Journal of Personality 85:4, August 2017The Odyssey of Episodic Memories:
Identifying the Paths and Processes
Through Which They Contribute to
Well-Being

C 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
V

DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12257

Frederick L. Philippe and L!
ea Bernard-Desrosiers
University of Quebec at Montreal

Abstract
Objective: This research highlights the processes through which lasting episodic memories and their characterized level ofneed satisfaction (autonomy, competence, and relatedness) can impact well-being, both at the situational level and over time.
Method: Study 1 (N 5 92, Mage 5 42.07 years, 72% female) investigated the effect of the unconscious activation of a personal
episodic memory on situational well-being using a subliminal priming procedure. Study 2 (N 5 275, Mage 5 22.45 years, 84%
female) followed the odyssey of an episodic memory by examining at various points over time its abstraction into perceptionsof general need satisfaction and its long-term effect on well-being.
Results: Study 1 revealed that the activation of a need-satisfying memory produced an immediate increase in well-being,
whereas the triggering of a need-thwarting memory led to an immediate decrease in well-being compared to controls. Study 2
revealed little influence of individual differences, but need satisfaction in episodic memories had a significant cumulative impact
on well-being at different points in time over months and was abstracted into greater perceptions of general need satisfaction
over time.
Conclusion: Results provide convincing evidence for the directive function of memories on well-being, both at the situational
level and over time.
Keywords: Episodic memories, well-being, need satisfaction, subliminal priming, memory function

The death of my dog. I was only a little girl when thisevent occurred. I remember wakening up in the morningand looking for my dog without finding her. My father
then told me that my aunt had come and had taken her.
Then, I went to the orthodontist and coming back from myappointment, my father confessed that my dog died during
the night and that he had put her body in the garage so that
I wouldn’t know. Since then, I stopped trusting people. My
dog was my best friend since I was born. (18-year-old
female participant’s memory of an event that occurred 8
years ago)
Conflict with the administration of the senior residence
where I live. After several attempts at resolving the conflictand no result, I made a complaint at the provincial housing
authority for non-peaceful enjoyment of the property where
I live. The administration responded a couple of months
later, requesting my eviction under false motives. I won
everything and obtained an important compensation. The
judge saw the dishonesty of the administration. I keep fromthose times a memory that has been painful, but what I
keep today is the pride of having had the courage to fightfor myself. (69-year-old female participant’s memory of anevent that occurred 4 years ago)
What is the magnitude of the impact of those kinds of memories on people’s well-being? And through what mechanisms dothey influence well-being and for how much time? Is it only theimmediate consequences of experiencing a significant life eventthat impacts well-being, or does the memory of that event continue to influence well-being over time, several months or years
after the event has occurred? The present research seeks to provide elements of response to these questions and highlight theCorrespondence concerning this article should be addressed to Frederick
L. Philippe, ELABORER – Laboratory for Research on Emotions andRepresentations, Department of Psychology, University of Quebec at
Montreal, PO Box 8888, Station Centre-Ville, Montreal (Quebec), H3C
3P8, Canada. Email: philippe.frederick@uqam.ca.

Memories and Well-Being

paths and processes through which memories can influencewell-being.
Access to several episodic memories is typically quickly lostin a day or two, as most of them only serve short-term goals(Conway, 2009), such as helping you track whether you alreadybrushed your teeth or ate your lunch. However, some other episodic memories will be remembered for weeks, months, or years(Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Conway, Singer,& Tagini, 2004). These memories are mostly about significant,unique, and affectively charged past events, such as the onespresented in the introduction of this article. They are experiencenear; that is, they include images and other sensory details of a
specific event, as well as the affective and motivational components (i.e., experiential components) representative of what has
been experienced during this event and how (Brewin et al.,2010; Conway, 2009; Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, &Lecours, 2011; Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, Lecours,& Lekes, 2012). Just as memories lost in a few days help orient
people toward their immediate or short-term goals, these memories are kept in long-term memory because they have personal
significance for the person, as they are related to the person’s
current medium- or long-term goals, concerns, or self-images(Conway et al., 2004; Singer & Salovey, 1993).
These memories get integrated within various levels of
abstraction of the self-memory system and contribute to new
self-knowledge (Conway, 2009; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000). For example, the memory of a social event where you
have been particularly talkative can contribute to building stable
perceptions of yourself as an extraverted person or stable worldviews (e.g., people are friendly). Once this self-knowledge has
emerged or the goal has been achieved or is not relevant to theperson anymore, access to the episodic memory is typically lostand only the stable, abstract conceptual self-knowledge remains
accessible (e.g., I am an extravert).
Thus, episodic memories represent transient processes of personality that orient the development of new self-knowledge overtime. Some memories will quickly turn into that self-knowledge
in a matter of weeks or months, while others will take years.
However, for the time that the episodic elements are preserved
and remain accessible, they can be activated by environmental
cues matching their content or whenever the person deliberately
retrieves the memory (Brewin et al., 2010; Conway & PleydellPearce, 2000) and can orient people’s behavior, attitudes, andfeelings, and, overall, their psychological adjustment and wellbeing. As such, episodic memories represent unique informationthat does not entirely reflect the person’s current conceptual selfknowledge (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002; McAdams & Pals, 2006). Consequently, they have a unique predictive
value for people’s future behavior, adjustment, and well-being,over and above people’s current conceptual self-knowledge variables, such as traits, attitudes, or general perceptions (Kuwabara& Pillemer, 2010; Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, et al.,2011; Philippe et al., 2012; Philippe, Koestner, & Lekes, 2013).
Episodic memories are expected to have an effect on wellbeing through various processes. A first way is through the nar-519

rated and reconstructive processing of memories. Much research
has shown that the way people frame and structure, through personal narratives, key episodic memories of their lives into autobiographical memories and life stories can strengthen identityand provide greater self-coherence, which translates into greater
well-being (McAdams, 2001). These narratives can also yieldpessimistic or diffuse self-views, which hinder well-being (e.g.,
McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001). This
process typically occurs consciously and deliberately throughautobiographical reasoning (Habermas & Bluck, 2000) andinvolves key or turning point memories of one’s life. A second
process, which has received much less attention, and that is thefocus of the present research, is that memories can influencewell-being through their frequent daily activation. According to
the self-memory system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; also
see Brewin et al., 2010), sensory-based episodic memory elements get constantly triggered in the self-memory knowledge
base without necessarily coalescing into a reminiscence experience. These memories, however, can direct people’s attitudes,
intentions, and behaviors mostly without their awareness,through what Pillemer (1998, 2003) calls a directive function. In
addition, this effect can occur for all types of episodic memories
preserved, although a greater effect can be expected from more
important memories, such as self-defining memories (Singer &Salovey, 1993) or memories at the core of one’s life story (McAdams, 2001).
Philippe and his colleagues (Philippe, Lecours, & BeaulieuPelletier, 2009; Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, et al.,2011; Philippe et al., 2012) have suggested that one componentof memories that orients this effect is their experiential component, representing (although not necessarily fully corresponding) what the person has experienced during the initial event(Conway, 2009; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). People’s
recalled emotional experiences of a past event or its valence(e.g., Comblain, D’argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2005; Kuwabara & Pillemer, 2010), and the satisfaction or the thwarting of
three core psychological needs (autonomy, competence, relatedness) identified by self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan,
2000), appear to correspond to such experiential components(Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, et al., 2011; Philippe,
Koestner, Lecours, et al., 2011).
Accordingly, a rising number of studies have shown thatmemories’ valence or memories’ need satisfaction can affectfuture attitudes, intentions, behaviors, and well-being, possibly
without people’s awareness. Kuwabara and Pillemer (2010)
found that, controlling for preexisting attitudes toward the university, students who reminisced about a positive university
memory were more likely than controls to donate to their university rather than to another charity. In addition, when students
were asked to provide the reasons of their donation, no students
invoked the recall of their memory as having influenced their
donation, which provides some evidence that this effectoccurred outside of their awareness. Similarly, Biondolillo &Pillemer (2014) found that students asked to recall a positive
memory that would motivate them to exercise actually reported

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higher levels of exercise in the week following the recall compared to controls. Again, when asked how they had motivatedthemselves to exercise, no participants mentioned having usedor brought to mind the memory recalled 1 week before as a motivator. There is also evidence that memories can alter well-being
in a similar fashion. Using a scrambled sentences task, Philippe
et al. (2012) supraliminally exposed participants to keywords
derived from an episodic memory they had described 2 weeks
before. Participants exposed to keywords of their own needsatisfying memory—compared to controls exposed to keywords
derived from the need-satisfying memory of someone else—
reported an immediate increase in well-being. In contrast, participants exposed to keywords of their own need-thwarting memory reported decreases in well-being compared to controls. The
few participants (4%) who had noticed that some of the keywords to which they were exposed were derived from theirmemory were removed from the analyses, thus ensuring that theeffect obtained occurred outside of the participants’ awareness.
In all these studies, however, unawareness of the participants
was only inferred. The possibility that participants did notice theeffect of their memory or did recall a memory purposefully tomotivate them, but forgot about it, remains plausible. The methods used in those studies could not guarantee that the effectoccurred unconsciously, since a memory was purposefullyrecalled or keywords derived from a memory were explicitly
shown. The present research will address this shortcoming byusing for the first time a subliminal priming method, whereinstimuli are only briefly shown for milliseconds. The immediate
effect of this unconscious activation on well-being will beassessed.

On the Long-Term Impact of Memories
If memories have an immediate effect on situational well-being
upon their activation, some memories that are frequently activated in a person’s life should therefore frequently exert theireffect and, over time, lead to enduring changes in well-being.
These memories could be more frequently activated because
they are more frequently thought about or because various external cues in the person’s environment are more likely to activatethem (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Philippe et al., 2012).
Recently, Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, et al. (2011)
showed that need satisfaction in self-defining memories, that is,memories that are frequently activated or thought about, waspositively associated with various measures of well-being. Other
studies have also shown that the presence of narrative themes
similar to the need satisfaction components in memory descriptions, such as agency (Adler, Skalina, & McAdams, 2008), communion (Bauer & McAdams, 2004), or intrinsic themes (Bauer,
McAdams, & Sakaeda, 2005) were associated with well-being.
However, only two studies to our knowledge have shown thatexperiential components of specific memories could predict
long-term changes in well-being over months (Milyavskaya,
Philippe, & Koestner, 2013) and years (Philippe et al., 2012).

Philippe & Bernard-Desrosiers

Both studies showed that need satisfaction in significant memories could predict increases in well-being over time, even after
controlling for traits or people’s general perceptions of need satisfaction in life.
While these studies provide some evidence for the long-term
impact of experiential components of memories on well-being, anumber of issues remain unresolved. First, all studies start investigating the effect of a memory after the memory is formed andafter the event of the memory has occurred. Therefore, it has
been yet impossible to know whether certain characteristics ofthe person, such as his or her traits or general perceptions (selfknowledge), orient the encoding or the recall of memories characterized by certain affective and motivational components. A
second issue is that it is unknown for how much time a memory
has an effect on well-being, from the initial aftereffects of theexperienced event encoded in memory to several months later.
The present research proposes to follow the odyssey of an episodic memory even before the event of that memory is experienced and encoded as a memory, examine its immediate
aftereffects, and continue following its cumulative impact on
well-being over months.

The Present Research
The present research has two purposes. A first objective was toinvestigate whether a memory can be activated unconsciously
through a subliminal priming procedure and to examine its
immediate effect on situational well-being. Study 1 will use asubliminal priming procedure and expose participants to keywords derived from a key episodic memory that they havedescribed 1 week before. It will then be investigated whether thelevel of need satisfaction of the memory primed predicts situational well-being as assessed following the priming. A second
purpose of the present research was to better understand how
long a specific memory can prospectively influence well-being,
while controlling for various person- and memory-level variables measured prior to the occurrence of the event of the memory. Study 2 measured traits, general perceptions of needsatisfaction, and well-being, as well as need satisfaction in a pastholiday memory prior to the current year’s holidays. Immediately after the holidays, participants described a significant eventthat occurred during those recent holidays and were assessed on
general need satisfaction and well-being and again at 1 and 2
months after the holidays. Study 2 therefore allowed us to highlight the precise path through which memories influence wellbeing over time and how need satisfaction in a specific holiday
memory can translate into general perceptions of need satisfaction and into well-being over months.

STUDY 1
Participants took part in an online study and were initially asked
to describe a self-defining episodic memory (a highly significant
memory that they frequently think about) and to rate the extent

Memories and Well-Being

to which they experienced during the event of their memory thethwarting or the satisfaction of the three psychological needs
core to self-determination theory.1 One week later, participants
completed an online task in which they were subliminallyprimed with keywords derived either from their own episodic
memory or from the episodic memory of another participant.
Priming of a need-satisfying episodic memory should immediately increase situational well-being as compared to a control
group of participants primed with the need-satisfying memoryof another participant. Conversely, priming of a need-thwarting
memory should immediately decrease situational well-being as
compared to a control group primed with the need-thwarting
memory of another participant. To increase the external validityof our study, we recruited participants from the general population. Furthermore, to rule out a number of alternative explanations, we enforced a number of controls. First, we assess life
satisfaction (a general well-being measure) to control for initialindividual differences in well-being. Second, at the end of theexperiment, we showed participants the keywords to which they
were subliminally exposed during the priming task and asked
them to rate the personal valence of these words in their life.
These ratings were then used to examine whether the selfrelated valence of the primed words to which participants were
exposed drove the effect or if it is rather the need satisfaction
characterizing the memory primed by those keywords, as
expected in theory.

MethodParticipants. Sample size was determined based on the effectsize (h2 5 .081) reported by Philippe et al. (2012), who examined the supraliminal priming effect of a memory on well-being.
A sample size of 92 participants was therefore deemed adequate
to detect a significant 2 3 2 interaction with a power of .80 andan alpha of .05. A total of 92 participants (66 females and 26
males) from the general population were recruited to take part ina study on personality and memories. They were between theages of 18 and 74 years old (M 5 42.07, SD 5 17.53). One participant reported technical difficulties during the study and wastherefore excluded from analyses (final N 5 91).
Measures Phase 1
Life Satisfaction. Life satisfaction was assessed using thefive-item Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener,
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) to serve as a general measureof well-being (1- to 7-point scale). Cronbach’s alpha was .84.
Episodic Memory. Participants were asked to describe indetail a positive or negative (or both) self-defining memory that
had occurred at least 1 year ago and that they frequently think
about. This memory had to reveal something about their identity
and how they generally perceive themselves. Participants were
free to recall any type of memory and were not guided in select-521

ing a memory of a particular valence (see Philippe, Koestner,
Beaulieu-Pelletier, et al., 2011, for the full instructions).
Memory Need Satisfaction. Participants indicated thelevel of psychological need satisfaction they experienced during
the event of their memory on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from
23 (Strongly disagree) to 13 (Strongly agree), with 0 representing Do not agree nor disagree or not applicable—this latter
option indicating that there was both need satisfaction and needthwarting in the event or that need satisfaction was not present
in the event. Autonomy refers to the need to feel volitional andauthentic in one’s actions. Competence is defined as the need tofeel effective and efficacious. Relatedness refers to the need tofeel connected, to care for others, and to be cared for by others inturn. Two items assessed each of the three basic psychologicalneeds postulated by self-determination theory (i.e., autonomy,competence, and relatedness). A sample item for autonomy is “I
felt free to do things and to think how I wanted”; for competence, “I felt capable or skillful”; and for relatedness, “I felt connected to one or more people.” An index of need satisfaction
was created by averaging all six items together. Cronbach’s
alpha was .84. Following the procedures outlined by Philippe
et al. (2012), participants were split into two groups as a functionof whether they had described a need-satisfying memory (M > 0
on the index) or a need-thwarting memory (M ! 0 on the index).
Measures Phase 2: One Week Later
Subliminal Memory Priming (Bunnies and Lions
Task). To subliminally prime the episodic memory, the Bunnies and Lions Task was used (Philippe & Bernard-Desrosiers,
2015). This task is programmed with a combination of HTML5,
Javascript, and jQuery, which are all open-source web programming languages. The task is presented to the participants as anamusing task that will help them remove their daily thoughts
before completing other scales. It thus shows pictures of a teddy
lion and bunny. These pictures help convince the participantsthat the task is amusing and not scientific, thus reducing participants’ potential concerns about other purposes that task could
serve. Below these pictures, a successive series of rapidly changing uppercase words appears on the screen in blue text of a
30-point font size. Half of these words are animal words (e.g.,
ELEPHANT, CHICKEN), including the word BUNNY and theword LION presented seven times each, whereas the other half
includes nonwords (e.g., XMARALDO). Embedded withinthese words and nonwords are six priming words shown randomly and repeatedly for a duration of 60 ms. The participant’stask is to separately count the number of times the word lion andthe word bunny appear on the screen. This dual task serves as acognitive load that monopolizes participants’ attention, thus
highly reducing the possibility that the primes are consciously
perceived. The initial practice task lasts 20 seconds. Participants
are then invited to do the same task again, this time lasting
36 seconds. Demonstrations, material, and instructions for
installation can be freely downloaded at http://www.elaborer.
org/bunnies&lions.html.

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Philippe & Bernard-Desrosiers

A research assistant, blind to the participants’ other data,
selected six keywords derived from each participant’s memory
description. Following Philippe et al. (2012), keywords representing the visual images of the event in the memory were chosen (e.g., beach, sun, sand, mother), but not valence words or
adjectives (e.g., love, proud, happy). Participants were primed
with these keywords using the Bunnies and Lions Task.
Situational Well-Being. Situational well-being wasassessed using the six-item scale of vitality (Ryan & Frederick,
1997; e.g., “I currently feel alive and vital”), and three positive(“I am joyful”) and three negative (e.g., “I am nervous”) affectitems. These three scales were combined to form an index ofsituational well-being (a 5 .88).
Words Valence. At the end of Phase 2, participants were
presented with the six keywords to which they were exposed
during the priming task and asked to rate the personal valence
those words had in their life in general on a 23 (very negative)
to 13 (very positive) Likert scale. This measure served to control for the semantic personal valence these words could have inthe participants’ lives and to ensure that an episodic memory
was primed rather than self-related words of a particular valence.
In the event that participants in the experimental group recognized that those words were derived from their memory and thatthey responded to the question suspiciously, they were told thatthe words had been derived from their memory and were asked
to rate the personal valence (the emotional charge) those words
had in their life in general, irrespective of their memory. Participants in the control group were just asked to rate the personalvalence these words had in their life in general. Word valence
ratings were averaged (a 5 .77).
Probing of Explicit Perceptions of the Primes During
the Subliminal Priming. In a type of funneled debriefing (seeBargh & Chartrand, 2000), participants were first asked whether
they had been disturbed by some words during the Bunnies andLions Task. They were also asked whether they had seen words
other than animal words and nonwords (e.g., DJDHAUUS) during that task. Finally, they were asked to guess how Phases 1
and 2 of the study were related. No participants reported having
been disturbed by words or having seen words other than animal
words and nonwords, and no one correctly guessed how the twophases of the study were related.
Procedures. Participants were recruited through their personal
email, as they had previously agreed to participate in studies.
Participants completed an online survey including demographic
questions and a scale of life satisfaction, and they were subsequently asked to describe a self-defining memory and to rate
the level of psychological need satisfaction they experienced
during the event described in their memory. One week later,
participants were invited to take part in a second, ostensibly
unrelated, online study on attentional processes. They wereprimed using keywords derived either from their own memory

Figure 1 Effect of priming a need satisfying or a need thwarting personal
memory on situational well-being. Error bars are standard errors: Study 1.

(experimental group) or from another participant’s memory(control group). Participants in the experimental and control
groups were yoked based on the level of need satisfaction of
their described memory (need satisfying or need thwarting).
That is, a participant assigned to the experimental group who
had reported a need-satisfying (need-thwarting) memory wasprimed with the keywords derived from his own memory andwas yoked to one participant assigned to the control group who
also had reported a need-satisfying (need-thwarting) memory,
but who was primed with the keywords from the participant in
the experimental group. All participants then reported their situational well-being following the priming task (i.e., the Bunnies and Lions Task). Finally, they were shown the priming
words to which they had been exposed and were asked to rate
the personal valence of those words in their daily life.

Results
There was no effect of gender (main effect or moderator) on all
study variables. Therefore, this variable will not be consideredin this study. A 2 (Need Level: Need Thwarting vs. Need Satisfaction) 3 2 (Conditions: Priming [own memory] vs. Control[someone else’s memory]) factorial ANOVA was computed to
examine the effect of the priming manipulation on participants’situational well-being. Results unveiled a significant main effectof need level on participants’ situational well-being. Participants
who described a need-thwarting memory reported lower situational well-being (M 5 4.17, SD 5 1.04) than participants
who described a need-satisfying memory (M 5 4.65, SD 5 .96),
F(1, 88) 5 5.97, p < .05, hp2 5 .06. Results also revealed a significant Need Level 3 Conditions interaction, F(1, 88) 5 6.18,
p < .05, hp2 5 .07. Simple effects of this interaction unveiled
that participants who described a need-thwarting memory andwho were primed with their own memory reported a marginallylower level of situational well-being (M 5 3.70, SD 5 0.82)

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than participants in the yoked control group (M 5 4.40,
SD 5 1.07), t(25) 5 21.78, p 5 .08, d 5 –.73, 95% CI [0.08,
21.48], with a large effect size. Conversely, participants whoreported a need-satisfying memory and who were primed withkeywords derived from their own episodic memory reported
marginally higher scores of situational well-being (M 5 4.84,
SD 5 0.96) than participants in the yoked control group(M 5 4.39, SD 5 .92), t(63) 5 1.85, p 5 .07, d 5 .48, 95% CI[–0.03, .92], with a medium effect size (see Figure 1).
Although simple effects showed marginal significance in the
expected direction (ps < .10), the participants primed with
their own need-satisfying memory reported significantly
higher well-being than participants primed with their own
need-thwarting memory, t(44) 5 3.26, p 5 .002, d 5 .98, 95%
CI [0.42, 1.84] and the two control groups, which did not differ
from each other, t(44) 5 0.03, ns, fell in between the two
experimental groups. Controlling for participants’ age andgeneral life satisfaction did not alter results, and there was no
Need Level 3 Conditions 3 Life Satisfaction interaction.
Multiple regressions were conducted on the priming and control groups, separately, with situational well-being as thedependent variable and need satisfaction in memories (continuous measure) and ratings of the valence of the priming words as
independent variables. Results revealed that need satisfaction
characterizing the memory was significantly associated with situational well-being for the primed participants, b 5 .50, p < .01,
B 5 .32, SE 5 .12, 95% CI [.08, .56], but not for participants inthe control group (b 5 –.01, ns). Furthermore, analyses revealed
that the valence of the priming words was not associated withsituational well-being in either group (primed: b 5 –.14, ns;
control: b 5 .26, ns). Results remained the same when controlling for participants’ age and general life satisfaction, and age
did not moderate the present findings. Taken together, theseresults suggest that priming a personal episodic memory had an
immediate effect on situational well-being as a function of theneed satisfaction level characterizing the memory primed. In
addition, results revealed that for the experimental group, thelevel of need satisfaction characterizing the episodic memory,
but not the personal valence of the keywords primed, predictedsituational well-being—thus providing further evidence that an
episodic memory and its related experiential components weresuccessfully primed and not semantic memory for some personally positive/negative words.

STUDY 2
While a certain number of studies have shown that aspects ofmemory can predict increases in well-being over time, a number
of issues remain unresolved. First, all studies start investigating
the effect of a memory once that memory is formed and not
before. Therefore, it has been yet impossible to know whether
certain characteristics of the person orient the encoding or therecall of certain memories is characterized by certain experiential components. A second issue is that all studies have only one

523

or two measurement time points. While a minimum of two measurement points of well-being is a must to show that a memory
leads to increases in well-being over time, only two time points
cannot show the accumulative effects of a memory on wellbeing over time or when this effect stops and that stable changes
in well-being can be observed. Several measurement points also
make it possible to differentiate between the immediate effect of
the event experienced on well-being and the continued effect ofthe memory over time on well-being.
Study 1 showed the immediate aftereffect of activating an
episodic memory on situational well-being. While this activation
was experimentally manipulated in Study 1, we expect that people’s episodic memories are constantly and naturally activatedby various cues of their living environment without necessarily
coalescing into a reminiscence (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000). As shown in Study 1, this unconscious activation nevertheless influences well-being, and, over time, frequent activations should leave a stable and enduring mark on well-being. In
Study 2, we wanted to highlight this long-term effect of memories on well-being by observing their odyssey, starting with prewell-being and pre–general need satisfaction measures before asignificant event that will be encoded as a memory even occurs
in participants’ lives. We followed the participants over the winter holidays and asked them to select an event that occurred during the holidays that was the most significant for them. We thenfollowed the odyssey of that memory over 2 months and examined how it translated over time into increases in general perceptions of need satisfaction and in well-being. Obviously, given
the strict time frame of our design (2 weeks to experience a significant event), the memories collected may not be self-defining
memories, such as the one collected in Study 1. Nevertheless,these memories should be significant enough memories that areat least preserved over weeks and months in long-term memory.
As such, they are unlikely to be mundane or trivial events. In
addition, we selected the winter holidays, which includes Christmas and New Year’s Eve in Canada, given that this period isoften characterized by highly emotional events, such as warm
family gatherings or strong interpersonal conflict. These memories should have a cumulative impact on well-being over time.
We hypothesized that need satisfaction in a key holiday memory would predict increases in general perceptions of need satisfaction and in well-being over time, beyond the immediate
increases that are expected to occur following the experience ofthe event of that memory. Given that memories represent transient aspects of people’s personality that initiate changes in outcomes over time, we expected the above effects to hold evenwhile controlling for people’s personality traits, which rather represent stable individual differences that do not instantiate changes
in well-being over such a short period of time (Soto, 2014).
Memories and traits should therefore represent fairly independent
constructs (Adler, Lodi-Smith, Philippe, & Houle 2016). In addition, to control for the type of memories people typically retrieve
and for how they typically rate them, need satisfaction in a significant past years’ holiday memory was also controlled for. Finally,
we also controlled for pre-event well-being and general need

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satisfaction measures. It was not the purpose of Study 2 to track
whether the holiday memory was activated unconsciously (which
would not be possible) or whether people thought about it deliberately, but rather to ascertain the long-term, accumulative impact
of need satisfaction in a memory on changes in perceptions ofgeneral need satisfaction and well-being over time.

MethodParticipants and Procedure. Participants were 275 undergraduate and graduate students (230 females, 45 males) aged
22.45 years (SD 5 4.26) on average. Following Kline’s (2010)
recommendation of using at least five cases per estimatedparameter, we determined that this sample size was adequate toestimate a path analysis of 55 parameters (5 3 55 5 275). All
study phases were completed online. At Time 1, participants
completed the Big Five and general need satisfaction and wellbeing scales. They also described a significant memory frompast years’ winter holidays. At Time 2, in the second week ofJanuary, participants were contacted again and were asked toagain complete scales of general need satisfaction and wellbeing and to describe the memory of a significant event that
occurred during the last winter holidays. Finally, participants
were contacted again in the second week of February and thesecond week of March to complete the same scales of generalneed satisfaction and well-being. Given the longitudinal natureof this study, there were missing data (9.4% of missing data).
Little’s missing completely at random (MCAR) test was nonsignificant, v2(22) 5 25.88, p 5 .26, thus suggesting that missing data patterns were not related in any ways to the otherindependent or dependent variables. The model presented in thisstudy was conducted with Mplus 7.3 (Muth!en & Muth!en,
1998–2015) using maximum likelihood estimation under
MCAR (Little & Rubin, 2002).
Measures
Big Five Traits. The Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava,1999) was used to assess the five traits of personality. This wellvalidated measure requires participants to rate on a 5-point scale
the extent to which each of 44 items describes themselves. In thisstudy, alphas were .77 and above for each of the five traits.
Well-Being. Five scales were used to assess well-being at
each measurement time point: a short scale of the Beck Depression Inventory (0- to 3-point scale; Beck, Ward, Mendelson,
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), a short Beck Anxiety Inventory (0- to
3-point scale) measuring the subjective state of anxiety (Osman,
Kopper, Barrios, Osman, & Wade, 1997), the 10-item Symptom
Checklist (0- to 4-point scale; Rosen et al., 2000), the Satisfaction With Life Scale (1- to 7-point scale; Diener et al., 1985),
and three short subscales (Growth, Acceptance, and Purpose) of
the Psychological Wellbeing Scale (PWB; 1- to 7-point scale;
Ryff & Keyes, 1995).2 All short scales have been used successfully in past research and have displayed adequate evidence ofvalidity and reliability (e.g., Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-

Philippe & Bernard-Desrosiers

Pelletier, et al., 2011; Philippe et al., 2012). A factorial analysis(maximum likelihood) on the present study data revealed one
factor, with all measures saturating this single factor with loadings higher than .50. Therefore, all scales were standardized andaveraged in an index assessing well-being. Alphas were allabove .81 across all four measurement time points.
Perceptions of General Need Satisfaction. The Balanced Measure of Psychological Needs scale (Sheldon & Hilpert, 2012) was used to measure the extent to which theparticipants felt that their needs for autonomy (e.g., “I feel free
to do things my own way”), competence (e.g., “I take on andmaster hard challenges”), and relatedness (e.g., “I feel lonely”)
were satisfied in general in their life. Eighteen items assess all
three needs with six items each on a 1- to 7-point Likert scale.
General need satisfaction was measured at each of the four measurement time points. Alphas for this complete short scale were
all above .86 across time points.
Past Years’ Holiday Memory. At Time 1, participants
were asked to describe a memory that occurred during the winterholidays in the past years. Overall, 25% of the participants
shared a memory that occurred last year, 35% described a memory that occurred between 2 and 5 years ago, and 40% told about
memories that were dated more than 5 years ago, most of thetime from their childhood. A sample memory is as follows:
It was Christmas, I was about 8 years old. We were celebrating with my family (my father, mother, brother) at myaunt’s place, uncle, and cousins. It was the moment where
we were opening the gifts. Like every year, it was happening in my aunt’s living room, where there was a nice hearth
and a large Christmas tree. My particular memory is when
my brother and I opened our gift: a Nintendo! We were sohappy. All our friends had one since a long time ago andwe were going to have one too. It is probably the gift I
received that I have been the happiest with in my life. And
my father (the funny guy) made the bad joke of hiding thegame cartridge that was coming with the Nintendo and told
us that we would have to wait to have a game. I believethat he quickly realized that we were disappointed andgave us the game.
Participants were then asked to rate their memory for needsatisfaction using the same six items used in Study 1. Alpha was.81. This memory served as a control variable for the way participants rate holiday memories in general.
Current Year’s Holiday Memory. Immediately after thecurrent winter holidays, at Time 2 (the second week of January),
participants were asked to describe in detail a significant event
they experienced during the holidays (between December 24thand January 5th). They also rated it for need satisfaction using
the same items they had used to rate their past years’ holiday
memory. Alpha was .80. A sample memory is as follows:

Memories and Well-Being

525

Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among all Study Variables

1. NS in past years’ holiday memory T1
2. General NSPH T1
3. Well-beingPH T1
4. NS in current holiday memory
5. General NSH T2
6. Well-beingH T2
7. General NS1m T3
8. Well-being1m T3
9. General NS2m T4
10. Well-being2m T4

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.43
5.33
0.02
1.66
5.31
0.00
5.28
0.05
5.27
0.01

1.51
0.75
0.72
1.39
0.75
0.79
0.84
0.76
0.86
0.83

—
.24**
.24**
.12
.22**
.15*
.26**
.21**
.30**
.23**

—
.76**
.27**
.84**
.72**
.84**
.68**
.80**
.69**

—
.20**
.70**
.81**
.68**
.77**
.69**
.76**

—
.31**
.28**
.39**
.31**
.35**
.28**

—
.80**
.86**
.70**
.83**
.74**

—
.73**
.80**
.69**
.83**

—
.77**
.88**
.75**

—
.70**
.81**

—
.81**

Note. NS 5 need satisfaction; T1 5 Time 1; T2 5 Time 2; T3 5 Time 3; T4 5 Time 4; PH 5 Preholidays; H 5 immediately after holidays; 1m 5 1 month after holidays;
2m 5 2 months after holidays.
**p < .01. *p < .05.

The Christmas family meeting. This year is special because
it has been one year that my grandfather passed away and
it is the first Christmas that we spend outside of his house,in a luxurious hotel. This year, no gift, except the illusionthat rich people’s style brings happiness. In all cases, it ismostly superficial anyway. During the dinner, I notice thatthe family is divided in two very distinct categories, thosethat try to look good to the high society and those whowant to show to what extent they can be ridiculous. Miserable show that my grandfather would have probably
stopped in the first place, because he was fervent of traditions like turkey and Christmas at home . . . and not in asuperficial environment.

Results
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations
among all study variables. Particularly striking in the correlations table is that the only nonsignificant correlation is between
need satisfaction in the past years’ holiday memory and needsatisfaction in the current holiday memory. This suggests thateach memory is fairly distinct from each other and does not massively reflect general personality variables.
A path analysis was conducted with Mplus 7.3 (Muth!en &Muth!en, 1998–2015) to examine the odyssey of the current holiday memory in predicting increases in perceptions of general needsatisfaction and increases in well-being. Past years’ holiday memory, T1 general need satisfaction, and T1 well-being were modeled
as exogenous variables. They were modeled to predict need satisfaction in the current holiday memory to estimate what variables
would predict the encoding of a more need-satisfying memory andtheir effect sizes. In return, need satisfaction in the current holiday
memory was expected to predict increases in general need satisfaction and well-being following the holidays (i.e., T2 measures). At
T3, one month after the holidays, all variables were expected to
predict general need satisfaction and well-being measured at T3,
which were further modeled to predict general need satisfaction
and well-being 2 months after the holidays (T4). Because we did
not have hypotheses about how the non-memory variables would

behave, we included all paths in the model, yielding a justidentified model. We also ran the same model while controllingfor all five traits as exogenous variables and report the results
below when appropriate.
Figure 2 shows the final model, which for clarity only
includes the paths for which the coefficients were significant. As
can be shown, the only variable predicting need satisfaction in
the current year’s holiday memory was general need satisfaction
at Time 1. This association was only weak to moderate in size.
Preholidays well-being did not lead to memories characterized
by greater need satisfaction, and, again, need satisfaction in past
years’ holiday memory was not associated with need satisfactionin the current year’s holiday memory. All five traits were also
unrelated to need satisfaction in the current year’s holiday memory, thus suggesting that traits did not influence the experienceof holiday memories.
Further shown in this model is that need satisfaction in thecurrent holiday memory predicted increases in both generalneed satisfaction and well-being at Time 2. This suggests thatthe experience of a need-satisfying event during the holidays
immediately led to an increase in both perceptions of generalneed satisfaction and well-being. These effects were small—both around 1%. One month later (Time 3), the model showsthat need satisfaction in the current holiday memory predictedfurther increases in general need satisfaction and well-being.
These increases occurred way past the experience of the original
event and even after taking into account the aftereffects of thatevent (Time 2 measures). Yet, the memory of that event continued to have an effect on people’s perceptions of general needsatisfaction and on their well-being. These effects were also of
small size ("1%). These effect sizes represent the effect of needsatisfaction in the current holiday memory on well-being andgeneral need satisfaction total scores. However, more informative effect sizes would be to calculate the amount of variance inwell-being changes and general need satisfaction changes occurring over 2 months that is explained by need satisfaction in thecurrent holiday memory. Results show that 6.2% of the varianceof change in well-being (4.1% at Time 2 and 2.1% at Time 3)
and 5.7% of change in general need satisfaction (2.3% and 3.4%

526

Philippe & Bernard-Desrosiers

Figure 2 Path analysis displaying the effect of current year’s holiday memory need satisfaction on changes in well-being and general need satisfaction overtime. Non-significant path coefficients are not shown for clarity. NS 5 Need satisfaction. **p < .01.

at Times 2 and 3) is uniquely accounted for by need satisfactionin the current holiday memory.
More than 2 months later, the direct effect of the current
year’s holiday memory was not significant anymore on generalneed satisfaction and well-being. Yet, this memory continued tohave an indirect effect through the double increases in generalneed satisfaction and in well-being that occurred at Times 2 and3, thus showing stable increases in both variables. Bootstrapping
using 5,000 resamples was used to estimate the significance of
the indirect effects of need satisfaction in the current year’s holiday memory to well-being and perceptions of general need satisfaction 2 months after the holidays (Time 4). Results revealed(see Table 2) small estimates, but all 95% confidence intervals
excluded the value of zero, therefore suggesting that all indirect
effects were significant at p < .05. All five traits were unrelated toall endogenous variables and did not predict any increases inwell-being or in general need satisfaction over time, with two
exceptions: Conscientiousness predicted increases in generalneed satisfaction from Times 1 to 2 (d 5 .07, p < .05), andNeuroticism predicted decreases in general need satisfaction from
Times 2 to 3 (d 5 –.10, p < .05). However, in all cases,
controlling for all five traits did not alter the associations among
the other variables. Age also did not moderate any of the reported
effects.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research was twofold. The first purpose was toinvestigate the impact of an unconscious activation of a memory
on situational well-being. Expecting that this unconscious effectof a memory on well-being can occur frequently, the second purpose was to examine the impact of memories on stable changes
in well-being over several months, while controlling for preevent measures of all kinds. Two studies provided convincing
evidence supporting the directive function of episodic memories
on well-being.
Study 1 highlighted for the first time that memories could betriggered by subliminal external cues. Depending on the

Table 2 Bootstrap Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals for All Indirect Effects Involving Current Holiday Memory

MemoryH ! WBH-T2 ! WB2m-T4
MemoryH ! WB1m-T3 ! WB2m-T4
MemoryH ! WBH-T2 ! WB1m-T3 ! WB2m-T4
MemoryH ! GNSH-T2 ! GNS2m-T4
MemoryH ! GNS1m-T3 ! GNS2m-T4
MemoryH ! GNSH-T2 ! GNS1m-T3!GNS2m-T4

Unstandardized
Estimates

Standardized
Estimates

95%
ConfidenceIntervals

.021
.014
.006
.011
.033
.013

.037
.024
.011
.019
.055
.021

[.007, .043][.001, .038][.002, .017][.002, .027][.011, .061][.003, .030]

Note. H 5 immediately after holidays; 1m 5 1 month after holidays; 2m 5 2 months after holidays; T2 5 Time 2; T3 5 Time 3; T4 5 Time 4; WB 5 well-being;
GNS 5 general need satisfaction.

Memories and Well-Being

experiential components of that memory, they will orient situational well-being accordingly, such that need satisfaction in a triggered memory will increase well-being, whereas need thwarting
will decrease it. A counterargument could be that people saw theprimes, but forgot about them when asked whether they had seenwords other than animal words and nonwords. However, thisalternative appears unlikely. Based on extensive pilot studies
using the Bunnies and Lions Task (Philippe & BernardDesrosiers, 2015), about one participant in 200 reports having
seen one prime when asked about non-animal words immediately
after the task (which lasts about a minute), and that ratio includes
all potential computer malfunctioning situations. So it is very
unlikely that conscious perceptions drove the effect in Study 1.
Another alternative explanation is that participants wereprimed with words and that it is the positive or negative valenceof those words that drove the effect. Since we used a yoking procedure, all participants in the control conditions received theexact same primes as those in the experimental conditions.
Therefore, any effect based on the social meaning of the primed
words used is not tenable. However, one may argue that thosewords may have some personal meaning for those who usedthem in their memory narrative. To investigate that alternative
explanation, we asked participants to rate the personal valenceof the words with which they were primed at the end of thestudy. Those ratings did not predict situational well-being, andcontrolling for them did not alter the findings. More strikingly,
need satisfaction in the memory of those for whom their own
memory was primed predicted increases in situational wellbeing, but not need satisfaction in the memory of those in thecontrol groups, thus providing further evidence that the memory
itself and its related experiential components drove the effect on
situational well-being. It should be acknowledged, however,that the power was a bit low in that study to conduct the appropriate independent group contrasts. Future research should replicate the present findings in a high-powered study.
Study 2 sought to examine the long-term effect of episodic
memories on well-being by following the odyssey of a personal
holiday memory over several months. Since measures were taken
before the key episodic memory was encoded, it was possible toexamine for the first time whether individual differences affectpeople’s encoding of a significant event they are about to experience. Quite interestingly, we found only one significant relationship. First, need satisfaction in a past holiday memory was not
significantly correlated with need satisfaction in the current
year’s holiday memory. This further supports the idea that memories are fairly distinct from one another and that unless they arepart of a common memory network, their experiential components are not similar (Philippe et al., 2012). Second, only generalneed satisfaction was positively associated with need satisfaction
in a current-year holiday memory, thus highlighting that participants with greater general need satisfaction tend to rate their
future experienced events with greater need satisfaction. However, the effect size of that correlation was small, which presupposes that this effect of general need satisfaction is slight.

527

Finally, all five traits of the Big Five were not significantly
associated with need satisfaction in the current year’s holiday
memory. These findings underscore that few stable individual
differences shape memories and need satisfaction components.
Based on these results, we believe that it can be concluded thatthe effect of these components of need satisfaction—which correspond to a representation of the recorded affective and cognitive experience of a specific event that occurred in people’s
lives—appear more important and more impactful on wellbeing than the effect of people’s typical way of shaping theirmemories. These findings also underscore that memories andtraits are independent constructs. Traits are slower to change
than memories and represent more stable and anchored individual differences. Memories represent the individual differences tostabilize in a near and far future. As such, memories are thedynamic and transient properties of personality, which, depending on how frequently they are triggered by the environment,
will orient the emergence of certain novel stable individual differences and outcomes (e.g., well-being) over time. These
results should, however, be interpreted with caution. Most of thememories collected in Study 2 will probably not become selfdefining memories, like the memories collected in Study 1.
These memories were about significant events, but not necessarily turning points or peak moments. It therefore remains possiblethat person-level variables influence more the encoding of those
types of highly significant memories than the types of memories
collected in Study 2.
Other findings of importance are that need satisfaction in thecurrent year’s holiday memories predicted increases in generalneed satisfaction and well-being immediately after the holidays,
thus confirming that the experience of a significant event does
have an impact on well-being in accordance with the level ofneed satisfaction characterizing the memory of that event. Of
even greater importance, need satisfaction in the current year’s
holiday memories predicted a further increase in general needsatisfaction and well-being 1 month later, even after taking into
account the initial increase. This is a key finding showing thateven after the initial aftereffects of an event, a memory can continue to directly affect perceptions of general need satisfaction
and well-being months after the event. This is particularly striking given the restrained range of memories that was investigated. As mentioned above, the selected holiday memory may
not be of a self-defining type. It is possible that this episodic
memory, although preserved over a couple of weeks, will be forgotten in the next couple of months. Indeed, a quick pilot study
5 months after the holidays with half of the participants of Study
2 revealed that 56% of the participants could no longer remember the memory they had described. Thus, even if the memory
was not one of striking importance, like the memories presented
in the introduction of this article or the ones defined by the participants in Study 1, it nevertheless impacted perceptions of general need satisfaction and well-being over time. More salient
self-defining memories are likely to have a cumulative effect on
well-being over a longer period of time.

528

The direct effects of need satisfaction in the current year’s
holiday memory on general need satisfaction and well-being
were small, all around 1%, and its indirect effects were evensmaller. However, these are the effects of only one significant
memory that occurred during the holidays over less than 3months. Considering that someone could experience, forinstance, five positive or negative events in a row over a shorttime span, well-being could vary from about 10% in only 2months, which is a substantial variation. It is also likely thatsome events, because of their greater significance for the person,
will have an impact over many months, even years (Philippe
et al., 2012; Pillemer, 2003). The reader should also keep inmind that this represents the percentage of variance accounted
for by need satisfaction in the holiday memory on the full scoreof well-being, of which about 66% is already explained by thelevel of well-being people had prior to the holidays. When considering only the variance of changes that occurred between preand postholidays, need satisfaction in the holiday memory
explained about 6% of those changes, which is important for
one single memory. Thus, overall, even if the effect of memories
in Study 2 appears small, their effect sizes are neverthelessimportant.

CONCLUSION
The present research highlighted the processes and the direct
and indirect paths through which significant episodic memories
and their associated need satisfaction components could influence well-being. Need satisfaction in episodic memories does
not seem to reflect stable individual differences in large part, butrather to represent the unique experiential components of thesignificant events that people experienced throughout their lives.
As such, memories correspond to an essential substructure of
personality that does not overlap with traits and other abstract
self-knowledge (Klein et al., 2002). Memories are likely to be
replaced by new ones or to be forgotten over time, but while
active, it appears that they can have an influential impact on
well-being for weeks, months, or years, and some perhaps for a
lifetime.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest withrespect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of thisarticle.

Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article:
Preparation of this manuscript was supported by Grant 4352012-1358 from the Social Sciences and Humanities ResearchCouncil of Canada awarded to the first author.

Philippe & Bernard-Desrosiers

Notes
1. Research has consistently shown that need satisfaction in memories is a stronger predictor of well-being than valence (Philippe,
Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, et al., 2011), emotions (Philippe, Koestner, Lecours, et al., 2011), or other commonly assessed memory
components (see Philippe et al., 2015). Therefore, the present
research focuses on need satisfaction as the target experiential component of memory.
2. We did not use the Autonomy, Competence, and Relationshipsubscales of the PWB because they map on the three needs postulated by self-determination theory.

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