Chapter 6: The True Nature of the UN Revealed;
Outlook for the Future
B. How UN Human-Rights Committees Operate;
Anticipated Future Activities
By Hosoya Kiyoshi

How do UN committees that concern themselves with human rights go about issuingtheir recommendations? When will demands issued by UN committees to the Japanese
government for apologies and reparations to former comfort women end? In this section,
I offer background that should help readers when they consider these questions. I also
explain how UN human rights committees operate, and provide a projection of future
activities.

Human-rights committees and the Human Rights Council
The chart on p. 2 provides information about UN human rights committees and the
Human Rights Council, all of which concern themselves with the comfort womencontroversy.
The first five committees listed are sessional committees. The last two, the CSW(Commission on the Status of Women) and the HRC (Human Rights Council) arestanding committees.
The CEDAW (Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women) is the committee that demanded the amendment of the Imperial Household Law
to allow women to succeed to the throne, in a draft of its concluding observations. It wasestablished to ensure that the rules outlined in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter “the Convention”) are observed.
In a draft of concluding observations, the CEDAW called for the amendment of theImperial Household Law on the grounds that it discriminates against women. The
CEDAW was mandated by the Convention. A sessional committee, the CEDAW has 23
members who hail from all the world’s regions; it meets for two-week periods two or
three times each year. At its sessions, it reviews reports received from 8-10 of the world’s
nations, prepares concluding observations, and compiles an annual report, which it
submits to the UN General Assembly.
Each committee has a different mission, but the other sessional committees operate inmuch the same way as the CEDAW.
The Human Rights Council, a standing committee, supplanted the Commission on
Human Rights, which operated under the aegis of the Economic and Social Council. The
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Commission, established in 1946, was a functional committee entrusted with thepromotion of human rights, which made recommendations on the basis of its
deliberations. However, its annual sessions were brief, and some of its members were thevery states that were guilty of violations of human rights. Those same members would
serve term after term, and the result was a biased, dysfunctional organization. The
Commission was dissolved in 2006.
UN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN COMFORT WOMEN ISSUES
Committee

Committee on the

Abbreviation

No. of parties

Date ratified

Type of

Overseeing

Participating

Sessions

Sessionof Convention

to Convention

by Japancommitteeorganization

nations

per year

venue

CEDAW

189 (not6/25/1985

Elimination of3

including US)

Discrimination
against Women
Human Rights

CCPR

Committee

168 (not3

including
PRC)

Committee on

CESCR

Economic, Social

164 (not6/21/1979

3
Sessional

including US)

and Cultural

GeneralRightsAssembly

Committee

CAT

159

All parties to

6/29/1999

2-3

Convention

Against TortureCommittee on the

Geneva

CERD

177

12/15/1995

2

Elimination of
RacialDiscrimination
Commission on
the Status of

---

---

Functional

Women (CSW)

Economic andAnnuallyNew

Social Council(March)York

Genevacommission

All UN member

N.A.

Human Rights
Council (HRC)

---

---

statesAuxiliary ofGeneral3 regular,

GeneralAssembly

2 special

Assembly

The Human Rights Council is not burdened with the maladies that plagued theCommission. Moreover, its recommendations have been given greater authority. (SeeChart on p. 3.)
Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the Human Rights Council is the UPR(Universal Periodic Review). All UN member states are reviewed once every four years.
Outcome reports of the review are adopted at a plenary session of the Council. They
include an evaluation of human rights in the state under review, and recommendations foraid that will promote human rights, such as technical cooperation, after a dialogue withthat state has taken place. The Council has the right to take action against states that do
not cooperate with the UPR.
Japan is expected to undergo review in 2017.

2

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS(NOW OBSOLETE) AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Years in existenceCommission on Human Rights
1946-2006

Human Rights Council
2006-present

Overseeing organization

Economic and Social Council

General Assembly

Function

Functional committee

General Assembly auxiliary

Member states

All UN member states

All UN member states

Number of sessions andduration
Members selected byOnce per year; 6 weeks

Terms of service

3 years; no term limits

At least 3 times per year; atleast 10 weeks
Consensus of at least 50% ofmember states in the General
Assembly
3 years; no more than 2
consecutive terms

Economic and Social Council

How committees operateThis section focuses on the CEDAW and the Convention on the Elimination of All Formsof Discrimination against Women.
The UN General Assembly directs the CEDAW to review reports submitted by eachnation party to the Convention approximately once every four years. The committee
compiles annual reports, which it submits to the General Assembly. The Chart on p. 5, 6
shows the workflow beginning with preparation and submission to the General
Assembly; the Chart on p. 7 shows the processes involved, which are:(1) The Japanese government prepares the government report (also called a “State
party report”).
(2) The Japanese government sends its report to the CEDAW via the UN General
Assembly.
(3) The CEDAW examines the report and prepares an agenda of topics (called a
LOI: List of Issues) to be discussed with the Japanese government.
(4) Committee members evaluate the report and enter into a direct, constructive
dialogue with a representative of the Japanese government.
(5) The Committee sends a draft report with its concluding observations and/or
recommendations to the Japanese government.
(6) The Japanese government returns the draft to the CEDAW, along with any
opinions it has formed.
(7) The CEDAW compiles an annual report and submits it to the UN General
Assembly.

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Apparently, CEDAW recommended that the Japanese government review the Imperial
Household Act (so that women could succeed to the throne) without warning, at Step (5).
The Japanese government responded by requesting that the recommendation be retracted.
The government’s request was perfectly reasonable, since there had been no mention ofimperial succession in the government’s report to CEDAW, nor was the topic broached in
the LOI, or discussed during the dialogue described in Step (4).
Suppose the Japanese government had approved the recommendation as it stood. The
result would have been terrible, a controversy that would have spawned contentious
arguments, just as with the comfort women issue. There would have been endless debates,
not only at the United Nations, but also within Japan. Perhaps that was the intention of
the member or members of the CEDAW who wrote the recommendation.
Here I would like to call readers’ attention to the reference materials the Committee used
to assess the Japanese government’s reports. In addition to the references cited ingovernment reports and in the dialogue between the Committee and the Japanese
government, the Committee proactively seeks information from NGOs (nongovernmental organizations). Information from the private sector is a valuable resource
for conducting multidimensional, critical evaluations of government reports.

4

PREPARATION OF CEDAW REPORT (CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS)(A)UN General Assembly (New York)(7) Delivery of CEDAW Annual Report

Economic and Social Council (New York)(7) Preparation and deliveryof CEDAW Annual Report(2) Delivery of government report

CEDAW (Geneva)
Committee operating under
the aegis of Un General Assembly 23 members serving terms of 4 years(January 1 through December 31)
 Duties
Evaluate government reports
Prepare and deliver reports
Solicit opinions from issuers of reports
Monitor results of recommendations(3) Evaluate LOI (List of Issues)(4) Evaluate reports

CEDAW dialogue with government representatives
Dialogues take place 3 times per year.
CEDAW holds dialogues with 8-10 nations during each two-week session.

Continued to (B) of the next page5

(B)(1) Preparation and delivery of government report→UN General Assembly (New York)Japan (Party to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women)←NPO
Duties of state parties
 Submission of progress reports(Initial report due within 2 years; subsequent reports due every 5 years)
 Publication of government report(6) Preparation and delivery of government’s opinions→CEDAW (Geneva)(5) Solicitation of government’s opinion on CEDAW recommendations→NPO →CEDAW (Geneva)
Relationship between CEDAW and Japanese government
No rights or authority bind the Japanese government to CEDAW.
 Japanese government must review CEDAW’s recommendations in connection with thegovernment report.
Japanese government may submit its opinions on those recommendations.
 CEDAW submits a report to the UN General Assembly, along with the Japanese
government’s response.
NGOs
Submission of government’s response→CEDAW dialogue with government representatives→Japan (Party to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women)

6PROCEDURES FOLLOWED IN THE PREPARATION OF CEDAW ANNUALREPORT
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

ProcedurePreparation of State party
reportDelivery of report to UN(CEDAW)
Pre-session examination ofreport and preparation of
agenda (LOI)
Deliberation on report;
dialogue with Japanese
government representatives(during session)
Discussion of report withJapanese government
representatives
Preparation and delivery ofJapanese government’s
opinions
Compilation of annual report;delivery to General Assembly

Implemented by
Japanese government
Japanese government
CEDAW

CEDAW

CEDAW

Japanese government

CEDAW

However, problems arise when Committee members intentionally select information thatreflects their personal biases, or when NGOs provide information that is skewed.
At a Committee meeting that took place in February 2016, there was a huge
breakthrough: more members disagreed with the accusation that comfort women weresex slaves than agreed with it. In other words, the content of information provided by theNGOs was balanced. It will be up to conservative NGOs to ensure that biased
information is not fed to the Committee in connection with other problems.

Schedule of activities pertaining to comfort women issues
Even at the critical February 2016 meeting of the CEDAW, we did not succeed inremoving the words apology and compensation vis à vis the comfort women from theCommittee’s report.
When will our next opportunity arise?
The chart below shows the deadlines for the Japanese government report specified by theConvention, and anticipated CEDAW dialogues.

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Future Discussions of the Comfort Women Controversy at the United Nations
Report: Deadline for submission of Japanese government report
Dialogue: Forecast for dialogue between UN committee and Japanese government
representatives
Committee
CEDAW(Committee on
the Eliminationof All Forms ofDiscrimination
against Women)
UNHRC(United Nations
Human Rights
Committee)

Most
recentdialogue
02/2016

2016

2017

2018

2019

February:
dialogue

2020
March:
report06/2014

July: report

CESCR(Committee on
Economic,
Social andCultural Rights)
CAT(Committee
against Torture)

05/2013

May: report

05/2013May:
reportNovember:possible
dialogue

CERD(Committee on
the Eliminationof Racial
Discrimination)
CSW(Commission
on the Status of
Women)HRC (Human
Rights Council)

08/2014January:reportAugust,November:possible
dialogue

2021

2022

November:possible
dialogueMarch,
June,
October:possible
dialogueMarch andJune orSeptember:possible
dialogue
April,
July:
possible
dialogue(03/2016)

March

March

March

March

March

March

March

(03/2016)

3 times peryear

3 times
per year

3 times peryear

3 times
per year

3 times peryear

3 times peryear

3 times
per year

For instance, the CEDAW has set a deadline of March 2020 for the submission of thenext government report. This makes a constructive dialogue in November of 2021 likely,
although it might be delayed until 2022. Whatever the case, the dialogue will take place
after the Olympic Games in Tokyo.
In the meantime, we can expect meetings at which torture and other cruel, inhuman ordegrading treatment or punishment; the elimination of racial discrimination, economic,
social and cultural rights; and civil and political rights are discussed. This means that wewill have to wait another five years, until 2021, before we can expose and refute the lies
equating comfort women with sex slaves.
Some readers may think this is too far in the future to even contemplate, but please
remember that the “sex slave” proponents have been building their “citadel” for morethan 20 years. Therefore, we should be pleased that we may be able to demolish it in far
less time than it took to build.

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Drawbacks of UN committees
The November 2014 issue of the monthly magazine Seiron carried an article I wrote
about the members of the UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Committee):
From the viewpoint of [anti-Japanese elements] who would attempt to
influence [the Committee], members who have little knowledge about
Japan, let alone specialized knowledge, are preferable because of theirmalleability. Because such members don’t know anything about Japan,
they have no reticence about making [preposterous] claims about Japan.
Self-proclaimed human-rights NGOs attempting to promote their antiJapanese assertions manipulate Committee members. They are using
spurious claims of their own invention to infringe upon the rights of Japanand the Japanese people. That is the unfortunate state of the UN today.

Such was the situation at the UNHRC two years ago, and it has not changed. Without
knowing how the Committee operates, one would not have realized how pernicious therecommendation in the CEDAW report was that attempted to meddle in Japan’s imperial
system.
The duties of Committee members are (1) examining reports submitted by national
governments and evaluating progress made in the implementation of the Convention(Articles 17 and 20), and (2) submitting the results of their investigation to the General
Assembly in the form of an annual report (Article 21).1
This aspect is misunderstood by those who harbor the mistaken assumption that theCommittee examines the Japanese government’s report on the human-rights situation,and then issues recommendations, meaning corrections to be made.
The Committee is decidedly not an examining body. The world is finally beginning torealize that CEDAW’s recommendations have neither legal force nor binding power.
Nevertheless, until a few years ago, calls to adhere to UN recommendations were obeyed.
Opponents of democracy wanted to perpetuate that misunderstanding, hoping to use the
UN to force the Japanese government to implement recommendations, something they
could not accomplish within Japan.
Those very same opponents of democracy are quick to espouse “defending theConstitution.” Nichibenren (Japan Federation of Bar Associations), which professes to bea champion of law and justice, is one such group; it is a beaming example of hypocrisy.
This time, the organization was plotting to introduce sham human rights into Japan’s
imperial system, and for a reason far more malicious than the instance from two years
ago, which I will demonstrate.

1

http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#intro.

9The source of information for the committees is government reports, discussions withgovernment representatives during dialogues, and material provided by NGOs. Of course,
some committee members will do research on their own, but they are obligated to
examine reports; they are not permitted to incorporate their personal opinions into thereports.
To protect their reputations as intellectuals and human-rights specialists, committee
members who are ignorant of the human-rights situation in Japan rely on information
provided by Japanese NGOs. After going through the proper formalities, NGOs post
information on the relevant committee’s website prior to meetings. This is a very
convenient resource for committee members. Nevertheless, at a meeting held two years
ago, a member posed a question to a government representative, prefacing it with, “We
have heard that ... .”However, what makes the incident relating to the imperial household particularly
nefarious is the fact that the attack on Japan’s imperial-succession system in CEDAW’s
concluding observations came without warning. There was no mention of imperial
succession in the government report submitted to the CEDAW, or in reports from NGOs.
Nor was the topic brought up in a dialogue.
For a topic to be broached in the CEDAW’s concluding observations, a decision to that
effect must be made by the Committee.
According to Rule 31 (Adoption of Decisions) of the Rules of Procedure governing
Committee work,
1. The Committee shall endeavor to reach its decisions by consensus.
2. If and when all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted, decisions of theCommittee shall be taken by a simple majority of the members present andvoting.2
This is just an hypothesis, but I would venture to say that CEDAW members voted twiceon the imperial-succession matter, once before they included it in their concluding
observations, and again when they made the decision to respect the Japan’s government
request to delete that particular observation. One can only wonder how the members
voted each time.
Hayashi Yoko, a Japanese woman, is the chairperson of CEDAW. Committee rules do
not allow members to participate in the review of State reports emanating from theirnative countries. But as chairperson, she must have been involved to some extent. Whatsort of leadership did she provide on that occasion?
According to Article 17 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination against Women, members shall be “experts of high moral standing and2

http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedawreport-a5638-RulesOfProcedure.htm#part1.

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competence in the field covered by the Convention.”3 However, it appears that CEDAW
members ignored the Convention, misrepresenting themselves as “experts of high moral
standing,” and engaged in a potential terroristic act by advocating the destruction of themost fundamental of Japan’s social and political system.
There is no system in place to monitor the members or to punish them for violations of
the rules. It seems to be the nature of sessional committees to place all their trust in the“high moral standing” of their members. We, its observers, are also to blame foroverlooking CEDAW’s collusion with certain NGOs.
Six years have elapsed since my first visit to Geneva to attend a session pertaining to theConvention on the Rights of the Child. At the time, I had the opportunity to speak
informally with a committee member from one of Europe’s leading nations. I was
surprised to hear him state that, “This job wears me out, and it’s pointless.” He explainedthat although committee members diligently examine the state of human rights in aparticular nation and issue recommendations, the government of that nation tends toignore them.
Committee members have little motivation to do the right thing and, as I mentioned
earlier, no one monitors them. Perhaps that is why they accept invitations to all-expensepaid junkets, and in return, side with anti-Japanese nations and issue recommendations
designed to emasculate and demolish Japan. The UN Human Rights Committee should
concentrate on addressing human-rights violations occurring today. This is no time for it
to be shirking its duties and torturing Japan (for more than 20 years!) about the comfort
women controversy. The Committee is infringing upon the human rights of and vilifying
the Japanese people. They say, “the Congress dances, but does not progress.” In this case,the UN dances, but does not progress. Actually, what is happening is far worse: the UN
Human Rights Committee has become toxic. This is one aspect of the United Nations thatneeds urgent reform.

3

http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article17.

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