SS BPG

National Aeronautics andSpace Administration

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RELEASE DATE: 18 OCT 2023

Space Security:
Best Practices Guide (BPG)

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Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG)

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REVISION AND HISTORY
Revision
No.

ChangeNo.

-

N/A

Description
Initial Release - Approved for Public Release

ReleaseDate
18 OCT
2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................ 4
1.3 CHANGE AUTHORITY/RESPONSIBILITY ......................................................................... 5
1.4 CONVENTION AND NOTATION.......................................................................................... 5
1.4.1 Principle Identification ....................................................................................................... 5
1.4.2 Information Included with the Principles ........................................................................... 6
1.5 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................... 7
1.6 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS .................................................................................. 7
2. DOCUMENTS ....................................................................................................................... 9
2.1 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS ............................................................................................... 9
2.2 ORDER OF PRECEDENCE .............................................................................................. 10
3. MISSION SECURITY .......................................................................................................... 10
3.1 GOVERNANCE ................................................................................................................. 10
3.1.1 Governance Background ................................................................................................ 10
3.1.2 Principles and Associated Controls for Governance ....................................................... 10
3.1.2.1 GV-RSK-01 Adaptive Risk Response and Resource Allocation Function.................... 10
3.2 SPACE MISSION ............................................................................................................... 11
3.2.1 Space Mission Background ............................................................................................ 11
3.2.2 Principles and Associated Controls for Space Missions ................................................. 11
3.2.2.1 Architecture .................................................................................................................. 11
3.2.2.1.1 MI-ARCH-01 Mission Essential Data Flow Function................................................. 11
3.2.2.1.2 MI-ARCH-02 Mission Least Privilege Function ......................................................... 12
3.2.2.2 Authentication and Authorization ................................................................................. 12
3.2.2.2.1 MI-AUTH-01 Boundary Protection Function ............................................................. 12
3.2.2.2.2 MI-AUTH-02 Comprehensive Authentication and Authorization Function ................ 13
3.2.2.3 Defensive Cybersecurity Operation ............................................................................. 14
3.2.2.3.1 MI-DCO-01 Mission Cyber Actor Actions Detection Function ................................... 14
3.2.2.3.2 MI-DCO-02 Mission Fault Management Function..................................................... 15
3.2.2.4 Integrity ........................................................................................................................ 15
3.2.2.4.1 MI-INTG-01 Communications Survivability Function ................................................ 15
3.2.2.4.2 MI-INTG-02 Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Survivability Function ................... 16
3.2.2.5 Mission Assurance ....................................................................................................... 16
3.2.2.5.1 MI-MA-01 Mission Recovery Function ...................................................................... 16
3.2.2.5.2 MI-MA-02 Cybersecurity-Safe State Function .......................................................... 16
3.2.2.6 Malware Protection ...................................................................................................... 17

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3.2.2.6.1 MI-MALW-01 Mission Malware Protection Function ................................................. 17
3.2.2.6.2 MI-MALW-02 Mission Software, Programmable Logic Devices, and Firmware
Integrity Function ........................................................................................................................ 17
3.2.2.7 Software Supply Chain Restriction .............................................................................. 18
3.2.2.7.1 MI-SOFT-01 Software Mission Assurance Function ................................................. 18
3.2.2.7.2 MI-SOFT-02 Software and Hardware Testing Function ............................................ 19
3.3 GROUND ........................................................................................................................... 20
3.3.1 Ground Background ........................................................................................................ 20
Ground principles will be principles that are applicable to the ground infrastructure, laboratoryenvironment, or integrated ground architecture. ......................................................................... 20
3.3.2 Principles and Associated Controls for Ground .............................................................. 20
3.3.2.1 Authentication and Authorization ................................................................................. 20
3.3.2.1.1 GR-AUTH-01 Unique Identifiers for Authentication Function .................................... 20
3.3.2.1.2 GR-AUTH-02 Risk-informed Authorization for Non-Mission Users Function ............ 20
3.3.2.1.3 GR-AUTH-03 Secure Workload-to-Workload Authenticator Function....................... 21
3.3.2.2 Device Authentication .................................................................................................. 21
3.3.2.2.1 GR-DEVA-01 Computing Device Authentication Function ........................................ 21
3.3.2.3 Integrity ........................................................................................................................ 22
3.3.2.3.1 GR-INTG-01 Software and Firmware Integrity Verification Function ........................ 22
3.3.2.4 Malware Protection ...................................................................................................... 23
3.3.2.4.1 GR-MALW-01 Malware Protection Function ............................................................. 23
3.3.2.5 Multi-Factor Authentication .......................................................................................... 23
3.3.2.5.1 GR-MFA-01 Risk-informed Use of Multi-Factor Authentication Function .................. 23
3.3.2.6 Monitoring .................................................................................................................... 24
3.3.2.6.1 GR-MON-01 Unique Identifiers for Authentication Function ..................................... 24
3.3.2.6.2 GR-MON-02 Risk-informed Authorization for Non-Mission Users Function ............. 24
3.3.2.6.3 GR-MON-03 Network and Communications Monitoring Function ............................ 25
3.3.2.6.4 GR-MON-04 Cyber Activity Response and Reporting Function ............................... 25
3.3.2.7 Software Restriction ..................................................................................................... 26
3.3.2.7.1 GR-SOFT-01 Software Installation Function............................................................. 26
A. APPENDIX A – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................... 27
B. APPENDIX B – PRINCIPLES IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX ............................................... 29
C. APPENDIX C – NASA STANDARD 1006 W/ CHANGE 1 ................................................... 31
D. APPENDIX D – NIST 800-53 REV 5 APPLICABLE CONTROLS ....................................... 48
E. APPENDIX E – LIST OF PRINCIPLES ............................................................................... 54
F. APPENDIX F – CHANGE REQUEST FORM ..................................................................... 56

TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Documents Influencing the Mission Manager ................................................................. 4

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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

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PURPOSEThe Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG) provides guidance on mission security
implementation in the form of principles coupled with applicable controls that cover both the spacevehicle and the ground segment. The BPG leverages security controls as defined in the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53 and serves as atranslation guide between NIST verbiage and NASA flight project parlance. The principles aremeant to be easily achievable regardless of mission, program, or project size, scope, or whether
international, corporate, or university. The principles selected focus on a risk-based approach to
mitigating vulnerabilities, that are impediments to mission success. Principles were identified as
an initial starting point of critical implementations for missions to consider. The underlying security
principles and associated controls were identified through an iterative process to address today’s
cyber actors Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used in attempts to compromise
mission capabilities. The guide is to be used as an initial starting point to mitigate against any
efforts to deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, or destroy information and technology used toaccomplish NASA mission success.
1.2

SCOPE

This guidance applies to all mission, programs, and projects regardless of class. Missions,programs, and projects are encouraged to use this document as a baseline for space security
principles. While this document is still in guidance form, the principles and controls will be
evaluated for inclusion into the main body of NASA Agency standards and requirements. It is
important that the missions, programs, and projects provide feedback on utility andimplementation of this guide to the Enterprise Protection Program (EPP) and Office of the Chief
Information Officer (OCIO). The term “mission” is meant to be all encompassing and include all
NASA missions, programs, and projects.
This Best Practices Guide provides guidance specific to mission, programs, and projects notalready covered in the existing NPRs and Standards. This guide does not replace Agency
requirement for missions to develop a System Security Plan (SSP) as identified in NPD 2800.1,
NPR 2810, and NPR 7120.5. Figure 1 shows a mapping of the documents influencing the mission
managers risk and programmatic decisions.
NPR 7120.5

Project Protection Plan
NPR 7120.5 Appendix I

Space Flight Program andProject Management Handbook

Data Management
Plan

Information
Technology
Management Plan

NASA-STD-1006

Security Plans
NPR 1600.1
NPR 1600.2
NPR 2810.1
NPR 1040.1

Risk
Management
Plan
NPR 8000.4
NPD 2200.1
NPR 2200.2
NPD 1441.1
NPR 8020.12

Software Management
Plan
NPR 7150.2
STD 8739.8

NPD 2200.1
NPR 2200.2
NPD 1441.1
Information
Management
Plan
NPR 2800.1

External Influencing Documents/References• NIST 800-53• MITRE ATT&CK• Space Mission Engineering: The New SMAAD

Software Safety
Guidebook8719.13

IT Security
NPR 2810.1

Figure 1 Documents Influencing the Mission Manager

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Due to the significant architectural, developmental (lifecycle), and operational differences
between the space mission and ground segments, this document sets forth principles in both
space mission and ground segments. Readers are encouraged to view the full set of principles
as designed to work together to provide a layered and comprehensive defense. In addition to thetwo segments, a single governance principle has been selected to provide context and guidance
for mission executive and operational leadership to include cybersecurity risk considerations inbudgeting and planning.
1.3

CHANGE AUTHORITY/RESPONSIBILITY

Currently, the Best Practice Guide will be issued under the auspices of the Enterprise Protection
Program, in coordination with OCIO, and will gather feedback on the principles with the goals ofincorporating the principles into an official NASA Standard. The standard will be developed along
the lines of how NASA-STD-1006 was developed. It is expected to move this process through amore accelerated timeline to meet both the needs of the missions who are actively designing anddeveloping their technical principles and the rapidly evolving capabilities of actors.
Proposed changes to this document shall be submitted via a Change Request (CR), found in
Appendix F, to the Enterprise Protection Program for consideration and disposition. All such
requests will be evaluated semi-annually (by a large group) for inclusion or exclusion in futureversions of the guide. If a principle is recommended for implementation into a NASA
STD/NPR/NPD or other document, it will be evaluated during the same semi-annual process.
1.4

CONVENTION AND NOTATIONThe Enterprise Protection Program and Office of the Chief Information Officer defines its
implementation of principle verb as follows:“Should” – Used to indicate good practice or a goal which is desirable but not mandatory anddoes not require formal verification. As applied to payloads, requirements identified to specify
proper hardware and software interfaces to contribute to overall payload mission success are
specified with “should” statements. “Should” statements not followed could result in operational
constraints or failure to meet payload objectives.
Rationales for many of the principles are intended to provide clarification, justification, purpose,or the source of a principle. In the event that there is an inconsistency between a principle and its
rationale, the principle always takes precedence.
1.4.1

Principle Identification

The controls listed in this Best Practices Guide use a naming schema consisting of three parts.
The first section identifies where the principle is applied, either mission, ground, or governance.
The second section identifies the portion of the system the principle is applied. The final section
is a sequential number for the principle.

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1.4.2 Information Included with the Principles

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In addition to the principle language and rationale, there are four additional pieces of information(controls):• Aerospace Space Threat Actor Capabilities• MITRE ATT&K Threat Actor Tactics• NIST 800-53 Revision 5 applicable cybersecurity controls• Space Mission Security and Protection Key Performance Parameters
There are seven Threat Actor Capabilities that are tied to the original Aerospace Technical
Operating Report (Aerospace TOR-2021-01333), where multiple capabilities may be invoked by
the cyber actor:• CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks• CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities• CAP-03: Ability to Defeat Cryptography and Authentication• CAP-04: Command and Control Sophistication• CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber and/or Physical Systems• CAP-06: Ability to Gain Physical Access• CAP-07: Sophistication of Human Influence
Additionally, the MITRE ATT&K Threat Actor Tactics (https://attack.mitre.org/) were explored toprovide the reader with potential paths for mitigations. There are twelve tactics that wereintroduced from Industrial Control Systems (ICS) or Operational Technologies (OT). Why would
one use ICS or OT tactics vs traditional cybersecurity tactics on a space mission system? ICS
and OT systems have very similar requirements to space mission systems for timing and are often
networked together. Space-based mission systems often have multiple operating systems on avariety of processors, that are often not protected (except the command link). Further since
Government and commercially developed spacecraft are currently incorporating common
standards and architectures such as TCP/IP and UDP in their design to enable systems
interconnection and communication. Additionally, incorporation of newer technology such as
artificial intelligence (AI) and machine language (ML) applications will potentially expand theprotection needs. As the integration and interconnection of systems continues to occur in the
future, it is important to consider the spacecraft from both information system and operational
technology views. The protection of increasingly more complex space systems will necessitate
the adaptation and implementation of Best Practices as they relate to design, intended operations,interconnections, and zero trust perspectives. The MITRE ATT&CK Threat Actor Tactics used
were:
• TAC-01: Initial Access• TAC-02: Execution• TAC-03: Persistence• TAC-04: Privilege Escalation• TAC-05: Evasion• TAC-06: Discovery• TAC-07: Lateral Movement• TAC-08: Collection• TAC-09: Command and Control• TAC-10: Inhibit Response Function• TAC-11: Impair Process Control• TAC-12: Impact

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Lastly the Space Mission Security and Protection Key Performance Parameters were used toround out the risk-based approach. These key performance parameters are divided into threeareas or pillars to ensure a space mission systems survivability/resiliency:• PREVENT: Design principles that remove the likelihood of cyber events• MITIGATE: Design principles that reduce the impact and/or likelihood of cyber events• RECOVER: Design principles that enable resiliency and restoration of capabilities
impaired due to a cyber event
Because there is no risk management framework for end-to-end integrated space mission
systems the combination of these four practices provides the beginnings of an informed risk
management framework for space missions. This combination will eventually enable engineers,
program managers, and leaders to make informed risk management decisions for space mission
cybersecurity and protection based in a system similar to what already exists for other risk
decisions that is comfortable and known. This system will be developed in the second release of
the guide.
1.5

BACKGROUND

During the months of October through December of 2021, team members from EnterpriseProtection Program (EPP) and the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) worked togenerate awareness of the need for clearly defined guidance for space mission and groundsegment cybersecurity controls. This process, driven by an explicit goal to develop a consensus
approach, met with stakeholders from across the Agency to solicit input and request participation
in a future working group.
Upon approval from the Enterprise Protection Board (EPB) to explore this topic further, EPP and
OCIO kicked-off the “Spacecraft Cyber Controls Working Group” with 45 key stakeholders from
OCIO, OCE, OSMA, SOMD, ESDMD, STMD, JPL, and SMD. The working group leveraged
existing research, reference material, and work already completed as noted below:• Risk analysis, vulnerability mapping, and critical cyber controls for Space Vehicle and
Ground segments completed by Aerospace Corporation• Flight Operations Directorate and Mission Control Center evaluation of operational
environment, contracts, and associated cybersecurity controls• Cybersecurity requirements guidance and control template already completed by
Gateway
Through numerous feedback sessions and draft revisions with key stakeholders, a final set of 27
controls was finalized for the Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG).
The final document was formatted and sent out for approval October 2023.
1.6

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONSThere were many questions that were asked during the Best Practices Guide creation. Whatfollows are the most frequently asked:• Why a Best Practices Guide versus formal technical requirements?
o After surveying available options for release of this artifact to NASA’s mission
community, it was determined by the community that a Best Practices Guide would
allow for timely and streamlined release

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Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG)o Formal technical requirements, similar to those existing in NASA-STD-1006, cantake significant time to adopt in the mission community; due to the dynamic natureof the space mission cybersecurity and protection area a more robust process willneed to be defined and undertaken; we may ultimately adopt some portion of thisdocument into formal technical standards
o The practices here do not have immediate solutions in all mission types andarchitectures, and formal requirements may not be achievable or cost effective formany missions until these concepts are implemented in product lines• There are two distinct categories of space security principles: space mission and groundsegment. What were the original sources for each group of principles?
o Space Mission§ The starting point for space mission critical principles was the risk andvulnerability landscape applicable to space vehicle and reflects a riskbased approach for the selection of controls; space vehicle risk analysis
research was leveraged that was conducted by Aerospace Corporation,
vetted by Department of Defense (DOD) space subject matter experts, andapproved for release by DOD
o Ground Segment§ For the ground segment, analysis was leveraged that was completed by
FOD/MCC in which NIST 800-53 controls applicable to the ground segment
were utilized and created a prioritization framework based on five criteria:
positioning and control, monitoring, availability, integrity, and confidentiality§ Work done by Aerospace Corporation for ground segment was alsoutilized, which provided categorization of the NIST 800-53 controls basedon a set of questions aimed at mission teamso For both the space mission and ground segments, the principles were downselected and aggregated to reach a preliminary set of Best Practice Guide criticalprinciples based on the above analysis and an orthogonal review to ensure theprinciples proposed were sufficient to address the various stages of known cyberactors techniques as developed in MITRE’s ATT&CK frameworko Due to NASA’s civil nature specific tuning of the principles and controls werenecessary to ensure there was not excessive language or overly restrictive
principles placed on missions, programs, and projects• Is selection of these principles tied in any way to a system security categorization such as
per FIPS 199? Or are these principles intended to be applied in a risk appropriate mannerto all spacecraft and ground segments?
o While these Best Practices Guide principles will be mapped to NIST 800-53
controls, and therefore can guide the development of a System Security Plan
(SSP) designed to support the Authority to Operate (ATO) process for systems ateach of the FIPS 199 categories (LOW, MODERATE, HIGH), Best Practices Guide
principle selection was based on risk modelling and should be used to prioritize
principles from a defense in depth model

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2. DOCUMENTS

2.1

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APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

Document Number

Revision

Document Title

ATT&CK

October 2022

MITRE ATT&CKCJCSI 6510.01

June 2015

Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network
Defense (CND)

DODI 8110.01

June 2021

Mission Partner Environment Information Sharing Capability
Implementation for the DoD

DODI 8500.01

October 2019

Cybersecurity

GP 10037

July 2021

Gateway Payload Interface Definition Document

GSFC-STD-1000

June 2016

Goddard Space Flight Center Rules for the Design,
Development, Verification, and Operation of Flight Systems

NASA-GB-8719.13

March 2004

NASA Software Safety Guidebook

NASA-STD-1006

November 2020

Space System Protection Standard

NASA-STD-8739.8

September 2022 Software Assurance and Software Safety

NIST 800-53

September 2020

Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems andOrganizations

NPD 2200.1

January 2020

Management of NASA Scientific and Technical Information

NPD 2800.1

December 2019

Managing Information Technology

NPR 1040.1

July 2003

NASA Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning Procedural
Requirements

NPR 1441.1

January 2015

NASA Records Management Program Requirements

NPR 1600.1

August 2013

NASA Security Program Procedural Requirements

NPR 1600.2

September 2019 NASA Classified National Security Information

NPR 2200.2

December 2021

Requirements for Documentation, Approval and Dissemination of
Scientific and Technical Information

NPR 2810.1

January 2022

Security of Information and Information Systems

NPR 7120.5

August 2021

NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management
Requirements w/Change 1

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Document Number

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Document Title

Revision

NPR 7120.7

August 2020

NASA Information Technology Program and Project Management
Requirements

NPR 7120.8

September 2018

NASA Research and Technology Program and ProjectManagement Requirements (Updated w/Chage 2)

NPR 7123.1

February 2020

NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements(w/Change 2)

NPR 7150.2

March 2022

NASA Software Engineering Requirements

NPR 8000.4

April 2022

Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements

TOR-2018-02275

August 2018

A Need for Robust Space Vehicle Cybersecurity

TOR-2019-02178

August 2019

Satellite Telemetry Indicators for Identifying Potential Cyber
Attacks

TOR-2021-01333

April 2021

Cybersecurity Protections for Spacecraft: A Threat BasedApproach

TOR-2021-01725

June 2021

Cybersecurity Protections for Space Systems

2.2

ORDER OF PRECEDENCE

In the event of a conflict between the principles and controls of this document and referencesused to create, the principles of this document are best practices and are not to supersede
referenced documentation. Resolution of any precedence conflicts are accomplished through theuse of waivers and deviations, or as per discretion of the mission manager. Nothing in thisdocument, however, supersedes applicable laws and regulations unless a specific exemption has
been obtained.
3. MISSION SECURITY
3.1

GOVERNANCE

3.1.1

Governance Background

Governance principles and controls address overarching mission, program, project themes thatshould be addressed within the mission, program, project.
3.1.2

Principles and Associated Controls for GovernanceThis section provides the individual principles and associated controls related to Governance.
3.1.2.1 GV-RSK-01 Adaptive Risk Response and Resource Allocation Function
Principle: As a best practice the mission should establish a continuous process of qualitative andquantitative mission security risk analysis and risk response for the duration of the mission.

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As a best practice the mission should establish a continuous process of qualitative andquantitative mission security risk analysis and risk response for the duration of the mission.
Rationale: Static cybersecurity defenses are not sufficient to rapidly adapt to changing risk
conditions such as the discovery of a new cyber actors modular attack toolkit with the capability
to integrate targeting packages for entirely new platforms in very short time frames. Thisrequirement calls for the design and operationalization of an organizational model forcybersecurity defense that can rapidly integrate new information across the entire lifecycle andtoolkit to reconfigure how architecture, design, testing, deployment, patching, monitoring,
analytics, alerting, and response activities are triggered, focused, and automated.
Risk mitigation recommendations should include, but not be limited to, making risk-appropriate
budgeting, contracting, procurement, and personnel assignment decisions. Effectively acting to
mitigate the identified risks will require support from the mission's management chain and mission
support providers.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses All CAP• Addresses All TAC• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) PM-9, PM-28, RA-7
• Addresses ALL Space Mission Security and Protection Pillars
3.2

SPACE MISSION

3.2.1

Space Mission BackgroundSpace mission principles will be principles that are applicable to the space vehicle, space-based
hosted payload, or space-based infrastructure or architecture.
3.2.2

Principles and Associated Controls for Space Missions

This section provides the individual principles and associated controls related to Space Missions.
3.2.2.1 Architecture
3.2.2.1.1

MI-ARCH-01 Mission Essential Data Flow Function

Principle: The mission should establish and maintain a current and accurate data flow diagram
covering mission essential data flows, including those that pass through mission-external service
providers.
Rationale: A good data flow diagram provides understanding what data is needed by the system,and how that data flows across networks and communications links. In turn, this provides
essential insight to understand where particular risk to the system may emerge, and where
additional scrutiny or defenses may be warranted.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit
Vulnerabilities• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-02: Execution
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Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AC-4, AC-4(2), AC-4(3),AC-4(6), AC-4(21), CA-3, CA-3(6), SC-32
Addresses MITIGATE Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar

3.2.2.1.2

MI-ARCH-02 Mission Least Privilege Function

Principle: The mission should employ the principles of domain separation and least privilege forthe on-board architecture, communications, and control.
Rationale: Least privilege designs will protect the main processor and core control functions of
the vehicle from compromised assemblies by limiting the actions that can be executed on sharedbuses and onboard networks from recognized attack vectors. Segmentation and boundary control
on the vehicle will mitigate supply chain attacks in procured or provided assemblies and in
onboard software of varying provenance, as well as operational vulnerabilities when multiplecommand paths are available (e.g., an instrument with its own command link). Fault management
systems should be employed to power off or block non-safety-critical assemblies that exhibit
behavior that suggests compromise or failure.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-07: Lateral Movement• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, SA-8(14),
SA-17(7), SC-3, SC-4, SC-6, SC-7(20), SC-7(21), SC-39, SI-17• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.2 Authentication and Authorization
3.2.2.2.1

MI-AUTH-01 Boundary Protection Function

Principle: The mission should establish a mediated access mechanism that prevents
unauthorized access to critical subsystems in the space segment.
Rationale: Cyber actors can exploit the ground system and use the ground segment to maliciouslyinteract with the space vehicle. The boundary protection may be logical or physical. Functionality
provides the following benefits:• Blocks unintended (incoming/outgoing) traffic• Enables generation and maintenance of Security Logs
• Prevents devices from polling other network devices• Prevents devices from polling the network for other devices• Prevents bridging of networks
Effective boundary protection should/would include confidentiality protection using encryption (asdefined by NASA STD 1006) in addition to some form of authentication (e.g., Galois/Counter
Mode GCM). This boundary protection also needs to include protection on the space vehicle side
where it protects itself from the ground being used as an attack vector. The inherent trust between
the ground and space vehicle needs addressed where the space vehicle can protect itself fromthe ground in the event the ground has been compromised. Each mission should identify/define
their most critical subsystems. Critical subsystems or control interfaces should have mediatedaccess between mission critical control interfaces, that could create mission ending
failure/consequence through either physical or software means.
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This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-12: Impact• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) SC-7, SC-7(3), SC-7(4), SC7(5), SC-7(9), SC-7(10), SC-7(11), SC-7(12), SC-7(13), SC-7(14), SC-7(15), SC-7(16),SC-7(17), SC-7(18), SC-7(19), SC-7(20), SC-7(21), SC-7(22), SC-7(28), SC-7(29)• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.2.2

MI-AUTH-02 Comprehensive Authentication and Authorization Function

Principle: The mission should ensure only authenticated and authorized personnel, devices, andsoftware are allowed to access the space mission system.
Rationale:• Cyber actors can masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain access.
• Unique identifiers and associated authenticators (passwords, multi-factor physical andvirtual, securely registered biometrics) and associated processes to verify entities at timeof issuance and authenticate entities at time of access request allow the mission to provide
a risk-aligned level of assurance that only vetted entities are allowed to access mission
digital resources.
• Non-mission users authorized to access mission computing resources as a specific subsetof all personnel pose a potential additional risk compared to mission users due to limited
ability to fully vet and verify their suitability. Therefore, the mission should perform a risk
assessment to determine the authorization needs of non-mission users that need toaccess the system (e.g., public users supporting commercial organizations); what
information they would need to access; and its restrictions (OPSEC, Privacy Act, ITAR,etc.). The risk assessment should incorporate supply chain considerations related toforeign national access to Agency or other potentially sensitive information.
• The existence of insecure static authenticators for access to applications and control
systems, such as hardcoded plaintext passwords or access tokens, can be discovered bycyber actors, brute forced, and reused across multiple similar systems creating an
opportunity for rapid widespread compromise within the mission ground segment.
Therefore, the mission should define policy and procedures to ensure that the developedor delivered systems do not embed unencrypted static authenticators in applications,access scripts, configuration files, or store unencrypted static authenticators on function
keys. With associated decryptors on the space mission system.
• Ensuring only devices known to and registered with the appropriate mission device
inventory and management platforms are allowed to access mission communications
networks significantly reduces the increased risk due to unknown devices operating within
mission environments. Therefore, the mission should provide the capability to uniquely
identify and authenticate all types of computing devices, including mobile devices andnetwork connected endpoint devices (including workstations, printers, servers, VoIP
Phones, VTC CODECs) before establishing a network connection. In addition, the mission
should, in consultation with the system security engineers and the AO, select theappropriate device identification and authentication mechanisms based on mission needs
and the strength of mechanism required in support of that mission. Ensuring on the space
mission system the right system has sent the right command at the right time.
• The mission should establish policy and procedures to prevent individuals (i.e., insiders)from masquerading as individuals with valid access to areas where commanding/updating

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attacker from performing potential mission ending actions like flight software upgrades,
burning read-only memory, changing fault responses, uploading stored commandsequences, or executing mission defined critical commands. The equipment and protocols
being used should include stronger encryption, authentication, and key management
procedures to reduce risk of confidentiality and integrity violations and impacting themission.
• While the rationale for this control appears to be more ground centric, while the space
mission system is in development mission personnel will be requiring access outlined in
the control.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capabilities:o CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks
o CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities
o CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical Systems
o CAP-07: Sophistication of Human Influence• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactics:
o TAC-01: Initial Accesso TAC-02: Executiono TAC-04: Privilege Escalation• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-8, IA-9,
IA-10, IA-11, IA-12, PE-2, PE-3, PM-10, SI-7(15)• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.3 Defensive Cybersecurity Operation
3.2.2.3.1

MI-DCO-01 Mission Cyber Actor Actions Detection Function

Principle: The mission should incorporate an on-board cyber actor actions detection function in
its requirements and resulting system.
Rationale: The mission should plan for the possibility of an on-board disruption deriving from asecurity incident and incorporate these considerations. Event detection, mitigations, and alertingof ground segment security operations team are critical controls to provide the capability for
operational teams to know when other controls have failed, rapidly respond (where possible). The
resulting lessons learned should be fed back into the design process. Monitoring of key software
observables (e.g., number of failed login attempts, unscheduled lockups of the flight receiver,indications of RFI on non-telecom equipment, performance changes, internal communication
changes) is needed to detect cyber actor actions that interdict mission success.
Cybersecurity attacks affecting components of in-flight systems are expected. A cybersecurity
incident response plan is key to the timely and effective response to a cybersecurity attack. All
suspected cyber actor actions should be reported. Raw event data should be further analyzed todetermine whether an anomalous event represents an attack, and if so, the nature of the attack,and the appropriate response to mitigate impact to the mission. Ensure the mission is following
NPR 7150.2 guidance for software to detect cyber actor actions, such as those in 3.11.8.

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This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-04: Command and Control
Sophistication• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-01: Initial Access• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AC-4(15), AU-2, AU-3, AU4, AU-5, AU-6, AU-8, AU-9, AU-14, CM-8(3), RA-5(7), SC-5(3), SC-7(9), SI-3(8), SI-4(1),SI-4(2), SI-4(4), SI-4(10), SI-4(11), SI-4(12), SI-4(13), SI-4(14), SI-4(15), SI-4(16), SI4(17), SI-4(18), SI-4(19), SI-4(20), SI-4(22), SI-4(23), SI-4(24)• Addresses MITIGATE Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.3.2

MI-DCO-02 Mission Fault Management Function

Principle: The mission should incorporate fault management bypass protection in its
requirements and resulting system.
Rationale: The mission should consider the possibility of fault management transitions to bypass
the system's protection measures and incorporate these considerations. Fault management
systems may be deliberately triggered in an effort to bypass the system's protective measures.
For example, safehold mode operations without command-link protection.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-04: Command and Control
Sophistication• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-01: Initial Access• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AC-4(15), AU-2, AU-3, AU4, AU-5, AU-6, AU-8, AU-9, AU-14, CM-8(3), RA-5(7), SC-5(3), SC-7(9), SI-3(8), SI-4(1),SI-4(2), SI-4(4), SI-4(10), SI-4(11), SI-4(12), SI-4(13), SI-4(14), SI-4(15), SI-4(16), SI4(17), SI-4(18), SI-4(19), SI-4(20), SI-4(22), SI-4(23), SI-4(24)• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.4 Integrity
3.2.2.4.1

MI-INTG-01 Communications Survivability Function

Principle: The mission should be able to recover from communications jamming and spoofing
attempts.
Rationale: Communications systems using a shared medium are susceptible to jamming andspoofing, resulting in loss of access (denial of service) and potential loss of data integrity andavailability. The prevalence of impacts to communications links in the RF and optical bands isincreasing, as well as potential for targeted spoofing of communications links.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical
Systems• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-10: Inhibit Response Function• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) CP-8, SC-5, SC-8, SC-40,
SC-40(1), SC-40(3), SI-10(3), SI-10(5), SI-10(6)• Addresses RECOVER Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar

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3.2.2.4.2
MI-INTG-02 Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Survivability Function
Principle: The mission should be able to recover from positioning, navigation, and timing jammingand spoofing attempts.
Rationale: As a specific example of MI-INTG-01, space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing(PNT) relying on a GNSS signal may experience loss of signal (denial of service) and potential
loss of the signal's data integrity. Manipulations (spoofing) of GNSS signal data may result inconsequences to the space vehicles PNT.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical
Systems• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-10: Inhibit Response Function• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AU-8, CP-8, SC-5, SC-40,
SC-40(1), SC-40(3), SI-10(3), SI-10(4), SI-10(5), SI-10(6)• Addresses RECOVER Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.5 Mission Assurance
3.2.2.5.1

MI-MA-01 Mission Recovery Function

Principle: The mission should include intentional disruptions consistent with the mission
vulnerability analysis in anomaly detection, response, and recovery plans and designs in the flightsegment and ground segment.
Rationale: A complete defense-in-depth architecture includes the ability of the space vehicle tomaintain safe operation through a security incident affecting flight or ground systems, and to
recover to a nominal state once the incident is resolved. Security incidents should be consideredalongside equipment failures, environmental events, natural disasters, and other sources of
disruption in onboard fault handling, anomaly response, and continuity-of-operations planning toensure mission resilience.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical
Systems• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-10: Inhibit Response Function• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) CP-2(5), IR-4, SA-8(24)• Addresses RECOVER Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.5.2

MI-MA-02 Cybersecurity-Safe State Function

Principle: The mission should design secure vehicle fault management functions and safe mode
operations.
Rationale: Fault management systems are one of the targets a cyber actor will attempt tocompromise. Designing security into these systems at the earliest opportunity is paramount.
Security should also be considered as a potential root cause of system malfunction that is
captured by the fault management system, and fault responses should be designed to mitigate
security events alongside other causes of system failure.

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This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit
Vulnerabilities• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-11: Impair Process Control• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) CP-12, SI-17, IR-4(3), IR4(5)• Addresses RECOVER Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.6 Malware Protection
3.2.2.6.1

MI-MALW-01 Mission Malware Protection Function

Principle: The mission system software updates should be validated as free from malware prior
to deployment, launch, and at defined regular intervals while the mission is in operations.
Rationale: On-orbit software updates/upgrades/patches and all software updates should bechecked for malware prior to load. Additionally, malware injected into space vehicle softwaremodules via supply chain attack may not be discovered until well into flight and may be activatedas a step in compromising a vehicle. Modules that have not been updated during flight may
therefore still pose a risk. Regular scans on stored copies of flight modules using updated
signatures may discover malware that has been in hiding, and regular monitoring of malware andvulnerability reports will also prompt response.
Integrity of software should be verified by employing a cryptographically secure hashing algorithm
to determine the hash (digest value) of the system (or software update package) being evaluated.
Additionally, the authenticity of the "control" or "reference" hash value, to which the system's hashis being compared, should also be signed using the private key of a cryptographic digital signature
to ensure that the control value was supplied by a legitimate, trusted entity. The reason for thisextra measure is that, in its absence, an attacker could modify the system being checked for
integrity and also make a corresponding modification to the control hash value so that thesubsequent integrity check still passes. This control aims to ensure that only legitimate entities
can supply control hash values for software and update packages.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical
Systems• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-02: Execution• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) CM-4(1), CM-7(8), CM-14,
RA-5, SA-10(1), SA-10(3), SA-10(4), SA-10(5), SA-10(6), SA-11(1), SA-11(2), SA-11(4),SA-11(5), SA-11(6), SA-11(8), SA-11(9), SI-2, SI-3, SI-21• Addresses MITIGATE Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.6.2
MI-MALW-02 Mission Software, Programmable Logic Devices, and Firmware
Integrity Function
Principle: The mission should establish and verify the integrity of it’s software images.
Rationale: On-orbit software updates/upgrades/patches. If TT&C is compromised or MOC or eventhe developer's environment, the risk exists to do a variation of a supply chain attack where after

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it is in orbit you inject malicious code or direct writes to memory. New or modified virus or malware
will not be identified without updated manufacturer definitions. Blocks, removes, or recommends
patches of commonly known virus or malware used to disrupt computer operations, gather
sensitive information, or gain access to private computer systems. Virus and malware includes:
computer worms, trojan horses, ransomware, spyware, etc.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical
Systems Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-02: Execution• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) CM-4(1), CM-7(8), CM-14,
RA-5, SA-10(1), SA-10(3), SA-10(4), SA-10(5), SA-10(6), SA-11(1), SA-11(2), SA-11(4),SA-11(5), SA-11(6), SA-11(8), SA-11(9), SI-2, SI-3, SI-7
• Addresses MITIGATE Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.7 Software Supply Chain Restriction
3.2.2.7.1

MI-SOFT-01 Software Mission Assurance Function

Principle: The mission should perform software assurance via established procedures andtechnical methods.
Rationale: The intent of this control is to ensure the provider follows a formal softwaredevelopment process when creating safety-critical software, including all MOTS, GOTS, COTS,
open-source, library acquired, and reused software. Software assurance methods must extend
into the development environment as well. In order to secure the development environment, thefirst step is understanding all the devices and people who interact with it. Maintain an accurate
inventory of all people and assets that touch the development environment. Ensure strong multifactor authentication is used across the development environment, especially for code
repositories, as cyber actors may attempt to sneak malicious code into software that's being built
without being detected. Use zero-trust access controls to the code repositories where possible.
For example, ensure the main branches in repositories are protected from injecting malicious
code. A secure development environment requires change management, privilege management,
auditing, and in-depth monitoring across the environment. The objectives of the software
assurance and software safety activities include the following:
•

•
•
•

Ensuring that the processes, procedures, and products used to produce and sustain thesoftware conform to all specified requirements and standards that govern those
processes, procedures, and productso A set of activities that assess adherence to, and the adequacy of the software
processes used to develop and modify software productso A set of activities that define and assess the adequacy of software processes toprovide evidence that establishes confidence that the software processes areappropriate for and produce software products of suitable quality for their intended
purposes
Determining the degree of software quality obtained by the software products
Ensuring that the software systems are safe and that the software safety-criticalrequirements are followed
Ensuring that the software systems are secure

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Employing rigorous analysis and testing methodologies to identify objective evidence andconclusions to provide an independent assessment of critical products and processes
throughout the lifecycle

The software development process should include software requirements definition, design,
implementation, verification, maintenance, and retirement phases, and incorporate software
quality assurance, configuration management, problem reporting and corrective action, reliability,
maintainability, safety, verification and validation, certification, and operational use of the software.
Additionally, software reuse, commercial off the shelf dependence, and standardization of
onboard systems using building block approach with addition of open-source technology leads toa potential supply chain vulnerability that must be mitigated appropriately. See NPR 7150.2D,
NASA Software Engineering Requirements and NASA-STD-8739.8B, Software Assurance andSoftware Safety Standard. Lastly, the mission should perform software assurance via establishedprocedures and technical methods, including checking against NASA's Assessed and Cleared
List.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit
Vulnerabilities• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-02: Execution• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) CA-8, CM-3(2), CM-3(7),CM-3(8), CM-4, CM-5, CM-7(4), CM-7(5), CM-10, IR-4(10), IR-6(3), MA-3(6), PM-30, PM30(1), RA-3(1), SA-4(3), SA-10(1), SA-15, SA-15(5), SA-15(7), SA-15(8), SA-15(11), SA17, SA-20, SA-21, SI-2, SI-7, SR-1, SR-2, SR-3, SR-3(2), SR-3(3), SR-4(4), SR-7, SR-9
• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.2.2.7.2

MI-SOFT-02 Software and Hardware Testing Function

Principle: The mission should establish procedures and technical methods to perform end to end
testing to include negative testing (i.e., abuse cases) of the mission hardware and software as it
would be in an operating state (test as you fly).
Rationale: Negative testing and analysis are necessary to validate that the system architectureand security-focused design features provide adequate resilience against a range of potential
attacks. Where faulted testing is standard practice in the mission lifecycle, security cases should
be added to the set of potential anomalous scenarios to test. Operational anomaly response
training should include security events and exercise operational interfaces to institutional security
organizations.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit
Vulnerabilities• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-02: Execution• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) CA-8, CM-3(2), RA-5, RA5(2), RA-5(3), SA-3, SA-4(3), SA-11(1), SA-11(2), SA-11(4), SA-11(5), SA-11(6), SA-11(8),SA-11(9)• Addresses MITIGATE Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar

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3.3
GROUND
3.3.1

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Ground Background

Ground principles will be principles that are applicable to the ground infrastructure, laboratoryenvironment, or integrated ground architecture.
3.3.2

Principles and Associated Controls for Ground

This section provides the individual principles and associated controls related to the ground.
NASA’s ground systems are required be NPD/NPR 2810 to follow the NIST Risk Management
Framework and the controls as described by the ITS-Handbooks and policy. The common controls
and best practices below do not conflict with existing requirements, but they support the existing
ATO process as defined by NPD/NPR 2810.
3.3.2.1 Authentication and Authorization
3.3.2.1.1

GR-AUTH-01 Unique Identifiers for Authentication Function

Principle: The mission should provide the capability for each system to uniquely identify andauthenticate organizational users and computing processes acting on behalf of organizational
users.
Rationale: The mission should manage authenticators used to access information system
resources by verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual,group, role, device, or process (application, API, microservice) receiving the authenticator. Unique
identifiers and associated authenticators (passwords, multi-factor physical and virtual, securely
registered biometrics) and associated processes to verify entities at time of issuance andauthenticate entities at time of access request allow the mission to provide a risk-aligned level ofassurance that only vetted entities are allowed to access mission digital resources.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capabilities:o CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks
o CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactics:
o TAC-01: Initial Accesso TAC-02: Execution• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) IA-2(5), IA-2(8), IA-5
• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.3.2.1.2

GR-AUTH-02 Risk-informed Authorization for Non-Mission Users Function

Principle: The mission should use only verified identities when provisioning authenticators toorganizational users and processes acting on behalf of users.
Rationale: Mission users authorized to access mission computing resources pose a potential
additional risk compared to Agency mission users due to limited ability to fully vet and verify theirsuitability.

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This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical
Systems• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-04: Privilege Escalation• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) IA-4(4), IA-8, IA-10, PM-10,
PS-2, SI-4(19)• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.3.2.1.3

GR-AUTH-03 Secure Workload-to-Workload Authenticator Function

Principle: The mission should define policy and procedures to ensure that the developed ordelivered systems do not embed unencrypted static authenticators in applications, access scripts,
configuration files, nor store unencrypted static authenticators on function keys.
Rationale: The existence of insecure static authenticators, such as hardcoded plaintext
passwords or access tokens, can be discovered by cyber actors, brute forced, and reused acrossmultiple similar systems creating an opportunity for rapid widespread compromise within the
mission ground segment.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-01: Initial Access• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) IA-5(7)• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.3.2.2 Device Authentication
3.3.2.2.1

GR-DEVA-01 Computing Device Authentication Function

Principle: The mission should provide the capability to uniquely identify and authenticate all typesof computing devices, including mobile devices and network connected endpoint devices(including workstations, printers, servers, VoIP Phones, VTC CODECs) before establishing a
network connection.
Rationale: The mission should, in consultation with the system security engineers and the AO,
select the appropriate device identification and authentication mechanisms based on mission
needs and the strength of mechanism required in support of that mission.
Ensuring only devices known to and registered with the appropriate mission device inventory andmanagement platforms are allowed to access mission communications networks and are
regularly revalidated significantly reduces the increased risk due to unknown devices operating
within mission environments.
The mission should ensure that the inventory of information system components includes
minimally but not limited to: hardware specifications (manufacturer, type, model, serial number,
physical location), software and software license information, information system/component
owner, and for a networked component/device, the machine name.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capabilities: CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks
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Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactics: TAC-01: Initial Access
Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) IA-3, IA-3(1), CM-8
Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar

3.3.2.3 Integrity
3.3.2.3.1

GR-INTG-01 Software and Firmware Integrity Verification Function

Principle:• The mission should require developers of information systems, system components, orinformation system services to enable integrity verification of software and firmware
components prior to delivery and during mission operations• Each system operated by the mission should provide the capability to verify the integrityof mission-defined software, firmware, and information• The mission should provide and employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorizedchanges to mission-defined software, firmware, and information• The mission should define processes and procedures to be followed when integrity
verification tools detect unauthorized changes to mission-defined software, firmware, andinformation
Rationale: Cyber actors have adopted and are refining their capability to infiltrate software supply
chains and to modify or replace valid software and firmware with compromised versions. Integrity
verification via methods such as checking published hashes and proper validation of code signing
certificates are important capabilities for mitigation of these attacker tactics.
Integrity of software should be verified by employing a cryptographically secure hashing algorithm
to determine the hash (digest value) of the system (or software update package) being evaluated.
Additionally, the authenticity of the "control" or "reference" hash value, to which the system's hashis being compared, should also be signed using the private key of a cryptographic digital signature
to ensure that the control value was supplied by a legitimate, trusted entity. The reason for thisextra measure is that, in its absence, an attacker could modify the system being checked for
integrity and also make a corresponding modification to the control hash value so that thesubsequent integrity check still passes. This control aims to ensure that only legitimate entities
can supply control hash values for software and update packages.
The mission should have accountability of software/system components includes the system
name, software owners, software version numbers, software license information, and for
networked components, the machine names and network addresses across all implemented
protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). The Program should maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) forall software code utilized and continuously update/revise it for each step in the software lifecycle(to include the deployment of that software). The SBOM, as described in Executive Order 14028,“Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity,” encompasses the elements defined in the U.S.
Department of Commerce the minimum elements for an SBOM.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capabilities: CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit
Vulnerabilities• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactics: TAC-02: Execution

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Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) CM-4(1), CM-7(8), CM-8,
CM-14, RA-5, SA-10(1), SA-10(3), SA-10(4), SA-10(5), SA-10(6), SA-11(1), SA-11(2), SA11(4), SA-11(5), SA-11(6), SA-11(8), SA-11(9), SI-2, SI-3, SI-7
Addresses MITIGATE Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar

3.3.2.4 Malware Protection
3.3.2.4.1

GR-MALW-01 Malware Protection Function

Principle:• Mission operated systems should employ malicious code protection mechanisms:
o at information system entry and exit points
o on system components
o capable of performing real-time scans of files from external sources on endpoints
devices and at network entry/exit points as the files are downloaded, opened, or
executed in accordance with organizational security policy to detect and eradicate
malicious code including those inserted through the exploitation of information
system vulnerabilities.
•

Missions should incorporate the results from malicious code analysis into organizational
incident response and flaw remediation processes

Rationale: Cyber actors utilize the execution of malicious code on mission systems to gain afoothold in the environment from which to gain persistence and carry out additional tactics to meettheir campaign goals.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capabilities: CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit
Vulnerabilities• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactics: TAC-02: Execution• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AC-4(14), AC-4(15), CM-11,
IR-4(12), RA-5, SC-8(4), SC-18(5), SC-35, SC-44, SI-3, SI-7
• Addresses MITIGATE Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.3.2.5 Multi-Factor Authentication
3.3.2.5.1

GR-MFA-01 Risk-informed Use of Multi-Factor Authentication Function

Principle: The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to implement MultiFactor Authentication of a specific level of assurance.
Rationale: Multi-Factor Authentication provides an additional level of assurance to interdict cyberactors who have already compromised a given user’s password. In the case of strong, phishingresistant MFA certain cyber actor techniques such as man-in-the-middle can be effectively
mitigated. In each of the following situations MFA should be employed:• network access to privileged accounts• network access to non-privileged accounts• network access to applications and services• local access to privileged accounts

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local access to non-privileged accounts

This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capabilities: CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactics: TAC-04: Privilege Escalation• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) IA-2(1), IA-2(2)• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.3.2.6 Monitoring
3.3.2.6.1

GR-MON-01 Unique Identifiers for Authentication Function

Principle: The mission should define the indicators of users (including those categorized asprivileged users) posing a significant risk in a mission-specific context.
Rationale: The mission should use these indicators on contextual information to monitor for user
actions that collectively indicate a further investigation by security analysts is warranted andtriggered. Credential compromise and insider threat can both result in actions that appear to meetbasic access policy and pass standard technical controls. Monitoring for anomalies in user
behavior allows for earlier detection of these cyber actor tactics. This control focuses on the Zero
Trust eXtended Ecosystem element of PEOPLE.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capabilities: CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactics: TAC-05: Evasion• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AC-2(12), AC-2(13), AT-2(2),AT-2(4), CA-2(2), IR-4(6), IR-4(7), IR-4(13), PM-12, SI-4(19), SI-4(20)• Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.3.2.6.2

GR-MON-02 Risk-informed Authorization for Non-Mission Users Function

Principle: The mission should design for capabilities to detect inappropriate or malicious activity
within the mission’s systems as soon as possible and provide alerts upon detection.
Rationale:• Early detection of cyber actor activity on end user devices and hosts running workloads is
critical to limiting the impact of those activities as closely to their initial point of entry.
Therefore, the mission should provide the capability for each system owner to provide
mission-defined host-based monitoring mechanisms on mission-defined information
system components.
• Monitoring information systems at the operating system and workload/application level isoften the last line of defense against cyber actor activities design to impact mission
capabilities in the form of exfiltration of, denial of access to, or modification of mission
critical data and its support for business/production processes. Therefore, the mission
should: monitor the use of information system accounts; provide the capability for eachsystem owner to identify unauthorized use of the information system through missiondefined techniques and methods; and provide the capability for each system owner todetect network services that have not been authorized or approved by mission-defined
authorization or approval processes.

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This control focuses on the Zero Trust eXtended Ecosystem element of DEVICES andWORKLOADS.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability:o CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities
o CAP-03: Ability to Defeat Cryptography and Authentication• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic:o TAC-02: Executiono TAC-05: Evasion• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AC-2(3), AC-2(4), AC-2(6),AC-2(11), AC-2(12), AC-2(13), SA-4(9), SA-9(2), SI-4, SI-4(22), SI-4(23)• Addresses MITIGATE Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.3.2.6.3

GR-MON-03 Network and Communications Monitoring Function

Principle: The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to monitor
communications at the external boundary of the system and at mission critical internal boundaries
within the system.
Rationale: The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to allow for enterpriselevel monitoring for unauthorized local network connections. The mission should make provisions
so that program-defined encrypted communications traffic is visible to mission-defined information
system monitoring tools. The mission should provide the capability for each system owner toanalyze collected outbound communications traffic to identify anomalies. The mission should
provide the capability for each system owner to monitor inbound and outbound communications
traffic continuously for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions. Early detection of cyberactor command and control communications, attempts to explore or move laterally within theenvironment, or to exfiltrate data require comprehensive network and communications monitoring
and analysis. This control focuses on the Zero Trust eXtended Ecosystem element of
NETWORKS.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-04: Command and Control
Sophistication• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-09: Command and Control• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) SC-7, SC-31, SI-4, SI-4(4),SI-4(10), SI-4(11), SI-4(15), SI-4(18)• Addresses MITIGATE Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.3.2.6.4

GR-MON-04 Cyber Activity Response and Reporting Function

Principle: The mission should develop parameters to describe normal activities on the network
for accessing and controlling mission applications and capabilities in a manner that allows security
operations incident response and leadership to make effective decisions about resource
allocation and risk management.
Rationale:
These parameters should guide decisions about where and when to employ automated response
and reporting mechanisms

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Normal network activity parameters should be developed by security analysts and mission
experts working together to describe quantitatively what currently known patterns of
network traffic look like. These parameters can be used to craft automated rules to trigger
alerts and changes to network security controls.
Automated alerting that brings high-quality information of possible cyber actor activities
directly to the attention of security analysts is a critical capability required to tighten theloop between initial access by cyber actors and the containment, eradication, and recovery
response activities. Therefore, the mission should employ automated mechanisms to alert
security personnel of anomalous, inappropriate, or unusual activities with security
implications that meet a certain threshold of confidence and potential impact based on
analysis.
Regular and systematic reporting of internally developed threat intelligence allows for theappropriate adjustments to mission-wide risk thresholds and risk response decisions.
Therefore, the mission should report identified indications of mission-defined inappropriate
or unusual activity to mission-defined personnel or role.

This control focuses on the Zero Trust eXtended Ecosystem element of AUTOMATION and
REPORTING.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capability: CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactic: TAC-01: Initial Access• Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AU-6, SI-4(12), SI-4(14)• Addresses MITIGATE and RECOVER Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
3.3.2.7 Software Restriction
3.3.2.7.1

GR-SOFT-01 Software Installation Function

Principle: The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to configure the flightand ground system to require a user to possess an explicit identified privilege to install software.
Rationale: The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to configure the flightand ground system to prevent the installation or upgrades to software and firmware without
verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized, has
not been revoked, and is approved by the organization. The mission should provide the capability
for each system owner to configure the flight and ground system to prevent mission execution inaccordance with mission-defined policies regarding software mission usage and restrictions. The
mission should enforce software installation policies through mission-defined methods (such asa centrally managed application whitelisting capability) managed by software development,
procurement, deployment, configuration, patching, and retirement processes].
Cyber actor attack sequences which rely on end users to trigger installation of malicious software
can be interdicted by controls which validate and restrict operating system, browser, application,and other software installation.
This Principle Addresses These Controls:• Addresses Primary Threat Actor Capabilities: CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit
Vulnerabilities• Interdicts Earliest Threat Actor Tactics: TAC-02: Execution

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Addresses NIST 800-53, Revision 5, cybersecurity control(s) AC-3(12), CM-2, CM-3(3),CM-7(6), CM-7(2), CM-11, CM-11(2), CM-11(3), CM-14, SI-7(12), SI-7(15)Addresses PREVENT Space Mission Security and Protection Pillar
A. APPENDIX A – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Acronym

AC
AO
API
ATO
ATT&CK
BPG
CA
CAP
CJCSI
CND
COMSEC
COOP
DOD
DODI
EPB
EPP
ESDMD
FIPS
FOD
GB
GSFC
GNSS
GP
IA
IA
ICS
IPv4
IPv6
IR
ITAR
JPL
KPP
MA
MCC
MFA
MITRE
NASA
NIST
NPD
NPR
OCE

Term
Access Control
Authorizing Official
Application Programming Interface
Authorization to Operate
Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge
Best Practices Guide
Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring (NIST 800.53)
Capability
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Computer Network
COMmunications SECurity
COntinuity of OPerations
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Instruction
Enterprise Protection Board
Enterprise Protection Program
Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate
Federal Information Processing Standard
Flight Operations Directorate
Guide Book
Goddard Space Flight Center
Global Navigation Satellite System
Gateway Payload
Information Assurance
Identification and Authentication (NIST 800.53)
Industrial Control Systems
Internet Protocol version 4Internet Protocol version 6
Incident Response
International Traffic in Arms Regulations
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Key Performance Parameter
Maintenance
Mission Control Center
Multi-Factor Authentication
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research and Engineering
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Institute of Standards and Technology
NASA Policy Directive
NASA Procedural Requirement
Office of the Chief Engineer

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Acronym
Term
OCIO
Office of the Chief Information Officer
OPSEC
OPerational SECurity
OSMA
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
OT
Operational Technologies
PE
Physical and Environment Protection
PM
Program Management
PNT
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
RA
Risk Assessment
RFI
Radio Frequency Interference
SBOM
Software Bill of Materials
SC
System and Communications Protection
SI
System and Information Integrity
SMD
Science Mission Directorate
SOMDSpace Operations Mission Directorate
SR
Supply Chain Risk Management (NIST 800.53)
SSP
System Security Plan
STD
Standard
STMDSpace Technology Mission Directorate
TAC
TacticTOR
Terms of Reference
VoIP
Voice over Internet Protocol
VTC CODEC
Video TeleConferencing COmpression-Decompression

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B. APPENDIX B – PRINCIPLES IMPLEMENTATION MATRIXAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

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Principle
NumberPrinciple Title

Principle Statement

GV-RSK-01

Adaptive Risk Response & Resource Allocation Function

As a best practice the mission should establish a continuous process of qualitative and quantitative
mission security risk analysis and risk response for the duration of the mission.

MI-ARCH-01

Mission Least Privilege Function

The mission should establish and maintain a current and accurate data flow diagram covering
mission essential data flows, including those that pass-through mission-external service providers.

MI-ARCH-02

Mission Essential Data Flow Function

The mission should employ the principles of domain separation and least privilege for the on-board
architecture, communications, and control.

MI-AUTH-01

Boundary Protection Function

MI-AUTH-02

Comprehensive Authentication and Authorization Function

MI-INTG-01

Communications Survivability Function

The mission should be able to recover from communications jamming and spoofing attempts.

MI-INTG-02

PNT Survivability Function

The mission should be able to recover from positioning, navigation, and timing jamming andspoofing attempts.

MI-SOFT-01

Software Mission Assurance Function

The mission should perform software assurance via established procedures and technical methods.

MI-SOFT-02

Software and Hardware Testing Function

The mission should establish procedures and technical methods to perform end to end testing toinclude negative testing (i.e., abuse cases) of the mission hardware and software as it would be inan operating state (test as you fly).
The mission system software updates should be validated as free from malware prior to
deployment, launch, and at defined regular intervals while the mission is in operations.

Mission Software, Programmable Logic Devices, and
MI-MALW-02
Firmware Integrity Function

The mission should establish and verify the integrity of its software images.

MI-DCO-01

Mission Adversarial Actions Detection Function

The mission should incorporate an on-board adversarial actions detection function in its
requirements and resulting system.

MI-DCO-02

Mission Fault Management

The mission should incorporate fault management bypass protection in its requirements andresulting system.

MI-MA-01

Mission Recovery Function

The mission should include intentional disruptions consistent with the mission threat analysis inanomaly detection, response, and recovery plans and designs in the flight segment and groundsegment.

MI-MA-02

Cyber-Safe State Function

The mission should design secure vehicle fault management functions and safe mode operations.

GR-AUTH-02 Risk-informed Authorization for Non-Program Users Function
GR-AUTH-03 Secure Workload-to-Workload Authenticator Function

Verification/Validation of Implementation

The mission should provide the capability for each system to uniquely identify and authenticate
organizational users and computing processes acting on behalf of organizational users.
The mission should use only verified identities when provisioning authenticators to organizational
users and processes acting on behalf of users.
The mission should define policy and procedures to ensure that the developed or delivered systems
do not embed unencrypted static authenticators in applications, access scripts, configuration files,
nor store unencrypted static authenticators on function keys.

GR-DEVA-01

Computing Device Authentication Function

The mission should provide the capability to uniquely identify and authenticate all types ofcomputing devices, including mobile devices and network connected endpoint devices (including
workstations, printers, servers, VoIP Phones, VTC CODECs) before establishing a network connection.
The mission should require developers of information systems, system components, or information
system services to enable integrity verification of software and firmware components prior todelivery and during mission operations.

GR-INTG-01

Software and Firmware Integrity Verification Function

Each system operated by the mission should provide the capability to verify the integrity of missiondefined software, firmware, and information.
The mission should provide and employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes
to mission-defined software, firmware, and information.
The mission should define processes and procedures to be followed when integrity verification
tools detect unauthorized changes to mission-defined software, firmware, and information.

GR-MALW-01 Malware Protection Function

Implementable
Yes/NoThe mission should establish a mediated access mechanism that prevents unauthorized access tocritical subsystems in the space segment.
The mission should ensure only authenticated and authorized personnel, devices, and software areallowed to access the space mission system.

MI-MALW-01 Mission Malware Protection Function

GR-AUTH-01 Unique Identifiers for Authentication Function

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Mission operated systems should employ malicious code protection mechanisms:• at information system entry and exit points• on system components• capable of performing real-time scans of files from external sources on endpoints devices and at
network entry/exit points as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance withorganizational security policy to detect and eradicate malicious code including those inserted
through the exploitation of information system vulnerabilities
The mission should incorporate the results from malicious code analysis into organizational
incident response and flaw remediation processes.
The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to implement Multi-Factor
Authentication of a specific level of assurance.
The mission should define the indicators of users (including those categorized as privileged users)
posing a significant risk in a mission-specific context.
The mission should design for capabilities to detect inappropriate or malicious activity within the
mission’s systems as soon as possible and provide alerts upon detection.
The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to monitor communications at theexternal boundary of the system and at mission critical internal boundaries within the system.

GR-MFA-01

Risk-informed Use of Multi-Factor Authentication Function

GR-MON-01

Unique Identifiers for Authentication Function

GR-MON-02

System-based Monitoring & Alerting Function

GR-MON-03

Network and Communications Monitoring Function

GR-MON-04

Threat Activity Response & Reporting Function

The mission should develop parameters to describe normal activities on the network for accessing
and controlling mission applications and capabilities in a manner that allows security operations
incident response and leadership to make effective decisions about resource allocation and risk
management.

GR-SOFT-01

Software Installation Function

The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to configure the system to require
a user to possess an explicit identified privilege to install software.

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If Not Able to Implement
What Would It Take

Comments

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C. APPENDIX C – NASA STANDARD 1006 W/ CHANGE 1
Latest version can be found at: https://standards.nasa.gov/standard/NASA/NASA-STD-1006

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D. APPENDIX D – NIST 800-53 REV 5 APPLICABLE CONTROLSAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

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APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE)$)/ -*)) /$)".4./ (.#1 /# - ,0$.$/ 0/#*-$5/$*).?$9 962-$/ Revision: Rev A
Release 18 OCT 2023
Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG) .++)-,'-#"&$#

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Document No: SS BPG
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APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Revision: Rev A
Release 18 OCT 2023
Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG) .++)-,'-#"&$#

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APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Revision: Rev A
Release 18 OCT 2023
Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG) .++)-,'-#"&$#

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Document No: SS BPG
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APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Revision: Rev A
Release 18 OCT 2023
Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG) .++)-,'-#"&$#

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<H6<HE6<FJ6 <I6 <L6<H6<I6<J6<FE6<FF*)

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Revision: Rev A
Release 18 OCT 2023
Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG)

E. APPENDIX E – LIST OF PRINCIPLESAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Document No: SS BPG
Page: 54 of 57

Revision: Rev A
Release 18 OCT 2023
Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG)
Principle

Principle Title

GV-RSK-01

Adaptive Risk Response & Resource Allocation Function

MI-ARCH-01

Mission Least Privilege Function

MI-ARCH-02

Mission Essential Data Flow Function

MI-AUTH-01

Boundary Protection Function

MI-AUTH-02

MI-DCO-01

Comprehensive Authentication and Authorization Function

Mission Adversarial Actions Detection Function

Principle Statement

Threat Actor Capability/Capabilities Addressed

As a best practice the mission should establish a continuous process of qualitative and quantitative
All Capabilities
mission security risk analysis and risk response for the duration of the mission.
The mission should establish and maintain a current and accurate data flow diagram covering
CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities
mission essential data flows, including those that pass-through mission-external service providers.
The mission should employ the principles of domain separation and least privilege for the on-board
CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks
architecture, communications, and control.

Document No: SS BPG
Page: 55 of 57

Threat Actor Tactics Interdicted

NIST 800-53 Rev 5 Controls

Space Protection Pillar(s) Addressed

All Tactics

PM-9, PM-28, RA-7

All Pillars

TAC-02: Execution

AC-4, AC-4(2), AC-4(3), AC-4(6), AC-4(21), CA-3, CA-3(6), SC-32

MITIGATE

TAC-07: Lateral Movement

AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, SA-8(14), SA-17(7), SC-3, SC-4, SC-6, SC-7(20), SC-7(21),SC-39, SI-17
SC-7, SC-7(3), SC-7(4), SC-7(5), SC-7(9), SC-7(10), SC-7(11), SC-7(12),SC-7(13), SC-7(14), SC-7(15), SC-7(16), SC-7(17), SC-7(18), SC-7(19),SC-7(20), SC-7(21), SC-7(22), SC-7(28), SC-7(29)PREVENTThe mission should establish a mediated access mechanism that prevents unauthorized access tocritical subsystems in the space segment.

CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks

TAC-12: Impact

The mission should ensure only authenticated and authorized personnel, devices, and software areallowed to access the space mission system.

• CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks• CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities• CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical Systems• CAP-07: Sophistication of Human Influence• TAC-01: Initial Access• TAC-02: Execution• TAC-04: Privilege Escalation

IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11, IA-12, PE-2, PE-3, PM-10,
SI-7(15)

PREVENT

TAC-01: Initial Access

AC-4(15), AU-2, AU-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-6, AU-8, AU-9, AU-14, CM-8(3),RA-5(7), SC-5(3), SC-7(9), SI-3(8), SI-4(1), SI-4(2), SI-4(4), SI-4(10),SI-4(11), SI-4(12), SI-4(13), SI-4(14), SI-4(15), SI-4(16), SI-4(17),SI-4(18), SI-4(19), SI-4(20), SI-4(22), SI-4(23), SI-4(24)MITIGATE

The mission should incorporate an on-board adversarial actions detection function in its
requirements and resulting system.

CAP-04: Command and Control Sophistication

PREVENT

MI-DCO-02

Mission Fault Management

The mission should incorporate fault management bypass protection in its requirements andresulting system.

CAP-04: Command and Control Sophistication

TAC-01: Initial Access

AC-4(15), AU-2, AU-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-6, AU-8, AU-9, AU-14, CM-8(3), RA5(7), SC-5(3), SC-7(9), SI-3(8), SI-4(1), SI-4(2), SI-4(4), SI-4(10),RECOVER
SI-4(11), SI-4(12), SI-4(13), SI-4(14), SI-4(15), SI-4(16), SI-4(17),SI-4(18), SI-4(19), SI-4(20), SI-4(22), SI-4(23), SI-4(24)MI-INTG-01

Communications Survivability Function

The mission should be able to recover from communications jamming and spoofing attempts.

CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical Systems

TAC-10: Inhibit Response Function

CP-8, SC-5, SC-8, SC-40, SC-40(1), SC-40(3), SI-10(3), SI-10(5), SI-10(6)RECOVER

MI-INTG-02

PNT Survivability Function

The mission should be able to recover from positioning, navigation, and timing jamming andspoofing attempts.

CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical Systems

TAC-10: Inhibit Response Function

AU-8, CP-8, SC-5, SC-40, SC-40(10), SC-40(3), SI-10(3), SI-10(4), SI-10(5),SI-10(6)

RECOVER

MI-MA-01

Mission Recovery Function

The mission should include intentional disruptions consistent with the mission threat analysis inanomaly detection, response, and recovery plans and designs in the flight segment and groundsegment.

CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical Systems

TAC-10: Inhibit Response Function

CP-2(5), IR-4, SA-8(24)RECOVER

MI-MA-02

Cyber-Safe State Function

The mission should design secure vehicle fault management functions and safe mode operations.

CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities

TAC-11: Impair Process Control

CP-12, SI-17, IR-4(3), IR-4(5)

RECOVERThe mission system software updates should be validated as free from malware prior to
deployment, launch, and at defined regular intervals while the mission is in operations.

CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical Systems

TAC-02: Execution

CM-4(1), CM-7(8), CM-14, RA-5, SA-10(1), SA-10(3), SA-10(4), SA-10(5),SA-10(6), SA-11(1), SA-11(2), SA-11(4), SA-11(5), SA-11(6), SA-11(8),SA-11(9), SI-2, SI-3, SI-71

MITIGATE

TAC-02: Execution

CM-4(1), CM-7(8), CM-14, RA-5, SA-10(1), SA-10(3), SA-10(4), SA-10(5),SA-10(6), SA-11(1), SA-11(2), SA-11(4), SA-11(5), SA-11(6), SA-11(8),SA-11(9), SI-2, SI-3, SI-7

MITIGATE

PREVENT

MI-MALW-01 Mission Malware Protection Function
Mission Software, Programmable Logic Devices, and Firmware
MI-MALW-02
Integrity Function

MI-SOFT-01

MI-SOFT-02

Software Mission Assurance Function

The mission should perform software assurance via established procedures and technical methods. CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities

TAC-02: Execution

Software and Hardware Testing Function

The mission should establish procedures and technical methods to perform end to end testing toinclude negative testing (i.e., abuse cases) of the mission hardware and software as it would be inan operating state (test as you fly).

CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities

TAC-02: Execution

CA-8, CM-3(2), RA-5, RA-5(2), RA-5(3), SA-3, SA-4(3), SA-11(1), SA-11(2),SA-11(4), SA-11(5), SA-11(6), SA-11(8), SA-11(9)MITIGATE• CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks• CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities• TAC-01: Initial Access• TAC-02: Execution

IA-2(5), IA-2(8), IA-5

PREVENT

CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical Systems

TAC-04: Privilege EscalationIA-4(4), IA-8, IA-10, PM-10, PS-2, SI-4(19)PREVENT

CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks

TAC-01: Initial Access

IA-5(7)

PREVENT

Computing Device Authentication Function

The mission should provide the capability to uniquely identify and authenticate all types ofcomputing devices, including mobile devices and network connected endpoint devices (including
CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks
workstations, printers, servers, VoIP Phones, VTC CODECs) before establishing a network connection.

TAC-01: Initial Access

IA-3, IA-3(1), CM-8

PREVENT

Software and Firmware Integrity Verification Function

The mission should require developers of information systems, system components, or information
system services to enable integrity verification of software and firmware components prior todelivery and during mission operations.
Each system operated by the mission should provide the capability to verify the integrity of missiondefined software, firmware, and information.
CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities
The mission should provide and employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes tomission-defined software, firmware, and information.
The mission should define processes and procedures to be followed when integrity verification tools
detect unauthorized changes to mission-defined software, firmware, and information.

TAC-02: Execution

CM-4(1), CM-7(8), CM-8, CM-14, RA-5, SA-10(1), SA-10(3), SA-10(4),SA-10(5), SA-10(6), SA-11(1), SA-11(2), SA-11(4), SA-11(5), SA-11(6),SA-11(8), SA-11(9), SI-2, SI-3, SI-7

MITIGATE

Mission operated systems should employ malicious code protection mechanisms:• at information system entry and exit points• on system components• capable of performing real-time scans of files from external sources on endpoints devices and at
network entry/exit points as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with
CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities
organizational security policy
to detect and eradicate malicious code including those inserted through the exploitation of
information system vulnerabilities
The mission should incorporate the results from malicious code analysis into organizational incident
response and flaw remediation processes.

TAC-02: Execution

AC-4(14), AC-4(15), CM-11, IR-4(12), RA-5, SC-8(4), SC-18(5), SC-35, SC-44,
MITIGATE
SI-3, SI-7

CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks

TAC-04: Privilege EscalationIA-2(1), IA-2(2)CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks

TAC-05: Evasion• CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities• CAP-03: Ability to Defeat Cryptography and Authentication• TAC-02: Execution• TAC-05: Evasion

AC-2(12), AC-2(13), AT-2(2), AT-2(4), CA-2(2), IR-4(6), IR-4(7), IR-4(13),PM-12, SI-4(19), SI-4(20)AC-2(3), AC-2(4), AC-2(6), AC-2(11), AC-2(12), AC-2(13), SA-4(9), SA-9(2),SI-4, SI-4(22), SI-4(23)CAP-04: Command and Control Sophistication

TAC-09: Command and Control

SC-7, SC-31, SI-4, SI-4(4), SI-4(10), SI-4(11), SI-4(15), SI-4(18)MITIGATE

CAP-01: Ability to Access Networks

TAC-01: Initial Access

AU-6, SI-4(12), SI-4(14)MITIGATE AND RECOVER

TAC-02: ExecutionAC-3(12), CM-2, CM-3(3), CM-7(6), CM-7(2), CM-11, CM-11(2),CM-11(3), CM-14, SI-7(12), SI-7(15)PREVENTGR-AUTH-02 Risk-informed Authorization for Non-Program Users Function
GR-AUTH-03 Secure Workload-to-Workload Authenticator Function

GR-INTG-01

CAP-05: Ability to Affect Cyber/Physical Systems

CA-8, CM-3(2), CM-3(7), CM-3(8), CM-4, CM-5, CM-7(4), CM-7(5), CM-10,
IR-4(10), IR-6(3), MA-3(6), PM-30, PM-30(1), RA-3(1), SR-1, SA-4(3),SA-10(1), SA-15, SA-15(5), SA-15(7), SA-15(8), SA-15(11), SA(17), SA-20,
SA-21, SI-2, SI-7, SR-9, SR-2, SR-3, SR-3(2)c, SR-3(3), SR-4(4), SR-7

GR-AUTH-01 Unique Identifiers for Authentication Function

GR-DEVA-01

The mission should establish and verify the integrity of its software images.

GR-MALW-01 Malware Protection Function

GR-MFA-01

Risk-informed Use of Multi-Factor Authentication Function

GR-MON-01

Unique Identifiers for Authentication Function

GR-MON-02

System-based Monitoring and Alerting Function

GR-MON-03

Network and Communications Monitoring Function

The mission should provide the capability for each system to uniquely identify and authenticate
organizational users and computing processes acting on behalf of organizational users.
The mission should use only verified identities when provisioning authenticators to organizational
users and processes acting on behalf of users.
The mission should define policy and procedures to ensure that the developed or delivered systems
do not embed unencrypted static authenticators in applications, access scripts, configuration files,
nor store unencrypted static authenticators on function keys.

The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to implement Multi-Factor
Authentication of a specific level of assurance.
The mission should define the indicators of users (including those categorized as privileged users)
posing a significant risk in a mission-specific context.
The mission should design for capabilities to detect inappropriate or malicious activity within the
mission’s systems as soon as possible and provide alerts upon detection.
The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to monitor communications at theexternal boundary of the system and at mission critical internal boundaries within the system.

GR-MON-04

Threat Activity Response and Reporting Function

The mission should develop parameters to describe normal activities on the network for accessing
and controlling mission applications and capabilities in a manner that allows security operations
incident response and leadership to make effective decisions about resource allocation and risk
management.

GR-SOFT-01

Software Installation Function

The mission should provide the capability for each system owner to configure the system to require
CAP-02: Ability to Discover and Exploit Vulnerabilities
a user to possess an explicit identified privilege to install software.

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASEPREVENTPREVENTMITIGATE

Revision: Rev A
Release 18 OCT 2023
Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG)

Document No: SS BPG
Page: 56 of 57

F. APPENDIX F – CHANGE REQUEST FORM

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Revision: Rev A
Release 18 OCT 2023
Title: Space Security: Best Practices Guide (BPG)

Document No: SS BPG
Page: 57 of 57

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APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE