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Joint Publication 3-16

AT E S O FAMultinational Operations

01 March 2019
Validated on 12 February 2021

PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for the Armed Forcesof the United States when they operate as part of a multinational (coalition or allied) force.
It addresses operational considerations for the commander and staff to plan, execute, andassess multinational operations.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performanceof the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations
for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), andprescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent
of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force andexecuting the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of objectives.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commandersof combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter;
however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.
c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service
publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally incoordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current
and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (allianceor coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and proceduresiPreface
ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States,
commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine andprocedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE
Lieutenant General, USMC
Director, Joint Force Developmentii

JP 3-16

SUMMARY OF CHANGESREVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-16
DATED 16 JULY 2013•This publication was validated without change on 12 February 2021•

Removes and replaces Range of Military Options to a Competition Continuum.

•

Updates and cleans up graphics throughout the joint publication (JP).

•Updates several of the quotes and examples throughout the JP.

•

Terminology and acronyms updated to current lexicon.

•

Utilizes “national” vice “political” will and decisions throughout.

•Updated out of date reference Internet links.

•‘Stability operations’ changed to ‘stability activities’.

•

Emphasized Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.

•

Enhanced the Multinational Logistic section.

•

Enhanced the Transition to Multinational Operations section.

•

Updates Appendix A, “Planning Considerations Checklist.”•

Updates Appendix B, “Multinational Planning Augmentation Team.”•

Updates Appendix C, “Multinational Strategy and Operations Group.”•

Adds Appendix D, “Multinational Logistics.”•

Adds Appendix E, “Commander's Checklist for Logistics in Support ofMultinational Operations.”•

Includes “Counter Threat Networks” under “Other Multinational Operations.”iii

Summary of Changes

Intentionally Blankiv

JP 3-16

TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. viii
CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
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Multinational Operations Overview ........................................................................... I-1
Strategic Context......................................................................................................... I-1
Nature of Multinational Operations ............................................................................ I-2
Security Cooperation .................................................................................................. I-5
Security Cooperation Considerations ......................................................................... I-6
Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability ............................................... I-8

CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS
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Command Authority ..................................................................................................II-1
Unified Action ...........................................................................................................II-2
Multinational Force Commander ...............................................................................II-4
Overview of Multinational Command Structures ......................................................II-4
Multinational Command Structures ...........................................................................II-8
Multinational Force Coordination..............................................................................II-9
Control of Multinational Operations ........................................................................II-17
Interorganizational Cooperation ..............................................................................II-18

CHAPTER III
GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
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Diplomatic and Military Considerations .................................................................. III-1
Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force..................................................... III-3
Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks ............................................................ III-5
Language, Religion, Culture, and Sovereignty ........................................................ III-6
Legal ........................................................................................................................ III-8
Doctrine and Training ............................................................................................ III-10
Funding and Resources .......................................................................................... III-10
Protection of Personnel, Information, and Critical Assets ..................................... III-11
Rules of Engagement ............................................................................................. III-12
Combat Identification and Friendly Fire Prevention ............................................. III-13

CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONSLand Operations ....................................................................................................... IV-1
Maritime Operations ................................................................................................ IV-3
Air Operations .......................................................................................................... IV-4
Space Operations ..................................................................................................... IV-7v

Table of ContentsInformation .............................................................................................................. IV-8
Cyberspace Operations .......................................................................................... IV-10

CHAPTER V
OTHER MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
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Stability Activities .................................................................................................... V-1
Special Operations .................................................................................................... V-2
Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations ....................................... V-2
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ..................................................................... V-4
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations .......................................................... V-5
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction ............................................................... V-7
Counterdrug Operations ............................................................................................ V-8
Countering Threat Networks..................................................................................... V-8
Personnel Recovery .................................................................................................. V-9

CHAPTER VI
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
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Assessment ............................................................................................................... VI-1
Intelligence ............................................................................................................... VI-1
Information Sharing ................................................................................................. VI-5
Communications ...................................................................................................... VI-9
Joint Fires ............................................................................................................... VI-11
Host-Nation Support .............................................................................................. VI-11
Civil Affairs Operations ......................................................................................... VI-13
Health Services ...................................................................................................... VI-14
Personnel Support .................................................................................................. VI-14
Public Affairs ......................................................................................................... VI-15
Multinational Logistics .......................................................................................... VI-16
Meteorology and Oceanography ............................................................................ VI-20
Environmental ........................................................................................................ VI-21
Transitions.............................................................................................................. VI-22
Multinational Communications Integration ........................................................... VI-25

APPENDIXA
Planning Considerations Checklist............................................................ A-1
B
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team .............................................B-1
C
Multinational Strategy and Operations Group ...........................................C-1
D
Multinational Logistics ............................................................................. D-1
ECommander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support ofMultinational Operations............................................................................ E-1
F
Points of Contact ........................................................................................ F-1
GReferences ................................................................................................. G-1
HAdministrative Instructions ....................................................................... H-1

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Table of Contents
GLOSSARY
Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5
FIGURE
I-1
II-1
II-2
II-3
II-4
II-5
II-6
II-7
II-8
II-9
II-10
III-1
III-2
IV-1
IV-2
IV-3
V-1
VI-1
VI-2
VI-3
B-1
D-1
D-2
D-3
D-4
D-5
D-6

Notional Competition Continuum ............................................................... I-3
Notional Multinational Command Structure ..............................................II-1
Notional Coalition Command and Control Structure ................................ II-4
Integrated Command Structure ..................................................................II-6
Lead Nation Command Structure ...............................................................II-6
Parallel Command Structure ......................................................................II-7
Coalition Command Relationships for Operation
Desert Storm (Land Forces) .....................................................................II-10
Order of Battle ..........................................................................................II-13
International Security Assistance Force Coalition
Command Relationships ..........................................................................II-14
Stabilization Force Coalition Command Relationships ...........................II-15
European Forces Coalition Command Relationships...............................II-16
Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations ............................ III-2
Partner Nation Contributions ................................................................... III-4
Multinational Force Land Component Commander
Notional Responsibilities ......................................................................... IV-2
Multinational Force Maritime Component Commander
Notional Responsibilities ......................................................................... IV-4
Multinational Force Air Component Commander
Notional Responsibilities ......................................................................... IV-5
Multinational Force Special Operations Component
Commander Notional Responsibilities...................................................... V-3
Multinational Intelligence Principles ....................................................... VI-2
Notional Transitions of Authority .......................................................... VI-25
Multinational Communication Integration ............................................. VI-26
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
Augmentation Roles ...................................................................................B-2
Logistics Principles of Multinational Operations...................................... D-2
United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Classes of Supply .................................................................................... D-11
Illustrative Multinational Joint Logistic Center Structure....................... D-15
Illustrative Logistic Command and Control
Organization: Alliance-Led ..................................................................... D-17
Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization:
United States-Led Multinational Operation ............................................ D-18
Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization:
United Nations-Commanded Multinational Operation ........................... D-20

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JP 3-16

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW•

Describes the strategic context for multinational operations•

Discusses the nature and tenets of multinational operations•

Describes how security cooperation provides ways and means to help achieve
national security and foreign policy objectives•

Outlines command and coordination relationships within national andmultinational chains of command•

Discusses diplomatic and military considerations related to building andmaintaining a multinational force•

Describes how language, religion, culture, and sovereignty considerations
effect planning for multinational operations•

Outlines how land, maritime, air, space, information, and cyberspace
operations are conducted in a multinational context
Fundamentals of Multinational Operations
Multinational operations are conducted by forces of
two or more nations, usually undertaken within the
structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible
arrangements include supervision by aninternational organization such as the United
Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), or Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe.

Strategic Context

Nations form regional and global geopolitical andeconomic relationships to promote their mutual
national interests, ensure mutual security against
real and perceived threats, conduct foreign
humanitarian assistance (FHA), conduct peace
operations, and promote their ideals. Cultural,diplomatic,
psychological,
economic,technological, and informational factors all
influence
multinational
operations
andparticipation. However, a nation’s decision toix

Executive Summary
employ military capabilities is always a politicaldecision.
Nature of Multinational
Operations

The tenets of multinational operations are respect,rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission
focus, team-building, trust, and confidence. Whilethese tenets cannot guarantee success, ignoringthem may lead to mission failure due to a lack ofunity of effort. National and organizational normsof culture, language, and communication affectmultinational force (MNF) interoperability.

Security Cooperation

US national and Department of Defense strategic
guidance emphasizes the importance of defense
relationships with allies and partner nations (PNs)
to advance national security objectives, promotestability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of
having to employ US military forces in a conflict.
Security cooperation (SC) activities are likely to be
conducted in a combatant command’s daily
operations. SC advances progress toward
cooperation within the competition continuum bystrengthening and expanding the existing networkof US allies and partners, which improves theoverall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force
and enables more effective multinational
operations.

Rationalization, Standardization,and Interoperability

International rationalization, standardization, andinteroperability with PNs is important for achieving
practical cooperation; efficient use of research,development, procurement, support, and production
resources; and effective multinational capability
without sacrificing US capabilities.

Command and Coordination Relationships
Command Authority

Although nations will often participate inmultinational operations, they rarely, if ever,relinquish national command of their forces. As
such, forces participating in a multinational
operation will always have at least two distinct
chains of command: a national chain of command
and a multinational chain of command.
National Command. As Commander in Chief, thePresident always retains and cannot relinquishx

JP 3-16

Executive Summary
national command authority over US forces.
National command includes the authority andresponsibility
fororganizing,
directing,coordinating, controlling, planning employment of,and protecting military forces.
Multinational Command. Command authority fora multinational force commander (MNFC) is
normally negotiated between the participating
nations and can vary from nation to nation. In
making a decision regarding an appropriate
command relationship for a multinational military
operation, the President carefully considers suchfactors as mission, size of the proposed US force,risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules ofengagement. Command authority will be specified
in the implementing agreements that provide a clear
and common understanding of what authorities are
specified over which forces.
Unified Action

Unified action during multinational operations
involves the synergistic application of all
instruments of national power as provided by eachparticipating nation; it includes the actions of
nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.

Multinational Force Commander

MNFC is a generic term applied to a commander
who exercises command authority over a militaryforce composed of elements from two or morenations. The extent of the MNFC’s command
authority is determined by the participating
nations or elements.

Overview of Multinational
Command Structures

No single command structure meets the needs ofevery multinational command, but national
considerations will heavily influence the ultimate
shape of the command structure.
The basic structures for multinational operations fall
into one of three types: integrated, lead nation (LN),or parallel command.


Integrated Command Structure. A good
example of this command structure is in NATO,
where a strategic commander is designated froma member nation, but the strategic command
staff and the commanders and staffs ofxiExecutive Summary
subordinate commands are of multinational
makeup.

Interorganizational Cooperation



LN Command Structure. An LN structure
exists when all member nations place theirforces under the control of one nation. The LN
command structure can be distinguished by adominant LN command and staff arrangementwith subordinate elements retaining strict
national integrity.



Parallel Command Structures. Under aparallel command structure, no single force
commander is designated. The MNF leadershipmust develop a means for coordination among
the participants to achieve unity of effort. Thiscan be accomplished through the use ofcoordination centers. Nonetheless, because of
the absence of a single commander, the use of aparallel command structure should be avoided,
if at all possible.

In many operational environments, the MNF
interacts with a variety of stakeholders requiring
unified action by the MNFC, including nonmilitary
governmental
departments
andagencies,
international organizations, and nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs).
Interorganizational
cooperation includes the coordination between the
Armed Forces of the United States; US
Government departments and agencies; state,
territorial, local, and tribal government agencies;
foreign military forces and government agencies;
international organizations; NGOs; and the private
sector.

General Planning Considerations
Diplomatic and Military
Considerationsxii

The composition of an MNF may change as partners
enter and leave when their respective national
objectives change or force contributions reach thelimits of their nation’s ability to sustain them. Somenations may even be asked to integrate their forces
with those of another, so that a contribution may, forexample, consist of an infantry company containing
platoons from different countries. The only
constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every
JP 3-16

Executive Summary
case, a calculated diplomatic decision by eachpotential member of a coalition or alliance. The
nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences
the multinational task force’s (MNTF’s) command
structure.
Numerous factors influence the military capabilities
of nations. The operational-level commander must
be aware of the specific operational limitations andcapabilities of the forces of participating nations andconsider these differences when assigning missions
and conducting operations. MNTF commanders at
all levels may be required to spend considerable
time consulting and negotiating with diplomats,host nation (HN) officials, local leaders, and others;
their role as diplomats should not be
underestimated.
Building and Maintaining a
Multinational Force

Building an MNF starts with the national decisions
and diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or spuran alliance into action. Discussion and coordination
between potential participants will initially seek tosort out basic questions at the national strategiclevel.

Mission Analysis and Assignment The MNFC’s staff should conduct a detailed
mission analysis. This is one of the most importantof Tasks
tasks in planning multinational operations andshould result in a revised mission statement,commander’s intent, and the MNFC’s planningguidance. As part of the mission analysis, force
requirements should be identified; standards forparticipation published (e.g., training-levelcompetence and logistics, including deployment,sustainment, and redeployment capabilities); andfunding requests, certification procedures, and force
commitments solicited from an alliance or likely
coalition partners.
Language, Religion, Culture, andSovereignty

Differing languages within an MNF may present
a significant challenge to command, control, andcommunications and potentially affect unity ofeffort if not mitigated. US forces cannot assume
the predominant language will automatically be
English, and specifying an official language for the
MNF can be a sensitive issue. Therefore, US forcesxiii

Executive Summary
should make every effort to overcome language
barriers.
Religion. Each partner in multinational operations
requires the capability to assess the impact ofreligion upon operations. Assigned religious affairs
personnel serve as general planning considerations
advisers to the command regarding religious factors
among the local population, as well as assigned,
attached, or authorized personnel.
Culture. Each partner in multinational operations
possesses a unique cultural identity—the result of
their physical environment, economic, political, andsocial outlook, as well as the values, beliefs, andsymbols that comprise their culture. Commanders
should strive to accommodate religious and cultural
customs, holiday observances, and similar concernsof MNF members.
Sovereignty Issues. Sovereignty issues will be
among the most difficult problems the MNFC may
be required to mitigate. Often, the MNFC will be
required to accomplish the mission throughcoordination, communication, and consensus, inaddition to traditional command concepts. National
sensitivities must be recognized and acknowledged.
Operations
Land Operations

In most multinational operations, land forces are an
integral and central part of the military effort. The
level and extent of land operations in a multinational
environment is largely a function of the overall
military objectives, any national caveats toemployment, and the forces available within the
MNF.
National doctrine and training will normally dictate
employment options within the MNF. Nations with
common tactics, techniques, and procedures will
also experience far greater interoperability.
Effective use of SC activities may significantly
reduce interoperability problems even for countries
with widely disparate weapons systems.

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Executive Summary
Maritime Operations

During multinational operations, maritime forces
can exercise sea control or project power ashore,
synchronize their operations with the other MNF
components, and support the MNFC’s intent andguidance in accomplishing the MNF mission.
Maritime forces are primarily navies and coast
guard; however, they may include maritimefocused air forces, amphibious forces, or othergovernment departments and agencies charged withsovereignty, security, or constabulary functions atsea.

Air Operations

Air operations provide the MNFC with a
responsive, agile, and flexible means of operationalreach. The MNFC can execute deep operations
rapidly, striking at decisive points and attacking
centers of gravity. Further, transportation andsupport requirements can be greatly extended in
response to emerging crisis and operational needs.
Multinational air operations are focused on
supporting the MNFC’s intent and guidance inaccomplishing the MNTF mission and, at the sametime, ensuring air operations are integrated with theother major MNF operational functions (land,
maritime, and special operations forces).

Space Operations

MNFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages ofspace-based capabilities.
Available spacecapabilities are normally limited to alreadydeployed assets and established priorities for spacesystem resources. Space systems offer global
coverage and the potential for real time and near realtime support to military operations. US Strategic
Command, through the joint force component
commander, enables commands to access various
space capabilities and systems.

Information

All military activities produce information.
Informational aspects are the features and details of
military activities observers interpret and use to
assign meaning and gain understanding. Those
aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes thatdrive behavior and decision making. The joint force
commander/MNFC leverages informational aspectsof military activities to gain an advantage; failing toleverage those aspects may cede this advantage toothers. Leveraging the informational aspects ofxv

Executive Summary
military activities ultimately affects strategic
objectives.
Cyberspace Operations

Cyberspace is a global domain within theinformation environment consisting of theinterdependent network of information technology
infrastructures and resident data, including theInternet, telecommunications networks, computer
systems, space-based resources, and embedded
processors and controllers.
Cyberspace uses
electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum(EMS) to create, store, modify, and exchange data
via networked systems. Cyberspace operations seek
to ensure freedom of action throughout theoperational environment for US forces and ourallies, while denying the same to our adversaries.
Cyberspace operations overcome the limitations of
distance, time, and physical barriers present in thephysical domains. Cyberspace links actions in thephysical domains, enabling mutually dependent
operations to achieve an operational advantage.
Other Multinational Operations

Stability Activities

Stabilization is the process by which military andnonmilitary actors collectively apply various
instruments of national power to address drivers ofconflict, foster HN resiliencies, and create
conditions that enable sustainable peace andsecurity. Stability is needed when a state is understress and cannot cope.
MNFs supporting
stabilization efforts should consider the use offundamentals of stabilization and the principles ofmultinational operations to plan and execute
military activities to facilitate long-term stability.
The fundamentals are conflict transformation, HN
ownership, unity of effort, and building HN
capacity.

Special Operations

Special operations forces (SOF) can provide the
MNTF with a wide range of specialized militarycapabilities and responses. SOF can provide
specific assistance in the areas of assessment,
liaison, and training of HN forces within the MNTF
operational area.

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Executive Summary
Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Management Operations

To prevail in the next conflict, an MNF must win
the fight for EMS superiority. Devices whosefunctions depend on the EMS are used by both
civilian and military organizations and individuals
for intelligence; communications; positioning,navigation, and timing; sensing; command andcontrol; attack; ranging; and data transmission andinformation storage and processing.

Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations

The President of the United States is the approvalauthority for noncombatant evacuation operations(NEOs), which will be conducted under the lead of
the chief of diplomatic mission, the President’s
personal representative to the HN. An NEO isconducted to relocate designated noncombatants
threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety.
NEOs are principally conducted by US forces toevacuate US citizens but may be expanded toinclude citizens from the HN, as well as citizens
from other countries.

Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance Operations

FHA operations, particularly in developing
countries, often require the intervention and aid ofvarious agencies, including the military, from allover the world, in a concerted and timely manner.
As a result, operations involve dynamic informationexchange, planning, and coordination.

Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction

Countering weapons of mass destruction is acontinuous campaign that requires a coordinatedmultinational and whole-of-government effort tocurtail the conceptualization, development,
possession, proliferation, use, and effects of
weapons of mass destruction related expertise,materials, and technologies.
CONCLUSION
This joint publication provides doctrine for the
Armed Forces of the United States when they
operate as part of a multinational (coalition or allied)
force.

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Executive Summary

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CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS“In the decades after fascism’s defeat in World War II, the United States and its
allies and partners constructed a free and open international order to better
safeguard their liberty and people from aggression and coercion. Although thissystem has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network of alliances andpartnerships remain the backbone of global security.”
Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America

1. Multinational Operations Overview
Multinational operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually
undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements
include supervision by an international organization such as the United Nations (UN),North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or Organization for Security and Cooperationin Europe. Commonly used terms under the multinational rubric include allied, bilateral,coalition, combined, or multilateral. However, within this publication, the term
multinational will be used to describe these actions. There are two primary forms of
multinational partnership the joint force commander (JFC) will encounter:a. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or
more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of themembers.
b. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
Coalitions are typically ad hoc; formed by different nations, often with different objectives;
usually for a single problem or issue, while addressing a narrow sector of common interest.
Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as
coalition operations.
2. Strategic Context
a. Nations form regional and global geopolitical and economic relationships topromote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived
threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), conduct peace operations (PO),and promote their ideals. Cultural, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological,
and informational factors all influence multinational operations and participation.
However, a nation’s decision to employ military capabilities is always a politicaldecision.
b. Since Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, the trend has been to conduct US
military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). This could be under the
auspices of a NATO operation, which may also include non-NATO nations (e.g., Operation
UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 2011) or an MNF consisting of a coalition of nations that isformed without NATO (e.g., Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, 2014-present).

I-1

Chapter I
Therefore, US commanders should be prepared to perform either supported or supporting
roles in military operations as part of an MNF. These operations could span the range ofmilitary operations and require coordination with a variety of United States Government(USG) departments and agencies, foreign military forces, local authorities, internationalorganizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The move to a morecomprehensive approach toward problem solving, particularly in regard tocounterinsurgency operations, other counter threat network activities, or stability activities,
increases the need for coordination and synchronization among military and nonmilitary
entities.
For more information on counterinsurgency operations and stability activities, see Joint
Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency; JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks; and JP
3-07, Stability.
c. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint
operations remains applicable to multinational operations. However, commanders andstaffs should account for differences in partners’ laws, doctrine, organization, weapons,
equipment, capacities, terminology, culture, politics, religion, language, and objectives.
There is no “standard template,” and each alliance or coalition normally develops its own
protocols and operation plans (OPLANs) to guide multinational action. While NATO
Allied doctrine provides guidance and authorities for US forces when operating as part ofa larger authorized NATO force, US forces should comply with US joint doctrine if NATO
doctrine is in conflict.
d. While most partner nations (PNs) recognize the range of military operations
terminology, authorities, commitments, and imposed constraints and restraints may not
mirror those of US forces who are now utilizing a ‘competition continuum’ (Figure I-1).
Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations,provides the NATO discussion comparable to JP 3-0, Joint Operations. For instance, somefrequent partners do not plan, execute, and assess their Services’ operations from a joint
perspective. Therefore, JFCs should establish early and continuous liaison that enhances
mutual understanding of each MNFs’ member’s commitment.
This enhanced
understanding allows the JFC to consider the member’s operational, legal, and logisticalconstraints and restraints (as prescribed by each partner’s national law and policy) andfacilitates operational planning that optimizes each contributing nation’s militarycapabilities.
3. Nature of Multinational Operations
After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that “mutual confidence”
is the “one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” The tenets of multinational
operations are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, teambuilding, trust, and confidence. While these tenets cannot guarantee success, ignoring them
may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort. National and organizational
norms of culture, language, and communication affect MNF interoperability. Each partnerin unified action has a unique cultural identity. Military forces, civilian agencies, NGOs,
and international organizations approach military conflict from different perspectives.

I-2

JP 3-16

Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

Notional Competition Continuum
Competition
Continuum

Cooperation

Strategic
Use of Force

AssureCompetition
Below Armed
Conflict
Deter

Armed
Conflict/War
CoerceCompelMajor Combat
Operations

Counter-Terrorism
Operations
Limited Contingency
Operations

Cyberspace Operations

Campaign
Operations
Activities

Operations in the Information Environment
Humanitarian
Assistance

Forward Presence
Freedom of
Navigation

Security Cooperation

Scale

Figure I-1. Notional Competition Continuum

National and organizational values, societal and social norms, historic contexts, religious
beliefs, and organizational discipline all affect the perspectives of multinational partners.
Partners with similar cultures and a common language experience fewer obstacles tointeroperability. Even minor differences, such as dietary restrictions or officer-enlisted
relationships, may affect military operations significantly. Commanders may have toaccommodate cultural sensitivities and overcome diverse or conflicting religious, social,societal, or traditional requirements, any of which can form bases for explicit or implicit
caveats on partners’ participation. In multinational operations, commanders rely upon thetenets to build teamwork and trust in a joint or multinational force in multiple ways.
Commanders should establish relationships with their multinational counterparts based
upon mutual respect. Team building is essential to successful MNF interoperability. It canbe accomplished through training, exercises, and assigning missions that fit organizational
capabilities. Building teamwork and trust takes time and requires the patience of allparticipants. The result is enhanced mutual confidence and unity of effort.
a. Respect. In assigning missions and tasks, the commander should consider thatnational honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat
capability. All partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must
be sought in mission assignment, organizational structure, and the operation assessment
process. Understanding, discussing, and considering partner ideas are essential to building
effective relationships, as are respect for each partner’s culture, customs, history, andvalues. Junior officers or even senior enlisted personnel in command of small national

I-3

Chapter I
contingents may be the senior representatives of their government within the MNF and, assuch, should be treated with the courtesy and respect afforded the commanders of othertroop contributing nations. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual
confidence cannot exist.
b. Rapport. US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with theircounterparts from PNs, as well as the multinational force commander (MNFC).
Establishing and maintaining rapport in a multinational environment through personal,
direct relationships is an effective means of ensuring successful unity of effort with oramong PNs. When interacting with non-English speakers, knowing at least a few phrases
and greetings will help establish a relationship. It is important to remember eye contact
and good listening skills are essential in building rapport. Therefore, when using aninterpreter, the focus should be on the person to whom the message is being conveyed.
Good rapport between leaders will improve teamwork among their staffs and subordinate
commanders and overall unity of effort. The use of liaisons can facilitate the developmentof rapport by assisting in the staffing of issues to the correct group and in monitoring
responses, while taking care not to relegate operational decision making to those liaisons.
c. Knowledge of Partners. In addition to learning about the threat, deployed US
forces must demonstrate the capability to communicate and interact effectively with local
nationals, government officials, and other multinational partners. Developing anddemonstrating communication skills, regional knowledge, local customs, values, andcultural awareness serves as a force multiplier that enables effective MNF operations.
d. Patience. Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent
pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires
untiring, evenhanded patience. This is more difficult to accomplish within coalitions than
within alliances; however, it is just as necessary. It is therefore imperative that US
commanders and their staffs apply appropriate resources, travel, staffing, and time not only
to maintain, but also to expand and cultivate multinational relationships. Without patienceand continued dialogue, established partnerships can rapidly degrade.
e. Mission Focus. When dealing with other nations, US forces should temper theneed for respect, rapport, knowledge, and patience with the requirement to ensure thenecessary tasks are accomplished by those with the capabilities, capacities, and authorities
to accomplish those tasks. This is especially critical with force protection (FP) where
failure could prove to have catastrophic results to personnel and mission. If operational
necessity requires tasks being assigned to personnel who are not proficient inaccomplishing those tasks, then the MNFC must recognize the risks and apply appropriate
mitigating measures (e.g., a higher alert level to potential threats). The JFC may need toconsider strategies to enable partners who may have capability shortfalls that would limit
their ability to accomplish tasks.
f. Trust and Confidence. Commanders should build personal relationships anddevelop trust and confidence with other leaders of the MNF. Developing these
relationships is a conscious collaborative act rather than something that just happens.
Commanders build trust through words and actions. Trust and confidence are essential toI-4

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Fundamentals of Multinational Operations
synergy and harmony, both within the joint force and with our multinational partners.
Coordination and cooperation among organizations are based on trust. Trust is based on
personal integrity (sincerity, honesty, and candor). Trust is hard to establish and easy tolose. There can be no unity of effort in the final analysis without mutual trust andconfidence. Accordingly, the ability to inspire trust and confidence across national lines
is a personal leadership quality to be cultivated. Saying what you mean and doing what
you say are fundamental to establishing trust and confidence in an MNF.
4. Security Cooperationa. Security cooperation (SC) provides ways and means to help achieve national
security and foreign policy objectives. US national and Department of Defense (DOD)
strategic guidance emphasizes the importance of defense relationships with allies andPNs to advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, andreduce the risk of having to employ US military forces in a conflict. SC activities arelikely to be conducted in a combatant command’s (CCMD’s) daily operations. SC
advances progress toward cooperation within the competition continuum bystrengthening and expanding the existing network of US allies and partners, which
improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and enables more
effective multinational operations. SC activities, many of which are shaping activities
within the geographic combatant commander (GCC) campaign plans—the centerpiece ofthe planning construct from which OPLANs/concept plans (CONPLANs) are now
branches—are deemed essential to achieving national security and foreign policy
objectives. SC activities also build interoperability with NATO Allies and other partners
in peacetime, thereby speeding the establishment of effective coalitions—a key factor in
potential major combat operations with near-peer competitors.
b. The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) provides the foundation for all
DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments and supports the President’s
National Security Strategy. With respect to SC, the GEF provides guidance on building
partner capacity and capability, relationships, and facilitating access (under the premisethat the primary entity of military engagement is the nation state and the means which
GCCs influence nation states is through their defense establishments). The GEF outlines
the following SC activities: defense contacts and familiarization, personnel exchange,
combined exercises and training, train and equip/provide defense articles, defense
institution building, operational support, education, and international armaments
cooperation.
c. GCC theater strategies, as reflected in their combatant command campaign plans(CCPs), typically emphasize military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities as daily
operations. GCCs shape their areas of responsibility through SC activities by continuallyemploying military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national
power. The GCC’s CCP provides a framework within which CCMDs conduct
cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, SC activities lessen the causesof a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires substantial US militaryintervention.

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Chapter I
d. The CCP is the primary document that focuses on each command’s activities
designed to attain theater strategic end states. The GEF and Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (referred
to as the JSCP), provide regional focus and SC priorities.
e. DOD components may develop supporting plans that focus on activities conductedto support the execution of the CCPs and on their own SC activities that directly contributeto the campaign end states and/or DOD component programs in support of broader Title
10, US Code, responsibilities. The Services conduct much of the detailed work to build
interoperability and capacity with NATO Allies and mission partners.
For additional information on SC, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation; Department of
Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities
Relating to Security Cooperation; the GEF; and the JSCP.
f. The DOD State Partnership Program establishes enduring relationships between
emerging PNs of strategic value and individual US states and territories. The DOD State
Partnership Program is an important contribution to the DOD SC programs conducted by
the GCCs in conjunction with the National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy,
National Military Strategy, Department of State (DOS), campaign plans, and theater SC
guidance to promote national and combatant commander (CCDR) objectives, stability, andpartner capacity.
For more detailed discussion on the DOD State Partnership Program, see Department of
Defense Instruction (DODI) 5111.20, State Partnership Program (SPP), and JP 3-29,
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
5. Security Cooperation Considerations
a. Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies
of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or otherdesignated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. The focus of US FID efforts is tosupport the host nation’s (HN’s) internal defense and development, which can be describedas the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself fromsecurity threats.
b. US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating,precluding, and countering threats or potential threats and addressing the root causes of
instability. DOD employs a number of FID tools that interact with foreign defense
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests,
support civil administration, provide SC, develop allied and friendly military capabilities
for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime andcontingency access to an HN. FID typically involves conventional and special operations
forces from multiple Services. Special operations forces (SOF), military information
support forces, and civil affairs (CA) units are particularly well suited to conduct or support
FID.

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Fundamentals of Multinational Operations
c. Security force assistance (SFA) is DOD’s activities that support the developmentof the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting
institutions. The US military conducts activities to improve the capabilities and capacities
of a PN’s (or regional security organization) executive, generating, and operating functions
through the execution of one or more SFA tasks, that include organizing, training,equipping, rebuilding/building, or advising. While DOD primarily assists those FSF
organized under the national ministry of defense (or equivalent regional military or
paramilitary forces), the US military may support and coordinate with other USG
departments and agencies that are leading USG efforts to develop or improve forces
assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence
services.
d. Successful SFA operations require planning and execution consistent with thefollowing imperatives:(1) Understand the Operational Environment (OE). This includes anawareness of the relationships between the stakeholders within the unified action
framework, the HN population, business environment information, and threats. Key to
SFA success is an in-depth understanding of the size, organization, capabilities,
disposition, roles, functions, and mission focus of the PN’s security force.
(2) Ensure Unity of Effort. Unity of command is preferred but often
impractical. Command relationships can range from the simple to complex and must be
clearly delineated and understood. Within a multinational context, establishingcoordinating boards or centers assists unity of effort among the stakeholders.
(3) Provide Effective Leadership. SFA seeks to provide and instill leadershipat all appropriate levels of the FSF. Both MNF and HN leadership must fully comprehend
the OE and be prepared and supportive for the SFA effort to succeed.
(4) Build Legitimacy. The ultimate objective of SFA is to develop security
forces that are competent, capable, committed, and confident to contribute to the legitimate
governance of the HN population.
(5) Manage Information. This encompasses the collection, preparation,
analysis, management, application, and dissemination of information.
(6) Sustainability. This includes two major efforts: the ability of the US/MNF
to sustain the SFA effort throughout the operation or campaign, and the ability of the PN
security forces to ultimately sustain their operations independently.
(7) Do No Harm. SFA is often undertaken in support of complex operations and
US/MNF actions can become part of the conflict dynamic that either increases or reduces
tensions. SFA planners and practitioners must be sensitive to and maintain awareness foradverse impacts in the security sector and on the HN population.
For additional discussion of SFA, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

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Chapter I
6. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability
a. International rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) with PNs
is important for achieving practical cooperation; efficient use of research, development,
procurement, support, and production resources; and effective multinational capability
without sacrificing US capabilities.
b. RSI should be directed at providing capabilities for MNFs to:(1) Conduct rapid pace operations effectively at by leveraging the capabilities ofthe entire MNF.
(2) Efficiently integrate and synchronize operations using common or compatible
doctrine.
(3) Communicate and collaborate at anticipated levels of MNF operations,particularly to prevent friendly fire and protect the exchange of data, information, andintelligence via either printed or electronic media in accordance with (IAW) appropriate
security guidelines.
(4) Share consumables consistent with relevant agreements and applicable law.
(5) Care for casualties consistent with relevant agreements and applicable law.
(6) Enhance military effectiveness by harmonizing capabilities of militaryequipment.
(7) Increase military efficiency through common or compatible Service support
and logistics.
(8) Establish overflight and access to foreign territory through streamlined
clearance procedures for diplomatic and nondiplomatic personnel.
(9) Assure technical compatibility by developing standards for equipment design,
employment, maintenance, and updating so those nations that are likely to participate areprepared. Extra equipment may be necessary so non-equipped nations are not excluded.
Such compatibility should include secure and nonsecure communications equipment andshould address other equipment areas, to include (but not limited to): ammunition
specifications, truck components, supply parts, and data transmission streams.
Detailed guidance on RSI may be found in CJCSI 2700.01, Rationalization,
Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Activities.
c. Rationalization. In the RSI construct, rationalization refers to any action that
increases the effectiveness of MNFs through more efficient or effective use of defense
resources committed to the MNF. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of
national priorities to higher multinational needs, standardization, specialization, mutual
support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to

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Fundamentals of Multinational Operations
both weapons and materiel resources (the processes to loan and/or transfer equipment toanother nation participating in an MNF operation) and non-weapons military matters.
d. Standardization. Unity of effort is greatly enhanced through standardization. The
basic purpose of standardization programs is to achieve the closest practical cooperation
among multinational partners through the efficient use of resources and the reduction ofoperational, logistic, communications, technical, and procedural obstacles in multinational
military operations.
(1) Standardization is a four-level process beginning with efforts forcompatibility, continuing with interoperability and interchangeability measures, andculminating with commonality. DOD is actively involved in several multinational
standardization programs, including:(a) NATO’s main standardization fora; the five-nation (United States,
Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand) Five Eyes Air Force
Interoperability Council (AFIC); the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New
Zealand (ABCANZ) Armies’ Program; and the thirteen-nation (Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain,
United Kingdom, and United States) Multinational Strategy and Operations Group(MSOG).
(b) The US also participates in the five-nation (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States) Combined Communications-Electronics
Board (CCEB) that enables strategic and deployed force headquarters (HQ) informationand data exchange and interoperability of communications-electronics systems above thetactical level of command, as well as the Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United
Kingdom, United States (AUSCANNZUKUS) Naval command, control, communications,and computers organization working to achieve standardization and interoperability incommunications systems.
(2) Alliances provide a forum to work toward standardization of national
equipment; doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Standardization is not
an end in itself, but it does provide a useful framework for commanders and their staffs.
Coalitions, however, are, by definition, created for a single purpose and usually (but notalways) for a finite length of time and, as such, are ad hoc arrangements. They may notprovide commanders with the same commonality of aim or degree of organizational
maturity as alliances.
(3) Alliances usually have developed a degree of standardization with regard toadministrative, logistic, and operational procedures.
The mechanisms for thisstandardization are international standardization agreements (ISAs). ISAs can be materielor non-materiel in nature. Non-materiel-related ISAs should already be incorporated into
US joint and Service doctrine and TTP. The five-paragraph operation order is one common
example. Materiel ISAs are implemented into the equipment design, development, or
adaptation processes to facilitate standardization. In NATO, ISAs are known as
standardization agreements (STANAGs) and AJPs and are instruments that are used toI-9Chapter I
establish commonality in procedures and equipment. The ABCANZ Standards are anothertype of ISA. The existence of these ISAs does not mean they will be automatically usedduring an alliance’s multinational operation. Their use should be clearly specified in the
OPLAN or operation order. In addition, these ISAs cannot be used as vehicles forobligating financial resources or transferring resources.
(4) Multinational publications (MPs) are a series of unclassified ISAs specificallydeveloped by NATO. MPs provide signatory nations with common doctrine, TTP, andinformation for planning and conducting operations. These publications are available to
all nations through a NATO sponsor.
(5) Standardization agreements like AJPs, MPs, STANAGs, and ABCANZ
standards provide a baseline for cooperation within a coalition. In many parts of the world,
these multilateral and other bilateral agreements for standardization between potential
coalition members may be in place prior to the formation of the coalition. However,participants may not be immediately familiar with such agreements. The MNFC
disseminates ISAs among the MNF or relies on existing standard operating procedures(SOPs) and clearly written, uncomplicated orders. MNFCs should identify where they canbest standardize the force and achieve interoperability within the force. This is moredifficult to accomplish in coalition operations since participants have not normally been
associated prior to the particular contingency. The same considerations apply when nonalliance members participate in an alliance operation. However, ISAs should be used
where possible to standardize procedures and processes.
(6) MNF SOPs provide for standardization of processes and procedures for
multinational operations. For example, the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team(MPAT) program developed an MNF SOP with the 31 MPAT nations, has used it within
real-world contingencies, and routinely uses it in exercises and training throughout the
Asia-Pacific region.
e. Interoperability. Interoperability greatly enhances multinational operations
through the ability to operate in the execution of assigned tasks. Nations whose forces areinteroperable across materiel and nonmateriel capabilities can operate together effectively
in numerous ways. For example, as part of developing PN security forces, the extent ofinteroperability can be used to gauge the effectiveness of SC/SFA activities. Althoughfrequently identified with technology, important areas of interoperability may include
doctrine, procedures, communications, and training.
(1) Factors that enhance interoperability start with understanding the nature ofmultinational operations as described in paragraph 3, “Nature of Multinational
Operations.” Additional factors include planning for interoperability and sharing
information, the personalities of the commander and staff, visits to assess multinational
capabilities, a command atmosphere permitting positive criticism and rewarding thesharing of information, liaison teams, multinational training exercises, and a constant effort
to eliminate sources of confusion and misunderstanding. The establishment of standards
for assessing the logistic capability of expected participants in a multinational operation
should be the first step in achieving logistic interoperability among participants. Such

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Fundamentals of Multinational Operations
standards should already be established for alliance members when the preponderance ofNATO nations are representative of a particular alliance.
(2) Factors that inhibit interoperability include restricted access to national
proprietary defense information; time available; any refusal to cooperate with partners;
differences in military organization, security, language, doctrine, and equipment; level ofexperience; and conflicting personalities.

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Intentionally Blank

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CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS
1. Command Authority
Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever,relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a
multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: anational chain of command and a multinational chain of command (see Figure II-1).
a. National Command. As Commander in Chief, the President always retains, andcannot relinquish, national command authority over US forces. National commandincludes the authority and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating,controlling, planning employment of, and protecting military forces. The President also
has the authority to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time. Allnations participating in a multinational operation will have their own form of nationalcommand. NATO and the European Union (EU) use the term “full command” to describe
national command by their member states.

Notional Multinational Command Structure
United States
President
andSecretary of Defense

National
Government

National
Government

Legitimizing
Authority*

CombatantCommanders

Multinational Force
Commander

US National ForceNational ForceNational Force*Examples include United Nations, alliances, treaties, or coalition agreements.

Legendnational command
command authority delegated to multinational force commander by participating nations
nation-to-nation communications

Figure II-1. Notional Multinational Command Structure

II-1Chapter IIb. Multinational Command. Command authority for an MNFC is normallynegotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. In making
a decision regarding an appropriate command relationship for a multinational military
operation, the President carefully considers such factors as mission, size of the proposed
US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE). Command
authority will be specified in the implementing agreements that provide a clear andcommon understanding of what authorities are specified over which forces.
For further details concerning command authorities, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the
Armed Forces of the United States.
2. Unified Action
a. Unified action during multinational operations involves the synergistic
application of all instruments of national power as provided by each participating
nation; it includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.
This construct is applicable at all levels of command. In a multinational environment,
unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates multinational operations
with the operations of other HN and national government agencies, internationalorganizations (e.g., UN), NGOs, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort in theoperational area (OA). When working with NATO forces, it can also be referred to as
a comprehensive approach.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONSIn 2002, the Combined Maritime Forces was formed to counter piracy
and terrorism in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean, athree million square mile area. In 2005, Somalian pirates began raiding
ships in the Indian Ocean, especially in the Gulf of Aden. On the average,
each captured ship earned the pirates several million dollars and, in
2008, the pirates attacked 24 ships and seized 14 ships. In response to
the increased piracy, the United Nations Security Council passed four
resolutions condemning piracy and authorizing military forces to
conduct anti-piracy operations in over one million square miles ofterritory. Under the Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task Force(CTF) 151, Counter-Piracy, was formed in January 2009 and is composedof forces from several nations and two multinational commands. For
example, in 2010, CTF 151 was commanded by the following countries:
Singapore, Republic of Korea, Turkey, and finally by Pakistan. CTF 151
consisted of multinational forces, CTF 508, the NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] component commanded by a Portuguese, and thenby a Dutch commodore, and CTF 465, European Union Naval Forces,
was commanded by the Swedish, French, and finally by the Spanish.
Twenty-five different nations patrolled the Indian Ocean and defeatedthe Somali pirates. CTF 151 also coordinated anti-piracy operations withnaval forces from China, Russia, and India.
Various Sources

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Command and Coordination Relationships

Somalian Piracy Threat Map (2005-2010)

b. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in
multinational operations. This is one of the major characteristics of operating in themultinational environment. Commanders should be prepared to address issues related tolegality, mission mandate, and prudence early in the planning process. In multinational
operations, consensus often stems from compromise.

COMBINED TASK FORCE 151
Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, a multinational task force established
to conduct counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and Somali
Basin, operates under a mission-based United Nations Security Council
Resolution mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces area of
operations to actively deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy in order toprotect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation forthe benefit of all nations. Contributing nations have included ships from
Australia, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and the US.
In conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European
Union Naval Force, ships from CTF 151 patrol in the Somali Basin andthe Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden.
CTF 151 also coordinates anti-piracy operations with naval forces from
China, Russia, and India.
Various Sources

II-3

Chapter II
3. Multinational Force Commandera. MNFC is a generic term applied to a commander who exercises command authority
over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the
MNFC’s command authority is determined by the participating nations or elements.
This authority can vary widely and may be limited by national caveats of those nations
participating in the operation. The MNFC’s primary duty is to unify the efforts of the
MNF toward common objectives. An operation could have numerous MNFCs.
(1) MNFCs at the strategic level are analogous to GCC level.
(2) MNFCs at the operational level may be referred to as subordinate MNFCs or
a multinational task force (MNTF). This level of command is roughly equivalent to the
US commander of a subordinate unified command or joint task force (JTF) and is theoperational-level portion of the respective MNF. Integrated MNTFs, such as the NATOled International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), will have embedded MNTF personnel
throughout the HQ. A lead nation (LN) MNTF HQ, like Multinational Force-Iraq, will be
staffed primarily by LN personnel and augmented by personnel from other MNTF
countries. Some integration in staff functions is possible, but the bulk of the work will behandled within the LN structure. The LN provides the commander and the majority ofstaff with the MNF HQ. Moreover, it is likely to dictate the language and command andstaff procedures utilized. Ultimately, the LN assumes responsibility for all aspects ofplanning; execution; assessment; command, control, communications, and information
structure; doctrine; and logistic coordination that supports it. Other nations assign
contributions to the force and fulfill some positions within the LN’s staff. Figure II-2
illustrates an example of the various command levels.
b. MNFCs should integrate and synchronize their operations directly with theactivities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the OA.
All MNTF commanders plan, conduct, and assess the effectiveness of unified action IAW
the guidance and direction received from the national commands, alliance or coalition
leadership, and superior commanders.
c. The MNF will attempt to align its operations, actions, and activities with NGOs
operating in a country or region. NGOs may be precluded from coordinating andintegrating their activities with those of an MNF to maintain their neutrality.
d. Training of forces within the MNTF command for specific mission standards
enhances unified action. The MNFC should establish common training modules orcertification training for assigned forces. Such training and certification of forces should
occur prior to entering the MNTF OA. Certification of forces should be accomplished bya team composed of subject matter experts from all nations providing military forces to the
MNFC.
4. Overview of Multinational Command Structures
No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command, but
national considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure.
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Command and Coordination Relationships

Notional Coalition Command and Control Structure

National Strategic
Government
and Military

Nation #2
National
Authorities

Nation #1
National
Authorities(Lead Nation)

Nation #3
National
Authorities

Theater Strategic

National
Strategic
Commander

Multinational
Force
Commander

National
Strategic
Commander

Operational Level

National
Component
Commander

Commander
Multinational
Task ForceNational
Component
Commander

Legendstrategic guidance and support
national command

collaboration
consultation

Figure II-2. Notional Coalition Command and Control Structure

However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation
to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities
clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command relationships are fairly
well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations
with which the US may operate in multinational operations.
a. Organizational Structure. The basic structures for multinational operations fall
into one of three types: integrated, LN, or parallel command.
(1) Integrated Command Structure. A good example of this command
structure (see Figure II-3) is in NATO, where a strategic commander is designated from amember nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs ofsubordinate commands are of multinational makeup. The key factors in an integrated
command are:(a) A designated single commander.
(b) A staff composed of representatives from all member nations.
(c) Subordinate commands and staffs integrated into the lowest echelon
necessary to accomplish the mission.

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Chapter II

Integrated Command Structure
Combined
Commander
Integrated
Headquarters Staff

Integrated
Component

Integrated
Component

Integrated
Component

Multinational
ForcesMultinational
ForcesMultinational
ForcesLegendcommandcoordination

staff positions open and to be filled

Figure II-3. Integrated Command Structure(2) LN Command Structure. An LN structure exists when all member nations
place their forces under the control of one nation (see Figure II-4). The LN command
structure can be distinguished by a dominant LN command and staff arrangement withsubordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the LN
structure is Multinational Force-Iraq, wherein a US-led HQ provided overall command andcontrol (C2) over US and multinational subordinate commands. US forces may encounter

Lead Nation Command Structure
Lead Nation
Headquarters

National Forces
Commander

United States
ForcesCommander

National Forces
Commander

National Forces

United States
ForcesNational Forces

Figure II-4. Lead Nation Command StructureII-6

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Command and Coordination Relationships
the term framework nation, which is defined in NATO, the EU, and UN documents todescribe a LN for an operation.
(a) An LN command structure may also be characterized by an integrated
staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff enables the commander todraw upon the expertise of multinational partners in areas where the LN may have lessexperience.
(b) Rotational command, a variation of LN command sometimes found in
multinational commands, allows each participating nation to be the LN in turn. To beeffective, command tour lengths should be adjusted so that participating nations mayalternate exercising the authority of the LN. An example of this type of command is theISAF, which has 12- to 24-month command tours that rotate among the participants.
Rotational command existed in ISAF from 2002 to February of 2007, after which time, the
MNFC has been the US and continues to be under Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT and,
therefore, was predominately a traditional LN construct.
(3) Parallel Command Structures. Under a parallel command structure, nosingle force commander is designated (see Figure II-5). The MNF leadership must develop
a means for coordination among the participants to achieve unity of effort. This can beaccomplished through the use of coordination centers (see paragraph 8.c., “Coordination
Centers”). Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel
command structure should be avoided, if at all possible.
b. Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishingforces normally establishes a national component, often called a national command

Parallel Command Structure
National
CommandNation #1

National
CommandNation #2

Coalition
Headquarters
Nation #1

Coalition
Headquarters
Nation #2
Coordination
CenterForces from
Nation #2

Forces from
Nation #1
Legendcommandcoordination

Figure II-5. Parallel Command Structure

II-7Chapter II
element, to effectively administer its forces. The national component provides a means
to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent
nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinationalcommander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces tosubordinate operational multinational organizations. In an administrative role, thesenational components are similar to a Service component command at the unified
command level in a US joint organization. The logistic support element of thiscomponent is also referred to as the national support element (NSE). An NSE may
provide common-user logistics (CUL) support to MNFs as well as national forces. It isalso possible that in some operations, selected CUL would be arranged by themultinational joint logistics center (MJLC) (or equivalent), thereby reducing the role of
the NSE in providing such logistics.
5. Multinational Command Structures
a. In multinational commands, national objectives are addressed and generally
subsumed within MNF objectives at the alliance treaty level. Typically, alliancecommand structures have been carefully developed over extended periods of time andhave a high degree of stability and consensus, doctrine, and standardization. Establishedcommand structures may be modified or tailored for particular operations, especiallyduring multinational operations that include non-allied members.
b. Multinational command relationships often reflect either an integrated command
structure or an LN command structure. Alliances typically have established command
structures, support systems, and standardized procedures. In combined operations, such
structures should be used to the maximum practical extent. Combined command andforce structures often mirror the degree of allied member participation. Subordinate
commands are often led by senior military officers from member nations. Effective
operations within an alliance require the senior national and military authorities be inagreement on the type of command relationships that will govern the operations of theforces. Notwithstanding peacetime command relationships, the national sensitivities
associated with actual operations will impact command relationships and operatingprocedures.
c. Coalitions often form in response to crises that occur outside the area or scope ofan established alliance or when the response requires more than an alliance can handle.
Coalition command relationships, which evolve as a coalition develops, are most often
characterized by one of two basic structures: LN or parallel. In coalition operations,member nations may initially desire to retain even more control of their own national
forces than is generally associated with combined operations. At the outset of a coalition,nations are often reluctant to grant extensive control over their forces to one LN.
Coalition counterparts are also sensitive to actions that might be construed as preferential
to the LN’s interests.
d. One means of ensuring the HQ is representative of the entire coalition is toaugment the HQ staff with representatives from the participating coalition members, suchas designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This provides

II-8

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Command and Coordination Relationships
the coalition commander with representative leadership and a ready source of expertiseon the capabilities of the respective coalition members and facilitates the planning
process.
e. During formation of the coalition, the early integration of the multinational
national command elements into the coalition planning process can greatly acceleratebuilding of unity of effort and reinforce the tenets of multinational operations. Nationalcommand elements represent the national command channels from each individual nation
within the multinational command. Meetings with the MNFC provide the setting for
open, candid input from participating nations.
f. LN and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition.
This situation occurs when two or more nations or organizations serve as controlling
elements for a mix of international forces. The command arrangement used by the Gulf
War coalition (see Figure II-6) provides a good example of the intricate web of command
structures possible. In that case, the US performed as the LN for a coalition of non-Arabcountries while Saudi Arabia functioned as the LN for the Arab coalition members. A
friendly forces coordinating council (since renamed to coalition coordination center[CCC]) provided the coordination conduit between the non-Arab (US-led) forces and theArab/Islamic (Saudi-led) command structures. Terms in the figure reflect theterminology used in the operation.
g. Figures II-7 through II-10 show examples of coalition command structures fromAfghanistan ISAF (Figure II-8), the NATO Balkans Stabilization Force (Figure II-9), andthe Balkans European Force Command (Figure II-10). In the Balkans, when the EU
assumed the mission from NATO, NATO continued to maintain a military HQ and aplace in the command chain as well, with a continued US presence in the country. These
diagrams highlight the evolution of multinational command structures, especially those
involving international organizations such as NATO, the EU, or the UN. These
organizations add a layer of complexity to the command structure as nations have toanswer to both the international organization chain of command, as well as their national
leadership.
6. Multinational Force Coordination
There are two key structural enhancements that should improve the coordination of
MNFs—a liaison network and coordination centers.
a. Liaison Network. Effective liaison is vital in any MNF. Differences in doctrine,organization, equipment, training, and national law demand a robust liaison structure tofacilitate operations. Not only is the use of liaison an invaluable confidence-building
tool, but it is also a significant source of information for the MNFC. During multinational
operations, US forces should establish liaison early with forces of each nation, byfostering a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitating the ability to integrate
and synchronize operations, assisting in the transfer of vital information, enhancing
mutual trust, gaining awareness and understanding of national caveats, and developing
an increased level of teamwork.

II-9Chapter II

Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM(Land Forces)
National
Command
Authority

National
Leaders of theUnited Kingdom

National
Leaders ofFranceNational
Leaders of
Saudi Arabia

United States
Force
Commander

British Force
Commander

French Force
Commander

Joint Forces
Command[Saudi]

Joint Forces
CommandNorth

Joint Forces
CommandEast

Coalition,
Coordination,
Communication
and Integration
CenterNational
Leaders of Arab/
Islamic Nations

1 Egyptian Corps
1 Syrian Division
2 Saudi and Kuwaiti
Task Forces

Bahrain, Kuwait,
Morocco, Oman, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, andUnited Arab Emirates
ForcesARCENTXVIII Airborne
Corps

VIII Corps

4x ArmyDivisions

1st Armoured
Division

DaguetDivision

2nd Brigade, 82nd
Division
18th Field Artillery
BrigadeMARCENT

3x ArmyDivisions

I Marine
Expeditionary
Force

2x Marine
Divisions

LegendARCENT
MARCENT

United States Army Central Command
Marine Corps Forces Central Command

national operational command
operational command
coordination

Figure II-6. Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM (Land Forces)(1) Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams
should be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics,
communication systems, and planning methods that are employed within their commands.
Liaison requirements for US forces participating in multinational operations are usually
greater than anticipated or staffed. Personnel liaison requirements should be identified

II-10

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Command and Coordination Relationships
early during the planning process and staffed accordingly. Team members should be
language qualified or provided linguist support. Although professional knowledge andfunctional expertise are key factors to successful liaison operations, understanding
language and culture are equally important and influential. Care should be taken to avoid
liaisons becoming proxy decision makers; their purpose is to improve, rather than replace,coordination among commanders.
OPERATION DESERT STORM: A STUDY OF US FORCES UNDERFRENCH OPERATIONAL CONTROLThe nation of France, wanting to support Kuwait after Iraq’s invasion on
02 August 1990, deployed a light armored division to Saudi Arabia,
which remained under direct French national authority in coordination
with Saudi Arabia during Operation DESERT SHIELD. For Operation
DESERT STORM, France agreed to shift operational control (OPCON) of
the Daguet Division to Lieutenant General (LTG) Gary Luck,
commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps, on 17 January 1991,
the day the air campaign began.
The XVIII Airborne Corps’ initial priority of effort was to seize As Salman,a town 90 miles inside Iraq with a 9,000 foot runway and adjacent to thenorth-south main supply route intersecting the paved east-west supply
route. LTG Luck assigned this objective to the Daguet Division. This
10,000 man, 3,000 vehicle (500 of which were armored) division wascomprised of three infantry regiments, two cavalry regiments, aheadquarters regiment and one regiment each of tanks, artillery,engineers, logistics/supply, and medical. Additionally, the Daguet
Division had two helicopter regiments consisting of 132 helicopters—60
of which were armed with anti-tank missiles. (See Figure II-7 – Order ofBattle. Note: a French regiment was equivalent to a US battalion).
LTG Luck heavily reinforced the Daguet Division. On 23 January 1991,
he passed OPCON of the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division,consisting of three battalions of infantry plus one artillery battalion, to
Brigadier General (Brig Gen) Bernard Janvier, the commanding generalof the Daguet Division. Additionally, LTG Luck transferred OPCON of
one engineer battalion, one military police battalion, one civil affairs
company, and two psychological operations vehicles with loudspeakers
to Brig Gen Janvier. These forces were completely integrated into theDaguet Division. The US military police took charge of the prisoners of
war whom the French captured, and the engineer battalion conducted
mine clearing operations with the French engineer regiment. LTG Luckalso gave operational control of one artillery brigade headquarters andfive field artillery battalions to Brig Gen Janvier in support of operationsin the eastern part of the campaign.
The French and the Americans units became a combined force. The
commander of artillery brigade headquarters acted as the fires chief andreported directly to Brig Gen Janvier, and the brigade’s fire control

II-11

Chapter II
system was integrated into the Daguet Division fires center, supporting a
combined US and French offensive on 18 February, 1991, under Frenchcommand. On 24 February, the Daguet Division crossed the line ofdeparture into Iraq, and captured As Salman two days later. Shortly after
the success of the Daguet Division, OPCON of the US units wastransferred back to US commanders, except for one US civil affairs
company that stayed under French OPCON until the Daguet Division
redeployed to France.
This example of Allies working together in multinational operations hadlasting benefits for both nations. Later, Brig Gen Bernard Janvier would
write “4,200 Americans served under my orders and this is the first timein a longtime [since World War I] that a French general officer commanded(American) GIs….”
Various Sources(2) The US Army’s digital liaison detachments (DLDs) have been in existence
since Operation DESERT STORM and were used extensively during Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. DLDs are specificallydesigned to provide US staffs with liaison teams composed of individuals with professional
knowledge and functional expertise in associated Army battle command systems to enableinterface with multinational units and are most effective when attached to the highest
possible headquarters.
For additional information on DLDs, see Army Techniques Publication 3-94.1, Digital
Liaison Detachment.
(3) SOF, in conjunction with conventional forces, have proven particularly
effective in integrating MNFs. Their language capabilities, regional expertise, culturalawareness, and experience in working and training with other countries’ militaries typicallyenable them to improve coordination and minimize misunderstanding during MNF
operations. Specifically, SOF can assist the MNFC to:(a) Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the
security assistance program to eligible foreign government military units conducting
internal defense and development operations.
(b) Assess foreign military force capabilities and provide direction or
recommendations toward improving HN special operations employment and sustainment
methods.
(c) Educate foreign military force senior officers and civilians in how toappropriately employ SOF.
(d) Train foreign military forces to operate and sustain indigenous
air/land/sea special operations resources and capabilities.

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Command and Coordination Relationships

Order of Battle
18

Daguet82

101

Group WestGroup East

Command Post
Red

Command Post
Green

1

24

Headquarters/
Reserves

2nd Brigade
6 Spahis

1
FL

2

4
D

10

1

39
503

6
1

3

325

9

3

Logistics Support
Group

6
2

6
FL

325

6

16

8
B

2
FL

6

18
82

Logistics

5

8

6

27

96

3
4

27

325

6
FL
2

3
1st Parachute
Hussards

2

1

319

54
4

6

1st Parachute
Hussards

1

201

11

9

Plus several
othercompanyunits

Plus several othercompany units

NOTE:
All cannon artillery is 155 millimeter except for 2/319th which is 105 millimeter.

LegendDFLMP

dragoons
Foreign Legion
military police

PSYOP
SF

psychological operations
special forcesBlack = American
Blue = French

Figure II-7. Order of Battle

II-13

Chapter II

International Security Assistance Force Coalition
Command Relationships 2010 - 20xx
COMISAF/
USFOR-A
NATO

United States

ISAF
Joint Command

ISAF SOF

NTM-A/
CSTC-A

United States

United Kingdom

United States

NATO

UnitedStatesNATO

NATO

UnitedStatesCFSOCCCJTF 435

United States

United States

RC North

CAPTF

RST-North

Biometrics

Germany

United States

United States

United States

NATO

NATO

RC WestCTAG-A

Italy

United Kingdom

NATO

NATO

RC Capitol
FranceNATO

NATO

RST-South

JIOC-A

United States

United States

RST-East

CJIATF-North

United States

United States

CTAG-P

RST-West

Italy

United States

Paladin(C-IED)RC South

RST-Capitol
United States

United States

JFEC
United States

United Kingdom

Odin (ISR)

NATO

United States

RC East30 Medical

United States

United States

NATO

Cyclone(Engineer)

RC Southwest

United States

United States
NATO

Legend
CAPTF
combined air power transition force
CFSOCC combined force special operations component
command
C-IED
counter-improvised explosive device
CJIATFcombined interagency task force
CJTF
combined joint task force
COMISAF commander, International Security Assistance Force
CSTC-A Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan
CTAG-A combined training advisory group-Army
CTAG-P combined training advisory group-police

ISAF
ISR
JFEC
JIOC-A
NATO
NTM-A
RC
RST
SOF
USFOR-A

International Security Assistance Forceintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancejoint fires and effects cell
Joint Information Operations Center-Afghanistan
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training MissionAfghanistan
regional command
regional security transition
special operations forces
United States Forces-Afghanistan

Figure II-8. International Security Assistance Force Coalition Command Relationships

II-14

JP 3-16

Command and Coordination Relationships

Stabilization Force Coalition Command Relationships
COMSFORCOMSFOR
Political Advisor(United States)
DCOMSFORDCOMOPS(France)(United Kingdom)
Chief of Staff

DCOMSFOR
Political Advisor(Germany)

DCOMOPS
Political Advisor

ACOS Support

ACOS JMAACOS Operations

HQ CMDT(Italy)(Netherlands)(United States)(United States)

Support Staff

JMA Staff

Operations Staff

Canada Czech Republic France Germany Hungary Netherlands
 Spain

Germany United StatesCzech Republic
Denmark
 Germany Netherlands
 Spain Turkey United Kingdom
 United States

CJ5(France)
PIO(United Kingdom)

Legend
ACOS
CJ5
CMDT
COMSFORDCOMOPS

assistant to the chief of staff
plans branchcommandantcommander, stabilization force
deputy commander, operations

DCOMSFOR
HQ
JMA
PIO

deputy commander, stabilization force
headquarters
joint military affairs
public information officer

Figure II-9. Stabilization Force Coalition Command Relationships(e) Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to
employ air/land/sea forces in specific operation situations.
(f) Facilitate force integration for multinational operations.
(g) Provide direct support to HNs by using air/land/sea resources to provide
intelligence, communications capability, and air or aviation support.
b. Coordination Centers. Another means of increasing MNF coordination is the useof a multinational coordination center (MNCC). US commanders should routinely
advocate creation of such a center in the early stages of any multinational effort, especially
one that is operating under a parallel command structure. It is a proven means ofintegrating the participating nations’ military forces into the multinational planning,
operations, and assessment processes, enhancing coordination and cooperation andsupporting an open and full interaction within the MNF structure. Normally, the MNCC
II-15

Chapter II

European Forces Coalition Command Relationships
NATO-led Operations

EU-led Operations

North Atlantic
Council

PSC

Military
Committee

EU MilitaryCommittee

SACEURDSACEUR/
Operation Commander
Strategic Direction Centre

SHAPE
NATO
Headquarters

EU Staff Group

JFC

OHQ

EUCE

EU Force
Headquarters

LegendDSACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EU
European Union
EUCE
European Union Command Element
JFC
joint force commander
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OHQ
PSC
SACEUR
SHAPE

operational headquarters
Political and Security Committee
Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Supreme Headquarters AlliedPowers Europe

Figure II-10. European Forces Coalition Command Relationships

is focused upon coordination of MNF operations, which will most likely involve classified
information. The addition of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is recommended
for coordination with the international humanitarian community indigenous populations
and institutions (IPI) and interagency partners. Additional coordination centers may beestablished to coordinate multinational logistics (MNL), functional areas, and media
affairs.
(1) Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues suchas force sustainment, alert and warning, host-nation support (HNS), movement control, andtraining. However, as an MNF matures, the role of the coordination center can be expanded
to include command activities.
(2) When a coordination center is activated, member nations provide a staff
element to the center that is comprised of action officers who are familiar with support
activities such as those listed above. MNF nations should be encouraged to augment thisstaff with linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with theirII-16

JP 3-16

Command and Coordination Relationships
144TH ARMY LIAISON TEAM DURING OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM
The 144th Army Liaison Team (ALT) was the third liaison team in thistheater of operations. In this theater, the ALT provided liaison to theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In accordance with theBonn Accord, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) organized
ISAF to support Afghanistan with security and stabilization operations.
The 144th ALT arrived in theater and was assigned to Combined Forces
Command-Afghanistan at ISAF headquarters. The ALT also provided
liaison services primarily for the combined joint operations directorate
and the combined joint intelligence directorate, but expanded mission
requirements to provide service for all staff sections within thecommand as required. The 144th ALT provided “air gap” bridging
capability for the US SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network, ISAF
Secret, the NATO SECRET Crisis Response Operations in NATO
Operating Systems, and the Combined Enterprise Regional Information
Exchange System (CENTRIXS) which was the coalition network solution.
Information
security
standardization
delayedCENTRIXS
implementation, as nations were reluctant to share information.
Various Sources

parent HQ. Apart from a central MNCC, such as the CCC, a number of functional
coordination centers may also be established within an overall combined logistics
coordination or support command for a multinational operation. Activities centrally
coordinated or controlled by such centers would include movement control, operational
contract support (OCS), theater-level logistic support operations, overall medical support,
and infrastructure engineering. One key to the success of such centers is the early
establishment and staffing with functionally skilled personnel to exercise appropriate control
of designated activities.
For additional guidance on organizing and manning an MNCC, refer to the MPATMNF SOP.
The MNF SOP can be viewed and downloaded from:https://community.apan.org/wg/mpat/p/sop.aspx.
7. Control of Multinational Operations
The degree of control exercised in an MNF is dictated by the degree of synchronization
required, the MNF structure, and the command relationships between members of the MNF.
In general, the more centralized the command structure, the greater the MNF’s ability toachieve unity of effort. Integrated command structures, operating within their allianceframework, afford the greatest degree of control. A parallel structure, with its separate lines
of command, typically offers the least control and ability to achieve unity of effort. LN
structures can exhibit a wide range of control depending on the mission set and the command
relationships assigned.

II-17

Chapter II
8. Interorganizational Cooperationa. In many OEs, the MNF interacts with a variety of stakeholders requiring unified
action by the MNFC, including nonmilitary governmental departments and agencies,
international organizations, and NGOs. Interorganizational cooperation includes thecoordination between the Armed Forces of the United States; USG departments andagencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces andgovernment agencies; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector. Interagency
coordination is a subset of interorganizational cooperation. These groups play an importantrole in providing support to HNs. Additionally, the MNF should be aware of private-sector
firms (e.g., businesses, contractors working for the military) operating in the OA. Thoughdifferences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives
are frequently very similar. CA or NATO civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) forces enhanceinterorganizational coordination through the establishment of a CMOC.
b. Relationships. The MNFC’s relationship with these organizations will varydepending on the nature of the contingency and the particular type of organization involved.
(1) Relationships with other governmental agencies (US and multinational
partners) and international organizations should be clearly defined to coordinate required
military support before commencement of operations, if possible. In some cases, otheragencies may be lead agent for operations with military forces providing support. In othercases, the lead agency is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between allied andcoalition forces and the agencies involved. The President, normally through the Secretary of
Defense (SecDef), should provide clear guidance regarding the relationships between US
military commanders and USG departments and agencies.
(2) To achieve the greatest unity of effort, the roles, missions, efforts, and activitiesof the international humanitarian community within the MNF OA should be factored into thecommander’s mission analysis. Every effort should be made to formally include
interorganizational coordination factors and requirements in MNF OPLANs.
(3) In addition, the OPLAN should provide guidance to the MNFC regarding
relationships with and support to NGOs and international organizations operating within the
OA. A transition plan is essential when relieving, replacing, or relinquishing control toNGOs and international organizations. This must begin as early as possible in the planning
cycle for such operations. Civil-military operations (CMO) planners should include
international organization/NGO capabilities, limitations, and operations within the MNF’splan whenever possible.
c. Coordination Centers. One means of enhancing the working relationship between
NGOs/international organizations when there is no command relationship is through theirintegration with existing coordination centers, as described in subparagraph 6.b.,“Coordination Centers.”
For additional information, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

II-18

JP 3-16

Command and Coordination Relationships
d. Agreements. The US DOS leads USG negotiations with international organizations
and other nations’ agencies. Although Congress has tightly restricted the delegation of
authority to negotiate and sign agreements with foreign nations, forces, and agencies to DOS,
formal agreements between the US military and US civilian government agencies may beestablished. Such agreements can take the form of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or
terms of reference. Concluding these negotiations prior to the commencement of operations
offers the best chance for success. There are regulatory and statutory fiscal constraints
involving agreements between the Armed Forces of the United States and other US
governmental departments and agencies. A staff judge advocate (SJA) should be consulted
before negotiating or entering into any agreements outside DOD.
For more detailed information on interagency coordination and on agencies expected to be
involved, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

II-19

Chapter II

Intentionally Blank

II-20

JP 3-16

CHAPTER III
GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS“There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting withoutthem.”
Sir Winston Churchill, 1 April 1945

1. Diplomatic and Military Considerations
a. Any number of different situations could generate the need for a multinational
response, from warfare to natural disasters. In responding to such situations, nations weightheir national interests and then determine if, when, and where they will commit theirnation’s resources. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign involvement
for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The composition of an MNF maychange as partners enter and leave when their respective national objectives change or force
contributions reach the limits of their nation’s ability to sustain them. Some nations may
even be asked to integrate their forces with those of another, so that a contribution may, forexample, consist of an infantry company containing platoons from different countries. The
only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every case, a calculated diplomatic
decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance. The nature of their national
decisions, in turn, influences the MNTF’s command structure. In a parallel command
structure, national forces essentially operate under their own doctrine and procedures
within the guidelines determined by the strategic national guidance and are notsignificantly impacted by multinational influences. Under the integrated and LN command
structures, more multinational involvement and interaction occurs. As such, this chapter
will primarily focus on issues affecting the latter two structures.
b. Capabilities. As shown in Figure III-1, numerous factors influence the militarycapabilities of nations. The operational-level commander must be aware of the specificoperational limitations and capabilities of the forces of participating nations and consider
these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations.
MNTF
commanders at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting andnegotiating with diplomats, HN officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats
should not be underestimated. MNTF commanders will routinely work directly with
political authorities in the region. Even within their own command, national andoperational limitations on the employment of the forces can significantly influence daily
operations.
c. Integration. The fundamental challenge in multinational operations is the effective
integration and synchronization of available assets toward the achievement of common
objectives. This may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate (andoccasionally incompatible) capabilities, ROE, equipment, and procedures. To reduce
disparities among participating forces, minimum capability standards should be establishedand a certification process developed by the MNFC. Identified shortcomings should besatisfied by either bilateral or multilateral support agreements (formal or informal) prior to
the deployment of forces to the OA. This process relies heavily upon detailed coordination
III-1

Chapter III

Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations
National Interests
Domestic Politics
Objectives
Arms Control Limitations
Doctrine
Organization
Training
Leader Development
Equipment
History
Defense Budget
Domestic Law
Treaties
Threats
CultureInfrastructure
Figure III-1. Factors Affecting the Military Capabilities of Nations

between national leadership, prospective forces, and the MNFC. The degree of involvementof each participant is likely to be primarily a national decision and commanders at all levels
must be cognizant of national mandates placed on individual units.
d. Preparation. In addition to planning and preparing for contingency operations ina multinational environment, CCDRs pursue national strategic end states as they develop
their theater or functional strategies. This translates into an integrated set of shaping
actions and activities by means of an operation or campaign plan.
(1) SC activities are designed to promote peace and security in a country or region
and prevent or mitigate crises by facilitating cooperation and building relationships toenhance an HN or region’s security. A multinational operation can be designed to support
a CCMD’s operation or campaign plan or a contingency operation.
(2) SC activities are undertaken well in advance of any crisis-precipitating event.
The military contribution to these efforts focuses on enhancing cooperation and building
and sustaining relationships to enhance regional security.
(3) A representative listing of SC activities might include:(a) Provide training, education, and equipment to build the capacity,
capability, and interoperability of PNs and organizations;(b) Conduct activities with PNs to confront threats and challenges before
they mature into a crisis;III-2

JP 3-16

General Planning Considerations(c) Conduct military-to-military senior leader and staff talks and exchanges;(d) Promote regional cooperation to meet shared challenges, as well as
decrease tension and rivalries;(e) Conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises; and(f) Conclude formal arrangements for the use of facilities, basing, or transitof military forces.
e. Employment. In most multinational operations, the differing degrees of national
interest result in varying levels of commitment by PNs. While some countries might
authorize the full range of employment, other countries may limit their forces to strictly
defensive or combat service support roles. Some examples of PN contributions can be seenin Figure III-2. However, offers of national support should not be declined outright.
Instead, every offer should be vetted through the MNFC and multinational partners andrecognized as support to the operation or campaign. This process helps maintain the
support of allies, friends, and partners and enhances the relationship. Additionally,
multinational support will help increase the perceived legitimacy of operations
domestically as well as internationally.
For additional information regarding legitimacy, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. For NATO
operations, see AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.
2. Building and Maintaining a Multinational Forcea. Building an MNF starts with the national decisions and diplomatic efforts to createa coalition or spur an alliance into action. Discussion and coordination between potential
participants will initially seek to sort out basic questions at the national strategic level.
These senior-level discussions could include organizations like the African Union, UN, or
NATO, existing coalitions or alliances, or individual nations. The result of these
discussions should determine:(1) The nature and limits of the response.
(2) The command structure of the response force.
(3) The essential strategic guidance for the response force to include military
objectives and the desired end states.
b. Command Issues. When the response force is resident within an alliance, theprocedures and structure of the alliance will normally determine operational-level
leadership for the response force. When the response force is based in a coalition (or an
LN structure in an alliance), the designated LN will normally select the operational-level
leadership. The Multinational Interoperability Council’s Coalition Building Guide,describes the LN construct and could be used by an LN and potential partners as a starting
point to address the coalition building process as it applies to multinational military
operations, particularly at the strategic level.
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Chapter III

Partner Nation Contributions
Combat Forces

Troops
Ships
Aircraft
Staff Officers
Trainers
Diplomatic recognition
Opening embassy or mission
 Supporting United Nations
security resolution


Noncombat
Forces

Diplomatic SupportDebt forgivenessUnfreezing assets
 Direct financial assistanceFinancial Support

Logistics, Lift, andSustainment
OCSBasing, Access, andOverflight Support
Stabilization andReconstruction
SupportGovernance andMinisterial Support

Logistic infrastructure
Strategic air and sea lift Intratheater lift
 Operational contract support (OCS)

Basing rights
Access to facilities
 Overflight rights






Humanitarian assistance
Public infrastructure

Constitutional support
Ministerial mentoring Civil service training supportFigure III-2. Partner Nation Contributions

c. These designated military leaders will coordinate military requirements andactions between participating nations. In an alliance such as NATO, this would normallybe the alliance’s military commander. The MNFC promulgates essential guidance to allmembers that should contain the following information:(1) Purpose of the multinational operation.
(2) Mission statement for the MNTF.
(3) Strategic end state and military end state for the MNTF.
(4) Strategic objectives and broad tasks for the MNTF with guidance fortermination or transition.
(5) Participating nations and expected initial contributions.
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General Planning Considerations(6) Designated LN and supporting guidance.
(7) Common security interests.
(8) Multinational communications strategy.
(9) Specific diplomatic, economic, and informational guidance and national
limitations, concerns, or sensitivities.
d. When dealing with PNs, sensitivities and cultural differences must be recognized
and acknowledged and procedures developed to mitigate or minimize additional conflict
between nations. Some planning considerations for multinational operations may include
language, culture and religion, diet, alcohol and tobacco consumption policies,
male/female contact/cohabitation policies, openness to biometrics, work hours, leave,
perspectives on ethics and corruption, working animals, ROE/rules for the use of force
caveats, and other duty limitations.
e. Maintaining a cohesive MNF may require the MNFC’s continual attention, as
nearly every action or event may impact national and military interests and may compete
for primacy with the MNF’s objective and end state. In some cases, national restrictions
may seem wholly out of line with national contributions. This tension between national
elements is not new, and commanders at all levels should be prepared to deal with it. As
discussed earlier, nations join multinational efforts for a variety of reasons, both known
and unknown. National will, popular support, and the perceived achievement of statedobjectives are just some of the factors that might influence continued national participation.
However, thorough pre-mission preparation and planning can pay significant dividends
later as the MNFC faces the challenge of maintaining a stable MNF.
3. Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks
a. The MNFC’s staff should conduct a detailed mission analysis. This is one of themost important tasks in planning multinational operations and should result in a revised
mission statement, commander’s intent, and the MNFC’s planning guidance. As part ofthe mission analysis, force requirements should be identified; standards for participation
published (e.g., training-level competence and logistics, including deployment,sustainment, and redeployment capabilities); and funding requests, certification
procedures, and force commitments solicited from an alliance or likely coalition partners.
b. Before the MNTF staff can develop proposed courses of action, the MNFC must
conduct an estimate of the situation. This enables the MNFC to analyze, in an organizedmanner, the many factors that will affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission(s).
This estimate should address the respective capabilities, national will, and national interestsof the MNTF components. Additionally, expected interagency contributions andinvolvement of each nation should be addressed. This is a critical step as each nation
determines its contribution to the operation. National force commitments, even in an
established alliance, are not automatic. For example, a NATO non-Article 5 crisis
response operation is one such case where nations can opt in or out based on their national
interests. Based upon these national contributions, and after determining the tasks
III-5

Chapter III
necessary to achieve the objectives that support mission accomplishment, the MNFC
should assign specific tasks to the elements of the MNTF most capable of completing thosetasks. If there are several different national elements that can complete a particular task,
the MNFC should consider assigning that task in a manner that allows each troop
contributing nation to make meaningful contributions to the end state.
4. Language, Religion, Culture, and Sovereignty
a. Language. Differing languages within an MNF may present a significant
challenge to command, control, and communications and potentially affect unity ofeffort if not mitigated. US forces cannot assume the predominant language willautomatically be English, and specifying an official language for the MNF can be asensitive issue. Therefore, US forces should make every effort to overcome language
barriers. Wherever and whenever possible, commanders should use exchange or liaison
officers or nonmilitary translators to facilitate interaction and coordination with HN forces.
Communication is conveyed through both verbal and nonverbal means, with information
loss, miscommunications, and misunderstandings having a negative impact on operations.
The additional time required to receive information, process it, develop plans from it,translate the plans, and distribute them to multinational partners can adversely impact the
speed and tempo of operations. Commanders may lessen these difficulties by early
identification of linguist support. They should assess the capabilities of US personnel tocommunicate with and to understand partners and use properly trained, multilingual
personnel as appropriate. Capability gaps may be mitigated through the use of contracted
support for interpreters and translators and should be addressed during the planning phasenormally involving coordination with US Army Intelligence and Security Command. HN
resources may serve an especially important role in this capacity, particularly if available
during the initial stages of the deployment. In addition, the importance of staffing the HQwith qualified liaison personnel cannot be too highly emphasized. This will usually place
additional demands upon US commanders for liaison personnel, but they are critical to thesuccess of any multinational mission.
b. Linguists and Area Experts. To assist with cultural and language challenges, the
MNTF employs linguists and area experts, often available within and through the Service
components or from other governmental agencies. In some instances, members of Service
forces may be especially familiar with the OA, its cultures, and languages as a result ofspecial training (e.g., foreign area officers), previous assignments, or heritage. The use ofsuch abilities should be maximized to facilitate understanding and communications.
Contract linguists should be screened for security purposes and vetted to verify theirabilities.
c. Religion. Each partner in multinational operations requires the capability to assess
the impact of religion upon operations. Assigned religious affairs personnel serve asadvisers to the command regarding religious factors among the local population, as well asassigned, attached, or authorized personnel. Assigned religious affairs personnel also
provide religious support through pastoral care, worship opportunities, and casualty
incident responses. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious and cultural
customs, holiday observances, and similar concerns of MNF members.
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General Planning Considerations
For more information on religious affairs, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
d. Culture. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural
identity—the result of their physical environment, economic, political, and social outlook,
as well as the values, beliefs, and symbols that comprise their culture. Even seemingly
minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. Commanders should
strive to accommodate religious and cultural customs, holiday observances, and similar
concerns of MNF members.
(1) There are a number of tools that can aid commanders and joint forces in
identifying and becoming familiar with troop contributing nations’ cultural tendencies andprovide insights into other cultures (HN, neighboring countries, adversaries, andsupporters). This may enable commanders to be more effective when interacting with theirother MNF leaders and the local populace. These tools can potentially assist commanders
in making more timely assessments of potential cultural impacts and minimize any
detrimental impact on operations and enable a more cohesive relationship with ourmultinational partners and friends.
(2) Some tools that provide analytical methodology for cultural evaluation
include:(a) Defense
Language
http://www.dliflc.edu/resources/.

Institute/Foreign

Language

Centerat(b) US Air Force Culture and Language Center at http://culture.af.mil/.
(c) US Navy Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture.
(d) US
MarineCorpsIntelligence
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence/Units/MCIA/.

Activityat(e) SOF global assessments conducted by US Special Operations Command.
(f) Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning at
https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/programs/investing-education-andtraining-our-marines/center-advanced-operational-culture-and.
e. Sovereignty Issues. Sovereignty issues will be among the most difficult problems
the MNFC may be required to mitigate. Often, the MNFC will be required to accomplish
the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditionalcommand concepts. National sensitivities must be recognized and acknowledged.
(1) The US commander, as part of the MNF, should coordinate with DOS,country teams, and the ambassador/chief of mission to the respective HN, if available, on
any sovereignty issues that cannot be resolved at the MNFC level. Examples ofsovereignty issues include basing, civil, or criminal jurisdiction over military andcontractor personnel, immigration, customs and taxation, claims, ground movement,

III-7

Chapter III
overflight rights, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, railheads, bordercrossings, frequency management, and operations in the territorial sea.
(a) Normally, such issues will be formally resolved with HNs through thedevelopment of appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently
developed status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), status-of-mission agreements, or defense
cooperation agreements (DCAs). These agreements, negotiated between the HN and thesponsoring organization on behalf of the participating countries, establish the detailed legal
status of MNFs.
(b) Authority to negotiate a SOFA or DCA is held at the national level. For
US forces, some specified portions of that authority have been delegated to the Joint Staff
and CCDRs. Neither the MNFC nor the staff has such authority without specific approvalor delegation from higher authority. Before any negotiations or agreement with anothernation, the SJA or appropriate legal authorities should be consulted. US forces remainsubject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which will be administered by theappropriate US commander.
(2) The commander may also create structures such as committees to address
sovereignty issues. These committees may be chaired by military or nonmilitary
representatives of the HN to facilitate cooperation and build trust. These organizations
could facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings and removing
impediments. In many cases, SC organizations, NGOs, and international organizations
present in the HN can help establish good will with the HN. In some cases, theseorganizations may also be called upon to assist in the conduct of operations or inestablishing a congenial relationship in the HN.
5. Legala. Commanders must ensure the MNTF complies with applicable national andinternational laws during the conduct of all military operations. Participating nations
should provide commanders with access to legal advice throughout the operation tofacilitate a comprehensive understanding of any national differences. In operations under
the authority of NATO, relevant alliance documents will be applicable.
b. US forces will comply with the law of war (also referred to by other nations as thelaw of armed conflict) during all armed conflicts however characterized and in all othermilitary operations. Additionally, US forces will be trained in the law of war IAW DODD
2311.01, DOD Law of War Program. US forces will report alleged violations of the lawof war (for which there is credible information or conduct during military operations thatwould constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict)through command channels.
Refer to DODD 2311.01, DOD Law of War Program, and CJCSI 5810.01, Implementationof the DOD Law of War Program.
c. International Agreements. International agreements are the primary source ofrules of international law applicable to US, multinational, and HN forces. SOFAs are one
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General Planning Considerations
type of international agreement. SOFAs are normally comprehensive; however, these may
be modified or become inapplicable in time of armed conflict. They prescribe most of thereciprocal rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities of the US forces, to include
DOD civilians and contractor personnel stationed abroad and of the governments of the
HN and PNs and their respective armed forces. Other important types of international
agreements concern security assistance and HNS agreements. For specific information on
HNS agreements (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing agreements [ACSAs]) andinternational agreements (e.g., defense cooperation agreements), contact the US embassy
military senior defense official or GCC’s legal advisor.
d. Treatment of Detainees. During the conduct of military operations, MNF
personnel must be prepared to detain a wide variety of individuals who fall into different
categories under the law of war. Regardless of the category or status of a detainee, MNFs
are required to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for all detainees IAW
applicable domestic law, international law, and policy. Additionally, US forces should beaware that other participating nations may categorize detainees differently. For this reason,and because the excessive use of force or the perceived mistreatment of detainees can also
seriously undermine public confidence in MNF operations, it is imperative commanders
provide clear guidance for detainee operations in a multinational environment.
For additional information, see JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.
e. The DOD Detainee Program establishes overarching DOD detainee policy. The
directive requires humane treatment of all detainees, however characterized, during allarmed conflicts and in all other military operations. The standards of treatment set forth in
the directive apply to all DOD components and contractors authorized to accompany theforce (CAAF), when assigned to or supporting the DOD components conducting,participating in, or supporting detainee operations. These standards also apply to all nonDOD personnel as a condition of permitting access to internment facilities or to detainees
under DOD control.
For additional information, see DODD 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program.
f. Military Justice(1) Jurisdiction over US forces suspected of committing a criminal offense will
be decided on a case-by-case basis, IAW applicable international agreements with HN civil
authorities. It is US policy to retain jurisdiction in all criminal cases to the fullest extent
possible. Foreign military commanders exercising operational control (OPCON) or
tactical control (TACON) over US forces will not administer discipline.
(2) Jurisdiction over non-US members of the MNTF in such circumstances will
also be decided IAW applicable international agreements with HN civil authorities. Since
national procedures with regard to jurisdiction will determine how each case will behandled, US commanders should defer such matters to the participating nation’s
authorities.

III-9

Chapter III
g. Commanders should coordinate with the joint force SJA to assist in resolving
potential legal conflicts that arise during multinational operations, such as jurisdictional
issues related to HN law and military justice, questions regarding compliance withinternational law, and issues related to the treatment of detainees. However, this does notrelieve the commander of the responsibility to understand and apply pertinent directives
related to the law of war and ROE.
6. Doctrine and Training
a. Doctrine. Some nations, and international organizations, possess doctrine andtraining programs with a full treatment of strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other
nations have doctrine and training programs smaller in both scope and capability to match
their national goals and objectives. When the Armed Forces of the United States participate
in multinational operations, US commanders should follow multinational doctrine andprocedures that have been ratified by the US. For multinational doctrine and procedures
not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinationalcommand’s doctrine and procedures where applicable and consistent with US law, policy,
and guidance. An example is the MNF SOP developed by 31 nations within the MPAT in
the Asia-Pacific region. It seeks to identify common starting points for the rapid activationand forming of an MNTF for crisis response situations (see Appendix B, “Multinational
Planning Augmentation Team”).
b. Training and Resources. When the situation permits, MNFCs at all levels shouldseek opportunities to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training
assistance and resource sharing consistent with agreements between MNF members. This
could include development of interoperable C2 and joint fires capabilities and procedures;the sale or loan of equipment; consistent and shared doctrine; common TTP; andparticipation in multinational exercises, including training at US national training centerswhen appropriate. GCCs should include this information in the SC portion of theircampaign plan.
7. Funding and Resources
Financial and resource considerations may vary greatly with each multinational
operation. Responsible parties need to become familiar with the added legal complexities
and ramifications when operating with MNFs. Reimbursement and other funding issues
are often complex. Many arrangements will be similar to those for UN operations whileother financial arrangements will be based on specific coalition agreements, MOUs, or
technical agreements. It is important to begin coordination of financial arrangements withprospective multinational partners as early in the planning process as possible. Often,
financial arrangements may be supported by special US logistic and funding authorities(the US’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid provisions, for example).
Examples of unique authorities include the provision of supplies, services, transportation,and logistic support to coalition forces supporting military and stability activities in Iraq
and Afghanistan and authorities to use ACSAs to lend certain military equipment to foreign
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan for personnel protection and survivability. Additional
examples of authorities are: establish an OCS coordination framework to preclude MNF

III-10JP 3-16

General Planning Considerations
contracting conflicts; preserve and support local economy and wage rates; and preclude
monopolization of HN vendors, services, and goods (ensure HN populace access to needed
resources).
In addition to the specific agreements governing each operation, important references on
multinational funding issues are contained in DOD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense
Financial Management Regulation (DODFMR), Volume 15, Security Cooperation Policy.
8. Protection of Personnel, Information, and Critical Assets
a. The protection function focuses on preserving the joint forces fighting potential infour primary ways. One way uses active defensive measures that protect the joint force,
its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications (LOCs)
from an enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures that make friendly
forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Equally important is
the application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of friendly fire. Finally,
emergency management and response reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due toaccidents, health threats, and natural disasters. As the MNFC’s mission requires, theprotection function also extends beyond FP to encompass protection of noncombatants; theforces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and interorganizational
partners.
See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for additional information on the protection function.
b. Commanders must understand that other nations do not necessarily execute FP in
the same way as the United States Armed Forces. Some nations’ armed forces may or may
not be willing or able to assume the same risk as US forces. US commanders, whether
under US control or under a command relationship to an MNF, must continuously assessthreats and vulnerabilities while implementing appropriate FP countermeasures IAW
published GCC directives. Special consideration must be given to personnel with duties
that require interaction with local populations.
c. Throughout multinational operations, risk management techniques andmethodologies should be used to reduce or offset risk by systematically identifying,assessing, and controlling risk.
d. Another significant problem facing the MNF is the potential for friendly fire.
Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms ofreference can increase this risk. MNF support or liaison teams can greatly assist inassessing and reducing the friendly fire risk to the MNF by recommending operational
coordination measures and technological solutions.
e. Finally, commanders must understand US forces, as part of an MNF, can potentiallybe the greater target. Enemies may view attacks against US Service members as aparticularly effective tactic, especially when using co-opted multinational or HN forces to
conduct these attacks against unsuspecting US forces. While these types of so-called“insider” or “green-on-blue” attacks may be context-specific to a particular theater, JFCs
should, nevertheless, ensure their protection plans at least take into account the potential
III-11

Chapter III
for these types of attacks and plan appropriate countermeasures as the situation dictates.
US forces operating at tactical levels may be especially vulnerable to unintended andadverse exploitative use of information to gain advantage. Commanders should
implement clear measures to ensure tactical information is accurate, timely, andadequately protected at all times.
f. Nontraditional threats, such as insider attacks, undermine an MNF’s ability inestablishing a secure and stable environment, as well as the cohesion of the MNFs.
Strategically, these types of threats provide a propaganda platform from which adversaries
can not only threaten the MNF’s objectives and termination criteria but also undermine theoverall efforts of the international community. Tactically, the breakdown of trust,communication, and cooperation between HNs and MNFs affects military capability.
Eliminating or minimizing nontraditional threats, especially by proper preparation andtraining of coalition forces, is critical to mission success. However, tougher FP standards
and measures that are overtly heavy handed must be well balanced yet culturally sensitive
enough to not send the wrong message to the very people and organizations the coalitionis trying to protect.
g. Commanders must recognize that FP may have a higher priority than achievementof specific tactical objectives as the information gained by an enemy’s successful attack
against US forces can have an operational or even strategic impact. This does not imply
that what is called for is a reduction of risk by isolation of US forces.
9. Rules of Engagementa. Obtaining concurrence for ROE from national authorities may be time-consuming
but is essential and should begin early in the planning process. Though the participants
may have similar national mandates, ROE may differ among the represented PNs. In manycases, commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalfof their nation in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardizationof ROE should be sought but may not be achievable. The MNFC should reconcile
differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailoredby member forces to their national policies and law.
b. It is essential that adjacent or mutually supporting formations and forces understandeach others’ ROE, as it cannot be assumed that each will react in an identical fashion to agiven situation. Without this understanding, events could result in misperceptions,confusion, and even friendly fire.
c. US forces assigned OPCON or TACON to an MNFC will follow the ROE of the
MNF for mission accomplishment, if authorized by SecDef. US forces retain the right ofself-defense. Apparent inconsistencies between the right of self-defense contained in US
standing rules of engagement and the MNF ROE will be submitted through the US chainof command for resolution. While the final resolution is pending, US forces will continue
to operate under US ROE. In the case of NATO operations, attention should be directed
to applicable alliance documents, such as, Military Committee 362/1, NATO Rules ofEngagement.

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General Planning Considerations
For additional information on standing rules of engagement, see CJCSI 3121.01, (U)Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.
10. Combat Identification and Friendly Fire Prevention
Tragically, “fog-of-war” situations can lead to friendly fire incidents. Rapid, reliable
identification of friends, foes, and neutrals, also known as combat identification (CID) is a
key survivability enabler that mitigates friendly fire incidents.
a. Effective CID enhances joint force capabilities by providing confidence in theaccuracy of engagement decisions throughout the force. The MNFC’s CID proceduresshould serve to optimize mission effectiveness by maximizing enemy engagements while
minimizing friendly fire and collateral damage. These measures are particularly importantin PO and traditional noncombat operations. Therefore, CID measures should beestablished early in the planning cycle.
b. CID considerations play an important role in FP. The MNFC’s CID proceduresmust be consistent with ROE and not interfere with a unit’s or an individual’s ability toengage enemy forces and conduct actions appropriate for self-defense.
CID
characterizations, when applied with ROE, enable engagement decisions and thesubsequent use, or prohibition of use, of weapons and capabilities that create lethal and/or
nonlethal effects. When developing the MNF CID procedures, important considerations
include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants.
For additional guidance on CID, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.
c. MNFCs must make every effort to reduce the potential for the unintentional killingor wounding of friendly personnel (to include civilians) by friendly fire. The destructive
power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo ofmodern combat, the fluid nature of the nonlinear OA, the changing disposition of attacking
and defending forces, and the presence of civilians in the OA, increase the potential forfriendly fire.
For additional information on protection of civilians, refer to Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute’s Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide (Second Edition) at
http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/PoC_MilRefGd_2nd_ed_Web_reduced.pdf.
d. Commanders must identify and assess situations that increase the risk of friendly
fire in the OE and institute appropriate preventive measures. The primary preventive
measures for limiting and reducing friendly fire are command emphasis, disciplined
operations, close coordination among component commands and multinational partners,
exercises, reliable and timely CID, effective SOPs, technology solutions (e.g.,
identification, friend or foe; friendly force tracking), and enhanced situational awareness(SA) of the OE. Commanders should seek to minimize friendly fire while not limiting
boldness and initiative.

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Intentionally Blank

III-14JP 3-16

CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS
1. Land Operations
In most multinational operations, land forces are an integral and central part of themilitary effort. The level and extent of land operations in a multinational environment islargely a function of the overall military objectives, any national caveats to employment,
and the forces available within the MNF.
a. National doctrine and training will normally dictate employment options within the
MNF. Nations with common TTP will also experience far greater interoperability.
Effective use of SC activities may significantly reduce interoperability problems even for
countries with widely disparate weapons systems.
b. The MNFC may assign the responsibility for land operations to an overall
multinational force land component commander (MNFLCC) or a task force (TF) within
the MNF command structure (for example: TF South, TF North). Such TFs may include
elements from a single nation or multiple nations, depending on the situation and theinteroperability factors of the nations involved. In addition, the MNFC may also assign an
area of operations (AO) to the MNFLCC or TF based upon the concept of operations(CONOPS). Figure IV-1 contains a representative sample of MNFLCC responsibilities.
c. The MNFC will also establish supported and supporting relationships between theland component command or TF and other MNTF components (maritime, air, and special
operations), based upon mission requirements, to assist in prioritizing actions; establishing
the main effort; and establishing formal command/coordination channels between thecomponents for a specific operation, mission, or phase.
d. A fundamental consideration for planning and executing land operations issustainability. The following factors impact the sustainability of land operations:(1) Personnel staffing requirements.
(2) Medical requirements and capabilities.
(3) Maintenance.
(4) Supply.
(5) Storage facilities.
(6) Transportation.
(7) Technical support and requirements.
(8) Common sourcing of support.

IV-1

Chapter IV(9) OCS.

Multinational Force Land Component Commander
Notional Responsibilities
Advise the multinational force commander (MNFC) on the proper employment offorces made available for tasking.



Develop the joint land operation plan/operation order in support of the MNFC’sconcept of operations and optimizing the operations of task-organized land forces.
The multinational force land component commander (MNFLCC) issues planningguidance to all subordinate and supporting elements and analyzes proposedcourses of action. The intent is to concentrate combat power at critical times andplaces to accomplish strategic, operational, and tactical goals.



Direct the execution of land operations as specified by the MNFC, which includes
making timely adjustments to the tasking of forces and capabilities made available.
The MNFLCC coordinates changes with affected component commanders as
appropriate.

Coordinate the planning and execution of joint land operations with the othercomponents and supporting agencies.



Evaluate the results of land operations to include the effectiveness of interdiction
operations and forwarding these results to the MNFC to support the combat
assessment effort.



Synchronize and integrate movement and maneuver, fires, and interdiction in
support of land operations.



Designate the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations.



Establish a personnel recovery coordination cell, and be prepared to implement a
personnel recovery plan and conduct personnel recovery of assigned forces.



Provide mutual support to other components by conducting operations such as
suppression of enemy air defenses and suppression of threats to maritime
operations.



Coordinate with other nations’ functional and Service components in support ofaccomplishment of MNFC objectives.



Provide an assistant or deputy to the area air defense commander for land-based
joint theater air and missile defense operations and coordination as determined by
the MNFC.

Support the MNFC's operations in the information environment by developing theinformation requirements that support land operations and synchronizing land force
information assets when directed, to include cyberspace requirements.

Establish standing operating procedures and other directives based on MNFC
guidance.

Provide inputs into the MNFC-approved joint operational area air defense planand the airspace control plan.

Integrate the MNFLCC’s communications systems and resources into the theater’s
networked communications system architecture or common operational picture tosynchronize MNFLCC’s critical voice and data requirements. These
communications systems requirements, coordination issues, and capabilities
should be considered in the joint planning and execution process.

Figure IV-1. Multinational Force Land Component Commander Notional Responsibilities

IV-2

JP 3-16

Operations
See JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations, for more detail. AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine forLand Operations, provides further information on doctrine for planning, preparing, andexecuting NATO land component operations.
2. Maritime Operations
During multinational operations, maritime forces can exercise sea control or project
power ashore, synchronize their operations with the other MNF components, and support
the MNFC’s intent and guidance in accomplishing the MNF mission. Maritime forces areprimarily navies and coast guard; however, they may include maritime-focused air forces,
amphibious forces, or other government departments and agencies charged withsovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea.
a. Maritime operational responsibility may be assigned to a multinational force
maritime component commander (MNFMCC) or a designated TF. Figure IV-2 contains a
representative sample of MNFMCC responsibilities.
b. The MNFC can also assign a maritime AO to the MNFMCC or naval TF within
the MNF OA, based upon the CONOPS. The MNFC will also establish support
relationships between the MNFMCC (or TF) and other MNF components (land, air, SOF),
based upon mission requirements, to assist in prioritizing actions, establishing the maineffort, and establishing formal command/coordination channels between the components
for a specific operation/mission or phase.
c. A fundamental consideration of maritime operations is sustainability.
following factors impact the sustainability of maritime operations:The(1) Number of surface ships (combatant and noncombatant).
(2) Number of submarine assets.
(3) Maintenance.
(4) Storage facilities.
(5) Weather and sea state conditions.
(6) Sea LOCs.
d. Properly planned, resourced, and employed maritime forces may conduct
operations that provide the MNFC with an MNF that can use the maneuver space of thesea to provide a broad range of options, generally unfettered by the requirement to obtain
HN permissions and access. Maritime forces can provide power projection, afloat HQ,logistics, area surveillance, and denial platforms and facilities for joint forces offering
advantages in flexibility and sustainability. Use of maritime forces may reduce the MNF
footprint ashore and enable support and sustainment to be landed in sufficient quantities,
as required, without necessarily placing it all in a vulnerable and essentially immobile
location. Seabasing of MNFs also reduces the possible negative impact on limited
IV-3

Chapter IV

Multinational Force Maritime Component Commander
Notional Responsibilities


Recommend to the multinational force commander (MNFC) the apportionment of
the joint maritime effort (after consultation with other component commanders).

Provide maritime forces to other component commanders in accordance with
MNFC apportionment decisions.



Control the execution of joint maritime operations, as specified by the MNFC, toinclude adjusting targets and tasks for available joint capabilities/forces. The
MNFC and affected component commanders will be notified, as appropriate, if themultinational force maritime component commander changes the planned joint
maritime operations during execution.

Assign and coordinate target priorities within the maritime area of operations (AO)
and integrate maneuver and movement, fires, and interdiction. The multinational
force maritime component commander nominates targets located within themaritime AO to the joint targeting process that may potentially require action byanother component commander’s assigned forces.



Contribute to maritime domain awareness. In order to allow decision makers tounderstand complex security environments, maritime components must:Persistently monitor the maritime domain to identify potential and actual
maritime threats;
Fuse and analyze intelligence and information when possible; andDisseminate intelligence and information in near real-time to the MNFC andother component commanders.

Function as the supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC.



Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of forces/capabilities
made available.



Establish a personnel recovery coordination center in the same manner as theland component commander.

Figure IV-2. Multinational Force Maritime Component Commander
Notional Responsibilities

infrastructure ashore and facilitates the protection of supplies and logistics support.
Maritime forces expand access options, reduce dependence on land bases, and create
uncertainty for adversaries.
e. Maritime transport vessels provide the bulk of heavy lift in support of multinational
operations.
See JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations, for details on maritime operations
3. Air Operations
a. Air operations provide the MNFC with a responsive, agile, and flexible means ofoperational reach. The MNFC can execute deep operations rapidly, striking at decisive points
and attacking centers of gravity. Further, transportation and support requirements can begreatly extended in response to emerging crisis and operational needs. Multinational air
operations are focused on supporting the MNFC’s intent and guidance in accomplishing theIV-4

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Operations
MNTF mission and, at the same time, ensuring air operations are integrated with the othermajor MNF operational functions (land, maritime, and special operations forces).
b. Overall MNF air operations will normally be assigned to a multinational force air
component commander (MNFACC) (the designation will be based on the type ofmultinational configuration used in the operation). MNFACC plans, coordinates, allocates,
and tasks air capabilities/force made available based on the MNFC’s air apportionment
decision (see Figure IV-3). The MNFC will also establish support relationships between
the MNFACC or TF and other MNF components based on MNF mission requirements, toassist in prioritizing actions and establish formal command/coordination channels between
the components for a specific operation/mission or phase.
c. Air Operations Planning. An integral part of the MNFC’s planning efforts is theconcept of air operations. The MNFACC conducts air operations planning and develops
the concept for air operations, describing how the multinational assets made available areenvisioned to be employed in support of the MNFC’s overall objectives. Both US
component commanders and MNFCs should provide highly trained liaison staffs tofacilitate integration, coordination, and synchronization of their operations. Air planningshould also include the use of logistic air assets and airfields. This is especially important
for the coordination of tactical air operations with logistic operations, especially the air
movement of supplies, their unloading, and rapid clearance from aerial ports. In the eventthat no established multinational guidance is available, planning considerations for
multinational air operations should resemble those for joint air operations.

Multinational Force Air Component Commander
Notional Responsibilities


Develop a multinational air operations plan to support the multinational force
commander’s (MNFC’s) objectives.



Recommend to the MNFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting withother component commanders.



Allocate and task air capabilities/forces made available based on the MNFC’s air
apportionment decision.

Provide oversight and guidance during execution of multinational air operations.



Coordinate multinational air operations with other component commanders andforces assigned to or supporting the MNFC.

Assess the results of multinational air operations.

Support MNFC information operations with assigned assets, when directed.



Function as the supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC.



Perform the duties of the airspace control authority, the area air defense
commander, and/or the space coordinating authority as designated.

Implement a personnel recovery plan for their own forces.

Figure IV-3. Multinational Force Air Component Commander Notional Responsibilities

IV-5

Chapter IV
See JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for details on the air planning process.
d. Airspace Control. The primary purpose of airspace control is to increase combat
effectiveness by promoting the safe, effective, and flexible use of airspace with minimal
restraint imposed on the users. International agreements; enemy and friendly force
structures; deployments and resupply operations; commanders’ concepts and operations;and operating environments such as foreign countries, the high seas, and amphibious
objective areas will necessitate different specific arrangements for airspace control. Since
participating nations’ policies and doctrines may vary in this regard, the MNFC should
ensure early, common understanding of the boundaries and limits of all operational areas.
(1) Responsibility. The responsibility for airspace control rests with the MNFC,
who normally designates an airspace control authority (ACA) to coordinate the airspacecontrol activities for multinational operations. In broad terms, the ACA establishes,
coordinates, and integrates the use of the airspace control area. Subject to the authority
and approval of the MNFC, the ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspacecontrol and for the coordination required among nations’ forces.
(2) When operating outside of a combat environment and within the borders ofanother sovereign nation, the ACA may perform coordination rather than control over theairspace. In those situations, the ACA needs to establish an effective relationship with the
HN airspace authority. In addition to increasing effectiveness, the HN interests are likely
to include safe domestic civil aviation, efficient commercial aviation, and international
overflight rights. Integrating airspace control efforts will have a positive impact on theoverall relationship between the HN and the MNF.
(3) The ACA establishes an airspace control system that is responsive to theneeds of the MNFC, integrates the MNF airspace control system with that of the HN, andcoordinates and deconflicts user requirements. Centralized direction by the ACA does not
imply command authority over any assets. Matters on which the ACA is unable to obtainagreement are referred to the MNFC for resolution. The responsibilities of ACA and
MNFACC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. If this is notpossible, the ACA staff should be collocated with the MNFACC staff.
See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for specific information on US joint operations and
AJP-3.3.5, Airspace Control, for specific information on NATO operations.
e. Air Defense. Air and missile defense operations must be coordinated with otheroperations, both on and over land and sea. The MNFC normally designates an area air
defense commander (AADC) to integrate the MNF’s defensive effort. The responsibilitiesof the MNFACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normally assigned to one
individual. When the situation dictates, the MNFC may designate a separate AADC and/or
ACA. In those joint operations where separate commanders are required and designated,close coordination is essential for unity of effort, prevention of friendly fire, anddeconflicting joint air operations.

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Operations
See JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, for details on air and missile defense
operations.
f. Sustainment. The following factors significantly influence sustainability during
air operations:(1) Available aircraft.
(2) Landing fields/air base support infrastructure.
(3) Weather.
(4) Maintenance.
(5) Supply.
(6) Storage facilities.
(7) Transportation.
(8) Technical support and requirements.
(9) Common sourcing of support.
(10) Secure LOCs.
(11) Medical support requirements and capabilities.
(12) OCS.
4. Space Operations
a. MNFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space-based capabilities.
Available space capabilities are normally limited to already-deployed assets andestablished priorities for space system resources. Space systems offer global coverage andthe potential for real time and near real time support to military operations. United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), through the joint force component commander,
enables commands to access various space capabilities and systems. As situations develop,
priorities for space support may change to aid the MNFC in assessing the changing
environment. Most important, MNFCs and their components need to anticipate “surge”
space-based capabilities needed for future phases due to the long lead times to reprioritizeor acquire additional capability.
b. Space Integration into MNF Operations. MNFs will have many of the samerequirements for space support as do US forces. Sharing of intelligence products is
controlled according to security guidelines. Unannotated commercial imagery may
facilitate information sharing with other MNFs. Weather data is also readily available toshare, as is Global Positioning System navigation support. Providing warning of anddefense against attack from all classes of ballistic missiles is important because it helps
IV-7

Chapter IV
build trust among MNFs. USSTRATCOM assists in development of missile warning
architectures and providing this information to MNFs in a process called “shared early
warning.”c. Space Coordinating Authority (SCA).
The SCA gathers operational
requirements that may be satisfied by space capabilities and facilitates the use of
established processes by joint force staffs to plan and conduct space operations. The SCA
coordinates with each MNF component and ally to reduce redundancy among, andinterference between, space operations, as well as conflicting support requests reaching
USSTRATCOM. The MNFC should consider the mission, nature, and duration of theoperation; preponderance of space force capabilities; and the C2 (including reachback) in
designating the SCA. MNF coordinating authority is normally retained at the MNF levelbut may be delegated to a component. The SCA may require additional liaison with MNFs.
For additional information on space operations, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.
5. Information
All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features anddetails of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain
understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior anddecision making. The JFC/MNFC leverages informational aspects of military activities togain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to others.
Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects strategic
objectives.
a. Multinational operations in the information environment should be based on asystemic understanding of the information environment. Themes and messages must be
agreed upon by all MNF participants and integrated into operations. The information
environment is dynamic and subject to rapid change requiring flexibility and adaptability
to mission and situation requirements. The development of capabilities, plans,
assessments, intelligence, and communications support applicable to operations in theinformation environment must begin early so information activities can be integrated into
the overall operation or campaign plan. This development also requires coordination withthe responsible DOD components and PNs. Coordination with allies above the JFC/MNFC
level is normally accomplished within existing defense arrangements, including bilateralarrangements. Operations in the information environment should be coordinated with all
stakeholders especially the appropriate GCC and DOS country team.
b. The Multinational Information Operations Cell
(1) When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force staff should be augmented
by planners and subject matter experts from the MNF. All MNF member nations should
be represented in the information operations (IO) cell in positions to integrate information
throughout the communications. Planners should seek to accommodate the requirementsof the MNF with the objective of using all the available resources. Direct representation
enables multinational information assets to be used efficiently and ensures theIV-8

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Operations
multinational plan for operations in the information environment is coordinated with allother aspects of the multinational operation. Toward that end, it is essential that from theinitiation of planning those activities, and the structures, systems, and facilities that support
them, be classified at the lowest level possible.
(a) Each nation has various resources to provide both classified andunclassified information to a particular information activity. To maximize the benefits of
information activities, all nations must be willing to share appropriate information toaccomplish the assigned mission. However, all MNF members should understand eachnation is obliged to protect information that it cannot share with other MNF nations.
(b) Information sharing arrangements in formal alliances, to include US
participation in UN missions, are worked out as part of alliance protocols. Information
sharing arrangements in ad hoc multinational operations where coalitions are working
together on a short-notice mission must be created during the establishment of the coalition.
For more information, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-13, Information Operations.
For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information
Operations.
(2) When the JFC is not the MNFC, it may be necessary for the JFC to brief the
MNFC and staff on the advantages of operations in the information environment to achieve
US and MNF objectives. The JFC should propose organizing a multinational IO cell. If
this is not acceptable to the MNFC, the JFC should assume responsibility for using
operations in the information environment to support US and MNF objectives.
c. Multinational Planning for Operations in the Information Environment.
Planning operations in the information environment to support multinational operations ismore difficult because of complex approval and security issues, differences in the level oftraining of involved forces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers.
(1) How to plan multinational operations is the prerogative of the MNFC. The
size, composition, and mission of the MNF, as well as diplomatic considerations, may
influence how multinational IO is planned. Coordination at the IO cell level, with detailed
planning at the individual element level, would give multinational planning for operationsin the information environment the most consistency with US planning procedures.
(2) The use of information should directly and demonstrably support theobjectives of the MNFC. This is particularly important when joint force planners areattempting to acquaint a non-US MNFC with the advantages of operations in theinformation environment.
(3) The subordinate JFC may undertake planning and execution of independent
operations in the information environment in support of multinational objectives.
See CJCSI 6510.01, Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network
Defense (CND).

IV-9

Chapter IV
d. Military information support operations (MISO) provide the commander with theability to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreigngroups and promote themes to change those groups’ attitudes and behaviors. MISO canalso degrade the enemy’s combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral
damage, and increase the population’s support for operations. MISO provide JFCs withways and means to influence political, military, economic, social, information, andinfrastructure aspects of the OE that may be as critical to operational success as actions
against enemy and adversary military capabilities. Target audiences are individuals orgroups selected for influence and may include enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral
groups or populations. MISO should be incorporated into all multinational operations.
(1) The MNFC should ensure all MISO, regardless of national origin, arecoordinated. MISO planning must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a
population for the arrival of MNFs and develop communication channels that can be usedfrom day one of the operation. A detailed analysis of a country’s culture, political climate,and military organization can help the MNFC to effectively apply MISO to communicate
policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly forces. US
MISO require US granted authorities/permissions and are approved in US channels
regardless of the composition of the MNF chain of command.
(2) Many NATO and Partnership for Peace nations still use the term
psychological operations in place of MISO. In the US, military information support forces
are trained personnel who primarily conduct MISO. It is important not to confuse thepsychological impact of other military operations with MISO. Many actions of the joint
force, such as air strikes, have psychological impact, but they are not MISO unless theirprimary purpose is to influence the attitudes, rules, norms, beliefs, and subsequent behaviorof a target audience. However, the psychological impact of such events can significantly
enhance or undermine program effectiveness and is considered during planning, execution,
and assessment. Regardless of the circumstances, all MISO are conducted within carefully
reviewed and approved programs and under mission-tailored product approval guidelinesthat flow from national-level authorities. MISO officers advise the commander andoperations officer on the possible psychological impacts of all actions and ongoing
operations.
See JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, and CJCSI 3110.05, Military
Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, foradditional information.
6. Cyberspace Operations
a. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of
the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data,
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, space-based
resources, and embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace uses electronics and theelectromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to create, store, modify, and exchange data via networked
systems. Cyberspace operations seek to ensure freedom of action throughout the OE for
US forces and our allies, while denying the same to our adversaries. Cyberspace operations

IV-10

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Operations
overcome the limitations of distance, time, and physical barriers present in the physicaldomains. Cyberspace links actions in the physical domains, enabling mutually dependent
operations to achieve an operational advantage.
b. Nations’ understanding of the role of cyberspace in military operations continues
to evolve. Operating capabilities, philosophies, and national limitations on cyberspace
activities in support of military operations are changing at a tempo that affects ongoing
MNF operations, as well as the planning of potential future ones. Mutually beneficial
national interests usually govern a contributing nation’s involvement in MNF cyberspace
operations. Cyberspace operations planning, coordination, and execution items that must
be considered when an MNF campaign plan or OPLAN is developed can include thenational agendas for each country of the MNF, which may differ significantly from thoseof the US, creating potential difficulties in determining cyberspace operations objectives.
The level of multinational network and other cyberspace operations integration is directly
influenced by differing national standards and laws, which may affect employment of PN
cyberspace capabilities or willingness to participate in certain cyberspace operations.
c. Multinational operations are becoming the norm for military operations, making
intelligence and information sharing with PNs increasingly important. Cyberspaceconnectivity, security, and assurance are essential for the multinational and HN forces’effective mutual support during operations. Cyberspace interoperability issues should also
be considered in light of cybersecurity policy requirements. Security restrictions may
prevent full disclosure of individual cyberspace operations plans and orders withmultinational partners; this may severely hamper cyberspace synchronization efforts.
While it may not be possible to share specific cyberspace plans, resources, and techniqueswith all partners due to restrictions, appropriate information on the broader intent,
objectives, and messaging should be provided, enabling PNs to conduct effective, if
unsynchronized, independent activities.
d. The threat may use cyberspace operations to penetrate US, MNF, and HN networks
to collect data on forces and systems or to create denial or manipulation effects. States are
the principal actors on the global stage, but non-state actors also threaten the security
environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, transnational criminalorganizations, cyberspace hackers, and other malicious non-state actors have transformed
global affairs with increased capabilities of mass disruption. Our partners and allies incyberspace go beyond just nation-states; multilateral organizations, NGOs, corporations,and other strategic influencers all provide opportunities for collaboration and partnership.
For further information, read JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

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Intentionally Blank

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CHAPTER V
OTHER MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
1. Stability Activities
a. Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively
apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster HNresiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security. Stability isneeded when a state is under stress and cannot cope. MNF supporting stabilization efforts
should consider the use of fundamentals of stabilization and the principles of multinational
operations to plan and execute military activities to facilitate long-term stability. The
fundamentals are conflict transformation, HN ownership, unity of effort, and building HN
capacity.
b. MNF provide support to facilitate the execution of tasks for which the HN isnormally responsible. These actions generally fall into one of three categories,
representing the collective effort associated with stabilization:(1) Tasks for which MNF retain primary responsibility.
(2) Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain responsibility but
MNFs execute or are prepared to execute.
(3) Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.
c. Joint or MNF planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of
hostilities should establish a sound foundation for later stability and enabled civil authority
activities. JFCs/MNFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum
created when sustained combat operations wind down. Accomplishing this task shouldease the transition to stability activities and shorten the path to the national strategic end
state and handover to another authority. Considerations are to:(1) Limit the damage to key infrastructure and services.
(2) Establish the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilize
military and paramilitary forces.
(3) Provide for the availability of local currency.
(4) Identify and manage potential stabilize phase enemies.
(5) Determine the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, engineer,
medical, multinational) and balance of capabilities that can produce lethal and/or nonlethal
effects for mission accomplishment and FP.
(6) Determine availability of HN law enforcement, health service support, andforce health protection (FHP) resources.

V-1

Chapter V(7) Secure key infrastructure nodes and facilitate HN law enforcement and first
responder services.
(8) Develop and disseminate multinational communication-related themes tosuppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority.
(9) Coordinate OCS to preclude destabilization of market wage and vendor rates;monopolization of vendor capability, goods, and services; and competition amongindividual MNF members for resources.
For specific details on stability activities, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-07, Stability;
DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations; JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency; and JP 4-02, Joint
Health Services. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the
Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction.
2. Special Operations
a. SOF can provide the MNTF with a wide range of specialized military capabilities
and responses. SOF can provide specific assistance in the areas of assessment, liaison, andtraining of HN forces within the MNTF OA. Special operations responsibility will
normally be assigned to a multinational force special operations component commander(MNFSOCC) or to a TF within the MNF command structure. The TF may be made up of
SOF from one nation or multiple nations depending on the situation and the interoperability
factors of the nations involved. Figure V-1 contains a representative sample of MNFSOCC
responsibilities.
b. SOF may deploy ahead of the multinational operations to evaluate capability offoreign units and identify training necessary to integrate them into the overall plan. This
capability is enhanced by routine interaction of SOF with foreign military units including,for example, combat aviation advisory support. SOF can make use of their language andcultural capabilities to liaise with multinational units as needed. SOF can train, advise,assist, and, in some cases, accompany HN or multinational forces to overcome existing
shortfalls identified during the assessment.
For specific details on special operations, see JP 3-05, Special Operations, and JP 3-22,
Foreign Internal Defense. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine
for Special Operations.
3. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations
a. The MNF is critically dependent on the EMS. To prevail in the next conflict, an
MNF must win the fight for EMS superiority. Devices whose functions depend on the
EMS are used by both civilian and military organizations and individuals for intelligence;
communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; sensing; C2; attack; ranging; anddata transmission and information storage and processing. The military requirement for
unimpeded access to, and use of, EMS is a key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum
operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as a focus of operations
themselves.
V-2

JP 3-16Other Multinational Operations

Multinational Force Special Operations Component Commander
Notional Responsibilities
Advise the multinational force commander (MNFC) on the proper employment ofspecial operations forces (SOF) and assets.

Plan and coordinate special operations and employ designated SOF in support of
the MNFC’s concept of operations.

Issue planning guidance.

Analyze various courses of action.

Coordinate the conduct of special operations with other component
commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the MNFC.



Evaluate the results of special operations.



Synchronize sustainment for SOF.



Establish a combat identification standing operating procedure and otherdirectives based on MNFC guidance.

Function as a supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC.



Focus operational-level functions and their span of control.



Develop and support selected information operations efforts.

Responsible for a personnel recovery plan covering their forces and should
establish a personnel recovery coordination center.

Figure V-1. Multinational Force Special Operations Component Commander
Notional Responsibilities

b. JEMSO are military actions undertaken by two or more Services operating inconcert to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic operational environment(EMOE). These actions include all joint force transmissions and receptions ofelectromagnetic (EM) energy. The EMS is the range of all frequencies of EM radiation.
EMS superiority is that degree of dominance in the EMS that permits the conduct ofoperations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference, while affecting anadversary’s ability to do the same.
c. JEMSO actions to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the EMOE rely on personnel
and systems from the legacy EMS-related mission areas (e.g., signals intelligence, EMS
management, electronic warfare [EW]). Instead of these mission areas being planned andexecuted in a minimally coordinated, stove-piped fashion, JEMSO guidance and processes
prioritize, integrate, synchronize, and deconflict all joint force actions in the EMOE, enhancing
unity of effort.
d. Operations within the air, maritime, and land domains are similar in their EMS
dependence through the execution of the joint functions. Since the EMS overlaps all thephysical domains and the information environment simultaneously, JEMSO provides theprocesses to effectively prioritize, integrate, synchronize, and deconflict the EMS aspects
of operations throughout the OE. Many space and cyberspace operations occur throughV-3

Chapter V
the EMS, especially at the tactical level, and require close coordination with other
JEMSO through EM battle management processes.
e. Effective EMS management is essential to integrate and deconflict MNF use of
the EMS for communications, C2, sensor operations, information activities, EW, directedenergy capabilities, signals intelligence, and FP. The number, sophistication, and variety
of systems operated by PNs make EMS management far more demanding in
multinational operations than in joint operations.
f. The MNFC provides guidance for planning and JEMSO to the MNF through theoperations directorate of a joint staff’s combined electronic warfare coordination cell
(CEWCC). Note: NATO/multinational terminology still references the CEWCC.
Therefore, the CEWCC, not joint EMS operations cell, will be used when discussing
NATO/multinational operations.
For more information on spectrum management, refer to JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic
Spectrum Management Operations; JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare; and Joint Doctrine
Note (JDN) 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.
4. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
a. The President of the United States is the approval authority for noncombatantevacuation operations (NEOs), which will be conducted under the lead of the chief of
diplomatic mission, the President’s personal representative to the HN. A NEO isconducted to relocate designated noncombatants threatened in a foreign country to aplace of safety. NEOs are principally conducted by US forces to evacuate US citizens
but may be expanded to include citizens from the HN, as well as citizens from othercountries.
b. NEOs are often characterized by uncertainty. They may be directed without
warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented diplomatic or
military relations with the US, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements withinor external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster.
c. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomaticconsiderations. Under ideal circumstances, there may be little or no opposition; however,commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat
operation.
d. NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force,
temporary occupation of physical objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. It
differs from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect theevacuees and the evacuation force. Forces operating in foreign territory to conduct a
NEO should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment, thesecurity of the force, and the extraction and protection of evacuees.
e. In planning for a NEO, the chief of mission, GCC, and JFC may consider the
possibility of operating with MNFs. When the NEO is to evacuate US citizens andV-4

JP 3-16Other Multinational Operations
nationals, and designated other persons abroad, the Secretary of State may recommend
to the President to approve the use of an MNF. Approval for US participation in, or useof, an MNF NEO will come only from the President. Under an emergency situation
involving the safety of human life or the protection of property, offers of voluntary
service from other countries may be accepted by the chief of mission prior to approval.
f. Multinational evacuations involve multiple nation diplomatic initiatives—with
MNFs conducting a NEO in a supporting role. A national decision from each of theparticipating nations is required to conduct a NEO with an MNF. Should the national
powers decide on a requirement for a multinational NEO, an initiating directive should
be issued to enable detailed operational planning to commence.
For additional guidance on NEOs, refer to JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations. Specific guidance on conducting NEOs within NATO is provided in AJP3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
5. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations
a. FHA operations, particularly in developing countries, often require theintervention and aid of various agencies, including the military, from all over the world,
in a concerted and timely manner. As a result, operations involve dynamic informationexchange, planning, and coordination.
For more information, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
b. An MNCC may be established by the senior commander in support of all JTFs,
as an option for multinational coordination of FHA operations. In such contingencies,
the MNCC also acts as a CMOC and/or CIMIC coordination center, in addition toproviding coordination of military support operations.
c. When military forces are involved in FHA operations, their assets are provided
primarily to supplement or complement the relief efforts of the affected country’s civil
authorities and/or of the humanitarian relief community. This support may include, but
is not limited to, logistics, transportation, airfield management, communications, medical
support, distribution of relief commodities, and security.
d. Although it is the primary responsibility of national civilian aid agencies,
governmental departments and agencies, civil facility authorities, and international
agencies to conduct disaster needs assessments, they may not have the ability to do so orcapability to respond fast enough depending on the complexity, size, and nature of theemergency/crisis. In such cases, along with multilateral and bilateral agreements,
military forces may be requested to provide and/or assist in disaster needs assessments.
For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.4.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military
Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance, and AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for CivilMilitary Cooperation.

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Chapter V
RESPONSE TO THE EARTHQUAKE IN HAITIOn 12 January 2010, a 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti, the poorest country
in the Western Hemisphere, killing 85,000, injuring many more,
displacing 900,000, and flattening much of the capital of Port-au-Prince,
where approximately half of the population of Haiti live. The earthquake
killed many civil servants and destroyed the National Palace, theSupreme Court, the Palais de Justice, the Parliament, 14 of the 16 Haitian
government ministry buildings, and the emergency operations center.
One report stated “At the time of the earthquake, Haiti’s government wasbarely functioning; it was rated as one of the most corrupt in the world
as a result, the government lacked the financial resources, management,
and leadership infrastructure to respond effectively.” Shortly after theearthquake, Haitian president, Rene Preval, sent several of his ministers
on motorbikes to the US embassy requesting aid. The first request wasfor the US to open and run the Toussaint Louveture Airport as thecontrol tower was out of commission.
Instability in Port-au-Prince has been a long-term concern. The United
Nations (UN) established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti. MINUSTAH, in its French acronym, in 2004, comprised of over
8,000 soldiers and policemen to keep order in Haiti. Additionally, theearthquake destroyed the main prison, enabling the escape of more than
4,000. Doctors without Borders treated 264 people in Port-au-Prince inthe five months following the earthquake for gunshot wounds andanother 2,147 patients for violence-related trauma.
The response to the earthquake was the largest humanitarian response
ever in Haiti. In addition to the UN, 140 countries sent personnel,
including 26 countries which sent military contingents, and 17 othercountries sent some military personnel as augmentees and liaison
officers. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and over
2,000 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also sent personnel. The
Haitian Minister of Tourism, the UN Principal Deputy, the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General, and the Deputy Head of
MINUSTAH, chaired the coordination support committee which
managed the overall response at the operational level. Members of thecommittee were UN agencies, multinational officers commanding
deployed forces, the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), and donors (e.g., World Bank, CanadianInternational Development).
The US agreed to take responsibility for the ports, airports, and roads
for distribution of humanitarian assistance, and the UN (supported bymultinational forces and Haitian authorities) was given the responsibility
for law and order. US forces and MINUSTAH jointly provided security atfood distribution points.

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JP 3-16Other Multinational Operations
The UN and the ICRC, as well as other NGOs, utilized the cluster
coordination mechanism and organized the response in 11 thematic
areas. The UN established a joint operations and tasking center at thetactical level which prioritized requests for all the military forces.
President Barack Obama designated USAID as the lead federal agency,with the Department of Defense and 10 other departments and agencies
supporting it. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), thesupported combatant commander, established Joint Task Force (JTF)Haiti, which dwarfed USAID. USAID sent hundreds of people, while JTFHaiti was in charge of over 22,000 servicemen. One USAID worker asked“How do we lead with such a small agency? We are smaller than a militaryband.”
JTF-Haiti exchanged liaison officers with MINUSTAH and received liaison
officers from Canada, France, and South Korea. The JTF commander
appointed a Canadian exchange officer assigned to the US Army’s XVIII
Airborne Corps to lead the JTF’s Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
Cell, which was the focal point between US efforts and the cluster groups.
The 2,000 person Canadian contingent JTF-Haiti collaborated with manyother agencies, organizations, and nations. The relationship between thevarious militaries and the NGOs worked very well because it was basedon commitment to the objectives, transparency between the participants,
and open communication and coordination. USSOUTHCOM establishedthe All Partners Access Network (APAN), an unclassified, nonmilitarycomputer network for use by all US Government agencies, internationalorganizations, the UN, and NGOs. Through APAN, which JTF-Haiti treatedas a core rather than adjunct tool to operationalize the “born unclassified”
principle, US Government organizations posted imagery (satellite,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and over 4,000 photographs from helicopter
overflights) to better assist in identifying needs and also received imagery
requests. Additionally, a UN civil-military coordination officer temporarily
relocated to USSOUTHCOM headquarters where the higher-level militarycivilian coordination was conducted. The United States Naval Ship
Comfort allowed NGO medical staff on board and use of their facilities.
The UN relied heavily on joint task force’s planning capabilities, and JTFHaiti provided much logistic support, especially transportation, to theNGOs for distribution of supplies. With roads blocked by debris, themilitary transported NGOs and other military contingents and their
supplies to isolated regions by aircraft and amphibious landing craft.
Various Sources

6. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
a. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are chemical, biological, radiological, andnuclear (CBRN) weapons or devices capable of a high order of destruction and/or causingmass casualties.

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Chapter V
b. Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) planning includes thedevelopment of global and regional multinational campaign plans to shape the environment
to prevent the US and multinational partners from being attacked or coerced with WMD.
The existence of CBRN materials, significant quantities of toxic industrial material, or thepresence of pandemic influenza or infectious disease and the potential for use precipitates
the need to plan, prepare for, and counter their use.
c. CWMD is a continuous campaign that requires a coordinated multinational andwhole-of-government effort to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession,
proliferation, use, and effects of WMD-related expertise, materials, and technologies.
See JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, for CWMD planningconsiderations; JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Environments, for CBRN planning considerations; and, for NATO-specific doctrine, see
AJP-3.8, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Defence.
7. Counterdrug Operations
a. Counterdrug (CD) operations are inherently interagency and/or multinational innature. DOD supports the USG lead agencies for both domestic and international CD
operations, so military planning requires coordination and collaboration with relevant
agencies and multinational partners. This helps ensure the effective integration of
supporting military forces and equipment. Military planners must understand some of theagencies and multinational organizations that lead or might become involved in CD
operations will have different goals, capabilities, limitations (such as policy and resource
constraints), standards, and operational philosophies.
b. Coordination and collaboration can be accomplished by integrating the efforts ofmilitary, civilian agency, and multinational planners early in the planning process. Militarycommanders who support CD operations must ensure interagency and multinational
planners clearly understand military capabilities, requirements, operational limitations,liaison, and legal considerations and military planners understand the nature of therelationship and the types of support they can provide. Robust liaison facilitates
understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.
See JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations, for more information. Also, refer to JP 3-08,
Interorganizational Cooperation, for interagency and multinational considerations.
8. Countering Threat Networks
Countering threat networks through network engagement involves developing andpartnering with friendly networks, which frequently, if not practically always, involve
allied, coalition, or HN military forces. Under network engagement, the MNF would be a
key element of the friendly network. The MNFC needs to understand the MNFs’ role in
the friendly network and how to best enable other friendly partners to reach mission
objectives, as well how to leverage PN authorities and capabilities. As with friendly
partners in general, individual members of the MNF may have differing authorities andV-8

JP 3-16Other Multinational Operations
capabilities that can affect how and in what ways they can partner with friendly, engage
neutral, and counter threat networks.
For more information on network engagement and countering threat networks, refer to JP
3-25, Countering Threat Networks.
9. Personnel Recovery
a. Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to
prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. IAW DODD
3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense, PR is applicable to all DOD
personnel, including the military, DOD civilians, and CAAF. PR may occur through three
options (diplomatic, civil, or military) or through any combination of these options. In
multinational operations, PR may be a secondary task during NEOs and salvage operations.
In addition, planning for peacetime search and rescue (SAR) operations must be
considered.
b. The MNFC must make a careful assessment of each MNF nation’s PR capability,
restrictions, and procedures. Normally, each nation and/or component is responsible for
conducting its own PR missions. However, participants may possess a variety of PR
methods ranging from civil SAR to dedicated combat SAR. Therefore, the MNFC may
designate an individual or establish an organization and procedures to coordinate thismission among all participants.
c. Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC). The MNFC should create a
PRCC to act as the MNF focal point for all personnel and equipment ready to perform PR
within the AO. The actual name of the PRCC will be based on the arrangement of theparticipating nations and could be joint or multinational. PRCCs coordinate with allcomponent PR activities, including coordination with the joint personnel recovery center(JPRC), if one has been established, and other component PRCCs. The MNFC should be
prepared to establish a JPRC if directed or if designated as the joint force supported
commander for PR. Further, the PRCC should be prepared to implement a PR plan andconduct PR for assigned forces. Functions of the PRCC include:(1) Coordinate PR operations, both within the MNF and with externalorganizations.
(2) Advise the MNFC or designated component commander on PR incidents andrequests.
(3) Coordinate requests for augmentation to support recovery operations as
required.
d. PR operations may extend across national lines of responsibility. Operational
flexibility, interoperability, and multisystem redundancy are the primary factors insuccessful PR operations. Commanders should know the PR capabilities available tomaximize unified action, achieve economy of force, and enhance SA to enable those mostV-9

Chapter V
capable of executing the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, andreintegrate.
See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, and DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the
Department of Defense, for additional information on PR. For NATO-specific doctrine,
see AJP-3.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment.

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JP 3-16

CHAPTER VI
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
1. Assessmenta. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of
employing joint/multinational force capabilities during military operations. There are a wide
range of assessment tools and methods to gauge the ability of the military instrument of
national power to prepare for and respond to national security challenges across the levels of
warfare and in all joint/multinational functions. It involves monitoring and evaluating thecurrent situation and progress toward mission completion. Assessments can help determine
whether a particular activity contributes to progress with respect to a set of standards or desired
objective or end state. Assessments also help identify the current status of dynamic systems(e.g., weather, the economy, the political and security climate) and can help anticipate thefuture status.
Refer to CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, for more information on Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) assessments. Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more
information on staff estimates, integration of assessment during planning, and conducting
operation assessment during execution.
b. Theater strategic and operational-level assessments provide a methodology for
JFC/MNFCs and Services to adjust planning and execution to be more effective, match the
dynamic OE, and better identify their risks and opportunities. At the strategic level, the CJCS
conducts deliberate and continuous assessments, such as the Annual Joint Assessment andthe CJCS’s Readiness System, respectively. Operation assessment refers specifically to theprocess the JFC/MNFCs and staff use during planning and execution to measure progress
toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions or effects, and achieving objectives.
Assessment begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what tomeasure and how to measure it. There is no uniform method by which joint/multinational
forces assign management responsibilities for the assessment. Assessment is an entire staff
effort, requiring expertise and inputs across the staff. Formalizing assessment roles andresponsibilities in each command is essential to an effective and efficient process.
c. To the maximum extent permitted by information-sharing policy constraints, it isimperative in multinational operations that the design, effort, and product of operationassessment be shared by all contributing nations.
Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on operation assessment (e.g., integrationof assessment design during the planning effort, roles and responsibilities, tenets of an effective
assessment, the assessment process, and development and use of assessment indicators). Refer
to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for more information on combat assessment.
2. Intelligencea. In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to issue intelligencecollection requirements to share intelligence with and coordinate receiving intelligence

VI-1

Chapter VI
from foreign military forces whenever possible within security guidelines. In somecircumstances, the JFC will need to seek authority to go outside the usual political-militarychannels to provide information to NGOs. Unique intelligence policy and dissemination
criteria may have to be tailored to each multinational operation.
b. A multinational intelligence center is necessary for merging and prioritizing theintelligence requirements from each participating nation and for acquiring and fusing all
the nations’ intelligence contributions. Likewise, the center should coordinate theintelligence collection planning and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
operations of each nation. Designating a single director of intelligence for themultinational command may assist in resolving potential disagreements among themultinational members.
c. Every interrelated intelligence operation of the intelligence process—planning anddirection, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, disseminationand integration, and evaluation and feedback—is substantively affected in multinational
operations. In some international operations or campaigns, JFCs will be able to use ISAs(e.g., NATO STANAG) as a basis for establishing rules and policies for conducting joint
intelligence operations. Since each multinational operation will be unique, suchagreements may have to be modified or amended based on the situation. The following
general principles provide a starting point for creating the necessary policy and procedures(see Figure VI-1).
(1) Maintain Unity of Effort. Each nation’s intelligence personnel need to viewthe threat from multinational, as well as national, perspectives. A threat to one element of
an MNF must be considered a threat to all MNF elements.
(2) Make Adjustments. There will be differences in intelligence doctrine andprocedures among the coalition partners. A key to effective multinational intelligence isthe willingness to make the adjustments required to resolve significant differences such as:(a) How intelligence is provided to the commander, the commander’s staff,
and forces.
(b) Procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies.

Multinational Intelligence Principles


Maintain unity of effort.



Make adjustments.

Plan early and plan concurrently.



Share all necessary information.

Conduct complementary operations.
Figure VI-1. Multinational Intelligence Principles

VI-2

JP 3-16Other Considerations(c) The degree of security afforded by different communications systems andprocedures.
(d) Administrative requirements.
(3) Plan Early and Plan Concurrently. National command channels determine
what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning
process. NATO and the Republic of Korea, via the Combined Forces Command, havedeveloped and exercised intelligence policies and procedures with the US that provide
examples of how multinational planning can be done in advance.
(4) Share All Necessary Information(a) MNF members should share all relevant and pertinent information andintelligence about the situation and threat without violating national disclosure policy(NDP). They should also write and/or classify material for release to as many of ourmultinational partners as possible. However, avoid sharing information about intelligencesources and methods with multinational members unless approved by the appropriate
authority.
(b) FP is a mission inherent to any commander, and intelligence support tothat mission is critical. Every effort must be made to share any data that could impact thecommander’s FP mission.
(c) The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) should establish
procedures for separating intelligence from sources and methods. To the greatest extent
possible, this information should be disseminated using a tear line to keep information
above the tear line (compartmented data) and disseminate the intelligence below tofacilitate intelligence sharing. Such considerations warrant increased emphasis for forces
operating at the tactical level, where timely information is especially critical to mission
success, as well as prevention of friendly fire and undesired collateral damage. Whenfeasible, intelligence production organizations operating in a multinational environment
should use the principle of “write for release” to facilitate timely dissemination of
information to interagency, international, nongovernmental, or multinational partners.
(d) The joint force J-2 should obtain the necessary authorizations from theforeign disclosure officers (FDOs) and designated intelligence disclosure officials from the
CCMD J-2 or FDO as soon as possible.
(5) Conduct Complementary Operations(a) Intelligence efforts of the nations should be complementary. HN security
services’ capabilities, for example, may contribute significantly to FP. Regional partners
will likely have unique cultural adeptness that make them more effective in disciplines,
such as human intelligence, open-source intelligence, and counterintelligence, and somemilitary partners may have more open intelligence exchanges with their respective lawenforcement counterparts. Furthermore, planning with friendly nations to fill shortfalls,
especially linguist requirements, may help overcome such limitations.
VI-3

Chapter VI(b) All intelligence resources and capabilities should be made available forapplication to the whole of the intelligence problem. Establishing a multinational
collection management element is essential for planning and coordinating multinational
collection operations.
See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for further details.
d. Geospatial Intelligence Geodetic Datums. Multinational operations requireinteroperable geodetic data, applications, and data exchange capabilities. Wheneverpossible, participants should agree to work on standard vertical and horizontal datums thatallow products to have common datum reference points. A multinational geodetic
reference plan should be developed and used to coordinate all products for use by member
forces, including access approval procedures and blending assets into a cohesive
production program.
See JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations, for further details.
e. Biometrics. Biometrics—the process of recognizing an individual based on
measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics—is an enabling
technology used across multiple joint functions; applicable in movement and maneuver,
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
COALITION INTELLIGENCE CENTER“We were established in 2001 at the beginning of Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM. Under J-2 [intelligence directorate of a joint staff], we were
established for the purpose of facilitating and sharing of intelligence. In
the beginning, there was some operational tactical intelligence that weshared with our coalition members and that information was limited tojust Afghanistan. But as the mission expanded into Iraq, we also had toexpand our purpose of sharing and discussing information while
establishing analytical teams to address specific questions from both
the Coalition and the US. Our Center is the forum where most of those
discussions take place.
The Coalition countries are all invited to have membership in theIntelligence Center. We put in perspective the nation’s involvement with
operations. Not every country has an intelligence interest and not every
country has an intelligence officer assigned to United States Central
Command (USCENTCOM). Those that do have an intelligence officer
assigned at USCENTCOM will participate with us on a daily basis. Thosethat do not have an intelligence officer, but do have intelligenceinterests, usually go through their country’s senior national
representative or through the operations officer to consult with us anddiscuss with us issues of common interest.”
Colonel Evilio Otero, Jr.
Chief, Coalition Intelligence Center
US Central Command Coalition Village

VI-4

JP 3-16Other Considerations
sustainment, and protection; and applicable to other joint functions such as crosscutting
many intelligence-related mission sets and functions. MNFs are employing biometrics inoperations with increasing frequency and improving results to identify known threats,
disrupt adversary freedom of movement within the populace, link people to events, andverify local and third-country nationals accessing MNF bases and facilities. PN and HNlaws and social sensitivities must be considered in establishment of coalition biometricobjectives and standards; staff legal and religious advisement can be especially useful inthis particular area.
f. Other Considerations. It is important to consider the ramifications of labelinginformation about an OA as intelligence, especially when interacting with nonmilitaryorganizations. Therefore, unclassified facts and/or data should be referred to as
information to facilitate its dissemination among members of the MNF for the purpose of
fostering mutual interests in resolving or deterring conflict or providing support.
3. Information Sharing
a. NDP. The release of classified information to multinational partners is governed
by NDP. Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior US commander by the chain ofcommand IAW National Security Decision Memorandum 119, Disclosure of Classified
United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International
Organizations, and NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure ofClassified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.
Detailed, written guidance may be supplemented with limited delegation of disclosure
authority where appropriate (e.g., combined/joint FP purposes). However, the senior US
officer needs to become personally concerned with the issues of intelligence sharing andreleasing of information early in the process and clearly state the commander’srequirements. Commanders should promote information sharing and inclusion of liaison
officers (LNOs) in secured systems as much as possible. Commanders should establish“Coalition forces continue to play a vital role in current, and likely all future
operations in the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility(AOR). The information sharing challenge is extremely complicated withmultiple coalitions, international organizations, and alliances participating indifferent operations. Many nations participate in multiple communities. These
include the 66-nation Global Counterterrorism Forces, the 51-nation
Multinational Coalition Forces-Iraq, the 11-nation Combined Naval Forces
Central Command, the 33-nation International Security Assistance Forces for
Afghanistan, the 26-member nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as wellas the traditional 6 Gulf Cooperation Council member states and our 25
regional AOR countries. USCENTCOM needs to be able to electronicallyshare information with these various communities of interests quickly andefficiently to successfully conduct coalition operations.”
Jill L. Boardman/Donald W. Shuey
Combined Enterprise Network Theater Information System;
Supporting Coalition Warfare World-WideApril 2004

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Chapter VI
and promulgate clear NDP-compliant guidance to subordinate elements that not only
permit but promote, as appropriate, flexibility to share information where and when it isneeded. A commander-led culture focused toward sharing as appropriate will go a long
way toward developing mutual trust and operational effectiveness.
b. The NDP is implemented within DOD by DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified
Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, and CJCSI
5221.01, Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Combatant Commands to DiscloseClassified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, contains a detailed discussion of sanitization and foreign
disclosure procedures.
c. Military information and intelligence should be derived and crafted to maximize
recipient eligibility. Such principles as accessibility, timely electronic dissemination, andscalable classification levels (e.g., tear lines) are just a few of the multiple techniques toenhance sharing. Intelligence and information should be written for release at the lowest
possible classification level and given the fewest possible dissemination restrictions within
foreign disclosure guidelines. This is important to maintain the integrity of a common
holistic understanding of the OE. Other nations are also likely to have access to their own
national intelligence and should be encouraged to share across MNFs.
d. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US
military operations should be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation, coupledwith the potential for rapid change, requires operations security (OPSEC) be an integral
part of any operation. OPSEC planners must consider the effect of media coverage and thepossibility that coverage may compromise essential security or disclose criticalinformation.
See DODD 5205.02, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program, for more information.
e. The success of joint and multinational operations and interagency coordination
hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. Information sharing,cooperation, collaboration, and coordination are enabled by an intelligence and information
sharing environment that fully integrates joint, multinational, and interagency partners in acollaborative enterprise. The JFC participating in the coalition or alliance tailors the policy
and procedures for that particular operation based on national and theater guidance. A JFC
participating in a coalition or alliance should tailor the policy and procedures for thatparticular operation based on theater guidance and national policy as contained in NDP-1,
National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to
Foreign Governments and International Organizations. NDP-1 provides policy andprocedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definition of terms,
release arrangements, and other guidance.
f. Information sharing, including intelligence information, plays a critical role in the
success of any multinational endeavor. Analysis of recent operational lessons learnedemphasizes that multinational operations are much more effective, efficient, and safe whenVI-6

JP 3-16Other Considerations
information is shared by all the forces involved. The ability to exchange tacticalinformation is especially critical for forces during execution. Information must flow
quickly from sensors to fusion processes to analysts and decision makers and ultimately tothose who execute actions. Some specific insights and recommendations from these
operational lessons learned include:(1) Develop categories/groups in which information can be released or disclosed.
Release is the physical transfer to another nation. With disclosure, the owning ororiginating nation maintains control, but the information may be visually or orally
displayed to another nation.
(2) Address information disclosure restrictions before major planning efforts andespecially before execution.
(3) Identify, delegate, and announce release authority early and to all concerned.
(4) Identify and pre-stage classified documents (e.g., Adaptive Planning andExecution System plans and orders) to be made releasable and distributed to multinational
partners at the right time.
g. Communications and Processing Architectures. Due to the perishable nature of
pertinent, releasable intelligence, it is imperative that a system be devised for and by the MNF
members that is capable of transmitting the most important intelligence rapidly to units.
Frequently, this system relies on the distribution of standardized equipment by one country’s
forces to ensure commonality. The system must also be firmly rooted in a network of coalition
LNOs at major intelligence production or communication centers, to provide redundant
intelligence communications channels to their parent nation and to determine and obtain
intelligence uniquely suited for that nation’s mission in time to exploit it.
(1) Several nations maintain and utilize separate classified Internet andcommunications systems. For US forces, the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network(SIPRNET) is the primary classified architecture solely for US-specific communicationand tasks not suitable for execution in a multination information-sharing environment. The
same can be expected of US partners and allies utilizing their respective national classified
systems for internal use.
(2) Unclassified networks are an operational imperative. In addition to classified
networks, an unclassified network using the Internet (commercially encrypted if available)
is a communications backbone for multinational operations. To enable timely and efficient
information sharing with nonmilitary organizations, the MNF should provide theseorganizations with access to current information on unclassified networks. MNFs should
be aware that many NGOs/international organizations are hesitant to use DOD-sponsored
information exchange Websites to avoid the appearance of close association with USG
entities. In such situations, MNFs should first coordinate regarding these concerns andthen be prepared to “push” information to specified organizational Websites.
(3) MNF networks such as the BICES [battlefield information collection andexploitation system], if established, are able to provide responsive information sharing
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Chapter VI
between the MNFs, but care must be taken to avoid the inadvertent sharing of classified
information that has not been sanitized for release to other nations. Detailed planning for
information sharing should be accomplished well in advance of operations with MNFs.
This may be very complicated based on the multiple classification levels allowed and by
the nature of PNs involved in the operation. Some PN countries have establishedintelligence-sharing agreements with the US STONEGHOST network. It is an encrypted
communications network designed to support collaboration and intelligence sharing
between the US defense intelligence community and its Commonwealth allies during
combat operations. Other MNFs have long-standing relationships with US Services andintelligence agencies, but release of US-produced intelligence is subject to review by the
FDO. The United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (USBICES) and United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System
Extended (US BICES-X) are capabilities that provide the US intelligence community amechanism for sharing intelligence with PNs who have the appropriate agreements with
the US. By mutual agreement, US BICES also allows nations to use the system for bilateral or multilateral intelligence sharing by implementing additional security measures.
US BICES-X services in support of United States Indo-Pacific Command(USINDOPACOM) are known as the Asia-Pacific Intelligence Information Network.
Within United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) area of responsibility, thesystem is referred to as the USCENTCOM Partner Network. US BICES-X is implemented
with PNs or a grouping of nations in alignment with CCMD requirements and theappropriate policy, security, and technical agreements with the PN(s). The use of crossnetwork information security solutions should be used whenever possible to avoid the
inadvertent sharing of information with networks external to those accessible by thecollective membership of a specific MNF. Often, LNOs can bridge the culture gap between
what multinational commanders/staffs say and what they mean.
(4) The MNF networks will provide responsive information sharing between the
MNF at both the unclassified level and the classified level. Mission partner information
sharing provides an operational framework for planning, preparation, and execution ofoperations with mission partners supported by effective information sharing and dataexchange. The mission partner information sharing framework integrates varied partner
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, andfacilities and policy approaches to enable mission partners to rapidly establish an
information sharing and data exchange network at an agreed security classification level
and in a common language.
For more information on mission partner information sharing, see DODI 8110.01, Mission
Partner Environment (MPE) Information Sharing Capability Implementation for the DOD.
h. Coordination. Within alliances, it is common for intelligence procedures,practices, and standardized agreements to be established and tested prior to actual use.
Coalitions, however, are frequently created and disbanded relatively quickly. Coalition
participants typically compensate for the lack of standardization through coordination
between national leadership and prospective forces. As mentioned above, coordinating theelements of communications architectures is essential. Additional areas requiringextensive coordination include the friendly use of the EMS, use of space and/or spaceVI-8

JP 3-16Other Considerations
assets, geographical location of intelligence collection assets, and targets of intelligencecollection. Intelligence processing centers should be multinational in character, serving
the MNFC but also recognizing intelligence that has value in support of national missions.
However, establishment of these multinational processing centers, particularly in the caseof ad hoc coalitions, will require extensive personal involvement and support from the
MNFC and the corresponding nation to make this a functioning reality. The MNFC priority
intelligence requirements should serve as the milestones to fully focus the intelligence
effort. The answers can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels.
i. Additional national and DOD-level references on information sharing useful toenhancing the information environment in support of joint and/or multinational operations
include the National Strategy for Information Sharing, United States Intelligence
Community Information Sharing Strategy, DOD Information Sharing Strategy, and DOD
Information Sharing Implementation Plan. Additionally, the Defense Information Systems
Agency has a Multinational Information Sharing Program Office with a mission to manage
current multinational information sharing efforts, provide the standard multinational
information sharing services and applications for future DOD information networks, andfacilitate information sharing among DOD components and eligible foreign nations in
support of planning and execution of military operations.
4. Communications
a. Communications are fundamental to successful multinational operations. Planningconsiderations include frequency management; equipment compatibility; proceduralcompatibility; cryptographic and information security; identification, friend or foe; anddata-link protocols. MNFCs should anticipate that some forces from MNF will have direct
and near-immediate communications capability from the OA to their respective national
leadership. This capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a sourceof frustration, as leaders external to the OA may be issuing guidance directly to theirdeployed national forces. Many communications issues can be resolved throughequipment exchange and liaison teams.
When exchanging equipment, special
consideration must be paid to the release of communications security (COMSEC) devices,
as well as the level and nature of classified information (material) released to individual
countries per NDP and any applicable exceptions. The ability of the MNF to exchange
information at all levels (i.e., strategic, operational, and tactical) should be a consideration
during planning and throughout execution. As difficult as communications are among all
partners in the force during the operation, the problem is compounded whencommunications are degraded or denied and limited compatible resources are stretchedeven further.
b. Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition,
geography, and location of the MNF. It is critical that operations and communications
planners begin the coordination process early to ensure both US and MNF communication
requirements are identified and sourced prior to operations. Interoperability is often
constrained by the least technologically capable participant. Effective communications
support enables control over diverse, widely dispersed air, maritime, land, and spaceelements. Access to both military and commercial satellites should be an early planning
VI-9Chapter VI
requirement to support widely dispersed elements. The MNFC should address the need for
integrated communications among all participating forces early in the planning phase of
the operation. MNF planning and technical communications systems control centersshould be established as soon as possible to coordinate all communications.
For more information regarding frequency management, refer to JP 6-01, Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.
c. In all multinational operations, a broadband, unclassified network will be a criticalrequirement for multinational coordination within the MNF OA. The international
humanitarian community and affected nations’ governments and militaries will normallyuse unclassified, commercially encrypted networks (such as the All Partners AccessNetwork [APAN]) as their primary collaboration and coordination tool. US forces shouldbe able to integrate with MNFs to support collaboration needed to conduct multinational
operations. US forces should expect to use SIPRNET solely for US-specificcommunication and tasks not suitable for execution in a multination information-sharing
environment. US forces in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility should expect to use
SIPRNET Release to United States of America, Five Eyes (or REL TO USA, FVEY) when
execution involves the Five Eyes nations. Satellite access to broadband Internet capability
should be planned as an operational necessity, if not currently available within the MNF
OA.
d. LNO teams should be sent to other MNF HQ to facilitate integration of operations.
These LNO teams should deploy with sufficient communications equipment to conduct
operations with their respective HQ. Consideration should also be given to possible
degradation of communications due to the extended distances over which the MNF may
operate and the impact of enemy exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. Urban
operations present other difficulties due to interference from physical structures orfrequency overlaps. Planning for communications support also includes provisions thatenable execution of required communications under adverse conditions. Additionally, US
law requires prior international and implementing agreements defining quid pro quo
payments for allied use of the Defense Information Systems Network and military satellite
communications assets.
e. Secure C2 systems are vital to the execution of MNF operations to avoid conflictand increase mutual understanding. The objective of secure C2 interoperability within an
MNF is to develop greater cooperation through improved technical capability, systeminterdependence, and SA in the OA.
f. Communications Security Release to Foreign Nations Policy. Disclosing,releasing, and transferring products or associated COMSEC information to foreign
governments is governed by DODI 8523.01, Communications Security (COMSEC).
Detailed guidance outlining criteria for release of information security products, services,
and information to foreign governments is provided in CJCSI 6510.06, Communication
Security Releases to Foreign Nations.

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JP 3-16Other Considerations
g. Under CJCSI 6510.06, Communication Security Releases to Foreign Nations, the
CJCS validates CCMD interoperability requirements to release COMSEC products or
associated COMSEC information to any foreign government. These secure C2
interoperability requirements originate from the theater Service components.
h. Release of COMSEC to foreign governments is permitted when there is a validated
interoperability requirement. Specifically, the GCC and the MNFC should have or develop
agreements on cryptographic, communications, and/or automated data processing security
issues among all multinational components and understand where capability gaps exist,
along with the implication of those gaps.
5. Joint Firesa. Integrating and synchronizing planning, execution, and assessment is pivotal to thesuccess of effective joint fires. Understanding the objectives, intentions, capabilities, andlimitations of all joint, interagency, and multinational partners in the OE may enable themeans to accomplish tasks and create effects.
b. Effective fire support coordination in multinational operations may require additional
efforts due to differing national priorities and the risk of friendly fire, civilian casualties, andcollateral damage. To maximize the fires of the MNF and to minimize the possibility offriendly fire, the MNFC should ensure fire support coordination throughout the MNF isdeveloped. These special arrangements may include communications and language
requirements, liaison personnel, and interoperability procedures. Standard operatingprocedures should be established for fire support to synchronize forces and optimize mission
partner capabilities.
See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for more details. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.9,
Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting.
6. Host-Nation Support
a. HNS will often be critical to the success of a multinational operation. In general,
centralized coordination of HNS planning and execution will help ensure HNS resources areallocated most effectively to support the MNF’s priorities. The more limited HNS resources
are in the OA, the greater the requirement for centralized management.
b. NATO doctrine recognizes the importance of centralized HNS coordination andgives NATO commanders the authority to:(1) Prioritize HNS requirements.
(2) Negotiate HNS agreements, on behalf of nations, with an HN.
(3) Coordinate HNS allocation with troop contributing nations and an HN.
c. In US-led multinational operations, nations typically negotiate their own HNSagreements. Nevertheless, participating nations should coordinate their HNS arrangements
VI-11

Chapter VI
with the MNFC, who in turn should coordinate HNS allocation with the HN. The MNFC
should involve participating nations in the negotiation of either commonly worded separate
bilateral agreements for target audiences or a single agreement applicable to the entire
MNTF.
d. Host-Nation Support Coordination Cell (HNSCC). To assist the MNFC in HNS
coordination activities, an HNSCC may be established. One of the most important functionsof the HNSCC is to assist the MNFC and legal counsel in developing technical arrangements(TAs) that involve sustainment matters such as infrastructure, financial management,purchasing and OCS, engineering, environment, hazardous material storage, landing and port
fees, medical operations and support, border customs, tariffs, and real estate.
(1) Staffing. The HNSCC should be staffed with specialists familiar with
developing and executing HNS agreements. In addition, consideration should be given to
including representatives of the HN within the HNSCC to:(a) Facilitate coordination and identification of resources for potential use by
the MNTF.
(b) Provide interpretation and translation services to the HNSCC staff.
(2) Information Requirements. To effectively plan and coordinate HNS
allocation, the HNSCC needs up-to-date information on HNS logistic capabilities andongoing HNS allocation to MNTF contingents throughout the operation. To ensure it
receives such information, the HNSCC must maintain close contact with the HN and with
MNTF contingents.
(3) Coordinating Activities.
In conducting its operations, the HNSCC
coordinates closely with appropriate CMOC organizations, the MJLC (if established), andthe HN’s representatives.
e. HNS is generally furnished IAW an agreement negotiated prior to the start of an
operation. HNS agreements are commonly established through diplomatic channels inbilateral and multilateral agreements with the HN. These are normally umbrella-type
agreements that are augmented to support contingencies by TAs detailing the specific support
to be provided and the type/amount of reimbursement.
f. During crises, it may be necessary for the GCC to request authority to negotiatebilateral HNS agreements for the purpose of providing logistic assistance to other nations.
Such negotiations are conducted in coordination with the Joint Staff, the Office of theSecretary of Defense, and DOS and in compliance with applicable US law and policy.
Alternatively, the MNFC may be authorized to negotiate HNS agreements on behalf of force
contributing nations, with their prior concurrence. This approach, which NATO doctrine
endorses, simplifies and streamlines the process and reduces the amount of time required toput such agreements into place.
g. Available HNS Infrastructure. Analysis of the physical infrastructure in the HN
is critical to understanding force sustainability. MNTF logistic planners should evaluate
VI-12

JP 3-16Other Considerations
what facilities and services (such as government, law enforcement, sanitation, power, fuel,and medical support) exist as viable support for local consumption and support of coalition
forces.
(1) First, assess the ability of the HN to receive MNTF personnel and equipment(e.g., ports and airfields).
(2) Second, determine the HN’s transportation capabilities and systems to moveforces once they arrive in theater.
(3) Third, evaluate availability of HN logistic support capabilities.
(4) The impact of obtaining HNS on the HN’s national economy must also be
considered, along with possible environmental impacts upon HNs. These must berecognized and addressed during the planning process.
(5) In addition, specific TAs in many areas (e.g., environmental cleanup, levyingof customs duties and taxes, hazardous material and/or waste storage, transit, and disposal)
may need to be developed to augment SOFAs that may have been concluded with HNs.
For more information on NATO HNS procedures, see AJP-4.5, Allied Joint Host Nation
Support Doctrine and Procedures.
7. Civil Affairs Operations
CA provide the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the OE.
The commander uses CA core competencies to analyze, evaluate, and influence the local
populace. As part of the commander’s CMO, CA conduct civil affairs operations (CAO)
that are nested within the overall mission and intent. CAO contribute significantly toensuring the legitimacy and credibility of the mission. The key to understanding the rolesof CAO and CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship between thecommand and every individual, group, and organization in the OE to create a desired effectand achieve the overall objectives. CA units can provide support to non-US units in
multinational operations. Planners coordinating CA support must realize the majority of
US CA units are in the Reserve Component and consider the mobilization timelines andrequirements to access these forces to support multinational operations.
a. Incorporating liaison and coordination procedures into CCPs, CONPLANs, andOPLANs (especially in a CMO annex) will facilitate proper education, training, andexercising between military and civilian personnel and assist the commander intransitioning responsibility, when directed, to the appropriate organizations upon mission
completion. One method to facilitate unified action and conduct on-site interagency
coordination for CMO is to establish a CMOC. The CMOC serves as the primary
coordination interface for US forces, humanitarian organizations, internationalorganizations, NGOs, MNFs, and other USG departments or agencies. The CMOC
facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CMO andCAO. The CMOC serves as one of the primary coordination interfaces for US forces with
IPI and mission partners. A CMOC is tailored to the specific tasks associated with the
VI-13

Chapter VI
mission and augmented by assets (e.g., engineer, medical, transportation) available to the
supported commander and mission partners. The CMOC facilitates continuous
coordination among the key participants with regard to CAO and in support of thecommander’s CMO plan to manage civil information, analyze civil considerations, anddevelop civil inputs to the common operational picture. This occurs from tactical levels
to strategic levels within a given OA, depending on the level of the CMOC. With the
exception of the 95th CA Brigade Headquarters and its subordinate battalion
headquarters, Army CA units are still organized to provide the supported commander
the manpower and equipment to form the nucleus of the CMOC. The CMOC function
requires over-the-horizon and nontraditional communications capabilities to mosteffectively conduct interagency collaborative planning and coordination, integratenonmilitary stakeholders to synchronize operations, and coordinate plans andoperations with the civil component of the OE.
b. CIMIC doctrine involves aspects of both CMO and interorganizational
cooperation as described in joint doctrine. Additionally, CIMIC teams are comprisedof a mixture of military and civilian members, much like a provincial reconstruction
team.
See JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, and AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for CivilMilitary Cooperation, for additional information.
8. Health Services
The medical assets committed supporting multinational operations consist of healthservice support and FHP capabilities that span the OE from point of injury/illness tothe appropriate role of care. It also includes health services with HN civil and military
authorities in support of stability activities and building partner capacity, to reestablish
or strengthen the HN infrastructure and governmental legitimacy. Components withinthese capabilities are essential in the execution of multinational operations.
See JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, for further details.
9. Personnel Support
Military operations include peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and otheractions that involve managing complex crises and contingency operations. To
accomplish these missions, the Services must be prepared to operate in a multinational
environment. Personnel support for multinational operations remains a national
responsibility; however, CCDRs and subordinate JFCs operating as part of an MNF
should establish a SOFA, memorandum of agreement (MOA), and/or MOU regarding
personnel support between members of any alliance and/or coalition prior to the onset
of operations that clearly define JFC command authority over MNF personnel,
command relationships, and reporting channels.
For additional guidance on personnel support to joint operations, refer to JP 1-0, Joint
Personnel Support.

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JP 3-16Other Considerations
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) civil-military cooperation(CIMIC) concept allows NATO members to operate independently in thefield while pursuing the common goals of investing in reconstruction of
the most critical areas of education, health, agriculture, small
infrastructure, security, and governance, while limiting or eliminating
duplication of effort and increasing cooperation between organizations.
During a 12-month period:
In the town of Ala Chapan outside Mazar-e Sharif, German International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) CIMIC members working with theGerman charity organization “German Forces helping children of thedeveloping world” completed construction and opened a high school
capable of serving 1,600 Afghan students.
In Logar Province, the Czech provincial reconstruction team (PRT)
continued to assist Afghan National Security Forces by training
members of the Afghan National Police in basic policing skills andknowledge.
At Shamail Daria village, Spanish ISAF doctors held a medical clinic
arranged by the Spanish CIMIC unit in a building constructed by the
Spanish Cooperation for Development Agency.
Greek authorities provided significant funding for the Hungarian PRT
implementing CIMIC civilian development projects in Afghanistan’s
Baghlan Province aimed at training, education, and health with specificfocus on improving the situation of Afghan women and creating job
opportunities.
Various Sources

10. Public Affairs
a. US public affairs (PA) planners should work closely with operational planners fromother countries to ensure appropriate levels of synchronization and consideration of eachnation’s the objectives.
b. Commanders at all levels should proactively plan to both anticipate, and to the
maximum extent possible given OPSEC constraints, support media coverage formultinational operations. Such support will typically be IAW the PA guidance establishedin the OPLAN and potentially amended by DOD and CCMD direction based on emergent
conditions, as well as consideration of multinational sensitivities. Accurate media
coverage of US operations is generally a key component of the commander’s overall plan
to influence the behavior of relevant actors to achieve operational objectives and is a DOD
obligation under the DOD’s principles of information. PA advises the MNFC on theimplications of command decisions, actions, and operations on stakeholder and key public
perceptions.

VI-15

Chapter VI(1) The speed and methods with which individuals and organizations can collect andbroadly disseminate information means that information about multinational activities and/or
operations quickly reach a global audience, creating an often difficult-to-counter first
impression about those activities/operations. Internet sites, social media and networks, text
messages, and cellular/satellite telephones are some of the means through which threat targets
and relevant actors can communicate with audiences globally in the information environment,
creating effects in the overall operational and security environments. This instantaneoustransmission of unfiltered, often incomplete, inaccurate, or intentionally biased information
makes the protection and leveraging of information a key consideration in all operational
planning, particularly with respect to PA operation.
(2) PA plans should leverage all aspects of public communication to achieve MNF
operational objectives. IAW the DOD principles of information, these plans should provide
for maximum disclosure of information, with minimum delay, consistent with OPSEC andhelp ensure an atmosphere of trust between the MNF and legitimate reporters that encourages
accurate coverage of operations. Additionally, PA should have a basic understanding ofseveral specific subjects, such as weapons and capabilities that can create nonlethal effects and
CBRN effects, to answer questions appropriately and minimize reactions.
(3) In most multinational operations, one or more centers will be established tosupport the media. Although the title may vary by operation depending on the command
structure, these centers are established to serve as the focal point for the interface between the
military and the media during operations.
(4) Responsibilities for establishing media ground rules and credentialing media aredeveloped and implemented through appropriate multinational command and staff channels.
Media outlets owned entirely or in part by governments or citizens of rival states might notreceive the same considerations as those working for outlets owned by governments or citizensof friendly nations. Additionally, noncredentialed journalists may not be given the same accessto a combat zone as those who have credentials. They should be encouraged to register at theappropriate information center.
(5) Credentialing is not intended to be a control measure or means to restrict certain
media outlets from access. It is primarily a method of validating individuals as journalists andproviding them with information that enhances their ability to report on activities within the
OA. Additionally, media must be credentialed to ensure they have official status under the
Geneva Conventions in the event of capture. Others covering military operations without such
credentials should be encouraged to register at the appropriate facility.
For US-specific doctrine, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional details. For NATOspecific doctrine, see NATO Military Public Affairs Policy, available atwww.nato.int/ims/docu/mil-pol-pub-affairs-en.pdf.
11. Multinational Logistics
a. The effective use of military logistics capabilities in conflict, post-conflict, or
humanitarian crisis situations demands cooperation and collaboration with international

VI-16

JP 3-16Other Considerations“Fewer than 30 reporters accompanied the entire invasion force to Normandy,
France, on 6 June 1944. In contrast, more than 500 journalists appeared
within hours to cover combat operations in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in
1989. At the beginning of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, more than
1,600 news media and support personnel were present, and some 1,500
reported on hurricane relief operations in Florida in 1992. Reporters provided
live television and radio coverage of the night amphibious landing that marked
the beginning of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia in 1992 and the endof the United Nations operation during Operation UNITED SHIELD in 1995.
More than 1,700 media representatives covered the initial phases ofpeacekeeping operations in the American sector of Bosnia in 1996.”
Major Barry Venable, US Army, Military Review, January-February 2002

organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. As such, military commanders and theirlogisticians tasked to support these complex support activities should consider the impactof these additional agencies during their mission planning and while in the theater ofoperations fulfilling their missions.
b. Successful multinational logistic operations are governed by several uniqueprinciples. First, multinational logistic operations are a collective responsibility ofparticipating nations and the MNFC, although nations are inherently responsible forsupporting their forces. Nations are highly reluctant to give MNFCs complete authority
for logistics. Nevertheless, a second principle is that MNFCs should be given sufficientauthority over logistic resources to ensure the force is supported in the most efficient andeffective manner. Third, cooperation and coordination are necessary among participating
nations and forces, which should make use of multinational logistic support arrangements
to reduce the logistic footprint in the OA. Finally, synergy results from the use ofmultinational integrated logistic support; to ensure this, the MNFC must have visibility of
the logistic activity during the operation.
c. Multinational operations have diplomatic and political factors. Generally, nations
are reluctant to commit forces early. In some MNFs, formal advance planning is
considered too sensitive for sharing. Thus, US logistics planners must work closely with
PNs to the extent possible in coordinating plans to support national decisions. Obtaining
early knowledge of the organic logistics support capabilities of forces provided byparticipating nations and identifying the means to support their needs will be critical toeffectively supporting the total force. When the US is the LN, logistics planning must
consider unique logistic requirements of military forces from other nations. Some nations
may require the US to provide some logistics support to permit their forces to operate inan expeditionary manner.
d. OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, andconstruction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations.
(1) OCS can be a significant force multiplier, but it is only one of numerous
sources of support to the joint force. The supported GCC and subordinate JFCs should

VI-17

Chapter VI
judiciously consider the proper mix of different sources of support to include organic US
military support and nonorganic support sources, to include multinational military support,
HNS, and contracted support. Each of these sources of support has advantages anddisadvantages that should be carefully weighed by the JFC and subordinate Service
component commanders in order to determine the most appropriate source of support.
(2) The JFC and the US military lead contracting activity must be cognizant ofchallenges and potential pitfalls on planning and executing OCS actions in a multinational
environment. Every effort must be made to arrange common contracting support, or at aminimum, to share vendor information. Planning for and executing common contracted
support in an MNF is complicated by the lack of a commonly accepted contracting policy
and procedures. In any case, US military planners need to advocate for some sort ofcontract support deconfliction, such as through a coordination mechanism similar to thejoint contract support board in major multinational operations where appropriate.
Commanders should consider establishing a requirement review board process to review,
approve, and prioritize major common contracted services.
e. Planning Considerations(1) For any successful operation, it is necessary to understand the essential
concepts of military logistics. The following outlines the critical needs for close CIMIC,
and identifies the areas of potential logistical support, which could be provided by the
military logistics systems across the competition continuum. Some of the major friction
points are identified, as well as those areas that require improvement and/or areas forfurther development to achieve a greater degree of national and multinational logistics
support.
(2) It is essential that the major contributing agencies, both military and civilian,work together to create standing logistical policies and an agreed upon/shared logistical
doctrine that will allow for the development and continued enhancement of theircommunications and collaborative partnership networks as an ongoing, day-to-day
business practice. These pre-existing logistical agreements and relationships areimperative in order to have well-established LOCs and known procedural practices, based
upon a common collaborative doctrine, which brings their agencies and respective
resources and procedures together to meet the challenges, well in advance of a particularcrisis or mission.
(3) Though MNL capabilities can and will vary in scope and magnitude fromnation to nation, the fundamental provision of logistical support will, in general, becomposed of the provision of the following logistics functions that can be deployed/utilized
on both a national or international basis in varying degrees of magnitude:(a) Inland surface, sea, air, and pipeline transportation networks and assets.
(b) Supply, distribution and storage facilities, and services.
(c) Life support services (food, water, and shelter).

VI-18

JP 3-16Other Considerations(d) Engineering assets and services.
(e) Communications assets and services.
(f) Medical assets and services.
(g) Vehicle and aircraft maintenance.
(h) Management of OCS.
(4) Information exchange, not only between multinational military forces but alsowith civilian counterparts, remains a significant impediment to overcome in conducting
interagency and MNL support missions.
(5) Some of the fundamental and key principles which need to be considered in
the planning and implementation of military logistics support are as follows:(a) Noncombat-related/crisis resolution/FHA operations or missions will
likely be civilian-led with logistics support from the military (most likely transportation
assets initially) in high demand.
(b) There will be a requirement for early and high-level involvement by thenational and multinational civilian and military logistics organizations involved in the
mission.
(c) The required collaborative logistical process, which should beestablished and institutionalized in advance of any mission, should include an active
dialogue and information sharing with national and international organizations and withNGOs.
(d) HN logistical needs, capabilities, and concerns should be considered andreflected in the planning and dialogue along with the use of HN power and related
infrastructure.
(e) The security and protection of logistics forces to provide assured
sustainment.
(6) Establishing an NSE(a) An NSE provides logistic support to MNFs, as well as to national forces.
NSEs are located geographically to best support the force and sited to take advantage of
air, rail, and/or sea LOCs. In cases where the MJLC (or equivalent) has real estate
management responsibility, nations desiring to locate NSEs in the MNFC’s OA must
coordinate with both the MJLC and the HN for final site approval. This is critical in thoseareas with limited air and seaports of debarkation in which several nations may becompeting for limited available space or facilities. NSEs from several nations may becollocated to achieve economies and efficiencies. Some nations may find it especiallyadvantageous to form a combined NSE.

VI-19

Chapter VI(b) NSEs are national activities that remain under control of national
authorities—not the MNFC. US NSEs will normally be under direct command of theirrespective Service component commander. In exceptional cases, the US NSE may be alogistically focused JTF under OPCON to the senior JTF commander. Both scenarios are
consistent with the practice of most nations participating in a multinational operation to
designate a national commander in-theater to which the NSE normally reports. In suchcases, the national commander retains national control over all national units and otherelements not transferred under OPCON or TACON of the MNFC.
(c) Regardless of the national command relationship that may exist, US
NSEs are expected to coordinate and cooperate fully with the appropriate MNF logistic C2organization and with the HN. It is incumbent upon the NSEs to provide liaison personnel
to logistic organizations, such as the MJLC, LN, role specialist nation (RSN), multinational
integrated logistic unit, joint logistics support group, or third-party logistic support
services, in order to establish and maintain the appropriate relationships.
f. The joint logistics enterprise (JLEnt) is a multitiered matrix of key global logistics
providers cooperatively structured through an assortment of collaborative agreements,
contracts, policy, legislation, or treaties utilized to provide the best possible support to the
JFC or other supported organization. The JLEnt may also include multinational partners
and international organizations. Participants operate across the strategic, operational, andtactical levels and many are affiliated with either supported or supporting commands andoperate under a variety of command relationships. The JLEnt is interconnected among
global logistics providers, supporting and supported organizations and units, and otherentities. Knowing the roles, responsibilities, relationships, and authorities of JLEnt
partners is essential to planning, executing, controlling, and assessing logistics operations.
JLEnt partners must collaborate to ensure the coordinated employment and sharing of
capabilities and resources. Global logistics providers manage end-to-end processes thatprovide capabilities to the supported CCDR to fulfill requirements.
Additional guidance on the JLEnt can be found in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
Additional guidance on multinational logistics can be found in Appendix D, “Multinational
Logistics;” Appendix E, “Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational
Logistics;” JP 4-0, Joint Logistics; JP 4-09, Distribution Operations; and JP 4-10,
Operational Contract Support. For specific NATO doctrine, see AJP-4, Allied Joint
Logistic Doctrine, and other AJPs in the 4 series. For a detailed discussion on JLEnt
visibility, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
12. Meteorology and Oceanography
The ability of commanders to anticipate and exploit meteorological and oceanographic(METOC) effects on multinational and adversary military capabilities in the OE is acornerstone of successful multinational operations. It is essential to address differences inlanguage, techniques, and data formats of multinational partners as soon as possible toachieve interoperability and best use of METOC capabilities for the MNF. The MNFC
should designate a lead multinational METOC officer to coordinate all METOC activities

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JP 3-16Other Considerations
and interoperability issues in the theater. The lead METOC officer must also ensure theintegration of accurate, timely, and relevant predictive assessments of METOC effects
throughout planning and execution. This enables MNFC's situational understanding, risk
management, and decision making to achieve a decisive advantage over the adversary.
Knowledge of the comparative differences between predictive METOC effects on
multinational and adversary capabilities enables MNFCs to achieve information
superiority, exploit favorable METOC windows of opportunity more rapidly than theadversary, and employ capabilities that enhance probability of mission success.
See JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, for additional details.
13. Environmental
a. Environmental considerations should be integrated in multinational operations. To
the extent practicable and consistent with mission accomplishment, commanders shouldtake environmental factors into account during planning, execution, and conclusion of amultinational operation. Commanders should also clearly identify guidance that may bedifferent from the normal practices of the member nations and obtain agreement fromparticipating nations. Besides agreeing on common objectives for the operation, the
MNF’s national component commanders should reach some understanding on
environmental protection measures during the operation, with particular emphasis at pointsof transition. Failure to accomplish this may result in misunderstandings, decreased
interoperability, and a failure to develop and implement a successful environmental annex
and plan for the operation. Additionally, the failure to consider environmental impacts on
the HN could result in an erosion of acceptance for the MNF within the HN.
b. Environmental considerations include, but are not limited to, the following:(1) Air pollution from ships, vehicles, aircraft, and construction machinery.
(2) Cleanup of contingency locations and other occupied areas to an appropriate
level.
(3) Protection of endangered species and marine mammals in the OA.
(4) Environmental safety and health.
(5) Hazardous material management.
(6) Hazardous waste disposal.
(7) Medical and infectious waste management and disposal.
(8) Natural and cultural resource protection.
(9) Noise abatement, including noise from aircraft operations.

VI-21

Chapter VI(10) Pesticide, insecticide, and herbicide management to control non-point
pollution.
(11) Resource and energy conservation through pollution prevention practices.
(12) Solid waste management and disposal.
(13) Oil and hazardous substance spills prevention and controls.
(14) Water pollution from sewage, food service, and other operations.
For a further discussion of environmental considerations, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer
Operations, and AJP-3.12, Allied Doctrine for Engineer Support to Joint Operations.
14. Transitions
Transitions are critical to multinational operations. In general, transition could be thetransition from one type of operation to another, the transition between the various phasesof an operation, the transition of a specific function or service from one organization toanother (i.e., logistics), or the transition of authority for the effort from one organization toanother (i.e., JTF to MNF or MNF to international organization/HN).
a. Transitioning to Multinational Operations(1) Transitioning from a US Joint Operation to a Multinational Operation.
The US may find it necessary to initiate military action before an international consensus
develops (such as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM). Following the development ofinternational support, a multinational operation, conducted by an alliance or a coalition,
possibly under UN or NATO management, may be authorized.
(2) Transitioning from a UN Operation to a Multinational Operation. In
transitioning from a UN operation to another multinational operation, as in the transition
from the United Nations protection force (UNPROFOR) to NATO’s Implementation Forcein Bosnia, the UN may remain the lead agency for humanitarian assistance within the OA.
In this case, the MNFC should be prepared to consider requests for assistance frominternational organizations and NGOs in accomplishing their humanitarian mission. A UN
representative HQ organization should remain in the area and serve as the coordinating
point of contact for possible assistance requests.
(a) The incoming MNFC should use the intratheater UN infrastructure andorganizations to facilitate early development and establishment of the new MNF.
(b) Essential to the successful transition is the development of a cooperativeenvironment between the UN and the new MNF. If a UN force or HQ is withdrawing fromthe OA, the new MNF should negotiate the transfer of materiel and infrastructure/facilities
with the UN commander as appropriate. This procedure would apply in reverse should a UN
force relieve another MNF. In addition, agreements between the UN and the MNF are

VI-22

JP 3-16Other Considerations
necessary to coordinate the shared use of specified resources. Claims relating to incidents
occurring prior to the MNF assuming command of operations are the responsibility of the UN.
(c) To effect a smooth transition, working groups should be established at
the appropriate levels to coordinate administrative, financial, and logistic matters.
(d) A critical component of the transition is the reorganization, certification,and reflagging of possible UN units, including logistic forces, to the MNFC.
(e) In the past, the US, as a member of an alliance or coalition, has beencalled upon to plan for extracting UN peacekeeping forces from threatening situations, as
was the case with UNPROFOR in the Balkans. In this kind of operation, normal logistic
support for threatened UN forces would likely be disrupted and the US might be required
to support UN contingents during extraction operations.
b. Transition Between Phases(1) A phase can be characterized by the focus that is placed on it. Phases are
distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from one another but must be planned in support ofeach other and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the operation.
Each phase should have a set of starting conditions (that define the start of the phase) andending conditions (that define the end of the phase). The ending conditions of one phase
are the starting conditions for the next phase.
(2) Working within the phasing construct, the actual phases used will vary(compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the multinational operation and be
determined by the MNFC. During planning, the MNFC establishes conditions, objectives,
or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches forpotential contingencies. Phases are planned to be conducted sequentially, but some
activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases.
The MNFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or
operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions. A multinational operation may
be conducted in multiple phases simultaneously if the OA has widely varying conditions.
For instance, the commander may transition to the stabilize phase in some areas whileremaining in the dominate phase in those areas where the enemy has not yet capitulated.
Occasionally, operations may revert to a previous phase in an area where a resurgent or
new enemy re-engages friendly forces.
(3) Transitions between phases are to be distinct shifts in focus by the MNF, often
accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. The activities that
predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable breakpoints.
The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set ofobjectives is achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change
in focus for the MNF and is, therefore, usually event driven, not time driven. Changing
the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing commander’s objectives,
desired effects, measures of effectiveness, priorities, command relationships, force
allocation, or factors in the OA. An example is the shift of focus from sustained combat

VI-23

Chapter VI
operations in the dominate phase to a preponderance of stability activities in the stabilize
and enable civil authority phases. Hostilities gradually lessen as the MNF begins toreestablish order, commerce, and local government and deters adversaries from resuming
hostile actions while the US and international community take steps to establish or restore
the conditions necessary for long-term stability. This challenge demands an agile shift in
MNF skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, mental outlooks, and interorganizational
coordination, with a wider range of interagency and multinational partners and otherparticipants to provide the capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.
For more information on phasing alternatives and details on individual phases, refer to JP
3-0, Joint Operations.
c. Transition of Multinational Logistics(1) Since the US may have an extensive logistic structure already in place in the
OA, it may be asked to assume the lead role in the MNL organization—at least for atransition period. The senior US logistic commander may be designated as the senior
logistics commander for the MNF and be given specified authorities and responsibilities
by the MNFC. Additionally, US contracts and HNS agreements may become the vehicles
for multinational agreements. The US may also be asked to assume LN and RSN roles.
LN and RSN roles may require the use of a Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Air
Force Contract Augmentation Program, construction capabilities contract program
contractors, Naval Facilities Engineering Command contingency construction, and service
contracts for supporting the MNF. These assets are generally used for the creation andsupport of contingency bases. Therefore, it is important to consider the plan, design,
establishment, operation, management, and transition or closing of contingency bases earlyin MNF planning.
(2) The extent to which the US accepts logistic responsibilities for the MNF is
decided by SecDef. However, two conditions are critical for a smooth transition tomultinational support: the US should have the proper legal arrangements (e.g., ACSAs) inplace to provide logistic support to members of the deploying MNF; PNs should be
prepared to reimburse the US for logistic services rendered, unless other arrangements havebeen made.
(3) GCCs are better positioned to support PNs in their own areas of responsibility
and have habitual relationships with those nations that enhance interoperability.
d. Transition of Authority. Military operations may include transitions of authority
and control among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the HN as its
capacity increases (see Figure VI-2). Each transition involves inherent risk. The risk is
amplified when multiple transitions must be managed simultaneously or when the force
must quickly conduct a series of transitions. Planning anticipates these transitions, andcareful preparation and diligent execution ensure they occur without incident. Transitions
are identified as decisive points on lines of effort; they typically mark a significant shift ineffort and signify the gradual return to civilian oversight and control of the HN. Becauseof these risks and complexities, lower-priority development projects may not be resourced.

VI-24

JP 3-16Other Considerations

Notional Transitions of Authority
Transfer of Lead Agency

Military
Culmination

Capacity

National
Strategic
End State
Military
End State

Time
Legendcivilian authority

military forces

host nation governmenttransition points

Figure VI-2. Notional Transitions of Authority

For more information on transitions of authority, see JP 3-07, Stability.
15. Multinational Communications Integrationa. Multinational communications integration (MCI) is the MNFs’ coordination andemployment of actions, images, and words to support the achievement of participating
nations’ overall strategic objectives and attaining the end state. The commander of the
MNF receives multinational communication strategy guidance for MCI and integrates thisguidance into all plans, operations, and actions of the MNF.
(1) MCI consists of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products
synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power in an MNF at thestrategic, operational, and tactical levels. MCI focuses on creating, strengthening, orpreserving conditions favorable to accomplish the MNF’s mission. In an MNF, the key iscoordinated communication integration among participating nations.
(2) The MCI should integrate all information activities into planning activities
relevant to the mission, addressing both current and future operations (see Figure VI-3).

VI-25

Chapter VI

Multinational Communications Integration
Strategic
Nation A

Nation B

Nation C

Strategic Direction

Operational

Multinational Force

Information
Operations

PublicAffairs

DefenseSupport to
Public
Diplomacy

Operations

Multinational Communications Integration

Audience 1

Audience 2

Audience 3

Figure VI-3. Multinational Communication Integration

This plan should minimize adverse effects on multinational operations from inaccurate
media reporting/analysis, violations of OPSEC, adversary propaganda, and promulgationof disinformation and misinformation. Well-planned information activities support isimportant in every phase of operations.
b. The MNFs’ predominant military activities that support MCI are IO, PA, anddefense support to public diplomacy. All multinational operations (executed or not
executed) should be viewed through the MCI perspectives and framework to facilitate
support of strategic objectives and end state.
Communication planning andsynchronization guidance should be integrated into military planning and operations,documented in OPLANs, and coordinated and synchronized with USG departments andagencies and multinational partners.
c. In addition to addressing MCI with partners during the mission analysis, careful
and thorough planning and coordination with multinational partners is critical to ensure themessages are consistent and account for regional, cultural, and language interpretations andperceptions. However, it is also important to recognize that interagency and multinational
partners may have their own goals and objectives, not all of which will be revealed to the
MNF, which may result in considerable challenges to the MCI effort.

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JP 3-16Other Considerations
Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 3-0, Joint Operations;
JP 3-13, Information Operations; JP 5-0, Joint Planning; and JP 3-61, Public Affairs, formore information on strategic guidance; commander’s communication synchronization;and the informational instrument of national power, IO, and PA.
d. The nature of each nation’s decision to participate in a multinational operation will
influence what they communicate to their population about their involvement. The
communication activities of each nation in the operation will reach audiences in the othercountries and serve to either support or undermine the objectives of the MNF and those of
the individual participating nations.

VI-27

Chapter VI

Intentionally Blank

VI-28

JP 3-16

APPENDIX APLANNING CONSIDERATIONS CHECKLISTMultinational operations as described in this publication cover a wide spectrum of
subjects. The checklist below provides an MNFC with a planning tool for multinational
operations directed through either an integrated or LN scenario. Operations conducted ina parallel command relationship will normally follow national planning guidance anddoctrine. Where possible, this checklist will attempt to highlight only those items
unique to multinational operations.
Detailed planning checklists for JTF directorates can be found in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force
Headquarters. Most material contained in those checklists is applicable to MNTF directorates
as well.
Strategic-Level Considerations_____

Has the political-military estimate been completed and coordinated with PNs?
Have the PNs reached agreement on the appropriate response?

_____

Have strategic assessments been shared within the constraints of national andorganizational information sharing regulations?

_____Has the LN, in coordination with other PNs, developed the strategic military
guidance for the operation? Does this strategic guidance contain:

_____

_____

_____

A clear description of objectives?

_____

A broad outline of any military activity envisioned?

_____

The desired end state?

_____

Key planning assumptions?

_____

Constraints or restraints on military operations and actions?

Has a mission analysis been accomplished?
_____

Has the commander’s mission statement been provided?

_____

Has an analysis of the situation, opposition forces, friendly forces, andrestrictions been conducted?

Have courses of action (COAs) been developed?
_____

Has a preferred COA been selected?

_____

Has the commander’s intent been developed/provided?
A-1

Appendix A_____

Have ROE been agreed upon by military commanders and national
policy makers?

_____

Has a CONOPS been developed and approved by the national andinteragency partners?

_____

Has a confirmation of capabilities and/or forces to be contributed beenobtained from our national and interagency partners, to include
government capabilities/forces and likely international organization,
NGO, and/or private sector contributors?

_____

Has an OPLAN been developed based on the approved CONOPS/campaign plan?

_____

Have annexes to OPLANs/CONPLANs/CCPs been developed to effectively
support multinational and/or interagency coordination and operations?

_____Has the OPLAN been approved by national and interagency partners?

_____

Has the operational-level commander been appointed?

_____

Has communication synchronization guidance been included in the OPLAN?

_____

Has the appropriate coordination been conducted with the DOS Bureau ofConflict and Stabilization Operations, their associated local humanitarianreconstruction and stabilization teams, US Agency for International
Development, and/or the US embassy country team(s) in the specific OA?
Has CCSWG, PA, and information guidance been included in every phase of
the OPLAN?

_____

Operational-Level Considerations_____

Have command relationships been established between the MNFC and national
forces?

_____Has an MNTF HQ been established?

_____

Have critical billet requirements been identified?

_____

Has a theater foreign disclosure authority been identified? Has a policy and a planfor the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information beenpromulgated?

_____

Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required
functional skills, training levels, and language? Have historical national
sensitivities been considered?

A-2

JP 3-16

Planning Considerations Checklist_____

Are there sufficient linguists available for both planning and execution?

_____

Do liaison elements have appropriate linguistic, communications,logistic, and office support capabilities in place?

_____Has the command structure been designed to minimize layers to a morehorizontal organization?

_____

Have 24-hour command centers been established if required?

_____Have C2 arrangements been made to include appropriate internationalorganization and NGO officials in coordinating functions?

_____Have multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?

_____

Have the multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability been
provided appropriate liaison personnel and interpreters (if necessary),
operators, and maintainers to enable interaction with the commander andother multinational members?

_____

Have arrangements been made for intra- and inter-staff communication
among same nation staff members?

_____

Have the strategic and military end states been identified? Are the conditions
tangible in military terms? Are they contained in the mission statement?

_____

Has the end state and termination criteria been articulated as part of thecommander’s vision for subordinates?
_____

What is the termination criteria?

_____

What constitutes mission success?

_____Has a mission analysis been conducted?

_____

Has planning guidance been developed and issued?

_____

_____

Does it contain the commander’s intent?

_____

Are the ROE established? Do they require adjustment?

Have COAs been developed?
_____

Has a preferred COA been selected?

_____

Has the commander’s intent been provided/developed?

A-3

Appendix A_____

Has the deployment time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) beendeveloped in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System andrequirements validated by the appropriate CCMD(s)?
_____Have requirements for non-US forces relying on strategic mobility for
deployment and/or redeployment been included in the TPFDD andvalidated?

_____

Has the deployment plan been deconflicted with HN, NGO, andcontractor transportation requirements to avoid competition for limited
transportation infrastructure?

_____

Has the probable cost of the multinational operations been determined and are
there mechanisms in place to track the cost?

_____

Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of themission?

_____Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in theform of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?

_____

Have SOFAs been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? Who has
been designated to negotiate technical agreements to implement SOFAs?

_____

Do the resources allocated to the force protection component of the mission
balance with the potential ramifications of failure to protect the force?

_____

Have the cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics of the OA been fusedwith the traditional study of geographic and military considerations to form an
intelligence estimate that identifies threat centers of gravity, as well as high-valueand high-payoff targets? Does the plan consider these issues in a way thatfacilitates operations and end state?

_____

Have determined efforts been made to pool information with applicable NGOs,
to increase efficiency of operations through coordination and eliminate
redundancy in operations?

_____

Are nonlethal weapons available for use?

_____

To what extent are riot control agents authorized for use?

_____

To what extent are nonlethal weapons authorized for use?

_____

Are forces, communication system capabilities, and logistic support robust
enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

A-4

JP 3-16

Planning Considerations Checklist_____

Has coordination been accomplished with multinational members
regarding communication equipment capability?

_____

What are the Information/data exchange requirements for the mission?

_____

Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?

_____

Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for thecommunication system network?

_____

Have common databases been provided for?

_____Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable
communication system network been selected to serve as network
manager for the multinational communication system infrastructure?

_____

Have agreements on cryptographic, communications and/or ADP
security issues, and other planning factors been reached among all
multinational components? Are compatible materials available?

_____

Have arrangements been made and/or established to allow contractor
multinational foreign nation employees to work on C2 staffs without
exposure to ADP and classified information used in daily operations?

_____Have the nations agreed to work on a standard datum and produce all products tothat datum?

_____

Has a multinational geospatial intelligence plan been produced and disseminatedwhich designates all products for use?

_____

Have special, adequate, and supportable intelligence sharing and foreign
disclosure procedures been established?

_____

Have special, adequate, and supportable geospatial sharing and foreign disclosure
procedures been established?

_____

Have special, adequate, and supportable biometrics sharing and foreign disclosure
procedures been established?
_____

Have the intelligence requirements been clearly stated to focus thecollection effort?

_____

Has the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed and have requests
for denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been
considered?

A-5

Appendix A_____

Have efforts been made to place sufficient intelligence collection resources under
the control of (or at least immediately responsive to) the MNFC?
_____

Have efforts been made to assign intelligence gathering tasks IAW the
MNFC’s intelligence requirements and according to the capability of themultinational equipment under MNF control?

_____

Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information
into multinational centralized processing and exploitation centers? Have
disclosure and release procedures been identified, with respect to each
PN?

_____

Can authorized targeting materials be disseminated rapidly?

_____

Has the MNFC’s authority to redistribute logistic assets and services been definedand agreed to?

_____

Has a coordinating mechanism been establish to coordination and execute OCS(contracting for goods and services) been established?

_____

A-6

_____

What, if any, ACSAs exist between participating nations to enable theprovision of supplies, services, transportation, and logistic support?

_____

Does principal logistics civil augmentation program structure have an
overall officer in charge or main point of contact for C2 of contractor
personnel?

Do other legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support to participating
nations?
_____

Have reimbursement or replacement in kind procedures been developed
and agreed to?

_____

Has the multinational commander designated a lead nation and/or role
specialist nation to provide CUL support to the MNF?

_____

Is there a means in place which authorizes exchange of mutual logistic
support of goods and services between the MNTF countries and accounts
for the amounts received?

_____

Has a logistics determination been made (i.e., what countries will
provide what piece of the logistics system, health services to include
ground and air evacuation, and medical logistics)?

JP 3-16

Planning Considerations Checklist_____

Have logistic reporting procedures been established and promulgated throughout
the force?

_____

Do transition plans include the accountability process for the return of US
equipment loaned to another nation in an MNF operation?

_____

Can the HN provide support, and if so, have negotiations to secure support been
established or completed?
_____

Are the mission economic and infrastructure repair plans known andbeing complied with by all nations, Services, and units?

_____

Has HNS been evaluated in the deployed location(s) to determine thelogistic requirements?

_____

Has an assessment of HN medical capabilities and a determination ofavailability to support MNF health services requirements beenaccomplished?

_____

Have coordinating centers been established for personnel movement, medical
support, ground and air evacuation, OCS, infrastructure engineering, and logistic
operations?

_____

Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumptionof in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to anotheragency or alliance?

_____

Has funding been identified to support operations and/or to provide
reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets?

_____

_____

Will common funding be available to support multinational common
costs and expenditures?

_____

Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses
will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national
funding by the participating nations?

Are medical facilities identified to support the operation? Are evacuation plans,
both intra- and inter-theater, in place?
_____

_____

Are CBRN threats known, and are troops and medical facilities prepared
to cope with their possible use?

Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service multinational
casualties, to include recognition of cultural differences in dealing withcasualties?

A-7

Appendix A_____

Have information activities been planned to support the operation?
_____

Have assets been requested to support the information portion of the
plan?

_____

Have procedures been established for coordination and approval of
information activities?

_____

Have military information support personnel been integrated into
analysis, targeting, and planning?

_____

Have information-related activities been integrated and tailored to the specificenvironment/mission assigned?

_____

Have population and resource control measures and the subordinate commander’sauthority to impose them been included in the MNF plan?

_____

Are there adequate CA personnel on hand to assist planners?

_____

Are there special operations personnel available to develop and execute
unconventional military options for the commander?

_____

Has a PA plan been promulgated that:_____

Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries
before initial public release of information concerning the MNF and its
mission?

_____States who (from which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously)
make the initial public release concerning the MNF and its mission?

_____

States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information
concerning the MNF and its national components?

_____

Is predeployment media training complete?

_____

Is the relationship between the inevitable media coverage of tactical operations
and future strategic decisions understood by all commanders?

_____Have requirements for combat camera support been arranged?

_____

Has an operation historian been designated and staff authorized?

_____

Is a mechanism in place for the collection, assessment, and reporting of lessons
learned?

A-8

JP 3-16

Planning Considerations Checklist_____

Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

_____

What are the redeployment and/or withdrawal plans for MNFs? Is the departureof forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions?
_____

What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in
humanitarian or other peaceful operations?

_____

What forces, equipment, and supplies will remain behind? Has disposalof equipment and supplies been properly planned?

_____

What are the C2 and command arrangements for departure?

_____

Who will support forces that remain behind?

_____Has the C2 systems support required for the diminishing MNF presence
been identified?

A-9

Appendix A

Intentionally Blank

A-10

JP 3-16

APPENDIX B
MULTINATIONAL PLANNING AUGMENTATION TEAM
1. Overview
a. The MPAT program was established by the Commander, USINDOPACOM, in
consultation with the chiefs of defense of various nations in the Asia-Pacific region in early
2000. The impetus for the program is to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment
and/or augmentation of MNTF HQ.
b. MPAT is not a program with formal participatory agreements. The key factor inprogram success to date has been the informal ad hoc nature of the program. Without
MOAs, terms of reference, or other more formal arrangements, the program has been able
to share information, and all participants have been able to jointly develop concepts andprocedures without the normal formal policy constraints—a key inhibitor to multinational
interoperability when working with other nations.
2. Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Composition
a. MPAT is an international cadre of military planners from 31 nations with interestsin the Asia-Pacific region that is capable of augmenting an MNF HQ established to planand execute coalition operations in response to military engagement, SC, and deterrence
operations and small-scale contingencies. Planners learn from each other the common
procedures for activating, forming, and employing a coalition TF HQ and associatedplanning processes. This is done through a series of multinational workshops called MPATTEMPEST EXPRESS staff planning workshops. The MPAT cadre also participates in
USINDOPACOM and other nations’ multinational exercises.
b. Participation also includes representation from UN organizations, internationalorganizations, and NGOs.
c. The MPAT Secretariat resides with the Pacific Command Exercises Directorate.
3. Multinational Force Standing Operating Proceduresa. MPAT planners are credited with developing an SOP for an MNTF HQ. This SOP
recognizes the existence of shared national interests in the region and seeks to standardize
some basic concepts and processes that will promote habits of cooperation, increase
dialogue, and provide for baseline MNTF operational concepts. Further, this SOP serves
as a centerpiece for the MPAT workshops and exercises aimed at improving
interoperability and MNTF operational readiness within the Asia-Pacific region. The
purpose of the SOP is straightforward:(1) Increase the speed of an MNF initial response.
(2) Improve interoperability among the participating forces.
(3) Enhance overall mission effectiveness.
B-1

Appendix B(4) Support unity of effort.
b. The MNF SOP is not a USINDOPACOM document, nor is it signed by any of theparticipants. It has been developed by the combined efforts of all the MPAT nations as amultinational document to provide the foundation of multinational crisis response. The
SOP is also unclassified and available for use by any nation in combined/joint or coalition
operations.
c. The procedures contained in the MNF SOP are primarily focused for use by an
MNTF HQ for use at the mid to lower end of the “competition continuum.” These include
numerous campaign operations activities such as limited contingency operations, stability
activities, PO (which includes peace building, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, andpeacemaking), FHA, NEO, SAR/PR, combating terrorism, and FID.
4. Organization
The MPAT is not a standing, billeted organization or TF. It is a cadre or pool of trainedplanners with MNF operations planning expertise that has developed relationships fromparticipation in MPAT events. Figure B-1 contains a list of potential key MNTF staff
billets or functional areas that can be filled with MPAT personnel from the various MNF
participating nations.
For additional information on the MPAT concept and MNF SOP, refer to the unclassified
MPAT Website at https://community.apan.org/wg/mpat/p/sop.aspx. This Website acts as
the portal for the MPAT program and MNF SOP. The updated MNF SOP can be obtained
via this portal, and the latest MPAT information can be found through this site.

Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Augmentation Roles Civil-military Maritime operations

 Medical

 Air operations

 Legal Special operations

 Public affairs Marine operations

 Military information support operations

 Sealift Operational planners

 Airlift Personnel

 Information operations

 Intelligence Air logistics

 Logistics

 Network/collaboration

 Communications

 Space operations

 Engineering Cyberspace operations

 Force movement and deployment

 Electromagnetic spectrum

 Force protection

operations

 Ground operations

Figure B-1. Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Augmentation Roles

B-2

JP 3-16

APPENDIX C
MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS GROUP
1. Overview
a. The MSOG is a joint, multinational forum for identifying operational andinteroperability issues and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level
that, if nationally implemented by MSOG member nations, will contribute to more
effective coalition operations.
b. The MSOG is a senior operator-led body for coordinating, deliberating, andfacilitating resolution of contemporary operational and interoperability issues. The
MSOG’s work focuses on resolving information interoperability problems, strategic andoperational issues, and interagency aspects considered as key to coalition operations.
c. The MSOG focuses on resolving information sharing and LN contemporary
operational and interoperability issues across all lines of development (doctrine,organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities). The MSOG also
addresses interagency/comprehensive approach activities that are key in establishing andexecuting coalitions, as well as policy issues for supporting and monitoring multinational
operations. These activities are targeted to positively impact coalition interoperability
policy, doctrine, and collaborative planning and execution.
2. Purpose
Since inception, the MSOG has evolved to keep pace with changes in the strategic
environment, transforming from strictly a tactical and operational forum to a strategic
platform focused on harmonizing collective efforts and resources. The MSOG provides aunique senior operator/planner-led multinational forum to understand and address strategicand operational challenges and risks to influence the development of operational practices
to enable more effective and aligned coalition operations and strategic approaches. The
MSOG’s objectives are to:a. Build relationships to enhance mutual trust and understanding of national
perspectives and operational challenges and risks, as well as identify where future strategic
opportunities and national interests align in order to better integrate efforts, capitalize on
activities, and magnify resources across multiple problem sets.
b. Influence and shape the development of operational practices for more effective
coalition operations in a constrained resource environment.
3. Composition
a. The creation of the Military Framework Chiefs of Defense (also referred to as the“Framework”) forum in 2016 was the key factor in the MSOG expanding in 2019 from theeight member nations to the current thirteen like-minded nations, mirroring those
represented in the Framework meeting. The MSOG is a forum that provides amultinational venue to understand and address contemporary strategic and operational
C-1

Appendix C
challenges, and is composed of countries that are most likely to form and lead a coalition
operation. The MSOG member nations are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, andthe United States. The member nations are equal participants in the MSOG. Whilemembership is not meant to be exclusionary, the criteria for membership is based upon anation’s demonstrated capacity and national will to lead international coalitions.
b. The MSOG is led by the MSOG Principals, who are the senior national
representatives for MSOG member nations and are flag officers/general officers from theirnation’s national defense HQ. The MSOG Principals define and articulate the strategic
direction of the MSOG and provide guidance for the MSOG activities. Invaluable levelsof trust and camaraderie are cultivated in the MSOG, which further encourage and promotenational efforts in coalition and multinational operations.
c. The following groups manage and/or implement/perform the work of the MSOG
according to the guidance of the MSOG Principals:(1) The Framework Steering Committee is composed of O-7/NATO OF-6
representatives and provides management oversight of tasks approved by the MSOG
Principals. It is the senior O-7-/NATO OF-6-level group that provides day-to-day
guidance, oversight, and direction to any directed working group, national secretaries, or
national officers as required.
(2) The Framework secretariat staff is the only full-time MSOG staff and works
in the US Joint Staff J-5 [Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Deputy Director Global
Integration]. The secretariat staff is responsible for managing and coordinating the day-today business activities for the MSOG, while serving as the central point of contact for the
MSOG Principals, the Framework Steering Committee, and national secretaries. In
addition to permanently assigned US personnel, twelve foreign liaison officers from other
Framework member nations are assigned full-time to the Secretariat staff. The Framework
secretariat staff conducts all external coordination, correspondence, and communication.
4. Products
MSOG-developed documents represent a nonbinding consensus view among MSOG
nations. These documents are reviewed and updated on a regular basis. The following are
representative examples of MSOG-developed documents. Refer to the MSOG community
on the APAN Website for the most current version of all MSOG documents.
a. Coalition Building Guide (CBG)(1) One of the MSOG’s early actions was the development of the CBG. The
purpose of the CBG is to facilitate LNs, troop-contributing nations, and participants in theestablishment and effective operation of a coalition anywhere on the globe. Specifically,
the CBG concentrates on the strategic and operational levels of multinational joint
operations and identifies some of the essential factors associated with the process of
coalition building. Additionally, it attempts to provide a common framework of reference
for contributing nations. The CBG is designed to assist the JFC and his staff, as well as
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Multinational Strategy and Operations Grouphighlight national factors. The CBG does not constitute official policy or doctrine, nordoes it represent a definitive staff planning or military decision-making guide. It is offered
to assist MSOG member nations and their potential partners in serving together in futurecoalitions and to assist other working groups in their exploration of related interoperability
issues. The CBG is based upon the LN concept. For the purposes of the CBG, the LN isdescribed as: That nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence toprovide the essential elements of national consultation and military leadership to coordinate
the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within theoverarching organizational framework provided by the LN, other nations participating in
the coalition may be designated as functional lead agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate
specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national
capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.
(2) The MSOG agreed that NATO Allied joint doctrine, unless otherwise
specifically directed, is default doctrine for planning and conducting multinational
operations. The CBG uses established NATO Allied joint doctrine as a basis. NATO
doctrine is the default doctrine for a MSOG member-led coalition unless the LN specifies
the military doctrine to be used. If an LN chooses to use other than NATO doctrine, thenit must ensure all participating partners have access to the doctrine in use. Operatingprocedures, as well as TTP, will be prescribed by the LN.
For additional guidance on the CBG, refer to the Multinational Interoperabilit yCouncil
Coalition
Building
Guide,
VolumeI-III,
3rd
Edition,https://community.apan.org/wg/mic/p/coalition_building_guide.
b. Comprehensive Approach Framework—A Military Perspective(1) Recent experiences of coalition operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, andother operations confirm the complexity of contemporary crises. Complex crises do notlend themselves to simple definition or analysis. Today’s challenges demand acomprehensive approach by the international community, including the coordinated action
from an appropriate range of civil and military actors, enabled by the orchestration,
coordination, and deconfliction of coalitions’ military instrument with the other
instruments of national power.
(2) The comprehensive approach framework is primarily designed for use byprospective coalition commanders and their staffs, but it also informs potential civilian
partners on the vision and views of the militaries organized within the MSOG concerning
the framework for the application of a comprehensive approach as both a mindset and amethod to crisis prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict activities. The central
idea is to demonstrate the possibilities but also the limitations of forming civil-military
partnerships both at home and in a region or a country by creating and operationalizing thespirit of a true team effort. The document, therefore, aims at establishing a certain
commonality in comprehensive approach understanding and terminology to support further
work between military and civilian partners in the context of coalition operations.

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Appendix C(3) To promote the synergies of a civil-military team effort, the national militariesof the MSOG nations have to specify their roles and possible contributions throughout allphases of involvement in a crisis abroad. These phases of conflict have been categorized
as crisis prevention, stabilization, and finally transition—when the military involvement
winds down to be handed over to other, better-suited agencies and organizations. This
expeditionary focus excludes all questions of how the individual MSOG nations handle
natural or man-made crises within their own respective boundaries, possibly also in acomprehensive manner. Likewise, possible considerations for a civil-military interface insituations of combat operations are not subject to the framework at hand.
(4) The document points out the products and services needed from civilian
partners, which may range from an early exchange of cultural views to very precise
demands for specific liaison arrangements. Acknowledging the existing overlap withcivilian organizations and actors, the areas of military logistics, and military medical
services have been given special attention.
(5) The underlying core theme throughout the document applies the following
triple concept to make the envisaged civil-military team effort a reality:(a) Establishing a common understanding of the problem at hand (which
includes information sharing and SA),(b) Defining a mutually acceptable vision for the problem solution (which
includes a set of outcomes or objectives that shall not contradict one another), and(c) Aiming at harmonizing the corresponding activities (which includes thewill to adjust in light of emerging insights).
c. The Military Contribution to Stabilization Operations (Stabilization Handbook)(1) Stabilization is a multidimensional concept involving reconstruction andnormalization activities and tasks that involves attributes of other programs such as
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and security sector reform (SSR) that must
be considered in defining common approaches to a campaign.
(2) The Stabilization Handbook addresses the tasks normally performed bymilitary forces in supporting stabilization operations when an HN is unable to govern
and/or to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Military forces perform myriad
functions in supporting broad coalition reconstruction, SSR, and stabilization efforts inorder to establish a safe and secure environment in a fragile state. The stabilization tasks
accomplished by military forces during a wide range of activities help set the conditions orframework for:(a) Facilitating reconciliation among local or regional adversaries;(b) Establishing political, legal, social, and economic institutions; andC-4

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Multinational Strategy and Operations Group(c) Setting the environment for transitioning responsibility to legitimate civil
authority operating under the rule of law.
(3) Accordingly, the document also addresses the need to consider acomprehensive approach in planning for and conducting stabilization operations, in orderto build strong relationships through cooperation, collaboration, and coordination with thevarious governmental, nongovernmental, private, and international organizations andagencies, as well as other military forces involved in stabilization operations.
For additional information on the MSOG and ongoing multinational interoperability
efforts, refer to the MSOG community on the APAN Website athttps://community.apan.org/wg/mic/.

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Appendix C

Intentionally Blank

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APPENDIX D
MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS
1. Introduction
a. The purpose of this appendix is to provide detailed guidance to US forces who
provide or receive logistic support during multinational operations.
The term“multinational” encompasses operations that may also be referred to as “allied,” “alliance,”“bilateral,” “combined,” “multilateral,” or “coalition.” The overall logistics doctrine forsupporting US joint operations has been established in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
b. MNL is any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supportinga MNF under the auspices of an alliance or coalition. This includes operations conductedunder a UN mandate. MNL includes activities involving both logistic units provided byparticipating nations designated for use by the MNFC, as well as a variety of MNL support
arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces.
c. Multinational operations of even modest complexity require some centralized
coordination of logistics and the use of mutual support arrangements to facilitate smooth,
timely, responsive, and effective deployment and force sustainment. This may include
negotiation of HNS and agreements relating to border crossings; customs and duty fees;
medical support; engineering; OCS; supplemental security forces; movement control; andprovision of CUL supplies, such as bulk petroleum.
See JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, for additional information on CUL.
d. The principles of logistics for US joint operations also apply to the logistics ofmultinational operations. However, because participating forces represent sovereign
nations, there are several unique principles for MNL operations. Figure D-1 lists theprinciples of MNL as contained in NATO’s logistic publication Military Committee 319/3,
NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics, and expanded upon in AJP-4, Allied Joint
Doctrine for Operational-Level Logistics. Although first formulated in NATO documents,
these principles are adaptable to all multinational operations.
2. Special Considerations in Organizing and Conducting Multinational Logistic
Operations
a. The Impact of National Sovereignty. The planning and conduct of logistics inoperations involving multiple sovereign nations characteristically differs from that inunilateral operations.
(1) MNFCs typically do not have the same degree of directive authority over
MNF logistics as commanders of national operations. Nations give MNFCs only as muchauthority over their national logistic resources as they are willing to concede to achieve
national objectives in the operation. These authorities are generally quite limited and often
involve only coordinating authority. As a result, effective logistic operations in a
multinational operation depend on personal relationships between multinational andD-1

Appendix D

Logistics Principles of Multinational Operations
Per MC 319/2 the NATO principles andpolicies for logistics are*:Collective responsibility
 Authority
 Primacy of operational requirements
 Cooperation
 Coordination
 Assured provision Sufficiency
 Efficiency
 Flexibility
 Visibility and transparency
 Synergy
 Simplicity
 Timeliness

Per Joint Publication 4-0 principles andpolicies for logistics include**:Economy Simplicity
 Flexibility
 Responsiveness Survivability
 Sustainability
 Attainability*Principles listed in NATO Publication MC 319/2, NATO Principles and Policies for
Logistics, and in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine.
**Principles listed in Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, as well as MC 319/2 and AJP-4.

LegendMC Military Committee

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Figure D-1. Logistics Principles of Multinational Operations

national force commanders. MNFCs and the logistic staff use persuasion and diplomacy
to encourage national contingents to support MNF operational priorities. In order to ensure
better understanding between commanders, LNOs should be dispatched to all relevantorganizations throughout the multinational C2 structure.
(2) US and other forces participating in multinational operations operate underlimitations imposed by applicable international agreements, including SOFAs, DCAs,
national laws, and regulations. The US has negotiated a number of bilateral SOFAs thatgovern US forces operating within another nation’s territory. SOFAs may also be
multilateral and should be negotiated to apply to all participants in the MNF. Detailed
SOFA provisions are usually contained in supporting TAs. Many of the areas addressedin the TAs relate directly to logistic issues: medical support, environmental obligations,customs and duties, movement control, landing rights and/or port utilization fees, and rights
and protection of MNF contractors. Accordingly, the MNFC’s logistic and legal staffs may
become closely involved with negotiation, implementation, and application of the SOFA
and TAs to ensure such documents facilitate rather than hinder logistic support of theoperation.
(3) Differences in national ROE, FP, and security requirements constitutepotential areas of friction in a multinational operation and could affect the security ofoperating bases and logistic assets on which US forces and MNFs rely on. MNFC FP and

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Multinational Logistics
security requirements should be identified early in the planning process and addressed
during TA negotiations.
(4) National laws guide the exchange of logistic support among nations. There
are a number of legal provisions that stipulate the manner in which US forces can exchange
logistic support with other force contingents and/or participate in MNL arrangements.
For more information on national laws guiding logistics support, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
b. The US as Provider and Recipient of Logistic Support. The US may provide
logistic support as part of its national contribution to a multinational operation, as it did in
Operations UNITED ASSISTANCE (West Africa) and ATLANTIC RESOLVE (Europe).
The US, in turn, could require extensive foreign logistic assistance (as in Operations
ENDURING FREEDOM, INHERENT RESOLVE, FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, and
RESOLUTE SUPPORT). The US, therefore, is likely to be both a consumer and providerof CUL in multinational operations. MNL may provide US commanders and logisticplanners with a means to effectively and efficiently support US forces.
3. Core Logistics Capabilities
The core MNL functions are supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, joint
health services, engineering, logistic services, and OCS. The MNL capabilities deliveredby these functions, when combined with multinational personnel service support, provide
the ability to globally project and sustain US forces operating as part of an MNF. Personnel
involved in MNL should work to integrate and make effective use of Service, joint,commercial, interagency, and MNL assets. Understanding these capabilities will enable
MNFCs and their subordinate commanders to obtain, provide, and sustain effective
logistics support. Additionally, logistic planners should identify areas where international
agreements would facilitate supply and maintenance support of multinational operations.
Developing mutually supportive relationships to enhance coordination is an importantenabler for MNL operations. ACSAs are examples of international agreements that allow
for the provision of cooperative logistics support. Upon identifying a need, the MNFC
should determine the feasibility of such agreements and, where applicable, pursue theirdevelopment in coordination with the appropriate higher command level.
a. Supply(1) Multinational support agreements and arrangements can usually beconsidered for the provision of food, water (bulk and bottled), bulk petroleum, someammunition types, and medical supplies. The supplies and services to be provided by MNL
will be determined in concert with nations prior to commencement of the operation andwill depend on the degree of standardization and interoperability within the force. Thisshould be determined during the logistic and HNS planning conferences. Possible methodsof multinational provision are given in NATO publication AJP-4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine
for Modes of Multinational Logistic Support.
(2) Supply transactions between nations or national forces may take the form of
pre-planned logistic assistance, emergency logistic assistance in crisis and conflict,D-3

Appendix D
multinational support, or redistribution. The compensation for delivered or redistributed
supplies should be executed IAW procedures agreed upon by the PN. Nations should
implement the provisions of these agreements in their national doctrine and procedures toenhance the efficient execution of mutual support.
b. Maintenance(1) Maintenance operations facilitate systems readiness for the MNFC. Eachmember nation executes maintenance as a core logistic function to maintain the fleet
readiness of units and capabilities.
(2) In crisis or conflict, an efficient maintenance organization, composed of MNF
and national repair facilities, is an essential component of MNF’s capability. Therefore,
nations should be encouraged to make bilateral and multilateral agreements in peace tocover use of national repair facilities in both peacetime and wartime. This facilitates thetransfer of repair loads from one nation’s facilities to another and will exercise crossservicing facilities and procedures. Whenever weapon systems are used by more than one
nation, a coordinated approach to logistics is recommended. Not only can logistic
resources be shared but, also by consolidating supply and maintenance requirements,
unique opportunities are created to reduce investment and operating costs.
c. Deployment and Distribution(1) The global dispersion of the threats, combined with the necessity to rapidly
deploy, execute, and sustain operations worldwide, makes the deployment and distributionfunction the cornerstone of MNL. This global distribution-based system requires the endto-end synchronization of all elements of distribution. The deployment and distributionfunction supports the movement of forces and unit equipment during the deployment andredeployment processes and supports materiel movement during the sustainment ofoperations. Asset and in-transit visibility provides the CCDR the capability to see andredirect strategic and operational commodity and force flow in support of current andprojected priorities.
See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and JP 4-09, Distribution
Operations, for additional information.
(2) Move the Force. The Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate], as the joint
deployment process owner, serves as the DOD focal point to improve the deployment
process supporting multinational operations and interagency coordination. Force providers
are supported by United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) during theplanning and execution of the deployment and redeployment process. USTRANSCOM,
as the Joint Deployment and Distribution Coordinator, supports the deployment process byproviding the strategic distribution capability to move forces and materiel in support of
MNFC operational requirements and to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to home
and/or demobilization stations.

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Multinational Logistics(3) Movement Control. A variety of organizations may be established to
manage, control, and coordinate strategic and operational movement for multinational
operations.
(a) In US-led multinational operations, the movement control concept isusually an extension of US joint doctrine, as discussed in JP 3-35, Deployment andRedeployment Operations, and JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.
(b) The organization and planning tools to synchronize and coordinate
movement control during multinational operations and in other kinds of multinational
operations are similar and will usually include:
1. A planning center (at the strategic or geographic command level) toconstruct a detailed multinational deployment plan.
2. A joint movement coordination center at the MNF HQ level.
3. An air component center for controlling air movements.
4. Organizational elements for managing/coordinating reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration activities to coordinate MNF movements with
the HN’s national movement coordination center, if established and allocating any
common-user transportation resources.
(c) In a NATO operation, for example, strategic movement is managed by
the allied movement coordination center (AMCC), which combines and deconflicts
separate, national, detailed, deployment plans into a single, multinational, deployment plan
to ensure smooth flow of forces IAW the MNFC’s deployment priorities. The AMCC, incooperation with NATO’s civil transportation planning boards and committees, also assists
nations in resolving strategic lift shortfalls through arrangements with other allied nations
and/or commercial transportation firms. See AJP-3.13, Allied Joint Doctrine for the
Deployment of Forces.
(d) At the operational level, a joint theater movement staff (JTMS) develops
movement and transportation directives and plans and recommends priorities for theater
movement requirements. A joint transportation coordination center (JTCC) may also beestablished. The JTCC focuses primarily on managing intratheater movements and tasking
any transportation assets provided by nations for support of the entire MNF.
(e) NATO’s JTMS and JTCC perform similar functions to a US joint
movement center (JMC). If the US establishes a separate, national JMC for managing
movement of US forces in a multinational operation, the JMC must coordinate closely withthe multinational movement control centers to ensure synchronized deployment andintratheater movement.
(f) In non-US-led coalitions, the US may be requested to function as LN for
deployment planning and movement control because of its expertise in these areas.

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Appendix D(4) Sustain the Force. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel
services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission
accomplishment. Sustainment is conducted for the duration of the joint mission. A logistic
concept of support must complement the overall CONOPS. Logistic planners accomplish
this by tailoring the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE), including
incoming stock, theater excess stock, and disposal requirements, or devising new
distribution capabilities. The JDDE is that complex system of equipment, procedures,
doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information, shared knowledge, organizations,facilities, training, and materiel that facilitates the successful conduct of multinational
distribution operations.
See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and JP 4-09, Distribution
Operations, for additional information.
d. Joint Health Services(1) Nations are ultimately responsible for providing medical care for their forces.
Because of national sensitivities, the US strives to rely on national resources for providing
joint health services to its forces to the maximum extent. Opportunities exist to rationalize
medical care within a multinational operation. For example, medical care roles could be
provided by an LN or RSN. However, differences in medical standards, customs, andtraining require careful consideration in planning multinational medical support. The
exchange of blood and blood products between nations is an especially sensitive issue.
Because of its robust, high-quality medical capabilities, the US may be able to provide
medical support to multinational partners, including Class VIII medical supplies,
veterinary services, medical laboratory services, optical fabrication, medical equipment
maintenance and repair, preventive medicine, and patient movement (ground and aerial
evacuation).
(2) US laws and policies, however, place restrictions on the provision of medical
support to other nations and the use of foreign medical support by US forces. US
commanders must be aware of such restrictions in non-US-led multinational operations
and inform the MNFC of these restrictions. Due to such restrictions, US commanders
should consult with the SJA.
See JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, for more detailed guidance on joint health services in
multinational operations.
e. Engineering(1) Engineering lends itself to multinational coordination and management
arrangements. Nations participating in a multinational operation may place assigned
engineer units under the OPCON or the TACON of the engineer TF commander. As analternative, engineer units may simply coordinate engineer activities with the MNFC andthe force engineer. Ultimately, all engineer operations should be coordinated with thetheater engineer to achieve a synchronized approach to engineer operations. The theater
engineer will typically be the supported US CCMD engineer.

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Multinational Logistics(2) To assist the force engineer, an engineer coordination element may beestablished. In a US-led multinational operation, this coordination element will normallycomprise a staff element within the logistics directorate of a joint staff and may involve a
number of functionally specific joint engineer boards—for example, the joint facilities
utilization board (JFUB), joint civil-military engineering board (JCMEB), and joint
environmental management board. These joint boards would be expanded with personnel
from coalition partners to form combined organizational elements with multinational
engineer coordination functions. In NATO doctrine, the central coordinating organizationfor engineering is called an engineer coordination cell (ECC) and may directly support theforce engineer, who is a special staff officer under the MNFC. If joint engineer boards
have been established in support of US forces in a NATO operation, they should coordinate
closely with the ECC. The theater engineer may also establish regional/component
subordinate offices to assist the ECC in coordinating multinational engineering activities.
For details on US engineering doctrine, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations. For
NATO doctrine, see AJP-3.12, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering.
f. Logistic Services. In addition to MNL coordination centers at the MNF HQ level,
nations participating in a multinational operation may determine the need for operationallevel support organizations to provide common support for the MNF. Such organizations
include naval advanced logistic support sites (NALSSs) and naval forward logistic sites(NFLSs) for supporting multinational maritime forces and intermediate staging bases(ISBs) for supporting ground and air units. MNL support elements serve as criticaltransshipment nodes, supply storage and distribution points, refueling stations, staging
bases for onward movement into tactical operational zones, medical support centers, andproviders of other CUL support. MNL sites may be organized as elements within the MNF
C2 structure under the command of the MNFC. Within a NATO maritime operation, forexample, NALSSs and NFLSs are elements of the multinational maritime force shore
support organization and may report either to a MNL maritime command or directly to amaritime element embedded in the MJLC. In such an organizational structure, NALSSs
and NFLSs are multinational organizations with NATO commanders and integrated
multinational staff. Multinational support organizations, however, could also be LNoperated organizations that provide support to multinational partners, as requested. For
example, the US could establish a national ISB outside the tactical operational area that isused for both staging and supporting US forces and providing logistic services to othernations. In this case, the logistic site providing MNL support is under command of theoperating nation (the US), and the site commander coordinates with the MNFC.
g. OCS. Theater support contracts and CUL-related external support contracts makeuse of regionally available supplies, services, and construction capability in immediate
support of deployed units, at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward operating
locations. The use of local contractor services can also play a very important role in theeconomic health within the countries where the operation is being conducted. In
multinational operations, commanders of US contracting entities are responsible forcontracting operations to support US forces, and contracting officers are guided by US laws
and the Federal Acquisition Regulation in obtaining contractor services. The contracting
coordination center prioritizes and coordinates national contracting of goods and services
D-7Appendix Dthat are in limited supply within the OA or are commonly needed by the entire force (or bymore than one component). These commonly needed goods and services may include food,
fuel, lodging, labor, construction materials, facilities, and transportation. To effectively
coordinate MNF contracting activities, the MNFC may publish a restricted items list that
identifies critical, limited supplies and services within the OA, the procurement of whichmust be coordinated with the contracting coordination center.
4. Multinational Logistics Planning Considerations
a. Logistic planning of multinational operations poses considerable challenges.
Realistically, only a few nations can logistically support themselves in every operational
phase: deployment, sustainment, and redeployment/termination.
b. MNL planning is complicated by several factors:(1) Advance planning for multinational operations is usually confined only toclose allies that are highly likely to join with the US in the planned operation. Even amongclose allies, some PNs may be reluctant to support advance planning of operations in which
the US is involved. As a result, most planning for multinational operations, therefore, tends
to be ad hoc.
(2) Nations are generally reluctant in the early planning process to commit forces
to the MNF. This is especially true regarding logistic contributions to MNF support.
Logistic planning for multinational operations, therefore, can be a lengthy, iterative
process, during which nations come to agreement on the logistic C2 organization andsupport arrangements only after extensive deliberation.
(3) Given these factors, planning for multinational operations usuallycommences only after the crisis has developed. Since logistics often is a limiting factor inoperations, logistic planning needs to be initiated as soon as possible and occur
concurrently with operational planning.
(4) Within a multinational operation, it is imperative that participating nations
have confidence in the way partners are supporting their forces. Nations are often reluctant
to, and sometimes prohibited from, sharing national OPLANs with potential partners
because of national security. Nonetheless, efforts should be made to share operation andlogistic support plans during the plan development stage. While selected details may not
be shared, general logistic support concepts, possible force/resource contributions, logistic
support requirements, capabilities, logistics security and protection requirements, andpossible support arrangements should be discussed.
(5) An information database regarding the logistic capabilities of potential
multinational partners is crucial for effective MNL planning. During peacetime, US andmultinational planners may be able to use such information to identify—in advance—
possible MNL contributions to an operation and to implement programs, including
multinational exercises and planning seminars, to enhance interoperability.
USINDOPACOM’s MPAT program is a good example that enhances MNL planning andprovides planners with the requisite planning tools.
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Multinational Logistics
c. To integrate partners in contingency logistics planning effectively, the MNFC
should consider the following measures:(1) Seek early assignment of logistic planners from participating nations to the
MNFC logistic planning staff.
(2) Produce MNL planning templates using US/LN data and planning factors.
Templates would be filled out by participating nation logistic planners.
(3) Arrange temporary assignment of US/LN logistic LNOs to the national HQof participating nations.
(4) Provide access to US/LN logistic information management systems or
arrange electronic interface between compatible national systems where feasible.
(5) Seek early briefings on participating nation logistic capabilities and shortfalls
and obtain commitments to cooperative logistic arrangements.
(6) Seek early staffing for MJLC (or equivalent) functional coordination bodies.
(7) Seek early agreement on an MNF basing strategy that may include
establishing efficient contingency bases to support mission requirements.
d. National operational preferences influence the degree to which nations are willing
to rely on MNL during the early phase(s) of an operation. Nevertheless, early MNL
planning increases the options available to national commanders for employing MNL for
mutual benefit during the critical first stages of an operation.
e. Perspective of US MNFC. When functioning as the MNFC, US commanders havethe responsibility to develop a CONOPS and initial concept of support, in coordination
with participating nations. Upon approval of participating nations, US and other MNL
planners iteratively develop the support plan during a series of planning conferences, astime allows. US MNFCs should address the following critical logistic issues in planningfor multinational operations.
(1) Logistic C2 relationships and organizational structure. Given differences innational terminology, it is essential that participating nations operate with the sameunderstanding of C2 relationships.
(2) Structure, staffing, and equipment of MNL organizations. Personnel fromparticipating nations need to be integrated into MNF logistic HQ organizations to makethem truly multinational.
(3) Logistic authorities and responsibilities of the MNFC and participating
nations.
(4) Logistic reporting requirements and reporting capabilities of participating
nations.

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Appendix D(5) Interoperability of logistic C2, communications, and information systems
within the force. Achieving interoperable logistic C2, communications, and information
systems is difficult, even with long-time allies. To facilitate interoperability, the UScommander serving as an MNFC may need to provide requisite systems to multinational
partners.
(6) Logistic requirements for national contingents (e.g., level of medical support,
amount of supplies to be maintained in the OA).
(7) Logistic capabilities of participating national contingents. The MNFC needs
to know to what extent national contingents may require support from nonorganic
resources in order to develop a logistic plan for the operation. NATO doctrine currently
requires certification of the logistic capabilities of non-NATO contingents before they
participate in non-Article 5 crisis response operations. Similar “certifications” may not be
relevant or required for US-led coalitions and, in any case, may be beyond the resources of
the US MNFC and staff to conduct. However, even in the case of less formal logistic
assessments, the US commander serving as an MNFC should be aware that suchassessments of multinational partner capabilities may be diplomatically or politicallysensitive and require multinational cooperation.
(8) Requirements for force-wide mutual support arrangements and implementing
mechanisms.
(9) Requirements for multinational support, including requirements for theaterand operational-level logistic forces.
(10) Requirements for enduring and contingency bases, which may benefit fromthe use of virtual base design technologies, best practices and lessons learned, andalternative energy technologies to reduce the base’s logistics footprint and sustainment
requirements.
(11) Concepts for logistic functions and use of MNL support arrangements, such
as RSN and LN, to implement such concepts.
(12) Prioritized requirements for HNS and available resources.
(13) Authorities and responsibilities of the MNFC and nations in arranging
support from host and transited nations. Centralized coordination of intratheater resource
allocation is essential for operationally efficient support of multinational operations.
(14) Availability of logistic planning tools, including logistic information
databases in the OA, and responsibilities for developing and maintaining such databases.
(15) Differences in classes of supply; see Figure D-2.
(16) Mechanisms to protect logistic technical databases and logistic information
systems.

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Multinational Logistics

United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Classes of Supply
Class of
SupplyUnited States

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

I

Subsistence: Food.

Items of subsistence (e.g. food and forage)
which are consumed by personnel oranimals at an approximate uniform rate,irrespective of local changes in combat or
terrain conditions.

II

General Support Items: Clothing, individual
equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets
and tool kits, hand tools, material,administrative, and housekeeping supplies.

Supplies for which allowances are
established by tables of organization andequipment (e.g., clothing, weapons, tools,
spare parts, vehicles).

III

Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants: Petroleum(including packaged items), fuels, lubricants,
hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives,
liquids and compressed gasses, coolants,
deicing, and antifreeze compounds, plus
components and additives of such products,
including coal.

Petroleum, oil, and lubricants for all
purposes, except for operating aircraft or
for use in weapons such as flame-throwers(e.g., gasoline, fuel oil, coal, and coke).

Aviation fuel and lubricants.

IIIa
IV

Construction/Barrier: Materials that support
fortification, obstacle and barrier construction,and construction material for basedevelopment and general engineering.

Supplies for which initial issue allowances
are not prescribed by approved issue
tables. Normally includes fortification andconstruction materials, as well as additional
quantities of items identical to thoseauthorized for initial issue (Class II) such asadditional vehicles.

V

Ammunition: Ammunition of all types(including chemical, radiological, and special
weapons), bombs, explosives, mines, fuses,
detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets,
propellants, and other associated items.

Ammunition, explosives and chemical
agents of all types.

VI

Personal Demand Items: Nonmilitary sales
items.

VII

Major End-Items: A final combination of end
products ready for intended use (e.g.,launchers, tanks, racks, adapters, pylons,mobile machine shops, and administrative
and tracked vehicles).

VIII

Medical Material/Medical Repair

IX

Repair Parts (less medical special repair
parts): All repair parts and components,
including kits, assemblies, material power
generators subassemblies (repairable andnon-repairable) required for all equipment;
dry batteries.

X(code as zero '0'): Material to support
military programs, not included in Classes I
through IX.

Figure D-2. United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Classes of Supply(17) Relationships with and support to international organizations, NGOs, andother nonmilitary organizations.

D-11

Appendix D(18) Coordination with US non-DOD departments and agencies on logistic
matters affecting the mission/operation. In addition to normal USG interagency
coordination efforts and procedures, CCDRs can use their joint interagency coordinationgroup and the associated or attached USG department or agency representatives andcommand LNOs to facilitate and foster logistics planning and coordination.
(19) Applicability of existing NATO or ABCANZ STANAGs to serve as a basis
for quick development of standardized coalition logistic procedures.
(20) Requirements for infrastructure improvements within the OA and funding
arrangements for such improvements, to include HN power resources and infrastructure.
(21) Requirements for operational energy and their associated risks, including
those risks related to the assured supply of bulk petroleum and electricity, if applicable.
(22) Logistic-related items, such as landing rights, customs, taxes, andenvironmental issues, to be addressed in SOFAs and supporting TAs.
(23) Environmental considerations and hazardous material/waste treatment andremoval.
(24) Up-front common funding authority and availability of funds.
(25) FP measures for logistic sites and activities.
(26) In addressing these issues, US MNFCs should keep in mind cultural aspectsof multinational partners that could affect the operation (e.g., dietary preferences, physicalcharacteristics, and religious practices and taboos). Appendix E provides a “Commander’s
Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.”
f. US Commander’s Perspective. The US commander should be an early and active
participant in the planning process, anticipate support requests, identify US support
requirements, and be prepared to respond appropriately. Close and continuous
coordination with the Joint Staff may also be necessary, especially when SecDef approvalis required for US participation in a specific MNL support arrangement—for example,
acceptance of RSN or LN responsibility. In cases where the US force commander is not“dual-hatted” as the MNFC, the following critical planning tasks should be addressed:(1) Incorporate MNFC logistic guidance into US support plans.
(2) Coordinate US logistic planning with MNFC logistic planning and maintaincontinuous liaison.
(3) Determine sources of support from the HN and available commercial sources
and consult with other participating nations and the MNFC in identifying potential
multinational support arrangements. (The US must clearly identify the extent to which it
can participate in multinational support arrangements.)

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JP 3-16

Multinational Logistics(4) Notify the MNFC as to the logistic supplies and services that the US will
make available to support other participants in the MNF and what limits there are on suchsupport. (US logistic contributions to the MNF are approved by SecDef and communicatedto MNFC planning staffs.)(5) If additional ACSAs are required, coordinate with designated negotiating
authorities (generally the cognizant GCC) and ensure Service components identify pointsof contact and implementation procedures for this authority.
(6) Notify the MNFC regarding what logistic assets are available for possible
redistribution.
(7) Notify the MNFC of relevant aspects of the US support plan in order to assist
the MNFC in harmonizing support for the entire MNF.
(8) Coordinate with nations contributing forces to US units (divisions, brigades,
air wings, maritime task forces) regarding support available from the framework unit andon what terms.
(9) Promulgate MNFC logistics policy, plans, and procedures to participating US
units.
(10) Assemble databases from all available sources on logistic capabilities of
non-US units operating within US framework units and with nations, including HNs,
located in the OA.
(11) Determine FP requirements for US logistic forces; coordinate measures with
the MNFC and HNs; and obtain clear specification of responsibilities of US forces, HNs,
and other multinational participants.
(12) Review US legal authorities and notify the MNFC regarding any legal
constraints that might have an impact on US participation in MNL activities.
(13) Reference lessons learned information systems during the planning process.
Appendix E, “Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational
Operations” is provided to assist US commanders and logistic staffs prepare to participate
in multinational operations.
g. NSE. An NSE is any national organization or activity that supports national forcesthat are part of an MNF. NSEs serve as the intermediary between national logisticalsupport at the strategic level to tactical-level forces. NSEs also coordinate and consolidate
CUL functions. Routinely, the US Service component of the MNF that has the
preponderance of the lead Service CUL responsibilities is designated the US NSE
responsible to provide CUL support to US forces. If the US force is geographicallydispersed, separate component NSEs may be required. NSEs include nationallycommanded NALSSs, NFLSs, ISBs, or other organizations within the OA that support
national forces assigned to the MNF.

D-13

Appendix D(1) An NSE provides logistic support, including supply, maintenance,transportation, health services, customs and border clearance, engineering, environmental,
and OCS. As noted above, an NSE may provide CUL support to MNFs, as well as tonational forces. It is also possible that, in some operations, selected CUL would bearranged by the MJLC (or equivalent), thereby reducing the role of the NSE in providing
such logistics.
(2) In both linear and nonlinear operations, NSEs are located geographically tobest support the force and sited to take advantage of air, rail, and/or sea LOCs. In cases
where the MJLC (or equivalent) has real estate management responsibility, nations desiring
to locate NSEs in the MNFC’s OA must coordinate with both the MJLC and the HN forfinal site approval. This is critical in those areas with limited air and sea ports ofdebarkation in which several nations may be competing for limited available space or
facilities. NSEs from several nations may be colocated to achieve economies andefficiencies. Some nations may find it especially advantageous to form a combined NSE.
(3) Command Relationships. NSEs are national activities that remain undercontrol of national authorities—not the MNFC. There are two basic options for US
command relationship of NSEs.
(a) US NSEs will normally be under direct command of their respective
Service component commander.
(b) In exceptional cases, the US NSE may be a logistically focused JTF
under OPCON to the senior JTF commander.
5. Control and Coordination Models
a. Logistic C2 Organizations(1) The logistic C2 organization of a multinational operation encompasses boththe internal logistic staff elements of the MNF HQ and the overall logistic organization, as
integrated into the total MNF C2 structure.
(2) If the operation is relatively small or involves only a few multinational
partners, the MNFC may rely on the combined-joint logistics office (CJ-4) staff,
augmented (if necessary) with functional experts, to plan and coordinate MNF logistic
activities.
(3) In the case of larger, more complex operations requiring more coordinationand common support, the MNFC may establish a separate organization to assist the CJ-4
in developing and executing the operation’s logistic support plan. NATO designates anorganization, such as an MJLC, for coordinating and managing MNF logistics.
(4) For a US-led multinational operation, the JFC may establish an organization
functionally similar to the MJLC that is tailored in size and specific functions to theparticular operation. This organization may be designated combined/joint logistics center,
MNL coordination center, or the like.
D-14

JP 3-16

Multinational Logistics(5) The MJLC (or its equivalent), if established, may be established as:(a) An augmentation to the CJ-4’s staff, especially during initial planning orfor smaller operations of limited duration.
(b) A separate staff section within the CJ-4 organization.
(c) A separate organization integrated in or colocated with the multinational
HQ or other supporting HQ.
(d) A module placed within a component command.
(6) As shown in Figure D-3, the MJLC may consist of various functional
coordination centers (or other equivalent bodies) that provide centralized coordination ofcommon support services, such as engineering, movement control, medical activities,
OCS, and HNS, and the provision of common supplies, such as bulk petroleum and rations.
The terminology used to designate such organizations and their specific functions varies
depending on the command organization for the operation (e.g., NATO, US-led coalition,
ABCANZ-member nation coalition).

Illustrative Multinational Joint Logistic Center Structure
Multinational
Force
Commander

Other
(as
Required)

HostNation
Support

Logistic
Operations

CombinedJoint Logistics
Officer

Force
SurgeonMultinational
Joint Logistic
Center

CJ-3

Transportation

MedicalForce
Engineer

CJ-8

Engineering Contracting

Logistic
Units
LegendCJ-3
CJ-8

combined-joint operations officer
director for force, structure, resource, andassessment, combined staff
operational command and control
coordination/technical advice

multinational command headquarters
multinational logistic organizational element
combined joint forces

Figure D-3. Illustrative Multinational Joint Logistic Center Structure

D-15

Appendix D(7) In a US-led multinational operation, for example, the MJLC could comprise
a number of joint logistic centers, offices, and boards that would be expanded to include
coordination of MNL matters. These bodies could include combined versions of a joint
logistics readiness center or joint logistics operations center, JMC, joint petroleum office,
JCMEB, JFUB, CCDR logistics procurement support board, theater patient movement
requirements center, joint blood program office, joint medical surveillance team, jointmateriel priorities and allocation board, and/or joint transportation board. See JP 4-0, Joint
Logistics, for details on the functions of these centers, offices, and boards.
(8) NATO has developed detailed doctrine regarding the structure of an MJLC,
referred to in NATO joint doctrine as the joint logistic support group (JLSG), including thefunctions and staffing of various coordinating centers. See AJP-4.6, Allied Joint Doctrine
for the Joint Logistic Support Group, for information on the organization and structure of
the JLSG.
(9) Depending on the command structure of the operation, some functions, such as
movement control, engineering (general, combat, and geospatial), and medical support, may
not fall under the staff cognizance of the CJ-4. The MNFC may determine that these functions
will be organized under other staff sections, such as the combined-joint operations officer,
staff engineer, or staff medical officer. Nonetheless, the CJ-4/MJLC will be involved incoordinating various aspects of these functions—for example, contracting for local supplies
and services in support of engineer and health services activities.
(10) Another important function of the CJ-4/MJLC is to maintain close
coordination on logistic matters with NGOs and international organizations through the
MNFC’s CMOC, if established. The US and other nations participating in an MNF may
establish separate CMOCs to best execute civil-military operations and objectives at thenational level. Nations need to closely coordinate their activities with the MNFC.
(11) In addition to functional coordination tasks, the MJLC may be assigned the
responsibility for coordinating the efforts of logistic units provided by nations to serve at
the theater/operational level for support of the entire MNF. NATO doctrine considers that
there may also be a need to establish tailored, component-level, subordinate multinational
logistic centers (MNLCs) to conduct component-level coordination.
(12) Regardless of the specific logistic C2 and/or management structuredeveloped for a multinational operation, execution of the MNFC’s logistic responsibilities
should be clearly delineated between the CJ-4 and the MJLC or equivalent.
(13) The CJ-4 is responsible for developing the initial logistic guidance, planningfor the logistic support of the operation, and promulgating logistic policies on behalf of the
MNFC. The MJLC (or equivalent) is primarily concerned with implementing theguidance, policies, and plans developed by the CJ-4 and approved by the MNFC.
Essentially, the MJLC performs the execution role for the CJ-4, serving as an extension of
the CJ-4 staff.

D-16

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Multinational Logistics(14) Regarding the overall logistic C2 organization, several options exist consistent
with the various multinational C2 structures. Figures D-4 through D-6 depict three possible
logistic C2 organizational structures modeled after past multinational operations.
(15) The structure represented in Figure D-4 can scale across any multinational
operations but is most applicable to larger multinational operations with many participants.
The key logistic organizational elements of this model are an MJLC, an MNLC for the
maritime component, and NSEs supporting respective national contingents. (Dependingon the size and complexity of MNF air and land forces, MNLCs may also be established
for the air and land component commands.)

Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization:
Alliance-Led Multinational Operation
President/
Secretary of
DefenseAlliance

US Geographic
CombatantCommandMultinational
Force
Commander

US Component
Commands

Air
Component

Land
Component

C-4

Component
Logistic
Commands

CJ-4

MJLC

Maritime
Component

C-4

National
ForcesNational
ForcesNational
Forces

NSE

NSE

NSE

SOF
Component

C-4

MNLC(M)

FLS

ALSS

LegendALSSadvance logistic support site
C-4
combined logistics
CJ-4
combined-joint logistics office
FLS
forward logistic site
MJLC
multinational joint logistic center
MNLC(M) multinational logistic center (maritime)
NSE
national support element
SOF
special operations forces

multinational command headquarters
multinational logistic organizational element
United Statesnational command
operational command and control
coordination

Figure D-4. Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization: Alliance-Led

D-17

Appendix D(16) In the operation represented, US contingents assigned to the MNF operate
under OPCON of the relevant component commander, as has occurred in NATO Balkan
operations. Alternatively, US forces could participate in the operation as a JTF and besupported through a combination of Service-specific logistic organizations and a joint
logistic organization responsible for providing CUL to US JTF units.
(17) In the structure depicted in Figure D-5 for a US-led multinational operation,
the relevant lead Service for CUL support of US forces also provides such support to PNs.
An MJLC, directed by the MNFC’s CJ-4, coordinates selected logistic activities (e.g., fuelsupply and distribution and medical support) with multinational partners through various
cells and boards. A JMC is also established. This structure is suited to operations where
only a few multinational partners contribute to a predominantly US MNF. The logistic
structure for the operation consists of US staff elements that are augmented withmultinational personnel to form an integrated joint structure.
(18) The logistics C2 structure for a non-US-led coalition operation may diverge
from the US or alliance models in various aspects. US logistic planners seek to influence
the MNL structure of a non-US-led coalition to be consistent with approved US joint
doctrine. However, US commanders and logistic staff should be prepared to operate within
C2 organizations that differ from those discussed within this publication.
(19) Figure D-6 represents a key feature of UN operations: responsibility forlogistic support may be shared between a force commander and a chief administrative
officer. This dual structure was developed to manage peace support operations involving
relatively few military forces (e.g., small peacekeeping contingents and observer teams)
that could be most efficiently supported through a single logistic organization. In several
larger, more recent operations, participating nations have been encouraged to provide theirown logistic support for their national contingents. (This support can be provided
organically or through bilateral/multilateral arrangements with other participating nations.)
Another option is that the US may be requested to serve as LN for the provision of selectedlogistic support to the entire MNF, as the US did in UN operations in Somalia II. In thiscase, the chief administrative officer exercised overall logistic coordination for the entire
UN mission—including the provision of support for other UN activities (such as election
monitoring and military observers)—but the US logistic group operated under the controlof the force commander.
(20) Other logistic C2 structures are possible. The key is that, in multinational
operations, there will almost always be a requirement for some centralized coordination or
management of common logistic support for the MNF. US commands and Services (andtheir staffs) must be prepared to support US forces in a variety of multinationalorganizational structures and, in the case of US-led operations, to establish logisticorganizations for coordinating logistic support for the entire MNF.
b. Incorporation of US Theater Logistics Management Considerations in
Multinational Operations

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JP 3-16

Multinational Logistics

Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization:
United States-Led Multinational Operation
President/
Secretary of
DefenseMultinational
Governments

MNFC

National Forces
Command
C/JLOC

Deputy

C/JCC

CJ-4

C/JMC
C/JMAB
C/JPO

Air
Component

US
Air
Forces

MN
Air
ForcesLand
Component

US
Land
Forces

MN
Land
ForcesMaritime
Component

US
Maritime
ForcesMN
Maritime
ForcesSOF
Component

US
SOF
Forces

MN
SOF
ForcesUS Component Logistic Command
Multinational Logistics
Organizations

Service Component Logistic
Command (CUL Provider)(NSE)

LegendC/JCC
C/JLOC
C/JMAB
C/JMC
C/JPO
CJ-4
CUL
MN
MNFC
NSE
SOF

combined/joint contracting center
combined/joint logistics operations center
combined/joint materiel allocation board
combined/joint movement center
combined/joint petroleum officecombined-joint logistics officecommon-user logistics
multinational
multinational force commander
national support element
special operations forces

multinational command headquarters
multinational logistic organizational element
United States
allies/multinational partners
national command
operational command and control
coordination (multinational)
coordination (national)
coordination (allies/multinational partners)

Figure D-5. Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization: United States-Led
Multinational Operation(1) In alliance operations, US forces are guided by previously agreed onprocesses and procedures. For coalition operations, STANAGs may also have beenpreviously concluded that determine the organization arrangements for an operation. For
example, within the ABCANZ Standardization Program, the participants have agreed to an
Army component logistic organization structure for multinational operations that comprise
two or more ABCANZ nations.

D-19

Appendix D

Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization:
United Nations-Commanded Multinational Operation

CIVPOL

Elected
Officials

Secretary Council
Secretary General

President/
Secretary of
DefenseSpecialRepresentativeof theSecretary General

US
Geographic
CombatantCommand

Military
Observers

Force
Commander

CAO

CISS
DCOS
Logistics

Personnel
COS

Operations
Logistic
Operations

Transportation

SupplyEngineering

Communications

MedicalContractor
Chief of Staff

National
Contingent

US
Contingent

Bilateral Support

National
SupportElements

LegendCAO
CISS
CIVPOLCOS
DCOS

chief administrative officer
chief integrated support services
civilian police
chief of staff
deputy chief of staff

multinational command headquarters
multinational logistic organizational element
United States
allies/multinational partners
national command
operational command and control
coordination

Figure D-6. Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization: United NationsCommanded Multinational Operation(2) In the case of US-led multinational operations, the US JFC is expected to
expand upon the tools available for managing joint logistic operations and adapt them to

D-20

JP 3-16

Multinational Logistics
the multinational environment. Current US doctrine for the logistic support of joint
operations identifies the need to capitalize on the assets and capabilities available in theaterto facilitate support to the warfighter. Joint theater logistics management (JTLM) is one
way to help achieve a unified focus within the theater by integrating information, productdelivery, flexible response, and effective C2. JTLM ensures the right product is delivered
to the right place at the right time.
(3) Options for expanding JTLM organizational structures to manage MNL
include using a predominant Service organization as the nucleus operational logistic
activity to manage common requirements; expanding the logistic readiness center; andusing the lead Service, as directed by the CCDR, to provide CUL support (e.g., fresh water)
to multinational partners.
(4) Regardless of the approach, US staff conducting JTLM functions will need to
be augmented by personnel from participating nations to give the JTLM organization thecapability to manage MNL activities. The nucleus for the organization may be available
through US personnel currently staffing logistic readiness centers and/or from other logisticcommands not anticipated to participate in the operation as a unit. GCCs can facilitate
establishment of multinational JTLM organizations by conducting logistic staff
augmentation planning exercises with prospective regional multinational partners.
(5) The challenge for JTLM organizations in multinational operations is to gain
visibility of the logistic requirements and status of the total MNF. To the extent feasible,
JTLM organizations should strive to use improved communications and modern
technology to integrate the logistic reporting and information systems of participating
nations. Enhanced logistic connectivity may be difficult to achieve, however, because of
the differences in technological sophistication among participants and national
requirements for information security.

D-21

Appendix D

Intentionally Blank

D-22

JP 3-16

APPENDIX ECOMMANDER’S CHECKLIST FOR LOGISTICS IN SUPPORT OF
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
1. General
Logistic operations as described in this publication cover a wide variety of subjects.
The checklist provided below offers the MNFC, the US JFC, and logisticians participatingin multinational operations a tool for use in planning logistic support.
2. Planninga. Overall Mission-Force Organization-C2_____ What is the nature of the operation—its specific mission, the size of the force, national
composition, and expected duration?
_____ Under what authority is the operation being conducted? UN?
governments only?

NATO?

National_____ Will a combined joint task force (CJTF) be formed? What forces will be under
OPCON of the CJTF commander or MNFC? How is “OPCON” understood by participating
nations?
_____ What is the overall C2 structure of the force?
_____ Will the forces be organized along component or national lines?
_____ Does the OPLAN provide a summary of the requirements, taskings, and concept ofmultinational operations that logistic planning must support?
b. Overall Logistics Planning_____ Is the planning for the multinational operation under way concurrently by operationand logistic planners?
_____ Has a JFC been designated to provide US input and interface with the multinational
planning element, especially for logistics?
_____ Will the US planning element represent both the operation and logistic communities?
_____ Have the force logistical concepts and requirements been determined and concisely
stated?
_____ Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of the mission?
_____ Have logistic policies, processes, and reporting procedures been coordinated,established, and promulgated throughout the force, and with key USG interagency partners,
international organization, or NGO partners as appropriate?
E-1

Appendix E_____ Is a listing available of national doctrinal, policy, and procedural publications
appropriate to the level at which the plan is prepared? Are multinational and joint Service
references included where applicable?
_____ Have logistics-related assumptions been stated and are they realistic?
_____ Has the MNFC identified financial responsibilities of all of the participants anddeveloped reimbursement procedures for CUL support?
_____ Has logistics support been planned for all phases of the operation?
_____ Does the US have any logistic agreements with any of the participating nations?
_____ How deep into the US held stocks are we willing to reach in support of PNs?
_____ Have the logisticians looked at the GCC’s theater distribution plans (TDPs) on
multinational movement support?
_____ Is there a requirement to build one or more contingency bases to support MNF
operations for US and PN forces?
c. Logistic C2 Relationships and Organization_____ What is the logistic C2 organization for the operation? Will an MJLC or equivalentorganization be established, or will the CJ-4 (and staff) manage and coordinate MNF
logistics? If established, where will the MJLC be located in the C2 structure?
_____ Has the multinational command structure been designed to eliminate unnecessary
duplication of logistic functions?
_____ Has the US structure been similarly aligned?
_____ Are the responsibilities for support clearly stated for the following? Are they alignedwith the correct authority?
(1) Supporting command(s)(2) Supported command(s)(3) HNS(4) Other Services(5) Multinational partners(6) NSE_____ What directive authority, if any, will the MNFC have over logistic support for the
MNF? Will the MNFC have OPCON over any logistic units or resources?

E-2

JP 3-16

Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations_____ Will the MNFC have “redistribution” authority over national logistic assets, and towhat extent has the US accepted such authority? What limits has the US imposed on MNFC
redistribution of US logistic assets?
_____ Have coordinating centers been established for movement control, medical support,
OCS, engineering, and logistic operations?
(1) Where will they be assigned?
(2) What authority will such centers have?
_____ For non-US-led operations, what (if any) US logistic elements will be attached tomultinational HQ?
_____ For US-led operations, what plans exist for incorporating PN staff into US logistic
C2 and operational organizations? What arrangements have been made to facilitate
integrating PN personnel into US logistic organizations (e.g., introduction to US systems
and procedures)?
_____ Have logistic supported and supporting command relationships been established orreferred to higher HQ for resolution?
_____ Will the US establish an NSE?
_____ Will the mission of the US NSE be to support all US components, or will there be
separate NSEs for each US component of the MNF?
_____ Will US NSE(s) have any responsibilities for providing support to non-US
contingents?
_____ Where will NSE(s) be located?
_____ What US liaison elements are needed?
_____ Does the US have a process to ensure US liaison elements on multinational command
staffs possess requisite authorities and have a full understanding of both US andmultinational objectives?
_____ What multinational liaison elements are needed, who will provide them, what
qualifications should they have, and where will they go?
_____ Are all the JDDOCs logistical C2 relationships and organizations specified in the
GCC’s TDP?
d. Logistic Communications and Information Systems_____ Have the communications and intelligence systems been established to rapidly
disseminate time-sensitive, logistic-related information to all participants?

E-3

Appendix E_____ What automated logistic information planning tools are available to support COA
analysis and to assist the MNFC logistic staff in ensuring operational priorities are fully
supported? Is a coalition logistic database available to support logistic planning? Are
participating nations being encouraged to populate the database with up-to-date
information that is usable by coalition logistic planners?
_____ Are national logistic information systems interoperable, and are workarounds orcontingency measures being implemented to facilitate exchange of critical logistic
information?
_____ What mechanisms are in place to protect logistic information databases andcommunications systems to ensure continuous logistic support in case of a cyberspace
attack?
_____ Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?
_____ Are all logistical information planning tools located in the GCC’s TDP?
e. MNL Support Arrangements_____ What is the concept for using RSN, LN, and multinational integrated logistic unit
(MILU) arrangements for providing CUL support to the MNF? Have requirements forsuch arrangements been identified and particular nations, with the requisite capabilities,
assigned the relevant responsibilities?
_____ Has the US offered to assume RSN, LN, or MILU responsibilities? For what
specific logistic functions and geographic area?
_____ To what extent can the US use theater support contracts to provide logistic support
to MNF contingents? What arrangements (legal and otherwise) need to be implemented
to allow for such use of US external support contract capabilities?
_____ If multinational theater support contract programs have been previously
established, can such capabilities be used to provide CUL in the planned operation?
_____ Are the logistic capabilities of all participating nations—large and small—being
fully leveraged through use of MNL arrangements to ensure the most operationallyeffective and efficient support of the MNF with the smallest logistics footprint?
_____ Are smaller participating nations that have compatible equipment encouraged tolink together to enhance mutual support?
_____ What are the implications of planned MNL arrangements for the size and structure of
US logistic forces assigned to the operation and the time-phased deployment of specific units?
_____ Is there a requirement for an MNF-wide mutual support agreement to facilitate
mutual support among all participating nations? Is the US able to participate in such an
agreement?

E-4

JP 3-16

Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations_____ Is there a requirement for waivers to US legal authorities to conduct mutual
logistic support with other nations?
_____ What action is being taken to obtain waivers (if required) to US legal authorities
to conduct mutual logistic support with other nations?
_____ What US element is charged to ensure the necessary ACSAs and related
implementing agreements are in place with participants?
_____ Does the US have an ACSA with each participating nation? If not, what will be
the legal mechanism for exchanging logistic support?
_____ What is the opportunity for the US to develop or use existing bilateral andmultilateral agreements with PN involved in the operation?
_____ To what extent do participating nations have open foreign military sales cases with
the US to facilitate participating in US logistic support?
_____ Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in theform of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?
_____ Are all MNL support arrangements located in the GCC’s TDP?
f. Logistic Capabilities/Certification_____ What level of sustainment stocks is mandated by the MNFC to maintain in the
OA? What level should US forces maintain?
_____ Are forces—MNF and US—sufficiently robust “logistically” to respond toincreased levels of operational intensity?
_____ Have standards regarding logistic capabilities been established and whatorganization will inspect and ascertain compliance with logistic-related standards prior to
deployment?
_____ Does the MNF logistic staff possess the requisite information regarding
participant logistic capabilities in order to properly coordinate MNF logistics? Are there
measures the MNF staff can take to assist nations in ameliorating any logistic
deficiencies?
_____ Is there a requirement for a formal logistic certification process, and, if so, how
can it be conducted with maximum cooperation and understanding among participating
nations?
g. Managing Allocation of HNS_____ What are the MNF requirements for logistic support provided from sources in the
OA?

E-5

Appendix E_____ What infrastructure and other HN logistic resources are available in the OA to meet
MNF requirements?
_____ What defense articles and services is the HN willing to provide and under what
reimbursement conditions, and what resources must be procured through contracts withlocal providers?
_____ How is HNS provision and allocation to be managed and coordinated? Is the MNFC
authorized by nations to negotiate HNS agreements on behalf of nations and to prioritize
allocation?
_____ Have the appropriate coordination channels been established with the HN to ensure
timely provision of HNS where it is most needed? Have the US and other MNF nations
established liaison teams in the MNF HQ and at key HNS locations to coordinate theprovision of HNS to national contingents?
_____ What HNS agreements do the US and other MNF nations already have in place with
HNs? How are pre-existing bilateral HNS arrangements to be integrated into a total MNF
HNS structure?
_____ Have MNF nations agreed on a policy for reconciling conflicts in HNS allocation
among nations?
h. Contracting_____ Is the MNFC authorized to coordinate multinational contracting efforts in the OA
in order to ensure priorities are efficiently supported?
_____ Has the MNF HQ organization that will manage this process been identified?
_____ Are the MNF contracting policies and processes available?
_____ Is a “restricted items list” required to manage contracting for scarce resources in the
OA?
_____ Will the MJLC or equivalent organization be required to negotiate contracts for theentire MNF? If so, have participating nations assigned requisite personnel to the MNF
contracting center?
_____ Does the US plan to use external support contracts during the operation?
_____ Who will manage this process?
_____ Will there be a single MNF manager for external support contracts to include
HNS, LOGCAP, AFCAP, and other contracted support?
_____ Who will be the US manager to interface into this process?

E-6

JP 3-16

Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations_____ Has the US identified the main point of contact of contractor personnel, including
both theater and external support contractors?
_____ Are all OCS requirements located in the GCC’s TDP?
i. Common Funding_____ Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs andexpenditures?
_____ Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will bereimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by theparticipating nations?
_____ Has the US identified funding to support operations and/or to provide
reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets?
j. SOFAs/TAs_____ Who is responsible for negotiating a SOFA with the HN(s), including transitednations? What is the status of SOFA negotiations?
_____ Who is responsible for negotiating the TAs to supplement the SOFA?
_____ What logistics-related issues/items need to be addressed in the SOFA and TA(s)?
For example, are US and other national contractors properly included as part of the MNF
for purposes of SOFA rights and obligations?
_____ What US elements are participating in these negotiations?
_____ Has the appropriate authority been delegated to the MNFC to negotiate andconclude with multinational partners agreements deemed necessary to conduct theplanned operation?
k. Relations with NGOs, International Organizations, and Local Populations_____ How will MNF logistic HQ coordinate with NGOs and internationalorganizations? Will a CMOC be established for this purpose? If NATO is participating,will country cluster coordination meetings be held?
_____ What MNF logistic organizational element is authorized as the main point ofcontact with international organizations and NGOs?
_____ What efforts have been made to obtain logistics-related information frominternational organizations and NGOs operating in the area and to take advantage of theirknowledge and contacts in the OA?

E-7

Appendix E_____ What efforts have been made to coordinate activities with such organizations to
reduce competition for local resources, enhance operational efficiency, and eliminate
redundancy in operations?
_____ What is the MNF concept for providing logistic support for the restoration of local
government and other civil-military activities? What are the MNF and US logistic
requirements to support local populations?
_____ What is the MNF concept for assisting local governments and populations throughacquisition of local goods and services?
l. Engineering_____ What is the MNF concept for general engineering, combat engineering, geospatial
support? How will MNF engineering activities be coordinated? Through whatorganizations?
_____ Have required projects been identified that benefit the entire MNF (e.g., bridge andmain supply route construction)?
_____ What resources will be used to execute these projects? Who will provide theresources?
_____ To what extent are HNS and commercial resources available for such projects? What
governmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations provide engineer logisticalsupport in the OA? How can MNFs leverage or be supplemented by those assets?
m. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)_____ What is the MNF EOD plan? How will EOD activities be coordinated? Throughwhat organizations? What resources will be used to execute EOD operations? Who will
provide the resources?
_____ What are the logistic support requirements for that plan?
_____ If humanitarian demining operations are to be conducted, are US forces trained in the
restrictions of demining placed on US forces?
n. Joint Health Services_____ What is the MNF concept for medical support? What level of capability are nations
required to provide their forces in the OA? What medical policy and guidance has been
issued to participating nations?
_____ What organizational element will coordinate medical support for the MNF during theoperation? Have nations identified skilled personnel to staff the multinational medical
coordination center?

E-8

JP 3-16

Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations_____ Are there any existing medical support agreements among participating nations orwith the HN? What opportunities exist for multinational arrangements to consolidate andrationalize medical support in the OA? Have LN and RSN health service responsibilities
been assigned to nations? Is there a role for multinational integrated medical units?
_____ What medical materiel (supplies and equipment) can the US offer to provide MNF
contingents? Has the US JFC notified the MNF chief medical officer of all US legal
restrictions that pertain to providing medical support to other nations’ personnel and theterms and conditions of such support?
_____ What restrictions apply to US acceptance of medical support from other countries?
_____ What is the quality of the medical capability in the OA?
_____ To what extent does US intend to contribute to and use an MNF blood bank?
_____ Is there any plan for the US forces to develop an initial preplanned supply support
package?
_____ What are the approved commercial sources of medical products?
_____ Are medical treatment facilities identified to support the operation? What is the statusof medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) (intratheater) and aeromedical evacuation (intratheaterand intertheater) plans?
_____ To what extent will US strategic aeromedical evacuation or battlefield MEDEVAC(air and ground) capabilities be required to support the MNF?
_____ What is the MNF and US theater (aeromedical evacuation and MEDEVAC) (air andground) policy?
_____ What is the process of reimbursement between US and multinational partners
regarding the provision and receipt of medical assistance, including (aeromedical evacuationand MEDEVAC) (air and ground)?
_____ Have necessary provisions been made to allow rendering of such health services toforeign forces?
_____ Are all medical services accounted for in GCC’s TDP?
o. Health Services_____ What diseases exist in country?
p. CBRN Threats_____ Are CBRN threats known and are US and MNF medical facilities prepared to copewith them (including prophylaxis and pretreatment)?

E-9

Appendix E_____ What diseases exist in country?
_____ What plans do the US and the MNF have to decontaminate personnel and materiel
and provide contamination mitigation and consequence management support?
_____ To what extent will the MNF and the US need to provide such support to the local
civilian population?
_____ Will multinational laboratory support provide for the identification andconfirmation of biological and chemical warfare agents and support selectedbiomonitoring requirements?
_____ Are alternate sites and capabilities identified in the event that key logistics nodes
and infrastructure are subjected to CBRN hazards?
_____ Are essential contractors and key civilian workers included in CBRN FP
planning?
q. Mortuary Affairs_____ Are mortuary affairs procedures in place to process multinational decedents, toinclude recognition of culture differences and timely return to national authorities?
_____ Are all mortuary affairs activities accounted for in GCC’s TDP?
r. Detainee Management_____ What is the MNF plan to handle and care for detainees? What are the US plan,role, and responsibilities?
_____ What will be detainee turn-over procedures and to what nation?
s. FP_____ What guidance has the MNFC issued regarding FP?
_____ What arrangements have been made with HNs and PNs for FP, especially in rearareas?
_____ What FP, if any, will be provided by HN and/or multinational partners to US
forces, and what FP will the US be required to provide other national contingents of the
MNF?
_____ Will there be a lead rear area security coordinator? What are the responsibilities
of logistic units to provide local security and to coordinate with the lead rear area security
organization?
_____ What element is responsible for FP planning?

E-10

JP 3-16

Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations_____ What element will be responsible to identify FP threats?
_____ Has munitions site planning been conducted?
_____ Have munitions control/security procedures been established?
t. Operational Energy_____ Has the staff requested contingents provide estimated power requirements?
u. Environmental Hazardous Waste_____ Has the staff legal office been consulted regarding applicable HN and otherenvironmental law?
_____ What is the higher authority guidance regarding environmental law and policy issues?
_____ What legal restrictions apply, if any, including the restrictions on the use of
appropriated funds or the requirement to notify the CJCS, the Office of the Secretary
Defense, or Congress?
_____ What, if any, MNFC guidance should be promulgated?
_____ Has an environmental checklist been prepared for use by contingents in assuming
responsibility for intratheater facilities?
_____ What are the applicable HN and other laws and policies relative to thehandling, movement, storage, and disposal of hazardous material?
_____ Has the staff requested contingents provide estimated power requirements?
_____ Has the staff estimated base camp power requirements and developed an efficient
power production and distribution plan?
_____ Has an energy surety checklist been prepared to assist contingent in identifying
and prioritizing critical infrastructure and systems?
3. Deployment_____ What automated system will be used to establish and execute the TPFDD?
_____ What will be the US contribution to strategic lift of forces other than US?
_____ Has the deployment plan deconflicted NGO/international organization and contractor
transportation requirements in order to avoid competition for limited transportation
infrastructure?
_____ What LOCs are to be established?

E-11

Appendix E_____ What will be the responsibilities assigned relative the LOCs from reception to
intratheater destinations?
_____ What en route support will national elements require?
_____ What role will the multinational HQ play with regard to contributing nations anden route support?
_____ What is the MNF requirements determination process for flowing the forces into
the theater?
_____ Has an MNF TPFDD/TPFDL been established? What is the method of insertionof forces into the theater?
_____ Is there a need for a logistics over-the-shore operation? If so, is that identified ina separate plan?
_____ What is the MNF plan to manage the flow of force into the OA for the MNFC?
_____ What will be the US management and operational responsibilities to support
deployment?
_____ What is the MNF plan to use US strategic lift capability to support deployment?
_____ What will be the reception ports of entry (to include border crossing points) into
the OA?
_____ What are MNF security arrangements for the POEs/PODs?
_____ What LOCs will be used?
_____ What is the plan to manage use of the LOCs?
_____ What LOC will the US use?
_____ What will be the US responsibilities for that LOC?
_____ What is MNF reception, staging, and onward movement plan to include enroute support for US forces?
_____ Has the MNFC selected and allocated staging areas and tactical unit assembly areas?
_____ What staging areas and tactical assembly areas have been allocated by the MNFC
for US use?
_____ What MNF agreements have been made for en route support of deploying forces,
to include the US?
_____ Is the MNFC obtaining clearances for MNF elements transiting en route nations?

E-12

JP 3-16

Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations_____ What is the MNF security plan for reception points in objective area?
_____ What is the MNF plan for coordinating international organization and NGO
movement into the OA?
_____ What is the process to manage road and rail movement into and out of the theater?
_____ Who has that management responsibility?
_____ Who will be the US manager of that flow?
_____ What are the reception requirements for the force moving by these modes?
_____ Who has highway regulation and control responsibility?
_____ Have custom and border clearances been planned for? Obtained? By whom?
_____ What HNS will be available, if any, to support US forces deploying into
the OA?
_____ What MNF and US logistic capabilities need to be deployed very early?
_____ What initial assets has the MNFC identified as requiring visibility during
deployment?
_____ Does the US agree to provide such visibility to MNFC? To what extent will thisinformation be shared with other MNF participants?
_____ What is the mechanism and frequency of reporting such information?
_____ Is there an FP plan covering force deployment?
4. Termination/Redeployment
The checklist for deployment also applies in large measure to the redeployment process.
The following represent some additional issues associated with termination andredeployment.
_____ Has the end state, exit strategy, and redeployment plan been developed by the
MNFC?
_____ What is the status of the US redeployment plan?
_____ Have the redeployment TPFDD and TPFDL been developed and validated?
_____ What are the HN and US customs/agriculture requirements?

E-13

Appendix E_____ Have the US Customs and Border Clearance agencies, particularly the US
Department of Agriculture, been contacted to determine requirements for returning cargoand passengers?
_____ If articles are left in theater, what are the procedures for transferring or disposingof those articles?
_____ What US forces, equipment, and materiel will remain in theater?
_____ What are the support requirements for this force?
_____ What MNF forces and materiel will remain in place?
_____ What is the MNF plan to dispose of excess or unusable or equipment wheretransportation costs exceed new purchase costs?
_____ What is the MNF plan for disposal of hazardous items?
_____ What is the MNF FP plan for withdrawing forces?
_____ What logistic support will be required for withdrawal?
_____ What is the MNF close-out plan for facilities? Does it include a checklist forenvironmental issues?
_____ What will be the role of LOGCAP, AFCAP, and NAVFAC contingency
construction and service contracts during US withdrawal?
_____ What is the estimated cost for facility restoration?
_____ Who will pay for the restoration? US or common funding?
_____ What is the plan to dispose of equipment procured through MNF resources?
_____ What is the destination for US equipment?
_____ What are the equipment readiness standards to be met before being redeployed?
_____ Where will withdrawing equipment be brought to standards? Are facilities
adequate for the task?
_____ Have standards been established for equipment being relocated?
_____ Are there applicable accounting procedures for reporting financial expenditures andhave reimbursement procedures been initiated?
_____ What is the plan to transition or close contingency bases as US forces draw down andredeploy?

E-14

JP 3-16

Commander’s Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations
5. Transition Considerations_____ Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption of
in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency oralliance?
_____ Will the US be asked to provide additional logistic resources or units to support theoperation?
_____ To what extent can other participating nations provide logistic resources that will
reduce the US logistic contribution to the operation?
_____ To what extent have the additional logistic requirements of the operation been
rationalized given the increased scope of the operation?
_____ To what extent has the logistic structure been identified to meet logistic requirements
above the maneuver unit level (e.g., corps or theater-level logistic units).
_____ How will the US JTF C2 structure be affected? Will the US assume command of
the operation?
_____ If the US is to lead the operation, to what extent will its C2 organization be augmented
by personnel from other participating nations?
_____ Will an MNFC be established to coordinate logistic support for the operation?
_____ What degree of authority for logistics will be given for the operation?
_____ How will costs of the operation be apportioned among participating members?
_____ To what degree will up-front common funding be made available and for what uses?
_____ Is there a need to develop MOAs to formalize relations among the participating
nations? Is there authority to negotiate and conclude such agreements? Have appropriate
MOAs been developed?
_____ What modifications are necessary to existing SOFAs and TAs to accommodate
forces from the additional countries? Is there authority to negotiate and conclude suchagreements?
_____ What agreements are necessary to permit the redistribution of logistic resources
during emergency conditions? Is there authority to negotiate and conclude suchagreements? Have all participating nations agreed to those provisions?
_____ To what extent will US logistic policies and procedures be changed to satisfy
either UN or regional alliance policies and procedures?
_____ Have logistic policies, procedures, processes, and reporting requirements been
identified and promulgated?
E-15

Appendix E_____ Has the ability of transferred units to support themselves and/or logistic
deficiencies been identified?
_____ If a NATO operation, to what extent and in what areas will NATO STANAGs beused?
_____ Will the participating nations provide logistically robust units that are selfsufficient?
_____ To what extent can existing contracts supporting US forces be amended tosupport the additional forces?

E-16

JP 3-16

APPENDIX FPOINTS OF CONTACT
Joint Staff/J-7/Joint Education and Doctrine/Doctrine Division and Joint and Allied
Doctrine Integrator/Joint Lessons Learned Division
Website:http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/
E-mail:js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil
Phone:
703-692-7273
DSN:
222-7273
Lead Agent and Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J-5/Director for Strategic Plans andPolicy/Deputy Director Transregional Threats Coordination Cell (DDT2C2)/
Multinational Operations Division (MOD)Phone:
703-614-9349
DSN:
224-9349
GS LeMay Center
E-mail:AFDDEC.DDJ@us.af.milCommand: USAF
Phone:
334-953-7597
DSN:
493-7597
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)/Homeland Defense, Policy,
Strategy and Doctrine Branch, N&NC/J521/Strategy, Policy, and Doctrine Division,
N&NC/J52
Phone:
719-554-1475
United States European Command (USEUCOM)
Phone:
497116805999
DSN:
314-430-5999
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)
Phone:
813-529-5215
DSN:
529-5215
United States Army (USA)
Phone:
703 695-5242
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) SOCOM_FMD_J9-D
E-mail:FMDJ9DALL@socom.mil
Command: USSOCOM
Phone:
813-826-5531
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
Phone:
402-294-2923
DSN:
271-2923

F-1

Appendix F
National Guard Bureau (NGB) Joint Staff (JS), Army National Guard (ARNG), and
Air National Guard (ANG)
Phone:
703-601-6791 and 703- 607-3218
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)
Phone:
305-437-1049
DSN:
567-1049
United States Coast Guard (USCG)
Phone:
202-372-1096

F-2

JP 3-16

APPENDIX GREFERENCES
The development of JP 3-16 is based upon the following primary references.
1. Generala. National Security Presidential Memorandum-4, Organization of the National
Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees.
b. NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military
Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.
c. National Security Decision Memorandum 119, Disclosure of Classified UnitedStates Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.
d. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/7, National Disclosure Policy.
e. National Strategy for Information Sharing.
f. Guidance for the Employment of the Force.
2. Department of Defense Publications
a. DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.
b. DODD 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program.
c. DODD 2311.01E, DOD Law of War Program.
d. DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW
Policy.
e. DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.
f. DODD 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent.
g. DODD 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation.
h. DODD 5205.02E DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program.
i. DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments
and International Organizations.
j. DODD 5530.3, International Agreements.
k. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations.

G-1

Appendix G
l. DODI 5000.64, Accountability and Management of DOD Equipment and Other
Accountable Property.
m. DODI 5000.68, Security Force Assistance (SFA).
n. DODI 8523.01, Communications Security (COMSEC).
o. DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,
Classification, and Declassification.
p. DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protectionof Classified Information.
q. DOD 7000.14R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation(FMRS), Volume 15, Security Cooperation Policy.
r. DOD Information Sharing Strategy.
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications
a. CJCSI 2700.01F, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Activities.
b. CJCSI 3110.01J, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
c. CJCSI 3110.05F, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan.
d. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use ofForce for US Forces.
e. CJCSI 5715.01C, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.
f. CJCSI 5810.01D, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.
g. CJCSI 6510.06C, Communication Security Releases to Foreign Nations.
h. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
i. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.
j. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.
k. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
l. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support in Joint Operations.
m. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
n. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

G-2

JP 3-16Referenceso. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.
p. JP 3-05, Special Operations.
q. JP 3-07, Stability.
r. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.
s. JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.
t. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.
u. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.
v. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.
w. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
x. JP 3-13, Information Operations.
y. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.
z. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.
aa. JP 3-14, Space Operations.
bb. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.
cc. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.
dd. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
ee. JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.
ff. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
gg. JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations.
hh. JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations.
ii. JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations.
jj. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
kk. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.
ll. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.
mm. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

G-3Appendix G
nn. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.
oo. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.
pp. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.
qq. JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.
rr. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
ss. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
tt. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.
uu. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.
vv. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.
ww. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
xx. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.
yy. JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.
zz. JDN 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.
4. Multinational Publications
a. AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.
b. AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.
c. AJP-3.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.
d. AJP-3.4.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations.
e. AJP-3.4.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian
Assistance.
f. AJP-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization andReconstruction.
g. AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation.
h. AJP-3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.
i. AJP-3.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment.

G-4

JP 3-16References
j. AJP-3.8, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological andNuclear Defence.
k. AJP-3.12, Allied Doctrine for Engineer Support to Joint Operations.
l. AJP-3.14, Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection.
m. AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine.
n. AJP-6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communications and Information Systems.
5. Other Publications
a. Army Techniques Publication 3-94.1, Digital Liaison Detachment.
b. Army Techniques Publication 3-22.40/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 315.8/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-07.3.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures 3-2.45/Coast Guard Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-93.2, MultiService Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Employment of Nonlethal Weapons.
c. MPAT
concept
andhttps://community.apan.org/mpat.

supporting

information,www.mpat.org

ord. MPAT, Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF-SOP),Version
3, 11 August November 2017, https://community.apan.org/wg/mpat/p/sop.aspx.
e. Multinational Interoperability Council, Coalition Building Guide, 3rd Edition,
Version
1.3,
March
2015
Version1,
7
November
2012,
https://community.apan.org/wg/mic/p/coalition_building_guide.https://community.apan.org/wg/mic/.
f. National Strategy for Information Sharing.
g. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College, Protectionof Civilians Military Reference Guide (Second Edition), January 2018
http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/PoC_MilRefGd_2nd_ed_Web_reduc
ed.pdf.

G-5

Appendix G

Intentionally Blank

G-6

JP 3-16

APPENDIX HADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the
Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf
and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorshipa. The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).
b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent and Joint
Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. Charles C. Pattillo Jr., Director for Strategic Plans and Policy(J-5)/Deputy Director Transregional Threats Coordination Cell (DDT2C2)/Multinational
Operations Division (MOD); Mr. Glenn P. Palmer and Mr. Craig R. Corey, Joint Staff J7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Branch; and Mr. Peter L. Croteau, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine
Branch.
3. Supersession
This publication supersedes JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, 16 July 2013.
4. Change Recommendations
a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,pleasecompletethe
Joint
Doctrine
FeedbackFormlocatedat:https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf
ande-mailitto:js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would changesource document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and otherorganizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
5. Lessons Learned
The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness

H-1

Appendix Hof the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned areroutinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of thedevelopment process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).
6. Distribution of Publications
Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be
IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,
Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD
Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.
7. Distribution of Electronic Publications
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions areavailable on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp(NIPRNET) and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/generic.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at
http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, andJoint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base AnacostiaBolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.
c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,
the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally
reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support
agencies.

H-2

JP 3-16

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS
AADC
ABCANZ
ACA
ACSA
AFIC
AJP
AMCC
AO
APAN
AUSCANNZUKUS

area air defense commander
American, British, Canadian, Australian,and New Zealandairspace control authority
acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
Five Eyes Air Force Interoperability Council
Allied joint publication
allied movement coordination centerarea of operations
All Partners Access Network
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom,
United States

C2
CA
CAAF
CAO
CBG
CBRN
CCC
CCDR
CCEB
CCMD
CCP
CD
CEWCC
CID
CIMIC
CJ-4
CJCS
CJCSI
CJTF
CMO
CMOC
COA
COMSECCONOPSCONPLANCUL
CWMD

command and control
civil affairs
contractors authorized to accompany the force
civil affairs operations
coalition building guidechemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
coalition coordination center
combatant commander
Combined Communications-Electronics Board
combatant command
combatant command campaign plancounterdrug
combined electronic warfare coordination cell
combat identification
civil-military cooperation
combined-joint logistic office
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
combined joint task force (NATO)
civil-military operations
civil-military operations centercourse of action
communications security
concept of operations
concept plancommon-user logistics
countering weapons of mass destruction

DCA
DLD

defense cooperation agreement
digital liaison detachment

GL-1

Glossary
DOD
DODD
DODI
DOS

Department of Defense
Department of Defense directive
Department of Defense instruction
Department of State

ECC
EM
EMOE
EMS
EOD
EU
EW

engineer coordination cellelectromagnetic
electromagnetic operational environment
electromagnetic spectrum
explosive ordnance disposal
European Union
electronic warfare

FDO
FHA
FHP
FID
FP
FSF

foreign disclosure officer
foreign humanitarian assistanceforce health protection
foreign internal defense
force protection
foreign security forces

GCC
GEF

geographic combatant commander
Guidance for Employment of the Force

HN
HNS
HNSCC
HQ

host nation
host-nation support
host-nation support coordination cell
headquarters

IAW
IO
IPI
ISA
ISAF
ISB

in accordance withinformation operationsindigenous populations and institutions
international standardization agreement
International Security Assistance Forceintermediate staging base

J-2
JCMEB
JDDE
JDN
JEMSO
JFC
JFUB
JLEnt
JLSG
JMC
JP

intelligence directorate of a joint staff
joint civil-military engineering board
joint deployment and distribution enterprisejoint doctrine note
joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
joint force commander
joint facilities utilization board
joint logistics enterprisejoint logistic support group
joint movement center
joint publication

GL-2

JP 3-16

Glossary
JPRC
JTCC
JTF
JTLM
JTMS

joint personnel recovery center
joint transportation coordination center
joint task force
joint theater logistics management
joint theater movement staff

LN
LNO
LOC

lead nation
liaison officerline of communicationsMCI
MEDEVAC
METOC
MILU
MISO
MJLC
MNCC
MNF
MNFACC
MNFC
MNFLCCMNFMCCMNFSOCC
MNL
MNLC
MNTF
MOA
MOU
MP
MPAT
MSOG

multinational communications integration
medical evacuation
meteorological and oceanographic
multinational integrated logistic unit
military information support operations
multinational joint logistics center
multinational coordination center
multinational force
multinational force air component commander
multinational force commander
multinational force land component commander
multinational force maritime component commander
multinational force special operations component
commander
multinational logistics
multinational logistic center
multinational task force
memorandum of agreement
memorandum of understanding
multinational publication
Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
Multinational Strategy and Operations Group

NALSS
NATO
NDP
NEO
NFLS
NGO
NSE

naval advanced logistic support site
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
national disclosure policy
noncombatant evacuation operation
naval forward logistic site
nongovernmental organization
national support element

OA
OCS
OE
OPCON
OPLAN

operational area
operational contract support
operational environment
operational control
operation planGL-3

Glossary
OPSEC

operations security

PA
PN
PO
PR
PRCC

public affairs
partner nation
peace operations
personnel recovery
personnel recovery coordination center

ROE
RSI
RSN

rules of engagement
rationalization, standardization, and interoperability
role specialist nation

SA
SAR
SC
SCA
SecDefSFA
SIPRNET
SJA
SOF
SOFA
SOP
SSR
STANAG

situational awarenesssearch and rescue
security cooperation
space coordinating authority
Secretary of Defense
security force assistance
SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
staff judge advocate
special operations forces
status-of-forces agreement
standard operating proceduresecurity sector reform
standardization agreement (NATO)

TA
TACON
TDP
TF
TPFDD
TTP

technical arrangementtactical control
theater distribution plantask force
time-phased force and deployment datatactics, techniques, and proceduresUN
UNPROFOR
US BICESUSCENTCOMUSGUSINDOPACOM
USSTRATCOMUSTRANSCOM

United Nations
United Nations protection force
United States Battlefield Information Collection and
Exploitation System
United States Battlefield Information Collection and
Exploitation System Extended
United Stats Central Command
United States Government
United States Indo-Pacific Command
United States Strategic Command
United States Transportation Command

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

US BICES-X

GL-4

JP 3-16

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Agreement, negotiated on a bilateral basiswith countries or international organizations, that allow United States forces toexchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation,
ammunition, and equipment. Also called ACSA. (Approved for incorporation into
the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-16 as the source JP.)combined. A term identifying two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies
operating together. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)
cross-servicing. A subset of common-user logistics in which a function is performed by
one Service in support of another Service and for which reimbursement is required
from the Service receiving support. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary with JP 3-16 as the source JP.)
integrated staff. A staff in which one officer only is appointed to each post on theestablishment of the headquarters, irrespective of nationality and Service. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)
lead nation. The nation with the will, capability, competence, and influence to provide
the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate
the planning, mounting, and execution of a multinational operation. Also called LN.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
multinational doctrine. The agreed-upon fundamental principles that guide theemployment of forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common
objective. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
multinational force commander. A general term applied to a commander who exercisescommand authority over a military force composed of elements from two or morenations. Also called MNFC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)
multinational integrated logistic unit. An organization resulting when two or morenations agree to provide logistics assets to a multinational logistic force under theoperational control of a multinational commander for the logistic support of amultinational force. Also called MILU. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary with JP 3-16 as the source JP.)
multinational logistics. Any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations
supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices ofan alliance or coalition, including those conducted under United Nations mandate.
Also called MNL. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 316 as the source JP.)

GL-5

Glossary
multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted byforces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition oralliance. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)
multinational staff. A staff composed of personnel of two or more nations within the
structure of a coalition or alliance. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)
rationalization. Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more
efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)
role specialist nation. A nation that has agreed to assume responsibility for providing aparticular class of supply or service for all or part of the multinational force. Also
called RSN. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary with JP 3-16 as
the source JP.)
specialization. An arrangement within an alliance wherein a member or group of members
most suited by virtue of technical skills, location, or other qualifications assume(s)greater responsibility for a specific task or significant portion thereof for one or moreother members. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)
status-of-forces agreement. A bilateral or multilateral agreement that defines the legal
position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Also
called SOFA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-16)

GL-6

JP 3-16

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1-0JP 2-0JP 3-0

JP 4-0JP 5-0

JP 6-0PERSONNEL

INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONSLOGISTICS

PLANS

COMMUNICATIONSSYSTEMAll joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-16 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
STEP #1 - Initiation

STEP #4 - Maintenancel

JP published and continuously
assessed by users
l Formal assessment begins
24-27 months following
publicationl Revision begins 3.5 years
after publicationl Each JP revision is completed
no later than 5 years after
signaturelJoint doctrine development
community (JDDC) submission to fillextant operational voidl Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis
l Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
validationl Program directive (PD) development
and staffing/joint working groupl PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorshipl JS J-7 approves and releases PD tolead agent (LA) (Service, combatantcommand, JS directorate)

MaintenanceInitiation

ENHANCEDJOINTWARFIGHTINGCAPABILITYJOINT
DOCTRINE
PUBLICATION

Approval

Development

STEP #3 - Approvall

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
JS J-7 prepares publication for signaturel JSDS prepares JS staffing packagel JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signaturel

STEP #2 - Developmentl

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the firstdraft (FD)l PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
l FD comment matrix adjudicationl JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) systeml Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrixl FC joint working group