Withdrawn NIST Technical Series Publication
Warning Notice
The attached publication has been withdrawn (archived) and is provided solely for historical purposes. It
may have been superseded by another publication (indicated below).

Withdrawn Publication
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Title
Publication Date(s)Withdrawal Date
Withdrawal Note

NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev. 4
Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems andOrganizations
April 2013 (including updates as of January 22, 2015)
September 23, 2021
SP 800-53 Rev. 4 is superseded in its entirety by SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (September
2020, including updates as of 12/10/20).

Superseding Publication(s) (if applicable)
The attached publication has been superseded by the following publication(s):Series/Number
Title
Author(s)Publication Date(s)URL/DOINIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev. 5
Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations
Joint Task Force
September 2020 (including updates as of December 10, 2020)
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5

Additional Information (if applicable)
Contact
Latest revision of theattached publication
Related Information
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Announcement Link

Computer Security Division (Information Technology Laboratory)
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/risk-management/sp800-53-controls
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final

Date updated: September 23, 2021

NIST Special Publication 800-53
Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls forFederal Information Systems
and Organizations
JOINT TASK FORCE
TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

This publication is available free of charge from:http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4

NIST Special Publication 800-53
Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls forFederal Information Systems
and Organizations
JOINT TASK FORCE
TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

This publication is available free of charge from:http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4

April 2013
INCLUDES UPDATES AS OF 01-22-2015

U.S. Department of Commerce
Rebecca M. Blank, Acting Secretary
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Patrick D. Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Authority
This publication has been developed by NIST to further its statutory responsibilities under theFederal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), Public Law (P.L.) 107-347. NIST is
responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum
requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply tonational security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising
policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 8b(3), Securing Agency
Information Systems, as analyzed in Circular A-130, Appendix IV: Analysis of Key Sections.
Supplemental information is provided in Circular A-130, Appendix III, Security of Federal
Automated Information Resources.
Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines mademandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory
authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing
authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official.
This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not
subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4462 pages (April 2013)
CODEN: NSPUE2This publication is available free of charge from: http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in orderto describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended
to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities,
materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.
There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by
NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication,
including concepts and methodologies, may be used by Federal agencies even before thecompletion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current
requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning andtransition purposes, Federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new
publications by NIST.
Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods andprovide feedback to NIST. All NIST Computer Security Division publications, other than the ones
noted above, are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

Comments on this publication may be submitted to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
Electronic Mail: sec-cert@nist.gov

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Reports on Computer Systems Technology
The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards andTechnology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technicalleadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test
methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance thedevelopment and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include thedevelopment of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines forthe cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information infederal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research,guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities
with industry, government, and academic organizations.

Abstract
This publication provides a catalog of security and privacy controls for federal information
systems and organizations and a process for selecting controls to protect organizational operations(including mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation from a diverse set of threats including hostile cyber attacks, natural
disasters, structural failures, and human errors. The controls are customizable and implemented aspart of an organization-wide process that manages information security and privacy risk. The
controls address a diverse set of security and privacy requirements across the federal governmentand critical infrastructure, derived from legislation, Executive Orders, policies, directives,
regulations, standards, and/or mission/business needs. The publication also describes how todevelop specialized sets of controls, or overlays, tailored for specific types of missions/business
functions, technologies, or environments of operation. Finally, the catalog of security controls
addresses security from both a functionality perspective (the strength of security functions andmechanisms provided) and an assurance perspective (the measures of confidence in theimplemented security capability). Addressing both security functionality and security assurance
ensures that information technology products and the information systems built from those
products using sound systems and security engineering principles are sufficiently trustworthy.

Keywords
Assurance; computer security; FIPS Publication 199; FIPS Publication 200, FISMA; Privacy Act;
Risk Management Framework; security controls; security requirements.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Acknowledgements
This publication was developed by the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency
Working Group with representatives from the Civil, Defense, and Intelligence Communities in an
ongoing effort to produce a unified information security framework for the federal government.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology wishes to acknowledge and thank the seniorleaders from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Committee on National Security Systems, and the members of the interagency
technical working group whose dedicated efforts contributed significantly to the publication. The
senior leaders, interagency working group members, and their organizational affiliations include:
Department of Defense

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Teresa M. Takai
DoD Chief Information Officer

Adolpho Tarasiuk Jr.
Assistant DNI and Intelligence Community
Chief Information Officer

Robert J. Carey
Principal Deputy DoD Chief Information Officer

Charlene Leubecker
Deputy Intelligence Community Chief
Information Officer

Richard Hale
Deputy Chief Information Officer for Cybersecurity

Catherine A. Henson
Director, Data Management

Dominic Cussatt
Deputy Director, Cybersecurity Policy

Greg Hall
Chief, Risk Management and Information
Security Programs Division

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Committee on National Security Systems

Charles H. Romine
Director, Information Technology Laboratory

Teresa M. Takai
Chair, CNSS

Donna Dodson
Cybersecurity Advisor, Information Technology Laboratory

Richard Spires
Co-Chair, CNSS

Donna Dodson
Chief, Computer Security Division

Dominic Cussatt
CNSS Subcommittee Tri-Chair

Ron Ross
FISMA Implementation Project Leader

Jeffrey Wilk
CNSS Subcommittee Tri-Chair
Richard Tannich
CNSS Subcommittee Tri-Chair

Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency Working Group
Ron Ross

Gary Stoneburner

Richard Graubart

Kelley Dempsey

NIST, JTF Leader

Johns Hopkins APL

The MITRE Corporation

NIST

Esten Porter

Bennett Hodge

Karen Quigg

Christian Enloe

The MITRE Corporation

Booz Allen Hamilton

The MITRE Corporation

NIST

Kevin Stine

Jennifer Fabius

Daniel Faigin

Arnold Johnson

NIST

The MITRE Corporation

The Aerospace Corporation

NIST

Lisa Kaiser

Pam Miller

Sandra Miravalle

Victoria Pillitteri

DHS

The MITRE Corporation

The MITRE Corporation

NIST

In addition to the above acknowledgments, a special note of thanks goes to Peggy Himes andElizabeth Lennon of NIST for their superb technical editing and administrative support. The
authors also wish to recognize Marshall Abrams, Nadya Bartol, Frank Belz, Deb Bodeau, Dawn
Cappelli, Corinne Castanza, Matt Coose, George Dinolt, Kurt Eleam, Jennifer Guild, Cynthia
Irvine, Cass Kelly, Steve LaFountain, Steve Lipner, Tom Macklin, Tim McChesney, Michael

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

McEvilley, John Mildner, Joji Montelibano, George Moore, LouAnna Notargiacomo, Dorian
Pappas, Roger Schell, Carol Woody, and the research staff from the NIST Computer Security
Division for their exceptional contributions in helping to improve the content of the publication.
And finally, the authors also gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the significant contributions
from individuals, working groups, and organizations in the public and private sectors, bothnationally and internationally, whose thoughtful and constructive comments improved the overall
quality, thoroughness, and usefulness of this publication.

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FIPS 200 AND SP 800-53
IMPLEMENTING INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS AND GUIDELINESFIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information
Systems, is a mandatory federal standard developed by NIST in response to FISMA. To comply withthe federal standard, organizations first determine the security category of their information
system in accordance with FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal
Information and Information Systems, derive the information system impact level from thesecurity category in accordance with FIPS 200, and then apply the appropriately tailored set ofbaseline security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls forFederal Information Systems and Organizations. Organizations have flexibility in applying thebaseline security controls in accordance with the guidance provided in Special Publication 800-53.
This allows organizations to tailor the relevant security control baseline so that it more closelyaligns with their mission and business requirements and environments of operation.
FIPS 200 and NIST Special Publication 800-53, in combination, ensure that appropriate security
requirements and security controls are applied to all federal information and information systems.
An organizational assessment of risk validates the initial security control selection and determines
if additional controls are needed to protect organizational operations (including mission,functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the
Nation. The resulting set of security controls establishes a level of security due diligence for theorganization.

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________DEVELOPING COMMON INFORMATION SECURITY FOUNDATIONSCOLLABORATION AMONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIESIn developing standards and guidelines required by FISMA, NIST consults with other federal
agencies and the private sector to improve information security, avoid unnecessary and costly
duplication of effort, and ensure that its publications are complementary with the standards andguidelines employed for the protection of national security systems. In addition to acomprehensive public review and vetting process, NIST is collaborating with the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Committee on
National Security Systems (CNSS) to establish a unified information security framework for thefederal government. A common foundation for information security will provide the Civil,
Defense, and Intelligence sectors of the federal government and their contractors, more costeffective and consistent ways to manage information security-related risk to organizational
operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The unified framework will
also provide a strong basis for reciprocal acceptance of authorization decisions and facilitate
information sharing. NIST is also working with many public and private sector entities to establish
mappings and relationships between the security standards and guidelines developed by NIST and
the International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission(ISO/IEC).

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SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST

The term security requirement is used by different communities and groups in different ways andmay require additional explanation to establish the particular context for the various use cases.
Security requirements can be stated at a very high level of abstraction, for example, in legislation,
Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, and mission/business needs statements. FISMA
and FIPS Publication 200 articulate security requirements at such a level.
Acquisition personnel develop security requirements for contracting purposes that address theprotections necessary to achieve mission/business needs. Systems/security engineers, systemdevelopers, and systems integrators develop the security design requirements for the information
system, develop the system security architecture and the architecture-specific derived security
requirements, and subsequently implement specific security functions at the hardware, software,and firmware component level.
Security requirements are also reflected in various nontechnical security controls that address
such matters as policy and procedures at the management and operational elements withinorganizations, again at differing levels of detail. It is important to define the context for each use of
the term security requirement so the respective communities (including individuals responsible forpolicy, architecture, acquisition, engineering, and mission/business protection) can clearlycommunicate their intent.
Organizations may define certain security capabilities needed to satisfy security requirements andprovide appropriate mission and business protection. Security capabilities are typically defined bybringing together a specific set of safeguards/countermeasures (i.e., security controls) derived
from the appropriately tailored baselines that together produce the needed capability.

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY NEUTRALITY
CHARACTERISTICS OF SECURITY CONTROLSThe security controls in the catalog with few exceptions, have been designed to be policy- andtechnology-neutral. This means that security controls and control enhancements focus on thefundamental safeguards and countermeasures necessary to protect information during
processing, while in storage, and during transmission. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of thispublication to provide guidance on the application of security controls to specific technologies,
environments of operation, communities of interest, or missions/business functions. Applicationspecific areas are addressed by the use of the tailoring process described in Chapter Three and theuse of overlays described in Appendix I. It should also be noted that while the security controls arelargely policy- and technology-neutral, that does not imply that the controls are policy- andtechnology-unaware. Understanding policy and technology is necessary so that the controls aremeaningful and relevant when implemented.
In the few cases where specific technologies are called out in security controls (e.g., mobile, PKI,
wireless, VOIP), organizations are cautioned that the need to provide adequate security goes wellbeyond the requirements in a single control associated with a particular technology. Many of theneeded safeguards and countermeasures are obtained from the other security controls in the
catalog allocated to the initial control baselines as starting points for the development of security
plans and overlays using the tailoring process. There may also be some overlap in the protections
articulated by the security controls within the different control families.
In addition to the customer-driven development of specialized security plans and overlays, NIST
Special Publications and Interagency Reports may provide guidance on recommended security
controls for specific technologies and sector-specific applications (e.g., Smart Grid, healthcare,
Industrial Control Systems, and mobile).
Employing a technology- and policy-neutral security control catalog has the following benefits:• It encourages organizations to focus on the security capabilities required for mission/businesssuccess and the protection of information, irrespective of the information technologies that are
employed in organizational information systems.
• It encourages organizations to analyze each security control for its applicability to specifictechnologies, environments of operation, missions/business functions, and communities ofinterest.
• It encourages organizations to specify security policies as part of the tailoring process for security
controls that have variable parameters.
The specialization of security plans using the tailoring guidance and overlays, together with a robust
set of technology- and policy-neutral security controls, promotes cost-effective, risk-based
information security for organizations—in any sector, for any technology, and in any operating
environment.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________INFORMATION SECURITY DUE DILIGENCE
MANAGING THE RISK TO ORGANIZATIONAL MISSIONS/BUSINESS FUNCTIONSThe security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53 are designed to facilitate compliance withapplicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, andguidance. Compliance is not about adhering to static checklists or generating unnecessary FISMA
reporting paperwork. Rather, compliance necessitates organizations executing due diligence withregard to information security and risk management. Information security due diligence includes
using all appropriate information as part of an organization-wide risk management program toeffectively use the tailoring guidance and inherent flexibility in NIST publications so that the
selected security controls documented in organizational security plans meet the mission andbusiness requirements of organizations. Using the risk management tools and techniques that areavailable to organizations is essential in developing, implementing, and maintaining thesafeguards and countermeasures with the necessary and sufficient strength of mechanism toaddress the current threats to organizational operations and assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation. Employing effective risk-based processes, procedures, andtechnologies will help ensure that all federal information systems and organizations have thenecessary resilience to support ongoing federal responsibilities, critical infrastructure applications,and continuity of government.

PAGE xSpecial Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________PRIVACY CONTROLSPROVIDING PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION

Appendix J, Privacy Control Catalog, is a new addition to NIST Special Publication 800-53. It is
intended to address the privacy needs of federal agencies. The Privacy Appendix:•

Provides a structured set of privacy controls, based on best practices, that help organizations
comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, instructions, regulations,policies, standards, guidance, and organization-specific issuances;•

Establishes a linkage and relationship between privacy and security controls for purposes ofenforcing respective privacy and security requirements which may overlap in concept and in
implementation within federal information systems, programs, and organizations;•

Demonstrates the applicability of the NIST Risk Management Framework in the selection,
implementation, assessment, and ongoing monitoring of privacy controls deployed in federal
information systems, programs, and organizations; and•Promotes closer cooperation between privacy and security officials within the federal
government to help achieve the objectives of senior leaders/executives in enforcing therequirements in federal privacy legislation, policies, regulations, directives, standards, andguidance.

There is a strong similarity in the structure of the privacy controls in Appendix J and the security
controls in Appendices F and G. For example, the control AR-1 (Governance and Privacy Program)requires organizations to develop privacy plans that can be implemented at the organizational or
program level. These plans can also be used in conjunction with security plans to provide an
opportunity for organizations to select the appropriate set of security and privacy controls inaccordance with organizational mission/business requirements and the environments in which theorganizations operate. Incorporating the same concepts used in managing information security
risk, helps organizations implement privacy controls in a more cost-effective, risked-based manner
while simultaneously protecting individual privacy and meeting compliance requirements.
Standardized privacy controls provide a more disciplined and structured approach for satisfying
federal privacy requirements and demonstrating compliance to those requirements.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________CAUTIONARY NOTE
IMPLEMENTING CHANGES BASED ON REVISIONS TO SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-53

When NIST publishes revisions to Special Publication 800-53, there are four primary types ofchanges made to the document: (i) security controls or control enhancements are added to orwithdrawn from Appendices F and G and/or to the low, moderate, and high baselines; (ii)supplemental guidance is modified; (iii) material in the main chapters or appendices is modified;and (iv) language is clarified and/or updated throughout the document.
When modifying existing tailored security control baselines at Tier 3 in the risk management
hierarchy (as described in Special Publication 800-39) and updating security controls at any tier asa result of Special Publication 800-53 revisions, organizations should take a measured, risk-based
approach in accordance with organizational risk tolerance and current risk assessments. Unlessotherwise directed by OMB policy, the following activities are recommended to implementchanges to Special Publication 800-53:• First, organizations determine if any added security controls/control enhancements areapplicable to organizational information systems or environments of operation following
tailoring guidelines in this publication.
• Next, organizations review changes to the supplemental guidance, guidance in the main
chapters and appendices, and updated/clarified language throughout the publication todetermine if changes apply to any organizational information systems and if any immediate
actions are required.
• Finally, once organizations have determined the entirety of changes necessitated by therevisions to the publication, the changes are integrated into the established continuous
monitoring process to the greatest extent possible. The implementation of new or modified
security controls to address specific, active threats is always the highest priority for sequencing
and implementing changes. Modifications such as changes to templates or minor languagechanges in policy or procedures are generally the lowest priority and are made in conjunction
with established review cycles.

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Table of Contents
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1

1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY .................................................................................................. 2
1.2 TARGET AUDIENCE.................................................................................................................. 3
1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SECURITY CONTROL PUBLICATIONS.................................................... 3
1.4 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................................ 4
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATION.......................................................................... 6
CHAPTER TWO THE FUNDAMENTALS .................................................................................. 7

2.1 MULTITIERED RISK MANAGEMENT............................................................................................. 7
2.2 SECURITY CONTROL STRUCTURE ............................................................................................. 9
2.3 SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES............................................................................................. 12
2.4 SECURITY CONTROL DESIGNATIONS ....................................................................................... 14
2.5 EXTERNAL SERVICE PROVIDERS ............................................................................................ 17
2.6 ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS .................................................................................... 20
2.7 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONS ................................................................................................. 26
CHAPTER THREE THE PROCESS ...................................................................................... 28

3.1 SELECTING SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES ........................................................................... 28
3.2 TAILORING BASELINE SECURITY CONTROLS ............................................................................ 30
3.3 CREATING OVERLAYS ............................................................................................................ 40
3.4 DOCUMENTING THE CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS ............................................................... 42
3.5 NEW DEVELOPMENT AND LEGACY SYSTEMS ........................................................................... 44
APPENDIX A REFERENCES ............................................................................................ A-1
APPENDIX B GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ B-1
APPENDIX C ACRONYMS ............................................................................................... C-1
APPENDIX D SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES – SUMMARY ............................................... D-1
APPENDIX E ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS ......................................................... E-1
APPENDIX F SECURITY CONTROL CATALOG .................................................................... F-1
APPENDIX G INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMS........................................................... G-1
APPENDIX H INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS .................................. H-1
APPENDIX IOVERLAY TEMPLATE .....................................................................................I-1

APPENDIX J PRIVACY CONTROL CATALOG ....................................................................... J-1

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Prologue“…Through the process of risk management, leaders must consider risk to US interests fromadversaries using cyberspace to their advantage and from our own efforts to employ the global
nature of cyberspace to achieve objectives in military, intelligence, and business operations… ““…For operational plans development, the combination of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts
must be evaluated in order to identify important trends and decide where effort should be applied
to eliminate or reduce threat capabilities; eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities; and assess,coordinate, and deconflict all cyberspace operations…”“…Leaders at all levels are accountable for ensuring readiness and security to the same degree
as in any other domain…"-- THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONSOFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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Foreword
NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, represents the most comprehensive update to thesecurity controls catalog since its inception in 2005. The publication was developed by NIST, theDepartment of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Committee on National Security
Systems as part of the Joint Task Force, an interagency partnership formed in 2009. This update
was motivated principally by the expanding threat space—characterized by the increasing
sophistication of cyber attacks and the operations tempo of adversaries (i.e., the frequency of suchattacks, the professionalism of the attackers, and the persistence of targeting by attackers). Stateof-the-practice security controls and control enhancements have been developed and integrated
into the catalog addressing such areas as: mobile and cloud computing; applications security;
trustworthiness, assurance, and resiliency of information systems; insider threat; supply chain
security; and the advanced persistent threat. In addition, Special Publication 800-53 has been
expanded to include eight new families of privacy controls based on the internationally accepted
Fair Information Practice Principles.
Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, provides a more holistic approach to information security
and risk management by providing organizations with the breadth and depth of security controls
necessary to fundamentally strengthen their information systems and the environments in whichthose systems operate—contributing to systems that are more resilient in the face of cyber attacks
and other threats. This “Build It Right” strategy is coupled with a variety of security controls for“Continuous Monitoring” to give organizations near real-time information that is essential forsenior leaders making ongoing risk-based decisions affecting their critical missions and business
functions.
To take advantage of the expanded set of security and privacy controls, and to give organizations
greater flexibility and agility in defending their information systems, the concept of overlays wasintroduced in this revision. Overlays provide a structured approach to help organizations tailor
security control baselines and develop specialized security plans that can be applied to specificmissions/business functions, environments of operation, and/or technologies. This specialization
approach is important as the number of threat-driven controls and control enhancements in the
catalog increases and organizations develop risk management strategies to address their specificprotection needs within defined risk tolerances.
Finally, there have been several new features added to this revision to facilitate ease of use byorganizations. These include:•

Assumptions relating to security control baseline development;•

Expanded, updated, and streamlined tailoring guidance;•

Additional assignment and selection statement options for security and privacy controls;•

Descriptive names for security and privacy control enhancements;•

Consolidated tables for security controls and control enhancements by family withbaseline allocations;•

Tables for security controls that support development, evaluation, and operational
assurance; and•Mapping tables for international security standard ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria).

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________The security and privacy controls in Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, have been designed
to be largely policy/technology-neutral to facilitate flexibility in implementation. The controls arewell positioned to support the integration of information security and privacy into organizational
processes including enterprise architecture, systems engineering, system development life cycle,
and acquisition/procurement. Successful integration of security and privacy controls into ongoingorganizational processes will demonstrate a greater maturity of security and privacy programs andprovide a tighter coupling of security and privacy investments to core organizational missions andbusiness functions.
The Joint Task Force

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ErrataThe following changes have been incorporated into Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4.
DATE

TYPE

CHANGE

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed CA-9 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-3

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed CM-10 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-4

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed MA-6 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-5

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed MP-3 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-5

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed PE-5 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-5

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed PE-16 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-5

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed PE-17 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-5

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed PE-18 Priority Code from P2 to P3 in Table D-2.

D-5

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed PL-4 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-6

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed PS-4 Priority Code from P2 to P1 in Table D-2.

D-6

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed SA-11 Priority Code from P2 to P1 in Table D-2.

D-6

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed SC-18 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-7

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed SI-8 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-8

05-07-2013

Editorial

Deleted reference to SA-5(6) in Table D-17.

D-32

05-07-2013

Editorial

Deleted CM-4(3) from Table E-2.

E-4

05-07-2013

Editorial

Deleted CM-4(3) from Table E-3.

E-5

05-07-2013

Editorial

Deleted reference to SA-5(6).

F-161

05-07-2013

Editorial

Changed SI-16 Priority Code from P0 to P1.

F-233

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted “(both intentional and unintentional)” in line 5 in Abstract.

iii

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted “security and privacy” in line 5 in Abstract.

iii

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “an initial set of baseline security controls” to “the applicable security
control baseline” in Section 2.1, RMF Step 2.

901-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted the following paragraph: “The security control enhancements section
provides…in Appendix F.”

1101-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “baseline security controls” to “the security control baselines” in Section
2.3, 2nd paragraph, line 6.

13

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “an initial set of security controls” to “the applicable security control
baseline” in Section 3.1, paragraph 2, line 4.

28

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “security control baselines” to “baselines identified in Appendix D” in
Section 3.1, paragraph 2, line 5.

28

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “an appropriate set of baseline controls” to “the appropriate security
control baseline” in Section 3.1, paragraph 3, line 3.

29

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted “initial” before “security control baseline” and added “FIPS 200” before“impact level” in Section 3.1, paragraph 3, line 4.

29

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “sets of baseline security controls” to “security control baselines” in
Section 3.1, paragraph 3, line 6.

29

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “initial set of baseline security controls” to “applicable security control
baseline” in Section 3.2, paragraph 1, line 1.

30

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “initial set of baseline security controls” to “applicable security control
baseline” in Section 3.2, paragraph 3, line 5.

31

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted “set of” before “security controls” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping
Considerations, Mobility paragraph, line 1.

33

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01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted “initial” before “set of” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping Considerations,
Mobility paragraph, line 2.

33

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “the baselines” to “each baseline” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping
Considerations, Mobility paragraph, line 3.

33

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “initial set of security controls” to “security control baseline” in Section 3.2,
Applying Scoping Considerations, Mobility paragraph, line 5.

33

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “specific” before “locations” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping
Considerations, Mobility paragraph, line 6.

33

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “initial” to “three” in Section 3.2, Applying Scoping Considerations,
Mobility paragraph, line 8.

33

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “initial set of baseline security controls” to “applicable security control
baseline” in Section 3.2, Selecting Compensating Security Controls, line 10.

36

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “a set of initial baseline security controls” to “security control baselines” in
Section 3.3, line 1.

40

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “.” after “C.F.R” in #3, Policies, Directives, Instructions, Regulations, andMemoranda.

A-1

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “Revision 1 (Draft)” to NIST Special Publication 800-52 in References.

A-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “Configuration,” to title of NIST Special Publication 800-52, Revision 1.

A-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed date for NIST Special Publication 800-52, Revision 1 to September 2013.

A-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Moved definition for Information Security Risk after Information Security Program
Plan in Glossary.

B-11

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added AC-2(11) to high baseline in Table D-2.

D-2

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed AC-10 Priority Code from P2 to P3 in Table D-2.

D-2

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed AC-14 Priority Code from P1 to P3 in Table D-2.

D-2

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed AC-22 Priority Code from P2 to P3 in Table D-2.

D-2

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed AU-10 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-3

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed CA-6 Priority Code from P3 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-3

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed CA-7 Priority Code from P3 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-3

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed CA-8 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-3

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed IA-6 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-4

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed IR-7 Priority Code from P3 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-5

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed MA-3 Priority Code from P2 to P3 in Table D-2.

D-5

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed MA-4 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-5

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed MA-5 Priority Code from P1 to P2 in Table D-2.

D-5

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted Program Management Controls from Table D-2.

D-8/9

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted the following sentence at end of paragraph:“There is no summary table provided for the Program Management (PM) family
since PM controls are not associated with any particular security control baseline.”

D-9

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added AC-2(12) and AC-2(13) to high baseline in Table D-3.

D-10

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed AC-17(5) incorporated into reference from AC-17 to SI-4 in Table D-3.

D-12

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed AC-17(7) incorporated into reference from AC-3 to AC-3(10) in Table D-3.

D-12

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed AC-6 to AC-6(9) in AU-2(4) withdrawal notice in Table D-5.

D-15

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “Training” to “Scanning” in SA-19(4) title in Table D-17.

D-34

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted SC-9(1), SC-9(2), SC-9(3), and SC-9(4) from Table D-18.

D-37

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added AC-2 and AC-5 to SC-14 and deleted SI-9 from SC-14 in Table D-18.

D-37

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DATE

TYPE

CHANGE

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted CA-3(5) from Table E-2.

E-4

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added CM-3(2) to Table E-2.

E-4

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added RA-5(2) and RA-5(5) to Table E-2.

E-4

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted CA-3(5) from Table E-3.

E-5

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added CM-3(2) to Table E-3.

E-5

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted bold text from RA-5(2) and RA-5(5) in Table E-3.

E-5

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added CM-8(9) to Table E-4.

E-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added CP-4(4) to Table E-4.

E-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added IR-3(1) to Table E-4.

E-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added RA-5(3) to Table E-4.

E-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted SA-4(4) from Table E-4.

E-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed SA-21(1) from “enhancements” to “enhancement” in Table E-4.

E-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted SI-4(8) from Table E-4.

E-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “risk management process” to “RMF” in Using the Catalog, line 4.

F-6

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “an appropriate set of security controls” to “the appropriate security
control baselines” in Using the Catalog, line 5.

F-6

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted extraneous “,” from AC-2 g.

F-7

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added AC-2(11) to high baseline.

F-10

01-15-2014

Substantive

Added the following text to AC-3(2) Supplemental Guidance:“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”F-11

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “ucdmo.gov” to “None” in AC-4 References.

F-18

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “.” after “C.F.R” in AT-2 References.

F-38

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed AC-6 to AC-6(9) in AU-2(4) withdrawal notice.

F-42

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted “csrc.nist.gov/pcig/cig.html” and added “http://” to URL in AU-2 References.

F-42

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “identify” to “identity” in AU-6(6) Supplemental Guidance.

F-46

01-15-2014

Substantive

Added the following text to AU-9(5) Supplemental Guidance:“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”F-49

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to AU-15.

F-53

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted extraneous “.” from CM-2(7) Supplemental Guidance.

F-66

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “)” after “board” in CM-3 g.

F-66

01-15-2014

Substantive

Added CA-7 to related controls list in CM-3.

F-66

01-15-2014

Substantive

Added the following text to CM-5(4) Supplemental Guidance:“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”F-69

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URLs in CM-6 References.

F-71

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “component” before “inventories” in CM-8(5).

F-74

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “tsp.ncs.gov” to “http://www.dhs.gov/telecommunications-service-prioritytsp” in CP-8 References.

F-86

01-15-2014

Substantive

Added the following text to CP-9(7) Supplemental Guidance:“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”

F-87

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “HSPD 12” to “HSPD-12” and added “http://” to URL in IA-2 References.

F-93

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “encrypted representations of” to “cryptographically-protected” in IA-5(1)
(c).

F-96

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “Encrypted representations of” to “Cryptographically-protected” in IA-5(1)Supplemental Guidance.

F-97

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DATE

TYPE

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01-15-2014

Substantive

Added the following text to IA-5(1) Supplemental Guidance:“To mitigate certain brute force attacks against passwords, organizations may also
consider salting passwords.”

F-97

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URL in IA-5 References.

F-99

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URL in IA-7 References.

F-99

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URL in IA-8 References.

F-101

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “:” to “;” after “800-61” and added “http://” to URL in IR-6 References.

F-10801-15-2014

Substantive

Added the following text to MP-6(7) Supplemental Guidance:“Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”

F-124

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URL in MP-6 References.

F-124

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “DoDI” to “DoD Instruction” and added “http://” to URLs in PE-3
References.

F-130

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted “and supplementation” after “tailoring” in PL-2 a. 8.

F-140

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “Special” before “Publication” in PL-4 References.

F-141

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to PL-7.

F-142

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted AT-5, AC-19(6), AC-19(8), and AC-19(9) from PL-9 Supplemental
Guidance.

F-144

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to PL-9.

F-144

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “Special” before “Publication” in PL-9 References.

F-144

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “731.106(a)” to “731.106” in PS-2 References.

F-145

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “Publication” to “Publications” and added “http://” to URL in RA-3
References.

F-153

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URLs in RA-5 References.

F-155

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URLs in SA-4 References.

F-160

01-15-2014

Substantive

Added the following text to SA-11(8) Supplemental Guidance:“To understand the scope of dynamic code analysis and hence the assurance
provided, organizations may also consider conducting code coverage analysis(checking the degree to which the code has been tested using metrics such as
percent of subroutines tested or percent of program statements called duringexecution of the test suite) and/or concordance analysis (checking for words thatare out of place in software code such as non-English language words orderogatory terms).”

F-169

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URLs in SA-11 References.

F-169

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to SA-16.

F-177

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “Training” to “Scanning” in SA-19(4) title.

F-181

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “physical” to “protected” in SC-8 Supplemental Guidance.

F-193

01-15-2014

Editorial

Changed “140-2” to “140” and added “http://” to URLs in SC-13 References.

F-196

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “authentication” after “data origin” in SC-20, Part a.

F-199

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “verification” after “integrity” in SC-20, Part a.

F-199

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “Control Enhancements: None.” to SC-35.

F-209

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted extraneous “References: None” from SI-7.

F-228

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DATE

TYPE

CHANGE

01-15-2014

Substantive

Added the following text as new third paragraph in Appendix G::“Table G-1 provides a summary of the security controls in the program
management family from Appendix G. Organizations can use the recommended
priority code designation associated with each program management control toassist in making sequencing decisions for implementation (i.e., a Priority Code 1[P1] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code 2 [P2]control; and a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has a higher priority for implementation
than a Priority Code 3 [P3] control.”

G-1/2

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added Table G-1 to Appendix G.

G-2

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URL in PM-5 References.

G-5

01-15-2014

Editorial

Deleted “Web: www.fsam.gov” from PM-7 References.

G-5

01-15-2014

Editorial

Added “http://” to URL in Footnote 124.

J-22

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed security control enhancement naming convention (i.e., format) by deleting
space between base security control and numbered enhancement designation.

Global

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “(iv) and” to “and (iv)” in Glossary definition for Developer.

B-6

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “an IR-2 (1) in the high baseline entry for the IR-2 security control” to “theIR-2 (1) (2) entry in the high baseline for IR-2” in Appendix D, paragraph 1, line 8.

D-1

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “enhancement (1)” to “enhancements (1) and (2)” in Appendix D,
paragraph 1, line 10.

D-1

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “in the security control catalog“ in Appendix D, paragraph 1, line 10.

D-1

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “SHARED GROUPS / ACCOUNTS“ to “SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNTS” in
Table D-3, AC-2(9) title.

D-10

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in Table D-4, AT-3(1) title.

D-14

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in Table D-4, AT-3(2) title.

D-14

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in Table D-4, AT-3(3) title.

D-14

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in Table D-4, AT-3(4) title.

D-14

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “-BASED“ to “BIOMETRIC” in Table D-9, IA-5(12) title.

D-23

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “/ ANALYSIS“ after “PENETRATION TESTING” in Table D-17, SA-11(5) title.

D-33

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “(1)” from normal font to bold font in Table E-4, SI-4(1).

E-701-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “SHARED GROUPS / ACCOUNTS“ to “SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNTS” in AC2(9) title.

F-10

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “use“ to “usage” in AC-2(12) part (a).

F-1001-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “policies“ to “policy” in AC-3(3).

F-1101-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “specifies that” in AC-3(3).

F-1101-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “The policy is“ to “Is” in AC-3(3) part (a).

F-1101-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “A“ to “Specifies that a” in AC-3(3) part (b).

F-1101-22-2015

Editorial

Added “Specifies that“ to AC-3(3) part (c).

F-1101-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “Organized-defined“ to “organization-defined” in AC-3(3) part (c).

F-1101-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “policies“ to “policy” in AC-3(4).

F-1201-22-2015

Editorial

Added “information“ before “flows” in AC-4(7).

F-1501-22-2015

Editorial

Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in AT-3(1) title.

F-39

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in AT-3(2) title.

F-39

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in AT-3(3) title.

F-39

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “ROLE-BASED“ before “SECURITY TRAINING” in AT-3(4) title.

F-39

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “the” before “relationship” in AU-12(1).

F-52

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DATE

TYPE

CHANGE

01-22-2015

Editorial

Moved “.” outside of closing bracket in Withdrawn section.

F-61

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “that“ to “those” in CP-7 part c.

F-84

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “list of“ in IA-2(10).

F-92

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “such as documentary evidence or a combination of documents andbiometrics“ in IA-4(3).

F-95

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “, such as documentary evidence or a combination of documents andbiometrics,“ in IA-4(3) Supplemental Guidance.

F-95

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “-BASED“ to “BIOMETRIC” in IA-5(12) title.

F-98

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “testing/exercises“ to “testing” in IR-4 part c.

F-105

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “and“ before “prior” in MA-4(3) part (b).

F-115

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “Sanitation“ to “Sanitization” in MP-7(2) Supplemental Guidance (twoinstances).

F-125

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “resign“ to “re-sign” in PL-4 part d.

F-141

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “security categorization decision is reviewed and approved by the“ before“authorizing” (first instance) in RA-2 part c.

F-151

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “reviews and approves the security categorization decision“ after“representative” RA-2 part c.

F-151

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “;“ to “,” after IA-2 in SA-4(10) Supplemental Guidance.

F-160

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “takes“ before assignment statement in SA-5 part c.

F-161

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “either is“ to “is either” in SA-11(3) part (b).

F-167

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “has been“ before “granted” in SA-11(3) part (b).

F-167

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “/ ANALYSIS“ after “PENETRATION TESTING” in SA-11(5) title.

F-168

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “enhancement“ after “control” in SA-12 Supplemental Guidance.

F-169

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “Related control: PE-21.” from SA-12(9) Supplemental Guidance.

F-171

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “reference to source“ to “references to sources” in SC-5.

F-187

01-22-2015

Editorial

Added “to be“ before “routed to” in SC-7(11).

F-190

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “i“ to “1” and “ii” to “2” in SI-4 part c.

F-219

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “USER“ to “USERS” in SI-4(20) title.

F-223

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted “for“ in SI-6(2).

F-225

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “interfaces” to “interactions” in SI-10(4) Supplemental Guidance.

F-229

01-22-2015

Editorial

Changed “-“ to “,” after AU-7 in PM-12 Supplemental Guidance.

G-8

01-22-2015

Substantive

Updated the introduction to Appendix H and Tables H-1 and H-2 in accordancewith the 2013 version of ISO/IEC 27001 and revised security control mapping
methodology.

H-1
through
H-12

01-22-2015

Editorial

Deleted UL-3 from related controls list in SE-1.

J-20

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
THE NEED TO PROTECT INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

he selection and implementation of security controls for information systems 1 andorganizations are important tasks that can have major implications on the operations 2 andassets of organizations 3 as well as the welfare of individuals and the Nation. Security
controls are the safeguards/countermeasures prescribed for information systems or organizations
that are designed to: (i) protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information that isprocessed, stored, and transmitted by those systems/organizations; and (ii) satisfy a set of defined
security requirements. 4 There are several key questions that should be answered by organizations
when addressing the information security considerations for information systems:

T•

What security controls are needed to satisfy the security requirements and to adequately
mitigate risk incurred by using information and information systems in the execution oforganizational missions and business functions?

•Have the security controls been implemented, or is there an implementation plan in place?

•

What is the desired or required level of assurance that the selected security controls, as
implemented, are effective in their application? 5

The answers to these questions are not given in isolation but rather in the context of an effective
risk management process for the organization that identifies, mitigates as deemed necessary, andmonitors on an ongoing basis, risks 6 arising from its information and information systems. NIST
Special Publication 800-39 provides guidance on managing information security risk at three
distinct tiers—the organization level, mission/business process level, and information systemlevel. The security controls defined in this publication and recommended for use by organizations
to satisfy their information security requirements should be employed as part of a well-definedrisk management process that supports organizational information security programs. 7

1

An information system is a discrete set of information resources organized expressly for the collection, processing,maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information. Information systems also include specialized
systems such as industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching/private branch exchange (PBX) systems, andenvironmental control systems.
2

Organizational operations include mission, functions, image, and reputation.

3

The term organization describes an entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an organizational structure(e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate, any of its operational elements).
4

Security requirements are derived from mission/business needs, laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, instructions, standards, guidance, and/or procedures to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
the information being processed, stored, or transmitted by organizational information systems.
5

Security control effectiveness addresses the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as
intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the information
system in its operational environment or enforcing/mediating established security policies.
6
Information security-related risks are those risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information or information systems and consider the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
7
The program management controls (Appendix G) complement the security controls for an information system(Appendix F) by focusing on the organization-wide information security requirements that are independent of any
particular information system and are essential for managing information security programs.

CHAPTER 1

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

It is of paramount importance that responsible officials understand the risks and other factors that
could adversely affect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, andthe Nation. 8 These officials must also understand the current status of their security programs andthe security controls planned or in place to protect their information and information systems inorder to make informed judgments and investments that mitigate risks to an acceptable level. The
ultimate objective is to conduct the day-to-day operations of the organization and accomplish theorganization’s stated missions and business functions with what the OMB Circular A-130 defines
as adequate security, or security commensurate with risk resulting from the unauthorized access,use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information.

1.1 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
The purpose of this publication is to provide guidelines for selecting and specifying security
controls for organizations and information systems supporting the executive agencies of thefederal government to meet the requirements of FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security
Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems. The guidelines apply to allcomponents 9 of an information system that process, store, or transmit federal information. The
guidelines have been developed to achieve more secure information systems and effective risk
management within the federal government by:•

Facilitating a more consistent, comparable, and repeatable approach for selecting andspecifying security controls for information systems and organizations;•

Providing a stable, yet flexible catalog of security controls to meet current information
protection needs and the demands of future protection needs based on changing threats,requirements, and technologies;•

Providing a recommendation for security controls for information systems categorized inaccordance with FIPS Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal
Information and Information Systems;•

Creating a foundation for the development of assessment methods and procedures fordetermining security control effectiveness; and•Improving communication among organizations by providing a common lexicon that
supports discussion of risk management concepts.

In addition to the security controls described above, this publication: (i) provides a set of
information security program management (PM) controls that are typically implemented at theorganization level and not directed at individual organizational information systems; (ii)provides a set of privacy controls based on international standards and best practices that helporganizations enforce privacy requirements derived from federal legislation, directives, policies,
regulations, and standards; and (iii) establishes a linkage and relationship between privacy andsecurity controls for purposes of enforcing respective privacy and security requirements which
may overlap in concept and in implementation within federal information systems, programs,
and organizations. Standardized privacy controls provide a more disciplined and structured
approach for satisfying federal privacy requirements and demonstrating compliance to those
8This includes risk to critical infrastructure/key resources described in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7.

9

Information system components include, for example, mainframes, workstations, servers (e.g., database, electronic
mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain name), input/output devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, printers), network
components (e.g., firewalls, routers, gateways, voice and data switches, process controllers, wireless access points,
network appliances, sensors), operating systems, virtual machines, middleware, and applications.

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requirements. Incorporating the same concepts used in managing information security risk,
helps organizations implement privacy controls in a more cost-effective, risked-based manner.
The guidelines in this special publication are applicable to all federal information systems 10other than those systems designated as national security systems as defined in 44 U.S.C.,
Section 3542. 11 The guidelines have been broadly developed from a technical perspective tocomplement similar guidelines for national security systems and may be used for such systems
with the approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such
systems. 12 State, local, and tribal governments, as well as private sector organizations areencouraged to consider using these guidelines, as appropriate.

1.2 TARGET AUDIENCEThis publication is intended to serve a diverse audience of information system and information
security professionals including:•Individuals with information system, security, and/or risk management and oversight
responsibilities (e.g., authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior information
security officers, 13 information system managers, information security managers);•

Individuals with information system development responsibilities (e.g., program managers,system designers and developers, information security engineers, systems integrators);•

Individuals with information security implementation and operational responsibilities (e.g.,
mission/business owners, information system owners, common control providers, information
owners/stewards, system administrators, information system security officers);•

Individuals with information security assessment and monitoring responsibilities (e.g.,
auditors, Inspectors General, system evaluators, assessors, independent verifiers/validators,
analysts, information system owners); and•Commercial companies producing information technology products and systems, creating
information security-related technologies, or providing information security services.

1.3 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SECURITY CONTROL PUBLICATIONS
To create a technically sound and broadly applicable set of security controls for information
systems and organizations, a variety of sources were considered during the development of thisspecial publication. The sources included security controls from the defense, audit, financial,healthcare, industrial/process control, and intelligence communities as well as controls defined by
10
A federal information system is an information system used or operated by an executive agency, by a contractor of an
executive agency, or by another organization on behalf of an executive agency.
11
A national security system is any information system (including any telecommunications system) used or operated byan agency or by a contractor of an agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency: (i) the function, operation, or
use of which involves intelligence activities; involves cryptologic activities related to national security; involves
command and control of military forces; involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; oris critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions (excluding a system that is to be used for routine
administrative and business applications, e.g., payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications); or(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have been specifically authorized undercriteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy.
12

CNSS Instruction 1253 provides implementing guidance for national security systems.

13

At the agency level, this position is known as the Senior Agency Information Security Officer. Organizations may
also refer to this position as the Senior Information Security Officer or the Chief Information Security Officer.

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national and international standards organizations. The objective of NIST Special Publication
800-53 is to provide a set of security controls that can satisfy the breadth and depth of security
requirements 14 levied on organizations, mission/business processes, and information systems andthat is consistent with and complementary to other established information security standards.
The catalog of security controls in Special Publication 800-53 can be effectively used to protect
information and information systems from traditional and advanced persistent threats in varied
operational, environmental, and technical scenarios. The controls can also be used to demonstratecompliance with a variety of governmental, organizational, or institutional security requirements.
Organizations have the responsibility to select the appropriate security controls, to implement thecontrols correctly, and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the controls in satisfying establishedsecurity requirements. 15 The security controls facilitate the development of assessment methods
and procedures that can be used to demonstrate control effectiveness in a consistent/repeatablemanner—thus contributing to the organization’s confidence that security requirements continue tobe satisfied on an ongoing basis. In addition, security controls can be used in developing overlays
for specialized information systems, information technologies, environments of operation, orcommunities of interest (see Appendix I).

1.4 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIESOrganizations use FIPS Publication 199 to categorize their information and information systems.
Security categorization is accomplished as an organization-wide activity 16 with the involvementof senior-level organizational personnel including, for example, authorizing officials, chief
information officers, senior information security officers, information owners and/or stewards,
information system owners, and risk executive (function). 17 Information is categorized at Tier 1(organization level) and at Tier 2 (mission/business process level). In accordance with FIPS
Publication 200, organizations use the security categorization results from Tiers 1 and 2 todesignate organizational information systems at Tier 3 (information system level) as low-impact,
moderate-impact, or high-impact systems. For each organizational information system at Tier 3,
the recommendation for security controls from the baseline controls defined in Appendix D is thestarting point for the security control tailoring process. While the security control selection
process is generally focused on information systems at Tier 3, the process is generally applicable
across all three tiers of risk management.
FIPS Publication 199 security categorization associates information and the operation and use of
information systems with the potential worst-case adverse impact on organizational operations
and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 18 Organizational assessments of risk,
including the use of specific and credible threat information, vulnerability information, and thelikelihood of such threats exploiting vulnerabilities to cause adverse impacts, guide and inform
14

Security requirements are those requirements levied on an information system that are derived from laws, Executive
Orders, directives, policies, instructions, regulations, standards, guidelines, or organizational (mission) needs to ensure
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being processed, stored, or transmitted.
15

NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides guidance on assessing the effectiveness of security controls.

16

See FIPS Publication 200, Footnote 7.

17

Organizations typically exercise managerial, operational, and financial control over their information systems and the
security provided to those systems, including the authority and capability to implement or require the security controls
deemed necessary to protect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
18
Considerations for potential national-level impacts and impacts to other organizations in categorizing organizational
information systems derive from the USA PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs).

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the tailoring process and the final selection of security controls. 19 The final, agreed-upon set of
security controls addressing specific organizational mission/business needs and tolerance for risk
is documented with appropriate rationale in the security plan for the information system. 20 The
use of security controls from Special Publication 800-53 (including the baseline controls as astarting point in the control selection process), facilitates a more consistent level of security forfederal information systems and organizations, while simultaneously preserving the flexibility
and agility organizations need to address an increasingly sophisticated and hostile threat space,specific organizational missions/business functions, rapidly changing technologies, and in somecases, unique environments of operation.
Achieving adequate information security for organizations, mission/business processes, andinformation systems is a multifaceted undertaking that requires:•

Clearly articulated security requirements and security specifications;•

Well-designed and well-built information technology products based on state-of-the-practice
hardware, firmware, and software development processes;•

Sound systems/security engineering principles and practices to effectively integrate
information technology products into organizational information systems;•

Sound security practices that are well documented and seamlessly integrated into the training
requirements and daily routines of organizational personnel with security responsibilities;•

Continuous monitoring of organizations and information systems to determine the ongoing
effectiveness of deployed security controls, changes in information systems and environmentsof operation, and compliance with legislation, directives, policies, and standards; 21 and•Information security planning and system development life cycle management. 22

From an engineering viewpoint, information security is just one of many required operational
capabilities for information systems that support organizational mission/business processes—
capabilities that must be funded by organizations throughout the system development life cycle inorder to achieve mission/business success. It is important that organizations realistically assess
the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation
arising from mission/business processes and by placing information systems into operation orcontinuing operations. Realistic assessment of risk requires an understanding of threats to andvulnerabilities within organizations and the likelihood and potential adverse impacts of successful
exploitations of such vulnerabilities by those threats. 23 Finally, information security requirements
must be satisfied with the full knowledge and consideration of the risk management strategy of

19

Risk assessments can be accomplished in a variety of ways depending on the specific needs of organizations. NIST
Special Publication 800-30 provides guidance on the assessment of risk as part of an overall risk management process.
20
Authorizing officials or designated representatives, by accepting the completed security plans, agree to the set of
security controls proposed to meet the security requirements for organizations (including mission/business processes)
and/or designated information systems.
21

NIST Special Publication 800-137 provides guidance on continuous monitoring of organizational information
systems and environments of operation.
22
NIST Special Publication 800-64 provides guidance on the information security considerations in the systemdevelopment life cycle.
23

NIST Special Publication 800-30 provides guidance on the risk assessment process.

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the organization, in light of the potential cost, schedule, and performance issues associated withthe acquisition, deployment, and operation of organizational information systems. 24

1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATIONThe remainder of this special publication is organized as follows:•

Chapter Two describes the fundamental concepts associated with security control selection
and specification including: (i) multitiered risk management; (ii) the structure of security
controls and how the controls are organized into families; (iii) security control baselines as
starting points for the tailoring process; (iv) the use of common controls and inheritance of
security capabilities; (v) external environments and service providers; (vi) assurance andtrustworthiness; and (vii) revisions and extensions to security controls and control baselines.

•

Chapter Three describes the process of selecting and specifying security controls fororganizational information systems including: (i) selecting appropriate security control
baselines; (ii) tailoring the baseline controls including developing specialized overlays; (iii)
documenting the security control selection process; and (iv) applying the selection process to
new and legacy systems.

•

Supporting appendices provide essential security control selection and specification-related
information including: (i) general references; 25 (ii) definitions and terms; (iii) acronyms; (iv)baseline security controls for low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact information
systems; (v) guidance on assurance and trustworthiness in information systems; (vi) a catalog
of security controls; 26 (vii) a catalog of information security program management controls;(viii) mappings to international information security standards; (ix) guidance for developing
overlays by organizations or communities of interest; and (x) a catalog of privacy controls.

24

In addition to information security requirements, organizations must also address privacy requirements that derivefrom federal legislation and policies. Organizations can employ the privacy controls in Appendix J in conjunction withthe security controls in Appendix F to achieve comprehensive security and privacy protection.
25

Unless otherwise stated, all references to NIST publications in this document (i.e., Federal Information Processing
Standards and Special Publications) are to the most recent version of the publication.
26
The security controls in Special Publication 800-53 are available online and can be downloaded in various formats
from the NIST web site at: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/home.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE FUNDAMENTALSSECURITY CONTROL STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, BASELINES, AND ASSURANCET

his chapter presents the fundamental concepts associated with security control selection
and specification including: (i) three-tiered risk management; (ii) the structure of security
controls and the organization of the controls in the control catalog; (iii) security control
baselines; (iv) the identification and use of common security controls; (v) security controls inexternal environments; (vi) security control assurance; and (vii) future revisions to the security
controls, the control catalog, and baseline controls.

2.1 MULTITIERED RISK MANAGEMENT
The selection and specification of security controls for an information system is accomplished aspart of an organization-wide information security program for the management of risk—that is,
the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation
associated with the operation of information systems. Risk-based approaches to security control
selection and specification consider effectiveness, efficiency, and constraints due to applicable
federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines. To
integrate the risk management process throughout the organization and more effectively address
mission/business concerns, a three-tiered approach is employed that addresses risk at the: (i)organization level; (ii) mission/business process level; and (iii) information system level. The risk
management process is carried out across the three tiers with the overall objective of continuous
improvement in the organization’s risk-related activities and effective inter-tier and intra-tiercommunication among all stakeholders having a shared interest in the mission/business success ofthe organization. Figure 1 illustrates the three-tiered approach to risk management.
STRATEGIC RISK
- Traceability and Transparency of
Risk-Based Decisions- Organization-Wide
Risk Awareness

TIER 1ORGANIZATION- Inter-Tier and Intra-Tier
Communications- Feedback Loop forContinuous Improvement

TIER 2MISSION / BUSINESS PROCESSESTIER 3

INFORMATION SYSTEMSTACTICAL RISKFIGURE 1: THREE-TIERED RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH

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Tier 1 provides a prioritization of organizational missions/business functions which in turn drives
investment strategies and funding decisions—promoting cost-effective, efficient information
technology solutions consistent with the strategic goals and objectives of the organization andmeasures of performance. Tier 2 includes: (i) defining the mission/business processes needed tosupport the organizational missions/business functions; (ii) determining the security categories of
the information systems needed to execute the mission/business processes; (iii) incorporating
information security requirements into the mission/business processes; and (iv) establishing anenterprise architecture (including an embedded information security architecture) to facilitate theallocation of security controls to organizational information systems and the environments inwhich those systems operate. The Risk Management Framework (RMF), depicted in Figure 2, isthe primary means for addressing risk at Tier 3. 27 This publication focuses on Step 2 of the RMF,
the security control selection process, in the context of the three tiers in the organizational risk
management hierarchy.

Architecture Description• Mission/Business Processes• FEA Reference Models• Segment and Solution Architectures• Information System Boundaries

Organizational Inputs
Starting
Point• Laws, Directives, Policy, Guidance• Strategic Goals and Objectives• Information Security Requirements• Priorities and Resource Availability

Repeat as necessary

Step 1
CATEGORIZE
Information Systems

Step 6

Step 2FIPS 199 / SP 800-60

MONITORSELECT

Security Controls

Security Controls

SP 800-137

RISK
MANAGEMENTFRAMEWORKFIPS 200 / SP 800-53

Security Life Cycle

Step 5

Step 3AUTHORIZE

IMPLEMENT

Information Systems

Security Controls

SP 800-37

Step 4

SP 800-160

ASSESS
Security Controls
SP 800-53A

Note: CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance for RMF Steps 1 and 2 for National Security Systems (NSS).

FIGURE 2: RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKThe RMF addresses the security concerns of organizations related to the design, development,
implementation, operation, and disposal of information systems and the environments in whichthose systems operate. The RMF consists of the following six steps:
27
NIST Special Publication 800-37 provides guidance on the implementation of the Risk Management Framework. A
complete listing of all publications supporting the RMF and referenced in Figure 2 is provided in Appendix A.

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Step 1: Categorize the information system based on a FIPS Publication 199 impact assessment; 28
Step 2: Select the applicable security control baseline based on the results of the security
categorization and apply tailoring guidance (including the potential use of overlays);
Step 3: Implement the security controls and document the design, development, andimplementation details for the controls;
Step 4: Assess the security controls to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented
correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting thesecurity requirements for the system; 29
Step 5: Authorize information system operation based on a determination of risk to organizational
operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from theoperation and use of the information system and the decision that this risk is acceptable; andStep 6: Monitor the security controls in the information system and environment of operation on
an ongoing basis to determine control effectiveness, changes to the system/environment, andcompliance to legislation, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.

2.2 SECURITY CONTROL STRUCTURE
Security controls described in this publication have a well-defined organization and structure. Forease of use in the security control selection and specification process, controls are organized into
eighteen families. 30 Each family contains security controls related to the general security topic of
the family. A two-character identifier uniquely identifies security control families, for example,
PS (Personnel Security). Security controls may involve aspects of policy, oversight, supervision,
manual processes, actions by individuals, or automated mechanisms implemented by information
systems/devices. Table 1 lists the security control families and the associated family identifiers inthe security control catalog. 31
TABLE 1: SECURITY CONTROL IDENTIFIERS AND FAMILY NAMESIDFAMILYID

FAMILYAC

Access Control

MP

Media Protection

AT

Awareness and TrainingPE

Physical and Environmental Protection

AU

Audit and Accountability

PL

Planning

CA

Security Assessment and Authorization

PS

Personnel Security

CMConfiguration Management

RA

Risk Assessment

CP

Contingency Planning

SA

System and Services Acquisition

IA

Identification and Authentication

SC

System and Communications Protection

IR

Incident Response

SI

System and Information Integrity

MA

Maintenance

PM

Program Management

28

CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security categorization guidance for national security systems.

29

NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides guidance on assessing the effectiveness of security controls.

30

Of the eighteen security control families in NIST Special Publication 800-53, seventeen families are described in the
security control catalog in Appendix F, and are closely aligned with the seventeen minimum security requirements forfederal information and information systems in FIPS Publication 200. One additional family (Program Management[PM] family) provides controls for information security programs required by FISMA. This family, while notspecifically referenced in FIPS Publication 200, provides security controls at the organization level rather than theinformation system level. See Appendix G for a description of and implementation guidance for the PM controls.
31

Privacy controls listed in Appendix J, have an organization and structure similar to security controls, including theuse of two-character identifiers for the eight privacy families.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________The security control structure consists of the following components: (i) a control section; (ii) a
supplemental guidance section; (iii) a control enhancements section; (iv) a references section;and (v) a priority and baseline allocation section. The following example from the Auditing andAccountability family illustrates the structure of a typical security control.
AU-3

CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS
Control: The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes
what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of theevent, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any individuals or subjects associated with theevent.
Supplemental Guidance: Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of

this control includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process
identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, filenames involved, and access control orflow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure andevent-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred).
Related controls: AU-2, AU-8, AU-12, SI-11.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION

The information system generates audit records containing the following additional information:[Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed information].
Supplemental Guidance: Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records

includes, for example, full-text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities
of group account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to
only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the useof audit trails and audit logs by not including information that could potentially be misleadingor could make it more difficult to locate information of interest.
(2)

CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENT

The information system provides centralized management and configuration of the content to be
captured in audit records generated by [Assignment: organization-defined information systemcomponents].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires that the content to be captured in
audit records be configured from a central location (necessitating automation). Organizations
coordinate the selection of required audit content to support the centralized management andconfiguration capability provided by the information system. Related controls: AU-6, AU-7.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

LOW AU-3

MOD AU-3 (1)HIGH AU-3 (1) (2)The control section prescribes specific security-related activities or actions to be carried out byorganizations or by information systems. The term information system refers to those functions
that generally involve the implementation of information technology (e.g., hardware, software,and firmware). Conversely, the term organization refers to activities that are generally processdriven or entity-driven—that is, the security control is generally implemented through human orprocedural-based actions. Security controls that use the term organization may still require somedegree of automation to be fulfilled. Similarly, security controls that use the term information
system may have some elements that are process-driven or entity-driven. Using the terms
organization and/or information system does not preclude the application of security controls at
any of the tiers in the risk management hierarchy (i.e., organization level, mission/businessprocess level, information system level), as appropriate.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________For some security controls in the control catalog, a degree of flexibility is provided by allowing
organizations to define values for certain parameters associated with the controls. This flexibility
is achieved through the use of assignment and selection statements embedded within the security
controls and control enhancements. Assignment and selection statements provide organizations
with the capability to tailor security controls and control enhancements based on: (i) security
requirements to support organizational missions/business functions and operational needs; (ii)risk assessments and organizational risk tolerance; and (iii) security requirements originating infederal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, or guidelines. 32
For example, organizations can specify additional information needed for audit records to support
audit event processing. See the AU-3(1) example above (i.e., [Assignment: organization-defined
additional, more detailed information]). These assignments may include particular actions to betaken by information systems in the event of audit failures, the frequency of conducting system
backups, restrictions on password use, or the distribution list for organizational policies andprocedures. 33 Once specified, 34 the organization-defined values for assignment and selection
statements become part of the security control, and the control implementation is assessed against
the completed control statement. Assignment statements offer a high degree of flexibility byallowing organizations to specify parameter values, without requiring those values to be one of
two or more specific predefined choices. In contrast, selection statements narrow the potential
input values by providing a specific list of items from which organizations must choose. 35
The supplemental guidance section provides non-prescriptive, additional information for a
specific security control. Organizations can apply the supplemental guidance as appropriate,when defining, developing, and/or implementing security controls. The supplemental guidance
can provide important considerations for implementing security controls in the context of
operational environments, mission/business requirements, or assessments of risk and can also
explain the purpose or meaning of particular controls. Security control enhancements may also
contain supplemental guidance when the guidance is not applicable to the entire control but
instead focused on a particular control enhancement. The supplemental guidance sections forsecurity controls and control enhancements may contain a list of related controls. Related
controls: (i) directly impact or support the implementation of a particular security control orcontrol enhancement; (ii) address a closely related security capability; or (iii) are referenced in
the supplemental guidance. Security control enhancements are by definition related to the basecontrol. Related controls that are listed in the supplemental guidance for the base controls are notrepeated in the supplemental guidance for the control enhancements. However, there may berelated controls identified for control enhancements that are not listed in the base control.
The security control enhancements section provides statements of security capability to: (i) add
functionality/specificity to a control; and/or (ii) increase the strength of a control. In both cases,
control enhancements are used in information systems and environments of operation requiring
32

In general, organization-defined parameters used in assignment and selection statements in the basic security
controls apply also to all control enhancements associated with those controls.
33
Organizations determine whether specific assignment or selection statements are completed at Tier 1 (organizationlevel), Tier 2 (mission/business process level), Tier 3 (information system level), or a combination thereof.
34

Organizations may choose to define specific values for security control parameters in policies, procedures, or
guidance (which may be applicable to more than one information system) referencing the source documents in the
security plan in lieu of explicitly completing the assignment/selection statements within the control as part of the plan.

35

Security controls are generally designed to be technology- and implementation-independent, and therefore do notcontain specific requirements in these areas. Organizations provide such requirements as deemed necessary in the
security plan for the information system.

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greater protection than provided by the base control due to the potential adverse organizational
impacts or when organizations seek additions to the base control functionality/specificity basedon organizational assessments of risk. Security control enhancements are numbered sequentiallywithin each control so that the enhancements can be easily identified when selected to supplement
the base control. Each security control enhancement has a short subtitle to indicate the intended
security capability provided by the control enhancement. In the AU-3 example, if the first control
enhancement is selected, the control designation becomes AU-3(1). The numerical designation ofa control enhancement is used only to identify the particular enhancement within the control. The
designation is not indicative of either the strength of the control enhancement or any hierarchicalrelationship among the enhancements. Control enhancements are not intended to be selectedindependently (i.e., if a control enhancement is selected, then the corresponding base security
control must also be selected). This intent is reflected in the baseline specifications in Appendix
D and in the baseline allocation section under each control in Appendix F.
The references section includes a list of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives,
policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines (e.g., OMB Circulars/Memoranda, Homeland
Security Presidential Directives, FIPS Publications, and NIST Special Publications) that are
relevant to a particular security control. 36 The references provide federal legislative and policy
mandates as well as supporting information for the implementation of security controls andcontrol enhancements. The references section also contains pertinent websites for organizations to
use in obtaining additional information for security control implementation and assessment.
The priority and security control baseline allocation section provides: (i) the recommended
priority codes used for sequencing decisions during security control implementation; and (ii) the
initial allocation of security controls and control enhancements to the baselines. Organizations
can use the priority code designation associated with each security control to assist in making
sequencing decisions for control implementation (i.e., a Priority Code 1 [P1] control has a higher
priority for implementation than a Priority Code 2 [P2] control, a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has
a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code 3 [P3] control, and a Priority Code 0[P0] indicates the security control is not selected in any baseline). This recommended sequencing
prioritization helps to ensure that the foundational security controls upon which other controls
depend are implemented first, thus enabling organizations to deploy controls in a more structured
and timely manner in accordance with available resources. The implementation of security
controls by sequence priority code does not imply the achievement of any defined level of risk
mitigation until all of the security controls in the security plan have been implemented. The
priority codes are intended only for implementation sequencing, not for making security control
selection decisions.

2.3 SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES
Organizations are required to adequately mitigate the risk arising from use of information andinformation systems in the execution of missions and business functions. A significant challenge
for organizations is to determine the most cost-effective, appropriate set of security controls,
which if implemented and determined to be effective, would mitigate risk while complying withsecurity requirements defined by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, regulations, policies,
directives, or standards (e.g., FISMA, OMB Circular A-130, HSPD-12, FIPS Publication 200).
There is no one correct set of security controls that addresses all organizational security concerns
in all situations. Selecting the most appropriate set of security controls for a specific situation or
36

Publications listed in the references section refer to the most recent versions of the publications. References areprovided to assist organizations in applying the security controls and are not intended to be inclusive or complete.

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information system to adequately mitigate risk is an important task that requires a fundamental
understanding of organizational mission/business priorities, the mission and business functions
the information systems will support, and the environments of operation where the systems willreside. With that understanding, organizations can demonstrate how to most effectively assure theconfidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information and information systems
in a manner that supports mission/business needs while demonstrating due diligence. Selecting,
implementing, and maintaining an appropriate set of security controls to adequately protect the
information systems employed by organizations requires strong collaboration with system owners
to understand ongoing changes to missions/business functions, environments of operation, andhow the systems are used.
To assist organizations in making the appropriate selection of security controls for information
systems, the concept of baseline controls is introduced. Baseline controls are the starting point forthe security control selection process described in this document and are chosen based on the
security category and associated impact level of information systems determined in accordancewith FIPS Publication 199 and FIPS Publication 200, respectively. 37 Appendix D provides alisting of the security control baselines. Three security control baselines have been identified
corresponding to the low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact information systems using
the high water mark defined in FIPS Publication 200 and used in Section 3.1 of this document toprovide an initial set of security controls for each impact level. 38
Appendix F provides a comprehensive catalog of security controls for information systems andorganizations, arranged by control families. Chapter Three provides additional information on
how to use FIPS Publication 199 security categories and FIPS Publication 200 system impact
levels in applying the tailoring guidance to the baseline security controls to achieve adequate risk
mitigation. Tailoring guidance, described in Section 3.2, helps organizations to customize thesecurity control baselines selected using the results from organizational assessments of risk.
Baseline tailoring actions include: (i) identifying and designating common controls; (ii) applying
scoping considerations; (iii) selecting compensating controls; (iv) assigning specific values tosecurity control parameters; (v) supplementing initial baselines with additional security controls
or control enhancements; and (vi) providing additional information for control implementation.

Implementation Tip
There are security controls and control enhancements that appear in the security control catalog(Appendix F) that are found in only higher-impact baselines or are not used in any of the baselines.
These additional security controls and control enhancements for information systems are available toorganizations and can be used in tailoring security control baselines to achieve the needed level ofprotection in accordance with organizational assessments of risk. The set of security controls in the
security plan must be sufficient to adequately mitigate risks to organizational operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the organizational risk tolerance.

37

CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance on security control baselines for national security systems.

38

The baseline security controls contained in Appendix D are not necessarily absolutes in that the guidance describedin Section 3.2 provides organizations with the ability to tailor controls in accordance with the terms and conditions
established by their authorizing officials and documented in their respective security plans.

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2.4 SECURITY CONTROL DESIGNATIONSThere are three distinct types of designations related to the security controls in Appendix F thatdefine: (i) the scope of applicability for the control; (ii) the shared nature of the control; and (iii)the responsibility for control development, implementation, assessment, and authorization. Thesedesignations include common controls, system-specific controls, and hybrid controls.
Common controls are security controls whose implementation results in a security capability thatis inheritable by one or more organizational information systems. Security controls are deemed
inheritable by information systems or information system components when the systems orcomponents receive protection from the implemented controls but the controls are developed,
implemented, assessed, authorized, and monitored by entities other than those responsible for thesystems or components—entities internal or external to the organizations where the systems orcomponents reside. Security capabilities provided by common controls can be inherited frommany sources including, for example, organizations, organizational mission/business lines, sites,
enclaves, environments of operation, or other information systems. Many of the controls needed
to protect organizational information systems (e.g., security awareness training, incident responseplans, physical access to facilities, rules of behavior) are excellent candidates for common control
status. In addition, there can also be a variety of technology-based common controls (e.g., Public
Key Infrastructure [PKI], authorized secure standard configurations for clients/servers, access
control systems, boundary protection, cross-domain solutions). By centrally managing anddocumenting the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and monitoring ofcommon controls, security costs can be amortized across multiple information systems.
The organization assigns responsibility for common controls to appropriate organizational
officials (i.e., common control providers) and coordinates the development, implementation,assessment, authorization, and monitoring of the controls. 39 The identification of common
controls is most effectively accomplished as an organization-wide exercise with the active
involvement of chief information officers, senior information security officers, the risk executive(function), authorizing officials, information owners/stewards, information system owners, andinformation system security officers. The organization-wide exercise considers the security
categories of the information systems within the organization and the security controls necessary
to adequately mitigate the risks arising from the use of those systems (see baseline security
controls in Section 2.3). 40 Common control identification for the controls that impact multiple
information systems, but not all systems across the organization could benefit from taking asimilar approach. Key stakeholders collaborate to identify opportunities to effectively employ
common controls at the mission/business line, site, or enclave level.
When common controls protect multiple organizational information systems of differing impact
levels, the controls are implemented with regard to the highest impact level among the systems. If
the common controls are not implemented at the highest impact level of the information systems,
system owners will need to factor this situation into their assessments of risk and take appropriate
risk mitigation actions (e.g., adding security controls or control enhancements, changing assigned
values of security control parameters, implementing compensating controls, or changing certain
aspects of mission/business processes). Implementing common controls that are less than39

The Chief Information Officer, Senior Information Security Officer, or other designated organizational officials at
the senior leadership level assign responsibility for the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, andmonitoring of common controls to appropriate entities (either internal or external to the organization).
40

Each common control identified by the organization is reviewed for applicability to each specific organizational
information system, typically by information system owners and authorizing officials.

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effective or that provide insufficient security capability for higher-impact information systems
can have a significant adverse impact on organizational missions or business functions.
Common controls are generally documented in the organization-wide information security
program plan unless implemented as part of a specific information system, in which case thecontrols are documented in the security plan for that system. 41 Organizations have the flexibility
to describe common controls in a single document or in multiple documents with references orpointers, as appropriate. In the case of multiple documents, the documents describing common
controls are included as attachments to the information security program plan. If the information
security program plan contains multiple documents, organizations specify in each document theorganizational officials responsible for development, implementation, assessment, authorization,and monitoring of the respective common controls. For example, the organization may requirethat the Facilities Management Office develop, implement, assess, authorize, and continuously
monitor physical and environmental protection controls from the PE family when such controls
are not associated with a particular information system but instead, support multiple systems.
When common controls are included in a separate security plan for an information system (e.g.,security controls employed as part of an intrusion detection system providing boundary protection
inherited by one or more organizational information systems), the information security programplan indicates which separate security plan contains a description of the common controls.

Implementation Tip
The selection of common controls is most effectively accomplished on an organization-wide basiswith the involvement of senior leadership (i.e., mission/business owners, authorizing officials, chief
information officers, senior information security officers, information system owners, information
owners/stewards, risk executives). These individuals have the collective knowledge to understandorganizational priorities, the importance of organizational operations and assets, and the importanceof the information systems that support those operations/assets. The senior leaders are also in thebest position to select the common controls for each security control baseline and assign specificresponsibilities for developing, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring those controls.

Common controls, whether employed in organizational information systems or environments ofoperation, are authorized by senior officials with at least the same level of authority/responsibility
for managing risk as the authorization officials for information systems inheriting the controls.
Authorization results for common controls are shared with the appropriate information systemowners and authorizing officials. A plan of action and milestones is developed and maintained forcommon controls that have been determined through independent assessments, to be less thaneffective. Information system owners dependent on common controls that are less than effective
consider whether they are willing to accept the associated risk or if additional tailoring is required
to address the weaknesses or deficiencies in the controls. Such risk-based decisions are influenced
by available resources, the trust models employed by the organization, and the risk tolerance ofauthorizing officials and the organization. 42

41
Information security program plans are described in Appendix G. Organizations ensure that any security capabilities
provided by common controls (i.e., security capabilities inheritable by other organizational entities) are described in
sufficient detail to facilitate adequate understanding of the control implementation by inheriting entities.
42
NIST Special Publication 800-39 provides guidance on trust models, including validated, direct historical, mediated,and mandated trust models.

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Common controls are subject to the same assessment and monitoring requirements as systemspecific controls employed in individual organizational information systems. Because common
controls impact more than one system, a higher degree of confidence regarding the effectivenessof those controls may be required.
Security controls not designated as common controls are considered system-specific or hybrid
controls. System-specific controls are the primary responsibility of information system owners
and their respective authorizing officials. Organizations assign a hybrid status to security controls
when one part of the control is common and another part of the control is system-specific. For
example, an organization may choose to implement the Incident Response Policy and Procedures
security control (IR-1) as a hybrid control with the policy portion of the control designated ascommon and the procedures portion of the control designated as system-specific. Hybrid controls
may also serve as predefined templates for further control refinement. Organizations may choose,for example, to implement the Contingency Planning security control (CP-2) as a predefined
template for a generalized contingency plan for all organizational information systems withinformation system owners tailoring the plan, where appropriate, for system-specific uses.
Partitioning security controls into common, hybrid, and system-specific controls can result insignificant savings to organizations in implementation and assessment costs as well as a moreconsistent application of security controls organization-wide. While security control partitioning
into common, hybrid, and system-specific controls is straightforward and intuitive conceptually,
the actual application takes a significant amount of planning and coordination. At the information
system level, determination of common, hybrid, or system-specific security controls follows thedevelopment of a tailored baseline. It is necessary to first determine what security capability isneeded before organizations assign responsibility for how security controls are implemented,
operated, and maintained.
Security plans for individual information systems identify which security controls required for
those systems have been designated by organizations as common controls and which controls
have been designated as system-specific or hybrid controls. Information system owners are
responsible for any system-specific implementation details associated with common controls.
These implementation details are identified and described in the security plans for the individual
information systems. Senior information security officers for organizations coordinate with
common control providers (e.g., facility/site managers, human resources managers, intrusion
detection system owners) to ensure that the required controls are developed, implemented, andassessed for effectiveness. Collectively, the security plans for individual information systems andthe organization-wide information security program plans provide complete coverage for all
security controls employed within organizations.
The determination as to whether a security control is a common, hybrid, or system-specific iscontext-based. Security controls cannot be determined to be common, hybrid, or system-specificsimply based on reviewing the language of the control. For example, a control may be systemspecific for a particular information system, but at the same time that control could be a common
control for another system, which would inherit the control from the first system. One indicator ofwhether a system-specific control may also be a common control for other information systems is
to consider who or what depends on the functionality of that particular control. If a certain part ofan information system or solution external to the system boundary depends on the control, thenthat control may be a candidate for common control identification.

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Implementation Tip•

Organizations consider the inherited risk from the use of common controls. Security plans,
security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones for common controls (or asummary of such information) are made available to information system owners (for systems
inheriting the controls) after the information is reviewed and approved by the senior official or
executive responsible and accountable for the controls.

•

Organizations ensure that common control providers keep control status information current
since the controls typically support multiple organizational information systems. Security plans,
security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones for common controls are usedby authorizing officials to make risk-based decisions in the security authorization process fortheir information systems and therefore, inherited risk from common controls is a significant
factor in such risk-based decisions.

•

Organizations ensure that common control providers have the capability to rapidly broadcast
changes in the status of common controls that adversely affect the protections being provided byand expected of the common controls. Common control providers inform system owners whenproblems arise in the inherited common controls (e.g., when an assessment or reassessment of
a common control indicates the control is flawed or deficient in some manner, or when a new
threat or attack method arises that renders the common control less than effective in protecting
against the new threat or attack method).

•Organizations are encouraged to employ automated management systems to maintain recordsof the specific common controls employed in each organizational information system to enhance
the ability of common control providers to rapidly communicate with system owners.

•

If common controls are provided to organizations by entities external to the organization (e.g.,shared and/or external service providers), arrangements are made with the external/sharedservice providers by the organization to obtain information on the effectiveness of the deployed
controls. Information obtained from external organizations regarding effectiveness of common
controls is factored into authorization decisions.

2.5 EXTERNAL SERVICE PROVIDERS
Organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on information system services provided byexternal providers to conduct important missions and business functions. External information
system services are computing and information technology services implemented outside of the
traditional security authorization boundaries established by organizations for their information
systems. Those traditional authorization boundaries linked to physical space and control of assets,
are being extended (both physically and logically) with the growing use of external services. In
this context, external services can be provided by: (i) entities within the organization but outsideof the security authorization boundaries established for organizational information systems; (ii)entities outside of the organization either in the public sector (e.g., federal agencies) or private
sector (e.g., commercial service providers); or (iii) some combination of the public and private
sector options. External information system services include, for example, the use of serviceoriented architectures (SOAs), cloud-based services (infrastructure, platform, software), or data
center operations. External information system services may be used by, but are typically not partof, organizational information systems. In some situations, external information system services
may completely replace or heavily augment the routine functionality of internal organizational
information systems.
FISMA and OMB policies require that federal agencies using external service providers toprocess, store, or transmit federal information or operate information systems on behalf of the

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federal government, assure that such use meets the same security requirements that federal
agencies are required to meet. Security requirements for external service providers including thesecurity controls for external information systems are expressed in contracts or other formal
agreements. 43 Organizations are responsible and accountable for the information security risk
incurred by the use of information system services provided by external providers. Such risk isaddressed by incorporating the Risk Management Framework (RMF) as part of the terms andconditions of the contracts with external providers. Organizations can require external providers
to implement all steps in the RMF except the security authorization step, which remains aninherent federal responsibility directly linked to managing the information security risk related tothe use of external information system services. 44 Organizations can also require external
providers to provide appropriate evidence to demonstrate that they have complied with the RMF
in protecting federal information. However, federal agencies take direct responsibility for theoverall security of such services by authorizing the information systems providing the services.
Relationships with external service providers are established in a variety of ways, for example,
through joint ventures, business partnerships, outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts,
interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, service-level agreements), licensing
agreements, and/or supply chain exchanges. The growing use of external service providers andnew relationships being forged with those providers present new and difficult challenges fororganizations, especially in the area of information system security. These challenges include:•

Defining the types of external information system services provided to organizations;•

Describing how those external services are protected in accordance with the information
security requirements of organizations; and•Obtaining the necessary assurances that the risk to organizational operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation arising from the use of the external services
is acceptable.

The degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is at an acceptable level
depends on the trust that organizations place in external service providers. In some cases, thelevel of trust is based on the amount of direct control organizations are able to exert on external
service providers with regard to employment of security controls necessary for the protection of
the service/information and the evidence brought forth as to the effectiveness of those controls. 45
The level of control is usually established by the terms and conditions of the contracts or servicelevel agreements with the external service providers and can range from extensive control (e.g.,negotiating contracts or agreements that specify detailed security requirements for the providers)to very limited control (e.g., using contracts or service-level agreements to obtain commodity

43

Organizations consult the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) when acquiring cloudservices from external providers. FedRAMP addresses required security controls and independent assessments for avariety of cloud services. Additional information is available at http://www.fedramp.gov.
44

To effectively manage information security risk, organizations authorize information systems of external providers
that are part of the information technologies or services (e.g., infrastructure, platform, or software) provided to thefederal government. Security authorization requirements are expressed in the terms and conditions of contracts withexternal providers of those information technologies and services.
45

The level of trust that organizations place in external service providers can vary widely, ranging from those who arehighly trusted (e.g., business partners in a joint venture that share a common business model and common goals) tothose who are less trusted and represent greater sources of risk (e.g., business partners in one endeavor who are also
competitors in another market sector). NIST Special Publication 800-39 describes different trust models that can be
employed by organizations when establishing relationships with external service providers.

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services such as commercial telecommunications services). 46 In other cases, levels of trust are
based on factors that convince organizations that required security controls have been employed
and that determinations of control effectiveness exist. For example, separately authorized external
information system services provided to organizations through well-established lines of business
relationships may provide degrees of trust in such services within the tolerable risk range of theauthorizing officials and organizations using the services.
The provision of services by external providers may result in certain services without explicit
agreements between organizations and the providers. Whenever explicit agreements are feasible
and practical (e.g., through contracts, service-level agreements), organizations develop suchagreements and require the use of the security controls in Appendix F of this publication. Whenorganizations are not in a position to require explicit agreements with external service providers(e.g., services are imposed on organizations, services are commodity services), organizations
establish and document explicit assumptions about service capabilities with regard to security. In
situations where organizations are procuring information system services through centralized
acquisition vehicles (e.g., governmentwide contracts by the General Services Administration orother preferred and/or mandatory acquisition organizations), it may be more efficient and costeffective for contract originators to establish and maintain stated levels of trust with external
service providers (including the definition of required security controls and level of assurancewith regard to the provision of such controls). Organizations subsequently acquiring information
system services from centralized contracts can take advantage of the negotiated levels of trust
established by the procurement originators and thus avoid costly repetition of activities necessary
to establish such trust. 47 Centralized acquisition vehicles (e.g., contracts) may also require theactive participation of organizations. For example, organizations may be required by provisions incontracts or agreements to install public key encryption-enabled client software recommended byexternal service providers.
Ultimately, the responsibility for adequately mitigating unacceptable risks arising from the use of
external information system services remains with authorizing officials. Organizations requirethat appropriate chains of trust be established with external service providers when dealing withthe many issues associated with information system security. Organizations establish and retain alevel of trust that participating service providers in the potentially complex consumer-provider
relationship provide adequate protection for the services rendered to organizations. The chain oftrust can be complicated due to the number of entities participating in the consumer-provider
relationship and the types of relationships between the parties. External service providers may
also outsource selected services to other external entities, making the chain of trust more difficultand complicated to manage. Depending on the nature of the services, organizations may find it
impossible to place significant trust in external providers. This situation is due not to any inherent
untrustworthiness on the part of providers, but to the intrinsic level of risk in the services. 48
46

Commercial providers of commodity-type services typically organize their business models and services around theconcept of shared resources and devices for a broad and diverse customer base. Therefore, unless organizations obtainfully dedicated services from commercial service providers, there may be a need for greater reliance on compensating
security controls to provide the necessary protections for the information system that relies on those external services.
Organizational assessments of risk and risk mitigation activities reflect this situation.
47

For example, procurement originators could authorize information systems providing external services to the federal
government under the specific terms and conditions of the contracts. Federal agencies requesting such services under
the terms of the contracts would not be required to reauthorize the information systems when acquiring such services(unless the request included services outside the scope of the original contracts).
48

There may also be risk in disallowing certain functionality because of security concerns. Security is merely one ofmultiple considerations in an overall risk determination.

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Where a sufficient level of trust cannot be established in the external services and/or providers,organizations can: (i) mitigate the risk by employing compensating controls; (ii) accept the risk
within the level of organizational risk tolerance; (iii) transfer risk by obtaining insurance to coverpotential losses; or (iv) avoid risk by choosing not to obtain the services from certain providers(resulting in performance of missions/business operations with reduced levels of functionality or
possibly no functionality at all). 49 For example, in the case of cloud-based information systems
and/or services, organizations might require as a compensating control, that all information stored
in the cloud be encrypted for added security of the information. Alternatively, organizations may
require encrypting some of the information stored in the cloud (depending on the criticality or
sensitivity of such information)—accepting additional risk but limiting the risk of not storing all
information in an unencrypted form.

2.6 ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
Assurance and trustworthiness of information systems, system components, and information
system services are becoming an increasingly important part of the risk management strategies
developed by organizations. Whether information systems are deployed to support, for example,
the operations of the national air traffic control system, a major financial institution, a nuclear
power plant providing electricity for a large city, or the military services and warfighters, thesystems must be reliable, trustworthy, and resilient in the face of increasingly sophisticated andpervasive threats. To understand how organizations achieve trustworthy systems and the roleassurance plays in the trustworthiness factor, it is important to first define the term trust. Trust, ingeneral, is the belief that an entity will behave in a predictable manner while performing specificfunctions, in specific environments, and under specified conditions or circumstances. The entity
may be a person, process, information system, system component, system-of-systems, or any
combination thereof.
From an information security perspective, trust is the belief that a security-relevant entity will
behave in a predictable manner when satisfying a defined set of security requirements under
specified conditions/circumstances and while subjected to disruptions, human errors, component
faults and failures, and purposeful attacks that may occur in the environment of operation. Trustis usually determined relative to a specific security capability 50 and can be decided relative to anindividual system component or the entire information system. However, trust at the information
system level is not achieved as a result of composing a security capability from a set of trusted
system components—rather, trust at the system level is an inherently subjective determinationthat is derived from the complex interactions among entities (i.e., technical components, physicalcomponents, and individuals), taking into account the life cycle activities that govern, develop,
operate, and sustain the system. In essence, to have trust in a security capability requires that
there is a sufficient basis for trust, or trustworthiness, in the set of security-relevant entities thatare to be composed to provide such capability.
Trustworthiness with respect to information systems, expresses the degree to which the systems
can be expected to preserve with some degree of confidence, the confidentiality, integrity, andavailability of the information that is being processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems acrossa range of threats. Trustworthy information systems are systems that are believed to be capable ofoperating within a defined risk tolerance despite the environmental disruptions, human errors,
49

Alternative providers offering a higher basis for trust, usually at a higher cost, may be available.

50

A security capability is a combination of mutually reinforcing security controls (i.e., safeguards/countermeasures)
implemented by technical means (i.e., functionality in hardware, software, and firmware), physical means (i.e., physicaldevices and protective measures), and/or procedural means (i.e., procedures performed by individuals).

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structural failures, and purposeful attacks that are expected to occur in the environments in which
the systems operate—systems that have the trustworthiness to successfully carry out assigned
missions/business functions under conditions of stress and uncertainty. 51

Security Capability
Organizations can consider defining a set of security capabilities as a precursor to the security
control selection process. The concept of security capability is a construct that recognizes that theprotection of information being processed, stored, or transmitted by information systems, seldom
derives from a single safeguard or countermeasure (i.e., security control). In most cases, suchprotection results from the selection and implementation of a set of mutually reinforcing security
controls. For example, organizations may wish to define a security capability for secure remoteauthentication. This capability can be achieved by the selection and implementation of a set of
security controls from Appendix F (e.g., IA-2[1], IA-2[2], IA-2[8], IA-2[9], and SC-8[1]). Moreover,security capabilities can address a variety of areas that can include, for example, technical means,
physical means, procedural means, or any combination thereof. Thus, in addition to the above
functional capability for secure remote access, organizations may also need security capabilities that
address physical means such as tamper detection on a cryptographic module or anomaly
detection/analysis on an orbiting spacecraft.
As the number of security controls in Appendix F grows over time in response to an increasingly
sophisticated threat space, it is important for organizations to have the ability to describe key security
capabilities needed to protect core organizational missions/business functions, and to subsequently
define a set of security controls that if properly designed, developed, and implemented, produce
such capabilities. This simplifies how the protection problem is viewed conceptually. In essence,using the construct of security capability provides a shorthand method of grouping security controlsthat are employed for a common purpose or to achieve a common objective. This becomes animportant consideration, for example, when assessing security controls for effectiveness.
Traditionally, assessments have been conducted on a control-by-control basis producing results thatare characterized as pass (i.e., control satisfied) or fail (i.e., control not satisfied). However, thefailure of a single control or in some cases, the failure of multiple controls, may not affect the overall
security capability needed by an organization. Moreover, employing the broader construct of security
capability allows an organization to assess the severity of vulnerabilities discovered in its information
systems and determine if the failure of a particular security control (associated with a vulnerability) or
the decision not to deploy a certain control, affects the overall capability needed for mission/businessprotection. It also facilitates conducting root cause analyses to determine if the failure of one security
control can be traced to the failure of other controls based on the established relationships among
controls. Ultimately, authorization decisions (i.e., risk acceptance decisions) are made based on the
degree to which the desired security capabilities have been effectively achieved and are meeting thesecurity requirements defined by an organization. These risk-based decisions are directly related toorganizational risk tolerance that is defined as part of an organization’s risk management strategy.

Two fundamental components affecting the trustworthiness of information systems are security
functionality and security assurance. Security functionality is typically defined in terms of the
security features, functions, mechanisms, services, procedures, and architectures implemented
within organizational information systems or the environments in which those systems operate.
Security assurance is the measure of confidence that the security functionality is implemented
correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting thesecurity requirements for the system—thus possessing the capability to accurately mediate andenforce established security policies. Security controls address both security functionality and51
While information is the primary area of concern, trustworthiness applies to the protections for all assets deemed
critical by organizations. Furthermore, protections are provided by technology (i.e., hardware, software, firmware),physical elements (i.e., doors, locks, surveillance), and human elements (i.e., people, processes, procedures).

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security assurance. Some controls focus primarily on security functionality (e.g., PE-3, PhysicalAccess Control; IA-2, Identification and Authentication; SC-13, Cryptographic Protection; AC-2,
Account Management). Other controls focus primarily on security assurance (e.g., CA-2, Security
Assessment; SA-17, Developer Security Architecture and Design; CM-3, Configuration Change
Control). Finally, certain security controls can support security functionality and assurance (e.g.,RA-5, Vulnerability Scanning; SC-3, Security Function Isolation; AC-25, Reference Monitor).
Security controls related to functionality are combined to develop a security capability with theassurance-related controls implemented to provide a degree of confidence in the capability within
the organizational risk tolerance.
Assurance Evidence—From Developmental and Operational Activities
Organizations obtain security assurance by the actions taken by information system developers,
implementers, operators, maintainers, and assessors. Actions by individuals and/or groups during
the development/operation of information systems produce security evidence that contributes tothe assurance, or measures of confidence, in the security functionality needed to deliver the
security capability. The depth and coverage of these actions (as described in Appendix E) also
contribute to the efficacy of the evidence and measures of confidence. The evidence produced bydevelopers, implementers, operators, assessors, and maintainers during the system development
life cycle (e.g., design/development artifacts, assessment results, warranties, and certificates of
evaluation/validation) contributes to the understanding of the security controls implemented byorganizations.
The strength of security functionality 52 plays an important part in being able to achieve theneeded security capability and subsequently satisfying the security requirements of organizations.
Information system developers can increase the strength of security functionality by employing aspart of the hardware/software/firmware development process: (i) well-defined security policies
and policy models; (ii) structured/rigorous design and development techniques; and (iii) soundsystem/security engineering principles. The artifacts generated by these development activities(e.g., functional specifications, high-level/low-level designs, implementation representations[source code and hardware schematics], the results from static/dynamic testing and code analysis)
can provide important evidence that the information systems (including the components thatcompose those systems) will be more reliable and trustworthy. Security evidence can also be
generated from security testing conducted by independent, accredited, third-party assessment
organizations (e.g., Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Cryptographic/Security Testing
Laboratories, and other assessment activities by government and private sector organizations).53
In addition to the evidence produced in the development environment, organizations can produce
evidence from the operational environment that contributes to the assurance of functionality andultimately, security capability. Operational evidence includes, for example, flaw reports, recordsof remediation actions, the results of security incident reporting, and the results of organizational
continuous monitoring activities. Such evidence helps to determine the effectiveness of deployed
security controls, changes to information systems and environments of operation, and compliancewith federal legislation, policies, directives, regulations, and standards. Security evidence,
52

The security strength of an information system component (i.e., hardware, software, or firmware) is determined by
the degree to which the security functionality implemented within that component is correct, complete, resistant todirect attacks (strength of mechanism), and resistant to bypass or tampering.
53

For example, third-party assessment organizations assess cloud services and service providers in support of theFederal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP). Common Criteria Testing Laboratories test andevaluate information technology products using ISO/IEC standard 15408. Cryptographic/Security Testing Laboratories
test cryptographic modules using the FIPS 140-2 standard.

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whether obtained from development or operational activities, provides a better understanding of
security controls implemented and used by organizations. Together, the actions taken during thesystem development life cycle by developers, implementers, operators, maintainers, and assessors
and the evidence produced as part of those actions, help organizations to determine the extent towhich the security functionality within their information systems is implemented correctly,
operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting stated security
requirements and enforcing or mediating established security policies—thus providing greater
confidence in the security capability.

The Compelling Argument for Assurance
Organizations specify assurance-related controls to define activities performed to generate relevant
and credible evidence about the functionality and behavior of organizational information systems andto trace the evidence to the elements that provide such functionality/behavior. This evidence is used
to obtain a degree of confidence that the systems satisfy stated security requirements—and do sowhile effectively supporting the organizational missions/business functions while being subjected tothreats in the intended environments of operation.

With regard to the security evidence produced, the depth and coverage of such evidence canaffect the level of assurance in the functionality implemented. Depth and coverage are attributes
associated with assessment methods and the generation of security evidence. Assessment methods
can be applied to developmental and operational assurance. For developmental assurance, depth
is associated with the rigor, level of detail, and formality of the artifacts produced during thedesign and development of the hardware, software, and firmware components of information
systems (e.g., functional specifications, high-level design, low-level design, source code). The
level of detail available in development artifacts can affect the type of testing, evaluation, andanalysis conducted during the system development life cycle (e.g., black-box testing, gray-box
testing, white-box testing, static/dynamic analysis). For operational assurance, the depth attributeaddresses the number and types of assurance-related security controls selected and implemented.
In contrast, the coverage attribute is associated with the assessment methods employed during
development and operations, addressing the scope and breadth of assessment objects included in
the assessments (e.g., number/types of tests conducted on source code, number of softwaremodules reviewed, number of network nodes/mobile devices scanned for vulnerabilities, numberof individuals interviewed to check basic understanding of contingency responsibilities). 54
Addressing assurance-related controls during acquisition and system development can helporganizations to obtain sufficiently trustworthy information systems and components that are
more reliable and less likely to fail. These controls include ensuring that developers employ
sound systems security engineering principles and processes including, for example, providing acomprehensive security architecture, and enforcing strict configuration management and control
of information system and software changes. Once information systems are deployed, assurancerelated controls can help organizations to continue to have confidence in the trustworthiness ofthe systems. These controls include, for example, conducting integrity checks on software andfirmware components, conducting penetration testing to find vulnerabilities in organizational

54
NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides guidance on the generation of security evidence related to security
assessments conducted during the system development life cycle.

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information systems, monitoring established secure configuration settings, and developing
policies/procedures that support the operation and use of the systems.
The concepts described above, including security requirements, security capability, security
controls, security functionality, and security assurance, are brought together in a model fortrustworthiness for information systems and system components. Figure 3 illustrates the key
components in the model and the relationship among the components.

TRUSTWORTHINESS

Facilitates risk response to a variety of threats, including
hostile cyber attacks, natural disasters, structural failures,and human errors, both intentional and unintentional.

(Systems and Components)
Enables

Security Requirements

Promotes Traceability from
Requirements to Capability toFunctionality with Degree of
Assurance

Derived from Mission/Business Needs, Laws, E.O.,
Policies, Directives, Instructions, Standards
Satisfies

Security Capability

Mutually Reinforcing Security Controls(Technical, Physical, Procedural Means)
Produces

Security Functionality

Features, Functions, Services,
Mechanisms, Processes, Procedures(Functionality-Related Controls)

Security Assurance

ProvidesConfidenceIn

Developmental/Operational Actions(Assurance-Related Controls)

Generates

Security Evidence

Development Artifacts, Flaw Reports,
Assessment Results, Scan Results,
Integrity Checks, Configuration Settings

FIGURE 3: TRUSTWORTHINESS MODEL

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Raising the bar on assurance can be difficult and costly for organizations—but sometimes
essential for critical applications, missions, or business functions. Determining what parts of theorganization’s information technology infrastructure demand higher assurance of implemented
security functionality is a Tier 1/Tier 2 risk management activity (see Figure 1 in Chapter Two).
This type of activity occurs when organizations determine the security requirements necessary toprotect organizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Determining security requirements andthe associated security capabilities needed to generate the appropriate protection is an integral
part of the organizational risk management process described in NIST Special Publication 80039—specifically, in the development of the risk response strategy following the risk framing andrisk assessment steps (where organizations establish priorities, assumptions, constraints, risk
tolerance and assess threats, vulnerabilities, mission/business impacts, and likelihood of threat
occurrence). After the security requirements and security capabilities are determined at Tiers 1
and 2 (including the necessary assurance requirements to provide measures of confidence in thedesired capabilities), those requirements/capabilities are reflected in the design of the enterprisearchitecture, the associated mission/business processes, and the organizational information
systems that are needed to support those processes. Organizations can use the Risk Management
Framework (RMF), described in NIST Special Publication 800-37, to ensure that the appropriate
assurance levels are achieved for the information systems and system components deployed tocarry out core missions and business functions. This is primarily a Tier 3 activity but can havesome overlap with Tiers 1 and 2, for example, in the area of common control selection.
Trustworthy information systems are difficult to build from a software and systems development
perspective. However, there are a number of design, architectural, and implementation principles
that, if used, can result in more trustworthy systems. These core security principles include, forexample, simplicity, modularity, layering, domain isolation, least privilege, least functionality,
and resource isolation/encapsulation. Information technology products and systems exhibiting ahigher degree of trustworthiness (i.e., products/systems having the requisite security functionality
and security assurance) are expected to exhibit a lower rate of latent design/implementation flaws
and a higher degree of penetration resistance against a range of threats including, for example,
sophisticated cyber attacks, natural disasters, accidents, and intentional/unintentional errors. 55 The
vulnerability and susceptibility of organizational missions/business functions and supporting
information systems to known threats, the environments of operation where those systems are
deployed, and the maximum acceptable level of information security risk, guide the degree oftrustworthiness needed.
Appendix E describes the minimum assurance requirements for federal information systems andorganizations and highlights the assurance-related controls in the security control baselines inAppendix D needed to ensure that the requirements are satisfied. 56

55
Organizations also rely to a great extent on security assurance from an operational perspective as illustrated by theassurance-related controls in Tables E-1 through E-3. Operational assurance is obtained by other than developmental
actions including for example, defining and applying security configuration settings on information technology
products, establishing policies and procedures, assessing security controls, and conducting a rigorous continuous
monitoring program. In some situations, to achieve the necessary security capability with weak or deficient information
technology, organizations compensate by increasing their operational assurance.
56
CNSS Instruction 1253 designates security control baselines for national security systems. Therefore, the assurancerelated controls in the baselines established for the national security community, if so designated, may differ from thosecontrols designated for non-national security systems.

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The importance of security assurance can be described by using the example of a light switch on awall in the living room of your house. Individuals can observe that by simply turning the switch on andoff, the switch appears to be performing according to its functional specification. This is analogous to
conducting black-box testing of security functionality in an information system or system component.
However, the more important questions might be—•Does the light switch do anything else besides what it is supposed to do?

•

What does the light switch look like from behind the wall?

•

What types of components were used to construct the light switch and how was the switch
assembled?

•

Did the switch manufacturer follow industry best practices in the development process?

This example is analogous to the many developmental activities that address the quality of the
security functionality in an information system or system component including, for example, designprinciples, coding techniques, code analysis, testing, and evaluation.
The security assurance requirements and associated assurance-related controls in Appendix E
address the light switch problem from the front of the wall perspective, and potentially from thebehind the wall perspective, depending on the measure of confidence needed about the component
in question. For organizational missions/business functions that are less critical (i.e., low impact),
lower levels of assurance might be appropriate. However, as missions/business functions become
more important (i.e., moderate or high impact) and information systems and organizations become
susceptible to advanced persistent threats by high-end adversaries, increased levels of assurance
may be required. In addition, as organizations become more dependent on external information
system services and providers, assurance becomes more important—providing greater insight andmeasures of confidence to organizations in understanding and verifying the security capability of
external providers and the services provided to the federal government. Thus, when the potential
impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation isgreat, an increasing level of effort must be directed at what is happening behind the wall.

2.7 REVISIONS AND EXTENSIONSThe security controls listed in this publication represent the state-of-the-practice safeguards andcountermeasures for federal information systems and organizations. The security controls 57 will
be carefully reviewed and revised periodically to reflect:•Experience gained from using the controls;•

New federal legislation, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, or policies;•

Changing security requirements;•

Emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and attack methods; and•Availability of new technologies.

The security controls in the security control catalog are expected to change over time, as controls
are withdrawn, revised, and added. The security controls defined in the low, moderate, and highbaselines are also expected to change over time as the level of security and due diligence for
mitigating risks within organizations changes. In addition to the need for change, the need forstability is addressed by requiring that proposed modifications to security controls go through a
57

The privacy controls listed in Appendix J will also be updated on a regular basis using similar criteria.

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rigorous public review process to obtain both public and private sector feedback and to build
consensus for such change. This provides over time, a stable, flexible, and technically sound setof security controls for the federal government, contractors, and any other organizations using thesecurity control catalog.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE PROCESSSELECTION AND SPECIFICATION OF SECURITY CONTROLST

his chapter describes the process of selecting and specifying security controls and control
enhancements for organizational information systems to include: (i) selecting appropriate
security control baselines; (ii) tailoring the baselines; (iii) documenting the security control
selection process; and (iv) applying the control selection process to new development and legacy
systems.

3.1 SELECTING SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES
In preparation for selecting and specifying the appropriate security controls for organizational
information systems and their respective environments of operation, organizations first determine
the criticality and sensitivity of the information to be processed, stored, or transmitted by thosesystems. This process, known as security categorization, is described in FIPS Publication 199. 58
The security categorization standard is based on a simple and well-established concept—that is,determining the potential adverse impact for organizational information systems. The results of
security categorization help guide and inform the selection of appropriate security controls (i.e.,
safeguards and countermeasures) to adequately protect those information systems. The security
controls selected for information systems are commensurate with the potential adverse impact onorganizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation if there is aloss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. FIPS Publication 199 requires organizations tocategorize information systems as low-impact, moderate-impact, or high-impact for the statedsecurity objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (RMF Step 1). The potential
impact values assigned to the security objectives are the highest values (i.e., high water mark)from the security categories that have been determined for each type of information processed,
stored, or transmitted by those information systems. 59 The generalized format for expressing thesecurity category (SC) of an information system is:
SC information system = {(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, impact), (availability, impact)},
where the acceptable values for potential impact are low, moderate, or high.

Since the potential impact values for confidentiality, integrity, and availability may not always be
the same for a particular information system, the high water mark concept (introduced in FIPS
Publication 199) is used in FIPS Publication 200 to determine the impact level of the information
system for the express purpose of selecting the applicable security control baseline from one of
the three baselines identified in Appendix D. 60 Thus, a low-impact system is defined as an
information system in which all three of the security objectives are low. A moderate-impact
system is an information system in which at least one of the security objectives is moderate and58

CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security categorization guidance for national security systems.

59

NIST Special Publication 800-60, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security
Categories, provides guidance on the assignment of security categories to information systems.

60
The high water mark concept is employed because there are significant dependencies among the security objectivesof confidentiality, integrity, and availability. In most cases, a compromise in one security objective ultimately affects
the other security objectives as well. Accordingly, security controls are not categorized by security objective. Rather,
the security controls are grouped into baselines to provide a general protection capability for classes of information
systems based on impact level.

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no security objective is greater than moderate. Finally, a high-impact system is an information
system in which at least one security objective is high.

Implementation Tip
To determine the impact level of an information system:

•
•
•
•

First, determine the different types of information that are processed, stored, or transmitted by the
information system. NIST Special Publication 800-60 provides common information types.
Second, using the impact values in FIPS Publication 199 and the recommendations of NIST
Special Publication 800-60, categorize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of each
information type.
Third, determine the information system security categorization, that is, the highest impact value
for each security objective (confidentiality, integrity, availability) from among the categorizations
for the information types associated with the information system.
Fourth, determine the overall impact level of the information system from the highest impact value
among the three security objectives in the system security categorization.

Note: For national security systems, organizations use CNSSI 1253 for security categorization.

Once the impact level of the information system is determined, organizations begin the security
control selection process (RMF Step 2). The first step in selecting and specifying security controls
for the information system is to choose the appropriate security control baseline. 61 The selectionof the security control baseline is based on the FIPS 200 impact level of the information system
as determined by the security categorization process described above. The organization selects
one of three security control baselines from Appendix D corresponding to the low-impact,
moderate-impact, or high-impact rating of the information system. 62 Note that not all security
controls are assigned to baselines, as indicated in Table D-2 by the phrase not selected. Similarly,
as illustrated in Tables D-3 through D-19, not all control enhancements are assigned to baselines.
Those control enhancements that are assigned to baselines are so indicated by an “x” in the low,
moderate, or high columns. The use of the term baseline is intentional. The security controls andcontrol enhancements in the baselines are a starting point from which controls/enhancements may
be removed, added, or specialized based on the tailoring guidance in Section 3.2.
The security control baselines in Appendix D address the security needs of a broad and diverse
set of constituencies (including individual users and organizations). Some assumptions thatgenerally underlie the baselines in Appendix D include, for example: (i) the environments inwhich organizational information systems operate; (ii) the nature of operations conducted byorganizations; (iii) the functionality employed within information systems; (iv) the types of
threats facing organizations, missions/business processes, and information systems; and (v) thetype of information processed, stored, or transmitted by information systems. Articulating theunderlying assumptions is a key element in the initial risk framing step of the risk management
process described in NIST Special Publication 800-39. Some of the assumptions that underlie thebaselines in Appendix D include:61

The general security control selection process may be augmented or further detailed by additional sector-specificguidance as described in Section 3.3, Creating Overlays, and Appendix I, template for developing overlays.
62

CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security control baselines for national security systems.

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Information systems are located in physical facilities;•

User data/information in organizational information systems is relatively persistent; 63•

Information systems are multi-user (either serially or concurrently) in operation;•

Some user data/information in organizational information systems is not shareable with otherusers who have authorized access to the same systems;•

Information systems exist in networked environments;•

Information systems are general purpose in nature; and•Organizations have the necessary structure, resources, and infrastructure to implement thecontrols. 64

If one or more of these assumptions is not valid, then some of the security controls assigned to theinitial baselines in Appendix D may not be applicable—a situation that can be readily addressedby applying the tailoring guidance in Section 3.2 and the results of organizational assessments ofrisk. Conversely, there are also some possible situations that are specifically not addressed in thebaselines. These include:•

Insider threats exist within organizations;•Classified data/information is processed, stored, or transmitted by information systems;•

Advanced persistent threats (APTs) exist within organizations;•

Selected data/information requires specialized protection based on federal legislation,
directives, regulations, or policies; and•Information systems need to communicate with other systems across different security
domains.

If any of the above assumptions apply, then additional security controls from Appendix F would
likely be needed to ensure adequate protection—a situation that can also be effectively addressedby applying the tailoring guidance in Section 3.2 (specifically, security control supplementation)and the results of organizational assessments of risk.

3.2 TAILORING BASELINE SECURITY CONTROLS
After selecting the applicable security control baseline from Appendix D, organizations initiate
the tailoring process to modify appropriately and align the controls more closely with the specificconditions within the organization (i.e., conditions related to organizational missions/business
functions, information systems, or environments of operation). The tailoring process includes:•

Identifying and designating common controls in initial security control baselines;•

Applying scoping considerations to the remaining baseline security controls;•

Selecting compensating security controls, if needed;

63

Persistent data/information refers to data/information with utility for a relatively long duration (e.g., days, weeks).

64

In general, federal departments and agencies will satisfy this assumption. The assumption becomes more of an issue
for nonfederal entities such as municipalities, first responders, and small (business) contractors. Such entities may not
be large enough or sufficiently resourced to have elements dedicated to providing the range of security capabilities thatare assumed by the baselines. Organizations consider such factors in their risk-based decisions.

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Assigning specific values to organization-defined security control parameters via explicit
assignment and selection statements;•

Supplementing baselines with additional security controls and control enhancements, if
needed; and•Providing additional specification information for control implementation, if needed.

The tailoring process, as an integral part of security control selection and specification, is part of acomprehensive organizational risk management process—framing, assessing, responding to, andmonitoring information security risk. Organizations use risk management guidance to facilitaterisk-based decision making regarding the applicability of security controls in the security control
baselines. Ultimately, organizations use the tailoring process to achieve cost-effective, risk-based
security that supports organizational mission/business needs. Tailoring activities are approved byauthorizing officials in coordination with selected organizational officials (e.g., risk executive[function], chief information officers, senior information security officers, information systemowners, common control providers) prior to implementing the security controls. Organizations
have the flexibility to perform the tailoring process at the organization level for all information
systems (either as a required tailored baseline or as the starting point for system-specific tailoring
activities), in support of a particular line of business or mission/business process, at the individual
information system level, or by using a combination of the above. 65
Conversely, organizations do not remove security controls for operational convenience. Tailoring
decisions regarding security controls should be defensible based on mission/business needs andaccompanied by explicit risk-based determinations. 66 Tailoring decisions, including the specificrationale for those decisions, are documented in the security plans for organizational information
systems. Every security control from the applicable security control baseline is accounted for
either by the organization (e.g., common control provider) or by the information system owner. If
certain security controls are tailored out, then the associated rationale is recorded in security plans(or references/pointers to other relevant documentation are provided) for the information systems
and approved by the responsible organizational officials as part of the security plan approval
process. 67
Documenting significant risk management decisions in the security control selection process isimperative in order for authorizing officials to have the necessary information to make credible,risk-based decisions with regard to the authorization of information systems. Since information
systems, environments of operation, and personnel associated with the system development life
cycle are subject to change, providing the assumptions, constraints, and rationale supporting thoseimportant risk decisions allows for a better understanding in the future of the security state of theinformation systems or environments of operation at the time the original risk decisions weremade and facilitates identifying changes, when previous risk decisions are revisited.

65

See also Section 3.3, Creating Overlays, and Appendix I, template for developing overlays.

66

Tailoring decisions can also be based on timing and applicability of selected security controls under certain definedconditions. That is, security controls may not apply in every situation or the parameter values for assignment statements
may change under certain circumstances. Overlays can define these special situations, conditions, or timing-related
considerations.
67

The level of detail required in documenting tailoring decisions in the security control selection process is at thediscretion of organizations and reflects the impact levels of the respective information systems implementing or
inheriting the controls.

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Identifying and Designating Common Controls
Common controls are controls that may be inherited by one or more organizational information
systems. If an information system inherits a common control, then that system does not need to
explicitly implement that control—that is, the security capability is being provided by anotherentity. Therefore, when the security controls in Appendix F call for an information system to
implement or perform a particular security function, it should not be interpreted to mean that all
systems that are part of larger, more complex systems or all components of a particular systemneed to implement the control or function. Organizational decisions on which security controls
are designated as common controls may greatly affect the responsibilities of individual systemowners with regard to the implementation of controls in a particular baseline. Common control
selection can also affect the overall resource expenditures by organizations (i.e., the greater thenumber of common controls implemented, the greater potential cost savings).
Applying Scoping Considerations
Scoping considerations, when applied in conjunction with risk management guidance, provide
organizations with a more granular foundation with which to make risk-based decisions. 68 The
application of scoping considerations can eliminate unnecessary security controls from the initial
security control baselines and help to ensure that organizations select only those controls that areneeded to provide the appropriate level of protection for organizational information systems—
protection based on the missions and business functions being supported by those systems and theenvironments in which the systems operate. Organizations may apply the scoping considerations
described below to assist with making risk-based decisions regarding security control selection
and specification—decisions that can potentially affect how the baseline security controls areapplied and implemented by organizations:•

CONTROL ALLOCATION AND PLACEMENT CONSIDERATIONS—

The term information system can refer to systems at multiple levels of abstraction ranging
from system-of-systems to individual single-user systems. The growing complexity of many
information systems requires careful analysis in the allocation/placement of security controls
within the three tiers in the risk management hierarchy (organization level, mission/businessprocess level, and information system level) without imposing any specific architectural
views or solutions. 69 Security controls in the initial baselines represent an information
system-wide set of controls that may not be applicable to every component in the system.
Security controls are applicable only to information system components that provide or
support the information security capability addressed by the controls.70 Organizations makeexplicit risk-based decisions about where to apply or allocate specific security controls inorganizational information systems in order to achieve the needed security capability and tosatisfy security requirements. 71 An example of this type of allocation is applying the68

The scoping considerations listed in this section are exemplary and not intended to limit organizations in renderingrisk-based decisions based on other organization-defined considerations with appropriate rationale.
69
This is especially true with the advent of service-oriented architectures where specific services are provided to
implement a single function.
70

For example, auditing controls are typically applied to components of an information system that provide auditing
capability (e.g., servers, etc.) and are not necessarily applied to every user-level workstation within the organization.
Organizations should carefully assess the inventory of components that compose their information systems todetermine which security controls are applicable to the various components.
71

As information technology advances, more powerful and diverse functionality can be found in smart phones, tablets,and other types of mobile devices. While tailor guidance may support not allocating a particular security control to a
specific technology or device, any residual risk associated with the absence of that control must be addressed in risk
assessments to adequately protect organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

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requirement from AC-18(1) (i.e., protecting wireless access to information systems using
authentication/encryption) to all wireless access except for wireless access to visitor
subnetworks which are not connected to other system components.
•

OPERATIONAL/ENVIRONMENTAL-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS—

Several of the security controls in the baselines are based on the assumption of the existenceof certain operational/environmental factors. Where these factors are absent or significantly
diverge from the baseline assumptions, it is justifiable to tailor the baseline. Some of the morecommon operational/environmental factors include:-

Mobility
The mobility of physical hosting environments can impact the security controls selected
for organizational information systems. As noted above, the set of security controls
assigned to each baseline in Appendix D assumes the operation of information systems in
fixed facilities and nonmobile locations. If those information systems operate primarily inmobile environments, the security control baseline should be tailored appropriately to
account for the differences in mobility and accessibility of the specific locations where
the systems reside. For example, many of the security controls in the Physical andEnvironmental Protection (PE) family that are selected in all three baselines reflect theassumption that the information systems reside in physical facilities/complexes that
require appropriate physical protections. Such controls would likely not provide added
value for mobile environments such as ships, aircraft, automobiles, vans, or space-based
systems. 72-

Single-User Systems and Operations
For information systems that are designed to operate as single-user systems (e.g., smart
phones), several of the security controls that address sharing among users may not beneeded. A single-user system or device refers to a system/device that is only intended to
be used by a single individual over time (i.e., exclusive use). Systems or devices that areshared by multiple users over time are not considered single-user. Security controls suchas AC-10, Concurrent Session Control, SC-4, Information in Shared Resources, and AC3, Access Enforcement 73 may not be required in single-user systems/operations and could
reasonably be tailored out of the baseline at the discretion of organizations.

-

Data Connectivity and Bandwidth
While many information systems are interconnected, there are some systems which forsecurity or operational reasons, lack networking capabilities—that is, the systems are air
gapped from the network. For nonnetworked systems, security controls such as AC-17,
Remote Access, SC-8, Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity, and SC-7, Boundary
Protection, are not applicable and may be tailored out of the security control baselines atthe discretion of organizations. In addition to nonnetworked information systems, there
are systems that have very limited or sporadic bandwidth (e.g., tactical systems that
support warfighter or law enforcement missions). For such systems, the application of
security controls would need to be examined carefully as the limited and/or sporadic
bandwidth could impact the practicality of implementing those controls and the viabilityof adversaries staging cyber attacks over the limited bandwidth.

72
The mobile nature of devices means that it is possible that, for some period of time, the devices may reside in fixedfacilities or complexes in fixed locations. During that time, the PE controls would likely apply.
73

Organizations consider whether individual users have administrator privileges before removing AC-3 from security
control baselines.

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Limited Functionality Systems or System Components
What constitutes an information system under the E-Government Act of 2002 is quite
broad. Fax machines, printers, scanners, pagers, smart phones, tablets, E-readers, anddigital cameras can all be categorized as information systems (or system components).
These types of systems and components may lack the general processing capabilities
assumed in the security control baselines. The nature of these constraints may limit thetypes of threats that these systems face, and hence the appropriateness of some of the
security controls. Thus, a control such as SI-3, Malicious Code Protection (required in allcontrol baselines) may not be practical for information systems or components that are
not capable of executing code (e.g., text-only pagers). However, because there is often noclear delineation between these types of information systems or components (e.g., smart
phones combine the digital capabilities of telephones, cameras, and computers), it isimportant that the application of security controls to limited functionality systems orcomponents be done judiciously and always take into account the intended use of thesystems, system capabilities, and the risk of compromise.

-

Information and System Non-Persistence
There is often an assumption that user information within organizational information
systems is persistent for a considerable period of time. However, for some applications
and environments of operation (e.g., tactical systems, industrial control systems), thepersistence of user information is often very limited in duration. For information systems
processing, storing, or transmitting such non-persistent information, several security
controls in the Contingency Planning (CP) family such as CP-6, Alternate Storage Site,
CP-7, Alternate Processing Site, and CP-9, Information System Backup, may not bepractical and can be tailored out at the discretion of organizations. For similar reasons,controls such as MP-6, Media Sanitization, and SC-28, Protection of Information at Rest,
are good candidates for removal through tailoring. 74 In addition to the non-persistence of
information, the information systems/services may be non-persistent as well. This can beachieved by the use of virtualization techniques to establish non-persistent instantiationsof operating systems and applications. Depending on the duration of the instantiations,some baseline controls might not be applicable.

-

Public Access
When public access to organizational information systems is allowed, security controls
should be applied with discretion since some security controls from the specified control
baselines (e.g., identification and authentication, personnel security controls) may not beapplicable for public access. Thus, in the case of the general public accessing federal
government websites (e.g., to download publically accessible information such as forms,
emergency preparedness information), security controls such as AC-7, Unsuccessful
Logon Attempts, AC-17, Remote Access, IA-2, Identification and Authentication, IA-4,
Identifier Management, and IA-5, Authenticator Management, typically would not be
relevant for validating access authorizations or privileges. However, many of thesecontrols would still be needed for identifying and authenticating organizational personnel
that maintain and support information systems providing such public access websites andservices. Similarly, many of the security controls may still be required for users accessing
nonpublic information systems through such public interfaces, for example, to access orchange personal information.

74
Organizations balance information persistence with the sensitivity of the information. Non-persistent information
may still require sanitization after deletion. In addition, organizations consider the duration of information sensitivity—
some information may be persistent, but only be sensitive for a limited time.

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SECURITY OBJECTIVE-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS—

Security controls that support only one or two of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability
security objectives may be downgraded to the corresponding control in a lower baseline (ormodified or eliminated if not defined in a lower baseline) only if the downgrading action: (i)reflects the FIPS Publication 199 security category for the supported security objective(s)before moving to the FIPS Publication 200 impact level (i.e., high water mark); 75 (ii) is
supported by an organizational assessment of risk; and (iii) does not adversely affect the levelof protection for the security-relevant information within the information system. 76 For
example, if an information system is categorized as moderate impact using the high watermark concept because confidentiality and/or integrity are moderate but availability is low,
there are several controls that only support the availability security objective and that
potentially could be downgraded to low baseline requirements—that is, it may be appropriate
not to implement CP-2(1) because the control enhancement supports only availability and isselected in the moderate baseline but not in the low baseline. The following security controls
and control enhancements are potential candidates for downgrading: 77•-

Confidentiality: AC-21, MA-3(3), MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-5(4), MP-6(1), MP-6(2), PE4, PE-5, SC-4, SC-8, SC-8(1);-Integrity: CM-5, CM-5(1), CM-5(3), SC-8, SC-8(1), SI-7, SI-7(1), SI-7(5), SI-10; and-Availability: CP-2(1), CP-2(2), CP-2(3), CP-2(4), CP-2(5), CP-2(8), CP-3(1), CP-4(1),CP-4(2), CP-6, CP-6(1), CP-6(2), CP-6(3), CP-7, CP-7(1), CP-7(2), CP-7(3), CP-7(4),CP-8, CP-8(1), CP-8(2), CP-8(3), CP-8(4), CP-9(1), CP-9(2), CP-9(3), CP-9(5), CP10(2), CP-10(4), MA-6, PE-9, PE-10, PE-11, PE-11(1), PE-13(1), PE-13(2), PE-13(3),PE-15(1).

TECHNOLOGY-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS—

Security controls that refer to specific technologies (e.g., wireless, cryptography, public key
infrastructure) are applicable only if those technologies are employed or are required to be
employed within organizational information systems. Security controls that can be explicitly
or implicitly supported by automated mechanisms do not require the development of suchmechanisms if the mechanisms do not already exist or are not readily available in commercial
or government off-the-shelf products. If automated mechanisms are not readily available,
75
When applying the high water mark in Section 3.1, some of the original FIPS Publication 199 confidentiality,
integrity, or availability security objectives may have been upgraded to a higher security control baseline. As part ofthis process, security controls that uniquely support the confidentiality, integrity, or availability security objectives may
have been upgraded unnecessarily. Consequently, it is recommended that organizations consider appropriate andallowable downgrading actions to ensure cost-effective, risk-based application of security controls.
76

Information that is security-relevant at the information system level (e.g., password files, network routing tables,
cryptographic key management information) is distinguished from user-level information within the same system.
Certain security controls are used to support the security objectives of confidentiality and integrity for both user-leveland system-level information. Caution should be exercised in downgrading confidentiality or integrity-related security
controls to ensure that downgrading actions do not result in insufficient protection for the security-relevant information
within the information system. Security-relevant information must be protected at the high water mark in order toachieve a similar level of protection for any of the security objectives related to user-level information.
77

Downgrading actions apply only to the moderate and high baselines. Security controls that are uniquely attributable
to confidentiality, integrity, or availability that would ordinarily be considered as potential candidates for downgrading(e.g., AC-16, AU-10, IA-7, PE-12, PE-14, SC-5, SC-13, SC-16) are eliminated from consideration because the controls
are either selected for use in all baselines and have no enhancements that could be downgraded, or the controls are
optional and not selected for use in any baseline. Organizations should exercise caution when downgrading security
controls that do not appear in the list in Section 3.2 to ensure that downgrading actions do not affect security objectives
other than the objectives targeted for downgrading.

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cost-effective, or technically feasible, compensating security controls, implemented throughnonautomated mechanisms or procedures, are used to satisfy specified security controls orcontrol enhancements (see terms and conditions for applying compensating controls below).
•

MISSION REQUIREMENTS-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS—

Some security controls may not be applicable (or appropriate) if implementing those controls
has the potential to degrade, debilitate, or otherwise hamper critical organizational missions
and/or business functions. For example, if the mission requires that an uninterrupted displayof mission-critical information be available at an operator console (e.g., air traffic controller
console), the implementation of AC-11, Session Lock, or SC-10, Network Disconnect, may
not be appropriate.
Selecting Compensating Security Controls
Organizations may find it necessary on occasion to employ compensating security controls.
Compensating controls are alternative security controls employed by organizations in lieu ofspecific controls in the low, moderate, or high baselines described in Appendix D—controls thatprovide equivalent or comparable protection for organizational information systems and theinformation processed, stored, or transmitted by those systems. 78 This may occur, for example,
when organizations are unable to effectively implement specific security controls in the baselines
or when, due to the specific nature of the information systems or environments of operation, thecontrols in the baselines are not a cost-effective means of obtaining the needed risk mitigation.
Compensating controls are typically selected after applying the scoping considerations in the
tailoring guidance to the applicable security control baseline. Compensating controls may be
employed by organizations under the following conditions:•••

Organizations select compensating controls from Appendix F; if appropriate compensating
controls are not available, organizations adopt suitable compensating controls from othersources; 79
Organizations provide supporting rationale for how compensating controls provide equivalent
security capabilities for organizational information systems and why the baseline security
controls could not be employed; andOrganizations assess and accept the risk associated with implementing compensating controls
in organizational information systems.

Assigning Security Control Parameter Values
Security controls and control enhancements containing embedded parameters (i.e., assignmentand selection statements) give organizations the flexibility to define certain portions of controls
and enhancements to support specific organizational requirements. After the initial application of
scoping considerations and the selection of compensating controls, organizations review the
security controls and control enhancements for assignment/selection statements and determine
appropriate organization-defined values for the identified parameters. Parameter values may beprescribed by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, orstandards. Once organizations define the parameter values for security controls and control
78

More than one compensating control may be required to provide the equivalent protection for a particular security
control in Appendix F. For example, organizations with significant staff limitations may compensate for the separationof duty security control by strengthening the audit, accountability, and personnel security controls.
79

Organizations should make every attempt to select compensating controls from the security control catalog in
Appendix F. Organization-defined compensating controls are employed only when organizations determine that the
security control catalog does not contain suitable compensating controls.

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enhancements, the assignments and selections become a part of the control and enhancement. 80
Organizations may choose to specify the values for security control parameters before selecting
compensating controls since the specification of the parameters completes the control definitions
and may affect compensating control requirements. There can also be significant benefits incollaborating on the development of parameter values. For organizations that work together on afrequent basis, it may be useful for those organizations to develop a mutually agreeable set of
uniform values for security control parameters. Doing so may assist organizations in achieving agreater degree of reciprocity when depending upon the information systems and/or services
offered by other organizations.
Supplementing Security Control Baselines
The final determination of the appropriate set of security controls necessary to provide adequate
security for organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems
operate is a function of the assessment of risk and what is required to sufficiently mitigate therisks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 81
In many cases, additional security controls or control enhancements (beyond those controls andenhancements contained in the baselines in Appendix D) will be required to address specificthreats to and vulnerabilities in organizations, mission/business processes, and/or information
systems and to satisfy the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives,
policies, standards, or regulations. 82 The risk assessment in the security control selection processprovides essential information in determining the necessity and sufficiency of the security
controls and control enhancements in the initial baselines. Organizations are encouraged to makemaximum use of Appendix F to facilitate the process of supplementing the initial baselines withadditional security controls and/or control enhancements. 83
Situations Requiring Potential Baseline Supplementation
Organizations may be subject to conditions that, from an operational, environmental, or threat
perspective, warrant the selection and implementation of additional (supplemental) controls toachieve adequate protection of organizational missions/business functions and the information
systems supporting those missions/functions. Examples of conditions and additional controls thatmight be required are provided below.
•

ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT

Security control baselines do not assume that the current threat environment is one where
adversaries have achieved a significant foothold and presence within organizations andorganizational information systems—that is, organizations are dealing with an advanced
persistent threat (APT). Adversaries continue to attack organizational information systems
and the information technology infrastructure and are successful in some aspects of suchattacks. To more fully address the advanced persistent threat, concepts such as insider threat
80

CNSS Instruction 1253 provides assignment of minimum values for organization-defined variables applicable tonational security systems. Parameter values can also be defined as part of overlays described in Section 3.4.
81
Considerations for potential national-level impacts and impacts to other organizations in categorizing organizational
information systems derive from the USA PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Presidential Directives.
82
In previous versions of Special Publication 800-53, tailoring referred only to the removal of security controls frombaselines and supplementation referred only to the addition of controls to baselines. In this document, the term tailoringhas been redefined to include both the addition of security controls to baselines (i.e., tailoring up) and the removal ofcontrols from baselines (i.e., tailoring down).
83

Security controls and control enhancements selected to supplement baselines are allocated to appropriate information
system components in the same manner as the control allocations carried out by organizations in the initial baselines.

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protection (CM-5(4)), heterogeneity (SC-29), deception (SC-26 and SC-30), non-persistence(SC-25 and SC-34), and segmentation (SC-7(13)) can be considered.
•

CROSS-DOMAIN SERVICES

Security control baselines do not assume that information systems have to operate acrossmultiple security domains. The baselines assume a flat view of information flows (i.e., thesame security policies in different domains when information moves across authorization
boundaries). To address cross-domain services and transactions, some subset of the AC-4
security control enhancements can be considered to ensure adequate protection of information
when transferred between information systems with different security policies.
•

MOBILITY

The use of mobile devices might result in the need for additional security controls and control
enhancements not selected in the initial baselines. For example, AC-7(2), which requires thepurging/wiping of information after an organization-defined number of unsuccessful logon
attempts, or MP-6 (8), which requires the capability for remote purging/wiping, could beselected in order to address the threat of theft or loss of mobile devices.
•

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

In some environments, classified and sensitive information 84 may be resident on national
security systems without all users having the necessary authorizations to access all of theinformation. In those situations, additional security controls are required to ensure that
information requiring strict separation is not accessed by unauthorized users. More stringent
access controls include, for example, AC-3(3) and AC-16. When classified information is
being processed, stored, or transmitted on information systems that are jointly owned bymultiple entities (e.g., coalition partners in military alliances), more restrictive controls formaintenance personnel may be required including, for example, MA-5(4).
Processes for Identifying Additional Needed Security Controls
Organizations can employ a requirements definition approach or a gap analysis approach inselecting security controls and control enhancements to supplement initial baselines. In therequirements definition approach, organizations obtain specific and credible threat 85 information(or make reasonable assumptions) about the activities of adversaries with certain capabilities or
attack potential (e.g., skill levels, expertise, available resources). To effectively withstand cyberattacks from adversaries with the stated capabilities or attack potential, organizations strive toachieve a certain level of defensive capability or cyber preparedness. Organizations can selectadditional security controls and control enhancements from Appendix F to obtain such defensive
capability or level of preparedness. In contrast to the requirements definition approach, the gap
analysis approach begins with an organizational assessment of its current defensive capability orlevel of cyber preparedness. From that initial capability assessment, organizations determine thetypes of threats they can reasonably expect to counter. If the current organizational defensive
capabilities or levels of cyber preparedness are insufficient, the gap analysis determines therequired capabilities and levels of preparedness. Organizations subsequently define the security
controls and control enhancements from Appendix F needed to achieve the desired capabilities orcyber-preparedness levels. Both of the approaches described above require timely and accurate

84

The example is illustrative only. CNSS Instruction 1253 provides specific guidance regarding security controls
required for national security systems.
85
While this example focuses on threats to information systems from purposeful attacks, the threat space of concern toorganizations also includes environmental disruptions and human errors.

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threat information. It is essential that organizations work with the appropriate threat identification
component to obtain such information.
During the tailoring process, organizations consider reevaluating the priority codes from thesecurity control baselines to determine if any changes to those priorities are appropriate. This isespecially important when adding security controls that are not included in any of the baselines,
because those controls have priority codes of P0. The reevaluation of priority codes can be basedon organizational assessments of risk or design/developmental decisions related to the security
architecture or the systems and security engineering process that may require certain sequencing
in security control implementation.
Enhancing Information Security without Changing Control Selection
There may be situations in which organizations cannot apply sufficient security controls within
their information systems to adequately reduce or mitigate risk (e.g., when using certain types of
information technologies or employing certain computing paradigms). Therefore, alternative
strategies are needed to prevent organizational missions/business functions from being adversely
affected— strategies that consider the mission and business risks resulting from an aggressive useof information technology. Restrictions on the types of technologies used and how organizational
information systems are employed provide an alternative method to reduce or mitigate risk that
may be used in conjunction with, or instead of, supplemental security controls. Restrictions on theuse of information systems and specific information technologies may be, in some situations, theonly practical or reasonable actions organizations can take in order to have the capability to carryout assigned missions/business functions in the face of determined adversaries. Examples of use
restrictions include:•

Limiting the information that information systems can process, store, or transmit or themanner in which organizational missions/business functions are automated;•

Prohibiting external access to organizational information by removing selected information
system components from networks (i.e., air gapping); and•Prohibiting moderate- or high-impact information on organizational information systemcomponents to which the public has access, unless an explicit risk determination is madeauthorizing such access.

Providing Additional Specification Information for Control Implementation
Since security controls are statements of security capability at higher levels of abstraction, thecontrols may lack sufficient information for successful implementation. Therefore, additional
detail may be necessary to fully define the intent of a given security control for implementation
purposes and to ensure that the security requirements related to that control are satisfied. For
example, additional information may be provided as part of the process of moving from control to
specification requirement, and may involve refinement of implementation details, refinement of
scope, or iteration to apply the same control differently to different scopes. Organizations ensurethat if existing security control information (e.g., selection and assignment statements) is not
sufficient to fully define the intended application of the control, such information is provided.
Organizations have the flexibility to determine whether additional detail is included as a part ofthe control statement, in supplemental guidance, or in a separate control addendum section. When
providing additional detail, organizations are cautioned not to change the intent of the security
control or modify the original language in the control. The additional implementation information
can be documented either in security plans or systems and security engineering plans. The type of

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additional detail that might be necessary to fully specify a security control for implementation
purposes is provided in the SI-7(6) example below:
SI-7

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY(6)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes tosoftware, firmware, and information.
Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic mechanisms used for the protection of integrity include,for example, digital signatures and the computation and application of signed hashes using
asymmetric cryptography, protecting the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash,and using the public key to verify the hash information. Related control: SC-13.

Additional implementation detail for SI-7(6):Digital signatures are applied to all traffic for which non-repudiation is required employing
SHA-256 or another approved NIST algorithm demonstrably of at least the same strength ofmechanism.

3.3 CREATING OVERLAYS
The previous sections described the process of tailoring security control baselines to achieve amore focused and relevant security capability for organizations. In certain situations, it may bebeneficial for organizations to apply tailoring guidance to the baselines to develop a set of
security controls for community-wide use or to address specialized requirements, technologies, or
unique missions/environments of operation. 86 For example, the federal government may decide toestablish a governmentwide set of security controls and implementation guidance for: (i) public
key infrastructure (PKI) systems that could be uniformly applied to all PKI systems implemented
within federal agencies; (ii) cloud-based information systems that are uniformly applied to all
federal agencies procuring or implementing cloud services; or (iii) industrial control systems(ICSs) at federal facilities producing electric power or controlling environmental systems infederal facilities. Alternatively, to address particular communities of interest with specialized
requirements, the Department of Defense, for example, may decide to establish a set of security
controls and implementation guidance for its tactical operations and environments by applying
the tailoring guidance to the standard security control baselines for national security systems toachieve more specialized solutions. In each of the above examples, tailored baselines can be
developed for each information technology area or for the unique circumstances/environments
and promulgated to large communities of interest—thus achieving standardized security
capabilities, consistency of implementation, and cost-effective security solutions.
To address the need for developing community-wide and specialized sets of security controls for
information systems and organizations, the concept of overlay is introduced. An overlay is a fully
specified set of security controls, control enhancements, and supplemental guidance derived fromthe application of tailoring guidance in Section 3.2 to security control baselines in Appendix D. 87
Overlays complement the initial security control baselines by: (i) providing the opportunity to add
or eliminate controls; (ii) providing security control applicability and interpretations for specificinformation technologies, computing paradigms, environments of operation, types of information
systems, types of missions/operations, operating modes, industry sectors, and statutory/regulatory
requirements; (iii) establishing community-wide parameter values for assignment and/or selection
statements in security controls and control enhancements; and (iv) extending the supplemental
guidance for security controls, where necessary. Organizations typically use the overlay concept86This type of tailoring can be conducted at the federal level or by individual organizations.

87

CNSS Instruction 1253 provides tailoring guidance and security control baselines for national security systems.

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when there is divergence from the basic assumptions used to create the initial security control
baselines (see Section 3.1). If organizations are not divergent from the basic assumptions for the
initial baselines, there is likely no need to create an overlay. Alternatively, the baselines may be
missing key assumptions which would justify creating an overlay with additional assumptions.
The full range of tailoring activities can be employed by organizations to provide a disciplined
and structured approach for developing tailored baselines supporting the areas described above.
Overlays provide an opportunity to build consensus across communities of interest and develop
security plans for organizational information systems that have broad-based support for very
specific circumstances, situations, and/or conditions. Categories of overlays that may be usefulinclude, for example:•

Communities of interest, industry sectors, or coalitions/partnerships (e.g., healthcare, law
enforcement, intelligence, financial, transportation, energy, allied collaboration/sharing);•

Information technologies/computing paradigms (e.g., cloud/mobile, PKI, Smart Grid, crossdomain solutions);•

Environments of operation (e.g., space, tactical);•Types of information systems and operating modes (e.g., industrial/process control systems,
weapons systems, single-user systems, standalone systems);•

Types of missions/operations (e.g., counterterrorism, first responders, research, development,
test, and evaluation); and•Statutory/regulatory requirements (e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Privacy Act).

Organizations can effectively use the risk management concepts defined in NIST Special
Publication 800-39 when developing overlays. The successful development of overlays requires
the involvement of: (i) information security professionals who understand the specific subject
area that is the focus of the overlay development effort; and (ii) subject matter experts in theoverlay area who understand the security controls in Appendix F and the initial baselines inAppendix D. The format and structure for developing overlays is provided in Appendix I.
Multiple overlays can be applied to a single security control baseline. The tailored baselines that
result from the overlay development process may be more or less stringent than the original
security control baselines. Risk assessments provide information necessary to determine if therisk from implementing the tailored baselines falls within the risk tolerance of the organizations
or communities of interest developing the overlays. If multiple overlays are employed, it ispossible that there could be a conflict between the overlays. If the use of multiple overlays resultsin conflicts between the application or removal of security controls, the authorizing official (ordesignee), in coordination with the mission/business owner and/or information owner/steward,
can resolve the conflict. In general, overlays are intended to reduce the need for ad hoc tailoringof baselines by organizations through the selection of a set of controls and control enhancementsthat more closely correspond to common circumstances, situations, and/or conditions. However,the use of overlays does not preclude organizations from performing further tailoring to reflectorganization-specific needs, assumptions, or constraints. Tailoring of overlays is accomplishedwithin the constraints defined within the overlay and may require the concurrence/approval of theauthorizing official or other organization-designated individuals. For example, an overlay created
for an industrial control system (ICS) may require tailoring for applicability to a specific type of
ICS and its environment of operation. But it is anticipated that the use of overlays would greatly
reduce the number and extent of organization-specific ad hoc tailoring.

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3.4 DOCUMENTING THE CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS
Organizations document the relevant decisions taken during the security control selection process,providing a sound rationale for those decisions. This documentation is essential when examining
the security considerations for organizational information systems with respect to the potential
mission/business impact. The resulting set of security controls and the supporting rationale for theselection decisions (including any information system use restrictions required by organizations)are documented in the security plans. Documenting significant risk management decisions in the
security control selection process is imperative so that authorizing officials can have access to thenecessary information to make informed authorization decisions for organizational information
systems. 88 Without such information, the understanding, assumptions, constraints, and rationale
supporting those risk management decisions will, in all likelihood, not be available when the stateof the information systems or environments of operation change, and the original risk decisions
are revisited. Figure 4 summarizes the security control selection process, including the selectionof initial baselines and the tailoring of the baselines by applying the guidance in Section 3.2.

Tailoring Guidance
INITIAL
SECURITYCONTROLBASELINE(Low, Mod, High)• Identifying and Designating Common Controls• Applying Scoping Considerations• Selecting Compensating Controls• Assigning Security Control Parameter Values• Supplementing Baseline Security Controls• Providing Additional Specification Information
for Implementation

TAILOREDSECURITYCONTROLBASELINE(Low, Mod, High)Creating Overlays

Before Tailoring

After Tailoring
Assessment of Organizational Risk

DOCUMENT SECURITY CONTROL DECISIONS
Rationale that the agreed-upon set of security controls for the information system provide adequate
protection of organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

FIGURE 4: SECURITY CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS

Iterative and Dynamic Nature of Security Control Tailoring
The security control tailoring process described above, while appearing to be sequential in nature,
can also have an iterative aspect. Organizations may choose to execute the tailoring steps in any
order based on organizational needs and the information generated from risk assessments. For
example, some organizations may establish the parameter values for security controls in the initialbaselines prior to selecting compensating controls. Other organizations may delay completing
assignment and selection statements in the controls until after the supplementation activities havebeen completed. Organizations may also discover that when fully specifying security controls forthe intended environments of operation, there may be difficulties that arise which may trigger theneed for additional (supplemental) controls. Finally, the security control tailoring process is notstatic—that is, organizations revisit the tailoring step as often as needed based on ongoingorganizational assessments of risk.
88
The security control selection process also applies to common control providers and the authorizing officials
rendering authorization decisions for common controls deployed within organizations.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________In addition to the iterative and dynamic nature of the security control tailoring process, there may
also be side effects as controls are added and removed from the baselines. Security controls inAppendix F can have some degree of dependency and functional overlap with other controls. In
many cases, security controls work together to achieve a security capability. Thus, removing aparticular security control from a baseline during the tailoring process may have unintended side
effects (and potentially adverse impacts) on the remaining controls. Alternatively, adding a new
security control to a baseline during the tailoring process may eliminate or reduce the need forcertain specific controls because the new control provides a better security capability than thecapability provided by other controls. For example, if organizations implement SC-30(2) using
virtualization techniques to randomly/frequently deploy diverse and changing operating systems
and applications, this approach could potentially limit the requirement to update the security
configurations in CM-2(2). Therefore, the addition or removal of security controls is viewed withregard to the totality of the information security needs of the organization and its information
systems, and not simply with regard to the controls being added or removed.

Implementation Tip
In diverging from the security control baselines during the tailoring process, organizations consider
some very important linkages between various controls and control enhancements. These linkages
are captured in the selection of controls and enhancements in the baselines and are especiallysignificant when developing overlays (described in Section 3.3 and Appendix I). In some instances,the linkages are such that it is not meaningful to include a security control or control enhancement
without some other control or enhancement. The totality of the controls and enhancements provide a
required security capability. Some linkages are obvious such as the linkage between Mandatory
Access Control enhancement (AC-3(3)) and Security Attributes (AC-16). But other linkages may be
more subtle. This is especially true in the case where the linkage is between security functionalityrelated controls and security assurance-related controls as described in Appendix E. For example, it
is not particularly meaningful to implement AC-3(3) without also implementing a Reference Monitor(AC-25). Organizations are encouraged to pay careful attention to the related controls section of the
Supplemental Guidance for the security controls to help in identifying such linkages.

Other Considerations
Organizational tailoring decisions are not carried out in a vacuum. While such decisions arerightly focused on information security considerations, it is important that the decisions bealigned with other risk factors that organizations address routinely. Risk factors such as cost,schedule, and performance are considered in the overall determination of which security controls
to employ in organizational information systems and environments of operation. For example, in
military command and control systems in which lives may be at stake, the adoption of security
controls is balanced with operational necessity. With respect to the air traffic control system andconsoles used by air traffic controllers, the need to access the consoles in real time to control the
air space outweighs the security need for an AC-11, Session Lock. In short, the security control
selection process (to include tailoring activities described in Section 3.2) should be integrated into
the overall risk management process as described in NIST Special Publication 800-39.
Finally, organizations factor scalability into the security control selection process—that is,
controls are scalable with regard to the extent/rigor of the implementation. Scalability is guided
by the FIPS Publication 199 security categorizations and the associated FIPS Publication 200
impact levels of the information systems where the controls are to be applied. For example,
contingency plans for high-impact information systems may contain significant amounts of

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implementation detail and be quite lengthy. In contrast, contingency plans for low-impact systems
may contain considerably less detail and be quite succinct. Organizations use discretion in
applying the security controls to organizational information systems, giving consideration to thescalability factors in particular operational environments. Scaling controls to the appropriate
system impact level facilitates a more cost-effective, risk-based approach to security control
implementation—expending only the level of resources necessary to achieve sufficient risk
mitigation and adequate security.

Implementation Tip
Maintaining a record of security control selection and control status can be addressed in one or
multiple documents or security plans. If using multiple documents, consider providing references tothe necessary information in the relevant documents rather than requiring duplication of information.
Using references to relevant documentation reduces the amount of time and resources needed byorganizations to generate such information. Other benefits include greater security awareness andunderstanding of the information system capabilities. Increased security awareness/understanding
supports more effective integration of information security into organizational information systems.

3.5 NEW DEVELOPMENT AND LEGACY SYSTEMSThe security control selection process described in this section can be applied to organizational
information systems from two different perspectives: (i) new development; and (ii) legacy. For
new development systems, the security control selection process is applied from a requirements
definition perspective since the systems do not yet exist and organizations are conducting initial
security categorizations. The security controls included in the security plans for the information
systems serve as a security specification and are expected to be incorporated into the systems
during the development and implementation phases of the system development life cycle. In
contrast, for legacy information systems, the security control selection process is applied from a
gap analysis perspective when organizations are anticipating significant changes to the systems(e.g., during major upgrades, modifications, or outsourcing). Since the information systems
already exist, organizations in all likelihood have completed the security categorization andsecurity control selection processes resulting in the establishment of previously agreed-uponsecurity controls in the respective security plans and the implementation of those controls within
the information systems. Therefore, the gap analysis can be applied in the following manner:•

First, reconfirm or update as necessary, the security category and impact level for the
information system based on the types of information that are currently being processed,
stored, or transmitted by the system.

•

Second, review the existing security plan that describes the security controls that are currently
employed considering any updates to the security category and information system impact
level as well as any changes to the organization, mission/business processes, the system, or
the operational environment. Reassess the risk and revise the security plan as necessary,
including documenting any additional security controls that would be needed by the system toensure that the risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation, remains at an acceptable level.

•

Third, implement the security controls described in the updated security plan, document in theplan of action and milestones any controls not implemented, and continue with the remaining
steps in the Risk Management Framework in the same manner as a new development system.

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Applying Gap Analyses to External Service Providers
The gap analysis perspective is also applied when interacting with external service providers. As
described in Section 2.5, organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on external providers for
information system services. Using the steps in the gap analysis described above, organizations
can effectively use the acquisition process and appropriate contractual vehicles to require external
providers to carry out the security categorization and security control selection steps in the RMF.
The resulting information can help determine what security controls the external provider either
has in place or intends to implement for the information system services that are to be provided.
If a security control deficit exists, the responsibility for adequately mitigating unacceptable risks
arising from the use of external information system services remains with authorizing officials. In
such situations, organizations can reduce the organizational risk to an acceptable level by:•

Using the existing contractual vehicle to require the external provider to meet the additional
security control requirements established by the organization;•

Negotiating with the provider for additional security controls if the existing contractual
vehicle does not provide for such added requirements;•

Approving the use of compensating controls by the provider; or•Employing alternative risk mitigation actions 89 within the organizational information system
when a contract either does not exist or the contract does not provide the necessary leveragefor organizations to obtain the needed security controls.

Implementation Tip
Many organizations operate and maintain complex information systems, often referred to as asystem-of-systems. Enterprise architecture plays a key part in the security control selection process
for these types of information systems. Organizations can address the complex system problem bydividing the system into two or more subsystems and applying the FIPS 199 security categorization
and FIPS 200 impact level determination to each subsystem. Applying separate impact levels toeach subsystem does not change the overall impact level of the information system; rather, it allows
constituent subsystems to receive a separate allocation of security controls instead of deploying
higher-impact controls across every subsystem. It is not valid to treat the subsystems as entirely
independent entities, however, since the subsystems are interdependent and interconnected.
Organizations develop security architectures to allocate security controls among subsystems
including monitoring and controlling communications at key internal boundaries within the systemand provide system-wide controls that meet or exceed the highest information system impact level ofthe constituent subsystems inheriting security capabilities from those controls. Organizations also
consider that replicated subsystems within complex systems may exhibit common vulnerabilities thatcan be exploited by common threat sources—thereby negating the redundancy that might be relied
upon as a risk mitigation measure. The impact due to a security incident against one constituent
subsystem might cascade and impact many subsystems at the same time.

89
For example, local policies, procedures, and/or compensating controls could be established by organizations to serveas alternative mitigation actions for risks identified in a gap analysis.

CHAPTER 3

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX AREFERENCES
LAWS, POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, REGULATIONS, MEMORANDA, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINESLEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS

1.

E-Government Act [includes FISMA] (P.L. 107-347), December 2002.

2.

Federal Information Security Management Act (P.L. 107-347, Title III), December 2002.

3.

Paperwork Reduction Act (P.L. 104-13), May 1995.

4.

USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56), October 2001.

5.
6.

Privacy Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-579), December 1974.
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, As Amended By Public Law No.
104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996.

7.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (P.L. 104-191), August 1996.

8.
9.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703), August 1954.
Executive Order 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information, November 2010.

10.

Executive Order 13587, Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified
Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information,
October 2011.
POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS, AND MEMORANDA

1.

Presidential Memorandum, National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for
Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, November 2012.

2.

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 5, Administrative Personnel, Section 731.106,
Designation of Public Trust Positions and Investigative Requirements (5 C.F.R. 731.106).

3.

Code of Federal Regulations, Part 5 Administrative Personnel, Subpart C—Employees
Responsible for the Management or Use of Federal Computer Systems, Section 930.301
through 930.305 (5 C.F.R. 930.301-305).

4.

Committee on National Security Systems Policy (CNSSP) No. 11, National Policy
Governing the Acquisition of Information Assurance (IA) and IA-Enabled Information
Technology (IT) Products, July 2003.

5.

Committee on National Security Systems Policy (CNSSP) No. 12, National Information
Assurance Policy for Space Systems Used to Support National Security Missions, March
2007.

6.

Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction 4009, National Information
Assurance Glossary, April 2010.

7.

Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction 1253, Version 2, Security
Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems, March 2012.

8.

Committee on National Security Systems Directive (CNSSD) No. 504, Directive on
Protecting National Security Systems from Insider Threat, January 2012.

9.

Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 2009.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

10.

Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705, Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facilities, May 2010.

11.

Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1), Federal Executive Branch National Continuity
Program and Requirements, February 2008.

12.

Executive Office of the President of the United States and Federal CIO Council, Federal
Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation
Guidance, December 2011.

13.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection, December 2003.

14.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, Policy for a Common Identification
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 2004.

15.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (National Security Presidential Directive 51),
National Continuity Policy, May 2007.

16.

Intelligence Community Directive Number 704, Personnel Security Standards andProcedures Governing Eligibility For Access To Sensitive Compartmented Information
And Other Controlled Access Program Information, October 2008.

17.

National Communications System (NCS) Directive 3-10, Minimum Requirements forContinuity Communications Capabilities, July 2007.

18.

National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Instruction(NSTISSI) 7003, Protective Distribution Systems (PDS), December 1996.

19.

Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, Appendix III, Transmittal
Memorandum #4, Management of Federal Information Resources, November 2000.

20.

Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise Architecture Program Management
Office, FEA Consolidated Reference Model Document, Version 2.3, October 2007.

21.

Office of Management and Budget, Federal Segment Architecture Methodology (FSAM),
January 2009.

22.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 01-05, Guidance on Inter-Agency
Sharing of Personal Data - Protecting Personal Privacy, December 2000.

23.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 02-01, Guidance for Preparing andSubmitting Security Plans of Action and Milestones, October 2001.

24.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 03-19, Reporting Instructions for theFederal Information Security Management Act and Updated Guidance on Quarterly IT
Security Reporting, August 2003.

25.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 03-22, OMB Guidance for Implementing
the Privacy Provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, September 2003.

26.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 04-04, E-Authentication Guidance forFederal Agencies, December 2003.

27.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 04-26, Personal Use Policies and File
Sharing Technology, September 2004.

28.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 05-08, Designation of Senior Agency
Officials for Privacy, February 2005.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

29.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 05-24, Implementation of Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12—Policy for a Common Identification Standard
for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 2005.

30.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 06-15, Safeguarding PersonallyIdentifiable Information, May 2006.

31.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 06-16, Protection of Sensitive
Information, June 2006.

32.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 06-19, Reporting Incidents Involving
Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency
Information Technology Investments, July 2006.

33.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum, Recommendations for Identity Theft
Related Data Breach Notification Guidance, September 2006.

34.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 07-11, Implementation of Commonly
Accepted Security Configurations for Windows Operating Systems, March 2007.

35.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 07-16, Safeguarding Against andResponding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, May 2007.

36.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 07-18, Ensuring New Acquisitions
Include Common Security Configurations, June 2007.

37.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 08-22, Guidance on the Federal Desktop
Core Configuration (FDCC), August 2008.

38.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 08-23, Securing the Federal
Government’s Domain Name System Infrastructure, August 2008.

39.

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Designation and Sharing of Controlled
Unclassified Information (CUI), May 2008.

40.

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Classified Information and Controlled
Unclassified Information, May 2009.

41.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 11-11, Continued Implementation ofHomeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12– Policy for a Common
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, February 2011.

42.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum, Requirements for Accepting ExternallyIssued Identity Credentials, October 2011.

43.

Office of Management and Budget Memorandum 11-33, FY 2011 Reporting Instructions
for the Federal Information Security Management Act and Agency Privacy Management,
September 2011.
STANDARDS

1.

International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission
27001:2005, Security techniques -- Information security management systems -Requirements.

2.

International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission
15408-1:2009, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT
security -- Part 1: Introduction and general model.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

3.

International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission
15408-2:2008, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT
security -- Part 2: Security functional requirements.

4.

International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission
15408-3:2008, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT
security -- Part 3: Security assurance requirements.

5.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 2001.
National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 140-3 (Draft), Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, December
2009.

6.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), March 2012.

7.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 186-3, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June 2009.

8.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 188, Standard Security Label for Information Transfer, September 1994.

9.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 190, Guideline for the Use of Advanced Authentication Technology
Alternatives, September 1994.

10.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 2001.

11.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), July 2008.

12.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information andInformation Systems, February 2004.

13.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information andInformation Systems, March 2006.

14.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 201-1, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees andContractors, March 2006.
GUIDELINES AND INTERAGENCY REPORTS

1.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-12, An
Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook, October 1995.

2.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-13,
Telecommunications Security Guidelines for Telecommunications Management Network,
October 1995.

3.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-14, Generally
Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems,
September 1996.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

4.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-15, MinimumInteroperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC), Version 1, January 1998.

5.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-16, Information
Security Training Requirements: A Role- and Performance-Based Model, April 1998.

6.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-17, Modes ofOperation Validation System (MOVS): Requirements and Procedures, February 1998.

7.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-18, Revision 1,
Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems, February 2006.

8.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-19, Mobile Agent
Security, October 1999.

9.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-20, Modes ofOperation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TMOVS):
Requirements and Procedures, October 1999.

10.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-21-1, Second
Edition, Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government, December
2005.

11.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-22, Revision 1a, A
Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for
Cryptographic Applications, April 2010.

12.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-23, Guidelines toFederal Organizations on Security Assurance and Acquisition/Use of Tested/Evaluated
Products, August 2000.

13.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-24, PBX
Vulnerability Analysis: Finding Holes in Your PBX Before Someone Else Does, August
2000.

14.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-25, Federal
Agency Use of Public Key Technology for Digital Signatures and Authentication, October
2000.

15.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-27, Revision A,
Engineering Principles for Information Technology Security (A Baseline for Achieving
Security), June 2004.

16.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-28, Version 2,
Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code, March 2008.

17.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-29, A Comparisonof the Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules in FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2,
June 2001.

18.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-30, Revision 1,
Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, September 2012.

19.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-32, Introduction
to Public Key Technology and the Federal PKI Infrastructure, February 2001.

20.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-33, Underlying
Technical Models for Information Technology Security, December 2001.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

21.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-34, Revision 1,
Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, May 2010.

22.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-35, Guide toInformation Technology Security Services, October 2003.

23.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-36, Guide to
Selecting Information Security Products, October 2003.

24.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37, Revision 1,
Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A
Security Life Cycle Approach, February 2010.

25.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38A—Addendum,
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext
Stealing for CBC Mode, October 2010.

26.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38B,
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, May 2005.

27.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38C,
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality, May 2004.

28.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38D,
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and
GMAC, November 2007.

29.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38E,
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, January 2010.

30.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38F,
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping,
December 2012.

31.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-39, Managing
Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View, March
2011.

32.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-40, Version 2,
Creating a Patch and Vulnerability Management Program, November 2005.

33.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-41, Revision 1,
Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy, September 2009.

34.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-43, Systems
Administration Guidance for Windows 2000 Professional System, November 2002.

35.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-44, Version 2,
Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers, September 2007.

36.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-45, Version 2,
Guidelines on Electronic Mail Security, February 2007.

37.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-46, Revision 1,
Guide to Enterprise Telework and Remote Access Security, June 2009.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________38.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-47, Security
Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems, August 2002.

39.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-48, Revision 1,
Guide to Securing Legacy IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks, July 2008.

40.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-49, Federal
S/MIME V3 Client Profile, November 2002.

41.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-50, Building an
Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program, October 2003.

42.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-51, Revision 1,
Guide to Using Vulnerability Naming Schemes, February 2011.

43.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-52, Revision 1(Draft), Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security(TLS) Implementations, September 2013.

44.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 1,
Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems andOrganizations: Building Effective Security Assessment Plans, June 2010.

45.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-54, Border
Gateway Protocol Security, July 2007.

46.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-55, Revision 1,
Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security, July 2008.

47.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-56A (Revised),
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography, March 2007.

48.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-57 Revision 3,
Recommendation for Key Management, July 2012.

49.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-58, Security
Considerations for Voice Over IP Systems, January 2005.

50.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-59, Guideline for
Identifying an Information System as a National Security System, August 2003.

51.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-60, Revision 1,
Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories,
August 2008.

52.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-61, Revision 2,
Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, August 2012.

53.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-63-1, Electronic
Authentication Guideline, December 2011.

54.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-64, Revision 2,
Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle, October 2008.

55.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-65, Integrating IT
Security into the Capital Planning and Investment Control Process, January 2005.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

56.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-66, Revision 1, An
Introductory Resource Guide for Implementing the Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule, October 2008.

57.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-67, Revision 1,
Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, January
2012.

58.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-68, Revision 1,
Guide to Securing Microsoft Windows XP Systems for IT Professionals: A NIST Security
Configuration Checklist, October 2008.

59.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-69, Guidance for
Securing Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist,
September 2006.

60.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-70, Revision 2,
National Checklist Program for IT Products--Guidelines for Checklist Users andDevelopers, February 2011.

61.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-72, Guidelines on
PDA Forensics, November 2004.

62.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-73-3, Interfaces
for Personal Identity Verification, February 2010.

63.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-76-1, Biometric
Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification, January 2007.

64.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-77, Guide to
IPsec VPNs, December 2005.

65.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-78-3,
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification (PIV),
December 2010.

66.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-79-1, Guidelines
for the Accreditation of Personal Identity Verification Card Issuers, June 2008.

67.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-81, Secure
Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide, Revision 1, April 2010.

68.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-82, Revision 1,
Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, April 2013.

69.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-83, Guide to
Malware Incident Prevention and Handling, November 2005.

70.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-84, Guide to Test,
Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities, September 2006.

71.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-85A-2, PIV Card
Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines (SP 800-73-3 Compliance), July
2010.

72.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-85B-1, (Draft)
PIV Data Model Test Guidelines, September 2009.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

73.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-86, Guide toIntegrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, August 2006.

74.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-87, Revision 1,
Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted Organizations, April 2008.

75.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-88, Guidelines forMedia Sanitization, September 2006.

76.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-89,
Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications, November
2006.

77.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-90A,
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators, January 2012.

78.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-92, Guide toComputer Security Log Management, September 2006.

79.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-94, Guide to
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), February 2007.

80.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-95, Guide to
Secure Web Services, August 2007.

81.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-96, PIV Card /Reader Interoperability Guidelines, September 2006.

82.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-97, Establishing
Robust Security Networks: A Guide to IEEE 802.11i, February 2007.

83.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-98, Guidelines for
Securing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems, April 2007.

84.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-100, Information
Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers, October 2006.

85.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-101, Guidelines
on Cell Phone Forensics, May 2007.

86.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-103 (Draft), An
Ontology of Identity Credentials, Part I: Background and Formulation, October 2006.

87.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-104, A Scheme for
PIV Visual Card Topography, June 2007.

88.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-106, Randomized
Hashing Digital Signatures, February 2009.

89.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-107,
Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms, August 2012.

90.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-108,
Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions, October 2009.

91.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-111, Guide to
Storage Encryption Technologies for End User Devices, November 2007.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

92.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-113, Guide to SSL
VPNs, July 2008.

93.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-114, User's Guide
to Securing External Devices for Telework and Remote Access, November 2007.

94.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-115, Technical
Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, September 2008.

95.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-116, A
Recommendation for the Use of PIV Credentials in Physical Access Control Systems(PACS), November 2008.

96.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-117, Version
1.0, Guide to Adopting and Using the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP), July
2010.

97.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-118(Draft), Guide to Enterprise Password Management, April 2009.

98.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-121, Revision 1,
Guide to Bluetooth Security, June 2012.

99.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-122, Guide toProtecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), April 2010.

100. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-123, Guide toGeneral Server Security, July 2008.
101. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-124, Guidelines
on Cell Phone and PDA Security, October 2008.
102. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-125, Guide to
Security for Full Virtualization Technologies, January 2011.
103. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-126, Revision 2,
The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP
Version 1.2, September 2011.
104. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-127, Guide to
Securing WiMAX Wireless Communications, September 2010.
105. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-128, Guide for
Security-Focused Configuration Management of Information Systems, August 2011.
106. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-133,
Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, December 2012.
107. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-137, Information
Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,
September 2011.
108. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-142, Practical
Combinatorial Testing, October 2010.
109. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-144, Guidelines
for Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing, December 2011.
110. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-145, The NIST
Definition of Cloud Computing, September 2011.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

111. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-146, Cloud
Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, May 2012.
112. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-147, Basic
Input/Output System (BIOS) Protection Guidelines, April 2011.
113. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-153, Guidelines
for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), September 2011.
114. National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report 7622, Notional Supply
Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems, October 2012.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX BGLOSSARYCOMMON TERMS AND DEFINITIONSAppendix B provides definitions for security terminology used within Special Publication 800-53.
Unless specifically defined in this glossary, all terms used in this publication are consistent withthe definitions contained in CNSS Instruction 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary.
Adequate Security[OMB Circular A-130,
Appendix III, Adapted]

Security commensurate with the risk resulting from the loss,
misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of information.

Advanced PersistentThreatAn adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise andsignificant resources which allow it to create opportunities toachieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors (e.g.,cyber, physical, and deception). These objectives typically
include establishing and extending footholds within theinformation technology infrastructure of the targetedorganizations for purposes of exfiltrating information,
undermining or impeding critical aspects of a mission, program,or organization; or positioning itself to carry out these objectives
in the future. The advanced persistent threat: (i) pursues its
objectives repeatedly over an extended period of time; (ii) adapts
to defenders’ efforts to resist it; and (iii) is determined to maintainthe level of interaction needed to execute its objectives.

AgencySee Executive Agency.

All Source IntelligenceIntelligence products and/or organizations and activities thatincorporate all sources of information, most frequently including
human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement
and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source
data in the production of finished intelligence.

[Department of Defense,
Joint Publication 1-02]

Assessment

See Security Control Assessment.

Assessor

See Security Control Assessor.

Assurance

Measure of confidence that the security features, practices,
procedures, and architecture of an information system accurately
mediates and enforces the security policy.

[CNSSI 4009]

Assurance Case
[Software Engineering
Institute, Carnegie Mellon
University]

Audit Log

A structured set of arguments and a body of evidence showingthat an information system satisfies specific claims with respect
to a given quality attribute.

[CNSSI 4009]

A chronological record of information system activities, including
records of system accesses and operations performed in a given
period.

Audit Record

An individual entry in an audit log related to an audited event.

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Audit Reduction Tools[CNSSI 4009]

Audit Trail[CNSSI 4009]

Authentication[FIPS 200]

Preprocessors designed to reduce the volume of audit records tofacilitate manual review. Before a security review, these tools canremove many audit records known to have little security
significance. These tools generally remove records generated by
specified classes of events, such as records generated by nightly
backups.
A chronological record that reconstructs and examines thesequence of activities surrounding or leading to a specificoperation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction
from inception to final result.
Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as aprerequisite to allowing access to resources in an information
system.

Authenticator

The means used to confirm the identity of a user, processor, or
device (e.g., user password or token).

Authenticity

The property of being genuine and being able to be verified andtrusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, ormessage originator. See Authentication.

Authorization(to operate)

The official management decision given by a seniororganizational official to authorize operation of an information
system and to explicitly accept the risk to organizational
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation),organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the
Nation based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of
security controls.

Authorization Boundary

All components of an information system to be authorized for
operation by an authorizing official and excludes separately
authorized systems, to which the information system isconnected.

Authorize Processing

See Authorization.

Authorizing Official

A senior (federal) official or executive with the authority toformally assume responsibility for operating an information
system at an acceptable level of risk to organizational operations(including mission, functions, image, or reputation),organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the
Nation.

Availability

Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

Baseline Configuration

APPENDIX B

A documented set of specifications for an information system, ora configuration item within a system, that has been formallyreviewed and agreed on at a given point in time, and which can bechanged only through change control procedures.

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Blacklisting

The process used to identify: (i) software programs that are notauthorized to execute on an information system; or (ii) prohibited
Universal Resource Locators (URL)/websites.

Boundary Protection

Monitoring and control of communications at the externalboundary of an information system to prevent and detectmalicious and other unauthorized communications, through theuse of boundary protection devices (e.g., gateways, routers,
firewalls, guards, encrypted tunnels).

Boundary Protection
DeviceA device with appropriate mechanisms that: (i) facilitates the
adjudication of different interconnected system security policies(e.g., controlling the flow of information into or out of aninterconnected system); and/or (ii) provides information systemboundary protection.

Central Management

The organization-wide management and implementation of selected
security controls and related processes. Central management includes
planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring theorganization-defined, centrally managed security controls and processes.

Chief Information Officer

Agency official responsible for:(i) Providing advice and other assistance to the head of theexecutive agency and other senior management personnel of theagency to ensure that information technology is acquired andinformation resources are managed in a manner that is consistent
with laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, andpriorities established by the head of the agency;(ii) Developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementationof a sound and integrated information technology architecture forthe agency; and(iii) Promoting the effective and efficient design and operation of
all major information resources management processes for theagency, including improvements to work processes of the agency.

[PL 104-106, Sec. 5125(b)]Note: Organizations subordinate to federal agencies may use the term Chief
Information Officer to denote individuals filling positions with similar security
responsibilities to agency-level Chief Information Officers.

Chief Information Security
Officer

See Senior Agency Information Security Officer.

Chief Privacy Officer

See Senior Agency Official for Privacy.

Classified Information

Information that has been determined: (i) pursuant to Executive
Order 12958 as amended by Executive Order 13526, or any
predecessor Order, to be classified national security information;or (ii) pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, tobe Restricted Data (RD).

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Commodity Service

An information system service (e.g., telecommunications service)provided by a commercial service provider typically to a large
and diverse set of consumers. The organization acquiring and/or
receiving the commodity service possesses limited visibility into
the management structure and operations of the provider, andwhile the organization may be able to negotiate service-levelagreements, the organization is typically not in a position torequire that the provider implement specific security controls.

Common Carrier

In a telecommunications context, a telecommunications company
that holds itself out to the public for hire to provide
communications transmission services.
Note: In the United States, such companies are usually subject to regulation byfederal and state regulatory commissions.

Common Control[NIST SP 800-37; CNSSI
4009]

Common Control Provider[NIST SP 800-37]

Common Criteria[CNSSI 4009]

A security control that is inheritable by one or moreorganizational information systems. See Security Control
Inheritance.
An organizational official responsible for the development,
implementation, assessment, and monitoring of common controls(i.e., security controls inheritable by information systems).
Governing document that provides a comprehensive, rigorous
method for specifying security function and assurance
requirements for products and systems.

Common Secure
Configuration

A recognized standardized and established benchmark that
stipulates specific secure configuration settings for a given
information technology platform.

Compensating Security
Controls

The security controls employed in lieu of the recommended
controls in the security control baselines described in NIST
Special Publication 800-53 and CNSS Instruction 1253 thatprovide equivalent or comparable protection for an information
system or organization.

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

Computer Matching
Agreement

APPENDIX B

An agreement entered into by an organization in connection witha computer matching program to which the organization is aparty, as required by the Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Act of 1988. With certain exceptions, a computer
matching program is any computerized comparison of two or
more automated systems of records or a system of records with
nonfederal records for the purpose of establishing or verifying theeligibility of, or continuing compliance with, statutory andregulatory requirements by, applicants for, recipients or
beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services withrespect to cash or in-kind assistance or payments under federal
benefit programs or computerized comparisons of two or more
automated federal personnel or payroll systems of records or asystem of federal personnel or payroll records with non-federal
records.

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Confidentiality[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

Configuration Control[CNSSI 4009]

Preserving authorized restrictions on information access anddisclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy andproprietary information.
Process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware,
software, and documentation to protect the information systemagainst improper modifications before, during, and after system
implementation.

Configuration Item

An aggregation of information system components that isdesignated for configuration management and treated as a single
entity in the configuration management process.

Configuration
Management

A collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining
the integrity of information technology products and information
systems, through control of processes for initializing, changing,and monitoring the configurations of those products and systems
throughout the system development life cycle.

Configuration Settings

The set of parameters that can be changed in hardware, software,or firmware that affect the security posture and/or functionality of
the information system.

Controlled Area

Any area or space for which an organization has confidence thatthe physical and procedural protections provided are sufficient tomeet the requirements established for protecting the information
and/or information system.

Controlled Interface

A boundary with a set of mechanisms that enforces the security
policies and controls the flow of information between
interconnected information systems.

[CNSSI 4009]

Controlled Unclassified
Information[E.O. 13556]

Countermeasures[CNSSI 4009]

Covert Channel Analysis[CNSSI 4009]

Covert Storage Channel[CNSSI 4009]

APPENDIX B

A categorical designation that refers to unclassified informationthat does not meet the standards for National Security
Classification under Executive Order 12958, as amended, but is(i) pertinent to the national interests of the United States or to theimportant interests of entities outside the federal government, and(ii) under law or policy requires protection from unauthorized
disclosure, special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits on
exchange or dissemination.
Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that
reduce the vulnerability of an information system. Synonymouswith security controls and safeguards.
Determination of the extent to which the security policy modeland subsequent lower-level program descriptions may allow
unauthorized access to information.
Covert channel involving the direct or indirect writing to a
storage location by one process and the direct or indirect readingof the storage location by another process. Covert storage
channels typically involve a finite resource (e.g., sectors on adisk) that is shared by two subjects at different security levels.

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Covert Timing Channel[CNSSI 4009]

Cross Domain Solution[CNSSI 4009]

Cyber Attack[CNSSI 4009]

Cyber Security[CNSSI 4009]

Cyberspace[CNSSI 4009]

Covert channel in which one process signals information toanother process by modulating its own use of system resources(e.g., central processing unit time) in such a way that thismanipulation affects the real response time observed by thesecond process.
A form of controlled interface that provides the ability to
manually and/or automatically access and/or transfer information
between different security domains.
An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of
cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or
maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure;or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled
information.
The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyberattacks.
A global domain within the information environment consistingof the interdependent network of information systems
infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors andcontrollers.

Data Mining/Harvesting

An analytical process that attempts to find correlations or patterns
in large data sets for the purpose of data or knowledge discovery.

Defense-in-Breadth

A planned, systematic set of multidisciplinary activities that seek
to identify, manage, and reduce risk of exploitable vulnerabilities
at every stage of the system, network, or subcomponent life cycle(system, network, or product design and development;
manufacturing; packaging; assembly; system integration;
distribution; operations; maintenance; and retirement).

[CNSSI 4009]

Defense-in-Depth

Information security strategy integrating people, technology, andoperations capabilities to establish variable barriers acrossmultiple layers and missions of the organization.

Developer

A general term that includes: (i) developers or manufacturers of
information systems, system components, or information systemservices; (ii) systems integrators; (iii) vendors; and (iv) productresellers. Development of systems, components, or services canoccur internally within organizations (i.e., in-house development)or through external entities.

Digital MediaA form of electronic media where data are stored in digital (asopposed to analog) form.

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Discretionary AccessControl[CNSSI 4009]

Domain[CNSSI 4009]

Enterprise[CNSSI 4009]

Enterprise Architecture[44 U.S.C. Sec. 3601]

Environment of Operation

An access control policy that is enforced over all subjects andobjects in an information system where the policy specifies that a
subject that has been granted access to information can do one ormore of the following: (i) pass the information to other subjects
or objects; (ii) grant its privileges to other subjects; (iii) change
security attributes on subjects, objects, information systems, or
system components; (iv) choose the security attributes to be
associated with newly-created or revised objects; or (v) change
the rules governing access control. Mandatory access controls
restrict this capability.
A means of restricting access to objects (e.g., files, data entities)
based on the identity and need-to-know of subjects (e.g., users,
processes) and/or groups to which the object belongs. The
controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain
access permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps
indirectly) on to any other subject (unless restrained bymandatory access control).
An environment or context that includes a set of system resources
and a set of system entities that have the right to access theresources as defined by a common security policy, security
model, or security architecture. See Security Domain.
An organization with a defined mission/goal and a definedboundary, using information systems to execute that mission, andwith responsibility for managing its own risks and performance.
An enterprise may consist of all or some of the following
business aspects: acquisition, program management, financial
management (e.g., budgets), human resources, security, andinformation systems, information and mission management. See
Organization.
A strategic information asset base, which defines the mission; theinformation necessary to perform the mission; the technologies
necessary to perform the mission; and the transitional processes
for implementing new technologies in response to changing
mission needs; and includes a baseline architecture; a target
architecture; and a sequencing plan.

[NIST SP 800-37]

The physical surroundings in which an information systemprocesses, stores, and transmits information.

Event

Any observable occurrence in an information system.

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

Executive Agency[41 U.S.C., Sec. 403]

Exfiltration

APPENDIX B

An executive department specified in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 101; amilitary department specified in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 102; anindependent establishment as defined in 5 U.S.C., Sec. 104(1);and a wholly owned Government corporation fully subject to theprovisions of 31 U.S.C., Chapter 91.
The unauthorized transfer of information from an information
system.

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External Information
System (or Component)

An information system or component of an information systemthat is outside of the authorization boundary established by theorganization and for which the organization typically has nodirect control over the application of required security controls or
the assessment of security control effectiveness.

External Information
System Service

An information system service that is implemented outside of theauthorization boundary of the organizational information system(i.e., a service that is used by, but not a part of, the organizational
information system) and for which the organization typically has
no direct control over the application of required security controls
or the assessment of security control effectiveness.

External Information
System Service Provider

A provider of external information system services to anorganization through a variety of consumer-producer
relationships including but not limited to: joint ventures; business
partnerships; outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts,
interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements);
licensing agreements; and/or supply chain exchanges.

External Network

A network not controlled by the organization.

FailoverThe capability to switch over automatically (typically without
human intervention or warning) to a redundant or standby
information system upon the failure or abnormal termination of
the previously active system.

Fair Information PracticePrinciples

Principles that are widely accepted in the United States andinternationally as a general framework for privacy and that arereflected in various federal and international laws and policies. In
a number of organizations, the principles serve as the basis foranalyzing privacy risks and determining appropriate mitigation
strategies.

Federal Agency

See Executive Agency.

Federal EnterpriseArchitecture

A business-based framework for governmentwide improvement
developed by the Office of Management and Budget that is
intended to facilitate efforts to transform the federal government
to one that is citizen-centered, results-oriented, and market-based.

[FEA Program Management
Office]Federal Information
System[40 U.S.C., Sec. 11331]

FIPS-Validated
Cryptography

APPENDIX B

An information system used or operated by an executive agency,
by a contractor of an executive agency, or by anotherorganization on behalf of an executive agency.
A cryptographic module validated by the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program (CMVP) to meet requirements specified in
FIPS Publication 140-2 (as amended). As a prerequisite to CMVP
validation, the cryptographic module is required to employ acryptographic algorithm implementation that has successfully
passed validation testing by the Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation Program (CAVP). See NSA-Approved Cryptography.

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Firmware[CNSSI 4009]

Guard (System)[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

Hardware[CNSSI 4009]

High-Impact System[FIPS 200]

Hybrid Security Control[CNSSI 4009]

Computer programs and data stored in hardware - typically inread-only memory (ROM) or programmable read-only memory(PROM) - such that the programs and data cannot be dynamically
written or modified during execution of the programs.
A mechanism limiting the exchange of information between
information systems or subsystems.
The physical components of an information system. See Software
and Firmware.
An information system in which at least one security objective(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS
Publication 199 potential impact value of high.
A security control that is implemented in an information system
in part as a common control and in part as a system-specificcontrol. See Common Control and System-Specific Security
Control.

Impact

The effect on organizational operations, organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, or the Nation (including thenational security interests of the United States) of a loss ofconfidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or an
information system.

Impact Value

The assessed potential impact resulting from a compromise of theconfidentiality, integrity, or availability of information expressed
as a value of low, moderate or high.

Incident

An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes theconfidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information systemor the information the system processes, stores, or transmits orthat constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of
security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.

[FIPS 200]

Industrial Control System

An information system used to control industrial processes suchas manufacturing, product handling, production, and distribution.
Industrial control systems include supervisory control and dataacquisition (SCADA) systems used to control geographicallydispersed assets, as well as distributed control systems (DCSs)
and smaller control systems using programmable logic controllers
to control localized processes.

Information

Any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts,
data, or opinions in any medium or form, including textual,numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual.
An instance of an information type.

[CNSSI 4009][FIPS 199]

Information Leakage

The intentional or unintentional release of information to an
untrusted environment.

Information Owner

Official with statutory or operational authority for specified
information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its
generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal.

[CNSSI 4009]

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Information Resources[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3502]

Information Security[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

Information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment,
funds, and information technology.
The protection of information and information systems fromunauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, andavailability.

Information Security
Architecture

An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that
describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise’s security
processes, information security systems, personnel andorganizational subunits, showing their alignment with theenterprise’s mission and strategic plans.

Information Security
PolicyAggregate of directives, regulations, rules, and practices thatprescribes how an organization manages, protects, and distributes
information.

[CNSSI 4009]

Information Security
Program Plan

Formal document that provides an overview of the security
requirements for an organization-wide information security
program and describes the program management controls andcommon controls in place or planned for meeting thoserequirements.

Information Security Risk

The risk to organizational operations (including mission,functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals,
other organizations, and the Nation due to the potential forunauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction of information and/or information systems.

Information Steward

An agency official with statutory or operational authority forspecified information and responsibility for establishing thecontrols for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination,and disposal.

[CNSSI 4009]

Information System[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3502]

A discrete set of information resources organized for thecollection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination,or disposition of information.
Note: Information systems also include specialized systems such asindustrial/process controls systems, telephone switching and private branchexchange (PBX) systems, and environmental control systems.

Information System
Boundary

See Authorization Boundary.

Information System
Component

A discrete, identifiable information technology asset (e.g.,
hardware, software, firmware) that represents a building block of
an information system. Information system components includecommercial information technology products.

[NIST SP 800-128, Adapted]

Information System Owner Official responsible for the overall procurement, development,(or Program Manager)
integration, modification, or operation and maintenance of an
information system.

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Information System
Resilience

The ability of an information system to continue to: (i) operate
under adverse conditions or stress, even if in a degraded ordebilitated state, while maintaining essential operational
capabilities; and (ii) recover to an effective operational posture ina time frame consistent with mission needs.

Information System
Security Officer[CNSSI 4009]

Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining theappropriate operational security posture for an information
system or program.

Information System
Service

A capability provided by an information system that facilitates
information processing, storage, or transmission.

Information SystemRelated Security Risks

Risks that arise through the loss of confidentiality, integrity, oravailability of information or information systems and thatconsiders impacts to the organization (including assets, mission,functions, image, or reputation), individuals, other organizations,and the Nation. See Risk.

Information Technology

Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem ofequipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage,
manipulation, management, movement, control, display,switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or
information by the executive agency. For purposes of thepreceding sentence, equipment is used by an executive agency if
the equipment is used by the executive agency directly or is usedby a contractor under a contract with the executive agency which:(i) requires the use of such equipment; or (ii) requires the use, to asignificant extent, of such equipment in the performance of aservice or the furnishing of a product. The term information
technology includes computers, ancillary equipment, software,
firmware, and similar procedures, services (including support
services), and related resources.

[40 U.S.C., Sec. 1401]

Information Technology
Product

See Information System Component.

Information TypeA specific category of information (e.g., privacy, medical,
proprietary, financial, investigative, contractor-sensitive, security
management) defined by an organization or in some instances, bya specific law, Executive Order, directive, policy, or regulation.

[FIPS 199]

Insider[Presidential Memorandum,
National Insider Threat
Policy and MinimumStandards for Executive
Branch Insider Threat
Programs]

APPENDIX B

Any person with authorized access to any U.S. Government
resource, to include personnel, facilities, information, equipment,
networks, or systems.

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Insider Threat[Presidential Memorandum,
National Insider Threat
Policy and MinimumStandards for Executive
Branch Insider Threat
Programs]

The threat that an insider will use her/his authorized access,wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of UnitedStates. This threat can include damage to the United States
through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national
security information, or through the loss or degradation of
departmental resources or capabilities.

[CNSSI 4009]

An entity with authorized access (i.e., within the security domain)that has the potential to harm an information system or enterprisethrough destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or
denial of service.

Insider Threat Program

A coordinated group of capabilities under centralized
management that is organized to detect and prevent theunauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. At a minimum,for departments and agencies that handle classified information,
an insider threat program shall consist of capabilities that provide
access to information; centralized information integration,
analysis, and response; employee insider threat awarenesstraining; and the monitoring of user activity on government
computers. For department and agencies that do not handle
classified information, these can be employed effectively forsafeguarding information that is unclassified but sensitive.

[Presidential Memorandum,
National Insider Threat
Policy and MinimumStandards for Executive
Branch Insider Threat
Programs]

Integrity[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

Guarding against improper information modification or
destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation
and authenticity.

Internal Network

A network where: (i) the establishment, maintenance, andprovisioning of security controls are under the direct control oforganizational employees or contractors; or (ii) cryptographic
encapsulation or similar security technology implemented
between organization-controlled endpoints, provides the same
effect (at least with regard to confidentiality and integrity). An
internal network is typically organization-owned, yet may beorganization-controlled while not being organization-owned.

Label

See Security Label.

Line of Business

The following OMB-defined process areas common to virtually
all federal agencies: Case Management, Financial Management,
Grants Management, Human Resources Management, Federal
Health Architecture, Information Systems Security, Budget
Formulation and Execution, Geospatial, and IT Infrastructure.

Local Access

Access to an organizational information system by a user (orprocess acting on behalf of a user) communicating through a
direct connection without the use of a network.

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Logical Access Control
System[FICAM Roadmap and
Implementation Guidance]

Low-Impact System[FIPS 200]

An automated system that controls an individual’s ability toaccess one or more computer system resources such as aworkstation, network, application, or database. A logical access
control system requires validation of an individual’s identity
through some mechanism such as a PIN, card, biometric, or othertoken. It has the capability to assign different access privileges todifferent persons depending on their roles and responsibilities inan organization.
An information system in which all three security objectives (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) are assigned a FIPS
Publication 199 potential impact value of low.

Malicious Code

Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorizedprocess that will have adverse impact on the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of an information system. A virus, worm,
Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects a host.
Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples ofmalicious code.

MalwareSee Malicious Code.

Managed Interface

An interface within an information system that provides boundary
protection capability using automated mechanisms or devices.

Mandatory Access Control

An access control policy that is uniformly enforced across all
subjects and objects within the boundary of an information
system. A subject that has been granted access to information isconstrained from doing any of the following: (i) passing theinformation to unauthorized subjects or objects; (ii) granting its
privileges to other subjects; (iii) changing one or more security
attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or systemcomponents; (iv) choosing the security attributes to be associatedwith newly-created or modified objects; or (v) changing the rules
governing access control. Organization-defined subjects may
explicitly be granted organization-defined privileges (i.e., they are
trusted subjects) such that they are not limited by some or all of
the above constraints.
A means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity(as represented by a security label) of the information containedin the objects and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance, formal
access approvals, and need-to-know) of subjects to accessinformation of such sensitivity. Mandatory Access Control is a
type of nondiscretionary access control.

[CNSSI 4009]

Marking

See Security Marking.

Media

Physical devices or writing surfaces including, but not limited to,magnetic tapes, optical disks, magnetic disks, Large-Scale
Integration (LSI) memory chips, and printouts (but not including
display media) onto which information is recorded, stored, or
printed within an information system.

[FIPS 200]

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Metadata

Information describing the characteristics of data including, forexample, structural metadata describing data structures (e.g., data
format, syntax, and semantics) and descriptive metadata
describing data contents (e.g., information security labels).

Mobile Code

Software programs or parts of programs obtained from remote
information systems, transmitted across a network, and executedon a local information system without explicit installation or
execution by the recipient.

Mobile Code Technologies

Software technologies that provide the mechanisms for the
production and use of mobile code (e.g., Java, JavaScript,
ActiveX, VBScript).

Mobile Device

A portable computing device that: (i) has a small form factor suchthat it can easily be carried by a single individual; (ii) is designed
to operate without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit
or receive information); (iii) possesses local, non-removable orremovable data storage; and (iv) includes a self-contained powersource. Mobile devices may also include voice communication
capabilities, on-board sensors that allow the devices to capture
information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local datawith remote locations. Examples include smart phones, tablets,
and E-readers.

Moderate-Impact System

An information system in which at least one security objective(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS
Publication 199 potential impact value of moderate and nosecurity objective is assigned a FIPS Publication 199 potential
impact value of high.

[FIPS 200]

Multifactor Authentication

Authentication using two or more different factors to achieveauthentication. Factors include: (i) something you know (e.g.,
password/PIN); (ii) something you have (e.g., cryptographic
identification device, token); or (iii) something you are (e.g.,biometric). See Authenticator.

Multilevel Security

Concept of processing information with different classifications
and categories that simultaneously permits access by users withdifferent security clearances and denies access to users who lackauthorization.

[CNSSI 4009]

Multiple Security Levels[CNSSI 4009]

National Security
Emergency Preparedness
Telecommunications
Services[47 C.F.R., Part 64, App A]

APPENDIX B

Capability of an information system that is trusted to contain, andmaintain separation between, resources (particularly stored data)of different security domains.
Telecommunications services that are used to maintain a state ofreadiness or to respond to and manage any event or crisis (local,
national, or international) that causes or could cause injury or
harm to the population, damage to or loss of property, or degradeor threaten the national security or emergency preparedness
posture of the United States.

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National Security System[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]

Network[CNSSI 4009]

Any information system (including any telecommunications
system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of anagency, or other organization on behalf of an agency—(i) the
function, operation, or use of which involves intelligence
activities; involves cryptologic activities related to national
security; involves command and control of military forces;
involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or
weapons system; or is critical to the direct fulfillment of military
or intelligence missions (excluding a system that is to be used forroutine administrative and business applications, for example,
payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management
applications); or (ii) is protected at all times by procedures
established for information that have been specifically authorizedunder criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act ofCongress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy.
Information system(s) implemented with a collection ofinterconnected components. Such components may include
routers, hubs, cabling, telecommunications controllers, key
distribution centers, and technical control devices.

Network Access

Access to an information system by a user (or a process acting on
behalf of a user) communicating through a network (e.g., local
area network, wide area network, Internet).

Nondiscretionary AccessControl

See Mandatory Access Control.

Nonlocal Maintenance

Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating
through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet)
or an internal network.

Non-Organizational User

A user who is not an organizational user (including public users).

Non-repudiation

Protection against an individual falsely denying having performeda particular action. Provides the capability to determine whether agiven individual took a particular action such as creating
information, sending a message, approving information, andreceiving a message.

NSA-Approved
Cryptography

Cryptography that consists of: (i) an approved algorithm; (ii) an
implementation that has been approved for the protection ofclassified information and/or controlled unclassified information
in a particular environment; and (iii) a supporting key
management infrastructure.

ObjectPassive information system-related entity (e.g., devices, files,
records, tables, processes, programs, domains) containing or
receiving information. Access to an object (by a subject) implies
access to the information it contains. See Subject.

APPENDIX B

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Operations Security[CNSSI 4009]

Organization[FIPS 200, Adapted]

Systematic and proven process by which potential adversaries canbe denied information about capabilities and intentions byidentifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified
evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities. The
process involves five steps: identification of critical information,
analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities, assessment of risks,
and application of appropriate countermeasures.
An entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an
organizational structure (e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate,
any of its operational elements).

Organizational User

An organizational employee or an individual the organization
deems to have equivalent status of an employee including, forexample, contractor, guest researcher, individual detailed fromanother organization. Policy and procedures for granting
equivalent status of employees to individuals may include needto-know, relationship to the organization, and citizenship.

Overlay

A specification of security controls, control enhancements,
supplemental guidance, and other supporting information
employed during the tailoring process, that is intended tocomplement (and further refine) security control baselines. The
overlay specification may be more stringent or less stringent thanthe original security control baseline specification and can beapplied to multiple information systems.

Penetration Testing

A test methodology in which assessors, typically working under
specific constraints, attempt to circumvent or defeat the security
features of an information system.

Personally Identifiable
Information

Information which can be used to distinguish or trace the identityof an individual (e.g., name, social security number, biometricrecords, etc.) alone, or when combined with other personal or
identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specificindividual (e.g., date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name,etc.).

[OMB Memorandum 07-16]

Physical Access Control
System[FICAM Roadmap and
Implementation Guidance]

Plan of Action andMilestones[OMB Memorandum 02-01]

Portable Storage Device

APPENDIX B

An automated system that manages the passage of people orassets through an opening(s) in a secure perimeter(s) based on aset of authorization rules.
A document that identifies tasks needing to be accomplished. It
details resources required to accomplish the elements of the plan,
any milestones in meeting the tasks, and scheduled completion
dates for the milestones.
An information system component that can be inserted into andremoved from an information system, and that is used to store
data or information (e.g., text, video, audio, and/or image data).
Such components are typically implemented on magnetic, optical,
or solid state devices (e.g., floppy disks, compact/digital video
disks, flash/thumb drives, external hard disk drives, and flash
memory cards/drives that contain non-volatile memory).

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Potential Impact[FIPS 199]

The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be
expected to have: (i) a limited adverse effect (FIPS Publication
199 low); (ii) a serious adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199
moderate); or (iii) a severe or catastrophic adverse effect (FIPS
Publication 199 high) on organizational operations,organizational assets, or individuals.

Privacy Act Statement

A disclosure statement required by Section (e)(3) of the Privacy
Act of 1974, as amended, to appear on documents used byorganizations to collect personally identifiable information fromindividuals to be maintained in a Privacy Act System of Records(SORN).

Privacy Impact
Assessment

An analysis of how information is handled: (i) to ensure handlingconforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements
regarding privacy; (ii) to determine the risks and effects ofcollecting, maintaining, and disseminating information in
identifiable form in an electronic information system; and (iii) to
examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes forhandling information to mitigate potential privacy risks.

[OMB Memorandum 03-22]

Privileged AccountAn information system account with authorizations of aprivileged user.

Privileged Command

A human-initiated command executed on an information system
involving the control, monitoring, or administration of the system
including security functions and associated security-relevant
information.

Privileged User

A user that is authorized (and therefore, trusted) to performsecurity-relevant functions that ordinary users are not authorized
to perform.

[CNSSI 4009]

Protective Distribution
SystemWire line or fiber optic system that includes adequate safeguards
and/or countermeasures (e.g., acoustic, electric, electromagnetic,
and physical) to permit its use for the transmission of unencrypted
information.

Provenance

The records describing the possession of, and changes to,components, component processes, information, systems,
organization, and organizational processes. Provenance enables
all changes to the baselines of components, component processes,
information, systems, organizations, and organizational
processes, to be reported to specific actors, functions, locales, or
activities.

Public Key Infrastructure

The framework and services that provide for the generation,
production, distribution, control, accounting, and destruction of
public key certificates. Components include the personnel,
policies, processes, server platforms, software, and workstations
used for the purpose of administering certificates and publicprivate key pairs, including the ability to issue, maintain, recover,and revoke public key certificates.

[CNSSI 4009]

APPENDIX B

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Purge

Rendering sanitized data unrecoverable by laboratory attack
methods.

Reciprocity

Mutual agreement among participating organizations to accept
each other’s security assessments in order to reuse information
system resources and/or to accept each other’s assessed security
posture in order to share information.

[CNSSI 4009]

Records

The recordings (automated and/or manual) of evidence ofactivities performed or results achieved (e.g., forms, reports, test
results), which serve as a basis for verifying that the organizationand the information system are performing as intended. Also used
to refer to units of related data fields (i.e., groups of data fields
that can be accessed by a program and that contain the complete
set of information on particular items).

Red Team Exercise

An exercise, reflecting real-world conditions, that is conducted asa simulated adversarial attempt to compromise organizational
missions and/or business processes to provide a comprehensive
assessment of the security capability of the information systemand organization.

Reference Monitor

A set of design requirements on a reference validation mechanism
which as key component of an operating system, enforces anaccess control policy over all subjects and objects. A reference
validation mechanism must be: (i) always invoked (i.e., complete
mediation); (ii) tamperproof; and (iii) small enough to be subject
to analysis and tests, the completeness of which can be assured(i.e., verifiable).

Remote Access

Access to an organizational information system by a user (or aprocess acting on behalf of a user) communicating through anexternal network (e.g., the Internet).

Remote Maintenance

Maintenance activities conducted by individuals communicating
through an external network (e.g., the Internet).

Resilience

See Information System Resilience.

Restricted Data

All data concerning (i) design, manufacture, or utilization of
atomic weapons; (ii) the production of special nuclear material; or(iii) the use of special nuclear material in the production ofenergy, but shall not include data declassified or removed fromthe Restricted Data category pursuant to Section 142 [of theAtomic Energy Act of 1954].

[Atomic Energy Act of 1954]

APPENDIX B

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Risk[FIPS 200, Adapted]

A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by apotential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i)the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event
occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence.
Information system-related security risks are those risks that arise
from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information or information systems and reflect the potential
adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission,functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

Risk Assessment

The process of identifying risks to organizational operations(including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting
from the operation of an information system.
Part of risk management, incorporates threat and vulnerability
analyses, and considers mitigations provided by security controls
planned or in place. Synonymous with risk analysis.

Risk Executive (Function)

An individual or group within an organization that helps to ensure
that: (i) security risk-related considerations for individual
information systems, to include the authorization decisions for
those systems, are viewed from an organization-wide perspectivewith regard to the overall strategic goals and objectives of theorganization in carrying out its missions and business functions;and (ii) managing risk from individual information systems is
consistent across the organization, reflects organizational risk
tolerance, and is considered along with other organizational risks
affecting mission/business success.

[CNSSI 4009]

Risk Management[CNSSI 4009, adapted]

Risk Mitigation[CNSSI 4009]

The program and supporting processes to manage information
security risk to organizational operations (including mission,functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals,
other organizations, and the Nation, and includes: (i) establishing
the context for risk-related activities; (ii) assessing risk; (iii)
responding to risk once determined; and (iv) monitoring risk overtime.
Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate riskreducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk
management process.

Risk Monitoring

Maintaining ongoing awareness of an organization’s risk
environment, risk management program, and associated activities
to support risk decisions.

Risk Response

Accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk toorganizational operations (i.e., mission, functions, image, or
reputation), organizational assets, individuals, otherorganizations, or the Nation.

APPENDIX B

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Role-Based AccessControl

Access control based on user roles (i.e., a collection of accessauthorizations a user receives based on an explicit or implicit
assumption of a given role). Role permissions may be inherited
through a role hierarchy and typically reflect the permissions
needed to perform defined functions within an organization. A
given role may apply to a single individual or to several
individuals.

Safeguards

Protective measures prescribed to meet the security requirements(i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) specified for an
information system. Safeguards may include security features,
management constraints, personnel security, and security ofphysical structures, areas, and devices. Synonymous with security
controls and countermeasures.

[CNSSI 4009]

Sanitization

Actions taken to render data written on media unrecoverable byboth ordinary and, for some forms of sanitization, extraordinarymeans.
Process to remove information from media such that data
recovery is not possible. It includes removing all classified labels,
markings, and activity logs.

Scoping Considerations

A part of tailoring guidance providing organizations with specificconsiderations on the applicability and implementation of security
controls in the security control baseline. Areas of consideration
include policy/regulatory, technology, physical infrastructure,system component allocation, operational/environmental, publicaccess, scalability, common control, and security objective.

Security

A condition that results from the establishment and maintenanceof protective measures that enable an enterprise to perform its
mission or critical functions despite risks posed by threats to its
use of information systems. Protective measures may involve a
combination of deterrence, avoidance, prevention, detection,
recovery, and correction that should form part of the enterprise’srisk management approach.

[CNSSI 4009]

Security Assessment

See Security Control Assessment.

Security Assessment Plan

The objectives for the security control assessment and a detailed
roadmap of how to conduct such an assessment.

Security Assurance

See Assurance.

Security AttributeAn abstraction representing the basic properties or characteristics
of an entity with respect to safeguarding information; typicallyassociated with internal data structures (e.g., records, buffers,
files) within the information system and used to enable theimplementation of access control and flow control policies,
reflect special dissemination, handling or distribution instructions,or support other aspects of the information security policy.

APPENDIX B

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Security Authorization

See Authorization.

Security Authorization
Boundary

See Authorization Boundary.

Security Capability

A combination of mutually-reinforcing security controls (i.e.,
safeguards and countermeasures) implemented by technicalmeans (i.e., functionality in hardware, software, and firmware),physical means (i.e., physical devices and protective measures),and procedural means (i.e., procedures performed by individuals).

Security Categorization

The process of determining the security category for informationor an information system. Security categorization methodologies
are described in CNSS Instruction 1253 for national security
systems and in FIPS Publication 199 for other than national
security systems. See Security Category.

Security Category

The characterization of information or an information system
based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss ofconfidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information or
information system would have on organizational operations,organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the
Nation.

[FIPS 199, Adapted; CNSSI
4009]

Security Control[FIPS 199, Adapted]

Security Control
Assessment[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

A safeguard or countermeasure prescribed for an information
system or an organization designed to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of its information and to meet a set ofdefined security requirements.
The testing or evaluation of security controls to determine theextent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating
as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect tomeeting the security requirements for an information system ororganization.

Security Control Assessor

The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting
a security control assessment.

Security Control Baseline

The set of minimum security controls defined for a low-impact,
moderate-impact, or high-impact information system thatprovides a starting point for the tailoring process.

[FIPS 200, Adapted]

Security Control
Enhancement

Augmentation of a security control to: (i) build in additional, but
related, functionality to the control; (ii) increase the strength ofthe control; or (iii) add assurance to the control.

Security Control
Inheritance

A situation in which an information system or application
receives protection from security controls (or portions of security
controls) that are developed, implemented, assessed, authorized,
and monitored by entities other than those responsible for thesystem or application; entities either internal or external to theorganization where the system or application resides. See
Common Control.

[CNSSI 4009]

Security Control Overlay

APPENDIX B

See Overlay.

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Security Domain[CNSSI 4009]

A domain that implements a security policy and is administeredby a single authority.

Security Functionality

The security-related features, functions, mechanisms, services,
procedures, and architectures implemented within organizational
information systems or the environments in which those systems
operate.

Security Functions

The hardware, software, and/or firmware of the information
system responsible for enforcing the system security policy andsupporting the isolation of code and data on which the protection
is based.

Security Impact Analysis[CNSSI 4009]

The analysis conducted by an organizational official to determine
the extent to which changes to the information system haveaffected the security state of the system.

Security Incident

See Incident.

Security Kernel

Hardware, firmware, and software elements of a trusted
computing base implementing the reference monitor concept.
Security kernel must mediate all accesses, be protected frommodification, and be verifiable as correct.

[CNSSI 4009]

Security Label

The means used to associate a set of security attributes with a
specific information object as part of the data structure for that
object.

Security Marking

The means used to associate a set of security attributes with
objects in a human-readable form, to enable organizational
process-based enforcement of information security policies.

Security Objective

Confidentiality, integrity, or availability.

[FIPS 199]

Security Plan

Formal document that provides an overview of the security
requirements for an information system or an information security
program and describes the security controls in place or planned
for meeting those requirements.
See System Security Plan or Information Security Program Plan.

Security Policy

A set of criteria for the provision of security services.

[CNSSI 4009]

Security Policy Filter

APPENDIX B

A hardware and/or software component that performs one ormore of the following functions: (i) content verification to ensure
the data type of the submitted content; (ii) content inspection,
analyzing the submitted content to verify it complies with adefined policy (e.g., allowed vs. disallowed file constructs andcontent portions); (iii) malicious content checker that evaluates
the content for malicious code; (iv) suspicious activity checker
that evaluates or executes the content in a safe manner, such as ina sandbox/detonation chamber and monitors for suspicious
activity; or (v) content sanitization, cleansing, and transformation,
which modifies the submitted content to comply with a definedpolicy.

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Security Requirement[FIPS 200, Adapted]

A requirement levied on an information system or an organizationthat is derived from applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives,
policies, standards, instructions, regulations, procedures, and/or
mission/business needs to ensure the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of information that is being processed, stored, ortransmitted.
Note: Security requirements can be used in a variety of contexts from high-level
policy-related activities to low-level implementation-related activities in systemdevelopment and engineering disciplines.

Security Service[CNSSI 4009]

A capability that supports one, or more, of the security
requirements (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability). Examplesof security services are key management, access control, andauthentication.

Security-Relevant
Information

Any information within the information system that canpotentially impact the operation of security functions or theprovision of security services in a manner that could result in
failure to enforce the system security policy or maintain isolationof code and data.

Senior Agency
Information Security
Officer

Official responsible for carrying out the Chief Information
Officer responsibilities under FISMA and serving as the Chief
Information Officer’s primary liaison to the agency’s authorizing
officials, information system owners, and information systemsecurity officers.

[44 U.S.C., Sec. 3544]

Note: Organizations subordinate to federal agencies may use the term Senior
Information Security Officer or Chief Information Security Officer to denoteindividuals filling positions with similar responsibilities to Senior Agency
Information Security Officers.

Senior Agency Official for
Privacy

The senior organizational official with overall organization-wide
responsibility for information privacy issues.

Senior Information
Security Officer

See Senior Agency Information Security Officer.

Sensitive Information

Information where the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access or
modification could adversely affect the national interest or the
conduct of federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals
are entitled under 5 U.S.C. Section 552a (the Privacy Act); thathas not been specifically authorized under criteria established by
an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in
the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

Sensitive Compartmented
Information[CNSSI 4009]

Service-Oriented
Architecture

APPENDIX B

Classified information concerning or derived from intelligencesources, methods, or analytical processes, which is required to behandled within formal access control systems established by the
Director of National Intelligence.
A set of principles and methodologies for designing anddeveloping software in the form of interoperable services. These
services are well-defined business functions that are built assoftware components (i.e., discrete pieces of code and/or data
structures) that can be reused for different purposes.

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Software[CNSSI 4009]

Computer programs and associated data that may be dynamically
written or modified during execution.

Spam

The abuse of electronic messaging systems to indiscriminately
send unsolicited bulk messages.

Special Access Program

A program established for a specific class of classified
information that imposes safeguarding and access requirementsthat exceed those normally required for information at the sameclassification level.

[CNSSI 4009]

SpywareSoftware that is secretly or surreptitiously installed into an
information system to gather information on individuals ororganizations without their knowledge; a type of malicious code.

Subject

Generally an individual, process, or device causing information toflow among objects or change to the system state. See Object.

Subsystem

A major subdivision or component of an information system
consisting of information, information technology, and personnel
that performs one or more specific functions.

Supplemental GuidanceStatements used to provide additional explanatory information for
security controls or security control enhancements.

Supplementation

The process of adding security controls or control enhancements
to a security control baseline as part of the tailoring process(during security control selection) in order to adequately meet theorganization’s risk management needs.

Supply Chain

Linked set of resources and processes between multiple tiers ofdevelopers that begins with the sourcing of products and services
and extends through the design, development, manufacturing,processing, handling, and delivery of products and services to theacquirer.

[ISO 28001, Adapted]

Supply Chain Element

An information technology product or product component that
contains programmable logic and that is critically important to thefunctioning of an information system.

SystemSee Information System.

System of Records Notice

An official public notice of an organization’s system(s) ofrecords, as required by the Privacy Act of 1974, that identifies: (i)the purpose for the system of records; (ii) the individuals coveredby information in the system of records; (iii) the categories ofrecords maintained about individuals; and (iv) the ways in which
the information is shared.

System Security Plan

Formal document that provides an overview of the security
requirements for an information system and describes the security
controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.

[NIST SP 800-18]

APPENDIX B

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System-Specific Security
Control

A security control for an information system that has not been
designated as a common security control or the portion of a
hybrid control that is to be implemented within an information
system.

Tailored Security Control
Baseline

A set of security controls resulting from the application of
tailoring guidance to a security control baseline. See Tailoring.

Tailoring

The process by which security control baselines are modified by:(i) identifying and designating common controls; (ii) applying
scoping considerations on the applicability and implementation of
baseline controls; (iii) selecting compensating security controls;(iv) assigning specific values to organization-defined security
control parameters; (v) supplementing baselines with additional
security controls or control enhancements; and (vi) providing
additional specification information for control implementation.

ThreatAny circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or
reputation), organizational assets, individuals, otherorganizations, or the Nation through an information system via
unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of
information, and/or denial of service.

[CNSSI 4009, Adapted]

Threat Assessment[CNSSI 4009]

Threat Source[FIPS 200]

Formal description and evaluation of threat to an information
system.
The intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of avulnerability or a situation and method that may accidentally
trigger a vulnerability. Synonymous with threat agent.

Trusted Path

A mechanism by which a user (through an input device) can
communicate directly with the security functions of theinformation system with the necessary confidence to support thesystem security policy. This mechanism can only be activated by
the user or the security functions of the information system andcannot be imitated by untrusted software.

Trustworthiness

The attribute of a person or enterprise that provides confidence toothers of the qualifications, capabilities, and reliability of that
entity to perform specific tasks and fulfill assigned
responsibilities.

[CNSSI 4009]

Trustworthiness(Information System)

APPENDIX B

The degree to which an information system (including theinformation technology components that are used to build thesystem) can be expected to preserve the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of the information being processed, stored, ortransmitted by the system across the full range of threats. A
trustworthy information system is a system that is believed to becapable of operating within defined levels of risk despite theenvironmental disruptions, human errors, structural failures, andpurposeful attacks that are expected to occur in its environment ofoperation.

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User[CNSSI 4009, adapted]

Virtual Private Network[CNSSI 4009]

Vulnerability

Individual, or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual,
authorized to access an information system.
See Organizational User and Non-Organizational User.
Protected information system link utilizing tunneling, security
controls, and endpoint address translation giving the impressionof a dedicated line.

[CNSSI 4009]

Weakness in an information system, system security procedures,internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or
triggered by a threat source.

Vulnerability Analysis

See Vulnerability Assessment.

Vulnerability Assessment

Systematic examination of an information system or product todetermine the adequacy of security measures, identify security
deficiencies, provide data from which to predict the effectivenessof proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy of suchmeasures after implementation.

[CNSSI 4009]

Whitelisting

APPENDIX B

The process used to identify: (i) software programs that are
authorized to execute on an information system; or (ii) authorized
Universal Resource Locators (URL)/websites.

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APPENDIX CACRONYMS
COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

APTAdvanced Persistent Threat

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CIO

Chief Information Officer

CISO

Chief Information Security Officer

CAVP

Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program

CMVP

Cryptographic Module Validation Program

CNSS

Committee on National Security Systems

CPO

Chief Privacy Officer

CUI

Controlled Unclassified Information

DCS

Distributed Control System

DNS

Domain Name System

DoD

Department of Defense

FAR

Federal Acquisition Regulation

FEA

Federal Enterprise Architecture

FICAM

Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management

FIPP

Fair Information Practice Principles

FIPS

Federal Information Processing Standards

FISMA

Federal Information Security Management Act

HSPD

Homeland Security Presidential Directive

ICS

Industrial Control System

IEEE

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IPsec

Internet Protocol Security

ISO/IEC

International Organization for Standardization/International ElectrotechnicalCommission

ITL

Information Technology Laboratory

LACS

Logical Access Control System

LSI

Large-Scale Integration

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NISTIR

National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency or Internal Report

NSA

National Security Agency

APPENDIX CPAGE C-1

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National Security Telecommunications and Information System Security
Instruction

ODNI

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OMB

Office of Management and Budget

OPSEC

Operations Security

PBX

Private Branch Exchange

PACS

Physical Access Control System

PIA

Privacy Impact Assessment

PII

Personally Identifiable Information

PIV

Personal Identity Verification

PKI

Public Key Infrastructure

RBAC

Role-Based Access Control

RD

Restricted Data

RMF

Risk Management Framework

SAISO

Senior Agency Information Security Officer

SAMI

Sources And Methods Information

SAOP

Senior Agency Official for Privacy

SAP

Special Access Program

SC

Security Category

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

SCI

Sensitive Compartmented Information

SOA

Service-Oriented Architecture

SORN

System of Records Notice

SP

Special Publication

TCP/IP

Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol

USB

Universal Serial Bus

VoIP

Voice over Internet Protocol

VPN

Virtual Private Network

APPENDIX CPAGE C-2

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX DSECURITY CONTROL BASELINES – SUMMARY
LOW-IMPACT, MODERATE-IMPACT, AND HIGH-IMPACT INFORMATION SYSTEMST

his appendix contains the security control baselines that represent the starting point indetermining the security controls for low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact
information systems. 90 The three security control baselines are hierarchical in nature withregard to the security controls employed in those baselines. 91 If a security control is selected forone of the baselines, the family identifier and control number are listed in the appropriate column.
If a security control is not used in a particular baseline, the entry is marked not selected. Security
control enhancements, when used to supplement security controls, are indicated by the number ofthe enhancement. For example, the IR-2 (1) (2) entry in the high baseline for IR-2 indicates thatthe second control from the Incident Response family has been selected along with control
enhancements (1) and (2). Some security controls and enhancements are not used in any of thebaselines in this appendix but are available for use by organizations if needed. This situation
occurs, for example, when the results of a risk assessment indicate the need for additional security
controls or control enhancements in order to adequately mitigate risk to organizational operations
and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
Organizations can use the recommended priority code designation associated with each security
control in the baselines to assist in making sequencing decisions for control implementation (i.e.,a Priority Code 1 [P1] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code 2 [P2]control; a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority
Code 3 [P3] control, and a Priority Code 0 [P0] indicates the security control is not selected inany baseline). This recommended sequencing prioritization helps ensure that security controls
upon which other controls depend are implemented first, thus enabling organizations to deploy
controls in a more structured and timely manner in accordance with available resources. The
implementation of security controls by sequence priority code does not imply any defined level ofrisk mitigation until all controls in the security plan have been implemented. The priority codes
are used only for implementation sequencing, not for making security control selection decisions.
Table D-1 summarizes sequence priority codes for the baseline security controls in Table D-2.
TABLE D-1: SECURITY CONTROL PRIORITIZATION CODES
Priority Code

Sequencing

ActionPriority Code 1 (P1)

FIRST

Implement P1 security controls first.

Priority Code 2 (P2)NEXT

Implement P2 security controls after implementation of P1 controls.

Priority Code 3 (P3)

LAST

Implement P3 security controls after implementation of P1 and P2 controls.

Unspecified Priority Code (P0)NONE

Security control not selected in any baseline.

90

A complete description of all security controls is provided in Appendices F and G. In addition, separate documents
for individual security control baselines (listed as Annexes 1, 2, and 3) are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications.
An online version of the catalog of security controls is also available at http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/home.
91
The hierarchical nature applies to the security requirements of each control (i.e., the base control plus all of its
enhancements) at the low-impact, moderate-impact, and high-impact level in that the control requirements at aparticular impact level (e.g., CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing—Moderate: CP-4(1)) meets a stronger set of security
requirements for that control than the next lower impact level of the same control (e.g., CP-4 Contingency Plan
Testing—Low: CP-4).

APPENDIX D

PAGE D-1

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table D-2 provides a summary of the security controls and control enhancements from Appendix
F that have been allocated to the initial security control baselines (i.e., low, moderate, and high).
The sequence priority codes for security control implementation and those security controls thathave been withdrawn from Appendix F are also indicated in Table D-2. In addition to Table D-2,
the sequence priority codes and security control baselines are annotated in a priority and baseline
allocation summary section below each security control in Appendix F.

CNTL
NO.

PRIORITYTABLE D-2: SECURITY CONTROL BASELINESCONTROL NAME92

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES
LOW

MOD

HIGH

Access Control
AC-1

Access Control Policy and Procedures

P1

AC-1

AC-1

AC-1

AC-2

Account Management

P1

AC-2

AC-2 (1) (2) (3)(4)

AC-2 (1) (2) (3)(4) (5) (11) (12)
(13)

AC-3

Access Enforcement

P1

AC-3

AC-3

AC-3

AC-4

Information Flow Enforcement

P1

Not Selected

AC-4

AC-4

AC-5

Separation of Duties

P1

Not Selected

AC-5

AC-5

AC-6

Least Privilege

P1

Not SelectedAC-6 (1) (2) (5)(9) (10)AC-6 (1) (2) (3)(5) (9) (10)AC-7Unsuccessful Logon Attempts

P2

AC-7

AC-7

AC-7

AC-8

System Use Notification

P1

AC-8

AC-8

AC-8

AC-9

Previous Logon (Access) Notification

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

AC-10

Concurrent Session Control

P3

Not Selected

Not Selected

AC-10

AC-11

Session Lock

P3

Not SelectedAC-11 (1)AC-11 (1)AC-12

Session Termination

P2

Not Selected

AC-12

AC-12

AC-13

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

AC-14

Permitted Actions without Identification orAuthentication

P3

AC-14

AC-14

AC-14

AC-15

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

AC-16

Security Attributes

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

AC-17

Remote Access

P1

AC-17

AC-17 (1) (2)(3) (4)AC-17 (1) (2)(3) (4)

AC-18

Wireless Access

P1

AC-18

AC-18 (1)AC-18 (1) (4)
(5)

AC-19

Access Control for Mobile Devices

P1

AC-19

AC-19 (5)AC-19 (5)AC-20

Use of External Information Systems

P1

AC-20

AC-20 (1) (2)AC-20 (1) (2)AC-21

Information Sharing

P2

Not Selected

AC-21

AC-21

AC-22

Publicly Accessible Content

P3

AC-22

AC-22

AC-22

AC-23

Data Mining Protection

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

AC-24

Access Control Decisions

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

AC-25

Reference Monitor

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

92
The security control baselines in Table D-2 are the initial baselines selected by organizations prior to conducting the
tailoring activities described in Section 3.2. The control baselines and priority codes are only applicable to non-national
security systems. Security control baselines for national security systems are included in CNSS Instruction 1253.

APPENDIX D

PAGE D-2

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

CNTL
NO.

PRIORITY________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES
LOW

MOD

HIGH

Awareness and Training
AT-1

Security Awareness and Training Policy andProcedures

P1

AT-1

AT-1

AT-1

AT-2

Security Awareness Training

P1

AT-2

AT-2 (2)AT-2 (2)AT-3

Role-Based Security Training

P1

AT-3

AT-3

AT-3

AT-4

Security Training Records

P3

AT-4

AT-4

AT-4

AT-5

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

AU-1

Audit and Accountability
AU-1

Audit and Accountability Policy andProcedures

P1

AU-1

AU-1

AU-2

Audit Events

P1

AU-2

AU-2 (3)AU-2 (3)AU-3Content of Audit Records

P1

AU-3

AU-3 (1)AU-3 (1) (2)

AU-4

Audit Storage Capacity

P1

AU-4

AU-4

AU-4

AU-5

Response to Audit Processing Failures

P1

AU-5

AU-5

AU-5 (1) (2)

AU-6

Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting

P1

AU-6

AU-6 (1) (3)

AU-6 (1) (3) (5)
(6)

AU-7

Audit Reduction and Report Generation

P2

Not SelectedAU-7 (1)AU-7 (1)AU-8Time Stamps

P1

AU-8

AU-8 (1)AU-8 (1)AU-9

Protection of Audit Information

P1

AU-9

AU-9 (4)AU-9 (2) (3) (4)AU-10

Non-repudiation

P2

Not Selected

Not Selected

AU-10

AU-11

Audit Record Retention

P3

AU-11

AU-11

AU-11

AU-12

Audit Generation

P1

AU-12

AU-12

AU-12 (1) (3)

AU-13

Monitoring for Information Disclosure

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

AU-14

Session Audit

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

AU-15

Alternate Audit Capability

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

AU-16

Cross-Organizational Auditing

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

Security Assessment and Authorization
CA-1

Security Assessment and Authorization
Policies and Procedures

P1

CA-1

CA-1

CA-1

CA-2

Security Assessments

P2

CA-2

CA-2 (1)CA-2 (1) (2)CA-3

System Interconnections

P1

CA-3

CA-3 (5)CA-3 (5)

CA-4

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

CA-5

Plan of Action and Milestones

P3

CA-5

CA-5

CA-5

CA-6

Security Authorization

P2

CA-6

CA-6

CA-6

CA-7

Continuous Monitoring

P2

CA-7

CA-7 (1)CA-7 (1)CA-8

Penetration Testing

P2

Not Selected

Not Selected

CA-8

CA-9

Internal System Connections

P2

CA-9

CA-9

CA-9

Configuration Management
CM-1

Configuration Management Policy andProcedures

P1

CM-1

CM-1

CM-1

CM-2

Baseline Configuration

P1

CM-2

CM-2 (1) (3) (7)CM-2 (1) (2) (3)
(7)

CM-3

Configuration Change Control

P1

Not SelectedCM-3 (2)CM-3 (1) (2)CM-4

Security Impact Analysis

P2

CM-4

CM-4

CM-4 (1)

CM-5

Access Restrictions for Change

P1

Not Selected

CM-5

CM-5 (1) (2) (3)APPENDIX D

PAGE D-3

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

PRIORITY________________________________________________________________________________________________

LOW

CM-6

Configuration Settings

P1

CM-6

CM-6

CM-6 (1) (2)

CM-7

Least Functionality

P1

CM-7

CM-7 (1) (2) (4)CM-7 (1) (2) (5)CM-8Information System Component Inventory

P1

CM-8

CM-8 (1) (3) (5)CM-8 (1) (2) (3)(4) (5)CNTL
NO.

CONTROL NAME

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES
MOD

HIGH

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

P1

Not Selected

CM-9

CM-9

CM-10

Software Usage Restrictions

P2

CM-10

CM-10

CM-10

CM-11

User-Installed Software

P1

CM-11

CM-11

CM-11

Contingency Planning
CP-1

Contingency Planning Policy andProcedures

P1

CP-1

CP-1

CP-1

CP-2

Contingency Plan

P1

CP-2

CP-2 (1) (3) (8)CP-2 (1) (2) (3)(4) (5) (8)CP-3Contingency Training

P2

CP-3

CP-3

CP-3 (1)CP-4Contingency Plan Testing

P2

CP-4

CP-4 (1)CP-4 (1) (2)CP-5

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

CP-6

Alternate Storage Site

P1

Not Selected

CP-6 (1) (3)CP-6 (1) (2) (3)CP-7Alternate Processing Site

P1

Not Selected

CP-7 (1) (2) (3)CP-7 (1) (2) (3)
(4)

CP-8

Telecommunications Services

P1

Not Selected

CP-8 (1) (2)CP-8 (1) (2) (3)
(4)

CP-9

Information System Backup

P1

CP-9

CP-9 (1)CP-9 (1) (2) (3)
(5)

CP-10

Information System Recovery andReconstitution

P1

CP-10

CP-10 (2)CP-10 (2) (4)CP-11

Alternate Communications Protocols

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

CP-12

Safe ModeP0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

CP-13

Alternative Security Mechanisms

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

Identification and Authentication
IA-1

Identification and Authentication Policy andProcedures

P1

IA-1

IA-1

IA-1

IA-2

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)P1

IA-2 (1) (12)IA-2 (1) (2) (3)(8) (11) (12)IA-2 (1) (2) (3)(4) (8) (9) (11)
(12)

IA-3

Device Identification and Authentication

P1

Not Selected

IA-3

IA-3

IA-4

Identifier Management

P1

IA-4

IA-4

IA-4

IA-5

Authenticator Management

P1

IA-5 (1) (11)IA-5 (1) (2) (3)(11)

IA-5 (1) (2) (3)
(11)

IA-6

Authenticator Feedback

P2

IA-6

IA-6

IA-6

IA-7

Cryptographic Module Authentication

P1

IA-7

IA-7

IA-7

IA-8

Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)

P1

IA-8 (1) (2) (3)(4)

IA-8 (1) (2) (3)(4)

IA-8 (1) (2) (3)
(4)

IA-9

Service Identification and Authentication

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

IA-10

Adaptive Identification and Authentication

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

IA-11

Re-authentication

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

Incident Response
IR-1

Incident Response Policy and Procedures

P1

IR-1

IR-1

IR-1

IR-2

Incident Response Training

P2

IR-2

IR-2

IR-2 (1) (2)

APPENDIX D

PAGE D-4

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

PRIORITY________________________________________________________________________________________________

LOW

IR-3

Incident Response Testing

P2

Not SelectedIR-3 (2)IR-3 (2)IR-4Incident Handling

P1

IR-4

IR-4 (1)IR-4 (1) (4)IR-5Incident Monitoring

P1

IR-5

IR-5

IR-5 (1)IR-6

Incident Reporting

P1

IR-6

IR-6 (1)IR-6 (1)IR-7

Incident Response Assistance

P2

IR-7

IR-7 (1)IR-7 (1)IR-8

Incident Response Plan

P1

IR-8

IR-8

IR-8

IR-9

Information Spillage Response

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

IR-10

Integrated Information Security Analysis
Team

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

CNTL
NO.

CONTROL NAME

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES
MOD

HIGH

Maintenance
MA-1

System Maintenance Policy and Procedures

P1

MA-1

MA-1

MA-1

MA-2

Controlled Maintenance

P2

MA-2

MA-2

MA-2 (2)MA-3Maintenance Tools

P3

Not Selected

MA-3 (1) (2)MA-3 (1) (2) (3)MA-4Nonlocal Maintenance

P2

MA-4

MA-4 (2)MA-4 (2) (3)MA-5

Maintenance Personnel

P2

MA-5

MA-5

MA-5 (1)MA-6Timely Maintenance

P2

Not Selected

MA-6

MA-6

Media Protection
MP-1

Media Protection Policy and Procedures

P1

MP-1

MP-1

MP-1

MP-2

Media Access

P1

MP-2

MP-2

MP-2

MP-3

Media Marking

P2

Not Selected

MP-3

MP-3

MP-4

Media Storage

P1

Not Selected

MP-4

MP-4

MP-5

Media Transport

P1

Not SelectedMP-5 (4)MP-5 (4)MP-6Media Sanitization

P1

MP-6

MP-6

MP-6 (1) (2) (3)MP-7Media Use

P1

MP-7

MP-7 (1)MP-7 (1)MP-8Media Downgrading

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

PE-1

Physical and Environmental Protection
PE-1

Physical and Environmental Protection
Policy and Procedures

P1

PE-1

PE-1

PE-2

Physical Access Authorizations

P1

PE-2

PE-2

PE-2

PE-3

Physical Access Control

P1

PE-3

PE-3

PE-3 (1)PE-4

Access Control for Transmission Medium

P1

Not Selected

PE-4

PE-4

PE-5

Access Control for Output Devices

P2

Not Selected

PE-5

PE-5

PE-6

Monitoring Physical Access

P1

PE-6

PE-6 (1)PE-6 (1) (4)PE-7

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

PE-8

Visitor Access Records

P3

PE-8

PE-8

PE-8 (1)PE-9Power Equipment and Cabling

P1

Not Selected

PE-9

PE-9

PE-10

Emergency Shutoff

P1

Not Selected

PE-10

PE-10

PE-11

Emergency PowerP1

Not Selected

PE-11

PE-11 (1)PE-12Emergency Lighting

P1

PE-12

PE-12

PE-12

PE-13

Fire Protection

P1

PE-13

PE-13 (3)PE-13 (1) (2)
(3)

PE-14

Temperature and Humidity Controls

P1

PE-14

PE-14

PE-14

PE-15

Water Damage Protection

P1

PE-15

PE-15

PE-15 (1)PE-16

Delivery and Removal

P2

PE-16

PE-16

PE-16

APPENDIX D

PAGE D-5

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

PRIORITY________________________________________________________________________________________________

LOW

PE-17

Alternate Work Site

P2

Not Selected

PE-17

PE-18

Location of Information System Components

P3

Not Selected

Not Selected

PE-18

PE-19

Information Leakage

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

PE-20

Asset Monitoring and Tracking

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

CNTL
NO.

CONTROL NAME

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES
MOD

HIGH
PE-17

Planning
PL-1

Security Planning Policy and Procedures

P1

PL-1

PL-1

PL-1

PL-2

System Security Plan

P1

PL-2

PL-2 (3)PL-2 (3)PL-3

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

PL-4

Rules of Behavior

P2

PL-4

PL-4 (1)PL-4 (1)

PL-5

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

PL-6

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

PL-7

Security Concept of Operations

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

PL-8

Information Security Architecture

P1

Not Selected

PL-8

PL-8

PL-9

Central Management

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

Personnel Security
PS-1

Personnel Security Policy and Procedures

P1

PS-1

PS-1

PS-1

PS-2

Position Risk Designation

P1

PS-2

PS-2

PS-2

PS-3

Personnel Screening

P1

PS-3

PS-3

PS-3

PS-4

Personnel Termination

P1

PS-4

PS-4

PS-4 (2)PS-5Personnel Transfer

P2

PS-5

PS-5

PS-5

PS-6

Access Agreements

P3

PS-6

PS-6

PS-6

PS-7

Third-Party Personnel Security

P1

PS-7

PS-7

PS-7

PS-8

Personnel Sanctions

P3

PS-8

PS-8

PS-8

Risk Assessment
RA-1

Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures

P1

RA-1

RA-1

RA-1

RA-2

Security Categorization

P1

RA-2

RA-2

RA-2

RA-3

Risk Assessment

P1

RA-3

RA-3

RA-3

RA-4

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

RA-5

Vulnerability Scanning

P1

RA-5

RA-5 (1) (2) (5)RA-5 (1) (2) (4)
(5)

RA-6

Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
SurveyP0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

System and Services Acquisition
SA-1

System and Services Acquisition Policy andProcedures

P1

SA-1

SA-1

SA-1

SA-2

Allocation of Resources

P1

SA-2

SA-2

SA-2

SA-3

System Development Life Cycle

P1

SA-3

SA-3

SA-3

SA-4

Acquisition Process

P1

SA-4 (10)

SA-4 (1) (2) (9)(10)

SA-4 (1) (2) (9)
(10)

SA-5

Information System Documentation

P2

SA-5

SA-5

SA-5

SA-6

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

SA-7

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

SA-8

Security Engineering Principles

P1

Not Selected

SA-8

SA-8

SA-9

External Information System Services

P1

SA-9

SA-9 (2)

SA-9 (2)APPENDIX D

PAGE D-6

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and Organizations

PRIORITY________________________________________________________________________________________________

LOW

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

P1

Not Selected

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

P1

Not Selected

SA-11

SA-12

Supply Chain Protection

P1

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-12

SA-13

Trustworthiness

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-14

Criticality Analysis

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-15

Development Process, Standards, and
Tools

P2

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-15

SA-16

Developer-Provided Training

P2

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-16

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and Design

P1

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-17

SA-18

Tamper Resistance and Detection

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-19

Component Authenticity

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-20

Customized Development of Critical
Components

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-21

Developer Screening

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SA-22

Unsupported System Components

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-1

SC-1

CNTL
NO.

CONTROL NAME

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES
MOD

HIGH

SA-10

SA-10
SA-11

System and Communications Protection
SC-1

System and Communications Protection
Policy and Procedures

P1

SC-1

SC-2

Application Partitioning

P1

Not Selected

SC-2

SC-2

SC-3

Security Function Isolation

P1

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-3

SC-4

Information in Shared Resources

P1

Not Selected

SC-4

SC-4

SC-5

Denial of Service Protection

P1

SC-5

SC-5

SC-5

SC-6

Resource Availability

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-7

Boundary Protection

P1

SC-7

SC-7 (3) (4) (5)(7)

SC-7 (3) (4) (5)(7) (8) (18) (21)SC-8Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

P1

Not Selected

SC-8 (1)SC-8 (1)SC-9

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

SC-10

Network Disconnect

P2

Not Selected

SC-10

SC-10

SC-11

Trusted PathP0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-12

Cryptographic Key Establishment andManagement

P1

SC-12

SC-12

SC-12 (1)SC-13

Cryptographic Protection

P1

SC-13

SC-13

SC-13

SC-14

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

SC-15

Collaborative Computing Devices

P1

SC-15

SC-15

SC-15

SC-16

Transmission of Security Attributes

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-17

Public Key Infrastructure Certificates

P1

Not Selected

SC-17

SC-17

SC-18

Mobile CodeP2

Not Selected

SC-18

SC-18

SC-19

Voice Over Internet Protocol

P1

Not Selected

SC-19

SC-19

SC-20

Secure Name /Address Resolution Service(Authoritative Source)

P1

SC-20

SC-20

SC-20

SC-21

Secure Name /Address Resolution Service(Recursive or Caching Resolver)

P1

SC-21

SC-21

SC-21

SC-22

Architecture and Provisioning for
Name/Address Resolution Service

P1

SC-22

SC-22

SC-22

SC-23

Session Authenticity

P1

Not Selected

SC-23

SC-23

SC-24

Fail in Known StateP1

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-24

APPENDIX D

PAGE D-7

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

PRIORITY________________________________________________________________________________________________

LOW

SC-25

Thin Nodes

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-26

HoneypotsP0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-27

Platform-Independent Applications

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-28

Protection of Information at Rest

P1

Not Selected

SC-28

SC-28

SC-29

Heterogeneity

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-30

Concealment and Misdirection

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-31

Covert Channel Analysis

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-32

Information System Partitioning

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-33

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

SC-34

Non-Modifiable Executable Programs

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-35

HoneyclientsP0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-36

Distributed Processing and Storage

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-37

Out-of-Band Channels

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-38

Operations Security

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-39

Process Isolation

P1

SC-39

SC-39

SC-39

SC-40

Wireless Link Protection

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-41

Port and I/O Device AccessP0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-42

Sensor Capability and Data

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-43

Usage Restrictions

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SC-44

Detonation Chambers

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SI-1

System and Information Integrity Policy andProcedures

P1

SI-1

SI-1

SI-1

SI-2

Flaw Remediation

P1

SI-2

SI-2 (2)SI-2 (1) (2)

SI-3

Malicious Code Protection

P1

SI-3

SI-3 (1) (2)SI-3 (1) (2)SI-4Information System Monitoring

P1

SI-4

SI-4 (2) (4) (5)SI-4 (2) (4) (5)SI-5Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives

P1

SI-5

SI-5

SI-5 (1)SI-6

Security Function Verification

P1

Not Selected

Not Selected

SI-6

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity

P1

Not Selected

SI-7 (1) (7)SI-7 (1) (2) (5)(7) (14)

SI-8

Spam Protection

P2

Not Selected

SI-8 (1) (2)SI-8 (1) (2)SI-9

Withdrawn

---

---

---

---

SI-10

Information Input Validation

P1

Not Selected

SI-10

SI-10

SI-11

Error Handling

P2

Not Selected

SI-11

SI-11

SI-12

Information Handling and Retention

P2

SI-12

SI-12

SI-12

SI-13

Predictable Failure Prevention

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SI-14

Non-Persistence

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SI-15

Information Output Filtering

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

SI-16

Memory Protection

P1

Not Selected

SI-16

SI-16

SI-17

Fail-Safe Procedures

P0

Not Selected

Not Selected

Not Selected

CNTL
NO.

CONTROL NAME

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES
MOD

HIGH

System and Information Integrity

APPENDIX D

PAGE D-8

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Tables D-3 through D-19 provide a more detailed summary of the security controls and control
enhancements in Appendix F. Each table focuses on a different security control family. Whereas
Table D-2 includes only those security controls and control enhancements allocated to the three
security control baselines, Tables D-3 through D-19 include all controls and enhancements for therespective security control families. The tables include the following information: (i) the security
controls and control enhancements that have been selected for the security control baselines as
indicated by an “x” in the column for the selected baseline; 93 (ii) the security controls and control
enhancements that have not been selected for any security control baseline (i.e., the controls andcontrol enhancements available for selection to achieve greater protection) as indicated by blankcells in the baseline columns; (iii) the security controls and control enhancements that have been
withdrawn from Appendix F as indicated by an “x” in the respective withdrawn column; and (iv)the security controls and control enhancements that have assurance-related characteristics orproperties (i.e., assurance-related controls) as indicated by an “x” in the respective assurance
column. Assurance-related controls are discussed in greater detail in Appendix E to include theallocation of such controls to security control baselines (see Tables E-1 through E-3).

93

The security control baselines in Tables D-3 through D-19 are only applicable to non-national security systems.
Security control baselines for national security systems are included in CNSS Instruction 1253.

APPENDIX D

PAGE D-9

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-3: SUMMARY — ACCESS CONTROLSx

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x

AC-1

Access Control Policy and Procedures

AC-2

Account ManagementAC-2(1)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNTMANAGEMENTxx

AC-2(2)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY / EMERGENCYACCOUNTSx

x

AC-2(3)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE INACTIVE ACCOUNTSxx

AC-2(4)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONSxx

AC-2(5)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT

AC-2(6)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT

AC-2(7)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ROLE-BASED SCHEMES

AC-2(8)ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC ACCOUNT CREATION

AC-2(9)ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED /GROUP ACCOUNTS

AC-2(10)ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIALTERMINATION

AC-2(11)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | USAGE CONDITIONSx

AC-2(12)ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT MONITORING / ATYPICAL USAGEx

AC-2(13)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK
INDIVIDUALS

x

AC-3

Access EnforcementAC-3(1)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED
FUNCTIONS

AC-3(2)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

AC-3(3)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3(4)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3(5)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY-RELEVANT INFORMATION

AC-3(6)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | PROTECTION OF USER AND SYSTEMINFORMATION

AC-3(7)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL

AC-3(8)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | REVOCATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS

AC-3(9)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | CONTROLLED RELEASE

AC-3(10)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | AUDITED OVERRIDE OF ACCESS CONTROLMECHANISMS

AC-4

Information Flow Enforcement

AC-4(1)INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | OBJECT SECURITY ATTRIBUTES

AC-4(2)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROCESSING DOMAINS

AC-4(3)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DYNAMIC INFORMATION FLOWCONTROL

AC-4(4)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONTENT CHECK ENCRYPTEDINFORMATION

AC-4(5)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | EMBEDDED DATA TYPES

AC-4(6)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | METADATA

AC-4(7)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ONE-WAY FLOW MECHANISMS

AC-4(8)INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTERS

AC-4(9)INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | HUMAN REVIEWS

AC-4(10)INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ENABLE / DISABLE SECURITY
POLICY FILTERS

APPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into AC-6.

x

Incorporated into MP-4 and SC-28.

xx

PAGE D-10

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

Control Enhancement Name

AC-4(11)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONFIGURATION OF SECURITY
POLICY FILTERS

AC-4(12)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DATA TYPE IDENTIFIERS

AC-4(13)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DECOMPOSITION INTO POLICYRELEVANT SUBCOMPONENTS

AC-4(14)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTERCONSTRAINTS

AC-4(15)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DETECTION OF UNSANCTIONEDINFORMATION

AC-4(16)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | INFORMATION TRANSFERS ON
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS

AC-4(17)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DOMAIN AUTHENTICATION

AC-4(18)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY ATTRIBUTE BINDING

AC-4(19)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | VALIDATION OF METADATA

AC-4(20)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | APPROVED SOLUTIONS

AC-4(21)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PHYSICAL / LOGICALSEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS

AC-4(22)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ACCESS ONLYASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________

x

Incorporated into AC-4.

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

AC-5

Separation of Duties

x

x

AC-6

Least PrivilegexxAC-6(1)LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONSxx

AC-6(2)LEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY
FUNCTIONSxx

AC-6(3)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED COMMANDS

AC-6(4)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | SEPARATE PROCESSING DOMAINS

AC-6(5)LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

AC-6(6)LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCESS BY NON-ORGANIZATIONAL
USERS

AC-6(7)LEAST PRIVILEGE | REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGES

AC-6(8)LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGE LEVELS FOR CODE EXECUTION

AC-6(9)AC-6(10)xxxLEAST PRIVILEGE | AUDITING USE OF PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONSxx

LEAST PRIVILEGE | PROHIBIT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS FROMEXECUTING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

x

x

x

x

AC-7

Unsuccessful Logon Attempts

AC-7(1)

UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | AUTOMATIC ACCOUNT LOCK

AC-7(2)

UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | PURGE / WIPE MOBILE DEVICE

AC-8

System Use Notificationxx

Incorporated into AC-7.

x

x

x

AC-9

Previous Logon (Access) Notification

AC-9(1)PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS

AC-9(2)

PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | SUCCESSFUL / UNSUCCESSFULLOGONS

AC-9(3)

PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF ACCOUNTCHANGES

AC-9(4)

PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | ADDITIONAL LOGON INFORMATION

AC-10

Concurrent Session Control

AC-11

Session Lockxx

AC-11(1)

SESSION LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYSx

x

Session Termination

x

x

AC-12

APPENDIX Dx

PAGE D-11

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

Control Enhancement NameASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________

x

Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6.

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

AC-12(1)

SESSION TERMINATION | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGEDISPLAYS

AC-13

Supervision and Review — Access Control

AC-14

Permitted Actions without Identification or Authentication

AC-14(1)

PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION| NECESSARY USESx

Incorporated into AC-14.

AC-15

Automated Marking

x

Incorporated into MP-3.

AC-16

Security Attributes

AC-16(1)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION

AC-16(2)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE VALUE CHANGES BY
AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

AC-16(3)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTEASSOCIATIONS BY INFORMATION SYSTEM

AC-16(4)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION OF ATTRIBUTES BY
AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

AC-16(5)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE DISPLAYS FOR OUTPUT DEVICES

AC-16(6)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATIONBY ORGANIZATION

AC-16(7)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | CONSISTENT ATTRIBUTE INTERPRETATION

AC-16(8)SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION TECHNIQUES / TECHNOLOGIES

AC-16(9)SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE REASSIGNMENT

AC-16(10)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION BY
AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

x

x

x

HIGH

x

AC-17

Remote Accessxx

AC-17(1)REMOTE ACCESS | AUTOMATED MONITORING / CONTROLx

x

AC-17(2)REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY / INTEGRITYUSING ENCRYPTIONxx

AC-17(3)REMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTSxx

AC-17(4)REMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS / ACCESSx

x

AC-17(5)REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS

AC-17(6)REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF INFORMATION

AC-17(7)xIncorporated into SI-4.

REMOTE ACCESS | ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR SECURITY
FUNCTION ACCESSx

Incorporated into AC-3(10).

AC-17(8)REMOTE ACCESS | DISABLE NONSECURE NETWORK PROTOCOLSx

Incorporated into CM-7.

AC-17(9)REMOTE ACCESS | DISCONNECT / DISABLE ACCESS

AC-18

Wireless Access

AC-18(1)

WIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION

x
x

x

x

x

x

AC-18(2)WIRELESS ACCESS | MONITORING UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS

AC-18(3)

WIRELESS ACCESS | DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKING

AC-18(4)WIRELESS ACCESS | RESTRICT CONFIGURATIONS BY USERS

AC-18(5)WIRELESS ACCESS | ANTENNAS / TRANSMISSION POWER LEVELS

AC-19

Access Control for Mobile Devices

AC-19(1)ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF WRITABLE /PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

x

Incorporated into MP-7.

AC-19(2)ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PERSONALLYOWNED PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

x

Incorporated into MP-7.

AC-19(3)ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PORTABLE
STORAGE DEVICES WITH NO IDENTIFIABLE OWNER

xIncorporated into MP-7.

APPENDIX D

Incorporated into SI-4.

x
x
x

x

x

PAGE D-12

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement Name

AC-19(4)ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | RESTRICTIONS FOR
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

AC-19(5)ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | FULL DEVICE / CONTAINERBASED ENCRYPTIONASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

HIGH

x

x

AC-20

Use of External Information Systemsxx

AC-20(1)USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED
USE

x

x

AC-20(2)USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE
DEVICESxx

AC-20(3)

USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NONORGANIZATIONALLY OWNED SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS / DEVICES

AC-20(4)USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NETWORK ACCESSIBLE
STORAGE DEVICES

x

x

x

x

AC-21

Information Sharing

AC-21(1)

INFORMATION SHARING | AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORT

AC-21(2)

INFORMATION SHARING | INFORMATION SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL

AC-22

Publicly Accessible Content

AC-23

Data Mining Protection

AC-24

Access Control Decisions

AC-24(1)ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | TRANSMIT ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONINFORMATION

AC-24(2)ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | NO USER OR PROCESS IDENTITY

AC-25

Reference Monitor

APPENDIX D

x

MOD

x

x

PAGE D-13

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-4: SUMMARY — AWARENESS AND TRAINING CONTROLSCONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

AT-1

Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures

x

x

x

x

AT-2

Security Awareness Training

x

x

x

x

AT-2(1)

SECURITY AWARENESS | PRACTICAL EXERCISES

x

AT-2(2)

SECURITY AWARENESS | INSIDER THREAT

x

AT-3

Role-Based Security Trainingx

AT-3(1)

ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLSx

AT-3(2)

ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLSx

AT-3(3)

ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | PRACTICAL EXERCISES

x

AT-3(4)

ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | SUSPICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS
AND ANOMALOUS SYSTEM BEHAVIOR

x

AT-4

Security Training Records

x

AT-5

Contacts with Security Groups and Associations

APPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into PM-15.

PAGE D-14

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Control Enhancement NameASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-5: SUMMARY — AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY CONTROLSx

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x

AU-1

Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures

AU-2

Audit Events

AU-2(1)

AUDIT EVENTS | COMPILATION OF AUDIT RECORDS FROM MULTIPLE
SOURCESx

Incorporated into AU-12.

AU-2(2)

AUDIT EVENTS | SELECTION OF AUDIT EVENTS BY COMPONENTx

Incorporated into AU-12.

AU-2(3)

AUDIT EVENTS | REVIEWS AND UPDATES

AU-2(4)

AUDIT EVENTS | PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONSx

Incorporated into AC-6(9).

AU-3Content of Audit Records

AU-3(1)

CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION

AU-3(2)

CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF
PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENT

AU-4

Audit Storage Capacity

AU-4(1)

AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE

x
x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

AU-5

Response to Audit Processing FailuresAU-5(1)RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | AUDIT STORAGE
CAPACITYx

AU-5(2)RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | REAL-TIME ALERTS

x

AU-5(3)RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | CONFIGURABLE
TRAFFIC VOLUME THRESHOLDS

AU-5(4)RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | SHUTDOWN ON
FAILURE

AU-6

Audit Review, Analysis, and Reportingx

AU-6(1)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PROCESS INTEGRATIONx

AU-6(2)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUTOMATED SECURITY
ALERTS

AU-6(3)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATE AUDITREPOSITORIESx

AU-6(4)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CENTRAL REVIEW AND
ANALYSISx

AU-6(5)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | INTEGRATION /SCANNING AND MONITORING CAPABILITIESxx

AU-6(6)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH
PHYSICAL MONITORINGxx

AU-6(7)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PERMITTED ACTIONSx

AU-6(8)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | FULL TEXT ANALYSIS OFPRIVILEGED COMMANDSx

AU-6(9)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH
INFORMATION FROM NONTECHNICAL SOURCESx

AU-6(10)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUDIT LEVELADJUSTMENT

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into SI-4.

x

x

Audit Reduction and Report Generation

x

x

x

AU-7(1)

AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC
PROCESSING

x

x

x

AU-7(2)

AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC SORTAND SEARCH

AU-8Time Stamps

x

x

x

x

AU-7

AU-8(1)

TIME STAMPS | SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIMESOURCE

AU-8(2)TIME STAMPS | SECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE

APPENDIX Dx

PAGE D-15

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

Control Enhancement NameASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

AU-9

Protection of Audit Information

AU-9(1)PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | HARDWARE WRITE-ONCE
MEDIA

AU-9(2)PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | AUDIT BACKUP ON SEPARATE
PHYSICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS

x

AU-9(3)

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | CRYPTOGRAPHICPROTECTIONx

AU-9(4)

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | ACCESS BY SUBSET OF
PRIVILEGED USERS

AU-9(5)PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

AU-9(6)

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | READ-ONLY ACCESS

AU-10

x

Non-repudiationx

AU-10(1)

NON-REPUDIATION | ASSOCIATION OF IDENTITIESx

AU-10(2)NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION PRODUCER
IDENTITYx

AU-10(3)

NON-REPUDIATION | CHAIN OF CUSTODYx

AU-10(4)NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION REVIEWERIDENTITYx

AU-10(5)NON-REPUDIATION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES

AU-11

Audit Record Retention

AU-11(1)

AUDIT RECORD RETENTION | LONG-TERM RETRIEVAL CAPABILITYxx

Incorporated into SI-7.

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

AU-12

Audit Generation

AU-12(1)

AUDIT GENERATION | SYSTEM-WIDE / TIME-CORRELATED AUDIT TRAIL

AU-12(2)

AUDIT GENERATION | STANDARDIZED FORMATS

AU-12(3)

AUDIT GENERATION | CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

AU-13

Monitoring for Information Disclosurex

AU-13(1)

MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | USE OF AUTOMATED
TOOLS

x

AU-13(2)

MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | REVIEW OFMONITORED SITES

x

x
x

AU-14

Session Auditx

AU-14(1)

SESSION AUDIT | SYSTEM START-UP

x

AU-14(2)SESSION AUDIT | CAPTURE/RECORD AND LOG CONTENTx

AU-14(3)SESSION AUDIT | REMOTE VIEWING / LISTENING

x

AU-15

Alternate Audit Capability

AU-16

Cross-Organizational Auditing

AU-16(1)

CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | IDENTITY PRESERVATION

AU-16(2)

CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | SHARING OF AUDITINFORMATIONAPPENDIX Dx

PAGE D-16

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-6: SUMMARY — SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION CONTROLSCONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

CA-1

Security Assessment and Authorization Policies andProcedures

x

x

x

x

CA-2

Security Assessments

x

x

x

x

CA-2(1)

SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS

x

x

x

CA-2(2)

SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTSx

CA-2(3)

SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

x

CA-3

System InterconnectionsxCA-3(1)SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY
SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

CA-3(2)SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY
SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

CA-3(3)SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NON-NATIONALSECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

CA-3(4)SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | CONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC NETWORKS

CA-3(5)SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | RESTRICTIONS ON EXTERNALSYSTEM CONNECTIONS

CA-4

Security Certification

CA-5

Plan of Action and MilestonesxCA-5(1)

PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR
ACCURACY / CURRENCY

x

CA-6

Security Authorization

CA-7

Continuous Monitoring

CA-7(1)CONTINUOUS MONITORING | INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into CA-2.

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

CA-7(2)CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS

CA-7(3)

CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TREND ANALYSESx

Incorporated into CA-2.

CA-8

Penetration Testingx

CA-8(1)PENETRATION TESTING | INDEPENDENT PENETRATION AGENT OR
TEAM

x

CA-8(2)PENETRATION TESTING | RED TEAM EXERCISES

x

CA-9

Internal System Connectionsx

CA-9(1)

INTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKSx

APPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

x

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-7: SUMMARY — CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT CONTROLSCONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

CM-1

Configuration Management Policy and Procedures

x

x

x

x

CM-2

Baseline Configuration

x

x

x

x

CM-2(1)BASELINE CONFIGURATION | REVIEWS AND UPDATES

x

x

x

CM-2(2)BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY/ CURRENCYx

CM-2(3)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | RETENTION OF PREVIOUS
CONFIGURATIONSx

CM-2(4)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWAREx

Incorporated into CM-7.

CM-2(5)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTHORIZED SOFTWAREx

Incorporated into CM-7.

CM-2(6)BASELINE CONFIGURATION | DEVELOPMENT AND TESTENVIRONMENTSx

CM-2(7)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | CONFIGURE SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS,
OR DEVICES FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS

x

x

x

CM-3

Configuration Change Control

x

x

x

CM-3(1)CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED DOCUMENT /NOTIFICATION / PROHIBITION OF CHANGESx

CM-3(2)CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | TEST / VALIDATE / DOCUMENT
CHANGESx

CM-3(3)

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED CHANGE
IMPLEMENTATION

CM-3(4)

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE

CM-3(5)CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED SECURITYRESPONSE

CM-3(6)

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | CRYPTOGRAPHY MANAGEMENT

CM-4

Security Impact AnalysisxCM-4(1)

SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | SEPARATE TEST ENVIRONMENTSx

CM-4(2)

SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | VERIFICATION OF SECURITY
FUNCTIONS

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

CM-5

Access Restrictions for Change

CM-5(1)ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATED ACCESSENFORCEMENT / AUDITINGx

CM-5(2)ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | REVIEW SYSTEM CHANGESx

CM-5(3)

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | SIGNED COMPONENTS

x

CM-5(4)

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

CM-5(5)ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT PRODUCTION /OPERATIONAL PRIVILEGES

CM-5(6)ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGES

CM-5(7)ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION
OF SECURITY SAFEGUARDSx

Incorporated into SI-7.

x

x

x

CM-6

Configuration Settings

CM-6(1)CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | AUTOMATED CENTRAL MANAGEMENT /APPLICATION / VERIFICATIONx

CM-6(2)CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGESx

CM-6(3)

CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | UNAUTHORIZED CHANGE DETECTIONx

Incorporated into SI-7.

CM-6(4)

CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | CONFORMANCE DEMONSTRATIONx

Incorporated into CM-4.

CM-7

Least Functionalityxx

CM-7(1)LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PERIODIC REVIEWxx

LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PREVENT PROGRAM EXECUTIONxx

CM-7(2)APPENDIX Dx

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and Organizations

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________

CM-7(3)

LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE

CM-7(4)

LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / BLACKLISTING

CM-7(5)LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / WHITELISTING

CM-8

Information System Component InventoryxCM-8(1)INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | UPDATES DURING
INSTALLATIONS / REMOVALSx

CM-8(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED
MAINTENANCE

x

CM-8(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED
UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTIONx

CM-8(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ACCOUNTABILITY
INFORMATIONx

CM-8(5)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | NO DUPLICATEACCOUNTING OF COMPONENTS

x

CM-8(6)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSESSEDCONFIGURATIONS / APPROVED DEVIATIONSx

CM-8(7)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | CENTRALIZEDREPOSITORYx

CM-8(8)INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED
LOCATION TRACKING

x

CM-8(9)INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSIGNMENT OFCOMPONENTS TO SYSTEMS

x

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

CM-9(1)CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN | ASSIGNMENT OFRESPONSIBILITY

CM-10

Software Usage Restrictions

CM-10(1)SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS | OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE

CM-11

User-Installed Software

CM-11(1)

USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | ALERTS FOR UNAUTHORIZEDINSTALLATIONS

CM-11(2)

USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | PROHIBIT INSTALLATION WITHOUTPRIVILEGED STATUS

APPENDIX DCONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-8: SUMMARY — CONTINGENCY PLANNING CONTROLSx

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

CP-1

Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures

CP-2

Contingency Plan

CP-2(1)CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS

CP-2(2)CONTINGENCY PLAN | CAPACITY PLANNING

CP-2(3)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESSFUNCTIONS

CP-2(4)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONSx

CP-2(5)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESSFUNCTIONSx

CP-2(6)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | ALTERNATE PROCESSING / STORAGE SITE

CP-2(7)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH EXTERNAL SERVICEPROVIDERS

CP-2(8)CONTINGENCY PLAN | IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS

CP-3

Contingency TrainingxCP-3(1)CONTINGENCY TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTSx

CP-3(2)CONTINGENCY TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS

x

CP-4

Contingency Plan Testingx

CP-4(1)CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANSx

CP-4(2)CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITEx

CP-4(3)

CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTINGx

CP-4(4)

CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | FULL RECOVERY / RECONSTITUTION

x

CP-5

Contingency Plan Update

CP-6

Alternate Storage Sitexx

CP-6(1)

ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITExx

CP-6(2)

ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x
x

Incorporated into CP-2.

x

ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | ACCESSIBILITY

x

x

CP-7

Alternate Processing Sitexx

CP-7(1)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITExx

CP-7(2)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | ACCESSIBILITYxx

CP-7(3)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PRIORITY OF SERVICExx

CP-7(4)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PREPARATION FOR USE

CP-6(3)CP-7(5)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | EQUIVALENT INFORMATIONSECURITY SAFEGUARDS

CP-7(6)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | INABILITY TO RETURN TO PRIMARY
SITE

CP-8

x
x

Incorporated into CP-7.

Telecommunications ServicesxxCP-8(1)TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PRIORITY OF SERVICEPROVISIONSxx

CP-8(2)TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURExx

CP-8(3)

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SEPARATION OF PRIMARY /ALTERNATE PROVIDERSx

CP-8(4)TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN

x

CP-8(5)TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | ALTERNATETELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTING

CP-9

Information System Backup

CP-9(1)APPENDIX D

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TESTING FOR RELIABILITY /INTEGRITY

x

x

x

x

x

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and Organizations

Control Enhancement NameASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

CP-9(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TEST RESTORATION USINGSAMPLING

x

CP-9(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICALINFORMATIONx

CP-9(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZEDMODIFICATION

CP-9(5)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATESTORAGE SITE

CP-9(6)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | REDUNDANT SECONDARY SYSTEM

CP-9(7)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

CP-10

Information System Recovery and Reconstitution

CP-10(1)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING

CP-10(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |TRANSACTION RECOVERY

CP-10(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS

CP-10(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | RESTOREWITHIN TIME PERIOD

CP-10(5)INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | FAILOVERCAPABILITY

CP-10(6)INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |COMPONENT PROTECTION

CP-11

Alternate Communications Protocols

CP-12

Safe Mode

CP-13

Alternative Security Mechanisms

APPENDIX D

x

Incorporated into CP-9.

x

x
x

x

x
x

x

Incorporated into CP-4.

x

Addressed by tailoring procedures.

xx

Incorporated into SI-13.

x

PAGE D-21

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-9: SUMMARY — IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION CONTROLS

LOW

MOD

HIGH

IA-1

Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures

x

x

x

IA-2

Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)

x

x

x

IA-2(1)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

x

x

x

IA-2(2)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTSxx

IA-2(3)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |LOCAL ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTSxx

IA-2(4)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |LOCAL ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

IA-2(5)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |GROUP AUTHENTICATION

IA-2(6)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE

IA-2(7)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE
DEVICE

IA-2(8)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT

IA-2(9)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAYRESISTANT

IA-2(10)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |SINGLE SIGN-ON

IA-2(11)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |REMOTE ACCESS - SEPARATE DEVICE

IA-2(12)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS

IA-2(13)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | OUT-OF-BAND
AUTHENTICATION

IA-3

Device Identification and AuthenticationIA-3(1)

DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC
BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION

IA-3(2)

DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC
BIDIRECTIONAL NETWORK AUTHENTICATION

IA-3(3)

DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DYNAMIC ADDRESS
ALLOCATION

IA-3(4)

DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DEVICEATTESTATION

IA-4

Identifier ManagementIA-4(1)IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | PROHIBIT ACCOUNT IDENTIFIERS AS
PUBLIC IDENTIFIERS

IA-4(2)IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION

IA-4(3)

IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATION

IA-4(4)IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS

IA-4(5)IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT

IA-4(6)IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT

IA-4(7)IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON REGISTRATION

IA-5

Authenticator Management

APPENDIX D

x

CONTROL BASELINES

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into IA-3(1).

x

x

x

x

x

x

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and Organizations

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement Name

IA-5(1)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PASSWORD-BASEDAUTHENTICATION

IA-5(2)

ASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PKI-BASED AUTHENTICATIONxx

IA-5(3)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON OR TRUSTED THIRDPARTY REGISTRATIONxx

IA-5(4)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FORPASSWORD STRENGTH DETERMINATION

IA-5(5)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CHANGE AUTHENTICATORS PRIOR
TO DELIVERY

IA-5(6)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS

IA-5(7)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | NO EMBEDDED UNENCRYPTEDSTATIC AUTHENTICATORS

IA-5(8)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE INFORMATION SYSTEMACCOUNTS

IA-5(9)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION
CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT

IA-5(10)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC CREDENTIALASSOCIATION

IA-5(11)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE TOKEN-BASEDAUTHENTICATION

x

x

x

IA-5(12)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | BIOMETRIC-BASEDAUTHENTICATION

IA-5(13)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | EXPIRATION OF CACHEDAUTHENTICATORS

IA-5(14)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MANAGING CONTENT OF PKI TRUSTSTORES

IA-5(15)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | FICAM-APPROVED PRODUCTS ANDSERVICES

Authenticator Feedback

x

x

x

IA-7

Cryptographic Module Authentication

x

x

x

IA-8

Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational
Users)xxxIA-8(1)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONALUSERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS FROM OTHER AGENCIES

x

x

x

IA-8(2)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONALUSERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF THIRD-PARTY CREDENTIALS

x

x

x

IA-8(3)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONALUSERS) | USE OF FICAM-APPROVED PRODUCTS

x

x

x

IA-8(4)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONALUSERS) | USE OF FICAM-ISSUED PROFILES

x

x

x

IA-8(5)IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONALUSERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV-I CREDENTIALS

IA-6

IA-9

Service Identification and Authentication

IA-9(1)SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | INFORMATIONEXCHANGE

IA-9(2)SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | TRANSMISSION OF
DECISIONS

IA-10

Adaptive Identification and Authentication

IA-11

Re-authentication

APPENDIX D

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-10: SUMMARY — INCIDENT RESPONSE CONTROLSCONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

IR-1

Incident Response Policy and Procedures

x

x

x

x

IR-2

Incident Response Training

x

x

x

x

IR-2(1)

INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTSxx

IR-2(2)

INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAININGENVIRONMENTS

x

x

IR-3

Incident Response Testingx

IR-3(1)

INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTINGx

IR-3(2)

INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | COORDINATION WITH RELATED
PLANS

x

IR-4

Incident HandlingIR-4(1)

INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES

IR-4(2)

INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RECONFIGURATION

IR-4(3)

INCIDENT HANDLING | CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

IR-4(4)

INCIDENT HANDLING | INFORMATION CORRELATION

IR-4(5)

INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATIC DISABLING OF INFORMATIONSYSTEM

IR-4(6)

INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES

IR-4(7)

INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - INTRA-ORGANIZATION
COORDINATION

IR-4(8)INCIDENT HANDLING | CORRELATION WITH EXTERNALORGANIZATIONS

IR-4(9)INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RESPONSE CAPABILITY

IR-4(10)INCIDENT HANDLING | SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATIONx

Incident Monitoringx

INCIDENT MONITORING | AUTOMATED TRACKING / DATA COLLECTION/ ANALYSIS

x

IR-6

Incident Reporting

IR-6(1)

INCIDENT REPORTING | AUTOMATED REPORTING

IR-6(2)

INCIDENT REPORTING | VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO INCIDENTS

IR-6(3)

INCIDENT REPORTING | COORDINATION WITH SUPPLY CHAIN

IR-7

Incident Response AssistanceIR-7(1)

INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR
AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION / SUPPORT

IR-7(2)

INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | COORDINATION WITH EXTERNALPROVIDERS

IR-8

Incident Response Plan

IR-9

Information Spillage Response

IR-9(1)INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL

IR-9(2)

INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | TRAINING

IR-9(3)

INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | POST-SPILL OPERATIONS

IR-9(4)

INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | EXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZEDPERSONNEL

IR-10

Integrated Information Security Analysis TeamAPPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

IR-5(1)

IR-5

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

PAGE D-24

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-11: SUMMARY — MAINTENANCE CONTROLSx

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x

MA-1

System Maintenance Policy and Procedures

MA-2

Controlled MaintenanceMA-2(1)

CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | RECORD CONTENT

MA-2(2)

CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

MA-3

Maintenance Toolsxx

MA-3(1)

MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLSxx

MA-3(2)

MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIAxx

MA-3(3)

MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL

MA-3(4)

MAINTENANCE TOOLS | RESTRICTED TOOL USE

MA-4

Nonlocal MaintenanceMA-4(1)NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUDITING AND REVIEW

MA-4(2)NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | DOCUMENT NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE

MA-4(3)NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | COMPARABLE SECURITY / SANITIZATION

MA-4(4)NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUTHENTICATION / SEPARATION OF
MAINTENANCE SESSIONS

MA-4(5)NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | APPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONS

MA-4(6)NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

MA-4(7)NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | REMOTE DISCONNECT VERIFICATION

MA-5

Maintenance Personnel

MA-5(1)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATEACCESS

MA-5(2)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR
CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

MA-5(3)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR
CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

MA-5(4)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | FOREIGN NATIONALS

MA-5(5)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | NON-SYSTEM-RELATED MAINTENANCE

MA-6

Timely MaintenanceMA-6(1)TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

MA-6(2)TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE

MA-6(3)

TIMELY MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PREDICTIVE
MAINTENANCE

APPENDIX D

x

Incorporated into MA-2.

x

x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x
x

x

x

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Control Enhancement NameASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-12: SUMMARY — MEDIA PROTECTION CONTROLSx

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x

MP-1

Media Protection Policy and Procedures

MP-2

Media Access

MP-2(1)MEDIA ACCESS | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS

MP-2(2)MEDIA ACCESS | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

MP-3Media Marking

x

x

MP-4

Media StoragexxMP-4(1)MEDIA STORAGE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

MP-4(2)MEDIA STORAGE | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESSxx

Incorporated into MP-4(2).
Incorporated into SC-28(1).

xIncorporated into SC-28(1).

x

x

MP-5

Media Transport

MP-5(1)MEDIA TRANSPORT | PROTECTION OUTSIDE OF CONTROLLED AREAS

x

Incorporated into MP-5.

MP-5(2)MEDIA TRANSPORT | DOCUMENTATION OF ACTIVITIESx

Incorporated into MP-5.

MP-5(3)

MEDIA TRANSPORT | CUSTODIANS

MP-5(4)MEDIA TRANSPORT | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

MP-6Media Sanitization

MP-6(1)MEDIA SANITIZATION | REVIEW / APPROVE / TRACK / DOCUMENT /VERIFYx

MP-6(2)MEDIA SANITIZATION | EQUIPMENT TESTINGx

MP-6(3)

MEDIA SANITIZATION | NONDESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUES

MP-6(4)MEDIA SANITIZATION | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATIONx

Incorporated into MP-6.

MP-6(5)MEDIA SANITIZATION | CLASSIFIED INFORMATIONx

Incorporated into MP-6.

MP-6(6)MEDIA SANITIZATION | MEDIA DESTRUCTIONx

Incorporated into MP-6.

MP-6(7)

MEDIA SANITIZATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATION

MP-6(8)MEDIA SANITIZATION | REMOTE PURGING / WIPING OF INFORMATION

MP-7Media Use

MP-7(1)MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE WITHOUT OWNER

MP-7(2)MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE OF SANITIZATION-RESISTANT MEDIA

MP-8Media Downgrading

MP-8(1)MEDIA DOWNGRADING | DOCUMENTATION OF PROCESS

MP-8(2)MEDIA DOWNGRADING | EQUIPMENT TESTING

MP-8(3)

MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

MP-8(4)MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATIONAPPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

PAGE D-26

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Control Enhancement Name

PE-1

Physical and Environmental Protection Policy andProcedures

ASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-13: SUMMARY — PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CONTROLSx

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

PE-2

Physical Access Authorizations

PE-2(1)PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | ACCESS BY POSITION / ROLE

PE-2(2)

PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | TWO FORMS OF
IDENTIFICATION

PE-2(3)

PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | RESTRICT UNESCORTEDACCESS

PE-3

Physical Access Control

PE-3(1)PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCESS

PE-3(2)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY / INFORMATION SYSTEM
BOUNDARIES

PE-3(3)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | CONTINUOUS GUARDS / ALARMS /MONITORING

PE-3(4)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | LOCKABLE CASINGS

PE-3(5)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | TAMPER PROTECTION

PE-3(6)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY PENETRATION TESTING

PE-4

Access Control for Transmission Medium

x

x

PE-5

Access Control for Output Devicesxx

PE-5(1)ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | ACCESS TO OUTPUT BYAUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

PE-5(2)ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | ACCESS TO OUTPUT BYINDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

PE-5(3)

ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | MARKING OUTPUT
DEVICES

x

x

x

x

x

PE-6

Monitoring Physical Accessx

PE-6(1)

MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | INTRUSION ALARMS /SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENTx

PE-6(2)

MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | AUTOMATED INTRUSIONRECOGNITION / RESPONSESx

PE-6(3)

MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

x

PE-6(4)

MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS TO
INFORMATION SYSTEMS

x

PE-7

Visitor Control

PE-8

Visitor Access Records

PE-8(1)VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | AUTOMATED RECORDS MAINTENANCE /REVIEW

PE-8(2)

VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | PHYSICAL ACCESS RECORDS

PE-9Power Equipment and CablingPE-9(1)POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | REDUNDANT CABLING

PE-9(2)POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROLS

PE-10

Emergency Shutoff

PE-10(1)

EMERGENCY SHUTOFF | ACCIDENTAL / UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION

PE-11

Emergency Power

PE-11(1)

EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY MINIMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

PE-11(2)

EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY SELF-CONTAINEDAPPENDIX D

x

x

x

Incorporated into PE-2 and PE-3.

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

Incorporated into PE-2.

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into PE-10.

xxx

PAGE D-27

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

Control Enhancement Name

PE-12

Emergency Lighting

PE-12(1)

EMERGENCY LIGHTING | ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESSFUNCTIONS

PE-13

Fire Protection

PE-13(1)

FIRE PROTECTION | DETECTION DEVICES / SYSTEMS

PE-13(2)FIRE PROTECTION | SUPPRESSION DEVICES / SYSTEMS

PE-13(3)FIRE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION

PE-13(4)FIRE PROTECTION | INSPECTIONS

PE-14

Temperature and Humidity Controls

PE-14(1)

TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | AUTOMATIC CONTROLS

PE-14(2)

TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | MONITORING WITH
ALARMS / NOTIFICATIONS

PE-15

Water Damage Protection

PE-15(1)

WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT

PE-16

Delivery and Removal

PE-17

Alternate Work Site

PE-18

Location of Information System Components

PE-18(1)

LOCATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS | FACILITY SITE

PE-19

Information Leakage

PE-19(1)

INFORMATION LEAKAGE | NATIONAL EMISSIONS / TEMPEST POLICIESAND PROCEDURES

PE-20

Asset Monitoring and Tracking

APPENDIX D

ASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

PAGE D-28

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-14: SUMMARY — PLANNING CONTROLSCONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

PL-1

Security Planning Policy and Procedures

x

x

x

x

PL-2

System Security Plan

x

x

x

x

PL-2(1)SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | CONCEPT OF OPERATIONSx

Incorporated into PL-7.

PL-2(2)SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

x

Incorporated into PL-8.

PL-2(3)SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | PLAN / COORDINATE WITH OTHER
ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES

PL-3

System Security Plan Update

PL-4

Rules of Behaviorx

PL-4(1)

RULES OF BEHAVIOR | SOCIAL MEDIA AND NETWORKINGRESTRICTIONS

x

PL-5

Privacy Impact Assessmentx

Incorporated into Appendix J, AR-2.

PL-6

Security-Related Activity Planningx

Incorporated into PL-2.

PL-7

Security Concept of Operationsxxx

Incorporated into PL-2.

PL-8

Information Security Architecturex

PL-8(1)INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE | DEFENSE-IN-DEPTHx

PL-8(2)

INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE | SUPPLIER DIVERSITY

x

PL-9

Central Managementx

APPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

PAGE D-29

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-15: SUMMARY — PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS

LOW

MOD

HIGH

PS-1

Personnel Security Policy and Procedures

x

x

x

PS-2

Position Risk Designation

x

x

x

PS-3

Personnel Screening

x

x

x

PS-3(1)PERSONNEL SCREENING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

PS-3(2)PERSONNEL SCREENING | FORMAL INDOCTRINATION

PS-3(3)PERSONNEL SCREENING | INFORMATION WITH SPECIAL PROTECTION
MEASURES

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

PS-4

Personnel Termination

PS-4(1)PERSONNEL TERMINATION | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

PS-4(2)PERSONNEL TERMINATION | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATION

PS-5

Personnel Transfer

x

CONTROL BASELINES

x
x

PS-6

Access Agreements

PS-6(1)ACCESS AGREEMENTS | INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIALPROTECTION

PS-6(2)ACCESS AGREEMENTS | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRINGSPECIAL PROTECTIONx

PS-6(3)

ACCESS AGREEMENTS | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

x

PS-7

Third-Party Personnel Security

x

PS-8

Personnel Sanctions

APPENDIX D

x

Incorporated into PS-3.

x

x

x

x

x

x

PAGE D-30

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement Name

RA-1

Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures

RA-2

Security Categorization

RA-3

Risk Assessment

RA-4

Risk Assessment Update

RA-5

ASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-16: SUMMARY — RISK ASSESSMENT CONTROLSxx
x

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into RA-3.

Vulnerability Scanning

x

x

x

RA-5(1)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY

x

x

x

RA-5(2)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE BY FREQUENCY / PRIOR TO NEWSCAN / WHEN IDENTIFIED

x

x

x

RA-5(3)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | BREADTH / DEPTH OF COVERAGEx

RA-5(4)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | DISCOVERABLE INFORMATIONx

RA-5(5)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PRIVILEGED ACCESSx

RA-5(6)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSES

RA-5(7)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED DETECTION AND
NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENTS

RA-5(8)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGSxx
Incorporated into CM-8.

x

Incorporated into CA-8.

x

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PENETRATION TESTING AND ANALYSES

RA-5(10)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATION

x

Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Surveyx

APPENDIX Dxxx

RA-5(9)RA-6

x

PAGE D-31

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-17: SUMMARY — SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION CONTROLSCONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

SA-1

System and Services Acquisition Policy and Procedures

x

x

x

x

SA-2

Allocation of Resources

x

x

x

x

SA-3

System Development Life Cycle

x

x

x

x

SA-4

Acquisition Process

x

x

x

x

SA-4(1)ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITYCONTROLSxxx

SA-4(2)ACQUISITION PROCESS | DESIGN / IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATIONFOR SECURITY CONTROLS

x

x

x

SA-4(3)ACQUISITION PROCESS | DEVELOPMENT METHODS / TECHNIQUES /PRACTICESx

SA-4(4)ACQUISITION PROCESS | ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TOSYSTEMSSA-4(5)ACQUISITION PROCESS | SYSTEM / COMPONENT / SERVICECONFIGURATIONSx

SA-4(6)ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCEPRODUCTSx

SA-4(7)ACQUISITION PROCESS | NIAP-APPROVED PROTECTION PROFILESx

SA-4(8)ACQUISITION PROCESS | CONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN

x

SA-4(9)ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS /SERVICES IN USE

x

SA-4(10)x

Incorporated into CM-8(9).

xxACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF APPROVED PIV PRODUCTS

x

x

x

x

SA-5

Information System Documentation

x

x

x

x

SA-5(1)INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIESOF SECURITY CONTROLSx

Incorporated into SA-4(1).

SA-5(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SECURITY-RELEVANT
EXTERNAL SYSTEM INTERFACESx

Incorporated into SA-4(2).

SA-5(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN

x

Incorporated into SA-4(2).

SA-5(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | LOW-LEVEL DESIGN

x

Incorporated into SA-4(2).

SA-5(5)

INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SOURCE CODE

x

Incorporated into SA-4(2).

SA-6

Software Usage Restrictions

x

Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7.

SA-7

User-Installed Softwarex

Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7.

SA-8

Security Engineering Principles

x

SA-9

External Information System Servicesx

SA-9(1)

EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | RISK ASSESSMENTS /ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALSx

SA-9(2)EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS /PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICESx

SA-9(3)EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | ESTABLISH / MAINTAIN TRUSTRELATIONSHIP WITH PROVIDERSx

SA-9(4)EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | CONSISTENT INTERESTS OF
CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERSx

SA-9(5)EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PROCESSING, STORAGE, ANDSERVICE LOCATION

x

SA-10

Developer Configuration Managementx

SA-10(1)DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | SOFTWARE /FIRMWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATIONx

SA-10(2)DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | ALTERNATIVECONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESSESx

APPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

PAGE D-32

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

Control Enhancement NameASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

SA-10(3)

DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE INTEGRITYVERIFICATIONx

SA-10(4)DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED GENERATIONx

SA-10(5)DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | MAPPING INTEGRITYFOR VERSION CONTROLx

SA-10(6)DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED
DISTRIBUTION

x

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluationx

SA-11(1)DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | STATIC CODEANALYSISx

SA-11(2)DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | THREAT AND
VULNERABILITY ANALYSESx

SA-11(3)

DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | INDEPENDENTVERIFICATION OF ASSESSMENT PLANS / EVIDENCE

x

SA-11(4)DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | MANUAL CODEREVIEWSx

SA-11(5)DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | PENETRATIONTESTINGx

SA-11(6)DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | ATTACK SURFACEREVIEWSx

SA-11(7)DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | VERIFY SCOPEOF TESTING / EVALUATIONx

SA-11(8)DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | DYNAMIC CODEANALYSISx

SA-12

Supply Chain Protectionx

SA-12(1)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ACQUISITION STRATEGIES / TOOLS /METHODSx

SA-12(2)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | SUPPLIER REVIEWS

SA-12(3)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | TRUSTED SHIPPING AND
WAREHOUSINGx

Incorporated into SA-12(1).

SA-12(4)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | DIVERSITY OF SUPPLIERSx

Incorporated into SA-12(13).

SA-12(5)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | LIMITATION OF HARM

SA-12(6)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | MINIMIZING PROCUREMENT TIMEx

Incorporated into SA-12(1).

SA-12(7)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION /ACCEPTANCE / UPDATEx

SA-12(8)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCEx

SA-12(9)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | OPERATIONS SECURITYx

SA-12(10)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOTALTEREDx

SA-12(11)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PENETRATION TESTING / ANALYSIS OFELEMENTS, PROCESSES, AND ACTORSx

SA-12(12)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTSx

SA-12(13)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMCOMPONENTS

x

SA-12(14)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | IDENTITY AND TRACEABILITYx

SA-12(15)SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PROCESSES TO ADDRESSWEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES

x

SA-13

Trustworthiness

x

SA-14

Criticality Analysisx

SA-14(1)CRITICALITY ANALYSIS | CRITICAL COMPONENTS WITH NO VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE SOURCING

APPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into SA-20.

PAGE D-33

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

SA-15

Development Process, Standards, and Toolsx

SA-15(1)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | QUALITY
METRICSx

SA-15(2)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | SECURITY
TRACKING TOOLSx

SA-15(3)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CRITICALITYANALYSISx

SA-15(4)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | THREATMODELING / VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

x

SA-15(5)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ATTACK
SURFACE REDUCTIONx

SA-15(6)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CONTINUOUS
IMPROVEMENTx

SA-15(7)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | AUTOMATED
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

x

SA-15(8)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | REUSE OF
THREAT / VULNERABILITY INFORMATIONx

SA-15(9)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | USE OF LIVEDATA

x

SA-15(10)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | INCIDENTRESPONSE PLAN

x

SA-15(11)DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ARCHIVEINFORMATION SYSTEM / COMPONENTxDeveloper-Provided Trainingxx

Developer Security Architecture and Designxx

SA-17(1)DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMALPOLICY MODELx

SA-17(2)DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | SECURITYRELEVANT COMPONENTS

x

SA-17(3)

DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMALCORRESPONDENCE

x

SA-17(4)DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | INFORMALCORRESPONDENCE

x

SA-17(5)DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN |CONCEPTUALLY SIMPLE DESIGN

x

SA-17(6)DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE
FOR TESTINGx

SA-17(7)DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE
FOR LEAST PRIVILEGE

x

SA-16
SA-17

SA-18

Tamper Resistance and Detectionx

SA-18(1)

TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | MULTIPLE PHASES OF SDLCx

SA-18(2)

TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | INSPECTION OF
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, OR DEVICES

x

SA-19

Component Authenticityx

SA-19(1)COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT TRAINING

x

SA-19(2)COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | CONFIGURATION CONTROL FOR
COMPONENT SERVICE / REPAIR

x

SA-19(3)COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | COMPONENT DISPOSAL

x

SA-19(4)COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SCANNING

x

SA-20

Customized Development of Critical Components

x

SA-21

Developer Screeningx

APPENDIX Dx

PAGE D-34

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________

SA-21(1)DEVELOPER SCREENING | VALIDATION OF SCREENING

x

SA-22

Unsupported System Componentsx

SA-22(1)

UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS | ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FORCONTINUED SUPPORTx

APPENDIX DCONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

PAGE D-35

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-18: SUMMARY — SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION CONTROLS

SC-1

System and Communications Protection Policy andProcedures

x

SC-2

Application PartitioningxSC-2(1)APPLICATION PARTITIONING | INTERFACES FOR NON-PRIVILEGED
USERS

x

SC-3

Security Function Isolationx

SC-3(1)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATIONx

SC-3(2)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | ACCESS / FLOW CONTROLFUNCTIONSx

SC-3(3)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MINIMIZE NONSECURITY
FUNCTIONALITYx

SC-3(4)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MODULE COUPLING ANDCOHESIVENESSx

SC-3(5)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | LAYERED STRUCTURES

x

SC-4

Information in Shared ResourcesSC-4(1)INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | SECURITY LEVELS

SC-4(2)

INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | PERIODS PROCESSING

SC-5

Denial of Service Protection

SC-5(1)DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | RESTRICT INTERNAL USERS

SC-5(2)DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | EXCESS CAPACITY / BANDWIDTH /REDUNDANCY

SC-5(3)DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | DETECTION / MONITORING

SC-6

Resource Availability

SC-7

Boundary Protection

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

Incorporated into SC-4.

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

SC-7(1)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PHYSICALLY SEPARATED SUBNETWORKSxSC-7(2)BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PUBLIC ACCESSx

SC-7(3)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ACCESS POINTSxx

SC-7(4)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONSSERVICESxx

SC-7(5)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DENY BY DEFAULT / ALLOW BY EXCEPTIONxx

SC-7(6)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESPONSE TO RECOGNIZED FAILURES

SC-7(7)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT SPLIT TUNNELING FOR REMOTE
DEVICESSC-7(8)BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATEDPROXY SERVERS

SC-7(9)BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT THREATENING OUTGOINGCOMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

SC-7(10)BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED EXFILTRATION

SC-7(11)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT INCOMING COMMUNICATIONS
TRAFFIC

SC-7(12)BOUNDARY PROTECTION | HOST-BASED PROTECTION

SC-7(13)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF SECURITY TOOLS /MECHANISMS / SUPPORT COMPONENTS

SC-7(14)BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PROTECTS AGAINST UNAUTHORIZEDPHYSICAL CONNECTIONS

SC-7(15)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE PRIVILEGED NETWORK ACCESSES

SC-7(16)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT DISCOVERY OF COMPONENTS /DEVICESAPPENDIX D

x

Incorporated into SC-7.
Incorporated into SC-7.

Incorporated into SC-7(18).

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Control Enhancement Name

SC-7(17)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT OF
PROTOCOL FORMATS

SC-7(18)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | FAIL SECURE

SC-7(19)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | BLOCKS COMMUNICATION FROM NONORGANIZATIONALLY CONFIGURED HOSTS

SC-7(20)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DYNAMIC ISOLATION / SEGREGATION

SC-7(21)

ASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMCOMPONENTS

xx

SC-7(22)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | SEPARATE SUBNETS FOR CONNECTING TO
DIFFERENT SECURITY DOMAINSx

SC-7(23)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DISABLE SENDER FEEDBACK ON
PROTOCOL VALIDATION FAILURE

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and IntegrityxxSC-8(1)

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC
OR ALTERNATE PHYSICAL PROTECTIONxx

SC-8(2)

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | PRE / POST
TRANSMISSION HANDLING

SC-8(3)

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHICPROTECTION FOR MESSAGE EXTERNALS

SC-8(4)TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CONCEAL /RANDOMIZE COMMUNICATIONS

SC-9Transmission Confidentiality

SC-10

Network Disconnect

SC-11

Trusted Pathx

SC-11(1)

TRUSTED PATH | LOGICAL ISOLATION

x

SC-12

Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management

SC-12(1)CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |AVAILABILITY

SC-12(2)CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |SYMMETRIC KEYS

SC-12(3)CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |ASYMMETRIC KEYS

SC-12(4)CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI
CERTIFICATESx

Incorporated into SC-12.

SC-12(5)CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI
CERTIFICATES / HARDWARE TOKENSx

Incorporated into SC-12.

x

Incorporated into SC-8.

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

SC-13

Cryptographic Protection

SC-13(1)CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | FIPS-VALIDATED CRYPTOGRAPHYx

Incorporated into SC-13.

SC-13(2)x

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | NSA-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHYx

Incorporated into SC-13.

SC-13(3)CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT FORMALACCESS APPROVALS

x

Incorporated into SC-13.

SC-13(4)CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | DIGITAL SIGNATURESx

Incorporated into SC-13.

SC-14

Public Access Protectionsx

Capability provided by AC-2, AC-3,
AC-5, SI-3, SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, SI-10.

SC-15

Collaborative Computing Devices

SC-15(1)COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | PHYSICAL DISCONNECT

SC-15(2)COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | BLOCKING INBOUND /OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

SC-15(3)COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | DISABLING / REMOVAL IN
SECURE WORK AREAS

APPENDIX D

x
x

x

x

Incorporated into SC-7.

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Control Enhancement Name

SC-15(4)COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | EXPLICITLY INDICATECURRENT PARTICIPANTS

ASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

SC-16

Transmission of Security Attributes

SC-16(1)

TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | INTEGRITY VALIDATION

SC-17

Public Key Infrastructure Certificates

x

x

SC-18

Mobile Codexx

SC-18(1)

MOBILE CODE | IDENTIFY UNACCEPTABLE CODE / TAKE CORRECTIVE
ACTIONS

SC-18(2)

MOBILE CODE | ACQUISITION / DEVELOPMENT / USE

SC-18(3)

MOBILE CODE | PREVENT DOWNLOADING / EXECUTION

SC-18(4)

MOBILE CODE | PREVENT AUTOMATIC EXECUTION

SC-18(5)

MOBILE CODE | ALLOW EXECUTION ONLY IN CONFINEDENVIRONMENTS

SC-19

Voice Over Internet Protocol

x

x

SC-20

Secure Name /Address Resolution Service(Authoritative Source)xx

SC-20(1)

SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE
SOURCE) | CHILD SUBSPACES

SC-20(2)

SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE
SOURCE) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY

SC-21

Secure Name /Address Resolution Service(Recursive or Caching Resolver)

SC-21(1)

SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE ORCACHING RESOLVER) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY

SC-22

Architecture and Provisioning for
Name/Address Resolution Service

SC-23

Session Authenticity

SC-23(1)

SESSION AUTHENTICITY | INVALIDATE SESSION IDENTIFIERS ATLOGOUT

SC-23(2)SESSION AUTHENTICITY | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGEDISPLAYS

SC-23(3)SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITHRANDOMIZATION

SC-23(4)SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITHRANDOMIZATION

SC-23(5)SESSION AUTHENTICITY | ALLOWED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES

SC-24

Fail in Known State

SC-25

Thin Nodes

SC-26

Honeypots

SC-26(1)HONEYPOTS | DETECTION OF MALICIOUS CODE

SC-27

Platform-Independent Applicationsxx

Incorporated into SC-20.

x
x

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into SC-23(3).

xxIncorporated into SC-35.

x

Protection of Information at Rest
PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHICPROTECTION

SC-28(2)PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | OFF-LINE STORAGE

SC-29

Heterogeneityx

SC-29(1)

HETEROGENEITY | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES

x

SC-30

Concealment and Misdirection

APPENDIX D

x

Incorporated into AC-12(1).

SC-28

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into SC-21.

SC-28(1)SC-30(1)

x

x

x
x

Incorporated into SC-29(1).

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Control Enhancement NameASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC-30(2)

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | RANDOMNESS

x

SC-30(3)

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CHANGE PROCESSING /STORAGE LOCATIONS

x

SC-30(4)CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | MISLEADING INFORMATION

x

SC-30(5)

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CONCEALMENT OF SYSTEMCOMPONENTS

x

SC-31

Covert Channel AnalysisxSC-31(1)

COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | TEST COVERT CHANNELS FOREXPLOITABILITYx

SC-31(2)COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MAXIMUM BANDWIDTH

x

SC-31(3)COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MEASURE BANDWIDTH IN
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

x

SC-32

Information System Partitioning
Transmission Preparation Integrity

SC-34

Non-Modifiable Executable ProgramsxSC-34(1)

NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | NO WRITABLE STORAGE

x

SC-34(2)NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | INTEGRITY PROTECTION/ READ-ONLY MEDIA

x

SC-34(3)

NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | HARDWARE-BASEDPROTECTION

x

SC-35

Honeyclients

SC-36

Distributed Processing and Storagex

SC-36(1)

DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | POLLING TECHNIQUES

x

SC-37

Out-of-Band ChannelsxSC-37(1)OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS | ENSURE DELIVERY / TRANSMISSION

x

SC-38

Operations Security

x

SC-39

Process Isolationx

SC-39(1)

PROCESS ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION

x

SC-39(2)

PROCESS ISOLATION | THREAD ISOLATION

x

SC-40

Wireless Link Protection
WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

SC-40(2)WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | REDUCE DETECTION POTENTIAL

SC-40(3)

WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | IMITATIVE OR MANIPULATIVECOMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION

SC-40(4)WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | SIGNAL PARAMETER IDENTIFICATION

SC-41

Port and I/O Device Access

SC-42

Sensor Capability and Data

SC-42(1)SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | REPORTING TO AUTHORIZEDINDIVIDUALS OR ROLES

SC-42(2)SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | AUTHORIZED USE

SC-42(3)SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | PROHIBIT USE OF DEVICES

SC-43

Usage Restrictions

SC-44

Detonation Chambers

APPENDIX D

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x
x

SC-33

SC-40(1)

CONTROL BASELINES

Incorporated into SC-8.

x

x

x

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CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement Name

SI-1

System and Information Integrity Policy and Procedures

SI-2

Flaw Remediation

SI-2(1)FLAW REMEDIATION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

SI-2(2)FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS

SI-2(3)FLAW REMEDIATION | TIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS / BENCHMARKSFOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

SI-2(4)FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED PATCH MANAGEMENT TOOLS

SI-2(5)FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE UPDATES

SI-2(6)FLAW REMEDIATION | REMOVAL OF PREVIOUS VERSIONS OFSOFTWARE / FIRMWARE

ASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN

TABLE D-19: SUMMARY — SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY CONTROLSx

CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

Incorporated into SI-2.

SI-3

Malicious Code Protectionxx

SI-3(1)MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

x

x

x

SI-3(2)MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATESxx

SI-3(3)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NON-PRIVILEGED USERS

SI-3(4)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | UPDATES ONLY BY PRIVILEGED
USERS

SI-3(5)MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

SI-3(6)MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | TESTING / VERIFICATION

SI-3(7)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NONSIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION

SI-3(8)MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDS

SI-3(9)MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTHENTICATE REMOTE COMMANDS

SI-3(10)MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSIS

x

Incorporated into AC-6(10).

xIncorporated into MP-7.

SI-4

Information System Monitoringx

SI-4(1)INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-WIDE INTRUSION
DETECTION SYSTEM

x

SI-4(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR REALTIME ANALYSIS

x

SI-4(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLINTEGRATIONx

SI-4(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND
COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

SI-4(5)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-GENERATED ALERTS

SI-4(6)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | RESTRICT NON-PRIVILEGED
USERS

SI-4(7)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TOSUSPICIOUS EVENTS

SI-4(8)INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROTECTION OF MONITORING
INFORMATION

SI-4(9)INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | TESTING OF MONITORING
TOOLS

x

SI-4(10)INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | VISIBILITY OF ENCRYPTEDCOMMUNICATIONSx

SI-4(11)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE COMMUNICATIONS
TRAFFIC ANOMALIESx

SI-4(12)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED ALERTS

x

SI-4(13)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / EVENTPATTERNSx

SI-4(14)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS INTRUSION
DETECTIONx

APPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into AC-6(10).

xxIncorporated into SI-4.

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CONTROL NAME
Control Enhancement NameASSURANCE

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________
CONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

x

x

SI-4(15)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS TO WIRELINECOMMUNICATIONSx

SI-4(16)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | CORRELATE MONITORING
INFORMATIONx

SI-4(17)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INTEGRATED SITUATIONAL
AWARENESSx

SI-4(18)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / COVERTEXFILTRATIONx

SI-4(19)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDIVIDUALS POSING GREATER
RISK

x

SI-4(20)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PRIVILEGED USERx

SI-4(21)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROBATIONARY PERIODSx

SI-4(22)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | UNAUTHORIZED NETWORKSERVICESx

SI-4(23)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | HOST-BASED DEVICESx

SI-4(24)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDICATORS OF COMPROMISExSecurity Alerts, Advisories, and Directivesx

SI-5(1)

SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES | AUTOMATED
ALERTS AND ADVISORIES

x

x

x

x

SI-5

SI-6

Security Function Verification

SI-6(1)

SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF FAILEDSECURITY TESTS

SI-6(2)

SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR
DISTRIBUTED TESTING

SI-6(3)

SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | REPORT VERIFICATIONRESULTSx

Incorporated into SI-6.

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity

x

x

x

SI-7(1)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITYCHECKSxxx

SI-7(2)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATEDNOTIFICATIONS OF INTEGRITY VIOLATIONSx

SI-7(3)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CENTRALLYMANAGED INTEGRITY TOOLSx

SI-7(4)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TAMPEREVIDENT PACKAGING

SI-7(5)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATEDRESPONSE TO INTEGRITY VIOLATIONSx

SI-7(6)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY |CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTIONx

SI-7(7)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY |INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE

x

SI-7(8)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUDITINGCAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENTSx

SI-7(9)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | VERIFY
BOOT PROCESSx

SI-7(10)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | PROTECTION
OF BOOT FIRMWAREx

SI-7(11)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CONFINEDENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITED PRIVILEGESx

SI-7(12)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITYVERIFICATIONx

APPENDIX D

x

x

Incorporated into SA-12.

x

x

x

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Control Enhancement NameASSURANCECONTROL NAME

CNTL
NO.

WITHDRAWN________________________________________________________________________________________________

SI-7(13)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODEEXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTSx

SI-7(14)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | BINARY OR
MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODEx

SI-7(15)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE
AUTHENTICATIONx

SI-7(16)SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TIME LIMITON PROCESS EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISIONxCONTROL BASELINES

LOW

MOD

HIGH

x

SI-8

Spam Protectionxx

SI-8(1)SPAM PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENTxx

SI-8(2)SPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATESx

x

SI-8(3)SPAM PROTECTION | CONTINUOUS LEARNING CAPABILITY

SI-9

Information Input Restrictions

SI-10

x

Incorporated into AC-2, AC-3, AC-5,
AC-6.

Information Input Validationx

SI-10(1)

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY

x

SI-10(2)

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / RESOLUTION OF ERRORS

x

SI-10(3)

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR

x

SI-10(4)

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / TIMING INTERACTIONS

x

SI-10(5)INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / RESTRICT INPUTS TO
TRUSTED SOURCES AND APPROVED FORMATS

x

SI-11

Error Handling

SI-12

Information Handling and Retention

SI-13

Predictable Failure Preventionx

SI-13(1)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TRANSFERRING COMPONENTRESPONSIBILITIESx

SI-13(2)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESSEXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION

SI-13(3)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | MANUAL TRANSFER BETWEENCOMPONENTS

x

SI-13(4)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | STANDBY COMPONENTINSTALLATION / NOTIFICATIONx

SI-13(5)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | FAILOVER CAPABILITY

x

SI-14

Non-Persistencex

SI-14(1)

NON-PERSISTENCE | REFRESH FROM TRUSTED SOURCES

x

SI-15

Information Output Filtering

x

SI-16

Memory Protection

x

SI-17

Fail-Safe Proceduresx

APPENDIX D

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Incorporated into SI-7(16).

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ADJUSTMENTS TO SECURITY CONTROL BASELINES
ALLOCATION OF SECURITY CONTROLS AND ASSIGNMENT OF PRIORITY SEQUENCING CODES

With each revision to SP 800-53, minor adjustments may occur with the security control baselines
including, for example, allocating additional controls and/or control enhancements, eliminating
selected controls/enhancements, and changing sequencing priority codes (P-codes). These changes
reflect: (i) the ongoing receipt and analysis of threat information; (ii) the periodic reexamination of
the initial assumptions that generated the security control baselines; (iii) the desire for common
security control baseline starting points for national security and non-national security systems toachieve community-wide convergence (relying subsequently on specific overlays to describe any
adjustments from the common starting points); and (iv) the periodic reassessment of priority codes
to appropriately balance the workload of security control implementation. Over time, as the security
control catalog expands to address the continuing challenges from a dynamic and growing threat
space that is increasingly sophisticated, organizations will come to rely to a much greater degree on
overlays to provide the needed specialization for their security plans.

APPENDIX D

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APPENDIX E

ASSURANCE AND TRUSTWORTHINESSMEASURES OF CONFIDENCE FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS

S

ecurity assurance is a critical aspect in determining the trustworthiness of information
systems. Assurance is the measure of confidence that the security functions, features,practices, policies, procedures, mechanisms, and architecture of organizational information
systems accurately mediate and enforce established security policies. 94 The objective of thisappendix is:•

To encourage organizations to include assurance requirements in procurements of
information systems, system components, and services;•

To encourage hardware, software, and firmware developers to employ development practices
that result in more trustworthy information technology products and systems;•

To encourage organizations to identify, select, and use information technology products thathave been built with appropriate levels of assurance and to employ sound systems andsecurity engineering techniques and methods during the system development life cycle
process;•

To reduce information security risk by deploying more trustworthy information technology
products within critical information systems or system components; and•To encourage developers and organizations to obtain on an ongoing basis, assurance evidence
for maintaining trustworthiness of information systems.

Minimum security requirements for federal information and information systems are defined in
FIPS Publication 200. These requirements can be satisfied by selecting, tailoring, implementing,and obtaining assurance evidence for the security controls in the low, moderate, or high baselines
in Appendix D. 95 The baselines also include the assurance-related controls for the minimum
assurance requirements that are generally applicable to federal information and information
systems. 96 However, considering the current threat space and the increasing risk to organizational
operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, posed by the advanced
persistent threat (APT), organizations may choose to implement additional assurance-related
controls from Appendix F. These additional controls can be selected based on the tailoring
guidance provided in Section 3.2. Organizations can also consider developing high-assurance
overlays for critical missions/business functions, specialized environments of operation, and/or
information technologies (see Section 3.3 and Appendix I). When assurance-related controls
cannot be satisfied, organizations can propose compensating controls (e.g., procedural/operational
94

Section 2.6 provides an introduction to the concepts of assurance and trustworthiness and how the two concepts are
related. A trustworthiness model is illustrated in Figure 3.
95
CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security control baselines for national security systems. Therefore, the assurancerelated controls in the baselines established for the national security community, if so designated, may differ from thosecontrols designated in Tables E-1 through E-3.
96

It is difficult to determine if a given security control baseline from Appendix D provides the assurance needed acrossall information technologies, users, platforms, and organizations. For example, while the use of formal methods might
be appropriate in a cross-domain product, different assurance techniques might be appropriate for a complex air traffic
control system or for a web server providing emergency preparedness information from the Department of Homeland
Security. Still, the existing baselines do have assurance aspects that reflect the minimum assurance that is anticipated tobe common across all technologies, users, platforms, and organizations.

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solutions to compensate for insufficient technology-based solutions) or assume a greater degreeof risk with regard to the actual security capability achieved.

The New Look for Assurance
While previous versions of Special Publication 800-53 addressed minimum assurance requirements,
the focus was on higher-level, more abstract requirements applied to the low, moderate, and highbaselines. This revision takes a fundamentally different approach to assurance by defining specificassurance-related security controls in Appendix F that can be implemented by organizations basedon the security categorizations of their information systems—making the assurance requirements
more actionable and providing opportunities for increasing the levels of assurance based on mission
and business needs, current/projected threats, unique operating environments, or the use of newtechnologies. The identification of specific assurance-related controls in the low, moderate, and highbaselines in easy-to read tables (Tables E-1, E-2, E-3) helps organizations to quickly define controls
necessary to satisfy minimum assurance requirements. The optional assurance-related controls in
Table E-4 provide organizations with specification language to use in acquisitions targeted at thedevelopers of information systems, system components, and information system services. The
controls address specific methodologies, techniques, design, and architectural considerations aswell as sound system and security engineering principles to fundamentally improve the quality of
hardware, software, and firmware components that will be integrated into organizational information
systems or the critical infrastructure. The designation of assurance-related controls is not intended to
imply a greater level of importance for such controls. Achieving adequate security for organizational
information systems requires the correct combination of both functionality- and assurance-related
security controls. Only by understanding the importance of the concept of assurance and recognizing
which security controls are more assurance-oriented versus functionality-oriented can organizations
select the most appropriate combination of controls to protect their organizational operations andassets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

The following sections provide a description of the assurance-related controls that are included ineach of the security control baselines in Appendix D. The criteria for whether a security control isassurance-related or functionality-related is based on the overall characteristics of the control. In
general, assurance-related controls are controls that: (i) define processes, procedures, techniques,or methodologies for designing and developing information systems and system components (i.e.,
hardware, software, firmware); (ii) provide supporting operational processes including improving
the quality of systems/components/processes; (iii) produce security evidence from developmental
or operational activities; (iv) determine security control effectiveness or risk (e.g., audit, testing,evaluation, analysis, assessment, verification, validation, monitoring); or (v) improve personnel
skills, expertise, and understanding (e.g., security awareness/training, incident response training,
contingency training).
Security controls may be designated as assurance-related controls even when the controls exhibit
some functional characteristics or properties (e.g., SI-4, Information System Monitoring). The
distinction between functionality and assurance is less important when describing the assurancerelated controls in the baselines—primarily because the security controls in the three baselines
after the tailoring process is applied, become part of the security plans for information systems
and for organizations. 97 However, the distinction becomes more important when organizations
exercise the option of selecting additional security controls to increase the level of assurance (orthe degree of confidence) in the security functionality and security capability.
97
Organizations are cautioned to carefully examine the assurance-related controls in the baselines during the tailoringprocess, including the development of overlays, to help ensure that controls are not being inadvertently eliminated thatprovide the measures of confidence in the security functionality needed for mission/business protection.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Minimum Assurance Requirements – Low-Impact Systems
Assurance Requirement: The organization, based on its security requirements, security policies, and needed

security capabilities, has an expectation of: (i) a limited strength of security functionality; and (ii) a limited
degree of confidence supported by the depth and coverage of associated security evidence, that the security
functionality is complete, consistent, and correct.
Supplemental Guidance: Security functionality and assurance for low-impact systems are achieved by the

implementation of security controls from the tailored low baseline in Appendix D. Assurance requirements
for low-impact systems (including the information technology components that are part of those systems),align with that which is readily achievable with unmodified, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products andservices. Due to the limited strength of functionality expected for low-impact systems, the depth/coverageof security evidence 98 produced is minimal and is not expected to be more than what is routinely provided
by COTS manufacturers, vendors, and resellers. The depth/coverage evidence is further supplemented by
the results of security control assessments and the ongoing monitoring of organizational information
systems and environments in which the systems operate. For other than technology-based functionality, theemphasis is on a limited degree of confidence in the completeness, correctness, and consistency ofprocedural and/or operational security functionality (e.g., policies, procedures, physical security, andpersonnel security). Assurance requirements specified in the form of developmental and operational
assurance controls for low-impact systems are listed in Table E-1. Organizations, through the tailoringprocess (including an organizational assessment of risk), may choose to add other assurance-related
controls and/or control enhancements to the set included in Table E-1.
TABLE E-1: ASSURANCE-RELATED CONTROLS FOR LOW-IMPACT SYSTEMS
ID
AC
AT
AU
CA
CM
CP
IA
IR
MA

CONTROLS
AC-1
AT-1, AT-2, AT-3, AT-4
AU-1, AU-6
CA-1, CA-2, CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA-9
CM-1, CM-2, CM-4, CM-8
CP-1, CP-3, CP-4
IA-1
IR-1, IR-2, IR-5
MA-1

ID
MP
PE
PL
PS
RA
SA
SC
SI

99

CONTROLS
MP-1
PE-1, PE-6, PE-8
PL-1, PL-2, PL-4
PS-1, PS-6, PS-7
RA-1, RA-3, RA-5
SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-4(10), SA-5, SA-9
SC-1, SC-39
SI-1, SI-4, SI-5

98

NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides additional information on depth and coverage in security control
assessments.
99
The assurance-related controls in Table E-1 are a subset of the security controls contained in the security control
baseline for low-impact systems in Appendix D. Implementing the assurance-related controls in Table E-1 (including
depth/coverage security evidence from NIST Special Publication 800-53A) will satisfy the minimum assurance
requirements for low-impact systems mandated by FIPS Publication 200.

APPENDIX E

PAGE E-3

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Minimum Assurance Requirements – Moderate-Impact Systems
Assurance Requirement: The organization, based on its security requirements, security policies, and needed

security capabilities, has an expectation of: (i) a moderate strength of security functionality; and (ii) a
moderate degree of confidence supported by the depth and coverage of associated security evidence, thatthe security functionality is complete, consistent, and correct.
Supplemental Guidance: Security functionality and assurance for moderate-impact systems are achieved by

the implementation of security controls from the tailored moderate baseline in Appendix D. Assurance
requirements for moderate-impact systems (including the information technology components that are partof those systems) add to the expectations at the low-assurance level by: (i) incorporating COTS security
functionality with greater strength of mechanism and capability than the strength of mechanism andcapability achieved in low-impact systems; (ii) requiring perhaps, some special development; (iii)establishing more secure configuration settings; and (iv) requiring some additional assessment of theimplemented capability. Due to the moderate strength of functionality expected for moderate-impact
systems, the depth/coverage of security evidence 100 produced is more substantial than the minimal evidence
produced for low-impact systems but still in the range of what can be provided by COTS manufacturers,
vendors, and resellers. The depth/coverage evidence is further supplemented by the results of additional
security control assessments and the ongoing monitoring of organizational information systems andenvironments of operation. For other than technology-based functionality, the emphasis is on a moderate
degree of confidence in the completeness, correctness, and consistency of procedural and/or operational
security functionality (e.g., policies, procedures, physical security, and personnel security). Assurance
requirements in the form of developmental and operational assurance controls for moderate-impact systems
are listed in Table E-2. Organizations, through the tailoring process (including an organizational assessmentof risk), may choose to add other assurance-related controls and/or control enhancements to the set
included in Table E-2.
TABLE E-2: ASSURANCE-RELATED CONTROLS FOR MODERATE-IMPACT SYSTEMS 101
ID

CONTROLSID

CONTROLS

AC
AT
AU
CA
CM

MP
PE
PL
PS
RA

MP-1
PE-1, PE-6, PE-6(1), PE-8
PL-1, PL-2, PL-2(3), PL-4, PL-4(1), PL-8
PS-1, PS-6, PS-7
RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, RA-5(1), RA-5(2), RA-5(5)

CP

AC-1
AT-1, AT-2, AT-2(2), AT-3, AT-4
AU-1, AU-6, AU-6(1), AU-6(3), AU-7, AU-7(1)CA-1, CA-2, CA-2(1), CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA-7(1), CA-9
CM-1, CM-2, CM-2(1), CM-2(3), CM-2(7), CM-3, CM-3(2), CM4, CM-8, CM-8(1), CM-8(3), CM-8(5)CP-1, CP-3, CP-4, CP-4(1)

SA

IA
IR
MA

IA-1
IR-1, IR-2, IR-3, IR-3(2), IR-5
MA-1

SC
SI

SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-4(1), SA-4(2), SA-4(9), SA-4(10),SA-5, SA-8, SA-9, SA-9(2), SA-10, SA-11
SC-1, SC-2, SC-39
SI-1, SI-4, SI-4(2), SI-4(4), SI-4(5), SI-5, SI-7, SI-7(1), SI-7(7),SI-10, SI-16

100

NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides additional information on depth and coverage in security control
assessments.
101

The assurance-related controls in Table E-2 are a subset of the security controls contained in the security control
baseline for moderate-impact systems in Appendix D. Implementing the assurance-related controls in Table E-2(including depth/coverage security evidence from NIST Special Publication 800-53A) will satisfy the minimum
assurance requirements for moderate-impact systems mandated by FIPS Publication 200. The bold text indicates thedelta from the low baseline (i.e., the assurance-related controls added to the low baseline to produce the increased levelof assurance in the moderate baseline).

APPENDIX E

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Minimum Assurance Requirements – High-Impact Systems
Assurance Requirement: The organization, based on its security requirements, security policies, and needed

security capabilities, has an expectation of: (i) a high strength of security functionality; and (ii) a highdegree of confidence supported by the depth and coverage of associated security evidence, that the security
functionality is complete, consistent, and correct.
Supplemental Guidance: Security functionality and assurance for high-impact systems are achieved by the

implementation of security controls from the tailored high baseline in Appendix D. Assurance requirements
for high-impact systems (including the information technology components that are part of those systems),
add to the expectations at the moderate assurance level by: (i) incorporating higher-end COTS security
capabilities that result from the application of commonly accepted best commercial development practices
for reducing latent flaw rates, some special development, and additional assessment of the implemented
capability. Due to the high strength of functionality expected for high-impact systems, the depth/coverageof security evidence 102 produced is more comprehensive than the evidence produced for moderate-impact
systems. Although the evidence may still be in the range of what can be provided by COTS manufacturers,
vendors, and resellers, greater assurance from independent assessment providers may be required. The
depth/coverage evidence is supplemented by the results of additional security control assessments and theongoing monitoring of organizational information systems/environments of operation. For other thantechnology-based functionality, there is a high degree of confidence in the completeness, correctness, andconsistency of procedural and/or operational security functionality (e.g., policies, procedures, physicalsecurity, and personnel security). Assurance requirements in the form of developmental and operational
assurance controls for high-impact information systems are listed in Table E-3. Organizations, through thetailoring process (including an organizational assessment of risk), may choose to add other assurancerelated controls and/or control enhancements to the set included in Table E-3.
TABLE E-3: ASSURANCE-RELATED CONTROLS FOR HIGH-IMPACT SYSTEMS

103

ID

CONTROLSID

CONTROLS

AC
AT
AU

MP
PE
PL

MP-1
PE-1, PE-6, PE-6(1), PE-6(4), PE-8
PL-1, PL-2, PL-2(3), PL-4, PL-4(1), PL-8

PS

PS-1, PS-6, PS-7

RA

RA-1, RA-3, RA-5, RA-5(1), RA-5(2), RA-5(4), RA-5(5)

CP

AC-1
AT-1, AT-2, AT-2(2), AT-3, AT-4
AU-1, AU-6, AU-6(1), AU-6(3), AU-6(5), AU-6(6), AU-7, AU7(1), AU-10
CA-1, CA-2, CA-2(1), CA-2(2), CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA7(1), CA-8, CA-9
CM-1, CM-2, CM-2(1), CM-2(2), CM-2(3), CM-2(7), CM-3, CM3(1), CM-3(2), CM-4, CM-4(1), CM-8, CM-8(1), CM-8(2), CM8(3), CM-8(4), CM-8(5)CP-1, CP-3, CP-3(1), CP-4, CP-4(1), CP-4(2)

SA

IA
IR
MA

IA-1
IR-1, IR-2, IR-2(1), IR-2(2), IR-3, IR-3(2), IR-5, IR-5(1)
MA-1

SC
SI

SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-4(1), SA-4(2), SA-4(9), SA-4(10),SA-5, SA-8, SA-9, SA-9(2), SA-10, SA-11, SA-12, SA-15, SA16, SA-17
SC-1, SC-2, SC-3, SC-7(18), SC-7(21), SC-24, SC-39
SI-1, SI-4, SI-4(2), SI-4(4), SI-4(5), SI-5, SI-5(1), SI-6, SI-7, SI7(1), SI-7(2), SI-7(5), SI-7(7), SI-7(14), SI-10, SI-16

CA
CM

102

NIST Special Publication 800-53A provides additional information on depth and coverage in security control
assessments.
103
The assurance-related controls in Table E-3 are a subset of the security controls contained in the security control
baseline for high-impact systems in Appendix D. Implementing the assurance-related controls in Table E-3 (including
depth/coverage security evidence from NIST Special Publication 800-53A) will satisfy the minimum assurance
requirements for high-impact systems mandated by FIPS Publication 200. The bold text indicates the delta from themoderate baseline (i.e., the assurance-related controls added to the moderate baseline to produce the increased level ofassurance in the high baseline).

APPENDIX E

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Security Controls to Achieve Enhanced Assurance

While the assurance-related controls allocated to the low, moderate, and high baselines in theprevious sections, represent minimum assurance requirements, organizations can, over time,choose to raise the level of assurance in their information systems—increasing the level oftrustworthiness accordingly. This is accomplished by adding assurance-related controls to thecontrols in the baselines to increase both the strength of security functionality and degree ofconfidence that the functionality is correct, complete, and consistent—making the functionality
highly resistant to penetration, tamper, or bypass. Security functionality that is highly resistant topenetration, tamper, and bypass requires a significant work factor on the part of adversaries tocompromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information system or systemcomponents where that functionality is employed.
Since high-assurance information technology products may be more costly and difficult to obtain,organizations may choose to partition their information systems into distinct subsystems to isolate
the critical components and focus the high-assurance efforts on a more narrowly defined subset of
information resources. Organizations that find it difficult to achieve high-assurance information
technology solutions may have to rely to a greater extent on procedural or operational protections
to ensure mission and business success. This includes, for example, reengineering critical mission
and business processes to be less susceptible to high-end threats. Table E-4 provides additional
developmental and operational activities (e.g., in the SA, SI, and CM security control families),that organizations can select to achieve an enhanced level of assurance (up to and including highassurance). The list of assurance-related controls is not intended to be exhaustive. Organizations,
during the tailoring process, may choose to designate other security controls as assurance-related
and add to the exemplar set in Table E-4.

APPENDIX E

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________TABLE E-4: SECURITY CONTROLS FOR ENHANCED ASSURANCE

104

ID

CONTROLS

ID

AC
AT
AU

MP
PE
PL

No additional controls.
PE-6(2), PE-6(3)PL-8 (all enhancements), PL-9

CA
CM
CP

AC-25
AT-2(1), AT-3 (all enhancements)
AU-6(4), AU-6(7), AU-6(8), AU-6(9), AU-6(10), AU-10 (allenhancements), AU-11(1), AU-13 (plus enhancements), AU14 (plus enhancements)CA-2(3), CA-5(1), CA-7(3), CA-8 (all enhancements), CA-9(1)CM-2(6), CM-4(2), CM-8(6), CM-8(7), CM-8(8), CM-8(9)CP-3(2), CP-4(3), CP-4(4), CP-12

CONTROLS

PS
RA
SA

IA

No additional controls.

SC

IR
MA

IR-3(1)
No additional controls.

SI

PS-6(2), PS-6(3)RA-5(3), RA-5(6), RA-5(8), RA-5(10), RA-6
SA-4(3), SA-4(5), SA-4(6), SA-4(7), SA-4(8), SA-9(1), SA9(3), SA-9(4), SA-9(5), SA-10 (all enhancements), SA-11 (allenhancements), SA-12 (all enhancements), SA-13, SA-14,
SA-15 (all enhancements), SA-17 (all enhancements), SA-18(plus enhancements), SA-19 (plus enhancements), SA-20,
SA-21 (plus enhancement), SA-22 (plus enhancement)
SC-2(1), SC-3 (all enhancements), SC-6, SC-7(22), SC-11(plus enhancement), SC-29 (plus enhancement), SC-30 (plusenhancements), SC-31 (plus enhancements), SC-32, SC-34(plus enhancements), SC-36 (plus enhancement), SC-37 (plusenhancement), SC-38, SC-39 (all enhancements)
SI-4(1), SI-4(3), SI-4(7), SI-4(9), SI-4(10), SI-4(11), SI-4(12),SI-4(13), SI-4(14), SI-4(15), SI-4(16), SI-4(17), SI-4(18), SI4(19), SI-4(20), SI-4(21), SI-4(22), SI-4(23), SI-4(24), SI-7(3),SI-7(6), SI-7(8), SI-7(9), SI-7(10), SI-7(11), SI-7(12), SI-7(13),SI-7(15), SI-7(16), SI-10 (all enhancements), SI-13 (plusenhancements), SI-14 (plus enhancement), SI-15, SI-17

104

The assurance-related controls in Table E-4 represent the additional security controls needed to achieve enhanced
levels of assurance (i.e., the controls needed to go beyond the minimum assurance levels that are represented by theassurance-related controls in Tables E-1, E-2, and E-3). When an assurance-related control is allocated to a baseline(i.e., listed in Tables E-1, E-2, or E-3), but all of its control enhancements are in Table E-4, it is designated in the tableas Control (all enhancements). When an assurance-related control and all of its control enhancements are not allocatedto baselines, it is designated in the table as Control (plus enhancements). When assurance-related control enhancementsfrom a particular control are allocated to one of the baselines, the remaining unselected control enhancements are listed
individually in Table E-4.

APPENDIX E

PAGE E-7

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX FSECURITY CONTROL CATALOGSECURITY CONTROLS, ENHANCEMENTS, AND SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE

T

he catalog of security controls in this appendix provides a range of safeguards andcountermeasures for organizations and information systems. 105 The security controls havebeen designed to facilitate compliance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders,
directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines. 106 The organization of the security
control catalog, the structure of the security controls, and the concept of allocating security
controls and control enhancements to the initial baselines in Appendix D are described in Chapter
Two. The security controls in the catalog with few exceptions, have been designed to be policyand technology-neutral. This means that security controls and control enhancements focus on thefundamental safeguards and countermeasures necessary to protect information during processing,while in storage, and during transmission. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this publication toprovide guidance on the application of security controls to specific technologies, communities ofinterest, environments of operation, or missions/business functions. These areas are addressed by
the use of the tailoring process described in Chapter Three and the development of overlays
described in Appendix I.
In the few cases where specific technologies are called out in security controls (e.g., mobile, PKI,
wireless, VOIP), organizations are cautioned that the need to provide adequate security goes wellbeyond the requirements in a single control associated with a particular technology. Many of theneeded safeguards/countermeasures are obtained from the other security controls in the catalog
allocated to the initial control baselines as the starting point for the development of security plansand overlays using the tailoring process. In addition to the organization-driven development ofspecialized security plans and overlays, NIST Special Publications and Interagency Reports may
provide guidance on recommended security controls for specific technologies and sector-specificapplications (e.g., Smart Grid, healthcare, Industrial Control Systems, and mobile).
Employing a policy- and technology-neutral security control catalog has the following benefits:•

It encourages organizations to focus on the security capabilities required for mission/businesssuccess and the protection of information, irrespective of the information technologies thatare employed in organizational information systems;•

It encourages organizations to analyze each security control for its applicability to specifictechnologies, environments of operation, missions/business functions, and communities ofinterest; and105

An online version of the catalog of security controls is also available at http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/home.

106
Compliance necessitates organizations executing due diligence with regard to information security and risk
management. Information security due diligence includes using all appropriate information as part of an organizationwide risk management program to effectively use the tailoring guidance and inherent flexibility in NIST publications sothat the selected security controls documented in organizational security plans meet the specific mission and business
requirements of organizations. Using the risk management tools and techniques that are available to organizations isessential in developing, implementing, and maintaining the safeguards and countermeasures with the necessary andsufficient strength of mechanism to address the current threats to organizational operations and assets, individuals,
other organizations, and the Nation. Employing effective risk-based processes, procedures, and technologies will help
ensure that all federal information systems and organizations have the necessary resilience to support ongoing federal
responsibilities, critical infrastructure applications, and continuity of government.

APPENDIX FPAGE F-1

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________•

It encourages organizations to specify security policies as part of the tailoring process forsecurity controls that have variable parameters.

For example, organizations using smart phones, tablets, or other types of mobile devices would
start the tailoring process by assuming that all security controls and control enhancements in theappropriate baseline (low, moderate, or high) are needed. The tailoring process may result incertain security controls being eliminated for a variety of reasons, including, for example, theinability of the technology to support the implementation of the control. However, the eliminationof such controls without understanding the potential adverse impacts to organizational missions
and business functions can significantly increase information security risk and should be carefully
analyzed. This type of analysis is essential in order for organizations to make effective risk-based
decisions including the selection of appropriate compensating security controls, when considering
the use of these emerging mobile devices and technologies. The specialization of security plans
using the tailoring guidance and overlays, together with a comprehensive set of technology- andpolicy-neutral security controls, promotes cost-effective, risk-based information security fororganizations—in any sector, for any technology, and in any operating environment.
The security controls in the catalog are expected to change over time, as controls are withdrawn,
revised, and added. In order to maintain stability in security plans and automated tools supporting
the implementation of Special Publication 800-53, security controls will not be renumbered eachtime a control is withdrawn. Rather, notations of security controls that have been withdrawn are
maintained in the catalog for historical purposes. Security controls are withdrawn for a variety ofreasons including, for example: the security capability provided by the withdrawn control has
been incorporated into another control; the security capability provided by the withdrawn control
is redundant to an existing control; or the security control is deemed to be no longer necessary.
There may, on occasion, be repetition in requirements that appear in the security controls andcontrol enhancements that are part of the security control catalog. This repetition in requirements
is intended to reinforce the security requirements from the perspective of multiple controls and/or
enhancements. For example, the requirement for strong identification and authentication when
conducting remote maintenance activities appears in the MA family in the specific context ofsystems maintenance activities conducted by organizations. The identification and authentication
requirement also appears in a more general context in the IA family. While these requirements
appear to be redundant (i.e., overlapping), they are, in fact, mutually reinforcing and not intended
to require additional effort on the part of organizations in the development and implementation of
security programs.

Implementation Tip
New security controls and control enhancements will be developed on a regular basis using state-ofthe-practice information from national-level threat and vulnerability databases as well as informationon the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by adversaries in launching cyber attacks. The
proposed modifications to security controls and security control baselines will be carefully weighed
during each revision cycle, considering the desire for stability of the security control catalog and theneed to respond to changing threats, vulnerabilities, attack methods, and information technologies.
The overall objective is to raise the basic level of information security over time. Organizations may
choose to develop new security controls when there is a specific security capability required and theappropriate controls are not available in Appendices F or G.

APPENDIX FPAGE F-2

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

SECURITY CONTROL CLASS DESIGNATIONSMANAGEMENT, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNICAL REFERENCES

Because many security controls within the security control families in Appendix F have various
combinations of management, operational, and technical properties, the specific class designations
have been removed from the security control families. Organizations may still find it useful toapply such designations to individual security controls and control enhancements or to individual
sections within a particular control/enhancement. Organizations may find it beneficial to employ
class designations as a way to group or refer to security controls. The class designations may also
help organizations with the process of allocating security controls and control enhancements to: (i)responsible parties or information systems (e.g., as common or hybrid controls); (ii) specific roles;
and/or (iii) specific components of a system. For example, organizations may determine that the
responsibility for system-specific controls they have placed in the management class belong to theinformation system owner, controls placed in the operational class belong to the Information
System Security Officer (ISSO), and controls placed in the technical class belong to one or more
system administrators. This example is provided to illustrate the potential usefulness of designatingclasses for controls and/or control enhancements; it is not meant to suggest or require additionaltasks for organizations.

APPENDIX FPAGE F-3

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________CAUTIONARY NOTEDEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND SERVICES

With the renewed emphasis on trustworthy information systems and supply chain security, it isessential that organizations have the capability to express their information security requirementswith clarity and specificity in order to engage the information technology industry and obtain thesystems, components, and services necessary for mission and business success. To ensure thatorganizations have such capability, Special Publication 800-53 provides a set of security controls in
the System and Services Acquisition family (i.e., SA family) addressing requirements for thedevelopment of information systems, information technology products, and information systemservices. Therefore, many of the controls in the SA family are directed at developers of thosesystems, components, and services. It is important for organizations to recognize that the scope ofthe security controls in the SA family includes all system/component/service development and thedevelopers associated with such development whether the development is conducted by internalorganizational personnel or by external developers through the contracting/acquisition process.
Affected controls include SA-8, SA-10, SA-11, SA-15, SA-16, SA-17, SA-20, and SA-21.

APPENDIX FPAGE F-4

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Fundamentals of the Catalog
Security controls and control enhancements in Appendices F and G are generally designed to bepolicy-neutral and technology/implementation-independent. Organizations provide information
about security controls and control enhancements in two ways:• By specifying security control implementation details (e.g., platform dependencies) in theassociated security plan for the information system or security program plan for theorganization; and• By establishing specific values in the variable sections of selected security controls through theuse of assignment and selection statements.
Assignment and selection statements provide organizations with the capability to specialize
security controls and control enhancements based on organizational security requirements or
requirements originating in federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations,standards, or guidelines. Organization-defined parameters used in assignment and selection
statements in the basic security controls apply also to all control enhancements associated withthose controls. Control enhancements strengthen the fundamental security capability in the basecontrol but are not a substitute for using assignment or selection statements to provide greater
specificity to the control. Assignment statements for security controls and control enhancements
do not contain minimum or maximum values (e.g., testing contingency plans at least annually).
Organizations should consult specific federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, or guidelines as the definitive sources for such information. The absence ofminimum and maximum values from the security controls and control enhancements does not
obviate the need for organizations to comply with requirements in the controlling source
publications.
The first security control in each family (i.e., the dash-1 control) generates requirements for
specific policies and procedures that are needed for the effective implementation of the othersecurity controls in the family. Therefore, individual controls and control enhancements in aparticular family do not call for the development of such policies and procedures. Supplemental
guidance sections of security controls and control enhancements do not contain any requirementsor references to FIPS or NIST Special Publications. NIST publications are, however, included ina references section for each security control.
In support of the Joint Task Force initiative to develop a unified information security framework
for the federal government, security controls and control enhancements for national security
systems are included in this appendix. The inclusion of such controls and enhancements is notintended to impose security requirements on organizations that operate national security systems.
Rather, organizations can use the security controls and control enhancements on a voluntary basiswith the approval of federal officials exercising policy authority over national security systems. In
addition, the security control priorities and security control baselines listed in Appendix D and in
the priority and baseline allocation summary boxes below each security control in Appendix F,
apply to non-national security systems only unless otherwise directed by the federal officials withnational security policy authority.

APPENDIX FPAGE F-5

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Using the Catalog
Organizations employ security controls 107 in federal information systems and the environments inwhich those systems operate in accordance with FIPS Publication 199, FIPS Publication 200, andNIST Special Publications 800-37 and 800-39. Security categorization of federal information andinformation systems, as required by FIPS Publication 199, is the first step in the RMF. 108 Next,
organizations select the appropriate security control baselines for their information systems bysatisfying the minimum security requirements set forth in FIPS Publication 200. Appendix D
includes three security control baselines that are associated with the designated impact levels of
information systems as determined during the security categorization process. 109 After baseline
selection, organizations tailor the baselines by: (i) identifying/designating common controls; (ii)applying scoping considerations; (iii) selecting compensating controls, if needed; (iv) assigning
control parameter values in selection and assignment statements; (v) supplementing the baseline
controls with additional controls and control enhancements from the security control catalog; and(vi) providing additional information for control implementation. Organizations can also use thebaseline tailoring process with the overlay concept that is described in Section 3.2 and Appendix
I. Risk assessments, as described in NIST Special Publication 800-30, guide and inform thesecurity control selection process. 110

CAUTIONARY NOTEUSE OF CRYPTOGRAPHY

If cryptography is required for the protection of information based on the selection of security
controls in Appendix F and subsequently implemented by organizational information systems, thecryptographic mechanisms comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives,
policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. This includes, for NSA-approved cryptography toprotect classified information, FIPS-validated cryptography to protect unclassified information, andNSA-approved and FIPS-compliant key management technologies and processes. Security controls
SC-12 and SC-13 provide specific information on the selection of appropriate cryptographic
mechanisms, including the strength of such mechanisms.

107

The security controls in Special Publication 800-53 are available online and can be downloaded in various formats
from the NIST web site at: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/800-53/home.
108

CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance for security categorization of national security systems.

109

CNSS Instruction 1253 provides guidance on security control baselines for national security systems and specifictailoring requirements associated with such systems.
110

There are additional security controls and control enhancements that appear in the catalog that are not used in any of
the initial baselines. These additional controls and control enhancements are available to organizations and can be usedin the tailoring process to achieve the needed level of protection in accordance with organizational risk assessments.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: ACCESS CONTROL
AC-1

ACCESS CONTROL POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

An access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and associatedaccess controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Access control policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

Access control procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AC family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AC-2

LOW AC-1

MOD AC-1

HIGH AC-1

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT
Control: The organization:a.

Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support
organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: organization-defined information
system account types];b.

Assigns account managers for information system accounts;c.

Establishes conditions for group and role membership;d.

Specifies authorized users of the information system, group and role membership, and accessauthorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes (as required) for each account;e.

Requires approvals by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] for requests tocreate information system accounts;f.

Creates, enables, modifies, disables, and removes information system accounts in accordancewith [Assignment: organization-defined procedures or conditions];g.

Monitors the use of information system accounts;

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h.

i.

Notifies account managers:
1.

When accounts are no longer required;

2.

When users are terminated or transferred; and3.

When individual information system usage or need-to-know changes;

Authorizes access to the information system based on:
1.

A valid access authorization;

2.

Intended system usage; and3.

Other attributes as required by the organization or associated missions/business functions;j.

Reviews accounts for compliance with account management requirements [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; andk.

Establishes a process for reissuing shared/group account credentials (if deployed) when
individuals are removed from the group.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system account types include, for example, individual, shared,

group, system, guest/anonymous, emergency, developer/manufacturer/vendor, temporary, andservice. Some of the account management requirements listed above can be implemented byorganizational information systems. The identification of authorized users of the information
system and the specification of access privileges reflects the requirements in other security
controls in the security plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on information system
accounts receive additional scrutiny by appropriate organizational personnel (e.g., system owner,
mission/business owner, or chief information security officer) responsible for approving suchaccounts and privileged access. Organizations may choose to define access privileges or otherattributes by account, by type of account, or a combination of both. Other attributes required forauthorizing access include, for example, restrictions on time-of-day, day-of-week, and point-oforigin. In defining other account attributes, organizations consider system-related requirements(e.g., scheduled maintenance, system upgrades) and mission/business requirements, (e.g., timezone differences, customer requirements, remote access to support travel requirements). Failure toconsider these factors could affect information system availability. Temporary and emergency
accounts are accounts intended for short-term use. Organizations establish temporary accounts as apart of normal account activation procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts without
the demand for immediacy in account activation. Organizations establish emergency accounts in
response to crisis situations and with the need for rapid account activation. Therefore, emergency
account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. Emergency and temporary
accounts are not to be confused with infrequently used accounts (e.g., local logon accounts used
for special tasks defined by organizations or when network resources are unavailable). Suchaccounts remain available and are not subject to automatic disabling or removal dates. Conditions
for disabling or deactivating accounts include, for example: (i) when shared/group, emergency, or
temporary accounts are no longer required; or (ii) when individuals are transferred or terminated.
Some types of information system accounts may require specialized training. Related controls:
AC-3, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-10, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, AU-9, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, CM-5,
CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PL-4, SC-13.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENTThe organization employs automated mechanisms to support the management of information
system accounts.
Supplemental Guidance: The use of automated mechanisms can include, for example: using
email or text messaging to automatically notify account managers when users are terminatedor transferred; using the information system to monitor account usage; and using telephonic
notification to report atypical system account usage.

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ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY / EMERGENCY ACCOUNTS

The information system automatically [Selection: removes; disables] temporary and emergency
accounts after [Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of account].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires the removal of both temporary andemergency accounts automatically after a predefined period of time has elapsed, rather than at
the convenience of the systems administrator.
(3)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE INACTIVE ACCOUNTS

The information system automatically disables inactive accounts after [Assignment: organizationdefined time period].
(4)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS

The information system automatically audits account creation, modification, enabling, disabling,
and removal actions, and notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.
(5)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT

The organization requires that users log out when [Assignment: organization-defined time-periodof expected inactivity or description of when to log out].
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-23.
(6)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT

The information system implements the following dynamic privilege management capabilities:[Assignment: organization-defined list of dynamic privilege management capabilities].
Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to conventional access control approaches which employ
static information system accounts and predefined sets of user privileges, dynamic access
control approaches (e.g., service-oriented architectures) rely on run time access control
decisions facilitated by dynamic privilege management. While user identities may remain
relatively constant over time, user privileges may change more frequently based on ongoingmission/business requirements and operational needs of organizations. Dynamic privilege
management can include, for example, the immediate revocation of privileges from users, as
opposed to requiring that users terminate and restart their sessions to reflect any changes inprivileges. Dynamic privilege management can also refer to mechanisms that change theprivileges of users based on dynamic rules as opposed to editing specific user profiles. This
type of privilege management includes, for example, automatic adjustments of privileges if
users are operating out of their normal work times, or if information systems are under duress
or in emergency maintenance situations. This control enhancement also includes the ancillaryeffects of privilege changes, for example, the potential changes to encryption keys used forcommunications. Dynamic privilege management can support requirements for information
system resiliency. Related control: AC-16.
(7)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ROLE-BASED SCHEMESThe organization:(a)

Establishes and administers privileged user accounts in accordance with a role-based access
scheme that organizes allowed information system access and privileges into roles;(b) Monitors privileged role assignments; and(c)Takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] when privileged role assignments are nolonger appropriate.

Supplemental Guidance: Privileged roles are organization-defined roles assigned to individuals
that allow those individuals to perform certain security-relevant functions that ordinary users
are not authorized to perform. These privileged roles include, for example, key management,
account management, network and system administration, database administration, and web
administration.
(8)

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC ACCOUNT CREATION

The information system creates [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts]
dynamically.
Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic approaches for creating information system accounts (e.g., as
implemented within service-oriented architectures) rely on establishing accounts (identities) at

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run time for entities that were previously unknown. Organizations plan for dynamic creationof information system accounts by establishing trust relationships and mechanisms with theappropriate authorities to validate related authorizations and privileges. Related control: AC16.
(9)ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNTSThe organization only permits the use of shared/group accounts that meet [Assignment:
organization-defined conditions for establishing shared/group accounts].
(10) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | SHARED / GROUP ACCOUNT CREDENTIAL TERMINATION
The information system terminates shared/group account credentials when members leave thegroup.
(11) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | USAGE CONDITIONS
The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances and/or usage
conditions] for [Assignment: organization-defined information system accounts].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can describe the specific conditions or circumstances
under which information system accounts can be used, for example, by restricting usage tocertain days of the week, time of day, or specific durations of time.
(12) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | ACCOUNT MONITORING / ATYPICAL USAGE
The organization:(a)Monitors information system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical usage];and(b) Reports atypical usage of information system accounts to [Assignment: organization-defined
personnel or roles].
Supplemental Guidance: Atypical usage includes, for example, accessing information systems

at certain times of the day and from locations that are not consistent with the normal usage
patterns of individuals working in organizations. Related control: CA-7.
(13) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALSThe organization disables accounts of users posing a significant risk within [Assignment:
organization-defined time period] of discovery of the risk.
Supplemental Guidance: Users posing a significant risk to organizations include individuals forwhom reliable evidence or intelligence indicates either the intention to use authorized accessto information systems to cause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Harm
includes potential adverse impacts to organizational operations and assets, individuals, otherorganizations, or the Nation. Close coordination between authorizing officials, information
system administrators, and human resource managers is essential in order for timely executionof this control enhancement. Related control: PS-4.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AC-3

LOW AC-2

MOD AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4)

HIGH AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (11) (12) (13)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT
Control: The information system enforces approved authorizations for logical access to informationand system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.
Supplemental Guidance: Access control policies (e.g., identity-based policies, role-based policies,

control matrices, cryptography) control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users orprocesses acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (e.g., devices, files, records,
domains) in information systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the information
system level and recognizing that information systems can host many applications and services insupport of organizational missions and business operations, access enforcement mechanisms canalso be employed at the application and service level to provide increased information security.

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Related controls: AC-2, AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AC-21, AC22, AU-9, CM-5, CM-6, CM-11, MA-3, MA-4, MA-5, PE-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6].
(2)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DUAL AUTHORIZATION
The information system enforces dual authorization for [Assignment: organization-defined
privileged commands and/or other organization-defined actions].

Supplemental Guidance: Dual authorization mechanisms require the approval of two authorizedindividuals in order to execute. Organizations do not require dual authorization mechanisms
when immediate responses are necessary to ensure public and environmental safety. Dualauthorization may also be known as two-person control. Related controls: CP-9, MP-6.
(3)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROLThe information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined mandatory access control
policy] over all subjects and objects where the policy:(a)Is uniformly enforced across all subjects and objects within the boundary of the information
system;(b) Specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from doing
any of the following;

(c)

(1)

Passing the information to unauthorized subjects or objects;(2)

Granting its privileges to other subjects;(3)

Changing one or more security attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or
information system components;(4)

Choosing the security attributes and attribute values to be associated with newly createdor modified objects; or(5)

Changing the rules governing access control; andSpecifies that [Assignment: organization-defined subjects] may explicitly be granted[Assignment: organization-defined privileges (i.e., they are trusted subjects)] such that they
are not limited by some or all of the above constraints.

Supplemental Guidance: Mandatory access control as defined in this control enhancement issynonymous with nondiscretionary access control, and is not constrained only to certain
historical uses (e.g., implementations using the Bell-LaPadula Model). The above class of
mandatory access control policies constrains what actions subjects can take with information
obtained from data objects for which they have already been granted access, thus preventing
the subjects from passing the information to unauthorized subjects and objects. This class of
mandatory access control policies also constrains what actions subjects can take with respect
to the propagation of access control privileges; that is, a subject with a privilege cannot passthat privilege to other subjects. The policy is uniformly enforced over all subjects and objects
to which the information system has control. Otherwise, the access control policy can be
circumvented. This enforcement typically is provided via an implementation that meets thereference monitor concept (see AC-25). The policy is bounded by the information systemboundary (i.e., once the information is passed outside of the control of the system, additional
means may be required to ensure that the constraints on the information remain in effect). The
trusted subjects described above are granted privileges consistent with the concept of leastprivilege (see AC-6). Trusted subjects are only given the minimum privileges relative to theabove policy necessary for satisfying organizational mission/business needs. The control ismost applicable when there is some policy mandate (e.g., law, Executive Order, directive, or
regulation) that establishes a policy regarding access to sensitive/classified information andsome users of the information system are not authorized access to all sensitive/classified
information resident in the information system. This control can operate in conjunction with
AC-3 (4). A subject that is constrained in its operation by policies governed by this control isstill able to operate under the less rigorous constraints of AC-3 (4), but policies governed bythis control take precedence over the less rigorous constraints of AC-3 (4). For example,

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while a mandatory access control policy imposes a constraint preventing a subject frompassing information to another subject operating at a different sensitivity label, AC-3 (4)permits the subject to pass the information to any subject with the same sensitivity label as the
subject. Related controls: AC-25, SC-11.
(4)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROLThe information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined discretionary access control
policy] over defined subjects and objects where the policy specifies that a subject that has been
granted access to information can do one or more of the following:(a)

Pass the information to any other subjects or objects;(b) Grant its privileges to other subjects;(c)

Change security attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or the information
system’s components;(d) Choose the security attributes to be associated with newly created or revised objects; or(e)Change the rules governing access control.

Supplemental Guidance: When discretionary access control policies are implemented, subjects
are not constrained with regard to what actions they can take with information for which they
have already been granted access. Thus, subjects that have been granted access to information
are not prevented from passing (i.e., the subjects have the discretion to pass) the information
to other subjects or objects. This control enhancement can operate in conjunction with AC-3(3). A subject that is constrained in its operation by policies governed by AC-3 (3) is still able
to operate under the less rigorous constraints of this control enhancement. Thus, while AC-3(3) imposes constraints preventing a subject from passing information to another subject
operating at a different sensitivity level, AC-3 (4) permits the subject to pass the information
to any subject at the same sensitivity level. The policy is bounded by the information systemboundary. Once the information is passed outside of the control of the information system,
additional means may be required to ensure that the constraints remain in effect. While theolder, more traditional definitions of discretionary access control require identity-based access
control, that limitation is not required for this use of discretionary access control.
(5)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY-RELEVANT INFORMATION

The information system prevents access to [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant
information] except during secure, non-operable system states.
Supplemental Guidance: Security-relevant information is any information within information
systems that can potentially impact the operation of security functions or the provision of
security services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce system security policies ormaintain the isolation of code and data. Security-relevant information includes, for example,
filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information, configuration
parameters for security services, and access control lists. Secure, non-operable system states
include the times in which information systems are not performing mission/business-related
processing (e.g., the system is off-line for maintenance, troubleshooting, boot-up, shut down).
Related control: CM-3.
(6)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | PROTECTION OF USER AND SYSTEM INFORMATION(7)ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4 and SC-28].
The information system enforces a role-based access control policy over defined subjects andobjects and controls access based upon [Assignment: organization-defined roles and users
authorized to assume such roles].
Supplemental Guidance: Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control policy that
restricts information system access to authorized users. Organizations can create specific roles
based on job functions and the authorizations (i.e., privileges) to perform needed operations
on organizational information systems associated with the organization-defined roles. Whenusers are assigned to the organizational roles, they inherit the authorizations or privileges
defined for those roles. RBAC simplifies privilege administration for organizations because
privileges are not assigned directly to every user (which can be a significant number of

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individuals for mid- to large-size organizations) but are instead acquired through roleassignments. RBAC can be implemented either as a mandatory or discretionary form ofaccess control. For organizations implementing RBAC with mandatory access controls, therequirements in AC-3 (3) define the scope of the subjects and objects covered by the policy.
(8)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | REVOCATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS

The information system enforces the revocation of access authorizations resulting from changes
to the security attributes of subjects and objects based on [Assignment: organization-defined rules
governing the timing of revocations of access authorizations].
Supplemental Guidance: Revocation of access rules may differ based on the types of accessrevoked. For example, if a subject (i.e., user or process) is removed from a group, access may
not be revoked until the next time the object (e.g., file) is opened or until the next time thesubject attempts a new access to the object. Revocation based on changes to security labels
may take effect immediately. Organizations can provide alternative approaches on how tomake revocations immediate if information systems cannot provide such capability and
immediate revocation is necessary.
(9)

ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | CONTROLLED RELEASE

The information system does not release information outside of the established system boundary
unless:(a)

The receiving [Assignment: organization-defined information system or system component]
provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]; and(b) [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] are used to validate theappropriateness of the information designated for release.
Supplemental Guidance: Information systems can only protect organizational information

within the confines of established system boundaries. Additional security safeguards may beneeded to ensure that such information is adequately protected once it is passed beyond theestablished information system boundaries. Examples of information leaving the systemboundary include transmitting information to an external information system or printing theinformation on one of its printers. In cases where the information system is unable to make adetermination of the adequacy of the protections provided by entities outside its boundary, asa mitigating control, organizations determine procedurally whether the external information
systems are providing adequate security. The means used to determine the adequacy of the
security provided by external information systems include, for example, conducting
inspections or periodic testing, establishing agreements between the organization and its
counterpart organizations, or some other process. The means used by external entities toprotect the information received need not be the same as those used by the organization, but
the means employed are sufficient to provide consistent adjudication of the security policy toprotect the information. This control enhancement requires information systems to employ
technical or procedural means to validate the information prior to releasing it to external
systems. For example, if the information system passes information to another system
controlled by another organization, technical means are employed to validate that the security
attributes associated with the exported information are appropriate for the receiving system.
Alternatively, if the information system passes information to a printer in organizationcontrolled space, procedural means can be employed to ensure that only appropriately
authorized individuals gain access to the printer. This control enhancement is most applicablewhen there is some policy mandate (e.g., law, Executive Order, directive, or regulation) that
establishes policy regarding access to the information, and that policy applies beyond therealm of a particular information system or organization.
(10) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | AUDITED OVERRIDE OF ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISMS
The organization employs an audited override of automated access control mechanisms under[Assignment: organization-defined conditions].
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-6.
References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AC-4

LOW AC-3

MOD AC-3

HIGH AC-3

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT
Control: The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of

information within the system and between interconnected systems based on [Assignment:
organization-defined information flow control policies].
Supplemental Guidance: Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel

within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed toaccess the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information.
Flow control restrictions include, for example, keeping export-controlled information from beingtransmitted in the clear to the Internet, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within theorganization, restricting web requests to the Internet that are not from the internal web proxy
server, and limiting information transfers between organizations based on data structures andcontent. Transferring information between information systems representing different security
domains with different security policies introduces risk that such transfers violate one or moredomain security policies. In such situations, information owners/stewards provide guidance atdesignated policy enforcement points between interconnected systems. Organizations consider
mandating specific architectural solutions when required to enforce specific security policies.
Enforcement includes, for example: (i) prohibiting information transfers between interconnected
systems (i.e., allowing access only); (ii) employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way
information flows; and (iii) implementing trustworthy regrading mechanisms to reassign security
attributes and security labels.
Organizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms
to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations (e.g., networks,
individuals, and devices) within information systems and between interconnected systems. Flowcontrol is based on the characteristics of the information and/or the information path. Enforcement
occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices (e.g., gateways, routers, guards, encrypted
tunnels, firewalls) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information
system services, provide a packet-filtering capability based on header information, or messagefiltering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using
document characteristics). Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering/inspection
mechanisms (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical to information
flow enforcement. Control enhancements 3 through 22 primarily address cross-domain solution
needs which focus on more advanced filtering techniques, in-depth analysis, and stronger flow
enforcement mechanisms implemented in cross-domain products, for example, high-assurance
guards. Such capabilities are generally not available in commercial off-the-shelf information
technology products. Related controls: AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, AC-21, CM-6, CM-7, SA-8, SC-2,
SC-5, SC-7, SC-18.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | OBJECT SECURITY ATTRIBUTESThe information system uses [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] associatedwith [Assignment: organization-defined information, source, and destination objects] to enforce[Assignment: organization-defined information flow control policies] as a basis for flow control
decisions.
Supplemental Guidance: Information flow enforcement mechanisms compare security attributes

associated with information (data content and data structure) and source/destination objects,
and respond appropriately (e.g., block, quarantine, alert administrator) when the mechanisms
encounter information flows not explicitly allowed by information flow policies. For example,
an information object labeled Secret would be allowed to flow to a destination object labeled
Secret, but an information object labeled Top Secret would not be allowed to flow to a

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destination object labeled Secret. Security attributes can also include, for example, source anddestination addresses employed in traffic filter firewalls. Flow enforcement using explicit
security attributes can be used, for example, to control the release of certain types of
information. Related control: AC-16.
(2)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PROCESSING DOMAINS

The information system uses protected processing domains to enforce [Assignment: organizationdefined information flow control policies] as a basis for flow control decisions.
Supplemental Guidance: Within information systems, protected processing domains areprocessing spaces that have controlled interactions with other processing spaces, thus
enabling control of information flows between these spaces and to/from data/information
objects. A protected processing domain can be provided, for example, by implementing
domain and type enforcement. In domain and type enforcement, information system processes
are assigned to domains; information is identified by types; and information flows arecontrolled based on allowed information accesses (determined by domain and type), allowed
signaling among domains, and allowed process transitions to other domains.
(3)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DYNAMIC INFORMATION FLOW CONTROLThe information system enforces dynamic information flow control based on [Assignment:
organization-defined policies].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational policies regarding dynamic information flow control
include, for example, allowing or disallowing information flows based on changing conditions
or mission/operational considerations. Changing conditions include, for example, changes inorganizational risk tolerance due to changes in the immediacy of mission/business needs,changes in the threat environment, and detection of potentially harmful or adverse events.
Related control: SI-4.
(4)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONTENT CHECK ENCRYPTED INFORMATION

The information system prevents encrypted information from bypassing content-checking
mechanisms by [Selection (one or more): decrypting the information; blocking the flow of theencrypted information; terminating communications sessions attempting to pass encrypted
information; [Assignment: organization-defined procedure or method]].
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-4.
(5)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | EMBEDDED DATA TYPESThe information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined limitations] on embedding
data types within other data types.
Supplemental Guidance: Embedding data types within other data types may result in reduced
flow control effectiveness. Data type embedding includes, for example, inserting executable
files as objects within word processing files, inserting references or descriptive information
into a media file, and compressed or archived data types that may include multiple embedded
data types. Limitations on data type embedding consider the levels of embedding and prohibit
levels of data type embedding that are beyond the capability of the inspection tools.
(6)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | METADATA

The information system enforces information flow control based on [Assignment: organizationdefined metadata].
Supplemental Guidance: Metadata is information used to describe the characteristics of data.
Metadata can include structural metadata describing data structures (e.g., data format, syntax,
and semantics) or descriptive metadata describing data contents (e.g., age, location, telephone
number). Enforcing allowed information flows based on metadata enables simpler and more
effective flow control. Organizations consider the trustworthiness of metadata with regard todata accuracy (i.e., knowledge that the metadata values are correct with respect to the data),
data integrity (i.e., protecting against unauthorized changes to metadata tags), and the bindingof metadata to the data payload (i.e., ensuring sufficiently strong binding techniques withappropriate levels of assurance). Related controls: AC-16, SI-7.
(7)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ONE-WAY FLOW MECHANISMS

The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined one-way information flows]
using hardware mechanisms.

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INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTERS

The information system enforces information flow control using [Assignment: organization-defined
security policy filters] as a basis for flow control decisions for [Assignment: organization-defined
information flows].
Supplemental Guidance: Organization-defined security policy filters can address data structuresand content. For example, security policy filters for data structures can check for maximum
file lengths, maximum field sizes, and data/file types (for structured and unstructured data).
Security policy filters for data content can check for specific words (e.g., dirty/clean word
filters), enumerated values or data value ranges, and hidden content. Structured data permits
the interpretation of data content by applications. Unstructured data typically refers to digital
information without a particular data structure or with a data structure that does not facilitate
the development of rule sets to address the particular sensitivity of the information conveyed
by the data or the associated flow enforcement decisions. Unstructured data consists of: (i)bitmap objects that are inherently non language-based (i.e., image, video, or audio files); and(ii) textual objects that are based on written or printed languages (e.g., commercial off-theshelf word processing documents, spreadsheets, or emails). Organizations can implement
more than one security policy filter to meet information flow control objectives (e.g.,
employing clean word lists in conjunction with dirty word lists may help to reduce false
positives).
(9)

INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | HUMAN REVIEWS

The information system enforces the use of human reviews for [Assignment: organization-defined
information flows] under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations define security policy filters for all situations where
automated flow control decisions are possible. When a fully automated flow control decision
is not possible, then a human review may be employed in lieu of, or as a complement to,automated security policy filtering. Human reviews may also be employed as deemednecessary by organizations.
(10) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ENABLE / DISABLE SECURITY POLICY FILTERS
The information system provides the capability for privileged administrators to enable/disable[Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] under the following conditions:[Assignment: organization-defined conditions].
Supplemental Guidance: For example, as allowed by the information system authorization,
administrators can enable security policy filters to accommodate approved data types.
(11) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | CONFIGURATION OF SECURITY POLICY FILTERS
The information system provides the capability for privileged administrators to configure[Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] to support different security policies.
Supplemental Guidance: For example, to reflect changes in security policies, administrators canchange the list of “dirty words” that security policy mechanisms check in accordance with thedefinitions provided by organizations.
(12) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DATA TYPE IDENTIFIERS
The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, uses
[Assignment: organization-defined data type identifiers] to validate data essential for information
flow decisions.
Supplemental Guidance: Data type identifiers include, for example, filenames, file types, filesignatures/tokens, and multiple internal file signatures/tokens. Information systems may allow
transfer of data only if compliant with data type format specifications.
(13) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DECOMPOSITION INTO POLICY-RELEVANT SUBCOMPONENTS
The information system, when transferring information between different security domains,decomposes information into [Assignment: organization-defined policy-relevant subcomponents]
for submission to policy enforcement mechanisms.
Supplemental Guidance: Policy enforcement mechanisms apply filtering, inspection, and/or
sanitization rules to the policy-relevant subcomponents of information to facilitate flow
enforcement prior to transferring such information to different security domains. Parsing
transfer files facilitates policy decisions on source, destination, certificates, classification,
attachments, and other security-related component differentiators.

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(14) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY POLICY FILTER CONSTRAINTS
The information system, when transferring information between different security domains,implements [Assignment: organization-defined security policy filters] requiring fully enumerated
formats that restrict data structure and content.
Supplemental Guidance: Data structure and content restrictions reduce the range of potential
malicious and/or unsanctioned content in cross-domain transactions. Security policy filtersthat restrict data structures include, for example, restricting file sizes and field lengths. Data
content policy filters include, for example: (i) encoding formats for character sets (e.g.,
Universal Character Set Transformation Formats, American Standard Code for Information
Interchange); (ii) restricting character data fields to only contain alpha-numeric characters;(iii) prohibiting special characters; and (iv) validating schema structures.
(15) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DETECTION OF UNSANCTIONED INFORMATION
The information system, when transferring information between different security domains,
examines the information for the presence of [Assignment: organized-defined unsanctioned
information] and prohibits the transfer of such information in accordance with the [Assignment:
organization-defined security policy].
Supplemental Guidance: Detection of unsanctioned information includes, for example, checking
all information to be transferred for malicious code and dirty words. Related control: SI-3.
(16) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | INFORMATION TRANSFERS ON INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-4].
(17) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | DOMAIN AUTHENTICATION
The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates source and destination points by[Selection (one or more): organization, system, application, individual] for information transfer.
Supplemental Guidance: Attribution is a critical component of a security concept of operations.
The ability to identify source and destination points for information flowing in information
systems, allows the forensic reconstruction of events when required, and encourages policy
compliance by attributing policy violations to specific organizations/individuals. Successfuldomain authentication requires that information system labels distinguish among systems,
organizations, and individuals involved in preparing, sending, receiving, or disseminating
information. Related controls: IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5.
(18) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | SECURITY ATTRIBUTE BINDING
The information system binds security attributes to information using [Assignment: organizationdefined binding techniques] to facilitate information flow policy enforcement.
Supplemental Guidance: Binding techniques implemented by information systems affect thestrength of security attribute binding to information. Binding strength and the assurance
associated with binding techniques play an important part in the trust organizations have in
the information flow enforcement process. The binding techniques affect the number anddegree of additional reviews required by organizations. Related controls: AC-16, SC-16.
(19) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | VALIDATION OF METADATA
The information system, when transferring information between different security domains, applies
the same security policy filtering to metadata as it applies to data payloads.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires the validation of metadata and thedata to which the metadata applies. Some organizations distinguish between metadata anddata payloads (i.e., only the data to which the metadata is bound). Other organizations do notmake such distinctions, considering metadata and the data to which the metadata applies aspart of the payload. All information (including metadata and the data to which the metadata
applies) is subject to filtering and inspection.
(20) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | APPROVED SOLUTIONS
The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined solutions in approved
configurations] to control the flow of [Assignment: organization-defined information] acrosssecurity domains.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations define approved solutions and configurations in crossdomain policies and guidance in accordance with the types of information flows across

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

classification boundaries. The Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO)
provides a baseline listing of approved cross-domain solutions.
(21) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PHYSICAL / LOGICAL SEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS
The information system separates information flows logically or physically using [Assignment:
organization-defined mechanisms and/or techniques] to accomplish [Assignment: organizationdefined required separations by types of information].
Supplemental Guidance: Enforcing the separation of information flows by type can enhanceprotection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit and by enabling
flow control by transmission paths perhaps not otherwise achievable. Types of separable
information include, for example, inbound and outbound communications traffic, service
requests and responses, and information of differing security categories.
(22) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | ACCESS ONLY
The information system provides access from a single device to computing platforms,
applications, or data residing on multiple different security domains, while preventing any
information flow between the different security domains.
Supplemental Guidance: The information system, for example, provides a desktop for users toaccess each connected security domain without providing any mechanisms to allow transfer
of information between the different security domains.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AC-5

LOW Not Selected

MOD AC-4

HIGH AC-4

SEPARATION OF DUTIES
Control: The organization:a.

Separates [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals];b.

Documents separation of duties of individuals; andc.

Defines information system access authorizations to support separation of duties.

Supplemental Guidance: Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized

privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation ofduties includes, for example: (i) dividing mission functions and information system support
functions among different individuals and/or roles; (ii) conducting information system support
functions with different individuals (e.g., system management, programming, configuration
management, quality assurance and testing, and network security); and (iii) ensuring security
personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions. Related
controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3, PE-4, PS-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AC-6

LOW Not Selected

MOD AC-5

HIGH AC-5

LEAST PRIVILEGE
Control: The organization employs the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorizedaccesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) which are necessary to accomplish
assigned tasks in accordance with organizational missions and business functions.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and information

systems. The principle of least privilege is also applied to information system processes, ensuringthat the processes operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish requiredorganizational missions/business functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional
processes, roles, and information system accounts as necessary, to achieve least privilege.
Organizations also apply least privilege to the development, implementation, and operation oforganizational information systems. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, CM-6, CM-7, PL-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS

The organization explicitly authorizes access to [Assignment: organization-defined security
functions (deployed in hardware, software, and firmware) and security-relevant information].
Supplemental Guidance: Security functions include, for example, establishing system accounts,

configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited,and setting intrusion detection parameters. Security-relevant information includes, forexample, filtering rules for routers/firewalls, cryptographic key management information,
configuration parameters for security services, and access control lists. Explicitly authorized
personnel include, for example, security administrators, system and network administrators,
system security officers, system maintenance personnel, system programmers, and otherprivileged users. Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19.
(2)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY FUNCTIONS

The organization requires that users of information system accounts, or roles, with access to[Assignment: organization-defined security functions or security-relevant information], use nonprivileged accounts or roles, when accessing nonsecurity functions.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement limits exposure when operating from within
privileged accounts or roles. The inclusion of roles addresses situations where organizations
implement access control policies such as role-based access control and where a change ofrole provides the same degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for both theuser and all processes acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between
a privileged and non-privileged account. Related control: PL-4.
(3)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED COMMANDSThe organization authorizes network access to [Assignment: organization-defined privilegedcommands] only for [Assignment: organization-defined compelling operational needs] anddocuments the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Network access is any access across a network connection in lieu of

local access (i.e., user being physically present at the device). Related control: AC-17.
(4)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | SEPARATE PROCESSING DOMAINS

The information system provides separate processing domains to enable finer-grained allocationof user privileges.
Supplemental Guidance: Providing separate processing domains for finer-grained allocation ofuser privileges includes, for example: (i) using virtualization techniques to allow additional
privileges within a virtual machine while restricting privileges to other virtual machines or to
the underlying actual machine; (ii) employing hardware and/or software domain separation
mechanisms; and (iii) implementing separate physical domains. Related controls: AC-4, SC-3,
SC-30, SC-32.
(5)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTSThe organization restricts privileged accounts on the information system to [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles].
Supplemental Guidance: Privileged accounts, including super user accounts, are typicallydescribed as system administrator for various types of commercial off-the-shelf operating
systems. Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles prevents day-to-day
users from having access to privileged information/functions. Organizations may differentiate
in the application of this control enhancement between allowed privileges for local accounts
and for domain accounts provided organizations retain the ability to control information

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

system configurations for key security parameters and as otherwise necessary to sufficiently
mitigate risk. Related control: CM-6.
(6)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCESS BY NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS

The organization prohibits privileged access to the information system by non-organizational
users.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: IA-8.
(7)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGESThe organization:(a)

Reviews [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] the privileges assigned to[Assignment: organization-defined roles or classes of users] to validate the need for suchprivileges; and(b) Reassigns or removes privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational
mission/business needs.
Supplemental Guidance: The need for certain assigned user privileges may change over timereflecting changes in organizational missions/business function, environments of operation,technologies, or threat. Periodic review of assigned user privileges is necessary to determine if
the rationale for assigning such privileges remains valid. If the need cannot be revalidated,organizations take appropriate corrective actions. Related control: CA-7.
(8)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGE LEVELS FOR CODE EXECUTION

The information system prevents [Assignment: organization-defined software] from executing at
higher privilege levels than users executing the software.
Supplemental Guidance: In certain situations, software applications/programs need to executewith elevated privileges to perform required functions. However, if the privileges required forexecution are at a higher level than the privileges assigned to organizational users invoking
such applications/programs, those users are indirectly provided with greater privileges thanassigned by organizations.
(9)

LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUDITING USE OF PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

The information system audits the execution of privileged functions.
Supplemental Guidance: Misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionallyby authorized users, or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised information
system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts
on organizations. Auditing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse,
and in doing so, help mitigate the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat(APT). Related control: AU-2.
(10) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PROHIBIT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS FROM EXECUTING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS
The information system prevents non-privileged users from executing privileged functions toinclude disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security safeguards/countermeasures.
Supplemental Guidance: Privileged functions include, for example, establishing information
system accounts, performing system integrity checks, or administering cryptographic key
management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals that do not possess appropriate
authorizations. Circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious
code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection from
non-privileged users.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

APPENDIX F-AC

LOW Not Selected

MOD AC-6 (1) (2) (5) (9) (10)

HIGH AC-6 (1) (2) (3) (5) (9) (10)PAGE F-20

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
AC-7

UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS
Control: The information system:a.

Enforces a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid logon
attempts by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; andb.

Automatically [Selection: locks the account/node for an [Assignment: organization-definedtime period]; locks the account/node until released by an administrator; delays next logon
prompt according to [Assignment: organization-defined delay algorithm]] when the
maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a local or

network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated byinformation systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined time
period established by organizations. If a delay algorithm is selected, organizations may choose toemploy different algorithms for different information system components based on the capabilitiesof those components. Responses to unsuccessful logon attempts may be implemented at both theoperating system and the application levels. Related controls: AC-2, AC-9, AC-14, IA-5.
Control Enhancements:(1)

UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | AUTOMATIC ACCOUNT LOCK[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-7].
(2)

UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS | PURGE / WIPE MOBILE DEVICE

The information system purges/wipes information from [Assignment: organization-defined mobile
devices] based on [Assignment: organization-defined purging/wiping requirements/techniques]
after [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive, unsuccessful device logon
attempts.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies only to mobile devices for which alogon occurs (e.g., personal digital assistants, smart phones, tablets). The logon is to themobile device, not to any one account on the device. Therefore, successful logons to any
accounts on mobile devices reset the unsuccessful logon count to zero. Organizations define
information to be purged/wiped carefully in order to avoid over purging/wiping which may
result in devices becoming unusable. Purging/wiping may be unnecessary if the informationon the device is protected with sufficiently strong encryption mechanisms. Related controls:
AC-19, MP-5, MP-6, SC-13.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW AC-7

P2

AC-8

MOD AC-7

HIGH AC-7

SYSTEM USE NOTIFICATION
Control: The information system:a.

APPENDIX F-AC

Displays to users [Assignment: organization-defined system use notification message orbanner] before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices
consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations,standards, and guidance and states that:
1.

Users are accessing a U.S. Government information system;

2.

Information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;

3.

Unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil
penalties; and4.

Use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and recording;

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________b.

Retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage
conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the information system; andc.

For publicly accessible systems:
1.

Displays system use information [Assignment: organization-defined conditions], before
granting further access;2.

Displays references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent withprivacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and3.

Includes a description of the authorized uses of the system.

Supplemental Guidance: System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warningbanners displayed before individuals log in to information systems. System use notifications areused only for access via logon interfaces with human users and are not required when such humaninterfaces do not exist. Organizations consider system use notification messages/banners displayedin multiple languages based on specific organizational needs and the demographics of information
system users. Organizations also consult with the Office of the General Counsel for legal review
and approval of warning banner content.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AC-9

LOW AC-8

MOD AC-8

HIGH AC-8

PREVIOUS LOGON (ACCESS) NOTIFICATION
Control: The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon (access) to the system, ofthe date and time of the last logon (access).
Supplemental Guidance: This control is applicable to logons to information systems via human userinterfaces and logons to systems that occur in other types of architectures (e.g., service-oriented
architectures). Related controls: AC-7, PL-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS
The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon/access, of the number ofunsuccessful logon/access attempts since the last successful logon/access.

(2)

PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | SUCCESSFUL / UNSUCCESSFUL LOGONS
The information system notifies the user of the number of [Selection: successful logons/accesses;
unsuccessful logon/access attempts; both] during [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

(3)

PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF ACCOUNT CHANGESThe information system notifies the user of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined
security-related characteristics/parameters of the user’s account] during [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].
(4)

PREVIOUS LOGON NOTIFICATION | ADDITIONAL LOGON INFORMATION

The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon (access), of the following
additional information: [Assignment: organization-defined information to be included in addition to
the date and time of the last logon (access)].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement permits organizations to specify additional
information to be provided to users upon logon including, for example, the location of last
logon. User location is defined as that information which can be determined by information
systems, for example, IP addresses from which network logons occurred, device identifiers, ornotifications of local logons.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

AC-10

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

CONCURRENT SESSION CONTROL
Control: The information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for each [Assignment:

organization-defined account and/or account type] to [Assignment: organization-defined number].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may define the maximum number of concurrent sessions for

information system accounts globally, by account type (e.g., privileged user, non-privileged user,
domain, specific application), by account, or a combination. For example, organizations may limit
the number of concurrent sessions for system administrators or individuals working in particularly
sensitive domains or mission-critical applications. This control addresses concurrent sessions for
information system accounts and does not address concurrent sessions by single users via multiple
system accounts.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

AC-11

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH AC-10

SESSION LOCK
Control: The information system:a.

Prevents further access to the system by initiating a session lock after [Assignment:
organization-defined time period] of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user; andb.

Retains the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification andauthentication procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: Session locks are temporary actions taken when users stop work and moveaway from the immediate vicinity of information systems but do not want to log out because of thetemporary nature of their absences. Session locks are implemented where session activities can be
determined. This is typically at the operating system level, but can also be at the application level.
Session locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of information systems, for example,
if organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays. Related control: AC-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SESSION LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS
The information system conceals, via the session lock, information previously visible on thedisplay with a publicly viewable image.

Supplemental Guidance: Publicly viewable images can include static or dynamic images, forexample, patterns used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery
life indicator, or a blank screen, with the additional caveat that none of the images convey
sensitive information.
References:

APPENDIX F-ACOMB Memorandum 06-16.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW Not Selected

P3

AC-12

MOD AC-11 (1)HIGH AC-11 (1)SESSION TERMINATION
Control: The information system automatically terminates a user session after [Assignment:

organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect].
Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions incontrast to SC-10 which addresses the termination of network connections that are associated with
communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect). A logical session (for local, network, andremote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses anorganizational information system. Such user sessions can be terminated (and thus terminate user
access) without terminating network sessions. Session termination terminates all processes
associated with a user’s logical session except those processes that are specifically created by theuser (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated. Conditions or trigger events
requiring automatic session termination can include, for example, organization-defined periods ofuser inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, time-of-day restrictions on
information system use. Related controls: SC-10, SC-23.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SESSION TERMINATION | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGE DISPLAYS

The information system:(a)Provides a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions wheneverauthentication is used to gain access to [Assignment: organization-defined information
resources]; and(b) Displays an explicit logout message to users indicating the reliable termination ofauthenticated communications sessions.
Supplemental Guidance: Information resources to which users gain access via authentication
include, for example, local workstations, databases, and password-protected websites/webbased services. Logout messages for web page access, for example, can be displayed after
authenticated sessions have been terminated. However, for some types of interactive sessions
including, for example, file transfer protocol (FTP) sessions, information systems typicallysend logout messages as final messages prior to terminating sessions.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

AC-13

LOW Not Selected

MOD AC-12

HIGH AC-12

SUPERVISION AND REVIEW — ACCESS CONTROL[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6].

AC-14

PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION
Control: The organization:a.

APPENDIX F-AC

Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined user actions] that can be performed on theinformation system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational
missions/business functions; andPAGE F-24

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________b.

Documents and provides supporting rationale in the security plan for the information system,
user actions not requiring identification or authentication.

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses situations in which organizations determine that noidentification or authentication is required in organizational information systems. Organizations
may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication including, forexample, when individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible federal information
systems, when individuals use mobile phones to receive calls, or when facsimiles are received.
Organizations also identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but may
under certain circumstances (e.g., emergencies), allow identification or authentication mechanisms
to be bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switchthat commands bypass of the logon functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored
use. This control does not apply to situations where identification and authentication have alreadyoccurred and are not repeated, but rather to situations where identification and authentication have
not yet occurred. Organizations may decide that there are no user actions that can be performed onorganizational information systems without identification and authentication and thus, the values
for assignment statements can be none. Related controls: CP-2, IA-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
(1)

PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION | NECESSARY USES

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-14].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

AC-15

LOW AC-14

MOD AC-14

HIGH AC-14

AUTOMATED MARKING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-3].

AC-16

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
Control: The organization:a.

Provides the means to associate [Assignment: organization-defined types of security
attributes] having [Assignment: organization-defined security attribute values] withinformation in storage, in process, and/or in transmission;b.

Ensures that the security attribute associations are made and retained with the information;c.

Establishes the permitted [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes] for[Assignment: organization-defined information systems]; andd.

Determines the permitted [Assignment: organization-defined values or ranges] for each of theestablished security attributes.

Supplemental Guidance: Information is represented internally within information systems using

abstractions known as data structures. Internal data structures can represent different types ofentities, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associatedwith individuals, devices, or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known
as objects, are typically associated with data structures such as records, buffers, tables, files, interprocess pipes, and communications ports. Security attributes, a form of metadata, are abstractions
representing the basic properties or characteristics of active and passive entities with respect tosafeguarding information. These attributes may be associated with active entities (i.e., subjects)
that have the potential to send or receive information, to cause information to flow among objects,

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________or to change the information system state. These attributes may also be associated with passive
entities (i.e., objects) that contain or receive information. The association of security attributes tosubjects and objects is referred to as binding and is typically inclusive of setting the attribute value
and the attribute type. Security attributes when bound to data/information, enables the enforcementof information security policies for access control and information flow control, either throughorganizational processes or information system functions or mechanisms. The content or assigned
values of security attributes can directly affect the ability of individuals to access organizational
information.
Organizations can define the types of attributes needed for selected information systems to support
missions/business functions. There is potentially a wide range of values that can be assigned toany given security attribute. Release markings could include, for example, US only, NATO, or
NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals). By specifying permitted attribute ranges andvalues, organizations can ensure that the security attribute values are meaningful and relevant. The
term security labeling refers to the association of security attributes with subjects and objects
represented by internal data structures within organizational information systems, to enable
information system-based enforcement of information security policies. Security labels include,for example, access authorizations, data life cycle protection (i.e., encryption and data expiration),
nationality, affiliation as contractor, and classification of information in accordance with legal andcompliance requirements. The term security marking refers to the association of security attributeswith objects in a human-readable form, to enable organizational process-based enforcement of
information security policies. The AC-16 base control represents the requirement for user-based
attribute association (marking). The enhancements to AC-16 represent additional requirements
including information system-based attribute association (labeling). Types of attributes include,for example, classification level for objects and clearance (access authorization) level for subjects.
An example of a value for both of these attribute types is Top Secret. Related controls: AC-3, AC4, AC-6, AC-21, AU-2, AU-10, SC-16, MP-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | DYNAMIC ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION

The information system dynamically associates security attributes with [Assignment: organizationdefined subjects and objects] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security
policies] as information is created and combined.
Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic association of security attributes is appropriate whenever the

security characteristics of information changes over time. Security attributes may change, forexample, due to information aggregation issues (i.e., the security characteristics of individual
information elements are different from the combined elements), changes in individual accessauthorizations (i.e., privileges), and changes in the security category of information. Related
control: AC-4.
(2)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE VALUE CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

The information system provides authorized individuals (or processes acting on behalf ofindividuals) the capability to define or change the value of associated security attributes.
Supplemental Guidance: The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affectthe ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for
information systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify security attributes toauthorized individuals. Related controls: AC-6, AU-2.
(3)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATIONS BY INFORMATION SYSTEM

The information system maintains the association and integrity of [Assignment: organizationdefined security attributes] to [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects].
Supplemental Guidance: Maintaining the association and integrity of security attributes tosubjects and objects with sufficient assurance helps to ensure that the attribute associations
can be used as the basis of automated policy actions. Automated policy actions include, forexample, access control decisions or information flow control decisions.

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SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION OF ATTRIBUTES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

The information system supports the association of [Assignment: organization-defined security
attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects] by authorized individuals(or processes acting on behalf of individuals).
Supplemental Guidance: The support provided by information systems can vary to include: (i)prompting users to select specific security attributes to be associated with specific information
objects; (ii) employing automated mechanisms for categorizing information with appropriate
attributes based on defined policies; or (iii) ensuring that the combination of selected security
attributes selected is valid. Organizations consider the creation, deletion, or modification of
security attributes when defining auditable events.
(5)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE DISPLAYS FOR OUTPUT DEVICES

The information system displays security attributes in human-readable form on each object thatthe system transmits to output devices to identify [Assignment: organization-identified special
dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions] using [Assignment: organization-identified
human-readable, standard naming conventions].
Supplemental Guidance: Information system outputs include, for example, pages, screens, or

equivalent. Information system output devices include, for example, printers and video
displays on computer workstations, notebook computers, and personal digital assistants.
(6)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | MAINTENANCE OF ATTRIBUTE ASSOCIATION BY ORGANIZATIONThe organization allows personnel to associate, and maintain the association of [Assignment:
organization-defined security attributes] with [Assignment: organization-defined subjects andobjects] in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires individual users (as opposed to theinformation system) to maintain associations of security attributes with subjects and objects.
(7)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | CONSISTENT ATTRIBUTE INTERPRETATIONThe organization provides a consistent interpretation of security attributes transmitted between
distributed information system components.

Supplemental Guidance: In order to enforce security policies across multiple components indistributed information systems (e.g., distributed database management systems, cloud-based
systems, and service-oriented architectures), organizations provide a consistent interpretationof security attributes that are used in access enforcement and flow enforcement decisions.
Organizations establish agreements and processes to ensure that all distributed information
system components implement security attributes with consistent interpretations in automatedaccess/flow enforcement actions.
(8)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ASSOCIATION TECHNIQUES / TECHNOLOGIESThe information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined techniques ortechnologies] with [Assignment: organization-defined level of assurance] in associating security
attributes to information.
Supplemental Guidance: The association (i.e., binding) of security attributes to information
within information systems is of significant importance with regard to conducting automatedaccess enforcement and flow enforcement actions. The association of such security attributes
can be accomplished with technologies/techniques providing different levels of assurance. For
example, information systems can cryptographically bind security attributes to information
using digital signatures with the supporting cryptographic keys protected by hardware devices(sometimes known as hardware roots of trust).
(9)

SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE REASSIGNMENTThe organization ensures that security attributes associated with information are reassigned only
via re-grading mechanisms validated using [Assignment: organization-defined techniques orprocedures].
Supplemental Guidance: Validated re-grading mechanisms are employed by organizations toprovide the requisite levels of assurance for security attribute reassignment activities. The
validation is facilitated by ensuring that re-grading mechanisms are single purpose and oflimited function. Since security attribute reassignments can affect security policy enforcement
actions (e.g., access/flow enforcement decisions), using trustworthy re-grading mechanisms isnecessary to ensure that such mechanisms perform in a consistent/correct mode of operation.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(10) SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS
The information system provides authorized individuals the capability to define or change the typeand value of security attributes available for association with subjects and objects.
Supplemental Guidance: The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affectthe ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for
information systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify security attributes toauthorized individuals only.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

AC-17

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

REMOTE ACCESS
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes and documents usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, andimplementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; andb.

Authorizes remote access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.

Supplemental Guidance: Remote access is access to organizational information systems by users (orprocesses acting on behalf of users) communicating through external networks (e.g., the Internet).
Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations
often employ encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity
over remote connections. The use of encrypted VPNs does not make the access non-remote;however, the use of VPNs, when adequately provisioned with appropriate security controls (e.g.,
employing appropriate encryption techniques for confidentiality and integrity protection) may
provide sufficient assurance to the organization that it can effectively treat such connections asinternal networks. Still, VPN connections traverse external networks, and the encrypted VPN
does not enhance the availability of remote connections. Also, VPNs with encrypted tunnels canaffect the organizational capability to adequately monitor network communications traffic formalicious code. Remote access controls apply to information systems other than public web
servers or systems designed for public access. This control addresses authorization prior toallowing remote access without specifying the formats for such authorization. While organizations
may use interconnection security agreements to authorize remote access connections, suchagreements are not required by this control. Enforcing access restrictions for remote connections isaddressed in AC-3. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, CA-3, CA-7, CM-8,
IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, MA-4, PE-17, PL-4, SC-10, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

REMOTE ACCESS | AUTOMATED MONITORING / CONTROLThe information system monitors and controls remote access methods.
Supplemental Guidance: Automated monitoring and control of remote access sessions allows

organizations to detect cyber attacks and also ensure ongoing compliance with remote accesspolicies by auditing connection activities of remote users on a variety of information systemcomponents (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smart phones, and tablets).
Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.
(2)

REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY / INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality andintegrity of remote access sessions.
Supplemental Guidance: The encryption strength of mechanism is selected based on the security
categorization of the information. Related controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(3)

REMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTSThe information system routes all remote accesses through [Assignment: organization-defined
number] managed network access control points.
Supplemental Guidance: Limiting the number of access control points for remote accesses
reduces the attack surface for organizations. Organizations consider the Trusted Internet
Connections (TIC) initiative requirements for external network connections. Related control:
SC-7.
(4)

REMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS / ACCESSThe organization:(a)Authorizes the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information
via remote access only for [Assignment: organization-defined needs]; and(b) Documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.
(5)REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING FOR UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS(6)REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF INFORMATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4].
The organization ensures that users protect information about remote access mechanisms fromunauthorized use and disclosure.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, PS-6.
(7)

REMOTE ACCESS | ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR SECURITY FUNCTION ACCESS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-3 (10)].
(8)REMOTE ACCESS | DISABLE NONSECURE NETWORK PROTOCOLS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7].
(9)REMOTE ACCESS | DISCONNECT / DISABLE ACCESSThe organization provides the capability to expeditiously disconnect or disable remote access tothe information system within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires organizations to have the capability
to rapidly disconnect current users remotely accessing the information system and/or disable
further remote access. The speed of disconnect or disablement varies based on the criticalityof missions/business functions and the need to eliminate immediate or future remote access toorganizational information systems.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-46, 800-77, 800-113, 800-114, 800-121.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AC-18

LOW AC-17

MOD AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (4)

HIGH AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (4)WIRELESS ACCESS
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation
guidance for wireless access; andb.

Authorizes wireless access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.

Supplemental Guidance: Wireless technologies include, for example, microwave, packet radio(UHF/VHF), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols (e.g.,
EAP/TLS, PEAP), which provide credential protection and mutual authentication. Related
controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, CA-3, CA-7, CM-8, IA-2, IA-3, IA-8, PL-4, SI-4.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

WIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION
The information system protects wireless access to the system using authentication of [Selection(one or more): users; devices] and encryption.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-8, SC-13.
(2)

WIRELESS ACCESS | MONITORING UNAUTHORIZED CONNECTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4].
(3)

WIRELESS ACCESS | DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKINGThe organization disables, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities internallyembedded within information system components prior to issuance and deployment.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-19.
(4)WIRELESS ACCESS | RESTRICT CONFIGURATIONS BY USERS

The organization identifies and explicitly authorizes users allowed to independently configure
wireless networking capabilities.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational authorizations to allow selected users to configure
wireless networking capability are enforced in part, by the access enforcement mechanisms
employed within organizational information systems. Related controls: AC-3, SC-15.
(5)WIRELESS ACCESS | ANTENNAS / TRANSMISSION POWER LEVELSThe organization selects radio antennas and calibrates transmission power levels to reduce theprobability that usable signals can be received outside of organization-controlled boundaries.
Supplemental Guidance: Actions that may be taken by organizations to limit unauthorized useof wireless communications outside of organization-controlled boundaries include, forexample: (i) reducing the power of wireless transmissions so that the transmissions are lesslikely to emit a signal that can be used by adversaries outside of the physical perimeters oforganizations; (ii) employing measures such as TEMPEST to control wireless emanations;and (iii) using directional/beam forming antennas that reduce the likelihood that unintended
receivers will be able to intercept signals. Prior to taking such actions, organizations canconduct periodic wireless surveys to understand the radio frequency profile of organizational
information systems as well as other systems that may be operating in the area. Related
control: PE-19.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-48, 800-94, 800-97.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AC-19

LOW AC-18

MOD AC-18 (1)HIGH AC-18 (1) (4) (5)ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes usage restrictions, configuration requirements, connection requirements, andimplementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices; andb.

Authorizes the connection of mobile devices to organizational information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: A mobile device is a computing device that: (i) has a small form factor

such that it can easily be carried by a single individual; (ii) is designed to operate without aphysical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit or receive information); (iii) possesses local, nonremovable or removable data storage; and (iv) includes a self-contained power source. Mobile
devices may also include voice communication capabilities, on-board sensors that allow the device
to capture information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local data with remote locations.
Examples include smart phones, E-readers, and tablets. Mobile devices are typically associatedwith a single individual and the device is usually in close proximity to the individual; however, thedegree of proximity can vary depending upon on the form factor and size of the device. The

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processing, storage, and transmission capability of the mobile device may be comparable to or
merely a subset of desktop systems, depending upon the nature and intended purpose of thedevice. Due to the large variety of mobile devices with different technical characteristics andcapabilities, organizational restrictions may vary for the different classes/types of such devices.
Usage restrictions and specific implementation guidance for mobile devices include, for example,
configuration management, device identification and authentication, implementation of mandatory
protective software (e.g., malicious code detection, firewall), scanning devices for malicious code,
updating virus protection software, scanning for critical software updates and patches, conducting
primary operating system (and possibly other resident software) integrity checks, and disabling
unnecessary hardware (e.g., wireless, infrared). Organizations are cautioned that the need toprovide adequate security for mobile devices goes beyond the requirements in this control. Many
safeguards and countermeasures for mobile devices are reflected in other security controls in the
catalog allocated in the initial control baselines as starting points for the development of security
plans and overlays using the tailoring process. There may also be some degree of overlap in therequirements articulated by the security controls within the different families of controls. AC-20
addresses mobile devices that are not organization-controlled. Related controls: AC-3, AC-7, AC18, AC-20, CA-9, CM-2, IA-2, IA-3, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PL-4, SC-7, SC-43, SI-3, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF WRITABLE / PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES(2)

ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PERSONALLY OWNED PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].
[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].
(3)

ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | USE OF PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES WITH NO IDENTIFIABLE OWNER[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].
(4)

ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | RESTRICTIONS FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATIONThe organization:(a)Prohibits the use of unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems
processing, storing, or transmitting classified information unless specifically permitted by theauthorizing official; and(b) Enforces the following restrictions on individuals permitted by the authorizing official to use
unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems processing, storing,or transmitting classified information:

(c)

(1)

Connection of unclassified mobile devices to classified information systems is
prohibited;(2)

Connection of unclassified mobile devices to unclassified information systems requires
approval from the authorizing official;(3)

Use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces within the unclassified mobile
devices is prohibited; and(4)

Unclassified mobile devices and the information stored on those devices are subject torandom reviews and inspections by [Assignment: organization-defined security officials],
and if classified information is found, the incident handling policy is followed.

Restricts the connection of classified mobile devices to classified information systems inaccordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies].

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-6, IR-4.
(5)

ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | FULL DEVICE / CONTAINER-BASED ENCRYPTION

The organization employs [Selection: full-device encryption; container encryption] to protect theconfidentiality and integrity of information on [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices].
Supplemental Guidance: Container-based encryption provides a more fine-grained approach to
the encryption of data/information on mobile devices, including for example, encrypting
selected data structures such as files, records, or fields. Related controls: MP-5, SC-13, SC28.
References: OMB Memorandum 06-16; NIST Special Publications 800-114, 800-124, 800-164.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AC-20

LOW AC-19

MOD AC-19 (5)HIGH AC-19 (5)USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Control: The organization establishes terms and conditions, consistent with any trust relationships

established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external information
systems, allowing authorized individuals to:a.

Access the information system from external information systems; andb.

Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external information
systems.

Supplemental Guidance: External information systems are information systems or components of

information systems that are outside of the authorization boundary established by organizations
and for which organizations typically have no direct supervision and authority over the applicationof required security controls or the assessment of control effectiveness. External information
systems include, for example: (i) personally owned information systems/devices (e.g., notebook
computers, smart phones, tablets, personal digital assistants); (ii) privately owned computing andcommunications devices resident in commercial or public facilities (e.g., hotels, train stations,convention centers, shopping malls, or airports); (iii) information systems owned or controlled by
nonfederal governmental organizations; and (iv) federal information systems that are not owned
by, operated by, or under the direct supervision and authority of organizations. This control also
addresses the use of external information systems for the processing, storage, or transmission oforganizational information, including, for example, accessing cloud services (e.g., infrastructure asa service, platform as a service, or software as a service) from organizational information systems.
For some external information systems (i.e., information systems operated by other federal
agencies, including organizations subordinate to those agencies), the trust relationships that havebeen established between those organizations and the originating organization may be such, thatno explicit terms and conditions are required. Information systems within these organizations
would not be considered external. These situations occur when, for example, there are pre-existing
sharing/trust agreements (either implicit or explicit) established between federal agencies ororganizations subordinate to those agencies, or when such trust agreements are specified byapplicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, or policies. Authorized individuals include, forexample, organizational personnel, contractors, or other individuals with authorized access toorganizational information systems and over which organizations have the authority to impose
rules of behavior with regard to system access. Restrictions that organizations impose on
authorized individuals need not be uniform, as those restrictions may vary depending upon thetrust relationships between organizations. Therefore, organizations may choose to impose different
security restrictions on contractors than on state, local, or tribal governments.
This control does not apply to the use of external information systems to access public interfaces
to organizational information systems (e.g., individuals accessing federal information throughwww.usa.gov). Organizations establish terms and conditions for the use of external information
systems in accordance with organizational security policies and procedures. Terms and conditions
address as a minimum: types of applications that can be accessed on organizational information
systems from external information systems; and the highest security category of information thatcan be processed, stored, or transmitted on external information systems. If terms and conditions
with the owners of external information systems cannot be established, organizations may impose
restrictions on organizational personnel using those external systems. Related controls: AC-3, AC17, AC-19, CA-3, PL-4, SA-9.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED USE
The organization permits authorized individuals to use an external information system to accessthe information system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only
when the organization:(a)Verifies the implementation of required security controls on the external system as specified
in the organization’s information security policy and security plan; or(b) Retains approved information system connection or processing agreements with theorganizational entity hosting the external information system.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement recognizes that there are circumstanceswhere individuals using external information systems (e.g., contractors, coalition partners)
need to access organizational information systems. In those situations, organizations need
confidence that the external information systems contain the necessary security safeguards(i.e., security controls), so as not to compromise, damage, or otherwise harm organizational
information systems. Verification that the required security controls have been implemented
can be achieved, for example, by third-party, independent assessments, attestations, or othermeans, depending on the confidence level required by organizations. Related control: CA-2.
(2)

USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES
The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of organization-controlled portablestorage devices by authorized individuals on external information systems.

Supplemental Guidance: Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices
in external information systems include, for example, complete prohibition of the use of suchdevices or restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices
may be used.
(3)

USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NON-ORGANIZATIONALLY OWNED SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS / DEVICES
The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of non-organizationally owned information
systems, system components, or devices to process, store, or transmit organizational information.

Supplemental Guidance: Non-organizationally owned devices include devices owned by otherorganizations (e.g., federal/state agencies, contractors) and personally owned devices. There
are risks to using non-organizationally owned devices. In some cases, the risk is sufficiently
high as to prohibit such use. In other cases, it may be such that the use of non-organizationallyowned devices is allowed but restricted in some way. Restrictions include, for example: (i)requiring the implementation of organization-approved security controls prior to authorizing
such connections; (ii) limiting access to certain types of information, services, or applications;(iii) using virtualization techniques to limit processing and storage activities to servers orother system components provisioned by the organization; and (iv) agreeing to terms andconditions for usage. For personally owned devices, organizations consult with the Office of
the General Counsel regarding legal issues associated with using such devices in operational
environments, including, for example, requirements for conducting forensic analyses during
investigations after an incident.
(4)

USE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | NETWORK ACCESSIBLE STORAGE DEVICES

The organization prohibits the use of [Assignment: organization-defined network accessible
storage devices] in external information systems.
Supplemental Guidance: Network accessible storage devices in external information systems
include, for example, online storage devices in public, hybrid, or community cloud-based
systems.
References: FIPS Publication 199.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

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MOD AC-20 (1) (2)

HIGH AC-20 (1) (2)

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AC-21

INFORMATION SHARING
Control: The organization:a.

Facilitates information sharing by enabling authorized users to determine whether accessauthorizations assigned to the sharing partner match the access restrictions on the information
for [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing circumstances where user
discretion is required]; andb.

Employs [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms or manual processes] toassist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to information that may be restricted in some manner(e.g., privileged medical information, contract-sensitive information, proprietary information,
personally identifiable information, classified information related to special access programs orcompartments) based on some formal or administrative determination. Depending on the particular
information-sharing circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the individual, group, ororganizational level. Information may be defined by content, type, security category, or special
access program/compartment. Related control: AC-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION SHARING | AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORTThe information system enforces information-sharing decisions by authorized users based onaccess authorizations of sharing partners and access restrictions on information to be shared.
(2)

INFORMATION SHARING | INFORMATION SEARCH AND RETRIEVALThe information system implements information search and retrieval services that enforce[Assignment: organization-defined information sharing restrictions].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

AC-22

LOW Not Selected

MOD AC-21

HIGH AC-21

PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE CONTENT
Control: The organization:a.

Designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information
system;b.

Trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain
nonpublic information;c.

Reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible
information system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; andd.

Reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and removes such information, if discovered.

Supplemental Guidance: In accordance with federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies,

regulations, standards, and/or guidance, the general public is not authorized access to nonpublic
information (e.g., information protected under the Privacy Act and proprietary information). This
control addresses information systems that are controlled by the organization and accessible to thegeneral public, typically without identification or authentication. The posting of information on
non-organization information systems is covered by organizational policy. Related controls: AC-3,
AC-4, AT-2, AT-3, AU-13.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

AC-23

LOW AC-22

MOD AC-22

HIGH AC-22

DATA MINING PROTECTION
Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined data mining prevention anddetection techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined data storage objects] to adequately
detect and protect against data mining.
Supplemental Guidance: Data storage objects include, for example, databases, database records, anddatabase fields. Data mining prevention and detection techniques include, for example: (i) limiting
the types of responses provided to database queries; (ii) limiting the number/frequency of databasequeries to increase the work factor needed to determine the contents of such databases; and (iii)
notifying organizational personnel when atypical database queries or accesses occur. This control
focuses on the protection of organizational information from data mining while such information
resides in organizational data stores. In contrast, AU-13 focuses on monitoring for organizational
information that may have been mined or otherwise obtained from data stores and is now available
as open source information residing on external sites, for example, through social networking orsocial media websites.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

AC-24

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS
Control: The organization establishes procedures to ensure [Assignment: organization-definedaccess control decisions] are applied to each access request prior to access enforcement.
Supplemental Guidance: Access control decisions (also known as authorization decisions) occur

when authorization information is applied to specific accesses. In contrast, access enforcement
occurs when information systems enforce access control decisions. While it is very common tohave access control decisions and access enforcement implemented by the same entity, it is not
required and it is not always an optimal implementation choice. For some architectures anddistributed information systems, different entities may perform access control decisions and accessenforcement.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | TRANSMIT ACCESS AUTHORIZATION INFORMATION

The information system transmits [Assignment: organization-defined access authorization
information] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Assignment:
organization-defined information systems] that enforce access control decisions.
Supplemental Guidance: In distributed information systems, authorization processes and access
control decisions may occur in separate parts of the systems. In such instances, authorization
information is transmitted securely so timely access control decisions can be enforced at theappropriate locations. To support the access control decisions, it may be necessary to transmit
as part of the access authorization information, supporting security attributes. This is due tothe fact that in distributed information systems, there are various access control decisions thatneed to be made and different entities (e.g., services) make these decisions in a serial fashion,
each requiring some security attributes to make the decisions. Protecting access authorization

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information (i.e., access control decisions) ensures that such information cannot be altered,spoofed, or otherwise compromised during transmission.
(2)

ACCESS CONTROL DECISIONS | NO USER OR PROCESS IDENTITY
The information system enforces access control decisions based on [Assignment: organizationdefined security attributes] that do not include the identity of the user or process acting on behalfof the user.

Supplemental Guidance: In certain situations, it is important that access control decisions can bemade without information regarding the identity of the users issuing the requests. These are
generally instances where preserving individual privacy is of paramount importance. In othersituations, user identification information is simply not needed for access control decisions
and, especially in the case of distributed information systems, transmitting such information
with the needed degree of assurance may be very expensive or difficult to accomplish.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

AC-25

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

REFERENCE MONITOR
Control: The information system implements a reference monitor for [Assignment: organizationdefined access control policies] that is tamperproof, always invoked, and small enough to be
subject to analysis and testing, the completeness of which can be assured.

Information is represented internally within information systems using
abstractions known as data structures. Internal data structures can represent different types ofentities, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associatedwith individuals, devices, or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known
as objects, are typically associated with data structures such as records, buffers, tables, files, interprocess pipes, and communications ports. Reference monitors typically enforce mandatory access
control policies—a type of access control that restricts access to objects based on the identity ofsubjects or groups to which the subjects belong. The access controls are mandatory because
subjects with certain privileges (i.e., access permissions) are restricted from passing thoseprivileges on to any other subjects, either directly or indirectly—that is, the information system
strictly enforces the access control policy based on the rule set established by the policy. The
tamperproof property of the reference monitor prevents adversaries from compromising thefunctioning of the mechanism. The always invoked property prevents adversaries from bypassing
the mechanism and hence violating the security policy. The smallness property helps to ensure thecompleteness in the analysis and testing of the mechanism to detect weaknesses or deficiencies(i.e., latent flaws) that would prevent the enforcement of the security policy. Related controls: AC3, AC-16, SC-3, SC-39.
Supplemental Guidance:

Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-AC

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: AWARENESS AND TRAINING
AT-1

SECURITY AWARENESS AND TRAINING POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

A security awareness and training policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities,
and compliance; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security awareness and training policy
and associated security awareness and training controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Security awareness and training policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
and2.

Security awareness and training procedures [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AT family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-16, 800-50, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AT-2

LOW AT-1

MOD AT-1

HIGH AT-1

SECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING
Control: The organization provides basic security awareness training to information system users(including managers, senior executives, and contractors):a.

As part of initial training for new users;b.

When required by information system changes; andc.

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the appropriate content of security awarenesstraining and security awareness techniques based on the specific organizational requirements andthe information systems to which personnel have authorized access. The content includes a basic
understanding of the need for information security and user actions to maintain security and torespond to suspected security incidents. The content also addresses awareness of the need for
operations security. Security awareness techniques can include, for example, displaying posters,
offering supplies inscribed with security reminders, generating email advisories/notices from

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

senior organizational officials, displaying logon screen messages, and conducting information
security awareness events. Related controls: AT-3, AT-4, PL-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SECURITY AWARENESS | PRACTICAL EXERCISES

The organization includes practical exercises in security awareness training that simulate actual
cyber attacks.
Supplemental Guidance: Practical exercises may include, for example, no-notice social

engineering attempts to collect information, gain unauthorized access, or simulate the adverse
impact of opening malicious email attachments or invoking, via spear phishing attacks,
malicious web links. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CP-4, IR-3.
(2)

SECURITY AWARENESS | INSIDER THREAT

The organization includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential
indicators of insider threat.
Supplemental Guidance: Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can
include behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction, attempts to gain access to
information not required for job performance, unexplained access to financial resources,
bullying or sexual harassment of fellow employees, workplace violence, and other serious
violations of organizational policies, procedures, directives, rules, or practices. Security
awareness training includes how to communicate employee and management concerns
regarding potential indicators of insider threat through appropriate organizational channels inaccordance with established organizational policies and procedures. Related controls: PL-4,
PM-12, PS-3, PS-6.
References: C.F.R. Part 5 Subpart C (5 C.F.R. 930.301); Executive Order 13587; NIST Special

Publication 800-50.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AT-3

LOW AT-2

MOD AT-2 (2)HIGH AT-2 (2)ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING
Control: The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned security

roles and responsibilities:a.

Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties;b.

When required by information system changes; andc.

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training basedon the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements oforganizations and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. In addition,organizations provide enterprise architects, information system developers, software developers,
acquisition/procurement officials, information system managers, system/network administrators,
personnel conducting configuration management and auditing activities, personnel performing
independent verification and validation activities, security control assessors, and other personnel
having access to system-level software, adequate security-related technical training specificallytailored for their assigned duties. Comprehensive role-based training addresses management,
operational, and technical roles and responsibilities covering physical, personnel, and technicalsafeguards and countermeasures. Such training can include for example, policies, procedures,
tools, and artifacts for the organizational security roles defined. Organizations also provide thetraining necessary for individuals to carry out their responsibilities related to operations andsupply chain security within the context of organizational information security programs. Role-

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

based security training also applies to contractors providing services to federal agencies. Related
controls: AT-2, AT-4, PL-4, PS-7, SA-3, SA-12, SA-16.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLSThe organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operation ofenvironmental controls.
Supplemental Guidance: Environmental controls include, for example, fire suppression anddetection devices/systems, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses,
smoke detectors, temperature/humidity, HVAC, and power within the facility. Organizations
identify personnel with specific roles and responsibilities associated with environmental
controls requiring specialized training. Related controls: PE-1, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15.
(2)

ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLSThe organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operation ofphysical security controls.
Supplemental Guidance: Physical security controls include, for example, physical access control

devices, physical intrusion alarms, monitoring/surveillance equipment, and security guards(deployment and operating procedures). Organizations identify personnel with specific roles
and responsibilities associated with physical security controls requiring specialized training.
Related controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5.
(3)

ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | PRACTICAL EXERCISES

The organization includes practical exercises in security training that reinforce training objectives.
Supplemental Guidance: Practical exercises may include, for example, security training forsoftware developers that includes simulated cyber attacks exploiting common software
vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows), or spear/whale phishing attacks targeted at seniorleaders/executives. These types of practical exercises help developers better understand theeffects of such vulnerabilities and appreciate the need for security coding standards andprocesses.
(4)

ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING | SUSPICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND ANOMALOUS SYSTEM BEHAVIOR

The organization provides training to its personnel on [Assignment: organization-definedindicators of malicious code] to recognize suspicious communications and anomalous behavior inorganizational information systems.
Supplemental Guidance: A well-trained workforce provides another organizational safeguardthat can be employed as part of a defense-in-depth strategy to protect organizations against
malicious code coming in to organizations via email or the web applications. Personnel aretrained to look for indications of potentially suspicious email (e.g., receiving an unexpectedemail, receiving an email containing strange or poor grammar, or receiving an email from anunfamiliar sender but who appears to be from a known sponsor or contractor). Personnel arealso trained on how to respond to such suspicious email or web communications (e.g., notopening attachments, not clicking on embedded web links, and checking the source of email
addresses). For this process to work effectively, all organizational personnel are trained andmade aware of what constitutes suspicious communications. Training personnel on how torecognize anomalous behaviors in organizational information systems can potentially provide
early warning for the presence of malicious code. Recognition of such anomalous behavior byorganizational personnel can supplement automated malicious code detection and protection
tools and systems employed by organizations.
References: C.F.R. Part 5 Subpart C (5 C.F.R. 930.301); NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-

50.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

APPENDIX F-AT

LOW AT-3

MOD AT-3

HIGH AT-3

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________AT-4

SECURITY TRAINING RECORDS
Control: The organization:a.

Documents and monitors individual information system security training activities including
basic security awareness training and specific information system security training; andb.

Retains individual training records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual

supervisors at the option of the organization. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, PM-14.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

AT-5

LOW AT-4

MOD AT-4

HIGH AT-4

CONTACTS WITH SECURITY GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PM-15].

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
AU-1

AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

An audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability policy andassociated audit and accountability controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Audit and accountability policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

Audit and accountability procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AU family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AU-2

LOW AU-1

MOD AU-1

HIGH AU-1

AUDIT EVENTSControl: The organization:a.

Determines that the information system is capable of auditing the following events:[Assignment: organization-defined auditable events];b.

Coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring auditrelated information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable
events;c.

Provides a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support afterthe-fact investigations of security incidents; andd.

Determines that the following events are to be audited within the information system:[Assignment: organization-defined audited events (the subset of the auditable events definedin AU-2 a.) along with the frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each identified
event].

Supplemental Guidance: An event is any observable occurrence in an organizational information

system. Organizations identify audit events as those events which are significant and relevant to

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

the security of information systems and the environments in which those systems operate in order
to meet specific and ongoing audit needs. Audit events can include, for example, password
changes, failed logons, or failed accesses related to information systems, administrative privilege
usage, PIV credential usage, or third-party credential usage. In determining the set of auditable
events, organizations consider the auditing appropriate for each of the security controls to be
implemented. To balance auditing requirements with other information system needs, this control
also requires identifying that subset of auditable events that are audited at a given point in time.
For example, organizations may determine that information systems must have the capability tolog every file access both successful and unsuccessful, but not activate that capability except for
specific circumstances due to the potential burden on system performance. Auditing requirements,
including the need for auditable events, may be referenced in other security controls and control
enhancements. Organizations also include auditable events that are required by applicable federallaws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Audit records can begenerated at various levels of abstraction, including at the packet level as information traverses the
network. Selecting the appropriate level of abstraction is a critical aspect of an audit capability andcan facilitate the identification of root causes to problems. Organizations consider in the definitionof auditable events, the auditing necessary to cover related events such as the steps in distributed,
transaction-based processes (e.g., processes that are distributed across multiple organizations) andactions that occur in service-oriented architectures. Related controls: AC-6, AC-17, AU-3, AU-12,
MA-4, MP-2, MP-4, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

AUDIT EVENTS | COMPILATION OF AUDIT RECORDS FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12].
(2)

AUDIT EVENTS | SELECTION OF AUDIT EVENTS BY COMPONENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12].
(3)

AUDIT EVENTS | REVIEWS AND UPDATESThe organization reviews and updates the audited events [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].
Supplemental Guidance: Over time, the events that organizations believe should be audited maychange. Reviewing and updating the set of audited events periodically is necessary to ensurethat the current set is still necessary and sufficient.
(4)

AUDIT EVENTS | PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (9)].
References: NIST Special Publication 800-92; Web: http://idmanagement.gov.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AU-3

LOW AU-2

MOD AU-2 (3)HIGH AU-2 (3)CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS
Control: The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes
what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of theevent, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any individuals or subjects associated with theevent.
Supplemental Guidance: Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of

this control, includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process
identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, filenames involved, and access control orflow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure andevent-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred).
Related controls: AU-2, AU-8, AU-12, SI-11.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION
The information system generates audit records containing the following additional information:[Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed information].

Supplemental Guidance: Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records

includes, for example, full text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities
of group account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to
only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the useof audit trails and audit logs by not including information that could potentially be misleadingor could make it more difficult to locate information of interest.
(2)

CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENT
The information system provides centralized management and configuration of the content to be
captured in audit records generated by [Assignment: organization-defined information systemcomponents].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires that the content to be captured in

audit records be configured from a central location (necessitating automation). Organizations
coordinate the selection of required audit content to support the centralized management andconfiguration capability provided by the information system. Related controls: AU-6, AU-7.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AU-4

LOW AU-3

MOD AU-3 (1)HIGH AU-3 (1) (2)

AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY
Control: The organization allocates audit record storage capacity in accordance with [Assignment:

organization-defined audit record storage requirements].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider the types of auditing to be performed and the audit

processing requirements when allocating audit storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit storage
capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in the potential loss
or reduction of auditing capability. Related controls: AU-2, AU-5, AU-6, AU-7, AU-11, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE

The information system off-loads audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto
a different system or media than the system being audited.
Supplemental Guidance: Off-loading is a process designed to preserve the confidentiality andintegrity of audit records by moving the records from the primary information system to asecondary or alternate system. It is a common process in information systems with limited
audit storage capacity; the audit storage is used only in a transitory fashion until the system
can communicate with the secondary or alternate system designated for storing the audit
records, at which point the information is transferred.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

APPENDIX F-AU

LOW AU-4

MOD AU-4

HIGH AU-4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________AU-5

RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES
Control: The information system:a.

Alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] in the event of an audit
processing failure; andb.

Takes the following additional actions: [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be taken(e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit
records)].

Supplemental Guidance: Audit processing failures include, for example, software/hardware errors,

failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded.
Organizations may choose to define additional actions for different audit processing failures (e.g.,by type, by location, by severity, or a combination of such factors). This control applies to each
audit data storage repository (i.e., distinct information system component where audit records are
stored), the total audit storage capacity of organizations (i.e., all audit data storage repositories
combined), or both. Related controls: AU-4, SI-12.
Control Enhancements:(1)

RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY

The information system provides a warning to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles,
and/or locations] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when allocated audit
record storage volume reaches [Assignment: organization-defined percentage] of repository
maximum audit record storage capacity.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may have multiple audit data storage repositories

distributed across multiple information system components, with each repository having
different storage volume capacities.
(2)

RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | REAL-TIME ALERTS

The information system provides an alert in [Assignment: organization-defined real-time period] to[Assignment: organization-defined personnel, roles, and/or locations] when the following audit
failure events occur: [Assignment: organization-defined audit failure events requiring real-timealerts].
Supplemental Guidance: Alerts provide organizations with urgent messages. Real-time alerts

provide these messages at information technology speed (i.e., the time from event detection toalert occurs in seconds or less).
(3)

RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | CONFIGURABLE TRAFFIC VOLUME THRESHOLDSThe information system enforces configurable network communications traffic volume thresholds
reflecting limits on auditing capacity and [Selection: rejects; delays] network traffic above thosethresholds.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations have the capability to reject or delay the processing of

network communications traffic if auditing such traffic is determined to exceed the storage
capacity of the information system audit function. The rejection or delay response is triggeredby the established organizational traffic volume thresholds which can be adjusted based onchanges to audit storage capacity.
(4)

RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES | SHUTDOWN ON FAILURE

The information system invokes a [Selection: full system shutdown; partial system shutdown;
degraded operational mode with limited mission/business functionality available] in the event of[Assignment: organization-defined audit failures], unless an alternate audit capability exists.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the types of audit failures that can trigger

automatic information system shutdowns or degraded operations. Because of the importanceof ensuring mission/business continuity, organizations may determine that the nature of theaudit failure is not so severe that it warrants a complete shutdown of the information system
supporting the core organizational missions/business operations. In those instances, partial
information system shutdowns or operating in a degraded mode with reduced capability may
be viable alternatives. Related control: AU-15.
References: None.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AU-6

LOW AU-5

MOD AU-5

HIGH AU-5 (1) (2)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING
Control: The organization:a.

Reviews and analyzes information system audit records [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] for indications of [Assignment: organization-defined inappropriate or unusual
activity]; andb.

Reports findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Audit review, analysis, and reporting covers information security-related

auditing performed by organizations including, for example, auditing that results from monitoringof account usage, remote access, wireless connectivity, mobile device connection, configuration
settings, system component inventory, use of maintenance tools and nonlocal maintenance,
physical access, temperature and humidity, equipment delivery and removal, communications at
the information system boundaries, use of mobile code, and use of VoIP. Findings can be reported
to organizational entities that include, for example, incident response team, help desk, information
security group/department. If organizations are prohibited from reviewing and analyzing audit
information or unable to conduct such activities (e.g., in certain national security applications or
systems), the review/analysis may be carried out by other organizations granted such authority.
Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AT-3, AU-7, AU-16, CA-7, CM-5, CM-10, CM-11,
IA-3, IA-5, IR-5, IR-6, MA-4, MP-4, PE-3, PE-6, PE-14, PE-16, RA-5, SC-7, SC-18, SC-19, SI-3,
SI-4, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PROCESS INTEGRATIONThe organization employs automated mechanisms to integrate audit review, analysis, andreporting processes to support organizational processes for investigation and response tosuspicious activities.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational processes benefiting from integrated audit review,

analysis, and reporting include, for example, incident response, continuous monitoring,
contingency planning, and Inspector General audits. Related controls: AU-12, PM-7.
(2)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUTOMATED SECURITY ALERTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4].
(3)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATE AUDIT REPOSITORIESThe organization analyzes and correlates audit records across different repositories to gainorganization-wide situational awareness.
Supplemental Guidance: Organization-wide situational awareness includes awareness across all

three tiers of risk management (i.e., organizational, mission/business process, and information
system) and supports cross-organization awareness. Related controls: AU-12, IR-4.
(4)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CENTRAL REVIEW AND ANALYSISThe information system provides the capability to centrally review and analyze audit records frommultiple components within the system.
Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms for centralized reviews and analyses include,for example, Security Information Management products. Related controls: AU-2, AU-12.
(5)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | INTEGRATION / SCANNING AND MONITORING CAPABILITIESThe organization integrates analysis of audit records with analysis of [Selection (one or more):vulnerability scanning information; performance data; information system monitoring information;[Assignment: organization-defined data/information collected from other sources]] to further
enhance the ability to identify inappropriate or unusual activity.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement does not require vulnerability scanning, thegeneration of performance data, or information system monitoring. Rather, the enhancement
requires that the analysis of information being otherwise produced in these areas is integrated
with the analysis of audit information. Security Event and Information Management System
tools can facilitate audit record aggregation/consolidation from multiple information systemcomponents as well as audit record correlation and analysis. The use of standardized audit
record analysis scripts developed by organizations (with localized script adjustments, asnecessary) provides more cost-effective approaches for analyzing audit record informationcollected. The correlation of audit record information with vulnerability scanning information
is important in determining the veracity of vulnerability scans and correlating attack detection
events with scanning results. Correlation with performance data can help uncover denial ofservice attacks or cyber attacks resulting in unauthorized use of resources. Correlation withsystem monitoring information can assist in uncovering attacks and in better relating audit
information to operational situations. Related controls: AU-12, IR-4, RA-5.
(6)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH PHYSICAL MONITORING

The organization correlates information from audit records with information obtained frommonitoring physical access to further enhance the ability to identify suspicious, inappropriate,
unusual, or malevolent activity.
Supplemental Guidance: The correlation of physical audit information and audit logs frominformation systems may assist organizations in identifying examples of suspicious behavior
or supporting evidence of such behavior. For example, the correlation of an individual’s
identity for logical access to certain information systems with the additional physical security
information that the individual was actually present at the facility when the logical accessoccurred, may prove to be useful in investigations.
(7)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | PERMITTED ACTIONS

The organization specifies the permitted actions for each [Selection (one or more): information
system process; role; user] associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit
information.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations specify permitted actions for information systemprocesses, roles, and/or users associated with the review, analysis, and reporting of audit
records through account management techniques. Specifying permitted actions on audit
information is a way to enforce the principle of least privilege. Permitted actions are enforcedby the information system and include, for example, read, write, execute, append, and delete.
(8)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | FULL TEXT ANALYSIS OF PRIVILEGED COMMANDSThe organization performs a full text analysis of audited privileged commands in a physicallydistinct component or subsystem of the information system, or other information system that isdedicated to that analysis.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires a distinct environment for the

dedicated analysis of audit information related to privileged users without compromising suchinformation on the information system where the users have elevated privileges including thecapability to execute privileged commands. Full text analysis refers to analysis that considers
the full text of privileged commands (i.e., commands and all parameters) as opposed toanalysis that considers only the name of the command. Full text analysis includes, forexample, the use of pattern matching and heuristics. Related controls: AU-3, AU-9, AU-11,
AU-12.
(9)

AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATION WITH INFORMATION FROM NONTECHNICAL SOURCES

The organization correlates information from nontechnical sources with audit information toenhance organization-wide situational awareness.
Supplemental Guidance: Nontechnical sources include, for example, human resources records

documenting organizational policy violations (e.g., sexual harassment incidents, improper useof organizational information assets). Such information can lead organizations to a more
directed analytical effort to detect potential malicious insider activity. Due to the sensitive
nature of the information available from nontechnical sources, organizations limit access tosuch information to minimize the potential for the inadvertent release of privacy-related
information to individuals that do not have a need to know. Thus, correlation of information

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

from nontechnical sources with audit information generally occurs only when individuals are
suspected of being involved in a security incident. Organizations obtain legal advice prior toinitiating such actions. Related control: AT-2.
(10) AUDIT REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUDIT LEVEL ADJUSTMENT
The organization adjusts the level of audit review, analysis, and reporting within the information
system when there is a change in risk based on law enforcement information, intelligence
information, or other credible sources of information.
Supplemental Guidance: The frequency, scope, and/or depth of the audit review, analysis, andreporting may be adjusted to meet organizational needs based on new information received.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AU-7

LOW AU-6

MOD AU-6 (1) (3)

HIGH AU-6 (1) (3) (5) (6)

AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION
Control: The information system provides an audit reduction and report generation capability that:a.

Supports on-demand audit review, analysis, and reporting requirements and after-the-fact
investigations of security incidents; andb.

Does not alter the original content or time ordering of audit records.

Supplemental Guidance: Audit reduction is a process that manipulates collected audit informationand organizes such information in a summary format that is more meaningful to analysts. Audit
reduction and report generation capabilities do not always emanate from the same information
system or from the same organizational entities conducting auditing activities. Audit reduction
capability can include, for example, modern data mining techniques with advanced data filters to
identify anomalous behavior in audit records. The report generation capability provided by the
information system can generate customizable reports. Time ordering of audit records can be asignificant issue if the granularity of the timestamp in the record is insufficient. Related control:
AU-6.
Control Enhancements:(1)

AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC PROCESSING

The information system provides the capability to process audit records for events of interest
based on [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit records].
Supplemental Guidance: Events of interest can be identified by the content of specific audit

record fields including, for example, identities of individuals, event types, event locations,
event times, event dates, system resources involved, IP addresses involved, or information
objects accessed. Organizations may define audit event criteria to any degree of granularity
required, for example, locations selectable by general networking location (e.g., by network or
subnetwork) or selectable by specific information system component. Related controls: AU-2,
AU-12.
(2)

AUDIT REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC SORT AND SEARCH
The information system provides the capability to sort and search audit records for events ofinterest based on the content of [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit
records].

Supplemental Guidance: Sorting and searching of audit records may be based upon the contentsof audit record fields, for example: (i) date/time of events; (ii) user identifiers; (iii) Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses involved in the event; (iv) type of event; or (v) event success/failure.
References: None.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW Not Selected

P2

AU-8

MOD AU-7 (1)HIGH AU-7 (1)TIME STAMPSControl: The information system:a.

Uses internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records; andb.

Records time stamps for audit records that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time
(UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and meets [Assignment: organization-defined
granularity of time measurement].

Supplemental Guidance: Time stamps generated by the information system include date and time.

Time is commonly expressed in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), a modern continuation ofGreenwich Mean Time (GMT), or local time with an offset from UTC. Granularity of timemeasurements refers to the degree of synchronization between information system clocks andreference clocks, for example, clocks synchronizing within hundreds of milliseconds or withintens of milliseconds. Organizations may define different time granularities for different systemcomponents. Time service can also be critical to other security capabilities such as access control
and identification and authentication, depending on the nature of the mechanisms used to support
those capabilities. Related controls: AU-3, AU-12.
Control Enhancements:(1)

TIME STAMPS | SYNCHRONIZATION WITH AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE

The information system:(a)Compares the internal information system clocks [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] with [Assignment: organization-defined authoritative time source]; and(b) Synchronizes the internal system clocks to the authoritative time source when the timedifference is greater than [Assignment: organization-defined time period].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides uniformity of time stamps for

information systems with multiple system clocks and systems connected over a network.
(2)

TIME STAMPS | SECONDARY AUTHORITATIVE TIME SOURCE
The information system identifies a secondary authoritative time source that is located in adifferent geographic region than the primary authoritative time source.

References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AU-9

LOW AU-8

MOD AU-8 (1)HIGH AU-8 (1)PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION
Control: The information system protects audit information and audit tools from unauthorizedaccess, modification, and deletion.
Supplemental Guidance: Audit information includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit

settings, and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information system activity. This control
focuses on technical protection of audit information. Physical protection of audit information isaddressed by media protection controls and physical and environmental protection controls.
Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-6.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | HARDWARE WRITE-ONCE MEDIA
The information system writes audit trails to hardware-enforced, write-once media.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to the initial generation of audit

trails (i.e., the collection of audit records that represents the audit information to be used for
detection, analysis, and reporting purposes) and to the backup of those audit trails. The
enhancement does not apply to the initial generation of audit records prior to being written to
an audit trail. Write-once, read-many (WORM) media includes, for example, Compact DiskRecordable (CD-R) and Digital Video Disk-Recordable (DVD-R). In contrast, the use ofswitchable write-protection media such as on tape cartridges or Universal Serial Bus (USB)drives results in write-protected, but not write-once, media. Related controls: AU-4, AU-5.
(2)

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | AUDIT BACKUP ON SEPARATE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS
The information system backs up audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] ontoa physically different system or system component than the system or component being audited.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement helps to ensure that a compromise of theinformation system being audited does not also result in a compromise of the audit records.
Related controls: AU-4, AU-5, AU-11.
(3)

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit
information and audit tools.
Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic mechanisms used for protecting the integrity of audit

information include, for example, signed hash functions using asymmetric cryptography
enabling distribution of the public key to verify the hash information while maintaining theconfidentiality of the secret key used to generate the hash. Related controls: AU-10, SC-12,
SC-13.
(4)

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | ACCESS BY SUBSET OF PRIVILEGED USERS

The organization authorizes access to management of audit functionality to only [Assignment:
organization-defined subset of privileged users].
Supplemental Guidance: Individuals with privileged access to an information system and whoare also the subject of an audit by that system, may affect the reliability of audit information
by inhibiting audit activities or modifying audit records. This control enhancement requiresthat privileged access be further defined between audit-related privileges and other privileges,
thus limiting the users with audit-related privileges. Related control: AC-5.
(5)

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATIONThe organization enforces dual authorization for [Selection (one or more): movement; deletion] of[Assignment: organization-defined audit information].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose different selection options for different

types of audit information. Dual authorization mechanisms require the approval of two
authorized individuals in order to execute. Dual authorization may also be known as twoperson control. Related controls: AC-3, MP-2.
(6)

PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | READ ONLY ACCESSThe organization authorizes read-only access to audit information to [Assignment: organizationdefined subset of privileged users].
Supplemental Guidance: Restricting privileged user authorizations to read-only helps to limit

the potential damage to organizations that could be initiated by such users (e.g., deleting audit
records to cover up malicious activity).
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

APPENDIX F-AU

LOW AU-9

MOD AU-9 (4)HIGH AU-9 (2) (3) (4)

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________AU-10

NON-REPUDIATION
Control: The information system protects against an individual (or process acting on behalf of anindividual) falsely denying having performed [Assignment: organization-defined actions to becovered by non-repudiation].
Supplemental Guidance: Types of individual actions covered by non-repudiation include, forexample, creating information, sending and receiving messages, approving information (e.g.,indicating concurrence or signing a contract). Non-repudiation protects individuals against later
claims by: (i) authors of not having authored particular documents; (ii) senders of not havingtransmitted messages; (iii) receivers of not having received messages; or (iv) signatories of nothaving signed documents. Non-repudiation services can be used to determine if information
originated from a particular individual, or if an individual took specific actions (e.g., sending anemail, signing a contract, approving a procurement request) or received specific information.
Organizations obtain non-repudiation services by employing various techniques or mechanisms(e.g., digital signatures, digital message receipts). Related controls: SC-12, SC-8, SC-13, SC-16,
SC-17, SC-23.
Control Enhancements:(1)

NON-REPUDIATION | ASSOCIATION OF IDENTITIESThe information system:(a)Binds the identity of the information producer with the information to [Assignment:
organization-defined strength of binding]; and(b) Provides the means for authorized individuals to determine the identity of the producer of theinformation.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement supports audit requirements that provide

organizational personnel with the means to identify who produced specific information in theevent of an information transfer. Organizations determine and approve the strength of thebinding between the information producer and the information based on the security categoryof the information and relevant risk factors. Related controls: AC-4, AC-16.
(2)

NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION PRODUCER IDENTITY

The information system:(a)

Validates the binding of the information producer identity to the information at [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; and(b) Performs [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement prevents the modification of information

between production and review. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example, by
the use of cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine if validations are in response touser requests or generated automatically. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16.
(3)

NON-REPUDIATION | CHAIN OF CUSTODY
The information system maintains reviewer/releaser identity and credentials within the establishedchain of custody for all information reviewed or released.

Supplemental Guidance: Chain of custody is a process that tracks the movement of evidence

through its collection, safeguarding, and analysis life cycle by documenting each person who
handled the evidence, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose for thetransfer. If the reviewer is a human or if the review function is automated but separate fromthe release/transfer function, the information system associates the identity of the reviewer ofthe information to be released with the information and the information label. In the case ofhuman reviews, this control enhancement provides organizational officials the means to
identify who reviewed and released the information. In the case of automated reviews, thiscontrol enhancement ensures that only approved review functions are employed. Related
controls: AC-4, AC-16.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(4)

NON-REPUDIATION | VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION REVIEWER IDENTITY

The information system:(a)

Validates the binding of the information reviewer identity to the information at the transfer orrelease points prior to release/transfer between [Assignment: organization-defined security
domains]; and(b) Performs [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement prevents the modification of information

between review and transfer/release. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example,
by the use of cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine validations are in response
to user requests or generated automatically. Related controls: AC-4, AC-16.
(5)

NON-REPUDIATION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

AU-11

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH AU-10

AUDIT RECORD RETENTION
Control: The organization retains audit records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period

consistent with records retention policy] to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of
security incidents and to meet regulatory and organizational information retention requirements.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations retain audit records until it is determined that they are nolonger needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes, forexample, retention and availability of audit records relative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests, subpoenas, and law enforcement actions. Organizations develop standard categories ofaudit records relative to such types of actions and standard response processes for each type ofaction. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) General Records Schedules
provide federal policy on record retention. Related controls: AU-4, AU-5, AU-9, MP-6.
Control Enhancements:(1)

AUDIT RECORD RETENTION | LONG-TERM RETRIEVAL CAPABILITY

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined measures] to ensure that long-term
audit records generated by the information system can be retrieved.
Supplemental Guidance: Measures employed by organizations to help facilitate the retrieval of

audit records include, for example, converting records to newer formats, retaining equipment
capable of reading the records, and retaining necessary documentation to help organizational
personnel understand how to interpret the records.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

AU-12

LOW AU-11

MOD AU-11

HIGH AU-11

AUDIT GENERATION
Control: The information system:a.

APPENDIX F-AU

Provides audit record generation capability for the auditable events defined in AU-2 a. at[Assignment: organization-defined information system components];

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________b.

Allows [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to select which auditable
events are to be audited by specific components of the information system; andc.

Generates audit records for the events defined in AU-2 d. with the content defined in AU-3.

Supplemental Guidance: Audit records can be generated from many different information systemcomponents. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated.
These events are typically a subset of all events for which the information system is capable ofgenerating audit records. Related controls: AC-3, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

AUDIT GENERATION | SYSTEM-WIDE / TIME-CORRELATED AUDIT TRAIL

The information system compiles audit records from [Assignment: organization-defined
information system components] into a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is timecorrelated to within [Assignment: organization-defined level of tolerance for the relationshipbetween time stamps of individual records in the audit trail].
Supplemental Guidance: Audit trails are time-correlated if the time stamps in the individual

audit records can be reliably related to the time stamps in other audit records to achieve a timeordering of the records within organizational tolerances. Related controls: AU-8, AU-12.
(2)

AUDIT GENERATION | STANDARDIZED FORMATS

The information system produces a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail composed of audit
records in a standardized format.
Supplemental Guidance: Audit information that is normalized to common standards promotesinteroperability and exchange of such information between dissimilar devices and information
systems. This facilitates production of event information that can be more readily analyzed
and correlated. Standard formats for audit records include, for example, system log records
and audit records compliant with Common Event Expressions (CEE). If logging mechanisms
within information systems do not conform to standardized formats, systems may convert
individual audit records into standardized formats when compiling system-wide audit trails.
(3)

AUDIT GENERATION | CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

The information system provides the capability for [Assignment: organization-defined individuals
or roles] to change the auditing to be performed on [Assignment: organization-defined information
system components] based on [Assignment: organization-defined selectable event criteria] within[Assignment: organization-defined time thresholds].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement enables organizations to extend or limit

auditing as necessary to meet organizational requirements. Auditing that is limited to conserve
information system resources may be extended to address certain threat situations. In addition,
auditing may be limited to a specific set of events to facilitate audit reduction, analysis, andreporting. Organizations can establish time thresholds in which audit actions are changed, forexample, near real-time, within minutes, or within hours. Related control: AU-7.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

AU-13

LOW AU-12

MOD AU-12

HIGH AU-12 (1) (3)MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
Control: The organization monitors [Assignment: organization-defined open source information

and/or information sites] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for evidence ofunauthorized disclosure of organizational information.
Supplemental Guidance: Open source information includes, for example, social networking sites.

Related controls: PE-3, SC-7.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | USE OF AUTOMATED TOOLSThe organization employs automated mechanisms to determine if organizational information has
been disclosed in an unauthorized manner.
Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms can include, for example, automated scripts tomonitor new posts on selected websites, and commercial services providing notifications andalerts to organizations.
(2)

MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE | REVIEW OF MONITORED SITESThe organization reviews the open source information sites being monitored [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

AU-14

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

SESSION AUDITControl: The information system provides the capability for authorized users to select a user
session to capture/record or view/hear.
Supplemental Guidance: Session audits include, for example, monitoring keystrokes, tracking

websites visited, and recording information and/or file transfers. Session auditing activities aredeveloped, integrated, and used in consultation with legal counsel in accordance with applicable
federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, or standards. Related controls:
AC-3, AU-4, AU-5, AU-9, AU-11.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SESSION AUDIT | SYSTEM START-UP

The information system initiates session audits at system start-up.
(2)

SESSION AUDIT | CAPTURE/RECORD AND LOG CONTENT

The information system provides the capability for authorized users to capture/record and log
content related to a user session.
(3)

SESSION AUDIT | REMOTE VIEWING / LISTENING

The information system provides the capability for authorized users to remotely view/hear allcontent related to an established user session in real time.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

AU-15

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

ALTERNATE AUDIT CAPABILITY
Control: The organization provides an alternate audit capability in the event of a failure in primary

audit capability that provides [Assignment: organization-defined alternate audit functionality].
Supplemental Guidance: Since an alternate audit capability may be a short-term protection employed

until the failure in the primary auditing capability is corrected, organizations may determine thatthe alternate audit capability need only provide a subset of the primary audit functionality that is
impacted by the failure. Related control: AU-5.
Control Enhancements: None.

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References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

AU-16

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING
Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined methods] for coordinating[Assignment: organization-defined audit information] among external organizations when audit
information is transmitted across organizational boundaries.
Supplemental Guidance: When organizations use information systems and/or services of externalorganizations, the auditing capability necessitates a coordinated approach across organizations.
For example, maintaining the identity of individuals that requested particular services acrossorganizational boundaries may often be very difficult, and doing so may prove to have significant
performance ramifications. Therefore, it is often the case that cross-organizational auditing (e.g.,
the type of auditing capability provided by service-oriented architectures) simply captures theidentity of individuals issuing requests at the initial information system, and subsequent systems
record that the requests emanated from authorized individuals. Related control: AU-6.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | IDENTITY PRESERVATIONThe organization requires that the identity of individuals be preserved in cross-organizational audit
trails.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies when there is a need to be able totrace actions that are performed across organizational boundaries to a specific individual.
(2)

CROSS-ORGANIZATIONAL AUDITING | SHARING OF AUDIT INFORMATIONThe organization provides cross-organizational audit information to [Assignment: organizationdefined organizations] based on [Assignment: organization-defined cross-organizational sharing
agreements].
Supplemental Guidance: Because of the distributed nature of the audit information, cross-organization sharing of audit information may be essential for effective analysis of theauditing being performed. For example, the audit records of one organization may not provide
sufficient information to determine the appropriate or inappropriate use of organizational
information resources by individuals in other organizations. In some instances, only the homeorganizations of individuals have the appropriate knowledge to make such determinations,thus requiring the sharing of audit information among organizations.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-AU

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION
CA-1

SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel
or roles]:1.

A security assessment and authorization policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational
entities, and compliance; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security assessment andauthorization policy and associated security assessment and authorization controls;andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Security assessment and authorization policy [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency]; and2.

Security assessment and authorization procedures [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CA family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-37, 800-53A, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW CA-1

P1

CA-2

MOD CA-1

HIGH CA-1

SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
Control: The organization:a.

Develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including:1.

Security controls and control enhancements under assessment;

2.

Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and3.

Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities;b.

Assesses the security controls in the information system and its environment of operation[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls
are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome withrespect to meeting established security requirements;c.

Produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment; and

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

d.

Provides the results of the security control assessment to [Assignment: organization-defined
individuals or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations assess security controls in organizational information

systems and the environments in which those systems operate as part of: (i) initial and ongoingsecurity authorizations; (ii) FISMA annual assessments; (iii) continuous monitoring; and (iv)system development life cycle activities. Security assessments: (i) ensure that information security
is built into organizational information systems; (ii) identify weaknesses and deficiencies early inthe development process; (iii) provide essential information needed to make risk-based decisions
as part of security authorization processes; and (iv) ensure compliance to vulnerability mitigation
procedures. Assessments are conducted on the implemented security controls from Appendix F(main catalog) and Appendix G (Program Management controls) as documented in System
Security Plans and Information Security Program Plans. Organizations can use other types ofassessment activities such as vulnerability scanning and system monitoring to maintain the
security posture of information systems during the entire life cycle. Security assessment reports
document assessment results in sufficient detail as deemed necessary by organizations, todetermine the accuracy and completeness of the reports and whether the security controls are
implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect tomeeting security requirements. The FISMA requirement for assessing security controls at least
annually does not require additional assessment activities to those activities already in place inorganizational security authorization processes. Security assessment results are provided to theindividuals or roles appropriate for the types of assessments being conducted. For example,
assessments conducted in support of security authorization decisions are provided to authorizing
officials or authorizing official designated representatives.
To satisfy annual assessment requirements, organizations can use assessment results from thefollowing sources: (i) initial or ongoing information system authorizations; (ii) continuous
monitoring; or (iii) system development life cycle activities. Organizations ensure that security
assessment results are current, relevant to the determination of security control effectiveness, andobtained with the appropriate level of assessor independence. Existing security control assessment
results can be reused to the extent that the results are still valid and can also be supplemented withadditional assessments as needed. Subsequent to initial authorizations and in accordance with
OMB policy, organizations assess security controls during continuous monitoring. Organizations
establish the frequency for ongoing security control assessments in accordance with organizational
continuous monitoring strategies. Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts provide usefulexamples of vulnerability mitigation procedures. External audits (e.g., audits by external entities
such as regulatory agencies) are outside the scope of this control. Related controls: CA-5, CA-6,
CA-7, PM-9, RA-5, SA-11, SA-12, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS

The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-definedlevel of independence] to conduct security control assessments.
Supplemental Guidance: Independent assessors or assessment teams are individuals or groups

who conduct impartial assessments of organizational information systems. Impartiality
implies that assessors are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with regard to
the development, operation, or management of the organizational information systems underassessment or to the determination of security control effectiveness. To achieve impartiality,
assessors should not: (i) create a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where
the assessments are being conducted; (ii) assess their own work; (iii) act as management or
employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in positions ofadvocacy for the organizations acquiring their services. Independent assessments can beobtained from elements within organizations or can be contracted to public or private sector
entities outside of organizations. Authorizing officials determine the required level of
independence based on the security categories of information systems and/or the ultimate risk
to organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Authorizing officials also
determine if the level of assessor independence provides sufficient assurance that the results

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

are sound and can be used to make credible, risk-based decisions. This includes determining
whether contracted security assessment services have sufficient independence, for example,
when information system owners are not directly involved in contracting processes or cannot
unduly influence the impartiality of assessors conducting assessments. In special situations,for example, when organizations that own the information systems are small or organizational
structures require that assessments are conducted by individuals that are in the developmental,
operational, or management chain of system owners, independence in assessment processes
can be achieved by ensuring that assessment results are carefully reviewed and analyzed byindependent teams of experts to validate the completeness, accuracy, integrity, and reliabilityof the results. Organizations recognize that assessments performed for purposes other thandirect support to authorization decisions are, when performed by assessors with sufficient
independence, more likely to be useable for such decisions, thereby reducing the need torepeat assessments.
(2)

SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS
The organization includes as part of security control assessments, [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency], [Selection: announced; unannounced], [Selection (one or more): in-depth
monitoring; vulnerability scanning; malicious user testing; insider threat assessment;
performance/load testing; [Assignment: organization-defined other forms of security assessment]].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can employ information system monitoring, insider

threat assessments, malicious user testing, and other forms of testing (e.g., verification andvalidation) to improve readiness by exercising organizational capabilities and indicating
current performance levels as a means of focusing actions to improve security. Organizations
conduct assessment activities in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders,
directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Authorizing officials approve the assessment
methods in coordination with the organizational risk executive function. Organizations can
incorporate vulnerabilities uncovered during assessments into vulnerability remediation
processes. Related controls: PE-3, SI-2.
(3)

SECURITY ASSESSMENTS | EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

The organization accepts the results of an assessment of [Assignment: organization-defined
information system] performed by [Assignment: organization-defined external organization] when
the assessment meets [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may often rely on assessments of specific information

systems by other (external) organizations. Utilizing such existing assessments (i.e., reusing
existing assessment evidence) can significantly decrease the time and resources required fororganizational assessments by limiting the amount of independent assessment activities thatorganizations need to perform. The factors that organizations may consider in determining
whether to accept assessment results from external organizations can vary. Determinations for
accepting assessment results can be based on, for example, past assessment experiences one
organization has had with another organization, the reputation that organizations have withregard to assessments, the level of detail of supporting assessment documentation provided, or
mandates imposed upon organizations by federal legislation, policies, or directives.
References: Executive Order 13587; FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-37,

800-39, 800-53A, 800-115, 800-137.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

CA-3

LOW CA-2

MOD CA-2 (1)HIGH CA-2 (1) (2)

SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONSControl: The organization:a.

APPENDIX F-CA

Authorizes connections from the information system to other information systems through theuse of Interconnection Security Agreements;

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________b.

Documents, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, andthe nature of the information communicated; andc.

Reviews and updates Interconnection Security Agreements [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to dedicated connections between information systems(i.e., system interconnections) and does not apply to transitory, user-controlled connections suchas email and website browsing. Organizations carefully consider the risks that may be introduced
when information systems are connected to other systems with different security requirements andsecurity controls, both within organizations and external to organizations. Authorizing officials
determine the risk associated with information system connections and the appropriate controls
employed. If interconnecting systems have the same authorizing official, organizations do notneed to develop Interconnection Security Agreements. Instead, organizations can describe theinterface characteristics between those interconnecting systems in their respective security plans.
If interconnecting systems have different authorizing officials within the same organization,organizations can either develop Interconnection Security Agreements or describe the interface
characteristics between systems in the security plans for the respective systems. Organizations
may also incorporate Interconnection Security Agreement information into formal contracts,
especially for interconnections established between federal agencies and nonfederal (i.e., private
sector) organizations. Risk considerations also include information systems sharing the same
networks. For certain technologies (e.g., space, unmanned aerial vehicles, and medical devices),there may be specialized connections in place during preoperational testing. Such connections may
require Interconnection Security Agreements and be subject to additional security controls.
Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-20, AU-2, AU-12, AU-16, CA-7, IA-3, SA-9, SC-7, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS
The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined
unclassified, national security system] to an external network without the use of [Assignment:
organization-defined boundary protection device].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations typically do not have control over external networks(e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate
communications (i.e., information flows) between unclassified national security systems andexternal networks. This control enhancement is required for organizations processing, storing,or transmitting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).
(2)

SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

The organization prohibits the direct connection of a classified, national security system to an
external network without the use of [Assignment: organization-defined boundary protection
device].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations typically do not have control over external networks(e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate
communications (i.e., information flows) between classified national security systems andexternal networks. In addition, approved boundary protection devices (typically managed
interface/cross-domain systems) provide information flow enforcement from information
systems to external networks.
(3)

SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | UNCLASSIFIED NON-NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined
unclassified, non-national security system] to an external network without the use of [Assignment;
organization-defined boundary protection device].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations typically do not have control over external networks(e.g., the Internet). Approved boundary protection devices (e.g., routers, firewalls) mediate
communications (i.e., information flows) between unclassified non-national security systems
and external networks. This control enhancement is required for organizations processing,storing, or transmitting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(4)

SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | CONNECTIONS TO PUBLIC NETWORKS

The organization prohibits the direct connection of an [Assignment: organization-defined
information system] to a public network.
Supplemental Guidance: A public network is any network accessible to the general public

including, for example, the Internet and organizational extranets with public access.
(5)

SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS | RESTRICTIONS ON EXTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS

The organization employs [Selection: allow-all, deny-by-exception; deny-all, permit-by-exception]
policy for allowing [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] to connect to external
information systems.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can constrain information system connectivity toexternal domains (e.g., websites) by employing one of two policies with regard to suchconnectivity: (i) allow-all, deny by exception, also known as blacklisting (the weaker of thetwo policies); or (ii) deny-all, allow by exception, also known as whitelisting (the stronger of
the two policies). For either policy, organizations determine what exceptions, if any, areacceptable. Related control: CM-7.
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-47.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CA-4

LOW CA-3

MOD CA-3 (5)HIGH CA-3 (5)SECURITY CERTIFICATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2].

CA-5

PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES
Control: The organization:a.

Develops a plan of action and milestones for the information system to document theorganization’s planned remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during
the assessment of the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in thesystem; andb.

Updates existing plan of action and milestones [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
based on the findings from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, andcontinuous monitoring activities.

Supplemental Guidance: Plans of action and milestones are key documents in security authorization

packages and are subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB. Related controls:
CA-2, CA-7, CM-4, PM-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY / CURRENCY

The organization employs automated mechanisms to help ensure that the plan of action andmilestones for the information system is accurate, up to date, and readily available.
References: OMB Memorandum 02-01; NIST Special Publication 800-37.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

APPENDIX F-CALOW CA-5

MOD CA-5

HIGH CA-5

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________CA-6

SECURITY AUTHORIZATION
Control: The organization:a.

Assigns a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the information
system;b.

Ensures that the authorizing official authorizes the information system for processing before
commencing operations; andc.

Updates the security authorization [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Security authorizations are official management decisions, conveyed

through authorization decision documents, by senior organizational officials or executives (i.e.,
authorizing officials) to authorize operation of information systems and to explicitly accept therisk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation basedon the implementation of agreed-upon security controls. Authorizing officials provide budgetary
oversight for organizational information systems or assume responsibility for the mission/business
operations supported by those systems. The security authorization process is an inherently federal
responsibility and therefore, authorizing officials must be federal employees. Through the security
authorization process, authorizing officials assume responsibility and are accountable for security
risks associated with the operation and use of organizational information systems. Accordingly,
authorizing officials are in positions with levels of authority commensurate with understanding
and accepting such information security-related risks. OMB policy requires that organizations
conduct ongoing authorizations of information systems by implementing continuous monitoring
programs. Continuous monitoring programs can satisfy three-year reauthorization requirements, so
separate reauthorization processes are not necessary. Through the employment of comprehensive
continuous monitoring processes, critical information contained in authorization packages (i.e.,
security plans, security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones) is updated on an
ongoing basis, providing authorizing officials and information system owners with an up-to-datestatus of the security state of organizational information systems and environments of operation.
To reduce the administrative cost of security reauthorization, authorizing officials use the resultsof continuous monitoring processes to the maximum extent possible as the basis for rendering
reauthorization decisions. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, PM-9, PM-10.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: OMB Circular A-130; OMB Memorandum 11-33; NIST Special Publications 800-37,

800-137.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

CA-7

LOW CA-6

MOD CA-6

HIGH CA-6

CONTINUOUS MONITORING
Control: The organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous
monitoring program that includes:a.

Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined metrics] to be monitored;b.

Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for monitoring and[Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for assessments supporting such monitoring;c.

Ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational continuous
monitoring strategy;d.

Ongoing security status monitoring of organization-defined metrics in accordance with theorganizational continuous monitoring strategy;

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________e.

Correlation and analysis of security-related information generated by assessments andmonitoring;f.

Response actions to address results of the analysis of security-related information; andg.

Reporting the security status of organization and the information system to [Assignment:
organization-defined personnel or roles] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Continuous monitoring programs facilitate ongoing awareness of threats,vulnerabilities, and information security to support organizational risk management decisions. The
terms continuous and ongoing imply that organizations assess/analyze security controls andinformation security-related risks at a frequency sufficient to support organizational risk-based
decisions. The results of continuous monitoring programs generate appropriate risk response
actions by organizations. Continuous monitoring programs also allow organizations to maintainthe security authorizations of information systems and common controls over time in highly
dynamic environments of operation with changing mission/business needs, threats, vulnerabilities,
and technologies. Having access to security-related information on a continuing basis throughreports/dashboards gives organizational officials the capability to make more effective and timely
risk management decisions, including ongoing security authorization decisions. Automation
supports more frequent updates to security authorization packages, hardware/software/firmware
inventories, and other system information. Effectiveness is further enhanced when continuous
monitoring outputs are formatted to provide information that is specific, measurable, actionable,
relevant, and timely. Continuous monitoring activities are scaled in accordance with the security
categories of information systems. Related controls: CA-2, CA-5, CA-6, CM-3, CM-4, PM-6, PM9, RA-5, SA-11, SA-12, SI-2, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONTINUOUS MONITORING | INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT
The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-definedlevel of independence] to monitor the security controls in the information system on an ongoingbasis.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can maximize the value of assessments of security

controls during the continuous monitoring process by requiring that such assessments be
conducted by assessors or assessment teams with appropriate levels of independence based oncontinuous monitoring strategies. Assessor independence provides a degree of impartiality to
the monitoring process. To achieve such impartiality, assessors should not: (i) create a mutual
or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted; (ii)assess their own work; (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they areserving; or (iv) place themselves in advocacy positions for the organizations acquiring theirservices.
(2)

CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS(3)

CONTINUOUS MONITORING | TREND ANALYSES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2].
The organization employs trend analyses to determine if security control implementations, thefrequency of continuous monitoring activities, and/or the types of activities used in the continuous
monitoring process need to be modified based on empirical data.
Supplemental Guidance: Trend analyses can include, for example, examining recent threat

information regarding the types of threat events that have occurred within the organization or
across the federal government, success rates of certain types of cyber attacks, emerging
vulnerabilities in information technologies, evolving social engineering techniques, resultsfrom multiple security control assessments, the effectiveness of configuration settings, andfindings from Inspectors General or auditors.
References: OMB Memorandum 11-33; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-39, 800-53A, 800-

115, 800-137; US-CERT Technical Cyber Security Alerts; DoD Information Assurance
Vulnerability Alerts.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

CA-8

LOW CA-7

MOD CA-7 (1)HIGH CA-7 (1)PENETRATION TESTING
Control: The organization conducts penetration testing [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] on [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or system components].
Supplemental Guidance: Penetration testing is a specialized type of assessment conducted on

information systems or individual system components to identify vulnerabilities that could be
exploited by adversaries. Such testing can be used to either validate vulnerabilities or determine
the degree of resistance organizational information systems have to adversaries within a set of
specified constraints (e.g., time, resources, and/or skills). Penetration testing attempts to duplicate
the actions of adversaries in carrying out hostile cyber attacks against organizations and provides amore in-depth analysis of security-related weaknesses/deficiencies. Organizations can also use theresults of vulnerability analyses to support penetration testing activities. Penetration testing can be
conducted on the hardware, software, or firmware components of an information system and can
exercise both physical and technical security controls. A standard method for penetration testing
includes, for example: (i) pretest analysis based on full knowledge of the target system; (ii) pretest
identification of potential vulnerabilities based on pretest analysis; and (iii) testing designed todetermine exploitability of identified vulnerabilities. All parties agree to the rules of engagement
before the commencement of penetration testing scenarios. Organizations correlate the penetration
testing rules of engagement with the tools, techniques, and procedures that are anticipated to be
employed by adversaries carrying out attacks. Organizational risk assessments guide decisions on
the level of independence required for personnel conducting penetration testing. Related control:
SA-12.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PENETRATION TESTING | INDEPENDENT PENETRATION AGENT OR TEAM

The organization employs an independent penetration agent or penetration team to perform
penetration testing on the information system or system components.
Supplemental Guidance: Independent penetration agents or teams are individuals or groups who

conduct impartial penetration testing of organizational information systems. Impartiality
implies that penetration agents or teams are free from any perceived or actual conflicts ofinterest with regard to the development, operation, or management of the information systems
that are the targets of the penetration testing. Supplemental guidance for CA-2 (1) provides
additional information regarding independent assessments that can be applied to penetration
testing. Related control: CA-2.
(2)

PENETRATION TESTING | RED TEAM EXERCISES

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined red team exercises] to simulate
attempts by adversaries to compromise organizational information systems in accordance with
[Assignment: organization-defined rules of engagement].
Supplemental Guidance: Red team exercises extend the objectives of penetration testing by

examining the security posture of organizations and their ability to implement effective cyberdefenses. As such, red team exercises reflect simulated adversarial attempts to compromiseorganizational mission/business functions and provide a comprehensive assessment of the
security state of information systems and organizations. Simulated adversarial attempts tocompromise organizational missions/business functions and the information systems that
support those missions/functions may include technology-focused attacks (e.g., interactions
with hardware, software, or firmware components and/or mission/business processes) andsocial engineering-based attacks (e.g., interactions via email, telephone, shoulder surfing, or
personal conversations). While penetration testing may be largely laboratory-based testing,organizations use red team exercises to provide more comprehensive assessments that reflect

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

real-world conditions. Red team exercises can be used to improve security awareness andtraining and to assess levels of security control effectiveness.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

CA-9

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH CA-8

INTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONSControl: The organization:a.

Authorizes internal connections of [Assignment: organization-defined information systemcomponents or classes of components] to the information system; andb.

Documents, for each internal connection, the interface characteristics, security requirements,
and the nature of the information communicated.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to connections between organizational information

systems and (separate) constituent system components (i.e., intra-system connections) including,for example, system connections with mobile devices, notebook/desktop computers, printers,
copiers, facsimile machines, scanners, sensors, and servers. Instead of authorizing each individualinternal connection, organizations can authorize internal connections for a class of components
with common characteristics and/or configurations, for example, all digital printers, scanners, andcopiers with a specified processing, storage, and transmission capability or all smart phones with a
specific baseline configuration. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-18, AC-19, AU-2, AU-12, CA7, CM-2, IA-3, SC-7, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS | SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKSThe information system performs security compliance checks on constituent system components
prior to the establishment of the internal connection.
Supplemental Guidance: Security compliance checks may include, for example, verification of

the relevant baseline configuration. Related controls: CM-6.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

APPENDIX F-CALOW CA-9

MOD CA-9

HIGH CA-9

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
CM-1

CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

A configuration management policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration management policy andassociated configuration management controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Configuration management policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

Configuration management procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CM family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CM-2

LOW CM-1

MOD CM-1

HIGH CM-1

BASELINE CONFIGURATION
Control: The organization develops, documents, and maintains under configuration control, acurrent baseline configuration of the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: This control establishes baseline configurations for information systems

and system components including communications and connectivity-related aspects of systems.
Baseline configurations are documented, formally reviewed and agreed-upon sets of specifications
for information systems or configuration items within those systems. Baseline configurations
serve as a basis for future builds, releases, and/or changes to information systems. Baseline
configurations include information about information system components (e.g., standard software
packages installed on workstations, notebook computers, servers, network components, or mobile
devices; current version numbers and patch information on operating systems and applications;and configuration settings/parameters), network topology, and the logical placement of thosecomponents within the system architecture. Maintaining baseline configurations requires creating
new baselines as organizational information systems change over time. Baseline configurations of
information systems reflect the current enterprise architecture. Related controls: CM-3, CM-6,
CM-8, CM-9, SA-10, PM-5, PM-7.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control Enhancements:(1)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | REVIEWS AND UPDATESThe organization reviews and updates the baseline configuration of the information system:(a)[Assignment: organization-defined frequency];(b) When required due to [Assignment organization-defined circumstances]; and(c)

As an integral part of information system component installations and upgrades.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CM-5.
(2)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY / CURRENCY
The organization employs automated mechanisms to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate,
and readily available baseline configuration of the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms that help organizations maintain consistentbaseline configurations for information systems include, for example, hardware and software
inventory tools, configuration management tools, and network management tools. Such tools
can be deployed and/or allocated as common controls, at the information system level, or at
the operating system or component level (e.g., on workstations, servers, notebook computers,
network components, or mobile devices). Tools can be used, for example, to track version
numbers on operating system applications, types of software installed, and current patchlevels. This control enhancement can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-8 (2) for
organizations that choose to combine information system component inventory and baseline
configuration activities. Related controls: CM-7, RA-5.
(3)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | RETENTION OF PREVIOUS CONFIGURATIONS

The organization retains [Assignment: organization-defined previous versions of baseline
configurations of the information system] to support rollback.
Supplemental Guidance: Retaining previous versions of baseline configurations to support

rollback may include, for example, hardware, software, firmware, configuration files, andconfiguration records.
(4)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7].
(5)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-7].
(6)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | DEVELOPMENT AND TEST ENVIRONMENTS

The organization maintains a baseline configuration for information system development and test
environments that is managed separately from the operational baseline configuration.
Supplemental Guidance: Establishing separate baseline configurations for development, testing,and operational environments helps protect information systems from unplanned/unexpected
events related to development and testing activities. Separate baseline configurations allow
organizations to apply the configuration management that is most appropriate for each type ofconfiguration. For example, management of operational configurations typically emphasizes
the need for stability, while management of development/test configurations requires greater
flexibility. Configurations in the test environment mirror the configurations in the operational
environment to the extent practicable so that the results of the testing are representative of the
proposed changes to the operational systems. This control enhancement requires separate
configurations but not necessarily separate physical environments. Related controls: CM-4,
SC-3, SC-7.
(7)

BASELINE CONFIGURATION | CONFIGURE SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, OR DEVICES FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS

The organization:(a)Issues [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system components, or
devices] with [Assignment: organization-defined configurations] to individuals traveling tolocations that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and(b) Applies [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to the devices when theindividuals return.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supplemental Guidance: When it is known that information systems, system components, or

devices (e.g., notebook computers, mobile devices) will be located in high-risk areas,
additional security controls may be implemented to counter the greater threat in such areas
coupled with the lack of physical security relative to organizational-controlled areas. For
example, organizational policies and procedures for notebook computers used by individuals
departing on and returning from travel include, for example, determining which locations areof concern, defining required configurations for the devices, ensuring that the devices are
configured as intended before travel is initiated, and applying specific safeguards to thedevice after travel is completed. Specially configured notebook computers include, forexample, computers with sanitized hard drives, limited applications, and additional hardening(e.g., more stringent configuration settings). Specified safeguards applied to mobile devices
upon return from travel include, for example, examining the device for signs of physicaltampering and purging/reimaging the hard disk drive. Protecting information residing on
mobile devices is covered in the media protection family.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CM-3

LOW CM-2

MOD CM-2 (1) (3) (7)

HIGH CM-2 (1) (2) (3) (7)CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL
Control: The organization:a.

Determines the types of changes to the information system that are configuration-controlled;b.

Reviews proposed configuration-controlled changes to the information system and approves
or disapproves such changes with explicit consideration for security impact analyses;c.

Documents configuration change decisions associated with the information system;d.

Implements approved configuration-controlled changes to the information system;e.

Retains records of configuration-controlled changes to the information system for[Assignment: organization-defined time period];f.

Audits and reviews activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to theinformation system; andg.

Coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities through[Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element (e.g., committee,board)] that convenes [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change conditions]].

Supplemental Guidance: Configuration change controls for organizational information systems

involve the systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition ofchanges to the systems, including system upgrades and modifications. Configuration change
control includes changes to baseline configurations for components and configuration items of
information systems, changes to configuration settings for information technology products (e.g.,
operating systems, applications, firewalls, routers, and mobile devices), unscheduled/unauthorizedchanges, and changes to remediate vulnerabilities. Typical processes for managing configuration
changes to information systems include, for example, Configuration Control Boards that approve
proposed changes to systems. For new development information systems or systems undergoing
major upgrades, organizations consider including representatives from development organizations
on the Configuration Control Boards. Auditing of changes includes activities before and after
changes are made to organizational information systems and the auditing activities required to
implement such changes. Related controls: CA-7, CM-2, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-9, SA-10, SI2, SI-12.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED DOCUMENT / NOTIFICATION / PROHIBITION OF CHANGESThe organization employs automated mechanisms to:(a)Document proposed changes to the information system;(b) Notify [Assignment: organized-defined approval authorities] of proposed changes to theinformation system and request change approval;(c)Highlight proposed changes to the information system that have not been approved or
disapproved by [Assignment: organization-defined time period];(d) Prohibit changes to the information system until designated approvals are received;

(2)

(e)

Document all changes to the information system; and(f)

Notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel] when approved changes to theinformation system are completed.

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | TEST / VALIDATE / DOCUMENT CHANGESThe organization tests, validates, and documents changes to the information system before
implementing the changes on the operational system.
Supplemental Guidance: Changes to information systems include modifications to hardware,

software, or firmware components and configuration settings defined in CM-6. Organizations
ensure that testing does not interfere with information system operations. Individuals/groups
conducting tests understand organizational security policies and procedures, information
system security policies and procedures, and the specific health, safety, and environmental
risks associated with particular facilities/processes. Operational systems may need to be taken
off-line, or replicated to the extent feasible, before testing can be conducted. If information
systems must be taken off-line for testing, the tests are scheduled to occur during plannedsystem outages whenever possible. If testing cannot be conducted on operational systems,
organizations employ compensating controls (e.g., testing on replicated systems).
(3)

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED CHANGE IMPLEMENTATIONThe organization employs automated mechanisms to implement changes to the current
information system baseline and deploys the updated baseline across the installed base.
(4)

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | SECURITY REPRESENTATIVEThe organization requires an information security representative to be a member of the[Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element].
Supplemental Guidance: Information security representatives can include, for example, senioragency information security officers, information system security officers, or information
system security managers. Representation by personnel with information security expertise isimportant because changes to information system configurations can have unintended side
effects, some of which may be security-relevant. Detecting such changes early in the process
can help avoid unintended, negative consequences that could ultimately affect the security
state of organizational information systems. The configuration change control element in thiscontrol enhancement reflects the change control elements defined by organizations in CM-3.
(5)

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | AUTOMATED SECURITY RESPONSE
The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security responses]
automatically if baseline configurations are changed in an unauthorized manner.

Supplemental Guidance: Security responses include, for example, halting information systemprocessing, halting selected system functions, or issuing alerts/notifications to organizational
personnel when there is an unauthorized modification of a configuration item.
(6)

CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | CRYPTOGRAPHY MANAGEMENTThe organization ensures that cryptographic mechanisms used to provide [Assignment:
organization-defined security safeguards] are under configuration management.
Supplemental Guidance: Regardless of the cryptographic means employed (e.g., public key,

private key, shared secrets), organizations ensure that there are processes and procedures inplace to effectively manage those means. For example, if devices use certificates as a basis for

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

identification and authentication, there needs to be a process in place to address the expirationof those certificates. Related control: SC-13.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CM-4

LOW Not Selected

MOD CM-3 (2)HIGH CM-3 (1) (2)

SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS
Control: The organization analyzes changes to the information system to determine potential

security impacts prior to change implementation.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities (e.g.,

Information System Administrators, Information System Security Officers, Information System
Security Managers, and Information System Security Engineers) conduct security impact analyses.
Individuals conducting security impact analyses possess the necessary skills/technical expertise to
analyze the changes to information systems and the associated security ramifications. Security
impact analysis may include, for example, reviewing security plans to understand security control
requirements and reviewing system design documentation to understand control implementationand how specific changes might affect the controls. Security impact analyses may also include
assessments of risk to better understand the impact of the changes and to determine if additional
security controls are required. Security impact analyses are scaled in accordance with the security
categories of the information systems. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-3, CM-9, SA-4, SA-5,
SA-10, SI-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | SEPARATE TEST ENVIRONMENTS
The organization analyzes changes to the information system in a separate test environment
before implementation in an operational environment, looking for security impacts due to flaws,
weaknesses, incompatibility, or intentional malice.

Supplemental Guidance: Separate test environment in this context means an environment that is

physically or logically isolated and distinct from the operational environment. The separation
is sufficient to ensure that activities in the test environment do not impact activities in theoperational environment, and information in the operational environment is not inadvertently
transmitted to the test environment. Separate environments can be achieved by physical or
logical means. If physically separate test environments are not used, organizations determine
the strength of mechanism required when implementing logical separation (e.g., separationachieved through virtual machines). Related controls: SA-11, SC-3, SC-7.
(2)

SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS | VERIFICATION OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS

The organization, after the information system is changed, checks the security functions to verify
that the functions are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired
outcome with regard to meeting the security requirements for the system.
Supplemental Guidance: Implementation is this context refers to installing changed code in theoperational information system. Related control: SA-11.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

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LOW CM-4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________CM-5

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE
Control: The organization defines, documents, approves, and enforces physical and logical access

restrictions associated with changes to the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Any changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of

information systems can potentially have significant effects on the overall security of the systems.
Therefore, organizations permit only qualified and authorized individuals to access information
systems for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades and modifications. Organizations
maintain records of access to ensure that configuration change control is implemented and tosupport after-the-fact actions should organizations discover any unauthorized changes. Access
restrictions for change also include software libraries. Access restrictions include, for example,
physical and logical access controls (see AC-3 and PE-3), workflow automation, media libraries,
abstract layers (e.g., changes implemented into third-party interfaces rather than directly into
information systems), and change windows (e.g., changes occur only during specified times,
making unauthorized changes easy to discover). Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATED ACCESS ENFORCEMENT / AUDITING

The information system enforces access restrictions and supports auditing of the enforcement
actions.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-12, AU-6, CM-3, CM-6.
(2)

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | REVIEW SYSTEM CHANGESThe organization reviews information system changes [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] and [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances] to determine whether
unauthorized changes have occurred.
Supplemental Guidance: Indications that warrant review of information system changes and thespecific circumstances justifying such reviews may be obtained from activities carried out byorganizations during the configuration change process. Related controls: AU-6, AU-7, CM-3,
CM-5, PE-6, PE-8.
(3)

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | SIGNED COMPONENTS
The information system prevents the installation of [Assignment: organization-defined softwareand firmware components] without verification that the component has been digitally signed using
a certificate that is recognized and approved by the organization.

Supplemental Guidance: Software and firmware components prevented from installation unlesssigned with recognized and approved certificates include, for example, software and firmware
version updates, patches, service packs, device drivers, and basic input output system (BIOS)
updates. Organizations can identify applicable software and firmware components by type, byspecific items, or a combination of both. Digital signatures and organizational verification ofsuch signatures, is a method of code authentication. Related controls: CM-7, SC-13, SI-7.
(4)

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | DUAL AUTHORIZATIONThe organization enforces dual authorization for implementing changes to [Assignment:
organization-defined information system components and system-level information].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ dual authorization to ensure that any changes toselected information system components and information cannot occur unless two qualified
individuals implement such changes. The two individuals possess sufficient skills/expertise todetermine if the proposed changes are correct implementations of approved changes. Dualauthorization may also be known as two-person control. Related controls: AC-5, CM-3.
(5)

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT PRODUCTION / OPERATIONAL PRIVILEGESThe organization:(a)Limits privileges to change information system components and system-related information
within a production or operational environment; and(b) Reviews and reevaluates privileges [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
Supplemental Guidance: In many organizations, information systems support multiple core

missions/business functions. Limiting privileges to change information system components
with respect to operational systems is necessary because changes to a particular information

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

system component may have far-reaching effects on mission/business processes supported by
the system where the component resides. The complex, many-to-many relationships between
systems and mission/business processes are in some cases, unknown to developers. Related
control: AC-2.
(6)

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGESThe organization limits privileges to change software resident within software libraries.
Supplemental Guidance: Software libraries include privileged programs. Related control: AC-2.
(7)

ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE | AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SAFEGUARDS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CM-6

LOW Not Selected

MOD CM-5

HIGH CM-5 (1) (2) (3)CONFIGURATION SETTINGS
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes and documents configuration settings for information technology products
employed within the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined security
configuration checklists] that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational
requirements;b.

Implements the configuration settings;c.

Identifies, documents, and approves any deviations from established configuration settings for[Assignment: organization-defined information system components] based on [Assignment:
organization-defined operational requirements]; andd.

Monitors and controls changes to the configuration settings in accordance with organizational
policies and procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: Configuration settings are the set of parameters that can be changed in

hardware, software, or firmware components of the information system that affect the security
posture and/or functionality of the system. Information technology products for which securityrelated configuration settings can be defined include, for example, mainframe computers, servers(e.g., database, electronic mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain name), workstations,
input/output devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, and printers), network components (e.g., firewalls,routers, gateways, voice and data switches, wireless access points, network appliances, sensors),
operating systems, middleware, and applications. Security-related parameters are those parameters
impacting the security state of information systems including the parameters required to satisfy
other security control requirements. Security-related parameters include, for example: (i) registry
settings; (ii) account, file, directory permission settings; and (iii) settings for functions, ports,
protocols, services, and remote connections. Organizations establish organization-wide
configuration settings and subsequently derive specific settings for information systems. The
established settings become part of the systems configuration baseline.
Common secure configurations (also referred to as security configuration checklists, lockdown
and hardening guides, security reference guides, security technical implementation guides) provide
recognized, standardized, and established benchmarks that stipulate secure configuration settings
for specific information technology platforms/products and instructions for configuring those
information system components to meet operational requirements. Common secure configurations
can be developed by a variety of organizations including, for example, information technology
product developers, manufacturers, vendors, consortia, academia, industry, federal agencies, andother organizations in the public and private sectors. Common secure configurations include the

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United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) which affects the implementation of
CM-6 and other controls such as AC-19 and CM-7. The Security Content Automation Protocol(SCAP) and the defined standards within the protocol (e.g., Common Configuration Enumeration)
provide an effective method to uniquely identify, track, and control configuration settings. OMB
establishes federal policy on configuration requirements for federal information systems. Related
controls: AC-19, CM-2, CM-3, CM-7, SI-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | AUTOMATED CENTRAL MANAGEMENT / APPLICATION / VERIFICATIONThe organization employs automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply, and verify
configuration settings for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-7, CM-4.
(2)

CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGESThe organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to respond tounauthorized changes to [Assignment: organization-defined configuration settings].
Supplemental Guidance: Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings can

include, for example, alerting designated organizational personnel, restoring establishedconfiguration settings, or in extreme cases, halting affected information system processing.
Related controls: IR-4, SI-7.
(3)

CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | UNAUTHORIZED CHANGE DETECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].
(4)

CONFIGURATION SETTINGS | CONFORMANCE DEMONSTRATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-4].
References: OMB Memoranda 07-11, 07-18, 08-22; NIST Special Publications 800-70, 800-128;

Web: http://nvd.nist.gov, http://checklists.nist.gov, http://www.nsa.gov.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CM-7

LOW CM-6

MOD CM-6

HIGH CM-6 (1) (2)LEAST FUNCTIONALITY
Control: The organization:a.

Configures the information system to provide only essential capabilities; andb.

Prohibits or restricts the use of the following functions, ports, protocols, and/or services:[Assignment: organization-defined prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or
services].

Supplemental Guidance: Information systems can provide a wide variety of functions and services.

Some of the functions and services, provided by default, may not be necessary to support essential
organizational operations (e.g., key missions, functions). Additionally, it is sometimes convenient
to provide multiple services from single information system components, but doing so increases
risk over limiting the services provided by any one component. Where feasible, organizations limit
component functionality to a single function per device (e.g., email servers or web servers, but notboth). Organizations review functions and services provided by information systems or individualcomponents of information systems, to determine which functions and services are candidates forelimination (e.g., Voice Over Internet Protocol, Instant Messaging, auto-execute, and file sharing).
Organizations consider disabling unused or unnecessary physical and logical ports/protocols (e.g.,
Universal Serial Bus, File Transfer Protocol, and Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) on information
systems to prevent unauthorized connection of devices, unauthorized transfer of information, or
unauthorized tunneling. Organizations can utilize network scanning tools, intrusion detection andprevention systems, and end-point protections such as firewalls and host-based intrusion detection

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

systems to identify and prevent the use of prohibited functions, ports, protocols, and services.
Related controls: AC-6, CM-2, RA-5, SA-5, SC-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PERIODIC REVIEWThe organization:(a)

Reviews the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to identify
unnecessary and/or nonsecure functions, ports, protocols, and services; and(b) Disables [Assignment: organization-defined functions, ports, protocols, and services within
the information system deemed to be unnecessary and/or nonsecure].
Supplemental Guidance: The organization can either make a determination of the relative

security of the function, port, protocol, and/or service or base the security decision on theassessment of other entities. Bluetooth, FTP, and peer-to-peer networking are examples ofless than secure protocols. Related controls: AC-18, CM-7, IA-2.
(2)

LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PREVENT PROGRAM EXECUTION

The information system prevents program execution in accordance with [Selection (one or more):[Assignment: organization-defined policies regarding software program usage and restrictions];
rules authorizing the terms and conditions of software program usage].
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-8, PM-5.
(3)LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE

The organization ensures compliance with [Assignment: organization-defined registration
requirements for functions, ports, protocols, and services].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use the registration process to manage, track, andprovide oversight for information systems and implemented functions, ports, protocols, andservices.
(4)

LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / BLACKLISTING

The organization:(a)Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software programs not authorized to execute on
the information system];(b) Employs an allow-all, deny-by-exception policy to prohibit the execution of unauthorizedsoftware programs on the information system; and(c)Reviews and updates the list of unauthorized software programs [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: The process used to identify software programs that are not authorized

to execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as blacklisting.
Organizations can implement CM-7 (5) instead of this control enhancement if whitelisting(the stronger of the two policies) is the preferred approach for restricting software program
execution. Related controls: CM-6, CM-8, PM-5.
(5)LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / WHITELISTING

The organization:(a)Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software programs authorized to execute on theinformation system];(b) Employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software
programs on the information system; and(c)Reviews and updates the list of authorized software programs [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: The process used to identify software programs that are authorized to

execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as whitelisting. In
addition to whitelisting, organizations consider verifying the integrity of white-listed software
programs using, for example, cryptographic checksums, digital signatures, or hash functions.
Verification of white-listed software can occur either prior to execution or at system startup.
Related controls: CM-2, CM-6, CM-8, PM-5, SA-10, SC-34, SI-7.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
References: DoD Instruction 8551.01.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW CM-7

P1

CM-8

MOD CM-7 (1) (2) (4)

HIGH CM-7 (1) (2) (5)INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops and documents an inventory of information system components that:1.

Accurately reflects the current information system;

2.

Includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information system;3.

Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting; and4.

Includes [Assignment: organization-defined information deemed necessary to achieveeffective information system component accountability]; andReviews and updates the information system component inventory [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to implement centralized information systemcomponent inventories that include components from all organizational information systems. In
such situations, organizations ensure that the resulting inventories include system-specificinformation required for proper component accountability (e.g., information system association,
information system owner). Information deemed necessary for effective accountability of
information system components includes, for example, hardware inventory specifications,software license information, software version numbers, component owners, and for networked
components or devices, machine names and network addresses. Inventory specifications include,for example, manufacturer, device type, model, serial number, and physical location. Related
controls: CM-2, CM-6, PM-5.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | UPDATES DURING INSTALLATIONS / REMOVALS

The organization updates the inventory of information system components as an integral part ofcomponent installations, removals, and information system updates.
(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE

The organization employs automated mechanisms to help maintain an up-to-date, complete,accurate, and readily available inventory of information system components.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations maintain information system inventories to the extent

feasible. Virtual machines, for example, can be difficult to monitor because such machines are
not visible to the network when not in use. In such cases, organizations maintain as up-todate, complete, and accurate an inventory as is deemed reasonable. This control enhancement
can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-2 (2) for organizations that choose to combine
information system component inventory and baseline configuration activities. Related
control: SI-7.
(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION

The organization:(a)

Employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to detect thepresence of unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware components within theinformation system; and(b) Takes the following actions when unauthorized components are detected: [Selection (one ormore): disables network access by such components; isolates the components; notifies[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is applied in addition to the monitoring forunauthorized remote connections and mobile devices. Monitoring for unauthorized systemcomponents may be accomplished on an ongoing basis or by the periodic scanning of systems
for that purpose. Automated mechanisms can be implemented within information systems orin other separate devices. Isolation can be achieved, for example, by placing unauthorized
information system components in separate domains or subnets or otherwise quarantining
such components. This type of component isolation is commonly referred to as sandboxing.
Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, CA-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7, RA-5.
(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATIONThe organization includes in the information system component inventory information, a means for
identifying by [Selection (one or more): name; position; role], individuals responsible/accountable
for administering those components.

Supplemental Guidance: Identifying individuals who are both responsible and accountable foradministering information system components helps to ensure that the assigned components
are properly administered and organizations can contact those individuals if some action isrequired (e.g., component is determined to be the source of a breach/compromise, component
needs to be recalled/replaced, or component needs to be relocated).
(5)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | NO DUPLICATE ACCOUNTING OF COMPONENTS

The organization verifies that all components within the authorization boundary of the information
system are not duplicated in other information system component inventories.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses the potential problem of duplicate

accounting of information system components in large or complex interconnected systems.
(6)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSESSED CONFIGURATIONS / APPROVED DEVIATIONS

The organization includes assessed component configurations and any approved deviations tocurrent deployed configurations in the information system component inventory.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on configuration settings establishedby organizations for information system components, the specific components that have beenassessed to determine compliance with the required configuration settings, and any approved
deviations from established configuration settings. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6.
(7)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | CENTRALIZED REPOSITORY

The organization provides a centralized repository for the inventory of information systemcomponents.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to implement centralized information

system component inventories that include components from all organizational information
systems. Centralized repositories of information system component inventories provide
opportunities for efficiencies in accounting for organizational hardware, software, andfirmware assets. Such repositories may also help organizations rapidly identify the location
and responsible individuals of system components that have been compromised, breached, or
are otherwise in need of mitigation actions. Organizations ensure that the resulting centralized
inventories include system-specific information required for proper component accountability(e.g., information system association, information system owner).
(8)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED LOCATION TRACKING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to support tracking of information systemcomponents by geographic location.
Supplemental Guidance: The use of automated mechanisms to track the location of information

system components can increase the accuracy of component inventories. Such capability may
also help organizations rapidly identify the location and responsible individuals of systemcomponents that have been compromised, breached, or are otherwise in need of mitigation
actions.
(9)

INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMSThe organization:(a)

APPENDIX F-CM

Assigns [Assignment: organization-defined acquired information system components] to an
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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(b) Receives an acknowledgement from the information system owner of this assignment.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the criteria for or types of information systemcomponents (e.g., microprocessors, motherboards, software, programmable logic controllers,and network devices) that are subject to this control enhancement. Related control: SA-4.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CM-9

LOW CM-8

MOD CM-8 (1) (3) (5)HIGH CM-8 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN
Control: The organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management planfor the information system that:a.

Addresses roles, responsibilities, and configuration management processes and procedures;b.

Establishes a process for identifying configuration items throughout the system development
life cycle and for managing the configuration of the configuration items;c.

Defines the configuration items for the information system and places the configuration items
under configuration management; andd.

Protects the configuration management plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Supplemental Guidance: Configuration management plans satisfy the requirements in configuration

management policies while being tailored to individual information systems. Such plans define
detailed processes and procedures for how configuration management is used to support systemdevelopment life cycle activities at the information system level. Configuration management plans
are typically developed during the development/acquisition phase of the system development life
cycle. The plans describe how to move changes through change management processes, how to
update configuration settings and baselines, how to maintain information system component
inventories, how to control development, test, and operational environments, and how to develop,
release, and update key documents. Organizations can employ templates to help ensure consistentand timely development and implementation of configuration management plans. Such templates
can represent a master configuration management plan for the organization at large with subsets ofthe plan implemented on a system by system basis. Configuration management approval processes
include designation of key management stakeholders responsible for reviewing and approving
proposed changes to information systems, and personnel that conduct security impact analyses
prior to the implementation of changes to the systems. Configuration items are the information
system items (hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) to be configuration-managed. As
information systems continue through the system development life cycle, new configuration items
may be identified and some existing configuration items may no longer need to be underconfiguration control. Related controls: CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-8, SA-10.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN | ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY

The organization assigns responsibility for developing the configuration management process toorganizational personnel that are not directly involved in information system development.
Supplemental Guidance: In the absence of dedicated configuration management teams assigned

within organizations, system developers may be tasked to develop configuration management
processes using personnel who are not directly involved in system development or integration.
This separation of duties ensures that organizations establish and maintain a sufficient degreeof independence between the information system development and integration processes andconfiguration management processes to facilitate quality control and more effective oversight.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CM-10

LOW Not Selected

MOD CM-9

HIGH CM-9

SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONSControl: The organization:a.

Uses software and associated documentation in accordance with contract agreements andcopyright laws;b.

Tracks the use of software and associated documentation protected by quantity licenses tocontrol copying and distribution; andc.

Controls and documents the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that thiscapability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproductionof copyrighted work.

Supplemental Guidance: Software license tracking can be accomplished by manual methods (e.g.,

simple spreadsheets) or automated methods (e.g., specialized tracking applications) depending onorganizational needs. Related controls: AC-17, CM-8, SC-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS | OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE

The organization establishes the following restrictions on the use of open source software:[Assignment: organization-defined restrictions].
Supplemental Guidance: Open source software refers to software that is available in source codeform. Certain software rights normally reserved for copyright holders are routinely provided
under software license agreements that permit individuals to study, change, and improve thesoftware. From a security perspective, the major advantage of open source software is that itprovides organizations with the ability to examine the source code. However, there are also
various licensing issues associated with open source software including, for example, theconstraints on derivative use of such software.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

CM-11

LOW CM-10

MOD CM-10

HIGH CM-10

USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE
Control: The organization:

a.
b.
c.

Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined policies] governing the installation of softwareby users;
Enforces software installation policies through [Assignment: organization-defined methods];
andMonitors policy compliance at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: If provided the necessary privileges, users have the ability to install

software in organizational information systems. To maintain control over the types of software
installed, organizations identify permitted and prohibited actions regarding software installation.
Permitted software installations may include, for example, updates and security patches to existing
software and downloading applications from organization-approved “app stores.” Prohibited
software installations may include, for example, software with unknown or suspect pedigrees orsoftware that organizations consider potentially malicious. The policies organizations select

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governing user-installed software may be organization-developed or provided by some external
entity. Policy enforcement methods include procedural methods (e.g., periodic examination of user
accounts), automated methods (e.g., configuration settings implemented on organizational
information systems), or both. Related controls: AC-3, CM-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, CM-7, PL-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | ALERTS FOR UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATIONS

The information system alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when theunauthorized installation of software is detected.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-7, SI-4.
(2)

USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE | PROHIBIT INSTALLATION WITHOUT PRIVILEGED STATUS

The information system prohibits user installation of software without explicit privileged status.
Supplemental Guidance: Privileged status can be obtained, for example, by serving in the roleof system administrator. Related control: AC-6.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

APPENDIX F-CM

LOW CM-11

MOD CM-11

HIGH CM-11

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: CONTINGENCY PLANNING
CP-1

CONTINGENCY PLANNING POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

A contingency planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy andassociated contingency planning controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Contingency planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

Contingency planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CP family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-34, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW CP-1

P1

CP-2

MOD CP-1

HIGH CP-1

CONTINGENCY PLAN
Control: The organization:a.

APPENDIX F-CP

Develops a contingency plan for the information system that:1.

Identifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency
requirements;

2.

Provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics;

3.

Addresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact
information;

4.

Addresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information
system disruption, compromise, or failure;5.

Addresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the
security safeguards originally planned and implemented; and6.

Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________b.

Distributes copies of the contingency plan to [Assignment: organization-defined key
contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];c.

Coordinates contingency planning activities with incident handling activities;d.

Reviews the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency];e.

Updates the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, information system, or
environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation,
execution, or testing;f.

Communicates contingency plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined key
contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; andg.

Protects the contingency plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Supplemental Guidance: Contingency planning for information systems is part of an overall

organizational program for achieving continuity of operations for mission/business functions.
Contingency planning addresses both information system restoration and implementation ofalternative mission/business processes when systems are compromised. The effectiveness ofcontingency planning is maximized by considering such planning throughout the phases of thesystem development life cycle. Performing contingency planning on hardware, software, andfirmware development can be an effective means of achieving information system resiliency.
Contingency plans reflect the degree of restoration required for organizational information
systems since not all systems may need to fully recover to achieve the level of continuity ofoperations desired. Information system recovery objectives reflect applicable laws, Executive
Orders, directives, policies, standards, regulations, and guidelines. In addition to information
system availability, contingency plans also address other security-related events resulting in a
reduction in mission and/or business effectiveness, such as malicious attacks compromising theconfidentiality or integrity of information systems. Actions addressed in contingency plansinclude, for example, orderly/graceful degradation, information system shutdown, fallback to amanual mode, alternate information flows, and operating in modes reserved for when systems areunder attack. By closely coordinating contingency planning with incident handling activities,
organizations can ensure that the necessary contingency planning activities are in place andactivated in the event of a security incident. Related controls: AC-14, CP-6, CP-7, CP-8, CP-9,
CP-10, IR-4, IR-8, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PM-8, PM-11.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS

The organization coordinates contingency plan development with organizational elements
responsible for related plans.
Supplemental Guidance: Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information

systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuityof Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber
Incident Response Plans, Insider Threat Implementation Plan, and Occupant Emergency
Plans.
(2)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | CAPACITY PLANNING

The organization conducts capacity planning so that necessary capacity for information
processing, telecommunications, and environmental support exists during contingency
operations.
Supplemental Guidance: Capacity planning is needed because different types of threats (e.g.,natural disasters, targeted cyber attacks) can result in a reduction of the available processing,telecommunications, and support services originally intended to support the organizational
missions/business functions. Organizations may need to anticipate degraded operations duringcontingency operations and factor such degradation into capacity planning.
(3)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization plans for the resumption of essential missions and business functions within[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation.

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Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planningincluding, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of
essential missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions
to the information system and its supporting infrastructure. Related control: PE-12.
(4)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME ALL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization plans for the resumption of all missions and business functions within[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of contingency plan activation.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planningincluding, for example, as part of business impact analyses. The time period for resumption of
all missions/business functions may be dependent on the severity/extent of disruptions to theinformation system and its supporting infrastructure. Related control: PE-12.
(5)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | CONTINUE ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization plans for the continuance of essential missions and business functions with little
or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that continuity until full information system
restoration at primary processing and/or storage sites.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planningincluding, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storagesites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on thecircumstances associated with the contingency (e.g., backup sites may become primary sites).
Related control: PE-12.
(6)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | ALTERNATE PROCESSING / STORAGE SITE

The organization plans for the transfer of essential missions and business functions to alternate
processing and/or storage sites with little or no loss of operational continuity and sustains that
continuity through information system restoration to primary processing and/or storage sites.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planningincluding, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Primary processing and/or storagesites defined by organizations as part of contingency planning may change depending on thecircumstances associated with the contingency (e.g., backup sites may become primary sites).
Related control: PE-12.
(7)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH EXTERNAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

The organization coordinates its contingency plan with the contingency plans of external service
providers to ensure that contingency requirements can be satisfied.
Supplemental Guidance: When the capability of an organization to successfully carry out its

core missions/business functions is dependent on external service providers, developing atimely and comprehensive contingency plan may become more challenging. In this situation,organizations coordinate contingency planning activities with the external entities to ensurethat the individual plans reflect the overall contingency needs of the organization. Related
control: SA-9.
(8)

CONTINGENCY PLAN | IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS

The organization identifies critical information system assets supporting essential missions andbusiness functions.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning

activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planningincluding, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Organizations identify criticalinformation system assets so that additional safeguards and countermeasures can be employed(above and beyond those safeguards and countermeasures routinely implemented) to help
ensure that organizational missions/business functions can continue to be conducted duringcontingency operations. In addition, the identification of critical information assets facilitates
the prioritization of organizational resources. Critical information system assets include
technical and operational aspects. Technical aspects include, for example, information

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technology services, information system components, information technology products, andmechanisms. Operational aspects include, for example, procedures (manually executed
operations) and personnel (individuals operating technical safeguards and/or executing
manual procedures). Organizational program protection plans can provide assistance in
identifying critical assets. Related controls: SA-14, SA-15.
References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publication 800-34.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CP-3

LOW CP-2

MOD CP-2 (1) (3) (8)HIGH CP-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8)CONTINGENCY TRAINING
Control: The organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent
with assigned roles and responsibilities:a.

Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming a contingency role or
responsibility;b.

When required by information system changes; andc.

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.

Supplemental Guidance: Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned

roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content andlevel of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know
when and where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are affected;
system administrators may require additional training on how to set up information systems atalternate processing and storage sites; and managers/senior leaders may receive more specifictraining on how to conduct mission-essential functions in designated off-site locations and how toestablish communications with other governmental entities for purposes of coordination oncontingency-related activities. Training for contingency roles/responsibilities reflects the specificcontinuity requirements in the contingency plan. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, CP-2, IR-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONTINGENCY TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTSThe organization incorporates simulated events into contingency training to facilitate effective
response by personnel in crisis situations.

(2)

CONTINGENCY TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS
The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic
contingency training environment.

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-50.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

CP-4

LOW CP-3

MOD CP-3

HIGH CP-3 (1)CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING
Control: The organization:a.

Tests the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the effectiveness ofthe plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan;b.

Reviews the contingency plan test results; and

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c.

Initiates corrective actions, if needed.

Supplemental Guidance: Methods for testing contingency plans to determine the effectiveness of theplans and to identify potential weaknesses in the plans include, for example, walk-through andtabletop exercises, checklists, simulations (parallel, full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises.
Organizations conduct testing based on the continuity requirements in contingency plans andinclude a determination of the effects on organizational operations, assets, and individuals arising
due to contingency operations. Organizations have flexibility and discretion in the breadth, depth,
and timelines of corrective actions. Related controls: CP-2, CP-3, IR-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS

The organization coordinates contingency plan testing with organizational elements responsible
for related plans.
Supplemental Guidance: Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information

systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuityof Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber
Incident Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans. This control enhancement does not
require organizations to create organizational elements to handle related plans or to align suchelements with specific plans. It does require, however, that if such organizational elements are
responsible for related plans, organizations should coordinate with those elements. Related
controls: IR-8, PM-8.
(2)

CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE

The organization tests the contingency plan at the alternate processing site:(a)

To familiarize contingency personnel with the facility and available resources; and(b) To evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support contingency
operations.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-7.
(3)

CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test thecontingency plan.
Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms provide more thorough and effective testingof contingency plans, for example: (i) by providing more complete coverage of contingency
issues; (ii) by selecting more realistic test scenarios and environments; and (iii) by effectively
stressing the information system and supported missions.
(4)

CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | FULL RECOVERY / RECONSTITUTION

The organization includes a full recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known
state as part of contingency plan testing.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-10, SC-24.
References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-

34, 800-84.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

CP-5

LOW CP-4

MOD CP-4 (1)HIGH CP-4 (1) (2)

CONTINGENCY PLAN UPDATE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-2].

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CP-6

ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes an alternate storage site including necessary agreements to permit the storage andretrieval of information system backup information; andb.

Ensures that the alternate storage site provides information security safeguards equivalent tothat of the primary site.

Supplemental Guidance: Alternate storage sites are sites that are geographically distinct fromprimary storage sites. An alternate storage site maintains duplicate copies of information and datain the event that the primary storage site is not available. Items covered by alternate storage site
agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physicaland environmental protection requirements, and coordination of delivery/retrieval of backup
media. Alternate storage sites reflect the requirements in contingency plans so that organizations
can maintain essential missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure inorganizational information systems. Related controls: CP-2, CP-7, CP-9, CP-10, MP-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE

The organization identifies an alternate storage site that is separated from the primary storage site
to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.
Supplemental Guidance: Threats that affect alternate storage sites are typically defined inorganizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural
failures, hostile cyber attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine
what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate storagesites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e.,hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant. Related control:
RA-3.
(2)

ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES
The organization configures the alternate storage site to facilitate recovery operations inaccordance with recovery time and recovery point objectives.

(3)

ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | ACCESSIBILITY

The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in theevent of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.
Supplemental Guidance: Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broadin geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations madeby organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Explicit mitigation actions
include, for example: (i) duplicating backup information at other alternate storage sites if
access problems occur at originally designated alternate sites; or (ii) planning for physicalaccess to retrieve backup information if electronic accessibility to the alternate site is
disrupted. Related control: RA-3.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-34.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CP-7

LOW Not Selected

MOD CP-6 (1) (3)

HIGH CP-6 (1) (2) (3)ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE
Control: The organization:a.

APPENDIX F-CP

Establishes an alternate processing site including necessary agreements to permit the transfer
and resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined information system operations] foressential missions/business functions within [Assignment: organization-defined time period

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consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives] when the primary processing
capabilities are unavailable;b.

Ensures that equipment and supplies required to transfer and resume operations are available
at the alternate processing site or contracts are in place to support delivery to the site within
the organization-defined time period for transfer/resumption; andc.

Ensures that the alternate processing site provides information security safeguards equivalent
to those of the primary site.

Supplemental Guidance: Alternate processing sites are sites that are geographically distinct fromprimary processing sites. An alternate processing site provides processing capability in the eventthat the primary processing site is not available. Items covered by alternate processing site
agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physicaland environmental protection requirements, and coordination for the transfer/assignment of
personnel. Requirements are specifically allocated to alternate processing sites that reflect therequirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions despite
disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational information systems. Related controls: CP-2,
CP-6, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, MA-6.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE

The organization identifies an alternate processing site that is separated from the primaryprocessing site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.
Supplemental Guidance: Threats that affect alternate processing sites are typically defined inorganizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural
failures, hostile cyber attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine
what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate processing
sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e.,hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant. Related control:
RA-3.
(2)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | ACCESSIBILITY

The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate processing site in theevent of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.
Supplemental Guidance: Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broadin geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations madeby organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Related control: RA-3.
(3)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PRIORITY OF SERVICE

The organization develops alternate processing site agreements that contain priority-of-service
provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including recovery time
objectives).
Supplemental Guidance: Priority-of-service agreements refer to negotiated agreements withservice providers that ensure that organizations receive priority treatment consistent with theiravailability requirements and the availability of information resources at the alternate
processing site.
(4)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PREPARATION FOR USE

The organization prepares the alternate processing site so that the site is ready to be used as theoperational site supporting essential missions and business functions.
Supplemental Guidance: Site preparation includes, for example, establishing configuration

settings for information system components at the alternate processing site consistent with therequirements for such settings at the primary site and ensuring that essential supplies andother logistical considerations are in place. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6.
(5)

ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | EQUIVALENT INFORMATION SECURITY SAFEGUARDS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-7].

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ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | INABILITY TO RETURN TO PRIMARY SITE

The organization plans and prepares for circumstances that preclude returning to the primaryprocessing site.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-34.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW Not Selected

P1

CP-8

MOD CP-7 (1) (2) (3)

HIGH CP-7 (1) (2) (3) (4)

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
Control: The organization establishes alternate telecommunications services including necessary
agreements to permit the resumption of [Assignment: organization-defined information system
operations] for essential missions and business functions within [Assignment: organizationdefined time period] when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either
the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to telecommunications services (data and voice) for

primary and alternate processing and storage sites. Alternate telecommunications services reflect
the continuity requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions
despite the loss of primary telecommunications services. Organizations may specify different time
periods for primary/alternate sites. Alternate telecommunications services include, for example,
additional organizational or commercial ground-based circuits/lines or satellites in lieu of groundbased communications. Organizations consider factors such as availability, quality of service, andaccess when entering into alternate telecommunications agreements. Related controls: CP-2, CP-6,
CP-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONSThe organization:(a)Develops primary and alternate telecommunications service agreements that contain priorityof-service provisions in accordance with organizational availability requirements (including
recovery time objectives); and(b) Requests Telecommunications Service Priority for all telecommunications services used fornational security emergency preparedness in the event that the primary and/or alternate
telecommunications services are provided by a common carrier.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider the potential mission/business impact insituations where telecommunications service providers are servicing other organizations withsimilar priority-of-service provisions.
(2)

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE

The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services to reduce the likelihood of sharing
a single point of failure with primary telecommunications services.
(3)

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SEPARATION OF PRIMARY / ALTERNATE PROVIDERS

The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services from providers that are separated
from primary service providers to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.
Supplemental Guidance: Threats that affect telecommunications services are typically definedin organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural
failures, hostile cyber/physical attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations
seek to reduce common susceptibilities by, for example, minimizing shared infrastructure
among telecommunications service providers and achieving sufficient geographic separation
between services. Organizations may consider using a single service provider in situations
where the service provider can provide alternate telecommunications services meeting theseparation needs addressed in the risk assessment.

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN

The organization:(a)Requires primary and alternate telecommunications service providers to have contingency
plans;(b) Reviews provider contingency plans to ensure that the plans meet organizational contingency
requirements; and(c)

Obtains evidence of contingency testing/training by providers [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Reviews of provider contingency plans consider the proprietary natureof such plans. In some situations, a summary of provider contingency plans may be sufficientevidence for organizations to satisfy the review requirement. Telecommunications service
providers may also participate in ongoing disaster recovery exercises in coordination with the
Department of Homeland Security, state, and local governments. Organizations may use thesetypes of activities to satisfy evidentiary requirements related to service provider contingency
plan reviews, testing, and training.
(5)

TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | ALTERNATE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTING

The organization tests alternate telecommunication services [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].
References: NIST Special Publication 800-34; National Communications Systems Directive 3-10;

Web: http://www.dhs.gov/telecommunications-service-priority-tsp.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CP-9

LOW Not Selected

MOD CP-8 (1) (2)

HIGH CP-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP
Control: The organization:a.

Conducts backups of user-level information contained in the information system [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives];b.

Conducts backups of system-level information contained in the information system[Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery
point objectives];c.

Conducts backups of information system documentation including security-related
documentation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery timeand recovery point objectives]; andd.

Protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information at storage
locations.

Supplemental Guidance: System-level information includes, for example, system-state information,

operating system and application software, and licenses. User-level information includes any
information other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed by organizations toprotect the integrity of information system backups include, for example, digital signatures andcryptographic hashes. Protection of system backup information while in transit is beyond thescope of this control. Information system backups reflect the requirements in contingency plans aswell as other organizational requirements for backing up information. Related controls: CP-2, CP6, MP-4, MP-5, SC-13.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TESTING FOR RELIABILITY / INTEGRITY

The organization tests backup information [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to verify
media reliability and information integrity.

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Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-4.
(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TEST RESTORATION USING SAMPLING
The organization uses a sample of backup information in the restoration of selected information
system functions as part of contingency plan testing.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: CP-4.
(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | SEPARATE STORAGE FOR CRITICAL INFORMATIONThe organization stores backup copies of [Assignment: organization-defined critical information
system software and other security-related information] in a separate facility or in a fire-rated
container that is not collocated with the operational system.
Supplemental Guidance: Critical information system software includes, for example, operating

systems, cryptographic key management systems, and intrusion detection/prevention systems.
Security-related information includes, for example, organizational inventories of hardware,
software, and firmware components. Alternate storage sites typically serve as separate storage
facilities for organizations. Related controls: CM-2, CM-8.
(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | PROTECTION FROM UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-9].
(5)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE

The organization transfers information system backup information to the alternate storage site
[Assignment: organization-defined time period and transfer rate consistent with the recovery timeand recovery point objectives].
Supplemental Guidance: Information system backup information can be transferred to alternate

storage sites either electronically or by physical shipment of storage media.
(6)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | REDUNDANT SECONDARY SYSTEM

The organization accomplishes information system backup by maintaining a redundant secondary
system that is not collocated with the primary system and that can be activated without loss of
information or disruption to operations.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-7, CP-10.
(7)

INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP | DUAL AUTHORIZATIONThe organization enforces dual authorization for the deletion or destruction of [Assignment:
organization-defined backup information].
Supplemental Guidance: Dual authorization ensures that the deletion or destruction of backup

information cannot occur unless two qualified individuals carry out the task. Individuals
deleting/destroying backup information possess sufficient skills/expertise to determine if the
proposed deletion/destruction of backup information reflects organizational policies andprocedures. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control. Related controls:
AC-3, MP-2.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-34.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CP-10

LOW CP-9

MOD CP-9 (1)HIGH CP-9 (1) (2) (3) (5)INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION
Control: The organization provides for the recovery and reconstitution of the information system toa known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.
Supplemental Guidance: Recovery is executing information system contingency plan activities torestore organizational missions/business functions. Reconstitution takes place following recovery
and includes activities for returning organizational information systems to fully operational states.
Recovery and reconstitution operations reflect mission and business priorities, recovery point/timeand reconstitution objectives, and established organizational metrics consistent with contingency
plan requirements. Reconstitution includes the deactivation of any interim information system

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capabilities that may have been needed during recovery operations. Reconstitution also includes
assessments of fully restored information system capabilities, reestablishment of continuous
monitoring activities, potential information system reauthorizations, and activities to prepare thesystems against future disruptions, compromises, or failures. Recovery/reconstitution capabilities
employed by organizations can include both automated mechanisms and manual procedures.
Related controls: CA-2, CA-6, CA-7, CP-2, CP-6, CP-7, CP-9, SC-24.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-4].
(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | TRANSACTION RECOVERYThe information system implements transaction recovery for systems that are transaction-based.
Supplemental Guidance: Transaction-based information systems include, for example, databasemanagement systems and transaction processing systems. Mechanisms supporting transaction
recovery include, for example, transaction rollback and transaction journaling.
(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | COMPENSATING SECURITY CONTROLS[Withdrawn: Addressed through tailoring procedures].
(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | RESTORE WITHIN TIME PERIODThe organization provides the capability to restore information system components within[Assignment: organization-defined restoration time-periods] from configuration-controlled andintegrity-protected information representing a known, operational state for the components.
Supplemental Guidance: Restoration of information system components includes, for example,

reimaging which restores components to known, operational states. Related control: CM-2.
(5)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | FAILOVER CAPABILITY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-13].
(6)

INFORMATION SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | COMPONENT PROTECTION
The organization protects backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software.

Supplemental Guidance: Protection of backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software

components includes both physical and technical safeguards. Backup and restoration software
includes, for example, router tables, compilers, and other security-relevant system software.
Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3.
References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publication 800-34.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

CP-11

LOW CP-10

MOD CP-10 (2)HIGH CP-10 (2) (4)ALTERNATE COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS
Control: The information system provides the capability to employ [Assignment: organizationdefined alternative communications protocols] in support of maintaining continuity of operations.
Supplemental Guidance: Contingency plans and the associated training and testing for those plans,

incorporate an alternate communications protocol capability as part of increasing the resilience oforganizational information systems. Alternate communications protocols include, for example,
switching from Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) Version 4 to TCP/IP
Version 6. Switching communications protocols may affect software applications and therefore,
the potential side effects of introducing alternate communications protocols are analyzed prior to
implementation.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

CP-12

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

SAFE MODE
Control: The information system, when [Assignment: organization-defined conditions] aredetected, enters a safe mode of operation with [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions ofsafe mode of operation].
Supplemental Guidance: For information systems supporting critical missions/business functions

including, for example, military operations and weapons systems, civilian space operations,
nuclear power plant operations, and air traffic control operations (especially real-time operational
environments), organizations may choose to identify certain conditions under which those systems
revert to a predefined safe mode of operation. The safe mode of operation, which can be activatedautomatically or manually, restricts the types of activities or operations information systems could
execute when those conditions are encountered. Restriction includes, for example, allowing only
certain functions that could be carried out under limited power or with reduced communications
bandwidth.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

CP-13

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS
Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined alternative or supplemental
security mechanisms] for satisfying [Assignment: organization-defined security functions] when
the primary means of implementing the security function is unavailable or compromised.
Supplemental Guidance: This control supports information system resiliency and contingency

planning/continuity of operations. To ensure mission/business continuity, organizations canimplement alternative or supplemental security mechanisms. These mechanisms may be lesseffective than the primary mechanisms (e.g., not as easy to use, not as scalable, or not as secure).
However, having the capability to readily employ these alternative/supplemental mechanisms
enhances overall mission/business continuity that might otherwise be adversely impacted if
organizational operations had to be curtailed until the primary means of implementing thefunctions was restored. Given the cost and level of effort required to provide such alternative
capabilities, this control would typically be applied only to critical security capabilities provided
by information systems, system components, or information system services. For example, anorganization may issue to senior executives and system administrators one-time pads in casemultifactor tokens, the organization’s standard means for secure remote authentication, iscompromised. Related control: CP-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

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LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
IA-1

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

An identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities,
and compliance; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy
and associated identification and authentication controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Identification and authentication policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
and2.

Identification and authentication procedures [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IA family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Supplemental Guidance:

Control Enhancements: None.
References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-63, 800-73, 800-76,

800-78, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

IA-2

LOW IA-1

MOD IA-1

HIGH IA-1

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)Control: The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates organizational users (orprocesses acting on behalf of organizational users).
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational users include employees or individuals that organizations

deem to have equivalent status of employees (e.g., contractors, guest researchers). This control
applies to all accesses other than: (i) accesses that are explicitly identified and documented in AC14; and (ii) accesses that occur through authorized use of group authenticators without individual
authentication. Organizations may require unique identification of individuals in group accounts(e.g., shared privilege accounts) or for detailed accountability of individual activity. Organizations
employ passwords, tokens, or biometrics to authenticate user identities, or in the case multifactor
authentication, or some combination thereof. Access to organizational information systems isdefined as either local access or network access. Local access is any access to organizational
information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where such access isobtained by direct connections without the use of networks. Network access is access to

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organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where suchaccess is obtained through network connections (i.e., nonlocal accesses). Remote access is a typeof network access that involves communication through external networks (e.g., the Internet).
Internal networks include local area networks and wide area networks. In addition, the use of
encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) for network connections between organizationcontrolled endpoints and non-organization controlled endpoints may be treated as internal
networks from the perspective of protecting the confidentiality and integrity of information
traversing the network.
Organizations can satisfy the identification and authentication requirements in this control bycomplying with the requirements in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 consistent withthe specific organizational implementation plans. Multifactor authentication requires the use of
two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The factors are defined as: (i) something
you know (e.g., password, personal identification number [PIN]); (ii) something you have (e.g.,
cryptographic identification device, token); or (iii) something you are (e.g., biometric). Multifactor
solutions that require devices separate from information systems gaining access include, forexample, hardware tokens providing time-based or challenge-response authenticators and smart
cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card and the DoD common
access card. In addition to identifying and authenticating users at the information system level(i.e., at logon), organizations also employ identification and authentication mechanisms at theapplication level, when necessary, to provide increased information security. Identification andauthentication requirements for other than organizational users are described in IA-8. Related
controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8.
Control Enhancements:(1)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged
accounts.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.
(2)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to nonprivileged accounts.
(3)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | LOCAL ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to privileged
accounts.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.
(4)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | LOCAL ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS

The information system implements multifactor authentication for local access to non-privileged
accounts.
(5)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | GROUP AUTHENTICATIONThe organization requires individuals to be authenticated with an individual authenticator when agroup authenticator is employed.
Supplemental Guidance: Requiring individuals to use individual authenticators as a second levelof authentication helps organizations to mitigate the risk of using group authenticators.
(6)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE

The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to privileged
accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining
access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism
requirements].
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-6.
(7)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - SEPARATE DEVICE

The information system implements multifactor authentication for network access to nonprivileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system
gaining access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism
requirements].

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IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT

The information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network
access to privileged accounts.
Supplemental Guidance: Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical toachieve successful authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replayresistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such as
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-timeauthenticators.
(9)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | NETWORK ACCESS TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS - REPLAY RESISTANT

The information system implements replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network
access to non-privileged accounts.
Supplemental Guidance: Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical toachieve successful authentications by recording/replaying previous authentication messages.
Replay-resistant techniques include, for example, protocols that use nonces or challenges such
as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and time synchronous or challenge-response one-timeauthenticators.
(10) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | SINGLE SIGN-ON
The information system provides a single sign-on capability for [Assignment: organization-defined
information system accounts and services].
Supplemental Guidance: Single sign-on enables users to log in once and gain access to multiple

information system resources. Organizations consider the operational efficiencies provided bysingle sign-on capabilities with the increased risk from disclosures of single authenticators
providing access to multiple system resources.
(11) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | REMOTE ACCESS - SEPARATE DEVICE
The information system implements multifactor authentication for remote access to privileged andnon-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from thesystem gaining access and the device meets [Assignment: organization-defined strength ofmechanism requirements].
Supplemental Guidance: For remote access to privileged/non-privileged accounts, the purposeof requiring a device that is separate from the information system gaining access for one of
the factors during multifactor authentication is to reduce the likelihood of compromisingauthentication credentials stored on the system. For example, adversaries deploying malicious
code on organizational information systems can potentially compromise such credentials
resident on the system and subsequently impersonate authorized users. Related control: AC-6.
(12) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALSThe information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV)
credentials.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to organizations implementing

logical access control systems (LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal
Identity Verification (PIV) credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that
conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum
11-11 requires federal agencies to continue implementing the requirements specified in
HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide use of PIV credentials. Related controls: AU-2, PE-3, SA-4.
(13) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | OUT-OF-BAND AUTHENTICATION
The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band authentication]
under [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].
Supplemental Guidance: Out-of-band authentication (OOBA) refers to the use of two separate

communication paths to identify and authenticate users or devices to an information system.
The first path (i.e., the in-band path), is used to identify and authenticate users or devices, andgenerally is the path through which information flows. The second path (i.e., the out-of-bandpath) is used to independently verify the authentication and/or requested action. For example,
a user authenticates via a notebook computer to a remote server to which the user desires
access, and requests some action of the server via that communication path. Subsequently, theserver contacts the user via the user’s cell phone to verify that the requested action originated

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from the user. The user may either confirm the intended action to an individual on thetelephone or provide an authentication code via the telephone. This type of authentication canbe employed by organizations to mitigate actual or suspected man-in the-middle attacks. The
conditions for activation can include, for example, suspicious activities, new threat indicators
or elevated threat levels, or the impact level or classification level of information in requested
transactions. Related controls: IA-10, IA-11, SC-37.
References: HSPD-12; OMB Memoranda 04-04, 06-16, 11-11; FIPS Publication 201; NIST

Special Publications 800-63, 800-73, 800-76, 800-78; FICAM Roadmap and Implementation
Guidance; Web: http://idmanagement.gov.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW IA-2 (1) (12)

P1

IA-3

MOD IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (8) (11)(12)

HIGH IA-2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (8) (9)(11) (12)DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Control: The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization-

defined specific and/or types of devices] before establishing a [Selection (one or more): local;
remote; network] connection.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational devices requiring unique device-to-device identification andauthentication may be defined by type, by device, or by a combination of type/device. Information
systems typically use either shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC] or
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP] addresses) for device identification ororganizational authentication solutions (e.g., IEEE 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol[EAP], Radius server with EAP-Transport Layer Security [TLS] authentication, Kerberos) to
identify/authenticate devices on local and/or wide area networks. Organizations determine therequired strength of authentication mechanisms by the security categories of information systems.
Because of the challenges of applying this control on large scale, organizations are encouraged toonly apply the control to those limited number (and type) of devices that truly need to support thiscapability. Related controls: AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, CA-3, IA-4, IA-5.
Control Enhancements:(1)

DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION

The information system authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined specific devices and/or
types of devices] before establishing [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection
using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.
Supplemental Guidance: A local connection is any connection with a device communicating

without the use of a network. A network connection is any connection with a device that
communicates through a network (e.g., local area or wide area network, Internet). A remoteconnection is any connection with a device communicating through an external network (e.g.,
the Internet). Bidirectional authentication provides stronger safeguards to validate the identityof other devices for connections that are of greater risk (e.g., remote connections). Related
controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.
(2)

DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL NETWORK AUTHENTICATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-3 (1)].
(3)

DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DYNAMIC ADDRESS ALLOCATIONThe organization:(a)Standardizes dynamic address allocation lease information and the lease duration assigned todevices in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined lease information and lease
duration]; and(b) Audits lease information when assigned to a device.

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Supplemental Guidance: DHCP-enabled clients obtaining leases for IP addresses from DHCP

servers, is a typical example of dynamic address allocation for devices. Related controls: AU2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-12.
(4)

DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | DEVICE ATTESTATIONThe organization ensures that device identification and authentication based on attestation ishandled by [Assignment: organization-defined configuration management process].
Supplemental Guidance: Device attestation refers to the identification and authentication of adevice based on its configuration and known operating state. This might be determined via
some cryptographic hash of the device. If device attestation is the means of identification andauthentication, then it is important that patches and updates to the device are handled via aconfiguration management process such that the those patches/updates are done securely andat the same time do not disrupt the identification and authentication to other devices.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

IA-4

LOW Not Selected

MOD IA-3

HIGH IA-3

IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT
Control: The organization manages information system identifiers by:a.

Receiving authorization from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to assign
an individual, group, role, or device identifier;b.

Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, or device;c.

Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, or device;d.

Preventing reuse of identifiers for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; ande.

Disabling the identifier after [Assignment: organization-defined time period of inactivity].

Supplemental Guidance: Common device identifiers include, for example, media access control(MAC), Internet protocol (IP) addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. Management of
individual identifiers is not applicable to shared information system accounts (e.g., guest andanonymous accounts). Typically, individual identifiers are the user names of the information
system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the account management
activities of AC-2 use account names provided by IA-4. This control also addresses individual
identifiers not necessarily associated with information system accounts (e.g., identifiers used inphysical security control databases accessed by badge reader systems for access to information
systems). Preventing reuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of previously used
individual, group, role, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups, roles, or devices.
Related controls: AC-2, IA-2, IA-3, IA-5, IA-8, SC-37.
Control Enhancements:(1)

IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | PROHIBIT ACCOUNT IDENTIFIERS AS PUBLIC IDENTIFIERS
The organization prohibits the use of information system account identifiers that are the same as
public identifiers for individual electronic mail accounts.

Supplemental Guidance: Prohibiting the use of information systems account identifiers that are

the same as some public identifier such as the individual identifier section of an electronic
mail address, makes it more difficult for adversaries to guess user identifiers on organizational
information systems. Related control: AT-2.
(2)

IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATIONThe organization requires that the registration process to receive an individual identifier includes
supervisor authorization.

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IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATIONThe organization requires multiple forms of certification of individual identification be presented to
the registration authority.
Supplemental Guidance: Requiring multiple forms of identification, such as documentary

evidence or a combination of documents and biometrics, reduces the likelihood of individuals
using fraudulent identification to establish an identity, or at least increases the work factor of
potential adversaries.
(4)

IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS

The organization manages individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as[Assignment: organization-defined characteristic identifying individual status].
Supplemental Guidance: Characteristics identifying the status of individuals include, forexample, contractors and foreign nationals. Identifying the status of individuals by specificcharacteristics provides additional information about the people with whom organizational
personnel are communicating. For example, it might be useful for a government employee toknow that one of the individuals on an email message is a contractor. Related control: AT-2.
(5)

IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT

The information system dynamically manages identifiers.
Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to conventional approaches to identification which presume

static accounts for preregistered users, many distributed information systems including, forexample, service-oriented architectures, rely on establishing identifiers at run time for entities
that were previously unknown. In these situations, organizations anticipate and provision forthe dynamic establishment of identifiers. Preestablished trust relationships and mechanisms
with appropriate authorities to validate identities and related credentials are essential. Related
control: AC-16.
(6)

IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENTThe organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] forcross-organization management of identifiers.
Supplemental Guidance: Cross-organization identifier management provides the capability fororganizations to appropriately identify individuals, groups, roles, or devices when conducting
cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of information.
(7)

IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON REGISTRATIONThe organization requires that the registration process to receive an individual identifier be
conducted in person before a designated registration authority.
Supplemental Guidance: In-person registration reduces the likelihood of fraudulent identifiers

being issued because it requires the physical presence of individuals and actual face-to-faceinteractions with designated registration authorities.
References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 800-76, 800-78.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

IA-5

LOW IA-4

MOD IA-4

HIGH IA-4

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT
Control: The organization manages information system authenticators by:a.

Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group,
role, or device receiving the authenticator;b.

Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization;c.

Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;

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Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution,
for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators;e.

Changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation;f.

Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions forauthenticators;g.

Changing/refreshing authenticators [Assignment: organization-defined time period byauthenticator type];h.

Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;i.

Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards toprotect authenticators; andj.

Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.

Supplemental Guidance: Individual authenticators include, for example, passwords, tokens,

biometrics, PKI certificates, and key cards. Initial authenticator content is the actual content (e.g.,
the initial password) as opposed to requirements about authenticator content (e.g., minimum
password length). In many cases, developers ship information system components with factory
default authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and configuration. Default
authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a significant
security risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be implemented via control
PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and by controls AC-3, AC-6, andSC-28 for authenticators stored within organizational information systems (e.g., passwords storedin hashed or encrypted formats, files containing encrypted or hashed passwords accessible withadministrator privileges). Information systems support individual authenticator management byorganization-defined settings and restrictions for various authenticator characteristics including,for example, minimum password length, password composition, validation time window for timesynchronous one-time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during the verification stage of
biometric authentication. Specific actions that can be taken to safeguard authenticators include, forexample, maintaining possession of individual authenticators, not loaning or sharing individual
authenticators with others, and reporting lost, stolen, or compromised authenticators immediately.
Authenticator management includes issuing and revoking, when no longer needed, authenticators
for temporary access such as that required for remote maintenance. Device authenticators include,for example, certificates and passwords. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, CM-6, IA-2, IA-4,
IA-8, PL-4, PS-5, PS-6, SC-12, SC-13, SC-17, SC-28.
Control Enhancements:(1)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION

The information system, for password-based authentication:(a)Enforces minimum password complexity of [Assignment: organization-defined requirements
for case sensitivity, number of characters, mix of upper-case letters, lower-case letters,
numbers, and special characters, including minimum requirements for each type];(b) Enforces at least the following number of changed characters when new passwords are
created: [Assignment: organization-defined number];(c)Stores and transmits only cryptographically-protected passwords;(d) Enforces password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions of [Assignment: organizationdefined numbers for lifetime minimum, lifetime maximum];(e)Prohibits password reuse for [Assignment: organization-defined number] generations; and(f)Allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to apermanent password.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to single-factor authentication ofindividuals using passwords as individual or group authenticators, and in a similar manner,when passwords are part of multifactor authenticators. This control enhancement does not
apply when passwords are used to unlock hardware authenticators (e.g., Personal Identity

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Verification cards). The implementation of such password mechanisms may not meet all of
the requirements in the enhancement. Cryptographically-protected passwords include, forexample, encrypted versions of passwords and one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords.
The number of changed characters refers to the number of changes required with respect tothe total number of positions in the current password. Password lifetime restrictions do not
apply to temporary passwords. To mitigate certain brute force attacks against passwords,
organizations may also consider salting passwords. Related control: IA-6.
(2)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PKI-BASED AUTHENTICATION

The information system, for PKI-based authentication:(a)

Validates certifications by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust
anchor including checking certificate status information;(b) Enforces authorized access to the corresponding private key;(c)

Maps the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and(d) Implements a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation in caseof inability to access revocation information via the network.
Supplemental Guidance: Status information for certification paths includes, for example,

certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, validation ofcertifications involves the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common
Policy Root trust anchor including certificate policy processing. Related control: IA-6.
(3)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | IN-PERSON OR TRUSTED THIRD-PARTY REGISTRATIONThe organization requires that the registration process to receive [Assignment: organizationdefined types of and/or specific authenticators] be conducted [Selection: in person; by a trusted
third party] before [Assignment: organization-defined registration authority] with authorization by[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
(4)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PASSWORD STRENGTH DETERMINATIONThe organization employs automated tools to determine if password authenticators are sufficiently
strong to satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on the creation of strong passwords

and the characteristics of such passwords (e.g., complexity) prior to use, the enforcement of
which is carried out by organizational information systems in IA-5 (1). Related controls: CA2, CA-7, RA-5.
(5)AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CHANGE AUTHENTICATORS PRIOR TO DELIVERY

The organization requires developers/installers of information system components to provide
unique authenticators or change default authenticators prior to delivery/installation.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement extends the requirement for organizations tochange default authenticators upon information system installation, by requiring developers
and/or installers to provide unique authenticators or change default authenticators for systemcomponents prior to delivery and/or installation. However, it typically does not apply to thedevelopers of commercial off-the-shelve information technology products. Requirements forunique authenticators can be included in acquisition documents prepared by organizations
when procuring information systems or system components.
(6)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORSThe organization protects authenticators commensurate with the security category of theinformation to which use of the authenticator permits access.
Supplemental Guidance: For information systems containing multiple security categories of

information without reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators
used to grant access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security
category of information on the systems.
(7)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | NO EMBEDDED UNENCRYPTED STATIC AUTHENTICATORSThe organization ensures that unencrypted static authenticators are not embedded in applications
or access scripts or stored on function keys.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations exercise caution in determining whether embedded orstored authenticators are in encrypted or unencrypted form. If authenticators are used in the

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manner stored, then those representations are considered unencrypted authenticators. This isirrespective of whether that representation is perhaps an encrypted version of something else
(e.g., a password).
(8)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MULTIPLE INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCOUNTSThe organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to manage
the risk of compromise due to individuals having accounts on multiple information systems.
Supplemental Guidance: When individuals have accounts on multiple information systems,

there is the risk that the compromise of one account may lead to the compromise of otheraccounts if individuals use the same authenticators. Possible alternatives include, for example:(i) having different authenticators on all systems; (ii) employing some form of single sign-on
mechanism; or (iii) including some form of one-time passwords on all systems.
(9)

AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | CROSS-ORGANIZATION CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENTThe organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] forcross-organization management of credentials.
Supplemental Guidance: Cross-organization management of credentials provides the capability

for organizations to appropriately authenticate individuals, groups, roles, or devices when
conducting cross-organization activities involving the processing, storage, or transmission of
information.
(10) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | DYNAMIC CREDENTIAL ASSOCIATION
The information system dynamically provisions identities.
Supplemental Guidance: Authentication requires some form of binding between an identity andthe authenticator used to confirm the identity. In conventional approaches, this binding isestablished by pre-provisioning both the identity and the authenticator to the information
system. For example, the binding between a username (i.e., identity) and a password (i.e.,
authenticator) is accomplished by provisioning the identity and authenticator as a pair in theinformation system. New authentication techniques allow the binding between the identity
and the authenticator to be implemented outside an information system. For example, withsmartcard credentials, the identity and the authenticator are bound together on the card. Using
these credentials, information systems can authenticate identities that have not been preprovisioned, dynamically provisioning the identity after authentication. In these situations,organizations can anticipate the dynamic provisioning of identities. Preestablished trust
relationships and mechanisms with appropriate authorities to validate identities and related
credentials are essential.
(11) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE TOKEN-BASED AUTHENTICATION
The information system, for hardware token-based authentication, employs mechanisms thatsatisfy [Assignment: organization-defined token quality requirements].
Supplemental Guidance: Hardware token-based authentication typically refers to the use of

PKI-based tokens, such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card.
Organizations define specific requirements for tokens, such as working with a particular PKI.
(12) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | BIOMETRIC-BASED AUTHENTICATION
The information system, for biometric-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy[Assignment: organization-defined biometric quality requirements].
Supplemental Guidance: Unlike password-based authentication which provides exact matchesof user-input passwords to stored passwords, biometric authentication does not provide suchexact matches. Depending upon the type of biometric and the type of collection mechanism,
there is likely to be some divergence from the presented biometric and stored biometric which
serves as the basis of comparison. There will likely be both false positives and false negatives
when making such comparisons. The rate at which the false accept and false reject rates areequal is known as the crossover rate. Biometric quality requirements include, for example,
acceptable crossover rates, as that essentially reflects the accuracy of the biometric.
(13) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | EXPIRATION OF CACHED AUTHENTICATORSThe information system prohibits the use of cached authenticators after [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(14) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | MANAGING CONTENT OF PKI TRUST STORESThe organization, for PKI-based authentication, employs a deliberate organization-wide
methodology for managing the content of PKI trust stores installed across all platforms including
networks, operating systems, browsers, and applications.
(15) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | FICAM-APPROVED PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
The organization uses only FICAM-approved path discovery and validation products and services.
Supplemental Guidance: Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM)-

approved path discovery and validation products and services are those products and services
that have been approved through the FICAM conformance program, where applicable.
References: OMB Memoranda 04-04, 11-11; FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications

800-73, 800-63, 800-76, 800-78; FICAM Roadmap and Implementation Guidance;
Web: http://idmanagement.gov.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

IA-6

LOW IA-5 (1) (11)

MOD IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (11)

HIGH IA-5 (1) (2) (3) (11)

AUTHENTICATOR FEEDBACK
Control: The information system obscures feedback of authentication information during theauthentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorizedindividuals.
Supplemental Guidance: The feedback from information systems does not provide information thatwould allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. For some typesof information systems or system components, for example, desktops/notebooks with relatively
large monitors, the threat (often referred to as shoulder surfing) may be significant. For other typesof systems or components, for example, mobile devices with 2-4 inch screens, this threat may beless significant, and may need to be balanced against the increased likelihood of typographic input
errors due to the small keyboards. Therefore, the means for obscuring the authenticator feedback is
selected accordingly. Obscuring the feedback of authentication information includes, for example,
displaying asterisks when users type passwords into input devices, or displaying feedback for avery limited time before fully obscuring it. Related control: PE-18.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

IA-7

LOW IA-6

MOD IA-6

HIGH IA-6

CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE AUTHENTICATION
Control: The information system implements mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic
module that meet the requirements of applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives,
policies, regulations, standards, and guidance for such authentication.
Supplemental Guidance: Authentication mechanisms may be required within a cryptographic

module to authenticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is
authorized to assume the requested role and perform services within that role. Related controls:
SC-12, SC-13.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: FIPS Publication 140; Web: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

IA-8

LOW IA-7

MOD IA-7

HIGH IA-7

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)Control: The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates non-organizational users (orprocesses acting on behalf of non-organizational users).
Supplemental Guidance: Non-organizational users include information system users other thanorganizational users explicitly covered by IA-2. These individuals are uniquely identified andauthenticated for accesses other than those accesses explicitly identified and documented in AC14. In accordance with the E-Authentication E-Government initiative, authentication of nonorganizational users accessing federal information systems may be required to protect federal,
proprietary, or privacy-related information (with exceptions noted for national security systems).
Organizations use risk assessments to determine authentication needs and consider scalability,
practicality, and security in balancing the need to ensure ease of use for access to federal
information and information systems with the need to protect and adequately mitigate risk. IA-2
addresses identification and authentication requirements for access to information systems byorganizational users. Related controls: AC-2, AC-14, AC-17, AC-18, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, MA-4,
RA-3, SA-12, SC-8.
Control Enhancements:(1)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS FROM OTHER AGENCIESThe information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV)
credentials from other federal agencies.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to logical access control systems(LACS) and physical access control systems (PACS). Personal Identity Verification (PIV)
credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication
201 and supporting guidance documents. OMB Memorandum 11-11 requires federal agencies
to continue implementing the requirements specified in HSPD-12 to enable agency-wide useof PIV credentials. Related controls: AU-2, PE-3, SA-4.
(2)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | ACCEPTANCE OF THIRD-PARTY CREDENTIALSThe information system accepts only FICAM-approved third-party credentials.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement typically applies to organizational

information systems that are accessible to the general public, for example, public-facing
websites. Third-party credentials are those credentials issued by nonfederal government
entities approved by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Trust
Framework Solutions initiative. Approved third-party credentials meet or exceed the set ofminimum federal government-wide technical, security, privacy, and organizational maturity
requirements. This allows federal government relying parties to trust such credentials at theirapproved assurance levels. Related control: AU-2.
(3)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | USE OF FICAM-APPROVED PRODUCTS

The organization employs only FICAM-approved information system components in [Assignment:
organization-defined information systems] to accept third-party credentials.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement typically applies to information systems thatare accessible to the general public, for example, public-facing websites. FICAM-approved
information system components include, for example, information technology products andsoftware libraries that have been approved by the Federal Identity, Credential, and Access
Management conformance program. Related control: SA-4.
(4)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | USE OF FICAM-ISSUED PROFILES

The information system conforms to FICAM-issued profiles.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses open identity management

standards. To ensure that these standards are viable, robust, reliable, sustainable (e.g.,
available in commercial information technology products), and interoperable as documented,
the United States Government assesses and scopes identity management standards andtechnology implementations against applicable federal legislation, directives, policies, andrequirements. The result is FICAM-issued implementation profiles of approved protocols(e.g., FICAM authentication protocols such as SAML 2.0 and OpenID 2.0, as well as otherprotocols such as the FICAM Backend Attribute Exchange). Related control: SA-4.
(5)

IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV-I CREDENTIALSThe information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification-I (PIV-I)
credentials.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement: (i) applies to logical and physical access

control systems; and (ii) addresses Non-Federal Issuers (NFIs) of identity cards that desire tointeroperate with United States Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) information
systems and that can be trusted by federal government-relying parties. The X.509 certificate
policy for the Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA) addresses PIV-I requirements.
The PIV-I card is suitable for Assurance Level 4 as defined in OMB Memorandum 04-04 and
NIST Special Publication 800-63, and multifactor authentication as defined in NIST Special
Publication 800-116. PIV-I credentials are those credentials issued by a PIV-I provider whose
PIV-I certificate policy maps to the Federal Bridge PIV-I Certificate Policy. A PIV-I provider
is cross-certified (directly or through another PKI bridge) with the FBCA with policies thathave been mapped and approved as meeting the requirements of the PIV-I policies defined in
the FBCA certificate policy. Related control: AU-2.
References: OMB Memoranda 04-04, 11-11, 10-06-2011; FICAM Roadmap and Implementation

Guidance; FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-63, 800-116; National Strategy
for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace; Web: http://idmanagement.gov.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

IA-9

LOW IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)MOD IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)

HIGH IA-8 (1) (2) (3) (4)SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Control: The organization identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined

information system services] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].
Supplemental Guidance: This control supports service-oriented architectures and other distributed

architectural approaches requiring the identification and authentication of information systemservices. In such architectures, external services often appear dynamically. Therefore, information
systems should be able to determine in a dynamic manner, if external providers and associatedservices are authentic. Safeguards implemented by organizational information systems to validate
provider and service authenticity include, for example, information or code signing, provenancegraphs, and/or electronic signatures indicating or including the sources of services.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | INFORMATION EXCHANGE

The organization ensures that service providers receive, validate, and transmit identification andauthentication information.
(2)

SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | TRANSMISSION OF DECISIONSThe organization ensures that identification and authentication decisions are transmitted between[Assignment: organization-defined services] consistent with organizational policies.
Supplemental Guidance: For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures), thedecisions regarding the validation of identification and authentication claims may be made byservices separate from the services acting on those decisions. In such situations, it is necessary

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

to provide the identification and authentication decisions (as opposed to the actual identifiers
and authenticators) to the services that need to act on those decisions. Related control: SC-8.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

IA-10

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

ADAPTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
Control: The organization requires that individuals accessing the information system employ[Assignment: organization-defined supplemental authentication techniques or mechanisms] under
specific [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances or situations].
Supplemental Guidance: Adversaries may compromise individual authentication mechanisms andsubsequently attempt to impersonate legitimate users. This situation can potentially occur with any
authentication mechanisms employed by organizations. To address this threat, organizations may
employ specific techniques/mechanisms and establish protocols to assess suspicious behavior(e.g., individuals accessing information that they do not typically access as part of their normal
duties, roles, or responsibilities, accessing greater quantities of information than the individuals
would routinely access, or attempting to access information from suspicious network addresses).
In these situations when certain preestablished conditions or triggers occur, organizations canrequire selected individuals to provide additional authentication information. Another potential use
for adaptive identification and authentication is to increase the strength of mechanism based on thenumber and/or types of records being accessed. Related controls: AU-6, SI-4.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

IA-11

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

RE-AUTHENTICATION
Control: The organization requires users and devices to re-authenticate when [Assignment:

organization-defined circumstances or situations requiring re-authentication].
Supplemental Guidance: In addition to the re-authentication requirements associated with session

locks, organizations may require re-authentication of individuals and/or devices in other situations
including, for example: (i) when authenticators change; (ii), when roles change; (iii) when security
categories of information systems change; (iv), when the execution of privileged functions occurs;(v) after a fixed period of time; or (vi) periodically. Related control: AC-11.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-IA

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: INCIDENT RESPONSE
IR-1

INCIDENT RESPONSE POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

An incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and associatedincident response controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Incident response policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

Incident response procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IR family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-61, 800-83, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

IR-2

LOW IR-1

MOD IR-1

HIGH IR-1

INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING
Control: The organization provides incident response training to information system users
consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities:a.

Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming an incident response roleor responsibility;b.

When required by information system changes; andc.

[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.

Supplemental Guidance: Incident response training provided by organizations is linked to theassigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure the appropriate content
and level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know
who to call or how to recognize an incident on the information system; system administrators may
require additional training on how to handle/remediate incidents; and incident responders may
receive more specific training on forensics, reporting, system recovery, and restoration. Incident
response training includes user training in the identification and reporting of suspicious activities,
both from external and internal sources. Related controls: AT-3, CP-3, IR-8.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control Enhancements:(1)

INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | SIMULATED EVENTSThe organization incorporates simulated events into incident response training to facilitate
effective response by personnel in crisis situations.

(2)

INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS
The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic
incident response training environment.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-50.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

IR-3

LOW IR-2

MOD IR-2

HIGH IR-2 (1) (2)

INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING
Control: The organization tests the incident response capability for the information system[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] todetermine the incident response effectiveness and documents the results.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine the overall

effectiveness of the capabilities and to identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident
response testing includes, for example, the use of checklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises,
simulations (parallel/full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Incident response testing canalso include a determination of the effects on organizational operations (e.g., reduction in mission
capabilities), organizational assets, and individuals due to incident response. Related controls: CP4, IR-8.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | AUTOMATED TESTING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test theincident response capability.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use automated mechanisms to more thoroughly andeffectively test incident response capabilities, for example: (i) by providing more complete
coverage of incident response issues; (ii) by selecting more realistic test scenarios and test
environments; and (iii) by stressing the response capability. Related control: AT-2.
(2)

INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | COORDINATION WITH RELATED PLANS

The organization coordinates incident response testing with organizational elements responsible
for related plans.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational plans related to incident response testing include, forexample, Business Continuity Plans, Contingency Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuityof Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, andOccupant Emergency Plans.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-84, 800-115.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

APPENDIX F-IR

LOW Not Selected

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
IR-4

INCIDENT HANDLING
Control: The organization:a.

Implements an incident handling capability for security incidents that includes preparation,
detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery;b.

Coordinates incident handling activities with contingency planning activities; andc.

Incorporates lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response
procedures, training, and testing, and implements the resulting changes accordingly.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations recognize that incident response capability is dependent on

the capabilities of organizational information systems and the mission/business processes being
supported by those systems. Therefore, organizations consider incident response as part of thedefinition, design, and development of mission/business processes and information systems.
Incident-related information can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example,
audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, user/administrator reports, andreported supply chain events. Effective incident handling capability includes coordination among
many organizational entities including, for example, mission/business owners, information systemowners, authorizing officials, human resources offices, physical and personnel security offices,
legal departments, operations personnel, procurement offices, and the risk executive (function).
Related controls: AU-6, CM-6, CP-2, CP-4, IR-2, IR-3, IR-8, PE-6, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSESThe organization employs automated mechanisms to support the incident handling process.
Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms supporting incident handling processes

include, for example, online incident management systems.
(2)

INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RECONFIGURATIONThe organization includes dynamic reconfiguration of [Assignment: organization-defined
information system components] as part of the incident response capability.
Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic reconfiguration includes, for example, changes to routerrules, access control lists, intrusion detection/prevention system parameters, and filter rules
for firewalls and gateways. Organizations perform dynamic reconfiguration of information
systems, for example, to stop attacks, to misdirect attackers, and to isolate components ofsystems, thus limiting the extent of the damage from breaches or compromises. Organizations
include time frames for achieving the reconfiguration of information systems in the definitionof the reconfiguration capability, considering the potential need for rapid response in order toeffectively address sophisticated cyber threats. Related controls: AC-2, AC-4, AC-16, CM-2,
CM-3, CM-4.
(3)

INCIDENT HANDLING | CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

The organization identifies [Assignment: organization-defined classes of incidents] and[Assignment: organization-defined actions to take in response to classes of incidents] to ensure
continuation of organizational missions and business functions.
Supplemental Guidance: Classes of incidents include, for example, malfunctions due todesign/implementation errors and omissions, targeted malicious attacks, and untargeted
malicious attacks. Appropriate incident response actions include, for example, gracefuldegradation, information system shutdown, fall back to manual mode/alternative technology
whereby the system operates differently, employing deceptive measures, alternate information
flows, or operating in a mode that is reserved solely for when systems are under attack.
(4)

INCIDENT HANDLING | INFORMATION CORRELATIONThe organization correlates incident information and individual incident responses to achieve anorganization-wide perspective on incident awareness and response.
Supplemental Guidance: Sometimes the nature of a threat event, for example, a hostile cyberattack, is such that it can only be observed by bringing together information from different
sources including various reports and reporting procedures established by organizations.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(5)

INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATIC DISABLING OF INFORMATION SYSTEM

The organization implements a configurable capability to automatically disable the information
system if [Assignment: organization-defined security violations] are detected.
(6)

INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - SPECIFIC CAPABILITIESThe organization implements incident handling capability for insider threats.
Supplemental Guidance: While many organizations address insider threat incidents as aninherent part of their organizational incident response capability, this control enhancement
provides additional emphasis on this type of threat and the need for specific incident handlingcapabilities (as defined within organizations) to provide appropriate and timely responses.
(7)

INCIDENT HANDLING | INSIDER THREATS - INTRA-ORGANIZATION COORDINATIONThe organization coordinates incident handling capability for insider threats across [Assignment:
organization-defined components or elements of the organization].

Supplemental Guidance: Incident handling for insider threat incidents (including preparation,

detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery) requires close coordination
among a variety of organizational components or elements to be effective. These components
or elements include, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners,
human resources offices, procurement offices, personnel/physical security offices, operations
personnel, and risk executive (function). In addition, organizations may require external
support from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
(8)

INCIDENT HANDLING | CORRELATION WITH EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

The organization coordinates with [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] tocorrelate and share [Assignment: organization-defined incident information] to achieve a crossorganization perspective on incident awareness and more effective incident responses.
Supplemental Guidance: The coordination of incident information with external organizations

including, for example, mission/business partners, military/coalition partners, customers, andmultitiered developers, can provide significant benefits. Cross-organizational coordination
with respect to incident handling can serve as an important risk management capability. This
capability allows organizations to leverage critical information from a variety of sources toeffectively respond to information security-related incidents potentially affecting theorganization’s operations, assets, and individuals.
(9)

INCIDENT HANDLING | DYNAMIC RESPONSE CAPABILITY

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined dynamic response capabilities] toeffectively respond to security incidents.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses the deployment of replacement or

new capabilities in a timely manner in response to security incidents (e.g., adversary actions
during hostile cyber attacks). This includes capabilities implemented at the mission/businessprocess level (e.g., activating alternative mission/business processes) and at the information
system level. Related control: CP-10.
(10) INCIDENT HANDLING | SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATIONThe organization coordinates incident handling activities involving supply chain events with otherorganizations involved in the supply chain.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example,

system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors,
vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents include, for example, compromises/breaches
involving information system components, information technology products, development
processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities.
References: Executive Order 13587; NIST Special Publication 800-61.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

APPENDIX F-IR

LOW IR-4

MOD IR-4 (1)HIGH IR-4 (1) (4)

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IR-5

INCIDENT MONITORING
Control: The organization tracks and documents information system security incidents.
Supplemental Guidance: Documenting information system security incidents includes, for example,

maintaining records about each incident, the status of the incident, and other pertinent informationnecessary for forensics, evaluating incident details, trends, and handling. Incident information canbe obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, incident reports, incident response
teams, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, and user/administrator
reports. Related controls: AU-6, IR-8, PE-6, SC-5, SC-7, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INCIDENT MONITORING | AUTOMATED TRACKING / DATA COLLECTION / ANALYSISThe organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the tracking of security incidents
and in the collection and analysis of incident information.
Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms for tracking security incidents andcollecting/analyzing incident information include, for example, the Einstein network
monitoring device and monitoring online Computer Incident Response Centers (CIRCs) orother electronic databases of incidents. Related controls: AU-7, IR-4.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-61.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

IR-6

LOW IR-5

MOD IR-5

HIGH IR-5 (1)INCIDENT REPORTING
Control: The organization:a.

Requires personnel to report suspected security incidents to the organizational incident
response capability within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; andb.

Reports security incident information to [Assignment: organization-defined authorities].

Supplemental Guidance: The intent of this control is to address both specific incident reporting

requirements within an organization and the formal incident reporting requirements for federal
agencies and their subordinate organizations. Suspected security incidents include, for example,
the receipt of suspicious email communications that can potentially contain malicious code. The
types of security incidents reported, the content and timeliness of the reports, and the designatedreporting authorities reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Current federal policy requires that all federal agencies (unlessspecifically exempted from such requirements) report security incidents to the United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) within specified time frames designated in the
US-CERT Concept of Operations for Federal Cyber Security Incident Handling. Related controls:IR-4, IR-5, IR-8.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INCIDENT REPORTING | AUTOMATED REPORTING

The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the reporting of security incidents.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: IR-7.
(2)

INCIDENT REPORTING | VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO INCIDENTS

The organization reports information system vulnerabilities associated with reported security
incidents to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
(3)

INCIDENT REPORTING | COORDINATION WITH SUPPLY CHAIN

The organization provides security incident information to other organizations involved in the
supply chain for information systems or information system components related to the incident.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example,

system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors,
vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents include, for example, compromises/breaches
involving information system components, information technology products, development
processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities. Organizations
determine the appropriate information to share considering the value gained from support byexternal organizations with the potential for harm due to sensitive information being released
to outside organizations of perhaps questionable trustworthiness.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-61; Web: http://www.us-cert.gov.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW IR-6

P1

IR-7

MOD IR-6 (1)HIGH IR-6 (1)INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE
Control: The organization provides an incident response support resource, integral to theorganizational incident response capability that offers advice and assistance to users of theinformation system for the handling and reporting of security incidents.
Supplemental Guidance: Incident response support resources provided by organizations include, forexample, help desks, assistance groups, and access to forensics services, when required. Related
controls: AT-2, IR-4, IR-6, IR-8, SA-9.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION / SUPPORTThe organization employs automated mechanisms to increase the availability of incident responserelated information and support.
Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms can provide a push and/or pull capability forusers to obtain incident response assistance. For example, individuals might have access to a
website to query the assistance capability, or conversely, the assistance capability may havethe ability to proactively send information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part ofincreasing understanding of current response capabilities and support.
(2)

INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL PROVIDERS

The organization:(a)

Establishes a direct, cooperative relationship between its incident response capability andexternal providers of information system protection capability; and(b) Identifies organizational incident response team members to the external providers.
Supplemental Guidance: External providers of information system protection capability include,for example, the Computer Network Defense program within the U.S. Department of
Defense. External providers help to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond tounauthorized activity within organizational information systems and networks.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

IR-8

LOW IR-7

MOD IR-7 (1)HIGH IR-7 (1)INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN
Control: The organization:a.

APPENDIX F-IR

Develops an incident response plan that:

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

1.

Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response
capability;

2.

Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;

3.

Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into theoverall organization;

4.

Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size,
structure, and functions;

5.

Defines reportable incidents;

6.

Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization;

7.

Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain andmature an incident response capability; and8.

Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];b.

Distributes copies of the incident response plan to [Assignment: organization-defined incident
response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];c.

Reviews the incident response plan [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];d.

Updates the incident response plan to address system/organizational changes or problems
encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing;e.

Communicates incident response plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined incident
response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; andf.

Protects the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Supplemental Guidance: It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinatedapproach to incident response. Organizational missions, business functions, strategies, goals, andobjectives for incident response help to determine the structure of incident response capabilities.
As part of a comprehensive incident response capability, organizations consider the coordinationand sharing of information with external organizations, including, for example, external service
providers and organizations involved in the supply chain for organizational information systems.
Related controls: MP-2, MP-4, MP-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-61.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

IR-9

LOW IR-8

MOD IR-8

HIGH IR-8

INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE
Control: The organization responds to information spills by:a.

Identifying the specific information involved in the information system contamination;b.

Alerting [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of the information spill using
a method of communication not associated with the spill;c.

Isolating the contaminated information system or system component;d.

Eradicating the information from the contaminated information system or component;e.

Identifying other information systems or system components that may have been subsequently
contaminated; and

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f.

Performing other [Assignment: organization-defined actions].

Supplemental Guidance: Information spillage refers to instances where either classified or sensitive

information is inadvertently placed on information systems that are not authorized to process suchinformation. Such information spills often occur when information that is initially thought to be oflower sensitivity is transmitted to an information system and then is subsequently determined to beof higher sensitivity. At that point, corrective action is required. The nature of the organizational
response is generally based upon the degree of sensitivity of the spilled information (e.g., security
category or classification level), the security capabilities of the information system, the specificnature of contaminated storage media, and the access authorizations (e.g., security clearances) ofindividuals with authorized access to the contaminated system. The methods used to communicate
information about the spill after the fact do not involve methods directly associated with the actual
spill to minimize the risk of further spreading the contamination before such contamination isisolated and eradicated.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL

The organization assigns [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with responsibility
for responding to information spills.
(2)

INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | TRAINING

The organization provides information spillage response training [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].
(3)

INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | POST-SPILL OPERATIONS

The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] to ensure thatorganizational personnel impacted by information spills can continue to carry out assigned tasks
while contaminated systems are undergoing corrective actions.
Supplemental Guidance: Correction actions for information systems contaminated due toinformation spillages may be very time-consuming. During those periods, personnel may nothave access to the contaminated systems, which may potentially affect their ability to conductorganizational business.
(4)

INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE | EXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] for personnel
exposed to information not within assigned access authorizations.
Supplemental Guidance: Security safeguards include, for example, making personnel exposedto spilled information aware of the federal laws, directives, policies, and/or regulations
regarding the information and the restrictions imposed based on exposure to such information.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

IR-10

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

INTEGRATED INFORMATION SECURITY ANALYSIS TEAM
Control: The organization establishes an integrated team of forensic/malicious code analysts, tool

developers, and real-time operations personnel.
Supplemental Guidance: Having an integrated team for incident response facilitates information

sharing. Such capability allows organizational personnel, including developers, implementers, andoperators, to leverage the team knowledge of the threat in order to implement defensive measuresthat will enable organizations to deter intrusions more effectively. Moreover, it promotes the rapid
detection of intrusions, development of appropriate mitigations, and the deployment of effective
defensive measures. For example, when an intrusion is detected, the integrated security analysis
team can rapidly develop an appropriate response for operators to implement, correlate the newincident with information on past intrusions, and augment ongoing intelligence development. This

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enables the team to identify adversary TTPs that are linked to the operations tempo or to specificmissions/business functions, and to define responsive actions in a way that does not disrupt themission/business operations. Ideally, information security analysis teams are distributed withinorganizations to make the capability more resilient.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-IR

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: MAINTENANCE
MA-1

SYSTEM MAINTENANCE POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:1.

A system maintenance policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system maintenance policy andassociated system maintenance controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

System maintenance policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

System maintenance procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MA family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

MA-2

LOW MA-1

MOD MA-1

HIGH MA-1

CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE
Control: The organization:a.

Schedules, performs, documents, and reviews records of maintenance and repairs on
information system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications
and/or organizational requirements;b.

Approves and monitors all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely andwhether the equipment is serviced on site or removed to another location;c.

Requires that [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly approve theremoval of the information system or system components from organizational facilities foroff-site maintenance or repairs;d.

Sanitizes equipment to remove all information from associated media prior to removal fromorganizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs;e.

Checks all potentially impacted security controls to verify that the controls are still
functioning properly following maintenance or repair actions; and

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________f.

Includes [Assignment: organization-defined maintenance-related information] inorganizational maintenance records.

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the information security aspects of the information

system maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to any system component(including applications) conducted by any local or nonlocal entity (e.g., in-contract, warranty, inhouse, software maintenance agreement). System maintenance also includes those components notdirectly associated with information processing and/or data/information retention such as scanners,
copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes,for example: (i) date and time of maintenance; (ii) name of individuals or group performing themaintenance; (iii) name of escort, if necessary; (iv) a description of the maintenance performed;and (v) information system components/equipment removed or replaced (including identification
numbers, if applicable). The level of detail included in maintenance records can be informed by
the security categories of organizational information systems. Organizations consider supply chain
issues associated with replacement components for information systems. Related controls: CM-3,
CM-4, MA-4, MP-6, PE-16, SA-12, SI-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | RECORD CONTENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MA-2].
(2)

CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIESThe organization:(a)

Employs automated mechanisms to schedule, conduct, and document maintenance andrepairs; and(b) Produces up-to date, accurate, and complete records of all maintenance and repair actions
requested, scheduled, in process, and completed.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-7, MA-3.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

MA-3

LOW MA-2

MOD MA-2

HIGH MA-2 (2)MAINTENANCE TOOLS
Control: The organization approves, controls, and monitors information system maintenance tools.
Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses security-related issues associated with maintenancetools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems.
Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items. Maintenance tools arepotential vehicles for transporting malicious code, either intentionally or unintentionally, into a
facility and subsequently into organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include,for example, hardware/software diagnostic test equipment and hardware/software packet sniffers.
This control does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system
maintenance, yet are a part of the system, for example, the software implementing “ping,” “ls,”“ipconfig,” or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch.
Related controls: MA-2, MA-5, MP-6.
Control Enhancements:(1)

MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLSThe organization inspects the maintenance tools carried into a facility by maintenance personnel
for improper or unauthorized modifications.

Supplemental Guidance: If, upon inspection of maintenance tools, organizations determine thatthe tools have been modified in an improper/unauthorized manner or contain malicious code,

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the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedures for incident
handling. Related control: SI-7.
(2)

MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIAThe organization checks media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before
the media are used in the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance diagnostic andtest programs, organizations determine that the media contain malicious code, the incident ishandled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures. Related
control: SI-3.
(3)

MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVALThe organization prevents the unauthorized removal of maintenance equipment containing
organizational information by:(a)Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment;(b) Sanitizing or destroying the equipment;(c)Retaining the equipment within the facility; or(d) Obtaining an exemption from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly
authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational information includes all information specifically owned

by organizations and information provided to organizations in which organizations serve as
information stewards.
(4)

MAINTENANCE TOOLS | RESTRICTED TOOL USE
The information system restricts the use of maintenance tools to authorized personnel only.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to information systems that are used

to carry out maintenance functions. Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-88.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

MA-4

LOW Not Selected

MOD MA-3 (1) (2)

HIGH MA-3 (1) (2) (3)NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE
Control: The organization:a.

Approves and monitors nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities;b.

Allows the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent withorganizational policy and documented in the security plan for the information system;c.

Employs strong authenticators in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic
sessions;d.

Maintains records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; ande.

Terminates session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.

Supplemental Guidance: Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities

conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., theInternet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities
carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information systemcomponent and not communicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques usedin the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions reflect the network accessrequirements in IA-2. Typically, strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant toreplay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for example,
PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric.

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Enforcing requirements in MA-4 is accomplished in part by other controls. Related controls: AC2, AC-3, AC-6, AC-17, AU-2, AU-3, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, MA-2, MA-5, MP-6, PL-2, SC-7,
SC-10, SC-17.
Control Enhancements:(1)

NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUDITING AND REVIEWThe organization:(a)

Audits nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions [Assignment: organization-defined
audit events]; and(b) Reviews the records of the maintenance and diagnostic sessions.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-12.
(2)

NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | DOCUMENT NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE

The organization documents in the security plan for the information system, the policies andprocedures for the establishment and use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic connections.
(3)

NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | COMPARABLE SECURITY / SANITIZATIONThe organization:(a)Requires that nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic services be performed from an
information system that implements a security capability comparable to the capability
implemented on the system being serviced; or(b) Removes the component to be serviced from the information system prior to nonlocal
maintenance or diagnostic services, sanitizes the component (with regard to organizational
information) before removal from organizational facilities, and after the service is performed,
inspects and sanitizes the component (with regard to potentially malicious software) before
reconnecting the component to the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Comparable security capability on information systems, diagnostic

tools, and equipment providing maintenance services implies that the implemented security
controls on those systems, tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controlson the information system being serviced. Related controls: MA-3, SA-12, SI-3, SI-7.
(4)

NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | AUTHENTICATION / SEPARATION OF MAINTENANCE SESSIONSThe organization protects nonlocal maintenance sessions by:(a)

Employing [Assignment: organization-defined authenticators that are replay resistant]; and(b) Separating the maintenance sessions from other network sessions with the information
system by either:(1)

Physically separated communications paths; or(2)Logically separated communications paths based upon encryption.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-13.
(5)

NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | APPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONS

The organization:(a)Requires the approval of each nonlocal maintenance session by [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles]; and(b) Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of the date and time of planned
nonlocal maintenance.
Supplemental Guidance: Notification may be performed by maintenance personnel. Approval of

nonlocal maintenance sessions is accomplished by organizational personnel with sufficient
information security and information system knowledge to determine the appropriateness ofthe proposed maintenance.
(6)

NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity andconfidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-8, SC-13.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(7)

NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE | REMOTE DISCONNECT VERIFICATION

The information system implements remote disconnect verification at the termination of nonlocal
maintenance and diagnostic sessions.
Supplemental Guidance: Remote disconnect verification ensures that remote connections from

nonlocal maintenance sessions have been terminated and are no longer available for use.
Related control: SC-13.
References: FIPS Publications 140-2, 197, 201; NIST Special Publications 800-63, 800-88; CNSS

Policy 15.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW MA-4

P2

MA-5

MOD MA-4 (2)HIGH MA-4 (2) (3)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintains a list of
authorized maintenance organizations or personnel;b.

Ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the information system haverequired access authorizations; andc.

Designates organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technicalcompetence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess therequired access authorizations.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to individuals performing hardware or software

maintenance on organizational information systems, while PE-2 addresses physical access forindividuals whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of thesystems (e.g., custodial staff, physical plant maintenance personnel). Technical competence ofsupervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on the information systems while
having required access authorizations refers to maintenance on and near the systems. Individuals
not previously identified as authorized maintenance personnel, such as information technology
manufacturers, vendors, systems integrators, and consultants, may require privileged access toorganizational information systems, for example, when required to conduct maintenance activities
with little or no notice. Based on organizational assessments of risk, organizations may issue
temporary credentials to these individuals. Temporary credentials may be for one-time use or forvery limited time periods. Related controls: AC-2, IA-8, MP-2, PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, RA-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE ACCESSThe organization:(a)Implements procedures for the use of maintenance personnel that lack appropriate security
clearances or are not U.S. citizens, that include the following requirements:(1)

Maintenance personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances, orformal access approvals are escorted and supervised during the performance of
maintenance and diagnostic activities on the information system by approved
organizational personnel who are fully cleared, have appropriate access authorizations,and are technically qualified;(2)

Prior to initiating maintenance or diagnostic activities by personnel who do not haveneeded access authorizations, clearances or formal access approvals, all volatileinformation storage components within the information system are sanitized and all
nonvolatile storage media are removed or physically disconnected from the system andsecured; and(b) Develops and implements alternate security safeguards in the event an information systemcomponent cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from the system.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement denies individuals who lack appropriate

security clearances (i.e., individuals who do not possess security clearances or possess
security clearances at a lower level than required) or who are not U.S. citizens, visual andelectronic access to any classified information, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), or
any other sensitive information contained on organizational information systems. Proceduresfor the use of maintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the information
systems. Related controls: MP-6, PL-2.
(2)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMSThe organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an
information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information possess security
clearances and formal access approvals for at least the highest classification level and for allcompartments of information on the system.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PS-3.
(3)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMSThe organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an
information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are U.S. citizens.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PS-3.
(4)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | FOREIGN NATIONALSThe organization ensures that:(a)

Cleared foreign nationals (i.e., foreign nationals with appropriate security clearances), areused to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems only
when the systems are jointly owned and operated by the United States and foreign allied
governments, or owned and operated solely by foreign allied governments; and(b) Approvals, consents, and detailed operational conditions regarding the use of foreign
nationals to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems
are fully documented within Memoranda of Agreements.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PS-3.
(5)

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL | NONSYSTEM-RELATED MAINTENANCE

The organization ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance activities notdirectly associated with the information system but in the physical proximity of the system, haverequired access authorizations.
Supplemental Guidance: Personnel performing maintenance activities in other capacities notdirectly related to the information system include, for example, physical plant personnel andjanitorial personnel.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

MA-6

LOW MA-5

MOD MA-5

HIGH MA-5 (1)TIMELY MAINTENANCE
Control: The organization obtains maintenance support and/or spare parts for [Assignment:
organization-defined information system components] within [Assignment: organization-definedtime period] of failure.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations specify the information system components that result inincreased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the
Nation when the functionality provided by those components is not operational. Organizational
actions to obtain maintenance support typically include having appropriate contracts in place.
Related controls: CM-8, CP-2, CP-7, SA-14, SA-15.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

The organization performs preventive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined
information system components] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].
Supplemental Guidance: Preventive maintenance includes proactive care and servicing oforganizational information systems components for the purpose of maintaining equipment andfacilities in satisfactory operating condition. Such maintenance provides for the systematic
inspection, tests, measurements, adjustments, parts replacement, detection, and correction of
incipient failures either before they occur or before they develop into major defects. The
primary goal of preventive maintenance is to avoid/mitigate the consequences of equipment
failures. Preventive maintenance is designed to preserve and restore equipment reliability byreplacing worn components before they actually fail. Methods of determining what preventive(or other) failure management policies to apply include, for example, original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) recommendations, statistical failure records, requirements of codes,
legislation, or regulations within a jurisdiction, expert opinion, maintenance that has alreadybeen conducted on similar equipment, or measured values and performance indications.
(2)

TIMELY MAINTENANCE | PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE

The organization performs predictive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined
information system components] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].
Supplemental Guidance: Predictive maintenance, or condition-based maintenance, attempts toevaluate the condition of equipment by performing periodic or continuous (online) equipment
condition monitoring. The goal of predictive maintenance is to perform maintenance at ascheduled point in time when the maintenance activity is most cost-effective and before theequipment loses performance within a threshold. The predictive component of predictive
maintenance stems from the goal of predicting the future trend of the equipment's condition.
This approach uses principles of statistical process control to determine at what point in the
future maintenance activities will be appropriate. Most predictive maintenance inspections are
performed while equipment is in service, thereby minimizing disruption of normal system
operations. Predictive maintenance can result in substantial cost savings and higher system
reliability. Predictive maintenance tends to include measurement of the item. To evaluate
equipment condition, predictive maintenance utilizes nondestructive testing technologies suchas infrared, acoustic (partial discharge and airborne ultrasonic), corona detection, vibration
analysis, sound level measurements, oil analysis, and other specific online tests.
(3)

TIMELY MAINTENANCE | AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE

The organization employs automated mechanisms to transfer predictive maintenance data to acomputerized maintenance management system.
Supplemental Guidance: A computerized maintenance management system maintains acomputer database of information about the maintenance operations of organizations andautomates processing equipment condition data in order to trigger maintenance planning,
execution, and reporting.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

APPENDIX F-MA

LOW Not Selected

MOD MA-6

HIGH MA-6

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: MEDIA PROTECTION
MP-1

MEDIA PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

A media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and associatedmedia protection controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Media protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

Media protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MP family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

MP-2

LOW MP-1

MOD MP-1

HIGH MP-1

MEDIA ACCESS
Control: The organization restricts access to [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital

and/or non-digital media] to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media.
Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk
drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, forexample, paper and microfilm. Restricting non-digital media access includes, for example,
denying access to patient medical records in a community hospital unless the individuals seeking
access to such records are authorized healthcare providers. Restricting access to digital media
includes, for example, limiting access to design specifications stored on compact disks in the
media library to the project leader and the individuals on the development team. Related controls:
AC-3, IA-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PL-2.
Supplemental Guidance:

Control Enhancements:(1)

MEDIA ACCESS | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4 (2)].

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(2)

MEDIA ACCESS | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28 (1)].
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-111.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

MP-3

LOW MP-2

MOD MP-2

HIGH MP-2

MEDIA MARKING
Control: The organization:a.

Marks information system media indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, andapplicable security markings (if any) of the information; andb.

Exempts [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media] from marking
as long as the media remain within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas].

Supplemental Guidance: The term security marking refers to the application/use of human-readable

security attributes. The term security labeling refers to the application/use of security attributeswith regard to internal data structures within information systems (see AC-16). Information
system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example,
diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, anddigital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Security
marking is generally not required for media containing information determined by organizations to
be in the public domain or to be publicly releasable. However, some organizations may require
markings for public information indicating that the information is publicly releasable. Marking of
information system media reflects applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies,
regulations, standards, and guidance. Related controls: AC-16, PL-2, RA-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: FIPS Publication 199.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

MP-4

LOW Not Selected

MOD MP-3

HIGH MP-3

MEDIA STORAGE
Control: The organization:a.

Physically controls and securely stores [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital
and/or non-digital media] within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]; andb.

Protects information system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved
equipment, techniques, and procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media.

Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk
drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, forexample, paper and microfilm. Physically controlling information system media includes, forexample, conducting inventories, ensuring procedures are in place to allow individuals to checkout and return media to the media library, and maintaining accountability for all stored media.
Secure storage includes, for example, a locked drawer, desk, or cabinet, or a controlled media
library. The type of media storage is commensurate with the security category and/or classificationof the information residing on the media. Controlled areas are areas for which organizations

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provide sufficient physical and procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established forprotecting information and/or information systems. For media containing information determinedby organizations to be in the public domain, to be publicly releasable, or to have limited or noadverse impact on organizations or individuals if accessed by other than authorized personnel,
fewer safeguards may be needed. In these situations, physical access controls provide adequate
protection. Related controls: CP-6, CP-9, MP-2, MP-7, PE-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

MEDIA STORAGE | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28 (1)].
(2)

MEDIA STORAGE | AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESSThe organization employs automated mechanisms to restrict access to media storage areas and toaudit access attempts and access granted.
Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms can include, for example, keypads on theexternal entries to media storage areas. Related controls: AU-2, AU-9, AU-6, AU-12.
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57, 800-111.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

MP-5

LOW Not Selected

MOD MP-4

HIGH MP-4

MEDIA TRANSPORT
Control: The organization:a.

Protects and controls [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media]
during transport outside of controlled areas using [Assignment: organization-defined security
safeguards];b.

Maintains accountability for information system media during transport outside of controlledareas;c.

Documents activities associated with the transport of information system media; andd.

Restricts the activities associated with the transport of information system media to authorized
personnel.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media.

Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk
drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, forexample, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information
storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers), that are transported outside of controlledareas. Controlled areas are areas or spaces for which organizations provide sufficient physicaland/or procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information
and/or information systems.
Physical and technical safeguards for media are commensurate with the security category orclassification of the information residing on the media. Safeguards to protect media duringtransport include, for example, locked containers and cryptography. Cryptographic mechanisms
can provide confidentiality and integrity protections depending upon the mechanisms used.
Activities associated with transport include the actual transport as well as those activities such as
releasing media for transport and ensuring that media enters the appropriate transport processes.
For the actual transport, authorized transport and courier personnel may include individuals fromoutside the organization (e.g., U.S. Postal Service or a commercial transport or delivery service).
Maintaining accountability of media during transport includes, for example, restricting transport
activities to authorized personnel, and tracking and/or obtaining explicit records of transport
activities as the media moves through the transportation system to prevent and detect loss,

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destruction, or tampering. Organizations establish documentation requirements for activities
associated with the transport of information system media in accordance with organizational
assessments of risk to include the flexibility to define different record-keeping methods for thedifferent types of media transport as part of an overall system of transport-related records. Related
controls: AC-19, CP-9, MP-3, MP-4, RA-3, SC-8, SC-13, SC-28.
Control Enhancements:(1)

MEDIA TRANSPORT | PROTECTION OUTSIDE OF CONTROLLED AREAS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5].
(2)

MEDIA TRANSPORT | DOCUMENTATION OF ACTIVITIES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-5].
(3)

MEDIA TRANSPORT | CUSTODIANS

The organization employs an identified custodian during transport of information system media
outside of controlled areas.
Supplemental Guidance: Identified custodians provide organizations with specific points ofcontact during the media transport process and facilitate individual accountability. Custodial
responsibilities can be transferred from one individual to another as long as an unambiguous
custodian is identified at all times.
(4)

MEDIA TRANSPORT | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION
The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality andintegrity of information stored on digital media during transport outside of controlled areas.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to both portable storage devices(e.g., USB memory sticks, compact disks, digital video disks, external/removable hard disk
drives) and mobile devices with storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers).
Related control: MP-2.
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-60.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

MP-6

LOW Not Selected

MOD MP-5 (4)HIGH MP-5 (4)MEDIA SANITIZATION
Control: The organization:a.

Sanitizes [Assignment: organization-defined information system media] prior to disposal,
release out of organizational control, or release for reuse using [Assignment: organizationdefined sanitization techniques and procedures] in accordance with applicable federal andorganizational standards and policies; andb.

Employs sanitization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with thesecurity category or classification of the information.

This control applies to all information system media, both digital and nondigital, subject to disposal or reuse, whether or not the media is considered removable. Examples
include media found in scanners, copiers, printers, notebook computers, workstations, network
components, and mobile devices. The sanitization process removes information from the media
such that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstructed. Sanitization techniques, including
clearing, purging, cryptographic erase, and destruction, prevent the disclosure of information tounauthorized individuals when such media is reused or released for disposal. Organizations
determine the appropriate sanitization methods recognizing that destruction is sometimes
necessary when other methods cannot be applied to media requiring sanitization. Organizations
use discretion on the employment of approved sanitization techniques and procedures for media
containing information deemed to be in the public domain or publicly releasable, or deemed tohave no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if released for reuse or disposal.
Supplemental Guidance:

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Sanitization of non-digital media includes, for example, removing a classified appendix from anotherwise unclassified document, or redacting selected sections or words from a document by
obscuring the redacted sections/words in a manner equivalent in effectiveness to removing themfrom the document. NSA standards and policies control the sanitization process for media
containing classified information. Related controls: MA-2, MA-4, RA-3, SC-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

MEDIA SANITIZATION | REVIEW / APPROVE / TRACK / DOCUMENT / VERIFY
The organization reviews, approves, tracks, documents, and verifies media sanitization anddisposal actions.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations review and approve media to be sanitized to ensurecompliance with records-retention policies. Tracking/documenting actions include, forexample, listing personnel who reviewed and approved sanitization and disposal actions,types of media sanitized, specific files stored on the media, sanitization methods used, date
and time of the sanitization actions, personnel who performed the sanitization, verification
actions taken, personnel who performed the verification, and disposal action taken.
Organizations verify that the sanitization of the media was effective prior to disposal. Related
control: SI-12.
(2)

MEDIA SANITIZATION | EQUIPMENT TESTING

The organization tests sanitization equipment and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] to verify that the intended sanitization is being achieved.
Supplemental Guidance: Testing of sanitization equipment and procedures may be conducted byqualified and authorized external entities (e.g., other federal agencies or external service
providers).
(3)

MEDIA SANITIZATION | NONDESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUESThe organization applies nondestructive sanitization techniques to portable storage devices prior
to connecting such devices to the information system under the following circumstances:[Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring sanitization of portable storage
devices].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to digital media containing classified

information and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). Portable storage devices can be
the source of malicious code insertions into organizational information systems. Many ofthese devices are obtained from unknown and potentially untrustworthy sources and may
contain malicious code that can be readily transferred to information systems through USB
ports or other entry portals. While scanning such storage devices is always recommended,sanitization provides additional assurance that the devices are free of malicious code toinclude code capable of initiating zero-day attacks. Organizations consider nondestructive
sanitization of portable storage devices when such devices are first purchased from the
manufacturer or vendor prior to initial use or when organizations lose a positive chain ofcustody for the devices. Related control: SI-3.
(4)

MEDIA SANITIZATION | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION(5)MEDIA SANITIZATION | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6].
[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6].
(6)

MEDIA SANITIZATION | MEDIA DESTRUCTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-6].
(7)

MEDIA SANITIZATION | DUAL AUTHORIZATIONThe organization enforces dual authorization for the sanitization of [Assignment: organizationdefined information system media].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ dual authorization to ensure that information

system media sanitization cannot occur unless two technically qualified individuals conduct
the task. Individuals sanitizing information system media possess sufficient skills/expertise todetermine if the proposed sanitization reflects applicable federal/organizational standards,
policies, and procedures. Dual authorization also helps to ensure that sanitization occurs as

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intended, both protecting against errors and false claims of having performed the sanitization
actions. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control. Related controls: AC-3,
MP-2.
(8)

MEDIA SANITIZATION | REMOTE PURGING / WIPING OF INFORMATIONThe organization provides the capability to purge/wipe information from [Assignment:
organization-defined information systems, system components, or devices] either remotely or
under the following conditions: [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects data/information on organizational

information systems, system components, or devices (e.g., mobile devices) if such systems,
components, or devices are obtained by unauthorized individuals. Remote purge/wipe
commands require strong authentication to mitigate the risk of unauthorized individuals
purging/wiping the system/component/device. The purge/wipe function can be implemented
in a variety of ways including, for example, by overwriting data/information multiple times orby destroying the key necessary to decrypt encrypted data.
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-60, 800-88;

Web: http://www.nsa.gov/ia/mitigation_guidance/media_destruction_guidance/index.shtml.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

MP-7

LOW MP-6

MOD MP-6

HIGH MP-6 (1) (2) (3)MEDIA USE
Control: The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of [Assignment: organization-

defined types of information system media] on [Assignment: organization-defined information
systems or system components] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].
Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media.
Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk
drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, forexample, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information
storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers). In contrast to MP-2, which restricts user
access to media, this control restricts the use of certain types of media on information systems, forexample, restricting/prohibiting the use of flash drives or external hard disk drives. Organizations
can employ technical and nontechnical safeguards (e.g., policies, procedures, rules of behavior) to
restrict the use of information system media. Organizations may restrict the use of portable storage
devices, for example, by using physical cages on workstations to prohibit access to certain external
ports, or disabling/removing the ability to insert, read or write to such devices. Organizations may
also limit the use of portable storage devices to only approved devices including, for example,
devices provided by the organization, devices provided by other approved organizations, anddevices that are not personally owned. Finally, organizations may restrict the use of portablestorage devices based on the type of device, for example, prohibiting the use of writeable, portablestorage devices, and implementing this restriction by disabling or removing the capability to write
to such devices. Related controls: AC-19, PL-4.
Supplemental Guidance:

Control Enhancements:(1)

MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE WITHOUT OWNER
The organization prohibits the use of portable storage devices in organizational information
systems when such devices have no identifiable owner.

Supplemental Guidance: Requiring identifiable owners (e.g., individuals, organizations, or

projects) for portable storage devices reduces the risk of using such technologies by allowing
organizations to assign responsibility and accountability for addressing known vulnerabilities
in the devices (e.g., malicious code insertion). Related control: PL-4.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(2)

MEDIA USE | PROHIBIT USE OF SANITIZATION-RESISTANT MEDIAThe organization prohibits the use of sanitization-resistant media in organizational information
systems.
Supplemental Guidance: Sanitization-resistance applies to the capability to purge informationfrom media. Certain types of media do not support sanitize commands, or if supported, theinterfaces are not supported in a standardized way across these devices. Sanitization-resistant
media include, for example, compact flash, embedded flash on boards and devices, solid statedrives, and USB removable media. Related control: MP-6.
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-111.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

MP-8

LOW MP-7

MOD MP-7 (1)HIGH MP-7 (1)MEDIA DOWNGRADING
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined information system media downgrading
process] that includes employing downgrading mechanisms with [Assignment: organizationdefined strength and integrity];b.

Ensures that the information system media downgrading process is commensurate with thesecurity category and/or classification level of the information to be removed and the accessauthorizations of the potential recipients of the downgraded information;c.

Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined information system media requiring
downgrading]; andd.

Downgrades the identified information system media using the established process.

This control applies to all information system media, digital and nondigital, subject to release outside of the organization, whether or not the media is consideredremovable. The downgrading process, when applied to system media, removes information fromthe media, typically by security category or classification level, such that the information cannot
be retrieved or reconstructed. Downgrading of media includes redacting information to enablewider release and distribution. Downgrading of media also ensures that empty space on the media(e.g., slack space within files) is devoid of information.
Supplemental Guidance:

Control Enhancements:(1)

MEDIA DOWNGRADING | DOCUMENTATION OF PROCESSThe organization documents information system media downgrading actions.

Organizations can document the media downgrading process byproviding information such as the downgrading technique employed, the identification
number of the downgraded media, and the identity of the individual that authorized and/or
performed the downgrading action.
Supplemental Guidance:(2)

MEDIA DOWNGRADING | EQUIPMENT TESTING

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined tests] of downgrading equipment andprocedures to verify correct performance [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
(3)

MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATIONThe organization downgrades information system media containing [Assignment: organizationdefined Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)] prior to public release in accordance withapplicable federal and organizational standards and policies.
(4)

APPENDIX F-MP

MEDIA DOWNGRADING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATIONThe organization downgrades information system media containing classified information prior torelease to individuals without required access authorizations in accordance with NSA standards
and policies.

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Supplemental Guidance: Downgrading of classified information uses approved sanitization

tools, techniques, and procedures to transfer information confirmed to be unclassified fromclassified information systems to unclassified media.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-MPLOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
PE-1

PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

A physical and environmental protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities,
and compliance; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental protection
policy and associated physical and environmental protection controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Physical and environmental protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency]; and2.

Physical and environmental protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PE family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PE-2

LOW PE-1

MOD PE-1

HIGH PE-1

PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONSControl: The organization:a.

Develops, approves, and maintains a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility
where the information system resides;b.

Issues authorization credentials for facility access;c.

Reviews the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; andd.

Removes individuals from the facility access list when access is no longer required.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals(e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials
are not considered visitors. Authorization credentials include, for example, badges, identification
cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine the strength of authorization credentials needed(including level of forge-proof badges, smart cards, or identification cards) consistent with federal

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standards, policies, and procedures. This control only applies to areas within facilities that havenot been designated as publicly accessible. Related controls: PE-3, PE-4, PS-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | ACCESS BY POSITION / ROLE

The organization authorizes physical access to the facility where the information system resides
based on position or role.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-6.
(2)

PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | TWO FORMS OF IDENTIFICATIONThe organization requires two forms of identification from [Assignment: organization-defined list of
acceptable forms of identification] for visitor access to the facility where the information system
resides.
Supplemental Guidance: Acceptable forms of government photo identification include, forexample, passports, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards, and drivers’ licenses. In thecase of gaining access to facilities using automated mechanisms, organizations may use PIV
cards, key cards, PINs, and biometrics. Related controls: IA-2, IA-4, IA-5.
(3)

PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS | RESTRICT UNESCORTED ACCESSThe organization restricts unescorted access to the facility where the information system resides
to personnel with [Selection (one or more): security clearances for all information contained within
the system; formal access authorizations for all information contained within the system; need foraccess to all information contained within the system; [Assignment: organization-defined
credentials]].
Supplemental Guidance: Due to the highly sensitive nature of classified information stored

within certain facilities, it is important that individuals lacking sufficient security clearances,
access approvals, or need to know, be escorted by individuals with appropriate credentials toensure that such information is not exposed or otherwise compromised. Related controls: PS2, PS-6.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW PE-2

P1

PE-3

MOD PE-2

HIGH PE-2

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL
Control: The organization:a.

Enforces physical access authorizations at [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points
to the facility where the information system resides] by;1.

Verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; and2.

Controlling ingress/egress to the facility using [Selection (one or more): [Assignment:
organization-defined physical access control systems/devices]; guards];b.

Maintains physical access audit logs for [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points];c.

Provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to control access to areas
within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible;d.

Escorts visitors and monitors visitor activity [Assignment: organization-defined
circumstances requiring visitor escorts and monitoring];e.

Secures keys, combinations, and other physical access devices;f.

Inventories [Assignment: organization-defined physical access devices] every [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; and

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g.

Changes combinations and keys [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and/or whenkeys are lost, combinations are compromised, or individuals are transferred or terminated.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals(e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials
are not considered visitors. Organizations determine the types of facility guards needed including,for example, professional physical security staff or other personnel such as administrative staff orinformation system users. Physical access devices include, for example, keys, locks, combinations,and card readers. Safeguards for publicly accessible areas within organizational facilities include,for example, cameras, monitoring by guards, and isolating selected information systems and/or
system components in secured areas. Physical access control systems comply with applicable
federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. The
Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management Program provides implementation guidance
for identity, credential, and access management capabilities for physical access control systems.
Organizations have flexibility in the types of audit logs employed. Audit logs can be procedural(e.g., a written log of individuals accessing the facility and when such access occurred), automated(e.g., capturing ID provided by a PIV card), or some combination thereof. Physical access points
can include facility access points, interior access points to information systems and/or components
requiring supplemental access controls, or both. Components of organizational information
systems (e.g., workstations, terminals) may be located in areas designated as publicly accessible
with organizations safeguarding access to such devices. Related controls: AU-2, AU-6, MP-2,
MP-4, PE-2, PE-4, PE-5, PS-3, RA-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | INFORMATION SYSTEM ACCESSThe organization enforces physical access authorizations to the information system in addition to
the physical access controls for the facility at [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces
containing one or more components of the information system].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides additional physical security for

those areas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components(e.g., server rooms, media storage areas, data and communications centers). Related control:
PS-2.
(2)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY / INFORMATION SYSTEM BOUNDARIESThe organization performs security checks [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] at thephysical boundary of the facility or information system for unauthorized exfiltration of information
or removal of information system components.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the extent, frequency, and/or randomness of

security checks to adequately mitigate risk associated with exfiltration. Related controls: AC4, SC-7.
(3)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | CONTINUOUS GUARDS / ALARMS / MONITORING

The organization employs guards and/or alarms to monitor every physical access point to thefacility where the information system resides 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CP-6, CP-7.
(4)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | LOCKABLE CASINGSThe organization uses lockable physical casings to protect [Assignment: organization-defined
information system components] from unauthorized physical access.
(5)

PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | TAMPER PROTECTION

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Selection(one or more): detect; prevent] physical tampering or alteration of [Assignment: organizationdefined hardware components] within the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may implement tamper detection/prevention at selected

hardware components or tamper detection at some components and tamper prevention at othercomponents. Tamper detection/prevention activities can employ many types of anti-tamper
technologies including, for example, tamper-detection seals and anti-tamper coatings. Antitamper programs help to detect hardware alterations through counterfeiting and other supply
chain-related risks. Related control: SA-12.

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PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL | FACILITY PENETRATION TESTING

The organization employs a penetration testing process that includes [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency], unannounced attempts to bypass or circumvent security controls associatedwith physical access points to the facility.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-2, CA-7.
References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 800-76, 800-78, 800-116;

ICD 704, 705; DoD Instruction 5200.39; Personal Identity Verification (PIV) in Enterprise
Physical Access Control System (E-PACS);
Web: http://idmanagement.gov, http://fips201ep.cio.gov.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW PE-3

P1

PE-4

MOD PE-3

HIGH PE-3 (1)ACCESS CONTROL FOR TRANSMISSION MEDIUM
Control: The organization controls physical access to [Assignment: organization-defined

information system distribution and transmission lines] within organizational facilities using[Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].
Supplemental Guidance: Physical security safeguards applied to information system distribution andtransmission lines help to prevent accidental damage, disruption, and physical tampering. In
addition, physical safeguards may be necessary to help prevent eavesdropping or in transit
modification of unencrypted transmissions. Security safeguards to control physical access tosystem distribution and transmission lines include, for example: (i) locked wiring closets; (ii)disconnected or locked spare jacks; and/or (iii) protection of cabling by conduit or cable trays.
Related controls: MP-2, MP-4, PE-2, PE-3, PE-5, SC-7, SC-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NSTISSI No. 7003.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW Not Selected

P1

PE-5

MOD PE-4

HIGH PE-4

ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES
Control: The organization controls physical access to information system output devices to prevent

unauthorized individuals from obtaining the output.
Supplemental Guidance: Controlling physical access to output devices includes, for example,

placing output devices in locked rooms or other secured areas and allowing access to authorizedindividuals only, and placing output devices in locations that can be monitored by organizational
personnel. Monitors, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines, and audio devices areexamples of information system output devices. Related controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-18.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | ACCESS TO OUTPUT BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALSThe organization:(a)Controls physical access to output from [Assignment: organization-defined output devices];and(b) Ensures that only authorized individuals receive output from the device.

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Supplemental Guidance: Controlling physical access to selected output devices includes, forexample, placing printers, copiers, and facsimile machines in controlled areas with keypadaccess controls or limiting access to individuals with certain types of badges.
(2)

ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | ACCESS TO OUTPUT BY INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

The information system:(a)Controls physical access to output from [Assignment: organization-defined output devices];and(b) Links individual identity to receipt of the output from the device.
Supplemental Guidance: Controlling physical access to selected output devices includes, forexample, installing security functionality on printers, copiers, and facsimile machines thatallows organizations to implement authentication (e.g., using a PIN or hardware token) on
output devices prior to the release of output to individuals.
(3)

ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES | MARKING OUTPUT DEVICES

The organization marks [Assignment: organization-defined information system output devices]
indicating the appropriate security marking of the information permitted to be output from thedevice.
Supplemental Guidance: Outputs devices include, for example, printers, monitors, facsimile

machines, scanners, copiers, and audio devices. This control enhancement is generally
applicable to information system output devices other than mobiles devices.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

PE-6

LOW Not Selected

MOD PE-5

HIGH PE-5

MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS
Control: The organization:a.

Monitors physical access to the facility where the information system resides to detect andrespond to physical security incidents;b.

Reviews physical access logs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and uponoccurrence of [Assignment: organization-defined events or potential indications of events];
andc.

Coordinates results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident response
capability.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational incident response capabilities include investigations of andresponses to detected physical security incidents. Security incidents include, for example, apparent
security violations or suspicious physical access activities. Suspicious physical access activities
include, for example: (i) accesses outside of normal work hours; (ii) repeated accesses to areas notnormally accessed; (iii) accesses for unusual lengths of time; and (iv) out-of-sequence accesses.
Related controls: CA-7, IR-4, IR-8.
Control Enhancements:(1)

MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | INTRUSION ALARMS / SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

The organization monitors physical intrusion alarms and surveillance equipment.
(2)

MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | AUTOMATED INTRUSION RECOGNITION / RESPONSESThe organization employs automated mechanisms to recognize [Assignment: organization-definedclasses/types of intrusions] and initiate [Assignment: organization-defined response actions].
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-4.

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MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

The organization employs video surveillance of [Assignment: organization-defined operational
areas] and retains video recordings for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on recording surveillance video
for purposes of subsequent review, if circumstances so warrant (e.g., a break-in detected byother means). It does not require monitoring surveillance video although organizations may
choose to do so. Note that there may be legal considerations when performing and retaining
video surveillance, especially if such surveillance is in a public location.
(4)

MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION SYSTEMSThe organization monitors physical access to the information system in addition to the physicalaccess monitoring of the facility as [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing
one or more components of the information system].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides additional monitoring for thoseareas within facilities where there is a concentration of information system components (e.g.,server rooms, media storage areas, communications centers). Related controls: PS-2, PS-3.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PE-7

LOW PE-6

MOD PE-6 (1)HIGH PE-6 (1) (4)

VISITOR CONTROL[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2 and PE-3].

PE-8

VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS
Control: The organization:a.

Maintains visitor access records to the facility where the information system resides for[Assignment: organization-defined time period]; andb.

Reviews visitor access records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Visitor access records include, for example, names and organizations of

persons visiting, visitor signatures, forms of identification, dates of access, entry and departure
times, purposes of visits, and names and organizations of persons visited. Visitor access records
are not required for publicly accessible areas.
Control Enhancements:(1)

VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | AUTOMATED RECORDS MAINTENANCE / REVIEWThe organization employs automated mechanisms to facilitate the maintenance and review ofvisitor access records.
(2)

VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | PHYSICAL ACCESS RECORDS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

APPENDIX F-PE

LOW PE-8

MOD PE-8

HIGH PE-8 (1)PAGE F-132

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________PE-9

POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING
Control: The organization protects power equipment and power cabling for the information systemfrom damage and destruction.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine the types of protection necessary for power

equipment and cabling employed at different locations both internal and external to organizational
facilities and environments of operation. This includes, for example, generators and power cablingoutside of buildings, internal cabling and uninterruptable power sources within an office or data
center, and power sources for self-contained entities such as vehicles and satellites. Related
control: PE-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | REDUNDANT CABLING

The organization employs redundant power cabling paths that are physically separated by[Assignment: organization-defined distance].
Supplemental Guidance: Physically separate, redundant power cables help to ensure that power

continues to flow in the event one of the cables is cut or otherwise damaged.
(2)

POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING | AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROLSThe organization employs automatic voltage controls for [Assignment: organization-defined criticalinformation system components].

References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PE-10

LOW Not Selected

MOD PE-9

HIGH PE-9

EMERGENCY SHUTOFF
Control: The organization:a.

Provides the capability of shutting off power to the information system or individual systemcomponents in emergency situations;b.

Places emergency shutoff switches or devices in [Assignment: organization-defined location
by information system or system component] to facilitate safe and easy access for personnel;
andc.

Protects emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of

information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe
computer rooms. Related control: PE-15.
Control Enhancements:(1)

EMERGENCY SHUTOFF | ACCIDENTAL / UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-10].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

APPENDIX F-PE

LOW Not Selected

MOD PE-10

HIGH PE-10

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________PE-11

EMERGENCY POWER
Control: The organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate[Selection (one or more): an orderly shutdown of the information system; transition of theinformation system to long-term alternate power] in the event of a primary power source loss.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AT-3, CP-2, CP-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY - MINIMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is
capable of maintaining minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss ofthe primary power source.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement can be satisfied, for example, by the use of asecondary commercial power supply or other external power supply. Long-term alternate
power supplies for the information system can be either manually or automatically activated.
(2)

EMERGENCY POWER | LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY - SELF-CONTAINEDThe organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is:(a)

Self-contained;(b) Not reliant on external power generation; and(c)Capable of maintaining [Selection: minimally required operational capability; full operational
capability] in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement can be satisfied, for example, by the use of

one or more generators with sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the organization. Longterm alternate power supplies for organizational information systems are either manually or
automatically activated.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PE-12

LOW Not Selected

MOD PE-11

HIGH PE-11 (1)EMERGENCY LIGHTING
Control: The organization employs and maintains automatic emergency lighting for the

information system that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption and that covers
emergency exits and evacuation routes within the facility.
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of

information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe
computer rooms. Related controls: CP-2, CP-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

EMERGENCY LIGHTING | ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

The organization provides emergency lighting for all areas within the facility supporting essential
missions and business functions.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

APPENDIX F-PE

LOW PE-12

MOD PE-12

HIGH PE-12

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
PE-13

FIRE PROTECTION
Control: The organization employs and maintains fire suppression and detection devices/systems

for the information system that are supported by an independent energy source.
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of

information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe
computer rooms. Fire suppression and detection devices/systems include, for example, sprinkler
systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, and smoke detectors.
Control Enhancements:(1)

FIRE PROTECTION | DETECTION DEVICES / SYSTEMSThe organization employs fire detection devices/systems for the information system that activate
automatically and notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] and [Assignment:
organization-defined emergency responders] in the event of a fire.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency

responders in the event that individuals on the notification list must have appropriate accessauthorizations and/or clearances, for example, to obtain access to facilities where classified
operations are taking place or where there are information systems containing classified
information.
(2)

FIRE PROTECTION | SUPPRESSION DEVICES / SYSTEMSThe organization employs fire suppression devices/systems for the information system thatprovide automatic notification of any activation to Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles] and [Assignment: organization-defined emergency responders].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can identify specific personnel, roles, and emergency

responders in the event that individuals on the notification list must have appropriate accessauthorizations and/or clearances, for example, to obtain access to facilities where classified
operations are taking place or where there are information systems containing classified
information.
(3)

FIRE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION

The organization employs an automatic fire suppression capability for the information system
when the facility is not staffed on a continuous basis.
(4)

FIRE PROTECTION | INSPECTIONS

The organization ensures that the facility undergoes [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
inspections by authorized and qualified inspectors and resolves identified deficiencies within[Assignment: organization-defined time period].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PE-14

LOW PE-13

MOD PE-13 (3)HIGH PE-13 (1) (2) (3)

TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS
Control: The organization:a.

Maintains temperature and humidity levels within the facility where the information system
resides at [Assignment: organization-defined acceptable levels]; andb.

Monitors temperature and humidity levels [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of

information system resources, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer
rooms. Related control: AT-3.

APPENDIX F-PE

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control Enhancements:(1)

TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | AUTOMATIC CONTROLSThe organization employs automatic temperature and humidity controls in the facility to prevent
fluctuations potentially harmful to the information system.

(2)

TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY CONTROLS | MONITORING WITH ALARMS / NOTIFICATIONS
The organization employs temperature and humidity monitoring that provides an alarm or
notification of changes potentially harmful to personnel or equipment.

References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PE-15

LOW PE-14

MOD PE-14

HIGH PE-14

WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION
Control: The organization protects the information system from damage resulting from waterleakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are accessible, working properly, andknown to key personnel.
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of

information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe
computer rooms. Isolation valves can be employed in addition to or in lieu of master shutoff
valves to shut off water supplies in specific areas of concern, without affecting entire
organizations. Related control: AT-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION | AUTOMATION SUPPORTThe organization employs automated mechanisms to detect the presence of water in the vicinity of
the information system and alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Automated mechanisms can include, for example, water detection

sensors, alarms, and notification systems.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PE-16

LOW PE-15

MOD PE-15

HIGH PE-15 (1)DELIVERY AND REMOVAL
Control: The organization authorizes, monitors, and controls [Assignment: organization-defined

types of information system components] entering and exiting the facility and maintains records ofthose items.
Supplemental Guidance: Effectively enforcing authorizations for entry and exit of information

system components may require restricting access to delivery areas and possibly isolating theareas from the information system and media libraries. Related controls: CM-3, MA-2, MA-3,
MP-5, SA-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

APPENDIX F-PE

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

PE-17

LOW PE-16

MOD PE-16

HIGH PE-16

ALTERNATE WORK SITE
Control: The organization:a.

Employs [Assignment: organization-defined security controls] at alternate work sites;b.

Assesses as feasible, the effectiveness of security controls at alternate work sites; andc.

Provides a means for employees to communicate with information security personnel in caseof security incidents or problems.

Supplemental Guidance: Alternate work sites may include, for example, government facilities or

private residences of employees. While commonly distinct from alternative processing sites,
alternate work sites may provide readily available alternate locations as part of contingency
operations. Organizations may define different sets of security controls for specific alternate worksites or types of sites depending on the work-related activities conducted at those sites. This
control supports the contingency planning activities of organizations and the federal telework
initiative. Related controls: AC-17, CP-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-46.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

PE-18

LOW Not Selected

MOD PE-17

HIGH PE-17

LOCATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Control: The organization positions information system components within the facility to minimize

potential damage from [Assignment: organization-defined physical and environmental hazards]
and to minimize the opportunity for unauthorized access.
Supplemental Guidance: Physical and environmental hazards include, for example, flooding, fire,

tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes, acts of terrorism, vandalism, electromagnetic pulse, electricalinterference, and other forms of incoming electromagnetic radiation. In addition, organizations
consider the location of physical entry points where unauthorized individuals, while not being
granted access, might nonetheless be in close proximity to information systems and therefore
increase the potential for unauthorized access to organizational communications (e.g., through theuse of wireless sniffers or microphones). Related controls: CP-2, PE-19, RA-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

LOCATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS | FACILITY SITE

The organization plans the location or site of the facility where the information system resides withregard to physical and environmental hazards and for existing facilities, considers the physical andenvironmental hazards in its risk mitigation strategy.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: PM-8.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

APPENDIX F-PE

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH PE-18

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________PE-19

INFORMATION LEAKAGE
Control: The organization protects the information system from information leakage due toelectromagnetic signals emanations.
Supplemental Guidance: Information leakage is the intentional or unintentional release of

information to an untrusted environment from electromagnetic signals emanations. Security
categories or classifications of information systems (with respect to confidentiality) andorganizational security policies guide the selection of security controls employed to protect
systems against information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION LEAKAGE | NATIONAL EMISSIONS / TEMPEST POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

The organization ensures that information system components, associated data communications,and networks are protected in accordance with national emissions and TEMPEST policies andprocedures based on the security category or classification of the information.
References: FIPS Publication 199.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

PE-20

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

ASSET MONITORING AND TRACKING
Control: The organization:a.

Employs [Assignment: organization-defined asset location technologies] to track and monitor
the location and movement of [Assignment: organization-defined assets] within [Assignment:
organization-defined controlled areas]; andb.

Ensures that asset location technologies are employed in accordance with applicable federallaws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance.

Supplemental Guidance: Asset location technologies can help organizations ensure that criticalassets such as vehicles or essential information system components remain in authorized locations.
Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel and the Senior Agency Official for
Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) regarding the deployment and use of asset location
technologies to address potential privacy concerns. Related control: CM-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-PE

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

PAGE F-138

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: PLANNING
PL-1

SECURITY PLANNING POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

A security planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security planning policy and associatedsecurity planning controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Security planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

Security planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PL family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-18, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW PL-1

P1

PL-2

MOD PL-1

HIGH PL-1

SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN
Control: The organization:a.

APPENDIX F-PL

Develops a security plan for the information system that:1.

Is consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture;

2.

Explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system;

3.

Describes the operational context of the information system in terms of missions andbusiness processes;

4.

Provides the security categorization of the information system including supporting
rationale;

5.

Describes the operational environment for the information system and relationships withor connections to other information systems;

6.

Provides an overview of the security requirements for the system;

7.

Identifies any relevant overlays, if applicable;

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

8.

Describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements
including a rationale for the tailoring decisions; and9.

Is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior toplan implementation;b.

Distributes copies of the security plan and communicates subsequent changes to the plan to[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];c.

Reviews the security plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency];d.

Updates the plan to address changes to the information system/environment of operation or
problems identified during plan implementation or security control assessments; ande.

Protects the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Supplemental Guidance: Security plans relate security requirements to a set of security controls andcontrol enhancements. Security plans also describe, at a high level, how the security controls andcontrol enhancements meet those security requirements, but do not provide detailed, technicaldescriptions of the specific design or implementation of the controls/enhancements. Security plans
contain sufficient information (including the specification of parameter values for assignment andselection statements either explicitly or by reference) to enable a design and implementation that isunambiguously compliant with the intent of the plans and subsequent determinations of risk toorganizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation if the plan is
implemented as intended. Organizations can also apply tailoring guidance to the security control
baselines in Appendix D and CNSS Instruction 1253 to develop overlays for community-wide useor to address specialized requirements, technologies, or missions/environments of operation (e.g.,
DoD-tactical, Federal Public Key Infrastructure, or Federal Identity, Credential, and Access
Management, space operations). Appendix I provides guidance on developing overlays.
Security plans need not be single documents; the plans can be a collection of various documents
including documents that already exist. Effective security plans make extensive use of references
to policies, procedures, and additional documents (e.g., design and implementation specifications)where more detailed information can be obtained. This reduces the documentation requirements
associated with security programs and maintains security-related information in other establishedmanagement/operational areas related to enterprise architecture, system development life cycle,
systems engineering, and acquisition. For example, security plans do not contain detailed
contingency plan or incident response plan information but instead provide explicitly or byreference, sufficient information to define what needs to be accomplished by those plans. Related
controls: AC-2, AC-6, AC-14, AC-17, AC-20, CA-2, CA-3, CA-7, CM-9, CP-2, IR-8, MA-4,
MA-5, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, PL-7, PM-1, PM-7, PM-8, PM-9, PM-11, SA-5, SA-17.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-7].
(2)

SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE(3)SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN | PLAN / COORDINATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-8].
The organization plans and coordinates security-related activities affecting the information systemwith [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or groups] before conducting such activities inorder to reduce the impact on other organizational entities.
Supplemental Guidance: Security-related activities include, for example, security assessments,

audits, hardware and software maintenance, patch management, and contingency plan testing.
Advance planning and coordination includes emergency and nonemergency (i.e., planned or
nonurgent unplanned) situations. The process defined by organizations to plan and coordinate
security-related activities can be included in security plans for information systems or otherdocuments, as appropriate. Related controls: CP-4, IR-4.

APPENDIX F-PL

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
References: NIST Special Publication 800-18.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PL-3

LOW PL-2

MOD PL-2 (3)HIGH PL-2 (3)SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN UPDATE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2].

PL-4

RULES OF BEHAVIOR
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes and makes readily available to individuals requiring access to the information
system, the rules that describe their responsibilities and expected behavior with regard to
information and information system usage;b.

Receives a signed acknowledgment from such individuals, indicating that they have read,understand, and agree to abide by the rules of behavior, before authorizing access to
information and the information system;c.

Reviews and updates the rules of behavior [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; andd.

Requires individuals who have signed a previous version of the rules of behavior to read andre-sign when the rules of behavior are revised/updated.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to organizational users. Organizations

consider rules of behavior based on individual user roles and responsibilities, differentiating, forexample, between rules that apply to privileged users and rules that apply to general users.
Establishing rules of behavior for some types of non-organizational users including, for example,
individuals who simply receive data/information from federal information systems, is often not
feasible given the large number of such users and the limited nature of their interactions with thesystems. Rules of behavior for both organizational and non-organizational users can also beestablished in AC-8, System Use Notification. PL-4 b. (the signed acknowledgment portion of thiscontrol) may be satisfied by the security awareness training and role-based security training
programs conducted by organizations if such training includes rules of behavior. Organizations
can use electronic signatures for acknowledging rules of behavior. Related controls: AC-2, AC-6,
AC-8, AC-9, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AT-2, AT-3, CM-11, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, MP-7, PS-6,
PS-8, SA-5.
Control Enhancements:(1)

RULES OF BEHAVIOR | SOCIAL MEDIA AND NETWORKING RESTRICTIONS

The organization includes in the rules of behavior, explicit restrictions on the use of social
media/networking sites and posting organizational information on public websites.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses rules of behavior related to theuse of social media/networking sites: (i) when organizational personnel are using such sites
for official duties or in the conduct of official business; (ii) when organizational information
is involved in social media/networking transactions; and (iii) when personnel are accessing
social media/networking sites from organizational information systems. Organizations also
address specific rules that prevent unauthorized entities from obtaining and/or inferring nonpublic organizational information (e.g., system account information, personally identifiable
information) from social media/networking sites.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-18.

APPENDIX F-PL

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW PL-4

P2

PL-5

MOD PL-4 (1)HIGH PL-4 (1)PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT[Withdrawn: Incorporated into Appendix J, AR-2].

PL-6

SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITY PLANNING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2].

PL-7

SECURITY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONSControl: The organization:a.

Develops a security Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the information system containing
at a minimum, how the organization intends to operate the system from the perspective of
information security; andb.

Reviews and updates the CONOPS [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: The security CONOPS may be included in the security plan for the

information system or in other system development life cycle-related documents, as appropriate.
Changes to the CONOPS are reflected in ongoing updates to the security plan, the information
security architecture, and other appropriate organizational documents (e.g., security specifications
for procurements/acquisitions, system development life cycle documents, and systems/security
engineering documents). Related control: PL-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW Not Selected

P0

PL-8

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Control: The organization:a.

b.

APPENDIX F-PL

Develops an information security architecture for the information system that:1.

Describes the overall philosophy, requirements, and approach to be taken with regard toprotecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information;2.

Describes how the information security architecture is integrated into and supports theenterprise architecture; and3.

Describes any information security assumptions about, and dependencies on, external
services;

Reviews and updates the information security architecture [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] to reflect updates in the enterprise architecture; andPAGE F-142

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________c.

Ensures that planned information security architecture changes are reflected in the security
plan, the security Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and organizational
procurements/acquisitions.

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses actions taken by organizations in the design anddevelopment of information systems. The information security architecture at the individual
information system level is consistent with and complements the more global, organization-wide
information security architecture described in PM-7 that is integral to and developed as part of theenterprise architecture. The information security architecture includes an architectural description,
the placement/allocation of security functionality (including security controls), security-related
information for external interfaces, information being exchanged across the interfaces, and theprotection mechanisms associated with each interface. In addition, the security architecture can
include other important security-related information, for example, user roles and access privileges
assigned to each role, unique security requirements, the types of information processed, stored,
and transmitted by the information system, restoration priorities of information and information
system services, and any other specific protection needs.
In today’s modern architecture, it is becoming less common for organizations to control all
information resources. There are going to be key dependencies on external information services
and service providers. Describing such dependencies in the information security architecture isimportant to developing a comprehensive mission/business protection strategy. Establishing,developing, documenting, and maintaining under configuration control, a baseline configurationfor organizational information systems is critical to implementing and maintaining an effective
information security architecture. The development of the information security architecture iscoordinated with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) toensure that security controls needed to support privacy requirements are identified and effectively
implemented. PL-8 is primarily directed at organizations (i.e., internally focused) to help ensurethat organizations develop an information security architecture for the information system, andthat the security architecture is integrated with or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture
through the organization-wide information security architecture. In contrast, SA-17 is primarily
directed at external information technology product/system developers and integrators (although
SA-17 could be used internally within organizations for in-house system development). SA-17,
which is complementary to PL-8, is selected when organizations outsource the development of
information systems or information system components to external entities, and there is a need todemonstrate/show consistency with the organization’s enterprise architecture and information
security architecture. Related controls: CM-2, CM-6, PL-2, PM-7, SA-5, SA-17, Appendix J.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE | DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH
The organization designs its security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that:(a)

Allocates [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Assignment:
organization-defined locations and architectural layers]; and(b) Ensures that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually
reinforcing manner.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations strategically allocate security safeguards (procedural,technical, or both) in the security architecture so that adversaries have to overcome multiple
safeguards to achieve their objective. Requiring adversaries to defeat multiple mechanisms
makes it more difficult to successfully attack critical information resources (i.e., increases
adversary work factor) and also increases the likelihood of detection. The coordination of
allocated safeguards is essential to ensure that an attack that involves one safeguard does notcreate adverse unintended consequences (e.g., lockout, cascading alarms) by interfering withanother safeguard. Placement of security safeguards is a key activity. Greater asset criticality
or information value merits additional layering. Thus, an organization may choose to placeanti-virus software at organizational boundary layers, email/web servers, notebook computers,
and workstations to maximize the number of related safeguards adversaries must penetrate
before compromising the information and information systems. Related controls: SC-29, SC36.

APPENDIX F-PL

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(2)

INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE | SUPPLIER DIVERSITY

The organization requires that [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] allocated to[Assignment: organization-defined locations and architectural layers] are obtained from different
suppliers.
Supplemental Guidance: Different information technology products have different strengths andweaknesses. Providing a broad spectrum of products complements the individual offerings.
For example, vendors offering malicious code protection typically update their products at
different times, often developing solutions for known viruses, Trojans, or worms according totheir priorities and development schedules. By having different products at different locations(e.g., server, boundary, desktop) there is an increased likelihood that at least one will detect
the malicious code. Related control: SA-12.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PL-9

LOW Not Selected

MOD PL-8

HIGH PL-8

CENTRAL MANAGEMENT
Control: The organization centrally manages [Assignment: organization-defined security controls
and related processes].
Supplemental Guidance: Central management refers to the organization-wide management andimplementation of selected security controls and related processes. Central management includes
planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally
managed security controls and processes. As central management of security controls is generally
associated with common controls, such management promotes and facilitates standardization of
security control implementations and management and judicious use of organizational resources.
Centrally-managed security controls and processes may also meet independence requirements forassessments in support of initial and ongoing authorizations to operate as part of organizational
continuous monitoring. As part of the security control selection process, organizations determine
which controls may be suitable for central management based on organizational resources andcapabilities. Organizations consider that it may not always be possible to centrally manage every
aspect of a security control. In such cases, the security control is treated as a hybrid control withthe control managed and implemented either centrally or at the information system level. Controls
and control enhancements that are candidates for full or partial central management include, but
are not limited to: AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4); AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (9); AC-18 (1) (3) (4) (5); AC-19 (4);AC-22; AC-23; AT-2 (1) (2); AT-3 (1) (2) (3); AT-4; AU-6 (1) (3) (5) (6) (9); AU-7 (1) (2); AU11, AU-13, AU-16, CA-2 (1) (2) (3); CA-3 (1) (2) (3); CA-7 (1); CA-9; CM-2 (1) (2); CM-3 (1)(4); CM-4; CM-6 (1); CM-7 (4) (5); CM-8 (all); CM-9 (1); CM-10; CM-11; CP-7 (all); CP-8 (all);SC-43; SI-2; SI-3; SI-7; and SI-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-37.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-PL

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: PERSONNEL SECURITY
PS-1

PERSONNEL SECURITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:1.

A personnel security policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy andassociated personnel security controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Personnel security policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

Personnel security procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PS family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PS-2

LOW PS-1

MOD PS-1

HIGH PS-1

POSITION RISK DESIGNATION
Control: The organization:a.

Assigns a risk designation to all organizational positions;b.

Establishes screening criteria for individuals filling those positions; andc.

Reviews and updates position risk designations [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management policy

and guidance. Risk designations can guide and inform the types of authorizations individuals
receive when accessing organizational information and information systems. Position screening
criteria include explicit information security role appointment requirements (e.g., training, security
clearances). Related controls: AT-3, PL-2, PS-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: 5 C.F.R. 731.106.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW PS-2

P1

PS-3

MOD PS-2

HIGH PS-2

PERSONNEL SCREENING
Control: The organization:a.

Screens individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system; andb.

Rescreens individuals according to [Assignment: organization-defined conditions requiring
rescreening and, where rescreening is so indicated, the frequency of such rescreening].

Supplemental Guidance: Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable federallaws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidance, and specific criteria
established for the risk designations of assigned positions. Organizations may define different
rescreening conditions and frequencies for personnel accessing information systems based on
types of information processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems. Related controls: AC-2, IA4, PE-2, PS-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PERSONNEL SCREENING | CLASSIFIED INFORMATIONThe organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, ortransmitting classified information are cleared and indoctrinated to the highest classification levelof the information to which they have access on the system.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-3, AC-4.
(2)

PERSONNEL SCREENING | FORMAL INDOCTRINATIONThe organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, ortransmitting types of classified information which require formal indoctrination, are formallyindoctrinated for all of the relevant types of information to which they have access on the system.
Supplemental Guidance: Types of classified information requiring formal indoctrination

include, for example, Special Access Program (SAP), Restricted Data (RD), and Sensitive
Compartment Information (SCI). Related controls: AC-3, AC-4.
(3)

PERSONNEL SCREENING | INFORMATION WITH SPECIAL PROTECTION MEASURESThe organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, ortransmitting information requiring special protection:(a)Have valid access authorizations that are demonstrated by assigned official government
duties; and(b) Satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel screening criteria].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational information requiring special protection includes, forexample, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and Sources and Methods Information(SAMI). Personnel security criteria include, for example, position sensitivity backgroundscreening requirements.
References: 5 C.F.R. 731.106; FIPS Publications 199, 201; NIST Special Publications 800-60,

800-73, 800-76, 800-78; ICD 704.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

APPENDIX F-PS

LOW PS-3

MOD PS-3

HIGH PS-3

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________PS-4

PERSONNEL TERMINATION
Control: The organization, upon termination of individual employment:a.

Disables information system access within [Assignment: organization-defined time period];b.

Terminates/revokes any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual;c.

Conducts exit interviews that include a discussion of [Assignment: organization-defined
information security topics];d.

Retrieves all security-related organizational information system-related property;

e.

Retains access to organizational information and information systems formerly controlled byterminated individual; andf.

Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system-related property includes, for example, hardware

authentication tokens, system administration technical manuals, keys, identification cards, andbuilding passes. Exit interviews ensure that terminated individuals understand the security
constraints imposed by being former employees and that proper accountability is achieved for
information system-related property. Security topics of interest at exit interviews can include, forexample, reminding terminated individuals of nondisclosure agreements and potential limitations
on future employment. Exit interviews may not be possible for some terminated individuals, forexample, in cases related to job abandonment, illnesses, and nonavailability of supervisors. Exit
interviews are important for individuals with security clearances. Timely execution of termination
actions is essential for individuals terminated for cause. In certain situations, organizations
consider disabling the information system accounts of individuals that are being terminated prior
to the individuals being notified. Related controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PS-5, PS-6.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PERSONNEL TERMINATION | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

The organization:(a)Notifies terminated individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements
for the protection of organizational information; and(b) Requires terminated individuals to sign an acknowledgment of post-employment
requirements as part of the organizational termination process.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel

regarding matters of post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.
(2)

PERSONNEL TERMINATION | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATIONThe organization employs automated mechanisms to notify [Assignment: organization-defined
personnel or roles] upon termination of an individual.
Supplemental Guidance: In organizations with a large number of employees, not all personnel

who need to know about termination actions receive the appropriate notifications—or, if such
notifications are received, they may not occur in a timely manner. Automated mechanisms
can be used to send automatic alerts or notifications to specific organizational personnel orroles (e.g., management personnel, supervisors, personnel security officers, information
security officers, systems administrators, or information technology administrators) when
individuals are terminated. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety
of ways, including, for example, telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via
websites.
References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW PS-4

P1

PS-5

MOD PS-4

HIGH PS-4 (2)PERSONNEL TRANSFER
Control: The organization:a.

Reviews and confirms ongoing operational need for current logical and physical accessauthorizations to information systems/facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred
to other positions within the organization;b.

Initiates [Assignment: organization-defined transfer or reassignment actions] within[Assignment: organization-defined time period following the formal transfer action];c.

Modifies access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational needdue to reassignment or transfer; andd.

Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment:
organization-defined time period].

Supplemental Guidance: This control applies when reassignments or transfers of individuals arepermanent or of such extended durations as to make the actions warranted. Organizations define
actions appropriate for the types of reassignments or transfers, whether permanent or extended.
Actions that may be required for personnel transfers or reassignments to other positions withinorganizations include, for example: (i) returning old and issuing new keys, identification cards,
and building passes; (ii) closing information system accounts and establishing new accounts; (iii)changing information system access authorizations (i.e., privileges); and (iv) providing for accessto official records to which individuals had access at previous work locations and in previous
information system accounts. Related controls: AC-2, IA-4, PE-2, PS-4.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW PS-5

P2

PS-6

MOD PS-5

HIGH PS-5

ACCESS AGREEMENTS
Control: The organization:a.

Develops and documents access agreements for organizational information systems;b.

Reviews and updates the access agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
andc.

Ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information
systems:
1.

Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and2.

Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational information systems
when access agreements have been updated or [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Access agreements include, for example, nondisclosure agreements,

acceptable use agreements, rules of behavior, and conflict-of-interest agreements. Signed accessagreements include an acknowledgement that individuals have read, understand, and agree to

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abide by the constraints associated with organizational information systems to which access is
authorized. Organizations can use electronic signatures to acknowledge access agreements unlessspecifically prohibited by organizational policy. Related control: PL-4, PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-8.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ACCESS AGREEMENTS | INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PS-3].
(2)

ACCESS AGREEMENTS | CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION

The organization ensures that access to classified information requiring special protection is
granted only to individuals who:(a)Have a valid access authorization that is demonstrated by assigned official government
duties;(b) Satisfy associated personnel security criteria; and(c)Have read, understood, and signed a nondisclosure agreement.

Supplemental Guidance: Classified information requiring special protection includes, forexample, collateral information, Special Access Program (SAP) information, and Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI). Personnel security criteria reflect applicable federal laws,
Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance.
(3)

ACCESS AGREEMENTS | POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

The organization:(a)Notifies individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements forprotection of organizational information; and(b) Requires individuals to sign an acknowledgment of these requirements, if applicable, as partof granting initial access to covered information.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel

regarding matters of post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

PS-7

LOW PS-6

MOD PS-6

HIGH PS-6

THIRD-PARTY PERSONNEL SECURITY
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes personnel security requirements including security roles and responsibilities forthird-party providers;b.

Requires third-party providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures
established by the organization;c.

Documents personnel security requirements;d.

Requires third-party providers to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles] of any personnel transfers or terminations of third-party personnel who possessorganizational credentials and/or badges, or who have information system privileges within[Assignment: organization-defined time period]; ande.

Monitors provider compliance.

Supplemental Guidance: Third-party providers include, for example, service bureaus, contractors,

and other organizations providing information system development, information technology
services, outsourced applications, and network and security management. Organizations explicitly
include personnel security requirements in acquisition-related documents. Third-party providers

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

may have personnel working at organizational facilities with credentials, badges, or information
system privileges issued by organizations. Notifications of third-party personnel changes ensure
appropriate termination of privileges and credentials. Organizations define the transfers andterminations deemed reportable by security-related characteristics that include, for example,
functions, roles, and nature of credentials/privileges associated with individuals transferred or
terminated. Related controls: PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-6, SA-9, SA-21.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-35.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

PS-8

LOW PS-7

MOD PS-7

HIGH PS-7

PERSONNEL SANCTIONSControl: The organization:a.

Employs a formal sanctions process for individuals failing to comply with establishedinformation security policies and procedures; andb.

Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment:
organization-defined time period] when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated,
identifying the individual sanctioned and the reason for the sanction.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizational sanctions processes reflect applicable federal laws,

Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Sanctions processes
are described in access agreements and can be included as part of general personnel policies andprocedures for organizations. Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel
regarding matters of employee sanctions. Related controls: PL-4, PS-6.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P3

APPENDIX F-PS

LOW PS-8

MOD PS-8

HIGH PS-8

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: RISK ASSESSMENT
RA-1

RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:
1.

A risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;
and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associatedrisk assessment controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

Risk assessment policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and2.

Risk assessment procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the RA family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-30, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

RA-2

LOW RA-1

MOD RA-1

HIGH RA-1

SECURITY CATEGORIZATION
Control: The organization:a.

Categorizes information and the information system in accordance with applicable federallaws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance;b.

Documents the security categorization results (including supporting rationale) in the security
plan for the information system; andc.

Ensures that the authorizing official or authorizing official designated representative reviews
and approves the security categorization decision.

Supplemental Guidance: Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective

security categorization decisions. Security categories describe the potential adverse impacts toorganizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals if organizational information andinformation systems are comprised through a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
Organizations conduct the security categorization process as an organization-wide activity with
the involvement of chief information officers, senior information security officers, information
system owners, mission/business owners, and information owners/stewards. Organizations also

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

consider the potential adverse impacts to other organizations and, in accordance with the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, potential national-level
adverse impacts. Security categorization processes carried out by organizations facilitate thedevelopment of inventories of information assets, and along with CM-8, mappings to specificinformation system components where information is processed, stored, or transmitted. Related
controls: CM-8, MP-4, RA-3, SC-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-39, 800-60.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

RA-3

LOW RA-2

MOD RA-2

HIGH RA-2

RISK ASSESSMENT
Control: The organization:a.

Conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from theunauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of theinformation system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits;b.

Documents risk assessment results in [Selection: security plan; risk assessment report;[Assignment: organization-defined document]];c.

Reviews risk assessment results [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];d.

Disseminates risk assessment results to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]; ande.

Updates the risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or whenever there
are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including theidentification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the
security state of the system.

Supplemental Guidance: Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective

risk assessments. Risk assessments take into account threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, andimpact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation
based on the operation and use of information systems. Risk assessments also take into accountrisk from external parties (e.g., service providers, contractors operating information systems onbehalf of the organization, individuals accessing organizational information systems, outsourcing
entities). In accordance with OMB policy and related E-authentication initiatives, authentication of
public users accessing federal information systems may also be required to protect nonpublic or
privacy-related information. As such, organizational assessments of risk also address public accessto federal information systems.
Risk assessments (either formal or informal) can be conducted at all three tiers in the risk
management hierarchy (i.e., organization level, mission/business process level, or information
system level) and at any phase in the system development life cycle. Risk assessments can also be
conducted at various steps in the Risk Management Framework, including categorization, security
control selection, security control implementation, security control assessment, information
system authorization, and security control monitoring. RA-3 is noteworthy in that the control mustbe partially implemented prior to the implementation of other controls in order to complete thefirst two steps in the Risk Management Framework. Risk assessments can play an important rolein security control selection processes, particularly during the application of tailoring guidance,
which includes security control supplementation. Related controls: RA-2, PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
References: OMB Memorandum 04-04; NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-39;

Web: http://idmanagement.gov.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW RA-3

P1

RA-4

MOD RA-3

HIGH RA-3

RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-3].

RA-5

VULNERABILITY SCANNING
Control: The organization:a.

Scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-definedprocess] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are
identified and reported;b.

Employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among
tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:1.

Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;2.

Formatting checklists and test procedures; and3.

Measuring vulnerability impact;c.

Analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments;d.

Remediates legitimate vulnerabilities [Assignment: organization-defined response times] inaccordance with an organizational assessment of risk; ande.

Shares information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control
assessments with [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to help eliminate
similar vulnerabilities in other information systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses ordeficiencies).

Supplemental Guidance: Security categorization of information systems guides the frequency andcomprehensiveness of vulnerability scans. Organizations determine the required vulnerability
scanning for all information system components, ensuring that potential sources of vulnerabilities
such as networked printers, scanners, and copiers are not overlooked. Vulnerability analyses forcustom software applications may require additional approaches such as static analysis, dynamic
analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Organizations can employ theseanalysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis
tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Vulnerability scanning includes, for example:(i) scanning for patch levels; (ii) scanning for functions, ports, protocols, and services that should
not be accessible to users or devices; and (iii) scanning for improperly configured or incorrectly
operating information flow control mechanisms. Organizations consider using tools that express
vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) naming convention and that
use the Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) to determine/test for the presence ofvulnerabilities. Suggested sources for vulnerability information include the Common Weakness
Enumeration (CWE) listing and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). In addition, security
control assessments such as red team exercises provide other sources of potential vulnerabilities
for which to scan. Organizations also consider using tools that express vulnerability impact by the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-4, CM-6,
RA-2, RA-3, SA-11, SI-2.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE TOOL CAPABILITY

The organization employs vulnerability scanning tools that include the capability to readily update
the information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.
Supplemental Guidance: The vulnerabilities to be scanned need to be readily updated as newvulnerabilities are discovered, announced, and scanning methods developed. This updatingprocess helps to ensure that potential vulnerabilities in the information system are identified
and addressed as quickly as possible. Related controls: SI-3, SI-7.
(2)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | UPDATE BY FREQUENCY / PRIOR TO NEW SCAN / WHEN IDENTIFIEDThe organization updates the information system vulnerabilities scanned [Selection (one or more):[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; prior to a new scan; when new vulnerabilities are
identified and reported].
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SI-3, SI-5.
(3)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | BREADTH / DEPTH OF COVERAGE

The organization employs vulnerability scanning procedures that can identify the breadth anddepth of coverage (i.e., information system components scanned and vulnerabilities checked).
(4)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | DISCOVERABLE INFORMATIONThe organization determines what information about the information system is discoverable byadversaries and subsequently takes [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].
Supplemental Guidance: Discoverable information includes information that adversaries could

obtain without directly compromising or breaching the information system, for example, bycollecting information the system is exposing or by conducting extensive searches of the web.
Corrective actions can include, for example, notifying appropriate organizational personnel,
removing designated information, or changing the information system to make designatedinformation less relevant or attractive to adversaries. Related control: AU-13.
(5)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PRIVILEGED ACCESS

The information system implements privileged access authorization to [Assignment: organizationidentified information system components] for selected [Assignment: organization-definedvulnerability scanning activities].
Supplemental Guidance: In certain situations, the nature of the vulnerability scanning may be

more intrusive or the information system component that is the subject of the scanning may
contain highly sensitive information. Privileged access authorization to selected systemcomponents facilitates more thorough vulnerability scanning and also protects the sensitive
nature of such scanning.
(6)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED TREND ANALYSESThe organization employs automated mechanisms to compare the results of vulnerability scansover time to determine trends in information system vulnerabilities.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, SI-4.
(7)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | AUTOMATED DETECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8].
(8)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | REVIEW HISTORIC AUDIT LOGSThe organization reviews historic audit logs to determine if a vulnerability identified in theinformation system has been previously exploited.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AU-6.
(9)

VULNERABILITY SCANNING | PENETRATION TESTING AND ANALYSES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-8].
(10) VULNERABILITY SCANNING | CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATIONThe organization correlates the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the presenceof multi-vulnerability/multi-hop attack vectors.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-40, 800-70, 800-115;

Web: http://cwe.mitre.org, http://nvd.nist.gov.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

RA-6

LOW RA-5

MOD RA-5 (1) (2) (5)HIGH RA-5 (1) (2) (4) (5)TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY
Control: The organization employs a technical surveillance countermeasures survey at[Assignment: organization-defined locations] [Selection (one or more): [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined events or indicators occur]].
Technical surveillance countermeasures surveys are performed by qualified
personnel to detect the presence of technical surveillance devices/hazards and to identify technicalsecurity weaknesses that could aid in the conduct of technical penetrations of surveyed facilities.
Such surveys provide evaluations of the technical security postures of organizations and facilities
and typically include thorough visual, electronic, and physical examinations in and about surveyedfacilities. The surveys also provide useful input into risk assessments and organizational exposure
to potential adversaries.
Supplemental Guidance:

Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-RA

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION
SA-1

SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:1.

A system and services acquisition policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities,
and compliance; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services acquisition policy
and associated system and services acquisition controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

System and services acquisition policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
and2.

System and services acquisition procedures [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SA family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SA-2

LOW SA-1

MOD SA-1

HIGH SA-1

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
Control: The organization:a.

Determines information security requirements for the information system or information
system service in mission/business process planning;b.

Determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to protect the information system
or information system service as part of its capital planning and investment control process;andc.

Establishes a discrete line item for information security in organizational programming andbudgeting documentation.

Supplemental Guidance: Resource allocation for information security includes funding for the initial

information system or information system service acquisition and funding for the sustainment of
the system/service. Related controls: PM-3, PM-11.
Control Enhancements: None.

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References: NIST Special Publication 800-65.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SA-3

LOW SA-2

MOD SA-2

HIGH SA-2

SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE
Control: The organization:a.

Manages the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined systemdevelopment life cycle] that incorporates information security considerations;b.

Defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the systemdevelopment life cycle;c.

Identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities; andd.

Integrates the organizational information security risk management process into systemdevelopment life cycle activities.

Supplemental Guidance: A well-defined system development life cycle provides the foundation forthe successful development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems.
To apply the required security controls within the system development life cycle requires a basic
understanding of information security, threats, vulnerabilities, adverse impacts, and risk to criticalmissions/business functions. The security engineering principles in SA-8 cannot be properly
applied if individuals that design, code, and test information systems and system components(including information technology products) do not understand security. Therefore, organizations
include qualified personnel, for example, chief information security officers, security architects,
security engineers, and information system security officers in system development life cycle
activities to ensure that security requirements are incorporated into organizational information
systems. It is equally important that developers include individuals on the development team thatpossess the requisite security expertise and skills to ensure that needed security capabilities are
effectively integrated into the information system. Security awareness and training programs canhelp ensure that individuals having key security roles and responsibilities have the appropriate
experience, skills, and expertise to conduct assigned system development life cycle activities. The
effective integration of security requirements into enterprise architecture also helps to ensure thatimportant security considerations are addressed early in the system development life cycle and thatthose considerations are directly related to the organizational mission/business processes. This
process also facilitates the integration of the information security architecture into the enterprisearchitecture, consistent with organizational risk management and information security strategies.
Related controls: AT-3, PM-7, SA-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-64.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SA-4

LOW SA-3

MOD SA-3

HIGH SA-3

ACQUISITION PROCESS
Control: The organization includes the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly
or by reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system, system component, or
information system service in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders,
directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and organizational mission/business needs:

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Security functional requirements;b.

Security strength requirements;c.

Security assurance requirements;d.

Security-related documentation requirements;e.

Requirements for protecting security-related documentation;f.

Description of the information system development environment and environment in which
the system is intended to operate; andg.

Acceptance criteria.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system components are discrete, identifiable information

technology assets (e.g., hardware, software, or firmware) that represent the building blocks of an
information system. Information system components include commercial information technology
products. Security functional requirements include security capabilities, security functions, andsecurity mechanisms. Security strength requirements associated with such capabilities, functions,and mechanisms include degree of correctness, completeness, resistance to direct attack, andresistance to tampering or bypass. Security assurance requirements include: (i) development
processes, procedures, practices, and methodologies; and (ii) evidence from development andassessment activities providing grounds for confidence that the required security functionality has
been implemented and the required security strength has been achieved. Security documentation
requirements address all phases of the system development life cycle.
Security functionality, assurance, and documentation requirements are expressed in terms of
security controls and control enhancements that have been selected through the tailoring process.
The security control tailoring process includes, for example, the specification of parameter values
through the use of assignment and selection statements and the specification of platform
dependencies and implementation information. Security documentation provides user andadministrator guidance regarding the implementation and operation of security controls. The levelof detail required in security documentation is based on the security category or classification levelof the information system and the degree to which organizations depend on the stated security
capability, functions, or mechanisms to meet overall risk response expectations (as defined in theorganizational risk management strategy). Security requirements can also include organizationallymandated configuration settings specifying allowed functions, ports, protocols, and services.
Acceptance criteria for information systems, information system components, and information
system services are defined in the same manner as such criteria for any organizational acquisitionor procurement. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 7.103 contains information
security requirements from FISMA. Related controls: CM-6, PL-2, PS-7, SA-3, SA-5, SA-8, SA11, SA-12.
Control Enhancements:(1)

ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLSThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to provide a description of the functional properties of the security
controls to be employed.
Supplemental Guidance: Functional properties of security controls describe the functionality(i.e., security capability, functions, or mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls andspecifically exclude functionality and data structures internal to the operation of the controls.
Related control: SA-5.
(2)

ACQUISITION PROCESS | DESIGN / IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION FOR SECURITY CONTROLSThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to provide design and implementation information for the security
controls to be employed that includes: [Selection (one or more): security-relevant external systeminterfaces; high-level design; low-level design; source code or hardware schematics; [Assignment:
organization-defined design/implementation information]] at [Assignment: organization-definedlevel of detail].

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Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may require different levels of detail in design andimplementation documentation for security controls employed in organizational information
systems, system components, or information system services based on mission/business
requirements, requirements for trustworthiness/resiliency, and requirements for analysis andtesting. Information systems can be partitioned into multiple subsystems. Each subsystem
within the system can contain one or more modules. The high-level design for the system isexpressed in terms of multiple subsystems and the interfaces between subsystems providing
security-relevant functionality. The low-level design for the system is expressed in terms ofmodules with particular emphasis on software and firmware (but not excluding hardware) andthe interfaces between modules providing security-relevant functionality. Source code andhardware schematics are typically referred to as the implementation representation of theinformation system. Related control: SA-5.
(3)

ACQUISITION PROCESS | DEVELOPMENT METHODS / TECHNIQUES / PRACTICESThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that
includes [Assignment: organization-defined state-of-the-practice system/security engineering
methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality
control processes].
Supplemental Guidance: Following a well-defined system development life cycle that includes

state-of-the-practice software development methods, systems/security engineering methods,
quality control processes, and testing, evaluation, and validation techniques helps to reduce
the number and severity of latent errors within information systems, system components, andinformation system services. Reducing the number/severity of such errors reduces the numberof vulnerabilities in those systems, components, and services. Related control: SA-12.
(4)

ACQUISITION PROCESS | ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-8 (9)].
(5)

ACQUISITION PROCESS | SYSTEM / COMPONENT / SERVICE CONFIGURATIONS

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to:(a)

Deliver the system, component, or service with [Assignment: organization-defined security
configurations] implemented; and(b) Use the configurations as the default for any subsequent system, component, or service
reinstallation or upgrade.
Supplemental Guidance: Security configurations include, for example, the U.S. Government

Configuration Baseline (USGCB) and any limitations on functions, ports, protocols, andservices. Security characteristics include, for example, requiring that all default passwords
have been changed. Related control: CM-8.
(6)

ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE PRODUCTS

The organization:(a)

Employs only government off-the-shelf (GOTS) or commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
information assurance (IA) and IA-enabled information technology products that compose an
NSA-approved solution to protect classified information when the networks used to transmit
the information are at a lower classification level than the information being transmitted; and(b) Ensures that these products have been evaluated and/or validated by NSA or in accordancewith NSA-approved procedures.
Supplemental Guidance: COTS IA or IA-enabled information technology products used toprotect classified information by cryptographic means may be required to use NSA-approved
key management. Related controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13.
(7)

ACQUISITION PROCESS | NIAP-APPROVED PROTECTION PROFILES

The organization:(a)

APPENDIX F-SA

Limits the use of commercially provided information assurance (IA) and IA-enabled
information technology products to those products that have been successfully evaluatedagainst a National Information Assurance partnership (NIAP)-approved Protection Profile for a
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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(b) Requires, if no NIAP-approved Protection Profile exists for a specific technology type but acommercially provided information technology product relies on cryptographic functionality
to enforce its security policy, that the cryptographic module is FIPS-validated.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(8)

ACQUISITION PROCESS | CONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN
The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of security control
effectiveness that contains [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].

Supplemental Guidance: The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if thecomplete set of planned, required, and deployed security controls within the information
system, system component, or information system service continue to be effective over time
based on the inevitable changes that occur. Developer continuous monitoring plans include asufficient level of detail such that the information can be incorporated into the continuous
monitoring strategies and programs implemented by organizations. Related control: CA-7.
(9)

ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES IN USE

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to identify early in the system development life cycle, the functions,ports, protocols, and services intended for organizational use.
Supplemental Guidance: The identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services early inthe system development life cycle (e.g., during the initial requirements definition and designphases) allows organizations to influence the design of the information system, information
system component, or information system service. This early involvement in the life cycle
helps organizations to avoid or minimize the use of functions, ports, protocols, or services thatpose unnecessarily high risks and understand the trade-offs involved in blocking specificports, protocols, or services (or when requiring information system service providers to doso). Early identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services avoids costly retrofittingof security controls after the information system, system component, or information systemservice has been implemented. SA-9 describes requirements for external information systemservices with organizations identifying which functions, ports, protocols, and services areprovided from external sources. Related controls: CM-7, SA-9.
(10) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF APPROVED PIV PRODUCTS
The organization employs only information technology products on the FIPS 201-approved
products list for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented within organizational
information systems.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: IA-2, IA-8.
References: HSPD-12; ISO/IEC 15408; FIPS Publications 140-2, 201; NIST Special Publications

800-23, 800-35, 800-36, 800-37, 800-64, 800-70, 800-137; Federal Acquisition Regulation;
Web: http://www.niap-ccevs.org, http://fips201ep.cio.gov, http://www.acquisition.gov/far.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW SA-4 (10)

P1

SA-5

MOD SA-4 (1) (2) (9) (10)

HIGH SA-4 (1) (2) (9) (10)INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION
Control: The organization:a.

APPENDIX F-SA

Obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or
information system service that describes:
1.

Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or service;2.

Effective use and maintenance of security functions/mechanisms; and3.

Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., privileged)functions;

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________b.

Obtains user documentation for the information system, system component, or information
system service that describes:
1.

User-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those security
functions/mechanisms;2.

Methods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, component, orservice in a more secure manner; and3.

User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or service;c.

Documents attempts to obtain information system, system component, or information systemservice documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent andtakes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in response;d.

Protects documentation as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy; ande.

Distributes documentation to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: This control helps organizational personnel understand the implementationand operation of security controls associated with information systems, system components, andinformation system services. Organizations consider establishing specific measures to determine
the quality/completeness of the content provided. The inability to obtain needed documentation
may occur, for example, due to the age of the information system/component or lack of support
from developers and contractors. In those situations, organizations may need to recreate selected
documentation if such documentation is essential to the effective implementation or operation of
security controls. The level of protection provided for selected information system, component, orservice documentation is commensurate with the security category or classification of the system.
For example, documentation associated with a key DoD weapons system or command and control
system would typically require a higher level of protection than a routine administrative system.
Documentation that addresses information system vulnerabilities may also require an increased
level of protection. Secure operation of the information system, includes, for example, initiallystarting the system and resuming secure system operation after any lapse in system operation.
Related controls: CM-6, CM-8, PL-2, PL-4, PS-2, SA-3, SA-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (1)].
(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SECURITY-RELEVANT EXTERNAL SYSTEM INTERFACES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)].
(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)].
(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | LOW-LEVEL DESIGN(5)

INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION | SOURCE CODE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)].
[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-4 (2)].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

SA-6

LOW SA-5

MOD SA-5

HIGH SA-5

SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7].

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SA-7

USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7].

SA-8

SECURITY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES
Control: The organization applies information system security engineering principles in thespecification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations apply security engineering principles primarily to new

development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades. For legacy systems,
organizations apply security engineering principles to system upgrades and modifications to theextent feasible, given the current state of hardware, software, and firmware within those systems.
Security engineering principles include, for example: (i) developing layered protections; (ii)establishing sound security policy, architecture, and controls as the foundation for design; (iii)
incorporating security requirements into the system development life cycle; (iv) delineating
physical and logical security boundaries; (v) ensuring that system developers are trained on how tobuild secure software; (vi) tailoring security controls to meet organizational and operational needs;(vii) performing threat modeling to identify use cases, threat agents, attack vectors, and attack
patterns as well as compensating controls and design patterns needed to mitigate risk; and (viii)
reducing risk to acceptable levels, thus enabling informed risk management decisions. Related
controls: PM-7, SA-3, SA-4, SA-17, SC-2, SC-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-27.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SA-9

LOW Not Selected

MOD SA-8

HIGH SA-8

EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEM SERVICES
Control: The organization:a.

Requires that providers of external information system services comply with organizational
information security requirements and employ [Assignment: organization-defined security
controls] in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies,
regulations, standards, and guidance;b.

Defines and documents government oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard
to external information system services; andc.

Employs [Assignment: organization-defined processes, methods, and techniques] to monitor
security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.

Supplemental Guidance: External information system services are services that are implemented

outside of the authorization boundaries of organizational information systems. This includes
services that are used by, but not a part of, organizational information systems. FISMA and OMB
policy require that organizations using external service providers that are processing, storing, ortransmitting federal information or operating information systems on behalf of the federal
government ensure that such providers meet the same security requirements that federal agencies
are required to meet. Organizations establish relationships with external service providers in avariety of ways including, for example, through joint ventures, business partnerships, contracts,
interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, and supply chain
exchanges. The responsibility for managing risks from the use of external information systemservices remains with authorizing officials. For services external to organizations, a chain of trust
requires that organizations establish and retain a level of confidence that each participating

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provider in the potentially complex consumer-provider relationship provides adequate protection
for the services rendered. The extent and nature of this chain of trust varies based on therelationships between organizations and the external providers. Organizations document the basis
for trust relationships so the relationships can be monitored over time. External information
system services documentation includes government, service providers, end user security roles andresponsibilities, and service-level agreements. Service-level agreements define expectations of
performance for security controls, describe measurable outcomes, and identify remedies andresponse requirements for identified instances of noncompliance. Related controls: CA-3, IR-7,
PS-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | RISK ASSESSMENTS / ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALS

The organization:(a)Conducts an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing ofdedicated information security services; and(b) Ensures that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services isapproved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].
Supplemental Guidance: Dedicated information security services include, for example, incident

monitoring, analysis and response, operation of information security-related devices such as
firewalls, or key management services. Related controls: CA-6, RA-3.
(2)

EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES
The organization requires providers of [Assignment: organization-defined external information
system services] to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the useof such services.

Supplemental Guidance: Information from external service providers regarding the specificfunctions, ports, protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can beparticularly useful when the need arises to understand the trade-offs involved in restricting
certain functions/services or blocking certain ports/protocols. Related control: CM-7.
(3)

EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | ESTABLISH / MAINTAIN TRUST RELATIONSHIP WITH PROVIDERS

The organization establishes, documents, and maintains trust relationships with external service
providers based on [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements, properties, factors,
or conditions defining acceptable trust relationships].
Supplemental Guidance: The degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is

at an acceptable level depends on the trust that organizations place in the external providers,
individually or in combination. Trust relationships can help organization to gain increased
levels of confidence that participating service providers are providing adequate protection forthe services rendered. Such relationships can be complicated due to the number of potential
entities participating in the consumer-provider interactions, subordinate relationships andlevels of trust, and the types of interactions between the parties. In some cases, the degree oftrust is based on the amount of direct control organizations are able to exert on external
service providers with regard to employment of security controls necessary for the protectionof the service/information and the evidence brought forth as to the effectiveness of thosecontrols. The level of control is typically established by the terms and conditions of thecontracts or service-level agreements and can range from extensive control (e.g., negotiating
contracts or agreements that specify security requirements for the providers) to very limited
control (e.g., using contracts or service-level agreements to obtain commodity services such ascommercial telecommunications services). In other cases, levels of trust are based on factorsthat convince organizations that required security controls have been employed and that
determinations of control effectiveness exist. For example, separately authorized external
information system services provided to organizations through well-established business
relationships may provide degrees of trust in such services within the tolerable risk range ofthe organizations using the services. External service providers may also outsource selected
services to other external entities, making the trust relationship more difficult and complicatedto manage. Depending on the nature of the services, organizations may find it very difficult to

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place significant trust in external providers. This is not due to any inherent untrustworthinesson the part of providers, but to the intrinsic level of risk in the services.
(4)

EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | CONSISTENT INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS
The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure thatthe interests of [Assignment: organization-defined external service providers] are consistent withand reflect organizational interests.

Supplemental Guidance: As organizations increasingly use external service providers, thepossibility exists that the interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational
interests. In such situations, simply having the correct technical, procedural, or operationalsafeguards in place may not be sufficient if the service providers that implement and control
those safeguards are not operating in a manner consistent with the interests of the consumingorganizations. Possible actions that organizations might take to address such concerns include,for example, requiring background checks for selected service provider personnel, examining
ownership records, employing only trustworthy service providers (i.e., providers with whichorganizations have had positive experiences), and conducting periodic/unscheduled visits toservice provider facilities.
(5)

EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS | PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND SERVICE LOCATIONThe organization restricts the location of [Selection (one or more): information processing;information/data; information system services] to [Assignment: organization-defined locations]based on [Assignment: organization-defined requirements or conditions].
Supplemental Guidance: The location of information processing, information/data storage, orinformation system services that are critical to organizations can have a direct impact on theability of those organizations to successfully execute their missions/business functions. Thissituation exists when external providers control the location of processing, storage or services.
The criteria external providers use for the selection of processing, storage, or service locations
may be different from organizational criteria. For example, organizations may want to ensurethat data/information storage locations are restricted to certain locations to facilitate incident
response activities (e.g., forensic analyses, after-the-fact investigations) in case of information
security breaches/compromises. Such incident response activities may be adversely affectedby the governing laws or protocols in the locations where processing and storage occur and/or
the locations from which information system services emanate.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-35.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SA-10

LOW SA-9

MOD SA-9 (2)HIGH SA-9 (2)DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Control: The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to:a.

Perform configuration management during system, component, or service [Selection (one ormore): design; development; implementation; operation];b.

Document, manage, and control the integrity of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined
configuration items under configuration management];c.

Implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component, or service;d.

Document approved changes to the system, component, or service and the potential security
impacts of such changes; ande.

Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and reportfindings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel].

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Supplemental Guidance: This control also applies to organizations conducting internal information

systems development and integration. Organizations consider the quality and completeness of theconfiguration management activities conducted by developers as evidence of applying effective
security safeguards. Safeguards include, for example, protecting from unauthorized modification
or destruction, the master copies of all material used to generate security-relevant portions of thesystem hardware, software, and firmware. Maintaining the integrity of changes to the information
system, information system component, or information system service requires configuration
control throughout the system development life cycle to track authorized changes and prevent
unauthorized changes. Configuration items that are placed under configuration management (ifexistence/use is required by other security controls) include: the formal model; the functional,
high-level, and low-level design specifications; other design data; implementation documentation;
source code and hardware schematics; the running version of the object code; tools for comparing
new versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions and software/firmware source code withprevious versions; and test fixtures and documentation. Depending on the mission/business needsof organizations and the nature of the contractual relationships in place, developers may provide
configuration management support during the operations and maintenance phases of the life cycle.
Related controls: CM-3, CM-4, CM-9, SA-12, SI-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATIONThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement allows organizations to detect unauthorizedchanges to software and firmware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or
mechanisms provided by developers. Integrity checking mechanisms can also address
counterfeiting of software and firmware components. Organizations verify the integrity ofsoftware and firmware components, for example, through secure one-way hashes provided bydevelopers. Delivered software and firmware components also include any updates to suchcomponents. Related control: SI-7.
(2)

DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | ALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESSESThe organization provides an alternate configuration management process using organizational
personnel in the absence of a dedicated developer configuration management team.
Supplemental Guidance: Alternate configuration management processes may be required, forexample, when organizations use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information technology
products. Alternate configuration management processes include organizational personnel
that: (i) are responsible for reviewing/approving proposed changes to information systems,
system components, and information system services; and (ii) conduct security impact
analyses prior to the implementation of any changes to systems, components, or services (e.g.,a configuration control board that considers security impacts of changes during development
and includes representatives of both the organization and the developer, when applicable).
(3)

DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | HARDWARE INTEGRITY VERIFICATIONThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to enable integrity verification of hardware components.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement allows organizations to detect unauthorizedchanges to hardware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or mechanisms
provided by developers. Organizations verify the integrity of hardware components, forexample, with hard-to-copy labels and verifiable serial numbers provided by developers, andby requiring the implementation of anti-tamper technologies. Delivered hardware components
also include updates to such components. Related control: SI-7.
(4)

DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED GENERATIONThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to employ tools for comparing newly generated versions of securityrelevant hardware descriptions and software/firmware source and object code with previous
versions.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses changes to hardware, software,and firmware components between versions during development. In contrast, SA-10 (1) and
SA-10 (3) allow organizations to detect unauthorized changes to hardware, software, andfirmware components through the use of tools, techniques, and/or mechanisms provided bydevelopers.
(5)

DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | MAPPING INTEGRITY FOR VERSION CONTROLThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to maintain the integrity of the mapping between the master build data
(hardware drawings and software/firmware code) describing the current version of securityrelevant hardware, software, and firmware and the on-site master copy of the data for the current
version.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses changes to hardware, software,and firmware components during initial development and during system life cycle updates.
Maintaining the integrity between the master copies of security-relevant hardware, software,and firmware (including designs and source code) and the equivalent data in master copies
on-site in operational environments is essential to ensure the availability of organizational
information systems supporting critical missions and/or business functions.
(6)

DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT | TRUSTED DISTRIBUTION

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to execute procedures for ensuring that security-relevant hardware,
software, and firmware updates distributed to the organization are exactly as specified by themaster copies.
Supplemental Guidance: The trusted distribution of security-relevant hardware, software, andfirmware updates helps to ensure that such updates are faithful representations of the mastercopies maintained by the developer and have not been tampered with during distribution.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SA-11

LOW Not Selected

MOD SA-10

HIGH SA-10

DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION
Control: The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or

information system service to:a.

Create and implement a security assessment plan;b.

Perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at[Assignment: organization-defined depth and coverage];c.

Produce evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the
security testing/evaluation;d.

Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process; ande.

Correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.

Supplemental Guidance: Developmental security testing/evaluation occurs at all post-design phasesof the system development life cycle. Such testing/evaluation confirms that the required security
controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, enforcing the desired security policy,
and meeting established security requirements. Security properties of information systems may beaffected by the interconnection of system components or changes to those components. These
interconnections or changes (e.g., upgrading or replacing applications and operating systems) may
adversely affect previously implemented security controls. This control provides additional typesof security testing/evaluation that developers can conduct to reduce or eliminate potential flaws.
Testing custom software applications may require approaches such as static analysis, dynamic

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analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Developers can employ theseanalysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis
tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Security assessment plans provide the specificactivities that developers plan to carry out including the types of analyses, testing, evaluation, andreviews of software and firmware components, the degree of rigor to be applied, and the types ofartifacts produced during those processes. The depth of security testing/evaluation refers to therigor and level of detail associated with the assessment process (e.g., black box, gray box, or white
box testing). The coverage of security testing/evaluation refers to the scope (i.e., number and type)of the artifacts included in the assessment process. Contracts specify the acceptance criteria for
security assessment plans, flaw remediation processes, and the evidence that the plans/processes
have been diligently applied. Methods for reviewing and protecting assessment plans, evidence,and documentation are commensurate with the security category or classification level of theinformation system. Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements. Related
controls: CA-2, CM-4, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SI-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | STATIC CODE ANALYSISThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to employ static code analysis tools to identify common flaws anddocument the results of the analysis.
Supplemental Guidance: Static code analysis provides a technology and methodology forsecurity reviews. Such analysis can be used to identify security vulnerabilities and enforce
security coding practices. Static code analysis is most effective when used early in thedevelopment process, when each code change can be automatically scanned for potential
weaknesses. Static analysis can provide clear remediation guidance along with defects toenable developers to fix such defects. Evidence of correct implementation of static analysis
can include, for example, aggregate defect density for critical defect types, evidence that
defects were inspected by developers or security professionals, and evidence that defects were
fixed. An excessively high density of ignored findings (commonly referred to as ignored or
false positives) indicates a potential problem with the analysis process or tool. In such cases,
organizations weigh the validity of the evidence against evidence from other sources.
(2)

DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSESThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to perform threat and vulnerability analyses and subsequenttesting/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.
Supplemental Guidance: Applications may deviate significantly from the functional and design

specifications created during the requirements and design phases of the system development
life cycle. Therefore, threat and vulnerability analyses of information systems, systemcomponents, and information system services prior to delivery are critical to the effective
operation of those systems, components, and services. Threat and vulnerability analyses atthis phase of the life cycle help to ensure that design or implementation changes have beenaccounted for, and that any new vulnerabilities created as a result of those changes have beenreviewed and mitigated. Related controls: PM-15, RA-5.
(3)

DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF ASSESSMENT PLANS /EVIDENCE

The organization:(a)Requires an independent agent satisfying [Assignment: organization-defined independence
criteria] to verify the correct implementation of the developer security assessment plan andthe evidence produced during security testing/evaluation; and(b) Ensures that the independent agent is either provided with sufficient information to complete
the verification process or granted the authority to obtain such information.
Supplemental Guidance: Independent agents have the necessary qualifications (i.e., expertise,skills, training, and experience) to verify the correct implementation of developer security
assessment plans. Related controls: AT-3, CA-7, RA-5, SA-12.

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DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | MANUAL CODE REVIEWS

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to perform a manual code review of [Assignment: organization-defined
specific code] using [Assignment: organization-defined processes, procedures, and/or
techniques].
Supplemental Guidance: Manual code reviews are usually reserved for the critical software andfirmware components of information systems. Such code reviews are uniquely effective at
identifying weaknesses that require knowledge of the application’s requirements or context
which are generally unavailable to more automated analytic tools and techniques such as
static or dynamic analysis. Components benefiting from manual review include for example,
verifying access control matrices against application controls and reviewing more detailed
aspects of cryptographic implementations and controls.
(5)

DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | PENETRATION TESTING

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to perform penetration testing at [Assignment: organization-definedbreadth/depth] and with [Assignment: organization-defined constraints].
Supplemental Guidance: Penetration testing is an assessment methodology in which assessors,

using all available information technology product and/or information system documentation(e.g., product/system design specifications, source code, and administrator/operator manuals)
and working under specific constraints, attempt to circumvent implemented security featuresof information technology products and information systems. Penetration testing can include,for example, white, gray, or black box testing with analyses performed by skilled security
professionals simulating adversary actions. The objective of penetration testing is to uncoverpotential vulnerabilities in information technology products and information systems resulting
from implementation errors, configuration faults, or other operational deployment weaknesses
or deficiencies. Penetration tests can be performed in conjunction with automated and manualcode reviews to provide greater levels of analysis than would ordinarily be possible.
(6)

DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | ATTACK SURFACE REVIEWS
The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to perform attack surface reviews.

Supplemental Guidance: Attack surfaces of information systems are exposed areas that makethose systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks. This includes any accessible areas where
weaknesses or deficiencies in information systems (including the hardware, software, andfirmware components) provide opportunities for adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities. Attack
surface reviews ensure that developers: (i) analyze both design and implementation changes
to information systems; and (ii) mitigate attack vectors generated as a result of the changes.
Correction of identified flaws includes, for example, deprecation of unsafe functions.
(7)

DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | VERIFY SCOPE OF TESTING / EVALUATIONThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to verify that the scope of security testing/evaluation provides
complete coverage of required security controls at [Assignment: organization-defined depth of
testing/evaluation].

Supplemental Guidance: Verifying that security testing/evaluation provides complete coverageof required security controls can be accomplished by a variety of analytic techniques ranging
from informal to formal. Each of these techniques provides an increasing level of assurance
corresponding to the degree of formality of the analysis. Rigorously demonstrating security
control coverage at the highest levels of assurance can be provided by the use of formal
modeling and analysis techniques including correlation between control implementation andcorresponding test cases.
(8)

DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION | DYNAMIC CODE ANALYSISThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to employ dynamic code analysis tools to identify common flaws anddocument the results of the analysis.

Supplemental Guidance: Dynamic code analysis provides run-time verification of software

programs, using tools capable of monitoring programs for memory corruption, user privilege

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issues, and other potential security problems. Dynamic code analysis employs run-time tools
to help to ensure that security functionality performs in the manner in which it was designed.
A specialized type of dynamic analysis, known as fuzz testing, induces program failures bydeliberately introducing malformed or random data into software programs. Fuzz testing
strategies derive from the intended use of applications and the functional and design
specifications for the applications. To understand the scope of dynamic code analysis andhence the assurance provided, organizations may also consider conducting code coverage
analysis (checking the degree to which the code has been tested using metrics such as percent
of subroutines tested or percent of program statements called during execution of the test
suite) and/or concordance analysis (checking for words that are out of place in software codesuch as non-English language words or derogatory terms).
References: ISO/IEC 15408; NIST Special Publication 800-53A;

Web: http://nvd.nist.gov, http://cwe.mitre.org, http://cve.mitre.org, http://capec.mitre.org.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SA-12

LOW Not Selected

MOD SA-11

HIGH SA-11

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION
Control: The organization protects against supply chain threats to the information system, systemcomponent, or information system service by employing [Assignment: organization-defined
security safeguards] as part of a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy.
Supplemental Guidance: Information systems (including system components that compose thosesystems) need to be protected throughout the system development life cycle (i.e., during design,development, manufacturing, packaging, assembly, distribution, system integration, operations,maintenance, and retirement). Protection of organizational information systems is accomplishedthrough threat awareness, by the identification, management, and reduction of vulnerabilities at
each phase of the life cycle and the use of complementary, mutually reinforcing strategies to
respond to risk. Organizations consider implementing a standardized process to address supply
chain risk with respect to information systems and system components, and to educate theacquisition workforce on threats, risk, and required security controls. Organizations use theacquisition/procurement processes to require supply chain entities to implement necessary security
safeguards to: (i) reduce the likelihood of unauthorized modifications at each stage in the supply
chain; and (ii) protect information systems and information system components, prior to taking
delivery of such systems/components. This control also applies to information system services.
Security safeguards include, for example: (i) security controls for development systems,
development facilities, and external connections to development systems; (ii) vetting development
personnel; and (iii) use of tamper-evident packaging during shipping/warehousing. Methods forreviewing and protecting development plans, evidence, and documentation are commensurate withthe security category or classification level of the information system. Contracts may specify
documentation protection requirements. Related controls: AT-3, CM-8, IR-4, PE-16, PL-8, SA-3,
SA-4, SA-8, SA-10, SA-14, SA-15, SA-18, SA-19, SC-29, SC-30, SC-38, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ACQUISITION STRATEGIES / TOOLS / METHODSThe organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined tailored acquisition strategies,
contract tools, and procurement methods] for the purchase of the information system, systemcomponent, or information system service from suppliers.
Supplemental Guidance: The use of acquisition and procurement processes by organizations

early in the system development life cycle provides an important vehicle to protect the supply
chain. Organizations use available all-source intelligence analysis to inform the tailoring ofacquisition strategies, tools, and methods. There are a number of different tools andtechniques available (e.g., obscuring the end use of an information system or system

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component, using blind or filtered buys). Organizations also consider creating incentives for
suppliers who: (i) implement required security safeguards; (ii) promote transparency into theirorganizational processes and security practices; (iii) provide additional vetting of theprocesses and security practices of subordinate suppliers, critical information systemcomponents, and services; (iv) restrict purchases from specific suppliers or countries; and (v)provide contract language regarding the prohibition of tainted or counterfeit components. In
addition, organizations consider minimizing the time between purchase decisions and requireddelivery to limit opportunities for adversaries to corrupt information system components or
products. Finally, organizations can use trusted/controlled distribution, delivery, andwarehousing options to reduce supply chain risk (e.g., requiring tamper-evident packaging of
information system components during shipping and warehousing). Related control: SA-19.
(2)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | SUPPLIER REVIEWS

The organization conducts a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement toacquire the information system, system component, or information system service.
Supplemental Guidance: Supplier reviews include, for example: (i) analysis of supplierprocesses used to design, develop, test, implement, verify, deliver, and support information
systems, system components, and information system services; and (ii) assessment of suppliertraining and experience in developing systems, components, or services with the required
security capability. These reviews provide organizations with increased levels of visibility
into supplier activities during the system development life cycle to promote more effective
supply chain risk management. Supplier reviews can also help to determine whether primary
suppliers have security safeguards in place and a practice for vetting subordinate suppliers, forexample, second- and third-tier suppliers, and any subcontractors.
(3)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | TRUSTED SHIPPING AND WAREHOUSING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12 (1)].
(4)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | DIVERSITY OF SUPPLIERS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12 (13)].
(5)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | LIMITATION OF HARM

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to limit harmfrom potential adversaries identifying and targeting the organizational supply chain.
Supplemental Guidance: Supply chain risk is part of the advanced persistent threat (APT).

Security safeguards and countermeasures to reduce the probability of adversaries successfully
identifying and targeting the supply chain include, for example: (i) avoiding the purchase ofcustom configurations to reduce the risk of acquiring information systems, components, or
products that have been corrupted via supply chain actions targeted at specific organizations;(ii) employing a diverse set of suppliers to limit the potential harm from any given supplier inthe supply chain; (iii) employing approved vendor lists with standing reputations in industry,and (iv) using procurement carve outs (i.e., exclusions to commitments or obligations).
(6)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | MINIMIZING PROCUREMENT TIME

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12 (1)].
(7)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | ASSESSMENTS PRIOR TO SELECTION / ACCEPTANCE / UPDATEThe organization conducts an assessment of the information system, system component, or
information system service prior to selection, acceptance, or update.
Supplemental Guidance: Assessments include, for example, testing, evaluations, reviews, andanalyses. Independent, third-party entities or organizational personnel conduct assessments ofsystems, components, products, tools, and services. Organizations conduct assessments touncover unintentional vulnerabilities and intentional vulnerabilities including, for example,
malicious code, malicious processes, defective software, and counterfeits. Assessments can
include, for example, static analyses, dynamic analyses, simulations, white, gray, and black
box testing, fuzz testing, penetration testing, and ensuring that components or services are
genuine (e.g., using tags, cryptographic hash verifications, or digital signatures). Evidence
generated during security assessments is documented for follow-on actions carried out byorganizations. Related controls: CA-2, SA-11.

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SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | USE OF ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

The organization uses all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of theinformation system, system component, or information system service.
Supplemental Guidance: All-source intelligence analysis is employed by organizations to

inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions. All-source intelligence
consists of intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all
sources of information, most frequently including human intelligence, imagery intelligence,measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data in the
production of finished intelligence. Where available, such information is used to analyze therisk of both intentional and unintentional vulnerabilities from development, manufacturing,and delivery processes, people, and the environment. This review is performed on suppliers at
multiple tiers in the supply chain sufficient to manage risks. Related control: SA-15.
(9)

SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | OPERATIONS SECURITY

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined Operations Security (OPSEC)
safeguards] in accordance with classification guides to protect supply chain-related information
for the information system, system component, or information system service.
Supplemental Guidance: Supply chain information includes, for example: user identities; uses

for information systems, information system components, and information system services;supplier identities; supplier processes; security requirements; design specifications; testingand evaluation results; and system/component configurations. This control enhancement
expands the scope of OPSEC to include suppliers and potential suppliers. OPSEC is a processof identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant tooperations and other activities to: (i) identify those actions that can be observed by potential
adversaries; (ii) determine indicators that adversaries might obtain that could be interpreted or
pieced together to derive critical information in sufficient time to cause harm to organizations;(iii) implement safeguards or countermeasures to eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level,
exploitable vulnerabilities; and (iv) consider how aggregated information may compromise
the confidentiality of users or uses of the supply chain. OPSEC may require organizations towithhold critical mission/business information from suppliers and may include the use ofintermediaries to hide the end use, or users, of information systems, system components, orinformation system services.
(10) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | VALIDATE AS GENUINE AND NOT ALTERED
The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to validate thatthe information system or system component received is genuine and has not been altered.
Supplemental Guidance: For some information system components, especially hardware, there

are technical means to help determine if the components are genuine or have been altered.
Security safeguards used to validate the authenticity of information systems and information
system components include, for example, optical/nanotechnology tagging and side-channel
analysis. For hardware, detailed bill of material information can highlight the elements withembedded logic complete with component and production location.
(11) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PENETRATION TESTING / ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS, PROCESSES, AND ACTORSThe organization employs [Selection (one or more): organizational analysis, independent thirdparty analysis, organizational penetration testing, independent third-party penetration testing] of[Assignment: organization-defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] associated with
the information system, system component, or information system service.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses analysis and/or testing of the

supply chain, not just delivered items. Supply chain elements are information technology
products or product components that contain programmable logic and that are criticallyimportant to information system functions. Supply chain processes include, for example: (i)hardware, software, and firmware development processes; (ii) shipping/handling procedures;(iii) personnel and physical security programs; (iv) configuration management tools/measures
to maintain provenance; or (v) any other programs, processes, or procedures associated withthe production/distribution of supply chain elements. Supply chain actors are individuals withspecific roles and responsibilities in the supply chain. The evidence generated during analyses

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________and testing of supply chain elements, processes, and actors is documented and used to inform
organizational risk management activities and decisions. Related control: RA-5.
(12) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The organization establishes inter-organizational agreements and procedures with entities
involved in the supply chain for the information system, system component, or information systemservice.
Supplemental Guidance: The establishment of inter-organizational agreements and procedures

provides for notification of supply chain compromises. Early notification of supply chain
compromises that can potentially adversely affect or have adversely affected organizational
information systems, including critical system components, is essential for organizations toprovide appropriate responses to such incidents.
(13) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure anadequate supply of [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components].
Supplemental Guidance: Adversaries can attempt to impede organizational operations by

disrupting the supply of critical information system components or corrupting supplier
operations. Safeguards to ensure adequate supplies of critical information system components
include, for example: (i) the use of multiple suppliers throughout the supply chain for theidentified critical components; and (ii) stockpiling of spare components to ensure operation
during mission-critical times.
(14) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | IDENTITY AND TRACEABILITY
The organization establishes and retains unique identification of [Assignment: organizationdefined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] for the information system, systemcomponent, or information system service.
Supplemental Guidance: Knowing who and what is in the supply chains of organizations is

critical to gaining visibility into what is happening within such supply chains, as well as
monitoring and identifying high-risk events and activities. Without reasonable visibility andtraceability into supply chains (i.e., elements, processes, and actors), it is very difficult fororganizations to understand and therefore manage risk, and to reduce the likelihood of adverse
events. Uniquely identifying acquirer and integrator roles, organizations, personnel, mission
and element processes, testing and evaluation procedures, delivery mechanisms, support
mechanisms, communications/delivery paths, and disposal/final disposition activities as wellas the components and tools used, establishes a foundational identity structure for assessmentof supply chain activities. For example, labeling (using serial numbers) and tagging (using
radio-frequency identification [RFID] tags) individual supply chain elements including
software packages, modules, and hardware devices, and processes associated with thoseelements can be used for this purpose. Identification methods are sufficient to support theprovenance in the event of a supply chain issue or adverse supply chain event.
(15) SUPPLY CHAIN PROTECTION | PROCESSES TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIESThe organization establishes a process to address weaknesses or deficiencies in supply chain
elements identified during independent or organizational assessments of such elements.
Supplemental Guidance: Evidence generated during independent or organizational assessmentsof supply chain elements (e.g., penetration testing, audits, verification/validation activities) is
documented and used in follow-on processes implemented by organizations to respond to therisks related to the identified weaknesses and deficiencies. Supply chain elements include, forexample, supplier development processes and supplier distribution systems.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-161; NIST Interagency Report 7622.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

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SA-13

TRUSTWORTHINESS
Control: The organization:a.

Describes the trustworthiness required in the [Assignment: organization-defined information
system, information system component, or information system service] supporting its criticalmissions/business functions; andb.

Implements [Assignment: organization-defined assurance overlay] to achieve such
trustworthiness.

Supplemental Guidance: This control helps organizations to make explicit trustworthiness decisions

when designing, developing, and implementing information systems that are needed to conduct
critical organizational missions/business functions. Trustworthiness is a characteristic/property of
an information system that expresses the degree to which the system can be expected to preserve
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information it processes, stores, ortransmits. Trustworthy information systems are systems that are capable of being trusted tooperate within defined levels of risk despite the environmental disruptions, human errors, andpurposeful attacks that are expected to occur in the specified environments of operation.
Trustworthy systems are important to mission/business success. Two factors affecting thetrustworthiness of information systems include: (i) security functionality (i.e., the security
features, functions, and/or mechanisms employed within the system and its environment ofoperation); and (ii) security assurance (i.e., the grounds for confidence that the security
functionality is effective in its application). Developers, implementers, operators, and maintainersof organizational information systems can increase the level of assurance (and trustworthiness),for example, by employing well-defined security policy models, structured and rigorous hardware,
software, and firmware development techniques, sound system/security engineering principles,and secure configuration settings (defined by a set of assurance-related security controls inAppendix E).
Assurance is also based on the assessment of evidence produced during the system development
life cycle. Critical missions/business functions are supported by high-impact systems and theassociated assurance requirements for such systems. The additional assurance controls in Table E4 in Appendix E (designated as optional) can be used to develop and implement high-assurance
solutions for specific information systems and system components using the concept of overlays
described in Appendix I. Organizations select assurance overlays that have been developed,
validated, and approved for community adoption (e.g., cross-organization, governmentwide),
limiting the development of such overlays on an organization-by-organization basis. Organizations
can conduct criticality analyses as described in SA-14, to determine the information systems,
system components, or information system services that require high-assurance solutions.
Trustworthiness requirements and assurance overlays can be described in the security plans fororganizational information systems. Related controls: RA-2, SA-4, SA-8, SA-14, SC-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: FIPS Publications 199, 200; NIST Special Publications 800-53, 800-53A, 800-60,

800-64.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SA-14

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
Control: The organization identifies critical information system components and functions byperforming a criticality analysis for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems,
information system components, or information system services] at [Assignment: organizationdefined decision points in the system development life cycle].

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Supplemental Guidance: Criticality analysis is a key tenet of supply chain risk management andinforms the prioritization of supply chain protection activities such as attack surface reduction, useof all-source intelligence, and tailored acquisition strategies. Information system engineers canconduct an end-to-end functional decomposition of an information system to identify missioncritical functions and components. The functional decomposition includes the identification ofcore organizational missions supported by the system, decomposition into the specific functions toperform those missions, and traceability to the hardware, software, and firmware components that
implement those functions, including when the functions are shared by many components within
and beyond the information system boundary. Information system components that allow for
unmediated access to critical components or functions are considered critical due to the inherent
vulnerabilities such components create. Criticality is assessed in terms of the impact of thefunction or component failure on the ability of the component to complete the organizational
missions supported by the information system. A criticality analysis is performed whenever anarchitecture or design is being developed or modified, including upgrades. Related controls: CP-2,
PL-2, PL-8, PM-1, SA-8, SA-12, SA-13, SA-15, SA-20.
Control Enhancements: None.
(1)

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS | CRITICAL COMPONENTS WITH NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE SOURCING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-20].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW Not Selected

P0

SA-15

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information systemservice to follow a documented development process that:1.

Explicitly addresses security requirements;

2.

Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process;3.

Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development
process; and4.

Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools
used in development; andReviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools,
and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organizationdefined security requirements].

Supplemental Guidance: Development tools include, for example, programming languages andcomputer-aided design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, forexample, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes.
Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk
assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle(including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track
authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Related controls: SA-3, SA-8.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | QUALITY METRICS
The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to:(a)Define quality metrics at the beginning of the development process; and(b) Provide evidence of meeting the quality metrics [Selection (one or more): [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined program review
milestones]; upon delivery].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptablelevels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collectionsof completion criteria or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution ofparticular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require
the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings haveno impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phasesof development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress.
Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining theseverity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in thedelivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severityof Medium or High.
(2)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | SECURITY TRACKING TOOLSThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to select and employ a security tracking tool for use during thedevelopment process.
Supplemental Guidance: Information system development teams select and deploy security

tracking tools, including, for example, vulnerability/work item tracking systems that facilitate
assignment, sorting, filtering, and tracking of completed work items or tasks associated withsystem development processes.
(3)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CRITICALITY ANALYSISThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to perform a criticality analysis at [Assignment: organization-definedbreadth/depth] and at [Assignment: organization-defined decision points in the systemdevelopment life cycle].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides developer input to the criticality

analysis performed by organizations in SA-14. Developer input is essential to such analysis
because organizations may not have access to detailed design documentation for information
system components that are developed as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information
technology products (e.g., functional specifications, high-level designs, low-level designs, andsource code/hardware schematics). Related controls: SA-4, SA-14.
(4)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | THREAT MODELING / VULNERABILITY ANALYSISThe organization requires that developers perform threat modeling and a vulnerability analysis forthe information system at [Assignment: organization-defined breadth/depth] that:(a)Uses [Assignment: organization-defined information concerning impact, environment ofoperations, known or assumed threats, and acceptable risk levels];(b) Employs [Assignment: organization-defined tools and methods]; and(c)

Produces evidence that meets [Assignment: organization-defined acceptance criteria].

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SA-4.
(5)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ATTACK SURFACE REDUCTION

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to reduce attack surfaces to [Assignment: organization-defined
thresholds].
Supplemental Guidance: Attack surface reduction is closely aligned with developer threat andvulnerability analyses and information system architecture and design. Attack surface
reduction is a means of reducing risk to organizations by giving attackers less opportunity to
exploit weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e., potential vulnerabilities) within information systems,

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information system components, and information system services. Attack surface reduction
includes, for example, applying the principle of least privilege, employing layered defenses,
applying the principle of least functionality (i.e., restricting ports, protocols, functions, andservices), deprecating unsafe functions, and eliminating application programming interfaces(APIs) that are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Related control: CM-7.
(6)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENTThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to implement an explicit process to continuously improve thedevelopment process.
Supplemental Guidance: Developers of information systems, information system components,

and information system services consider the effectiveness/efficiency of current development
processes for meeting quality objectives and addressing security capabilities in current threat
environments.
(7)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY ANALYSISThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to:(a)

Perform an automated vulnerability analysis using [Assignment: organization-defined tools];(b) Determine the exploitation potential for discovered vulnerabilities;(c)

Determine potential risk mitigations for delivered vulnerabilities; and(d) Deliver the outputs of the tools and results of the analysis to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles].
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: RA-5.
(8)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | REUSE OF THREAT / VULNERABILITY INFORMATIONThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to use threat modeling and vulnerability analyses from similar systems,
components, or services to inform the current development process.
Supplemental Guidance: Analysis of vulnerabilities found in similar software applications caninform potential design or implementation issues for information systems under development.
Similar information systems or system components may exist within developer organizations.
Authoritative vulnerability information is available from a variety of public and private sector
sources including, for example, the National Vulnerability Database.
(9)

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | USE OF LIVE DATA

The organization approves, documents, and controls the use of live data in development and test
environments for the information system, system component, or information system service.
Supplemental Guidance: The use of live data in preproduction environments can result insignificant risk to organizations. Organizations can minimize such risk by using test or
dummy data during the development and testing of information systems, information systemcomponents, and information system services.
(10) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN
The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to provide an incident response plan.
Supplemental Guidance: The incident response plan for developers of information systems,

system components, and information system services is incorporated into organizational
incident response plans to provide the type of incident response information not readily
available to organizations. Such information may be extremely helpful, for example, whenorganizations respond to vulnerabilities in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information
technology products. Related control: IR-8.
(11) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS | ARCHIVE INFORMATION SYSTEM / COMPONENTThe organization requires the developer of the information system or system component to archive
the system or component to be released or delivered together with the corresponding evidence
supporting the final security review.

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Supplemental Guidance: Archiving relevant documentation from the development process canprovide a readily available baseline of information that can be helpful during information
system/component upgrades or modifications.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

SA-16

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH SA-15

DEVELOPER-PROVIDED TRAINING
Control: The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to provide [Assignment: organization-defined training] on the correct
use and operation of the implemented security functions, controls, and/or mechanisms.
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to external and internal (in-house) developers. Trainingof personnel is an essential element to ensure the effectiveness of security controls implemented
within organizational information systems. Training options include, for example, classroom-styletraining, web-based/computer-based training, and hands-on training. Organizations can also
request sufficient training materials from developers to conduct in-house training or offer selftraining to organizational personnel. Organizations determine the type of training necessary andmay require different types of training for different security functions, controls, or mechanisms.
Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, SA-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

SA-17

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH SA-16

DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN
Control: The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or

information system service to produce a design specification and security architecture that:a.

Is consistent with and supportive of the organization’s security architecture which isestablished within and is an integrated part of the organization’s enterprise architecture;b.

Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality, and the allocation of
security controls among physical and logical components; andc.

Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms, and services work together toprovide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.

Supplemental Guidance: This control is primarily directed at external developers, although it could

also be used for internal (in-house) development. In contrast, PL-8 is primarily directed at internal
developers to help ensure that organizations develop an information security architecture and suchsecurity architecture is integrated or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture. This distinction
is important if/when organizations outsource the development of information systems, information
system components, or information system services to external entities, and there is a requirement
to demonstrate consistency with the organization’s enterprise architecture and information security
architecture. Related controls: PL-8, PM-7, SA-3, SA-8.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL POLICY MODEL
The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to:(a)

Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal policy model describing the[Assignment: organization-defined elements of organizational security policy] to be enforced;and(b) Prove that the formal policy model is internally consistent and sufficient to enforce thedefined elements of the organizational security policy when implemented.
Supplemental Guidance: Formal models describe specific behaviors or security policies using

formal languages, thus enabling the correctness of those behaviors/policies to be formally
proven. Not all components of information systems can be modeled, and generally, formal
specifications are scoped to specific behaviors or policies of interest (e.g., nondiscretionary
access control policies). Organizations choose the particular formal modeling language andapproach based on the nature of the behaviors/policies to be described and the available tools.
Formal modeling tools include, for example, Gypsy and Zed.
(2)

DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | SECURITY-RELEVANT COMPONENTS
The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to:(a)Define security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and(b) Provide a rationale that the definition for security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware iscomplete.
Supplemental Guidance: Security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware represent the

portion of the information system, component, or service that must be trusted to perform
correctly in order to maintain required security properties. Related control: SA-5.
(3)

DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | FORMAL CORRESPONDENCE

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to:(a)

Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal top-level specification thatspecifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of
exceptions, error messages, and effects;(b) Show via proof to the extent feasible with additional informal demonstration as necessary,that the formal top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model;(c)Show via informal demonstration, that the formal top-level specification completely covers theinterfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;(d) Show that the formal top-level specification is an accurate description of the implemented
security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and(e)

Describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms not addressedin the formal top-level specification but strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware,
software, and firmware.

Supplemental Guidance: Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained throughmodeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model,
and that any additional code or implementation details present have no impact on the
behaviors or policies being modeled. Formal methods can be used to show that the high-levelsecurity properties are satisfied by the formal information system description, and that theformal system description is correctly implemented by a description of some lower level, forexample a hardware description. Consistency between the formal top-level specification andthe formal policy models is generally not amenable to being fully proven. Therefore, acombination of formal/informal methods may be needed to show such consistency.
Consistency between the formal top-level specification and the implementation may require
the use of an informal demonstration due to limitations in the applicability of formal methods
to prove that the specification accurately reflects the implementation. Hardware, software, andfirmware mechanisms strictly internal to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware

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include, for example, mapping registers and direct memory input/output. Related control: SA5.
(4)

DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | INFORMAL CORRESPONDENCE
The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to:(a)

Produce, as an integral part of the development process, an informal descriptive top-levelspecification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, andfirmware in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects;(b) Show via [Selection: informal demonstration, convincing argument with formal methods as
feasible] that the descriptive top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model;(c)Show via informal demonstration, that the descriptive top-level specification completely
covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;(d) Show that the descriptive top-level specification is an accurate description of the interfaces tosecurity-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and(e)

Describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms not addressedin the descriptive top-level specification but strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware,
software, and firmware.

Supplemental Guidance: Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained throughmodeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model,
and that any additional code or implementation details present has no impact on the behaviors
or policies being modeled. Consistency between the descriptive top-level specification (i.e.,high-level/low-level design) and the formal policy model is generally not amenable to being
fully proven. Therefore, a combination of formal/informal methods may be needed to showsuch consistency. Hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms strictly internal to securityrelevant hardware, software, and firmware include, for example, mapping registers and direct
memory input/output. Related control: SA-5.
(5)

DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | CONCEPTUALLY SIMPLE DESIGNThe organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to:(a)

Design and structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to use acomplete, conceptually simple protection mechanism with precisely defined semantics; and(b) Internally structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware with specific regard
for this mechanism.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-3.
(6)

DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE FOR TESTING

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware tofacilitate testing.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SA-11.
(7)

DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN | STRUCTURE FOR LEAST PRIVILEGE

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware tofacilitate controlling access with least privilege.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-5, AC-6.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

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TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION
Control: The organization implements a tamper protection program for the information system,
system component, or information system service.
Supplemental Guidance: Anti-tamper technologies and techniques provide a level of protection for

critical information systems, system components, and information technology products against anumber of related threats including modification, reverse engineering, and substitution. Strong
identification combined with tamper resistance and/or tamper detection is essential to protecting
information systems, components, and products during distribution and when in use. Related
controls: PE-3, SA-12, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | MULTIPLE PHASES OF SDLC

The organization employs anti-tamper technologies and techniques during multiple phases in thesystem development life cycle including design, development, integration, operations, andmaintenance.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations use a combination of hardware and software techniques

for tamper resistance and detection. Organizations employ obfuscation and self-checking, forexample, to make reverse engineering and modifications more difficult, time-consuming, andexpensive for adversaries. Customization of information systems and system components canmake substitutions easier to detect and therefore limit damage. Related control: SA-3.
(2)

TAMPER RESISTANCE AND DETECTION | INSPECTION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, OR DEVICES

The organization inspects [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, systemcomponents, or devices] [Selection (one or more): at random; at [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency], upon [Assignment: organization-defined indications of need for inspection]] todetect tampering.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses both physical and logicaltampering and is typically applied to mobile devices, notebook computers, or other systemcomponents taken out of organization-controlled areas. Indications of need for inspection
include, for example, when individuals return from travel to high-risk locations. Related
control: SI-4.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SA-19

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY
Control: The organization:a.

Develops and implements anti-counterfeit policy and procedures that include the means todetect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system; andb.

Reports counterfeit information system components to [Selection (one or more): source ofcounterfeit component; [Assignment: organization-defined external reporting organizations];[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].

Supplemental Guidance: Sources of counterfeit components include, for example, manufacturers,

developers, vendors, and contractors. Anti-counterfeiting policy and procedures support tamper
resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code. Externalreporting organizations include, for example, US-CERT. Related controls: PE-3, SA-12, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT TRAINING

The organization trains [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to detect counterfeit
information system components (including hardware, software, and firmware).

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COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | CONFIGURATION CONTROL FOR COMPONENT SERVICE / REPAIR

The organization maintains configuration control over [Assignment: organization-defined
information system components] awaiting service/repair and serviced/repaired components
awaiting return to service.
(3)

COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | COMPONENT DISPOSAL

The organization disposes of information system components using [Assignment: organizationdefined techniques and methods].
Supplemental Guidance: Proper disposal of information system components helps to prevent

such components from entering the gray market.
(4)

COMPONENT AUTHENTICITY | ANTI-COUNTERFEIT SCANNING

The organization scans for counterfeit information system components [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SA-20

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

CUSTOMIZED DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS
Control: The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined
critical information system components].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations determine that certain information system components likely

cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which
there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re-implementationor custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance.
This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software,and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations
where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom
develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g.,enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection fromdeletion of system and application files. Related controls: CP-2, SA-8, SA-14.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SA-21

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

DEVELOPER SCREENING
Control: The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined
information system, system component, or information system service]:a.

Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organizationdefined official government duties]; andb.

Satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel screening criteria].

Supplemental Guidance: Because the information system, system component, or information systemservice may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security
interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer istrustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of

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the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples ofauthorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks,
citizenship, and nationality. Trustworthiness of developers may also include a review and analysis
of company ownership and any relationships the company has with entities potentially affecting
the quality/reliability of the systems, components, or services being developed. Related controls:
PS-3, PS-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

DEVELOPER SCREENING | VALIDATION OF SCREENING

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or
information system service take [Assignment: organization-defined actions] to ensure that therequired access authorizations and screening criteria are satisfied.
Supplemental Guidance: Satisfying required access authorizations and personnel screening

criteria includes, for example, providing a listing of all the individuals authorized to perform
development activities on the selected information system, system component, or information
system service so that organizations can validate that the developer has satisfied the necessary
authorization and screening requirements.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SA-22

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Control: The organization:a.

Replaces information system components when support for the components is no longer
available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer; andb.

Provides justification and documents approval for the continued use of unsupported systemcomponents required to satisfy mission/business needs.

Supplemental Guidance: Support for information system components includes, for example,

software patches, firmware updates, replacement parts, and maintenance contracts. Unsupported
components (e.g., when vendors are no longer providing critical software patches), provide asubstantial opportunity for adversaries to exploit new weaknesses discovered in the currently
installed components. Exceptions to replacing unsupported system components may include, forexample, systems that provide critical mission/business capability where newer technologies are
not available or where the systems are so isolated that installing replacement components is not an
option. Related controls: PL-2, SA-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS | ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FOR CONTINUED SUPPORTThe organization provides [Selection (one or more): in-house support; [Assignment: organizationdefined support from external providers]] for unsupported information system components.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses the need to provide continued

support for selected information system components that are no longer supported by theoriginal developers, vendors, or manufacturers when such components remain essential tomission/business operations. Organizations can establish in-house support, for example, bydeveloping customized patches for critical software components or secure the services ofexternal providers who through contractual relationships, provide ongoing support for thedesignated unsupported components. Such contractual relationships can include, for example,
Open Source Software value-added vendors.
References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION CONTROLSDEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND SERVICES

With the renewed emphasis on trustworthy information systems and supply chain security, it isessential that organizations have the capability to express their information security requirementswith clarity and specificity in order to engage the information technology industry and obtain thesystems, components, and services necessary for mission and business success. To ensure thatorganizations have such capability, this publication provides a set of security controls in the System
and Services Acquisition family (i.e., SA family) addressing requirements for the development of
information systems, information technology products, and information system services. Therefore,
many of the controls in the SA family are directed at developers of those systems, components, andservices. It is important for organizations to recognize that the scope of the security controls in the
SA family includes all system/component/service development and the developers associated withsuch development whether the development is conducted by internal organizational personnel or byexternal developers through the contracting/acquisition process. Affected controls include SA-8,
SA-10, SA-11, SA-15, SA-16, SA-17, SA-20, and SA-21.

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SC-1

SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:1.

A system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities,
and compliance; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and communications protection
policy and associated system and communications protection controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

System and communications protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency]; and2.

System and communications protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SC family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-2

LOW SC-1

MOD SC-1

HIGH SC-1

APPLICATION PARTITIONING
Control: The information system separates user functionality (including user interface services)from information system management functionality.
Supplemental Guidance: Information system management functionality includes, for example,

functions necessary to administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers, andtypically requires privileged user access. The separation of user functionality from information
system management functionality is either physical or logical. Organizations implement separationof system management-related functionality from user functionality by using different computers,
different central processing units, different instances of operating systems, different network
addresses, virtualization techniques, or combinations of these or other methods, as appropriate.
This type of separation includes, for example, web administrative interfaces that use separate
authentication methods for users of any other information system resources. Separation of system
and user functionality may include isolating administrative interfaces on different domains andwith additional access controls. Related controls: SA-4, SA-8, SC-3.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

APPLICATION PARTITIONING | INTERFACES FOR NON-PRIVILEGED USERS

The information system prevents the presentation of information system management-related
functionality at an interface for non-privileged users.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement ensures that administration options (e.g.,administrator privileges) are not available to general users (including prohibiting the use of
the grey-out option commonly used to eliminate accessibility to such information). Such
restrictions include, for example, not presenting administration options until users establish
sessions with administrator privileges. Related control: AC-3.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-3

LOW Not Selected

MOD SC-2

HIGH SC-2

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION
Control: The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity functions.
Supplemental Guidance: The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity

functions by means of an isolation boundary (implemented via partitions and domains). Suchisolation controls access to and protects the integrity of the hardware, software, and firmware that
perform those security functions. Information systems implement code separation (i.e., separationof security functions from nonsecurity functions) in a number of ways, including, for example,
through the provision of security kernels via processor rings or processor modes. For non-kernel
code, security function isolation is often achieved through file system protections that serve toprotect the code on disk, and address space protections that protect executing code. Information
systems restrict access to security functions through the use of access control mechanisms and byimplementing least privilege capabilities. While the ideal is for all of the code within the security
function isolation boundary to only contain security-relevant code, it is sometimes necessary toinclude nonsecurity functions within the isolation boundary as an exception. Related controls: AC3, AC-6, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-13, SC-2, SC-7, SC-39.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION

The information system utilizes underlying hardware separation mechanisms to implement
security function isolation.
Supplemental Guidance: Underlying hardware separation mechanisms include, for example,

hardware ring architectures, commonly implemented within microprocessors, and hardwareenforced address segmentation used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate
attributes (i.e., readable, writeable).
(2)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | ACCESS / FLOW CONTROL FUNCTIONS

The information system isolates security functions enforcing access and information flow control
from nonsecurity functions and from other security functions.
Supplemental Guidance: Security function isolation occurs as a result of implementation; thefunctions can still be scanned and monitored. Security functions that are potentially isolated
from access and flow control enforcement functions include, for example, auditing, intrusion
detection, and anti-virus functions.
(3)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MINIMIZE NONSECURITY FUNCTIONALITY

The organization minimizes the number of nonsecurity functions included within the isolation
boundary containing security functions.
Supplemental Guidance: In those instances where it is not feasible to achieve strict isolation of

nonsecurity functions from security functions, it is necessary to take actions to minimize thenonsecurity-relevant functions within the security function boundary. Nonsecurity functions

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contained within the isolation boundary are considered security-relevant because errors or
maliciousness in such software, by virtue of being within the boundary, can impact the
security functions of organizational information systems. The design objective is that the
specific portions of information systems providing information security are of minimalsize/complexity. Minimizing the number of nonsecurity functions in the security-relevant
components of information systems allows designers and implementers to focus only on thosefunctions which are necessary to provide the desired security capability (typically accessenforcement). By minimizing nonsecurity functions within the isolation boundaries, theamount of code that must be trusted to enforce security policies is reduced, thus contributing
to understandability.
(4)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | MODULE COUPLING AND COHESIVENESS

The organization implements security functions as largely independent modules that maximize
internal cohesiveness within modules and minimize coupling between modules.
Supplemental Guidance: The reduction in inter-module interactions helps to constrain security

functions and to manage complexity. The concepts of coupling and cohesion are importantwith respect to modularity in software design. Coupling refers to the dependencies that one
module has on other modules. Cohesion refers to the relationship between the different
functions within a particular module. Good software engineering practices rely on modular
decomposition, layering, and minimization to reduce and manage complexity, thus producing
software modules that are highly cohesive and loosely coupled.
(5)

SECURITY FUNCTION ISOLATION | LAYERED STRUCTURESThe organization implements security functions as a layered structure minimizing interactions
between layers of the design and avoiding any dependence by lower layers on the functionality or
correctness of higher layers.
Supplemental Guidance: The implementation of layered structures with minimized interactions

among security functions and non-looping layers (i.e., lower-layer functions do not depend on
higher-layer functions) further enables the isolation of security functions and management ofcomplexity.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-4

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH SC-3

INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES
Control: The information system prevents unauthorized and unintended information transfer via

shared system resources.
Supplemental Guidance: This control prevents information, including encrypted representations of

information, produced by the actions of prior users/roles (or the actions of processes acting on
behalf of prior users/roles) from being available to any current users/roles (or current processes)that obtain access to shared system resources (e.g., registers, main memory, hard disks) after thoseresources have been released back to information systems. The control of information in sharedresources is also commonly referred to as object reuse and residual information protection. This
control does not address: (i) information remanence which refers to residual representation of datathat has been nominally erased or removed; (ii) covert channels (including storage and/or timing
channels) where shared resources are manipulated to violate information flow restrictions; or (iii)components within information systems for which there are only single users/roles. Related
controls: AC-3, AC-4, MP-6.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | SECURITY LEVELS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-4].

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INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES | PERIODS PROCESSING

The information system prevents unauthorized information transfer via shared resources inaccordance with [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] when system processing
explicitly switches between different information classification levels or security categories.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies when there are explicit changes in

information processing levels during information system operations, for example, duringmultilevel processing and periods processing with information at different classification levels
or security categories. Organization-defined procedures may include, for example, approved
sanitization processes for electronically stored information.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW Not Selected

P1

SC-5

MOD SC-4

HIGH SC-4

DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION
Control: The information system protects against or limits the effects of the following types ofdenial of service attacks: [Assignment: organization-defined types of denial of service attacks orreferences to sources for such information] by employing [Assignment: organization-defined
security safeguards].
Supplemental Guidance: A variety of technologies exist to limit, or in some cases, eliminate theeffects of denial of service attacks. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain
types of packets to protect information system components on internal organizational networks
from being directly affected by denial of service attacks. Employing increased capacity andbandwidth combined with service redundancy may also reduce the susceptibility to denial ofservice attacks. Related controls: SC-6, SC-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | RESTRICT INTERNAL USERS

The information system restricts the ability of individuals to launch [Assignment: organizationdefined denial of service attacks] against other information systems.
Supplemental Guidance: Restricting the ability of individuals to launch denial of service attacks

requires that the mechanisms used for such attacks are unavailable. Individuals of concern can
include, for example, hostile insiders or external adversaries that have successfully breached
the information system and are using the system as a platform to launch cyber attacks on third
parties. Organizations can restrict the ability of individuals to connect and transmit arbitrary
information on the transport medium (i.e., network, wireless spectrum). Organizations canalso limit the ability of individuals to use excessive information system resources. Protection
against individuals having the ability to launch denial of service attacks may be implemented
on specific information systems or on boundary devices prohibiting egress to potential target
systems.
(2)

DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | EXCESS CAPACITY / BANDWIDTH / REDUNDANCY

The information system manages excess capacity, bandwidth, or other redundancy to limit theeffects of information flooding denial of service attacks.
Supplemental Guidance: Managing excess capacity ensures that sufficient capacity is available

to counter flooding attacks. Managing excess capacity may include, for example, establishingselected usage priorities, quotas, or partitioning.
(3)

DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION | DETECTION / MONITORING

The organization:(a)

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(b) Monitors [Assignment: organization-defined information system resources] to determine if
sufficient resources exist to prevent effective denial of service attacks.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider utilization and capacity of information system

resources when managing risk from denial of service due to malicious attacks. Denial ofservice attacks can originate from external or internal sources. Information system resources
sensitive to denial of service include, for example, physical disk storage, memory, and CPU
cycles. Common safeguards to prevent denial of service attacks related to storage utilizationand capacity include, for example, instituting disk quotas, configuring information systems toautomatically alert administrators when specific storage capacity thresholds are reached, using
file compression technologies to maximize available storage space, and imposing separate
partitions for system and user data. Related controls: CA-7, SI-4.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-6

LOW SC-5

MOD SC-5

HIGH SC-5

RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
Control: The information system protects the availability of resources by allocating [Assignment:

organization-defined resources] by [Selection (one or more); priority; quota; [Assignment:
organization-defined security safeguards]].
Supplemental Guidance: Priority protection helps prevent lower-priority processes from delaying orinterfering with the information system servicing any higher-priority processes. Quotas prevent
users or processes from obtaining more than predetermined amounts of resources. This control
does not apply to information system components for which there are only single users/roles.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-7

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

BOUNDARY PROTECTION
Control: The information system:a.

Monitors and controls communications at the external boundary of the system and at key
internal boundaries within the system;b.

Implements subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are [Selection:
physically; logically] separated from internal organizational networks; andc.

Connects to external networks or information systems only through managed interfaces
consisting of boundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational
security architecture.

Supplemental Guidance: Managed interfaces include, for example, gateways, routers, firewalls,

guards, network-based malicious code analysis and virtualization systems, or encrypted tunnels
implemented within a security architecture (e.g., routers protecting firewalls or application
gateways residing on protected subnetworks). Subnetworks that are physically or logicallyseparated from internal networks are referred to as demilitarized zones or DMZs. Restricting or
prohibiting interfaces within organizational information systems includes, for example, restricting
external web traffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces and prohibiting external

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traffic that appears to be spoofing internal addresses. Organizations consider the shared nature ofcommercial telecommunications services in the implementation of security controls associatedwith the use of such services. Commercial telecommunications services are commonly based on
network components and consolidated management systems shared by all attached commercial
customers, and may also include third party-provided access lines and other service elements.
Such transmission services may represent sources of increased risk despite contract security
provisions. Related controls: AC-4, AC-17, CA-3, CM-7, CP-8, IR-4, RA-3, SC-5, SC-13.
Control Enhancements:(1)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PHYSICALLY SEPARATED SUBNETWORKS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].
(2)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PUBLIC ACCESS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].
(3)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ACCESS POINTSThe organization limits the number of external network connections to the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates morecomprehensive monitoring of inbound and outbound communications traffic. The Trusted
Internet Connection (TIC) initiative is an example of limiting the number of external network
connections.
(4)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

The organization:(a)Implements a managed interface for each external telecommunication service;(b) Establishes a traffic flow policy for each managed interface;(c)Protects the confidentiality and integrity of the information being transmitted across eachinterface;(d) Documents each exception to the traffic flow policy with a supporting mission/business needand duration of that need; and(e)

Reviews exceptions to the traffic flow policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
and removes exceptions that are no longer supported by an explicit mission/business need.

Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SC-8.
(5)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DENY BY DEFAULT / ALLOW BY EXCEPTION

The information system at managed interfaces denies network communications traffic by default
and allows network communications traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception).
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to both inbound and outboundnetwork communications traffic. A deny-all, permit-by-exception network communications
traffic policy ensures that only those connections which are essential and approved areallowed.
(6)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESPONSE TO RECOGNIZED FAILURES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7 (18)].
(7)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT SPLIT TUNNELING FOR REMOTE DEVICES
The information system, in conjunction with a remote device, prevents the device fromsimultaneously establishing non-remote connections with the system and communicating via
some other connection to resources in external networks.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is implemented within remote devices (e.g.,

notebook computers) through configuration settings to disable split tunneling in those devices,and by preventing those configuration settings from being readily configurable by users. This
control enhancement is implemented within the information system by the detection of split
tunneling (or of configuration settings that allow split tunneling) in the remote device, and byprohibiting the connection if the remote device is using split tunneling. Split tunneling might
be desirable by remote users to communicate with local information system resources such as
printers/file servers. However, split tunneling would in effect allow unauthorized external
connections, making the system more vulnerable to attack and to exfiltration of organizational

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information. The use of VPNs for remote connections, when adequately provisioned withappropriate security controls, may provide the organization with sufficient assurance that it
can effectively treat such connections as non-remote connections from the confidentiality andintegrity perspective. VPNs thus provide a means for allowing non-remote communications
paths from remote devices. The use of an adequately provisioned VPN does not eliminate theneed for preventing split tunneling.
(8)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATED PROXY SERVERSThe information system routes [Assignment: organization-defined internal communications traffic]
to [Assignment: organization-defined external networks] through authenticated proxy servers atmanaged interfaces.
Supplemental Guidance: External networks are networks outside of organizational control. A

proxy server is a server (i.e., information system or application) that acts as an intermediaryfor clients requesting information system resources (e.g., files, connections, web pages, orservices) from other organizational servers. Client requests established through an initialconnection to the proxy server are evaluated to manage complexity and to provide additional
protection by limiting direct connectivity. Web content filtering devices are one of the mostcommon proxy servers providing access to the Internet. Proxy servers support logging
individual Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sessions and blocking specific Uniform
Resource Locators (URLs), domain names, and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Web proxies
can be configured with organization-defined lists of authorized and unauthorized websites.
Related controls: AC-3, AU-2.
(9)

BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT THREATENING OUTGOING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

The information system:(a)

Detects and denies outgoing communications traffic posing a threat to external information
systems; and(b) Audits the identity of internal users associated with denied communications.
Supplemental Guidance: Detecting outgoing communications traffic from internal actions thatmay pose threats to external information systems is sometimes termed extrusion detection.
Extrusion detection at information system boundaries as part of managed interfaces includes
the analysis of incoming and outgoing communications traffic searching for indications ofinternal threats to the security of external systems. Such threats include, for example, traffic
indicative of denial of service attacks and traffic containing malicious code. Related controls:
AU-2, AU-6, SC-38, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4.
(10) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED EXFILTRATIONThe organization prevents the unauthorized exfiltration of information across managed interfaces.
Supplemental Guidance: Safeguards implemented by organizations to prevent unauthorized

exfiltration of information from information systems include, for example: (i) strict adherence
to protocol formats; (ii) monitoring for beaconing from information systems; (iii) monitoringfor steganography; (iv) disconnecting external network interfaces except when explicitly
needed; (v) disassembling and reassembling packet headers; and (vi) employing traffic profile
analysis to detect deviations from the volume/types of traffic expected within organizations orcall backs to command and control centers. Devices enforcing strict adherence to protocolformats include, for example, deep packet inspection firewalls and XML gateways. These
devices verify adherence to protocol formats and specification at the application layer andserve to identify vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices operating at the network ortransport layers. This control enhancement is closely associated with cross-domain solutions
and system guards enforcing information flow requirements. Related control: SI-3.
(11) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | RESTRICT INCOMING COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC
The information system only allows incoming communications from [Assignment: organizationdefined authorized sources] to be routed to [Assignment: organization-defined authorized
destinations].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement provides determinations that source anddestination address pairs represent authorized/allowed communications. Such determinations
can be based on several factors including, for example, the presence of source/destination

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address pairs in lists of authorized/allowed communications, the absence of address pairs inlists of unauthorized/disallowed pairs, or meeting more general rules for authorized/allowed
source/destination pairs. Related control: AC-3.
(12) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | HOST-BASED PROTECTION
The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based boundary protection
mechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].
Supplemental Guidance: Host-based boundary protection mechanisms include, for example,

host-based firewalls. Information system components employing host-based boundary
protection mechanisms include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices.
(13) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF SECURITY TOOLS / MECHANISMS / SUPPORT COMPONENTS
The organization isolates [Assignment: organization-defined information security tools,
mechanisms, and support components] from other internal information system components byimplementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components ofthe system.
Supplemental Guidance: Physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces are useful,for example, in isolating computer network defenses from critical operational processing
networks to prevent adversaries from discovering the analysis and forensics techniques oforganizations. Related controls: SA-8, SC-2, SC-3.
(14) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PROTECTS AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS
The organization protects against unauthorized physical connections at [Assignment:
organization-defined managed interfaces].
Supplemental Guidance: Information systems operating at different security categories orclassification levels may share common physical and environmental controls, since thesystems may share space within organizational facilities. In practice, it is possible that theseseparate information systems may share common equipment rooms, wiring closets, and cabledistribution paths. Protection against unauthorized physical connections can be achieved, forexample, by employing clearly identified and physically separated cable trays, connection
frames, and patch panels for each side of managed interfaces with physical access controls
enforcing limited authorized access to these items. Related controls: PE-4, PE-19.
(15) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE PRIVILEGED NETWORK ACCESSESThe information system routes all networked, privileged accesses through a dedicated, managed
interface for purposes of access control and auditing.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AU-2, SI-4.
(16) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PREVENT DISCOVERY OF COMPONENTS / DEVICES
The information system prevents discovery of specific system components composing a managed
interface.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects network addresses of information

system components that are part of managed interfaces from discovery through common tools
and techniques used to identify devices on networks. Network addresses are not available fordiscovery (e.g., network address not published or entered in domain name systems), requiring
prior knowledge for access. Another obfuscation technique is to periodically change network
addresses.
(17) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT OF PROTOCOL FORMATS
The information system enforces adherence to protocol formats.
Supplemental Guidance: Information system components that enforce protocol formats include,for example, deep packet inspection firewalls and XML gateways. Such system components
verify adherence to protocol formats/specifications (e.g., IEEE) at the application layer andidentify significant vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices operating at the networkor transport layers. Related control: SC-4.
(18) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | FAIL SECURE
The information system fails securely in the event of an operational failure of a boundary
protection device.

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Supplemental Guidance: Fail secure is a condition achieved by employing information systemmechanisms to ensure that in the event of operational failures of boundary protection devices
at managed interfaces (e.g., routers, firewalls, guards, and application gateways residing onprotected subnetworks commonly referred to as demilitarized zones), information systems do
not enter into unsecure states where intended security properties no longer hold. Failures ofboundary protection devices cannot lead to, or cause information external to the devices toenter the devices, nor can failures permit unauthorized information releases. Related controls:
CP-2, SC-24.
(19) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | BLOCKS COMMUNICATION FROM NON-ORGANIZATIONALLY CONFIGURED HOSTS
The information system blocks both inbound and outbound communications traffic between[Assignment: organization-defined communication clients] that are independently configured by
end users and external service providers.
Supplemental Guidance: Communication clients independently configured by end users andexternal service providers include, for example, instant messaging clients. Traffic blocking
does not apply to communication clients that are configured by organizations to perform
authorized functions.
(20) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DYNAMIC ISOLATION / SEGREGATION
The information system provides the capability to dynamically isolate/segregate [Assignment:
organization-defined information system components] from other components of the system.
Supplemental Guidance: The capability to dynamically isolate or segregate certain internal

components of organizational information systems is useful when it is necessary to partitionor separate certain components of dubious origin from those components possessing greater
trustworthiness. Component isolation reduces the attack surface of organizational information
systems. Isolation of selected information system components is also a means of limiting thedamage from successful cyber attacks when those attacks occur.
(21) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ISOLATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The organization employs boundary protection mechanisms to separate [Assignment:
organization-defined information system components] supporting [Assignment: organizationdefined missions and/or business functions].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can isolate information system components performing

different missions and/or business functions. Such isolation limits unauthorized information
flows among system components and also provides the opportunity to deploy greater levels ofprotection for selected components. Separating system components with boundary protection
mechanisms provides the capability for increased protection of individual components and to
more effectively control information flows between those components. This type of enhanced
protection limits the potential harm from cyber attacks and errors. The degree of separation
provided varies depending upon the mechanisms chosen. Boundary protection mechanisms
include, for example, routers, gateways, and firewalls separating system components into
physically separate networks or subnetworks, cross-domain devices separating subnetworks,
virtualization techniques, and encrypting information flows among system components using
distinct encryption keys. Related controls: CA-9, SC-3.
(22) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | SEPARATE SUBNETS FOR CONNECTING TO DIFFERENT SECURITY DOMAINS
The information system implements separate network addresses (i.e., different subnets) to connect
to systems in different security domains.
Supplemental Guidance: Decomposition of information systems into subnets helps to provide

the appropriate level of protection for network connections to different security domains
containing information with different security categories or classification levels.
(23) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DISABLE SENDER FEEDBACK ON PROTOCOL VALIDATION FAILURE
The information system disables feedback to senders on protocol format validation failure.
Supplemental Guidance: Disabling feedback to senders when there is a failure in protocol

validation format prevents adversaries from obtaining information which would otherwise be
unavailable.
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-41, 800-77.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-8

LOW SC-7

MOD SC-7 (3) (4) (5) (7)

HIGH SC-7 (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (18) (21)

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
Control: The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] oftransmitted information.
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks and all types of

information system components from which information can be transmitted (e.g., servers, mobile
devices, notebook computers, printers, copiers, scanners, facsimile machines). Communication
paths outside the physical protection of a controlled boundary are exposed to the possibility ofinterception and modification. Protecting the confidentiality and/or integrity of organizational
information can be accomplished by physical means (e.g., by employing protected distribution
systems) or by logical means (e.g., employing encryption techniques). Organizations relying oncommercial providers offering transmission services as commodity services rather than as fully
dedicated services (i.e., services which can be highly specialized to individual customer needs),
may find it difficult to obtain the necessary assurances regarding the implementation of needed
security controls for transmission confidentiality/integrity. In such situations, organizations
determine what types of confidentiality/integrity services are available in standard, commercial
telecommunication service packages. If it is infeasible or impractical to obtain the necessary
security controls and assurances of control effectiveness through appropriate contracting vehicles,organizations implement appropriate compensating security controls or explicitly accept theadditional risk. Related controls: AC-17, PE-4.
Control Enhancements:(1)

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR ALTERNATE PHYSICAL PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to [Selection (one or more):prevent unauthorized disclosure of information; detect changes to information] duringtransmission unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physicalsafeguards].
Supplemental Guidance: Encrypting information for transmission protects information fromunauthorized disclosure and modification. Cryptographic mechanisms implemented to protect
information integrity include, for example, cryptographic hash functions which have common
application in digital signatures, checksums, and message authentication codes. Alternative
physical security safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. Related
control: SC-13.
(2)

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | PRE / POST TRANSMISSION HANDLINGThe information system maintains the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of
information during preparation for transmission and during reception.
Supplemental Guidance: Information can be either unintentionally or maliciously disclosed or

modified during preparation for transmission or during reception including, for example,
during aggregation, at protocol transformation points, and during packing/unpacking. These
unauthorized disclosures or modifications compromise the confidentiality or integrity of theinformation. Related control: AU-10.
(3)

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION FOR MESSAGE EXTERNALS

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals
unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physical safeguards].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized

disclosure of information. Message externals include, for example, message headers/routing
information. This control enhancement prevents the exploitation of message externals andapplies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who
are not authorized users. Header/routing information is sometimes transmitted unencrypted
because the information is not properly identified by organizations as having significant value

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________or because encrypting the information can result in lower network performance and/or higher
costs. Alternative physical safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems.
Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(4)

TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CONCEAL / RANDOMIZE COMMUNICATIONS

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to conceal or randomize
communication patterns unless otherwise protected by [Assignment: organization-definedalternative physical safeguards].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses protection against unauthorized

disclosure of information. Communication patterns include, for example, frequency, periods,
amount, and predictability. Changes to communications patterns can reveal information
having intelligence value especially when combined with other available information related
to missions/business functions supported by organizational information systems. This control
enhancement prevents the derivation of intelligence based on communications patterns andapplies to both internal and external networks or links that may be visible to individuals who
are not authorized users. Encrypting the links and transmitting in continuous, fixed/random
patterns prevents the derivation of intelligence from the system communications patterns.
Alternative physical safeguards include, for example, protected distribution systems. Related
controls: SC-12, SC-13.
References: FIPS Publications 140-2, 197; NIST Special Publications 800-52, 800-77, 800-81,

800-113; CNSS Policy 15; NSTISSI No. 7003.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-9

LOW Not Selected

MOD SC-8 (1)HIGH SC-8 (1)TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8].

SC-10NETWORK DISCONNECT
Control: The information system terminates the network connection associated with acommunications session at the end of the session or after [Assignment: organization-defined time
period] of inactivity.
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to both internal and external networks. Terminating

network connections associated with communications sessions include, for example, de-allocating
associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating system level, or de-allocating networking
assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single, operating
system-level network connection. Time periods of inactivity may be established by organizations
and include, for example, time periods by type of network access or for specific network accesses.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

APPENDIX F-SC

LOW Not Selected

MOD SC-10

HIGH SC-10

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SC-11

TRUSTED PATH
Control: The information system establishes a trusted communications path between the user andthe following security functions of the system: [Assignment: organization-defined security
functions to include at a minimum, information system authentication and re-authentication].
Supplemental Guidance: Trusted paths are mechanisms by which users (through input devices) can

communicate directly with security functions of information systems with the requisite assurance
to support information security policies. The mechanisms can be activated only by users or the
security functions of organizational information systems. User responses via trusted paths areprotected from modifications by or disclosure to untrusted applications. Organizations employ
trusted paths for high-assurance connections between security functions of information systems
and users (e.g., during system logons). Enforcement of trusted communications paths is typicallyprovided via an implementation that meets the reference monitor concept. Related controls: AC16, AC-25.
Control Enhancements:(1)

TRUSTED PATH | LOGICAL ISOLATION

The information system provides a trusted communications path that is logically isolated anddistinguishable from other paths.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-12

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT
Control: The organization establishes and manages cryptographic keys for required cryptography

employed within the information system in accordance with [Assignment: organization-definedrequirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction].
Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic key management and establishment can be performed using

manual procedures or automated mechanisms with supporting manual procedures. Organizations
define key management requirements in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive
Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance, specifying appropriate options,levels, and parameters. Organizations manage trust stores to ensure that only approved trust
anchors are in such trust stores. This includes certificates with visibility external to organizational
information systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems. Related controls:
SC-13, SC-17.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | AVAILABILITY
The organization maintains availability of information in the event of the loss of cryptographic keys
by users.

Supplemental Guidance: Escrowing of encryption keys is a common practice for ensuring

availability in the event of loss of keys (e.g., due to forgotten passphrase).
(2)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | SYMMETRIC KEYS

The organization produces, controls, and distributes symmetric cryptographic keys using[Selection: NIST FIPS-compliant; NSA-approved] key management technology and processes.
(3)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | ASYMMETRIC KEYS

The organization produces, controls, and distributes asymmetric cryptographic keys using[Selection: NSA-approved key management technology and processes; approved PKI Class 3
certificates or prepositioned keying material; approved PKI Class 3 or Class 4 certificates andhardware security tokens that protect the user’s private key].

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(4)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI CERTIFICATES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12].
(5)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT | PKI CERTIFICATES / HARDWARE TOKENS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-12].
References: NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-13

LOW SC-12

MOD SC-12

HIGH SC-12 (1)CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION
Control: The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined cryptographic

uses and type of cryptography required for each use] in accordance with applicable federal laws,
Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.
Supplemental Guidance: Cryptography can be employed to support a variety of security solutions

including, for example, the protection of classified and Controlled Unclassified Information, theprovision of digital signatures, and the enforcement of information separation when authorizedindividuals have the necessary clearances for such information but lack the necessary formal
access approvals. Cryptography can also be used to support random number generation and hashgeneration. Generally applicable cryptographic standards include FIPS-validated cryptography and
NSA-approved cryptography. This control does not impose any requirements on organizations touse cryptography. However, if cryptography is required based on the selection of other security
controls, organizations define each type of cryptographic use and the type of cryptographyrequired (e.g., protection of classified information: NSA-approved cryptography; provision ofdigital signatures: FIPS-validated cryptography). Related controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-7, AC-17,
AC-18, AU-9, AU-10, CM-11, CP-9, IA-3, IA-7, MA-4, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, SA-4, SC-8, SC-12,
SC-28, SI-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
(1)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | FIPS-VALIDATED CRYPTOGRAPHY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13].
(2)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | NSA-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13].
(3)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT FORMAL ACCESS APPROVALS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13].
(4)

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION | DIGITAL SIGNATURES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-13].
References: FIPS Publication 140; Web: http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval, http://www.cnss.gov.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-14

LOW SC-13

MOD SC-13

HIGH SC-13

PUBLIC ACCESS PROTECTIONS[Withdrawn: Capability provided by AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, SI-3, SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, SI-10].

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COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES
Control: The information system:a.

Prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices with the following exceptions:[Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed]; andb.

Provides an explicit indication of use to users physically present at the devices.

Supplemental Guidance: Collaborative computing devices include, for example, networked whiteboards, cameras, and microphones. Explicit indication of use includes, for example, signals tousers when collaborative computing devices are activated. Related control: AC-21.
Control Enhancements:(1)

COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | PHYSICAL DISCONNECT

The information system provides physical disconnect of collaborative computing devices in amanner that supports ease of use.
Supplemental Guidance: Failing to physically disconnect from collaborative computing devices

can result in subsequent compromises of organizational information. Providing easy methods
to physically disconnect from such devices after a collaborative computing session helps toensure that participants actually carry out the disconnect activity without having to go throughcomplex and tedious procedures.
(2)

COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | BLOCKING INBOUND / OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].
(3)COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | DISABLING / REMOVAL IN SECURE WORK AREAS

The organization disables or removes collaborative computing devices from [Assignment:
organization-defined information systems or information system components] in [Assignment:
organization-defined secure work areas].
Supplemental Guidance: Failing to disable or remove collaborative computing devices frominformation systems or information system components can result in subsequent compromisesof organizational information including, for example, eavesdropping on conversations.
(4)

COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES | EXPLICITLY INDICATE CURRENT PARTICIPANTS
The information system provides an explicit indication of current participants in [Assignment:
organization-defined online meetings and teleconferences].

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement helps to prevent unauthorized individuals

from participating in collaborative computing sessions without the explicit knowledge ofother participants.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-16

LOW SC-15

MOD SC-15

HIGH SC-15

TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES
Control: The information system associates [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes]

with information exchanged between information systems and between system components.
Supplemental Guidance: Security attributes can be explicitly or implicitly associated with theinformation contained in organizational information systems or system components. Related
controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-16.
Control Enhancements:(1)

TRANSMISSION OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES | INTEGRITY VALIDATION

The information system validates the integrity of transmitted security attributes.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement ensures that the verification of the integrityof transmitted information includes security attributes. Related controls: AU-10, SC-8.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-17

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATES
Control: The organization issues public key certificates under an [Assignment: organization-

defined certificate policy] or obtains public key certificates from an approved service provider.
Supplemental Guidance: For all certificates, organizations manage information system trust stores toensure only approved trust anchors are in the trust stores. This control addresses both certificateswith visibility external to organizational information systems and certificates related to the internal
operations of systems, for example, application-specific time services. Related control: SC-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: OMB Memorandum 05-24; NIST Special Publications 800-32, 800-63.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-18

LOW Not Selected

MOD SC-17

HIGH SC-17

MOBILE CODE
Control: The organization:a.

Defines acceptable and unacceptable mobile code and mobile code technologies;b.

Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for acceptable mobile code andmobile code technologies; andc.

Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of mobile code within the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Decisions regarding the employment of mobile code within organizational

information systems are based on the potential for the code to cause damage to the systems if used
maliciously. Mobile code technologies include, for example, Java, JavaScript, ActiveX, Postscript,
PDF, Shockwave movies, Flash animations, and VBScript. Usage restrictions and implementation
guidance apply to both the selection and use of mobile code installed on servers and mobile code
downloaded and executed on individual workstations and devices (e.g., smart phones). Mobile
code policy and procedures address preventing the development, acquisition, or introduction of
unacceptable mobile code within organizational information systems. Related controls: AU-2,
AU-12, CM-2, CM-6, SI-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

MOBILE CODE | IDENTIFY UNACCEPTABLE CODE / TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The information system identifies [Assignment: organization-defined unacceptable mobile code]and takes [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].
Supplemental Guidance: Corrective actions when unacceptable mobile code is detected include,for example, blocking, quarantine, or alerting administrators. Blocking includes, for example,
preventing transmission of word processing files with embedded macros when such macros
have been defined to be unacceptable mobile code.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(2)

MOBILE CODE | ACQUISITION / DEVELOPMENT / USE

The organization ensures that the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code to be
deployed in the information system meets [Assignment: organization-defined mobile code
requirements].
(3)

MOBILE CODE | PREVENT DOWNLOADING / EXECUTION
The information system prevents the download and execution of [Assignment: organizationdefined unacceptable mobile code].

(4)

MOBILE CODE | PREVENT AUTOMATIC EXECUTION
The information system prevents the automatic execution of mobile code in [Assignment:
organization-defined software applications] and enforces [Assignment: organization-defined
actions] prior to executing the code.

Supplemental Guidance: Actions enforced before executing mobile code, include, for example,

prompting users prior to opening electronic mail attachments. Preventing automatic executionof mobile code includes, for example, disabling auto execute features on information systemcomponents employing portable storage devices such as Compact Disks (CDs), Digital Video
Disks (DVDs), and Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices.
(5)

MOBILE CODE | ALLOW EXECUTION ONLY IN CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS

The organization allows execution of permitted mobile code only in confined virtual machine
environments.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-28; DoD Instruction 8552.01.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

SC-19

LOW Not Selected

MOD SC-18

HIGH SC-18

VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for Voice over Internet Protocol(VoIP) technologies based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used
maliciously; andb.

Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of VoIP within the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-6, SC-7, SC-15.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-58.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-20

LOW Not Selected

MOD SC-19

HIGH SC-19

SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE)
Control: The information system:a.

Provides additional data origin authentication and integrity verification artifacts along withthe authoritative name resolution data the system returns in response to external name/address
resolution queries; andb.

Provides the means to indicate the security status of child zones and (if the child supports
secure resolution services) to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and childdomains, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace.

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Supplemental Guidance: This control enables external clients including, for example, remote

Internet clients, to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the
host/service name to network address resolution information obtained through the service.
Information systems that provide name and address resolution services include, for example,
domain name system (DNS) servers. Additional artifacts include, for example, DNS Security(DNSSEC) digital signatures and cryptographic keys. DNS resource records are examples ofauthoritative data. The means to indicate the security status of child zones includes, for example,
the use of delegation signer resource records in the DNS. The DNS security controls reflect (andare referenced from) OMB Memorandum 08-23. Information systems that use technologies otherthan the DNS to map between host/service names and network addresses provide other means toassure the authenticity and integrity of response data. Related controls: AU-10, SC-8, SC-12, SC13, SC-21, SC-22.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE) | CHILD SUBSPACES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-20].
(2)

SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY

The information system provides data origin and integrity protection artifacts for internal
name/address resolution queries.
References: OMB Memorandum 08-23; NIST Special Publication 800-81.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-21

LOW SC-20

MOD SC-20

HIGH SC-20

SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR CACHING RESOLVER)
Control: The information system requests and performs data origin authentication and data

integrity verification on the name/address resolution responses the system receives from
authoritative sources.
Supplemental Guidance: Each client of name resolution services either performs this validation on

its own, or has authenticated channels to trusted validation providers. Information systems thatprovide name and address resolution services for local clients include, for example, recursive
resolving or caching domain name system (DNS) servers. DNS client resolvers either perform
validation of DNSSEC signatures, or clients use authenticated channels to recursive resolvers that
perform such validations. Information systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map
between host/service names and network addresses provide other means to enable clients to verify
the authenticity and integrity of response data. Related controls: SC-20, SC-22.
Control Enhancements: None.
(1)

SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR CACHING RESOLVER) | DATA ORIGIN / INTEGRITY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-21].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-81.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-22

LOW SC-21

MOD SC-21

HIGH SC-21

ARCHITECTURE AND PROVISIONING FOR NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE
Control: The information systems that collectively provide name/address resolution service for an

organization are fault-tolerant and implement internal/external role separation.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supplemental Guidance: Information systems that provide name and address resolution services

include, for example, domain name system (DNS) servers. To eliminate single points of failure
and to enhance redundancy, organizations employ at least two authoritative domain name system
servers, one configured as the primary server and the other configured as the secondary server.
Additionally, organizations typically deploy the servers in two geographically separated network
subnetworks (i.e., not located in the same physical facility). For role separation, DNS servers withinternal roles only process name and address resolution requests from within organizations (i.e.,from internal clients). DNS servers with external roles only process name and address resolution
information requests from clients external to organizations (i.e., on external networks including
the Internet). Organizations specify clients that can access authoritative DNS servers in particularroles (e.g., by address ranges, explicit lists). Related controls: SC-2, SC-20, SC-21, SC-24.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-81.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-23

LOW SC-22

MOD SC-22

HIGH SC-22

SESSION AUTHENTICITY
Control: The information system protects the authenticity of communications sessions.
Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses communications protection at the session, versus

packet level (e.g., sessions in service-oriented architectures providing web-based services) andestablishes grounds for confidence at both ends of communications sessions in ongoing identitiesof other parties and in the validity of information transmitted. Authenticity protection includes, forexample, protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks/session hijacking and the insertion of false
information into sessions. Related controls: SC-8, SC-10, SC-11.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SESSION AUTHENTICITY | INVALIDATE SESSION IDENTIFIERS AT LOGOUT

The information system invalidates session identifiers upon user logout or other session
termination.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement curtails the ability of adversaries from

capturing and continuing to employ previously valid session IDs.
(2)

SESSION AUTHENTICITY | USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGE DISPLAYS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-12 (1)].
(3)

SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH RANDOMIZATION

The information system generates a unique session identifier for each session with [Assignment:
organization-defined randomness requirements] and recognizes only session identifiers that aresystem-generated.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement curtails the ability of adversaries fromreusing previously valid session IDs. Employing the concept of randomness in the generationof unique session identifiers helps to protect against brute-force attacks to determine futuresession identifiers. Related control: SC-13.
(4)

SESSION AUTHENTICITY | UNIQUE SESSION IDENTIFIERS WITH RANDOMIZATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-23 (3)].
(5)

SESSION AUTHENTICITY | ALLOWED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIESThe information system only allows the use of [Assignment: organization-defined certificate
authorities] for verification of the establishment of protected sessions.
Supplemental Guidance: Reliance on certificate authorities (CAs) for the establishment of

secure sessions includes, for example, the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and/or Transport
Layer Security (TLS) certificates. These certificates, after verification by the respective

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

certificate authorities, facilitate the establishment of protected sessions between web clients
and web servers. Related control: SC-13.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-52, 800-77, 800-95.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-24

LOW Not Selected

MOD SC-23

HIGH SC-23

FAIL IN KNOWN STATE
Control: The information system fails to a [Assignment: organization-defined known-state] for[Assignment: organization-defined types of failures] preserving [Assignment: organization-definedsystem state information] in failure.
Supplemental Guidance: Failure in a known state addresses security concerns in accordance with themission/business needs of organizations. Failure in a known secure state helps to prevent the lossof confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information in the event of failures of organizational
information systems or system components. Failure in a known safe state helps to prevent systems
from failing to a state that may cause injury to individuals or destruction to property. Preserving
information system state information facilitates system restart and return to the operational modeof organizations with less disruption of mission/business processes. Related controls: CP-2, CP10, CP-12, SC-7, SC-22.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-25

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH SC-24

THIN NODES
Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined information systemcomponents] with minimal functionality and information storage.
Supplemental Guidance: The deployment of information system components with reduced/minimalfunctionality (e.g., diskless nodes and thin client technologies) reduces the need to secure every
user endpoint, and may reduce the exposure of information, information systems, and services tocyber attacks. Related control: SC-30.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-26

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

HONEYPOTS
Control: The information system includes components specifically designed to be the target of

malicious attacks for the purpose of detecting, deflecting, and analyzing such attacks.
Supplemental Guidance: A honeypot is set up as a decoy to attract adversaries and to deflect their

attacks away from the operational systems supporting organizational missions/business function.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Depending upon the specific usage of the honeypot, consultation with the Office of the GeneralCounsel before deployment may be needed. Related controls: SC-30, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4.
Control Enhancements: None.
(1)

HONEYPOTS | DETECTION OF MALICIOUS CODE

[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-35].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-27

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

PLATFORM-INDEPENDENT APPLICATIONSControl: The information system includes: [Assignment: organization-defined platform-

independent applications].
Supplemental Guidance: Platforms are combinations of hardware and software used to run software

applications. Platforms include: (i) operating systems; (ii) the underlying computer architectures,or (iii) both. Platform-independent applications are applications that run on multiple platforms.
Such applications promote portability and reconstitution on different platforms, increasing theavailability of critical functions within organizations while information systems with specificoperating systems are under attack. Related control: SC-29.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-28

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST
Control: The information system protects the [Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity] of[Assignment: organization-defined information at rest].
Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the confidentiality and integrity of information atrest and covers user information and system information. Information at rest refers to the state of
information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems.
System-related information requiring protection includes, for example, configurations or rule sets
for firewalls, gateways, intrusion detection/prevention systems, filtering routers, and authenticator
content. Organizations may employ different mechanisms to achieve confidentiality and integrity
protections, including the use of cryptographic mechanisms and file share scanning. Integrity
protection can be achieved, for example, by implementing Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM)
technologies. Organizations may also employ other security controls including, for example,
secure off-line storage in lieu of online storage when adequate protection of information at rest
cannot otherwise be achieved and/or continuous monitoring to identify malicious code at rest.
Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, CA-7, CM-3, CM-5, CM-6, PE-3, SC-8, SC-13, SI-3, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized
disclosure and modification of [Assignment: organization-defined information] on [Assignment:
organization-defined information system components].

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Supplemental Guidance: Selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect

the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information. The strength of mechanism iscommensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information. This control
enhancement applies to significant concentrations of digital media in organizational areas
designated for media storage and also to limited quantities of media generally associated withinformation system components in operational environments (e.g., portable storage devices,mobile devices). Organizations have the flexibility to either encrypt all information on storage
devices (i.e., full disk encryption) or encrypt specific data structures (e.g., files, records, orfields). Organizations employing cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest also
consider cryptographic key management solutions. Related controls: AC-19, SC-12.
(2)

PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | OFF-LINE STORAGE

The organization removes from online storage and stores off-line in a secure location [Assignment:
organization-defined information].
Supplemental Guidance: Removing organizational information from online information system

storage to off-line storage eliminates the possibility of individuals gaining unauthorizedaccess to the information through a network. Therefore, organizations may choose to move
information to off-line storage in lieu of protecting such information in online storage.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57, 800-111.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-29

LOW Not Selected

MOD SC-28

HIGH SC-28

HETEROGENEITY
Control: The organization employs a diverse set of information technologies for [Assignment:
organization-defined information system components] in the implementation of the information
system.
Supplemental Guidance: Increasing the diversity of information technologies within organizational

information systems reduces the impact of potential exploitations of specific technologies and also
defends against common mode failures, including those failures induced by supply chain attacks.
Diversity in information technologies also reduces the likelihood that the means adversaries use tocompromise one information system component will be equally effective against other systemcomponents, thus further increasing the adversary work factor to successfully complete planned
cyber attacks. An increase in diversity may add complexity and management overhead which
could ultimately lead to mistakes and unauthorized configurations. Related controls: SA-12, SA14, SC-27.
Control Enhancements:(1)

HETEROGENEITY | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUESThe organization employs virtualization techniques to support the deployment of a diversity ofoperating systems and applications that are changed [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].
Supplemental Guidance: While frequent changes to operating systems and applications poseconfiguration management challenges, the changes can result in an increased work factor foradversaries in order to carry out successful cyber attacks. Changing virtual operating systems
or applications, as opposed to changing actual operating systems/applications, provide virtualchanges that impede attacker success while reducing configuration management efforts. In
addition, virtualization techniques can assist organizations in isolating untrustworthy software
and/or software of dubious provenance into confined execution environments.
References: None.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-30

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION
Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined concealment andmisdirection techniques] for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] at[Assignment: organization-defined time periods] to confuse and mislead adversaries.
Supplemental Guidance: Concealment and misdirection techniques can significantly reduce thetargeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity and available attack surface) toinitiate and complete cyber attacks. For example, virtualization techniques provide organizations
with the ability to disguise information systems, potentially reducing the likelihood of successful
attacks without the cost of having multiple platforms. Increased use of concealment/misdirection
techniques including, for example, randomness, uncertainty, and virtualization, may sufficiently
confuse and mislead adversaries and subsequently increase the risk of discovery and/or exposing
tradecraft. Concealment/misdirection techniques may also provide organizations additional time tosuccessfully perform core missions and business functions. Because of the time and effort required
to support concealment/misdirection techniques, it is anticipated that such techniques would be
used by organizations on a very limited basis. Related controls: SC-26, SC-29, SI-14.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | VIRTUALIZATION TECHNIQUES[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-29 (1)].
(2)

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | RANDOMNESSThe organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined techniques] to introduce
randomness into organizational operations and assets.
Supplemental Guidance: Randomness introduces increased levels of uncertainty for adversaries

regarding the actions organizations take in defending against cyber attacks. Such actions may
impede the ability of adversaries to correctly target information resources of organizations
supporting critical missions/business functions. Uncertainty may also cause adversaries tohesitate before initiating or continuing attacks. Misdirection techniques involving randomness
include, for example, performing certain routine actions at different times of day, employing
different information technologies (e.g., browsers, search engines), using different suppliers,
and rotating roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel.
(3)

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CHANGE PROCESSING / STORAGE LOCATIONS

The organization changes the location of [Assignment: organization-defined processing and/or
storage] [Selection: [Assignment: organization-defined time frequency]; at random time intervals]].
Supplemental Guidance: Adversaries target critical organizational missions/business functions

and the information resources supporting those missions and functions while at the same time,trying to minimize exposure of their existence and tradecraft. The static, homogeneous, anddeterministic nature of organizational information systems targeted by adversaries, make such
systems more susceptible to cyber attacks with less adversary cost and effort to be successful.
Changing organizational processing and storage locations (sometimes referred to as moving
target defense) addresses the advanced persistent threat (APT) using techniques such as
virtualization, distributed processing, and replication. This enables organizations to relocate
the information resources (i.e., processing and/or storage) supporting critical missions andbusiness functions. Changing locations of processing activities and/or storage sites introduces
uncertainty into the targeting activities by adversaries. This uncertainty increases the work
factor of adversaries making compromises or breaches to organizational information systems
much more difficult and time-consuming, and increases the chances that adversaries may
inadvertently disclose aspects of tradecraft while attempting to locate critical organizational
resources.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(4)

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | MISLEADING INFORMATIONThe organization employs realistic, but misleading information in [Assignment: organizationdefined information system components] with regard to its security state or posture.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement misleads potential adversaries regarding thenature and extent of security safeguards deployed by organizations. As a result, adversaries
may employ incorrect (and as a result ineffective) attack techniques. One way of misleading
adversaries is for organizations to place misleading information regarding the specific security
controls deployed in external information systems that are known to be accessed or targetedby adversaries. Another technique is the use of deception nets (e.g., honeynets, virtualized
environments) that mimic actual aspects of organizational information systems but use, forexample, out-of-date software configurations.
(5)

CONCEALMENT AND MISDIRECTION | CONCEALMENT OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined techniques] to hide or conceal[Assignment: organization-defined information system components].

Supplemental Guidance: By hiding, disguising, or otherwise concealing critical information

system components, organizations may be able to decrease the probability that adversaries
target and successfully compromise those assets. Potential means for organizations to hide
and/or conceal information system components include, for example, configuration of routersor the use of honeynets or virtualization techniques.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-31

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS
Control: The organization:a.

Performs a covert channel analysis to identify those aspects of communications within theinformation system that are potential avenues for covert [Selection (one or more): storage;
timing] channels; andb.

Estimates the maximum bandwidth of those channels.

Supplemental Guidance: Developers are in the best position to identify potential areas within

systems that might lead to covert channels. Covert channel analysis is a meaningful activity when
there is the potential for unauthorized information flows across security domains, for example, inthe case of information systems containing export-controlled information and having connections
to external networks (i.e., networks not controlled by organizations). Covert channel analysis isalso meaningful for multilevel secure (MLS) information systems, multiple security level (MSL)
systems, and cross-domain systems. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, PL-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | TEST COVERT CHANNELS FOR EXPLOITABILITY

The organization tests a subset of the identified covert channels to determine which channels are
exploitable.
(2)

COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MAXIMUM BANDWIDTHThe organization reduces the maximum bandwidth for identified covert [Selection (one or more);storage; timing] channels to [Assignment: organization-defined values].

Information system developers are in the best position to reduce themaximum bandwidth for identified covert storage and timing channels.
Supplemental Guidance:(3)

APPENDIX F-SC

COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS | MEASURE BANDWIDTH IN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
The organization measures the bandwidth of [Assignment: organization-defined subset of
identified covert channels] in the operational environment of the information system.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

This control enhancement addresses covert channel bandwidth inoperational environments versus developmental environments. Measuring covert channel
bandwidth in operational environments helps organizations to determine how muchinformation can be covertly leaked before such leakage adversely affects organizational
missions/business functions. Covert channel bandwidth may be significantly different whenmeasured in those settings that are independent of the particular environments of operation(e.g., laboratories or development environments).
Supplemental Guidance:

References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-32

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

INFORMATION SYSTEM PARTITIONING
Control: The organization partitions the information system into [Assignment: organization-defined
information system components] residing in separate physical domains or environments based on[Assignment: organization-defined circumstances for physical separation of components].
Supplemental Guidance: Information system partitioning is a part of a defense-in-depth protection

strategy. Organizations determine the degree of physical separation of system components fromphysically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, to components in separate
rooms for the more critical components, to more significant geographical separation of the mostcritical components. Security categorization can guide the selection of appropriate candidates fordomain partitioning. Managed interfaces restrict or prohibit network access and information flow
among partitioned information system components. Related controls: AC-4, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3,
SC-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: FIPS Publication 199.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-33

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

TRANSMISSION PREPARATION INTEGRITY[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8].

SC-34

NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS
Control: The information system at [Assignment: organization-defined information systemcomponents]:a.

Loads and executes the operating environment from hardware-enforced, read-only media;
andb.

Loads and executes [Assignment: organization-defined applications] from hardwareenforced, read-only media.

The term operating environment is defined as the specific code that hosts
applications, for example, operating systems, executives, or monitors including virtual machinemonitors (i.e., hypervisors). It can also include certain applications running directly on hardware
platforms. Hardware-enforced, read-only media include, for example, Compact Disk-Recordable
Supplemental Guidance:

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(CD-R)/Digital Video Disk-Recordable (DVD-R) disk drives and one-time programmable readonly memory. The use of non-modifiable storage ensures the integrity of software from the pointof creation of the read-only image. The use of reprogrammable read-only memory can be accepted
as read-only media provided: (i) integrity can be adequately protected from the point of initialwriting to the insertion of the memory into the information system; and (ii) there are reliablehardware protections against reprogramming the memory while installed in organizational
information systems. Related controls: AC-3, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | NO WRITABLE STORAGE

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined information system components]
with no writeable storage that is persistent across component restart or power on/off.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement: (i) eliminates the possibility of malicious

code insertion via persistent, writeable storage within the designated information systemcomponents; and (ii) applies to both fixed and removable storage, with the latter being
addressed directly or as specific restrictions imposed through access controls for mobile
devices. Related controls: AC-19, MP-7.
(2)

NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | INTEGRITY PROTECTION / READ-ONLY MEDIAThe organization protects the integrity of information prior to storage on read-only media andcontrols the media after such information has been recorded onto the media.
Supplemental Guidance: Security safeguards prevent the substitution of media into information

systems or the reprogramming of programmable read-only media prior to installation into thesystems. Security safeguards include, for example, a combination of prevention, detection,and response. Related controls: AC-5, CM-3, CM-5, CM-9, MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, SA-12, SC28, SI-3.
(3)

NON-MODIFIABLE EXECUTABLE PROGRAMS | HARDWARE-BASED PROTECTION

The organization:(a)

Employs hardware-based, write-protect for [Assignment: organization-defined information
system firmware components]; and(b) Implements specific procedures for [Assignment: organization-defined authorized individuals]
to manually disable hardware write-protect for firmware modifications and re-enable the writeprotect prior to returning to operational mode.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-35

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

HONEYCLIENTS
Control: The information system includes components that proactively seek to identify malicious

websites and/or web-based malicious code.
Supplemental Guidance: Honeyclients differ from honeypots in that the components actively probe

the Internet in search of malicious code (e.g., worms) contained on external websites. As withhoneypots, honeyclients require some supporting isolation measures (e.g., virtualization) to ensurethat any malicious code discovered during the search and subsequently executed does not infectorganizational information systems. Related controls: SC-26, SC-44, SI-3, SI-4.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-36

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE
Control: The organization distributes [Assignment: organization-defined processing and storage]

across multiple physical locations.
Supplemental Guidance: Distributing processing and storage across multiple physical locations

provides some degree of redundancy or overlap for organizations, and therefore increases the work
factor of adversaries to adversely impact organizational operations, assets, and individuals. This
control does not assume a single primary processing or storage location, and thus allows forparallel processing and storage. Related controls: CP-6, CP-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING AND STORAGE | POLLING TECHNIQUESThe organization employs polling techniques to identify potential faults, errors, or compromises to[Assignment: organization-defined distributed processing and storage components].
Supplemental Guidance: Distributed processing and/or storage may be employed to reduce

opportunities for adversaries to successfully compromise the confidentiality, integrity, oravailability of information and information systems. However, distribution of processing
and/or storage components does not prevent adversaries from compromising one (or more) of
the distributed components. Polling compares the processing results and/or storage content
from the various distributed components and subsequently voting on the outcomes. Polling
identifies potential faults, errors, or compromises in distributed processing and/or storage
components. Related control: SI-4.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-37

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS
Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band channels] forthe physical delivery or electronic transmission of [Assignment: organization-defined information,
information system components, or devices] to [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or
information systems].
Supplemental Guidance: Out-of-band channels include, for example, local (nonnetwork) accesses toinformation systems, network paths physically separate from network paths used for operationaltraffic, or nonelectronic paths such as the US Postal Service. This is in contrast with using thesame channels (i.e., in-band channels) that carry routine operational traffic. Out-of-band channels
do not have the same vulnerability/exposure as in-band channels, and hence the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability compromises of in-band channels will not compromise the out-of-bandchannels. Organizations may employ out-of-band channels in the delivery or transmission of manyorganizational items including, for example, identifiers/authenticators, configuration managementchanges for hardware, firmware, or software, cryptographic key management information, security
updates, system/data backups, maintenance information, and malicious code protection updates.
Related controls: AC-2, CM-3, CM-5, CM-7, IA-4, IA-5, MA-4, SC-12, SI-3, SI-4, SI-7.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

OUT-OF-BAND CHANNELS | ENSURE DELIVERY / TRANSMISSION

The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure that
only [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or information systems] receive the[Assignment: organization-defined information, information system components, or devices].
Supplemental Guidance: Techniques and/or methods employed by organizations to ensure that

only designated information systems or individuals receive particular information, systemcomponents, or devices include, for example, sending authenticators via courier service but
requiring recipients to show some form of government-issued photographic identification as acondition of receipt.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-38

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

OPERATIONS SECURITY
Control: The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined operations security

safeguards] to protect key organizational information throughout the system development life
cycle.
Supplemental Guidance: Operations security (OPSEC) is a systematic process by which potential

adversaries can be denied information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations byidentifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified information that specifically relates
to the planning and execution of sensitive organizational activities. The OPSEC process involves
five steps: (i) identification of critical information (e.g., the security categorization process); (ii)analysis of threats; (iii) analysis of vulnerabilities; (iv) assessment of risks; and (v) the applicationof appropriate countermeasures. OPSEC safeguards are applied to both organizational information
systems and the environments in which those systems operate. OPSEC safeguards help to protect
the confidentiality of key information including, for example, limiting the sharing of information
with suppliers and potential suppliers of information system components, information technology
products and services, and with other non-organizational elements and individuals. Information
critical to mission/business success includes, for example, user identities, element uses, suppliers,
supply chain processes, functional and security requirements, system design specifications, testing
protocols, and security control implementation details. Related controls: RA-2, RA-5, SA-12.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-39

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

PROCESS ISOLATION
Control: The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each executing

process.
Supplemental Guidance: Information systems can maintain separate execution domains for each

executing process by assigning each process a separate address space. Each information systemprocess has a distinct address space so that communication between processes is performed in amanner controlled through the security functions, and one process cannot modify the executing
code of another process. Maintaining separate execution domains for executing processes can be

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achieved, for example, by implementing separate address spaces. This capability is available inmost commercial operating systems that employ multi-state processor technologies. Related
controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-6, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PROCESS ISOLATION | HARDWARE SEPARATION

The information system implements underlying hardware separation mechanisms to facilitateprocess separation.
Supplemental Guidance: Hardware-based separation of information system processes isgenerally less susceptible to compromise than software-based separation, thus providing
greater assurance that the separation will be enforced. Underlying hardware separation
mechanisms include, for example, hardware memory management.
(2)

PROCESS ISOLATION | THREAD ISOLATION

The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each thread in [Assignment:
organization-defined multi-threaded processing].
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SC-40

LOW SC-39

MOD SC-39

HIGH SC-39

WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION
Control: The information system protects external and internal [Assignment: organization-defined

wireless links] from [Assignment: organization-defined types of signal parameter attacks orreferences to sources for such attacks].
Supplemental Guidance: This control applies to internal and external wireless communication links

that may be visible to individuals who are not authorized information system users. Adversaries
can exploit the signal parameters of wireless links if such links are not adequately protected. There
are many ways to exploit the signal parameters of wireless links to gain intelligence, deny service,or to spoof users of organizational information systems. This control reduces the impact of attacks
that are unique to wireless systems. If organizations rely on commercial service providers fortransmission services as commodity items rather than as fully dedicated services, it may not be
possible to implement this control. Related controls: AC-18, SC-5.
Control Enhancements:(1)

WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms that achieve [Assignment:
organization-defined level of protection] against the effects of intentional electromagnetic
interference.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects against intentional jamming thatmight deny or impair communications by ensuring that wireless spread spectrum waveforms
used to provide anti-jam protection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. The
control enhancement may also coincidentally help to mitigate the effects of unintentional
jamming due to interference from legitimate transmitters sharing the same spectrum. Mission
requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives,
regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines determine levels of wireless link availability
and performance/cryptography needed. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(2)

WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | REDUCE DETECTION POTENTIAL

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to reduce the detection potentialof wireless links to [Assignment: organization-defined level of reduction].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is needed for covert communications andprotecting wireless transmitters from being geo-located by their transmissions. The control
enhancement ensures that spread spectrum waveforms used to achieve low probability of

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detection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Mission requirements, projected
threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, and guidelines determine the levels to which wireless links should be undetectable.
Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(3)WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | IMITATIVE OR MANIPULATIVE COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wirelesstransmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications
deception based on signal parameters.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement ensures that the signal parameters of

wireless transmissions are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Such unpredictability
reduces the probability of imitative or manipulative communications deception based uponsignal parameters alone. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13.
(4)WIRELESS LINK PROTECTION | SIGNAL PARAMETER IDENTIFICATION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent the identification of[Assignment: organization-defined wireless transmitters] by using the transmitter signal
parameters.
Supplemental Guidance: Radio fingerprinting techniques identify the unique signal parametersof transmitters to fingerprint such transmitters for purposes of tracking and mission/user
identification. This control enhancement protects against the unique identification of wirelesstransmitters for purposes of intelligence exploitation by ensuring that anti-fingerprinting
alterations to signal parameters are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. This control
enhancement helps assure mission success when anonymity is required. Related controls: SC12, SC-13.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-41

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

PORT AND I/O DEVICE ACCESS
Control: The organization physically disables or removes [Assignment: organization-definedconnection ports or input/output devices] on [Assignment: organization-defined information
systems or information system components].
Supplemental Guidance: Connection ports include, for example, Universal Serial Bus (USB) and

Firewire (IEEE 1394). Input/output (I/O) devices include, for example, Compact Disk (CD) andDigital Video Disk (DVD) drives. Physically disabling or removing such connection ports and I/O
devices helps prevent exfiltration of information from information systems and the introduction ofmalicious code into systems from those ports/devices.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

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MOD Not Selected

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SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA
Control: The information system:a.

Prohibits the remote activation of environmental sensing capabilities with the following
exceptions: [Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation of sensors
is allowed]; andb.

Provides an explicit indication of sensor use to [Assignment: organization-defined class ofusers].

Supplemental Guidance: This control often applies to types of information systems or systemcomponents characterized as mobile devices, for example, smart phones, tablets, and E-readers.
These systems often include sensors that can collect and record data regarding the environment
where the system is in use. Sensors that are embedded within mobile devices include, for example,
cameras, microphones, Global Positioning System (GPS) mechanisms, and accelerometers. While
the sensors on mobiles devices provide an important function, if activated covertly, such devices
can potentially provide a means for adversaries to learn valuable information about individuals
and organizations. For example, remotely activating the GPS function on a mobile device could
provide an adversary with the ability to track the specific movements of an individual.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | REPORTING TO AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS OR ROLES
The organization ensures that the information system is configured so that data or informationcollected by the [Assignment: organization-defined sensors] is only reported to authorizedindividuals or roles.

Supplemental Guidance: In situations where sensors are activated by authorized individuals(e.g., end users), it is still possible that the data/information collected by the sensors will besent to unauthorized entities.
(2)

SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | AUTHORIZED USE

The organization employs the following measures: [Assignment: organization-defined measures],so that data or information collected by [Assignment: organization-defined sensors] is only used
for authorized purposes.
Supplemental Guidance: Information collected by sensors for a specific authorized purpose

potentially could be misused for some unauthorized purpose. For example, GPS sensors thatare used to support traffic navigation could be misused to track movements ofindividuals. Measures to mitigate such activities include, for example, additional training toensure that authorized parties do not abuse their authority, or (in the case where sensor
data/information is maintained by external parties) contractual restrictions on the use of thedata/information.
(3)

SENSOR CAPABILITY AND DATA | PROHIBIT USE OF DEVICES

The organization prohibits the use of devices possessing [Assignment: organization-definedenvironmental sensing capabilities] in [Assignment: organization-defined facilities, areas, or
systems].
Supplemental Guidance: For example, organizations may prohibit individuals from bringing cell

phones or digital cameras into certain facilities or specific controlled areas within facilities
where classified information is stored or sensitive conversations are taking place.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

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SC-43

USAGE RESTRICTIONSControl: The organization:a.

Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for [Assignment: organizationdefined information system components] based on the potential to cause damage to theinformation system if used maliciously; andb.

Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of such components within the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system components include hardware, software, or firmware

components (e.g., Voice Over Internet Protocol, mobile code, digital copiers, printers, scanners,
optical devices, wireless technologies, mobile devices). Related controls: CM-6, SC-7.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SC-44

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

DETONATION CHAMBERS
Control: The organization employs a detonation chamber capability within [Assignment:

organization-defined information system, system component, or location].
Supplemental Guidance: Detonation chambers, also known as dynamic execution environments,

allow organizations to open email attachments, execute untrusted or suspicious applications, andexecute Universal Resource Locator (URL) requests in the safety of an isolated environment or
virtualized sandbox. These protected and isolated execution environments provide a means ofdetermining whether the associated attachments/applications contain malicious code. Whilerelated to the concept of deception nets, the control is not intended to maintain a long-term
environment in which adversaries can operate and their actions can be observed. Rather, it isintended to quickly identify malicious code and reduce the likelihood that the code is propagatedto user environments of operation (or prevent such propagation completely). Related controls: SC7, SC-25, SC-26, SC-30.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

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MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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SI-1

SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel orroles]:1.

A system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles,
responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities,
and compliance; and2.

Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity policy
and associated system and information integrity controls; andReviews and updates the current:
1.

System and information integrity policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
and2.

System and information integrity procedures [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for theeffective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SI family.
Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organizationlevel may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy canbe included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, canbe represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The
procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information
systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishingpolicy and procedures. Related control: PM-9.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SI-2

LOW SI-1

MOD SI-1

HIGH SI-1

FLAW REMEDIATION
Control: The organization:a.

Identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws;b.

Tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness andpotential side effects before installation;c.

Installs security-relevant software and firmware updates within [Assignment: organizationdefined time period] of the release of the updates; andd.

Incorporates flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations identify information systems affected by announced

software flaws including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report thisinformation to designated organizational personnel with information security responsibilities.
Security-relevant software updates include, for example, patches, service packs, hot fixes, andanti-virus signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during security assessments,

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continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. Organizations takeadvantage of available resources such as the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) or Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases in remediating flaws discovered in organizational
information systems. By incorporating flaw remediation into ongoing configuration management
processes, required/anticipated remediation actions can be tracked and verified. Flaw remediation
actions that can be tracked and verified include, for example, determining whether organizations
follow US-CERT guidance and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts. Organization-definedtime periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety offactors including, for example, the security category of the information system or the criticality of
the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw). Some types of flaw
remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the degree andtype of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration andalso the types of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, organizations
may determine that the testing of software and/or firmware updates is not necessary or practical,
for example, when implementing simple anti-virus signature updates. Organizations may also
consider in testing decisions, whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained
from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures. Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, CM-3,
CM-5, CM-8, MA-2, IR-4, RA-5, SA-10, SA-11, SI-11.
Control Enhancements:(1)

FLAW REMEDIATION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENTThe organization centrally manages the flaw remediation process.

Supplemental Guidance: Central management is the organization-wide management andimplementation of flaw remediation processes. Central management includes planning,
implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally
managed flaw remediation security controls.
(2)

FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS

The organization employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-6, SI-4.
(3)

FLAW REMEDIATION | TIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS / BENCHMARKS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The organization:(a)Measures the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation; and(b) Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined benchmarks] for taking corrective actions.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement requires organizations to determine thecurrent time it takes on the average to correct information system flaws after such flaws havebeen identified, and subsequently establish organizational benchmarks (i.e., time frames) for
taking corrective actions. Benchmarks can be established by type of flaw and/or severity ofthe potential vulnerability if the flaw can be exploited.
(4)

FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED PATCH MANAGEMENT TOOLS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-2].
(5)

FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE UPDATESThe organization installs [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant software andfirmware updates] automatically to [Assignment: organization-defined information systemcomponents].
Supplemental Guidance: Due to information system integrity and availability concerns,

organizations give careful consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic
updates. Organizations must balance the need to ensure that the updates are installed as soon
as possible with the need to maintain configuration management and with any mission oroperational impacts that automatic updates might impose.
(6)

FLAW REMEDIATION | REMOVAL OF PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE

The organization removes [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware components]
after updated versions have been installed.

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Supplemental Guidance: Previous versions of software and/or firmware components that are notremoved from the information system after updates have been installed may be exploited byadversaries. Some information technology products may remove older versions of software
and/or firmware automatically from the information system.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-40, 800-128.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW SI-2

P1

SI-3

MOD SI-2 (2)HIGH SI-2 (1) (2)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION
Control: The organization:a.

Employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points todetect and eradicate malicious code;b.

Updates malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available inaccordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;c.

Configures malicious code protection mechanisms to:d.

1.

Perform periodic scans of the information system [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] and real-time scans of files from external sources at [Selection (one or more);
endpoint; network entry/exit points] as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed inaccordance with organizational security policy; and2.

[Selection (one or more): block malicious code; quarantine malicious code; send alert toadministrator; [Assignment: organization-defined action]] in response to malicious code
detection; andAddresses the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication andthe resulting potential impact on the availability of the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls,

electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, notebook
computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes, for example, viruses, worms, Trojan
horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats (e.g., UUENCODE,
Unicode), contained within compressed or hidden files, or hidden in files using steganography.
Malicious code can be transported by different means including, for example, web accesses,
electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and portable storage devices. Malicious code
insertions occur through the exploitation of information system vulnerabilities. Malicious code
protection mechanisms include, for example, anti-virus signature definitions and reputation-based
technologies. A variety of technologies and methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects ofmalicious code. Pervasive configuration management and comprehensive software integrity
controls may be effective in preventing execution of unauthorized code. In addition to commercial
off-the-shelf software, malicious code may also be present in custom-built software. This could
include, for example, logic bombs, back doors, and other types of cyber attacks that could affectorganizational missions/business functions. Traditional malicious code protection mechanisms
cannot always detect such code. In these situations, organizations rely instead on other safeguards
including, for example, secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted
procurement processes, and monitoring practices to help ensure that software does not performfunctions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that in response to thedetection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, organizations candefine actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, actions in response todetection of malicious downloads, and/or actions in response to detection of maliciousness whenattempting to open or execute files. Related controls: CM-3, MP-2, SA-4, SA-8, SA-12, SA-13,
SC-7, SC-26, SC-44, SI-2, SI-4, SI-7.

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Control Enhancements:(1)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENTThe organization centrally manages malicious code protection mechanisms.

Supplemental Guidance: Central management is the organization-wide management andimplementation of malicious code protection mechanisms. Central management includes
planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined,
centrally managed flaw malicious code protection security controls. Related controls: AU-2,
SI-8.
(2)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATESThe information system automatically updates malicious code protection mechanisms.
Supplemental Guidance: Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, signaturedefinitions. Due to information system integrity and availability concerns, organizations give
careful consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic updates. Related control:
SI-8.
(3)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NON-PRIVILEGED USERS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (10)].
(4)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | UPDATES ONLY BY PRIVILEGED USERS

The information system updates malicious code protection mechanisms only when directed by aprivileged user.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement may be appropriate for situations where forreasons of security or operational continuity, updates are only applied when selected/approvedby designated organizational personnel. Related controls: AC-6, CM-5.
(5)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES(6)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | TESTING / VERIFICATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].
The organization:(a)Tests malicious code protection mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
by introducing a known benign, non-spreading test case into the information system; and(b) Verifies that both detection of the test case and associated incident reporting occur.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CA-2, CA-7, RA-5.
(7)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | NONSIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION

The information system implements nonsignature-based malicious code detection mechanisms.
Supplemental Guidance: Nonsignature-based detection mechanisms include, for example, theuse of heuristics to detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behavior of malicious
code and to provide safeguards against malicious code for which signatures do not yet exist or
for which existing signatures may not be effective. This includes polymorphic malicious code(i.e., code that changes signatures when it replicates). This control enhancement does notpreclude the use of signature-based detection mechanisms.
(8)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDS

The information system detects [Assignment: organization-defined unauthorized operating systemcommands] through the kernel application programming interface at [Assignment: organizationdefined information system hardware components] and [Selection (one or more): issues a warning;
audits the command execution; prevents the execution of the command].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement can also be applied to critical interfaces

other than kernel-based interfaces, including for example, interfaces with virtual machines
and privileged applications. Unauthorized operating system commands include, for example,
commands for kernel functions from information system processes that are not trusted toinitiate such commands, or commands for kernel functions that are suspicious even thoughcommands of that type are reasonable for processes to initiate. Organizations can define themalicious commands to be detected by a combination of command types, command classes,
or specific instances of commands. Organizations can define hardware components by
specific component, component type, location in the network, or combination therein.

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Organizations may select different actions for different types/classes/specific instances ofpotentially malicious commands. Related control: AU-6.
(9)

MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | AUTHENTICATE REMOTE COMMANDS

The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] toauthenticate [Assignment: organization-defined remote commands].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement protects against unauthorized commands

and replay of authorized commands. This capability is important for those remote information
systems whose loss, malfunction, misdirection, or exploitation would have immediate and/or
serious consequences (e.g., injury or death, property damage, loss of high-valued assets or
sensitive information, or failure of important missions/business functions). Authentication
safeguards for remote commands help to ensure that information systems accept and executein the order intended, only authorized commands, and that unauthorized commands are
rejected. Cryptographic mechanisms can be employed, for example, to authenticate remotecommands. Related controls: SC-12, SC-13, SC-23.
(10) MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION | MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSISThe organization:(a)

Employs [Assignment: organization-defined tools and techniques] to analyze thecharacteristics and behavior of malicious code; and(b) Incorporates the results from malicious code analysis into organizational incident response
and flaw remediation processes.
Supplemental Guidance: The application of selected malicious code analysis tools andtechniques provides organizations with a more in-depth understanding of adversary tradecraft(i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) and the functionality and purpose of specificinstances of malicious code. Understanding the characteristics of malicious code facilitates
more effective organizational responses to current and future threats. Organizations canconduct malicious code analyses by using reverse engineering techniques or by monitoring
the behavior of executing code.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-83.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW SI-3

P1

SI-4

MOD SI-3 (1) (2)

HIGH SI-3 (1) (2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING
Control: The organization:a.

Monitors the information system to detect:
1.

Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with [Assignment: organizationdefined monitoring objectives]; and2.

Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections;b.

Identifies unauthorized use of the information system through [Assignment: organizationdefined techniques and methods];c.

Deploys monitoring devices:
1. Strategically within the information system to collect organization-determined essential
information; and2. At ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to
the organization;d.

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Heightens the level of information system monitoring activity whenever there is an indicationof increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or
the Nation based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible
sources of information;f.

Obtains legal opinion with regard to information system monitoring activities in accordancewith applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or regulations; andg.

Provides [Assignment: organization-defined information system monitoring information] to[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Selection (one or more): as needed;[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system monitoring includes external and internal monitoring.

External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at the information systemboundary (i.e., part of perimeter defense and boundary protection). Internal monitoring includes
the observation of events occurring within the information system. Organizations can monitor
information systems, for example, by observing audit activities in real time or by observing othersystem aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring
objectives may guide determination of the events. Information system monitoring capability isachieved through a variety of tools and techniques (e.g., intrusion detection systems, intrusion
prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring
software, network monitoring software). Strategic locations for monitoring devices include, forexample, selected perimeter locations and near server farms supporting critical applications, withsuch devices typically being employed at the managed interfaces associated with controls SC-7
and AC-17. Einstein network monitoring devices from the Department of Homeland Security canalso be included as monitoring devices. The granularity of monitoring information collected isbased on organizational monitoring objectives and the capability of information systems to
support such objectives. Specific types of transactions of interest include, for example, Hyper Text
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. Information system monitoring is
an integral part of organizational continuous monitoring and incident response programs. Output
from system monitoring serves as input to continuous monitoring and incident response programs.
A network connection is any connection with a device that communicates through a network (e.g.,
local area network, Internet). A remote connection is any connection with a device communicating
through an external network (e.g., the Internet). Local, network, and remote connections can beeither wired or wireless. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, AC-8, AC-17, AU-2, AU-6, AU-7, AU-9,
AU-12, CA-7, IR-4, PE-3, RA-5, SC-7, SC-26, SC-35, SI-3, SI-7.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-WIDE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM

The organization connects and configures individual intrusion detection tools into an information
system-wide intrusion detection system.
(2)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS FOR REAL-TIME ANALYSISThe organization employs automated tools to support near real-time analysis of events.
Supplemental Guidance: Automated tools include, for example, host-based, network-based,transport-based, or storage-based event monitoring tools or Security Information and EventManagement (SIEM) technologies that provide real time analysis of alerts and/or notifications
generated by organizational information systems.
(3)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOL INTEGRATIONThe organization employs automated tools to integrate intrusion detection tools into access
control and flow control mechanisms for rapid response to attacks by enabling reconfiguration ofthese mechanisms in support of attack isolation and elimination.
(4)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

The information system monitors inbound and outbound communications traffic [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency] for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.
Supplemental Guidance: Unusual/unauthorized activities or conditions related to information

system inbound and outbound communications traffic include, for example, internal trafficthat indicates the presence of malicious code within organizational information systems or

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propagating among system components, the unauthorized exporting of information, or
signaling to external information systems. Evidence of malicious code is used to identify
potentially compromised information systems or information system components.
(5)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-GENERATED ALERTS

The information system alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when thefollowing indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: [Assignment: organizationdefined compromise indicators].
Supplemental Guidance: Alerts may be generated from a variety of sources, including, forexample, audit records or inputs from malicious code protection mechanisms, intrusion
detection or prevention mechanisms, or boundary protection devices such as firewalls,
gateways, and routers. Alerts can be transmitted, for example, telephonically, by electronic
mail messages, or by text messaging. Organizational personnel on the notification list can
include, for example, system administrators, mission/business owners, system owners, orinformation system security officers. Related controls: AU-5, PE-6.
(6)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | RESTRICT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (10)].
(7)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO SUSPICIOUS EVENTS

The information system notifies [Assignment: organization-defined incident response personnel(identified by name and/or by role)] of detected suspicious events and takes [Assignment:
organization-defined least-disruptive actions to terminate suspicious events].
Supplemental Guidance: Least-disruptive actions may include, for example, initiating requests

for human responses.
(8)

INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROTECTION OF MONITORING INFORMATION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-4].
(9)INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | TESTING OF MONITORING TOOLSThe organization tests intrusion-monitoring tools [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

Supplemental Guidance: Testing intrusion-monitoring tools is necessary to ensure that the tools

are operating correctly and continue to meet the monitoring objectives of organizations. The
frequency of testing depends on the types of tools used by organizations and methods of
deployment. Related control: CP-9.
(10) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | VISIBILITY OF ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS
The organization makes provisions so that [Assignment: organization-defined encrypted
communications traffic] is visible to [Assignment: organization-defined information systemmonitoring tools].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations balance the potentially conflicting needs for encrypting

communications traffic and for having insight into such traffic from a monitoring perspective.
For some organizations, the need to ensure the confidentiality of communications traffic isparamount; for others, mission-assurance is of greater concern. Organizations determine
whether the visibility requirement applies to internal encrypted traffic, encrypted traffic
intended for external destinations, or a subset of the traffic types.
(11) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC ANOMALIESThe organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of theinformation system and selected [Assignment: organization-defined interior points within thesystem (e.g., subnetworks, subsystems)] to discover anomalies.
Supplemental Guidance: Anomalies within organizational information systems include, forexample, large file transfers, long-time persistent connections, unusual protocols and ports inuse, and attempted communications with suspected malicious external addresses.
(12) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED ALERTS
The organization employs automated mechanisms to alert security personnel of the following
inappropriate or unusual activities with security implications: [Assignment: organization-defined
activities that trigger alerts].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement focuses on the security alerts generated byorganizations and transmitted using automated means. In contrast to the alerts generated by

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information systems in SI-4 (5), which tend to focus on information sources internal to thesystems (e.g., audit records), the sources of information for this enhancement can include
other entities as well (e.g., suspicious activity reports, reports on potential insider threats).
Related controls: AC-18, IA-3.
(13) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / EVENT PATTERNSThe organization:(a)Analyzes communications traffic/event patterns for the information system;(b) Develops profiles representing common traffic patterns and/or events; and(c)Uses the traffic/event profiles in tuning system-monitoring devices to reduce the number offalse positives and the number of false negatives.

(14) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS INTRUSION DETECTION
The organization employs a wireless intrusion detection system to identify rogue wireless devices
and to detect attack attempts and potential compromises/breaches to the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Wireless signals may radiate beyond the confines of organization-

controlled facilities. Organizations proactively search for unauthorized wireless connections
including the conduct of thorough scans for unauthorized wireless access points. Scans are notlimited to those areas within facilities containing information systems, but also include areas
outside of facilities as needed, to verify that unauthorized wireless access points are notconnected to the systems. Related controls: AC-18, IA-3.
(15) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | WIRELESS TO WIRELINE COMMUNICATIONS
The organization employs an intrusion detection system to monitor wireless communications
traffic as the traffic passes from wireless to wireline networks.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: AC-18.
(16) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | CORRELATE MONITORING INFORMATIONThe organization correlates information from monitoring tools employed throughout the
information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Correlating information from different monitoring tools can provide amore comprehensive view of information system activity. The correlation of monitoring toolsthat usually work in isolation (e.g., host monitoring, network monitoring, anti-virus software)
can provide an organization-wide view and in so doing, may reveal otherwise unseen attack
patterns. Understanding the capabilities/limitations of diverse monitoring tools and how to
maximize the utility of information generated by those tools can help organizations to build,
operate, and maintain effective monitoring programs. Related control: AU-6.
(17) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INTEGRATED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
The organization correlates information from monitoring physical, cyber, and supply chain
activities to achieve integrated, organization-wide situational awareness.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement correlates monitoring information from amore diverse set of information sources to achieve integrated situational awareness. Integrated
situational awareness from a combination of physical, cyber, and supply chain monitoring
activities enhances the capability of organizations to more quickly detect sophisticated cyberattacks and investigate the methods and techniques employed to carry out such attacks. In
contrast to SI-4 (16) which correlates the various cyber monitoring information, this control
enhancement correlates monitoring beyond just the cyber domain. Such monitoring may help
reveal attacks on organizations that are operating across multiple attack vectors. Related
control: SA-12.
(18) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | ANALYZE TRAFFIC / COVERT EXFILTRATIONThe organization analyzes outbound communications traffic at the external boundary of theinformation system (i.e., system perimeter) and at [Assignment: organization-defined interior
points within the system (e.g., subsystems, subnetworks)] to detect covert exfiltration of
information.
Supplemental Guidance: Covert means that can be used for the unauthorized exfiltration oforganizational information include, for example, steganography.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(19) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDIVIDUALS POSING GREATER RISKThe organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] ofindividuals who have been identified by [Assignment: organization-defined sources] as posing an
increased level of risk.
Supplemental Guidance: Indications of increased risk from individuals can be obtained from avariety of sources including, for example, human resource records, intelligence agencies, law
enforcement organizations, and/or other credible sources. The monitoring of individuals is
closely coordinated with management, legal, security, and human resources officials withinorganizations conducting such monitoring and complies with federal legislation, Executive
Orders, policies, directives, regulations, and standards.
(20) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PRIVILEGED USERS
The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] ofprivileged users.
(21) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | PROBATIONARY PERIODS
The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring] ofindividuals during [Assignment: organization-defined probationary period].
(22) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | UNAUTHORIZED NETWORK SERVICES
The information system detects network services that have not been authorized or approved by[Assignment: organization-defined authorization or approval processes] and [Selection (one ormore): audits; alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]].
Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized or unapproved network services include, for example,

services in service-oriented architectures that lack organizational verification or validationand therefore may be unreliable or serve as malicious rogues for valid services. Related
controls: AC-6, CM-7, SA-5, SA-9.
(23) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | HOST-BASED DEVICES
The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined host-based monitoringmechanisms] at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].
Supplemental Guidance: Information system components where host-based monitoring can be

implemented include, for example, servers, workstations, and mobile devices. Organizations
consider employing host-based monitoring mechanisms from multiple information technology
product developers.
(24) INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING | INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
The information system discovers, collects, distributes, and uses indicators of compromise.
Supplemental Guidance: Indicators of compromise (IOC) are forensic artifacts from intrusions

that are identified on organizational information systems (at the host or network level). IOCs
provide organizations with valuable information on objects or information systems that havebeen compromised. IOCs for the discovery of compromised hosts can include for example,
the creation of registry key values. IOCs for network traffic include, for example, Universal
Resource Locator (URL) or protocol elements that indicate malware command and control
servers. The rapid distribution and adoption of IOCs can improve information security by
reducing the time that information systems and organizations are vulnerable to the same
exploit or attack.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-61, 800-83, 800-92, 800-94, 800-137.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

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SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES
Control: The organization:a.

Receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from [Assignment:
organization-defined external organizations] on an ongoing basis;b.

Generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary;c.

Disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to: [Selection (one or more):[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment: organization-definedelements within the organization]; [Assignment: organization-defined externalorganizations]]; andd.

Implements security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notifies theissuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.

Supplemental Guidance: The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)

generates security alerts and advisories to maintain situational awareness across the federal
government. Security directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the
responsibility and authority to issue such directives. Compliance to security directives is essential
due to the critical nature of many of these directives and the potential immediate adverse effects
on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation should the
directives not be implemented in a timely manner. External organizations include, for example,
external mission/business partners, supply chain partners, external service providers, and otherpeer/supporting organizations. Related control: SI-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES | AUTOMATED ALERTS AND ADVISORIESThe organization employs automated mechanisms to make security alert and advisory information
available throughout the organization.
Supplemental Guidance: The significant number of changes to organizational information

systems and the environments in which those systems operate requires the dissemination of
security-related information to a variety of organizational entities that have a direct interest in
the success of organizational missions and business functions. Based on the information
provided by the security alerts and advisories, changes may be required at one or more of thethree tiers related to the management of information security risk including the governancelevel, mission/business process/enterprise architecture level, and the information system level.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-40.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SI-6

LOW SI-5

MOD SI-5

HIGH SI-5 (1)SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION
Control: The information system:a.

Verifies the correct operation of [Assignment: organization-defined security functions];b.

Performs this verification [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined systemtransitional states]; upon command by user with appropriate privilege; [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency]];c.

Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of failed security verification
tests; andd.

[Selection (one or more): shuts the information system down; restarts the information system;[Assignment: organization-defined alternative action(s)]] when anomalies are discovered.

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Supplemental Guidance: Transitional states for information systems include, for example, systemstartup, restart, shutdown, and abort. Notifications provided by information systems include, forexample, electronic alerts to system administrators, messages to local computer consoles, and/or
hardware indications such as lights. Related controls: CA-7, CM-6.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | NOTIFICATION OF FAILED SECURITY TESTS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-6].
(2)

SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR DISTRIBUTED TESTING

The information system implements automated mechanisms to support the management of
distributed security testing.
Supplemental Guidance: Related control: SI-2.
(3)

SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION | REPORT VERIFICATION RESULTS

The organization reports the results of security function verification to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizational personnel with potential interest in security function

verification results include, for example, senior information security officers, information
system security managers, and information systems security officers. Related controls: SA-12,
SI-4, SI-5.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SI-7

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH SI-6

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY
Control: The organization employs integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to[Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, and information].
Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur

due to errors or malicious activity (e.g., tampering). Software includes, for example, operating
systems (with key internal components such as kernels, drivers), middleware, and applications.
Firmware includes, for example, the Basic Input Output System (BIOS). Information includes
metadata such as security attributes associated with information. State-of-the-practice integritychecking mechanisms (e.g., parity checks, cyclical redundancy checks, cryptographic hashes) andassociated tools can automatically monitor the integrity of information systems and hosted
applications. Related controls: SA-12, SC-8, SC-13, SI-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY CHECKSThe information system performs an integrity check of [Assignment: organization-defined
software, firmware, and information] [Selection (one or more): at startup; at [Assignment:
organization-defined transitional states or security-relevant events]; [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]].
Supplemental Guidance: Security-relevant events include, for example, the identification of a

new threat to which organizational information systems are susceptible, and the installation of
new hardware, software, or firmware. Transitional states include, for example, system startup,
restart, shutdown, and abort.
(2)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED NOTIFICATIONS OF INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

The organization employs automated tools that provide notification to [Assignment: organizationdefined personnel or roles] upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.
Supplemental Guidance: The use of automated tools to report integrity violations and to notify

organizational personnel in a timely matter is an essential precursor to effective risk response.

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Personnel having an interest in integrity violations include, for example, mission/businessowners, information system owners, systems administrators, software developers, systems
integrators, and information security officers.
(3)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CENTRALLY-MANAGED INTEGRITY TOOLSThe organization employs centrally managed integrity verification tools.
Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: AU-3, SI-2, SI-8.
(4)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TAMPER-EVIDENT PACKAGING[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-12].
(5)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUTOMATED RESPONSE TO INTEGRITY VIOLATIONS

The information system automatically [Selection (one or more): shuts the information system
down; restarts the information system; implements [Assignment: organization-defined security
safeguards]] when integrity violations are discovered.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations may define different integrity checking and anomaly

responses: (i) by type of information (e.g., firmware, software, user data); (ii) by specificinformation (e.g., boot firmware, boot firmware for a specific types of machines); or (iii) a
combination of both. Automatic implementation of specific safeguards within organizational
information systems includes, for example, reversing the changes, halting the information
system, or triggering audit alerts when unauthorized modifications to critical security files
occur.
(6)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to detect unauthorized changes tosoftware, firmware, and information.
Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic mechanisms used for the protection of integrity include,for example, digital signatures and the computation and application of signed hashes using
asymmetric cryptography, protecting the confidentiality of the key used to generate the hash,and using the public key to verify the hash information. Related control: SC-13.
(7)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE

The organization incorporates the detection of unauthorized [Assignment: organization-defined
security-relevant changes to the information system] into the organizational incident response
capability.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement helps to ensure that detected events aretracked, monitored, corrected, and available for historical purposes. Maintaining historical
records is important both for being able to identify and discern adversary actions over an
extended period of time and for possible legal actions. Security-relevant changes include, forexample, unauthorized changes to established configuration settings or unauthorized elevationof information system privileges. Related controls: IR-4, IR-5, SI-4.
(8)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | AUDITING CAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The information system, upon detection of a potential integrity violation, provides the capability toaudit the event and initiates the following actions: [Selection (one or more): generates an audit
record; alerts current user; alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];[Assignment: organization-defined other actions]].
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations select response actions based on types of software,

specific software, or information for which there are potential integrity violations. Related
controls: AU-2, AU-6, AU-12.
(9)

SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | VERIFY BOOT PROCESSThe information system verifies the integrity of the boot process of [Assignment: organizationdefined devices].
Supplemental Guidance: Ensuring the integrity of boot processes is critical to starting devices inknown/trustworthy states. Integrity verification mechanisms provide organizational personnel
with assurance that only trusted code is executed during boot processes.
(10) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | PROTECTION OF BOOT FIRMWARE
The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] toprotect the integrity of boot firmware in [Assignment: organization-defined devices].

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Supplemental Guidance: Unauthorized modifications to boot firmware may be indicative of a

sophisticated, targeted cyber attack. These types of cyber attacks can result in a permanentdenial of service (e.g., if the firmware is corrupted) or a persistent malicious code presence(e.g., if code is embedded within the firmware). Devices can protect the integrity of the bootfirmware in organizational information systems by: (i) verifying the integrity and authenticityof all updates to the boot firmware prior to applying changes to the boot devices; and (ii)preventing unauthorized processes from modifying the boot firmware.
(11) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS WITH LIMITED PRIVILEGESThe organization requires that [Assignment: organization-defined user-installed software] executein a confined physical or virtual machine environment with limited privileges.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations identify software that may be of greater concern withregard to origin or potential for containing malicious code. For this type of software, user
installations occur in confined environments of operation to limit or contain damage frommalicious code that may be executed.
(12) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY VERIFICATIONThe organization requires that the integrity of [Assignment: organization-defined user-installedsoftware] be verified prior to execution.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations verify the integrity of user-installed software prior to

execution to reduce the likelihood of executing malicious code or code that contains errors
from unauthorized modifications. Organizations consider the practicality of approaches toverifying software integrity including, for example, availability of checksums of adequate
trustworthiness from software developers or vendors.
(13) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE EXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTS
The organization allows execution of binary or machine-executable code obtained from sources
with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code only in confined physical or
virtual machine environments and with the explicit approval of [Assignment: organization-defined
personnel or roles].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to all sources of binary or machine-

executable code including, for example, commercial software/firmware and open source
software.
(14) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | BINARY OR MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODE
The organization:(a)Prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no
warranty and without the provision of source code; and(b) Provides exceptions to the source code requirement only for compelling mission/operational
requirements and with the approval of the authorizing official.
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies to all sources of binary or machine-

executable code including, for example, commercial software/firmware and open source
software. Organizations assess software products without accompanying source code fromsources with limited or no warranty for potential security impacts. The assessments address
the fact that these types of software products may be very difficult to review, repair, or
extend, given that organizations, in most cases, do not have access to the original source code,and there may be no owners who could make such repairs on behalf of organizations. Related
control: SA-5.
(15) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | CODE AUTHENTICATION
The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate [Assignment:
organization-defined software or firmware components] prior to installation.
Supplemental Guidance: Cryptographic authentication includes, for example, verifying thatsoftware or firmware components have been digitally signed using certificates recognized andapproved by organizations. Code signing is an effective method to protect against malicious
code.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(16) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION W/O SUPERVISION
The organization does not allow processes to execute without supervision for more than
[Assignment: organization-defined time period].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses processes for which normal

execution periods can be determined and situations in which organizations exceed such
periods. Supervision includes, for example, operating system timers, automated responses, or
manual oversight and response when information system process anomalies occur.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-147, 800-155.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SI-8

LOW Not Selected

MOD SI-7 (1) (7)

HIGH SI-7 (1) (2) (5) (7) (14)SPAM PROTECTION
Control: The organization:a.

Employs spam protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detectand take action on unsolicited messages; andb.

Updates spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance withorganizational configuration management policy and procedures.

Supplemental Guidance: Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls,

electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, mobile
devices, and notebook/laptop computers. Spam can be transported by different means including,for example, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection
mechanisms include, for example, signature definitions. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3, SC-5, SC7, SI-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SPAM PROTECTION | CENTRAL MANAGEMENTThe organization centrally manages spam protection mechanisms.
Supplemental Guidance: Central management is the organization-wide management andimplementation of spam protection mechanisms. Central management includes planning,
implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally
managed spam protection security controls. Related controls: AU-3, SI-2, SI-7.
(2)

SPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATESThe information system automatically updates spam protection mechanisms.
(3)

SPAM PROTECTION | CONTINUOUS LEARNING CAPABILITY
The information system implements spam protection mechanisms with a learning capability tomore effectively identify legitimate communications traffic.

Supplemental Guidance: Learning mechanisms include, for example, Bayesian filters that

respond to user inputs identifying specific traffic as spam or legitimate by updating algorithm
parameters and thereby more accurately separating types of traffic.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-45.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

APPENDIX F-SI

LOW Not Selected

MOD SI-8 (1) (2)

HIGH SI-8 (1) (2)

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________SI-9

INFORMATION INPUT RESTRICTIONS[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6].

SI-10

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION
Control: The information system checks the validity of [Assignment: organization-defined

information inputs].
Supplemental Guidance: Checking the valid syntax and semantics of information system inputs(e.g., character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values) verifies that inputs match
specified definitions for format and content. Software applications typically follow well-defined
protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between
software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured
data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attackersupplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages, thenthe attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data to beinterpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component thatreceives the tainted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret thedata incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to passing to interpreters prevents the content frombeing unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation helps to ensure accurate andcorrect inputs and prevent attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks.
Control Enhancements:(1)

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY

The information system:(a)Provides a manual override capability for input validation of [Assignment: organizationdefined inputs];(b) Restricts the use of the manual override capability to only [Assignment: organization-defined
authorized individuals]; and(c)

Audits the use of the manual override capability.

Supplemental Guidance: Related controls: CM-3, CM-5.
(2)

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / RESOLUTION OF ERRORSThe organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within[Assignment: organization-defined time period].
Supplemental Guidance: Resolution of input validation errors includes, for example, correcting

systemic causes of errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input.
(3)

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR

The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects
organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received.
Supplemental Guidance: A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is

unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensuresthat there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying information
system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse,
unintended side effects.
(4)

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | REVIEW / TIMING INTERACTIONS

The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components indetermining appropriate responses for invalid inputs.
Supplemental Guidance: In addressing invalid information system inputs received acrossprotocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider
the impact of the error response on other protocols within the protocol stack. For example,
802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control
Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to invalid packet input). TCP
assumes packet losses are due to congestion, while packets lost over 802.11 links are typically
dropped due to collisions or noise on the link. If TCP makes a congestion response, it takes

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

precisely the wrong action in response to a collision event. Adversaries may be able to use
apparently acceptable individual behaviors of the protocols in concert to achieve adverse
effects through suitable construction of invalid input.
(5)

INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | RESTRICT INPUTS TO TRUSTED SOURCES AND APPROVED FORMATS

The organization restricts the use of information inputs to [Assignment: organization-defined
trusted sources] and/or [Assignment: organization-defined formats].
Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement applies the concept of whitelisting to

information inputs. Specifying known trusted sources for information inputs and acceptableformats for such inputs can reduce the probability of malicious activity.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SI-11

LOW Not Selected

MOD SI-10

HIGH SI-10

ERROR HANDLING
Control: The information system:a.

Generates error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without
revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries; andb.

Reveals error messages only to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations carefully consider the structure/content of error messages.

The extent to which information systems are able to identify and handle error conditions is guided
by organizational policy and operational requirements. Information that could be exploited byadversaries includes, for example, erroneous logon attempts with passwords entered by mistake as
the username, mission/business information that can be derived from (if not stated explicitly by)
information recorded, and personal information such as account numbers, social security numbers,
and credit card numbers. In addition, error messages may provide a covert channel for transmitting
information. Related controls: AU-2, AU-3, SC-31.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P2

SI-12

LOW Not Selected

MOD SI-11

HIGH SI-11

INFORMATION HANDLING AND RETENTION
Control: The organization handles and retains information within the information system andinformation output from the system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders,
directives, policies, regulations, standards, and operational requirements.
Supplemental Guidance: Information handling and retention requirements cover the full life cycle ofinformation, in some cases extending beyond the disposal of information systems. The National
Archives and Records Administration provides guidance on records retention. Related controls:
AC-16, AU-5, AU-11, MP-2, MP-4.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
LOW SI-12

P2

SI-13

MOD SI-12

HIGH SI-12

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION
Control: The organization:a.

Determines mean time to failure (MTTF) for [Assignment: organization-defined information
system components] in specific environments of operation; andb.

Provides substitute information system components and a means to exchange active andstandby components at [Assignment: organization-defined MTTF substitution criteria].

Supplemental Guidance: While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, this control addresses potential

failures of specific information system components that provide security capability. Failure rates
reflect installation-specific consideration, not industry-average. Organizations define criteria for
substitution of information system components based on MTTF value with consideration forresulting potential harm from component failures. Transfer of responsibilities between active andstandby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or security capability(e.g., preservation of state variables). Standby components remain available at all times except for
maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress. Related controls: CP-2, CP-10, MA-6.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TRANSFERRING COMPONENT RESPONSIBILITIESThe organization takes information system components out of service by transferring component
responsibilities to substitute components no later than [Assignment: organization-defined fraction
or percentage] of mean time to failure.
(2)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7 (16)].
(3)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | MANUAL TRANSFER BETWEEN COMPONENTS

The organization manually initiates transfers between active and standby information systemcomponents [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] if the mean time to failure exceeds[Assignment: organization-defined time period].
(4)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | STANDBY COMPONENT INSTALLATION / NOTIFICATIONThe organization, if information system component failures are detected:(a)Ensures that the standby components are successfully and transparently installed within[Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and(b) [Selection (one or more): activates [Assignment: organization-defined alarm]; automaticallyshuts down the information system].
Supplemental Guidance: Automatic or manual transfer of components from standby to activemode can occur, for example, upon detection of component failures.
(5)

PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION | FAILOVER CAPABILITY

The organization provides [Selection: real-time; near real-time] [Assignment: organization-defined
failover capability] for the information system.
Supplemental Guidance: Failover refers to the automatic switchover to an alternate information

system upon the failure of the primary information system. Failover capability includes, forexample, incorporating mirrored information system operations at alternate processing sites or
periodic data mirroring at regular intervals defined by recovery time periods of organizations.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-SI

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
SI-14

NON-PERSISTENCE
Control: The organization implements non-persistent [Assignment: organization-defined

information system components and services] that are initiated in a known state and terminated[Selection (one or more): upon end of session of use; periodically at [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency]].
Supplemental Guidance: This control mitigates risk from advanced persistent threats (APTs) bysignificantly reducing the targeting capability of adversaries (i.e., window of opportunity andavailable attack surface) to initiate and complete cyber attacks. By implementing the concept of
non-persistence for selected information system components, organizations can provide a known
state computing resource for a specific period of time that does not give adversaries sufficient timeon target to exploit vulnerabilities in organizational information systems and the environments inwhich those systems operate. Since the advanced persistent threat is a high-end threat with regard
to capability, intent, and targeting, organizations assume that over an extended period of time, apercentage of cyber attacks will be successful. Non-persistent information system components andservices are activated as required using protected information and terminated periodically or upon
the end of sessions. Non-persistence increases the work factor of adversaries in attempting tocompromise or breach organizational information systems.
Non-persistent system components can be implemented, for example, by periodically re-imaging
components or by using a variety of common virtualization techniques. Non-persistent services
can be implemented using virtualization techniques as part of virtual machines or as new instancesof processes on physical machines (either persistent or non-persistent).The benefit of periodic
refreshes of information system components/services is that it does not require organizations tofirst determine whether compromises of components or services have occurred (something that
may often be difficult for organizations to determine). The refresh of selected information systemcomponents and services occurs with sufficient frequency to prevent the spread or intended impactof attacks, but not with such frequency that it makes the information system unstable. In someinstances, refreshes of critical components and services may be done periodically in order tohinder the ability of adversaries to exploit optimum windows of vulnerabilities. Related controls:
SC-30, SC-34.
Control Enhancements:(1)

NON-PERSISTENCE | REFRESH FROM TRUSTED SOURCES

The organization ensures that software and data employed during information system component
and service refreshes are obtained from [Assignment: organization-defined trusted sources].
Supplemental Guidance: Trusted sources include, for example, software/data from write-once,

read-only media or from selected off-line secure storage facilities.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SI-15

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

INFORMATION OUTPUT FILTERING
Control: The information system validates information output from [Assignment: organization-

defined software programs and/or applications] to ensure that the information is consistent withthe expected content.
Supplemental Guidance: Certain types of cyber attacks (e.g., SQL injections) produce output resultsthat are unexpected or inconsistent with the output results that would normally be expected fromsoftware programs or applications. This control enhancement focuses on detecting extraneouscontent, preventing such extraneous content from being displayed, and alerting monitoring toolsthat anomalous behavior has been discovered. Related controls: SI-3, SI-4.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

SI-16

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

MEMORY PROTECTION
Control: The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security

safeguards] to protect its memory from unauthorized code execution.
Supplemental Guidance: Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in non-executable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Security safeguards
employed to protect memory include, for example, data execution prevention and address spacelayout randomization. Data execution prevention safeguards can either be hardware-enforced orsoftware-enforced with hardware providing the greater strength of mechanism. Related controls:
AC-25, SC-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P1

SI-17

LOW Not Selected

MOD SI-16

HIGH SI-16

FAIL-SAFE PROCEDURES
Control: The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined fail-safe
procedures] when [Assignment: organization-defined failure conditions occur].
Supplemental Guidance: Failure conditions include, for example, loss of communications among

critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe
procedures include, for example, alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on
subsequent steps to take (e.g., do nothing, reestablish system settings, shut down processes, restart
the system, or contact designated organizational personnel). Related controls: CP-12, CP-13, SC24, SI-13.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.
Priority and Baseline Allocation:
P0

APPENDIX F-SI

LOW Not Selected

MOD Not Selected

HIGH Not Selected

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX G

INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMSORGANIZATION-WIDE INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTROLSThe Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requires organizations todevelop and implement an organization-wide information security program to address
information security for the information and information systems that support theoperations and assets of the organization, including those provided or managed by anotherorganization, contractor, or other source. The information security program management (PM)controls described in this appendix are typically implemented at the organization level and not
directed at individual organizational information systems. The program management controls
have been designed to facilitate compliance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders,
directives, policies, regulations, and standards. The controls are independent of any FIPS
Publication 200 impact levels and therefore, are not directly associated with any of the security
control baselines described in Appendix D. The program management controls do, however,complement the security controls in Appendix F and focus on the programmatic, organizationwide information security requirements that are independent of any particular information system
and are essential for managing information security programs. Tailoring guidance can be applied
to the program management controls in a manner similar to how the guidance is applied tosecurity controls in Appendix F. Organizations specify the individual or individuals responsible
and accountable for the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and monitoringof the program management controls. Organizations document program management controls in
the information security program plan. The organization-wide information security program plan
supplements the individual security plans developed for each organizational information system.
Together, the security plans for the individual information systems and the information security
program cover the totality of security controls employed by the organization.

In addition to documenting the information security program management controls, the security
program plan provides a vehicle for the organization, in a central repository, to document all
security controls from Appendix F that have been designated as common controls (i.e., security
controls inheritable by organizational information systems). 111 The information security program
management controls and common controls contained in the information security program plan
are implemented, assessed for effectiveness, 112 and authorized by a senior organizational official,with the same or similar authority and responsibility for managing risk as the authorization
officials for information systems. Plans of action and milestones are developed and maintained
for the program management and common controls that are deemed through assessment to be lessthan effective. Information security program management and common controls are also subject
to the same continuous monitoring requirements as security controls employed in individualorganizational information systems.
Table G-1 provides a summary of the security controls in the program management family from
Appendix G. Organizations can use the recommended priority code designation associated witheach program management control to assist in making sequencing decisions for implementation
111

Common controls are those security controls that are inheritable by one or more organizational information systems,
and thus are separate and distinct from information security program management controls.
112

Assessment procedures for program management controls and common controls can be found in NIST Special
Publication 800-53A.

APPENDIX GPAGE G-1

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________(i.e., a Priority Code 1 [P1] control has a higher priority for implementation than a Priority Code2 [P2] control; and a Priority Code 2 [P2] control has a higher priority for implementation than a
Priority Code 3 [P3] control.

CNTL
NO.

CONTROL NAMEPRIORITYTABLE G-1: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

PM-1

Information Security Program Plan

P1

PM-2

Senior Information Security Officer

P1

PM-3

Information Security Resources

P1

PM-4

Plan of Action and Milestones Process

P1

PM-5

Information System Inventory

P1

PM-6

Information Security Measures of
Performance

P1

PM-7

Enterprise Architecture

P1

PM-8

Critical Infrastructure Plan

P1

PM-9

Risk Management Strategy

P1

PM-10

Security Authorization Process

P1

PM-11

Mission/Business Process Definition

P1

PM-12

Insider Threat Program

P1

PM-13

Information Security Workforce

P1

PM-14

Testing, Training, and Monitoring

P1

PM-15

Contacts with Security Groups andAssociations

P3

PM-16

Threat Awareness Program

P1

INITIAL CONTROL BASELINES
LOW

MOD

HIGH

Deployed organization-wide.
Supporting information security program.
Not associated with security control baselines.
Independent of any system impact level.

Cautionary Note
Organizations are required to implement security program management controls to provide a foundation
for the organizational information security program. The successful implementation of security controls
for organizational information systems depends on the successful implementation of organization-wide
program management controls. However, the manner in which organizations implement the program
management controls depends on specific organizational characteristics including, for example, the size,
complexity, and mission/business requirements of the respective organizations.

APPENDIX GPAGE G-2

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________PM-1

INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM PLAN
Control: The organization:a.

Develops and disseminates an organization-wide information security program plan that:1.

Provides an overview of the requirements for the security program and a description of
the security program management controls and common controls in place or planned formeeting those requirements;

2.

Includes the identification and assignment of roles, responsibilities, management
commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;

3.

Reflects coordination among organizational entities responsible for the different aspects
of information security (i.e., technical, physical, personnel, cyber-physical); and4.

Is approved by a senior official with responsibility and accountability for the risk being
incurred to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, andreputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation;b.

Reviews the organization-wide information security program plan [Assignment: organizationdefined frequency];c.

Updates the plan to address organizational changes and problems identified during plan
implementation or security control assessments; andd.

Protects the information security program plan from unauthorized disclosure andmodification.

Supplemental Guidance: Information security program plans can be represented in single documents

or compilations of documents at the discretion of organizations. The plans document the program
management controls and organization-defined common controls. Information security programplans provide sufficient information about the program management controls/common controls(including specification of parameters for any assignment and selection statements either explicitly
or by reference) to enable implementations that are unambiguously compliant with the intent of
the plans and a determination of the risk to be incurred if the plans are implemented as intended.
The security plans for individual information systems and the organization-wide information
security program plan together, provide complete coverage for all security controls employedwithin the organization. Common controls are documented in an appendix to the organization’s
information security program plan unless the controls are included in a separate security plan for
an information system (e.g., security controls employed as part of an intrusion detection systemproviding organization-wide boundary protection inherited by one or more organizational
information systems). The organization-wide information security program plan will indicate
which separate security plans contain descriptions of common controls.
Organizations have the flexibility to describe common controls in a single document or in multiple
documents. In the case of multiple documents, the documents describing common controls areincluded as attachments to the information security program plan. If the information security
program plan contains multiple documents, the organization specifies in each document theorganizational official or officials responsible for the development, implementation, assessment,
authorization, and monitoring of the respective common controls. For example, the organization
may require that the Facilities Management Office develop, implement, assess, authorize, andcontinuously monitor common physical and environmental protection controls from the PE family
when such controls are not associated with a particular information system but instead, support
multiple information systems. Related control: PM-8.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

APPENDIX GPAGE G-3

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
PM-2

SENIOR INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER
Control: The organization appoints a senior information security officer with the mission andresources to coordinate, develop, implement, and maintain an organization-wide information
security program.
Supplemental Guidance: The security officer described in this control is an organizational official.

For a federal agency (as defined in applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies,
or regulations) this official is the Senior Agency Information Security Officer. Organizations may
also refer to this official as the Senior Information Security Officer or Chief Information Security
Officer.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

PM-3

INFORMATION SECURITY RESOURCES
Control: The organization:a.

Ensures that all capital planning and investment requests include the resources needed to
implement the information security program and documents all exceptions to thisrequirement;b.

Employs a business case/Exhibit 300/Exhibit 53 to record the resources required; andc.

Ensures that information security resources are available for expenditure as planned.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations consider establishing champions for information security

efforts and as part of including the necessary resources, assign specialized expertise and resources
as needed. Organizations may designate and empower an Investment Review Board (or similargroup) to manage and provide oversight for the information security-related aspects of the capitalplanning and investment control process. Related controls: PM-4, SA-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-65.

PM-4

PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES PROCESS
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Implements a process for ensuring that plans of action and milestones for the security
program and associated organizational information systems:
1.

Are developed and maintained;

2.

Document the remedial information security actions to adequately respond to risk toorganizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; and3.

Are reported in accordance with OMB FISMA reporting requirements.

Reviews plans of action and milestones for consistency with the organizational risk
management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions.

Supplemental Guidance: The plan of action and milestones is a key document in the information

security program and is subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB. With theincreasing emphasis on organization-wide risk management across all three tiers in the risk
management hierarchy (i.e., organization, mission/business process, and information system),organizations view plans of action and milestones from an organizational perspective, prioritizing
risk response actions and ensuring consistency with the goals and objectives of the organization.
Plan of action and milestones updates are based on findings from security control assessments and

APPENDIX GPAGE G-4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

continuous monitoring activities. OMB FISMA reporting guidance contains instructions regardingorganizational plans of action and milestones. Related control: CA-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: OMB Memorandum 02-01; NIST Special Publication 800-37.

PM-5

INFORMATION SYSTEM INVENTORY
Control: The organization develops and maintains an inventory of its information systems.
Supplemental Guidance: This control addresses the inventory requirements in FISMA. OMB

provides guidance on developing information systems inventories and associated reporting
requirements. For specific information system inventory reporting requirements, organizations
consult OMB annual FISMA reporting guidance.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: Web: http://www.omb.gov.

PM-6

INFORMATION SECURITY MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Control: The organization develops, monitors, and reports on the results of information security

measures of performance.
Supplemental Guidance: Measures of performance are outcome-based metrics used by anorganization to measure the effectiveness or efficiency of the information security program andthe security controls employed in support of the program.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-55.

PM-7

ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
Control: The organization develops an enterprise architecture with consideration for information

security and the resulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation.
Supplemental Guidance: The enterprise architecture developed by the organization is aligned with

the Federal Enterprise Architecture. The integration of information security requirements andassociated security controls into the organization’s enterprise architecture helps to ensure that
security considerations are addressed by organizations early in the system development life cycle
and are directly and explicitly related to the organization’s mission/business processes. This
process of security requirements integration also embeds into the enterprise architecture, anintegral information security architecture consistent with organizational risk management andinformation security strategies. For PM-7, the information security architecture is developed at asystem-of-systems level (organization-wide), representing all of the organizational information
systems. For PL-8, the information security architecture is developed at a level representing an
individual information system but at the same time, is consistent with the information security
architecture defined for the organization. Security requirements and security control integration
are most effectively accomplished through the application of the Risk Management Frameworkand supporting security standards and guidelines. The Federal Segment Architecture Methodology
provides guidance on integrating information security requirements and security controls into
enterprise architectures. Related controls: PL-2, PL-8, PM-11, RA-2, SA-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-39.

APPENDIX GPAGE G-5

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________PM-8

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN
Control: The organization addresses information security issues in the development,

documentation, and updating of a critical infrastructure and key resources protection plan.
Supplemental Guidance: Protection strategies are based on the prioritization of critical assets andresources. The requirement and guidance for defining critical infrastructure and key resources andfor preparing an associated critical infrastructure protection plan are found in applicable federallaws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Related
controls: PM-1, PM-9, PM-11, RA-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: HSPD 7; National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

PM-9

RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Control: The organization:a.

Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of
information systems;b.

Implements the risk management strategy consistently across the organization; andc.

Reviews and updates the risk management strategy [Assignment: organization-defined
frequency] or as required, to address organizational changes.

Supplemental Guidance: An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, anunambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment
methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across theorganization with respect to the organization’s risk tolerance, and approaches for monitoring riskover time. The use of a risk executive function can facilitate consistent, organization-wide
application of the risk management strategy. The organization-wide risk management strategy canbe informed by risk-related inputs from other sources both internal and external to the organization
to ensure the strategy is both broad-based and comprehensive. Related control: RA-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-39.

PM-10

SECURITY AUTHORIZATION PROCESS
Control: The organization:a.

Manages (i.e., documents, tracks, and reports) the security state of organizational information
systems and the environments in which those systems operate through security authorization
processes;b.

Designates individuals to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities within the organizationalrisk management process; andc.

Fully integrates the security authorization processes into an organization-wide risk
management program.

Supplemental Guidance: Security authorization processes for information systems and environmentsof operation require the implementation of an organization-wide risk management process, a Risk
Management Framework, and associated security standards and guidelines. Specific roles within
the risk management process include an organizational risk executive (function) and designatedauthorizing officials for each organizational information system and common control provider.
Security authorization processes are integrated with organizational continuous monitoring

APPENDIX GPAGE G-6

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

processes to facilitate ongoing understanding and acceptance of risk to organizational operations
and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Related control: CA-6.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-39.

PM-11

MISSION/BUSINESS PROCESS DEFINITION
Control: The organization:a.

Defines mission/business processes with consideration for information security and theresulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, otherorganizations, and the Nation; andb.

Determines information protection needs arising from the defined mission/business processes
and revises the processes as necessary, until achievable protection needs are obtained.

Supplemental Guidance: Information protection needs are technology-independent, required

capabilities to counter threats to organizations, individuals, or the Nation through the compromiseof information (i.e., loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability). Information protection needs
are derived from the mission/business needs defined by the organization, the mission/businessprocesses selected to meet the stated needs, and the organizational risk management strategy.
Information protection needs determine the required security controls for the organization and theassociated information systems supporting the mission/business processes. Inherent in defining anorganization’s information protection needs is an understanding of the level of adverse impact that
could result if a compromise of information occurs. The security categorization process is used tomake such potential impact determinations. Mission/business process definitions and associatedinformation protection requirements are documented by the organization in accordance withorganizational policy and procedure. Related controls: PM-7, PM-8, RA-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-60.

PM-12

INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM
Control: The organization implements an insider threat program that includes a cross-discipline
insider threat incident handling team.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations handling classified information are required, under

Executive Order 13587 and the National Policy on Insider Threat, to establish insider threat
programs. The standards and guidelines that apply to insider threat programs in classified
environments can also be employed effectively to improve the security of Controlled Unclassified
Information in non-national security systems. Insider threat programs include security controls to
detect and prevent malicious insider activity through the centralized integration and analysis ofboth technical and non-technical information to identify potential insider threat concerns. A seniororganizational official is designated by the department/agency head as the responsible individual
to implement and provide oversight for the program. In addition to the centralized integration andanalysis capability, insider threat programs as a minimum, prepare department/agency insider
threat policies and implementation plans, conduct host-based user monitoring of individual
employee activities on government-owned classified computers, provide insider threat awarenesstraining to employees, receive access to information from all offices within the department/agency(e.g., human resources, legal, physical security, personnel security, information technology,
information system security, and law enforcement) for insider threat analysis, and conduct selfassessments of department/agency insider threat posture.
Insider threat programs can leverage the existence of incident handling teams organizations may
already have in place, such as computer security incident response teams. Human resources

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

records are especially important in this effort, as there is compelling evidence to show that some
types of insider crimes are often preceded by nontechnical behaviors in the workplace (e.g.,
ongoing patterns of disgruntled behavior and conflicts with coworkers and other colleagues).
These precursors can better inform and guide organizational officials in more focused, targeted
monitoring efforts. The participation of a legal team is important to ensure that all monitoring
activities are performed in accordance with appropriate legislation, directives, regulations,policies, standards, and guidelines. Related controls: AC-6, AT-2, AU-6, AU-7, AU-10, AU-12,
AU-13, CA-7, IA-4, IR-4, MP-7, PE-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-8, SC-7, SC-38, SI-4, PM-1, PM-14.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: Executive Order 13587.

PM-13

INFORMATION SECURITY WORKFORCE
Control: The organization establishes an information security workforce development andimprovement program.
Supplemental Guidance: Information security workforce development and improvement programs

include, for example: (i) defining the knowledge and skill levels needed to perform information
security duties and tasks; (ii) developing role-based training programs for individuals assigned
information security roles and responsibilities; and (iii) providing standards for measuring andbuilding individual qualifications for incumbents and applicants for information security-related
positions. Such workforce programs can also include associated information security career paths
to encourage: (i) information security professionals to advance in the field and fill positions withgreater responsibility; and (ii) organizations to fill information security-related positions withqualified personnel. Information security workforce development and improvement programs arecomplementary to organizational security awareness and training programs. Information security
workforce development and improvement programs focus on developing and institutionalizingcore information security capabilities of selected personnel needed to protect organizational
operations, assets, and individuals. Related controls: AT-2, AT-3.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

PM-14

TESTING, TRAINING, AND MONITORING
Control: The organization:a.

b.

Implements a process for ensuring that organizational plans for conducting security testing,training, and monitoring activities associated with organizational information systems:
1.

Are developed and maintained; and2.

Continue to be executed in a timely manner;

Reviews testing, training, and monitoring plans for consistency with the organizational risk
management strategy and organization-wide priorities for risk response actions.

Supplemental Guidance: This control ensures that organizations provide oversight for the security

testing, training, and monitoring activities conducted organization-wide and that those activities
are coordinated. With the importance of continuous monitoring programs, the implementation of
information security across the three tiers of the risk management hierarchy, and the widespreaduse of common controls, organizations coordinate and consolidate the testing and monitoring
activities that are routinely conducted as part of ongoing organizational assessments supporting avariety of security controls. Security training activities, while typically focused on individual
information systems and specific roles, also necessitate coordination across all organizational
elements. Testing, training, and monitoring plans and activities are informed by current threat andvulnerability assessments. Related controls: AT-3, CA-7, CP-4, IR-3, SI-4.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control Enhancements: None.
References: NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-37, 800-53A, 800-137.

PM-15

CONTACTS WITH SECURITY GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONSControl: The organization establishes and institutionalizes contact with selected groups andassociations within the security community:a.

To facilitate ongoing security education and training for organizational personnel;b.

To maintain currency with recommended security practices, techniques, and technologies; andc.

To share current security-related information including threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents.

Supplemental Guidance: Ongoing contact with security groups and associations is of paramountimportance in an environment of rapidly changing technologies and threats. Security groups andassociations include, for example, special interest groups, forums, professional associations, news
groups, and/or peer groups of security professionals in similar organizations. Organizations selectgroups and associations based on organizational missions/business functions. Organizations sharethreat, vulnerability, and incident information consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive
Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. Related control: SI-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

PM-16

THREAT AWARENESS PROGRAM
Control: The organization implements a threat awareness program that includes a crossorganization information-sharing capability.
Supplemental Guidance: Because of the constantly changing and increasing sophistication ofadversaries, especially the advanced persistent threat (APT), it is becoming more likely thatadversaries may successfully breach or compromise organizational information systems. One of
the best techniques to address this concern is for organizations to share threat information. Thiscan include, for example, sharing threat events (i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) thatorganizations have experienced, mitigations that organizations have found are effective against
certain types of threats, threat intelligence (i.e., indications and warnings about threats that arelikely to occur). Threat information sharing may be bilateral (e.g., government-commercial
cooperatives, government-government cooperatives), or multilateral (e.g., organizations taking
part in threat-sharing consortia). Threat information may be highly sensitive requiring special
agreements and protection, or less sensitive and freely shared. Related controls: PM-12, PM-16.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: None.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

APPENDIX H

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDSSECURITY CONTROL MAPPINGS FOR ISO/IEC 27001 AND 15408

T

he mapping tables in this appendix provide organizations with a general indication of
security control coverage with respect to ISO/IEC 27001, Information technology–Security
techniques–Information security management systems–Requirements 113 and ISO/IEC
15408, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Evaluation criteria for IT security. 114
ISO/IEC 27001 may be applied to all types of organizations and specifies requirements forestablishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining, and improving a
documented information security management system (ISMS) within the context of businessrisks. NIST Special Publication 800-39 includes guidance on managing risk at the organizational
level, mission/business process level, and information system level, is consistent with ISO/IEC
27001, and provides additional implementation detail for the federal government and its
contractors. ISO/IEC 15408 (also known as the Common Criteria) provides functionality andassurance requirements for developers of information systems and information systemcomponents (i.e., information technology products). Since many of the technical security controls
defined in Appendix F are implemented in hardware, software, and firmware components of
information systems, organizations can obtain significant benefit from the acquisition andemployment of information technology products evaluated against the requirements of ISO/IEC
15408. The use of such products can provide evidence that certain security controls are
implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired effect in satisfying statedsecurity requirements.
Previously, the ISO/IEC 27001 mappings were created by relating the primary security topic
identified in each of the Special Publication 800-53 base controls to a similar security topic in the
ISO/IEC standard. This methodology resulted in a mapping of security control relationships
rather than a mapping of equivalent security control requirements. The ISO/IEC 27001:2013
update provided an opportunity to reassess whether the implementation of a security control fromSpecial Publication 800-53 satisfied the intent of the mapped control from ISO/IEC 27001 andconversely, whether the implementation of a security control from ISO/IEC 27001 satisfied theintent of the mapped control from Special Publication 800-53. To successfully meet the mapping
criteria, the implementation of the mapped controls should result in an equivalent information
security posture. However, this does not mean that security control equivalency based solely on
the mapping tables herein should be assumed by organizations. While the revised security control
mappings are more accurate, there is still some degree of subjectivity in the mapping analysis
because the mappings are not always one-to-one and may not be completely equivalent. The
following examples illustrate some of the mapping issues:•

Example 1: Special Publication 800-53 contingency planning and ISO/IEC 27001 business
continuity management were deemed to have similar, but not the same, functionality.

•

Example 2: In some cases, similar topics are addressed in the two security control sets but
provide a different context, perspective, or scope. Special Publication 800-53 addresses

113

ISO/IEC 27001 was published in October 2013 by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and theInternational Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
114

ISO/IEC 15408 was published in September 2012 by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) andthe International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
APPENDIX H

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

information flow control broadly in terms of approved authorizations for controlling accessbetween source and destination objects, whereas ISO/IEC 27001 addresses information flow
more narrowly as it applies to interconnected network domains.
•

Example 3: Security control A.6.1.1, Information Security Roles and Responsibilities, in
ISO/IEC 27001 states that “all information security responsibilities shall be defined andallocated” while security control PM-10, Security Authorization Process, in Special
Publication 800-53 that is mapped to A.6.1.1, has three distinct parts. The first part states thatthe organization “designates individuals to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities…” If
A.6.1.1 is mapped to PM-10 without providing any additional information, organizations
might assume that if they implement A.6.1.1 (i.e., all responsibilities are defined andallocated), then the intent of PM-10 would also be fully satisfied. However, this would not be
the case since the other two parts of PM-10 would not have been addressed. To resolve andclarify the security control mappings, when a security control in the right column of Tables
H-1 and H-2 does not fully satisfy the intent of the security control in the left column of thetables, the control in the right column is designated with an asterisk (*).

In a few cases, an ISO/IEC 27001 security control could only be directly mapped to a Special
Publication 800-53 control enhancement. In such cases, the relevant enhancement is specified inTable H-2 indicating that the corresponding ISO/IEC 27001 control satisfies only the intent of thespecified enhancement and does not address the associated base control from Special Publication
800-53 or any other enhancements under that base control. Where no enhancement is specified,the ISO/IEC 27001 control is relevant only to the Special Publication 800-53 base control.
And finally, the security controls from ISO/IEC 27002 were not considered in the mapping
analysis since the standard is informative rather than normative.

APPENDIX H

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table H-1 provides a mapping from the security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53 to
the security controls in ISO/IEC 27001. Please review the introductory text at the beginning ofAppendix H before employing the mappings in Table H-1.
TABLE H-1: MAPPING NIST SP 800-53 TO ISO/IEC 27001

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

AC-1

Access Control Policy and Procedures

AC-2
AC-3

Account Management
Access Enforcement

AC-4
AC-5
AC-6
AC-7
AC-8
AC-9
AC-10
AC-11
AC-12
AC-13
AC-14

Information Flow Enforcement
Separation of Duties
Least Privilege
Unsuccessful Logon Attempts
System Use Notification
Previous Logon (Access) Notification
Concurrent Session Control
Session Lock
Session Termination
Withdrawn
Permitted Actions without Identification orAuthentication
Withdrawn
Security Attributes
Remote AccessWireless Access
Access Control for Mobile Devices
Use of External Information Systems
Information Sharing
Publicly Accessible Content
Data Mining Protection
Access Control Decisions
Reference Monitor
Security Awareness and Training Policy andProcedures
Security Awareness Training
Role-Based Security Training
Security Training Records
Withdrawn
Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures
Audit EventsContent of Audit Records
Audit Storage Capacity
Response to Audit Processing Failures
Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting
Audit Reduction and Report Generation
Time Stamps
Protection of Audit Information
Non-repudiation
Audit Record Retention
Audit Generation

AC-15
AC-16
AC-17
AC-18
AC-19
AC-20
AC-21
AC-22
AC-23
AC-24
AC-25
AT-1
AT-2
AT-3
AT-4
AT-5
AU-1
AU-2
AU-3
AU-4
AU-5
AU-6
AU-7
AU-8
AU-9
AU-10
AU-11
AU-12
APPENDIX H

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.9.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1,
A.18.2.2
A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.5, A.9.2.6
A.6.2.2, A.9.1.2, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5, A.13.1.1,
A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.18.1.3
A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3
A.6.1.2
A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
A.9.4.2
A.9.4.2
A.9.4.2
None
A.11.2.8, A.11.2.9
None--None--NoneA.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.2
A.6.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1
A.6.2.1, A.11.2.6, A.13.2.1
A.11.2.6, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1
None
None
None
A.9.4.1*
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.7.2.2, A.12.2.1
A.7.2.2*
None--A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
None
A.12.4.1*
A.12.1.3
None
A.12.4.1, A.16.1.2, A.16.1.4
None
A.12.4.4
A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.18.1.3
None
A.12.4.1, A.16.1.7
A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3
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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

AU-13
AU-14
AU-15
AU-16
CA-1
CA-2
CA-3
CA-4
CA-5
CA-6
CA-7
CA-8
CA-9
CM-1
CM-2
CM-3
CM-4
CM-5
CM-6
CM-7
CM-8
CM-9
CM-10
CM-11
CP-1
CP-2
CP-3
CP-4
CP-5
CP-6
CP-7
CP-8
CP-9
CP-10
CP-11
CP-12
CP-13
IA-1
IA-2
IA-3
IA-4
IA-5
IA-6
IA-7
IA-8
IA-9
APPENDIX H

Monitoring for Information Disclosure
Session Audit
Alternate Audit Capability
Cross-Organizational Auditing
Security Assessment and Authorization Policies
and Procedures
Security Assessments
System Interconnections
WithdrawnPlan of Action and Milestones
Security Authorization
Continuous Monitoring
Penetration Testing
Internal System Connections
Configuration Management Policy andProcedures
Baseline Configuration
Configuration Change Control
Security Impact Analysis
Access Restrictions for Change
Configuration Settings
Least Functionality
Information System Component Inventory
Configuration Management Plan
Software Usage Restrictions
User-Installed Software
Contingency Planning Policy and Procedures
Contingency Plan
Contingency Training
Contingency Plan Testing
Withdrawn
Alternate Storage Site
Alternate Processing Site
Telecommunications Services
Information System Backup
Information System Recovery andReconstitution
Alternate Communications Protocols
Safe Mode
Alternative Security Mechanisms
Identification and Authentication Policy andProcedures
Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Device Identification and Authentication
Identifier Management
Authenticator Management
Authenticator Feedback
Cryptographic Module Authentication
Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)
Service Identification and Authentication

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.
None
A.12.4.1*
None
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.14.2.8, A.18.2.2, A.18.2.3
A.13.1.2, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2--None
None
None
None
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
None
A.12.1.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4
A.14.2.3
A.9.2.3, A.9.4.5, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.4, A.12.5.1
None
A.12.5.1*
A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2
A.6.1.1*
A.18.1.2
A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.6.1.1, A.17.1.1, A.17.2.1
A.7.2.2*
A.17.1.3--A.11.1.4, A.17.1.2, A.17.2.1
A.11.1.4, A.17.1.2, A.17.2.1
A.11.2.2, A.17.1.2
A.12.3.1, A.17.1.2, A.18.1.3
A.17.1.2
A.17.1.2*
None
A.17.1.2*
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.9.2.1
None
A.9.2.1
A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.3
A.9.4.2
A.18.1.5
A.9.2.1
None
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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

IA-10
IA-11
IR-1
IR-2
IR-3
IR-4
IR-5
IR-6
IR-7
IR-8
IR-9
IR-10
MA-1
MA-2
MA-3
MA-4
MA-5
MA-6
MP-1
MP-2
MP-3
MP-4
MP-5
MP-6
MP-7
MP-8
PE-1
PE-2
PE-3
PE-4
PE-5
PE-6
PE-7
PE-8
PE-9
PE-10
PE-11
PE-12
PE-13
PE-14
PE-15
PE-16
PE-17
PE-18
PE-19
PE-20
PL-1
PL-2
PL-3
PL-4
APPENDIX H

Adaptive Identification and Authentication
Re-authentication
Incident Response Policy and Procedures
Incident Response Training
Incident Response Testing
Incident Handling
Incident Monitoring
Incident Reporting
Incident Response Assistance
Incident Response Plan
Information Spillage Response
Integrated Information Security Analysis Team
System Maintenance Policy and Procedures
Controlled Maintenance
Maintenance Tools
Nonlocal Maintenance
Maintenance Personnel
Timely MaintenanceMedia Protection Policy and ProceduresMedia AccessMedia Marking
Media Storage
Media Transport
Media Sanitization
Media UseMedia Downgrading
Physical and Environmental Protection Policy
and Procedures
Physical Access Authorizations
Physical Access Control
Access Control for Transmission Medium
Access Control for Output Devices
Monitoring Physical AccessWithdrawn
Visitor Access Records
Power Equipment and Cabling
Emergency Shutoff
Emergency Power
Emergency Lighting
Fire Protection
Temperature and Humidity Controls
Water Damage Protection
Delivery and Removal
Alternate Work Site
Location of Information System Components
Information Leakage
Asset Monitoring and Tracking
Security Planning Policy and Procedures
System Security Plan
Withdrawn
Rules of Behavior

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.
None
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1 A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.7.2.2*
None
A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.6None
A.6.1.3, A.16.1.2
None
A.16.1.1
None
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.11.2.4*, A.11.2.5*
None
None
None
A.11.2.4
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.11.2.9
A.8.2.2
A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.11.2.9
A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.3, A.11.2.5, A.11.2.6
A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.11.2.7
A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.11.1.2*
A.11.1.1, A.11.1.2, A.11.1.3
A.11.1.2, A.11.2.3
A.11.1.2, A.11.1.3
None--NoneA.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2, A.11.2.3
A.11.2.2*
A.11.2.2
A.11.2.2*
A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1
A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2
A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2
A.8.2.3, A.11.1.6, A.11.2.5
A.6.2.2, A.11.2.6, A.13.2.1
A.8.2.3, A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1
A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1
A.8.2.3*
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.14.1.1--A.7.1.2, A.7.2.1, A.8.1.3
PAGE H-5

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

PL-5
PL-6
PL-7
PL-8
PL-9
PS-1
PS-2
PS-3
PS-4
PS-5
PS-6
PS-7
PS-8
RA-1
RA-2
RA-3
RA-4
RA-5
RA-6
SA-1
SA-2
SA-3
SA-4
SA-5
SA-6
SA-7
SA-8
SA-9
SA-10
SA-11
SA-12
SA-13
SA-14
SA-15
SA-16
SA-17
SA-18
SA-19
SA-20
SA-21
SA-22
SC-1
SC-2
SC-3
SC-4
SC-5
SC-6
APPENDIX H

Withdrawn
Withdrawn
Security Concept of Operations
Information Security Architecture
Central Management
Personnel Security Policy and Procedures
Position Risk Designation
Personnel Screening
Personnel Termination
Personnel Transfer
Access Agreements
Third-Party Personnel Security
Personnel Sanctions
Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures
Security Categorization
Risk Assessment
Withdrawn
Vulnerability Scanning
Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
SurveySystem and Services Acquisition Policy andProcedures
Allocation of Resources
System Development Life Cycle
Acquisition Process
Information System Documentation
Withdrawn
Withdrawn
Security Engineering Principles
External Information System Services
Developer Configuration Management
Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Supply Chain Protections
TrustworthinessCriticality Analysis
Development Process, Standards, and Tools
Developer-Provided Training
Developer Security Architecture and Design
Tamper Resistance and Detection
Component Authenticity
Customized Development of Critical
Components
Developer Screening
Unsupported System Components
System and Communications Protection Policy
and Procedures
Application Partitioning
Security Function Isolation
Information In Shared Resources
Denial of Service Protection
Resource Availability

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.
----A.14.1.1*
A.14.1.1*
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
None
A.7.1.1
A.7.3.1, A.8.1.4
A.7.3.1, A.8.1.4
A.7.1.2, A.7.2.1, A.13.2.4
A.6.1.1*, A.7.2.1*
A.7.2.3
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.8.2.1
A.12.6.1*--A.12.6.1*
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
None
A.6.1.1, A.6.1.5, A.14.1.1, A.14.2.1, A.14.2.6
A.14.1.1, A.14.2.7, A.14.2.9, A.15.1.2
A.12.1.1*----A.14.2.5
A.6.1.1, A.6.1.5, A.7.2.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.2.2, A.15.2.1,
A.15.2.2
A.12.1.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.4, A.14.2.7
A.14.2.7, A.14.2.8
A.14.2.7, A.15.1.1, A.15.1.2, A.15.1.3
None
None
A.6.1.5, A.14.2.1,
None
A.14.2.1, A.14.2.5
None
None
None
A.7.1.1
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
None
None
None
None
None
PAGE H-6

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

SC-7
SC-8
SC-9
SC-10
SC-11
SC-12
SC-13
SC-14
SC-15
SC-16
SC-17
SC-18
SC-19
SC-20
SC-21
SC-22
SC-23
SC-24
SC-25
SC-26
SC-27
SC-28
SC-29
SC-30
SC-31
SC-32
SC-33
SC-34
SC-35
SC-36
SC-37
SC-38
SC-39
SC-40
SC-41
SC-42
SC-43
SC-44
SI-1
SI-2
SI-3
SI-4
SI-5
SI-6
SI-7
SI-8
SI-9
APPENDIX H

Boundary Protection
Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Withdrawn
Network Disconnect
Trusted Path
Cryptographic Key Establishment andManagement
Cryptographic Protection
Withdrawn
Collaborative Computing Devices
Transmission of Security Attributes
Public Key Infrastructure Certificates
Mobile Code
Voice Over Internet Protocol
Secure Name/Address Resolution Service(Authoritative Source)
Secure Name/Address Resolution Service(Recursive or Caching Resolver)
Architecture and Provisioning for
Name/Address Resolution Service
Session Authenticity
Fail in Known State
Thin Nodes
Honeypots
Platform-Independent Applications
Protection of Information at Rest
Heterogeneity
Concealment and Misdirection
Covert Channel Analysis
Information System Partitioning
WithdrawnNon-Modifiable Executable Programs
Honeyclients
Distributed Processing and Storage
Out-of-Band Channels
Operations Security
Process Isolation
Wireless Link Protection
Port and I/O Device AccessSensor Capability and Data
Usage Restrictions
Detonation Chambers
System and Information Integrity Policy andProcedures
Flaw Remediation
Malicious Code Protection
Information System Monitoring
Security Alerts, Advisories, and Directives
Security Function Verification
Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity
Spam Protection
Withdrawn

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.
A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3
A.8.2.3, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3--A.13.1.1
None
A.10.1.2
A.10.1.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.18.1.5--A.13.2.1*
None
A.10.1.2
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
A.8.2.3*
None
None
None
None
--None
None
None
None
A.12.x
None
None
None
None
None
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.12.6.1, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.16.1.3
A.12.2.1
None
A.6.1.4*
None
None
None
--PAGE H-7

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

SI-10
SI-11
SI-12
SI-13
SI-14
SI-15
SI-16
SI-17
PM-1
PM-2
PM-3
PM-4
PM-5
PM-6
PM-7
PM-8
PM-9
PM-10
PM-11
PM-12
PM-13
PM-14
PM-15
PM-16

APPENDIX H

Information Input Validation
Error Handling
Information Handling and Retention
Predictable Failure Prevention
Non-Persistence
Information Output Filtering
Memory Protection
Fail-Safe Procedures
Information Security Program Plan
Senior Information Security Officer
Information Security Resources
Plan of Action and Milestones Process
Information System Inventory
Information Security Measures of PerformanceEnterprise Architecture
Critical Infrastructure Plan
Risk Management Strategy
Security Authorization Process
Mission/Business Process Definition
Insider Threat Program
Information Security Workforce
Testing, Training, and Monitoring
Contacts with Security Groups andAssociations
Threat Awareness Program

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
A.6.1.1*
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
A.6.1.1*
None
None
A.7.2.2*
None
A.6.1.4
None

PAGE H-8

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table H-2 provides a mapping from the security controls in ISO/IEC 27001 to the security
controls in Special Publication 800-53. 115 Please review the introductory text at the beginningof Appendix H before employing the mappings in Table H-2.
TABLE H-2: MAPPING ISO/IEC 27001 TO NIST SP 800-53

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

A.5 Information Security Policies
A.5.1 Management direction for information security
A.5.1.1 Policies for information security
A.5.1.2 Review of the policies for information security
A.6 Organization of information security
A.6.1 Internal organization
A.6.1.1 Information security roles and responsibilities
A.6.1.2 Segregation of duties
A.6.1.3 Contact with authorities
A.6.1.4 Contact with special interest groups
A.6.1.5 Information security in project management
A.6.2 Mobile devices and teleworking
A.6.2.1 Mobile device policy
A.6.2.2 Teleworking
A.7 Human Resources Security
A.7.1 Prior to Employment
A.7.1.1 Screening
A.7.1.2 Terms and conditions of employment
A.7.2 During employment
A.7.2.1 Management responsibilities
A.7.2.2 Information security awareness, education, andtraining
A.7.2.3 Disciplinary process
A.7.3 Termination and change of employment
A.7.3.1 Termination or change of employment
responsibilities
A.8 Asset Management
A.8.1 Responsibility for assets
A.8.1.1 Inventory of assets
A.8.1.2 Ownership of assets
A.8.1.3 Acceptable use of assets
A.8.1.4 Return of assets
A.8.2 Information Classification
A.8.2.1 Classification of information
A.8.2.2 Labelling of Information
A.8.2.3 Handling of Assets
A.8.3 Media Handling
A.8.3.1 Management of removable media
A.8.3.2 Disposal of media
A.8.3.3 Physical media transfer
A.9 Access Control

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

All XX-1 controls
All XX-1 controls

All XX-1 controls, CM-9, CP-2,PS-7, SA-3, SA-9, PM- 2,
PM-10
AC-5
IR-6
SI-5, PM-15
SA-3, SA-9, SA-15
AC-17, AC-18, AC-19
AC-3, AC-17, PE-17

PS-3, SA-21
PL-4, PS-6
PL-4, PS-6, PS-7, SA-9
AT-2, AT-3, CP-3, IR-2, PM-13
PS-8
PS-4, PS-5

CM-8
CM-8
PL-4
PS-4, PS-5
RA-2
MP-3
MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7, PE-16, PE-18, PE- 20,
SC-8, SC-28
MP-2, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6, MP-7
MP-6
MP-5

115

The use of the term XX-1 controls in mapping Table H-2 refers to the set of security controls represented by the firstcontrol in each family in Appendix F, where XX is a placeholder for the two-letter family identifier.
APPENDIX H

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

A.9.1 Business requirement of access control
A.9.1.1 Access control policy
A.9.1.2 Access to networks and network services
A.9.2 User access management
A.9.2.1 User registration and de-registration
A.9.2.2 User access provisioning
A.9.2.3 Management of privileged access rights
A.9.2.4 Management of secret authentication informationof users
A.9.2.5 Review of user access rights
A.9.2.6 Removal or adjustment of access rights
A.9.3 User responsibilities
A.9.3.1 Use of secret authentication information
A.9.4 System and application access control
A.9.4.1 Information access restriction
A.9.4.2 Secure logon procedures
A.9.4.3 Password management system
A.9.4.4 Use of privileged utility programs
A.9.4.5 Access control to program source code
A.10 Cryptography
A.10.1 Cryptographic controls
A.10.1.1 Policy on the use of cryptographic controls
A.10.1.2 Key Management
A.11 Physical and environmental security
A.11.1 Secure areas
A.11.1.1 Physical security perimeter
A.11.1.2 Physical entry controls
A.11.1.3 Securing offices, rooms and facilities
A.11.1.4 Protecting against external and environmental
threats
A.11.1.5 Working in secure areas
A.11.1.6 Delivery and loading areas
A.11.2 Equipment
A.11.2.1 Equipment siting and protection
A.11.2.2 Supporting utilities
A.11.2.3 Cabling security
A.11.2.4 Equipment maintenance
A.11.2.5 Removal of assets
A.11.2.6 Security of equipment and assets off-premises
A.11.2.7 Secure disposal or reuse of equipment
A.11.2.8 Unattended user equipment
A.11.2.9 Clear desk and clear screen policy
A.12 Operations security
A.12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities
A.12.1.1 Documented operating procedures
A.12.1.2 Change management
A.12.1.3 Capacity management
A.12.1.4 Separation of development, testing, andoperational environments
A.12.2 Protection from malware
A.12.2.1 Controls against malware

APPENDIX HNIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

AC-1AC-3, AC-6
AC-2, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8
AC-2
AC-2, AC-3, AC-6, CM-5
IA-5
AC-2
AC-2
IA-5
AC-3, AC-24
AC-7, AC-8, AC-9, IA-6
IA-5
AC-3, AC-6
AC-3, AC-6, CM-5

SC-13
SC-12, SC-17

PE-3*
PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5
PE-3, PE-5
CP-6, CP-7, PE-9, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15, PE-18, PE- 19
SC-42(3)*PE-16
PE-9, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15, PE-18, PE-19
CP-8, PE-9, PE-10, PE-11, PE-12, PE-14, PE-15
PE-4, PE-9
MA-2, MA-6
MA-2, MP-5, PE-16
AC-19, AC-20, MP-5, PE-17
MP-6
AC-11
AC-11, MP-2, MP-4

All XX-1 controls, SA-5
CM-3, CM-5, SA-10
AU-4, CP-2(2), SC-5(2)CM-4(1)*, CM-5*

AT-2, SI-3

PAGE H-10

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

A.12.3 Backup
A.12.3.1 Information backup
A.12.4 Logging and monitoring
A.12.4.1 Event logging
A.12.4.2 Protection of log information
A.12.4.3 Administrator and operator logs
A.12.4.4 Clock synchronization
A.12.5 Control of operational software
A.12.5.1 Installation of software on operational systems
A.12.6 Technical vulnerability management
A.12.6.1 Management of technical vulnerabilities
A.12.6.2 Restrictions on software installation
A.12.7 Information systems audit considerations
A.12.7.1 Information systems audit controls
A.13 Communications security
A.13.1 Network security management
A.13.1.1 Network controls
A.13.1.2 Security of network services
A.13.1.3 Segregation in networks
A.13.2 Information transfer
A.13.2.1 Information transfer policies and procedures
A.13.2.2 Agreements on information transfer
A.13.2.3 Electronic messaging
A.13.2.4 Confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements
A.14 System acquisition, development andmaintenance
A.14.1 Security requirements of information systems
A.14.1.1 Information security requirements analysis andspecification
A.14.1.2 Securing application services on public networks
A.14.1.3 Protecting application services transactions
A.14.2 Security in development and support
processes
A.14.2.1 Secure development policy
A.14.2.2 System change control procedures
A.14.2.3 Technical review of applications after operating
platform changes
A.14.2.4 Restrictions on changes to software packages
A.14.2.5 Secure system engineering principles
A.14.2.6 Secure development environment
A.14.2.7 Outsourced development
A.14.2.8 System security testing
A.14.2.9 System acceptance testing
A.14.3 Test data
A.14.3.1 Protection of test data
A.15 Supplier Relationships
A.15.1 Information security in supplier relationships
A.15.1.1 Information security policy for supplier
relationships
A.15.1.2 Address security within supplier agreements

APPENDIX HNIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.

CP-9AU-3, AU-6, AU-11, AU-12, AU-14
AU-9
AU-9, AU-12
AU-8
CM-5, CM-7(4), CM-7(5), CM-11
RA-3, RA-5, SI-2, SI-5
CM-11
AU-5*

AC-3, AC-17, AC-18, AC-20, SC-7, SC-8, SC-10
CA-3, SA-9
AC-4, SC-7
AC-4, AC-17, AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, CA-3, PE-17, SC-7,
SC-8, SC-15
CA-3, PS-6, SA-9
SC-8
PS-6

PL-2, PL-7, PL-8, SA-3, SA-4
AC-3, AC-4, AC-17, SC-8, SC-13
AC-3, AC-4, SC-7, SC-8, SC-13

SA-3, SA-15, SA-17
CM-3, SA-10, SI-2
CM-3, CM-4, SI-2
CM-3, SA-10
SA-8
SA-3*
SA-4, SA-10, SA-11, SA-12, SA-15
CA-2, SA-11
SA-4, SA-12(7)SA-15(9)*SA-12
SA-4, SA-12

PAGE H-11

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS

A.15.1.3 Information and communication technology
supply chain
A.15.2 Supplier service delivery management
A.15.2.1 Monitoring and review of supplier services
A.15.2.2 Managing changes to supplier services
A.16 Information security incident management
A.16.1 Managing of information security incidents andimprovements
A.16.1.1 Responsibilities and procedures
A.16.1.2 Reporting information security events
A.16.1.3 Reporting information security weaknesses
A.16.1.4 Assessment of and decision on information
security events
A.16.1.5 Response to information security incidents
A.16.1.6 Learning from information security incidents
A.16.1.7 Collection of evidence
A.17 Information security aspects of business
continuity management
A.17.1 Information security continuity
A.17.1.1 Planning information security continuity
A.17.1.2 Implementing information security continuity
A.17.1.3 Verify, review, and evaluate information security
continuity
A.17.2 Redundancies
A.17.2.1 Availability of information processing facilities
A.18 Compliance
A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual
requirements
A.18.1.1 Identification of applicable legislation andcontractual requirements
A.18.1.2 Intellectual property rights
A.18.1.3 Protection of records
A.18.1.4 Privacy and protection of personal information
A.18.1.5 Regulation of cryptographic controls
A.18.2 Information security reviews
A.18.2.1 Independent review of information security
A.18.2.2 Compliance with security policies and standards
A.18.2.3 Technical compliance review

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not
fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.
SA-12

SA-9
SA-9

IR-8
AU-6, IR-6
SI-2
AU-6, IR-4
IR-4
IR-4
AU-4*, AU-9*, AU-10(3)*, AU-11*

CP-2
CP-6, CP-7, CP-8, CP-9, CP-10, CP-11, CP-13
CP-4

CP-2,CP-6, CP-7

All XX-1 controls
CM-10
AC-3, AC-23, AU-9, AU-10, CP-9, SC-8, SC-8(1), SC-13,
SC-28, SC-28(1)Appendix J Privacy controls
IA-7, SC-12, SC-13, SC-17
CA-2(1), SA-11(3)All XX-1 controls, CA-2
CA-2

Note: The content of Table H-3, the mapping from the functional and assurance requirements in ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria)
to the security controls in Special Publication 800-53, is unaffected by the changes above.

APPENDIX H

PAGE H-12

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Table H-3 provides a generalized mapping from the functional and assurance requirements in
ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria) to the security controls in Special Publication 800-53. The
table represents an informal correspondence between security requirements and security controls(i.e., the table is not intended to determine whether the ISO/IEC 15408 security requirements are
fully, partially, or not satisfied by the associated security controls). However, the table can serve
as a beneficial starting point for further correspondence analysis. Organizations are cautioned thatsatisfying ISO/IEC 15408 security requirements for an particular evaluated and validated
information technology product as represented by the presence of certain security controls from
Appendix F, does not imply that such requirements have been satisfied throughout the entire
information system (which may consist of multiple, integrated individual component products).
Additional information explaining the specific mappings that appear in Table H-3 is available atthe National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) website at: http://www.niap-ccevs.org.
TABLE H-3: MAPPING ISO/IEC 15408 TO NIST SP 800-53

ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLSFunctional Requirements

FAU_ARP.1

FAU_GEN.1

APPENDIX H

Security Audit Automatic Response
Security Alarms

Security Audit Data Generation
Audit Data Generation

AU-5

Response to Audit Processing FailuresAU-5(1)

Response to Audit Processing Failures
Audit Storage Capacity

AU-5(2)

Response to Audit Processing Failures
Real-Time Alerts

AU-5(3)

Response to Audit Processing Failures
Configurable Traffic Volume Thresholds

AU-5(4)

Response to Audit Processing Failures
Shutdown on FailurePE-6(2)

Monitoring Physical Access
Automated Intrusion Recognition / Responses

SI-3

Malicious Code Protection

SI-3(8)

Malicious Code Protection
Detect Unauthorized Commands

SI-4(5)

Information System Monitoring
System-Generated Alerts

SI-4(7)

Information Systems Monitoring
Automated Response to Suspicious Events

SI-4(22)

Information Systems Monitoring
Unauthorized Network Services

SI-7(2)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Automated Notifications of Integrity Violations

SI-7(5)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Automated Response to Integrity Violations

SI-7(8)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Auditing Capability for Significant Events

AU-2

Audit Events

AU-3

Content of Audit Records

AU-3(1)

Content of Audit Records
Additional Audit Information

AU-12

Audit Generation

PAGE H-13

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLSFAU_GEN.2

Security Audit Data Generation
User Identity Association

AU-3

Content of Audit Records

FAU_SAA.1

Security Audit Analysis
Potential Violation Analysis

SI-4

Information System Monitoring

FAU_SAA.2

Security Audit Analysis
Profile-Based Anomaly DetectionAC-2(12)

Account Management
Account Monitoring / Atypical Usage

SI-4

Information System Monitoring

FAU_SAA.3

Security Audit Analysis
Simple Attack Heuristics

SI-3(7)

Malicious Code Protection
Non Signature-Based Protection

SI-4

Information System Monitoring

SI-3(7)

Malicious Code Protection
Non Signature-Based Protection

FAU_SAA.4

Security Audit Analysis
Complex Attack Heuristics

SI-4

Information System Monitoring

FAU_SAR.1

Security Audit Review
Audit Review

AU-7

Audit Reduction and Report Generation

FAU_SAR.2

Security Audit Review
Restricted Audit Review

AU-9(6)

Protection of Audit Information
Read Only Access

FAU_SAR.3

Security Audit Review
Selectable Audit Review

AU-7

Audit Reduction and Report Generation

AU-7(1)

Audit Reduction and Report Generation
Automatic Processing

AU-7(2)

Audit Reduction and Report Generation
Automatic Sort and Search

FAU_SEL.1

Security Audit Event Selection
Selective Audit

AU-12

Audit Generation

FAU_STG.1

Security Audit Event Storage
Protected Audit Trail Storage

AU-9

Protection of Audit Information

FAU_STG.2

Security Audit Event Storage
Guarantees of Audit Data Availability

AU-9

Protection of Audit Information
Alternate audit capability

FAU_STG.3

Security Audit Event Storage
Action In Case of Possible Audit Data
Loss

AU-5

Response to Audit Processing FailuresAU-5(1)

Response to Audit Processing Failures
Audit Storage Capacity

AU-5(2)

Response To Audit Processing Failures
Real-Time Alerts

AU-5(4)

Response To Audit Processing Failures
Shutdown on Failure

AU-4

Audit Storage Capacity

AU-5

Response to Audit Processing FailuresAU-5(2)

Response To Audit Processing Failures
Real-Time Alerts

AU-5(4)

Response To Audit Processing Failures
Shutdown on Failure

AU-10

Non-Repudiation

AU-10(1)

Non-Repudiation
Association Of Identities

AU-10(2)

Non-Repudiation
Validate Binding of Information Producer
Identity

FAU_STG.4

FCO_NRO.1

APPENDIX H

Security Audit Event Storage
Prevention of Audit Data Loss

Non-Repudiation of Origin
Selective Proof of Origin

PAGE H-14

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS
FCO_NRO.2

FCO_NRR.1

FCO_NRR.2

Non-Repudiation of Origin
Enforced Proof of Origin

Non-Repudiation of Receipt
Selective Proof of Receipt

Non-Repudiation of Receipt
Enforced Proof of Receipt

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
AU-10

Non-Repudiation

AU-10(1)

Non-Repudiation
Association Of Identities

AU-10(2)

Non-Repudiation
Validate Binding of Information Producer
Identity

AU-10

Non-Repudiation

AU-10(1)

Non-Repudiation
Association Of Identities

AU-10(2)

Non-Repudiation
Validate Binding of Information Producer
Identity

AU-10

Non-Repudiation

AU-10(1)

Non-Repudiation
Association Of Identities

AU-10(2)

Non-Repudiation
Validate Binding of Information Producer
Identity

FCS_CKM.1

Cryptographic Key Management
Cryptographic Key Generation

SC-12

Cryptographic Key Establishment andManagement

FCS_CKM.2

Cryptographic Key Management
Cryptographic Key Distribution

SC-12

Cryptographic Key Establishment andManagement

FCS_CKM.3

Cryptographic Key Management
Cryptographic Key Access

SC-12

Cryptographic Key Establishment andManagement

FCS_CKM.4

Cryptographic Key Management
Cryptographic Key Destruction

SC-12

Cryptographic Key Establishment andManagement

FCS_COP.1

Cryptographic Operation
Cryptographic Operation

SC-13

Cryptographic Protection

FDP_ACC.1

Access Control Policy
Subset Access Control

AC-3

Access EnforcementAC-3(3)

Access Enforcement
Mandatory Access Control

AC-3(4)

Access Enforcement
Discretionary Access Control

AC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Role-Based Access Control

AC-3

Access EnforcementAC-3(3)

Access Enforcement
Mandatory Access Control

AC-3(4)

Access Enforcement
Discretionary Access Control

AC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Role-Based Access Control

AC-3

Access EnforcementAC-3(3)

Access Enforcement
Mandatory Access Control

AC-3(4)

Access Enforcement
Discretionary Access Control

AC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Role-Based Access Control

AC-16

Security Attributes

FDP_ACC.2

FDP_ACF.1

APPENDIX H

Access Control Policy
Complete Access Control

Access Control Functions
Security Attribute Based AccessControl

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS
FDP_DAU.1

FDP_DAU.2

Data Authentication
Basic Data Authentication

Data Authentication
Data Authentication With Identity of
Guarantor

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SC-16

Transmission of Security Attributes

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(1)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Integrity Checks

SI-7(6)

Software, Firmware, And Information
Integrity
Cryptographic Protection

SI-10

Information Input Validation

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(1)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Integrity Checks

SI-7(6)

Software, Firmware, And Information
Integrity
Cryptographic Protection

SI-10

Information Input Validation

FDP_ETC.1

Export from the TOE
Export of User Data without Security
Attributes

No Mapping.

FDP_ETC.2

Export from the TOE
Export of User Data with Security
Attributes

AC-4(18)

Information Flow Enforcement
Security Attribute Binding

AC-16

Security Attributes

AC-16(5)Security Attributes
Attribute Displays for Output Devices

SC-16

Transmission of Security Attributes

AC-3

Access EnforcementAC-3(3)

Access Enforcement
Mandatory Access Control

AC-4

Information Flow Enforcement

AC-4(1)

Information Flow Enforcement
Object Security Attributes

AC-3

Access EnforcementAC-3(3)

Access Enforcement
Mandatory Access Control

AC-4

Information Flow Enforcement

AC-3

Access EnforcementAC-3(3)

Access Enforcement
Mandatory Access Control

AC-4

Information Flow Enforcement

AC-4(1)

Information Flow Enforcement
Object Security Attributes

AC-4(2)

Information Flow Enforcement
Processing Domains

AC-4(7)

Information Flow Enforcement
One-Way Flow Mechanisms

AC-16

Security Attributes

SC-7

Boundary Protection

FDP_IFC.1

FDP_IFC.2

FDP_IFF.1

APPENDIX H

Information Flow Control Policy
Subset Information Flow Control

Information Flow Control Policy
Complete Information Flow Control

Information Flow Control Functions
Simple Security Attributes

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS
FDP_IFF.2

FDP_IFF.3

FDP_IFF.4

FDP_IFF.5

FDP_IFF.6

FDP_ITC.1

FDP_ITC.2

FDP_ITT.1

FDP_ITT.2

FDP_ITT.3

APPENDIX H

Information Flow Control Functions
Hierarchical Security Attributes

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
AC-3

Access EnforcementAC-3(3)

Access Enforcement
Mandatory Access Control

AC-4(1)

Information Flow Enforcement
Object Security Attributes

AC-16

Security Attributes

Information Flow Control Functions
Limited Illicit Information Flows

SC-31

Covert Channel Analysis

SC-31(2)Covert Channel Analysis
Maximum Bandwidth

Information Flow Control Functions
Partial Elimination of Illicit Information
Flows

SC-31

Covert Channel Analysis

SC-31(2)Covert Channel Analysis
Maximum Bandwidth

Information Flow Control Functions
No Illicit Information Flows

SC-31

Covert Channel Analysis

SC-31(2)Covert Channel Analysis
Maximum Bandwidth

Information Flow Control Functions
Illicit Information Flow Monitoring

SC-31

Covert Channel Analysis

SI-4(18)

Information System Monitoring
Analyze Traffic / Covert Exfiltration

Import from Outside of the TOE
Import of User Data without Security
Attributes

AC-4(9)

Information Flow Enforcement
Human Reviews

AC-4(12)

Information Flow Enforcement
Data Type Identifiers

Import from Outside of the TOE
Import of User Data with Security
Attributes

AC-4(18)

Information Flow Enforcement
Security Attribute Binding

AC-16

Security Attributes

SC-16

Transmission of Security Attributes

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

SC-5

Denial of Service Protection

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

SC-5

Denial of Service Protection

AC-4(21)

Information Flow Enforcement
Physical / Logical Separation of Information
Flows

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(1)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Integrity Checks

SC-8(1)

Transmission Integrity
Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

SI-7(5)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Automated Response to Integrity Violations

Internal TOE Transfer
Basic Internal Transfer Protection

Internal TOE Transfer
Transmission Separation by Attribute

Internal TOE Transfer
Integrity Monitoring

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS
FDP_ITT.4

Internal TOE Transfer
Attribute-Based Integrity Monitoring

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(1)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Integrity Checks

SC-8(1)

Transmission Integrity
Cryptographic or Alternate PhysicalProtection

AC-4(21)

Information Flow Enforcement
Physical / Logical Separation of Information
Flows

SI-7(5)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Automated Response to Integrity Violations

FDP_RIP.1

Residual Information Protection
Subset Residual Information
Protection

SC-4

Information in Shared Resources

FDP_RIP.2

Residual Information Protection
Full Residual Information Protection

SC-4

Information in Shared Resources

FDP_ROL.1

Rollback
Basic Rollback

CP-10(2)Information System Recovery andReconstitution
Transaction Recovery

FDP_ROL.2

Rollback
Advanced Rollback

CP-10(2)Information System Recovery andReconstitution
Transaction Recovery

FDP_SDI.1

Stored Data Integrity
Stored Data Integrity Monitoring

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(1)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Integrity Scans

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(1)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Integrity Scans

SI-7(5)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Automated Response to Integrity Violations

Inter-TSF User Data Confidentiality
Transfer Protection
Basic Data Exchange Confidentiality

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

Inter-TSF User Data Integrity
Transfer Protection
Data Exchange Integrity

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(6)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Cryptographic Protection

FDP_SDI.2

FDP_UCT.1

FDP_UIT.1

FDP_UIT.2

APPENDIX HStored Data Integrity
Stored Data Integrity Monitoring andActionInter-TSF User Data Integrity
Transfer Protection
Source Data Exchange Recovery

No Mapping.

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLSFDP_UIT.3

Inter-TSF User Data Integrity
Transfer Protection
Destination Data Exchange Recovery

No Mapping.

FIA_AFL.1

Authentication Failure
Authentication Failure Handling

AC-7

Unsuccessful Logon Attempts

FIA_ATD.1

User Attribute Definition
User Attribute Definition

AC-2

Account Management

IA-2

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)

Specification of Secrets
Verification of Secrets

IA-5

Authenticator ManagementIA-5(1)

Authenticator Management
Password-Based Authentication

IA-5(12)Authenticator Management
Biometric Authentication

IA-5

Authenticator ManagementIA-5(1)

Authenticator Management
Password-Based Authentication

IA-5(12)Authenticator Management
Biometric Authentication

AC-14

Permitted Actions without Identification orAuthentication

IA-2

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)

IA-8

Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)

AC-14

Permitted Actions without Identification orAuthentication

IA-2

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)

IA-8

Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)

IA-2(8)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Privileged Accounts Replay ResistantIA-2(9)Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts Replay ResistantIA-2(8)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Privileged Accounts Replay ResistantIA-2(9)Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts Replay ResistantIA-2(1)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Privileged Accounts

IA-2(2)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts

FIA_SOS.1

FIA_SOS.2

FIA_UAU.1

FIA_UAU.2

FIA_UAU.3

FIA_UAU.4

FIA_UAU.5

APPENDIX H

Specification of Secrets
TSF Generation of Secrets

User Authentication
Timing of Authentication

User Authentication
User Authentication Before Any Action

User Authentication
Unforgeable Authentication

User Authentication
Single-Use Authentication
Mechanisms

User Authentication
Multiple Authentication Mechanisms

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NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
IA-2(3)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Local Access To Privileged Accounts

IA-2(4)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Local Access To Non-Privileged Accounts

IA-2(6)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Privileged Accounts Separate Device

IA-2(7)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts Separate Device

IA-2(11)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Remote Access - Separate Device

FIA_UAU.6

User Authentication
Re-Authenticating

IA-11

Re-authentication

FIA_UAU.7

User Authentication
Protected Authentication Feedback

IA-6

Authenticator Feedback

FIA_UID.1

User Identification
Timing of Identification

AC-14

Permitted Actions without Identification orAuthentication

IA-2

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)

IA-8

Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)

AC-14

Permitted Actions without Identification orAuthentication

IA-2

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)

IA-8

Identification and Authentication (NonOrganizational Users)

FIA_UID.2

User Identification
User Identification Before Any Action

FIA_USB.1

User-Subject Binding
User-Subject Binding

AC-16(3)Security Attributes
Maintenance Of Attribute Associations By
Information System

FMT_MOF.1

Management of Functions in TSF
Management of Security Functions
Behavior

AC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Role-Based Access Control

AC-6

Least Privilege

AC-6(1)

Least Privilege
Authorize Access To Security Functions

AC-6

Least Privilege

AC-6(1)

Least Privilege
Authorize Access To Security Functions

AC-16(2)Security Attributes
Attribute Value Changes By Authorized
Individuals

AC-16(4)Security Attributes
Association of Attributes By Authorized
Individuals

AC-16(10)Security Attributes
Attribute Configuration By Authorized
Individuals

FMT_MSA.1

APPENDIX H

Management of Security Attributes
Management of Security Attributes

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FMT_MSA.2

Management of Security Attributes
Secure Security Attributes

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
AC-16

Security Attributes

CM-6

Configuration Settings

SI-10

Information Input Validation

FMT_MSA.3

Management of Security Attributes
Static Attribute Initialization

No Mapping.

FMT_MSA.4

Management of Security Attributes
Security Attribute Value Inheritance

No Mapping.

FMT_MTD.1

Management of TSF DataManagement of TSF Data

AC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Role-Based Access Control

AC-6

Least Privilege

AC-6(1)

Least Privilege
Authorize Access To Security Functions

AU-6(7)

Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting
Permitted Actions

AU-9(4)

Protection of Audit Information
Access By Subset of Privileged Users

AC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Role-based Access Control

AC-6

Least Privilege

AC-6(1)

Least Privilege
Authorize Access To Security Functions

FMT_MTD.2

Management of TSF DataManagement of Limits on TSF Data

FMT_MTD.3

Management of TSF Data
Secure TSF Data

SI-10

Information Input Validation

FMT_REV.1

Revocation
Revocation

AC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Rose-based Access Control

AC-3(8)

Access Enforcement
Revocation Of Access Authorizations

AC-6

Least Privilege

AC-6(1)

Least Privilege
Authorize Access To Security Functions

AC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Role-based Access Control

AC-6

Least Privilege

AC-6(1)

Least Privilege
Authorize Access To Security Functions

FMT_SAE.1

Security Attribute Expiration
Time-Limited Authorization

FMT_SMF.1

Specification of Management
Functions
Specification of Management
Functions

No Mapping.

FMT_SMR.1

Security Management Roles
Security Roles

AC-2(7)

Account Management
Role-based schemesAC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Role-Based Access Control

AC-5

Separation of Duties

AC-6

Least Privilege

AC-2(7)

Account Management
Role-based schemesAC-3(7)

Access Enforcement
Role-Based Access Control

AC-5

Separation of Duties

FMT_SMR.2

APPENDIX H

Security Management Roles
Restrictions on Security Roles

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FMT_SMR.3

Security Management Roles
Assuming Roles

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
AC-6

Least Privilege

AC-6(1)

Least Privilege
Authorized Access to Security Functions

AC-6(2)

Least Privilege
Non-Privileged Access For Nonsecurity
Functions

FPR_ANO.1

Anonymity
Anonymity

No Mapping.

FPR_ANO.2

Anonymity
Anonymity Without Soliciting
Information

No Mapping.

FPR_PSE.1

Pseudonymity
Pseudonymity

No Mapping.

FPR_PSE.2

Pseudonymity
Reversible Pseudonymity

No Mapping.

FPR_PSE.3

Pseudonymity
Alias Pseudonymity

No Mapping.

FPR_UNL.1

Unlinkability
Unlinkability

No Mapping.

FPR_UNO.1

Unobservability
Unobservability

No Mapping.

FPR_UNO.2

Unobservability
Allocation of Information Impacting
Unobservability

No Mapping.

FPR_UNO.3

Unobservability
Unobservability Without Soliciting
Information

No Mapping.

FPR_UNO.4

Unobservability
Authorized User Observability

No Mapping.

FPT_FLS.1

Fail Secure
Failure with Preservation of SecureState

SC-7(18)

Boundary Protection
Fail Secure

SC-24

Fail in Known StateFPT_ITA.1

Availability of Exported TSF Data
Inter-TSF Availability within a Defined
Availability Metric

CP-10

Information System Recovery And
Reconstitution
Restore Within Time Period

SC-5

Denial of Service Protection

SC-5(2)

Denial of Service Protection
Excess Capacity/Bandwidth/Redundancy

SC-5(3)

Denial of Service Protection
Detection/Monitoring

Confidentiality of Exported TSF
DataInter-TSF Confidentiality During
Transmission

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection

Integrity of Exported TSF Data
Inter-TSF Detection of Modification

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(1)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Integrity Scans

FPT_ITC.1

FPT_ITI.1

APPENDIX H

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FPT_ITI.2

FPT_ITT.1

FPT_ITT.2

FPT_ITT.3

FPT_PHP.1

FPT_PHP.2

FPT_PHP.3

APPENDIX HNIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SI-7(5)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Automated Response to Integrity Violations

SI-7(6)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Cryptographic Protection

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(1)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Integrity Scans

SI-7(5)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Automated Response to Integrity Violations

SI-7(6)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Cryptographic Protection

Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer
Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer
Protection

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection

Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer
TSF Data Transfer Separation

AC-4(21)

Information Flow Enforcement
Physical / Logical Separation Of Information
Flows

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
IntegritySI-7(1)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Integrity Scans

SI-7(5)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Automated Response to Integrity Violations

SI-7(6)

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity
Cryptographic Protection

PE-3(5)

Physical Access Control
Tamper Protection

PE-6(2)

Monitoring Physical Access
Automated Intrusion Recognition / Responses

SA-18

Tamper Resistance and Detection

PE-3(5)

Physical Access Control
Tamper Protection

PE-6(2)

Monitoring Physical Access
Automated Intrusion Recognition / Responses

SA-18

Tamper Resistance and Detection

PE-3(5)

Physical Access Control
Tamper Protection

Integrity of Exported TSF Data
Inter-TSF Detection and Correction of
Modification

Internal TOE TSF Data Transfer
TSF Data Integrity Monitoring

TSF Physical Protection
Passive Detection of Physical Attack

TSF Physical Protection
Notification of Physical Attack

TSF Physical Protection
Resistance to Physical Attack

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Tamper Resistance and Detection

CP-10

Information System Recovery andReconstitution

CP-12

Safe Mode

CP-10

Information System Recovery andReconstitution

CP-12

Safe Mode

Trusted Recovery
Automated Recovery Without Undue
Loss

CP-10

Information System Recovery andReconstitution

CP-12

Safe Mode

Trusted Recovery
Function Recovery

SI-6

Security Function Verification

SI-10(3)Information Input Validation
Predictable Behavior

SC-24

Fail in Known State

IA-2(8)

Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Privileged Accounts Replay ResistantIA-2(9)Identification and Authentication(Organizational Users)
Network Access To Non-Privileged Accounts Replay ResistantSC-23

Session Authenticity

SI-3(9)

Malicious Code Protection
Authenticate Remote Commands

FPT_RCV.1

Trusted Recovery
Manual Recovery

FPT_RCV.2

Trusted Recovery
Automated Recovery

FPT_RCV.3

FPT_RCV.4

FPT_RPL.1

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SA-18

Replay Detection
Replay Detection

FPT_SSP.1

State Synchrony Protocol
Simple Trusted Acknowledgement

No Mapping.

FPT_SSP.2

State Synchrony Protocol
Mutual Trusted Acknowledgement

No Mapping.

FPT_STM.1

Time Stamps
Reliable Time Stamps

AU-8

Time Stamps

FPT_TDC.1

Inter-TSF TSF Data Consistency
Inter-TSF Basic Data Consistency

AC-16(7)Security Attributes | Consistent Attribute
Interpretation

AC-16(8)Security Attributes
Association Techniques/Technologies

FPT_TEE.1

Testing of External Entities
Testing of External Entities

SI-6

Security Functionality Verification

FPT_TRC.1

Internal TOE TSF Data Replication
Consistency
Internal TSF Consistency

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity

FPT_TST.1

TSF Self-Test
TSF Testing

SI-6

Security Functionality Verification

SI-7

Software, Firmware, and Information
Integrity

Fault Tolerance
Degraded Fault Tolerance

AU-15

Alternate Audit Capability

CP-11

Alternate Communications Protocols

SC-24

Fail in Known State

SI-13

Predictable Failure Prevention

SI-13(1)Predictable Failure Prevention
Transferring Component Responsibilities

FRU_FLT.1

APPENDIX H

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTSFRU_FLT.2

Fault Tolerance
Limited Fault Tolerance

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SI-13(2)Predictable Failure Prevention
Time Limit on Process Execution Without
Supervision

SI-13(3)Predictable Failure Prevention
Manual Transfer Between Components

SI-13(4)Predictable Failure Prevention
Standby Component Installation/Notification

SI-13(5)Predictable Failure Prevention
Failover Capability

AU-15

Alternate Audit Capability

CP-11

Alternate Communications Protocols

SC-24

Fail in Known State

SI-13

Predictable Failure Prevention

SI-13(1)Predictable Failure Prevention
Transferring Component Responsibilities

SI-13(2)Predictable Failure Prevention
Time Limit on Process Execution Without
Supervision

SI-13(3)Predictable Failure Prevention
Manual Transfer Between Components

SI-13(4)Predictable Failure Prevention
Standby Component Installation/Notification

SI-13(5)Predictable Failure Prevention
Failover Capability

FRU_PRS.1

Priority of Service
Limited Priority of Service

SC-6

Resource Availability

FRU_PRS.2

Priority of Service
Full Priority of Service

SC-6

Resource Availability

FRU_RSA.1

Resource Allocation
Maximum Quotas

SC-6

Resource Availability

FRU_RSA.2

Resource Allocation
Minimum and Maximum Quotas

SC-6

Resource Availability

FTA_LSA.1

Limitation on Scope of Selectable
Attributes
Limitation on Scope of Selectable
Attributes

AC-2(6)

Account Management
Dynamic Privilege ManagementAC-2(11)

Account Management
Usage Conditions

FTA_MCS.1

Limitation on Multiple Concurrent
Sessions
Basic Limitation on Multiple
Concurrent Sessions

AC-10

Concurrent Session Control

FTA_MCS.2

Limitation on Multiple Concurrent
Sessions
Per-User Limitation on Multiple
Concurrent Sessions

AC-10

Concurrent Session Control

FTA_SSL.1

Session Locking and Termination
TSF-Initiated Session Locking

AC-11

Session Lock

AC-11(1)Session Lock
Pattern-Hiding Displays

Session Locking and Termination
User-Initiated Locking

AC-11

Session Lock

AC-11(1)Session Lock
Pattern-Hiding Displays

FTA_SSL.2

APPENDIX H

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NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

Session Locking and Termination
TSF-Initiated Termination

AC-12

Session Termination

SC-10

Network Disconnect

FTA_SSL.4

Session Locking and Termination
User-Initiated Termination

AC-12(1)Session Termination
User-Initiated Logouts / Message Displays

FTA_TAB.1

TOE Access Banners
Default TOE Access Banners

AC-8

System Use Notification

FTA_TAH.1

TOE Access History
TOE Access History

AC-9

Previous Login (Access) Notification

AC-9(1)

Previous Login (Access) Notification
Unsuccessful Logons

FTA_TSE.1

TOE Session Establishment
TOE Session Establishment

AC-2(11)

Account Management
Usage Conditions

FTP_ITC.1

Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

IA-3(1)

Device Identification and Authentication
Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication

SC-8

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

SC-8(1)

Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity
Cryptographic or Alternate Physical Protection

SC-11

Trusted PathFTA_SSL.3

FTP_TRP.1

Trusted Path
Trusted Path
Assurance Requirements

ASE_INT.1
EAL1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

ST Introduction
ST Introduction

SA-4

Acquisition Process

ASE_CCL.1
EAL1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

Conformance Claims
Conformance Claims

PL-2

System Security Plan

SA-4(7)

Acquisition Process
NIAP-Approved Protection Profiles

ASE_SPD.1
EAL1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

Security Problem Definition
Security Problem Definition

PL-2

System Security Plan

SA-4

Acquisition Process

ASE_OBJ.1
EAL1

Security Objectives
Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment

PL-2

System Security Plan

SA-4

Acquisition Process

ASE_OBJ.2
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

Security Objectives
Security Objectives

PL-2

System Security Plan

SA-4

Acquisition Process

APPENDIX H

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NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLSASE_ECD.1
EAL1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

Extended Components Definition
Extended Components Definition

No Mapping.

ASE_REQ.1
EAL1

Security Requirements
Stated Security Requirements

PL-2

System Security Plan

SA-4

Acquisition Process

ASE_REQ.2
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

Security Requirements
Derived Security Requirements

PL-2

System Security Plan

SA-4

Acquisition Process

ASE_TSS.1
EAL1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

TOE Summary Specification
TOE Summary Specification

PL-2

System Security Plan

SA-4(1)

Acquisition Process
Functional Properties of Security Controls

ASE_TSS.2

TOE Summary Specification
TOE Summary Specification with
Architectural Design Summary

PL-2

System Security Plan

SA-4(1)

Acquisition Process
Functional Properties of Security ControlsSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information For
Security Controls

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignAC-25

Reference Monitor

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSA-18

Tamper Resistance and Detection

SC-3

Security Function Isolation

SC-3(1)

Security Function Isolation
Hardware Separation

SC-3(2)

Security Function Isolation
Minimize Nonsecurity Functionality

SC-41

Process Isolation

SA-4(1)

Acquisition Process
Functional Properties of Security ControlsSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security ControlsSA-4(1)

Acquisition Process
Functional Properties of Security ControlsSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

ADV_ARC.1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

ADV_FSP.1
EAL1

ADV_FSP.2
EAL2

APPENDIX H

Security Architecture
Security Architecture Description

Functional Specification
Basic Functional Specification

Functional Specification
Security-Enforcing Functional
Specification

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS

ADV_FSP.3
EAL3

ADV_FSP.4
EAL4

ADV_FSP.5
EAL5
EAL6

ADV_FSP.6
EAL7

Functional Specification
Functional Specification With
Complete Summary

Functional Specification
Complete Functional Specification

Functional Specification
Complete Semi-Formal Functional
Specification with Additional Error
Information

Functional Specification
Complete Semi-Formal Functional
Specification with Additional Formal
Specification

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SA-17(4)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignInformal CorrespondenceSA-4(1)

Acquisition Process
Functional Properties of Security ControlsSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17(4)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignInformal CorrespondenceSA-4(1)

Acquisition Process
Functional Properties of Security ControlsSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17(4)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignInformal CorrespondenceSA-4(1)

Acquisition Process
Functional Properties of Security ControlsSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17(4)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignInformal CorrespondenceSA-4(1)

Acquisition Process
Functional Properties of Security ControlsSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17(3)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignFormal Correspondence

SA-17(4)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignInformal Correspondence

ADV_IMP.1
EAL4
EAL5

Implementation Representation
Implementation Representation of the
TSF

SA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

ADV_IMP.2
EAL6
EAL7

Implementation Representation
Complete Mapping of the
Implementation Representation of the
TSF

SA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17(3)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignFormal Correspondence

TSF Internals
Well-Structured Subset of TSF
Internals

SA-8

Security Engineering Principles

SC-3(3)

Security Function Isolation
Minimize Nonsecurity Functionality

SC-3(4)

Security Function Isolation
Module Coupling and CohesivenessSC-3(5)

Security Function Isolation
Layered Structures

ADV_INT.1

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ADV_INT.2
EAL5

ADV_INT.3
EAL6
EAL7

ADV_SPM.1
EAL6
EAL7

ADV_TDS.1
EAL2

ADV_TDS.2
EAL3

ADV_TDS.3
EAL4

ADV_TDS.4
EAL5

APPENDIX H

TSF Internals
Well-Structured Internals

TSF Internals
Minimally Complex Internals

Security Policy Modeling
Formal TOE Security Policy ModelTOE Design
Basic Design

TOE Design
Architectural Design

TOE Design
Basic Modular Design

TOE Design
Semiformal Modular Design

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SA-8

Security Engineering Principles

SC-3(3)

Security Function Isolation
Minimize Nonsecurity Functionality

SC-3(4)

Security Function Isolation
Module Coupling and CohesivenessSC-3(5)

Security Function Isolation
Layered Structures

SA-8

Security Engineering Principles

SA-17(5)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignConceptually Simple DesignSC-3(3)

Security Function Isolation
Minimize Nonsecurity
Functionality

SC-3(4)

Security Function Isolation
Module Coupling and CohesivenessSC-3(5)

Security Function Isolation
Layered Structures

AC-25

Reference Monitor

SA-17(1)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignFormal Policy Model

SA-17(3)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignFormal CorrespondenceSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSA-17(2)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSecurity Relevant Components

SA-17(4)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignInformal Correspondence

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS
ADV_TDS.5
EAL6

ADV_TDS.6
EAL7

TOE Design
Complete Semiformal Modular Design

TOE Design
Complete Semiformal Modular Design
with Formal High-Level Design
Presentation

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSA-17(2)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSecurity Relevant Components

SA-17(4)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignInformal CorrespondenceSA-4(2)Acquisition Process
Design / Implementation Information for
Security Controls

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSA-17(2)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignSecurity Relevant Components

SA-17(3)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignFormal Correspondence

SA-17(4)Developer Security Architecture and
DesignInformal Correspondence

AGD_OPE.1
EAL1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

Operational User Guidance
Operational User Guidance

SA-5

Information System Documentation

AGD_PRE.1
EAL1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

Preparative Procedures
Preparative Procedures

SA-5

Information System Documentation

ALC_CMC.1
EAL1

CM Capabilities
Labeling of the TOE

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMC.2
EAL2

CM Capabilities
Use of a CM System

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMC.3
EAL3

CM Capabilities
Authorization Controls

CM-3

Configuration Change Control

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMC.4
EAL4
EAL5

CM Capabilities
Production Support, Acceptance
Procedures, and Automation

CM-3

Configuration Change Control

CM-3(1)

Configuration Change Control
Automated Document / Notification /Prohibition of Changes

CM-3(3)

Configuration Change Control
Automated Change Implementation

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

APPENDIX H

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS
ALC_CMC.5
EAL6
EAL7

CM Capabilities
Advanced Support

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

CM-3

Configuration Change Control

CM-3(1)

Configuration Change Control
Automated Document / Notification /Prohibition of Changes

CM-3(2)

Configuration Change Control
Test / Validate / Document Changes

CM-3(3)

Configuration Change Control
Automated mechanisms to field and deploy

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.1
EAL1

CM Scope
TOE CM Coverage

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.2
EAL2

CM Scope
Parts of the TOE CM Coverage

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.3
EAL3

CM Scope
Implementation Representation CM
Coverage

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.4
EAL4

CM Scope
Problem Tracking CM Coverage

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

ALC_CMS.5
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

CM Scope
Development Tools CM Coverage

CM-9

Configuration Management Plan

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

ALC_DEL.1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7

Delivery
Delivery Procedures

MP-5Media Transport

SA-10(1)Developer Configuration Management
Software / Firmware Integrity Verification

SA-10(6)Developer Configuration Management
Trusted Distribution

SA-18

Tamper Resistance and Detection

SA-19

Component Authenticity

ALC_DVS.1
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5

Development Security
Identification of Security Measures

SA-1

System and Services Acquisition Policy
and Procedures

SA-3

System Development Lifecycle

SA-12

Supply Chain Protection

ALC_DVS.2
EAL6
EAL7

Development Security
Sufficiency of Security Measures

CM-5

Access Restrictions for Change

SA-3

System Development Lifecycle

SA-12

Supply Chain Protection

ALC_FLR.1

Flaw Remediation
Basic Flaw Remediation

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

SA-11

Developer Security Testing / Evaluation

SI-2

Flaw Remediation

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

SA-11

Developer Security Testing / Evaluation

SI-2

Flaw Remediation

SA-10

Developer Configuration Management

SA-11

Developer Security Testing / Evaluation

SI-2

Flaw Remediation

ALC_FLR.2

ALC_FLR.3

APPENDIX H

Flaw Remediation
Flaw Reporting Procedures

Flaw Remediation
Systematic Flaw Remediation

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NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS

ALC_LCD.1
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6

Life-Cycle Definition
Developer Defined Life-Cycle Model

SA-3

System Development Life Cycle

SA-15

Development Process, Standards, andTools

ALC_LCD.2
EAL7

Life-Cycle Definition
Measurable Life-Cycle Model

SA-3

System Development Life Cycle

SA-15

Development Process, Standards, andTools

ALC_TAT.1
EAL4

Tools and Techniques
Well-Defined Development Tools

SA-15

Development Process, Standards, andTools

ALC_TAT.2
EAL5

Tools and Techniques
Compliance with Implementation
Standards

SA-15

Development Process, Standards, andTools

ALC_TAT.3
EAL6
EAL7

Tools and Techniques
Compliance with Implementation
Standards – All Parts

SA-15

Development Process, Standards, andTools

ATE_COV.1
EAL2

Coverage
Evidence of Coverage

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_COV.2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5

Coverage
Analysis of Coverage

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_COV.3
EAL6
EAL7

Coverage
Rigorous Analysis of Coverage

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_DPT.1
EAL3

Depth
Testing: Basic Design

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_DPT.2
EAL4

Depth
Testing: Security Enforcing Modules

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_DPT.3
EAL5
EAL6

Depth
Testing: Modular Design

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_DPT.4
EAL7

Depth
Testing: Implementation
Representation

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

SA-11(7)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Verify Scope of Testing / Evaluation

ATE_FUN.1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5

Functional Tests
Functional Testing

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ATE_FUN.2
EAL6
EAL7

Functional Tests
Ordered Functional Testing

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ATE_IND.1
EAL1

Independent Testing
Independent Testing – Conformance

CA-2

Security Assessments

CA-2(1)

Security Assessments
Independent Assessors

SA-11(3)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Independent Verification of Assessment Plans/ Evidence

APPENDIX H

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ATE_IND.2
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6

Independent Testing
Independent Testing – Sample

ATE_IND.3
EAL7

Independent Testing
Independent Testing – Complete

AVA_VAN.1
EAL1

AVA_VAN.2
EAL2
EAL3

AVA_VAN.3
EAL4

AVA_VAN.4
EAL5

AVA_VAN.5
EAL6
EAL7

APPENDIX H

Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability Survey

Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability Analysis

Vulnerability Analysis
Focused Vulnerability Analysis

Vulnerability Analysis
Methodical Vulnerability Analysis

Vulnerability Analysis
Advanced Methodical Vulnerability
Analysis

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
CA-2

Security Assessments

CA-2(1)

Security Assessments
Independent Assessors

SA-11(3)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Independent Verification of Assessment Plans/ Evidence

CA-2

Security Assessments

CA-2(1)

Security Assessments
Independent Assessors

SA-11(3)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Independent Verification of Assessment Plans/ EvidenceCA-2(2)

Security Assessments
Specialized Assessments

CA-8

Penetration Testing

RA-3

Risk Assessment

SA-11(2)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw
Remediation

SA-11(5)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Penetration TestingCA-2(2)

Security Assessments
Specialized Assessments

CA-8

Penetration Testing

RA-3

Risk Assessment

SA-11(2)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw
Remediation

SA-11(5)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Penetration TestingCA-2(2)

Security Assessments
Specialized Assessments

CA-8

Penetration Testing

RA-3

Risk Assessment

SA-11( 2)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw
Remediation

SA-11(5)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Penetration TestingCA-2(2)

Security Assessments
Types of Assessments

CA-8

Penetration Testing

RA-3

Risk Assessment

SA-11(2)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw
Remediation

SA-11(5)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Penetration TestingCA-2(2)

Security Assessments
Types of Assessments

CA-8

Penetration Testing

RA-3

Risk Assessment

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ISO/IEC 15408 REQUIREMENTS

NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS
SA-11(2)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Threat And Vulnerability Analyses / Flaw
Remediation

SA-11(5)Developer Security Testing and Evaluation
Penetration Testing

ACO_COR.1

Composition Rationale
Composition Rationale

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignACO_DEV.1

Development Evidence
Functional Description

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignACO_DEV.2

Development Evidence
Basic Evidence of Design

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignACO_DEV.3

Development Evidence
Detailed Evidence of Design

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignACO_REL.1

Reliance on Dependent Component
Basic Reliance Information

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignACO_REL.2

Reliance on Dependent Component
Reliance Information

SA-17

Developer Security Architecture and
DesignACO_CTT.1

Composed TOE Testing
Interface Testing

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ACO_CTT.2

Composed TOE Testing
Rigorous Interface Testing

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ACO_VUL.1

Composition Vulnerability Analysis
Composition Vulnerability Review

CA-2

Security Assessments

CA-8

Penetration Testing

RA-3

Risk Assessment

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

CA-2

Security Assessments

CA-8

Penetration Testing

RA-3

Risk Assessment

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

CA-2

Security Assessments

CA-8

Penetration Testing

RA-3

Risk Assessment

SA-11

Developer Security Testing and Evaluation

ACO_VUL.2

ACO_VUL.3

APPENDIX H

Composition Vulnerability Analysis
Composition Vulnerability Analysis

Composition Vulnerability Analysis
Enhanced-Basic Composition
Vulnerability Review

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APPENDIX IOVERLAY TEMPLATEAPPLYING TAILORING GUIDANCE FOR SPECIAL CONDITIONS OR COMMUNITY-WIDE USE

116

O

rganizations may use the following template when developing tailored baselines using theconcept of overlays. 117 The template is provided as an example only—organizations may
choose to use other formats or modify the format in this appendix based on organizational
needs and the type of overlay being developed. The level of detail included in the overlay is at thediscretion of the organization initiating the overlay but should be of sufficient breadth and depth
to provide an appropriate rationale and justification for the resulting tailored baseline developed,
including any risk-based decisions made during the overlay development process. Security
control baseline tailoring using the concept of overlays results in security plans that are subject toapproval by authorizing officials. The example template consists of eight sections:•

Identification;•

Overlay Characteristics;•

Applicability;•

Overlay Summary;•

Detailed Overlay Control Specifications;•Tailoring Considerations;•Definitions; and•Additional Information or Instructions.

How Overlays Can Be Used
Within the Risk Management Framework (RMF), overlays are implemented as part of the
tailoring process after the completion of an initial security categorization process described in
Section 3.1 and any organization-specific guidance. The security categorization process results inthe determination of an impact level of the information system, and is subsequently used to selectan initial set of security controls from one of the security control baselines in Appendix D. 118
After the initial set of security controls is identified, organizations initiate the tailoring process tomodify and align the controls more closely with the specific conditions within the organizations.
Overlays provide tailoring guidance from a community-wide perspective to address specialized
requirements, missions/business functions, technologies, or environments of operation. Overlays
provide uniformity and efficiency of security control selection by presenting tailoring options

116

Tailored baselines produced using the concept of overlays can be published independently in a variety of venues andpublications including, for example, OMB policies, CNSS Instructions, NIST Special Publications, industry standards,
and sector-specific guidance. As part of the overlay initiative, the previous guidance in Appendix I regarding industrial
and process control system security will be transferred to NIST Special Publication 800-82.
117
While organizations are encouraged to use the overlay concept to tailor security control baselines, generating widely
divergent overlays on the same topic may prove to be counterproductive. The overlay concept is most effective whencommunities of interest work together to create consensus-based overlays that are not duplicative.
118
CNSS Instruction 1253 provides security categorization guidance and security control baselines for national security
systems.

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developed by security experts and other subject matter experts to information system owners
responsible for implementing and maintaining such systems.
There is a considerable range of options that can be used to construct overlays, depending on thespecificity desired by the overlay developers. Some overlays may be very specific with respect tothe hardware, firmware, and software that form the key components the information system andthe environment in which the system operates. Other overlays may be more abstract in order to be
applicable to a large class of information systems that may be deployed in different environments.
The example template described below can be used for any level of specificity on this continuumof potential options for overlays.
Overlays that provide greater specificity are typically developed by organizations with authority
over the information system owners and environments of operation. Organizations decide on theappropriate tailoring actions for the selected baseline security controls as described in Section 3.2.
Many of the variables and conditions that qualify the overlay for use on a specific information
system are made explicit to ensure consistency when applying the overlay. Overlays that provide
less specificity can also be developed by security and subject matter experts for application tolarge classes of information systems or in situations where there is less than full knowledge about
the specific implementation details related to the system. Less specific overlays may require
additional tailoring to customize the set of security controls for the specific information system.
These overlays leave many of the assignment and selection statements in the security controls(i.e., the variable portion of the controls) to be completed by the organization that owns andoperates the information system. The eight sections comprising the overlay are described below.
Identification
Organizations identify the overlay by providing: (i) a unique name for the overlay; (ii) a version
number and date; (iii) the version of NIST Special Publication 800-53 used to create the overlay;(iv) other documentation used to create the overlay; (v) author or authoring group and point ofcontact; and (vi) type of organizational approval received. Organizations define how long theoverlay is to be in effect and any events that may trigger an update to the overlay other thanchanges to NIST Special Publication 800-53 or organization-specific security guidance. If there
are no unique events that can trigger an update for the overlay, this section provides that notation.
Overlay Characteristics
Organizations describe the characteristics that define the intended use of the overlay in order tohelp potential users select the most appropriate overlay for their missions/business functions. This
may include, for example, a description of: (i) the environment in which the information system
will be used (e.g., inside a guarded building within the continental United States, in an unmanned
space vehicle, while traveling for business to a foreign country that is known for attempting togain access to sensitive or classified information, or in a mobile vehicle that is in close proximity
to hostile entities); (ii) the type of information that will be processed, stored, or transmitted (e.g.,
personal identity and authentication information, financial management information, facilities,
fleet, and equipment management information, defense and national security information, systemdevelopment information); (iii) the functionality within the information system or the type ofsystem (e.g., standalone system, industrial/process control system, or cross-domain system); and(iv) other characteristics related to the overlay that help protect organizational missions/business
functions, information systems, information, or individuals from a specific set of threats that may
not be addressed by the assumptions described in Chapter Three.

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Applicability
Organizations provide criteria to assist potential users of the overlay in determining whether or
not the overlay applies to a particular information system or environment of operation. Typicalformats include, for example, a list of questions or a decision tree based on the description of thecharacteristics of the information system (including associated applications) and its environmentof operation at the level of specificity appropriate to the overlay.
Overlay Summary
Organizations provide a brief summary of the salient characteristics of the overlay. This summary
may include, for example: (i) the security controls and control enhancements that are affected by
the overlay; (ii) an indication of which controls/enhancements are selected or not selected basedon the characteristics and assumptions in the overlay, the tailoring guidance provided in Section
3.2, or any organization-specific guidance; (iii) the selected controls/enhancements including an
overview of new supplemental guidance and parameter values; and (iv) references to applicablelaws, Executive Orders, directives, instructions, regulations, policies, or standards.
Detailed Overlay Control Specifications
Organizations provide a comprehensive expression of the security controls/control enhancementsin the overlay as part of the tailoring process. This may include, for example: (i) justification for
selecting or not selecting a specific security control/control enhancement; (ii) modifications to the
supplemental guidance or the addition of new supplemental guidance for the security controls andcontrol enhancements to address the characteristics of the overlay and the environments in which
the overlay is intended to operate; (iii) unique parameter values for security control selection orassignment statements; (iv) specific statutory and/or regulatory requirements (above and beyond
FISMA) that are met by a security control or control enhancement; (v) recommendations forcompensating controls, as appropriate; and (vi) guidance that extends the basic capability of thecontrol/enhancement by specifying additional functionality, altering the strength of mechanism,or adding or limiting implementation options.
Tailoring Considerations
Organizations provide information to information system owners and authorizing officials to
consider during the tailoring process when determining the set of security controls applicable totheir specific information systems. This is especially important for overlays that are used in anenvironment of operation different from the one assumed by the security control baselines (asdefined in Section 3.1). In addition, organizations can provide guidance on the use of multiple
overlays applied to a security control baseline and address any potential conflicts that may arise
between overlay specifications and baseline controls.
Definitions
Organizations provide any terms and associated definitions that are unique and relevant to theoverlay. The terms and definitions are listed in alphabetical order. If there are no unique terms ordefinitions for the overlay, this is stated in this section.
Additional Information or Instructions
Organizations provide any additional information or instructions relevant to the overlay notcovered in the previous sections.

APPENDIX I

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APPENDIX JPRIVACY CONTROL CATALOGPRIVACY CONTROLS, ENHANCEMENTS, AND SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCET

he need to protect an individual's privacy is as important today as it was in 1974 when the
Privacy Act first sought to balance the government's need to collect information from anindividual with a citizen's right to be notified as to how that information was being used,collected, maintained, and disposed of after the requisite period of use. These concerns are also
shared in the private sector, where healthcare, financial, and other services continue to bedelivered via the web with increasingly higher levels of personalization. The proliferation ofsocial media, Smart Grid, mobile, and cloud computing, as well as the transition from structured
to unstructured data and metadata environments, have added significant complexities andchallenges for federal organizations in safeguarding privacy. These challenges extend wellbeyond the traditional information technology security view of protecting privacy which focused
primarily on ensuring confidentiality. Now there are greater implications with respect tocontrolling the integrity of an individual's information, and with ensuring that an individual's
information is available on demand. The challenging landscape requires federal organizations to
expand their view of privacy, in order to meet citizen expectations of privacy that go beyond
information security.

Privacy, with respect to personally identifiable information (PII), 119 is a core value that can beobtained only with appropriate legislation, policies, procedures, and associated controls to ensurecompliance with requirements. Protecting the privacy of individuals and their PII that is collected,
used, maintained, shared, and disposed of by programs and information systems, is a fundamental
responsibility of federal organizations. Privacy also involves each individual’s right to decide
when and whether to share personal information, how much information to share, and theparticular circumstances under which that information can be shared. In today’s digital world,
effective privacy for individuals depends on the safeguards employed within the information
systems that are processing, storing, and transmitting PII and the environments in which thosesystems operate. Organizations cannot have effective privacy without a basic foundation of
information security. Privacy is more than security, however, and includes, for example, theprinciples of transparency, notice, and choice.
This appendix provides a structured set of controls for protecting privacy and serves as a roadmap
for organizations to use in identifying and implementing privacy controls concerning the entire
life cycle of PII, whether in paper or electronic form. The controls focus on information privacy
as a value distinct from, but highly interrelated with, information security. Privacy controls are
119

OMB Memorandum 07-16 defines PII as information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s
identity such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc., alone, or when combined with otherpersonal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth,mother’s maiden name, etc. OMB Memorandum 10-22 further states that “the definition of PII is not anchored to any
single category of information or technology. Rather, it requires a case-by-case assessment of the specific risk that anindividual can be identified by examining the context of use and combination of data elements. In performing thisassessment, it is important for agencies to recognize that non-PII can become PII, whenever additional information ismade publicly available, in any medium and from any source that, when combined with other available information,
could be used to identify an individual.” NIST Special Publication 800-122 also includes a definition of PII that differsfrom this appendix because it was focused on the security objective of confidentiality and not privacy in the broad
sense. Organizational definitions of PII may vary based on the consideration of additional regulatory requirements. The
privacy controls in this appendix apply regardless of the definition of PII by organizations.

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the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards employed within organizations to protect
and ensure the proper handling of PII. 120 Organizations may also engage in activities that do not
involve the collection and use of PII, but may nevertheless raise privacy concerns and associatedrisk. The privacy controls are equally applicable to those activities and can be used to analyze theprivacy risk and mitigate such risk when necessary.
The privacy controls in this appendix are based on the Fair Information Practice Principles(FIPPs) 121 embodied in the Privacy Act of 1974, Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002,
and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policies. The FIPPs are designed to build publictrust in the privacy practices of organizations and to help organizations avoid tangible costs andintangible damages from privacy incidents. There are eight privacy control families, each aligningwith one of the FIPPs. The privacy families can be implemented at the organization, department,
agency, component, office, program, or information system level, under the leadership andoversight of the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) 122 andin coordination with the Chief Information Security Officer, Chief Information Officer, program
officials, legal counsel, and others as appropriate. Table J-1 provides a summary of the privacy
controls by family in the privacy control catalog.
TABLE J-1: SUMMARY OF PRIVACY CONTROLS BY FAMILYID

PRIVACY CONTROLSAP

Authority and Purpose

AP-1

Authority to CollectAP-2

Purpose Specification

AR

Accountability, Audit, and Risk Management

AR-1

Governance and Privacy Program

AR-2

Privacy Impact and Risk Assessment

AR-3

Privacy Requirements for Contractors and Service Providers

AR-4

Privacy Monitoring and Auditing

AR-5

Privacy Awareness and Training

AR-6

Privacy Reporting

AR-7

Privacy-Enhanced System Design and Development

AR-8

Accounting of Disclosures

DI

Data Quality and Integrity

DI-1

Data Quality

DI-2

Data Integrity and Data Integrity Board

DM

Data Minimization and Retention

DM-1

Minimization of Personally Identifiable Information

DM-2

Data Retention and Disposal

120
In 2010, the Federal CIO Council Privacy Committee issued a framework for designing and implementing a privacy
program entitled Best Practices: Elements of a Federal Privacy Program (Elements White Paper). The privacy controls
in this appendix mirror a number of the elements included in the paper. Organizations can use the privacy controls andthe guidance in the paper to develop an organization-wide privacy program or enhance an already existing program.
121

The FIPPs are widely accepted in the United States and internationally as a general framework for privacy and arereflected in other federal and international laws and policies. In a number of organizations, FIPPs serve as the basis foranalyzing privacy risks and determining appropriate mitigation strategies. The Federal Enterprise Architecture Security
and Privacy Profile (FEA-SPP) also provided information and materials in development of the privacy controls.
122

All federal agencies and departments designate an SAOP/CPO as the senior organizational official with the overall
organization-wide responsibility for information privacy issues. OMB Memorandum 05-08 provides guidance for thedesignation of SAOPs/CPOs. The term SAOP/CPO as used in this appendix means an organization’s senior privacy
leader, whose job title may vary from organization to organization.

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ID
DM-3

PRIVACY CONTROLSMinimization of PII Used in Testing, Training, and Research

IP

Individual Participation and Redress

IP-1

Consent

IP-2

Individual Access

IP-3

Redress

IP-4

Complaint Management

SE

Security

SE-1

Inventory of Personally Identifiable Information

SE-2

Privacy Incident Response

TR

Transparency

TR-1

Privacy Notice

TR-2

System of Records Notices and Privacy Act Statements

TR-3

Dissemination of Privacy Program Information

UL

Use Limitation

UL-1

Internal Use

UL-2

Information Sharing with Third Parties

There is a strong similarity between the structure of the privacy controls in this appendix and thestructure of the security controls in Appendices F and G. For example, the control AR-1
(Governance and Privacy Program) requires organizations to develop privacy plans that can be
implemented at the organizational or program level. These plans can also be used in conjunction
with security plans to provide an opportunity for organizations to select the appropriate set of
security and privacy controls in accordance with organizational mission/business requirements
and the environments in which the organizations operate. Incorporating the fundamental concepts
associated with managing information security risk helps to ensure that the employment ofprivacy controls is carried out in a cost-effective and risk-based manner while simultaneously
meeting compliance requirements. Standardized privacy controls and assessment procedures(developed to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls) will provide a more disciplined andstructured approach for satisfying federal privacy requirements and demonstrating compliancewith those requirements.
In summary, the Privacy Appendix achieves several important objectives. The appendix:•

Provides a structured set of privacy controls, based on best practices, that helps organizations
comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, instructions, regulations,policies, standards, guidance, and organization-specific issuances;•

Establishes a linkage and relationship between privacy and security controls for purposes ofenforcing respective privacy and security requirements that may overlap in concept and in
implementation within federal information systems, programs, and organizations;•

Demonstrates the applicability of the NIST Risk Management Framework in the selection,
implementation, assessment, and ongoing monitoring of privacy controls deployed in federal
information systems, programs, and organizations; and•Promotes closer cooperation between privacy and security officials within the federal
government to help achieve the objectives of senior leaders/executives in enforcing therequirements in federal privacy legislation, policies, regulations, directives, standards, andguidance.

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HOW TO USE THIS APPENDIX
The privacy controls outlined in this publication are primarily for use by an organization’s Senior
Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) when working with program managers,
mission/business owners, information owners/stewards, Chief Information Officers, Chief Information
Security Officers, information system developers/integrators, and risk executives to determine how
best to incorporate effective privacy protections and practices (i.e., privacy controls) withinorganizational programs and information systems and the environments in which they operate. The
privacy controls facilitate the organization’s efforts to comply with privacy requirements affecting thoseorganizational programs and/or systems that collect, use, maintain, share, or dispose of personallyidentifiable information (PII) or other activities that raise privacy risks. While the security controls inAppendix F are allocated to the low, moderate, and high baselines in Appendix D, the privacy controls
are selected and implemented based on the privacy requirements of organizations and the need toprotect the PII of individuals collected and maintained by organizational information systems andprograms, in accordance with federal privacy legislation, policies, directives, regulations, guidelines, andbest practices.
Organizations analyze and apply each privacy control with respect to their distinct mission/business andoperational needs based on their legal authorities and obligations. Implementation of the privacy
controls may vary based upon this analysis (e.g., organizations that are defined as covered entities
pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA] may have additional
requirements that are not specifically enumerated in this publication). This enables organizations todetermine the information practices that are compliant with law and policy and those that may needreview. It also enables organizations to tailor the privacy controls to meet their defined and specificneeds at the organization level, mission/business process level, and information system level.
Organizations with national security or law enforcement authorities take those authorities as well asprivacy interests into account in determining how to apply the privacy controls in their operational
environments. Similarly, organizations subject to the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical
Efficiency Act (CIPSEA), implement the privacy controls consistent with that Act. All organizations
implement the privacy controls consistent with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, subject to any
exceptions and/or exemptions.
Privacy control enhancements described in Appendix J reflect best practices which organizations should
strive to achieve, but are not mandatory. Organizations should decide when to apply control
enhancements to support their particular missions/business functions. Specific overlays for privacy,
developed in accordance with the guidance in Section 3.2 and Appendix I, can also be considered tofacilitate the tailoring of the security control baselines in Appendix D with the requisite privacy controls
to ensure that both security and privacy requirements can be satisfied by organizations. Many of the
security controls in Appendix F provide the fundamental information protection for confidentiality,
integrity, and availability within organizational information systems and the environments in whichthose systems operate—protection that is essential for strong and effective privacy.
Organizations document the agreed upon privacy controls to be implemented in organizational
programs and information systems and the environments in which they operate. At the discretion of
the implementing organization, privacy controls may be documented in a distinct privacy plan orincorporated into other risk management documents (e.g., system security plans). Organizations alsoestablish appropriate assessment methodologies to determine the extent to which the privacy controls
are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect tomeeting designated privacy requirements. Organizational assessments of privacy controls can be
conducted either by the SAOP/CPO alone or jointly with the other organizational risk management
offices including the information security office.

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Implementation Tip•

Select and implement privacy controls based on the privacy requirements of organizations andthe need to protect the personally identifiable information (PII) of individuals collected andmaintained by systems and programs.

•

Coordinate privacy control selection and implementation with the organizational Risk Executive
Function, mission/business owners, enterprise architects, Chief Information Officer, SAOP/CPO,
and Chief Information Security Officer.

•

View the privacy controls in Appendix J from the same perspective as the Program
Management controls in Appendix G—that is, the controls are implemented for eachorganizational information system irrespective of the FIPS 199 categorization for that system.

•

Select and implement the optional privacy control enhancements when there is a demonstrated
need for additional privacy protection for individuals and PII.

•

Apply the privacy controls consistent with any specific exceptions and exemptions included inlegislation, Executive Orders, directives, policies, and regulations (e.g., law enforcement or
national security considerations).

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE

This family ensures that organizations: (i) identify the legal bases that authorize a particularpersonally identifiable information (PII) collection or activity that impacts privacy; and (ii) specify intheir notices the purpose(s) for which PII is collected.

AP-1

AUTHORITY TO COLLECT
Control: The organization determines and documents the legal authority that permits the collection,use, maintenance, and sharing of personally identifiable information (PII), either generally or insupport of a specific program or information system need.
Supplemental Guidance: Before collecting PII, the organization determines whether thecontemplated collection of PII is legally authorized. Program officials consult with the Senior
Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and legal counsel regarding theauthority of any program or activity to collect PII. The authority to collect PII is documented in
the System of Records Notice (SORN) and/or Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) or otherapplicable documentation such as Privacy Act Statements or Computer Matching Agreements.
Related controls: AR-2, DM-1, TR-1, TR-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e); Section 208(c), E-Government Act of2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Circular A-130, Appendix I.

AP-2

PURPOSE SPECIFICATION
Control: The organization describes the purpose(s) for which personally identifiable information(PII) is collected, used, maintained, and shared in its privacy notices.
Supplemental Guidance: Often, statutory language expressly authorizes specific collections and usesof PII. When statutory language is written broadly and thus subject to interpretation, organizations
ensure, in consultation with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer(CPO) and legal counsel, that there is a close nexus between the general authorization and any
specific collection of PII. Once the specific purposes have been identified, the purposes are clearly
described in the related privacy compliance documentation, including but not limited to Privacy
Impact Assessments (PIAs), System of Records Notices (SORNs), and Privacy Act Statements
provided at the time of collection (e.g., on forms organizations use to collect PII). Further, in order
to avoid unauthorized collections or uses of PII, personnel who handle PII receive training on theorganizational authorities for collecting PII, authorized uses of PII, and on the contents of thenotice. Related controls: AR-2, AR-4, AR-5, DM-1, DM-2, TR-1, TR-2, UL-1, UL-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(3)(A)-(B); Sections 208(b), (c), E-

Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347).

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: ACCOUNTABILITY, AUDIT, AND RISK MANAGEMENT

This family enhances public confidence through effective controls for governance, monitoring, risk
management, and assessment to demonstrate that organizations are complying with applicableprivacy protection requirements and minimizing overall privacy risk.

AR-1

GOVERNANCE AND PRIVACY PROGRAM
Control: The organization:a.

Appoints a Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO)
accountable for developing, implementing, and maintaining an organization-wide governanceand privacy program to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations regarding
the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and disposal of personally identifiable information(PII) by programs and information systems;b.

Monitors federal privacy laws and policy for changes that affect the privacy program;c.

Allocates [Assignment: organization-defined allocation of budget and staffing] sufficient
resources to implement and operate the organization-wide privacy program;d.

Develops a strategic organizational privacy plan for implementing applicable privacy
controls, policies, and procedures;e.

Develops, disseminates, and implements operational privacy policies and procedures thatgovern the appropriate privacy and security controls for programs, information systems, or
technologies involving PII; andf.

Updates privacy plan, policies, and procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency,
at least biennially].

The development and implementation of a comprehensive governance andprivacy program demonstrates organizational accountability for and commitment to the protectionof individual privacy. Accountability begins with the appointment of an SAOP/CPO with theauthority, mission, resources, and responsibility to develop and implement a multifaceted privacy
program. The SAOP/CPO, in consultation with legal counsel, information security officials, andothers as appropriate: (i) ensures the development, implementation, and enforcement of privacy
policies and procedures; (ii) defines roles and responsibilities for protecting PII; (iii) determines
the level of information sensitivity with regard to PII holdings; (iv) identifies the laws, regulations,and internal policies that apply to the PII; (v) monitors privacy best practices; and (vi)monitors/audits compliance with identified privacy controls.
Supplemental Guidance:

To further accountability, the SAOP/CPO develops privacy plans to document the privacy
requirements of organizations and the privacy and security controls in place or planned formeeting those requirements. The plan serves as evidence of organizational privacy operations andsupports resource requests by the SAOP/CPO. A single plan or multiple plans may be necessary
depending upon the organizational structures, requirements, and resources, and the plan(s) may
vary in comprehensiveness. For example, a one-page privacy plan may cover privacy policies,
documentation, and controls already in place, such as Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) and
System of Records Notices (SORN). A comprehensive plan may include a baseline of privacy
controls selected from this appendix and include: (i) processes for conducting privacy risk
assessments; (ii) templates and guidance for completing PIAs and SORNs; (iii) privacy training
and awareness requirements; (iv) requirements for contractors processing PII; (v) plans foreliminating unnecessary PII holdings; and (vi) a framework for measuring annual performancegoals and objectives for implementing identified privacy controls.

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Control Enhancements: None.

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107347); Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541; OMB
Memoranda 03-22, 05-08, 07-16; OMB Circular A-130; Federal Enterprise Architecture Security
and Privacy Profile.
References:

AR-2

PRIVACY IMPACT AND RISK ASSESSMENT
Control: The organization:a.

Documents and implements a privacy risk management process that assesses privacy risk toindividuals resulting from the collection, sharing, storing, transmitting, use, and disposal of
personally identifiable information (PII); andb.

Conducts Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) for information systems, programs, or otheractivities that pose a privacy risk in accordance with applicable law, OMB policy, or any
existing organizational policies and procedures.

Organizational privacy risk management processes operate across the life
cycles of all mission/business processes that collect, use, maintain, share, or dispose of PII. The
tools and processes for managing risk are specific to organizational missions and resources. They
include, but are not limited to, the conduct of PIAs. The PIA is both a process and the documentthat is the outcome of that process. OMB Memorandum 03-22 provides guidance to organizations
for implementing the privacy provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002, including guidance on
when PIAs are required for information systems. Some organizations may be required by law orpolicy to extend the PIA requirement to other activities involving PII or otherwise impacting
privacy (e.g., programs, projects, or regulations). PIAs are conducted to identify privacy risks andidentify methods to mitigate those risks. PIAs are also conducted to ensure that programs orinformation systems comply with legal, regulatory, and policy requirements. PIAs also serve as
notice to the public of privacy practices. PIAs are performed before developing or procuring
information systems, or initiating programs or projects, that collect, use, maintain, or share PII and
are updated when changes create new privacy risks.
Supplemental Guidance:

Control Enhancements: None.

Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); Federal Information Security
Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541; OMB Memoranda 03-22, 05-08, 10-23.
References:

AR-3

PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACTORS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes privacy roles, responsibilities, and access requirements for contractors and service
providers; andb.

Includes privacy requirements in contracts and other acquisition-related documents.

Contractors and service providers include, but are not limited to,
information providers, information processors, and other organizations providing information
system development, information technology services, and other outsourced
applications. Organizations consult with legal counsel, the Senior Agency Official for Privacy(SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO), and contracting officers about applicable laws, directives,
policies, or regulations that may impact implementation of this control. Related control: AR-1,
AR-5, SA-4.
Supplemental Guidance:

Control Enhancements: None.

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m); Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48
C.F.R. Part 24; OMB Circular A-130.
References:

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and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________AR-4

PRIVACY MONITORING AND AUDITING
Control: The organization monitors and audits privacy controls and internal privacy policy[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to ensure effective implementation.
Supplemental Guidance: To promote accountability, organizations identify and address gaps inprivacy compliance, management, operational, and technical controls by conducting regularassessments (e.g., internal risk assessments). These assessments can be self-assessments or thirdparty audits that result in reports on compliance gaps identified in programs, projects, andinformation systems. In addition to auditing for effective implementation of all privacy controls
identified in this appendix, organizations assess whether they: (i) implement a process to embedprivacy considerations into the life cycle of personally identifiable information (PII), programs,
information systems, mission/business processes, and technology; (ii) monitor for changes toapplicable privacy laws, regulations, and policies; (iii) track programs, information systems, andapplications that collect and maintain PII to ensure compliance; (iv) ensure that access to PII isonly on a need-to-know basis; and (v) ensure that PII is being maintained and used only for thelegally authorized purposes identified in the public notice(s).
Organizations also: (i) implement technology to audit for the security, appropriate use, and loss of
PII; (ii) perform reviews to ensure physical security of documents containing PII; (iii) assess
contractor compliance with privacy requirements; and (iv) ensure that corrective actions identified
as part of the assessment process are tracked and monitored until audit findings are corrected. The
organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) coordinates
monitoring and auditing efforts with information security officials and ensures that the results areprovided to senior managers and oversight officials. Related controls: AR-6, AR-7, AU-1, AU-2,
AU-3, AU-6, AU-12, CA-7, TR-1, UL-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Federal Information Security Management

Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347);
OMB Memoranda 03-22, 05-08, 06-16, 07-16; OMB Circular A-130.

AR-5

PRIVACY AWARENESS AND TRAINING
Control: The organization:a.

Develops, implements, and updates a comprehensive training and awareness strategy aimed atensuring that personnel understand privacy responsibilities and procedures;b.

Administers basic privacy training [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least
annually] and targeted, role-based privacy training for personnel having responsibility for
personally identifiable information (PII) or for activities that involve PII [Assignment:
organization-defined frequency, at least annually]; andc.

Ensures that personnel certify (manually or electronically) acceptance of responsibilities forprivacy requirements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least annually].

Through implementation of a privacy training and awareness strategy, theorganization promotes a culture of privacy. Privacy training and awareness programs typicallyfocus on broad topics, such as responsibilities under the Privacy Act of 1974 and E-Government
Act of 2002 and the consequences of failing to carry out those responsibilities, how to identify
new privacy risks, how to mitigate privacy risks, and how and when to report privacy incidents.
Privacy training may also target data collection and use requirements identified in public notices,such as Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) or System of Records Notices (SORNs) for a program
or information system. Specific training methods may include: (i) mandatory annual privacy
awareness training; (ii) targeted, role-based training; (iii) internal privacy program websites; (iv)manuals, guides, and handbooks; (v) slide presentations; (vi) events (e.g., privacy awareness week,
privacy clean-up day); (vii) posters and brochures; and (viii) email messages to all employees andcontractors. Organizations update training based on changing statutory, regulatory, mission,
Supplemental Guidance:

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program, business process, and information system requirements, or on the results of compliancemonitoring and auditing. Where appropriate, organizations may provide privacy training as part ofexisting information security training. Related controls: AR-3, AT-2, AT-3, TR-1.
Control Enhancements: None.

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e); Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 07-16.
References:

AR-6

PRIVACY REPORTING
Control: The organization develops, disseminates, and updates reports to the Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB), Congress, and other oversight bodies, as appropriate, todemonstrate accountability with specific statutory and regulatory privacy program mandates, andto senior management and other personnel with responsibility for monitoring privacy program
progress and compliance.
Supplemental Guidance: Through internal and external privacy reporting, organizations promoteaccountability and transparency in organizational privacy operations. Reporting also helps
organizations to determine progress in meeting privacy compliance requirements and privacy
controls, compare performance across the federal government, identify vulnerabilities and gaps inpolicy and implementation, and identify success models. Types of privacy reports include: (i)annual Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) reports to OMB; (ii) reports to Congress
required by the Implementing Regulations of the 9/11 Commission Act; and (iii) other public
reports required by specific statutory mandates or internal policies of organizations. The
organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) consultswith legal counsel, where appropriate, to ensure that organizations meet all applicable privacy
reporting requirements.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002

(P.L. 107-347); Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §3541; Section 803, 9/11 Commission Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1; Section 804, 9/11 Commission
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-3; Section 522, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (P.L. 108-447);
OMB Memoranda 03-22; OMB Circular A-130.

AR-7

PRIVACY-ENHANCED SYSTEM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
Control: The organization designs information systems to support privacy by automating privacy

controls.
Supplemental Guidance: To the extent feasible, when designing organizational information systems,

organizations employ technologies and system capabilities that automate privacy controls on thecollection, use, retention, and disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII). By building
privacy controls into system design and development, organizations mitigate privacy risks to PII,
thereby reducing the likelihood of information system breaches and other privacy-related
incidents. Organizations also conduct periodic reviews of systems to determine the need for
updates to maintain compliance with the Privacy Act and the organization’s privacy policy.
Regardless of whether automated privacy controls are employed, organizations regularly monitor
information system use and sharing of PII to ensure that the use/sharing is consistent with theauthorized purposes identified in the Privacy Act and/or in the public notice of organizations, or ina manner compatible with those purposes. Related controls: AC-6, AR-4, AR-5, DM-2, TR-1.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10); Sections 208(b) and(c), E-

Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memorandum 03-22.

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AR-8

ACCOUNTING OF DISCLOSURES
Control: The organization:a.

Keeps an accurate accounting of disclosures of information held in each system of records
under its control, including:(1) Date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of a record; and(2) Name and address of the person or agency to which the disclosure was made;b.

Retains the accounting of disclosures for the life of the record or five years after thedisclosure is made, whichever is longer; andc.

Makes the accounting of disclosures available to the person named in the record upon request.

Supplemental Guidance: The Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer(CPO) periodically consults with managers of organization systems of record to ensure that therequired accountings of disclosures of records are being properly maintained and provided topersons named in those records consistent with the dictates of the Privacy Act. Organizations are
not required to keep an accounting of disclosures when the disclosures are made to individuals
with a need to know, are made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, or are made to a law
enforcement agency pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3). Heads of agencies can promulgate rules toexempt certain systems of records from the requirement to provide the accounting of disclosures toindividuals. Related control: IP-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c)(1), (c)(3), (j), (k).

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: DATA QUALITY AND INTEGRITYThis family enhances public confidence that any personally identifiable information (PII) collected
and maintained by organizations is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete for the purpose for which
it is to be used, as specified in public notices.

DI-1

DATA QUALITY
Control: The organization:a.

Confirms to the greatest extent practicable upon collection or creation of personallyidentifiable information (PII), the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness of that
information;b.

Collects PII directly from the individual to the greatest extent practicable;c.

Checks for, and corrects as necessary, any inaccurate or outdated PII used by its programs or
systems [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; andd.

Issues guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, utility, objectivity, and integrity ofdisseminated information.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations take reasonable steps to confirm the accuracy and relevanceof PII. Such steps may include, for example, editing and validating addresses as they are collectedor entered into information systems using automated address verification look-up application
programming interfaces (API). The types of measures taken to protect data quality are based on
the nature and context of the PII, how it is to be used, and how it was obtained. Measures taken tovalidate the accuracy of PII that is used to make determinations about the rights, benefits, or
privileges of individuals under federal programs may be more comprehensive than those used tovalidate less sensitive PII. Additional steps may be necessary to validate PII that is obtained fromsources other than individuals or the authorized representatives of individuals.
When PII is of a sufficiently sensitive nature (e.g., when it is used for annual reconfirmation of a
taxpayer’s income for a recurring benefit), organizations incorporate mechanisms into information
systems and develop corresponding procedures for how frequently, and by what method, theinformation is to be updated. Related controls: AP-2, DI-2, DM-1, IP-3, SI-10.
Control Enhancements:(1)

DATA QUALITY | VALIDATE PIIThe organization requests that the individual or individual’s authorized representative validate PII
during the collection process.

(2)

DATA QUALITY | RE-VALIDATE PIIThe organization requests that the individual or individual’s authorized representative revalidatethat PII collected is still accurate [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (c) and (e); Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-554), app C § 515, 114 Stat.
2763A-153-4; Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501; OMB Guidelines for Ensuring andMaximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated byFederal Agencies (October 2001); OMB Memorandum 07-16.
References:

DI-2

DATA INTEGRITY AND DATA INTEGRITY BOARD
Control: The organization:a.

APPENDIX J

Documents processes to ensure the integrity of personally identifiable information (PII)
through existing security controls; andPAGE J-12

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________b.

Establishes a Data Integrity Board when appropriate to oversee organizational Computer
Matching Agreements 123 and to ensure that those agreements comply with the computer
matching provisions of the Privacy Act.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations conducting or participating in Computer Matching

Agreements with other organizations regarding applicants for and recipients of financial assistanceor payments under federal benefit programs or regarding certain computerized comparisonsinvolving federal personnel or payroll records establish a Data Integrity Board to oversee andcoordinate their implementation of such matching agreements. In many organizations, the Data
Integrity Board is led by the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer(CPO). The Data Integrity Board ensures that controls are in place to maintain both the quality andthe integrity of data shared under Computer Matching Agreements. Related controls: AC-1, AC-3,
AC-4, AC-6, AC-17, AC-22, AU-2, AU-3, AU-6, AU-10, AU-11, DI-1, SC-8, SC-28, UL-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

DATA INTEGRITY AND DATA INTEGRITY BOARD | PUBLISH AGREEMENTS ON WEBSITE
The organization publishes Computer Matching Agreements on its public website.

References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a (a)(8)(A), (o), (p), (u); OMB Circular A-

130, Appendix I.

123

Organizations enter into Computer Matching Agreements in connection with computer matching programs to which
they are a party. With certain exceptions, a computer matching program is any computerized comparison of two or
more automated systems of records or a system of records with nonfederal records for the purpose of establishing orverifying the eligibility of, or continuing compliance with, statutory and regulatory requirements by, applicants for,recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with respect to cash or in-kind assistance or
payments under federal benefit programs or computerized comparisons of two or more automated federal personnel orpayroll systems of records or a system of federal personnel or payroll records with nonfederal records. See Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(8)(A).

APPENDIX JPAGE J-13

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: DATA MINIMIZATION AND RETENTION

This family helps organizations implement the data minimization and retention requirements tocollect, use, and retain only personally identifiable information (PII) that is relevant and necessary
for the purpose for which it was originally collected. Organizations retain PII for only as long asnecessary to fulfill the purpose(s) specified in public notices and in accordance with a National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA)-approved record retention schedule.

DM-1

MINIMIZATION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
Control: The organization:a.

Identifies the minimum personally identifiable information (PII) elements that are relevant
and necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose of collection;b.

Limits the collection and retention of PII to the minimum elements identified for the purposes
described in the notice and for which the individual has provided consent; andc.

Conducts an initial evaluation of PII holdings and establishes and follows a schedule forregularly reviewing those holdings [Assignment: organization-defined frequency, at least
annually] to ensure that only PII identified in the notice is collected and retained, and that the
PII continues to be necessary to accomplish the legally authorized purpose.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations take appropriate steps to ensure that the collection of PII isconsistent with a purpose authorized by law or regulation. The minimum set of PII elements
required to support a specific organization business process may be a subset of the PII theorganization is authorized to collect. Program officials consult with the Senior Agency Official for
Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and legal counsel to identify the minimum PII
elements required by the information system or activity to accomplish the legally authorizedpurpose.
Organizations can further reduce their privacy and security risks by also reducing their inventoryof PII, where appropriate. OMB Memorandum 07-16 requires organizations to conduct both an
initial review and subsequent reviews of their holdings of all PII and ensure, to the maximum
extent practicable, that such holdings are accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Organizations
are also directed by OMB to reduce their holdings to the minimum necessary for the proper
performance of a documented organizational business purpose. OMB Memorandum 07-16
requires organizations to develop and publicize, either through a notice in the Federal Register oron their websites, a schedule for periodic reviews of their holdings to supplement the initial
review. Organizations coordinate with their federal records officers to ensure that reductions inorganizational holdings of PII are consistent with NARA retention schedules.
By performing periodic evaluations, organizations reduce risk, ensure that they are collecting only
the data specified in the notice, and ensure that the data collected is still relevant and necessary forthe purpose(s) specified in the notice. Related controls: AP-1, AP-2, AR-4, IP-1, SE-1, SI-12, TR1.
Control Enhancements:(1)

MINIMIZATION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION | LOCATE / REMOVE / REDACT / ANONYMIZE PIIThe organization, where feasible and within the limits of technology, locates and removes/redacts
specified PII and/or uses anonymization and de-identification techniques to permit use of theretained information while reducing its sensitivity and reducing the risk resulting from disclosure.
Supplemental Guidance: NIST Special Publication 800-122 provides guidance onanonymization.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (e); Section 208(b), E-Government Act of2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 07-16.

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
DM-2

DATA RETENTION AND DISPOSAL
Control: The organization:a.

Retains each collection of personally identifiable information (PII) for [Assignment:
organization-defined time period] to fulfill the purpose(s) identified in the notice or as
required by law;b.

Disposes of, destroys, erases, and/or anonymizes the PII, regardless of the method of storage,in accordance with a NARA-approved record retention schedule and in a manner that preventsloss, theft, misuse, or unauthorized access; andc.

Uses [Assignment: organization-defined techniques or methods] to ensure secure deletion or
destruction of PII (including originals, copies, and archived records).

Supplemental Guidance: NARA provides retention schedules that govern the disposition of federal

records. Program officials coordinate with records officers and with NARA to identify appropriate
retention periods and disposal methods. NARA may require organizations to retain PII longer thanis operationally needed. In those situations, organizations describe such requirements in the notice.
Methods of storage include, for example, electronic, optical media, or paper.
Examples of ways organizations may reduce holdings include reducing the types of PII held (e.g.,delete Social Security numbers if their use is no longer needed) or shortening the retention period
for PII that is maintained if it is no longer necessary to keep PII for long periods of time (thiseffort is undertaken in consultation with an organization’s records officer to receive NARA
approval). In both examples, organizations provide notice (e.g., an updated System of Records
Notice) to inform the public of any changes in holdings of PII.
Certain read-only archiving techniques, such as DVDs, CDs, microfilm, or microfiche, may not
permit the removal of individual records without the destruction of the entire database containedon such media. Related controls: AR-4, AU-11, DM-1, MP-1, MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-6,
MP-7, MP-8, SI-12, TR-1.
Control Enhancements:(1)

DATA RETENTION AND DISPOSAL | SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONThe organization, where feasible, configures its information systems to record the date PII iscollected, created, or updated and when PII is to be deleted or archived under an approved record
retention schedule.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(1), (c)(2); Section 208 (e), E-

Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); 44 U.S.C. Chapters 29, 31, 33; OMB Memorandum 0716; OMB Circular A-130; NIST Special Publication 800-88.

DM-3

MINIMIZATION OF PII USED IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH
Control: The organization:a.

Develops policies and procedures that minimize the use of personally identifiable information(PII) for testing, training, and research; andb.

Implements controls to protect PII used for testing, training, and research.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations often use PII for testing new applications or information

systems prior to deployment. Organizations also use PII for research purposes and for training.
The use of PII in testing, research, and training increases risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuseof the information. If PII must be used, organizations take measures to minimize any associatedrisks and to authorize the use of and limit the amount of PII for these purposes. Organizations
consult with the SAOP/CPO and legal counsel to ensure that the use of PII in testing, training, andresearch is compatible with the original purpose for which it was collected.

APPENDIX JPAGE J-15

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control Enhancements:(1)

MINIMIZATION OF PII USED IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH | RISK MINIMIZATION TECHNIQUESThe organization, where feasible, uses techniques to minimize the risk to privacy of using PII for
research, testing, or training.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can minimize risk to privacy of PII by using techniquessuch as de-identification.
References: NIST Special Publication 800-122.

APPENDIX JPAGE J-16

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION AND REDRESSThis family addresses the need to make individuals active participants in the decision-making process
regarding the collection and use of their personally identifiable information (PII). By providing
individuals with access to PII and the ability to have their PII corrected or amended, as appropriate,
the controls in this family enhance public confidence in organizational decisions made based on the
PII.

IP-1

CONSENT
Control: The organization:a.

Provides means, where feasible and appropriate, for individuals to authorize the collection,use, maintaining, and sharing of personally identifiable information (PII) prior to its
collection;b.

Provides appropriate means for individuals to understand the consequences of decisions toapprove or decline the authorization of the collection, use, dissemination, and retention of PII;c.

Obtains consent, where feasible and appropriate, from individuals prior to any new uses ordisclosure of previously collected PII; andd.

Ensures that individuals are aware of and, where feasible, consent to all uses of PII notinitially described in the public notice that was in effect at the time the organization collected
the PII.

Supplemental Guidance: Consent is fundamental to the participation of individuals in the decision-

making process regarding the collection and use of their PII and the use of technologies that may
increase risk to personal privacy. To obtain consent, organizations provide individuals appropriate
notice of the purposes of the PII collection or technology use and a means for individuals toconsent to the activity. Organizations tailor the public notice and consent mechanisms to meet
operational needs. Organizations achieve awareness and consent, for example, through updated
public notices.
Organizations may obtain consent through opt-in, opt-out, or implied consent. Opt-in consent is
the preferred method, but it is not always feasible. Opt-in requires that individuals take affirmative
action to allow organizations to collect or use PII. For example, opt-in consent may require an
individual to click a radio button on a website, or sign a document providing consent. In contrast,
opt-out requires individuals to take action to prevent the new or continued collection or use ofsuch PII. For example, the Federal Trade Commission’s Do-Not-Call Registry allows individuals
to opt-out of receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls by requesting to be added to a list. Implied
consent is the least preferred method and should be used in limited circumstances. Implied consent
occurs where individuals’ behavior or failure to object indicates agreement with the collection or
use of PII (e.g., by entering and remaining in a building where notice has been posted that security
cameras are in use, the individual implies consent to the video recording). Depending upon thenature of the program or information system, it may be appropriate to allow individuals to limit
the types of PII they provide and subsequent uses of that PII. Organizational consent mechanisms
include a discussion of the consequences to individuals of failure to provide PII. Consequences
can vary from organization to organization. Related controls: AC-2, AP-1, TR-1, TR-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

CONSENT | MECHANISMS SUPPORTING ITEMIZED OR TIERED CONSENTThe organization implements mechanisms to support itemized or tiered consent for specific usesof data.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations can provide, for example, individuals’ itemized choices

as to whether they wish to be contacted for any of a variety of purposes. In this situation,organizations construct consent mechanisms to ensure that organizational operations comply
with individual choices.

APPENDIX JPAGE J-17

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b), (e)(3); Section 208(c), E-Government

Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 10-22.

IP-2

INDIVIDUAL ACCESS
Control: The organization:a.

Provides individuals the ability to have access to their personally identifiable information(PII) maintained in its system(s) of records;b.

Publishes rules and regulations governing how individuals may request access to records
maintained in a Privacy Act system of records;c.

Publishes access procedures in System of Records Notices (SORNs); andd.

Adheres to Privacy Act requirements and OMB policies and guidance for the proper
processing of Privacy Act requests.

Supplemental Guidance: Access affords individuals the ability to review PII about them held withinorganizational systems of records. Access includes timely, simplified, and inexpensive access todata. Organizational processes for allowing access to records may differ based on resources, legal
requirements, or other factors. The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief
Privacy Officer (CPO) is responsible for the content of Privacy Act regulations and record request
processing, in consultation with legal counsel. Access to certain types of records may not beappropriate, however, and heads of agencies may promulgate rules exempting particular systems
from the access provision of the Privacy Act. In addition, individuals are not entitled to access to
information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding. Related controls:
AR-8, IP-3, TR-1, TR-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a (c)(3), (d)(5), (e) (4); (j), (k), (t); OMB

Circular A-130.

IP-3

REDRESS
Control: The organization:a.

Provides a process for individuals to have inaccurate personally identifiable information (PII)
maintained by the organization corrected or amended, as appropriate; andb.

Establishes a process for disseminating corrections or amendments of the PII to otherauthorized users of the PII, such as external information-sharing partners and, where feasible
and appropriate, notifies affected individuals that their information has been corrected oramended.

Supplemental Guidance: Redress supports the ability of individuals to ensure the accuracy of PII

held by organizations. Effective redress processes demonstrate organizational commitment to data
quality especially in those business functions where inaccurate data may result in inappropriate
decisions or denial of benefits and services to individuals. Organizations use discretion in
determining if records are to be corrected or amended, based on the scope of redress requests, thechanges sought, and the impact of the changes. Individuals may appeal an adverse decision andhave incorrect information amended, where appropriate.
To provide effective redress, organizations: (i) provide effective notice of the existence of a PII
collection; (ii) provide plain language explanations of the processes and mechanisms forrequesting access to records; (iii) establish criteria for submitting requests for correction oramendment; (iv) implement resources to analyze and adjudicate requests; (v) implement means ofcorrecting or amending data collections; and (vi) review any decisions that may have been the
result of inaccurate information.

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Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Organizational redress processes provide responses to individuals of decisions to deny requests forcorrection or amendment, including the reasons for those decisions, a means to record individual
objections to the organizational decisions, and a means of requesting organizational reviews of theinitial determinations. Where PII is corrected or amended, organizations take steps to ensure that
all authorized recipients of that PII are informed of the corrected or amended information. In
instances where redress involves information obtained from other organizations, redress processes
include coordination with organizations that originally collected the information. Related controls:
IP-2, TR-1, TR-2, UL-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (d), (c)(4); OMB Circular A-130.

IP-4

COMPLAINT MANAGEMENT
Control: The organization implements a process for receiving and responding to complaints,

concerns, or questions from individuals about the organizational privacy practices.
Supplemental Guidance: Complaints, concerns, and questions from individuals can serve as avaluable source of external input that ultimately improves operational models, uses of technology,
data collection practices, and privacy and security safeguards. Organizations provide complaint
mechanisms that are readily accessible by the public, include all information necessary forsuccessfully filing complaints (including contact information for the Senior Agency Official for
Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) or other official designated to receive complaints),
and are easy to use. Organizational complaint management processes include tracking mechanisms
to ensure that all complaints received are reviewed and appropriately addressed in a timely
manner. Related controls: AR-6, IP-3.
Control Enhancements:(1)

COMPLAINT MANAGEMENT | RESPONSE TIMESThe organization responds to complaints, concerns, or questions from individuals within[Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: OMB Circular A-130; OMB Memoranda 07-16, 08-09.

APPENDIX JPAGE J-19

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: SECURITY

This family supplements the security controls in Appendix F to ensure that technical, physical, andadministrative safeguards are in place to protect personally identifiable information (PII) collected or
maintained by organizations against loss, unauthorized access, or disclosure, and to ensure thatplanning and responses to privacy incidents comply with OMB policies and guidance. The controls
in this family are implemented in coordination with information security personnel and in accordancewith the existing NIST Risk Management Framework.

SE-1

INVENTORY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
Control: The organization:a.

Establishes, maintains, and updates [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] aninventory that contains a listing of all programs and information systems identified ascollecting, using, maintaining, or sharing personally identifiable information (PII); andb.

Provides each update of the PII inventory to the CIO or information security official[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to support the establishment of information
security requirements for all new or modified information systems containing PII.

Supplemental Guidance: The PII inventory enables organizations to implement effective

administrative, technical, and physical security policies and procedures to protect PII consistent
with Appendix F, and to mitigate risks of PII exposure. As one method of gathering information
for their PII inventories, organizations may extract the following information elements from
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) for information systems containing PII: (i) the name andacronym for each system identified; (ii) the types of PII contained in that system; (iii)classification of level of sensitivity of all types of PII, as combined in that information system; and(iv) classification of level of potential risk of substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or
unfairness to affected individuals, as well as the financial or reputational risks to organizations, if
PII is exposed. Organizations take due care in updating the inventories by identifying linkable datathat could create PII. Related controls: AR-1, AR-4, AR-5, AT-1, DM-1, PM-5.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e) (10); Section 208(b)(2), E-Government

Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memorandum 03-22; OMB Circular A-130, Appendix I; FIPS
Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-122.

SE-2

PRIVACY INCIDENT RESPONSE
Control: The organization:a.

Develops and implements a Privacy Incident Response Plan; andb.

Provides an organized and effective response to privacy incidents in accordance with theorganizational Privacy Incident Response Plan.

Supplemental Guidance: In contrast to the Incident Response (IR) family in Appendix F, which

concerns a broader range of incidents affecting information security, this control uses the term
Privacy Incident to describe only those incidents that relate to personally identifiable information(PII). The organization Privacy Incident Response Plan is developed under the leadership of the
SAOP/CPO. The plan includes: (i) the establishment of a cross-functional Privacy Incident
Response Team that reviews, approves, and participates in the execution of the Privacy Incident
Response Plan; (ii) a process to determine whether notice to oversight organizations or affectedindividuals is appropriate and to provide that notice accordingly; (iii) a privacy risk assessment
process to determine the extent of harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to affectedindividuals and, where appropriate, to take steps to mitigate any such risks; (iv) internal

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

procedures to ensure prompt reporting by employees and contractors of any privacy incident to
information security officials and the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy
Officer (CPO), consistent with organizational incident management structures; and (v) internal
procedures for reporting noncompliance with organizational privacy policy by employees orcontractors to appropriate management or oversight officials. Some organizations may be requiredby law or policy to provide notice to oversight organizations in the event of a breach.
Organizations may also choose to integrate Privacy Incident Response Plans with Security
Incident Response Plans, or keep the plans separate. Related controls: AR-1, AR-4, AR-5, AR-6,
AU-1 through 14, IR-1 through IR-8, RA-1.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e), (i)(1), and (m); Federal Information

Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541; OMB Memoranda 06-19, 07-16;
NIST Special Publication 800-37.

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: TRANSPARENCY

This family ensures that organizations provide public notice of their information practices and theprivacy impact of their programs and activities.

TR-1

PRIVACY NOTICE
Control: The organization:a.

Provides effective notice to the public and to individuals regarding: (i) its activities that
impact privacy, including its collection, use, sharing, safeguarding, maintenance, and disposalof personally identifiable information (PII); (ii) authority for collecting PII; (iii) the choices, ifany, individuals may have regarding how the organization uses PII and the consequences of
exercising or not exercising those choices; and (iv) the ability to access and have PII amended
or corrected if necessary;b.

Describes: (i) the PII the organization collects and the purpose(s) for which it collects that
information; (ii) how the organization uses PII internally; (iii) whether the organization shares
PII with external entities, the categories of those entities, and the purposes for such sharing;(iv) whether individuals have the ability to consent to specific uses or sharing of PII and how
to exercise any such consent; (v) how individuals may obtain access to PII; and (vi) how the
PII will be protected; andc.

Revises its public notices to reflect changes in practice or policy that affect PII or changes in
its activities that impact privacy, before or as soon as practicable after the change.

Supplemental Guidance: Effective notice, by virtue of its clarity, readability, and comprehensiveness,enables individuals to understand how an organization uses PII generally and, where appropriate,
to make an informed decision prior to providing PII to an organization. Effective notice also
demonstrates the privacy considerations that the organization has addressed in implementing its
information practices. The organization may provide general public notice through a variety ofmeans, as required by law or policy, including System of Records Notices (SORNs), Privacy
Impact Assessments (PIAs), or in a website privacy policy. As required by the Privacy Act, theorganization also provides direct notice to individuals via Privacy Act Statements on the paper andelectronic forms it uses to collect PII, or on separate forms that can be retained by the individuals.
The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) is
responsible for the content of the organization’s public notices, in consultation with legal counsel
and relevant program managers. The public notice requirement in this control is satisfied by anorganization’s compliance with the public notice provisions of the Privacy Act, the E-Government
Act’s PIA requirement, with OMB guidance related to federal agency privacy notices, and, whereapplicable, with policy pertaining to participation in the Information Sharing Environment(ISE). 124 Changing PII practice or policy without prior notice is disfavored and should only beundertaken in consultation with the SAOP/CPO and counsel. Related controls: AP-1, AP-2, AR-1,
AR-2, IP-1, IP-2, IP-3, UL-1, UL-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

PRIVACY NOTICE | REAL-TIME OR LAYERED NOTICEThe organization provides real-time and/or layered notice when it collects PII.

Supplemental Guidance: Real-time notice is defined as notice at the point of collection. A

layered notice approach involves providing individuals with a summary of key points in theorganization’s privacy policy. A second notice provides more detailed/specific information.
124

The Information Sharing Environment is an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism and homeland security
information. The ISE was established by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638. See the ISE website at: http://www.ise.gov.

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(3), (e)(4); Section 208(b), E-

Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 07-16, 10-22, 10-23; ISEPrivacy Guidelines.

TR-2

SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICES AND PRIVACY ACT STATEMENTS
Control: The organization:a.

Publishes System of Records Notices (SORNs) in the Federal Register, subject to required
oversight processes, for systems containing personally identifiable information (PII);b.

Keeps SORNs current; andc.

Includes Privacy Act Statements on its forms that collect PII, or on separate forms that can beretained by individuals, to provide additional formal notice to individuals from whom theinformation is being collected.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations issue SORNs to provide the public notice regarding PII

collected in a system of records, which the Privacy Act defines as “a group of any records under
the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of an individual or bysome identifying number, symbol, or other identifier.” SORNs explain how the information isused, retained, and may be corrected, and whether certain portions of the system are subject toPrivacy Act exemptions for law enforcement or national security reasons. Privacy Act Statements
provide notice of: (i) the authority of organizations to collect PII; (ii) whether providing PII is
mandatory or optional; (iii) the principal purpose(s) for which the PII is to be used; (iv) the
intended disclosures (routine uses) of the information; and (v) the consequences of not providing
all or some portion of the information requested. When information is collected verbally,organizations read a Privacy Act Statement prior to initiating the collection of PII (for example,
when conducting telephone interviews or surveys). Related control: DI-2.
Control Enhancements:(1)

SYSTEM OF RECORDS NOTICES AND PRIVACY ACT STATEMENTS | PUBLIC WEBSITE PUBLICATIONThe organization publishes SORNs on its public website.
References:

TR-3

The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(3); OMB Circular A-130.

DISSEMINATION OF PRIVACY PROGRAM INFORMATION
Control: The organization:a.

Ensures that the public has access to information about its privacy activities and is able tocommunicate with its Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer(CPO); andb.

Ensures that its privacy practices are publicly available through organizational websites orotherwise.

Supplemental Guidance: Organizations employ different mechanisms for informing the public about

their privacy practices including, but not limited to, Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), System
of Records Notices (SORNs), privacy reports, publicly available web pages, email distributions,blogs, and periodic publications (e.g., quarterly newsletters). Organizations also employ publicly
facing email addresses and/or phone lines that enable the public to provide feedback and/or directquestions to privacy offices regarding privacy practices. Related control: AR-6.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Section 208, E-Government Act of 2002

(P.L. 107-347); OMB Memoranda 03-22, 10-23.

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________FAMILY: USE LIMITATIONThis family ensures that organizations only use personally identifiable information (PII) either as
specified in their public notices, in a manner compatible with those specified purposes, or asotherwise permitted by law. Implementation of the controls in this family will ensure that the scopeof PII use is limited accordingly.

UL-1

INTERNAL USE
Control: The organization uses personally identifiable information (PII) internally only for theauthorized purpose(s) identified in the Privacy Act and/or in public notices.
Supplemental Guidance: Organizations take steps to ensure that they use PII only for legallyauthorized purposes and in a manner compatible with uses identified in the Privacy Act and/or in
public notices. These steps include monitoring and auditing organizational use of PII and training
organizational personnel on the authorized uses of PII. With guidance from the Senior Agency
Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and where appropriate, legal counsel,
organizations document processes and procedures for evaluating any proposed new uses of PII toassess whether they fall within the scope of the organizational authorities. Where appropriate,
organizations obtain consent from individuals for the new use(s) of PII. Related controls: AP-2,
AR-2, AR-3, AR-4, AR-5, IP-1, TR-1, TR-2.
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(1).

UL-2

INFORMATION SHARING WITH THIRD PARTIES
Control: The organization:a.

Shares personally identifiable information (PII) externally, only for the authorized purposes
identified in the Privacy Act and/or described in its notice(s) or for a purpose that iscompatible with those purposes;b.

Where appropriate, enters into Memoranda of Understanding, Memoranda of Agreement,
Letters of Intent, Computer Matching Agreements, or similar agreements, with third parties
that specifically describe the PII covered and specifically enumerate the purposes for which
the PII may be used;c.

Monitors, audits, and trains its staff on the authorized sharing of PII with third parties and on
the consequences of unauthorized use or sharing of PII; andd.

Evaluates any proposed new instances of sharing PII with third parties to assess whether the
sharing is authorized and whether additional or new public notice is required.

Supplemental Guidance: The organization Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief

Privacy Officer (CPO) and, where appropriate, legal counsel review and approve any proposed
external sharing of PII, including with other public, international, or private sector entities, forconsistency with uses described in the existing organizational public notice(s). When a proposed
new instance of external sharing of PII is not currently authorized by the Privacy Act and/or
specified in a notice, organizations evaluate whether the proposed external sharing is compatible
with the purpose(s) specified in the notice. If the proposed sharing is compatible, organizations
review, update, and republish their Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), System of Records
Notices (SORNs), website privacy policies, and other public notices, if any, to include specificdescriptions of the new uses(s) and obtain consent where appropriate and feasible. Informationsharing agreements also include security protections consistent with the sensitivity of theinformation being shared. Related controls: AR-3, AR-4, AR-5, AR-8, AP-2, DI-1, DI-2, IP-1,
TR-1.

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________
Control Enhancements: None.
References: The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(7), (b), (c), (e)(3)(C), (o); ISE Privacy

Guidelines.

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Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems
and Organizations________________________________________________________________________________________________

Acknowledgements
This appendix was developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and thePrivacy Committee of the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council. In particular, wewish to thank the members of the Privacy Committee's Best Practices Subcommittee and its
Privacy Controls Appendix Working Group—Claire Barrett, Chris Brannigan, Pamela Carcirieri,
Debra Diener, Deborah Kendall, Martha Landesberg, Steven Lott, Lewis Oleinick, and Roanne
Shaddox—for their valuable insights, subject matter expertise, and overall contributions in
helping to develop the content for this appendix to Special Publication 800-53. We also wish torecognize and thank Erika McCallister, Toby Levin, James McKenzie, Julie McEwen, andRichard Graubart for their significant contributions to this project. A special note of thanks goesto Peggy Himes and Elizabeth Lennon for their superb administrative support. The authors also
gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the significant contributions from individuals, groups, andorganizations in the public and private sectors, whose thoughtful and constructive comments
improved the overall quality, thoroughness, and usefulness of this publication.

APPENDIX JPAGE J-26