COMPARATIVE STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND
THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE ORDER
By John K.-H. Quah and Bruno Strulovici

Abstract: We identify a natural way of ordering functions, which we call the interval
dominance order and develop a theory of monotone comparative statics based on thisorder. This way of ordering functions is weaker than the standard one based on the
single crossing property (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) and so our results apply insome settings where the single crossing property does not hold. For example, they
are useful when examining the comparative statics of optimal stopping time problems. We also show that certain basic results in statistical decision theory which areimportant in economics - specifically, the complete class theorem of Karlin and Rubin(1956) and the results connected with Lehmann’s (1988) concept of informativeness- generalize to payoff functions obeying the interval dominance order.

Keywords: single crossing property, interval dominance order, supermodularity,
comparative statics, optimal stopping time, complete class theorem, statistical decision theory, informativeness.
JEL Classification Numbers: C61, D11, D21, F11, G11.

Authors’ Emails: john.quah@economics.ox.ac.uk bruno.strulovici@economics.ox.ac.uk

Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Ian Jewitt for many stimulating conversations.

11. Introduction
A central concept in the theory of monotone comparative statics is the single crossing
property.1 Let X be a subset of the real line R, and {f (·, s)}s∈S a family of functions
mapping X to R and parameterized by s in S ⊆ R. We say that this family is orderedby the single crossing property if for all s00 > s0 and x00 > x0 , the following holds:
f (x00 , s0 ) − f (x0 , s0 ) ≥ (>) 0 =⇒ f (x00 , s00 ) − f (x0 , s00 ) ≥ (>) 0.

(1)

To keep our discussion simple, assume that f (·, s) has a unique maximum in X forall s. The fundamental importance of the single crossing property (SCP) arises fromthis result (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)): if the family {f (·, s)}s∈S is ordered by thesingle crossing property, then argmaxx∈X f (x, s) is increasing in s.
It is trivial to see that SCP is also necessary for comparative statics in the following
sense: if we require argmaxx∈Y f (x, s00 ) ≥ argmaxx∈Y f (x, s0 ) for all Y ⊂ X whenevers00 > s0 , then (1) must hold. (This is true since we could let Y be any set consistingof two points in X.) In other words, SCP is necessary if we require the monotone
comparative statics conclusion to be robust to certain changes in the domain of theobjective functions.
However, SCP is not necessary for monotone comparative statics if we only requireargmaxx∈Y f (x, s00 ) ≥ argmaxx∈Y f (x, s0 ) for Y = X or for Y belonging to a particular
subcollection of the subsets of X. To see this, consider Figures 1 and 2. In both cases,
we have argmaxx∈X f (x, s00 ) ≥ argmaxx∈X f (x, s0 ); furthermore, argmaxx∈Y f (x, s00 ) ≥argmaxx∈Y f (x, s0 ) where Y is any closed interval contained in X. In Figure 1, SCP
is satisfied (specifically, (1) is satisfied) but this is not true in Figure 2. Consider
the points x00 and x0 as depicted in Figure 2. We see that f (x0 , s0 ) = f (x00 , s0 ) but
f (x00 , s00 ) < f (x0 , s00 ), violating SCP.
1

Early contributions to the literature on monotone comparative statics include Topkis (1978),

Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives (1990), and Milgrom and Shannon (1994). For a textbook
treatment see Topkis (1998).

2

The first objective of this paper is to develop a new way of ordering functions
that guarantees monotone comparative statics, whether the situation is like the one
depicted in Figure 1 or the one depicted in Figure 2. We call this new order theinterval dominance order. This order is more general than the one based on the
single crossing property. We show that it holds in some significant situations where
SCP does not hold; at the same time it retains many of the nice comparative statics
properties associated with SCP.
The second objective of this paper is to bridge the gap between the literature on
monotone comparative statics and the closely related literature in statistical decision
theory on informativeness. We refer in particular to Lehmann’s concept of informativeness (1988) which in turn builds on the complete class theorem of Karlin and
Rubin (1956).2 In that setting, the state of the world is unknown and the agent has
to take an action based on an observed signal, which conveys information on the true
state. Karlin and Rubin identify conditions under which optimal decision rules (insome well-defined sense) must be monotone, i.e., the agent’s action is higher when
he receives a higher signal.3 Lehmann shows how we may compare the informativeness of two families of signals (or experiments) when the optimal decision rules aremonotone.
A crucial assumption in the Karlin-Rubin and Lehmann theorems is that theagent’s payoff in state s when she takes action x, which we write as f (x, s), has
the following property: f (·, s) is a quasiconcave function of x, achieving a maximum
at x̄(s), with x̄ increasing in s (like the situation depicted in Figure 2). However,their results do not cover the case where {f (·, s)}s∈S is ordered by the single crossing
property. Amongst other things, SCP allows for non-quasiconcave payoff functions(see Figure 2); indeed this feature is crucial to many of its economics applications.
2

Economic applications of Lehmann’s concept of informativeness can be found in Persico (2000),

Athey and Levin (2001), Levin (2001), Bergemann and Valimaki (2002), and Jewitt (2006).
3
In other words, monotone decision rules form a complete class.

3

In short, the standard results on comparative informativeness accommodates thesituation depicted in Figure 2 but not that in Figure 1, whereas the standard resultson comparative statics accommodate the situation in Figure 1 but not that in Figure
2.
We generalize the Karlin-Rubin and Lehmann results by showing that their conclusions hold even when the payoff functions {f (·, s)}s∈S satisfy the interval dominanceorder. In this way, we obtain a single condition on the payoff functions that is useful for both comparative statics and comparative informativeness, so results in one
category extend seamlessly into results in the other.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the interval
dominance order, explore its properties, and develop a comparative statics theorem.
Section 3 is devoted to applications. In Section 4 we show that the concept of IDO canbe easily extended to settings with uncertainty and that it is useful in that context.
Lehmann’s concept of informativeness is introduced in Section 5 and we demonstrate
its relevance for payoff functions obeying the interval dominance order. Finally, we
generalize Karlin and Rubin’s complete class theorem in Section 6.

2. The Interval Dominance Order
We begin by showing how a situation like that depicted in Figure 2, involving a
violation of SCP, can arise naturally in an economic setting.
Example 1. Consider a firm producing some good whose price we assume is fixedat 1 (either because of market conditions or for some regulatory reason). It has
to decide on the production capacity (x) of its plant. Assume that a plant withproduction capacity x costs Dx, where D is a positive scalar. Let s be the state of
the world, which we also identify with the demand for the good. The marginal costof producing the good in state s is c(s). We assume that, for all s, D + c(s) < 1.
The firm makes its capacity decision before the state of the world is realized and its
4

production decision after the state is revealed.
Suppose it chooses capacity x and the realized state of the world (and thus realized
demand) is s ≥ x. In this case, the firm should produce up to its capacity, so that its
profit Π(x, s) = x − c(s)x − Dx. On the other hand, if s < x, the firm will produce(and sell) s units of the good, giving it a profit of Π(x, s) = s − c(s)s − Dx. It is easy
to see that Π(·, s) is increasing linearly for x ≤ s and thereafter declines, linearly witha slope of −D. Its maximum is achieved at x = s, with Π(s, s) = (1 − c(s) − D)s.
Suppose s00 > s0 and c(s00 ) > c(s0 ). In other words, the state with higher demand also
has higher marginal cost. Then it is clear that the situation depicted in Figure 2 canarise, with f (·, s0 ) = Π(·, s0 ) and f (·, s00 ) = Π(·, s00 ).

Let X be a subset of R and f and g two real-valued functions defined on X. We
say that g dominates f by the single crossing property (which we denote by g SC f )if for all x00 and x0 such that x00 > x0 , the following holds:
f (x00 ) − f (x0 ) ≥ (>) 0 =⇒ g(x00 ) − g(x0 ) ≥ (>) 0.

(2)

A family of real-valued functions {f (·, s)}s∈S , defined on X and parameterized by sin S ⊂ R is referred to as an SCP family if the functions are ordered by SCP, i.e.,
whenever s00 > s0 , we have f (·, s00 ) SC f (·, s0 ).
In Figure 2, we have argmaxx∈R+ f (x, s00 ) > argmaxx∈R+ f (x, s0 ) even thoughf (·, s00 ) does not dominate f (·, s0 ) by SCP. Notice, however, that violations of (2)can only occur if we compare points x0 and x00 on opposite sides of the maximum
point of f (·, s0 ). This suggests that a possible way of weakening SCP, while retaining
comparative statics, is to require (2) to hold only for a certain collection of pairs{x0 , x00 }, rather than all possible pairs.
The set J is an interval of X if, whenever x0 and x00 are in J, any element x in X
such that x0 ≤ x ≤ x00 is also in J.4 Let f and g be two real-valued functions defined
4Note that X need not be an interval in the conventional sense, i.e., X need not be, using our5

on X. We say that g dominates f by the interval dominance order (or, for short, g
I-dominates f , with the notation g I f ) if (2) holds for x00 and x0 such that x00 > x0
and f (x00 ) ≥ f (x) for all x in the interval [x0 , x00 ] = {x ∈ X : x0 ≤ x ≤ x00 }.
Clearly, the interval dominance order (IDO) is weaker than ordering by SCP. For
example, in Figure 2, f (·, s00 ) I-dominates f (·, s0 ) but f (·, s00 ) does not dominate f (·, s0 )by SCP.
For many results in the paper, we shall impose a mild regularity condition on theobjective function. A function f : X → R is said to be regular if argmaxx∈[x0 ,x00 ] f (x)is nonempty for any points x0 and x00 with x00 > x0 . Suppose the set X is such thatX ∪[x0 , x00 ] is always closed, and thus compact, in R (with the respect to the Euclidean
topology). This is true, for example, if X is finite, if it is closed, or if it is a (notnecessarily closed) interval. Then f is regular if it is upper semi-continuous withrespect to the relative topology on X.
We are now ready to examine the relationship between the interval dominanceorder and monotone comparative statics. Theorem 1 gives the precise sense in which
IDO is both sufficient and necessary for monotone comparative statics. To deal withthe possibility of multiple maxima we need a way of ordering sets. The standard wayof ordering sets in this context is the strong set order (see Topkis (1998)). Let S 0 and
S 00 be two subsets of R. We say that S 00 dominates S 0 in the strong set order, andwrite S 00 ≥ S 0 if for any for x00 in S 00 and x0 in S 0 , we have max{x00 , x0 } in S 00 andmin{x00 , x0 } in S 0 . Suppose that S 00 and S 0 both contain their largest and smallest
elements. Then it is clear that if S 00 ≥ S 0 , the largest (smallest) element in S 00 is
greater than the largest (smallest) element in S 0 .5
terminology, an interval of R. Furthermore, the fact that J is an interval of X does not imply that
it is an interval of R. For example, if X = {1, 2, 3, }, then J = {1, 2} is an interval of X, but ofcourse neither X nor J are intervals of R.
5
Throughout this paper, when we say that something is ‘greater’ or ‘increasing’, we mean to saythat it is greater or increasing in the weak sense. Most of the comparisons in this paper are weak,so this convention makes sense. When we are making a strict comparison, we shall say so explicitly,

6

Theorem 1: Suppose that f and g are real-valued functions defined on X ⊂ R
and g I f . Then the following property holds:(?)

argmaxx∈J g(x) ≥ argmaxx∈J f (x) for any interval J of X.

Furthermore, if property (?) holds and g is regular, then g I f .
Proof: Assume that g I-dominates f and that x00 is in argmaxx∈J f (x) and x0 is
in argmaxx∈J g(x). We need only consider the case where x00 > x0 . Since x00 is inargmaxx∈J f (x), we have f (x00 ) ≥ f (x) for all x in [x0 , x00 ] ⊆ J. Since g I f , we also
have g(x00 ) ≥ g(x0 ); thus x00 is in argmaxx∈J g(x). Furthermore, f (x00 ) = f (x0 ) so thatx0 is in argmaxx∈J f (x). If not, f (x00 ) > f (x0 ) which implies (by the fact that g I f )that g(x00 ) > g(x0 ), contradicting the assumption that g is maximized at x0 .
To prove the other direction, we assume that there is an interval [x0 , x00 ] such thatf (x00 ) ≥ f (x) for all x in [x0 , x00 ]. This means that x00 is in argmaxx∈[x0 ,x00 ] f (x). There
are two possible violations of IDO. One possibility is that g(x0 ) > g(x00 ); in this case,by the regularity of g, the set argmaxx∈[x0 ,x00 ] g(x) is nonempty but does not contain
x00 , which violates (?). Another possible violation of IDO occurs if g(x00 ) = g(x0 )but f (x00 ) > f (x0 ). In this case, the set argmaxx∈[x0 ,x00 ] g(x) either contains x0 , which
violates (?) since argmaxx∈[x0 ,x00 ] f (x) does not contain x0 , or it contains some element
distinct from x00 , which also violates (?).

QED

For the interval dominance order to be useful in applications, we need some simple
ways of checking that the property holds. For this purpose, the next result is crucial.
Proposition 1: Suppose that X is an interval of R and the functions f , g :X → R are absolutely continuous on compact intervals in X (and thus f and g aredifferentiable a.e.). If there is an increasing and positive function α : X → R suchthat g 0 (x) ≥ α(x)f 0 (x) a.e., then g I f .
If the function α in Proposition 1 is a constant ᾱ, then we obtain g(x00 ) − g(x0 ) ≥ᾱ(f (x00 ) − f (x0 )), which implies g SC f . When α is not a constant, the functions f
and g in Proposition 2 need not be related by SCP, as the following example shows.
as in ‘strictly higher’, ‘strictly increasing’, etc.

7Let f : [0, M ] → R be a differentiable and quasiconcave function, with f (0) = 0
and a unique maximum at x∗ in (0, M ). Let α : [0, M ] → R be given by α(x) = 1
for x ≤ x∗ and α(x) = 1 + (x − x∗ ) for x > x∗ . Consider g : [0, M ] satisfying
g(0) = f (0) = 0 with g 0 (x) = α(x)f 0 (x) (as in Proposition 1). Then it is clearthat g(x) = f (x) for x ≤ x∗ and g(x) < f (x) for x > x∗ . The function g is also
quasiconcave with a unique maximum at x∗ and g I-dominates f , but g does not
dominate f by SCP.
Proposition 1 is a consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Suppose [x0 , x00 ] is a compact interval of R and α and h are real-valued
functions defined on [x0 , x00 ], with h integrable and α increasing (and thus integrable
R x00
as well). If x h(t)dt ≥ 0 for all x in [x0 , x00 ], then
Z x00

0

Z x00

α(t)h(t)dt ≥ α(x )x0h(t)dt.

(3)x0

Proof: We confine ourselves to the case where α is an increasing and differentiable
function. If we can establish (3) for such functions, then we can extend it to all
increasing functions α since any such function can be approximated by an increasing
and differentiable function.
R x00
The function H(t) = α(t) t h(z)dz is absolutely continuous and thus differentiable a.e.; by the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have H(x00 ) − H(x0 ) =R x0 0H (t)dt. Note that H(x00 ) = 0 and that by the product rule,
x00
0

0

Z x00
h(z)dz − α(t)h(t).

H (t) = α (x)
t

So
0

0

Z x00

−H(x ) = −α(x )Z x00
h(t)dt =

x0

0

α (x)
x0

!

Z x00
h(z)dz
t

Z x00
dt −

α(t)h(t)dt.
x0

Note that the first term on the right of this equation is always nonnegative by assumption and so we obtain (3).

QED
8

Proof of Proposition 1: Consider x00 and x0 in X such that x00 > x0 and assume
that f (x) ≤ f (x00 ) for all x in [x0 , x00 ]. Since f is absolutely continuous on [x0 , x00 ],R x∗
f (x00 ) − f (x) = x f 0 (t)dt (with an analogous expression for g). We then have
Z x00

Z x00

0

g (t)dt ≥
x

0

0

Z x00

α(t)f (t)dt ≥ α(x )f 0 (t)dt,x0

xwhere the second inequality follows from Lemma 1. So
g(x00 ) − g(x0 ) = α(x0 )(f (x00 ) − f (x0 ))and g(x00 ) ≥ (>)g(x0 ) if f (x00 ) ≥ (>)f (x0 ).

(4)
QED

Another familiar concept in the theory of monotone comparative statics, and one
which is stronger than SCP, is the concept of increasing differences (see Milgrom
and Shannon (1994) and Topkis (1998)). The function g dominates f by increasing
differences (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and Topkis (1998)) if for any x00 and x0
in X, with x00 > x0 , we haveg(x00 ) − g(x0 ) ≥ f (x00 ) − f (x0 ).

(5)

We say that a function g dominates f by conditional increasing differences (anddenote it by g IN f ) if (5) holds for all pairs x0 and x00 in X such that f (x00 ) ≥ f (x)for x in [x0 , x00 ]. Clearly, if g dominates f by conditional increasing differences theng I-dominates f . The next result gives sufficient conditions under which g and f canbe related in this manner.
Proposition 2: Suppose X is an interval of R and the functions f , g : X → R
are absolutely continuous on compact intervals in X (and thus f and g are differentiable a.e.). If there is an increasing function α : X → R with α(x) ≥ 1 for all x in
X such that g 0 (x) ≥ α(x)f 0 (x) a.e., then g IN f .
Proof: Retrace the proof of Proposition 1; the result follows from (4).

9

QEDMany problems in economic theory involves the maximization of the difference
between benefits and costs arising from some activity. The next result shows therelevance of conditional increasing differences to problems of this sort.
Proposition 3: Let X ⊂ R and b, b̃, and c be real-valued functions defined on X,
with c an increasing function. If b̃ dominates b by conditional increasing differences,then the function Π̃ dominates the function Π by conditional increasing differences,where Π̃(x) = b̃(x) − c(x) and Π(x) = b(x) − c(x). Consequently, argmaxx∈X Π̃(x) ≥argmaxx∈X Π(x).
Proof: Suppose Π(x00 ) ≥ Π(x) for x in [x0 , x00 ]. Since c is increasing, we also haveb(x00 ) ≥ b(x) for x in [x0 , x00 ]. By conditional increasing differences b̃(x00 ) − b̃(x0 ) ≥b(x00 ) − b(x0 ). Adding −c(x00 ) + c(x0 ) to both sides of this inequality, we obtainΠ̃(x00 ) − Π̃(x0 ) ≥ Π(x00 ) − Π(x0 )as required. The final comparative statics statement follows from Theorem 1. QEDThere are several issues relating to Proposition 3 that are worth highlighting.
Firstly, the proposition does not assume that the benefit functions b and b̃ are increasing in x. It does, of course, require that they be related by conditional increasing differences; furthermore, this cannot be weakened to to SCP or I-dominance (seeMilgrom and Shannon (1994)). The assumption that c is increasing is crucial toits proof. Indeed, without this assumption, the conclusion that argmaxx∈X Π̃(x) ≥argmaxx∈X Π(x) is only possible by assuming that b̃ dominates b by increasing - rather
than conditional increasing - differences (see Athey et al. (1998)).
In this section, we introduced the interval dominance order and gave a quick
survey of its basic properties. This theory admits further development. In particular,
we shall examine in Section 4 how the property arises in decision problems under
uncertainty. There is also natural way in which the order may be defined in higher
dimensions, with useful implications for comparative statics in that context. Thisissue, and others, are studied in detail in a companion paper (see Quah and Strulovici
10

(2007)). The next section is devoted to applying the theoretical results obtained sofar; readers interested in a quick overview of the theory can skip the next section.
3. Applications of the IDO property
Example 2. A very natural application of Propositions 1 and 2 is to the comparative statics of optimal stopping time problems. We consider a simple deterministic
problem here; there is a natural extension to the stochastic optimal stopping time
problem which we examine in Quah and Strulovici (2007).
Rx
Suppose we are interested in maximizing Vδ (x) = 0 e−δt u(t)dt for x ≥ 0, whereδ > 0 and the function u : R+ → R is bounded on compact intervals and measurable.
So x may be interpreted as the stopping time, δ is the discount rate, u(t) the cash
flow or utility of cash flow at time t (which may be positive or negative), and Vδ (x)is the discounted sum of the cash flow (or its utility) when x is the stopping time.
We are interested in how the optimal stopping time changes with the discountrate. It seems natural that the optimal stopping time will rise as the discount rate
δ falls. This intuition is correct but it cannot be proved by the methods of concave
optimization since Vδ need not be a quasiconcave function. Indeed, it will have aturning point every time u changes sign and its local maxima occur when u changes
sign from positive to negative. Changing the discount rate does not change the times
at which local maxima are achieved, but it potentially changes the time at which
the global maximum is achieved, i.e., it changes the optimal stopping time. The next
result gives the solution to this problem.
Proposition 4: Suppose that δ > δ̄ > 0. Then the following holds:(i) Vδ̄ IN Vδ ;(ii) argmaxx≥0 Vδ̄ (x) ≥ argmaxx≥0 Vδ (x); and(iii) maxx≥0 Vδ̄ (x) ≥ maxx≥0 Vδ (x).
Proof: The functions Vδ̄ and Vδ are absolutely continuous and thus differentiable11

a.e.; moreover,Vδ̄0 (x) = e−δ̄x u(x) = e(δ−δ̄)x Vδ0 (x).
Note that the function α(x) = e(δ−δ̄)x is increasing and greater than 1. So part (i)follows from Proposition 2 and part (ii) from Theorem 1. For (iii), let us supposethat Vδ (x) is maximized at x = x∗ . Then for all x in [0, x∗ ], Vδ (x) ≤ Vδ (x∗ ). SinceVδ (0) = Vδ̄ (0) = 0, the fact that Vδ̄ IN Vδ now guarantees that Vδ̄ (x∗ ) ≥ Vδ (x∗ ).
Finally, note that maxx≥0 Vδ̄ (x) ≥ Vδ̄ (x∗).

QED

Example 3. Consider a firm that chooses output x to maximize profit, given by
Π(x) = xP (x) − C(x), where P is the inverse demand function and C is the costfunction. Imagine that there is a change in market conditions, so that the both P
and C are changed to P̃ and C̃ respectively. When can we say that argmaxx≥0 Π̃(x) ≥argmaxx≥0 Π(x)? By Theorem 1, this holds if Π̃ I-dominates Π. Intuitively, we will
expect this to hold if the increase in the inverse demand is greater than any increasein costs. This idea can be formalized in the following manner.
Assume that all the functions are differentiable, that P̃ and P take strictly positive
values, and that the cost functions are strictly increasing. Define a(x) = Π̃(x)/Π(x).
ThenΠ̃0 (x) = a0 (x)xP (x) + a(x)(xP (x))0 − C̃ 0 (x)
"
#
0
C̃
(x)
C 0 (x),≥ a(x)(xP (x))0 −C 0 (x)where the inequality follows since xP (x) > 0. Now suppose we make we assume thata(x) =P̃ (x)
C̃ 0 (x)
≥ 0 ,
P (x)
C (x)

(6)

then we obtain Π̃0 (x) ≥ a(x)Π0 (x). By Proposition 1, Π̃ I-dominates Π if a is increasingand (6) holds; in other words, the ratio of the inverse demand functions is increasing
in x and greater than the ratio of the marginal costs.6
6

Note that our argument does not require that P be decreasing in x.

12

Example 4. The perceptive reader will notice that Proposition 1 and Lemma 1
when presented in a somewhat different context are in fact very familiar since they
are closely related to standard results on stochastic dominance. For example, recall
that a density function γ defined on some interval [a, b] in R is said to first orderstochastically dominate another density function β defined on the same interval if
Rx
Rx
β(t)dt ≥ a γ(t)dt for all x in [a, b]. It is well known that this implies that for anyaincreasing and bounded utility function u defined on [a, b], we have
Z b
Z bu(t)γ(t)dt ≥u(t)β(t)dt ;
a

(7)

a

in other words, the expected utility of γ is greater than that of β.
One could think of this basic result as an application of the theory developed
here. If γ first order stochastically dominates β then f : [a, b] → R defined by f (x) =Rx(γ(t) − β(t)) dt has the following properties: f (a) = f (b) = 0 and f (x) ≤ 0 = f (b)afor all x in [a, b]. By Proposition 1, the function g defined by
Z xu(t) (γ(t) − β(t)) dt
g(x) =
aI-dominates f since g 0 (x) = u(x)f 0 (x). So g(b) ≥ g(a) = 0, which gives us (7).
4. The interval dominance order when the state is uncertain
Consider the following problem. Let {f (·, s)}s∈S be a family of functions parameterized by s in S, an interval of R, with each function f (·, s) mapping Y , an interval of
R, to R. Assume that all the functions are quasiconcave, with their peaks increasing
in s; by this we mean that argmaxx∈Y f (x, s00 ) ≥ argmaxx∈Y f (x, s0 ) whenever s00 > s0 .
(Note that since each function f (·, s) is quasiconcave, it either has a unique maximizeror they must form an interval.) We shall refer to such a family of functions as a QCIP
family, where QCIP stands for quasiconcave with increasing peaks. Interpreting s tobe the state of the world, an agent has to choose x under uncertainty, i.e., before13

s is realized. We assume the agent maximizes the expected value of his objective;
formally, he maximizesZ
F (x, λ) =f (x, s)λ(s)ds,s∈S

where λ : S → R is the density function defined over the states of the world. It
is natural to think that if the agent considers the higher states to be more likely,
then his optimal value of x will increase. Is this true? More generally, we can ask
the same question if the functions {f (·, s)}s∈S form an IDO family, i.e., a family of
regular functions f (·, s) : X → R, with X ⊆ R, such that f (·, s00 ) I-dominates f (·, s0 )whenever s00 > s0 .
One way of formalizing the notion that higher states are more likely is via themonotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property. Let λ and γ be two density functions
defined on the interval S of R and assume that λ(s) > 0 for s in S. We call γ an
MLR shift of λ if γ(s)/λ(s) is increasing in s. For density changes of this kind, there
are two results that come close, though not quite, to addressing the problem we posed.
Ormiston and Schlee (1993) identify some conditions under which an upward
MLR shift in the density function will raise the agent’s optimal choice. Amongst
other conditions, they assume that F (·; λ) is quasiconcave. This will hold if all thefunctions in the family {f (·, s)}s∈S are concave but will not generally hold if thefunctions are just quasiconcave. Athey (2002) has a related result which says that an
upward MLR shift will lead to a higher optimal choice of x provided {f (·, s)}s∈S isan SCP family. As we had already pointed out in Example 1, a QCIP family neednot be an SCP family.
The next result gives the solution to the problem we posed.
Theorem 2: Let S be an interval of R and {f (·, s)}s∈S be an IDO family. ThenF (·, γ) I F (·, λ) if γ is an MLR shift of λ. Consequently, argmaxx∈X F (x, γ) ≥argmaxx∈X F (x, λ).
Notice that since {f (·, s)}s∈S in Theorem 2 is assumed to be an IDO family, weknow (from Theorem 1) that argmaxx∈X f (x, s00 ) ≥ argmaxx∈X f (x, s0 ). Thus Theorem
14

2 guarantees that the comparative statics which holds when s is known also holds
when s is unknown but experiences an MLR shift.7
The proof of Theorem 2 requires a lemma (stated below). Its motivation arises
from the observation that if g SC f , then for any x00 > x0 such that g(x0 ) − g(x00 ) ≥(>) 0, we must also have f (x0 ) − f (x00 ) ≥ (>) 0. Lemma 2 is the (less trivial) analog
of this observation in the case when g I f .
Lemma 2: Let X be a subset of R and f and g two regular functions defined on
X. Then g I f if and only if the following property holds:(M)

if g(x0 ) ≥ g(x) for x in [x0 , x00 ] theng(x0 ) − g(x00 ) ≥ (>) 0 =⇒ f (x0 ) − f (x00 ) ≥ (>) 0.

Proof: Suppose x0 < x00 and g(x0 ) ≥ g(x) for x in [x0 , x00 ]. There are two possible
ways for property (M) to be violated. One possibility is that f (x00 ) > f (x0 ). By
regularity, we know that argmaxx∈[x0 ,x00 ] f (x) is nonempty; choosing x∗ in this set, wehave f (x∗ ) ≥ f (x) for all x in [x0 , x∗ ], with f (x∗ ) ≥ f (x00 ) > f (x0 ). Since g I f , wemust have g(x∗ ) > g(x0 ), which is a contradiction.
The other possible violation of (M) occurs if g(x0 ) > g(x00 ) but f (x0 ) = f (x00 ). By
regularity, we know that argmaxx∈[x0 ,x00 ] f (x) is nonempty, and if f is maximized at x∗
with f (x∗ ) > f (x0 ), then we are back to the case considered above. So assume thatx0 and x00 are both in argmaxx∈[x0 ,x00 ] f (x). Since f I g, we must have g(x00 ) ≥ g(x0 ),contradicting our initial assumption.
So we have shown that (M) holds if g I f . The proof that (M) implies g I f issimilar.

QED

Proof of Theorem 2: This consists of two parts. Firstly, we prove that if F (x00 , λ) ≥F (x, λ) for all x in [x0 , x00 ], then, for any s̃ in S,
Z s∗(f (x00 , s) − f (x0 , s)) λ(s)ds ≥ 0
s̃7

We are echoing an observation that was also made by Athey (2002) in a similar context.

15

(8)

(where s∗ denotes the supremum of S). Assume instead that there is s̄ such thatZ s∗(f (x00 , s) − f (x0 , s)) λ(s)ds < 0.

(9)

s̄

By the regularity of f (·, s̄), there is x̄ that maximizes f in [x0 , x00 ]. In particular,f (x̄, s̄) ≥ f (x, s̄) for all x in [x̄, x00 ]. Since {f (·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family of regularfunctions, we also have f (x̄, s) ≥ f (x00 , s) for all s ≤ s̄ (using Lemma 2). Thus
Z s̄(f (x̄, s) − f (x00 , s)) λ(s)ds ≥ 0,
(10)s∗

where s∗ is the infimum of S. Notice also that f (x̄, s̄) ≥ f (x, s̄) for all x in [x0 , x̄],
which implies that f (x̄, s) ≥ f (x0 , s) for all s ≥ s̄. Aggregating across s we obtainZ s∗(f (x̄, s) − f (x0 , s)) λ(s)ds ≥ 0.

(11)

s̄

It follows from (9) and (11) that
Z s∗

Z s∗

00

(f (x̄, s) − f (x , s)) λ(s)ds =s̄(f (x̄, s) − f (x0 , s)) λ(s)ds

s̄

Z s∗
+

(f (x0 , s) − f (x00 , s)) λ(s)ds

s̄

> 0.
Combining this with (10), we obtainZ s∗(f (x̄, s) − f (x00 , s)) λ(s)ds > 0 ;s∗in other words, F (x̄, λ) > F (x00 , λ) which is a contradiction.
Given (8), the function H(·, λ) : [s∗ , s∗ ] → R defined by
Z s̃H(s̃, λ) =(f (x00 , s) − f (x0 , s)) γ(s)dss∗satisfies H(s∗ , λ) ≥ H(s̃, λ) for all s̃ in [s∗ , s∗ ]. Defining H(·, γ) in an analogous fashion, we also have H 0 (s̃, γ) = [γ(s)/λ(s)]H 0 (s̃, λ) for s̃ in S. Since γ is an upward MLR
shift of λ, the ratio γ(s)/λ(s) is increasing in s. By Proposition 1, H(·, γ) I H(·, λ).
16

In particular, we have H(s∗ , γ) ≥ (>)H(s∗ , γ) = 0 if H(s∗ , λ) ≥ (>)H(s∗ , λ) = 0.
Re-writing this, we have F (x00 , γ) ≥ (>)F (x0 , γ) if F (x00 , λ) ≥ (>)F (x0 , λ).

QEDNote that Theorem 2 remains true if S is not an interval; in Appendix A, we prove
Theorem 2 in the case where S is a finite set of states.
We turn now to two applications of Theorem 2.
Example 1 continued. Recall that in state s, the firm’s profit is Π(x, s). It achieves
its maximum at x∗ (s) = s, with Π(s, s) = (1 − c(s) − D)s, which is strictly positive by assumption. The firm has to choose its capacity before the state of theworld is realized; we assume that s is drawn from S, an interval in R, and has
a distribution given by the density function λ : S → R. We can think of theRfirm as maximizing its expected profit, which is S Π(x, s)λ(s)ds, or more generally,
let us assume that it maximizes the expected utility from profit, i.e., it maximizesR
F (x, λ) = S u(Π(x, s), s)λ(s)ds, where, for each s, the function u(·, s) : R → R isstrictly increasing. The family {u(Π(·, s), s)}s∈S consists of quasiconcave functions,the peaks of which are increasing in s. By Theorem 2, we know that an upward MLR
shift of the density function will lead the firm to choose a greater capacity.
Example 5. Consider a firm that has to decide on when to launch a new product.
The more time the firm gives itself, the more it can improve the quality of the productand its manufacturing process, but it also knows that there is a rival about to launcha similar product. In formal terms, we assume that the firm’s profit (if it is not
anticipated by its rival) is an increasing function of time π̄ : R+ → R+ . If therival launches its product at time s, then the firm’s profit falls to w(s) (in R). In
other words, the firm’s profit in state s is π(t, s) = π̄(t) for t ≤ s and w(s) fort > s, where w(s) < π̄(s). Clearly, each π(·, s) is a quasiconcave function and{π(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family. The firm decides on the launch date t by maximizingR
F (t, λ) = s∈S π(t, s)λ(s)ds, where λ : R+ → R is the density function over s. By
Theorem 2, if the firm thinks that it is less likely that the rival will launch early,
in the sense that there is an upward MLR shift in the density function, then it will
17

decide on a later launch date.
Note that we impose no restrictions on the function w : R+ → R, which gives
the firm’s profit should it be anticipated by its rival at time s. If w is an increasing
function of s, then one can check that {π(·, s)}s∈S is an SCP-ordered family, but
Theorem 2 gives us the desired conclusion without making this stronger assumption.
5. Comparing Information Structures8
Consider an agent who, as in the previous section, has to make a decision before
the state of the world (s) is realized, where the set of possible states S is a subset of
R. In this section we assume that the decision x is picked from a finite set X in R.
Suppose that, before he makes his decision, the agent observes a signal z. This signal
is potentially informative of the true state of the world; we refer to the collection{H(·|s)}s∈S , where H(·|s) is the distribution of the signal z conditional on s, as theinformation structure of the decision maker’s problem. (Whenever convenient, weshall simply call this information structure H.) We assume that, for every s, H(·|s)
admits a density function and has the compact interval Z as its support. We say that
H is MLR-ordered if H(·|s00 ) is an MLR shift of H(·|s0 ) whenever s00 > s0 .
We assume that the agent has a prior distribution λ on S. We allow either of thefollowing: (i) S is a compact interval and λ admits a density function with S as its
support or (ii) S is finite and λ has S as its support.
The agent’s decision rule (under H) is a map from Z to X. We denote his
posterior distribution (on S) upon observing z by λzH ; so the agent with a decision
rule φ : Z → X will have an ex ante utility given by

Z
Z
Z
z
U(φ, H, λ) =u(φ(z), s)dλH dMH,λ =
z∈Z

s∈S

u(φ(z), s) dJH,λZ×S

where MH,λ is the marginal distribution of z and JH,λ the joint distribution of (z, s)
given H and λ. A decision rule φ̂ : Z → X that maximizes the agent’s (posterior)
8

We are very grateful to Ian Jewitt for introducing us to the literature in this section and thenext and for extensive discussions.

18

expected utility at each realized signal is called an H-optimal decision rule. We denotethe agent’s ex ante utility using such a rule by V(H, λ, u).
Consider now an alternative information structure given by the collection {G(·|s)}s∈S ;we assume that G(·|s) admits a density function and has the compact interval Z as
its support. What conditions will guarantee that the information structure H is morefavorable than G in the sense of offering the agent a higher ex ante utility; in otherwords, how can we guarantee that V(H, λ, u) ≥ V(G, λ, u)?
It is well known that this holds if H is more informative than G according to thecriterion developed by Blackwell (1953); furthermore, this criterion is also necessary if
one does not impose significant restrictions on u (see Blackwell (1953) or, for a recent
textbook treatment, Gollier (2001)). We wish instead to consider the case where asignificant restriction is imposed on u; specifically, we assume that {u(·, s)}s∈S is an
IDO family. We show that, in this context, a different notion of informativeness due
to Lehmann (1988) is the appropriate concept.9
Our assumptions on H guarantee that, for any s, H(·|s) admits a density function
with support Z; therefore, for any (z, s) in Z × S, there exists a unique element in
Z, which we denote by T (z, s), such that H(T (z, s)|s) = G(z|s). We say that H is
more accurate than G if T is an increasing function of s.10 Our goal in this section isto prove the following result.
Theorem 3: Suppose {u(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family, G is MLR-ordered, and λ isthe agent’s prior distribution on S. If H is more accurate than G, we obtain
V(H, λ, u) ≥ V(G, λ, u).
9(12)

For a discussion of the advantages of Lehmann’s concept over Blackwell’s, see Lehmann (1988)

and Persico (2000). Some papers with economic applications of Lehmann’s concept of informativeness are Persico (2000), Athey and Levin (2001), Levin (2001), Bergemann and Valimaki (2002),
and Jewitt (2006). Athey and Levin’s paper also explores other related concepts of informativenessand their relationship with the payoff functions.
10
The concept is Lehmann’s; the term accuracy follows Persico (2000).

19

This theorem generalizes a number of earlier results. Lehmann (1988) establishesa special case of Theorem 3 in which {u(·, s)}s∈S is a QCIP family. Persico (1996)
has a version of Theorem 3 in which {u(·, s)}s∈S is an SCP family, but he requires the
optimal decision rule to vary smoothly with the signal, a property that is not generally
true without the sufficiency of the first order conditions for optimality. A proof of
Theorem 3 for the general SCP case can be found in Jewitt’s (2006) unpublishednotes.11
To prove Theorem 3, we first note that if G is MLR-ordered, then the family00of posterior distributions {λzH }z∈Z is also MLR-ordered, i.e., if z 00 > z 0 then λzH is0

an MLR shift of λzH .12 Since {u(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family, Theorem 3 guarantees
that the G-optimal decision rule can be chosen to be increasing with z. Therefore,
Theorem 3 is valid if we can show that for any increasing decision rule ψ : Z → X
under G there is a rule φ : Z → X under H that gives a higher ex ante utility, i.e.,ZZu(ψ(z), s)dJG,λ .
u(φ(z), s)dJH,λ ≥
Z×S

Z×S

This inequality in turn follows from aggregating (across s) the inequality (13) below.
Proposition 5: Suppose {u(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family and H is more accurate
than G. Then for any increasing decision rule ψ : Z → X under G, there is anincreasing decision rule φ : Z → X under H such that, at each state s, the distribution
of utility induced by ψ and H(·|s) first order stochastically dominates the distribution
of utility induced by φ and G(·|s). Consequently, at each state s,ZZu(φ(z), s)dH(z|s) ≥u(ψ(z), s)dG(z|s).
z∈Z
11

(13)

z∈Z

However, there is at least one sense in which it is not correct to say that Theorem 3 generalizes

Lehmann’s result. The criterion employed by us here (and indeed by Persico (1996) and Jewitt(2006) as well) - comparing information structures with the ex ante utility - is different from thecriterion Lehmann used. We return to this issue in the next section (specifically, Corollary 1), where
we compare information structures using precisely the same criterion as Lehmann’s.
12This is not hard to prove; indeed, the two properties are equivalent.

20(At a given state s, a decision rule ρ and a distribution on z induces a distribution
of utility in the following sense: for any measurable set U of R, the probability of{u ∈ U } equals the probability of {z ∈ Z : u(ρ(z), s) ∈ U }. So it is meaningful torefer, as this proposition does, to the distribution of utility at each s.)
Our proof of Proposition 5 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Suppose {u(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family and H is more accurate thanG. Then for any increasing decision rule ψ : Z → X under G, there is an increasing
decision rule φ : Z → X under H such that, for all (z, s),u(φ(T (z, s)), s) ≥ u(ψ(z), s).

(14)

Proof: We shall only demonstrate here the way in which we construct φ from
ψ; the fact that it is an increasing rule is proved in Appendix B. We shall confine
ourselves here to the case where S is a compact interval; the proof can be modified
in an obvious way to deal with the case where S is finite.
For every t̄ in Z and s in S, there ia a unique z̄ in Z such that t̄ = T (z̄, s). This
follows from the fact that G(·|s) is a strictly increasing continuous function (since it
admits a density function with support Z). We write z̄ = τ (t̄, s); note that because
T is increasing in both its arguments, the function τ : Z × S → Z is decreasing in s.
Note also that (14) is equivalent tou(φ(t), s) ≥ u(ψ(τ (t, s)), s).

(15)

We will now show φ(t) may be chosen to satisfy (15). We may partition S = [s∗ , s∗∗ ]into the sets S1 , S2 ,..., SM , where M is odd, with the following properties: (i) if
m > n, then any element in Sm is greater than any element in Sn ; (ii) whenever m isodd, Sm is a singleton, with S1 = {s∗ } and SM = {s∗∗ }; (iii) when m is even, Sm is
an open interval; (iv) for any s0 and s00 in Sm , we have ψ(τ (t, s0 )) = ψ(τ (t, s00 )); and(v) for s00 in Sm and s0 in Sn such that m > n, ψ(τ (t, s0 )) ≥ ψ(τ (t, s00 )).
21

In other words, we have partitioned S into finitely many sets, so that within eachset, the same action is taken under ψ and the actions are decreasing. This is possible
because X is finite, ψ is increasing in the signal and τ is decreasing in s. We denotethe action taken in Sm by ψm , with ψ1 ≥ ψ2 ≥ ψ3 ≥ ... ≥ ψM . Establishing (15)involves finding φ(t) such thatu(φ(t), sm ) ≥ u(ψm , sm ) for any sm ∈ Sm ; m = 1, 2, ..., M .

(16)

In the interval [ψ2 , ψ1 ], we pick the largest action φ̂2 that maximizes u(·, s∗ ) inthat interval. By the IDO property,u(φ̂2 , sm ) ≥ u(ψm , sm ) for any sm ∈ Sm ; m = 1, 2.

(17)

Recall that S3 is a singleton; we call that element s3 . The action φ̂4 is chosen to be
the largest action in the interval [ψ4 , φ̂2 ] that maximizes u(·, s3 ). Since ψ3 is in thatinterval, we have u(φ̂4 , s3 ) ≥ u(ψ3 , s3 ). Since u(φ̂4 , s3 ) ≥ u(ψ4 , s3 ), the IDO property
guarantees that u(φ̂4 , s4 ) ≥ u(ψ4 , s4 ) for any s4 in S4 . Using the IDO property again(specifically, Lemma 2), we have u(φ̂4 , sm ) ≥ u(φ̂2 , sm ) for sm in Sm (m = 1, 2) sinceu(φ̂4 , s3 ) ≥ u(φ̂2 , s3 ). Combining this with (17), we have found φ̂4 in [ψ4 , φ̂2 ] suchthatu(φ̂4 , sm ) ≥ u(ψm , sm ) for any sm ∈ Sm ; m = 1, 2, 3, 4.

(18)

We can repeat the procedure finitely many times, at each stage choosing φ̂m+1 (for modd) as the largest element maximizing u(·, sm ) in the interval [ψm+1 , φ̂m−1 ], andfinally, choosing φ̂M +1 as the largest element maximizing u(·, s∗∗ ) in the interval[ψM , φ̂M −1 ]. It is clear that φ(t) = φ̂M will satisfy (16).

QED

Proof of Proposition 5: Let z̃ denote the random signal received under information
structure G and let ũG denote the (random) utility achieved when the decision rule ψis used. Correspondingly, we denote the random signal received under H by t̃, withũH denoting the utility achieved by the rule φ, as constructed in Lemma 3. Observe22that for any fixed utility level u0 and at a given state s0 ,Pr[ũH ≤ u0 |s = s0 ] = Pr[u(φ(t̃), s0 ) ≤ u0 |s = s0 ]= Pr[u(φ(T (z̃, s0 )), s0 ) ≤ u0 |s = s0 ]≤ Pr[u(ψ(z̃), s0 ) ≤ u0 |s = s0 ]= Pr[ũG ≤ u0 |s = s0 ]where the second equality comes from the fact that, conditional on s = s0 , the distribution of t̃ coincides with that of T (z̃, s0 ), and the inequality comes from the factthat u(φ(T (z, s0 )), s0 ) ≥ u(ψ(z), s0 ) for all z (by Lemma 3).
Finally, the fact that, given the state, the conditional distribution of ũH firstorder stochastically dominates ũG means that the conditional mean of ũH must also
be higher than that of ũG .

QEDAs a simple application of Theorem 3, consider again Example 1, where a firm has
to decide on its production capacity before the state of the world is realized. Supposethat before it makes its decision, the firm receives a signal z from the information
structure G. Provided G is MLR-ordered, we know that the posterior distributions(on S) will also be MLR-ordered (in z). It follows from Theorem 2 that a higher
signal will cause the firm to decide on a higher capacity. Assuming the firm is risk
neutral, its ex ante expected profit is V(λ, G, Π), where λ is the firm’s prior on S.
Theorem 3 tells us that a more accurate information structure H will lead to a higher
ex ante expected profit; the difference V(λ, , H, Π) − V(λ, , G, Π) represents what thefirm is willing to spend for the more accurate information structure.
Our next example is a less straightforward application of Proposition 5.
Example 6. There are N investors, with investor i having wealth wi > 0 and thestrictly increasing Bernoulli utility function vi . These investors place their wealthwith a manager who has to decide on an investment policy; specifically, the mangerPmust allocate the total pool of funds W = N
i=1 wi between a risky asset, with returns in state s, and a safe asset with return r > 0. Denoting the fraction invested
23

in the risky asset by x, investor i’s utility (as a function of x and s) is given byui (x, s) = vi ((xs + (1 − x)r)wi ). It is easy to see that {ui (·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family.
Indeed, we can say more: for s > r, ui (·, s) is strictly increasing in x; for s = r, ui (·, r)
is the constant vi (rwi ); and for s < r, ui (·.s) is strictly decreasing in x.
Before she makes her portfolio decision, the manager receives a signal z from some
information structure G. She employs the decision rule ψ, where ψ(z) (in [0, 1]) is thefraction of W invested in the risky asset. We assume that ψ is increasing in the signal.
(We shall justify this assumption in the next section.) Suppose that the manager
now has access to a superior information structure H. By Proposition 5, there isan increasing decision rule φ under H such that, at any state s, the distribution of
investor k’s utility under H and φ first order stochastically dominates the distributionof k’s utility under G and ψ. In particular, (13) holds for u = uk . Aggregating acrossstates we obtain Uk (φ, H, λk ) ≥ Uk (ψ, G, λk ), where λk is investor k’s (subjective)prior; in other words, k’s ex ante utility is higher with the new information structure
and the new decision rule.
But even more can be said because, for any other investor i, ui (·, s) is a strictlyincreasing transformation of uk (·, s), i.e., there is a strictly increasing function f suchthat ui = f ◦uk . It follows from Proposition 5 that (13) is true, not just for u = uk but
for u = ui . Aggregating across states, we obtain Ui (φ, H, λi ) ≥ Ui (ψ, G, λi ), where λi
is investor i’s prior.
To summarize, we have shown the following: though different investors may havedifferent attitudes towards risk aversion and different priors, the greater accuracy of
H compared to G allows the manager to implement a new decision rule that gives
greater ex ante utility to every investor.

Finally, we turn to the following question: how important is the accuracy criterion
to the results in this section? For example, we may wonder if the conclusion in
Theorem 3 is, in a sense, too strong. Theorem 3 tells us that when H is more24

accurate than G, it gives the agent a higher ex ante utility for any prior that he may
have on S. This raises the possibility that the accuracy criterion may be weakened if
we only wish H to give a higher ex ante utility than G for a particular prior. However,this is not the case, as the next result shows.
Proposition 6: Let S be finite, and H and G two information structures on S.
If (12) holds at a given prior λ∗ which has S as its support and for any SCP family{u(·, s)}s∈S , then (12) holds at any prior λ which has S as its support and for any
SCP family.
Proof: Given a prior λ with S as its support, and given the SCP family {u(·, s)}s∈S ,we define the family {ũ(·, s)}s∈S by ũ(x, s) = [λ(s)/λ∗ (s)]u(x, s). The ex ante utilityof the decision rule φ under H, when the agent’s utility is ũ, may be written as
ZX∗∗
Ũ(φ, H, λ ) =λ (s) ũ(φ(z), s)dH(z|s).
s∈S

Clearly,U(φ, H, λ) ≡

X

Z
λ(s)

u(φ(z), s)dH(z|s) = Ũ(φ, H, λ∗ ).

s∈SFrom this, we conclude that
V(H, λ, u) = V(H, λ∗ , ũ).

(19)

Crucially, the fact that {u(·, s)}s∈S is an SCP family, guarantees that {ũ(·, s)}s∈S is
also an SCP family. By assumption, V(H, λ∗ , ũ) ≥ V(G, λ∗ , ũ). Applying (19) to bothsides of this inequality, we obtain V(H, λ, u) ≥ V(G, λ, u).

QED

Loosely speaking, this result says that if we wish to have ex ante utility comparability for any SCP family (or, even more strongly, any IDO family), then fixing theprior does not lead to a weaker criterion of informativeness. A weaker criterion can
only be obtained if we fix the prior and require ex ante utility comparability for asmaller class of utility families.13
13This possibility is explored in Athey and Levin (2001).

25

To construct a converse to Theorem 3, we assume that there are two states andtwo actions and that the actions are non-ordered with respect to u in the sense that x1
is the better action in state s1 and x2 the better action in s2 , i.e., u(x1 , s1 ) > u(x2 , s1 )and u(x1 , s2 ) < u(x2 , s2 ). This condition guarantees that information on the stateis potentially useful; if it does not hold, the decision problem is clearly trivial sinceeither x1 or x2 will be unambiguously superior to the other action. Note also thatthe family {u(·, s1 ), u(·, s2 )} is an IDO family. We have the following result.
Proposition 7: Suppose that S = {s1 , s2 }, X = {x1 , x2 }, and that the actions
are non-ordered with respect to u. If H is MLR-ordered and not more accurate thanG, then there is a prior λ̄ on S such that V(H, λ̄, u) < V(G, λ̄, u).
Proof: Since H is not more accurate than G, there is z̄ and t̄ such thatG(z̄|s1 ) = H(t̄|s1 ) and G(z̄|s2 ) < H(t̄|s2 ).

(20)

Given any prior λ, and with the information structure H, we may work out theposterior distribution and the posterior expected utility of any action after receipt ofa signal.
We claim that there is a prior λ̄ such that, action x1 maximizes the agent’s posterior expected utility after he receives the signal z < t̄ (under H), and action x2
maximizes the agent’s posterior expected utility after he receives the signal z ≥ t̄.
This result follows from the assumption that H is MLR-ordered and is proved inAppendix B.
Therefore, the decision rule φ such that φ(z) = x1 for z < t̄ and φ(z) = x2 forz ≥ t̄ maximizes the agent’s ex ante utility, i.e.
V(H, λ̄, u) = U(φ, H, λ̄)= λ̄(s1 ) { u(x1 |s1 )H(t̄|s1 ) + u(x2 |s1 )[1 − H(t̄|s1 )] }+ λ̄(s2 ) { u(x1 |s2 )H(t̄|s2 ) + u(x2 |s2 )[1 − H(t̄|s2 )] } .
Now consider the decision rule ψ under G given by ψ(z) = x1 for z < z̄ and26

ψ(z) = x2 for z ≥ z̄. We haveU(ψ, G, λ̄) = λ̄(s1 ) { u(x1 |s1 )G(z̄|s1 ) + u(x2 |s1 )[1 − G(z̄|s1 )] }+ λ̄(s2 ) { u(x1 |s2 )G(z̄|s2 ) + u(x2 |s2 )[1 − G(z̄|s2 )] } .
Comparing the expressions for U(ψ, G, λ̄) and U(φ, H, λ̄), bearing in mind (20), andthe fact that x2 is the optimal action in state s2 , we see thatU(ψ, G, λ̄) > U(φ, H, λ̄) = V(H, λ̄, u).
Therefore, V(G, λ̄, u) > V(H, λ̄, u).

QED

6. Statistical Decision Theory
Much of what is known and used in economics on comparative information havetheir origins in statistical decision theory, so it is appropriate for us to re-present andfurther develop the results of the last section in that context.14 The main result inthis section is a complete class theorem, which says that, in a certain sense and undercertain conditions (which we will make precise), the statistician need only employ
increasing decision rules.
We assume that the statistician conducts an experiment in which she observes therealization of a random variable (i.e., the outcome of the experiment) that takes values
in a compact interval Z in R. The distribution of this random variable depends on
the state s; we denote this distribution by H(·|s) and assume that it admits a density
function and has Z as its support. The state s is chosen by Nature from a set S, also
contained in R. As in the previous section, S may either be a compact interval or afinite set of points. Unlike the last section, we now adopt the perspective of a classicalrather than Bayesian statistician, so we do not assume at the outset the existence ofa (prior) probability distribution on S.
14

For an introduction to statistical decision theory, see Blackwell and Girshik (1954) or Berger(1985).

27

Upon observing the experiment’s outcome, the statistician takes a decision froma finite set X contained in R; formally, a decision function (or rule) is a measurable
map φ from Z to X. Associated to each action and state is a loss; the loss function
L maps X × S to R. Let D be the set of all decision functions. This experiment,
which we shall call H, has the risk function RH : D × S → R, given byZ
L(φ(z), s)dH(z|s).
RH (φ, s) =z∈ZFor a classical statistician, the risk function RH is the central concept with which
decisions and experiments are compared. Note that our assumptions guarantee that
this function is well defined.
Comparison of Experiments
Suppose now that the statistician may conduct another experiment G that also
has outcomes in Z. At each state s, the distribution G(·|s) admits a density function
and has Z as its support. We denote G’s risk function by RG . Our first result of thissection is a re-statement of Proposition 5 in the context of statistical decisions.
Proposition 8: Suppose {−L(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family and H is more accurate
than G. Then for any increasing decision rule ψ : Z → X under G, there is anincreasing decision rule φ : Z → X under H such that
RH (φ, s) ≤ RG (ψ, s) at each s ∈ S.

(21)

This proposition considers the case when {−L(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family. It saysthat for any increasing decision rule employed in experiment G, there is a decision
rule under H which gives lower risk at every possible state. For this result to beinteresting, we must explain why allowing the statistician to employ other decisionrules under G (besides increasing rules) is of no use to her. If we can show this, thenexperiment G is indeed superior to H (as measured by risk).
28

We have already implicitly given (in the previous section) the justification for thefocus on increasing decision rules in the case of a Bayesian statistician. The Bayesian
will have a prior on S, given by the probability distribution λ, and is interested indecision rules ψ that minimize the expected or Bayes risk, which is
Z

Z
Z
z
RG (ψ, s)dλ =L(ψ(z), s)dλG dMG,λ
s∈S

z∈Z

s∈S

where λzG is the posterior distribution of s given z and MH,λ is the marginal distribution of z. Since {G(·|z)}z∈Z - and thus {λzG }z∈Z - is MLR-ordered (in z) and{−L(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family, ψ can indeed be chosen to be increasing.15 Thus,
when presented with the alternative experiments H and G obeying the conditionsof Proposition 6, the Bayesian statistician will certainly prefer H since it follows
immediately from (21) that H gives a lower Bayes risk.
For the classical statistician who chooses not to use Bayes risk as her criterion, adifferent justification must be given for the focus on increasing decision rules.
The completeness of increasing decision rules
We confine our attention to experiment G. The decision rule ψ is said to be atleast as good as another decision ψ̃, if RG (ψ, s) ≤ RG (ψ̃, s) for all s in S. A subset D0of decision rules forms an essentially complete class if for any decision rule ψ̃, there
is a rule ψ in D0 that is at least as good as ψ̃. The following is the main result of thissection.
Theorem 4: Suppose {−L(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family and G is MLR-ordered.
Then the increasing decision rules form an essentially complete class.
Theorem 4 is an example of a complete class theorem; it generalizes the complete
class theorem of Karlin and Rubin (1956), which in turn generalizes Blackwell andGirshik (1954, Theorem 7.4.3). Karlin and Rubin (1956) establishes the essential
15

This claim follows from Theorem 2. Note that our argument here is completely analogous tothe one we used to establish Theorem 3.

29completeness of increasing decision rules under the assumption that {L(·, s)}s∈S is afamily of quasiconvex functions, with argminx∈X L(x, s) increasing with s. Clearly,
this is a special case of our assumption that {−L(·, s)}s∈S forms an IDO family.16
For the classical statistician, Theorem 4 provides the justification for the restriction to increasing decision rules in Proposition 8. Combining these two results tells usthat when an experiment H is more accurate than G, then H is capable of achieving
lower risks at all states. So we have discovered something about the classical statistician that we already know about her Bayesian counterpart: she too regards H as
superior to G.
Corollary 1: Suppose {−L(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family, H is more accurate thanG, and G is MLR-ordered. Then for any decision rule ψ : Z → X under G, there isan increasing decision rule φ : Z → X under H such that
RH (φ, s) ≤ RG (ψ, s) at each s ∈ S.

(22)

Proof: If ψ is not increasing, then by Theorem 4, there is an increasing rule ψ̄that is at least as good as ψ. Proposition 8 in turn guarantees that there is a decision
rule under H that is at least as good as ψ̄.

QEDCorollary 1 is a generalization of Lehmann (1988) which establishes a version ofthis result in the case where {−L(·, s)}s∈S is a QCIP family. Note that Corollary 1
is the classical analog to the Bayesian Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 4: The idea of the proof is to show that the statistician who
uses a strategy that is not increasing is in some sense debasing the information madeavailable to her by G.
Having assumed that Z is a compact interval, we can assume, without further
loss of generality, that Z = [0, 1]. Suppose that ψ is a decision rule (not necessarily
16

It is worth pointing out that Theorem 4 is not known even for the case where {−L(·, s)}s∈S

forms an SCP family.

30

increasing) under G where the actions taken are exactly x1 , x2 ,...xn (arranged inincreasing order). We construct a new experiment Ḡ along the following lines. For
each s, Ḡ(0|s) = 0 and Ḡ(k/n|s) = PrG [ψ(z) ≤ xk |s] for k = 1, 2, ..., n, where theright side of the second equation refers to the probability of {z ∈ Z : ψ(z) ≤ xk }under the distribution G(·|s). We define tk (s) as the unique element in Z that obeys
G(tk (s)|s) = Ḡ(k/n|s). (Note that t0 (s) = 0 for all s.) Any z in ( (k − 1)/n, k/n )may be written as z = θ [(k − 1)/n] + (1 − θ) [k/n] for some θ in (0, 1); we defineḠ(z|s) = G(θtk−1 (s) + (1 − θ)tk (s)|s).

(23)

This completely specifies the experiment Ḡ.
Define a new decision rule ψ̄ by ψ̄(z) = x1 for z in [0, 1/n]; for k ≥ 2, we haveψ̄(z) = xk for z in ( (k − 1)/n, k/n ]. This is an increasing decision rule under Ḡ. It
is also clear from our construction of Ḡ and ψ̄ that, at each state s, the distribution
of utility induced by Ḡ and ψ̄ equals the distribution of utility induced by G and ψ.
We claim that G is more accurate than Ḡ. Provided this is true, Proposition 5says that there is an increasing decision rule φ under G that is at least as good asψ̄ under Ḡ, i.e., at each s, the distribution of utility induced by G and φ first orderstochastically dominates that induced by Ḡ and ψ̄. Since the latter coincides withthe distribution of utility induced by G and ψ, the proof is complete.
That G is more accurate than Ḡ follows from the assumption that G is MLRordered. We prove this in Appendix B.

QED

It is clear from our proof of Theorem 4 that we can in fact give a sharper statementof that result; we do so below.
Theorem 4? : Suppose {−L(·, s)}s∈S is an IDO family and G is MLR-ordered.
Then for any decision rule ψ : Z → X, there is increasing decision rule φ : Z →X such that, at each s, the distribution of utility induced by G and φ first orderstochastically dominates the distribution of utility induced by G and ψ.
Example 6 continued. Recall that we assumed in this application that the man31

ager’s decision rule under G, which is ψ, is increasing in the signal. Provided G is
MLR-ordered, Theorem 4? provides a justification for this rule.
Let ψ̃ be a (not necessarily increasing) decision rule. Theorem 4? tells us that forsome investor k, there is an increasing decision rule ψ : Z → X such that, at eachs, the distribution of uk induced by G and ψ first order stochastically dominates the
distribution of uk induced by G and ψ̃. This implies thatZZ
uk (φ(z), s)dG(z|s) ≥uk (ψ̃(z), s)dG(z|s).
z∈Z

(24)

z∈Z

Aggregating this inequality across states, we obtain Uk (ψ, G, λk ) ≥ Uk (ψ̃, G, λk ), i.e.,
the increasing rule gives investor k a higher ex ante utility.
However, we can say more because, for any other investor i, ui (·, s) is just an
increasing transformation of uk (·, s), i.e., there is a strictly increasing function f suchthat ui = f ◦ uk . Appealing to Theorem 4? again, we see that (24) is true if uk isreplaced with ui . Aggregating this inequality across states gives us Ui (ψ, G, λi ) ≥Ui (ψ̃, G, λi ). In short, we have shown the following: any decision rule admits anincreasing decision rule that (weakly) raises the ex ante utility of every investor. Thisjustifies our assumption that the manager uses an increasing decision rule.
Appendix A
Our objective in this section is to prove Theorem 2 in the case where S is a finite
set. Suppose that S = {s1 , s2 , ..., sN } and the agent’s objective function is
F (x, λ) =NX

f (x, si )λ(si )i=1where λ(si ) is the probability of state si . We assume that λ(si ) > 0 for all si . Let
γ be another distribution with support S. We say that γ is an MLR-shift of λ if
γ(si )/λ(si ) is increasing in i.
Proof of Theorem 2 for the case of finite S: Suppose F (x00 , λ) ≥ F (x, λ) for xP
in [x0 , x00 ]. We denote (f (x00 , si ) − f (x0 , si ))λ(si ) by ai and define Ak = N
i=k ai . By
32

assumption, A1 = F (x00 , λ) − F (x0 , λ) ≥ 0; we claim that Ak ≥ 0 for any k (this claim
is analogous to (8) in the proof of Theorem 2).
Suppose instead that there is M ≥ 2 such that
AM =

N
X

(f (x00 , si ) − f (x0 , si )) λ(si ) < 0.

i=M

As in the proof of Theorem 2 in the main part of the paper, we choose x̄ thatmaximizes f (·, sM ) in [x0 , x00 ]. By the IDO property and Lemma 2, we havef (x̄, si ) − f (x00 , si ) ≥ 0 for i ≤ M and(25)

f (x̄, si ) − f (x0 , si ) ≥ 0 for i ≥ M .

(26)(These inequalities (25) and (26) are analogous to (10) and (11) respectively.) Following the argument used in Theorem 2, these inequalities lead to
A1 =

N
X

(f (x00 , si ) − f (x0 , si ))λ(si ) < 0,

(27)

i=1

which is a contradiction. Therefore AM ≥ 0.
Denoting γ(si )/λ(si ) by bi , we haveF (x00 , γ) − F (x0 , γ) =NXai b i .

i=1

It is not hard to check that17
A1 b 1 +N
X

Ai (bi − bi−1 ) =NXai b i .

Since γ is an MLR shift of λ, bi − bi−1 ≥ 0 for all i and soPThus (28) guarantees that N
1=1 ai bi ≥ A1 b1 ; in other words,
F (x00 , γ) − F (x0 , γ) ≥

(28)

1=1

i=2

PN

i=2 Ai (bi − bi−1 ) ≥ 0.

γ(s1 )[F (x00 , λ) − F (x0 , λ)] .
λ(s1 )(29)

It follows that the left hand side is nonnegative (positive) if the right side is nonnegative (positive), as required by the IDO property.
17This is just a discrete version of integration by parts.

33

QED

Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 3 continued: It remains for us to show that φ is an increasing rule.
We wish to compare φ(t0 ) against φ(t) where t0 > t. Note that the construction of φ(t)first involves partitioning S into subsets S1 , S2 , ...SM obeying properties (i) to (v). In
particular, (v) says that the actions (under ψ) associated to any two points in a set Sm
are the same; we denoted that action by ψm . To obtain φ(t0 ), we first partition S into
disjoints sets S10 , S20 ,..., SL0 , where L is odd, with the partition satisfying properties(i) to (v). We denote the action associated to Sk0 by ψk0 . Any s in S belongs to someSm and some Sk0 . The important thing to note is that
ψk0 ≥ ψm .

(30)

This follows immediately from that fact that t0 > t and ψ is increasing.
The construction of φ(t0 ) involves the construction of φ̂02 , φ̂04 , etc. The action φ̂02
is the largest action maximizing u(·, s∗ ) in the interval [ψ20 , ψ10 ]. Comparing this with
φ̂2 , which is the largest action maximizing u(·, s∗ ) in the interval [ψ2 , ψ1 ], we knowthat φ̂02 ≥ φ̂2 since (following from (30)) ψ20 ≥ ψ2 and ψ10 ≥ ψ1 .
By definition, φ̂04 is the largest action maximizing u(·, s03 ) in [ψ40 , φ̂02 ], where s03 refers
to the unique element in S30 . Let m̄ be the largest odd number such that sm̄ ≤ s03 .
(Recall that sm̄ is the unique element in Sm̄ .) By definition, φ̂m̄+1 is the largest element
maximizing u(·, sm̄ ) in [ψm̄+1 , φ̂m̄−1 ]. We claim that φ̂04 ≥ φ̂m̄+1 . This is an applicationof Theorem 1. If follows from the following: (i) s03 ≥ sm̄ , so u(·, s03 ) I u(·, sm̄ ); (ii)the manner in which m̄ is defined, along with (30), guarantees that ψ40 ≥ ψm̄+1 ; and(iii) we know (from the previous paragraph) that φ̂02 ≥ φ̂2 ≥ φ̂m̄−1 .
So we obtain φ̂04 ≥ φ̂m̄+1 ≥ φ(t). Repeating the argument finitely many times (onφ̂06 and so on), we obtain φ(t0 ) ≥ φ(t).

QED

Proof of Proposition 6 continued: It remains for us to show how λ̄ is constructed.
We denote the density function of H(·|s) by h(·|s). It is clear that since the actions

34

are non-ordered, we may choose λ̄(s1 ) and λ̄(s2 ) such thatλ̄(s1 )h(t̄|s1 ) [u(x1 , s1 ) − u(x2 , s1 )] = λ̄(s2 )h(t̄|s2 ) [u(x2 |s2 ) − u(x1 , s2 )].

(31)

Re-arranging this equation, we obtainλ̄(s1 )h(t̄|s1 )u(x1 |s1 )+λ̄(s2 )h(t̄|s2 )u(x1 |s2 ) = λ̄(s1 )h(t̄|s1 )u(x2 |s1 )+λ̄(s2 )h(t̄|s2 )u(x2 |s2 ).
Therefore, given the prior λ̄, the posterior distribution after observing t̄ is such thatthe agent is indifferent between actions x1 and x2 .
Suppose the agent receives the signal z < t̄. Since H is MLR-ordered, we haveh(z|s1 )h(z|s2 )≥.
h(t̄|s1 )h(t̄|s2 )This fact, together with (31) guarantee thatλ̄(s1 )h(z|s1 ) [u(x1 , s1 ) − u(x2 , s1 )] ≥ λ̄(s2 )h(z|s2 ) [u(x2 |s2 ) − u(x1 , s2 )].
Re-arranging this equation, we obtainλ̄(s1 )h(z|s1 )u(x1 |s1 )+λ̄(s2 )h(z|s2 )u(x1 |s2 ) ≥ λ̄(s1 )h(z|s1 )u(x2 |s1 )+λ̄(s2 )h(z|s2 )u(x2 |s2 ).
So, after observing z < t̄, the (posterior) expected utility of action x1 is greater thanthat of x2 . In a similar way, we can show that x2 is the optimal action after observing
a signal z ≥ t̄.

QED

Proof of Theorem 4 continued: We denote the density function associated to the
distribution G(·|s) by g(·|s). The probability of Zk = {z ∈ Z : ψ(z) ≤ xk } is givenR
by 1Zk (z)g(z|s)dz, where 1Zk is the indicator function of Zk . By the definition ofḠ, we haveZḠ(k/n|s) =1Zk (z)g(z|s)dz.

Recall that tk (s) is defined as the unique element that obeys G(tk (s)|s) = Ḡ(k/n);
equivalently,ZḠ(k/n|s) − G(tk (s)|s) =
1Zk (z) − 1[0,tk (s)] (z) g(z|s)dz = 0.
35

(32)

The function W given by W (z) = 1Zk (z)−1[0,tk (s)] (z) has the following single-crossing
type condition: z > tk (s), we have W (z) ≥ 0 and for z ≤ tk (s), we have W (z) ≤ 0.18
Let s0 > s; since G(·|s) is MLR-ordered, g(z|s0 )/g(z|s) is an increasing function of z.
By a standard result (see, for example, Athey (2002, Lemma 5)), we have
Z


0
0
Ḡ(k/n|s ) − G(tk (s)|s ) =1Zk (z) − 1[0,tk (s)] (z) g(z|s0 )dz ≥ 0.

(33)This implies that tk (s0 ) ≥ tk (s).
To show that G is more accurate than Ḡ, we require T (z, s) to be increasing ins, where T is defined by G(T (z, s)|s) = Ḡ(z|s). For z = k/n, T (z, s) = tk (s), which
we have shown is increasing in s. For z in the interval ( (k − 1)/n, k/n ), recall (see(23)) that Ḡ(z) was defined such that T (z, s) = θtk−1 (s) + (1 − θ)tk (s). Since bothtk−1 and tk are increasing in s, T (z, s) is also increasing in s.

QED

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38yf (,s )

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Figure 1xyf (,s )

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Figure 2x