Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

Near, Far, Wherever You Are:
Views on Sino-Russian Relations

A scene from the fifth session of the SRC International Summer Symposium “Northeast
Asia’s Faultline: One Hundred Years of Sino/Russian/Soviet Competitive Cooperation”
held on 14 July 2017.

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Mongolia’s view on Sino-Russian relations
Nyamdoljin Adiya(Institute of International Affairs, Mongolian Academy of Sciences)

First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the invitation to participate in thisconference.

Actually, there is no Mongolian view on Sino-Russian relations. Officially, theMongolian government doesn’t publicly comment about other states’ relations withthird parties. But Sino-Russian relations are unique, since these are the only two statesthat could influence Mongolia’s international position and internal development.

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My presentation will be in three parts. Firstly, I’m going to start out with a history.
Then I am going to talk about Mongolia and Sino-Russian relations during the Cold
War. Finally, I will discuss Mongolia’s view of Sino-Russian relations after the Cold
War. Many of you know that Mongolia is between geopolitical giants – Russia andChina. Mongolia cannot match its two neighbors in any quantitative criteria. This is arare case in the political geography of the world given that both countries are nuclear
powers, permanent members of the UN Security Council, and two of the main politicaland economic players in the world. Mongolia is a small country with a territory of 1.5
million square kilometers and a population of 3 million people.

To represent the history of relations between Mongolia and its two neighbors, I decided
to go back to the times of Chinggis Khaan. I am obviously not the first person to talkabout him. Mongolia is better known to the world through its great leader Chinggis
Khaan. In Sherry Ortner’s view, Chinggis Khaan is a key symbol for Mongols. In an
analysis of historical personalities, in 1995 the Washington Post named Chinggis Khaan
the “Man of the Millennium”. Chinggis Khaan built the largest contiguous land empire
in world history ranging from Korea and China to Eastern Europe. The empire included
the Middle East and he wisely ruled this vast territory with its countless number ofpeople. This was the only period in history when the Mongols dominated therelationship with their two neighbors. It’s a historical fact that Eurasia has gained its
present geopolitical shape only after many nations were brought under the united rule ofChinggis Khan, his children and grandchildren.

Actually, the Mongols provided the first historical context between Russia and China,
because of the direct contact with the Qing Dynasty. In 1689, Russia and the Qing
Dynasty signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk. It was the first document of its kind in thehistory of Russia-China relations. While setting the framework for political and trade3Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

relations between the two countries, the document failed to specify the borders.
According to this treaty, Mongolia had lost territory in the south to the Manchu, and in
the north to the Russians. The remaining central part began to experience increasingpressure on both sides.

From 1691 to 1911, Mongolians were under Manchu rule for 220 years. From the
beginning of the 1900s, Mongolia attracted Russia’s attention and gained its politicalstrategic respect. In Russian strategy, this region was supposed to become a “bufferzone” between Russia and China and to assure a “balance of power” in East and Central
Asia where the rivalry of great powers had started to intensify.

Taking into the consideration the great powers’ sharpening competition, Mongolians
helped to preserve the status quo in Asia. The independence of Mongolia and potential
deterioration of relations with China over the Chinese-Mongolian disputes did notcorrespond with the important foreign policy goals of Russia. Given this situation, theRussian government agreed to support Outer Mongolia only in achieving autonomy
under China’s suzerainty. The proclamation of independence by Mongolia in December
1911 brought Russia to complicated diplomatic ground with China over Mongolia.

Mongolia again became a factor in international relations at the end of World War Two.
In 1945 the Mongolian People’s Republic was not an independent state. It was legallypart of China, although the Chinese had not been able to exercise effective control. At
the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Soviet Union insisted that the position ofMongolia between the USSR and China be clarified. The Soviet Union played an activerole in eliminating the duality of the status of Mongolia from the point of view ofinternational law. However, Roosevelt secured the recognition of Outer Mongolia’s

4Vol. 5, April 25, 2018status quo by the provision, “The status quo in Outer Mongolia shall be preserved”,
which was spelled out in the Yalta Treaty.

Both China and the Soviet Union obligated themselves not to subjugate Mongolia in the
future, and the two sides agreed to grant independence to Mongolia after a “referendum
on independence” was organized. In October 1945, the Mongolian people cast theirvotes in favor of full independence. Based on returns of the referendum, the People’s
Republic of China officially recognized the Mongolian People’s Republic on 6 January
1946. When the United Nations was established in 1945, Mongolia applied formembership. However, due to the different excuses by the Republic of China and theWestern powers, its application for membership was rejected several times until 1961.

Border clashes between China and the USSR almost led to war in the late 1960s andearly 1970s. Mongolia concluded a bilateral treaty with the USSR in 1966. The 20-year
treaty included defense-related agreements and the Soviet Union stationed troops inMongolia to enhance its strategic advantage over China. The Sino-Soviet
rapprochement process resulting from General Secretary Gorbachev’s proposals during
his speech at Vladivostok in July of 1986 had a positive impact on the normalization of
Sino-Mongolian relations, particularly in the 1990s. The withdrawal of Soviet/Russian
military forces stationed on the territory of Mongolia contributed greatly to thenormalization of Sino-Russian and Sino-Mongolian relations. The withdrawal also led
to the beginning of a new era in Mongolia’s security environment.

In the early 1990s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union provided an opportunity for
Mongolia to free itself from the dominating Soviet influence. In 1994 Mongolia madesweeping changes to its national security and foreign policies by adopting three basic
documents – National Security, Foreign Policy Concepts and the Military Doctrine.

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Foreign Policy Concepts provides that Mongolia shall safeguard its security and vital
national interests by political and diplomatic means, and create a favorable external
environment. According to this concept, Mongolia’s top foreign policy priority is good
relations with its two neighbors. It does not mean keeping equidistance between them ortaking identical positions on all issues. This policy means strengthening trust anddeveloping good-neighbor relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with both ofthem. Mindful of its experience from 1960 to the 1980s, Mongolia pursues a policy of
non-involvement in relation to the future possible disputes between Russia and China,
unless the disputes affect its vital national interests.

As a practical step towards a balanced relationship with Russia and China, Mongolia
has declared nonalignment with any great power. It will not allow any state to use its
territory for the purpose of committing acts of aggression or other violent acts, nor will
it conclude any treaty or agreement that would run counter to the sovereignty andindependence of its neighbors. Mongolia’s policy of the non-stationing or non-transit offoreign troops on its territory is in full conformity with the Sino-Russian declaration not
to use the territory, territorial waters and airspace of other countries against each other.

Mongolia’s open, multi-pillar foreign policy is designed not only to overcome its
former isolation from the outside world, but also to accelerate its development and thus
to add some political and economic weight as well as to obtain some credible
counterweights to its Southern and Northern neighbors. Hence, its foreign policy
priority is to develop broad relations with the world’s influential countries such as the
US, Japan, Britain, Germany and France. Mongolia aims to foster the political andeconomic interests of these countries in Mongolia. Therefore, Mongolia is looking for athird neighbor, while understanding that not one single state, but a group of states, could

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together add up to a “third neighbor”. Since Mongolia borders only Russia and China,
this third-neighbor strategy aims at forging special ties with more distant countries thatmight be willing to make investment and support Mongolia’s development. The policyof Mongolia in respect of the third neighbor is not directed against any state, especiallyagainst the two neighboring powers.

After the Cold War, Russia and China created a political and economic alliance called
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Since the beginning of 2000, bothneighbors invited Mongolia to the SCO. Mongolia is now participating in thisorganization as an observer.

Mongolia is interested in promoting trilateral Mongolia-Russia-China relationships,
including the possibility of its becoming a bridge for cooperation between the twoneighbors.

Mongolian leaders held separate bilateral summit meetings with their Chinese andRussian counterparts in the summer of 2014 in Ulaanbaatar. Mongolia pushed for a newtrilateral mechanism to make certain that these two powerful neighbors did not proceedwith transportation and energy cooperation without considering the interests ofMongolia.

The first trilateral summit among the three presidents took place on the sidelines of the
11-12 September 2014 SCO annual meeting in Dushanbe. Tajikistan President
Elbegdorj suggested all sides work together on specific projects related to transnationaltransit infrastructure development. The three countries agreed in principle to build a‘Steppe Road’ in Mongolia, reviving a pre-modern transport network that facilitatedtrade between China and Russia. They also agreed to incorporate the ‘Steppe Road’ into7

Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

the Chinese ‘One Belt and One Road’ and the Russian Eurasian Economic Union(EEU).

Since that first tripartite summit, there have been two others. On 9 July 2015 Mongolian
President Elbegdorj met Xi Jinping and Putin at the second trilateral summit meeting in
Ufa, Russia on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting and 15th annual SCO summit. At thismeeting, the three presidents approved a roadmap for trilateral cooperation.

The third tripartite summit on 23 June 2016, organized on the sidelines of the 16th SCO
annual meeting in Uzbekistan’s Tashkent, saw the breakthrough agreement onestablishing an economic corridor between the three countries. They signed an“Economic Corridor Plan” agreement, the purpose of which is to coordinate specificplans to facilitate economic traffic among the countries.

The concept of One Belt One Road is very positive for Mongolia. But some of thedecisions may be politically difficult to implement as far as they might involve more
influence from China, both economically and politically. Therefore, Mongolia should be
able to determine what kind of conditions should be tolerable and how it could use
those initiatives in a beneficial way.

In conclusion, I would like to say that Mongolia has complicated relations with China
and Russia. The independence and sovereignty of Mongolia depend on the balance ofpower between Russia and China. Distortion of this balance may endanger Mongolia’s
independence. The beginning of the last century was marked by the release of Outer
Mongolia from the Qing Empire with the Russian Empire’s support. Further
developments related to the attainment of Mongolia’s independence and nationalsovereignty were also associated with the use of force. This was the case with the8Vol. 5, April 25, 2018struggle against Chinese occupation, in the battles against Japan on the river at
Khalkhin Gol, and confrontation in the 1960s and 1980s with China. Only thewithdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia in the late 1980s led to the country nolonger being seen as an arena of direct military confrontation between the two neighbors.
These changes have become a precondition for the radically new international politicalsituation around Mongolia, characterized by non-military rivalry between the great
powers. An important principle of the foreign policy of Mongolia was not joining any
military-political blocs. Now five nuclear powers have recognized the territory ofMongolia as a nuclear weapon free zone. Mongolia’s two neighbors also reaffirmed
their legally binding commitments with respect to Mongolia assumed because ofbilateral treaties.

Peaceful relations between these two nuclear powers leads to stability, not only in
Mongolia but also in Eurasia. The time in the 1960s and the 1970s when China and theSoviet Union were opposed was very dangerous. Mongolia also views closer ties
between Russia and China as helpful to Mongolia’s interests in a variety of areas. For
example, the most important economic exchange between Russia and China involves
energy. Russia is a major energy exporter, while China’s imports grow each year.
Moreover, China has become a profitable market for Mongolian products of the mining
industry.

Mongolia should take advantage of its geographical location. Mongolia can participate
in building a railway network because the country is the shortest route that can link
China and Russia, and Asia and Europe. In addition to this, Mongolia could develop its
transit transport under the project “Russia- Mongolia- China Economic Corridor”. BothRussia and Mongolia are interested in the involvement of China’s Road and Belt
initiative, and its implementation is important for all concerned.

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Russia-China Relations: an Indian Perspective
Ajay Patnaik(Jawaharlal Nehru University)

The India and China relationship has many paradoxes. On the one hand, both arecooperating on a global level in many multilateral forums. Also, simultaneously, there
are a lot of competitive elements to the relationship and engagement. Russia on theother hand, which had a very difficult relationship with China in the 1970s and 1980s,
has developed this relationship to a phenomenal level. I want to consider how I shouldlook at Russia in this paradox of the India and China relationship. Russia is developing
its relationship with China. Does it impact India? Or, does India have the same views as
Russia as far as its relationship with China is concerned?

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Obviously, certain aspects of the Russia-China relationship are compatible with India’s
long-term interests. For example, these include building a multi-polar world order,
cooperation through multilateral economic institutions and climate negotiations. In thelong-term, we have a lot of compatibility. However, in certain respects, China’s policies
and actions have negatively affected India’s interests. The reason for which India did
not go to the Belt Road Initiative conference in China is the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC). Other controversies include aggressive energy acquisition in Eurasia
by China, and blocking India’s entry into global forums like the Nuclear SuppliersGroup (NSG) and permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council.
These issues create difficulties in the India-China relationship.

This paper will analyze how Russia is caught between two friendly countries: one witheconomic progress — that is China — and, the other (India) with great expectations
from a traditional friend like Russia. China is growing at a very fast rate as an economic
power. It is not difficult to understand why Russia has taken so much of an interest in
developing this relationship, especially after the Ukrainian crisis and sanctions. But at
the same time, India has been a traditional friend, and Russia would not like to see India
as a declining power, or as a weak power in Asia. Also, it is not in Russia’s interest to
let that happen. What I am saying is, Russia would like China and India to be important
vectors in its Asia policy. However, there is a problem with some of the Chinese moves.
These moves have the potential for creating strong disappointment with Russia’s failure
to factor in India’s concerns effectively with Beijing.

The three states are, nevertheless, working in tandem on some global and regional
issues. We should have hope that Russia’s relationship with India and China can be
helpful in minimizing the differences between New Delhi and Beijing. Russia wasinstrumental in the India-China relationship going to a higher level. All three countries

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were looking towards cooperation with the United States and Europe. Then, in 2006
BRICS was formed and the first summit was held in 2009. There has been this urge tocome together and Russia has always been a catalyst to bring India and China closer.

There are still unsettled borders, but all three countries have some convergence ofinterest in changing the global order - the order that is being created in the post-Cold
War period. The three countries are worried that their emergence as global players
could be blocked if this unipolar world continues. Consequently, you find in summit
after summit, the emphasis is on a multipolar world order. That has been a common
concern for India, China, and Russia, because the three countries favor a global orderwhere there is no single dominant power. All three are now rising up, and they would
like to have their voices heard. The current institutions that have existed since theSecond World War such as the European Union are not compatible with the interests ofthese countries. They see their sovereignty being constrained in the name of humanrights and democracy.

There is also more focus in BRICS on climate negotiations. Each country is trying tocreate a clean environment using different energy sources rather than relying on thecoal-based power sector. With the Americans withdrawing from the Paris climate talks,
the onus is not just on Western Europe but also India, China, and Russia. India, China
and Russia are big polluters but also interested in sustainable growth and arrestingclimate change. They are committed to the Paris Agreement, and they will continue tobe so.

Similarly, these countries have come together on the issue of international terrorism.
Why did India join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after its initial
reluctance? It was because of the anti-terrorism networking that the SCO could do by12Vol. 5, April 25, 2018exchanging information. India’s reluctance to join a multilateral organization led by
China changed. When India found terrorist elements crossing its borders the SCO
became a more useful platform so it applied to join. Nevertheless, from India’s
perspective, China has a double-standard on Pakistan-based terrorists targeting India.
India’s efforts to get some individuals based in Pakistan named as terrorists by theUnited Nations has faced resistance from China. Even though America has alreadydeclared these individuals ‘terrorists’, China is blocking. Beijing has blocked every
move by India in the United Nations Security Council to name Pakistani terrorists as
global terrorists, or even their organizations as global terrorist organizations. From
India’s point of view, China has been ignoring these Pakistan-based terrorist networks,
focusing more on other areas and not taking into account India’s concerns.

Pakistan has been one of the factors that shapes the India-China relationship. Russia has
been instrumental in bringing India to the SCO and BRICS. However, there are
multilateral institutions where Russia supports India’s case but is unable to persuade
China. India is keen on becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council, but
is unable to find support from China. India hopes Russia will help. In fact, quite
recently, the Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, was quoted as saying, “We
are not putting any pressure. What we feel, since Russia and China share good relations,Moscow should talk with China. Our effort is to convince China on the issue and also
involve nations friendly with both countries.” It was also reported in the Indian press
that lack of help from Moscow was possibly the reason why India was delaying anagreement on two additional nuclear reactors at Kudankulam (The Times of India, 6June 2017).

The Sino-Pakistan nexus often hinders attempts to improve bilateral and multilateralengagement between New Delhi and Beijing. When China decided to build the CPEC,

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there was no engagement with India. India’s concerns were not considered. This project
has further strained the relationship between India and China. Russia’s interest in the
CPEC will not go down well with India. In my latest book, I had advocated the idea of“India’s Silk Road Strategy”. India’s establishment would like Russia to show moreinterest in the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC) which is
progressing at a slow pace. A lot of work has been done to put this corridor in place, butthere are stretches where they are not complete. India, like China, has also shown
interest in a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the Eurasian
Economic Union, but nothing much has come about on this. If China manages to brokera deal between its BRI and the EEU, India will have reason to feel aggrieved with
Russia.

You can also see the first-ever joint military exercise by Russia and Pakistan. The
exercise, though not on a big scale, was called Druzhba-2016 and held from 24
September to 7 October 2016. Russia supplied four helicopters to Pakistan and thisannoyed India. Because of mounting concerns in India, Russia announced that it would
not hold the exercise in the future. The episode did introduce some irritants into therelationship. Pakistan is also set to receive four MI-35 attack helicopters from Russia
for $153 million in 2017.

So, Russia’s interest in the CPEC, is wonderful from the Chinese perspective, but from
India’s point of view, CPEC passes through an area which is disputed. The area is
occupied by Pakistan. Whenever Indian leaders or heads of the military visit areas
occupied by Pakistan, China raises huge objections. Inside India but disputed by China,
Beijing raises huge objections. I’m not saying the entirety of China’s Silk Road corridor
is bad. In fact, I have a different view about India’s INSTC and China’s Silk Road
project — they can be harmonized with each other and encourage cooperation in

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Eurasia. It’s not impossible for us to cooperate, but there are serious sovereignty issues
where India will not compromise. China never does. Responding to queries about
India’s non-participation in One Belt One Road (OBOR), the official spokesperson of
the Indian External Affairs Ministry commented that the international community iswell aware of India’s position on the CPEC, which is being projected as the flagshipproject of the OBOR (MEA, 13 May 2017).

No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns and sovereignty ofterritory and integrity. The disconnect between Russia and India on this issue is quite
clear. Russia has shown interest in the CPEC and wants closer cooperation with China.
The CPEC riles India more than anything, so as far as China’s recent activities in theregion are concerned, New Delhi probably hoped for a less-enthusiastic response from
Russia to such Chinese moves.

To counter China’s moves — this is also important — Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi made a pitch for developing the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor with support fromJapan, while addressing the annual general meeting of the African Development Bankin Gujarat’s capital, Gandhinagar, in May 2017. The Indian and Japanese governments
presented a vision document. This move was a desire to curtail the ever-increasingpresence of China on the continent. Further details on this corridor were expected to be
discussed during the scheduled meeting of these two Prime Ministers later in 2017.

Now, India’s simple strategy, as I said, is to go through Iran, and to have this railway
corridor right up to Russia — it’s the INSTC. Another port in Iran is Chabahar, from
where one can enter into Afghanistan and enter into three Central Asian countries:
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. This will be India’s look-north policy of the15

Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

north-south axis of the Silk Road. India is also trying — but not doing much, andhoping Russia will put pressure on neighboring countries to fast-track these projects.

There are differences on the nature of military cooperation between Russia and China.
The Sukhoi 35 is one of Russia’s most advanced military aircraft, and it is being sold toChina. Obviously, this will bolster Chinese capability, which might ultimately help
Pakistan. Actually, many things are Pakistan-centric here. Russia is selling its mostadvancedaircraft,

which

the

Chinesesometimes

have

been

accusedofreverse-engineering. The Chinese might then sell this aircraft to Pakistan. India is not
happy that such advanced weapons are being exchanged in this region by China. This isa situation where some of the actions of Russia might not gel well with India’s interests.
I believe that big countries have to pursue independent national interests. Nevertheless,since you are working towards a synergy at the global level, you also have to limit thepossibilities of competition and conflict and try to moderate defenses to a level where
big countries can work together. Recently, this has not been the case.

China is also a competitor on the energy market. Over the last 10 years, China has
become India’s main competitor. In 2005, India lost the PetroKazakh bid in Kazakhstan
to China. India offered 3.9 billion dollars for PetroKazakh, so China had to give 4.1
billion dollars. India lost another important bid to China in 2008. Putin has been
speaking since 2006 about the SCO energy club, but nothing has really come out of that.
For example, there has been no collective joint project. India believes Moscow is close
to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan so why can’t there be joint collective
efforts for energy in this region? Why do India and China need to compete with eachother?

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To conclude, Russia needs to reassure India about its concerns regarding territorial
sovereignty issues, even as China tries to overlook India’s concerns. Moscow needs tobring Beijing to accept that there can be no different attitude towards terrorists in
Xinjiang and terrorists in Kashmir. Both are linked and need to be dealt with firmly.
Without this recognition, the SCO will be a forum which only takes care of China’s
interests. Russia can change this perception by making the SCO a truly universal forum
for combating international terrorism. Russia, India, and China are already cooperating
globally. Finally, the BRICS framework must act as a catalyst in fostering greater
India-China cooperation on the contentious issues that plague the relationship. Thank
you.

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Sino-Russian Competition/Cooperation in Latin
America
Ulises Granados(Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico)

My research is about Sino-Russian competition and cooperation in Latin America. A
big question is whether a new era of Washington antagonism versus China and Russia isin the making. Another significant question is what Russia and Chinese interests are in
Latin America? Why are their interests more visible than before? The Russian andChinese presence in Latin America can be understood as a kind of reaction to America’s
lack of interest in the region. This is a common view among some specialists who argue
that the US, since 9/11 and President Obama’s pivot to Asia, has been preoccupied with18

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other parts of the world. Or perhaps the US took for granted a region that someAmericans think of as a ‘backyard’ of the US.

Consequently, the Chinese and the Russians have been going slowly but steadily into
Latin America. This has been the case since the 1990s. Russia’s foreign policy strategy
has given special attention to Latin America. This is especially true for South America
more than Mexico and Central America. China, too, since the 1990s, has been interested
in Latin America. However, its interest is different from Russia. The Chinese presence
and interest in Latin America goes back many years. China has had a long tradition offriendship with the region since the 1970s. The basic policy of Chinese engagement in
Latin America is based on the One China policy. This is the frame which has beenshaping the relationship between Beijing and most Latin American countries. Recently,
in 2008 and in 2016, there were Chinese policy papers on Latin America. China’s
foreign policy to Latin America is becoming more complex. The Chinese government
has put much effort in using Latin America for their economic development. So, what is
the nature of the Chinese and Russian presence in the hemisphere? How do they
respond to US hemispheric policy? How complementary or competitive are Beijing andMoscow’s interactions with countries in the region?

My presentation is as follows. I identify some features of Chinese involvement in theregion. This is followed by an analysis of the cooperative nature of Russia’s andChina’s presence in Latin America, and a discussion as to what extent they might
compete and cooperate. Finally, I will consider what the limits might be of the overall
Chinese and Russian presence in Latin America.

Volatile political processes in Latin America are important to remember because theymight affect future Chinese and Russian engagement in the region. First, I want to say

19Vol. 5, April 25, 2018that the Chinese interest in Latin America is framed by the One China policy. To date,
11 countries in Central America and the Caribbean still have diplomatic relations with
Taipei, so the basic policy of Chinese engagement in the region is trying to strengthen
this One China policy, and if it’s possible, to change diplomatic recognition. The mostrecent example of a country changing its diplomatic recognition of Taipei is Panama.

President Xi Jinping travelled to the region in 2013, 2014, and 2016. On the lastoccasion, he went to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Lima,
Peru. For China, Latin America is very important because it is a huge market.
Especially Central and South America are important for raw materials. Trade has been
growing in the last few years. China has been engaging in active UN diplomacy withsome selected countries in South America. China is also active at the multilateral levelwith the Forum of China and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. This
forum has to be updated next year. We will have a meeting with the Chinese
representatives, I think, in October. There will be a meeting for specialists in order togive new ideas and proposals for how to foster this bilateral relationship. It’s very
important that the relationship is based on two white papers. The 2008 white paper was
aspirational in nature so it was updated in September 2016. There are also new concepts
that I observed after the One Belt One Road (OBOR) meeting in Beijing. Is it possible
for Latin America to be inserted in this OBOR grand strategy? I don’t know how
exactly, but we will find out.

China belongs as an observer to some multilateral mechanisms in Latin America likethe Pacific Alliance. China has been very active with Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela,
Peru, Colombia, and with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Chinese companies are very
interested in forging trade relationships in the region, but the huge problem is that they
don’t invest a lot. Foreign Direct Investment is still very low in Latin America. During20Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

last year’s APEC meeting in Lima President Xi Jinping offered his own vision of an
Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area (FTA) that was initially proposed in 2014. He is very
interested in forging these FTAs as a super FTA in the Asia-Pacific region. FTAs
already exist with Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Mercosur.

In comparison, Russian interest in Latin America started in the early 2000s. Russia iscurrently an observer of the Organization of American States (OAS), Mercosur and theCentral American Integration System. Trade has been growing between Russia andLatin America, but on a lower level as compared with China. Why is Russia in Latin
America? I think that since the Georgia conflict in 2008 and after events in Crimea in2014 the Russians are looking for partners in the Western Hemisphere. Some countries
have supported Russia by abstaining to vote against it in the UN. Bilaterally, Russia hasforged particularly good relationships with Cuba, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, andVenezuela, and to a certain extent, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Peru.
With Nicaragua, it is very interesting to know that, like the Chinese, the Russians too
are interested in the trans-oceanic channel.

Russia is very interested in Argentina and Brazil. Some State-Owned Enterprises are
doing deals in oil and gas, and in the arms industry. Venezuela is also a good partner intrade dealings in the oil industry. Finally, bilateral relations with Cuba have been
growing since 2000. Russia has written off 90% of the outstanding debt of Havana. It is
important to point out that the Trump factor is important. It’s necessary to put Russian
advances in Latin America in a global perspective. Until the election of US President
Donald Trump, I think observers noted that Russian interests were mainly in Eurasia,
not in the Americas. Actually, Jose Insulza, the former Secretary General of the OAS,
recognized two years ago that Russia’s intention to influence Latin America ispractically impossible. I don’t think it’s impossible, but it seems limited.

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So, there is cooperation between China and Russia in the region. I think at the global
level, there are some conventions of interest, but conversion of interest is mostly in
Eurasia, not in Latin America. I think Latin America might be of secondary importancefor Russia and China from the geographical perspective, as compared with Europe, theMiddle East, or the Asian realm.

At the institutional level, cooperation is framed within BRICS. Despite BRICS, at thebilateral level, Russia-China cooperation beyond mere statements of cooperation
appears difficult. There might be one exception — Venezuela. Venezuela is having
trouble paying its debt. It has also fallen behind on shipments of crude oil. It is possiblethat a coordinated political decision between Moscow and Beijing might be reached in
the near future, but it’s not certain. It is improbable to see a mechanism for
Sino-Russian cooperation in Latin America, such as an SCO-type organization. This isbecause both countries understand that the level of terror activities in the hemisphere isalmost non-existent. Furthermore, they recognize that US political influence in thehemisphere remains strong and cannot be easily confronted. As a result, there are limits
to cooperation.

What about Sino-Russian competition in the hemisphere? There is a certain degree ofcompetition. Russia is looking to maintain partners — especially Venezuela, Nicaragua,
Ecuador, and Bolivia. As for Moscow in the political realm, I think there is a kind of
shadow over the political process in the region. Moscow’s interest in anti-American
candidates for future presidential elections in the region, including Mexico in 2017,
might be likely to emerge soon. But in the economic realm, there might be some kind ofcompetition because of China. I think Sino-Russian competition is more likely todevelop in the race for economic partners. In Argentina, we have seen recently that
Russia has lost some bids to China and America for steam turbine contracts for nuclear

22Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

power plants. Another area is arms transfer to Venezuela and to other countries. Arms
sales market in Latin America are very small, if you think globally. However, there issome kind of competition between China and Russia.

The Cuba case is particularly interesting. I think that Cuba is very keen to have both
Beijing’s assistance (such as a new batch of computers), but is also hoping to have deals
with Russia in other areas (like oil shipments). But I don’t think this is a conflict. I think
the presence, in general, of Russia and China in Latin America goes in parallel. The two
powers are not clashing, but neither are they cooperating. It’s like a bad neighbor thatyou live with, but you don’t speak to him, so we live our own lives.

My basic conclusions are that Russian interests in the region have intensified recently,
especially since 2014. The Chinese presence is more consistent and more complete.
China and Russia’s objectives in the region are not identical. They have a different story
in the region, and their own projection of hard and soft power is unique. In politics, I
think Russia is thought of as a greater threat, because of the potential for triggering USintervention. There may be more links with left-wing candidates in future presidential
elections, like in Mexico. China is more worried about economic and commercial
aspects in Latin America. The economy is of paramount importance for Beijing.

So, what is in the future? I think Sino-Russian cooperation is extremely limited beyond
the BRICS model. Venezuela and Cuba are two special cases where cooperation ispossible. I think it’s possible to see a pattern of commercial competition between
Beijing and Moscow in big infrastructure projects and arms sales in the region, and it’s
important to know that China will be likely to have the upper hand here, because it’s
economically more powerful.

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Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

In sum, it’s possible to characterize the Sino-Russian presence in Latin America as
co-existence, rather than cooperation and competition. On a final note, politics in Latin
America is changing quickly. Until two years ago, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile had
left-wing, anti-American politicians and heads of states. Now things are changing, sothat might influence the short, medium, and long-term Russian and Chinese presence inthe area.

24Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

Comments to the Papers Presented during thePanel Near, Far, Wherever You Are: Views on
Sino-Russian Relations

Jarosław Jańczak
(Adam Mickiewicz University)

The three papers: Mongolia's view on Sino-Russian Relations by Adiya Nyamdoljin,
Russia-China Relations: An Indian Perspective by Ajay Patnaik and Sino-RussianCompetition/Cooperation in Latin America by Ulises Granados, present a very25

Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

interesting and holistic approach to Russian-Chinese relations. The last one, developed
not in the context of direct neighborhood, but through the perspective of “third states”,
creates a much wider perspective for understanding the nature and dynamism of these
relations. The three papers deal, in fact, with three levels of how the competition andcooperation between the two big actors have been built. The case of Mongolia reveals
the local dimension of the processes (being sandwiched between two dominantneighbors), India – the regional dimension (considering the Asian continent as amega-region) and Latin America – the global. This variety of perspectives
contextualizes Russian-Chinese relations in a multi-level approach.

The papers reveal at least four common factors when debating the relations. First, whatis stressed by all the authors is the long-lasting presence, influence and/or competitionof Russia and China in the debated states and regions. At the same time, however, theirmodel differs. China seems to have built its position there gradually, consistently andemploying a step-by-step strategy, as opposed to Russia, which after the post-Cold War
withdrawal entered the regions concerned with a new impetus, especially following the
Georgian and Ukrainian wars. The isolation of Russia by the West pushed it towards theEast, as well as other global regions. The question arises, however, of how lasting thisshift is. The neo-functional approach – especially in the context of the West still
dominating in Russian import-export – would suggest that, sooner or later, the relations
will have to be normalized. Would that mean diminishing Russian interest in the26

Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

non-western dimensions of foreign policy? If so, will China be left as the dominant
actor in the debated regions?

Second, the three papers employ (even if the authors do not declare it directly) theperspective of classical border studies to understand the dynamism of the analyzed
processes. Russian-Chinese relations, as examined from the perspective of third parties,
reveal that state borders are not static, even from the non-neorealist perspective. States
try to expand, not necessarily by territorial expansion, but by building zones ofinfluence, alliances, integration groupings, client relations, etc. To understand thedomestic dynamism of a state, a look at how its edges are organized and how theychange is relevant (Walters 2004). Using, for example, the concept of geopoliticalmodels (as proposed by Browning and Joennimi 2008), it seems that both China andRussia implement a neo-imperial model, based on nested, concentric circles. Here, theinfluence zones have been created by powers, attracting (or forcing) other states tobelong to their “own” respective camps. At the same time, however, the discourse ofboth Russia and China follows the neo-medieval order (with many more or less equal
centers), criticizing American domination and calling for a multi- or polycentric worldorder. The same refers to their borders and the geostrategies visible there. While theborder between Russia and China follows the model of a limes (a final, confirmed line
separating political-territorial entities), especially after the final solution of territorial
disputes (Iwashita 2008), Mongolia exemplifies a march (a buffer zone) or colonial27

Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

frontier (border of expansion) in Russian-Chinese relations, and India – a colonial
frontier with China, due to boundary disputes.

Third, all the texts are dominated by a (neo-)realist approach, with states, interests andgeopolitical games involving Russia and China, and seem to be rooted in the
Huntingtonian concept of clashing civilizations (Huntington 1996). One should
remember, however, that apart from the dominating element of conflict in his
considerations, the model also stresses integration within civilizations, which is often
underestimated. It should be noted that other academic approaches could additionallyenrich the understanding of the processes investigated, for example – social
constructivism, with its concentration on norms, ideas and identities, and a strong
explanatory value in international relations. The question is how strong Russia andChina are as “normative powers.” What norms, values and ideas that they promote are
attractive for Mongolia, India or Latin American states? But also, in the mutual relationsof both powers, which of the above-enumerated elements flow across their common
border and in which direction?

Fourth, the issue visible in all the texts is the world order, with both Russia and China
promoting a multipolar model. This global approach means that the two powers areaiming at local and regional leadership. Leadership in international relations means thata state is willing and capable of encouraging other actors to contribute to achieving28Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

collective goals (Lübkemeier 2007, p. 7) followed by the recognition of this leadershipby other actors. Russia seems to have strong ambitions for leadership, but its
capabilities, especially economic, are limited, in contrast to China, which appears tohave more resources but is moderate with its aspirations. The question arises of whether
a joint leadership of a new world order, mutually supplementing respective shortages, ispossible, especially in the debated regions?

The above general comments allow me to make further remarks regarding each of thetexts. In the case of Mongolia as presented by Adiya Nyamdoljin, several aspects areworth stressing, as they add new insights into the Russian-Chinese neighborhood. For
example, the historical legacy of the Mongols, who ruled Russia and China in the past.
Is this period of history only a symbol of foreign domination in both states, or can it betransformed into a symbolic manifestation of the unity or roots of “Asianness”? Anotheraspect discussed is the current self-positioning of Mongolia with regard to its neighbors
in response to their foreign policies. Is Mongolia going to play the role of a buffer zone,
or rather a bridge? Both strategies can be politically and economically beneficial, yettheir implementation depends on the external environment. The same refers tomodernization: is it to be executed in the form of “Russification”, “Chinization” ormaybe “Westernization”? Finally, who are the Mongols today and who do they want to
be: how do they define their (geo)political and normative belonging? The author
stresses the Russian interest in Mongolia that appeared two decades after the collapse of29

Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

the Soviet Union, which can be interpreted as counterbalancing China’s growing
economic, and thus political position in the region. This makes Russia a rival of China
in Mongolia (Radchenko 2017). Since the shared Russian-Chinese border was finallyset, competition has taken place in other forms and locations, as reflected in the direct
relations of both states with Mongolia, as well as in multilateral projects affecting it (forexample One Belt One Road vs. Eurasian Economic Union).

The Indian perspective, as presented by Ajay Patnaik, adds a set of further considerations.
His argument of India always opposing a unipolar world order well explains the hopes
this state has had about China and Russia. On the other hand, the geopolitical realities,
especially related to China-Pakistan relations, have revised this strategy. Consequently
and paradoxically, especially recently, the US has been playing a key role, as reflected in
the last summit of Prime Minister Modi and President Trump, where America wasannounced to be “a primary partner” of India. Another dimension where
Russian-Chinese relations as visible in the Indian context is the One Belt One Road
initiative, especially with regard to the argument of bypassing India and privileging
Pakistan. This argument reminds us of other grand infrastructural projects that were tolink the West and the East, and were initially enthusiastically welcomed by numerous
states. Step by step, however, they became the reasons for distrust and the potential
revision of the world order (Koziel 2017). This was the case of the Berlin-Baghdad
railroad, initiated by the reunified, economically booming and politically expanding30

Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. Initially considered a tool of free tradeand globalization, it eventually became one of the reasons for the First World War (thatstarted in the Balkans, the weakest link between Germany and the Ottoman Empire),
having threatened the British colonies in the Middle East and India (Engdal 2014).
Similarly, the Belt and Road initiative can be considered a manifestation of bridgebuilding between China and the West, and additionally strengthening Chinese-Russiancooperation. But it also provides a non-military instrument for redefining power
relations with a highly conflictive potential. A question can be also posed, what would
be the aim of the Mumbai-St. Petersburg transportation corridor? Another aspect of thetext also seems to be relevant. If India is favoring cooperation with Russia in order toblock growing China that supports Pakistan, a normative explanation is still missing:how much can the world’s biggest democracy tighten an alliance with a semi-autocratic
partner? This means that the anti-western Indian position collides not only with thegeopolitical but also normative misfit in the region. Finally, the argument about India
supporting the “voices from the South” reorients the axes of interpretation: from theWest vs. the East, towards the North vs. the South (paradoxically, the RussianFederation is a part of the South).

Finally, the paper by Ulises Granados, investigating how Russia and China interact in
Latin America, presents several interesting ideas. What is striking here is the policy ofboth states to promote multipolarity, a policy implemented in the “inner court” of the31Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

USA. The key question is, however, not how the only global superpower reacts, but
why Russia and China are attractive to the states of the region. By offering investments(China) and subsidies (Russia) both can try to counterbalance the US, additionallyproposing assistance without a “normative conditionality”. It might have beeninteresting to include one more actor here – the European Union and its involvement in
the region, especially with regard to human rights and environmental protection
principles. Another question refers to the durability of this strategic convergence ofRussia and China in Latin America. The economic interests of both countries dominate
there but, sooner or later, the necessity of their protection may appear. This would mean
the necessity of their political (or even military) presence (Grady 2017), which again
may lead to a situation where coexistence is replaced with competition or even conflict.

Russian-Chinese relations, marked with asymmetries and difficulties, but also withpragmatisms and cooperation, have been changing together with domestic changes in
Russia and China. Yet this partnership, visible both in border relations (elimination of
long-lasting border disputes) and Eurasian cooperation (as visible in the declaration of
the complementary character of the One Belt One Road and Eurasian Economic Union
projects) is sometimes interpreted as a signal of Russian pragmatism. If Moscow is notable to counterbalance Beijing, it decided to join it as part of a bandwagoning strategy(Kaczmarski and Rodkiewicz 2016). The relative strength of states never remains
constant (Kennedy 1988). It is an open question if the same strategy will, sooner or later,

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Vol. 5, April 25, 2018be employed in the areas where both states compete, for example in Mongolia, India or
Latin America.

Bibliography:
Browning, Christopher and Perti Joenniemi, Geostrategies of the European
Neighbourhood Policy, “European Journal of International Relations”, vol. 14, no. 3,
2008, pp. 519-551.
Engdahl, William, A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New
World Order, Pluto Press: London, 2014.
Grady, John, SOUTHCOM Tidd: Russia, Iran and China Expanding Influence inCentral, South America, “USNI News”, 10.04.2017.
Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order, Simon & Schuster: New York, 1996.
Iwashita, Akihiro, Border dynamics in Eurasia: Sino‐soviet border disputes
and the aftermath, “Journal of Borderlands Studies”, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2008, pp. 69-81.
Kaczmarski, Marcin and Witold Rodkiewicz, Rosyjska Eurazja wobecchińskiego Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku: adaptacja zamiast konkurencji, „KomentarzeOśrodka Studiów Wschodnich, No. 219, 2016.
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Hyman: London, 1988.
Koziel, Hubert, Kolej, która skłóciła imperia, „Rzeczpospolita”, 16.06.2017.

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Vol. 5, April 25, 2018

Northeast Asia Today
北東アジアの現在
Vol.5, April 25, 2018
EDITORS
Akihiro Iwashita (Hokkaido University)
Jonathan Bull (Hokkaido University)
Mihoko Kato (Hokkaido University)

NIHU Area Studies Project for Northeast Asia
Hokkaido University Group
Leader: Akihiro Iwashita
Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University
Kita-9, Nishi-7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, 060-0809 Japan
Tel: +81-11-706-2388

Fax: +81-11-706-4952

https://hokudaislav-northeast.net/en/©2018 by the Slavic-Eurasian Research CenterAll rights reserved34