Mental States Task (MST): Development, Validation, and Correlatesof a Self-Report Measure of Mentalization
Genevieve Beaulieu-Pelletier,1 Marc-André Bouchard,1 and Frederick L. Philippe2
12

University of Montreal
University of Quebec at Montreal

Objectives:

Mental states refer to the quality of one’s capacity to mentally elaborate and open up
to his or her subjective experience. The Mental States Task (MST) was developed to evaluate individual
differences relative to this capacity. Method:
Using the MST, participants described a story froman emotionally challenging image and responded to a set of items about their cognitive and emotional
processes while completing the task. The validation of the French version of the MST comprises
two samples: 264 undergraduate/graduate students with a mean age of 27.27 years (Sample 1), and206 students with a mean age of 26.61 years (Sample 2). The validation of the English version of
the MST also includes two samples: 110 undergraduate students with a mean age of 20.15 years(Sample 3) and 188 students with a mean age of 20.90 years (Sample 4). Results: Results suggestthat 6 mental states can be distinguished and that the MST presents an adequate factorial structure,in both its French and English versions. The MST scores were associated with mental state scoresderived from a content analysis method and with other related constructs (e.g., authenticity, empathy).
Conclusions: Overall, findings provide convincing evidence of validity and reliability for the MST
as an assessment tool of mental states. This innovative measure is likely to facilitate the clinical and
C 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J. Clin. Psychol. 69:671–695,
empirical investigation of mentalization. 
2013.
Keywords: mental states; mentalization; emotional regulation; mental elaboration; Mental States Task
(MST)

Background
Mentalization refers to a process of mental representation, elaboration, and interpretation of
one’s and others’ mental contents (e.g., beliefs, motives, emotions, intentions, desires, and needs)
and of openness towards these (e.g., Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Bouchard & Lecours, 2008;
Fonagy, 2008). Such a process facilitates accurate inferences about one’s and others’ subjective
experience that underpin everyday behaviors, to make sense of those behaviors. Mentalizing thus
helps to organize the subjective experience elicited by encountered situations.
The mental states model (Bouchard, Audet, Picard, Carrier, & Milcent, 2001; Bouchard
et al., 2008) is an empirical model of mentalization that has recently been developed. According
to this model, the different qualities of mentalization are determined by differences in one’s
mental states—that is, one’s attitudes toward one’s own and others’ subjective experience in thehere-and-now moment. The quality of mental states is believed to depend on (a) a register ofmental representations sensitive to cues from the body and the environment and (b) a modulator
system. More precisely, a situation encountered is assumed to trigger specific clusters of mental
representations that get activated in memory, as well as their associated affective components(Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009;
Philippe, Lecours, & Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2009). These activated clusters of mental representations
differ in their level of elaboration (i.e., a high or low number of representations and associations,more or less densely connected).

Please address correspondence to: Genevieve Beaulieu-Pelletier, Department of Psychology, Universityof Montreal, P. O. Box. 6128, Station Centre-ville, Montreal (Quebec), Canada, H3C 3J7. E-mail:genevieve.beaulieu-pelletier@umontreal.ca
JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 69(7), 671–695 (2013)
Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jclp).

C 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
DOI: 10.1002/jclp.21942

672

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

A second process serves regulatory purposes by modulating one’s degree of conscious openness to the content of the mental representations activated and to their related affective components. Different defensive and regulatory strategies can be used to limit one’s openness to thepotentially threatening affective and representational contents (e.g., inhibiting, restraining, orreappraising the subjective experience).
These two processes—representation/elaboration and openness/modulation—are part ofseveral theoretical and empirical models (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Hofmann,
Friese, & Strack, 2009; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). These models share the general assumptionthat one mental process is largely in charge of the automatic activation of mental representations
and their associated affective components, while another secondary process modulates theiractivity level. The interactions between these two processes can yield different mental statesthat are theoretically identified according to an increasingly reflective continuum ranging fromlow- to high-mental state quality (Bouchard et al., 2001): concrete thinking, low defensive level,intermediate defensive level, objective-rational, high defensive level, and reflective thinking.

Concrete Thinking
Concrete thinking represents an important defect in representation and elaboration of thesubjective experience (e.g., few mental representations and associations) in that there is a lackof connection to emotional experiences and low awareness of one’s mental contents. The person
does not necessarily defend himself against emotional and mental contents, but does not possess
the adequate level of representational capacities to interpret and integrate them.

Low Defensive Level
The subject is emotionally overwhelmed by his or her activated representational contents andunable to make sense of it. The subjective experience is perceived as threatening, preventing theperson from an adequate elaboration of and openness to the experience. The mental contents
are defended against through immature defenses (e.g., splitting, distortion, acting out), which
are usually associated with the borderline personality organization or with psychological (e.g.,
Nickel & Egle, 2006; Perry & Hoglend, 1998) and interpersonal maladjustment (e.g., Bullitt &Farber, 2002; Ungerer, Waters, Barnett, & Dolby, 1997).

Intermediate Defensive Level
The recognition and elaboration of the representational contents are impeded as the person
obliterates a part of his or her subjective experience or downplays the personal meaning andemotional expression of a recognized experience. Defenses of denial, minimization, disavowal,
or emotional suppression are used to deal with the experience. These kinds of defenses involve
failure to acknowledge one’s and others’ distressing emotions and difficulties, which leads tointerpersonal maladjustment (Gross & John, 2003; Ungerer et al., 1997).

Objective-Rational
The subjective experience is treated with an objectifying attitude (third-person perspective).
Although there is some recognition and elaboration of the representational contents at play, theperson takes distance from his or her subjective experience. The main focus is on objective andexternal facts and situations (public and observable aspects) and not on the emotional, private,
and subjective aspects. This emotional distance can be beneficial, such as when observing andanalyzing one’s and others’ experience in a neutral or objective manner, which could be adaptive
in some contexts (e.g., problem solving, intellectual tasks). However, it may also impoverish
one’s interpersonal relationships and lead to an impaired empathic connection.

Mental States Task

673

High Defensive Level
A first movement of elaboration and openness to the true subjective experience is present,
but defended against in a second movement of retraction, using more mature defenses(e.g., repression, reaction formation, undoing, altruism) and adaptive emotional regulation
strategies such as reappraisal (e.g., a positive reevaluation of a difficult experience or a happily ending story (King, Scollon, Ramsey, & Williams, 2000). Mature defense mechanisms havebeen shown to predict reduced psychological symptoms (e.g., Bouchard et al., 2008; Dauphin
et al., 2010; Perry & Hoglend, 1998; Vaillant, 1992) and enhanced psychological and physicalwell-being (e.g., Vaillant, Bond, & Vaillant, 1986; Vaillant, 1992).

Reflective Thinking
Reflective thinking is the capacity to recognize, elaborate, and be aware of and moved by thefull subjective experience of the moment, of either the self or the other. It relies on some level ofmetacognitive capacity, including self-reflection and self-understanding. Expression of emotions
are toned down, clear, and differentiated. Reflective thinking is associated with a relative absenceof immature defenses and with some use of mature defensive and emotional regulation strategies(e.g., self-observation, anticipation, humor).
Overall, concrete thinking and low defensive level and intermediate defensive level mental
states represent “lower” mental states according to the reflective continuum, as they are all
expected to be associated with less mature and less adaptive consequences. Conversely, highdefensive level and reflective thinking represent “higher” mental states, as they are expected
to be associated with more mature and adaptive consequences. The objective-rational mental
state falls in-between these two broad categories, being associated with both adaptive and lessadaptive consequences depending on the characteristics of the situation encountered.
One construct that is closely related to mental states is that of defense mechanisms. However,three aspects distinguish these constructs. First, some mental states do not involve defense
mechanisms per se. Concrete thinking, for instance, involves no particular defense mechanism,
but rather a defect in one’s representational capacities.
Second, mental states transcend defense mechanisms; they may be tainted by defense mechanisms, but they also reflect several other psychological processes. For instance, mental states
include both the quality of the activated mental representations and the modulation of these
representations. Defense mechanisms do not reflect the quality of mental representations, as they
only become operative to help the person protect against self-threatening mental contents (e.g.,
Cramer, 1998; Davidson & MacGregor, 1998). In addition, the modulation activity includes not
only defense mechanisms but also the effect of coping and emotional regulation processes, alongwith the person’s current mindset with respect to the situation encountered. Therefore, mental
states result from various psychological processes and reflect one’s mental organization relative
to the situation encountered.
Third, mental states are situation-based, whereas defense mechanisms are typically measured
as a general tendency or dispositional concept (Chaplin, John, & Goldberg, 1988; Cramer, 1998;
Davidson & MacGregor, 1998). Indeed, mental states correspond to one’s immediate mental
attitude toward a precise situation or theme (e.g., a tendency to be emotionally overwhelmed
and to use splitting when confronted with the theme of loss), whereas defense mechanisms
represent one’s general defensive style (e.g., using splitting across diverse situations). As such,mental states may reflect general defense mechanisms actualized in a situational context, whilestill representing a different construct.

Mental States Rating System
Derived from the mental states model, the Mental States Rating System content analysis (MSRS;Bouchard et al., 2001) was developed to measure these mental states (for a review on thedevelopment of the MSRS, see Bouchard et al., 2008). The MSRS is a content analysis methodthat identifies the six main mental states described above within written material or transcriptions

674

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013of spontaneous reactions to various situations (Goldfeld et al., 2008). Mental states are inferredfrom the material by experts and scored according to criteria corresponding to each mental statecategory (see Bouchard et al., 2001).
In one study, participants at risk of developing alcoholism were classified with the MSRS
as either predominantly reflective or nonreflective. Scores on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Testsuggested that the reflective group presented better impulse control and presumably superior
executive functions relative to the nonreflective group (Lepadatu, 2003). Other studies using the
MSRS revealed that the quality of mental states was negatively associated with psychologicalsymptoms in clinical and nonclinical populations (Bouchard et al., 2008; Dauphin et al., 2010)
and with childhood trauma (Dauphin et al., 2010). Finally, a recent study indicated that thequality of mental states was moderately positively associated with emotional intelligence, including social functioning, social skills, empathy, stress tolerance, and impulse control (Tremblay,
Bouchard, Lecours, & Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2011).
Although the MSRS is a rich and promising method to measure mental states, it presents
some disadvantages in its application. Indeed, the MSRS scoring method requires judges withcompetent clinical judgment (including reflectivity) and extensive training (more than 50 hoursof training with experienced judges). In addition, the rating is time-consuming in that every
sentence and discourse sequence needs to be coded from extensive written material or interviews
transcribed verbatim. These issues limit the accessibility of this measure to both researchers andclinicians and point to the necessity to create a more practical instrument.
A first attempt to develop a self-report questionnaire based on the mental states model was
made by Goldfeld and colleagues (2008). Although convergent correlation indices between theoriginal observer-rated MSRS and the self-report assessment were partially encouraging, thisself-report measure was designed for psychotherapists, thus supposing some basic mentalizing
capacity and the use of a highly specialized language. The purpose of the present study wasto create a new self-report instrument evaluating mental states that would be suitable for thegeneral population.
Such an instrument would be particularly useful in clinical settings, notably for patients’ diagnosis and evaluation (e.g., evaluation of therapeutic indications and progresses; understandingof the patient’s mental functioning; identifying the potential repercussions of the mental states
endorsed). It could also prove very useful for clinicians (e.g., self-evaluation of one’s own psychic functioning relative to different issues; evaluation of these issues and of their evolution
in supervision/formation; exploration of therapeutic impasses according to the mental states
held by the clinician during sessions). Two studies were thus conducted to create and validatea practical task and a self-report to measure mental states modalities, both in French (Study 1)
and in English (Study 2).

Study 1The purpose of Study 1 was to develop a task, called the Mental States Task (MST), based on
the mental states model and the MSRS content analysis. Exploratory and confirmatory factor
analyses were used to validate the factorial structure of the MST. In addition, scores obtainedwith the original MSRS content analysis were compared with those obtained with the MST.
It was hypothesized that these scores would be moderately positively associated. Convergent
validity was further assessed with measures of openness to subjective experience (authenticity,
mindfulness, and empathy), defense mechanisms, emotional dysregulation (alexithymia), psychological adjustment (psychological and physical symptoms, life satisfaction, self-esteem, andborderline traits), and quality of emotional experiences (emotional traits, emotions elicited after
the MST completion, and enjoyment of the task).
It was hypothesized that concrete thinking would be negatively associated with openness toexperience, reflective emotions elicited by the task (e.g., interest), and enjoyment of the task, asconcrete thinking presents a lack of connection with conscious emotional experiences and a low
awareness of mental contents. Concrete thinking was not expected to be associated with any
specific types of defense.

Mental States Task

675

Low defensive level was anticipated to be negatively associated with openness to experienceand psychological adjustment (as one may be aware of and moved by one’s experience, but withtoo much intensity—the experience being perceived as overwhelmingly threatening, eventually
preventing one from opening entirely to the experience) and to be positively related to immature
defenses, negative emotional traits, and elicitation of negative emotions.
Intermediate defensive level was expected to be negatively related to openness to experience(as a part of the subjective experience is obliterated or the personal meaning and emotional
expression of a recognized experience is downplayed) and positively related to the immature
defense of distortion (e.g., denial).
It was hypothesized that objective-rational would be mostly negatively associated with openness to experience variables and positively associated with a preference for external thinking styleand the mid-level defense of intellectualization, as the experience is treated with an objectifying
attitude which introduces a distance from the emotional and subjective aspects of situations.
High defensive level was expected to be weakly positively associated with openness to experience (because of the first movement of elaboration and openness to the true subjective experiencethat is present, but defended against in a second movement of retraction) and moderately positively with mature defenses and psychological adjustment.
Reflective thinking was anticipated to be moderately positively related to openness to experience, along with elicitation of reflective emotions (because of the capacity to recognize, elaborate,
and be interested in and moved by the full subjective experience of the moment). Reflective thinking was also expected to be positively related to the use of mature defenses because the measureused in the present study to assess mature defenses mostly represented adaptive regulatory
strategies (i.e., self-observance, self-assertion, and anticipation). These adaptive strategies were
anticipated to be beneficial for the reflective process.

MethodParticipants
Two samples of participants were recruited from a French Canadian university. Sample 1 comprised 264 undergraduate/graduate students from various departments (197 females, 67 males);mean age was 27.27 years (standard deviation [SD] = 6.89). Sample 2 comprised 206 undergraduate/graduate students (154 females, 52 males); mean age was 26.61 years (SD = 6.36).
Participants in each sample completed the MST, but not the same convergent measures, given
the high number of different measures used in this study.

Measures (Samples 1 and 2)
MST. The MST was created for the present study to assess mental states. The 3BM cardof the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943/1971) was used to prime participants
with a conflicting psychological challenge. This image depicts the huddled form of a person (ageand sex unclear) lying on the floor against a couch with his or her right arm bowed around thehead. Beside the person, there is a revolver on the floor (blurred, so it is frequently seen as a set ofkeys or it remains unnoticed). Research has shown that similar paintings or images can be used
to successfully prompt automatic emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Gyurak, & Ayduk, 2007;
Downey, Mougios, Ayduk, London, & Shoda, 2004). Thus, the 3BM card seems appropriate to
set up an appropriate context to examine the process of mentalization and mental states.
This image was shown to evoke themes related to the loss of a relationship and depressive experiences and emotions (Aronow, Altman, & Reznikoff, 2001), themes that are central in humanlife and preponderant in clinical psychology (e.g., Monroe, Rohde, Seely, & Lewinsohn, 1999).
However, its ambiguity makes it so that the participant is only primed with such themes andnot necessarily monopolized by a conscious and strong experience of these themes. Participants
were asked to write down a story that came to mind in response to the image. They were also
asked to describe what occurred in their story, what led to the event, what the protagonists felt

676

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

and thought, and how their story ended. Participants were asked to provide sufficient detail anda minimum length of text so that we could fully understand their story.
Next, participants responded to items assessing their mental states during the previous task.
The instructions were as follows: The following items refer to how you felt during the previous
task. While you were doing the previous task (i.e., while you were looking at the picture, thinking
about a story and writing your story), to what extent did you find yourself in each of these following
mental states? In previous pilot studies (Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2012), a large pool of 92 items was
generated that was meant to encompass all the mental states covered by the MSRS. The items
were formulated as reflecting the conscious activity resulting from the person’s representational
capacities and defensive functions elicited by the task. In other words, items are not based on
one’s capacity to observe and be aware of one’s mental states during the task (e.g., I have defended
myself thinking that what the character was going through was not that bad), but rather on one’s
conscious activity resulting from the attitude endorsed during the task (e.g., I thought that what
the character was going through was not that bad). Consequently, defensive strategies and low
introspective abilities can be reasonably avoided.
Four versions of the MST items have been created in these pilot studies to obtain the final
version of the MST. Using both rational and empirical methods (e.g., expert categorization,
descriptive statistics, item analyses, factorial analyses), the scale was reduced to its present final
form comprising 24 items (see Table 1). In line with the mental states theoretical framework,
the final form of the MST measures a set of six mental states, each assessed with four items:
concrete thinking (CONC), low defensive level (LoDef), intermediate defensive level (IntDef),
objective-rational (OBR), high defensive level (HiDef), and reflective thinking (REF). Items
were responded to on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely
agree).
Scores for each mental state were obtained by averaging the four items of each subscale. A
total score was also calculated. To this end, the raw score of each subscale was multiplied by aweight reproducing the reflective continuum: CONC (*1), LoDef (*1), IntDef (*1), OBR (*2),
HiDef (*3), and REF (*3). “Lower” mental states (CONC, LoDef, and IntDef) were indexed
by a lower score than “higher” mental states (HiDef and REF). However, because IntDef, forinstance, is not expected to lead to more adaptive consequences than CONC and LoDef, thesethree mental states were indexed by the same score. HiDef and REF were also indexed by thesame score as they are equally likely to lead to adaptive consequences. The OBR mental state
falls in between these categories. Consequently, it was indexed by an intermediate score.
Next, each score was summed and divided by the total sum of the raw scores. The total MST
equation is expressed as follows: Total MST = (CONC*1 + LoDef*1 + IntDef*1 + OBR*2 +HiDef*3 + REF*3) / (CONC + LoDef + IntDef + OBR + HiDef + REF). The higher the
total MST score, the more reflective the overall level of mental states functioning is presumed tobe. Such a scoring procedure has been used with success in past studies measuring overall levelof defensive functioning (e.g., Perry & Hoglend, 1998).

MSRS. The MSRS described in the Introduction section was used to rate the mental
states actualized in the written stories. The MSRS was scored according to a 0 to 100 scale (0 =CONC to 100 = REF). In the present study, 100 protocols randomly selected from Samples 1
and 2 were rated. Two judges, blind to the participants’ scores on the other measures, rated 50%of the protocols (n = 50). The first judge (first author) coded the remainder of the material (total
n = 100). These judges were trained by the second author, an experienced clinical psychologist,
who developed the MSRS. Interrater reliability for the first half of the material was satisfactory,
with an intraclass correlation coefficient of .70.
Sample 1 Measures
The convergent measures chosen in the presents studies were used because of their capacity tocapture different facets of mental elaboration and/or of openness to subjective experience—awareness of, interest in, and recognition of one’s or others’ inner life, defensive and emotional

Mental States Task

677

Table 1
Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings: Study 1
Varimax rotated factor structure

Conc1
Conc2
Conc3
Conc4
LoDef1
LoDef2
LoDef3
LoDef4IntDef1
IntDef2
IntDef3
IntDef4
Obr1
Obr2
Obr3
Obr4

HiDef1

HiDef2
HiDef3

HiDef4

Ref1
Ref2
Ref3
Ref4

MST Item

1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

6th

I did not have much to write about.
I was not very inspired.
The image was not telling me much.
The material did not inspire any particularthoughts.
I was afraid of what I was feeling.
I was afraid of the state I would be in once I
would have completed the task.
I loved and hated the character.
I saw or I thought about horrible, scary things.
I thought that what the character was going
through was not that bad.
The character amused me.
I did not see any particular problem in thecharacter’s situation.
I found the character ridiculous to be affectedthat way.
I was mostly trying to focus on well structuring
the story’s facts and their sequence.
I was mostly trying to organize my thoughts
well.
I was focused on the facts and events of thestory, like a detached observer.
I was writing in a journalistic manner (ex:reporting the facts, the events that occurred,
the characters, etc).
I thought that the situation experienced by thecharacter was difficult, but that things always
settle down.
I was repeating to myself that with time things
would return to normalcy for the character.
I told myself that what the character was
experiencing was difficult, but that he/shewould not stay in this specific situation or
position for a long time.
Although the character’s situation was difficult,
I felt the need to end my story in a positive
way, so that I did not dwell on the negative.
The character’s situation moved me, but I was
not overwhelmed with sadness.
I was touched by what the character was
experiencing, without being distressed.
I was becoming aware of what was happening
inside myself (thoughts, sensations, etc).
The task triggered in me feelings that I was
easily able to manage.

.88
.75
.67
.61

−.02
.02
−.01
.05

−.11
−.10
−.04
−.07

.03
.06
.16
.24

−.06
−.20
−.18
−.31

.10
.02
.11
.07

−.08
−.16

.06
.12

.74
.72

.03
.02

−.13
−.12

.02
.06

−.04
.00
.24

−.10
−.09
.20

.64
.58
−.15

−.06
.05
.10

.03
.11
−.01

.01
−.25
.65

−.14
.21

.06
−.10

−.04
−.11

.05
.18

.04
−.08

.50
.44

.14

.04

.26

.05

−.07

.40

.01

−.02

.09

.77

.11

.15

.07

.10

.00

.64

.15

−.03

.18

−.02

−.09

.52

−.10

.06

.12

.11

.05

.51

−.04

.31

.04

.80

−.08

−.06

.17

.05

.01

.74

.07

.01

.15

.03

−.02

.73

−.01

.00

.16

.05

−.02

.64

.01

.18

.00

.08

−.18

.27

.05

.02

.67

−.06

−.24

.13

−.09

.02

.63

−.02

−.27

.17

.29

−.21

.42

−.07

−.08

.06

−.10

.11

.41

.01

Note. MST = Mental States Task. Study 1: n = 232 (176 females, 56 males) randomly selected from samples
1 and 2. Factors loadings equal to or greater than .40 appear in bold. Conc = Concrete, LoDef = Low
defensive level, IntDef = Intermediate defensive level, OBR = Objective-rational, HiDef = High defensive
level, Ref = Reflective.
To obtain the French version of the MST items, see author notes for correspondence modalities.

678

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

regulation strategies, attitude toward emotions, and psychological and physical adjustment as aresult of one’s mental functioning.

Authenticity functioning. The French translation (Philippe & Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2010)of the Authenticity Inventory (AI-3; Kernis & Goldman, 2006) comprises 45 items divided infour components. Awareness refers to the awareness of one’s motives, feelings, and cognitions.
Unbiased processing is defined as not denying, distorting, or exaggerating internal experiencesand externally based self-evaluative information. Behavioral authenticity corresponds to acting in
coherence with one’s values, preferences, and needs, and not acting falsely. Relational orientationrefers to valuing and achieving openness and truthfulness and to being genuine and not fakein close relationships. A global score of authentic functioning combines scores on these four
components. (See Table 3 for the Likert scale points and alpha coefficients of all scales.)Mindfulness. The French version (Beaudry, 2010) of the Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) was used to assess mindfulness, defined as an enhanced
attention to and awareness of current experience. In this 15-item scale, higher scores reflect
higher levels of dispositional mindfulness.
Defense mechanisms. A total of 17 items from the French version of the Defensive Style
Questionnaire (DSQ-60; Trijsburg, Bond, Drapeau, Thygesen, & De Roten, 2005) were used
to measure five types of defense mechanisms. These five types of defenses were splitting (e.g.,
ambivalence about representations of the self and representations of others), major reality
distortion (e.g., denial), intellectualization (e.g., distancing from one’s emotionality), altruism(e.g., seeking to help other people), and adaptive defenses (e.g., self-observance, self-assertion,
anticipation), with adaptive defenses representing the highest level of defense maturity andsplitting corresponding to the lowest one. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) has shownadequate factorial structure for these 17 items in previous work (Philippe et al., 2012).
Psychological symptoms. The French version (Fortin, Coutu-Wakulczyk, & Engelsmann, 1989) of the short scale of the Symptom Checklist-10-Revised (SCL-10R; Rosen etal., 2000) was used to assess various psychological symptoms. The SCL-10R comprises 10 items
and correlates at .95 with the full 90-item original scale. Participants were asked to rate theextent to which they have been bothered by each symptom during the last month.
Life satisfaction. The French version (Blais, Vallerand, Pelletier, & Brière, 1989) of theSatisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) is a 5-item scale measuring general happiness with one’s life.
Explicit self-esteem. The one-item self-esteem measure of Robins, Hendin, and Trzesniewski (2001), “I have high self-esteem,” was used in this study. This item has been shown todisplay high test-retest reliability, high correlations with commonly used self-esteem measures(e.g., correlations between .70 and .80 with the Social Behaviour Inventory and the Rosenberg
Scale), and yields results very similar to the Rosenberg Scale (see Robins et al., 2001).
Sample 2 Measures
Empathy. The French translation (Mehrabian, 2000) of the Questionnaire Measure of
Emotional Empathy (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) was used to measure empathic tendency.
In the present study, a total of 10 items were selected from the 33-item original questionnaire(e.g., “I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems”). Items were selected fortheir reference to openness and connection with others’ emotions, without tapping into extreme
emotional responses and reactions. Items of this latter sort have not been selected, as the present
study focuses on adaptive emotional investment (e.g., be moved by others’ sadness without
feeling completely depressed or dysfunctional).

Mental States Task

679

Task enjoyment. Five items devised for the present study aimed to assess participants’appreciation and constructive emotional impact of the MST: “I found the task interesting,” “I
liked completing the task,” “This task made me feel good,” “I enjoyed asking myself all thesequestions related to the task,” and “Being in contact with the thoughts and feelings elicited by
the task made me feel good.” These items were averaged into an enjoyment index.
Alexithymia. The French version (Loas, Otmani, Verrier, Fremaux, & Marchand 1996)of the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) includes
three factors: factor 1 assesses difficulties in identifying feelings and distinguishing them frombodily sensations; factor 2 reflects difficulties describing and communicating feelings; and factor
3 denotes a preference for externally oriented thinking style, in comparison to introspective
thought.
Borderline traits. The French translation (Lecours & Philippe, 2009) of the McLean
Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality Disorder (MSI-BPD; Zanarini et al., 2003)
is based on a subset of questions from the borderline module of the Diagnostic Interview
for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV) Borderline
Personality Disorder (DSM-IV BPD). The MSI-BPD comprises 10 items (one item per DSM-IV
BPD criterion, except for the ninth criterion, which contains two items). The scale utilizes a yes(1) or no (0) response format. Each endorsed item is worth one point on a scale ranging from 1
to 10.
Physical symptoms. The French version (Beaulieu-Pelletier & Philippe, 2010) of the Physical Health Questionnaire (PHQ; Schat, Kelloway, & Desmarais, 2005) comprises 14 items
evaluating the frequency with which one experiences sleep disturbances, headaches, respiratory
infections, and gastrointestinal problems.
Positive and negative emotions. The French adaptation (Lapierre, Gaudreau, & Blondin,
1999) of a short version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Thompson, 2007)
was administered to assess emotions. This short version comprises five positive (active, alert,
determined, attentive, inspired) and five negative (afraid, nervous, upset, ashamed, hostile)
emotional items. Five items assessing reflective experience (interested, calm, enthusiast, contemplative, curious) were added to form an emotional reflective subscale. Two measurement
moments were used: (a) At the beginning of the experiment, to assess trait-like affectivity (Ingeneral, to what extent do you feel each of these emotions) and (b) right after the completionof the MST, to assess emotional reactions elicited by the task (Time 2: How do you feel at thepresent moment).
Social desirability. The French version (Tremblay, Lachance, & Richer, 2006) of the short
Marlowe-Crowne Form C (Reynolds, 1982) was administered to assess the tendency to distort
self-presentation toward a socially desirable bias. This 13-item scale utilizes a true-false response
format. Higher scores on the scale correspond to a higher social desirability tendency.
Procedure
Participants were randomly contacted through their institutional e-mail and explained that wewere conducting an online study about personality. The incentive was that their participation
allowed them to be entered into a draw of three prizes of $125. Participants in Sample 1 completed
the AI-3, MAAS, DSQ, SCL-10R, Satisfaction with Life Scale, the self-esteem item, and finally
the MST. Participants in Sample 2 completed the PANAS (in general), Questionnaire Measure of
Emotional Empathy, TAS-20, MSI-BPD, PHQ, Marlowe-Crowne, MST, task enjoyment items,
and finally the PANAS (at the present moment).

680

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

Results
Factorial Structure
An exploratory factor analysis, using principal axis factoring as the method of estimation, wasperformed on the 24 items of the MST with varimax rotation. This analysis was conducted on arandom selection of 50% of the participants from Samples 1 and 2 (n = 232). Results revealed six
factors with an eigenvalue higher than one (4.19, 3.25, 2.50, 1.95, 1.53, and 1.17). In addition,
examination of the scree test (i.e., the point where the decline in eigenvalues starts to level off)showed six clear factors. Each item loaded on its respective factor (see Table 1) and their factor
loadings ranged from .40 to .88.
A CFA was performed on the remaining half of the participants (n = 236) to confirm thefactorial structure of the MST. The model included six latent variables (CONC, LoDef, IntDef,
OBR, HiDef, and REF), each comprised four observed variables (i.e., items). Fit indices for thismodel using LISREL 8.8 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2003) and robust maximum likelihood as themethod of estimation were satisfactory: Satorra-Bentler c2(degree of freedom [df] = 237, n =236) = 375.79, p < .000; normed chi-square (c2/df) = 1.59; non-normed fit index (NNFI) =.93; comparative fit index (CFI) = .94; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) =.049 [.040; .059]; standardized root mean square residual (SRMSR) = .069; Akaike information
criterion (AIC) = 501.79.
Figure 1 illustrates the factor loadings of each mental state and the intercorrelations among
the latent variables. All factor loadings ranged from .47 to .82. Alternative factorial models werealso tested based on some theoretical concerns. One alternative model consisted in merging REF
and CONC to examine if those two dimensions were not just the opposite of each other. Other
alternative models examined whether CONC and IntDef, CONC and OBR, IntDef and OBR,
LoDef and REF, HiDef and OBR, or HiDef and REF could be combined. Results for all ofthese alternative models revealed less adequate fit indices, all SB c2(df = 242, n = 236) > 490.89,
AICs > 589.57, thus suggesting that the original model should be preferred.
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations of all six mental states
for Samples 1 and 2 (total n = 471). Opposed mental states were negatively associated witheach other (e.g., CONC and REF), whereas mental states that share some characteristics werepositively correlated (e.g., CONC, IntDef, and OBR).

Reliability
Reliability coefficients were .82 (CONC), .69 (LoDef), .62 (IntDef), .70 (OBR), .82 (HiDef), and.66 (REF). The subscales thus show an acceptable degree of internal consistency in light of thefact that they are each composed of only four items.

Gender Differencest tests were conducted to examine gender differences among all mental states. Results revealed
no gender differences on all mental states, except on OBR, t(469) = 3.83, p < .05, d = .40. Men
showed higher levels of OBR (M = 3.75, SD = 1.30) than women (M = 3.24, SD = 1.25). This
predominance of OBR in men has been obtained in previous studies (Normandin & Bouchard,
1993; Lecours, Bouchard, & Normandin, 1995).

Convergent Validity
It was hypothesized that the total MST score would be correlated with the MSRS score. Results
supported this hypothesis, as the total MST score was moderately positively associated with the
MSRS score (r = .45, p < .05). A very high correlation was not realistically expected between
the MST and the MSRS scores, as instruments assessing the same construct with different
methods (self-report versus observer-rating) usually correlate moderately with each other. Thesefindings suggest that the MST adequately assesses mental states as described by the mental statesmodel.

Mental States Task

Figure 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis using Robust Maximum Likelihood.
Note. n = 236 randomly selected from samples 1 and 2.

681

682

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

Table 2Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlational Results Among Mental States Modes: Samples 1
and 2
Mean (SD)CONC (1)LoDef (2)IntDef (3)OBR (4)
HiDef (5)REF (6)
Total MST (7)Females

Males

t

d

2.92 (1.44)
1.79 (.99)
2.07 (1.09)
3.24 (1.25)
4.11 (1.70)
4.08 (1.31)
2.08 (.19)

2.97 (1.37)
1.93 (.99)
2.25 (1.04)
3.75 (1.30)
4.11 (1.68)
3.99 (1.38)
2.05 (.20)

−0.37
−1.33
−1.63
−3.83**
−0.02
0.64
1.51

.04
.14
.17
.40
.00
.07
.16

1

2

3

4

5

6

–
−.10* –
.23** −.10* –
.18**
.01
.24** –
−.05
−.07
.07
.10* –
**
.08
−.07
−.05
.28** –−.44−.66** −.21** −.36** −.15** .57** .69**

Note. Based on Samples 1 and 2 combined. n = 470 (351 females, 119 males). CONC = Concrete, LoDef= Low defensive level, IntDef = Intermediate defensive level, OBR = Objective-rational, HiDef = Highdefensive level, REF = Reflective, Total MST = total score on MST.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Table 3 reports the correlations among mental states and related constructs for Samples 1(n = 264) and 2 (n = 207). First, one possible concern is the degree to which the MST correlateswith social desirability. The correlations between mental states and social desirability ranged
from –.22 to .12, with only one significant correlation: LoDef, r = –.22, p < .05. This indicatesthat the results obtained from the MST do not seem to be characterized by social desirability
biases.

Openness to subjective experience. Results broadly suggest that CONC and LoDef were
negatively associated with openness to subjective experience. IntDef and OBR were unrelated
or negatively related to openness to experience variables (negative correlations with empathy for both IntDef and OBR, and negative correlations with some authenticity variables for
OBR). HiDef was associated with empathy and authentic relationships, but unrelated to theother openness variables. Finally, REF was mostly positively associated with the openness tosubjective experience variables. A particular consideration regarding these results concerns therelatively low correlations obtained with mindfulness. This might potentially be explained by
the fact that the measure assessing mindfulness (MAAS) used in the present study only taps
the attention/present focus aspect of mindfulness, but not other features of mindfulness such as
acceptance and nonjudgment—features that could potentially be more highly correlated withcertain mental states.
Emotional dysregulation. Results showed that CONC was unrelated to the three alexithymia factors and that LoDef was positively related to the alexithymia factors representing
difficulty identifying and describing emotions. Both IntDef and OBR were positively related tothe alexithymia factor representing external thinking style, HiDef was negatively correlated withdifficulty identifying emotions, and REF was unrelated to the three alexithymia factors.
Defense mechanisms. Results revealed a relative absence of adaptive defenses in CONCand LoDef, a moderate positive association between immature defenses and LoDef, the use of
intellectualisation in OBR, and of mature defenses in HiDef and REF. Unexpectedly, IntDef
was not associated with major distortion defenses, such as denial.
Psychological adjustment. Results broadly revealed that LoDef was associated with poor
psychological adjustment, as opposed to HiDef, which was associated with better psychologicaladjustment. REF in contrast was unrelated to psychological adjustment.

Mental States Task

683

Table 3
Correlational Results Among Mental States Modes and Related Constructs: Samples 1 and 2
Scalepoints Alpha CONC LoDef IntDef
Social desirability
0–1
Openness to subjective experience
Global authentic functioning 1–5
Awareness
1–5
Unbiased processing
1–5
Behavioral authenticity
1–5
Relational orientation
1–5
Mindfulness
1–6
Empathy
1–7
Emotional dysregulation
Total alexithymia
1–5
Difficulty identifying
1–5
Difficulty describing
1–5
Externally thinking style
1–5
Defense mechanisms
Splitting
1–9
Distortion
1–9
Intellectualisation
1–9
Altruism
1–9
Adaptive
1–9
Psychological adjustment
Psychological symptoms
1–5
Physical symptoms
1–7Life satisfaction
1–7
Self-esteem
1–7
Borderline traits
0–1
Emotional experiences
Emotional traits
Positive
1–5
Negative
1–5
Reflective
1–5
Emotions elicitation after MST
Positive
1–5
Negative
1–5
Reflective
1–5
Enjoyment index
1–7−.22**

.12

OBR

HiDef

REF

Total
MST

.10

.08

−.10

−.03

.53

.09

.89
.76
.63
.69
.77
.86
.61

−.15*
−.09
−.16**−.03−.19**
−.15*
−.18*

.80
.76
.80
.57

.06
−.01
.10
.05

.64
.67
.79
.64
.72

−.02
.33**
.01
−.09
.36** −.03.08
.22** −.02−.14* −.03.01−.20** −.15* −.01

.08
.09
.14*
.08
.06

.81
.84
.88
–
.72

.01
−.10
.08
.05
−.14

.36** −.05
.28** −.03.07−.26**−.22**.15***.27 −.15*

.06
−.16*
−.01
.02
−.13

−.12*
.04
.15*
.15*
−.15*

−.03
.01
−.01
.09
.09

−.15*
.01
.08
.09
.00

.68
.70
.51

−.01
−.01
.17*

−.06
.12
.22**
.01
−.16* −.01

.11
−.11
.01

.01
−.10
.10

.03
.03
.07

−.01
−.09
.05

.75
.68
.64
.88

−.16* −.04
.16*
−.06
.48**
.04
.07
−.21** −.02−.53**.11 −.09−.37**.06−.22**.07−.29**.08−.41**.06−.27**.01−.25**.06.10 −.25**
.34**
.43**
.20**
.10

−.10
.09
−.02
.08
−.12* −.05−.16**
.03
−.04
.22**
−.06
.06
−.22**
.14*

.17*
.07
.05 −.10
.13
.11
.22**
.17*

−.10
−.16*
−.08
.04

.21**
.16**
.22**
.07
.21**
.12*
.19**
−.03
.05
.01
−.14

.26**
.17**
.18**
.15*
.34**
.19**
.25**
−.23**
−.18*
−.17*
−.16*

−.10 −.03 −.13*.03.02 −.03−.02 −.09 −.15*
.21**
.16**
.22**
**
**
.20
.19
.28**

.27**
.10
−.10 −.08
.15*
.18**
−.03
.23**

.21**
.15*
.05 −.14
.27**
.26**
.63**
.56**

Note. MST = Mental States Task. CONC = Concrete, LoDef = Low defensive level, IntDef = Intermediate
defensive level, OBR = Objective-rational, HiDef = High defensive level, REF = Reflective, Total MST =total score on MST.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Emotional traits and emotional elicitation. Results showed that positive and negative
emotional traits were unrelated to all mental states modes, except for the LoDef mode, which
was associated with more negative emotions in general. All mental states modes were unrelated
to the reflective emotional trait, except the LoDef mode, which was negatively correlated with it
and, surprisingly, the CONC mode, which was positively related to it.
Results also revealed that LoDef led to a higher negative emotional elicitation following the
MST. IntDef, OBR, and REF were conducive to a higher positive emotional elicitation, andOBR, HiDef, and REF modes promoted a higher reflective emotional elicitation. Of particularinterest for CONC is the important decrease in its correlations with reflective emotional traits
and reflective emotions elicitation from .17 to –.20, ps < .05.

684

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

Concerning the enjoyment of the task, results showed that HiDef and REF seem to promote
enjoyment of the task, while CONC seems to hinder it.

Study 2The purpose of Study 2 was to translate the MST from French to English and to further extend
its ecological validity to an English population. The factorial structure of the English MST
was first examined. Convergent evidence of validity was obtained by replicating some of themost important findings of Study 1 and was expanded with additional related measures of selfattentiveness (rumination vs. self-reflection), emotion regulation (reappraisal vs. suppression),and attitudes toward sadness (denial/disinterest/harmful vs. growth). Peer reports were also
added in this study to provide convergent validity indices from a different perspective.
It was hypothesized that CONC would be negatively related to self-reflection and would
show low interest in the emotion of sadness. LoDef was anticipated to be positively associatedwith rumination and with considering sadness as harmful. IntDef was expected to be positively
related to the use of suppression and with denial of sadness. It was hypothesized that OBR would
be positively associated with the use of strategies aimed at distancing oneself from emotional
experiences, such as suppression and denial of sadness, but also with some adaptive strategies likereappraisal. HiDef should be negatively associated with low interest in the emotion of sadness—
as a first movement of openness—and positively associated with some adaptive regulation
strategies such as reappraisal. Finally, REF was anticipated to be positively related to selfreflection, interest in, and valuing of the emotion of sadness, as well as use of some adaptive
regulation strategies such as reappraisal.

MethodParticipants
Two samples of English participants were recruited from an English-speaking Canadian university. Sample 3 comprised 110 undergraduate students from various departments (82 females,
28 males). Mean age was 20.15 years (SD = 3.92 years). A total of 188 undergraduate students(104 females, 83 males, 1 missing gender value) took part in Sample 4. Mean age was 20.90 years(SD = 5.22 years). Again, the convergent measures used were not the same in each sample.

Measures (Samples 3 and 4)
MST. The MST used in Study 1 was translated in English for this study. First, two bilingualEnglish-French contributors translated the MST into English, producing two parallel English
versions. Then, both versions were back-translated into French by two other contributors. The
similarity between the original French questionnaire and the back-translated French version
is a marker of the quality of the intermediary English version. Subsequently, a committee of
two bilingual graduate students and a professor of psychology evaluated both English versions
according to their readability and concordance with the original version and finally decided
upon a final version of the English MST.
Sample 3 Measures
Authenticity, empathy, and borderline traits. These measures were the same as thoseused in Study 1 (in their respective English versions). See Table 5 for the Likert scale points andalpha coefficients of all scales.
Sample 4 Measures
Self-attentiveness. The Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) was used to assess ruminative and reflective types of private self-attentiveness (24items). Rumination refers to a self-attentiveness motivated by perceived threats, losses, orMental States Task

685

injustices to the self (e.g., “I always seem to be rehashing in my mind recent things I’ve said ordone”), whereas reflection corresponds to a self-attentiveness motivated by curiosity or interestin the self (e.g., “I love exploring my ‘inner’ self”).

Emotion regulation. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003)
is a 10-item scale that assesses two common emotion regulation strategies: cognitive reappraisaland suppression. Reappraisal refers to a form of cognitive change that involves construing a potentially emotion-eliciting situation in a way that changes its emotional impact (e.g., “I control
my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in”), whereas Suppression corresponds to a form of response modulation that involves inhibiting ongoing emotion-expressive
behavior (e.g., “I control my emotions by not expressing them”).
Attitudes toward sadness. The Questionnaire on the Attitude Toward the Emotion of
Sadness (Lecours & Philippe, 2010) was used to evaluate reactions to situations eliciting sadness.
Sadness was used as the target emotion because it is the one mostly expressed in the TAT card
used for the MST. Participants were asked to think of their typical reaction when facing a situation that can arouse a state of sadness and to rate to what extent various statements correspondto their habitual reaction (Generally, when I am in a situation that can arouse sadness . . . ).
Four subscales were selected according to their theoretical relevance to the present study:
Denial (four items), Disinterest (three items), Harmful (three items), and Growth (four items).
Denial refers to the feeling that one is never or rarely sad, and that life is always beautiful(e.g., “I tell myself that this situation does not affect me because I am never sad”). Disinterest
corresponds to a noninterest in understanding about what sadness signals or informs (e.g., “I
am not interested in understanding what I am experiencing”). Harmful is defined as perceiving
sadness as overly harmful and threatening, as an emotion that should not exist or should exist
as little as possible (e.g., “I feel that I hate sadness”). Growth measures the feeling that sadness
highlights occasions for personal growth and self-understanding (e.g., “I consider that sadness
helps me to better understand myself”).
A CFA on the present study data showed that all four factors adequately fit the data, SatorraBentler c2 (df = 71, n = 188) = 109.23, p < .01, NC = 1.54, RMSEA = .054 (.032; .073), NNFI
= .96, CFI = .97, SRMR = .084, with factor loadings ranging from .45 to .84.
Peer reports. A variety of single items were used to assess a number of peer perceptions
relative to the participants. Items were chosen for their clear, face-valid, and simple formulation,and single items were preferred to keep the questionnaire as brief as possible for the peers.
First, peer ratings of the participants’ use of suppression and reappraisal strategies of emotional regulation were measured with two items used by Gross and John (2003; Study 3): “Mypeer controls his or her emotions by not expressing them” and “My peer changes the way he/sheis thinking about the situation when he/she wants to feel less negative emotion,” respectively.
Second, two items were selected from the RRQ (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) and adapted for
close others to assess peer perceptions of ruminative and reflective types of self-attentiveness:“My peer tends to ‘ruminate’ or dwells over things that happen to him/her for a really long timeafterward” and “My peer is very self-inquisitive by nature,” respectively. Third, participants’difficulty describing their feelings was assessed with the item “It is difficult for my peer to reveal
his or her innermost feelings, even to close friends,” derived from the TAS-20 (Bagby et al., 1994).
Finally, peer perceptions of the participants’ externally oriented thinking style was measured
with the item “My peer prefers talking to people about their daily activities rather than their
feelings,” also derived from the TAS-20.
Procedure
Procedures were the same as those described in Study 1. Participants in Sample 3 were asked
to complete the AI-3, Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy, MSI-BPD, and MST.
Participants in Sample 4 were asked to complete the RRQ, ERQ, QAFET, and MST. At theend of the questionnaire, participants in the fourth sample were asked if they would agree to686

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013provide the e-mail of a close other who knows them well, to obtain a more complete picture of
the participants’ personality. They were told that their close other would not have access to theinformation they provided in this study and that they would not be permitted to see their peer’s
responses as well, to preserve confidentiality.

Results
Factor Structure
A CFA was conducted on the MST items with participants from Samples 3 and 4 combined.
The model comprised six latent variables (CONC, LoDef, IntDef, OBR, HiDef, and REF), eachcomprised four observed variables (i.e., items). Fit indices for this model using LISREL 8.8(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2003) and robust maximum likelihood were satisfactory: Satorra-Bentler
χ2 (df = 237, n = 298) = 497.40, p < .000; NC = 2.13; NNFI = .89; CFI = .91; RMSEA = .062(.054; .069); SRMSR = .079; AIC = 629.40.
Figure 2 shows the factor loadings of each mental state and the intercorrelations among thelatent variables. All factor loadings ranged from .39 to .83, except for the factor loading of Ref
1, which was at .23, but was still significant. Although the loading of this item was low, resultsof all analyses were virtually the same when excluding this item. This item was thus kept for
the remaining analyses. The same alternative factorial models tested in Study 1 were also tested
to examine if some mental states could be combined. Results for all of these alternative models
revealed less adequate fit indices than the original model, all SB χ2 (df = 242, n = 298) > 598.21,
AICs > 721.21, suggesting that the original model should be preferred.
A multisample CFA analysis was conducted to examine whether the English version of the
MST differed from the French version presented in Study 1. A first model was conducted witheach group tested separately in one run, with all parameters in each group allowed to vary freely.
Fit indices for this configural model were adequate: Satorra-Bentler χ2 (df = 474) = 869.81,
p < .000; NC = 1.84; NNFI = .91; CFI = .92; RMSEA = .057; SRMSR = .069. Next, factor
loadings of the French version were constrained to be equal to those of the English version.
Fit indices for this constrained model were very similar, SB χ2 (df = 492) = 909.69, p < .000,
NC = 1.85, NNFI = .91, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .057, SRMSR = .074, but the  χ2 difference
test (adjusted for SB scaling) was significant, ,χ2 (18) = 39.02, p < .05, thus suggesting thatsome parameters were not fully invariant.
Further examination of these differences revealed that three factor loadings out of 24 were
not invariant across the versions. HiDef3 and Obr4 were significantly higher in the French
version than in the English version (.70 and .79, vs. .54 and .48, respectively) and IntDef4 wassignificantly higher in the English version than in the French one (.76 vs. .47). There were noother significant differences when these three parameters were allowed to vary freely across thegroups, χ2 (15) = 23.72, p = .07. Thus, overall, the differences between the French and theEnglish versions were fairly small.
Table 4 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations of all six mental states for
Samples 3 and 4 combined. As in Study 1, opposed mental states were negatively associated,
whereas mental states that share some characteristics were positively correlated.

Reliability
Reliability coefficients were .77 (CONC), .67 (LoDef), .70 (IntDef), .72 (OBR), .79 (HiDef), and.58 (REF), thus showing an acceptable degree of internal consistency.

Gender Differencest tests revealed no gender differences on all mental states.

Convergent Validity
Table 5 reports the correlations for Sample 3 (n = 110) among some of the measures usedin Study 1 and the six mental states. Overall, the associations between the mental states andMental States Task

Figure 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis using Robust Maximum Likelihood.
Note. n = 298 from samples 3 and 4.

687

688

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

Table 4Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlational Results Among Mental States Modes: Samples 3
and 4
Mean (SD)CONC (1)LoDef (2)IntDef (3)OBR (4)
HiDef (5)REF (6)
Total MST (7)FemalesMalest

2.72 (1.35)
2.24 (1.15)
1.84 (1.02)
3.09 (1.34)
3.54 (1.59)
4.11 (1.27)
2.05 (.20)

2.82 (1.33)
2.31 (1.09)
2.07 (.98)
3.34 (1.27)
3.69 (1.58)
4.21 (1.07)
2.04 (.16)

−0.58
−0.54
−1.85
−1.54
−0.78
−0.74
0.40

d

1

2

3

4

5

6

.07 –
.06 −.07
–
.23
.36**
.02
–
.19
.33**
.02
.26** –
.09
.05
−.04
−.01
.11
–
.08 −.25**
.04
−.10
.02
.29** –
.05 −.54** −.31** −.49** -.16** .57** .63**

Note. MST = Mental States Task. Based on Samples 3 and 4 combined. n = 298 (186 females, 111 males, and1 missing value). CONC = Concrete, LoDef = Low defensive level, IntDef = Intermediate defensive level,
OBR = Objective-rational, HiDef = High-defensive level, REF = Reflective, Total MST = total score on
MST.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Table 5
Correlational Results Among Mental States Modes and Related Constructs: Samples 3 and 4
Scalepoints Alpha CONC LoDef IntDef OBR
Global authentic functioning
1–5
Awareness
1–5
Unbiased processing
1−5Behavioral authenticity
1–5
Relational orientation
1–5
Empathy1−7
Borderline traits
0–1
Emotional regulation
Rumination
1–7
Self-reflection
1–7
Reappraisal
1–7
Suppression
1−7
Reactions to sadness
Denial
1–7
Disinterest
1–7
Harmful
1–7
Growth1–7Peer reportsa
Suppression
1–7
Reappraisal
1–7
Rumination
1–7
Reflection
1–7
Difficulty expressing emotions 1–7
External thinking style
1–7

.87
.73
.63
.67
.75
.69
.79

−.16
−.14
−.03
−.14
−.16
−.26**
−.11

.90
.91
.84
.77

−.13
−.18*
−.04
.16*

.80
.50
.67
.82

.21**
.13
.21**
.09
.14
.16*
*
−.01
−.18

–
–
–
–
–
–

.13
.15
.23*
−.05
−.11
.11
.02
.32** −.09
−.06
.07
.14
.07
.14
.28*
.31**
.22
.19

HiDef

−.36** −.18 −.06.05−.40** −.17
.01
.01
−.22*
.02 −.06 −.05−.26** −.18 −.04.05−.24* −.22* −.10
.13
.02 −.26** −.25** .16.31** −.07 −.19 −.12
.21** −.22** −.04 −.01
.15* −.02 −.01
.00
.40**
.13 −.04.19*.26** .16*
.27** −.05
.27**
.04
−.07
−.08

.18*
.03
.04
.05

REF

.34** .36**
.21*
.30**
.22*
.13
.25** .27**.36** .40**
.23*
.32**
−.08 −.13.04.06.20** .10
.18*
.26**
.04 −.19**.28** .04−.17* −.17*.26* −.03.14.16*.22 −.08.04.03.07 −.29*.04 −.17.26* −.01.32** .00

Total
MST

−.04
.10
−.29*
−.08
.01
.07

−.03
−.28**
−.04
.24**
−.14
.08
−.32**
−.03
−.20
−.24*

Note. MST = Mental States Task. CONC = Concrete, LoDef = Low defensive level, IntDef = Intermediate
defensive level, OBR = Objective-rational, HiDef = High defensive level, REF = Reflective, Total MST =total score on MST.
a n = 76.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Mental States Task

689

authenticity, empathy, and borderline traits in this study were similar to the ones obtained inStudy 1). These results confirm the convergent validity indices across the two studies.

Emotional regulation. Table 5 also reports the correlations among mental states and additional constructs relative to emotional regulation, for Sample 4 (n = 188). Broadly, CONC,
LoDef, and IntDef were generally associated with less adaptive emotional regulation functioning. OBR was positively associated with reappraisal, suppression, and denial of sadness. HiDef
showed a fairly strong correlation with reappraisal and associations with reactions to sadness
that represent both the initial openness of HiDef and its secondary defensive retraction; it was
negatively associated with disinterest in sadness, but positively associated with denial of sadness
and perceptions of sadness as being harmful. Finally, REF was generally related to adaptive
emotional regulation functioning.

Peer Reports
The correlations among participants’ mental states and peer ratings (n = 76) are shown in
Table 5. CONC was positively associated with an externally thinking style as evaluated by peers.
According to peers, LoDef was positively associated with rumination and difficulty describing
emotions, while IntDef was positively related to suppression. OBR was positively correlatedwith difficulty describing emotions and an external thinking style, and positively correlated with
suppression (marginal significance). Finally, HiDef and REF were negatively associated withrumination as evaluated by peers. Unexpectedly, reappraisal and self-reflection as evaluated by
the peers were unrelated to participants’ mental states.

General Discussion
The goal of the present research was to develop a practical measure assessing mental statesas actualized in the here and now. Overall, the present results suggest that the MST possesses
a strong factorial structure and adequate predictive validity with respect to a large range ofrelated concepts. In line with the mental states model, the MST appears to well represent both“lower” and “higher” mental states according to the reflective continuum, which were found tobe linked to a large range of negative/immature and positive/mature constructs, respectively. In
addition, each mental state measured by the MST appears to have particular characteristics andto distinctively relate to some specific constructs.
Factor analyses of the MST indicated that six mental states can be both conceptually andempirically distinguished, namely, concrete thinking, low defensive level, intermediate defensive
level, objective-rational, high defensive level, and reflective thinking, in both French and English
versions of the task. Intercorrelations among these mental states also confirmed the hierarchical structure of these mental states, that is, opposed mental states were found to be negatively
associated (e.g., concrete and reflective thinking), whereas mental states that share some characteristics were positively correlated (e.g., concrete thinking, intermediate defensive level, andobjective-rational, which are all characterized by some distant attitude with respect to one’s
subjective experience). Moreover, these intercorrelations were of an acceptable moderate effectsize, without being too highly correlated. Overall, these findings suggest that each mental stateis sufficiently distinct from the other, and that each appears to tap into specific characteristics.
The total MST score derived from this six-factor model correlated positively and moderately
with the score derived from the original MSRS content analysis method. This finding wasimportant to confirm that the MST adequately assesses mental states as described by the mental
states model. Although the MSRS observer-rated method has privileged access to some aspects
more difficult to obtain with the MST self-report (e.g., clinical judgment), the results of thepresent research suggest that the MST has adequate power to assess mental states along thereflective continuum.

690

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

Portraits of Mental States
The present findings suggest that the MST is strong enough to capture with sufficient finesse
the different characteristics and issues of each mental state. The portrait of each mental state isdetailed below according to the findings obtained in the present research.

Concrete thinking. The lack of openness toward one’s subjective experience and emotional
dysregulation were highlighted by the negative associations between concrete thinking andmindfulness and authenticity, and by its positive correlation with an external thinking style
as rated by peers. Concrete thinking was also negatively associated with positive and reflective
emotions elicited after the MST and with lower levels of enjoyment of the task, thus underscoring
the lack of interest and of reflectivity with respect to emotional contents. The negative association
with empathy reveals a lower interest in others’ emotional experience. There was no specificcorrelation with immature defenses, but a negative association was found with the use of moremature defenses, which is consistent with the claim that higher representational capacities areneeded to use more mature defenses (e.g., Chan, 1997; Cramer, 2006). Finally, concrete thinking
was unrelated to all psychological adjustment variables, which highlights a very interesting issue
that concrete people may—despite their impoverished representational capacities—not present(or report) more psychological symptoms or lower positive adjustment, as compared with people
with better representational capacities.
Low defensive level. Low defensive level was positively associated with trait-like negative
emotionality, negative emotions elicited after the MST, and the perception of sadness as aharmful emotion. Some self-reflection capacity was present; it was, however, mostly motivatedby perceived threats, leading to rumination, as rated by the participants and their peers. The
consequent lack of openness and the presence of emotional dysregulation were highlighted by
the negative associations with mindfulness and authenticity and by the positive correlations withdifficulties identifying and describing emotions. Peers corroborated this latter finding.
Furthermore, as expected, this mental state was found to be associated with the use of immature defenses and with less adaptive strategies of regulation, such as suppression. It was also
negatively associated with the use of more adaptive defenses, which is consistent with the higher
mental elaboration capacities needed to use more mature defenses (e.g., Chan, 1997; Cramer,
2006). There was also a positive correlation with the intellectualization defense, presumably
related to the difficulty talking about and describing exactly what one feels, as reflected in theintellectualization items. The above are usually characteristic of the borderline personality organization and our findings further supported the relationship between low defensive level mental
state and borderline traits. Finally, this mental state was associated with impaired psychologicaladjustment, as indicated by its positive correlations with psychological and physical symptoms,
and its negative correlations with life satisfaction and self-esteem.
Intermediate defensive level. The results partially corroborated the definition of thismental state. Emotional dysregulation was highlighted by the positive association with a preference for external thinking instead of a focus on one’s subjective experience. The failure toacknowledge others’ emotional experience was demonstrated by the negative association with
empathy. Intermediate defensive level was not associated with major distortion defenses, but was
positively related to denial of the emotion of sadness and to the use of suppression—this latter
result being corroborated by peers. Finally, IntDef was unrelated to all psychological adjustment
variables, except for a positive association with self-esteem.
These findings raise the important concern of underreporting. In fact, the use of denial andminimization strategies may prevent one from reporting personal difficulties and symptoms if
the items of the questionnaires are too obvious or susceptible to social desirability. A mainconsequence of this bias seems to be that several correlational results with this mental state werenonsignificant. Along these concerns, it is unclear how to interpret the positive association with
explicit self-esteem. Future research should clarify this issue by comparing, for instance, explicit

Mental States Task

691

and implicit measures of self-esteem, to reduce denial and bias effects (for a distinction between
secure and fragile high self-esteem, see Zeigler-Hill, 2006).

Objective-rational. The emotional distance from one’s subjective experience was highlighted by the positive correlations with external thinking style (as rated by participants andtheir peers) and with difficulties describing emotions (as rated by peers), and by the negative
associations with some authenticity subscales (Study 1) and empathy. It was also positively
related to the use of intellectualization, denial of the emotion of sadness, and suppression as
rated by the participants (marginally significant as rated by peers), all of which suggest an emotional distance and difficulty describing emotions. Although the pattern of correlations is similar
to the one obtained for concrete thinking and intermediate defensive level states, the objectiverational stance was further characterized by more adaptive emotional regulation strategies, suchas cognitive reappraisal, and more adaptive outcomes, such as fewer physical symptoms. Moreover, this mental state was associated with more positive and reflective emotions elicited after
the MST, thus suggesting some positive involvement in an emotionally challenging task.
High defensive level. The presence of some reflective processes and openness to the true
subjective experience was highlighted by the positive associations with interest in the emotionof sadness, reflective emotions elicited after the MST, enjoyment of the task, and authentic
relationship connections (Study 1), and by the negative association with difficulty identifying
emotions. Findings also provided some evidence of a second movement of retraction. Although
the emotion of sadness was envisioned with interest, it was also considered potentially harmful
and denied. Furthermore, the high defensive level state was positively related to mature defenses (e.g., self-observation, anticipation) and adaptive emotional regulation strategies such asreappraisal (e.g., positive reevaluation of the experience). This latter result is important, as thecorrelation was moderately high with reappraisal, thus underscoring the essential contributionof positive explicit reevaluation of the experience in this mental state. In sum, the subjective
experience is first embraced with interest and openness and is re-evaluated and reinterpreted
in a more positive and constructive light to cope with the experience. Finally, results support
the fact that this mental state was associated with better psychological adjustment (reduced
psychological symptoms and enhanced life satisfaction and self-esteem).
Reflective thinking. Full openness toward one’s subjective experience was highlighted
by the positive associations with mindfulness, authenticity, self-reflection, and interest in theemotion of sadness as well as perceiving sadness as an important emotion that has the potential
for personal growth. Reflective thinking was also positively associated with reflective and positive
emotions elicitation and with higher levels of enjoyment of the task, thus underscoring a greatinterest and reflectivity with respect to emotional contents. A higher interest in others’ subjective
experience was demonstrated by the positive association with empathy. Reflective thinking was
also expected and found to be related to the use of mature defenses (because of the measure usedin the present research) and to reappraisal strategies seeking to regulate difficult experiences.
Finally, consistent with past research (Bouchard et al., 2008), reflective thinking was unrelated to psychological adjustment. A possible explanation for this result rests on the distinction
between satisfaction versus maturity, which have been suggested to be two independent processes (e.g., Noam, 1998) that are conducive to different forms of well-being (King, 2001). In thepresent research, psychological adjustment mostly focused on satisfaction outcomes (e.g., life
satisfaction, self-esteem) rather than maturity. Maturity refers to a deeper self-understanding
characterized by personal growth (King, 2001), which is more likely to relate to reflective thinking. In the present research, results on attitudes toward sadness provide preliminary evidence
supporting this anticipated relationship. Indeed, reflective thinking was the only mental state
associated with perceiving sadness as having a potential for personal growth. Therefore, examining the relationship between reflective thinking and maturity outcomes (e.g., personal growth,
integration of the self, ego-development) appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Overall, concrete thinking, low defensive level and intermediate defensive level as measured by
the MST appear to well represent “lower” mental states according to the reflective continuum,

692

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

as they were found to be mostly linked to a large range of negative/immature constructs.
Conversely, high defensive level and reflective thinking seem to correspond to “higher” mental
states and were found to be mostly associated with positive/mature constructs. The objectiverational mental state appears to fall between these two broad categories, as it was found tobe associated with both negative/immature and positive/mature constructs. The consequencesof the objective-rational state presumably depend on the context; it may be associated withmore negative/immature consequences in contexts requiring emotional investment or attention,
but be adaptive in emotional contexts requiring intellectual abilities or quick problem solving.
Future research should examine this issue within different types of context.
The present findings also support the usefulness of aggregating all the subscales of the MST
into a measure of a mental states continuum along the line of their negative to positive contributions to the process of mentalization. Indeed, the Total MST score was positively related
to openness and interest in subjective experiences (authenticity, mindfulness, empathy), positiveand reflective emotions elicitation, the use of more mature defenses and adaptive emotional regulation strategies (reappraisal instead of suppression), perceptions of sadness as having a potential
for growth, and less psychological symptoms and emotional dysregulation (alexithymia).

Adaptability of the MSTThe MST can be adapted to diverse research questions, psychological issues, and populations.
The items can be easily adapted depending on the image chosen. For example, if one seeks tostudy couple relationships, the card #4 of the TAT could be used (the image portrays a woman
grabbing the shoulders of a man while the man is turning away from her, with another woman
in the background). In this case, the MST items could be adapted to the perspective of oneof the two characters or to both of them. Moreover, the MST can be adapted to other typesof material toward which participants are asked to react, think, or write about. For instance,
participants could be invited to read a vignette or to watch a film excerpt and then to write
down their spontaneous reactions to the material or to describe personal memories. Only someitems would have to be slightly adapted to fit a more personal material (e.g., “I thought thatthe situation I experienced [by the character] was difficult, but that things always settle down.”
The MST has the great advantage of being easily adaptable to various material and, consequently,
to diverse research questions.

Limitations and Conclusions
The present research was limited in a number of ways. First, all measures were self-report.
Although the MST was created with particular attention to bias concerns, this was not necessarily
the case for the other questionnaires used in this research. As discussed above, the use of denial
and minimization defenses in the intermediate defensive level stance could prevent one from
reporting personal difficulties and symptoms if the items are too obvious or susceptible to social
desirability. Likewise, self-closure from subjective experiences due to the emptiness characterizing
concrete thinking may have precluded adequate evaluation of one’s psychological adjustment
and problems (e.g., evaluation of one’s difficulties to identify emotions or of life satisfaction).
Behavioral or indirect psychological adjustment and emotional regulation measures might beneeded in future research to confirm the present findings (e.g., explicit versus implicit self-esteem
or observers’ ratings of the participants’ reactions to a simulated situation of rejection or tonegative feedback).
Second, only university students were recruited, which limits the generalization of the results.
Future research should replicate the present findings with community dwelling and clinicalpopulations. Finally, the present research focused on assessing mental states with an image related
to loss/depressive states. Consequently, its usefulness with respect to other themes remains
unknown (e.g., competence, couple interactions, sexuality). In its present form, the MST is nota global measure, but assesses mental states in the specific context of loss, which is an essential
clinical theme. Future research may use different images with the MST to capture the portraitof the person’s mental states with respect to other themes.

Mental States Task

693

In sum, the present research proposes a practical task that evaluates differences in attitudes
toward one’s and others’ subjective experience, in both French and English. Analyses suggested
that six mental states can be theoretically and empirically distinguished. The present findings
provide adequate evidence of validity and reliability for the MST as a task to evaluate mental
states in the here and now. This innovative self-report measure is likely to contribute to future
research in diverse domains and approaches, notably in facilitating the empirical investigationof mentalization and mental states. Future interesting avenues concern the clinical use of the
MST, which could eventually be used with patients in psychotherapy and clinicians. These few
stimulating avenues give an overview of the range of possible applications of the MST. It is ourhope that the development of the MST will encourage future research on mental states.

References
Aronow, E., Altman Weiss, K., & Reznikoff, M. (2001). A practical guide to the Thematic Apperception
Test: The TAT in clinical practice. Philadelphia, PA: Brunner-Routledge.
Bagby, R. M., Parker, J. D. A., & Taylor, G. J. (1994). The 20-item Toronto Alexithymia scale—I. Item
selection and cross-validation of the factor structure. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 38, 23–32.
Bateman, A., & Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy for Borderline Personality Disorder: Mentalization-Based
Treatment. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Beaudry, S. (2009). French validation of the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale. Unpublished manuscript.
Beaulieu-Pelletier (2012). Vers un approfondissement de l’évaluation des états mentaux : exploration de leurs
propriétés et répercussions [Deepening the evaluation of mental states: Examining their properties andrepercussions] (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Montreal, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Beaulieu-Pelletier, G., & Philippe, F. L. (2010). French translation of the Physical Health Questionnaire(PHQ). Unpublished manuscript.
Blais, M. R., Vallerand, R. J., Pelletier, L. G., & Brière, N. M. (1989). L’Échelle de satisfaction de vie:
Validation canadienne-française du “Satisfaction with Life Scale.” (French Canadian validation of theSatisfaction with Life Scale) Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement, 21, 210–223.
Bouchard, M. A., Audet, C., Picard, C., Carrier, M., & Milcent, M.-P. (2001). The Mental States Rating
System. Scoring manual. Unpublished manuscript.
Bouchard, M. A., & Lecours, S. (2008). Contemporary approaches to mentalization in the light of Freud’s
Project. In F. N. Busch (Ed.), Mentalization: Theoretical considerations, research findings, and clinicalimplications (Part I, chap. 3, pp. 103–129). New York, NY: The Analytic Press.
Bouchard, M. A., Target, M., Lecours, S., Fonagy, P., Tremblay, L.-M., Schachter, A., & Stein, H. (2008).
Mentalization in adult attachment narratives: Reflective functioning, mental states, and affect elaborationcompared. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 25, 47–66.
Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in psychologicalwell-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 822–848.
Bullitt, C., & Farber, B. A. (2002). Sex differences in the relationship between interpersonal problems anddefensive style. Psychological Reports, 91, 767–768.
Chan, D. W. (1997). Defensive styles and psychological symptoms among Chinese adolescents in HongKong. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 32, 269–276.
Chaplin, W. F., John, O. P., & Goldberg, L. R. (1988). Conceptions of states and traits: Dimensional
attributes with ideals as prototypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 541–557.
Cramer, P. (1998). Coping and defense mechanisms: What’s the difference? Journal of Personality, 66,
919–946.
Cramer, P. (2006). Protecting the self: Defense mechanisms in action. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Dauphin, J., Lecomte, C., Bouchard, M. A., Cyr, J., David, P., & Philippe, F. L. (2010). Are mentalization,
autobiographical memory and childhood trauma related? Manuscript submitted for publication.
Davidson, K., & MacGregor, M. W. (1998). A critical appraisal of self-report defense mechanism measures.
Journal of Personality, 66, 965–991.
Diener, E., Emmons, R. A., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The Satisfaction With Life Scale. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 49, 71–76.
Downey, G., Mougios, V., Ayduk, O., London, B. E., & Shoda, Y. (2004). Defensive Motivational System:
Insights from the startle response to rejection cues. Psychological Science, 15, 668–673.

694

Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 2013

Ferguson, M. J., & Bargh, J. A. (2004). How social perception can automatically influence behavior. Trends
in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 33–39.
Fonagy, P. (2008). The Mentalization-focused approach to social development. In F. N. Busch (Ed.), Mentalization: Theoretical considerations, research findings, and clinical implications (Part I, chap. 1, pp.
3–56). New York, NY: The Analytic Press.
Fortin, M. F., Coutu-Wakulczyk, G., & Engelsmann, F. (1989). Contribution to the validation of the SCL90-R in French-speaking women. Health Care for Women International, 10, 27–41.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An
integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 692–731.
Goldfeld, P., Terra, L., Abuchaim, C., Sordi, A., Wiethaeuper, D., Bouchard, M. A., . . . Ceitlin, L. H.
(2008). Mental states as part of countertransference responses in psychotherapists facing reports oftraumatic events of mourning and sexual violence. Psychotherapy Research, 18, 523–534.
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: Implications
for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 348–362.
Gyurak, A., & Ayduk, O. (2007). Defensive physiological reactions to rejection: The effect of self-esteem
and attentional control on startle response. Psychological Science, 18, 886–892.
Hofmann, W., Friese, M., & Strack, F. (2009). Impulse and self-control from a dual-systems perspective.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 162–176.
Jöreskog, K. G., & Sörbom, D. (2003). LISREL 8.54 for Windows (Computer software). Lincolnwood, IL:
Scientific Software International.
Kernis, M. H., & Goldman, B. M. (2006). A multicomponent conceptualization of authenticity: Theory andresearch. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 283–357.
King, L. A. (2001). The hard road to the good life: The happy, mature person. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 41, 51–72.
King, L. A., Scollon, C. K., Ramsey, C., & Williams, T. (2000). Stories of life transition: Subjective well-being
and ego development in parents of children with Down Syndrome. Journal of Research in Personality,
34, 509–536.
Lapierre, A. M., Gaudreau, P., & Blondin, J.-P. (1999, June). Évaluation de l’affectivité positive et négative encontexte sportif: Traduction francophone du PANAS. [Evaluation of the positive and negative affectivity
in sport context: French translation of the PANAS]. Paper presented the 23rd Annual Meeting of theSociété Québécoise de Recherche en Psychologie, Quebec, Qc, Canada
Lecours, S., Bouchard, M. A., & Normandin, L. (1995). Countertransference as the therapist’s mental activity: Experience and gender differences among psychoanalytically oriented psychologists. Psychoanalytic
Psychology, 12, 259-280.
Lecours, S., & Philippe, F. L. (2010). Evaluation of the attitude toward the emotion of sadness. Unpublishedmanuscript.
Lecours, S., & Philippe, F. L. (2009). French translation of the McLean Screening Instrument for Borderline
Personality Disorder. Unpublished manuscript.
Lepadatu, S. I. (2003). Event-related potentials and life events in subjects at high risk for alcohol dependence(Unpublished master’s thesis). McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Loas, G., Otmani, O., Verrier, A., Fremaux, D., & Marchand, M.-P. (1996). Factor analysis of the French
version of the 20 items Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20). Psychopathology, 29, 139–144.
Mehrabian, A. (2000). Manual for the balanced emotional empathy scale (BEES). Unpublished manuscript.
Mehrabian, A., & Epstein, N. (1972). A measure of emotional empathy. Journal of Personality, 40, 525–543.
Monroe, S. M., Rohde, P., Seeley, J. R., & Lewinsohn, P. M. (1999). Life events and depression in adolescence:
Relationship loss as a prospective risk factor for first onset of major depressive disorder. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 108, 606–614.
Murray, H. A. (1971). Thematic Apperception Test: Manual. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Original work published 1943).
Nickel, R., & Egle, U. T. (2006). Psychological defense styles, childhood adversities and psychopathology inadulthood. Child Abuse and Neglect, 30, 157–170.
Noam, G. (1998). Solving the ego development-mental health riddle. In P. M. Westenberg, A. Blasi, & L. D.
Cohn (Eds.), Personality development (pp. 271–296). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Normandin, L., & Bouchard, M. A. (1993). The effects of theoretical orientation and experience on rational,
reactive and reflective countertransference. Psychotherapy Research, 3, 77–94.

Mental States Task

695

Perry, J. C., & Hoglend, P. (1998). Convergent and discriminant validity of Overall Defensive Functioning.
The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186, 529–535.
Philippe, F. L., & Beaulieu-Pelletier, G. (2010). French translation of the Authenticity Inventory (AI-3).
Unpublished manuscript.
Philippe, F. L., Bois, K., Lecours, S., Desmet, M., Boucher, S., Beaulieu-Pelletier, G., & Fortin, A. (2012).
Revisiting the scoring procedure of the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire: New empirical and theoretical implications. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Philippe, F. L., Lecours, S., & Beaulieu-Pelletier, G. (2009). Resilience and positive emotions: Examining
the mediating role of emotional memories. Journal of Personality, 77, 139-175.
Reynolds, W. M. (1982). Development of reliable and valid short forms of the Marlowe-Crowne Social
Desirability Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38, 119-125.
Robins, R. W., Hendin, H. M., & Trzesniewski, K. H. (2001). Measuring global self-esteem: Construct validation of a single-item measure and the Rosenberg self-esteem scale. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 27, 151–161.
Rosen, C. S., Drescher, K. D., Moos, R. H., Finney, J. W., Murphy, R. T., & Gusman, F. (2000). Six- andten-item indexes of psychological distress based on the Symptom Checklist-90. Assessment, 7, 103-111.
Schat, A. C. H., Kelloway, E. K., & Desmarais, S. (2005). The Physical Health Questionnaire (PHQ): Construct validation of a self-report scale of somatic symptoms. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology,
10, 363-381.
Smith, E. C., & DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual
integration and links to understanding memory systems. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4,
108-131.
Thompson, E. R. (2007). Development and validation of an internationally reliable short-form of the Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 38, 227-242.
Trapnell, P. D., & Campbell, J. D. (1999). Private self-consciousness and the five-factor model of personality:
Distinguishing rumination from reflection. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 284-304.
Tremblay, L.-M., Bouchard, M. A., Lecours, S., & Beaulieu-Pelletier, G. (2011). Relationships between
emotional intelligence and defenses. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Tremblay, S., Lachance, L., & Richer, L. (2006). Étude des qualités psychométriques d’une adaptationquébécoise abrégée de l’Échelle de désirabilité sociale de Marlowe-Crowne. [Examining the psychometricproperties of a French adaptation of the short Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale]. Paper presented
at the 74th Annual Meeting of the Association Francophone Pour Le Savoir, Montreal, Qc, Canada.
Trijsburg, W., Bond, M., Drapeau, M., Thygesen, K., & de Roten, Y. (2005, June). The defense stylequestionnaire (DSQ-60): Shorter but improved. Paper presented at the 36th Annual Meeting of theSociety for Psychotherapy Research, Montreal, Qc, Canada.
Ungerer, J. A., Waters, B., Barnett, B., & Dolby, R. (1997). Defense style and adjustment in interpersonal
relationships. Journal of Research in Personality, 31, 375–385.
Vaillant, G. E. (1992). Ego mechanisms of defense: A guide for clinicians and researchers. Washington, DC:
American Psychiatric Press.
Vaillant, G. E., Bond, M., & Vaillant, C. O. (1986). An empirically validated hierarchy of defense mechanisms.
Archives of General Psychiatry, 43, 786-794.
Zanarini, M. C., Vujanovic, A., Parachini, E. A., Boulanger, J. L., Frankenburg, F. R., & Hennen, J. (2003).
A screening measure for BPD: The McLean Screening instrument for borderline personality disorder(MSI-BPD). Journal of Personality Disorders, 17, 568–573.
Zeigler-Hill, V. (2006). Discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem: Implications for narcissism
and self-esteem instability. Journal of Personality, 74, 119–144.