Jonathan Berkshire Miller

Post-War U.S.-Japan Reconciliation:
Healing as a National Security Strategy
Jonathan Berkshire Miller
Senior Visiting Fellow, JIIAOn November 30, 2017, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), co-hosted a daylong symposium with the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace (CEIP), entitled “PostWar U.S.-Japan Reconciliation: Healing as a National Security Strategy”. The following is abrief synopsis of the event.

T

he relatively swift transformation of the U.S.-Japan relationship after World War II̶
from brutal enemies with racial animus to close allies is a remarkable product ofhistory, yet mutual efforts by many players in support of this historical reconciliation
process are rarely considered in the foreign policy arena. Moreover, the valuable
contribution that these efforts make to each countryʼs long-term national security is generally
unappreciated, even as the lack of such progress among many countries in East Asia is bemoaned
and seen to be a serious geopolitical risk factor. Last year marked the 70th year since Japan
enacted its post-War constitution and it is important to reflect upon bilateral reconciliation efforts,
what they have accomplished, what helped or hindered these efforts, and what work remains.
During discussions in Washington, D.C. a group of experts and scholars focused on the USJapan relationship gathered at the offices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace inWashington, D.C. with an aim to consider these issues from a contemporary foreign policy andnational security perspective as well as from a historical one, in order to examine them in a global
context to think through what̶if any̶lessons might apply to broader geopolitical relations inAsia today.
The conference began with senior representatives from JIIA and CEIP stressing theimportance of looking at US-Japan reconciliation from the perspective of how it serves as thefoundation for national strategy and modern diplomacy for both countries. Historical tension
is often so pervasive in the region that it becomes an organizing principle, of sorts, for nations
politics and foreign policy. This has been evident time and again in Northeast with tensions
between Japan and its neighbors, China and South Korea. As participants noted, the U.S.-Japansituation is unique, as U.S. and Japan shared an incredibly intense, but relatively brief periodof conflict around World War II, and yet managed steadily to overcome the animosities related
to that legacy and creating a strong security alliance and economic relationship. Histor y issomething that one cannot undo but is something that is one of the crucial determinants of where
Japan is today.

Morning Address: Congresswoman Niki Tsongas (D) – MA
Congresswoman Tsongas made a morning address to start the conference and noted that Japanis one of the United Statesʼ greatest friends and most critical allies. She then recanted some of herown personal experience with Japan when she lived there with her family in the 1960s, when her41
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Post-War U.S.-Japan Reconciliation: Healing as a National Security Strategy

father was an air force pilot. Tsongas spent her time emphasizing the close economic and security
ties of the alliance and noted that from a state-level, Japan is Massachusettsʼs fifth largest trading
partner, with companies operating in a diverse array of fields, such as pharmaceuticals, medical
devices, manufacturing and electronics, that are Japanese-owned, supporting jobs and innovative
new products in a wide range of areas. Tsongas also highlighted the key security challenges in
the region, a fact which has been underscored by the provocative actions of North Korea as oflate, and of Chinaʼs destabilizing activities in the maritime domain (East and South China Seas).
According to the Congresswoman, it is important for Tokyo and Washington to have dialogue andcommunication at every level to further the long-term relationship.

Panel 1 Discussion: US-Japan Historical Reconciliation:
Dr. Jennifer Lind, Dartmouth College
Dr. Lind opened up the panel with a thoughtful discussion of the key milestones in US-Japan
reconciliation, such as President Obamaʼs recent visit to Hiroshima and Shinzo Abeʼs visit to PearlHarbor. Lind stressed that those visits, and the remarks made by both leaders, showed empathy
for the suffering on the other side and a strong commitment to friendship. But, while important,
Lind also emphasized that such visits donʼt cause reconciliation – rather they are the result of it.
According to Lind, reconciliation – which was true in the case between Washington and Tokyo comes first from a strategic need that pushes countries together. It is only in this case - and underthose conditions - that leaders have incentives to accept what are often massive domestic politicalcosts of pursuing reconciliation toward a formerly hated adversary.
Lind went on to discuss the vast gulf in remembrance on both sides, which is common
after conflict where each side sees the other as the aggressor who is at fault, toward whom nosympathy, no concessions are owed. Each side sees itself as acting in self-defense. This gives
rise to opposing narratives in which each side frames itself as a victim. As Lind noted, often“entrepreneurial politicians” use such fears in order to seize or consolidate power. With regard
to the US-Japan alliance, Lind stressed that the relationship grew out of shared strategic needduring the Cold War, aimed at Soviet containment but continues today amidst shared interests ina geopolitically volatile East Asian environment. Lind pointed to a number of key examples over
the years that were the result of this reconciliation such as Obamaʼs visit to Hiroshima and Abeʼsvisit to the USS Arizona Memorial in Pearl Harbor.
Lind concluded with discussion on Japanʼs relations with South Korea, noting “cautiouspessimism” while stressing that South Korea continues to hedge between China and the US –preventing real space for reconciliation at the state level. Lind noted that the 2015 comfort womenagreement, despite the current uncertainty of the deal, was a good start and showed tremendous
compromise on both sides.

Dr. Toshihiro Nakayama, Keio University
Dr. Nakayama began his talk by noting that the basic conditions of the U.S.-Japan relationship andthen went on to discuss the historical background to this relationship before World War II, suchas the links during the Meiji restoration period. Nakayama noted that this part of history should
not be forgotten when looking at US-Japan reconciliation. At the same time, Nakayama noted thestrains within Japan in the post-war period where some groups attached themselves to pacifism
after the war and were cautious on the alliance with Washington; others say the US-Japan allianceas a hurdle to Japanʼs sovereignty and ability to be a “normal” nation. Of course, this is a point thatis less contentious nowadays and Nakayama noted all the historical markers and relationshipsthat have lifted and sustained the alliance, such as the growth during the Reagan-Nakasone years
or the George W. Bush and Junichiro Koizumi years. Nakayama stressed that these efforts made42
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space for the later reconciliation efforts such as Obamaʼs visit to Hiroshima and Abeʼs visit toPearl Harbor.
Nakayama concluded with discussion on the US-Japan relationship in its current state. He
noted that, while many in Japan were concerned when President Donald Trump was elected inthe US last year, Tokyo was able to move forward because the US remains the best choice forJapan as an ally and friend. This alliance will lead both sides to address a constantly evolving
security environment in East Asia.

Dr. Michael Auslin, Stanford University
Dr. Auslin closed the session by posing the question on whether US-Japan efforts since 1945
is more a sign of cooperation, due to shared interests, rather than true reconciliation. When
exploring this further, he looked at the question of “what is reconciliation?” and put forth three
types of reconciliation: temporal, geographical and societal. Auslin noted that the first one
suggests that time has “healed wounds” over the seven decades following World War II. The
second category, focused on geography, premises that reconciliation has been helped due to thegeographic distance between Japan and the US providing a geopolitical buffer of sorts. The final
category, looking at societal reconciliation, is the most important and difficult for Auslin.
Auslin noted that societal reconciliation can be sub-categorized in three realms: state, groups
and individuals. In this vein, he noted while states can reconcile without incredible difficulty –this question is much more challenging for groups and individuals. Auslin used examples of some
US prisoners of war and there lingering bitterness and inability to reconcile. He concluded thatreconciliation is a far more fraught process, beyond the state level, and is probably much morefragile than what we might think.

Luncheon Keynote Discussion:
Keynote: Ambassador Michael Armacost, Stanford University
Ambassador Armacost opened the lunch keynote speech by noting that US-Japan reconciliation
is an issue that is a personal for him, as he was alive before World War II. He noted thatreconciliation is a challenging and constant process but was necessar y to heal the ghosts of
the War. Washington and Tokyo needed to acknowledge the past and yet seek to overcome
it, transform their status from arch-enemies into strategic partners. Armacost then discussed
the immediate post-war history and the relatively benign occupation and how that contributed
to reconciliation. Afterwards, Armacost noted that the emergence of the Cold War prompted
the transformation of the US occupation of Japan into an alliance. This alliance proved not
only durable but it always provided incentive on the American side to cultivate a cooperative
relationship with the Japanese.
Armacost stressed that, in light of Cold War realities, it was hardly surprising that politicalreconciliation moved for ward. It was probably easier for Americans and was taken on withgreater comfort level and more readily than it was for the Japanese. For Japan, reconciliation
offered practical benefits and an evident geopolitical logic. Armacost concluded with discussionof current day situation and noted that he thought Prime Minister Abeʼs statement history, madeon the 70th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II, came “pretty close” to coming to termswith Japanʼs actions during the conflict. Armacost also mentioned that there should be less a
focus on apologies – for which Japan has made on several occasions – and more on education
related to the war in Japan. Armacost finished up by noting the strong links for the US and Japanand called it a “global alliance”.
During the Q&A session, Armacost noted that the Japan-South Korea agreement in 2015
seemed to be a reasonable one but it is unfortunate that it has not been implemented as expected.
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Post-War U.S.-Japan Reconciliation: Healing as a National Security Strategy

Discussant: Dr. Gerald Curtis, Columbia University
Dr. Curtis, as a discussant for Ambassador Armacost, noted the uniqueness of the US-Japan
relationship and its strength through reconciliation. For Curtis, reconciliation is not about
forgetting or forgiving, but about overcoming hatred and enmity and nurturing feelings of trustand friendship. Curtis stressed that this is what happened in the U.S.-Japan relationship after thewar. How did this happen? To answer this, Curtis noted a number of factors including: a relatively
benign occupation, the US government decision to retain the institution of the Emperor, and thecombination of US magnanimity in victory and Japanese humility in defeat.
Curtis also noted that the American militar y presence in Japan over decades resulted inmany soldiers and their families living in Japan and then coming back to the States with positive
stories to tell. Their experiences there was another important element in growing the US-Japan
relationship and alliance. He then went on to discuss other powerful elements such as intellectual
exchange programs like the Fulbright Commission and International House of Japan and therole the army and navy Japanese language programs played in producing a postwar coterie ofJapan specialists who were committed to a strong US-Japan relationship. This helped foster
reconciliation and, according to Curtis, showed that reconciliation was not simply about joint
strategic interests facing common threats, but also deep personal and social connections. He
noted that the JET program today is playing an important role in producing Japan specialists thatis comparable to the role played by the wartime military language program, and that it is doing soin the context of peace rather than war.
During the Q&A session, Curitis noted, although he believes it was inappropriate for Korean
President Moon to invite a former comfort woman and serve “Dokdo shrimp” at the dinner hehosted for President Trump, the Japanese government had nothing to gain from protesting
his action. President Moon was playing to a domestic Korean audience which would not beinfluenced by the Japanese protest. All it accomplished was to draw more international attention
to the comfort women issue. Continuing to protest the erection of comfort women statues incities and towns in the United States will only damage Japanʼs reputation. It would be far betterfor Japanese to continue to express sympathy for these women and not do things that only
publicize the issue and inflame public opinion.

Panel 2 Discussion: US-Japan Historical Reconciliation in a Global Context:
Dr. Thomas Berger, Boston University
Dr. Berger opened the second panel by asking the question: when does histor y become aproblem? According to Berger, it tends to become a problem when you have a combination of twofactors: a collective set of memories and calculations of interest. With this background, Berger
spoke at length on the Japan-Korea relationship and noted it is unnatural in strategic terms forTokyo and Seoul to be at loggerheads. Part of the reason for the tension, according to Berger,
is the way in which the memory of relations with Japan has been politicized by South Korea
over the course of the last 70 years since the end of the colonial occupation. To illustrate this,Berger pointed to the Rhee years and his powerful movement to try to define a Korean identity
and create a sense of there being one Korea based on two principles: anti-communism and antiJapanese. Sometimes interests have trumped this political entrepreneurship in the Japan-Korea
relationship, but the struggle and emotions are social facts on the peninsula.
Berger noted that, when you have a combination of interests and of calculations, you canwind up with history becoming periodically a problem – as in the Japan-Korea case. Berger thenshifted to the US-Japan relationship as the anomaly case where there was great pain during thewar, but strong reconciliation efforts in the seven decades following. Much of this was due toshared interests and the Cold War, as previous panelists noted. As Berger stressed, history was44
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not able to interfere in their strategic relationship in the way that history has interfered with theJapanese-Korean relationship. Closing on the ties between the US and Japan, Berger noted thatthe relationship is stabilized by the perception that there are common interests and network ofhuman ties that never give up on this process.
During the Q&A sessions, on the questions about the implications of political system to thereconciliation process, Berger noted, in a democratic country, while it may be more difficult forleaders to create a consensus, it is more meaningful because it has greater legitimacy and it canlead to greater societal change. He also pointed out that, in the reconciliation process, educationis one of the important tools. According to him, it can either promote or hinder reconciliation,
depending upon the type of narratives that you are perpetuating through the educational system.

Dr. Rohan Mukherjee, Yale NUS
Dr. Mukherjee focused his remarks on to issues in the context of historical reconciliation. First,
he compared U.S.-Japan reconciliation with the reconciliation that took place between the United
Kingdom and India since the end of the Second World War. And second, Mukherjee assessed theimplications of U.S.-Japan reconciliation for Asian security more broadly. On the issue of the UKIndia comparison, Mukherjee stressed the differences in the two cases but also noted importantsimilarities. As Mukherjee noted, there is similarity in the manner in which each of these
relationships periodically becomes contentious in the domestic politics of the countries involved.
So, according to Mukherjee, in Japan, there is of course resistance in certain quarters against
the U.S. alliance, particularly against the status of forces agreements and the impact of the U.S.
military presence.
The second theme of Mukherjeeʼs remarks focused on the implications of the U.S.-Japan
reconciliation on Asian security, and the most important question being: does reconciliation
between the U.S. and Japan come at the cost of reconciliation perhaps for Japan with othercountries. In this light, Mukherjee talked about historical ties between Japan and India bothduring and after the war. He also noted that the U.S.-Japan reconciliation has been beneficial forregional security but also noted that some argue that U.S. alliances in East Asia, including thatwith Japan, were structured as a hub and spoke system and so there was no complex multilateralform of cooperation that could effectively tie the U.S. down and create a community of intereststhat might eventually have evolved in a group identity in the way that the E.U. did.

Keiko Iizuka, Yomiuri Shimbun
Ms. Iizuka opened her talk by noting the series of key events that have hallmarked US-Japan
reconciliation, such as the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, and more recently President Obamaʼsvisit to Hiroshima and Prime Minister Abeʼs visit to the U.S.S Arizona Memorial, Pearl Harbor.
She insisted that these reciprocal visits clearly affected the public sentiment on both sides of theU.S. and Japan. But, Iizuka then noted that the situation on reconciliation however is far different
with regard to Japan and its neighbors in East Asia. Iizuka spoke for some time on the difficulty ofhistorical reconciliation efforts with Okinawa and noted that the tensions over US bases, and alsothat between Tokyo and Naha, remains a big concern.
Iizuka noted that the citizen ʼ s personal sentiments could both contribute and damage
countriesʼ diplomatic relations including reconciliation on history. On the East Asian security
relationship and specifically ties between Japan and South Korea, she talked on how historicalissues have inhibited the two sides to move forward on practical security cooperation amidst
tensions on the Korean peninsula.

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