A Comprehensive Study on the Applicability of Japanese
Dam Technologies to the Alarming Conditionof Angat Dam in Bulacan, Philippines

AMEERHA P. ORTEGAADRC Visiting Researcher
FY2014B

Disclaimer

This report was compiled by an ADRC visiting researcher (VR) from ADRC
member countries.

The views expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect the views of theADRC. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on themaps in the report also do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the
ADRC.

2

Acknowledgement

The opportunity I had as a Visiting Researcher was a big milestone in my career for it offers a great opportunity forlearning and professional growth and development. I am grateful for having a chance to meet so many wonderfulpeople and professionals who led me throughout this research program.
My deepest gratitude goes to the following…
to Asian Disaster Reduction Center and its wonderful staff who untiringly took time out to hear,
gives guidance and advices and arranges facilities to make my stay comfortable…
to the Government of Japan who continuously supports the activities of ADRC and unselfishly
shares the knowledge and learning in DRR to the other countries…
to the Office of Civil Defense, for choosing me as this year’s visiting researcher…
to my co-researcher, Ms. Fathmath Shaushan Moosa and Mr. Yeshey Lotay, for all the laughter andfriendship we shared throughout this program. I hope to continue cooperating with all of you in thenear future.
A thousand thanks to my family, to my loving mother, for the guidance of my father, to my wonderfulhusband and daughter, for the love and support you’ve given me.
And above all, to my Creator who lead me to this path. He embraces me in the winter cold nights andcheers me up in the cherry blossoms, in Your Holy Name, I offer everything.

3

Table of Contents
Acknowledgement

3

Abstract

5

Introduction

5

Statement of the Problem

6

Objective of the Research

6

Expected result

6

Scope and Delimitation of the Study

7

Significance of the Research

7

Environmental Impacts of Dams

7

Economic Impacts of Dams

7

Human Impacts of Dams

7

Review of Literature and Studies

8Japan’s Record of Dam / Dike Failure and Flooding

8

Philippines’ Record of Dam Failure

13

Data Analysis

17

The Vaiont (Vajont) landslide of 196317

Dam Break Analysis for Polavaram Project18

TED Case Study

18

Dam Breach Modeling

19

Teton Dam Failure

19

Prediction of Embankment Dam Breach Parameters

20

Dam Breach Problems

21

Japanese Dam Technologies

22High Durability and Earthquake-resistance of Dams can Reduce LCC

22

Upgrading Technologies to Effectively Use Existing Dams
Environmentally Friendly Technologies to Conserve the Environment
and Ecosystem

23

Activities of Stakeholders in Angat Dam

24
26

Conclusions

31

References

35

Appendices

35

List of Major Dam Failures

36

Philippines River Law

43

Japan River Law

59

4

A Comprehensive Study on the Applicability of Japanese
Dam Technologies to the Alarming Conditionof Angat Dam in Bulacan, Philippines

Ameerha P. Ortega
ADRC Visiting Researcher
April 2015

ABSTRACT
A review of the present status of Angat Dam, Bulacan, Philippines in theeffectiveness of disaster preparedness of the different stakeholders in relation to thewarning from the experts that the West Valley Fault which runs through the central
Metro Manila area is potentially active, and a splay sits 200 meters east of the Angat
dam. Expert predicts of clear and present danger of dam breach when a magnitudeof 7.2 on the Richter scale earthquakes strike triggering activity in Marikina West Valley
Fault Line.
Adapting Japanese Dam Technologies is being considered to address theoccurring problem of country’s largest hydropower dam.

INTRODUCTION
Angat dam is one of the country's largest dams. This dam supplies potable waterand energy to Metro Manila and nearby areas. The Angat River Basin is situated on thesoutheastern part of Central Luzon, originating on the slopes of the Sierra Madre
Mountains. It has a catchment area of 781 km2 and estimated annual run-off of 873
MCM collecting from the main tributaries of Matulid and Maputi rivers. The watershedarea is bounded by Umiray River in the northeast, the Kanan River in the southeast, andthe Marikina River in the south. The river defines a huge semi-elliptical curve of about 12
kilometers long near Sitio Bitbit in Norzagaray, Bulacan Province. At a few kilometers
downstream, the river emerges from the mountain, flowing in a westerly course acrossthe lowland plains of Bulacan before emptying its water into Manila Bay.
The Angat Lake created by the dam is the main potable water supply source ofthe Metro Manila Area. However this water when in over abundance, due to very
heavy rainfall, is also the cause of widespread flooding, deaths, and accompanying
misery affecting not only the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga but also the Metro
Manila Area. This happens every time the dam water reaches its maximum height andthe spilled water races down through the gullies and streams to the east of the dam
and this rampaging water joins the water of the Marikina river system multiplying the5floodwater volume of the Marikina River system thereby causing rapid increase in thevolume of floodwater in the Marikina Valley. This happens every time very heavy rains
overfill the Angat water reservoir.
This study determined the capabilities/preparedness of the different stakeholders
in relation with the problems of Angat Dam. Specifically, it sought answers to the levelof preparedness of the different stakeholders in relation with the problems of Angat
Dam along the phases of disaster management such as a) prevention, b) mitigation, c)
response, and d) recovery and rehabilitation. This study is also concern with the policies
that can be formulated to enhance the disaster management preparedness of thedifferent stakeholders’ tasks to ensure security, peace and order in Angat Dam and its
environment.
The objectives of this study are: 1). to qualify the socio-economic impacts
resulting from the extreme events; 2). to determine possible schemes that would
minimize the impacts of extreme events downstream as a result of hydrometeorological extremes that often plague the region; and 3). to identify local
adaptation strategies that will minimize damage to the people, and properties in thebasin as well as to the recipients of the water downstream of the basin.
Among the expected results of this study are as follows: a) a closer relationshipbetween Japan-Philippines and ADRC member countries in solving disaster problems
particularly in dam break, flooding, and typhoon; b) affected areas of Angat Dam in
the Philippines will find a way to correct the threat of the ageing dam to Bulacan, andMetro Manila residents; and c) to make a documentation on disaster related to dambreach (i.e. flooding, typhoon, earthquake.

SCOPE AND DELIMITATION OF THE STUDYThis study dealt with the capabilities/preparedness of the different stakeholders in
relation with the problems of Angat Dam. It emphasizes on the disaster management
program particularly on the prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery andrehabilitation.
Similarly taken into consideration in this paper is the goal of the study summarizes
as follows: 1) to shed light on the various forms of danger caused by dam failure; 2) tolearn on the practices being used by Japan in monitoring and addressing problems
caused by dam failure, and 3) to evolved strategies designed to eradicate or minimize
occurrences of calamities be it natural or man-made, when solution is at hand and only
requires implementation of such.
Stake holders includes, but not limited to, the province of Bulacan, the provinceof Rizal, the Metro Manila areas, the Angat Dam Management, the National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR), National Irrigation Authority (NIA), the Metropolitan

6Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), the National Government (DILG, DOH,
DSWD, NEDA, the Congress of the Philippines, the different agencies in Japan (ADRC,
JICA, etc.), the DRRMC (National, Regional, Provincial, Municipal,) . The vision, mission
and goals taken were only along that which is responsive to disaster management.
Resources meanwhile covered the manpower, transportation facilities, communication
facilities, infrastructure support system and equipments. Also covered are the referred
linkages with the government and private agencies.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH
Dam safety is a huge global concern. Dams built some 50 years ago are highly
prone to dam bursts particularly in countries that lack adequate monitoring. As dams
get old, they become increasingly more expensive to maintain. Most alarming, dams
have not been built to allow for the erratic hydrological patterns that climate change isbringing. Extreme storms and increasingly severe floods can trigger earthquake as aresult of the weight of the reservoir and earthquake increase the probability of dam
failure and the risk of downstream flooding. The research will have a tremendous
implication to the following:
Environmental Impacts of Dams
The environmental consequences of large dams are numerous and varied,
and includes direct impacts to the biological, chemical and physical properties ofrivers and riparian (or "stream-side") environments. The dam wall itself blocks fish
migrations, which in some cases and with some species completely separate
spawning habitats from rearing habitats. The dam also traps sediments, which are
critical for maintaining physical processes and habitats downstream of the dam(include the maintenance of productive deltas, barrier islands, fertile floodplainsand coastal wetlands).
Economic Impacts of Dams
Large dams have long been promoted as providing "cheap" hydropower
and water supply. Today, we know better. The costs and poor performance oflarge dams were in the past largely concealed by the public agencies that built
and operated the projects. Dams consistently cost more and take longer to build
than projected. In general, the larger a hydro project is, the larger its construction
cost overrun in percentage terms. The true risks and costs of dams are being
forced into the open due to increasing public scrutiny and attempts to attract
private investors to existing and new projects.
Human Impacts of Dams
Large dams have forced some 40-80 million people from their lands in thepast six decades, according to the World Commission on Dams. Indigenous, tribal,

7

and peasannt communities havee been pa
articularly hardhhit. Th
hese legions of dammreefugees haave, in thee great ma
ajority of ca
ases, beenn econommically, cultturally anddpssychologic
cally devasstated. Thoose displac
ced by rese
ervoirs are only the mostmvisibleevictims of laarge dam
ms. Millions more hav
ve lost lannd and hoomes to th
he canals,,
irrrigation sc
chemes, roads, po
ower line
es and inndustrial ddevelopments thattacccompanyy dams. Many more have lost accessa
to cleancwate
er, food so
ources anddotther naturral resourc
ces in the dammed area. Millions havee suffered from theediiseases tha
at dams andalarge irrigation projectspinn the tropics bring. And
A
those
e
liv
ving downstream of dams hav
ve sufferedd from thee hydrolog
gical channges damss
brring to riveers and ec
cosystems; an estima
ated 400-80
00 million p
people--rooughly 10%%
off humanityy--fall into this catego
ory of dam-affected people.

RELATEED STUDY
Y AND LITEERATURE (CASE STTUDIES/EX
XPERIENC
CES)
Despite thee presence
e of volum
minous da
ata and in
nformationn around the worlddconcerrning dam breach, the researccher believ
ves that hisstory of disaster and calamitiess
of Japa
an and Philippines is still the be
est source of preventtive measu
ures. For th
hat reason,,the Jappanese exp
perience shallsbe thee first to bee discussedd.
Japan’s Record of Dam / Dikee Failure andaFloodinng

The 192
23 Great Ka
antō Earthq
quake
7.9 earthq
On 1 Septe
ember 192
23 about 11:58:44 a.mm. JST, a magnitudemquake withh
its focu
us deep beeneath Izu
u Ōshima IslandI
in th
he Sagami Bay struck the Kanttō Plain off
Honshuu (本本, litera
ally "Main Island") Islaand. Varied accounts indicate
e the durattion of theeearthquake was between fourf(4) andd 10 minuttes and reccorded 57 aftershockks.
TThe earthq
quake afffected Ch
hubu and Kanto Re
egion in th
he Honshuu Island. Itt
devastated Tokyyo, Chiba, Kanagaw
wa espec
cially the port city of Yokohama anddKamakkura City wherew
a Gre
eat Buddha statue weighingw
84
4,000 kgs m
moved alm
most 2 feet,,and caaused wid
despread damagedd througho
out the Ka
antō Regio
on. It alsoo affectedd
Shizuokka Prefectu
ure in Chubbu Region..
Estimated casualtieE
es totaledd about
142,800
0 deaths, including about 40,,000 who
went missing and were presumed
d dead.
Emban
nkments along severral rivers brroke dueto the earthquakeke. Many laarge fires brokebout
and soome deve
eloped in
nto firestorrms thatswept across cities.
c
An estimate
ed 6,400
peoplee were killeed and 38
81,000 houses weredestroyyed by the fire alone.

Fire in Marunouchi

Photto credit: en.w
wikipedia.org

8

A strong typ
phoon stru
uck Tokyo Bay
B
De
estruction in
n Yokohamaaat abbout the same time as thetearthquake. Win
nds from the typhoooncausedd fires offf the coast of No
oto
Peninsu
ula in Ishhikawa Prefecture to
spread rapidly. Many homeshweereburied or sweptt away byy landslide
es inthe moountainous and hilly coastal
c
are
eas
in westtern Kanag
gawa Prefe
ecture, killing
about 800 peeople. A collapssing
Photto credit: en.wikipedia.org
gmountaofainsideinthevillage
Nebukaawa, westt of Odaw
wara, pushhed
the enttire villagee and a pa
assenger train carrying over 1000 passengers, along
g with theerailwayy station, in
nto the sea.
A tsunami withw
wave
es up to 10 m (33 ft) high stru
uck the coast of Sa
agami Bayy(Kanaggawa Prefecture), Bō
ōsō Peninssula (Chiba Prefectuure), Izu Islands, andd the eastt
coast of Izu Penninsula (Tokkyo Prefec
cture) withhin minute
es. The tsunami killeed many,,
includinng about 100 people
e along Yu
ui-ga-hamaa Beach inn Kamakurra and an estimatedd
50 peoople on thee Enoshimaa causeway. Over 570,000 hom
mes were destroyed, leaving an
nto have exxceeded US$1
estimatted 1.9 million homelless. The daamage is estimatedeUbillionn(or aboout $14 billiion today).

47 Typhoonn Kathleenn
The 194
SSeptembe
er of 194
47, TyphooonKathleeen with ma
aximum sustained windsof 185kkm/h (115mph) struc
ck the Ka
anto
Regionn and producedpa recoordbreakinng amountt of rainfall of 166.8 mmm(Sept 13-15)
1
andd the maxximum hourly
rainfall was 34.7 mm/hr.
m
It affectedd six (6) prefecturesps inKanto Region namely Toko,T
Chiiba,Saitama, Gunmaa, Ibaraki, and Tochigi
Prefectture. The ty
yphoon ca
aused seveeral
dike faailures such as the massive dikedfailure along th
he Tone River whhichd in an inu
undated arrea 3km widew
resulted
and afffected 30
00,000 peo
ople and theresultannt flow also affe
ected Tokyo
Metroppolitan Are
ea. The tootal affectedarea iss estimatedd to be ata around 440
Photo credit:: JWA Presenttation dated 4 Feb 20159km2 in which 600
0,000 peop
ple were affected an
nd about 150,000 ho
ouses damaged. Theetyphooon claimed
d 1,100 livess and econnomic loss is estimate
ed at abou
ut 100B Yenn.
Photo creditt: JWA Presenta
ation dated 4 Fe
eb 2015

58 Typhoonn Kanogaw
wa
The 195
On 20 Se
eptember 1958, Typphoon Ka
anogawa (with inte
ernational name off
Typhooon Ida) forrmed in th
he West Pa
acific near Guam movingmwe
est at 185 km/h (1155mph). TheT
typhoon struck JapanJ
in southeastesern Honshu
u on 26 Sept with win
nds of 190
0km/h (120mph), crossed the Easte
ern portionn of the country aand emerrged fromm
Fukushiima Prefecture intoo the Pacific Ocean
n. Typhooon Kanoga
awa becaame extraatropicaal on 27 Sep
pt, moved through Sapporo be
efore dissip
pating on 2
28 Septembber.
TTyphoon Kanogawa
Ka producedd heavy ra
ainfall that reached 748.6 mm
m (29.47 in)on Mouunt Amagii on the Izu
u Peninsula
a. In the capitalccity
y of Tokyo,, the storm
m droppeddalmost 430 mm (117 inch) of rainfall. AcrossA
the country,cth
he rains ca
aused flood
ding alonggthe Kanno, Merug
go, and Arrakawa rivers; the flo
ooding of the Kanoo River desstroyed toovillagess along thee Izu Penin
nsula. The heavyhrain
nfall caused dike failure and flo
ooding onn
The rains resulted in at leastt
both siides of thee main strream andd several tributaries.
t
1,900 laandslides, includingi
7 in the Tokyo
786
T
area
a. There was a storm
m tide of 1.1
1 m (3.6 ft)
in Chib
ba, which flooded 120,000 ac
cres of rice fields. AlongA
the coast, thhere weree
32 shipss that weree missing oro sunk, andd another 20
2 were daamaged.
A
Acrossthee country, more thann 520,000 homes we
ere flooded, 17,743 damageddhouses, more thaan 244 roadd or rail bridges weree destroyedd, 12,000 p
people left homeless,,
1,138 innjured peo
ople and 1,269 died in the typphoon. Ove
erall damaaged was estimateddat arouund 20.6B Yen.
Y

1
10

The 197
78 Izu-Oshiima-Kinkaii Earthquakke
On 14 Jannuary 1978
8, a destru
uctive eartthquake ofo 7.0 Mag
gnitude oc
ccurred att
Southeastern are
ea of Izu Pe
eninsula. Th
he epicentter of the mainmshockk was located aboutt
15km offo the east coast of the peninsula, midw
way betwe
een the peeninsula annd OshimaaIsland. The main shock wass followed by a serie
es of aftersshocks lastting for a weekw
withhtheir ep
picenters movingmgraadually in a westerly
y direction. The large
est aftersho
ock was apair of shakings thatttook place at 7:30
7a.m. anda
7:36 a.m.
aon Ja
anuary 15, 1978 withhtheir ep
picenters located ap
pproximately in the middle of the Izu Pe
eninsula bu
ut most off
the shoocks are prresumed too have had
d a focal depthdof abbout 10 kmm.
TThe earthq
quake cauused 25 fa
atalities, 21
11 injured people, 96 collapse
ed houses,,damag
ged 9 railw
ways and 4 road tunnnels. Local tsunami was
w observe
ed at Izu-O
Oshima (355cm) annd at Tateyyama (12cm).
TTwo (2) da
ams retain
ning tailinggs from Mo
ochikoshi goldgmine failed, lea
ading to areleasee of a largge volume of tailingss. One of the damss, No.1 dikke, collapsed almostt
simultaneously with the sha
aking of the main shock, but anotheradaam, No.2 dike,dfaileddabout 24
2 hours laater at a timme when theret
was no shaking
g. The failure of the No.1
N
dike issknown to have been trigg
gered by the liquefa
action whhich developed in the tailingss
depositt in the imp
poundmennt pond.

The 201
11 Great Ea
ast Japan Earthquakee
The 20011 earthq
quake of the pacificccooast of Tōhhoku, also known as the Greatt
East Japan Earthquakke, the 2011 Tohokuueaarthquake and 3.11 earthquakke, was amaagnitude 9.0
9 that oc
ccurred att 14:46 JSTTonn 11 Marc
ch 2011 laasting abo
out six (6)minutes, withh epicente
er approximately 70
0kilo
ometers (443 mi) east of Oshikaa Peninsulaaof Tōhoku. It was tthe most powerfulleaarthquake ever reco
orded in Ja
apan. Theeeaarthquake triggeredd powerfu
ul tsunamii
waaves that reachedrhheights of up to 40.55meeters (133 ft)
f in Miyako in Tōhooku’s IwateePreefecture, andainundaated a tottal area off
ap
pproximate
ely 561 km2
2 in Japan.

Photto credit: en.w
wikipedia.orgg

The mainm
shockk was prec
ceded byynumber of laarge afterrshocks, annd severallof which is over 7.0 Magnnitude. Ama
7.4 Mw atagnitude
15:008(JST),,
7.9
9 Mw at 15
5:15 and a 7.7 Mw quake att

1
11

15:26 all occurred on 11 March. A month later, a major aftershock struck offshore on 7
April with a magnitude of 7.4 Mw. Four days later on 11 April, another magnitude 7.1
Mw aftershock struck Fukushima, on 7 December 2012 a large aftershock of magnitude
7.3 Mw caused a minor tsunami, and again on 26 October 2013 small tsunami waves
were recorded after a 7.1 Mw aftershock. As of 16 Mar 2012 aftershocks continued,
totaling 1887 events over magnitude 4.0. As of 6 December 2013 there have been a
total of 776 aftershocks of 5.0M or greater, 112 of 6.0M or greater, and 8 over 7.0 M asreported by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA).
The earthquake took the lives of 15,889 persons, 6,152 were injured and 2,601
went missing across 20 prefectures. Of the total confirmed deaths, 14,308 weredrowned, 677 were crushed to death and 145 perished from burns. Also, 19 foreigners
died in the earthquake; two (2) from US, Canadian Missionary, Chinese, Korean,
Taiwanese, Pakistan and a Filipino.
The earthquake and tsunami totally collapsed a 127,290 building, 272,788 halfcollapsed and 474,989 buildings were partially damaged, 300 hospitals were damaged,
and 11 were completely destroyed. An estimated 230,000 automobiles and trucks weredamaged or destroyed in the disaster. All of Japan’s ports were briefly shut down after
the earthquake and 15 ports were located in the disaster area. A total of 319 fishingports were damaged.
Japan’s transport network suffered
severe disruptions. Many sections of Tōhoku
Expressway were damaged. All railways
were suspended in Tokyo with an estimated
20,000 people stranded at major stations
across the city, also 20,000 stranded visitors
spent the night of 11 – 12 March inside theTokyo Disneyland. JR East train lines suffereddamaged in the worst hit areas, 23 stations
on seven (7) lines were washed away, withdamaged of loss of track in 680 locations
and the 30-km radius around the Fukushima
Daiichinuclearplant.
The
TōhokuShinkansen bullet train was worst hit, with JR
East estimating 1,100 sections of the line
varying from collapsed station roofs to bent
power pylons, will need repairs. A tsunami
flooded Sendai Airport, while Narita andHaneda airport briefly suspended operations.
Cellular and landline phone service sufferedmajor disruptions in the affected area.

Tsunami flooding on the Sendai Airport

Photo credit: en.wikipedia.org

Train washed away uphill from Onagawa
Station runway

Japanese authorities inspected over 400 dams following the earthquake,according to the reports, almost all of these dams withstood minor to severe ground12

shaking
g and reta
ained their reservoir withw genera
ally minor to modera
ate damag
ge exceptt
Fujinumma Dam.
The Fujinuma Dam was locateddap
pproximately 80 kilommeter fromm the faulttru
upture annd direcctly oppo
osite theeap
pproximate middle of the 600
0-kilometerrfa
ault rupturre zone. According to theereeport, the dam was nearly full when theeeaarthquake occurredd. The damdcresttreeportedlywass
ovvertoppeddap
pproximately 20-25 minutes after theeeaarthquake with a large dischargeedeeveloping later. Th
he resulting
g breachhflo
ow travelled down a narroww canyonndoown to th
he village of Nagannuma thattcaauses floooding and washing away fiveeaway fivefhouses while daamaging others,odisa
abling a brridge and blocked roadsrwithhdebris. Seven (7) loss lives andaone (1) went missing. Repo
ortedly, som
me locals attemptedadto repa
air the leakks in the daam before it complettely failed.
Fujinuma-ike is an irrig
gation rese
ervoir situated on thee right brannch of upp
per SunokooRiver and it taps waterw
fromm the mainn stream off Sunoko River by hea
ad race. There
T
existss
an auxxiliary embbankment dam on the right abutmentt saddle. The consttruction off
Fujinumma dam, auxiliaryadaam and headhrace
e were started in Ap
pril 1937, suspendeddduring the World War II and completted in Octtober 1949
9. Fujinuma
a dam is ana earth filll
dam withw
the heeight of 18.5 meterr and the crest leng
gth of 133
3.2 meter, while theeauxiliarry dam is ofo earth em
mbankmennt type with the heig
ght of 10.5 meter andd the cresttlength of 72.5 meter. Fromm 1977 to 1979,1
the spillwaysan
nd surface
e protectio
on work off
Fujinumma Dam werew
repaiired and fromf1984 to 1992, countermeasures against theeleakage by grouting as we
ell as upgra
ading of inntakes werre conduc
cted. The agriculturalalwater takentfromm Fujinuma
a dam irriga
ates the la
and of 837 ha and th
he dam is manageddand opperated by
y Ebanaga
awa Irrigation District.

Philippiness’ Record ofo Dam Faillure

Marinduque Mininng and Ind
dustrial Corrp., Sipalayy Negros Occidental
O
l


198
82 Nov 8: damdfailuree due to sliippage of foundation on clay soil, 28 million metriccton
ns of tailinggs releasedd resulting in a widespread inun
ndation of agriculturral land upp
to 1.5m high and the siltation of Ta
ao-Angan River1
13

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation, Mankayan, Benguet


1986 Oct 17: collapsed of tailings pond 3 due to wakened dam embankment
caused by additional loading caused the siltation of the Abra River which affectednine (9) municipalities

Manila Mining Corp (MMC) in Placer, Surigao Del Norte1987 July 9: dam failure causing fish kills
1995 Sept 2: dam foundation failure at tailing pond 5 of Placer copper-gold project
killing 5 people and coastal pollution
1999 Apr 26: 700,000 tonnes of cyanide tailings spill from damaged concrete pipe intailings pond due to excessive rains caused 40 houses to be buried and 40 hectaresof land affected including 20 hectares of agricultural land

PHILEX Mining Corp

1992 Jan: In Tuba, Benguet, collapsed of wall of tailings pond due to “weakened
dam structure caused by 1990 earthquake” 80 million metric tons of tailings
released

Itogon-Suyoc Mines Inc , Mankayan, Benguet


1993 June: overtopping at the dam of the Itogon-Suyoc gold and mines occurred
during a typhoon when the dam penstock and diversion tunnel were blocked
caused the siltation of adjoining river

MARCOPPER Mining/Placer Dome, Marinduque

1993: the Maguila-guila siltation dam collapsed due to the pressure from heavy
siltation at the dam wall and caused the Mogpog River to be flooded resulting todeath of 2 children, livestock killed, agricultural land contamination, downstream
communities and Mogpog Town flooded
1996 Mar 24: old drainage tunnel burst, releasing over 3 million m3 of tailing fromstorage pit into 2 major river systems, over 1,200 residents evacuated, 18km of riverfilled with tailings

Canatuan Gold Mines2007 April 6 & July 11: In Canatuan Gold Mines in Siocon, Zamboanga Del Norte
heavy rains washed out the clay soil and destructed the concrete wall of thesulphide dam which resulted to contamination of water, where cyanide andmercury is detectable, flows to the Canatuan River down to Siocon River andtowards the sea.

14

Ph
hoto credit: napocor.com
nAngat DamD
In Foccus
MALOLOS CITY— Th
he expertss commissiioned to testt
the sttructural in
ntegrity off
Angat Dam havee recommended its immediatee rehabilita
ation afterr finding th
hat the 44-year-old structuree and its diike in Norza
agaray, Buulacan, sit on a fault line and could floodd
30 citiees and towns if damaaged in an earthquak
ke.
The
e
recom
mmendatioon
wass
Official nameAngat Damrevealed byb officialss of the Me
etropolitannWaterwork
ks and Se
ewerage System leddLocationBaran
ngay San Loreenzo,
by Administrator Gerardo Esquivel,,
Norzaagaray, Bulaccan,
Philipppinesduring a meetingmwith provincial officialss
led by Go
ov. Wilhelm
mino Sy-Alv
varado att
Constru
uction began
November 1961
the provincial capito
ol here.
Opening date
Octob
ber 16, 1967
Constru
uction cost
Php 315.344
3MillioonJohhn Grimston, Tonkin andaTaylorr
Operatoor(s)Natioonal PowerInternation
nal, the ggroup commmissioneddCorpo
orationto study thet
dam’ss structural integrity,,
said a series of fault lines weree identifieddDaam and spillw
ways
in the founndation off the mainn dike anddImpounnds
Angatt River
up to 15 kilometers u
upstream.
Length568 metersme experts ssaid an ea
arthquakee
The
Height
131 meters
m
on
the
W
WesternMarikina
Va
alley
Fault
t
Width (base)(550 metersmcould trig
gger moveement on the faultt
Reservoirlines beneeath the ddam and its
i dikes. Iff
Createss
Angatt Reservoir
those weree damageed, they wa
arned, theeTotal caapacity
850 millionmcubic metersmflood wavve would aaffect not onlyoareassnear the Angat Rivver but exttend bothhPower statioon
upstream and dow
wnstream into theeTurbinees
10 Veertical shaft, Francis
F
floodplain
of
the
Pam
mpangaR
iver.
turbinne (Includes turbinestfrom the main
poweerhouse and thetauxiliary powerho
ouse)Installed capacityTha
at would fflood 30 citiescanddtowns in Bulacan, Pampanga anddMetro Mannila, they said.

256,0000 kW

1
15

The flood waters in some areas of Norzagaray, Bustos and Baliuag could reachas high as 30 meters during the initial break of the dam, the experts’ report says. They
could reach as high as 10 meters in Pulilan and Plaridel and all the way to Calumpit
and Malolos City. Areas of Pampanga and Metro Manila could experience floods ofthree to five meters, they said.
“Considering the safety of the Angat Dam and Dyke is indeed a national security
concern which needs to be addressed immediately. There is a need to undertake
remediation work at the earliest possible time,”.

Myth about Angat Dam and Bustos Dam
Bustos Dam also known as Angat Afterbay Regulator Dam (AARD) is a small irrigation
dam at Bustos, Bulacan is often mistaken by the locals as Angat Dam since it is locatedclose to the nearby town of Angat. It is important to correct such wrong notion to avoid
further misconception to the issue.
The project is located at Barangay Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan, served by the Angat River.
The main dam is about 18 meters above sea level. Among the 2.5-meter high, six-span
dam’s main features are easily deflectable and inflatable rubber body, resistance tosedimentation, economical and having auto-deflation system.
History
Built in 1926, 50 kilometers upstream from the Bustos Dam as a fixed type river
weir without gates, AARD is the longest rubber dam in Asia at 79 meters and thesecond largest in the world serving nearby cities: Real, Quezon, Rodriguez(Montalban), Rizal, Antipolo City, Rizal.
In 1967, steel sector gates were installed on top of the regulator dam for the
purpose of generating irrigation water, power supply and domestic water supply.
Rehabilitation
With its construction, the Bustos Dam’s height was increased by 2.5 meters
and later renamed Angat Afterbay Regulator Dam, increasing the service area of
the Angat-Maasim Rivers Irrigation System (AMRIS), which operates the AARD from25,000 hectares in 1927 to 31,485 hectares in 20 towns in Bulacan and Pampanga
benefitting 20,562 farmers.
The series of typhoons from 1968 to the early part of 1980 was damaging to
the dam whose Bay 1 sector gate finally gave way in September 1990 after
typhoon "Iriang" carried away the structure 250 meters downstream from its
original post. The agency has undertaken temporary rehab works in the dam using
their own budget and through funding assistance from the World Bank.

16

The
present
dam
was
LTD.,
re
ehabilitatedd by Kurimoto,KO
Osaka,
Jap
pan, manufacturing date,ass of May, 1997. It ha
as Washedd Out,
In
ntake, Sluic
ce and Ro
oller Gatess sets.
It’’s clear spans are 4.6% 1.53 meters.
Itss gate (oopening) heights
h
are
e 4.5
and 1.0 me
eters. The weights ofo theleeaves are 5.4 and 1.0 tons. The
opperating sp
peed is 0.3
3 m./ min.

Historical markker: Rehabilitationn of Apron at the Dam.
Historica
al Marker

In 2001
1, The Japaan Internattional
C
Cooperation Agency
y (JICA) hashapprov
ved a P50
00-million grant-in aid
a to theegoovernment for the repairrandd improvem
ment of th
he Angat A
Afterbay RegulatoryRyDam (AARD
D) in Bustos, Bulacan.
By thee 3rd Quaarter of 2014, The National Irrigation Ad
dministratioon (NIA) iss
biidding outt the P1-billion contra
act for thee rehabilita
ation of thee Bustos rubber damminn Bulacan.

DATA ANALYSIS
To givee a clearer view of thetresearrcher’s top
pic and to avoid que
estionable
e acts andddeeds that may
y result too infringem
ment of propertypriight and copyright law, theeresearccher summ
marizes the following casecstudiees:

A. Thee Vaiont (Vajont) laandslide ofo 1963Th
he Vajont reservoir disaster is a classic example of the coonsequenc
ces of theefailure of enginee
ers and ge
eologists too understa
and the na
ature of thee problemm that theyywere trrying to deeal with. During the fillingfof thee reservoir a block oof approxim
mately 270
0million cubic mettres detachhed from oneowall and slid intoo the lake a
at velocitie
es of up too
30 m/seec (appro
ox. 110 km//h). As a reesult a wave over to
opped the dam by 250
2 m anddswept onto the valleyv
belo
ow, with th
he loss of about 250
00 lives. Re
emarkably
y the dammremained unbrok
ken by the flood.
Since the ca
atastrophic
c failure, a huge range of work
k has beenn undertak
ken on theecauses of the faillure. Initially the was a large am
mount of speculationn about the locationnof the slidingssurfa
ace, but moremrecen
nt studies have confirrmed that iit was loca
ated in thinn
(5 - 15 cm)cclay laayers in thee limestonee. It is claim
med by some that ass such it represents areactiv
vation of an old land
dslide (Henndron and Patten, 19985; Pasutoo and Solddati, 1991),,
whilst othersoclaimm that it was
w a first-time movem
ment (Skemmpton, 196
66; Petley, 1996). It iss
likely th
hat increassing the lev
vel of the reservoir
rdrrove up poore pressurres in the clayclayers,,reducinng the effe
ective norm
mal streng
gth and heence the shears
resisttance. Ressistance too117movement was created by the chair-like form of the shear surface. Dropping the levelof the reservoir induced hydraulic pressures that increased the stresses as water in the
jointed limestone tried to drain. It has been estimated that the total thrust from thiseffect was 2 - 4 million tonnes (!?) (Muller, 1964). Failure occurred in a brittle manner,
inducing catastrophic loss of strength. The speed of movement is probably the result offrictional heating of the pore water in the clay layers (Voight and Faust, 1982, 1992).

B. Dam Break Analysis for Polavaram Project
Drastic changes in geographical surface characteristics and meteorologicalcharacteristics lead to flash flood, whose magnitude if exceeds the capacity of
spillways causes overtopping of embankment dams, resulting in the dam failure. Whena dam fails, a large quantity of storage water is released to downstream, producing aflood wave which is capable of creating disastrous damage to the downstream people
and property. Pre-determination of flood wave characteristics along the downstream
river reach is very much essential in mitigating such disasters. The Prediction ofcharacteristics of dam-breach flood wave formation and the downstream propagation
for all the existing and the future major dams located in the earthquake prone areas
and regions of heavy rainfall is very much essential. Accordingly the down-stream
developments can be controlled, the possible extent of inundation of downstreamzone can be predicted and the emergency action plan can be formulated to mitigate
the disaster. The present study aims to predict the characteristics of the flood wave likepeak flood stage, peak flood discharge and their times of occurrence at different
locations downstream in the river due to dam-breach, for a hypothetical dam-breachpattern for a rock-fill dam on the Godavari River. The effect of variation of duration ofbreach of dam on the outflow hydrographs is also studied. The National Weather
Service Dam Break Flood Forecasting (DAMBRK) model has been used for the study
and the results are discussed in terms of outflow hydrographs.

C. TED Case Studies - Three Gorges Dam
The Three Gorges is the general name for the Qutang, Wuxia, and Xiling gorges.
The Three Gorges area begins at Baidicheng in Fengjie County, Sichuan Province, andends at Nanjinguan in Yichang County, Hubei province, a distance of 193 kilometers.
The Three Gorges area, well known for its precipitous terrain and numerous scenic spots,
has been listed as the best of the top 40 scenic spots in China.
Since no specific measures have been implemented, China is eager to importinternational parts and equipment for the dam construction. The China Yangtze Three
Gorges Project Development Corporation, which is responsible for overseeing the entire
project, announced that some stages of construction would be opened to bids frominternational companies.
The government has also approved importing key
technologies, materials, and spare parts needed to build the twenty-six 680,000 kilowatt
turbo generators and the 50,000 volt high tension transmission lines. Joint ventures forthe dam itself are also possible. These parts and equipment are expensive andtherefore, the amount of trade should be significant.

18Technical assistance from abroad, such as the United States and Japan,
constitute international service flows. For example, the U.S. Department of Interiors
Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers are helping with technicalassistance on design and construction.

D. Dam Breach Modeling – An overview of Analysis Methods
The paper presents an overview of today’s typically used methods for predicting
dam breach outflow hydrographs, with discussion of the advantages anddisadvantages of different approaches for specific applications. The methods
presented range from simpler well established methods to more complex approaches
now under development.
The two primary tasks in the analysis of a potential dam failure are the predictionof the reservoir outflow hydrograph and the routing of that hydrograph through thedownstream valley to determine dam failure consequences. When populations at risk
are located close to a dam, it is important to accurately predict the breach outflowhydrograph and its timing relative to events in the failure process that could trigger thestart of evacuation efforts. This paper provides an overview of the methods used to
predict breach outflow hydrographs, ranging from simple methods appropriate forappraisal-level estimates to more complex methods for analysis of individual cases. The
progression of technology development is followed from methods that predict peakoutflow directly to those that predict breach development directly and model thehydraulics analytically, and finally to methods that model erosion processes, breachdevelopment and hydraulics in great detail.

E. Teton dam failure (June 12, 1975)
Case Studies of dam breach geography and hydraulics
Dams provide many benefits to society; however, floods resulting from dam
failures have produced some of the most devastating disasters of the last two centuries(Wahl, 1998). Therefore, earth-dam failure has become a subject of increasing concern
among dam engineers, federal, state, and local officials, and society at large.
Despite the existence of ample documentation, the prevailing mechanisms forearth-dam failure are still not clearly understood. Studies have shown that earth-dam
failures can be due to many causes. Generally, these are classified into: (1) hydrologic,and (2) geotechnical. Failure usually results in the eventual development of a breachcompromising a certain length of embankment. The breach width has been
documented in a large number of cases. Dam-breach studies have shown that theshape and time evolution of the breach determine to a large extent the characteristicsof the outflow hydrograph (Ponce, 1982).

The objective of the paper is to develop a dimensionless relationshipbetween geometric and hydraulic parameters governing earth-dam breach
failures.

19

F.

Prediction of Embankment Dam Breach Parameters
A Literature Review and Needs Assessment

This peer-reviewed report examines the role, importance, and methods forpredicting embankment dam breach parameters needed for analysis of potential
dam-failure floods. Special emphasis is given to dam breach analysis within the context
of the risk assessment process used by the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation).
Current methods for predicting embankment dam breach parameters and numericallymodeling dam breach events are reviewed, and the needs and opportunities fordeveloping improved technologies are discussed. Recent technical advances that
could contribute to improvements in dam breach simulation are identified. In addition
to this literature review, Reclamation and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS)
cosponsored an international workshop on dam breach processes February 10-11, 1998,
attended by about 35 leading professionals working in this field. The workshop provided
an opportunity to review and discuss the state-of-the art, ongoing research, and futureneeds for dam breach analysis tools. Key findings from this literature review and theworkshop include:














There is presently both a need and opportunity to achieve significant
improvements in technology used to analyze embankment dam breachprocesses. The potential benefits to be achieved from this effort may
significantly aid risk assessment studies, in which thresholds of dam failure,probabilities of failure, and consequences of failure are all of prime
importance.
When population centers are located close to dams, accurate predictionof breach parameters is crucial to development of effective emergency
action plans, design of early warning systems, and characterization of
threats to lives and property.
Warning time is the most important parameter affecting potential loss oflife due to dam failure.
The primary benefits of improved prediction of breach initiation andformation times will accrue to the population within a few kilometers of
the structure, but this is also the region which historically has the greatest
risk for loss of life.
The distinction between breach initiation time and breach formation time
has not been clearly made in the literature or the available case study
data; this impacts the ability to accurately predict warning time.
Although breach initiation time is critical to the determination of loss of life,
there is little guidance in the literature for its prediction. Numerical dam
breach models have the potential to predict breach initiation times, but
are not widely used and are not based on observed breach erosion
mechanisms.
Breach parameter prediction equations based on analyses of dam failurecase studies have significant uncertainty, breach formation time isespecially difficult to predict

20

G. Dam-break Problems
Solutions and Case Studies
A dam is an engineering structure constructed across a valley or naturaldepression to create a water storage reservoir. Such reservoirs are required for threemain purposes: (1) provision of a dependable water supply for domestic and/or
irrigation use; (2) flood mitigation and (3) generation of electric power.
In providing water supply, the reservoir storage is filled during the periods of above
average stream-flow. For flood mitigation, the storage reservoir is kept nearly empty
during drought and periods of low rainfall, so that when rainstorms occur, the storage
volume available in the reservoir provides a buffer against severe flooding events. For
power generation, the storage reservoir provides a head of water upstream of the dam
and the potential energy of this water is converted first to kinetic and then to electricalenergy. A large dam has two essential requirements. First, it must be reasonably
watertight. Second, the dam must be stable. Movements and deformations of the dam
and its foundations cannot be eliminated, but they must be predicted and allowed forin the design. Because of these requirements, the location and design of dams areundoubtedly influenced to some extent by structural and/or geological features. It
therefore follows that geological factors, and the proximity of construction materials are
elements of overriding importance in determining the type of dam constructed at agiven site. Once a site has been selected for a dam, consideration has to be given to
deciding which type of dam is most suited to the site. Anyway, at any site, several typesof dam should be considered. In general, three factors control this final decision: (1) the
topography of the dam site and reservoir area; (2) the strength and variability of thefoundations and (3) the availability and suitability of construction materials.
These factors are largely controlled by the geological structure and history of thesite, and an informed decision requires a great deal of geological data analysis,
particularly for the second and third factors, presented in a manner that planners andengineers can use in design calculation and procedures. When designing a large dam,the engineers have to abide by two main goals: (1) the dam must be stable and (2) the
structure must be constructed as economically as possible. The two objectives areagainst each other: ensuring stability by over-design increases the costs, while costcutting methods could lead to unsafe structures. On a worldwide scale, it is clear thatthe objective of constructing stable dams is not always achieved. During the 1900–1965
period, for example, about 1% of the 9000 large dams in service throughout the world
have failed, and another 2% have suffered serious accidents.
A comparison was made between disasters (both Japan and Philippines
experiences) and it was decided that the information are useful to this research for thefollowing reasons: 1) that Japan is more vulnerable to earthquake than the Philippines;2) that dams in Japan withstand even the most powerful earthquake with tolerable
damage to life and property; and 3) that the Japanese technologies (particularly in
dam technologies) is way above compare to the most advanced country in the world.
A detailed and more comprehensive discussion on the said subject follows:21

A Review of Japanese Dam Technologies
Due to geographical location of Japan, unintentionally, gained mastery ofhazards and almost perfectly developed technology to rule over harsh environment.
But this, of course, did not happen overnight. It took many years of painful endeavorand sacrifices before it attained a world class technology.
Japanese supremacy in dam technology could be summarized as follows:
Japanese believed in the philosophy that dams are very useful in hydroelectric
power generation, water resource development, flood control, and other areas.
Furthermore, they believed that dams must continue to function and must not break
down. Japanese advanced technologies offers a construction of sound dams, evenusing less-than-ideal materials on less-than-ideal foundations, within a short period oftime and with low cost. They will have excellent qualities such as high strength, highdurability, and resistance to earthquakes, which will also yield very low life-cycle cost.
1. High Durability and Earthquake-resistance of Dams can Reduce Life Cycle Cost
(LCC)
a. Japanese dams have endured major earthquakes owing to Japanese dam
technologies
b. High durability of dams together with speedy construction can reduce LCC
c. Reduce LCC through Total Quality Management (TQM)
Japanese dams have endured
major earthquakes owing to Japanese
dam technologies The history ofmodern dam construction in Japanbegan in 1887 when an earth dam tocollect water for water supply was built.
Japan’s first concrete dam to supply
water was completed in 1900. The olderof the two (the earth dam) was
damaged by massive flooding in 1982.
The concrete dam was damaged by
the Great Hanshin (Kobe) Earthquake in
1995, which measured 7.3 on the
Richter scale. Both dams are still inservice, even though they sufferedminor
damagesunderfrequent
occurrence of major natural disasters.

From Dam Technologies of Japan

Selection of expected seismic motion(Level 2 seismic motion)

Review of the dam's earthquake
resistance

Review of the earthquake resistance ofthe dam's associated structures“Procedures in testing toverify earthquake resistance”“Smart” construction utilizing information and communication technologies (ICT)can make the work process more efficient and accurate. By using ICT, data can beshared and made traceable so it can be used to ensure quality. This is an example of
the Total Quality Management (TQM) effort in dam construction to ensure uniform dam
quality, make dams more durable and thereby reduce their life cycle cost.

22

F
From
Dam Technnologies of Japaan

Foor a dam tot functionn over a period of tim
me it should be consstantly rep
paired anddmaintaained. The cost requirred for dam
m mainten
nance, rep
pairs and reenewed is low at theebeginnning, but eq
quipment shouldsbe renewed afteraabou
ut 10 years..
2. Upgradingg Technolo
ogies to Effectivelyy Use Exiisting Dam
ms (Reduce Costs,,
C
Constructio
on Periodss, Environm
mental Impa
acts)
d. Increasing reserv
voir volume
e under op
peratione. Constrruction to enableemoore effectiv
ve use of reeservoir wa
ater under operationn(Improoving opera
ation, Increeasing disccharge cap
pacity）
f. Restoriing dam fu
unction Co
ontrol sedim
ment）
O
One
way of improv
ving dam function is increa
asing reserrvoir volumme underr
operation. The heeight of the dam caan be raise
ed under operation,oto increase reservoirr
volumee. To do this, the safe
ety of the existinge
dam is assesssed, ways tto unify thee old dammwith the new construction are exammined, and the stabillity of the foundation and theenewly constructeced dam exxtension is examined
d. Even oldd dams ca
an be maade higherr
followinng detailed
d and careeful assessm
ment.

From Damm Technologies of Japan

2
23

Ussing Japann’s upgrad
ding technnologies, we
w can drill the dam
m body an
nd build awater intakeiin th
he existing
g dam undder operattion, and thus increa
ase the wa
ater supplyyand disscharge capacity. The selectiv
ve intake facilityfcann be built at any deepth in theedam too take wa
ater at thee tempera
ature requuired for use. The w
water is wa
armer anddclearerr near the surface,swhile water near the bottomb
is coldercand muddier.

From Dam Technologies ofo JapanJa
ies to resto
apan has technologtore dam performancpce and ma
ake dams last longerr
under operation. Sedimen
nt bypass tunnel is a techniquue used too prevent sedimenttflowingg into the damdreserrvoir by byypassing it into a tun
nnel leadinng downstrream frommthe daam. Using this technnique, rese
ervoir volu
ume reducction resulting from sedimenttaccum
mulation is minimized,mallowing thet
dam too be used longer.
l
A non-pow
wered siph
hon is used to suckk and rem
move the sediment that hassaccum
mulated at the botto
om of the reservoir. The sipho
on’s intake works by itself anddsucks seediment at a rate deepending ono the sediment den
nsity in the ddischarge pipe.
3. Environme
entally Frie
endly Tec
chnologiess to Conserve thee Environm
ment andd
Ecosystemmg. Conse
erving wate
er quality inn the reserv
voir
h. Conse
erving the ecosystemei. Monito
oring for the water quuality and environmeent during constructioonJa
apan is workingw
hard to ke
eep
reservooir water cllean and tot protect theenvironnment. Isssues caussed by riverrwater remaining
g in the damdreserrvoir
includeevariation
of
the
wa
ater
temperrature andd the amou
unt of orga
anic
tion
substannces in thee water, eutrophicaeand peersistent mu
uddy wate
er.
W
While
new
wly constrructed daamscreate a new environmeeent, they alsoaaffect the habita
ats and ne
esting grou
undsof birdds of preyy. Dams submerge thehabitatts of rare plants,pandd prevent fish
going upstream
m and downstreaam.
Japan has techniques to minimize theeffects
onofdaamconsstruction
ecosysttems.
From Dam Technologies of Japan

2
24

In
n the planning phase of a daam constru
uction projjects, we conduct surveyssonn
items listed in Table 1 an
nd condu
uct qualita
ative forec
casting an
nd assessm
ment. If asignifica
ant impac
ct on the environme
ent is likely
y, we examine methhods to protect theeenvironnment andd assess thee impact ofo the activ
vities that will
w be take
en.

F
From
Dam Technologies of Jap
panInn Japan, whenwdischharging the muddy water that has bee
en generatted duringg
the couurse of agg
gregate prroduction, concrete placemen
nt and other construcction workk,the waater shouldd first meet a wate
er-quality standard in order tto protectt the riverr
environnment. Muddy waterr is treatedd at facilitie
es at dam construction sites (quarry sites,,
aggreggate sites, dam sitess) using po
oly-aluminu
um chloridde (PAC), polymer coagulant,c,carbonn dioxide andaother chemicals.
cFrom Daam Technologiees of Japan

In Jappan, when dischargin
ng the mud
ddy waterr
hat has beenbgeneerated duuring the course offthaggregate productio
on, concre
ete placem
ment anddother construction woork, the wa
ater shouldd first meetta water-quuality standdard in order to prrotect theeriv
ver enviro
onment. Muddy
Mwater is trreated att
faacilities att dam co
onstruction sites (quuarry sites,,
aggregate sites, damm sites) uusing poly--aluminummchloride (PAAC), polym
mer coagulant, carbo
on dioxideeand other chemicals.
c

Dam construction, usinng large machinerymnt of sand,,and carryiing a masssive amounsoil and rocks, cancbe a source off noise, vibration annd dust. To protect the locall
commu
unity and naturalnenv
vironment,, levels aree measured
d and nec
cessary measures areetaken.

225

Froom Dam Techno
ologies of Japann

A closer look to thee advanta
ages Japanese damm technolo
ogies could offer iss
insurmoountable; it is the besst, most effficient, sec
cured, andd defendab
ble dam teechnologyyin the worldw
today.
Activitie
es of Stakeeholders inn Angat Daam
Manila Bulletin – Sat,S
Dec 144, 2013DAM BREAAK DRILL — More thann 12,000 students, heealth worke
ers, and goovernmenttyees walk along thee MacArthhur Highwa
ay going tot the eva
acuation sitesat thee
employBulacan Sports Complex
Cin Sta. Isabel, Malolos CityC as part of the Angat Dam Break Drilll
yesterdday morninng.
Malolos City,C
Bulacan — Feaarless Bula
akenyos chheered ass they resolved thee“doommsday scennario” pose
ed by a possiblepAn
ngat Damm break in the eventt of a 7.2-magnittude earthquake likee the one th
hat struck Bohol last October.
n 12,000 stu
udents andd residents in all of Bu
ulacan rosee from bed
d at dawnnMore thanyesterdday to gather in fronnt of the Centro Schoolar Univerrsity (CEU) and otherr specifieddvenuess where An
ngat Dam Break Drillss were set.
In times of chaos and devastation wroug
ght by a po
owerful ea
arthquake that
t
could
d
trigger the “deestruction” of the 45-year-olld Angat Dam, preparedne
ess, gooddmanaggement annd strong leeadership can makee a big diffe
erence in saving as manymlivessas posssible.
TThis
was thhe assessm
ment of Offfice of Civ
vil Defense
e 3 Region
nal Directo
or JosefinaaTimoteoo on the Angat Dam Break Drill
D conduucted by thetProvincial Gove
ernment off
Bulacan early yessterday moorning.
TThe drill wa
as made afteraGov. WilhelminoWo M. Sy-Alvaarado ordeered the reeview anddupgradding of Em
mergency ActionAPlan
ns of the provincialpggovernme
nt, includinng variouss
schoolss in this histtoric capita
al city, as partpof thee adaptatio
on programm on the “clear
“
and
d

2
26

present danger” being poised by the destructive effects of global warming and climatechange.
Earlier, Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) Director
Renato U. Solidum assessed that Angat Dam is susceptible to a break once Bulacan ishit by an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.2. In a matter of hours, the whole of
Bulacan will be inundated.
Timoteo said the drill conducted by the Provincial Government and theProvincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (PDRRMO), is “99.9 perfect.”

Aging Angat Dam poses grave threat to Bulacan, Metro Manila residents
Tuesday, 05 April 2011 23:31 Ramon Efren R. Lazaro / Correspondent

CITY OF MALOLOS—Half of Bulacan could be wiped out if the aging Angat Dam
is not rehabilitated within seven years.
This was the assessment of Bulacan Gov. Wilhelmino Sy Alvarado as he wasinformed by dam experts that the life expectancy of Angat Dam is only for 50 years
and it is now 43 years old. However, the life span of the dam can be extended foranother 50 years if it is rehabilitated before the end of its expected life span.
Alvarado also noted it is time that the dam structure be assessed of its structural
capability to withstand water pressure in its reservoir because of its age.
The governor also quoted a statement by Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage
System (MWSS) that because of its age and the presence of the Marikina West Valley
Fault Line in the vicinity of the dam “making our water supply source at risk,” a newwater source is needed to help mitigate the loss of water supply from other sources incase of major disasters such as natural calamities (referring for the construction of the
Laiban Dam in Rizal province).
He said that Dr. Kaare Hoeg of the Norwegian Technical Institute previously
noted that Angat Dam may be able to withstand intensity 7.5 earthquake.
Alvarado added if the aging dam gives way to the stress from the water pressure
from its water reservoir or if a big earthquake strikes, the main water source for Metro
Manila will be destroyed, leaving it with no potable water to sustain its residents.
However, these situations will not only imperil the main water source for Metro
Manila, Alvarado told the Business Mirror, but also could wipe out half of Bulacan
province and an estimated 2 million of its residents killed by rampaging water and flood.
Alvarado said the MWSS and other concerned agencies should not prioritize theconstruction of Laiban Dam but should give importance for the rehabilitation of Angat
Dam.

27

The governor said the Laiban Dam project is capable of providing Metro Manila
with 1,900 million liters per day (MLD) of water compared with the 4,019 MLD of waterthat Angat Dam currently provides.
“Common sense dictates that we should first give priority to the rehabilitation of
the water source that provides the majority of the water needs for Metro Manila
because of its perceived vulnerability due to its age and the catastrophic damage it
can bring when tragedy strikes, rather than prioritize a project that is to provide only anaugmentation supply of water,” Alvarado noted.
Because of these, Alvarado said he recently met with officials of the MWSS, theNational Power Corp. (Napocor) and other concerned government agencies andrecommended that a technical working group be created to assess the structural
capability of the aging Angat Dam and for eventual rehabilitation.
In an interview on Friday, Froilan Tampinco, president of Napocor, admitted thata technical working group is set to undertake assessment on the structural soundness ofAngat Dam and its finding to be submitted to President Aquino.
Tampinco said dam experts, local or foreign, will be tapped to make an expert
study on Angat Dam and added that to give credibility to its findings, these experts will
not be tapped from concerned government agencies that will be sponsoring the study.
Tampinco also admitted that water seapages at the dike of Angat Dam butthese are only natural because of the materials used in its construction.
However, Tampinco would not confirm nor deny if there were any cracks in the
dam’s structure because of its age and added that is why they are to conduct the
study to assess the structural soundness of the dam and what actions need to be takenon its findings.
Angat Dam before it bursts
FROM THE STANDS by Domini M. Torrevillas (The Philippine Star) updated May 13, 2014 - 12:00am

The alarm bells are ringing. We’re being told not to waste water as our source ofthe commodity is near bankruptcy, ie., running dry. This may sound melodramatic, but
the danger of Angat Dam’s water level probably going to drop to zero level cannot beignored.
Media reporters tell us that according to data from the Philippine Atmospheric,Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration, the water level at the Angat
Dam had reached the critical level of 180 meters due to lack of rainfall. Brief rain
showers have not helped raise the water level. Cloud seeding over the dam’swatershed has not started as the Napocor. is still trying to secure a clearance from the28

Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines to do so – why it’s taking the CAAP time to givethe clearance is beyond comprehension.
Angat Dam’s critical water level is a big issue, but there is yet a bigger issue — if
the dam’s rehabilitation is not made, the dam could burst when a big earthquake
takes place. When that happens, whatever water remains inside the dam could drown
people, houses and rice fields around the dam. Already, some local residents, by flightof their imagination perhaps, report seeing cracks on the walls of the facility.
Our attention was drawn to Angat Dam by lawyer Jesus I. Santos, whose primaryadvocacy during the last 36 years has been the preservation of the Angat Dam
watershed since he appeared as counsel for the victims of the October 26, 1978
tragedy where many Bulakeños perished as a result of the sudden release of waterfrom the dam.
For years, Jess said, “Often than not, I was alone in calling the attention of thegovernment to the importance of the watershed.” Recently, light broke through when
he learned that Rep. Linabelle Ruth Villarica had been elected to chair thecommittee investigating the condition of the watershed. Villarica (a second termer
from the 4th District, Bulacan) is president of the Central Luzon bloc in the House which
consists of 23 members (coming from Pampanga, Tarlac, Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija
and Zambales). It came naturally that Angat Dam would be her, and the bloc’s major
concern.
Subsequently, the bloc filed House Resolution 846 directing the committee on
public works and highways to immediately conduct an investigation in aid of legislation
to look into the status of the Angat Dam Rehabilitation Project, also called Angat Dam
and Dike Strengthening Project, with the end of expediting its implementation to ensure
the safety and reliability of the Angat dam and dike from geological and hydrometeorological hazards.
The resolution came on the heels of the warning from the PHIVOLCS that theWest Valley Fault which runs through the central Metro Manila area is potentially active,
and that a splay or local fault runs 200 meters east of the Angat dam and dike, and any
movement of the West Valley fault may affect the local fault.
A Safety Study was conducted; this recommended the strengthening of the dam
and dike, and construction of a spillway to accommodate the updated Probable Main
Flood (PMF) of 12,000 cubic meters.
Accordingly, government agencies signed a memorandum of agreement on
Oct. 21, 2011 to identify, prioritize and implement a program for the safety and integrityof the Angat Dam in the event of an earthquake. The result was the creation of ADDSP,
which was approved on Sept. 4, 2012, by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) with a budget of P1.826m for its implementation.
The resolution was prepared based on an aid memoire by Engr. Jose D. Dorado
Jr., ADDSP project manager. It is pending with the committee on rules, which has yet to29schedule a meeting to formally refer it to the committee on public works and highways.
According to Villarica, the resolution was carefully crafted to refer it to only one
committee, the committee on public works and highways, and not to the jointcommittees on environment, energy, local government and public works, for speedy
action.
To date, the project has not been implemented, according to Villarica, “perhaps
due to the unpredictable nature of natural calamities.”
But there is a bigger issue than unpredictable natural calamities.
It’s not only the government that is responsible for the slow-foot implementation of
ADDSP. Let’s look at Angat Dam’s history. Located in Norzagaray, Bulacan, the dam
and dike were constructed by the Napocor in the early 1960s as a multi-purpose facility
for domestic water supply, irrigation, power and flood control.
As stated above, PHIVOLCS announced the potential danger of the West Valley
Fault affecting the dam, government agencies signed a MOA to identify, prioritize andimplement a program and project that will ensure the safety and reliability of the damfrom geological and hydro-meteorological hazards. Immediately after the MOA signing,
the Safety Study was undertaken – thus the creation of ADDSP.
The project, according to an aide memoire from the Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System, will be implemented under a Design-Build Scheme, and is aflagship component of Metro Manila’s Water Security Legacy that ensures the longterm sustainability of its water supply.
Here now comes a twist of fate. On Oct. 9, 2012, the Supreme Court approved
the sale of the 218-megawatt hydroelectric power plant (HEEP) of the Angat Dam to acompany that is owned and controlled by the Korean government. The decision said
the bidding of the facility was transparent and objective, and the award of operationof the dam’s hydropower facility to Korea Water Resources Development Corp. (KWater) was valid and legal.
The Court said the National Power Corporation should “retain full supervision andcontrol over the extraction and diversion of waters from the Angat River,” while K-Water
can use the water in the Angat dam for hydropower generation and acquire
generation assets.
The hydropower facility, said the Court, was sold pursuant to the privatization
provision mandated under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act or the EPIRA law.
According to the MWSS aide memoire, “in light of the Supreme Court decisionconfirming the sale of the AHEP to K-Water as valid and legal, discussion is still ongoing
between MWSS and K-Water being the new AHEPP owner, regarding theimplementation of the Project. Under the terms of the bid, K-Water is obligated toundertake mandatory rehabilitation of Angat Dam.”

30

It is therefore clear: K-Water is in charge of the rehabilitation of the dam. So far,no physical manifestations of physical rehabilitation works at the site are evident. KWater must do something now, to prevent the possibility of the dike cracking, and thedam breaking loose when an earthquake of severe magnitude takes place.
Then we can continue praying for the rain to fall.
And Jess Santos can pursue his study of the deforestation of the Angat
watershed, leading to the poor water supply from the denuded forest land.

CONCLUSIONS:This study aimed at understanding the alarming condition of Angat Dam,
Philippines. Based on the study conducted, the main findings can be summarized asfollows:
1. Rehabilitate Angat dam ASAP; - if the dam’s rehabilitation is not made, the dam
could burst when a big earthquake takes place. When that happens, whateverwater remains inside the dam could drown people, houses and rice fields
around the dam.
2. Activities concerning DRRM must be given to DRRMC R-3 as lead agency;
concerned government agencies and recommended that a technical working
group be created to assess the structural capability of the aging Angat Damand develop policies that will ensure safety and order within the area;
3. Enhance capability/preparedness of all sector not only government entities;
There's no national dam safety law yet in the Philippines. 'There are many
stakeholders in dam operations in the Philippines, but there is no single office thatmonitors the dams because there is no law on dam safety;'
4. Conduct periodic dam-break-drill, at least twice a year. Institute a wider
information dissemination campaign. there is truth to the saying POWER IN
INFORMATION, you now have in your hands a life-saving revelation to somebody
who needs to hear it.
5. This study must have a follow-up study – Safety is everybody’s concern, we
should join hands in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in Angat dam.:and last but not the least,
6. Adopt Japanese dam technologies in Angat dam, Philippines

REFERENCES

31

1.

Toshikatsu Omachi. “The River Law with Commentary by Article: Legal Framework
for River and Water Management in Japan”. February 1999 by the Infrastructure
Development Institute – Japan.

2.

“Rivers in Japan”. By the Infrastructure Development Institute – Japan.

3.

“A Visual Introduction to Dam Projects in Japan”. 2000 by Japan Dam Engineering
Center.

4.

“Dam Technologies of Japan: Japanese advanced technologies can meet all of
your needs about Dams”. 2013 by Japan Dam Foundation.

5.

Tadahiko SAKAMOTO. “Current Activities on Construction and Management ofDams in Japan”.

6.

“Fujinuma Dam.” http://damnet.or.jp/cgi-bin/binranA/All.cgi?db4=0483

7.

Harder, Leslie F.; Keith I. Kelson; Tadahiro Kishida; Robert Kayen (6 June2011). "Preliminary Observations of the Fujinuma Dam Failure Following the March
11, 2011 Tohoku Offshore Earthquake, Japan". Geotechnical Extreme Events
Reconnaissance (GEER). GEER Association. Retrieved 15 July 2011.

8.

“Review of the Cause of Fujinuma-ike Failure: Summary Report”. January 25, 2012
by Japan Commission on Large Dams (JCOLD)

9.

Kenji Ishihara. “Post-Earthquake Failure of a Tailings Dam Due to Liquefaction of
the Pond Deposit”. (May 6, 1984). International Conference on Case Histories inGeotechnical Engineering.

10.

Sevilla, Farah. “Major tailings dam disasters in the Philippines”. April 2011.

11.

“Philippine Tailings Dam Disasters”. April 2011.

12.

Nobuyuki ICHIHARA. “Flood Management, Water Resource Utilization in Japan,
and Outline of IWRM” and “Advanced Dam Operation in KIZU River Basin, Kansai
Region” Presentations by Japan Water Agency on February 4, 2015

13.

Saturo NISHIKAWA Ph.D. “The Japanese Experience of Disaster Risk Management
and the Expectations for the post-2015 Framework for DRR” Presentation by Japan
Water Agency on February 4, 2015

14.

“The 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake”.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1923_Great_Kant%C5%8D_earthquake

15.

Rutger de Graaf, Fransje Hooimeijer. “Urban Water in Japan: 11 Urban Water
Series”. June 2008 by CRC Press.

16.

Patricia Ann JARANILLA-SANCHEZ, Yoshi SHIBUO and Toshio KOIKE. “Optimizationof dam operation for maximizing water use and flood prevention: A Case Study ofAngat Dam, Philippines”. University of Tokyo

32

17.

Calderon, Margaret M., Camacho, Leni D., Carandang, Myrna G., Dizon, JosefinaT., Rebugio, Lucrecio L., Tolentino, Noel L.. “A Water User Fee for Households inMetro Manila, Philippines”. June 2004 by the Economy and Environment Programfor Southeast Asia (EEPSEA).

18.

Tabios , Guillermo Q. and David, Cristina Ph.D. “The cases of Angat, Laguna,Batangas and Cebu City: Competing uses of water”. 2002 by Development
Research News

19.

Patricia Ann JARANILLA-SANCHEZ, Lei WANG and Toshio KOIKE. “Water use
quantification in Angat Watershed, Philippines”. University of Tokyo

20.

RAMESH MADDARAMSETTY, S.SURVA RAO, K.MANJULA VANI, T.SHIVAJI RAO (2010)– Dam Break Analysis for Polavaram Project - The Prediction of characteristics of
dam-breach flood wave formation and the downstream propagation for all theexisting and the future major dams located in the earthquake prone areas andregions of heavy rainfall is very much essential.

21.

WAHL TONY L., Hydraulic Engineer, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, CO, (2010)
DAM BREACH MODELING – AN OVERVIEW OF ANALYSIS METHODS - When
populations at risk are located close to a dam, it is important to accurately
predict the breach outflow hydrograph and its timing relative to events in the
failure process that could trigger the start of evacuation efforts.

22.

SHAHID AZAM, QIREN LI (2010) Tailings Dam Failures: A Review of the Last One
Hundred Years - A large number of tailings dam failure incidents remain
unreported or lack basic information when reported. This has seriously hindered
the development of safety regulations in such areas.

23.

ICOLD (2001). Tailings Dams - Risk of Dangerous Occurrences, Lessons Learnt from
Practical Experiences, Bulletin 121.

24.

Rico M, Benito G, Salgueiro AR, Diezherrero A, and Pereira HG. (2007). Reported
Tailings Dam Failures: A Review of the European Incidents in the Worldwide
Context.

25.

Elsevier, Netherlands. Vick SG. (1990). Planning, Design, and Analysis of Tailings
Dams. BiTech Publishers Limited, Canada.

26.

RICO, M., BENITO, G., DIEZ-HERERO, A.3 Floods from tailings dam failures - Following
the collapse of a mining waste dam, only a part of tailings and polluted water
stored at the dam is released, and this outflow volume is difficult to estimate prior
the incident.

27.

V.K. HAGEN, Re-evaluation of design floods and dam safety, in: Proceedings ofthe 14th International Congress on Large Dams, vol.1, Commission on Large Dams
Congress, Rio de Janeiro, 1982, pp.275-491.

28.

Tijdschrift voor Nederlandse Taal- en Letterkunde (Magazine for Dutch language
and Literature), 1947. The first known appearance of dam stems from 1165.

33

However, there is one village, Obdam, that is already mentioned in 1120. The word
seems to be related to the Greek word taphos, meaning grave or grave hill. So
the word should be understood as dike from dug out earth. The names of morethan 40 places (with minor changes) from the Middle Dutch era (1150–1500 CE)
such as Amsterdam (founded as 'Amstelredam' in the late 12th century)and Rotterdam, also bear testimony to the use of the word in Middle Dutch at that
time.
29.

HELMSTETTER A., SORNETTE D., GRASSO, J.R., ANDERSEN J.V., GLUZMAN S.,PISARENKO, V. (2003) - A slider block model for landslides: Application to Vaiont
and La Clapierre landslides. Journal of Geophysical Research, in press.

30.

HENDRON A.J. & PATTON F.D. (1985) - The Vaiont Slide, a Geotechnical Analysis
Based on New Geologic Observations of the Failure Surface. I, II, Technical ReportGL-85-5, U.S. Army Eng. Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, MS.

31.

HUTCHINSON J.N. (1987) - Mechanisms producing large displacements inlandslides on pre-existing shears. Proc. 1st Sino-British Geological Conference,
Taipei, Mem. Geol. Surv. China, 9, 1805-1841.

32.

KILBURN C.R.J. & PETLEY D.N. (2003) - Forecasting giant, catastrophic slope
collapse: lessons from Vajont, Northern Italy. Geomorphology, 54 (1-2), 21-32.

33.

KILBURN C.R.J. & VOIGHT B. (1998) – SLOW rock fracture as eruption precursor at
Soufriere Hills volcano. Montserrat. Geophys. Res. Lett., 25, 3665-3668.

34.

LEONARDS G.A. (1987) – Dam failures. Special Issue. Eng. Geol., 24 (1-4), 1-577.

35.

LO K.Y., LEE C.F. AND GELINAS, P. (1972) - Alternative Interpretation of the Vaiont
Slide. In: CORDING E.J. (Ed) Stability of Rock Slopes. Proc. 13th Symp. on RockMechanics, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1971, ASCE, New York, 595-623.

34

APPENDICES

List of Major Dam Failures
Dam/Incident

Year

Location

Fatalities

Details35

Marib Dam

575

Sheba, Yemen

Puentes Dam

1802

Lorca, Spain

Bilberry
reservoir

1852

Holme Valley,
United Kingdom

Dale Dike
Reservoir

1864

South Yorkshire,
United Kingdom

244 Defective construction, small leak in wall
grew until dam failed. More than 600
houses were damaged or destroyed.

Mill River
Dam

1874

Williamsburg,
United States

South Fork
Dam

1889

Johnstown,
United States

Walnut Grove
Dam

1890

Wickenburg,
United States

139 Lax regulations and cost cutting lead toan insufficient design, which fell apartwhen the reservoir was full. 600 million
gallons of water were released, wiping
out 4 towns and making national
headlines. This dam breaks lead toincreased regulation of dam
construction.
2,209 Blamed locally on poor maintenance byowners; court deemed it an "Act of God".
Followed exceptionally heavy rainfall.
Caused Johnstown flood. 1,600 homes
were destroyed.
100 Heavy snow and rain following public
calls by the dam's chief engineer tostrengthen the earthen structure.

Gohna Lake
dam

1894

Garhwal, India

1 Failure of a landslide dam. Authorities
had been able to evacuate the valley.

McDonald
Dam
Hauser Dam

1900

Texas, UnitedStatesHelena, UnitedStates

8 Extreme current caused failure.

Austin Dam

1911

Austin, UnitedStates

78 Poor design, use of dynamite to remedy
structural problems. Destroyed paper
mill and much of the town of Austin.

Desná Dam

1916

Desná, AustriaHungary (nowCzech Republic)

62 Construction flaws caused the dam
failure.

Lake Toxaway
Dam

1916

Transylvania
County, USA

0 Heavy rains caused the dam to give way.
Dam was later rebuilt in the 1960s

Sweetwater
Dam

1916

San Diego
County, USA

0 Over-topped from flooding.

Lower Otay
Dam

1916

San Diego
County, USA

14 Over-topped from flooding.

1908

Unknown causes, possibly neglect. The
consequent failure of the irrigation
system provoked the migration of up to
50,000 people from Yemen.
608 1,800 houses and 40,000 trees
destroyed.
81 Failed due to heavy rain.

0 Heavy flooding coupled with poor
foundation quality. Workers managed towarn people downstream.

36

Tigra Dam

1917

Gwalior, India

1,000 Failed due to water infiltrating throughfoundation. Possibly more fatalities.

Gleno Dam

1923

Province ofBergamo, Italy

356 Poor construction and design.

Llyn
Eigiau dam
and Coedty
reservoir

1925

Dolgarrog, United
Kingdom

17 The outflow from Llyn Eigiau destroyed
Coedty reservoir. Contractor blamedcost-cutting in construction but 25" ofrain had fallen in preceding 5 days.

St. Francis
Dam

1928

Santa Clarita,
United States

600 Geological instability of canyon wall that
could not have been detected withavailable technology of the time.

Secondary
Dam of Sella
ZerbinoNant-y-Gro
dam

1935

Molare, Italy

111 Geological unstable base combined withflood.

1942

Elan Valley, United
Kingdom

0 Destroyed during preparation
for Operation Chastise in WW II.

Edersee Dam

1943

Ruhr, Germany

70 Destroyed by bombing during Operation
Chastise in World War II. Widespread
destruction.

Möhne Dam

1943

Ruhr, Germany

1,579 Destroyed by bombing during Operation
Chastise in World War II. 11 factories
were destroyed, 114 seriously damaged.

Tangiwaidisaster

1953

Whangaehu
River, New Zealand

151 Failure of Mount Ruapehu's crater lake.

Vega de Tera

1959

Ribadelago, Spain

Malpasset
dam

1959

Côte d'Azur, France

Kurenivka
mudslide
Panshet Dam

1961

Kiev, Ukraine

1961

Pune, India

144 According to dam workers testimonies,
the grounds had serious structural
deficiencies due to poor construction. On
the night of January 9, a 150 meters longportion of the contention wall collapsed
letting out nearly 8 million cubic metersof stored water.
423 Geological fault possibly enhanced by
explosives work during construction;
initial geo-study was not thorough. Two
villages were destroyed.
1,500 Caused by heavy rains with up to 2,000
fatalities.
1,000 Dam wall burst due to pressure ofaccumulated rain water.

Baldwin Hills
Reservoir

1963

Los Angeles, UnitedStatesSpaulding Pond
Dam (Mohegan
Park)

1963

Norwich, UnitedStates5 Subsidence caused by overexploitation of local oil field. 277 homes
destroyed.
6 More than $6 million estimateddamages.

37

Vajont Dam

1963

Monte Toc, Italy

2,000 Strictly not a dam failure, since the dam
structure did not collapse and is still
standing. Filling the reservoir caused
geological failure in valley wall, leading to
110 km/h landslide into the lake; waterescaped in a seiche over the top of dam.
Valley had been incorrectly assessedstable. Several villages completely wipedout.
28 Caused by heavy rains.
107 A tailings dam at Plakalnitsa copper minenear the city of Vratsa failed. A total
450,000 cu m of mud and water
inundated Vratsa and the nearby villageof Zgorigrad, which suffered widespread
damage. The official death toll is 107, but
the unofficial estimate is around 500
killed.
2,000 Flash floods over-topped the dam during
construction.
89 A tailings dam built too tall collapsed,
flooding Certeju de Sus with toxic
tailings.
125 Unstable loose constructed dam createdby local coal mining company, collapsed
in heavy rain. 1,121 injured, 507 houses
destroyed, over 4,000 left homeless.

Swift Dam
Mina
Plakalnitsa

1964
1966

Montana, USA
Vratsa, Bulgaria

Sempor Dam

1967

Certej dam
failure1971

Central Java
Province, Indonesia
Certej Mine,
Romania

Buffalo Creek
Flood

1972

West Virginia,
United States

Canyon Lake
Dam

1972

South Dakota,
United States

Banqiao andS
himantan
Dams

1975

Zhumadian, China

Teton Dam1976

Idaho, UnitedStatesLaurel Run
Dam

1977

Johnstown, UnitedStates

Kelly Barnes
Dam

1977

Georgia,UnitedStates39 Unknown, possibly design error as dam
was raised several times by owners to
improve power generation.

Machchu-2
Dam

1979

Morbi, India

5,000 Heavy rain and flooding beyond spillway
capacity. Old estimates were 1,80025,000 but a recent book by Sandersara& Wooten reduces the bracket to 5,00010,000.

238 Flooding, dam outlets clogged withdebris. 3,057 injuries, over 1,335 homes
and 5,000 automobiles destroyed.
171,000 Extreme rainfall, beyond the planned
design capability of the dam, dumped on
China by Typhoon Nina. 11 million
people lost their homes. Worst dam
failure.
11 Water leakage through earthen wall,
leading to dam failure. 13,000 head of
cattle died.
40 Heavy rainfall and flooding that overtopped the dam. Six other dams failed
the same day, killing five people.

38

Wadi Qattara
Dam

1979

Benghazi, Libya

0 Flooding beyond discharge and storage
capacity damaged the main dam anddestroyed the secondary dam in thescheme.
3 Outlet pipe erosion; dam undermaintained due to location.

Lawn Lake
Dam

1982

Rocky Mountain
National Park,
United States

Tous Dam

1982

Valencia, Spain

Val di Stava
dam

1985

Tesero, Italy

Upriver Dam

1986

Washington
State, UnitedStatesKantale Dam

1986

Kantale, Sri Lanka

180 Poor maintenance, leakage, andconsequent failure. Destroyed over 1600
houses and 2000 acres of paddy fields.

Peruća Dam
detonation

1993

Split-DalmatiaCounty, Croatia

Merriespruittailings dam

1994

Free State, South
Africa0 Not strictly a dam failure as there was adetonation of prepositioned explosives by retreating Serb
Forces.
17 Dam failed after a heavy thunderstorm.
The dam was in an unacceptablecondition prior to failure. Widespreaddevastation and environmental damage.

Saguenay
Flood

1996

Quebec, Canada

Meadow Pond
Dam

1996

New Hampshire,
United States

Opuha Dam

1997

Canterbury, New
Zealand0 Heavy rain during construction caused
failure, dam was later completed.

Doñanadisaster

1998

Andalusia, Spain

0 Over-steepened dam failed by sliding on
weak clay foundation, releasing 4–5

25 Heavy flooding coupled with poor qualityof the dam wall, lack of qualified staff
and negligence of a warning of heavy
rain in the area. On the next day,newspapers reported possibly 40
fatalities and 25 disappeared but in the
coming days the count went down to 8
or 9. One year later, LaVanguardia spokeof 25.
268 Poor maintenance and low margin forerror in design; outlet pipes failed
leading to pressure on dam.
0 Lightning struck power system, turbines
shut down. Water rose behind dam while
trying to restart. Backup power systems
failed, could not raise spillway gates intime. Dam overtopped (rebuilt).

10 Problems started after two weeks ofconstant rain, which severely engorgedsoils, rivers and reservoirs. Post-floodenquiries discovered that the network ofdikes and dams protecting the city waspoorly maintained.
1 Design and construction deficiencies
resulted in failure in heavy icing
conditions.

39

million cubic metres of acidic minetailings into the River Agrio, a tributary of
the River Guadiamar, which is the main
water source for the Doñana National
Park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
0 Caused by damage sustained during
the 921 earthquake.

Shihgang Dam

1999

TaiwanMartin County
coal slurry
spill

2000

Martin County,
United States

Vodní nádrž
Soběnov

2002Soběnov, Czech
Republic

Zeyzoun Dam

2002

Zeyzoun, Syria

22 2,000 individuals displaced and over
10,000 directly affected.

Ringdijk
GrootMijdrecht (nl)2003

Wilnis, Netherlands

Hope Mills
Dam

2003

North Carolina,
United States

0 Peat dam became lighter than water
during droughts and floated away.
Around 1,500 residents had to be
evacuated.
0 Caused by heavy rains. 1,600 people
evacuated.

Silver Lake
Dam

2003

Michigan, UnitedStatesBig Bay Dam

2004

Mississippi, UnitedStatesCamará Dam

2004

Paraiba, Brazil

Shakidor Dam

2005

Pasni, Pakistan

Taum Sauk
reservoir

2005

Lesterville, UnitedStatesCamposNovos Dam
Gusau Dam

2006

CamposNovos, Brazil
Gusau, Nigeria

2006

0 Failure of a coal slurry impoundment.
The water supply for over 27,000
residents was contaminated. The spill
was 30 times larger than the Exxon
Valdez oil spill and one of the worst
environmental disasters ever in thesoutheastern United States
0 Extreme rainfall during the 2002
European floods.

0 Heavy rains caused earthen dam andbank to wash away. 1,800 people
evacuated.
0 A small hole in the dam grew andeventually led to failure. 104 buildings
damaged or destroyed.
3 Poor maintenance. 3000 people
homeless. A second failure happened 11days after.
70 Sudden and extreme flooding caused byabnormally severe rain.
0 Computer/operator error; gauges
intended to mark dam full were notrespected; dam continued to fill. Minorleakages had also weakened the wall
through piping. The dam of the lower
reservoir withstood the onslaught of theflood.
0 Tunnel collapse.
40 Heavy flooding. Approximately 500
homes were destroyed, displacing 1,000
people.

40

Ka Loko Dam

2006

Kauai, UnitedStatesLake Delton

2008

Lake Delton, UnitedStatesKoshi Barrage

2008

Koshi Zone, Nepal

Kingston
Fossil Plant
coal fly ash
slurry spill
Algodões Dam

2008

Roane County,
United States

2009

Piaui, Brazil

Sayano–Shushenskaya
Dam

2009

Sayanogorsk,
RussiaSitu
GintungDam

2009

Tangerang,
Indonesia

98 Poor maintenance and heavy monsoon
rain.

Kyzyl-Agash
Dam

2010

Qyzylaghash,Kazakhstan

Hope Mills
Dam

2010

North Carolina,
United States

43 Heavy rain and snowmelt. 300 people
were injured and over 1000 evacuatedfrom the village.
0 Sinkhole caused dam failure. Second
failure of the dam, will be replaced.

Testalinda
Dam

2010

Oliver, Canada

0 Heavy Rain, low maintenance. Destroyed
at least 5 homes. Buried Highway 97.

Delhi Dam2010

Iowa, United States

0 Heavy rain, flooding. Around 8,000
people had to be evacuated.

Niedow Dam

2010

1 Heavy rain, over-topped from flooding.

Ajka alumina
plant accident

2010

Lower Silesian
Voivodeship,
PolandAjka, Hungary

Kenmare2010

Topuito,Mozambique

2011

Sukagawa,Japan

2012

Campos dos
Goytacazes,Brazil

Resourcestailings

dam
Fujinuma Dam

Campos dos
Goytacazesdam

7 Heavy rain and flooding. Several possible
specific factors to include poor
maintenance, lack of inspection andillegal modifications.
0 Failure due to June 2008 Midwest floods.
250 Heavy rain. The flood affected over 2.3
million people in the northern partof Bihar.
0 Failure of a fly ash slurry pond.

7 Heavy rain. 80 people injured, 2000
homeless.
75 Collapses when turbine 2 broke apartviolently, flooding the turbine hall andcausing the ceiling to collapse.

10 Failure of concrete impound wallon alumina plant tailings dam. One
million cubic meters of red
mudcontaminated a large area, withindays the mud had reached the Danube.
1 Failure of tailings dams at titanium mine.
300 homes had been rebuilt.
8 Failed after 2011 Tōhoku earthquake. 7
dead and 1 unknown. Japanese authority
says dam failure caused by earthquake
which has death toll is not reported
world-wide since 1930.
0 Failed after a period of flooding. 4000
people displaced.

41

Ivanovo Dam

2012

Biser, Bulgaria

Köprü Dam

2012

Adana
Province,Turkey

Tokwe
Mukorsi Dam

2014

Masvingo
Province,Zimbabwe

8 Failed after a period of heavy snowmelt.
A crack in the dam went un-repaired foryears. Eight people killed and several
communities flooded.
10 A gate in the diversion tunnel broke after
a period of heavy rain during thereservoir's first filing. The accident killed
ten workers.
0 Downstream slope failure on a 90.3 m(296 ft) tall embankment dam, possiblyas the reservoir was being filled.
Residents evacuated upstream.

42

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1067
December 31, 1976
THE WATER CODE OF THE PHILIPPINESA DECREE INSTITUTING A WATER CODE, THEREBY REVISING AND CONSOLIDATING THE LAWS
GOVERNING THE OWNERSHIP, APPROPRIATION, UTILIZATION, EXPLOITATION, DEVELOPMENT,CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF WATER RESOURCES.

WHEREAS, Article XIV, Section 8 of the New Constitution of the Philippines provides, inter alia, that allwaters of the Philippines belong to the State;
WHEREAS, existing water legislations are piecemeal inadequate to cope with increasing scarcity of waterand changing patterns of water use;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a Water Code based on rational concepts of integrated and multi-purpose
management of water resources and sufficiently flexible toadequately meet future developments:
WHEREAS, water is vital national development and it has become increasingly necessary for government
to intervene actively in improving the management of water resources;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers inme vested by the Constitution, do hereby orders and decree the enactment of the water Code of thePhilippines of 1776, as follows:
CHAPTER IDECLARATION OF OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLESArticle 1. This Code shall be known as "The Water Code of the Philippines."
Article 2. The objectives of this Code are:a. To establish the basic principles and framework relating to the appropriation, control andconservation of water resources to achieve the optimum development and rational utilization ofthese resources;
b. To define the extent of the rights and obligation of water users and owners including theprotection and regulation of such rights;
c. To adopt a basic law governing the ownership, appropriation, utilization, exploitation,
development, conservation and protection of water resources and rights to land related
thereto; andd. To identify the administrative agencies which will enforce this Code.
Article 3. The underlying principles of this code are:a. All waters belong to the State.
b. All waters that belong to the state can not be the subject to acquisitive prescription.

43

c. The State may allow the use or development of waters by administration concession.
d. The utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources shallbe subject to the control and regulation of the government through the National Water
Resources Council, hereinafter referred to as the Council.
e. Preference in the use and development of waters shall consider current usages and be
responsive to the changing needs of the country.
Article 4. Waters, as used in this Code, refers to water under the grounds, water above the ground,water in the atmosphere and the waters of the sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
CHAPTER IIOWNERSHIP OF WATERS
Article 5. The following belong to the state:a. Rivers and their natural beds;
b. Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and thebeds themselves;c. Natural lakes and lagoons;d. All other categories of surface waters such as water flowing over lands, water form rainfall
whether natural or artificial, and water from agriculture runoff, seepage and drainage;e. Atmospheric water;f.

subterranean or ground water; andg. Seawater
Article 6. The following waters found on private lands also belong to the States:
a. Continuous or intermittent waters rising on such lands;b. Lakes and lagoons naturally waters rising on such lands;c. Rain water and falling on such lands;
d. Subterranean or ground waters; and,e. Waters in swamps and marshes.
The owner of the land where the water is found may use the same for domestic purposes without
securing a permit, provided that such use shall have be registered, when required by the Council. The
Council, however, may regulate such use when there is wastage, or in times of emergency.
Article 7. Subject to the provisions of this Code, any person who captures or collects water by means ofcisterns, tanks, or pools shall have exclusive control over such water and the right to dispose of the
same.

44

Article 8. Water legally appropriated shall be subject to the control of the appropriator from themoment it reaches the appropriator's canal or aqueduct leading to the place where the water will be
used or stored and, thereafter, so long as it is being beneficially used for the purposes for which it wasappropriated.
CHAPTER III
APPROPRIATION OF WATERS
Article 9. Waters may be appropriated and used in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
Appropriation of water, as used in this Code, is the acquisition of rights over the use of waters or
the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed
by law.
Article 10. Water may be appropriated for the following purposes:
a. Domestic;b. Municipal;
c. Irrigation;d. Power generation;e. Fisheries;
f. Livestock raising;g. Industrial;
h. Recreational; andi. Other purposes;
Use of water for domestic purposes is the utilization of water for drinking, washing, bathing, cooking
or other household needs, home gardens, and watering or lawns or domestic animals.
Use of water for municipal purposes is the utilization of water for supplying the water requirementsof the community.
Use of water for irrigation is the utilization of water for producing agricultural crops.
Use of water for power generation is the utilization of water for producing electrical or mechanicalpower.
Use of water for power fisheries is the utilization of water for the propagation and culture of fish as acommercial enterpriseUse of water for livestock raising is the utilization of water for large herds or flocks of animals raised
as a commercial enterprise.

45

Use of water for industrial purposes is the utilization of water in factories, industrial plants and mines,
including the use of water as an ingredient of a finished product.
Use of water for recreational purposes is the utilization of water for swimming pools, bath houses,
boating, water skiing, golf courses and other similar facilities in resorts and other places of recreation.
Article 11. The state, for reasons of public policy, may declare waters not previously appropriated, inwhole or in part, exempt from appropriation for any or all purposes and, thereupon, such waters may
not be appropriated for those purposes.
Article 12. Waters appropriated for a particular purpose may be applied for another purpose only uponprior approval of the Council and on condition that the new use does not unduly prejudice the rights ofother permittees, or require an increase in the volume of water.
Article 13. Except as otherwise herein provided, no person, including government instrumentalities orgovernment-owned or controlled corporations, shall appropriate water without a water right, whichshall be evidenced by a document known as a water permit.
Water rights is the privilege granted by the government to appropriate and use water.
Article 14. Subject to the provisions of this Code concerning the control, protection, conservation, andregulation of the appropriation and use of waters, any person may appropriate or use natural bodies ofwater without securing a water permit for any of the following.
a. Appropriation of water by means of hand carried receptacles; andb. Bathing or washing, watering or dipping of domestic or farm animals, and navigation ofwatercrafts or transportation of logs and other objects by flotation.
Article 15. Only citizens of the Philippines, of legal age, as well as juridical persons, who are duly
qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, may apply for water permits.
Article 16. Any person who desires to obtain a water permit shall file an application with the Council
who shall make known said application to the public for any protests.
In determining whether to grant or deny an application, the Council shall considerthe following:protests filed, if any; prior permits granted; the availability of water; the water supply need forbeneficial use; possible adverse effects; land-use economics; and other relevant factors.
Upon approval of an application, a water permit shall be issued and recorded.
Article 17. The right to the use of water is deemed acquired as of the date of filing of the application fora water permit in case of approved permits, or as of the date of actual use in a case where no permit isrequired.
Article 18. All water permits granted shall be subject to conditions of beneficial use, adequate standardsof design and construction, and such other terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Council.
Such permits shall specify the maximum amount of water which may be diverted or withdrawn, themaximum rate diversion or withdrawal, the time or times during the year when water may bediverted or withdrawn, the points or points of diversion or location of wells, the place of use, thepurpose for which water may be used and such other requirements the Council deems desirable.

46

Article 19. Water rights may be lent or transferred in whole or in part to another person with priorapproval of the Council, after due notice and hearing.
Article 20. The measure and limit of appropriation of water shall be beneficial use.
Beneficial use of water is the utilization of water in the right amount during the period that the wateris needed for producing the benefits for which the water is appropriated.
Article 21. Standards of beneficial use shall be prescribed by the council for the appropriator of water
for different purposes and conditions, and the use of waters which are appropriated shall be measured
and controlled in accordance therewith.
Excepting those for domestic use, every appropriator of water shall maintain water control andmeasuring devices, and keep records or water withdrawal. When required by the council, allappropriators of water shall furnish information on water use.
Article 22. Between two or more appropriation of water from the same sources of supply, priority intime of appropriation shall give the better right, except that in times of emergency, the use of water fordomestic and municipal purposes shall have a better fight over all other uses; Provided, That wherewater shortage is recurrent and the appropriator for municipal use has a lower priority in time of
appropriation, them it shall be his duty to find an alternative source of supply in accordance withconditions prescribed by the Council.
Article 23. Priorities may be altered on grounds of greater beneficial use, multi-purpose use, and othersimilar grounds after due notice and hearing, subject to payment of compensation is proper cases.
Article 24. A water right shall be exercised in such a manner that rights of third persons or of otherappropriators are not prejudiced thereby.
Article 25. A holder of a water permit may demand the establishment of easements necessary for theconstruction and maintenance of the works and facilities needed for the beneficial use of the waters tobe appropriated subject to the requirements of just compensation and to the following conditions:a. That he is the owner, lessee, mortgage or one having real right over the land upon which hepurposes to use water; andb. That the proposed easement is the most convenient and the least onerous to the servient estate.
Easement relating to the appropriation and use of waters may be modified be agreement of thecontracting parties provided the same is not contrary to law or prejudicial to third persons.
Article 26. Where water shortage is recurrent, the use of the water pursuant to a permit may, in theinterest of equitable distribution of benefits among legal appropriators, be reduced after due notice andhearing.
Article 27. Water users shall bear the diminution of any water supply due to natural causes or force
majeure.
Article 28. Water permits shall continue to be valid as long as water is beneficially used; however, itmaybe suspended on the grounds of non-compliance with approved plans and specifications orschedules of water distribution; use of water for a purpose other than that for which it was granted;

47

non-payment of water charges, wastage; failure to keep records of water diversion, when required; andviolation of any term or condition of any permit or of rules and regulations promulgated by the Council.
Temporary permits may be issued for the appropriation and use of water for short periods under
special circumstances.
Article 29. Water permits may be revoked after due notice and hearing on grounds of non-use; grossviolation of the conditions imposed in the permit; unauthorized sale of water; willful failure or refusal tocomply with rules and regulations or any lawful order; pollution, public nuisance or acts detrimental to
public health and safety; when the appropriator is found to be disqualified under the law to exploit anddevelop natural resources of the Philippines; when, in the case of irrigation, the land is converted to
non-agricultural purposes; and other similar grounds.
Article 30. All water permits are subject to modification or cancellation by the Council, after due noticeand hearing, in favor of a project of greater beneficial use or for multi-purpose development, and awater permittee who suffers thereby shall be duly compensated by the entity or person in whose favor
the cancellation was made.
CHAPTER IVUTILIZATION OF WATERS
Article 31. Preference in the development of water resources shall consider security of the State,
multiple use, beneficial effects, adverse effects and cost of development.
Article 32. The utilization of subterranean or ground water shall be coordinated with that of surface
waters such as rivers, streams, springs and lakes, so that a superior right in one is not adversely affectedby an inferior right in the other.
For this purpose, the Council shall promulgate rules and regulations and declare the existence ofcontrol areas for the coordinated development, protection, and utilization of subterranean or groundwater and surface waters.
Control area is an area of land where subterranean or ground water and surface water are sointerrelated that withdrawal and use in one similarly affects the other. The boundary of a control
area may be altered from time to time, as circumstances warrant.
Article 33. Water contained in open canals, aqueducts or reservoirs of private persons may be used byany person for domestic purpose or for watering plants as long as the water withdrawn by manual
methods without checking the stream or damaging the canal, aqueduct or reservoir; Provided, That thisright may be restricted by the owner should it result in loss or injury to him.
Article 34. A water permittee or appropriator may use any watercourse to convey water to anotherpoint in the watercourse for the purpose stated in a permit and such water may be diverted orrecaptured at that point by said permittee in the same amount less allowance for normal losses intransit
Article 35. Works for the storage, diversion, distribution and utilization of water resources shall containadequate provision for the prevention and control of diseases that may be induced or spread by suchworks when required by the Council.
Article 36. When the reuse of waste water is feasible, it shall limited as much as possible to such uses
other than direction human consumption. No person or agency shall distribute such water for public

48

consumption until it is demonstrated that such consumption will not adversely affect the health andsafety of the public.
Article 37. In the construction and operation of hydraulic works, due consideration shall be given to thepreservation of scenic places and historical relics and in addition to the provisions of existing laws, noworks that would required the destruction or removal of such places or relics shall be undertaken
without showing that the destruction or removal is necessary and unavoidable.
Article 38. Authority for the construction of dams, bridges and other structures across of which may
interfere with the flow of navigable or floatable waterways shall first be secured from the Departmentof Public Works, Transportation and Communications.
Article 39. Except in cases of emergency to save life or property, the construction or repair of thefollowing works shall be undertaken only after the plans and specifications therefore, as may berequired by the Council, are approved by the proper government agency; dams for the diversion orstorage of water; structures for the use of water power; installations for the utilization of subterraneanor ground water and other structures for utilization of water resources.
Article 40. No excavation for the purpose of emission of a hot spring or for the enlargement of theexisting opening thereof shall be made without prior permit.
Any person or agency who intends to develop a hot spring for human consumption must first obtaina permit from the Department of Health.
Article 41. No person shall develop a stream, lake, or spring for recreational purposes without first
securing a permit from the council.
Article 42. Unless otherwise ordered by the President of the Philippines and only in times of nationalcalamity or emergency, no person shall induce or restrain rainfall by any method such as cloud seeding
without a permit from the proper government agency.
Article 43. No person shall raise or lower the water level of a river, stream, lake, lagoon or marsh nor
drain the same without a permit.
Article 44. Drainage systems shall be so constructed that their outlets are rivers, lakes, the sea, natural
bodies of water, such other water course as any be approved by the proper government agency.
Article 45. When a drainage channel is constructed by a number of persons for their common benefit,
cost of construction and maintenance of the channel be borne by each in proportion to the benefits
derived.
Article 46. When artificial means are employed to drain water from higher to lower land, the owner ofthe higher land shall select the routes and methods of drainage that will cause the minimum damage tothe lower lands, subject to the requirements of just compensation.
Article 47. When the use, conveyance or storage of water results in damage to another, the person
responsible for the damage shall pay compensation.
Article 48. When a water resources project interferes with the access of landowner to a portion of his
property or with the conveyance of irrigation or drainage water, the person or agency constructing the
project shall bear the cost of construction and maintenance of the bridges, flumes and other structures49

necessary for maintaining access, irrigation, or drainage in addition to paying compensation for land andincidental damages.
Article 49. Any person having an easement for an aqueduct may enter upon the servient land for the
purpose of cleaning, repairing or replacing the aqueduct or the removal of obstructions therefrom.
Article 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the interventionof man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate can not construct works which will impede this natural flow, unless heprovides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase this natural flow.
Article 51. The banks or rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire
length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas andforty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in theinterest of recreation, navigation, flotage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in thiszone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, flotage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind.
Article 52. The establishment, extent, from, and conditions of easement of water not expressly
determined by the provisions of this Code shall governed by theprovisions of the Civil Code.
CHAPTER V
CONTROL OF WATERS
Article 53. To promote the best interest and the coordinated protection of flood plain lands, theSecretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications may declare flood control areas andpromulgate guidelines for governing flood plain management plans in these areas.
Article 54. In declare flood control areas, rules and regulations may be promulgate to prohibit or control
activities that may damage or cause deterioration of lakes and dikes, obstruct the flow of water, change
the natural flow of the river, increase flood losses or aggravate flood problems.
Article 55. The government may construction necessary flood control structures in declared flood
control areas, and for this purpose it shall have a legal easement as wide as may be needed along andadjacent to the river bank and outside the bed or channel of the river.
Article 56. River beds, sand bars and tidal flats may not be cultivated except upon prior permission fromthe Secretary of the Department of Public works, Transportation and Communication and suchpermission shall not be granted where such cultivation obstructs the flow of water or increase floodlevels so as to cause damage to other areas.
Article 57. Any person may erect levees or revetments to protect his property from flood, encroachment
by the river or change in the course of the river, provided that such constructions does not cause
damage to the property of another.
Article 58. When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse private lands, the owners or
the affected lands may not compel the government to restore the river to its former bed; nor can they
restrain the government from taking steps to revert the river or stream to its former course. The ownersof the lands thus affected are not entitled to compensation for any damage sustained thereby.

50However, the former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the abandoned bed proportion
to the area lost by each.
The owners of the affected lands may undertake to return the river or stream to its old bed at theirown expense; Provided, That a permit therefore is secured from the Secretary of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication and work pertaining thereto are commenced within two years
from the changes in the course of the river or stream.
Article 59. Rivers, lakes and lagoons may, upon the recommendation of the Philippines Coast Guard, bedeclared navigable either in whole or in part.
Article 60. The rafting of logs and other objects on rivers and lakes which are floatable may be controlled
or prohibited during designated season of the year with due regard to the needs of irrigation anddomestic water supply and other uses of water.
Article 61. The impounding of water in ponds or reservoirs may be prohibited by the Council upon
consultation with the Department of Health if it is dangerous to public health, or it may order that such
pond or reservoirs be drained if such is necessary for the protection of public health.
Article 62. Waters of a stream may be stored in a reservoir by a permittee in such amount as will notprejudices the right of any permittee downstream. Whoever operates the reservoir shall, when required,release water for minimum stream flow.
All reservoir operations shall be subject to rules and regulations issued by the Council or any proper
government agency.
Article 63. The operator of a dam for the storage of water may be required to employ an engineer
possessing qualifications prescribed for the proper operations, maintenance and administration of thedam.
Article 64. The Council shall approve the manner, location, depth, and spacing in which borings for
subterranean or ground water may be made, determine the requirements for the registration of every
boring or alteration to existing borings as well as other control measures for the exploitation ofsubterranean or ground water resources, and in coordination with the Professional Regulation
Commission prescribe the qualifications of those who would drill such borings.
No person shall drill a well without prior permission from the Council.
Article 65. Water from one river basin may be transferred to another river basin only with approval of
the Council. In considering any request for such transfer, the Council shall take into account the fullcosts of the transfer, the benefits that would accrue to the basin of origin without the transfer, thebenefits would accrue to the receiving basin on account of the transfer, alternative schemes for
supplying water to the receiving basin, and other relevant favors.

CHAPTER VICONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF WATERS AND
WATERSHEDS AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES

51

Article 66. After due notice and hearing when warranted by circumstances, minimum stream flows forrivers and streams and minimum water levels for lakes may be established by the Council under suchconditions as may be necessary for the protection of the environment, control of pollution, navigation,
prevention of salt damage, and general public use.
Article 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any groundwater may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources (DENR) as a protected area. Rules andregulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners
or occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of thesurface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management
or administration of such waters.
Article 68. It shall be the duty of any person in control of a well to prevent the water from flowing on thesurface of the land, or into any surface water, or any porous stratum underneath the surface without
being beneficially used.
Article 69. It shall be the duty of any person in control of a well containing water with minerals or othersubstances injurious to man, animals, agriculture, and vegetation to prevent such waters from flowing
on the surface of the land or into any surface water or into any other aquifer or porous stratum.
Article 70. No person shall utilize an existing well or pond or spread waters for recharging subterraneanor ground water supplies without prior permission of the Council.
Article 71. To promote better water conservation and usage for irrigation purposes, the merger ofirrigation associations and the appropriation of waters by associations instead of by individuals shall be
encouraged.
No water permit shall be granted to an individual when his water requirement can be supplied
through an irrigation association.
Article 72. In the consideration of a proposed water resource project, due regard shall be given to
ecological changes resulting from the construction of the project in order to balance the needs ofdevelopment and the protection of the environment.
Article 73. The conservation of fish ad wild life shall receive proper consideration and shall becoordinated with other features of water resources development programs to insure that fish andwildlife values receive equal attention with other project purposes.
Article 74. Swamps and marshes which are owned by the State and which have a primary value forwaterfowl propagation or other wildlife purposes may be reserved and protected from drainage
operations and development.
Article 75. No person shall, without prior permission from the National Pollution Control Commission,build any works that may produce dangerous or noxious substance or perform any act which may resultin the introduction of sewage, industrial waste, or any pollutant into any source of water supply.
Water pollution is the impairment of the quality of water beyond a certain standard. This standard
may vary according to the use of the water and shall be set by the National Pollution Control
Commission.

52

Article 76. The establishment of cemeteries and waste disposal areas that may affect the source of awater supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use shall be subject to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Department or Health.
Article 77. Tailings from mining operations and sediments from placer mining shall not be dumped intorivers and waterways without prior permission from the Council upon recommendation be the National
Pollution Control Commission.
Article 78. The application of agriculture fertilizers and pesticides may be prohibited or regulated by the
National Pollution Control Commission in areas where such application may cause pollution of a sourceof water supply.
CHAPTER VII
ADMINISTRATION OF WATERS AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE
Article 79. The Administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code, including the granting of
permits and the imposition of penalties for administrative violations hereof, are hereby vested in the
council, and except in regard to those functions which under this Code are specifically conferred uponother agencies of the government, the Council is hereby empowered to make all decisions anddeterminations provided for in this Code.
Article 80. The Council may deputize any official or agency of the government to perform any of its
specific functions or activities.
Article 81. The Council shall provide a continuing program for data collection, research and manpower
development need for the appropriation, utilization, exploitation, conservation, and protection of thewater resources of the country.
Article 82. In the implementation of the provisions of this Code, the Council shall promulgate thenecessary rules and regulations which may provide for penalties consisting of a fine not exceeding One
thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) and/or suspension or revocation of the water permit or other right to theuse of water. Violations of such rules and regulations may be administratively dealt with by the Council.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in newspapers ofgeneral circulation.
Rules and regulations prescribed by any government agency that pertain to the utilization,
exploitation, development, control, conservation, or protection of water resources shall, if thecouncil so requires, be subject to its approval.
Article 83. The Council is hereby authorized to impose and collect reasonable fees or charges for water
resources development from water appropriators, except when it is for purely domestic purpose.
Article 84. The Council and other agencies authorized to enforce this Code are empowered to enter
upon private lands, with previous notice to the owner, for the purpose of conducting surveys andhydrologic investigations, and to perform such other acts as are necessary in carrying out their functions
including the power to exercise the right of eminent domain.
Article 85. No program or project involving the appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development,
control, conservation, or protection of water resources may be undertaken without prior approval of
the Council, except those which the council may, in its discretion, exempt.

53

The Council may require consultation with the public prior to the implementation of certain water
resources development projects.
Art. 86. When plans and specifications of a hydraulic structure are submitted for approval, thegovernment agency whose functions embrace the type of project for which the structure is intended,shall review the plans and specifications and recommend to the Council proper action thereon and thelatter shall approve the same only when they are in conformity with the requirements of this Code andthe rules and regulations promulgated by the Council. Notwithstanding such approval, neither theengineer who drew up the plans and specifications of the hydraulic structure, nor the constructor who
built it, shall be relieved of his liability for damages in case of failure thereof by reason of defect in plans
and specifications, or failure due to defect in plan construction, within ten (10) years from thecompletion of the structure.
Any action recover such damages must be brought within five (5) years following such failure.
Article 87. The Council or its duly authorized representatives, in the exercise of its power to investigate
and decide cases brought to its cognizance, shall have the power to administer oaths, compel theattendance of witnesses be subpoena duces tecum.
Non-compliance or violation of such orders or subpoena and subpoena duces tecum shall bepunished in the same manner as indirect contempt of an inferior court upon application by the
aggrieved party with the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of Rule 71of the Rules of Court.
Article 88. The Council shall have original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation,utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters within themeaning and context of the provisions of this Code.
The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies shall be immediately executory and theenforcement thereof may be suspended only then a bond, in an amount fixed by the Council toanswer for damages occasioned by the suspension or stay of execution, shall have been filed by theappealing party, unless the suspension is by virtue of an order of a competent court.
All dispute shall be decide within sixty (60) days after the parties submit the same for decision or
resolution.
The Council shall have the power to issue writs of execution and enforce its decisions with theassistance of local or national police agencies.
Article 89. The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies may be appealed to the court offirst Instance of the province where the subject matter of the controversy is situated within fifteen (15)days from the date the party appealing receives a copy of the decision, of any of the following grounds:(1) grave abuse of discretion; (2) question of law; (3) questions of fact and law.

CHAPTER VIIIPENAL PROVISIONS

54

Article 90. The following acts shall be penalized by suspension or revocation of the violator's water
permit or other right to the use of water and/or a fine of not exceeding One thousand Pesos (P1,000.00),
in the discretion of the Council:
a. Appropriation of subterranean or ground water for domestic use by an overlying landownerwithout registration required by the Council;
b. Non-observance of any standard of beneficial use of water.
c. Failure of the appropriator to keep a record of water withdrawal when required.
d. Failure to comply with any of the terms or conditions in a water permit or a water rights grant.
e. Unauthorized use of water for a purpose other than that for which a right or permit was granted.
f.

Construction or repair of any hydraulic work or structure without duly approved plans andspecifications, when required.

g. Failure to install a regulating and measuring device for the control volume of water appropriated,when required.
h. Unauthorized sale, lease, or transfer of water and/or water rights.
i.

Failure to provide adequate facilities to prevent or control diseases when required by theCouncil in the construction of any work for the storage, diversion, distribution and utilization ofwater.

j.

Drilling of a well without permission of the Council.

k. Utilization of an existing well or ponding or spreading of water for recharging subterranean or
ground water supplies without permission of the Council.
l.

Violation of or non-compliance with any order, rules and regulation of the Council.

m. Illegal taking or diversion of water in an open canal, aqueduct or reservoir.
n. Malicious destruction of hydraulic works or structures valued at not exceeding P5,000.00.
Article 91. A. A fine of not exceeding Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) or imprisonment for not morethat three (3) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court, shall be imposed
upon any person who commits any of the following acts:
1. Appropriation of water without a water permit, unless such person is expressly exempted fromsecuring a permit by the provisions of this code;
2. Unauthorized obstruction of an irrigation canal.
3. Cultivation of river bed, sand bar or tidal flat without permission.
4. Malicious destruction of hydraulic works or structure valued at not exceeding Twenty-FiveThousand Pesos (P25,000.00)

55

B. A fine exceeding Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) but not more than Six Thousand Pesos(P6,000.00) or imprisonment exceeding three years (3) years but not more than (6) years or bothsuch fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court, shall be imposed on any person who
commits any of the following acts:
1. Distribution for public consumption of water which adversely affects the health and safety ofthe public.
2. Excavation or enlargement of the opening of a hot spring without permission.
3. Unauthorized obstruction of a river or waterway, or occupancy of a river bank or seashore
without permission.
4. Establishment of a cemetery or a waste disposal area near a source of water supply or reservoir
for domestic or municipal use without permission.
5. Constructing, without prior permission of the government agency concerned, works that
produce dangerous or noxious substances, or performing acts that result in the introduction of
sewage, industrial waste, or any substance that pollutes a source of water supply.
6. Dumping mine tailings and sediments into rivers or waterways without permission.
7. Malicious destruction of hydraulic works or structure valued more than Twenty-five Thousand(P25,000.00) but not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
C. A fine exceeding Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) but not more than ten Thousand Pesos(P10,000.00) or imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twelve (12) years, or bothsuch fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court, shall be imposed upon any person who
commits any of the following acts:
1. Misrepresentation of citizenship in order to qualify for water permit.
2. Malicious destruction of a hydraulic works or structure, valued at more than One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
Article 92. If the offense is committed by a corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or any otherjuridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the President, General Manager, and other guilty
officer or officers of such corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or entity, without prejudice tothe filing of a civil action against said juridical person. If the offender is an alien, he shall be deported
after serving his sentence, without further proceedings.
After final judgment of conviction, the Court upon petition of the prosecution attorney in the sameproceedings, and after due hearing, may when the public interest so requires, order the suspensionof or dissolution of such corporation, trust, firm, partnership association or juridical person.
Article 93. All actions for offenses punishable under Article 91 of this code shall be brought before theproper court.
Article 94. Actions for offenses punishable under this Code by a fine of not more than Three Thousand(P3,000.00) or by an imprisonment of not more than three (3) years, or both such fine andimprisonment, shall prescribed in five (5) years; those punishable by a fine exceeding Three Thousand
Pesos ( 3,000.00) but not more than six thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) or imprisonment exceeding three(3) years but not more than six years (6) years or both such fine and imprisonment, shall prescribe in56

seven (7) years; and those punishable by a fine exceeding Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) but not morethan Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or an imprisonment exceeding Six (6) years but not more thanTwelve (12) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
CHAPTER IX
TRANSITORY AND FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 95. Within two (2) years from the promulgation of this code, all claims for a right to use water
existing on or before December 31, 1974 shall be registered with the council which shall be confirm said
rights in accordance with the provisions of this Code, and shall set their respective priorities.
When priority in time of appropriation from a certain source of supply cannot be determined, the orderof preference in the use of the waters shall be as follows:a. Domestic and municipal use;b. Irrigation;c. Power generation;d. Fisheries;
e. Livestock raising;f. Industrial use; andg. Other uses.
Any claim not registered within said period shall be considered waived and the use of the water
deemed abandoned, and the water shall thereupon be available for disposition as unappropriatedwaters in accordance with the provisions of this code.
Article 96. No vested or acquired right to the use of water can arise from acts or omissions which areagainst the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.
Article 97. Acts and contracts under the regime of old laws, if they are valid in accordance therewith,shall be respected, subject to the limitations established in this Code. Any modification or extension ofthese acts and contracts after the promulgation of this code, shall be subject to the provisions hereof.
Article 98. Interim rules and regulations promulgated by the Council shall continue to have binding force
and effect, when not in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
Article 99. If any provision or part of this Code, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance,
is declared unconstitutional or invalid for any reason, the other provisions of parts therein shall not beaffected.

Article 100. The following laws, parts and/or provisions of laws are hereby repealed:a. The provisions of the Spanish law of waters of August 3, 1866, the Civil Code of Spain of 1889
and the Civil Code of the Philippines (R. A. 386) on ownership of waters, easement relating towaters, use of public waters which are inconsistent with the provision of the Code;

57

b.

The provisions of R. A. 6395, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the National Power
Corporation, particularly section 3, paragraph (f), and section 12, so far as they relate to theappropriation of waters and the grant thereof;c. The provisions of Act. No. 2152 as amended, otherwise know as the Irrigation Act, section 3,
paragraphs (k) and (m) of P.D. No. 813, R. A. 2056; Section 90, C. A. 137; andd. All Decrees, Laws, Acts, parts of Acts, Rules of Court, executive orders, and administrative
regulations which are contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Code.
Article 101. This Code shall take effect upon its promulgation.

Done in the City of Manila, this 31st day of December, Nineteen Hundred and Seventy-Six.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines

By the President:

JACOBO C. CLAVE
Presidential Executive Assistant58