Chapter 4
Nanjing, as Observed by Diplomats….. Major General Sasaki was the top China expert in the Army, had friendly
relationships with most of the main leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Party, including
Chiang Kai-shek, and understood the Nationalist Party’s Revolution. He loved China.....
He knew the most about Nanjing before and after its capture. I believed Major General
Sasaki’s statement expressed the correct view on Nanjing then. I have never seen nor
heard a so-called Nanjing massacre. It is said something happened in Nanjing but I thinkthat what Major General Sasaki described in his book was the fact. (Statement by Mr.
Iwai Eiichi, Assistant Consul)

Near Chong Shang Road in Nanjing. A Japanese soldier found a carriage, to which heattached the Japanese flag, and ran it with a Chinese riding along.
(December 23, 1937)136) Interview with Mr. Iwai Eiichi (岩井英一), Assistant Consul
Mr. Iwai Eiichi, a China expert in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, graduated from theDong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen or East Asian Literary School. It was said that he had astrong network of acquaintances in the military world. His name appeared in the context
of several incidents that occurred in China, including the Chengdu Incident and the
Xingyi Construction Movement.
I heard that he was in Shanghai in the beginning of 1938 and asked him for interview
about the Nanjing incident. Unexpectedly, he sent me a long letter, in which he asked me
to call him before the interview. I called him at once and he said he was going to take atrip to Nagoya so we set the interview for the following week. It was 1984.
Mr. Iwai was born in 1899. When we met he was 85 years old yet in very fine health. He
practiced judo in the old days and his firm body proved it. His memory was splendid, heremembered China-Japan diplomacy before the War in detail and he talked about thosetimes for an hour. He wrote the book Memory of Shanghai, but he spoke to me about
things that were not in the book.
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should try to get to know the Army and encourage thesharing of information with them,” that was Mr. Iwai's idea. So, he proposed this to Mr.
Kawai Tatsuo (河相達夫), the Director of the Information Bureau, to hold a dinner
meeting with Army once a month. Attendees were, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Kawai, Mr. Tanaka Shigetoku (田中重徳), the Chief of the First Department of theInformation Bureau, and Mr. Iwai, and from the Army, Mr. Kagesa Sadaaki (影佐禎昭),
the Chief of the China Section, and the selection of other members was up to Mr. Kagesa.
The first meeting was scheduled for August 13 at a Japanese restaurant in Akasaka. Thatday, in Tokyo, the decision to dispatch two Divisions to Shanghai was finalized, while inShanghai, the Chinese Army and Japanese Landing Force initiated battle. Both the Armyand the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were in a great stir. They waited for Mr. Kagesa at therestaurant and he eventually appeared. Mr. Kagesa brought with him from the Army,
Major Kawamoto Yoshitaro (川本芳太郎) of the Military Affairs Department of theMilitary Affairs Bureau, who came with Mr. Kagesa, but the other invitee, Lieutenant
Colonel Watari Sakon (渡左近), Chief of the China Department of the General Staff
Headquarters, could not make it.
2During dinner, opposed to the idea of an all-out attack, which Mr. Iwai insisted on, Mr.
Kagesa said, “We decided to dispatch two Divisions to Shanghai, and one Division to
Qingdao.” Mr. Iwai protested, “All available Divisions should be dispatched to Shanghai,attack Nanjing, and then we can conclude a peace treaty.”
Mr. Iwai believed that if Japan attacked Nanjing, China would surrender. Mr. Kagesa
eventually agreed with him. After that, Mr. Iwai visited Beijing and Tianjin in August and
September, then Shanghai and Nanjing in December.
– Did you think, at the time, that if Japan captured Nanjing China would havesurrendered?
In the previous year, I went to Chongqing from Nanjing to my new appointment, consulgeneral in Chengdu. Before reaching Chongqing, I had to change to smaller boats acouple of times. The Chang Jiang was a serpentine river and during the week-long trip I
felt as though I was in the same place as I was from the previous day. Chengdu wassituated in a far, far-off place. China declared already they would keep fighting even if
they had to run into the depths of their huge country, so I knew that if we started a war
against China, it would get serious. As I met Mr. Kagesa, I knew that the war would not
end anytime soon. Nevertheless, to capture the enemy's capital was a main wartime
objective.
I guessed that the discussion at the meeting on the 13th was conveyed to General Matsui,
the Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, by Mr. Kagesa, the Chief of the
China Department, because I heard that, when General Matsui was leaving for China, atthe platform at Tokyo Station, he said to the Prime Minister Konoe, who had come to see
General Matsui off, that he would advance as far as Nanjing. This meant that Mr. Kagesa
gave General Matsui this advice, which was the thought that I shared with Mr. Kagesa.
This struck me as I read the Note written by the Prime Minister Konoe. I didn't write thisstory in my book because it might sound self-serving, but this was very likely what had
happened.
– At the end of December 1937, you went to Shanghai and Nanjing.

3Mr. Kawai went to inspect the occupied areas and I accompanied him. We left Tokyo on
December 31.
– Did someone else accompany you?
No, it was only the two of us.
– After that, did you go to Nanjing?
I went to Nanjing with Mr. Kawai. We stayed in Nanjing for a couple of days. It was three
weeks after the capture, so we were unable to find a decent hotel or inn--maybe we stayedsomewhere in Nanjing, or found an inn in Xiaguan and stayed there.
– Did you visit the consulate-general?
Well, no. I didn't know in what situation the consulate-general was. We had no particularplan for the consulate-general, but just to inspect the place that we had occupied.
– What was the situation in Nanjing?
The city was a battlefield; it looked like as battlefields do.
– Did you see any scene of a massacre or hear about a massacre?
I didn't see anything. I didn't hear anything. Also, in Tokyo, I never heard of such a thing.
Mr. Kawai had a strong personal sense of justice and was very keen to those kinds ofrumors. I suspected that the purpose of his Nanjing visit was to investigate the rumor
himself.
– Probably after you returned to Shanghai, Chief Kawai talked with reporters Hallett
Abend of The New York Times, and David Fraser of The Times of London. Did you know
that?
No, I didn't know that. Mr. Kawai could speak English so he spoke with foreign4reporters. I couldn't understand English, as my specialty was Chinese, so we worked
separately, in those cases.
– You were working at the Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
After returned to Tokyo, did you hear something in the Ministry about a massacre?
I stayed in China for about two weeks and returned to Japan on January 13. I have norecollection of such talk in Tokyo as well. It might be possible that I heard something but
I had no interest in it so I don't remember.
In 1965, “Biography of a Military Man,” was published, which was a diary written by
Major General Sasaki Toichi (佐々木到一), who performed brilliantly as the BrigadierCommander of the Nanjing Attack Forces. Major General Sasaki was the top expert on
China in the Army, had friendly relationships with most of the main leaders of theChinese Nationalist Party, including Chiang Kai-shek, and understood the Nationalist
Party’s Revolution. He loved China. Nevertheless, Major General Sasaki joined in on
the Nanjing Attack, and after its capture, he served as the Commander of the Nanjing
Garrison. He knew the most about Nanjing before and after its capture. I believed Major
General Sasaki’s statement expressed the correct view on Nanjing then.
I have never seen nor heard a so-called Nanjing massacre. It is said something happenedin Nanjing but I think that what Major General Sasaki described in his book was the fact.
– Mr. Ishii Itaro (石射猪太郎), the Chief of the East Asia Bureau, wrote in his memoir
after the War that stories of atrocities in Nanjing quickly spread around the world, causing
a sensation, and all accusations focused on the Japanese Army. And he described therelationship between Japan and China, as “China-Japan”, or the “China-Japan” War,China coming first. What was his intention?
Mr. Ishii graduated from the Dong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen, or the East Asian Literary
School, like I did. He was senior to me. When Mr. Ishii became consul-general, the news
was greatly welcomed and Mr. Ouchi, the head of the Dong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen, helda party for him.
Mr. Ishii thought of himself as an expert on China. However, his ideas were not5acceptable to the Army, and I have also a difference of opinion from him. The Axis
Powers gradually gained support from members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, yet
Mr. Ishii was different from them in that respect, too. The expression “Japan-China” waschanged to “China-Japan” after the War because China won.
– You went Shanghai again in February, as the Vice-Consul of the Shanghai
Consulate-General. In Shanghai then, did you hear something about a massacre?
I left Tokyo on February 25, 1938 and arrived in Shanghai on the 28th. I will say againthat I heard nothing about a massacre.

37) Interview with Mr. Kasuya Yoshio (粕谷孝夫), Assistant Consul

Mr. Kasuya Yoshio was born in 1909, joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1934, andin July 1937 his duty station changed from the London Embassy to the Consulate-Generalin Shanghai. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident had already occurred, and in Shanghai
confrontation between Japan and China was expected as well.
Five months after he was assigned to the Shanghai Consulate-General, Nanjing fell.
Several members of the Shanghai Consulate-General entered Nanjing as soon as Nanjing
was captured, and in the following year, Mr. Kasuya was appointed Nanjing
Consul-General. He was 28 years old.
In January 1938, in Nanjing, several issues arose concerning US interests . In the middleof January, the American consulate complained that Japanese soldiers trespassed on US
property. Also, on January 26, an assault occurred on Consul John Allison. The story wasthat a Chinese woman who claimed that she was raped by Japanese soldier tried to findthe offender. Together with Consul Allison, Professor Riggs of Ginling College andJapanese military policeman they tried to enter the Japanese soldiers’ barracks. A
Japanese soldier started to argue with Consul Allison and the soldier struck Consul
Allison. Remember that in the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), during this very period, the Tribunal
accused Japanese soldiers of committing atrocities. Assistant Consul Kasuya went toNanjing during this period to handle matters pertaining to the interests of foreign
6countries, including those of the US.
After the War, Mr. Kasuya served as Ambassador to Peru and Thailand. After retiring in
1971, he joined Matsushita Electric Industrial. I interviewed him in autumn 1985, at his
office at Matsushita Electric Industrial, which was located in the World Trade Center
Building. Mr. Kasuya was 75 years old, with fine silver-gray hair. He was friendly andsmiled during our discussion.
– When Nanjing fell, were you in Shanghai?
Yes. We had the embassy and consul-general in Shanghai but both of them were situatedin the same building and their duties were not clearly separated.
Staff included Mr. Okamoto Suemasa (岡本季正), Mr. Tajiri Akiyoshi (田尻愛義), Mr.
Sone Eki (曽称益), Mr. Okumura Katsuzo (奥村勝蔵), and Mr. Wajima Eiji
(倭島英二).
I was very busy with matters related to the Shanghai area.
– It is said that when the Japanese army entered Nanjing, a massacre occurred. You wereat the Shanghai Consulate-General then. Did you hear about the incident?

I never heard anything directly. It is often called a massacre, but I don't understand this.
I had been in Shanghai and so busy with matters related to Shanghai.
– At the time, The New York Times and Chinese newspapers wrote about Nanjing.
Did they? I didn't read The New York Times or Chinese newspapers.
– Americans and Germans who were in Nanjing at the time established the International
Committee for Nanjing Safety Zone to demand and protest against the Japanese
Consulate. Those demands and protests were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via
Shanghai. Did you hear about these things when you were at the Shanghai ConsulateGeneral?

7I didn't hear about these things either.
– According to a memoir written by Mr. Uemura Shinichi (上村伸一), who was the Chiefof the First Department of the East Asia Section at the Ministry, protests, reports andphotos from Nanjing piled up in a room.
He wrote this? This is the first time I have heard of this.
– The following year, 1938, you went to Nanjing.
In January. I don't remember the exact date. I was in Nanjing until October of the sameyear.
– Who else were at the Nanjing Consulate-General?
Mr. Fukui Atsushi (福井淳), was, to my memory, the acting consul-general. He was laer
replaced by Mr. Hanawa Yoshitaka (花輪義敬). Also, Mr. Tanaka Shoichi (田中正一)
and Mr. Fukuda Tokuyasu (福田篤泰) were there. Mr. Tanaka spoke fluent Chinese. In
addition, a couple of young staffers were there. The Consulate compound had aconsulate area and a residence and I lived in the residential area.
– Was Mr. Hidaka Shinrokuro (日高信六郎) there?
When the Consulate was closed in August, I saw him there but after that he returned to
the Embassy in Shanghai. Mr. Hidaka was the Chief of the Personnel Department when
I joined the Ministry.
– What was the situation in Nanjing?
Uneventful and nothing special. The shops were open and Japanese merchants were
there. There was no such thing as a massacre.
– What was your duty in Nanjing?

8My duty was to contact and negotiate with foreign countries. There were many foreign
consul-generals, and my duty was to negotiate with them. With foreigners there, thatmeans their interests were there as well, so troubles occurred as a matter of course.
The American Consul was Mr. Allison, who was later appointed Ambassador to Japan.
He spoke Japanese fluently.
– In Nanjing, the International Committee for Nanjing Safety Zone was organized by thethird-party nationals like Mr. Rabe and Mr. Bates. Did you see them?
I knew nothing of them.
– The incident, that Consul Allison was struck, happened at the end of January.
Yes. Mr. Allison went to the Japanese soldiers’ barracks to either confirm his suspicion or
to investigate, and tried to cross a sentry line despite the guard’s warning and he was hit-that's what I heard.
– Was it a significant matter?
It was said that the Consul made a claim against Japan and the main office of the Ministryhandled it well--thus the matter was soon resolved.
– What kind of person was Consul Allison? Pro-Japanese? Or Anti-Japanese?
He was knowledgeable about Japanese. It seemed that he didn't take the incident badly inparticular.
– As an Assistant Consul, you must have performed many negotiations with the Army.
Major Hongo Tadao (本郷忠夫), who was in charge of Army information, handled the
responsibility of negotiations. When I got a claim against the Army from a foreign
consulate, I negotiated with Major Hongo. He was a son of General Hongo Fusataro(本郷房太郎.). Later, Major Hongo died in New Guinea; he was a good man.

9

Later, Colonel Hirota Yutaka (広田豊) arrived as the Chief of the Negotiations
Department. Mr. Hirota had an office in Shanghai, he was a calm person. Mr. Hirota
could speak English, he lived in the US at one time and he was a so-called globallyminded person. He knew the US well. I assumed that he belonged to the “common sense”
group. Later, he transferred to the aviation sector and became a divisional commander.
And, though it was only once, I met Colonel Muto Akira (武藤章). He had an ear for
listening. His attitude, of hearing people voice themselves, might be related with his highposition, but anyway, he was not an arrogant person.
– From the end of January to the beginning of February 1938, Major General Homma
Masaharu visited Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou, from Tokyo. At that time Colonel
Hirota accompanied him.
At the time, Mr. Honma was the Chief of the Second Department in General Staff
Headquarters. I heard Mr. Honma had arrived. It was said that he came to inspect specificareas in China. I didn't know Mr. Hirota arrived with him.
– Have you ever heard about the Nanjing incident?
No.
– According to Mr. Johnson, the American Ambassador to China, the Japanese embassy
tried to send a telegram and the Army prevented this. Did this really happened at the
Nanjing General-Consulate?
No such things happened. I think the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had their own telegraphequipment.

10Supplement

I (Ara) couldn't meet half of the survivors, mostly because of declining health.
Nevertheless, they sent me letters and postcards concerning the situation in Nanjing at thetime. I exchanged letters with some of them for a number of years. Statements from those
who I could not meet in person are as follows.

38) Major Yoshikawa Takeshi (吉川猛), Staff Officer of the Central
China Area Army
The Central China Area Army had six staff officers and Mr. Yoshikawa Takeshi, theyoungest of them, was the only one still alive. When I asked him for an interview, he wasundergoing repeated hospitalized, so he was not able to talk to me personally. But he wasable to answer my questions with detailed letters. At times, due to his illness, his letters
stopped but over three years we exchanged eight letters, in which he wrote the following
replies:
One dog barked a lie and millions of dogs spread it as truth – once a thing is thought of as
true, it is tough to argue and correct it. The first impression deeply pierces into humans’emotion.
In December 1937, as we moved the Headquarters of the Central China Area Army toSuzhou, Staff Officer Ninomiya, the Chief of Logistics, and I, a Staff Officer of theGeneral Affairs Section, were called in by General Matsui. General Matsui gave us asevere scolding, that our treatment of the bodies were wrong, that only the bodies ofJapanese soldiers were being handled properly but the bodies of Chinese soldiers werebeing neglected--this was not acceptable. That was the kind of person Excellency Matsui
was.

39) Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao (寺田雅雄,), Staff Officer of the10th Army
11

Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao served as a leading staff officer of the Strategy
Department in the 10th Army and later became well-known as the Chief of Strategy
Department in the Kwantung Army during the Nomonhan Incident, that is, theSoviet-Japanese border conflicts.
When I asked him for an interview he was over 90 years old and I was unable to meet him.
But he answered my questions in his letters below:
Due to the fact that the Operation in the Shanghai Area seemed deadlocked, Imperial
Headquarters planned to land the 10th Army at Hangzhou Bay. The 10th Army was very
cautious not to take the same path as the Shanghai Area Army took, so they simply
focused on strategy.
The 10th Army adopted the strategy to advance in a rush as soon as they landed at
Hangzhou Bay. Therefore, they understood that it would be impossible to get supplies
from the rear. That's why we had to manage to get food wherever we can. The strategy
adopted by the 10th Army was so tough and brave that the enemy in the Shanghai Areaquickly withdrew.
Regarding disciplinary problem, it was said that we were wrong to rely on local areas forfood. But I don't think discipline of the 10th Army was especially bad.
I never heard of the “Nanjing incident” in those days.
Mr. Terada lived in Obama City, Fukui. When I went to Fukui, I tried meeting with him,
but he was bedridden, so I was unable to meet him.

40) Captain Sento Shunzo (仙頭俊三), Staff Officer of the 10th Army
The 10th Army had the Kunizaki Detachment (mainly 9th Brigade, 5th Division). The
Kunizaki Detachment was instructed to cut off the enemy’s retreat by crossing theYangtze at around Wuhu and advancing to Pukou. Mr. Sento, a Strategy Staff Officer inthe 10th Army, joined the Detachment.
Due to his health conditions, I was unable to see Mr. Sento Shunzo in person but he12

replied to my letters as well as showed me his memos from the time. His recollection of
those days was as follows:
On December 12, 1937 as we advanced to Pukou, which was on the opposite side of the
Yangtze from Xiaguan, I saw that our artillery was shooting a number of 15 centimeterhigh explosive shells over Pukou. The bodies of the enemy, which were floating along
both sides of Yangtze, was in the order of several hundreds by my estimate. Bodies werehardly found in midstream. I saw that the quay wall of Xiaguan had turned red, andbodies seemed to have had their hands and feet tied.
I knew nothing about a massacre then. Regarding discipline, as far as the Kunizaki
Detachment was concerned, there were no disciplinary problems.

41) Lieutenant Colonel Goto Mitsuzo (後藤光蔵), Military Attaché
Lieutenant Colonel Goto Mitsuzo went to the 10th Army’s front line as a Military Attaché
and entered Nanjing. He was known as the last Konoe Division Commander.
Due to his health, I could not meet him but he described in his letter the situation when heentered Nanjing.
Nanjing was an empty town--no one there. I stayed at an empty home, nothing happened.
He died in December 1986.

42) Captain Okamura Tekizo (岡村適三), Shanghai Military Police
While Mr. Okamura Tekizo was in Shanghai, the Shanghai incident occurred. He thenwent to Nanjing as soon as Nanjing was captured.
He had a health problem, senile ischemia, and I was unable to meet with him, but he did
answer my questions in his letter, as shown below:
13

I didn't hear about Nanjing incident at the time. Regarding disciplinary problem of thetroops, I heard nothing in particular from Lieutenant Colonel Yokota Masataka(横田昌隆), Chief of Military Police of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, Major
Uesuna Katsushichi (上砂勝七), Chief of Military Police of the 10th Army, andLieutenant Fujino Ranjo (藤野鸞丈), Sub-Chief.
I heard the Japanese Army acted arrogantly.
Because he was a military policeman he must have been familiar about disciplinary
matters relating to the Japanese Army. I wanted to hear in detail of this from him in person
and after several letters were exchanged, he agreed.
On the day of meeting, when I called him from Fukuoka Airport to announce my arrival,
one of his family members told me, “He said something in the morning and completely
forgot about it in the afternoon, so an interview is impossible.” I shrugged and went backhome.

43) Mr. Horikawa Takeo (堀川武夫), Reporter for the Domei Tsushin
Mr. Horikawa Takeo joined the 16th Division and after the War he taught at Hiroshima
University.
I was unable to meet him due to his illness, but I listened to him say the following:
As for your question, I didn't see nor hear anything in particular.

44) Mr. Fujimoto Kame (藤本亀), Reporter for the Asahi Shimbun
Mr. Fujimoto Kame entered Nanjing through Guanghua Gate on December 13.
After the War, he served as the director of the Sanyo Shimbun and as the president of
Sanyo Hoso Broadcasting. Due to his health, I was unable to meet him, but he wrote me:
14

I want to inform you that during the time I joined the Army I didn't see nor hear ofanything in particular.

45) Mr. Asami Kazuo, Reporter for the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun
Mr. Asami Kazuo entered Nanjing on December 13. I asked him for an interview, but hedeclined my request, saying that he had no clear memory of that time. At the same time hestated:I wish that this fact, of the massacre of the century, will never be denied and denial will
not be an occasion to praise--an accompaniment to--militarism.

46) Mr. Nishino Gen (西野源,), Reporter for the Osaka Mainichi
ShimbunMr. Nishino Gen joined the Army from the Nagoya general office of the Osaka Mainichi
Shimbun, and entered Nanjing through Guanghua Gate with the 9th Division.
As to your questions, unfortunately I heard nothing. It is common that a number ofgroundless rumors fly on the battlefield.

47) Mr. Otani Kosho大谷光照, Chief Abbot of Nishi-Honganji Temple
Chief Abbot Kosho Otani visited Shanghai in November 1937 as consolation visit for the
Imperial Army in Shanghai, then went to Nanjing to attend the entrance ceremony on
December 17. On the 18th, the next day, a memorial service, which was held at an airfieldwithin the Castle, was performed by the Chief Abbot.
He described the situation of Nanjing as follows;15

I arrived in Nanjing on the evening of the 14th, it was the next day after the final captureof the city, and I lodged in Nanjing and stayed for 4 days. I entered the Castle several
times and I saw no massacre and heard no rumor of one at all. At that time, the battle wasentirely over, the town was calm, no citizens were found there – it was not a
circumstance under which a massacre occurred. The Japanese Army lodged inside andoutside of the Castle, getting their rest in peace.

48) Mr. Ishikawa Tatsuzo, War Correspondent
Mr. Ishikawa Tatsuzo was awarded the first Akutagawa prize for his novel, “Sobo (蒼氓),” in 1935 and in 1937 he was dispatched by the magazine Chuo Koron to Nanjing,
immediately after its capture. He left Tokyo on December 21, 1937 and visited Shanghai,Suzhou, and Nanjing, and returned to Tokyo at the end of January 1938.
During his visit, he mainly met soldiers of the 16th Division and, based on his experienceduring that time, he wrote the novel, “Soldiers Being Alive,” and published it in themagazine Chuo Koron, which was released on February 18. However, on the day of
release, Chuo Koron was banned from sale under the Newspapers Regulation Law and Mr.
Ishikawa was prosecuted,. In September, he was sentenced to four months in prison,suspended for three years.
After the War, his novel, “Soldiers Being Alive,” was said to have described the Nanjing
incident.
In October 1984, I asked him for an interview but I was unable to meet with him. Later, I
found the reason--three months after he declined, in January 1985, he died of pneumonia.
At the time I asked him for interview, his gastric ulcer was improving, yet his condition
was not good enough to withstand an interview. However, he responded to my letter atthat time:
When I entered Nanjing, it was two weeks after the entrance ceremony. I didn't see any
trace of a massacre.
It is impossible to clear out hundreds and thousands bodies within a couple of weeks.
I have never believed that Nanjing massacre story and I don't believe now.

16

People the author contacted and received no reply due to death or illness, are:Colonel Matsuda Chiaki (松田千秋), Staff Officer of the Shanghai Expeditionary
Army
Major Yonihana Utakichi (米花宇太吉), Chief of the Press Team, Shanghai
Expeditionary Army
Mr. Isshiki Tatsuo (一色達夫), Chief of the Photo Team, Shanghai Expeditionary
Army
Mr. Kojima Tomou (小島友宇), Nanjing Special Service Agency
Major Yamazaki Masao (山崎正男), Staff Officer, 10th Army
Captain Shimizu Takeo (清水武夫), Staff Officer, 10th Army
Lieutenant Colonel Miyamoto Seiichi (宮本清一), Staff Officer, Central District
Army
Mr. Fukuda Atsuyasu (福田篤泰), Assistant Consul, Nanjing Consulate
Mr. Goto Mitsutaro (後藤光太郎), Staff in the Information Bureau, Ministry ofForeign Affairs
Mr. Ikeno Seikyu (池野清躬), Interior Ministry official, Ministry of the Interior
Mr. Maeda Yuji (前田雄二), Reporter for the Domei Tsushin
Mr. Fudo Kenji (不動健治), Chief of the Photography Department for the Domei
Tsushin
Mr. Kato Sho（加藤松, Reporter for the Domei Tsushin
Mr. Haraikawa Chikashige (祓川親茂), Photographer for the Domei Tsushin

17

Mr. Takasaki Osamu (高崎修), Photographer for the Domei Tshushin
Mr. Kikuchi Hisataro (菊池久太郎), Radio Operator
Mr. Tabata Masashi (田畑雅), Photographer for the Asahi Shimbun
Mr. Endo Tshuyoshi (遠藤毅), Chief of Field Senior Post, Transportation andCommunications Director General’s Office18