Received: 11 October 2019
DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12544|

Revised: 25 January 2020|

Accepted: 3 March 2020

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Is the negative always that bad? Or how emotion regulation andintegration of negative memories can positively affect well-being
Iliane Houle| Frederick L. Philippe

Department of Psychology, University ofQuebec at Montreal, Montreal, QC, Canada
Correspondence
Iliane Houle, Department of Psychology,
University of Quebec at Montreal, P.O Box
8888, Station Centre-Ville, Montreal, QC
H3C 3P8, Canada.
Email: houle.iliane@courrier.uqam.ca
Funding information
Fonds de Recherche du Québec-Société etCulture; Fondation Marc Bourgie; Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Councilof Canada, Grant/Award Number: 4352012-1358

Abstract
Objective: The purpose of this study was to determine whether coherent integrationof negative memories into the self could positively predict well-being over time,
and whether certain emotion regulation strategies could facilitate this coherent integration. In turn, coherent integration of negative memories was expected to further
facilitate adaptive emotion regulation strategies over time.
Method: A total of 303 participants took part in this longitudinal study. At Phase 1,
they completed measures of emotion regulation and well-being. Three months later,
they described the memory of the most negative event they experienced since Phase 1,
and completed measures assessing its integration. One month later, participants­completed the well-being measures again, and another month later, their emotion
regulation was reassessed.
Results: Adaptive emotion regulation predicted adaptive memory integration, which
in turn led to increases in well-being and adaptive emotion regulation. Contrariwise,
the incapacity to adaptively regulate emotions predicted poor memory integration,
which in turn led to decreases in well-being.
Conclusion: The way people regulate their negative emotions acts as an individual
difference influencing how negative memories are integrated into the self, which canin return alter well-being and emotion regulation capacity over time.
KEYWORDS
emotion regulation, integration process, negative memories, well-being

1|

IN T RO D U C T ION

Difficult negative events are an integral part of every individual's existence. Since these negative events can be encodedin our memory system, the memory of a negative event
can be remembered for a very long time. Past research has
shown that negative memories can greatly influence people's
well-being. Indeed, when they are recalled, memories leadto a reexperience of the experiential components characterizing them (i.e., emotional charge, motivational properties,
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and this reexperience
impacts situational well-being. For instance, the conscious
Journal of Personality. 2020;88:965–977.

recall of a negative memory can lead to an immediate decrease in mood and well-being (Houle & Philippe, 2017;
Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, Lecours, & Lekes,2012). Moreover, memories can influence people's sense ofwell-being over time (Houle & Philippe, 2017; Milyavskaya,
Philippe, & Koestner, 2013; Philippe et al., 2012). In otherwords, a single negative memory can continue to constantly
influence and decrease well-being months after the event of
this memory has occurred (Philippe & Bernard-Desrosiers,
2017). However, some individuals have experienced a handful
number of negative events in their lives but they still, nevertheless, display a high level of well-being (e.g., Fredrickson,

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jopy© 2020 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003). Would it thus be possible
for negative memories to also positively influence people's
sense of well-being? What are the individual differences thatenable people to gain well-being from their negative memories, and how?
The present study is aimed at answering these questions
by looking at the way people integrate their negative memories into their self, as well as the influence of emotion regulation on this integration process. More precisely, the purposeof the study was to determine whether the manner, in whichmemories of past negative events are integrated into people's
self-concepts could in turn predict changes in well-being overtime. Additionally, we sought to establish whether emotion
regulation could represent an individual difference influencing the integration of negative memories, and whether thisintegration could also further influence emotion regulation in
return. This study will thus ascertain how the integration ofmemories of important negative events is the central tenantof an important feedback loop in the processing of negative
emotional situations, which can fuel well-being and build
more adaptive emotion regulation strategies. It will also underscore how certain emotion regulation strategies can sustain memory integration, a key process at the heart of theconstruction of the self.

1.1 | The integration of memories into theself and well-being
According to many authors, memories can play a fundamental role in the construction of people's self and identity (e.g.,
Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). Memory integration is theprocess that occurs when memories are integrated into theperson's self in a coherent way and this process can facilitate well-being. Indeed, the self-memory system (Conway& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) specifies that life events are initially encoded as episodic memories and can be integrated
into the autobiographical knowledge base and the conceptual
self when they link with other existing mental representations
at these levels. The impossibility to link emotional episodic
memories to the autobiographical knowledge base, becauseof conflicting information for instance, can lead to memory
intrusions (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004), that is, involuntary recalls of details of a negative past event (Brewin,1998). Self-determination theory (SDT: Ryan & Deci, 2017)
further specifies that memory integration occurs when individuals start by acknowledging and accepting aspects of
their past, present, and future. It then becomes possible forthem to bring these aspects into harmony within their identity
to form a coherent sense of self (Weinstein, Deci, & Ryan,
2011; Weinstein, Pryzbylski, & Ryan, 2013). The literaturethus suggests that individuals need to coherently integrate thememories of their past experiences to build a coherent sense

HOULE and PHILIPPE

of self and thereby gain well-being. More specifically, SDT
proposes that acceptance of a past experience is the first stepin this process and the self-memory system underscores thatmemory intrusions are a marker of poor memory integration.
Recent research by Kaap-Deeder and colleagues (2016)
empirically showed that acceptance and intrusion could be
distinguished, as the absence of poor integration is not a guaranty of the presence of adaptive integration. Corroborating
Weinstein and colleagues (2011), they showed that acceptance of a negative past event reflects an adaptive integration of negative memories. They also showed that intrusions
could serve as an independent indicator of poor integration,
as highlighted by other research (Ehlers & Clark, 2000;
Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005).
However, not all past experiences are equally easy to integrate. On the one hand, it is well known that memories of
positive events lead to greater mood and well-being when
they are recalled and over time (Houle & Philippe, 2017;
Philippe & Bernard-Desrosiers, 2017; Philippe et al., 2012),
and people are generally willing to acknowledge and accept
positive memories and integrate them into their self, as they
are not usually self-threatening (Weinstein et al., 2011).
Negative memories, on the other hand, are typically more difficult to integrate than positive memories because they can beparticularly painful to remember (Gillihan, Kessler, & Farah,
2007; Philippe et al., 2012) and can reflect aspects of people's identity with which they are not happy about and thatthey do not necessarily want to accept (Pals, 2006; Weinstein
et al., 2011). However, not only negative events are inevitable
and constitute an integral part of human life, but the memories of these negative events are also often more likely thanpositive ones to provide people with a sense of meaning andto lead to greater psychological growth (McLean & Thorne,
2003; Pals, 2006). For instance, memories of past conflicts
have been found to be associated with gaining insights about
one's life, as well as learning important lessons (McLean &Thorne, 2003). In this sense, it seems crucial to better understand how negative memories, through their coherent integration into people's self, can promote well-being and growth,rather than only lead to the adverse outcomes they are moreusually associated with.
Research has indeed shown that integration of negative
memories was associated with well-being (Weinstein et al.,2011), life satisfaction, maturity, wisdom, and ego-resiliency(Pals, 2006). Unfortunately, most of the existing studies on
the integration of negative memories have only investigatedmemories of distant past events, and the designs used were
mostly cross-sectional or assessed well-being at only one time
point, thus, limiting our understanding of the direction of theeffect. In response to this, several memory researchers haveunderscored the importance of conducting longitudinal studies to disentangle how this memory integration process canlead to changes in people's well-being over time (McAdams

HOULE and PHILIPPE& McLean, 2013; Pals & McAdams, 2011). Accordingly, we
propose to longitudinally investigate whether adaptive versus poor integration of negative memories can indeed predictchanges in well-being. Moreover, we also sought to determine what individual differences could influence this adaptive versus poor negative memory integration.

1.2 | Regulation of negative
emotions and the integration ofnegative memories
While the literature seems clear on the idea that adequate integration of negative memories should facilitate well-being
over time, the factors influencing memory integration are
not very well known. We suggest that the way people process and regulate their emotions and the negative events theyexperience is likely to alter the way they will encode these
events in memory and thereby affect how they will integratethese memories into their self.
Recent research in the field of SDT (Ryan & Deci, 2017)
has suggested that regulation of negative emotions can influence how people process and experience negative andself-threatening experiences (Roth et al., 2014; Ryan et al.,2006). Furthermore, several SDT authors have proposed thatthe capacity to regulate, process, and make sense of emotional experiences, particularly the negative ones, is central towell-being (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2001). They insist, like manyother emotion theorists (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Gross, 2015), thatnegative emotions are essential informational inputs, which
can guide people's actions, but also contribute to psychological growth (Ryan & Deci, 2017). Accordingly, negative
emotions need to be acknowledged, taken into account, andadaptively regulated, rather than denied or suppressed. The
emotion regulation model proposed by SDT focuses on threedifferent styles of emotion regulation: integrative regulation,
dysregulation, and controlling regulation (Roth et al., 2014).
Integrative regulation refers to a more adaptive emotion
regulation style. It is characterized by Openness, interest, andtolerance toward new emotional material or situation, even if
they are self-threatening (Roth et al., 2014; Ryan et al., 2006).
Thus, people who present an integrative regulation style are
more able to experience negative emotions and events without being defensive, and should in turn adaptively reflect on
their negative experiences and use the memories of thoseexperiences to facilitate their psychological well-being andgrowth over time. Past studies have shown that integrative
emotion regulation was related to more volitional and lessdefensive functioning when participants were instructed toreflect and write about an induced self-threatening situation(Roth et al., 2014).
Dysregulation is characterized by a lack of capacity toadequately and effectively regulate negative emotions, and

  

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by an emotional overflow when facing new negative experiences. People who present this style can be unable to function
or perform as usual when they are confronted by emotionalsituations (Roth et al., 2014). As negative experiences arehighly self-threatening for them, they should be less capable to reflect on them, and the recall of memories of such
experiences should be each time highly emotionally disturbing, which should lead to decreases in well-being overtime.
Dysregulation has been found to be related to defensivenesswhen participants were instructed to reflect on an induced
self-threatening situation (Roth et al., 2014).
Controlling regulation is characterized by a rigid intolerance toward negative emotions and situations, and by a strong
desire to hide, ignore, and suppress any negative emotions
that could be experienced (Roth et al., 2014). Accordingly,
individuals with a controlling regulation style should not
be able to acknowledge and elaborate past negative events.
Empirically, controlling regulation has also been found to berelated to defensiveness and emotional suppression following
an induced self-threatening situation (Roth et al., 2014).
We, therefore, argue that the way individuals regulate
their negative emotions can influence how they process thenegative events they experience, and thus, have an impact on
how they will encode, integrate into their memory system,
and remember the memories of these past events. More specifically, we propose that the regulation of negative emotions
can affect individuals’ capacities to adaptively integrate their
negative memories into their self.
Researchers have indeed suggested that an adaptive integrative process first requires nondefensiveness toward emotions and emotional material (Roth & Assor, 2010; Weinstein,
Przybylski, & Ryan, 2013). Accordingly, integrative emotion
regulation, which is a more adaptive regulation style associated with Openness, interest, and acknowledgment of negative experiences, should facilitate the acceptance and theintegration of negative memories into the self. Contrariwise,
dysregulation, which is characterized by a lack of emotion
regulation capacities and emotional overflow, should leadto poor memory integration, notably emotional memory intrusions. Finally, controlling regulation is associated with adesire to suppress and repress negative emotions and with adenial of negative experiences. As such, people with a controlling regulation style should not be able to accept and adaptively integrate their negative memories, as they are not evencapable of acknowledging them. However, because they deny
and repress negative situations and their emotional charge,
these individuals are unlikely to report memory intrusions.
Weinstein and colleagues (2011, 2013) have also suggested the existence of the reverse effect by proposing thatthe integrative process could positively affect self-regulationand lead to a greater capacity to adaptively regulate emotions.
Furthermore, past studies have shown that memories are frequently used as resources to guide people's emotions when

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HOULE and PHILIPPE

confronted by novel and self-threatening situations (Philippe,
Koestner, Lecours, Beaulieu-Pelletier, & Bois, 2011;
Philippe, Lecours, & Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2009), and that they
can facilitate emotional Openness (Houle, Philippe, Lecours,& Roulez, 2017; Pillemer, 2003). We, therefore, argue that amore coherent and adaptive integration of negative memories
should in return facilitate people's capacities to regulate theiremotions and predict improvements in emotion regulation
over time.

2|

TH E P R E S E N T ST U DY

The present study had three purposes. First, we sought todetermine whether regulation of negative emotions could
represent an individual difference impacting adaptive versus
poor integration of negative memories. Second, we aimed
at verifying whether adaptive versus poor memory integration could in turn predict changes in people's well-being overtime. The third purpose was to establish whether adaptive
memory integration could ultimately facilitate the adoptionof a more adaptive and integrative emotion regulation on thelong-term.
To assess changes in well-being and emotion regulation
over time, a longitudinal design in four phases was used. At
Phase 1, participants completed self-report scales assessing
well-being and emotion regulation strategies of negative
emotions. Three months later, at Phase 2, they described thememory of the most negative event they had experienced
since Phase 1, rated it for valence and significance, and completed measures assessing the integration of this memory.
Following Kaap-Deeder, Vansteenkiste, Petegem, Raes, andSoenens (2016), we assessed integration of the past negative
event with the two indicators discussed in the Introduction;
acceptance and intrusion. One month later, at Phase 3, participants completed again the well-being measures assessedat Phase 1 and, at Phase 4, another month later, they wereadministered the measure of emotion regulation once more.
In the present longitudinal design, emotion regulation andwell-being were assessed before the event of the negative
memory even occurred: they were thus not influenced by thisevent. Consequently, the present design could better capture
the influence of a specific negative memory integration onchanges in well-being and emotion regulation.

2.1|

Purpose 1

Determine whether emotion regulation can impact negative
memories' integration.
1a Integrative emotion regulation was expected to positively
predict acceptance of the negative event memory (anindicator of adaptive integration). Integrative regulation
was also expected to either be unrelated or negatively
related to intrusions of the negative event memory (anindicator of poor integration).
1b Dysregulation was hypothesized to positively predictmemory intrusions and to either be unrelated or to negatively predict memory acceptance.
1c As controlling regulation is characterized by a desire to
suppress and ignore negative emotions and situations, thisemotion regulation style was expected to be either not related or negatively related to acceptance, and to be either
not related or positively related to intrusions.

|

2.2

Purpose 2

Verify whether memory integration can predict changes inwell-being over time.
2a Memory acceptance was hypothesized to predict an increase in well-being over time.
2b Contrariwise, memory intrusions were expected to predicta decrease in well-being.

|

2.3

Purpose 3

Assess whether memory integration can in turn alter emotion
regulation over time.
3a Memory acceptance was expected to predict an increasein the level of integrative emotion regulation over time.
3b Intrusions were hypothesized to predict an increase in dysregulation over time.
All the above hypotheses were expected to hold while
controlling for memory valence and significance. These variables were used to control for potential differences of importance and negativity in participants’ reported memories.

3
3.1

|

M ETHOD|

Participants

A Monte Carlo analysis was performed to determine the required sample size. Given the longitudinal nature of the study
and the small effect sizes expected, we judged that a minimum power of .70 was sufficient. Based on past studies on
the influence of memories on well-being over time (Philippe& Bernard-Desrosiers, 2017; Philippe et al., 2012), standardized regression coefficients between .15 and .20 were
expected for each of the associations we hypothesized. The  

HOULE and PHILIPPE

stability of the variables assessed at different phases (autoregressive coefficients) was expected to be between .60 and.70 over 4 or 5 months. The analysis unveiled that a sample
size of 300 participants would yield power between .70 and.91 to detect significant coefficients between .15 and .20 for
all the hypothesized associations. Accordingly, a total of 303(80% female) community-dwelling participants (n = 239)
and graduate/undergraduate students (n = 64) took part in the
study. Their age ranged from 18 to 81 years old (M = 35.68,
SD = 14.51). Given the longitudinal design and the multiple assessments, there was 16% of missing data over thefour phases of the study. However, Little's MCAR test was
nonsignificant: χ(17) = 11.54, p = .82. This suggested thatthe missing data patterns were not dependent of any othervariables of the study. Hence, the model was analyzed using
maximum likelihood under MCAR as estimation method(Little & Rubin, 2002) with Mplus 7.3.

3.2
3.2.1

|

Measures: Phase 1|

Well-being

Five scales were used to assess well-being. The Satisfaction
with Life Scale (SWLS: Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin,1985) measured hedonic well-being (7-point scale, ranging
from 1 to 7), a short version of the Psychological Well-Being
Scale (PWB; Ryff & Keyes, 1995) measured eudaimonic
well-being (7-point scale, ranging from 1 to 7), a short 13item version of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck
& Beck, 1972) measured depressive symptoms (4-point
scale, ranging from 0 to 3), a short 6-item version of the Beck
Anxiety Inventory (BAI: Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer,1988) measured participants’ subjective state of anxiety (4point scale, ranging from 0 to 3), and the 10-item Symptom
Checklist (SCL-10R: Rosen et al., 2000) measured various
psychological symptoms (5-point scale, ranging from 0 to 4).
All these scales have been previously used together in an
index of well-being (e.g., Philippe & Bernard-Desrosiers,
2017; Philippe, Dobbin, Ross, & Houle, 2017). Moreover,a factorial analysis, using Maximum Likelihood, revealed
one factor (eigenvalue: 3.38) in the present study data. All
scales loaded on a single factor of well-being, with all factor loadings >.61. Accordingly, the scales were standardized
and averaged in a single index of well-being. Alpha was .88
at Phase 1.

3.2.2 | Emotion regulation ofnegative emotions
Emotion regulation of negative emotions was assessed withthe scale developed by Roth and colleagues (2009, 2014).

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This scale has been used in previous studies and demonstrated adequate evidence of validity and reliability in various
samples (Eilot, Assor, & Roth, 2006; Roth, Assor, Niemiec,
Ryan, & Deci, 2009, Roth & Assor, 2012; Roth et al., 2014;
Roth, Shane, & Kanat-Maymon, 2017). Participants indicatedtheir degree of agreement with 20 items, regarding the way
they generally perceive and experience negative emotions.
Ratings were made on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = disagreestrongly; 7 = agree strongly). The original scale evaluatedthe regulation of a specific emotion (e.g., fear). However, as
we were interested in a broader emotional range, we slightly
adapted the items so they would measure the regulation ofnegative emotions in general, by replacing the word “fear”
with “negative emotions.” An integrative emotion regulation
subscale was assessed by seven items, and a sample item was“Sometimes, feeling negative emotions helps me to understand important things about myself.” A dysregulation subscale was assessed by six items, and a sample item was “Ioften behave under the influence of my negative emotions,even if I don't want to behave like that.” Finally, a controlling
regulation subscale was assessed by seven items, and a sample
item was “Usually, I ignore my negative emotions.” To confirm the structure of this adapted scale, a confirmatory factor
analysis was conducted with Robust Maximum Likelihood as
estimation method. The model included three latent variables(Integrative regulation, Dysregulation, and Controlling regulation), each comprising six or seven items. The model also
estimated six covariances among the measurement errors of
the items that were similarly formulated. Fit indices weresatisfactory: Satorra–Bentler χ2 = 344.79, df = 161, p < .01,
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .93, Root Mean Square Errorof Approximation (RMSEA) = .06 [.05; .07], Standardized
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .08. Factor loadings
were all significant and ranged from .45 to .87 for integrative
regulation, from .49 to .89 for dysregulation, and from .52 to.86 for controlling regulation. Alphas were .88 for integrative regulation, .85 for dysregulation, and .89 for controlling
regulation.

3.3
3.3.1

|

Measures: Phase 2|

Negative memory

Instructions were adapted from previous studies on memories(Philippe et al., 2012; Singer & Salovey, 1993). Participants
were invited to describe:
A personal memory of the most negative eventthat you experienced since this study's firstphase (about three months ago), which is significant (important) for you. Describe generally what happened, where it happened, who

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HOULE and PHILIPPE

you were with (if anyone), and how you andother people reacted. What was your role andwhat were the consequences of your reaction and/or your behavior during this event?
Provide enough details so we can understandwhat happened, like if you had to tell it tosomeone.
Participants described their memory in a provided textbox and there was no length limit. A total of 35.30% of thememories described by participants were about major interpersonal conflict (e.g., two former spouses having a major
conflict regarding who should have the legal custody of theirchild), 23.10% were about a substantial stress (e.g., a woman
whose husband has been recently sentenced to 2 years ofprison, while they were trying to have a child), 14.50% wereabout one's own physical or psychological illness or the oneof a significant other (e.g., a person who received a diagnosis
of fibromyalgia), 13.90% were about a significant loss (e.g.,
unexpected breakup after 10 years of marriage), 8.60% wereabout an important failure (e.g., a person who performed
poorly at a job interview and did not get the job), 2.00% wereabout a disturbing social event (e.g., a shooting at a mosquelocated in the person's neighborhood), and finally, 2.30% of
the memories described were about more minor unpleasantevents (e.g., a person bored by her job).

3.3.2

|

Negative memory valence

Participants were asked to rate the personal valence of theevent they described on a 7-point Likert scale (–3 = very
negative; +3 = very positive).

3.3.3

|

Negative memory significanceThe significance of the negative event memory was assessedwith a single item: “To what extent the negative event you
just described is significant (important) for you?”, rated on a
5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very).

3.3.4 | Negative memory adaptive
integration: AcceptanceFour items were used to measure acceptance of the negative
event described (Kaap-Deeder et al., 2016; Weinstein et al.,2011). Ratings were made on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). Sample
items were “I accept the experience I had” and “I embracethat this event is a part of my past.” Alpha was .83 for acceptance in this study.

3.3.5 | Negative memory poor
integration: Intrusion
The intrusion subscale of the Impact of event scale (Horowitz,
Wilner, & Alvarez, 1979) assessed intrusions related to thenegative event. Five items were used and participants rated
the extent to which they experienced each difficulty presented, in relation to the negative memory they described.
Ratings were made on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1(Not at all) to 5 (Often). Sample items were “I thought about
it when I didn't mean to” and “Other things kept making me
think about it.” Alpha was .90.

3.4|

Measures: Phase 3

|

3.4.1

Well-being

The same measures of well-being used at Phase 1 were administrated once more to the participants. Alpha was .87 at
Phase 3.

3.5|

Measures: Phase 4

3.5.1 | Emotion regulation ofnegative emotions
The measure of emotion regulation was completed again
in Phase 4. Alphas at Phase 4 were .90 for integrative emotion regulation, .81 for dysregulation, and .92 for controlling
regulation.1

3.6|

Procedure

The community-dwelling participants were randomly selected from a compiled list of people interested to participate in studies in psychology recruited across various
public areas on the Island of Montreal (Canada), and were
contacted through the email they provided when they subscribed to the list. The graduate/undergraduate students
were randomly selected from a list of students from various departments, and were recruited through their university email. All participants were invited to take part in astudy of four phases about negative memories and wellbeing. At Phase 1, participants completed an online questionnaire, in which they responded to diverse measures ofwell-being, and a measure of emotion regulation. About
3 months later (M = 2.70 months, SD = 20.71 days),2 they
were contacted again and completed an online questionnaire, in which they were asked to describe the memoryof the most negative event they experienced since the first

−.34**−.22**.04−.15**−.16**
.01
.73**
.01
−.31**−.19****p < .01.

*p < .05;

Note: n = 303. Range stands for the possible range of the Likert scale used.

1–7
3.41
Controlling regulation, Phase 4 (12)

1.85

–
−.07
−.50**.32**−.34**
−.11
.05
−.07
.72**
.06
−.46**
1–7
3.82
Dysregulation, Phase 4 (11)

1.50

−.05
.35**

.45**
.15**

.10
.15**

−.13*
−.19**−.31**−.13*−.54**
.23**

.78**
.31**

.87**
Z-score1–7.93Integrative regulation, Phase 4 (10)

.81
.00

5.70

Well-being, Phase 3 (9)––−.41**−.33**.40**−.16**.41 **−.01−.18**−.27**

.29**
−.05

.21**
.39**

−.32**
1–5

1–7

2.70
Intrusion (8)

1.41
5.04
Acceptance (7)1.17–−.18**
−.13*
−.10
.09
.14*
−3 to + 3
1.31
−1.92
Negative memory valence (6)

–
−.04

–
−.03

.04
.11

−.38**−.21**

−.11
1–5

1–7

4.00
Negative memory significance (5)

1.03

3.53
Controlling regulation, Phase 1 (4)

1.77

–
−.04

–
.19**

−.54**
1–7

1–7

3.91
Dysregulation, Phase 1 (3)

.93
5.59
Integrative regulation, Phase 1 (2)1.68–
Z-score.83.00
Well-being, Phase 1 (1)−.40**

–

.31**

–

10
9
8
7
5
4
3
2
1
Range
SD
M

Table 1 reports means, standard deviations, and correlational results of all study variables. To determine the impact of emotion regulation on memory integration, and theeffect of this memory integration on changes in well-being
and emotion regulation over time, a path analysis was conducted. In the model, well-being at Phase 1 was used as
an exogenous variable, to control for the initial level ofwell-being and to model changes in well-being over time.
The three emotion regulation styles (integrative regulation,
dysregulation, and controlling regulation) were also modeled as exogenous variables. These exogenous variables
were modeled to predict acceptance and intrusion of thenegative memory, as assessed 3 months later. The valence
and the significance of the memory were also included in
the model at this level as control variables. Covariancesamong Phase 2's variables (acceptance, intrusion, memory significance, and valence) were added to the model.
Well-being at Phase 3 was modeled to be predicted by acceptance, intrusion, significance, and valence. Finally, thethree emotion regulation styles measured at Phase 4 weremodeled as endogenous variables and placed at the end of
the model. All possible paths were initially estimated in themodel, yielding a just-identified model.
Figure 1 shows the final model. To facilitate its comprehension, only significant paths (p < .05) were includedin the figure, and the covariances among the variables assessed at Phase 2 were also excluded. However, these covariances were all significant at p < .01 (coefficients >.37 and<−.15). Regarding our first purpose, which was to determine
whether emotion regulation could influence the integrationof negative memories, results unveiled that our three hypotheses were generally confirmed. Indeed, integrative emotion
regulation at Phase 1 positively predicted acceptance of thenegative memory and its significance. Contrariwise, dysregulation at Phase 1 positively predicted memory intrusions,

6

R E S U LTS

Means, standard deviations, and correlations|

TABLE 14

11phase of the study. They reported how many weeks had
passed since the occurrence of the event of their memory
to ensure that all participants followed the instructions anddescribed the memory of an event that occurred after Phase
1. Afterward, they rated this negative memory for valence,
significance, acceptance, and intrusion. About a month
later, (M = 1.30 months, SD = 7.18 days), at Phase 3, they
completed the same well-being measures assessed at Phase
1. Finally, about one more month later (M = 1.47 months,
SD = 10.10 days), participants responded to the fourthphase of the study, and filled the emotion regulation measure again.3 As an incentive, at each phase completed, they
were entered into a draw for three prizes of $100, for a totalof four draws of three prizes.

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Phase 1

Phase 23 months

Memoryvalence.291 monthIntegrative
regulation

.72**

*
.20*

**

.75*
*

.12*

Acceptance

.09*

4*
- .2
*

- .1

*
-17

Dysregulation

Phase 4

1 month

Well-being

Integrative
regulation

Phase 32*

Well-being

*

-.15

*

.14*
Intrusion.16*

Dysregulation

.60**

*

*
-.23

.13
MemorysignificanceControlling
regulation.71**

Controlling
regulation

F I G U R E 1 Path analysis displaying the effects of emotion regulation (integrative regulation, dysregulation, and controlling regulation)
on negative memory's acceptance, intrusion, valence, and significance, and the effects of acceptance and intrusion on changes in well-being andemotion regulation over time. n = 303, *p < .05, **p < .01. Non-significant path coefficients are not shown for the sake of clarity, as well as
covariances among memory's acceptance, intrusion, valence. These covariances were all significant at p < .01 (coefficients >.37 and <−.15)

and controlling regulation was not associated with any indicator of memory integration. Additionally, well-being at
Phase 1 was positively related to acceptance and negatively
to intrusions and significance. Thus, it appears that emotion
regulation actually corresponds to an individual difference
impacting the way people integrate their negative memories,
since integrative regulation led to more adaptive integrationof the negative memory, whereas dysregulation led to poorer
memory integration. These associations were also independent of participants’ baseline level of well-being at the beginning of the study.
Concerning our second purpose, which was to investigate whether memory integration could predict changes inwell-being over time, results revealed that our two hypotheses were supported. Indeed, acceptance of the negative memory positively predicted increases in well-being at Phase 3.
Conversely, intrusions predicted decreases in well-being at
Phase 3. Well-being at Phase 1 was also positively associatedwith well-being at Phase 3. These results were obtained while
controlling for the chosen memory's valence and significance. Thus, the way people integrate their negative memories seems to be a key factor influencing their well-being overthe following months.
Regarding our third purpose, which was to assess whether
memory integration could in turn affect emotion regulation
over time, results revealed that acceptance effectively led to
an increase in integrative regulation at Phase 4. An unexpected result was that acceptance also predicted decreases indysregulation at Phase 4. Thus, adaptive memory integration
facilitated adaptive emotion regulation over time, not only
by increasing integrative regulation, but also by additionallydecreasing dysregulation. Integrative regulation at Phase
1 was positively related to integrative regulation at Phase4, while dysregulation at Phase 1 was positively related todysregulation at Phase 4. However, a surprising finding wasthat integrative regulation at Phase 1 led to an increase in  

HOULE and PHILIPPE

TABLE 2

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Bootstrap estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the indirect effects tested in the model
Unstandardized estimates

95% confidence intervals

Standardized estimates

Integrative regulation (P1) → Acceptance → WB (P3).067[.005; .192].011

Dysregulation (P1) → Intrusion → WB (P3)−.088[−.207; −.019]−.019

Integrative regulation (P1) → Acceptance→ Integrative regulation (P4).025[.002; .060].025

Integrative regulation (P1) → Acceptance→ Dysregulation (P4)−.024[−.072; −.001]−.018

Note: WB = Well-being; P1 = Phase 1; P3 = Phase 3; P4 = Phase 4.

dysregulation at Phase 4 as well. Yet, as shown in Table 1,
these two variables were not correlated, and this increase
appears to be the product of a suppression effect.4 Contrary
to what we expected, memory intrusions were not related toincreases in dysregulation at Phase 4. Acceptance of a negative memory thus appears to be the favored process throughwhich memory integration can facilitate more adaptive emotion regulation over time.
An additional finding was that controlling regulation at
Phase 4 was positively predicted by controlling regulation at
Phase 1, but was also negatively predicted by well-being at
Phase 3. Therefore, higher level of well-being at Phase 3 wasassociated with a decrease in the use of controlling regulation
strategies over time.5
To evaluate whether the indirect effects of integrative regulation and dysregulation on well-being at Phase 3 and on
emotion regulation at Phase 4 were significant, bootstrapping
analyses were performed, using 5,000 resamples. Table 2
presents the results. All 95% confidence intervals excluded
the value zero, hence indicating that all the indirect effects
tested were significant at p < .05. More specifically, integrative regulation at Phase 1 indirectly increased well-being at Phase 3, through its effect on memory acceptance.
Conversely, dysregulation at Phase 1 indirectly decreased
well-being at Phase 3, through its impact on memory intrusions. Moreover, integrative regulation at Phase 1 indirectly
increased integrative regulation at Phase 4 and indirectly decreased dysregulation at Phase 4, through its effect on memory acceptance.

5|

D IS C U SSION

The purpose of the present study was to determine whether
negative emotion regulation strategies could influence how
people can integrate memories of past negative events into
their self, and how this memory integration could in turn predict changes in well-being and emotion regulation over time.
Results evinced that participants who presented an integrative emotion regulation style reported more significant negative memories, but also reported higher acceptance of thenegative event they described in their memory. In turn, thismemory acceptance led to an increase in participants' wellbeing over time. Acceptance of the negative memory also
predicted an increase in integrative emotion regulation overtime, as well as a decrease in dysregulation. Contrariwise,
participants with a dysregulation style reported experiencing
more intrusions related to their negative memory, and thispoorer memory integration led in turn to a decrease in theirwell-being over time. Finally, controlling regulation was not
associated with memory integration, neither adaptive nor
maladaptive.

5.1 | Emotion regulation as an individual
difference influencing memory integration
The present study is one of the first to explore the individual
differences influencing the integration of negative memories.
The results suggest that emotion regulation is a key factor
influencing whether individuals adaptively or poorly integrate into their self the negative past events they experienced.
Indeed, it seems that the capacity to fully acknowledge andbe open to negative emotions and events can provide people
with greater reflexivity toward these events and the negative
emotions experienced, without perceiving these events as
self-threatening. Consequently, they can more readily accept
the negative events they experienced and recognize them as
an important and normal component of their lives, which can
inform them about themselves and the world they live in.
Contrariwise, poorer emotion regulation capacities canlead individuals to feel overwhelmed by negative emotions
and situations. This emotional overflow appears to obstruct
the processing of negative events and to provoke memory intrusions. Researchers have suggested that intrusive traumatic
memories can serve an emotional processing function, suchthat the intrusion would be a way for the person to relive an
overwhelming event in an attempt to make more sense ofwhat happened (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Krans,
Naring, Becker, & Holmes, 2009). Hence, it is possible that,for dysregulated people, intrusions sought to facilitate abetter processing and comprehension of the negative event

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|   

experienced, in order to overcome the emotional overflow
associated with it. However, many studies, such as the present one, have shown that even though intrusions may attempt
to serve this emotional processing function, they are usuallyassociated with negative outcomes on the long-term, such as
severe psychological symptoms (for an overview, see Brewin,
Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010). In the end, it thus appears that intrusions are generally more deleterious for the
person than adaptive.
Finally, the suppression and repression of negative emotions seems to prevent both acceptance and intrusions related
to the memories of negative events. At the short-term level,
controlling regulation may be more adaptive than dysregulation in terms of preventing symptoms (low well-being) andperhaps limit the emotional pain associated with the emotional overflow that accompanies dysregulation. However,this denial of negative emotions and situations leads individuals to completely ignore an important part of what theyexperience, which prevents the formation of a coherent andflexible self. Over time, the chronic use of suppression is
likely to lead to an impoverish self and hinder psychological
growth, as shown by the negative cross-sectional association
between controlling regulation and well-being. Our study
thus provides additional evidence concerning the importanceof acknowledging and taking into account negative emotions,as adaptive regulation of these emotions can facilitate the acceptance and integration of the negative events we experiencein our everyday life.
Another concept that seems closely related to emotion regulation and integration in SDT is motivation, and more precisely autonomous motivation. Indeed, autonomy has beenshown to correlate with greater self-awareness (Weinstein,
Przybylski, & Ryan, 2012), emotional Openness and receptivity (Hodgins & Knee, 2002). Roth and colleagues (2019)
have also recently proposed that integrative emotion regulation is associated with volitional functioning and could be facilitated by a more autonomy-supportive environment. Thus,
motivation and emotion regulation appear to show similar
patterns in people, and could be two different avenues facilitating the integration of negative memories into the self.
Future research could investigate whether they would eachindependently predict memory integration over time.

5.2 | The integration of negative memories
can predict changes in well-being
The present results are the first, to our knowledge, to establish that the adaptive versus poor integration of a personal
negative memory can predict changes in well-being overtime. Indeed, past research has only suggested that the integration of a negative memory from a distant past was correlated with greater well-being and maturity. Our longitudinal

HOULE and PHILIPPE

study investigated changes in well-being over time instilledby memory integration, and thereby showed that the integration of negative recent events can impact people's level ofwell-being on the long-term.
On the one hand, adaptive negative memory integration
increased participants’ well-being. Indeed, negative situations and events can reveal important information to people
about themselves and others, which can allow them to learn
and grow from these negative events over time (McLean &Thorne, 2003; Pals, 2006). Therefore, if individuals are able
to accept, reflect on, and thus, integrate past negative experiences—rather than only perceive them as a threat for theself—it becomes possible to gain a sense of well-being fromthese experiences.
On the other hand, poor integration of a negative memory led to decreases in well-being over time. Literature on
memories proposes that the frequent and repetitive recall ofa negative memory can lead to frequent decreases in positive mood, which can, in turn, over time, negatively affectone's stable sense of well-being (Adler, Philippe, LodiSmith, & Houle, 2016; Houle & Philippe, 2017; Philippe
et al., 2012). Additionally, many authors have suggested
that intrusive memories are difficult to incorporate into
the person's autobiographical knowledge, which is the partof the self which represents the conceptual knowledge theperson has about one's life, such as general events, lifetime
periods, and important life themes and goals (Conway &Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer, et al., 2004). It is
this autobiographical knowledge that acts to attenuate theprompt activation of memories by various environmental
cues (Conway, Meares, et al., 2004). Since intrusive memories are often not embedded and contextualized in the autobiographical knowledge (or only weakly), they are moreeasily and frequently activated by the environment (Ehlers,
Hackmann, & Michael, 2004). Thus, negative memories
that are not coherently integrated into the person's self are
more likely to be frequently recalled, to reactivate the negative emotions experienced during the initial event, andthereby to frequently induce mood decreases and ultimately
reduce well-being over time. Overall, our results highlightthat people can experience many negative events in theirlives, but if they adaptively and coherently integrate theminto their self, they can ultimately gain well-being throughthem. This finding may underscore an important mechanism through which resilience operates (Fredrickson et al.,2003).
Although the longitudinal design of the present researchallowed us to highlight the directionality of the hypothesized
effects, memory integration could still be a proxy for a third
variable. Hence the present findings cannot confirm causality. Future research with experimental designs will be needed
to manipulate memory integration and confirm its effect on
well-being.

HOULE and PHILIPPE

5.3 | Memory integration can influenceemotion regulation strategies over time
Another important finding of the present research is that
adaptive integration of negative memories appears to facilitate the adoption of a more adaptive and flexible emotion regulation style on the long-term. To this day, very few studies
have assessed the impact of memories on emotion regulationand none, to our knowledge, has investigated how a specificpersonal memory could lead to changes in emotion regulation over time.
The present findings suggest that the capacity to accept
and integrate negative memories into a coherent sense of self
can provide individuals with greater capabilities to cope withnegative situations and to regulate their negative emotions on
the long-term. Memories can indeed serve as resources onto
which people can rely on to guide their emotions, thoughts,
and behaviors when facing new situations (Houle & Philippe,
2017; Philippe et al., 2009, 2011; Pillemer, 2003). In fact,
memories of past events represent a useful source of information about the possible consequences associated with experiencing negative emotions and situations. If a person has beenable in the past to adaptively regulate his/her emotions in a difficult situation and to afterward accept and integrate this eventand grow from it, this person can then assume that positive
consequences can ultimately emerge from negative events.
This could, therefore, enhance interest and Openness toward
negative emotions and situations in the future. Hence, there
appears to be a feedback loop between emotion regulation andmemory integration: a more adaptive emotion regulation style
can lead to a more adaptive memory integration, which canin return lead to even more adaptive emotion regulation. Thishighlights how memories of past events can influence the way
people process emotional information in the present.
However, intrusions related to negative memories did notpredict an increase in dysregulation over time as we expected.
It thus seems that the capacity to process and accept negative
past events is more substantial in the prediction of changes
in emotion regulation over time than poor integration ofnegative memories. However, even though the memories described in our study were subject to intrusions, they were notspecifically traumatic memories. Consequently, it is possiblethat the impact of intrusions on emotion regulation over time
could have been dampened. Research on traumatic intrusive
memories would be needed to better capture the effect thatpoor memory integration and intrusions can have on changes
in emotion regulation over time.

6|

L IM ITAT ION S

Some limitations of the present study need to be underscored. First, the present findings need to be generalized with

  

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caution, as there were more females than males in our sample. In addition, females might have been more interested inparticipating in a study on negative memories than males,thus, creating a self-selection bias. Second, the design of thisstudy was built to assess changes in well-being and participants described a negative memory that occurred after the
first phase of the study. While this memory's significanceand valence were controlled for in the analyses, it is possible that the memories assessed were not as central to participants' self than some other older negative memories. As
such, the memories assessed in this study could have beenless difficult to adaptively integrate, as compared to more
self-central ones. However, on average, participants rated
their memory as quite significant for them (see Table 1),
and the memories described were generally about significant
themes—we can thus reasonably presume that the memories
reported were fairly important and central for the majorityof the participants. Third, we did not control in our analyses
for the arousal of the memory, which could have played arole in the results obtained. Arousal has indeed been found tohave an impact on how an event is recalled (Smith, Bibi, &Sheard, 2003), but the effect that memory arousal can haveon general well-being over time remains unknown. Future
research could investigate this association. Fourth, all scales
used in the present study were self-reported. It is possiblethat individuals who wanted to suppress and deny their negative emotions and the negative events they experienced werebiased in their evaluation of their own capacities to regulate
their emotions, as well as of their acceptance of a past negative event. Future research could be conducted with indirect
measures of emotion regulation and memory acceptation to
overcome this limitation.
In sum, the present study is the first to establish that theway people regulate their negative emotions represents animportant individual difference influencing how they will
adaptively or poorly integrate negative memories into theirself. Moreover, it demonstrates that this integration of negative memories can in turn lead to changes in well-being
and emotion regulation strategies over time. Accordingly, itsuggests that the negative is indeed not always that bad, as
individuals can gain well-being from the negative events theyexperience, provided that they are able to acknowledge andbe open to these experiences, in order to adaptively integratethem into a coherent sense of self.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and publication of this article: Preparation of this manuscript was supported by a grantfrom the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
435-2012-1358 awarded to the second author and by scholarships from the Fonds de Recherche du Québec—Société etCulture, from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research

976

|   

Council, and from the Fondation Marc Bourgie awarded to
the first author.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest withrespect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of thisarticle.
ORCID
Iliane Houle
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8490-6592
Frederick L. Philippe
https://orcid.
org/0000-0001-6997-8072
ENDNOTES
1

At each phase, following the measures described above, a few additional measures were also assessed, but were not analyzed in thepresent study (e.g., networked memories).

2

At each phase, we sent one invitation to participants, and then,emailed two reminders to the non-respondents at an interval of one
week. Therefore, the average period of time between Phases 1 and 2
was three months, but respondents could complete Phase 2 up to a
maximum of one month after the first invitation. This strategy wasused to maximally reduce attrition.

3

All questionnaires were completed in French, using validated French
versions of each scale. The only scale that was not already validated
in French was the acceptance scale of four items, which we translatedusing a back translation method (Vallerand, 1989).

4

An alternative explanation is that since integrative regulation is characterized by openness and interest toward negative emotions, it canthereby lead individuals to fully experience negative emotions. In
cases where such an openness does not lead to more acceptance of anegative event and to greater well-being over time, the person could
start to perceive this event as self-threatening, which could increase
dysregulation over time. Accordingly, we tested the significance of
the interaction between integrative regulation and acceptance, but theresult of this interaction was not significant. Thus, this alternative
explanation seems unlikely.

5

The same model was tested again with only the significant paths. Fit
indices for this model were satisfactory: (29) = 32.91, ns; CFI = 1.00;
RMSEA = .02 [.00; .05]; SRMR = .04. The results of this simplified
model were virtually the same as the full-identified model.

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How to cite this article: Houle I, Philippe FL. Is thenegative always that bad? Or how emotion regulationand integration of negative memories can positively
affect well-being. J Pers. 2020;88:965–977. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12544