NPI Research Note

Maritime Security Study Group Research Progress Report
Increasingly Complex and Sophisticated “Hybrid Warfare” during Peacetime:

Japan’s Comprehensive Response and the Japan-US Response
Saito Takashi (former Chief of Staff, Joint Staff), Chairman
Research Committee on Maritime Security

Overview of current researchThis study group is focused on research delving into law enforcement in a “gray zone,”situation. Besides returning to the basics, we have expanded our scope of inquiry to include
not only law enforcement but also the domain of “space” to be considered along with land,sea, and air domains; and the “cyber domain” and the “electromagnetic domain” asconceptual spaces. In addition, the scope has been expanded to the “cognitive domain” inwhich—rather than relying on information warfare and public opinion warfare—advanced
information processing technologies are used for the ultimate goal of influencing thedecision-making of national leaders. Thus, this research deepens investigation into thenature of so-called “hybrid warfare.” Even in the conventional area of the sea, there aresubjects related to the seabed—such as underseas resources and underseas cables—thatshould be considered from a new perspective as well. With this view, it is essential to beaware that competition between countries has already begun in peacetime.
Battles in the cyber, electromagnetic, and space domains can occur independently but in“hybrid warfare” in which these battles are intricately intertwined, our research addresses
Japan’s role in the Japan-US alliance and what the rules-based international order shouldbe.

Our ongoing research proceeds with recognition of the following issues:⚫

Besides the three conventional domains of land, sea, and air, the additional space,cyber, electromagnetic, and cognitive domains are becoming increasingly complex andelaborate as a result of rapid technological innovations. While these domains are being
controlled by various means, the use of “hybrid warfare,” which involves bothconventional and new domains of warfare, by both state and non-state actors, is likely
to become the norm in the future.

-1The thoughts and opinions in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any organization with which he is affiliated.

© Nakasone Peace Institute 2020⚫

China is skillfully avoiding the military intervention of other countries while
harnessing and utilizing all available national means to pursue its own superiority
during peacetime. It is actively engaged in behaviors designed to achieve its
determined national goals. The means China is adopting to achieve these ends can,depending on the circumstances, include military force. Russia has already carried out
this type of military action in Ukraine and elsewhere. Thus, it is highly likely that state
actors and others will imitate and utilize these means.

⚫

In particular, the trends in China toward reforming the People’s Liberation Army
Strategic Support Force; trends in the China Coast Guard, whose liaisons with thePeople’s Liberation Army are being strengthened under the direction of the Central
Military Commission; the Chinese goal of achieving hegemony in the space domain;and its insistence on claiming territorial rights indicate that, rather than showing any
willingness to adopt a more yielding position, China is instead increasing its activities
in these areas.

⚫

At the same time, the conflict between the US and China is becoming increasingly
serious. The post-corona world is highly unpredictable; thus, the escalation of an
unexpected event or a miscalculation into a major military conflict cannot be ruled out.
However, despite the fact that globalization has suddenly lost a great deal of
momentum as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, if we base our strategy on acool-headed and dispassionate calculation, we will see that a state of emergency inwhich large-scale military conflict rapidly develops in a peaceful world such as ourswith widespread economic ties is highly unlikely.

⚫

Currently, countries are already engaged in competition or conflict over nationalinterests at a level below that of armed attack and the line between “peacetime” and“contingency” has already become blurred. Therefore, it is necessary to do away with adualistic view of security that clearly delineates “peacetime” from “contingency,” asrepresented by the Japanese proverb “Soldiers are trained for a hundred years for thepurpose of a single morning’s battle.”

With awareness of the above issues, the research is currently moving in the following
direction:

General argument: Concentration of comprehensive national powerModern warfare does not rely solely on military means but is rather a “total war” that
includes the economy, resources, and information. However, in recent years, new means of
war have been added, such as electromagnetic and cyber warfare. Because of the uniquecharacteristics of these new means of waging war, even if there is an attack, it is difficult tojudge whether a military objective was intended when these means are utilized. Thus, it isnecessary to recognize that these means represent a new category that goes beyond thedualism of “war” and “peace.” Specifically, this requires that the response to “hybridwarfare,” which develops during peacetime, not only rely on diplomatic and defense-2The thoughts and opinions in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any organization with which he is affiliated.

© Nakasone Peace Institute 2020

authorities but also include government-affiliated organizations and private industry inorder to concentrate the comprehensive power of the country.
Particularly in the domains of space, cyber, electromagnetism, and deep-sea resources,
which previously were not considered military domains, comprehensive initiatives in theform of “industry-government-academia collaboration,” in which government-affiliatedorganizations, university research facilities, and private industry work together, arerequired.
Discussion I: Issues with domestic systems
When discussing “hybrid warfare,” one of the problems that arises is how to respond,
particularly when the situation has not developed to the level of armed conflict. At present,
the law that can be applied during situations that are below the level of an armed conflict is“Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and thePeople's Security in Armed Attack Situations etc.” Chapter III Article 21 of this Act
indicates that the “measures and other required policies” that are to be applied to “acontingency situation” are as follows:
1) Enhancement of the system for gathering and compiling information about thecircumstances and analyzing and evaluating the situation
2) Preparation for formulating a response policy for use in various situations
3) Strengthening cooperation between the police, the Japan Coast Guard and otherrelated organizations, and the Self-Defense Forces.
The above three measures apply to “hybrid warfare,” which was assumed by thecommittee that drew up the Act to not have reached the level of armed conflict. Furthereffort is necessary to carry out this policy.
① Enhancement of a system for surveillance and intelligence gathering
Key to a response to hybrid warfare is the early detection of the signs and prevention of
their becoming established facts. For that purpose, it is necessary to enhance theinformation collection and monitoring system for the entire country regarding the space,cyber, electromagnetic, and cognitive domains, as well as the conventional surveillance
and information gathering of sea and airspace.
② Creating a lateral command structure for the cognitive domain“Cognitive warfare,” which in recent years has consisted of spreading “fake news” viasocial networking sites (SNS) and identifying public trends using artificial intelligence(AI) and big data processing technology, is conducted with the ultimate aim of
influencing the decisions made by national leaders. It is thus far more complex,
diverse, and sophisticated than conventional public opinion, legal, and psychological
warfare, out of which it grew. Response to cognitive warfare cannot rely solely on
military intelligence; rather, the ability to gather wide-ranging information via theInternet and technological trends, the ability to evaluate and disseminate information
to the international community and a command structure that is able to harness the fullpower of the country are now required.
-3The thoughts and opinions in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any organization with which he is affiliated.

© Nakasone Peace Institute 2020

③ Constructing a lateral organization in the cyber domain
The term “cyber” refers to a complex system that includes the exploitation of private
data and sensitive information held by private corporations and governmentorganizations for the purpose of causing social confusion by interfering with financial
institutions, engineering the breakdown of essential infrastructural elements, andcoordinating cyber and electromagnetic attacks in order to disrupt and paralyze
governmental or working unit command structures. These events cannot be dealt withindividually, but rather require an organizational structure that provides a general
overview of the entire situation and can respond laterally.
④ Centralized management of satellite orbit data
In the space domain, to ensure the secure utilization of satellites, the ability to avoid
debris and intentional interference is of utmost importance. It is therefore important for
countries that share problem awareness to share information. This in turn requires thatdata regarding the orbits of satellites be monitored in a centralized manner. At that time,coordinating with Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) should beconsidered.1⑤ Reinforcing collaboration among the police, the Japan Coast Guard, and theSelf-Defense Forces
Rather than only reinforcing collaboration during actual and map-based training
exercises, there must be a shared awareness of the facts that, while collaborative efforts
place greater demand on our own human resources, the command and control
relationships between the military and law enforcement agencies will be clarified, andthere is a need to respond appropriately to hybrid warfare, which lacks a clear
distinction between peacetime and contingencies. For this reason, it is necessary toorganize the command and control relationship between the Self-Defense Forces andlaw enforcement agencies that will respond during peacetime through activity such as
coast guard operations, security operations, and defense operations. It is also important
to increase the interoperability of equipment utilized by the Maritime Self-Defense
Force and the Japan Coast Guard. In such cases, the restrictions imposed by Article 25of the Japan Coast Guard Law that prevent involvement in military actions must not beinterpreted as impeding military and non-military cooperation.
⑥ Need for the early involvement of other ministries and agencies in the Alliance
Coordination Group (ACG)
Other ministries and agencies now participate as needed in the Alliance Coordination
Group (ACG),2 which is part of the current alliance coordination mechanism. An
important part of an effective response to the increasingly prevalent hybrid warfare is
the ability to detect as soon as possible the signs of its operation. The early detection ofsuch indications over a wide area requires not only collaboration between the defense
and diplomatic ministries but also for the relevant ministries and agencies to take theinitiative from the beginning and lead cooperation between Japan and the US. In that-4The thoughts and opinions in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any organization with which he is affiliated.

© Nakasone Peace Institute 2020

sense, continuous involvement by other ministries and agencies in the ACG even prior
to the appearance of any indication of cyber warfare is required.
Discussion II: Issues of domestic law and international norms in hybrid warfare① Issues with domestic law
Even if the situation does not rise to the level of an armed attack or clear infringement
upon national sovereignty, it has a negative effect on national interests. Such situationshave shown signs of occurring not only in the realm of “territorial land and airspace”
but also in the cyber domain. In addition, in the space domain, interference withsatellites has become a reality. To deal with such a situation, it is necessary to clarify
how to respond in accordance with domestic law.
② Issues with international norms
Is there a necessity for regulations that establish traffic rules for satellites and otherobjects in space similar to the Convention on the International Regulations forPreventing Collisions at Sea (CORLEG)? Although international discussion onregulations concerning space as well as the cyber and electromagnetic domains iscurrently ongoing, there is need for caution so that the space, cyber, andelectromagnetic domains do not become a situation similar to that of the South China
Sea.
Discussion III: Japan-US cooperation on hybrid warfare
There is no question that the commitment of the US military is vitally important indeterring and dealing with an armed attack situation. We recognize the increase anddeepening of cooperation between Japan and the US for that purpose. However, to respondto hybrid warfare, which is becoming increasingly complex, sophisticated, and therefore
difficult to deter, it is important to establish, at the stage below the level of armed conflict,a concrete and explicit cooperative relationship that goes beyond the framework of thecurrent Japan-US defense and diplomatic collaboration. Such a relationship will lead to thedeterrence of situations that are below the level of an armed attack.
① Establishment of a new Japan-US framework
For Japan and the US to respond to hybrid warfare, it is necessary to create a newframework for cooperation based on the Japan-US alliance that goes beyond the current“New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” Furthermore, there is a need tocreate a framework that facilitates a deep level of involvement of all relatedorganizations and agencies and not solely those related to defense and foreign affairs.
② Concrete and explicit Japan-US cooperation in situations below the level ofarmed attack
After achieving mutual understanding of the legal systems in Japan and the US, theJapanese and US response to situations that are below the level of an armed attack must
be concretely and explicitly expressed.
-5The thoughts and opinions in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any organization with which he is affiliated.

© Nakasone Peace Institute 2020

In particular, it is necessary to devise procedures by which cooperation between theJapan Coast Guard, the police, the Japan Self-Defense Forces, the U.S. Armed Forces,
and the U.S. Coast Guard can be carried out from the stage of warning and surveillance
for the purpose of guarding the coasts and engaging in security operations. This needs
to be done in such a way so as to ensure that it is within the policing powers of theJapan Self-Defense Force.
③ Division of roles of and cooperation between the Japan and the United States inthe space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains
There is ongoing debate over attacking enemy bases as a form of missile defense, but
this debate is taking place on the premise of a Japan-US “shield and spear” policy.
In addition to this debate, the time has come to comprehensively coordinate the roles
played by Japan and the US and the procedures for the two countries to collaborate
when events in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains occur that do not rise to
the level of armed conflict. This must include discussion on whether these newprocedures should be an extension of the abovementioned premise.
④ Japan-US collaboration for the purpose of forming international norms in thespace, cyber, and electromagnetic domains
To prevent hostile actions that would disrupt order in the space, cyber, andelectromagnetic domains, there is an urgent need to formulate effective international
norms regarding these domains as well as a surveillance system to monitor them. Thus,
Japan and the US must cooperate and lead the international community in these efforts.

September 11, 2020
Notes
1Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE): An automatic alert monitoring systemthat utilizes Japan Air Self-Defense Force radar bases, early warning systems, interceptors, andground-to-air missiles. It utilizes the four stages of air defense: discovery (flight detection andtracking), identification (belonging to which nation), interception (prevention of the invasion of air
space by a craft of unknown origin), and defeat (repelling an enemy craft that has invaded). Ballistic
missile defense is operated as part of the common guidance system of the three branches of theJapan Self-Defense Forces.
Alliance Coordination Mechanism, Alliance Coordination Group (ACG): According to the “NewGuidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” that was approved in 2015 in a 2 + 2 agreement
by Japan and the US, an “Alliance Coordination Mechanism” was established. Its objective is toreinforce the sharing of information between the governments of Japan and the US during times ofpeace in order to ensure the cooperation of the entire government—including all related
agencies—within the alliance in a seamless and effective manner. ACG is an organization thatcoordinates policies related to the activities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the US militarythrough the agreement of the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Sub-Committee. Its members include
diplomacy- and defense-related department heads, directors, and supervisors in both governments.
2-6The thoughts and opinions in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of any organization with which he is affiliated.

© Nakasone Peace Institute 2020