CHAPTER 5: JAPAN AND WORLD WAR I
1. A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS
Japan finally enters the war
On June 28, 1914, during a visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Archduke
Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his wife wereassassinated by a Serbian youth. That incident caused the already tense situation in the
Balkan peninsula to worsen, and on July 28 Austria declared war on Serbia. On August 1
Germany declared war on Russia. France and Britain soon declared war on Germany. Europe
was now enveloped in the dark clouds of conflict: World War I had broken out.

On August 4 Britain declared war on Germany. On the same day William Conyngham Greene,
British ambassador to Japan, called on Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki, to explain how Britain
would handle the European war in the context of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, adding that “ifthe fighting should extend to the Far East, and an assault on Hong Kong and Weihaiwei wereto occur, His Majesty’s government would rely on the support of the Imperial government.”
Also on August 4, the Japanese government announced that it would observe strict neutrality,
but if the object of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should become endangered, Japan would takethe necessary measures to fulfill its obligations thereto, at the same time expressing thefervent hope that Japanese participation would not be necessary. 1

Still on the same day, in Britain, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey summoned Japanese
Ambassador Inoue Katsunosuke, and told him that His Majesty’s government “was deeply
grateful to the Japanese Government for their generous offer of assistance.” Grey added thatsince France had aided the Russian fleet during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was entitledto ask the UK for assistance, given the terms of the alliance, but Japan did not do so. This wasindeed a “generous attitude” that demonstrated sincerity and self-restraint, and it
encouraged the UK to avoid causing trouble for Japan. However, in the event that Japan’s aid
became necessary, “His Majesty’s Government would gladly avail themselves of Japanese
assistance.”2

Subsequently a formal request emanated from the UK, asking the Japanese government “toemploy some of their warships in hunting out and destroying German armed merchantmen

Kajima Morinosuke, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 3, 1894-1922 (Tokyo: Kajima Institute ofInternational Peace, 1980), 38-39.
1

2

Ibid., 39, 41.

1

in China”3 to protect British commercial vessels. There were minor inconsistencies in the
British and Japanese perceptions of exactly what Japan’s sphere of action would be, but on
August 15, Japan sent an ultimatum of the following nature to Germany:(1) Withdraw German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds immediately from theJapanese and Chinese waters, and disarm at once those which cannot be so
withdrawn.
(2) On a date not later than September 15th, 1914, deliver the entire leased territory of
Kiao-chou [Jiaozhou] to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without condition ofcompensation, with a view to eventual restoration of same to China. 4
Japan had no desire to become involved in the war. However, on August 23, when one week
had passed (an unprecedently generous deadline for a reply to an ultimatum) and no reply
had been forthcoming, Japan declared war on Germany.

Japanese troops wasted no time launching an offensive on Qingdao, and by early November
had taken possession of all railways in Shandong province: Jiaozhou Bay, Qingdao, and Jiaoji(Jiaozhou to Jinan). Meanwhile, in mid-October, the Japanese Navy seized German
possessions north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean.
Japan refuses to send troops to Europe
Beginning in the autumn of 1914, after Japan joined the war against Germany, requests
emanating from Britain, France, and Russia for the deployment of Japanese troops to Europe
were received. Japan turned down these requests. When a second request emanated fromBritain, Foreign Minister Katō sent a resolute refusal, stating that the Imperial army’s “soleobject is national defence. The dispatch of the Imperial army far away from home for purpose
other than those partaking of the nature of national defence is therefore incompatible withthe fundamental principle of its system….”5Additionally, Japan received appeals from Belgium, France, and Serbia to send army units to
Europe, but rejected each and every one of them.

3

Ibid., 41.

4Ibid., 54.

Ibid., 211; Itō Masanori, ed., Katō Takaaki, gekan (Katō Takaaki, vol. 2) (Tokyo: Kato Hakudenki
hensan iinkai (Compilation Committee for the Biography of Count Kato), 1929).
52When the aforementioned requests were made, Britain came forth with an offer to assist withthe cost of dispatching troops, and with the opinion that by dispatching those troops Japan
should certainly have an important, active role in postwar Allied conferences. Nevertheless,Japan responded in the negative.

Within the same time frame, on September 2, Britain asked Japan to dispatch a fleet to theMediterranean Sea, but the Japanese government replied that the Navy’s purpose was todefend Japan from foreign invaders, and that Japan did not have the reserves for an overseas
campaign.6 On November 15 Britain asked Japan, once again, to send a fleet to the Dardanelles
to join with the British fleet in blockading the German and Turkish fleets. On that occasion
Britain offered to assist with repairs necessitated by damage to Japanese ships, and to furnish
fuel and munitions at no cost to Japan. But the Japanese, citing the same reasons as before,
said no, explaining that dispatching a Japanese fleet to Europe would weaken Japan’s
defenses, and that the presence of the main fleet in Japanese waters was indispensable tokeeping the peace in the Far East. However, the activity of German warships intensified, andin January 1917 Britain again requested the deployment of Japanese warships to theMediterranean Sea. After lengthy negotiations, Japan acquiesced, and dispatched a torpedo
squadron comprising a cruiser and eight destroyers in early February.

Incidentally, in February 1917, Germany announced that it would engage in unrestrictedsubmarine warfare, and true to its word, did exactly that, causing severe damage to Allied
vessels. Many Japanese passenger ships sailing to and from Europe were attacked and sunkin the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Although the Japanese hadrefused to dispatch a fleet to the Mediterranean, they were forced to change their stance whenconfronted with that situation. However, the Ōkuma Cabinet (1914-16) had already refused
to dispatch a fleet. For the Terauchi Cabinet (1916-18) to overturn that decision, it needed
assurance of British support for Japanese claims on Shandong and German possessions northof the equator in the Pacific. When the Japanese government queried Britain, it received areply, on February 16, stating that His Majesty’s government would willingly support thoseclaims.

I hope that my brief description of the reasons behind Japan’s entrance into the First World
War will help readers understand that Japanese participation in that conflict was not
motivated by malicious or self-serving intentions, as the following account in a Japanese highschool textbook would have us believe:

6

Ibid., 214.

3

The [Japanese government] declared war against Germany, believingthat an ideal opportunity had arrived that would permit Japan toexpand its influence in Asia, on the strength of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance.7

The truth is that our government opted to enter the war only after carefully considering
multiple factors: appeals from the Allies, friendship and treaties with other nations, theunderlying principles of Japan’s armed forces, the unfolding of the war situation, and national
interests. There was certainly no unscrupulous underlying motive.
The Twenty-One Demands in context
During World War I, Sino-Japanese relations were complicated by what are referred to as theTwenty-One Demands, which are considered by some to be a synonym for aggression against
China. An account in the aforementioned textbook describes them as follows:

In 1915 Japan forced the Twenty-One Demands on the Yuan Shikai
government. These constituted a significant infringement of Chinese
sovereignty and were greeted by vehement opposition from China. The
US attempted to rein Japan in, but Japan removed only a portion of thedemands, issued an ultimatum, and forced the Chinese to accept them. 8

Accounts on this topic in other Japanese history textbooks, without exception, are similar incontent and message. But is it really possible to condemn Japan because of the Twenty-One
Demands? The aforementioned American historian Griswold offers his opinion on thismatter, which thoroughly explains Japan’s reasons for presenting the Twenty-One Demands
and their historical background.

Japan had been making great strides toward wealth and power since
her war with Russia. But she had by no means reached the objectives
the attainment of which she believed her geographical situation madeimperative. The position in Korea, southern Manchuria and eastern
Inner Mongolia that she had wrested from Russia and fortified with thesundry political instruments already discussed had enhanced her senseof security, yet left it far from complete. Russia herself, though bound to
Japan by various treaties, was still a menace to the north. England and7

Naoki Kōjirō et al., Nihonshi santeiban (Japanese history, third edition) (Tokyo: Jikkyō Shuppan,

1989).
8

Ibid.

4

the United States caused her further uneasiness. The Knox
neutralization scheme and the Chinchow [Jinzhou]-Aigun project had
threatened the foundations of her special position north of the Great
Wall. South of it, in China proper, she had experienced the samedifficulty in forcing her way into the thicket of Europeans rights andprivileges as had the United States.

(…)

In China proper lay the raw materials and natural resources which, forEurope, were profitable speculations, but for Japan were the lifebloodof existence … [Japan] had not attained her goal; she was fearful oflosing what she had, and this because of the competitive imperialism ofWestern nations, thousands of miles away, to which China was ofinfinitely less political and economic significance than to Japan. Now
that these Western nations were preoccupied with the war, Japan
would adjust the situation. Since 1895, when France, Russia andGermany had forced her to return the Liaotung [Liaodong] Peninsula to
China, Western interventionists had repeatedly thwarted Japan in her
pursuit of what, to her, was not only a just but vitally essential policy.
This time she would profit by experience. She would strengthen her
foothold in Manchuria and Mongolia, and make that in Shantung[Shandong] secure enough to withstand another Triple Intervention.
She would establish access to China’s raw materials, to the financial,industrial and commercial privileges which she considered
indispensable to her existence as a modern industrialized state, and forwhich she had been too poor, financially, to compete with Europe.
Because she had not been able to accomplish these ends by economicmeans, she would do so by political. Finally, she would make thecontract so binding that it could not be broken on European council
tables once the war freed Europe’s attention. Such, briefly, was theorigin of the Twenty-One Demands.9
Were the Twenty-One Demands unreasonable?
In January 1915 Hioki Eki, Japanese ambassador to the nascent Republic of China, underorders from Foreign Minister Katō, presented the Twenty-One Demands to President Yuan
Shikai. A summary follows.

9

Griswold, op. cit., 187-89.

5Group I: Four articles whereby the Japanese government demands that the Chinese
government agree in advance to Japan’s disposition of former German interests in Shandong
province.

Group II: Seven articles demanding: a 99-year extension of the leases on Port Arthur andDalian, as well as on the South Manchurian and Anfeng (Andong-Mukden) railways;
permission for Japanese nationals to reside, travel, and conduct business in South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia; the consent of the Japanese government when a railway is to bebuilt or the Chinese government employs advisers, to be obtained in advance.

Group III: Two articles demanding that the Hanyeping Co. be made a joint Japanese-Chineseconcern when the opportune moment arrives.

Group IV: One article demanding that the Chinese government neither cede nor lease any
harbor, bay, or island along the coast of China to a third power.

Group V: Seven articles (these were desiderata, not demands) that were alleged to infringe
upon Chinese sovereignty: (Article 1) a request that the Chinese government employ
Japanese political and military advisers; (Article 2) a request that Japanese hospitals, temples,and schools be given the right to own land; (Article 3) a request that joint Japanese-Chinese
police forces be established in certain areas, if necessary; (Article 4) a request that China
purchase a fixed amount of weapons from Japan or establish a Japanese-Chinese jointly
operated arsenal; (Article 5) a request that railway construction rights in South China be
granted to Japan; (Article 6) a request that priority be given to Japan concerning theconstruction or working of railways, mines, and harbors in Fujian province; (Article 7) arequest that Japanese subjects be granted the right to do missionary work in China.

Thus, there were 14 demands; again, the five articles in Group V were desiderata. The term
“Twenty-One Demands” itself was a Chinese construction — an exaggeration designed, forpropaganda purposes, to have a negative effect — and it certainly was misinterpreted.

Were the so-called Twenty-One Demands in fact unreasonable? I will now investigate two or
three of them in depth.

For instance, let us have a look at Group II, which concerns Manchuria and Mongolia. Thereis nothing remarkable about extending the term of lease for concessions in Port Arthur andDalian, or for the South Manchuria Railway, for 99 years. Remember that when Britain leased
Hong Kong from China, the term was 99 years. The Chinese objected to allowing Japanese6citizens to reside, engage in business, and own land in Manchuria and Mongolia, saying thatas long as Japanese nations enjoyed extraterritoriality there, they may as well have colonizedthose areas. Perhaps the Chinese had a point there, but China had already granted special
rights of the same sort in Outer Mongolia to Russia, so this argument was hardly persuasive.

An examination of Group III, which relates to the Hanyeping Ironworks, tells us that this was
not a new demand. It was based on a longstanding relationship between the ironworks andJapan. Zhang Zhidong, the Viceroy of Huguang, established the enterprise in Hanyang in 1892.
It had started out with iron mines in Daye, and then the ironworks was established. Later,
entrepreneur and politician Sheng Xuanhuai took over the business. In 1896, the year after
the 1st Sino-Japanese War ended, he combined three entities: the Hanyang Arsenal, the Dayeiron mines, and the Pingxiang colliery to form Hanyeping Ironworks. Also in 1896, the Yahata
Steel Works was founded in Japan. Because iron ore is scarce in Japan, the Japanese signed acontract with Hanyeping in 1899 for the importation of iron ore to Japan and the export ofthe same amount of coal to China. Since Germany plotted to obstruct Japanese interests after
the Boxer Rebellion, Japan lent ¥3 million to Hanyeping in 1904, and with the Daye Iron Mineas collateral, extracted a promise not to sell that collateral to any other nation for a period of
60 years. This arrangement permitted Japan to fulfill the huge demand for iron ore during the
Russo-Japanese War. When the 1911 (Xinhai) Revolution broke out, revolutionary forces
attempted to confiscate Hanyeping. Sheng Xuanhuai attempted to avoid confiscation by
paying CN¥ 2 million, asking Japan for help in raising the money. Japan agreed, provided that
Hanyeping be made a joint Sino-Japanese venture. A provisional merger contract was drawn
up. The relationship between Japan and Hanyeping was strengthened, but China was leaning
toward nationalizing the firm. Hanyeping, which was of life-and-death importance to Japan,
was now in a precarious position. This situation prompted the submission of Group II, whose
articles were not at all sudden new demands.
Group V desiderata did not infringe upon Chinese sovereignty
There was considerable background behind and reasons for the desiderata in Group V, forwhich Japan was accused of infringing upon Chinese sovereignty. For instance, the reference
to Fukien [Fujian] in Article 6 is related to the demand concerning harbors, bays, and islands
along the coast of China in Group IV.

The historical background: In 1898, when the Western powers divided up China, Japan and
China signed a diplomatic note stating that China would not cede Fujian province to any othernation. However, in December 1900 the US was contemplating establishing a concession at
Sansha Bay, located on the coast of that province. Japan objected, stating that such anenterprise would violate an agreement concluded between Japan and China, and also conflictwith the objective of maintaining territorial integrity in China, which the US had advocated.
Moreover, this would be an attempt to violate Chinese sovereignty coming in the face ofAmerican arguments against doing exactly that. Consequently, the US abandoned that
scheme.

7However, according to political scientist Takagi Yasaka, that incident was recorded in 1915,
but accounts pertaining to it were not published until 1924. 10, 11 Therefore, in 1915, when
the Twenty-One Demands were the target of international scrutiny, the world knew nothingof the Sansha Bay concession scheme. Japanese aspirations in and requests pertaining toFujian province were condemned unilaterally because the world was totally ignorant of thehistorical background. This is one example that demonstrates that the criticism of theTwenty-One Demands was unfair.

Another example: in mid-March 1915 during negotiations pertaining to the Twenty-One
Demands, Sun Yat-Sen, one of the leaders of the Chinese revolution, sent a note to Koike
Chōzō, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Political Affairs Bureau. In it Sun proposed a JapanChina covenant that would include the following terms: (1) to facilitate joint Japan-China
operations, Chinese weapons would be manufactured to match the gauge of Japanese
weapons, (2) when the Chinese military or government planned to employ foreigners,
Japanese would be given priority, and (3) Japan would be consulted in advance when foreign
capital was needed or a merger was planned for mines, railways, or coastal routes. 12
Surprisingly, Sun’s alliance proposal was almost identical to portions of the Twenty-One
Demands (Group II, Group III, and Articles 4, 5, and 6 of Group V), in connection with which
Japan was criticized for infringing upon Chinese sovereignty. Sun Yat-sen’s proposal
demonstrates that his aspirations were almost exactly the same as Japan’s demands anddesiderata. The fact that the Twenty-One Demands, despite the amount of censure theyreceived from China and elsewhere, actually matched Chinese preferences renders
meaningless the vast majority of disparagement Japan was subjected to for presenting theTwenty-One Demands.
Asahi Shinbun: “Chinese locutions are offensive”
Negotiations between Japan and China over the Twenty-One Demands persisted for fourmonths; the long, drawn-out process included 25 meetings, if one counts only official
sessions. During that time Japan acceded to Chinese wishes, withdrawing some of thedemands. Revision after revision was made, but still no agreement could be reached.
Ultimately Group V was deleted with the proviso that negotiations concerning it would be

Takagi Yasaka, Beikoku tōyō seisaku no shiteki kōsatsu (Historical considerations of US Far Easternpolicy) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1942).
10

US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, Volume II;https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914-20v02/d236; Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, with the Address of the President to Congress December 7, 1915;
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1915/d87.
11

12

Usui Katsumi, Nihon to Chūgoku: Taishō jidai (Japan and China: Taishō era) (Tokyo: Hara Shobō,1972).

8

held at a later date. The matter was settled by incorporating the remaining 16 articles into an
ultimatum that China was pressed to accept. The fact that an ultimatum was issued gives theimpression that force was involved, but today we are certain beyond a reasonable doubt that
Yuan Shikai himself asked that it be issued.

Furthermore, I should mention that another factor instrumental in the ultimatum’s issuancewas uncompromisingly inflexible public opinion, and here journalists must accept some
responsibility. Newspaper editorials came out with language like “Give them a deadline!” and“China is to blame!” (Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 01 May and 04 May), “An ultimatum is inevitable!”(Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun, 04 May), “An ultimatum must be the next step” (Jiji Shinpō, 05
May). The 05 May edition of the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun went as far to censure China, calling thelanguage in the Chinese government’s final reply “exceedingly offensive,” and said that the“Empire’s demands must be met, representing as they do, a grand 100-year plan for East
Asia.” Even progressive politician Yoshino Sakuzō concluded that “at this point we have no
choice but to issue an ultimatum.” We must be mindful that these opinions were thepredominating ones at that time.
How the Twenty-One Demands were distorted
China formally accepted the ultimatum issued by Japan, and the negotiations came to an end.
A treaty between Japan and China including 16 articles came into being and was signed andsealed on May 25, 1915 (the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915). I would now like to address a few
of the repercussions engendered by that treaty.

On May 11, US Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan sent a notification to both Japan and
China; it read, in part, as follows:[T]he Government of the United States has the honor to notify theImperial Japanese Government that it cannot recognize any agreement
or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be enteredinto between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing … thepolitical or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or theinternational policy relative to China commonly known as the open
door policy.13

13 US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, Telegram from Secretary of State Bryan to Ambassador Guthrie in Tokyo, 11 May 1915;
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1915/d143.

9This was the harbinger of US Far Eastern policy informed by the open door policy, which
later achieved fame as the “nonrecognition policy.” Bryan’s nonrecognition reflex was
eventually embraced by Secretary of State Henry Stimson, in his nonrecognition of theManchurian Incident, when it became even more widely known. Later, during negotiations
between Japan and the US, after the 2nd Sino-Japanese War began, it morphed into
Secretary Cordell Hull’s rigid “respect for principles,” which severely harmed Japan-US
relations and ultimately provoked war between Japan and the US. From this standpoint it
is safe to conclude that Bryan’s announced nonrecognition of the Twenty-One Demands
was a crucial step in the process leading to the Greater East Asian War.

Now I would like to point out how China’s extremely exaggerated, distorted version of theTwenty-One Demands, publicized at home and abroad, created needless misunderstanding.
Chinese repudiation of the Twenty-One Demands subsequently became the main theme of
the anti-Japanese movement. The most influential organization in that movement was the
All-Hubei Society for Commercial and Diplomatic Affairs.

A pamphlet issued by that organization, claiming to be an explanation of the Twenty-One
Demands, made the following claims about them.

1.
2.
3.
4.

China shall cede police and administrative authority in South Manchuria to Japan.
All instructors of Chinese army and navy personnel shall be Japanese.
The Japanese language shall be taught in all Chinese schools.
In the event of insurrections in China, China shall ask Japan for military support, andJapan shall maintain public order in China.
5. China shall cede all oil interests.
6. Japanese nationals shall have the right to engage in business anywhere in China.
All of the above were fictitious “demands” that had no connection to the actual TwentyOne Demands. Publicizing these fabrications further aggravated the problem.

The situation grew even worse when Paul Reinsch, US ambassador to China, became
involved. Reinsch was known for wearing two hats: pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese, he wasboth an official representative of the US Department of State and an unofficial advisor to
the Chinese government. Historian Charles Tansill had the following to say about Reinsch:
In connection with [the Twenty-One Demands] the American
Minister at Peking, Paul Reinsch, sent to the Department of State a10series of dispatches so critical in tone that they helped to create inAmerican minds a fixation of Japanese wickedness that madeeventual war a probability. This probability was increased when
Secretary Bryan (May 11, 1915) sent to Tokyo a nonrecognition notethat was later exhumed from the old files of State Department
correspondence by Secretary Stimson and fashioned into a hand
grenade that shattered all hope of peaceful relations between Japanand the United States.14
1. Eventual fate of the Twenty-One Demands
With the conclusion of the 1915 treaty, the matter of the Twenty-One Demands wasconsidered settled. But what was the eventual fate of the individual demands? The Chinese
claimed that the treaty was forced upon them, and that they were not exercising free willwhen they signed it. They insisted that it be declared null and void. They deliberately failed
to adhere to its terms, and in 1923 the Chinese National Assembly passed a resolution
abrogating the treaty.

If it were possible to abrogate a treaty on the grounds that it was signed under some pressure,most of the world’s treaties would immediately be revoked. For instance, the Treaty of Peking
signed after the 1st Sino-Japanese War was, in fact, a consequence of the Triple Intervention.
Suppose the Japanese had espoused the same logic employed by the Chinese. They could haveinsisted that the Treaty of Peking was forced upon them, declared it null and void, andclaimed the right to take permanent possession of the Liaodong peninsula. Then there would
have been absolutely no need to extend the leases in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia (Group II of the Twenty-One Demands). But would the Chinese consent to such a
position? Furthermore, the Germans could have made the same claim about the Treaty of
Versailles. As could the Japanese with respect to the Potsdam Declaration, which followed thedropping of the atomic bombs on Japan. In the first place, China’s logic was patently selfserving. In the second place, the Japanese were not guilty of suppressing Chinese free will.
Remember that the treaty the Chinese found so objectionable was the product of a full fourmonths of diplomatic negotiations.

What is surprising is that soon after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty, in June of
1915, China issued a decree ordering the punishment of traitors. According to the draconian
decree, the definition of a traitor was anyone who leased land to a Japanese; traitors were to
be summarily executed, without the benefit of a trial. Of course, the intent here was to prevent
Japanese from acquiring land. At about the same time, the Chinese secretly distributed ahandbook to civil servants in South Manchuria, instructing them to obstruct land leaseTansill, Charles Callan, Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-1941 (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1952), 51; https://archive.org/details/backdoortowarroo0000char_c3u3.
14

11

transactions that involved Japanese. Therefore, land leases in South Manchuria that shouldhave been finalized the moment the treaty was signed, now disappeared into thin air. That agovernment could use a decree issued at the very moment an international treaty had beenconcluded to obstruct its implementation was an act of betrayal without precedent anywherein the world. As a result, China infringed on every right the Japanese had acquired throughthe treaty in South Manchuria and East Inner Mongolia. This action strained andexponentially worsened the relationship between Japan and China in Manchuria, and became
one of the primary causes of the Manchurian Incident.

As I stated earlier, in the end only 16 of the 21 demands were presented to China. These wereincorporated into the June 1915 treaty, but at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922
Japan returned Shandong province to China, and retracted its preferential rights pertaining
to railways in Manchuria and Mongolia, and the hiring of advisors. Every single one of thedesiderata in Group V, which had been tabled for future discussion, was withdrawn.
Consequently, in 1922, when the Washington Conference ended, most of the original
demands had lapsed, and only 10, which had survived in the treaty, remained. Even they cameto naught, caught in the maelstrom of China’s vicious anti-Japanese campaign.

12