Implications of Full Devolution on Vertical and Horizontal Gaps
in Decentralization: The Case of a Fast Starter

Damcelle Torres-Cortes1 and Ferdinand C. Maquito2

1 Assistant Professor, College of Public Affairs and Development, University of the Philippines Los Baños
2 Assistant Professor, College of Public Affairs and Development, University of the Philippines Los Baños

共有型成長（shared growth）には地方分権の推進が不可欠だが、東南アジアではフィリピンやインドネシアが地方分権の先進国とされる。他方、タイは中央集権色が濃いとされる。
この３国におけるCOVID-19対策を比較検討した。

Abstract

This paper rests on the premise that horizontal and vertical gaps are essential aspects of shared growth, and thatamong the recognized governance strategies to achieve such growth is decentralization. In its report “East Asia
Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work”, the World Bank categorized the Philippines as a ‘fast starter”. In
2022, the Philippines will be moving towards full devolution following the 2018 pronouncement of the Philippine
Supreme Court, which effectively increases the constitutionally mandated budgetary share of all local government
units (LGUs). While this paper is mainly about the case of the Philippines, we cast the discussion in an international
context by comparing it with two other ASEAN countries: another ‘fast starter’ Indonesia, and ‘cautious mover’
Thailand.
We present a preliminary exploration of how the extent of decentralization as described in the World Bank study,
has contributed to the journey towards shared growth. We use the COVID-19 pandemic as the contextual backdrop
for the examination. The pandemic serves as a test of endurance, and more importantly of the effectiveness ofdecentralization mechanisms at a time when central and local coordination and complementation are most crucial.
Due to time and space constraints, our exploration presents a general and macro view of COVID-19 responses in thePhilippines, Indonesia and Thailand, in light of delegated authorities and devolved functions within their respective
governance systems.
In general, COVID-19 has shown the efficacy of decentralization, where it has empowered LGUs, in the experience of the three ASEAN countries in coping with the pandemic. While these cases appear to be a minority in thesecountries, it nevertheless prompted a renewed push on decentralization. The paper surfaces further insights on how
decentralization can be effectively deployed to address vertical and horizontal gaps in developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia.
Keywords

decentralization, devolution, local governments, COVID-19, pandemic, shared growth, vertical gap, horizontal gap,
Southeast Asia

Introduction

Vertical and Horizontal Gaps, Shared Growth, andDecentralization
This paper rests on the premise that horizontal andvertical gaps are essential aspects of shared growth, andthat among the recognized governance strategies toachieve such growth is decentralization. We refer tohorizontal and vertical gaps as shorthand for fiscal disparities derived from economic concepts of horizontal
and fiscal imbalance.1 We define horizontal gap as the
1 Vertical fiscal imbalance exists “when transfers to subnational129

Damcelle Torres-Cortes, et al.

disparity between richer and poorer Local Government
Units (LGUs). In a broad sense, the richer here wouldrefer to the traditional centers of growth (for example,
the capital metropolis of the country). This horizontal
gap is supposedly reduced by a push towards a decentralization, whereby economic growth is redistributedout of the traditional centers of growth to what was oncethe periphery. Vertical gap relates to the ability of LGUs
to deliver the devolved public services given its fiscal
resources, both from national government transfers andindependently sourced income like local taxes, fees,
borrowings. This gap widens when the LGU’s combined
resources are insufficient to meet local needs.
Horizontal and vertical gaps accordingly reflect thetwin elements of shared growth, a type of developmentthat holistically accounts for equitable distribution alongside conventional economic goals of increased income
and inclusion.2 Shared growth seeks to attain both efficiency and equity and doing so entails closing both horizontal and vertical gaps. The “shared” dimension
emphasizes the socio-economic goal of equity achieved
through addressing the horizontal gap, while the“growth” aspect captures the socio-economic goal of
efficiency, achieved through reducing the vertical gap.
Development and governance theories offer multitudes of approaches for achieving shared growth.
Among the widely accepted and long-standing strategies is decentralization, which — consistent with thegoal of equity — involves distribution of power andauthorities combined with their own revenues (and borrowing) arenot sufficient to finance their expenditure responsibilities”(Boadway and Eyraud, 2018: 6). Horizontal fiscal imbalanceoccurs when there is vertical fiscal imbalance not only in theaggregate, but also across subnational jurisdictions (Boadway andEyraud, 2018), resulting in inequities across regions or localities.
2 Shared growth is sometimes used interchangeably with inclusive
growth as both call for a holistic understanding of development byintegrating pro-poor and pro-marginalized orientations. Bothconcepts challenge traditional economic development indicators
which fail to measure quality of life and how certain individuals
and groups are left behind despite a rise in national income. The
World Bank has clarified that inclusive growth “refers to both thepace and distribution of economic growth” (Anand, et al. 2013: 1),
the latter reflecting equity considerations. Shared growth is theterm most associated with “income distribution schemes”(Ianchovichina and Lundstrom 2009: 2).

130

resources from the central to the periphery. Governments
decentralize for a range of reasons - political, economic,
democratic, and otherwise. But efforts to disperse decision making, action, and spending are often associatedwith spurring economic outputs and spreading development outcomes from the metropolis to the countryside.
Decentralization during the COVID-19 Pandemic
In its report “East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local
Government Work’’, the World Bank 3 observed a widespread trend towards decentralization in East Asia sincethe 1990s. It categorized the Philippines as a “faststarter” for “rapidly introduc(ing) major structural,institutional, and fiscal reforms” to decentralize. While
this paper is mainly about the case of the Philippines, wecast the discussion in an international context by comparing it with two other ASEAN countries: Indonesia
and Thailand. The said World Bank report classified thePhilippines and Indonesia as “fast starters”. Meanwhile,
Thailand, together with Cambodia, was classified as a“cautious mover” given the limited implementation ofmodest decentralization policies. A more recent JETROIDE study4 confirmed that the World Bank classification
appears to be still generally applicable. “Except for
Thailand, both the Philippines and Indonesia seem toenjoy higher local autonomy from the central
government.”5This paper is a preliminary exploration of how theextent of decentralization as described in the WorldBank study, has contributed to the journey towards
shared growth. We use the COVID-19 pandemic as thecontextual backdrop for the examination. The coronavirus outbreak brought about global health and economic
crises that upended long-term efforts to promote inclusive and equitable development. The virus first emerged
3 The World Bank (2005). East Asia decentralizes: making local
government work.
4 Nagai, F., & Funatsu, T. (2019). Introduction: Analysis of local
government survey data. In F. Nagai, T. Funatsu & K. Kagoya(Eds.), New waves of decentralization in Southeast Asia (pp.
1-29). Institute of Developing Economies - Japan External Trade
Organization, p.27
5		Nagai & Funatsu, supra.

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in Asia so ASEAN nations, mostly less-developed
nations, had to be quick and adaptive in preventing the
spread of a worldwide contagion. In a sense, the pandemic is a test of endurance, and more importantly ofthe effectiveness of decentralization mechanisms at atime when central and local coordination and complementation are most crucial. Due to time and space constraints, our exploration presents a general and macro
view of COVID-19 responses in the Philippines,
Indonesia and Thailand, in light of delegated authorities
and devolved functions within their respective governance systems – all based on desk research of policies
and issuances, news reports, and scholarly studies.
There are indeed various aspects of the decentralization
within a pandemic such as previous experience withepidemics, vaccination capacity, and other socio-cultural dimensions that are not fully accounted for in the
study. As earlier mentioned, while the paper focuses on
the Philippines, it distills insights and lessons by comparing Philippine country experience with fellow “faststarter” Indonesia, and “cautious mover” Thailand.
Through this limited cross-country approach, the study
hopes to contribute to an enriched and nuanced appreciation of decentralization and shared growth, and stimulate scholarship on associated topics that the paper isunable to address.

The Philippines: Decentralization and
COVID-19 Pandemic Response of a Fast
Starter

Since 1991, the Philippines had in place a comprehensive decentralization policy: the Local Government
Code (LGC). When news of COVID-19 raised worldwide alarm, however, the Philippine national government took the reins in providing a response. This was
somehow expected given the novelty and scale of thehealth issue involved, as well as the acknowledged
tyrannical inclinations of the President. Although governors and mayors have authority to suspend school andwork within their jurisdictions, the national government-imposed island-wide lockdowns to curb the spreadof coronavirus. The Inter-Agency Task Force for theManagement of Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF),

led by a former military official, was established to“assess, monitor, contain, control and prevent the
spread”6 of an epidemic, including the COVID-19 pandemic. The task force was at the forefront of crafting
executive policies on what is permissible throughout the
pandemic. Its power was most evident in its authority to
declare the alert levels that dictate curfew hours, travel
restrictions, as well as health and safety protocols. It
was only after the second surge that the IATF allowed
LGUs to assess local conditions and declare targeted
village-level lockdowns.
The centralized approach to the pandemic became atodds with the autonomy of local officials. Populist politics exacerbates the dynamics7 as when the President
reprimanded LGUs that the National Government “calls
the shots” when it comes to COVID-19 response. The
President further reminded that in such time of crisis,
the LGUs’ job is to comply.8 This was not a welcome
stance for local chief executives who with their boots
strapped need to quickly provide reliefs and solutions todaily challenges - from jobs, food, transport and healthcare - of their constituents. Many officials were not only
vocal against national policies but also innovatively
crafted ways to respond. The national government however did not make it easy for them to do so. Several
anecdotes illustrate this; we briefly cite two. One is thecase of the Pasig City mayor who allowed the movementof tricycles to ferry critical personnel.9 Another is thecase of the Marikina City mayor who started to build atesting center.10 Both were initiatives to address glaring
infrastructure gaps but were strongly rejected by
National Government Agencies as these did not follow
centrally-determined guidelines.
6 Porcalla, D. (2014, June 3). Task force on emerging infectious diseases formed. Philstar Global.
7 Castillo, R., Ramos, K., Alarde, J., & Fajermo, E. (2021).
Philippines. Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy.
8 Esguerra, D. J. (2020). Duterte warns: During crisis, national
gov’t calls the shots, LGUs comply. Philippine Daily Inquirer.
9 Gotinga, J. (2020, April 1). Vico Sotto on NBI Summons: We
complied with all directives. Rappler.
10 ____ (2020, April 15). Marikina to open coronavirus testing
center sans DOH license. Rappler.

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Damcelle Torres-Cortes, et al.

While LGUs generally faced various difficulties indealing with the pandemic, there are cases where LGUs
have coped well. A study identifies regional outliers
which had above average performance in addressing the
pandemic.11 These outliers, forming the minority, are
LGUs that had lower infection and mortality rates given
their economic, health, and demographic data, such as
working population, population density, ICU beds, doctors on quarantine, number of frontliners, and grossregional domestic product. Outliers were found in all of
the three major islands of the country (Luzon, Visayas,
and Mindanao). Best practices included early community lockdowns, mass testing, opening free infection
control centers, and quarantine facilities for returning
Overseas Filipino Workers. Some LGUs were willing topurchase their own vaccines in response to the
President’s call to do so.12
The Indonesian Case. Early responses of the Indonesian
government were slow and lacking in transparency, suggesting that policies were partial towards certain interests13. The lack of transparency was largely due to the
exclusion of inputs from various stakeholders.
Amendments of the state budget in 2020 were madewith little involvement of the House of Representatives(DPR) and civil society. This resulted, quite expectedly,in largely ineffective policies, such as: a) chaotic implementation of the social safety net policies because ofout-of-date data on beneficiaries; b) pre-employment
card policies that were prone to conflicts of interest andcorruption; c) policies for national economic recovery
that excluded farmers and fishers; and d) uniform policies applied irrespective of the state of infection of an
11 Talabis, D. A. S., Babierra, A. L., Buhat, C. A. H., Lutero, D. S.,
Quindala III, K. M., & Rabajante, J. F. (2021). Local government
responses for Covid-19 management in the Philippines. BMC
Public Health, 21(1), 1-15.
12 Tolentino Jr., A. (2021, November 20). Local autonomy in words
and in deeds. The Manila Times.
13 Ayuningtyas, D., Haq, H. U., Utami, R. R. M., & Susilia, S.
(2021). Requestioning the Indonesia government’s public policy
response to the Covid-19 pandemic: Black box analysis for theperiod of January–July 2020. Frontiers in Public Health, 9(1),
1-13.

132

LGU.14
Some of the findings of a quantitative study suggestthat stronger provincial governments are a good defense
against the pandemic.15 More specifically, the study
found that COVID-19 infection and mortality rates
tended to be lower, the higher the regional sustainable
development index, and the regional development index,
for all Indonesian provinces. In the case of Java province, the death rate tended to be lower, the higher the
public health development index. In the case of Sumatra
province, the death rate tended to be lower, the higher
governmental and institutional setting.
Where empowered LGUs were able to better copewith the pandemic,16 ”(m)ost coherent response strategies have come from district and municipal governments who have enforced their own lockdowns, driven
coordinated contract-tracing regimes, and set up theirown social support services.” Further examples ofregional good practices in Indonesia are:17 a) Bangka
Belitung province has come up with a citizen monitoring bracelet (using an application called “Fight COVID19”) that is used to track citizens entering Bangka
Belitung via the airport and seaports, and ensure theircompliance with quarantine and other measures to prevent the spread of the disease; b) North Maluku province has made a breakthrough with “traveling markets”
to ensure that local economies can continue to function
while avoiding the spread of COVID-19 through clusters in traditional markets; and c) Central Java hasformed a “jogo tonggo” (“look after your neighbors”)
task force at the neighborhood level as a way to decentralize responsibility for handling COVID-19.

14 Hasan, A. M. (2020, September 14). Budget politics in Indonesia’s
Covid-19 response. Indonesia at Melbourne.
15 Sevindik, I., Tosun, M. S., & Yilmaz, S. (2021). Local response to
the Covid-19 pandemic: The case of Indonesia. Sustainability,
13(10), 1-15.
16 Meckelburg, R., & Bal, C. S. (2021). Indonesia and Covid-19:
Decentralization and social conflict. In J. N. Pieterse, H. Lim & H.
Khondker (Eds.), Covid-19 and governance: Crisis reveals (pp.
74-87). Routledge.
17 Hasan, supra.

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Thailand: Decentralization and
COVID-19 Pandemic Response of a
Cautious Mover (from decentralization
to centralization)

Thailand’s lukewarm attitude towards decentralization is largely attributable to its history and politics. As
a constitutional monarchy, a top-down approach permeates the way power is organized and exercised in government. Its Constitution mandates decentralization but
it was able to formulate its Decentralization Plan only at
the start of 2000, or a decade later than its ASEAN fast
starter neighbors.18 But despite the passage of the
Decentralization to Local Administrative Organizations(LAOs) Act, the central government of Thailand continues to be the direct authority that takes control over thewhole country.19 The current leadership’s military orientation adds to this reluctance to share authority. A
former army leader, Thailand’s Prime Minister concentrates authority to the central government and relies onstate soldiers instead of community leaders for local
mobilization.
Nonetheless, in the early stages of the outbreak,Thailand was reported to have had one of the most successful responses to the pandemic.20 Some scholars
credit this achievement to local governments. Notably,at the onset of the pandemic, Thai state leaders needed
time to consolidate its plan and overall approach to acrisis as unexpected and as novel as COVID-19. The
urgency of the situation however prompted local officials to take action without having to wait for instructions from national officials.21 In other words, the central
government’s slow action activated the country’s

18 The ASEAN Secretariat-Jakarta. (2021). Assessment report on
public service delivery systems in ASEAN member states.
19 Naprathansuk, N., Pharcharuen, W., & Manaf, H. A. (2021). An
analysis on fragile people of a local government strategic between
Malaysia and Thailand in time of Covid-19 pandemic. Turkish
Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education, 12(8), 22182226.
20 Nethipo, V. (2021, August 13). Covid-19 crisis response under
Thailand’s authoritarian approach. Prachatai.
21 Kamnuansilpa, P. (2021, August 4). Where did we go wrong in thebattle against Covid? Bangkok Post.

decentralization scheme (albeit limited) and compelledlocal and provincial leaders to implement an immediate
response.22 Governors headed provincial communicabledisease committees and were responsible for introducing restrictions against the spread of COVID-19.23
Another local mechanism that helped contain the pandemic was the Village Health Volunteers (VHV) groupwhich has over a million members who are mostly
women. These volunteers have played a key role in connecting people with the formal healthcare system forover 40 years even in the absence of financial compensation. The VHVs enabled the public to be informed
about COVID-19 as well as collected data that are essential for public health decision-making.24
In the second wave of the pandemic, however,Thailand fell back to its standard centralist system. By
this time, national authorities had already secured its
foothold by establishing and legitimizing institutional
mechanisms for control. Like many countries, it established a national focal point for pandemic response: theCenter for COVID-19 Situation Administration (CCSA).
The CCSA, led by the Prime Minister, controlled the
distribution of all resources, and extended the role of themilitary through the initiative called ‘Army Delivery’,which allowed soldiers to assimilate into most social
activities and conduct strict surveillance of citizens.25
The pandemic further tightened the Thai
Government’s long-held grip on its powers when it
declared a national state of emergency under theEmergency Decree 2005. The emergency status has
been used by the Central Government to monopolize
decision-making, while it delegated authority to
Bangkok-appointed provincial governors at the local
level, rather than decentralized local authorities.26 The
22 Kamnuansilpa, P., & Laochankham, S. (2021, September 17).
Leadership does matter: Thailand’s Covid-19 response. New
Mandala: New Perspectives on Southeast Asia.
23 Ibid.
24 Cohen, A. (n.d.). The role of Thailand’s village health volunteersin Covid-19 prevention and control. The University of Sydney.
25 Kamnuansilpa & Laochankham, supra.
26 Boossabong, P. & Chamchong, P. (2020). Coping with Covid-19 in

133

Damcelle Torres-Cortes, et al.

decree restricts personal movements, assemblies,
fear-mongering or misleading communications, among
others where the Prime Minister has the ultimate control over.27

efficiency of LGUs. A Provincial Governor has also
cited the upcoming drop in transfers in 2023, when thetransfers will be computed based on the very poor government revenues during the pandemic.31

Budgetary Reforms in the ThreeCountries

Indonesia. Instead of expanding expenditures, most
LGUs in Indonesia reallocated their budget to increase
the allocation to COVID-19 related mitigation activities.32 Additional emergency funding, however, appears
to have helped reducing the COVID-19 deaths, especially in the case of Bali and Java islands.33
One budgetary reform priority that the pandemic has
prompted is a push to improve the quality of local government budget.34 Utilization of the regional budgets,
including the intergovernmental transfer to the region
and village fund (TKDD) has been quite low and below
optimal. To rectify this, the government is drafting a billon Central and Regional Relations (RUU HKPD) whichis expected to accelerate the improvement and distribution of public services, through such provisions as: a)regional taxation that promotes ease of doing business;b) transfer to regions based on performance; c) management of regional expenditures in an efficient and disciplined manner; d) controlled regional financing; and e)
fiscal policy synergy between government and local
governments. The RUU HKPD appears to put a priority
on efficiency by strengthening the fiscal decentralization process and improving the quality of intergovernmental transfers.

All three countries instituted emergency funding tocope with the pandemic, and implicitly as part of efforts
to address vertical and horizontal gaps exacerbated by
the pandemic. In this section, however, we focus onchanges or lack thereof in the fiscal resources madeavailable by the central government to the LGUs, as partof their decentralization efforts.
Philippines. As in the Indonesian case, Philippine LGUs
funded their COVID responses from their existing budgets.28 A further step in its decentralization, however, isnow being implemented, which results in expanded
resources for LGUs, following the Mandanas-Garcia
Supreme Court ruling of 2018.29 This is accompanied,
however, with the full devolution of the public services.
A Devolution Transition Plan for the next three years toallow LGUs to absorb full devolution.
Concerns over the court ruling cum full devolution
have been raised, for one, by the Department of
Finance,30 which estimates that this will yield 3 percent
lower economic growth, because of the lower spendinga non-democratic system: Policy lessons from Thailand’s centralised government. International Review of Public Policy, 2(3).
358-371.
27 Marome, W., & Shaw, R. (2021). Covid-19 response in Thailand
and its implications on future preparedness. International Journalof Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(3), 1-10.

Thailand. Efforts to attain fiscal decentralization in
Thailand have also begun through the enactment of the
Decentralization Act by increasing the proportion of
local expenditures to 20% by 2001 through increase in

28 De Vera, B. O. (2022, February 21). Local government are funding their own projects – DOF. Philippine Daily Inquirer.

31 Torregoza, H. (2022, January 9). Chiz to LGUs: Don’t depend on
windfall from Mandanas ruling. Manila Bulletin.

29 The Philippine Supreme Court held that the base for computing
LGUs’ share in national taxes should include customs and otherduties collected by the central government. This effectively
increases the overall allocation for LGUs by at least 50% (WorldBank 2021).

32 Qibthiyyah, R. M. (2021). Province and local finances inIndonesia during Covid-19 pandemic (LPEM-FEBUI Working
Paper No. 059). Institute for Economic and Social Research Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia.

30 Department of Finance. (2021, November 30). Fiscal consolidation necessary to minimize long-term economic scarring fromCOVID-19 pandemic, SC rule on expanded LGU tax share– DOF.

134

33 Ibid, p.6
34 Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia (May 2021) Fiscal
and Economic Updates.

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local taxes and shared taxes. However, local governments have been constrained/limited to collecting only
the following types of taxes: signboard tax, land andbuilding, and local maintenance tax. Hence, local governments still complain of minimal fiscal autonomy inregards to financial resources.35
The government’s economic stimulus packages
during the pandemic included multiple tax relief measures, several rounds of cash handouts, and subsidies forutilities and consumption. These heavy spending programmes were financed through budget reallocation,
government savings, and additional borrowing.
Consequently, the Thai Government’s public debt hasballooned in the last fiscal year, but at a manageablelevel.36 For 2022, Thailand’s revised budget is slightly
reduced but strong calls were made to prioritize fiscal
stimulus, health and social assistance as the country
reels from the pandemic, and to reduce military spending.37 While still operating on a deficit, Thailand’s 2023
fiscal year budget has been increased. One possible
cause of concern raised over the 2022 budget being
finalized is that the lessons of the value of decentralization seem to have been ignored, as the central government continues to have the largest share of the budget
and is being based on overly optimistic assumptions of
economic growth.38

Of the three countries, Thailand’s experience appears
to have been the most discouraging, having started on
the right decentralized approach to coping with the pandemic, and reverting to a more centralized approach that
contributed to the deterioration of the performance of its
pandemic containment. To be fair, however, Thailand
has fared the best, as shown in Table 1, in terms of suppressing its death rate to 356 as against that 500+ of thefast starters. Moreover, Thailand’s higher number ofcases per million population indicates the higher qualityof its health infrastructure, which has kept the death rate
lower despite the higher infection rate. This contrasts
with the Philippines’ fragmented health system despite
devolution.

Conclusion

The death rate is just among the many indicators ofeffective pandemic response yet Thailand’s management of COVID-19 has been hailed as a striking success, with a recent Lowy Institute analysis ranking it 4thout of 98 countries in terms of its response to thepandemic.41

In general, COVID-19 has shown the efficacy ofdecentralization, where it has empowered LGUs, in theexperience of the three ASEAN countries in copingwith the pandemic. While these cases appear to be aminority in these countries, it nevertheless has prompteda renewed push on decentralization.

Table 1. Comparative Pandemic Statistics
Country

Total Cases

Indonesia
Philippines
ThailandWorld

6,005,646
3,677,616
3,575,398
484, 868, 439

Cases/Million
Pop’n21,56132,80251,001
62,204

Deaths/Million
Pop’n.
556
527
356
790

Source: Worldometers39
As of March 30, 2022, 00:07 GMT
Note: The death rate data was confirmed to be more or less that samewith that of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
tracker, as of February 28, 2022.40

39 Worldometer. Coronavirus. Accessed on March 31, 2022 https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries
35 Japan International Cooperation Agency (2007). Trends andDevelopments in Decentralization in Thailand in JICA Programon Capacity Building of Thai Local Authorities.
36 Andriansyah A. and Sok S. (December 7, 2021). Fiscal Policy is
Key to the Post-Pandemic Recovery. Bangkok Post.
37 Guild, J. (2021, September 19). Thailand’s 2022 budget takes
shape. The Diplomat.
38 Ibid.

40 Center for Strategic and International Studies. Southeast Asia
Covid-19 tracker. Accessed on 31 March 2022. https://www.csis.
org/programs/southeast-asia-program/projects/past-projects/
southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker The population data, fromWorldometers, used for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand
were 278,658,728, 112,186,005, and 70,105,552, respectively.
41 Lowy Institute. Covid performance rankings. Accessed on
March31,2022.https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/covidperformance/#rankings

135Damcelle Torres-Cortes, et al.

Although most aspects of Thai governance are centralized, its primary healthcare services are localized
and community-based – a set-up that has been in placeprior to the pandemic. The health system was designed
to ensure a more equitable distribution of healthresources42. The system is led and supported by a competent and reliable Ministry of Public Health, which has
been known to have shown strong leadership throughcoordinated efforts from various departments throughout the pandemic.43
Thailand’s experience in curtailing and managing
the impacts of COVID-19 has underscored the value ofa functional and empowered multi-level government.
“The society has learned that centralized solution
making is unable to tackle both health and economic
problems. Provincial governors and local organizations
must have power to ensure swift and efficient solutions.”
Moreover, the government must provide space forengaging with various stakeholders and supporting
grassroots and community-level networks.44
Although less dramatic, the same could be said fromthe experiences of Indonesia and the Philippines. These
fast starters, however, have shown to be relatively
advancing on their local budget reforms.
Several insights on appreciating shared growth canbe gleaned from our study. First is that decentralization
is not simply about distributing power and resources.
More profoundly, it is about establishing functional androbust central-local relations. The second insight thenflows from this: the pace or extent of devolution is not
the only consideration; the service to be devolved isequally important. To ensure that decentralization
addresses both horizontal and vertical gaps, it is crucial
to ascertain which services are best left to local vis à vis
national authorities. A decentralized health system such
42 Cohen, A. (n.d.). The role of Thailand’s village health volunteersin Covid-19 prevention and control. The University of Sydney.
43 Osewe, P. L. (2021). Pandemic preparedness and response strategies: Covid-19 lessons from the Republic of Korea, Thailand, andViet Nam. Asian Development Bank.
44 Marome, W., & Shaw, R. (2021). Covid-19 response in Thailand
and its implications on future preparedness. International Journalof Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(3), 1-10.

136

as that in Thailand proved instrumental to combating
COVID-19 as against the Philippines’ sweeping devolution which left the provision of healthcare services fragmented. Lastly, regardless of the pace or extent ofdecentralization, creatively carving out spaces forautonomy and local participation is a useful antidote tocentralist approaches, and a necessary ingredient ofshared growth. In the Philippines, institutionalized
powers of local mayors enabled them to push for relevant initiatives. In all three countries, community pantries and volunteers catered to needs that governments
were unable to support.
COVID-19 is not likely to be the last pandemic tovisit us. Efforts to make populations less vulnerable andmore resilient have to be put in place now, even as weseem to be recovering from the pandemic. LGUs will bein the forefront of this fight. A rational strategy would
be to waste no time in pushing their capacities to farewell in battle. In a word, to further push for decentralization towards bridging vertical and horizontal gaps,
and achieving shared growth.

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