proceedings
The 4th Australia and Japan
1.5 Track Security Dialogue
Canberra, 10–11 December 2007
Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Australia–Japan
Commerce Agreement (1957)
Session 1: Possible future strategic shocks in East Asia
A maritime coalition centred on the Japan–Australia–US trilateral alliance: 			aiming for a regional maritime coalition in the southwestern Pacific		
2
VADM (ret) Hideaki Kaneda, The Okazaki InstitutePossible strategic ‘shocks’ in Asia 						Dr Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute

14

Session 2: New regional security architecture in the Asia Pacific and the role 		of Australia and Japan
Emerging Asia–Pacific security architectures: the Australia–Japan factor		
Professor William T Tow, Australian National University
The Japanese approach to an East Asian Community and Japan–Australia
partnership								Dr Yoshihide Soeya, Keio University

22

39

Session 3: The rise of China (PRC) and its implications for the region
China rising: the view from ‘down under’
Dr Brendan Taylor, SDSC, Australian National University

47

The impacts of China’s rise on the Asian international system			Dr Seiichiro Takagi, Aoyama Gakuin University

55

Session 4: Review and prospects for the Australia–Japan strategic relationship
Review and prospects for the bilateral strategic relationship between Japanand Australia								Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi, Aoyama Gakuin University
The Japan–Australia strategic relationship: an Australian perspective		
Dr Mark Thomson, Australian Strategic Policy Institute

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A maritime coalition centredon the Japan–Australia–US
trilateral alliance: aiming for aregional maritime coalition in
the southwestern Pacific
VADM (ret) Hideaki Kaneda
Director, The Okazaki Institute

1 The rising importance of sea lane
security
One of the constant and continued anxieties
in the Asia–Pacific region is sea lane security.
It is the source of concerns not only in theregion, but also in the adjacent regionsof the Indian Ocean, Oceania and theSouth Pacific, and the East Pacific. All the sea
lanes connecting these regions have faced
and will face risks of attacks by international
terrorist groups and by pirates (possiblywith connections to terrorist groups). This isespecially evident at major choke points, suchas the northwest Indian Ocean (including theStrait of Hormuz), India’s southern coasts, andthe Malacca–Singapore Strait.

Risks to security in the Asia–PacificregionTo assess the security situation in theAsia–Pacific region, let us first consider the
potential for the manifestation of threats in
the region.
On the Korean Peninsula, where militaryconfrontation continues in principle, therelationship between the US and South
Korea is becoming more distant due to theemergence of more receptive feelings toward
North Korea among South Koreans, based on
their ethnic identity and the current South
Korean Government’s policy of promoting
more independent national defence.
The Six‑Party Talks, initiated by the nuclear
development program of North Korea,

have made some progress, such as theagreement to disable nuclear facilities within
this year. This has been possible due to theadvancement in US–North Korea bilateraltalks, backed by a more compromising posture
taken by the Bush administration. However,the future prospects for the talks are unclear,
as North Korea still practices brinkmanshipdiplomacy to win further concessions fromthe US. With other issues (such as ballistic
missile development and unlawful activities,
including the abduction of foreign nationals)
still unsolved, North Korea remains a source ofconcern at least in the short term.
In the Taiwan Strait, political tension is still
high, providing another source of concern
in the medium to long term. The tension isdue to political, military and psychologicalpressures from mainland China, Taiwan’s
democratisation and pursuit of independence,the expected shift in the military balance
between China and Taiwan in the near
future, and change in the delicate balanceof the US–China relationship in the current
situation. If any emergency occurs in this area,
it will undoubtedly cut off the vital sea lanes
passing near Taiwan.
Overall, the region embraces several
instability factors, including China’s
aggressive advance toward the oceans and its
intensive build‑up of maritime and air power,
developments in politically unstable nationsof Southeast Asia, and the delicate balance ofstrategic relationships among major powers,
including the US, China, Japan and Russia.
The safety of sea lanes in the region is no
exception—it is also subject to the effects ofregional instability factors.
In the current security situation, there areeight notable instability factors that threaten
regional security. They can be classified into
two major categories: conventional andnonconventional factors.

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

Of the four conventional factors, the first is
confrontational structures that are remnantsof the Cold War era, such as those in the
Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, whichstill cast shadows of instability, uncertainty,
and unpredictability in the region. The second
factor is the rapid build‑up of Chinese military
power, mostly in naval and air forces, which
has the potential to disrupt the regional
military power balance. The third factor
involves territorial, religious and ethnic
disputes founded on historical controversies(territorial disputes over islands have aparticular potential to develop into armed
clashes). The fourth factor is confrontations
over maritime interests, which are closely
related to territorial disputes over islands.
All these factors are likely to create serious
impacts on the safety and stability of theregion as a whole, as they can reduce thesafety of sea lanes.
Nonconventional factors, on the other
hand, are those new factors that became
apparent after the end of the Cold War. The
fifth factor is the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction and ballistic missiles
from Northeast Asia to Pakistan and otherregions, mainly through regional sea lanes.
The sixth factor is the increased vigour ofterrorist activities such as bomb attacks, asinternational terrorist groups strengthen ties
with other relevant groups in and out of theregion, mainly targeting nations with weaker
governance, islandal seas and remote islands(this became especially apparent after the 9/11
terrorist attacks). The seventh factor is thetrend to globalisation and reorganisation of  
unlawful maritime activities, such as piracy,
drug smuggling, and human trafficking in theregion. The eighth factor is China’s long-term
ambition to secure maritime hegemony,demonstrated by its efforts to build strategic
bases along the vast major sea lanes
connecting the Middle East and Northeast
Asia, in a way that confronts the existing
marine powers, such as the US, or Japan.



Our examination of these instability factors
reveals some common key words, suchas ‘safety of sea lanes’. Sea lane security
is not only important for the securityof the Asia–Pacific region, but for mostother regions.

Significance of sea lanes today
The significance of sea lanes today can beanalysed from two perspectives: ‘maritime
transportation’ and ‘marine usage.’ The
economies of the Asia–Pacific region,
including Japan’s economy, are far more
dependent on oceans than are economies inany other region. Therefore, the oceans haveextreme strategic significance in this region.
Moreover, the dynamism of economic growthseen in the Asia–Pacific region recently has
made sea lane security even more vital forthe continued growth and developmentof the region as a whole, as sea lanes are
the communication medium of regional
economies (‘maritime transportation’), while
the oceans provide vast resources that cansecure the economic development of coastal
countries in the region (‘marine usage’).
These two aspects are essential for regional
economic development.
In terms of ‘maritime transportation,’ theglobal economy today enjoys smoother
distribution of materials and information
than in the past. This is due to the extensive
and rapid development and deploymentof transportation infrastructures withinformation technologies. Also, mutual
exchanges between nations have increased as
the ideological confrontation of the Cold War
era has dissipated and the barriers distancing
nations from one another have dissolved. In
addition, the transition of formerly socialist
nations to market economies and the rapid
economic development of developing
countries have led to the development ofvaried forms of economic cooperation among
nations, and the further deepening of mutualProceedings

dependencies in the global economy. To
maintain and develop such relationships, thetransport sector has become more important
than ever. This is especially true in the caseof maritime transportation, as it enables
economical and massive transport of cargo.
This means that securing sea lane safety has
become much more important.
In particular, Japan’s economy and lifestyle arelargely dependent on maritime transportation
using safe sea lanes. Its past economic
development would not have been possible
without such security. Oil resources from
the Middle East are essential materials tosustain the Japanese economy, and their
shipment is entirely dependent on the broad
sea lane from the Middle East, through theIndian Ocean, Malacca–Singapore Strait andSouth China Sea, to the East China Sea. It is
no exaggeration to call these sea lanes thelifeline of the Japanese economy. Moreover,
the Malacca–Singapore Strait is also part ofthe lifeline of other Northeast Asian countries,
such as China and South Korea—making
it, in a sense, the Achilles’ heel of the global
economy. About 50,000 vessels navigate
through the strait, carrying more than aquarter of the world’s maritime transportvolume and about half of the trade volumesof Japan, China, and South Korea. About
50% of global oil tanker volume, and about
85% of oil tankers from the Middle East to
Northeast Asia, pass through the strait.
As the major user of the Malacca–Singapore
Strait until very recently, Japan provided
many beneficial projects in the area todevelop and maintain safe navigation routes
through the strait in coordination with thecoastal countries—Singapore, Indonesia, andMalaysia. The projects, delivered mainly by theprivate sector, such as the Japan Foundation,and backed up by the Japanese Government,
were highly appreciated. Recently, however,the situation around the Malacca–Singapore
Strait has changed drastically. In addition

to the rapid and significant increase in thevolume of oil imports by other East Asian
countries, such as NIE (newly industrialised
economy) countries like South Korea andTaiwan, and China (which is experiencing
remarkable economic growth), the coastal
countries have increased the number ofoil refineries along the strait, resulting ina significant increase in the volume of oil
products shipped in the region. Growth inregional economies has also led to increases
in shipments of products and raw materials
other than oil through the strait.
Furthermore, the coastal countries havechanged the nature of their dependency on
the strait significantly, from being ‘provider’
nations in the past to being ‘user’ nations, as
they continue to develop container shipment
hub ports, such as Singapore Harbor and theport of Tanjun Pelapas in Malaysia, and toexert effort for industrial development along
the coasts.
As clearly demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War,during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 when
China fired ballistic missiles into waters off
Taiwan, during the 9/11 terrorist attacks andthe Afghanistan War to control and containthe terrorist groups in 2001, and during the
Iraq War from 2003, if there is any direct orindirect disruption to the security of thesemajor sea lanes, it will seriously and adversely
affect the international economy as well as
the security of the surrounding regions andcoastal countries. Because of the extent of
sea lanes, however, it is not possible for any
coastal nation on its own to secure the safetyof the sea lanes. There is a growing realisationthat cooperative and coordinated efforts by
the coastal nations are required.
Typical examples of cooperative programsaround the Malacca–Singapore Strait include
MalSinDo and Eyes in the Sky, which are
structured to fight international terroristgroups and piracy around the strait using
multilateral coastal naval forces, and ReCAAP,

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

which is a coalition among the strait user
countries backed up by Japan. Anotherexample is OEF–MIO (Operation Enduring
Freedom Maritime Interdiction Operation),
the maritime terrorism prevention activity
in the northwest Indian Ocean started
immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks
and continued ever since by multilateralnaval forces.
From the perspective of ‘marine usage,’
the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) allows coastal countries tohold sovereign rights over internal waters,
territorial seas and connecting waterways,
and to have jurisdiction over their exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) as well as the use ofmarine resources and the right to protect
the environment on the continental shelf.
With the establishment of EEZs by coastal
countries, almost half of the world’s seas are
now under the jurisdiction of one country
or another.
In the original definition of EEZs, based on
the fundamental philosophy of UNCLOS,
the coastal countries’ jurisdiction over their
EEZs gives them the right to manage andcontrol marine resources and to execute
their resource control obligations, but does
not imply the right to monopolise use of
the resources. In reality, however, efforts
to determine national borders between
coastal countries do not always lead toamicable settlements, because of conflicts
over marine interests and historical disputes
over territories. Typical of such disputes
is the Japan–China mid‑line issue in the
East China Sea.
With the prospect of terrestrial resource
depletion in the future, there is growinginterest in abundant marine resources,
such as fisheries and seabed resources. This
has led to the rise of extreme nationalism
among developing countries, especially in
China, which is now acting as an unruly

‘resource-greedy’ and ‘marine environment
polluter’ nation.
The rise of nationalism in such countries
invites an explosion of effort to steal thevested rights of developed countries. Proofof this is the serious strife and struggles
at international forums negotiating theprotection and development of fisheryresources or intergovernmental discussions
on the jurisdiction of deep seabed resources
upon the entry into force of UNCLOS. This fact
highlights the growing need for cooperative
measures for marine usage among relevant
countries. Such measures should take
into account the management of limited
resources and the conservation of the global
environment under established internationaland regional rules.

Increasing importance of broad
sea lanes and the roles of Japanand Australia
Securing the safety of sea lanes in theAsia–Pacific region is certainly important for
the regional economy and regional security,
but sea lanes do not end in one single region.
The major sea lanes, which are the lifeline ofJapan, extend far beyond the regional seas,
into the Indian Ocean, Oceania–South Pacific,
and East Pacific regions.
The need to ensure the safety of broad sea
lanes is not likely to diminish in the future, butwill grow. At the same time, various factorsthat obstruct sea lane safety are becoming
more evident everywhere in the region andin the world. In this sense, it is important
to ensure that the world can benefit from‘managed maritime freedom’ under known
rules built by consensus among relevant
countries. This is easy to understand, butdifficult to realise. Because sea lanes connect
one region to another through oceans, it
is urgently necessary to build a consensus
among broader regional beneficiary countries

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to seek common benefits and to cooperate toensure sea lane safety.
Among major sea lanes adjacent to Japan,
those in the Oceania, South Pacific, andEast Pacific regions are relatively stable, withno significant threats. In those regions, theUS maintains overwhelming influence frombases in Hawaii, Guam, and the west coastof the US. The presence of other major sea
power allies, such as Australia and Canada,also ensures the stability of these sea lanes.
If there is any potential threat in theseregions, it may be China’s aggressive militaryadvancement toward the Pacific Ocean as
it continues its rise as a major world power.
China’s activities will require continued
attention. In this sense, the alliance amongmajor Pacific sea powers (Japan, Australia,
and Canada), with the world’s largest andstrongest sea power, the US, at the centre will
be significant in securing the safety of sea
lanes in the pan‑Pacific region.
The alliance with Australia will beespecially significant, as it maintains strong
relationships with Asian nations, including
Japan, not only in the area of sea lane security
but also in the overall area of regional security.
Considering the recent international economic
and security situation, Australia is one of themost important allies in the ‘expanded Asia,’
extending from south to north.

Impact of India’s emergence
In the context described in this paper, India is
one of the most important countries in the‘expanded Asia,’ extending from east to west.
The Indian Ocean region used to receive
relatively less attention from Asia–Pacificcountries from economic and security
perspectives. Recently, however, there is
growing recognition in the importance of thenorthern Indian Ocean region, and of India’s
predominant power in the region.

India has the population of more than one
billion—the world’s second largest next toChina. With a variety of ethnic groups withdifferent religions, languages and cultures,
it is the world’s biggest democratic country
governed by an administration elected
through free multiparty elections. Moreover,India shares many common basic values
and systems with Japan and other major
developed countries, such as freedom,democracy, and a market economy.
Having promoted liberalisation and economic
reforms since the 1990s, India maintains
a high economic growth rate through thedevelopment of information technologies
and IT industries. Supported by its robust
economic growth, India is exercising active
and multifaceted diplomacy, enhancing its
presence in the international community.
However, the land route connecting thenorthern Indian Ocean region and theAsia–Pacific region is not yet fully developed,
inevitably increasing dependence on thevast sea lanes passing through the region.
Moreover, in both regions, ‘marine usage’ (theexploitation of maritime resources, such as
fisheries and seabed resources) is a key for
their future development. Because of thesefactors, any disturbance or disruption of thesafety of these sea lanes would likely cause
severe adverse effects on the economy andsecurity of both regions.
The northern Indian Ocean is in a strategicallyand geopolitically important location, as acorridor connecting the Asia–Pacific region
with the Middle East and Europe. It also
forms part of the ‘arc of instability’—anexpression that first appeared in the US’s
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, released
immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The region provides potential bases forinternational terrorist group activities,
as well as a stage for state‑to-state andwithin‑state confrontations.

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

Considering these factors, the vast sea
lanes connecting the Indian Ocean and thePacific Ocean should be recognised as the
major economic and strategic artery to run
through the ‘arc of inseparability,’ rather thanthe ‘arc of instability’. In other words, theycreate an inseparable and integrated region inwhich coordination and cooperation efforts
connect the Asia–Pacific region and northern
Indian Ocean.
In August 2007, Japan’s then Prime Minister
Abe and India’s Prime Minister Shinh held
the India–Japan Summit, and agreed on
the recognition that ‘strong India is Japan’s
benefits, and strong Japan is India’s benefits.’
The Japanese side welcomed the emergenceof India as a major power, and emphasised its
intention to provide support for India’s further
economic development, and to promote moremutual exchange efforts at every level.
Prime Minister Abe stated that Japanand India, as two major sea powers anddemocratic countries that share basic values
and interests, should address measures
to ensure the safety of the sea lanes, incooperation with other countries. In his
speech on ‘the exchange between two
oceans’ delivered to the Indian Parliament, hereflected on the long history of ties between
Japan and India, and stated that the newly
emerging ‘expanded Asia’ would integrate
East Asia and South Asia through exchanges
between the ‘two great oceans’—the Pacificand the Indian. Those links could grow into an
open and transparent network that covers theentire Pacific Ocean region, including the US
and Australia.
Current Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda
is to fully and actively continue the basic
Asian diplomacy policy launched byPrime Minister Abe.



2 Development of bilateral andtrilateral relationships among three
countries
Japan, Australia and the US are all sea
powers. The Japan–US alliance has been andwill continue to be, in principle, a maritime
alliance at least for the foreseeable future. The
US has allied relationships with other major
powers, including Australia, and becauseof the two countries’ geopolitical situation,
the US–Australia alliance also has thecharacteristics of a maritime alliance.
Although Japan and Australia have notentered into a formal alliance, the agreement
made in March 2007 enabled them to begin a‘semi‑alliance’ relationship. Because of Japan’sand Australia’s geopolitical relationship,
the semi‑alliance between them is also
basically a maritime one. The developmentof Japan–Australia bilateral relationships inthe security area may provide a foundation
for its development into a trilateral maritime
alliance that includes the US.

Japan–US alliance
After World War II, the US took on the vital‘keystone’ role in global and regional security.
Since the end of the Cold War, and especiallyafter the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US has
used much of its energy responding to new
dangers, such as state‑to-state confrontations
based on religious and ethnic conflicts,
the unrelenting activities of international
terrorist groups, and the links between
Islamic radical groups and their expanding
influence. Especially important have been the
US responses in Iraq and Afghanistan, where
massive deployments of armed forces havenot made any progress, and Washington’s
responses to Iran and North Korea, which
half‑openly pursue the development of
nuclear weapons. Another vital issue
for the US is how to build constructiveProceedings

relationships with China and India, which havethe potential to develop into powerful rivals in
the future.
In such a situation, the US considers Japan
to be the core of its new military strategy in
Asia, and plans to strengthen the positionof US forces in Japan as ‘Beyond Far East
Regional Forces,’ with their bases literally the‘core military bases’. Needless to say, Japanis a sovereign nation, so the Japanese side
will decide whether the positioning of US
bases and US forces in Japan is appropriate
to the national situation and interests ofJapan, although the alliance with the US is to
be maintained.
In the medium to long term, however, Japanand the US need to seek greater mutuality inthe operation of the US–Japan alliance fromthe global and regional perspectives. Even
today, Japan has implemented cooperation inregional and global operations, including thedevelopment of a framework for cooperation
with the US forces under the Law Concerning
Measures to Ensure Peace and Security ofJapan in Situations in Areas Surrounding
Japan; international cooperative activities
under the Anti‑Terrorism Special Measures
Law and the Specials Measures Law for
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistancein Iraq. These kinds of activities will likely
increase in importance in the future.
The fight against international terrorism, on
the other hand, requires more comprehensive
measures for a much longer period of time.
As international terrorist groups will likely
develop more complex and sophisticatedtactics, there will be greater opportunity touse international cooperation in activities toprevent terrorist attacks. Analyses of terrorist
activities indicate greater associations andlinkages between international terroristgroups and existing terrorist organisations
in Southeast Asia. This means that there
will be a greater need to develop regional
maritime security cooperation with an aim of

defending the sea lanes in order to respondagainst terrorist attacks and other unlawful
activities in the Malacca–Singapore Strait andSoutheast Asian islandal seas.
Furthermore, if the situation calls for it, there
will be increased opportunities to engage
in global joint actions through multilateralforces and coalitions based on UN resolutions
or regional agreements, as in the OEF–MIO,
which Japan and other countries are
implementing in the northwest Indian Ocean.
In such situations, the US Navy and Japan’s
Maritime Self Defense Force are expected
to take more active roles in international
cooperative actions. As seen here, broad sea
lane defence will have greater weight in the
future of the Japan–US maritime alliance.

US–Australia alliance
In September 1951, Australia, New Zealand andthe US signed the ANZUS Treaty. New Zealandwithdrew from the treaty in 1985 as a gesture
to oppose the US’s nuclear policies, and the
US cancelled the alliance commitment to New
Zealand in 1986. Instead of the three-nation
alliance, the US and Australia started the
US–Australia Ministerial Meeting on Security(AUSMIN), which has been held annually
ever since.
Since the start of AUSMIN, Australia has
become a major ally of the US and actively
participated in the Gulf War and military
sanctions against Iraq. Australia’s cooperation
with the US is not limited to military
cooperation in the field and in joint drills andexercises. The very foundation of the allianceis joint military information centres in many
places on Australian territory. These include
ground stations to receive early warning
information from satellites that provides
the basis for ballistic missile defence, andthe communication centre to monitor thenavigation of vessels in the Oceania–South
Pacific region. The sharing of military
information between the US and Australia

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

is a ‘tie that binds’, and is considered to be
one of the most important functions of the
US–Australia alliance.
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Australia
decided to apply Article 4 of the ANZUS Treaty,
which stipulates the exercise of the rightof collective self‑defence, and dispatchedvessels, aircraft and Special Forces to support
the anti‑terrorist activities of the US forces.
When the military operation against Iraq
began in March 2003, Australia also sent
vessels, airplanes and Special Forces. By
May 2007, there were about 1600 Australian
troops stationed in Iraq.
In addition, Australia is making efforts
to strengthen its defence policies andequipment. Although the actual form ofparticipation is still debated domestically,
Australia decided to participate in the US‑led
Missile Defense Plan in December 2003. A
decision to introduce the Aegis system as the
combat system for Australia’s new air‑defence
destroyers was made in August 2004, and theAustralian Defence Force is making efforts toimprove interoperability with the US throughthe development of US–Australia joint drill
facilities in Australia.
Australia is also implementing joint drills with
Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom
and New Zealand under the Five Party
Defence Agreement.

Japan–Australia semi-alliance
Australia is a valuable and important partnerin the Asia–Pacific region and shares common
basic values with Japan, such as respect forhuman rights, freedom, and democracy. In
the security aspect as well, Australia andJapan have common strategic interests asallies of the US and share similar interests innational defence. From such a perspective,
it is vital for both countries to develop abase of bilateral cooperation through thepromotion of defence and security exchanges,

and to seek more effective cooperation andcoordination. Such efforts will certainly bebeneficial for the peace and stability of theAsia–Pacific region. The recent promotion andexpansion of defence exchanges between
the two countries, such as cooperation in Iraq
and humanitarian aid after natural disasters,
have demonstrated steady progress in thedevelopment of a cooperative relationship in
the security field.
Based on the current situation, Japan agreed
with Australia in March 2007 to promotesecurity cooperation between Japan andAustralia as a ‘semi‑alliance’ in order to further
reinforce bilateral security cooperation
under a comprehensive framework, andconcluded the Joint Declaration of Japanand Australia on Security Cooperation. This
was the first time Japan had entered such analliance, other than its alliance with the US.
In June 2007, the ministers of defence andforeign affairs of both countries held theirfirst regular security talks (so‑called ‘2+2 talks’)in Tokyo. The agenda included missile defence
cooperation and joint drills between theJapan Self Defense Forces and the Australian
Defence Force.
The March 2007 joint declaration set aframework for reinforcing and expanding
bilateral cooperation in the security field. The
declaration selected for cooperation the areasof national border security; anti‑terrorism;
arms reduction and anti‑proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their carrier
tools; peacekeeping activities; exchangesof strategic information; maritime security
and air security; disaster relief and otherhumanitarian support activities; and others.
Based on the joint declaration, Japan andAustralia conducted bilateral joint drills off theeast coast of Japan in April 2007, a five‑navy
joint drill with the US, India and Singapore in
the Bay of Bengal in September 2007, and atrilateral naval joint drill with the US at Naha,Japan, the following month.

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The Japan–Australia semi‑alliance will not
remain at the level of promoting bilateral
cooperation in security fields, but may
develop into a trilateral relationship withmore emphasis on maritime alliances.
Furthermore, it could move toward thebuilding of a regional maritime coalition thatembraces other major democratic sea powers
in ‘extended Asia.’

3 A Japan–Australia–US regional
maritime coalition
Japan, Australia and the US should constitutea maritime alliance covering the Asia–Pacificregion, Oceania and the South Pacific. They
need to create a ‘Southwestern Pacific
Maritime Coalition’ with other democratic
sea powers in the region to ensure the safetyof sea lanes. At the same time, Japan andAustralia need to make efforts to realise
broader regional maritime coalitions under
the leadership of the US in the Indian Ocean
and the East Pacific, in cooperation withother democratic sea powers in neighbouring
waters, such as India and Canada, and towork on the development of more organic
coordination between these regional
coalitions in order to promote the safety ofbroad sea lanes. Ultimately, both countries
need to take on roles and responsibilities
appropriate for their national powers andsituations, as major actors in a ‘global
maritime coalition’ that gathers all the world’s
democratic sea powers.

Japan–Australia–US maritime alliance
The maritime alliance of Japan, Australia andthe US in the southwestern Pacific should playa major part in building the regional maritime
coalition for broader sea areas, taking
advantage of benefits arising from theirrelationships in alliances and semi‑alliances,
their characteristics as sea powers, theirdemocratic systems, and their modernised
military forces.

As democratic nations, one of their main
aims would be to attempt the disseminationand solidification of their common concepts
and values—that is, democracy. Since a
regional maritime coalition would inevitably
involve countries with different traditions
and governance systems, asking for thecooperation of those countries in maintaining
security and order would be a big challenge
for the three allies.
In addition, Japan, Australia and the USthemselves have fundamental differences intheir geopolitical, environmental, historical,
cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds,
although they share democratic values.
Their national concepts are not entirely thesame, and there are some differences in theirpolitical systems. However, they undoubtedlyshare basic concepts as mature, developed,
democratic countries, and their history for the
past sixty years since the end of World War II
clearly demonstrates those shared concepts.
As sea powers, the three allies must maintain‘properly managed maritime freedom’ inorder to survive and prosper as nations.
For this, they need to find logical solutions
to problems in determining EEZs and theextent of continental shelves, which havebeen the source of serious state‑to-state
disputes between nations with common
national borders, even after UNCLOS enteredinto effect.
As is well known, Japan and China haveseveral disputes, including territorial disputes
over the Senkaku Islands, and the issue of theJapan–China mid‑line and Oki‑no-TorishimaIsland in relation to determining their EEZs.
Although these matters might look like simple
questions of determining territorial rights
over remote islands, or deciding the scopeof economic interests over the oceans, they
are—in reality and more importantly—about
China’s military challenge in the West Pacificand its military advancement toward theThe 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue‘Second Islandal Defense Line’ from the ‘First
Islandal Defense Line,’ and that fact shouldbe thoroughly realised. In other words, theseissues should be considered not only fromthe viewpoint of Japan’s territorial disputes,
but also in view of security issues the US
and Australia cannot overlook. Considering
these factors, ensuring ‘maritime security’and ‘control of marine interests’ will become
important for the three countries as a way
to effectively deter aggressive and unlawfuladvances by China.
On the other hand, it is possible to findcommon interests with regional countries,
including China, in ‘maintaining the maritime
order’. This is because it is in the interests ofall the countries and people in the region tomaintain regional maritime order, for example
to prevent terrorist attacks (including
maritime terrorism) by international terroristgroups in association with local groups,
and to address the problems of piracy, drug
smuggling, and people trafficking. There is
no reason for other countries to refuse tocooperate in such responses.
Finally, there is the three allies’ third common
feature: they all manage modern militaryforces. The region includes some countries
with many islands and broad areas topatrol, but quantitatively and qualitatively
inadequate maritime military and police
forces. For example, the media has reported
that North Korea was able to supply
weapons (small arms and mini‑submarines)
to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in thePhilippines. Therefore, the allies will be
responsible for providing capacity-building
and other support acceptable to local people.
The three countries could address suchproblems in cooperation with othercountries, not only under the Proliferation
Security Initiative to control weapons ofmass destruction, but also through aid forthe control of other weapons. In terms of11humanitarian aid, it is still vivid in our memorythat Japan, Australia, and the US swiftly sent
troops for the relief and recovery support
activities after the tsunami disaster of 2004,
and their efforts were welcomed by the
local people.

A regional maritime coalition in thesouthwestern Pacific
The maritime alliance of Japan, Australia andthe US should take responsibilities appropriate
to the three countries’ national power as the
major responsible stakeholders of a regional
maritime coalition in the southwestern
Pacific, which links the Asia–Pacific region
with Oceania and the South Pacific.
Here, ‘maritime coalition’ is defined as a‘global or broader regional nation‑to-nation
coalition with the objective to maintainand secure safe and free use of oceans inpeacetime.’ This kind of coalition does notnecessarily require the entry into force of aninternational agreement or convention, but
can be a multinational network based on
mutual confidence with common concepts.
Therefore, it is possible to enter into a
coalition relationship with any coastal
countries as long as they share common
objectives. In building such a maritime
coalition, each member nation is required totake a responsible role proportionate to thefeatures of the nation or the region. How
countries take responsibility may differ froma country to a country and each country can
decide on what it can contribute.
For example, Japan has a vital interest in themaintenance of sea lanes extending fromsouth of the Suez Canal (or east of the Cape ofGood Hope) to Northeast Asia. Considering
its national situation and national power,
however, the extent of the area for which
Japan can actively take a responsible role willremain from the Northeast Asian seas to theMalacca–Singapore Strait and surrounding12

Proceedings

areas. In the Indian Ocean, west of the strait,
the responsible role can be assigned to thedemocratic maritime nations in East Asia,
led by the major power, India. India will thus
make a more positive contribution to security
cooperation with other maritime democratic
countries, such as Japan, Australia and theUS, and to the global and broader regional
nation‑to-nation coalition to secure free andsafe use of the oceans.
One precondition for accession to such a
regional maritime coalition will be whether anation shares three basic maritime interests
with other countries:• existence—to cooperate in maintaining
the security of the region in peacetime aswell as in emergency or crisis• prosperity—to cooperate and to prosper
together in commerce and trade, as wellas in marine resource development• value—to sincerely pursue theconservation and development of various
benefits the seas can provide, in termsof marine environment protection andmarine resource control.
In short, the basic requirement to join
the coalition is that the nation has noserious dispute over maritime interests or
territories, economic conflicts, or objections
to environmental conservation or thedevelopment of marine resources. Even
if there is a seed of dispute, building a
coalition that allows fair and democratic
ways of solving disputes is essential forthe maintenance of the coalition. More
importantly, the coalition needs to be built
on the action principle of ‘service to others,’
which is based on the concept of diplomacy.
Considering all these factors, it will be thebest to create a coalition among the US
allies (in other words, among the democratic
countries that share the same three interestsin the coalition’s existence, prosperity, andvalue), then add friendly maritime nations

that have those interests and abide by theaction principle of service to others, andeventually expand the coalition to include
other nations. For the moment, Japan,
Australia, and the US can build the core of thecoalition in the southwestern Pacific.

Development into a global maritime
coalition
The Japan–Australia–US maritime allianceshould take the initiative to build theSouthwestern Pacific Maritime Coalitionand cooperate with the creation of otherregional maritime coalitions in the Indian
Ocean (involving India) and in the East Pacific(involving Canada). For Japan, Australia,
and the US, it will be especially important
to ensure the association with India, a key
country in the ‘arc of inseparability’.
Thinking more globally, France and Italy in the
Mediterranean, the United Kingdom in the
North Atlantic, and Germany in Europe could
become major members of US‑led regional
maritime coalitions, founded on the free anddemocratic concept and sharing the common
pursuit of existence, prosperity, and value.
Ultimately, this could lead to the buildingof a global maritime coalition. From Japan’s
perspective, the initiative for a global
maritime coalition coincides with the‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ proposedby former Foreign Minister Aso, and the‘coalition of nations based on common values’
referred to by former Prime Minister Abe
and by current Prime Minister Fukuda, who
promised to promote Abe’s concept in his
diplomatic policies.

The challenge of security cooperation in
the coastal sea lanes
Finally, one important question for global
or regional maritime coalitions is how tosecure the safety of the sea lanes at theirpoints of convergence on the coasts, even if

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

regional maritime coalitions can be formedin those areas. Such areas have been thestages for historic confrontations over theland territories and marine interests of coastal
nations, as demonstrated in the relationships
between Japan, China, Korea, and Russia. In
those areas, the national interests of multiple
countries are intertwined, and it is extremely
difficult to form a cooperative system.
It is not so easy to build a coalition system
in Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia, as thecoastal sea lanes in those regions involve
many seeds of confrontation. For example,
Russia has recently unilaterally declared its
interests in the Arctic Ocean, motivated by
the abundant seabed resources there andby the increased possibility of year-roundnavigation due to global warming. In the East
China Sea and South China Sea, China has
coerced and aggressively advanced toward
oceans, which has led to more confrontations
over territories and marine interests such as
sea‑bottom resources. For Japan, Australia
and the US, coordination with the three
coastal countries of Indonesia, Malaysia andSingapore along the Malacca–Singapore Strait
will be the most important.
Other areas have similar and even more
complicated problems. Around the coastsof the Arabian Peninsula there are religious
confrontations centred on Islam, conflicts
over oil rights and concessions, and a hotbedof international terrorism and piracy. Someor all of those factors are also in play along
East African coasts and in the eastern
Mediterranean. However, it is possible
to develop opportunities to resolve suchproblems in the future if we aim for regional
maritime coalitions among the relevant
coastal countries.
In this sense, it is essential to form regional
maritime coalitions in the oceans first. During
the development of such coalitions, there will
be many opportunities to develop mutual

13

confidence—even between countries withdisputes—and to cooperate with each otherto attain the common target.

4 Conclusion
What Japan and Australia need to do is, first,
to take an initiative with the US to develop
cooperative relationships on the securityof ocean sea lanes in the southwest Pacific,
while solidifying cooperative systems withcoastal countries of major sea lanes such as
the Malacca–Singapore Strait. Moreover, thetwo countries need to develop stronger ties
with countries in the neighbouring Indian
Ocean and East Pacific, as they can form
the axes of regional maritime coalitions toprotect oceanic sea lanes. The Southwestern
Pacific Maritime Coalition can promote
more efforts to conduct policy dialogue
and joint drills between countries. It will beespecially important for economic prosperity
and maritime security to build a stronger
relationship with India.
Nonetheless, it is also necessary to takeevery opportunity and use every channel of
diplomacy and defence connecting regionalcountries, such as direct intergovernmental
dialogues, to realise all these objectives.
It will be important to continue regional
security talks (such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum), the naval dialogue framework (suchas the International Sea Power Symposium
and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium)and forums for dialogue between private
and public sectors (such as those involving
major maritime think‑tanks and institutes).
In the meantime, both governments should
actively use the outcome of those forums andmake efforts at every possible opportunity
to develop mutual confidence between thenavies or other maritime forces of regional
coastal countries.

14

Proceedings

Possible strategic ‘shocks’ in Asia
Dr Rod Lyon
Australian Strategic Policy InstituteStrategic ‘shocks’ in Asia might come in avariety of forms, and in the somewhat gloomy
paper that follows I explore a number ofthem. Of course, much of how we think about
the possible range of shocks depends upon
how we define the key term, ‘shock’. It would
be tiresome merely to revisit the traditional
regional ‘flashpoints’ of The Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Taiwan
and South Asia. Those flashpoints still pose
dangers; indeed, they pose serious dangers.
Any one of them might precipitate a conflictin which the casualties numbered in the
millions. But here we hit the definitional
problem: would it really be much of a ‘shock’
if one of the well-known flashpoints wereto pose more intense problems for theregion? Moreover, if we are happy merely
to rehearse the traditional flashpoints,
aren’t we in danger of overlooking the‘alternative strategic futures’ of Asia? In short,focusing remorselessly on the well-known
flashpoints might well serve to diminish ourunderstanding of what might go seriously
wrong in our region.

What is a ‘shock’?
In this paper I will interpret the term ‘shock’
to mean a radical discontinuity. By thatdefinition, North Korea’s continuing to bea problem wouldn’t be a shock to anyone.
North Korea’s penchant for abrupt, bizarre
and often self-destructive policy initiatives
is so well known that a wide range of
behaviour is now tolerated by the region
under the rubric that it is merely typical of
the regime’s eccentricities. True, it mightchoose to behave even more bizarrely, but
the difference would essentially be one ofdegree. Even a more erratic, more threatening
North Korea wouldn’t be a ‘shock’. Rather,

North Korea’s transformation to a liberal,
engaged democracy would be a shock; apleasant shock, perhaps, but certainly a shock,a ‘radical discontinuity’ in the genuine senseof the term.
I would also argue that a focus on
discontinuities actually captures most ofwhat interests us about where the region
might be going. Discontinuities often have an
explanatory power in international relationsat least as profound as that provided byhistorical continuities. In the discipline ofinternational relations, such a claim mightwell be disputed. After all, much of thediscipline emphasises the slow, grinding
nature of change in the international system.
The natural inclination of any analyst
attempting to forecast the future is to look forthe existing trends and then to assume thatthose trends will continue.
But over the past  years, for example, thetrends from the world of 1987 have probably
been less influential in shaping where we aretoday than have the major discontinuities of
the intervening years: the end of the Cold War,the Asian Financial Crisis, and 9/11 perhaps
most prominent amongst them. An analyst
projecting forward from 1987’s trends would
now be sadly astray, for even the end of theCold War by 1990 was largely invisible to thebulk of strategic analysts in the mid-1980s.
By comparison, an analyst who had madebetter allowance in 1987 for possible
discontinuities in global and regional patterns
might be closer to the mark. I say ‘might’ becloser to the mark, because here we hit the
primary snag of forecasting on the basis ofpossible strategic shocks: there are many
more potential discontinuities than evercome true. After all, just about all patternsof stable behaviour might shift. How do weknow which ones will? The brutal answer isthat we don’t know. Even the usual metrics
of likelihood and importance seem to offer

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialoguepoor guidance. There was scarcely a bettercase during most of the 1980s for arguingthat the Soviet Union was likely to collapse
than for claiming that Western alliances were.
Similarly, there was barely a better case forbelieving that a major catastrophic terrorist
attack would be the most important potential
discontinuity of 2001 rather than the souring
of US–China relations earlier that same year.
Despite those methodological hurdles, there’s
a new bout of interest in spotting possible
strategic discontinuities in Asia. Pentagon
official, James Shinn, delivered a paper at
the IISS’s 2007 Geneva conference in which
he explored possible ‘Black Swan’ events in
Asia.1 The term ‘Black Swan’ comes from a
recently published book by Nassim Nicholas
Taleb, called The Black Swan: The Impact of theHighly Improbable. The ‘Black Swan’ category
describes events with three key features:
rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective(though not prospective) predictability.
(This essentially means that in hindsightpeople believe that what occurred wasentirely predictable!)
Shinn’s list contained a mixed bag ofpossibilities, including:•

another tsunami in Southeast Asia,
somewhere along the Belt of Fire•

human to human avian flu breaks out on
Sumatra or Java•

another EP-3-type military accident, in theair, afloat, or even under the sea—perhapsa Chinese submarine surfaces under a US
aircraft carrier, rather than just astern•a shooting war starts across the Taiwan
Straits•

a nuclear warhead is mounted on a
Taepodong missile on a launch pad inNorth Korea•

a nuclear device appears to be on board amerchant ship in the Pacific headed who
knows where•15

a coup in Thailand, the Philippines,
or Pakistan.

Not all of those possibilities seem—to mymind, at least—entirely in line with thecategory definitions of a Black Swan outlined
earlier. Some events on the list, a coup in thePhilippines, for example, or a naval incident
at sea, seem unlikely to have extreme impact;
others, a shooting war in the Taiwan Straits,
would in certain conditions seem entirely
predictable. In terms of the definitions ofBlack Swans originally provided by Taleb,
it is possible that Mr Shinn’s examples
actually include numerous ‘gray swans’.2
Gray swans represent our attempt to think
our way down paths that are unlikely rather
than unpredictable.
Taleb’s thesis, of course, is that theworld—and not merely Asia—is headed forthe ungentle terrain of ‘Extremistan’, a place
where events are shaped disturbingly by aprocess of fractal randomness. To be a Black
Swan, an event does not have to be merely
rare, or wild, ‘it has to be unexpected, has
to lie outside our tunnel of possibilities.’3 In
mathematical terms, many of Taleb’s Black
Swans occur more than twenty standard
deviations from the mean. In a world wherea measure of three standard deviations
is usually taken to suggest statisticalimprobability, it is in this sense that Black
Swan events are genuinely unforeseeable.
Unfortunately, that means Taleb’s thesis
doesn’t help us much in identifying the
emerging Black Swans. If such events are
genuinely unforeseeable, what point in trying
to foresee them? We may have no option but
to settle for an analysis of events that are
predictable to some extent, and which might‘shock’ or reverse the currently rather benign
patterns of Asia–Pacific security. This might
happen in a number of ways. If we imagine
certain future scenarios is which we ask ‘What
happened to make the good Asia–Pacific go16

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bad?’ then it seems to me there are several
possible discontinuities that could have a
profoundly destabilising effect on the region.
I propose to look briefly at five such futuristic
historical plots:
1. the Asia in which a ‘stew’of non‑traditional security
issues—everything from environmentalpressures, to high sex-ratio imbalances,to pandemics, ageing populations and a
failure of urbanisation—combined to drive
the region into protracted crisis
2. the Asia in which domestic modernisation
derailed in key Asian countries
3. the Asia in which economic
interdependence gave way toeconomic competition
4. the Asia that slid into nuclear proliferation
and a world of nuclear hazard
5. the Asia that followed the historicaltrajectory of Europe’s past and fell into
great-power conflict.
Of those five ‘shocked’ Asias, the last two are
the result of tensions typical of traditional
conflict paths, but the first three emerge
from failures in the broader agenda ofdomestic development patterns, economics
and non-traditional security. I think therelative balance between the different sorts
of failures—the narrow, traditional and thebroad, non-traditional—is actually aboutright. The traditional security pressures
are relatively well managed in Asia, largely
because of the security structure put in place
after the Second World War, the comparative
strategic weakness of the main Asian players
over the decades since, and the fact thatthe theatre was a ‘second front’ during theCold War. Of course, that security structureis decaying, so some ‘shocked’ Asias can beforeseen down that path. But Asian security
has for some decades had something of abroader ‘developmental’ pattern to it, and it
would be entirely reasonable to suppose thatsome Black Swans might emerge within thatbroader arena.  
All five shocks are about things that generate
big waves in the region and possibly beyond
it. Generating big waves is not easy to do:
Asia is a large region, so large that we havetraditionally seen it as a set of regional
security sub-complexes. In this sense, I havenot attempted to include ‘single-state’
failures on this list of shocks. Undoubtedly,
some single-state failures—China’s failure,
for example—could be profoundly disturbing.
But in general, I have tried to concentrate hereon broader patterns of change that might
be shocking.

First shock: the stew of
non‑traditional security pressures
Asia is the world’s great region of successful
modernisation. The success of development
strategies across broad swathes of the region
has enhanced levels of human security
for hundreds of millions of people. It has
also eased perceptions that security is azero‑sum game. Modernisation has depended
prominently upon strategies of urbanisationand industrialisation. Urbanisation assists theaccumulation of both capital and labour andso is central to the development path.
But it might be worth thinking about an
Asia where those strategies were subject
to sudden reversal. In that Asia, higheconomic dynamism ‘eats’ the environment,
and environmental outcomes become
suddenly acute: a scenario that is notentirely fanciful given what we know fromprevious environmental shift patterns. We
do know that great powers can ruin theirown environment: the USSR did so, so thereis, sadly, nothing to suggest that Asian
great powers will automatically be blessedwith the wisdom to avoid such outcomes.
Moreover, we need to consider this possible
outcome in the light of human ignorance

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

about the environment overall: we know
less about the global environment than anineteenth-century physician knew about thehuman body. We simply don’t understand its
workings well enough to know what actions
cause what effects. In those circumstances,rapid growth strategies for a large fractionof the world’s population might easily induce
environmental crises.
Urbanisation itself may break down in many
parts of Asia. As a world, we are long past
the time when large cities were thought torepresent the pinnacle of national greatness.
Many of the mega-cities of the world today
are no longer like the London and Parisof yesteryear. In many parts of the world,
cities attest to national weakness: Lagos isa prime example. When Robert Kaplan was
writing of ‘the coming anarchy’, he drew
prominently upon the West African urban
condition as a metaphor for the future of
the world: ‘because the demographic realityof West Africa is a countryside draining into
dense slums by the coast, ultimately theregion’s rulers will come to reflect the valuesof these shanty-towns.’4
Asia’s future success story depends upon
the linked strategies of urbanisation andmodernisation working. Asia, simply
because of its population, will have multiple
mega‑cities, but global experience indesigning, constructing and managing
mega-cities is still relatively limited.
Asia is also beset by looming demographic
problems: ageing populations, the ‘barebranches’5 of high sex-ratios because of thepreference for male offspring, and actual
population contraction are driving several
Asian countries into unfamiliar demographic
terrain. A regional or global pandemic which,like the 1918 Spanish flu, naturally targeted
the younger members of a population (thosewith lower exposure to a variety of flu strains
during their lives) might well pose serious

17

problems for the emerging demographic
profiles in the region.
In fact, this first ‘shocked’ Asia, an Asia
beset by a stew of non-traditional securitypressures is actually a relatively easy one toenvisage. It is one that Dr Alan Dupont, forexample, has explored in his book, East Asia
Imperilled.6 Dupont argues that a new classof transnational, non-military threats has
the potential to reverse decades of hard-won
development across the region. It is a scenario
we should take seriously.

Second shock: domestic failuresacross Asia
The importance of domestic politics in Asian
security is the theme behind the latest
National Bureau of Asian Research’s volume
in its Strategic Asia series.7 Asia’s strategic
stability has been largely based upon a setof domestic success stories: stories that—in
turn—are essentially based upon general
patterns of regional good governance andnational transformation. Regional dynamism
is based at the micro-level upon an interlinked
pattern of national dynamism.
So, we must look at what might constitutea set of national discontinuities. Almost all
the major Asian countries are in some kind ofpolitical transitions, even Japan and Australia.
For some of those countries, the transitions
will be deeply transformative. Overall, we
are witnessing a mix of leadership change,
institutional alteration and important societal
change across the region. It is unclear wheremost of those developments are headed.
Thomas Carothers in an important article for
the Journal of Democracy in 2002 argued that
we were witnessing ‘the end of the transition
paradigm’.8 Most of the regimes experiencing
transitional modernisation pressures would,
Carothers argued, fail to become mature
democracies and would live for the long termin a political ‘gray zone’.

18

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Australia’s former Secretary of Defence, Mr Ric
Smith, presented a paper in Singapore whichinvestigated some potential challenges for
the Asian security environment.9 His rangeof possible risks included risks of ‘domestic
political management’, because agendas of
economic reform have in many countries
easily outpaced the domestic political reforms
that typically accompany them. In China,
Vietnam, Pakistan and Burma, for example,
those risks are most easily seen; and in thosecountries it is not at all apparent how politicalsystems can evolve in stabilising ways. Beyond
those cases, there is a much broader swatheof countries where political transitions have
not yet been consolidated: Thailand, thePhilippines and Indonesia, for example.
Recent academic research on international
security has led us to place an increased
emphasis on regime types as a key
determinant of conflict patterns. So how
Asian domestic politics flex and adjust overcoming years is important to security ina broad regional sense, and not merely alocalised, national one. In Asia, domestic
priorities often shape foreign and strategic
policies. China, for example, has built a foreign
policy to sustain its domestic priorities ofgrowth and stability. In a region which hasoften embraced a non-intervention principle
in relation to issues of domestic politics,
we are all steadily becoming more engaged
in precisely those sorts of issues. Regional
security could not help but be affected wereseveral regional countries to slide backwards
into older-style authoritarian regimes.

Third shock: economic
competition?; a new wave ofprotectionism?
So far the pace of economic developmentin Asia has been a clear positive factor for
Asian security. Putting it somewhat crudely,
the region has been ready to agree to forms

of interdependence where everybody makes
money. Economic relationships have easily
outpaced security relationships. Tradehas been a driver of economic growth,and, in many cases, a driver of politicalmodernisation as well. The region as awhole has been ‘driven by growth’, to use
James Morley’s phrase.10
The main effect of that increasing
interdependence has been, principally,
to soften a set of unresolved historicalantagonisms. But this has not been the caseacross the board: just to look briefly at Japan’s
own case, for example, Japan’s economic
integration with its neighbours has increased
but Japan’s level of security seems to haveworsened as its neighbours’ economic power
has increased. Geopolitical outcomes havelong been about more than interdependence
and this remains true in Asia today.
But just as trade and interdependence canhave positive outcomes, they can also spur
negative policy outcomes, which also ripple
into the security area. So far the region has
side-stepped a fear about relative gains,because of its preference for absolute gains(a policy preference typical of countries at alow level on the development trajectory). But
can that preference last? Much would seemto depend on the condition of great-power
relationships. Under what circumstances cansome regional powers remain indifferent
to the rapid escalation of others in terms of
power assets? Christopher Layne once wrotethat economic growth rates would be thebasis for undoing unipolarity at the global
level. They will almost certainly be the basis
for a new regional security order in Asia.
So perceptions of economic outcomesmust become sharper as those growth
rates begin to suggest a more fundamental
rearrangement of the regional security
order. In that rearrangement, perceptions ofThe 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogueeconomic growth as a ‘win-win’ outcome will
start to decline as perceptions of a shiftingorder suggest a more definite set of ‘winners’
and ‘losers’ in Asia.
That suggest the current condition, where
regional tensions about differential growth
rates are muted, can’t last. It is alreadyapparent that the key US–China trade link
is under stress. The US Treasury Secretary,
Henry Paulson has described the link ascharacterised by three dynamics: deepening
interdependence, a strained policy consensus,
and the rise of economic protectionism.11
He noted that ‘the tectonic plates’ of the
US–China economic relationship were
shifting, as perceptions of outcomes
became sharper. The same dynamic
already characterises many of the bilateral
economic relationships between the region’s
great powers.

Fourth ‘shock’: nuclear proliferation
The Asia–Pacific region has grown vigorously
in an environment where the pressuresof nuclear dynamism have been relatively
contained: contained by what Mitchell Reiss
would call the ‘bridled ambitions’ of mostregional states.12 Those bridled ambitions havebeen augmented by two particularly usefulmechanisms: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and the associated elements ofthat regime; and the US doctrine of extended
nuclear deterrence (END). But what would ittake for the ambitions to become unbridled?
A breakdown in the current pattern is most
likely to be driven by a failure in one orboth of the key mechanisms outlined in thepreceding paragraph:•

A breakdown of the extended nuclear
deterrence system, either through US
disengagement (highly unlikely) oran erosion of the credibility of the US
guarantee (more likely).

•19

A breakdown of the NPT regime, inparticular by the move of status-quo
powers towards the development ofindigenous nuclear arsenals– such proliferation is most likely to occur
initially outside the region (e.g. in the
Middle East), but would probably notremain isolated there.

The Asia Pacific is already a multipolar
nuclear region (with US, Russia, China, India,
Pakistan, and, perhaps, DPRK all ranked as
nuclear-weapon states). Indeed, only Britain
and France and Israel stand as NWS outside
the region. Of the current Asian powers, only
the US has ever ‘extended’ nuclear deterrence
to others, and that system was devised fora different world. New strategic pressures
are flowing through Asia, the result of amuch more complex security landscape.
Nuclear proliferation is a worry and its effects
uncertain; to echo William Walker’s judgment,
it might reflect a breakdown in the strategicorder as well as in the nuclear one. It mightalso generate a new security order so complex
as to undo any prospects for great power
cooperation on regional public order goods.
Nuclear proliferation might have somestabilising effects. It’s possible that somestrategic rivalries might be ‘contained’ by
the sobering prospects that those rivalries
might escalate into costly contests. But
there would be an obvious edginess tointernational politics in Asia were theregion to host perhaps double the numberof nuclear-weapon states that it currently
does. Variations in arsenal sizes, different
levels of vulnerability to preemptive
strikes, asymmetries in conventional force
capabilities, and uncertainties about national
red-lines, nuclear thresholds and targetingstrategies would all make for a moredangerous Asia Pacific. That Asia would be aregion replete with nuclear hazard.

20

Proceedings

Fifth ‘shock’: great power conflict inAsia
I think this ‘shock’ has long been a concernof academics and international relations
scholars. In particular it calls to mind Aaron
Friedberg’s scenario, that Asia’s future might
be Europe’s past.13 Such a future would be
profoundly shaped by the unreconciled
great-power tensions in Asia. The region
has no historical experience of all the great
powers being strong simultaneously, andno experience of systematised security
cooperation between those powers.
We are inclined to think of discontinuities
as abrupt events, much like the suddennessof the terrorist attacks on 9/11. But inthis scenario, I think the fundamental
discontinuities would reflect shifts in thedeep, slower-moving layers of international
relations. It might plausibly be argued thata discontinuity could still be fundamentally
important even though it assumed a more
protracted form. In this sense, for example,
the gradual breakdown of Robert Ross’s
bipolar Asian security ‘structure’ (a structure
characterised by a dominant maritime power
and a dominant continental power14) canbe thought of as a particularly importantdiscontinuity. The move by the continental
power into the maritime domain is certainly
a profound strategic development, raising as
it does a host of issues about possible conflictand cooperation.
It is certainly true that the Asia of great-power
conflict is not destined to arise. On the otherside of the balance to the forces outlined
above, we need to place the two factorsthat John Ikenberry would typically identify
as constraining great-power conflict acrossthe globe:•

nuclear weapons•

the existence of an OECD ‘system’
that is more than the prominence of asingle power.

Nuclear weapons I have spoken about earlier.
The OECD ‘system’ seems to presuppose
the broad continuance of the world orderin its current shape. World orders are slow
to change, but not immune from change.
At a time when global power is in any
event shifting to Asia, it is entirely possiblethat we are witnessing the transition toa new global order, one less coloured byWestern preferences.
Great power conflict is a relatively rare thing,especially if we talk in particular about thosegreat power conflicts that draw others in (seeJack Levy’s identification of nine such ‘world
wars’ in the international system since 1475).15
But while great-power conflict is genericallyrare, it is a relatively common thing at times ofmajor power transitions. And such transitions
now loom in Asia.

Implications for Australia and Japan
None of the shocks sketched above are within
the control of Australia or Japan, althougheach country, singly and together, can and do
pursue policies intended to ease some of theshocks. We already do some things to offset
the non-traditional security challenges aroundthe region, and the bilateral security pact
concluded in 2007 provides a framework fordoing more. Similarly, both countries work to
deflect pressures for nuclear breakout and to
reinforce the current set of non-proliferation
norms across the region. We both work toease the coming ‘great-power transition’that looms in the next twenty years, and sowork to reduce the prospects for great-power
conflict in the region. On the other hand,
we have little scope to affect the internal
political dynamics of key players, regardlessof whether those dynamics concern politicaladjustment to the pressures of modernisationor emerging demographic profiles.
Some of the Asias depicted above are wellbeyond our ability to shape. But it will remain
important for our two countries to work

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

together in a region that promises to be amore turbulent one than what we have beenused to.

Conclusion
The Asian security environment does
have a downside as well as an upside. I’ve
concentrated here on ‘things that might
go wrong’, rather than ‘things that might
go right’. The latter would clearly be thesubject of a different paper. I’ve concentrated
here on two different sorts of ‘shocks’: theshocks of modernisation as it were, and theshocks of interstate rivalry. They are notentirely disconnected, though neither dothey necessarily cascade into each other. Asa direct strategic problem, managing thecomplex power transitions in Asia look likely
to be one of the key problems of our time.
But we will have to manage those transitions
as part of an even more complex tapestryof problems at both the regional and theglobal levels.  

Endnotes1

2

3James Shinn (2007) ‘Tracking Asia’s Black
Swans’, Remarks prepared for the IISS
Global Strategic Review, “Managing Global
Security and Risk”, Geneva 7-9 September.
Copy available at http://www.iiss.
org/conferences/global-strategic-review/
plenary-sessions/plenary-session-2
Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007) The
Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly
Improbable (New York: Random House).
For a treatment of the ‘gray swan’phenomenon, see Chapters 14 ff.
Taleb, p.213.

4 Robert Kaplan (2000) The Coming Anarchy:
Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War(New York: Vintage Books) p.12
5

Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer(2005) Bare Branches: The Security

21

Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male
Population (Cambridge, MA: The
MIT  Press).
6 Alan Dupont (2001) East Asia
Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to
Security (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press).
7

Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (2007) (eds.)
Strategic Asia 2007-08: Domestic Political
Change and Grand Strategy (Seattle: NBR).

8 Thomas Carothers (2002) ‘The end of
the transition paradigm’, Journal of
Democracy. 13,1: 5-21
9 Ric Smith (2007) ‘Australia and Asia:
Managing Change, Managing Risk’,
RSIS Distinguished Lecture, Singapore,
26 November.
10 James Morley (1998) (ed.) Driven by
Growth: Political Change in the Asia-PacificRegion (M.E. Sharpe).
11 Henry Paulson (2007) ‘Remarks on
Managing Complexity and Establishing
New Habits of Cooperation in US-China
Economic Relations’, 2007 George
Bush US-China Relations Conference,
23 October. Available at http://treasury.
gov/press/releases/hp633.htm
12 Mitchell Reiss Bridled Ambition: Why
Countries Constrain their Nuclear
Capabilities (Washington: Woodrow
Wilson Center).
13 Aaron Friedberg (2000) ‘Will Europe’s pastbe Asia’s future?’ Survival, 42,3: 147-160
14 See Robert Ross (1999) ‘The Geographyof the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first
Century’, International Security, 23,4: 81-118
15 Jack Levy (1983) War in the Modern GreatPower System, 1495-1975 (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky).

22

Proceedings

Emerging Asia–Pacific security
architectures:the Australia–
Japan factor
Professor William T Tow
Australian National University

Historical shifts in international security
relations often occur unexpectedly andambiguously. Lord Grey’s famous warning at
the outset of the First World War that ‘thelights were going out all over Europe’ hardly
anticipated monumental change evoked by
the demise of that continent’s century-old
concert system of order-building. Nor has
the end of the Cold War—contrary to the
expectations of many observers—spelled
the end of the American-led Eurasian
network of security alliances.1 Instead, NATOhas expanded eastward to underwrite theemergence of a ‘new Europe’ forged from theold Soviet empire. The US postwar systemof bilateral Pacific alliances, meanwhile,
has been renovated to hedge against arising People’s Republic of China (PRC) andto confront terrorism, nuclear proliferationand other ‘asymmetrical threats’. Nearly
two decades after the fall of the USSR, the US
alliance system remains the most cohesive
regional security mechanism operating in
the Asia Pacific, with Japan and Australia
constituting its two key components.
Pressures are intensifying within the region,
however, to complement and eventually
to supplant this alliance system with moreregionally indigenous organisations or‘architectures’. The East Asian Summit (EAS)
has perhaps captured the most attention
as a likely instrument for shaping suchchange. The ‘ASEAN + 3’ (APT) process was
initially a response by the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China,
Japan and South Korea to perceived economic
barriers imposed by the United States, theEuropean Community and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) that led to the 1997–98

Asian Financial Crisis.2 Some Asian states(i.e. Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea)
resented the IMF view that this crisis waslargely precipitated by the inefficiencies andinflexibility of various market-state processes
for wealth creation and managementthat characterise much of East Asia’s
economic growth.
As a result, a question arose among regional
policy-planners as to whether it was ‘possible
to create a regional political architecture
which would allow regional elites to promote
their preferred visions of transnational
cooperation while simultaneously preserving
regional autonomy?’3 In addressing thatquestion, the APT gradually evolved into theEast Asian Summit, which initially convened
in December 2005, in Kuala Lumpur andincluded the thirteen APT states plus
Australia, New Zealand and India. China andMalaysia spearheaded an ‘East Asian-centric’
formula for establishing the EAS as an
exclusivist organisation, reflecting a ‘bloc
politics’ approach to regional politico-security
identity. This proved to be unsuccessful; Japan,
Singapore and Indonesia fought effectively forthe adoption of a more inclusive, ‘pan‑Asian’model for EAS development. 4 Japan’s Prime
Minister Koizumi had already proposed(in January 2002) his idea for an ‘Asian
Community’ that would employ the APT for‘secur(ing) prosperity and stability’ in East Asiaand apply ‘open, transparent and inclusive
processes’ for institutional development.5
Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe, further
refined Koizumi’s vision of open regionalism
by adding a distinctly ideological component
to it. His advocacy for creating a Eurasian ‘arcof freedom and prosperity’ directly challenged
proponents of ‘Asian values’, and proscribed
the conscious ascendancy of ‘emerging andmature democracies’.6
The Abe government’s zero-sum outlook on
regional organisation, embracing state-centric
ideological orientation as a predominant

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

component for security organisation,
contests ASEAN’s (and, more recently,
China’s) traditional blueprint for regional
security. Strengthening security ties withboth Australia and India, moreover, weredeemed as integral by the Abe government,
and led to Japanese efforts to forge a‘quadrilateral’ security coalition involving
Australia, India, Japan and the United States.
However, the Japanese expectation that theother proposed affiliates would embrace
this formula proved to be incorrect. Only
the United States seriously contemplated
operationalising Abe’s vision; Australia andIndia were wary of it. The Abe government’s
passing in September 2007 was a benchmark
in Japanese regional security diplomacy. Bylate November, Japan’s new Prime Minister,Yasuo Fukukda was strongly endorsing aten-year ‘ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work
Plan’ that would underwrite the creation of
an ASEAN Community by 2015 and promotesecurity community-building through both
the APT and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).7
The vestiges of any Japanese ‘containment
revisited’ strategy directed toward China wereclearly buried when Fukuda visited China
in late December. He supported what hetermed a ‘strategically reciprocal partnership’
between China and Japan. He also positedthat the US–Japan alliance best worked
as a ‘contributor to peace and stability inthe region, which means cordial and open
relations with all nations in the region.’8
This chapter will initially identify and assess
those policy interests and questions that bothcurrently unite and potentially complicate
Australian–Japanese interaction on regional
security architectures. The two countries’
respective alliances with the United States,
their relations with China, and selected‘transnational’ or ‘alternative security’ issues
are assessed. It will then briefly evaluate how
and why Australia and Japan have pursued
multilateral security and economic-security

23

politics and to what extent that pursuit has
been successful. The chapter’s conclusion
offers policy recommendations that
Canberra and Tokyo could ponder regarding
future collaboration in regional security
community building without undermining
their still highly valued bilateral alliance ties
with the United States.

Architectural dynamics: backgroundand challenges
Disagreement prevails over what actuallyconstitutes ‘security architecture’. When
proposing a Conference on Security
Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) in July 1990,
Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans
envisioned ‘a wholly new institutional processthat might be capable of evolving, in Asia justas in Europe, as a framework for addressing
and resolving security problems.’9 However,what specific organising principles should
be applied to realise such a process remains
contested. Evans’ vision of incorporating a
European model (the Conference for Security
Cooperation in Europe, CSCE) to address
Asian security problems was not received
favourably by many within Asia. Many Asianelites continued adherence to realist thought,
comfortable with their existing notionsof international hierarchy and convincedthat new power blocs or tacit great power
concerts would prevail over norm-based
regional institutions in the post-Cold War
Asian security environment. ASEAN’s vision of
Asian institutionalism, allegedly predicated onregionally indigenous values, never fully tookhold as Southeast Asian elites instead hedged
between accommodating and balancing
Chinese and American power.10
While a precise definition of ‘architectures’has continued to elude regional policy-makers
and analysts, debate over how to shapeand refine them has intensified. By 2007,
Southeast Asian policy leaders were referring
to architecture-building as embodying ‘…a24

Proceedings

loose, overlapping pattern of partnerships
formed around functional areas of interest
with varying memberships and varying
agendas’.11 Critics of this view argue thata preoccupation with crafting new andincreasingly complicated ‘architectures’merely obfuscates the task of integrating
the many instrumentalities and mechanisms
already established in ways that would
better ensure regional stability.12 No realconsensus has yet materialised, however, on
what strategy can best serve that purpose.
As integral participants at both the bilateraland multilateral levels of Asia–Pacific security
politics, however, Japan and Australia canplay a key role in reconciling the region’svarious perspectives of appropriate security
policy infrastructure.

Intra-alliance management
A first step is to identify areas of potential
complementarity between the traditional US
bilateral ‘hub and spokes’ regional alliancenetwork and the region’s burgeoning
multilateral security forums. This will not
be easy as challenges related to shifting
national security interests and traditional
US resistance to multilateral security politics
in the region must be overcome. Both
Australia and Japan, moreover, have newnational leaderships (the Rudd and Fukuda
governments, respectively) while the UnitedStates is now immersed in a national election
process that renders the Bush administration
less effective in formulating long-term US
national security policy for the remainder of
its term.
Although in power only a short time,
the new Australian Government led by
Kevin Rudd has already demonstrated its
zeal for environmental politics. It has ratified
the Kyoto accord and, of more symbolic
consequence to Japan, is monitoring
adherence to international anti-whaling
accords in the Antarctic.13 Japanese officials

warned that they would ‘not tolerate
any moves to obstruct our researchwhaling program’ before backing down tointernational pressure and promising tosuspend its killing of humpback whales.14
Also, in a move perceived as a refutation of
the Bush administration’s Middle East policy,
Rudd has served notice that Australia will
be withdrawing its combat forces from Iraq
during 2008.
The Fukuda government’s softer lineon the PRC relative to the Koizumi–Abe
administrations has already been noted. This
modified Japanese posture towards China—
the country that most observers view to be
the burgeoning ‘peer competitor’ to American
power and influence in Asia—renders
doubtful any prospect for ‘threat oriented’,multilateral security arrangements such as
the quadrilateral coalition of democracies,
initially envisioned by Abe and strongly
supported by key Bush administration
officials such as Vice-President Dick Cheney.
Japanese domestic political infighting has
also spilled over to impede Fukuda’s ability
to sustain Japanese naval refuelling support
to US military operations in Afghanistan.
Although legislation was eventually passed in
mid-January 2008 to revive this operation, theepisode highlighted Japan’s growing internal
political divisions over supporting US global
strategy relative to Japanese constitutional
restraints on defence policy.15
Intra-alliance policy management is thus
becoming a more difficult undertaking for
all three governments. Ongoing, ‘functional’,
alliance collaboration continues among thethree allies in such areas as missile defence
research and testing, maritime patrollingof key sea lanes of communication andintelligence-sharing. Without widespreadconsensus over what constitutes the ‘generalinterest’ of alliance affiliation, however, thetask confronting policy-makers in Australia,
Japan and the United States of ‘bridging’The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks
in ways that can produce robust approaches
to shaping regional stability becomes
more difficult.16
Traditional US resistance to multilateral
security politics in the region compounds
such ‘bridging’ difficulties. This was
initially illustrated by George H W Bush’s
administration’s strong opposition to
Gareth Evans’ CSCA proposal. Worried that it
would focus on arms control measures that
could limit US naval power in the Pacific, anddisillusioned by the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization’s (SEATO’s) failure to replicate
NATO’s brand of American-dominatedmultilateralism in Europe, US Secretary ofState James Baker requested that Australia
withdraw its proposal. Baker’s request was
supported by the then Japanese government,
concerned that any intensification ofmultilateral security politics would weaken
the US commitment to its bilateral security
treaty with Japan.17
Little has since changed. George W Bush’s
administration has strongly signalled its
preference for maintaining a hub andspokes alliance strategy in Asia as part ofits broader campaign to balance potential
contenders for hegemony in the Asia Pacific(e.g. containing China or collaborating
selectively with India). US Deputy Secretaryof State John Negroponte insisted in May
2007 testimony before the US House ofRepresentatives’ Committee on Foreign
Affairs that the ongoing US strategic presence
and its bilateral alliances remained the‘bedrock’ of its Asia policy.18
US skepticism of ‘cooperative multilateralism’
stems from Washington’s past problems
in addressing key Asia–Pacific regional
security crises in the post-Cold War era.
The 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis andthe subsequent failure of the Korea Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) regime

25

to induce acceptable North Korean nuclear
policy behaviour, for example, clearly swayed
the George W Bush administration to reject
President Clinton’s growing reliance on
multilateral Asian security dialogues. Morerecent American perceptions that China has
employed multilateral security diplomacy
via its ‘New Security Concept’ to contest
US strategic influence in the region, andChina’s initiative with Russia and various
Central Asian states to form the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization as a counter toNATO activities in Afghanistan are illustrativeof US concerns.19
Both the Clinton and George W Bushadministrations have been less reluctant
to explore a variant of multilateral security
cooperation in Asia known as ‘minilateralism’.
As defined here, ‘minilateral’ arrangementsare ‘ad hoc’ policy coalitions, usually involving
three or four core states, who may be but
are not always, allied formally but who
affiliate to resolve a specific issue or issues.
Minilaterals may differ from classical alliances
because they are not always ‘threat-centric’and indeed often underwrite or perpetuate
strategic reassurance or confidence-building
arrangements.20 They are frequently
regarded, however, as useful mechanisms
for coordinating mutual interests ‘beyond
bilateralism’ when such coordination promises
to maximise their collective strategic position
within a regional or global balance of power.
Minilateral security cooperation is most likely
to occur when potential rivals to minilateralist
partners are not yet so threatening as topreclude confidence-building and other formsof cooperative security behaviour.21
Early post-Cold War ‘minilaterals’ in Asia weremainly designed under such circumstances.
They included KEDO, the US–Japan–South
Korea Trilateral and Oversight Group (TCOG)
to coordinate diplomacy toward Pyongyang
following the North Korean Taepodong

26

Proceedings

missile test in 1998, the Four Powers Talks onstabilising the Korean Peninsula and ‘Jakarta
Workshop’ participants (China and ASEAN
claimants) to address territorial disputes in
the South China Sea. The Trilateral Strategic
Dialogue (TSD), created in 2002 and upgradedto the ministerial level in 2005, is anotherexample. Represented by Australia, Japanand the United States as a mechanism forstrengthening the exchange and coordinationof their approaches to ‘non-traditional’ as wellas threat-centric regional and international
security problems, the TSD is nevertheless‘threat-centric’ to the extent that Chinese
power and the North Korean threat are
inevitably discussed in this forum. The
question of to what extent this dialogue will
mature beyond the ‘talking shop’ stage ofministers or their immediate subordinates
to develop a concrete general purpose andcorresponding organisational attributes is still
an open one.22
Minilateralism arguably replicates the
exclusivist and hierarchical characteristics of
the US-led bilateral alliance network in the
Asia Pacific. The ‘senior’ or most powerfulally usually initiates a security coalition
in response to an issue or crisis that is of
direct concern to itself. There is usually no
independent secretariat or other executive
component established to represent or
negotiate possible differences that may arise
among minilateral affiliates. The possible
transformation of the Six Party Talks format
into a more permanent Northeast AsianRegional Peace and Security Structure may,
however, constitute a test of how wellminilateral groupings formed to manage aparticular security issue—in this case theNorth Korean nuclear problem—can evolve
into a brand of multilateralsm capable ofaddressing a wider range of Asia–Pacificsecurity issues.

Australia, its alliances and the ‘China
factor’For Australian national security planners,
reconciling ongoing American and Japanesepropensities to apply minilateralism as ameans of strengthening alliance politics
with China’s obvious apprehensions overthis trend is essential. One analyst has
recently and aptly outlined this problem:
bilateral Australia–Japan security links candevelop in parallel with these two countries
existing bilateral security alliances with the
US only if all three states share perceptions
and interests of regional security, and if
Washington does not promote a ‘miniature
NATO-type organisation’ designed tocontain China.23 Australia does not view its
American alliance, or its increasingly robust
bilateral security relationship with Japan,
as components of a containment posturedirected toward China. Australia’s trading
relationship with the PRC is expanding
dramatically. Thus, the ‘China factor’ is a
key dimension of the new Australian Labor
government’s effort to remain ‘a good US ally’
but a ‘more independent one.’ Kevin Rudd
signalled consistently during his October/
November 2007 election campaign that hewill be less prone to endorse nearly every US
position on international security than was his
immediate predecessor.24
From the Trilateral Security Dialogue’s
outset in 2002, Chinese officials andanalysts have directed low-key criticism
towards it as a potential instrument ofanti-China containment.25 They became
especially concerned when TSD consultations
were scheduled to convene during the
September 2007 Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit and by theprospect that those discussions would
endorse an initiative to expand the TSD into aquadrilateral alliance involving India. Chinese
President Hu Jintao had already expressed
his personal displeasure over ‘exploratory

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

sidetalks’ held between India and the TSD
states during the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) security policy meeting in Manila
on 24–25 May 2007.26 He subsequently
engineered a diplomatic counter-initiative
to neutralise the TSD by persuading theHoward government to announce a bilateralSino–Australian strategic dialogue at APEC.27
Although this initiative was launched withsome fanfare, it should be noted that Japanand the United States have long maintained
separate bilateral dialogues with the PRC.
The timing and effect of the announcement
was, however, assigned greater emphasis by
the PRC than whatever actual substance such
Sino–Australian dialogue might yield.
As key regional US allies, how Japan andAustralia relate to Asian crisis spots or‘flashpoints’ is carefully observed by and,
when possible, influenced by Washington.
Taiwan and North Korea remain the two
major unresolved regional security issues
emanating from the Cold War. Accessible
sea lanes of communication are also a mainconcern, as are nuclear proliferation andregional links to international terrorism.
Due largely to uncompromising Chinese
insistence that Taiwan remains a strictlyinternal affair; the fate of that island polity
has not been incorporated into regional
multilateral security agendas. China has
worked assiduously, for example, to preclude
any discussion of the Taiwan Strait at APEC’s
Heads-of-State summits.
The question of what Japan and Australia
would actually do if the PRC were to attack
Taiwan, however, is very much alive as acentral issue of American alliance politics
in the Pacific. This issue draws attention tothe overriding relevance of the US bilateralalliance network over nascent multilateral
security groupings in the region. The latter
have not thus far been able to generatesufficiently robust mechanisms to ensurethat confidence-building and crisis resolution

27

will prevail over classical power balancing
scenarios such as a Sino–American war
exploding in the Taiwan Strait. This reality
has been increasingly self-evident over the
past few months and years. In February 2005,
Japan incurred Beijing’s wrath by agreeing
to an explicit reference to the stability of the
Taiwan Strait as a ‘common [Japanese andAmerican] strategic objective.’28
US basing operations in Japan (and especiallyat Kadena Air Base in Okinawa) constitute thenearest concentration of US military power tothe Strait (approximately 350 nautical miles,
3 1/2 sailing days, from the Strait) and are theprimary staging post for moving US carrier
forces into the East China Sea. Despite the
Fukuda government’s recent efforts to repair
Sino–Japanese tensions which intensified
under the Koizumi/Abe governments, it
is highly unlikely that it would defy US
expectations that Japan provide transit
facilities and logistical support in any futureSino–American war over Taiwan.29
Major Australian ports and bases (except
Darwin) are more than 4,000 miles from
Taiwan. This distance, combined with thefact that Australia’s geopolitical orientation
is more with Japan, the US and the wider
Pacific than with China, would initiallyappear to preclude Australian forces playing
a major role in support of any US military
operations.30 The most fundamental concern
regarding Australian involvement in a Taiwan
contingency, however, is how intense US
pressure would be for Australia to provide
military support. While visiting Beijing inAugust 2004, Australian Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer publicly surmised that theAustralian–American alliance or ‘ANZUS’ did
not necessarily cover situations apart fromdirect attacks on the signatories’ homelands.
He was immediately ‘corrected’ by American
officials and by Prime Minister John Howardon this interpretation. This episode illustrated
the extent to which Washington insists that

28

Proceedings

an attack on its own forces in the Pacifictriggers a commitment for allied response.31
The landslide victory of the Taiwan Nationalist
Party in Taiwan’s January 2008 legislativeelections and the strong prospect of a similar
victory in that island’s presidential election inlate March could at least temporarily defuse
the Sino–Taiwanese tensions precipitated by
the arguably separatist postures championed
by Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party(DDP) government. US pressure on Australia’s
own ‘hedging’ strategy could likewise
be  educed.

Multilateralism and transnational
security
The ascension of international terrorism andother ‘asymmetrical threats’ as a leading
concern of strategic policy-planners has
been accompanied by an interest in how
multilateral frameworks can be employed toneutralise them. As one observer has recently
noted, the Bush administration has engaged
in such multilateral security initiatives as
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
the Six Party Talks, and the ARF and has
proposed others such as the (unsuccessful)
Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI).
Washington’s multilateral commitments
and interactions, however, have been largely
and correctly viewed by other Asia–Pacificstates as ‘US-centric.’32 A major question
which confronts the US and its regional
allies is whether they are prepared to modify
the United States’ historical insistence onmanaging key regional security issues.33‘Traditional’ or state-centric security issues arestill marked by high degrees of tension andmistrust; ‘non-traditional’ or asymmetricalproblems could provide the basis fordeveloping precedents for greater security
cooperation in multilateral forums.
Evidence is growing that such is gradually
becoming the case. Within a week following

the 26 December 2004 South Asian tsunami,
US military officials spearheaded the creationof the ‘Core Group’, initially comprising
the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, India andthe Netherlands, to establish military andcivilian assistance programs to the victims ofthat natural disaster.34 Various geopoliticalrationales accompanied this genuinely
humanitarian response. Australia and theUnited States were given the opportunity
to ‘make a major anti-terrorism andrelationship-building investment in Indonesia,
a country indispensable to regional security
and the global war on terrorism.’35 A truce
imposed over the protracted insurgency
conflict in Aceh was a short-term byproductof the Indonesian Government wishing toappear commensurately benign. Japan andIndia both entertained calculations that
their prominence in tsunami disaster relief
operations would translate into greater
support for permanent UN Security Council
membership.36 The fundamental outcomeof this relief effort, however, was morenormative than material. It posited a common
idealism shared by Australia, Japan and theUnited States as ‘like-minded states’ defined,
as Thomas Wilkins put it, ‘by what theystand for…’.37
Normative preferences are also reflected in
the text of the March 2007 Australia–Japan
Declaration on Security Cooperation.38 Most
‘areas of cooperation’ in the Declaration andthe ‘Action Plan’ that has emanated from it
are related to transnational security concerns:
law enforcement against transnational
crime, border security, peace operations,humanitarian operations and coordination
against pandemics. Counter-terrorism andcounter-proliferation against weapons ofmass destruction are arguably transnationalin context, involving diplomatic action,
institutional support and technical capabilities
that are not exclusively state-centric incharacter but require expanded multilateral

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

coordination. The language of the Declaration
was hardly coincidental in this regard.
Recent patterns of Australia–Japansecurity cooperation have assumed a
distinctly transnational flavour, including
peacekeeping and peace building operations
in Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor; aid toSouth Pacific microstates, pollution control,
environmental assistance to Indonesia,
climate change and energy security, joint
pre-deployment training for peace operations
and mutual participation in urban search andrescue training exercises.39 Recent Australian–Japanese differences over Japan’s ‘scientific’whaling operations in the Southern Ocean
constitute a major challenge for bothcountries’ leaderships. This challenge mustbe finessed to assure respective electorates’
support for continued or intensified security
collaboration in these areas of transnational
security policy.

Responding to Asia–Pacificmultilateral security politics
Despite their fundamental involvement in
the US Cold War alliance system, cooperation
between Australia and Japan in multilateral
security arenas clearly preceded the end ofthat struggle. Both countries were, from 1965
to 1975, members of the Asian Pacific Council(ASPAC) formed to promote democraticvalues and greater socio-economic cohesionin the region. Japan was a less enthusiastic
participant than Australia in this grouping
due to its apprehensions that it would forge
into a military organisation (an ‘Asian NATO).
Both states perceived little utility, however, insustaining ASPAC following the enunciationof the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, and theUnited States rapprochement with the PRC
in 1971–1972, that isolated Taiwan (an ASPAC
member) and defused the tacit containment
rationales that had previously shaped muchof ASPAC’s strategic purpose. 40 Australia has
maintained long-standing defence contacts

29

on the Malayan Peninsula, initially throughthe Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, theAnglo–Malayan Defense Agreement and,since 1971, through the Five Power Defense
Arrangements.41 As its postwar economic
capabilities grew, Japan intermittently
launched multilateral security-related
diplomacy initiatives that were received withvarying degrees of success: Prime Minister
Takeo Fukuda’s ‘heart-to-heart diplomacy’
initiative toward ASEAN states in 1977
designed to strengthen ASEAN resilience in
the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War;
Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama’s proposal
to promote regional multilateral security
dialogues in July 1991 within the ASEAN
Post-Ministerial framework, and cooperative
security diplomacy emanating from the
Higuchi Report in August 1994. 42
Neither Australia nor Japan was prone tosupplanting their core bilateral alliancerelationships with the United States. However,both countries were intent not to be shut out
from whatever indigenous regional security
community-building processes might emerge
as the Cold War drew to a close. Nor did
they wish to see their senior American ally
marginalised from Asia because, as maritime
powers situated on the peripheries of that
continent, any such development would
decrease their own strategic leverage within
it. 43 This reflected what could be viewed asa brutal policy dilemma confronting both
Australian and Japanese policy-makers.
Both Australia and Japan were obvious
beneficiaries of the largely hierarchical‘hub-and-spokes’ alliance system maintainedby Washington during the Cold War,extracting greater regional influence by virtueof their close affiliation with American power.
Precisely due to that affinity, however, both
continued to be regarded as regional proxies
for US interests on such issues as East Timor,
the China–Taiwan dispute, ethnic and religious
grievances and Asian institution-building.

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This made it harder for these two American
allies to be viewed as genuine participants inbuilding Asia’s regionalist identity and shaping
its processes. Their early post-Cold War
efforts to sell their regional neighbours on thebenefits of ‘open regionalism’ by nominating
an American-endorsed APEC as the preferredcommunity-building mechanism fell onlargely deaf ears, particularly in the aftermathof the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis. The
saving grace to date is that more exclusivist
models pursued by China, Malaysia and otherstates favouring the ‘East Asian’ model overthe ‘Pan-Asian’ vision have arguably been no
more successful in fostering their own, often
disparate visions of what an Asian security
community actually should be. 44
Compounding Australia’s and Japan’sdifficulties ‘fitting into the region’ havebeen their recent efforts to reconstitutetheir politico-security agendas in waysthat accommodate their geography
without compromising their respective
alliances with the US. Australian Foreign
Minister Gareth Evans spearheaded the
Hawke/Keating Labor government’s efforts
during the early 1990s to apply a ‘middle
power’ strategy to link Australian diplomaticand security interests with regional
multilateral security initiatives. His CSCA
proposal for a multilateral security dialogue
was very similar to the aforementioned
Nakayama initiative. It was clearly intended
as a regional coalition‑building strategy thatwould establish Australia as a ‘competent’
yet independent member of a burgeoning
Asia–Pacific security community. Critics
argued that ‘middle power policy’ limited
Australia’s influence within and beyond theregion. Instead, they asserted Australia shouldplay the role of a ‘pivotal’ power between
developed and underdeveloped countries andnot merely be satisfied with staking a claim asa legitimate or ‘acceptable’ regional security
player. 45 This criticism was taken to heartby the Howard government in its efforts to‘reinvigorate’ the American alliance. It argued
during the 1996 election campaign that thealliance had been neglected by Labor, andAustralia must rectify what it perceived to
be an ‘imbalanced’ diplomatic and national
security posture too weighted toward Asia.
If Australia has attempted to reconcile alliancepolitics and multilateral security diplomacy
by pursuing diverse approaches for becoming
a more credible Asia–Pacific actor, Japan has
assigned greater predominance to ‘hedging’its alliance with the United States against an
increasingly powerful Asia. Richard Samuels
has characterised this as Japan’s ‘new grandstrategy’: building up its defence capabilities
only to the extent required to warrant asustained US commitment to Japanese
security, while simultaneously ‘building
an East Asian Community that resembles
the stable, prosperous, economicallyintegrated Western Europe and that is built
on a Japanese commitment to the values of
democracy and freedom’. 46
Tokyo’s preferred vision of multilateral
security and economic cooperation is apan-Asian community that would enmesh
US politico-economic interests in theregion within norms and institutions
tailored to safeguard Japanese tradinginterests throughout Asia and beyond.
Chinese, American and European marketing
competition would be regulated undera regional architecture underwriting
what could be viewed as Japanesequasi‑mercantilist strategy promoted under
the guise of ‘regional community-building’.
A resuscitated APEC or a pan-Asian versionof an East Asian Community that cultivates‘open regionalism’ by actually tolerating‘soft’ forms of trade protectionism (selected
and intermittent bilateral or regional tradepreference agreements) would conform tothis Japanese vision in ways that may be
more palatable to the US and Australian

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

policy-makers. An Asian Regional Bank underTokyo’s leadership would be a more overt andtherefore less acceptable form of Japanese
neo-mercantilism, generating Westernfears that it would coordinate the rise of an
economic protectionist bloc under Japaneseor joint Japanese–Chinese leadership.
This latter prospect was embodied in the‘Miyazawa Plan’, named after Japan’s thenforeign minister who proposed different
versions of it during and following the Asian
Financial Crisis. The Plan was rejected because
Washington (through the International
Monetary Fund or IMF) developed tangible
apprehensions about an Asian initiative todefect from the existing system of global
economic management during that time.
Japan, absorbing the hard lessons aboutexerting its interests independently of its
senior security ally, prevented a similar
Chinese blueprint for the EAS from emerging
at that grouping’s inaugural meeting in Kuala
Lumpur in December 2005. 47 Asia–Pacificcommunity-building processes, from Japan’s
perspective, must strike a delicate balance.
They should ensure that US cooperation andsupport for Japan’s security and prosperity is
not undermined. Simultaneously, however,they must also counterbalance the prospectthat the US will exploit Asian economic
weakness to develop comparative advantages
in regional trade and excessive geopoliticalhubris (at Japan’s expense). They must
curb the potential hegemonic threat now
represented by Chinese economic growth tolong-standing Japan’s economic prosperity
and its political influence with both theUnited States and its regional neighbours.
As can be discerned from the above
discussion, both Australia and Japan have
oscillated between embracing multilateral
security and distancing themselves fromthat approach in pursuit of regional security.
Australia has attempted to reconcile allianceand multilateral politics by cultivating an

31

elusive balance between being a loyal andvalued American ally and establishing a morecommitted ‘regionalist’ posture throughmiddle power diplomacy. However, Prime
Minister John Howard’s extraordinary
personal relationship with US President
George Bush that intensified after 9/11
undermined any chance of that balance
being perceived as credible by Asian states
and leaders. 48 Despite the explosive growthof Sino–American trade ties and Australia’s
accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity andCooperation (TAC) as a precondition for it
winning a seat at the EAS table, the overall
trends in Australian foreign policy did notreflect prioritisation of Asian multilateralism
within Canberra’s decision-making councils.
Australian military personnel were quickly
dispatched to Afghanistan after 9/11 and to
Iraq as part of the March 2003 US-led invasionof that country in the context of Australia
pursuing a more ‘globalist’ strategic posture
as a required component of alliance politics. 49
Japan’s policy undulations on multilateral
security politics have been at least as
pronounced, with its visible enthusiasm forthis approach in the early 1990s giving way
to a more nuanced (at best) or even skepticaloutlook following the 1997–98 Asian Financial
Crisis. US apprehensions about Japanesemotives in shifting toward more regionalist
postures following that crisis, and how
such a shift could affect Japanese defence
burden-sharing within an alliance context
and international peacekeeping contributions
as part of American-led ‘coalitions of thewilling’ was a key factor. So too was Japan’s
growing disillusionment with the ARF’s ability
to implement effectively its announced
regional confidence-building and preventive
defence initiatives in the face of perceived
Chinese intransigence. A growing mood ofconservatism in Japanese domestic politics
reflected in the election of Junichiro Koizumi
and Shinzo Abe as successive prime ministers,

32

Proceedings

and the evolution of new asymmetric threatssuch as terrorism and nuclear proliferationin North Korea, were all significant factors in
discouraging Japan’s expenditure of politicalsupport and national resources toward
multilateral cooperative security in Asia. While
Japan has not lost all interest or confidence inthe politics of multilateral security, it cannot
pursue it apart from calibrating its effects on
the US bilateral alliance.50

Conclusion: policy
recommendations
If the above trends are taken into account,
the appeal of the TSD as an alternative to
multilateralism is easier to understand. For
Australian and Japanese policy-makers todevelop cooperative multilateral security
ventures with little history of regional successis truly a daunting task. The challenge ismade even more overwhelming as China’s
and India’s ascents to great power status
further complicate the Asia–Pacific’s strategic
environment. How much easier it must be
for Australia and Japan, as longstanding
US alliance partners, to build on their
existing alliance framework by expanding
intra-alliance ties in designated traditional
and transnational security policy sectors andto label it multilateral security behaviour!
The appeal of ‘competitive geometry’ inthe form of TSD or other variants is that itis relatively clear-cut and incorporates thebest assets of alliance affiliation such as
state-of-the-art military technology transfers,
force interoperability and constant dialogue
and planning. That appeal, however, must
be balanced by the prospects that otherregional powers invariably regard sucharrangements as directed against themselves,
thus intensifying regional tensions andundercutting any real prospects of building a
genuine and more stable regional cooperative
security network. In such a case, moreover,the ‘truth is not somewhere in between.’

Australia’s pivotal power strategy and Japan’s‘Goldilocks consensus’ have compoundedboth Australian and Japanese policy
ambiguity and regional marginalisation.
What policy directions should be pursued
now? At least three approaches warrant
mutual exploration by the new Australianand Japanese governments: (1) renewing
multilateralism’s complementarity to existing
bilateral or minilateral arrangements byconcentrating on strengthening just one
major multilateral security architecture in theregion; (2) encouraging confidence-building
between Japan and China; and (3) helping theUnited States define what inevitably will bea new American security posture in Asia asthat region experiences intensified regional
multipolarity. Each of these steps deserves
separate and extensive analyses which are far
beyond the scope of this paper. Only limited
discussion of the basic rationales that justify
their policy consideration can be offeredwithin the limited space available here.
First, Australia and Japan should move jointly
to designate their preference for which of
the several burgeoning multilateral security
architectures will command the bulk of
their attention and resources. The criteria
by which existing multilateral architectures
can be evaluated have been recently spelledout by Allan Gyngell: (a) facilitating regional
trade and investment in ways that enable
the Asia–Pacific’s regional economies to
respond more effectively to natural disasters,
pandemics, climate change, energy security
and other transnational security issues;(b) guaranteeing that regional
community‑building strengthens linkages
between the Asia–Pacific’s sub-regional
sectors, including Northeast Asia, Southeast
Asia, South Asia and the ‘wider Pacific’;(c) promoting common regional security
interests through addressing core regional
security issues (i.e., the Taiwan Strait,
North Korea, etc.); and (d) ensuring that key

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

pan-regional heads of government convene
regularly and systematically to discuss ‘the fullrange of regional security issues’.51 As Gyngell
admits, no one security architecture will beable to fulfill all of these functions equallywell over the short-term. APEC, however,looms as the one existing architecture that
fulfills most of these requirements at least
temporarily. A gradual integration of APEC
and the EAS into a new regional security
organisation spearheaded by an annual
Heads of Government (along the lines ofNATO’s annual summit) and incorporating
both foreign and economic ministers into its
framework might be considered one possiblemodel for future Asia–Pacific order-building.
Any such body needs to be regionally inclusive(pan-Asian), not exclusive; ecumenicalthrough incorporation of broader security
perspectives rather than merely focusing on
military or other types of ‘material power’,and sufficiently authoritative to work
regularly with the United Nations, the IMF
and other organs of international governanceto address core problems of regional security
and development.
Second, the intractable Sino–Japanese
security dilemma must be modified overthe next few years if prospects for a stable
Asia–Pacific security order are to be realised.
Implementing viable confidence-building
and preventive diplomacy mechanisms at
both the bilateral and multilateral levels
will be integral to overcoming lingeringhistorical, cultural and strategic animosities
between Northeast Asia’s two powerhouseeconomies. Reiterating and respecting
international norms are probably appropriate
for defusing tensions in the East China Sea(rights of maritime passage) while China andTaiwan finesse ‘Chinese solutions’ to theirlong-standing differences over irredentism.
Any effort by a TSD mechanism to force theTaiwan issue, short of an unprovoked militaryinvasion of Taiwan by the PRC, would be

33

counterproductive and only intensify what
is already the region’s most serious security
dilemma. In a similar vein, regional security
may be best served by quietly shelving the2005 US–Japan Consultative Committee’sreference to the Taiwan Strait, and by US
policy officials exercising greater restraint
toward conveying their ‘expectations’ about
Australia’s alliance behaviour during a future
Taiwan Strait crisis. China is well aware of
regional concerns about its own intermittent
bellicosity directed toward Taiwan. It is lesslikely to adopt policies of moderation if it
perceives that the TSD powers are eager to
use a future such episode to neutralise byforce what they see as a growing military
imbalance in China’s favour. Beijing, however,will need to strengthen its transparency
on the nature and intent of its ongoingmilitary buildup as a quid pro quo for greater
TSD constraint. Japan could also advanceconfidence-building proposals for preventing
conflict escalation over Taiwan in ongoingSino–Japanese strategic dialogues, while
Australia could propose similar discussions
as part of its new bilateral strategic dialogue
with China. Both Japan and Australia could
also consider establishing separate crisis
hotlines with Beijing, a precedent that
could be emulated by the secretariat of any
overarching regional security organisationthat may emerge in Asia.52
Third, both Australia and Japan must continue
improving their own defence capabilities
to face independent contingencies that the
US believes may not justify direct militaryintervention on their behalf. The possibility of
the Rudd government resurrecting elementsof the ‘Defence of Australia’ (DOA) posture
which prevailed during the Hawke/Keating
years is strong; although Australia’s present
commitment to supporting coalition efforts
against insurgents in Afghanistan appears
to be an enduring one. Increasingly, Australia
will be required to deploy its forces along

34

Proceedingsthe ‘arc of instability’ that includes its
northern approaches, Melanesia and other
South Pacific venues without anticipatingeven those moderate levels of US logisticalsupport that were available during the 1999
East Timor operation. Japan’s historical legacy
and its constitution still act as constraints
against projecting its Self-Defense Force inindependent military operations. In this sense,
the US–Japan alliance will remain the primarycatalyst for constraining future Japanesemilitary operations. Within the bilateralalliance framework, however, Japan will
gradually be compelled to raise its defence
burden-sharing to increasingly significant
levels as the costs and political impediments
associated with the United States maintaining
defence expenditures higher than most of
the world’s other great powers combined
eventually take their toll. The United States
will remain a superpower for some time tocome. However, it will inevitably become a‘more ordinary’ great power as it prioritises
its commitments in the Middle East, tohomeland security and to its ability to
project significant rather than overwhelming
levels of offshore power along the Eurasian
peripheries. China, India, and Russia willcontinue to close the military capabilities gap
between the US and themselves. Australia
and Japan can render a great service to their
American partner and to global stability by
becoming more effective than was the case
immediately after 9/11, by reasoning with
Washington which of its commitments calls
for military responses.
Australia and Japan together face a historicalcrossroads in international relations notunlike that recognised by Lord Grey. Unlikethat venerable and somewhat tragic figure
who confronted an exhausted European
concert on the verge of war, however, theirprospects for helping to keep the lights
burning bright in the Asia–Pacific region are
infinitely better. Striking an effective balance

between sustaining the best of bilateralism
and applying a more sophisticated brandof multilateralism is crucial for shaping theAsia–Pacific’s future security order. As allies
long accustomed to cultivating strategic trustwith each other, Australia and Japan would
now be well served by extending that legacy
to those surrounding them.

Endnotes
1

A recent exposition of this argument
is Rajan Menon’s The End of Alliances(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007).

2

Background is provided by C. Randall
Henning, East Asian Financial Cooperation.
Policy Analysis in International Economics
68 (Washington, DC: Institute forInternational Economics, October 2002),
pp. 11-31.

3Mark Beeson, ‘ASEAN Plus Three andthe Rise of Reactionary Regionalism ‘,Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2(August 2003), p. 261. More skepticalassessments include David Hund, ‘ASEAN
Plus Three: towards a new age of pan-East
Asian Regionalism? A skeptic’s appraisal’
The Pacific Review 16, no. 3 (September
2003), pp. 383-417 and David Martin Jonesand Martin L.R. Smith, ‘Making Process,Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving
East Asian Regional Security Order,’International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer2007), pp. 148-184. For a recent update,consult Shaun Breslin, ‘Supplying Demandor Demanding Supply? An Alternative
Look at the Forces Driving East Asian
Community Building,’ Policy Analysis
Brief, The Stanley Foundation, November
2007 at http://www.stanleyfoundation.
org/publications/pab/Breslin_07_PAB.pdf.
Accessed on 6 January 2008.

4 The Japanese position and diplomaticrole leading up to the EAS is coveredby Michael Auslin and Michael Green,

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue‘Japan’s Security Policy in East Asia,’ Asian
Economic Policy Review 2, no. 2 (December2007), pp. 217-218. Also see Edwin Cody,‘East Asian Summit Marked by Discord,’
The Washington Post, December 14, 2005
and Mohan Malik, ‘The East Asia Summit,’
Australian Journal of International Affairs
60, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 207-211.
5

Takashi Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian
Community: A Site for Japan–China Power
Struggles,’ Japanese Studies 26, no. 1 (May2006), p. 5.

6 Auslin and Green, pp. 217-218.
7

A text of the Cooperative Work Plan is
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/asean/conference/asean3/plan0711.
pdf. Accessed on 5 January 2008.

8 As cited at the blog site, ‘He came,they talked, what next?’ Observing
Japan, November 17, 2007. See also ‘The
bankruptcy of the China hawks,’ ibid.,
January 1, 2008. Both at http://www.
observingjapan.com/ and both accessedon 5 January 2008.
9 As cited in David Dewitt, ‘Common,
Comprehensive and Cooperative Security,’
Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1994), p. 5.
10 Evelyn Goh, ‘Meeting the China

Challenge: The US in Southeast AsianRegional Security Strategies,’ Policy
Studies, no. 16 (Washington, D.C.: East
West Center 2005 and Evan Medeiros,‘Strategic Hedging and the Future of
Asia–Pacific Stability,’ The Washington
Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005-06),
pp. 145-167.
11 Address by Teo Chee Hean, Minister

for Defence, Singapore on ‘Security
Cooperation in Asia: Managing Alliancesand Partnerships,’ at the Sixth IISS Asian
Security Summit Shangri-la Dialogue,
Singapore, 3 June 2007 at http://www.

35iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-ladialogue/plenary-session-speeches2007/fifth-plenary-session--teo-cheehean. Accessed on 6 January 2008.
12 Richard Smith, ‘Regional Security: Is‘Architecture’ All We Need?’ Policy Analysis
Brief , The Stanley Foundation, December
2007 at http://www.stanleyfoundation.
org/publications/pab/SmithPAB07.pdf.
Accessed on 6 January 2008.
13 In mid-December 2007, Australian

Foreign Minister Stephen Smith warned
that ‘Australia is determined to play aleading role in international efforts tostop Japan’s whaling practices,’ serving
notice that ‘Australia strongly believes
that there is no credible scientificjustification for the hunting of whales,
and is opposed to all commercial and‘scientific’ whaling.’ See ‘Total secrecy
on whaler watching,’ The Australian,
1 January 2008.
14 ‘Australian opposition leader warnsof diplomatic rift over whaling
crackdown,’ International Herald Tribune,
14 December 2007.
15 The Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force’s
refueling mission in the Indian Ocean on
Nov. 1 was terminated when a ‘special
law’ authorising the mission expired after
the government and the upper house of
the Diet controlled by opposition parties
failed to reach an agreement to extend
the law. See Hisane Misaki, ‘Japan’s Fukuda
in fight for his life,’ Asia Times Online,
December 22, 2007 at http://www.
atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IL22Dh01.
html. Accessed on 8 January 2008. On 11
January 2008, Fukuda’s ruling coalition
government, under strong pressure fromthe US, forced enabling legislation throughthe lower house of Japanese government
after the upper house had previously
vetoed previous efforts to do so.

36

Proceedings

16 The concept of ‘general interest’ in alliancepolitics was initially developed by Glenn H.
Snyder, ‘the Security Dilemma in Alliance
Politics,’ World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984),
pp. 461-495. See Eric Talmadge, ‘Japan
to Resume Its Mission in Indian Ocean,’
Washington Post, January 12, 2008, A-11.
17 Akiko Fukushima, ‘Multilateral ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Northeast Asia:
Receding or Emerging?’ in Benjamin L. Self
and Yuki Tatsumi, ed., Confidence-Building
Measures and Security Issues in Northeast
Asia (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson
Center 2000), p. 44 and Goh, ‘The ASEAN
Regional Forum in United States East
Asian Strategy,’ The Pacific Review 17, no. 1(March 2004), p. 51.
18 Negroponte, ‘The Future of Political,
Economic and Security Relations
with China’ at http://www.state.
gov/s/d/2007/84118.htm. Accessed on
8 January 2008.
19 David M. Finkelstein, ‘The People’s
Liberation Army and China in Transition,’in Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E.
Marti (eds.), The People’s Liberation Armyand China in Transition (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University, 2002),
pp. 197-210. Accessed at http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/pla-china_transition_14_
ch10.htm on 8 January 2008.
20 An American perspective of the minilateralfactor in Asia–Pacific security politics isoffered by Michael J. Green, ‘ The UnitedStates and East Asia in a unipolar Era,’ inQuansheng Zhao, ed., Future Trends in East
Asian International Relations (London andPortland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 36.
21 This theoretical approach is developedin the context of trilateral alliancerelations by William T. Tow, ‘’Contingent

Trilateralism’: Applications for the Trilateral
Security Dialogue,’ in William T. Tow, Mark
J. Thomson, Yoshinobu Yamamoto andSatu Limaye, eds., Asia–Pacific Security: U.S,
Australia and Japan and the New Security
Triangle (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 27.
22 Extensive background on the TSD isprovided in various chapters of Tow,
et. al., Asia-Pacific Security… (London:
Routledge, 2007).
23 Purnendra Jain, ‘Japan–Australia security
ties and the United States: the evolutionof the trilateral dialogue process andits challenges,’ Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs 60, no. 4 (December2006), pp. 521-535.
24 Andrew Symon, ‘Australia’s new PM is old
Asia hand,’ Asia Times Online, November
27, 2007 at http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/Southeast_Asia/IK27Ae01.html.
Accessed on 13 January 2008.
25 See, for example, Yan Wei, ‘A Broader
Asia Without China?’ Beijing Review No.
38, September 20, 2007 at http://www.
bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2007-09/25/
content_77617_2.htm. Accessed on
8 January 2008.
26 See a critical but thorough account of
the quadrilateral initiative’s evolution by
Brig. Gen. Shafaat Ahmad (Ret.), ‘Joint
naval exercise: SEATO in new format?’ The
Daily Star, October 6, 2007at http://www.
thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=6809.
Accessed on 13 January 2008.
27 ‘Aust, China agree to annual security
talks,’ Australian Defence Report, 6September 2007 at http://www.
australiandefencereport.com.au/907/10-09-2007/aust_china_agree_to_
annual_secur.htm and ‘Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s regular press
conference on 6 September 2007 at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cemy/

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

eng/fyrth/t359857.htm.  Accessed on
8 January 2008.
28 Anthony Faiola, ‘Japan to Join US Policy
on Taiwan; Growth of China Seen behind
Shift,’ Washington Post, 18 February 2005,
p. A-129 Inter-related US basing operations in the
Pacific involving Japan and other US allies
are weighed in a widely debated RAND
Corporation report released in May 2001.
See Zalmay Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky
and others, The United States and Asia:
Toward a New US Strategy and Force
Posture (MR-1315-AF) Santa Monica: RAND,
May 2001 and summarised at http://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB68/
index1.html. Accessed on 13 January
2008. Also see Col. Lawrence M. Martin,Jr., ‘Countering a Strategic Gambit:
Keeping US Air Power Employable ina China–Taiwan Conflict,’ Air & SpacePower Journal XIX, no. 3 (Fall 2005) at
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/
airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/martin.html.
Accessed on 13 January 2008.
30 This point is discussed by William T. Tow
and Chen-Shen Yen, ‘Australia–Taiwan
Relations: The Evolving Geopolitical
Setting,’ Australian Journal of International
Affairs 61, no. 3 (September 2007),
especially pp. 338-339.
31 ‘US spells out ANZUS conditions’,
ABC radio transcript, August 20,
2004 at http://www.abc.net.au/pm/
content/2004/s1181620.htm. Accessed on
14 January 2008.
32 Brendan Taylor, ‘The Bush Administration
and Asia–Pacific Multilateralism– Unrequited Love?’ Paper for
Fulbright Symposium on Maritime
Governance and Security: Australianand American Perspectives, Universityof Tasmania, Hobart, 28-29 June 2006 at37

http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache:
QoES2dLg7iIJ:rspas.anu.edu.au/gssd/
analysis/Taylor_Fulbright_2006%2520_
final.pdf+brendan+taylor+multilateral
ism+transnational+security+Asia&hl=
en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=au. Accessed on
14 January 2008.
33 Michael J. Green, ‘The United Statesand East Asia in the Unipolar Era,’ inQuansheng Zhao, ed., Future Trends inEast Asian International Relations (London:
Routledge 2002), pp. 36-38.
34 ‘Bush announces int’l coalition tocoordinate relief,’ IndiaInfo.Com December
30, 2004 at http://news.indiainfo.
com/2004/12/30/3012tsunamibush.html.
Accessed on 14 January 2008.
35 Soeren Kern, ‘The Geopolitics of Tsunami
Relief,’ Real Instituto Elcano, August 2005
at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/
wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/
Asia-Pacific/ARI+8-2005. Accessed on
14 January 2008.
36 Ibid. and Tim Huxley, ‘The tsunami andsecurity: Asia’s 9/11?’ Survival 47, no. 1(March 2005), pp. 125-127.
37 Thomas S. Wilkins, ‘Towards a ‘Trilateral
Alliance?’ Understanding the Roles of
Expediency and Values in American–
Japanese–Australian Relations’, Asian
Security3, no. 3 (2007), p. 266.
38 A text of this document can be found on
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/australia/joint0703.html. Accessed on
16 January 2008.
39 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Major
elements of the Action Plan to implement
the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on
Security Cooperation’, at http://www.
mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/

38

Proceedings

action0709.html and Japan Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Japan–Australia Relations’,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/australia/index.html. Both sources
accessed on 16 January 2008.
40 C W Braddick, ‘Japan, Australia and
ASPAC,’ in Brad Williams and Andrew
Newman, eds., Japan, Australia andAsia–Pacific Security (London and New
York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 30-46. Nine
Asia–Pacific countries were represented
in ASPAC: Australia, the ‘Republic ofChina’ (ROC Taiwan), Japan, the Republicof Korea (ROK), Malaysia, New Zealand,
the Philippines, Thailand and the Republicof Vietnam (ROV). Delegates from
Laos usually attended meetings with‘observer’ status.
41 The classic study on this remains Chin
Kin Wah’s The Defence of Malaysia andSingapore: The Transformation of a Security
System 1957-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
42 Paul Midford, ‘Japan’s leadership rolein East Asian Security multilateralism:
the Nakayama proposal and the logic ofreassurance,’ The Pacific Review 13, no. 3(September 2000), pp. 367–97 and G. John
Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, ‘Between
balance of power and community: thefuture of multilateral cooperation in theAsia–Pacific,’ International Relations of theAsia–Pacific Vol. 2 (2002), pp. 69-94.
43 Mark Beeson and Hidetaka Yoshimatsu,‘Asia’s odd men out: Australia, Japan, andthe politics of regionalism,’ International
Relations of the Asia–Pacific 7, no. 23 (2007),
pp. 227-250.
44 As contended by David Martin Jonesand Michael L.R. Smith, ‘Making Process,Not Progress...’45 See Carl Ungerer, ‘The ‘Middle Power’Concept in Australian Foreign Policy,’
Australian Journal of Politics and History 53,
no. 4 (2007), especially pp. 546-550.
46 Samuels, ‘Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,’ The
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 (Autumn
2006), p. 121.
47 C Johnstone, ‘Strained Alliance: US–Japan
Diplomacy in the Asian financial crisis,’
Survival 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 121-138
and Mohan Malik, ‘The East Asia Summit,’
Australian Journal of International Affairs
60, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 107-111.
48 W Tow, ‘ Deputy sheriff or independent
ally? Evolving Australian–American ties
in an ambiguous world order,’ The Pacific
Review 17, no. 2 (June 2004), pp. 271-290.
49 For in-depth analysis, see William Tow,
‘ANZUS: Regional versus Global Securityin Asia,’ International Relations of theAsia–Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005), pp. 197-216.
50 A definitive analysis of recent trends is
by Takeshi Yuzawa, ‘Japan’s changing
conception of the ASEAN Regional Forum:from an optimistic liberal to a pessimistic
realist perspective,’ Pacific Review 18, no. 4(December 2005), pp. 463-497.
51 Gyngell, ‘Design Faults: The Asia Pacific’s
Regional Architecture,’ Policy Brief (Sydney:
Lowy Institute for International Policy,
July 2007).
52 Reports surfaced at the end of August
2007 that China and Japan have discussed
the establishment of crises hotlines. See
Chisa Fujioka, ‘China military vexes Japandespite minister’s visit,’ Reuters, August
31, 2007 at http://in.reuters.com/article/
worldNews/idINIndia-29265520070831.
Accessed on 18 January 2008.

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

The Japanese approach to an
East Asian Community andJapan–Australia partnership
Yoshihide Soeya
Keio University

1 Introduction
Japan and Australia are natural partners
in the regional process toward building an
East Asian Community. They share basic
values as the foundation of a regionalarchitecture, and above all are well situatedto cultivate the middle ground, so to speak,in between the US and China—the two
major powers constituting the basic strategic
and geopolitical parameter for East Asia.
The role of Japan and Australia therein is
intrinsically premised on the alliance with theUS, but this does not exclude the possibilityof Japan and Australia jointly constructing asound infrastructure as a core element of an
East Asian order that the US and China will
have to take into serious account as they deal
with each other, as well as with the region asa whole.
I would like to conceptualise a community
as a process—perhaps an everlastingprocess—toward the creation of a security
community. There should be no disagreementthat community-building efforts in East Asia
have just begun. No matter how embryonicthey are, however, they can and should beseen as the critical beginning of a long‑term
process of community building, which willcertainly have repeated ups and downs, butwhich will also continue to move toward thefinal goal of a security community. Even if we
accept the likely prospect that the goal will
not be achieved for a long time, continuing
to move toward the goal is feasible andimportant: hence my conceptualisation of acommunity as a process.

39

The goal, as well as a conceptual basis, ofa security community is the elimination of
war or the use of force as means of settlinginter‑state conflict, sustained by the norm ofpeaceful settlement of political differences
as well as the common values of democracy.
As such, it can be argued that expectations
relevant for a security community alreadyexist among democracies in East Asia.
In the East Asian context, thisconceptualisation of a community would
naturally invite some resistance from China,
particularly its central government and thePeople’s Liberation Army. And there areseveral cases where the actual evolution of
security issues indicates tendencies contrary
to the development of a security community,
even including overbearing behaviours by
the US Administration. These two major
powers will be critical in their own rights inthe evolution of an East Asian Community inyears ahead, but the process could and shouldbe led primarily by countries that can cultivate
the middle ground in the US–China strategic
relationship, including Japan and Australia (aswell as ASEAN and South Korea).
Japanese involvement in this process should
also provide an important framework within
which Japan would continue to debate
and implement necessary changes in its
regional and security policies in the years
ahead. Australia is a natural partner as Japan
continues to grope for a new regional role anddiplomacy, which was amply demonstrated
in the proposal by Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi in January 2002 to invite
Australia and New Zealand as core membersof an East Asian Community.
This paper will give an overview to theevolution of Japanese policies toward East
Asia since the end of the Cold War, and will
examine the central Japanese thinking andapproach leading to the Koizumi proposal, andconcerning the US and China factors.

40

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2 Japan’s initial efforts in
multilateral security
Soon after the end of the Cold War,
there arose an awareness among central
policymakers in Japan that the predominanceof the alliance relationship with the US in
Japan’s post‑Cold War responses is deeply
related to the lack of effective multilateral
forums for Japanese security policy. Facing
the end of the Cold War, therefore, it was
natural for the Japanese strategic thinkers to
opt for multilateral security cooperation, notnecessarily as an alternative to the US–Japan
alliance, but as a new tool to cope with new
security challenges.
The initial attempt in this direction was taken
by Yukio Sato, then Director-General of theInformation and Intelligence Bureau of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Specifically, Satoplayed a critical role in the early 1990s as abridge between Japan and ASEAN in the initialexchange and sharing of ideas at the track II
level, eventually leading to the establishmentof the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994.
At about the time the ASEAN Regional
Forum was created, the Japanese defence
establishment was also groping for a pathto multilateral security cooperation. In
February 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa
created an advisory panel on post‑Cold
War security and defense policy. Hosokawa
resigned in April, and the advisory panel’sreport was presented in August to the
Murayama government, which succeeded
the shortlived Hata government. The reportcharacterised the post‑Cold War security
environment as opaque and uncertain,
and placed the promotion of multilateral
security cooperation on top of the priority list,
followed by the effective management of the
US–Japan security relationship and Japanese
defence capability.
The report specifically argued that the criticalissue was whether the US would be able toplay a leadership role in multilateral security
cooperation, and that Japan and the US
should promote broad and close cooperation,
based on the institutional settings of the
US–Japan security treaty, toward effective
multilateral security cooperation.1
This process invited intervention by theUS, which feared that the emphasis on
multilateral security cooperation would
weaken the foundation of the US–Japan
alliance. In fact, in 1994 (exactly at the time
when the Japanese advisory panel called for
greater participation in multilateral security),
the North Korean crisis verged on military
conflict between the US and North Korea.
The situation was saved by Jimmy Carter’svisit at the last minute, leading to the Geneva
agreement which established the Korea
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in
exchange for North Korea’s commitment tofreeze its nuclear programs.2 This crisis led tothe subsequent revision of the 1978 Guidelines
for Japan–US Defense Cooperation, which
occurred in 1997.
As indicated by the discussion at the defense
advisory panel, however, Japan’s primaryconcern in this period had to do with thegeneral fluidity of the uncertain security
environment, which required a new approach
toward multilateral security cooperation intandem with the alliance with the US.

3 From Fukuda Doctrine to Koizumi
Proposal
In retrospect, the longstanding policy ofJapan toward Southeast Asia since the late1970s was represented by the so‑called
Fukuda Doctrine. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda
announced a three-point policy toward
Southeast Asia in Manila in August 1977:• First, Japan is committed to peace andis determined not to become a military
power.

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue• Second, Japan will establish a‘heart‑to‑heart’ relationship of mutual
trust with Southeast Asia beyond
economics and politics.

• Third, Japan will cooperate with ASEAN’s
efforts to strengthen solidarity andresilience, nurture relations of mutual
understanding with the Indochinesestates, and thus contribute to the peace
and prosperity of the entire Southeast
Asian region.
The political essence of the Fukuda Doctrine
had to do with the message in the third
point—to serve as a bridge between ASEAN
and Indochina for the peace and prosperityof all Southeast Asia as an equal partner. This
principle remained to form the core thinking
of Japan’s Southeast Asia policy during thesubsequent years, which was revitalised at
the time of the Cambodian peace process inthe early 1990s, when Japan actively sought
to play a political role.3
Arguably, with the realisation of ASEAN–10
in 1997, the expressed political goal of the
Fukuda Doctrine was about to be achievedon ASEAN’s own initiative, with mucheconomic backing provided by Japanese
official development assistance, private
trade and foreign direct investment. In early
1997, anticipating the birth of ASEAN–10,
Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimotoproposed the Japan–ASEAN summit tofurther accelerate the integration of ASEAN
and to further Japan’s relations with theASEAN countries.
The realisation of ASEAN–10, however,coincided with the Asian financial crisis,
forcing ASEAN countries to go through a
set of restructuring efforts in domestic
economies, politics, and regionalarrangements. Also, at about the sametime, China shifted its main strategic focus
from ‘high’ politics to ‘low’ politics. ASEAN,
following its usual instinct to carefully balance

41

relations with external powers, turned theHashimoto proposal into its own initiative
leading to the establishment of ASEAN+3 at
the end of 1997.
These developments have ushered ina new momentum toward deepening
regional integration. Singapore took an
important initiative to officially propose afree trade agreement (FTA) with Japan in
December 1999 when Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong visited Japan. Japan, which had
already started to study such arrangementswith several countries, including South Korea,
responded positively and the negotiations
gained momentum.
In the meantime, observing the momentumof a series of bilateral FTA initiatives andachieving its goal of joining the World Trade
Organization, China also came up with
its own FTA initiative, most symbolicallyindicated by the Chinese proposal of an FTA
with ASEAN at the occasion of the ASEAN+3
summit meeting in November 2000. In thefollowing year, Chinese and ASEAN leaders
reached a basic agreement that they would
achieve a free trade area within the coming
ten years. This was quickly followed up in
November 2002, when the leaders signed
a comprehensive framework agreement tocarry out the plan.
These China–ASEAN initiatives haveprompted the Koizumi government todevelop its own regional strategy built on theongoing process of FTA negotiations. In Prime
Minister Koizumi’s policy speech delivered in
Singapore in January 2002, 4 Koizumi proposedan ‘Initiative for Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive
Economic Partnership,’ built upon theJapan–Singapore Economic Agreement
for a New Age Partnership (the so‑called
Japan–Singapore FTA), which Koizumi signed
prior to the speech.
More importantly, the Koizumi proposal
included an ambitious reference to an East

42

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Asian Community. Koizumi said to theaudience in Singapore that ‘our goal shouldbe the creation of a community that acts
together and advances together.’ Koizumi
expressed his expectation that, starting fromJapan–ASEAN cooperation, ‘the countries of
ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea,
Australia and New Zealand will be core
members of such a community.’
To substantiate such a partnership with
ASEAN, the Koizumi speech advanced a new
approach to Japanese diplomacy with ASEAN.
While stating his basic stance to promote thepolicies of the Fukuda Doctrine, Koizumi ineffect made clear a comprehensive design forJapan’s regional engagement. Following thisKoizumi initiative, the Japanese Government
hosted a bilateral ASEAN–Japan summit
meeting in Tokyo in December 2003. This
was the very first occasion when the ASEAN
countries agreed to hold such a meetingoutside Southeast Asia.
The proposal for an East Asian Community
in the Koizumi speech has ignited a processof conceptual competition between China
and Japan. Particularly, the inclusion ofAustralia and New Zealand embodied theline of division between the two. In theJapanese thinking, there still remains a
concern about the China-centered processof community building possibly developing
into a closed region, particularly vis‑a‑vis the
US. In the Japanese conception, the inclusionof Australia and New Zealand has a double
function. First, they provide a venting channel
leading to the US as a security anchor in East
Asia. Second, the membership of Australia and
New Zealand is also important from the pointof view of the values that will sustain thefoundation of an East Asian Community andkeep it open to the rest of the world.
From the Japanese point of view, behindthe competition over the membershipcomposition—between the ASEAN+3 formulaand the ASEAN+6 formula (involving Australia,
New Zealand and India) for the East Asian
Summit—lies this conceptual competition,
if not a geopolitical rivalry, between Japanand China.

4 The US and an East Asian
Community
With the end of the Cold War, coping withthe predominant power of the US at a timeof transition became a central componentof many nations’ strategies. The US itself
has been fundamental readjusting its global
strategy, with a primary focus on how
best to use its predominant power, and forwhat purposes.
In these major US efforts of strategic
readjustment, there has always been a strong
temptation to resort to unilateralism, bothin agenda setting and in the execution of its
power. While the tendency to unilateralism
has become quite apparent with the adventof the George W Bush administration,
particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, it has
never ceased to be an American trait—evenin previous years, including the time of the
Clinton administration.
Simultaneously, however, there has always
existed an inclination for US administrations
to work with the international community
whenever it is possible and beneficial for the
US. One could argue that the intention behind
the willingness to resort to multilateralism
is still unilateralist, but this is true of theso‑called great powers, including China,almost by definition. The question is about
the relative weight Washington gives tounilateralism and to the multilateral approachas means of its foreign policy.
Arguably, US strategic objectives have been
constant since the end of the Cold War. The
maintenance of a new global order after
the Cold War has been of primary concern,and Washington’s determination not toThe 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

allow any rising power to challenge the US,
either regionally or globally, has been strong.
The 1991 Gulf War represented the firstmanifestation of such US global strategy
in the post‑Cold War era. Since the endof the Cold War, the US has also regarded
terrorism and the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction as main sources of
threat to global stability as well as to its
national security. Throughout the 1990s, theUS forward-deployed military presence hasoften become a target of terrorist attacks,
many of which have allegedly been by
al‑Qaeda. And yet, 9/11 proved to be a historicturning point because it gave the Bushadministration a clear goal and a mission
in a war against terrorism and those who
harbor terrorists. This war is likely to continue
for a few decades, even with the changeof administrations, but with a somewhat
adjusted approach gravitating toward
multilateral cooperation.
A preferable scenario for the rest of us in
East Asia is to integrate the US power into theprocess of building a security community, in
one way or another. Here, the US inclination
to use force unilaterally stands against
the norm of a security community. Also, astrongly value-oriented approach by the
US administration could also constitute an
obstacle in the triggering phase of the process
to build a security community, if not to thefinal objective. There are still undemocratic
or democratically developing countries
in East Asia, and a strong missionary zeal
supported by a deep commitment to values
could only discourage those countries fromjoining the efforts to build the community.
The security landscape in East Asia, however,is complex, involving China, Russia, Japanand the Korean Peninsula; this makes thelikelihood of US unilateralism dominating thesecurity scene very slim.
In all likelihood and almost by definition,
the US will not become a formal member of43

an East Asian Community. In the process ofcommunity building, however, the US power
needs to be accommodated rather thanalienated or antagonised. East Asia also needs
to be able to speak in a common language
about the benefits and disturbances the US
might bring to community-building efforts. In
a nutshell, an East Asian Community shouldbe able to coexist with the US. Japan andAustralia should have a special role to play inthis respect.

5 The rise of China and an East
Asian Community
Coping with the rise of China has also been
an important component of the strategic
readjustment of many nations after theend of the Cold War. In the process towardbuilding a security community, China would
also have to be accommodated, so that
it would commit itself to the principle ofpeaceful management of differences. There
now exist a few circumstantial conditions inwhich efforts toward these goals are worth
making. The most favourable factor is China’s
unmistakable commitment to a new strategy
sustained by a ‘New Security Concept.’
The strategic focus on economic matters
by China is now fully demonstrated by thecomposition of its central leadership as wellas its policy substance. Accordingly, thisstrategy has now shifted Chinese attention
away from traditional hard security issues
into the management of economic and social
problems domestically, as well as multilateraldiplomacy with its neighbours. Perhaps theexternal environment is now better thanat any time since the end of the Cold War
to reach out to China to develop a common
security agenda.
Skeptics would argue that economic growthwould simply increase People’s Liberation
Army’s portion of the pie. However, theoutcome of the race between possible

44

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Chinese participation in security community
building, on the one hand, and the likelihoodof its traditional military thinking regaining
control, on the other, is uncertain at best.
What is certain is that China’s current
emphasis on coexistence reflects its
long‑term strategy, and that there are manyfactors capable of affecting the turn of eventsin this critical race.
This shift in Chinese strategies, on top of
Washington’s preoccupation with the war
against terrorism and nonproliferation in
the Middle East as well as East Asia, is an
important source of stability in the US–China
relationship in recent years. This indicatesthat the motivation on the part of China for
a better relationship with the US dates wellback, to the pre‑9/11 context.
In effect, China has stopped challenging US
predominance in the Asia–Pacific region
and the world since the late 1990s. This has
basically been the bottom line of Chinese
regional strategy since after the Taiwan
crises in 1995 and 1996, when both Beijing
and Washington sought to restore therelationship with mutual visits by Jiang Zemin
and Bill Clinton in 1997 and 1998. There isreasonable evidence to believe that China also
readjusted its policy toward Japan with thesame strategic considerations in the summerof 1999, perhaps upon re‑examining theeffect of Jiang Zemin’s trip to Japan in 1998.
The Taiwan question is now an object of
the strategic coexistence between the US
and China. In principle, the Taiwan question
still remains a wild card for US–China
relations and could upset their strategic
coexistence. Now, however, the Chinese
economy-centered strategy appears to beworking. Taiwan’s economic dependence on
China is ever-deepening, which in turn gives
confidence to Beijing in advancing its ‘united
front’ policy toward ‘comrades’ in Taiwan.

Having noted all this, however, one should not
overlook the fact that in Chinese long‑termthinking there remains an inclination to thinkof the relationship with the US in competitive
terms. These basic urges in the Chinese
psyche are often revealed in the Chineseconceptualisation of East Asian regionalism.
Many political thinkers, for instance, see in
the Chinese FTA initiatives toward East Asian
countries the value of breaking the possible
encirclement of China by the US‑centredgroupings of democracies, and even the meritof isolating Taiwan.
This indicates that a China-centred East
Asian Community would give rise to someelements of concern regarding its openness,particularly in relation to US power and someof the value dimensions, which also lead
ultimately to the US factor. As we have seen,
central in the Japanese conceptualisation andapproach to an East Asian Community is thisconcern about the possible closed nature of
a community associated with deep-seated
Chinese imperatives.

6 Japanese internationalism andnationalism, and the case for a
Japan–Australia partnershipI have argued elsewhere that the YoshidaLine embracing the postwar Constitution
and the US–Japan alliance has eloquently
expressed Japan’s ‘postwar consensus,’ built
on a determination to step down from thestage of politics among major powers andto follow a de facto middle power strategy.5
Japan was born anew and embarked ona fresh start with the 1951 signing of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan’s ‘postwar
regime,’ embracing the Yoshida Line, became
an integral part of the postwar ‘San Francisco
regime’ that contributed to Japan’s postwar
peace and prosperity.
In essence, Japan’s security policy after theend of the Cold War represents an extension

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogueof that post‑World War II Japanese consensus.
First and foremost, the new security
environment after the end of the Cold
War has spurred the transformation of theisolationist pacifism Japan maintained during
the Cold War into a more proactive andinternationalist pacifism. Japan now seeks
participation in United Nations peacekeeping
operations or, more broadly, the domain ofinternational security.
It is within this context that the public isshowing greater support for a revision of the
postwar Constitution, particularly the total
renunciation of military potential in Article 9.
For example, one of the recent opinion polls
conducted by the Yomiuri Shinbun6 reveals
that, while 56% of respondents favour
constitutional revision, 70% do so because
they believe the present Constitution does
not clearly justify the existence of the
Self Defense Forces, and 47% support therevision because they feel that the current
Constitution cannot adequately deal
with new issues, such as contributions tomultilateral security. This is in line with theresults of many other opinion polls, indicatingthat constitutional revision is far from being
an issue of nationalism for the majority of
the Japanese public. After all, the emphasis in
Ichiro Ozawa’s theory of Japan as a ‘normal
state’ was also placed more on Japan’s
participation in international peacekeeping
efforts than on anything else.
Despite these deep realities in Japanesesociety, since the end of the Cold War Japan
has been perceived by its Asian neighbours
and many other countries to be seeking a
return to its former major-power status.
Particularly among its Asian neighbours,
domestic calls for Japan to become a ‘normal
state’ have been equated with a swing to
the right and a desire to exert its military
will on others. Simply put, this is a grossmisunderstanding and distortion of Japan’s
foreign policy.

45

That said, there must also be recognitionof the fact that the misunderstandings
and distortions may have been fueled byrevisionist political statements by politicalleaders amid changing Japanese discourses
on security policies and issues. What thesestatements really reveal is frustration withvarious aspects of the postwar set‑up.
Such frustrations are increasingly being
vented haphazardly, out of resentment
toward attacks from China and Korea anddissatisfaction over the ‘postwar consensus’of Japan. Paradoxically, such isolated
expressions have gained a degree of public
support precisely because of the lack of astrategy on the part of their proponents. Werea desire to revive Japan’s prewar aspirations
actually articulated clearly as a strategy, theJapanese public would be the first to reject
it—as amply implied by the opinion polls.
Upon examining Japan’s strategic context,
comprising institutional inertia, the dynamics
of democratic competition, pragmatism,
concern about the future of US power, andthe shifting regional balances of power,
Richard Samuels concludes that they
‘converge to make the discontinuation ofJapan’s revisionist course seem likely.’7 Indeed,
the current revisionist, nationalistic moodin Japanese politics and society is in essence
an excessive reaction to the rather extreme
pacifist premises of the postwar Japanese
defence and security policies, and thus would
turn out to be a transitional phenomenon.
True, in this dynamic process of transition,
somewhat naive nationalism has propelled
the changes. These changes, however,
have not gone beyond the premises ofJapan’s overall postwar consensus. Evenin the event (although unlikely in the near
future) that Japan recognises the right ofcollective self‑defence and collective security,
the outcome should be a much tighter
alliance with the US and full participation in46

Proceedings

multilateral security cooperation rather thananything else.
The Japanese conception and approach toan East Asian Community, based on an equal
partnership with Australia and New Zealand,
and in fact with Korea and ASEAN as well,should be regarded as a manifestation of
the internationalism of post‑Cold War Japanrather than as an expression of nationalism.
Some of the political discourse in Japan,
particularly because of its anti-China tone,
might give the impression that nationalism isbeing expressed. In reality, however, elementsof competition with China, if any, are carefully
embraced in Japan’s broader multilateralapproach toward East Asian regionalism,
which is nothing but a manifestation ofJapan’s de facto middle-power diplomacy.
This is the conceptual foundation upon whicha genuine partnership between Japan andAustralia could and should be realised in areal world. The signing of the Japan–Australia
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation on
March 13, 2007 is the most recent testimony
to this.8 The areas of cooperation and themethods of practical cooperation signify
typical middle-power cooperation between
Japan and Australia, including humanitarianrelief operations, peace operations, andregional capacity building.9
This clearly indicates that, in the overall
context discussed in this paper, therelationship between Japan and Australia has
the potential to lead community-building
efforts from the middle ground, between
the US and China. In this sense, Japan andAustralia are natural partners who cancooperate on an equal basis, in the true
sense of the term (that is, not as a politicalslogan), for the stability and prosperity of theregion and the world. If the Japan–Australia
partnership evolves on the basis of thisconceptual foundation, its role may
eventually become acceptable to the Chinese

long‑term strategy of ‘peaceful rise,’ without
contradicting the ultimate logic of the alliancewith the US and its role as a security anchor
for the region.

Endnotes
1

Prime Minister’s Advisory Group on
Defense Issues, The Modality of the
Security and Defense Capability of Japan,
August 12, 1994.

2

Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A
Contemporary History, Basic Books, New
York, 1997.

3

Yoshihide Soeya, ‘Vietnam in Japan’s
regional policy,’ in James Morley andMasashi Nishihara (eds), Vietnam Joins theWorld, ME Sharpe, New York, 1997.

4 Speech by Prime Minister of Japan
Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Japan and ASEAN in
East Asia: a sincere and open partnership,’January 14, 2002. Available at http://www.
mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/
speech.html
5

Yoshihide Soeya, Nihon-no Middle Power
Gaiko [Japan’s Middle Power Diplomacy],
Chikuma-shobo, Tokyo, 2005). Koreantranslation is also available from the Orum
publishers.

6 Daily Yomiuri, April 4, 2006.
7

Richard J Samuels, ‘Japan’s Goldilocks
strategy,’ The Washington Quarterly(Autumn 2006), p. 121.

8 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/
australia/joint0703.html
Accessed on 23  January 2008.
9 The joint declaration specifically mentions
the following items under the subheadingof ‘areas of cooperation.’
The scope of security cooperation
between Japan and Australia will include,
but not be limited to the following:

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue(i) law enforcement on combatingtransnational crime, including trafficking
in illegal narcotics and precursors, people
smuggling and trafficking, counterfeiting
currency and arms smuggling(ii) border security(iii) counter-terrorism(iv) disarmament and counter-proliferationof weapons of mass destruction and theirmeans of delivery(v) peace operations(vi) exchange of strategic assessments andrelated information(vii)maritime and aviation security(viii)humanitarian relief operations, including
disaster relief(ix) contingency planning, including for
pandemics.
As part of the abovementioned
cooperation, Japan and Australia will,
as appropriate, strengthen practicalcooperation between their respective
defence forces and other security-related
agencies, including through:(i) exchange of personnel(ii) joint exercises and training to further
increase effectiveness of cooperation,
including in the area of humanitarian relief
operations(iii) coordinated activities including thosein the areas of law enforcement, peace
operations, and regional capacity building.

47

China rising: the view from‘down under’
Dr Brendan Taylor
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Australian National University

Australia is affectionately known as the‘lucky country.’ It is also known, however, as
the ‘frightened country’—to borrow fromthe title of a classic text published in 1979 by
Alan Renouf, a former Head of the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs.1 In this paper,
I argue that these two notions capture well
the approach that Australia, over the past
decade under the Howard government, hastaken towards the (re)emergence of China.
On the one hand, Canberra’s perceptions ofChina’s rise are more sanguine and generally
more optimistic than those espoused in Tokyoand Washington. Like many of its Southeast
Asian neighbours, however, Australia also
harbours some apprehensions about thepossible ramifications of China’s growing
regional influence. For this reason, I will argue,
Canberra during the Howard years pursued
what might loosely be termed a ‘hedging
strategy’ combining elements of engagementwith a rising China and ‘soft balancing’against it. Contrary to recent speculation of a
new tilt toward China (and away from Japan)
under the new Rudd government, I conclude
the paper by predicting a continuation of this‘hedging’ approach.

The lucky country?
Canberra’s optimism vis-à-vis China’s(re)emergence was apparent in thestatements of senior figures throughout
the Howard years. Prime Minister Howardhimself famously stated during an address
at the Lowy Institute for International
Policy in March 2005 that ‘Australia does
not believe that there is anything inevitable
about escalating strategic competition
between China and the United States.’248

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Likewise, during a visit to China in June 2005,
the then Australian Defence Minister
Robert Hill indicated that he saw China’s
expanding military expenditure as a processof ‘modernisation, not destabilisation.’3 In
July 2005, and in a rare public disagreementwith President Bush, Howard suggested
while standing on the White House lawnthat the Sino–Australian relationship was‘mature enough’ to ride through ‘temporary
arguments’ over human rights and that
he remained ‘unashamed’ in developing
Australia’s relations with China. 4 Likewise,in January 2006 the Australian Ambassador
to the United States, Dennis Richardson,
asserted that ‘the question for Australia is
not whether China’s growth is innately goodor bad; Australia made up its mind long agothat is was a good thing. China’s growthis unambiguously good for Asia and theUnited States.’5
Three factors, in my view, have contributed
towards Australia’s optimistic view of China’s(re)emergence. The first, and most obvious,
is economic. Last year, for instance, China
overtook Japan to officially become Australia’s
leading trading partner.6 A large proportion ofthis trade consists of resource exports, which
are set to increase still further following
the resumption of LNG shipments from theNorth West Shelf to Guangdong in May 2006.
China is also Australia’s second largest export
destination for agricultural goods and its
largest market for international student
enrolments. As the disposable incomes ofmany Chinese continue to increase, a tourism
boom is also well underway.7 Taken together,
this has led to a situation where China’s rise isseen as nothing short of an economic blessing
for Australia which, incidentally, was largely
responsible for funding significant tax cuts
under the Howard government. Consistent
with this, Australians ranked China as the
economy most important to their country(both now and into the future) in a recent

foreign policy poll conducted by the Lowy
Institute for International Policy.8
Second, and relatedly, domestic politicalfactors have also proven conducive toAustralia’s more optimistic take on rising
China. Canberra is not shackled by the same
deep-seated nationalist sentiment thattoday we see throughout Northeast Asia,
fuelled in the Japanese case by the factthat it has fought several major wars with
China. Indeed, recent polling indicates that
the Australian public has generally positive
feelings towards China. In the 2007 version of
the aforementioned Lowy poll, for instance,
56% of Australians expressed positive feelings
toward China.9 An identical result wasrecorded in another recent poll conductedunder the auspices of Sydney University’sUnited States Studies Centre. Here 56% also
expressed a favourable opinion of China and,interestingly, a whopping 75% said the sameof Japan.10
Third, Australia’s geographic distance from thegreat power machinations of Northeast Asia
can also be seen to have contributed towards
the sense of optimism attending China’s
rise. To be sure, with the bulk of Australia’s
economic interests concentrated in the
Northeast Asian sub-region, our desire forcontinued strategic stability in this part of
the world is especially acute. Indeed, forthis reason alone the prospect—however
unlikely—of Sino–Japanese tensions everspiralling into open conflict is one that would
keep most Australian policy-makers awakeat night.
At the same time, however, Australia’s
fortuitous geographical positioning reduces
apprehensions surrounding China’s militarymodernisation in a way that would simply not
be possible for Japan. Canberra recognises,of course, that Beijing is moving beyond an
exclusive focus on Taiwan Strait scenarios
and that China’s capacity to deploy forces

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

along its maritime periphery is increasing
in a fairly rapid and significant way.11 Yet
China’s capacity to project power beyond its
immediate neighbourhood remains limited
and is likely to remain so into the foreseeable
future. As the respected American defence
analyst Phillip Saunders has recently observed‘China’s ambitious military modernisation
efforts are likely to improve the PLA’s
capability to project power globally, but thiswill be a gradual, long-term process.’12 This,of course, augurs well for a geographicallydistant Australia.
Added to this, China presently does nothave access to military bases in Australia’s
immediate neighbourhood, while Canberra
is of the view that any serious Chinese
attempt to project power into this part of
the world would, in the current strategic
environment, be strongly resisted by othermajor powers (namely the US).13 To be sure,Beijing’s long-range ballistic missiles alreadygive it the capacity to strike at Australia andit is continuing to modernise its strategic
nuclear forces. However, this modernisation
process continues to be a relatively slow one
and China’s strategic nuclear force remains
very small.14 Against that backdrop, it remains
difficult to conceive of circumstances in which
China would chose to expend this relatively
limited arsenal against Australian targets.

The frightened country?
However remote the prospect of a major
Chinese attack against Australia mightcurrently seem, it is still one which has
certainly not been dismissed altogether inAustralia’s defence planning.15 Hence, while
Canberra’s view of China’s (re)emergencehas tended to be more sanguine than thatheld in Tokyo and Washington, it would be a
mistake to characterise Australia’s positionon this issue as one of complete comfort. As
Coral Bell wrote in 1964, ‘a vague sense of
China as a distinctly alarming force is woven

49

into the original fabric of Australian national
attitudes.’16 Most recently, that same ‘vague
sense’ of alarm was reflected beautifully inthe 2007 Defence Update:
China’s emergence as a major market and driverof economic activity both regionally and globallyhas benefited the expansion of economic growthin the Asia–Pacific and globally. But the pace andscope of its military modernisation, particularly
the development of new and disruptive
capabilities such as the anti-satellite (ASAT)
missile (tested in January 2007) could create
misunderstandings and instability in the region.17

In its most recent manifestation, this lingering
apprehension vis-à-vis China is driven by two
factors. First, by a sense of uncertainty about
what the region would look like and how it
would operate were China to unambiguously
become the dominant power in this part of
the world. As Hugh White, a prominent figurein the Australian debate puts it, ‘None of us
know how a strong and unrestrained China
would behave, but it might seek to dominate
the region politically, economically and evenmilitarily in ways that would impinge upon
our interests.’18 On the one hand, Beijing’s
leadership capacity has been called into
question following the repeated cover-upof disease outbreaks (such as SARS), thealmost non-existent Chinese response to
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and due tothe continued opacity of domestic politics
in China.19 At the same time, the experienceof Nazi Germany has embedded deep in
the Western psyche a belief that states
undertaking military modernisation programs
who also display a flagrant regard for humanrights of their own subjects are more prone
to behaving aggressively in their foreign
relations than those which do not exhibit
these characteristics.
The second, equally deep-seated sourceof Australia’s latent apprehension comesfrom our longstanding sense that we are50

Proceedings

essentially regarded as ‘outsiders’ in Asia.
Renouf touched upon this insecurity in his
characterisation of Australia as a ‘frightened
country’; a country that literally lives in fear of
its own neighbourhood, that is unable to see
the opportunities in the Asian region clearly
and that also exhibits a strong penchantfor seeking out a great and powerful friend.
However, it was the American politicalscientist Samuel Huntington who probably
captured it best when referring to Australia
as a ‘torn country’—a society divided
over whether or not it belongs to Asia.20
Interestingly, Beijing has at times been
responsible for reinforcing this sense ofvulnerability, such as in mid-2005 when it
reportedly opposed Australian membership of
the inaugural East Asia Summit.21
During the Howard years, Australia
compensated for these perceived
vulnerabilities by adopting what might loosely
be termed a ‘hedging strategy’. ‘Hedging’, ofcourse, is an imprecise term whose usage cansometimes confuse as much as it clarifies.
In all of its manifestations, however, theconcept of ‘hedging’ would appear to involvea combination of engagement and indirect(or soft) balancing behaviour. Not unlikean ‘insurance’ policy, hedging strategies,
as Evelyn Goh has recently observed,‘cultivate a middle position that forestalls
or avoids having to choose one side (or one
straightforward policy stance) at the obvious
expense of another’.22
Australia and China have certainly deepened
their engagement in a number of areas
since normalising relations 35 years ago.
At that time, bilateral trade stood at
A$100 million, whereas by 2006 it hadreached $A33 billion.23 Beijing and Canberra
are currently in the process of negotiating aFree Trade Agreement (FTA). Their cooperation
on environmental issues is becoming
an increasingly important facet of therelationship. The issue of climate change has

become a priority area here, as demonstrated
by the establishment of an Australia–China
Joint Coordination Group on Clean Coal
Technology in January 2007.24 Interestingly,
however, Australia’s strategic engagementwith China has thus far remained
rather limited.25
Juxtaposed against this deepening
engagement, however, Australia during
the Howard years also seemed to indirectly
balance against China’s growing power
and influence. The centerpiece of this ‘soft
balancing’ approach was, of course, Australia’s
alliance with the US. Interestingly, however,
Canberra was always careful to avoid
creating the impression that its single mostimportant strategic relationship was everbeing used as an instrument with which to‘hard balance’ or ‘contain’ China. From an earlystage, for instance, Canberra refused to join
Washington in lobbying for a continuationof the European Union (EU) arms embargo
against China.26 In August 2004, Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer famously andcontroversially questioned whether Australia’s
ANZUS commitments would apply in thecase of a Taiwan Straits contingency.27 In
early 2005, Australia initially refused to join
the so‑called ‘Halibut Group’—a multilateral
forum led by US officials and designed tofacilitate private dialogue amongst selected
American allies regarding China.28 Again in
March 2006, prior to the inaugural gatheringof the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) to beheld at Ministerial Level in Sydney, Downerpublicly stated that ‘a policy of containmentof China would be a very big mistake.’ His
purpose in so doing appears to have been
to publicly distance himself from earlier
comments made by US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice during media interviews
where she indicated that the US, Japan andAustralia needed to be mindful of the paceand reach of Beijing’s military buildup andalso raised the prospect of China becoming ‘anegative force’.29

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

The TSD itself can certainly be regarded as
one of the key ‘soft balancing’ components
of Canberra’s ‘hedging’ strategy. The official
Australian rationale, of course, is that thisthree-way initiative is in no way directed
at China. A raft of other justifications havebeen advanced: America, Australia and Japan,
for instance, are each liberal democracies,
espousing broadly similar economic andpolitical values; they are each regarded—albeit to varying degrees—essentially as‘outsiders’ in Asia; and they share increasingly
common security concerns, such as
terrorism and WMD proliferation. Why, so
the official line goes, should these three‘natural allies’ not cooperate? The objectivesof facilitating Japan’s ‘normalisation’ or ofchecking America’s unilateralist tendencies
in foreign affairs have also been posited atvarious junctures.30
Any evidence suggesting an absence of the‘China factor’ from the strategy and politics
surrounding the TSD, however, remains far
from compelling. The repeated emphasis
given to the democratic credentials of the
TSD members automatically and implicitly
targets China—a sense of ostracism thatwas reinforced by subsequent suggestions
that the TSD might be expanded to include
India. The fact that the statement resulting
from the March 2006 meeting of the TSD
also made explicit mention of China does
make it difficult to sustain the argumentthat Beijing is not a focus of discussion atthese gatherings.31
It has certainly not escaped Beijing’s attention
that the TSD is comprised of members whoeach harbor (albeit differing) apprehensions
regarding China’s rise. Notwithstanding
assurances that it is being undertaken
to counter the growing threat posedby terrorist and rogue state actors, theintensification of missile defence researchcollaboration between the US, Japan andAustralia announced in June 2007 can be51

seen in a similar way.32 Indeed, so too can theAustralia–Japan security declaration which
was signed in March 2007. As Aurelia George
Mulgan has observed:
Australia is now figuring much larger in Japan’s
strategic calculations as well as in its economic
and trade vision for the region. These are
pre-eminently China-focused rather than centringon the value of the Australia–Japan relationshipfor its own sake.33

The Rudd government and Asian
security: time for a cool change?
Speculation is presently rife, however, thata significant recalibration of Australia’s‘hedging’ approach is set to occur under the
Rudd government. China is said to be themajor beneficiary of this anticipated policy
shift and Japan the biggest loser. The Straits
Times of Singapore, for instance, reports that:
Mr Rudd has a deeper understanding of China.
He will recognise that to keep the Australianeconomy going, ties with China would have tobe very close. He might seek more cooperationand dialogue with China on economic as well as
security issues.34

In similar vein, an editorial printed in theJapan Times suggests that:
Under Mr Rudd, who has a strong affinity
with China, Australia’s approach towards its
relations with China may change. He wasstationed in Beijing for two years in the 1980s
and speaks fluent Chinese … If Mr Rudd moves toaccommodate China’s growing influence, Japan
should seriously consider how to use it as leveragein lessening conflict and friction with China andgetting the country to play a constructive rolein Asia.35

The Yomiuri Shimbun is less up beat, however,observing that:
There are views there could be a setback inAustralia–Japan relations under the new Rudd
Administration.36

52

Proceedings

While such sentiments are understandable,
my view is that they are also misplaced.
Indeed, for at least three reasons I would
argue that, when it comes to Australianapproaches to Asian security, the subtle
changes which may occur under the Rudd
government should not obscure the fact thatmuch will remain the same as it was during
the Howard period.
First, Rudd has made no secret of his
continued commitment to the American
alliance. Indeed, Rudd’s first words on foreign
policy during his election night victory speech
indicated that the alliance would remain
central under his watch.37 This, of course, isentirely consistent with the Labor Party’s
longstanding commitment to the alliance,
notwithstanding the aberration of theMark Latham candidacy.
To be sure, Rudd’s approach to the alliancewill certainly not be identical to Howard’s.
Michael Fullilove, for instance, has recently
speculated that Canberra will now beless likely to participate in any future US
unilateral adventures. In his terms ‘Australia
will remain a robust and familiar ally to
America, but it may no longer be the best
redoubt for outlaws.’ He also suggests thata Rudd government will more actively seek
to influence Washington’s attitudes andbehaviours, in sharp contrast to the often
unswerving loyalty of the Howard years.
Nevertheless, Fullilove also goes on to positthat Rudd may actually move Australia
closer to the US.38 While this, from Rudd’s
perspective, ought not to preclude Australia
from simultaneously developing more
intimate ties with Beijing, the reverse may
not necessarily be true. The Chinese, who
remain intent upon further softening US
alliance relationships throughout the region,
continue to view the America–Australia
tie as a fundamental impediment to theirdeveloping any genuine strategic relationshipwith Canberra.

Second, while the depth of Australia’s
economic engagement with China can hardly
be called into question, its engagement atother levels remains relatively shallow andunderdeveloped. Engagement, of course, isa multi-layered, multi-dimensional processthat also encompasses a wide spectrum ofpeople‑to-people contacts and personal
linkages. Yet Australia and China remainvery different societies: we speak a different
language, our cultures are diametrically
opposed and our values are fundamentallyin conflict. Trying to develop the same levelof trust and intimacy that currently exists
in the Australia–US or, for that matter, theAustralia–Japan relationship is therefore likely
to be a long-term project and one that willalmost certainly encounter a good deal moretrials and tribulations than has thus far been
acknowledged in either Beijing or Canberra.
Indeed, two areas of potential difficulty are
already apparent. The first is in relation to the
proposed FTA between Australia and China.
Where negotiations were notoriously slow
during the Howard years, they have virtually
ground to a halt under Rudd’s watch. The new
Prime Minister has already controversially cut
resources allocated to these FTA negotiations.
Added to this, China is increasingly
focused upon growing its own domestic
consumption and on ‘going global’ in the areaof investment. Trade is thus becoming lessof a priority in this environment—a factor
which does not augur particularly well forthe future progress of the FTA.39 The second
area of potential difficulty is human rights.
Despite Rudd’s pro-China credentials, he has
previously criticised China in this area. He is
also likely to face pressure from the left-wingof his own Labor Party to press Beijing
on this front. Hence, where the Howard
government was able to largely insulate theSino–Australian relationship from difficulties
over human rights issues by conducting
discussions regarding these matters in theThe 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

context of a private bilateral dialogue, Rudd
may not have this luxury. 40
Third, and most importantly in the context of
this discussion, is the continued importanceof Japan to Australia. Japan remains Australia’s
second largest trading partner and there
is very little to suggest that its economic
centrality to this country will soon diminish.
The longevity of the Australia–Japan security
relationship should not be underestimatedeither. Greater strategic collaboration
between our two countries, we should
recall, began during the 1970s and has been
expanded substantially from the 1990s
onwards. 41 To be sure, some rebalancing of theAustralia–Japan relationship is likely to occur
following Howard’s noticeable tilt towards
Tokyo which took place at the beginningof 2007. In my view, that tilt was driven
primarily by domestic political considerations
and was an attempt on the part of Howard
to differentiate himself from Rudd in anelection year.
Against that backdrop, rather than executing
any fundamental re-ordering of Australia’s
approach to Asian security, my view is that
we will see the new Rudd government revert
to the delicate ‘balancing act’ that was sucha defining feature of Australian foreign
policy throughout most of the Howard years.
America and Japan will remain central here,
in my view, as Canberra continues to ‘hedge’against some of the less savoury potentialities
associated with China’s (re)emergence. In
the words of my colleague Robert Ayson,‘the countries of Asia will find that the Rudd
government, and especially its leader, iscommitted to regional engagement and topositioning Australia wisely in the emerging
great power picture … But Australia’s 26th
prime minister will be under no illusion that
old-fashioned relations of power between
states are being sidelined in the region or that
Asia is destined for increasing peace as wellas prosperity. The region’s realists, and there53

are many of them, will find that Kevin Rudd issomeone who can understand and speak theirlanguage. They will find, in short, that Rudd isfluent in much more than mandarin.’42

Endnotes
1

Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country,(Melbourne: MacMillan, 1979).

2

Prime Minister the Hon. John Howard
MP, address at the opening of the Lowy
Institute for International Policy, Sydney,
31 March 2005.

3

Cited in Paul Dibb, ‘Don’t Get Too Close to
Beijing’, The Australian, 2 August 2005.

4 Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon.
John Howard MP, Joint Press Conferencewith the President of the United Statesof America George W. Bush, The WhiteHouse, Washington DC, 19 July 2005.
5

Geoff Elliott, ‘Stay cool on China,
Ambassador tells US’, The Australian,
30 January 2006.

6 Jessica Irvine, ‘China now biggest partner’,Sydney Morning Herald, 1 September 2007.
7

See Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, ‘People’s Republic ofChina Country Brief – December 2007’.
Available from the world wide web: (www.
dfat.gov.au/geo/china/cb_index.html).
[accessed 9 December 2007].

8 Allan Gyngell, Australia and the World;
public opinion and foreign policy, (Sydney,
NSW: Lowy Institute for International
Policy, 2007), p.13.
9 Ibid, p.5.
10 See Alan Dupont, ‘Benefits offset costsof US alliance’, Sydney Morning Herald,
3 October 2007.
11 For further reading see Michael D. Swaine,‘China’s Regional Military Posture’, inDavid Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China

54

Proceedings

and Asia’s New Dynamics, (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2005),
pp.266-285.
12 Phillip C. Saunders, ‘China’s Global
Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools’,
Occasional Paper 4, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, Washington DC, October 2006,
p.18.
13 See Hugh White, Beyond the Defence ofAustralia, Lowy Institute Paper 16, (Sydney,
NSW: Lowy Institute for International
Policy), pp.34-35.
14 For further reading see US Departmentof Defense, Annual Report of the Military
Power of the People’s Republic of China, (USGovernment Printing Office, Washington
DC, 2007), pp.18-20.
15 See, for example, Commonwealth ofAustralia, Defence 2000: Our Future
Defence Force, (Canberra: Department of
Defence, 2000), p.23.
16 Coral Bell, ‘Australia and China: Power
Balance and Policy’, in A.M. Halperin, ed.,
Policies Toward China: Views from Six
Continents, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965).
17 Australian Department of Defence,
Australia’s National Security: A Defence
Update 2007, (Canberra: Commonwealthof Australia, 2007), p.19.
18 Hugh White, ‘The limits to optimism:
Australia and the rise of China’, Australian
Journal of International Affairs, vol.59, no.4,
December 2005, p.476.
19 See, for example, Joshua Kurlantzickand Devin Stewart, ‘Hu’s on First?’, The
National Interest, No.92, November/
December 2007, pp.63-67.
20 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of
Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, vol.72,
no.3, Summer 1993, p.42; and Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations andthe Remaking of World Order, (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp.151-154.
21 Patrick Walters, ‘Beijing plays spoiler on
Asia summit’, The Australian, 6 April 2005.
22 Evelyn Goh, ‘Understanding ‘hedging’ inAsia-Pacific security’, PacNet Newsletter
No. 43, Pacfic Forum CSIS, Honolulu,
Hawaii, 31 August 2006.
23 See Malcolm Cook, ‘Building on
Strong Foundations: The Future of the
China-Australia Relationship: Outcomes
Report’, Perspectives, Lowy Institute forInternational Policy, Sydney, July 2007.
24 See Australian Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, ‘People’s Republic ofChina Country Brief – December 2007’.
25 See Australian Department of Defence,
Australia’s National Security: A Defence
Update 2007, p.35.
26 See Michael Wesley, ‘Australia-China’in Brendan Taylor, ed., Australia as an
Asia-Pacific Regional Power: Friendships in
Flux?, (London: Routledge, 2007), p.72.
27 Hamish McDonald and Tom Allard, ‘ANZUS
loyalties fall under China’s shadow’, Sydney
Morning Herald, 18 August 2004.
28 See William T. Tow, ‘Sino-American
relations and the ‘Australia factor’:inflated expectations or discriminate
engagement?’, Australian Journalof International Affairs, vol.59, no.4,
December 2005, p.454.
29 Patrick Walters, ‘Containing China a Big
Mistake: Downer’, The Australian,
16 March 2006.
30 For further reading on the TSD and its
objectives see William T Tow, Mark J
Thomson, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Satu
P. Limaye, Asia-Pacific Security: US, Australia
and Japan and the New Security Triangle,(London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

31 See Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Australia–
Japan relations: New directions’, Strategic
Insights, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, July 2007, p.2.
32 Patrick Walters, ‘Possibility of a bigger rolein security architecture’, The Australian,
9 June 2007.
33 Mulgan, ‘Australia–Japan relations: New
directions’, p.2.
34 William Choong and Sim Chi Yin, ‘Rudd
govt expected to be closer to China’,
Straits Times, 26 November 2007.
35 ‘Australia with a new face’, The Japan
Times, 28 November 2007.
36 Cited in Choong and Yin, ‘Rudd govt
expected to be closer to China’.
37 Available from the world wide web: (www.
alp.org.au/media/1107/spepme240.php).
[Accessed 9 December 2007].
38 Michael Fullilove, ‘Ally with a new attitude;
Australia’s prime minister, the staunchestof Bush supporters, is ousted’, Los Angeles
Times, 29 November 2007.
39 For further reading see Rowan Callick,‘China Free Trade agreement shapes up as
an early challenge for Rudd’,
The Australian, 3 December 2007.
40 For further reading see Steve Lewis andCath Hart, ‘Left to create China crisis for
Rudd’, The Australian, 12 April, 2007.
41 For further reading see Brendan Taylor
and Desmond Ball, ‘Australia–Japan’,in Brendan Taylor, ed., Australia as an
Asia–Pacific Regional Power: Friendships in
Flux?, (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.50-59.
42 Robert Ayson, ‘Kevin Rudd and Asia’s
Security’, PacNet Newsletter No.49,
Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii,
29 November 2007.

55

The impacts of China’s rise on
the Asian international system
Seiichiro Takagi
Aoyama Gakuin University1

Introduction
At the end of 1978, China departed fromthe path of revolution and switched toa policy of reform and opening up, witheconomic development as the fundamental
goal of the state. The economic and social
development which China has attained todate has brought about various changes
on the international scene. Clearly, themost striking is China’s huge newfoundeconomic presence within the international
community. According to statistics publishedby the Chinese Government in January 2006,
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has
risen to US$2.26 trillion, making it the fourthlargest in the world. There is also a view that
China’s GDP is already effectively the thirdlargest in the world, given the undervaluationof its currency (the yuan) and China’s low
domestic prices.
This rapid economic growth was
accomplished through export-oriented
industrialisation and the active introductionof foreign capital. As a result, China’s global
trade presence has also grown rapidly—
according to World Trade Organization
statistics, by 2004 China was already the thirdlargest trading nation in the world. China is
now Japan’s number one trade partner. In
terms of other indices as well, such as inward
direct investment and foreign exchange
reserves, China is now a leading economic
player on the world stage.
Although this in itself is a significant enoughchange, the consequences of China’s
dramatic economic growth are not limited
to the expansion of its economic presencein the world. This paper tries to examine theconsequences of China’s rapid economic

56

Proceedings

growth in terms of the international
political system.

1 The influence of China’s
economic growth on its
international behaviour
In view of the rapid and sustained growth of
its economy, China’s presence is in various
ways a desirable one for the international
community. Having become the factory
to the world, China is now for many
countries a vital source of supply of low
priced consumer goods. Also, the steady
expansion of the middle class over the courseof approximately a quarter of a century of
economic growth has created an enormous
market. The recovery of the Japanese
economy—long mired in stagnation after
the burst of the bubble at the start of the
1990s—has been heavily reliant on China,both as an investment destination and as anexport market.
From a broader perspective, it should bepointed out that as China has realised its
economic growth by integrating itself withinternational institutions such as the World
Trade Organization, it has become an actor
that is not likely to benefit from disrupting
the existing international order. As advocatesof the theory of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ point
out, irrespective of China’s massive presence
in terms of macroeconomic indicators, thenation ranks lower than one hundredth in
the world in per capita GDP and, as it requires
continuous long term growth, this trend canbe expected to continue in the future.
It is undeniable, however, that the various
changes accompanying China’s rapid
economic growth have aroused major
concern in the international community.
Foremost among these, as many
commentators have observed, is the factthat China’s rapid economic growth hasenabled it to swiftly modernise its militarycapability. According to official Chinese
statistics, China’s military expenditure has
increased by over 10% almost every year since1989. However, an annual report on Chinese
military power issued by the US Departmentof Defense states that those official figures
account for no more than a third to a half ofChina’s actual military spending. China has
been using this huge military expenditure
to import advanced weaponry from Russia,
improve military training standards, enhance
the computerisation of its military, andrapidly modernise its military capability,with particular emphasis on naval and airforces. This rapid modernisation of China’s
military capability—coupled with the serious
lack of transparency that surrounds it—hascome to be a major source of anxiety formany countries.
Second, as has been evident since the later
half of the 1990s, demand by China fornatural resources (especially for energy
resources) is rising rapidly in tandem with its
rapid economic growth. The fact that China
has to seek supplies of those resources fromabroad is exerting a major influence on its
conduct towards other nations. In particular,
the rapid rise in China’s level of dependenceon oil from other nations since it became a
net oil importer in 1993 has contributed tothe soaring oil prices of recent years. The factthat China has strengthened its relations with‘problem states’ such as Iran, Venezuela, andthe Sudan, with a view to ensuring sources ofsupply for oil, has also become a major cause
of international concern.
Furthermore, there is also major cause forapprehension about the domestic social
consequences of China’s rapid economic
growth. First, as has often been pointed out,
growth has broken down the old ‘equalityof poverty’ and brought about various acutedisparities. According to a 2005 report by theUnited Nations Development Programme,
disparity in income levels is such that theThe 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

ratio of income in urban areas to income inrural areas is 6 to 1, and over the past twenty
years the national Gini index has increased
by 50% to 0.46.2 Although the latter figure
is lower than in several Latin Americanand African countries, the urban income
disparity is seemingly the worst in the world.
Against this background there has been a
sharp rise in the number of cases of social
unrest. In January 2006 the Public Security
Department announced that in 2005 there
had been more than 87,000 instances of‘offenses of disturbing social order,’ suchas public disturbances and incidents ofgroup violence—an increase of 6.6% overthe previous year.3 Notably, there have beenreports of cases in which conflict over issues
such as the forceful appropriation of land
and irregular charges have led to violent
disputes in agricultural communities. As
noted by Elizabeth Economy, an expert on
China’s environmental problems, there arealso frequent protest movements sparked by
the ongoing aggravation of environmental
problems such as air and water pollution anddesertification—the pursuit of economic
development having led to a disregard for theburden placed on the environment. 4
It appears that these kinds of situation—
especially incidents of violence on a larger
scale—are currently confined to the levelof regional disputes, and that there is nonationwide coordination. The Hu Jintao–Wen
Jiabao regime seems to be fully aware of thegravity of these problems, as demonstrated
by slogans such as ‘putting people first,’‘constructing a harmonious society,’ and‘the theory of scientific development.’
Furthermore, the advocates of the ‘peacefulrise’ theory assert that, because China will
have to respond appropriately to this kindof domestic situation over a long period,
China will need a peaceful international
environment, and that its continuing
development will thus inevitably be peaceful.5

57

However, there are limits to the ability of thecurrent regime to counter these problems,and it is conceivable that suppression of
discontent (coupled with unremitting
corruption among officialdom and theinadequacies of the social security system)
could jeopardise the very survival of theregime. Notably, the theory of the ‘revolutionof rising expectations’ suggests that, in theevent of a significant slowdown in economic
growth (even if negative growth were
avoided), this danger would rapidly loom.
Under such circumstances, the leadership
might succumb to the temptation to inflame
tensions with other nations in order todisplace domestic discontent and avert acrisis. Even if it did not go to such lengths, it
is likely that it would not make any effective
efforts to contain demonstrations of mass
discontent directed at foreign nations.
It is possible that the rise of nationalism that
accompanies rapid economic development
will further intensify these trends. As aChinese researcher told me a few years ago,
in the initial stages of reform and opening
up, nationalism was a friend of reform andopening up because it was essential to
overcome China’s low level of development,
but now nationalism turned against any
opening up to the outside world, due toa rise in self confidence resulting from
economic growth.6
This trend is being spurred on by the recent
exceptionally rapid spread of the internet.
According to a survey by the China Internet
Information Center, the total number ofinternet users in China was 620,000 in 1997,
22.5 million in 2000, and 111 million in 2005.
The 2005 figure is nearly five times the2000 figure, and 179 times the 1997 total.7
Against this backdrop, the anti‑Japanesedemonstrations that took place in many
Chinese cities in April 2005 were organisedover the internet through email andchat rooms, and rapidly assumed major

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Proceedings

proportions. Even after the activities on thestreets were brought under control in May,
criticism of Japan continued unabated on
the internet. It is said that on July 1, activists
sent UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan aletter, with 46 million electronic signaturesattached, opposing Japan’s accession
to permanent membership of the UN
Security Council.8
How should we deal with such problematic
behaviour on the part of China, stemmingfrom its economic and social development?
As well as devising ways to alleviate and avoid
the damage which that behaviour entails (thenatural response), we should probably also
work towards a pre-emptive response andwherever possible assist China as much as we
can in its efforts to mitigate and dispel thecauses of the behaviour.
For example, the rapid rise in Chinese energy
demand is not the result of China’s rapid
economic growth alone—it is also partly due
to China’s inefficient use of energy. According
to some assessments, China’s energy
consumption per unit GDP (oil equivalent
conversion) is approximately ten times that ofJapan and four times that of the US. Althoughthose assessments may be biased by theconversion of GDP into dollars at the market
rate, China definitely has significant room for
improvement in energy efficiency—and an
improvement in efficiency would certainly
slow down the increase in demand. Assisting
China to improve its energy efficiency would
not simply be in China’s interests—it is a taskthat ought to be performed in the interests ofthe entire international community.
China’s environmental pollution is also notsolely a domestic problem, but is also a hugeproblem for Japan and South Korea, which
are downwind in the jetstream. According toa Japanese study on sulfur dioxide that fell
on Japan in January 1999, in all regions but
one over 50% of it originated in China, withthe proportion reaching 75% in one region.

The same is true (although to a lesser extent)of the spread of yellow dust caused by theadvance of desertification. In fact, some of
China’s environmental problems now assume
a global dimension. According to a study by
the International Energy Agency publishedin November 2006, China is now the second
largest emitter of carbon dioxide, accountingfor 18% of the global total (after the US, with22%), and is expected to overtake the USwithin four years.9
Elizabeth Economy points out regional
disparities in China’s response toenvironmental pollution, and cites the
support of leaders for protecting theenvironment, the existence of the necessary
resources to do so, and the strong backingof the international community as thecommon features in those regions thatare succeeding in this regard.10 In this case,the international community includes not
only the governments of environmentallyadvanced nations but also non-governmentorganisations, which play a key role. It is also
possible that China might witness a replay ofthe pattern seen in Eastern Europe and theformer Soviet Union, where demonstrationsof discontent by local residents overenvironmental problems proved to be a vital
first step towards government reform anddemocratisation. Hence, assistance with theenvironment could transform into low key
backing for democratisation.
It is really up to China alone to make efforts
to reduce the disparities and eliminate
corruption. Although there is little scope forparticipation by the international community,
there may be times when it will need toexercise prudence so as not to become
part of the problem. With regard to China’s
modernisation of its military capability,
the international community must takemeasures to avoid risks and demand increasedtransparency, while taking care not to fall
into the trap of the security dilemma. China

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

formerly concealed all information regarding
its military capabilities. It was international
persuasion at the ASEAN Regional Forumand other venues that led China to publish
at least a national defence white paper.
Although it was highly unsatisfactory byinternational standards, it is a welcome step
forward. Finally, the international community
must cope with Chinese nationalism calmly,
without rising to the bait of its anti-foreign
tendencies, and at the same time seek
cooperation with cooler Chinese heads
through mutual understanding.

2 The effects on the international
system of China’s immense growth
China’s growth and the East Asianinternational system
China’s economic and social development
has not only effected various changes in its
own conduct towards other countries—it has
also had major effects on the nature of theinternational system. These changes havebeen due to China’s conduct towards othernations—principally a result of its immense
economic growth. Chief among them are thetwo changes considered below.
The first change is the increase in China’s
influence in the surrounding region. When
China stood isolated internationally, facing
sanctions from Western nations over the
Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989, it
sought a breakthrough by focusing on the
improvement of its relations with the nationsof Southeast Asia, which had not taken sucha critical stance on the incident. Between
the latter half of 1989 and 1991, China
normalised relations with Laos, Indonesia,
and Vietnam, established diplomatic
relations with Singapore and Brunei, actively
participated in the Cambodian peace process
in 1991, and then collaborated with thesubsequent UN peacekeeping operationin Cambodia. It developed relations with59

regional organisations, attending the ASEAN
post ministerial meeting in July 1991 as aguest of the chair nation, and at the end ofthat year becoming a member of APEC, alongwith Taiwan and Hong Kong. A few years
after the Tiananmen Square incident, China
made headway in its relations with other
Asian countries, with the Japanese Emperor’svisit to China in 1992 and the establishmentof diplomatic relations with the Republic ofKorea in the same year. China reacted calmly
to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the endof 1991, and swiftly established diplomatic
relations with the successor states which
comprised the Community of Independent
States, including Russia. China declared its
intention to join the ASEAN Regional Forum,
the founding of which was agreed upon in
1993, and in 1994 became a consultative
dialogue partner of ASEAN. However, it mustalso be pointed out that at same time thetheory of the ‘Chinese threat’ was gaining
currency in the nations of Southeast Asia,
against a backdrop of China’s rapid economic
growth in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s
Southern Tour speeches of 1992 and disputes
over sovereignty in the South China Sea.
In order to change this state of affairs, fromthe mid-1990s China became even more
actively involved in Southeast Asia. At theASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in 1996,
China became a full dialogue partner of
ASEAN and presented a new security concept
incorporating the notion of cooperative
security. The following year, China hosted
an ASEAN Regional Forum inter-sessional
meeting on confidence building. At thetime of the Asian currency/financial crisis
in 1997, China responded to the concernsof Southeast Asian nations by averting
devaluation of its currency, the yuan, andconcurrently gave economic assistanceto Thailand and Indonesia. At the end ofthat year, China launched the ASEAN+1
consultation mechanism with the nationsof ASEAN, while simultaneously joining the60Proceedings

ASEAN+3 mechanism encompassing China,
Japan, and South Korea. Under ASEAN+1, in
2000 China proposed the conclusion of afree trade agreement with the nations of
ASEAN, with a view to sharing the fruits of its
own economic growth with them; in 2004 aframework agreement was finally concluded.
In 2000 China also began discussions with
ASEAN nations over sovereignty disputes in
the South China Sea, and in 2002 it signed
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea. In 2003 China joined theTreaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia and announced a strategic partnershipwith the nations of ASEAN.
At more or less the same time that thesedevelopments were taking place, China was
making great strides in its relations with
the nations of Central Asia, its neighbours
to the north. In 1996 China took advantageof the signing of an agreement with Russia,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan on
confidence-building measures in borderareas to inaugurate the Shanghai Five
Summit Meeting. Since then, the Shanghai
Five have held an annual summit meeting,expanding and deepening their cooperative
relationship. In 2001 Uzbekistan was admitted
to the group and it was transformed
into a formal regional organisation, theShanghai Cooperation Organization. To thesouth as well, China was making progress,
developing improved relations with India
while maintaining amicable relations withPakistan. By setting aside the resolutionof territorial problems as a precondition to
improved relations, India and China took
the opportunity of the 1988 visit to China by
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to start improving
their relationship. In 1993 the two nations
concluded an agreement on maintaining
tranquility in the areas around the line ofactual control, and in 1996 concluded anagreement on confidence‑building measuresin the military field relating to the same areas.
Improvements in China’s relations with India

were set back by India’s nuclear testing in May
1998, but the summer of 1999 saw a recovery.
As the above developments illustrate, against
a backdrop of rapid economic growth sincethe 1990s, China has succeeded in improving
relations with its neighbours throughvigorous diplomacy, and has strengthened
its presence in the region. However, these
events did not signify the instant formationof an Asian power balance in which
China predominated. This was because
simultaneously with the developments
described above, other—sometimes
countervailing—developments were taking
place in Asia. Of particular importance was
the strengthening of the Japan–US security
alliance. After the end of the Cold War, thesecurity partnership between Japan and the
US lapsed into a temporary drift, due to theloss of the potential common enemy in the
shape of the Soviet Union. However, starting
around 1994, there were concrete activities
by both parties to improve the situation. In
the Joint Declaration on Security issued in
April 1996, the two nations reaffirmed theimportance of the alliance in the post-Cold
War era without identifying any nation as
a potential enemy. They agreed that, evenafter the end of the Cold War, the US–Japansecurity alliance played a vital role in thepreservation of peace and stability in theAsia–Pacific region as an institution capable ofresponding effectively to regional instability
and uncertainty. Such a move was not meant
to be directed against the expansion ofChina’s influence, and the joint declaration
affirmed China’s ‘constructive role’ as being
in the common interest of Japan and the US.
Rather, many of the actions taken by China
since 1996 have been countermeasuresagainst the strengthened US–Japan alliance.
Following the 1996 declaration, theframework of cooperation in the Japan–US
security alliance was strengthened stepby step with the revision of the Japan–US

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

61

defence cooperation guidelines in 1997, thestart of joint technical research on missile
defence in 1999 (which was propelled by thefiring of a Taepodong missile by North Korea
in 1998), and Japanese legislation relating tocontingencies in areas surrounding Japan in
1999. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001,
the two nations have been drawing closer
ever more rapidly, with the acceleration of therealignment of US forces in Japan, and against
a background of the affirmation of the global
significance of the US–Japan alliance. Thiscan be seen in the identification of joint
strategic objectives in February 2005; theformalisation of each nation’s missions, roles,
and capabilities in October 2005; and the
publication in May 2006 of the Roadmap for
Realignment Implementation. Concurrently,
the realignment of the US–South Korea
alliance also made progress through the
Future of the Alliance and Security Policy
Initiative meetings, despite turbulence causedby rising domestic anti-US sentiment, while
the US–Australia alliance also remains onan even keel. The evolution of the linkage
between the Japan–US and the Australia–USsecurity alliances, which seems to have gained
steam since 2008, is not ostensibly directedagainst China but will certainly function as
the antidote to the formation of a Sino-centric
Asian order.

the US. In the international relief efforts that
followed the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami,
the US constituted a formidable presence,
contributing a large-scale dispatch of forcesthat included an aircraft carrier, as wellas providing enormous sums in financial
assistance; likewise, Japan dispatched its self
defence forces and made the largest financial
contribution of any nation. The East Asia
Summit of December 2005 witnessed a tugof war between Japan and China over which
nations should participate. The Southeast
Asian nations sided with Japan, which insisted
that Australia and India be invited.

•

any one of the three handles its
relationship with the second inconsideration of its relationship withthe third

The nations of Southeast Asia are notcompletely under the influence of China,
either. After the Asian currency crisis, Japan
provided a far greater sum in assistancethan China under the New Miyazawa
Initiative, which was unveiled in 1998.
In December 2003 Japan hosted theJapan–ASEAN Commemorative Summit
Meeting in Tokyo, which was intended tostrengthen its collaboration with ASEAN
nations. Similarly, the number of countries
reinforcing cooperative relations with the
US since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has
increased, and in 2003 the Philippines andThailand became ‘major non NATO allies’ of•

the political and military capability of
any one is significant enough to seriously
affect the strategic balance if it changesalignment from the second to the third•

none of the three has a stable andlasting alignment with either one of theother two. 11

Formation of a US–China–India strategic
triangle?
Another change in international systems
brought about by China’s (and India’s)
economic growth which merits examinationis the possible formation of a strategic
triangular relationship between the US, China,
and India which encompasses the entire
Asian region. Here the strategic triangle isdistinguished from trilateral relationships by
the existence of three conditions:

The US played the critical role in what
seems to be the formation of this triangular
relationship. The US’s post-Cold War policy
towards China has undergone fluctuationof great magnitude, with the trauma of the
Tiananmen Square incident and the loss ofthe need for an anti-Soviet card due to the62

Proceedings

collapse of the Cold War order. Nevertheless,in addition to its renewed recognition of theimportance of the Chinese market due toChina’s rapid economic growth since 1992, theUS recognised China’s strategic importancedue to factors such as its permanent
membership of the UN Security Council,
its possession of nuclear weapons, and its
role in the problem of the Korean Peninsula.
When Jiang Zemin visited the US in 1997, thetwo sides agreed to work toward building a‘constructive strategic partnership.’ However,anxieties over China’s military modernisationand lack of transparency about it, suppressionof human rights, and other factors were notallayed. On the other side, China was awarethat US markets, technology, and investment
were essential for economic development andrecognised the need to maintain amicable
relations with the US (the sole superpower inthe post-Cold War era) in order to ensure thestability of the international environment,
without which it would not be able toconcentrate on economic development.
However, China strongly resented the US
inclination towards unilateralism and theimposition of its own values in matters suchas human rights and democratisation.
Given this state of affairs, the US began
to turn its attention to India, which had
switched to a policy of opening up to theoutside world and was achieving rapid
economic growth, primarily as a balance
to China. From the mid-1990s onwards, a
succession of US think-tanks released reports
stressing the importance of India, and thesewere essentially rehashed in a Department of
Defense report entitled Asia 2025, publishedin 1999. In this new climate of awareness,in 2000 President Clinton visited India andPrime Minister Vajpayee visited the US. When
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited the US
in April 2001, the Bush administration, which
had previously designated China as the US’s
main strategic competitor, acknowledgedthat India was already a major global power.
After visiting Japan on a round of stops in
Asia to explain the US policy of promoting
missile defence in May 2001, Deputy Secretaryof State Richard Armitage subsequently
went on to India, skipping China. After 9/11,
cooperation between the US and India greweven stronger and the sanctions over the 1998
nuclear testing were rescinded.
As has already been mentioned, China had
been steadily improving its relations with
India since 1988. However, it took China
some time to treat India as a force to be
reckoned with in the global power balance.
Since the establishment of a ‘strategic
partnership’ with Russia in 1996, China had
been pursuing a strategy to promote a
multipolar global power structure, with thedeliberate intention of opposing the trend
towards unilateral domination by the US, but
China did not immediately treat India as atarget of this strategy. Only when it realisedthat the US and India were rapidly growing
closer, as noted above, China changed theway in which it handled India. In January
2002, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited India,
accompanied by his ministers of economic
affairs, in an effort to strengthen relations
through economic ties. When Prime Minister
Vajpayee visited China in June 2003, China
finally expressed its intention to include
India in its strategy to promote multipolarity.
In January 2005, China and India began a‘strategic dialogue,’ and, when Prime Minister
Wen Jiabao visited India in April of the same
year, the two nations announced a ‘strategic
partnership for peace and stability.’
It is interesting that, while relations
between China and India were visibly
progressing, US–Indian relations were also
progressing further. In January 2004, theUS and India agreed on the ‘next steps instrategic partnership,’ and in June 2005 theystrengthened their cooperation on security
in the form of the ‘New Framework for

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

the US–India Defense Relationship.’ When
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the
US the following month, the US Government
agreed to cooperate with India for its civil
nuclear energy program, despite the factthat India had pursued the development of
nuclear weapons outside the framework of
the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty withits 1998 nuclear testing. In March 2006
President Bush visited India and proclaimed a‘strategic partnership.’Meanwhile, in the wake of 9/11, Sino–US
relations have improved rapidly on the
diplomatic front. In August 2005 the twonations began ‘senior dialogues’ between
the US Deputy Secretary of State and China’s
Executive Vice Foreign Minister, which
covered a number of problem areas. The US
took this opportunity to designate China asa ‘stakeholder’ in the existing international
system. However, the US refuses to categorise
these dialogues as ‘strategic,’ as the Chinese
had hoped, characterising its relations
with China as a ‘complex relationship,’and showing no intention of concluding astrategic partnership with China. Moreover,by expressly stipulating that China should
be a ‘responsible’ stakeholder, the US wasclearly signaling to China that it wished
China’s actions to meet with US expectations.
The Quadrennial Defense Review Report(QDR) published by the Department of
Defense immediately after 9/11 expressed astrong sense of wariness regarding China’s
modernisation of its military capability, andthe QDR published in February 2006 explicitly
states that ‘… China has the greatest potential
to compete militarily with the United Statesand field disruptive military technologies
that could over time offset traditional US
military advantage’.12
Under these circumstances, India is now inpole position, being courted diplomaticallyby both China and the US, as both nations
principally seek to use India to achieve a63

favourable balance against one another.
However, Sino–Indian and US–Indian relations
are certainly not completely stable. Although
the territorial disputes between China
and India have currently been effectively
decoupled from other problems, they havein no way been resolved, and India’s distrustof China since the 1962 border war has notbeen dispelled. India is also opposed to, andwary of, the US’s inclination towards unilateraldomination and becoming a pawn in US
strategy towards China. In the long term, thepossibility that the US military angst currently
directed at China may be brought to bear on
India cannot be ruled out, depending on how
India’s economic and military development
progresses. The US, China, and India all
prize their independence, and the trilateralrelationship seems to be in the processof coalescing into a strategic triangular
relationship in which the three sets of bilateralrelations evolve in intricate correlation with
one another.

3 Conclusion
China’s phenomenal economic growth led
to a very complex and confusing outcome.
In many ways China became a welcome
international presence and actor, but inmany other ways it also caused international
concern. Whichever is judged to be morecritical, no one can deny that China hasachieved a greater presence because ofits dramatic economic growth and theconsequences of that growth, especially in theAsia–Pacific region. However, as there wereconcomitant, and sometimes countervailing,developments in the region, China’s enhanced
presence did not lead to the formationof a China-dominant regional system.
Another interesting systemic implicationof China’s rise, coinciding with India’s rise,is the possibility that a US–China–India
strategic triangle may be emerging in theAsia–Pacific region.

64

Proceedings

Endnotes
1

2

3

An earlier version of this paper was
published as ‘China’s economic and social
development and the international scene,’
Asia–Pacific Review, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006,
pp. 27–37.
Wenran Jiang, ‘Dynamics of China’s social
crisis,’ China Brief, vol. VI, issue 2(January 20, 2006), p. 2.
‘2005nian quanguo xinshi lianshu
huiluo’ [The number of cases of criminal
prosecution dropped in 2005], Renmin
Ribao, January 20, 2006, p. 10.

4 Elizabeth Economy, ‘China’s Environmental
Challenge,’ Current History, vol. 104, no. 683(September 2005), pp. 279–280.
5

For further details of the evolution of
the theory from this point of view, see
Seiichiro Takagi, ‘Chugoku “Wahei kukki”ron no Genndannkai’ [The current phaseof China’s theory of ‘peaceful rise], Kokusai
Mondai, no. 540 (March 2005), pp. 31–45.

6 Interview with Jin Canrong, August 2004.
7

China Internet Network Information
Center, 17th Statistical Survey Report on theInternet Development in China (January2006), p. 26.

8 Peter Hays Gries, ‘Chinese nationalism:
challenging the state?’ Current History, vol.
104, no. 683 (September 2005), pp. 251–252.
9 Asahi, November 21, 2006.
10 Elizabeth Economy, op. cit., p. 282.
11 Lowell Dittmer, ‘The strategic triangle: acritical review,’ in Ilpyong J. Kim (ed.), The
Strategic Triangle, Paragon House, New
York, 1987, p. 33.
12 The Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial
Defense Review Report, February 6,
2006, p. 29.

Review and prospects for thebilateral strategic relationshipbetween Japan and Australia
Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi
Aoyama Gakuin University

1 Introduction
Historically speaking, Japan and Australia’s
relations were full of tensions and conflicts.
Even if both countries normalised diplomatic
relations in 1952, the legacy of World War II
was vivid in the minds of the Australianpeople. Australia’s discriminatory policies
against Japanese in both immigration andtrade ignited Japanese people’s anxieties
and concerns.
Despite enhanced postwar economic
relations, Australia’s perception of Japan,
especially Japan’s increasing security role
under the US–Japan alliance, had been
ambivalent for many decades. On the one
hand, there had been a clear recognitionon the part of Australia that the enhanced
security role of Japan underlined by thealliance with the US would contribute greatly
to the security and stability of the Asia–Pacificregion. However, at the same time, there
was a strong feeling in Australia that the
ANZUS alliance among the victorious powers
should be the key pillar of regional security
management in the Asia–Pacific region,
rather than the US–Japan alliance. Australia
had a deep-seated belief that Australia,
second only to the US in defeating Japan, had
to play a key role in regional security affairs,
and that ANZUS should be the key alliance inthe region.
With heightened Cold War tensions in
Asia, the centre of gravity of international
politics in Asia and the Pacific shifted to
the north. Japan emerged as an economic
power. Northeast Asia became a strategicallyimportant region in the global Cold War

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

confrontation. Thus, the US paid more
attention to Japan and, as a result, put ahigher priority on the US–Japan alliance forregional security management. The US–Japan
alliance increased its importance as a key
component of the Asia–Pacific regional order.
Faced with this power shift in theAsia–Pacific region, Australia’s attitude
was ambivalent. On the one hand, as aCold War warrior, Australia welcomed thedevelopment of US–Japan relations, because
it further encouraged Japan to adopt more
Western‑oriented policies in the Cold War. On
the other hand, however, Australia could not
help feeling left out because of its gradualisolation from the major power centre of
regional politics and security.
This feeling of isolation, coupled with a strong
sense of mission to play an important role inregional political and security management,
forced Australia to search for a new role oridentity in regional diplomacy in the 1970s.
Australia began to define its role as an honest
broker for achieving accommodation between
Southeast Asian countries and Japan, or
as a balancer to check or somehow absorb
rising Japanese power in the region. Indeed,
Australia became a first dialogue partner of
ASEAN in 1974.
These Australian policies and attitudes
introduced various irritating factors into
Japan–Australia bilateral relations. Australia
was perceived in Japanese diplomatic circles
as an uncomfortable partner that gave‘lectures’ in a too straightforward way, based
upon ‘Western’ norms and rules. However,these irritants have now been removed to alarge extent and new areas of cooperation
are emerging which need constructive joint
engagement by both countries.
In the meantime, the 1957 Australia–Japan
Commerce Agreement paved the way fordeepening economic interdependence
between the two countries. That

65

interdependence, along with confidencebuilding, overcame the legacy of the past.
Japan and Australia gradually expanded
their cooperative relationship over thefollowing decades. Both countries took
the joint leadership role in promoting thecause of Asia–Pacific cooperation from thelate 1970s. Their joint endeavour to launch
the Asia‑Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) forum symbolised the deepening
understanding and collaboration between
the two countries. Cooperative activities haverecently expanded to include security areas.1
However, despite the recent willingness byboth governments to expand their bilateralrelationships to address pressing regional andglobal issues, there are a variety of issues that
require skillful management of the bilateralrelationship. Those issues arise mainly fromstructural changes in the regional and global
political, security and economic environments.
In this paper, I touch upon a few issue andareas in which both governments should
respond more carefully in the decades
to come:•first, the changing power relationships
among the countries in the region,
especially transformations ofNortheast Asian international relations,and the implications for regional
security architecture•

second, the project to build an East Asian
Community•

third, bilateral relations between Japanand Australia.

I take three dimensions into consideration
when I examine the challenges facing Japanand Australia in Asia: competition andrivalry; regional production networks; andthe normative structures of international
relations in East Asia.2

66

Proceedings

State-to-state competition and rivalry
States are still the key players of international
relations. This is a well known and old
fashioned standard approach to the analysisof strategic and international relations.
Usually, we identify changes in ‘national
power,’ such as economic power (reflected inGDP), military power, technological capacity,
size of population, etc. as key factors affecting
strategic relations.
Asia’s political and strategic environments
have been becoming more fluid, uncertain
and complicated. The rise of China; a more
assertive Japan pursuing an enhanced
regional and global security role; thepredominant US military power, thequagmire in Iraq and Asians’ ambivalence
toward the US; India’s rise; North Korea’s
nuclear development—all these are making
the strategic landscape of Asia more fluidand complicated.
Because of this, there are deep-seated senses
of uncertainty, insecurity and vulnerability
in most of the Asian countries. Responding
to those insecurities and uncertainties,
East Asian countries have been taking avariety of strategies to protect their own
interests, ranging from ‘engagement’ to‘risk hedging’ and ‘soft balancing’. Japan andAustralia are no exceptions.
Bilateralism is another characteristic ofstate strategies adopted by most of thecountries of the region in responding to
uncertainties. Almost all the countries of theregion have been enhancing security andeconomic relations with others on a bilateralbasis. Indeed, many countries in Asia havebeen concluding free trade and security
cooperation agreements.

Regional production networks
However, a focus only on state to-state
relations (competition and rivalry) is notenough to understand contemporary
East Asian international relations. I point out
a second perspective: the rapid expansion of
the cross-border and multinational production
network, mainly conducted by multinational
companies, and its implications for security
and state to-state relations in Asia (not justincreased trade and investment volume).
Multinational companies are constructing
region-wide production networks. Manycompanies are connecting with each otheracross national boundaries through those
production networks. This phenomenon ismore pronounced in Asia than in any otherregion of the world. Our prosperity depends
on our development of even more effective
regional production networks.

Normative structures underlining
East Asia’s international relations
The third challenge arises from the normative
structure or value structure of contemporary
East Asian international relations. By ‘norm
structure’ and ‘value structure,’ I mean
the different approaches to organising theinternational affairs of the region. We arewitnessing a serious competition among
East Asian countries in this area. Competition
over the norms and rules will greatly affectthe future shape of international relations in
the region, including the cause of East Asia
Community building.

2 Alliances + a (subregional
security multilateralism inNortheast Asia)
Asia’s international political economy andsecurity landscape is changing rapidly,
particularly in Northeast Asia. How toformulate mechanisms to deal with thosechanges is a major policy challenge forboth Japan and Australia, given theirrespective political and economic stakes inNortheast Asia.

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

Knowing how to respond to changing
international relations in Northeast Asia
is becoming more pressing, given new
developments such as rising Chinese
military power, Japan’s desire to be a more
active player in regional and global security,
North Korea’s nuclear development programs,
South Korea’s quest for more ‘autonomous’positions in the developing new regional
power structure (reflecting this, the structureof the US–South Korea alliance has beenchanging), and Taiwan’s pursuit of a broader
space for survival in international affairs.
Northeast Asia is becoming a more importantregion for Australia, too. Australia’s major
trading partners are in Northeast Asia,and their weight in Australia’s trade has
been constantly increasing. Maintaining
stable relationships among the countries
in Northeast Asia is critically important forAustralia’s economic prosperity.
Alliances centred on Washington havebeen and will continue to be crucial forpeace and stability in Asia, providing astable framework of managing transition,
especially in Northeast Asia. Almost allstates in the region acknowledge that thealliances provide ‘public goods’ of stability
for the region, although some make theacknowledgment begrudgingly.
However, the function of the alliances ismainly to sustain the status quo in the
short term. It remains to be seen whether
the current mode of US centred security
management will be adequate for the
management of the longer term powertransformation of the region. We may haveto think about a new, longer term, regional
security architecture for the region, based
upon the existing alliance arrangements.
I refer this as an ‘alliances + a’ system forsecurity management.
In this regard, we should pay more carefulattention to the ongoing Six Party Talks. The

67

Six Party process promises to establish amore stable regional security multilateralism
in Northeast Asia that addresses a variety of
security issues in the region.
How should we conceive security
multilateralism in Northeast Asia? We
usually assume the establishment of asingle multilateral security institutionthat regulates security issues collectively.
Indeed, there have been many proposals toconstruct multilateral security institutions inNortheast Asia, for example in the style of the
Asian version of the Conference of Security
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). And the socalled ‘2 + 4 formula’ on Korean affairs has
been proposed since the 1970s. It is assumed
in these ideas that a single multilateral
security institution could address a variety of
security‑related issues.
My arguments are based on a different
conception of security multilateralism. I
argue that linking institutions (whether
bilateral, multilateral, regional or global),rather than establishing a single multilateral
institution, is critical for developing security
multilateralism. Mutually coordinated orinterlinked institutions create de facto
security multilateralism.3
There are several bases for this argument.
Our initial focus of discussions is the
Korean Peninsula. First, there are a variety
of security issues to be addressed in thepeninsula—issues that are closely connectedwith each other. A piecemeal approach is
not effective. For example, the North Korea’s
nuclear issue cannot be dealt with in isolationfrom the larger security issue of the peninsula.
It is closely linked with US–DPRK relations,North–South relations, Japan–DPRK relations,
China–DPRK relations, relations with global
institutions such as the United Nations, theNuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the armistice regime, peace-regime building,68

Proceedings

economic cooperation and so forth. Those
issues must be addressed simultaneously toresolve the nuclear crisis. A comprehensive
approach is critical to resolve conflicts, whichmust be dealt with as a whole.
Second, although we must address a variety
of security issues simultaneously, each issue
needs a different composition of participating
countries and different commitments fromeach. Some issues would be handled more
appropriately on a bilateral basis, while otherissues may be best addressed by a group of
three or four countries. Some issues need tobe addressed by six countries. For example,
the transition from the armistice regime toa peace regime needs a group of countries
different from the group of countries thatwould address the missile and nuclear issue. A
single multilateral institution cannot address
all of these issues, so some division of labour
among different institutions is necessary.
Third, because of these multiple aspectsof Northeast Asian security, we will need avariety of institutions to address respective
security issues, whether bilateral, trilateral,
quadrilateral or otherwise. We will havebilateral institutions between, for example,
the US and the DPRK, North Korea andSouth Korea, Japan and the DPRK, China andthe DPRK, and so forth, reflecting different
agendas and commitments. We may havea trilateral institution addressing militaryconfidence-building across the DMZ (the US,
South Korea and North Korea). We may have aquadrilateral institution among North Korea,
South Korea, the US and China that deals withthe transition from the armistice regime to apeace regime.
Fourth, because of the need for acomprehensive approach, an issue of criticalimportance is how to coordinate thesedifferent institutions, thereby strengtheningan overall security structure. Put differently,
how one institution links with others andwhat institutional relations are developed
between the institutions are critical forthe overall regional security structure.
The establishment of mutually reinforcing
institutional relations is important in thisregard; we must produce synergistic effects
by linking institutions effectively.
Fifth, not a single multilateral institution
but instead well-coordinated and mutuallyconnected institutional relationships will
form de facto security multilateralism in
the Korean Peninsula. De facto security
multilateralism will emerge as a result of thecoordination of different institutions throughinstitutional linkages.
Sixth, therefore, institutional linkages (howone institution is linked with others) are key
when we talk about security multilateralism.
As far as institutional linkages are concerned,a certain type of institutional linkage isconducive to security and order. On theother hand, institutions may conflict witheach other, thereby weakening overall
security. Institutions may be linked in various
ways, and the linkages can strengthen
regional structures for stability or weaken
them. Individual institutions can operate
independently only as long as they do notaffect each other. But they will amalgamate
into larger bodies to cope with problems
that are beyond the scope of any single
institution. Depending on the type of
institutional linkage, we can expect both
positive and negative effects on the operationof the respective institutions. I argue thata stable regional security order could beestablished through institutional linkages
and coordination, even in conflict-ridden
Northeast Asia. De facto multilateralcoordination could be possible by adequately
linking a variety of institutions.
Seventh, although most security-related
issues in the region will be addressed bydifferent groups of countries, we need some

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

comprehensive multilateral forum or umbrellaframework where institutional relations canbe coordinated to enhance an overall security
structure. An umbrella framework is quite
important, given that resolving pressing
security concerns such as the North Korean
nuclear issue will take a long time (probably
more than a decade) and various institutions
will have to be coordinated during this longtransition period. Without institutional
coordination under a common umbrella
institution, the final goal (a peaceful,prosperous and nuclear-free Korean Peninsula)
will not be achieved.
If we look back at the past from thisperspective, we can find some quite
interesting developments. There are already avariety of institutions on the Korean Peninsulathat address security issues. A serious concern
for Northeast Asian regional security is not alack of multilateral security institutions, but
a lack of coordination and linkages between
existing institutions. There already exist
many useful institutions covering Northeast
Asia—bilateral, subregional, regional andglobal ones—that could contribute to regional
peace and stability if they were interlinked
and integrated in an appropriate way. For
example, we have many institutions that link
South Korea and North Korea, such as the
1992 Basic Agreement and the Agreementon Non Nuclearization. There is also the1994 Agreed Framework between the US andthe DPRK, and a bilateral institution between
Japan and the DPRK underlined by the2002 Pyongyang Declaration.
However, those institutions have notfunctioned well. They have been weak, andhave not bound the relevant parties strongly.
Even when agreements were concluded,
serious difficulties in implementing themquickly arose. One reason is that the various
institutions operated independently and were
not linked with other institutions. Mutually
coordinated institutional linkages that would

69

generate a synergistic effect on regional
stability have been blocked by one or more of
the parties concerned.
So, the most serious problem is the lackof institutional linkage and coordination.
Institutional linkages have been prevented
and/or limited and, as a result, no synergistic
effect has been generated. For example, the1992 North–South Basic Agreement has notbeen well linked with other institutions, suchas the South Korea–US, South Korea–China,
South Korea–Japan, DPRK–US or DPRK–Japanbilateral institutions. Because of the lackof institutional linkages and coordination,
one party could easily sabotage theimplementation of an agreement.
How can we assess the Six Party Talks
underway to address the North Korean
nuclear crisis from the viewpoint of thesearguments about institutional linkages? The
Six Party Talks provide an excellent laboratorywhen we discuss the possibility of creating a
multilateral security framework in the region.
In my view, the success of the talks depends toa large extent on whether we can successfully
link and coordinate various institutions witheach other, and then amalgamate them intode facto multilateralism. This means that
the Six Party Talks are not a venue where wecan address security issues directly, but they
are important in coordinating a variety of
institutions that will be developed to address
different security-related issues among
different groups of countries. 4
The joint statement of the fourth roundof the Six Party Talks, in September 2005,
suggests how institutional relations are
crucial. The talks were established to resolve
the North Korean nuclear issue. However, thejoint statement clearly demonstrates that acomprehensive approach is critical to resolve
the nuclear impasse; it refers not only to
North Korea’s pledge to dismantle its nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs, but

70Proceedings

also to a variety of other issues, including
security assurance, US–DPRK normalisation,
Japan–DPRK normalisation, energy andfood assistance, economic cooperation,
peace-regime building on the peninsula,and so forth. The statement also refers the
1992 North–South Basic Accord, the 2002
Japan–Pyongyang Declaration, multilateral
security reassurance, the transformationof the armistice regime to a peace regime,
provision of energy, economic cooperation,
the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, theInternational Atomic Energy Agency and soforth. Almost all security issues on the Korean
Peninsula will have to be addressed to resolve
the nuclear crisis.
It is almost certain that resolving theNorth Korean nuclear issue will be a longprocess. As was seen in the 1994 US–DPRKAgreed Framework, it may take more thana decade to finally dismantle the DPRK’s
nuclear development program and establish apermanent structure of peace, even if the six
countries agree on some formula to dismantle
the nuclear programs soon.
If the joint statement is implemented,
various institutions will be created in thislong process, and existing institutions willneed to be revitalised. As I have mentioned,
different issues will involve different specificcommitments and obligations by the parties
concerned; therefore, various types of
institutional arrangements with different
memberships will be created in the process.
For example, the Four Party Talks that wereaborted in the late 1990s may be revitalised
to tackle the transformation of the armisticeregime to a peace regime. Other subregional,
trilateral or bilateral institutions focusing onsuch issues as conventional arms reduction,
missiles, biochemical weapons, and bilateralrelations (US–DPRK, South Korea–North
Korea, China–DPRK, Japan–DPRK, US–China,
Japan–China, etc.), as well as regional

institutions to address different issues, willbe established.
The third session of the fifth round of theSix Party Talks held in February 2007 agreed
to set up working groups to carry out theinitial actions and full implementation of theSeptember 2005 joint statement. The various
working groups are requested to discussand formulate specific action plans for the
implementation of the joint statement. They
are also requested to report to the Six Party
Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progressof their work. These arrangements indicate
that, based on the working groups, a variety
of institutions with different membershipcomposition will be established under theumbrella of the Six Party Talks. The talks willserve as an institution coordinating various
other institutions, whether bilateral, trilateralor quadrilateral ones.
Rather than directly addressing specificsecurity issues, the Six Party Talks will be aloosely organised multilateral umbrella forum
under which existing and newly establishedinstitutions are mutually coordinated. Under
that umbrella, decoupled institutions must beamalgamated into an integrated institutional
package, thereby enhancing the regional
security structure.
Institutional linkages and coordination under
the Six Party Talks are quite important, giventhat individual institutions in Northeast Asia
are generally weak and therefore vulnerable
to changes in the policies and attitudes ofeven one of the parties concerned. Therefore,
institutions will need some supporting
mechanisms for the implementation of theagreements. By linking institutions, we canstrengthen the institutions and, therefore, theimplementation of the agreements.
Thus, I argue that there is a possibility for
Northeast Asia to develop multilayered,interlinked, institutional mechanisms

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

based on existing and newly establishedinstitutions. Mutually reinforcing relations
between various institutions could beestablished through institutional linkages,
even if individual institutions are still weak
and limited in their scope.
Finally, mutually coordinated institutional
relations (which we may call a ‘concert ofpowers’ system for security management)
will support regional peace and stability, even
if North Korea’s nuclear programs are nottotally dismantled. Indeed, North Korea willcontinue to resist the total dismantling of its
nuclear development programs and weapons.
Our concern over North Korea’s nuclear threat
might not disappear forever.
Even so, we can effectively contain thethreat through institutional coordination
based on some form of a concert of powers
in Northeast Asia. In addition, the possible
institutional coordinating mechanisms
centred on the Six Party Talks will also serve
not just as a regional collective constraint
on North Korea’s nuclear ambition, butalso as a regional instrument to respond tosuch ‘emergencies’ as Korean unification,a collapse of the North Korean regime,
domestic disturbances in China, an so on.
The coordinating mechanism based on the
Six Party Talks would serve as a regional
mechanism to smooth power transition andadjustment. Thus, the significance of theSix Party Talks far goes beyond resolving theNorth Korea’s nuclear crisis.5

3 Economic relations andtheir security implications: theemergence of regional production
networks connecting Japan withthe rest of Asia
When we talk about a new security
architecture (based on the alliances) in
Northeast Asia, we must understandcurrent economic relations in the region. The

71

respective economic engagements of Japanand Australia are different in this regard.
Australia’s economic relations with the rest of
Asia show a quite traditional trading pattern:
exporting mineral and other natural resources
and importing manufactured goods. Japan’s
economic relations with the rest of Asia
are fundamentally different from those ofAustralia. Japan is more and more closely
connected with the rest of Asia throughregional industrial production networks.
Multinational companies have been
expanding their production networks
across national boundaries. Japan-based
multinationals have played crucial roles
in establishing regional production
networks. East Asia has grown into a giant,East Asia-wide, factory with economies
interlinked through extensive, region-wide
production and distribution networks run bymultinational companies. We do not see thisphenomenon in other regions of the world.
East Asian production networks led bymultilateral companies have given rise toa ‘triangular’ trade pattern: Japan and NIEs
(newly industrialised economies) export
capital goods and sophisticated intermediate
goods (parts and components) to theless‑developed countries (some ASEAN
countries and China), which process them forexport to North America and Europe.
China’s position reflects this triangular traderelationship. China’s surplus vis-à-vis the US
is offset by its huge trade deficit with other
Asian economies. So we can say that themassive US trade deficit is held against East
Asia as a whole.
China’s export of high-technology products
has expanded in recent years. This growthis also attributable to China’s integration
into the East Asia-wide regional production
and distribution networks formed throughextensive foreign direct investment by foreign

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Proceedings(not Chinese) firms. In the meantime, China’s
contribution in terms of added value has been
limited to its function in the assembly sector,
which is heavily dependent on the supply ofabundant cheap labor.
The recent increase of exports fromSoutheast Asia to China could be explainedby the expansion of cross-border production
networks led by multinational companies.
The most rapidly increasing items of tradefrom Southeast Asia to China are notfinished goods or agricultural products, but
components and parts to be assembled byforeign multinational companies in China
for export.
These days, goods marked ‘Made in China’
are mostly made elsewhere by multinational
companies, and the label should read
‘Assembled in China.’6 Multinational
companies are using China as the final
assembly site in their cross-border production
networks. Japan-based multinational
companies are largely ‘invisible’ behind the‘Chinese’ factories producing a large amountof tradable goods. And about 60% of China’s
exports are controlled by foreign companies.
This means that multinational companies
are now playing the key roles in producing,supplying and assembling various parts
for the final products in the region. We are
obtaining income through these networks.
Japan’s economic relations with the rest of
Asia, including its relations with China, must
be understood in this broader picture, which
gives us a new understanding of East Asian
economic relations and their implications forsecurity in Asia.
First, Japan views China as an opportunity,
and a challenge. However, the argument thatJapan is concerned about China’s economic
development (that Japan fears losing its world
no. 2 position to China) is fundamentally
flawed, and ignores the fundamental changes
in the economic structures in East Asia overthe past decades. China gives Japan plenty of
economic opportunities.
Second, Japan is not competing with China.
The real economic competition is taking place
not between state and state, but between
private firms operating globally.
Third, Chinese firms are not competitors forJapanese firms in the foreseeable future.
Real competition is taking place between
Japanese firms across national boundaries.
SONY–Japan’s rival is not Chinese firms
but SONY–China. Toyota–Japan will soon
be competing with Toyota–China in a
global market.
Fourth, these aggressive ventures bymultinational companies have been changing
domestic politics. The political influence ofcompanies that are aggressively pursuing a
region-wide production strategy is growing.
Look at the case of Japan. The presidents of
the Japan Economic Federation, the mostpowerful business association, used to bemostly CEOs of the big companies heavily
protected by the government, such as big
banks. But this has changed. The previous
president was the CEO of TOYOTA and thecurrent one is from CANON—both global
companies aggressively pursuing regional andglobal strategies.
Fifth, Japan’s prosperity is more and more
dependent on the success of multinational
companies. Japan-based multinational
companies are getting the bulk of theirprofits from their overseas business in East
Asia, including China. Actually, Japan’s profits
from overseas investment are now roughly
equal to Japan’s annual trade surplus. Japan isgetting huge amounts of profit from overseas
investments today. The country is becoming
more and more dependent on overseas
business for its economic welfare.
Sixth, with the coming of an ageing society,Japan must generate profit overseas byeffectively using the huge assets it has

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

accumulated over past decades. Japan
desperately needs good overseas markets
for investment to sustain its prosperity.
China’s growth provides Japan with excellent
opportunities for investment and contributing
to the upgrading of Japanese economic
structures. It is good for Japan to hear that
hundreds of millions of excellent Chinese
people are ready to work for Japan‑based
firms and sustain Japan’s prosperity. There
are no reasons why Japan should be worried
about it.
Seventh, what Japan is concerned about
is domestic instability and economic
disturbance in China, which might be caused
by internal contradictions and the lack ofChinese economic governance. Japan should
be concerned that the Chinese leadershipmay face serious criticisms that it has been‘selling’ China to foreign multinationals, once
economic growth slows down.7
Eighth, all these factors affect our security
calculations. It is becoming more difficult for
countries to resort to military force, although
we need to prepare for such emergencies(see Peter Brook’s excellent book on the
security implications of the emerging regional
production networks). We can reasonably
expect the tensions and conflicts to becontained within a manageable scope if
we have a clear understanding of this new
economic reality.8

4 East Asian Community building
Normative premises of regional
cooperation
The futures of Japan and Australia are closely
connected with that of East Asia. Therefore,
East Asian Community building is importantfor both countries.
However, the current level of functional
cooperation is not enough. East Asia today
needs much stronger and more intrusive

73

regional institutions that touch upondomestic affairs to address pressing political,
security, economic, and social issues.
Strengthening domestic governanceinstitutions and harmonising domestic
institutions among East Asian countries
are critical. More binding measures formilitary confidence-building are also criticallyimportant. For this, East Asia needs somedegree of ‘likemindedness’ among the states
on social organisations and internal values.
Japan’s primary goal is to make East Asia amore integrated economic area. As we haveseen, Japanese firms have already established
two region-wide production and distribution
networks in East Asia since the middle ofthe 1980s (one with Southeast Asia and theother with China). The pressing task of Japan
is to connect the two networks more closely,
thereby constructing ‘seamless’ networks ofproduction and distribution that will greatly
enhance the international competitiveness ofJapanese firms in a global market.9 Using thisadvantageous position, Japan could become a
21st century economic phoenix.
In this regard, contrary to the general view,the government and business communityof Japan welcome the venture by China and
ASEAN to conclude a free trade agreement(FTA) between them, because Japanesefirms will be the largest beneficiary such an
agreement. What Japan is concerned about isthat China and ASEAN might fail to conclude
a deeper FTA, with a substantial openingof their respective economies and their
institutional and regulatory harmonisation.
Indeed, the current FTA between China
and ASEAN is too shallow to tackle deeper
integration issues.
The issue of which countries should be
invited to the first East Asia Summit was
hotly debated for many years. Of criticalimportance is not just ‘Who are stakeholders
in East Asia?’, but the fundamental norms and74

Proceedings

principles of organising international relationsin the region. China’s reluctance to invite
Australia, India and New Zealand to the first
East Asia Summit demonstrates that China’s
norms and principles are not necessarily inharmony with those of others in the region.
There are thus several distinct approaches on
how to organise the international relations of
the region (see Figure 1 and Table 1).

On the other hand, we have an American
way that emphasises ‘internal’ aspects andharmonisation. Democracy, freedom, humanrights and good governance are the key
principles that should underline international
relations in the region. The harmonisation ofdomestic institutions underlined by liberal
norms is vital in this regard. Australia’s
position is close to that of the US.

On the one hand, we have a Chinese way. The‘New Security Concept’ and the concept of‘Peaceful Development’ were recently added
to the decades-old Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-existence. Although these concepts
emphasise various new forms of inter-state
relations (such as mutual trust, mutual
benefit, dialogue and consultation, confidencebuilding, cooperation, and so forth), they arebasically the Westphalia type of norms ofinternational relations.

In between, we have an ASEAN way and a
hybrid type of Japanese way. Japan has been
moving toward accepting an American way
more positively. Strengthening domestic
governance institutions and harmonisationof domestic institutions among East Asian
countries are critical.

Chinese norms and principles mostly relateto ‘external’ dimensions that could beapplied only in inter-state relations. As for‘internal’ matters, China sticks firmly to the
traditional concepts of national sovereignty
and non-intervention. China is selling theso called ‘Beijing Consensus’ instead of a
‘Washington Consensus.’

What Japan and Australia must be mostconcerned about is that international
relations in East Asia are organised undermixed principles and norms from China’s way
and an old-fashioned ASEAN way, mostly
dealing with only the external dimension ofstate to-state relations and taking internalmatters out of the regional agenda.
In this regard, it is critically important for
ASEAN countries to successfully develop newnorms and principles for cooperation in the
ASEAN Charter, overcoming old-fashioned

Figure 1: Organising norms/principles of international relations
ARF
APEC
ASEAN+3
China

ASEAN

EAS(?)
New
ASEAN

Japan

Australia

Note: Left hand side: ‘External’ norm oriented, Right hand side: ‘Internal’ norm oriented

USThe 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

75

Table 1: External and internal norms/principles‘External’ norms and principles‘Internal’ norms and principles

Sovereignty

Democracy, human rights

Non‑intervention in internal affairs

Harmonisation of domestic institutions

Different nation-building processes

Good governanceState security

Human security

Border measures (tariffs, etc.)

Democratisation of internal political system

Democratisation of international affairs

ASEAN premises of cooperation. Japan andAustralia should encourage ASEAN’s shift ofnormative premises of cooperation.

unipolar world. In a sense, we have bothbeen seeking to jointly manage US power in
East Asia.

Enhancing trans-Pacific linkages andresponding to a US unipolar world

Other Asian nations are more ambivalent.
On the one hand, they understand thatthe continued engagement of the US in
Asia is essential; on the other, they areconcerned about US intervention in thename of protecting human rights, promoting
democracy and good governance, andfighting against terrorism. US global power
creates a lot of local resistance; it is not
automatically transformed into US influenceand prestige in Asia.

North America, including both the US andCanada, will continue to play the critical rolefor peace and prosperity in East Asia. We must
make the best efforts to reconcile East Asian
institutions with Asia–Pacific institutions.
Despite East Asia’s recent economic growth,
the basic economic relationship between
East Asia and North America has not changedfor decades. Economically, the US market
is still critical for Asia’s growth, and Asia isquite vulnerable to policy changes by the US.
Asia needs a broader regional framework foreconomic coordination between Asia andNorth America.  
Militarily, the US forward militarypresence—underlined by a web of alliancenetworks—continues to provide a basic
foundation of regional peace and stability,
containing military tensions and rivalries.
Therefore, it is critically important for Asia todevelop trans-Pacific institutions, in tandemwith East Asian ones.
In this regard, Japan and Australia must be
more sensitive to the ambivalence among
Asians toward the US. Both our countries
need to handle relations with the US carefully.
Overall, we are both comfortable in a US‑led

Japan and Australia should be aware of thesesensitivities. Neither we, nor the US, shouldtake it for granted that ASEAN countries andSouth Korea fully support the US–Japan and
US–Australia alliances.
Responding to changes in the East Asianstrategic landscape, Japan has beenenhancing its alliance relations with the US.
The alliance is critically important, and willcontinue to provide a basic foundation ofregional peace and stability.
But Japan and Australia must go beyond these
alliances. We have many issues that must
be addressed multilaterally. Our countries
should not try to run away to the comfortable
shelter of the US alliance. We must faceand respond to the challenges, even if thatdemands a painful rethinking of our own pastand future roles in East Asia. Especially, as I

76

Proceedings

pointed out, there is a promising potential
for Northeast Asia to develop a multilateralframework for security management based
upon the ongoing Six Party Talks processes
that would greatly contribute to developing
stable relations among the major powers inNortheast Asia. Japan and Australia should
not miss this golden opportunity.  

5 Conclusion: Japan–Australia
bilateral relationships
Australia’s strategic stake in Northeast
Asia has increased with closer economic
relations with the region’s economies.
Japan will occupy a much larger part ofAustralia’s strategic thinking on Asia in thedecades to come because Japan’s future
foreign and defense policy direction will
increasingly affect Australia’s political andeconomic interests. How Japan develops its
relationships with the rest of Asia—especiallywith China—will be crucial to Australia’s
strategic and economic interests.
Contrary to popular belief, the 1990s was notthe ‘lost decade’ for Japan. Japan adapted
itself to changing internal and external
environments during the 1990s, although theprocess was painful and difficult. Japanese
governmental and political institutions havebecome more transparent and accountable,
and therefore resilient. Japanese privatecompanies have become more competitive,
taking more aggressive business practices
abroad. A new generation of political leaders
is more willing to assert Japan’s interests
in international affairs. Japan is changing
and rising.10
Kenneth Pyle of the University of Washington,a distinguished scholar of modern Japanesepolitical history, argues that ‘Japan is making
a revolutionary change of course.’ For morethan 150 years of its modern history, Japan
has adapted both its foreign policy and its
domestic institutions to fit changes in theinternational system. According to Pyle, ‘Abe’selection is an unmistakable indication ofJapan’s maturing response to the far reachingchanges in its post Cold War environment.’11
Australia has been welcoming and has
encouraged Japan to take a more proactive
policy line in regional and international
security for many years. However, at thesame time, it is against Australia’s interests
if proactive Japanese security policies
cause negative reactions among Japan’s
neighbours. It is in the best interests ofAustralia that Japan’s as yet undefined global
and regional security roles are welcomed andwell accepted in the region. The worst-casescenario for Australia would arise if Japan’s
expanded security role, together with its
more assertive foreign policy, causes serious
trouble with its Asian neighbours.
Thus, it is crucial for Australia that Japan’s
expanded new security roles (which Australia
strongly supports, especially under the former
Howard government) are developed with
regional blessings. For that to happen, it
would be highly desirable for Australia to havechannels available to make Australia’s voiceheard in Japan’s decision-making processes.
Through those channels, Australia could help
Japan expand its security roles, with blessingsfrom the other countries in the region.
It seems to me that this consideration pushed
the Australian Government to propose andconclude the March 2007 joint security
declaration with Japan. The declaration clearly
demonstrates that Japan’s future direction
has been occupying  more of Australia’s
strategic thinking. Contrary to generalperceptions on the security declaration,
which most people understood and assessedin the context of alliance coordination todeal with the rise of China, I have a strong
feeling that the ‘Japan factor’ drove Australia’s
proposal to conclude the declaration, not

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

the ‘China factor’ (although the China factor
was involved).
On the other hand, Japan has ‘discovered’Australia as one of its most importantpartners in dealing with greattransformations in East Asia. Japanappreciates Australia’s strategic thoughts
and insights in its foreign and security
policy considerations.
Japan and Australia share basic policy
orientations to the changing regional
environments in the Asia–Pacific region.
However, the new Labor government under
Kevin Rudd’s leadership may pose policy
challenges for Japan in its relations with
Australia, which were firmly establishedunder John Howard. Intensive strategic
dialogue and consultation should be further
enhanced, given the tremendous implications
for both countries of decisions about how to
respond to the great transformations of Asianinternational relations.
The challenges to Japan–Australia cooperation
are so huge that both countries need toaddress them carefully and creatively.

Endnotes
1

Tsutomu Kikuchi, ‘Toward multilateral
initiatives: can Japan and Australia copewith an emerging Asia Pacific?,’ in Peter
King and Yoichi Kibata (eds), Peace Buildingin the Asia Pacific Region, Allen & Unwin,
NSW, 1996, pp. 1–15.

2 Tsutomu Kikuchi, ‘Beyond “Strategic
Studies”: strategic relations in East Asia,’
paper presented at the Plenary 3, The
Global Strategic Balance and Competition
among the Major Powers in East Asia:
Implications and Responses, The 21st
Asia–Pacific Round Table, June 5–7, 2007,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

377

Tsutomu Kikuchi, ‘Institutional linkages
and security governance: security
multilateralism in the Korean Peninsula’(a chapter of a forthcoming book to
be published by the United Nations
University, Tokyo).

4 On institutional interplay, see Vinod K
Aggarwal (ed.), Institutional Designs for aComplex World, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, 1998; Oran Young, Governance inWorld Affairs, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, 1999.
5

This may take a form of a loose ‘concert ofpowers’ among the major powers.

6 David Barboza, ‘Some assembly needed:
China as Asian factory,’ New York Times,
9 February 2006.
7

Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign
Direct Investment during the Reform Era,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2003.

8 On the security implications ofcross‑border production networks, see
Stephen G Brooks, Producing Security:
Multinational Corporations, Globalization,and the Changing Calculus of Conflict,
Princeton University Press, Princeton,
2005.
9 See a series of the annual reports by theJapanese Ministry of Economics, Trade andIndustry (METI).
10 Kenneth B Pyle, Japan Rising: The
Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose,
Public Affairs, New York, 2007.
11 Kenneth B Pyle, ‘Abe Shinzo and Japan’schange of course,’ NBR Analysis (National
Bureau of Asian Research), vol. 17, no. 4,
October 2006, pp. 5–31.

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Proceedings

The Japan–Australia strategic
relationship; an Australianperspective
Dr Mark Thomson
Australian Strategic Policy InstituteOn the 6th of July 1957 in Hakone Japan thePrime Minister of Japan Nobusuke Kishi andAustralia’s Trade Minister ‘Black Jack’ McEwen
signed the Agreement of Commerce between
Australia and Japan. Designed to improve anddevelop commercial relations between thetwo countries, the Agreement heralded what
was to be a mutually beneficial economic
partnership between Australia and Japan;
a partnership that has now endured for morethan half a century and remains as vibrantand strong as it has ever been.
Over the same period, relations between
Japan and Australia have grown in otherways with culture, tourism and education
now firmly established as important partsof the bilateral relationship. While suchdevelopments may have been foreseen by
those present at the signing of the Agreementback in 1957, it is unlikely that they anticipatedJapan and Australia drawing together tocooperate in the security domain as has
occurred over the past several years.
This paper reviews the development ofrelations between Australia and Japanand examines prospects for the future. It
begins by looking broadly at the impact of
the 1957 Agreement on Commerce before
narrowing its focus to explore in detail the
recent developments on the security andstrategic fronts.

‘Being desirous of improving anddeveloping commercial relations…’
In essence, the 1957 Agreement conferredmost-favoured-nation status to each of theparties. Put simply, Australia and Japan agreed

that trade between the two countries would
face no greater tariffs, tax barriers or otherhindrances than imposed on any third party,
and that quotas or other restrictions onimports would not differ from those imposedon all third parties.
Compared with the aspirations of today’s
free trade advocates, it was a modest
agreement. It even included a clause allowing
either nation to ‘take such measures as
are necessary to safeguard its externalfinancial position and balance of payments’.
Nonetheless, it unleashed trade between
Australia and Japan which has grown
substantially over the years. In 1957, forexample, Australia exported only $67,000 ofcoal to Japan1. Today annual exports of coalfrom Australia to Japan stand in excess of$9 billion2.
The volume of trade between the twocountries is impressive. According to dataprepared by Australia’s Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade;•

Japan was the number one destination forAustralian merchandise exports in 2006
with a value of A$32.6 billion representing
19.4% of the total•

Japan was the number three source ofmerchandise imports to Australia in 2006
with a value of A$17.4 billion representing
14.3% of the total.

From the Japanese side, these merchandise
exports and imports put Australia at number
twelve in the ranking of Japanese export
destinations (1.9%) and number five in termsof import sources (4.8%).
The importance of Japan as an export
destination for Australia is not a recent
development. In fact, it took only ten years
after the signing of the 1957 Agreement forJapan to become Australia’s number one
export destination, a position it has held for
four decades.

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

The success of trade between Australia
and Japan is built upon the complementary
structure of the two country’s economies.
Australia has resources that Japan needs, andJapan is an efficient manufacturer of goods
that Australia desires. In addition, Australia is
an attractive destination for Japanese tourists
and students. Around 700,000 Japanesepeople visit Australia each year. Interest ineach other’s cultures is also strong withmore than 300,000 Australian students
studying Japanese in secondary schools andtertiary institutions.
With so much vested in the relationship,
it is not surprising that the last forty years
have seen a growing political relationshipbetween the two nations. In 1957, the then
Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies
visited Japan—the first Australian leader
to do so. Subsequently, Australian Prime
Ministers visited Japan four times in the 1970s,
five times in the 1980s, six times in the 1990s
and five times already this decade.
It is worth remembering that the depth andbreadth of bilateral relations between Japanand Australia owes a lot to the foresight andcontinued efforts of governments on bothsides.  The 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship andCo-operation between Japan and Australia
was an important step in cementing the gains
from the 1957 treaty3. It remains the only
bilateral umbrella treaty to which Australia isa party to.
What makes the 1957 Agreement, and eventhe 1976 Treaty, so impressive is that they
were achieved against a background of lessthan complete amity between Australia andJapan. The 1957 Agreement was signed only
five years after the San Francisco peace treaty
was concluded. At that time, WWII still cast aheavy shadow over Australian perceptions ofJapan. Conversely, Australia carried the burdenof a racist immigration policy (only effectively
revoked in 1973) that hardly endeared it to its
Asian neighbours, Japan included.

79

But such matters are now largely the concernof historians. So much so that in the past
several years Australia and Japan havebegun to broaden their relationship beyond
shared economic benefit to embrace—albeit
tentatively—shared strategic interests.

‘Affirming that the strategic
partnership between Australia andJapan…’Many have been surprised at the pace
Australia and Japan have moved to deepen
their defence and security relationship overthe past couple of years.
In June 2007 the two nations held inaugural
two-plus-two defence and foreign ministertalks in Tokyo4. This meeting followed thesigning of a Joint Declaration on Security
Cooperation5 in March that committed
both sides to work together ‘to respondto new security challenges and threats’.
Both initiatives complement the inaugural
Australia–Japan–United States strategic
trilateral dialogue6 that brought the threenation’s foreign ministers together to discuss
security in March 2006.
Perceptions in Australia of what is behind the
newfound strategic partnership between
Australia and Japan vary.7
On one side are those who see recent eventsin entirely positive terms. Japan is finallyshaking off the strictures of an outdated
post-WWII constitution to play a role befitting
the world’s second largest economy. In this‘coming of age’ tale, deepening security
cooperation with Australia and the UnitedStates will help Japan emerge as an effective
security actor for the good of all. To the extent
that this version of the story has villains, they
are the villains of the so-called non-traditional
security agenda; violent non-state actors,
transnational criminals, pandemic causing
microbes, weak states in need of rebuilding
and rogue states in need of restraint.

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Proceedings

Others see a less promising narrative
developing. The long-established power
balance in East Asia is being torn by the riseof China causing roles and relationships tobe redefined. In this version of the story, the
new found closeness between Australia andJapan, and the United States in turn, represent
the first steps in counter-balancing the riseof China as a great power. Take care, we are
told in this version of the story, or our actions
might create a China more in line with ourfears than our hopes.
So where does the truth lie?
The more upbeat of the two assessments cancertainly lay claim to reflecting the official
line of the three countries. For example, thejoint communiqué following the March 2006
Australia–Japan–United States Trilateral
Strategic Dialogue reads like a checklist of
uncontroversial security concerns centred
mainly, but not exclusively, on the Asia Pacific.
Topics canvassed included North Korean
and Iranian proliferation, counter‑terrorism
cooperation, democratic reform in Burma,
the stability of Pacific Island states andpreparing to deal with the consequences ofmajor pandemics.
The only mention of China was a single
sentence that ‘welcomed China’s constructive
engagement in the region and concurredon the value of enhanced cooperation withother parties…’ The only hint to changing
power balances was a tangential reference
to ‘the importance of reinforcing our global
partnership with India’ (in which the reader isleft to speculate on the meaning of the term
‘global partnership with India’). And the only
concrete actions agreed to were to enhancethe ‘exchange of information and strategic
assessments’ and, naturally, to hold anotherdialogue. In the final analysis, the Trilateral
Strategic Dialogue saw the three nations
agree to agree on things that they had alreadyagreed upon.

Although the Australia–Japan Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation is amuch more substantive document than
the anodyne trilateral communiqué, it still
accords closely with an upbeat perspectiveof the emerging security relationship. At its
heart is a list of nine areas for cooperation;eight focused directly on non-traditional
security issues and one for the exchange of
information. There is absolutely no reference
to balance-of-power geopolitics, let alone
anything that could be construed as asuggestion of collective defence. The joint
declaration is most definitely not a mutual
defence treaty or pact.
Nonetheless, the joint declaration does
establish a program of strengthened defence
and security cooperation through exchangesof personnel, coordinated activities and joint
exercises. Importantly, however, the latter
two initiatives are cast in the context of
non-traditional security concerns, specifically;
humanitarian relief, law enforcement, peace
operations and regional capacity building.
The joint declaration was followed by an
Action Plan in September 20078 that provided
more detail without expanding the scope ofplanned cooperation.
The joint statement9 following thetwo‑plus‑two talks in June 2007 was blandin the extreme, once again canvassing a
range of non-traditional security problems
while avoiding any mention of China. The
only point of vaguely strategic import was a
diplomatic statement of concern regarding
North Korean proliferation.
Thus, on the basis of what has been said
officially, and in terms of actual cooperationin Iraq and elsewhere, the emerging trilateral
Australia–Japan–United States and bilateral
Australia–Japan security relationships are
explicitly directed at security concerns otherthan the changing power balance in East Asia.

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

So where does this leave the interpretationof recent events centred on counterbalancing
China’s rise? Certainly, none of the three
countries have ever suggested that theircloser security relationship has anything to
do with China, if anything they have argued
the contrary. Explicitly so in the case ofAustralia, whose then Prime Minister John
Howard said that the trilateral dialogue (andby implication the bilateral Australia–Japan
strategic relationship) ‘is not directed against
China or the people of China’10. Nonetheless,there are two strong reasons to give credence
to a perspective that puts China at the centreof recent developments.
First, the mere fact the United States andtwo of its Asia–Pacific allies are drawing
together on security issues is important inand of itself. In this regard, context is critical.
While the US–China relationship has warmed
considerably in the years following 9/11,
tensions remain between the two countries.
In part, this reflects memories of the threerecent Sino–American crises; the 2001 EP-3
aircraft downing incident, the 1996 Taiwan
Strait crisis and the 1999 US bombing of theChinese embassy in Belgrade.
While these events are now in the past, thefact remains that both the United States andChina are strategically wary of each other—tothe extent that they both appear to be
developing military capability with each otherin mind. The United States does so explicitly
through its stated policy of maintaining
decisive military superiority in order to‘influence countries at the strategic crossroads’ of which China stands preeminent in
US thinking.11 For its part, China is developinga range of advanced weapons, including
anti-satellite capabilities, presumably withthe aim of having freedom of action (against
US counters) across its air and maritime
approaches particularly around Taiwan12. With
the military balance between China and theUnited States at the forefront of both nation’s

81

minds, any move by the US to consolidate its
alliances in the Asia Pacific inevitably, even if
inadvertently, factors into that balance.
Second, and even more important, therecent bilateral and trilateral initiatives usedlanguage that put China on the opposing
side of an ideological rift. The preamble to
the Australia–Japan joint declaration refersto ‘democratic values, a commitment tohuman rights, freedom and the rule of law’and the trilateral communiqué mentions‘supporting the emergence of democracies’.
By themselves, these statements arenothing more than diplomatic recitals of
long established positions.  But, once again,
context is everything.
The ideological rhetoric needs to be seen inlight of the US position, reaffirmed as recently
as 2006, calling for ‘political liberalization’ in
China13—the inevitable conclusion of which
would be an end to the communist regime.
Couple this with the proposal from the UnitedStates14 to create a partnership of democracies
including Australia, India, Japan and theUnited States—centred geographicallyaround, but necessarily excluding, China—anda different picture emerges: Despite therecent warming of relations between China
and the United States/Japan, an ideologicalrift remains that, among other things, defines
a sphere of security cooperation centred on
the United States to the exclusion of China.
Similarly, though somewhat less pointedly,
under foreign minister Aso, Japan embarked
on a program of ‘values based diplomacy’with an emphasis ‘on ‘universal values’ suchas freedom, democracy, human rights, therule of law and the market economy’ whichsought to ‘[f]urther strengthen ties with the
US, Australia, India and the member statesof the EU and NATO among others’ andcreate an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ thatformed a ‘prosperous and stable region basedon universal values around the outer rim of
the Eurasian continent’15.

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Proceedings

At least one neoconservative commentator16
in the United States has gone so far as topropose establishing a League of DemocraticStates ‘to bestow legitimacy on actions
that liberal nations deem necessary but
autocratic nations [specifically China andRussia] refuse to countenance’ and specificallymentions ‘Japan, Australia and India’ as
potential members.
To the surprise of some domestic
commentators, Australia’s normally pragmatic
Prime Minister at the time, John Howard,
was quick to accept this ideologically based
conception of strategic affairs. His responsewhen challenged on China’s possible reaction
to the development of a closer bilateral
security relationship between Australia
and Japan was informative. On two suchoccasions he argued, not unreasonably, that
there was no conflict in Australia having
constructive relations with both nations,
before then pointing out that Australia’s
relationship with Japan fell into a qualitatively
different category because both nations aredemocracies.17 On other occasions he has
stressed the ideological basis of the trilateralrelationship between the United States,
Japan and Australia18 going so far as tocall it ‘a natural coming together of three
Pacific democracies’.  
China’s response to the Australia–Japan–
United States trilateral has been diplomatic.
When asked for China’s perspective on thetrilateral strategic dialogue, President Hu
said that China ‘believed that countries inthis region should increase their dialogue
and cooperation on the basis of mutual trust,mutual benefit, equality and cooperation
to attain common security and common
development’19. The notion of ‘mutual trust,mutual benefit, equality and cooperation’has for several years now been the basis forwhat China calls its ‘new security concept’.
The question is; can a model of security
cooperation that differentiates between

democracies and non-democracies bereconciled with one based on equality?
Apparently not—from China’s perspectiveat least—if India is added to create aquadrilateral grouping. According to media
reports that were subsequently confirmed
by official Australian sources20, China senta demarche (a ‘please explain’ diplomaticnote) to Canberra, New Delhi, Tokyo andWashington on the eve of senior officials
from those capitals meeting to discuss
security on the sidelines of the May 2007
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila.21
Subsequently, both New Delhi and Canberra
downplayed any suggestion of a four-way
security partnership22, notwithstanding joint
maritime exercises involving the four nations
and Singapore in September 200723.
So where does this leave us? Which of
the two disparate interpretations of thegrowing security partnerships between
Australia, Japan and the United States iscorrect?  To some extent, it depends on
the preconceptions that one brings to thequestion. Those who see the world changed
irrevocably by the events of 9/11 tend to place
greater emphasis on the gains from engaging
a responsible and prosperous nation like Japanto assist with the new non-traditional security
agenda. Those who see the emergence ofChina through the bitter lessons of European
history fear a repeat of the nonsensicalsituation that saw the world go to war in 1914.  
The Howard government was confident thatit could reap the benefits promised by theformer perspective while avoiding the risks
inherent in the latter. Others are not so sure.
Australia’s new Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
has, so far, adopted a decidedly more cautious
approach.  While committing to continue
security cooperation with Japan across theeffectively full gamut of areas set out in the2006 joint declaration, he’s taken a firm line
against a formal defence pact with Japan

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

83

arguing that it would ‘unnecessarily tie our
security interests to the vicissitudes of an
unknown security policy future in North East
Asia’. In contrast, his predecessor John
Howard said that the joint declaration might
eventually lead to a treaty24, a view consistent
with that expressed by then JapaneseForeign Minister Aso who left open thepossibility of a future Australia–Japan–UnitedStates alliance25.

engaging Japan on non-conventional security
matters must be conservatively balanced
against the danger of provoking a potentiallydire deterioration in international relations
in East Asia. A key part of doing so is forAustralia, Japan and the United States toremain constructively engaged with China.
For Australia, the task has been made easierby the recently announced Australia–China
strategic dialogue.

In many ways, however, Australia has adifferent view of China to both the UnitedStates and Japan. We have no arguments
over history or trade and, unlike the UnitedStates, we do not lecture the Chinese regime
about how to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’.
In fact, following the 2007 two-plus-two talks
in June 2007, the Australian Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer was at pains to explain
to the media that China’s growing military
budget was both reasonable and benign26.
Australia’s perspective of China is best
described as relaxed and comfortable.

It remains to be seen whether the Australia–
China dialogue leads to security cooperation
between Australia and China on par withthat being developed between Australia andJapan. Even more interesting would be an
Australia–China joint declaration on security.

On past experience, Australia’s largely
sanguine view of China will limit thepotential of either the bilateral or trilateral
initiatives to go beyond their present
carefully circumscribed limits. Recent joint
Australia–Japan diplomatic pronouncements
reinforce this judgment. And even thoughthe Howard government took Australia
one small step closer to a partnership ofdemocracies on China’s periphery, this is will
not survive the new Rudd Labor government.
If there was ever any doubt of this, Stephen
Smith, the new Australian foreign minister,
put the matter to bed during his inauguralvisit to Japan and China when he informed
both nations that Australia would no longer
participate in four-way security talks withJapan, India and the United States27.
This more cautious approach makes sense.
From Australia’s perspective, prudence
dictates that the potential benefits of

The fact that the Australia–China dialoguecommenced at the ministerial level issignificant. While bilateral security dialogues
are not extraordinary—China and Japan
have held seven and China and the UnitedStates four—these have all been at the viceministerial level. Whatever happens, at least
the Australia–China strategic dialogue bringsa degree of symmetry to Australia’s relations
with the powers of North Asia and softens
the perception that earlier Australia/Japan/US
initiatives were directed at China.

Moving forward
Assuming that the foregoing argument
is correct, the new dimensions of theAustralia–Japan relationship will be more
focused on security issues than strategic
affairs (in the sense of competition between
great powers). That still leaves ample room
for worthwhile cooperation given the twocountries’ shared interests.  
To begin with, Australia and Japan aremercantile states which are highly dependent
on the free flow of goods, materials
and energy to and from our shores. As aconsequence, their prosperity is vulnerable toeven relatively small disruptions in the global

84

Proceedings

security landscape.  Moreover, in recent years
both have experienced rapid growth in tradewith China; a phenomena that has every
prospect of continuing into the future.

controls, transport security, law enforcement,international finance and the development ofresponse capabilities for chemical, biologicaland radiological incidents.

Then there is the fact that both countries areclose allies of the United States. And while
their respective alliances greatly enhance our
local security, both are subject to growing
expectations from the US to support its
broader security global agenda in places like
Afghanistan and Iraq. Recent cooperation
between the Australian Defence Force and
the Japanese Self Defense Force in Iraq shows
the potential for synergies from bringing
together complementary capabilities.

Arguably the most tangible commitment that
Australia and Japan have made in countering
terrorism was the dispatch of forces (albeit
in quite different roles) to Afghanistan in theaftermath of 9/11. Of course, it would be naïve
to pretend that Australia and Japan’s effortsin Afghanistan were not at least equally
motivated by a desire to nurture the US
alliance for its own sake.  

Finally, both countries have open democratic
political systems and free market economies.
Thus, while their two cultures reflect distinctly
different Eastern and Western heritages,
they nevertheless share a range of importantunderlying values. Specifically, they agree on
the fundamental relationship between theindividual and the state, and on the best way
to build prosperity at home and abroad.
Taken together, these three factors give
Australia and Japan a good deal of common
ground, and indeed common cause, towork together. It’s not surprising thenthat cooperation is already underway inseveral areas.
Of all the security issues that have arisen inrecent years, none has attracted as muchattention as that of Islamist terrorism. Both
Australia and Japan lost citizens in the 9/11
attacks of 2001 and the Bali bombing of 2002,
making terrorism an important issue for both
our countries. It’s understandable then, thatthey have been cooperating on a numberof levels to combat international terrorism.
This was formalised in the Statement andAction Plan issued jointly by the Australianand Japanese Prime Ministers in July 2003
and reinforced in the Joint Declaration of
2007. Cooperation embraces immigration

The rise of Islamist terrorism has, in turn,given new urgency to containing the spreadof Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
Accordingly, both Australia and Japan are
members of the ‘core group’ of fifteen
countries participating in the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI).
While the PSI and other ongoing
non‑proliferation initiatives are important,
it is the diplomatic efforts underway to curb
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions that willbe critical in the immediate future. Here,the opportunity for Australia and Japan tocooperate has been limited. Although there
is much at stake in North Korea, the reality
is that Australia is but a concerned observer
while Japan is a direct party to theSix Party talks.
On the question of Iranian proliferation,
Australia and Japan are so distant as to beirrelevant in the first instance. That said;
following the 2003 attempt to ‘disarm’
Iraq, Japan and Australia ended up working
together to rebuild infrastructure inthat country.  
Despite the relatively circumscribed level ofcooperation between Australia and Japan on
counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation,a worthwhile contribution to the overall
international effort has resulted in both areas.

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

The same is equally true for cooperation
between Australia and Japan in othernon‑conventional security areas. No doubt
this will continue as opportunities arise andnew challenges emerge.
Finally, although future cooperation between
Australia and Japan will likely avoid trying to
influence the actual or perceived balance ofpower in East Asia, it is still perhaps possible
for the two countries to enhance strategic
stability in that region. Specifically, Japanand Australia could work towards creating asecurity architecture for East Asia based oncooperation rather than confrontation.
It has become cliché to say that the stabilityof East Asia depends on finding a way tosimultaneously accommodate the riseof China as a great power, manage thenormalisation of Japan as a strategic entityand keep the United States engaged as astabilising factor in the region. Usually it isassumed, implicitly or otherwise, that thiswould be easer if there was a regional forum,
usually termed a security architecture, tofacilitate consultation and dispute resolution.
None of the existing alphabet soup ofregional forums is suitable for this purpose;most are two large to be practical and all are
principally focused on non-security affairs.   
The most credible proposal at present is to
evolve the six party talks into some sort ofstanding entity to deal with questions ofNorth Asian security. Such an entity would
have the advantage of engaging China, Japanand the United States on an equal basis. Of
course, the difficulty of institutionalising sucha forum would be the exclusion of the myriadof smaller nations in the broader region
including those of Southeast Asia. But thismight be unavoidable if a workable solution
is sought; the problems of what is essentiallyNorth Asian security are not going to besolved by convening a ‘general assembly’ of
the Asia Pacific.

85

Even if a manageably small and properly
focused ‘security architecture’ emerges, itwill be at best a means to an end. What’s
ultimately needed is a combination of implicit
norms and explicit rules by which regionalcountries—and especially China, Japan,
United States—delineate power, resolve
disputes and accommodate each other’sinterests. Although a forum for discussionis almost certainly necessary, it will not
be sufficient.  
Australia has a strong stake in seeing a forum
emerge with the necessary accompanying
rules and norms. The country’s three key
trading partners (Japan, China and the UnitedStates) are the principle strategic players inEast Asia, and the United States is its closest
ally. Australia’s security and prosperity
depends critically on the strategic stability of
East Asia. The same, of course, is even moreacutely true for Japan.
Of itself, the recently established security/
strategic partnership between Australia andJapan is but a minor development in the
broader landscape of East Asian security.
Nonetheless, it presents the opportunity forboth nations to work together on the truly
strategic task of helping establish an effective
security architecture for East Asia. Arguably,
the prospects for doing so are improved by
the distinctly different relationships they eachhave with the key players—the United States
and China in particular. It may be that, aswith commerce, Australia and Japan find that
their complementary characteristics deliver
mutual benefit.

Endnotes
1

Phil Ingram, Australia-Japan Commerce
Agreement 1957 - 50th Anniversary,
Commentary, at http://www.australia.
or.jp/english/seifu/50/20070627.html

2 Australian DFAT, Japan Fact Sheet, at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/jap.pdf

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Proceedings

Gary Woodard, Moreen Dee and Max
Suich, Negotiating the Australia-Japan
Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation:
Reflections and Afterthoughts, ANU,
Asia Pacific Economic Papers #362,
2007, at www.eaber.org/intranet/
documents/26/901/AJRC_Woodard_07.pdf

4 Japan, Australia eye meeting in June,
Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 2007,
at http://www.smh.com.au/news/
World/Japan-Australia-eye-meeting-inJune/2007/05/23/1179601489149.html
5Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on
Security Cooperation, 13 March 2007,
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/
aus_jap_security_dec.html

6 Joint Statement Australia-Japan-UnitedStates; Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,
18 March 2006, at http://www.
foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/
joint_statement-aus-japan_usa_180306.
html
7

Recent Australian commentary includes:
Gerard Henderson, Friends in peace andprosperity. The Sydney Morning Herald,
March 13, 2007 at http://www.smh.com.
au/news/opinion/friends-in-peace-andprosperity/2007/03/12/1173548110222.html
Paul Kelly, Security accord flags new
Japan, The Australian, March 13, 2007,
at http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.
au/paulkelly/index.php/theaustralian/comments/security_accord_flags_new_japan
Rod Lyon, Evolving secuiry structures will
displace US hegemony. The Australian,March 22, 2007, at http://theaustralian.
news.com.au/story/0,20867,214236317583,00.html
Greg Sheridan, Howard can make history
with Indian alliance, The Australian, April
19, 2007, at http://www.theaustralian.
news.com.au/story/0,20867,2158053425377,00.html

Greg Sheridan, Madness to miss politicalinvestment, The Australian, March 14, 2007,
at http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com.
au/gregsheridan/index.php/theaustralian/comments/madness_to_miss_political_
investment
Hugh White, Japan’s welcome to arms, The
Diplomat, April/May 2007,  at http://www.
the-diplomat.com/article.aspx?aeid=2687
8 Security cooperation with Japan, Media
Release, Prime Minister John Howard,
9 September 2007, at http://www.
pm.gov.au/media/Release/2007/Media_
Release24545.cfm
Major Elements of the Action Plan toimplement the Japan-Australia Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation,
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/
australia/action0709.html
9 Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence
Ministerial Consultation – Joint Statement
2007, at http://www.foreignminister.gov.
au/releases/2007/fa064_07.html
10 Joint statement and press conference by
the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia,
Sydney, 9 September 2007, at http://www.
pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/
Interview24544.cfm
Joint Press Conference with the Presidentof the People’s Republic of China, His
Excellency Hu Jintao, 6 September
2007, at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/
Interview/2007/Interview24538.cfm  
11 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2006,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/qdr-2006-report.pdf
12 Military Power of the People Republic ofChina, 2007, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Report to Congress, at http://
www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523China-Military-Power-final.pdf

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue

13 Reference 11 above and The National
Security Strategy for the United Statesof America, 2006, at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/
14 Dennis Shanohan, Pacific allies to enlist
India, The Australian, March 15 2007, at
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.
au/story/0,20867,21384779-601,00.html
15 Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizon– New Pillar for Japan’s Foreign Policy, at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/
horizons.pdf
16 Robert Kagan, The Illusion of Managing
China, Washington Post, 15 May 2005,
at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/13/
AR2005051301405.html
Robert Kagan, League of Dictators?,
Washington Post, 30 April 2006, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/28/
AR2006042801987.html
Robert Kagan, The world divides... anddemocracy is at bay, Timesonline,
2 September 2007, at http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/
columnists/guest_contributors/
article2367065.ece
17 John Howard, Press Conference, Sydney,
9 March 2007, at http://www.pm.gov.
au/media/Interview/2007/Interview24193.
cfm and John Howard, Doorstop
Interview, Sydney, 11 March 2007, http://
www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/
Interview24194.cfm.
18 Reference 10 above.
19 Joint Press Conference with Prime Minister
John Howard and President Hu Jintao,
Sydney, 6 September 2007, at http://www.
pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/
Interview24538.cfm

87

20 Brendan Nicholson, Japan jittery
over closer ties between Australia andChina, The Age, 6 February 2008, at
http://www.theage.com.au/news/
national/japan-jittery-over-our-ties-withchina/2008/02/05/1202090421830.html
21 Brahma Chellaney, ‘Quad Initiative’: aninharmonious concert of democracies’, The
Japan Times, 19 July 2007, at http://search.
japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20070719bc.
html
Siddharth Varadarajan, ‘China demarches
to 4 nations’, The Hindu, 14 June 2006, at
http://www.thehindu.com/2007/06/14/
stories/2007061404451200.htm
22 Stephen McDonell, Nelson reassures
China over regional defence pact, ABC
Online, at http://www.abc.net.au/news/
stories/2007/07/09/1973982.htm
23 Navies join forces for Exercise MALABAR,RAN website, at http://www.navy.gov.
au/news/navies-join-forces-for-exercisemalabar
24 John Howard, Doorstop interview Imperial
Hotel, Tokyo, 11 March 2007, at http://
www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/
Interview24195.cfm
25 Ministers Aso, Downer, Kyuma and Nelson– 2 + 2 Joint Ministerial Doorstop, 6 June
2007, at http://www.foreignminister.gov.
au/transcripts/2007/
070607_min_doorstop.html
26 Alexander Downer, Media
Conference, Tokyo, 6 June 2007, at
http://www.foreignminister.gov.
au/transcripts/2007/070608_media_
conference.html
27 Reference 20 above.

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Proceedings

About the Organisations
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