Kazuya Sakamoto

The World and Japan 150 Years from Meiji– Looking Back on History –*Kazuya Sakamoto**
Abstract
We stand at a historical milestone that marks 150 years from the Meiji Restoration of
1868, during which Japan radically changed its national polity in the face of the advance ofWestern powers and set itself on the path to dokuritsu jison (independence and self-respect).
After its defeat in the Second World War, Japan joined forces with Western countries in theconstruction of a liberal world order based on such values as freedom, democracy, and therule of law. It is correct to say that an end to fighting signifies an end to war in that armed
conflict between nations ceases, but a true end to war takes more than this. Peace mustbe established among the warring nations, and this requires the completion of certain
processes of postwar settlement, without which the war is not over. Only now are we able toreflect on our past perception of history not for the purposes of self-criticism and apology,
but to chart our future course. The phrase that comes to mind in describing Japan 150 years
from the Meiji Restoration is “independence and self-respect,” the philosophy of the noted
Meiji thinker Yukichi Fukuzawa. This slogan of Fukuzawa is as important to Japan 150
years from Meiji as it was to Meiji Japan. The critical difference with Meiji Japan is that thisindependence and self-respect is to be realized within the development of the liberal worldorder.

For a number of reasons, the year 2018 affords us an excellent opportunity to look backon the history of Japanʼs diplomacy and national security. It also provides an appropriatevantage point for surveying the future.

I. Milestone in Histor yFirst and foremost, as the subject of this symposium notes, we stand at a historical milestonethat marks 150 years from the Meiji Restoration of 1868, during which Japan radically changed
its national polity in the face of the advance of Western powers and set itself on the path todokuritsu jison (independence and self-respect). During these 150 years, Japan learned from theWest to become a modern constitutional state, rebuilt itself as a modern industrialized nation,and eventually entered into war with the United States and Britain, the two leading powers of theWest. After its defeat, Japan joined forces with Western countries in the construction of a liberal
world order based on such values as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.
You may object that this is far too general a presentation of history, but I would argue thatit provides a meaningful platform for us to review the history of Japanʼs diplomacy and national
security and also to look forward to the future.
*

This is an edited transcript of the keynote speech of a symposium “150 Years from the Meiji Restoration―Modernization and Japan in a Global Context―” held by JIIA and Kansai Association of Corporate
Executives in March 2018.

** Prof. Kazuya Sakamoto is a Professor of Graduate School of Law and Politics at Osaka University
specializing in International Politics and Diplomatic History.

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The World and Japan 150 Years from Meiji – Looking Back on History –As the framework of the Group of Seven (G7) clearly shows, Japan has today become oneof the major proponents of the liberal world order. There is no question that its diplomatic andsecurity policies are focused on contributing to maintaining and furthering this world order andworking within it to preserve Japanʼs own security and prosperity and enhance Japanʼs politicalstanding in the world.
Therefore, I believe that all examination of Japanese diplomacy and national security must be
premised on these historical developments that have defined the history of Japanʼs relations with
the West since the Meiji Restoration.
This year marks not only 150 years from the Meiji Restoration, but also the centenary of theend of the First World War in 1918. Exactly 50 years after the Meiji Restoration and seven years
after the end of the Meiji period (1868−1912), Japan stood beside the United States and Britain
as one of the warʼs victors. It became a permanent member in the postwar League of Nations andcame to be known as one of the “Big Five” nations.
Japan adopted Western technologies, institutions, and thought in its effort to catch up with
the Western powers and pursued its vision of a “fukoku kyohei (rich country and strong army)”
by concentrating its energies on fostering modern industries and reinforcing its military. Japanfought two wars̶the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars̶and paid for them in blood,
sweat, and tears. It then made herculean efforts to revise the unequal treaties entered into force
at the close of the Edo period (1600−1868), and as a result of these endeavors achieved the major
accomplishment of emerging from the First World War as a prosperous nation.
Although Japan stood with the United States and Britain among the victors at the end of theFirst World War, the situation changed thereafter as Japan increasingly came into conflict withthese nations while working toward a new postwar world order. Eventually, this would develop
into a world war with them (and China) over the establishment of a new order in the Asia-Pacific.
The question of why this happened has already been thoroughly examined and discussed.
Still, it is worth revisiting it now, a centur y after those events. At the ver y least, such a reexamination would be extremely helpful in organizing our thoughts.
In addition to being 150 years from the Meiji Restoration and 100 years from the end of theFirst World War, this year also marks the 30th year of the Heisei period (the imperial era ofEmperor Akihitoʼs reign), and what is effectively its final year. We knew from a hundred years agothat the first two milestones would take place this year, but no one knew that these milestones
would also coincide with the last year of the Heisei period. In Japan, where we use both theWestern calendar and imperial eras, this coincidence adds profoundly to the significance of thismilestone year.
The immense physical and mental shock that accompanied Japanʼs destruction and defeat in
the Second World War against the United States, Britain, and China does not bear repeating here.
Recovery from the physical shock was relatively quick, and Japan was able to recover during the
Showa period. Indeed, it achieved more than mere recovery. Japan surprised the world with its
emergence as a major economy, and its people came to enjoy a level of affluence that far exceeded
anything experienced in the prewar years. What is more, Japan has become a country able toassist other countries in promoting their own economic development.
By contrast, recovery from the mental shock took much longer. Problems related to historicalperception and contrition became enmeshed with diplomatic relations, and I believe it has taken
the entire 30 years of the Heisei period to process that shock. In this context, the significanceof the statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War released by thegovernment of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2015 should not be underestimated.
Next year will mark the start of a new imperial era. At that point, the Showa period will nolonger be the previous era in the minds of the Japanese people, but will instead recede two eras
into the past. What this means is that our historical understanding of the Second World War will
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become less and less a question of apology and remorse, and increasingly a point of reflection
from which to consider the future. The passage of the 30 years of the Heisei period and the startof a new imperial era will have a very significant impact on how we mentally process the Second
World War. I believe this will lead to a change in our mindset.

II. The Abe Statement
Let us consider what it takes to end a war. It is correct to say that an end to fighting signifies an
end to war in that armed conflict between nations ceases. But a true end to war takes more than
this. Peace must be established among the warring nations, and this requires the completion ofcertain processes of postwar settlement, without which the war is not over. This brings us to thequestion of how these processes can be completed.
Although there are no well-defined rules here, common sense informs us that in order tobring the war to a true end, national borders must be redrawn, war criminals must be punished,issues of claims and compensation must be settled, and a peace treaty or its equivalent must be
concluded. In Japanʼs case, postwar settlement with the United States and Britain was completedwith the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty six years after the war ended in the summerof 1945. Its settlements with China were achieved through the Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty signedwith the Nationalist government of Taiwan seven years after the war, and the Japan-China Joint
Communiqué concluded with the Beijing government 27 years later. Setting aside the Soviet
Union and the matter of the Northern Territories, Japanʼs postwar settlements have therefore
been completed with all nations.
It should be noted, however, that these are legal processes of settlement between nations. So,
do they signify full postwar settlement? Perhaps in theory, but the reality is more complicated.
Nations are ultimately collections of people, which means that some process of moral settlement
must also be considered. It is unrealistic to think that the completion of legal processes will allow
us to forget the past and return to normal relations. Actions have human and material costs andconsequences, and there is a moral and ethical need to come to terms with these consequences.
Remorse must be expressed concretely both in words and deeds, and long-term efforts must be
made to heal the rift and rebuild relations.
The difficulty with a moral settlement is that established rules and norms are lacking evenmore than for the legal settlements. It is therefore not something that can be dealt with byfollowing a prescribed course of action, and it also cannot be dealt with by simply acceding to
the requests of another nation. If it were that straightforward, moral settlements would be nodifferent from legal settlements.
Beginning in the 1980s, problems concerning historical perception emerged with China andSouth Korea, and they pertain to this moral settlement for the Second World War. The issue
became very serious because of the Japanese peopleʼs divided response to the criticism of Japanʼs
perception of history leveled by the Chinese and South Korean governments. Some inside Japanagreed with the criticism and admitted that part of the public did indeed subscribe to a faulty
understanding of history. This group argued that failure to correct these misconceptions wasevidence that moral obligations to make amends for the war had not been met, and that therefore
the war had not truly come to an end. They felt that this omission needed to be rectified as theprimary task in Japanʼs diplomatic relations with China and South Korea, and that the government
needed to clearly refute the faulty perception of history that remained in places. However, others
strongly opposed this position, and the entire nation was soon embroiled in an angry debate.
An examination of the problem reveals that the government itself did not have a faulty
perception of histor y. The point is that the government has never subscribed to any specifichistorical interpretation, for example concerning the causes of the Second World War.
In this case, therefore, Japan should have done what it always had, which was to say that the5Japan Review Vol.2 No.2 Fall 2018

The World and Japan 150 Years from Meiji – Looking Back on History –interpretation of history should be left to historians and not made a subject of debate between
governments. However, there were many in Japan who felt that this approach would damage
diplomatic relations with China and South Korea. Ultimately, therefore, it was concluded that the
government should present an understanding of history that would satisfy both those countries.
This led to the statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995 on the 50th anniversaryof the end of the war.
Perhaps all would have been well if ever yone had found the Murayama statement to besatisfactor y. That would have put the question of historical perception to rest and ended thewrangling with China and South Korea. However, the problem with this short statement wasthat it made very facile use of such terms as “aggression” and “colonial rule” without giving any
context. Japan had fought against many countries in the course of the Second World War and thewar had many complex aspects to it. But the Murayama statement sounded as if Japan and Japanalone was in the wrong in all aspects of the war. This gave rise to a very strong reaction in Japan.
Seeing this, China and South Korea redoubled their criticism and cited Japanʼs domestic reaction
as evidence that Japan was not adequately contrite. This further fed the debate that was raging inJapan̶a debate that came to divide the nation on the question of whether to affirm or negate the
Murayama statement.
The problem of historical perception is not about how we can close the gap in our mutual
perceptions so that we can be friendly neighbors. The real question is how we can develop
friendly relations notwithstanding the differences that may persist in our perceptions of history.
What distinguishes the Abe statement that was released twenty years after the Murayama
statement is its recognition of this very point. Regardless of whether its historical perception
would accord with those of the Chinese and South Korean governments, the Japanese
government decided to indicate its historical understanding of the Second World War, limiting its
statement to the bare minimum required. The Abe statement did not seek to refute the Murayama
statement. Instead, it sought to “recast” the Murayama statement to provide historical context tosuch terms as aggression and colonial rule that had been used in the earlier statement. Having
established the historical context, the Abe statement then proceeded to touch on apologies andexpressions of remorse. It explained the path of peace that Japan has walked after the war andexpressed gratitude to the countries that had worked to build peace with Japan in the postwar
world. Finally, although no repeated apology was given for the damage done by Japan in the war,
the document stated that Japan would continue to reflect upon its past actions.
The Abe statement was a success for a number of reasons. The first reason is the reactionof the great majority of Japanese people, who had no real objections to the statement. The otherreason is that Shoichi Watanabe, the renowned conservative critic who died last year, praised theAbe statement highly and gave it a score of 120 points out of 100. If that is his appraisal, I would
have to give the statement 100 points just for its efficacy. The most important thing about the Abestatement was that, unlike the Murayama statement, it did not ignite divisive debate at home.
To achieve this outcome, the Abe statement had to satisfy both supporters of the Murayama
statement and those who had criticized it. The solution was to avoid refuting the earlier statement
and instead to simply recast it. This was very important in convincing those who, like Watanabe,
had severely criticized the Murayama statement.
The governments of China and South Korea did not severely criticize the Abe statement. Ifthey had done so, the government could have said, once the statement was released, that thiswas the Japanese governmentʼs understanding of history and that it was widely supported by thepeople. Japanese government could have offered to explain further if there were any problems
with this understanding and stated that, while it would not repeat the apologies that were made in
the past, it was prepared to explain how it reflected on the past.
No other country in the world has issued a statement of its historical understanding of the
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war like the one made by Prime Minister Abe. Should any country repeat the claim that Japanʼs
perception of the war is unpardonable, we are now in a position to rebut that claim by asking
which country Japan is being compared to.
Only now are we able to reflect on our past perception of history not for the purposes of selfcriticism and apology, but to chart our future course. This brings to mind what E. H. Carr, theBritish historian, noted in his famous lecture entitled “What is History.” To paraphrase his words,
Carr said that history is an unending dialogue between the past and the present, and a dialogue
between the present and the future. I believe we are now able to reflect on the Second World War
in this context, and apart from any need to arrive at a moral settlement.

III. Three Points of Reflection
When we look back to the Second World War from within this framework, there are of course
many reasons for reflection and remorse. But, standing at this milestone 150 years after the Meiji
Restoration, I believe there are three points of reflection that deserve our special attention as weseek to contribute with renewed commitment to furthering the liberal world order that Japan
worked with the West to build in the postwar period. These are the Manchurian Incident, theTripartite Pact entered into by Japan, Germany, and Italy, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. Due to time considerations, I will limit myself to the main points of the argument.

The Manchurian Incident
Let us start with the Manchurian Incident of 1931. Japan resorted to the use of military force toprotect its imperialistic interests in China, an action taken notwithstanding the promise madethree years earlier in the Kellogg–Briand Pact not to use war to resolve international disputes.
This marked the first step toward deteriorating relations with the United States and Britain overthe matter of China. Ultimately, Japan would tread the path to war. Japan will never do this again.
Japan is now committed to its renunciation of war not only by observing international law,
but also by writing a pledge to renounce war into the Constitution. This solemn pledge has been
upheld for more than 70 years, and Japan is determined to abide by its pledge in the future.
Perhaps it can be argued that this in itself is evidence of appropriate reflection. But in order todeepen this reflection, we need to consider certain questions. If war and military force cannot be
used as a means to resolving international disputes, then what means are available? What are weto do when talks and negotiation fail?
Suppose an international dispute arises over economic interests. Because Japan is alreadya major economic power, it can make a concession in order to arrive at a resolution, or it may
simply give up on resolving the dispute. But can the same apply to an international dispute that
affects Japanʼs national security? Japan can of course use militar y force to defend itself. The
right of self-defense is recognized in the Kellogg–Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter.
Moreover, it is protected by the Constitution of Japan (at least according to the interpretation of
the government).
But the problem is how to define self-defense. In fact, in the Manchurian Incident, Japanjustified it as an act of self-defense. Putting that question aside and looking back on Japan ʼsdiplomatic and security policies over the past 150 years, the most significant difference made in
the first and second halves of this period was the treatment of the Korean Peninsula. In the firsthalf Japan included the security of the peninsula in its scope of self-defense, but in the second half
it did not. Aritomo Yamagata, an elder statesman in the Meiji period, divided self-defense into twolines to be guarded: the line of sovereignty, which pertains to defending the security of national
territor y, and the line of interest, which pertains to defending the security of places closely
related to the security of national territory. Yamagata went on to argue that the Korean Peninsula
was within Japanʼs line of interest. Even the Sino-Japanese War over the Korean Peninsula was
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The World and Japan 150 Years from Meiji – Looking Back on History –claimed by Munemitsu Mutsu, the then minister of foreign affairs, to be a war of self-defense.
This claim was made in the context of Yamagataʼs framework of the meaning of self-defense.
In postwar Japan, self-defense has applied solely to the line of sovereignty. The line of interest,on the other hand, has been defended in cooperation with the United States, and later throughwhat has come to be called the Japan-US Alliance, ever since the Korean War that began in
1950. Given that Japan cannot employ military force for the security of the Korean Peninsula,this alliance has been maintained on the understanding that Japan will cooperate through otheravailable means.
I have two points to make on this matter. We often hear people say that a nation must be
prepared to defend itself. That is quite understandable. However, discussions of self-defense
must extend to the question of ensuring the security of the line of interest as well. Otherwise,
what results is a half-baked discussion. It is important to remember that collective self-defense
constitutes the basic principle of self-defense in the contemporary world, and that Japan needs
the Japan-US Alliance for maintaining peace and security in the Far East.
My second point is that the Japan-US Alliance, together with NATO, provides a foundation
for the security of the free world. In this sense, the defense of Japan is very deeply related to thedefense of the free world and the preservation of the liberal world order.

Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Pact
The second matter that requires our reflection is the Tripartite Pact signed by Japan, Germany,and Italy in 1940. By allying itself with Germany, the enemy of the United States and Britain,
Japan also established itself as an anti-Anglo-American nation. For Japan, it was a complete
miscalculation to think that the Tripartite Pact would act as deterrence in preventing war with theUnited States. The very opposite turned out to be true. The mistaken assessment of the power ofGermany was a huge error on the part of Japan.
This is probably the most important point for reflection concerning the Tripartite Pact. But
I personally focus on Japanʼs critical error in allying itself with Nazi Germany, the worldʼs worst
racist nation. Due to this choice, postwar Japan was made to bear the stigma of having allied itself
with the nation that perpetrated the Holocaust. While that is itself regrettable, what Japan should
truly regret is that it allied itself with a country whose creed and values were the exact opposite
of its own.
When the Paris Peace Conference convened to determine the settlement of the First World
War, Japan advocated the inclusion of the principle of racial equality in the Covenant of the newly
founded League of Nations. Although the Japanese proposal failed due to the obstruction of US
president Woodrow Wilson, it won the support of many countries including China. At the end of
the First World War, the world was still standing on the side of racism and racial discrimination
with full impunity. Japan ʼs call to share the principle of racial equality as a universal value
constitutes a brilliant achievement in Japanʼs diplomatic history and is something we should be
proud of. All of this was blotted out by Japanʼs alliance with Nazi Germany.
After the Second World War, the world accepted the principle of racial equality as proclaimed
in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If Japan had notallied itself with Germany, I believe Japanʼs contribution to the realization of this principle andvalue would have been more widely acknowledged.
As a member of the free world, Japanʼs diplomacy today is based squarely on espousing theprinciples and values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. In a sense, this is Japanʼs second
attempt at the principle- and value-based diplomacy that became stalled halfway in the prewar
years due to the alliance with Germany. As in the case of its advocacy for racial equality, I believe
this also represents an important contribution by Japan to the world.
Freedom, democracy, and the rule of law are values born in the West. The very fact that Japan
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Kazuya Sakamotois proclaiming their universality constitutes its contribution to establishing these as universal
principles and values in the world today. For example, consider the framework of the G7. This isa gathering of the developed countries that are leading the free world with these principles andvalues. As Japan is a country with a history and culture totally different from those of the West,I believe that its presence in the G7 is critically important in proving the universality of liberalprinciples and values to the world. If the remaining six countries had created a framework, such agathering would have been nothing more than a gathering of the leaders of the free “West” rather
than the free “world.”

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
One more important point concerning the Second World War that demands our reflection isthe concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan withdrew from the League of
Nations following its disputes with Europe and America over the Manchurian Incident and thefounding of Manchukuo. Upon quitting the League of Nations, Japan issued an imperial rescript
stating that the withdrawal from the League of Nations did not mean that Japan would henceforth
stand aloof in Asia or isolate itself and neglect to maintain friendly ties with the nations of theWest.
But this commitment began to change with the passage of time. First, it was argued that theimportance of harmonious cooperation between Japan, Manchuria, and China was so great thatthe partial contravention of the interests of the West could not be helped. Next, once the Second
World War had started, Japan took the position that Western imperialists had to be ejected fromthe Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
It is true that the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere contained elementsof sympathy for Asian masses suffering under Western colonial rule, as well as a reaction toWestern racism. It also reflected Japanʼs emotional response to the dissatisfaction it felt forWestern attitudes toward it in several areas, notwithstanding the fact that Japan had been such an
assiduous student of the West.
However, Japan basically began promoting the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Spherebecause it believed this concept would contribute to its own national security and economic
prosperity, and believed it would raise Japan ʼs standing in the world. In other words, Japanconcluded that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would serve its own national interests.
The truth was that Japan did not have the power to ensure the security of all the East Asian
countries. Even supposing that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere had succeeded, itwould have been extremely difficult for Japan working within that bloc to become the major
economic power that it did become after the war. In the postwar period, Japan achieved dramatic
economic development within the framework of global economic development, or in other words,
within a “global co-prosperity sphere.” The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was, I think,probably too narrow and restrictive in scope.
My problem with the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would not be solved even if it
had been accomplished through peaceful means. The fundamental problem that I find with thisconcept is that the very idea of creating an exclusive Asian region was deeply flawed.
The concept of a Greater East Asia underestimated the forces of globalization that were
unleashed in the world in the latter half of the 19th century and continued unabated since aroundthe Meiji Restoration. Globalization had reduced the size of the globe and transformed theworld into a single entity. Not fully cognizant of these changes, Japan subscribed to a worldview
oddly reminiscent of the three-cornered contest that prevailed during the Three States Period in
Chinese history. Germany would triumph and lead Europe, the continents of North and SouthAmerica would be led by the United States, and Japan would be the leader in Asia. However,regionalism is fundamentally unviable in a globalized world.
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The World and Japan 150 Years from Meiji – Looking Back on History –Therefore, if Japan wishes to be a leader̶in many meanings of the word̶among nations,
it must not seek to become the leader of Asia. In an increasingly globalized world, Japan shouldmake effective use of its unique characteristics and capabilities to help bring the world closer
together, and to occupy an honored place in international society by standing as one leader
among many leaders of the world.

IV. 150 Years from Meiji: Independence and Self-Respect
In light of all that I have said today, the phrase that comes to mind in describing Japan 150 years
from the Meiji Restoration is “independence and self-respect,” the philosophy of the noted Meiji
thinker Yukichi Fukuzawa. Meiji Japan sought to build a nation of independence and self-respect
so that it could stand on a par with the West. I believe this slogan of Fukuzawa is as important toJapan 150 years from Meiji as it was to Meiji Japan. The critical difference with Meiji Japan is that
this independence and self-respect is to be realized within the development of the liberal worldorder. The world is one, and Japan must cherish the values of the liberal world order and perfect
the mechanisms of collective self-defense with its ally, the United States. Independence and selfrespect is to be realized within this framework. And if Japan were to consider the path of a “richcountry and strong army,” it must do so not solely for its own sake but for the sake of the entire
free world.

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