John Chuan-Tiong Lim

External and Internal Reconciliation:
War Memories and Views of History
Regarding Japan in Postwar Taiwan
John Chuan-Tiong Lim*

Abstract
Taiwanese society today is often characterized as a Japan-friendly society. Yet things are notquite so simple. The formation of differing war memories and views of history is caused
partly by the blending of selective elements of remembering and forgetting. Postwar
reconciliation between Taiwan and Japan can be seen at two levels̶external reconciliation
with Japan and internal reconciliation within Taiwanese society. Taiwanʼs postwar external
reconciliation with Japan seems to have proceeded relatively well. Taiwan has recognized
the contributions made by Japan during the colonial period. Of course, there exist a numberof historical issues between Japan and Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan has shown
little inclination to use these issues with Japan for political purposes. In contrast, internal
reconciliation, that is, the work for promoting reconciliation within Taiwanese society,appears complex and unfinished even today. Two Taiwan-related controversies erupted
in 2015 in connection with the 70th anniversary of the end of the war. One of them wasa dispute concerning the views of wartime history held by Taiwan and Mainland China.
Another revealed the existence of different views of histor y within Taiwanese society.
Taiwan is left with the major challenge of how to share memories of different wartime
experiences to achieve reconciliation. The issue of postwar reconciliation af fects theformation of war memories and views of history in postwar society in numerous ways. As
such, when debating reconciliation, we ought to avoid simplifying relationships to thosebetween the perpetrator and the victim.

More than seventy years after the end of the Second World War, reconciliation
between Japan and neighboring countries over the conflict and colonial rule
remains a major challenge. It goes without saying that progress in the reconciliation
process is important for strengthening mutual relations and achieving true peace.
The debate on reconciliation has frequently tended to simplify relationships to those between
the perpetrator and the victim. War and colonial rule can in no way be justified. Yet the issue ofpostwar reconciliation is not merely an issue of wartime and colonial experiences or postwar
settlement, and affects the formation of war memories and views of history in postwar society innumerous ways. As such, I want to argue that reconciliation research needs to be conducted withmore diverse perspectives and greater attention to specifics.
Taiwanese society today is often characterized as a Japan-friendly society. Yet things are notquite so simple. The ways in which memories of the war resurfaced and the differing narratives
that were recounted in Taiwan in 2015, on the 70th anniversar y of the end of the War ofResistance Against Japan, demonstrated the complexity of the reconciliation process in Taiwan.

＊John Chuan-Tiong Lim is an associate fellow at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. Email: johnlim@gate.sinica.
edu.tw

61
Japan Review Vol.2 No.2 Fall 2018

External and Internal Reconciliation: War Memories and Views of History Regarding Japan in Postwar Taiwan

In this essay, I look at some of the controversies surrounding the reconciliation process
between postwar Taiwanese society and Japan Taiwanʼs past colonizer and ruler as wellas the differences in war memories and views of history between waishengren ( 外省人 ) andbenshengren（ 本省人 ）that came to light in 2015. I will attempt to clarify the two-sided natureof external and internal reconciliation that can be found in Taiwanese society. The formationof differing war memories and views of histor y is caused partly by the blending of selective
elements of remembering and forgetting that I will identify.

I. External Reconciliation: Postwar Reconciliation between Taiwan and Japan
Reconciliation Attempts by the Taiwanese Government
Postwar reconciliation between Taiwan and Japan can be seen at two levels. One of them is at thegovernmental level. The other is at the level of society.
With regard to the Taiwanese governmentʼs attempts at reconciliation, we can note themagnanimous attitude to postwar settlement displayed by President Chiang Kai-shek, which has
also been often acknowledged in postwar Japan society. The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty wasconcluded between Taiwan (Republic of China) and Japan in 1952, and people in Japan long felt
gratitude to Taiwan for gestures such as relinquishing the right to compensation.
Taiwanese society has recognized the contributions made by Japan during the colonial period.
Especially in comparison to China and South Korea, Taiwan stands out in the way in which itremembers Japanʼs contributions. For example, Taiwan has recognized the contributions of Yoichi
Hatta1 to pre-war Taiwanese agricultural irrigation projects, especially the Chianan Canal. In 2011,
the Taiwanese government opened a museum dedicated to Yoichi Hatta, with President Ma Yingjeou attending and speaking at the opening ceremony. The ceremony was one manifestation ofhow Taiwanese accept and honor the contributions and positive aspects of Japanese colonial rule.
As is widely known, so-called historical issues have long existed between Japan and its
neighbors in postwar East Asia. Of course, there exist a number of historical issues between
Japan and Taiwan, starting with the issue of comfort women. At the same time, Taiwan has shown
little inclination to use these issues with Japan for political purposes. Every time there is a major
incident related to historical issues between Japan and neighboring countries, Taiwan naturally
asserts its viewpoints, but generally avoids using historical issues to influence relations withJapan. Taiwan has been especially careful not to incite nationalism.

The Reconciliation Process at the Level of Taiwanese SocietyTaiwan is known as one of the most Japan-friendly societies in the world, but this friendship withJapan gradually developed during the 1990s. One reason is that the older generation of people
in Taiwan who spoke Japanese started expressing their feelings for Japan in the 1990s. With theadvent of democratization in Taiwan, they became able to express their sentiment for Japan. In
most households, although many elderly people who experienced Japanese colonial rule could
speak Japanese, they refrained from doing so at home during the long postwar authoritarian era.2
It was common for grandchildren to not know that their grandparents spoke Japanese.
Another reason was the so-called “Japanophilia” phenomenon3 among young people in the1

Yoichi Hatta (1886-1942) was a Japanese hydraulic engineer. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial
University in 1910, he was employed by the Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan and was put incharge of waterworks as well as power generation and irrigation projects.

2Taiwanʼs authoritarian era refers to the administrations of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, fromthe end of World War II to the lifting of martial law and the start of democratization in 1987.

3“Japanophilia” ( 哈日 , hari) refers to those who are avid followers of Japanese culture.

62
Japan Review Vol.2 No.2 Fall 2018

John Chuan-Tiong Lim

1990s, which is when Japanese pop culture really started attracting Taiwanese youth.4 Since then,Japanese comics and animated films, movies and pop music, as well as public baths, matcha, andother forms of Japanese traditional culture, have gained a strong following among the Taiwanese.
In short, there were circumstances that caused two generations to get a better impression ofJapan.
Yet there is one thing that we must not forget. The generation in-between, which was exposedto the Kuomintang governmentʼs “anti-Japanese” education, does not necessarily have the same
feelings for Japan as do the generations that preceded and followed it. We can now see that
this generation is catching up with the rest of Taiwanese society in its degree of openness toJapan. For example, even among second-generation waishengren in their 50s and early 60s at
my research institute, it is not uncommon for people in these age groups to say they understandJapan and to express their sense of closeness to the countr y. It can be claimed that a Japanfriendly structure that spans several generations now exists in Taiwanese society.5

Building Friendship between Taiwan and Japan
Looking at developments in recent years, we can discern the closeness of the two societies bylooking at the number of travelers and school trips between Japan and Taiwan. The number ofpeople traveling from Taiwan to Japan in 2017 was 4.56 million.6 As Taiwanʼs population is 23
million, this is quite a large number. The number of Japanese travelers to Taiwan rose to 1.9
million7 that year and continues to climb.
According to 2015 data, the number one foreign destination for Taiwanese high-school field
trips was Japan. The top overseas destinations for Japanese students until 2015 were the UnitedStates and then Singapore, but Taiwan overtook the United States as the most popular destinationin 2016. This is clearly an expression of the mutual trust that exists between Japan and Taiwan.
The affinity between Japan and Taiwan was also seen after the earthquake in 2011 that struck
northeastern Japan. As has also been reported in Japan, Taiwan strongly sympathized with Japanafter the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 and provided donations of more than 20 billion
yen, which is more than the sum of donations received from other countries. Japanese people
are still expressing their gratitude for the assistance. Japan likewise provided relief after later
earthquakes in Taiwan, allowing feelings of mutual affinity to spread to citizens, as suggested by
the idea of a “Japanese-Taiwanese earthquake community.”

II. Internal Reconciliation: Lessons from the 2015 Controversies
The Historical Context: 70th Anniversar y of Victor y in the War of Resistance
Against JapanAs discussed above, Taiwanʼs postwar external reconciliation with Japan seems to have proceeded
relatively well. In contrast, internal reconciliation, that is, the work for promoting reconciliation
within Taiwanese society, appears complex and unfinished even today. Here I would like todiscuss a series of controversies that came about in connection with the 70th anniversar y of4It could be said that the Japanese pop culture boom in Taiwan started before the 1990s, but postwar
restrictions on the dissemination of Japanese culture prevented the broadcasting of Japanese songs andTV dramas. These restrictions were lifted in 1993.

5

One demonstration of this inter-generational Japan-friendly structure in Taiwanese society is the craze
caused by the Japan-friendly movie Cape No.7 that premiered in August 2008. It was common to see
three generations of people going together to the cinema to watch the movie.

6

According to data from Taiwanʼs Tourism Bureau.

7

According to data from Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO).

63
Japan Review Vol.2 No.2 Fall 2018

External and Internal Reconciliation: War Memories and Views of History Regarding Japan in Postwar Taiwan

victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan.
In 2015, the Kuomintang was in power under the administration of Ma Ying-jeou. That year,
the government was involved in a number of anniversar y events. Media organizations fromJapan and all over the world were eager to cover the military parade in Beijing that was held tocommemorate Chinaʼs victory in World War II, while the activities of the Ma administration did
not receive so much attention. One such activity was the publication of a pamphlet summarizing
the Republic of Chinaʼs position on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of the war. Iwas invited by Taiwanʼs Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss what would go into the document
and to put it together.8 Attention was paid to what kind of statement Prime Minister Shinzo Abewould give in Japan on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, but similar activities wereunfolding in Taiwan. Besides the pamphlet, a small-scale military parade was held in Taiwan.
One of the aims of these events by the Ma administration was perhaps to keep alive theRepublic of China ʼ s view of histor y. Amid growing fears that the “ naturally independentgeneration”9 was losing their sense of pre-1949 Chinese history, the Ma administration had theaim of continuing a vision of the Republic of Chinaʼs history that extended more than 100 years
into the past, going all the way back to the Xinhai Revolution. Another aim was to emphasize thatwithout the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, the postwar Taiwan of today would notexist, thus stressing the intimate relationship between the Republic of China and Taiwan.

Controversy I: Taiwan and Mainland China
Two Taiwan-related controversies erupted in 2015 in connection with the 70th anniversary of theend of the war.
One of them was a dispute between Taiwan and Mainland China. The focal point was theMa administrationʼs fierce opposition to the Communist Party of China presenting itself as the“key pillar” ( 中流砥柱 ) in the War of Resistance Against Japan. The Ma administration refuted
this claim by saying that it was the Nationalist government that had contributed the most to thevictory and had suffered the most casualties. At the heart of this issue were the tensions andcontradictions between the view of history held by the Republic of China and that of the PeopleʼsRepublic of China. We can say that reconciliation has yet to be achieved on this issue between
Mainland China and Taiwan. We can also note that former Vice President and former Kuomintang
Chairman Lien Chan made a symbolic gesture by attending the Beijing militar y parade on
September 3, 2015. The Ma administration was opposed to Lienʼs attendance and mobilized publicopinion to step up criticism of Lien.10

Controversy II: Another View of Histor y inside Taiwan
There was another controversy in 2015 that revealed the existence of different views of history
within Taiwanese society. It started with an interview given by former President Lee Teng-huithat was carried in the Japanese magazine Voice. What gained attention was his remark that “WhenI was young, I regarded Japan as my fatherland and I fought for Japan.”In response to this, the Ma administration once again expressed its displeasure and started
criticizing Lee Teng-hui. At the heart of the issue were the contradictions between the Republicof Chinaʼs view of history and the view of history held by people in Taiwan. As the controversy
8The pamphlet emphasized how under the leadership of Chairman Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang
government, as well as soldiers and the people, fought bravely in the War of Resistance Against Japan,
made tremendous sacrifices, and emerged victorious.

9

The “naturally independent generation” ( 天然独世代、tianran du shidai) refers to young people inTaiwan with a strong awareness of Taiwan as an independent state.

10Ma Ying-jeou also instructed people to leave messages on the Kuomintang website and Facebook page
criticizing the actions of Lien Chan.

64
Japan Review Vol.2 No.2 Fall 2018

John Chuan-Tiong Lim

grew, there was opposition from those advocating the Taiwanese view of history as well. For
example, the mother of Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je said that she agreed with Lee Teng-hui based onher own experiences. In this way, historical controversies were communicated and discussed by
the Taiwanese media.

III. Conclusion
In conclusion, I first want to say that we can see considerable progress when it comes to external
reconciliation in Taiwanese society, meaning reconciliation with Japan. The building of intergenerational friendship with Japan has gone relatively smoothly. This also demonstrates one
aspect of the flexibility of Taiwanese society ʼs views of history and identity. Yet this does notnecessarily mean that the internal reconciliation of Taiwanese society is going well. It would seemthat reconciliation has yet to happen between two views of history.
Another point is worth making about the issue of selective remembering and selectiveforgetting. This does not come up so often in debates within Taiwanese society, but theKuomintang does not necessarily have positive feelings for Japan because it fought Japan for eightyears and made countless sacrifices. In contrast, fighting Japan for eight years is an experiencethat is not present in the Taiwanese view of history. At the time, Taiwan was under Japanesecolonial rule, meaning that Taiwan was on the frontline as part of the Imperial Japanese Army andwas bombed by American aircraft flying over from China. In this sense, we can tell that a large
gap has existed between the Kuomintangʼs view of history and the indigenous Taiwanese view ofhistory. Perhaps this can be explained using the concepts of selective remembering and selectiveforgetting? We are left with the major challenge of how to share our memories of different
wartime experiences to achieve reconciliation.
Finally, I want to say that when debating reconciliation, we ought to avoid simplifying
relationships to those between the perpetrator and the victim. The issue of postwar reconciliation
is not merely an issue of wartime and colonial experiences or postwar settlement, and affects
the formation of war memories and views of history in postwar society in numerous ways. As
such, I want to argue that more diverse perspectives and specificity are needed when conducting
research into reconciliation.

65
Japan Review Vol.2 No.2 Fall 2018