2023 MANFRED LACHS SPACE LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITIONTEAM No. 5

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THEPEACE PALACE, THE HAGUE

Case concerning
Laser Activities and the Use of Anti-Satellite Weapons in Outer Space

ARGYLIAMV.
KOLIGIAN

ON SUBMISSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICEMEMORIAL FOR THE APPLICANTARGYLIAM

TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................IV
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ............................................................................................ XVSTATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................. XVISUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ...................................................................................... XXI
ARGUMENTS .................................................................................................................. 1
I. THE USE OF PALVER-3 WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. ........... 1
A. The use of Palver-3 did not violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. .......... 1
1. The gravity of using Palver-3 did not reach the threshold of armed force. 1
2. Argyliam had no hostile intent against Koligian by using Palver-3. ............ 3
B. The use of Palver-3 did not violate relevant provisions of the OST. ............ 4
1. The use of Palver-3 did not violate Article IV of the OST. ............................ 4
2. Argyliam did not violate Article VIII of the OST. ......................................... 5
3. Argyliam did not violate Article IX of the OST. ............................................ 6
a. Argyliam did not bear the obligation to consult with Koligian under Article IXof the OST. .............................................................................................................. 6
b. Argyliam did not violate the principle of “due regard” under Article IX of the
OST. ........................................................................................................................ 7
C. The use of Palver-3 was justified by necessity. .............................................. 8
1. The use of Palver-3 was to safeguard an outweighing essential interest. .... 9
2. The use of Palver-3 was against a grave and imminent peril. ...................... 9
3. The use of Palver-3 was the only way to safeguard Argyliam’s essential
interest. ................................................................................................................. 10
II. ARGYLIAM IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF IRIORD-8. ....................... 11
A. Argyliam is not liable under Article III of the LIAB. ................................. 12
1. Argyliam was not at fault. .............................................................................. 12
a. Argyliam was not at objective fault. ................................................................ 13
b. Argyliam was not at subjective fault. ............................................................... 13
2. There is no established causal link between Palver-3 and the destruction ofIriord-8. ................................................................................................................ 14
B. Argyliam is not liable under Article VII of the OST. .................................. 15
C. In any event, Argyliam is not liable under general international law. ...... 15
D. The claim of Koligian shall be barred under the doctrine of “clean hands”.
............................................................................................................................... 16
III. THE USE BY KOLIGIAN OF ASAT MISSILE AGAINST PALVER-2 CONSTITUTES AVIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.......................................................................... 17
A. The use of ASAT missile violates Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. ........... 17
1. The use of ASAT missile by Koligian constitutes the use of force. ............. 18
a. The gravity of Koligian’s use of an ASAT missile reaches the threshold ofarmed force. .......................................................................................................... 18
b. Koligian had hostile intent against Argyliam by using ASAT missile............ 19
2. Koligian cannot invoke self-defense to justify the use of force. .................. 20
I

B. The use of ASAT missile against Palver-2 violated relevant provisions of
the OST. ................................................................................................................ 21
1. Koligian violated Article VIII of the OST by interfering with the jurisdiction
and control of Palver-2. ...................................................................................... 21
a. Argyliam retains jurisdiction and control over Palver-2. ............................... 21
b. Koligian infringed the jurisdiction and control over Palver-2. ...................... 22
2. The use of ASAT missile violated Article IX of the OST. ............................ 23
a. Koligian failed to comply with the principle of “due regard”. ....................... 23
i. Koligian failed to conform to the no-harm principle......................................... 24
ii. Koligian failed to reduce the creation of space debris. .................................... 24
b. Koligian breached the obligation to avoid harmful contamination. .............. 25
c. Koligian was contrary to the obligation of undertaking international
consultations......................................................................................................... 26
i. Koligian had reason to believe the activity would cause potentially harmfulinterference. .......................................................................................................... 27
ii. Koligian failed to fulfill its obligation of consultation. .................................... 27
C. The wrongfulness of Koligian’s violation of international obligations
cannot be precluded by invoking necessity. ...................................................... 28
1. Koligian’s essential interest did not face a grave and imminent peril. ...... 28
2. It was not the only way for Koligian to safeguard its essential interest. .... 29
3. The essential interest of Argyliam was seriously harmed. .......................... 30
IV. KOLIGIAN IS LIABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF
PALVER-2. .................................................................................................................... 31
A. Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2 under Article III of the
LIAB. .................................................................................................................... 31
1. ASAT missile falls within the meaning of “space object”. .......................... 31
2. Koligian was at fault. ...................................................................................... 32
3. The damage to Palver-2 was caused by ASAT missile. ............................... 33
C. Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2 under generalinternational law. ................................................................................................ 34
SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT ................................................................................. XXIIIILIST OF ABBREVIATIONSARSIWA

Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts

ASAT

Anti-Satellite

Compromis

Facts of the present case, as agreed by the Parties

COPUOS

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

ESA

European Space Agency

I.C.J.

International Court of JusticeICSID

International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes

Id

In the same place

Inc.

Incorporated

ITLOS

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

JAXA

Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency

LEO

Low Earth Orbit

LIAB

Convention on International Liability for Damage

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration of U.S.

OST

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies

P.C.A.

Permanent Court of Arbitration

P.C.I.J.

Permanent Court of International Justice

R.I.A.A.

Reports of International Arbitral Awards

SSA

Space Situational Awareness

SSVSpace Servicing Vehicle

TPNW

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

U.N.

United Nations

UNCED

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

U.N.G.A.

United Nations General Assemblyv.

VersusVCLTVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction
III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
I. TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, Government ofMember States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, and theGovernment of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development,
Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, entered into
force Mar. 27, 2001, TIAS 96-611 [hereinafter Multilateral Space Station Agreement]...................................................................................................................................... 15
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, enteredinto force Feb. 25, 1991, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Espoo
Convention] .................................................................................................................. 28
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, enteredinto force, Oct. 9, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 ................................. passim
Statute of the International Court of Justice, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945............ 16
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use ofOuter Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, entered into force Oct.
10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 ........................................................ passim
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, entered into force Jan. 22, 2021 ......... 4
United Nations Charter. ........................................................................................ passim
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force May. 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 33 ........................................................................................................... passim
II. CASESa) International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Tur.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19) ... 20
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 324 (June19) ................................................................................................................................ 14
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26)................................................................................................................................ 13, 14
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2022 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 9) ............................................................................ 15, 16
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3(Feb. 14) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert) ....................................... 16
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 15 (Feb. 2) ................................................................................ 14IVCorfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) ....................... 1, 20, 24
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec.4) ......... 1, 8, 20
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25)............................................................................................................................... passim
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) ................................................................. 10
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226(July 8) ................................................................................................................... 20, 32
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) ........................................................................................... 1, 10
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) .............. 13
Nuclear Tests (Aus. v. Fr.), Dissenting Opinion, 1974 I.C.J. 372 (Dec. 20) ................ 24
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgement, 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6) .............................. 21
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 8 (Apr. 20) . 28
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgement, 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24) .......................................................................................................... 34
Verbatim Record (1999/35), Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), I.C.J.
Verbatim Record 10 (May 12, 1999) ........................................................................... 16b) Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.)
Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. 95, Ser. A/B, No.70(June 28)....................................................................................................................... 16
Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. 21, Ser. A, No.9 (July 26)................................................................................................................................ 16, 34
S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. 40, Ser. A, No. 1 (Aug. 17) .................... 9c) Reports of International Arbitral Awards (R.I.A.A.)
Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), 31 R.I.A.A. 358, 571 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2015). ................................................................................................................... 24
Trail Smelter arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941) ........ 24d) International Tribunals
M/V Saiga (No.2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No.2, Judgment of July 1, 1999, ITLOS
Rep. 10 ........................................................................................................................... 8VM/V Norstar (No.25) (Pan. v. It.), Case No.25, Judgment of Apr. 10, 2019, ITLOS Rep.
7.................................................................................................................................... 14e) Other Judicial Decisions
LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision
on Liability, (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203 ............................................................ 8III. UNITED NATIONS’ MATERIALSCOPUOS, Active Debris Removal – An Essential Mechanism for Ensuring the Safety
and Sustainability of Outer Space, Report of the International Interdisciplinary
Congress on Space Debris Remediation and On-Orbit Satellite Servicing, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.16 (Jan. 27, 2012) ............................................. 22, 23, 25, 27
COPUOS, Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of theCommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (June 12-21, 2019)............................................................................................................................... passim
COPUOS, Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee space debris mitigation
guidelines, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.366 (July 17, 2018) ................................. 11, 25
G.A. Res. 47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer
Space (Dec.14, 1992) ..................................................................................................... 4
G.A. Res. 60/99, International Cooperation in the Peaceful uses of Outer Space, (Jan.
6, 2006) ........................................................................................................................ 25
G.A. Res. 62/68, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities (Jan. 8, 2008) ................................................................................................ 26
Int’l Law Comm’n R. Ago, Addendum to the Eight Report on State Responsibility, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add. (Feb. 5, 1979) ......................................................................... 29
Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd Sess., Articles on Responsibility of States for InternationallyWrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (2001) ............................................................ passim
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) .. 29
S.C. Comm. for Conventional Armaments, Res. at Its Thirteenth Mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/C.3/32/Rev.1 (Aug.18, 1948)...................................................................................... 5
U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., 32 mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.25-51 (Mar. 10, 1969) ..... 3
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 67 mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.67-78 (July 30, 1970)...... 3
U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., 408 mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.408 (Oct. 25, 1954) ................ 3
U.N. Secretary-General, Current developments in science and technology and theirpotential impact on international security and disarmament efforts, U.N. Doc.
A/77/188 (July 18, 2022) ..................................................................................... 2, 8, 19
VI

U.N. Secretary-General, Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/77/80 (June 24, 2022) ............................................ 2
U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency andConfidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, U.N. Doc. A/68/189 (July 29,2013). ........................................................................................................................... 25
U.N. Secretary-General, Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of
responsible behaviors: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/76/77 (July 13,2021) ..................................................................................................................... passim
UNCED, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (June 14, 1992) ................................................................................. 26
U.N.G.A, Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing, U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/77/L.62 (Oct. 13, 2022) ..................................................................................... 25
IV. LITERATUREa) Books
ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, CAUSATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2022).............. 33
BENKÖ MARIETTA & SCHROGL KAI-UWE, SPACE LAW: CURRENT PROBLEMS ANDPERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE REGULATION, ELEVEN, UTRECHT (2005) ......................... 22
BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS (1953)........................................................................................................ 33
BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW (1997) ............................................................. 5, 32
BRUNO SIMMA, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY (1994) ...... 21
CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2008) ....................... 1
DAVID WRIGHT ET AL., THE PHYSICS OF SPACE SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL (2005)........................................................................................................................................ 2
ESA, EUROPE’S EYES ON THE SKIES (2008) ................................................................... 3
FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE (2020) ................... 11, 23
GEORGE T. HACKET, SPACE DEBRIS AND THE CORPUS IURIS SPATIALIS (1994) ...... 13, 23
GERALD FITZMAURICE, HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1957) ................ 16
H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1961) ....................................... 14
HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR (2012).......... 1
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963) ... 1, 19
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) .......................... 18
VIIINTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF
FORCE (2018) ............................................................................................................... 18
JAMS BOND, PEACETIME FOREIGN DATA MANIPULATION AS ONE ASPECT OF OFFENSIVEINFORMATION WARFARE QUESTIONS OF LEGALITY UNDER THE UNITED NATIONSCHARTER ARTICLE 2(4) (1996) ..................................................................................... 19
JOANNA KULESZA, DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016) ........................... 13
JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES(2004) ........................................................................................................................... 21
K.F. SCHWETJE, LIABILITY AND SPACE DEBRIS, IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF
ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE: STATE OF THE LAW AND MEASURES OF PROTECTION (1990)...................................................................................................................................... 23
L.M. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS (1946)...................................................................................................... 18
LOTTA VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT IN SPACE LAW: ASSESSING THE
PRESENT AND CHARTING THE FUTURE (2008) .............................................................. 24
M. T. SAVAGE, THE MILLENNIAL PROJECT: COLONIZING THE GALAXY IN EIGHT EASYSTEPS (1992) ................................................................................................................ 26
M. WELL, IRAQ, KWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR AFTERMATH (1993) ................... 3
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017) .................................................. 5, 26
MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
LAWMAKING (2010).................................................................................................. 5, 23
MARC G. CARNS, ORBITAL DEBRIS PREVENTION AND MITIGATION EFFORTS AMONG
MAJOR SPACE ACTORS (2023) ...................................................................................... 27
OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2021) ................................................... 3, 19, 20
P. JANKOWITSCH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES, IN SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE (1992) ............................................................................... 18
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE
IT (1994)....................................................................................................................... 18
S. TKATCHOVA, SPACE-BASED TECHNOLOGIES AND COMMERCIALIZED DEVELOPMENT:ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS AND BENEFITS (2011) .......................................................... 26
VLADIMIR KOPAL, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 37’ ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1994).... 32
W. S. WONG & J. FERGUSSON, MILITARY SPACE POWER: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES (2010)...................................................................................................................................... 26
WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING (2012) ............................................. 19
VIII

YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE (2005) ............................. 21b) Collections
Andrea Bianchi, Environmental Harm Resulting from the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space: Some Remarks on State Responsibility and Liability, in
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 231 (Francesco
Francioni et al. eds., 1991) ........................................................................................... 26
Albrecht Randelzhofer & Oliver Dörr, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, 200 (Bruno Simma eds. 2012) ........................................ 18
Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Stephen Mick, Article VIII, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON
SPACE LAW 157 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009) .................................................... 6, 22
Fabio Tronchetti, Chapter 6, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 336 (Frans von der Dunk et
al. eds., 2015) ................................................................................................................. 4
Jinyuan Su, Control over activities harmful to the environment, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 79 (Ram S. Jakhu & Paul Stephen Dempsey eds., 2017). 23
Lars Hostbeck, Space Weapons, Concepts and their International Security Implications,in HANDBOOK OF SPACE: SECURITY POLICIES, APPLICATIONS AND PROGRAMS 12 (KaiUwe Schrogl et al. eds., 2015) ..................................................................................... 20
Lesley J. Smith & Armel Kerrest, Article VII, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE
LAW 141 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009) ............................................................. 15, 34
Michael Gerhard, Article VI, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 103 (Stephan
Hobe et al eds., 2009) .................................................................................................. 17
Michael Gerhard & K. Gungaphul-Brocard, The Impact of National Space Legislationon Space Industry Contracts, in CONTRACTING FOR SPACE 64 (L.J. Smith & I. Baumanned. 2011)....................................................................................................................... 22
NATO, Rule 61, in TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TOCYBER OPERATIONS 288 (Micharl N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2017)................................... 11
Kai-Uwe Schrogl & Julia Neumann, Article IV, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACELAW 77 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009) ....................................................................... 4
Olivier Ribbelink, Article III, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 67 (Stephan
Hobe et al. eds. 2009) .................................................................................................. 26
Sergio Marchisio, Article IX, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 27 (Stephan
Hobe et al. eds., 2009) ................................................................................................... 7
Setsuko Aoki, Law and Military Uses of Outer Space, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
SPACE LAW 204 (Ram S. Jakhu et al. eds., 2017) .......................................................... 5
Yuval Shany, Sources and the Enforcement of International Law, in THE OXFORDHANDBOOK OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Samantha Besson & Jean d’Aspremont eds., 2017) .................................................................................................. 7c) Articles
IX

Abhijit Biswas et al., Status of NASA’s Deep Space Optical Communication Technology
Demonstration, IEEE INT’L CONF. ON SPACE OPTICAL COMMC’N TECH.
DEMONSTRATION 24 (2017) ........................................................................................... 2
Adam G. Quinn, The New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty and the
Weaponization of Space, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 475 (2008) ............................................ 5
B. S. Robinson et al., Laser Communications for Human Space Exploration in Cislunar
Space: ILLUMA-T and O2O, 10524 FREE-SPACE LASER COMMC’N & ATMOSPHERICPROPAGATION XXX 1 (2018) ......................................................................................... 2
Bengt Anderberg & Ove Bring, Battlefield Laser Weapons and International Law, 57
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 457 (1988) ....................................................................................... 3
Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts andTribunals, 3 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 368 (1953) .......................................................... 16
Bin Cheng, International Responsibility and Liability for Launch Activities, 20 AIR &SPACE L. 297 (1995)............................................................................................... 12, 32
Bin Cheng, The Extra-Terrestrial Application of International Law, 18 CURRENT LEGALPROBS. 132 (1965) ....................................................................................................... 15
Brandon Hart, Legal Implications Surrounding Recent Interception of Spy Satellite,
JOINT CTR. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS J. 1 (2008) .......................................................... 28
Brian D. Green, Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing: Safety Tool or Security
Threat, 75 A.F. L. REV. 39 (2016) ........................................................................ 3, 9, 10Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM.
J. INT’L L. 346 (1980)................................................................................................... 12
Christopher M. Petras, The Debate over the Weaponization of Space: A Military-Legal
Conspectus, 28 AIR & SPACE L. 171 (2003) .................................................................. 5
Christopher M. Petras, The Use of Force in Response to Cyber-Attack on Commercial
Space Systems – Reexamining Self-Defense in Outer Space in Light of the Convergenceof U.S. Military and Commercial Space Activities, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1213 (2002) 11
Colleen Hanley, Regulating Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites over Isreal: A Black
Hole in the Open Skies Doctrine, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 423 (2000) ............................... 10
Dakota S. Rudesill, Precision War and Responsibility: Transformation MilitaryTechnology and the Duty of Care under the Laws of War, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 517 (2007)...................................................................................................................................... 11
Danielle Miller & Elsbeth Magilton, On-Orbit Satellite Servicing Standards Are a
Necessity for the Private Space Industry, 31 AIR & SPACE L. 4 (2018)....................... 31
David A. Koplow, An Inference about Interference: A Surprising Application of
Existing International Law to Inhibit Anti-Satellite Weapons, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 737(2014) ....................................................................................................................... 2, 19X

David A. Koplow, Asat-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of
Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187 (2009) .............................. 11, 19, 33
David A. Koplow, Reverse Distinction: A U.S. Violation of the Law of Armed Conflictin Space, 13 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 25 (2022) .................................................................. 2
David Wright, Space Debris, 60 PHYSICS TODAY 35 (2007) ....................................... 25
Deborah Housen-Couriel, Cybersecurity and Anti-Satellite Capabilities (ASAT), New
Threats and New Legal Responses, 4 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 116 (2015)................. 19
Frans G. von der Dunk, Liability versus Responsibility in Space Law: Misconception
or Misconstruction, 34 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 363 (1991) ................................... 12Frans G. von der Dunk, Target Practising in a Global Commons: The Chinese ASAT
Test and Outer Space Law, 22 Kor. J. Air & Space L. & Pol’y 55 (2007) ............. 27,32
Gabriel Lafferranderie, Jurisdiction and Control of Space Objects and the Case of anInternational Intergovernmental Organisation, 54 GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 228 (2005).................................................................................................................................. 6, 23
H.A. Baker, Liability for Damage Caused in Outer Space by Space Refuse, 13 AIR &SPACE L. 183 (1988)..................................................................................................... 22
Henry R. Hertzfeld, In-Space Maneuvering, Servicing, and Resource Use: The
Commercial Need for Legal Assurances, 57 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 137 (2014) . 30
Ivan Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CAL. L. REV. 507 (1967)...................................................................................................................................... 28
James P. Lampertius, The Need for an Effective Liability Regime for Damage Caused
by Debris in Outer Space, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 447 (1992) ........................................ 27
Jochen Pfeifer, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 30 GER.
J. AIR & SPACE L. 215 (1981)....................................................................................... 13
John W. Heath Jr., Mahan's Legacy, How Will a New Generation of Weapons Fit into
Competing Visions of Outer Space, 43 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 298 (2000) ............. 3
K. U. Hörl & J. Hermida, Change of Ownership, Change of Registry? Which Objects
to Register, What Data to Furnish, When and Until When, 46 PROC. ON INT’L INST.
SPACE L. 452 (2003)..................................................................................................... 30
Kazuhiro Nakatani, Taepodong Missile Incident and Emerging Issues of Interpretation
and Application of Space Treaties, 44 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 144 (2001) ............ 32
L. J. Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary
Reparation Policies in Peru's Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 51 (2007)...................................................................................................................................... 16
Mahir Al Banna, Can Soft Law Regulate Outer Space Activities?, 125 J. L. POL’Y &GLOBALIZATION 56 (2022) ............................................................................................. 7
XI

Martha Mejia-Kaiser, Collision Course: 2008 Iridium-Cosmos Crash, 52 PROC. INT’L
INST. SPACE L. 274 (2009) ........................................................................................... 13
Michael C. Mineiro, Article IX’s Principle of Due Regard and International
Consultations: An Assessment in Light of the European Draft Space Code-of-Conduct,
53 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 674 (2010) .................................................................... 6
Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321 (2008)................................................................................................................................. 27,28
Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War
and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1051
(1998) ........................................................................................................................... 10
Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (1999)........................................................................................................................................ 2
Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Operations in Space, 10 UNYB
89 (2006) .................................................................................................................... 3, 9
Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary
International Law, 9(2) J. ENV’T L. 221 (1997) .......................................................... 26
Paul B. Larsen, Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR L. &COM. 295 (2006) .......................................................................................................... 26
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects underInternational and National Law, 54 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 165 (2011).............. 17
S. Hao et al., Low Earth Orbit Satellite internet constellations: status quo andsuggestions, 22 CHINA NEW TELECOMM. 19 (2020) ...................................................... 2
Samuli Haataja & Afshin Akhtar-Khavari, Stuxnet and International Law on the Use ofForce: An Informational Approach, 7 CAMB. INT’L L.J. 99 (2018) ............................... 1
Setsuko Aoki, Standard of Due Diligence in Operating a Space Object, 55 PROC. INT’L
INST. SPACE L. 392 (2012) ........................................................................................... 13
Stephen Gorove, Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinizing
Reappraisal, 3 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 114 (1973) ...................................................... 4
Villani, The Security Council’s Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional
Organizations, YBNL 535 (2022) ............................................................................... 21
V. INTERNATIONAL SITES
Brian Weeden, 2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Fact Sheet (Nov. 23, 2010),
https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_ sheetupdated_2012.pdf ............. 25
XII

E. Luzhansky et al., Overview and Status of the Laser Communication Relay
Demonstration (Feb. 26, 2016), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20160001877 .............. 2
ESA, ESA’s Annual Space Environment Report (Apr. 22, 2022),
https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.p
df .................................................................................................................................. 27
JAXA, Space Debris Mitigation Mechanism in Japan (Apr. 3, 2009),
https://sma.jaxa.jp/TechDoc/........................................................................................ 31
NASA, Cygnus-completes-station-mission-after-four-months (June 28 2022), https://
blogs.nasa.gov/spacestation/2022/06/28/ cygnus-completes-station-mission-after-fourmonths/......................................................................................................................... 30
NASA,
Guidelinesfor
Risk
Management
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://confluence.ivv.nasa.gov:8445/display/IMS ...................................................... 29
NASA, Northrop Grumman makes history, Mission Extension Vehicle docks to target
satellite (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/02/northropgrumman-history-mission-extension-vehicle-docks-satellite/ ..................................... 30
NASA, On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing 2 (OSAM-2) (June 24, 2022),
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/tdm/osam-2.html .............................................. 30
Oliver Dörr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLICINTERNATIONAL
LAW,
(Nov.
20,
2022),
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e427 ................................................................................................................................ 1
VI. NATIONAL LEGISLATION
Act on Securing Proper Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Records (2016) (Japan)...................................................................................................................................... 17
Act on Space Activities (1982) (Swed.) ....................................................................... 17
Act on Space Activities (2018) (Fin.) .......................................................................... 32
Argentina Digital Act: Information, Technologies and communications (2014) (Arg.)...................................................................................................................................... 17
Commercial Space Launch Act (1984) (U.S.) ............................................................. 15
Land Remote Sensing Policy (1992) (U.S.)................................................................. 17
Law of the Russian Federation “about space activity” (1993) (Russ.) ........................ 32
National Aeronautics and Space Act (2010) (U.S.) ..................................................... 32
Ordinance of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on Space Activity (1996) (Ukr.) .......... 17
Outer Space Act (2016) (Den.) .................................................................................... 32
XIII

Space Activities Regulations (2001) (Aus.) ................................................................. 15
Space Development Promotion Act (2005) (S. Kor.) .................................................. 17
The French Space Operations Act (2008) (Fr.) ............................................................ 17
The National Space Policy (2020) (U.S.) ................................................................ 9, 11
The Space Industry Regulations (2021) (U.K.) ............................................................. 9VII. MISCELLANEES
Chapter III: The General Problem Underlying the Drafting of Part 2 of the Draft
Articles, [1982] 2(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 30 ............................................................ 12Inter-Agency Space Debri Coordination Committee, IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines, IADC-02-01 Revision 2, (Mar. 13 ,2020) ................................................ 25
Second Int’l Conf. on the Protection of the North Sea, Ministerial Declaration, Principle
VII (London) (Nov. 25, 1987) ..................................................................................... 26
U.S. Sen., Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Convention on
International Liability or Damage Caused by Space Objects, 92 Cong., 2nd Sess., Exec.
Rep. No. 92-38,7 (1972) .............................................................................................. 32

XIV

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether Argyliam violated international law by using Palver-3?
II. Whether Argyliam is liable for the destruction of Iriord-8?
III. Whether Koligian violated international law by using ASAT missile against
Palver-2?
IV. Whether Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2?

XV

STATEMENT OF FACTSBACKGROUND
Argyliam is a small island State that has become an international financial andbanking center, famous for providing high-quality tourist services. With significant
wealth, Argyliam invested in high-tech and advanced space applications. Since
Argyliam could not effectively maintain viable and adequate armed forces to protect its
neutrality. Considering its small size, Argyliam has attempted to fill this gap throughspace technology. Also, an explicit provision in the Constitution of Argyliam states that
the State will remain outside international alliances and be permanently neutral.
Koligian is a space-faring State with a significant history of space exploration andexploitation. Since 2020 it has actively facilitated and encouraged the growth of its
private sector in space activities.
Argyliam contracted with Charalg Inc. to obtain the information necessary to
avoid collisions of objects in space. Charalg Inc. is a Space Situational Awarenessservice provider founded in 2028 and registered in Koligian. Charalg Inc. provided
information and data through a global network of fully automated ground-based andspace-based sensors capable of surveying and tracking space objects. Charalg Inc.
provided information and data to a large number of States, enjoying a considerable
reputation for reliability.
THE LAUNCH OF PALVER-1 -2 AND -3
On 1 January 2031, Argyliam launched three satellites with laser capabilities,
named Palver- 1 -2 and -3 (“Palver”), which were registered in Argyliam’s national
XVI

register of space objects. Relevant information was also sent to the United Nations andplaced on the U.N. Register. Located in the LEO, their deployment of the Palver system
was mainly for experimental purposes to establish proof of concept and initial
components for a system of satellite-to-satellite communication by laser beams andwould contribute to the defense of the State.
KASSOF’S SPYING ACT
On 31 March 2031, the intelligence services of Argyliam reported that “according
to cross-checked information,” the satellite EVGA-1607 was conducting “continuous
spying on critical infrastructure facilities and military sites” in Argyliam. The orbit of
EVGA-1607 periodically brought the satellite into proximity with Palver-3. EVGA1607 was registered in the State of Kassof and had been placed in orbit at an altitude of
210 km above the surface of the Earth on 25 February 2031.
On 1 April 2031, a Note Verbale to the Ambassador of Kassof protested against
the “spying of his country” through EVGA-1607 and requested its immediate cessationand non-repetition in the future. The Ambassador of Kassof replied that EVGA-1607
was a satellite deployed for purely commercial applications and no espionage had everoccurred through it.
THE LASER EMISSION BY PALVER-3 AND THE DESTRUCTION OF IRIORD-8
However, on 10 April 2031, Argyliam was assured by the country’s intelligence
services that the espionage activities of EVGA-1607 continued. The Defense Ministerof Argyliam ordered Palver-3 to emit a laser beam directed at EVGA-1607 as thesatellites were nearing conjunction to dazzle and blind EVGA-1607’s sensors. This
XVII

action was undertaken based on data provided by Charalg Inc.
The data provided by Charalg Inc. was not completely accurate, resulting in asmall but critical time delay in the emitted laser beam which by-passed EVGA-1607
completely and mis-hit Iriord-8, a satellite registered in Koligian. The laser damaged
an electronic component of Iriord-8, further triggering a misfire of attitude control
thrusters that pushed it out of orbit and into the atmosphere, where it was completely
burned up.
The destruction of Iriord-8 was a setback for the Koligian economy and criticalinfrastructure. Its telecommunications services were greatly impacted, and many State
services suffered damage.
THE KOLIGIAN’S DIPLOMATIC NOTE OF PROTEST
On 20 April 2031, the Ambassador of Koligian delivered a diplomatic note ofprotest to Argyliam to accuse Argyliam of “unlawful weaponization of outer space” and“aggressive military” space activities. In particular, Koligian called on the immediate
deactivation of the three laser systems on Palver, given “the dangers their existenceentailed for the freedom of all States to peacefully explore and use outer space.”
The Argyliam Foreign Minister clarified that “the responsibility for theunfortunate incident lies entirely with the Koligian company Charalg Inc., which
recklessly provided us with false information” and that the Palver had been placed inorbit “in accordance with international law to protect the independence, territorial
integrity and permanent neutrality of Argyliam.”
THE UNEXPECTED FAILURE OF PALVER-2
XVIII

On 10 May 2031, Palver-2 unexpectedly ceased responding to commands. All
ability to control it was lost and could not be restored; however, the laser beam remainedin an active state, and there was “a slight possibility of spontaneous activation,” and thechances of this happening “were less than 3%”. In the meantime, the Palver-2 drifted
toward a densely populated orbit with 150 functioning satellites. The individual
satellites were registered in several States, including five registered in Koligian. Palver2 was expected to enter this orbit on 13 May 2031.
Koligian asked Argyliam to take immediate measures to “manage the course” ofPalver-2. Argyliam declared that having developed the necessary technology, it would
immediately send a Space Servicing Vehicle (SSV) to re-boost Palver-2 for the satellite
to gain the necessary altitude so there would be no possibility of interference with theoperation of neighboring satellites. In response to questions from journalists, theArgyliam Minister of Defense said that the SSV had passed the ground-based
experimental phase, which was “completely successful,” and had not yet been launched
and tested in space.
THE LAUNCH AND RESULTS OF ASAT MISSILE BY KOLIGIAN
Soon in the evening of the day, Koligian launched a direct-ascent anti-satellite(ASAT) missile directed at and successfully hit Palver-2. The satellite, including its
laser system, was completely destroyed. The debris generated by this strikeaccumulated in a part of the orbit and was burned up for re-entry into the atmosphere.
The entire Palver system required the synergy of all three individual lasers to work
effectively, and without Palver-2, it was rendered inoperable. It would be several years
XIXbefore Argyliam could restore its space laser protection system.
Argyliam and Koligian entered into diplomatic consultations, the results of which
proved inconclusive. Argyliam then initiated these proceedings by Application to theInternational Court of Justice. Koligian accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, and theparties submitted this Agreed Statement of Facts.
THE RELEVANT TREATIES
Argyliam and Koligian are Parties to the United Nations Charter, the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the five United Nations treaties on outer space.

XX

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THE USE OF PALVER-3 WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force, which
requires the gravity of the act and a hostile intent against another State. While the powerof the laser beam lacked destructive capacity, the hit on Iriord-8 was accidental. Thus,
the use of Palver-3 did not violate Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
B. Since Palver-3 did not carry nuclear weapons or WMD, Argyliam did not
violate Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. Without intervening the jurisdiction andcontrol of space objects, Argyliam did not violate Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty.
Under Article IX, Argyliam paid due regard to the corresponding interests of Koligianwith proper assessment. Moreover, Argyliam did not bear the obligation to consult inlack of knowledge to assert potentially harmful interference.
C. In any event, the use of Palver-3 was justified by necessity since it was the only
way to safeguard an outweighing essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.
II. ARGYLIAM IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF IRIORD-8.
A. Conforming to international obligations and acting with due diligence,
Argyliam was not at both objective and subjective fault. Moreover, a sufficiently clear
and certain causal link is not established due to the interruption of inaccurate data. Thus,
Argyliam was not liable under Article III of the Liability Convention.
B. As demonstrated above, causality is not established. Thus, Argyliam is thus notliable under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty.
C. Without any breach of its international obligations by using Palver-3, Argyliam
is not liable under general international law.
XXI

D. Failing to authorize and continuously supervise the activities of Charalg Inc.
which led to the destruction of Iriord-8, Koligian is barred to claim reparation due tothe “clean hands” doctrine.
III. THE USE BY KOLIGIAN OF ASAT MISSILE AGAINST PALVER-2 CONSTITUTES AVIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A. The use of ASAT missile by Koligian violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
since the act constituted the use of force and was inconsistent with the purposes of theUnited Nations.
B. Koligian violated Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty by interfering with
Argyliam’s jurisdiction and control over Palver-2. Moreover, Koligian violated Article
IX of the Outer Space Treaty by failing to pay due regard, causing contamination inouter space and breaching its obligation of international consultations.
C. Koligian cannot invoke necessity to preclude the wrongfulness of its act, since
the use of ASAT missile was not the only way for Koligian to safeguard an outweighing
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.
IV. KOLIGIAN IS LIABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF
PALVER-2 BY USING ASAT MISSILE.
A. Koligian is liable under Article III of the Liability Convention since ASAT
missile is a space object and the damage was due to Koligian’s fault.
B. Koligian is liable under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty by establishing a
causal link between the use of ASAT missile and the destruction of Palver-2.
C. Since Koligian’s use of ASAT missile constituted an internationally wrongful
act causing the damage, Koligian is liable under general international law.
XXIIARGUMENTS
I. THE USE OF PALVER-3 WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.
As both Argyliam and Koligian are State Parties to the U.N. Charter and the OST,
the Applicant submits that the use of Palver-3 did not violate Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter [A] and relevant provisions of the OST. [B] In any event, the use of Palver-3
was justified by necessity. [C]
A. The use of Palver-3 did not violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force in international
relations.1 The term “force”, as used in the U.N. Charter,2 refers only to “armed force”.3
The proof of “armed force” rests on its gravity 4 and hostile intent. 5 The Applicant
submits that the use of Palver-3 did not constitute the use of force, because it did notreach the threshold of armed force [1] and lacked hostile intent. [2]1. The gravity of using Palver-3 did not reach the threshold of armed force.
The gravity of an act is its capacity to destroy lives or property.6 The assessment

Article 2(4), U.N. Charter; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua [hereinafter Nicaragua] (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100 (June27); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 8 (2008).
1

2

Article 31, VCLT; Preamble, Articles 42, 44, 46, U.N. Charter.

Oliver Dörr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLICINTERNATIONAL
LAW,
(Nov.
20,
2022),
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e427.
34Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9).

5

Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 432, 466 (Dec. 4).

IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362 (1963);
HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 74 (2012);
Samuli Haataja & Afshin Akhtar-Khavari, Stuxnet and International Law on the Use ofForce: An Informational Approach, 7 CAMB. INT’L L.J. 99, 107 (2018).
61

of destructive capacity shall consider the means adpoted and the nature of the target.7
The power of lasers used for telecommunications in LEO is lower than 10 watts,8 which,according to the Secretary-General’s Report on Current Developments,9 could merely
dazzle or temporarily blind sensors on board satellites. Mere dazzle or temporary
blindness did not amount to the destruction of a sensor, since the damage is reversible.10
In casu, Palver-3 emitted a laser beam which was used for telecommunications in
LEO.11 The target of the beam was a sensor on board EVGA-1607.12 Given the power
level of the laser beam, the sensor would only be dazzled or temporarily blinded.13 In
addition, the dazzle or temporary blindness would not result in the destruction ofMichael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 911(1999).
7

8

E. Luzhansky et al., Overview and Status of the Laser Communication Relay
Demonstration (Feb. 26, 2016), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20160001877; B. S.
Robinson et al., Laser Communications for Human Space Exploration in Cislunar
Space: ILLUMA-T and O2O, 10524 FREE-SPACE LASER COMMC’N & ATMOSPHERICPROPAGATION XXX 1, 4 (2018); Abhijit Biswas et al., Status of NASA’s Deep Space
Optical Communication Technology Demonstration, IEEE INT’L CONF. ON SPACEOPTICAL COMMC’N TECH. DEMONSTRATION 24, 26, (2017); S. Hao et al., Low Earth
Orbit Satellite internet constellations: status quo and suggestions, 22 CHINA NEW
TELECOMM. 19, 61 (2020).
U.N. Secretary-General, Current developments in science and technology and theirpotential impact on international security and disarmament efforts, at 12, U.N. Doc.
A/77/188 (July 18, 2022). [Report on Current developments]
9

U.N. Secretary-General, Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/77/80 (June 24, 2022) [Report on Prevention of
an Arms Race in Outer Space]; David A. Koplow, An Inference about Interference: A
Surprising Application of Existing International Law to Inhibit Anti-Satellite Weapons,
35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 737, 799 (2014).
10

11

Compromis, ¶5.

12Compromis, ¶8.

DAVID WRIGHT ET AL., THE PHYSICS OF SPACE SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL 117(2005); David A. Koplow, Reverse Distinction: A U.S. Violation of the Law of Armed
Conflict in Space, 13 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 25, 68 (2022).
13

2

EVGA-1607, because the sensor is used to collect data from the Earth, 14 which is
independent of the operation of the satellite.15
Thus, the use of Palver-3 was incapable of destroying property and therefore did
not reach the threshold of armed force.
2. Argyliam had no hostile intent against Koligian by using Palver-3.
The “hostile intent” indicates that a State intends to compel another State to do or
refrain from doing something. 16 It presupposes the awareness of an action against
another State.17 An act by mistake is precluded from the use of force.18
In casu, Argyliam directed a laser beam at EVGA-1607, a satellite belonging to athird country.19 To stop the spying, the laser beam was targetted at a sensor on board
EVGA-1607.20 The targeting is precise based on the capabilities of SSA technologies.21

Brian D. Green, Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing: Safety Tool or Security
Threat, 75 A.F. L. REV. 39, 83 (2016).
14

Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Operations in Space, 10 UNYB
89, 118 (2006).
15

16

M. WELL, IRAQ, KWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR AFTERMATH 725 (1993).

OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE
IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (2021).
17

U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 67 mtg., at 3, 31, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.67-78 (July 30,1970); U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., 32 mtg., at 38, U.N. Doc. A/AC.134/SR.25-51 (Mar.
10, 1969); U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., 408 mtg., at 58, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.408 (Oct. 25,
1954).
18

19

Compromis, ¶8.

Bengt Anderberg & Ove Bring, Battlefield Laser Weapons and International Law, 57
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 457, 459 (1988); John W. Heath Jr., Mahan's Legacy, How Will a
New Generation of Weapons Fit into Competing Visions of Outer Space, 43 PROC. ON
L. OUTER SPACE 298, 300 (2000).
20

21

ESA, EUROPE’S EYES ON THE SKIES 47-48 (2008).
3However, due to an inaccuracy in the data, Iriord-8 was wrongly hit.22 Although
Argyliam chose a reputable company, Charalg Inc, as the data provider,23 Argyliam was
not able to verify the SSA data.24 Thus, Argyliam could not be aware of the inaccuracy
and had no hostile intent against Koligian.
Therefore, the use of Palver-3 failed to meet the criteria of armed force and did not
violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
B. The use of Palver-3 did not violate relevant provisions of the OST.
The use of Palver-3 did not violate Article IV of the OST because it not carrynuclear weapons or WMD, [1] Article VIII of the OST because it did not interfere with
Koligian’s jurisdiction and control, [2] and Article IX of the OST because it compliedwith the principle of “due regard” and did not trigger the obligation to consult. [3]1. The use of Palver-3 did not violate Article IV of the OST.
Under Article IV of the OST, States are prohibited to place in orbit around theEarth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of WMD.25
In the interpretation of this Article, mild nuclear reactions for non-weaponization
purposes are not prohibited.26 The sorting of purpose is irrelevant to the actual use.27

22

Compromis, ¶9.

23Compromis, ¶3.

24Compromis, ¶9;25

Article IV, OST.

Article 1, TPNW; G.A. Res. 47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space (Dec.14, 1992); Stephen Gorove, Arms Control Provisions in
the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinizing Reappraisal, 3 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 114, 115(1973); Fabio Tronchetti, Chapter 6, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 336 (Frans von derDunk et al. eds., 2015).
26

27

Kai-Uwe Schrogl & Julia Neumann, Article IV, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON
4

WMD have been understood as weapons designed and capable of causing widespreaddevastation and loss of life, in particular chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.28
In casu, Palver-3 was for experimental purposes in telecommunications29 where
weapons are irrelevant.30 Even if the operation of Palver-3 involved nuclear payloads
to propel the satellite or generate lasers, it is not for weaponized use and the productionof nuclear bombs. 31 As the laser beam emitted by Palver-3 was not capable ofdestroying property,32 it did not fall within the scope of WMD.
Thus, Palver-3 did not carry nuclear weapons or WMD under Article IV of the
OST. Therefore, the use of Palver-3 did not violate Article IV of the OST.
2. Argyliam did not violate Article VIII of the OST.
Article VIII of the OST lays down that a State of registry retains jurisdiction andcontrol over the space object.33 “Jurisdiction” concerns the power of a State to adopt
valid and binding legal norms over property and personnel thereof.34 “Control” means

SPACE LAW 77 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009).
S.C. Comm. for Conventional Armaments, Res. at Its Thirteenth Mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/C.3/32/Rev.1 (Aug.18, 1948); Setsuko Aoki, Law and Military Uses of Outer Space,in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 204 (Ram S. Jakhu et al. eds., 2017).
28

29

Compromis, ¶5.

Christopher M. Petras, The Debate over the Weaponization of Space: A MilitaryLegal Conspectus, 28 AIR & SPACE L. 171, 186 (2003); Adam G. Quinn, The New Ageof Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty and the Weaponization of Space, 17 MINN. J.
INT’L L. 475, 494 (2008).
30

31

Compromis, ¶5.

32

Supra Argument I(A)(1).

33

Article VIII, OST.

BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 72, 86 (1997); MALCOLM N.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 483 (2017); MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE– AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 66 (2010).
34

5

the right to adopt technical rules35 which must be based on legitimate jurisdiction andnot on factual control capabilities.36
In casu, Argyliam did not seek to exercise its jurisdiction over property in Iriord8, which respected Koligian’s jurisdiction over its satellite. Although the emission of
the laser beam deprived Koligian of its effective control over the technical arrangements
for Iriord-8,37 the use of Palver-3 did not violate Koligian’s right to adopt technical rules
based on legitimate jurisdiction. Thus, Argyliam did not violate Article VIII of the OST.
3. Argyliam did not violate Article IX of the OST.
Argyliam did not violate Article IX of the OST since it did not bear the obligation
to consult with Koligian [a] and did not violate the principle of “due regard”. [b]a. Argyliam did not bear the obligation to consult with Koligian under
Article IX of the OST.
According to Article IX of the OST, an obligation to consult arises when the
conduct would cause potentially harmful interference with the activities of other States
for peaceful purposes.38 “Having reason to believe” means having knowledge to assert
potentially harmful interference accompanied by the planned activity.39

35

Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Stephen Mick, Article VIII, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARYON SPACE LAW 157 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009).

Gabriel Lafferranderie, Jurisdiction and Control of Space Objects and the Case of anInternational Intergovernmental Organisation, 54 GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 228, 230(2005).
36

37

Compromis, ¶9.

38

Article IX, OST.

Michael C. Mineiro, Article IX’s Principle of Due Regard and International
Consultations: An Assessment in Light of the European Draft Space Code-of-Conduct,
53 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 674, 678 (2010).
39

6

In casu, Argyliam used Palver-3 to emit the laser beam directly against the target.40
Given the preciseness of the laser beam and the reliability of data,41 Argyliam had noreason to believe that the use of Palver-3 would interfere with other space objects.42
Thus, Argyliam was not obliged to consult other States including Koligian.
Therefore, Argyliam did not bear the obligation to consult any State under Article
IX of the OST.
b. Argyliam did not violate the principle of “due regard” under Article
IX of the OST.
Article IX of the OST stipulates that States shall pay due regard to thecorresponding interests of other State Parties.43 “Due regard” refers to the performanceof an act with a certain standard of care, attention, or observance.44
The UNCOPUOS LTS Guidelines is a “soft law” instrument formulated to set forth
the technical standards of space activities as legally binding agreements cannot bereached. 45 In line with the LTS Guidelines, when using laser beams in outer space,measures of precaution include reducing the probability of accidental illumination andtaking a quantitative evaluation of the laser radiation power.46
40

Compromis, ¶8.

41

Supra Argument I(A)(2)(b).

42

Compromis, ¶3.

43

Article IX, OST.

Sergio Marchisio, Article IX, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 27(Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009).
44

Mahir Al Banna, Can Soft Law Regulate Outer Space Activities?, 125 J. L. POL’Y &GLOBALIZATION 56, 56-61 (2022); Yuval Shany, Sources and the Enforcement ofInternational Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONALLAW 808 (Samantha Besson & Jean d’ Aspremont eds., 2017).
45

46

COPUOS, Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of7

In this case, the laser beam was emitted as the satellites were nearing
conjunction, 47 and based on data provided by a company enjoying a considerable
reputation for reliability.48 Moreover, Argyliam particularly chose the laser beam used
for telecommunication, 49 whose power level was lower than 10 watts. 50 Thus, byconforming to the LTS Guidelines, the use of Palver-3 was acted with due regard.
In conclusion, the use of Palver-3 did not violate the provisions of the OST.
C. The use of Palver-3 was justified by necessity.
In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case,51 necessity is a ground to preclude wrongfulness
as customary international law.52 A State may invoke necessity when certain conditions
laid down in Article 25 of the ARSIWA are cumulatively satisfied.53
The Applicant submits that in any event, the use of Palver-3 was justified bynecessity because the use of Palver-3 was to safeguard an outweighing essential interest

the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, at 52, 66, U.N. Doc. A/74/20 (June12-21, 2019). [LTS Guidelines]
47

Compromis, ¶8.

48

Compromis, ¶3.

49

Compromis, ¶5.

50Report on Current developments, supra note 9, at 12.

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40 (Sept.
25). [hereinafter Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros]
51

Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 5; M/V Saiga (No.2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case
No.2, Judgment of July 1, 1999, ITLOS Rep. 10, 55; LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 256 (Oct. 3,2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203, 265. [hereinafter LG&E Energy]
52

53

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 51.
8[1] against a grave and imminent peril54 [2] as the only way.55 [3]1. The use of Palver-3 was to safeguard an outweighing essential interest.
According to Article 25(1) of the ARSIWA, the purpose of the act must be tosafeguard an essential interest outweighing its harm to another interest.56 That national
security is an essential interest of a State looms large in the S.S. Wimbledon Case.57
In casu, the EVGA-1607 was conducting espionage activities on the criticalmilitary sites of Argyliam.58 This conduct unveiled critical national secrets of Argyliam,putting its national security at stake. 59 By contrast, as submitted above, 60 theanticipatory impairment was only temporary blindness of that sensor,61 even without
affecting the operation of EVGA-1607.62
In comparison, the use of Palver-3 was to safeguard Argyliam’s national security,
which is an outweighing essential interest.
2. The use of Palver-3 was against a grave and imminent peril.
A grave and imminent peril shall be objectively established and not merely

Int’l Law Comm’n, 53rd Sess., Article 25(1)(a), Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (2001). [hereinafter ARSIWA]
54

55

Article 25(1)(b), ARSIWA.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 53rd Sess., at 173, U.N. Doc. A/56/10(2001).
56

57

S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. 40, Ser. A, No. 1 (Aug. 17).

58

Compromis, ¶6.

Brian D. Green, supra note 14; The National Space Policy, Article 1(d), (2020) (U.S.);The Space Industry Regulations, Articles 191, (2021) (U.K.).
59

60

Supra Argument I(A)(1).

61

Supra Argument I(A)(1).

62

Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 15.
9apprehended as possible. 63 Considering the secrecy of certain activities, this Court
determined in the Nicaragua case that internal files of the intelligence service can bedeemed as evidence.64
In casu, the critical infrastructure facilities and military sites of Argyliam were
under continuous spying of EVGA-1607.65 The spy satellite was constantly acquiring
detailed data of the national secrets of Argyliam, 66 which could be transmitted andutilized in almost real time. 67 As a result, the continuous espionage seriously
undermined the national security of Argyliam thereby.68
The above evidence is admissible because it is based on cross-checked andcorroborated information gathered by the Intelligence Agency. 69 Thus, Palver-3 wasused against a grave and imminent peril.
3. The use of Palver-3 was the only way to safeguard Argyliam’s essential
interest.
The term “only way” emphasized the exclusion of other lawful acts, including
unilateral acts or international cooperation. 70 Legitimate ASAT technology requires
63

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra note 51.

64

Nicaragua, supra note 1, at 38.

65

Compromis, ¶6.

Colleen Hanley, Regulating Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites over Isreal: A
Black Hole in the Open Skies Doctrine, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 423, 426 (2000).
66

Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century
War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1051, 1064 (1998).
67

68

Brian D. Green, supra note 14.

69

Compromis, ¶¶6, 8.

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 154, 194 (July 9).
7010

precision71 and minimal debris generation.72 Only cyber attacks to interfere with thecommand of the satellite73 meets the standard of legitimacy.74
In casu, Argyliam had no chance of international cooperation given Kassof’s
denial of its spying activities.75 In respect of unilateral techniques, since the actionablesatellite—Palver-3 was launched to only test satellite-to-satellite telecommunication,76
an effective cyber attack was not feasible in lack of imperative installation.77
Thus, the use of Palver-3 was the only way for Argyliam to safeguard its national
security and was justified by necessity. Therefore, the use of Palver-3 did not violate
international law.
II. ARGYLIAM IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF IRIORD-8.
The Applicant submits that Argyliam is not liable for the destruction of Iriord-8
under Article III of the LIAB [A], Article VII of the OST [B] and general international
law [C]. Moreover, the claim of Koligian shall be barred due to the principle of “cleanDavid A. Koplow, Asat-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulationof Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1198 (2009); Dakota S. Rudesill,
Precision War and Responsibility: Transformation Military Technology and the Duty ofCare under the Laws of War, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 517, 534 (2007).
71

COPUOS, Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee space debris
mitigation guidelines, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.366 (July 17, 2018). [Debris
Mitigation Guidelines].
72

The National Space Policy, Article 1(d), (2020) (U.S.); Christopher M. Petras, The
Use of Force in Response to Cyber-Attack on Commercial Space Systems –Reexamining Self-Defense in Outer Space in Light of the Convergence of U.S. Military
and Commercial Space Activities, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1213, 1230 (2002).
73

74

FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 2ND EDITION 839 (2020).

75

Compromis, ¶7.

76

Compromis, ¶5.

NATO, Rule 61, in TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLETO CYBER OPERATIONS 288 (Micharl N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2017).
77

11

hands”. [D]A. Argyliam is not liable under Article III of the LIAB.
Under Article III of the LIAB, liability arises when damage occurs in outer space
between space objects from different launching States.78 The liability covered under
Article III of the LIAB is fault-based and causation between the space object anddamage shall be established.79
As Argyliam and Koligian were qualified launching States, 80 the Applicant
submits that Argyliam is not liable under Article III of the LIAB since Argyliam is not
at fault [1] and there is no established causal link between the use of Palver-3 and thedestruction of Iriord-8. [2]
1. Argyliam was not at fault.
No definition of “fault” exists in the LIAB81 and one has to “fall back” on generalinternational law.82 In general international law, “fault” arises on two grounds: objective
fault and subjective fault.83 The Applicant submits that Argyliam is not at fault on bothobjective [a] and subjective grounds. [b]78Article III, LIAB.

Article III, LIAB; Bin Cheng, International Responsibility and Liability for Launch
Activities, 20 AIR & SPACE L. 297, 297 (1995).
79

80

Compromis, ¶¶5, 9.

Carl Q. Christol, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74
AM. J. INT’L L. 346, 368 (1980).
81

82

Chapter III: The General Problem Underlying the Drafting of Part 2 of the Draft
Articles, [1982] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’n 30, ¶54.
Frans G. von der Dunk, Liability versus Responsibility in Space Law: Misconception
or Misconstruction, 34 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 363, 366 (1991).
83

12

a. Argyliam was not at objective fault.
Laid down in the Nottebohm case, 84 objective fault refers to the breach of an
obligation imposed by law. The use of Palver-3 did not breach Argyliam’s international
obligations.85 Even if this Court finds the opposite, the wrongfulness of Argyliam’s
conduct is precluded by necessity.86 Thus, Argyliam was not at objective fault.
b. Argyliam was not at subjective fault.
Subjective fault denotes the intent or negligence to cause damage,87 which can beevaluated by a certain degree of due diligence.88 According to the Genocide case, due
diligence requires States to exercise reasonable measures available to prevent harm.89
Liability can not be incurred simply because the desired result is not achieved.90
As demonstrated above,91 whilst Argyliam laments the outcome of the mishit on
Iriord-8, Argyliam fufilled its duty of due diligence by taking two reasonable measures

84

Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 10 (Apr. 6).

85

Supra Argument I(A); Supra Argument I(B).

86

Supra Argument I(C).

Jochen Pfeifer, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 30 GER.
J. AIR & SPACE L. 215, 225 (1981).
87

Martha Mejia-Kaiser, Collision Course: 2008 Iridium-Cosmos Crash, 52 PROC.
INT’L INST. SPACE L. 274, 277 (2009); JOANNA KULESZA, DUE DILIGENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (2016).
88

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide [hereinafter Genocide] (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment,
2007 I.C.J. 43, 430 (Feb. 26); GEORGE T. HACKET, SPACE DEBRIS AND THE CORPUS
IURIS SPATIALIS 66 (1994); Setsuko Aoki, Standard of Due Diligence in Operating aSpace Object, 55 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 392, 396 (2012).
89

90

Genocide, supra note 89.

91

Supra Argument I(B)(3)(b).
13

to avert harm.92 Thus, Argyliam is not subjectively at fault.
2. There is no established causal link between Palver-3 and the destructionof Iriord-8.
According to Article III of the LIAB, causation is indispensable to liability.93 The
standard of causality is whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal link
between the use of the space object and damage. 94 The causal link must not beinterrupted by a subsequent intervening event.95
In casu, the inaccuracy of data resulted in a critical time delay, 96 leading to a mishit on Iriord-8. 97 By providing wrong data, the conduct of Charalg Inc. interrupted thecausal link between the use of Palver-3 and the damage of Iriord-8 as a subsequentintervening event. Since Charalg Inc., a national registered in Koligian, 98 is a nongovernmental entity of Koligian,99 Argyliam is not responsible for the conduct of thecompany.100 Thus, the destruction of Iriord-8 was not caused by Argyliam.
92

LTS Guidelines, supra note 46.

93

Article III, LIAB.

Genocide, supra note 89, at 234; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep.
Congo), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 324, 332 (June 19); Certain Activities Carried Out by
Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 15, 26 (Feb.
2).
94

M/V Norstar (No.25) (Pan. v. It.), Case No.25, Judgment of Apr. 10, 2019, ITLOS
Rep. 7, 99; H.L.A. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 163 (1961).
95

96

Compromis, ¶9.

97Compromis, ¶9.

98Compromis, ¶3.

Bin Cheng, The Extra-Terrestrial Application of International Law, 18 CURRENTLEGAL PROBS. 132, 135 (1965); Commercial Space Launch Act, Section 405.7, (1984)(U.S.); Space Activities Regulations, Article 1.03, (2001) (Aus.); Article 6, MultilateralSpace Station Agreement.
99

100

Article VI, OST.
14

Therefore, Argyliam is not liable for the damage under Article III of the LIAB.
B. Argyliam is not liable under Article VII of the OST.
Article VII of the OST enshrines the liability of a launching State for damage
caused by its space object.101 Thus, causality is a necessary condition for liability.102 As
demonstrated above, the destruction of Iriord-8 was not caused by Palver-3.103 Thus,
Argyliam is not liable under Article VII of the OST.
C. In any event, Argyliam is not liable under general international law.
Under general international law, a State committing an internationally wrongful
act is liable for damage caused thereby.104 With a conduct in breach of international
obligations attributable to a State, that State commits an internationally wrongful act.105
As submitted above, Argyliam did not breach its international obligations by using
Palver-3.106 Alternatively, the use of Palver-3 was justified by necessity.107 In addition,
the causal link was cut off.108 Therefore, in any event, Argyliam is not liable undergeneral international law.

101

Article VII, OST.

Lesley J. Smith & Armel Kerrest, Article VII, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE
LAW 126, 141 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009); Armed Activities on the Territory of theCongo [hereinafter Armed Activities] (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2022
I.C.J. 1, 32 (Feb. 9).
102

103

Supra Argument II(A)(2).

Factory at Chorzów (Ger.v. Pol.), Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. 21, Ser. A, No.9 (July26); Armed Activities, supra note 102, at 257.
104

105

Article 2, ARSIWA.

106

Supra Argument I.

107

Supra Argument I(C).

108

Supra Argument II(A)(2).
15

D. The claim of Koligian shall be barred under the doctrine of “clean hands”.
General principles of law shall lead this Court to decide on cases.109 The “clean
hands” doctrine is espoused by judicial decisions,110 scholars,111 and State practice112
as a general principle of law. Under this doctrine, a claimant’s claims shall be barred
due to his illegal conduct in relation to the claims he brings. 113 Koligian’s claim isbarred for the violation of its supervision obligation under Article VI of the OST.
According to Article VI of the OST, the space activities of non-governmental
entities require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State.114
Specifically, a State should adopt means of receiving information, and subsidiary means
for intervention or deterrence,115 which is appreciated by numerous State practices.116

109

Art. 38, ¶1, I.C.J. Statute.

Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. 95, Ser. A/B,
No.70 (June 28); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, 16 (Feb. 14) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert).
110

GERALD FITZMAURICE, HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1957); L. J.
Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary
Reparation Policies in Peru's Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 51, 52(2007).
111

Verbatim Record (1999/35), Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), I.C.J.
Verbatim Record 10 (May 12, 1999).
112

Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts andTribunals, 3 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 368, 369 (1953).
113

114

Article VI, OST.

Michael Gerhard, Article VI, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 103, 119(Stephan Hobe et al eds., 2009).
115

Land Remote Sensing Policy, Section 203, (1992) (U.S.); Act on Securing Proper
Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Records, Article 13, (2016) (Japan); The French
Space Operations Act, Articles 23-25, (2008) (Fr.); Space Development Promotion Act,
Articles 24-28, (2005) (S. Kor.); Argentina Digital Act: Information, Technologies andcommunications, Articles 64-67, (2014) (Arg.); Ordinance of the Supreme Soviet of
Ukraine on Space Activity, Article 8, (1996) (Ukr.); Act on Space Activities, Section 35, (1982) (Swed.).
116

16

As demonstrated above,117 Charalg Inc. is a non-governmental entity of Koligian.
Since Koligian was particularly advanced in the digitalization of telecommunication,118
it was capable of receiving information or imposing intervention or deterrence.
Nonetheless, while Charalg Inc. provided inaccurate data twice,119 Koligian failed toadopt any measure aforementioned. Thus, the illegal conduct of Koligian is establishedby omission. 120 Therefore, Koligian’s claim, which derived from its violation ofinternational law, shall be barred.
In conclusion, Argyliam is not liable for the destruction of Iriord-8.
III. THE USE BY KOLIGIAN OF ASAT MISSILE AGAINST PALVER-2 CONSTITUTES AVIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The Applicant submits that the use by Koligian of ASAT missile against Palver-2
violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter; [A] and the relevant provisions of the OST.
[B] In any event, its wrongfulness cannot be precluded by invoking necessity. [C]
A. The use of ASAT missile violates Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force inconsistent with theCharter’s purposes, 121 which also applies in outer space.122 Koligian’s use of ASAT

117

Supra Argument II(A)(2).

118

Compromis, ¶10.

119

Compromis, ¶¶3, 9.

Paul Stephen Dempsey, Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects underInternational and National Law, 54 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 165, 167 (2011).
120

121

Supra Argument I(A).

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 256–257 (2003); P.
JANKOWITSCH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES, IN SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 145-148 (1992).
122

17

missile violates Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter because it constitutes the use of force,[1] and self-defense cannot be invoked to justify the use of force. [2]1. The use of ASAT missile by Koligian constitutes the use of force.
The use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is generally accepted as theuse of armed force.123 According to the benchmark of armed force aformentioned,124
the use by Koligian of ASAT missile amounts to the “armed force” because it possesses
both the gravity [a] and hostile intent [b] elements.
a. The gravity of Koligian’s use of an ASAT missile reaches the thresholdof armed force.
Armed force is based on the capacity to destroy lives and property125 in its specificcontext. 126 In outer space, the destructive capacity could be evidenced by using
weapons127 with a certain level of kinetic impact.128 This involves the application ofsevere physical force to cause explosions129 or high-speed collisions.130

L.M. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS 70 (1946); Albrecht Randelzhofer & Oliver Dörr, Article 2(4), in 1
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, 200, 234 (Bruno Simma ed.
2012); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW
WE USE IT 248 (1994); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON
AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE 4 (2018).
123

124

Supra Argument I(A).

125

IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 6.

126

OLIVIER CORTEN, supra note 17, at 67.

JAMS BOND, PEACETIME FOREIGN DATA MANIPULATION AS ONE ASPECT OF
OFFENSIVE INFORMATION WARFARE QUESTIONS OF LEGALITY UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER ARTICLE 2(4) 78 (1996).
127

128

Corfu Channel, supra note 4, at 13, 35.

129

JAMS BOND, supra note 127.

130David A. Koplow, supra note 10, at 737.
18

The direct-ascent ASAT missile is classified as a kinetic-energy weapon, 131
recognized by the Secretary-General’s report,132 with the capacity to cause a high-speed
collision or explosion of satellites.133 In outer space, using a missile to cause a kinetic
impact will amount to an attack physically.134
In casu, Koligian launched a direct-ascent ASAT missile targeting Palver-2.135 It
successfully hit the target, as to exert kinetic impacts on the satellite via physicalforce.136 Ultimately, Palver-2 was rammed into at a fatal speed and exploded,137 with
its assets completely destroyed.138 Thus, the use of ASAT missiles by Koligian amounts
to the gravity of armed force.
b. Koligian had hostile intent against Argyliam by using ASAT missile.
“Hostile intent” embodies that a State intends to compel another State to refrainfrom doing something, 139 as revealed by this court, 140 a prerequisite for the use offorce.141 Moreover, it does not depend on the fundamental motives guiding the State’s

Deborah Housen-Couriel, Cybersecurity and Anti-Satellite Capabilities (ASAT),New Threats and New Legal Responses, 4 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 116, 116 (2015).
131

132

Report on Current Developments, supra note 9.

133

David A. Koplow, supra note 71, at 1201.

134

WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 362 (2012).

135

Compromis, ¶14.

136

Compromis, ¶14.

137

Compromis, ¶14.

138

Article VIII, OST.

139

OLIVIER CORTEN, supra note 17, AT 67.

Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 454; Corfu Channel, supra note 4, at 109;
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Tur.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 3, 29 (Dec. 19).
140

141

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
19

action, but only on whether the will of other States is being coerced.142 Although theuse of ASAT missile only takes minutes, it involves a necessary direction in advance.143
In casu, SSV was intended for Palver-2 in a moderate way.144 However, Koligian’s
use of ASAT missile destroyed Palver-2, eliminating any possibilities for SSV145 andfurther rendering the entire Palver system inoperable.146 As a result, well-prepared inadvance, Koligian compelled Argyliam to refrain from the restoration and utilization ofPalver-2. Thus, Koligian had hostile intent against Argyliam by using ASAT missile.
2. Koligian cannot invoke self-defense to justify the use of force.
According to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the use of force under Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter can be excluded by self-defense.147 However, to invoke self-defense,a State must demonstrate that it has been the victim of an intentional armed attack148 byanother State.149 In addition, members exercising self-defense must immediately report

226, 263 (July 8).
142

OLIVIER CORTEN, supra note 17, AT 77.

Lars Hostbeck, Space Weapons, Concepts and their International Security
Implications, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE: SECURITY POLICIES, APPLICATIONS AND
PROGRAMS 12 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. eds., 2015).
143

144

Compromis, ¶13.

145

Compromis, ¶14.

146

Compromis, ¶15.

JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
6 (2004).
147

Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgement, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 189-190 (Nov. 6); YORAMDINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 175 (2005); BRUNO SIMMA, THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 661-678 (1994).
148

Villani, The Security Council’s Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional
Organizations, YBNL 535, 552 (2022).
149

20

to the Security Council.150
In casu, the direct-ascent ASAT missile was used against Palver-2,151 the satellite
uncontrolled accidentally.152 As a result, any intent of Argyliam could not be carried out
by Palver-2. Simultaneously, the act was not even reported to the Security Council.153
Thus, Koligian did not face an armed attack and cannot invoke self-defense to justify
the use of force.
B. The use of ASAT missile against Palver-2 violated relevant provisions of
the OST.
Koligian’s use of an ASAT missile violated Article VIII of the OST by interferingwith Argyliam’s jurisdiction and control over Palver-2. [1] Moreover, Koligian also
violated Article IX of the OST in breach of the obligations of due regard principle,
preventing harmful contamination, and international consultation. [2]
1. Koligian violated Article VIII of the OST by interfering with thejurisdiction and control of Palver-2.
The Applicant submits that Koligian violated Article VIII of the OST since
Argyliam retains jurisdiction and control over Palver-2 [a] and Koligian infringed it byusing ASAT missile. [b]a. Argyliam retains jurisdiction and control over Palver-2.
Under Article VIII of the OST, the State of registry retains jurisdiction and control

150

Article 51, U.N. Charter.

151

Compromis, ¶14.

152

Compromis, ¶12.

153

Compromis, ¶14.
21

over the space object.154 While the term “jurisdiction” refers to the right to regulate aspace object, “control” is the ability to enforce jurisdiction.155“Retaining jurisdiction and control” includes the right to avoid external
infringement. 156 Consequently, whether a space object is unfunctional or
uncontrollable, 157 permanently or temporarily, 158 does not affect its jurisdiction andcontrol.159 In casu, the State of registry Argyliam160 retains jurisdiction and control over
Palver-2, regardless of the loss of factual control.161
b. Koligian infringed the jurisdiction and control over Palver-2.
States are obligated not to interfere with the jurisdiction and control over space
objects of another State.162 The prohibited interference includes the extinction of the154

Article VIII, OST.

Michael Gerhard & K. Gungaphul-Brocard, The Impact of National Space
Legislation on Space Industry Contracts, in CONTRACTING FOR SPACE 64 (L.J. Smith &I. Baumann eds. 2011).
155

156

Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Stephen Mick, supra note 35.

BENKÖ MARIETTA & SCHROGL KAI-UWE, SPACE LAW: CURRENT PROBLEMS ANDPERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE REGULATION, ELEVEN, UTRECHT 42 (2005).
157

COPUOS, Active Debris Removal - Report of the International Interdisciplinary
Congress on Space Debris Remediation and On-Orbit Satellite Servicing [hereinafter
Active Debris Removal], at 33, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.16 (Jan. 27, 2012);
H.A. Baker, Liability for Damage Caused in Outer Space by Space Refuse, 13 AIR &SPACE L. 183, 191 (1988); Hacket, supra note 89, at 189-199; K.F. SCHWETJE,
LIABILITY AND SPACE DEBRIS, IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF ACTIVITIES IN OUTERSPACE: STATE OF THE LAW AND MEASURES OF PROTECTION 36-40 (1990).
158

FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, supra note 74, at 156; Active Debris Removal,
supra note 158.
159

160

Compromis, ¶5.

161

Compromis, ¶12.

162

MANFRED LACHS, supra note 34, at 66.
22right to modify a space object 163 and any frustration of technical arrangements
necessary for the fulfillment of its mission.164 Specifically, States are not at liberty toremove space debris without the consent of the State of registry.165
In casu, the mission of Palver-2 was to operate the telecommunications system.166
The re-boost of Palver-2 by SSV served as a necessary technical arrangement for thefulfillment of this mission.167 Nonetheless, ASAT missile completely destroyed Palver2,168 depriving the possibility to adopt technical arrangements aforementioned.169 Thus,
Koligian infringed the jurisdiction and control over Palver-2.
2. The use of ASAT missile violated Article IX of the OST.
Koligian violated Article IX of the OST by failing to comply with the due regard
principle [a] and breaching the obligation to prevent harmful contamination. [b]Moreover, Koligian breached the obligation to undertake international consultations. [c]a. Koligian failed to comply with the “due regard” principle.
When conducting space activities, States shall pay due regard to the corresponding
interests of all other States.170 According to the P.C.A., the extent of due regard relates
163

Gabriel Lafferranderie, supra note 36, at 230.

164

MANFRED LACHS, supra note 34, at 66.

Jinyuan Su, Control over activities harmful to the environment, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 79 (Ram S. Jakhu & Paul Stephen Dempsey eds., 2017);
Brian Weeden, Overview of the Legal and Policy Challenges of Orbital Debris Removal
1 SPACE POLICY 27, 41 (2011);
165

166

Compromis, ¶5.

167

Compromis, ¶13.

168

Compromis, ¶14.

169

Compromis, ¶13.

170

Article IX, OST.
23

to the anticipated impairment.171 It requires States to conform to the no-harm principle[i] and to reduce the creation of space debris. [ii]i. Koligian failed to conform to the no-harm principle.
The no-harm principle indicates that State in observation of other States’ interests
shall refrain from causing harm or damage to its property.172 Further recognized by thiscourt,173 it requires States to standardize their actions so as not to injure the rights ofother States.174
In casu, in the absence of international cooperation,175 the destruction of Palver-2
by Koligian’s ASAT missile seriously impaired the national defense of Argyliam,176
which would take years to restore.177 Thus, Koligian failed to conform to the no-harmprinciple by posing a severe threat to Argyliam’s national security.
ii. Koligian failed to reduce the creation of space debris.
Given its destructive nature, 178 the direct-ascent ASAT missile is capable of

Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), 31 R.I.A.A. 358, 571 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2015).
171

172

Trail Smelter arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1932 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1941).

Corfu Channel, supra note 4, at 22; Nuclear Tests (Aus. v. Fr.), Dissenting Opinion,
1974 I.C.J. 372, 389 (Dec. 20).
173

L. VIIKARI, THE ENVIRONMENTAL ELEMENT IN SPACE LAW: ASSESSING THE PRESENTAND CHARTING THE FUTURE 152 (2008).
174

175

Compromis, ¶13.

176

Compromis, ¶5.

177

Compromis, ¶15.

Supra Argument III(A)(1)(a); U.N.G.A, Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite
missile testing, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/77/L.62 (Oct. 13, 2022).
178

24

destroying satellites into numerous space debris.179 The U.N.G.A. Resolution 60/99,180
as well as UNCOPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 181 reflected that thequantitative assessment of debris created182 by an independent party is required.183 The
intentional destruction shall be prenvented according to the mitigation guideline of
IADC,184 UNCOPUOS and also the TCBMs requirements.185
In casu, destroyed by ASAT missile, Palver-2 fragmented into thousands ofpieces,186 and even small debris could cause catastrophic damage.187 Koligian failed toassess the space debris that endangered the international community.
Therefore, Koligian breached the due regard principle under Article IX of the OST.
b. Koligian breached the obligation to avoid harmful contamination.

U.N. Secretary-General, Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles
of responsible behaviors: Rep. of the Secretary-General, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/76/77 (July13, 2021) [hereinafter Principles of Responsible Behaviors].
179

G.A. Res. 60/99, at 27, International Cooperation in the Peaceful uses of Outer
Space, (Jan. 6, 2006).
180

181

Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 72.

David Wright, Space Debris, 60 PHYSICS TODAY 35, 39 (2007); Brian Weeden, 2007
ChineseAnti-Satellite
Test
Fact
Sheet
(Nov.
23,
2010),
https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_ sheetupdated_2012.pdf.
182

183

Active Debris Removal, supra note 158, at 42.

Inter-Agency Space Debri Coordination Committee, IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines, ¶5.2, IADC-02-01 Revision 2, (Mar. 13 ,2020).
184

U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency andConfidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/68/189(July 29, 2013).
185

186

Compromis, ¶14.

M. T. SAVAGE, THE MILLENNIAL PROJECT: COLONIZING THE GALAXY IN EIGHT EASYSTEPS 149 (1992); W. S. WONG & J. FERGUSSON, MILITARY SPACE POWER: A GUIDE TO
THE ISSUES 69 (2010); S. TKATCHOVA, SPACE-BASED TECHNOLOGIES ANDCOMMERCIALIZED DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS AND BENEFITS 213 (2011).
187

25

Under Article IX of the OST, harmful contamination shall be avoided in space
exploration by appropriate measures.188 The appropriateness requires States to conformto the “precautionary principle”, 189 which is part of customary international law.190
In outer space, the precautionary principle could be further specified by the Draft
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities(APTHHA).191 Space debris is characterized as one particular transboundary harm192 to
the space environment.193
In casu, considering the debris generated and the harm it resulted in near LEO
orbit reveals the transboundary harm by the unilateral missile attack.194 Thus, Koligian
breached the obligation to avoid harmful contamination.
c. Koligian was contrary to the obligation of undertaking international

188

Article IX, OST.

Article III, OST; Olivier Ribbelink, Article III, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON
SPACE LAW 67 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds. 2009); Paul B. Larsen, Application of the
Precautionary Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 295, 301 (2006).
189

UNCED, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (June 14, 1992); Second Int’l Conf. on the Protection of the North Sea,
Ministerial Declaration, Principle VII (London) (Nov. 25, 1987); Owen McIntyre &Thomas Mosedale, Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law,
9(2) J. ENV’T L. 221, 223 (1997).
190

G.A. Res. 62/68, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from
Hazardous Activities [hereinafter APTHHA] (Jan. 8, 2008); Olivier Ribbelink, supranote 187; MALCOLM N. SHAW, supra note 34, at 72.
191

Andrea Bianchi, Environmental Harm Resulting from the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space: Some Remarks on State Responsibility and Liability, in
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 231, 262 (Francesco
Francioni et al. eds., 1991).
192

Active Debris Removal, supra note 158, at 7; James P. Lampertius, The Need for an
Effective Liability Regime for Damage Caused by Debris in Outer Space, 13 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 447,448 (1992).
193

194

Compromis, ¶14.
26

consultations.
Koligian was obligated to consult because it had reason to believe the use of ASAT
missile would cause potentially harmful interference. [i] Further, Koligian failed tofulfill its obligation to consult. [ii]i. Koligian had reason to believe the activity would cause potentiallyharmful interference.
“Harmful interference” includes interference with the freedom of physicalmovement or operations of space objects.195 Moreover, the enormous power of directascent ASAT missiles is widely recognized, 196 with potential interference with thetarget and also other space objects by the debris resulted.197
In casu, ASAT missile completely destroyed Palver-2, 198 which obviously
deprived the freedom of physical movement or operations of Palver-2. Koligian shouldhave sufficient knowledge of potentially harmful interference with Palver-2 ahead of
the use of ASAT missile.
ii. Koligian failed to fulfill its obligation of consultation.
The OST does not specify the procedure for appropriate international

Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321, 337 (2008).
195

Principles of Responsible Behaviors, supra note 179; ESA, ESA’s Annual Space
Environment
Report(Apr.
22,2022),
https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.p
df.
196

MARC G. CARNS, ORBITAL DEBRIS PREVENTION AND MITIGATION EFFORTS AMONG
MAJOR SPACE ACTORS 57 (2023); Frans G. von der Dunk, Target Practising in a Global
Commons: The Chinese ASAT Test and Outer Space Law, 22 Kor. J. Air & Space L. &Pol’y 55,63 (2007).
197

198

Compromis, ¶14.
27

consultations. 199 As a result, the procedure of consultation depends on the planned
activity.200 In Pulp Mills case, this Court identified a requirement of notification as partof consultation.201 The minimum standard of notification requires information of thepotentially harmful interference for taking appropriate action.202
In casu, Argyliam proposed SSV as an immediate measure. 203 Nevertheless,
Koligian used ASAT missile unilaterally204 without any notification.205 Thus, Koligian
failed to fulfill the obligation of international consultation.
C. The wrongfulness of Koligian’s violation of international obligations
cannot be precluded by invoking necessity.
Koligian could not invoke necessity because the use of ASAT missile was neither
to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril [1] nor the only
way, [2] and it seriously harmed Argyliam’s essential interest. [3]
1. Koligian’s essential interest did not face a grave and imminent peril.
As submitted before, 206 the peril has to be objectively established, which means
the existence of extremely serious present danger to the threatened essential interest.207
Ivan Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CAL. L. REV. 507, 517(1967).
199

Brandon Hart, Legal Implications Surrounding Recent Interception of Spy Satellite,
JOINT CTR. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS J. 1, 34 (2008).
200

Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay [Pulp Mills] (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J.
8, 51 (Apr. 20).
201

202

Article 3(2), Espoo Convention; Mineiro, supra note 195, at 339.

203

Compromis, ¶13.

204

Compromis, ¶14.

205

Compromis, ¶14.

206

Supra Argument I(C)(1).

207

Int’l Law Comm’n R. Ago, Addendum to the Eight Report on State Responsibility,28

In practice, an individual risk of less than 20% is considered unlikely.208
In casu, the chance for the laser’s spontaneous activation was less than 3%.209
Even if activated, Palver-2 would be almost impossible to cause any damage in lack ofadjustable emitting direction. Further, Palver-2 was expected to enter orbit in threedays,210 allowing the preparation of SSV within 24 hours.211 Thus, the realization of
peril was not objectively established.
Therefore, Koligian’s essential interest did not face a grave and imminent peril.
2. It was not the only way for Koligian to safeguard its essential interest.
As aforementioned, 212 the “only way” available to safeguard that interest is
excluded if other lawful means are available. The “way” is not limited to unilateral
action but includes conduct through international cooperation.213
A direct-ascent ASAT missile could reach the target in a few minutes. 214
Meanwhile, according to NASA, 215 SSV is proficient in lifting satellites for safe

at 19, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add. (Feb. 5, 1979).
NASA:
Guidelinesfor
Risk
Management
https://confluence.ivv.nasa.gov:8445/display/IMS.
208

209

Compromis, ¶12.

210

Compromis, ¶12.

211

Compromis, ¶13.

212

Supra Argument I(C)(2).

(Oct.

16,

2017),

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its 53rd Sess., at 173, U.N. Doc. A/56/10(2001)
213

K. U. Hörl & J. Hermida, Change of Ownership, Change of Registry? Which Objects
to Register, What Data to Furnish, When and Until When, 46 PROC. ON INT’L INST.
SPACE L. 452, 454 (2003).
214

NASA, Cygnus-completes-station-mission-after-four-months (June 28 2022),
https:// blogs.nasa.gov/spacestation/2022/06/28/ cygnus-completes-station-missionafter-four-months/; NASA, On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing 2
215

29

modification.216
In casu, the SSV already successfully passed the ground-based experiment, readyfor the launching process. 217 Koligian, as a space-faring State, could cooperate topromote the SSV measure.218 In any event, Koligian could still use ASAT missile as alast resort, with the consent of Argyliam. Therefore, the use of ASAT missile toprematurely destroy Palver-2 was not the only way presented.
3. The essential interest of Argyliam was seriously harmed.
As demonstrated above,219 national security is a State’s essential interest. Spacebased services for national defense are essential to national security.220 Further, thePrinciples of Responsible Behaviors characterized that actions would undermine
national security by interfering with space-based services. 221
In casu, the re-boost of Palver-2 and the restoration of the telecommunication
system via SSV222 were expected to be probable.223 ASAT missile destroyed Palver-2(OSAM-2) (June 24, 2022), https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/tdm/osam-2.html;
NASA, Northrop Grumman makes history, Mission Extension Vehicle docks to target
satellite (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2020/02/northropgrumman-history-mission-extension-vehicle-docks-satellite/.
Henry R. Hertzfeld, In-Space Maneuvering, Servicing, and Resource Use: The
Commercial Need for Legal Assurances, 57 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 137, 137 (2014).
216

217

Compromis, ¶13.

218

Compromis, ¶4.

219

Supra Argument I(C)(1).

220

Principles of Responsible Behaviors, supra note 179, at 43.

221

Principles of Responsible Behaviors, supra note 179.

222

Compromis, ¶13.

Danielle Miller & Elsbeth Magilton, On-Orbit Satellite Servicing Standards Are a
Necessity for the Private Space Industry, 31 AIR & SPACE L. 4, 4 (2018); JAXA, HTV6
Reentry to Earth's Atmosphere: JAXA's President, Naoki Okumura's Address H-II
223

30

completely 224 and erased all possibilities of restoration. 225 Since the Palvers system
contributed greatly to the national security of Argyliam,226 Argyliam’s essential interest
was seriously harmed and Koligian cannot invoke the circumstance of necessity.
In conclusion, the use of ASAT missile by Koligian constitutes a violation ofinternational law.
IV. KOLIGIAN IS LIABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF
PALVER-2.
The Applicant submits that Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2 under
the LIAB, [A] Article VII of the OST, [B] and general international law. [C]
A. Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2 under Article III of the
LIAB.
The Applicant submits that Koligian is liable since the following elements227 aresatisfied: ASAT missile falls within the scope of “space object” under the LIAB; [1]Koligian was at fault; [2] the damage was caused by the use of ASAT missile. [3]
1. ASAT missile falls within the meaning of “space object”.
Under the LIAB, there is no clear definition of the term “space object”.228 In lightof its context and purpose,229 “space object” refers to any man-made object attempted

Transfer Vehicle KOUNOTORI6 Mission Completion
https://global.jaxa.jp/press/2017/02/20170206_kounotori6.html.
224

Compromis, ¶14.

225

Compromis, ¶15.

226

Compromis, ¶2.

227

Supra Argument, II(A).

228

Article I, LIAB.

229

Article 31, VCLT; BIN CHENG, supra note 34, at 499.
31

(Feb.

6,

2017),

or physically brought into outer space.230 This definition is also appreciated by State
practices. 231 Since ASAT missile was a man-made object physically brought into
space,232 it falls within the meaning of “space object”.233
2. Koligian was at fault.
As submitted above, 234 fault arises in two forms: objective fault refers to thebreach an international obligation; subjective fault denotes the intent or negligence tocause damage. The direct-ascent ASAT missile is to destroy a satellite completely.235
The set of ASAT missiles was well-prepared with hostility, and the deliberate action
with intent would establish fault.236
In casu, Koligian violated the abovementioned international obligations,237 which
reveals the objective fault. Besides, given the destructive capacity of ASAT missile,
Koligian directed it against Palver-2 and successfully destroyed the satellite,238 which
Bin Cheng, supra note 79, at 300; VLADIMIR KOPAL, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 37’ ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 99 (1994); Kazuhiro Nakatani, Taepodong Missile Incident
and Emerging Issues of Interpretation and Application of Space Treaties, 44 PROC. ON
L. OUTER SPACE 144, 144 (2001); U.S. Sen., Report from the Committee on Foreign
230

Relations on the Convention on International Liability or Damage Caused by Space
Objects, 92 Cong., 2nd Sess., Exec. Rep. No. 92-38,7 (1972).
National Aeronautics and Space Act, Section 20103, (2010) (U.S.); Law of theRussian Federation “About Space Activities, Article 17, (1993) (Russ.); Act on Space
Activities, Section 4, (2018) (Fin.); Out Space Act, Article 4, (2016) (Den.).
231

232

Compromis, ¶5.

233

Frans G. von der Dunk, supra note 197, at 66.

234

Supra Argument II(A)(1).

235

Principles of Responsible Behaviors, supra note 179, at 6.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 261 (July 8).
236

237

Supra Argument III.

238

Compromis, ¶14.
32

indicates the intent of subjective fault.
Thus, Koligian was at fault.
3. The damage to Palver-2 was caused by ASAT missile.
Causality demands a “sufficiently direct and certain” causal link establishedbetween the use of space object and damage.239 The causal link can be established if
the damage is a direct consequence of a space object,240 focusing on State’s conduct
which enables the harmful outcome to materialize.241
In casu, Koligian launched ASAT missile towards Palver-2. 242 In light of its
destructive capacity, 243 the use of ASAT missile enabled the harmful outcome tomaterialize against Palver-2.244 Thus, the damage was caused by ASAT missile.
B. Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2 under Article VII of the
OST by using ASAT missile.
Under Article VII of the OST, launching States are liable for damage caused by
the launched object to another State. 245 The liability is absolute and only concerns
damage, causality and the launched object. 246 In casu, Koligian launched ASAT

239

Supra Argument II(A)(2).

BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 242 (1953).
240

241

ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, CAUSATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (2022).

242

Compromis, ¶14.

243

David A. Koplow, supra note 71, at 1201.

244

Compromis, ¶14.

245

Article VII, OST.

246

Lesley J. Smith & Armel Kerrest, supra note 102, at 163.
33

missile. 247 As demonstrated above, the damage and causality are established. 248
Therefore, Koligian is liable under Article VII of the OST.
C. Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2 under generalinternational law.
Under general international law, 249 liability is based on damage caused by theinternationally wrongful act250 which requires that the act is attributable to the State andconstitutes a breach of international obligation of the State.251
In casu, the use of ASAT missile is attributed to Koligian,252 and in violation of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as well as Articles VIII & IX of the OST, it constitutes
internationally wrongful acts.253 The causality between the destruction of Palver-2 andKoligian’s internationally wrongful act was submitted before.254 Therefore, Koligian isliable under general international law.
In conclusion, Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2.

247

Compromis, ¶14.

248

Supra Argument IV(A).

249

Article 31, ARSIWA; Factory at Chorzów, supra note 104.

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgement,
1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (May 24).
250

251

Article 1, ARSIWA.

252

Compromis, ¶14.

253

Supra Argument III.

254

Supra Argument IV(A).
34

SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
For the foregoing reasons, the Government of Argyliam, Applicant respectfully requests
the Court to adjudge and declare that:
1. The use of Palver-3 was in conformity with international law.
2. Argyliam is not liable for the destruction of Iriord-8.
3. The use by Koligian of ASAT missile against Palver-2 constitutes a violation ofinternational law.
4. Koligian is liable for the destruction of Palver-2.

XXII