IIPS Japan Policy Commentary

Policy-Driven Science and Technology—From iPS cells to science-and-technology diplomacy—
By Professor Taizo Yakushiji
Research Counsellor

Introduction
In 2012, Shinya Yamanaka became the first Japanese recipient of the Nobel Prize inPhysiology or Medicine in 25 years. This splendid achievement makes him thenineteenth Japanese Nobel laureate in a line of succession stretching back to Dr. Hideki
Yukawa, the nation’s first prize recipient (if University of Chicago professor Yoichiro
Nambu, who obtained US citizenship, is included in the list).
Professor Yamanaka’s award represents a golden opportunity to restore Japanese
self-confidence (as many Japanese have, of late, lost confidence in the nation’s vitality).
Many Japanese will undoubtedly have been reassured that Japan is still fighting-fit interms of scientific and technological prowess.
In recent times, there has been debate in the mass media regarding the decline inJapan’s power as a nation. The context for this has been the remarkable advances madeby China and South Korea. However, in terms of science and technology, Japan’spower as a nation is not declining at all—it is instead growing. For example, as there
have been three Japanese winners—Dr. Kunihiko Kodaira, Dr. Heisuke Hironaka, andDr. Shigefumi Mori—of the Fields Medal (which is nicknamed “the mathematician’sNobel prize”), Japan’s scientific and technological research capability has become
well-known throughout Asia and the entire world. Many will likely recall the splendid
achievements of the Hayabusa, which recently shot photographs of far distant asteroids
and returned to Earth on a single ion engine.
The significance of Professor Yamanaka’s Nobel Prize
The Nobel Prize was awarded to Professor Yamanaka in recognition of the fact that hewas the first person to establish a technique for creating iPS cells. Of even greater
significance than this, however, is the fact that (as Professor Yamanaka himself recalls)
the prize was awarded to him a mere six years after he had established this technique.
How was it that he was able to win this prize after such a short interval? In the author’sview, this represents a typical example of “policy-driven science and technology.”
This most celebrated prize for science and technology is awarded to individual
scientists and technologists, not to nations. However, although leading-edge scientificand technological research involves assiduous work over a long period of time andcould conceivably be performed with nothing more than a pencil and paper (just likeresearch in mathematics or theoretical physics), there has, in recent times, been a shift
towards experimental research, which requires that researchers team up with research
assistants, put forward original ideas, and then verify them experimentally. This trend isevident in physics and chemistry as well as in medicine and physiology. Super
Kamiokande and the giant particle accelerator at CERN in Switzerland represent
examples of this phenomenon in the field of elementary particles.

-1-The outstanding nature of the research conducted by Professor Yamanaka’s group oniPS cells was due to the fact that it was founded on experimental work. Their uniqueconcept involved identifying four genes (from numerous possible candidates) which,when combined, would initialize the somatic-cell program. Experimental science wasrequired to verify this unique idea. This, in turn, required a superb team of experimental
assistants. There is no doubt that the impetus for Professor Yamanaka’s Nobel Prize
was provided by a highly talented group of research assistants led by KazutoshiTakahashi, an early graduate student of Professor Yamanaka when he was an assistantprofessor at Nara Institute of Science and Technology. As a graduate of the Faculty ofScience and Engineering at Doshisha University, Mr. Takahashi—who devised the ideaof selecting the four genes—is an expert at logical, step-by-step experimentation. At thepress conference held after he had been informed of his Nobel Prize, ProfessorYamanaka acknowledged Kazutoshi Takahashi’s achievements in this regard.
Experimental science requires numerous researchers and large amounts ofexperimental equipment. It is external public funding for research that makes such
experimental research possible. If this research funding can be obtained, a certain
percentage (normally 30%) is allocated for general and administrative expenses, and theuniversity can use this to pay the salaries of research assistants. This money can also beapplied to the purchase of experimental equipment. Thus, the government is becoming
involved in the promotion of research. Aside from the construction of large research
installations like Super Kamiokande, there is no need for the government to expend
huge amounts of the national treasury in support of original research. A moderate
degree of assistance—providing back-up support for small research teams and enablingthem to continue their research—will be sufficient. In this case, a “moderate degree ofassistance” means research funding of approximately 100 million yen per annum for a
pre-determined period (normally around five years).
The government is faced with the problems of how best to unearth research that islikely to bear fruit and of how to determine the size of the research support subsidy. Inempirical terms, its only recourse is to rely on the judgments of senior researchers who
have a research track record. Naturally, such arbiters can be wrong. These seniorresearchers might also reject research that conflicts with their own ideas and principles.
For these reasons, it is standard practice for research to be reviewed by several such
arbiters. The external funding for Professor Yamanaka’s initial research came from aprogram administered by the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) that isknown as CREST (the full name for which is “JST Strategic Basic Research Programs”).
Dr. Tadamitsu Kishimoto, the former president of Osaka University who discovered
interleukin 6, a key substance in the field of immunology, has played a major role inthis arbitration. Dr. Kishimoto, who served as an arbiter in the area of advanced medical
technology to combat infectious diseases and serious immune diseases, made thefollowing comments after the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Professor Yamanaka:“At the time, Professor Yamanaka was an assistant professor at Nara Institute ofScience and Technology and was conducting his research on a shoestring, with just twograduate students to help him. There were some who said that the proposition—that, ifgenes that characteristically appear in embryonic stem cells were to be inserted into
mature cells, the mature cells might possibly return to an immature state—was outside
the scope of my fields, which are infectious diseases and serious immune diseases. At
the time, everyone believed that—although it was an interesting idea—mature cells-2-

would be very unlikely to revert to normal, and no one had bothered to start any
research work based on this premise. However, since this was an original and bold ideathat had been the subject of an article in the well-known magazine Cell, and, since
Professor Yamanaka’s research was well organized, his proposal was accepted on thestrength of the consensus view that it would not hurt to have one researcher pursuingthis avenue. The upshot of this was that Kyoto University, which was impressed by theaward of CREST program funding for Professor Yamanaka’s work, offered him aprofessorship at its Institute for Frontier Medical Sciences. With increased manpower,as well, in the shape of more graduate students, his research was able to proceed at afaster clip, resulting in the discovery of iPS cells.”(Excerpt from the journal to commemorate the 12th anniversary of the CRESTprogram)
A misconception regarding the Council for Science and Technology Policy
The body established by the Cabinet Office to promote policy-driven science andtechnology is known as the Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP).
The CSTP remained in existence during the administration of the Democratic Partyof Japan (DPJ). Indicative of the DPJ administration’s inability to execute policy,
however, there was no evidence of any notable achievements during this period. Thereason for this would seem to be that neither the DPJ nor the members of the CSTP
fully understood that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration had founded
this body for the purpose of implementing policy-driven science and technology.
At the time that this author belonged to the CSTP, it was comprised of top-classspecialists in science and technology, including Dr. Tadamitsu Kishimoto, the former
president of Osaka University, who was mentioned above; Professor Hiroyuki Abe, theformer president of Tohoku University; and presidents and vice presidents of several
major companies. Following a simple process, this group accomplished much in theway of implementing policy-driven science and technology. In other words, we simply
determined—from a policy standpoint—which of the many scientific and technologicalfields ought to be strengthened and funded.
Naturally, funding required political backing, without which it would have been
impossible to sway the powerful Ministry of Finance. Accordingly, we enjoyed close
links with the Investigative Committee on National Development Based on Science andTechnology, part of the LDP’s Policy Research Council, and crossed swords with thedirector general of the Ministry of Finance’s Budget Bureau. This was the process bywhich we promoted policy-driven science and technology.
The CSTP Bioethics Committee
In order to establish key policies, meetings known as “special investigative committees,”
which brought together numerous experts, were held under the umbrella of the CSTP.
One of these—the Bioethics Committee—proved highly contentious and extremelydifficult to manage.
The Bioethics Committee can be traced back to June 6, 2001, when the Act on
Regulation of Human Cloning Techniques came into effect. This law stipulated that it islegal to create cloned sheep like Dolly but illegal to clone human beings. Asupplementary provision to this law required the government to review the handling of-3-

human fertilized embryos (somatic cell nuclear transfer embryonic stem cells, orSCNTES) and take necessary measures within three years. The fast-approachingdeadline for this was June 2004.
When the author was a member of the CSTP, the Bioethics Committee was chairedby Professor Hiroo Imura, the former president of Kyoto University. Since ProfessorImura was a doctor, it was mistakenly assumed that he was an advocate ofhuman-embryo research. Despite the fact that the deadline for reaching a decision waslooming, under his chairmanship, the Bioethics Committee turned into a dogfightbetween supporters and opponents of human-embryo research, and this atmospherecompletely precluded any conclusion from being reached. On January 6, 2004,
Professor Imura resigned as chairman of the committee, saying as he departed that acommittee like this would be better off with a political scientist like Mr. Yakushiji aschairman. The author was utterly astounded by this stunning statement.
The deadline for reaching a decision was six months away. According to the learned
opponents of human-embryo research on the committee, it would have been unwise toreach a decision before more safety information and up-to-date medical information
were made available. Consequently, for the first three months, the committee
summoned numerous doctors and held hearings. As a result of this, a certain level ofconfidence was built up among the faction opposed to human-embryo research as well,and it became apparent that there were different shades of opinion among the membersof this opposition camp.
Thus it was that, with time running out, the author moved for a show of hands for oragainst in the afternoon session of the Bioethics Committee on June 23, 2004, in the
belief that it would have been irresponsible to enter both sides of the argument into theofficial record. The details of the motion were as follows: (1) overall, this research shallbe considered to be a social system program; (2) women shall not be used as
experimental vehicles for this research; (3) the ban on research shall not be lifted unlessthe safety of research is guaranteed; and (4) research into the cloning of embryos(SCNTES) shall be restricted to one or two laboratories only. Thus, the proposal that weconsidered was one that also took into account the views of opponents ofhuman-embryo research. The following day, however, banner headlines in four major
newspapers proclaimed that the “Council for Science and Technology Policy lifts ban
on research into cloning of embryos.” This was the first and last time that the CSTP wasfeatured on the front page of any major newspaper.
For the next few days, the author faced a barrage of questions from magazines andthe mass media. The author was even attacked by committee members opposed to thedecision who had gone along with it behind closed doors. (Strikingly, however, the only
newspaper to report the matter accurately was the Asahi Shimbun, which had been
consistently critical of the committee’s work.) In addition, the author arranged andscheduled mass media interviews for opponents as well as supporters of the decision,
thereby helping to disseminate also the opposing view. As the tide of events movedforward, both the opponents of the decision and the mass media subsequently moved on
to consequential issues (such as the passing of the relevant legislation). A few years
later, the author was even able to re-establish good personal relations with thedecision’s opponents.

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The above-mentioned discovery of iPS cells by Professor Yamanaka in 2006
changed the dynamic. At the time that the author was holding external hearings of theBioethics Committee, it was clear that the tide was swinging this way. Then, in 2005,
UNESCO’s General Conference adopted its Universal Declaration on Bioethics andHuman Rights, and, in March 2006, the organization convened a general session of its
International Bioethics Committee (IBC), which was held at Sophia University in thepresence of Crown Prince Naruhito and to which the author was also invited. With this,the author’s tumultuous term of service to the CSTP’s Bioethics Committee came to anend.
Conclusion
As a member of the CSTP, the author was able to assist in the execution of a number ofpolicy-driven science-and-technology initiatives, such as the draft of the Third Basic
Plan for Science and Technology and the institutional reforms enshrined within it. One
such initiative, which continues to this day, is science-and-technology diplomacy.
Japan has continued to overlook the fact that innovation is born of societal norms.
Without social reforms, Japan will likely lapse into a state of deadlock from which nofresh innovation will emerge. In a sense, the act of grafting new ideas onto the things
one has learned, in order to come up with completely new inventions, represents a formof betrayal of one’s teachers. The more rigid the structure of teaching and learning, thefewer the people emerging who can graft on new ideas.
Henry Dyer, the Scot who created the Faculty of Engineering at the University ofTokyo during the Meiji era, was surprised at the skill with which his students were able
to rapidly build new types of construction. As described in the novel Clouds above theHill, societal norms during the Meiji era were characterized by a lack ofconstraints—society was fluid, and the rapid promotion of able personnel was common.
Shinichiro Ogaki, the president of the National Institute for Environmental Studies(NIES) (and a friend of the author) has recently said the same, relating how the students
whom he taught almost 20 years ago at the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok
are conducting environmental research which is more advanced than that presently
being carried out at NIES. For this reason, he adds, NIES has concluded an umbrella
contract with the AIT under which they will carry out joint environmental research.
Japan, too, will have to enter into cooperative programs in science and technology
with developing nations on an equal footing. It was in line with this thinking that theauthor, at the end of his time on the CSTP, initiated a new policy-driven
science-and-technology project with funding from the Overseas Cooperation Fund
administered by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and matchingscience-and-technology promotion funding from the JST. This was the Science andTechnology Diplomacy Program (also known as SATREPS). The scale of the budget
for this program is the same as that of the CREST program—100 million yen perannum per project, for three to five years. There are currently 66 projects underway in
34 countries in Asia, Africa, and South America, in fields such as the environment,
disaster prevention, and infectious diseases.
The objective of this program is social implementation. In other words, the intention
is that putting projects into effect in different countries with different societal norms
will lead Japanese researchers and researchers from the countries in question to come up
with innovations.
-5© IIPS (Institute for International Policy Studies)