AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPS

RIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security

Editorial Advisory Board:

No. 184

Akio Watanabe (Chair)
Masashi Nishihara
Yoshiji Nogami
Taizo Yakushiji

11 September 2013

Editorial Committee:

STRATEGY SHARING RATHER THAN
REFLECTION SHARING (1): A
PRINCIPLE FOR PROACTIVE
RELATIONS WITH KOREA(PART 1 OF 2)

Taizo Yakushiji
Hisayoshi Ina
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Shujiro Urata andToshiro Iijima
Editor & Online Publisher:
Yoshji Nogami
President, JIIA

Kazuo Ogoura
Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations appear to
be strained in the political and diplomatic domains.
The current situation is, in particular, a source ofserious concern for many observers ofinternational relations in Japan, as the present
state of affairs, unlike previous phases of bilateral
tension, has come after the Kim-daejung
administration in the ROK and the government led
by Obuchi in Japan, under which the two countries
seemed to overcome at last the negative legacy ofthe past and to put their bilateral relations on a“future-orientated” course.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

The enormous increase of cultural exchanges between Japan and theROK, which was partly caused by the Kanryu boom in Japan but also spurred by
Kim-daejung’s open door policy for Japanese cultural inflow to the ROK, added a
new dimension to the bilateral relations.
One of the most important aspects of this period, at least viewed from theJapanese side, was a clear recognition by the ROK government that post-warJapan had contributed substantially to the economic development andestablishment of democratic rule in the ROK. In other words, the good and solid
relations between the two countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s werebased upon two undercurrents or policy stances.
One was the Japanese stance, namely to join hands with the ROK toachieve recovery from the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s and to promotecultural exchanges between the two countries, particularly among young people,
so that they may be able to view each other emancipated from the negative
legacies of the past.
The other undercurrent was the policy stance of the ROK government: topromote or strengthen the democratic trend in the ROK and to implement a“Sunshine Policy” towards North Korea.
Ironically, it was just such a policy stance that inadvertently absorbed thenationalist sentiment of Koreans. Kim-daejung’s policy did not cause theJapanese bitter feelings towards the ROK over the latter’s persistence in raising
issues related to history.
Again paradoxically, the Sunshine Policy towards the North did notengender much tension with Japan as the Japanese policy towards the Northwas too much focused on the issue of abduction and there was no clear“strategy” underlying its policy towards North Korea.
There was also the China factor. China, which already loomed in thebackground as an important factor to be considered in Japan-ROK relations, didnot, because of its undemocratic political system, reflect a disproportional
importance in ROK diplomacy. In addition, the distance that the Kim-daejung
government maintained in relation to the business community put some
restraints on the ROK’s political approach towards China.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary2

AJISS-CommentaryThe Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Moreover, the fairly stable and friendly relations between Japan andChina during that period did not, at least in Japan’s view, create a situation inwhich the ROK and China formed a common front against Japan. In other words,
neither Japan nor the ROK thought of using the “China card” in dealing with eachother.
During the Kim-daejung administration and immediately thereafter, theUS was not only a military ally for the ROK but also a nation that had longencouraged democratization in the ROK. It was indeed thanks to US intervention
that Kim-daejung was exempted from a death sentence. In addition, for carryingout the Sunshine Policy towards North Korea, the ROK government at that time
did not particularly wish to emphasize the strength of its alliance with the US.
With respect to Japanese policy towards the US, the bilateral alliance withthe US, though increasingly regarded as a pattern of global commitment, was
not yet recognized, at least openly, as a bastion against a possible Chinese
threat.
For these reasons, the American factor did not figure as a potential
source of friction between the ROK and Japan.
All these factors that contributed to stable and friendly relations between
Japan and the ROK have undergone substantial changes over the subsequent
decade.
First of all, the Lee-myongbak administration leaned more towards
strengthening economic and trade relations with the US and China as theJapanese economy experienced persistent depression. It did not particularly
appreciate Japan’s democracy as something that could inspire the ROK.
In addition, the somewhat confused diplomatic policy stance of Japan’s
DPJ government engendered frustration in the ROK and, together with thespeedy rise of China, gave rise in the ROK to a somewhat nationalistic sentimenttowards Japan in the form of diminished attention to relations with Japan. The
dramatic visit of Koizumi to North Korea also rekindled in the ROK the traditional
suspicion about Japan’s use of the North Korean card.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary3

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

On the Japanese side, frustration became all the stronger over the ROK’s
attitude on historical issues as Japan experienced Kim-daejung’s policy and theKanryu boom of Korean films and dramas in Japan.

To be continued.

Kazuo Ogoura is former Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of Korea andcurrently Special Guest Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University and Ritsumeikan
University.
.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary4