Emotion
2011, Vol. 11, No. 6, 1279 –1290© 2011 American Psychological Association
1528-3542/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0025848

The Role of Autobiographical Memory Networks in the Experience ofNegative Emotions: How Our Remembered Past Elicits Our Current Feelings
Frederick L. Philippe and Richard KoestnerSerge Lecours, Genevieve Beaulieu-Pelletier, andKaty Bois

McGill University

Université de Montréal
The present research examined the role of autobiographical memory networks on negative emotional
experiences. Results from 2 studies found support for an active but also discriminant role of autobiographical memories and their related networked memories on negative emotions. In addition, in line with
self-determination theory, thwarting of the psychological needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness was found to be the critical component of autobiographical memory affecting negative emotional
experiences. Study 1 revealed that need thwarting in a specific autobiographical memory network related
to the theme of loss was positively associated with depressive negative emotions, but not with othernegative emotions. Study 2 showed within a prospective design a differential predictive validity between
2 autobiographical memory networks (an anger-related vs. a guilt-related memory) on situational anger
reactivity with respect to unfair treatment. All of these results held after controlling for neuroticism(Studies 1 and 2), self-control (Study 2), and for the valence (Study 1) and emotions (Study 2) found in
the measured autobiographical memory network. These findings highlight the ongoing emotionalsignificance of representations of need thwarting in autobiographical memory networks.
Keywords: autobiographical memory, negative emotions, need thwarting, networked memories, selfdetermination theory2003). A process through which memory can influence emotional
experience is through people’s deliberate use of their autobiographical memory via reminiscence. Research has shown that therecall of autobiographical memories can influence one’s current
emotional experience (e.g., LeDoux, 1992; Schwartz, Weinberger,& Singer, 1981), and that the specificity of this recall also affects
the intensity of this emotional experience (e.g., Philippot,
Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003). Research also has shown that autobiographical reminiscence can buffer emotional experiences. Josephson, Singer, and Salovey (1996) presented empirical evidence
suggesting that people often deliberately recall positive memories
to repair a negative mood. It also has been shown that autobiographical reminiscences can serve a lesson-learning function(Wong & Watt, 1991) or a social sharing function (Alea & Bluck,2003) that can facilitate emotional appraisal and self-regulation(Pasupathi, 2003) when similar situations are later encountered.
An alternative perspective for examining the use of autobiographical memory on emotional experience is to consider the
direct or automatic effect of autobiographical memory. Pillemer(1998, 2001, 2003) suggests that while the directive function of
autobiographical memory can be based on reminiscence, it is also
likely to occur automatically, based on associative processing ofshared similarities between environmental cues and autobiographical memory knowledge. Indeed, it is very unlikely that people
purposefully search their autobiographical memory for directive
guidance when needed (Pillemer, 2003). Such a directive function
is much more likely to occur automatically and mostly out ofawareness. In such a way, autobiographical memories would play
an active role in emotional experience as their content would
automatically be used to inform people on how to appraise situations (Robinson, 1986; Scherer, 2005; Smith & Kirby, 2000). We

Although the relation between memory and emotion has long
been of interest to researchers in psychology, the vast majority ofthis research has focused on one possible direction for this relationship— how emotions can affect memories. For example, research during the 1980s and 1990s examined how one’s current
mood affects the recall of mood-congruent memories (e.g., Bower& Cohen, 1982; Clore & Parrott, 1991) or how emotional memories are better remembered than neutral ones (Heuer & Reisberg,
1990). It is interesting that the reverse relationship— how memory
influences emotion— has received much less attention. The purpose of the present research was to investigate this particular
direction of the relationship, that is, the directive function of
autobiographical memories with respect to emotional experience.
The directive function of autobiographical memory refers to theuse of past experiences to guide current and future thoughts,
emotions, and behaviors (Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005).
Only recently have researchers begun to examine how memory foreveryday life events can have a directive function for diverse
adaptive outcomes, including emotional experience (Pillemer,

This article was published Online First October 24, 2011.
Frederick L. Philippe and Richard Koestner, Department of Psychology,
McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Serge Lecours, Genevieve
Beaulieu-Pelletier, and Katy Bois, Department of Psychology, Universitéde Montréal, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Frederick L. Philippe is now at the Université du Québec á Montréal.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Frederick
L. Philippe, Université du Québec á Montréal, P.O. Box 8888, Station
Centre-Ville, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3C 3P8. E-mail: philippe.frederick@uqam.ca
1279

1280

PHILIPPE, KOESTNER, LECOURS, BEAULIEU-PELLETIER, AND BOIS

based our research on this conceptualization of an automatic
directive function of autobiographical memories directly used byappraisal processes.

Automatic Directive Function of Autobiographical
MemoryOur basic premise was that autobiographical memories are an
important source of information for the self to adaptively guide
responses to life situations (Pillemer, 2003; Robinson, 1992).
Autobiographical memories can play such a central role inmoment-to-moment appraisal because of their minute sensitivity tocues (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Both external and internal cues—specific situations, people, and contexts encountered ineveryday life—trigger specific autobiographical memories that are
encoded with features related to these situations, people, or contexts (e.g., a same location, a physical resemblance to a significant
other, an evaluative context; e.g., Andersen & Baum, 1994; Mace,
2005; Pillemer, 2003). This triggering mechanism is a continual
process of which people are typically unaware (Conway &Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Roediger, 1990). The autobiographicalmemories activated by the cue are then processed by higher ordercognitive structures, and the information they contain is used toappraise the situation characterized by the cue (Smith & Kirby,
2000). Andersen and Baum (1994) illustrated this process in astudy showing that people experienced negative emotions when
they were about to meet a stranger who looked slightly similar toa past significant other with whom they had had negative experiences. The encoded experiences related to a past significant otherappeared to influence people’s current appraisal and emotional
experience because the new and the old person shared somesimilar characteristics. This process is akin to what has beentermed associative processing in social cognition to account for
how implicit attitudes are formed (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2006).
A direct consequence of this cuing/triggering process is that itshould be mostly context-dependent to facilitate a quick andadapted response—that is, specific themes or contexts trigger
specific sets of memories, but not theme-unrelated or contextunrelated sets of memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000;
Philippe, Lecours, & Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2009). Consequently,
memories activated by a specific theme (e.g., loss) or situation(e.g., unfair treatment) should trigger theme-related memories
only, which should in turn predict theme-related or situationspecific outcomes (e.g., people’s situational emotional experienceor behavior). Thus, memories should be highly context-dependent.
Furthermore, autobiographical memories that are related to frequently encountered themes in people’s lives should then be frequently activated and should have, over time, an enduring influence on theme-related outcomes.
Another important characteristic of this system is that when amemory is activated, other memories that are linked to it also get
activated because activation spreads across the links (Anderson,
1984; Bower, 1981; Christianson & Engelberg, 1999). Such a
network of memories is often formed on the basis of the contiguityof memory elements, such as similar events and themes (Brown &Schopflocher, 1998; Burt, Kemp, & Conway, 2003; Kemp, Burt,& Malinen, 2009; Robinson, 1992), but also more specificallybetween situations or events sharing a common feature, such as asame place, person (Andersen & Baum, 1994), object, motive(Woike, 2008), or emotion (Bower, 1981; Conway, 2003). Because of their associations with the main memory, networked
memories should get activated at the same moment as the main
memory is triggered and should equally serve the appraisal processes.

Toward a Self-Determination Perspective of Appraisal
Autobiographical memories remain attached to representationsof how the initial event has been experienced, primarily determined by the person’s goals at the encoding (Conway, 2008;
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). For example, in a sports competition, if a person’s primary goal is to beat the other team, thisperson may feel deeply frustrated by a loss and encode this
episodic event as a highly negative one. Conversely, anotherperson taking part in the same competition may be motivated tohave fun while playing. This goal could be achieved despite theloss, with the competition event encoded as a positive experience.
Thus, people’s working goals at encoding heavily determine thetype of experiential representations that will remain attached to the
autobiographical memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
Although people’s goals may vary across situations, selfdetermination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) proposes that humans
have an overarching goal of growth, which is expressed throughthe daily pursuit of fulfillment of three psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Autonomy refers to the needto feel volitional and authentic in one’s actions. Competence isdefined as the need to feel effective and efficacious. Relatedness
refers to the need to feel connected and to care for others and be
cared for by others in turn. Researchers have highlighted thefundamental nature and importance of these three needs in specific
events and across diverse domains and cultures (e.g., Deci et al.,
2001; Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001) and have shown that
their satisfaction in everyday life is positively associated with
self-regulatory capacities (Grolnick, McMenamy, & Kurowski,
2006; Ryan, 1995) and measures of well-being such as psychological growth, purposes and meaning in life, and general life
satisfaction (e.g., Meyer, Enstrom, Harstveit, Bowles, & Beevers,
2007; Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon,
Ryan, & Reis, 1996).
Because of the fundamental nature and prominence of theseneeds across situations, their need satisfaction representations
should remain attached to a majority of significant autobiographical memories. Indeed, recent research (Philippe, Koestner,
Beaulieu-Pelletier, & Lecours, in press) has shown that needsatisfaction in autobiographical memories is a basic component ofsuch memories and a distinct one from several other memory
components examined in past memory research. An important
point is that, according to self-determination theory, it is not somuch the objective situation that is either need satisfying or needthwarting, but whether the situation is perceived as such by the
person (Deci & Ryan, 2000). It is thus expected that people arecapable of a reflective process as to whether their needs weresatisfied or thwarted during a past event when recalling thismemory (Philippe et al., in press).
We propose that perceptions of a situation being either needsatisfying or need thwarting are determined, at least partly, by the
autobiographical memory network triggered by the situation (seeMEMORY AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

Deci & Ryan, 2000, for a similar view). Therefore, if the overall
network of memories activated by a situation contains needsatisfying representations, the appraisal of the situation will beinferred as satisfying the psychological needs, thus signaling
possibilities for psychological growth and the opportunity tobuild the self. The appraisal processes thus will stimulate emotional processes facilitating openness to the environment, suchas experiences of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2001), a
lower level of negative emotional reactivity, and emotional
self-regulation (Hodgins & Knee, 2002). Conversely, if theoverall network of memories contains need-thwarting representations, the appraisal of the situation will be inferred as needthwarting, thus signaling a potential threat to the self and to theinnate psychological growth goal and should lead to specificnegative emotional experiences related to the ongoing situationthat seek to protect the self from the need-thwarting situation(Hodgins & Knee, 2002).

Empirical Evidence
Recent research has empirically supported such an integrated
model. First, an autobiographical memory assessment procedure
was developed to collect descriptions of a main memory related toa cue (e.g., a film clip) or a given theme (e.g., romantic relationship). In addition, this assessment collects networked memories as
participants are asked to freely associate and describe other autobiographical memories that they find related in any way to theirmain memory, thus allowing for the measurement of an autobiographical memory network. Various memory components (e.g.,valence, need satisfaction, vividness) also can be measured foreach reported memory, including the main and the networked
memories (Philippe et al., 2009). Other research previously has
shown that need-satisfaction components in autobiographicalmemory networks are different from other memory componentsthat have been investigated in past research, such as vividness,significance, rehearsal, sharing with others, and power, intimacy,
and achievement motives (Philippe et al., in press, Studies 1 and
2). In addition, need satisfaction in autobiographical memory
networks was found to be the best predictor of well-being ratings,
including informants’ ratings of well-being, among the above
described memory components (Philippe et al., in press; Philippe,
Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, Lecours, & Lekes, 2010, Study 2).
Furthermore, need satisfaction in both the main memory and the
networked memories was found to contribute independently to theprediction of well-being. This latter finding stresses that the organization of autobiographical memories into networks is a significant component of a memory system. Using a controlled experimental design, another study showed that implicit priming ofidiosyncratic (personalized) keywords related to the participants’autobiographical memory network led to higher or lower subsequent well-being ratings, depending on whether the primed memory network was either need satisfying or need thwarting (Philippe
et al., 2010, Study 3). This latter study supports the thesis thatwhen one’s autobiographical memory network is activated byexternal cues, one’s appraisal processes are automatically influenced as a function of the need-satisfying or need-thwarting information contained in the triggered autobiographical memory
network.

1281
The Present Research

The empirical evidence presented above supports the theory thatspecific organizations of autobiographical memories into networks
may have important consequences on people’s emotional experiences. However, the above research looked only at general types of
autobiographical memory (i.e., self-defining memories; see Singer& Salovey, 1993) and at a very general outcome (well-being). In
addition, the context-dependent role of autobiographical memory
has not been investigated. In the present research, we sought toshow that need thwarting in theme-specific autobiographical memory networks is associated with specific and theme-related negative emotional experiences. That is, autobiographical memory networks related to a specific theme that are replete withrepresentations of incompetence, rejection, or constrained autonomy should be associated with negative emotional experiences
theoretically related to such a theme. Moreover, in line with past
research (Philippe et al., in press), we expected that the associationof need thwarting in memory networks with negative emotions
would be independent of the particular valence of the memory
network. Study 1 investigated the specificity of autobiographicalmemory networks by examining whether need thwarting in an
autobiographical memory network related to the theme of loss
would be specifically associated with depressive negative emotions, but not with nondepressive negative emotions. Study 2prospectively examined the differential predictive value of two
autobiographical memory networks, one theme-related and theother theme-unrelated, on situational anger reactivity.

Study 1
People frequently encounter cues associated with loss during
their life—the loss of a significant other, the loss of an important
object, interpersonal rejection, and losses related to one’s health orrole behavior. Experiencing a situation of loss or encounteringloss-related cues should trigger specific autobiographical memories that are characterized by loss-related features along with theirassociated networked memories. Loss has been both theoreticallyand empirically related to the experience of depressive emotions(e.g., Monroe, Rohde, Seeley, & Lewinsohn, 1999). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text
revision) reports that depressive states are accompanied by acomplex but specific emotional experience characterized by feelings of sadness, guilt, self-devaluation, and lower levels of interest
and pleasure (i.e., reduced joy). Therefore, if a loss-related situation is appraised as need thwarting based on the information
contained in the activated memory network, depressive emotions
should be experienced. Over time, people with need-thwarting
loss-related memory networks should come to experience a highfrequency of depressive emotions in their life, which should beshown in the report of general depressive emotional experiences,
but not in the report of other types of negative emotions theoretically unrelated to loss. Therefore, we hypothesized that needthwarting in loss-related autobiographical memory networks
would be significantly associated with depressive emotions, but itwould be unrelated to nondepressive negative emotions.
We also sought to underscore that autobiographical memories
are not equivalent to a direct measure of life events. In otherwords, people who experienced a high number of actual loss

1282

PHILIPPE, KOESTNER, LECOURS, BEAULIEU-PELLETIER, AND BOIS

events in their life should not necessarily report higher levels ofneed thwarting in loss-related memories. In line with selfdetermination theory and the emotional memory network theory, it
is how these life events are experienced, encoded, and organized
into networks that should determine their related emotional outcomes, not just the number and severity of actual loss events. That
is to say, we expected that two people with the same number andseverity of actual loss events may represent these losses in theirmemory networks in very different ways, especially as regards toneed thwarting. These differences in memory networks should be
associated with distinct and different experiences of depressive
emotions. Therefore, we expected that need thwarting in lossrelated memories would be associated with greater depressive
emotions, even after controlling for the number of life loss eventsand the impact these events had in people’s lives. In addition, thisrelationship should hold after controlling for neuroticism, which
has been shown to play a major role in people’s negative emotional
experience (e.g., Allik & Realo, 1997; Costa & McCrae, 1995).
Finally, in line with past research (Philippe et al., in press), we
expected that need thwarting in a loss-related autobiographicalmemory network would be associated with depressive emotions,even after controlling for the valence of the autobiographicalmemory network.

MethodParticipants. Participants were 215 undergraduate students(188 women, 27 men) from a Canadian university. Mean age was
22.72 years (SD ⫽ 4.88).
Measures.
Neuroticism. The Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling,
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) was used to assess neuroticism. This
brief scale uses two pairs of adjectives to assess each of the fivepersonality factors. This scale has yielded correlations between .65
and .87 with the complete Big-Five Inventory (John & Srivastava,1999). In this study, the two pairs of adjectives measuring neuroticism were used. Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert
scale (1 ⫽ disagree strongly, 7 ⫽ agree strongly) their degree ofagreement with each pair of adjectives (e.g., “I see myself as. . .
anxious, easily upset”). Adequate evidence of validity and reliability has been found for this scale (Ehrhart et al., 2009; Gosling etal., 2003). In this study, the correlation between the two pairs ofadjectives was .47.
Depressive and nondepressive emotions.
The Differential
Emotions Scale–IV (Izard, Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993)
assesses the frequency of experience of 12 different discrete emotions with 36 items. Three items assess each emotion, and each
item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (rarely ornever) to 5 (very often). Positive emotions include enjoyment andinterest, and the negative emotions measured are anger, sadness,
disgust, contempt, fear, guilt, shame, shyness, and hostility toward
the self. The emotion of surprise constitutes the 12th emotion andcan be considered both positive and negative (Izard et al., 1993;
Machleit & Eroglu, 2000). The prompt reads, “In your daily life,
how often do you. . .?” and sample items include “Feel glad aboutsomething” (enjoyment), “Feel discouraged, like you can’t makeit, nothing is going right” (sadness), “Feel like you did something
wrong” (guilt). In the present study, depression-related emotions
were combined into an index labeled depressive emotions, that is,

guilt, sadness, hostility inward (i.e., self-devaluation), lack ofinterest (interest reversed), and reduced pleasure (enjoyment reversed). These emotions have shown strong implications in lossrelated situations (Blumberg & Izard, 1985, 1986; Izard, 1972).
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was .85 for this index. All remaining
emotions were combined into an index labeled nondepressive
negative emotions, that is, anger, contempt, disgust, fear, shame,and shyness. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for this index was .83.
Surprise was excluded because it is neither positive nor negative(Izard et al., 1993; Machleit & Eroglu, 2000).
Life loss events scale. A slightly modified version of the Life
Events Questionnaires (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978) wasused in this study. Two researchers examined the 82 items of thisinventory and kept only the items highly related to a loss experience (e.g., death of family member or close friend, breaking up
with a girlfriend or boyfriend or breaking an engagement, being
fired or laid off from work, etc.). Overall, 18 items were retained.
For each item, participants rated whether they ever experienced
this type of event and, if so, indicated the effect of this event on
their life on a scale from 1 (no effect) to 7 (very strong effect). The
sum of the number of yes-rated events and the average of the
impact ratings were both standardized and averaged in an index
labeled life loss events.
Emotional Memory Network Assessment (EMNA).
Loss memory description. The EMNA (Philippe et al., 2009)is a questionnaire used to collect networks of autobiographicalemotional memories. In this study, instructions were adapted andparticipants were asked to describe a main personal memory
related to an important loss. The questionnaire first asked theparticipants to describe “a personal memory of an event in which
you experienced an important loss (ex., departure, decease, rejection, the loss of something important, separation, etc.).” Participants also were asked to provide sufficient details in the description of their memory so that another person could understand it.
Loss memory need thwarting. Participants also were asked torate the level of psychological need satisfaction they experienced
when this event occurred on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from⫺3 (strongly disagree) to ⫹3 (strongly agree), with 0 representing
do not agree nor disagree or not applicable, this latter option
indicating that there was an equal level of both need satisfaction
and need thwarting in the event or that neither need thwarting nor
need satisfaction was present in the event. Participants were thus
provided with two items assessing each of the three psychologicalneeds postulated by self-determination theory (i.e., autonomy,competence, and relatedness). A sample item for autonomy is “I
felt free to do things and to think how I wanted”; for competence,“I felt that my reaction was adequate”; and for relatedness, “I felt
connected to one or more people.” These items were derived frompast research (e.g., Reis et al., 2000; Ryan, Rigby, & Przybylski,
2006; Sheldon et al., 2001) and adapted to assess experienceduring past events. Confirmatory factor analyses (Philippe et al., inpress) showed that these items adequately discriminated the threeneeds among each other, and a second-order factor also emerged,
indicating the possibility of combining all three needs together, as
is commonly done by self-determination theory researchers (e.g.,
Deci et al., 2001; Gagn&eacute, 2003; Hagger, Chatzisarantis, &Harris, 2006; La Guardia, Ryan, Couchman, & Deci, 2000). In
addition, Philippe et al. (in press, Study 1) showed that there
existed a very large correlation (r ⫽ .70) between need satisfactionMEMORY AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

in memory descriptions as rated by the participants themselves andas coded by independent blind judges. Therefore, participants’
ratings of need satisfaction in memories for past events can beconsidered as reliable and valid. All items were reverse-coded torefer to need thwarting and averaged in an index that is referred toas loss memory need thwarting. Cronbach’s alpha for this index
was .73 in this study.
Loss memory valence. Participants were asked to rate theemotional valence of their reported main memory when it occurred
on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from ⫺3 (very negative) to ⫹3(very positive). This assessment provides an overall measure of theapproach versus avoidance value of the loss memory.
Networked memories. To assess the networked memories of
the reported main memory, the EMNA further asked participants
to recall and list other personal memories that they might find to be
directly or indirectly related to the main memory they had justdescribed and to write down a description for each. A maximum ofseven spaces was provided to the participants to describe seven
networked memories. However, they were informed that they did
not have to report as many memories. They could write down only
those memories that came spontaneously to mind. Thus, participants were free to recall any number of networked memories
between one and seven. However, only the first three memories
were analyzed.1 After describing all of their networked memories,
participants were asked to rate their degree of need satisfaction foreach networked memory using the same items and scale presented
above. In line with the scoring algorithm presented in Philippe andcolleagues (2009), the need satisfaction score of each network
memory was averaged, thus taking into account the number of
networked memories reported in the score. This score was reversecoded to assess need thwarting and was labeled networked memories need thwarting. Participants were also asked to indicate
whether each of their reported networked memories was either apositive or negative experience and to rate its intensity on the same
valence scale presented above. These ratings were also averaged in
an index labeled networked memories valence.
Overall memory network (OMN) need thwarting and valence.
In line with the emotional memory network theory (Philippe et al.,2009), which specifies that it is the whole network composed of amain memory and its related networked memory that is important—and not each of its constituents taken separately—the loss
memory need-thwarting score and the networked memories needthwarting score were averaged together in an index labeled OMNneed thwarting. The same procedure was performed with valenceas the loss memory valence score and the networked memories
valence score were averaged together in an index labeled OMNvalence.
Procedure. Randomly selected participants from a Canadianuniversity received an e-mail explaining that we were conducting
a study about personality and memory. The incentive was that their
participation allowed them to be entered into a draw of three prizesof $125. Participants were told that participating in this study
involved completing an online questionnaire on a secure Web site.
Participants were also assured that all of their responses would
remain confidential and anonymous. Those who agreed to complete the questionnaire logged into a secure Web site and expressed their agreement with the terms of an informed consent byclicking a specific button. The time taken to complete the survey
was calculated. All participants took a reasonable amount of time1283

to complete it (between 15 min and 1 hr; M ⫽ 32.13 min).
Participants completed, in order, the neuroticism scale, the life
events scale, and the emotion inventory. Finally, it is important tonote that the EMNA was completed last by all participants.

Results and Discussion
Correlational results (see Table 1) showed that need thwarting in
the loss memory and in the networked memories and the averageof these two scores, OMN need thwarting, were positively associated with depressive and nondepressive emotions. However, thecorrelations between OMN need thwarting, loss memory needthwarting, or networked memories need thwarting and depressive
emotions were significantly stronger than the correlations with
nondepressive emotions, ts(212) ⬎ 2.83, p ⬍ .01. The loss memory valence, the networked memories valence, and the average ofthese two scores, OMN valence, were weakly correlated withdepressive emotions and unrelated to nondepressive emotions,
except for networked memories valence that was weakly but
significantly associated with nondepressive emotions, p ⬍ .05.
Partial correlations showed that when nondepressive emotions
were controlled for, OMN need thwarting, loss memory needthwarting, and networked memories need thwarting were positively related to depressive emotions (rps ⬎ .34, p ⬍ .001).
However, when depressive emotions were controlled for, thesevariables were all unrelated to nondepressive emotions (rps ⬍ .08,ns). Finally, neuroticism was the most important predictor of bothdepressive and nondepressive emotions (rs ⬎ .57, p ⬍ .001). In
addition, life loss events were positively associated with depressive and nondepressive negative emotions, but they were unrelated
to OMN need thwarting and OMN need valence and the separate
components of these scores.
Regression analyses were conducted to examine the additionalrole of networked memories need thwarting (i.e., the memories
associated with the main loss-related memory) in the prediction ofdepressive emotions over and above the need-thwarting score of
the loss-related main memory. Results of the regression analysis
revealed that need thwarting in networked memories predicted an
additional 6.4% of the variance in depressive emotions, over andabove the main memory related to loss, F(1, 212) ⫽ 16.12, p ⬍.001. Thus, networked memories appear to have an incremental
predictive value over the main memory with respect to emotional
experiences. This further supports the position that the whole
autobiographical memory network is important and not only asingle main memory.
Regression analyses also examined the preferential use of needthwarting over valence in an autobiographical memory network
related to loss. Results revealed that when both OMN valence and1

Our research approach used to ask participants to provide a maximumof seven linked memories (see Philippe et al., 2009). However, we foundout that only the first three linked memories had a predictive value forsome outcomes. The subsequent four memories were rarely fully completed by all participants and their variance was either redundant orequivalent to that of the first three memories. This finding is in line withpast research suggesting that only the first few answers that spontaneously
come to an individual’s mind in response to a question are considered
representative of his or her most influential constructs (Higgins, King, &Mavin, 1982).

PHILIPPE, KOESTNER, LECOURS, BEAULIEU-PELLETIER, AND BOIS

1284

Table 1Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Overall Memory Networks (OMN) Need Thwarting and Valence, Depressive
and Nondepressive Emotions, Neuroticism, and Life Loss Events: Study 1
Variable

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1. OMN need thwartinga
2. Loss memory need thwarting
3. Networked memories need thwarting
4. OMN valenceb
5. Loss memory valence
6. Networked memories valence
7. Depressive emotions
8. Nondepressive emotions
9. Neuroticism
10. Life loss eventsc

0.08
⫺0.15
0.30
⫺0.82
⫺1.46
⫺0.55
2.27
2.11
3.95
0.00

0.98
1.21
1.13
1.42
1.72
1.65
0.66
0.59
1.43
0.71

—
.85ⴱ
.83ⴱ
⫺.45ⴱ
⫺.27ⴱ
⫺.44ⴱ
.40ⴱ
.24ⴱ
.31ⴱ
.08

—
.40ⴱ
⫺.18ⴱ
⫺.25ⴱ
⫺.12
.32ⴱ
.18ⴱ
.21ⴱ
.05

—
⫺.59ⴱ
⫺.22ⴱ
⫺.64ⴱ
.36ⴱ
.22ⴱ
.32ⴱ
.09

—
.65ⴱ
.94ⴱ
⫺.21ⴱ
⫺.11
⫺.24ⴱ
⫺.05

—
.37ⴱ
⫺.17ⴱ
⫺.04
⫺.11
.01

—
⫺.20ⴱ
⫺.14
⫺.25ⴱ
⫺.06

—
.71ⴱ
.64ⴱ
.21ⴱ

—
.57ⴱ
.25ⴱ

—
.28ⴱ

Note. N ⫽ 215.
aThis score is equal to the combination of Variables 2 and 3. b This score is equal to the combination of Variables 5 and 6. c This index is thestandardization of the number of yes-rated loss events (M ⫽ 6.14, SD ⫽ 2.30) and of the average of all effect ratings for each yes-rated event (M ⫽ 3.70,
SD ⫽ 0.92).
ⴱp ⬍ .01.

OMN need thwarting were examined concurrently, OMN needthwarting was the only significant predictor of depressive emotions, accounting for 11.9% of the variance over and above valence, F(1, 212) ⬎ 30.16, p ⬍ .001. This finding suggests that needthwarting in memory is a better predictor of negative emotional
experiences than valence in memory.
A path analysis was conducted with OMN need thwarting,neuroticism, and life loss events as exogenous variables and depressive and nondepressive emotions as the two endogenous variables, controlling for the covariance between these two types ofnegative emotions (which is why a path analysis was used). Paths
were drawn from all exogenous variables to all endogenous variables to control for all of their effects. The fit indices of thisjust-identified model were uninformative, as just-identified models
yield perfect fit. However, the path coefficients are of interest.
Figure 1 shows the final model. As can be seen, OMN needthwarting was positively associated with depressive emotions,even after controlling for neuroticism, life loss events, and theshared variance between depressive and nondepressive emotions.
In addition, as hypothesized, OMN need thwarting was unrelated
to nondepressive emotions. The path coefficient for the relation-

ship between OMN need thwarting and depressive emotions was
significantly different from the path coefficient for the relationshipbetween OMN need thwarting and nondepressive emotions, t(213)⫽ 2.46, p ⬍ .05. These results support our hypotheses that needthwarting in memory networks related to the theme of loss would
be significantly associated with depressive emotions, but not withnegative emotional experiences theoretically unrelated to loss.2
Finally, controlling for age or gender did not alter the results.
Furthermore, there were no significant interactions between OMN
need thwarting and either neuroticism or life loss events.
Taken together, results of Study 1 support our hypotheses. First,
need thwarting in loss-related memory networks was found to be
distinctively associated with depressive emotions, but not with
nondepressive negative emotions. Although the design of Study 1
is correlational and the direction of these relationships remains
unclear, this finding nonetheless suggests that autobiographicalmemory networks may influence people’s emotional experience.
Furthermore, it also supports the postulate that autobiographicalmemories are context-dependent and that theme-specific autobiographical memory networks are associated with specific themerelated emotional experiences, but not with theme-unrelated ones.
Furthermore, the theme-dependent hypothesis held even after controlling for neuroticism and life loss events. Finally, Study 1
showed that need thwarting in memory was more strongly associated with negative emotions than valence in memory.

2

Figure 1. Path analysis of neuroticism, life loss events, and overallmemory network (OMN) need thwarting predicting nondepressive negative and depressive emotions: Study 1. Double-headed arrows are covariances, one-headed black arrows are paths, and one-headed white arrows
represent measurement errors. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01.

Correlations between OMN need thwarting and each separate emotion
were also examined. Results revealed that OMN need thwarting wascorrelated between .15 and .22 with each of the six nondepressive negative
emotions and between .25 and .34 with each of the five depressive
emotions. These results highlight that the correlations for OMN needthwarting were consistently lower with nondepressive negative emotions
and consistently higher with depressive emotions. There were no instancesof a correlation between OMN need thwarting and a specific emotion that
could have dramatically lowered or increased the correlations between
OMN need thwarting and one of the two indexes of emotion.

MEMORY AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

Study 2
Study 1 showed that need thwarting in loss-related autobiographical memory networks was associated with depressive emotions. As stated in the introduction, we believe that memories canprospectively influence emotional experiences as they inform theappraisal processes and determine how to react to situations.
However, the design of Study 1 did not allow us to draw any
conclusion with respect to this directive function of memories as
only cross-sectional relationships were examined as well as measures of emotions experienced in general. Study 2 improves on thisissue by examining how participants’ memory network can predict
their emotional reactivity 2 weeks later in response to a trigger
related to the theme of their memory network. A second purposeof Study 2 was to examine the experience of a specific emotion.
Although Study 1 differentiated depressive and nondepressive
emotions, both types of emotion comprised a large number ofdifferent emotions. Study 2 specifically tapped the emotional experience of anger. Finally, we postulated in the introduction that a
specific cue should trigger memory networks specifically related
to this cue, but not cue-unrelated memory networks. Therefore,
Study 2 compared an anger-related memory network with a guiltrelated memory network in the prediction of anger reactivity
following a trigger.
More specifically, a first group of participants was asked todescribe a main memory about an event in which they had beentreated unjustly, a theme largely evoking anger (Eisenberg, 2000).
A second group of participants described a main memory about an
event in which they committed an important error, a theme mostly
evoking guilt (Lazarus, 1991). Both groups also described networked memories related to their main memory and rated theirlevel of need satisfaction for each memory. A between-groups
design instead of a repeated measures design was used to ensurethat the description of the first memory network was not influencing the description or the retrieval of memories of the second
memory network. Two weeks later, in an ostensibly unrelated
study, all participants were shown a film excerpt depicting someone being treated unjustly. Anger elicitation to the film excerpt
was collected. Because the film excerpt was about unfair treatment, this film clip was expected to automatically activate amemory network related to this theme in the participants’ mind.
Consequently, the level of need thwarting in this specific memory
network should increase participants’ anger reactivity to the film
excerpt. However, the memory network pertaining to having committed an important error should not be activated by the film clip
and therefore should not have any effect on anger reactivity
because it is irrelevant to the theme of unfair treatment. Therefore,
we hypothesized that need thwarting in the memory network
related to having been treated unjustly would predict anger reactivity to a related film excerpt shown 2 weeks later. In addition, it
was expected that need thwarting in the memory network related tohaving committed an important error would be unrelated to anger
reactivity to the film excerpt. Need thwarting was expected to leadto anger because need thwarting should activate self-mechanismsthat seek to defend the self against the potential need-thwarting
situation. Indeed, anger has been shown to be frequently evoked inorder to protect oneself against a threatening target (e.g., Izard,
1971).

1285

Study 1 showed that the strongest predictor of negative emotional experience was neuroticism. Therefore, we controlled again
for this trait in this study. In addition, because self-control has beenshown to be particularly involved in the regulation of anger (e.g.,
Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), we also controlled for this trait. As
in Study 1, we expected that the main hypothesis would hold, evenafter controlling for these two traits.
In sum, the design of Study 2 improves on Study 1 in three
ways. First, Study 2 used a prospective design; thus, the directionof the relationship between OMN need thwarting and emotional
experience can be investigated in terms of the predictive validity of
autobiographical memory networks. Second, Study 2 used a target
and a nontarget autobiographical memory network, allowing us torule out the possibility that all types of OMN need thwarting
significantly predict some negative emotional experiences. A third
improvement is that the present design allowed us to control forthe exact moment at which the OMN should be presumably
activated (with the film excerpt), predicting the direct situational
consequence of this activation on emotional reactivity.

MethodParticipants and procedure. Participants were undergraduate students and were recruited in classrooms. A female experimenter introduced herself and asked the students to take part in astudy about personal memories. Participants who agreed to participate in the study completed demographic information, neuroticism and self-control scales, and one of the two following versionsof the EMNA. In the target version of the EMNA, participants
were asked to describe a personal memory of an event in which
someone treated them unjustly. In the nontarget version of the
EMNA, participants were asked to describe a personal memory ofan event in which they committed an important error. These twothemes— being treated unjustly and committing an error—werechosen as they both represent negative events potentially accompanied by high levels of emotional arousal. However, they tap intovery different emotions—the former evoking anger and the latter
guilt (Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991). Two weeks later, a male experimenter went to the same classroom to introduce himself andasked the participants to take part in an ostensibly unrelated
experiment about emotions. This second experiment was presented
without any mention of the previous study and participants were
led to believe that the two experimenters were part of different
research laboratories. Participants were first asked to rate theircurrent emotional experience using an emotional inventory (Time1) and were then shown a film excerpt depicting someone being
treated unjustly. After watching the film clip, participants wereasked to rate again their current emotional experience (Time 2).
Participants were then prompted for their suspicion that the twostudies might have been related, were fully debriefed, and thanked
for their participation. No participants guessed that the two studies
were related to each other. The final sample was composed of 73(target group— unfair-treatment memory network: n ⫽ 35; nontarget group— committed-error memory network: n ⫽ 38) students(55 women, 18 men). Mean age was 23.76 years (SD ⫽ 6.77).
Ninety-four percent of the participants who completed the firstphase of the experiment took part in the second phase 2 weeks
later.

1286

PHILIPPE, KOESTNER, LECOURS, BEAULIEU-PELLETIER, AND BOIS

Film excerpt. A short film excerpt from the TV series Six
Feet Under (Ball, 2002) lasting 1:12 min was shown to theparticipants to induce anger by depicting someone being treatedunjustly. The excerpt contains an intense verbal fight between adaughter and her mother. The mother speaks harshly to her daughter, and it is understood that the mother refuses to give herdaughter the money she owes her. The scene ends with the daughter running out of the house, slamming the door behind her.
Participants were probed for their familiarity with the series andthis particular episode. Only four participants reported to havepreviously watched the episode. Deleting these participants fromthe analyses did not affect the results.
Measures.
Neuroticism. Participants completed a 12-item version of the
Neuroticism subscale of the NEO Personality Inventory—Revised(Costa & McCrae, 1992) on a 5-point Likert scale (1 ⫽ strongly
disagree, 5 ⫽ strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha coefficient in thisstudy was .76.
Self-control.
The Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney,
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) was used to assess self-control. This
scale comprises 13 items responded to on a 5-point Likert scale
format (1 ⫽ not at all, 5 ⫽ very much). Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was .75 in this study.
EMNA. The EMNA (Philippe et al., 2009) used in Study 1
was again used in Study 2. In this study, the people who werepart of the target group were asked to describe “. . .a personal
memory of an event in which you were treated unjustly bysomebody.” Participants in the nontarget group were asked todescribe “. . .a personal memory of an event in which you
committed an important error.” They also recalled and listed
networked memories that they found to be directly or indirectly
related to their main memory. Participants were asked to rate
the psychological need satisfaction (␣ ⫽ .69) and emotional
content of each of their reported memories. However, in thisstudy, instead of using a one-item valence measure, we used an
extensive measure of emotional content. Participants wereasked to rate the emotions they felt when the event of each of
their reported memories occurred using a 14-item scale used inpast research (Philippe et al., 2009, Study 2). This scale included five positive emotions (e.g., determined; ␣ ⫽ .72), fivenegative emotions (e.g., scared; ␣ ⫽ .61) and four anger-related
emotions (i.e., angry, disgusted, scornful, and hostile; ␣ ⫽ .72).
Valence and need-thwarting OMN scores calculations wereidentical to those used in Study 1 with the difference that in thisstudy, a separate OMN valence score was computed for positive, negative, and anger-related emotions, in addition to theglobal OMN valence composite score.
Emotional inventory. Emotional adjective items included thefull 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), seven of the 11 basic emotionsof Izard in the form of adjectives (Blumberg & Izard, 1985: theemotions of interest, guilt, shame, and fear already being assessedby the PANAS), and four other emotional items used in past
research (angry, happy, amused, and disappointed; Tugade &Fredrickson, 2004, Study 1). These emotional items were used toassess participants’ emotions before (Time 1) and after the film
excerpt (Time 2). In the present study, we were particularly interested in anger-related emotions. The anger-related emotions usedwere scornful, irritable, disgusted, hostile, mad, and angry. Cron-bach’s alphas for these six anger-related emotions were .82 and .78
before and after the film excerpt, respectively. Because we wereassessing emotions at two different time points, we used an extensive emotional inventory to prevent participants from guessing
the types of emotion of interest in this study. Indexes composed of
positive emotions (Time 1: ␣ ⫽ .88; Time 2: ␣ ⫽ .89) and of
non–anger-related negative emotions (Time 1: ␣ ⫽ .70; Time 2:
␣ ⫽ .84) were also computed.

Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks. Analysis of the anger-related emotions before and after the film excerpt confirmed that the inductionof anger was successful. A paired t test between the anger measure
at Times 1 and 2 was significant, t(72) ⫽ 2.25 p ⬍ .05. Effect size
was medium (d ⫽ 0.53). This result suggests that the anger
induction was sufficiently effective. In addition, there were nodifferences across the two groups on the reported anger levels,
either before or after the induction, ts(71) ⬍ 0.20, p ⫽ .84. The
induction was also specific to anger as there was no significant
change between Times 1 and 2 with respect to non–anger-related
negative emotions, t(72) ⫽ ⫺0.22, ns. Participants experienced,
however, significantly reduced positive emotions after the film
clip, t(72) ⫽ 3.04, p ⬍ .05, d ⫽ 0.72, which is not surprising as
anger naturally inhibits the experience of positive emotions (e.g.,
Diener & Emmons, 1985).
OMN need thwarting and anger elicitation. Because memory networks are believed to be theme-specific, that is, activatedby specific situations, we hypothesized that the OMN related to
unfair treatment would be triggered by the film excerpt and thatneed thwarting in this specific OMN would positively predictanger reactivity to the film excerpt. Conversely, OMN needthwarting related to having committed an important error should
be unrelated to the anger reactivity to the film excerpt because thisnetwork is irrelevant to the situation depicted in the film clip andshould not be activated by this cue.
To test these hypotheses, we conducted a multiple regression analysis with anger levels at Time 2 as the dependent variable. Independent variables were anger levels at Time 1, group condition (0 ⫽committed-error OMN, 1 ⫽ unfair-treatment OMN), OMN needthwarting, and the interaction term Group ⫻ OMN Need Thwarting.
In addition, control variables of neuroticism and self-control wereadded to the model. Results revealed that while controlling for anger
levels at Time 1 (␤ ⫽ .70, p ⬍ .001), the interaction term Group ⫻OMN Need Thwarting emerged as a significant predictor of anger
levels at Time 2 (␤ ⫽ ⫺.28, p ⬍ .05). No other effects emerged as
significant, including those of neuroticism and self-control or theirinteraction term with group condition or their third order interaction
term Group ⫻ OMN. In addition, controlling for age or gender did notalter the present results.
Figure 2 shows the significant interaction plot, in line with
Aiken and West’s (1991) recommendations for plotting interactions. As can be seen, in the unfair-treatment memory networkgroup, when OMN need thwarting related to having been treatedunjustly was equal to ⫺1 standard deviation to the mean (in otherwords, when the OMN was showing low need thwarting), anger
reactivity was low. When OMN need thwarting related to having
been treated unjustly was equal to ⫹1 standard deviation to themean (in other words, when the OMN was showing high need

MEMORY AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS

Figure 2. Plot of the interaction of anger reactivity and need thwarting in
the committed-error and unfair-treatment overall memory networks(OMN): Study 2.

thwarting), anger reactivity was high. In the committed-error
memory network group, however, all levels of OMN need thwarting related to having committed an important error were unrelated
to anger reactivity. Examination of the simple effects revealed thatthe slope of the unfair-treatment memory network group was
significant, t(71) ⫽ ⫺2.56, p ⬍ .05. These results suggest thatneed thwarting in the OMN related to being treated unjustly
facilitated the anger reactivity toward a film excerpt related to sucha theme. Finally, the slope of the committed-error memory network group was not significant, t(71) ⫽ 0.27, ns, suggesting thatneed thwarting in the OMN related to having committed an important error had no effect on the expression of anger as elicited bya film excerpt related to unfair treatment.
The difference between the main emotional memory and the
networked memories was examined. Although these two components are assumed to reach their highest level of prediction when
they are combined— because it is the output of the overall memory
network that is important and less each of its constituents taken
separately—it is still interesting to examine whether one of thesetwo components had a stronger impact on anger reactivity than theother. Therefore, we conducted two additional regression analyses,
one with need thwarting in the main emotional memory and its
interaction term with group conditions and another with needthwarting in the networked memories and its interaction term withgroup condition. The dependent variable and control variables
were the same as above. Results showed that the interaction
between either need thwarting in the Main Memory ⫻ Group orneed thwarting in the Networked Memories ⫻ Group was significant, ␤ ⫽ ⫺.21, p ⬍ .10, and ␤ ⫽ ⫺.26, p ⬍ .05, respectively.
These results suggest that both the main memory and the networked memories are contributive.
Further analyses were conducted to examine the role of valence.
The global OMN valence score, the positive emotions OMN score,
the negative emotions OMN score, and the anger-related OMN
score were each entered in separate regression analyses. For eachof these variables, their interaction term with group conditions was
also entered in the regression. The other variables in the model
were the same as those presented above. Results revealed nosignificant interaction or main effect for any OMN valence-related
variables. In addition, their inclusion in the model did not affectthe significance of the interaction term OMN Need Thwarting ⫻Group. These results thus suggest that OMN need thwarting is amore comprehensive predictor of anger reactivity than OMN va-

1287

lence or emotion. We also examined whether OMN need thwartingor OMN valence could predict positive emotional or non-angerrelated emotional reactivity. Both OMN need thwarting and OMNvalence (including all types of OMN emotion score examined
above) and their interaction term with group condition failed tosignificantly predict reactivity to these other types of emotions(ps ⬎ .32). Finally, controlling for age and gender did not affectany of the above results.
Thus, overall, results showed that OMN need thwarting has animportant influence on situational emotional reactivity. In addition, the present findings suggest that memory networks are relatively theme-dependent, such that only memory networks related
to the theme of the film excerpt were presumably activated during
the film clip and influenced the situational emotional reactivity.
Other memory networks related to other themes or situations were
not activated and, therefore, did not influence the situational emotional reactivity. These findings also support the idea that needthwarting in memory networks is not a proxy variable for people’s
global negative functioning. Indeed, people in the nontarget group
who reported high levels of need thwarting in an OMN related tohaving committed an important error were not those who expressed the highest level of anger in response to the theme of being
treated unjustly. Furthermore, results held even after controllingfor general traits such as neuroticism and self-control.

General Discussion
The purpose of the present research was to examine the automatic directive function of autobiographical memories on negative
emotional experiences. Results from two studies suggest that autobiographical memories contribute to people’s negative emotional
experience in specific situations. More striking, it appears thatneed-thwarting representations encoded within these autobiographical memories are associated with negative emotions experienced when these memories are triggered by theme-relevant cuesand that this mechanism can have both enduring and generalemotional consequences (Study 1) as well as situational emotional
consequences (Study 2). In addition, these results do not appear tobe due to common affect-related traits, such as neuroticism or
self-control. Overall, activation of need-thwarting autobiographical memories would appear to be a way to influence one’s appraisal and negative emotional experience.
The present research constitutes a first set of studies showingthat theme-specific autobiographical memories can have an automatic directive function on negative emotional experiences theoretically related to such themes. Study 1 showed that need thwarting in a memory network related to loss was associated withdepressive emotional experiences, but not with other nondepressive negative emotions. One explanation for this result is thatloss-related memory networks are relatively frequently activatedby various cues in life events and experiences. Whenever such asituation is faced or such a cue is encountered, loss-related memory networks become activated and inform the appraisal processes
that a need-satisfying or need-thwarting situation is occurring. If aloss-related situation is appraised as need thwarting based on theinformation contained in the activated memory network, depressive emotions should be experienced. Over time, people withneed-thwarting loss-related memory networks would come to experience a high frequency of depressive emotions in their life.

1288

PHILIPPE, KOESTNER, LECOURS, BEAULIEU-PELLETIER, AND BOIS

Conversely, people with loss-related memory networks that arelower in need thwarting (or that even contain need-satisfying
representations) would experience a lower frequency of depressive
emotions.
Study 2 examined this thematic effect more specifically andconvincingly. The results of Study 2 showed that need-thwarting
memory components in a memory network related to a specifictheme (being treated unjustly) predicted the elicitation of a specificemotion (anger) following the viewing of a film clip activating thisspecific theme. In addition, Study 2 also showed that memory
networks unrelated to the theme of a cue (i.e., having committed an
important error) were presumably not activated and thus exerted
no effect on emotional reactivity. Indeed, Study 2 highlighted thatneed thwarting in memory networks related to having committed
an important error was unrelated to anger elicitation following afilm clip activating the theme of being treated unjustly. Thesefindings highlight not only the theme-specific but also the discriminant role of autobiographical memories on emotional experiences.
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 showed that autobiographicalmemory networks possess considerable predictive value with respect to specific emotional outcomes.
An important implication of the present research is that althougha single autobiographical memory may predict emotional outcomes, the influence of its related networked memories is not
negligible. Indeed, networked memories were shown to add over
and above the variance captured by the main memory (i.e., themain memory directly related to the assessed theme) in the prediction of negative emotions. The most intriguing aspect withrespect to networked memories is that these memories do not need
to be logically and holistically related to the main memory’s
central theme. For instance, networked memories can pertain tovarious themes or they can contain other emotional aspects that are
unrelated to the central aspect of the main memory. Yet, it was
shown that these networked memories do contribute to the experience of specific negative emotions as a function of the needthwarting level characterizing them because of their association
with the main memory based on shared features. Networked memories may thus act as a buffer or enhancer with respect to difficult
emotional events. The extent to which the network of memories isneed thwarting or need satisfying may alter how the difficult event
is perceived and the intensity of the negative emotional experience
when this event is reactivated. Future research will be needed to
examine the potential buffer or enhancing effect of networked
memories.
The present studies showed that need thwarting in autobiographical memory networks was a better predictor of emotional experiences than valence or specific emotions characterizing the memory networks. Similar results were also obtained elsewhere withrespect to well-being (Philippe et al., in press). Why is needsatisfaction/thwarting more important than the valence or emotion
in memory? First, it should be noted that psychological needs andemotion are closely related (e.g., Sheldon et al., 2001). However,psychological needs reflect a primary motivation or goal, and goals
are known to saturate autobiographical memories (e.g., Conway,2003). These needs are intertwined with people’s overarching
psychological growth goal and life situations are automaticallyappraised in line with such a goal—that is, the extent to which theexternal situation is contributive to the individual’s well-being(Lazarus, 1991). In addition, in appraisal theories, goals are ex-pected to predict emotional elicitation. Past need satisfaction orneed thwarting should thus have a more profound impact on
people’s current appraisal processes and emotional experience
than the past positive or negative emotions they may have subjectively felt as a consequence of a goal. Enthusiasm, for instance, isless closely related to a goal and is best seen as a consequence of
one’s actual or potential goal achievement. Therefore, need satisfaction in memory assessments may capture a more profoundcognitive and emotional trace than emotion in memories.
Some limitations of the present research need to be highlighted.
First, only self-reported emotional inventories were used as outcome variables. Future research should use physiological measuresor informant assessments in order to present a different angle ofvalidity. A second limitation of the present research is that only
emotional experience was assessed, whereas a number of emotional processes influencing people’s emotional experience havebeen highlighted in past research, including emotion regulation(e.g., Gross, 1999), coping strategies (e.g., Carver, Scheier, &Weintraub, 1989), or different types of appraisal (e.g., Lazarus,
1991). It is unclear whether need-satisfying memory networks
activate one or more of these emotional processes to regulate theexperience of negative emotions, whether it is only that negative
emotions are not activated when need-satisfying memory networks
are at play, or whether both circumstances can occur. Future
research should examine this issue. Third, the two present studies
relied on the assumption that memory networks are actually automatically triggered in people’s mind whenever specific cues areencountered. However, the present research provides no direct
evidence of this fact. Neuropsychological studies may be needed totest this assumption. Finally, our samples did not include a large
proportion of male participants, perhaps lowering the power todetect significant gender moderations. Therefore, our findings withrespect to gender should be interpreted with caution.
In sum, the present research is the first to highlight that themespecific autobiographical memory networks may have an automatic directive function on certain theme-related negative emotional experiences. In addition, need thwarting in autobiographicalmemories and memory organization into networks appear to be
critical processes influencing people’s emotional experience. Examining the role of need-thwarting representations in autobiographical memory networks thus appears to be a fruitful avenue forthe broad field of emotion research.

References
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing andinterpreting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Alea, N., & Bluck, S. (2003). Why are you telling me that? A conceptualmodel of the social function of autobiographical memory. Memory, 11,
165–178. doi:10.1080/741938207
Allik, J., & Realo, A. (1997). Emotional experience and its relation to thefive-factor model in Estonian. Journal of Personality, 65, 625– 647.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1997.tb00329.x
Andersen, S. M., & Baum, A. (1994). Transference in interpersonal relations: Schema-triggered inferences and affect based on significant-otherrepresentations. Journal of Personality, 62, 459 – 498. doi:10.1111/
j.1467-6494.1994.tb00306.x
Anderson, J. R. (1984). Spreading activation. In J. R. Anderson & S. M.
Kosslyn (Eds.), Tutorials in learning and memory: Essays in honor of
Gordon Bower (pp. 61–91). San Francisco, CA: Freeman.

MEMORY AND NEGATIVE EMOTIONS
Ball, A. (Creator). (2002). Six feet under [TV series]. New York, NY:
HBO.
Bluck, S., Alea, N., Habermas, T., & Rubin, D. C. (2005). A tale of threefunctions: The self-reported uses of autobiographical memory. Social
Cognition, 23, 91–117. doi:10.1521/soco.23.1.91.59198
Blumberg, S. H., & Izard, C. E. (1985). Affective and cognitive characteristics of depression in 10- and 11-year-old children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 194 –202. doi:10.1037/00223514.49.1.194
Blumberg, S. H., & Izard, C. E. (1986). Discriminating patterns of emotions in 10- and 11-year-old children’s anxiety and depression. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 852– 857. doi:10.1037/00223514.51.4.852
Bower, G. H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36,
129 –148. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.36.2.129
Bower, G. H., & Cohen, P. R. (1982). Emotional influences in memory andthinking: Data and theory. In M. S. Clark & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Affect andcognition: The 17th Annual Carnegie Symposium on Cognition (pp.
291–331). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brown, N. R., & Schopflocher, D. (1998). Event cueing, event clusters, andthe temporal distribution of autobiographical memories. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 12, 305–319. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199808)
12:4⬍305::AID-ACP569⬎3.0.CO;2-5
Burt, C. D. B., Kemp, S., & Conway, M. A. (2003). Themes, events, andepisodes in autobiographical memory. Memory & Cognition, 31, 317–
325. doi:10.3758/BF03194390
Carver, C. S., Scheier, M. F., & Weintraub, J. K. (1989). Assessing coping
strategies: A theoretically based approach. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 56, 267–283. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.2.267
Christianson, S.-A., & Engelberg, E. (1999). Organization of emotional
memories. In T. Dalgleish & M. Power (Eds.), Handbook of cognitionand emotion (pp. 211–227). New York, NY: Wiley.
Clore, G. L., & Parrott, W. G. (1991). Moods and their vicissitudes: The
informational properties of affective thoughts and feelings. In J. Forgas(Ed.), Emotion and social judgments (pp. 133–163). Elmsford, NY:
Pergamon Press.
Conway, M. A. (2003). Cognitive–affective mechanisms and processes in
autobiographical memory—Commentary. Memory, 11, 217–224. doi:
10.1080/741938205
Conway, M. A. (2008). Exploring episodic memory. In E. Dere, A. Easton,
L. Nadel, & J. P. Huston (Eds.), Handbook of episodic memory (Vol. 18,
pp. 19 –29). Oxford, England: Elsevier.
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of
autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological
Review, 107, 261–288. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.261
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). NEO PI-R professional manual.
Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1995). Domains and facets—Hierarchicalpersonality-assessment using the Revised Neo Personality Inventory.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 64, 21–50. doi:10.1207/
s15327752jpa6401_2
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and the “why” of goalpursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268. doi:10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01
Deci, E. L., Ryan, R. M., Gagné, M., Leone, D. R., Usunov, J., &Kornazheva, B. P. (2001). Need satisfaction, motivation, and well-being
in the work organizations of a former Eastern bloc country. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 930 –942. doi:10.1177/
0146167201278002
Diener, E., & Emmons, R. A. (1985). The independence of positive andnegative affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47,
1105–1117. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.47.5.1105
Ehrhart, M. G., Ehrhart, K. H., Roesch, S. C., Chung-Herrera, B. G.,
Nadler, K., & Bradshaw, K. (2009). Testing the latent factor structure1289

and construct validity of the Ten-Item Personality Inventory. Personality
and Individual Differences, 47, 900 –905. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2009.07.012
Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, regulation, and moral development. Annual
Review of Psychology, 51, 665– 697. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.665
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive
psychology: The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56, 218 –226. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.56.3.218
Gagné, M. (2003). The role of autonomy support and autonomy orientationin prosocial behavior engagement. Motivation and Emotion, 27, 199 –223. doi:10.1023/A:1025007614869
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit andexplicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 692–731. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.132.5.692
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A very brief
measure of the Big Five personality domains. Journal of Research in
Personality, 37, 504 –528. doi:10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00046-1
Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Grolnick, W. S., McMenamy, J. M., & Kurowski, C. O. (2006). Emotional
self-regulation in infancy and toddlerhood. In L. Balter & C. S. TamisLeMonda (Eds.), Child psychology: A handbook of contemporary issues(2nd ed., pp. 3–25). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Gross, J. J. (1999). Emotion regulation: Past, present, future. Cognition &Emotion, 13, 551–573. doi:10.1080/026999399379186
Hagger, M. S., Chatzisarantis, N. L., & Harris, J. (2006). From psychological need satisfaction to intentional behavior: Testing a motivationalsequence in two behavioral contexts. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 32, 131–148. doi:10.1177/0146167205279905
Heuer, F., & Reisberg, D. (1990). Vivid memories of emotional events:
The accuracy of remembered minutiae. Memory & Cognition, 18, 496 –506.
Higgins, E. T., King, G. A., & Mavin, G. H. (1982). Individual constructaccessibility and subjective impressions and recall. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 35– 47. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.43.1.35
Hodgins, H. S., & Knee, R. (2002). The integrating self and conscious
experience. In E. L. Deci, & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook on selfdetermination research (pp. 87–100). Rochester, NY: University ofRochester Press.
Izard, C. E. (1971). The face of emotion. New York, NY: AppletonCentury-Crofts.
Izard, C. E. (1972). Patterns of emotions: A new analysis of anxiety anddepression. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Izard, C. E. (1977). Human emotions. New York, NY: Plenum Press.
Izard, C. E., Libero, D. Z., Putnam, P., & Haynes, O. M. (1993). Stabilityof emotion experiences and their relations to traits of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 847– 860. doi:10.1037/
0022-3514.64.5.847
John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: History,measurement, and theoretical perspectives. In L. A. Pervin & O. P. John
(Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed., pp.
102–138). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Josephson, B. R., Singer, J. A., & Salovey, P. (1996). Mood regulation andmemory: Repairing sad moods with happy memories. Cognition &Emotion, 10, 434 – 444. doi:10.1080/026999396380222
Kemp, S., Burt, C. D. B., & Malinen, S. (2009). Investigating the structureof autobiographical memory using reaction times. Memory, 17, 511–
517. doi:10.1080/09658210902939330
La Guardia, J. G., Ryan, R. M., Couchman, C. E., & Deci, E. L. (2000).
Within-person variation in security of attachment: A self-determination
theory perspective on attachment, need fulfillment, and well-being.

1290

PHILIPPE, KOESTNER, LECOURS, BEAULIEU-PELLETIER, AND BOIS

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 367–384. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.79.3.367
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
LeDoux, J. E. (1992). Emotion as memory: Anatomical systems underlying
indelible neural traces. In S. A. Christianson (Ed.), The handbook of
emotion and memory: Research and theory (pp. 269 –288). Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Mace, J. H. (2005). Priming involuntary autobiographical memories. Memory, 13, 874 – 884. doi:10.1080/09658210444000485
Machleit, K. A., & Eroglu, S. A. (2000). Describing and measuring
emotional response to shopping experience. Journal of Business Research, 49, 101–111. doi:10.1016/S0148-2963(99)00007-7
Meyer, B., Enstrom, M. K., Harstveit, M., Bowles, D. P., & Beevers, C. G.
(2007). Happiness and despair on the catwalk: Need satisfaction, wellbeing, and personality adjustment among fashion models. Journal of
Positive Psychology, 2, 2–17. doi:10.1080/17439760601076635
Monroe, S. M., Rohde, P., Seeley, J. R., & Lewinsohn, P. M. (1999). Life
events and depression in adolescence: Relationship loss as a prospective
risk factor for first onset of major depressive disorder. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 108, 606 – 614. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.108.4.606
Pasupathi, M. (2003). Emotion regulation during social remembering:
Differences between emotions elicited during an event and emotions
elicited when talking about it. Memory, 11, 151–163. doi:10.1080/
741938212
Philippe, F. L., Koestner, R., Beaulieu-Pelletier, G., & Lecours, S. (inpress). The role of need satisfaction as a distinct and basic psychologicalcomponent of autobiographical memories: A look at well-being. Journalof Personality.
Philippe, F. L., Koestner, R., Beaulieu-Pelletier, G., Lecours, S., & Lekes,
N. (2010). The role of episodic memories in current and future wellbeing. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Philippe, F. L., Lecours, S., & Beaulieu-Pelletier, G. (2009). Resilience andpositive emotions: Examining the role of emotional memories. Journalof Personality, 77, 139 –176. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00541.x
Philippot, P., Schaefer, A., & Herbette, G. (2003). Consequences of specific processing of emotional information: Impact of general versus
specific autobiographical memory priming on emotion elicitation. Emotion, 3, 270 –283. doi:10.1037/1528-3542.3.3.270
Pillemer, D. B. (1998). Momentous events, vivid memories. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Pillemer, D. B. (2001). Momentous events and the life story. Review ofGeneral Psychology, 5, 123–134. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.5.2.123
Pillemer, D. B. (2003). Directive functions of autobiographical memory:
The guiding power of the specific episode. Memory, 11, 193–202.
doi:10.1080/741938208
Reis, H. T., Sheldon, K. M., Gable, S. L., Roscoe, J., & Ryan, R. M.
(2000). Daily well-being: The role of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 419 – 435. doi:
10.1177/0146167200266002
Robinson, J. A. (1986). Autobiographical memory: A historical prologue. In
D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 19 –24). New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511558313.005
Robinson, J. A. (1992). First experience memories: Contexts and functionin personal histories. In M. A. Conway, D. C. Rubin, H. Spinnler, &W. A. Wagenaar (Eds.), Theoretical perspectives on autobiographicalmemory (pp. 223–239). Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic.
Roediger, H. L. (1990). Implicit memory: Retention without remembering.
American Psychologist, 45, 1043–1056. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.45.9.1043
Ryan, R. M. (1995). Psychological needs and the facilitation of integrative
processes. Journal of Personality, 63, 397– 427. doi:10.1111/j.14676494.1995.tb00501.x
Ryan, R. M., Rigby, C. S., & Przybylski, A. (2006). Motivation pull ofvideo games: A self-determination theory approach. Motivation andEmotion, 30, 347–365. doi:10.1007/s11031-006-9051-8
Sarason, I. G., Johnson, J. H., & Siegel, J. M. (1978). Assessing the impactof life changes: Development of the Life Experiences Survey. Journal ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 932–946. doi:10.1037/0022006X.46.5.932
Scherer, K. R. (2005). Unconscious processes in emotion: The bulk of theiceberg. In P. Niedenthal, L. Feldman-Barrett, & P. Winkielman (Eds.),
The unconscious in emotion (pp. 312–334). New York, NY: Guilford
Press.
Schwartz, G. E., Weinberger, D. A., & Singer, J. A. (1981). Cardiovasculardifferentiation of happiness, sadness, anger and fear following imagery
and exercise. Psychosomatic Medicine, 45, 109 –114.
Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Kim, Y., & Kasser, T. (2001). What’s
satisfying about satisfying events? Comparing ten candidate psychological needs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 325–339.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.80.2.325
Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., & Reis, H. T. (1996). What makes for a goodday? Competence and autonomy in the day and in the person. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 1270 –1279. doi:10.1177/
01461672962212007
Singer, J. A., & Salovey, P. (1993). The remembered self: Emotion andmemory in personality. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2000). Consequences require antecedents:
Toward a process model of emotion elicitation. In J. Forgas (Ed.),
Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition (pp. 83–106).
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self-control
predicts good adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of Personality, 72, 271–324. doi:10.1111/j.00223506.2004.00263.x
Tugade, M. M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). Resilient individuals use
positive emotions to bounce back from negative emotional experiences.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 320 –333. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.86.2.320
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS
scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063–1070.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063
Woike, B. A. (2008). A functional framework for the influence of implicit
and explicit motives on autobiographical memory. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12, 99 –117. doi:10.1177/1088868308315701
Wong, P. T. P., & Watt, L. M. (1991). What types of reminiscence areassociated with successful aging? Psychology and Aging, 6, 272–279.
doi:10.1037/0882-7974.6.2.272

Received January 27, 2010
Revision received March 7, 2011
Accepted May 11, 2011 䡲