Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime
Japan:The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities ＊Lee Woo-Youn1W
I.

Introduction

hen one takes the position that mobilized Korean workers were forcibly removed
and coerced into providing labor in wartime Japan (1937-1945), issues such as
the wages paid to the mobilized workers and wage disparities with Japanese
workers end up not being discussed, and become blind spots for researchers.
Prior research that approaches the subject exclusively from a perspective of “forced removal of
workers and forced labor” simply brushes away the issues considered in this paper by labelingthem as the products of “slave labor and slave-like living conditions,” even though they deserve to
be examined in connection with the subject of mobilized labor.
Almost all published research on wartime-mobilized labor approaches the subject under thetwo assumptions of “forced removal of workers and forced labor” and “slave labor and slave-likeliving conditions.” These assumptions create a significant obstacle for researchers trying to recreate what the work and daily lives of the Korean laborers must have been like. Researchers end
up failing to look at the aspects of workersʼ lives in which the laborers demonstrated autonomy,
as well as the wide-ranging and highly diverse events of daily life that may not accord with
the narrative of “slave labor” and “slave-like living conditions.” Perspectives of this type haveconsistently contributed to narrow the spectrum of subjects and topics in research on the historyof wartime mobilized labor.
The following questions are examined in this paper to bring more clarity to the subject ofmobilized Korean workers in wartime Japan. To what extent were wages actually paid to Korean
mineworkers who were working in coal and metal mines? How were their wages determined?
How large was the disparity in wages with Japanese workers? What was the trend in wartime
wage disparities and how did wartime disparities compare to prewar wage disparities? By
shedding light on these questions, this paper seeks to eliminate the obstacles that stand in theway of understanding the lives of mobilized Korean workers. However, as explained in this paper,
research on the wages paid to Korean workers must cope with the critically important issues ofremittances to family in Korea and forced saving. Specifically, were remittances to family being
handled properly, and were workers able to withdraw money from their savings on their own
discretion? If remittances and withdrawals from savings were being made against the will of
the workers, the payment of high wages would prove to be meaningless. This matter shall be＊This article was originally published in Japanese as 李宇衍「戦時期日本へ労務動員された朝鮮人鉱夫（石炭、金属）の賃金と民族間の格差」『エネルギー史研究 : 石炭を中心として』 32, 2017-03-24. 6387 頁
and was translated into English by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

1

Ph. D in Economics at Graduate School, Sungkyunkwan University (2010. 5). Email: wooyoun@skku.
edu

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Lee Woo-Younaddressed in a future paper.
The present writer would like to point out that most of the materials used in this paper werecompiled by researchers who adhere to the viewpoint of “forced removal of workers and forcedlabor.” In Section II, an attempt will be made to examine the wage levels of Korean mineworkers(including those who worked at metal mines), and to see if, as widely believed, the miners were
working for basically no wages or for a pittance. Section III will explain the formulas used for
calculating wages by using examples from mines. Section IV compares the wages of Koreans andJapanese and will examine if discrimination in the payment of salaries based on ethnicity existed,
as is commonly believed. Section V builds on the previous sectionʼs discussion and examines how
wage disparities between Koreans and Japanese evolved during wartime, as well as contrasting
the changes with disparities in the prewar period. The conclusion summarizes the points made inthis paper and presents topics that deserve to be examined in future research.

II.

Wage Levels

Labor mobilization and relocation of Korean workers to Japan began in September 1939 with thestart of the “recruitment” of laborers. While it is frequently assumed that “wartime mobilizedlabor” was unpaid, this is not true. Wages were in fact paid under the mobilization programand continued to be paid under the “conscription” program launched in October 1944. 2 The
mineworkers examined in this paper were no exception, which leads to the questions of how andhow much they were paid.
In 1940, shortly after the start of the mobilization of Korean workers, the Japan Mining
Association [Nihon Kozan Kyokai] conducted a survey of Korean workers in 78 major mines(comprising both coal and metal mines; hereafter referred to as mines) throughout Japan. The
survey covered such matters as “Instruction and Training Facilities” for civic education, “Work
Conditions” of Korean workers, including wages, and “Remittance and Savings.” The findings
were published as a massive 300-page report entitled Survey Report of Workers from the Korean
Peninsula (Hanto-jin rodosha ni kansuru chosa hokoku). (Japan Mining Association 1940; Pak
Kyong-Sik, ed., 1981, Vol. II, pp. 1-300) Table 1 presents data from the 46 mines that provided afull response on average monthly wage, and average savings and remittances per worker. The
monthly cost of food was calculated by multiplying the daily cost by 31. For mines that did notprovide information on the cost of food (indicated by an asterisk), the monthly cost of food wasassumed to be 18.60 yen, calculated using the highest daily cost of food of any mine, which was 0.60
yen. The figures in the “Difference” column were calculated by subtracting savings, remittancesand food costs from the average wage. The exclusion of food costs yields a high degree ofdispersion, which indicates that wages, savings and remittances varied significantly among the2

Regarding the wages of conscripted workers, the following explanation is given in Kokumin choyo no
kaisetsu [Explanation of the national conscription system] (Yoshio Morita ed., Government-Generalof Korea, Mining Bureau, Labor Section, editorial super vision). “Question: Roughly, how muchare conscripted workers paid? Answer: In the Japanese homeland, wages for respondents [persons
responding to conscription] are controlled. Workers are categorized by type of work, region and age,and basically the same rate applies to workers in the same category. For example, in shipbuilding, about
60 yen is paid per month during the first three months. After three months, the rate rises to above 100
yen. In coalmining, excavators generally earn a maximum of about 6 yen [per day], a minimum of 3yen, and an average of 4.50 yen. The rate does not fall below 2.50 yen even during the training period.
Wages for respondents working in Korea are set to be somewhat higher than the general level of wages.
It should be noted that all wages for conscripted workers in both the Japanese homeland and Korea aresubject to the approval of the Government-General of Korea.” (Kokumin Soryoku Chosen Renmei, 1944,
pp. 42-43)

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Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

mines surveyed.3 While this implies that the averages may be of somewhat limited significance,these figures will be used here, as no other data is available.
One point should be made at the outset regarding calculations. “Monthly average remittance”
is not the average amount for all employed workers or workers who worked at the mine for atleast one day in that month, but rather signifies the average amount for workers who actually
made remittances. For example, consider the data from the Mitsui Sunagawa Coal Mine in the
Sapporo District. As of the end of July 1940, the mine employed 622 miners, and an averageof 279 miners made remittances during the four months between March and June (pp. 30-32).
Calculating based on these figures, 44.7 percent of the miners remitted an average amount of
32.34 yen. Although it does not appear in Table 1, another notable case is the Akenobe Mine in
the Osaka District. The response from this mine shows the average monthly number of miners
working at this mine during the first six months of 1940 and the average monthly number ofminers making remittances, indicating that 71.8 percent were remitting funds (pp. 98-101). Similar
data is available for the Ikuno Mine, also in the Osaka District, showing that 72.8 percent wereremitting funds (pp. 153-155). The response from the Takaya Mine in the Sendai District provides
the average monthly number of miners and remitters during the months between March andJuly, indicating that 70.1 percent were remitting funds (pp. 54-54).4 A somewhat different picture
emerges from a report compiled by the Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo]
entitled Survey Report on the Working Conditions of Workers from the Korean Peninsula [Hanto
romusha kinro jokyo ni kansuru chosa hokoku] (hereafter Survey Report). According to this, only
34.0 percent of the miners working at a coalmine in Hokkaido in 1941 were making remittances
to their family in Korea. (Institute for Science of Labor 1943a; Pak Kyong-Sik ed., 1982, Vol. 1, pp.
373, 482) It is also reported that among miners working at the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Minein Hokkaido in early 1943, only 20 to 30 percent were remitting funds. (Tadashi Kosho 2011, p.
358) It may be possible to explain the differences in the ratio of remitters as follows. The data
in Table 1 was gathered immediately after the start of wartime labor mobilization, implying that
the Korean workers were still unfamiliar with their work and work conditions and were easilypressured by employers to make remittances. By contrast, the lower ratios reported in theSurvey Report and by Kosho reflect the possibility that workers were rejecting the solicitation of
employers and were remitting funds on their own.
It is well known that the cost of food, as well as savings, were withheld from wages. Moreover,because savings mostly constituted forced savings, it is very likely that the amounts of savings
appearing in Table 1 were withheld from wages. When remittances are subtracted, the averageremaining balance (difference) comes to 18.50 yen, which is equivalent to 25.7 percent of theaverage monthly wage of 71.95 yen. While the balance is obtained by subtracting savings, the costof food, and remittances from monthly wages, other amounts were also being deducted for suchitems as taxes, utilities, rationed goods, clothing and monthly installment payments. According
to data for 1944, amounts deducted for these items came to about 16.7 percent of wages. (Table
2) To summarize these figures, 18.6 percent of wages were withheld as savings, 21.2 percent forthe cost of food, 16.7 percent for taxes and other items, and 25.7 percent for remittances. Thus, a
total of 56.5 percent was being withheld or deducted from wages, meaning that any miner making
remittances was doing so out of the remaining 43.5 percent. Furthermore, the data for 1940
shown in Table 2 indicates that remitters were sending the equivalent of 34.5 percent includedin the remaining 43.5 percent and were spending the equivalent of 9.3 percent on personal
3

Wages for Korean coalminers also varied significantly among mines during the 1920s. See Chong JinSong(1989).

4

As the number of participants in forced saving programs is thought to be roughly equal to the numberof employees or workers on payrolls, this issue can be ignored.

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Lee Woo-Youn

expenditures. On the other hand, it can be calculated that those who did not remit funds retained
43.5 percent of their wages for spending at their own discretion.
Although the above estimates are based on fragmentar y information, they do not differ
significantly from materials published in the past. The following can be confirmed from theinformation summarized in Table 2. There is very little difference in the ratio of monthly wages
saved and remitted by workers at the Hitachi Mine in Ibaraki Prefecture between 1940 and
1941. The figures for 1944 depict the breakdown of expenditures for an average coalminer in the
Kyushu District, whose daily wages ranged between 7 and 8 yen and monthly wages amounted
to 150 yen. A comparison between 1940 and 1944 points to a slightly lower remittance ratio and ahigher balance ratio. Other than that, there are almost no differences in deducted amounts andother ratios. The figures for 1945 are based on materials from the Sumitomo Inaushi Mine thatreport on wages earned, deducted amounts and remittances made by 44 Korean workers during
a four-month period. Average amounts for these three items are shown in Table 2. It is notablethat here again, no significant difference can be found in the breakdown of expenditures between
1940 and 1945.5
In other words, although Table 2 was compiled from different sources, the consensus is thateven after subtracting forced savings, food costs and other expenses, workers were left withat least 40 percent of their wages as disposable income. Because workers were keeping morethan 40 percent of their wages as disposable income, employers pressured workers to makeremittances to their families. However, many Korean workers did not comply, simply because
they preferred to spend their money locally. It is believed that decisions on fund remittanceswere the subject of very intense arguments between workers and on-site personnel managers
who doubled as the dormitory masters where the workers were housed. The abovementioned
Survey Report that investigated 14 mines touches on this matter in a section entitled “Promoting
Savings,” which contains the following entry regarding “Coalmine B.” “Monthly wages are paidby the dormitory master. The practice is to reach an agreement on how much would be saved andremitted, whereupon workers are handed their remaining balance.” (Pak Kyong-Sik ed. 1982, Vol.
1, p. 4716)
Prior research states that workers received nothing or very small amounts of “pocket money”
because all or most of the wages were withheld for forced savings, various types of installment
5

Table 2 was compiled to examine the breakdown of wages and expenditures, but this table cannot be
used in discussing trends in wartime wages. Coal and metal mining wages were continuously rising.
The “Price Freeze Order” of September 19, 1939 prohibited any further increase in prices, rents,
charges, transportation charges, wages and salar y. Thereafter, the order was renewed ever y year.
(Cohen 1949, pp. 358-359) Wages were controlled after March 1939. However, due to chronic labor
shortages, businesses found other ways to raise wages to attract workers. That is, aside from controlledwages, businesses paid a wide array of allowances that included temporary allowance, family allowanceand long-term employment allowance to effectively raise wages. (Akira Hara 1976, p. 242) Wages wereraised to retain workers and, as a result, the average daily wage for men increased from 3.08 yen in 1940
to 5.676 yen in 1944. (Cohen 1949, p. 166)

6

Another example can be found in Coalmine A where records state, “Wages are paid through thedormitory master, but no more than 10 yen per month is handed to workers. Workers are made to saveor remit the remainder. (Interest on company savings is 6.5 percent per annum.) In some cases, workers
have returned home at the end of their two-year contract with 1,300 yen in savings. The 10 yen of pocket
money is mostly spent on food, drink and gambling. Some workers purchase clothes.” Another example
is Coalmine C where records state, “All wages were paid through the dormitory master. As a rule,pocket money was kept within 10 yen per month, and the remaining money was allocated to savings andremittance (as a rule, remittance amounted to no more than 20-30 yen.” The “10 yen rule” was regularly
applied to workers with a positive attitude toward remitting funds, but the company probably had
nothing it could do with workers who did not remit money. On the other hand, Table 1 shows that theupper limit of the “rule” on remittances was also not always obeyed.

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Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

savings, food costs and other expenses, and concludes that workers had no possibility of making
remittances.7 However, more than 40 percent of wages remained in the hands of workers after
the deduction of forced savings and other items. Of this remaining amount, workers maderemittances to their families either on their own discretion or under pressure from personnel
managers, or other wise spent the money locally. On July 19, 1939, Par ticulars Concerning
Implementation of Above Guidelines [Migi no yoko toriatsukai ni kansuru saimoku] (“Above
Guidelines” refers to Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu
yoko]) was announced. From this date onward through the end of the war, the general rule wasthat “with the exception of minimal amounts, all wages must be remitted or saved.” (Particulars
Concerning Implementation of Above Guidelines) [Chosen-jin Kyosei Renko Jittai Chosa
Hokokusho Henshu Iinkai] ed. 1999, p. 43). However, due to the resistance of Korean workers,
this rule was not enforced. Deductions included the costs of work clothes and food, but rent was
not charged to those who lived in the dormitory for single workers. Money remaining after the
deduction of necessary living expenses and savings, if not remitted, was spent on such items as
clothes, various food items, gambling, alcohol and tobacco. Details of such expenditures will be
discussed in a future paper.

7

Pak Kyong-Sik quotes the account of a worker who was mobilized in 1941. “When I arrived at mywork after being conscripted, I found that my wage was 1.30 yen, which was only half the amountadvertised. My plans immediately fell through. There was no way I could think about remitting funds
because I barely had enough to feed myself.” (1965, p. 87) Shigeru Nagasawa writes in his study of the
Joban Coalmine in Fukushima that little money was left after the cost of food and other expenses werededucted. “After paying for daily necessities and after money was withheld for the companyʼs forcedsavings, there was absolutely no room left for the Korean workers to send money home. And if there
was some money left, it was a very small amount.” (1977, p. 131) In his study of the same region, Shoji
Yamada writes, “Wages were withheld for forced saving and the workers only received a small amountof pocket money. The intent was to prevent workers from escaping to distant places.” (1978, p. 650)
Eidai Hayashi claimed, “Out of the wages that they received, workers paid for food (0.60 – 0.65 yen perday), bedding, cigarettes, alcohol and soap. The rest was taken away for Patriotic Savings, savings for
retirement, normal savings, national bonds and forced savings. As a result, not a single cent was paid
to the workers.” (1991, p. 36) Cook and Cook also quote the account of a mobilized worker. “Wages?
They didnʼt pay us anything. When we were coming from Korea, they told us we would receive 1.50
yen. But we werenʼt paid even for a single day of work.” (1992, p. 196) Kim Moon-Young takes a more
flexible position than the foregoing researchers and says that, after various expenses were deducted,“Not much was left to be paid to the workers. Not very many workers were able to remit more than theremittable amount of 15 yen.” (1995, pp. 86-87) While there is evidence of restrictions being placed on
remittance amounts, it remains unknown whether such restrictions were commonplace. Kim In-Dok
writes, “Rarely did workers receive any money from their employers. It appears this was the generalrule… Even if monthly wages were received, the amounts were extremely small. Generally speaking,workers only received a small amount of pocket money from their employers.” (2002, pp. 49-50) Chon
He-Gyon quotes the account of a mobilized worker as follows. Regarding monthly wages, “What was
paid to us was so little it would be finished with a single dayʼs outing.” Based on this he writes, “It canbe concluded that they received a small amount of pocket money each month.” (2006, p. 171) Ho KanMu directly quotes the oral account of a Korean worker. “The monthly wage was no more than pocket
money. So, we could not even think about sending money home.” (2014, p. 64) Unlike the foregoing
researchers, Chon Gi-Ho expresses doubts about whether the remittances made by Korean workers
were properly paid to their families. (2003, pp.113-114) I San-Wi proposes the theory that remittancesthat had not been made were included in the unpaid amounts held in deposit after the end of the war.
(2014, p. 61) As noted above, the present writer plans to address issues related to remittances to families
in Korea and unpaid amounts in a future paper.

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III.

Methods for Calculating Wages

The methods used in calculating wages are discussed in this section with a focus on coalmines.8
As attested to by Eidai Hayashi, “ While wages dif fered among mines, extremely complex
methods were used for calculating the wages of miners.” [Hayashi 1991: Bibliography [Kaidai],p. 34] The most detailed explanation of wage calculation methods is provided by the Institutefor Science of Labor (1943b) in Korean Peninsula Workers in Coalmines [Tanko ni okeru hantojin romusha], the contents of which can be summarized as follows. First of all, “new arrivals”
underwent “three months” of training during which they were paid a flat daily amount. At the endof this period, workers were assigned to such tasks as excavating, tunneling, loading and hauling.
For these tasks, wage rates were normally based on the value of group output.9 Finally, workers
were paid a flat daily amount for such tasks as machine operation, machining, coal washing andmiscellaneous tasks. Output-based wage calculation for excavating, tunneling and related tasks is
explained below.10(1) Determining the total wage pool: For excavating, the total wage amount was calculated bymultiplying a per-ton value by the net tonnage of coal produced. For tunneling, the total wage
pool was calculated by multiplying a per-tsubo (approx. 3.3 m2) value by the total area cleared(in tsubo). (2) Adjusting the total wage pool: A fixed bonus amount was added for every cart
exceeding a previously determined production norm. When miners performed any another task,
the relevant amount would also be added to the total wage pool. When a decline in production
tonnage was anticipated due to the assignment of National Labor Volunteers [Kinro Hokoku
Tai] or new recruits, a certain amount was added to the total wage pool under the heading of“Compensation for Diminished Skill.” Additions were also made to the total wage pool whenlarge numbers of Korean workers were mixed into the teams, or allowances were added to thewage pool for training or accompanying newly recruited unskilled miners. (3) Determining
the per-ton value: Starting with the valuation on the labor portion of per-ton production cost,various factors were taken into consideration in determining the per-ton value of coal produced.
First, consideration was given to maintaining a balance with wages paid for other tasks. Second,consideration was given to seasonal factors that made mining more difficult. Third, consideration
was given to diminished output when excavation reached a poor- quality working face or vein. (4)Determining the production tonnage: Production tonnage was calculated based on the numberof coal-filled carts removed from the mine. The weight of coal per cart was estimated by sight.
(It is reported that estimation by sight varied ver y little from actual measurement.) A fixedrate downward adjustment was made in the number of carts when the loads contained large
amounts of inferior-grade “waste.” (It should be noted that some Korean workers suspected thatthe carts were not being properly counted.) (5) After calculating the total wage pool using the8

Between 1939 and 1945, a total of 144,004 Korean workers were mobilized and assigned to mines. Of
this number, 121,574 workers (84.4 percent) worked in coalmines. It is reported that, among suchcoalminers, a great many of them worked inside the mines as excavators. (Lee Woo-Youn 2015, p. 6)

9In Japanese, this system is referred to as dantai dekidaka-barai seido. Following the example of Chon
Jin-Song, dekidaka-barai seido has been rendered as seisan daka chingin seido [output-based wage rate]in this paper. The term dantai has been added because, as outlined below, the aggregate wage for theentire work group was first determined, and this aggregate amount was then allocated among individual
workers.

10

According to the Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans (1999,
p 299), wages at metal mines were as follows. Wages for workers working inside the mines were
determined on a contract basis (output-based wage rate), while flat-rate wages were paid to thoseworking outside the mines. These arrangements applied to both Korean and Japanese workers. During
the training period, a “temporary employment” wage was paid, amounting to 1.20–1.30 yen. After theend of the training period, performance pay was added according to the type of work assignment.

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above methods, wages were allotted to individual workers based on fixed ratios that took into
consideration each individualʼs skill level and work assignment. The ratios calculated by on-site
supervisors were referred to as buritsu, or “rate.” For instance, assume that rates ranged from aminimum of 10 to a maximum of 16. Each worker was then given a rate, and the individualʼs wage
was calculated based on his rate. (Institute for Science of Labor 1943b, pp. 769-770)
The calculation process can be shown using the following example. Assume that on the day ofmeasurement, output came to 247 carts with a per-cart value of 0.75 yen. A total of 20 carts werededucted for “waste”, 1.9 carts were deducted for carr ying less than the specified load, and
0.6 carts were added for carrying more than the specified load. As a result, net output equaled
226.15 carts (243 - 20 - 1.9 + 0.6), so that the total wage pool came to 162.83 yen (0.75 x 226.15).
Assuming that National Labor Volunteers were working in the mines on this day, compensation ismade for diminished productivity at the rate of 0.20 yen per cart. Hence, the total compensation
amount for diminished productivity comes to 45.20 yen (0.20 x 226.15). Next, a training allowanceof 0.30 yen is paid per inexperienced National Labor Volunteer, so that a training allowance of
5.40 yen (0.30 x 18 volunteers) is added to the wage pool. After deducting 21.42 yen for the costof explosives used on this day, the total wage pool comes to 192.01 yen. This total amount was
divided among the workers based on the following calculation method. Assuming that a Japanese
worker, 16 to 18 years old with at least one month of experience, has a skill level of 10 points, theworker with the lowest skill level who worked on this day is given a skill score of 11.5 points andthe worker with the highest skill level is given a skill score of 16.0 points. Adding the skill points
for all workers yields 588.4 points in total. Based on this, the wage payable per skill point is 0.328
yen (192.01 ÷ 588.4). Hence, the least skilled worker with a skill score of 11.5 points received 3.77
yen (0.328 x 11.5), and the most skilled worker with a skill score of 16.0 points received 5.25 yen(0.328 x 16.0). (Institute for Science of Labor 1943b, pp. 770-771)
While the same wage scale was applied to both Korean and Japanese workers, thiscomplicated calculation method potentially gave rise to misunderstandings. In addition, theassessment (calculation) of the rate and other factors created room for ethnic discrimination.11 A
review of disputes arising between Korean workers and their employers shows that wage disputes
occurred frequently during 1939 and 1940, but decreased to nearly zero after 1941. (Editorial
Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans 1999, p. 254) On the other
hand, food-related disputes increased as dietary conditions deteriorated.12 Both the Government11

According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers [Hokkaido to Chosen-jin rodosha] compiled by the Editorial
Committee of the Sur vey Repor t on the Forced Removal of Koreans (1999), wage calculations
were complex, and its structure gave rise to suspicions that wages were subject to ethnicity-based
discrimination. (p. 253)

12

According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers, with the passage of time, Korean workers “came tounderstand” that wages differed depending on “diligence” and “capability” (the individualʼs muscle
power). (p. 254) It can be judged that this was not so much the result of gaining a better understandingof the wage system, but rather reflected the development of a certain relation of trust between Korean
workers and their employers on matters related to wages. Another cause of wage disputes was that
recruiters had quoted the highest standards of pay to prospective recruits. But once they arrived
at their work, they found that wages were output-based or were flat daily rates. (Ministry of Justice,
Criminal Affairs Bureau 1941, p. 1,233) According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers, during January–
December 1944, there were 134 cases of labor disputes in Hokkaido involving immigrant Korean
workers (10,166 participants). The largest number (48 cases) pertained to labor management issues(of which 24 involved use of violence). The second largest number (27 cases) pertained to contract
extension issues and return to Korea (of which 23 involved opposition to contract extension). Also tied
for second (27 cases) were cases pertaining to food and medical issues. (p. 1,593) Wage-related disputes
were frequent during the beginning of this period, but totaled only 7 cases (200 participants) in 1944. (p.
326)

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General of Korea and the Japanese government were aware of these issues. On February 13,
1942, the “recruitment” system of labor mobilization was replaced by “government-mediatedrecruitment.” At this time, the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Labor issued Guidelines
on Training and Treatment of Incoming Workers [Inyu romusha kunren toriatsukai yoko], whichcontained the following provision. “ Workers shall be made to fully understand in advancethat individual wages will differ according to individual efficiency and diligence.” (Ministr yof Welfare and Ministr y of Home Affairs 1942, p. 77) Guidelines on Mediated Recruitment ofWorkers Relocated to the Homeland [Naichi inyu assen yoko] dated February 20, 1942 and issued
by the Government-General of Korea contains the following provision. “In particular, terms of
employment shall be thoroughly communicated… Have workers fully understand and accept that
individual wages will naturally differ according to ability.” (Maeda 1943, p. 51)13
Yutaka Nishinarita makes the following statement based on materials from the Sumitomo
Konomai Gold Mine in Hokkaido for 1942. “ Non-payment of wages was by no means the
exception.” (Nishinarita 1997, p. 277) The material used by Nishinarita is reproduced here as
follows.
Date:
From:

July 8, 1942
Kiyoji Kimura, Chief Administrator of Gongju-gun, Mokdong-myeon,To:

Director of Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine

Re:

Request on Payment of Workerʼs Wages… This is in regard to a complaint filed by the worker named below who was employed by yourcompany on March 22, 1940 and departed your company at the end of his term of employment
on April 27, 1942, at which time he returned to his place of origin. The complaint states that his
wages could not be precisely determined and paid at the time of his departure due to the hassle,
and that he was given verbal assurances by the personnel manager during his voyage backthat unpaid wages for 24 days would be remitted to him at a later date. Although two months
have passed since his return, he has yet to receive any remittance. The worker has on several
occasions requested that this matter be pursued. While knowing well that you are busy, werequest that you investigate this matter and inform us of your findings.
Worker in question:
Chungcheong-do, Gongju-gun, Mokdong-myeon, Iin-ri
Che Geum-Ok
Nishinarita takes the above description “wages could not be precisely determined and paid” asproof that “wages payable to Korean workers were very sloppily managed.” However, it should be
noted that the above case involves the settlement of outstanding wages after the end of the termof employment, and is not a problem that arose during the period of employment in the mine.
It is also important to note that, since the start of the mobilization of Korean workers in 1939,
employers were required to file monthly reports with local government authorities regarding thework performed by Korean workers, living conditions, wages and other matters related to labor
13

Accounts from mobilized workers also contain statements that, “The more you worked, themore you were paid.” (Nittei Kyosen-ka Kyosei Doin Higai Shinso Kyumei Iinkai [Investigative
Committee on Victims of Forced Mobilization under Occupation by Imperial Japan;
hereinafter, Investigative Committee] 2005, p. 287; 2007a, pp. 109, 159, 551; 2009, p. 164)
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Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

management. This requirement came into effect pursuant to a directive dated July 29, 1939 issued
jointly by the Vice Ministers of the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Entitled
Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu yoko], the directive
was for warded to all local authorities. Concurrent to this directive, Particulars Concerning
Implementation of Guidelines [Toriatsukai ni kansuru saimoku] (Editorial Committee of theSurvey Report on the Forced Removal of Koreans, 1999, p. 44) and Procedures for Recruitment of
Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu tetsuzuki] (Investigative Group on the Truth of Forced
Removal of Koreans ed. 1974, p. 622) were issued, which specified the obligations of employers.
On the same day, Administrative Procedures for the Immigration of Korean Workers to theHomeland [Chosen-jin rodosha naichi iju ni kansuru jimu tetsuzuki] was issued, which required all
employers to file monthly reports with the local chief of police regarding work conditions, wages,savings, remittances and other matters. (Sumitomo Utashinai Mine 1940, pp. 15-16) Under these
conditions, it would have been impossible to systematically avoid payment of wages to Korean
workers.14
It is also important to note that Che Geum-ok, the Korean worker in the case cited above,
went to the local government office to complain that his wages had not been remitted to him,
whereupon the local administrator issued a formal letter explaining the background of the caseand sought a response from the employer. Yoshihiko Moriya refers to a case where remittancesfrom Japan had not reached family members, which resulted in an exchange of letters between
the local government office and the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine (1996, pp. 134-135), leading
one to believe that in this instance also, a response was received from the mining company.
Because employers were obligated to file monthly reports with local government authorities on
the payment of wages to Korean workers, it can be said that an established procedure was inplace for resolving problems related to the non-payment of outstanding wages. The case citedby Nishinarita should not be interpreted to mean that wages payable to Korean workers in Japan“were sloppily managed.” Instead, the case should be taken as evidence that the payment ofwages was systematically managed and implemented. The marks of systematic management
can also be seen in a survey conducted in 1942 of Korean workers employed in a certain mine.
Asked what they looked forward to, the leading response was “payday.” [Sangyo Rodo Chosasho
1942, p. 18] Given the materials currently on hand, this would be the most rational interpretation.
The discovery of new materials related to coal and metal mines may very well enable us to moreaccurately describe the diverse conditions that existed.
Due to changes in the war situation, all gold mines were closed in 1943, and the Korean
workers employed at the above-mentioned Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine were relocated to coalmines in the Kyushu area. Chon He-Gyon has focused on matters related to wages in the context
of this relocation. Chon pointed out that wages, allowances and savings ranging across 18 to 20
items were settled and paid to the workers, and argued that the regulations related to wages andother matters during the process of relocation prove that there was “coercion.” [2011, pp. 574575] This argument is difficult to understand as it provides no basis for why the settlement andpayment of these amounts could be proof of “coerced labor.” It is quite clear that this case, too,should be interpreted as evidence of systematic management of wage payment as was the casedescribed above. For example, Moriya points out that Korean and Japanese workers were treated
14

The following is an account of a worker relocated to Sakhalin in 1941. “Question: Did you
receive your unpaid wages when you were leaving? Answer: Where I was working, if you did
your work, they would pay you for that month. They paid the monthly amount, and neverfailed or refused to pay. Question: Were you paid for all the work you did? Answer: Yes, forevery month that I worked, I was basically paid in the same month.” (Investigative Committee
20071, p. 159)
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Lee Woo-Younequally in the settlement of wages, allowances and savings in the process of relocation, with the
exception that Korean workers received a relocation allowance equal to three monthsʼ wages thatwas paid as a severance allowance, as well as leave pay, food and drink allowances, and parting
gifts. [1991, p. 29]

IV.

Wage Disparities Between Korean and Japanese Workers

Wages were paid to Korean workers throughout the entire period of the mobilization andrelocation of Korean workers to Japan. This began with “recruitment” in September 1939 andcontinued through “ government-mediated recruitment ” introduced in Februar y 1942 and“conscription” instituted in September 1944. Rules pertaining to “recruitment” were set down inthe directive dated July 29, 1939 issued jointly by the Vice Ministers of the Ministry of Welfare
and the Ministry of Home Affairs and addressed to all local government authorities under thetitle of Policies Pertaining to the Immigration of Korean Workers to the Homeland [Chosen-jin
rodosha naichi iju ni kansuru hoshin] (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on the Forced
Removal of Koreans 1999, p. 493) This document instructs Japanese employers to “avoid as muchas possible any discrimination in the treatment of Korean workers as compared to homeland
workers.”15 The mobilization of Korean workers through “government-mediated recruitment”
was announced in the Cabinet decision of February 13, 1942 entitled Policies Pertaining to the
Employment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin romusha katsuyo ni kansuru hoshin] (pp. 24-25), whichcontains the following directive. “At all levels, there shall be no difference in the treatment ofsuch workers as compared to homeland workers.”16 Finally, the same can be said for the rules on“conscription,” which emphasized that “There is absolutely no discrimination between homelandand Korean workers in wages and in all other matters.” (Kokumin Soryoku Chosen Renmei 1944,

15

On the same day, a joint directive was issued by the vice-ministers of the Ministry of Welfare
and the Ministry of Home Affairs to local government authorities. Attached to Guidelines on
Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu yoko], this directive was entitled
Administrative Procedures for the Immigration of Korean Workers to the Homeland [Chosen-jin
rodosha naichi iju ni kansuru jimu tetsuzuki]. Article 13 of this directive instructs that, “There
must be no manner of discriminatory treatment compared to homeland workers.” (Hajime
Maeda 1943, p. 31) The same phrase (“There must be no manner of discriminatory treatmentcompared to homeland workers”) is repeated in Particulars Concerning Implementation ofAbove Guidelines [Migi no yoryo toriatsukai ni kansuru saimoku] attached to Guidelines on
Recruitment of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha boshu yoko]. (Chosen-jin Kyosei Renko
Jittai Chosa Hokokusho Henshu Iinkai ed. 1999, p. 43) Guidelines on Recruitment of Korean
Workers was issued in September 1939, and included the provision that there must be “nodiscriminatory treatment compared to homeland workers.” (Investigative Group on the Truthof Forced Removal of Koreans ed., Chosen-jin kyosei renko kyosei rodo [Forced removal andforced labor of Koreans] 1974, p. 621)

16

The same is repeated in Guidelines on Training and Treatment of Incoming Workers [Inyuromusha kunren toriatsukai yoko], issued by the Ministry of Welfare on the same day, and in
Guidelines on Mediated Recruitment of Workers Relocated to the Homeland [Naichi inyu assenyoko] that was issued by the Government-General of Korea on Februar y 20, 1942. These
documents both state, “Due attention shall be paid to avoid any sense of discrimination. ”(Shigeru Nagasawa 1992, Vol. 2, p. 76; Pak Kyong-Sik ed. 1976, Vol. 4, p. 1,254)
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Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

pp. 41-42)17
Reports also can be found from individual mines stating that no wage discrimination existed
between Korean and Japanese workers. A total of 52 mines responded to the Survey Report ofWorkers from the Korean Peninsula outlined in the preceding section. (pp. 1-300) Among these,a total of 21 mines either responded explicitly that “no difference whatsoever existed between
the treatment of Korean workers” and Japanese workers, or stated that the “same treatment”
was accorded to Korean and Japanese workers. Needless to say, this means that both groups
were subject to the same wage schedule, and not that everyone received the same amount. The
1940 Notice on Terms of Employment [Shugyo annai] of the Sumitomo Utashinai Mine (coalmine)states that, “wages shall be based on performance [output level].” (Sumitomo Utashinai Mine
1940b, p. 22) The Rules of Employment [Shugyo kisoku] of the Iwaki Mine contains the following:“3. Factors determining wages (1): Wages… shall be calculated based on predetermined unit
value and output… Wages for jointly performed tasks shall be calculated… proportionately.”(Shigeru Nagasawa 1987, p. 168) The point that the above Notice on Terms of Employment andRules of Employment have in common is that no distinction is made between Japanese and Korean
workers. The fact is that no document exists to show that the two groups of workers were treateddifferently.18 According to the Sumitomo Utashinai Mineʼs Terms Requested and Answer to theTerms Requested (Collection of Occupation Forces-related Materials [Shinchu-gun kankei tsuzuri]),
Korean workers who went on strike after the end of the war demanded that they be paid “anadditional 0.50 yen to compensate for the fact that they were receiving 0.50 yen less than Japanese
workers during the war.” The company responded to this demand by stating that no differencein wages existed between Korean and Japanese workers, and that wages were calculated on thebasis of experience, skill, and amount of work performed. (1945, pp. 415-417) Following this
response, this matter was never brought up again.
Materials of the Tokyo District Mining Association regarding the Sado Mine (metal mine)state that the mine, “in compliance with government policy, adopted a non-discrimination policyin the treatment of Korean and Japanese workers.” The treatment of Korean workers is stated tobe the same as “homeland workers.” [p. 147] The method for calculating wages is explained asfollows. “Most of the workers from the Korean Peninsula work at jobs inside the mine. As is thecase with homeland workers, wages for Korean workers working inside the mine is calculated
based on output volume and a unit value that is calculated in advance based on such factors asage, experience, type of task performed and difficulty of task. The few Korean workers working
outside the mine are paid a flat wage.” (p. 150) Writing in the same year, Hajime Maeda, the headof the personnel department of the Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship Company, reported that there
was no wage disparity between Japanese and Korean workers, and that wages were determinedbased on levels of diligence and skill. (1943, p. 149)
Documents of the Japanese government, the Government-General of Korea and individual
mines all state that there was no wage discrimination based on ethnicity. But were theseclaims accurate? Is it possible that Korean workers were being paid less than their Japanesecounterparts for performing the same tasks? The first researcher to give an unambiguous answer
to this question was Pak Kyong-Sik. (1965) His work continues to be regarded in academic circles
17“Application for Requisition” filed by the Hokkaido Collier y & Steamship Company with
the Ministry of Munitions and the Government-General of Korea contains a section entitled“Wages for Conscripted Workers,” which states, “Workers conscripted under the provisions ofArticle 18-2 of the National Requisition Ordinance shall receive wages in accordance with the
Ministry of Welfareʼs Regulations Concerning Wages of Conscripted Workers. (“Application for
Requisition” reproduced in Yoshihiko Moriya 1995, p. 40)

18

Letter of Shigeru Nagasawa cited by Munehiro Miwa.
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Lee Woo-Youn

as representing the mainstream of research and constitutes the generally accepted theory. Pak
Kyong-Sik draws his conclusions from the information summarized in Table 3, which outlines the
distribution of wages (monthly wages) by ethnicity in a Hokkaido coalmine. The source of thisinformation is the survey conducted by the Institute for Science of Labor between January 15 andFebruary 7, 1942, the results of which were published as Survey Report of Working Conditions of
Korean Peninsula Workers. The information used by Pak Kyong-Sik is drawn from page 90 of theSurvey Report, which provides data on Coalmine D. (Pak Kyong-Sik ed., 1982, Vol. 1, p. 90)19
Table 3 shows that 82.3 percent of the Japanese workers received wages exceeding 50 yen,while 75.0 percent of the Korean workers earned less than 50 yen. Based on this information, Pak
Kyong-Sik concluded that Korean workers received about half the amount received by Japanese
workers and argued that this was proof of “ethnic discrimination.” This table is cited again in
the “Summary Table” [Sokatsuhyo] appearing on pages 173-174 of the Survey Report. However,immediately before this table, “Korean Workers: Number of Years Employed” [Chosen-jin kinzoku
nensu] and “Japanese Workers: Numbers of Years Employed” [Naichi-jin kinzoku nensu] appear
on pages 169 – 170. Based on this information, Table 4 shows distribution of years employedamong workers at Coalmine D.
In the case of Korean workers, 89.3 percent had been employed for less than two years, andonly 10.7 percent had been employed for more than two years. In the case of Japanese workers,
the corresponding figures were 42.8 percent and 57.2 percent, respectively.20 As can be surmised
from Table 4, Korean workers were highly concentrated in the wage range of below 50 yen, while
Japanese workers were concentrated in the relatively high wage range of above 50 yen. However,this skewed wage distribution reflects differences in work efficiency resulting from differencesin years of employment. Shigeru Nagasawa presented a survey conducted at the Iriyama Coal
Company in the Joban coal district that estimates differences in work efficiency resulting fromdifferences in the composition of work teams. According to this study, in the case of a teamconsisting of four Japanese and three Korean workers, the average measure of tunneling advance
per worker was 0.8 shaku (about 24 cm). The corresponding figure for a team consisting of eight
Korean workers with two years of experience was 0.51 shaku (about 15 cm: equivalent to 63.8
percent of the previous mixed Japanese-Korean team). Moreover, a team of eight Korean workers
who had just completed three months of training achieved only 0.25 shaku (about 8 cm). (Shigeru
Nagasawa 1987, p. 28 citing Collected Papers on the Forced Removal of Koreans [Chosen-jin kyosei
renko ronbun shusei] 1993, p. 170) This data indicates that the number of years of employment, or

19

The survey covered the following 20 sites: 6 coalmines in Hokkaido, 3 metal mines in Honshu,
5 coalmines in Kyushu, 3 construction companies in Honshu, 2 factories in Honshu, and 1
factory in Kyushu. The survey addressed production management, labor management andworker welfare facilities. (Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] (1943a), pp.
3-8)

20

There is also a significant difference between Korean and Japanese workers with less than
one year of experience. The vast majority of Koreans had worked for less than one year.
The standard term of labor contracts was two years, which applied to both “recruitment”
and “government-mediated recruitment.” Employers made various efforts to retain Korean
workers at the end of their contract period. For example, mining companies defrayed the costof several types of options, which included bringing family members from Korea, paying fora temporary visit to Korea, or paying a contract extension bonus. This was done because theexperience and skills gained by a Korean coalminer during the two-year period of his contract
were considered by the employers to constitute extremely valuable assets.
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Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

the accumulation of work experience, was the determining factor in work efficiency.21
The abovementioned Survey Report contains two more surveys that report on distributions by
ethnicity and work experience, and the distribution of wages. Table 5 summarizes the informationfrom Coalmine B, which was located in Hokkaido as in the case of Coalmine D.
In terms of years of employment, unlike in the case of Coalmine D, the Korean workers wereconcentrated in the 1–2 year range, while 42 percent of the Japanese workers were new handswith less than one year of experience. On the other hand, Korean workers with more than two
years of experience accounted for 23.0 percent, while Japanese workers with more than two yearsof experience accounted for a much higher proportion, or 42.3 percent. These two differencesbalanced each other out so that, in comparison with Coalmine D, the distribution of wages among
Korean and Japanese workers was ver y close to being identical. Thus, Korean and Japanese
workers earning less than 50 yen accounted for 20.8 percent and 21.7 percent, respectively. The
corresponding figures for Korean and Japanese workers earning more than 50 yen were 79.2
percent and 73.8 percent, respectively.
In the case of Metal Mine I, there were no Korean workers with more than two years of work
experience, while 46.2 percent of the Japanese workers had been employed for more than two
years. As a result, the distribution of wages shows that Korean and Japanese workers earning lessthan 50 yen accounted for 35.0 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively. Conversely, a substantiallyhigher proportion of Japanese workers earned more than 50 yen than their Korean counterparts.
It can be seen that the conclusions Pak Kyong-Sik reached regarding the presence of “ethnic
discrimination” in wages is based on a one-sided interpretation of the data. As previously noted,
wartime wages of Korean and Japanese workers were basically determined by the level of work
efficiency. Judging logically, it is clear that wages were determined by work performance (coaloutput or metal ore output) and that work performance was directly and significantly affected by
years of employment. This fact is borne out by data from Coalmine B and Metal Mine I on the
distributions of work experience and wages. Looking at this important material collected, collated
and later compiled by Pak Kyong-Sik himself, it seems that, instead of looking at the entire bodyof information available, Pak Kyong-Sik extracted certain portions of the information and arrived
at hastily formulated conclusions.22
For more than 50 years, the asser tions made by Pak Kyong-Sik were never criticallyexamined. Consequently, these errors have survived to the present and have been repeated timeand again. For example, Kim Moon-Young uncritically adopted Pak Kyong-Sikʼs wage distribution
from Coalmine D in Hokkaido and added some fragmentary statements from witnesses to saythat the wages paid to Korean workers were one-half of those paid to Japanese workers, orslightly exceeded one-half. (1995, pp. 138-141) Chon Gi-Ho used data from 18 mines operated
by Nippon Mining Company (known for its gold mines) to argue that “ethnicity-based wage
discrimination” existed. (2013, pp. 102-104) The salient points of his research are summarized inTable 7, consisting of the average wages of laborers working inside the mines and those working
outside the mines as of March 1943.
According to Chon Gi-Ho, wages paid to Koreans working inside the mines were equivalent to
21

In the prewar period, wages paid for principal mining tasks such as excavating and tunnelingwere output-based. Chong Jin-Song(1989) points out that, when the details of the wage
determination system are taken into consideration, it is difficult to identify the existence of
ethnicity-based wage differentials even during the 1920s.

22

Survey Report on the Working Conditions of Workers from the Korean Peninsula [Hanto romushakinro jokyo ni kansuru chosa hokoku] is reproduced in Pak Kyong-Sik (1981) Chosen mondai
shiryo sosho, dai ni maki: senji kyosei renko – romu kanri seisaku II [Collected materials on
Korean issues, Vol. 2: wartime forced removal, labor management policies II].
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Lee Woo-Youn“75–85 percent of the wages paid to Japanese workers.” Having re-tabulated and re-calculated thedata used by Chon Gi-Ho, the present writer found that Korean wages were actually equivalent
to 86.8 percent of Japanese wages. It is questionable whether this level of disparity can be fairly
labeled to constitute ethnic discrimination. Moreover, very substantial variations are seen amongmines. Thus, the ratio of Korean to Japanese wages ranges from a low of 73.6 percent to a high of
112.2 percent. Instances of high Korean wages are found at the Bajo and Onoyama gold mines.
As for workers employed outside the mines, Korean wages amounted to 94.1 percent of Japanesewages. Notably, Korean wages exceeded Japanese wages at seven mines, including the Hokuryu
Mine. A comparison of mines indicates that the range of wage differentials was larger among
those working outside the mines than among those working inside the mines. Thus, in the caseof workers employed outside the mines, the ratio of Korean to Japanese wages ranges from a lowof 67.8 percent to a high of 129.7 percent.
As has been noted, among workers employed outside the mines, Korean wages exceeded
Japanese wages in certain instances. Chon Gi-Ho has attempted to explain this phenomenon
in the following manner. “The number of Japanese male workers employed outside the mines
decreased, and the number of Japanese female workers and temporar y workers employedoutside the mines increased, resulting in an overall decline in Japanese wages. As a result, wages
for Korean workers employed outside the mines became relatively higher.” This is a plausible
explanation. However, as previously stated, the nominal wages of both Korean and Japanese
workers continued to climb throughout the war years, and there are cases where Koreans
working inside the mines were being paid more than their Japanese counterparts. In otherwords, there is a possibility that wages for Koreans working inside the mines for the Nippon
Mining Company were higher than those of their Japanese counterparts because Korean wages
rose faster than Japanese wages, and not because the wages of Japanese workers employedoutside mines declined. If this explanation is correct, it can then be argued that the figures inTable 7 do not really suggest a significant disparity in wages based on ethnicity, but rather thatthey reflect the relatively small difference in labor efficiency that existed between Korean andJapanese workers. This is a highly significant conclusion that leads to another question. Did
the composition of Japanese mining teams change in a manner that lowered the productivityof Japanese workers, or did Korean wages rise relatively faster than that of Japanese workers?
An effort must be made to determine which of these two possibilities more accurately reflects
the course of events. To answer this question, it is necessary to examine data on changes in thewages of specific workers, such as may be found in “payroll ledgers.” While this information does
exist, unfortunately it has not been made public.
The assertion that ethnicity-based wage discrimination did not exist in wartime Japan in asystematic and organized fashion, at least on an institutional level as indicated in the rules of
employment of individual mines, is not necessarily new. The problem is that this position has
been ignored in Korean academic circles. Shigeru Nagasawa has written concerning the Joban
Mine that the wages of Korean workers were based on a subcontracting system where wages
were calculated according to output, and that this arrangement applied to Japanese workers as
well. Furthermore, Nagasawa explains that the calculation of individual wages was based on thefollowing three factors: total output of the relevant work area, the proportional rate assigned toeach individual worker (11 points for a highly skilled veteran front-line coalminer known as an
osakiyama; 10 points for a only slightly less skilled front-line miner known as a sakiyama; 9.0 – 9.5
points for a back-end miner known as an atoyama; 7.5 – 8 points for a new hand), and the numberof days worked. (Nagasawa 1977, p. 101 citing Collected Papers on the Forced Removal of Koreans
1993, p. 130) Nagasawa affirms the existence of the same arrangement in a paper published in
1987. Specifically, he notes that the wages of coalminers working in the Joban Mine were basedon a contracted unit value and production tonnage, and that, as in the case of Japanese workers,
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wages were calculated according to collective output. He adds that a fixed daily wage applied toother tasks, and that wages differed by type of work performed but not by ethnicity. Nagasawa
concludes that a reading of “Terms of Wages” alone does not point to ethnic discrimination, andasserts that the same can be said about other companies as well. (Nagasawa 1987, citing Collected
Papers on the Forced Removal of Koreans 1993, pp. 168-169)
Hiroshi Ichihara has argued that wages were determined based on productivity and type of job
performed, and asserts that wage-related disputes occurred because it was difficult to properly
explain this arrangement to Korean workers. Ichihara concludes that this should not be taken
as evidence of ethnic discrimination, and interprets this to have been a problem that originatedin the shortcomings of worker relocation organizations in Korea. (Ichihara, 1997, p. 25) The
problem was that worker relocation organizations failed to properly inform Korean workers of
why wages differed among individuals. Ichihara points out that the Government-General of Korea
was not responsible for this misunderstanding and that the problem should be attributed to thepersonnel departments of Japanese coal and metal mines that were recruiting workers in Korea.
Kazumasa Aizawa is notable for his research on metal mines. When explaining the wage
system of the Mukuromi Gold Mine in Iwate Prefecture, Aizawa states that wages for Korean
workers were based on a grading system, which was also applied to calculating wages forJapanese workers. Aizawa explains that equal pay was paid for equal work because the purposeof recruiting Koreans was not to boost profits through payment of low wages, but to supplement
the workforce and overcome labor shortages. (1988, p. 242) Although pursuing higher profit
rates and supplementing the workforce are not mutually exclusive, Aizawa should be credited
for correctly recognizing that the primary purpose of Korean recruitment was to supplement
the workforce and overcome the general shortage of labor. On the other hand, Nishinarita
concluded that, although Korean wages were slightly lower than those of their Japanesecounterparts, this essentially reflected differences in skill levels and did not mean that the wage
system discriminated based on ethnicity. However, Nishinarita states that the amounts received
by Korean workers were actually ver y small due to forced savings, and that this is proof of
exploitation. (1997, pp. 274-277)23
Hiroshi Ichiharaʼs research on coalminers in Hokkaido reveals that in 1940, Korean workers at
the Sumitomo Utashinai Mine were earning 30 percent less than Japanese workers. However, he
explains that the disparity was due to the lower efficiency of Korean workers resulting from thelanguage barrier and lower skill levels. (1991, p. 103) According to Hokkaido and Korean Workers[Hokkaido to Chosen-jin rodosha] compiled by the Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on
the Forced Removal of Koreans, work at the coalmines operated by the Hokkaido Colliery &Steamship Company was conducted on a contract basis and, in accordance with the companyʼsinternal regulations, there was no discrimination in wages between Korean and Japanese
workers. That is, he writes that “wage differentials” resulted from differences in experience (yearsof employment) or, in other words, differences in work efficiency. (1999, pp. 248-251) Among
more recent researchers, Brandon Palmer concludes that Korean workers were subject to the23

Survey Report on the Working Conditions of Workers from the Korean Peninsula [Hanto romushakinro jokyo ni kansuru chosa hokoku] is reproduced in Pak Kyong-Sik (1981) Chosen mondai
shiryo sosho, dai ni maki: senji kyosei renko – romu kanri seisaku II [Collected materials on
Korean issues, Vol. 2: wartime forced removal, labor management policies II].
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Lee Woo-Younsame wage system as Japanese workers. (2014, p. 300)24 In this connection, the following witness
accounts are noteworthy. Accounts from Kyushu coalmines recount that workers were told, “Work
more and earn more; work less and earn less.” (Editorial Committee of the Survey Report on theForced Removal of Koreans 2006b, p. 177) In the case of Hokkaido, this became, “Load more andwage will increase; load less and wage will decrease.” (Editorial Committee of the Survey Reporton the Forced Removal of Koreans 2006b, p. 153)

V.

Trends in Wage Differentials

What trends can be identified in wartime wage differentials between Korean and Japanese
workers? Did prewar wage differentials increase or decrease in wartime? While it is not easy
to answer these questions, the purpose of this section is to sketch a rough outline based on
published materials. Table 8 presents data from the Meiji Mining Companyʼs Akaike Coalmine
located in Fukuoka Prefecture. The data covers the period between July 1944 and October
1945, and records the average daily wages of coalminers and installers (workers in charge of
installing structures to prevent collapse in mineshafts and other work areas) by ethnicity. Mostof the Korean workers employed in wartime coalmines worked inside the mines and, among
these, the largest number worked as excavators. (Lee Woo Youn, 2015) As important as theinformation in Table 8 is, as the only source covering this period, and notwithstanding the factthat it was published in 1991, this data has never been used by researchers. As previously noted,
a complex array of charges was withheld from wages, including forced savings and food costs.
This has given rise to the generally accepted theory that a mere pittance was paid in wages after
the deduction of these considerable sums, and that very serious ethnic discrimination existed inwages. It is likely that these assumptions have clouded the vision of researchers and prevented
them from using this available material.
The following can be surmised concerning wage differentials between Korean and Japanese
workers during a 14-month period leading to the end of the war. First, with regard to excavators,
the wage dif ferential ranged between 0.8 and 5.0 percent. With regard to installers, after
excluding an exceptionally high differential registered in March 1945, the wage differential
ranged between 1.4 and 5.0 percent. This differential is far too small to be identified as evidence of
ethnic discrimination, and should be interpreted to reflect differences in work efficiency. It is also
notable that Korean wages exceeded Japanese wages during certain periods. For excavators, thisoccurred during May and June 1945, and in November 1944 for installers. For the whole of 1944,
wages for Korean excavators were 2.9 percent lower than their Japanese counterparts. However,in 1945, this relation was reversed to give a slight advantage to Korean excavators.25 During
1944, wages for Korean installers were 2.1 percent lower than their Japanese counterparts. The
differential increased to 4.2 percent in 1945. As of September 1943, of the total number of Korean
workers working inside coalmines, 54.2 percent were employed as excavators and 8.9 percent as
installers. (Sekitan Tosei-kai Romu-bu 1943, p. 317) Taking these figures into consideration, it ispossible to theorize that ethnicity-based wage differentials in the Akaike Coalmine were lower in1945 than in 1944.
24

Forced savings also applied to Japanese workers. This is because this system was adopted asa policy measure to counter wartime inflation. During the war years, Korean workers wereable to normally withdraw their savings at the end of their term of employment. However,immediately after the end of the war, some workers hurriedly returned home before being
able to settle accounts and withdraw their savings. This matter will be addressed in detail in a
future paper.

25

Although Table 8 indicates “0.0,” the actual figure is 0.03 percent. That is, in 1945, wages for
Korean workers were 0.03 percent higher than those for Japanese workers.
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In the following paragraphs, an attempt is made to sketch a rough outline of trends in
ethnicity-based wage differentials using the fragmentary data that is available. First, a series ofother available sources shall be introduced. According to data covering 1942 from the Hitachi
Coalmine in Ibaraki Prefecture, monthly average wages for Korean and Japanese workers were
52.96 yen and 59.46 yen, respectively, indicating that Japanese workers were paid more. However,
the average number of workdays per month came to 21.9 days and 24.9 days, respectively,
indicating that the Japanese workers worked three more days than their Korean counterparts.
This data can be used to calculate the average daily wage for the two groups, which indicates that
Korean workers earned 2.42 yen and Japanese workers earned 2.39 yen. That is, this calculationshows that Korean workers were earning slightly more per working day than their Japanesecounterparts. (Rodo Jijo Chosasho, 1942, p. 90) At this point, it cannot be determined whether thisdifferential reflects differences in labor efficiency or some other factor. However, among someJapanese labor managers, there was an understanding that this situation resulted from the “special
economic treatment” accorded to Korean workers.26 For this reason, there was considerable
dissatisfaction among some Japanese that they were being treated the “same as Koreans who had
just completed their training period.” (Masaru Tonomura 2012, p. 67)27 In a survey of an unnamed
coalmine located in Hokkaido, the Institute for Science of Labor found that Korean wages werehigher in all of the categories of excavators, installers and mechanics working inside the mine,and that Japanese wages were higher for transporters, operators and miscellaneous tasks. (1943c,
Pak Kyong-Sik ed., 1981, Vol. I, p. 19) Commenting on these examples, E.W. Wagner has written,
28“Koreans were paid the standard wage scale for Japanese workers.” (1951, p. 46) R. Mitchellpoints out that in certain instances, Korean workers “were not being treated worse than Japanese
conscripts, and that in some cases they were being treated better.” (1967, p. 85)
The following material from the Joban Coalmine in Fukushima Prefecture also seems to havenever been used before. In December 1944, the company adopted a plan to raise wages in thefollowing year and estimated the increase in costs. The average daily labor cost used in thesecalculations is presented in Table 9. First, it is noted that the wage differential is larger than thatat the Akaike Coalmine. Once again, it can be assumed that the reason for the disparity lies inthe difference in the distribution of the number of years employed. Unfortunately, no data canbe found in this material to prove this inference. As a proxy for years of employment, Table 10
summarizes the age structure of the miners working at the Joban Coalmine.
There is a significant difference in age distribution data available for the Iwaki Coalmine
and the Joban Coalmine. First, the data from the Iwaki Coalmine includes both Korean as wellas Japanese workers, who were in the majority, and presents the distribution for the entire
workforce. Second, it should be noted that a comparison of the age distributions of Korean and
26

The following excerpt is from a document of Sumitomo Mining Company. “Workers from the
Korean Peninsula undergo three months of training upon recruitment. The GovernmentGeneral of Korea shows a particularly strong interest in the treatment of workers and theirtraining and education during this period. This interest goes to the extent of becoming
meddlesome. Regarding wages, the Government-General of Korea demands cer tain
assurances. From the perspective of the labor managers of this mine, these matters constitutespecial treatment (preferential treatment that generally exceeds what is economically rational)
accorded solely to workers from the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, such workers must betreated separately from the other workers.” (Sumitomo Konomai Mining Company 1941, citedin Yoshihiko Moriya ed. 1991, III The Koreans [Chosen-jin] Vol. 2, p. 1,483)

27

Tonomura cites the November 1940 issue of Tokudaka Monthly [Tokudaka geppo] as his
source.

28

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: Coals and Metals in Japan’s War Economy
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Lee Woo-Youn

Japanese workers indicates that the age of Korean workers does not correspond to their years of
employment, and merely indicates the age at which they were mobilized and relocated to Japan.
Korean workers were employed under two-year contracts, very few extended their contract at
the end of two years and a very large number of Korean workers escaped before the end of their
two year contracts. In contrast, Japanese coalminers mostly consisted of “on-site conscripts (genin choyo)” who were originally hired by the employer but later assigned as national conscripted
workers in the same workplace. Therefore, the age distribution of Japanese workers moreclosely corresponds to their years of employment. Table 10 shows that 62.1 percent of the
Korean workers at the Joban Coalmine were in their twenties. Compared to this high level ofconcentration, the data from the Iwaki Coalmine depicts a far more even age distribution. In otherwords, the Koreans working at the Joban Coalmine were less experienced and less skilled thantheir Japanese counterparts because far fewer of them had several years of actual experience inthe mines. For this reason, the disparity in wages between Korean and Japanese workers shownin Table 9 can be interpreted to reflect the relatively lower productivity of Korean workers.
Table 9 also shows that the wage differential decreased between 1944 and 1945. Moriya hasreached the following conclusion using data from Sumitomoʼs Konomai Mine in Hokkaido. “On
the grounds that Korean workers were less productive, wage increases were implemented six
months to one year later than for Japanese workers. However, in the latter stage of governmentmediated recruitment, this discriminator y treatment was gradually removed, beginning withthe most skilled workers. Moreover, in the conscription stage, all discrimination was basicallyeliminated.” (2009, Vol. 3, pp. 37-38)29 While the implication is that ethnic discrimination gradually
decreased during wartime, it is not possible to generalize this conclusion based on currently
available information. Efforts must be made to discover new materials, and at the same time tocarefully examine any data that is found.
Another important challenge is to identify the characteristics of wartime wage differentials
between Korean and Japanese workers by comparing prewar wage disparities with wartime
disparities. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to undertake such comparisons based on
the information available at this time. The primary reason is the general paucity of wage datafrom both the prewar and wartime periods. As previously noted, data available from the Nippon
Mining Company only covers March 1943, while data from the Meiji Mining Companyʼs Akaike
Coalmine is the only time-series data that covers a period of more than one year. Prewar data on
wage differentials by ethnicity at coal and metal mines in Japan is also extremely scarce. In lightof the scarcity of information, it is the hope of the present writer that the following observations
on trends in wage differentials may provide future researchers with valuable hints to be pursued.
First, Pak Kyong-Sik has written that, in 1921, the wages of Korean coalminers were equal to60 percent of the wages of Japanese coalminers. (1956, p. 35; 2008, Hangul edition, p. 39) If thisis correct, it would mean that wage differentials decreased substantially during the war years.
However, because Pak Kyong-Sik inexplicably fails to cite any sources for his calculation, this lineof inquiry cannot be pursued further. Second, the following can be found in materials preparedby the Osaka Municipal Governmentʼs Department of Social Affairs, Survey Section. Wages forcoalminers are presented by ethnicity in a list that divides wages into the three categories of“highest, standard and lowest” as of June 1923. Wages for Korean workers are lower than those ofJapanese workers by 23.3 percent in the highest category, 16.0 percent in the standard category
and 11.1 percent in the lowest category. This level of disparity is significantly larger than what was
29

In exceptional cases, the standard work unit differed among companies. However, normally one
work unit was equivalent to nine hours of work inside the mines or ten hours outside the mines.
“Government-mediated recruitment” began in February 1942, and “conscription” began in September
1944. The source used by Shigeru Moriya is the Sumitomo Konomai Mineʼs Notice on Change in Wage
by Job Description and Worker Number [Romu-in shokumei bango kettei chingin henko tsuchi sho].

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Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

observed at the Akaike Coalmine during the war years. However, compared with data for wage
differentials during the war period from the Joban Coalmine of the Nippon Mining Company, thelevel of disparity is roughly the same. This makes it difficult to discuss whether disparities weregrowing or narrowing.
The third relevant source is entitled Work Conditions of Korean Workers in the District [Kannai
Chosen-jin rodo jijo] and was compiled by the Fukuoka District Employment Agency (1929).
Already cited in the research of Chong Jin-Song, this source states that “in 1928, wages for
Korean coalminers were 20–30 percent lower than Japanese coalminers.” (Chong Jin-Song1989, p.
208)
As the previously mentioned Akaike Coalmine was also located in Fukuoka Prefecture, a
reduction in the wage differential between Korean and Japanese workers during the war years
can be ascertained by comparing data from the two mines. The fourth source again comesfrom Osaka and contains October 1930 wage data for manufacturing and construction jobs,
which belong to job categories very similar to mining. This data affirms a sizeable disparity,with wages for Korean construction workers and manufacturing workers amounting to only
67.1 percent and 70.2 percent, respectively, of wages for corresponding Japanese workers. A
comparison of these figures with wartime coalmining wages points to a narrowing of ethnicitybased wage differentials. It should be noted, however, that manufacturing wages represent wages
for craftsmen (skilled workers), so that direct comparison with coalmining wages would not beappropriate. Due caution must be exercised in undertaking such comparisons. The fifth and final
source of information is entitled Conditions of Korean Workers [Chosen-jin rodosha ni kansuru
jokyo] (1924), which was compiled by the Ministry of Home Affairsʼ Department of Social Affairs,
Section 1. This is the only comprehensive sur vey that covers the Japanese homeland in its
entirety. The publication contains information on coalmine and mining wages for July 1924. The
information on mining wages is excerpted and reproduced in Table 11.
The job categories in Table 11 consist of “extraction and metallurgy,” “extraction,” and“mining,” suggesting that the nationwide sur vey was not conducted using a common set ofcriteria. Fukushima and Ibaraki Prefectures neighbor each other and sit astride the Joban
coalfield, one of Japanʼs three largest coalfields. Unlike Ibaraki Prefecture, there is hardly any
evidence of ethnicity-based wage disparity in Fukushima. Data for Hokkaido also points toeither no disparity or higher wages for Korean workers. While it is difficult to explain this result,what can be deduced from this table is that wages for Korean and Japanese workers differedsignificantly among individual coal and metal mines. This means that any effort to observe thetrends in ethnic wage disparities between the 1920s and 1945 will ultimately have to await the
publication of wage-related data from individual companies,30 analysis of which will allow us toverify whether prewar wage differentials decreased during the war years. However, two additional
points must be taken into consideration. As mentioned before, the first point to bear in mind is theimpact of changes in the composition of Japanese workers on wage differentials with their Koreancounterparts. Second, if a trend is actually identified for this relatively short period of time, it will
be important to determine the implication of such a trend. With these points in mind, it can besaid that research on wartime ethnic wage disparity and trends in this disparity has just started.
30

According to Naoki Tanaka, the payroll ledgers [chingin daicho] of the Nitchitsu Emukae
Mining Company were archived at Kyushu Universityʼs Research Institute on Industrial Labor.
(1978, p. 609) Payroll ledgers consisted of separate sheets entered and kept for each individual
worker, and covers both Korean and Japanese workers. Each sheet contains detailed monthly
records of work performed, wages paid and various allowances paid. It is presumed that thismaterial is currently held at Kyushu Universityʼs archives. It is believed that large volumes ofthis type of information exist. However, these have yet to be published.
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Lee Woo-Youn

As Japan mobilized its resources for total war, the most important objective was to increase
output. To achieve this purpose, workers had to be incentivized. Employers on the other hand,were flush with cash that came from the wartime increase in money supply and government
support for war industries. Putting these two factors together, it can be inferred that there wasno monetary rationale for employers to pay discriminatory wages to Korean workers for reasons
unrelated to labor productivity. In fact, discriminatory wages would have had a negative impact on
the immediate objectives of managing Japanʼs wartime systems.

VI.

Conclusion

Using materials published by researchers who have taken the position of “forced removal of
workers and forced labor,” we have observed that wartime wages paid to Korean coal and metalmine workers in Japan were high enough to allow a degree of choice in allocating earnings
between remittances to family in Korea and local expenditure. We were able to confirm that theassertion made in prior research that “wages were either never paid, or amounted to a mere
pittance” is not supported by the available empirical data. Furthermore, we found that the wagesof Korean coal and metal mine workers were not significantly different from the wages paid
to Japanese workers. Thus, we have shown in this paper that the assertion of “ethnicity-based
wage discrimination” found in prior research cannot be proven to be correct. In addition, various
research and empirical data exist suggesting that the wage differential between Korean andJapanese workers actually decreased during the war years. Progress in research on this topic
must await the publication of new materials from individual companies.
It has been the contention of prior research that a very large part of receivable wages waswithheld through a system of forced savings. If this contention is accurate, it inevitably leads tothe question of whether such savings were equitably paid back to Korean workers. Similarly, it
must be determined whether remittances made to family members were properly delivered to theintended recipients. Although these are questions that cannot be avoided and must be answeredin considering the wages paid to Korean workers, the fact is that they have never been subjected
to rigorous and thorough research. This indeed is the area that the present writer hopes to
examine in future research. Parallel to a re-examination of remittances and forced savings, thefeatures and characteristics of “forced removal” of workers must be identified. Moreover, actsof Korean resistance, including escape and disputes with employers, must be studied, and abetter understanding of the everyday life of Korean workers must be attempted by assessing thepurchase of a wide range of consumer goods and examining such behavior as drinking, gambling,use of holidays, and excursions. Such research will allow us to more accurately re-create theeveryday life of Korean coal and metal miners who were mobilized to work in wartime Japan.
These are the challenges that the present writer looks forward to addressing in future research.

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Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

Table 1: Wages and Expenditures at Major Mines in 1940
(Units: yen, %)Location

Name

Type

Averagemonthly
wage

Averagemonthlysavings

SapporoDistrict

Utashinai Coalmine

Coal

84.29

6.75

41.50

18.6*

17.44

Sorachi Coalmine

Coal

78.33

15.10

25.78

13.95

23.50

Yubetsu Coalmine

Coal

71.39

18.82

24.92

17.05

10.60

Harutori Coalmine

Coal

99.06

10.00

20.00

18.6*

50.46

Yubari Coalmine

Coal

68.89

8.18

26.10

14.57

20.04

Mitsui Sunagawa
Coalmine

Coal

80.37

20.16

23.49

13.95

22.77

Toyoha Mine

Metal

85.00

35.00

45.00

18.6*

-13.60

Shizukari Mine

Metal

80.04

20.17

24.93

16.28

18.67

Konomai Mine

Metal

85.46

36.78

31.94

17.05

-0.31

Takadama Mine

Metal

51.34

13.55

16.78

12.40

8.61

Hosokura Mine

Metal

58.42

2.50

16.00

15.50

24.42

Funauchi Mine

Metal

70.00

6.00

50.00

18.6*

-4.60

Tokyo
District

Sado Mine

Metal

66.77

11.44

21.16

12.40

21.77

Kawazu Mine

Metal

58.98

16.56

23.51

10.85

8.06

Osaka
District

Tsuchikura Mine

Metal

80.00

10.00

30.00

18.60

21.40

Okuki Mine

Metal

70.00

5.00

20.00

18.6*

26.40

Shirataki Mine

Metal

67.57

23.04

19.47

10.85

14.21

Kishu Mine

Metal

67.09

4.20

6.10

15.50

41.29

Ooya Mine

Metal

85.50

7.50

17.00

18.6*

42.40

Wanibuchi Mine

Metal

64.10

3.70

40.00

13.95

6.45

Imade Mine

Metal

65.00

3.00

25.00

13.95

23.05

Besshi Mine

Metal

62.11

19.40

29.00

9.30

4.41

Sanyo Anthracite
Mine

Coal

79.64

38.13

57.28

12.40

-28.17

Iizuka Coalmine

Coal

76.10

10.39

21.13

16.43

28.15

Shinnyu Coalmine

Coal

74.67

15.00

25.00

14.88

19.79

Hojo Coalmine

Coal

76.48

11.00

35.00

14.88

15.60

Namazuta Coalmine

Coal

80.35

20.00

20.00

14.88

25.47

Kamiyamada
Coalmine

Coal

74.10

16.00

35.00

14.88

8.22

Sakito Coalmine

Coal

77.10

8.00

32.33

18.6*

18.17

Sendai
DistrictFukuoka
District

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Japan Review Vol.1 No.3 Spring 2018

Averagemonthly
remittance

Cost of food DifferenceLee Woo-Youn

Location

Name

Type

Averagemonthly
wage

Averagemonthlysavings

Fukuoka
District

Aso Company

Coal

72.00

22.50

22.50

15.50

11.50

Yoshikuma
Coalmine

Coal

50.61

6.73

27.50

15.50

0.88

Mineji – Himine
Coalmine

Coal

64.48

15.38

22.24

13.95

12.91

Shakanoo Coalmine

Coal

72.96

17.10

20.80

13.18

21.89

Shimoyamada
Coalmine

Coal

70.22

12.50

10.88

13.95

32.89

Hirayama Coalmine

Coal

73.87

11.07

25.00

15.50

22.30

Toyokuni Coalmine

Coal

65.61

10.00

20.00

15.50

20.11

Yamano Coalmine

Coal

40.00

6.23

21.30

17.05

-4.57

Inohana Coalmine

Coal

90.00

16.22

13.51

15.50

44.77

Nakatsuru No. 1
Mine

Coal

64.22

6.00

6.50

13.95

37.77

Onoura Coalmine

Coal

66.30

5.50

7.50

13.95

39.35

Iwaya Coalmine

Coal

72.88

11.92

23.29

18.6*

19.07

Yoshinoura
Coalmine

Coal

67.00

16.20

30.35

15.50

4.95

Senryu Coalmine

Coal

63.86

13.41

27.24

15.50

7.71

Ikeno Coalmine

Coal

76.64

6.01

14.96

15.50

40.17

Kanda Coalmine

Coal

85.47

10.29

28.75

15.50

30.93

Saganoseki Mine

Metal

75.64

12.73

16.72

12.40

33.79

71.95
(100.0)13.37(18.6)

24.84(34.5)

15.24(21.2)

18.50(25.7)

Average
Ratio (%)

Averagemonthly
remittance

Cost of food Difference

Source: Japan Mining Association [Nihon Kozan Kyokai] (1940), pp. 4-300, as excerpted in Pak Kyong-Sik (1981)
Chosen mondai shiryo sosho, dai ni kan: senji kyosei renko – romu kanri seisaku II [Collected materials on Korean issues,
Vol. 2: wartime forced removal, labor management policies II].

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Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

Table 2: Breakdown of Wages and Expenditures(Units: yen, %)
Year
1940
1941

1944

Amounts withheld
Food
Savings
Other
15.24
13.37
11.78
(21.2)(18.6)(16.4)
11.50(Cannot becomputed)
18.00(12.0)

45.00(30.0)

Remitted
Sub-total
40.39(56.1)

25.00(16.7)

88.00(58.7)
67.16(53.8)

1945

Balance24.84(34.5)
21.52(Cannot becomputed)
40.00(26.7)
36.88(29.6)

(9.3)

Total
6.72

71.95
(100.00)
52.96(Cannot becomputed)
150(100.00)
124.79(100.00)

22.00(14.7)
20.75(16.6)

Sources: Data for 1940 is from Japan Mining Association (1940), pp. 1-300. Data for 1941 is from Rodo Jijo Chosa Jo(1941), p. 90. This source provides no data on monthly average income, savings and remittance for 1941. Data for 1944is from Sekitan Tosei Kai Kyushu Chibu (1945), p. 209, and data for 1945 is from Yoshihiko Moriya (1996), p. 128.

Table 3: Wage Distribution by Ethnicity at Coalmine D in Hokkaido(Units: number of individuals, %)Japanese
KoreanLess than 30 yen
32
(3.6)
117
(36.1)

30-50 yen123
(14.0)
126(38.9)

50-70 yen187
(21.3)
40(12.3)

70-90 yen
194
(22.1)
22(6.8)

90-110 yen
181(20.6)
7(2.2)

110-130 yen(18.2)
(3.7)

Total
160
12

877
(100.0)324(100.0)Source: Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] (1943a), p. 90.

Table 4: Distribution of Years Employed by Ethnicity at Coalmine D in Hokkaido(Units: number of persons, %)KoreanJapanese

Less than 1 year273
(74.8)
276(29.6)

1-2 years53(14.5)
123(13.2)

2-3 years
39(10.7)
106(11.4)

3-4 years-

4-5 years-

101(10.8)

Source: See text48
Japan Review Vol.1 No.3 Spring 2018

(4.5)

5 years or more-

42

(30.5)

Total
-

285

365
(100.0)933(100.0)Lee Woo-Youn

Table 5: Years Employed and Wages at Coalmine B(Units: number of persons, %)A: Years employed
KoreanJapanese

Less than 1 year
194
(20.8)
2,263
41.8

1-2 years524(56.2)
861
15.9

2-3 years
215(23.0)
523
9.7

3-4 years

Less than 30 yen
130(13.7)
443(8.7)

30-50 yen
68
(7.1)
655
(12.9)

50-70 yen98
(10.3)
611(12.0)

70-90 yen134
(14.1)
753(14.8)

8.3

4-5 years

448

5.6

305

5 years or more

18.8

1,017

Total
933
(100.0)
5,417
100.0

B: Wages
KoreanJapanese

90-110 yen
147(15.4)
1,179(23.2)

110 yen or more
375
(39.4)
1,435(28.3)

Total
952(100.0)5,076(100.0)Source: Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] (1943a), pp. 169-170 for years employed, and pp. 80-81
for wages.

Table 6: Years Employed and Wages at Metal Mine I(Units: number of persons, %)A: Years employed
KoreanJapanese

Less than 1 year96
(33.8)
654(31.9)

1-2 years
188(66.2)
450(21.9)

2-3 years

3-4 years

4-5 years324(15.8)

298(14.5)

257(12.5)

Less than 30 yen
38(14.6)
73(4.2)

30-50 yen53
(20.4)
222(12.9)

50-70 yen69
(26.5)
469(27.2)

70-90 yen47
(18.1)
403(23.4)

90-110 yen
34(13.1)
299(17.4)

5 years or more

(3.4)

70

Total
284
(100.0)2,053(100.0)

B: Wages
KoreanJapanese

110-130 yen(7.3)(14.9)

Total
19
256

260
(100.0)1,722(100.0)Source: Institute for Science of Labor [Rodo Kagaku Kenkyu-jo] (1943a), p. 54 and pp. 169-170 for years employed, andpp. 173-174 for wages.

49Japan Review Vol.1 No.3 Spring 2018

Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

Table 7: Wages at Nippon Mining Company(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)Name of
Mine

In-mine workers

Outside workers

KoreanJapanese

Hokuryu

3.435

4.038

Toyoha

4.207

Eniwa

Wage differential

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

14.9

2.912

2.771

-5.1

5.586

24.7

3.171

3.055

-3.8

3.534

4.327

18.3

2.826

3.364

16.0

Ogane

3.806

5.091

25.2

2.712

3.251

16.6

Kamikita

3.631

4.273

15.2

2.695

2.868

6.0

Akaishi

3.395

3.493

2.8

-

2.572

-

Hanawa

3.127

4.149

24.6

2.378

2.475

3.9

Otani

3.050

3.232

5.6

2.551

2.079

-22.7

Takadama

2.342

3.091

24.2

1.524

1.958

22.2

Hitachi

3.112

4.226

26.4

2.823

2.688

-5.02

Nikko

2.321

2.797

17.0

2.293

2.169

-5.7

Mikawa

3.031

3.801

20.3

1.561

2.221

29.7

Minegasawa

2.804

2.843

1.4

2.283

2.250

-1.5

Ogoya

3.394

4.110

17.4

2.405

2.446

1.6

Shirataki

3.614

4.073

11.3

2.291

2.171

-5.5

Bajo

3.660

3.262

-12.2

1.322

1.900

30.4

Onoyama

3.170

2.998

-5.7

2.893

2.230

-29.7

Kasuga

2.696

2.880

6.4

2.512

2.986

15.9

Source: Chon Gi-Ho (2003), p. 103, based on data contained in Nippon Mining Company, Showa 17 nen shimohankijigyo gaikyo [Summary of operations during second half of Showa 17 (1942)].
Note: Wage differential in Tables 7 and 8 are computed as follows: (Japanese wages – Korean wages) x 100 / Japanesewages.

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Lee Woo-Youn

Table 8: Average Daily Wages at Meiji Mining Company’s Akaike Coalmine(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)
Year

1944

1945

Month

Excavators

Installers

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

June

4.17

4.29

2.8

3.82

3.94

3.0

July

4.28

4.51

5.1

3.83

3.96

3.3

Aug

4.28

4.39

2.5

3.82

3.92

2.6

Sep

4.21

4.32

2.5

3.88

3.97

2.3

Oct

4.32

4.42

2.3

3.84

3.98

3.5

Nov

4.41

4.58

3.7

3.95

3.93

-0.5

Dec

4.49

4.56

1.5

4.01

4.04

0.7

Average

4.31

4.44

2.9

3.88

3.96

2.1

Jan

4.61

4.68

1.5

4.08

4.20

2.9

Feb

4.72

4.89

3.5

4.01

4.19

4.3

Mar

4.77

4.96

3.8

4.00

4.43

9.7

Apr

4.56

4.32

-5.6

4.96

5.21

4.8

May

4.62

4.39

-5.2

4.93

5.19

5.0

June

5.15

5.14

-0.2

5.04

5.11

1.4

July

5.29

5.33

0.8

5.20

5.29

1.7

Average

4.82

4.82

0.0

4.60

4.80

4.2

Source: Meiji kogyosho romu geppo [Meiji Mining Company monthly labor report], various issues, as cited in Eidai
Hayashi (1991), pp. 1153-1220.

Table 9: Daily Wages at Joban Coalmine(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)Category

In-mine male workers

Outside male workers

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

KoreanJapanese

Wage differential

Old average daily wage

4.127

4.998

17.4

2.797

3.805

26.5

New average daily wage

4.947

5.743

13.9

3.594

4.400

18.3

Source: Joban Coalmining Company (1944), p. 382.

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Korean Coal and Metal Mineworkers Mobilized in Wartime Japan: The Question of Wages and Ethnicity-Based Disparities

Table 10: Age Distribution of Coalminers(Units: number of persons, %)
Age
15-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56 and over
Total

Korean workers (Joban Coalmine)
435
1,587
1,365
614
475
197
66
11
4
4,754

Ratio
9.2
33.4
28.7
12.9
10.0
4.1
1.4
0.2
0.1
100.0

Total all workers (Iwaki Coalmine)
752
894
905
856
797
637

Ratio
13.6
16.2
16.4
15.5
14.3
11.6

671

12.2

5,212

100.0

Source: Shigeru Nagasawa (1987), p. 175.
Note: Data as of October 31, 1944 for Joban Coalmine and October 31, 1943 for Iwaki Coalmine

Table 11: Mining Related Wages(Units: wages in yen, differential in %)Prefecture and Job
Fukuoka: Extraction and Metallurgy

Saga: Extraction

Yamaguchi: Extraction

Fukushima: Extraction and Metallurgy

Ibaraki: Mining

Hokkaido: Extraction and Metallurgy

Ethnicity
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential
Japanese
KoreanWage differential

HighestNormal
3.40
2.90

14.7

25.0
2.00
1.80

10.0

11.1

5.6

2.8

0.0

5.0

1.50
1.50
0.0

1.50
1.50
0.0

2.80
2.50
10.7

1.50
1.50

2.00
1.90

2.50
2.50
0.0

0.90
0.80

1.80
1.70

3.60
3.50

1.00
1.00
0.0

2.00
1.67
16.5

3.97
3.00
24.4

Lowest
2.00
1.50

1.20
0.70
41.7

2.50
2.50
0.0

1.60
1.80
-12.5

Source: Compiled from Ministr y of Home Affairs, Department of Social Affairs, Section 1, Chosen-jin rodosha ni
kansuru jokyo [Conditions of Korean workers], pp. 489-529.

52Japan Review Vol.1 No.3 Spring 2018

Lee Woo-Youn

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Acknowledgement
I am grateful to Professor Munehiro Miwa for his guidance on matters related to notation andcitation.

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