2023 MANFRED LACHS SPACE LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITIONTEAM No. 5

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THEPEACE PALACE, THE HAGUE

Case concerning
Laser Activities and the Use of Anti-Satellite Weapons in Outer Space

ARGYLIAMV.
KOLIGIAN

ON SUBMISSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICEMEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENTKOLIGIANTABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................................... I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................. III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................... IV
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............................................................................................................ XIIISTATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................... XIV
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................................ XIX
I. THE USE OF PALVER-3 VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW. ................................................... XIX
II. ARGYLIAM IS LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF IRIORD-8. ............................................ XIX
III. KOLIGIAN’S USE OF ASAT MISSILE AGAINST PALVER-2 WAS NOT CONTRARY TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW. ................................................................................................................. XX
IV. KOLIGIAN IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF PALVER-2....................................... XX
ARGUMENTS ..................................................................................................................................... 1
I. THE USE OF PALVER-3 VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW. ......................................................... 1
A. Argyliam violated the OST by using Palver-3. ................................................................. 1
1. Argyliam violated Article VIII of the OST. ....................................................................... 1
2. Argyliam violated Article IX of the OST. .......................................................................... 2
a. Argyliam breached the principle of “due regard”. .............................................................. 2
b. Argyliam violated the obligation of undertaking international consultations. .................. 4i. Argyliam had reason to believe that the laser emission would cause potentially harmfulinterference. .............................................................................................................................. 4
ii. Argyliam did not take appropriate international consultations. ............................................ 5
B. Argyliam violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. ......................................................... 6
1. The use of Palver-3 qualified as the use of force. .............................................................. 6
a. The gravity of using Palver-3 reached the threshold of armed force. ................................ 7
b. Argyliam was acting with hostile intent. .............................................................................. 8
2. The use of Palver-3 was inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. ............ 9
C. The wrongfulness of Argyliam’s use of Palver-3 cannot be precluded. ....................... 10
1. The use of Palver-3 constituted an internationally wrongful act. ................................. 10
2. The wrongfulness of the act cannot be precluded by necessity. .................................... 11
a. Argyliam’s essential interest did not face a grave and imminent peril. ............................ 11
b. Emitting a laser was not the only way to safeguard Argyliam’s essential interest. .......... 12
II. ARGYLIAM IS LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF IRIORD-8. ................................................ 13
A. Argyliam is liable for the destruction of Iriord-8 under Article III of the LIAB. ....... 14
1. The damage of Iriord-8 can be covered by the LIAB. .................................................... 14
2. Argyliam was at fault. ....................................................................................................... 14
3. The destruction of Iriord-8 was due to Argyliam’s fault. .............................................. 15
a. The “but for” test is satisfied. ............................................................................................ 15
b. The damage must be reasonably foreseeable. ................................................................... 16
B. Argyliam is liable under Article VII of the OST. ........................................................... 17
C. Argyliam is liable under general international law. ...................................................... 18
D. Koligian did not come to this Court with unclean hands.............................................. 18
III. KOLIGIAN’S USE OF THE ASAT MISSILE AGAINST PALVER-2 WAS NOT CONTRARY TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW. ................................................................................................................... 20I

A. Koligian’s use of the ASAT missile did not violate the OST.......................................... 20
1. Koligian did not violate Article VIII of the OST............................................................. 20
a. Palver-2 was in the legal status of space debris. ............................................................... 20
b. Koligian did not infringe the jurisdiction and control over Palver-2. .............................. 21
2. Koligian complied with Article IX of the OST. ............................................................... 21
a. Koligian did not violate the principle of “due regard”. .................................................... 22
i. Palver-2 was not a corresponding interest............................................................................ 22
ii. In any event, Koligian complied with the principle of “due regard”. ................................. 23
b. Koligian did not violate the obligation to prevent harmful contamination. ..................... 23
c. Koligian did not violate the obligation of undertaking international consultations. ....... 24
B. Koligian’s use of the ASAT missile against Palver-2 did not violate Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter. .................................................................................................................................. 24
1. Space debris mitigation appeared as an instant customary international law............. 25
a. The opinio juris was evidenced. ......................................................................................... 26
b. The actual State practices were presented. ........................................................................ 26
2. The use by Koligian of the ASAT missile against Palver-2 was conducting a space debris
mitigation process. ........................................................................................................................ 27
a. Palver-2 endangered the constellation and Argyliam should have taken space debris
mitigation measures. ...................................................................................................................... 27
b. Since Argyliam could not reach an effective measure, Koligian was forced to takeappropriate mitigation measures. ................................................................................................ 28
3. Koligian was in lack of hostile intent. .............................................................................. 29
C. Even if Koligian violated international law, the wrongfulness could be precluded bynecessity.......................................................................................................................................... 29
1. The use of the ASAT was to safeguard an outweighing essential interest. ................... 29
2. The use of ASAT missile was against a grave and imminent peril. ............................... 31
3. The use of ASAT missile was the only way for Koligian. ............................................... 32
a. The other ways were not available at that moment. .......................................................... 32
b. The later use of ASAT missile was also not feasible. ........................................................ 33
IV. KOLIGIAN IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF PALVER-2......................................... 33
A. Koligian is not liable under Article III of the LIAB. ..................................................... 33
1. ASAT missile is not a “space object”. .............................................................................. 34
2. Koligian was not at fault. .................................................................................................. 35
B. Koligian is not liable under Article VII of the OST. ...................................................... 35
C. Koligian is not liable under general international law. ................................................. 35
SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT .................................................................................................... XXIIILIST OF ABBREVIATIONSARSIWA

Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts

ASAT

Anti-Satellite

Compromis

Facts of the present case, as agreed by the Parties

COPUOS

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

I.C.J.

International Court of Justice

Inc.

Incorporated

LEO

Low Earth Orbit

LIAB

Convention on International Liability for Damage

LTS

Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration of U.S.

OST

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies

P.C.I.J.

Permanent Court of International Justice

R.I.A.A.

Reports of International Arbitral Awards

SSA

Space Situational Awareness

SSVSpace Servicing Vehicle

TCBMs

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space
Activities

U.N.

United Nations

U.N.G.A.

United Nations General Assembly

U.S.

United States of America

UNIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Researchv.

VersusVCLTVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

IIITABLE OF AUTHORITIES
I. TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, enteredinto force, Oct. 9, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.[hereinafter LIAB]... passim
Statute of the International Court of Justice, entered into force Oct. 24,
1945.[hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]................................................................................... 25
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use ofOuter Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, entered into force Oct.
10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.[hereinafter OST] ......................... passim
United Nations Charter.[hereinafter U.N. Charter] .............................................. passim
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force May. 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 33.[hereinafter VCLT] ............................................................................ passim
II. CASESa) International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Tur.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19). .... 6
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 257 (Dec. 19). .......................................................................... 20
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgement, 1985 I.C.J. 13(June, 3)........................................................................................................................ 25
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),2015 I.C.J. 665 (Dec. 16) (separate opinion by Robinson, J.) ....................................... 8
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) ....................... 6, 18, 29
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec.4). ... 6, 11
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25)............................................................................................................................... passim
Jurisdictional Immunities (Ger. v. It.), Judgement, 2012 I.C.J. 100 (Feb. 3)............... 25
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) ................................................................. 32
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226(July 8). .................................................................................................................... 7, 25
North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Neth.), Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Jul. 8)...................................................................................................................................... 25
Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgement, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (April, 6). ............................. 35IVOil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6) ............................... 10
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgement, 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20) ...
.................................................................................................................................... 2, 5
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24) .................................................................................................... 11, 18b) Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.)
Factory at Chorzów Case (Ger. v. Pol.), Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.9 (July26). ............................................................................................................................... 18c) Reports of International Arbitral Awards (R.I.A.A.)
Administrative Decision No. II (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1930) .. 15
Angola Cases (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928, 1930) ............... 15Life Insurance Claims (Ger. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 121 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1924). ............. 15
Lusitania Case (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1923) ............................ 35
War-Risk Insurance Premium Claims Arbitration, (U.S. v. Ger.) 7 R.I.A.A. 44 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1923) .............................................................................................................. 15d) Other Judicial Decisions
LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision
on Liability, (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203 .......................................................... 11
M/V Saiga (No.2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No.2, Judgment of July 1, 1999, ITLOS
Rep. 10 ......................................................................................................................... 12
III. UNITED NATIONS’ MATERIALSArticles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int’l Law
Comm’n, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (2001). ................................................. passim
Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, and of theThreat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, U.N. Doc. CD/1839 (Oct. 29, 2008)...................................................................................................................................... 34
G.A. Res. 60/99, at, 27, International Cooperation in the Peaceful uses of Outer Space,(Jan. 6, 2006)................................................................................................................ 26
G.A. Res. 73/203, Identification of customary international law (Feb. 14, 2019) ...... 25
Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
.............................................................................................................................. Passim
Special Rapporteur on International Liability, Third Report of the Special Rapporteur,Int’l. Law Comm., U.N. Doc DA/CN.4/360 (Jun. 28, 1982) (by Robert Quentin-Baxter).
V

...................................................................................................................................... 16
U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, Guidelines for the Long-term
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (June 12-21, 2019) .............................................................. 3
U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, Rep. of the Events of Interest, U.N.
DOC. A/CONF.101/11 (Nov. 2, 1982) ......................................................................... 30
U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Active Debris Removal, Rep. of theInternational Interdisciplinary Congress on Space Debris Remediation and On-Orbit
Satellite Servicing, at 47, 48, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.16 (Jan. 27, 2012).
...................................................................................................................................... 27
U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.1/L.260 (Nov. 29, 2002) ......................................................................... 20
U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Recommendations of the Group ofGovernmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer
Space Activities: views of States members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses ofOuter Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1080 (Nov. 7, 2014). ............................................ 13
U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Recommendations of the Group ofGovernmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer
Space Activities: views of States members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses ofOuter Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1080/Add.2 (Mar.13, 2015). ................................ 13
U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., at 52, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.94 (July. 3, 1968) (French,
Canadian & Italian delegate) ....................................................................................... 14
U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, 56th Sess., Provisional Summary Rec. of the 2791st Meeting
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2791 (May 7, 2004). ................................................................ 18
U.N. Secretary-General, Current Developments in Science and Technology and Their
Potential Impact on International Security and Disarmament Efforts, U.N. Doc.
A/76/182 (July 19, 2021) ....................................................................................... 2, 3, 7
U.N. Secretary-General, Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of
responsible behaviours, U.N. Doc. A/76/77 (July 13, 2021) ................... 5, 8, 12, 13, 22
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on further
practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, U.N. Doc.
A/74/77 (Apr. 9 2019). ................................................................................................. 12
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency
and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, U.N. Doc. A/68/189(July 29, 2013). ............................................................................................................ 13
IV. LITERATUREa) Books
VI

BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS (1953). ....................................................................................................... 18
BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW (1998). ...................................... 14
BUENOS AIRES, REPORT OF THE 53D CONFERENCE OF THE I.L.A. (1968). .................... 34
CHRISTIAN HENDERSON, THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018). ........... 6CHRISTOPHER J. BORGEN, THE FUTURE LAW OF THE ARMED CONFLICT (2022) .......... 22
DAVID WRIGHT, LAURA GREGO & LISBETH GRONLUND, THE PHYSICS OF SPACESECURITY (2005). ......................................................................................................... 22
H. KLINKRAD, SPACE DEBRIS: MODELS AND RISK ANALYSIS (2006) ........................... 21
H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1985). ...................................... 15
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963). ........ 7
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). ......................... 17
J. PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) ............................... 28
J. SCHEFTER, THE GROWING PERIL OF SPACE DEBRIS, 221/1 POPULAR SCIENCE (1982)...................................................................................................................................... 27
J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: STATE TERRITORY(1970) ........................................................................................................................... 28
JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION (2004). ........... 19
KATARZYNA MALINOWSKA, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE OF ON-ORBITSERVICING (2020). ........................................................................................................ 32
L. ANSELMO, SPACE DEBRIS, 41 ADVANCES IN SPACE RESEARCH (2008) .................... 21
LORD MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS (1956) .............................................. 30
M. WELL, IRAQ AND KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR AFTERMATH (1993). ......... 8
M.T. SAVAGE, THE MILLENNIAL PROJECT: COLONIZING THE GALAXY IN EIGHT EASYSTEPS (1992) ................................................................................................................ 27
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017). .......................................................... 25
MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
LAW-MAKING (1972). ......................................................................................... 1, 16, 21
OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). ...............................................6, 8, 24, 28
SPACESECURITY.ORG., SPACE SECURITY 2008 (2008) .................................................. 28
W. R. MANNING, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: CANADIANRELATIONS, 1784–1860 (1943) .................................................................................... 30
W.S. WONG & J. FERGUSSON, MILITARY SPACE POWER: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES (2010)...................................................................................................................................... 27
VIIWILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING (2012) ............................................. 23
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (2005). .............................. 6b) Collections
Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, 200 (Bruno Simma ed. 2012) .............................................................. 28
Armel Kerrest & Lesley Jane Smith, Article VII, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE
LAW, 126 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds.,2009). .................................................................. 35
Eligar Sadeh, Obstacles to International Space Governance, in 3 HANDBOOK OF SPACE:SECURITY POLICIES, APPLICATIONS AND PROGRAMS 23 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. eds.,
2015) ............................................................................................................................ 27
L. J. Smith & A. Kerrest, Article III: LIAB, in 2 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW
131 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009). .......................................................................... 15
L. Perek, Ex Facto Sequitur Lex: Facts which Merit Reflection in Space Law inParticular with Regard to Registration and Space Debris Mitigation, in II ESSENTIAL
AIR AND SPACE LAW-SPACE LAW: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE
REGULATION 29 (Marietta Benko & Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. eds., 2005) .................... 21
Lars Hostbeck, Space Weapons, Concepts and their International Security Implications,in 54 HANDBOOK OF SPACE: SECURITY POLICIES, APPLICATIONS AND PROGRAMS 955(Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. eds., 2015) ............................................................................. 32
Sergio Marchisio, Article IX, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 169 (Stephan
Hobe et al. eds.,2009). ............................................................................................. 7, 27
T. Weir, Complex liabilities, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVELAW 32 (A. Tunc, ed. 1983). .................................................................................. 16, 18c) Articles
Bin Cheng, International Responsibility and Liability for Launch Activities, 20 AIR &SPACE L. 297 (1995)............................................................................................... 17, 35
Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, 74 AM.
J. INT’L L. 346 (1980). ........................................................................................... 17, 35
Craig Covault, Space Control, 166 AVIAT. WK. & SPACE TECH. 59 (2007) ................ 28
Craig H. Allen, Taking Narrow Channel Collision Prevention Seriously to More
Effectively Manage Marine Transportation System Risk, 41 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (2010).
...................................................................................................................................... 32
David A. Koplow, Asat-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of
Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187 (2009) .......................................... 28
David A. Koplow, Reverse Distinction: A U.S. Violation of the Law of Armed Conflictin Space, 13 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 25 (2022) ................................................................. 7David A. Koplow, The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space,
59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 331 (2018) ................................................................................... 30
Eric Hagt, The U.S. Satellite Shootdown: China’s Response, 3 BULL AT. SCI. 1 (2008).
VIII

...................................................................................................................................... 28
Gabriel Lafferranderie, Jurisdiction and Control of Space Objects and the Case of anInternational Intergovernmental Organization (ESA), 54 GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 228(2005) ............................................................................................................................. 1
Harry H. Almond Jr., Peaceful Purposes and Peaceful Activities in Outer Space, 29
PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 1 (1986) ............................................................................. 28
Hitoshi Nasu, Targeting a Satellite: Contrasting Considerations between the Jus ad
Bellum and the Jus in Bello, 99 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 131 (2022).
...................................................................................................................................... 23
Isavella Maria Vasilogeorgi, Military Uses of Outer Space: Legal Limitations,Contemporary Perspectives, 39 J. SPACE L. 379 (2014). ............................................... 5
Ivan Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CAL. L. REV. 507 (1967)...................................................................................................................................... 24
J-C Liou, NL Johnson & NM Hill, Controlling the Growth of Future LEO Debris
Populations with Active Debris Removal, 5-6 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 648 (2010). ...... 21
Jochen Pfeifer, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 30 GER.
J. AIR & SPACE L. 215 (1981)....................................................................................... 34
Julian Hermida, Risk Management in Arianespace Launch Agreements, 25 ANN. AIR &SPACE L. 143 (2000)..................................................................................................... 31
Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Legal Aspects of Space Activities by Private Enterprises:
Introductory Report, 19 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 234 (1976). ................................. 21
Kunihiko Tatsuzawa, Definition of the Space Object, 34 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 357(1991). .......................................................................................................................... 34
Leopold, C. Vernon & Scafuri Allison L., Orbital Space Flight under International law,
19 FED. B.J. 227 (1959)................................................................................................ 34
Luke Punnakanta, Space Torts: Applying Nuisance and Negligence to Orbital Debris,
86 SOUTH. CALIF. LAW REV, 182 (2012). .................................................................... 16
M. Mejia-Kaiser, Informal Regulations and Practices in the Field of Space Debris
Mitigation, 34 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 21 (2009) ........................................................... 26
Michael C. Mineiro, Article IX’s Principle of Due Regard and International
Consultations: An Assessment in Light of the European Draft Space Code-of-Conduct,
53 PROC. ON INT’L INST. SPACE L. 674 (2010). ............................................. 2, 4, 22, 24
Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321 (2008). 4, 5
Neta Palkovitz, Dealing with the Regulatory Vacuum in LEO, 59 PROC. ON INT’L INST.
SPACE L. 419 (2016)................................................................................................. 8, 18
Ntorina Antoni & Federico Bergamasco, To Orbit and Beyond: Present Risks andLiability Issues from the Launching of Small Satellites, 57 PROC. ON INT’L INST. SPACE
L. 75 (2014). .............................................................................................................. 7, 9Paul Dembling, Cosmos 954: Space Treaties, 6 J. SPACE L. 129 (1978). .................... 16
IX

R. Lemkin, Genocide as a crime under International Law, 41 AJIL 145 (1947)........ 28
Rahim Moloo, A Comment on the Clean Hands Doctrine in International Law, 2010
INTER ALIA 39 (2010) .................................................................................................. 18
Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public Interest in Outer Space, 32 J.
SPACE L. 31 (2006). ....................................................................................................... 2
Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of theInternational Responsibility of States, 35 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 9 (1992)................... 3
Ricky J. Lee & Sarah L. Steele, Military Use of Satellite Communications, Remote
Sensing, and Global Positioning Systems in the War on Terror,79 J. AIR L. & COM. 69(2014). .......................................................................................................................... 26
Ricky J. Lee, The Jus Ad Bellum in Spatialis: The Exact Content and Practical
Implications of the Law on the Use of Force in Outer Space, 29 J. SPACE L. 93 (2003).
........................................................................................................................................ 5
Robert Rosenstock, The ILC and State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 792 (2002)...................................................................................................................................... 35
Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful Conduct,
3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2000). .................................................................... 12
Samuli Haataja & Afshin Akhtar-Khavari, Stuxnet and International Law on the Use ofForce: An Informational Approach, 7 CAMB. INT’L L.J. 99 (2018). ............................. 2
Sarah M. Mountin, The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with
Commercial Communication Satellite Signals, 90 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR
COL. 101 (2014). ............................................................................................................ 2
Stephen Gorove, Definitional Issues Pertaining to Space Object, 37 PROC. ON L. OUTERSPACE 87 (1994). .......................................................................................................... 33
Tom Ruys, The Meaning of Force and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are
Minimal Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4), 108 AM. J. INT’L L.
159 (2014). ..................................................................................................................... 4
V. Kayser, Commercial Exploitation of Space: Developing Domestic Regulation, XVII
ANN. AIR & SPACE. L. 187 (1992)................................................................................ 21
V. S. Vereshchetin, Against the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Outer Space(Reply to Opponent), 27 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 358 (1984). .................................. 1
Youri H. Kolossoy, Non-Use of Force III Outer Space, 26 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE
205 (1983). ..................................................................................................................... 1
V. INTERNATIONAL SITESAir Sat One, Aircraft Satcom Internet and Data Solutions - Air Sat One (Nov. 20, 2022),
https://www.airsatone.com/aircraft-internet-and-data-solutions.................................. 30
Annelie Klint Nilsson, Phobos-Grunt and Yinghuo-1 (May 5, 2020), https://www.irf.se/en/irf-in-space/phobos-grunt-and-yinghuo-1/. .................................................. 7
Brian Weeden, Dealing with Galaxy 15: Zombiesats and on-orbit servicing (May 24,
X2010), https://thespacereview.com/article/1634/1. ...................................................... 32
Cabinet Office, Study Report of Sub-working Group on On-orbit Servicing, Government of Japan (Apr. 29, 2022) https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/english/stm/study_report.pdf. ................................................................................................................... 31
China’s Views on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Space Activities(Nov. 20, 2022), https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ChinaE-In-extenso.pdf........................................................................................................... 13
CNSA, Space Object Registration Management Method (Feb. 8, 2001), http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758823/n6758839/c6796215/content.html .................................... 26
ESA Space Debris Office, Automatic Collision Avoidance (Apr. 23, 2021),
https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Automating_collision_avoidance. . 32
ESA, Requirements on Space Debris Mitigation for Agency Projects (Apr. 1, 2008),
https://technology.esa.int/page/space-debris-mitigation. ............................................. 26
Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.nasa.gov/news/debris_fa
q.html ........................................................................................................................... 23
GOST R., Space Technology Items. General Requirements for Space Vehicles fo
r Near-Earth Space Debris Mitigation (Jan. 1, 2019), http://nd.gostinfo.ru/docum
ent/6431006.aspx ......................................................................................................... 26
Himanshu Goenka, Japanese Space Debris Collector, JAXA’s Kounotori6, Fails To
Deploy Junk-Fishing Net (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.ibtimes.com/japanese-spacedebris-collector-jaxas-kounotori6-fails-deploy-junk-fishing-net-2487001 ................. 32
JAXA, Space Debris Mitigation Mechanism in Japan (Apr. 3, 2009), https://sma.jaxa.jp/TechDoc/ ....................................................................................................... 26
Laws Applicable to Space Situational Awareness (SSA), https://spacelaws.com/art
icles/laws-relating-to-space-situational-awareness-ssa/. ............................................. 16
NASA, NASA Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance Best
Practices Handbook (2020), https://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/OCE_docs/OCE_50.pdf ..... 3
NASA, Process for Limiting Orbital Debris: NASA-STD-8719.14 (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/nasa/nasa-std-871914. ......................................... 26
Oliver Dörr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e427. ............................................................................................... 6
Petr Bohacek, Commentary on the Responsible Use of Lasers in Space, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/PULS_Submission-to-UNODA_reARE
S7536.pdf. ...................................................................................................................... 4
Sanjeev Miglani & Krishna N. Das, Modi Hails India as Military Space Power
After Anti-Satellite Missile Test, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-satellite-idUSKCN1R80IA ...................................................... 24
Space Foundation Editorial Team, Components of a Satellite, https://www.spacef
oundation.org/space_brief/satellite-components/ .......................................................... 7
XI

Space safety magazine, SpaceX Failure, CRS-7 Mission Ends In Catastrophic Loss Of
Vehicle (June 28, 2015), https://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/news/spacex-failurecrs-7-mission-ends-in-catastrophic-loss-of-vehicle/. ................................................... 28
Space Situational Awareness, SSI Issue Guide (Nov. 16, 2022), https://spacesecu
rityindex.org/2020/09/space-situational-awareness/. ................................................... 16
UNIDIR, Towards ASAT Test Guidelines (May 17, 2018), https://unidir.org/publi
cation/towards-asat-test-guidelines. ............................................................................. 23
UNOOSA maintains a “Compendium of Space Debris Mitigation Standards Ado
pted by States and International Organizations”, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwor
k/topics/space-debris/compendium.html. .................................................................... 26
VI. NATIONAL LEGISLATION
Act on Space Activities (2018) (Fin.) .......................................................................... 19
Basic Space Law (2008) (Japan).................................................................................. 19
French Space Operation Act (2008) (Fr.) ..................................................................... 19
Ordinance of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on Space Activity (1996) (Ukr.) .......... 34
Outer Space Act (2016) (Den.) .................................................................................... 19
Space Development Promotion Act (2007) (S. Kor.) .................................................. 34
Space Object Registration Management Method (2001) (China)................................ 34
The National Space Policy (2020) (U.S.) .................................................................... 19
The Space Industry Regulations (2021) (Eng.)............................................................ 19VII. MISCELLANEES
Chapter III: Doctrine Section 1: Writings of Specialists, [1978] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L
Comm’n. ...................................................................................................................... 15
Chapter III: The General Problem Underlying the Drafting of Part 2 of the Draft
Articles, [1982] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n. ................................................................ 15
European Space Policy Institute (ESPI), ESPI REPORT 76 IN-ORBIT SERVICES FULLREPORT 28 (ESPI ed., 2020) ........................................................................................ 31
NASA Safety Standard Guidelines And Assessment Procedures For Limiting Orbital
Debris (1995) ............................................................................................................... 31
U.S. Dep’t of Nat’l Sec. & Def., Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-5—
Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems, Presidential Memoranda (Sept. 4, 2020)...................................................................................................................................... 34
U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (2019). .................... 31

XII

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether Argyliam violated international law by using Palver-3?
II. Whether Argyliam is liable for the destruction of Iriord-8?
III. Whether Koligian violated international law by using the ASAT missile against
Palver-2?
IV. Whether Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2?

XIII

STATEMENT OF FACTSBACKGROUND
Argyliam is a State with a high-tech and flourishing space industry. Argyliam’s
Constitution explicitly states that the State shall stay outside international alliances andremain permanently neutral. Considering its small size, it attempted to fill the gap
through technology. Under a philosophy that space could provide an immediate
comparative advantage in Argyliam’s military sector, significant government funding
was directed towards research into dual-use space applications
Koligian is a space-faring State with a notable history of space exploration andexploitation. Since 2020 it has actively facilitated and encouraged the growth of its
private sector in space activities.
Founded in 2028 and registered in Koligian, Charalg Inc. is a private company thatprovides SSA services. It provided information and data through a global network offully automated, ground-based, and space-based sensors. Argyliam contracted with
Charalg Inc. to obtain the information necessary for avoiding collisions of space objects.
Charalg Inc. had built a considerable reputation for reliability, except on a single
occasion, in December 2029, when its provision of incorrect data almost caused asatellite collision in LEO.
THE SET OF PALVER SYSTEM
On 1 January 2031, Argyliam launched three satellites with laser capabilities,
named Palver-1 -2 and -3 (“Palver”), registered in Argyliam. The Foreign Minister of
Argyliam stated that the deployment was mainly for experimental purposes to establish

XIV

proof of concept and initial components for a system of satellite-to-satellite
communication by laser beam and would contribute to the defense of the State.
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGYLIAM AND KASSOF
On 31 March 2031, the intelligence services of Argyliam informed the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense that the satellite EVGA-1607 was“continuously spying on critical infrastructure facilities and military sites” in Argyliam.
EVGA-1607 was registered in Kassof and had been placed in orbit at an altitude of 210
km above the surface of the Earth on 25 February 2031.
Kassof and Argyliam have a long history of confrontation, which ended when, by
an international arbitral tribunal ruling in 2027, the two States settled their dispute overthe delimitation of their (common) continental shelf.
On 1 April 2031, Argyliam Foreign Minister sent a Note Verbale to theAmbassador of Kassof, protesting against the “spying of his country” through EVGA1607 and requiring immediate cessation and non-repetition in the future. Kassof
declared that EVGA-1607 was a satellite deployed for purely commercial applications,and no espionage had ever occurred. Moreover, Kassof was firmly looking forward tofriendly relations with Argyliam.
PALVER-3’S LASER CAUSED THE DESTRUCTION OF IRIORD-8
On 10 April 2031, without other evidence but the information provided by
Argyliam itself, Argyliam’s Defense Minister ordered Palver-3 to emit a laser beam
directed at EVGA-1607, intending to dazzle and blind it. This action was based ontargeting data from Charalg Inc.
XVThe data provided by Charalg Inc. was not completely accurate, resulting in a timedelay. And the emitted laser beam by-passed EVGA-1607 completely and instead hit
Iriord-8, which was registered in Koligian. The laser damaged an electronic componentof Iriord-8, triggering a misfire of attitude control thrusters and pushing it into theatmosphere where it was completely burned up.
The destruction of Iriord-8 was a significant setback for Koligian’s economy andcritical infrastructure. The telecommunications services were greatly impacted, andmany State services suffered considerable damage since Koligian had been particularly
advanced in digitizing telecommunications through satellite utilization.
THE KOLIGIAN’S DIPLOMATIC NOTE OF PROTEST
On 20 April 2031, the Ambassador of Koligian delivered a diplomatic note ofprotest to Argyliam, in which the Government of Koligian accused Argyliam of the“unlawful weaponization of outer space” and “aggressive military” space activities, inparticular, given “the dangers their existence entailed for the freedom of all States to
explore and use outer space peacefully”.
The Argyliam Foreign Minister replied by saying that “the responsibility for theunfortunate incident lies entirely with the Koligian company Charalg Inc. and the Palver
system had been placed in orbit in accordance with international law to protect theindependence, territorial integrity, and permanent neutrality of Argyliam”.
THE GRAVE AND IMMINENT PERIL IMPOSED BY PALVER-2
On 10 May 2031, all ability to control Palver-2 was lost and could not be restored
since it ceased responding to commands unexpectedly and without explanation.
XVI

However, according to official statements from the Argyliam Ministry of Defense, thelaser beam remained active, and there was a possibility of spontaneous activation.
According to the same sources, the chances of this happening “were less than 3%”. In
the meantime, the uncontrolled Palver-2 was drifting toward a densely populated orbit
with 150 functioning satellites.
Most of these satellites were in a constellation operated by an international
consortium to provide global Internet services, including for aircraft and maritime use.
The individual satellites were registered in several states, including five in Koligian.
Palver-2 was expected to enter this orbit on 13 May 2031.
On the morning of 11 May 2031, four States, including Koligian, asked Argyliam
to take immediate measures to manage Palver-2. Argyliam declared that it would
immediately send a SSV to re-boost Palver-2 to gain the necessary altitude so that it
would not interfere with neighboring satellites. The SSV was expected to rendezvous
with Palver-2 and initiated the re-boost operation within 24 hours of launch. However,the SSV had not yet been launched and tested in space.
KOLIGIAN’S SOLUTION OF USING ASAT MISSILE
In this circumstance, Koligian launched an ASAT missile, which successfully hit
Palver-2. The satellite, including its laser system, was destroyed. The debris generated
by this strike accumulated in a part of the orbit without any satellites operating before
the debris re-entered the atmosphere, where it was completely burned up. The entire
Palver system required all three individual lasers to work effectively. Without Palver-2,
it would take several years for Argyliam to restore the system.
XVII

Argyliam and Koligian entered into diplomatic consultations, the results of which
proved inconclusive. Argyliam initiated these proceedings by Application to theInternational Court of Justice. Koligian accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, and theparties submitted Agreed Statement of Facts.
THE RELEVANT TREATIES
Argyliam and Koligian are Parties to the United Nations Charter, the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the five United Nations treaties on outer space.

XVIII

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THE USE OF PALVER-3 VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A. Argyliam violated Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty by intervening in
Koligian’s jurisdiction and control over Iriord-8. In addition, Argyliam was contrary to
Article IX for failing to pay due regard and undertake international consultations.
B. By using Palver-3, Argyliam violated Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
since the gravity and hostile intent of this act constituted the use of force and wasinconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
C. Argyliam cannot invoke necessity to preclude the wrongfulness of its act,
because the use of Palver-3 was not the only way for Argyliam to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril.
II. ARGYLIAM IS LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF IRIORD-8.
A. Argyliam is liable under Article III of the Liability Convention, and the reasonsare as follows. First, the destruction of Iriord-8 could be covered. Second, Argyliam
was acting at fault. Third, the destruction of Iriord-8 was due to Argyliam’s fault.
B. Argyliam is liable under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. Under Article
VII, causation and fault are needed to establish international liability. Argyliam is liable
under Article VII since the two elements were satisfied.
C. Argyliam is liable under general international law. Under general internationallaw, the responsible State is liable for damages caused by its internationally wrongfulact. Argyliam’s use of Palver-3 constituted an internationally wrongful act and caused
the destruction of Iriord-8. Thus, Argyliam is liable under general international law.
D. Koligian did not come to the Court with unclean hands since it did not breach
XIXthe obligation of supervision under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
III. KOLIGIAN’S USE OF ASAT MISSILE AGAINST PALVER-2 WAS NOT CONTRARY TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A. Koligian did not violate Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty since it did notintervene in Argyliam’s jurisdiction and control over Palver-2. Besides, Koligiancomplied with Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty by fulfilling the obligation ofinternational consultation, preventing harmful contamination and paying due regard.
B. Koligian’s use of the ASAT missile against Palver-2 complied with Article 2(4)of the United Nations Charter. Considering the active debris removal of the spacedebris Palver-2 in specific tense circumstances, Koligian acted without hostile intent
and did not violate Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
C. In any event, the wrongfulness of the act could be precluded by invoking
necessity since using the ASAT missile was the only way for Koligian to safeguard its
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.
IV. KOLIGIAN IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF PALVER-2.
A. Since the ASAT missile was not a space object and Koligian was not at fault,
Koligian is not liable under Article III of the Liability Convention.
B. Under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, causation and fault are required toestablish international liability. For the same reasons above, Koligian is neither liable
under this Article.
C. Koligian is not liable under general international law since it did not breach any
international obligations.

XX

ARGUMENTS
I. THE USE OF PALVER-3 VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The use of Palver-3 by Argyliam violated relevant provisions of the OST [A] andArticle 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. [B] In addition, the wrongfulness of the act cannot be
precluded by necessity. [C]
A. Argyliam violated the OST by using Palver-3.
By using Palver-3, Argyliam violated Article VIII of the OST for intervening in
Koligian’s jurisdiction and control over Iriord-8 [1] and violated Article IX of the OST
for failing to pay due regard and take international consultations. [2]
1. Argyliam violated Article VIII of the OST.
Article VIII of the OST demonstrates that the State of registry retains jurisdiction
and control over their space objects.1 Combined as one concept,2 the jurisdiction andcontrol of a State will be infringed if other States interfere with any technicalarrangements necessary to fulfill its mission in outer space.3
In casu, Koligian registered Iriord-8,4 hence retained jurisdiction and control overit. The laser beam emitted by Palver-3 damaged and finally caused the destruction ofIriord-8,5 rendering it incapable of fulfilling the mission to offer telecommunication

1

Article VIII, OST.

Gabriel Lafferranderie, Jurisdiction and Control of Space Objects and the Case of anInternational Intergovernmental Organization (ESA), 54 GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 228,
231 (2005).
2

MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
LAW-MAKING 66 (1972).
3

4Compromis, ¶9.

5

Id.
1

services.6 Consequently, Argyliam violated Article VIII of the OST by intervening in
Koligian’s jurisdiction and control over Iriord-8.
2. Argyliam violated Article IX of the OST.
Argyliam violated Article IX of the OST since it breached the principle of “dueregard” [a] and the obligation of undertaking international consultations. [b]a. Argyliam breached the principle of “due regard”.
Article IX of the OST stipulates that States shall pay due regard to thecorresponding interests of all other States when conducting their activities in outerspace.7 “Corresponding interest” refers to the legal rights of other States in the peaceful
use and exploration of outer space.8 States must prove beyond reasonable doubt thatevery possible step is undertaken to avoid harm.9
The use of laser beams in outer space could cause potential damage to other spacesystems.10 Further, LEO is one of the most congested orbits,11 in which operations are

Compromis, ¶10; Sarah M. Mountin, The Legality and Implications of Intentional
Interference with Commercial Communication Satellite Signals, 90 INT’L L. STUD. SER.
US NAVAL WAR COL. 101, 124 (2014).
6

7

Article IX, OST.

Michael C. Mineiro, Article IX’s Principle of Due Regard and International
Consultations: An Assessment in Light of the European Draft Space Code-of-Conduct,
53 PROC. ON INT’L INST. SPACE L. 674, 677 (2010); Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating
to the Global Public Interest in Outer Space, 32 J. SPACE L. 31, 47 (2006).
8

Sergio Marchisio, Article IX, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 169, 176(Stephan Hobe et al. eds.,2009); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.),
Judgement, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 56 (Apr. 20).
9

U.N. Secretary-General, Current Developments in Science and Technology and
Their Potential Impact on International Security and Disarmament Efforts, ¶43, U.N.
Doc. A/76/182 (July 19, 2021) [Current Developments].
10

Neta Palkovitz, Dealing with the Regulatory Vacuum in LEO, 59 PROC. ON INT’L
INST. SPACE L. 419, 420 (2016).
112inherently high risk.12
According to Guideline B.10 of the 2019 LTS Guidelines, before using lasers,
States should take quantitative assessment of the power of laser radiation and the riskof failure or damage to space objects. 13 Moreover, the risk can be estimated withreliable data.14 To remove data bias, NASA suggested States shall validate all the SSA
data before forming the scheme of operations.15 Though non-binding, these technicalstandards could serve as a way to measure whether States paid due regard.16
In casu, Argyliam emitted a laser in LEO.17 However, Argyliam did not take any
assessment to prevent possible damage to other satellites in LEO. 18 In addition,
Argyliam failed to validate the data provided by Charalg Inc., who once almost caused
an accident by sending incorrect data.19 Consequently, Argyliam breached the principleof due regard.

Ntorina Antoni & Federico Bergamasco, To Orbit and Beyond: Present Risks andLiability Issues from the Launching of Small Satellites, 57 PROC. ON INT’L INST. SPACE
L. 75, 75 (2014); STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES AND
POLICIES 128 (1991).
12

U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, Guidelines for the Long-term
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (June 12-21, 2019) [2019 LTS Guidelines].
13

14

Current Developments, ¶43.

NASA, NASA Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance B
est Practices Handbook (2020) (Nov. 21, 2022), https://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/OCE_docs/OCE_50.pdf.
15

Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of theInternational Responsibility of States, 35 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 45 (1992).
16

17

Compromis, ¶9.

18

Id.

19

Compromis, ¶3.
3

b. Argyliam violated the obligation of undertaking international
consultations.
Article IX of the OST demonstrates that a State shall “undertake appropriate
international consultations”20 when it has reason to believe that the planned activity
would cause potentially harmful interference with the activities of other States in thepeaceful exploration and use of outer space.21
Argyliam breached the obligation of undertaking international consultations since
it had reason to believe that the laser emission would cause potentially harmfulinterference. [i] However, it did not take appropriate international consultations. [ii]i. Argyliam had reason to believe that the laser emission would cause
potentially harmful interference.
“Having reason to believe” should be interpreted as having knowledge that provesa planned activity would cause potentially harmful interference. 22 “Harmfulinterference” in outer space involves interference with the freedom of physicaloperations in outer space.23
The use of laser beams in outer space can interfere with the freedom of passing
satellites’ physical operations. 24 Besides, considering the high risk of operating in

20

Article IX, OST.

21

Mineiro, supra note 8, at 678.

Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321, 336 (2008).
22

23

Mineiro, supra note 8, at 678.

Petr Bohacek, Commentary on the Responsible Use of Lasers in Space (Nov. 20,2022),
https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/PULS_Submission-toUNODA_reARES7536.pdf.
24

4

LEO, 25 laser emission in LEO is globally regarded as an activity with potentiallyharmful interference, embodied in the report of Responsible Behaviours.26
In casu, as a State with a flourishing space industry, 27 Argyliam should have
known the aforementioned interference with passing space objects by Palver-3’s laser
in LEO. Hence, Argyliam was obligated to undertake appropriate international
consultations with potentially affected States,28 including Koligian, whose satellites in
LEO could be passed by the laser.
ii. Argyliam did not take appropriate international consultations.
The appropriate international consultations include, minimally, contacting thepotentially affected States and providing them with information sufficient to prevent
potentially harmful interference.29
Nevertheless, Argyliam did not contact or provide any information for Koligianand other potentially affected States.30 The only action taken by Argyliam was to issue
a Note Verbale to Kassof, irrelevant to laser emission.31 Thus, Argyliam did not fulfill
the obligation to take appropriate international consultations.
In conclusion, Argyliam violated Article IX of the OST for failing to pay due

25

Ntorina Antoni & Federico Bergamasco, supra note 12.

U.N. Secretary-General, Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles
of responsible behaviours, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/76/77 (July 13, 2021) [Responsible
Behaviours].
26

27

Compromis, ¶1.

28

Pulp Mills, supra note 9, at 68.

29

Mineiro, supra note 22, at 336.

30

Compromis, ¶8.

31

Compromis, ¶7.
5

regard and undertake appropriate international consultations.
B. Argyliam violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter declares that States must refrain from the use offorce in international relations. 32 The prohibition of the use of force is equallyapplicable to any sphere of international activities,33 including outer space.34
The Respondent submits that Argyliam violated the obligation by emitting a laser
beam since it qualified as the use of force [1] and was inconsistent with the Purposesof the United Nations. [2]1. The use of Palver-3 qualified as the use of force.
“Force” under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter refers solely to armed force. 35
Furthermore, to constitute the prohibited armed force, the gravity of the act and hostile
intent are required.36
The Respondent submits that the use of Palver-3 constituted the prohibited armed
force since its gravity reached the threshold of armed force [a] and Argyliam was acting
32

Article 2(4), U.N. Charter.

Youri H. Kolossoy, Non-Use of Force III Outer Space, 26 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE
205, 206 (1983).
33

V. S. Vereshchetin, Against the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Outer Space(Reply to Opponent), 27 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 358, 359 (1984).
34

Oliver Dörr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Nov. 20, 2022), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ep
il/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e427; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 86 (2005); Article 31, VCLT.
35

OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE
IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (2010); CHRISTIAN HENDERSON, THE USE
OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (2018); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment,
1949 I.C.J. 4, 38 (Apr. 9); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J.
432, 466 (Dec.4); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Tur.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J.
3, 29 (Dec. 19).
36

6

with hostile intent. [b]a. The gravity of using Palver-3 reached the threshold of armed force.
The prohibition of armed force does not refer to specific weapons.37 Further, thegravity of armed force depends on its capacity to destroy lives or property.38 Thus,
using any instrument capable of causing physical destruction would be covered.39
According to the 2021 U.N. Secretary-General’s report, the laser beam could be
used as a non-kinetic weapon to attack satellites. 40 Due to the sensitivity andimportance of the electronic components on a satellite,41 merely a 40-watt laser could
destroy them and permanently damage the satellite,42 often leading to the failure of thewhole mission.43
Besides, when measuring the capacity of causing physical destruction, the soonand close consequences shall be taken into account.44 A satellite’s value is derived from

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 244 (July 8).
37

IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362 (1963);
Samuli Haataja & Afshin Akhtar-Khavari, Stuxnet and International Law on the Use ofForce: An Informational Approach, 7 CAMB. INT’L L.J. 99, 107 (2018).
38

39

HENDERSON, supra note 36, at 79, 80.

Current Developments, ¶43; David A. Koplow, Reverse Distinction: A U.S. Violationof the Law of Armed Conflict in Space, 13 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 25, 68 (2022).
40

Space Foundation Editorial Team, Components of a Satellite, https://www.spa
cefoundation.org/space_brief/satellite-components/
41

42

Current Developments, ¶43.

Annelie Klint Nilsson, Phobos-Grunt and Yinghuo-1 (May 5, 2020), https://www.irf.se/en/irf-in-space/phobos-grunt-and-yinghuo-1/.
43

MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAWAPPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 334 (2017).
44

7

its function in enabling or assisting terrestrial activities. 45 Thus, the terrestrial
consequences arising from the damage to the satellite should be considered.46
In casu, Palver-3’s laser damaged an electronic component of Iriord-8,47 resulting
in its burnout. 48 Furthermore, Iriord-8’s destruction was a significant setback for
Koligian’s critical infrastructure,49 with considerable damage to many State services,50
whose consequences even overlap normal physical destruction. 51 Hence, the laser
beam emitted by Palver-3 was capable of causing physical destruction.
b. Argyliam was acting with hostile intent.
The “hostile intent” indicates a State’s intention to compel another State to do or
refrain from doing something. 52 Hostile intent is obviously present when a State
intends to carry out attacks that may result in loss of lives or damage to property.53
In casu, despite Kassof’s willingness to develop friendly relations with45

Responsible Behaviours, supra note 26, at 26, 55.

Hitoshi Nasu, Targeting a Satellite: Contrasting Considerations between the Jus ad
Bellum and the Jus in Bello, 99 INT’L L. STUD. SER. U.S. NAVAL WAR COL. 142, 158(2022).
46

47

Compromis, ¶9.

48

Id.

49

Compromis, ¶10.

50

Id.

51

Sarah M. Mountin, supra note 6, at 178.

CORTEN, supra note 36, at 67; M. WELL, IRAQ AND KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND
THEIR AFTERMATH 725 (1993); Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the
Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), 2015 I.C.J. 665, 823 (Dec. 16) (separate opinion by
Robinson, J.).
52

Tom Ruys, The Meaning of Force and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are
Minimal Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4), 108 AM. J. INT’L L.
159, 173 (2014).
53

8

Argyliam,54 Argyliam chose to blind EVGA-1607,55 a purely commercial satellite.56
Besides, as submitted above,57 the laser was capable of causing permanent damage tothe satellite. Thus, Argyliam intended to compel Kassof from normal commercial
activities, and the hostile intent is obviously presented here.
In conclusion, the use of Palver-3 constitutes the use of force.
2. The use of Palver-3 was inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force “inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations”.58 Notably, one purpose is to “maintain peace andsecurity”,59 preventing the unilateral use of armed force.60 Thus, any form of use offorce is contrary to the Purposes of the United Nations61 if it does not fall under theaccepted exceptions,62 namely the right to self-defense and enforcement actions under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.63

54

Compromis, ¶7.

55

Compromis, ¶8.

56

Compromis, ¶7.

57

Supra Argument I(B)(1)(a)(i).

58

Article 2(4), U.N. Charter.

59

Article 1(1), U.N. Charter.

60

Dörr, supra note 35.

Ricky J. Lee, The Jus Ad Bellum in Spatialis: The Exact Content and Practical
Implications of the Law on the Use of Force in Outer Space, 29 J. SPACE L. 93, 104(2003).
61

Isavella Maria Vasilogeorgi, Military Uses of Outer Space: Legal Limitations,Contemporary Perspectives, 39 J. SPACE L. 379, 388 (2014).
62

63

Chapter VII, U.N. Charter.
9

As submitted before,64 Argyliam’s act constitutes the use of force. Since this act
was not a response to an armed attack65 or mandated by Security Council, it did not
fall under the accepted exceptions. Therefore, the use of Palver-3 was inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations and violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
C. The wrongfulness of Argyliam’s use of Palver-3 cannot be precluded.
Argyliam’s use of Palver-3 constitutes an internationally wrongful act, [1] and thewrongfulness of the act cannot be precluded by invoking necessity. [2]1. The use of Palver-3 constituted an internationally wrongful act.
According to Article 2 of the ARSIWA, 66 an internationally wrongful act is abreach of international law attributable to the State,67 which this Court also recognizedon several occasions.68 Article 4 of the ARSIWA stipulates that the conduct of the State
organ is attributable to the State.69 “State organ” covers all individuals constituting theorganization of the State and acting on its behalf.70
In casu, the laser emission was ordered by the Defense Minister of Argyliam,71

64

Supra Argument I(B)(1).

Article 51, U.N. Charter; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161,
186 (Nov. 6).
65

Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int’l Law
Comm’n, 53rd Sess., Article 25, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (2001) [ARSIWA].
66

67

Article 2, ARSIWA.

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment,
1980 I.C.J. 3, 29 (May 24); Nicaragua, supra note 52, at 118; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 54 (Sept. 25).
68

69

Article 4, ARSIWA.

70

Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10, 40 (2001).

71

Compromis, ¶8.
10

who acts on behalf of the State. Thus, it is attributable to Argyliam. Besides, as
previously submitted,72 Argyliam’s use of Palver-3 breached obligations under Article
VIII and Article IX of the OST and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Hence, the use of
Palver-3 constituted an internationally wrongful act.
2. The wrongfulness of the act cannot be precluded by necessity.
Affirmed by this Court as customary international law in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project case,73 necessity can be used as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness ofan internationally wrongful act.74 It can be invoked when the act in question is the only
way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.75
Argyliam cannot invoke necessity since its essential interest did not face a grave
and imminent peril, [a] and emitting a laser was not the only way to safeguard its
essential interest. [b]a. Argyliam’s essential interest did not face a grave and imminent peril.
The peril faced must be grave and imminent before taking steps to protect theinterest. 76 Moreover, the peril has to be objectively established and not merely
apprehended as possible.77 Accordingly, this Court noted that the invoking State could
72

Supra Argument I(B); Supra Argument I(A).

73

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 68, at 41.

Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 36, at 466; M/V Saiga (No.2) (St. Vincent v.
Guinea), Case No.2, Judgment of July 1, 1999, ITLOS Rep. 10, 55; LG&E Energy Corp.
et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 256(Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203, 265.
74

75

Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep., supra note 70, at 40.

Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful
Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 16 (2000).
76

77

Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep., supra note 70, at 40.
11not be the sole judge of the necessity.78
In casu, except for the so-called “cross-checked information” contended by
Argyliam,79 there was no other evidence showing that Kassof was spying on it.80 In
practice, space systems are largely dual-use, making it difficult for even the major space
powers to determine the intent behind a particular behavior.81
Thus, Argyliam was the sole judge of the necessity. Given Kassof’s denial82 andthe difficulty of verification in outer space,83 the peril cannot be objectively established.
b. Emitting a laser was not the only way to safeguard Argyliam’s
essential interest.
The plea is excluded if other lawful means are available, even if they are morecostly or inconvenient.84 Besides, the “way” here is not limited to unilateral actions but
also comprises cooperative actions with other States or international organizations.85
According to TCBMs provided by Secretary-General, there are adequate
mechanisms contributing to clarifying ambiguous situations, such as multilateraldiplomatic exchanges and other channels. 86 In practice, these mechanisms are also
78

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 68, at 42, 43.

79

Compromis, ¶6.

80Compromis, ¶7.

81

Responsible Behaviours, supra note 26, at 40.

82

Compromis, ¶7.

U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on further
practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, U.N. Doc.
A/74/77, ¶39 (Apr. 9 2019).
83

84

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 68, at 41, 42.

85

Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep., supra note 70, at 83.

U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, U.N. Doc.
8612

supported by numerous States,87 including the U.S.,88 Russia,89 and China.90
In casu, Kassof replied actively and expressed friendly willingness.91 Given theavailability of adequate mechanisms provided by TCBMs, Argyliam could continue
bilateral or multilateral consultations with Kassof and the international community,
exploring further solutions. Therefore, emitting a laser was not the only way for
Argyliam and Argyliam cannot invoke necessity to preclude the wrongfulness.
To conclude, Argyliam’s use of Palver-3 violated international law, and the act’s
wrongfulness cannot be precluded by necessity.
II. ARGYLIAM IS LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF IRIORD-8.
The Respondent submits that Argyliam is liable for the loss of Iriord-8 under
Article III of the LIAB, [A] Article VII of the OST [B] and general international law, [C]besides, Koligian did not come to this Court with unclean hands. [D]A/68/189 (July 29, 2013) [TCBMs].
87

Responsible Behaviours, supra note 26, at 10.

U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Recommendations of the Groupof Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer
Space Activities: views of States members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses ofOuter Space, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1080 (Nov. 7, 2014).
88

U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Recommendations of the Groupof Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer
Space Activities: views of States members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses ofOuter Space, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1080/Add.2 (Mar.13, 2015).
89

China’s Views on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Space
Activities (Nov. 20, 2022), https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/20
17/04/China-E-In-extenso.pdf.
9091Compromis, ¶7.
13

A. Argyliam is liable for the destruction of Iriord-8 under Article III of the
LIAB.
Article III of the LIAB establishes fault-based liability for damage caused in outerspace.92 Argyliam is liable for the destruction of Iriord-8 for the following reasons:first, the damage was covered by the LIAB; [1] second, Argyliam was at fault; [2] third,
the destruction of Iriord-8 was due to the fault of Argyliam. [3]1. The damage of Iriord-8 can be covered by the LIAB.
The “damage” in the LIAB involves loss of or damage to the property of States.93
Supported by the travaux préparatoires, the damage caused by a space object does not
require collision between the two space objects or components.94 Thus, if one space
object is damaged by laser beams released from another space object, the damage could
be covered by the LIAB.95
In casu, the laser beam was emitted by Palver-3.96 Hence, even if there were no
collisions, the LIAB would cover the damage resulting from the laser beam.
2. Argyliam was at fault.
No definition of “fault” exists in the LIAB. 97 Turning to general international

92

Article 3, LIAB.

93

Article 1, LIAB.

Article 32, VCLT; U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., at 52, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.94(July. 3, 1968) (French, Canadian & Italian delegate); BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 331 (1998).
94

95

BIN CHENG, supra note 94, at 331.

96

Compromis, ¶8.

97

CARL Q CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 117 (1982).
14

law,98 fault denotes the failure to adhere to obligations imposed by law.99 As submitted
above, 100 by emitting a laser beam, Argyliam has violated Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, Article VIII, and Article IX of the OST, and thus was at fault.
3. The destruction of Iriord-8 was due to Argyliam’s fault.
Pursuant to Article III of the LIAB, causation is required between the fault anddamage. 101 And the test of causation is proximate causation. 102 To satisfy theproximate causation, the damage would not have occurred “but for” the initial action103[a] and it must be reasonably foreseeable.104 [b]a. The “but for” test is satisfied.
The proximate causation requires that the destruction of Iriord-8 would not haveoccurred but for the laser emission.105

Article 31, VCLT; Chapter III: The General Problem Underlying the Drafting ofPart 2 of the Draft Articles, [1982] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 30, ¶54.
98

L. J. Smith & A. Kerrest, Article III: LIAB, in 2 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE
LAW 131, 132 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009); Chapter III: Doctrine Section 1:
Writings of Specialists, [1978] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L COMM’N 188, 195, ¶499.
99

100

Supra Argument I(A)(B).

101

Article III, LIAB.

CHRISTOL, supra note 97, at 102; Angola Cases (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1011,
1013 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928, 1930); Paul Dembling, Cosmos 954: Space Treaties, 6 J.
SPACE L. 129, 135 (1978).
102

H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 114, 121 (1985) [hereinafter
HART].
103

Administrative Decision No. II (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A 23, 23 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1930); War-Risk Insurance Premium Claims Arbitration, (U.S. v. Ger.) 7 R.I.A.A. 44,
55 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1923); Life Insurance Claims (Ger. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 121, 121(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1924).
104

105

HART, supra note 103, at 114, 121.
15

As previously elaborated, 106 Argyliam was at fault for emitting a laser beam,
which was the initial act of the damage. The laser damaged an electronic component ofIriord-8, triggering a misfire of attitude control thrusters and pushing it into the atmosphere,
where it was completely incinerated.107 Without emitting a laser beam, Iriord-8 would

not have been destroyed. Hence, the “but for” test is satisfied.
b. The damage must be reasonably foreseeable.
Proximate causation requires the general class of harm to be foreseeable. 108 Dueto the ultra-hazardous nature of space activities, 109 the damage is consideredreasonably foreseeable if the risk of harm, however slight, was inherently establishedin the act.110
No single SSA provider can fully understand the space environment,111 especiallygiven the challenge posed by the sheer number of space objects.112 Additionally, theprecision of SSA data varies depending on the nature and purpose of activities. 113

106

Supra Argument I(A).

107

Compromis, ¶9.

Luke Punnakanta, Space Torts: Applying Nuisance and Negligence to Orbital
Debris, 86 SOUTH. CALIF. LAW REV, 182, 183 (2012).
108

MANFRED LACHS, supra note 3, at 115; Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep, supra note 70, at
149.
109

Special Rapporteur on International Liability, Third Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Int’l. Law Comm., at 58, U.N. Doc DA/CN.4/360 (Jun. 28, 1982) (byRobert Quentin-Baxter).
110

Space Situational Awareness, SSI Issue Guide (Nov. 16, 2022), https://spaces
ecurityindex.org/2020/09/space-situational-awareness/.
111

UNCOPUOS, Rep. of the Legal Subcommittee on its Sixty-first Session, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/1260, 23 (Apr. 19, 2022).
112

Laws Applicable to Space Situational Awareness (SSA) (Nov. 16, 2022), htt
ps://spacelaws.com/articles/laws-relating-to-space-situational-awareness-ssa/.
113

16

Moreover, as submitted before, using lasers in outer space is a universally recognizedhigh-risk activity. 114 Thus, relying on collision avoidance data from a single SSA
provider to fire the laser is inherently risky.
In casu, Argyliam used a laser beam in LEO.115 Knowing that Charalg Inc. hadonce provided incorrect data,116 Argyliam still relied solely on it and applied the data
to laser emission,117 contrary to the original purpose of collision avoidance.118 Thus,
without validating the data from Charalg Inc., the laser emission was extremely risky
and Argyliam should foresee the damage caused by this ultra-hazardous space activity.
B. Argyliam is liable under Article VII of the OST.
Article VII of the OST stipulates the liability of a launching State for damage
caused by its space objects to other States. 119 Liability under Article VII refers to
liability under general international law, namely fault-based liability. 120 Besides,
causality must be established between the damage and the space object launched.121
As submitted above, Argyliam was acting at fault and Palver-3 caused the114

Supra Argument I(A)(2).

115

Compromis, ¶9.

116

Compromis, ¶3.

117

Compromis, ¶9.

118

Compromis, ¶3.

119

Article VII, OST.

Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, 74
AM. J. INT’L L. 346, 353 (1980); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 503 (2008).
120

Bin Cheng, International Responsibility and Liability for Launch Activities, 20 AIR& SPACE L. 297, 297 (1995).
121

17

destruction of Iriord-8. 122 Hence, Argyliam, as the launching State, is liable under
Article VII of the OST.
C. Argyliam is liable under general international law.
Under general international law, the responsible State is liable for damages causedby its internationally wrongful act. 123 This is considered a principle of generalinternational law.124 As submitted above,125 the destruction of Iriord-8 was caused byusing Palver-3, which constitutes an internationally wrongful act. Thus, Argyliam isliable for the destruction of Iriord-8.
D. Koligian did not come to this Court with unclean hands.
The doctrine of “unclean hands” demonstrates that a party’s claims would bebarred due to its involvement in activities unlawful under international law.126
However, this Court has never explicitly endorsed the unclean hands doctrine inany judgments, 127 and it is doubtful whether the principle is a part of generalinternational law.128 Even if this Court holds the doctrine applicable, the Respondent

122

Supra Argument II(B)(2); Supra Argument II(B)(3).

123

BIN Cheng, supra note 121, at 297; Corfu Channel, supra note 36, at 23.

Factory at Chorzów Case (Ger. v. Pol.), Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.9, at
21 (July 26); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 257 (Dec. 19).
124

125

Supra Argument I(C)(1).

BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 155 (1953).
126

Rahim Moloo, A Comment on the Clean Hands Doctrine in International Law, 2010
INTER ALIA 39, 41 (2010).
127

U.N. Int’l Law. Comm’n, 56th Sess., Provisional Summary Rec. of the 2791st
Meeting, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2791 (May 7, 2004).
128

18

submits that Koligian did not violate Article VI of the OST and did not come to thisCourt with unclean hands.
Article VI of the OST provides that the activities of non-governmental entities inouter space require continuing supervision by the appropriate State. 129 However,
Article VI does not provide a criterion for “continuing supervision”.130 Thus, States arefree to implement the form of such supervision131 as long as they ensure that nongovernmental entities comply with the OST.132
In casu, there was no evidence showing that Charalg Inc. was contrary to theOST.133 Besides, in practice, no State requires companies to provide all specific data inreal-time.134 In this situation, since Koligian did not need access to each company’s
real-time data, Charalg Inc.’s single error cannot prove Koligian breached the obligationof supervision.135 Thus, Koligian does not come to this Court with unclean hands.
Therefore, Argyliam is liable for the destruction of Iriord-8.

129

Article VI, OST.

130

JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION 45 (2004).

V. Kayser, Commercial Exploitation of Space: Developing Domestic Regulation,
XVII ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 187, 190 (1992).
131

Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Legal Aspects of Space Activities by Private Enterprises:
Introductory Report, 19 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 234, 236 (1976).
132

133

Compromis, ¶3.

Act on Space Activities (2018) (Fin.); The Space Industry Regulations (2021)(Eng.); The French Space Operations Act (2008) (Fr.); Outer Space Act (2016) (Den.);
Basic Space Law (2008) (Japan); National Space Policy (2020) (U.S.).
134

135

Compromis, ¶9.
19

III. KOLIGIAN’S USE OF THE ASAT MISSILE AGAINST PALVER-2 WAS NOTCONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The use by Koligian of the ASAT missile against Palver-2 did not violate
international law since it was not contrary to the OST, [A] and Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. [B] In any event, Koligian could invoke necessity to preclude thewrongfulness. [C]
A. Koligian’s use of the ASAT missile did not violate the OST.
The Respondent submits that Koligian did not violate Article VIII of the OST for
not intervening in Argyliam’s jurisdiction and control over Palver-2. [1] Besides,
Koligian did not breach Article IX of the OST by fulfilling the obligation of consultation,
preventing harmful contamination and following the principle of due regard. [2]
1. Koligian did not violate Article VIII of the OST.
Under Article VIII of the OST, the State of registry retains jurisdiction and control
over the space object.136 Nonetheless, Palver-2 was in the legal status of space debris,[a] and the takedown of Palver-2 did not infringe its jurisdiction and control. [b]a. Palver-2 was in the legal status of space debris.
According to the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 137 any nonfunctional man-made objects located in Earth orbit, including uncontrolled satellites arecharacterized as space debris.138 In casu, Palver-2 ceased responding to commands and136

Article VIII, OST.

U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.1/L.366, at 1 (July 17, 2018) [COPUOS Guidelines].
137

L. Perek, Ex Facto Sequitur Lex: Facts which Merit Reflection in Space Law inParticular with Regard to Registration and Space Debris Mitigation, in II ESSENTIAL
AIR AND SPACE LAW-SPACE LAW: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE
138

20

could not be restored, 139 which was officially confirmed by Argyliam, the State ofregistry.140 Therefore, Palver-2 was space debris.
b. Koligian did not infringe the jurisdiction and control over Palver-2.
The jurisdiction and control would not be infringed if the technical arrangements
necessary for fulfilling the space object’s mission were not interfered with.141 As spacedebris increases, active debris removal has been called for142 to remove space debris
that has lost technical arrangements to fulfill its mission.143
In casu, the uncontrolled Palver-2 became space debris. 144 The entire Palver
system’s mission had already failed without the synergy of all three satellites.145 In thissituation, since Argyliam no longer maintained necessary technical arrangements over
Palver-2, Koligian’s action did not infringe Argyliam’s jurisdiction and control.
2. Koligian complied with Article IX of the OST.
Koligian conformed to Article IX of the OST since it did not breach the principleof due regard, [a] the obligation for preventing harm contamination [b] and undertaking
international consultations. [c]REGULATION 29, 43 (Marietta Benko & Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. eds., 2005); H.
KLINKRAD, SPACE DEBRIS: MODELS AND RISK ANALYSIS 27 (2006); L. ANSELMO,SPACE DEBRIS, 41 ADVANCES IN SPACE RESEARCH 1003 (2008).
139

Compromis, ¶12.

140

Compromis, ¶12.

141

MANFRED LACHS, supra note 3.

J-C Liou, NL Johnson & NM Hill, Controlling the Growth of Future LEO Debris
Populations with Active Debris Removal, 5-6 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 648, 648 (2010).
142

143

COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 137, at 30.

144

Supra Argument (III)(A)(1)(a).

145

Compromis, ¶15.
21

a. Koligian did not violate the principle of “due regard”.
Article IX of the OST provides that States shall pay due regard to thecorresponding interests of other States.146 The Respondent submits that Palver-2 was
not a corresponding interest, [i] and in any event, Koligian complied with the principleof due regard. [ii]i. Palver-2 was not a corresponding interest.
“Corresponding interests” refer to the legal rights of other States in the peaceful
use and exploration of outer space.147 It excludes activities that threaten international
peace and security,148 which is determined in the context of technologies and actualuse of space.149
As submitted above, 150 the laser emission could cause permanent damage tosatellites151 and threaten international peace and security.152 In casu, Palver-2 alreadylost control, with a 3% chance of spontaneous activation, posing a severe hazard in
LEO.153 Therefore, Palver-2 was not a corresponding interest of Argyliam.

146

Article IX, OST.

147

Mineiro, supra note 8, at 678.

CHRISTOPHER J. BORGEN, THE FUTURE LAW OF THE ARMED CONFLICT 166 (2022);
Ricky J. Lee & Sarah L. Steele, Military Use of Satellite Communications, Remote
Sensing, and Global Positioning Systems in the War on Terror,79 J. AIR L. & COM. 69,
77 (2014).
148

149

FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 523 (2007).

150

Supra Argument I(B)(1)(a)DAVID WRIGHT, LAURA GREGO & LISBETH GRONLUND, THE PHYSICS OF SPACESECURITY 128 (2005).
151

152

Responsible Behaviours, supra note 26, at 14.

153

Compromis, ¶12.
22

ii. In any event, Koligian complied with the principle of “due regard”.
States must prove beyond reasonable doubt that every possible step is undertaken
to prevent harm.154 According to COPUOS Guidelines and UNIDIR Guidelines, 155
when using the ASAT missile, States should consider the orbital altitude of the debris
cloud, assuring it is low enough for debris to enter the atmosphere and other satellites
would not pass by.156
In casu, Koligian targeted Palver-2 in LEO at a sufficiently low altitude of about
200km, 157 and the debris was completely burned up without interfering with othersatellites.158 The limited time available impeded Koligian to adopt further sophisticatedmethods.159 Therefore, Koligian complied with the principle of due regard.
b. Koligian complied with the obligation to prevent harmful
contamination.
Harmful contamination shall be avoided in space exploration by appropriate
measures.160 The prior concern is not the result but measures taken to prevent harmful
contamination.161 In casu, following the due regard principle, Koligian did not cause

154

Sergio Marchisio, supra note 9, at 176.

COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 137, at 10; UNIDIR, Towards ASAT Test
Guidelines (May 17, 2018), https://unidir.org/publication/towards-asat-test-guidelin
es.
155

156

WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 377 (2012).

Compromis, ¶¶5, 14; Frequently Asked Questions (Sept. 2, 2011), https://www.nasa.gov/news/debris_faq.html.
157

158

Compromis, ¶14.

159

Compromis, ¶12.

160

Article IX, OST.

Ivan Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CAL. L. REV. 507, 517(1967).
16123

any harmful contamination and fulfilled the obligation.162
c. Koligian did not violate the obligation of undertaking international
consultations.
Under Article IX of the OST,163 States are obligated to consult when it has reason
to believe the planned activity would cause potentially harmful interference. 164“Harmful interference” in outer space includes interference with the freedom ofphysical movement or operations of space objects.165
In casu, Palver-2 lost control and could not be restored. 166 Thus, its physicaloperations and movement could no longer be exercised.167 As a result, Koligian had
no reason to believe that there would be any harmful interference with it.
Therefore, Koligian did not violate the obligation of consultation under Article IXof the OST.
B. Koligian’s use of the ASAT missile against Palver-2 did not violate Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
As previously submitted, to qualify as the prohibited armed force, gravity andhostile intent are required.168 The Respondent submits that Koligian’s use of the ASAT
missile did not violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Admittedly, the ASAT missile

162

Compromis, ¶14.

163

Article IX, OST.

Harry H. Almond Jr., Peaceful Purposes and Peaceful Activities in Outer Space, 29
PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 1, 10 (1986).
164

165

Mineiro, supra note 8, at 678.

166

Compromis, ¶12.

167

Id.

168

Supra Argument (I)(B)(1).
24

has the aforementioned destructive capacity,169 but Koligian did not act with hostile
intent,170 as compelling another State to do or refrain from something.171
Since space debris mitigation appeared as an instant customary international law[1] and the use by Koligian of the ASAT missile against Palver-2 was conducting aspace debris mitigation process, [2] it reveals the absence of hostile intent. [3]
1. Space debris mitigation appeared as an instant customary internationallaw.
To determine the existence and content of customary international law, a generalpractice and opinio juris are required.172 In the modern era, the requirement of State
practices has been tempered, since a short period is not a bar to the formation ofcustomary international law. 173 In space law, instant customary international law
emerges when non-binding resolutions manifest strong expectation that States would
abide by them and is gradually justified by State practice.174
The Respondent submits that space debris mitigation is characterized as instantcustomary international law since the opinio juris [a] and the actual States practices175

169

Supra Argument (I)(B)(1)(a)(i).

170

CORTEN, supra note 36, at 67.

171

Id.

G.A. Res. 73/203, Identification of customary international law, at 9 (Feb. 14,2019); Article 38(1)(b), I.C.J. Statute.
172

North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Neth.), Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. 4, 43(Jul. 8).
173

174

BIN CHENG, supra note 94, at 133.

MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (2017); Case Concerning theContinental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgement, 1985 I.C.J. 13, 20 (June, 3);Jurisdictional Immunities (Ger. v. It.), Judgement, 2012 I.C.J. 100, 122 (Feb. 3).
175

25

are both satisfied. [b]a. The opinio juris was evidenced.
Non-binding though, U.N. resolutions have normative value, providing evidence
for opinio juris.176 The U.N.G.A. Resolution concerning International Cooperationand the COPUOS Guidelines177 revealed the opinio juris of space debris mitigation.
b. The actual State practices were presented.
Consistent with the resolutions and guidelines of international organizations,launch-competent States have adopted their mitigation standards in legislation andtechnical standards.178 These de facto international standards,179 including the NASA
Technical Standard,180 the European Code of Conduct,181 as well as the standards ofChina, Russia and Japan,182 evidenced the actual State practices upon the opinio juris.

176

Nuclear Weapons, supra note 37, at 254.

G.A. Res. 60/99, International Cooperation in the Peaceful uses of Outer Space, at
27 (Jan. 6, 2006); COPUOS Guidelines, supra note 137, at 366.
177

M. Mejia-Kaiser, Informal Regulations and Practices in the Field of Space Debris
Mitigation, 34 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 21, 26 (2009).
178

UNOOSA maintains a “Compendium of Space Debris Mitigation Standards
Adopted by States and International Organizations”, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ou
rwork/topics/space-debris/compendium.html.
179

NASA, Process for Limiting Orbital Debris: NASA-STD-8719.14 (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/nasa/nasa-std-871914.
180

ESA, Requirements on Space Debris Mitigation for Agency Projects (Apr. 1, 2008),
https://technology.esa.int/page/space-debris-mitigation.
181

CNSA, Space Object Registration Management Method (Feb. 8, 2001), http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758823/n6758839/c6796215/content.html; JAXA, Space Deb
ris Mitigation Mechanism in Japan (Apr. 3, 2009), https://sma.jaxa.jp/TechDoc/;
GOST R., Space Technology Items. General Requirements for Space Vehicles fo
r Near-Earth Space Debris Mitigation (Jan. 1, 2019), http://nd.gostinfo.ru/docum
ent/6431006.aspx.
18226

2. The use by Koligian of the ASAT missile against Palver-2 wasconducting a space debris mitigation process.
Considering the aforementioned instant customary international law of spacedebris mitigation, 183 the Respondent submits that Palver-2 endangered theconstellation and Argyliam should have taken the space debris mitigation measures. [a]As a result, Koligian was forced to take appropriate mitigation measures. [b]a. Palver-2 endangered the constellation and Argyliam should havetaken space debris mitigation measures.
Telecommunication, air transport, and many other activities all rely on spacebased facilities. 184 Even a small collision of the commercial satellite infrastructure
would affect the global economy. 185 Besides, the chain reaction called Kessler
Syndrome would enlarge further collisions.186 To avoid harm, debris producing Statesshould take the lead in removing their debris.187
In casu, the uncontrolled Palver-2 endangered a densely populated orbit of 150

183

Supra argument (III)(A)(2)(a).

184

WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, supra note 156, at 359.

Eligar Sadeh, Obstacles to International Space Governance, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
SPACE: SECURITY POLICIES, APPLICATIONS AND PROGRAMS 23, 34 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl etal. eds., 2015).
185

M.T. SAVAGE, THE MILLENNIAL PROJECT: COLONIZING THE GALAXY IN EIGHT EASYSTEPS 149 (1992); J. SCHEFTER, THE GROWING PERIL OF SPACE DEBRIS, 221/1 POPULARSCIENCE 48 (1982); W.S. WONG & J. FERGUSSON, MILITARY SPACE POWER: A GUIDE TO
THE ISSUES 69 (2010).
186

U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Active Debris Removal, Rep. of
the International Interdisciplinary Congress on Space Debris Remediation and OnOrbit Satellite Servicing, at 47, 48, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.16 (Jan. 27,
2012).
187

27

functioning satellites.188 Argyliam, as the State of registry,189 should take mitigation
measures to avoid the forthcoming harm caused by the space debris Palver-2.
b. Since Argyliam could not reach an effective measure, Koligian wasforced to take appropriate mitigation measures.
Failure of the debris producing State to de-orbiting the debris could not prevent
other States from rectifying the consequence to preserve their essential interest innecessity.190 State practices of U.S.191 and India192 revealed the act of using ASAT
missiles in debris removal, 193 demonstrating that the ASAT missile is capable ofremoving the threat of space debris.
In casu, faced the danger posed by the space debris Palver-2, Koligian had to act
in a specific limited time.194 Thus, Koligian was forced to choose the ASAT missile toremove the threat and carry out the mitigation process.195

188

Compromis, ¶12.

189

Compromis, ¶5.

J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: STATETERRITORY 101 (1970); R. Lemkin, Genocide as a crime under International Law, 41
AJIL 145, 151 (1947); J. PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101
190(2005).
SPACESECURITY.ORG., SPACE SECURITY 2008 165 (2008); Craig Covault, Space
Control, 166 AVIAT. WK. & SPACE TECH. 59, 61 (2007); Eric Hagt, The U.S. Satellite
Shootdown: China’s Response, 3 BULL AT. SCI. 1, 5 (2008).
191

Sanjeev Miglani & Krishna N. Das, Modi Hails India as Military Space Po
wer After Anti-Satellite Missile Test (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/art
icle/us-india-satellite-idUSKCN1R80IA.
192

David A. Koplow, Asat-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulationof Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1238 (2009).
193

194

Compromis, ¶12.

195

Compromis, ¶14.
28

3. Koligian was in lack of hostile intent.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force when one State intends
to compel another.196 This explicitly requires forcing the will at the level of against theState, which should be examined in the specific circumstances.197 Moreover, without
forcing the State to accept a new circumstance, merely against its will could not amountto compelling it.198
In casu, since Palver-2 was drifting space debris,199 the removal would not compel
Argyliam to accept a new circumstance. Having to take debris mitigation measures,200
Koligian did not intend to compel Argyliam at the level of against the State. Therefore,
Koligian, without hostile intent, did not violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
C. Even if Koligian violated international law, the wrongfulness could beprecluded by necessity.
As submitted above, necessity could be invoked to preclude the wrongfulness.201
Koligian could invoke necessity since the use of the ASAT missile was to safeguard an
outweighing essential interest [1] against a grave and imminent peril, [2] and was the
only way for Koligian. [3]1. The use of the ASAT was to safeguard an outweighing essential interest.
The act in question must be aimed at safeguarding an essential interest, while not
Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY, 200, 226 (Bruno Simma ed. 2012).
196

197

CORTEN, supra note 36, at 84.

198

Corfu Channel, supra note 36, at 19.

199

Supra Argument (III)(A)(1)(a).

200

Supra Argument (III)(A)(2)(b)(ii).

201

Supra Argument (I)(C).
29impairing another State’s essential interest.202 “Essential interest” includes the interestof a State and the international community as a whole,203 which covers the safety of
the civilian population and the environment.204 The interest relied on must outweigh
all other considerations.205
In casu, Palver-2 was drifting towards the constellation,206 which was operated tosecure flight safety with stable Internet services. 207 Once a collision happens, theregenerated space debris 208 would seriously impair the function of the entire
constellation.209 Given the high risk of collision, 210 the threat to the safety of civilians
in flight and the space environment posed by Palver-2 and potential space debris
constituted an impairment of the essential interest.
By contrast, Palver-2 lost control and cannot be restored.211 Any interest in the202

Article 25, ARSIWA.

203

Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep., supra note 70, at 83.

W. R. MANNING, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:CANADIAN RELATIONS, 1784–1860 422 (1943); LORD MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW
OPINIONS 228 (1956); Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep., supra note 70, at 83.
204

205

Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep., supra note 70, at 84.

206

Compromis, ¶12.

Compromis, ¶12; Air Sat One, Aircraft Satcom Internet and Data Solutions - Air
Sat One (Nov. 20, 2022), https://www.airsatone.com/aircraft-internet-and-datasolutions.
207

DAVID WRIGHT, supra note 151, at 1; David A. Koplow, The Fault Is Not in Our
Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 331, 334 (2018).
208

209

SAVAGE, supra note 186. W.S. WONG & J. FERGUSSON, supra note 186.

UNCOPUOS, Rep. of the Events of Interest, at 45, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.101/11 (Nov.
2, 1982).
210

211

Compromis, ¶12.
30

utilization of Palver-2 did not exist. 212 Hence, Koligian was safeguarding an
outweighing essential interest by using the ASAT missile.
2. The use of the ASAT missile was against a grave and imminent peril.
The peril has to be objectively established and not merely apprehended as
possible.213 Besides, peril appearing in the future is still imminent if it is established.214
In casu, Palver-2 was expected to enter the orbit on 13 May. Meanwhile, its laser
remained active, which could spontaneously emit at any time. 215 Though Argyliam
claimed the likelihood was less than 3%,216 according to NASA’s standard in spacesystems, even a probability of one in a thousand is unacceptable.217 Thus, the potential
for spontaneous laser activation surpassed the risk control limits.218
Besides, this event occurred in LEO,219 inherently with high risks of collision.220
Thus, the risk was even higher when Palver-2 was drifting towards the large

212

Compromis, ¶15.

213

Int’l Law. Comm’n, Rep., supra note 70, at 81.

214

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 68, at 42.

215

Compromis, ¶12.

216

Id.

U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (2019); Michael W.
Taylor, Trashing the Solar System One Planet at a Time: Earth's Orbital Debris
Problem, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 34 (2007); NASA Safety Standard
Guidelines And Assessment Procedures For Limiting Orbital Debris (1995).
217

Julian Hermida, Risk Management in Arianespace Launch Agreements, 25 ANN.
AIR & SPACE L. 143, 144 (2000).
218

219

Compromis, ¶4.

European Space Policy Institute (ESPI), ESPI REPORT 76 IN-ORBIT SERVICES
FULL REPORT 28 (ESPI ed., 2020); Cabinet Office, Study Report of Sub-working Group on On-orbit Servicing, Government of Japan (Apr. 29, 2022) https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/english/stm/study_report.pdf.
22031

constellation in LEO.221 Therefore, the peril faced was grave and imminent.
3. The use of the ASAT missile was the only way for Koligian.
The peril must not be escapable by any other lawful means, even more costly.222
The Respondent submits that the use of ASAT missile at that time was the only way
since other ways were not effective, [a] and the later use of ASAT missile was also not
feasible. [b]a. The other ways were not available at that moment.
Other measures, such as the SSV, often face a significant risk of failure in orbital
tests223 due to the high risk of space activities.224
In casu, the SSV provided by Argyliam has only been tested on the ground.225
Without a successful orbital test, it is highly doubtful whether the SSV would fulfill its
mission. Besides, though active collision avoidance may be an option, 226 it would

Compromis, ¶12; Craig H. Allen, Taking Narrow Channel Collision Prevention
Seriously to More Effectively Manage Marine Transportation System Risk, 41 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 1, 6 (2010).
221

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 140 (July 9).
222

Himanshu Goenka, Japanese Space Debris Collector, JAXA’s Kounotori6, Fails To
Deploy Junk-Fishing Net (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.ibtimes.com/japanese-spacedebris-collector-jaxas-kounotori6-fails-deploy-junk-fishing-net-2487001; Space safety
magazine, SpaceX Failure, CRS-7 Mission Ends In Catastrophic Loss Of Vehicle (June28, 2015), https://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/news/spacex-failure-crs-7-missionends-in-catastrophic-loss-of-vehicle/.
223

KATARZYNA MALINOWSKA, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE OF ON-ORBITSERVICING 13-14 (2020).
224

225

Compromis, ¶13.

ESA Space Debris Office, Automatic Collision Avoidance (Apr. 23, 2021),
https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Automating_collision_avoidance.
226

32

usually take months and was not feasible then.227
b. The later use of the ASAT missile was also not feasible.
First, although a missile’s flight time could only be minutes, it shall be aimed at
an expected spot for the fast speed of satellites, which would take a long time to bewell-prepared.228 Second, it could be hours before a ground-based ASAT was in theproper position to attack a satellite in LEO due to the Earth’s rotation.229
In casu, Koligian launched the ASAT missile on the evening of 11 May,230 and
Palver-2 was predicted to enter the orbit on 13 May.231 If delayed, it would miss thetime of launching and the debris generated would be much closer to the orbit of theconstellation, leaving no space in case of any accident. Hence, destroying Palver-2 on
the evening of 11 May was the only way for Koligian.
In conclusion, Koligian’s use of the ASAT missile did not violate international law.
IV. KOLIGIAN IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF PALVER-2.
Koligian was not liable under Article III of the LIAB,232 [A] Article VII of the OST,[B] and general international law. [C]
A. Koligian is not liable under Article III of the LIAB.

Brian Weeden, Dealing with Galaxy 15: Zombiesats and on-orbit servicing (May24, 2010), https://thespacereview.com/article/1634/1.
227

Lars Hostbeck, Space Weapons, Concepts and their International Security
Implications, in 54 HANDBOOK OF SPACE: SECURITY POLICIES, APPLICATIONS AND
PROGRAMS 955, 967 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. eds., 2015).
228

229

David Wright, supra note 151, at 156.

230

Compromis, ¶14.

231

Compromis, ¶13.

232

Article III, LIAB.
33

Under Article III of the LIAB, Koligian was not liable since the ASAT missile is
not a “space object” [1] and Koligian was not at fault. [2]
1. ASAT missile is not a “space object”.
The damage covered by LIAB must be caused by a “space object”.233 Under the
LIAB, the definition of “space object” is ambiguous. 234 Supported by the State
practice, 235 space objects shall be placed in outer space, 236 at least taking orbital
movement237 with a minimum speed surrounding the orbit.238 The term direct-ascentmeans that the missile is directly towards the target, spending no time in Earth orbit.239
In casu, the ASAT missile used by Koligian directly targeted Palver-2 without
entering the orbit.240 Thus, in line with subsequent State practice, an ASAT missile
without orbital movement was not a space object.241

Stephen Gorove, Definitional Issues Pertaining to Space Object, 37 PROC. ON L.
OUTER SPACE 87, 93 (1994).
233

234

Article 31, VCLT; Article I, LIAB; BIN CHENG, supra note 94, at 493.

235

Article 32, VCLT.

U.S. Dep’t of Nat’l Sec. & Def., Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-5—
Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems, Presidential Memoranda (Sept. 4, 2020);
Article 1(a), Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space,and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, U.N. Doc. CD/1839(Oct. 29, 2008).
236

Leopold, C. Vernon & Scafuri Allison L., Orbital Space Flight under Internationallaw, 19 FED. B.J. 227, 240 (1959); Kunihiko Tatsuzawa, Definition of the Space Object,
34 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 357, 360 (1991); Article 1, Ordinance of the Supreme
Soviet of Ukraine on Space Activity (1996) (Ukr.).
237

238

BUENOS AIRES, REPORT OF THE 53D CONFERENCE OF THE I.L.A. 176 (1968).

239

Lars Hostbeck, supra note 228, at 12.

240

Compromis, ¶13; DAVID WRIGHT, supra note 151, at 157.

Article 2(3), Space Development Promotion Act (2007) (S. Kor.); Article 2, Space
Object Registration Management Method (2001) (China).
241

34

2. Koligian was not at fault.
Liability under Article III of the LIAB is based on fault,242 which refers to thebreach of an obligation imposed by law.243 As submitted above,244 Koligian did notbreach international obligations since it conformed to the U.N. Charter and the OST.
Therefore, Koligian was not acting at fault and is not liable under the LIAB.
B. Koligian is not liable under Article VII of the OST.
Article VII of the OST stipulates that a launching State is liable for damage causedby its space objects to another State.245 To establish the liability under Article VII, thefault is also required. 246 Nonetheless, the ASAT missile is not a space object, andKoligian was not at fault. Therefore, Koligian is not liable under Article VII of the OST.
C. Koligian is not liable under general international law.
Liability under general international law represents a consequence of
responsibility when the breach of obligation causes damage. 247 Arising from theinternationally wrongful act, 248 State responsibility is established if the act is
attributable to State and violates an international obligation of the State.249

242

Article III, LIAB.

Jochen Pfeifer, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 30
GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 215, 225 (1981); Armel Kerrest & Lesley Jane Smith, Article
VII, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 126, 142 (Stephan Hobe et al.
eds.,2009); Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgement, 1955 I.C.J. 4,10 (April, 6).
243

244

Supra Argument III.

245

Article VII, OST.

246

Christol, supra note 120, at 353; BROWNLIE, supra note 120, at 503.

247

BIN CHENG, supra note 121, at 300.

248

Robert Rosenstock, The ILC and State Responsibility, 96 A.J.I.L. 792, 792 (2002).

249

Article 1, ARSIWA; Factory at Chorzów Case, supra note 124, at 21; Lusitania Case35

In casu, as mentioned before, Koligian did not violate international obligations,250
and thereby the internationally wrongful act was not established. Therefore, Koligianis not liable under general international law.
In conclusion, Koligian is not liable for the destruction of Palver-2.

(U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 23, 39 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1923).
250

Compromis, ¶14.
36

SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
For the foregoing reasons, the Government of Koligian, Respondent, respectfully
requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:
1. The use of Palver-3 violated international law.
2. Argyliam is liable for the destruction of Iriord-8.
3. The use by Koligian of the ASAT missile against Palver-2 is not contrary tointernational law.
4. Koligian is not liable for the destruction of Palver-2.

XXI