The Hidden Cost of Direct Democracy:
How Ballot Initiatives Affect Politicians’ Selection and Incentives

July 1, 2015

Abstract
Citizen initiatives and referendums play an important role in modern democracies, from treaty
ratifications in the European Union to gay marriage in California, to the control of foreign workers
in Switzerland. Departing from the classic opposition between direct and representative democracy, we study the equilibrium effects of direct democracy institutions on the incentives and selection of elected officials. We find that facilitating direct democracy induces a negative spiral onpoliticians’ role and contribution to society, which may dominate any direct benefit. The theory
offers predictions on reelection probabilities and politicians’ performance consistent with recent
evidence from the U.S. states.

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Introduction

Direct democracy institutions, such as citizen initiatives and referendums, play an important role inregimes otherwise based on representative democracy: In the period 1990-2010, almost 800 ballot initiatives were proposed in U.S. states (against the 433 of the two preceding decades), of which roughly
45% were approved.1 Since 1990, referendums took place in 91 countries, including 30 European
ones (Kaufmann and Waters, 2004). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 27 of the 30 newly
established democracies adopted direct democracy institutions. Since 2012, direct democracy is alsoavailable at the European Union level via the European Citizens’ Initiative.
Understanding the impact of these institutions on the democratic process is thus of prime importance. Scholars of direct democracy, however, have traditionally focused on two comparatively narrow themes. One, dating back to Plato’s Republic (Book VIII),2 is the tyranny of the majority: Larger
social groups can systematically impose their preferences on minorities. The other theme emphasizes
voters’ lack of wisdom and expertise (Campbell et al., 1960; Maskin and Tirole, 2004).
Crucially, both arguments – as well as important counter-arguments (Lupia, 1994; Bowler and Donovan, 1998; Garrett and McCubbins, 2008) – focus on a single policy decision: They do not study how
direct democracy affects politicians’ incentives and the overall democratic process. Clearly, not all
decisions can be made through initiatives and referendums. In modern, hybrid democracies (Garrett,2005), citizens still delegate many decisions to elected representatives. This paper departs from theexisting literature by studying how direct democracy on some issues affects the quality of politicians’
decisions on all issues. This question seems especially important in light of the growing body of
empirical work on the topic.3
Most theoretical studies of the interaction between elected officials’ behavior and direct democracy(Matsusaka, 1992; Gerber, 1996; Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001) focus on the following intuitive
point: Allowing direct democracy typically improves the congruence between policies and the elec1

Data available at www.iandrinstitute.org/data.html.
The Federalist Papers (1788) feature another eminent exposition of this theory: Madison highlights the risk ofcollective decision made “not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior forceof an interested and overbearing majority.”
3
See, for example, Bali and Davis (2007), Kelleher and Wolak (2007), Matsusaka (2008, 2010), Dyck (2009), Dyck
and Lascher (2009), Rydberg (2010), Funk and Gathmann (2011, 2013), Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014).
2

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torate’s preferences. This intuition is in line with recent evidence on issues such as abortion rights anddeath penalty (Matsusaka, 2010), as well as with historical accounts of the origins of direct democracyin the U.S. (Cronin, 1989), where citizens’ demand for increased ability to control potential abuses
and failures of representative democracy played a key role.4
Despite its intuitive appeal, the previous argument is incomplete: To assess how efficient direct
democracy is at preventing political failures, one should also consider how direct democracy affects
politicians’ equilibrium incentives, expertise, and selection. If direct democracy is effective at correcting politicians’ mistakes, how does that affect the frequency of such mistakes? And how does it
affect the risk of mistakes along dimensions which are not amenable to direct democracy?
As a first step towards answering these questions, this paper analyzes a principal-agent model ofelectoral control. The expertise (built on costly information acquisition) and competence of an elected
official are endogenously determined through electoral selection and incentives. Direct democracy ismodeled as citizens’ ability to amend some policies chosen by their elected official. The main findingis that increasing voters’ amendment power undermines their ability to credibly reward expertise
acquisition by an incumbent and to learn about her competence. Besides its normative implications,addressing the equilibrium effects of direct democracy on elected officials’ incentives and behavior
also helps to explain recent empirical evidence (Bali and Davis, 2007; Dyck, 2009; Dyck and Lascher;
Kelleher and Wolak, 2007; Rydberg, 2010) that is hard to reconcile with previous theories.
Direct Democracy and Responsibility Substitution
In the model, a politician’s competence level affects two dimensions of policymaking. One dimension
can be amended through direct democracy. Examples include economic decisions, such as banning
golden parachutes for CEOs or limiting property taxes (California’s Proposition 13), social decisions,such as Switzerland’s recent decision to limit immigration or forbidding the construction of minarets,
and political ones, such as Italy’s repeal of proportional rule in 1991 and 1993. The second dimen4

This motivation, put forth by the Progressive Movement, is summarized in Theodore Roosevelt’s “Charter of Democracy” speech (1912): “I believe in the initiative and the referendum, which should be used not to destroy representative
government, but to correct it when ever it becomes misrepresentative. ... In the great majority of cases it is far better that
action on legislative matters should be taken by those specially delegated to perform the task; in other words, that the work
should be done by the experts chosen to perform it. But where the men thus delegated fail to perform their duty, then it
should be in the power of the people themselves to perform the duty.”

3

sion, by contrast, is not amenable to direct democracy. Some examples include the management ofinternational conflicts,5 the ability of attracting public funds and, more generally, any policy which
requires access to sensitive information or high-level interactions with foreign elected officials.
The quality of a policy typically depends on the intrinsic ability of the policymaker, as well as her
effort to acquire expertise on that particular policy. These two components are modeled separately: apolitician’s competence is viewed as her intrinsic type, and is assumed to be exogenous and constantthroughout the game. Expertise, by contrast, is the result of an information-acquisition task. The
effort devoted to this task is endogenous: in equilibrium, expertise depends on politicians’ electoral
incentives as well as innate ability.
Citizens cannot directly observe competence. However, their ability to assess the competence of anincumbent politician is increasing in the effort that she exerts: If voters expect a politician to spend
little time working on a given policy issue, they will hardly learn anything about her competence byobserving outcomes along that issue. If, on the other hand, they expect her to invest a great deal ofeffort and resources, outcomes should be highly correlated with her abilities.
Suppose, in that context, that direct democracy becomes feasible along one policy dimension. Specifically, suppose that citizens can avoid at least some of the negative consequences of a bad policy alongthat dimension by amending it. While this ability clearly carries positive value, it also entails indirect effects. The first negative consequence is a responsibility substitution effect: Citizens’ improved
ability to “fix” the incumbent’s mistakes reduces their ability to credibly commit to reward effort(via equilibrium reelection incentives). This increased leniency reduces the incumbent’s incentives toexert effort, and thus increases the probability that she chooses a bad policy.
This effect is just the first iteration of a disincentive spiral. Lower effort reduces citizens’ ability toassess the politician’s competence, and therefore their expected utility along the second dimension,
which cannot be amended. Since citizens are now more concerned about the incumbent’s competence
than her effort, they require a higher posterior belief about her competence, conditional on observing
a bad policy, to reelect her.6 This is only possible, however, if bad policies are less revealing of
5

The use of direct democracy in ratifying international treaties is explicitly prohibited by the Italian Constitution.
The entire analysis concerns the probability of reelection following a poor policy. It is easy to show, and intuitive,that successful policies should always be rewarded by reelection of the incumbent.
6

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incompetence than before. This, in turn, implies that the incumbent’s equilibrium effort must go
down.
While the precise mechanics of this disincentive spiral are beyond the scope of this introduction, its
implications are clear: The introduction (or facilitation) of direct democracy have negative indirect
effects on citizens’ welfare. As it turns out, this negative spiral can dominate the initial benefit of
direct democracy. By weakening the role of elected officials, direct democracy can have perverse
effects on citizens’ ability to select good politicians. These effects can prove extremely damaging,as they not only increase the risk of bad policies along dimensions which citizens can correct, butalso along dimensions that citizens cannot directly affect. As a result, voters’ expected utility is nonmonotonic in the cost of direct democracy and, under certain circumstances, citizens might be better
off without direct democracy. Strikingly, this latter result may occur even when direct democracy
entails no legal, “technological,” or cognitive cost whatsoever.
Implications
The indirect effect of direct democracy uncovered here is worth emphasizing for several reasons.
Firstly, it is derived in a framework where earlier criticisms of direct democracy (such the tyrannyof the majority or voters’ lack of knowledge) do not apply. It is a pure and novel equilibrium phenomenon, completely independent of other considerations. Secondly, recent theories have cast ahomogeneously favorable light on direct democracy institutions (Matsusaka, 1992; Matusaka andMcCarty, 2001; Boehmke and Patty, 2007; Besley and Coate, 2008; Le Bihan, 2013). Ignoring theequilibrium effects of such institutions on the role of politicians seems dangerous, as this paper illustrates.
The analysis also sheds light on key empirical observations about direct democracy. Firstly, the theory
explains why incumbents in U.S. states with initiatives seem to enjoy a lower level of support (Dyck,
2009), but display higher reelection rates, especially conditional on poor performance (Kelleher and
Wolak, 2007; Bali and Davis, 2007). Secondly, the model provides an interpretation for the recent
increase in the frequency of initiatives, as well as the recent criticism that these institutions havereceived (Cronin, 1989; Gerber, 1999; Broder, 2000).77

For example, in Arizona, where initiatives that restricted bilingual education in 2000, or, in 2004 and 2006, denied
benefits and access to state education to undocumented immigrants, or in California (see, for example, “Tyranny of the5The model also makes a contribution to contract theory: It formalizes relational contracts (Macaulay,
1963; Macneil, 1978; Levin, 2003) with both adverse selection and moral hazard and studies how
the principal’s ability to correct the agent’s actions affect equilibrium incentives and selection. The
present mechanisms and effects, such as the disincentive spiral and the responsibility substitution
effect (see Section 5), the structure and uniqueness of a “natural” equilibrium (see Appendix B.1) andthe technical condition uncovered here regarding the discerning power of incentives (Appendix B.3)
may be applied to other economic settings, such as the interaction between an employee/contractor
and a manager/owner with limited contractual instruments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the literature review. Section 3 introduces themodel and discusses the key assumptions of the paper. Section 4 characterizes the equilibria of themodel. Section 5 exposes the disincentive spiral induced by direct democracy and its implications
for citizens’ welfare. Section 6 discusses the testable implications of the model, and relates them torecent empirical evidence. Appendix A contains the proofs omitted from the main text. Appendix B
shows that the class of equilibria studied in the paper are optimal from the voters’ viewpoint and are
the only ones surviving in a generalized version of the model (where a few results of technical interest
are also established, and the consequences of relaxing some other key assumptions are discussed).

2

Related literature

Most theories of direct democracy have focused on its comparison with representative democracy.8
Closer to the present paper, some theories consider the impact of direct democracy institutions on
representative democracy. These works have typically studied distributional or ideological issues
in the context of a spatial model, showing that direct democracy can improve policies by introducing competition in policymaking. Direct democracy may help alleviate political inertia (Matsusaka,1992) and can allow a better expression of citizen preferences by unbundling multidimensional issues
Majority” in The Economist, December 17th 2009, or David Brooks’ “The Bloody Crossroads,” published on September
7, 2009 in The New York Times, where direct democracy is believed to be a cause of the recent fiscal crisis in California –see Matsusaka, 2005a, for a description of the debate.)
8
Persson and Tabellini (1994) show how electing a representative agent can help solve the credibility problem associated with dynamic capital taxation. In Redoano and Scharf (2004) and Loeper (2011), direct and representative democracy
are compared in a setting with multiple districts and inter-jurisdictional externalities (see also Maskin and Tirole, 2004).

6

(Besley and Coate, 2008; Matsusaka, 2008). Initiatives and referendums may also benefit the electorate by creating informational cues that disseminate socially beneficial knowledge (Boehmke andPatty, 2007).
In contrast to these works, the present paper focuses on the equilibrium effects of direct democracy
institutions on the role of elected officials, including their incentives, selection, and policies. Similar
questions have been studied in a static setting. In Matsusaka and McCarty (2001), direct democracytranslates into giving amendment power to an interest group over the policy chosen by an elected
official. In Gerber (1996), the threat of an initiative endogenously increases the alignment between
voters’ preferences and implemented policies. A similar idea is featured in Le Bihan (2013) and
Hugh-Jones (2012).9 Those works focus on static agency problems and ignore the connection between
political delegation, information acquisition, and political selection.
The responsibility substitution effect identified in this paper is related to recent work identifying
indirect drawbacks of ex post control in other political arenas. For instance, the legislative oversightof bureaucracy (Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson, 2007) can distort the allocation of effort acrossobservable and non observable tasks by bureaucrats. Similarly, the judicial review of elected officials(Fox and Stephenson, 2011) can exacerbate a politician’s incentives to posture.
Like the present paper, Kessler (2005) studies a model where agents can acquire costly information
about the mapping between policies and outcomes. Unlike the present paper, she contrasts pure direct
legislation to representative democracy. However, the observation that representative democracy, byconcentrating rewards from policymaking to a single agent, provides stronger incentives for acquiring
information is an intellectual precursor of the disincentive spiral described here. The present paper
also shares some characteristics with Besley and Smart (2007), in which voters use elections to discipline the incumbent and select honest politicians who do not act on their hidden information forthe second period. In contrast to that work, here politicians have heterogeneous abilities and acquire
information endogenously to produce good policies.
9

In Le Bihan (2013) initiatives reduce the opportunity cost for non congruent politicians to act on their policy preferences, rather than on voters’, even on issues not amenable to direct democracy. In High-Jones (2012), non-congruent
politicians choose to adopt direct democracy to “tie their hands” and ultimately improve their long term electoral chances.
The model provides an explanation for the higher electoral survival of incumbents under direct democracy, but not for the
lower approval rate that they typically enjoy.

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3

Model

The model has two periods, and features two politicians–an incumbent and a challenger–and a polity
of voters which acts as a unitary agent. The incumbent is in office in the first period, and the votersdecide whether or not to replace her with a challenger. Incumbent and challenger are drawn from thesame pool of politicians. A politician privately observes his type θ, which can either be competent(θ = C) or incompetent (θ = N ) and is constant over time. It is common knowledge that the share ofcompetent types is q.
In each period, the politician in office chooses a policy x. The mapping between policies and voter
payoff depends on a state h. For simplicity, both the state and the policy are assumed to be binary,taking values in {R, S}. To make the model more concrete, S is interpreted as a default policy, andR as a policy change (see Appendix B.4 for the alternative scenario).
While unable to directly observe the state, the representative can acquire costly expertise (e ∈ [0, 1])that enhances her ability to learn the state. Specifically, when h = R a politician with expertise egets no signal with probability 1 − e and learns the state with probability e, while she gets no signal
whenever h = S.10 The cost of acquiring expertise level e for a politician of type θ is τθ (e) =e2 /2τθ , where τθ is (with a slight abuse of notation) a productivity parameter that is increasing incompetence.11 The ratio ττNC < 1 is denoted by τ . The state h is i.i.d. across periods, equal to S withprobability ρ and to R with probability 1 − ρ. To avoid corner solutions, the condition ρτC < 1 is
imposed throughout the analysis.
At the end of the first period, voters observe both the policy and the state, and decide whether toreelect the incumbent or to replace her with a challenger randomly drawn from the pool of politicians.
Voters are unable to directly observe politicians’ competence and expertise, which are both relevant totheir second-period utility (see below). The assumption, here, is that a politician’s competence affects
two policy dimensions: The policy for which she acquires expertise, and a second policy dimension
which is not amenable to direct democracy (many such policies exist in practice, see the introduction
and the discussion below).
10

The signal structure here is chosen for simplicity (see Appendix B.4), and follows Bénabou and Tirole (2006) andTirole (2009).
11
The quadratic formulation is chosen for simplicity, and is generalized in Appendix B.

8In the second period, a new state is drawn. An elected challenger can only acquire new expertise. A
reelected incumbent, instead, can also rely on past expertise to detect the state. In other words, policy
expertise is assumed to be persistent.
Voters’ utility has two separable components, corresponding to the two policy dimensions. Letu(xt , ht ) denote voters’ utility in period t ∈ {1, 2} when the state is ht and the policy is xt . The
first-policy component simply yields u(x1 , h1 ) + u(x2 , h2 ) (discounting across period is irrelevant tothe analysis and omitted). The utility from the second dimension equals V if the politician is competent and 0 otherwise, and is received at the end of the second period. Thus, the overall utility is equaltou(x1 , h1 ) + u(x2 , h2 ) + Iθ=C V
The utility is normalized as follows: u equals zero if x = S, regardless of the state; u(R, S) = −1
(bad reform), and u(R, R) = B > 0 (good reform). In the baseline model, it is assumed that x = R
is undesirable in the absence of additional information beyond the prior: ρB < 1 − ρ. Therefore,choosing x = R is efficient only after receiving the signal.
A politician gets a payoff of 1 from being in office. This reelection payoff is, of course, what motivatesthe incumbent to put effort in the first period. Notice that, once in office in the second and final
period, no politician has incentive to acquire additional expertise. As such, it is assumed that in thesecond period politicians in office choose the optimal policy conditional on their information. As
a consequence, a challenger who cannot rely on previous expertise chooses policy S. A reelected
incumbent with expertise e, instead, learns that the state is R with probability e, in which case shechooses x = R, and chooses S otherwise.
Voters’ strategy is defined by the reelection probability f (x, h) for each first period outcome, chosen
optimally given their belief about the incumbent’s expertise and competence, and by whether or not
an initiative is proposed.
Initiatives
In this environment, it seems natural to model direct democracy as a policy amendment to the elected
official’s decision. In particular, it is assumed that citizens can modify the second-period policy after9

learning the state. In practice (this is the only relevant amendment under the assumptions), citizens
can implement the reform R to match a realization of state h = R that was undetected by the politician
in office.12
The cost of the amendment is denoted by c, and has several interpretations. First, if c is above B, it
makes the exercise of direct democracy so costly that it amounts to ruling it out. As a consequence,c is restricted without loss of generality to the interval [0, B]. If c = 0, on the other hand, direct
democracy bears no direct cost. In between, c captures (i) voters’ inability to fully undo the effects
of an unwelcome policy, due to well documented lags or imperfections (Gerber et al., 2004) in theimplementation of direct legislation, (ii) legal costs (e.g., signature requirements), and (iii) technological and cognitive costs (e.g., the cost of producing, disseminating, and acquiring detailed policy
information).
Citizens’ expected utility in the second period can be then written as follows: if the incumbent with
type θ is reelected, U (θ, e) = Beρ + (1 − e)(B − c)ρ + Iθ=C V , where e is the expertise of theincumbent, and θ is (with a slight abuse of notation) her type. If a challenger is elected, the expectedutility is simply U = ρ(B −c)+qV . The difference (B −c) is the direct benefit of direct democracy incase a useful reform has not been undertaken by the elected official (which happens with probabilityρ(1 − e) when the incumbent is reelected, and with probability ρ when a challenger is in office).
Finally, it is assumed that Bρ < qV , which guarantees that, if voters could observe the type of
the incumbent, they would always reelect a competent type and always oust an incompetent type,regardless of her expertise:13 ∀ e ∈ [0, 1], U (C, e) > U > U (N, e).
In summary, the timing of the game is as follows:• Nature draws the type θ of the incumbent and the state h1 in the first period.
• The incumbent chooses expertise e, possibly observes a signal about h1 , and then chooses x1 .
• Citizens observe h1 and x1 and vote between the incumbent and the challenger.
• Nature draws h2 and, if applicable, the type of the challenger.
12

Among existing direct democracy institutions, an ex post policy amendment would formally correspond to the notionof “popular referendum,” as discussed by the Founding Fathers of the U.S. constitution. However, here the policy isamended by citizens only in favor of the reform, which is closer, in spirit, to a citizen initiative.
13
The assumption is made for convenience, as it avoids corner equilibria.

10• If the incumbent is reelected, she may observe a signal about h2 (depending on e and h2 ).
• The politician elected to the office chooses x2 .
• h2 and x2 are observed. If h2 = R and x2 = S, citizens may amend x2 to R at cost c.
• Everyone gets their utility and the game ends.
Discussion
While Appendix B shows that the insights of this baseline model are robust to several alternative or
more general specifications, a few observations are in order.
First, assuming that voters are perfectly homogeneous avoids concerns about the tyranny of the majority (orthogonal to the analysis). However, it also generates important implications for the interpretation of the policy dimension x. While direct democracy sometimes affects divisive ethical issues, suchas the death penalty, the available evidence (e.g., Matsusaka, 2010) shows that many ballot initiatives
are about issues with important common value aspects, such as labor and product market regulation,
term limits, and school funding.
Second, the model allows both initiatives and the realization of the utility from competence (V ) onlyin the second period. The reason is that the strategic environment of the model is unaffected byfirst period quantities. As such, having initiatives and/or competence payoff (as long as competence
is unobserved before the election) also in the first period has no consequence on the equilibrium
analysis.
Third, the model assumes complementarity in expertise across policy dimensions. However, the second policy dimension can be interpreted more broadly: the competence payoff V can represent unforeseen (or low-probability) contingencies, such as a terrorist attack or a financial crisis, or the gainfrom having a “dedicated” politician, who is more inclined to work in the interest of the populationand less prone to divert away public resources for personal reasons.
Fourth, the model’s asymmetries do capture real phenomena. In particular, (i) incumbents have theopportunity of acquiring policy expertise that challengers cannot access, (ii) incumbents have manyreasons to have voters fix their polices rather than attempting to do so themselves (interest groups,
reputational risk, organizational rigidities), and (iii) assuming that voters are more informed ex post11

about policy is not equivalent to assuming that they have more expertise in general (fixing a policy
mistake ex post is not equivalent to getting it right from the start).

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Equilibrium and political contract

This model features several equilibria, including one in which both types of incumbent acquirezero expertise and are always reelected. It also includes a Pareto dominated equilibrium (see Appendix B.1) in which the incumbent acquires expertise but does, in the first period, the opposite ofwhat her signal tells her to do, as a way of signaling her competence. The present analysis focuseson the more relevant and realistic equilibria in which (1) the incumbent chooses the reform R if andonly if the need of a reform is revealed to her, and (2) the expertise acquisition is strictly positive forat least a subset of parameters’ space where the equilibrium is defined. Those equilibria are referred
to as natural. The next section shows that there are two natural equilibria, and the paper will selectamong them on grounds of empirical plausibility and theoretical robustness.

4.1

Reelection probabilities and incumbent’s choice

Equilibria are characterized by backward induction. Let eθ denote the expertise level of each typeθ. Taking these levels as given, voters reelect the incumbent conditional on observing the mismatch(S, R) if and only if their posterior belief about her competence is above some threshold, denoted byp̄r , which is given by the following formula.
P ROPOSITION 1 The posterior threshold for reelection of the incumbent is given byp̄r =qV − eN cρ
.
V + cρ(eC − eN )Proof. Voters’ expected second-period utility from reelecting the incumbent, given a posterior p, is
p[V + ρeC B + ρ(1 − eC )(B − c)] + (1 − p)[ρeN B + ρ(1 − eN )(B − c)],12

while their expected second-period utility with a challenger is qV + ρ(B − c). Comparing these

expressions yields the threshold.

In Appendix B, it is also shown that it is interim and ex ante optimal for the voter to always reelectwhen the policy matches the state, an not to reelect when an unnecessary reform is implemented
f (S, S) = f (R, R) = 1, f (R, S) = 0.
In the first period, the incumbent chooses the expertise level eθ ∈ [0, 1] which solves the optimization
problem14 maxe∈[0,1] [(1 − ρ) + ρe + (1 − e)ρf ]−τθ (e), here f is her reelection probability in case ofa mistake. (Recall that the reelection payoff has been normalized to 1). Convexity of the cost function
implies that the optimal expertise level is characterized by the first-order condition eθ = (1 − f )τθ ρ.

4.2

Equilibria

In this setting, there may exist two natural equilibria: a responsive equilibrium, where the incumbent iselected with strictly positive probability even after making a mistake (i.e., f > 0), and an unresponsive
equilibrium, where failure of implementing R when the state is R leads to the demise of the incumbent
ρwith probability one (f = 0). Let φ1 = qVρ and φ2 = (1−q)V.

P ROPOSITION 2 (E QUILIBRIUM ) There exists a threshold c2 > 0 such that no natural equilibrium
exists when c > c2 . When c ≤ c2 , there are two natural equilibria: (i) an unresponsive equilibrium,characterized by the reelection probability f = 0; (ii) a responsive equilibrium, where f = f ∗ ∈[0, 1], which is implicitly defined byZ(f ) = eN (f ∗ )[1 + cφ1 ] − e2N (f ∗ )cφ1 − eC (f ∗ )[1 − cφ2 ] − e2C (f ∗ )cφ2 = 0(1)

and such that there exists a threshold c1 ∈ [0, c2 ] such that, f ∗ < 1 whenever c ∈ [c1 , c2 ] and f ∗ = 1
otherwise.
A direct implication of Proposition 2 is that the responsive equilibrium is associated with positive
expertise only when the cost of direct democracy c is large enough.
14

The equation uses the result, established in Appendix B.1, that the incumbent is surely reelected if she manages todetect the reform state R or if voters observe h = S.

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4.3

Equilibrium selection

The game’s two natural equilibria (responsive and unresponsive) have opposite normative implications for the value of direct democracy and make starkly different predictions for its impact on politicians’ and voters’ behavior.
In the unresponsive equilibrium, any incumbent’s mistake is punished maximally (f = 0) and independently of all parameters of the model, including the cost of direct democracy. Compared to the
responsive equilibrium, this maximal punishment results in a higher expected utility for the voter anda lower expected utility for the incumbent (regardless of his type).15 As a consequence, if voters’
and politicians’ behaviors empirically respond to the presence of direct democracy, then it must bethat incumbents, not voters, are their highest payoff among natural equilibria. Indeed, a criterion
based on the incumbent’s equilibrium payoff (as, for example, in Eguia and Shepsle, 2015) selects the
responsive equilibrium.
Direct democracy does seem to influence various aspects of political outcomes. In particular, direct
democracy systematically affects voters’ opinions and voting behavior (Bowler and Donovan, 1998;
Dyck, 2009; Dyck and Lascher, 2009), as well as on politicians’ actions, characteristics, and electoral
prospects (Bali and Davis, 2007; Funk and Gathmann, 2011 and 2013; Rydberg, 2010).
There are also theoretical reasons why voters might be unable to carry out this maximal punishment,
developed in Appendix B. Firstly, incorporating probabilistic voting into our model would yield aunique equilibrium similar to our responsive equilibrium and featuring responsibility substitution, acentral prediction of our analysis. Secondly, if the quality of candidates is allowed to vary endogenously with electoral incentives – for example, as a result of participation constraints (Caselli andMorelli, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008)– this creates an upper boundon the size of the punishment that voters are able to impose on the incumbent, ruling out the unresponsive equilibrium. While these richer models seem realistic and in line with previous literature,
our equilibrium selection allows us to present the theoretical mechanism in its simplest form.
We thus focus on the responsive equilibrium, and refer to it as ‘the’ equilibrium.
15

To see why the latter claim must hold, notice that, by the Envelope Theorem, the incumbent’s equilibrium payoff isincreasing in f .

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5Disincentive spiral and welfare analysis

In equilibrium, the cost of initiatives affects voters’ ability to induce expertise acquisition and filter
out incompetent politicians. The incumbent risks not being reelected if she made a mistake (S, R).
Ideally, voters would like such a mistake to reveal, as much as possible, an incompetent type. The
separating power of the electoral process is its ability to weed out incompetent politicians. This ismeasured by the posterior probability p that the incumbent is competent, conditional on observing(S, R): the lower that posterior, the more selective the electoral process.
The next proposition shows that, in equilibrium, this posterior is decreasing with electoral incentives:a lower probability f of reelection conditional on the mistake (S, R) lowers the probability of ousting
C (f ))
a competent type. Let p(f ) = q(1−eC (fq(1−edenote the probability that the incumbent is))+(1−q)(1−eN (f ))competent, conditional on (S, R).
P ROPOSITION 3 (R ESPONSIBILITY S UBSTITUTION ) In equilibrium, (i) eC (f ) − eN (f ) is decreasing in f , and (ii) p(f ) is increasing in f .
The value of f that induces voters’ indifference is given byq
qV − cρeN (f )=,q + (1 − q)η(f )V + cρ(eC (f ) − eN (f ))(2)where eC (f ), eN (f ) are the equilibrium expertise levels of both types of incumbent given the ‘electoral disincentive’ f , and η(f ) = [1 − eN (f )]/[1 − eC (f )] > 1. Indeed, the left-hand side of (2) isthe equilibrium posterior probability that the incumbent is competent, conditional on making a mistake. The right-hand side is the posterior threshold above which citizens prefer the incumbent over thechallenger (see Proposition 1), and depends on (a) the equilibrium expertise levels eN (f ) and eC (f )chosen by the incumbent, and (b) the cost c of correcting mistakes in the second period.
This posterior threshold is decreasing in c, reflecting the fact that, when direct democracy is cheaper,
voters care more about competence per se and less about the value of past expertise, since they canamend mistakes at lower cost.
As a result, a lower cost c weakens electoral incentives in a self-reinforcing pattern that is now ex-

15

plained. First, it raises the posterior threshold at which voters accept to reelect the incumbent. Other
things equal, thus, η must decrease: the equilibrium posterior conditional on a mistake must increase,in order to keep voters indifferent. The Proof of Proposition 3, part (ii), shows that η(f ) is decreasingin f . Therefore, f must increase in equilibrium. The intuition is that, to achieve a higher posteriorconditional on a mistake, the incumbent must have acquired a lower level of expertise, which is possible only if the “electoral disincentive” f is higher. From part (i) of Proposition 3, a higher f implies
that eN (f ) and eC (f ) − eN (f ) decrease. Other things equal, this increases the right-hand side of (2),which must again be offset by a lower η, hence a higher f , and so forth. Therefore, the impact of alower direct democracy cost has a spiraling negative effect on electoral incentives.

Z(f)

|
1

0

f

Figure 1: Responsibility substitution effect. The zero of Z(f ), which implicitly defines f ∗ , shifts tothe left as c declines. Parameter values: c = 0.4 (black line) and 0.3 (grey line); V = 1, ρ = 0.8,
q = 0.44, τC = 1, τN = 0.6.
Figure 1 displays the equilibrium reelection probability (derived from the voter’s indifference condition, corresponding to the zero of the function Z(f ) defined in (1) for two values of c. As the cost of
direct democracy decreases, the responsibility substitution effect makes voters more willing to reelectan incumbent who mistakenly chose the status quo policy over the reform, which in turns dampens
her incentive to acquire expertise to avoid these mistakes. The impact of direct democracy on welfare
is a priori ambiguous: Policy mistakes harm voters less than before, but they are more likely to occur.
The next section compares these direct and indirect effects.

16

5.1

Welfare and direct democracy

This section studies the impact of direct democracy on citizens’ welfare. The benchmark corresponds
to c = B, which is equivalent to the absence of direct democracy.16 Let EU (c) be the voter’s expectedutility when the cost of direct democracy is equal to c
EU (c) = qV + ρ(B − c) + ρ(c + B)E(eθ )where E(eθ ) = (1 − q)eN + qeC is the expected expertise. If EU (B) ≥ EU (c), direct democracy at
cost c reduces citizens’ ex ante welfare with respect to pure representative democracy.
P ROPOSITION 4 There exists τ ∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) such that for all τ ≥ τ ∗ , EU (c) is strictly increasing inc ∈ [c1 , c2 ].
Intuitively, increasing c has two consequences: First, the direct loss associated with a politician’s
mistake in the second period, which occurs with probability ρ[1 − E(eθ )], increases. Second, theprobability of a policy mistake decreases because (a) the electoral incentive 1 − f increases (incentivegain), and (b) the average expertise is increasing in 1 − f (expertise gain). This second consequence
embodies the responsibility substitution effect mentioned earlier in this paper.
When the productivity ratio τ increases (i.e., competence types get closer, and the screening problem
voters face is more severe), the direct policy loss decreases (keeping the electoral incentive constant).
Moreover, the equilibrium electoral incentive, which requires the posterior to take a specific value,
must be larger: if it was to remain constant, then type separation would be lower, and the posteriorconditional on a mistake would be too high. Finally, an increase in τ also increases the expected
responsiveness to electoral incentives, thereby increasing the incentive gain.
As a consequence, when τ is large enough (a sufficient condition being τ ≥ 1/2), responsibility
substitution dominates the direct effect of “cheaper” policy amendments on the whole domain [c1 , c2 ]:although initiatives are ex post beneficial for voters, as long as the incumbent is acquiring someexpertise in equilibrium, a marginal reduction in c hurts voters, ex ante, through worse behavior and
16

Notice the implicit assumption that B ≤ c2 . Since B > c2 implies that representative democracy features zeroexpertise acquisition, assuming B ≤ c2 rules out the case of a fully dysfunctional representative democracy, where any
institutional change can only be welfare improving.

17

poorer selection of elected officials.
The next result compares welfare levels, and focuses on the extreme case in which the cost of initiatives is zero: this situation is referred to as costless amendments. The goal is to study under which
conditions pure representative democracy dominates costless amendments.
P ROPOSITION 5 The introduction of costless amendment reduces citizens welfare when the expected
expertise is high enough: E(eθ )|c=B ≥ 1/2.
For parameters such that the equilibrium level of expertise under representative democracy is highenough (i.e., ρ large enough or V small enough), Proposition 5 implies that introducing costless
direct democracy reduces expected welfare. The result is driven by responsibility substitution.

5.2

Discussion

The analysis shows that the introduction or facilitation of direct democracy along a single policy
dimension can reduce voters’ ex ante welfare, even when the ex post exercise of direct democracy
always improves welfare. In particular, there are two key factors which modulate the impact of direct
democracy: the initial quality of representative democracy and the degree of type separation. On the
one hand, when equilibrium expertise under representative democracy is high enough, voters’ welfare
is lower even when direct democracy is costless. On the other, when the screening problem facedby voters is difficult enough (the productivity ratio τ is close enough to 1) voters’ welfare is strictlyincreasing in c.
The observation that direct democracy can reduce citizens’ welfare because of its indirect effect onpoliticians behavior is consistent with Woodrow Wilson’s appraisal of direct democracy in Switzerland (“The State,” 1898, Chapter VIII):[...] the Referendum [...] has dulled the sense of responsibility among legislators without in fact
quickening the people to the exercise of any real control in affairs.

The same idea appears, a few years earlier, in the work of James Bryce (1888), an important scholarof the American political system, who highlights the lowered “authority and sense of responsibilityof the legislature” induced by direct legislation. This paper not only formalizes these ideas, but also18

provides an explanation for the dulled responsibility among legislators: the reduced effectiveness ofthe electoral process at screening competence and rewarding expertise.

6

Testable implications and existing evidenceThis section derives the model’s main comparative statics and predictions and discusses their empirical support. In particular, the model can explain the puzzling fact that elected officials in states withdirect democracy, while enjoying lower job approval rates than other states, are more likely to bereelected, especially conditional on bad economic performance.

6.1

Job approval, reelection rates, and cost of initiatives

The responsibility substitution effect predicts that direct democracy should be associated with a lower
probability that the incumbent chooses the optimal policy for the voters. Direct democracy should thenbe correlated with higher dissatisfaction towards elected officials (and, more generally, representative
government), and that this effect should be stronger when direct democracy is cheaper (low c):
Implication 1 The incumbents’ approval rate should be lower with direct democracy, and increasingin the cost of proposing an initiative.
This predictions is consistent with the evidence documented by Dyck (2009) and Dyck and Lascher(2009): Dissatisfaction towards government and incumbents is higher in states with direct democracy.17
Despite being relatively less satisfied about their elected officials’ performance, Section 5 shows thatcitizens under direct democracy do not necessarily punish them with lower reelection rates. In fact, theanalysis shows that the reelection rate conditional on a policy mistake decreases in the cost of direct
democracy. The prediction is more subtle with respect to the unconditional reelection probability,
1 − ρ(1 − E(eθ ))(1 − f ): although voters are more forgiving with policy mistakes, those mistakes
17

While the possibility that causation runs the other way—that is states with systematically worse elected officials are
more prone to the adoption of direct democracy—cannot be excluded, the fact that most of the initiatives states adopted
direct democracy over a century ago should significantly mitigate these concerns.

19also become more likely, so the difference across regimes in overall reelection rates should be lesspronounced.
Implication 2 The difference between direct and pure representative democracy in incumbent’s reelection rates conditional on a policy mistake should be positive, and larger than the overall
difference in incumbent’s reelection rates.
These predictions are consistent with the evidence documented by Kelleher and Wolak (2007), andBali and Davis (2007): In states that allow initiatives, legislators’ reelection rates do not statisticallydiffer from non-initiative states in normal times, but are statistically higher in times of bad economic
performance.

6.2

Likelihood of policy optimality and expected competence

The equilibrium probability that an initiative occurs can be interpreted, for empirical purposes, as
the frequency at which initiatives occur in the data. The unprecedented increase in the frequency of
US initiatives (Matsusaka, 2005b) over the last three decades, together with the criticism (Broder,2000; Gerber, 1999; Cronin, 1989) that these institutions have received, can be interpreted throughthe lenses of responsibility substitution: While direct democracy enables a “reaction to a legislature’s
inactivity on issues of importance to the voters,” as argued by California State Senator Tom Harman,
such inactivity might indeed be endogenous to the presence of direct democracy.
The next result describes how the expected need for a policy change (i.e., the probability ρ that areform is optimal) affects the equilibrium.
P ROPOSITION 6 The incumbent’s equilibrium expertise level is increasing in ρ, and the equilibrium
2 ∗freelection probability f ∗ , as a function of (ρ, c), is supermodular in [0, 1] × [c1 , c2 ]: ∂∂c∂ρ> 0.

Since ∂f
< 0, the sensitivity of the electoral incentive to the cost of direct democracy is lower when∂creforms are more likely to be needed, because the derivative of the equilibrium expertise τθ ρ(1 − f )to the electoral incentive (1 − f ) is proportional to ρ. As a consequence, the adjustment in f that isneeded to offset a change in c and to maintain voters’ indifference is decreasing in ρ.
The result may be interpreted as follows: The indirect effect of direct democracy on a politician’s
20Figure 2: Expertise acquisition, as a function of competence distribution and direct democracy cost.
performance is stronger when the expected optimality of the reform is relatively low. During policy
emergencies or economic turmoil, by contrast, the incumbent’s behavior should be less elastic tochanges in the cost of direct democracy. As a result, a weaker responsibility substitution effect should
result in a lower frequency of initiatives (despite an arguably higher dissatisfaction with representative
government). This prediction is indirectly supported by Boemhke (2005), who finds that the size ofthe budget deficit is associated with a lower frequency of initiatives.
Finally, this paper studies how the equilibrium depends on the probability q that politicians (bothincumbent and challengers) are competent. Inspection of equation (1), which defines f , suggests thatq has an ambiguous effect on this variable. This point is illustrated by Figure 2, which displays therelationship between q and c1 , c2 (the threshold values for c that define equilibrium expertise in themodel). c1 is the smallest cost of initiative for which expertise matters to voters and c2 is the largest
cost of initiatives for which nonzero expertise acquisition can arise in equilibrium. The following
proposition formalizes this intuition.
P ROPOSITION 7 c1 and c2 are strictly quasiconcave in q, with an interior maximizer.
In equilibrium, expertise is maximized when c = c2 (that is, when f = 0), and is equal to zero forc ≤ c1 . Therefore, fixing a value for c (e.g., low enough to be below c1 for some q) and letting q vary,
the analysis shows a non-monotonic relationship between q and the equilibrium level of expertise. As
the uncertainty surrounding the incumbent’s type vanishes (i.e., q goes to 0 or 1), the range of costs
inducing a positive equilibrium level of expertise shrinks to zero.
As a consequence, initiatives have more likely to generate pernicious indirect effects when voters21

face significant uncertainty about politicians’ competence. By contrast, when voters are more concerned about disciplining politicians (as in the Progressive Era) rather than selecting them, then direct
democracy is less likely to negatively affect elected official’s incentives and selection.

7

Conclusion

Direct democracy institutions have a broader impact than suggested by merely looking at the individual issues which they have successfully influenced. In the United States and elsewhere, the growing
importance of citizen initiatives concerns not only the policies that are decided by those initiatives,
but also the behavior and the selection of elected officials. While citizen initiatives, referendums,
and petitions provide a vital energy to democracies, they also reduce the accountability of politicians
and narrow their role in the political landscape, giving them a perverse incentive to default on their
responsibilities. This paper provides the first formalization of this idea, which may be traced back to
the century-old concerns expressed by James Bryce (1888) and Woodrow Wilson (1898).
More broadly, the paper provides a new framework to think about the dynamic equilibrium effects
of direct democracy on citizens’ welfare and politicians’ selection, incentives, and electoral survival.
Even when it is immune from its standard criticisms, direct democracy creates a responsibility substitution effect and ensuing disincentive spiral which can more than offset the direct welfare gainfrom initiatives. The increased alignment between policies and voters’ preferences, which has been
predicted by the existing literature on direct democracy, is no longer guaranteed.
The model also generates comparative statics that are consistent with existing and novel evidence
from U.S. states. In particular, the theory can explain why (1) incumbents are more likely to bereelected, conditional on poor economic performance, when direct democracy is present, and (2)voters are overall less satisfied with their elected officials in states where initiatives are present and/or
subject to lower signature requirements. As explained in Section 6.2, there is indirect evidence thatthe responsibility substitution has become more salient in the United States, which helps explain thecriticism that direct democracy institutions have received there in recent years.18
18
In 2011, less than 18% of Californians thought that the initiative process did not need to be reformed (source: Public
Policy Institute of California Statewide Survey, May 2011).

22

AppendicesA

Proofs

Proof of Proposition 2. First, let’s define
c1 =

1−τ
;
φ2 + φ1 τ

c2 =

1−τ
φ2 (1 − ρ) + φ1 τ (1 − τ ρ)

The proof is based on the following lemma.
L EMMA 1 For c ≤ c2 , there exists a natural equilibrium with f = 0 and at most one other naturalequilibrium with f ∈ (0, 1).
Proof.

The condition f < 1, which is necessary for a positive expertise level, can only hold in

equilibrium if voters weakly prefer the challenger to the incumbent, conditional on a policy mistake(S, R):
qV − cρeN (f )q(1 − eC (f ))=.
q(1 − eC (f )) + (1 − q)(1 − eN (f ))V + cρ(eC (f ) − eN (f ))This condition may be re-expressed asa(f ) = b(f ),(3)where a(f ) = eN (f )[1 + cφ1 ] − e2N (f )cφ1 and b(f ) = eC (f )[1 − cφ2 ] + e2C (f )cφ2 . The case f = 0
corresponds to a(0) ≤ b(0). Using that eC = ρτC and eN = ρτN , this yields c ≤ c2 .
If f ∈ (0, 1), equilibrium expertise must be such that voters are, conditional on a mistake, exactly
indifferent between challenger and incumbent, i.e., such that a(f ) = b(f ).
It is easy to show that a is decreasing in f , and that b is either everywhere decreasing in f or firstdecreasing and then increasing.19 An equilibrium probability f is a root of the function a − b. It
19

Seen as a function of eN , a is a quadratic concave polynomial that reaches its peak at (1+φ1 )/(2φ1 ) > 1. Therefore,
a is increasing in eN on [0, 1] and, therefore, decreasing in f . Similarly, b is a quadratic convex polynomial in eC , whose
minimizer eb is always strictly less than 1, and is negative if φ2 < 1. Therefore there exists fb such that eC (f ) is in theincreasing range of b if and only if f > fb .

23

is now shown that the function a − b is strictly quasiconcave (i.e., strictly increasing, then strictly
decreasing). Equivalently, it suffices to show that b0 − a0 satisfies the single-crossing property (i.e.,crosses the x-axis only once, from negative to positive. Let fb denote the (possibly, equal to 1) valueof f such that b is decreasing on [0, fb ] and increasing on [fb , 1]. Since a is decreasing, the functiona − b is decreasing on [fb , 1]. To conclude the proof of quasiconcavity, it suffices to show that if a − b
is decreasing around any value f < fb , then it is decreasing on [f, 1]. For f < fb , a0 (f ), b0 (f ) arenegative, anda0 (f )
1 + cφ1 − 2eN (f )cφ1=τ,0
b (f )
1 − cφ2 + 2eC (f )cφ2
which is increasing on f , since 1 − cφ2 + 2eC (f )cφ2 is positive (since b0 is negative). Now suppose0 ˆ
0 (f )
that (a − b)0 (fˆ) ≤ 0 for any fˆ < fb . Then, ab0 ((ffˆ)) > 1 and hence ab0 (f> 1 and (a − b)0 (f ) < 0 for)

all f ∈ (fˆ, fb ). In particular, given that a(1) − b(1) = 0, the function a − b can only cross the x-axis
once, and it does so from below. This shows that there exists at most one level of f for which (3)holds and, therefore, at most one intermediate incentives equilibrium. Now suppose that a(0) > b(0).
If a(fˆ) = b(fˆ) for some fˆ ∈ (0, 1), strict quasi-concavity implies that a(f ) < b(f ) for all f > fˆ,
which contradicts the fact that a(1) = b(1). As a consequence, it is required that a(0) ≤ b(0), whichis equivalent to c ≤ c2 .

Lemma 1 shows that there are three possible cases: (i) no natural equilibrium (c > c2 ), (ii) an unresponsive equilibrium and a responsive equilibrium with f = 1 and zero expertise20 and (iii) a
responsive equilibrium with positive expertise (f ∈ (0, 1)) and an unresponsive equilibrium. Thereremains to identify under which condition the last two cases hold. A responsive equilibrium withpositive expertise obtains if and only if (3) is satisfied for some f ∈ (0, 1). Since a(1) = b(1) = 0 and
a0 (f )/b0 (f ) is increasing in f , a necessary condition for the existence of f < 1 such that a(f ) = b(f )0(1)
is that ab0 (1)≥ 1. Otherwise, b0 (f ) < a0 (f ) < 0 for all f (recalling that a, b are decreasing) and,0(1)
(1+cφ1 )therefore, a(f ) > b(f ) for all f < 1. Using that ab0 (1)= τ(1−cφ, one obtains the desired condition2)c ≥ c1 .

Proof of Proposition 3. (i) immediately follows from eC (f ) − eN (f ) = (1 − f )ρ(τC − τN ) ≥ 0.
N (f )
is decreasing in f . Since eθ (f ) = (1−f )ρτθ , the derivative(ii) It suffices to show that the ratio 1−e1−eC (f )N (f )of the ratio 1−e
has the same sign as ρ[τN (1 − eC (f )) − τC (1 − eN (f ))] < 0, where the inequality
1−eC (f )20

Notice that f = 1 is always a solution of Z(f ) = 0.

24follows from eC (f ) ≥ eN (f ) ∀f .

Proof of Proposition 4. Denote by EU the expected utility to the voter as a function of the cost of
proposing an initiative c. Then EU (c) = qV + ρ(B − c) + ρ(c + B)((1 − q)eN + qeC ). Differentiating
it with respect to c yields:
dEU= df ∗ /dc × (B + c)((1 − q)e0N + qe0C ) − ((1 − q)(1 − eN ) + q(1 − eC ))|| {z }
{z
} |
{z
}
dc
Incentive gain

Expertise gain

Direct policy loss

The incentive gain can be computed by applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the equation thatdefines f ∗ , which is eC (1 − φ2 c + eC φ2 c) − eN (1 + φ1 c − eN φ1 c) = 0. This yields
1(1 − eN )eN φ1 c + (1 − eC )eC φ2 c
df ∗
=
.
0
dc
c eN (2eN φ1 c − 1 − φ1 c) + e0C (2eC φ2 c + 1 − φ2 c)Using the fact that e0N = e0C τ and substituting the equation defining f ∗ into the denominator of df ∗ /dc(also the fact that eN = τ eC ), the following obtains:df ∗
1 (1 − eN )eN φ1 c + (1 − eC )eC φ2 c
1 (1 − eN )τ (1 − q) + (1 − eC )q
= 0
= 0
dc
ceC
τ eN φ1 c + eC φ2 cceC
τ 2 (1 − q) + q
As a consequence, the derivative becomes
D = (1 − eC )q(Λ(τ ) − 1) − (1 − eN )(1 − q)(1 − Λ(τ )τ ),(1−q)τ +q
where Λ(τ ) = B+c> 1. The necessary and sufficient condition for D > 0 can be expressedc (1−q)τ 2 +q

as
(1 + Λ)(qeC + (1 − q)eC τ ) ≥ 1 + Λ(1 − eC τ )(1 − q)(1 − τ )which implicitly defines a τ ∗ < 1/2 (possibly equal to zero21 ) such that ∀τ > τ ∗ , D > 0.
21

When τ = 1/2,Λτ =1 + c (1 − q)τ 2 + τ q
2(1 − q)τ 2 + 2τ q
(1 − q)τ + q≥≥> 1.
c (1 − q)τ 2 + q(1 − q)τ 2 + q(1 − q)τ 2 + q

Moreover, when qeC > (1 + (1 − q)Λ)(1 + Λ)−1 , it is possible to show that τ ∗ = 0.

25

Proof of Proposition 5. The difference between EU (B) and EU (c) in equilibrium is given byd(c) = qV + ρ(c + B)E(e(1)) − qV − ρ(B − c) − ρ(c + B)E(e(c))
and the condition follows from computing that difference for c = 0: d(c) = 2ρE(e(1)) − ρ.

Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Since eθ = (1 − f )ρτθ , ∂eθ /∂ρ = ∂[ρ(1 − f )]/∂ρ, equation 1 (which
implicitly defines f ) can be re-expressed as(1 − f )ρτN [1 + cφ1 ] − [(1 − f )ρτN ]2 cφ1 − (1 − f )τC ρ[1 − cφ2 ] − [(1 − f )τC ρ]2 cφ2 = 0
After dividing both sides by (1 − f )ρτC and rearranging terms, one obtains

−1
τ
1
V
τ τN
τC
(1 − f )ρ =+− (1 − τ )+q 1 − q ρcq1−q= − ρcV 2 (1 − τ )(ii) Using (4) yields ∂f
∂c

h

τ τN
τC
+ 1−q
q

i−1

2

∂ f
= ρ2Vc2 (1 − τ )and ∂c∂ρ

h

(4)

τ τN
τC
+ 1−q
q

i−1

> 0. 

Proof of Proposition 7 The thresholds can be expressed as


−1
−1
1
1−ρ
τ
1 − ρτ
VV++τ
; c2 = [1 − τ ],c1 = [1 − τ ]
ρ
1−q q
ρ
1−q
q
their denominators are strictly quasiconvex in the relevant domain: therefore, they are both decreasing
between 0 and their unique interior minimizer, and then increasing from there onwards. Moreover,these denominators are also strictly positive in the whole domain of q. Since the reciprocal of a strictly
quasiconvex function that is positive on a subset of Rn is strictly quasiconcave on that subdomain, thenc1 and c2 are both strictly quasiconcave functions, and their maximizer must be the minimizer of their

denominators.

26

B

General model and robustness

B.1

Self-enforcing political contracts

This section establishes that the “natural” policy of implementing the reform if and only if the incumbent learns that the state is equal to R is optimal from voters’ viewpoint, and optimally achieved bysurely reelecting the incumbent if she made no mistake, reelecting her with lower probability (andousting her otherwise) if she chose the default option when the reform was needed, and punishing her
with certain ousting if she implemented a bad reform.
An equilibrium of the kind described above, with f (S, S) = f (R, R) = 1, f (R, S) = 0, andf (S, R) ∈ [0, 1), clearly dominates any no-expertise equilibrium. It is now established that it isalso optimal among all possible equilibria inducing a positive expertise level.
First, consider voters’ reelection strategy conditional on observing h = S. In that case, the incumbent
cannot have received the signal revealing h = R, irrespective of her type and expertise level. Typeselection cannot occur in that case, and the best voters can hope for, given h = S, is that the incumbent
chooses x = S, which is ex ante optimal, and a fortiori optimal conditional on not receiving any
signal. Moreover, voters want to reelect the incumbent, other things equal, for two reasons. First, theirposterior about her competence is the same as their belief about the competence of the challengers.
Second, the incumbent has the strict advantage, compared to her challengers, of having acquired someexpertise, which is useful for the second period. Therefore, an optimal strategy is to set f (S, S) = 1
and f (R, S) = 0, as it achieves exactly this.22
Suppose, instead, that the state is h = R. In this case, voters want the incumbent to choose the reformx = R when she learns the state. Thus, abstracting for now from the adverse selection problem,
voters want the incumbent to choose R if and only if she received the signal. Taking now into accountadverse selection, in any equilibrium with some expertise acquisition, the competent type acquires
more expertise than the incompetent type because it is less costly for her to do so. Therefore, thenatural policy not only maximizes voters’ first-period utility, but it also increases the probabilityof selecting a more competent politician. Thus, setting f (R, R) = 1 is optimal. The remaining
22

Setting f (R, S) small enough would also yield an optimal strategy, provided that the incumbent follows the “natural
policy,” since (R, S) does not arise on the equilibrium path.

27

probability f (S, R) is pinned down by equilibrium conditions. If f (S, R) = 1, the incumbent isalways reelected if she chooses the default action S; as a consequence, she has no incentive foracquiring expertise.23 This establishes the following result.
P ROPOSITION 8 (NATURAL P OSITIVE -E XPERTISE E QUILIBRIUM ) Any optimal equilibrium can be
implemented by setting f (S, S) = f (R, R) = 1 and f (R, S) = 0. The remaining reelection probability f = f (S, R) ∈ [0, 1] is determined by equilibrium conditions.
In this equilibrium, the expertise level is given by eθ (f ) = (1 − f )τθ ρ. Because the cost function T isconvex, eθ (f ) is decreasing in f . Since τθ (e) has increasing differences in (e, θ), the expertise levels
are also ranked: eC (f ) ≥ eN (f ) for all f .
The above analysis also applies to the more general model presented in the Section B.3.

B.2

Probabilistic voting

Suppose that, instead of being fully rational, voting behavior was probabilistic. In that case, voters’
would elect the incumbent if and only if the net gain in expected utility vis à vis the challenger wasabove the realization of a preference shock ξ: given a posterior p about the incumbent, her reelection
probability is
P r[ξ ≤ p[V + ρeC B + ρ(1 − eC )(B − c)] + (1 − p)[ρeN B + ρ(1 − eN )(B − c)] − qV − ρ(B − c)].
which simplifies to
P r[ξ ≤ (p − q)V + ρc(peC + (1 − p)eN )](5)

For simplicity,24 let’s assume (as often the case in the literature) that ξ is drawn from a uniform withsupport [−1/2ψ, 1/2ψ], where, to guarantee that reelection probabilities are interior, it is also assumed
that 1/2 − ψqV > 0 and 1/2 + ψ[(1 − q)V + ρc(1 − τ )] < 1. In this case, it immediately follows thatf (S, S) = 1/2. Moreover, an incumbent of type θ chooses expertise eθ = τθ ρ[f (R, R) − f (S, R)].
23

In that equilibrium, voters are indifferent between reelecting the incumbent and the challenger, as both have the same
expected competence and the incumbent has no expertise.
24
What matters is the supermodularity of 5 in (p, c).

28

In a natural equilibrium, where politicians act optimally on their information, the following obtains(after a few steps):qeC
q(1 − eC )f (R, R) − f (S, R) = ψq[V + cρ(eC − eN )]−qeC + (1 − q)eN
q(1 − eC ) − (1 − q)(1 − eN )

As a consequence, using the fact that ec = τ eN , and the equilibrium is identified by the solution ofG(e; c) = e, whereG(e; c) = ψτC ρq[V + ceρ(1 − τ )]1 − q + (1 − q)τ
.
[q + (1 − q)τ ](1 − q + [(1 − q)τ ]e)

P ROPOSITION 9 (R ESPONSIBILITY S UBSTITUTION ) There is a unique equilibrium, where expertiseis increasing in c.
Proof. To see that the fixed point must be unique, notice that G(0; c) > 0. Combining that with thefact that G is increasing and convex in e with the boundary conditions ψqV < 1/2 and ψ[(1 − q)V +ρc(1 − τ )] yields
1>q∂G(e; c)∂G(e; c)τC ρψ[V + ρc(1 − τ )] =>.
q + (1 − q)τ
∂e
∂e
e=1

As a consequence, Banach’s theorem holds. Since G is also increasing in c, then it must be thatsupermodular in (c, e), which implies that the zero of G − e must also increase in c. This completes

the proof.

B.3

General modelThis section studies a general model whose unique natural equilibrium corresponding to the responsive equilibrium of the model presented in the main text. This version of the model also shows thatthe results derived in the main text generalize to a large class of cost functions.
As discussed in Section 4, the model presented in the body of this paper allows us to provide thesimplest formal description of the responsibility substitution effect. In this environment, however,
responsibility substitution is only associated with one – the responsive equilibrium – of the two natural29

equilibria that arise. In the other, the unresponsive equilibrium, voters are able to maximize thestrength of the electoral incentives for the incumbent to avoid policy mistakes. Moreover, this ability
is not affected by the cost of correcting these mistakes ex post (i.e., the cost of proposing initiatives).
Outside option. After observing the outcome of her expertise acquisition, the incumbent chooses
whether or not to run for reelection and which policy to implement. If she chooses not to run forreelection, she obtains an outside option Oθ , which is assumed to depend on her competence. The
outside option can be interpreted as the choice of a private sector job, or the choice of running fora higher level political office.25 In line with the literature (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Mattozzi and
Merlo, 2008; Messner and Polborn, 2004), it is assumed that political competence is correlated withthe value of the outside option (OC > ON ). For simplicity, ON is set to zero. The following assumptions also requires that, at least in some circumstances (depending on voters behavior), the C-typemight actually prefer OC over running for reelection.
A SSUMPTION 1 (PARTICIPATION C ONSTRAINT ) OC ∈ ((1 − ρ)(1 − ρ2 )−1 , 1) .
This assumption implies that a competent incumbent prefers her outside option over a regime in which
voters reelect her only when she chooses the optimal policy. It therefore imposes an upper bound on
the reelection pressure that voters can put on the incumbent.
In this modified environment, λθ (resp. λ0θ ) denotes type θ’s probability of running for reelection uponreceiving no signal. θ’s optimal strategy then solvesρe [λ0 f (y 0 , R) + (1 − λ0 )Oθ ] +
h


i
max
1−ρ
e,λ,λ0 ,y,y 0  +(1 − ρe) λf (y, S) + ρ(1−e)
f (y, R) + (1 − λ)Oθ − τθ (e) 
1−ρe
1−ρe
The incompetent type always runs for reelection since her outside option is zero. In any equilibriumwith a positive expertise level, the competent type must also run with positive probability λC > 0.26
25

Mitt Romney constitutes a recent example of a politician who chose not to run for reelection in order to try to compete
for a higher political office.
26
Otherwise, an incumbent running for reelection would reveal himself as an incompetent type. Voters would, therefore, never reelect her (U (C, e) > U > U (N, e)), and the incumbent would optimally choose a zero level of expertise.

30

Convexity of the cost function implies that the optimal expertise is characterized byeθ = [λ0 f (yθ0 , R) + (1 − λ0 )Oθ − λf (yθ , R) − (1 − λ)Oθ ] ρτθ .
P ROPOSITION 10 The mixing probability λ satisfies the following conditions:(i) When f (y 0 , S) = 0, λC = 0;(ii) When f (y 0 , R) = f (y, S) = 1, there exists a unique lower bound f for f (y 0 , S) above which
λC > 0.
1−ρ
1−ρ
Proof. (i) The maintained assumptions imply that 1−ρef (y, S) < 1−ρ
2 < OC , from which the result1−ρfollows. For (ii), first observe that the expected payoff from running for reelection is equal to 1−ρe+ρ(1−e)
f , where f1−ρe= f (y, R). Substituting into this equation the search level e = (1 − f )τC ρ that

permits a strictly positive value of λ, one obtains
ρ − ρ2 eτC
1 − ρ + ρ(1 − (1 − f )τC ρ)f=
1−
I:= L(I)
1 − ρ2 (1 − f )τC
1 − ρ2 eτCwhere I = (1 − f ) is the electoral incentive. Since ∂ 2 L(I)/∂ 2 I = 2τC ρ2 (1 − ρ)(1 − ρ2 τC I)−3 > 0,
L(I) is strictly convex. Moreover, it is decreasing for I close enough to 0. As a consequence, L must
be monotonic on the range values in (L(0), L(1)).

In light of this result, it is possible to show27 that there exists a threshold ĉ > c1 (whose definitionis similar to c2 ) below which the unique natural equilibrium with a positive level of expertise isanalogous to the responsive equilibrium of the baseline model (i.e., λC = 1, f = f ∗ ). It must be also
noted that above ĉ the unique natural positive expertise equilibrium features a fixed level of expertise(eθ (f )) and the competent type randomizes between entry and outside option. In that equilibrium, alower cost of direct democracy increases λC , thereby improving voters’ welfare.
General functional form for the cost of effort. If one assumes that {τθ (e)}θ∈{C,N } are increasing,continuous, and convex functions, an interior expertise acquisition requires τθ (0) = τθ0 (0) = andτθ0 (1) < ρ. Assuming that condition is also satisfied, a sufficient condition for the model to generate
the same set of results presented in the paper is that the two assumptions below hold.28
27
28

Details are available under request. The argument closely following the proof of Proposition 2.
The proofs of Lemma 1 and of Propositions 2, 3, 5, and 4 apply to this setting with minimal modifications.

31

A SSUMPTION 2 (I NCREASING D IFFERENCES ) TN0 (e) > TC0 (e) for all e > 0.
This assumption, which is very standard in signaling models, ensures that the politician’s effort isincreasing in her competence, in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection.
A SSUMPTION 3 (D ISCERNING P OWER OF E LECTORAL I NCENTIVES )
TC00 TC0−1 (z)κ(z) = 00 0−1  is weakly decreasing in z.
TN TN (z)This second assumption states that the differential in responsiveness across types does not decrease
with the strength of the electoral incentives, and is essentially equivalent to the signed ratio monotonicity condition introduced by Quah and Strulovici (2012): stronger electoral incentive lead tohigher type separation.

B.4

Robustness

This section discusses alternative assumptions, which could easily be accommodated by the model.
Discount factor. If voters discount second-period utility by a factor β < 1, their posterior threshold,which is only based on second-period utility, is not affected. If politicians discount their secondperiod payoff, this is equivalent to reducing their rent from being reelected, which does not affectqualitatively the analysis. Overall, discounting second-period payoffs reduces equilibrium effort but
does not qualitatively affect the impact on welfare of direct democracy.
Initiatives in both periods. Allowing initiatives in the first period has no impact on the equilibrium:
it does not affect voters’ threshold or politicians’ reelection incentives. However, it does mitigate theimpact of second-period direct democracy on politicians’ first-period effort.
Symmetric policy amendment. Assuming that citizens can undo a reform (i.e., move from R to S)
does not affect the analysis. Given the signal structure, in any natural equilibrium politicians only
implement the reform if it is optimal (i.e., (R, S) does not arise in equilibrium).
Symmetric signal structure. The model can accommodate a symmetric signal structure: given ex. This framework is considerably
pertise e, Pr(Learn R | h = R, e) = Pr(Learn S | h = S, e) = 1+e2
32

less tractable, but does not affect the qualitative nature of the results studied in this paper.
Weaker form of persistence of expertise. Assuming that a reelected incumbent inherits only a(possibly type–dependent) fraction Bθ of her first period effort does not affect the results.
Partially observable competence. In general, one could allow citizens to get a signal linked tothe incumbent’s competence in the first period, as long as the signal is imperfect, at the expense of
expositional simplicity.
Interpretation of the policy space. The interpretation of the policy space can be reverted without
altering the basic message of the paper: Rather than the reform, x = R can represent a safe policy to which voters can return by proposing an initiative. Under this interpretation, representatives
acquire expertise in order to learn when and when not to implement a change. While the baseline
interpretation seems more appropriate as a model of initiative, the latter can be better suited to model
referendums in Europe.

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