CHAPTER 6: US REATLIATION: WASHINGTON NAVALCONFEREANCE
2. RESULTS OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
Freezing of the PacificFirst, we have the Washington Naval Treaty (also known as the Five-Power Treaty and Treaty
Between the Five Powers Concerning the Limitation of Naval Armament). Its three essential points
are listed below.
(1) Respective ratios of capital ships to be held by each of the signatories was set as follows:
BritainUnited States
JapanFranceItaly

553
1.75
1.75

(2) Capital ships under construction were to be scrapped; no capital ships were to be built for
the next 10 years.
(3) Capital ships were limited to 35,000 tons standard displacement and guns with a caliber nolarger than 16 inches (406 millimeters); aircraft carriers were limited to 27,000 tons
standard displacement and guns with a caliber no larger than 8 inches.
(4) Cruisers were limited to 10,000 tons standard displacement and guns with a caliber nolarger than 8 inches; no limits were placed on their construction.
(5) The status quo, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, would be maintained; no new
fortifications, naval bases, or coastal defenses would be constructed in the territories listed
below:(A) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire inthe Pacific Ocean, except those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska andthe Panama Canal Zone, and the Hawaiian Islands; 1(B) Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may
hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110° east longitude,
except those adjacent to the coast of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia and its
Territories, and New Zealand;1Consequently, the US abandoned the idea of fortifying Guam, Pago Pago, the Philippines, and the Aleutians.

1(C) The Chishima (Kurile) Islands, the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands, the Ryūkyū Islands,
Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands and any insular territories or possessions in thePacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.
The US had succeeded in limiting the number of Japanese capital ships to 60% of those possessedby Britain and the US. In exchange, it was agreed that the status quo in the Pacific (referred to as
the “freezing of the Pacific”) would be preserved. The treaty prohibited the Japanese, British, andAmericans from building new fortifications on the Pacific islands in their possession. Butexceptions were made for the US (Hawaii) and Britain (Singapore). Both nations were permitted
to fortify those territories at their discretion. The Americans reinforced Hawaii, which would serveas an important advance base for the US military, and Britain made Singapore its major citadel inthe Far East.
Because of this historical background, no sooner had the Greater East Asian War broken out thanthe Japanese attacked both Hawaii and Singapore. These naval construction limitations enabled
the US to pursue its aspiration: the construction of a navy second to none.
Trading whiskey for water: termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
Next, we have the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Americans looked askance atthe notion of renewing the alliance (the third Anglo-Japanese Alliance was scheduled to expire inJuly 1921) and hoped it would be abrogated. As already stated, they suspected that with the threat
from Imperial Russia now gone, it was possible that the US might be forced into a war against
Britain and Japan. Of greater concern to the Americans, however, was the likelihood that thealliance would further encourage Japanese inroads into China. Japan and Britain were in favor ofcontinuing with the alliance, but since neither could ignore the US, the Four-Power Treaty (signedby Japan, Britain, US, and France) was concluded in its stead. The announcement of thetermination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance appears in Article IV of that treaty.
Thus the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the pillar of Japanese diplomacy for 21 long years, came to anend in August 1923.
This was a cause for rejoicing for the US. President Harding described the obtaining of anagreement whereby the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be immediately terminated as “a matterof the greatest gratification.”2 3

In fact, these words were not those of President Harding, but of the American Delegation in a report presentedto Harding. See Office of the Historian, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, Volume
1: Report of the American Delegation, February 9, 1922.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1922v01/d88.
2Kohsaku Tamura, “Genesis of the Pacific War (I),” CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: A Review of East Asiatic
Affairs Vol. XII, No. 2 (1943), 182.
32Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge revealed his unwavering opposition to the alliance as follows: “The chiefand most important point in the [Four-Power] treaty is the termination of the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance. That was the main object of the treaty. It is sufficient to say that in my judgment theAnglo-Japanese Alliance was the most dangerous element in our relations with the Far East andwith the Pacific.”4On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey, the former British foreign secretary, expressed appreciation
for Japan’s never having taken unfair advantage of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Though he didmention that the Japanese had used it to strengthen their position in China during World War I(Grey was referring to the Twenty-One Demands), he wondered whether any Western nation
burdened with overpopulation, as Japan was, would have taken advantage with such self-restraint.
He clearly regretted the demise of the alliance.
Unsurprisingly, the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance pushed Japan further towardisolation from the international community. The aforementioned Thomas A. Bailey quotes aJapanese diplomat, commenting about the Four-Power Treaty that replaced the alliance, lamenting,“We have discarded whiskey and accepted water.5” To the Japanese, the new treaty had neither
significance nor utility. From then on, they had no choice but to contend with the chaotic situationin the Far East on their own. At a time when they most needed an alliance, they had none. Japanwas forced into isolation against its will. When I recollect the next 20 years, which culminated in
the Greater East Asian War, years plagued with isolation and distress, I too lament the abrogationof the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Nine-Power Treaty: codification of the Open Door Policy
Third was the Nine-Power Treaty Concerning China, the conclusion of which may have been themost historically significant achievement of the Washington Conference.
It was signed by nine nations on February 6, 1922, the final day of the conference. Signatories
agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity ofChina. They also promised to help establish and maintain the Open Door Policy and equal
opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations (see below).
ARTICLE I6
The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

4Westel Woodbury Willoughby, China at the Conference (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1922), 347.

5Bailey, op. cit., 696.

This article, composed by Elihu Root, is referred to as the “Root resolutions.” Alfred Sao-ke Sze, minister
plenipotentiary, a member of the Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference, submitted a list of 10 principles
relating to China at a meeting of the Far Eastern Committee; Elihu Root, former US secretary of state, wrote thecounterproposal.
63(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial andadministrative integrity of China;(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop
and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining
the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations
throughout the territory of China;(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special
rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly
States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.
ARTICLE III
With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equalityof opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the Contracting
Powers, other than China, agree that they will not seek any arrangement which might
purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights withrespect to commercial or economic development in China … or any such monopoly
or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other Power of the right ofundertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China. … .
ARTICLE V
China agrees that, throughout the whole of the railways in China, she will not
exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular there shall be nodiscrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on
the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which
they are proceeding.
ARTICLE VII
The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinionof any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty,and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frankcommunication between the Contracting Powers concerned.7(I have intentionally omitted any discussion of Articles II, IV, VI, VIII, or IX.)
In the late 19th century the Open Door Policy, as championed by Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes, was little more than an aspiration. But with the Nine-Power Treaty, the US incorporated
this principle of US Far Eastern policy into an international treaty, thus making it binding. Since
the US had succeeded in having it recognized by all the Powers, the Nine-Power Treaty came tobe called the “Chinese Magna Carta.”
But since the Nine-Power Treaty effectively rejected Japan’s China policy, which emphasized thespecial relationship between Japan and China, it constrained Japan to an excessive extent, and7

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/pre-war/9_power.html.

4became the primary point of contention between Japan and the US, ultimately leading up to theGreater East Asian War.
Until that war commenced the US used the treaty uninhibitedly to condemn Japan’s China policy,and alleged Japanese violations of that treaty as a basis for denouncing Japan, beginning with theManchurian Incident, through the Shanghai incidents, to the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese
tolerated such criticism until November 1938, during the 2nd Sino-Japanese War, when they
formally repudiated the Open Door Policy and equal opportunity for commerce and industry, themain principles of the Nine-Power Treaty (I shall discuss this later). Then, at the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials), Japan was adjudged to have violated
international treaties. One of those cited was the Nine-Power Treaty. Indeed, that treaty continuedto hound Japan relentlessly for a quarter century, from the Washington Conference to the postwar
era.
Here I would like to add that in connection with the Nine-Power Treaty, the Lansing-Ishii
Agreement was cancelled. As already stated, that agreement was reached between special envoy
Ishii Kikujirō and Secretary of State Robert Lansing in 1917. The diplomatic note stated that “thegovernments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special
relations between countries, and, consequently, the government of the United. States recognizes
that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions arecontiguous.” However, after the Nine-Power Treaty, which demands fealty to the Open Door
Policy vis à vis China, was concluded, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was deemed to have lost its
raison d’être, and was cancelled in 1923 in accordance with the wishes of the US. As theaforementioned Mr. Griswold indicated, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was simply a “grudgingconcession”8 whose intent was to appease the Japanese during the war with Germany.
In conclusion, as already stated, at the Washington Conference Japan announced the withdrawalof troops from Siberia and returned Shandong province to China, as promised, and withdrew all
demands in Group V of the Twenty-One Demands.9
The apotheosis of US Far Eastern policy
After the Russo-Japanese War the Japan-US relationship changed. As I have already discussed, ina complete turnaround, what had been until then satisfactory ties veered toward confrontation. US
Far Eastern policies, including the attempt to oust Japan from Manchuria through dollar diplomacy,
8Griswold, op. cit., 217.

Also revealed by the Chinese delegation via Charles Evans Hughes at a meeting of the Far Eastern
Committee on January 24, 1922 was a secret treaty between Russia and China concluded in 1896. The reason forrevealing it was to establish the fact that such a treaty would enmesh China in an international dispute, and thatJapanese aggression was so severe as to necessitate a treaty between Russia and China. This gesture only served toprove that Japan had a just reason to make war with Russia. The attempt to convince world powers to place moretrust in China created the opposite impression. See Komatsu Midori, Washinton kaigi no shinsō (The truth about theWashington Conference) (Tokyo, Chūgai Shinronsha, 1921).
95and to control Japan’s China policy using the guise of the Open Door Policy, had ended in failure.
Even at the Paris Peace Conference, Japanese diplomacy defeated China’s claims and extended
Japan’s sphere of influence from Manchuria and Mongolia to the equator in the distant south,acquiring for Japan the most powerful status in Asia. The opportunity to block Japan’s rapid
progress presented itself in the form of the Washington Conference. While that conference gave
the appearance of serving as a symbol of postwar pacifism and international cooperation. Inactuality, because it disregarded the current reality to a great extent, it ultimately gave rise to an
unexpected contradiction.
For instance, the US had succeeded in orchestrating the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,
which it had viewed with unease and suspicion, and replacing it with the Four-Power Treaty,
thereby breaking the link between Japan and Britain. But as a result, the Japanese found themselves
not only in exile, but also forced to deal with the subsequent chaos and sudden changes in the Far
Eastern situation, even though they had absolutely no desire to do so.
Moreover, even a cursory examination of the Nine-Power Treaty Concerning China reveals thetreaty’s greatest flaw: its basis on the assumption that eventually a solid stable government would
appear in China, and that China would unite and form a modern nation. That China would become
even more chaotic due to the penetration of communism, and head toward violent exclusionism,
did not figure in the Nine-Power-Treaty scenario. The treaty signed at the Washington Conference
was premised not on the real China, but on a pie-in-the-sky China. It was impotent in the face ofsubsequent changes in the situation in China. Instead, it revealed the disconnection from reality
and the illusions that pervaded the Washington Conference.
The system formed by the treaties concluded at the conference is referred to as the Washington
Treaty System. It is interesting that in the West, the Versailles System, the objective of which is
the weaking of Germany, and in the East, the Washington System, intended to constrain Japaneseadvancement into Asia, appeared at roughly the same time. And it is even more ironic, historically,that those systems gave rise to the Second World War, because over the course of the next 20 years
Germany and Japan took it upon themselves to destroy them.
The Washington Conference is commonly thought of as the stage on which the international
codification of American Far Eastern Policy took place. It was also a venue where concepts andprinciples took precedence. Or, if we use Griswold’s words, “the Treaties of Washington were theapotheosis of the traditional Far Eastern policy of the United States.” 10 Since the Washington
Conference prevented further Japanese inroads into China and the Pacific, and smoothed the way
for American advancement into East Asia, we can correctly conclude that it was, in essence, a
political duel between Japan and the US.

10Griswold, op. cit., 331.

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