To: Sharon Ahlers
From: Anubhav Jain
Date: May 1, 2004
Subject: Ethics in technical presentations: BART case study
The Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) incident is sometimes seen as a case ofthree ethical engineers trying to protect the public in the face of unresponsivemanagers. In this interpretation, the engineers identify an important and real
flaw in BART's Automatic Train Control (ATC) system, and BART management
fires the engineers instead of listening to their concerns[1]. However, while a
possibly hostile management may have contributed to BART's problems [2], thisexplanation fails to address one of the most basic conflicts in the story: theconflict between technical and non-technical information. Under BART'smanagement system, technical decisions were made by non-technical staff. In
converting technical information for managers, details could be covered andfalse impressions created. Ethics in this case regards how to build the bridge
between the regions of technical and non-technical information. There isevidence that Westinghouse may not have acted ethically in its presentation ofinformation to the BART board of directors, but no guidelines are in place
dictating ethical transformation of technical information.
BART: Introduction and Aftermath to the Westinghouse Presentation
The BART project is a public transportation system serving San Francisco,Alameda, and Contra Costa counties. Construction began around 1963 [3];organization of design responsibilities were somewhat complicated. The BART
Board of Directors and Local Government made high-level decisions, relying on
public funding; the system would be put in place by Parsons-BrinckerhoffTudor-Bechtel (PBTB), a consulting firm; PBTB in turn subcontracted theAutomatic Train Control (ATC) system to Westinghouse[4].
The Board of Directors had the task of making decisions about technical issues
implementing BART; however, because BART was publicly funded, Board
members were chosen for their good public relations skills rather than theirtechnical expertise [4]. This meant BART design decisions were made by anunspecialized group of people.
Around 1971, three engineers working for BART – Holger Hsortsvang, Max
Blakenzee, and Robert Bruder – saw problems in Westinghouse's ATC design [3].
Growing discontent with management responses to their concerns, and under
the recommendation of a Board member, Daniel Helix, the three hired an Anubhav Jain 2004

A. Jain – ethics in technical presentations

2outside consultant, William Burfine, to present their issues anonymously to theBoard of Directors.
At the ensuing meeting, both Westinghouse and Burfine presented their case.
The Board put their support in Westinghouse – in the words of Blackenzee,
Burfine was "slaughtered" [4]. The three engineers were later fired after
unsuccessfully trying to arrange another meeting.
In the aftermath, BART was plagued with controversial problems due toWestinghouse's design. The California State legistature's "Post report" foundtrain-control deficiencies, a three-man panel found the BART ATC to notprovide adequate passenger safety under full-scale operation, and perhaps
most vividly in 1972 the lead car in a BART train operating under ATC crashedinto a sandpile [5].
Analysis
Since BART decision-makers, specifically the Board of Directors and General
Manager B.R. Stokes, were not trained in engineering, they could not look attechnical information directly. Instead, they were forced to make decisions
based on the most convincing non-technical presentation of information. Given
this, is not surprising that BART's Board of Directors voted in favor ofWestinghouse's design and rejected Burfine's report. When Westinghouse andBurfine presented their argument to the Board, it is clear that Westinghouse
had the more convincing presentation. Blankenzee describes the Westinghousepresentation as "beautiful", while Burfine's was underprepared and did notstand up to Westinghouse's rebuttals [4]. Unable to see the technicalentanglements behind Westinghouse's presentation, the Board had to make adecision, and it cannot be blamed for putting its trust in the more effective
non-technical argument.
The focus, then, should not be on the engineers or management, because it isquite likely that both were fulfilling their professional duties competently.
Instead, the question to ask is this: To what extent was the Westinghouse'spresentation and status reports a fair representation of their actual problems
and progress? Flaws in the ATC design were still not fixed by the time BART
was operational, as evidenced in October of 1972 when a train operating underWestinghouse's ATC overshot its terminal, causing the lead car to crash into asandpile [5]. While it may be true that Westinghouse intended for these
problems to be fixed, it seems that the nature and number of problems weremost likely suppressed from the Board, given the confidence with which theBoard voted in favor of Westinghouse (either 10-2 or 8-2)[3]. This false
impression of assurance would then prevent the Board from making the rightdecision and compromise public safety.

A. Jain – ethics in technical presentations

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So did Westinghouse unethically present their technical information to theBoard? A look at the "suggested guidelines for use with the fundamental canonsof engineering ethics", section 3b, states:
Engineers shall be completely objective and truthful in all professional reports,statements, or testimony. They shall include all relevant and pertinent information in suchreports, statements, or testimony [6].

While this seems to incriminate Westinghouse, is it even possible to follow? A"completely objective" report of technical information would be nothing otherthan a list of data points, which is hardly a report. To make information
useful, an opinion is needed interpreting the data. Furthermore, the next
sentence dictating that "all relevant and pertinent information" be included inreports makes objectivity impossible because it involves the inherently
subjective decision of what data is important. Therefore, these guidelines
would be a poor way to judge Westinghouse, as any recommendation they
made would involve their personal opinions.
Instead, a new code is needed to guide an engineer's transformation oftechnical information into recommendations for unspecialized decision-makers.
It is important to realize that this problem is not unique to the BART case or todecades past. Some accounts of the recent Columbia disaster, in which theshuttle was lost in re-entry, attribute the tragedy to a faulty PowerPoint slide[7]. The slide placed critical information about wing damage frommanagement in a maze of nested bullets. It was easy to see how this disastercan be seen not as the result of poor decision-making, but the presentation oftechnical information in a hidden and complex way.
References
1. Kline, Ronald R. Using History and Sociology to teach Engineering ethics.
IEEE Technology and Society Magazine; 2001/2002. p15.
See also Bruder's account in [3], p142.
2. Friedlander, G. The case of the three engineers vs. BART. IEEE Spectrum;Oct 1974. pp.69-76.
3. Unger, S. The BART case: ethics and the employed engineer. IEEE Spectrum;
Issue 4, 1973. p6.
4. Anderson et al. Divided Loyalties. pp12-13, 143-145.
5. Friedlander, G. Bigger Bugs in Bart? IEEE Spectrum; March 1973. p32,35,37.

A. Jain – ethics in technical presentations

6. Code of Ethics of Engineers.
https://engineering.purdue.edu/MSE/Undergrad/ethics.pdf. Accessed March
5, 2003.
7.Thompson, C. Powerpoint makes you dumb. The New York Times; December
14, 2003.

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