Technical Advisory Committee of the Nuclear Risk Research Center
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry
1-6-1 Otemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100-8126 Japan

June 6, 2015

Dr. George Apostolakis
Head, Nuclear Risk Research Center
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry
1-6-1 Otemachi, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo, 100-8126 JapanSUBJECT:

FIRE RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Dear Dr. Apostolakis:
During the third meeting of the Technical Advisory Committee of the Nuclear Risk
Research Center (NRRC), May 25-29, 2015, we were briefed by representatives ofyour staff on selected research and testing activities related to fire protection and firerisk assessment. This letter report provides our observations and recommendations
on the scope and planned direction of those research programs.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1. NRRC should increase priority for fire research and testing programs in thefollowing areas to improve the information that is available to support
development and application of realistic assessments of the risk from fires inJapanese nuclear power plants.
•Development of realistic estimates of ignition frequencies, fire growth times,
and heat release rates based on physical characteristics of electrical cabinets•Development of realistic estimates of ignition frequencies, fire growth times,
and heat release rates based on physical characteristics of transientcombustible materials•Testing to measure the response times and effectiveness of incipient fire
detection systems in prototypical nuclear power plant electrical cabinets

BACKGROUNDThe Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) is conducting
research and testing to improve the understanding of fire prevention, detection,suppression, and propagation to reduce the impacts from fires that may affect-1-nuclear power plant safety. We were briefed on several issues related to guidance
for the development and implementation of fire risk assessments in Japan. Those
issues were discussed in the context of specific topics that are addressed in
NUREG/CR-6850, which provides methods and data for use in fire risk assessmentsthat are currently being performed in the United States.
During this meeting, we were briefed on the current status of CRIEPI research andtesting in the following areas:•High energy arcing fault (HEAF) tests•

Heat and smoke propagation between adjacent rooms (multi-room fire tests)•Lubricating oil fire tests•

Cable fire extinguishing system tests•

Impacts of smoke and soot deposition on electrical control systems•

Verification of fire propagation analysis codes

DISCUSSION
Experience from numerous detailed fire risk assessments performed in the UnitedStates and Europe has shown that a few general types of scenarios typically accountfor most of the fire risk. The following items briefly discuss those contributions andtheir relationship to fire research and testing programs.
Electrical Cabinet Fires
A predominant contribution to the total fire risk at many nuclear power plants is fromfires that originate in electrical cabinets and propagate to nearby cable trays. The
specific impacts from fire damage and the corresponding event sequences dependon the plant-specific design and the configuration of cabinets and cables in each firearea. However, these types of scenarios collectively often account for much morethan half of the total plant-specific fire risk.
An important observation about these scenarios is that they most often involve fires
that originate in intermediate voltage AC power buses or motor control centers, lowvoltage AC or DC power distribution cabinets, or instrumentation and controlcabinets. Although high energy electrical faults contribute to the risk in some plantspecific locations, HEAF damage scenarios are typically a rather modest contribution
to the overall fire risk at most plants.
Fire risk analysts often identify two related issues in the methods and data from
NUREG/CR-6850 as sources of potential conservatism in these assessments. The
first issue is that the general "electrical cabinet" fire category in NUREG/CR-6850
contains a broad variety of very different cabinets. For example, it contains cabinetsthat range from digital instrumentation and control cabinets with power supply-2-voltages as low as 24V DC to plant-level AC power supply switchgear with voltagesof 13.8kV or higher. No distinction is made in NUREG/CR-6850 regarding the typeof cabinet, its typical configuration or circuitry, or general internal energy content.
The total plant-level frequency of these "electrical cabinet" fires is derived from all
fires that occur in any cabinet, and it is then subsequently distributed equally among
all cabinets. Experience from the compilation of actual fire event data does notsupport these uniform assumptions.
The second related issue is that NUREG/CR-6850 recommends the use of similarheat release rates (HRRs) and growth times for fires that originate in any "electricalcabinet". These HRRs and growth times are further based on limited data derived
from very conservative electrical cabinet fire tests that were performed for different
research objectives. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research has acknowledged that further testing is needed to measurerealistic HRRs and fire growth times for a representative range of electrical cabinet
types and configurations. Initial testing for a limited sample of cabinets has been
completed and a draft report has been published (NUREG-2178).
Targeted research and testing in the following areas will provide valuable data andinformation to support more realistic assessments of the risk from fires that originate
in electrical cabinets.
The general "electrical cabinet" fire category in NUREG/CR-6850 should be
subdivided to account for the actual types of cabinets that are present in a typical
nuclear power plant. For example, five or six subcategories may be defined, basedon general voltage level, energy content, and types of circuits (e.g., power supply,instrumentation and control). Generic and plant-specific data for fire ignition
frequencies should then be compiled separately for each cabinet subcategory. To
the extent possible, the fire event data should also describe the severity, detection
and suppression times, and observed extent of damage from each documented fire.
Additional fire testing should be performed for a larger selection of typical electricalcabinets, including low voltage instrumentation and control cabinets containing
varying types and amounts of cables, AC and DC power distribution panels, circuit
breaker cubicles for intermediate voltage AC buses and motor control centers, andhigh voltage AC switchgear. The fire tests should not use external accelerants toignite or fuel each fire, and the subsequent fire growth rates and HRRs should bemeasured. To the extent possible, multiple tests should be performed to provide
information about the variability and uncertainty in the measured parameters. Thesetests should build on the experience from the initial testing reported in NUREG-2178
and should take advantage of international collaboration.
Transient Combustible Fires
Fires from transient combustibles are often identified as an important contribution tooverall fire risk or as a source of resource-intensive fire modeling and analyses thatare needed to develop realistic estimates of the actual risk. These fires are mostoften important contributors to the risk in locations that contain electrical cabinets,
instrumentation and control cables, and occasionally the Main Control Room.

-3-Similarly to the discussion about electrical cabinet fires, risk analysts often identify
two related issues in the methods and data from NUREG/CR-6850 as sources ofpotential conservatism in these assessments. The first issue is that the ignition
frequencies for these fires are compiled only for very broad categories of building
types and personnel activities. Those frequencies are then distributed among all
normally accessible plant locations, according to general assessments of thefrequency and types of personnel activities that are conducted in each location.
Refinements that have been made to the original NUREG/CR-6850 guidance forallocation of these fires permit limited credit for administrative controls that should
restrict the presence of transient combustibles in specific locations. However, fire
analysts have indicated that these prescribed fire allocations are not consistent withactual operating experience.
The second related issue is that NUREG/CR-6850 recommends the use of a limited
number of HRRs and growth times for transient combustible fires. These HRRs andgrowth times are based on selected fire test data for specific types and quantities ofmaterials that may not be representative of actual nuclear power plant transient fireexperience. We are not aware of any currently sponsored fire testing to further
refine these HRRs and growth times for a more representative sample of transientcombustible materials that may be present in various locations in a nuclear powerplant.
Targeted research and testing in the following areas will provide valuable data andinformation to support more realistic assessments of the risk from transientcombustible fires.
Generic and plant-specific data for fires that involve transient combustible materials
should be better categorized to describe the type of activity that was involved inpersonnel-caused fires, the ignition source for equipment-caused fires, the specificmaterial that was ignited, the plant location, and the fire protection administrative
controls that applied for that location. To the extent possible, the fire event data
should also describe the severity and extent of damage from each documented fire.
This information will improve the assessment of transient combustible fire
frequencies and their causes, and will provide improved bases for the allocation ofthese fires among plant-specific locations.
Additional fire testing should be performed for more representative types andquantities of transient combustible materials that may be present in nuclear power
plants, based on the fire operating experience and documented plant walkdowns.
The fire tests should use representative ignition sources, and the subsequent fire
growth rates and HRRs should be measured. To the extent possible, multiple tests
should be performed to provide information about the variability and uncertainty inthe measured parameters.
Incipient Fire Detection Systems
As a consequence of detailed fire risk assessments, several U.S. nuclear power
plants have installed or proposed to install sensitive incipient fire detection systems.
These systems are intended to provide early warning of an impending fire before thedevelopment of significant smoke, heat, or open flames. Because electrical cabinet-4-

fires are a predominant source of the fire risk in many plants, these systems aremost often proposed for low voltage instrumentation and control cabinets andselected AC or DC power distribution panels.
Current fire risk assessment guidance permits only limited credit for the effectivenessof incipient detection systems to alert plant personnel to the source and location of
an impending fire with sufficient time to take preventive actions before a damaging
fire is ignited (e.g., deenergize the affected circuit). If Japanese nuclear power
plants conclude that such systems will improve safety, additional testing of thesesystems in prototypical nuclear power plant cabinet configurations and fire ignition
sources is needed to provide better data for their quantitative evaluation in fire risk
assessments.

We recommend that NRRC should consider extension of the current CRIEPI fire
research and testing programs to address these issues in a timely manner to support
the development and application of realistic assessments of the risk from fires inJapanese nuclear power plants.

Sincerely,John W. Stetkar
Chairman

REFERENCES
1.

"Fire PRA and Fire Test Research, NRRC's Perspective," NRRC Presentation
to NRRC Technical Advisory Committee, May 28, 2015, Confidential.

2.

NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI 1011989, "EPRI / NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology
for Nuclear Power Facilities," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission andElectric Power Research Institute, Final Report, September 2005.

3.

NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1, EPRI 1019259, "Fire Probabilistic Risk
Assessment Methods Enhancements," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissionand Electric Power Research Institute, Technical Report, September 2010.

4.

NUREG-2178, EPRI 3002005578, "Refining And Characterizing Heat ReleaseRates From Electrical Enclosures During Fire (RACHELLE-FIRE)," Volume 1,
Peak Heat Release Rates and Effect of Obstructed Plume, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission and Electric Power Research Institute, Draft Report
for Comment, March 2015.

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