateral alliance.” In
addition to the strengthening and consolidation of the alliance “core,” the hub-and-spokes hastaken on a “networking” aspect. Washington has not only encouraged contacts between the“spokes”―such as Japan and Australia, and with elusive success; Korea and Japan―but new“strategic partners” have been sought as affiliates to the existing H&S network. Among thesepotential adherents to the US-alliance network is India, which has been brought into the “Quad”
process (and FOIP), but also key South East Asian (SEA) states such as Vietnam and Singapore.
With its origins as a set of formal military alliances, the US-alliance network, was originallydesigned to counter the Cold War threat emanating from the Communist bloc. With the collapseof the USSR in 1991 and the subsequent integration of the PRC into the capitalist world economy
since then, these alliances were adrift and “threatless” for most of the Post–Cold War period. New
life was breathed into the US-alliance network after the 2001 terrorist attacks as Asian allies were
co-opted by Washington to provide military support for the “war on terror.” By 2011, Washington
had begun to view its military interventions in the Middle East as costly diversion away from theevident locus of geopolitical power centering on the Indo-Pacific. The “pivot” (or “rebalance”)
policy of the Obama Administration sought to refocus attention back to this crucial region.6 This
policy shift was in response to increase Chinese assertiveness in the region, exemplified by
its rapid military modernisation and its assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS). Now, theTrump-era National Security Strategy (2017) makes explicit the return of “great power rivalry”
with a risen China and a resurgent Russia, with an ever provocative nuclear-armed North Korea
in the background. The US has thus begun to push back more forcefully against these actors,
which have both shown a disregard for internal norms and law and seek to pressure the US and
its allies through an array of “disruptive” policies and “hybrid warfare” techniques.7 The original
raison d’être of the alliance system of balancing potential great power threats has apparently
resurfaced accompanied by talk of a “new Cold War.”
But the alliance has also concentrated upon renewing the normative legacy of the so-called “SanFrancisco system” that has always accompanied the actual military alliance dyads themselves.8
During the Cold War American military predominance, extended through its alliance network,
imposed peace and stability upon the region, allowing for East Asian states to focus upon rapid
economic advancement, as well as supplying a variety of “public goods” such as freedom of theseas. This US-imposed regional order served the security interests of allies, (and some nonallies), well until the beginning of the 21st Century. Yet, as this San Francisco system has beeneroded both by a relative decline in American power, it has been concomitantly challenged byever more disruptive activities by new regional challengers such as North Korea, China, andRussia. As such, renewed efforts are underway by the US and its allies to uphold the liberalprinciples of the de facto “Rules-based order” centered around the principles of free trade, open
markets, human rights (and support for democratisation). Such efforts have coalesced into theFree and Open Indo-Pacific vision that unites the core US allies, with India, and which welcomesany state that subscribes to its principles. The shared commitment to maintaining a rules5

Thomas Wilkins, “From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Alliance?: Australia-Japan Security Ties andthe Asia-Pacific”, Asia Policy 20 (2015), pp. 81–112.

6

Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia (New York: Twelve, 2016).

7

Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and Japan Facing ʻDisruptiveʼ Challenges to the Rules Based Order in the
Indo-Pacific,” Policy Brief, September 26, 2018.

8

Kimie Hara, The San Francisco System and Its Legacies: Continuation, Transformation and Historical
Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2015).

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based order based upon US regional primacy unites the US-alliance network in response to its
challengers that seek to act as “spoilers” of regional order, and revise the status quo throughcoercive and unilateral actions.
However, the US-alliance network faces challenges going for ward in upholding both its
primacy and its vision of regional order. Firstly, the US no longer enjoys undisputed economic or
military supremacy, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the abrogation of the Trans-PacificPartnership (TPP) in 2017 and the failure to adequately replace the carefully crafted Pivot/
Rebalance strategy of the previous Administration with a tangible and cohesive regional strategy
has weakened the props of the US-led alignment. Instead we have an as yet ill-defined policy of“strategic competition.” Secondly, the Presidency of Donald Trump has rhetorically undercut US
commitment to its allies by questioning security guarantees and spreading accusations of freeriding among allies. This has greatly undermined US credibility among allies and foes alike.
Paradoxically, however, his demands for increased alliance contributions (in light of limited
American resources) may actually strengthen the aggregate capabilities at the heart of the USalliance network as allies increase their defence budgets and military acquisitions. Lastly, there
are signs of distancing at the periphery of the original H&S network. It is arguable that bothThailand and the Philippines are drifting away from Washington and seeking a closer relationshipwith the PRC, while New Zealand has been officially expelled from ANZUS, and South Korea tosome extent remains a moribund ally, trapped by its unavoidable focus upon the North Korean
threat. These relationships will require political investment and resources to renew to avoid thefurther slippage of these peripheral allies into Chinaʼs orbit.

The SCO strategic partnership network
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, spearheaded by Beijing, represents a newly emergent
security alignment in eastern Eurasia in implicit, if not direct, contention with the H&S network.
In partnership with Moscow, by means of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, and with India
as the latest major power to accede to the organization (2017), the SCO now clearly represents
an alternate pole of power in the Indo-Pacific and potential challenger to the vision of regional
order championed by Washington and its allies. The SCO has its origins in the post–Cold War
rapprochement between erstwhile Communist allies, Russia and China, which was formalisedin its 1996 Strategic Partnership, and 2001 Treaty of Good neighbourliness and Cooperation.9
These two events occurred near-simultaneously with the foundation of the “Shanghai Five,” later
to become the SCO, to include the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan, in an axis of authoritarian Eurasian states. It was initially created to resolve
border disputes and mitigate strategic competition between Beijing and Moscow in the Central
Asian region itself, but soon developed into a formal organization to address a range of joint
non-traditional security challenges, dubbed the “Three Evils” of terrorism, separatism andreligious extremism, faced by all parties. Alarmed by US military intervention in West Asia, theorganization soon took on anti-hegemonic tones, asserting that American/Western influence
was to be excluded from this region. It also began to serve as a platform for the championshipof a multipolar world order, and an antithesis of Western values, as represented by the maritime
democracies of the US-alliance network. Washington ʼ s request for SCO Obser ver status
was denied and the organization consolidated itself as an exclusive six-member plurilateralarrangement until 2017. At this point former Observer States India and Pakistan were admitted
9“Joint Declaration by the Peopleʼs Republic of China and the Russian Federation, Adopted at Beijing
on 25 April 1996,” 2 May 1996, United Nations General Assembly, A/51/127, https://undocs.org/
pdf?symbol=en/A/51/127; ʻTreaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the
Peopleʼs Republic of China and the Russian Federation,ʼ 24 July 2001, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15771.shtml.

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to the club, thus significantly expanding the extent of its reach across the whole of eastern
Eurasia. In addition, Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia currently hold Observer status,
whilst Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, are Dialogue Partners,
thus indicating the “network” facet of the SCO alignment, and clearly demonstrating its powers of“attraction” for other regional states.
The eight full members with China and Russia (and now India) at its core, account for
approximately half the worldʼs population, about 80% of the Eurasian Landmass, a quarter ofworld GDP and around 20% of total world militar y expenditure. 10 The SCO bloc stretches
across the “Heartland” of the Eurasian continent, thus providing a geopolitical counterweightto the “Rimland” of US maritime allies. It is frequently mischaracterised as an “Asian NATO” or“alliance of the East,” but this fails to capture its novelty as an organization which superintends
a “web” of bilateral strategic partnerships between the members. And whilst it includes a highdegree of security cooperation on both traditional and non-traditional security threats, it does notentail a mutual defence pact (as per alliances). Thus, it conforms to the definition of a strategic
partnership as “a form of enhanced bilateral cooperation between two states (or other actors)
that brings them into closer alignment on security and economic issues in order to reduce
uncertainties and aggregate joint capabilities.”11 In addition to the web of strategic partnerships
upon which it rests, an intricate organizational apparatus has been fabricated, including a Heads
of State Council and a Heads of Government Council; the highest decision-making bodies, andtwo permanent organs; the Secretariat and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). It
now operates across a range of diplomatic, security, economic, (including joint energy projects,
new financial architecture, and development funds), intelligence, cyber, and even social-cultural,
areas. It therefore represents a new and, in some ways, “hybrid” form of security alignment, quitedistinct from alliances.
Until the present, the organization has been dominated by China, with Russia as a nominal
co-equal leader (though the accession of India will potentially dilute this influence), and has
been seen by many analysts as the prototype of the kind of institutional apparatus that accuratelyreflects Chinese values and interests. According to Swagata Saha “China has been attempting
to shape a non-Western security grouping to counterbalance NATO and allow China more room
for militar y action in Asia.”12 Thus, the SCO in some ways ser ves as a backstop to Chinese
outward assertiveness directed toward its Asian neighbours (e.g. SCS, Taiwan, Japan), whilst
covering Russiaʼs aggression in Eastern Europe. Though the internal parties (excepting IndiaPakistan) have amicably resolved their border disputes, both China and Russia have territorial
disputes with their Asian neighbours (e.g. Northern Territories, SCS). And while the SCO
claims to prioritise non-traditional security issues (the “Three Evils”) it engages in high-intensity
warfighting exercises (“Peace Missions”) involving frontline military capabilities (with a degreeof inter-operability between members states forces, centered upon Russian weapon platforms,
or variants thereof). On the basis of such activities it aims to advance an alternative to Western
ideology, with Russia and China cooperating diplomatically (through the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC)) to advance a multipolar order and resist the liberal international orderrepresented by the US and its allies. Its internal system principle is based upon the “Shanghai
Spirit”―a set of internal norms that guide its interaction with external parties. According to
10World Bank, “Data-GDP (current US$) 2018,” https://data.worldbank.org; Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database 2018, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

11

Thomas S. Wilkins, Security in Asia Pacific: The Dynamics of Alignment (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2019),
p. 125.

12

Swagata Saha, “The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” East Asia Forum, 17 October
2014.

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the SCO Charter, this encompasses: “mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internalaffairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military
superiority in adjacent areas.”13 Though it claims not to target any other country, in reality, thisrepresents an effort to challenge and revise the international order in line with the preferencesof the authoritarian powers, and to mask active efforts to destabilize the US rules-based order
above.
But despite its formidable potential, and clear representation as an alternative pole of power
to the US H&S network, the organization faces significant internal challenges. Firstly, the recent
expansion to include India (and Pakistan), weakens Beijingʼs heretofore dominant position asde facto leader of the SCO. Instead of a Sino-Russian leadership dyad at the core, now India will
make it a triad. And though New Delhi subscribes to certain aspects of the SCO worldview suchas multi-polarity, and shares notions of non-interference and the dangers of the “Three Evils”,
India is a democracy in many ways closer to Western traditions, and which, despite its now
misnomered “non-alignment” policy, is closely aligned with the extended US-alliance network as
well. Moreover, China and India (Arunachal Pradesh), as well as India and Pakistan (Kashmir),have territorial disputes, that could threaten the internal integrity of the SCO. Whether thiswill weaken the SCOʼs cohesion, and whether it will transform it into a less effective and unitedmultilateral security dialogue forum (“talk shop”), instead of a coherent alignment bloc, remains
to be seen. Secondly, the importation of the “Indo-Pak” problem―the fact that two members are
actually antagonists, rather than allied or aligned, threatens to undermine the internal securityof the SCO in potentially combustible ways. Lastly, Western analysts in particular have pointed
out that the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, heretofore the “engine” of the SCO is also riven
with contradictions, with Moscow fearing an increased Chinese strategic presence on its borders
and in Central Asia, and resentful of Chinese economic expansion, sometimes outside of the
SCO framework, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which vies with the Russian-led
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This indicates that the alignment functions as much as a “pactof restraint”―preventing one another from aligning with the US, for example, than a genuine
confluence of long-term strategic interests, let alone, shared values.

The ASEAN security community network

In some ways caught in-between the Sino-US-led “blocs,” the ASEAN security community seeks
to drive internal (intramural) cooperation between South East Asian (SEA) states and safeguard
their mutual external interests through strength in numbers. ASEAN was initially formed as aregional intergovernmental organization in 1967 at the height of the Cold War, to protect itself
against outside interventions by the Communist powers (Vietnam, China) who threatened todestabilise newly independent but fragile post-colonial states faced with a multitude of internal
nation-building challenges. With the end of the Cold War tension in SEA, the organization
experienced a “second birth” with the accession of formerly antagonistic CLMV states in the
1990s (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). Based upon the ASEAN Charter (2007) andunder the (current) banner of “ASEAN 2020” it aims at building an “ASEAN Community” based
upon a tripod of: Political-Security community (of most relevance here), Economic community,
and Socio-cultural community. Under this triad it engages in a range of intergovernmental
cooperation and facilitates economic (including an ASEAN Free Trade Area), political, security,
military, educational, and sociocultural integration activities. There is no simple definition of a“security community,” but Raimo Väyrynen defines it as “a collective arrangement in which its
members have reasons to trust that the use of military and economic coercion in their mutual
13

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” p. 3.

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Evolving Security Alignments of the Indo-Pacific: The US Alliances, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and ASEAN

relations is unlikely.”14 In other words, though they specifically eschew a collective defence pact
(as per alliance), they conceive of their security as being advanced collectively. This makes thisform of security alignment, quite distinguishable from the alliance paradigm.
Though ASEAN was primarily concerned with incubating intramural cooperation between
its membership until the 1990s, it henceforth took on an external orientation as a discerniblealignment of states, seeking to shape the wider regional security order in the Indo-Pacific. This
“network” building, (usually referred to as “ASEAN-plus”) is conducted by means of a wide arrayof multilateral institutions (i.e. security architecture) that engage with external parties, suchas the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3, and ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting+ (ADMM+), plus the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Throughthis extended network the ASEAN members themselves seek to “enmesh” other regional states,
especially the major powers, in their own normative framework (see below).
ASEAN is primarily a vehicle to safeguard the security interests of the small and mediumsized SEA member states both internally and externally, through intramural cooperation, andstrength in numbers, respectively. When combined they count a population of approximately 651
million and aggregated GDP of about $3trn and total military budget of $40bn.15 They employ
the organization and its extended institutional network as a “shield” against external interference
in SEA, and as a way of mediating tensions between SEA and external powers, including theformer two alignment blocs, with varying degrees of success. They also prioritise non-traditional
security issues such as transnational crime, unregulated population movements, environmental
disasters, infectious diseases, food security, transnational pollution, piracy, and terrorism. They
have championed a package of “norms,” in part an assertion of “Asian” versus “Western” values,
known as the “ASEAN Way.” This entails “the importance of neutrality; sovereignty and territorial
integrity; the peaceful settlement of disputes; informal, non-confrontational negotiations; and thepromotion of domestic stability and social harmony―which together underscore the importanceof state autonomy and non-interference in the affairs of other states.”16 And they have sought
to “export” these norms across the larger Indo-Pacific theatre by means of their ASEAN-plus
institutional architecture, including gaining external states adhesion to the Treaty of Amity andCooperation (TAC); a loose form of non-aggression pact. This attempt to “enmesh” external
parties in an ASEAN-led normative framework―lacking the militar y or economic weight tootherwise influence external states―has had some limited success in underwriting their claim to“ASEAN centrality” in regional security affairs.
But the ASEAN security community suffers from a range of limitations as a pole of alignment
in the Indo-Pacific. Firstly, it lacks the critical mass of power resources and capabilities to assert
its influence in the face of any opposition by the other alignment blocs, or individual powerfulstates. In particular, despite some aspirations to integrate SEAʼs defence industries, it has nocollective defence agreement or combined military capabilities, as in the H&S (and to a minor
degree, in the SCO). For this reason, it has devoted its security diplomacy toward normative
efforts at confidence-building and cooperation through the medium of ASEAN-plus institutions
as a means to shape regional order. Secondly, perhaps because of these issues, ASEAN (andits extended network) have come in for sustained criticism for a lack of effectiveness in the
security sphere. The ASEAN-plus institutions are not seen as efficient security providers by
14

Raimo Väyrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities?: Steps towards Theory-Building (The Joan
B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2000), p.166.

15

World Bank, “Data-GDP (current US$) 2018,” https://data.worldbank.org; Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database 2018, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

16

Richard Stubbs, “The ASEAN Alternative? Ideas, Institutions and the Challenge to ʻGlobalʼ Governance,”
The Pacific Review 21, no. 4 (2008), p. 451.

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regional parties, including its members states, who retain national defence capabilities and a
gamut of security agreements with external powers, especially the US (some can be counted aspart of the original H&S, such as Thailand and the Philippines, as well as new strategic partners
in the extended network, such as Singapore and Vietnam, for example). ASEAN organs havenot successfully addressed even non-traditional security challenges in the region such as hazepollution, the refugee crisis in Myanmar, and human rights concerns, though they have hadgreater success on counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy operations. They have certainly failed todeal with traditional security disputes such as the SCS as a meaningful alignment of states. Lastly,
questions remain as to the sustained momentum of ASEAN toward its aspiration to become agenuine “Security Community,” both due to the stark diversity in political makeup and national
power between its members, and some minor territorial disputes between member states (e.g.
Preah Vihear temple, between Thailand and Cambodia). But external factors have placedpressure upon its proclaimed “neutrality” toward great power rivalry and territorial disputes in
the region. Examples of compromised neutrality include Cambodiaʼs scuttling of the 2016 ASEAN
Summit declaration regarding the SCS as a result of Chinese diplomatic pressure on Phnom
Penh.17 This cruelly exposed the divisions within the ASEAN membership and its inability to
act cohesively as a united front, thus calling into question the actual coherence of ASEAN as ameaningful security alignment.

Conclusion

It is conventional wisdom among analysts that the “noodle-bowl” of multilateral institutions ofvarious stripes have not been fully effective in addressing the pressing multifarious challenges theregion faces: great power rivalry, nuclear proliferation, maritime and territorial disputes (though
it may fare better at dealing with non-traditional security issues such as piracy, and trans-national
criminal organizations). Nor have sporadic efforts to build a “regional community” (sometimes
predicated upon institutional security architecture) fared any better. One thinks of the failed “EastAsian Community” of former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, or the “Asia-Pacific Community” offormer Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, for example.
Thus, in place of these, this ar ticle has suggested that looking at the three principlealignment groupings in the region is an alternative to understanding how security in theregional is structured and operates to maintain regional order. The strong adherence of states
within these alignments to each of these groupings also testifies that they normally prioritise
their alignments as their most effective form of security provision in an uncertain and unstablesecurity environment. As this article has demonstrated, these new alignments can take theform of reconfigured alliances in the US case, or hybrid strategic partnership/plurilaterals,
like the SCO, or security communities, in the ASEAN case. In other words, security alignment
does not always and only occur through formal military alliances, but through alternative “nonalliance” means, such as the SCO and ASEAN. Additionally, the reach of these three alignment
groupings is extended, by their respective efforts to “network” beyond their core memberships.
For example: the American-led H&S system seeks to attract additional “strategic partners” (e.g.
Singapore, Vietnam, India), whilst the SCO includes a range of Observer and Dialogue Partners,and ASEAN heads a suite of “ASEAN plus” institutional offshoots (e.g. EAS, ARF etc.). It is also
important to recognise that alignments can vary in depth and cohesion over time, and can evolveand transform. Moreover alignments are not always “water-tight,” with some states participatingin multiple alignments (e.g. India is a member of the SCO and a Strategic Partner with the US/
Quad), thus complicating the situation. Also, interestingly the SCO and ASEAN also increasingly
17

Manuel Mogato, Michael Martina, Ben Blanchard, “ASEAN Deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia
Blocks Statement,” Reuters, 25 July 2016.

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Evolving Security Alignments of the Indo-Pacific: The US Alliances, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and ASEAN

engage in cooperative activities, and partially share a similar worldview.18 A recognition ofimportance of the alignment phenomenon for understanding the security landscape of the IndoPacific, as well as an appreciation of the transforming nature of alignments themselves, gets us
closer to understanding the security structures upon which regional security order is ultimately
predicated.

18“Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN Secretariat) and the Secretariat of The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO Secretariat),”
21 April 2005, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/ASEAN-SCO-MOU.pdf.

80Japan Review Vol.3 No.2 Fall 2019