Foreword
We are now at a critical juncture. We must choose whether to continue
our current high-carbon economy out of mere habit, which could
eventually lead to fierce competition over limited resources, or todauntlessly move toward transforming our economy into a low-carbon
one with more sustainability.
If we are to choose the latter, our most urgent task is to find ways toconsistently seek out more balanced economic growth on a global scale,to ensure energy security, and to ease global warming.
While the pursuit of renewable energy sources such as solar power,
wind power, biomass, and others will certainly contribute to realizing a
low-carbon economy, the wise utilization of nuclear energy must be
incorporated into our efforts toward a more sustainable economy andsociety.
At the same time, we cannot just close our eyes to the potential risks
associated with nuclear energy. We now face serious challenges suchas the risk of nuclear proliferation, in particular to states with lessconcern about global norms and to non-state actors; the threat of theftof nuclear materials and terrorism using nuclear materials against
citizens and social infrastructure; and the risk of nuclear accidents. We
understand that properly addressing such risks would be essential topromoting nuclear energy, and we believe that human wisdom will
prevail. We also note the importance of balancing the need tostrengthen non-proliferation with the enhancement of nuclear
disarmament to satisfy the security concerns of a broader range ofstates.
In order to consider a balanced approach toward promoting nuclear
energy while containing the risks associated with nuclear energy, the－i－Japan Institute of International Affairs launched a taskforce on “Atoms
for a Sustainable Future” in 2007. The taskforce, led by Ambassador
Tetsuya Endo, former deputy chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission of Japan, and former representative of the Japanese
government to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), consistsof leading Japanese experts on nuclear energy, research anddevelopment, international law, international security and the environment.
The taskforce submitted its policy recommendation paper to the Ministryof Foreign Affairs of Japan in January 2008. It contained 13
recommendations, including adoption of the “Three S” (or safety, security
and safeguards (or non-proliferation)) concept, for the Government ofJapan, which chaired the G8 Summit Meeting in 2008, as well as for theinternational community in dealing with this important issue.
Our recommendations, including the “Three S” concept, were incorporated
into G8 statements. However, our mission to encourage the safe andsecure utilization of nuclear energy is yet to be finished. Since
submitting our paper, we have continued to discuss our ideas with ourcolleagues in various parts of the world, and have received a broad
range of feedback and input.
This booklet is the outcome of the taskforce’s extensive examinationand discussion of the future of nuclear energy and sustainableeconomies. We are calling for immediate actions by policymakers andleaders in the industry with a view to bringing about greater use of
secure and safe nuclear energy. We hope that this booklet will make amodest contribution to discussions and measures aimed at our goal of asustainable future.
Yoshiji Nogami
President
The Japan Institute of International Affairs－ii－Contents

Foreword ··························································································

i

Executive Summary ·········································································

v

I Introduction ···············································································

1

II Toward a More Balanced Approach to Promoting Peaceful
Use of Nuclear Energy ······························································

7

1. Developing Appropriate Social and Policy Infrastructure
for Nuclear Energy ·····························································

7

2. Toward Strengthening the ‘Three S’ ....................................

12

III Reducing Nuclear Threats ·······················································

25

IV Conclusion ···············································································

29

Members of the Task Force ···························································

33

－iii－

Executive Summary

The world faces serious challenges that could threaten the survival of
the human race. Tightening energy supplies and global warming areamong these imminent challenges. Safe and secure utilization of
nuclear energy will play an important role in coping with these problems,by easing pressure from energy security needs and supplying energy
with far fewer carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions than other major energy
sources. The world seems to have entered a ‘Nuclear Renaissance.’
Yet nuclear energy also poses security, safety and non-proliferation
challenges. Like other cutting-edge technologies, nuclear energy has
two facets: a sunny side and a shadowy side. When it is used forpeaceful purposes such as power generation, medical services,
agriculture and industry, it can make a contribution to the betterment of
the quality of life. However, it can also be used for military or criminal
purposes. Thus, there are both great opportunities and great risks.
It is extremely important for the international community to make along-term, sustained commitment to a ‘balanced’ approach to thepeaceful use of nuclear energy in a world that is safer from nuclear
risks. We believe that various international fora should provide
platforms for discussing ways to cooperate toward this common goal.
Therefore, we recommend the international community urgently
address the following issues.

－v－

¾

Toward a More Balanced Approach to Promoting Peaceful
Use of Nuclear Energy by Strengthening Global Nuclear
Non-Proliferation

1.

Developing Appropriate Social and Policy Infrastructure for
Nuclear Energy
Recommendation (R) 1: Establish the ‘Three S’ (safety, security andsafeguards (as the symbol of non-proliferation))” as auniversal guiding principle for safe and secure developmentof nuclear energy activities
There is a new international environment for
nuclear activities in which the need for nuclear energy has
been increasing in developing countries. This mandates
broader and clearer awareness of the indispensability of the‘Three S’ for the introduction and operation of nuclear power
and for the harmonization and, where necessary, strengtheningof the rules and regulations governing the ‘Three S’ in an
integrated manner, so that the world can enjoy the benefits ofnuclear energy while minimizing the nuclear risks.
The ‘Three S’ should not be perceived as unilateral
imposition by industrialized states of strict regulation on or
barriers to developing countries’ pursuit of nuclear energythat may result in creating new nuclear ‘haves’ and‘have-nots.’ For safe and peaceful promotion of nuclear
energy, the establishment of mechanisms for international
cooperation could be also effective, especially in the areas oftechnical assistance for developing human resources andsharing best practices in safety, security and non-proliferation
activities.
R. 2:

Provide appropriate international financial assistance tonuclear energy programs and projects in developing
countries－vi－

R. 3:

Address nuclear energy as an effective tool for coping with
global warming and develop appropriate schemes toincorporate nuclear energy into such efforts

2. Toward Strengthening the ‘Three S’
R. 4:
Ensure nuclear safety as a top priority for introducing nuclear
programs and promote international cooperation
R. 5:
Address liability properly both in domestic regulatory
frameworks and in international cooperation
R. 6:
Strengthen international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism
and address nuclear security concerns
R. 7:
Universalize the Additional Protocol and enhance the export
control regime(1) Pursue universalization of the Additional Protocol(2) Make adherence to the Additional Protocol a condition for
nuclear trade
R. 8:
Explore ways to utilize assurance of fuel supply andmultilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle in promoting
non-proliferation and sharing nuclear energy opportunities(1) Make reliable assurance of supply key to effective
multilateral mechanisms(2) Multilateral mechanisms should not create new nuclear‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’
R. 9:
Address concerns over the back end of the fuel cycle
R. 10:
Strengthen enforcement and implementation mechanisms
for non-proliferation(1) Strengthen supplementary measures such as PSI andUNSCR 1540
(2) Set conditionalities for withdrawal from the NPT(3) Strengthen the linkage between the IAEA and the UN
Security Council for enforcement(4) Promote proper combinations of dialogue through ad hoc
fora, incentives, and enforcement－vii－

R. 11:Deepen and widen international collaboration in developing
more proliferation-resistant technology, sophisticatedsafeguards and verification technology－viii－

¾

Reducing Nuclear Threats

We recognize that the ‘grand bargain’ among the three pillars of the
NPT -- non-proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, andnuclear disarmament – continues to be a vital part of the international
non-proliferation regime, and each component should be properly
addressed. Pursuing nuclear disarmament and strengthening nuclear
non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing. In addition, in order to further
widen and strengthen the global non-proliferation campaign,
disarmament efforts by all nuclear armed states are indispensable. In
this context, we need to revisit the importance of addressing andadopting measures for nuclear disarmament.
R. 12:

R. 13:

R. 14:

Reemphasize nuclear disarmament and reaffirm the totalelimination of nuclear weapons as an important goal forhuman civilization as well as the responsibility of all
nuclear-weapon states, whether de facto or de jure
Address security incentives for nuclear proliferation, inparticular taking into account regional security dynamics andsecurity assurance in ways that reduce reliance on nuclear
weapons in security strategy
Achieve early entry-into-force of the CTBT and startnegotiations on an FMCTAll states regardless of NPT status should act toreinforce disarmament and non-proliferation norms. It is
important that all states adhere to global norms ofdisarmament and non-proliferation. The entire global nuclear
community now bears a special responsibility to envision andimplement measures to reinforce disarmament andnon-proliferation norms that could make the global
non-proliferation regime more sustainable in the long run.

－ix－

It may take time to realize and implement measures to meet thesechallenges, but the risks are imminent. The international community
must begin discussing concrete steps and taking immediate actions to
reduce such risks in order to ensure the best utilization of nuclear
energy for a sustainable future.

－x－

I.

Introduction
The world faces serious challenges that could threaten thesurvival of the human race. Tightening energy supplies andglobal warming are among these imminent challenges. Safe
and secure utilization of nuclear energy will play an importantrole in coping with these problems, by easing pressure fromenergy security needs and supplying energy with far fewer
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions than other major energy
sources.
Yet nuclear energy also poses security, safety andnon-proliferation challenges. Like other cutting-edge
technologies, nuclear energy has two facets: a sunny side
and a shadowy side. When it is used for peaceful purposessuch as power generation, medical services, agriculture andindustry, it can make a contribution to the betterment of thequality of life. However, it can also be used for military or
criminal purposes. Thus, there are both great opportunities
and great risks.
It is extremely important that the peaceful use of nuclear
energy take into account nuclear security against terrorist
activities, the safe operation of nuclear energy facilities, andthe prevention of proliferation. Without addressing thesechallenges, the peaceful use of nuclear energy cannot bepromoted.

1. Growing Needs of Nuclear Energy
First, on the sunny side, nuclear energy can ease energy
security competition. The world seems to have entered a‘Nuclear Renaissance.’ As economies grow, energy
demands also increase. For example, in Asia where there－1－are rising energy-consuming countries such as China andIndia, it is predicted that meeting the demand for energy will
become a serious challenge not only for individual countries
but for the region as a whole. In other regions such as Latin
America, Africa and the Middle East, plans and expressionsof interest in nuclear energy have been increasing. The
expectation that nuclear energy will fill the gap between
energy demand and supply has become very high.
Second, nuclear energy is expected to contribute to global
efforts to cope with the global warming problem as its CO2
emissions are much less than those from fossil fuel sources.
Alternative energy sources such as solar and wind power are
also considered environmentally-friendly. However, theirenvironmental advantage is constrained by low energy
density, high cost, and lack of consistency in supply. Among
major energy sources, including non-fossil fuels, nuclear
power is one of the most effective energy sources for
reducing CO2 emissions.
Given the energy security and environmental challenges that
we face, the role of nuclear energy will become all the more
important. We believe that promoting nuclear energy globally
would provide an effective way to cope with these challenges.
To this end, international cooperation should be deepened
and expanded.
2. Deepening Concerns over Nuclear Threats
While we expect nuclear energy to play an increasing role inbettering our lives, we need to pay great attention to theshadowy side of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy also poses
serious security challenges, and such challenges haveseemingly become more serious.

－2－

The world has had to live for more than sixty years with theserious threat of nuclear devastation, a threat that is theresult of the huge number of nuclear weapons that could
destroy the earth several times over. While this danger
continues, we also face rising nuclear proliferation threats.
The international nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as its cornerstone, isunder serious challenge from North Korea’s ambition forpossessing nuclear weapons, Iran’s pursuit of its own fuelcycle capabilities, A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market, etc.
Nuclear technology is no longer a cutting-edge technology.
This fact suggests that anyone can gain relatively easy
access to and acquisition of nuclear technology. Dual-use
technology and materials are widely handled by diverse
companies and engineers of various nationalities, evennon-member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Sensitive nuclear technology could be acquired in the nameof the ‘inalienable right’ to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Once such sensitive technology falls into the hands of a state
determined to go nuclear, that state could achieve its
objective by diverting peaceful nuclear programs to military
use and withdrawing from international non-proliferation
treaties and agreements. The threats of nuclear terrorism
and thefts of or illicit trade in nuclear materials andtechnology by non-state actors are also of grave concern.
3. Agenda for a Sustainable Nuclear Future
Under such circumstances, what can we do to promote thesunny side of nuclear energy, i.e., the peaceful use of
nuclear energy, while containing the shadowy side, i.e.,various security and safety risks, and the misuse of nuclear
energy?

－3－For promoting the sunny side, we need a renewedrecognition of the principles for promoting nuclear energy tocontribute to sustainable growth in the global economy, tosolve global warming problems, and to meet energy security
needs, in balance with further efforts to reduce the risks
posed by the threats of nuclear proliferation, nuclear
terrorism, and existing nuclear weapons. We also need to bereminded that concerns over the safety of nuclear activities
have become increasingly important for maintaining thecredibility and sustainability of nuclear energy activities. We
should give the utmost attention to the reduction, safe
storage and disposition of nuclear waste.
To contain the shadowy side, we need to strengthen global
non-proliferation efforts so that the peaceful use of nuclear
energy is not exploited to acquire nuclear weapons
capabilities. We recognize that no other actor, either state or
non-state, should be allowed to possess nuclear weapons
and weaponization capabilities. Neither should any state or
non-state actor assist others’ proliferation activities. As theuse of nuclear energy spreads, the risks and threats thatarise from such activities will increase. In particular, recent
challenges such as the cases of North Korea and Iranpresent great risks of proliferation, illustrating inadequacies
in the international mechanisms that oversee and prevent
exploitation of peaceful nuclear activities for military
purposes.
Peaceful nuclear facilities could be diverted into military ones
without detection if safeguards do not properly function forsuch facilities. A peaceful nuclear program could be used toaccumulate materials and capabilities for military purposes,
hiding such intentions before withdrawal from the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the－4－International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and otherinternational non-proliferation obligations.
A peaceful
nuclear program could also be used to cover clandestine
nuclear activities. In order to prevent such actions, we needto fix the weakest links in the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime so that the regime can meet new
realities and challenges.
We also should not forget that nuclear non-proliferation anddisarmament are two sides of the same coin. They have tobe promoted hand-in-hand. Progress in nuclear disarmament
would convince non-nuclear weapon states to further
associate themselves with global efforts to strengthen
non-proliferation while reductions in the threat of nuclear
proliferation would motivate nuclear weapon states toaccelerate the process of nuclear disarmament.
It is our hope that all nuclear threats will be reduced andeventually eliminated. All human beings should rememberthat the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the goal of
every civilization. All nations must share a common goal
regarding nuclear disarmament and make every effort toachieve it, while the legitimate security concerns of every
nation must be addressed in the course of achieving thisgoal.
Nuclear terrorism is now perceived as one of the gravest
security threats in nuclear-related activities as it would havesuch severe consequences. While the probability of such an
event is not high, it would cause serious damage to economic,
social and security order. The security of nuclear materials
and facilities must become a priority.

－5－

It is extremely important for the international community tomake a long-term, sustained commitment to a ‘balanced’
approach to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a worldthat is safer from nuclear risks. We believe that various
international fora, including G8 Summit meetings, should
provide platforms for discussing ways to cooperate toward
this common goal.
Therefore, we recommend the international community
urgently address the following issues.

－6－

II.

Toward a More Balanced Approach to Promoting Peaceful
Use of Nuclear Energy by Strengthening Global Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
We reaffirm that each nation has the ‘inalienable right’ to enjoy
the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy inconformity with the non-proliferation provisions andsafeguards obligations in the NPT and the IAEA Statute. This
‘inalienable’ right should not permit the acquisition of sensitive
nuclear materials and technology in the absence oftransparent and plausible plans for strictly peaceful purposes.
Since nuclear energy promotes energy security and better
protects the environment, we recognize the importance ofinternational cooperation in promoting the peaceful use of
nuclear energy. At the same time, it is important that all
nations be aware of the risks related to the introduction of
nuclear power.

1. Developing Appropriate Social and Policy Infrastructure for
Nuclear Energy
Recommendation 1: Establish the ‘Three S’ as a universal guiding
principle for safe and secure development of nuclear energy
activities
The ‘Nuclear Renaissance’ should be welcomed from theviewpoints of energy security and global environmental
protection, but without blind optimism. Due to the dual natureof nuclear energy and the necessity for nuclear energy risk
management, states that intend to introduce peaceful nuclear
activities must take into account: a) the safety of theirfacilities and operations; b) the security of facilities andmaterials; and c) non-proliferation (or safeguards), that is,－7－

Safety, Security, and Safeguards or the ‘Three S’s. On‘Safety,’ ensuring safety in the operation of nuclear facilities
is an indispensable condition for nuclear power programs tobe accepted by the local community. At the same time, it isimportant to note that a nuclear accident anywhere could
have adverse impacts globally on the promotion of nuclear
energy. On ‘Security,’ nuclear facilities and nuclear materials
could be identified by terrorists as targets, generating
growing concern over terrorism. They also could make anduse ‘dirty bombs’ with radioactive materials. The use of ‘dirty
bombs’ could cause serious environmental, social andeconomic damage. Therefore, as a measure for winningconfidence in nuclear energy activities, nuclear security
should be given more attention. It must be noted that
‘Safeguards’ in the context of the ‘Three S’ refer to any
measures designed to prevent nuclear proliferation. This is
not intended to undermine the significance of othernon-proliferation measures, although ‘Safeguards’ remain at
the center of a wide spectrum of non-proliferation measures.
There is a new international environment for nuclear
activities in which the need for nuclear energy has been
increasing in developing countries. This mandates broader
and clearer awareness of the indispensability of the ‘Three S’for the introduction and operation of nuclear power and forthe harmonization and, where necessary, strengthening of
the rules and regulations governing the ‘Three S’ in an
integrated manner, so that the world can enjoy the benefits ofnuclear energy while minimizing the nuclear risks. With suchan integrated and, where necessary, strengthened andstreamlined framework for the ‘Three S’, the prerequisites for
introducing and operating nuclear energy activities will
become clearer, and the transparency and sustainability of－8－international cooperation and technology transfer for thepeaceful use of nuclear energy will be enhanced.
It should be noted, however, that the introduction of the‘Three S’ concept is not intended to create a gap between
nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots.’ Instead, it means thatinternational cooperation in introducing nuclear energy
must accompany cooperation in building a firm
regulatory/management infrastructure for nuclear power
programs based on the ‘Three S’ concept in countries that
introduce nuclear energy programs. In other words, countries
providing nuclear cooperation must realize the essentiality ofproviding support for capacity building in the ‘Three S’ toreduce various risks related to nuclear energy over the longrun.
The ‘Three S’ is being increasingly recognized as afoundation for introducing peaceful nuclear programs. In its
declaration, the July 2008 G8 summit meeting endorsed the‘Three S’ concept for strengthening nuclear security, nuclear
safety and non-proliferation rules and guidelines. Working
out the details and implementing the concept would be left tothe appropriate international institutions and/or mechanisms
such as the IAEA. It would also be useful to invite the nuclear
industry into discussions on the ‘Three S’ as they haveexpertise and are, in many cases, primarily responsible forbuilding and operating nuclear facilities. Still, it is important toraise awareness of this concept worldwide.
As mentioned above, it is not our desire to discriminate
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ by setting up thisframework. The ‘Three S’ should not be perceived asunilateral imposition by industrialized states of strict
regulation on or barriers to developing countries’ pursuit of－9－nuclear energy. Rather, we consider it essential that theinternational community (in particular exporting countries andappropriate institutions) provide opportunities for dialogue
and necessary assistance (both technical and financial) tostates that have nuclear power plants or that have plans to
introduce nuclear power programs so that they can meet therequirements of the ‘Three S’. This process would require
cooperation with the IAEA. For the safe and peacefulpromotion of nuclear energy, the establishment of mechanisms
for international cooperation could be also effective,
especially in the areas of technical assistance for developing
human resources and sharing best practices in safety,
security and non-proliferation activities.
Recommendation 2: Provide appropriate international financial
assistance to nuclear energy programs and projects indeveloping countries
Introducing a nuclear power program requires solid
infrastructure in various aspects, including human resource
development, regulatory legislation and agencies, technologicalcapabilities, and financial procurement capabilities (acomprehensive list of such needs is shown in the IAEA’s“Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for
Nuclear Power”). Above all, capital procurement would be a
key to expanding nuclear energy worldwide since nuclear
power generation needs a large initial capital investment andrequires a long-term payback period. Developing countries
need to attract international capital for their nuclear programs.
Therefore, the international community should offer
innovative financial mechanisms with which private andpublic investment for the construction of nuclear reactors
would be facilitated. In this regard, the IAEA Secretariat
should further examine and elaborate on the report(GC(52)/res/12, September 2008) submitted at the request of－10－

the IAEA General Conference to the Director General of the
IAEA (cf. GC(50)/res/13, September 2006 and GC(51)/res/14,
September 2007). Other existing financial mechanisms suchas World Bank loans and OECD guidelines for export credit,
which currently discriminate against nuclear projects, should
be made available for nuclear power projects.
It may also be worth examining the linking of financial
support through the mechanisms mentioned above with thefulfillment of the ‘Three S’ guidelines since this would
contribute to enhancing the safety and security of nuclear
activities as well as non-proliferation.
Recommendation 3: Address nuclear energy as an effective toolfor coping with global warming and develop appropriate schemes
to incorporate nuclear energy into such efforts
Global warming is one of the most imminent problems thathumanity faces. Currently, there is no incentive or
mechanism to facilitate the utilization of nuclear energy forenvironmental purposes, even though nuclear energy is quite
effective in terms of reducing CO2 emissions. Utilization of
nuclear energy is excluded from the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). Such discrimination against nuclear
energy might undermine international efforts to cope with
global warming. To begin with, we urge the international
community to acknowledge that nuclear energy would be aneffective way to contribute to containing the increase of CO2
emissions. Then, serious consideration should be given to
the establishment of a relevant mechanism for utilizing
nuclear energy projects for environmental purposes. In
particular, we back the creation of a policy mechanism tosystematically incorporate the promotion of nuclear energy
into the efforts to tackle global warming in the new round ofnegotiations on a post-Kyoto Protocol mechanism.

－11－

2.

Toward Strengthening the ‘Three S’

SafetyRecommendation 4: Ensure nuclear safety as a top priority for
introducing nuclear programs and promote international
cooperation
Confidence in the safety of nuclear power operations is anindispensable basis for promoting nuclear energy. Obtaining
such confidence should be a high priority for government andindustry in introducing nuclear power plants because
confidence in the safe operation of nuclear facilities isundoubtedly one of the most important prerequisites for the
hosting communities in accepting nuclear facilities. Nuclear
safety also inspires international confidence, in particular, inneighboring states.
To develop the regulatory frameworks and other domestic
infrastructure, administrative capacity and technicallycompetent experts needed in this area, international
cooperation in sharing information and good practices,
technical cooperation, finance and other approaches must be
further encouraged, in conjunction with nuclear industrial
cooperation.
It is also important that the international community
encourage states to accede to international conventions fornuclear safety, such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety,
the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent FuelManagement and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention
on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and others.

－12－

Recommendation 5: Address liability properly both in domestic
regulatory frameworks and in international cooperation
Historically, successful development of nuclear energy
programs has paid great attention not only to developing
industrial policy to support the nuclear industry, but also toestablishing a nuclear liability system under which thenuclear industry would be able to reduce the risk and burdenof nuclear incidents and local communities hosting nuclear
plants would be well supported and compensated in theevent of a nuclear incident. We recognize that nuclear safety
and liability are important issues when introducing nuclear
energy programs. In addition, nuclear accidents could inflicttrans-border damage on neighboring countries. To respondproperly to such situations, the international community
needs appropriate international arrangements on regulations
and compensation as well as coordination of laws andregulations on nuclear liability among countries. For example,
in Asia, there are more than 100 nuclear power plants inoperation, and more are either under construction or planned.
Asian countries have their own domestic liability schemes,
but these have not been coordinated for standardization on
substances and procedures for application, in particular fortrans-border accidents.
The lack of a domestic nuclear liability scheme and international
coordination could also be a serious obstacle for international
cooperation and assistance in peaceful nuclear activities
since it would pose some risks and uncertainty with regard to
supplier liability. All states, particularly new nuclear powerstates, should establish liability legislation and a mechanism
for compensation relevant to nuclear accidents that would bein conformity with internationally established norms andprinciples for nuclear liability.

－13－

The international community should provide cooperation tostates wishing to introduce nuclear energy in establishing a
regulatory framework and administrative capacities toproperly address safety and liability, and acceding to relevantinternational treaties.
Security
Recommendation 6: Strengthen international efforts to combat
nuclear terrorism and address nuclear security concerns
Coping with threats of nuclear terrorism is the current security
priority. Terrorism in general has become the gravest concern
for international security and ordinary people. To eliminate
terrorism, it is essential that we deal with the root causes andeliminate the ‘seed bed’ of terrorism. In the meantime, should
terrorism be linked to nuclear activities, the level of threat
would be incomparably high. Therefore, it is critical to shutany route of access by terrorists to nuclear materials and toprevent terrorists or other non-state actors from committing
themselves to illicit transfer of materials and technology. To
that end, all states should develop strong domestic regulatory
and enforcement mechanisms based on United Nations
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540.
The international community should unite to confront thesethreats under the International Convention for the Suppressionof Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, andstrengthen domestic control and management over materials
and facility security.
Yet a global effort to cope with nuclear terrorism could be
more effective. The G8 countries should offer assistance to－14－

other countries to implement effective accounting and control
over their stockpiles of nuclear, radioactive and otherradiological materials.
The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons andMaterials of Mass Destruction (nuclear, radiological,
biological and chemical) was launched at the G8 Kananaskis
Summit in June 2002 to cope with the growing threat ofterrorists acquiring such weapons and materials. The G8 andtheir partners have been implementing specific projects in
Russia, including the securing of nuclear materials, thedismantlement of nuclear submarines and the destruction ofchemical weapons. Then its activities were expanded to
Ukraine. Because the prospect of related materials, equipment
and technology falling into the wrong hands is a global
danger, the activities under this Partnership should be
globally expanded in scope and membership. In this sense,
the G8 Global Partnership could be utilized as a channel for
providing the necessary financial and technical cooperation
to countries urgently requiring measures to strengthen
security and physical protection of nuclear and radiologicalmaterials, and for implementing UNSCR 1540 andsuccessive resolutions.
We should also note the importance of sharing information,
expertise and best practices among like-minded countries on
nuclear security and physical protection as well as that ofprotecting sensitive information. In particular, efforts tofacilitate information sharing and mutual cooperation among
nuclear operators and facilities should be promoted on a
global scale.

－15－

Safeguards (Non-Proliferation)
Recommendation 7: Universalize the Additional Protocol andenhance the export control regime(1) Pursue universalization of the Additional Protocol
We believe that universalization of the Additional Protocol(AP) to the IAEA safeguards agreements is one of the mostimportant and effective ways to check nuclear proliferation.
We recognize that it would be difficult to make the AP
obligatory now. However, in the spirit of cooperation, andgiven the globally shared interests in reducing nuclear
threats, all countries should sign and ratify the AP at theirearliest convenience. The international community must
create a more effective way to utilize the AP in multilateraland bilateral ways for the purpose of non-proliferation.
(2) Make adherence to Additional Protocol a condition
for nuclear trade
Strengthening export control measures is essential for
preventing proliferation. We strongly encourage the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) to adopt adherence to the AP as anadditional condition for supplying nuclear-related materials
and technology in the NSG guidelines. The Additional
Protocol is useful as a guarantee to secure greatertransparency on the end-use of shipped technology andmaterial. If this is too difficult, the G8 and leading countries
such as China may voluntarily declare that concluding the AP
will be a condition for the supply of nuclear materials andtechnology.
While we are aware of concerns over its unconditional
extension, a moratorium by the G8 regarding the transfer ofsensitive technology and materials to additional statesshould be extended until a proper guideline or mechanism to－16－

regulate nuclear trade is established. In the meantime, we
encourage the NSG and other international fora to continue
discussing means to ensure effective oversight and intrusive
access to transferred technology and material.
Recommendation 8: Explore ways to utilize assurance of fuelsupply and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle inpromoting non-proliferation and sharing nuclear energy
opportunities(1) Make reliable assurance of supply key to effective
multilateral mechanisms
Recently, various measures have been discussed tostrengthen the international non-proliferation regime that isunder serious challenge. Above all, discourse over multilateralcontrol of nuclear fuel cycles has been revitalized. Currently,
there are twelve proposals being floated.
Given Article IV of the NPT, it would be impossible to force allstates to join a fuel supply mechanism. It is also arguable
whether fuel supply assurance mechanisms are a realistic
incentive to keep nations from developing their own
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. In particular,
determined proliferators would not give up their pursuit ofacquisition of fuel cycle capabilities even if their fuel supply
were to be guaranteed. Nevertheless, reliable assurance of
supply mechanisms would function as an effective backup tomarket mechanisms for nuclear fuel, and eventually provide
great incentives for states to join such mechanisms.
It is important to discuss assurance of supply and multilateralapproaches as these would contribute to strengthening
international non-proliferation norms. At the very least,
assurance of fuel supply for non-nuclear fuel cycle states (ormultilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle) has－17－significance in shaping and embedding robust non-proliferation
norms and habits in the international community.
(2) Multilateral mechanisms should not create new
nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’
International interdependence is already a fact in the area of
nuclear fuel supply, and it will become increasingly importantas most ‘national’ fuel cycle programs have international
elements. Therefore, for some countries -- such as those withsmall-scale nuclear programs -- it would be more efficient torely on an international mechanism as a backup to fuelprocurement through market mechanisms. Multilateralapproaches may provide an alternative means for states toprocure nuclear fuels. Furthermore, international interdependence
would help ensure that ‘national’ programs would not bediverted for military purposes as interdependence could
function as a mutual oversight mechanism.
We are aware of concerns about these mechanisms. First,
such multilateral fuel cycle arrangements should not distort
existing, relatively well-functioning market mechanisms forfuel procurement. Second, consumer states would beconcerned over the possible emergence of a nuclear energy
producers’ cartel that would extend control over not only thefuel market, but also consumer states’ sovereignty over their
nuclear programs. There is also concern that such mechanisms
could fix the status of supplier states (or ‘nuclear haves’) andconsumer states (or ‘nuclear have-nots’) – in other words,
they could create another form of discrimination in theinternational nuclear order. Therefore, it is necessary forsuch mechanisms to be flexible enough to accept various
types of contribution by member states, depending on what
they can provide to the mechanisms. Such mechanisms must
be inclusionary rather than exclusionary. Third, focusing on－18－

enrichment service in the multilateral approaches or on
assurances of supply is not sufficient in coping with the risk
of fuel supply disruption. Attention should also be paid toother functions in the front end process, such as mining,
conversion, and fuel fabrication, when envisioning suchmechanisms.
Recommendation 9: Address concerns over the back end of thefuel cycle
We should also look at the entire nuclear fuel cycle, frommining to spent fuel management. Most countries withcivilian nuclear reactors face problems relating to the
management of spent fuel. To make international assuranceof supply credible and attractive, we need to address the
management of the back end of the fuel cycle. Providing
viable spent fuel management options would further increase
the reliability of international mechanisms for managing thenuclear fuel cycle.
We also should be reminded that effective management of
the back end of the fuel cycle is important in the context ofboth non-proliferation and nuclear security, as well as
utilization of resources. Measures should be taken toincrease the transparency of stockpiles of recovered uranium
and plutonium. The stockpiles of plutonium should bemaintained at appropriate sizes, and they must be properly
protected. We may pursue efficient use of recovered uranium
and plutonium, such as burning them in reactors, for the sakeof utilizing them as resources. This would also contribute to
the reduction of the stockpiles of such materials.

－19－

Recommendation 10: Strengthen implementation and enforcement
mechanisms for non-proliferation
Despite international coordinated efforts and negotiations,the international community has so far been unable to stop
nuclear weapon development by North Korea and Iran’s
attempt to acquire its own capability of uranium enrichment,
or a potential breakout capability. The lack of cooperation
by North Korea and Iran with the inspection agency and thewhole international community has severely undermined thecredibility and effectiveness of the multilateral non-proliferation
regime. They have demonstrated the limits in implementationand enforcement of the existing non-proliferation regime.
Even though these crises originated in an era before the
IAEA Safeguards mechanism was strengthened with theintroduction of Additional Protocols, the stalemate in the
prolonged negotiations for resolving these problems
symbolize the weakening credibility of the NPT-IAEA system,in particular, in preventing ‘determined’ countries frompursuing nuclear weapon programs.
On-going efforts by the international community to negotiatewith such states must be appreciated, but unfortunately boththe Six-party Talks on North Korean nuclear issues andnegotiations between the EU3+3 and Iran are not making
substantial breakthroughs toward full resolution of these
problems. If the international community fails to properly
address the nuclear problems of North Korea and Iran andstop their quest for nuclear weapons, we may have to beconcerned that potential nuclear aspirants might learn
lessons from the experiences of North Korea and Iran.
If the international non-proliferation regime fails to addressthese problems with total dismantlement of the nuclear
threats from the two countries, the credibility of the－20－

non-proliferation regime could be further undermined.
Recognizing that proliferation is the most serious security
threat to all the countries in the world, going beyond theinterests of individual countries, the international community
should coordinate in approaching these proliferation
concerns. Furthermore, to prevent other countries fromfollowing suit, resolving these two cases and pursuingmeasures to strengthen enforcement and implementation of
the non-proliferation regime should be done in a combinedmanner.
(1) Strengthen supplementary measures
Policy measures such as UNSCR 1540 and the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) are important elements of theinternational non-proliferation regime. They can play a role infilling gaps that are not covered by other conventional
non-proliferation mechanisms such as export controls and
IAEA safeguards. Under UNSCR 1540, UN member statesshould sincerely develop and implement domestic measures
to prevent non-state actors from being involved in covert andovert proliferation activities. PSI could also facilitateawareness of the importance of domestic enforcement andinternational cooperation in enforcement against illicit
transactions and the transportation of sensitive materials andtechnology.
(2) Set conditionalities for withdrawal from the NPT
Exploitation of the provision for withdrawal in the NPT (Article
X) is a great concern, especially after North Korea’s declarationof withdrawal. Exploitation of Article X could undermine theeffectiveness of NPT norms. Conditionality for withdrawal
from the NPT may be properly addressed at the NPT Review
Conference and the UN Security Council. For example, we
may consider a conditionality for withdrawal that would－21－

require non-compliance with the NPT or the IAEA Statute to
be rectified before a member state would be allowed towithdraw from the Treaty or the IAEA.
(3) Strengthen the linkage between the IAEA and the UN
Security Council for enforcement and verification
Enforcement in cases of non-compliance is necessary tomaintain the credibility and reliability of the international
non-proliferation regime. In this sense, the linkage of the
IAEA and the UN Security Council, which is prescribed in the
IAEA Statute, should be reinforced in a way that strengthens
the capacity for enforcing non-proliferation rules. Theinternational community’s demonstration that it is united andwill not tolerate non-compliance with IAEA safeguards
agreements through the adoption of resolutions at the UN
Security Council and the imposition of sanctions authorized
by these resolutions enforcement would strengthen
non-proliferation and deter potential proliferators.
The UN Security Council could also launch more intrusive
verification teams in coordination with the IAEA, in cases ofserious non-compliance.
(4) Promote proper combinations of dialogue through ad
hoc fora, incentives, and enforcement
In the meantime, addressing region-specific or issue-specificsecurity concerns in multilateral fora other than the UN or
IAEA can provide effective ways to reduce nuclear threats,and supplement efforts made through the UN or IAEA. For
example, for imminent proliferation problems such as North
Korea and Iran, multilateral negotiation frameworks such as
the Six-party Talks and the EU3 + 3 could play significant
roles in securing channels for dialogue with the countries
concerned and finding solutions (although these two
examples have not been successful so far). Proper and－22－

balanced combinations of dialogue, incentives, and credible
enforcement with the possibility of sanctions should be
utilized for resolving existing proliferation problems.
Recommendation 11: Deepen and widen international collaborationin developing more proliferation-resistant technology, sophisticatedsafeguards and verification technology
We need to utilize every measure available to us in order toeffectively respond to the threat of nuclear non-proliferation.
Such measures include institutional and technologicalmeasures in addition to political ones. Institutional measuresmean IAEA safeguards and measures such as mechanisms
for the assurance of fuel supply and multilateral approaches
to the nuclear fuel cycle, whereas technological measures
imply the development of proliferation-resistant technologies
that make it more difficult to divert nuclear material for
nuclear weapon purposes.
It is widely recognized that strengthening safeguards throughuniversal adherence to the Additional Protocol, which aims toenhance the ability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear
material or activities, or improving the technology to verify
non-diversion of nuclear material, would play an importantrole in the enhancement of nuclear non-proliferation.
In addition, the technological approach, i.e., the developmentof proliferation-resistance technology, is another promising
approach that, in combination with other measures, could
enhance nuclear non-proliferation in an optimized manner.
For example, technology to extract weapon-usable plutonium,
mixed with other elements in the reprocessing of spent fuelcan be considered proliferation-resistant technology because it
makes diversion more difficult in the sense that it requires
extra processes to separate out weapon-usable plutonium.

－23－

International discussion of proliferation resistance has beenrevitalized in the context of the development of next-generation
nuclear energy systems, including fast reactors, since around2000. Advanced nuclear states should be further engaged indeveloping more proliferation-resistant fuel cycle and nuclear
reactor technologies, and more effective safeguards
technologies, in their respective research and development
programs or through such multilateral collaboration fora as
INPRO, GIF and GNEP as well as bilateral cooperation
programs.
For the development of proliferation-resistant technology,
objective and quantitative evaluation of the proliferation
resistance of each candidate technology is required.
However, there is no clear international consensus on
methodologies for evaluating proliferation resistance. It isalso important, therefore, for the international community toreach a consensus on such methodologies and a common
understanding on the extent to which proliferation resistanceis required for the introduction of next-generation nuclear
energy systems.
We need to achieve an optimization of next-generation
nuclear energy systems as a whole, taking also into accountother requirements such as safety, economic competitiveness,and reduction of environmental burden. An international
consensus on the methodologies for evaluating proliferation
resistance will help make it easier to achieve such
optimization.

－24－

III.

Reducing Nuclear Threats
In order to make the world safer from nuclear threats, alltypes of security threats derived from nuclear activities
should be equally addressed. A balanced approach of
promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, bolsteringsafety, security and safeguards to strengthen non-proliferationand suppress nuclear terrorism, and reducing existing
nuclear weapons is another important element in the pursuitof a world free from nuclear threats that would enable us toenjoy the benefits of nuclear energy.
We recognize that the ‘grand bargain’ among the three pillarsof the NPT -- non-proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, and nuclear disarmament – continues to be a vital
part of the international non-proliferation regime, and eachcomponent should be properly addressed. Pursuing nuclear
disarmament and strengthening nuclear non-proliferation are
mutually reinforcing. In particular, it should be rememberedthat the political commitment of nuclear-weapon states tofurther efforts in nuclear disarmament, reiterated at the 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000
Review Conference, must be faithfully pursued. In order tofurther widen and strengthen the global non-proliferation
campaign, disarmament efforts by all nuclear armed states
are indispensable. In this context, we need to revisit theimportance of addressing and adopting measures for nuclear
disarmament.

Recommendation 12: Reemphasize nuclear disarmament andreaffirm the total elimination of nuclear weapons as an important
goal for human civilization
We believe that all nuclear-weapon states, whether de facto
or de jure, share a heavy responsibility in reducing nuclear－25－threats around the world. They should all commit to further
efforts toward nuclear disarmament, and take concrete steps
toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We welcome
the progress made by certain states, including the UnitedStates and Russia, on nuclear arms reduction. In this regard,
the opinions in favor of the elimination of nuclear weapons
expressed in op-eds of the Wall Street Journal in January
2007 and January 2008 by Henry Kissinger, George Schulz,
William Perry and Sam Nunn, or the ‘Gang of Four,’ are very
encouraging. They say that total elimination of nuclear
weapons is still a long-term goal, but they suggest that asafer world without nuclear weapons is an achievable goalfor humanity, and they also tell us that it is time to take clear
and firm steps toward that goal. The op-eds by the ‘Gang of
Four’ are also indicative of the trend towards diminishing thestrategic and political roles of nuclear weapons. We need toconsolidate this trend.
Therefore, we urge that further concrete steps be taken by
the United States and Russia for achieving security with lessreliance on nuclear weapons. Although nuclear weapons
would play certain roles in a stable strategic balance for thetime being, it should be reiterated that such a strategicbalance should be replaced with one without nuclear
weapons. As the first step, we expect that negotiations forpost-START I and post-SORT strategic arms control
arrangements between the two countries would result indeep cuts in both deployed and reserve nuclear warheads.
Such efforts by the United States and Russia would leadother countries to make their own commitments to reducing
nuclear weapons.
Other nuclear armed states should take steps toward thegoal of total elimination of nuclear weapons now.

－26－

To begin with, they should make their nuclear capabilities anddoctrines transparent through declarations.
In order to further encourage nuclear weapon states toengage in nuclear disarmament, it is also worth considering
the establishment of an international mechanism toconstantly monitor and verify the dismantlement of nuclear
arsenals. Although we need to carefully examine financial
efficiency and other conditions, this could be pursued either
through strengthening the NPT review process by establishinga standing secretariat or by establishing a multilateralmechanism for monitoring compliance and implementation ofinternational commitments under the treaty. For building trustand confidence between nuclear weapon states andnon-nuclear
weaponstates,approaches
involving
non-nuclear weapon states in the verification process mightwell be pursued.
We believe that such progress would serve to create
international circumstances for nuclear disarmament andnon-proliferation favorable to the total elimination of nuclear
weapons.
Recommendation 13: Address security incentives for nuclear
proliferation
To that end, nuclear-weapon states should take measuresthat diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security
policies to minimize the risk that such weapons would everbe used, and to facilitate a process that ends in their totalelimination. These measures should include efforts toeliminate other weapons of mass destruction such as
chemical and biological weapons and to improve regional
security environments, particularly in conflict-stricken regions,－27－

since the presence of such weapons could be used to justify
the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
We also recognize that an unstable regional security ordercould motivate states to pursue the nuclear option. Measures
to decrease strategic incentives (or regional security
concerns) that could drive states to go nuclear should beconsidered and implemented alongside measures to develop
non-proliferation
institutional
mechanisms.
Security
assurance through a multilateral framework that includes
both non-proliferation/disarmament and non-aggressioncommitments may be negotiated as a confidence building
measure. Security assurance could be useful in both
reducing incentives to possess nuclear weapons as adeterrent and shaping relationships among regional rivals bydiminishing the role of nuclear weapons in cases of conflict.
We also recognize the importance of confidence building for
reducing nuclear threats and anxiety by increasing thetransparency of both military and civilian nuclear activities,
including not only nuclear doctrines but also nuclear energyplans.
Recommendation 14: Achieve early entry-into-force of the CTBT
and start negotiations on an FMCTWe recognize the importance of the CTBT and an FMCT tosupplement the NPT in further reducing nuclear threats. Testbans and moratoria contribute to putting off upgrades ofexisting weapons and development of new weapons.
Although 180 countries (as of September 2008) have alreadysigned the CTBT and 145 have ratified it, the treaty has not
yet entered into force because some Annex 2 states have notdeposited their instruments with the UN Secretary General.
We urge those states that have not signed or ratified the－28－

CTBT to do so promptly. In particular, nuclear weapon statesthat have not ratified should do so without delay. Other
Annex 2 states should also fulfill their responsibilities in
reducing global nuclear threats by signing and ratifying the
CTBT.
We also urge members of the Conference on Disarmament
not to block FMCT negotiations. We believe that verificationof fissile material production is desirable even if theoreticallyit may not detect violations perfectly. However, it isunproductive to set verification issues as a condition forentering into negotiations. Details of a verification mechanism
should be discussed during negotiations. Similarly, linking
FMCT negotiations with other unrelated matters can also beseen as intended to block negotiations.
In the meantime, we urge all nuclear armed states both
inside and outside the NPT to declare a moratorium of the
production of fissile materials for weapons purposes,
respecting the spirit of an FMCT. Furthermore, we requestthat all nuclear armed states strengthen accountancy andcontrol of their fissile materials for nuclear weapons anddisclose information on their status for confidence building
purposes.

IV.

Conclusion: Toward a more sustainable non-proliferation
regimeThe world faces serious challenges that could threaten thesurvival of the human race. Coping with energy security andglobal warming are the most urgent tasks in securing asustainable future for humanity. Nuclear energy will play animportant role in this respect by easing pressure from energy－29－security needs and supplying energy with far fewer CO2
emissions than other major energy sources.
Yet nuclear energy may also pose challenges if safety,
security and proliferation concerns are not properly
addressed. If nuclear energy is to play a significant role in asustainable future for human beings, the key will be for thepeaceful use of nuclear energy to take into account nuclear
security against terrorist activities, the safe operation of
nuclear energy facilities, the prevention of proliferation andthe promotion of nuclear disarmament. Without addressingthese challenges, the peaceful use of nuclear energy cannot
have a sustainable future either. Therefore, we stress theimportance of a balanced approach to strengthen nuclear
safety, security, and non-proliferation measures as well as topromote peaceful use in an appropriate, effective manner. In
this regard, the ‘Three S’ would provide a useful conceptual
framework to comprehensively deal with nuclear risks whilepursuing safe and secure nuclear activities.
In discussing the sustainability of a world free of the threat ofnuclear weapons, we also need to consider the sustainabilityof the global non-proliferation regime and the universal
norms that the regime has provided. All states regardless of
NPT status should act to reinforce universal disarmamentand non-proliferation norms.
A decision by the NSG in September 2008 to make India an
exception to the NSG guidelines may have raised the risk ofundermining the universal norms of non-proliferation
provided by the NPT. Some observers have pointed out andcriticized the inconsistency of this decision with the existing
consent on the ‘grand bargain’ of NPT (among
non-proliferation obligations, nuclear disarmament efforts－30－

and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy). The decision
might disappoint states loyal to the NPT’s ‘grand bargain.’
Some argue that the NPT has become irrelevant to the realityof global proliferation concerns, and that accepting India as alegitimate partner in global non-proliferation efforts is more
important. However, it is indeed vital that India play an activerole in strengthening global efforts to prevent the proliferationof nuclear weapons. Equally important, though, is to makeefforts to ensure all states adhere to global norms ofdisarmament and non-proliferation.
The importance of the universal norms and universal adherence
to them is that they certainly reduce the diplomatic and financial
costs of keeping states in compliance with thenon-proliferation rules prescribed in the NPT and the IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, and that they encourage states tospontaneously cooperate in strengthening non-proliferation
efforts. If the sense of adherence (or loyalty) of member
states to the global non-proliferation regime declines, theinternational community will have to pay a higher price todissuade states from going nuclear and to maintain
non-proliferation. The entire global nuclear community,
including India, should be aware that the nuclear deal with
India is a critical exception to the universal norms. It therefore
has imposed on the community a special responsibility toenvision and implement measures to reinforce disarmamentand non-proliferation norms that could make the global
non-proliferation regime more sustainable in the long run.
Nuclear disarmament should also be further promoted for asustainable future. Promoting nuclear disarmament would
strengthen the norms of the international non-proliferation
regime, and thus it would encourage states to engage inglobal non-proliferation efforts. It is also important that we－31－

recognize nuclear disarmament as the goal to be achieved,
not just as a goal to be held up as an ideal. Nuclear armed
states both within and outside the NPT should startconsidering and taking actions toward elimination of their
nuclear weapons.
We also recognize that nuclear disarmament andnon-proliferation are two sides of the same coin. Promoting
nuclear disarmament would facilitate international cooperationin non-proliferation, and strengthened efforts in nuclear
non-proliferation would provide a foundation for further
reduction of nuclear weapons. We believe that respecting the‘Three S’ concept in promoting nuclear energy and sincerely
encouraging nuclear disarmament are essential in helping
nuclear energy gain universal legitimacy and confidence.
It may take time to realize and implement measures to meetthese challenges, but the risks are imminent. Theinternational community must begin discussing concrete
steps and taking immediate actions to reduce such risks inorder to ensure the best utilization of nuclear energy for asustainable future.

－32－

Members of the Task Force
Tetsuya Endo*, Ambassador, Former Vice Chairman, Japan Atomic
Energy Commission
Yumi Akimoto, Chief Executive Emeritus, Mitsubishi Materials
Corporation
Masahiko Asada, Professor, Kyoto University
Takahiko Ito, Advisor, Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Hiroshi Nakanishi, Professor, School of Government, Kyoto University
Masashi Nishihara, President, Research Institute for Peace andSecurity
Shinichi Ogawa, Director of Research Department, National Institutefor Defense Studies
Toshio Okazaki, President, Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Yoji Uchiyama, Professor, Department of Risk Engineering, Universityof Tsukuba
Nobumasa Akiyama, Associate Professor, School of International andPublic Policy, Hitotsubashi University* Task Force Leader－33－

Tetsuya Endo is currently a Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Japan
Institute of International Affairs. He was Vice Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission of the Japanese Government. He served invarious overseas diplomatic postings, including Vienna and New
Zealand as Ambassador. His domestic postings include Director-Generalfor Science and Technology at the Foreign Ministry and Head ofJapan-North Korea Normalization Talks and KEDO.
Yumi Akimoto is currently President of the Japan Atomic Relations
Organization. From 1958 to 1960, he participated in nuclear chemistryresearch at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Since then, he
has been engaged in various domestic and international nuclear
programs pertaining to fuel cycle, environmental and non-proliferation
issues. Dr. Akimoto served as President & CEO and then Chairman of
Mitsubishi Materials Cooperation, from 1994 to 2003. He also served
as President & CEO of Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co.
Masahiko Asada is Professor of International Law at the Graduate
School of Law, Kyoto University, and a member of the International
Affairs Panel of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission. A former Senior
Associate (1988-1989) at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, he served as
Legal Adviser to the Japanese Delegation to the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva from 1991 to 1993. He has also been amember of the UN Panel on Verification in 2006. Professor Asada isthe author of numerous articles on international law, arms control anddisarmament, the use of force, and international humanitarian law.
Takahiko Ito is currently Advisor of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., aswell as Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan. He
has worked for Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., since 1964 and spenthis business career in the nuclear power field serving as Executive
Vice President & Director, Division Manager of the Power Generation
Division, and Director and General Manager of the Hamaoka Nuclear
Power Station (Chubu Electric Power's NPS).

－34－

Yohji Uchiyama is Professor and Chairperson of the Department of
Risk Engineering, Faculty of Systems and Information Engineering, atthe University of Tsukuba. His areas of specialty are technologicalassessment of energy systems, covering life cycle analysis of energy
supply technologies and energy utilization technologies, andengineering economics. He served as a senior research engineer
managing both the technological assessment section and the energy
systems section at the Central Research Institute of the Electric Power
Industry. He is an executive director of the Japan Energy andResources Association and a vice president of the Japanese electricheat association.
Toshio Okazaki joined the Science and Technology Agency (STA) in
1966. Afterwards, he served in several important positions in thescience and technology field such as First Secretary of the Japanese
Embassy in France (1977), Director General of the Atomic Energy
Bureau (1994) and Vice-Minister for Science and Technology (1998).
He is currently President of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA).
Shinichi Ogawa is the director of the Research Department, National
Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Ministry of Defense. He started
his career as a research assistant at the National Institute for Defense
Studies in 1978. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Yale
University with a concentration in international relations, nuclear arms
control and strategic studies. Most of Dr. Ogawa's publications are on
U.S.-Soviet/Russian strategic issues, nuclear arms control andnon-proliferation.
Masashi Nishihara is President of the Research Institute for Peaceand Security, Tokyo, and also Chairman of the Japanese Association
for International Security. From 2000-2006 he served as President of
the National Defense Academy, Yokosuka. Earlier, from 1986-1992 Dr.
Nishihara was on the Council of the International Institute for Strategic－35－

Studies, London. In 2004-2006 he was a member of the Weapons ofMass Destruction Commission.
Nobumasa Akiyama is an Associate Professor at the Graduate Schoolof Law and the Graduate School of International Public Policy at
Hitotsubashi University, and an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Centerfor the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan
Institute of International Affairs. His other professional appointments
include memberships in various governmental and academic study
groups at the Ministry of Defense, the Japan Atomic Energy
Commission, and the Japan Atomic Industry Forum, and advisor to theJapanese delegation to the NPT Review Conference. Professor
Akiyama has published extensively and presented papers at various
conferences on non-proliferation, Japan’s national security andnuclear energy. Recently, he has been working on institutional
problems at the nexus of the peaceful use of nuclear energy andnuclear proliferation.

－36－