<Book Review>

The Japanese Colonial Legacy in Korea 1910-1945: A New Perspective
George Akita and Brandon Palmer
MerwinAsia Publishers, 2015
Reviewed by Aldric Hama
“Who controls the past control the future: who controls present controls the past.”--George Orwell
Historians George Akita, University of Hawaii-Manoa, and Brandon Palmer,
Coastal Carolina University, describe the origin of Japanese colonial policy in Korea andcompare Japanese Korea with contemporaneous European colonies. They conclude thatJapanese policies were “embedded in realism, moderation, mutualism and proportionality
in its application” to Korea, thereby forming the “foundation for South Korea’s postwar
developmental miracle.” Their sources span a wide range of works, including the writingsof Meiji-era leaders who developed Japanese colonial policy, and sources written bymodern authors.
The current findings greatly contrast to the prevailing “nationalist” narrative of
the colonial era (1910-1945), which portray the Koreans as victims of Japaneseimperialism and ascribe numerous evils to the Japanese, including “cultural annihilation,”“exploitation” and “sexual slavery of women”. The nationalist narrative also “refuses toacknowledge” any benefit Korea may have received during the colonial era. Akita
himself states that he accepted the nationalist narrative until recently—when he waspresented with evidence contradicting it. Indeed, the authors point out that the nationalist
narrative, a presentation of “facts” in a “black and white,” us-against-them manner,
should sound alarms to any discerning reader of history. The authors say the nationalist
narrative—the politically-correct historical view—lacks objectivity and is a clear
example of ideology overriding the facts. The authors call for a “second look” at thehistorical evidence,” and offer a “scholarly rebuttal,” of the nationalist narrative’s claims.
One of the tenets of the Korean nationalist narrative is that the Japanese sought toculturally annihilate Koreans by outlawing their culture. In fact, Akita and Palmer point
out, the Japanese Governor-General of Korea invested much time and effort preserving“major Korean historical sites and symbols” and went as far as introducing a law
concerning the preservation of Korea’s cultural heritage, which has carried over to thepresent. The Governor-General’s reason for this, oddly enough, was to promote the“Korean identity.” Korean language and history was taught in public schools, again, as away of promoting Korean identity. Akita and Palmer relate that traditional Korean dress(hanbok) was allowed and the Korean language, Hangul, was allowed in films up untilthe early 1940s.1 In 1941, the Governor-General encouraged the Japanese in Korea tolearn the Korean language, as few Koreans at the time were able to speak conversational
Japanese.2
While the nationalist narrative speaks of “the black period” of Japanese rule andsays Korean suffering was “unlike that of any other people,” Akita and Palmer point out
that compared to contemporary Western colonialism, Japan’s policy was quite“moderate.” The Western colonial powers generally lacked interest in the welfare of
their subjects and, thus, there were limited efforts of modernizing largely rural
populations.3 Western colonies, Akita and Palmer suggest, were meant to “serve theeconomic needs of the metropole, not to compete with it.” Subjects in Western colonies
were forced to harvest crops and work on construction projects. In the Belgian CongoFree State, “individuals who did not meet their assign quotas were beaten, whipped andtortured.” In the Dutch East Indies, Indonesians were forced to devote sixty-six days outof the year “for the cultivation of cash crops for the government.” The Dutch and theirnative collaborators “confiscated as much as half of the harvest,” resulting in famines.
The Philippines was treated by the U.S. as a plantation, as American authorities“promoted an intensely dependent, export economy based on cash crop agriculture andextractive industries like mining.” During the Philippine-American War (1899-1902), asa means of denying material support for Filipino guerrillas, civilians were forced out of
their villages and put into concentration camps, wherein prisoners died of starvation ordisease. About one million Filipinos were killed during the process of “pacification.”
Similar concentration camps were used in European African colonies. By contrast, inKorea, the authors point out, there were no concentration camps.
Another example cited in the book of Japan’s moderate colonial policy is theGovernor-General’s response to terrorism. In the Philippines, American forces tortured
suspected subversives and executed captured guerillas. By contrast, in response to theattempted assassination of Japanese Governor-General Masatake Terauchi in 1910,“hundreds” of Korean nationalists were arrested the following year, but eventually only
105 were convicted. Furthermore, the book states that “most sentences were commuted orreduced on appeal.” To those familiar with modern South Korean history, it should bepointed out that, in its own struggle against North Korean communist subversion, South
Korean security tortured and “disappeared” suspects, in keeping with American practice.
The book’s thesis is that closer examination of the Japanese colonial era showsthat the period was neither “black” nor uniquely brutal. Despite Korean taxation,
modernization of their own country was financed primarily by the Japanese people—theGovernor-General was “constantly strapped for cash.” Developmental works, including
1

The current reviewer saw newspapers from the 1930s, written in Hangul, on display at the Seoul Museumof History, Seoul, South Korea, in 2016.
2
Committee Against Government Apologies to Korea (2010). A New Look at the Annexation of Korea.
Tokyo: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact.
3
The lack of European effort in modernizing their African colonies could be one of the reasons why postcolonial African countries failed to thrive. However, the failure of African states to, for example, become
major exporting nations like South Korea, generations after the expulsion of Europeans, suggests more
profound reasons.

2the building of transportation infrastructures, government buildings, hospitals, sewage
systems, providing clean running water and electricity to Korean homes, were provided
by and large funded by Japanese taxpayers. Seoul was transformed into a modern citywith paved roads and multi-storied buildings. Literacy was enhanced by building schools
and expanding primary and secondary education to all children, including females.
Korean businesses were created, with Japanese subsidies, in mining, agriculture,
manufacturing and construction, creating both jobs and capital, which in turn gave rise toa Korean middle class.4 Socially, the Governor-General worked at multiple levels,
ending the heavy-handed influence of the yangban, the Korean hereditary elite,
improving the social status of the paekchong, a Korean outcaste group, and alleviating
the heretofore crushing taxes borne by average Korean. Indeed, the authors point out,
from anti-Japanese Korean sources no less, that before the colonial era, almost all
Koreans (“97%”) were politically powerless: “the common people were abused andforgotten” and reformers were suppressed. During the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), agents of
the Korean emperor sold public office and land rights; the Korean emperor’s favor could
be obtained at a price. Not surprisingly, the nationalist narrative entirely ignores the grim
reality of pre-colonial era Korea. Perhaps those espousing the nationalist narrative are
more comfortable with a feudal, elitist Korea and reject the present as it is based on a pastbuilt by a despised, alien race and their Korean “collaborators”.
While careful historians might dismiss the Korean nationalist narrative as nothing
more than a mirroring of Korean ethnocentrism and xenophobia, the narrative thrives
well beyond Korea’s borders and, in fact, shapes foreign attitudes and polices towards
Japan. The current book does not address this peculiarity, but it may be worthwhile
exploring. The nationalist narrative serves as the basis to blame the Japanese for current
Korean “social distortions” and as the foundation of hard-line attitudes against Japan onissues such as the “comfort women” and Takeshima Islands. American adoption of thenationalist narrative leads to government pronouncements against Japan that are
ideologically based and historically inaccurate—such as the House Resolution thatcondemned Japanese “forced military prostitution” during World War II. The nationalist
narrative is espoused by many—but not all—Japanese intellectuals as well, as observedby their constant calls for appeasement in the face of aggressive Korean demands.
Mistrust and resentment will continue so as long as the nationalist historical narrative is
accepted by all sides as fact.
While the current book and others have seen the nationalist narrative for what it is,
it nonetheless persists.5 The book suggests that the nationalist narrative reflects deep
Korean “resentment,” of “humiliation of being subjugated” by an “alien ruler.” However,this does not entirely explain the persistence of the nationalist narrative beyond Korea’sborders. One possible explanation could be the attractiveness by many of the romantic
notions of “victimization” and “oppression” that envelopes the nationalist narrative. Theauthors note that the nationalist narrative “dominated Western and Asian academic
worlds from the early 1950s to the mid-1990s”. The 1950s and 1960s saw the ascent andNot mentioned in the current book is that at war’s end, The Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951) forced
Japan to forfeit all properties and assets in Korea and was not allowed to seek restitution.
5Oh, S. (2015). Getting Over It! Tokyo, Japan: Tachibana Publishing.
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strengthening of leftist dogma within the intellectual class and a rejection of all things
Western. Central to leftist dogma is never-ending conflict between the bourgeoisie“oppressors” and the alienated “oppressed”. The Allied victory over the Axis was avictory over “fascist” and “imperialist” ideologies that allegedly pervaded pre-war
Western, as well as Japanese, thinking. To guard against the re-emergence of “fascism”
and “imperialism,” the general public are constantly reminded of what is really aninvented past. Thus, in response to Japanese attempts to correct the historical record orvisits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese politicians, there are streams of warnings fromWashington, D.C., as well as China and Korea, against the revival of “Japaneseimperialism” and “historical denial”.
Akita and Palmer do note increasing revisionist coverage of the colonial era
emerging within South Korea, apparently due to a growing need to fully explain theabrupt transformation of Korea from a feudal to a modern society in the early part of the20th century. Perhaps better relations between Korea and Japan will follow with genuine
recognition of Japan’s sacrifices in colonial Korea. However, the nationalist narrative
currently overwhelms the cultural and political elite, both outside as well as within Korea,
and recent events do not suggest that this will change in the near future. The culture ofvictimization is particularly rampant in the U.S. and it is within the U.S. that Koreannationalists, with American moral support, hope to propagate their historical narrativeand quash any opposing views. Indeed, to this reviewer, Japanese efforts to counter theKorean nationalist narrative so far have been fruitless, akin to current efforts within
America to preserve its own unique historical identity.

Aldric Hama4