A/HRC/53/52
Advance unedited version

Distr.: General
28 June 2023
Original: English

Human Rights Council
Fifty-third session
19 June–14 July 2023
Agenda items 2 and 4
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of theHigh Commissioner and the Secretary-General
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention

Situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1 February 2021
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights*
Summary
The present report, prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/49/23,
identifies trends and patterns of human rights violations in Myanmar between 1 February
2021 and 30 April 2023 with a focus on the human rights impact of the denial of humanitarianaccess. The report analyzes actions by all duty-bearers and finds that the Myanmar military
is most responsible for the negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights and on deliveryof humanitarian action. The report documents that the military has established an allencompassing system of control based on instrumentalization of the legal and administrative
spheres in Myanmar. Urgent and concrete steps are needed to ensure essential needs of all
people are met, including food and healthcare, and to respect, protect and fulfil peoples’
fundamental rights. This report concludes with recommendations to all parties, including themilitary authorities, the National Unity Government’, and the international community.

* The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent developments.

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I. Introduction and methodology
1.
In resolution A/HRC/49/23, the Human Rights Council requested the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights to monitor and assess the overall situation of humanrights in Myanmar, with a particular focus on accountability regarding alleged violations ofinternational human rights law and international humanitarian law and to makerecommendations on additional steps necessary to address the current crisis and to present a
written update at its 53rd session.
2.
This report presents findings from monitoring and documentation activities conducted
remotely by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) between 1
February 2021 and 30 April 2023, examining trends and patterns in violations of international
human rights law and, where applicable, of international humanitarian and criminal law.
Paramount among these violations are the Myanmar military’s targeting of civilians,
including by restricting access to humanitarian assistance for communities impacted byviolence, armed conflict, and systematic discrimination against Rohingya, other minorities
and perceived opponents of the regime.
3.
As denial of humanitarian access results in loss of civilian lives during violence andconflicts, as well as in long-term human rights consequences such as food insecurity and lackof medical assistance, this report is based on a holistic approach to civilian protection
involving both immediate and direct harm from violence and conflicts, and medium- to longterm negative impacts on the ability of people to exercise their fundamental rights.
4.
Further affirming the critical importance of strengthening civilian protection andguarantees for meaningful humanitarian access, the United Nations Security Council in its
resolution S/RES/2669(2022) of December 2022 on the situation in Myanmar reiterated “thenecessity for full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” while underlying “the need forscaled up humanitarian assistance to all people in need in Myanmar and to ensure the full
protection, safety and security of humanitarian and medical personnel”. 1 Furthermore, toaddress its concerns at the deteriorating humanitarian situation as compounded byincreasingly challenging humanitarian access and attacks on humanitarian personnel,2 the
Human Rights Council called on the military to exercise utmost restraint and ensure full
protection of human rights of all persons in Myanmar. Similarly, the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (ASEAN) repeatedly called on Myanmar authorities to implement theFive-Point Consensus, cease violence, and ensure safe and timely delivery of humanitarianassistance.3 However, confirming findings from previous reports, 4 the military has shown
complete disregard for these attempts at addressing the human rights, humanitarian, andpolitical crises flowing from the coup of February 2021 and the subsequent violent
suppression of opposing voices.
5.
Additionally, the centrality of protection of human rights as a key priority inhumanitarian action5 is highlighted in several key UN policy documents. These include theSecretary-General’s Call to Action for Human Rights 6 and his Common Agenda 7 which
reiterated that the achievement of the goals of justice, peace, prevention, equality, and leaving
no one behind are grounded in a system that has at its core the protection and promotion ofhuman rights

1

http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2669.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G23/058/09/PDF/G2305809.pdf?OpenElement.
3 https://asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/Consolidated_Draft_Chairmans_Statement_on_the_Situation_in_Myanmar4.pdf.
4 https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5221-situation-human-rights-myanmar-1february-2022-report-united.
5 https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/202011/IASC%20Policy%20on%20Protection%20in%20Humanitarian%20Action%2C%202016.pdf.
6 https://www.un.org/sg/sites/www.un.org.sg/files/atoms/files/The_Highest_Asperation_A_Call_
To_Action_For_Human_Right_English.pdf.
7 https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agendareport/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdf.
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6.
To ensure wide collection of data and verified information and support theparticipation and representation of different actors, OHCHR strived to engage as many
interlocutors as feasible. It collected testimonies and information from primary sources,
including victims and witnesses, and verifiable secondary sources – all of which underwent
credibility assessment in accordance with OHCHR’s standard methodology. A total of 53
interviews with primary sources were conducted along with 43 formal consultations withpartners and organizations through secure communication platforms. Moreover, OHCHR
sought to gather information and data through the United Nations system and its existingmechanisms. It also submitted questionnaires to the Myanmar military, the National Unity
Government,8 ethnic armed organizations, and relevant private companies.
7.
Throughout the documentation process, interlocutors consistently raised protection
concerns confirming that fear of retaliation by the military for the peaceful exercise offundamental rights permeates every aspect of life within and outside Myanmar. Widespreadand systematic violations perpetrated by the military have created an environment where both
Myanmar’s people and representatives of international organizations believe they are at riskof becoming targets for expressing opinions opposing military rule, sharing information,
assisting people in need, and operating without military-issued authorizations, among others.
For these reasons, and in full respect of the “do no harm” principle, this report does notpresent details that may lead to the identification of interlocutors, unless expressly authorized.
Similarly, whenever necessary, geographical references are limited to the states and regionsof Myanmar as identification of townships may result in retaliatory acts against individuals
concerned.
8.
National and international interlocutors nonetheless provided a wealth of knowledge
and information, although on numerous occasions cautioned OHCHR from publicly using
them to avoid further military reprisals. Similarly, this sense of fear also extended to areas
under the control of other duty-bearers from which only anecdotal information was received,
not meeting the necessary standards for verification and inclusion in the report. Additional
documentation efforts on denial of humanitarian access in areas outside military control are
therefore necessary.
9.
The complexity of Myanmar’s humanitarian environment is characterized by themultiple needs of diverse communities in the various States and Regions, and the presenceof multiple types of actors inside and outside Myanmar. For each individual situation andactor, there are different levels of access, challenges, and concerns. Rather than focusing on
localized specificities, the report seeks to support accountability efforts by analysing broader
patterns of actions and omissions by duty-bearers affecting the rights of people-in-need oflife-saving assistance and essential services.

II. Legal framework10.
As the humanitarian fallout from large scale human rights violations across Myanmar
expands, this report aims to promote accountability and adequate protection of the civilian
population by duty-bearers under international human rights law and international
humanitarian law. To this end, the report considers humanitarian relief to include actions
exclusively aimed at ensuring the survival of those directly affected by violence and conflictthrough relief consignment, equipment, and personnel. For the purpose of this report, actors
proactively contributing to the delivery of goods and services are considered as aid providers
as their primary functions are aimed at reducing the suffering of the civilian population andensuring their survival. Consequently, denial of humanitarian assistance refers to all thoseactions and measures carried out by duty-bearers, whether legislative, administrative, or incontext of military action, that prevent and obstruct both access to persons-in-need and theiraccess to aid. Denial also encompasses duty-bearers’ actions – regardless of intent – that haveas direct consequences the curtailment of full, safe, unhindered, and predictable access.

8

The National Unity Government is headed by President Win Myint and has Aung San Suu Kyi as
State Counsellor. See further A/HRC/48/67, paras. 70-72.
3

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11.
Under human rights treaty and customary law, fundamental rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to life, security, food, housing,health, movement, and access to information demand that conditions for their realization are
established and protected both in times of peace and conflict.9 In its general comments No.
1210 and No. 1411, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes thecore obligations deriving from the right to the highest attainable standards of health to include
the duty to ensure non-discriminatory access to health facilities, services, and essential drugs,
access to adequate food to guarantee freedom from hunger and malnutrition, access to basic
shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable water among
others. The denial of humanitarian assistance may amount to violations of the obligations torespect and protect human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. Corollary tothese obligations, duty-bearers must refrain from attacking humanitarian personnel, facilities,
equipment, and transport, or unduly imposing restrictions on medical and humanitarian
personnel, civil society, non-governmental organizations, journalists, and media workers.
This is to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches populations-in-need in an impartial,
unfettered, and predictable manner as a critical component of efforts to meet the protectionneeds of the population.
12.
Within the framework of international humanitarian law, civilians and hors de combat
personnel are entitled to all protections deriving from Common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions and relevant customary law, and the civilian population-in-need is entitled toreceive impartial humanitarian assistance. 12 Under international humanitarian law parties toa conflict must subject to their right of control, allow and facilitate the unimpeded passage ofimpartial humanitarian relief. 13 In the context of armed conflicts, the intentional obstruction
or denial of humanitarian assistance may constitute war crimes such as wilful killing, tortureand other degrading treatment, starvation, and collective punishment. Such intentional denial
can also constitute crimes against humanity such as murder, extermination, torture and otherinhumane acts, or persecution, when committed in the context of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population.

III. Human rights situation and protection of civilians
13.
As previously reported, military actions since February 2021, including through its“four cuts” strategy 14 against the civilian population, continue to expose the people in
Myanmar to pervasive human rights violations, resulting in staggering humanitarian impacts.
14.
Between February 2021 and April 2023, credible sources verified that at least 3,452
persons have died at the hands of the military and its affiliates, 21,807 individuals werearrested, and 5,839 convicted without any respect for judicial guarantees. Additionally, 154have been sentenced to death and four known to be executed.15 An estimated 1.5 million
people have been internally displaced, with nearly one million in the central regions alone,
and approximately 60,000 civilian structures have been reportedly burnt or destroyed. 16 Over75,000 people have reportedly fled to neighbouring countries. 17 More than one million
Rohingya already live under appalling conditions in refugee camps in Bangladesh and recent

9https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf
Myanmar is State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICESCR); International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women; Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the International Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities.
10 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G99/420/12/PDF/G9942012.pdf?OpenElement.
11 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/Health/GC14.pdf.
12 https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0421-commentary-additional-protocols-8-june-1977-genevaconventions-12-august-1949.
13 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law Database, Rule 55.
14 A/HRC/52/21.
15 https://aappb.org/?cat=109.
16 https://reliefweb.int/attachments/ef5a4668-4964-4da9-83e1472fc4ec544e/OCHA%20Myanmar%20-%20Humanitarian%20Update%20No.%2029.pdf.
17 https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/4475.
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reductions to food rations due to limitations on available humanitarian funds are expected tohave devastating consequences. 18 Of the remaining 600,000 Rohingya in Rakhine, nearly
150,000 live in camps where they are deprived of fundamental rights including freedom of
movement. Under the current conditions, safe, dignified, and sustainable returns remain
impossible.
15.
Combined with the enduring impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the military coup
has resulted in erasure of nearly a decade of progress, with a doubling of poverty levels since
March 2020. 19 Estimates indicate that 17.6 million people – one-third of the overall
population – require some form of humanitarian assistance, marking a steep spike comparedto the one million in need prior to the coup.20 Restrictions on humanitarian access have beenin place for decades under various governments and were mostly directed at limiting thedelivery of assistance to minority groups. Since the coup, restrictions have increased amid a
dramatic surge in humanitarian needs for all communities.
16.
Food insecurity is on the rise in Myanmar, with 15.2 million people requiring foodand nutrition support. Food prices have escalated tremendously by 63 and 177 per cent in
2021 and 2022 respectively. Food production has diminished because of continued violence
and insecurity, reduced land access due to travel restrictions, displacement, land seizures,
mine and unexploded ordnances contamination, insufficient agricultural workforce, and hightransportation costs. Numerous interlocutors highlighted that many people are at risk of
starvation.
17.
In addition to the direct attacks on healthcare personnel and infrastructure and severe
restrictions arbitrarily imposed on access to food assistance, the military has continued to
instrumentalise the legal and administrative framework of Government to control and limit
life-saving humanitarian assistance/relief. Imposition of martial law on an additional 40
townships across the country in February 2023 21 has further diminished access to aid of
populations-in-need.

A.

Access to populations-in-need18.
Barriers to humanitarian access were already significant under previous governments,
with serious concerns continuously raised regarding operations in Kachin and Rakhine,
including for the Rohingya, among others. As part of its attempts to assert control, themilitary has imposed a range of legal, financial, and bureaucratic requirements on civilsociety and humanitarian activity that have severely reduced civic space and delivery of lifesaving assistance. These restrictions have resulted in aid not reaching populations in conflictaffected areas, particularly those where the military has been most active in its attempts tosuppress and crush resistance to its rule. Due to military actions, humanitarian assistance inmost areas in the country can only be provided by evading military rules at great personalrisk of arrest, mistreatment or even death. In areas under military control, access topopulations-in-need has been limited through all-encompassing restrictive measures that
instrumentalize the legal and administrative systems to control aid.

1.

Registration regime
19.
In October 2022, 22 the military unilaterally imposed amendments to the 2014
organisation registration law (‘registration law’), which formalised further restrictions oncivil society and humanitarian actions. These amendments are the centrepiece of aninterlocking system linking registration to several critical aspects of humanitarian action,
18

https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133597.
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/publication/myanmar-economic-monitor-july-2022reforms-reversed.
20 https://myanmar.un.org/sites/default/files/202301/mmr_humanitarian_response_plan_2023%20final.pdf.
21 https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2023-02-03-red.pdf,
https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2023-02-23-red.pdf. In 2021,
the military imposed martial law in seven townships in Yangon and Chin.
22 https://bangkok.ohchr.org/ngo-law-myanmar/.
19

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including banking, importation and procurement of aid items, and movement of aid workers
and items. Together with targeted restrictions in violence and conflict-affected areas, thesehave been instrumental in controlling and limiting necessary humanitarian assistance topopulations-in-need.
20.
These amendments introduce compulsory registration of all non-profit organizations
and impose lengthy and onerous administrative procedures and criminal penalties, including
up to five years’ imprisonment, for lack of compliance. In their applications, organizations
must disclose personal information of staff, funding sources, proposed project details, andoperational locations. Vaguely formulated provisions, such as prohibiting any contact withbroadly-defined groups including those organizations deemed “unlawful” or opponents ofthe military, are likely to result in their arbitrary application. This regime therefore facilitates
extensive oversight by the military of non-profit organizations and their activities.
21.
Since adoption, the registration law has created a chilling effect within civil society
and forced many organizations to grapple with whether their compliance could be perceived
as legitimising the military. Engaging with non-registered organizations or the lack of formal
registration pose significant risks and impediments to humanitarian actions. These range
from carrying out operations without legal protection, to being unable to receive funds andoperate bank accounts. Individual staff members are also exposed to continuous risks ofharassment, arrest and prosecution.
22.
Conversely, registration necessarily entails ongoing military scrutiny of humanitarian
actors and politicises delivery of humanitarian assistance. One interlocutor highlighted how
military-run ministries persist in obtaining programme funding, budgeting, and expenditure
information as part of the registration or renewal processes. Others noted the military
requested removal of certain geographic areas and activities from draft memoranda ofunderstanding required as part of the registration process. This carries serious risks ofpoliticization of humanitarian assistance and aid diversion from those most in need to thosecomplying with military rule. An interviewee emphasized the dilemma imposed onhumanitarian actors, observing “If you register, you cannot do your work because you cannot
do anything the military does not permit.”
2.

Banking, finance, importation, and procurement
23.
Even before imposition of the registration law, the military, through the Central Bankof Myanmar,23 had been directing banks’ heightened scrutiny of their clients since the coup.
Under the guise of customer due diligence, banks increasingly request documentation, key
among which has been valid registration papers. However, many organizations’ registrations
have now expired, and the previous registration approval system has been suspended, leading
to banking challenges, including delays and denials of funds transfers. Later, the Central
Bank of Myanmar imposed a separate approvals process for transactions over USD 10,000
without any specified timeframes, considerably impacting on humanitarian operations andprogrammes.
24.
Alongside restrictions on the formal banking sector, the Central Bank of Myanmar
has also directed mobile financial service providers similarly to comply with customer due
diligence requirements, 24 involving proof of Citizenship Scrutiny Cards. As denial of
citizenship and lack of civil documentation disproportionately impact minority groups,
particularly Rohingya, these measures will necessarily affect such communities, as well asothers who feel uncomfortable with the risks of sharing personal identifying information toreceive funds. With respect to cash programmes, and given significant concerns around dataprotection and security, the military oversight of mobile financial service providers
constitutes a form of access restriction to populations-in-need.

23

In June 2022, six active-duty lieutenant colonels were reportedly appointed to positions of Director and
Deputy Director within the central bank. In September 2022, Major General Zaw Myint Naing wasreportedly retired from the Defence Ministry’s Accounts Department and appointed one of the bank’s
three vice-governors.
24 Central Bank of Myanmar Letter No. MaBaBa/NaPaTa (List) (724), 15 August 2022.
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25.
With organizations’ registrations and/or import licences gradually expiring after thecoup, humanitarian actors have faced increasing difficulties importing essential items suchas medicines and food into the country. Currently, registration under the new regime is aprerequisite for obtaining import licences. Interlocutors explained that securing an importlicence requires valid registration, outlined in the registration law, which in turn depends ona military-approved memorandum of understanding. Given the lack of clarity on
implementation of the registration regime, aggravated by the absence of regulations orprocedures, it is unclear whether any organization has been successful in securing new importlicences. In rare instances where items can still be imported into the country, certain
interlocutors described lengthy holdups – of up to several months – at the port and withcustoms authorities, at times leading to the spoiling of perishable items.
26.
Due to these obstacles to the import of goods through international procurement
orders, some organizations have had to rely on in-country supplies. Interviewees describedvarious challenges with local procurements. One described requiring military permissions topurchase food and shelter items. Others were not able to purchase medicines and othercommodities to the quantities required due either to hoarding by suppliers and/or limits
placed on amounts that may be purchased. Another interlocutor described an authorization
system requiring food suppliers to report to the military details about sale and purchasetransactions. OHCHR also received information about an organization being denied
permission to purchase medicines due to their area of operation.
3.

Freedom of movement: travel authorizations and checkpoints
27.
Limitations on freedom of movement have represented a long-term pressing andcontinuous human rights concern in Myanmar, including under the previous quasi-civilian
Government. After the coup, the situation has significantly deteriorated as the military has
increasingly attempted to control movements. Delays and denial of visas have become a tool
for the military to decide time, locations, and functions of those entering the country. Oncein country, travel authorizations are required for movements of international staff anddistribution of humanitarian assistance. For both visas and travel authorizations, validorganisational registration is required. This has particularly affected areas outside militarycontrol, as the military tightly manages access to those areas, with interlocutors reporting that
authorization regimes infringe upon a wide range of fundamental rights.
28.
While the pre-coup travel authorization regime in general did not apply to nationalorganizations and staff, under the new regime, national and international organizations that
intend to operate in military-defined travel-restricted areas are required to cooperate with therelevant administration and military structures. On 17 March 2023, the National Unity
Government also requested all local and international organizations to seek priorauthorization before travelling through or within areas under its control.25 Grassroots andcommunity-based organizations also reported being required to coordinate with anti-military
armed groups when entering territories under their control.
29.
Interlocutors confirmed that checkpoints are the main impediment to free movementof people and goods, and they serve as a means for various groups to assert control overterritory vis-à-vis the civilian population. Interlocutors noted that military checkpoints are asystematic fixture at the entrance and exit of state/region capitals under their control, which
are also usually the main commercial hubs for the area. Military checkpoints are also set upnear army camps and bases, and along access roads to areas held by anti-military armed
groups. Sometimes, ad-hoc checkpoints are also set up following security incidents. Passing
a checkpoint typically involves showing paperwork such as travel authorization approvals,
letters of recommendation, and identity papers to security forces. Screening and confiscationof phones have been consistently reported.
30.
Checkpoints are also locations where bribery, confiscation of goods, and/or arrests
take place. While UN entities appear to be generally less affected, others delivering
humanitarian assistance or transporting goods face harassment, intimidation and extortion.

25

https://www.burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/2023-03-17-NUGMOHAI_Statemennt-8-pio-en.pdf.
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Even with the requisite documentation, security officials systematically seek informal
payments. Amounts are typically determined on the spot, based on factors such as the identityof the individual seeking passage, the rank of the official on duty, and the type of goods beingtransported. For aid providers, such informal payments are either entirely borne by national
staff on a personal basis or embedded into the supply chain when utilising third party
suppliers or transportation service providers and cannot be formally reported due tocompliance issues.
31.
Interlocutors also reported appropriations of material assistance from aid deliveries,
presented occasionally as informal taxation, when passing through checkpoints. Thisoccurred not only at military installations, but also at others by anti-military armed groups.
Given the multiplicity of checkpoints along any transportation route, such taxations –whether in cash or in kind – inevitably drive up prices of commodities, leading to highly
inflated prices or even scarcity of essential items in rural areas.
32.
Quantity restrictions and de facto bans on transport of certain goods – resulting in
confiscations – are also enforced at military checkpoints. Interviewees reported that vehicles
are only allowed to transport as little as two or five sacks of rice, depending on the location,and that motorbikes up to half a bag of rice. Numerous interlocutors stated that medical
products and supplies are deemed particularly sensitive items and they are systematicallyconfiscated at checkpoints. Those transporting these goods often face arrest and questioning
by security forces. In one case, an individual stopped while transporting medicines at a
military checkpoint faced a lengthy interrogation aimed at identifying the beneficiaries. Afterpayment of a certain sum to the military, the security officials released the individual, but
confiscated the medicines.
4.

Safety and security of humanitarian actors
33.
A key consequence of the coup is that security has dramatically worsened forhumanitarian workers and aid providers are consistently exposed to risks of arrest,harassment or other mistreatment or even death. While no comprehensive and systematiccollection of data on attacks on humanitarian actors since the coup is in place, figures fromcredible sources vary between 13 and 40 killed, and 17 and 28 wounded.26 Reports of arrests
range between 43 and 212 individuals arrested. It is likely that these figures represent a mere
fraction of the reality on the ground. Despite analytical limitations, it is evident that national
actors are the most exposed as they account for all casualties, highlighting the continuous
personal risks they face when alleviating the plight of victims. As one interviewee described,“Other people and I were trying to bring older people to the monastery and on the way,artillery [shelling] fell down. When you go to help people, you have to look at the sky andlook at the ground. It is very difficult.”
34.
Incidents documented since February 2021 have repeatedly shown that the military
perceives aid providers as part of the population opposing their rule, rather than as actors
who deserve specific protection. One interviewee emphasised: “There is a complete
disregard for all humanitarian principles. There are no legal protections in place forhumanitarian workers”. In the early days of the coup, the military targeted medical personnel
with arrest, and repeatedly opened fire on ambulances at protests. One interviewee reported
that merely possessing an identification card that lists a medical role puts individuals at riskof arrest when passing through military checkpoints. In the following months, attacks on
ambulances have continued to occur, as have arrests and detention of health workers, andattacks against medical facilities and other protected objects.
35.
Interviewees reported that in November 2021, the military raided a clinic that had
been in operation for over two decades in Kayah State, arresting four doctors, 13 nurses andone volunteer while also confiscating medical supplies and food rations. On 11 April 2023
in Pazigyi village, Sagaing, a military combat aircraft bombed attendees, including womenand children, at an inauguration ceremony for a community building. Minutes later, ahelicopter arrived and opened fire on the injured and those rescuing them. Later that day,26

8

https://data.humdata.org/dataset/myanmar-attacks-on-aid-operations-education-health-and-protection;
https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/search?detail=1&country=MM&sort=desc&order=Year.

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another military aircraft shot at people collecting dead bodies and human remains. This attack
reportedly resulted in the deaths of up to 168 people, including at least 45 women and 38
children.
36.
As indicated above, aid providers also face significant risks of harassment,
intimidation, arrest, and detention when delivering assistance and passing throughcheckpoints. In Rakhine and parts of southern Chin, several aid providers and medics werearrested for transporting essential supplies, including medicines, when the military had
placed blanket restrictions on humanitarian access. Orders imposing curfews or restrictions
on the number of individuals who can travel on a given vehicle at one time – often reported
in areas under martial law – have made transportation of humanitarian assistance even morerisky. An interviewee stated, “The main overall risk is that when you deliver assistance, you
are considered as associated to illegal groups and get arrested for that.”
37.
Anti-military armed elements were also identified as responsible for violence against
humanitarian actors, including killings, detention, and harassment. In an emblematic case inJune 2022, a group in Mon claimed responsibility for killing a staff member of the World
Health Organization.27
5.

Telecommunications
38.
Since 1 February 2021, the military has restricted mobile data and call services in an
apparent attempt to control the population, who overwhelmingly access the Internet using
mobile phones.28
39.
By mid-2021, the military’s blockage of telecommunications services hasconcentrated on areas most affected by conflict and violence. While reports indicate that antimilitary armed elements and others have attacked telecommunications towers, electricity
shortages have also caused service disruptions in certain areas. In most cases, however, themilitary has systematically ordered restrictions on telecommunications services in areas
where it carries out military operations, particularly in townships in Chin, Kachin, Kayah,
Magway, Mandalay, and Sagaing. In these areas, the military has blocked mobile internet
access for sustained periods, with frequent reports of mobile telephone service cuts prior tolaunching military operations. Lack of transparency and secrecy of service-restriction orders,increasing military-linked ownership in the telecommunications sector, and alleged
intimidation acts against service providers to bolster compliance with military rules havecreated significant challenges to document fully the impact of orders and limitations onmobile communications.
40.
These restrictions affect both the ability of populations-in-need to seek aid, and of aid
providers to reach them. Interlocutors report that disruptions of Internet services had lifethreatening consequences. Absence of connectivity has limited the ability of communities toreceive timely information and warnings about attacks, thus reducing the time to seek safety.
Further, blocking mobile phone and data services significantly hampered individuals’ ability
to share critical information on humanitarian needs. Those living in areas affected by
shutdowns have had to undertake dangerous and lengthy travel to reach functional service
areas. When shutdowns affect only mobile data services, civilians expressed fear that
communications through unencrypted methods expose them to extensive military
surveillance.
41.
At the same time, communications restrictions have hampered the work of aid
providers in several ways. Medical staff reported severe limitations in assisting rural
populations, including by limiting their ability to obtain information and provide remote
medical advice. Organizations reported that Internet shutdowns prevented them from sharing
life-saving information through online trainings; from using mobile banking applications,further limiting access to funds in an already highly restrictive banking environment; posed
numerous logistics obstacle to humanitarian actions; and prevented comprehensive datacollection, needs assessments, coordination among stakeholders, receipt of authorizations,27

https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2022/06/myanmar-anti-military-group-shoots-who-staff-worker-inmawlamyine-june-8.
28 A/HRC/48/67.
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including from donors, and effective delivery of assistance. While several organizations
continue to provide life-saving assistance despite the enormous challenges, the ability togather timely information on the security situation in targeted areas, negative risks
assessments result in aid providers often having to avoid those areas.

B.

Access of populations-in-need to aid

1.

Military’s “four cuts” strategy
42.
The military’s “four cuts” strategy, traditionally directed at cutting off ethnic armed
organizations’ access to food, funds, intelligence, and recruits, has been redeployed against
a broader set of anti-military armed groups and civilians perceived to support them withdevastating impacts. Its systematic implementation, which relies on tactics including
burnings of entire villages, use of airstrikes and artillery shelling, as well as arbitrary arrests,
enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, has resulted in mass displacements of overa million people.
43.
Through the “four cuts” policy, limitations of movements, denial of humanitarianassistance, and the use of scorched-earth tactics, the military intended to sever grassroots
support for anti-military groups. Following resumption of hostilities with the Arakan Armyin late 2022, the military imposed a complete ban on movements and humanitarian actions
in eight townships in Rakhine and southern Chin amidst airstrikes and artillery shelling. They
enforced these restrictions through checkpoints on main roads, waterways, bridges, and othersupply routes, effectively preventing access to food, medicines, healthcare, and otheressential items, with tremendous impact on all communities, including the Rohingya. Despite
a ceasefire in November 2022, numerous restrictions remain in place and humanitarianaccess remains inadequate.
44.
Documentation of numerous burning incidents around the country highlight thewidespread and systematic nature of this tactic, which appears to carry both an element ofcollective punishment of the entire local civilian population perceived as opposing themilitary, and a strategic goal of depriving them of shelter, food, water, livelihoods, and lifesaving aid. Numerous interlocutors stressed that while burning villages, the military targeted
livestock, food storage facilities, and other essential agricultural materials. Where they exist,
health facilities were also targeted.
45.
Groups with specific vulnerabilities, such as persons with disabilities, the elderly, or
those unable to flee upon the military’s arrival, are at serious risk of being killed, including
being burned alive. In March 2023, an interviewee reported that around 80 soldiers entereda village in Sagaing and set fire on an estimated 175 houses. Seven elderly persons, including
two with disabilities, were burned to death.
46.
In addition to deaths and injuries, systematic implementation of the “four cuts”
strategy has resulted in massive displacement and continuous increases in protection andhumanitarian needs. Repeated airstrikes and artillery shelling expose civilians to risks ofrecurring displacement with the military not sparing formal displacement sites or temporary
shelter solutions. Interlocutors reported an increased targeting of shelters for displaced
persons and monasteries since early 2023 and of monks being killed and arrested forproviding assistance. Interlocutors added that, as a consequence, monasteries have become
reluctant to provide shelter to people fleeing violence.
47.
With nothing left to return to, hundreds of thousands of people, mostly in thenorthwest, central and southeast regions, have fled. Many went into jungles where they live
under tarpaulins and improvised tents in extremely precarious conditions. Interviewees
explained that any aspect of life in the jungle becomes life-threatening, particularly whendisplacement is prolonged due to ongoing and repeated military operations. OHCHR
received accounts of children dying from snake bites without having access to medicines,
highlighting the risks resulting from prolonged forced displacement and restricted access tohumanitarian assistance. Credible sources also reported numerous deaths of displaced newborns and elderly due to injuries, chronic diseases, communicable diseases, and inadequate
living conditions, all attributable to the military’s denial of humanitarian access.

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2.

Landmines and unexploded ordnances
48.
Interlocutors unanimously agreed that the extensive presence of anti-personnel
landmines, explosive remnants of war, including mortars, artillery, air-delivered weaponry,
and other unexploded ordnances across the country, pose a significant risk to displaced
populations accessing humanitarian assistance and to any return to places of origin. Pending
independent verification, credible sources attribute responsibility for use of mines mainly tothe military. Anti-military armed groups, however, are also reported to manufacture
landmines and improvised explosive devices, and to make use of them after seizing themfrom overrun military targets. Anti-military armed elements are reportedly targeting militaryconvoys, including by improvised explosive devices in populated areas. Reports of targetingof public buses, in violation of international humanitarian law, were also received.
49.
Interlocutors report that mines are laid both as part of military tactics to defend bases
and outposts, but also to deter returns and use of facilities. In violation of international norms,
mines have been laid near or in clinics, health facilities, religious buildings, homes andvillages following raids, and along supply routes commonly used to deliver assistance andaccess health and livelihood opportunities. Of serious concern is that, in addition to acomplete absence of humanitarian demining activities, no systematic recording and markingof planted mines is carried out, exposing the civilian population to significant risks andcontinuing protection concerns long into the future.
50.
With the continued escalation of violence, interlocutors estimate that 12 out of 14
states and regions are contaminated by mines. Although likely representing underreported
figures, the number of incidents increased by 136 per cent in 2021 with 92 killed and 216
injured,29 and by 176 per cent in 2022, 112 killed and 287 injured, 30 when compared to precoup figures of 64 killed and 163 injured.31 These figures raise serious protection concerns
for civilians which are magnified by the increasing military reliance on airstrikes, as this will
inevitably lead to a larger number of unexploded ordnances on the ground. Survivors often
find themselves in critical conditions with no access to adequate health services.

3.

Impact on the right to health51.
The military’s actions have had a profound negative impact on Myanmar’s healthsystem, and on individuals’ right to health.
52.
At the systemic level, almost all facets of the public health system – governance andleadership; financing; health workforce; medical products and technologies; healthmonitoring and information; and service delivery – have been negatively affected by the
military’s policies. In two high-profile instances, Doctor Htar Htar Lin, Director of the Public
Health Department who led Myanmar’s COVID-19 vaccination programme, and Doctor Soe
Oo, Director-General of the Public Health Department, were arrested under spurious charges
of corruption, and sentenced to three and two years’ imprisonment respectively. 32 Public
expenditure on the health sector has declined since 2021, likely resulting from decreased
spending on medical products and construction.33 For their leadership and participation in
the Civil Disobedience Movement, healthcare professionals have been targeted with arbitrary

29

https://www.unicef.org/myanmar/media/7431/file/Myanmar_Landmine_ERW_Incidents_
Information.pdf.
30 https://www.unicef.org/myanmar/media/8731/file/Myanmar%20LandmineERW%20Incidents%20Information%20(January-February%202023).pdf.
31 https://www.unicef.org/myanmar/media/6306/file/Myanmar%20LandmineERW%20Incidents%20Information.pdf.
32 https://www.gnlm.com.mm/mohss-director-of-public-health-department-dr-htar-htar-lin-directorgeneral-dr-soe-oo-retired-sentenced-to-prison-under-anti-corruption-law/; https://myanmarnow.org/en/news/health-official-who-kept-covid-19-vaccine-funds-from-junta-hit-with-corruptioncharge/.
33 http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099134001292342538/pdf/P1791060704c4d0720a
7ac0c3c23f1b5b90.pdf;
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099335012232233060/pdf/P17910601de02e0880b23b07
6d6f795c50d.pdf.
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arrest and detention, and threatened with licence revocations.34 Given Myanmar’s healthcare
landscape, which relies heavily on midwives’ and other community health workers’
grassroots activities for health education, disease surveillance, service delivery, and referral
services to ensure primary healthcare, systematic military violence and violations have farreaching implications both for health service delivery and for upstream health monitoringand information systems for public health policy.
53.
Attacks on healthcare have been a prominent feature since the coup, including as partof restricting humanitarian assistance to crush anti-military opposition. Since February 2021,
there have been three distinct phases:(i)
In the early months following the coup, health workers were targeted for their
participation in the Civil Disobedience Movement and mass protests. OHCHR received
credible testimonies of security forces attacking ambulances and assaulting health workers;
raiding and occupying health facilities; as well as searching for wounded protesters andpressuring health facilities to not provide treatment.
(ii)
Around mid-2021 and coinciding with Myanmar’s third COVID-19 wave, themilitary obstructed COVID-19-related care by monopolizing medical supplies, especiallyoxygen tanks, for military-run facilities. Arrests continued unabated focusing on healthprofessionals who dared to criticize health policies and for providing care outside of militaryfacilities.
(iii) Since late 2021, attacks on healthcare have been strongly linked to escalating violence
around the country. Some interlocutors reported arrests of health workers and of people
transporting medical supplies. One person reported requiring 10 days of hospitalization due
to injuries inflicted by soldiers who found medical supplies in the vehicle and accused theperson of links to anti-military armed elements. Others described obstructions to healthcare
access, including through imposition of physical roadblocks and authorization regimes thatprevent timely access to treatment. In one case, an individual who was injured by airstrikes
spent six hours passing through three checkpoints, before reaching the hospital where
medical attention was not provided until the next day, necessitating a leg amputation. The
patient, however, later died from excessive blood loss. OHCHR also received consistentreports of confiscation and destruction of medical supplies, and of deliberate destruction of
hospitals, clinics and ambulances. Certain interviewees stated that whilst it was possible topass through military checkpoints with small amounts of paracetamol, other items including
those deemed critical to improve living conditions, such as emergency kits and products forinjury care, antibiotics, antimalarial drugs and insecticide-treated mosquito nets, andantivenoms for snakebites, would be confiscated. Others reported the military’s burnings ofambulances; arson of a clinic and medicines worth 30 million Kyat; burning of a hospital,
including the operation theatre and delivery room; and bombing of an out-patient centre.
54.
OHCHR has also documented a pattern of the military preventing access toemergency health services, and in some instances trying to arrest injured persons, following
airstrikes and artillery shelling in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, Sagaing, andTanintharyi.
55.
Interlocutors generally stated that, even if the military did not physically deny accessto hospitals, people fear arrest for seeking treatment for violence-induced injuries. In one
case, a villager tending his goats was shot by the military, and then arrested at a clinic after
receiving treatment. Other reports include an individual who was arrested when getting a
COVID-19 vaccination, and a patient who was arrested after receiving treatment at a hospitalon suspicion of being an anti-military armed group member. People therefore avoid seeking
medical care, and several interlocutors reported numerous deaths due to restricted access.
Minorities, particularly Rohingya communities, are further victimized by this situation.
56.
Continued insecurity has a severe impact on access to primary and other forms ofhealthcare, resulting in preventable deaths. Some interlocutors highlighted that pregnant
women are unable to receive adequate antenatal care, and that those displaced are at particularrisk of pregnancy and birth complications. In one case, curfew prevented a labouring woman

34

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A/HRC/53/52

from getting transportation to hospital, leading to deaths of both mother and child; in another,a pregnant woman requiring medical attention was denied permission to travel, resulting in
foetal death. Other interviewees described parents being unable to obtain basic
immunisations for their infants; diabetes and hypertension patients being unable to secure
medication to treat their conditions; and HIV and tuberculosis patients fearing arrest for
visiting urban hospitals.
57.
Therefore, the interrelated and essential elements of the right to health, comprisingavailability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of healthcare services, goods, andfacilities, are gravely impaired in Myanmar. 35 Moreover, given increasing forced
displacement, substantial drops in childhood vaccination rates, and rising malaria cases, there
are serious concerns about risks of outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases and of drugresistant malaria which would likely spread beyond Myanmar’s borders.
4.

Impact on the right to adequate food58.
While supply chain disruptions contributed to rising food and fuel prices in the earlymonths following the coup, 36 the military has since been actively violating the right toadequate food in blatant breach of its human rights obligations.
59.
Similar to attacks on healthcare, there are strong correlations between violations of
the right to food and armed violence. Parts of the country that have experienced the mostintense violence are also suffering from the most severe restrictions on access to food. In
areas where the military carried out systematic and widespread burning of villages, 37
OHCHR received multiple reports of the military and its affiliates looting and destroying
existing food stocks during ground operations. Testimonies indicated that soldiers andmembers of military-aligned armed elements pillaged food items and valuables, killed
livestock, and burnt harvests, food supplies and storage facilities. One interviewee
additionally reported soldiers “…destroy[ing] the water well so that people cannot drink”.
60.
Multiple interlocutors from these areas highlighted the military’s deliberate
constriction of access to food and distortion of associated markets by burning private sector
food processing and storage facilities, purchasing all rice stocks in the local area by forcing
traders to only sell to the military, and prohibiting food item purchases from other areas.
Others reported expropriations and destructions of agricultural materials to prevent
cultivation, including confiscation of equipment, fertiliser, and seeds, and contamination ofagricultural land with mines. One interviewee stated: “In villages, the military is burning
houses and destroying paddy fields and food granaries to punish people in the areas as they
perceive them as PDF [People Defence Forces] supporters.” In one incident, three displaced
persons were killed after attempting to return to their village to cultivate crops. Aninterlocutor asserted: “Our people are not allowed to grow their own food […] they havebeen killed for that. They cannot buy food. So there has been a complete denial of access tofood.”
61.
Across violence-affected areas, the military and its affiliates impaired the right toadequate food by obstructing food transportation. OHCHR received reports of the militaryimposing blockades on food items or requiring authorization before permitting delivery offood assistance, typically intended for conflict-affected or displaced communities. Alongtransportation routes, the military and its affiliates also established checkpoints where
significant proportions of food assistance were confiscated, leading effectively to selfrationing of food transportation. In one instance, military affiliates confiscated 10 out of 15
rice bags being transported, leading subsequent deliveries to be limited to five rice bags.
Interlocutors also confirmed widespread bribery at checkpoints and arrests of individuals
transporting food items.
62.
OHCHR also received credible reports of anti-military armed groups imposing
movement restrictions impacting access to food, engaging in bribery at checkpoints, and35

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14.
https://www.wfp.org/news/rising-food-and-fuel-prices-looming-threat-poorest-and-most-vulnerablemyanmar-warns-wfp.
37 A/HRC/52/21.
36

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detaining individuals perceived to be supplying food to the military. While the scale ofviolations and abuses committed by anti-military armed elements appear to be considerably
lower than the comprehensive manner in which the military restricts access to food, it is clearthat the core content of the right to adequate food are gravely impaired. 38 An interviewee
commented: “Food in any way inside the country [is] seen as a tool or weapon to support
certain actors … food is under special observation.”

IV. Conclusions and recommendations
63.
As the post-coup human rights crisis continues to worsen, Myanmar’s overall
humanitarian situation has also deteriorated to alarming levels. Through theimplementation of its “four cuts” policy aimed at severing support for anti-militarygroups, the military has killed and injured thousands of civilians while destroying goods
and infrastructure necessary for survival, including food, shelter, and medical centres.
In violation of international obligations, the military has targeted humanitarian actions
and actors through an all-encompassing system of military measures and the
instrumentalization of the legal and administrative spheres, forcing aid providers toeither renounce support to people in desperate need of life-saving aid or to deliver atenormous personal risks.
64.
Meanwhile, duty bearers have failed to meet their obligation to protect civilians.
Security across the country has deteriorated as the military has persistently targeted
civilians through airstrikes and razing of populated areas. Widespread use oflandmines by multiple actors has also furthered insecurity. As a result, manyorganizations have forgone or drastically modified operations in affected areas,
negatively impacting a wide range of human rights protections for individuals affectedby violence. Local actors, who are overwhelmingly carrying out operations, arecontinuously risking death, arrest, torture, and harassment. Violations and restrictions
documented in this report, when conducted as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population, and if they resulted in severely depriving fundamental
rights of individuals perceived as part of a group opposing military rule may constitutethe crime against humanity of persecution.
65.
Amongst the numerous and interconnected measures put in place by the military
to control or deny humanitarian assistance, a key obstacle are the military checkpoints.
These are unanimously reported to be places of arbitrary enforcement of unclear rules,
instilling fear in anyone who has to cross them. Whenever possible, those seeking
assistance and those seeking to assist try to avoid checkpoints. Given increased violence
and mine contamination across the country this is, however, increasingly difficult,resulting in a clear negative impact on the quantity, quality, and timeliness of assistancereaching people-in-need.
66.
While the military restricts movements of people through several measures, theinstrumental use of the pre-existing arbitrary and discriminatory travel authorizations
regime plays a critical role. In all areas under its control, the military strategicallydecides on the groups of beneficiaries and types of aid to be delivered, as well as its
timing, in violation of principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, andindependence. Similarly, the military prevents the movement of goods andhumanitarian items through systemic restrictions, and the ability of individuals totransfer and safely access funds.
67.
These pervasive and interlinked restrictions are anchored in the recently
imposed regime for compulsory registration of organizations. Through its unilateral
instrumentalization of the legal system and criminalization of lack of compliance orengagement with non-registered organizations, the military has cohesively linked accessto funds, goods, authorizations, visa, and numerous other critical aspects of38

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https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=4slQ6QSmlBEDzFEovLCuW%
2BKyH%2BnXprasyMzd2e8mx4fouQpDVshj73SoMLU1JTdjtZDTDYerYia%2BctGqO8NrWmRL%2Ft1OyyKtqjxnygkOzYPp9tCfBWVc0bkQ1mCWULU7.

A/HRC/53/52

humanitarian actions, to registration. Registration depends on lengthy and onerous
administrative procedures whose rules remain unclear and are under the discretion of
the military. Intrusive documentation is required of applicants and stringent checks
indicate the intention to politicize the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
68.
In the light of the above findings, the High Commissioner recommends thatmilitary authorities:(a)
Cease immediately all violence and attacks directed against the people of
Myanmar and civilian infrastructures across the country, in compliance with Security
Council resolution S/RES/2669(2022);(b)
Ensure full compliance with international human rights law andinternational humanitarian law and, in particular, refrain from planting anti-personnel
landmines which are inherently indiscriminate weapons greatly contributing to thesuffering of the civilian population. Accurate recording and marking must be
implemented and, whenever possible, implement humanitarian demining activities.
(c)Release immediately all those arbitrarily detained, prosecuted and/or
sentenced, particularly those deprived of liberty for carrying out humanitarian action,
as well as those who exercise their rights to freedom of expression, association, andpeaceful assembly. Discontinue politically-motivated prosecutions of all persons
expressing opposition to the military’s assertion of power;(d)Immediately cease implementation of the unilateral amendments made to
the 2014 Organizations Registration Law and all other actions aimed at restricting
humanitarian and civic space and ensure that humanitarian organizations haveunrestricted and predictable access to all people-in-need across the country without
fear of retaliation for the exercise of rights;(e)Take all prompt and necessary action, including in the banking andfinancial sectors, to guarantee the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and qualityof food and healthcare products and services essential to meet the pressing needs of all
people in Myanmar, without any discrimination.
69.
The High Commissioner further recommends to the National Unity Governmentand other duty-bearers:(a)Take all steps to protect the civilian population, including stopping the useof inherently indiscriminate explosive devices, investigate reports of human rights
violations, and take all adequate measures to ensure full compliance with internationallaw by members of anti-military armed groups under their control;(b)
Refrain from imposing physical or administrative restrictions on thedelivery of humanitarian assistance to people-in-need in the areas under their control;(c)
Allow unrestricted access to humanitarian organizations to assess needs
and develop responses on accurate and evidence-based data;
70.
The High Commissioner recommends that the Security Council, also in view ofthe documented disregard by the military of resolution S/RES/2669 (2022), take steps
to refer the full scope of the current situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal
Court;
71. Further, the High Commissioner recommends that the Security Council, ASEAN,
and other Member States:(a)
Maintain continuous attention to the situation on the ground and takenecessary steps to promote political solutions to end the crisis and guarantee access toall people in need of life-saving assistance in the shortest possible time given the gravityof the situation;(b)
Take urgent action to ensure that the Humanitarian Response Plan isadequately funded to provide humanitarian organizations with necessary resources tomeet the compelling demands of the people in Myanmar;

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A/HRC/53/52(c)
Ensure adequate funding for the “2023 Joint Response Plan: Rohingya
Humanitarian Crisis” to ensure that members of the Rohingya community in
Bangladesh receive life-saving humanitarian assistance;(d)Provide flexible direct funding to local humanitarian organizations to
support their ability to assist the population-in-need with life-saving aid and services;(e)
Advocate for meaningful access to OHCHR in the country to facilitate
independent and impartial monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation,
including on civilian protection and humanitarian actions.

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