PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Research Article
PROCRASTINATION, DEADLINES, AND PERFORMANCE:
Self-Control by Precommitment
Dan Ariely1 and Klaus Wertenbroch2
1

Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 2INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

Abstract—Procrastination is all too familiar to most people. People
delay writing up their research (so we hear!), repeatedly declare they
will start their diets tomorrow, or postpone until next week doing odd
jobs around the house. Yet people also sometimes attempt to control
their procrastination by setting deadlines for themselves. In this article, we pose three questions: (a) Are people willing to self-impose
meaningful (i.e., costly) deadlines to overcome procrastination? (b)Are self-imposed deadlines effective in improving task performance?
(c) When self-imposing deadlines, do people set them optimally, formaximum performance enhancement? A set of studies examined theseissues experimentally, showing that the answer is “yes” to the first twoquestions, and “no” to the third. People have self-control problems,
they recognize them, and they try to control them by self-imposing
costly deadlines. These deadlines help people control procrastination,
but they are not as effective as some externally imposed deadlines in
improving task performance.

Good resolutions are useless attempts to interfere with scientific laws. Their origin is pure vanity. Their result is absolutely nil.
—Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray

Self-control problems arise when preferences are inconsistentacross time or context (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Loewenstein, 1996). For
example, before going to a restaurant dieters may choose not to havecrème brûlée, but when the time comes to have dessert they may givein to the temptation and order it after all, only to regret having eaten it
after the meal is over. The issue is not whether having crème brûlée isright or wrong, but that ordering it is inconsistent with the decision
makers’ preferences both before and after the event. One way to think
about these issues is that individuals have a set of preferences, X, atsome point in time (or under a certain set of environmental conditions) and a different set of preferences, Y, at some other point intime. In the case of the crème brûlée, dieters may prefer not to consume it (Y) before going to the restaurant, prefer to eat it (X) whenordering dessert and consuming it at the restaurant, and prefer not tohave eaten it after the meal is over (Y). This type of systematic preference reversal is often described by hyperbolic time discounting(e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Kirby, 1997; Laibson, 1997), under which immediately available rewards have a disproportionate effect on preferences relative to more delayed rewards, causing a time-inconsistenttaste for immediate gratification. Crème brûlée poses but a minor
self-control problem. Examples of more important self-control problems include not exercising enough, scratching a rash, nail biting,smoking, engaging in unsafe sex, abusing drugs, overspending, procrastination, and so forth.

Address correspondence to Dan Ariely, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 38 Memorial Dr., E56-329, Cambridge, MA 02142; e-mail: ariely@mit.edu.
VOL. 13, NO. 3, MAY 2002

One of the causes for the apparent changes in preferences overtime is changes in the saliency of the costs and benefits of the activity
in question (Akerlof, 1991). For example, well in advance of actually
taking on the responsibility of writing a book, the benefits of completing such a task loom large, and the costs seem small. Consequently, authors take on such tasks. But as the deadline draws closer,
the saliency of the costs and benefits changes. Authors become increasingly aware of the costs (the time needed for completing thetask), while the benefits become increasingly less clear.
Although such time-inconsistent preferences may form serious
obstacles to following a planned course of action, they can be overcome. In addition to exercising willpower to resist temptation (Hoch& Loewenstein, 1991; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), people canbind, or precommit, their own behavior (Prelec, 1989; Schelling,
1992; Strotz, 1956; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Wertenbroch, 1998). For
example, people who want to diet, but recognize that crème brûlée
will tempt them to deviate from their plan, can preempt temptation by
going to a restaurant with a less tempting menu. A wealth of anecdotes describes examples of binding behaviors, including frequenting
health retreats where some food types are not available, saving in
non-interest-bearing Christmas clubs, or buying small packages ofcigarettes in order to reduce consumption (Wertenbroch, 1998). An
extreme example was provided by Schelling (1992), who describeddrug addicts sending self-incriminating letters to be held in trust (andmailed to the person they fear the most will find out about their addiction) in the event of a relapse into drug use. What characterizes binding behavior is the voluntary imposition of constraints (that are costly
to overcome) on one’s future choices in a strategic attempt to resist
future temptations.
Although time-inconsistent preferences and self-control havebeen the subject of much theoretical analysis in psychology and economics (Ainslie, 1975; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; O’Donoghue & Rabin,
1999, 2000; Prelec, 1989; Strotz, 1956; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981;
Tversky & Shafir, 1992), controlled empirical evidence of self-control strategies is scarce. The few studies that have looked at self-control show that people do attempt to impose costly restrictions onthemselves. In the domain of consumer choice, Wertenbroch (1998)
showed with experimental and field data that people are willing toforgo quantity discounts on goods that they may be tempted to overconsume, effectively paying a “self-control premium” to implementa precommitment strategy of rationing their own consumption ofsuch “vices.” Similarly, Read, Loewenstein, and Kalyanaraman (1999)
asked participants to pick three rental movies either simultaneously(for later consumption) or sequentially (for more immediate consumption). Their results showed that participants used the simultaneous
choices to precommit to watching more “high-brow” (as opposed tomore tempting “low-brow”) movies. In the domain of medical testing,
Trope and Fishbach (2000) allowed participants to set the magnitudeof self-imposed penalties for failing to undergo small, unpleasant
medical procedures. Their results showed that participants used these
Copyright © 2002 American Psychological Society

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Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance
penalties strategically as precommitment devices, setting higher penalties for more aversive procedures.
What remains unclear from the studies that have documented suchself-control behavior is the extent to which attempts to impose restrictions on oneself are successful. The work we report here examined selfcontrol empirically, with a focus on procrastination. In particular, wewere interested in the effectiveness of setting potentially costly deadlines as a way to overcome procrastination. To address this issue, we
looked at tasks on which performance could be evaluated objectively.
Using performance measures, we could test not only whether people use
self-imposed deadlines as precommitment mechanisms, but also
whether or not these mechanisms improve performance. We asked threequestions regarding procrastination, self-control, and performance:• Do people self-impose costly deadlines on tasks in which procrastination may impede performance?
• Are people correct in imposing deadlines on themselves? In otherwords, are self-imposed deadlines effective in improving task performance?
• Do people set their deadlines optimally, for maximum performanceenhancement?

PILOT STUDIESThe two pilot studies took place within the context of a semesterlong course (14 weeks) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology(MIT). Participants were students in the class, and as part of theircourse requirement had to write either three short papers (Pilot Study
1) or one short paper (Pilot Study 2). The instructor explained thateach student was free to choose the dates by which he or she committed to hand in the short papers, but that the deadlines had to be announced in advance and were binding.
Each of the deadlines was scored by taking its distance (number ofdays) from the last day of class. Thus, a score of zero implies a planned
submission on the last day of class (as would be predicted in the absence of self-control problems). Any other response indicates a more
severe deadline than necessary. In the first pilot study, the mean deadline across all three papers was 21.2 days before the end of the course,and significantly earlier than the last possible deadline, t(83)  8.05, p .001. The mean deadline was 32.8 days before the end of the course forthe first paper, t(27)  5.72, p  .001; 20.4 days before the end for thesecond paper, t(27)  5.04, p  .001; and 10.4 days before the end forthe third paper, t(27)  4.45, p  .001. These results show that the students set themselves deadlines well before the last day of class.
To rule out the possibility that students self-impose deadlines because of a preference for distributing events evenly over time (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993), in Pilot Study 2 we gave the students asingle task. The mean self-imposed deadline in this case was 41.59
days before the end of the course, t(21)  15.44, p  .001, suggestingthat setting early deadlines is strategic, and not an outcome of a desire
to space tasks evenly.

STUDY 1: THE FREE-CHOICE/NO-CHOICE STUDY
MethodParticipants
Study 1 took place during a semester-long executive-education
course at MIT. Participants were 99 professionals, most of whom par-220

ticipated in the class via interactive video. The two sections of thecourse (which, based on records provided by the executive-education
program, did not differ in overall academic performance) were eachassigned to a different condition (so there was no random assignmentof individuals to treatments but rather a random assignment of sections to treatments).

Procedure
During the first lecture, the instructor went over the syllabus,
which included instructions for the study. One part of the course requirements was to write three short papers. Students in the no-choicesection (48 students) were given fixed, evenly spaced deadlines for thepapers (a paper at the end of each third of the course). Students in thefree-choice section (51 students) were given detailed instructions
about setting their own deadlines (as in the pilot studies). These instructions indicated that each student was free to choose the dates bywhich he or she wanted to hand in the short papers. Four external constraints were set regarding the dates: First, students had to hand intheir papers no later than the last lecture; second, students had to announce the deadlines for submission prior to the second lecture; third,
the dates were final and could not be changed; and fourth, the dates
were binding, such that each day of delay beyond the deadline would
cause a 1% penalty in the paper’s overall grade. Finally, it was explained clearly that there were no grade advantages for early submissions because the instructor would not provide grades or feedback on
the assignments before the end of the course. Explaining to the students that there would be no feedback before the end of the course wasimportant because it eliminated incentives for students to hand in papers early in order to get feedback that they could use to improve subsequent papers.
In fact, the external incentives for the students in the free-choicesection encouraged submission of all three papers on the last possible day. By setting their deadlines as late as possible, the students
would have the most time to work on the papers, the highest flexibility in arranging their workload, and the opportunity to learn the mostabout the topic before submitting the papers. Students also had an
incentive to set submission dates late because the penalty would beapplied only to late submissions and not to early ones. Finally, students who wanted to submit assignments early could privately plan
to do so without precommitting to the instructor. Of course, such private deadlines might be less psychologically meaningful than thedeadlines they set with the instructor, and hence more pliant and lesseffective.

Results and Discussion
First, we examined the declared deadlines for each of the three papers. Again, each deadline was scored by taking its distance (numberof days) from the last day of class, so that a score of zero indicates aplanned submission on the last day of class (perfectly normative).
Other responses indicate the severity of the deadlines the students imposed on themselves. The mean deadlines were significantly earlier
than the last possible deadline—41.78 days before the end of thecourse for the first paper, t(44)  8.41, p  .001; 26.07 days before
the end for the second paper, t(44)  8.10, p  .001; and 9.84 days
before the end for the third paper, t(44)  4.97, p  .001. Figure 1
shows that only 43 deadlines (32%) were set for the final week ofclass. The majority of the deadlines were set prior to the last lecture,
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCEDan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch

Fig. 1. Frequency distribution of the declared deadlines in Study 1 as a function of the week of class (Week 1 is the first week, and Week 14 thelast week), plotted separately for the three papers.

and in fact, only 12 students (27%) chose to submit all three papers on
the last day of class.1
These results indicate that people are willing to self-impose deadlines to overcome procrastination, even when these deadlines arecostly (our first question). The students could have chosen less binding private deadlines, but instead chose deadlines that involved morecommitment and greater potential cost (a grade penalty for being late).
It seems that they were willing to take the risk of losing grade points
to apply the self-control mechanism of precommitment.
Next, we compared the grades in the two sections to see if flexibility in setting deadlines caused higher or lower grades compared withexternally imposed, evenly spaced deadlines. There were three possible predictions: (a) If students do not have self-control problems,
greater flexibility should lead to higher grades. (b) If students do haveself-control problems, and if they both use deadlines to overcome
these problems and set these deadlines optimally, greater flexibility
should allow them to achieve higher grades. (c) If students do have

1. Because of missing data, the percentages do not fit with the total numberof students in the class.
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self-control problems, and they use deadlines to overcome these problems, but do not set these deadlines optimally, greater flexibility mightlead to lower grades. In sum, flexibility, compared with evenly spaced
deadlines, should lead to lower grades only if people have self-control
problems yet do not set their own deadlines optimally.2 The results
supported the third prediction. The grades in the no-choice section(M  88.76) were higher than the grades in the free-choice section (M 
85.67), t(97)  3.03, p  .003.
In addition to having a direct effect on performance, deadlines canhave a secondary effect on other aspects of performance that also require the investment of time as a resource. A natural candidate forthis measure is the students’ performance on a final project that wasdue on the last day of class. Grades for the final project showed thesame effect: Scores were lower in the free-choice section (M  77)
than in the no-choice section (M  86), t(95)  4.15, p  .001, suggesting that students with late self-imposed deadlines for the three fo-

2. We use the term optimally relative to participants’ performance under theevenly spaced deadlines in the no-choice section. If performance can be improved, it is suboptimal by definition.

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Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performancecal tasks might not have had sufficient time to dedicate to the final
project.
Although the students were instructed about the penalties associated with missing the deadlines, it is possible that students in the freechoice section, compared with those in the no-choice section, treatedthese deadlines as less binding because they were self-imposed.3 To
demonstrate that the better performance in the no-choice section wascaused by the timing of the deadlines and not by the perceived force ofthe externally imposed deadlines, we compared the performance ofthe students in the no-choice section with the performance of thosestudents in the free-choice section who chose evenly spaced (or almost
evenly spaced) dates for submission. This comparison isolates the effect of deadline type (self vs. external) on performance. If these twogroups with similarly spaced deadlines differed in their performance,
the overall difference between the sections could be attributed to thenature of the deadlines (self vs. external). However, if students who
spaced their deadlines evenly showed similar performance regardlessof the nature of the deadline, the overall difference between the sections was likely due to the timing of the deadlines. The results showedthat the performance difference between the two sections decreased
dramatically and became nonsignificant when only those students who
had evenly spaced deadlines were included in the analysis (effect size
reduced by 59%). This comparison suggests that the overall effect ofself-imposing deadlines was due primarily to the timing of the deadlines, not just a weaker perceived potency of self-imposed deadlines.

STUDY 2: THE PROOFREADING STUDY
The combined results of the pilot studies and Study 1 suggest thatdecision makers who face situations in which they can self-impose
deadlines recognize two conflicting forces. On the one hand, they realize the value of binding themselves to overcome procrastination; on
the other hand, they understand the normative reasons to set the deadlines as late as possible. We propose that decision makers combine
these two perspectives and come up with deadlines whose timing is
suboptimal (as shown in Study 1) but better than delaying all deadlines to the last possible day. Thus, we hypothesize that performance
under self-imposed deadlines is lower than performance under externally imposed, evenly spaced deadlines but higher than performance
under maximally delayed deadlines (when all tasks are due simultaneously at the end of the period). To examine this hypothesis, we now
focus on our second and third questions: whether self-imposed deadlines improve performance and, if so, whether people know how to set
deadlines for maximum performance enhancement. Study 2 was designed to examine these questions in a controlled experimental setup,
providing a more sensitive test of the effect of deadlines on performance than Study 1 did, coupled with a more objective performancemeasure.

be contingent on the quality of the proofreading, with 10¢ paid per
correctly detected error and a $1 penalty for each day of delay. A totalof 60 students participated in the study, randomly assigned to the threeexperimental conditions.

Procedure
We chose a task that people cared about but one whose outcome
was not central to their lives (in contrast to the course grades in theprevious studies). We also wanted a task for which performance scores
would be more objective and for which we could pay participants accordingly. We therefore designed a proofreading task in which we deliberately planted spelling and grammatical mistakes. We used a
postmodern text generator4 to create text that was grammatically correct but not meaningful, as shown by the following sample:“Sexual identity is intrinsically impossible,” says Foucault; however, according
to de Selby[1], it is not so much sexual identity that is intrinsically impossible,
but rather the dialectic, and some would say the stasis, of sexual identity. Thus,
D’Erlette[2] holds that we have to choose between premodern dialectic theory
and subcultural feminism imputing the role of the observer as poet.

We created three such texts with a length of about 10 pages each, andinserted in each of them a total of 100 grammatical and spelling errors.
Study 2 included three different conditions. In each condition, weclearly explained to the participants that their payoffs would dependon how many errors they detected and on the time of submission ofeach proofread text. Participants were told that submitting their tasks
early was permitted (without increasing their compensation), but thatdelay in submission would result in a penalty of $1 for each day of delay. In the evenly-spaced-deadlines condition, participants had to submit one of the three texts every 7 days; in the end-deadline condition,
they had to submit all three texts at the end of 3 weeks (21 days); andin the self-imposed-deadlines condition, they had to choose their own
deadline for each of the three texts within the 3-week window (as in
the previous studies).

Results and Discussion

In MIT’s newspaper and on bulletin boards, we placed an ad looking for “native English speakers to help us proofread papers by otherstudents to evaluate writing skills.” We also noted that payment wouldFirst, we determined whether the self-imposed-deadlines condition
replicated the results of the previous studies. The results showed thatparticipants in this condition chose to space out their proofreadingtasks, F(2, 38)  63.28, p  .001, thus showing a preference for selfimposing costly deadlines.
We analyzed three aspects of performance across the different conditions: number of errors detected, delays in submissions, and earnings (see Fig. 2). All differences were statistically significant (all ps .01) in the expected direction. As predicted, the number of errors correctly detected was highest in the evenly-spaced-deadlines condition,
followed by the self-imposed-deadlines condition, with the lowest performance in the end-deadline condition. Results were similar for participants’ delays in submitting their proofreading work (in this case,shorter delays resulted in higher payoffs). Participants’ earnings reflected a combination of error detection and delay and thus show thesame pattern of results.

3. Evidence against this argument is that all students (in both sections)handed in their papers on or before the deadlines.

4. The text-generating engine is on the Web at http://www.elsewhere.org/
cgi-bin/postmodern/.

MethodParticipants

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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCEDan Ariely and Klaus Wertenbroch

Fig. 2. Mean errors detected (a), delays in submissions (b), and earnings (c) in Study 2, compared across the three conditions (error bars are
based on standard errors). Delays are measured in days, earnings in dollars.

Next, we examined the same measures focusing on the participantsin the self-imposed-deadlines condition who had spaced their tasks
evenly, or approximately evenly (n  10). Mirroring the results of Study
1, the differences between the evenly-spaced-deadlines condition andthe (“sophisticated”) self-imposed-deadlines condition decreased dramatically and became nonsignificant for all dependent measures: delay
in submissions (effect size reduced by 55%), errors detected (effectsize reduced by 79%), and earnings (effect size reduced by 55%). This
reduction in effect sizes provides additional evidence that a central
cause of the lower performance in the self-imposed-deadlines condition compared with the evenly-spaced-deadlines condition was suboptimal spacing of the tasks.
Finally, we asked participants to evaluate their overall experienceon five attributes: how much they liked the task, how interesting it
was, how good the quality of the writing was, how good the grammatical quality was, and how effectively the text communicated the ideas
contained in it. Responses to all questions were on a 100-point scale,on which higher numbers represented higher quality ratings. An analysis of the average subjective evaluation across the five questions revealed a pattern that was the opposite of the performance results, F(2,57)  17.06, p  .001. Participants in the evenly-spaced-deadlines
condition liked the task the least (M  22.1), followed by the participants in the self-imposed-deadlines condition (M  28.12), followedby participants in the end-deadline condition, who liked the task themost, or disliked it the least (M  37.9). These results are not surprising, as the texts were meaningless and the tasks were boring, if not annoying. We suggest that the pattern would have been reversed if thetask had been inherently enjoyable; participants in the evenly-spaceddeadlines condition would have enjoyed it the most, followed by parVOL. 13, NO. 3, MAY 2002

ticipants in the self-imposed-deadlines condition, and finally by participants in the end-deadline condition.
In addition, we asked participants to estimate how much time they
had spent on each of the three texts. The time estimates revealed a mirror
image of the subjective evaluations, F(2, 57)  45.76, p  .001, indicating that increased time spent on the task caused the evaluation to be morenegative. Participants in the evenly-spaced-deadlines condition indicatedthey spent the most time on the task (M  84 min), participants in the
self-imposed-deadlines condition spent an intermediate amount of timeon the task (M  69.9 min), and participants in the end-deadline condition spent the least time on the task (M  50.8 min). Taken together, theresults show that when deadline constraints increased, performance improved, time spent on the task increased, and enjoyment of the task decreased (because of enhanced recognition of the true low quality of thetexts). The effectiveness of the constraints themselves depended on thetype of constraint—self-imposed deadlines improved performance, but
not to the same degree as evenly spaced deadlines.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
The studies presented here show that people sometimes impose
deadlines on themselves, even when missing these deadlines leads topenalties. In a world without self-control problems, such behavior
would seem nonnormative. A rational decision maker with time-consistent preferences would not impose constraints on his or her choices. But
if people impulsively procrastinate, and if they also are aware of theirprocrastination problems (e.g., Bénabou & Tirole, in press; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999), self-imposing costly deadlines can be strategic
and reasonable. Study 1 demonstrated that self-imposed deadlines do

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Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performancenot enhance performance as much as externally imposed, evenly spaced
deadlines. The results from Study 2 show that performance under selfimposed deadlines is lower than performance under evenly spaced deadlines, but higher than performance under maximally delayed deadlines.
We can now return to the three questions posed earlier. (a) Do people
self-impose costly deadlines to overcome procrastination? (b) Are selfimposed deadlines effective in improving task performance? (c) Do
people set self-imposed deadlines optimally? The answer to the first twoquestions is “yes,” and the answer to the last question is “no.” Our findings demonstrate that people understand the value of binding themselves to overcome procrastination, even in the face of strong normative
reasons for setting deadlines as late as possible. Our participants showedsome sophistication in their understanding of their own procrastination
problems, but many did not set their deadlines to bind themselves optimally. Whether our evidence of such “imperfect” sophistication (or“partial naiveté”) reflects biased self-perception, cognitive limitations incalibrating deadlines, or a deliberate mixed strategy of balancing flexibility and self-control is a question for future research. What is clear
from our empirical evidence is that procrastination is a real behavioral
problem, that people strategically try to curb it by using costly self-imposed deadlines, and that self-imposed deadlines are not always as effective as some external deadlines in boosting task performance.
Acknowledgments—We thank Jose Fernando Camoes Mendonca Oliveira
Silva for his humor and advice, and the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

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(RECEIVED 1/2/01; REVISION ACCEPTED 6/13/01)

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