CJEAS
Contemporary Japan and East-Asian Studies
January 1, 2019 Vol. 3 No. 1

http://jeast.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/

China’s Public Diplomacy towards Southeast
Asian Nations

Edited and Published bySociety for Contemporary Japan and East-Asian Studies

Contents◼ AbstractⅠ◼ Thesis
Introduction

1

1. China’s Public Diplomacy towards ASEAN Countries2

2. China’s Defensive, Assertive, and Aggressive Public
Diplomacy8

3. Major Issue with Public Diplomacy: Lack of Political
Philosophy

18

Conclusion

24

Note

ⅰ

Profile of the Authorⅱ

Abstract
Since the mid-2000s, there has been great interest in China’s soft power. By looking
at China public diplomacy toward ASEAN countries, this paper seeks to analyze theshifting discourses and ideological sources of China’s public diplomacy.
This paper argues that China’s public diplomacy towards ASEAN has the threestrategic goals of “explaining China”, “disseminating information abroad so as to serve
China”, and “protecting China’s national interests”, and these goals combine in acomplex fashion. It concludes that China’s foreign policy philosophy today includes thethree ideologies of universal values, Marxism-Leninism, and Chinese traditional
thought, and as a nation that is poised to grow to a global superpower, China cannot
depend completely on any one of the three ideologies in its foreign policy philosophy
and vacillates between all three.

I摘要特别是自 2000 年代中叶以后，中国越来越重视加强本国的软实力。通过分析中国对东南亚各国的公共外交，本文试图阐明两个问题：（1）1990 年代之后的中国公共外交发生过何种转变，具有何种特征？（2）中国公共外交的意识形态
的根基在哪里？
本文认为中国的公共外交经历了三个阶段， 目前的中国公共外交同时具有
三个要素：“防御性公共外交”、“积极性公共外交”和“攻击性公共外交”。普世价值，马恩列毛的共产主义思想和中国的传统文化都为中国公共外交的提供理论基础，但是目前的中国公共外交无法立足于任何一种思想之上，导致中国的软实力缺乏意识形态的根基。

IIChina’s Public Diplomacy towards Southeast Asian Nations
AOYAMA Rumi
Professor
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, International Studies Program
Waseda University

Introduction
With its rapid economic growth, China’s presence has seen a definitive increase,not only in the political realm but in the cultural realm as well. It has been a little over
10 years since the world’s first Confucius Institute was established in Seoul in 2004,
and today there are already 525 Confucius Institutes in 138 countries, and 1113
Confucius Classrooms (up until December 2017), according to China’s Confucius
Institute Headquarters. Transformers 4, which was released in 2014, not only featured
famous Chinese actors such as Li Bingbing, but the film was shot in China and many
Chinese brand products such as cars, TVs, milk, and mineral water made appearances as
well.
Since the mid-2000s, there has been great interest in China’s soft power. Softpower is defined as the ability to get what you want through attraction1, and Joseph Nyeargues that China’s soft power is increasing on all fronts including culture, politicalvalue, and foreign policy, although it is still no match for US soft power2. China’s
public diplomacy is said to have been particularly successful in Southeast Asian
countries3.
In recent years, tensions between China and neighboring countries such as Japan,
the Philippines, and Vietnam have escalated over maritime sovereignty. China’s rigid
position towards its neighbors regarding maritime issues has in reality increased
concerns and alarm towards China in some East Asian nations. Against this backdrop,
East Asia has served as a stage where Japan and China are in fierce competition over

Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books,
1990; and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public
Affairs, 2004; Joseph Nye, “Think Again, Soft Power,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2006/02/23/thinkagain-soft-power/ (accessed on January 31, 2019).
2 Joseph Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power”, Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29. 2005.
3 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, pp.33-35.
11

soft power4. There are some who argue that even with economic growth, delayedpolitical reform in China is an obstacle to China increasing its soft power in Southeast
Asia5.
However, the realities of power politics in the international order have resulted inalterations to China’s deployment of public diplomacy even as it increases its soft
power, and issues facing China in increasing its soft power are also changing. Whatform has China’s public diplomacy taken in terms of its policies? What is China seeking
to serve as a base for its soft power? In order to answer these questions, this paper firstconsiders the policy transitions in China’s public diplomacy towards ASEAN countries.
Next, we elucidate the characteristics of China’s public diplomacy as well as China’s
methods for carrying out its public diplomacy towards ASEAN countries. Lastly, we
discuss issues in China’s public diplomacy by considering the dialogue taking place in
China.
Here, we define public diplomacy as efforts made primarily by a government
regarding mainly education, culture, and dissemination of information.

1. China’s Public Diplomacy towards ASEAN Countries
In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in China’s presence in Asia.
However, China’s increase in influence in Asia is a very recent phenomenon.
In the beginning of the 1990s, China has started fully participating in regionalorganizations by simultaneously demarcating borders with neighboring countries andimproving relations with them. China began its relations with ASEAN by sending its
foreign minister Qian Qichen to the 24th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July
1991 and signing an agreement with ASEAN. In 1994, China attended the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF), and in 1996 China became a dialogue partner of ASEAN.
Through proposals by Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto, ASEAN+3 (Japan, China,
South Korea) was first established in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in December 1997. In
this manner, by 1997 China had gradually created a foundation for cooperation with
ASEAN.

Ian Hall and Frank Smith, “The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional
Competition”, Asian Security, 9:1, 2013, pp.1-18; Jing Sun, Japan and China as Charm Rivals: SoftPower in Regional Diplomacy, University of Michigan Press, 2013.
5 Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Soft Power in East Asia: A Quest for Status and Influence?,” NBR
Special Report #42, January 2013,https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/451/docs/Huang_FINAL_China_Soft_Power_and_Status.pdf(accessed on January 31, 2019).
4

2

With such a transition in policy as a backdrop, China’s public diplomacy towards
ASEAN began to be deployed. China’s engagement with ASEAN since 1996 has gone
through the following three stages, leading to the present day.
(1) Eliminating Perception of China as Threat: 1996-2002
With the redefinition of the US-Japan Security Treaty in April 1996, fears of China
being encircled by the US have increased, and China suddenly became closer to
ASEAN countries. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis China did not devalue theyuan, which led to China being seen in an increasingly positive light by Southeast Asian
countries. China took this opportunity to begin in earnest its assertive diplomacy
towards ASEAN. However, there were several obstacles to China and ASEAN
developing ties, including memory of China’s history of supporting communist
movements throughout the world as well as tensions surrounding territorial waters in
the South China Sea.
Immediately after the end of the Cold War, China declared to Southeast Asian
countries that it would return to the “spirit of Bandung”. When President Yang
Shangkun visited Indonesia in June 1991, he emphasized that “China had no intentionof seeking political and economic influence through overseas Chinese.”6 In November
2000, China proposed an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) at the ASEAN
Summit, and at the ASEAN Summit held in November 2001, China and ASEAN agreed
to implement the ACFTA by 2020. As a result, ASEAN countries began to see China as“not a threat but an opportunity”, and ASEAN countries took a step away from seeing
China as a threat and towards taking advantage of China’s growth.
Another major obstacle between China and ASEAN is the territorial disputesurrounding the Spratly (“Nansha” in Chinese) Islands and the Paracel (“Xisha” in
Chinese) Islands. Although it is by no means easy to solve territorial disputes, efforts to
do so have begun since the end of the 1990s. In July 1999, China announced that it
would consider a regional code of conduct7 in the South China Sea at a meeting in
Singapore between ASEAN and China. At the same time, Foreign Minister Tang
Jiaxuan announced that it would be the first signatory among the five nuclear weapon
states to the annex of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty(SEANWFZ; signed in 1995, effective 1997). Of course, there were major differences inviews between China and ASEAN regarding SEANWFZ. China claims that its pledge“Beijing does not Seek Influence through Overseas Chinese,” Straits Times, 6 June 1991.
The South China Sea code of conduct was drafted by the Philippines and Vietnam but was strongly
opposed by Malaysia.
673

not to attack or threaten signatories to SEANWFZ with nuclear weapons does not apply
to its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or the continental shelf.
In 2000, a working group between China and ASEAN established by working level
Senior Officials’ Consultations8 has met four times and has discussed the draft for theSouth China Sea code of conduct9. Through a series of negotiations after that, in 2002, a“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)” between China
and ASEAN was announced. As a result of the signing of the South China Sea code of
conduct, relations between China and ASEAN countries progressed in a major way. In
October 2003, China became the first non-member of ASEAN to sign the Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and forged a strategic partnership for
peace and prosperity with ASEAN.
(2) China’s Engagement Strategy and Public Diplomacy: 2002-2006
The United States, Japan, and ASEAN countries have made vigorous efforts toincorporate China into the international and regional orders. Meanwhile, since 2000
China has transitioned to a strategy of incorporating Asian countries. At the 16th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in November 2002, China
viewed the first 20 years of the 21st century as a “strategic opportunity” and beganplacing more importance on neighboring countries as a region. With such a foreign
policy strategy, since 2000, China has launched an assertive diplomatic offensive
towards ASEAN countries. After the DOC was signed, relations between China and
ASEAN countries developed rapidly.
Against this backdrop, educational and cultural exchanges with Southeast Asian
nations have been strongly backed by the Chinese government and have seen rapid
development. In October 2003, the first Plan of Action (2005-2010) between China and
ASEAN was agreed. Plans of Actions are renewed every five years, and include specificpolicies to reinforce exchanges in culture, education, media, etc.
In November 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao made nine proposals to strengthen
political, economic, and cultural relations with ASEAN countries10. As a result of the
The first meeting of the working level Senior Officials’ Consultations between China and ASEAN
was held in 1995 in Hangzhou.
9 “External Relations,” http://www.aseansec.org/10370.htm (accessed on August 8, 2012).
10 The nine proposals by Premier Wen Jiabao are as follows: (1) Strengthening of the system ofcooperation by dialogue at every level including interactions between leaders. (2) Support of theASEAN initiative. (3) Strengthening of cooperation in areas such as customs and inspections,
including FTAs. (4) Creation of a China-ASEAN energy ministerial level dialogue mechanism. (5)Promotion of cooperation in five important areas and steady execution of memorandum ofcooperation on traffic. (6) Strengthening of cooperation in non-traditional security areas including
8

4

proposal by Premier Wen Jiabao, in 2005 a memorandum on cultural exchanges was
signed between China and ASEAN. Meanwhile, the two foreign policy positions of “notusing overseas Chinese for political purposes” and “setting aside maritime disputes”
have played a major role in eliminating fears towards China by ASEAN countries. The
position of multilateralism that has started to emerge in Chinese foreign policy has
further strengthened relations with ASEAN countries. Of course, cultural, educational,
and media exchanges have occurred on a bilateral basis between China and individual
ASEAN countries, but by strengthening relations with ASEAN as a regionalorganization, cultural exchanges between China and ASEAN countries have beenfurther promoted. Since the 2000s, cultural exchanges have developed between China
and ASEAN countries.
(3) Dilemma between Territorial Issues and Strengthening of Relations: since 2006
In the latter half of the 2000s, relations between China and ASEAN countries havepassed a turning point. Since 2006, China’s policies towards ASEAN countries havebeen to take a hard line regarding maritime territorial issues while strengthening
political, economic, and cultural relations.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into effect in
1994, introduced the new concept of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and a deadlineof May 12, 2009 was set for each nation to apply for an EEZ. In view of this deadline,
around 2006 China added “national sovereignty and security” to its national interests,
which already included economic development, and made explicit its intent to protect
its maritime interests. As a result, since 2007, tensions surrounding maritime issues have
escalated between China and Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. This type of maritime
policy was inherited by the Xi Jinping administration, and President Xi Jinping stated,“this is an issue regarding our core interests and we will not negotiate”11 during amaritime security. Signing of agreement between China and ASEAN regarding Southeast Asian
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty as soon as possible. Execution of Declaration of Conduct in theSouth China Sea and cooperation in the South China Sea as soon as possible. Adherence to theprinciple of setting aside arguments and engaging in joint development, and proactively studying
methods for joint development in disputed waters. (7) Signing of Great Mekong Subregion
information memorandum with five Mekong River basin countries. Participation of China as
observer in the East ASEAN Growth Area and strengthening cooperation with eastern ASEAN
countries. (8) Strengthening cultural and youth exchanges. Signing of cultural cooperationagreement with ASEAN. Implementation of mutual exchanges of youth volunteers, deployment oflanguage studies instruction, medical cooperation, and spreading of agricultural technologies. (9)Implementation of commemoration activities with 2006, the 15th anniversary of the formation of the
dialogue partnership, as a “Year of Friendship and Cooperation between China and ASEAN”.
11 Jiefang Daily, January 30, 2013.
5

meeting of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China in January 2013, once againemphasizing China’s position of not yielding in matters concerning sovereignty,
security, and development interests.
In the South China Sea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan
have been entangled in territorial disputes. Malaysia and Brunei dispute relatively littleof China’s positions, and it is claimed that as long as China does not take any actions tocompromise the security and national interests of those nations, there would be no
sudden shifts in sentiment in those countries towards considering China a threat12 . On
the other hand, Vietnam and the Philippines are completely at odds with China andtensions are escalating.
Even amid intense disputes with some Southeast Asian nations regarding maritime
issues, China continues to increase its economic, cultural, and military cooperation with
ASEAN. In 2006, the China-ASEAN Cultural Forum was established, and cultural
exchanges centered on the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region have been promoted.
At the China-ASEAN Cultural Forum, exhibitions of publications and joint events were
held. In October 2009, a radio broadcast called Voice of Beibu Gulf was started13.
China is also putting effort into cultivation of human resources and humanexchanges in Southeast Asia in various fields. According to a report from China,
approximately 1500 police executives from Southeast Asia received training in China
from 2006 to 2011, and the number of people from Southeast Asia receiving training infood production in China is as many as several tens of thousands per session14.
Furthermore, at the China-ASEAN Summit held in October 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao
proposed a target of 100,000 foreign students from China to ASEAN countries and fromASEAN countries to China, respectively, by 202015.
Since 2011, the US pivot to Asia strategy has begun to be implemented, withmilitary relations with allies in the Asia-Pacific region being reinforced and with the US
promoting the TPP. China interpreted this as an attempt to encircle China, which served
as an impetus for the “One Belt, One Road” foreign policy. In September 2013,
Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Making Sense of Malaysia’s China Policy: Asymmetry, Proximity, andElite’s Domestic Authority,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, April 2013, pp. 1-39.
13 Voice of Beibu Gulf is primarily aimed at Vietnam and Thailand, and is broadcast in the fivelanguages of English, Thai, Vietnamese, Cantonese, and Mandarin.
14 “Waijiabu Fubuzhang Fu Ying jiu Zhongguo Dongmeng Guanxi Jieshou Xinhuashe Caifang(Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying Interviewed by Xinhua News Agency in terms of China-ASEAN
Relations,” http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-08/05/content_2198728.htm (accessed on January 31,2019).
15 “Wen Jiabo Zongli Zai Di Shisan Ci Zhongguo Yu Dongmeng Lingdaoren Huiyi Shang de
Jiaohua (Premier Wen Jiabao’s Speech at the 13st China-ASEAN Summit,”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-10/30/c_12718147.htm (accessed on October 30, 2010).
12

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President Xi Jinping announced in Kazakhstan the concept of a Silk Road Economic
Belt, and in October, he announced in Indonesia the concept of a 21st-Century Maritime
Silk Road. Against this backdrop, at a Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference held thatsame October, “peripheral diplomacy” was emphasized, and in November 2014, theChinese government announced the creation of new Silk Road fund ($40 billion) at the
APEC meeting held in Beijing. In March 2015, the National Development and Reform
Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce jointly
announced the One Belt, One Road policy.
With the announcement of the One Belt, One Road strategy, the west and south of
China became strategic areas for which various measures have been put in place.
Amid this, China’s diplomatic offensive towards ASEAN countries, which play avital role in the Maritime Silk Road, has intensified. While China’s basic stanceregarding territorial issues in the South China Sea has not changed, it seems to have also
compromised slightly with Southeast Asian countries. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang
Yi announced a policy in August 2014 in a meeting with ASEAN to resolve the South
China Sea issue through dialogue with concerned parties, and to maintain security in theSouth China Sea with the concerned parties16. Up to now, China had been strongly
pushing for bilateral negotiations regarding territorial issues, but Wang Yi’sannouncement marked an acceptance of multilateral negotiations between China and
ASEAN17.
At a China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Laos in July 2016, Foreign
Minister Wang Yi announced that it would accelerate dialogue regarding a South China
Sea code of conduct (COC), which would be legally binding, and complete
implementation by the first half of 2017. Foreign Minister Wang also proposed setting
up a hotline between China and ASEAN in order to avoid unforeseen situations at sea.
Based on its position that “issues regarding the South China Sea have no effect on
the friendship and cooperation between China and ASEAN”18, China has put effort intostrengthening relations with ASEAN. Based on the fact that the One Belt, One Road
strategy fosters a strengthening of relations in five areas (Wu Tong): policy, finance,“Wang Yi: Yi ‘Shuanggui Silu’ Chuli Nanhai Wenti (Wang Yi: ‘Dual-track’ Approach in
Resolving the South China Sea Issue),”
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/08-09/6477091.shtml (accessed on January 31, 2019).
17 “Zhongguo Dui Nanhai Wenti ‘Shuanggui Silu’ Chengxian (China’s Emerging ‘Dual-track
Approach in South China Sea,” http://m.ftchinese.com/story/001059524 (accessed on January 31,2019).
18 “Minami Shina Kai Mondai, Chugoku to ASEAN no Yuko Kyoryoku ni Eikyo se zi = O Gaigo
Bucho (Strategic Cooperation between China and ASEAN will not be Influenced by South China
Sea Issue, Said Foreign Minister Wang),” http://japanese.china.org.cn/politics/txt/201606/15/content_38672949.htm (accessed on January 31, 2019).
16

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trade, infrastructure, and people-to-people exchanges, further promotion of cultural
exchanges has become an important policy topic.
In addition to bilateral cooperation so far and the implementation of the action planwith ASEAN, subregion level cooperation has been reinvigorated with theestablishment of One Belt, One Road. In March 2016, the Lancang-Mekong
Cooperation Summit was held for the first time in Sanya, Hainan Province in China.
Cultural exchange is the third important pillar along with politics and the economy in
the newly created Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework. For cultural exchanges,
specific policies were raised including culture and arts activities, cooperation in
occupational training and exchanges between universities, medical cooperation,
promotion of tourism, think tank cooperation, and youth exchanges19.
Thus, it is only very recently—since entering the 2000s—that we have seen a rapid
development in Chinese public diplomacy policies towards ASEAN countries. In recent
years, relations between China and ASEAN countries have worsened due to tensions
surrounding the increasingly complex maritime territorial dispute. On the other hand,
China’s policies towards ASEAN countries is based on the principle that “even if there
are territorial issues, we can make progress on political, economic, and cultural
cooperation.” Thus, China continues to put effort into strengthening its relations with
ASEAN countries through the China-ASEAN regional framework that has been
established so far, and through subregional cooperation frameworks. Against thisbackdrop, maritime issues have not stopped exchanges in areas such as culture and arts,
media, and education even when such maritime issues have increased the perception inSoutheast Asia that China is a threat. There is still potential in some countries for China
to continue to increase its presence.

2. China’s Defensive, Assertive, and Aggressive20 Public Diplomacy
China’s public diplomacy towards ASEAN countries has developed greatly in thepast decade or so. Starting from defensive public diplomacy through explaining China,
China’s public diplomacy has turned to assertive offensive from the late 1990s, and now
is aggressively protecting China’s “core interests”. The message that China is trying to“Lancangjiang-Meigonghe Hezuo Zhouci Lingdairen Huiyi Sanya Xuanyan (Sanya Declarationof the First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation,”
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/t1350037.shtml (accessed on January 31,2019).
20 In 1948, the United Kingdom had classified its propaganda into aggressive propaganda, defensive
propaganda, and assertive propaganda as ideal types.
198

convey through public diplomacy has greatly changed since the end of the Cold War,and today, the defensive, assertive, and aggressive elements are entangled together incomplex ways.
(1) “Explaining China” - Defensive Public Diplomacy
Since the Tiananmen Square incident, the Chinese government has put further
effort into public diplomacy. The international environment surrounding China has
become unfavorable as a result of the Tiananmen Square incident and the end of theCold War. Amid this, the Chinese government has intensified its international public
relations activities, and has begun in earnest to create a favorable national image.
According to studies by Hongying Wang, throughout the 1990s, the national image that
the Chinese government tried to create was that of a “major nation that is aninternational cooperator and peace-loving.”21 Since the 21st century China has gone a
step further from the 1990s, and in addition to creating a “national image for China,”
has made clear the fact that it seeks to further develop its economy through its
international public relations activities.
In order to combat the perception of China as a threat, at the Boao Forum for Asia
held in November 2003, Zheng Bijian, Chairman of the China Reform Forum,
introduced the concept of a “peaceful rise.” Since the 16th National Congress of theCommunist Party of China, “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” have garneredattention as new national images that China hopes would stick, and various studies
pertaining to this have been conducted. However, “peaceful rise” drew unexpected
criticism both domestically and internationally. John Mearsheimer, a proponent of theoffensive realism theory has asserted that China’s rise cannot be peaceful22.
The idea that the Western media has demonized China and that it is unfair in its
coverage of China has been the impetus behind China’s defensive public diplomacy.
Following the publication of Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu [中国可以说不: Chinese

Who Can Say No], the next major publication Yaomo Hua Zhongguo de
Beihou [妖魔化中国的背后: Behind a Demonized China], which argues that
the US mass media does not cover China objectively and that its coverage isbiased, was released in 1997. The publication also indicated a sense of despair amongauthors who had held hope for the United States, and argues that the US media depicts

Hongying Wang, “National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,” China: An International
Journal (Vol. 1), March 2003, p. 52.
22 John Mearsheimer, “Why China’s Rise Will not Be Peaceful,” September 17, 2004,
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf (accessed on January 31, 2019).
21

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China as the number one enemy of the United States, that the US media has not only
shown China in a negative light but has fully demonized China, and that this image of a“demonized” China is what has been planted in the minds of the American populace.
The authors criticized the stance of the US mass media and the image created by thismass media, and as a result became popular. “Demonized” became a popular
catchphrase, and has had such a deep impact on the society that it continues to be a
popular phrase. During the torch relay for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, what drove
Chinese students abroad to action against the Free Tibet movement by cheering on thetorch bearers while waving Chinese flags is this dissatisfaction against the Western
media’s demonization of China.
The notion that the Western media has demonized China and that it is unfair in its
coverage of China is shared by both public and private spheres. Zhao Qizheng, former
director of the State Council Information Office, pointed out that 90% or more of the
US media’s coverage of China is negative, bringing up the example that images of theyoung man blocking the tank during the Tiananmen Square incident on June 4, 1989
have continued to be broadcast for more than 20 years. He has criticized the stance of
the US media as lacking objectivity, as well as the image of China created by the media
of being “authoritarian” and “undemocratic”.
In order to erase this negative image of China created by the Western media, theChinese government has put effort into information dissemination as well as cultural
exchanges. The purpose of this defensive public diplomacy is to “explain China to theworld,” in the words of the Chinese government. In other words, this defensive public
diplomacy explains China’s policies and development, China’s history, and the “China
problem” taken up in international public opinion, and combats “attacks” on China.
It was against this backdrop that the first Confucius Institute was established in
2004. Since then, the number of Confucius Institutes has rapidly increased, and by theend of 2015, there were 500 Confucius Institutes in 135 nations, and 1000 Confucius
Classrooms. Additionally, 25 China Culture Centers were established as of February
2015, including in three Southeast Asian countries: Laos, Thailand, and Singapore. The
Chinese government has plans to build even more China Culture Centers and aims toincrease the number of China Culture Centers to 50 by 2020.
Confucius Institutes teach the Chinese language and the main activities of the
China Culture Centers include courses on tai chi, martial arts, traditional Chinese
medicine, Chinese cuisine, calligraphy, and ink paintings. It is likely that the aim here isto erase the negative image created by the Western media by bringing people into10

contact with Chinese culture and language through the activities of the Confucius
Institutes and China Culture Centers.
It is not necessarily true that the Confucius Institutes’ activities have been effective
in increasing China’s soft power. However, it can be seen where the focus of China’s
public diplomacy is based on the number of Confucius Institutes established, and whichcountries have taken a flexible stance towards cultural exchanges with China. Thailand
has stood out in terms of the degree to which it has taken part in cultural exchanges with
China. As shown in table 1, Thailand has the greatest number of Confucius Institutes
and Confucius Classrooms, and has the seventh highest number in the world when
taking Confucius Institutes alone. China Culture Centers have also been established in
Thailand, and there are many foreign students from Thailand in China (table 2).
◼

Table 1 - Number of Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms inSoutheast Asian Countries
Name of Country

Number of

Number of

Number of Registered Students

Confucius

Confucius(2015)

Institutes

Classrooms(2017)(2017)

Vietnam100Cambodia

1

3

14180

Laos

1

1

3834

Myanmar

0

3

14509

Thailand15

20

187831

Singapore

1

2

13727

Philippines

4

3

45409

Indonesia

6

2

10630

Malaysia

2

0

2709

Brunei

1

66100

Source: Created by author based on data released by Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban)◼

Table 2 - Number of Foreign Students in China (2010)
Name of Country

Number of Foreign Students in China

Vietnam

13018

Cambodia

502

Laos

1859

Myanmar972

11

Thailand

13177

Singapore

3608

Philippines

2989

Indonesia

9539

Malaysia

3885

Brunei31

East Timor

27

Source: Created by author based on China’s foreign affairs white paper “中国外交 [Chinese diplomacy] (2011) .”Note: The data was taken by totaling the number of long term and short-term foreign students.

The Philippines and Vietnam are in an intense dispute with China over maritime
territorial issues but based on the number of Confucius Institutes and foreign students
studying in China, it would be difficult to say that relations are weak.
Lastly, China’s public diplomacy is focused on major nations and emerging
nations. Countries where the number of Confucius Institutes exceeds ten in 2017
include the United States (110), the United Kingdom (29), South Korea (23), Germany(19), France (17), Russia (17), Thailand (15), Japan (14), Australia (14), Italy (12),Canada (12), and Brazil (10). ASEAN countries do not necessarily take a high priority
in China’s public diplomacy.
(2) “Telling a Story in China’s Own Words” - Assertive Public Diplomacy
Since the end of the Cold War, China’s public diplomacy, which had been centeredon “explaining China”, has seen a major change in the latter half of the 2000s.
While China was unable to find an effective counterargument to the perception ofChina as a threat, an argument took place within China over “pandas vs. dragons”.
China has a saying that “the Chinese are the children of dragons,” and many Chinese
take this as a point of pride. However, in many cases, the perception of dragons among
English speakers is influenced by Greek mythology, in which dragons are the symbol ofaggression and evil. As a result, one academic argued that the animal symbolizing China
should be switched from the aggressive and strong dragon to the gentler panda. As aresult of this statement, a major argument ensued over the internet. In the end, theargument for the dragon as the symbol of China won out, but it was decided to change
the English term for the mythical animal from “dragon” to “loong”. Through sucharguments, differences between Chinese and Western cultures were seen close up, andattention began to be paid towards the difficulty in expressing China’s arguments inother languages.
12Based on political trends in China at the time, it may be seen as inevitable that the
dragon, which is an important part of the traditional culture, would win in the argumentof “pandas vs. dragons”. In the latter half of the 2000s, the importance of the power toincrease China’s voice on the international stage and have an influence on international
public opinion came to be understood more clearly and widely in China. Against thisbackdrop, China’s public diplomacy also switched from engaging in the world order led
by Western nations to moving away from Western-centrism. At the 17th National
Congress of the Communist Party of China (referred to below as 17th National
Congress) held in October 2007, the term “soft power” appeared for the first time in the
Party’s official documents, and the National Congress made explicit China’s national
policy of promoting the culture industry and emphasizing culture as an important tool
for soft power. Since culture came to be incorporated as an aspect of its foreign policy
strategy, the policy of “harmonizing but not agreeing” came to the fore, even withregard to its public relations and culture strategy. At the 17th National Congress,
President Hu Jintao stated the concept of a “harmonious world (和諧世界)”23, which isa traditional Chinese saying, and today, “political influence, economic competitiveness,a friendly image, and attractiveness of moral principles” are stated aims of China’s
foreign policy. It is said that President Hu Jintao specifically chose “harmony” as the
English translation for the Chinese character 和 to be conveyed as a key concept
throughout the world in order to match the spirit of the UN Charter and not go against
Western values24.
In this manner, the importance of soft power at the Party and governmental level
was brought forth in 2007, and in 2009 the concept of public diplomacy was brought
forth, and China switched its position to that of assertive public diplomacy. China’s
public diplomacy slogans have changed from “peaceful rise” and “peacefuldevelopment”, which match Western discourse, to “harmonious world” under the Hu
Jintao administration based on Chinese traditional culture, and finally to the “Chinese
Dream” under the Xi Jinping administration. In other words, China’s public diplomacy
has switched from a more defensive “China is not ...” to a more assertive “China is ...”The Chinese government, which promoted the strategy of increasing China’s voiceon the international stage and influencing international public opinion, has emphasized
the following four areas: spreading of media overseas, development of the cultureindustry, strengthening overseas Chinese diplomacy, and development of think tanks.
The phrase “harmonious world” was first used at the 2005 Asian-African Summit.
Zhao Qi-Zheng, “Liyong Gonggong Waijiao Chuanda Zhongguo Shengyin (Delivering China’s
Voice by Public Diplomacy,” Bainianchao 12th ed. 2012, p. 74.
23
24

13

⚫

Spreading of Media Overseas
In order to realize China-centric information dissemination, the Chinese
government first worked to break down the monopoly of the Western media.
“Worldwide, there are more than 300 media corporations, but of these, 144 are
American. 90% of the international news in the world is covered by four major news
agencies (UPI, AP, Reuters, and AFPBB News).”25 “The United States creates 90% of
the world’s news and 75% of the world’s TV programs.”26 Underlying such statements
is the strong fear towards the monopoly that Western nations, particularly the UnitedStates, have on discourse in the form of media and television.
China has started focusing on power over opinion, investing 45 billion RMB inoverseas expansions of newspapers, and television and radio programs, as well as
creation of advertisements relating to China’s national image. Since the end of 2009, acommercial made by China entitled “Made in China, Made in the World” aired on CNN
in North America and Europe, as well as on the internet. Also, the day before President
Hu Jintao visited the US in January 2011, a commercial by China played on loop on anelectronic billboard in Times Square.
Through increased publicity activities abroad, China Radio International currently
broadcasts in 50 languages, and China Internet Information Center, People’s Daily
Online, Xinhua News Agency, and CCTV have international content in close to 10
languages. In the 12th five-year plan of the newspaper publication industry in 2012,
overseas expansion of newspaper publications was raised as an important goal. In orderto support overseas expansion of newspaper publications, the Import-Export Bank of
China plans more than 20 billion RMB in foreign currency financing27.
In order to combat the influence of the Western media, the Chinese media plans to
expand overseas and particularly to the United States and Africa. With the start of the
One Belt, One Road plan, television stations in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
have taken the initiative in media exchanges with Southeast Asian countries. In August
2015, Guangxi Television signed a cooperation agreement with MGTV, whichbroadcasts in Chinese in 10 ASEAN countries and is headquartered in Bangkok,“Gaosu Duishou: Women de Liliang he Juexin (Let our Opponent Know our Strength andResolution)”, Guangming Daily, December 30, 2013.
26 “Zhongguo Meiti Goujian Guoji Huayuquan de ‘Kun’ he ‘Po’ (Challenges and Choices for
Chinese Media to Create Global Discourse),” http://www.cri.com.cn/entry/299310de-3917-4acf91c2-624f571304e8.html (accessed on May 4, 2014).
27 “Zou Chuqu: Zhongguo Baoye de Lujing ji Celue Fenxi (Going Out: Direction and Strategy for
Chinese Newspaper),” http://media.people.com.cn/n/2013/0319/c359295-20841439.html (accessedon January 31, 2019).
25

14

Thailand. Guangxi Television considers this cooperative relationship as the first step to
expanding to Southeast Asia.
⚫

Development of the Culture Industry
Particularly since 2002, the new goal of “leveraging market mechanisms in order
to coordinate central areas with outlying areas as well as the government with theprivate sector in order to improve upon the deficit in cultural trade,”28 has been added
to public diplomacy. As a result, whereas when high officials from the government
previously visited countries abroad only trade representatives joined them, in recent
years cultural representatives have joined them as well.
The movement to reform the cultural system, which started in 2002, was of course
a cause for the dramatic increase in importance placed towards international cultural
exchanges. In reforming the cultural system, international cultural exchanges have beenemphasized as an important aid towards overseas expansions of domestic corporations,and international cultural exchanges have met protection/development and overseas
expansion of domestic corporations.
With such policies, China has promoted reform in the cultural system in threestages and has invested a large amount of money towards the culture industry. China
aims to improve its technological levels and expand its presence into Europe and theUnited States in coordination with the Discovery Channel, the US animation company
DreamWorks SKG, and others. On the other hand, Southeast Asia has a large Chinese
speaking population, which makes it a relatively easy environment for Chinese dramas
and animated works to thrive.
⚫

Strengthening “Overseas Chinese Public Diplomacy”
In 2011, China’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council first
proposed the concept of “Overseas Chinese public diplomacy”. Overseas Chinese
public diplomacy is a coined phrase and is said to be a combination of diaspora
diplomacy and public diplomacy.
In 2008, a riot occurred in Tibet, which triggered demonstrations disrupting the
Olympic torch relay abroad. In the face of such disruptions, some overseas Chinese andChinese students abroad demonstrated their opposition to Tibetan independence andacted to defend the Beijing Olympics. Such offensive and defensive acts towards the“Wenhua Buzhang Zhang Jiazheng: Wenhua Waijiao yao Baozheng Zhongguo Wenhua deAnquan (Minister of Culture Zhang Jiazheng: Culture Diplomacy needs to Ensure the Safety of
Culture),” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Romania
http://www.chinaembassy.org.ro/chn/whjy/t175500.htm (accessed on December 19, 2004).
28

15

Beijing Olympics and the Tibet issue have reinforced the importance of the overseas
Chinese in public diplomacy. The importance placed on overseas Chinese public
diplomacy was likely inspired in large part by the Israel lobby in the United States.
With the start of the overseas Chinese public diplomacy, the importance of such
public diplomacy was pointed out in the Outline of Overseas Chinese Affairs
Development (2011-2015), which presents the goal of “transmitting China’s excellent
culture and fostering good will” through overseas Chinese public diplomacy. The
human affairs system supporting overseas Chinese operations has been strengthened.
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei became the vice minister of the Overseas
Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (2012), and Qiu Yuanping, vice minister of
the Office of Foreign Affairs of the CPC Central Committee, took office as the directorof the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (2013).
Relations between China and ASEAN countries developed rapidly as a result of the
adoption of the foreign policy indicating that the overseas Chinese would not be relied
upon for political purposes. However, if strengthening of overseas Chinese public
diplomacy is proactively pursued even in ASEAN countries, this would likely result in
China’s public diplomacy strategy backfiring and an increased perception that China isa threat.
⚫

Development of Think Tanks
Since the start of the Xi Jinping administration, restrictions on speech havetightened, but an increased level of importance has been placed in think tanks on public
diplomacy.
At a top-level meeting held to discuss peripheral diplomacy held in October 2013,“influence towards the financial world, academia, the media, think tanks, and the like”
was raised as an important topic for cultural exchanges that China will take part in in
the future, and was officially set forth as a government policy. In the previously
mentioned Lancang-Mekong Summit as well, an agreement was made to create a thinktank network among the six nations of China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, andVietnam.
(3) “Protecting China’s Interests” - Aggressive Public Diplomacy
Following the Japanese government’s nationalization of the Senkaku Islands in
2012, in 2013 the Chinese government announced that it would set its air defense
identification zone over a wide area of the East China Sea including the airspace above
the Senkaku Islands. As a result, Sino-Japanese relations entered their worst period
16since the resumption of diplomatic ties. The battle for public opinion between the twocountries regarding the territorial issue started then.
At the current stage, aggressive public diplomacy has been deployed in Europe andthe United States. On July 27, 2012, the Tokyo Metropolitan government, which sought
to purchase the Senkaku Islands, placed an opinion advertisement in the Wall Street
Journal seeking US approval. In response, Chen Guangbiao, a private entrepreneur from
Jiangsu Province, placed an advertisement in the New York Times pertaining to the
Senkaku Islands on August 31, 2012. Additionally, on December 1, 2012, a group
including mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, which advocate for
Chinese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, placed an advertisement in the New YorkTimes and the Times.
In December 2013, Prime Minister Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which further
escalated the publicity battle between Japan and China. As for moves made by China,
from December 26, 2013, the day when Prime Minister Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine, toJanuary 24, 2014, 78 Chinese diplomats stationed abroad were said to have madeappearances in overseas media and criticized the visit a total of 120 times29.
From the perspective of China’s public diplomacy, this publicity battle between
Japan and China can be seen as an implementation by the Chinese government of apublic diplomacy that contributes to specific foreign policy, targeting a specific country
for the first time since the end of the Cold War. In August 2012, Hu Jintao issued anotification including a statement that “we will promote public diplomacy and cultural
exchanges and protect China’s legal interests overseas.” “Protecting China’s overseasinterests” was added for the first time to the objectives of public diplomacy, which
include “explaining China” and conveying China’s principle of a “harmonious world”
overseas.
Under the slogan of “protecting China’s interests”, China launched another intense
public diplomacy war in 2016. After the Hague-based Permanent Court Arbitration
issued a decision against China on the case filed by Manila in 2013 concerning
maritime entitlements and the status of features in the South China Sea, China
approached many nations to rally support for Beijing. Cambodia was one of the first to
do so30.
“Anbei Canbai Jingguo Shenshe, Zhongri Shilun Kaida (Abe’s Visit to Yasukuni Shrine Intrigued
War of Public Opinion between China and Japan),”http://v.ifeng.com/news/world/2014002/019a7105-45e0-4ebf-a12c-f5dbc1031a4e.shtml (accessed on
January 31, 2019).
30 “China Using ‘Soft Power’ to Assert Rights over South China Sea,”
http://www.voanews.com/a/china-soft-power-asean/3430297.html (accessed on January 31, 2019).
29

17

As described above, the Chinese government, which aims to emerge from theinternational isolation resulting from the Tiananmen Square incident, has strengthened
its public diplomacy since the end of the Cold War, and is currently simultaneously
implementing the defensive, assertive, and aggressive sides to its public diplomacy.
Since the end of the Cold War, China has sought to strengthen its publicity
activities abroad and has put forth new policy after policy, which has definitively
increased China’s cultural presence on the international stage. The number of Confucius
Institutes, Confucius Classrooms, and China Culture Centers has rapidly increased. The
Chinese government has promoted cooperation with the media and think tanks abroadand has put effort into establishing cooperative relations with Disney and Hollywood as
well.
The primary targets of China’s public diplomacy are the United States and Europe,
but China is also engaged in a diplomatic offensive towards Southeast Asian countries
as well due to geographical proximity.
3. Major Issue with Public Diplomacy: Lack of Political Philosophy
Although China’s presence in Southeast Asian countries continues to increase, as
shown in table 3, it is not necessarily the case that China’s public diplomacy efforts
have yielded significant results. The impact of China’s public relations/culture strategy
is not necessarily directly proportional to its presence, and China also faces difficult
challenges.
◼

Table 3 - Popular Sentiment towards China in Indonesia
80
60
40
20
0
Spring Spring Spring Spring Spring Spring Spring Spring Spring Spring2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015
favorable

unfavorable

Source: Created by author based on data from Pew Research Center.

Several reasons can be attributed to this limits of China’s soft power. Needless tosay, China’s rigid maritime policies have been a major obstacle to its expansion of soft
power. Furthermore, views towards the public relations/culture/foreign policy strategy
18

of China, which is not a democracy, have become increasingly critical in recent years.
Research versions of Confucius Institutes have been established at Waseda University inJapan, Stanford University and University of Chicago in the United States, and others,
and the Chinese government has invested funds towards the research, but there aremany who have raised concerns regarding the independence of research and academic
freedom. Also, there have been many instances in recent years of China’s freedom ofspeech being examined up close.
Furthermore, lack of political philosophy has also impaired China’s soft power.
Regarding the value of liberal democracy, Fu Ying, the chairperson of China’s National
People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee has stated three sources of strength for
the United States as a superpower: “American values, military alliances, and aninternational system including the United Nations”31. On the other hand, China, which
does not necessarily share the same values as democratic nations, has not issued a clear
answer as to what the base of values is for China’s soft power.
Various ideologies have arisen in an increasingly diverse dialogue space, andissues and challenges surrounding China’s development are being debated among theseideologies. Below, the domestic debate concerning China will be considered, andreasons that China, which seeks to be a global superpower, cannot create a foreign
policy strategy to which the world could relate will be explored.
(1) Pluralistic Society
Since the end of the Cold War, China has transitioned from a monolithic society toa pluralistic society as the media has undergone market reforms. As Western nations
have become idealized and people began yearning for democratization and a market
economy, the people’s interest has shifted to practical issues such as how China should
democratize and undergo market reforms, and how China should overcome its multitude
of societal ills.
In the 30 plus years since the Chinese economic reform, Chinese society has
greatly changed. Over a 30-year period, China has experienced remarkable economic
development with a growth rate averaging in the double digits per year and has
overtaken Japan to be the second largest economy in the world after the United States.
However, an examination China’s Gini coefficient, which is an index indicating
disparities in income and wealth, has shown another face of China. In 1978, China’s“Fu Ying: G20 Fenghui Qianhou Kan Zhongmei Hezuo Fenqi (Fu Ying: Views on China-US
Differences around G20 Summit)” http://www.guancha.cn/fuying/2016_08_31_373003_3.shtml(accessed on January 31, 2019).
31

19

Gini coefficient was 0.22, but rose steadily over a decade starting in 2003 to reach 0.44,
which is close to the world average, and China’s National Bureau of Statistics hasrevealed that China’s Gini coefficient has hovered stably between 0.4 and 0.5. However,the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics published their own study in2012, which yielded the result that China’s Gini coefficient had reached 0.61 by 201032.
While there are questions about the reliability of the figures calculated in the study,
there is likely no controversy to the notion that China has transformed from an equal
society at the time that its economic reform was first launched to an unequal society.
Now, 30 plus years after the launch of China’s economic reform, both benefits andchallenges of the economic reform have been exposed. What was the base for China’s
politics and economy as it sustained an average annual economic growth rate of 10%
over the past 30 years? What caused the economic disparity? Public opinion in China
regarding challenges that will determine the future of China have become increasingly
diverse and polarized.
In Chinese society today, there is a clash of various opinions. Neoliberalism, neoMarxism, universal values, the New Left, and neo-Confucianism (culturalconservatism) are ideas that emerged in China after the end of the Cold War, and intense
debate is taking place among supporters of the respective beliefs in the general public,
centered on the intellectuals.
Neo-Marxism takes its ideas from Marxism-Leninism as well as Maoism to try to
restore China’s equal society. The cultural conservatives including the neo-Confucians
have their eyes on ancient Chinese culture and returning China to its traditional roots
and not Western democracy or Marxism-Leninism. The New Left share concerns
towards excessive market reforms in the economy and call for a big government. On theother hand, views among the New Left regarding political reform are varied, with someamong the New Left being sympathetic towards the Cultural Revolution, and somearguing for the importance of political reform. Believers in universal values andneoliberalism argue for the importance of simultaneously undergoing political andeconomic reforms and point out the dangers of political interference in the market.
In this manner, the discourse in China since the 1990s has developed around thetwo axes of democratization and market economy. In today’s China, ideologies havediversified, various opinions have become polarized, and each of the ideologies has its“Zhongguo Jiating Jini Xishu Da 0.61 Gaoyu Quanqiu Pingjun Shuiping (China’s Gini
Coefficient Reached 0.61, Higher than Global Average),” http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201212/10/c_124070295.htm (accessed on January 31, 2019).
32

20

own various strata of supporters. This is likely the basis for the notion that “Chinesesociety is falling apart.”(2) Myriad Voices Fighting Over “China’s Path”/ “Beijing Consensus”
In the latter half of the 2000s, arguments were made over Beijing Consensus versus
Washington Consensus both inside and outside of China. Beijing Consensus is aconcept created by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 200433.
Various interpretations have been made on what exactly the Beijing Consensus is34,
and the general consensus is that there is no “China model” that can be followed byother countries. The Chinese government itself has not publicly confirmed the existenceof a Beijing Consensus. Inside China as well, many argue that there is no such thing as
the Beijing Consensus, and even former high officials in the Chinese government havestated that “China’s success is the result of having followed the Washington
Consensus.”35
Since the global financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, the environment inside China changed subtly, and debate surrounding
the “China model” and “China’s path” suddenly intensified. What triggered this debate
were two books that were published in 2009. The first book is Zhongguo Zhi Lu Yu
Zhongguo Moshi(1948-2009) [China’s Path and China’s Model (1948-2009)] publishedby the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the other is Zhongguo Zhi Lu: Jiedu
Renmin Gongheguo de 60 Nian [China’s Path: Analyzing 60 Years of the People’s
Republic], written by Pan Wei, a professor at Peking University who is a proponent of
the New Left movement.
China’s Path and China’s Model (1948-2009) states that the China model is “amodel that is compatible with China’s conditions, having at its core the development ofsocialism with Chinese characteristics. Primary themes of the model including
modernization, market reform, and globalization, and the model seeks to realize
modernization of the Chinese economy and society as well as a great revival of theChinese people, promoting economic development and systemic change in an
incremental manner.”36
Joshua Cooper Ramo’s publication regarding the Beijing Consensus is Joshua Cooper Ramo, The
Beijing Consensus, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004.
34 Ming Lu Chen & David S. G. Goodman, “The China Model: One Country, Six Authors,” Journalof Contemporary China, 21(73), 2012, pp.169-185.
35 “Wanghui: Zhongguo Daolu de Dutexing yu Pubianxing (Wanghui: Universality and Specificity
of China’s Path),” http://gov.finance.sina.com.cn/chanquan/2011-04-19/9785.html (accessed on
December 26, 2014).
36 “Zhongguo Daolu yu Zhongguo Moshi (China’s Path and China Model) (1949～2009),”33

21

Meanwhile, Pan Wei states that the Chinese economy derives its strength from thefollowing three factors: first, that its labor and products are competitive while its land
and finances are controlled by the nation; second, that the mixed economy of stateowned corporations and private corporations lends strength to the Chinese economy;
and third, that its politics, its system of selecting managers based on merit, its unity,
administrative groups emphasizing service, and division of tasks in the government hasbrought success to China today37.
Both books seek to analyze the China model, and to find the source of success 60
years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China and 30 years after the launchof China’s economic reform. As mentioned above, 2009 when the books were publishedhappened to be the year when the Chinese government proposed the concept of public
diplomacy and was a period when the Chinese government started putting effort into
dissemination of information abroad for China’s own benefit by “telling the story in
China’s own words”. The Chinese domestic media, reflecting the government’s
positions, has taken the singular position that China should improve its ability to
influence international public opinion.
The China model explained in the two books emphasizes China’s uniqueness anddoes not necessarily take into consideration adaptability to other countries. Thus, thesebooks cannot be considered successful in terms of explaining the China model, but the
publication of these two books, which seems to have had the backing of thegovernment, has allowed for an invigorated discussion on the China model.
Zhang Weiying, a neoliberal, has denied the existence of the China model andstates that there is no special advantage to China’s development process. He argues that
economic reform and promotion of a market economy without political reforms would
be difficult, and that privatization of state-owned corporations could resolve injustice,corruption, and lack of morals, and can also provide a political base for the Communist
government38.
On the cultural conservative side, some argue for the existence of the China model,
but the mainstream including Jiang Qing deny the existence of the China model. Gan
Yang, a proponent of Confucian socialism, states that while a path for China exists in

http://www.china.com.cn/news/zhuanti/09dlms/node_7078341.htm (accessed on January 31, 2019).
37 “Panwei: Zhongguo Moshi shi Chuse de Liyi Pinghe Xingshi (Panwei: China’s Model is a
Remarkable Best Way to Balance Interests),” http://www.aisixiang.com/data/33137.html (accessedon January 31, 2019).
38 “Gaige Bixu Zouch Lixiang Xianjing: Reform must Avoid the Trap of Ideal)”,
http://home.ftchinese.com/story/001053841?page=2 (accessed on January 31, 2019).
22

which “by completely denying Chinese civilization, one would wake up to Chinese
civilization and gain confidence in it,” the China model does not exist39.
On the other hand, Zhang Weiwei, author of Zhongguo Zhenhan (中国震撼: The
China Wave) affirms the existence of the China model. He further dismisses the Westernnotion that democracy and autocracy are at odds with each other and introduces theconcept of “good politics” and “bad politics”. He believes that when China is
successful, it is because it is engaging in good politics. He also believes that evencountries that have adopted democracy face challenges due to bad politics. Zhang
Weiwei cites countries that have been strongly impacted by the global financial crisis
such as Greece, Ireland, Iceland, and Spain as examples of this.40
Wang Hui, an eminent proponent of the New Left, argues that the most major
characteristic of the China model is the role of sovereignty and the state. He argues that
the Communist Party of China has penetrated every corner of Chinese society, and that
China has a unique type of sovereignty in a party-based state system. This uniquepolitical system has brought success to China. Wang Hui argues that the largest issue
facing China today is how to create national “autonomy” while keeping the country
open41.
As described above, proponents of the various ideologies that have emerged sincethe 1990s interpret the China model and China’s path according to their own positions,and it is often difficult to find common ground between their arguments.
(3) Vacillating Foreign Policy Philosophy
As can be seen from debates inside China, China’s society has become pluralistic
and various ideologies exist within China. Thus, it is difficult to conceptualize thesituation inside China in terms of simple dichotomies such as conservative versus
reformist, dove versus hawk, or internationalist versus conservative. Against thisbackdrop, there are various views in China regarding the China model and China’s path,and there is no consensus at this point. In reality, China is still at the stage where it istrying to figure out its own political philosophy.

“ ‘Rujiao Shehui Zhuyi’ Zhongguo Daolu shi Zhongguo Moshi (Confucian Socialism, China’s
Path is China Model),” http://history.sina.com.cn/his/zl/2014-04-21/152888957.shtml (accessed on
January 31, 2019).
40 “Zhang Weiwei: Zhongguo Jueqi shi Feichang Bu Rongyi de (Zhang Weiwei: China’s Rise is
Incredibly Uneasy),” http://info.whb.cn/xxd/view/10183 (accessed on December 26, 2014).
41 “Wang Hui: Zhongguo Gongchandang he Zhongguo Moshi (Chinese Communist Party and China
Model),” http://www.guancha.cn/century-tsinghua-chinese-model-internationalforum/2011_11_09_61616.shtml (accessed on January 31, 2019).
39

23

On the other hand, when taking a broad perspective on the various arguments being
made since the 1990s regarding the base of China’s soft power, it can be seen that there
are three main ideologies coexisting as political bases for China: universal values,
Marxism-Leninism, and traditional Chinese thought.
Since the start of the Xi Jinping administration, the idea of universal values has
been increasingly seen as a threat. From 1993 to 2004, reasons for the collapse of theformer Soviet Union have been systematically studied in China, and some conclusions
were drawn from 2004 to 2005. It is also said that from 1996, lessons from the collapseof the former Soviet Union have been analyzed42. Based on these lessons, the Xi Jinping
administration has kept a particularly watchful eye on the “Peaceful Evolution” theory
in order not to have a repeat of the Soviet collapse in China and has increased its
vigilance against the idea of universal values.
This is highly important for the Chinese government, which seeks legitimacy basedon the Marxist-Leninist ideology. On the other hand, after having introduced a market
economy and allowed private property, the Chinese government cannot simply return to
the Marxist-Leninist utopia.
Traditional Chinese thought has commonalities in name with the Confucius
Institutes and also shares sentiments with a portion of the Chinese public who want toreturn back to China’s traditional roots. However, radicals within the neo-Confucian
movement have slogans against both universal values and Marxism-Leninism, and thus,
the idea of returning to a traditional society is incompatible in part with the philosophyof the Communist Party of China.
Therefore, China’s foreign policy philosophy today includes the three ideologies ofuniversal values, Marxism-Leninism, and Chinese traditional thought, and as a nationthat is poised to grow to a global superpower, China cannot depend completely on any
one of the three ideologies in its foreign policy philosophy and vacillates between all
three.
In terms of actual deployment of China’s public diplomacy, China often puts forth“Chinese traditional thought” as its political philosophy, and “harmonious world” and“Chinese Dream” are also based on Chinese traditional thought. However, there is noconsensus within China, and China has not always been successful at explaining
China’s path based on Chinese traditional thought. The fact that China has not put fortha clear message regarding its foreign policy philosophy and its political values is amajor obstacle to China increasing its soft power.

42

David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, 2008, p.55.
24

Conclusion
China’s public diplomacy has been deployed in a targeted manner to important
players in international politics such as developed nations in the West and emerging
nations, but since the 2000s, importance has also been placed on public diplomacy
towards Southeast Asian countries neighboring China. China’s public diplomacy
towards ASEAN has the three strategic goals of “explaining China”, “disseminating
information abroad so as to serve China”, and “protecting China’s national interests”,
and these goals combine in a complex fashion.
The most major characteristic of China’s engagement with ASEAN is that it seeks
to increase the effect of its public diplomacy by not only engaging in bilateral ties but
strengthening cooperation with ASEAN as a regional organization. Thus,
multilateralism, which started emerging in China’s foreign policy, has played a majorrole in addition to setting aside territorial issues and not relying on the overseas Chinese
population for political purposes.
Recently, as a result of China’s rigid maritime policies, Southeast Asian countries
have increasingly seen China as a threat, which caused a major slowdown in theincrease of China’s soft power. On the other hand, it is important to note that
subregional and regional exchange channels that have been created so far were notstopped as a result of maritime issues, and that new Confucius Institutes and China
Culture Centers continue to be built, Chinese media continues to penetrate Southeast
Asia, and think tank exchanges continue.
Thus, infrastructure necessary for public diplomacy such as Confucius Institutes,
broadcasts abroad, and even development and use of think tanks has been developed ina major way. However, China still has no answers on how to brand itself, and it has notbeen able to explain in a logical manner to other countries what path it seeks to take. As
a result, China’s soft power is not necessarily in direct proportion to its presence.
John Ikenberry has the optimistic view that while the era of unipolar dominance by
the United States may end, the Western “liberal hegemonic order” will win in the end43.
However, China, which aims to be a global superpower, is still considering the base of
its own political values and seems not to have decided whether to follow the path ofuniversal values, Marxism-Leninism, or Chinese traditional thought.

G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System
Survive?,” Foreign Affairs, No. 23, 2008, pp. 23-37.
43

25

26

Note
This article is originally written for the research supported by the Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science (JSPS) research grant No. [25301018](FY 2013-2015) on China’s
Cultural Diplomacy toward ASEAN Countries.

iProfile of the Author
Aoyama, Rumi

青山 瑠妙

Education: Ph.D. in Law, Keio University, 2006
Current Position: Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda
University Director, Waseda Institute of Contemporary ChineseStudies
Research field: International Relations, Political Science, Politics and Foreign
Policy of Contemporary China
Webpage: https://www.waseda.jp/prj-wiccs/

iiContemporary Japan and East-Asian Studies
Date of Publication: January 1, 2019
Publisher: Society for Contemporary Japan and East-Asian Studies
Editorial Office:
Editor in Chief: Yasuhiro MATSUDA, Ph.D.
Vice Editor in Chief and Executive Editor: Wei-Hsiu Huang, Ph.D.
Assistant Editor: Iying WEI

当代日本与东亚研究
出版日：2019 年 1 月 1 日
出版者：当代日本与东亚研究会
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副主编兼执行编辑：黄助理编辑：魏 逸莹伟修2017 年 8 月 1 日创刊当代日本与东亚研究第 3 卷第 1 号 2019 年 1 月

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