INTERNATIONALRELIGIOUS

FREEDOM
Firoozeh Soltan Mohammadi | Rooha Imani | Seyyed-Soroush Abbasi | Syeed-Amin Abbasi | Seyyed-Karam Abbasi | Nasim Kashani Nejad | Homayoun Khanlori| Nima Mahin Bakht | Sanaz Tafazoli | Shahrouz Esmaeili | Nemat Pourvali | Mehr-Ali Hemmati | Hamid Gorgin | Ghadir Rahimi | Mohammad Bahrami | Seyed
Fereydoun Taheri | Seyed Farhad Zalnouri | Ali Nazari | Noshad Taheri | Seyed Fariborz Shah-Ebrahimi | Farzad Rahmatabadi | Amin Malekzade | Meraj Hemmati| Bardia Tajdini | Rashid Mohammadi | Hamid Afshari | Masoum Razavi | Naghi Rahmani | Faezeh Ranai | Seyed Foad Shah-Ebrahimi | Navid Hassanlou | Hamid
Zandi Nejhad | Meysam Azimi | Afshin Azimi | Seyed Shahoo Shah-Ebrahimi | Seyed Ali Dakei | Kamyab Heidari | Siavash Kaliani | Kaki Saeed Almasi | Faezeh
Abdipour | Parwa Behdad | Elaheh Mohammadi | Pooya Saraf | Leili Karami | Hami Bahadori | Shayan Gholami | Shaghayegh Bahrami | Kamyar Habibi | Badie
Khazei | Sirous Zabihi | Armaghan Zabihi | Arash Zamani | Saman Khadem | Parisa Roohi Zadegan | Niloofar Hamedi | Aida Rasti | Amin Sharifi | Atash Shahkarami| Enayatollah Naeimi | Sepehr Ziaee | Payam Vali | Malihe Nazari | Joseph Shahbazian | Atollah Zafar | Fariba Ashtari | Zhila Shahriari | Elham Choubdar | Bita
Haghighi | Samiyeh Gholinejad | Negar Darabi | Mohammad Chegini | Mohammad Golbaz | Sara Ahmadi |Homayoun Zhaveh | Mahboubeh Misaghian | Farid Alavi | Neda Shabani | Peyman Manavi | Jamileh Pakrou| Parvan Manavi | Soroush Agahi | Kianoush Salmanzadeh | Payam Shabani | Elham Salmanzadeh | Houman
Khoshnam | Fariba Kamalabadi | Mahvash Sabet | Afif Naeimi | Saeed Naseri | Hamid Naseri | Afsaneh Emami| Saman Ostovar | Saha Sabeti | Zahra Sedighi-Hamadani | Shafigh Eslami | Nima Shadpour | Nematollah
Shadpour | Mostafa Khosraji | Hasan Nisi | Jome Naami | Abdolsadeh Azari | Shahram Najaf-Tomaraei| Shahnaz Sabet | Reza Radmanesh | Mishak Manavipour | Behieh Manavipour | Hanan Hashemi | Haleh
Gholami | Gholamreza Keyvanmanesh | Melika Qaragozlu | Soori Babaei Chegini | Hayedeh Ram | Fardin Naddafian | Zhila Sharafi Nasrabadi | Negar Ighani |Shaghayegh Khaneh-Zarin | Samin Ehsani | Hiwa Yazdan Mehdi Abadi | Mitra Bandi Amirabadi | Amin Zolfaghari | Morteza Mashhood Kari | Ahmad Sarparast |Ayub Pour Rezazadeh | Seyyed Sadrullah Fazeli Zare | Yusef Mehrdad | Sahba Farnoush | Shakila Monfared | Parizad Hamidi Shafagh | Noushin Jafari | Monireh
Arabshahi | Saba Kord Afshari | Yasaman Ariani | Zeynab Jalalian | Farid Zirgi Moghaddam | Ataollah Melaki | Roya Melaki | Atieh Salehi | Arezou Mohammadi| Nasim Ghanvatian | Mehrallah Afshar | Arash Rasekhi | Maral Rasti | Mahnaz Jan Nesar | Sakineh Behjati | Hadi Rahimi | Alireza Nourmohammadi | Ameen
Khaki | Milad Goudarzi | Abdolreza Ali Haghnejad | Ardeshir Fanaian | Mohammad Nouri | Sina Dehghan | Behnam Eskandarian | Kasra Nouri | Mostafa Abdi
| Mohammad Sharifi Moghaddam | Saeed Soltanpour | Milad Davardan | Farhang Sahba | Anoush Rayeneh | Ali Sani | Afshin Bulbulan | Marjan Davari | Zaman
Fadaei | Farhad Fahandezh | Abdolrahim Kouhi | Amanollah Balochi | Abbas Dehghan | Adel Naimi | Youcef Nadarkhani | Golrokh Ebrahimi Iraee | Mahsa Amini

2023 Annual Report

U N I TE D S TAT E S CO M M I SSI O N O N

A protester seen holding a rosary and a placard with a picture of Mahsa Amini during the demonstration.
Protesters organized a demonstration following the death of Mahsa Amini. Mahsa fell into a coma anddied after being arrested in Tehran by the morality police for allegedly violating the country’s hijab rules.
Amini’s death has sparked weeks of violent protests across Iran. (Photo by Onur Dogman / SOPA Images/
Sipa USA)(Sipa via AP Images)

A N N UA L R E PO R T
OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOMCOMMISSIONERSNury Turkel
Chair
Abraham Cooper
Vice ChairDavid Curry
Frederick A. Davie
Sharon Kleinbaum
Mohamed Magid
Stephen Schneck
Erick UelandFrank Wolf
Erin D. Singshinsuk
Executive Director

APRIL 2023

PROFESSIONAL STAFF
Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of Research and Policy
Roy Haskins, Director of Operations Management

Danielle Ashbahian, Chief of Public Affairs
Keely Bakken, Supervisory Policy Analyst
Thomas Kraemer, Chief Administrative Officer
Jamie Staley, Supervisory Policy Advisor
Scott Weiner, Supervisory Policy Analyst
Kurt Werthmuller, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Susan Bishai, Policy Analyst
Mollie Blum, Researcher
Mingzhi Chen, Senior Policy Analyst
Patrick Greenwalt, Policy Analyst
Sema Hasan, Policy Analyst
Veronica McCarthy, Public Affairs Associate
Hilary Miller, Researcher
Nora Morton, Operations Specialist
Dylan Schexnaydre, Researcher
Zack Udin, Research Analyst
Madeline Vellturo, Senior Policy Analyst
Luke Wilson, Researcher

U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714
Washington, DC 20401(P) 202–523–3240
www.uscirf.gov

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and Overview

1

About this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
Standards for CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
USCIRF’s 2023 CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2

Implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act

5

Key Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
Recommendations to the Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
Recommendations to Congress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
Key USCIRF Resources & Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
Legal Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
Key Developments in 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7

Countries Recommended for Designation asCountries of Particular Concern (CPCs)

12

Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
Burma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
Nicaragua. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
Tajikistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Turkmenistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46

Countries Recommended for theState Department’s Special Watch List (SWL)

48

Algeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
Azerbaijan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
Central African Republic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
Kazakhstan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
Malaysia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
Sri Lanka. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68

Other Key Developments

71

Transnational Repression and Influence by Religious Freedom Violators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
Religious Freedom Concerns in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
Laws Restricting Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
Emerging Religious Freedom Concerns in Other Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
Combating Antisemitism: Positive Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
Religious Freedom Concerns for Indigenous Peoples in Latin America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75

Key USCIRF Recommendations Implemented in 2022

77

Designating the Worst Violators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
Filling IRF-Related Appointments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
Designation of Rohingya Genocide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
Raising IRF Issues in Multilateral Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
Implementation of Executive Order 13926 – Advancing International Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . .  78
Refugee Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
Advocacy for Religious Prisoners of Conscience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
Enforcement of China-Related Human Rights Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
Congressional Action Promoting Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79

Appendix 1 Commissioner Biographies

81

Appendix 2 Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List

83

Appendix 3 Highlights of USCIRF’s Public Activities in 2022

89

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEWIn September 2022, Iran’s morality police arrested, beat, and mortallyadministration of President Joseph R. Biden to continue to coordinate
wounded Mahsa Zhina Amini because her visible hair violated theinternational action to lift the veil of impunity under which Iran’s leadgovernment’s religiously grounded headscarf law. Outraged byership continues to operate.
this flagrant denial of life, young women and girls led hundreds of
Beyond Iran, this report sounds the alarm regarding the deterithousands of fellow Iranians in peaceful protests asserting their rightoration of religious freedom conditions in a range of other countries
to freedom of religion or belief, risking severe punishment, permanentand provides policy recommendations to the U.S. government toinjury, and even death. Rather than respect this call to abide by its oblirespond to violations occurring in these places. This year, these coungations under international law, the Iranian government ramped up atries include Sri Lanka, which USCIRF is recommending for placement
campaign of violent repression against its own people. Security forceson the State Department’s Special Watch List (SWL) for the first time.
shot children like Kian Pirfalak (age nine), beat and killed girls like Nika
USCIRF previously published country updates on Sri Lanka in 2021
Shakarami (age 16), and repeatand 2022 and found sufficient
edly sexually harassed, sexuallyevidence of severe violations
assaulted, and raped scores ofof religious freedom, such as
peaceful protesters like Armita
discrimination against religious
Iranian authorities’ repression of
Abbasi (age 21). Iran’s governminorities in the form of tarfreedom of religion or belief has been ament then used intimidation andgeted arrests using problematic
decades-long campaign targeting boththreats to prevent victims’ famlegislation and appropriation ofilies from speaking publicly andland and property. Similarly,
religious minorities and members of thetruthfully about this repression.
USCIRF is recommending CPC
majority Shi’a Muslim community.
The cover of this year’s U.S.
designations for Cuba and NicCommission on International
aragua for the first time afterReligious Freedom (USCIRF)
previously recommending themannual report honors the Iranianfor placement on the SWL since
women and girls who have been at the forefront of the ongoing pro2004 and 2019, respectively. In Cuba, religious freedom conditions
tests for greater freedom in Iran and have faced extreme and violent
in 2022 worsened considerably, with the government seeking total
consequences for their participation. Iranian authorities’ systematic
dominance over religious life in the country. Additionally, the regime inuse of sexual and gender-based violence against them represents a
Nicaragua has sharply increased its persecution of the Catholic Church
purposeful weaponization of religious conceptions of purity, modesty,
by imprisoning clergy, shuttering church-affiliated organizations, andand gender hierarchy in an effort to shame Iranians out of peacefullyprohibiting Catholic rituals.
asserting their fundamental right to religious freedom.
The cover also honors the many other Iranians, known and
About This Report
unknown, held in prison in 2022 on account of their religious beliefs,
Created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, asactivity, or identity by displaying the names of the individuals from Iranamended (IRFA), USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan U.S. govwho are included in USCIRF’s Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims
ernment advisory body, separate from the State Department, that
List. Iranian authorities’ repression of freedom of religion or belief hasmonitors and reports on religious freedom abroad and makes policy
been a decades-long campaign targeting both religious minorities
recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress.
and members of the majority Shi’a Muslim community. During 2022,
USCIRF bases these recommendations on the provisions of its authoin addition to its repression of protesters, Iran’s leadership continued
rizing legislation and the standards in the Universal Declaration of
to target members of the Baha’i, Christian, Gonabadi Sufi, Zoroastrian,
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Yarsani, Sunni Muslim, Shi’a Muslim, and nonreligious communities(ICCPR), and other international documents. USCIRF’s mandate andwith harassment, arrests, egregiously long prison sentences, multiannual reports are different from, and complementary to, the mandate
year internal exiles, or bans on participating in political and social
and annual reports of the State Department’s Office of International
activities. Iranian security services also targeted religious minorities
Religious Freedom.
who have fled abroad as well as activists in other countries, including
USCIRF’s 2023 Annual Report assesses religious freedom vioon U.S. soil, who opposed mandatory headscarf laws and other relilations and progress in 28 countries during calendar year 2022 andgious freedom restrictions. Based on these systematic, egregious,
makes independent recommendations for U.S. policy. The key findand ongoing violations of religious freedom, in this report USCIRF is
ings, recommendations, and analysis in this report are based on aagain recommending that Iran be designated by the U.S. Department
year’s research by USCIRF, including travel, hearings, meetings, andof State as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC). USCIRF urges the

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

1

I N T R O D U C T I O N A N D OV E R V I E W

briefings, and are approved by a majority vote of Commissioners.
exercises significant political power and territorial control; is outside
Under the statute, each Commissioner has the option to include athe control of a sovereign government; and often employs violence
statement with his or her own individual views.
in pursuit of its objectives.”
The report’s primary focus is on two groups of countries: first,
The Annual Report highlights the countries and entities that, in
those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should desigUSCIRF’s view, merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation; it is intended tonate as CPCs under IRFA, and second, those that USCIRF recommends
focus U.S. policymakers’ attention on the worst violators of religious
the State Department should
freedom globally. The fact that aplace on its SWL. The reportcountry or nonstate group is notalso includes USCIRF’s recomcovered in this report does not
mendations of nonstate actors
mean it did not violate religious
The Annual Report highlights the countries
for designation by the State
freedom during the reportingand entities that, in USCIRF’s view,
Department as Entities of Particyear. It only means that based
merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation;ular Concern (EPCs) under IRFA.
on the information available to
In addition, the report analyzes
USCIRF, the conditions during
it is intended to focus U.S. policymakers’
the U.S. government’s implethat year did not, in USCIRF’s
attention on the worst violators ofmentation of IRFA during theview, meet the high threshold—religious freedom globally.
reporting year and provides recthe perpetration or toleration
ommendations to bolster overallof particularly severe or severe
U.S. efforts to advance freedom
violations of religious freeof religion or belief abroad. It
dom—required to recommend
also includes a section discussing key trends and developments inthe country or nonstate group for CPC, SWL, or EPC designation. In
religious freedom globally during the reporting period, including
the case of a nonstate group, it also could mean that the group didin countries that are not recommended for CPC or SWL status. Thisnot meet other statutory requirements, such as exercising significant
year, that section covers topics including transnational repression andpolitical power and territorial control.
influence by religious freedom violators, religious freedom concerns
USCIRF monitors and has concerns about religious freedom
in Europe, laws restricting religious freedom, emerging religious freeconditions abroad, including violations of freedom of religion or belief
dom concerns in other countries, positive developments in combating
perpetrated or tolerated by governments and entities not covered
antisemitism, and religious freedom concerns for indigenous peoples
in this report. The full range of USCIRF’s work on a wide variety ofin Latin America. Finally, the report’s last section highlights key USCIRF
countries and topics can be found at www.uscirf.gov.
recommendations that the U.S. government has implemented since
USCIRF’s previous annual report.
USCIRF’S 2023 CPC, SWL, andIn this report, USCIRF uses the terms “religious freedom,” “freeEPC Recommendations
dom of religion,” and “freedom of religion or belief” interchangeably
For 2023, based on religious freedom conditions in 2022, USCIRF
to refer to the broad right to freedom of thought, conscience, andrecommends that the State Department:
religion or belief—including the right to nonbelief—protected underinternational human rights law.
■ Redesignate as CPCs the following 12 countries: Burma, China,

Standards for CPC, SWL, and
EPC Recommendations
IRFA defines CPCs as countries where the government engages inor tolerates “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom. It
defines the State Department’s SWL for countries where the government engages in or tolerates “severe” violations of religious freedom.
Under IRFA, particularly severe violations of religious freedom
mean “systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious violations . . . , including violations such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention without charges;(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of theright to life, liberty, or the security of persons.” Although the statutedoes not specifically define severe violations of religious freedom,in making SWL recommendations USCIRF interprets it to mean violations that meet two of the elements of IRFA’s systematic, ongoing,and egregious standard (i.e., that the violations are systematic andongoing, systematic and egregious, or ongoing and egregious).
To meet the legal standard for designation as an EPC, a nonstategroup must engage in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined above, and must also be “a nonsovereign entity that

2 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan;
■

■

■

■

Designate as additional CPCs the following five countries:
Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, Syria, and Vietnam;
Maintain on the SWL the following two countries: Algeria andthe Central African Republic (CAR);
Include on the SWL the following nine countries: Azerbaijan,
Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey,
and Uzbekistan; andRedesignate as EPCs the following seven nonstate actors:
al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), theHouthis, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic Statein West Africa Province (ISWAP also referred to as ISIS-West
Africa), and Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).

The conditions supporting the CPC or SWL recommendationfor each country are described in the relevant country chapters of
this report. The conditions supporting the EPC recommendations for
Boko Haram and ISWAP are described in the Nigeria chapter and for
HTS in the Syria chapter.
For al-Shabaab, the Houthis, ISGS, and JNIM, the EPC recommendations are based on the following conditions:I N T RO D U C T I O N A N D OV E R V I E W

Militant Islamist insurgency al-Shabaab continued to operate inparts of Somalia despite military pressure from the Somali government and its allies. The group continued to conduct attacks basedon religion in its efforts to establish a state that will enforce a singularinterpretation of Islamic law. In addition to targeting military andcivilian infrastructure, al-Shabaab also targeted houses of worship. In
July, al-Shabaab fighters bombed a mosque in Baidoa during Friday
prayers, killing several worshipers.
In 2022, the Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah,
did not significantly expand its territorial holdings throughout Yemen
after making marginal gains in the year prior. A truce that began
in April expired in October despite calls for its renewal; however,even during the brief cessation of hostilities, the Houthis continued
their egregious religious freedom violations. The group continued toundermine the rights of women and girls by imposing a mahram (maleescort) requirement, even as broader male guardianship restrictions
increased considerably. Jewish prisoner Libi Marhabi remained in

Houthi detention despite multiple appeals for his release, and the tiny
remaining Jewish community faced ongoing repression from Houthi
leaders. Authorities persisted in systematically persecuting the Baha’i
community by detaining and torturing members while plunderingBaha’i land, property, and assets. The Houthis harassed, detained,
and tortured Yemeni Christians, particularly converts from Islam, andthe group also detained more than 200 Christian foreign workers fromAfrica on false accusations. Only a few thousand Christians remainedin the country, as many fled such persecution.
Militant Islamist insurgencies ISGS and JNIM expanded theirreach in the Sahel, including in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Both
ISGS and JNIM engaged in intimidation and conducted attacks basedon religion and enforced harsh interpretations of Islamic law in theirareas of control. Abuses continued into early 2023 when militant
Islamist fighters attacked an Ahmadiyya mosque in Burkina Faso,
demanding the attendees change their faith before killing the imamand several others.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACTKey Findings

designated certain populations for priority consideration as refugees,
In 2022, the administration of President Joseph R. Biden continued
including multiple groups fleeing religious persecution. This followed
to prioritize protecting international religious freedom (IRF) anda commitment from the United States Citizenship and Immigration
increasing accountability for violations. In March, the U.S. DepartServices (USCIS) to increase staffing levels to more efficiently process
ment of State determined that the “Burmese military committed
refugee claims. Additionally, USCIS provided temporary protected
genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya” andstatus to Afghan nationals living in the United States.
imposed further sanctions against Burmese individuals and entities
In November, the State Department designated 12 countries
responsible for the regime’s ongoing violent crackdown. In April,as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) under the International
President Biden signed into law the permanent reauthorization of
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for engaging in or tolerating particularly
the Global Magnitsky Humansevere violations of religious
Ri g h t s Ac co u n t a b ili t y Ac t
freedom, including for the(Global Magnitsky Act). USCIRF
first time Cuba and Nicaragua.
welcomed the permanent reauUSCIRF welcomed the new CPC
In November, the State Department
thorization, which provides
designations but expressed tredesignated 12 countries as
the U.S. government with themendous disappointment that
authority to impose sanctions
the State Department failed to“countries of particular concern” (CPCs)(i.e., issue visa bans and asset
include India and Nigeria among
under the International Religious Freedom Act
freezes) against foreign persons
its list of CPCs. While the State(IRFA) for engaging in or
engaging in gross human rights
Department reimposed existtolerating particularly severe violations ofabuses, such as severe religious
ing sanctions on eight of the 12
freedom violations.
countries it designated as CPCs,
religious freedom, including for the
T h e U. S . g o v e r n m e n t
it issued waivers on taking any
first time Cuba and Nicaragua.
continued to serve as the Secaction against the remaining
retariat of the International
four. USCIRF has long called
Religious Freedom or Belief
on administrations to refrain
Alliance (IRFBA). During 2022,
from issuing waivers and relyIRFBA made multicountry statements on egregious religious freedom
ing exclusively on existing sanctions to hold CPCs accountable. The
violations in Nicaragua and Nigeria, the rights of religious minority
State Department placed four countries on its “Special Watch List”
groups such as the Baha’i and Ahmadiyya Muslim communities to(SWL) for severe religious freedom violations, including two countries
freely practice their faiths, and the incompatibility of blasphemy
for the first time, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Vietnam.
laws with freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression. In
Although the State Department designated Vietnam as a CPC in 2004
addition, the U.S. government cosponsored a United Nations Humanand 2005, it never previously placed Vietnam on the SWL. Finally, theRights Council (UNHRC) resolution on freedom of religion or belief
State Department designated nine “entities of particular concern”
and supported convening a special session of the UNHRC to address(EPCs), which are nonstate actors that engage in particularly severe
Iran’s suppression of protesters.
violations of religious freedom. The Wagner Group, a private Russian
In September, President Biden maintained the heightened
military firm, received an EPC designation for the first time in light ofadmissions cap for refugees at 125,000 for fiscal year (FY) 2023 andits actions in CAR.

STATE DEPARTMENT 2022 DESIGNATIONSCPC Designations

Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, andTurkmenistan

SWL Countries

Algeria, Central African Republic, Comoros, and Vietnam

EPC Designations

Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Houthis, the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, the IslamicState in West Africa Province, Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, the Taliban, and the Wagner GroupUSCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

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I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATION■■■

Promptly appoint a well-qualified individual within the National Security Council(NSC) as Special Adviser to the President
on IRF and provide financial resources andstaff needed to fulfill the mandate outlined in IRFA;
Strengthen advocacy on behalf of individuals persecuted on the basis of religion
by maintaining the United States’ leadership roles in IRFBA and the International
Contact Group on Freedom of Religion
or Belief, participating in and supporting
future events to advance internationalreligious freedom, and continuing to implement the executive order on Advancing
International Religious Freedom;

■

■

■

Increase the use of the Global Magnitsky
Act and other human rights related financial and visa authorities to impose asset
freezes and/or visa bans on individuals
and entities for severe religious freedom
violations, citing specific abuses, and coordinate with other countries with similar
sanctions regimes on such targeted sanctions whenever possible;

Fully implement the Elie Wiesel Genocideand Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 todevelop policies to enhance the capacity of
the United States to prevent and respondto atrocities worldwide, including thoseagainst religious communities;
Review U.S. polic y toward the four
CPC-designated countries for which
waivers were is sued on taking any
action—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—to make policychanges for meaningful consequencesand encourage positive change;
Continue to strengthen the mechanismsof the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program(USRAP) to increase the ability to meet theadmissions ceiling for refugees in FY 2023,
and prioritize for resettlement survivorsof the most egregious forms of religious
persecution, including Iranian religious
minorities eligible for processing under
the Lautenberg Amendment, membersof other severely persecuted religious or
belief communities, and survivors of genocide or other atrocity crimes;

■

■

■

Address longstanding flaws in the treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited
Removal, including by enhancing the quality and oversight of the initial processingof noncitizens, improving detention
conditions, and appointing a high-level
official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate andoversee reforms;
Allocate greater funding to programs
that support civil society and humanrights defenders in exile who document
and monitor religious freedom violations in countries where civil society isrepressed; andPerform an assessment on foreign governments’ transnational repression as it relates
to religious freedom, including analysis of
how to improve U.S. government policyand U.S. collaboration with allies to preventand counter transnational targeting of religious communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS■■

Examine U.S. policy related to IRF issues,
including the ef fec tiveness of CPC
designations for mitigating religious
freedom violations, through legislation,
hearings, briefings, and other actions;and assess, during congressional delegation trips abroad, conditions for
persons of all faiths and beliefs as well
as nonbelievers;
Advocate, as individual members ofCongress, for IRF by sponsoring religious prisoners of conscience throughthe Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s (TLHRC) Defending Freedoms
Project, collaborating with the International Panel of Parliamentarians for
Freedom of Religion or Belief, and joining the U.S. House of Representatives
or U.S. Senate Bipartisan Task Forcefor Combating Antisemitism and caucuses such as the House IRF Caucus andAhmadiyya Muslim Caucus;■

Reintroduce and pass the bipartisan
Stop Helping Adversaries Manipulate

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Factsheet: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution Globally
Factsheet: Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List
■ Issue Brief: Implications of Laws Promoting State-Favored Religions■ Hearing: Women’s Roles in Advancing International Religious Freedom■ Podcast: Breaking Down the State Department’s IRF Designations■■

6 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

Ever y thing (SHAME) Ac t to prohibit
any person from receiving compensation for lobbying on behalf of foreign
adversaries, including those engaging inparticularly severe violations of the rightto freedom of religion or belief; and■Permanently reauthorize the U.S. Commis sion on Inter national Religiou s
Freedom to ensure Congress and the
public continue to receive independent,
bipartisan monitoring and analysis ofinternational religious freedom issues.

I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

Legal Framework

Key Developments in 2022

IRFA, as amended by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious FreeKey U.S. Government IRF Positions
dom Act of 2016, seeks to make religious freedom a higher priority
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad Husin U.S. foreign policy through a range of mechanisms and tools.
sain continued implementing his mandate through public speeches
These include governmental institutions (USCIRF as an indepenand meetings, including with the nongovernmental organization
dent legislative branch agency requiring regular reauthorization, the(NGO) IRF Roundtable and other stakeholders. In addition, Ambasambassador at large and the State Department’s IRF Office, and asador Hussain traveled to Mauritania, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia,
special adviser on the White House NSC staff); ongoing monitoring
the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates as welland annual reports on international religious freedom violations; andas Morocco, the Gambia, and Senegal to meet with government
the imposition of consequences
officials and faith communities
for the worst violators. The
to advance religious freedom.
consequences set forth in IRFAIn March, the Senate conconsist of CPC designations andfirmed Deborah E. Lipstadt as
The State Department did not designate
related actions, placement on
Special Envoy to Monitor andthe State Department’s SWL,
Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, or Syria
Combat A ntisemitism andthe ability to bar entry to theelevated the rank to an ambasas CPCs in 2022 despite
United States of foreign offisador position for the first time.
USCIRF’s
recommendations
to
do
so
and
cials responsible for particularly
Since assuming her mandate,its own reporting documenting thesevere religious freedom violaAmbassador Lipstadt has contions, and EPC designations fornature and extent of the religious freedom
demned antisemitic remarks
nonstate actors.
delivered by a UN official; metviolations
in
those
countries.
IRFA includes religious
with NGOs and other stakeholdfreedom as an element of U.S.
ers; and traveled to Argentina
foreign assistance, cultural
and Chile, the United Kingdom,exchange, and international
Belgium, France, and South
broadcasting programs and requires training on religious freedom andAfrica and Morocco to meet with government officials and faith leadreligious persecution for State Department foreign service officers
ers to combat antisemitism, anti-Muslim hatred, racism, and otherand U.S. immigration officials. Further, it includes provisions on U.S.
forms of intolerance and discrimination.
refugee and asylum policy. It also specifically cites U.S. participation
In 2022, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, andin multilateral organizations as an avenue for advancing religious
Human Rights Uzra Zeya, who also serves concurrently as the U.S.
freedom abroad. IRFA is centered on the right to freedom of reliSpecial Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, highlighted ongoing humangion or belief as recognized in international law, as articulated in therights violations in Xinjiang, China, and delivered remarks on protectUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
ing Tibetans’ right to freedom of religion or belief at an event on theon Civil and Political Rights, and other international instruments andsidelines of the 51st session of the UNHRC.
regional agreements.
For a more detailed description of IRFA, its legislative history,
Lack of Designations for Afghanistan, India, Nigeria,
and its implementation, see USCIRF’s Factsheet: IRFA.
and Syria
Alongside IRFA, other laws provide tools to sanction individual
religious freedom abusers. Some apply to specific countries, such
The State Department did not designate Afghanistan, India, Nigeas the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA,
ria, or Syria as CPCs in 2022 despite USCIRF’s recommendations
P.L.111-195). More broadly, the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act allows theto do so and its own reporting documenting the nature and extent
president, who has delegated these authorities to the secretaries ofof the religious freedom violations in those countries. USCIRF has
treasury and state, to deny U.S. visas to and freeze the U.S.-based
recommended CPC status for Afghanistan since 2022, India sinceassets of any foreigner responsible for “extrajudicial killings, torture,
2020, Nigeria since 2009, and Syria since 2014, and it issued a public
or other gross violations of internationally protected human rights”
statement criticizing the State Department’s omissions. Information
against someone seeking to expose illegal government activity or toon the religious freedom violations that took place in Afghanistan,
exercise or defend internationally protected rights. Executive Order
India, Nigeria, and Syria in 2022 can be found in the country chapters(E.O.) 13818, issued in December 2017 to implement and build on thein this report.
Global Magnitsky Act, authorizes visa bans and asset freezes against
foreign persons involved in “serious human rights abuse,” providing
New Designations for Cuba, Nicaragua, CAR,
an even more expansive basis for targeted sanctions.
and Vietnam
In addition, Section 7031(c) of the State Department’s FY 2023
annual appropriations (P.L. 117-328) requires the secretary of state to
The State Department elevated Cuba and Nicaragua to CPC status
make foreign officials and their immediate family members ineligible
based on worsening religious freedom conditions in those countries
for U.S. entry if there is credible evidence that such individuals haveand placed CAR and Vietnam on the SWL for the first time, thoughbeen involved in “a gross violation of human rights.” Unlike the visa
Vietnam was designated as a CPC in 2004 and 2005. USCIRF continineligibility provision enacted in IRFA, visa bans under this provision
ues to conclude and recommend that Vietnam should be designatedmay be announced publicly.
as a CPC, but it hopes the SWL designation will encourage the

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I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

Vietnamese government to take concrete steps to address longstanding religious freedom concerns.

Malign Foreign Influence
In 2022, a bipartisan group of members of Congress introduced the
SHAME Act to prohibit lobbyists from receiving compensation fromcountries designated as foreign adversaries by the U.S. Departmentof Commerce. Most of the designated countries engage in particularly severe religious freedom violations and other egregious humanrights abuses. The SHAME Act would considerably strengthen theexisting regulatory framework around lobbying on behalf of foreign
governments. The current regulatory framework, governed by theForeign Agent Registration Act of 1938 and the Lobbying Disclosure
Act, does not prevent lobbyists from working on behalf of foreign
adversaries engaging in gross violations of human rights. As such,foreign adversaries can legally attempt to promote their interests or
influence U.S. government policy on human rights and internationalreligious freedom issues.

Multilateral Engagement

Individual Violators
During 2022, there were no known visa denials to any foreign officials
for particularly severe religious freedom violations under Section
212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the provision
added by IRFA. However, the U.S. government continued its use ofnewer accountability tools to deny U.S. visas to or block the U.S.-based
assets of foreigners for corruption or human rights abuses.
As of December, the U.S. government had sanctioned 606 foreign individuals and entities under the Global Magnitsky Act and therelated 2017 E.O. 13818, including multiple sanctions for religious
freedom violations. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed
Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on Chinese public security officials
responsible for human rights and religious freedom violations in the
Tibetan Autonomous Region and on Iranian law enforcement authorities for violently cracking down on protesters.
The U.S. government also used non-Global Magnitsky Act
tools to hold violators accountable. Following the State Department designating the Burmese military’s atrocities against the
Rohingya as genocide, the Treasury Department, under E.O. 14014,
sanctioned Burmese military commanders, a Burmese military unit,
and arms dealers responsible for or complicit in serious humanrights abuses. In addition, the Treasury Department sanctioned
Iranian officials in September, twice in October, in November, andin December under E.O. 13553 for their brutal crackdown against
Iranian protesters.

In 2022, the United States served the first year of a three-year term
as a member of the UNHRC after having been elected to the bodyin October 2021. The U.S. government cosponsored a resolution on
Freedom of Religion or Belief and also supported calling an Urgent
Debate on human rights violations occurring in Afghanistan against
women and girls. During the Urgent Debate, the U.S. government
Programs
highlighted the longstanding human rights violations perpetrated
IRFA envisaged the funding of religious freedom programs authorizing
against the Shi’a Muslim community in Afghanistan and cosponU.S. foreign assistance to promote and develop “legal protections andsored a resolution strongly condemning all violations occurringcultural respect for religious freedom.” For FY 2022, the State Departin Afghanistan. In addition, in December, the State Department
ment was required to make funds available for international religious
released multicountry joint statements condemning the Taliban’s
freedom programs. During 2022, the State Department’s Bureau ofdecisions to ban women from attending universities and working
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor issued several requests forfor NGOs.
proposals to advance religious freedom and/or provide protection
Following Iran’s violent crackdown on Iranians protesting
to religious minority groups—including in Bulgaria and Romania,
Mahsa Zhina Amini’s death at the hands of Iran’s Morality Police
Cuba, and Ethiopia.
for wearing an “improper hijab,” the U.S. government supported
Throughout 2022, the Biden administration funded humanitarianconvening a special session of the UNHRC on Iran’s human rights
aid for religious groups targeted for persecution or genocide andviolations. At the special session’s conclusion, the U.S. government
programs to promote religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism.
voted in favor of establishing
In March, the State Departmenta fact-finding mission to thorand the U.S. Agency for Interoughly and independently
national Development (USAID)
investigate human rights vioannounced more than $152 milAsof
December,theU.S.
government
lations related to the protests.
lion in humanitarian assistance
had sanctioned 606 foreign individuals
During 2022, the U.S. govfor the Rohingya humanitarianernment also organized an eventand entities under the Global Magnitsky Act
crisis. In May, USAID announced
on the protection of ethnic andand the related 2017 E.O. 13818,$808 million in humanitarianreligious minority groups inassistance for the Syria crisis,
including multiple sanctions for
Afghanistan and an event on
including funding to support
religious freedom violations.
protecting the right to freedom
safe spaces and psychosocialof religion or belief for Tibetan
support for women and girls. In
Buddhists; joined a 47-country
September, the State Departjoint statement on human rights
ment and USAID announced
conditions in Xinjiang, Hong$170 million in additional humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya
Kong, and Tibet; and cosponsored and supported a resolution thathumanitarian crisis and $326.7 million in humanitarian assistance toremoved Iran from the UN Commission on the Status of Women.
vulnerable populations in Afghanistan. Critically, throughout 2022,
USAID maintained the Strategic Religious Freedom and International
Religious Freedom Sector Council to advise and coordinate action on

8 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

I M PL E M E N TAT I O N O F T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L I G I O US FR E E D O M AC T

policy steps to advance USAID’s commitment to freedom of religion
or belief.

Refugee Resettlement
Under USRAP, the president sets a ceiling for how many refugees theUnited States will accept from abroad each year; under IRFA, religious
persecution should be considered in this determination.
In October 2021, the Biden administration increased the annual
refugee ceiling to 125,000 for FY 2022, which doubled FY 2021’s
62,500-refugee ceiling. For FY 2022, the Biden administration
designated certain populations for priority consideration as refugees—including Turkic Muslim refugees who are nationals or last
habitual residents of China, Rohingya Muslim refugees who are nationals or last habitual residents of Burma, and Iraqi and Syrian nationals
who are members of religious or ethnic minority groups. In addition,in March 2022, President Biden signed the renewal of the Lautenberg
Amendment—a special program allowing certain persecuted religious
minority groups to resettle in the United States. Despite these steps,
only 25,465 refugees were admitted to the United States in FY 2022.
USCIS has prioritized increasing staffing levels to process refugeeclaims more efficiently.
In September, the White House announced that it was maintaining the admission ceiling at 125,000 for FY 2023. The Biden
administration also pledged to continue implementing E.O. 14013 in
FY 2023 to rebuild and enhance USRAP and to prioritize persecuted
religious populations for U.S. resettlement. In December, the State
Department announced an initiative to resettle vulnerable Rohingya
refugees as a part of USRAP.

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal
As authorized by IRFA, USCIRF examined the U.S. government’s treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited Removal, the process that allows
DHS officers to quickly deport—without immigration court hearings—noncitizens who arrive at U.S. ports of entry or cross the borderwithout proper documents unless they can establish a credible fear of
persecution or torture. USCIRF has long monitored the subject, including in comprehensive reports released in 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2016that document major problems successive administrations have notaddressed. Specifically, USCIRF found that DHS officials often fail tofollow required procedures to identify asylum seekers and refer themfor credible fear determinations; that they detain asylum seekers ininappropriate, prison-like conditions; and that funding disparities anda lack of high-level oversight hamper the complicated, multiagency
process. These flaws raise serious concerns that the United States iserroneously returning asylum seekers to countries where they could
face persecution or torture in violation of both U.S. and international
law—a risk that Expedited Removal has only exacerbated.
In 2021, President Biden ordered the secretary of homeland
security to review expedited removal procedures and make recommendations for “creating a more efficient and orderly process thatfacilitates timely adjudications and adherence to standards of fairness and due process,” a step that USCIRF welcomed. Although therecommendations have not been made public, in March 2022, DHS
rescinded a notice that expanded Expedited Removal procedures tothe maximum extent permitted. With its recission, the risk of erroneously returning asylum seekers to countries where they could facepersecution, while still real, is reduced.

Notable Congressional Efforts to Promote Religious
Freedom Abroad
In 2022, Congress continued its own IRF promotion efforts. In April,Congress passed the permanent reauthorization of the Global Magnitsky Act, which USCIRF applauded. Additionally, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee held a hearing on the crisis in Burma one year after
the coup. The TLHRC held a hearing on discrimination and persecution against Muslims around the world and a hearing on the perilous
state of religious freedom in Nicaragua. The Congressional-Executive
Commission on China held hearings on China’s control of religion
through digital authoritarianism, growing constraints on language andethnic identity in China, and human rights abuses in Tibet, including
religious rights violations.
In addition, members of Congress advocated for the release ofprisoners of conscience, including religious prisoners, through the
TLHRC’s Defending Freedoms Project. Members sent the executive
branch letters on religious freedom violations in Burma, China, India,
Iran, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Vietnam as well as letters advocating fora USRAP Priority 2 designation for religious minorities in Afghanistan
and improvements in education for Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar.
Members also participated in numerous USCIRF events and hearings,
including the launch of the 2022 annual report, a hearing on U.S.
policy and freedom of religion or belief in North Korea, a hearing on
the crackdown on religious freedom in Nicaragua, and a hearing on
China’s religious freedom violations.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

92023 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
Afghanistan

India

Pakistan

Turkmenistan

Burma

Iran

RussiaVietnam

China

Nicaragua

Saudi Arabia

Cuba

Nigeria

Syria

Eritrea

North Korea

Tajikistan■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES
Algeria

Egypt

Kazakhstan

TurkeyAzerbaijan

Indonesia

Malaysia

Uzbekistan

Central African Republic

Iraq

Sri Lanka

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

11

AFGHANISTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Afghanistan continued
to deteriorate, as they have since the Taliban seized control of
the country in August 2021. In contrast to its pledges for change
and inclusivity upon its seizure of power, the Taliban has since ruled
Afghanistan in a deeply repressive and intolerant manner—essentially unchanged from its previous era in power from 1996 to 2001.
Its rigorous enforcement on all Afghans of its harsh interpretation of
Shari’a violates the freedom of religion or belief of religious minorities; women; members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) community; and Afghans with differing interpretations of Islam, such as predominantly Shi’a Muslim
members of the ethnic Hazara community. Taliban leaders havefurther issued a series of decrees specifying acceptable behaviors
under their interpretation of Islam, particularly targeting women by
restricting their freedom of movement, dress, education, participation in sports, right to work, and healthcare. The group’s Ministry for
Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) enforces what
its officials deem religiously appropriate conduct through a notoriously violent and hardline Islamist policing system that has been
especially harsh and progressively worsening toward Afghan women.
Despite continued promises to protect all ethnic and religious communities residing in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s de facto
government has been unable or unwilling to provide religious
and ethnic minorities safety and security against radical Islamist violence, particularly in the form of attacks by the IslamicState-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and factions of the Taliban
itself. In April, for example, ISIS-K bombed several religious sites,

including Sahib Khalifa Mosque, a Sufi house of worship in Kabul,
killing almost 50 worshipers, and Mawlawi Sekandar Sufi Mosquein Kunduz Province, killing 33 people. Much of the related violence
has targeted Hazara villages, schools, and places of worship, suchas a series of attacks in April against the Seh Dokan Mosque in
Mazar-i-Sharif and twin bombings at Abdul Rahim Shahid HighSchool in the Shi’a-dominated area of Kabul. That same month,
the Taliban tortured and killed a Hazara midwife in Mazar-e-Sharif,
amputating her legs, stabbing her, and shooting her 12 times.
In August, an attack on a Shi’a Muslim neighborhood in Kabul
during the holy days of Muharram left eight people dead. These
existential threats led several members of Parliament in the United
Kingdom, along with a group of key scholars and advocates, towarn in their unofficial inquiry in August of an imminent threat of
genocide facing the Hazara community.
The Taliban also either actively targets, discriminates against,
or outright denies the existence of many vulnerable religious
minorities such as Christians—who the Taliban falsely insist do
not exist in the country—as well as Ahmadiyya Muslims, Baha’is,and nonbelievers. Members of these groups are unable to express
their faiths or beliefs openly because they face dire consequences,including death, if discovered by the Taliban or ISIS-K. The Taliban
reportedly assured the Sikh and Hindu communities of their safety
shortly following the group’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021; however, several subsequent incidents of vandalism and violence led
many to flee the country in 2021 and 2022, leaving behind fewer
than 100 Hindus and Sikhs.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Designate Afghanistan under the de facto
rule of the Taliban as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Expand the existing Priority 2 (P-2) designation granting U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program (USRAP) access for certain
Afghan nationals and their family members to explicitly include Afghan religious

minorities at extreme risk of religious
persecution;■■

Integrate protections for freedom of religion or belief into all potential dialogue
with the Taliban; continue to clearly andpublicly condemn ongoing and severe
atrocities committed by the Taliban and
ISIS-K; and emphasize to Taliban leadership the close relationship between
religious freedom and overall security; andImpose targeted sanctions on Taliban
officials responsible for severe violations

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: Religious Freedom in Afghanistan
Hearing: Religious Freedom in Afghanistan: One Year since the Taliban Takeover■ Podcast: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in South Asia
■ Factsheet: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution Globally■■

12 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3of religious freedom by freezing thoseindividuals’ assets and/or banning theirentry into the United States under humanrights related financial and visa authorities—citing specific religious freedom
violations—and coordinate with allies toimpose similar sanctions.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Create by law a P-2 designation for members of religious groups at extreme risk ofpersecution by the Taliban.

Afghanistan is home to a diverse array of ethnic groups, including
Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Balochs. Historically,
the nation was religiously diverse, but the vast majority of non-Muslims
fled after the Taliban seized control in 1996, and many of those who
remained subsequently fled the country following the U.S. withdrawal
in August 2021. The country’s current population of over 38 million isapproximately 99.7 percent Muslim (84.7–89.7 percent Sunni and 10–15
percent Shi’a, including Ismailis and Ahmadis), with the few remaining
non-Muslims (Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, Christians, Buddhists, Zoroastrians, and others) comprising the remaining 0.3 percent. Statistics forsmaller groups are difficult to substantiate as most members are now
reportedly in hiding; however, estimates for the Ahmadiyya Muslim
community range from 450 to 2,500, and as many as 10,000 to 12,000
Christians likely lived in Afghanistan at the beginning of the year. The
country’s reported last remaining Jew, Zebulon Simentov, left in 2021.

Policing Society and Restricting Women
The Taliban has placed many other restrictions on Afghan society
based on the regime’s interpretation of religious law, such as the banning of music. In January 2022, a video emerged from Paktia Province
in which Taliban members humiliated two local musicians and burned
their instruments. As a result of such incidents—including several
executions and attacks since August 2021—many artists, entertainers,
and musicians have fled Afghanistan, while those remaining hide theirtrade in fear; the Artistic Freedom Initiative reports that around 3,000
performers have requested help to leave.
However, the Taliban has focused its most disastrous, sweeping,and repressive policies against the country’s women in an effort toimplement its vision of religious law that excludes Afghan womenfrom all opportunities and aspects of public life. In May, the MPVPV
issued a decree stating that women in Afghanistan must cover theirfaces in public, ideally wearing a burqa, and warned women not towear colorful clothing, high-heeled shoes, perfume, or anything ostensibly meant to attract the opposite sex. Secondary schools for girls
remained closed throughout 2022, contingent on plans for the Taliban
to set Islamic and cultural conditions for female students aged 12
and older, according to statements from the group. Furthermore,
the de facto government announced in December a complete ban
on women attending universities, prompting a series of protests
across the country by male and female students as well as widespreadinternational condemnation, including from the United Nations (UN)
Security Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and many
Muslim-majority countries. Days later, the Taliban demonstrated its
recalcitrance by announcing yet another ban—this time on women’s

employment with local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—leading to similar international outrage and thesuspension of activities by a number of organizations. The UN joined in
temporarily closing some of its aid programs in Afghanistan, warningof “life-threatening consequences” from the Taliban’s actions.

Key U.S. Policy
While the United States has not recognized the Taliban regime as theofficial government of Afghanistan, a U.S. government delegation
met with Taliban representatives in Qatar in June, underscoring U.S.
commitment to the Afghan people in the wake of the deadly earthquakes that hit eastern Afghanistan earlier that month. U.S. officials
emphasized the importance of the Taliban fulfilling its public commitments, including protecting the rights of all Afghans. The officials
also expressed concern regarding the ongoing presence of al-Qaeda,
ISIS-K, and other terrorist organizations in Afghanistan that continue to target religious minorities and those with differing beliefs. In
August, U.S. drone strikes killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiriin Kabul, and the U.S. Department of State accused the Taliban ofgrossly violating the 2020 Doha Declaration.
Refugee resettlement remains one of the most crucial but challenging U.S. policy issues regarding Afghanistan. At present, only
Afghan nationals who meet a highly limited set of conditions, such as
working directly for U.S. authorities or U.S.-funded programs or forNGOs or media outlets based in the United States, have priority status
for resettlement. Efforts to extend the program to other communities
and individuals at particular risk since the Taliban’s return to power
have largely stalled. As of the end of 2022, and despite recognition
from Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and some members of Congress regarding the horrendous conditions that religious minorities
and other especially vulnerable populations face in Afghanistan, no
specific legislation or policy initiative has yet emerged that would
extend the crucial P-2 designation to those communities. Many such
vulnerable families are reportedly among the thousands of displaced
Afghans who by the end of 2022 still remained in limbo at the Emirates Humanitarian Centre in Abu Dhabi, awaiting U.S. processing incooperation with United Arab Emirates authorities.
On November 30, the State Department redesignated the
Taliban as an “entity of particular concern,” or EPC, under IRFA for
engaging in particularly severe violations of religious freedom. However, the State Department did not designate Afghanistan as a CPC,
likely due to its nonrecognition of the Taliban as the de facto governing authority; it also did not designate ISIS-K as an EPC due to thegroup’s lack of territorial control—its horrific campaign of violenceagainst Afghan religious minorities notwithstanding.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )13

AFGHANISTAN

BackgroundBURMAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Burma continued to
decline significantly. Since staging a military coup in February
2021, the country’s junta—the Tatmadaw—has ruled throughthe State Administration Council (SAC) under the leadership ofGeneral Min Aung Hlaing. The SAC maintains full control of only
an estimated 17 percent of the country’s total territory, and inthat limited space it has significantly cracked down on all dissent
and freedoms.
Throughout the year, the SAC continued to link its legitimacy
to the sponsorship of Burma’s Buddhist majority. In August, Major
General Zaw Min Tun promised that any verbal, written, or online
post insulting Buddhism would be punished according to the law.
In July, General Hlaing joined two Buddhist monks in consecratinga replica of Shwezigon Pagoda in Moscow, Russia. In March, it wasreported that since the time of the coup, the junta had destroyed,raided, and looted at least 30 Buddhist monasteries in Sagaing
Region and 20 more in Magwe Region. The SAC’s sponsorshipis limited to those Buddhist communities that support the junta.
The government violently targeted houses of worship belonging to religious minorities throughout the year, with evidence
suggesting the SAC is using the same tactics against these communities that its forces have deployed against Muslim-majority
Rohingyas since 2017. From the time of the 2021 coup throughDecember 2022, government forces damaged or destroyed atleast nine Catholic churches in Kloikaw Diocese in Kayah State andseverely affected at least 16 out of 38 Catholic parishes. Government forces have also burned villages of religious minorities andeven members of the Buddhist majority, destroying homes andhouses of worship and schools in the process. The conflict displaced

over 1.1 million people during that same timeframe, bringing thetotal of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Burma to 1.4 million.
This number includes 121,000 from religious minority communities
as well as from majority Buddhist groups within Kachin and Shanstates. The SAC has deliberately blocked the delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations.
The increasing conflict between the SAC and the various ethnic armies, as well as forces aligned with the opposition National
Unity Government (NUG), have caused the conflict to spread toapproximately 83 percent of Burma’s territory. Growing evidence
reveals that neither the SAC nor the NUG have the ability to control many of the territories within Burma, including the regionsin Rakhine State that are or were formerly home to the Rohingya
community. Instead, the ethnoreligious militia known as the Arakan
Army (AA) has become the dominant political force in that region,lessening the influence of both the SAC and the NUG in RakhineState. Some members of the Rohingya community who spokewith USCIRF reported that in addition to the Tatmadaw and other
Burmese authorities who drove them out of Rakhine State, theAA has also targeted members of their community. The AA has
yet to reverse its past opposition to the presence of the Rohingya
community in Rakhine.
International efforts to hold the Burmese authorities and theTatmadaw legally accountable for atrocities they committed against
the Rohingya community continued throughout 2022. Relatedcases were ongoing at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), theInternational Criminal Court (ICC), and in Argentina under the principle of Universal Jurisdiction. In July, the ICJ dismissed the SAC’s
objections to the case, allowing it to proceed.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Burma as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);Engage with the prodemocracy Burmese
opposition, including the NUG, as well as
ethnic armed organizations as outlinedin the Burma Unified through Rigorous
Military Accountability Act of 2022, andprioritize religious freedom—including justice, voluntary repatriation, and restored
citizenship for the Rohingya community—
as a prerequisite for recognition and/or
ongoing and substantial engagement;■

Work with Bangladeshi authorities andthe international community to assist the
Rohingya community with immediateneeds while waiting for eventual voluntary repatriation, including identifying
solutions to fully scale up livelihood andskills training programs for adults andyouths and providing access to the
Burmese curriculum to ensure a quality
education for all children within Cox’s
Bazar; and■KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Factsheet: Pursuing Justice and Accountability: Next Steps for Rohingya Community of Burma
Policy Update: Burma■ Podcast: Rohingya Genocide Determination and Accountability■ Commission Delegation Visit: Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, in November 2022■■

14 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

Expand options for Rohingya refugees
to resettle in the United States—with
an emphasis on especially vulnerable
members of that community—and encourage like-minded partner countries to do
the same.

Burma’s population consists of Buddhists (87.9 percent), Christians (6.2
percent), Muslims (4.3 percent), Animists (0.8 percent), and Hindus(0.5 percent). Although the 2008 constitution treats Buddhism as thede facto state religion while recognizing Christianity, Islam, Hinduism,
and Animism, non-Buddhist religious and ethnic minorities have faced
longstanding persecution. In 2015, Burma passed race and religion
laws with the support of hardline Buddhist nationalist groups such as
the Ma Ba Tha. These laws regulate religious conversion, marriage,
and births; they also restrict the religious freedom of non-Buddhists,
particularly Muslims.
In 2022, the SAC continued to perpetrate mass human rights
violations within Burma. The SAC has received support from Russia
and China, although there are indications China’s past support for
the Tatmadaw had waned by late 2022. In July, the SAC ordered theexecution of four prodemocracy activists, and in August, General
Hlaing extended the state of emergency by six months, citing ongoing
efforts to combat the opposition, whom he referred to as “terrorists.”
In December, an SAC court found former State Counsellor Aung San
Suu Kyi guilty of corruption, sentencing her to 33 years in prison.

Rohingya and Other Refugees
Muslim-majority Rohingya have borne the brunt of religious freedom
violations by Burmese authorities and ethnic armies, and the corresponding violence has externally displaced most of that community.
Of the reported 600,000 Rohingya who remain within Burma, at least
100,000 are likely in IDP camps. Sea crossings remained a persistent
challenge, as an estimated 1,920 people, mostly Rohingya, fled Burmaby sea between January and November; of those, a total of 119 werereported dead or missing. Rohingya and other contacts inside Burmagenerally indicate that the government heavily restricts their freedomof movement, further noting that some Rohingya received university
admissions in 2022 but still faced persistent discrimination.
In November, USCIRF traveled to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, toassess the conditions of the approximately one million Rohingya who
reside in the refugee camps established in 2017. The majority of refugees to whom USCIRF spoke confirmed a desire to repatriate to
Burma. USCIRF learned that the Bangladesh government had approved
recent initiatives to provide a Burmese curriculum to children within the
Rohingya refugee community as well as livelihood and skills training
for youths and adults. Multiple groups working with those refugees
consistently communicated that Bangladesh and the international
community need to urgently scale up such initiatives while seeking
creative solutions to funding shortfalls. In 2022, Bangladesh only permitted humanitarian funds for Rohingya refugee programs, insistingthat development and other forms of funding would both imply andestablish permanence for the refugees’ presence in Cox’s Bazar.
In November, USCIRF met in Malaysia with refugees of several Burmese diaspora communities, all having fled persecution in
their homeland; they represented various Christian groups primarily
from Chin State, including the Zomi people. They indicated somein their communities had attempted to return to Burma during thequasi-democratic period that ended with the 2021 coup, but subsequent violence forced them to flee again. These refugees’ lack offormal status in Malaysia has prevented them from accessing healthcare and other essential services in addition to preventing children
from attending schools and adults from accessing stable employment
opportunities.

Regional Efforts at Accountability
In April 2021, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and SAC leader General Hlaing met and agreed to a Five-Point
Consensus to restore peace to Burma. In 2022, General Hlaing
completely disregarded that plan. His government restricted accessby ASEAN’s Special Envoy to all parties involved in the conflict,including ethnic and religious groups and detained elected leaders.
In November, following the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits, ASEAN
leaders reaffirmed Burma’s place in their ranks and called on the
military to comply with the consensus.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States continued to impose sanctions on the SAC, theBurmese military, and other Burmese authorities throughout 2022,
including targeting the regime’s military aircraft suppliers. President
Joseph R. Biden gave a speech in February denouncing the military
junta and marking the coup anniversary. In March, Secretary of State
Antony J. Blinken announced that the United States had determinedthat the atrocities the Burmese authorities and the Tatmadaw committed against the Rohingya in August 2017 constituted genocide. In
July, at the ASEAN summit in Bangkok, Thailand, Secretary Blinken
urged China and ASEAN members to escalate pressure on Burma’s
rulers to return to democracy and to hold them accountable to theFive-Point Consensus.
Since 2017 to the end of the reporting period, U.S. contributions to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis reached approximately $1.9
billion, making the United States the largest single donor in supportof humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees inside and outside
Burma. In September, the United States announced more than $170
million in additional humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees,
and in December it announced a resettlement program for vulnerable members of that community in collaboration with Bangladesh
and the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees. Alsoin December, President Biden signed into law the Burma Unified
through Rigorous Military Accountability Act as part of the 2023
National Defense Authorization Act, which updated how the U.S.
government can engage with ethnic armed organizations and prodemocracy forces.
In December, the United States supported UN Security Council
Resolution 2669 denouncing the Tatmadaw’s human rights violations
since the coup—the first such resolution on Burma to pass since its
independence in 1948. On November 30, the U.S. Department ofState redesignated Burma as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed as therelevant presidential action existing ongoing restrictions referenced
in 22 CFR 126.1.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )

15

BURMA

BackgroundCHINAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in China further deteriorated. The government continued to vigorously implement
its “sinicization of religion” policy and demand that religious
groups support the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule andideology. The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD),
the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), and statecontrolled religious organizations are integral in implementing
this coercive policy. Although China officially recognizes Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism, groups
with perceived foreign connections—such as Uyghurs and other
Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, underground Catholics, and housechurch Protestants—are especially vulnerable to persecution.
The Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services took effect in March, banning religious content
on the internet and further constricting the narrow space for religious groups. The Chinese government and state-owned entities
such as Hikvision—accused of complicity in abuses in the Uyghur
region, known as Xinjiang—hired former U.S. officials and former
members of Congress to lobby on their behalf, undermining religious freedom and related human rights in China.
During the year, Chinese authorities continued their repressive
sinicization of Islam and forced assimilation policy in Xinjiang that
attempts to eradicate Uyghurs’ and other Turkic Muslims’ distinct
ethnoreligious identities. In May, a report based on leaked internal
police files from two Xinjiang counties confirmed the existence
and brutality of concentration camps where Uyghurs have beendetained. The report held high-level CCP and government officials,
including CCP leader Xi Jinping, responsible. New reports noteda policy shift from detaining Uyghurs in camps to sending them toprisons. Forced labor, political indoctrination, mass surveillance,
an intrusive homestay program that embeds officials in Uyghur
households, and forced interfaith marriages also continued.
Government control and suppression of Tibetan Buddhism
intensified. Authorities restricted Tibetans’ access to religious
sites, banned religious gatherings, destroyed sites and symbols of
religious significance, and subjected Tibetan monks and nuns topolitical indoctrination, including at “reeducation centers.” Authorities reportedly tortured Tibetan monks in prison, including Rinchen
Tsultrim and Sherab Gyatso, who suffer from poor health, and theydetained Tibetans for religious activities honoring the Dalai Lamaor possessing his portraits. The Chinese government repeatedly
stated its intent to interfere in the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, claiming it has the ultimate authority to appoint his successor. In 2022, atleast three Tibetans self-immolated, protesting the government’s
policies in Tibet. Moreover, authorities reportedly conducted mass
DNA collection in Tibet, likely to strengthen surveillance and control there.
Despite renewal in October of the Vatican-China agreement
on bishop appointments, in December the Vatican protested thegovernment’s installation of a bishop without its approval. Across
China, authorities detained or otherwise forcibly disappeared
Catholic priests and bishops—including Bishop Joseph Zhang
Weizhu and Bishop Augustine Cui Tai—who refused to join thestate-controlled Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.
Persecution of Protestant house church Christians also
intensified in 2022. The government carried out a nationwide
crackdown on house churches by harassing, detaining, physically abusing, and sentencing Protestants who refused to join
the state-controlled Three-Self Patriotic Movement. Authorities targeted Reformed house church Christians, including Elder
Zhang Chunlei of Ren’ai Reformed Church and Pastor An Yankui
of Taiyuan Zion Reformed Church. Reports also emerged of harshpersecution of ethnic minority Protestants, such as Lisu and Nu
Protestants in Yunan Province and Kyrgyz Protestants in Xinjiang
reeducation camps.
The government continued its persecution of Falun Gong
and the Church of Almighty God (CAG), often using “anti-cult”
provisions under Article 300 of China’s Criminal Law. In 2022, Falun
Gong sources documented 7,331 cases of harassment and arrest,
633 prison sentences, and 172 deaths because of persecution.
Reports also documented detention, imprisonment, and tortureof CAG members, some of whom reportedly died due to abuses.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate China as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Adopt a whole-of-government approachby elevating and integrating religious freedom as a key strategic objective in U.S.
foreign policy toward China and by raising
religious freedom concerns in all bilateraldialogues and engagement;

16 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3■■Continue imposing sanctions to target
Chinese officials and entities responsible
for severe religious freedom violations,especially within the CCP’s UFWD, SARA,
and the public security and state security
apparatus; andWork with like-minded countries in international fora, including the United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHRC), to collectively hold the Chinese government
accountable for severe religious freedom
violations, including by creating a UN

Commission of Inquiry to investigate andidentify perpetrators of ongoing genocideand crimes against humanity in Xinjiangand document other severe human rights
abuses throughout China.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Support legislation to counter the CCP’smalign influence in the United States,
particularly its lobbying ef forts that
undermine religious freedom and related
human rights.

China is officially an atheist state. Of its estimated 1.4 billion people,
approximately 18 percent are Buddhist, including Tibetan Buddhists;
five percent are Christian; and two percent are Muslim. Other significant religious traditions include Taoism, Falun Gong, and folk
religion practices.
The CCP has long repressed religious freedom and in recent
years has become increasingly hostile toward religion, implementing
campaigns to “sinicize” Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, and Christianity toremove alleged “foreign influences.” These policies require religious
groups to support the CCP, including by altering their religious teachings to conform to CCP ideology and policy. Both registered andunregistered religious groups that run afoul of the CCP face harassment, detention, arrest, imprisonment, and other abuses.

Accountability for International Crimes
against Uyghurs
In August, the UNHRC’s special rapporteur on contemporary forms ofslavery, concluded that forced labor of Uyghurs and other minorities
in Xinjiang “may amount to enslavement as a crime against humanity.” That same month, then UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights Michelle Bachelet found that human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including arbitrary and discriminatory detention of Uyghurs andother predominantly Muslim groups, “may constitute international
crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.” In October, the UNHRC
rejected a motion led by Western member states to hold a debate on
China’s human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other Muslims in
Xinjiang. UNHRC member states voting against the motion included
Muslim-majority countries, such as Qatar, Indonesia, the United ArabEmirates, and Pakistan.
In June, the European Parliament adopted a resolution
condemning China’s oppression of Uyghurs, including “mass deportation, political indoctrination, family separation, restrictions on
religious freedom, cultural destruction and the extensive use of
surveillance.” The resolution further stated that the “birth prevention
measures and the separation of Uyghur children from their families
amount to crimes against humanity and represent a serious riskof genocide.” In a December resolution, the European Parliament
reiterated its recognition of China’s abuses against Uyghurs as constituting crimes against humanity and representing a serious risk of
genocide. The Parliament urged European Union (EU) member statesto “consider prosecuting Chinese officials deemed responsible forcrimes against humanity, on the basis of the principle of universal
jurisdiction” and called for “additional EU sanctions targeting Chinese officials and entities responsible for crimes against humanity.”

Religious Freedom in Hong Kong
In May, Hong Kong authorities arrested 90-year-old Cardinal Joseph
Zen Ze-kiun, bishop emeritus of Hong Kong, accusing him of “colluding with foreign forces” under Hong Kong’s National Security

Law (NSL). Despite his release on bail, his situation remained precarious. Democracy activist and religious freedom advocate Jimmy Lai,
another high-profile Catholic figure, pled not guilty to NSL charges
in August and court authorities postponed his trial in December. He
is currently serving prison terms on other charges related to his political activism. If convicted, both Zen and Lai could face the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment. In the U.S. Department of State’s March2022 Hong Kong Policy Act Report, religious groups stated concern
about the Chinese government’s potential “targeting of civil society
organizations or individuals affiliated with religious groups that wereactive in the 2019 pro-democracy movement.”

Key U.S. Policy
In March, the State Department announced visa sanctions on Chinese
officials deemed responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses
in China and abroad that targeted religious and spiritual practitioners
and members of ethnic minority groups, including transnational
repression to silence Uyghur American activists. That same month,
the U.S. Department of Justice arrested and charged Wang Shujun
for engaging in transnational repression activities on behalf of China’s
Ministry of State Security (MSS). Wang’s victims included Uyghur andTibetan activists in the United States and abroad. In May, the JusticeDepartment indicted Wang and four MSS agents on espionage andtransnational repression charges.
On November 30, the State Department redesignated China
as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed existing restrictions on exportsof crime control or detection instruments or equipment to China. In
December, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed financial
sanctions on Wu Yingjie, party secretary of Tibet Autonomous Region(TAR), and Zhang Hongbo, TAR Public Security Bureau director, forhuman rights abuses in Tibet, pursuant to Executive Order 13818.
In addition, the State Department imposed visa sanctions on Zhang
and Tang Yong, former deputy director of Chongqing city, for humanrights and religious freedom violations in Tibet and against Falun
Gong practitioners, respectively.
The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) took effect inJune, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection began implementing itby prohibiting imports from Xinjiang. In August, the U.S. Departmentof Homeland Security published its initial consolidated UFLPA Entity
List, subjecting named Chinese entities to “rebuttable presumptions”
in accordance with the UFLPA. In December, the U.S. Department ofCommerce added Tianjin Tiandi Weiye Technologies to its Entity Listfor complicity in human rights violations against Uyghurs and other
Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang.
In December, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Uyghur Policy Act of 2021 (H.R.4785) to address human rights issues
in Xinjiang. Members of Congress introduced bills in 2022 to counter
foreign lobbying on behalf of countries like China, including the PAID
OFF Act of 2022 (S.4901), the SHAME Act (H.R.9140), and the Disclosing Foreign Influence in Lobbying Act (S.4254).

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Factsheet: State-Controlled Religion and Religious Freedom Violations in China
Hearing: China’s Religious Freedom Violations: Domestic Repression and Malign Influence Abroad■ Podcast: The Plight of Christians in China■■

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )

17

CHINA

BackgroundAdditional view statement on China by
Commissioners Abraham Cooper, David Curry,Frederick A. Davie, Sharon Kleinbaum, Mohamed
Magid, Stephen Schneck, Nury Turkel, Eric Ueland,and Frank Wolf
At the height of Cold War hostilities in 1980, it would have been unthinkable for any reputable firm to take on the Soviet Union as a client.
And yet today, untold profits are being raked in by lobbyists
willing to whitewash the record and aims of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) and government.
It’s time to make this activity illegal.
As the Commission’s report documents, the Chinese Government
is an equal opportunity persecutor of people of faith—Christians,
Tibetan Buddhists, Uyghur Muslims, and Falun Gong practitioners.
In Xinjiang, the CCP is committing genocide, operating a networkof mass internment camps and prisons and systematically separating
Uyghur children from their parents.
Any notion of Hong Kong’s autonomy is fantasy. A once vibrant,
open society has been transformed with shocking speed. The ruthless crackdown on dissent found 90-year-old Catholic Cardinal Zen
in its crosshairs.
In every corner of the globe the Chinese government actively
works to subvert U.S. interests.
FBI Director Christopher Wray said, “the counterintelligence andeconomic espionage efforts emanating from the government of China
and the Chinese Communist Party are a grave threat to the economic
well-being and democratic values of the United States.”
The Chinese government oversees the most advanced surveillance state in human history and actively exports these technologies
to other repressive regimes worldwide.
As USCIRF recommends in this report, we urge the Biden Administration and Congress to ban lobbying groups and law firms from
representing the Chinese government and its interests.

18 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

CHINAU S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )

19

CUBA
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Cuba worsened. Throughout the year, the Cuban government tightly controlled religious
activity through surveillance, harassment of religious leaders andlaypeople, forced exile, fines, and ill treatment of religious prisonersof conscience. Religious leaders and groups that are unregisteredor conducted unsanctioned religious activity—as well as journalistic reporting on religious freedom conditions—faced relentless
oppression from the Office of Religious Affairs (ORA) and state
security forces.
The Cuban government regularly targeted members of religious communities who refused to abide by strict regulations
set out by the ORA. Authorities subjected pastors to detention,interrogation, threats of prison sentences on false charges, andconfiscation of property. In February, authorities detained Reverend Yordanys Díaz Arteaga, the president of the Christian
Reformed Church of Cuba, after an extensive search of his home
and the confiscation of technology belonging to his church. He
was later interrogated and threatened with criminal charges at
an unknown location and held incommunicado under effective
house arrest. Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported
that Reverend Díaz became a target of the government after his
denomination withdrew from the regime-aligned Cuban Councilof Churches. He reportedly arrived in the United States in August.
In April, evangelical couple Pastors Mario Jorge Travieso andVelmis Adriana Medina Mariño planned an April 29–30 prayer
event called “Breaking the Chains” to focus on the wives andmothers of political prisoners. The regime made repeated threats
to Pastors Travieso and Medina and several members of theirchurch who planned to participate. Authorities arbitrarily detained
the pastors, interrogated them for six hours, and threatened themwith imprisonment. The organizers canceled the event due to theregime’s various threats.
USCIRF received reports indicating that Cuban authorities
detained and interrogated citizens who traveled or planned totravel to the United States in 2022, including Catholic layman Dagoberto Valdés and his son Javier Valdés Delgado as well as Mildrey
Betancourt Rodríguez, a member of the Alliance of Non-Registered
Churches. Similarly, in October the Office of the Directorate of
Identification, Immigration, and Foreigners of Cuba arbitrarily
barred Imam Abu Duyanah, imam of the Cuban Association for
the Dissemination of Islam, from traveling to Mecca for “reasonsof public interest” without any specifications.
Additionally, threats and persecution by the government
caused several religious leaders to leave Cuba in 2022. In March,
Pastor Enrique de Jesús Fundora Pérez of the Apostolic Movement fled the country to seek asylum in Switzerland after state
security officials threatened him with up to 30 years in prison for“sedition” and “incitement to commit a crime.” He drew the ireof authorities when he gave monetary and spiritual aid to familiesof political prisoners from the July 11, 2021 (J11) protests. Pastor
Alain Toledano, a prominent Cuban religious leader of the unregistered Emmanuel Church of the Apostolic Ministry, has experienced
severe harassment from the Cuban government for over 20 years. In
June, Cuban state security presented Toledano with an ultimatum:leave the country within 30 days or face imprisonment. The UnitedStates granted him and his family emergency parole in July. In September, Father David Pantaleon, head of Cuba’s Jesuit Order andpresident of the Conference of Religious Men and Women in Cuba,
had to leave the country after the government refused to renew
his residence permit. During an interview in his native Dominican
Republic, Father Pantaleon reported that the ORA cited his support
for political prisoners and the Jesuits’ critical position toward theregime as the main reasons for his expulsion.
The Cuban government continued to target independentjournalists who report on religious freedom by threatening criminal
charges and fines, often under Decree Law 370, and imposing travel
restrictions. Cuban authorities twice interrogated and fined young
Catholic layman and journalist Adrián Martínez Cádiz this year.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Cuba as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Encourage Cuban authorities to extend an
official invitation for unrestricted visits by
USCIRF, the U.S. Ambassador at Large forInternational Religious Freedom, and theUnited Nations (UN) Special Rapporteuron freedom of religion or belief; and■Impose targeted sanctions on Cuban
government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious
freedom—including Caridad Diego, headof the ORA—by freezing those individuals’
assets and/or barring their entry into the

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Cuba
Report: Constitutional Reform and Religious Freedom in Cuba
■ Event: Constitutional Reform and Religious Freedom in Cuba■■

20 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

United States under human rights related
financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise human rights and democracy concerns in Cuba and highlight the situation
facing religious leaders and organizations
persecuted by the Cuban government,
among others.

CUBA

Background
While there are no independent sources on Cuba’s religious demographics, a reported 60–70 percent of Cuba’s estimated populationof 11.1 million self-identify as Catholic. Approximately 25–30 percent identify as unaffiliated or another religion, such as Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Buddhists, Muslims, Jews, Quakers, Moravians,
and members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. An
estimated 70 percent of Cubans engage in one or more practices
associated with Santería, a syncretic religion born out of the Yoruba
tradition mixed with elements of Catholicism.
Cuba is a one-party system under the ruling Cuban Communist
Party, with no independent judiciary. The state regulates and controls
religious institutions through the ORA of the Central Committee of the
Cuban Communist Party. The Law of Associations requires religiousorganizations to apply to the Ministry of Justice, where the ORA ishoused, for registration. However, the Ministry of Justice continues
to deny registration for religious groups and leaves long-standing
requests for registration unanswered. Unregistered religious groups
are particularly vulnerable, as membership or association with an
unregistered religious group is a crime. The ORA exercises direct
and arbitrary control over the affairs of registered religious organizations, requiring permission for virtually any activity other than regularworship services.

The Ladies in WhiteThe Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) is an organization of wives andrelatives of dissidents imprisoned in 2003. Cuban authorities actively
surveil and violently detain members of the Ladies in White and prevent them from attending religious services on Sundays.
The Cuban regime has aggressively targeted the leader of the
movement, Berta Soler. In January, Soler and her husband Ángel Moyaannounced a campaign seeking the release of all political prisoners
from the J11 protests. Subsequently, authorities subjected Solerand Moya to repeated arbitrary detentions. These detentions often
included interrogations at police stations and fines. Such offenses
occurred on 15 consecutive Sundays between January and May. In
September, Soler detailed that government agents parked a large
container in front of her house, reportedly to obscure when authorities
arrest her or her husband when they leave their home.
In September, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
issued follow-up precautionary measures to its 2013 decision in favorof the Ladies in White, appealing to the Cuban government to maintain “necessary measures to protect the rights to life and personal
integrity of the members of the Ladies in White.” The decision also
documents numerous cases of harassment, detentions, and fines up
to September 2022.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience
Several religious leaders and laypeople remained in prison at the endof 2022 for their participation in the J11 protests. Select cases areincluded in USCIRF’s Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) Victims List,
including Christian pastors and Santería practitioners.
Pastor Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo of the Monte de Sion Independent
Church participated in the J11 protests and was detained that day. The
government claims that Pastor Rosales Fajardo was involved in perpetrating a violent attack during the protest, despite evidence to thecontrary. The Cuban government tried him in December 2021 on chargesof “disrespect,” “assault,” “criminal incitement,” and “public disorder”
and sought to impose a 10-year sentence. Pastor Rosales Fajardo wassentenced to eight years in prison in April, but the government reduced
his sentence to seven years in May. In June, a court upheld his revised
sentence. According to CSW, only the prosecution was allowed to provide evidence, which included testimony from at least 12 policemen.
President of the unregistered Free Yoruba Association of Cuba
(Asociación de Yorubas Libres de Cuba, or “Free Yorubas”) Donaida
Pérez Paseiro and her husband, the community’s vice president Loreto
Hernández García, were charged with “public disorder,” “disobedience,” “spreading the epidemic,” and “incitement” and eventuallysentenced to eight years in prison. Pérez Paseiro experienced multiple
medical emergencies while in prison and authorities reportedly tried
to force her to renounce her faith. Hernández García reportedly suffers from several health conditions, including asthma, hypertension,
diabetes, and other cardiac issues. Prison authorities also reportedly
tried to force him to renounce his faith. In May, Radio Televisión Martíreported that Hernández García’s health has severely deteriorated inprison, as authorities fail to provide him food that takes into consideration his diabetes. He received medical treatment in a hospital, but
state security forced him back into prison in June.

Key U.S. Policy
The U.S. government continued to place robust sanctions on Cuban
officials. In January, the U.S. Department of State imposed visa restrictions on eight officials “implicated in attempts to silence the voices of
the Cuban people through repression, unjust detentions, and harshprison sentences” of J11 protesters. Further rounds of visa restrictions came in June and July when the State Department imposed
restrictions on an additional 33 individuals for “unfair trials and unjust
sentencing and imprisonment” of J11 protesters, plus media andcommunications officials who “formulate and implement policies that
restrict Cubans’ ability to freely access and share information and who
engage in the spread of disinformation.”
In September, the U.S. Embassy in Havana announced theresumption of immigrant visa processing and consular services forthe first time since 2017.
On November 30, the State Department for the first time designated Cuba as a CPC under IRFA and imposed as the relevant
president action the existing ongoing restrictions referenced in 31
CFR 515.201 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act. Cuba previously had been on the State Department’s
Special Watch List since 2019.

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ERITREAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Eritrea remained
extremely poor. The government did not register any new religious organizations, and individuals practicing faiths other than
the four officially recognized by the government faced intimidation and prosecution by Eritrean authorities. Members of officiallyrecognized religions also faced restrictions and government
backlash for practicing their faith. Dozens of religious prisonersof conscience remain imprisoned in decrepit, unsanitary, andinhumane conditions.
Eritrean authorities continued to detain dozens of people
imprisoned for their religious belief or practice. The government
detained 20 Jehovah’s Witnesses for conscientious objection tomilitary service and other expressions of their faith.
In February, Patriarch Abune Antonios, the former leaderof the Eritrean Orthodox Church, died at age 94 after spending
a decade and a half under house arrest because of his religious
beliefs, his calls for the release of political prisoners, and his resistance to government pressure to excommunicate members of
the church.

In October, security forces detained three Catholic leaders
for two months for raising Eritrea’s human rights violations in theirsermons. Prison conditions are abysmal, with detainees living insqualor and subject to violence and intimidation.
Eritrean forces have also continued to engage militarily in the
Tigray region of neighboring Ethiopia, where ethnically affiliatedrebel fighters seek respect for autonomous local governance. In
past years, Eritrean troops operating in support of the Ethiopian
government in the region have attacked religious sites and triggered
community-based religious violence in some areas. Reports suggestthat in 2022, Eritrean forces in Ethiopia continued to commit humanrights abuses and undermine the peace process, exacerbating the
likelihood that instability could yield additional religious freedom
violations in Ethiopia.
The Tigrayan crisis has also impacted Eritrean refugees living in
Ethiopia, some of whom fled Eritrea’s repressive religious and humanrights policies. Violence from both sides in the conflict has destabilized
the Tigray region, causing some Eritrean refugees to flee back acrossthe border to their country of origin or face violence and abuses.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■■

responsible for severe violations ofreligious freedom by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry
into the United States under human rights
related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations;

Redesignate Eritrea as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Maintain the existing, ongoing arms
embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a)of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations as the presidential action imposed
as a consequence of the CPC designation to encourage religious freedom
improvements;
Impose targeted sanctions on Eritrean
government agencies and of f icials■■

Engage with the Eritrean government to
end religious persecution of unregisteredreligious communities, grant full citizenship rights to Jehovah’s Witnesses, andrelease the remaining detainees held on
account of their religious activities; andCoordinate an initiative through theInternational Religious Freedom orBelief Alliance (IRFBA) to encourage the

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Factsheet: Religious Freedom Concerns in the Horn of Africa
Factsheet: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution Globally■ Press Statement: USCIRF Mourns the Passing of Patriarch Abune Antonios■■

22 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

Eritrean government to extend an official
invitation for unrestricted visits by theUnited Nations (UN) Special Rapporteuron the situation of human rights in Eritrea,
the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of
religion or belief, the UN Working Groupon Arbitrary Detention, and the International Red Cross.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Highlight religious freedom issues in
Eritrea through legislation, hearings andbriefings, and a congressional delegation trip to Eritrea to engage with Eritrean
officials to encourage them to advancehuman rights and religious freedom.

Following military conflict with and secession from neighboring Ethiopia, Eritrea gained independence in 1993. With a population of justover six million people, Eritrea’s religious demography is difficult toassess. The government recognizes three Christian denominations—
Eritrean Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant—estimated to comprise
between 49 and 63 percent of the population. It also recognizes Islam,estimated to comprise between 37 and 49 percent of the population.
Minority communities adhere to the Baha’i, Jewish, and traditional
animist faiths.
The Eritrean constitution protects citizens’ rights to freedom of
religion or belief. The law and constitution prohibit religious discrimination and provide for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief
and the freedom to practice any religion and to change one’s religion.
However, the government regularly violates these rights in practice.
Proclamation No. 73 of 1995 permits the government to exert fullcontrol over religious activities in the country. The government ofEritrea requires all religious groups to apply for registration, with
only the four approved communities allowed to operate since 2002.
Applications from other faith communities have been denied forbeing “defective,” according to the Office of Religious Affairs. Without formal registration, faith groups’ rights are denied and they areprohibited from building or owning houses of worship or engaging in
religious practices such as praying in groups.
Eritrean authorities signed the Joint Declaration of Peace andFriendship with neighboring Ethiopia in July 2018. The accord ended
over two decades of war between the two countries. Following thepeace treaty, President Isaias Afwerki delivered a much anticipatedspeech on Independence Day, saying “the beginning of a new era” hadcome to Eritrea. Historically, Eritrea justified its oppression of politicaland civil rights by citing security concerns related to the ongoing war
with Ethiopia. Many observers anticipated that the President’s commitment would translate into advancements for human rights, including
religious freedom. However, nearly five years after the agreement, overa thousand political prisoners, including many imprisoned for exercising
their freedom of religion or belief, remain behind bars.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience
In February 2022, Patriarch Abune Antonios, the former leader of theEritrean Orthodox Church, died at age 94 after spending a decadeand a half under house arrest because of his religious beliefs andadvocacy. Patriarch Antonios had been imprisoned for over a decade
after condemning government interference in church affairs andcalling for the release of imprisoned Christians. In 2006, Eritrean
authorities removed him from his position as the ordained head of
the Eritrean Orthodox Church and placed him under house arrest. A
year later, he was forcibly disappeared from his residence and taken
to an undisclosed location. He was reportedly denied proper medicalcare throughout his custody.
In October, security forces detained Catholic leaders Bishop
Fikremariam Hagos Tsalim, Father Mihretab Stefanos, and Friar Abbot
Abraham at the airport in Asmara as they returned from traveling inEurope. The government did not publicize charges against Tsalim andhis colleagues, but sources from the ground report that they weretargeted for publicly highlighting human rights violations in Eritrea
in their homilies. Authorities held them in detention for two months
before releasing them on December 29.
The Eritrean government continued to imprison 20 Jehovah’s
Witnesses: 14 men and six women. These religious prisoners include
an 80-year-old man and two men who have been in prison for morethan 17 years without formal charges against them. Eritrean officials
reportedly refused to meet with representatives of the Jehovah’s
Witness community to discuss these violations.
Conditions for religious prisoners of conscience in Eritrea areparticularly poor. First-hand accounts describe physical abuse, sexual
violence, and torture as normal and ongoing practices. Prisoners areoften denied medical treatment, and many have died in prison due tosevere human rights abuses. Many prisons reportedly use metal shipping containers to hold large numbers of people. In prison, praying
aloud, singing, preaching, and possessing religious books are banned.
Arrested individuals have reported being asked to sign documents
certifying that they renounce their faith or that they join or return to
the Eritrean Orthodox Church; if they do not, they face transfer toworse conditions.

Cross-Border Military Activity
In 2022, Eritrean forces continued to engage militarily in neighboring
northern Ethiopia, where their activities have historically included
attacks on religious infrastructure. This conflict has also aggravatedreligious freedom challenges in Eritrea itself. The Eritrean government
has reportedly increased conscription to meet the demand for military
support in Tigray, raising the risk of prosecution against conscientious
objectors. Eritrean refugees who fled to Ethiopia to avoid restrictive
Eritrean government policies, including religious restrictions, havebeen detained and forcibly returned to Eritrea in the context of the
Tigray conflict. Targeted violence by the Tigray People’s Liberation
Front has also impacted Eritrean refugees, likely including those fleeing religious persecution.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States has extremely limited diplomatic relations with
Eritrea. Diplomats continued to raise issues of human rights and religious freedom in official conversations with representatives from theEritrean government. Due to religious freedom violations and otherhuman rights abuses, the Joseph R. Biden administration declined
to invite Eritrean government leaders to the high-profile U.S.-Africa
Leaders Summit held in December in Washington, DC.
On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignatedEritrea as a CPC for engaging in and tolerating particularly severe
violations of international religious freedom. In 2022, the UnitedStates renewed sanctions imposed in 2021 under Executive Order(E.O.) 13818 (which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act) and E.O. 14046 (Imposing Sanctions
on Certain Persons with Respect to the Humanitarian and Human
Rights Crisis in Ethiopia) against Eritrean entities and individuals perpetuating the crisis in Ethiopia.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )23

ERITREA

BackgroundINDIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in India continued to worsen.
Throughout the year, the Indian government at the national,
state, and local levels promoted and enforced religiously discriminatory policies, including laws targeting religious conversion,interfaith relationships, the wearing of hijabs, and cow slaughter,
which negatively impact Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Dalits, andAdivasis (indigenous peoples and scheduled tribes). The national
government also continued to suppress critical voices—particularly
religious minorities and those advocating on their behalf—including through surveillance, harassment, demolition of property, anddetention under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) andby targeting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) under theForeign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA).
The Indian government invoked the UAPA and the Sedition Act
throughout the year to target freedom of religion and expression,
creating an increasing climate of intimidation and fear. Authorities
surveilled, harassed, detained, and prosecuted a number of journalists, lawyers, rights activists, and religious minorities advocating
for religious freedom. Hundreds of cases remained pending against
individuals for involvement in the 2019 peaceful protests against
the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), which provides a pathway
to citizenship strictly for non-Muslims from Pakistan, Afghanistan,and Bangladesh. As of 2022, only 92 of more than 700 cases had
reached trial, and many of those arrested under the UAPA continued
to languish in jail. During India’s fourth Universal Periodic Review(UPR), United Nations (UN) member states emphasized protections
for religious minorities and expressed concern over the broad application of India’s “anti-terror” laws. Additional official efforts, such as
the National Register of Citizens (NRC) process in Assam, also aimed
to identify “undocumented” Bengali-speaking Muslims.
The continued enforcement of discriminatory laws facilitateda culture of impunity for widespread campaigns of threats andviolence by mobs and vigilante groups. In March, for example,
Karnataka’s state government issued a hijab ban in public schools.

Despite widespread protests and instances of violence, state highcourt judges upheld the ban, agreeing with the government’s argument that the hijab is not essential to practicing Islam. India’s state
governments also continued to pass and enforce anti-conversion
laws, currently existing in 12 states, including legislation in multiple
states aimed to prohibit and criminalize interfaith marriages. Public
notice requirements for interfaith marriages imposed in 10 states
have, at times, resulted in violent reprisals against couples. The
ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) committed to enforcing harsher
penalties for interfaith marriages in its 2022 election manifesto for
Uttar Pradesh.
Violent attacks were also perpetrated across India under thejustification of protecting cows from slaughter or transport, which
is illegal in 18 states. Examples of violence against Christians, Muslims, and Dalits around suspicions of cow smuggling were reported
in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi. In August, BJP member Gyan Dev
Ahuja was recorded publicly calling for his listeners to “kill anyone
involved in cow slaughter.”Throughout the year, destruction of property—including
places of worship in predominantly Muslim and Christian neighborhoods—continued. In June, local authorities demolished thehomes of three Muslim families in Uttar Pradesh following protests
against derogatory language used by members of the BJP. Hindu
nationalists bulldozed a Catholic center near Mangalore in February and attacked, looted, and destroyed the homes of hundredsof Christians in December for their refusal to convert to Hinduism. In addition, at least four madrasas (Islamic seminaries) weredemolished following a statement in May from the Chief Ministerof Assam that madrasas should be eliminated.
Social media platforms continued to facilitate widespreaddisinformation, hate speech, and incitement of violence toward religious minorities. In February, Twitter removed a caricature sharedby the verified account of Gujarat BJP depicting Muslim men hungby a noose.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Designate India as a “country of particularconcern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations ofreligious freedom, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Advance human rights for all religious
communities in India and promote religious freedom, dignity, and interfaithdialogue through bilateral engagement
and in multilateral forums;■■

Condemn ongoing religious freedom
violations and support religious organizations and human right s groups
targeted for their advocacy of religious
freedom; andImpose targeted sanctions on Indian government agencies and officials responsible
for severe violations of religious freedom
by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry into the United

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in India
Issue Update: India’s State-Level Anti-Conversion Laws
■ Podcast: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in South Asia
■ Podcast: Anti-Conversion Laws and Growing Intolerance in India■■

24 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3States under human rights related financial and visa authorities, citing specificreligious freedom violations.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise religious freedom issues in the
U.S.-India bilateral relationship and highlight concerns through hearings, briefings,
letters, and congressional delegations.

India is the world’s most populous democracy, with an estimated 1.4
billion people, 79.8 percent of whom are Hindu, 14.2 percent Muslim,
2.3 percent Christian, and 1.7 percent Sikh. Smaller religious groups
include Buddhists, Jains, Baha’is, Jews, Zoroastrians (Parsis), andnonreligious persons. India’s constitution establishes the nation asa secular, democratic republic, and Article 25 grants all individuals
freedom of conscience, including the right to practice, profess, andpropagate religion. Despite these secular principles, since 2014, theIndian government—led by the BJP—has facilitated and supported
national and state-level policies that undermine religious freedom
for minority groups.

Anti-Conversion Laws
At the end of the reporting period, 12 of India’s 28 states had legislation that criminalized religious conversion in various circumstances(Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh). These laws are not limited to
instances of coercion, and they contain broad and vague language thatcan be used to target voluntary religious conversions. Common features of these laws include prohibitions on conversions, requirements
to notify the government of one’s intent to convert, and burden-shifting provisions that presume an accused individual is guilty.
These laws carry penalties of hefty fines and imprisonmentand disproportionately target Christians and Muslims. Increasingly,
anti-conversion laws are used to prevent interfaith marriages or relationships, including so-called “Love Jihads,” a derogatory term thattargets Muslims and refers to conversions occurring in the context ofinterfaith marriages. Under the Special Marriage Act, interfaith marriages require a 30-day notice period, allowing individuals to object
to the marriage. In April, the state of Haryana enacted its Preventionof Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act prohibiting conversion “bymarriage or through marriage.” Authorities, including police, at times
assist Hindu vigilante groups to “enforce” these anti-conversion laws.

Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) andNational Register of Citizens (NRC)
Since the CAA’s introduction in 2019, over 200 petitions have been
filed against the religiously discriminatory act. The CAA, combinedwith the NRC, is perceived as an attempt to disenfranchise Muslims ofIndian citizenship. The CAA aims to provide citizenship to non-Muslim
migrants (Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, and Parsis) fromAfghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. While the act’s purported
intention is to aid persecuted religious minorities, it does not include
vulnerable communities such as Rohingya Muslims, Ahmadiyya Muslims, Hazara Shi’a Muslims, or Baha’is. Since its enactment, journalists,
activists, and students have been arrested and detained for their
participation in widespread protests against the law.
The NRC is unique to the state of Assam, and since its publicationin 2019 it aims to distinguish Indian citizens from “undocumented
migrants.” Those deemed “foreign” under the NRC include Assam’s
Bengali-speaking Muslims, who have also been arrested under the

UAPA in some instances. As many as 700,000 Muslim residents in
Assam are estimated to be at risk of having their citizenship revoked.

Attacks on Religious Minorities
In 2022, there were numerous attacks against religious minorities andtheir places of worship. Demolitions of mosques in Muslim communities led to arrests and violent clashes. In May, the Home Minister ofMadhya Pradesh ordered the demolition of homes in predominantly
Muslim neighborhoods. While the Indian Supreme Court stated that
demolitions “cannot be retaliatory,” the practice has continued.
Mob attacks against religious minorities and members ofscheduled tribes further demonstrate how vigilantes and Hindu
nationalists act with impunity. In January, a Hindu nationalist group
allegedly beat a Muslim man for traveling with a Hindu woman in
Mangalore. In March, a Hindu nationalist group attacked a Christian
youth leader in Karnataka for sharing about Christianity outside acollege. Social media and news channels served as a platform for
Hindu nationalist groups to stoke tensions and encourage violence
toward minority groups.

Sexual Violence and Harassment ofReligious Minorities
Muslim women continued to face discrimination and harassment, bothat the local and state levels. In January, GitHub shut down an Indian
website that published the names of—and purported to “auctionoff”—Muslim women who had publicly opposed Hindu nationalism
and the government’s treatment of religious minorities. That samemonth, students across India protested against policies that would
require female students to remove their head scarves or stay homefrom school. These demonstrations were met with rival protests byHindu nationalists. In February, sectarian violence erupted between
those supporting the right to wear the hijab and Hindu students
wearing saffron robes. Subsequently, in Karnataka the BJP banned any
religious garb in public schools. In October, the government released
11 men who, as part of a Hindu nationalist mob, were convicted for thegang rape of Bilkis Bano, a pregnant Muslim woman, and for attacking her family during the 2002 violence in Gujarat. In Uttar Pradesh,reports of sexual assault and attacks against Dalits also continued.

Key U.S. Policy
In 2022, the Joseph R. Biden administration again failed to designate
India as a CPC for engaging in particularly severe religious freedom
violations. The United States and India continued to maintain strong
bilateral ties around economic trade and technology. Trade reached$120 billion in 2022, making the United States India’s largest trading
partner. President Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi interacted
on multiple occasions, including the G20 and G7 Summits and the
Quad Leaders Summit. In July, U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha J. Power traveled to India to discusschallenges of food insecurity, climate change, and the COVID-19
pandemic. In September, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely S. Ratner cochaired the sixth U.S.-India 2+2
Intersessional Dialogues in New Delhi.

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25

INDIA

BackgroundIRAN
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Iran sharply deteriorated.
Following the death of Mahsa Zhina Amini after her arrest andtorture by police for wearing an “improper hijab,” Iran repressednationwide protests with lethal force, detained and killed children,
sexually assaulted and raped detained protesters, and engaged inother gross violations of human rights, including executions of protesters without due process. Scores of protesters received charges
grounded in Islamic religious concepts that in Iran carry the death
penalty, raising serious concerns of mass executions. Iran’s government also escalated its repression of Baha’is, restricting access toreligious sites, issuing legal rulings supporting confiscation of Baha’i
properties, denying Baha’is entrance to universities, and conducting
systematic arrests. Security forces arrested 30 Yarsanis in Khermanshah and sentenced two Yarsanis, including a community leader, toprison terms for “propaganda against the state.” Iranian security
forces destroyed a Sunni mosque in Zahedan and threatened Sunni
clerics who condemned the killing of at least 96 protesters following
Friday prayers on September 30. Prison officials at Bander Abbas
prison tortured Sunni cleric Musa Rahimi to death following his arrestfor holding prayers on the date designated by Saudi Arabia insteadof Iran’s religious establishment. The Tehran Revolutionary Court
sentenced an Iranian Christian to a 10-year prison sentence, andhe and two other Christians also received a 10-year “deprivationof social rights” upon their release for their membership in a housechurch. Several other Christians faced sentencing and prison time on

similar charges. In January, Ministry of Intelligence officials in Dezful
summoned eight Christians and pressured them to abandon theirfaith. Several members of Iran’s Gonabadi Sufi community remained
under alleged arbitrary detention, including in solitary confinement.
Iran also continued to persecute nontheists and members of spiritualist movements. In August, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps(IRGC) arrested eight followers of Erfan-e Halgheh. Iran’s leadershipalso spread explicitly antisemitic messages over traditional and social
media. It continued targeting Iranian religious minorities abroad, in
one case, forcibly repatriating dissidents.
In 2022, women and girls continued to face religious freedom
repression in Iran. Religiously grounded laws in Iran continued toallow impunity for men who murdered women for violating “family
honor.” Security forces arrested and deployed egregious violenceagainst women and girls who peacefully protested the increased
enforcement of mandatory headscarf laws. Golrokh Iraee, a women’s rights activist who previously served prison time for writing an
unpublished short story criticizing the stoning of adulterers, wasarrested in September and moved in November from Qarchak
to Evin Prison. Iran also targeted and actively executed lesbian,gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) Iranians
on religious grounds, including those outside the country. Prison
officials hanged two gay men on sodomy charges in January andtwo other gay men in July. In August, a court in Urmia issued death
sentences against two LGBTQI+ activists for “corruption on Earth.”

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■■

Redesignate Iran as a “country of particularconcern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations ofreligious freedom, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Impose targeted sanctions on Iranian
government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious
freedom by freezing those individuals’
assets and/or barring their entry into theUnited States under human rights related
financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations;Issue clarifications of general and specific sanctions licenses, expedite theprocessing of general license applications,and continue issuing new general licenses
that facilitate financial and technologicalsupport for Iranians asserting their freedom of religion or belief through peacefuldemonstrations and labor strikes; and■Work with members of the International
Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance andother international associations to support
the United Nations (UN) Fact Finding Mission to Iran and support a Security Council
referral of the situation in Iran to the International Criminal Court for crimes against
humanity against those asserting freedomof religion or belief.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: Religious Freedom in Iran in 2022
Special Report: Religious Propaganda in Iran
■ Podcast: The Nexus of Religious Freedom and Women’s Rights in Iran
■ Podcast: Religious Prisoners of Conscience in Iran■■

26 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

The U.S. Congress should:■■

Reauthorize and exercise oversight toensure implementation of the Lautenberg Amendment, which aids persecuted
Iranian religious minorities seeking refugee status in the United States, and urge
the Biden administration to expand theprogram’s capacity to process, vet, andresettle Iranian religious minorities.
Convey, through legislation, press statements, and media messaging, bipartisan
support for Iranian protesters’ calls for
greater religious freedom in Iran.

IRAN

Background
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic, authoritarian state withrestricted political participation. Ninety to 95 percent of the population are Shi’a Muslim, while Sunni Muslims account for 5–10 percent.
Approximately 0.3 percent ascribe to other religions, including the
Baha’i faith, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Judaism. While the Jaafari
school of Shi’a Islam is the official religion, the constitution extends fullrespect to the five major Sunni schools. It also recognizes Christians,
Jews, and Zoroastrians as protected minorities. Five of the parliament’s
290 seats are reserved for religious minorities—two for Armenian
Christians and one each for Assyrian/Chaldean Christians, Jews, andZoroastrians. There are two Hindu temples, and Buddhism has historical influences. Iran is home to several other religious groups that facepersecution, including Mandeans, Yarsanis, nonbelievers, and spiritual
movements, such as Erfan-e Halgheh.

Religious Minorities
In 2022, Iran’s government escalated its persecution of Baha’is, conducting nationwide arrests and spreading propaganda against thegroup. In February, Judge Mohammadghasem Ain al-Kamali of Branch
1 of the Semnan Revolutionary Court ruled that the Execution of Imam
Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) could legally confiscate the property of
Baha’is following false allegations against a Baha’i man in the province.
Branch 54 of the Tehran Appeals Court upheld the decision in August
following the destruction of six Baha’i houses in Rooshankooh. In July,
Iran rearrested three members of the now disbanded Friends of Iran(Yaran Iran) who previously spent a decade in prison. In late August,Ministry of Intelligence officials arrested 14 Baha’is during a religious
study in Ghaemshahr. Throughout the fall and winter of 2022, Irancontinued its systematic campaign of Baha’i arrests.
Iran’s government also continued using antisemitic rhetoric toincite intolerance against Jews. In April, an IRGC-affiliated think tankdeclared there was no “real antisemitism” in Nazi Germany. Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei regularly uses antisemitic tropes such as Jewish financial
domination and deliberately conflates Judaism and Israeli government
policy in his tweets. U.S. Department of State Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Deborah E. Lipstadt has condemned
repeatedly this “vile antisemitic rhetoric.”
The government also targeted Christian Iranians, particularly
converts from Islam. In February, the Tehran Court of Appeal ordereda review of the sentences of nine Christians on the grounds thatmembership in a house church did not constitute a threat to national
security, leading to their acquittal. However, the lower courts continued sentencing Christians on national security grounds. Pastor
Youcef Nadarkhani, who is serving a six-year sentence for leading a
400-member house church, was allowed a five-day furlough for Easterbut returned to Evin Prison shortly thereafter. In May, the Civil Courtof Bandar Anzali levied a fine of $185 (six million tomans) on Christianconvert Rahmat Rostimipour for violating Article 500 of Iran’s penal

code prohibiting education “contrary to Islam.” In August, Iran’sSupreme Court declined to review the 10-year prison sentence againsthouse church leader Anooshavan Avedian. That same month, housechurch leader Josef Shahbazian began a 10-year sentence at Evin
Prison following a June 2020 raid on a private home in which security
forces arrested 30 Christians. In October, however, two Christianprisoners, Nasser Navard Goltapeh and Fariba Dalir, were released
from Evin Prison. Following the outbreak of mass protests, the Ministry of Intelligence reportedly pressured Armenian Christian churches
and church leaders to issue statements supporting the government.
Sunni Muslim Iranians faced repression in 2022 as security
forces targeted communities in the geographic and social peripheryin response to protests. Cleric Musa Rahimi reportedly died under
torture in a prison in Bandar Abbas following his arrest for announcing
the start of Eid al-Fitr in alignment with the Saudi date rather than the
Iranian date. In September, security forces in Zahedan shot at least
96 people leaving the Makki Grand Mosque to attend protests. In
November, security forces opened fire on worshipers at the mosque.
Both the IRGC and a Shi’a religious official linked to Ayatollah Khamenei condemned Sunni clerics for comments supporting protesters andcriticizing the government. Iran’s most prominent Sunni cleric, Molavi
Abdolhamid, continued to express his support for protesters.
Iran also continued its mistreatment of Gonabadi Sufis in 2022.
Three Gonabadi Sufis at Great Tehran Prison were denied access tovisitors in April. In August, Gonabadi Sufi journalist Kasra Nouri was
moved from Adel Abad Prison in Shiraz to a local Ministry of Intelligence office. During protests in December, security forces arrested
Gonabadi Sufi Mohsen Afrouz.

Key U.S. Policy
The Joseph R. Biden administration has supported protesters in Irancalling for greater religious freedom. In remarks at the UN General
Assembly, President Biden lauded “the brave women of Iran who right
now are demonstrating to secure their basic rights.” In November, theUnited States voted in favor of establishing a UN fact-finding mission
on Iran at the UN Human Rights Council. That same month, Vice President Kamala D. Harris stated that the United States would “work with
our partners to remove Iran from the UN Commission on the Status of
Women.” In December, the United States voted in favor of the resolution—which it cosponsored—to remove Iran from the commission.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the State Department
continued to impose targeted sanctions on Iranian officials for violating religious freedom in 2022, including leaders in Iran’s IRGC andBasij militias. In September, the Treasury issued General License D-2,
which facilitates outside technological support to Iranians protestingfor greater religious freedom and other rights.
On November 30, the State Department redesignated Iran as a
CPC under IRFA and, as the relevant presidential action, imposed travel
restrictions on Iranian officials complicit in religious freedom violations.

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NICARAGUAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Nicaragua worsened considerably. The government of Nicaragua, under President Daniel
Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo, escalated its campaignof harassment and severe persecution against the Catholic Churchby targeting clergy, eliminating Church-affiliated organizations, andplacing restrictions on religious observances. Violations of religious
freedom that occurred in previous years—such as hate speechagainst the Catholic Church and denial of entry into the country
for clergy—continued in 2022 as well.
The Nicaraguan government heightened its crackdown
against members of the clergy. Despite the high level of persecution against Catholic leaders since protests in 2018, 2022 was
the first year in which the government imprisoned members of theclergy. Father Manuel Salvador García was sentenced in June to two
years in prison for threatening a crowd with a weapon, and later hewas sentenced to another two years and eight months for allegedly
assaulting a parishioner. José Leonardo Urbina was sentenced to
30 years in prison for abuse of a minor; his secret trial lasted only
two days and lacked due process. Additionally, the government
made several high-profile moves against Rolando Álvarez, Catholic
bishop of the Diocese of Matagalpa and Estelí. Following multiple
instances of harassment in spring and summer, in August police
conducted an early-morning raid on Bishop Álvarez’s church in
Matagalpa, detained him, and put him under house arrest in Managua. Additional priests detained in 2022 include Óscar Benavidez inAugust and Enrique Martínez Gamboa in October. The government
also engaged in hate speech against clergy and expelled priests or
prevented them from returning to the country.
Within the context of a widespread crackdown on civilsociety organizations critical of the government, the Ortega

regime has also pressured the Catholic Church by hindering or
preventing Church-affiliated organizations and services fromoperating. In 2022, the regime shut down over 3,000 nongovernmental organizations, often citing legislation such as the“foreign agents” law or Law No. 977, Law against Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Financing of the Proliferationof Arms, to justify its consolidation of control over civil society.
The National Assembly ordered the revocation of the legal status of a Catholic university and several Catholic educational andcharitable projects in the city of Estelí and later approved a lawthat would strengthen its control over educational institutions
and strip funding from the Jesuit-run school Universidad Centroamericana (Central American University).
In May, the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications andPostal Services (TELCOR) ordered the removal of the Episcopal
Conference of Nicaragua’s Canal Católico (Catholic Channel). In
its place the regime began airing Nicarao TV, widely perceived
as a propaganda network. TELCOR also ordered the closure ofat least eight radio stations operated by the Catholic Church.
In August, police in Sébaco forcibly entered the chapel whereRadio Católica operated. They seized broadcast equipment andforced the church’s priest to take refuge in the parish house forseveral days.
In June, the government canceled the legal status of Missionaries of Charity—an order established by Mother Teresa—for
allegedly failing to declare the origins of its funding in line with
Law No. 977. Missionaries of Charity had operated in Nicaragua
since 1988, running a “children’s nursery, a home for abused andabandoned girls and a nursing home.” The government also forced
the nuns in the order to leave the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Nicaragua as a “country ofparticular concern,” or CPC, for engaging
in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Impose targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan government agencies and officials
responsible for violence and other punitive actions against houses of worship,
religious leaders, and organizations by
freezing those individuals’ assets and/or
barring their entry into the United States

under human rights related financial andvisa authorities, citing specific religious
freedom violations;■■

Press the Nicaraguan government tounconditionally release religious prisoners of conscience, commit to due process
for religious detainees, and permit accessto Bibles and religious consultations for allpolitical prisoners; andExercise increased scrutiny of any loan or
financial or technical assistance provided
by international financial institutions for

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: Religious Freedom in Nicaragua in 2022
Hearing: Crackdown on Religious Freedom in Nicaragua■ Podcast: Nicaragua’s Assault on Religious Freedom■ Podcast: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in Nicaragua■■

28 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

projects in Nicaragua, pursuant to the
Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence toConditions for Electoral Reform Act of
2021 (RENACER Act).
The U.S. Congress should:■

Hold public hearings to amplify congressional concerns over religious prisonersof conscience in Nicaragua and workwith like-minded parliamentarians inother countries to advocate for theirrelease and the release of other prisonersof conscience.

President Ortega is the head of state and government of Nicaragua.
He and his party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, exercise
authoritarian control over the government and electoral process.
Roman Catholics account for about 50 percent of Nicaragua’s population; Evangelical Christians account for 33.2 percent; followers ofunspecified religions account for 13.2 percent; Jews, Muslims, andothers account for 2.9 percent; and 0.7 percent do not adhere to
any religion.
Nicaragua is embroiled in a social and political crisis that started
after the government’s repression of peaceful protests in April 2018.
The Ortega administration began targeting the Catholic Church after
it aided demonstrators and individual clergy voiced opposition to thegovernment’s human rights abuses. Since 2018, government actors
and pro-Ortega groups have routinely intimidated and harassed
worshipers; vandalized churches; and targeted clergy with defamatory accusations, arbitrary arrests, death threats, deportations, andviolent attacks.

Persecution of Bishop Rolando Álvarez
The Nicaraguan government’s persecution against Bishop Álvarez is
illustrative of its crackdown on members of the clergy. Álvarez was amediator in the national dialogue in 2018 and was critical of the government’s human rights record. In May, police placed Álvarez under
24-hour surveillance. As a result, Álvarez took refuge in a church inManagua—which the police then surrounded—and began a hunger
strike to protest his treatment. Police allowed the bishop to return tohis own diocese in Matagalpa but escorted his vehicle for the two-hourjourney. On August 5, the national police announced an investigation into Bishop Álvarez. He was under de facto house arrest at his
Matagalpa church residence for two weeks until police conducted anearly-morning raid on the church, detained the bishop, and put him
under house arrest in Managua. He was charged with “conspiracy,”“spreading false news,” and “damaging the Nicaraguan governmentand society.” Vice President Murillo justified the bishop’s arrest byarguing that it served to “guard the peace, security, and tranquilityof Nicaraguan families.” In February 2023, a court sentenced BishopÁlvarez to 26 years in prison and also announced that “he would be
fined and stripped of his Nicaraguan citizenship.”
Authorities detained seven other men at the same time as BishopÁlvarez’s arrest, including three priests, one deacon, two seminarians,
and one layman. In February 2023, the regime sentenced the men to
10 years in prison for "conspiracy to undermine national integrity"and "for spreading false news.” Days later, the regime released theseven men and exiled them to the United States along with over 200
other political prisoners.

Harassment of Clergy
The government continued to use similar tactics as in previous years
to incite fear in the Catholic community. It again expelled priests andprevented them from returning to the country after traveling abroad,without any official explanation. Monsignor Waldemar Sommertag
served as the papal nuncio in Managua starting in 2018. In March

2022, the Nicaraguan government abruptly withdrew his credentials
and forced him to leave the country. In September, the Directorate
General of Immigration and Nationality notified Father Juan de Dios
García via email that he was banned from returning after he visited
family in the United States. A short while later, the regime denied
entry to Father Guillermo Blandón after he traveled to Israel with astopover in the United States.
Shortly after Pope Francis acknowledged dialogue between the
Vatican and the Nicaraguan government, President Ortega—during
a televised speech—called the Church a “perfect dictatorship” andrenewed his old accusations of clergy as “killers” and “coup plotters.”
In December, he also accused clergy of “calling for bloodshed” during
the 2018 protests.

Prohibition of Religious Rituals
The regime continued to arbitrarily ban Catholic processions in several
cities. In August, the police prohibited a procession in Managua for“reasons of internal security.” In lieu of the procession, parishioners
gathered peacefully under heavy police presence for Mass at thecathedral. Similar prohibitions occurred at least four times in September, twice in October, and twice in November.

Key U.S. Policy
The U.S. government continued to enact robust sanctions against
Nicaraguan organizations and officials. The RENACER Act expanded
the Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors list to include Nicaragua. In
March, the U.S. Department of State added nine Nicaraguan officials
to the list for “undermining the democratic processes or institutions ofNicaragua” during the 2021 sham election, making those individuals
ineligible for visas and admission to the United States. Further roundsof visa restrictions came in June and July when the State Department
imposed restrictions on an additional 116 individuals for undermining
democracy, including judges, prosecutors, National Assembly members, and Interior Ministry officials.
In June, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control sanctioned the state-owned mining company Empresa
Nicaraguense de Minas and one official in the government pursuant
to Executive Order 13851. In October, the Joseph R. Biden administration announced another slate of sanctions against individuals andentities in Nicaragua “to hold the Ortega-Murillo regime accountablefor its escalating human rights violations, continued dismantling of
democratic institutions,” and attacks on civil society. These measures
put pressure on Nicaragua’s gold sector, allow for future trade restrictions, and impose visa restrictions on more than 500 individuals “whowork for the Nicaraguan government or formulate, implement, or
benefit from policies or actions that undermine or injure democratic
institutions.”
On November 30, the State Department for the first time designated Nicaragua as a CPC under IRFA and imposed as the relevant
president action the existing ongoing restrictions referenced in section 5 of the Nicaragua Investment Conditionality Act of 2018 (theNICA Act). Nicaragua previously had been on the State Department’s
Special Watch List since 2019.

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NICARAGUA

Background

NIGERIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Nigeria remained poor,
with both state and nonstate actors committing particularly
severe violations of religious freedom. While some officials
worked to address drivers of religious freedom violations, others
actively infringed on the religious freedom rights of Nigerians,
including by enforcing blasphemy laws. Criminal activity and violent
armed group incidents impacting religious freedom worsened.
A Shari’a court sentenced Sheikh Abduljabar Kabara to deathfor blasphemy. Judicial authorities sentenced humanist leader
Mubarak Bala to 24 years in prison for blasphemy and othercharges. A high court ruled that blasphemy laws in Shari’a penal
codes are constitutional and remanded the blasphemy case against
Yahaya Sharif Aminu back to Shari’a courts for retrial. In September,
armed officers conducted a surprise raid on the residence of thepresiding judge of the Kano Court of Appeal, who was the only
judge who dissented the ruling. Kabara, Bala, and Sharif Aminu
remained incarcerated at year’s end, along with several other individuals accused of blasphemy. Meanwhile, religious police arrested
19 people accused of organizing a wedding ceremony for two individuals of the same sex in Kano State, where Muslims convicted oflesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+)
activity face execution or public flogging under Shari’a legal codes.
Mob violence in Zamfara killed Christian university student
Deborah Yakubu due to blasphemy accusations. Officials in Bauchi
State arrested Christian healthcare worker Rhoda Jatau for blasphemy for comments she shared on social media in the aftermathof the violence. Authorities only brought minor charges against twoof the instigators of violence against Yakubu and no charges against
the instigators of violence against Jatau.
Rampant violence and atrocities across Nigeria continued
to impact freedom of religion or belief, including militant Islamist
violence; some forms of identity-based violence; mob violence;and criminal, political, and vigilante violence impacting worship.
The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) claimed several
attacks against Christian communities, including allegedly killing
40 people in an attack on a Catholic Church in Ondo State during
Pentecost Sunday services and bombing a market in Borno State
that sold alcohol.
In many of the country’s complex violent crises, armed actors
targeted worshipers and religious leaders. Attacks targetedchurches and mosques in Kaduna State, mosques in Zamfara andKatsina states, and several Christian leaders in other parts of thecountry. Tensions at the intersection of ethnicity, religion, and geographic heritage yielded atrocities in several regions, including in
Plateau, Benue, and Anambra states.
Federal authorities accelerated efforts to address violence
impacting religious freedom, including by institutionalizing harsher
punishments against perpetrators, improving military efforts toneutralize Islamist fighters in the north, and strengthening efforts toinvestigate and arrest perpetrators of the most egregious attacks.
The effectiveness of these efforts remained in question, while
in some regions state and local officials failed to fully prosecuteindividuals who incited mob violence against alleged blasphemers.
Security and judicial sector reform aimed at deterring andproviding redress for religious violence remained stagnant, withsuch efforts largely absent from or peripheral to leading politicians’
policy priorities. The government’s human rights record continued
to be poor, with reports emerging of a decades-long forced abortion campaign facilitated by the Nigerian military against rescued
abductees of Boko Haram.
Despite continued religious freedom challenges in the country, in November the U.S. Department of State failed to designate
Nigeria as a country of particularly concern (CPC) for engaging inparticularly severe violations of religious freedom.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Designate Nigeria as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by
the International Religious Freedom Act(IRFA), and redesignate Boko Haram and
ISWAP as “entities of particular concern,”
or EPCs, for engaging in systematic,
ongoing, and egregious violations ofreligious freedom, as defined by IRFA;
Appoint a Special Envoy for Nigeria andthe Lake Chad Basin to maximize U.S.

diplomatic efforts to address religious
freedom violations and atrocity risk inNigeria and the Lake Chad Basin; and■Diplomatically, financially, and administratively support Nigerian civil society
organizations to coordinate a national
dialo g u e o n im ple m e nting Uni te dNations Human Rights Council (UNHCR)
Resolution 16/18 and to promote religious freedom and tolerance whilesafeguarding freedom of expression.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESHearing: Religious Freedom, Violence, and U.S. Policy in Nigeria
Policy Update: Violence and Religious Freedom in Nigeria■ Policy Update: Blasphemy Laws in Nigeria■ Commission Delegation Visit: Abuja in June 2022
■ Podcast: Religious Freedom Takeaways on the Ground in Nigeria■■

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The U.S. Congress should:■■

Revitalize the bipartisan Nigeria caucus
to place due focus on security, atrocity
risk, human rights, and religious freedom
challenges in Nigeria; andRequest that the Government Accountability Of fice (GAO) investigate theeffectiveness of U.S. assistance to Nigeria
in achieving religious freedom objectives
in the country.

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with an estimated
219 million people. Among these, 53.5 percent identify as Muslim;
45.9 percent identify as Christian; and 0.6 percent identify with otherreligious or nonreligious beliefs, including atheism, African traditionalreligions, the Baha’i faith, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism. Nigeria’s
1999 Constitution protects freedom of religion or belief and prohibits
the state from establishing a state religion. The Nigerian Criminal
Code includes a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment for blasphemy. Twelve northern states use Islamic Shari’a criminal and family
codes alongside civil and customary laws. These Shari’a codes prohibit
blasphemy and other offenses based on Islamic law as interpreted byeach state’s High Court.

Blasphemy Cases
In December, a Shari’a court sentenced Sheikh Abduljabbar Kabara to
death by hanging for offending the Prophet in his preaching. In April,a court in Kano State sentenced humanist leader Mubarak Bala to 24
years in prison for blasphemy after he pled guilty against the adviceof his lawyers and seemingly against his own convictions. In August,a high court in Kano ruled that blasphemy laws in Shari’a penal codes
are constitutional and remanded the blasphemy case against TijaniyyaMuslim Yahaya Sharif Aminu back to Shari’a courts for retrial.
In May, a mob in Zamfara State stoned Christian student Deborah
Yakubu to death and burned her body because they perceived remarks
she made in a WhatsApp thread as insulting to Islam. In June, a mob in
Abuja stoned and burned Muslim Ahmad Usman to death for alleged
blasphemy, although investigations implicated organized criminal
activity as likely playing a major role in the incident.
Some government officials made public statements condemning
mob violence against alleged blasphemers and issued temporary
curfews to quell rising threats to public safety. However, authorities
limited charges against two alleged perpetrators of violence thatkilled Yakubu to bailable offenses. When a mob in Bauchi State mobilized to retaliate against Christian healthcare worker Rhoda Jatau formaking comments they considered blasphemous in the aftermath of
Yakubu’s murder, authorities arrested Jatau on charges of blasphemy
instead of arresting those who incited violence against her.

Violence Impacting Religious Freedom
Rampant violence and atrocities across Nigeria continued to impact
freedom of religion or belief for many Nigerians. During a rampage
across several villages in February, ISWAP burned at least one church.
In April, ISWAP bombed a bar in Taraba State in an attempt to target“infidel Christians,” killing three and injuring 19. Investigations allege
that ISWAP killed at least 40 people in a June attack on Pentecost
Sunday targeting a Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo State. In October,
ISWAP attacked a church in Kogi State, killing two people and injuring
several others. Boko Haram also continued to commit violations in its

campaign to install undemocratic Islamic rule, with 100 of the schoolgirls they abducted in Chibok in 2014 still missing.
Complex violent crises across the country involving dynamic
alliances of insurgent, criminal, and vigilante actors also impacted
freedom of worship for both Muslims and Christians. In Kaduna Statein March, alleged bandits reportedly abducted 14 worshipers froma mosque during Isha prayers. In June, two simultaneous attacks on
churches in Kaduna State reportedly killed eight people and resulted
in 38 abductions. In July, armed actors abducted two priests in Kaduna
State, resulting in the death of one. In September, gunmen kidnapped
dozens of worshipers from Friday prayers in Zamfara State, and laterthat month armed assailants killed 15 people during an attack ona mosque. In December, gunmen abducted 19 worshipers from amosque in Katsina State.
In Plateau State in March 2022, tensions triggered by an attack
on a convoy of Muslim worshipers in August 2021 reignited, resulting
in fatalities from both Muslim and Christian communities. In May,
armed assailants killed a pregnant Muslim Hausa woman and her fourchildren, with local analysis concluding that discrimination likely playeda key role in the attack.
In January, the Nigerian government issued a policy considering
all activities by or in support of “bandits” and “gunmen” as prosecutable under the Terrorism Prevention Act (2013). In April, the NigerianCongress made kidnapping punishable by death and criminalized
ransom payments in an attempt to curb growing abduction rackets
that have impacted religious leaders and worshipers. Authorities
also made several prominent arrests, including five individuals for
conducting the Pentecost church attack in Owo.
Despite these efforts, ISWAP expanded its territorial reach andconducted several sophisticated attacks in 2022. While the Nigerian
government often projects an overly optimistic picture of its capacity
and readiness to combat violent actors, sources from the groundallege that chronic institutional challenges plague the effectivenessof Nigeria’s security and judicial systems.

Key U.S. Policy
In 2022, the Joseph R. Biden administration again failed to designate
Nigeria as a CPC for engaging in particularly severe religious freedom
violations, having removed it from the CPC list the previous year. In
April, the U.S. Congress approved the release of a nearly $1 billion
weapons sale to Nigeria that was paused due to human rights concerns, garnering criticism from human rights organizations. The U.S.
Embassy in Nigeria held several trainings with Nigerian security forces
to improve civilian protection in military operations. The U.S. government continued to support peacebuilding programs and efforts
to promote interfaith dialogue and harmony. The U.S. Embassy also
demonstrated commitment to protect Nigeria’s religious and cultural
heritage, including by funding a project to protect the Busanyin Shrinein the Osun Osogbo Sacred Grove.

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NIGERIA

Background

NORTH KOREAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in North Korea remained
among the worst in the world. North Korea’s ruling ideology,
known as Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, forbids competing ideologies—including religious ones—and treats religion as an existential
threat. The country’s most fundamental legal document, known as
the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Leadership
System, requires absolute loyalty and obedience to the teachingsof North Korean leaders. The Ten Principles contradict the rights
and freedoms enshrined in international law and in the country’s
own constitution, which nominally grants religious freedom. The
ruling Workers’ Party of Korea actively enforces the Ten Principles
at all levels of government and across society, monitors and controls religious belief and activities, and systematically denies North
Korean citizens the right to religious freedom.
North Korea’s discriminatory songbun system classifies
citizens based on their perceived loyalty to the state. Religious practitioners belong to the “hostile” class and are considered enemiesof the state, deserving “discrimination, punishment, isolation, andeven execution.” The government attempts to provide an illusionof religious freedom to the outside world through state-controlled
religious sites and organizations, which include the Korean Buddhist
Federation, the Korean Christian Federation, and the Korean Catholic Association. In reality, religious freedom remains nonexistent
as authorities actively and systematically target and persecute

religious groups and adherents, including Christians, practitionersof shamanism, and others.
Protestant Christians remain especially vulnerable to persecution. According to a 2022 report by the War Crimes Committeeof the International Bar Association and the Committee for Human
Rights in North Korea, human rights abuses—including religious
freedom abuses—in North Korean detention centers amount tocrimes against humanity. Christians make up a disproportionate
number of detainees in these detention centers. Authorities consider the practice of their faith a political crime and levy particularly
harsh punishments on prisoners from that community, including
severe torture and killing. For example, a former detainee at the
Onsong labor detention center estimated that between 50 and 60
percent of the facility’s population are Christian or have had contact with Christianity. The Ministry of State Security, North Korea’s
secret police agency, is the principal perpetrator responsible forthe persecution of Christians.
Furthermore, North Korean law bans shamanistic practices
as “superstitious acts.” The Ministry of People’s Security, North
Korea’s police agency, is primarily responsible for abuses against
practitioners of shamanism. Information on religious freedom conditions for practitioners of other major religious traditions in North
Korea—such as Buddhism, Catholicism, and Chondoism—remains
severely limited.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate North Korea as a “country ofparticular concern,” or CPC, for engaging
in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Integrate security and human rights ascomplementary objectives in broader U.S.
policy toward—and in bilateral negotiations with—North Korea; and■Impose targeted and broad sanctions—
including coordinated, multilateralsanctions with international partners—asappropriate for religious freedom violations in North Korea and consider lifting
certain sanctions in return for concrete
progress in religious freedom and related
human rights.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Reauthorize the North Korean Human
Rights Act and swiftly confirm the nominee for Special Envoy for North Korean
Human Rights Issues.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■Special Report: Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and the Right to Freedom of Religion, Thought, and Conscience in North Korea
Hearing: U.S. Policy and Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea

32 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

North Korean Defectors and Refugees

Key U.S. Policy

Defectors and refugees from North Korea are primary sources of
information about religious freedom conditions in the country. In
recent years, however, the number of North Koreans arriving inSouth Korea has decreased significantly due to tightened security
along borders between China and North Korea as well as between
China and Southeast Asian countries; the COVID-19 pandemic has
contributed to a further decrease. According to the South Korean
Ministry of Unification, only 67 North Koreans defected to South
Korea in 2022—one of the lowest numbers in over 20 years. The
Chinese government views all North Korean refugees as illegal economic migrants and repatriates them if discovered, without regard totheir risk of persecution upon return, in violation of its international
obligations. North Korean refugees who have contact with Christian
missionaries and nongovernmental organization workers in China
face severe punishment when repatriated to North Korea. Chinese
authorities have expelled hundreds of South Korean missionaries
since 2017, many of whom played an instrumental role in helping
North Korean refugees escape.

There was little to no change in U.S.-North Korea relations in 2022.
Officials with the administration of President Joseph R. Biden
repeated the U.S. commitment to diplomacy and dialogue with North
Korea, without preconditions, to which the North Korean government
offered no positive response. During President Biden’s visit with South
Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in May, the two leaders issued ajoint statement that expressed grave concern over the human rights
situation in North Korea. In December, U.S. Secretary of State Antony
J. Blinken, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin, and their Australian counterparts issued a joint statement during the U.S.-Australia
Ministerial Consultations that called on North Korea to engage indenuclearization dialogue, while expressing grave concern over severe
human rights violations in that country.
On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignatedNorth Korea as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed as the relevant
presidential action the existing, ongoing restrictions to which thecountry is already subject under Sections 402 and 409 of the Trade
Act of 1974. That same month, pursuant to Executive Order 13687, theU.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned North Korea’s Ministry ofState Security Border Guard General Bureau (BGGB) for its complicity
in human rights abuses along that country’s borders with China andRussia. On January 23, 2023, shortly after the reporting period, President Biden nominated Julie Turner for the position of Special Envoyon North Korean Human Rights Issues.
In March, Representative Young Kim (R-CA) and Representative
Ami Bera (D-CA) introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives a bipartisan bill to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act (H.R.7332),
but the House took no further action on the measure. In May, Senator
Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) introduced the Senate
version of the bill (S.4216), which the Senate passed in December. As
the law expired at the end of fiscal year 2022 and was not reauthorized
by the conclusion of the 117th Congress (January 2021–January 2023),
members of the House and Senate are likely to reintroduce new versions.

International Accountability in the
United Nations (UN)In March, Tomás Ojea Quintana, then Special Rapporteur on thesituation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea, submitted a report to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
raising concerns about North Korea’s deprivation of its people’s fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression, religion,and thought. It recommended that North Korea “review the Law on
the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture, and promote
and protect freedom of expression, access to information and freedom of religion, including for young people.” In August, the UNHRC
appointed Elizabeth Salmón of Peru as the incoming Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )33

NORTH KOREA

Information about religious demographics and religious freedom
conditions in North Korea is difficult to confirm and often outdated.
Historically, North Koreans followed Buddhism and an indigenous
syncretic religious movement known as Chondoism (Religion of the
Heavenly Way). The country was also home to a sizeable Christiancommunity before the Korean War (1950–1953), with Pyongyang
known as the “Jerusalem of the East,” but successive crackdowns haveshrunk the Christian population to an estimated two percent of thetotal population. Shamanism and traditional folk religion practices,such as fortunetelling, are also prevalent.

In April, the UNHRC adopted a resolution condemning “[longstanding] and ongoing systematic, widespread and gross humanrights violations and other human rights abuses committed” in North
Korea. It expressed grave concerns over North Korea’s persecutionof individuals on religious and other grounds; denial of the right tofreedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right toadopt a religion or belief; and discrimination based on the songbun
system. The UNHRC also called on the North Korean government
to ensure the right to thought, conscience, and religion or belief. In
December, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution expressing
concerns over North Korea’s dire human rights conditions and callingfor international efforts to improve them.

BackgroundPAKISTAN
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, Pakistan’s religious freedom conditions continued todeteriorate. Religious minorities were subject to frequent attacks
and threats, including accusations of blasphemy, targeted killings, lynchings, mob violence, forced conversions, sexual violenceagainst women and girls, and desecration of houses of worshipand cemeteries. Members of the Shi’a Muslim, Ahmadiyya Muslim,
Christian, Hindu, and Sikh communities faced the continued threatof persecution via harsh and discriminatory legislation, such as
anti-Ahmadiyya and blasphemy laws, as well as increasingly aggressive societal discrimination amid a rise in radical Islamist influence.
These laws have enabled and encouraged radical Islamists to operate with impunity, openly targeting religious minorities or thosewith differing beliefs, including nonbelievers.
The new government under Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif,
which took office in April, weaponized the country’s blasphemy
laws against former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his cabinet
members. Religious minorities, however, were especially vulnerable to prosecution or violence based on blasphemy allegations
in a society that has grown increasingly intolerant of religious
diversity. Blasphemy cases remained a substantial threat to religious freedom, as did the sort of mob violence that has longaccompanied such accusations. In February, a court sentenced
Notan Lal—the owner and principal of a private school in Ghotki,
Sindh—to life in prison under Article 295(c) of the Pakistani Penal
Code (PPC) after a student accused him of insulting the Prophet
three years prior. His appeal remains pending despite pleas ofinnocence. That same month, an angry mob in Punjab Provincestoned to death Muhammad Mushtaq, a mentally ill man accusedof burning the Qur’an; a mob of some 300 people then hanged
his body from a tree.
Societal violence and targeted killings also continued toplague the country’s religious minorities. In January, unknown
gunmen killed a Christian priest and wounded another as theydrove home from Sunday Mass in Peshawar. In May, unidentified
assailants gunned down two Sikh businessmen in Peshawar, and aseminary student stabbed to death an Ahmadiyya man in Okara
District, Punjab Province. The victim’s family members accused
the chief cleric of the seminary of provoking the student to commit murder by delivering sermons calling for violence against the
Ahmadiyya community. From January to July alone, that community
reported the desecration of over 170 graves and at least two housesof worship, often with the assistance of authorities. In July in Punjab
Province, 53 Ahmadiyya graves were desecrated in Gujranwala
District under the supervision of the police, while security forces
arrested several Ahmadis for conducting Islamic ritual slaughterin celebration of the Eid al-Adha holiday and thereby “posing as
Muslims.” In June, a group of armed men desecrated a Hindu temple in Karachi after two spokespersons for India’s ruling Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) reportedly made insulting statements about
the Prophet Muhammad; Pakistan’s government vowed to holdthe perpetrators accountable, although it had made no arrests by
the end of 2022.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Pakistan as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing
the administration from taking otherwise
legislatively mandated action as a result of
the designation;
Enter into a binding agreement, under
Section 405(c) of IRFA, with the Pakistani
government to encourage substantial
steps to address religious freedom violations with benchmarks, including but notlimited to:■■Release blasphemy prisoners and otherindividuals imprisoned for their religion
or beliefs;
Repeal blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya
laws; until such repeal, enact reforms

to make blasphemy a bailable offense,
require evidence by accusers, ensure
proper investigation by senior police
officials, allow authorities to dismiss
unfounded accusations, and enforce
existing Penal Code articles criminalizing perjury and false accusations;
■

■

■

■

Remove requirements for self-identification of religion on identity documents;
Address radical Islamist rhetoric, which
often precedes attacks on minorities,
while protecting freedom of expression;
Hold accountable individuals who incite
or participate in vigilante violence, targeted killings, forced conversions, andother religiously based crimes; andReform educational textbooks, curricula,and teacher training materials to ensure
content is inclusive of and not discriminatory toward religious minorities.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■Country Update: Religious Freedom in Pakistan in 2022
Podcast: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in South Asia

34 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3■

Impose targeted sanctions on Pakistani
government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious
freedom by freezing those individuals’
assets and/or barring their entry into theUnited States under human rights related
financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Incorporate religious freedom concerns
into its larger oversight of the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship through hearings,
letters, and congressional delegations andadvocate for the release of religious prisoners of conscience in Pakistan, including
Junaid Hafeez, Asif Pervaiz, Notan Lal,
Zafar Bhatti, and Aneeqa Ateeq.

Pakistan’s population is an estimated 96.5 percent Muslim (85–90
percent Sunni, 10–15 percent Shi’a, and 0.2 percent Ahmadi) withsmaller populations of Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Baha’is,
and Zoroastrians comprising the remaining 3.5 percent. Pakistan wasestablished as an Islamic Republic in 1956, granting special status toIslam; the constitution establishes Islam as the state religion, defines
the country’s purpose “wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to ordertheir lives . . . in accordance with the teachings and requirements ofIslam,” and allows only Muslims to serve as president and prime minister. Pakistan’s constitution nominally protects religious freedom byprohibiting faith-based discrimination and guaranteeing the right toreligious practices and education while reserving 10 seats for religious
minorities in the National Assembly, four in the Senate, and 23 in four
provincial assemblies. However, a 1974 constitutional amendment
declares Ahmadis non-Muslims, excluding them from representation.
In addition, Pakistan maintains several laws, including criminal blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya laws, that further restrict the freedom of
religion or belief.

Blasphemy and Anti-Ahmadiyya Laws
Sections 295 and 298 of the PPC criminalize acts and speech insulting
religion or defiling the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad, places ofworship, or religious symbols. These vague provisions are frequently
abused to levy false accusations against Shi’a Muslims, Ahmadiyya
Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and others who do not adhere
to the majority Sunni interpretation of Islam. Those accused of blasphemy face violence, imprisonment with limited opportunity for
bail, and even the death sentence, although no blasphemy convict
has been executed by the state in Pakistan. In January 2023—after
the reporting period—the National Assembly passed a draft law
that would increase the penalties for certain blasphemy cases to life
imprisonment while eliminating their eligibility for bail.
Articles 298(b) and 298(c) of the PPC prohibit Ahmadis fromself-identifying as Muslim, forcing them to sign a declaration swearing
they are non-Muslim to obtain basic civil rights, such as the right tovote or receive national identification cards. Ahmadiyya Muslims areprohibited from citing the Qur’an or Hadith; displaying Qur’anic text
on gravestones, houses of worship, or elsewhere; sharing their faith;or calling their places of worship “mosques.”

Sexual Violence and Forced Conversion of Womenand Girls
Abductions, forced conversion to Islam, rape, and forced marriage—frequently allowed with impunity—remain imminent threats
for religious minority women and children, particularly Christians,
Hindus, and Sikhs. In January, neighbors abducted, forcibly converted
to Islam, and married Mahnoor Ashraf, a 14-year-old Christian girl in
Lahore, to a 45-year-old Muslim man. In March, in Sindh Province, a
man attempting to abduct and forcibly marry 18-year-old Hindu Pooja

Kumari shot and killed her when she resisted. In April, 12-year-old
Christian Zarvia Pervaiz was abducted, forced to convert to Islam, andmarried to a 40-year-old man; a Lahore judge dismissed her parents’case in August, claiming that she had converted and married “of her
own free will” despite her status as a minor.
In October, concerns over such abuses prompted several United
Nations special rapporteurs, including those on freedom of religion
or belief and on violence against women and girls, to express theirconcern to the government of Pakistan. That communication provided
a series of individual examples, which it referred to as “indicative ofa wider phenomenon throughout the country,” and it warned of thereported “inaction and complicity of security forces and the judiciaryin the face of these abuses.”

Radical Islamism: Armed Groups andPolitical Influence
Radical Islamist influence continued to worsen in 2022, including
through armed groups, political factions, and individuals, many ofwhom used rhetoric, disinformation, or direct violence targeting
religious minorities. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) gained popularity, using blasphemy laws as rallying points. In March, the IslamicState in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) killed over 60 in a deadly attack on a Shi’amosque, marking yet another instance of extremist violence against
religious minorities.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States has long considered Pakistan’s stability and security a foreign policy priority, making it one of the largest recipientsof U.S. foreign aid—more than $32 billion over the last two decades.
It increased that level of aid in 2022, largely due to the devastating
floods that covered vast swaths of Pakistani territory from June toAugust, killing over 1,700 and destroying around 2.3 million homes. By
the start of 2023, the U.S. government had provided over $98 million
in humanitarian assistance in response to that crisis, largely throughthe U.S. Agency for International Development. This assistance camein addition to U.S. support in 2022 for Pakistani efforts to combat the
COVID-19 epidemic, including pledging and partially implementing
the donation of an additional 77 million vaccine doses. In October, theUnited States hosted a visit from Pakistan’s outgoing Chief of Army
Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, just weeks after announcing plans
to move forward with a $450 million deal to support the Pakistani Air
Force’s F-16 program. Reports suggest that these dynamics may point
to improvement in bilateral relations, long complicated by the twocountries’ starkly differing agendas and interests vis-à-vis Pakistan’s
neighbors in Afghanistan, India, and China.
On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignatedPakistan as a CPC under IRFA. However, as in prior years, the State
Department issued a national interest waiver that absolved Pakistan of
liability to sanctions or other significant penalties that would otherwise
accompany that designation.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )35

PAKISTAN

BackgroundRUSSIA
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in the Russian Federation continued to decline. Authorities increasingly prosecuted
members of religious minority communities using a range oflegal mechanisms, including a 1996 religion law; laws on terrorism,
extremism, and “undesirable organizations”; provisions criminalizing blasphemy; and others. These vague laws continued to give
authorities broad powers to outlaw religious groups, prosecuteindividuals based on their religious speech or religious activities,
and ban religious literature deemed “extremist.” The government
also continued to fine Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, Old Believers, and others for illegal missionary activities and other violationsof various restrictions.
Russian authorities frequently relied on the country’s extremism statutes to punish individuals for participating in so-called“extremist” organizations—without adequately defining “extremism.” In 2022, the government detained, imprisoned, and finedadherents of Muslim theologian Said Nursi, members of the Muslim
group Tablighi Jamaat, and Jehovah’s Witnesses on such charges.
Since the Supreme Court declared Jehovah’s Witnesses “extremist” in 2017, authorities have subjected the group to 1,874 home
searches, with 201 occurring in 2022. In June, the European Courtof Human Rights concluded that Russia had violated Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ rights and ordered the government to pay pecuniary
damages. By the end of the year, more than 100 Jehovah’s Witnesses remained in Russian custody.
Officials continued to detain and sentence Muslims on
unsubstantiated terrorism and sedition charges for their realor alleged affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an Islamist groupthat Russia has designated a terrorist organization. International
human rights organization Memorial reported in December thatat least 328 people were in prison or faced prosecution or investigation for such alleged affiliations, of whom 108 had received

prison sentences between 10–15 years and 105 had received
sentences of 15 years or more. In Russian-occupied Crimea,
occupation authorities have regularly imprisoned predominantly
Muslim Crimean Tatars who oppose the Russian occupation,
charging them in connection with their Muslim identity and religious activities.
In February, Russian military forces launched a full-scale andunjustified invasion of Ukraine with the purported goal of the“demilitarization and denazification” of the country. This “denazification” rhetoric often resulted in antisemitic Russian propaganda
and remarks from government officials, including Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov. As part of its war propaganda, the Russian government also pointed to the alleged flourishing of “satanism” andother religious movements—so-called “cults”—in Ukraine, with one
official calling for the “desatanization of Ukraine.” Dissidents within
Russia voicing opposition to the war on religious grounds faced
fines and detention for allegedly discrediting and disseminating
false information about the Russian army. Religious leaders who
refused to voice support for the invasion, such as the chief rabbi of
Moscow, were forced to flee Russia.
Ukrainian religious communities living in areas invaded by
Russia experienced gross religious freedom violations perpetrated
by Russian forces. Several reports document Russian military personnel threatening, detaining, disappearing, and torturing religious
figures in order to exert control and influence over local populations. In the first six months of the war, at least 20 religious figures
were reported killed and another 15 kidnapped. Russian artillery
and gunfire regularly destroyed and damaged Ukrainian placesof worship and other religious facilities. By December, the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had verified damage to at least 102 religious sites, with otherorganizations reporting damage to more than 300.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Russia as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Impose targeted sanctions on Russian
government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious
freedom by freezing those individuals’
assets and/or barring their entry into theUnited States under human rights related

about events inside Russia, including
those related to religious freedom.

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and■Allocate greater funding to programs
supporting:■■Russian civil society, including Russian
civil society actors in exile, that monitorsand documents human rights and religious freedom violations in Russia; andIndependent media that counters Russian disinformation and antisemitism
and reports uncensored information

The U.S. Congress should:■

Engage with repressed religious communities in Russia and occupied Ukraine andraise ongoing religious freedom issues
through hearings, meetings, letters, congressional delegation trips abroad, andother actions for community representatives to inform the U.S. government and/or public of existing conditions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESBackgrounder: Religious Freedom in Russia and Regions under Russian Occupation
Podcast: Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The Religious Regulation Framework■ Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes European Court Judgment against Russia on Jehovah’s Witnesses■ Podcast: Russia’s Religious Freedom Violations in Ukraine■ Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes Release of Religious Prisoner of Conscience Dennis Christensen■■

36 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

According to a 2020 poll, 63 percent of Russia’s population identify
as Orthodox Christian, seven percent as Muslim, and 26 percent
as having no religious faith. Less than one percent belong to othervarious communities, including Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Buddhists, Jews, Hindus, Baha’is, Falun Gong practitioners,
Scientologists, and followers of indigenous religions. Russian law
considers Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as “traditional”
religions and grants special recognition and privileges to the Russian
Orthodox Church.
In 2022, Russia enacted legislation that threatened to further
curtail religious freedom by expanding already broad, vague terms
such as “extremism,” “propaganda,” and “foreign influence.” In July,
President Vladimir Putin signed amendments to the country’s extremism law that created a database of “extremist materials” and a unified
register of individuals involved in “extremist” or “terrorist” activities.
In December, a new version of the country’s foreign agents law went
into effect permitting authorities to label individuals considered to
be under “foreign influence” as agents of another country. That samemonth, Putin signed into law a bill punishing anyone who promotes“LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender] propaganda” and anotherbill banning rallies and demonstrations in proximity to certain places,
including churches and religious sites. Russia’s widening crackdown
on civil society following its invasion of Ukraine led the United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to adopt a resolution in Octoberappointing a special rapporteur to monitor human rights in Russia.

“Extremism” and “Nontraditional”
Religious Groups
In 2022, Russian authorities sentenced more than 40 Jehovah’s Witnesses to prison time for peaceful religious activities portrayed as“extremist.” In September, a court in Gukovo sentenced four Jehovah’s Witnesses to seven years in prison and another two Jehovah’s
Witnesses to six and a half years for praying and singing hymns. All
six had been in pretrial detention since August 2020. In November, a
court fined Jehovah’s Witness Igor Gusev $9,921 (600,000 rubles) for
discussing the Bible. In October, a court in occupied Crimea sentenced
three Jehovah’s Witnesses to six years in prison for holding religious
services. In May, Dennis Christensen was released from prison anddeported to Denmark after completing his six-year sentence.
In August, six Muslims accused of teaching and discussing theworks of Said Nursi had their first hearing in Moscow. They were
initially detained in October 2021 and charged with extremism.
Authorities opened cases or started trials against several other Muslims in Dagestan and Tatarstan on similar Nursi-related allegations.
In March, an appeals court in Omsk sentenced one Tablighi Jamaat
member to two years in prison and another two to suspended sentences for giving sermons and spreading Tablighi Jamaat teachings.

Muslims Accused of Terrorism
Muslims accused of involvement in HT face decades in prison, despite
no evidence of defendants advocating for or participating in violence.

In November, a military court sentenced four Muslims from Kazan to
between 11 and 18 years in prison reportedly related to their talking
about religion and holding meetings, holidays, and tea parties after
Friday prayers. In Crimea, Russian authorities often use terrorism
allegations connected to religious identity to suppress predominantly
Muslim Crimean Tatar civil activists opposed to their rule. In March,a military court in Rostov-on-Don sentenced five Crimean Tatars to
between 15 and 19 years in prison for alleged HT activities. More thana dozen other activists originally arrested alongside the five in March
2019 were also sentenced in 2022 to prison terms ranging from 12 to
15 years. In July, three lawyers known for defending Crimean Tatars
were disbarred in retaliation for their work. Imprisoned Crimean Tatars
reported medical neglect, being served food violating their religious
dietary requirements, and inhumane living conditions, including rat-infested cells and a lack of access to beds, clean water, and sanitary
toilet facilities.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
In October, a UNHRC commission determined that Russia had committed war crimes in Ukraine, including summary executions, torture,and rape. Religious communities in Ukraine experienced these andother human rights violations, with Russian forces targeting religious
leaders, religious buildings, and other sites of religious or spiritual
importance. In March, Russian soldiers in Kherson reportedly beat,strangled, and sexually assaulted an Orthodox Church of Ukraine
priest until he agreed to cooperate with them. In November, Russianforces reportedly abducted, tortured, and killed an Evangelical deacon and his son. In June, Russian artillery struck the Svyatohirsk Lavra
monastery complex in the region of Donetsk, killing two monks and anun. That same month, Russian forces reportedly destroyed a mosque
while assaulting Severodonetsk, killing 20 people seeking shelter in it.

Key U.S. Policy
U.S.-Russian relations nosedived as the United States rallied the international community against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. The
United States imposed several rounds of sanctions targeting Russia’s
financial, defense, shipping, and technology sectors as well as Russian government and military officials involved in the war and humanrights violations in Ukraine, including President Putin. In September,the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned individuals operatingas Russia’s occupation authorities in Crimea for specifically targeting
religious and ethnic minorities. Following U.S. measures, Russia sanctioned and barred entry to several U.S. government officials, including
USCIRF Commissioners. In April, President Joseph R. Biden signed
into law legislation suspending trade relations with Russia and banning
the importation of Russian oil. On November 30, the U.S. Departmentof State redesignated Russia as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed as
the relevant presidential action existing ongoing sanctions issued
for individuals identified pursuant to the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act
of 2012 and the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy,
and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, as amended.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )37

RUSSIA

Background

SAUDI ARABIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

In 2022, religious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia remainedpoor despite some nominal improvements. The Saudi government continued to systematically deny non-Muslims the ability
to build houses of worship or worship in public. According to the
1992 Saudi Basic Law of Governance, the constitution is the Qur’an
and the sunna (traditions of the Prophet). The judicial system islargely governed by a Saudi interpretation of Shari’a as informed by
Hanbali jurisprudence. Apostasy (including conversion away from
Islam) and blasphemy are both crimes carrying the potential for adeath sentence, though blasphemy is more often punished throughprison sentences, fines, and lashings, and no executions on either
charge have taken place in recent years.
Power in Saudi Arabia is highly centralized within the Al Saudruling family. The ruling monarch, King Salman bin Abdel Aziz Al
Saud, holds the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” In
September, King Salman bin Abdelaziz appointed his son Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman as prime minister, further centralizing the family’s power. Crown Prince Mohammed has systematicallycracked down on both religious and political dissent despite
overseeing economic reforms associated with Saudi Vision 2030.
Saudi law is largely uncodified, but in 2022 the government madeprogress toward digital procedures for the law of evidence and awritten penal code, both of which could reduce the risk of arbitrary
and inconsistent sentencing of religious dissidents and enhanceaccountability within the Saudi judicial system.
Shi’a Muslims also faced ongoing discrimination in housing,
employment, and the judiciary, and they remained without accessto senior positions in the government and military. The government
continued to prosecute, jail, sentence, and execute Shi’a Muslims
involved in protests in 2011 against discrimination on the basis of
their religious identity. While some were released in 2022, many of
those charged and sentenced were minors when they are alleged
to have committed their crimes. In March, Saudi Arabia carriedout its largest known mass execution, killing 81 people, including
41 Shi’a Muslims who participated in the 2011 protests. The headof the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention ofVice commented on the executions, saying that “one of the mostlegitimate actions is to preserve religion . . . and one of the ways toachieve that is to eliminate violators and eradicate them.”
The Saudi leadership’s continued centralization of governancehas sidelined the country’s religious establishment but has not eliminated state-imposed religious interpretations that restrict freedomof religion or belief. The government took steps to increase its
control of the judiciary by arresting sitting judges and appointing
new ones, potentially impacting ongoing legal cases against religious minorities and dissenters. Beginning in the summer of 2022,
Saudi courts began issuing egregiously long prison sentences
against dissidents—including religious dissidents—who peacefully
expressed their beliefs. Several detained prisoners of conscience
had their sentences extended arbitrarily and for excessively long
lengths of time. In April, the Saudi government made preparations
to deport four Uyghur Muslims to China but delayed the deportation following international pressure.
Saudi women have benefited from recent legal reforms but
continue to face restrictions on their religious freedom. The March2022 Saudi Personal Status Law standardizes in writing laws that werepreviously subject to the discretion of Saudi officials and ensures certain protections for women’s consent to marriage. At the same time,
it codifies systematic religious freedom restrictions affecting women,
including the male guardianship system and a legal prohibition on
Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men. Saudi women who haveprotested the guardianship system began receiving appallingly long
prison sentences in 2022. In August, the Saudi Specialized Criminal
Court (SCC) sentenced Salma al-Shehab to 34 years in prison andan additional 34-year travel ban over her tweets supporting womenactivists advocating for guardianship system reform.
The Saudi government also continued to restrict the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+)
community's freedom of religion or belief. Same-sex relations arepunishable by death based on the government’s interpretation ofreligion, though the government has not executed anyone on thesegrounds in recent years.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Saudi Arabia as a “countryof particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious
violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing
the administration from taking otherwise
legislatively mandated action as a result of
the designation; andExplore legal options for penalizing
U.S. companies complicit in the Saudi

government’s religious freedom violations, including those enabling theelectronic surveillance of the cellular
phones, emails, social media accounts,
and private messages of religious minorities and religious dissidents.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Hold public hearings to amplify congressional concerns over religious freedom
violations in Saudi Arabia, including the

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Saudi Arabia

38 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

prolonged detention of religious prisonersof conscience, and work with like-mindedparliamentarians in other countries toadvocate for them and other prisoners ofconscience to be released; and■Convey publicly to the administration
bipartisan concern over religious freedom
violations in Saudi Arabia.

Out of 34 million Saudis, 85–90 percent are Sunni Muslim and 10–15
percent are Shi’a Muslim. The United Nations (UN) estimates that 38
percent of the population are expatriates, including at least two million
Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, practitioners of folk religions, andthe unaffiliated. Non-Muslim citizens gather for religious purposes inprivate and often hide their identity to avoid harsh social and official
consequences. The government has also been increasingly tolerantof practices with non-Muslim religious origins like yoga, Halloween
costumes, and Christmas decorations.

Muslim Dissidents
In 2022, the Saudi government released two Shi’a Muslims whose death
sentences were converted to life sentences in 2021. Authorities released
Dawood al-Marhoon in February and Murtaja Qureiris in June, both ofwhom were minors when they are alleged to have committed crimes.
However, in July the SCC sentenced Jalal al-Labbad to death for his participation in 2011 protests despite being a minor at the time. In August,the court also upheld a death sentence against Abdullah al-Derazi, who
was a minor when he is alleged to have committed his crimes.
Saudi Arabia also continued to persecute dissident Sunni religious leaders and their families. Malik al-Dowaish, son of imprisoned
Sunni religious scholar Suleiman al-Dowaish, was arrested in Julyafter calling for his father’s release. In February, the Court of Appeal
upheld a two-year prison sentence against Malik’s brother Abdulrahman. Malik and his other brother Abdulwahhab (arrested in August2021) were released in September, but Malik was rearrested later thatmonth. Suleiman al-Dowaish was arrested in 2016 following tweets
about a religious sermon he gave in Mecca. Sheikh Salman al-Ouda,
arrested in 2017 over his religious beliefs, continues to be detained
despite reports in 2021 of his deteriorating health. There are similar
health concerns for Mohammad Hassan al-Habib, arrested in July 2016
over the content of his sermons. In October, the SCC again postponeda court hearing for religious scholar Hassan Farhan al-Maliki, arrested
in 2017 and charged with calling into question the fundamentals ofIslam, among other charges.

Non-Muslim Religious Minorities
Saudi textbooks reflect some improvement regarding the portrayalof non-Muslims, but they still teach that Jewish and Christian holy
books were “corrupted” and “distorted” in their interpretation andcompare Jews to “donkeys carrying books.” During a sermon at theGrand Mosque in Mecca in July, Imam Saleh bin al-Humaid called forbringing “annihilation upon the plundering and occupying Jews.”
During the Muslim World League’s Forum on Common Values
among Religious Followers, held in May, non-Saudi leaders from the

Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities came to
Saudi Arabia to discuss religious issues, though not issues related toreligious freedom in Saudi Arabia itself.

Women and LGBTQI+ People andReligious Freedom
In September, the Public Prosecution and the governor of the Asirregion opened an investigation into a violent August raid by security
forces on a “social education house” (Dar al-Reaya) for women and girls
in Khamis Mushait. Women and girls can be sent to social education
houses for religiously grounded violations, including disobedience(‘uquq) and running away (taghayyub) from a male guardian’s home.
During the raid, reportedly in response to protests over the mistreatment of residents at the facility, Saudi security officials assaulted womenand girls living at the facility, whipped them with belts and sticks, anddragged them by their hair. During the year, the government continued
to detain activists who protested the guardianship system and those
who expressed support for them on social media.
Saudi Arabia has jailed members of the LGBTQI+ community on
religious grounds and has arrested LGBTQI+ social media influencers on the basis that their content could “negatively impact public
morality.” Saudi textbooks, while reflecting considerable improvement in other areas, continue to use religion as a basis to claim thatfluid gender identity is “among the greatest of sins” that “make onedeserving of a curse” and that dressing in the manner of a different
gender will be “cursed with expulsion and banishment from the mercyof Allah Almighty.”

Key U.S. Policy
The Joseph R. Biden administration has expressed concern overreligious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia but has imposed limited
tangible consequences in light of security and economic interests
exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In April, President
Biden nominated Michael Ratney as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,
but Ratney was not confirmed by the end of the reporting period.
He was renominated in January 2023. In July, President Biden visited
Saudi Arabia and met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman,
where he “underscored” human rights concerns.
U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Deborah E. Lipstadt made her first official overseas trip to Saudi Arabia
in July to discuss antisemitism with Saudi officials. She indicated an
openness to hosting a discussion on “Judeo-Arabic issues” in Saudi
Arabia in the future.
On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignated Saudi
Arabia as a CPC under IRFA but reimposed the longstanding waiver ontaking any presidential action as a consequence of the designation.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )39

SAUDI ARABIA

BackgroundSYRIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Syria remained poor
amidst the ongoing civil war and continuing political fragmentation, humanitarian crises, and contested governance. The
government of President Bashar al-Assad—which controlled
two-thirds of Syria’s territory— committed egregious humanrights abuses such as arbitrary detention and torture, enforced
disappearance and, with its allies, civilian-targeted fatal attacks
in opposition- and rebel-held regions. While President Assadappeared in March at a Christian ecclesiastical conference inDamascus, the government’s treatment of other groups such as
Druze challenged its claims of protecting religious minorities. In Julyand December, state security and government-affiliated militias
responded with lethal force to Druze communities’ anti-regime protests. The government angered its Alawi Muslim base by releasing
hundreds of detained Sunni Muslims—whom it has long deemed
militants—during the holy season of Ramadan. Yet, the regime
kept at least 136,000 people in arbitrary detention and continued
to capitalize on the conflict-fueled sectarianism it helped establish,
appropriating Sunni Muslims’ religious authority and stoking Alawis’
fear of Sunnis gaining power.
Nonstate actors, such as Turkish-supported armed oppositiongroups (TSOs) in the north-central region and former al-Qaeda
affiliate and U.S.-designated terrorist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham(HTS) in Idlib in the northwest, perpetrated many violations against
religious minorities. Emboldened by Turkey’s support and intensifying military action in northern Syria, TSOs continued to target
religious minorities, especially Yazidis, for rape, assassination,
kidnapping for ransom, confiscation of property, and desecrationof cemeteries and places of worship. In June, TSOs desecrated
Yazidi graves, and in December, on a Yazidi holy day, the Faylaq
al-Sham faction vandalized a cemetery near Afrin. Despite HTS’s
robust campaign to distance itself from its past massacres andother crimes against religious minorities, the group’s governancein the northwest advanced a Salafi-Jihadist ideology disenfranchising Christians and Druze. HTS continued to expropriate property,
restrict religious rituals, arrest and detain religious minorities andnonconforming Sunni Muslims, and impose religiously justified
dress codes on women. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),a longstanding perpetrator of mass atrocities against Syria’s religious minorities, did not regain territory. However, it asserted
its presence via a major prison break in Hasaka in January andnumerous attacks on civilians and the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF). Its morality police (Hisba) used religion to justify
killing people accused of prostitution and witchcraft in Deir al-Zor
and to extort zakat, or religious alms, from local populations.
Turkey, Iran, and Russia contributed to the devastation and displacement of endangered religious minority communities in Syria
via direct military actions such as airstrikes, drones, and bombings.
In November, Turkey conducted airstrikes in northern Syria andTurkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan amplified longstanding
threats to escalate land operations there, ostensibly in retaliation
for a November 13 bombing in Istanbul that Turkey attributed to
Syrian-based Kurdish terrorists. The U.S. Department of Stateacknowledged Turkey’s concerns about terrorism but stressed theneed for de-escalation. The Autonomous Administration of North
and East Syria (AANES) and its SDF militia—which have helped
stabilize religious freedom conditions in parts of northern Syria—
expressed concern that Turkey’s threatened military encroachment
would prevent the SDF’s ability to secure the region against thethreat of ISIS insurgency and the TSOs that have laid waste to religious minority communities. Already displaced within and outside
Syria, and vulnerable on the basis of their religious identity, minorities in rebel-held areas face precarious conditions subject to ruin
from any additional crisis, such as the massive 2023 earthquakes.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Designate Syria as a “country of particularconcern,” or CPC, for engaging in and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and egregious
violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom Act(IRFA), and redesignate HTS as an “entityof particular concern,” or EPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious
violations of religious freedom, as definedby IRFA;
Impose targeted sanctions on additional
Syrian government agencies and officials,

HTS principals, and the leadership of
TSOs responsible for severe violations ofreligious freedom by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry
into the United States under human rights
related financial and visa authorities, citing
specific religious freedom violations; and■Support religious freedom in north andeast Syria by: 1) fully implementing General
License No. 22 in areas the AANES governs;2) encouraging inclusion of the AANES in
any U.S.-backed political solution for Syria,

pursuant to United Nations (UN) Resolution 2254, including Geneva-based talks toresolve the conflict “as the basis for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition;”and 3) assisting the efforts of local partners
to ascertain the whereabouts of kidnapped
and missing Yazidi women and girls.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise the profile of Syria’s vulnerable
religious minority communities throughhearings, meetings, letters, congressionaldelegation trips abroad, or other actions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESHearing: Freedom of Religion or Belief in Syria
Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes the U.S. Government’s Issuance of a General License Including Northeast Syria■ Podcast: The Suffocating Hold of HTS on Northwest Syria■ Factsheet: Religious Freedom in Syria under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)■■

40 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

Article 3 of Syria’s constitution states that the president must be
Muslim and that Islamic jurisprudence is a major source of legislation.
The same article calls for the government to respect all religions, toprotect the personal status of religious communities, and to ensure
the freedom to practice religious “rituals that do not prejudice public order.” The government continued to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses,
restrict proselytization, and prohibit the conversion of Muslims toother religions.
The demography of Syria reflects over 11 years of war resulting inmass casualties and displacement. Over 87 percent of the almost 21.5
million-person population is Muslim, with 74 percent Sunni Muslims
and the remaining 13 percent Shi’a, Alawi, and Ismaili Muslims. Christians—including Syriac-Assyrians, Maronites, Armenians, and othergroups—constitute between two and 10 percent of the population,with some humanitarian organizations reporting that war-related displacement and migration has diminished Christian numbers from 1.5
million before 2011 to only 300,000 in 2022. Druze comprise approximately three percent, the Jewish community is now essentially gone,and estimates for Yazidis are obscured by the Syrian government
inaccurately classifying them as Muslims.
The war—triggered in 2011 by the government’s repression ofpeaceful protests—has narrowed in territorial scope. Major areas ofongoing conflict include the northern swath encompassing the borderwith Turkey, Idlib Governorate in the west, the Jazira region in the east,and three Turkish “cantons” including Afrin and those formed by the
Euphrates Shield and Peace Spring military operations.

Religious Minorities’ Concerns
Throughout the war, Druze communities have avoided countering theAssad regime’s portrayal of itself as the protector of religious minorities from militant jihadist groups. However, in July and December,
Druze-majority villages in the southern province of Suweida staged
large protests expressing long-simmering resentment against theAssad regime, resulting in a government crackdown and fatal clashes
with Syrian security forces and affiliated militias. Non-regime-held
regions such as Idlib have proven even more inhospitable to Druze.
At least 53 kidnapping cases in Druze-majority villages of Idlib Governorate took place between January and August 2022: 23 by HTS,
16 by ISIS, and 14 by other Islamist organizations. Druze in Idlib haveexpressed concern that despite HTS’s public overtures to them, themilitant group cannot or will not bring to justice foreign-origin Islamist
fighters who target the Druze for violence, as in the case of the murderof an elderly couple in August.
Christians experienced political disenfranchisement as well
as violent attacks. In July, an explosion destroyed a Greek Orthodox church during its inauguration in the Hama Governorate, which
HTS partially controls. Christian communities in some parts of Idlib

approached extinction due to displacement and flight from TSO andHTS harassment and attacks. Those who remain in other villages face
HTS and other militant groups’ restrictions on their rituals and housesof worship, appropriation of land and other property, kidnappings,
and murder.
While the international community took steps toward accountability for Syrian ISIS members who participated in the Yazidi genocidethat began in 2014, Yazidis within Syria remain subject to legal discrimination across multiple regions’ frameworks of governance, andmilitant jihadist groups target them for forced conversion, rape andother sexual violence, and murder. The SDF continues to rescue genocide survivors still enslaved within ISIS fighter cells, but in 2022, at least
2,763 Yazidi women and girls kidnapped from Iraq were still missing,many potentially hidden within northeast Syrian camps detaining ISIS
fighters and their families.

Religious Freedom Conditions in the
North and East
Areas governed by the AANES remained more conducive to religious
freedom than government or rebel-held regions. The Kurdish-initiated, ethnically diverse, and multi-confessional administration
continued to support pluralistic initiatives. In January, the AANES
hosted the International Conference on Mesopotamian Religions
and Beliefs, featuring representatives from a variety of religious andpolitical institutions across the Middle East and North Africa and fromnumerous faiths and ethnic backgrounds. Some Sunni Muslim Araband Christian residents objected to the AANES’s educational reforms,
such as bans in October on niqabs in school settings and on Assyrian
schools’ use of the Syrian government’s curriculum over that of the
AANES. Overall, however, the AANES’s stabilization of the region
for religious minorities contrasted favorably with the violence anddisplacement advanced by TSOs and the Turkish military.

Key U.S. Policy
U.S.-Syria relations have been strained for several decades, and since
1979, the United States has named Syria on its list of state sponsorsof terrorism. Over the course of the present civil war, the UnitedStates has introduced several sanctions on Syria and related individual
actors, pursuant to the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019 andvarious executive orders. In May, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
announced the release of a general license authorizing wider forms
of private economic activity in certain non-regime-held areas, including—and as recommended by USCIRF since 2021—those within the
AANES, a region uniquely supportive of religious freedom.
In May and September, the State Department announced $808
million and $756 million, respectively, in additional humanitarianassistance to Syria, making the United States the largest humanitarian
donor since the beginning of the conflict.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )

41

SYRIA

BackgroundTAJIKISTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

In 2022, religious freedom conditions in Tajikistan remained dire.
The Tajik government continued to severely repress the country’s
Muslim majority. Children under the age of 18 are barred fromvisiting mosques and all other public religious activities except for
funerals. Private religious education is banned, and children are
only allowed to receive religious instruction from their parents
at home. Since 2014, the government has appointed all imams,
required them to wear state-issued religious garments, and strictly
dictated their sermons. People under the age of 35 are not allowed
to perform the Hajj.
The government enforced restrictions on how Muslims mournthe dead, including a ban on wearing black clothes. In June, police
stopped a woman wearing a black dress to mourn the death of her
son and detained her for seven hours at a police station, where she
was beaten to the point of unconsciousness. After her family saw
her injuries and complained to the police, they were threatenedwith 15 days of jail time. In addition, police sometimes harassed
individuals wearing hijabs or beards as a symbol of Islamic piety andblocked them from entering government buildings.
In 2022, the Tajik government implemented new methods ofpersecution specifically aimed at the country’s minority Ismaili Shi’aMuslim population, including the imprisonment of a prominent
religious leader, closure of a religious school and other community
activities, and shuttering of religious bookstores that sold Ismaili
literature and other materials.
In Tajikistan, the government punished alleged extremism andterrorism without requiring acts that involved violence or incitement of imminent violence. Charges are often arbitrarily issued
against religious individuals and their trials lacked due process
and procedural safeguards. The Tajik government continued to
imprison multiple individuals on lengthy prison sentences for peacefully expressing their faith, including those who veered from thestate-scripted sermons, preached without an official appointmentby the government, provided religious education, or attempted toshare their faith publicly. In August, Ismaili Muslim cleric Muzaffar
Davlatmirov was sentenced to five years in prison on “extremism”
charges after officiating funeral services for protesters killed by
the government. The Tajik government continued to target anyone with ties to the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT),a moderate Islamic political party banned in Tajikistan since 2015,
including through the use of transnational repression and requests
for extradition from other countries. One of the founders of the
IRPT, 80-year-old Zubaydullo Rozik, was placed in special punishment cells twice over the past year for teaching religion to otherprisoners, which is illegal in Tajik prisons.
The government continued to require the registration of
all religious communities. Unregistered religious communities
cannot legally convene religious meetings or assemblies, own
or use property for religious purposes, produce or import religious literature, receive donations, carry out charitable work,or invite foreign persons to participate in religious activities. In
May, government officials told Protestant Christian leaders thatthe government would not register any new churches. Like therestrictions placed on Muslims, children of Christian families
cannot attend church or other related activities such as religious
camps. In August, the government demanded that all non-Muslim
communities fill out questionnaires detailing information about
the community’s employees and their families and any financial
contributions the community receives. In September, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRCtee) determined thatTajikistan’s refusal to register Jehovah’s Witnesses violated Articles 18(1) and 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, which guarantee protections for the right tofreedom of religion or belief.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Redesignate Tajikistan as a “country ofparticular concern,” or CPC, for engaging
in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing
the administration from taking otherwise
legislatively mandated action as a result of
the designation;
Condition U.S. security assistance to the
Tajik government on 1) reform of the2009 religion law and the improvementof conditions for freedom of religion or
belief, and 2) mandated religious freedom training for Tajik officials, including
education about the benefits of religious
freedom for countering and preventing
violent extremism;■

Impose targeted sanc tions on Tajik
government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious
freedom by freezing those individuals’
assets and/or barring their entry into theUnited States under human rights related

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and■Press the Tajik government at the highest levels to identify and immediately
release individuals imprisoned in Tajikistan for their peaceful religious activities
or religious affiliations; account for thewhereabouts of all prisoners of conscience, including those imprisoned onreligious grounds; and allow international observers to monitor conditionsin Tajik prisons.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCountry Update: Religious Freedom in Tajikistan
Press Statement: USCIRF Vice Chair Nury Turkel Calls on Tajikistan to Release Shamil Khakimov■ Podcast: The Persecution of Muslims in Tajikistan■■

42 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

President Emomali Rahmon has ruled Tajikistan since 1992, centering
power in the hands of his family. Tajikistan faced multiple crises in
2022, including increased economic hardship due to Russia’s invasionof Ukraine, ongoing security challenges from Islamic State-Khorasan
Province (ISIS-K) in neighboring Afghanistan, increased drug trafficking
along the Tajik-Afghan border, and the continuation of the Tajik-Kyrgyz
border conflict throughout the year.
The country’s population is predominantly Muslim, with around86 percent adhering to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam and approximately four percent identifying as Ismaili Shi’a, a group that primarily
resides in the mountainous eastern part of the country known as theGorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). The largest Christiangroup is Russian Orthodox, but other Christian communities include
Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Jews, Baha’is,
and Zoroastrians also make up small communities.
UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders Mary Lawlor conducted a two-week-long official visit to Tajikistan
in November and December but was denied access to the GBAO.
Lawlor concluded that the situation for human rights defenders,
including those working on behalf of religious freedom, is deteriorating as they face “harassment, threats, criminalization, closed unfair
trials, and imprisonment.”

Legal Framework for Controlling Religion
Tajikistan’s legal environment for freedom of religion or belief sharply
declined after the adoption of several highly restrictive laws beginning in 2009. Its Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Unions
requires religious organizations to complete burdensome registration
applications to operate legally. Applicants must secure an attestationfrom local government officials confirming that at least 10 persons
over 18 years old in their locality are members. Applicants mustthen submit detailed information to the government’s Committee
on Religion, Regulation of Traditions, Celebrations, and Ceremonies, including the organization’s planned activities, founders andstructure, and basic tenets and attitudes toward education, family,
marriage, and health. The government exercises broad discretion todeny applications and strip religious organizations of their registration.
The administrative and penal codes provide for large fines and prison
terms for religion-related charges such as organizing or participatingin “unapproved” religious meetings.
Tajikistan maintains additional legal barriers severely curtailing the right to freedom of religion or belief. The Law on Parental
Responsibility bans minors from any organized religious activities
except funerals. The Law on Military Duty and Service provides for
mandatory military service with no exemption for conscientious
objectors. Conscripts must either serve two years in the armed
services or pay a substantial fine and take a month-long course inmilitary preparedness.

The GBAO and Repression of Ismaili Shi’as
In 2022, the Tajik government increasingly repressed the country’s
Ismaili Shi’a population, who are primarily ethnic Pamiris located in

the GBAO. Authorities cracked down on civil society in the GBAO
following protests in mid-May over the government’s decision
not to investigate the death of an activist in police custody. The
government arrested over 200 people, imprisoned Pamiri journalists and repatriated them from Russia, and began country-wide
suppression of Pamiris that included repression of their freedomof religion or belief.
In May in the capital Dushanbe, authorities began pressuring
staff at the Ismaili tariqa (school), officially registered with the government since 2012, to cease all religious and secular educational
activities. In September, the government forcibly closed the school
along with all the bookstores in Dushanbe selling religious literature.
Islamic religious studies are now only taught in one school that remains
open in the capital. In addition, authorities shut down development
projects funded and created by the Ismaili religious leader, Europebased Aga Khan, including schools, summer camps for children,banks, and telecommunications.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience
In August, Ismaili Muslim cleric Muzaffar Davlatmirov received afive-year prison sentence on “extremism” charges. Following thegovernment’s violent crackdown in the GBAO, Davlatmirov gave
sermons calling on people to remain peaceful but also criticized theauthorities’ use of force. After authorities killed three local informal
leaders in the May protests, Davlatmirov led their religious services
and gave janaza (funeral) prayers. The secret police arrested him on
July 26 and sentenced him in private court proceedings only eightdays later.
Since February 2019, Jehovah’s Witness Shamil Khakimov has
been in prison for “inciting religious hatred.” Tajik authorities targeted
the nonviolent 71-year-old for sharing his faith in public and havedenied him access to adequate medical care. In November 2022,
the Khujand City Court rejected Khakimov’s request for transfer toa specialized hospital to treat signs of gangrene in his legs and poor
eyesight, again disregarding UNHRCtee requests for Khakimov toreceive proper medical treatment.

Key U.S. Policy
In February, the United States and Tajikistan celebrated 30 years of
diplomatic relations. Since recognizing Tajikistan’s independence in
1991, the U.S. government has provided over $1.8 billion in assistanceto promote economic development, education, and health as well as
regional security, including joint military exercises and $330 million insecurity assistance to combat terrorism and narco-trafficking. The U.S.
government has pledged an additional $60 million in security assistance over the next two years. In May, Assistant Secretary of State forSouth and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu visited Tajikistan to discussbilateral cooperation on economic and security issues.
On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignatedTajikistan as a CPC under IRFA, although it also maintained a waiveron imposing any related sanctions on the country “as required in theimportant national interest of the United States.” It has designatedTajikistan as a CPC each year since 2016.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )43

TAJIKISTAN

BackgroundTURKMENISTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan remained
poor. The government controls all aspects of religious life andexpression, dictating and surveilling religious practice andpunishing nonconformity through administrative harassment,
imprisonment, and torture.
The government of Turkmenistan is an extremely authoritarianregime with an abysmal record on human rights and freedom of thepress. As a result, the country is largely closed off from the rest of
the world, making it difficult for accurate information to flow intoor out of its borders. The government’s tight hold on society andinformation also makes it difficult to document the full scope ofthe ongoing religious freedom violations, which are certainly more
extensive than the limited number of reports indicate. In addition to
the closed-off nature of the country, those who can get informationout often do so at great risk to their lives and liberty. Turkmenistan’s
diaspora community and citizens in exile are often unwilling to share
information about the government’s religious freedom violations
for fear of retaliation against them or their families. Nevertheless,the available information continues to present a bleak picture.
During the year, the government continued to treat all independent religious activity with suspicion, maintaining a large
surveillance apparatus that monitors believers at home and abroad.
Turkmen law requires religious groups to register under intrusive
criteria, strictly controls registered groups’ activities, and punishes
religious activities by unregistered groups, which are banned.
Persons accused of criminal religious offenses are often triedin closed-regime courts where sentences remain secret. Prisonersof conscience are often disappeared in the state’s prison systemand presumed to be held without contact with the outside world.
The authorities hold many religious prisoners at the notorious
Ovadan-Depe Prison, located in the remote desert 50 miles northof the capital city of Ashgabat. Ovadan-Depe was built to househigh-level political dissidents and enemies of the state, and its
prisoners routinely die from harsh conditions that include tortureand starvation. In October, five Muslims who are serving 12-year
prison sentences for meeting to study the writings of Turkish
Muslim theologian Said Nursi were transferred to a strict-regime
labor camp.
Turkmenistan maintains its compulsory two-year military service requirement, described as a “sacred duty” in Turkmenistan’s
constitution, and does not offer alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors. As USCIRF’s past reporting shows, Jehovah’s
Witnesses have been imprisoned under Turkmenistan’s criminal
code for conscientious objection. Although all those imprisoned
were granted amnesty in 2021, the government conscription officecontinued to summon Jehovah’s Witnesses for compulsory military service in 2022. In March, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee found that Turkmenistan violated Articles 9(1) and18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights byimprisoning a Jehovah’s Witness for his conscientious objection tocompulsory military service.
Online activity remained limited by blocked internet accessand extremely slow network speeds. In January, then President
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow instructed the head of the Ministry
for State Security to further increase state control of the internet andrestrict public access to internet sources that “threaten the constitutional order.” In March, then President Berdimuhamedow ostensibly
handed government leadership over to his son Serdar in managed“elections” while giving himself the position of speaker of the Senate. This transition did not bring any improvements in conditions forhuman rights and individual freedoms; if anything, they worsened.
Throughout the year, Gurbanguly remained active in government
leadership, and in January 2023 he was appointed “national leader,”making clear he still controlled the Turkmen government.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■

Redesignate Turkmenistan as a “countryof particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious
violations of religious freedom, as definedby the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing
the administration from taking otherwise
legislatively mandated action as a result of
the designation;■■

Impose targeted sanc tions on Turkmenistan government agencies andofficials responsible for severe violations

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■

Podcast: Turkmenistan’s Tight Grip on Religious Freedom

44 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3of religious freedom by freezing thoseindividuals’ assets and/or barring theirentry into the United States under humanrights related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom
violations; andTake presidential action to limit security
assistance to Turkmenistan under IRFA
Section 405(a)(22) to hold the government of Turkmenistan accountable for its
particularly severe violations of religious
freedom;■

Urge the government of Turkmenistan toprovide an acceptable civilian alternative
to military service.

Turkmenistan is a highly repressive country ruled since 2007 by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who enforces a cult of personality thatproliferates his image in golden monuments and fawning official
coverage. During 2022, the year his son Serdar nominally took overas the country’s president, space for civil society continued to shrink,
most directly affecting women and internet users. Women werebanned from sitting in the front seat of cars and were required toadhere to strict dress codes, though enforcement did weaken during
the year. Internet access and government censorship of information
continued to worsen with the government’s increased curtailing of
VPNs and incredibly slow broadband, earning Turkmenistan’s mobileand fixed broadband speeds a ranking of 177th out of 179 countries
as of January 2023.
Turkmenistan holds the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in theworld, which is vital to its geopolitical relations with Russia, China, Iran,and potentially Europe. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine,
European Union countries have sought new sources of natural gas todecrease their dependence on Russia, including from Turkmenistan.
The majority of the population is Sunni Muslim, at 89 percent,while approximately nine percent of the population is Eastern Orthodox, typically Russian Orthodox or Armenian Apostolic. There aresmall communities of Shi’a Muslims, Roman Catholics, Protestant
Christians, and Baha’is.

Legal Framework for Controlling Religious Activity
Although Turkmenistan’s 2016 religion law asserts that the country is asecular state with religious freedom, it requires all religious activity to
be registered with the state under intrusive criteria, mandates that the
government be informed of all foreign financial support, bans private
religious education and worship, and prohibits the public wearingof religious garb except by clerics. The State Commission on Religious Organizations and Expert Evaluation of Religious Information
Resources (SCROEERIR) oversees all religious activity, including registrations, the appointment of religious leaders, the building of housesof worship, and the import and publication of religious literature.

Registration of Religious Organizations
Turkmen law requires all religious organizations to register with the
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) by sending applications to SCROEERIR tooperate legally. The process is burdensome and designed to allow
for significant government interference in the functioning of religious organizations. The MOJ will register an organization only if
SCROEERIR has endorsed the application and the organization’s goals
or activities do not “contradict Turkmenistan’s constitution,” giving

the government latitude to arbitrarily deny registration applications.
SCROEERIR must approve all individuals appointed as leaders of religious organizations, each of whom under law must have “appropriate
religious education.” In addition, the process requires religious organizations to provide detailed information about founding members,
including names, addresses, and birth dates. Recognized communities
must reregister every three years.
Even if successfully registered, religious organizations enjoy little
legal protection. If a court finds that a religious organization is violating Turkmenistan’s constitution, it may suspend the group’s activities.
The law further provides that MOJ officials may attend any religious
event held by a registered organization and question its leaders about
the organization’s activities. Registered organizations may importreligious literature only with SCROEERIR approval.
Unregistered religious organizations are forbidden from conducting religious activities, producing or disseminating religious
materials, proselytizing, and gathering for religious services, even in
private residences. Reports indicate that registering churches is very
difficult and that Turkmenistan’s Christian minority has been largely
driven underground. Although not technically banned, Jehovah’s
Witnesses have not been granted registration and are therefore
unable to operate legally. Religious activity is forbidden in prisonsand in the military.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States engaged with the government of Turkmenistan
on a variety of issues such as border and regional security programs,
efforts to mitigate climate change, trade, and educational and cultural
exchanges; U.S. foreign assistance served to reinforce these objectives. Turkmenistan also enjoys most-favored-nation trading status.
In September, the commander of the Montana National Guard
traveled to Turkmenistan for talks on reviving the state partnershipprogram facilitating collaborative military trainings between the
United States and Turkmenistan. In November, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu traveled
to Turkmenistan to discuss cooperation on a wide range of bilateraland regional issues.
On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignatedTurkmenistan as a CPC under IRFA but kept in place a waiver ofthe sanctions that should accompany the designation based on the“important national interest of the United States,” as it has done since2014. The waiver effectively neutralizes the consequences of Turkmenistan’s CPC designation, removes any incentive for the government toreform its brutal policies, and lends credence to the regime’s claims
that security concerns warrant its harsh repression of religious freedom.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )45

TURKMENISTAN

BackgroundVIETNAM
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Vietnam worsened.
Authorities intensified their control and persecution of religious
groups—especially unregistered, independent communities,
including Montagnard and Hmong Protestants, Cao Dai followers,
Hoa Hao Buddhists, and Unified Buddhists, as well as other unrecognized movements such as Duong Van Minh and Falun Gong.
Even members of state-controlled religious groups experienced
persecution. During the year, authorities harassed and persecuted
some independent groups, particularly Montagnard Protestants
and Cao Dai, for observing International Human Rights Day andInternational Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence
Based on Religion or Belief. The 2018 Law on Belief and Religion(LBR) remained restrictive, and groups encountered challenges withregistration due to the law’s uneven and inconsistent application
throughout the country, contravening international standards. In
June, the government introduced two repressive draft decrees toimplement the LBR, which, if passed, could further restrict religious
freedom in Vietnam.
USCIRF received many reports of local authorities harassing
members of unregistered Montagnard Protestant groups, disrupting and banning their peaceful religious activities, interrogating
and threatening them with imprisonment, imposing heavy fines,
and coercing them to denounce and leave their denominations andinstead join state-controlled Protestant organizations. During theyear, some unregistered Montagnard Protestant churches in Cu
Mgar district of Dak Lak Province requested guidance from theircommune governments on lawfully conducting religious activities;
they also requested the implementation of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which
Vietnam is a party. In response, authorities detained, interrogated,
fined, and threatened the Montagnards with imprisonment.
There was a significant increase in the number of reported
incidents of local authorities coercing Hmong Christian converts
to publicly renounce their faith, including some who attended
state-controlled Protestant churches. Those who refused tocomply faced threats and physical assaults, hefty fines, dispossession of properties that threaten their livelihood, denial ofimportant identification documents and birth certificates that
render them effectively stateless, and banishment from families
and local Hmong communities.
Meanwhile, harassment of Catholic communities also
increased. In February, officials from Vu Ban, Hoa Binh Province,
disrupted a Mass celebrated by Archbishop Joseph Vu Van Thien of
Hanoi and other priests. The Hanoi Archdiocese delivered a formal
letter of complaint to the provincial government, protesting the
local authorities’ frequent harassment and urging them to respect
the religious freedom of Catholics in that province. Additionally,land disputes between Catholics and local governments persisted.
Working with state-controlled Cao Dai groups, local authorities disrupted and banned home-based independent Cao Dai
religious activities and observance of important rituals, demanding that adherents obtain approval for such activities and join thestate-controlled organization. Authorities in An Giang and Dong
Thap provinces similarly prevented or disrupted home-based religious activities of independent Hoa Hao Buddhists.
Authorities harassed members of the independent Unified
Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV). In December, local authorities in Ngoc Hoi district, Kon Tum Province, destroyed a UBCV
pagoda, reportedly in retaliation against its abbot’s refusal to join
the state-controlled Buddhist church. Moreover, local authorities
threatened to demolish a religious hall built by Khmer-Krom Theravada Buddhists in Loan My Village, Vinh Long Province.
Authorities also continued persecution of other religious
movements—including Doung Van Minh, Falun Gong, Ha Mon,the Jesus Church, Peng Lei Buddhists, the World Mission Society
Church of God, and Yiguandao—characterizing many of them as“false” or “evil” religions and vowing to eradicate them. In May,
the Hanoi Government Committee for Religious Affairs stated thatsuch groups are ineligible for registering religious activities withthe government.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Designate Vietnam as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging insystematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by
the International Religious Freedom Act(IRFA), and enter into a new binding agreement with the government to address
worsening religious freedom conditions;
Engage with the Vietnamese governmentand relevant academic and civil society
stakeholders to encourage amendments

to the 2018 LBR and the two 2022 draft
implementing decrees to conform to international standards, including by making
registration simpler and optional;■

Hold Vietnam accountable for religious
freedom violations as a member of theUnited Nations Human Rights Council(UNHRC) and press Vietnam to allow
relevant United Nations (UN) Special
Procedures unfettered access to the country to monitor and investigate religious

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■Country Update: Religious Freedom in Vietnam in 2021
Factsheet: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution Globally

46 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

freedom and other human rights violations; and■Direct the U.S. Mission in Vietnam to highlight and monitor the conditions of religious
prisoners of conscience and to advocate for
their wellbeing in prison and release.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Support legislative efforts to improve religious freedom in Vietnam, including by
reintroducing the Vietnam Human Rights
Act (H.R.3001).

International Accountability

Vietnam is a religiously diverse country with related demographics
varying greatly across research studies and reports. Religious traditions with a significant presence in the country include Buddhism,
Hoa Hao Buddhism, Cao Dai, Catholicism, and Protestantism. As of
December, the government had officially recognized a total of 16 religions and 43 religious organizations. Many groups, however, refused
to register for fear of persecution or concern over their independence,
which has led state-controlled and independent religious groups tocompete for representation.
Vietnam’s constitution states that citizens “can follow any religion
or follow none” and that “all religions are equal before the law.” The
constitution also mandates respect and protection for freedom ofbelief and religion. However, it allows authorities to restrict humanrights, including religious freedom, for reasons of “national defense,
national security, social order and security, social morality, and community well-being.” Vietnam’s 2018 LBR contains similar provisions
permitting restrictions on the right to religious freedom.

In October, Vietnam was elected to a three-year term (2023–2025) asa member on the UNHRC, despite widespread and deep concerns
over the country’s human rights record. The Unrepresented Nations
and Peoples Organization expressed concern over Vietnam’s UNHRC
candidacy due to the country’s systematic violation of the rights of
its citizens—particularly indigenous peoples—including its religious
freedom violations through enforcement of the LBR. Four prominentinternational human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch andAmnesty International, voiced concerns about the country’s humanrights situation and called on the government to “ensure compliancewith obligations under the ICCPR and other international human rightslaw” in accordance with its pledges. They also called on Vietnam to
invite all UN special procedures and allow them “full and unfetteredaccess to the country” to monitor human rights situations. Also in
October, following that UNHRC election, six UNHRC special rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or
belief and the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples,
sent a Joint Allegation Letter (JAL) to the Vietnamese government
concerning its human rights violations. The JAL raised specific concerns over the LBR’s restrictions on religious freedom that affectedindependent, unregistered religious groups, including Khmer-Krom
Theravada Buddhists.

Legal and Policy Developments
In June, the government introduced two draft decrees to implement the LBR, one of which would replace the current implementing
Decree 162/2017/ND-CP and increase control and suppression ofregistered religious activities. In addition, the punishment decree
would impose harsh administrative punishments—including heavyfines, suspension of religious activities, and forced dissolution ofreligious organizations—on groups for vaguely and broadly defined“violations.” The Vietnamese Communist Party’s Vietnam Fatherland
Front and the Government Committee for Religious Affairs (GCRA)
organized consultation sessions and conferences on the draft decrees.
Experts warned that if passed in their current form, the two decrees
could further restrict religious freedom in Vietnam.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience andPrison Conditions
Conditions for religious prisoners of conscience remained dire in 2022.
For example, renowned religious freedom advocate and Hoa Hao
Buddhist Nguyen Bac Truyen remained in prison, serving an 11-year
sentence while suffering from heart, liver, and other health conditions.
Authorities transferred him to Gia Trung prison in Gia Lai Province,
where he was reportedly subjected to forced labor. Phan Van Thu,
founder of the An Dan Dai Dao Buddhist group, died while serving
a life sentence in prison after reportedly succumbing to an unspecified medical issue in November. In May, court authorities in Dak Lak
Province sentenced Montagnard Protestant Y Wo Nie to four years’
imprisonment for reporting religious persecution to internationalorganizations. Furthermore, despite the government’s announcementin April that it would deliver religious books to 54 prisons, former
prisoners reported that access to religious scriptures—especiallythose in ethnic minority languages—remained severely lacking. They
also reported poor prison conditions and that prison authorities oftenbanned religious practices such as public or group prayers.

Key U.S. Policy
In 2022, officials with the administration of President Joseph R.
Biden, including Secretary of the State Antony J. Blinken and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman, raised Vietnam’s humanrights issues and its international human rights obligations with theirVietnamese counterparts. Marking the International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief
on August 22, the U.S. Embassy and six other Western embassies inVietnam issued a joint statement condemning “continuing acts ofviolence targeting individuals, including those belonging to religious
minorities, on the basis of religion or belief.” The 26th U.S.-Vietnam
Human Rights Dialogue convened in Hanoi in November, during
which U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain raised religious freedom concerns. In May,
Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Representative Chris Smith(R-NJ), and other members of the House of Representatives sent a
letter to President Biden, urging him to raise religious freedom andother human rights concerns with Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham
Minh Chinh during the U.S.-Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Summit.
On November 30, the U.S. Department of State placed Vietnam
on its Special Watch List for severe violations of religious freedom.
While USCIRF has recommended Vietnam’s designation as a CPC
every year since 2002—finding that despite some notable areas of
improvement, “systematic, ongoing, and egregious” violations ofreligious freedom within the meaning of IRFA persist—the State
Department had previously designated it as a CPC only in 2004
and 2005.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R C O U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R C O N C E R N ( C P C )47

VIETNAM

BackgroundALGERIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Algeria remained poor.
Since beginning its campaign to forcibly close Evangelicalchurches in 2017, the Algerian government has failed to show
meaningful commitment to improving religious freedom conditions over the last five years. Government authorities continued
to forcibly close churches and prosecute members of Muslim andnon-Muslim minority communities on charges of blasphemy, proselytization, and unauthorized worship. The Algerian government also
continued to deny several religious minority groups the registration
required to worship collectively, including the Evangelical Protestant Association (EPA) and the Ahmadiyya Muslim community.
Algerian law regulates the manifestation of religion or belief
through several legal mechanisms, including the Algerian Penal
Code and Ordinance 06-03 on the regulation of non-Muslim organizations. Some of these provisions, including laws penalizing
blasphemy, proselytization, and unregistered religious activity—all
subject to imprisonment and fines—are inconsistent with international legal protections for religious freedom.
In 2022, the wali (governor) of Tizi Ouzou commenced proceedings to close at least four churches in that province, bringing
the total number of EPA churches closed by the government to 21.
Civil society members report that the government has encouraged
individual churches to register outside of the EPA umbrella in an
attempt to fracture the growing community.
Authorities arrested the EPA’s top leader, Pastor Salaheddine
Chalah, in November 2021 following the U.S. government’s decision
to add Algeria to its Special Watch List for engaging in severe religious freedom violations. Other EPA leaders reportedly experienced
harassment at the same time, including surveillance and property
searches by government officials. In March, a court in Tizi Ouzou
convicted Chalah of “practicing worship without the prior (approval)of the National Commission for non-Muslim worship” and “callingthrough social media for the disobedience of laws by a clergyman,”sentencing him to 18 months in prison and a fine of $1,400 (200,00
dinars). The government charged Chalah as a “clergyman” while atthe same time refusing to register the EPA as a religious organization, reflecting a biased government double standard specificallyagainst the EPA.
Authorities sentenced Mohamed Derrab, a Christian convert, to
18 months in prison for proselytization while continuing to prosecute
Pastor Hamid Boussadi on charges of proselytization and holding
worship without permission. In September, the Algerian government requested that Caritas, a nongovernmental development
organization affiliated with the Catholic Church, cease operating in
the country, reportedly due to its purported foreign influences. In acontext where the government has a history of undermining religious
freedom and then justifying it as protecting against foreign influence,
this development raises red flags for the future.
Several Muslims remain detained on charges of blasphemy,
including political opposition members Yacine Mebarki and Walid
Kechida and scholar Dr. Said Djabelkhir. According to local media
reports, at least one additional unnamed Muslim individual faced
blasphemy charges in 2022. In June, a tribunal in Bejaia charged
18 Ahmadiyya Muslims with blasphemy and unauthorized group
participation, detaining three members of the group. The judge
ordered the immediate detention of three members and released
the others pending further investigation. In December, Abdul Ghani
became the sixth Ahmadiyya Muslim to be sentenced to a multiyear
prison sentence, with the judge accusing the Ahmadiyya Muslim
community of being a “threat to national security” and a threat toAlgeria’s traditional Maliki school of thought. Advocates estimatethat over 100 Ahmadis are facing prosecution, most of them for“unauthorized worship” in the context of the religious group’s
unregistered status.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

detained on charges of blasphemy andproselytization;

Maintain Algeria on the Special Watch Listfor engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);Enter into an agreement with the Algerian
government and provide associated financial and technical support to obligate theAlgerian government to take substantial
steps to address violations of religious
freedom, including but not limited to:■D e c r i m i n a lizi n g b l a s p h e my a n dproselytization and releasing those

■

■

■

Registering the EPA and the Ahmadiyya
community as non-Muslim and Muslim
religious organizations, respectively;
Reopening closed and sealed churches
and working in good faith with EPA
members to address remaining healthand safety code violations; andDirect U.S. Embassy officials to attend andobserve court proceedings on blasphemy

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■

48

Factsheet: Law and Religion in Algeria
Podcast: The State of Religious Freedom in Algeria

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

charges or cases related to houses of worship to emphasize the U.S. government’s
concerns about such cases.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Continue to raise the implementation of
blasphemy laws and closure of housesof worship with the U.S. Department ofState and relevant Algerian counterparts
to ensure religious freedom concerns areincorporated into the U.S.-Algeria bilateralrelationship.

Algeria is home to nearly 43 million people, 99 percent of whomare estimated to be Sunni Muslim. The remaining one percent of
the population comprises Jews, nonbelievers, Muslim minorities(including Ahmadiyya and Shi’a Muslims), and Christians (including
Roman Catholics, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Evangelicals,
Lutherans, the Reformed Church, and Egyptian Coptic Christians).
Algeria’s constitution establishes Islam as the official state religion.
Algeria has a long history of repression and persecution of religious minorities, including against Jews, people who practice the
Baha’i faith, Protestant Christians, and Ahmadiyya Muslims. Despite
Algeria’s constitution affording all Algerians the right to freedom of
opinion and worship, the Algerian government limits the free expression and practice of belief through the enforcement of laws that favora particular interpretation of Islam and restrict religious activities.
Algeria’s penal and information codes criminalize blasphemy, withpunishments including imprisonment for up to five years and fines.
Algeria’s Criminal Code also censors publications by prohibiting content that is “contrary to Islamic morals.”Through Ordinance 06-03, passed in 2006, the Algerian government requires all non-Muslim organizations to register with the
Minister for Non-Muslim Affairs in order to conduct activities andestablish places of worship. The process for registration has been
opaque and poorly implemented, creating legal uncertainty for somenon-Muslim religious communities, which the government exploits
to repress and prosecute religious minorities. Ordinance 06-03 also
criminalizes proselytization by non-Muslims, with punishments of up to
five years in prison and a maximum fine of $8,347 (one million dinars).

Restrictions on Christians
Authorities convicted the EPA’s top leader, Pastor Salaheddine Chalah,
and three other parishioners of “practicing worship without the prioropinion (or approval) of the National Commission for non-Muslim Worship.” The three parishioners were sentenced to six months in prison,
while Pastor Chalah, who was also convicted of “calling through social
media for the disobedience of laws by a clergyman,” was sentenced
to 18 months in prison. Other EPA leaders reported increased harassment in late 2021 and early 2022.
A court in Tizi Ouzou sentenced Christian convert Mohamed
Derrab to 18 months in prison for “shaking the faith of a Muslim.”
Derrab was preaching and distributing Bibles outside of his church in
Tizi Ouzou following its closure by authorities. The government also
continued to prosecute Pastor Hamid Boussadi for holding unauthorized worship services and proselytizing.

Restrictions on Muslims
Several Muslims remain detained on charges of blasphemy, including
political opposition members Yacine Mebarki and Walid Kechidaand scholar Dr. Said Djabelkhir. Authorities arrested Mebarki in 2020
for “inciting atheism” and “offending Islam” after finding a ripped
Qur’an in his home. In 2021, authorities sentenced opposition activist
Kechida to three years in prison with charges including “offending theprecepts” of Islam in internet memes. In 2021, authorities arrested
scholar and Sufism expert Djabelkhir and charged him with blasphemy
after a fellow academic filed a complaint about his writings on various
Islamic rituals. Local media reports indicate that at least one unnamed
Muslim individual has been arrested on charges of blasphemy in 2022.|
On June 6, 2022, the First Instance Tribunal in Bejaia charged 18
Ahmadiyya Muslims with “participation in an unauthorized group”
and “denigrating Islam” under Article 46 of the Law on Associations
and Article 144 of the Algerian Penal Code, respectively. The judge
ordered the immediate detention of three members and released
the others pending further investigation. Advocates estimate thatover 100 Ahmadis are facing prosecution, mostly for “unauthorized
worship” in the context of their unregistered status.

Targeting Religious Actors Perceived as Foreign
The Algerian government has historically targeted religious leadersand communities it views as foreign, sometimes threatening religious
freedom rights in the process. Officials prosecute individuals associated with “foreign movements” with blasphemy charges to overridea lack of evidence or extend prison sentences.
On December 26, an Algerian court sentenced Ahmadiyya Muslim Abdul Ghani to three years in prison and a fine of $1,500 (200,000
dinars). In his verdict, the judge accused the Ahmadiyya Muslim community of being a “threat to national security,” an entity “working forforeign interests,” and a threat to Algeria’s traditional Maliki schoolof thought.
In 2022, the Algerian government requested that Caritas, a nongovernmental development organization affiliated with the Catholic
Church, cease operating in the country. Analysts posit that Caritas’supposed foreign ties influenced the government’s decision. Whilemembers of the Catholic community still worship and practice theirreligion in Algeria, some religious minorities expressed concern thatthe government’s targeting of Caritas may precede further restrictions
against religious minorities viewed as outsiders.

Key U.S. Policy
On November 30, the State Department maintained Algeria on its
Special Watch List for severe violations of religious freedom. Several
high-profile U.S. officials visited Algeria in 2022, including Secretary ofState Antony J. Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman,
and an interagency delegation that included officials from the State
Department, Department of Defense, and National Security Council.
Topics for discussion included human rights and religious freedom
concerns as well as stabilization and development assistance.
The United States is one of Algeria’s top trading partners, andprofessional exchanges play a valuable role in strengthening the
U.S.-Algeria law enforcement and security partnership at both thesenior and working levels. The Middle East Partnership Initiative has
supported the work of Algeria’s civil society through programmingthat provides training to journalists, businesspeople, female entrepreneurs and parliamentarians, legal professionals, and the heads ofleading nongovernmental organizations.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R S P E C I A L W AT C H L I S T

49

ALGERIA

BackgroundAZERBAIJANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Azerbaijan trended negatively. The government continued to exert significant control
over all religious practice, primarily through enforcement of thecountry’s law On Freedom of Religious Beliefs (religion law). The
religion law requires religious communities to register to legallyengage in religious activity, requires state review and approvalof religious literature and related materials, and places numerous
other limitations on freedom of religion or belief. In March, President Ilham Aliyev signed into law amendments to the religion law
that reassigned the power to appoint imams from the nominallyindependent Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) to the official State
Committee for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA), further
entrenching state control over the practice of Islam. In May, the
SCWRA fired Shi’a imam Mirseymur Aliyev after he reportedly held
Ramadan prayers on a different day than mandated by the state.
That same month, the CMB announced the imposition of an age
restriction that barred citizens over the age of 65 from performing
the Hajj. Authorities also raided, seized religious literature from, andfined about 20 Muslims across the country who met for worship inprivate homes or held religious events with children.
While religious minorities have generally noted positive
strides for religious freedom in Baku, others have shared that
local authorities outside of the capital have surveilled Christians.
During the year, the government failed yet again to register any
non-Muslim religious communities, leaving some communities
of Protestant Christians and Jehovah’s Witnesses without registration and therefore unable to operate legally. Meanwhile, the
SCWRA disclosed registering approximately 22 Muslim communities. Officials continued to reject requests for a civilian alternative
to mandatory military service despite the allowance of such an
option in the constitution. In a reversal of recent practice, Azerbaijan resumed detaining Jehovah’s Witnesses who sought toconscientiously object. In July, conscription authorities detained
Royal Karimov and held him for more than three months. In September, a local court sentenced Seymur Mammadov to ninemonths in prison for his refusal to serve in the military before
converting that punishment in December to a one-year suspended sentence.
Azerbaijani nongovernmental organizations tracking politicalprisoners in the country documented as many as 19 individuals
imprisoned at the end of the year for their religious activism, themajority of whom are members of the Muslim Unity Movement(MUM). Throughout the year, law enforcement regularly detained
additional members of the MUM, which the group characterized
as a “provocation and pressure against the movement.” In June,
MUM member Elgiz Mammadov alleged that he was raped whilein police custody. In a positive development, a court granted early
release to Muslim theologian Elshan Mustafaoglu, who had served
seven and a half years of his 10-year prison sentence.
International bodies and other organizations continued toquestion the Azerbaijani government’s willingness to protect andpreserve religious and cultural heritage sites in Nagorno-Karabakh
and neighboring territories under Azerbaijani control. In February,
then Minister of Culture Anar Karimov announced the creation ofa working group to remove Armenian Apostolic inscriptions fromchurches that he characterized as “fictitious.” The government
seemingly backpedaled on the plan following international outcry,
and in March the European Parliament condemned “Azerbaijan’s
continued policy of erasing and denying the Armenian cultural
heritage in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.” During the reporting
period, Caucasus Heritage Watch, a research initiative supported
by Cornell University, documented through satellite imagery thedestruction of St. Sargis Church. In past years, Azerbaijan has
claimed that Armenian forces also damaged religious sites.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Azerbaijan on the Special Watch
List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);Work with the government of Azerbaijan
to revise the 2009 religion law, as mostrecently amended in 2022, to comply withinternational human rights standards andto bring it into conformity with recommendations made in 2012 by the Councilof Europe’s Venice Commission and theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe;■■

Assist the Azerbaijani government, in collaboration with international partners, todevelop an alternative civilian service andpermit conscientious objection in line with
its constitution and pursuant to its commitment made to the Council of Europe
and obligations under international humanrights law; andAllocate funding to the U.S. Agency
for International Development andU.S. Embassy in Baku to restore, preserve, and protect places of worshipand other religious or cultural sites in

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■

50Special Report: Tolerance, Religious Freedom, and Authoritarianism
Podcast: Differences between Religious Tolerance and Religious Freedom

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding
territories.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise concerns, through public hearingsand other actions, about Azerbaijan’s
religious freedom and broader humanrights abuses, including treatment of
the MUM, directly with the Azerbaijani
Embassy and other government officials
and advocate for the release of all prisoners of conscience.

Detention of MUM Members

The U.S. government estimates the population of Azerbaijan at morethan 10.3 million people, of whom approximately 96 percent identify
as Muslim. According to Azerbaijani government statistics, as manyas 65 percent of Muslims identify as Shi’a, while the remaining 35
percent identify as Sunni. The remaining four percent of the population comprises atheists, Armenian Apostolics, Baha’is, Catholics,
Georgian Orthodox, members of the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Molokans, Protestants,
and Russian Orthodox. The constitution defines the state as secularand mandates the separation of religion and state. Despite these provisions, however, the government is actively involved in the regulationand management of virtually all religious activities. In general, thegovernment remained concerned about the potential for “religious
strife” in the country and undertook efforts to continue to limit independent religious activism and activities in 2022.

The government increasingly cracked down on the MUM, a Shi’aMuslim group that has criticized the state’s control of religion. In May,a court sentenced MUM member Razi Humbatov to six years in prison
on drug trafficking charges that the group asserted were fabricatedto punish him for his public criticism of authorities. During the courseof Humbatov’s trial, police detained five additional MUM members
who came to the courthouse to protest, some of whom received 30
days of administrative detention and claimed that the police beat andtortured them. In June, police detained MUM member Fariz Aliyev
after he protested in support of MUM leader Taleh Bagirzade andother religious prisoners. Throughout the year, police also detained
MUM members Elshan Abbasov, Shahin Gadirov, Nejat Aliyev, Samir
Babayev, and Mirtofiq Huseynov on alleged drug-related charges. In
two separate instances in June and November, Bagirzade and otherimprisoned MUM members participated in a hunger strike to protest
ongoing and regular police abuse, including allegations of tortureand religious insults.

Legislating Increased Control of Muslims
At the beginning of the year, Azerbaijan’s parliament introduced aproposal to amend the country’s religion law and reduce the role of
the CMB, an entity that has historically overseen the practice of Islamin the country. The government formally adopted the amendments
in March, which removed the ability of the CMB to appoint imams tomosques and shrines and assigned that authority instead to an official state body, the SCWRA. A member of parliament explained thechange as a measure to ensure that imams have a “pro-state position,”
although other politicians objected to the move on the grounds thatit violated the constitution. Similarly, the government eliminated theright of the CMB to register mosques and permitted state oversightof donations to religious associations.

Retaliation for Conscientious Objection
Although the constitution provides for an alternative to mandatory
military service, the government did not offer one in practice andretaliated against conscientious objectors who requested an alternative civilian service due to their religious beliefs. In July, authorities
detained Jehovah’s Witness Royal Karimov after he disclosed his
conscientious objection; they held him against his will at a local military
unit for more than three months before releasing him in November.
In September, the Goranboy District Court sentenced Jehovah’s
Witness Seymur Mammadov to nine months in prison for his conscientious objection. Following Mammadov’s appeal of the verdict, thecourt ruled to suspend his sentence and subsequently released him
in mid-December. According to Mammadov, he was not permitted
to have a Bible while in prison. Other Jehovah’s Witnesses remained
subject to travel restrictions due to their conscientious objection.

Key U.S. Policy
In 2022, the United States and Azerbaijan marked 30 years of diplomatic relations that have largely prioritized cooperation on European
energy security, bilateral trade and investment, and efforts to combat
terrorism and transnational threats. The U.S. government regularly
engaged with Azerbaijani counterparts to underscore the importanceof ongoing peace negotiations with Armenia and to urge an end to
military hostilities. In June, Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried traveled to Azerbaijan, where
she highlighted U.S. support for fundamental freedoms and met with
Azerbaijani civil society.
The U.S. Department of State continued to raise religious freedom concerns directly with Azerbaijani officials. In May, Ambassador
at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain met withthen Minister of Culture Anar Karimov and discussed “best practices
for preserving the country’s beautifully diverse religious and cultural
heritage.” In June, Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Dickerson met
with officials from the SCWRA. In November and December, theSenate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee respectively held hearings on U.S. policy in the Caucasus thatinvolved significant discussion of Azerbaijan.
On December 9, the State Department designated Kerim Heydar Alimardanov, an official in the Main Department for Combating
Organized Crime in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, pursuant to Section 7031(c) for “his involvement in a gross violation of human rights,
namely torture of detainees in 2015 and 2016.” Alimardanov was
reportedly involved in the 2015 Nardaran case that led to the arrest,
alleged torture, and sentencing to prison of many MUM members.

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AZERBAIJAN

BackgroundCENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

In 2022, religious freedom conditions in the Central African
Republic (CAR) remained poor. Armed group violence, which
resumed in early 2020 after a brief respite, led to the politicization of religious identity in several localities and resulted inviolence based on religious or ethnoreligious affiliation. Previous
years’ trends of state-backed fighters targeting Muslim civilians
with violence, torture, and extrajudicial detention continued. In
at least one instance, fighters defending Muslim communities
targeted Christian civilians in retaliation for state-backed abuses
against Muslims.
The CAR government continued to collaborate with nonstatearmed actors, including the Wagner Group—a military contractor
with ties to the Russian government—and local vigilante fighters,
despite trends of these actors targeting religious minorities andcommitting human rights abuses. Furthermore, the CAR government made efforts to shield these partners from accountability forabuses, inhibiting multilateral efforts to investigate allegations ofreligious targeting and human rights violations.
From September 2021 to February 2022, national defense
forces and other security personnel recruited approximately 600
fighters from local vigilante groups in Basse-Kotto and Ouaka
Prefectures to fight against rebel groups. Elements from theformer Christian and animist-affiliated anti-balaka armed groups
committed abuses, mainly against Muslim communities. In May,
national defense forces arrested and tortured three Fulani Muslim

youths in Bokolobo, Ouaka Prefecture, killing one of them. The
Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (Union for Peace in Central
African Republic), a local rebel group in the area, vowed retaliationand subsequently attacked a national defense forces checkpoint
in Bokolobo, Ouaka Prefecture, killing two soldiers, six anti-balaka
combatants, and five civilians from the Christian community. On
the following day in the same area, presumed national defense
forces and anti-balaka combatants carried out a reprisal attack on
a Muslim community, killing nine civilians.
Muslim Central Africans also continue to face discriminationand displacement. Government authorities charge Muslims higher
fees and fines than non-Muslims for the same services or penalties.
Analysts familiar with the situation on the ground assess that Muslims are disproportionately represented among CAR’s displaced
population and have struggled to return safely to their areas oforigin due to continued intimidation and lack of support.
The Special Criminal Court (SCC) tried its first cases against
armed group leaders responsible for crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and severe violence and made several other prominent arrests. However, executive authorities continued trends ofundermining justice mechanisms and constitutional power in 2022.
President Faustin-Archange Touadera forcibly removed the Constitutional Court's presiding judge, who had spoken out against theillegality of Touadera's efforts to change the constitution to allow
himself to run for a third presidential term.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Maintain CAR on the Special Watch List forengaging in or tolerating severe violationsof religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Provide financial, administrative, anddiplomatic support to the SCC and otherinvestigations into ethnoreligious targeting and other human rights abusesby state actors or state-backed foreign

fighters in CAR, and urge the CAR government to cease all obstructions to suchinvestigations;■

Impose targeted sanctions on CAR government agencies and officials and otherrelevant foreign actors responsible forsevere violations of religious freedom byfreezing those individuals’ assets and/or
barring their entry into the United States

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■

52

Factsheet: Religious Freedom Concerns in Central Africa
Podcast: Religious Freedom Backslides in Central African Republic

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

under human rights related financial andvisa authorities, citing specific religious
freedom violations; and■Continue to allocate funding for humanitarian assistance, including for refugees,
internally displaced persons (IDPs), andreturnees as well as funding programs torebuild mosques destroyed during thecivil conflict.

Justice Progress and Setbacks

CAR’s constitution provides for freedom of religion or belief and equal
protection under the law, regardless of religion. Approximately 89
percent of CAR’s population identify as Christian, nine percent identify
as Muslim, one percent practice folk religions, and one percent are
religiously unaffiliated.
In 2012, predominantly Muslim militias in CAR’s north mobilized
and marched on the capital in response to longstanding grievanceswith the government’s marginalization of and discrimination against
Muslim minorities. In response, militias from predominantly Christianand folk religion-practicing communities mobilized for self-protection
and began retaliating against Muslim civilian communities. This triggered more than half a decade of political and ethnoreligious violence,
including attacks on individuals based on their religious identity anddeliberate attacks on houses of worship and religious enclaves incities across CAR. Muslim communities bore the brunt of the conflict,with violence displacing an estimated 80 percent of CAR’s Muslim
population in the first two years.
In 2019 and 2020, instances of religious violence decreased
following a political agreement and increased CAR government
cooperation with the Wagner Group. However, following contested
elections at the end of 2020 and the remobilization of a united rebel
militia, state-sponsored abuses against Muslims have been on the rise.

Strong justice mechanisms are crucial to achieving justice for victims of
religious violence in CAR and deterring future violations. In particular,
the SCC, a hybrid court established to investigate and prosecute serious international crimes committed since 2003, began hearing casesin 2022. Its first case resulted in the conviction of three members ofrebel militia 3R for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and severe
violence against civilians. The SCC also arrested two former Central
African Armed Forces members and one ex-Séléka militia general in
2022 on charges of crimes against humanity.
Yet, SCC trials and other justice efforts have been under threat
from other parts of the CAR government. Last year, national security
forces prevented the SCC from accessing former armed group leader
Hassan Bouba Ali for his scheduled appearance and released him incontravention of the SCC’s warrant. In 2022, the CAR government
obstructed UN efforts to investigate religious targeting and otherhuman rights abuses.
President Touadera also sought in 2022 to undermine othergovernment institutions and the constitution. In May, Touadera proposed reforms to eliminate term limits, and in August he established
a commission to revise the constitution. When the independent
Constitutional Court declared those efforts unconstitutional andannulled the commission, Touadera requested the Constitutional
Court’s head jurist, Daniele Darlan, to retire, which she refused to
do. Touadera then forcibly dismissed Darlan by decree, which many
considered unconstitutional, and appointed Jean Pierre Waboé as
the new head of the Constitutional Court.
Given that security forces under executive control in CAR haveshown bias against religious minorities, the independence of judicial
institutions is critical to ensuring accountability for abuses by government actors. Recent government efforts undermine the constitution
and erode the independence of the judiciary, threatening mechanisms
designed to provide justice for human rights abuses and religious
freedom violations.

Politicization of Religion by Armed Actors
In several regions of CAR, ethnicity and religion are so strongly linked
that violence based on ethnoreligious identity poses a risk to religious
freedom. Since the resumption of fighting in December 2020, theUnited Nations (UN) secretary general has found that targeted arrestsof alleged rebel collaborators “disproportionately affected religious
and ethnic minorities.” A joint human rights investigation reported anotable “increase in targeted attacks against the civilian population,
especially Muslims” and found that CAR authorities used a stateof emergency to commit abuses that “specifically targeted certain
communities (Muslims and Peuhl).”
The CAR government has also tolerated religious freedom violations by both foreign and domestic proxy fighters it enlists to help
achieve military objectives. In Ouaka prefecture, the CAR government recruited fighters from former Christian- and animist-affiliatedanti-balaka militias that reportedly targeted Muslim communities
on the basis of religion in their campaign to eliminate rebel militias.
These vigilante fighters also carried out a reprisal attack on a Muslim
community in Bokolobo after rebel fighters in the area attacked their
checkpoint in May.
Relying on foreign and proxy fighters complicates the CAR government’s involvement in the violations they commit, but it does not
absolve the government of complicity or responsibility. CAR authorities have acted to protect both Wagner and anti-balaka elements
operating on the government’s behalf from accountability for religious
violence and human rights abuses.

Key U.S. Policy
In 2022, the United States pledged $48 million in emergency humanitarian assistance to CAR in addition to the $140 million alreadyallocated. The U.S. government remains a main source of financial
support to the SCC.
In October, the spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in Bangui,
CAR, publicly expressed concern regarding political developments inthe country after Touadera’s administration removed the president of
the Constitutional Court. A delegation from CAR attended the Joseph
R. Biden administration’s U.S-Africa Leaders Summit in December.
On November 30, recognizing escalating state abuses against
Muslim communities in CAR, the U.S. Department of State placed CAR
on its Special Watchlist for the first time for engaging in or tolerating
severe violations of religious freedom. The U.S. government also
designated the Wagner Group, a military contractor closely linked
with the Russian government, as an Entity of Particular Concern forengaging in particularly severe religious freedom violations in CAR in
2021, including attacks on mosques and disappearing Muslim leaders.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BackgroundEGYPT
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Egypt generally trended
consistent with 2021. The government continued to make overtures toward religious minority communities and to promotereligious tolerance. For example, under President Abdel Fattah
El-Sisi, the government appointed the first-ever Christian judge
to the Supreme Constitutional Court in February. Egypt also continued its cultural heritage preservation program, announcing
the restoration of more historic synagogues. In May, authorities
convicted and sentenced the “extremist Islamist” murderer of a
Coptic Orthodox priest. The government also continued reviewing
and approving Christians’ applications to register their worshipsites as churches.
However, restrictions on new church construction and the slow
pace of approvals for the backlog of legalization applications filed
since the Church Construction Law of 2016 have forced many congregations to assemble in structurally unsafe buildings not intended
for communal worship. In August, the government attributed aseries of deadly fires at several Coptic Orthodox churches to faulty
electrical setups and other structural deficiencies, which humanrights organizations identified as a result of systemic discrimination
against Copts. Rights organizations have also noted that the 2016
legislation is inherently discriminatory in continuing to subject
churches to requirements and approval processes that do not apply
to Sunni mosques. The 2016 law also offers no legalization process
for the houses of worship of Ahmadiyya Muslims, Baha’is, Shi’a Muslims, and other religious groups. In addition, even after successfully
registering, some churches continued to face threats. In June, thegovernment’s approval of the license for Luxor’s Archangel Michael
Church prompted some Islamist residents of that and other villages
to riot and set fire to Copts’ personal property.
State security and prosecutors continued to invoke theblasphemy statute and other laws to arrest, detain, convict, andsentence Egyptians from a diverse range of religious backgrounds.
Reports of individual violent assaults against Copts increased, withseveral attacks unfolding in April during the seasons of Christian
Easter and Muslim Ramadan. This included crimes such as the fatal
stabbing of Father Arsanios Wadid and the deadly shooting ofRani Ra’fat by six men, one of whom posted social media videos
confirming a militant Islamist motivation for the murder. In July,another assailant stabbed the father and son owners of a shop in
Giza that sold alcohol—a practice associated with non-Muslims.
Coptic women suffered both anti-Christian and female-targetedabuse, such as the suspected kidnapping and potential forced
conversion to Islam of Mariam Waheeb and a male pharmacist’s
physical assault of Naveen Sobhi for appearing in non-Islamic dress
during the Muslim holy days of Ramadan. The latter case is notable
for the police’s pressuring of the victim to agree to adjudication bya local, nonjudicial “reconciliation” session, which doubly victimizes
Copts and other minorities by forcing them to reconcile with their
attacker, commonly resulting in lenient punishments for assailants.
In February, Egypt’s child-fostering laws and practices attracted
scrutiny when authorities removed a four-year-old boy from his
Coptic Orthodox adoptive family and placed him in an orphanage
upon discovering his origins as an unidentified infant that a priest
had found in the local church. Although prosecutors reportedly
invoked laws presuming the Muslim identity of unknown children, in
December, Egypt’s National Council for Human Rights asserted theillegality of the child’s transfer to the orphanage, urging the government to return him to his would-be adoptive parents. Personal
status laws regulating family matters such as marriage, divorce, andinheritance also disproportionately burden religious minorities,
especially women. In December, President El-Sisi encouraged “allsegments of society” to participate in dialogue surrounding draft
amendments to these laws.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■■

Include Egypt on the Special Watch Listfor engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Conduct a comprehensive review of all U.S.
assistance to Egypt and continue to withhold a portion of Foreign Military Financing(FMF) for specified international religious
freedom violations along with broader
human rights concerns; andIncorporate religious freedom concerns
into U.S.-Egypt bilateral engagement byencouraging Egypt to: 1) ensure equal
protection of all religious communities,
including through phasing out customaryreconciliation councils to resolve incidents
of violence against religious minorities andproposing universal “houses of worship”
legislation that treats identically the construction, repair, and registration of housesof worship of all religions; 2) repeal Article
98(f) of the Criminal Code, which penalizes“ridiculing or insulting a heavenly religion
or a sect following it,” and until that isaccomplished limit the conditions underwhich the law is applied and allow charged
individuals to post bail; and 3) lift all travelbans and asset freezes on released religious prisoners of conscience and establish
independent oversight and appeals mechanisms for travel bans.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise religious freedom issues throughhearings, meetings, letters, congressionaldelegation trips abroad, or other actions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESSpecial Report: Assessing Religious Freedom in Egyptian Curriculum Reform
Event: Assessing Religious Freedom in Egyptian Curriculum Reform■ Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes Egypt’s Release of Coptic Activist Ramy Kamel■ Press Statement: USCIRF Commends Release of Egyptian Religious Prisoner Reda Abdel Rahman■■

54

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

Article 2 of Egypt’s constitution identifies Islam as the state religion
and the “principles of Shari’a” as the primary source of legislation.
Article 64 provides for “absolute” freedom of belief, although only
adherents of “heavenly religions” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism)
may practice their religion publicly and build places of worship. Bansfrom 1960 remain in effect on Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baha’is.
Egypt’s population is approximately 107.7 million, an estimated90 percent of whom are Sunni Muslims. Non-Sunni Muslims such as
Shi’a comprise less than one percent. At an estimated 10 percent
or more, Egypt’s indigenous Copts constitute the largest Christian minority in the Middle East and North Africa. Christian leaders
estimate over 90 percent of Copts belong to the traditional Coptic
Orthodox Church, with Coptic Catholics, Coptic Evangelical Protestants, and other small denominations comprising the remainder. There
are reportedly up to 2,000 Baha’is, approximately 1,500 Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and fewer than 10 Jews in Egypt.

State Targeting of Religious Identity,
Expression, and Activism
The Egyptian criminal justice system remained the locus of systematicand ongoing religious freedom violations. In January and February,
authorities released from long-term detention religious prisoners ofconscience Ramy Kamel, a Copt, and Reda Abdel Rahman, a Qur’anist
Muslim. Both Abdel Rahman and Patrick Zaki—a Coptic human rights
researcher released at the end of 2021—remain under travel bans.
Throughout 2022, Zaki also endured numerous adjournments of histrial for the charge of “spreading false news” via the publication of
an online testimonial discussing anti-Coptic discrimination. In June,
Al-Mataria prosecutors wielded the same charge to detain Coptic
attorney Hani Farouk Gibran—later releasing him—for posting messages on social media such as, “No to attacks on churches in Egypt,burning homes and kidnapping girls.”
Egypt continues to enforce Law 98(f) of Egypt’s Penal Code,a blasphemy statute that bans “insulting the heavenly religions.”
In September, an appeals court in Cairo upheld a five-year prison
sentence against Marco Girgis, a Copt, on charges including breachof 98(f) and “exploiting religion in promoting extremist ideas, contempt of Islam, and transgression of the values of the Egyptianfamily” for allegedly sharing sexually explicit digital material. In
June, United Nations human rights experts expressed concern
over the detention and potential deportation of Abdulbaqi Saeed
Abdo, a Yemeni asylum seeker and convert to Christianity accusedof “contempt of Islam.”
Egyptians of Sunni Muslim backgrounds also faced government
harassment and detention. In February, the Court of Cassation rejected
the appeal of imprisoned blogger Anas Hassan, arrested in 2019 foradministering an “Egyptian Atheists” page on Facebook and charged

with violation of 98(f) and information technology laws. Also that month,
the public prosecutor stated it would order “investigative measures”
against journalist and television presenter Ibrahim Issa for his publicstatements questioning a miracle connected to the Prophet Muhammad. In August, the Heliopolis Misdemeanors Court announced thetrial of another television personality, Islamic preacher and Al-Azhar
instructor Mabrouk Attia, for on-air jokes about Jesus Christ following
a lawyer’s filing of a criminal complaint that the statements showed
contempt for both Christianity and Islam.
Authorities also arrested or detained individuals related to mob
protests and attacks on Christian churches; however, several suchdetainees were members of targeted church communities. In January,
security officials arrested nine Copts for online videos showcasing theirpeaceful protest of the government’s failure to permit the rebuildingof the fire-ravaged St. Joseph and Abu Seifein Church in Samalout.
Charges included “participating in a demonstration threatening public
safety and committing a terrorist act.” They were released in April,
the same month the government relaunched its Presidential Pardon
Committee, possibly in advance of the 27th Conference of the Parties,
or COP27 climate summit, which Egypt hosted in November.

Educational Curriculum Reforms
The government of Egypt implemented some religious tolerance
reforms to the national primary and secondary school educational
curricula consistent with its 2021 National Human Rights Strategy.
However, a USCIRF assessment found that despite slight improvements, religionization of the curriculum remained endemic. Subjects
such as Arabic Language and Social Studies advanced government-endorsed versions of Sunni Islam while underrepresenting, excluding,or negatively characterizing—for example, using antisemitic rhetoric
toward—religious minorities such as non-Sunni Muslims, Christians,
and Jews.

Key U.S. Policy
The U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership assumed an even higher profile
throughout the year in advance of the COP27. Despite Egypt’s robust
efforts to rehabilitate international perceptions of the country’s humanrights violations, the administration of President Joseph R. Biden andthe U.S. Congress took measures to communicate concerns overEgypt’s human rights record. As in 2021, Congress conditioned up to$300 million of the $1.3 billion annual FMF aid package to Egypt onhuman rights improvements. However, in September, the administration chose to withhold only $130 million. In approving the other $170
million, the United States noted part of the grant was due to President
El-Sisi’s release of 500 political prisoners out of the total of more than
60,000 in detention. The withheld aid accounted for 10 percent of theUnited States’ total annual allocation to Egypt.

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EGYPT

BackgroundINDONESIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, Indonesia’s religious freedom conditions remained poor,
as in the prior year. The country maintains several regulations
that either constitute blasphemy laws or effectively function as
such: Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965, Criminal Code Article
156(a), and Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Transaction (known as the ITE law) Articles 27(3) and 28(2). Indonesia
also maintains a 2006 joint regulation on houses of worship that
local authorities often exploit to hinder religious communities’
right to build and maintain houses of worship. Minority religious
leaders throughout Indonesia report that this regulation enables
corruption, emboldening local Islamic religious leaders and/or
political officials to coerce bribes from religious communities toobtain permission to proceed with construction. In addition, minorities’ houses of worship—especially for groups that are officiallyunrecognized—are especially vulnerable to attacks and lack theprotections afforded to majority-affiliated religious sites in law orin practice. For example, in early January, Pontianak District Court
sentenced 21 men to only four and a half months in prison for ransacking and burning an Ahmadiyya mosque in West Kalimantan theprior year but released them a mere 16 days later.
Indonesia recognizes six official religions, excluding the lessthan 0.5 percent of the population who practice traditional orindigenous faiths, including forms of animism or syncretic versions of religions. In 2016, followers of traditional faiths appealed
to the Constitutional Court against the 2013 Civil Administrative
Law, which codified discriminatory regulations such as forcing
members of indigenous groups to leave the religion sectionof their national identification cards blank. Despite the Constitutional Court ruling in favor of traditional faith communities,
members still reported discrimination in accessing public services
such as education.

In December, the Indonesian Parliament passed a new criminal
code that reinforces the criminalization of blasphemy, further undermining religious freedom. Article 300 broadens the sorts of acts,
speech, or outcomes to which the blasphemy prohibition applies andexpands enforcement to include fines and up to three years in prison.
Article 302 criminalizes “inciting” someone to leave their faith—an
offense that carries a punishment of up to two years’ imprisonment.
The law replaced the Dutch colonial-era code and will gradually takeeffect over a period of up to three years. This legal development
coincided with a general backsliding of democratic norms as well as
growing political and societal influence from conservative Islamist
organizations, such as the quasi-governmental Indonesia Ulema
Council (MUI), that seek to impose their religious interpretations
on others. The MUI responded to public criticism of provisions in
the then draft criminal code that incorporated the MUI’s preferredreligious views on issues of sexual morality by insisting that all six ofIndonesia’s officially recognized religions condemn the lesbian, gay,bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) community andtherefore the government should not protect its members.
The enshrinement of a particular interpretation of Islam into
Indonesian law that is binding on all people regardless of theirreligious beliefs coincides with the government’s increased levelof international cooperation to combat religiously based violent
extremism, which remained a persistent concern. The country’s
counterterrorism force, known as Densus 88, continued to pursue radical Islamist groups believed responsible for killing several
Christian farmers in Sulawesi the prior year. In September, Densus
88 pursued and killed a group of radical Islamist militants in thatarea, and in December, the National Police arrested 24 suspected
terrorists in connection with a suicide bombing that targeted apolice precinct in Astanaanyar, West Java.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Indonesia on the Special Watch Listfor engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);Work with the Indonesian government to:■■Amend the criminal code to comply withinternational human rights standards,
including relating to the freedom of religion or belief;
Repeal or amend the existing blasphemy
laws, including Indonesia’s ITE law;

■

■

■

Release all individuals currently detained
or imprisoned on blasphemy charges;
Repeal or revise the 2006 Joint Regulation on houses of worship.

Incorporate training on internationalreligious freedom standards into the bilateral partnership on combating violent
extremism, including the U.S. Agency forInternational Development’s (USAID) funded
programs such as the Harmoni and MAJu
projects, and all education initiatives towhich the U.S. government contributes; andKEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■

56

Factsheet: Blasphemy and Related Laws in ASEAN Member Countries
Podcast: The Legacy of Blasphemy Laws in Southeast Asia

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023■

Urge the Indonesian government, as chairof the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and its Intergovernmental
Commission on Human Rights, to publicly
advocate for religious freedom, pluralism,
and inclusion throughout the region.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise Indonesia’s ongoing religious
freedom challenges through hearings,
meetings, letters, congressional delegation
trips abroad, and other actions.

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country. Muslims comprise 87.2 percent of the country’s 267 million citizens, witharound 99 percent identifying as Sunni and less than one percent and
0.2 percent identifying as Shi’a or Ahmadiyya Muslim, respectively.
Protestant Christians comprise seven percent of the population, Roman
Catholics 2.9 percent, and Hindus 1.7 percent; 0.9 percent identify withother minority religions such as Buddhism or Confucianism.
In light of this diversity, Indonesia has a long tradition of religious
pluralism. Article 29 of its constitution “guarantees the independenceof each resident to embrace religion and worship according to theirrespective religions and beliefs.” The government has long promoted
Pancasila, an ideology that comprises five principles: monotheism,
civilized humanity, national unity, deliberative democracy, and social
justice. However, its promotion of this ideology extends only to thosereligious groups that leaders of the officially recognized religions
determine as legitimate. In addition, the government requires all
citizens to list their religious affiliation on their identification cards—apractice that has forced nonreligious persons and members of unrecognized religious minorities to misrepresent their faith or leave thefield blank. This omission can impact access to licenses, permits,
education, and employment.
In addition to hosting the G20 meeting in November, Indonesia
also hosted the G20 Religion Forum, which brought together religious
and government leaders to discuss interfaith initiatives and strategies
to confront extremism. That same month, Indonesia launched a joint
campaign with India—a country that USCIRF recommends as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC—to promote moderate Islam. In
January 2023, just after the reporting period, Indonesia assumed thechairmanship of the regional ASEAN, placing it in a potential position
to guide the bloc’s response to human rights challenges relevant toreligious freedom, such as the ongoing conflict in Burma.

Criminal Code Process
According to human rights activists, the government provided minimal, if any, opportunity for civil society and religious minorities toengage with the criminal code revision process since the new draft
code was first introduced in 2019. In contrast, officials reportedly
consulted with conservative Islamic groups during that process incoordination with the MUI. However, religious freedom advocateshave expressed tentative hope that the new code’s gradual implementation may afford civil society and the judicial system space toreview and modify its provisions.

Limited Central Government Authority
Many of Indonesia’s religious freedom violations against religious
minorities are perpetrated by local governing authorities, far outside
the control of Indonesia’s central government. In March, the mayor ofa city within greater Jakarta publicly opposed a Ministry of Religious
Affairs regulation on the volume level of the azan, or Muslim call to

prayer, which Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors and officials cannot
publicly criticize without risk of blasphemy allegations. In July, reports
circulated of public and private schools forcing girls to wear the hijab,
illustrating the central government’s limited success in preventing
local schools from implementing such measures. Furthermore, insome areas where central or provincial government authorities havedelegated social and education services to quasi-governmental andnongovernmental organizations, violent Islamist groups have set
up schools to reportedly radicalize children. Such groups also run
boarding schools and coordinate through social media to raise funds
for violent Islamist activities.

Expansion of Provincial Religious Laws
In July, the Indonesian government formally declared that the customsof the Minangkbakau people, who comprise the ethnic majority ofWest Sumatra, are based on the philosophical values of the Qur’an.
Provincial leaders requested this legal decision to legitimize their further development of local laws based on Shari’a (Syariah). The central
government currently exempts the autonomous province of Aceh
from national laws and permits it to implement its own legal system,
which is based on a rigid interpretation of Syariah and is enforced
through a religious police force. Enforcement mandates women towear hijabs and bans them from straddling motorcycles, among otherrestrictions, regardless of their faith or personal choice. Violators ofthese religiously based laws are often subjected to corporal punishment, and neither Muslims nor non-Muslims are able to opt out of thisofficial interpretation.

Key U.S. Policy
Throughout 2022, the USAID-funded Harmoni program continued
to support the Ministry of Social Affairs and local organizations bystrengthening Inter-Religious Harmony Forums; countering violent
extremist narratives through community, university, and school-based
campaigns; and rehabilitating women and children returning fromconflict zones in the Middle East and the Philippines. The UnitedStates also maintained bilateral exchange programs such as the International Visitor Leadership Program to host Indonesian leaders in the
United States.
In February, the United States marked one year since the administration of President Joseph R. Biden released its Indo-Pacific Strategy.
As part of this strategy, the United States launched the Indonesia
Millennium Challenge Corporation, which dedicated $698 million to
support infrastructure and development goals as well as initiatives forclean energy. The United States also allocated resources for a 30 percent increase in educational advising centers in Indonesia, althoughthese programs did not include discussion of religious freedom or
broader human rights. In November, rhetoric from the MUI and otherreligious organizations against the LGBTQI+ community prompted theIndonesian government to cancel a visit from the U.S. Special Envoy
to Advance the Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons.

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BackgroundIRAQ
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Iraq continued todeteriorate as a result of the Iraqi Federal Government’s (IFG)
intensifying political factionalism and resulting administrative
paralysis. The government’s instability fueled intra-Shi’a Muslim
and Sunni Muslim-disenfranchising sectarianism and stalled progress on initiatives that would help advance freedom of religion
or belief, including addressing the pressing concerns of Iraq’s
diverse religious minorities. The year-long government deadlock
arose from the October 2021 elections, which cemented divisions
among followers of Shi’a Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, rival Shi’afactions aligned with Iran, and Sunni Muslims of both Arab andKurdish backgrounds. Following al-Sadr’s unexpected resignationfrom Parliament and Sadrists’ protests in Baghdad in the summer,
their Iran-backed Shi’a opponents moved forward with a new
government in October.
Late in December, the new administration formally recognized
for the first time in 47 years Yazidis’ ownership of their residential
properties in the Sinjar district in northern Iraq. However, the yearof political stasis exacerbated the government’s neglect of otherinitiatives that would benefit vulnerable religious minorities. The
government did not adequately implement the Yazidi Survivors Law(YSL), which Parliament passed in 2021 to provide reparations for
Yazidi, Christian, Turkmen, and Shabak victims of the Islamic Stateof Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Likewise, the IFG and the semi-autonomous
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—which each lay claim to Sinjar—failed to substantially carry out the provisions of the 2020 United
Nations (UN)-brokered Sinjar Agreement intended to stabilize thearea and enable the return of Yazidis displaced by ISIS’s genocide.
The IFG did not bring under control the Popular Mobilization
Units (PMU or PMF) or al-Hashd al-Shaabi, a government-affiliatedumbrella organization of largely Shi’a Muslim, pro-Iran militias. These
groups used checkpoint interrogations and detentions, enforced

disappearance, extortion, and physical violence and targeted Sunni
Muslims and other religious minorities, including Christians andYazidis. On the outskirts of Mosul and in the Nineveh Plains—areas
with numerous indigenous religious minorities and subject to the
IFG’s and KRG’s jurisdictional disputes—the PMF’s aggressive useof checkpoints, seizure of Christians’ land and businesses, and othertargeted harassment deterred displaced Christians’ return to thearea and fueled further emigration. Iraqi military forces also targeted
religious minorities, as in a May operation against Yazidi fighters,
which displaced at least 3,000 Yazidi civilians—already traumatizedby recent displacement and by recurrent Turkish airstrikes—in their“largest exodus” since the 2014 genocide.
For its part, the KRG continued to promote religious coexistence and its status as a refuge for over two million religiously
diverse Iraqis and Syrians displaced to the Kurdistan Region of
Iraq (KRI) by years of conflict and the threat of ISIS. In October, theKRG, along with religious minority stakeholders, participated ina series of UN workshops analyzing the KRG’s laws, mechanisms,
policies, and programs with the goal of strengthening its protection of minority groups’ rights. However, some Christian groups
indigenous to the Nineveh Plains raised concerns over the KRG’s
failure to resolve longstanding grievances such as lack of KRG funding and other support for Assyrian-run schools; discrimination in
employment and municipal services; and unresolved KRG-tolerated
or -initiated misappropriation of Christians’ land, businesses, andother property. Christian residents have cited their lack of security
and threats from ISIS, the PMF/PMU, and the KRG as the main drivers of emigration from the area, bringing their ancient communities
almost to the point of extinction. Similarly, Yazidi genocide survivors
feared returning to their Sinjar homeland—caught in the stranglehold of vying militias—and remained in displacement camps within
the KRI prone to fire and other hazards.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Iraq on the Special Watch List forengaging in or tolerating severe violationsof religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Use diplomatic channels and multilateralengagement to encourage the IFG and the
KRG to expedite processing the return of
kidnapped and displaced Yazidi genocide
survivors and assist them in reintegrating
into Iraqi society; to resolve conflicts overdisputed areas per Article 140 of the Iraqi
constitution, while including all religious
and ethnic minorities in the process; and■■Impose targeted sanctions on additional
PMF leaders responsible for severe violations of religious freedom by freezing
those individuals’ assets and/or barring
their entry into the United States underhuman rights related financial and visa
authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; andContinue to assist Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities in rebuilding communities

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Press Release: USCIRF Commemorates the Eighth Anniversary of the Yazidi Genocide
Factsheet: Religious Freedom amid Iraq’s Political Crisis■ Podcast: Recovering from Genocide: The Yazidis’ Return to Sinjar■ Podcast: Iraq's Beleaguered Religious Minority Communities■■

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USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

devastated by ISIS and in advocating fortheir own interests, including opening abroad discussion on holding fair and freeelections to select their own local leaders aswell as representatives to the IFG and KRG.

to comprehensively implement the Sinjar
Agreement with full inclusion of the Yazidi
community in particular;

The U.S. Congress should:■

Incorporate religious freedom concerns
into its larger oversight of the U.S.-Iraq
bilateral relationship through hearings, letters, and congressional delegations and by
appropriating funding for development programming to strengthen religious freedom.

IRAQ

BackgroundIraq’s population is approximately 95–98 percent Muslim, with 61–64
percent Shi’a and 29–34 percent Sunni. Christians—consisting of
Catholic, Orthodox and Assyrian Church of the East, Protestant Evangelical, and others—comprise approximately one percent, althoughaccurate figures are obscured by frequent displacement both within
and beyond Iraq’s borders.
Iraq is unique as a Shi’a-majority Arab state. It has ties to boththe Sunni-majority Arabic-speaking world and Iran, a non-Arab Shi’acountry. Iraq is also home to numerous ethnic and religious minorities
such as Kurds, Yazidis, Sabean Mandaeans, Kaka’is, Shabaks, andTurkmen as well as members of Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac, Armenian,and other Christian churches. In 2022, at least 2,763 Yazidi women andgirls kidnapped from Sinjar by ISIS were still missing, many potentiallyhidden within northeast Syrian camps detaining ISIS fighters andtheir families. Yazidi Iraqis welcomed the international community’s
additional steps toward accountability and justice, such as a German
court’s judgment in July convicting a repatriated German ISIS memberof genocide.
Article 2 of the federal constitution establishes Islam as the official religion and affirms “the full religious rights of freedom of belief
and religious practice to all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis andMandean Sabaeans.” However, the penal code contains blasphemy
statutes, and since 2016, the Law of United National Identity requires
non-Muslim minors to convert to Islam if one of their parents becomes
Muslim, as in the ongoing legal case of an Assyrian child.
In the years since the 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein’s
regime, sectarianism has flourished, with political power in the IFG
distributed along religious lines among dominant Shi’a politicalparties, a Kurdish president, an Arab Shi’a prime minister, and an
Arab Sunni president of Parliament.

Other Religious Freedom Issues in the IFG and KRG
Within weeks of the new administration’s emergence in October,
IFG agencies issued eviction notices to Christians in a displacement
settlement in Baghdad’s Zayouna district, leaving the families—manyof whom ISIS had displaced from their Nineveh homelands in 2014—
facing homelessness during winter. The evictions were completed in
February 2023.
Community members from other religious minorities, including
Sabaean Mandaeans, Shabaks, and Kaka’is, have communicated theirintentions to lobby international bodies for minority protections andthe new IFG administration for constitutional and other legal safeguards for religious and ethnic minorities. These activists note that,for example, Article 125 of the federal constitution sets forth “administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights” for minorities but
lacks mechanisms of enforcement.
Political representation remained an important concern for religious minorities, with communities pointing out flaws in both the IFG’s

and KRG’s quota systems for elected representatives from minority
religious backgrounds. Some minority advocates suggested boththe IFG and KRG amend their existing quotas to ensure minority
representation is effective and meaningful rather than symbolic andvulnerable to dominant religious groups’ political appropriationof minorities’ seats. In February, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court
further limited the political representation of Yazidis, Shabaks, andFeyli Kurds, forcing those minorities to campaign within the alreadyseverely circumscribed Christian and Mandaean components. In
March, archaeologists criticized both IFG and KRG leaders’ ongoingsectarianizing of cultural heritage sites, finding it amounts to cultural
heritage predation. In the IFG, confessional political and religious
groups leveraged the ethnic and religious political quota system, theIraqi Constitution of 2005, and a collection of later laws, including
religion-specific endowments, to misappropriate and alter the character of religious heritage sites. Meanwhile, the KRG’s “land grabs”
of indigenous Christians’ villages and sites constituted a form oftargeted demographic change, prompting continued displacement
and migration.
In May, the Iraqi Parliament passed a Sadr-proposed law criminalizing Iraqis’ and foreigners’ ostensible attempts to normalize relations
with Israel. The law did not address Judaism and set forth exceptions
for Iraqis’ “religious visits” to Israel as preapproved by the Ministryof the Interior. However, it not only potentially “promot[ed] an environment of antisemitism” but also reflected Iraq’s rampant politicalsectarianism, with Shi’a parliamentary blocs advancing the legislationin part to distance themselves from Sunni Kurds’ and Arabs’ perceived
receptivity to normalizing ties with Israel.

Key U.S. Policy
The administration of President Joseph R. Biden continued to prioritize Iraq’s stabilization and economic development in U.S. relations
with both the IFG and KRG.
In July, the United States condemned an attack on a resort in
Duhok that killed at least eight civilians. The IFG attributed the striketo Turkey, which frequently carries out airstrikes in northern Iraq inostensible pursuit of members of the terrorist-designated Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK). The strikes have contributed to the abandonment of nearby Christian villages, threatened already traumatized
Yazidis in Duhok’s displacement camps, and inhibited Yazidis’ returnto Sinjar. The United States maintained its “strong support for Iraq’s
sovereignty and its security, stability, and prosperity, including thatof the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.”
The United States Agency for International Development
asserted its commitment to providing financial assistance to help
enable the approximately 1.67 million displaced Iraqis’ return to theirhomes. In November, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Alina L. Romanowski
redeclared a disaster in Iraq for fiscal year 2023 “due to the ongoingcomplex emergency and humanitarian crisis.”U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R S P E C I A L W AT C H L I S T

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KAZAKHSTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Kazakhstan remained relatively the same as last year as the government failed to introduce
meaningful reform and continued to restrict religious activity.
In January, new amendments to the country’s expansive religion
law came into force that did not include substantive reforms andpreserved many provisions that systematically violate freedom of
religion or belief. Throughout the year, the government continued
to prohibit unregistered religious activity, require state approval
for religious literature, and restrict missionary activity, among other
undue limitations.
The government continued to suppress groups and individuals it perceived as following “nontraditional” religions, along with
Sunni Muslims who do not subscribe to the state’s interpretationof Islam. By the end of the year, at least 10 Muslim men were still
imprisoned on charges related to their online religious activity,
including discussing their beliefs and sharing religious content.
Those in prison include five men sentenced due to their participation in a WhatsApp conversation on Islam in 2019, despite a2021 United Nations (UN) Working Group opinion that called fortheir release. In March, an Atyrau court found Sarsen Netekov
and Nurlan Atalykov guilty of belonging to the Tablighi Jamaat
movement, sentencing both men to a year of restricted freedom
and blocking their bank accounts. In July, authorities imprisoned

Anatoli Zernichenko for posting excerpts from religious texts on
his private Instagram page.
Kazakhstan also maintained an official ban on women andgirls wearing a hijab in public schools in the face of continued callsby activists and parents to rescind the ban. In October, an Almaty
school barred a Muslim schoolgirl who wears a hijab from attendingclass for a month, stating that religious garb did not comply withuniform regulations issued by the Ministry of Education. In addition,
Ahmadiyya Muslims remained unregistered as a religious association due to official discrimination. As in years past, authorities
issued over 140 administrative fines for religious offenses throughout 2022, primarily targeting Muslims.
Non-Muslim religious minorities, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses
and Protestant Christians, also encountered restrictions on religious
activities, including raids on unauthorized meetings, negative publicity from state-sponsored groups, and forced official apologies
for missionary activities. In a positive development, the official
Financial Monitoring Agency removed several Jehovah’s Witness
associations and members of the Church of Scientology from asecret list of “high-risk” entities that prevented them from accessingbanking services for the past few years. It remains unclear how manyother organizations and individuals may be included on this list, asProtestant churches have reportedly experienced similar issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Kazakhstan on the Special Watch
List for engaging in or tolerating severe
violations of religious freedom pursuant
to the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA);
Continue to engage with the governmentof Kazakhstan to revise the 2011 religion
law, as amended in 2021, and other relevant legislation to comply with international
human rights standards, including repealing or amending registration requirements,

ending all expert mandatory review of religious materials, and removing or reducing
administrative fines for religious activities;■■

Provide training to law enforcement andlocal officials in line with international
human rights standards through programs
such as the Workshop on Inclusive Governance to protect religious freedom; andCall for Kazakhstan to release all those
imprisoned due to their religious activities

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESIssue Update: Kazakhstan’s Religion Law Amendments
Podcast: Religious Prisoners of Conscience in Kazakhstan■ Special Report: Tolerance, Religious Freedom, and Authoritarianism

■

■

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USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

or beliefs immediately, permit all incarcerated individuals to practice their religion,and investigate and cease all torture.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Advocate for religious freedom reformand other measures aimed at improving
the human rights landscape in Kazakhstan
through the Congressional U.S.-Kazakhstan Caucus.

According to a 2021 census, Kazakhstan is home to more than 19
million people, with 69.3 percent of Kazakh citizens identifying as
Muslim. Most Muslims in Kazakhstan are Sunni, although other sectsof Islam—such as Shafi’i Sunni, Shi’a, Sufi, and Ahmadiyya groups—are
also represented. Christians comprise 17.2 percent of the population
and are mostly Russian Orthodox. Other Christian denominations
include Catholics, Protestants, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, among
others. Eleven percent of Kazakhs did not indicate any religious affiliation, and two percent of Kazakhs are atheist. Additional religious
groups represent about 0.2 percent of the population and include
Jews, Buddhists, members of the International Society of Krishna
Consciousness, Baha’is, Scientologists, and others.
The state gives preferential treatment to the Hanafi school ofSunni Islam and Russian Orthodoxy, recognizing the “historical role”
of both in the country and placing them in the unofficial category of“traditional” religions. The government heavily regulates religious
groups it considers “threatening,” including Muslim groups, Evangelical Christians, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, in an ostensible effort tocombat extremism.

Religion Law Amendments
In December 2021, Kazakhstan passed amendments to its 2011 law,
On Religious Activities and Religious Associations, which came into
force in early January. After soliciting recommendations to improvereligious freedom in the context of meetings carried out throughthe U.S.-Kazakhstan Religious Freedom Working Group, Kazakhstan
adopted amendments touted as liberalizing but that included little
notable reform. While the amendments included switching from apermission-based system to a “notification-based” system for religious groups seeking to hold events outside their registered place ofworship, it changed little in practice. Religious groups are still effectively required to seek permission from local authorities and provide
in-depth details about the nature of their event.
Authorities have applied the “notification” amendment to theregularly scheduled meetings of groups that rent their religious facilities. Authorities mostly enforced the amendment for larger meetingsand events, such as when police disrupted the annual commemorationof Jesus Christ’s death, a widely observed occasion, in three Jehovah’s Witness communities across Kostanay region. Yet, in Aqmola
region, police also disrupted a typical, smaller meeting of Jehovah’s
Witnesses. In all cases, authorities stated that no one submitted therequired notification for the event.

Targeting of Muslims
The state often targets Sunni Muslims who practice Islam independently from the state, particularly for the distribution of religious
materials and online religious activities. Officials often use questionable or false claims of “extremism” or terrorism charges to detain,
arrest, and imprison Muslims. In particular, Kazakhstan continued
to target individuals affiliated with the Tablighi Jamaat movement
and other Muslim groups on its list of prohibited foreign organizations deemed extremist. Released prisoners have faced continued
punishments and endure long bans on religious, social, and financial
activities. Of the 10 individuals known to be imprisoned on suchcharges, all identify as Sunni Muslim. Despite the UN Working Groupon Arbitrary Detention’s 2021 opinion that called for the release ofeight individuals jailed in 2019 for participating in a WhatsApp discussion about Islam, five of the men remained imprisoned at the end of2022. In February, the Kyzylorda Regional Court rejected a petition
for early release submitted by one of those men, Bolatbek Nurgaliyev,
claiming he violated prison rules when he prayed in his free time.
In June, a local court sentenced Sunni Muslim Anatoli Zernichenko
to seven years in prison on charges under Penal Code Article 256 for the“propaganda of terrorism or public calls to commit terrorism” after heposted religious content on social media. The court ordered that he paya fine equivalent to six months’ average local wages. The state reliedon “expert” theological analysis to support the final verdict. In anothercase, reports claimed prison officials tortured religious prisoner Dadash
Mazhenov, beating him and allegedly breaking his jaw.

Attitude toward China’s Ongoing Genocide
Kazakhstan continued to hold an at-times ambiguous position withrespect to neighboring China’s ongoing genocide of Uyghurs andother ethnic Turkic Muslims. In an October session of the UN Human
Rights Council, Kazakhstan voted against a motion to discuss humanrights abuses against Uyghurs and Muslims in Xinjiang. Notably, thepolice continued to disrupt individuals protesting the detention of
Uyghur and ethnic Kazakh family members in China. In mid-September, just prior to a state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping, Kazakh
authorities in Almaty region detained several protesters who regularly
advocated for the Chinese government to release their relatives.
Authorities charged those detained with violating the legal procedures for holding peaceful assemblies.

Key U.S. Policy
In 2022, while the United States and Kazakhstan collaborated on key
issues regarding security, development, and human rights, engagement on religious freedom matters was less of a focus. The U.S.
government continued to provide economic assistance through the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to strengthen
Kazakhstan’s capacity for governance in key areas, including thelegal enabling environment, the energy sector, and the health sector. In May, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian
Affairs Donald Lu traveled to Kazakhstan to meet with government
officials and civil society and discuss President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s reform agenda, human rights, and women’s empowerment. In
response to the government of Kazakhstan’s violent management ofprotests in January 2022, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
called for an international investigation into the state-sponsored violence and a review of U.S. security assistance to the country in lightof Kazakhstan’s human rights abuses. In November, U.S. Departmentof State Spokesperson Ned Price noted that Kazakhstan’s November
presidential election lacked meaningful political competition; he also
expressed U.S. government support for President Tokayev’s proposed
reforms, including protection of human rights. In December, bothsides came together for the U.S.-Kazakhstan Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue, where officials discussed human rights conditions in
Kazakhstan. Public reporting did not indicate whether representatives
discussed religious freedom issues.

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BackgroundMALAYSIAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Malaysia remained thesame as in 2021. Article 160 of the constitution links Malay ethnicity with Islam, infringing on ethnic Malays’ ability to choose
their own religion. The government requires all citizens to obtain areligious identification card known as MyKad through the Ministryof Home Affairs (MOHA), which lists whether they are Muslims.
Federal and state governments compel all citizens designatedas Muslims to adhere to a strict, state-approved interpretation ofSunni Islam according to Shafi’i jurisprudence. This system essentially prevents Malaysians who are officially labeled as Muslims
from changing their religion, with only a few exceptions in recent
years involving lengthy court processes. Although the National
Registration Department—under MOHA’s jurisdiction and responsible for MyKad—is not affiliated with any religious office, it mustobtain approval from Islamic affairs departments at the state and/or national level to change a registered Muslim’s designation.
Malaysia’s Penal Code Sections 298 and 298A criminalize
blasphemy, and government authorities use Section 233 of theCommunications and Multimedia Act of 1998 (CMA) in effect asa blasphemy law as well. At least five states criminalize apostasy
with fines, imprisonment, or detention in a “rehabilitation” center.
Politicians have consistently supported these restrictions, including
during 2022. In January, Ahmad Marzuk Shaary, deputy minister inthe prime minister’s Department of Religious Affairs, confirmed theintent of the federal Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM)
to continue monitoring online posts for blasphemy. In July, theFederal Territories Islamic Religious Department detained Siti
Nuramira Abdullah under Article 298 for allegedly insulting Islam byremoving religious attire at the Crackhouse Comedy Club in Kuala
Lumpur. One of the club’s founders, Rizal Van Geyzel, was arrested
under Section 4(1) of the Sedition Act and Section 233 of the CMA.

Malaysia maintains a dual legal system that devolves the maintenance and regulation of Shari’a (known domestically as Syariah) toindividual state or federal departments. State-led religious departments coordinate with the security services to control and enforce
the affairs of Muslims to varying degrees depending on the state,creating restrictions on religious freedom for both Muslim andnon-Muslim residents. For example, in early December, Terengganu’s state government passed amendments to its Syariah Codewhich, among other restrictions, placed new regulations on attire
for men and women and criminalized pregnancy out of wedlock.
Islamic affairs departments and some politicians justified using
Syariah Codes to restrict human rights and individual freedoms as
an effort to “protect the well-being” of Muslims.
The phenomenon of unilateral conversions—when a parent converts to Islam and then converts their child, often in an
apparent attempt to win custody following a divorce—remains
a persistent issue in Malaysia. Children of these conversions who
do not identify as Muslim are forced to endure lengthy legal proceedings to change their designated religion to coincide with theirbeliefs. In February, Loh Siew Hong regained custody of her threechildren, who had been unilaterally converted by their father. In
April, a High Court decision finally allowed an unidentified woman
to change her religion, concluding an eight-year legal struggle
to overturn her unilateral conversion by her father when she wasfour years old.
Throughout 2022, the government of Malaysia continued towithhold the 2019 Special Taskforce’s report examining cases ofenforced disappearances, including Pastor Raymond Koh, Amri
Che Mat, and others. Malaysian security forces and religious affairs
departments likely targeted these individuals, at least in part, fortheir religious identity and practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Malaysia on the Special Watch Listfor engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights;■

Raise at every opportunity with the Malaysian government that it should:■

Ratify international treaties on humanrights that directly or indirectly impact
religious freedom, including the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination and the■

Ratify the 1951 Covenant on Refugees
and/or develop a law to regulate the
Malaysian government’s response andobligations to refugees and asylum seekers, many of whom have fled religious
persecution in their home countries;
Release the Special Taskforce’s report
investigating cases of enforced disappearances; andKEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCommission Delegation Visit: Kuala Lumpur in November 2022
Podcast: The Impact of Malaysia’s Dual Legal System on Religious Freedom■ Factsheet: Blasphemy and Related Laws in ASEAN Member Countries■■

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USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023■

Prioritize raising religious freedom concerns in all bilateral engagement with
Malaysia, including through a visit by the
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom with official counterpartsand religious leaders in Malaysia.

The U.S. Congress should:■

Raise Malaysia’s ongoing religious freedom concerns in all bilateral engagement,
hearings, meetings, letters, congressionaldelegation trips abroad, and other actions.

Malaysia is a highly pluralistic society. Around 61.3 percent of the
population identify as Muslim, the vast majority of whom adhere tostate-sponsored Sunni Islam. Buddhists comprise 19.8 percent; 9.2
percent are Christian; 6.3 percent are Hindu; 1.3 percent practiceConfucianism, Taoism, and other traditional Chinese religions; andabout 0.8 percent identify with no religion. Although Malaysia wasfounded as a secular state, Article 3 of the 1957 Constitution places
Islam—interpreted as Sunni Islam—as the federation’s official religion. Article 11(4) provides that state and federal law “may control
or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or beliefs among
persons professing the religion of Islam.”Rising Islamism and Its Mainstreaming
throughout Malaysia
In 2022, Malaysia’s Malay-majority population, other Muslim communities, and both federal and state institutions continued toexperience increased Islamization. Despite a constitutional ban on
hudud (corporal punishments), several states, including Kelantan,
Kedah, and Terengganu, have incorporated them into their legal
system to be implemented if the federal ban is removed. Then Prime
Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob’s administration worked to elevatethe position of tahfiz institutions—religious schools that are notobliged to provide formal, nonreligious education alongside theirinstruction—through legislation to standardize their curriculum andregulations. Around 1,200 such schools exist throughout the country
and have played a role in introducing Malay students to Islamist
ideology, heightening the influence of fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, and increasing the risk for radical Islamist groups toestablish a presence.
The increased role of Islamist rhetoric and ideology was alsopresent in the Islamic Party’s (PAS) political calls for the strengthening of Syariah and religiously based laws throughout Malaysia. PAS’s
coalition earned second place during the 2022 general elections(GE15) in November. In its outreach, PAS utilized social media platforms such as TikTok to spread hateful and inflammatory messages
against non-Muslims to motivate its electoral base. Malaysia’s Islamist
populist parties have used social media to stoke religious and populist sentiment against what they characterize as plots to Christianize
the country or take rights and privileges away from Muslim Malay
communities. GE15 witnessed the collapse of support among ethnic
Malays for the traditional United Malay National Organization and arealignment of most of this demographic behind PAS. During the elections, multiple political actors exploited ethnic and religious concerns
in their efforts to mobilize Malay Muslim and other Muslim Bumiputra
voters. In November, King Al-Sultan Abdullah called upon longtime
opposition figure Anwar Ibrahim to form a national unity government
with some ideologically and geographically disparate parties.

Dual Legal System and State Control of Muslims
Malaysia’s federal and state governments use the country’s dual
legal system to regulate and control the Muslim population. Thissystem emerged in the 1990s and coincided with a rapid bureaucratization of religion. States where PAS controls the government require

individuals to live their lives in accordance with a rigid interpretationof Islam, regardless of their religious belief. They enforce clothing
restrictions for men and women and prohibit indigenous practices,such as dancing, and other clothing deemed haram (forbidden).
Malaysia’s state-level Syariah systems also place undue burden
on Muslim members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer,
and intersex (LGBTQI+) community. In several states, religiously basedlaws criminalize sexual relations for LGBTQI+ people and permit
caning and imprisonment as punishment. In October, JAKIM officers
joined the police in raiding a Halloween-themed party in Kuala Lumpur
for the local LGBTQI+ community, detaining only those whose MyKad
cards identified them as Muslims. LGBTQI+ community members inother parts of the country reported similar incidents in 2022, indicatingthat local authorities have repeatedly attempted to disrupt LGBTQI+
events under the pretext of preventing Muslims from attending. Furthermore, the JAKIM, in coordination with its state-level counterparts,
continued to organize mukhayyams (conversion therapy camps) totarget and compel Muslim members of the LGBTQI+ community toundergo “rehabilitation.” The government reported that it had subjected at least 1,733 LGBTQI+ people to these programs in 2021, but
it has not released numbers for 2022.

Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Malaysia hosts significant numbers of refugees and asylum seekers
fleeing violations of religious freedom, such as religious minorities
from Burma, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Since Malaysia is not party
to the 1951 Covenant on Refugees, it effectively leaves those fleeing
religious persecution and in search of refugee status in a grey legalarea, void of protection.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States is Malaysia’s third-largest trading partner, and thetwo countries maintain strong bilateral ties. In March, U.S. Secretaryof State Antony J. Blinken spoke with then Foreign Minister Saifuddin
Abdullah via phone to strengthen bilateral relations. The UnitedStates maintains a deep, institutionalized, bilateral military relationship with Malaysia and regularly engages in joint military exercises.
The two countries continued to partner on counterterrorism efforts
through information sharing, capacity-building programs for law
enforcement and judicial authorities, and assistance to improve
immigration security and border controls. The United States also
works with Malaysia through regional organizations such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, neither
religious freedom nor broader human rights issues have played asubstantial, visible role in such engagement.
Through both the International Visiting Leadership Program
and the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the United Stateshosts leaders from Malaysia in programs that often include religious
freedom issues. The United States is actively engaged with civil society in Malaysia to promote tolerance and counter violent extremism.
In August, then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy
Pelosi (D-CA) visited Kuala Lumpur, accompanied by a congressionaldelegation, where she praised Malaysia for its “leadership in ASEAN
on repudiating Burma for its deadly crackdown on dissent.”U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R S P E C I A L W AT C H L I S T

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BackgroundSRI LANKAUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

In 2022, religious freedom conditions in Sri Lanka continued
on a worrying trajectory. The Sri Lankan government targeted
the rights of religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Hindus, by using problematic legislation, engaging in discrimination
against them, and instigating land disputes intended to expropriate their property. Authorities harassed and imprisoned religious
actors associated with the protest movement in 2022 (Aragalaya,or “Struggle” in Sinhala) and intimidated members of minority
religious communities. Muslims who posted supportive messages
for protesters on social media were identified, questioned, andarrested under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) Act. During the year, Sri Lanka faced an economic
and political crisis resulting in a lack of basic necessities. The
Aragalaya called for accountability for corruption and economic
mismanagement, leading to the resignation of then President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in May and the election of former Prime Minister
Ranil Wickremesinghe as president in July.
The 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) gives Sri Lankan
authorities broad powers to search, arrest, and detain individuals.
Nearly 300 Muslim men and women remained in detention withoutcharges in connection to the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings (a seriesof coordinated “bomb blasts that ripped through churches andluxury hotels” that killed over 200 people) based on a combinationof the PTA, the ICCPR Act, and/or the penal code. The PTA andthe ICCPR Act (designed to incorporate the international treaty
into domestic law) often are used to restrict freedom of expression
among minority groups. Authorities also utilized the PTA to crack
down on Aragalaya protesters. In August, police dispersed a protest using tear gas and water cannons and arrested three students,
including Galwewa Siridhamma Thero, a Buddhist monk and organizer of the Inter University Bhikku (Monks’) Federation. President
Wickremesinghe signed an order that the three men could be heldfor 90 days without evidence or the opportunity to seek bail. The
United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders
expressed support for the three men. The government released
Siridhamma Thero on bail in December.

The government published proposed amendments to the
PTA in January, but experts assessed that the amendments did
not go far enough in addressing the worst aspects of the act. In
September, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) published areport on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka. Nada Al-Nashif,then UN Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights, urged thegovernment to repeal the PTA and draft a new counterterrorism
law in its place.
The Sri Lankan government discriminated against Muslims andtargeted the practice of Islam. In August, the Ministry of Defense
announced the addition of several Tamil and Muslim groups andindividuals to a list of designated persons accused of “terrorism
related activities” and/or “funding for terrorism” under the country’s UN Regulations No. 1 of 2012. The list included a single motherof two who subsequently lost her job, a business owner who sits on
a local-level peace commission, and Muslim poet Ahnaf Jazeem.
Organizations included on these kinds of lists often have theirassets and bank accounts frozen. Inclusion on such lists is used to
intimidate different communities and disproportionately targets
religious minorities. The government also closely monitored theaffairs and finances of Muslim organizations, particularly thosethat receive foreign donations. Such surveillance impacts Muslim
organizations dedicated to the alms-giving pillar of Islam, known
as zakat; for example, groups wishing to donate money to thefamilies of PTA/ICCPR Act detainees must inform the Terrorism
Investigation Division to do so.
The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense previously decreed that
all imported Islamic books are subject to review and will only bereleased following approval from the ministry to protect against“terrorism.” Reports indicate that this practice is ongoing andaffects all reading material with Arabic script, Qur’anic translations, and material related to Islamic education. The Ministry of
Education recalled Islamic textbooks for several grades after thediscredited Presidential Task Force for “One Country, One Law”
raised concerns over unspecified “objectionable words” andclaimed “they might contain ideas of extremist ideology.”

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Sri Lanka on the Special Watch Listfor engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Direct U.S. Embassy officials to urge
the Sri Lankan government to repeal orsignificantly reform the PTA and other lawsthat disproportionately affect religious andethnic minorities; and■Advocate for the full implementation of
UNHRC Resolution 51/1 to promote reconciliation, accountability, and religious

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES■■64Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Sri Lanka
Podcast: Troubling Signs for Religious Freedom in Sri Lanka

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

freedom and other related human rights
in Sri Lanka.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Hold public hearings highlighting religious
freedom conditions in Sri Lanka and U.S.
policy toward Sri Lanka.

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is a presidential
republic with a unicameral parliament. President Wickremesinghe
serves as chief of state and head of government, having previously
served as prime minister for five separate terms between 1993 and2020. Under Article 9 of the Sri Lankan constitution, Buddhism isafforded special status. The state is directed to “protect and foster”
Buddhism, which holds the “foremost place” within the country.
The constitution also guarantees the freedom of religion or beliefin subsequent articles.
Sri Lanka is both religiously and ethnically diverse. Buddhists
account for about 70 percent of the population, followed by Hindus
at 12.6 percent, Muslims (mostly Sunni) at 9.7 percent, Roman Catholics at 6.1 percent, other Christians at 1.3 percent, and adherentsof “other” religions at about 0.05 percent. Most Sri Lankans are Sinhalese, a majority of whom are Buddhist. The second-largest ethnic
group, Sri Lankan Tamils, are mostly Hindu with a significant Christianminority. Members of the next-smallest ethnic group are traditionallycalled Sri Lankan Moors, who are mostly Muslim and eschew formal
ethnic classification. Also included are Indian Tamils and a small number of other ethnicities.

Land Disputes
The Ministry of Defense heads the Task Force for Archaeological
Heritage Management in the Eastern Province and works in collaboration with the Archaeological Department, security agencies, andBuddhist clergies to “identify archaeological monuments and facilitate the repair or construction of Buddhist sites.” In some cases, thiscollaboration has led to the expropriation of Hindu and Muslim sites
where there were formerly no Buddhist populations, leading to fears
that the program is transforming the region’s demographic landscape.
The National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL)
documented several incidents involving the appropriation of Hindu
temples between January and August, ranging from the removalof Hindu flags at a temple by unknown persons to erecting statuesof Buddha on Hindu temple sites. In June, Buddhist monks and the
Sri Lankan Army attempted to dedicate a new Buddhist shrine in
Mullaitivu despite a 2018 court order prohibiting any new buildingin the area. The same court ordered the removal of new structuresin July. Government authorities filed a motion asking for the court toreconsider the order, arguing that the new structure was meant topreserve archaeological materials and that demolishing the building
would create interreligious tensions. That same day, a judge revised
the previous order, specifying that the building could remain but thatno further construction could take place.

Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act
The Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA) governs marriage,
divorce, and other family law matters for all Muslim Sri Lankans andis based on Shari’a law, Islamic legal practice, and local customs. The
MMDA established a tax-funded Muslim judge (Quazi) court system,
including a Board of Quazis and an Advisory Board. Muslim couples
can only marry under the MMDA.
Observers argue that the MMDA is discriminatory toward Muslim
women and is in violation of domestic and international human rights
law, as it does not provide them with the same rights and protections
afforded to women in other religious communities in Sri Lanka. The
MMDA does not require a woman’s consent before the registrationof a marriage, allows for unilateral divorce by the husband without
giving the same right to the wife, presents bureaucratic hurdles towomen seeking divorce that are not required for men, and allows thearbitrary provision for wife and child maintenance by a Quazi, among
other problematic practices. Additionally, the MMDA lacks a minimum
age for marriage, providing Quazis the ability to permit marriage of agirl younger than 12 years old, despite common law requiring an age
minimum of 18 years old.

Harassment of Religious Actors
Participating in the Aragalaya
Catholic priest Father Amila Jeewantha Peiris was heavily involvedin the protests in Galle Face. In July, a court imposed a travel ban on
him for alleged participation in “unlawful assembly and damage to
public property” during a protest in June. Later in July, police raided
Father Peiris’s church in the southern city of Balangoda, seeking his
arrest. Authorities claimed he was liable for “being part of an unlawful
assembly, obstructing public employees from performing duties, criminal assault and causing hurt.” Father Peiris later filed a fundamental
rights petition with the Supreme Court to prevent his arrest, but heeventually surrendered to the court and posted bail.

Key U.S. Policy
The United States is Sri Lanka’s largest export market, accounting foralmost 25 percent of Sri Lankan exports. U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka
has historically focused on “supporting Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions, encouraging economic development, and promoting humanrights.” In December, the U.S. Department of State announced nearly$240 million in new U.S. government assistance to support Sri Lanka
during its acute economic crisis.
In May, the State Department twice condemned violence against
Aragalaya protesters and expressed concern about state of emergency declarations, which “can be used to curb dissent.” In a Junecall with then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, U.S. Secretary ofState Antony J. Blinken affirmed “the United States’ commitment to
the Sri Lankan people during this challenging time and the importanceof supporting reforms that address the concerns of all Sri Lankans,including on democratic governance and human rights.” U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka Julie J. Chung condemned the use of the PTA
against Sri Lankans expressing their views.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R S P E C I A L W AT C H L I S T

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BackgroundTURKEYUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Turkey remained fairly consistent overall but did see some slight improvements. In June, thegovernment finally released long-awaited regulations for religious
minority foundations’ board member elections. The government’s
failure to provide these regulations had prevented religious minority
communities from electing foundation leadership for the last nine
years. While the issuance of the regulations represented a positive
development for the ability of some groups to operate, some critics panned the procedure as another means to “perpetuate state
control” over non-Muslim communities. Although an April decisionby the Constitutional Court ruled that schools’ refusal to exempt
children from mandatory religious classes violated freedom of religion or belief, the government took no apparent action to remedy
the situation. On the contrary, schools reportedly pushed Kurdish
students who wanted to enroll in Kurdish language courses to takereligious classes instead. During the year, the government also took
no steps to grant legal personality to religious communities, permit
conscientious objection to mandatory military service, or reopen
the Theological School of Halki or any other seminary.
The Turkish government continued to discriminate against
Alevis and refuse to recognize their places of worship, known as
cemevis. In February, Alevis protested the government’s discriminatory policy of charging utility fees for their places of worshipand not others, like mosques. That same month, President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan announced that the government would reduce thefees by classifying cemevis as residences rather than commercial
establishments, but notably it did not categorize them as places ofworship. In October, President Erdoğan announced the creationof a state-run “Alevi-Bektaşi Culture and Cemevi Directorate” toallegedly address the community’s issues; however, many Alevis
criticized the move as a means to subject Alevism to government
authority and promote their assimilation to Sunni Islam. Alevis also
continued to experience targeted violence throughout the year. In
July, coinciding with the beginning of the holy month of Muharrem,
several individuals conducted a string of attacks on Alevi places ofworship and associations, with one assailant reportedly stabbing awoman who had to be hospitalized. Days later, two men physicallyassaulted Selami Sarıtaş, the leader of an Istanbul cemevi.
Other religious communities, including Christians and Jews,
also experienced instances of societal violence, intimidation,and the destruction or vandalization of their religious sites overthe course of the year. In June, several persons attacked a Syriac
family related to an alleged land dispute while the family hosted
Syriac clergy members in their house. In July, vandals destroyed 36
headstones in the Jewish Hasköy cemetery in Istanbul. Remnantsof the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—which maintained
a presence in Turkey—continued to pose a threat to religious
minorities. Alleged ISIS members reportedly planned to carry out
attacks on Alevis and an Ankara cemevi, and after the reporting
period, additional plots to attack churches and synagogues alsocame to light.
The Turkish government continued to criminalize blasphemy or“insulting religious values” under Article 216(3) of the Penal Code,frequently levying such charges to crack down on criticism of the government and expression perceived as offensive to Islam. Throughout
the year, numerous individuals and entities faced prosecution or
investigation on criminal blasphemy charges, including Turkish pop
singer Sezen Aksu and Swedish music streaming service Spotify.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Turkey on the Special Watch Listfor engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
Raise in all meetings with Turkish government officials and press at the highest levels
for the reopening of the Theological Schoolof Halki (Halki Seminary) and for full compliance with European Court of Human Rights
rulings on freedom of religion or belief; and■Track and comprehensively document in
the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report religious
communities’ efforts to open, regain, renovate, and protect places of worship andother religious sites of spiritual, cultural, or
historical importance; include informationon the vandalization, damage, and destruction of such sites; and work with the Turkish
government to ensure their protection.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES
Staff Visit: Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakır, and Mardin in March 2022
Issue Update: Blasphemy Charges in Turkey■ Podcast: Conditions for Religious and Nonbelief Communities in Turkey■ Podcast: The Alevi Struggle for Rights in Turkey■■

66

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

The U.S. Congress should:■

Incorporate consideration of Turkey’s treatment of religious minorities and broader
human rights issues into its continued
evaluation of the U.S.-Turkey bilateralrelationship, including in the context ofproposed legislation.

The U.S. government estimates the population of Turkey at just over83 million. The Turkish government has claimed that 99 percent of the
population is Muslim, with 78 percent reportedly identifying as Hanafi
Sunni. Between 10 million and 25 million people identify as Alevi, thecountry’s largest religious minority, and there is also a small populationof Shi’a Muslims. An estimated 0.2 percent of the population comprises
atheists, Armenian Apostolics, Baha’is, Bulgarian Orthodox, Chaldean
Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Protestants,
Roman Catholics, Russian Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Syriac Orthodox,
Yazidis, and others.
The constitution defines Turkey as a secular (laik) state and provides for the freedom of conscience, religious belief, and conviction.
Despite these provisions, the government maintained an active role inreligious affairs, directly overseeing the practice of Islam through theofficial Directorate of Religious Affairs, or Diyanet, and managing theaffairs of other religious communities through the General Directorateof Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü).
The overall situation for human rights in Turkey continued to
decline amid the government’s ongoing targeting of political opponents, censorship of media, and alleged use of torture. The downward
trajectory of recent years led Human Rights Watch to assert that “theauthoritarian and highly centralized presidential government of Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan has set back Turkey’s human rights record by decades.”In June, the European Parliament adopted a report that reiterated serious human rights concerns and called on Turkey to address persistentreligious freedom issues such as: lack of legal personality for religious
communities, compulsory religious education, failure to recognize
Alevis and their places of worship, restrictions on the training andsuccession of clergy, and the continued closure of Halki Seminary.
According to reports, Turkey also rejected the citizenship applicationsof some Uyghurs due to purported “national security” and “publicorder” risks.

Foundation Elections andOther Discriminatory Policies
The government has regularly inserted itself in the internal affairsof religious communities, interfered in leadership elections, andprevented religious minorities from opening places of worshipand training facilities for religious leaders. For the last nine years,
the many religious minority communities that manage their affairs
through foundations have been unable to elect new leadership dueto the government’s refusal to issue regulations for those elections.
Finally, in June, the government published those regulations but
included a new residency requirement for candidates competing inparts of Istanbul, generating concerns that it would limit participation.
Armenian Patriarch Sahak Maşalyan stated that the patriarchate did
not know why religious communities had to wait so long to hold elections, and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew criticized the extended
delay as a “great injustice” and expressed his disappointment thatthe state did not heed the communities’ appeals on various elementsof the regulations.

In June, a citizen won a lawsuit to have information includedon his national identification card to reflect Tengrism as his religion
instead of Islam, after the Ministry of Interior reportedly denied his
initial request.

Charges of Blasphemy
Turkish authorities continued to rely on blasphemy charges to penalize individuals considered critical of the government or perceived
to have “insulted” Islam. In January, a group lodged a complaint
against pop singer Sezen Aksu on such charges after she posted aclip of a five-year-old song to YouTube in which she referred to thereligious figures of Adam and Eve as “ignorant.” In a thinly veiledreference to Aksu, President Erdoğan threatened to “tear out those
tongues,” while the Diyanet warned citizens “to be extremely sensitive and careful in every sentence, statement and approach madeabout the distinguished, leading, and exemplary figures of Islam.”
In August, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced
an investigation into Spotify after complaints emerged that users
had created “insulting” playlist names such as “God’s Ringtone,”“Songs God listened to while exiling Adam from paradise,” and“Eve didn’t hear when God announced the forbidden fruit [because
she was] listening to this playlist,” among others. In September,
authorities began an investigation against a scholar and atheist who
called certain religious figures “fairy tales.” Yet another individual
was indicted on incitement charges after he posted a photo during
the holy month of Ramadan of himself and others drinking alcohol
captioned with the phrase “may the lord accept.”

Key U.S. Policy
The United States and Turkey continued to cooperate closely on
matters related to security and economic relations. With the launch of
Russia’s full-scale invasion and war against Ukraine, the U.S. government increasingly engaged with the Turkish government—which has
attempted to position itself as a potential mediator to the conflict—on efforts to assist Ukraine. In April, the United States and Turkey
launched the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism, which convened threetimes throughout the year to review aspects of the bilateral relationship such as trade, defense cooperation, and counterterrorism. During
the year, the State Department condemned Turkey’s unjust convictions and sentencing of philanthropist Osman Kavala and Istanbul
Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu.
The U.S. government continued to raise religious freedom concerns in Turkey. In September, Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain traveled to Turkey, where he met
with Turkish officials including the Spokesperson and Chief Advisor
to the President İbrahim Kalın and President of Religious Affairs Ali
Erbaş. Public messaging, however, indicated a greater focus on refugees and individuals fleeing religious persecution in other countries
than on Turkey’s own religious freedom violations. U.S. Ambassador
to Turkey Jeffry L. Flake also met with representatives of various
religious communities.

U S C I R F – R E C O M M E N D E D F O R S P E C I A L W AT C H L I S T

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BackgroundUZBEKISTANUSCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST
KEY FINDINGSI

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan trended slightly
positively in a few areas, although most concerns related to thefundamental protection of this right remained. The government
continued to severely restrict freedom of religion or belief throughits 1998 law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,as amended in 2021, which requires religious groups to obtain registration to engage in religious activity and prohibits unregisteredreligious activity, the private teaching of religion, missionary activity,and proselytism, in addition to other undue restrictions. Although thegovernment allowed the opening of some new mosques and registered a handful of religious minority communities—including three
Protestant Christian churches and one Shi’a Muslim mosque—theregistration process remained a burdensome and insurmountablechallenge to other religious minority communities. Local governments and mahallas (local neighborhood committees) still arbitrarily
blocked some registration applications submitted by Jehovah’s
Witnesses and Protestant Christians.
While the government continued to issue sporadic pardonsthat resulted in the release of some individuals convicted in connection with their peaceful religious activities, more than 2,000
Muslims remained imprisoned on various charges of “extremism”
and other related offenses. Throughout the year, authorities continued to detain, arrest, imprison, and ill-treat Muslims for distributing
unauthorized or illegal religious materials, criticizing state-approved
imams, holding prayers in unsanctioned areas, and leading informalclasses on Islam without government permission. Law enforcement authorities conducted raids against and detained alleged
members of the Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir for meeting to discuss
religious texts or sharing such texts online. In July, a local court in
Bukhara sentenced Muslim Bobirjon Tukhtamurodov, who studied
the works of Muslim theologian Said Nursi, to more than five years

in prison for allegedly recruiting youth to the so-called “Nurchilar” group. In another case, Muslim blogger Fazilhoja Arifhojaev
received a seven-and-a-half-year prison sentence in January after
he reshared a Facebook post that stated that Muslims should notcongratulate non-Muslims on their religious holidays. According to
Human Rights Watch, Arifhojaev’s lawyer said that his client experienced ill-treatment and torture while in police custody. USCIRF
received reports throughout the year that Uzbekistan pursued
individuals who had fled abroad on religiously motivated charges
and requested their extradition. In an apparent effort to suppress
information, Uzbekistan’s State Security Service (Davlat Xavfsizlik
Xizmati) also intimidated human rights activists documenting thecountry’s ongoing religious freedom violations—including during
USCIRF’s commissioner delegation visit—and reportedly warned
journalists against reporting on such issues.
Authorities sought to limit some elements of Islam and Islamic
practice unofficially considered inappropriate. For instance, in May
police in two districts of Tashkent rounded up at least 10 men andthreatened them with arrest if they refused to have their beards
shaved, drawing criticism from the U.S. ambassador to Uzbekistan.
Similarly, officials have harassed women and girls who wear the
hijab and maintained that only a “light-colored national headscarf”
may be worn in schools. Despite a public announcement made inrecent years that children can attend mosques, in April security
officials in the exclave of So’x (or Sokh) reportedly raided and droveout children from the Hazrati Ali mosque during the holy month of
Ramadan. Authorities allegedly dissuaded or hindered attempts by
Muslims to reopen previously closed places of worship, such as the
Abu Zar mosque and the Nazira Bibi Xonim mosque in Tashkent,and required Muslims interested in performing the Hajj or Umra
pilgrimages to apply to their mahalla.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT■■

Include Uzbekistan on the Special Watch
List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);Work with the government of Uzbekistan to revise the 1998 religion law, as
amended in 2021, and other relevant legislation to comply with international humanrights standards, including by removing
registration requirements on religious
communities, permitting the possession

and distribution of religious literature, andpermitting the sharing of religious beliefs;■■

Press at the highest levels for the immediate release of individuals imprisoned
for their peaceful religious activities orreligious affiliations, and press the government of Uzbekistan to treat prisoners
humanely and allow for independent prison
monitoring; andAllocate funding for the U.S. Agency
for International Development and U.S.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIESCommission Delegation Visit: Tashkent and Bukhara in April 2022
Country Update: Uzbekistan: Space for Reform■ Podcast: Uzbekistan: Gaps in Principles and Practice■■68

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

Embassy in Tashkent to provide litigation
support to individuals and religious communities prosecuted in connection with
their peaceful religious activities.
The U.S. Congress should:■

Advocate on behalf of individuals imprisoned for their peaceful religious activities
or religious affiliations through letters,
floor speeches, hearings, delegations,and other engagements with or about
Uzbekistan.

The government of Uzbekistan estimates the country’s population
at nearly 35 million people. Varying estimates assess that between
88 and 96 percent of people identify as Sunni Muslim; one percent
identify as Shi’a Muslim; 2.2 percent identify as Russian Orthodox; and1.6 percent identify as atheist, Baha’i, Buddhist, Catholic, Jehovah’s
Witness, Jewish, Protestant, or a member of the International Societyof Krishna Consciousness.
Uzbekistan’s reform agenda related to religious freedom slowedin 2022 relative to previous years, although the government introduced additional legislative and other policy changes that alternately
represented positive and negative developments for freedom of
religion or belief. At the beginning of the year, Uzbekistan signaled
its intent to abolish administrative fines for wearing religious attire
in public after formally dropping the ban previously included in the
country’s religion law. Meanwhile, in June the government adopted a
new law on advertising that prohibits “disrespect for traditional symbols of the country,” including religious symbols. In the foreign policy
sphere, in October Uzbekistan voted against the United Nations
Human Rights Council holding a debate on China’s human rights
abuses perpetrated against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities
in Xinjiang.

Fines, Detention, and Arrest of Muslims
Uzbekistan continued to repress Muslims whose independent religious
practice violated the country’s religious regulations and whose actions
the government equated with “extremism” or “religious fundamentalism.” For example, in several instances courts handed down fines toMuslims who held or permitted prayers in unauthorized locations suchas businesses. In January, law enforcement raided the business of Farhod Rahmonov because he allowed his employees to pray at their placeof work. The next month, a local Tashkent court fined him the equivalentof $1,982 (21,600,000 So’m). In March, a court jailed Nosir Numanov for
15 days after he performed Friday prayers in a teahouse with a group offriends. The court also fined the teahouse owner approximately $2,473(27,000,000 So’m).
Likewise, authorities routinely cracked down on Muslims forillegal possession or distribution of religious texts. According to nongovernmental organization Forum 18, in January and February policearrested as many as 24 men for keeping “extremist” religious content
on their phones. In April, a judge sentenced Hasan Abdirahimov tofour years in prison for “liking” and sharing religious materials online;
he was already serving a previous sentence for listening to banned
sermons. In May, Oybek Hamidov received five years in prison after heshared an audio file of a sermon. That same month, a court sentenced
Alimardon Sultonov to seven years in a labor camp on numerous
charges, including storage of materials with “religious extremism,”
despite claims he had experienced torture. His family has asserted he
was arrested due to his criticism of state-appointed imams, among
other public figures.
Women are also targeted, often in connection with their collective religious activity. Following a raid in the beginning of theyear, police accused four women of teaching Islam without official
permission and fined each around $124 (1,350,000 So’m). In January, officials detained another 12 women—who had gathered in a
private home for religious readings—on charges of Hizb ut-Tahrir
membership.

Persistent Obstacles for Religious Minorities
Despite the passage of a revised religion law with a supposedly
streamlined registration process in July 2021, few non-Muslim religious communities have managed to obtain the legally required
registration. Only two Pentecostal churches and one Evangelicalchurch received registration in June and September 2022, respectively, since the adoption of those amendments. Numerous religious
communities that have sought registration in recent years remained
unregistered by year’s end.
Various communities reported to USCIRF that they were often
required to inform the government of their activities, that they limited some practices in light of the continued bans on proselytism
and missionary activity, and that some still could not import religious
literature. In a few instances, police subjected Jehovah’s Witnesses tointerrogation, seized their possessions, threatened them with fines forsharing their beliefs, and in one case searched an individual’s private
home. Forum 18 reported that in early 2022, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs ordered non-Muslim religious communities to install surveillance cameras in their places of worship, causing some members tocease attending services amid fears of possible retaliation.

Key U.S. Policy
As in recent years, the United States and Uzbekistan took steps tobuild closer relations in 2022, an effort exemplified by the numberof high-level visits paid by both countries to the other throughout
the year. For example, Assistant Secretary of State for South andCentral Asian Affairs Donald Lu traveled to Tashkent twice, in May
and November, to “advance our support for . . . freedom of religion
or belief,” among other priorities. In August, a congressional delegation that included Representative Trent Kelly (R-MS), cochair of
the Uzbekistan Caucus, and Representative Darin LaHood (R-IL) also
visited to discuss bilateral relations.
The U.S. government continued to prioritize religious freedom
concerns in the country at all levels of engagement. In December, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Foreign Minister Vladimir
Norov on the occasion of the two countries’ annual Strategic Partnership Dialogue, where Secretary Blinken highlighted his appreciation
for “the work being done on reforms, including on religious freedom.”
Similarly, visiting delegations from Uzbekistan regularly interactedwith the U.S. Department of State’s Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain and Under Secretary for
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya to discuss
freedom of religion or belief. Then U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan
Daniel N. Rosenblum frequently raised religious freedom issues in his
meetings and other public fora.

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BackgroundOTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

T

his section highlights some important developments and trends
that impacted religious freedom conditions around the worldin 2022, particularly—but not only—in countries and regions
not covered elsewhere in this report.

who oppose its religiously grounded laws occurred on U.S. soil; in early
2023, just after the reporting period, the U.S. Department of Justiceannounced details of an Iranian government conspiracy to kidnap
and return to Iran a Brooklyn-based Iranian American woman whose
activism opposes mandatory hijab laws and other religious restrictions
by Iran’s government.
Transnational Repression and Influence
Regarding other countries, Saudi Arabia also engaged in transby Religious Freedom Violators
national repression, including the monitoring of religious dissidents.
While abuser governments perpetrate most religious freedom violaIn August, a U.S. court convicted a former employee of Twitter after
tions within their own countries, several authoritarian governments
he “took bribes in exchange for accessing, monitoring, and conveying
often and insidiously seek to extend their religious repression beyond
the private information of Twitter users to officials of the Kingdom
their borders.
of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Royal family.” That case highlights
The Chinese government continued its transnational repression
the country’s ongoing efforts to monitor and suppress social media
campaigns throughout 2022, targeting ethnic and religious minoriactivity both inside and outside of its borders. Saudi authorities haveties, human rights activists, and others living in diaspora. It usedarrested scores of religious dissidents for their Twitter posts, senits economic and geopoliticaltencing some to decades ofinfluence to pressure foreign
imprisonment—including Salma
countries, including majorial-Shehab, a Saudi student in thety-Muslim countries such as
United Kingdom (UK) whom a
While abuser governments perpetrate
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United
Saudi court sentenced to an
Arab Emirates, and Kazakhstanastonishing 34 years in prison
most religious freedom violations withinto repatriate Uyghurs, Kazakhs,
for implying support for polititheir own countries, several authoritarianand others—sometimes throughcal dissidents on social media.
governments often and insidiously
the use of Interpol Red Notices.
Meanwhile, Forum 18 reported
seek to extend their religious repression
The Chinese government alsothat in October, Russian law
harassed and intimidated vicenforcement threatened to subbeyond their borders.
tims by threatening their family
mit Interpol Red Notices to seek
members in China and by sendthe extradition of two individuing or recruiting undercover
als targeted for their religious
agents to conduct transnational
belief or activity. Throughout
repression activities abroad on its behalf, including in the United
the year, USCIRF also received reports that government officials inStates. Reports emerged during the year revealing that China operUzbekistan continued to pursue or seek the extradition of Muslim
ates more than 100 overseas “police service stations” in at least 53
individuals who had fled abroad—typically to countries in Europe—tocountries, including one in New York City—causing concerns about
avoid prosecution on various religiously motivated charges, such as
their use to harass and intimidate ethnic minorities and dissidents
illegal possession or distribution of unauthorized religious materials.
abroad, including Uyghurs and Tibetans. In Thailand, approximately 60
members of the Protestant Shenzhen Holy Reformed Church, over 50
Religious Freedom Concerns in Europe
Uyghurs, and an ethnic Mongolian activist have experienced ongoingharassment and intimidation by Chinese officials operating in thatIn 2022, religious communities throughout Europe continued to facecountry and remained in fear of repatriation to China.
restrictions on certain religious practices and discrimination on the
Iran’s government continued to pursue religious minorities andbasis of their faith. As in years past, Muslims and Jews navigatedthose challenging the legal imposition of its religious interpretations
discriminatory policies and societal intolerance that increasingly
on Iranians without their consent. In Germany, the Islamic Revolutionthreatened their way of life, compelling some individuals to emigrate.
ary Guard Corps (IRGC) has overseen shooting and arson attacks on
Christian communities similarly faced rising prejudices.
synagogues. Religious minorities from Iran who fled to Turkey andSome European countries maintained restrictions on wearing
Europe faced threats and harassment from the IRGC on the basis ofreligious garb—an issue that impacts Jews, Sikhs, and other religious
their faith. Iranians seeking asylum in Turkey from religiously groundedgroups but most blatantly targets Muslim women and encourages
laws in their home country faced an ongoing threat of deportation andsocietal discrimination against them. In January, the French Senate
severe consequences. In some cases, Iran’s repression of individuals
approved an amendment to ban head coverings in sporting events,

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although the National Assembly had not moved to enact the ban byauthorities found bullet holes at a synagogue in Essen. Additionally,
the end of the year. In March, the Court of Cassation—France’s highvandals targeted synagogues in other countries, including Spain andest court—upheld a ban set by the Bar Council in Lille that prohibited
Italy, and desecrated Holocaust memorials in Lithuania and Greece.
the wearing of religious symbols in courtrooms, including head covAs in previous years, individuals also targeted Muslim cemeteries
erings. In May, the town council of the French city of Grenoble voted
throughout Europe, including in Germany and Sweden. Unknown
to permit women to wear a “burkini,” but France’s top administrative
individuals threw stones at a mosque in Sweden in September andcourt ruled against that decision. In August, a body of the rulingset fire to a mosque in the Netherlands in August.
political party in Denmark proposed a ban on hijabs for elementary
Vandalism and restrictive policies also targeted or impacted
school girls. In October, the Swiss government introduced a draft law
Christian communities. According to local clergy, arsonists likely set
to ban face coverings and fine violators up to approximately $1,100
fire to a church in Rautjarvi, Finland, during December Christmas(1,000 Swiss francs). The European Court of Justice ruled in Octoberservices, while in Paris, France, a suspicious fire seriously damaged athat prohibitions on religious symbols in the workplace is not discrimiRussian Orthodox Church on Easter Sunday. In addition, three Ausnatory if those restrictions are applied equally. Jews also experienced
trian churches were the targets of vandalism in the span of two weeks.
discrimination in manifesting their religion through their clothing; forIn December, UK authorities arrested a woman for silently praying
example, in March, a bus driver in Sweden refused to allow a Jewish
outside of an abortion clinic and charged her with violating a legal
man to board because he was wearing an unspecified “Jewish symbol”“buffer zone,” which bans protests around abortion clinics in certain
on his clothes.
UK localities.
European countries continued to debate the issue of ritualslaughter. State regulations requiring the stunning of animals before
Laws Restricting Religious Freedom
slaughter, with no religious exemptions, force Jews and Muslims to
In 2022, governments in various parts of the world maintained laws
abandon important religious practices and send them an exclusionary
based on religion that may result in violations of international stanmessage. In March, Greece dropped an amendment that, if passed,
dards regarding freedom of religion or belief. As USCIRF delineatedwould have allowed ritual slaughter of animals without pre-stunning.
in an issue brief in November, such governments repress religious
In the Belgian region of Brussels-Capital, the Federal Parliament of
freedom through laws and policies that coerce compliance with a
Belgium rejected a bill that would require pre-stunning of animals. A
particular religious interpretation, typically one that aligns with an
public petition to the government of the UK calling for a ban on ritual
official or state-favored religion. These sorts of laws can lead to severe
slaughter without pre-stunning ultimately did not garner enough votes
violations of freedom of religion or belief and other human rights,
for consideration by the British Parliament.
including discrimination on the basis of religion against individuals andAs part of stated efforts to counter “extremism,” governments
communities who do not adhere to the state’s interpretation. Targets
continued to single out Muslim communities for suspicion and placeof such discrimination include religious minorities, dissenters within
undue restrictions on mosques and affiliated spaces. In February 2023,
the majority faith, nonreligious
just after the reporting period,
persons, women, and members
French President Emmanuelof the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
Macron announced that France
transgender, queer, and intersex
had conducted nearly 28,000
As part of stated efforts to(LGBTQI+) community. USCIRF’s
investigations since 2019 tocounter “extremism,” governments
repor t found that althoughcombat “political Islamism.” Asthere is no inevitable contradica result, the government temcontinued to single out Muslim communities
tion between religious freedom
porarily or permanently closed
for suspicion and place undue restrictions on
and a country’s adoption of an
906 establishments, including
mosques and affiliated spaces.
official or favored religion, mostmosques, Qur’anic schools,
governments within this catebusinesses, and civil society
gory also maintained laws ororganizations, and seized overpolicies on the basis of religion$57.5 million (54 million euros).
that led to discrimination or repression. Far fewer countries—less thanReports of physical attacks against individuals on the basis ofa third—named an official or favored religion and yet maintained noreligion persisted throughout the year. For example, in January, indidiscriminatory laws or policies based on that religion.
viduals assaulted two Orthodox Jews in the UK and in September
Blasphemy laws remained one of the most pervasive and corverbally harassed and physically attacked Jews on public transportarosive ways that governments—in a variety of religious, cultural, andtion in Germany. In August, a man in France murdered his neighbor,political contexts—employed laws in 2022 to enforce a particular
Eyal Haddad, confessing to police that he did so because the victim
interpretation of an official or favored religion or to protect such a
was Jewish. During another incident in France, police officers physireligion. Such laws violate freedom of religion or belief, including thecally assaulted two Muslim women in May and attempted to forcibly
right to express a full range of thoughts and beliefs that others mightremove one’s hijab.
find blasphemous; they also violate freedom of expression and proThe vandalism of places of worship, holy sites, and other places
mote intolerance and discrimination against minorities.
of religious significance remained a threat to religious freedom in
As described in their respective chapters, a number of the counEurope throughout the year. Vandals desecrated Jewish cemeteries intries USCIRF recommends for Country of Particular Concern or Special
Greece, Germany, and Hungary, among other places. On Yom Kippur,
Watch List designation in this report maintain and enforce blasphemy
an unidentified individual broke a window during religious services
laws, leading to related prosecutions and, in some cases, to societal
at a synagogue in Hanover, Germany; mere weeks later, German

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violence such as mob attacks. However, blasphemy cases continued
demonstrates the ways in which the increasing enforcement of theseto emerge in other countries as well. For example, in August, cyberlaws as enshrined in criminal and Shari’a codes poses a significant risk
security specialists with Bahrain’s Office of the Public Prosecutor
to religious freedom for Nigerians—especially religious minorities
questioned and eventually recommended charges against three
and those who espouse unpopular or dissenting religious beliefs,
members of the Tajdeed Society, a Shi’a Muslim cultural organization,worldviews, or interpretations.
for YouTube videos in which they reportedly questioned elementsof traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Those individuals subsequently
Emerging Religious Freedom Concerns
stood trial on blasphemy-related charges beginning in February 2023,
in Other Countries
after the reporting period. In November, authorities in Mali issued a
In Belarus, religious freedom conditions continued to trend negawarrant to arrest a Kamite preacher on charges of blasphemy after
tively in 2022 as the government persisted in exerting control over all
he released a video that contained content that many considered
aspects of society following the country’s fraudulent 2020 election
insulting to Islam. Officials arrested six of the preacher’s followers forthat kept President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in power. Authorities
complicity when they refused to tell them where the man was hiding.
reportedly fined, detained, and sentenced at least 20 Christian reliSixteen European countries also maintained blasphemy laws—
gious leaders for perceived political activities and forced several toand in some cases enforced or sought to reinforce them in 2022. For
flee the country. In January, amendments to the Criminal Code took
example, in August, an Italian man who cursed in public received aeffect, recriminalizing with fines or up to two years’ imprisonment indifine of over $200 (200 euros) for violating Article 724 of the Criminal
vidual activities in unregistered or forcibly dissolved nongovernmental
Code, which penalizes blasphemy. In October, a Polish political party,
organizations, including religious organizations. In March, police
United Poland, submitted a proposal to parliament that would further
briefly detained four mothers of Belarusian soldiers for attending
expand the country’s existing blasphemy law by dropping a requireprayers for peace at the Orthodox Holy Spirit Cathedral in Minsk. In
ment that an individual actually take religious offense from another’s
September, the government closed the Roman Catholic Church ofactions. These actions stood in marked contrast to efforts elsewhereSaints Simon and Helena (Red Church) in Minsk—a symbol of politicalin Europe in recent years to repeal or nullify such laws, such as Norway
opposition to the Lukashenka regime during the 2020 protests—after(2015), Denmark (2017), Greece (2019), the Republic of Ireland (2020),
a mysterious fire broke out, and officials gave no timetable for theand Scotland (2021).
repairs they claimed to be making.
In addition to these lingering blasphemy laws in Europe, vague
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February,
and overbroad hate speech laws also remained a parallel legal chalUkrainian authorities increasingly scrutinized the Ukrainian Ortholenge to religious freedom. Such laws criminalize speech that does
dox Church (UOC)—which is historically and ecclesiastically linked
not amount to incitement to violence, denying the integral right ofto the Moscow Patriarchate—
individuals to peacefully anddespite the UOC declaring inpublicly share and express their
May its “full independence andreligious beliefs—including
autonomy.” The Security Serbeliefs that others in society may
Sixteen European countries also maintained
vice of Ukraine (SBU) searchedfind offensive or controversial.
hundreds of UOC churches
For example, Finnish prosecublasphemy laws—and in some casesand other religious facilities
tors charged MP Päivi Räsänen
enforced or sought to reinforce them in 2022
and opened criminal proceedand Evangelical Lutheran Bishop
ings against dozens of UOC
Juhana Pohjola with hate speechclergy for collaborating within 2021 for expressing religious
Russian authorities, spreading
beliefs concerning LGBTQ+
pro-Russian propaganda, or justifying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In
issues. Although a court dismissed all charges against them in March
November, a group of Ukrainian parliamentarians proposed a bill that,
2022, the Finnish prosecutor appealed the ruling in May and the Court
if passed into law, would ban the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) andof Appeals subsequently delayed a new hearing to August 2023.
religious organizations subordinate to the ROC, cancel property conUSCIRF highlighted several regional and country-specific contracts with ROC-aligned religious organizations, and regulate the use
texts in which blasphemy cases remained especially concerning inof the term “Orthodox” by religious groups. In December, President
2022. For example, USCIRF’s October issue update on related laws
Volodymyr Zelenskyy ordered his Cabinet of Ministers to also submit
in Southeast Asia found that blasphemy allegations and convictions
a bill to parliament that would make it “impossible for religious orgacontinued to represent serious, ongoing religious freedom abuse innizations affiliated with centers of influence in the Russian Federation
Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia, while Brunei’s Shari’a-based
to operate in Ukraine.” While the Ukrainian parliament had not passed
Penal Code also enshrined restrictive and punitive blasphemy laws.
any such legislation banning religious groups by the end of 2022, its
At the same time, the Buddhist-majority countries of Burma andpotential to still do so remained a serious concern.
Thailand maintained their own versions of blasphemy laws as part
In Qatar, the increasingly concerning trend of official discrimof their authoritarian arsenals. USCIRF’s December issue update on
ination against the country’s small Baha’i community continued.
blasphemy charges in Turkey delineated the ways in which the Turkish
For example, the government has not renewed residency visas forgovernment uses Article 216(3) of its Penal Code to restrict freedom
many Baha’is, despite their having lived peacefully in the country forof religion or belief and freedom of expression. Its use of blasphemy
decades, while plans for a new Baha’i cemetery remained in hiatus. In
charges is generally politically motivated and has served as a tool toMay, the Court of Cassation upheld the 2021 conviction of Remy Rousilence dissenting or simply different voices. USCIRF’s most recent
hani, chair of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Qatar,
policy update on blasphemy laws in Nigeria, released in October,

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on vague charges of financial crimes over his handling of money for
Combating Antisemitism: Positive Developmentsthat community. In March, the Baha’i International Community raised
While antisemitism continued to present an alarming resurgence inconcerns that Qatar’s Baha’i community is “at risk of being eradicatedvarious parts of the world in 2022, a number of countries in Europe,
from the country” should these trends persist long term.
Latin America, the Middle East, and North Africa launched or continThe Islamic State continued to pose a threat to freedom ofued substantive and ongoing initiatives to combat this trend.
religion or belief, gaining strength, territory, and fighters in several
The European Commission published a strategy in 2021 oncontexts. In addition to threats from the group discussed in the relecombating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life in Europe, which—vant country chapters—including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, , andamong other items—called for all European Union (EU) member
Turkey—affiliates in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congostates to develop their own national strategies on combating(DRC), and others continued to conduct attacks, harm civilians, andantisemitism. In 2022, Denmark and Germany joined the list of EU
enforce harsh interpretations of Islamic law in their campaigns tomember states to announce their individual strategies, followed byestablish governance based on their religious beliefs. For example,
France, Spain, and Sweden in early 2023, shortly after the reporting
the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Defense Forces (ADF) reportedly
period. However, Finland was the only additional EU member statecontinued to enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic law and commit
to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance working
egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief, including forced
definition of antisemitism and its examples in 2022. Outside of theprayer, conversion, and marriage.
EU, Bosnia also newly agreed to adopt the definition, and Croatia
In addition to violent threats from Islamic State affiliates, armed
followed suit in early 2023, just months after it created and filled thegroups in the DRC directly placed religious communities in their line
role of Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Croatia for Holocaustof fire, including targeting houses of worship. An attack in March
Issues and Combating Antisemitism in September. In another first,
by the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO) on a
Sweden appointed its first Special Investigator responsible for outchurch compound in Ituri Province killed 18 civilians seeking refuge
lining the status of the Jewish community in Sweden and proposing
there. Rwandan-backed armed group M23 also attacked worshipers
a national strategy on supporting Jewish life.
at an Adventist church in the context of a wider massacre that killed
In April, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Culan estimated 270 people in December in Kishishe.
tural Organization (UNESCO) partnered with the Latin American
In Ethiopia, armed actors targeted religious infrastructure in the
Jewish Congress to organize a workshop for policymakers fromcontext of the ongoing civil conflict in the Tigray and Oromia regions,
Latin America and the Caribbean to promote education to address
impacting worship for several faith communities. In Oromia, Ethioantisemitism, which 60 policymakers from 14 countries attended.
pian security forces attacked practitioners of an indigenous religion
In July, Israel’s Holocaust memorial center Yad Vashem launched
conducting a sacred prayer ceremony and abducted, tortured, anda collaborative effort with the Organization of American States
executed several spiritual leaders and other worshipers. Instability andCommissioner to Monitor
impunity for violence in Ethiopia
and Combat Anti-Semitism tohave also aggravated religious
translate educational materials
tensions in some regions andabout the Holocaust into Spanled to nonstate armed actors
Indigenous peoples in Latin America
ish. Yad Vashem officials also
attacking houses of worship andannounced a similar agreement
have
long
faced
a
seriesofreligious communities. In April,that month with Argenticollective and individual threats to thealleged anti-Muslim extremists
na’s Ministry of Education to
attacked the funeral of a Musfull enjoyment of their religious freedom
promote Holocaust-related
lim elder in the northern city ofand related rights . . .
educational and commemoraGondar and killed 20 members
tive activities in that country.
of that community. In NovemIn the Arabian Gulf
ber, an unidentified armed
region, some government s
group killed at least 15 worshipmoved for ward with recent
ers in a drone attack on an Evangelical Christian church in Oromia,
initiatives to promote Jewish life, implement school curricula that
following similar attacks on nearby sites earlier that month.
positively show Jews as entwined in the national and cultural fabMeanwhile, religious freedom conditions in various parts ofric, and spread Holocaust awareness. In January, the United Arab
South Asia continued to exhibit substantial challenges throughout theEmirates hosted its first official International Holocaust Rememyear. In Bangladesh, the Armed Police Battalion extorted, harassed,
brance Day commemoration at the Anwar Gargash Diplomaticand arbitrarily arrested Rohingya refugees, while government officials
Academy in Abu Dhabi, under Ministry of Culture and Education
imposed new restrictions making it more difficult for these refugees
sponsorship. In November, the privately run Crossroads of Civilito secure livelihood and for their children to receive education. Elsezations Museum in Dubai held the country’s first-ever Kristallnacht
where in the country, perpetrators also reportedly vandalized several
commemoration, hosting a Holocaust survivor for the event who
Hindu temples in a series of incidents in October and December,also subsequently appeared at a local school to share about her
echoing deadly anti-Hindu riots that targeted temples and worshipers
experiences. Bahrain’s Hammad Global Center for Peaceful Coexone year prior. Meanwhile, in July, a High Court in Nepal affirmed theistence also cohosted a Holocaust remembrance event in January
conviction of a pastor for illegal proselytization—despite the droppingin which Israeli President Isaac Herzog and former Ashkenazi Chiefof all charges against him one month prior—but revised his sentence
Rabbi Yisrael Meir Lau participated.
from two years’ imprisonment to one year and reportedly released
him on bail in January 2023, pending appeal.

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Religious Freedom Concerns for
Indigenous Peoples in Latin America
Indigenous peoples in Latin America have long faced a series of collective and individual threats to the full enjoyment of their religious
freedom and related rights: lack of recognition of ancestral landownership, state absence and organized crime, extraction of natural
resources by legal and illegal companies, breakdown of the social
fabric, and dispossession of land by appropriation. Although not allthese areas of concern unambiguously connect to religious freedom
from a Western perspective, the holistic nature of most indigenous
worldviews in the region means that indigenous groups often indeed
perceive and experience them as religious freedom violations. For
example, in Nicaragua, the government canceled the legal status ofa number of indigenous nongovernmental organizations in March,
including the Center for Justice and Human Rights of the Atlantic
Coast of Nicaragua, which focuses on environmental development
and defending the customs and sacred territories of the country’s
native communities. Additionally, in July—in a case that illustrates

issues that other indigenous communities also face—illegal miners in Peru attacked leaders of the Sua Panki, Tufino, Wawain, andMamayaque communities in the Department of Amazonas. This sort ofharassment and violence forces the displacement of these traditional
communities and serves to break their social fabrics.
Religious freedom concerns also impact indigenous individuals
across Latin America through several other key issues: conversion,
contributions to patronal feasts, construction of places of worship,proselytism and religious education, and renunciation of ancestral
practices and expulsion from communal property. Indigenous community leaders themselves have often perpetrated related violations,although organized crime as well as revolutionaries and paramilitarygroups have also contributed to these challenges. Researchers at theObservatory of Religious Freedom in Latin America documented 497
such incidents in 2022 in Chile, Mexico, and Colombia; in one such
incident, authorities of San Juan Mazatlán in Mexico detained 15
indigenous individuals from six different families from an evangelical
Christian community for not contributing to local Catholic festivities.

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KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONSIMPLEMENTED

T

he International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), as
amended, mandates USCIRF to make independent policy
recommendations to the president, secretary of state, andCongress. The recommendations are based on USCIRF’s research on
religious freedom conditions abroad and assessment of U.S. policy. In
addition, USCIRF’s mandate includes tracking the U.S. government’s
implementation of USCIRF’s recommendations and reviewing, to theextent practicable, the effectiveness of such implemented recommendations in advancing religious freedom internationally. While notable
U.S. government actions pursuant to USCIRF’s recommendations
are detailed throughout this report, this section highlights the key
USCIRF recommendations implemented during 2022 and early 2023,
including several longstanding recommendations. The list, which is not
exhaustive, is meant to showcase the effectiveness of U.S. government
actions resulting from the implementation of USCIRF’s recommendations. Unless otherwise noted, the recommendations highlighted here
were included in USCIRF’s 2022 Annual Report.

Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions■

USCIRF has consistently called on the U.S. government to increase
the use of human rights related financial and visa authorities toimpose asset freezes and/or visa bans on individuals and entities for severe religious freedom violations, citing specific abuses.
Over the course of 2022, the U.S. government issued sanctions
under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act(Global Magnitsky Act) and other authorities against individuals
and entities specifically for religious freedom abuses. Significant
sanctions issued during the year for religious freedom abuses arelisted below.
■■

Designating the Worst Violators■■■

On November 30, 2022, the U.S. Department of State designated
12 countries as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) under
IRFA. USCIRF recommended that the State Department designate
10 of the 12 countries as CPCs. The two countries that USCIRF
did not recommend for CPC status but that the State Department designated as such—Cuba and Nicaragua, which USCIRF
had recommended for the State Department’s Special Watch List
(SWL)—experienced severe deteriorations in religious freedom
conditions after USCIRF issued its 2022 Annual Report.

■■

Alongside the CPC designations, the State Department placed four
countries on its SWL under IRFA. USCIRF recommended two ofthese countries—Algeria and the Central African Republic (CAR)—
for such placement. CAR was added to the SWL for the first time.
At the same time, the State Department also designated nine
nonstate actors as “entities of particular concern,” seven of which
USCIRF recommended for such designation.

■■

USCIRF recommended that the Joseph R. Biden administration fill
and maintain the position of Special Envoy for North Korean Human
Rights Issues. In January 2023, after the reporting period, the Biden
administration nominated Julie Turner to serve as Special Envoy
with the rank of Ambassador.

In September, twice in October, in November, and twice inDecember, the Treasury Department sanctioned Iranian officials
for their brutal crackdown on demonstrators protesting Mahsa
Zhina Amini’s death in police custody. Prior to her death, Iran’s“Morality Police” arrested and tortured Amini for wearing an“improper hijab.”
In October, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced
the imposition of visa restrictions against current and former
Taliban officials responsible for violence against women andrestrictive policies based on the group’s interpretation of religion,such as barring girls from attending secondary school.
In December, the Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese public security officials responsible for human rights and religious
freedom violations in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
In December, the Treasury Department sanctioned North Korea’s
Ministry of State Security Border Guard General Bureau forhuman rights violations, including forced labor and torture.

Designation of Rohingya Genocide■

Filling IRF-Related Appointments

In September, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned“judges” serving in Russian-occupied Crimea who imposed harshsentences on members of religious minority groups for exercising
their religious freedoms.

In March 2022, the State Department determined that the atrocities committed by the Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw,
against the Rohingya constitute genocide and crimes against
humanity, an action that USCIRF had been recommending since2019. Four days after the determination, the Treasury Department
sanctioned Burmese military units, commanders, and arms dealers.
USCIRF has highlighted the importance of a genocide determination to the Rohingya community and how to hold perpetrators ofmass atrocities accountable.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

77

K E Y USC I R F R ECO M M E N DAT I O N S I M PL E M E N T E D I N 2022

Raising IRF Issues in Multilateral Engagement■■

USCIRF recommended that the Biden administration maintain the
United States’ leadership role in the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA). In 2022, the United States continued
to serve as the Secretariat for IRFBA. During the year, IRFBA mademulticountry statements on egregious religious freedom violations
in Nicaragua and Nigeria, the rights of religious minority groups
such as the Baha’i and Ahmadiyya Muslim communities to practicetheir faith freely, and the incompatibility of blasphemy laws withfreedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression.
USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government prioritize freedomof religion or belief in the United States’ renewed engagement with
the United Nations (UN) human rights system, including at the UN
Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In 2022, the United States served
the first year of a three-year term as a member of the UNHRC.
During the year, the U.S. government cosponsored a resolution on
Freedom of Religion or Belief, supported calling an urgent debate
about ongoing human rights violations against women and girls
in Afghanistan, and supported convening a special session andestablishing a fact-finding mission on Iran’s human rights violations
following Mahsa Zhina Amini’s death in police custody. In addition,
the U.S. government supported a resolution that removed Iran fromthe UN Commission on the Status of Women, organized eventson protecting ethnic and religious minority groups in Afghanistan
and protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief for Tibetan
Buddhists, and joined a 47-country joint statement on human rights
conditions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet.

Freedom Rashad Hussain traveled to Turkey to meet with Turkish
government officials, civil society groups, and religious communities on religious freedom related issues.
■

■

■

■

■
■

■

USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government collaborate withand encourage multilateral organizations, such as the Organizationof American States (OAS), to monitor and investigate religious
freedom violations that occur in Nicaragua. In August, the OAS
adopted a resolution strongly condemning the harassment of andarbitrary restrictions placed on religious organizations in Nicaragua.
USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government increase engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
to stem ongoing religious freedom violations and promoteaccountability in Burma. In May, the U.S. government hosted a
U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit and released a joint statement callingfor an immediate cessation of violence in Burma. In November,President Biden attended the 10th Annual U.S.-ASEAN Summit inCambodia and elevated U.S.-ASEAN relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral Engagement■■

USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government urge relevant
Algerian government officials to deliver clear and timely responses
to registration requests by non-Muslim organizations as requiredby Ordinance 06-03. In 2022, U.S. government officials, including
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman, raised issues
surrounding religious organization registration with Algerian government officials and other relevant stakeholders.
USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government prioritize travel toTurkey for officials at the highest levels of the Office of International
Religious Freedom to meet with Turkish counterparts and raiseissues related to freedom of religion or belief and antisemitism. In
September, U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious

78 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government conduct a comprehensive review of all U.S. assistance to Egypt and continue towithhold a portion of Foreign Military Financing for specified international religious freedom violations. Congress conditioned up to$300 million of the $1.3 billion annual Foreign Military Financing aid
package to Egypt on human rights improvements. In September,the administration chose to withhold $130 million.
USCIRF recommended that Congress incorporate religious freedom concerns into its larger oversight of the U.S.-Iraq bilateralrelationship through hearings, letters, and congressional delegations. In November, House Veterans Affairs Committee members
traveled to Iraq and raised religious freedom issues.
USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government grant a waiver ofsanctions in the areas governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. In May, the U.S. government issued ageneral license authorizing wider forms of private economic activity
in areas of northeast and northwest Syria outside the control of
President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government continue to allocate funding for humanitarian assistance, including for refugees,
internally displaced persons, and returnees in CAR. In 2022, theU.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) maintained its
support for CAR, including through health and nutrition assistanceas well as water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance; protection
programs for CAR’s most vulnerable populations; and shelter andsettlement support.
USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government provide financial,administrative, and diplomatic support to CAR’s Special Criminal
Court (SCC), including urging the CAR government to cease all
obstructions to such investigations. In 2022, the U.S. government
continued to support the SCC, including through statements recognizing the body’s accomplishments.

Implementation of Executive Order 13926 Advancing International Religious Freedom■■

USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government, in its engagements with Turkish government officials, press for the reopeningof the Theological School of Halki. In 2022, Office of International
Religious Freedom staff visited the Theological School of Halki andurged Turkey to allow the seminary to reopen.

USCIRF has called on the Biden administration to continue to implement the executive order on Advancing International Religious
Freedom, signed by then President Donald J. Trump in June 2020.
The executive order included several of USCIRF’s longstanding
recommendations related to the prioritization of religious freedom in U.S. foreign policy. This included increasing related foreignassistance and developing an overall strategy for promoting religious freedom abroad and country-specific action plans. In 2022,
the Biden administration implemented the executive order in thefollowing ways:■

The State Department continued to pursue country-specific action plans, again dedicated $50 million to IRF-related

K E Y USC I R F R ECO M M E N DAT I O N S I M PL E M E N T E D I N 2022

programming, and continued to provide training on IRF issues
to foreign service officers.
■■

USAID continued to advance religious freedom within its priorities and programming, including through activities to address
the needs of vulnerable religious minority communities in various
parts of the world as well as organizational initiatives such as
the IRF Sector Council to foster agency-wide coordination andcooperation.

■■

The State Department condemned the Russian government’s
imprisonment of Jehovah’s Witnesses for holding religious
meetings.
The U.S. Mission in Vietnam advocated for access to religious
materials and clergy for persons who were incarcerated.
Members of Congress advocated for the release of RPOCs,
including by adopting RPOCs through the Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission’s (TLHRC) Defending Freedoms Project andspeeches on the Senate floor.

Refugee Resettlement■■

USCIRF has consistently recommended that the U.S. government
maintain a robust refugee resettlement program and that victimsof the most severe religious persecution be prioritized. In September 2022, the Biden administration maintained the annual refugee
ceiling at 125,000 for FY 2023.

Enforcement of China-Related
Human Rights Legislation■

USCIRF recommended that Congress reauthorize the Lautenberg
Amendment to aid persecuted Iranian religious minorities seeking refugee status in the United States. In March, the Lautenberg
Amendment was reauthorized.

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal■

USCIRF has repeatedly recommended that successive administrations address the longstanding flaws in the treatment of asylum
seekers in expedited removal that USCIRF has identified in reports
issued in 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2016.
■

In March 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a new rule that
authorizes asylum officers from the United States Citizenship andImmigration Services (USCIS) to consider the asylum applicationsof individuals subject to expedited removal who assert a fear of
persecution or torture and pass the required credible fear screening, as USCIRF had recommended. Prior to the new rule, USCIS
asylum officers could only conduct an initial screening to evaluate
whether an applicant’s fear of persecution or torture was credible.
If the asylum officers found the fear credible, then the application
would be referred to an immigration judge for consideration.

USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government enforce China-related human rights legislation to ensure that U.S. companies do
not contribute to religious freedom violations in China. In June,
the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) went into effectand U.S. Customs and Border Protection began implementationof the law by prohibiting imports from Xinjiang. In August, DHS
published its UFLPA entities list identifying foreign companies
involved in human rights violations in Xinjiang. Foreign companies
appearing on the entities list are presumed to produce products
wholly or in part with forced labor, and as such their products
are prohibited entry at U.S. ports of entry. In December, the U.S.
Department of Commerce added Tianjin Tiandi Weiye Technologies to its entities list for the company’s human rights violationsin China, including against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other membersof Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang. As such, the company will
be subject to import restrictions.

Congressional Action Promoting
Religious Freedom■

USCIRF recommended that Congress highlight international religious freedom issues through legislation, hearings, briefings, andother actions.
■■

Advocacy for Religious Prisoners of Conscience■■

USCIRF has recommended that U.S. government officials and members of Congress press foreign governments for the release ofreligious prisoners of conscience (RPOCs). Pursuant to this recommendation, U.S. officials actively engaged on RPOC cases aroundthe world.
■■

The State Department strongly condemned the Burmese government’s arrest and detention of Reverend Hkalam Samson
and called for his release. Reverend Samson has been one of
Burma’s most respected religious leaders and a prominent voice
for peace.

In April, Congress passed and the president signed into law thepermanent reauthorization of the Global Magnitsky Act.
In December, Congress passed and the president signed into
law the Burma Act.
In 2022, Congress held several hearings on international religious
freedom issues. Those hearings include a House Foreign Affairs
Committee hearing on the Burma crisis one year after the coup,
TLHRC hearings on discrimination against Muslims worldwide
and the perilous state of religious freedom in Nicaragua, andCongressional Executive Commission on China hearings on China’s control of religion through digital authoritarianism, growing
constraints on language and ethnic identity in China, and humanrights abuses in Tibet.

The State Department marked the 33rd birthday of Gedhun
Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama, who has been missing
since the Chinese government abducted him as a six-year-old
child, and urged the Chinese government to account for his
whereabouts and wellbeing.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

79

APPENDIX 1 COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES
Nury Turkel, Chair

Abraham Cooper, Vice Chair

REAPPOINTED BYAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), then Speaker of
the U.S. House of Representatives, for aterm expiring in May 2024. Lawyer, author,
human rights advocate, Senior Fellow at
the Hudson Institute, and member of theCouncil on Foreign Relations.

Hon. Mitch McConnell (R), Senate Minority
Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024.
Associate Dean and Director of Global Social
Action for the Simon Wiesenthal Center, aleading Jewish human rights organization.

David Curry, Commissioner

Frederick A. Davie, Commissioner

APPOINTED BY

REAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Kevin McCarthy (R), then House Minority
Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024. President and CEO of Global Christian Relief,
an international ministry that advocates onbehalf of those who are persecuted for their
Christian faith.

Hon. Charles Schumer (D), Senate Majority Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024.
Senior Strategic Advisor at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City and Senior
Advisor on Racial Equity at Interfaith America.

Sharon Kleinbaum, Commissioner

Mohamed Magid, Commissioner

APPOINTED BYAPPOINTED BY

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term
expiring in May 2023. Spiritual leader of Congregation Beit Simchat Torah in New York
City and Commissioner on New York City's
Commission on Human Rights.

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term
expiring in May 2024. Executive Religious
Director and Imam of All Dulles Area Muslim
Society Center, Chairman of International
Interfaith Peace Corps, member of the Muslim Jewish Council, Co-President of Religions
for Peace, and Co-Founder of the Multi-faith
Neighbors Network.

Stephen Schneck, Commissioner

Eric Ueland, Commissioner

APPOINTED BYAPPOINTED BY

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term expiring in May 2024. Political philosopher andretired professor from The Catholic University of America. Catholic advocate for social
justice and serves on the governing boardsof Catholic Climate Covenant and Catholic
Mobilizing Network.

Hon. Mitch McConnell (R), Senate Minority
Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024.
Visiting Fellow at the Heritage Institutewith history of service in the United States
Congress, the executive branch, and theprivate sector.

Frank Wolf, Commissioner
APPOINTED BY

Hon. Kevin McCarthy (R), then House Minority
Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024.
Retired U.S. Member of Congress, Founderand former Co-Chairman of the Tom Lantos
Human Rights Commission.

APPENDIX 1

81

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION
OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

Introduction
The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), as amended
by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2016,
requires USCIRF to:make publicly available, to the extent practicable . . . lists ofpersons it determines are imprisoned or detained, have disappeared, been placed under house arrest, been tortured,or subjected to forced renunciation of faith for their religious
activity or religious freedom advocacy by the governmentof a foreign country that the Commission recommends fordesignation as a country of particular concern [CPC] . . . orby a nonstate actor that the Commission recommends fordesignation as an entity of particular concern [EPC].
USCIRF developed the Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB)
Victims List—an online public database—to implement this provision
for countries USCIRF recommends for Country of Particular Concern(CPC) or Special Watch List (SWL) status. The list also includes such
victims located in the de facto territories of nonstate actors that
USCIRF recommends for Entity of Particular Concern (EPC) status,
according to the same criteria.

Perpetrator

Not
Released

Algeria

5

Azerbaijan

6

Due to limited resources, USCIRF is unable to identify and document
all victims that meet the statutory requirement to be included on the FoRB
Victims List and generally relies on receiving submissions from outside
individuals and organizations. As such, the information contained in the
database does not reflect country, regional, or global trends. Furthermore, percentages highlighted in this section should not be used forextrapolation purposes nor interpreted as a particular group experiencing
greater violations than another or a particular country committing violations at a greater rate than others. To support this project, USCIRF invites
those with credible information on victims to submit information using theVictims List Intake Form. Additional information about the FoRB Victims
List can be found in USCIRF’s FoRB Victims List Factsheet.

Perpetrators
By the end of 2022, the FoRB Victims List included nearly 2,000 individuals
targeted by 26 different countries and entities. More than 1,400 victims
remain in some form of custody, while more than 300 have been released.
The detention status of approximately 200 cases remains unknown, andsix individuals are listed as deceased after dying in state custody. The
following table provides a breakdown of the data by country.

Released

Died in
Custody

Unknown

Total
5

3

2

11

29

146

753

Burma

4

China

578

4

Cuba

8

1

2

11

Egypt

2

12

1

15

Eritrea25

24

1

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Houthis

1

1

India

44

10

1

119

1

Indonesia

167

Iraq

2
11

Nicaragua

9

Nigeria

6

55
1

7

7

294
2

Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP)
Malaysia

2
2

6

Iran

Kazakhstan

50
2

3

1

1

1

15

4

4
9

3

9

APPENDIX 2

83

A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

Perpetrator

Not
Released

Released

Died in
Custody
1

North Korea

1

Pakistan

61

21

Unknown
8

Total
9
83

Russia318

50

Saudi Arabia

38

6

1

369

Tajikistan

9

3

12

Turkmenistan

6

21

27

Uzbekistan

5230

Vietnam

59

6

2

10

77

Total

1,418

339

6

189

1,952

44

82

Based on the information maintained in the database, the following chart reflects the percentage of individuals imprisoned by country.
Among the violators, China imprisoned the most FoRB victims, followed by Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, India, Eritrea, and Saudi
Arabia. Victims from all other countries and entities individually constituted one percent or less than one percent of the victims in the database.

VICTIMS BY PERPETRATOR

84 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

Religions and Beliefs
The FoRB Victims List contains individuals with a wide variety of beliefs
and religions, as reflected in the following table.

Religion or Belief

Number of Victims
Documented

Adivasi

1Baha’i

129

Bon

1

Buddhist - Hoa Hao

6

Buddhist - Theravada

3

Buddhist - Tibetan

73

Buddhist - Unspecified/Other

28

Christian - Catholic

40

Christian - Church of Almighty
God

236

Christian - Jehovah’s Witness

227

Christian - Orthodox

14

Christian - Protestant

113

Christian - Unspecified/Other

62

Duong Van Minh

4

ECKist (Eckankar)

1

Erfan-e Halgheh Practitioner

2

Falun Gong

208

Hindu

11

Humanist

1

Jewish1

Muslim - Ahmadiyya

22Muslim – Qur’anist

1

Muslim - Shi’a37

Muslim - Sufi

61

Muslim - Sunni

300

Muslim - Unspecified/Other

264

Santería

5

Scientologist

1

Shaman1

Sikh

1

Yarsani37

Unknown/Unspecified

61

Total

1,952

APPENDIX 2

85

A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

The following chart provides a percentage for the individuals, based on their religion or belief, maintained in the database.

VICTIMS BY RELIGION OR BELIEF

86 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

Nature of Charges
Individuals included on the FoRB Victims List face a range of charges inseveral different legal contexts. USCIRF created groupings for similar
charges to identify how foreign governments and entities justify theincarceration of the individuals included on the FoRB Victims List.
USCIRF’s categories are not mutually exclusive, and individuals areoften included in more than one category based on varying charges
brought against them. While USCIRF excludes from the FoRB Victims
List individuals known to have committed or promoted violence, many
individuals on the list face unsubstantiated accusations of violent
crimes by the foreign government.
USCIRF is in the process of identifying charges for more than aquarter of the victims. Dozens of victims are not facing any charges,
yet they remain imprisoned or have been subjected to other violations
included on the FoRB Victims List that do not involve legal charges,
such as enforced disappearance or forced renunciation of faith.

Nature of Charges
Categories

Number of
Individuals
Charged

PercentageofIndividuals
Charged

14

1%

Apostasy

4< 1%Arms Trafficking & Illicit Useof Weapons

32

2%

Assault & Battery

9

< 1%

Banned Organization

473

24%

Blasphemy100

5%

Aid & Abetment

Breach of Privacy & Disclosure

2

< 1%

Conversion

29

1%

Crimes Involving Minors

4

< 1%

Criminal Premeditation &Conspiracy

26

1%

Cult

309

Nature of Charges
Categories

Number of
Individuals
Charged

PercentageofIndividuals
Charged52

3%Immorality

9

< 1%

Incitement to Commit Crime& Violence

43

2%

Insulting Public Officials& Institutions

9

< 1%

Leaking State Secrets

4

< 1%

Mercenarism

2

< 1%

Miscellaneous Religious Crimes

14

1%

Murder & Attempted Murder

27

1%

Negligence

1

< 1%

No Charges/Not Applicable

65

3%Illicit Financing

16%

Public Disorder

91

5%

Refusing & Absconding
Military Service

23

1%

Defamation

2

< 1%

Drug Trafficking & Illicit Drug Use

9

< 1%

Embezzlement & Fraud

9

< 1%

Separatism

28

1%

165

8%

4%

257

13%

Spreading Propaganda &False or Misleading Ideas,
Information, or Materials

Fabricating &Destroying Evidence

5

< 1%

Subversion

76

Filing a False Police Report

3

< 1%

Terrorism

270

14%

Forgery

7

< 1%

3

< 1%

Harboring a Fugitive

5

< 1%

Hate Speech

108

6%

Illegal Assembly

118

6%

Illegal Business Activity

5

< 1%

Illegal Migration &Entry/Exit of Country

6

< 1%

Environmental Crimes
Extremism

1< 1%

Theft & Robbery
Threat2< 1%

Treason & Sedition

197

10%

Unlawful Disobedience

49

3%

Violating Prison Rules

11

1%

Unknown

559

29%

APPENDIX 2

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A PPE N D I X 2 FR E E D O M O F R E L I G I O N O R B E L I E F V I C T I MS L I S T

The following chart hightlights the top 10 most common types of charges for individuals on the FoRB Victims List.

TOP TEN MOST COMMON CHARGES

88 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3

APPENDIX 3 HIGHLIGHTS OF
USCIRF’S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES IN 2022

In addition to releasing an Annual Report by May 1 of each year,
USCIRF produces research and additional information related tointernational religious freedom throughout the year. This Appendix
highlights USCIRF’s events and other materials from calendar year
2022. USCIRF’s 2022 press releases and statements and op-eds areavailable on USCIRF’s website at www.uscirf.gov. USCIRF’s 2022
Tweets can be found here.

Hearings:
■
■

■
■

■

■

■
■

February 2022: Anti-Muslim Policies and Bias in Europe
March 2022: Women’s Roles in Advancing International
Religious Freedom

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■

■
■

January 2022: Religious Freedom in Tajikistan in 2021
(Country Update)February 2022: Religious Freedom in Vietnam in 2021
(Country Update)
March 2022: Religious Freedom in Iraq in 2021
(Country Update)
March 2022: Religious Freedom in Russia and Regions under
Russian Occupation (Backgrounder)
April 2022: 2022 Annual Report
May 2022: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution
Globally (Factsheet)

May 2022: Freedom of Religion or Belief in Syria■

August 2022: Religious Freedom in Afghanistan: One Yearsince the Taliban Takeover■

September 2022: Religious Freedom, Violence, and U.S. Policyin Nigeria■

October 2022: U.S. Policy and Freedom of Religion or Belief inNorth Korea■

July 2022: Religious Freedom in Iran in 2022 (Country Update)November 2022: Crackdown on Religious Freedom in Nicaragua■

July 2022: Religious Propaganda in Iran (Special Report)

December 2022: China’s Religious Freedom Violations:
Domestic Repression and Malign Influence Abroad

Events:■Publications:February 2022: Global Compact on Refugees
March 2022: The Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
and the State of International Religious Freedom (Congressional Briefing)

■

■

■

■

May 2022: Pursuing Justice and Accountability: Next Steps for
the Rohingya Community of Burma (Factsheet)
June 2022: Increasing Religious Freedom Restrictions on
Baha’is in Qatar (Factsheet)
July 2022: Constitutional Reform and Religious Freedom in
Cuba (Special Report)

July 2022: Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and the Right to
Freedom of Religion, Thought, and Conscience in North Korea(Special Report)
August 2022: Religious Freedom in Pakistan in 2022
(Country Update)August 2022: Religious Freedom in Nicaragua in 2022
(Country Update)August 2022: Religious Freedom in Afghanistan(Country Update)

April 2022: 2022 Annual Report: Key Findings andRecommendations■

June 27, 2022: An Unflinching Voice: USCIRF’s Impact on International Religious Freedom (Congressional Briefing)■

August 2022: Constitutional Reform and Religious Freedom in
Cuba■

September 2022: Assessing Religious Freedom in Egyptian
Curriculum Reform■

November 2022: Iranian Government Propaganda against
Religious Minorities■

October 2022: Blasphemy Laws in Nigeria (Policy Update)■November 2022: Law and Religion in Algeria (Factsheet)■

August 2022: Assessing Religious Freedom in Egyptian
Curriculum Reform (Special Report)
September 2022: Uzbekistan: Space for Reform(Country Update)
September 2022: Violence and Religious Freedom in Nigeria(Policy Update)
October 2022: Blasphemy and Related Laws in ASEAN
Member Countries (Issue Update)November 2022: Implications of Laws Promoting StateFavored Religions (Issue Brief)

APPENDIX 3

89

A PPE N D I X 3 H I G H L I G H T S O F USC I R F 'S PU B L I C AC T I V I T I E S I N 2022

■

■

■

■

■
■

■
■

■

■

■

November 2022: Religious Freedom Conditions in India(Country Update)■November 2022: Religious Freedom in Syria under Hay’at
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (Factsheet)■

December 2022: Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) Victims
List (Factsheet)■

December 2022: Blasphemy Charges in Turkey (Issue Update)
December 2022: Tolerance, Religious Freedom, andAuthoritarianism (Special Report)
December 2022: Religious Freedom in Burma (Policy Update)
December 2022: Religious Freedom Conditions in Cuba(Country Update)
December 2022: Kazakhstan’s Religion Law Amendments(Issue Update)
December 2022: Religious Freedom Conditions in Saudi Arabia(Country Update)
December 2022: State-Controlled Religion and Religious
Freedom Violations in China (Factsheet)

January 2022: Worrying Trends for Religious Freedom inCentral and Eastern Africa■

January 2022: Christians in Extreme Danger in Afghanistan■

February 2022: Nicaragua’s Assault on Religious Freedom

■
■

■

■

■

■

July 2022: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions inSouth Asia
July 2022: U.S. Policy Advances for International Religious
Freedom over the Past Year
August 2022: Russia’s Religious Freedom Violations in Ukraine
August 2022: The Impact of Malaysia’s Dual Legal System on
Religious Freedom■

August 2022: Troubling Signs for Religious Freedom in Sri Lanka■

August 2022: The 5th Anniversary of the Rohingya Genocide■

September 2022: The Plight of Christians in China

■

■

■

■

September 2022: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions
in Nicaragua
September 2022: Religious Prisoners of Conscience in
Kazakhstan
September 2022: Turkmenistan’s Tight Grip on Religious
Freedom
October 2022: The Nexus of Religious Freedom & Women’s
Rights in Iran■

October 2022: The Legacy of Blasphemy Laws in Southeast Asia

February 2022: Iraq’s Beleaguered Religious Minority
Communities
March 2022: Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Part 1:“Denazification” Narrative■

March 2022: Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Part 2:
The Religious Regulation Framework■

March 2022: The Status of Religious Freedom for the Baha’i
Community
April 2022: Rohingya Genocide Determination andAccountability

April 2022: USCIRF Releases 2022 Annual Report with
Recommendations for U.S. Policy
May 2022: Anti-Conversion Laws and Growing Intolerance in India
May 2022: Content Moderation Online and Its Impact on
Religious Freedom
May 2022: Treatment of Asylum Seekers in the Expedited
Removal Process■

June 2022: Uzbekistan: Gaps in Principles and Practice■June 2022: Religious Prisoners of Conscience in Iran■July 2022: Religious Freedom Takeaways on the Ground in
Nigeria■

April 2022: Persecuted Christians around the World■■

July 2022: Conditions for Religious and Nonbelief Communities in Turkey

February 2022: The Grim Backdrop to the Beijing Olympics

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July 2022: Preview of the 2022 International Ministerial Conference on Freedom of Religion or Belief

October 2022: Russia’s Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses

April 2022: Nontheists Facing Challenges to Freedom of Belief■■

June 2022: Preview of the IRF Summit 2022

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November 2022: Religious Freedom Conditions in Sri Lanka(Country Update)

Spotlight Podcast Episodes:■■

June 2022: Religious Freedom Backslides in Central African
Republic

90 U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 2 3■

October 2022: Civil Society’s Important Role in Promoting
Freedom of Religion or Belief
November 2022: Recovering from Genocide: The Yazidis’
Return to Sinjar
November 2022: The Persecution of Muslims in Tajikistan
November 2022: The Suffocating Hold of HTS on
Northwest Syria■

November 2022: The Alevi Struggle for Rights in Turkey■

December 2022: Preview of IRF Summit 2023■

December 2022: Reflecting on USCIRF’s Visit to Cox’s Bazar■

December 2022: Breaking Down the State Department’s
IRF Designations

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R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S■ CO U N T R I E S O F PA R T I C U L A R CO N C E R N ■Afghanistan

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Pakistan

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Iran

RussiaVietnam

China

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Nigeria

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Tajikistan■ S P E C I A L WAT C H L I S T CO U N T R I E S ■Algeria

Egypt

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TurkeyAzerbaijan

Indonesia

Malaysia

Uzbekistan

Central African Republic

Iraq

Sri Lanka

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714
Washington, DC 20401
Telephone: (202) 523–3240
www.uscirf.gov