Research Briefing
By Melanie Gower,
Patrick Butchard,
CJ McKinney
29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration andEconomic Development
Partnership

Summary1
The agreement between the UK and Rwanda
2 Parliamentary scrutiny and approval
3 Legal challenges and court decisions
4 Changes in response to the Supreme Court judgment
5 Frequently asked questions about the Rwanda policy
Annex: International law issues

commonslibrary.parliament.uk

Number 9568

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Image Credits
UK-Rwanda agreement by UK Home Office. Licensed under CC BY-2.0 / image
cropped.
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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Contents
Summary

4

1

The agreement between the UK and Rwanda

6

1.1

April 2022: announcement and reactions

6

1.2

Key elements of the asylum partnership9

1.3

How are people chosen for relocation?

13

2

Parliamentary scrutiny and approval

16

2.1

The April 2022 memorandum of understanding

16

2.2

The December 2023 treaty

17

3

Legal challenges and court decisions

19

3.1

First flight halted by European court

19

3.2

Policy found unlawful by UK courts

21

3.3

Government response: Revised Rwanda policy

23

4

Changes in response to the Supreme Court judgment

24

4.1

Upgrading the deal to a treaty

24

4.2

New law treating Rwanda as safe

25

5Frequently asked questions about the Rwanda policy

27

5.1

When would flights to Rwanda begin?

27

5.2

How many people would be sent to Rwanda?

28

5.3

Would the scheme deter unauthorised journeys to the UK?

29

5.4

How much does it cost?

30

5.5

Are there comparable precedents?

31

Annex: International law issues

3

33

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Summary
The Government intends to send some people who have tried to claim asylumin the UK to Rwanda to seek asylum there. The policy is designed to deter
unauthorised immigration, especially people arriving by small boat.
The Supreme Court found in November 2023 that sending asylum seekers to
Rwanda was unlawful. In response, the Government secured a new treaty
with Rwanda and new legislation from Parliament, both designed to make therelocation scheme lawful. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak hopes to begin sending
people to Rwanda in July, if his party wins the 2024 general election.

People attempting to claim asylum in the UK
will be sent to live in Rwanda instead
The UK and Rwanda agreed a Migration and Economic Development
Partnership in April 2022. It included a five-year ‘asylum partnershiparrangement’ as detailed in a non-binding memorandum of understanding. In
December 2023, this was upgraded to a formal treaty.
The arrangement allows the UK to forcibly relocate asylum seekers, people
who have already been refused asylum, and other people who have madeunauthorised journeys to the UK. Rwanda will either grant them asylum or
permanent residence; they cannot apply for return to the UK. Under thetreaty, relocated people cannot be sent out of Rwanda (unless the UK
requests their return).

The UK is making significant economic aid andper-person payments to Rwanda
In return, the UK is providing £370 million in development funding to Rwanda,
plus another £120 million once 300 people have been relocated. The UK will
also pay up to £171,000 per person relocated, largely to cover a five-year
integration package. By the end of 2023, £240 million had already been paid
to Rwanda. Another £50 million was due for payment in April 2024.
The arrangement has been controversial, including in Parliament and amongsome Conservatives. Critics have raised concerns about the policy’s legality,
practicality, morality, efficacy and expense. The Labour Party says it wouldcancel the scheme.

4

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Asylum seekers will no longer have their claim
processed in the UK if they arrive illegally
The Home Office plans to use the relocation agreement to remove people whohave made dangerous journeys to the UK and are considered ‘inadmissible’ tothe UK’s asylum system. Once the Illegal Migration Act 2023 is fully in force,people’s asylum claims would be automatically inadmissible if they havearrived illegally since 20 July 2023.
People whom the Home Office wishes to relocate to Rwanda will be identified
and referred to the Rwandan authorities on a case-by-case basis, after an
initial screening process in the UK.
Although the scheme originally focused on inadmissible asylum seekers, it
has since been expanded to cover people who never lodge an asylum claim,
have an asylum claim turned down or go voluntarily (one man has voluntarily
relocated to Rwanda after being refused asylum).

The plan has been held up by legal
challenges, and may be again
Nobody has been forcibly relocated under the UK-Rwanda asylum partnershipsince the policy was announced. The first planned flight in June 2022 washalted following a controversial European Court of Human Rights injunction.
In November 2023, the Supreme Court found that the Rwanda arrangements
were unlawful. In a unanimous decision, the court held that Rwanda was nota safe country because of the risk that it might send refugees back to places
where they would be persecuted.
The Government has decided to press ahead with the Rwanda policy. It is
attempting to make the arrangements lawful by including extra safeguards
for refugees in the new treaty with Rwanda and introducing a new Safety of
Rwanda Act which instructs the courts to treat Rwanda as safe. Both cameinto force on 25 April 2024.
Fresh litigation challenging aspects of the policy has begun nevertheless.

Criticism from the UN Refugee Agency
The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, has questioned whether the scheme iscompatible with the UK’s obligations under international refugee and humanrights laws. Some of its concerns are summarised in the annex to this briefing.

5

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership1

The agreement between the UK and
RwandaIn April 2022, the UK and Rwanda announced a Migration and Economic
Development Partnership.
This bilateral agreement centres around an ‘asylum partnershiparrangement’. The asylum partnership was initially agreed in a non-binding
memorandum of understanding (MOU) but is now, with some modifications, ina formal treaty.
The arrangement allows the UK to ask Rwanda to assume responsibility forsome people who have claimed asylum in the UK and/or arrived in the UK
illegally. Those relocated to Rwanda will be able to apply for permission tostay in that country.
Nobody will be able to apply for return to the UK, but the UK can request theirreturn. Otherwise, the treaty does not permit Rwanda to send people away:
everyone relocated is to be granted asylum or permanent residence.
The UK will pay Rwanda up to £170,000 for each relocated person to coverprocessing costs and a five-year integration package, plus up to £500 million
in economic aid. The UK Government has also committed to resettle in the UKa small number of vulnerable refugees currently in Rwanda.

1.1

April 2022: announcement and reactions
The original MOU on the asylum partnership was signed in Kigali on 13 April
2022 by the then Home Secretary, Priti Patel, and Rwanda’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Vincent Biruta. It came into force on the same date.1
Media reports of the agreement emerged that evening. 2 The then Prime
Minister, Boris Johnson, announced the policy in a speech the following day,
14 April 2022. 3 The deal was also summarised in a Home Office press release,
World first partnership to tackle global migration crisis, and a media
factsheet: Factsheet: Migration and Economic Development Partnership.

1

2
3

6

Home Office, Memorandum of Understanding between the government of United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland and the government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an
asylum partnership arrangement, 13 April 2022
For example, “UK to send asylum seekers to Rwanda for processing”, The Guardian, 13 April 2022
Prime Minister’s Office, PM speech on action to tackle illegal migration, 14 April 2022

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

The asylum partnership was part of a broader set of changes to the asylum
system, under the overarching New Plan for Immigration policy agenda. The
prospect of relocation to Rwanda is one of the ways in which the Government
is seeking to deter people who make unauthorised journeys to the UK rather
than claiming asylum in countries they pass through on the way (such as
France). 4Controversy
The Government’s interest in securing asylum partnership agreements withother states was well-known and commented on during passage of the
Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Nevertheless, the announcement of thepartnership with Rwanda generated considerable controversy andcommentary domestically and overseas.
Some opposition parties in Rwanda objected to the scheme.5 The EU
Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, criticised it for not being a“humane and dignified migration policy”. 6
The arrangement was opposed in the UK Parliament, including by the former
Prime Minister, Theresa May, and some other senior Conservatives. 7 Theircriticisms highlighted concerns about the policy’s likely legality, practicality,
efficacy and expense. The Archbishop of Canterbury said that the plan does
not stand the judgment of God, and some Home Office officials also
reportedly raised objections. 8
Aside from practical concerns, refugee rights advocates objected in principle
to the use of ‘externalisation’ policies by developed states such as the UK. 9 In
April 2022, a coalition of over 150 civil society organisations wrote to thePrime Minister and Home Secretary outlining their opposition to the policy.
Refugee law practitioners and academics argued that the deal undermines
the post-World War 2 international protection regime. The Migration Policy
Institute think tank commented that it “advances the idea that states can pay
to cast off the responsibilities they signed up to under the 1951 Geneva
Convention”. 10

4
5
6

7

8

9
10

7

HC Deb 15 December 2023 c653
“Rwandan opposition criticises deal to accept UK’s asylum seekers”, The Guardian, 14 April 2022
“Migrant crossings: PM defends Rwanda plan as ‘the morally right thing to do”, Sky News, 15 April
2022
HC Deb 19 April 2022 c29; David Davis, “Hard-won Brexit freedoms shouldn’t be abused to outsource
asylum”, The Times, 19 April 2022; Andrew Mitchell, “The Government’s Rwanda plan will be
impractical, ineffective – and expensive”, Conservative Home, 19 April 2022
“UK’s Rwanda asylum plan the ‘opposite of nature of God’ – Welby”, BBC News, 17 April 2022; “Home
Office perm sec ‘tells staff to get on with’ Rwanda asylum scheme”, Civil Service World, 22 April 2022
Refugee Council, Briefing on the UK Government’s agreement with Rwanda, April 2022
Migration Policy Institute, Commentaries, The UK-Rwanda Agreement Represents Another Blow to
Territorial Asylum, April 2022

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) said the UK was abdicating responsibility toothers and therefore threatening “the international refugee protection
regime, which has stood the test of time, and saved millions of lives”:
The UK has supported UNHCR’s work many times in the past and is providing
important contributions that help protect refugees and support countries inconflicts such as Ukraine. However, financial support abroad for certain
refugee crises cannot replace the responsibility of States and the obligation toreceive asylum seekers and protect refugees on their own territory –irrespective of race, nationality and mode of arrival.
While UNHCR recognizes the challenges posed by forced displacement,
developed countries are host to only a fraction of the world’s refugees and are
well resourced to manage claims for asylum in a humane, fair and efficientmanner. 11

In contrast, the UK and Rwandan Governments contended that the global
asylum system is “broken”. They believe the partnership is a “world-leading”
approach which “can set a new international standard” and will support thehumane and respectful treatment of refugees. 12 They argued:[it] is a first-class policy that will see major investment in jobs, skills, andopportunities in Africa. [...]
And it is a template for how to deliver a fairer and more effective global asylum
system – one that deters criminality, exploitation and abuse, and promises abright new future for those who find a new home in a wonderful country. 13

Ministers accused critics of failing to offer a viable alternative. 14 One of thepolicy’s supporters, Tony Smith, a former head of Border Force, welcomed thedeal for having “opened up a very real possibility of removing persons whoenter illegally to another country”. Writing in The Telegraph, he suggested it
reflected the limited options available to the Government:
It takes two to tango. Absent any international collaboration from France, theEU or source and transit countries, the Government has nowhere to go otherthan to negotiate returns agreements like this with countries like Rwanda.
Anything less means, in effect, open borders. If that’s what refugee groups andlawyers are advocating, then they should be honest about it and say so. 15

The Labour Party has said it would call off the deal with Rwanda. 16

11
12
13

14
15

16

8

UNHCR UK, UN Refugee Agency opposes UK plan to export asylum, 14 April 2022
Home Office press release, Home Secretary and Rwandan Minister Biruta visit Geneva, 19 May 2022
Priti Patel and Vincent Biruta, “Repairing the broken asylum system is a moral imperative”, 19 May
2022“Priti Patel: Rwanda plan critics ‘fail to offer their own solutions’”, The Guardian, 18 April 2022
Tony Smith, “Time to push ahead with Rwanda deportations, no matter what the lawyer-activistssay”, The Telegraph, 23 May 2022
“Keir Starmer vows to scrap Rwanda asylum scheme 'straight away'”, BBC News, 10 May 2024; seealso Policy Mogul, Yvette Cooper's speech to Labour Conference, 27 September 2022

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

1.2

Key elements of the asylum partnership
On 5 December 2023, Home Secretary James Cleverly signed a treaty on theasylum partnership with the Rwandan Government. 17 The treaty partly
replicated the terms of the original MOU but made some significant changes(see section 4.1 below). This section outlines the main terms of the asylum
partnership as restated in the new treaty.
The stated objective of the asylum partnership is to:deter dangerous and illegal journeys to the United Kingdom which are putting
people’s lives at risk and to disrupt the business model of people smugglers
who are exploiting vulnerable people. 18

It aims to achieve this by relocating asylum seekers, and people arriving in
the UK without permission, to Rwanda where they can apply for asylum. 19
Those not entitled to asylum will be granted a Rwandan permanent residence
permit instead. 20
Rwanda commits to processing individual asylum cases in accordance withthe 1951 Refugee Convention (which it has signed), and current international
standards including international human rights law. The treaty creates“binding obligations” between the two states and will become part of
Rwanda’s domestic law once ratified.21
The treaty is due to last until 13 April 2027 but can be renewed. The clock
stops ticking if a court order requires suspension of the arrangements. The
agreement can be terminated by either party with three months’ notice. 22

The UK’s responsibilities under the treaty
Rwanda needs to approve each individual transfer request before the person
is relocated. The timing of a relocation request is determined by the UK, but
requests will not be made before the person has been through an initial
asylum screening process in the UK.
The treaty does not specify any minimum or upper limit on the number oftransfer requests made. 23

17

18
19
20
21
22
23

9

Home Office, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an asylum
partnership to strengthen shared international commitments on the protection of refugees andmigrants, 5 December 2023
As above, art 2(1)As above, art 3
As above, art 10(4)(a)As above, arts 2(2) and 6
As above, art 23
As above, art 4

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

When submitting a transfer request to Rwanda, the UK commits to providing
information about that person, including about special needs or healthissues. 24 The UK is not obliged to disclose such information if it would becontrary to domestic or international law. 25
If Rwanda accepts the person for transfer, the UK will “where possible”
provide additional information about them, such as languages spoken or
dietary requirements. Annex C to the treaty contains further provisions ondata management and protection.
The UK assumes responsibility for arranging (and funding) transport to
Rwanda, including the provision of escorts where necessary. 26

Processing and reception arrangements in Rwanda
Rwanda promises to provide all arrivals with accommodation and support
that is adequate to ensure their “health, security and wellbeing”. People arefree to enter and leave the allocated accommodation at all times”.27 There ismore detail on these assurances in Part 1 of Annex A to the treaty.
Relocated people have the right to claim asylum in Rwanda. They must beprocessed by Rwanda’s asylum system in accordance with its national andinternational legal obligations.
Annex B to the treaty contains procedural safeguards for asylum applicants.
These include:•

Being given the opportunity to lodge an asylum claim, provide
supporting written evidence and attend an in-person interview•

Initial decisions being made by an impartial First Instance Body made upof people trained in asylum law•

Notification of the asylum decision in writing, giving “detailed reasons”•

Access to an interpreter and to legal representation at every stage of theasylum claim

For the first six months, the First Instance Body must consider the advice of a“seconded independent expert” before deciding to refuse asylum.
The treaty then says there is a right of appeal to an ‘Appeal Body’. For the first
five years, the Appeal Body must be jointly headed by one Rwandan judge andone judge from another Commonwealth country. These two will select theother judges of the Appeal Body, who must be “from a mix of nationalities”.

24
25
26
27

10

As above, art 5(2)As above, art 5(6)As above, art 6
As above, art 8

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Like the First Instance Body, the Appeal Body must consult an independent
expert before making decisions, in this case for the first 12 months.
These would be new institutions. Normally, asylum decisions in Rwanda aremade by a Refugee Status Determination Committee with appeals to agovernment minister and then the High Court of Rwanda. 28

Possible case outcomes and post-decision entitlements
People who are relocated from the UK to Rwanda cannot apply to return to
the UK under the partnership arrangement. The UK can, however, decide torequest that someone be returned. 29
People found to be eligible for asylum will be granted refugee status (or anequivalent status for non-Refugee Convention cases) by Rwanda. Those noteligible for asylum, or who have not applied for it, will be allowed to stay
anyway. Rwanda commits to “regularise that person’s immigration status in
Rwanda, so as to ensure a right to remain in Rwanda in the form of apermanent residence permit”. 30
Part 2 of Annex A to the treaty has more detail on the rights of people granted
permission to stay in Rwanda (as a refugee or otherwise). These include
language classes, integration programmes and freedom of movement.
Nobody can be removed from Rwanda unless the UK requests their return.
The treaty says the parties:
shall cooperate to agree an effective system for ensuring that removal
contrary to this obligation does not occur, which includes systems (with theconsent of the Relocated Individual as appropriate) for returns to the United
Kingdom and locating, and regularly monitoring the location of, the Relocated
Individual. 31

The treaty does not place restrictions on the UK’s right to request someone’s
return. Circumstances in which this might happen include a UK court
determining that the relocated person is under 18 (and unaccompanied) or
explicitly ordering that the person be brought back. 32 The Home Office has
also reportedly said that return would be requested if the person commits aserious crime in Rwanda and loses their right to reside.33

28

29

30
31
32
33

11

Home Office, Rwanda: country information on the asylum system, version 1.0, 9 May 2022 [since
withdrawn], paras 4.7 and 4.11
Home Office, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an asylum
partnership to strengthen shared international commitments on the protection of refugees andmigrants, 5 December 2023, art 11(1)As above, art 10(4)(a)As above, art 10(3)As above, art 3(4) and heading of art 11“Asylum seekers jailed for serious crimes in Rwanda will be sent back to UK”, The Telegraph, 5
December 2023

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Monitoring and oversight
Joint Committee of UK and Rwandan Government representatives
A Joint Committee comprising representatives of the UK and Rwandan
Governments (mostly officials) has been set up as required by the MOU andnow the treaty. Its role is to monitor and review implementation of the asylum
partnership arrangement and to make non-binding recommendations. It
serves as a forum to exchange information, discuss best practice, and resolve
technical or administrative issues.
The Joint Committee will meet at least once every six months. The firstmeeting took place on 31 May 2022. 34
Independent Monitoring Committee
A Monitoring Committee, comprising people independent of the UK and
Rwandan governments, has also been formed as required by the MOU andnow the treaty. It reports and makes recommendations to the Joint
Committee.35
The committee’s “key function” is to advise on how to ensure that the treaty isadhered to in practice. It sets its own terms of reference, but the Joint
Committee can set additional terms of reference provided they do notconflict. 36 The Monitoring Committee’s latest terms of reference say it willassess compliance with the treaty across “the entire relocation process fromthe beginning”.37
This will happen largely through “field visits”. The terms of reference say that
the Monitoring Committee will be able to make unannounced visits toaccommodation, asylum processing centres and any other locations used toprocess cases. 38 The treaty also provides that the committee is to have“unfettered access” to relevant locations, people, and documents. 39 The
committee will meet at least twice a year.
As of May 2024 there were eight members, four appointed by Rwanda andfour by the UK.

34

35

36
37
38
39

12

Home Office, First meeting of the Migration and Economic Development Partnership Joint
Committee, 31 May 2022, 2 September 2022
Home Office, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an asylum
partnership to strengthen shared international commitments on the protection of refugees andmigrants, 5 December 2023, art 15(4)(b) and (c)As above, arts 15(4) and 16(5)Home Office, Monitoring Committee: terms of reference, 11 January 2024, p2
As aboveHome Office, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an asylum
partnership to strengthen shared international commitments on the protection of refugees andmigrants, 5 December 2023, art 14(1)Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Resettlement of refugees in Rwanda to the UK
As part of the deal, the UK has also committed to resettle in the UK anunspecified “portion” of Rwanda’s most vulnerable refugees. 40 The Home
Office has said this is expected to amount to “tens” of cases, involving people
who have complex needs. 41

1.3

How are people chosen for relocation?
People inadmissible to the UK asylum system
Asylum seekers whom the UK wishes to transfer to Rwanda will be identified
and referred to the Rwandan authorities on a case-by-case basis, after an
initial screening process following arrival in the UK. The Home Office says
relocations will initially focus on people who have made dangerous journeys
to the UK via a safe country since May 2022. 42
Broad parameters on who is eligible to be relocated to Rwanda are set out inthe Home Office ‘inadmissibility’ policy:
A person who is otherwise suitable for inadmissibility action as set out in thisguidance may be eligible for removal to Rwanda… if:•they have claimed asylum on or after 1 January 2022, and•their journey to the UK can be described as having been dangerous[, and]•they do not have families with children under the age of 18…

A dangerous journey is defined as one able or likely to cause harm or injury,
including journeys by small boat or hidden in a lorry. 43

What are inadmissible asylum claims?
The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 provides for people who were previously
present in or have another type of connection with a “safe third State” to betreated as inadmissible to the UK’s asylum system. 44 The Home Office canremove them to any safe third state that agrees to receive them, without firsthaving to consider the asylum claim.
The inadmissibility rules would be strengthened by the Illegal Migration Act
2023. People’s asylum claims would be automatically inadmissible if, broadly
speaking, they have entered the country illegally since 20 July 2023. 45 Proof of
having travelled through a safe country would no longer be required.
The core provisions of the Illegal Migration Act are mostly not in force at timeof writing and have been disapplied entirely in Northern Ireland. 46

13

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development PartnershipA ‘notice of intent’ is issued to people whose claims are being considered
under the current inadmissibility rules. If the person is being considered forrelocation to Rwanda this will also be specified in the letter. The notice ofintent gives people seven days to respond if they are in a detention centre, or
14 days if they are not detained.47
Caseworkers must consider the relevant country policy and information
documents to determine whether relocation to Rwanda is suitable in an
individual case. 48 The Home Office says it will “undertake a case-by-caseassessment when considering enforced removal. This means individual
vulnerabilities will be taken into consideration and assessed against ourknowledge of the conditions in Rwanda”.49
Decisions that Rwanda is safe for a particular person can be challenged
through the judicial review process, although the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024
requires “compelling evidence”. The 2024 Act also restricts the ability ofjudges to issue an injunction suspending the person’s removal from the UK. 50
Although the scheme originally focused on asylum seekers, other people
making unauthorised journeys to the UK can also be relocated. The two
governments have agreed that the treaty covers failed asylum seekers andpeople who take a voluntary relocation package. 51

People refused asylum in the UK
People whose asylum claim has been considered but turned down by the UK
can be sent to Rwanda if they arrived illegally (and have exhausted theirappeal rights). 52
Home Office guidance on this cohort does not explain how people might beselected from among the large number potentially eligible. 53 A departmentalpress release has however pointed to people who “could not have been

40
41

42
43
44
45
46

47
48
49

50
51

52
53

14

As above, art 19
PQ 180360 [on Refugees: Rwanda], answered on 19 April 2023; Home Affairs Committee, Asylum andmigration oral evidence HC 197, 11 May 2022, Q25
Home Office, Inadmissibility: safe third country cases, version 9.0, 29 April 2024, pp8-9
As above
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s80B
Illegal Migration Act 2023, s5
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Re Application for Judicial Review (Rev2) [2024] NIKB
35, 13 May 2024
Home Office, Inadmissibility: safe third country cases, version 9.0, 29 April 2024, p22
As above, p23
Home Office, Migration and Economic Development Partnership with Rwanda: Equality Impact
Assessment, 29 April 2024, section 2a
Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, s4
Letter to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation fromthe British High Commissioner concerning the interpretation of terms in the Rwanda partnershipagreement, 13 May 2024
As aboveHome Office, Removal of Failed Asylum Seekers to Rwanda (PDF), version 1.0, 13 May 2024

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

returned to… countries such as Syria or Afghanistan”. It also states explicitlythat removals from this cohort can be “enforced”, not just voluntary. 54

People who do not claim asylum at all
An addendum to the original MOU, agreed in March 2023, extended thepartnership to “individuals arriving illegally in the United Kingdom, who do
not make an asylum claim”. 55 The Home Office has not set out a policy on
removing non-asylum seekers to Rwanda against their will.

People who agree to go
The scheme also covers “assisted”, or voluntary, relocations. 56 People whotake assisted relocation are eligible for up to £3,000. 57
There is one known case of someone accepting assisted relocation to
Rwanda. 58 Although he had been refused asylum in the UK, voluntary
relocation can be taken up by “any individual who does not have leave toremain” – not just failed asylum seekers.

Who will not be sent to Rwanda?
Unaccompanied children are exempt from removal under the treaty. 59 The
treaty does envisage families with children being relocated, although theHome Office says that “at least initially” this would only be voluntary. 60
Rwandan asylum seekers in the UK would also be excluded. 61 During passageof the Safety of Rwanda Bill, a Home Office minister committed to an
additional exception for certain Afghans with links to the armed forces. 62
The Government has been reluctant to identify publicly any other cohorts whoare suitable or otherwise for relocation to Rwanda. It is concerned that doing
so could influence decisions made by asylum seekers and people smugglers
and undermine the policy’s intended deterrent effect. 63

54
55
56

57
58
59

60

61
62
63

15

Home Office press release, Failed asylum seekers detained for removal to Rwanda, 15 May 2024
Home Office, Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding, 18 March 2023
Letter to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation fromthe British High Commissioner concerning the interpretation of terms in the Rwanda partnershipagreement, 13 May 2024
Home Office, Voluntary and assisted departures (PDF), version 6.0, 18 March 2024
“Failed asylum seeker given £3,000 to go to Rwanda”, BBC News, 1 May 2024
Home Office, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an asylum
partnership to strengthen shared international commitments on the protection of refugees andmigrants, 5 December 2023, art 3(4)Home Office, Migration and Economic Development Partnership with Rwanda: Equality Impact
Assessment, 29 April 2024, section 2aHome Affairs Committee, Asylum and migration oral evidence HC 197, 11 May 2022, Q24 and Q26
HL Deb 22 April 2024 c1327
HC Deb 19 April 2022 c29

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

2

Parliamentary scrutiny and approval

2.1

The April 2022 memorandum of understanding
The original UK-Rwanda memorandum of understanding (MOU) was not put
before Parliament for formal scrutiny or a vote. Unlike the subsequent treaty(see below), it did not fall under the parliamentary scrutiny requirements of
the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 because it did not create
any legally binding obligations. 64
Public Law Project, a charity, criticised the absence of parliamentary scrutiny.
It also observed that the decision to use an MOU rather than a treaty was
relevant to the European Court of Human Rights’ decision to grant an
injunction which led to the cancellation of the first removal flight on 14 June
2022 (see section 3.1 below). 65
In an October 2022 report, the House of Lords International Agreements
Committee criticised the decision to use an “unenforceable” MOU rather thana formal treaty. The report said “it is unacceptable that the Government
should be able to use prerogative powers to agree important arrangementswith other states that have serious human rights implications without any
scrutiny by Parliament”. 66
The Rwanda policy as expressed in the MOU was nevertheless debated in
Parliament and examined by select committees, albeit after it had come into
force. Relevant parliamentary activity included:•

In April 2022, the Home Secretary made a statement to the House ofCommons on the “global migration challenge”, including the Migrationand Economic Development Partnership (which had been announced
while Parliament was in recess). 67•

In May 2022, the Home Affairs Committee held a one-off evidence session
with a Home Office minister and a senior official. 68

64

Home Office, Memorandum of Understanding between the government of the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provisionof an asylum partnership arrangement, 14 April 2022, para 1.6
Public Law Project, Why treaties matter: statement on flight cancellation, 15 June 2022
International Agreements Committee, Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Rwanda
for the provision of an asylum partnership arrangement, 18 October 2022, HL 71, 2022-23, p11
HC Deb 19 April 2022 c25
Home Affairs Committee, Oral evidence: Asylum and migration, HC 197, 11 May 2022. See also theminister’s follow-up letter to the committee of 15 June 2022 (PDF).

65
66

67
68

16

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

2.2•

In June 2022, the Joint Committee on Human Rights held a one-off
evidence session with three expert witnesses examining the human rights
implications of the deal. 69•

In July 2022, the Home Affairs Committee made several
recommendations about the Rwanda scheme in a report about Channel
crossings. 70•

In June 2023, the Women and Equalities Committee expressed concern
about the process for selecting people for removal to Rwanda in a reportabout equality in the asylum process. 71

The December 2023 treaty
The UK and Rwanda signed a new asylum partnership treaty on 5 December
2023. It was laid before Parliament on 6 December 2023. 72

Commons scrutiny of the treaty
Section 20 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRAG)
allows Parliament to object to a treaty being ratified. The House of Commons
can delay ratification indefinitely, in theory, by adopting resolutions to that
effect. 73
However, the Government is not obliged to provide parliamentary time for adebate or vote on a treaty. This considerably reduces the effectiveness of thedelay powers because in the Commons the Government controls most of thetime on the floor of the House.
The Home Affairs Committee recommended that the Government should
provide time for a debate on the UK-Rwanda treaty. 74 The Government said it
was unable to find time for a Commons debate but the treaty could be
examined during passage of the Safety of Rwanda Bill (see section 4.2
below). 75

69

70

71

72
73
74

75

17

Joint Committee on Human Rights, Oral evidence: The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic
Development Partnership and Human Rights, 8 June 2022. See also the Home Secretary’s letter tothe committee of 14 October 2022 (PDF).
Home Affairs Committee, Channel crossings, migration and asylum, 18 July 2022, HC 199 2022-23,
p45
Women and Equalities Committee, Equality and the UK asylum process, 27 June 2023, HC 93 202223, paras 176-186
Written statement HCWS101, 6 December 2023
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, s20
Home Affairs Committee, UK-Rwanda treaty: provision of an asylum partnership, HC 434 2023-24, 12January 2024
Letter from Leader of the House of Commons to Joanna Cherry MP (PDF), 31 January 2024

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Lords scrutiny of the treaty
The Lords International Agreements Committee has a remit to scrutinise alltreaties laid before Parliament. It held an inquiry into the UK-Rwanda treaty,
to which the Home Secretary gave oral evidence. James Cleverly told thecommittee that the Government would not operationalise the Rwanda
scheme “until we are confident that the measures underpinning the treaty
have been put in place” by the Rwandan Government. 76
The committee’s report, published on 17 January 2024, welcomed thatcommitment but recommended against ratification:
The Home Secretary told us that the Government would not “operationalise
this scheme until we are confident that the measures underpinning the treaty
have been put in place; otherwise, the treaty is not credible”. We welcome thatcommitment but would go further. The Government should not ratify the
Rwanda Treaty until Parliament is satisfied that the protections it provides
have been fully implemented since Parliament is being asked to make a
judgement, based on the Treaty, that Rwanda is safe.
The Government should submit further information to Parliament in due course
to confirm that the necessary legal and practical steps and training identified
in this report, which underpin the protections provided for in the Treaty, havebeen put in place and bedded in. It should then allow for a further debate
before proceeding to ratification. 77

The report was followed by a full House of Lords debate on a motion by thecommittee’s chair, Lord Goldsmith (Labour), that the treaty not be ratified
until fully implemented. 78 This was the first debate ever held under section 20
of CRAG. The Lords resolved against ratification by 214 votes to 171. 79
A House of Lords resolution against a treaty does not prevent or delay it frombeing ratified. But it does mean that the Government must lay before
Parliament a statement explaining why the treaty should nevertheless be
ratified.80 It can then proceed to ratify.
On 25 April 2024, the Home Secretary laid a statement under section 20 of
CRAG explaining why the treaty would be ratified despite the Lords’
resolution. 81 The treaty came into force on the same day, having been ratified
by both countries. 82

76

77

78
79
80
81

82

18

International Agreements Committee, Corrected oral evidence: UK-Rwanda asylum agreement, 19
December 2023, Q21
International Agreements Committee, Scrutiny of international agreements: UK–Rwanda Agreement
on an Asylum Partnership (PDF), HL 43 2023-24, 17 January 2024, paras 47-48 (footnotes andemphasis omitted).
HL Deb 22 January 2024 cc596-656
HL Deb 22 January 2024 cc656-658
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, s20 (7) and (8)Home Office, Statutory statement for the provision of an asylum partnership to strengthen sharedinternational commitments on the protection of refugees and migrants, 25 April 2024
Home Office press release, UK-Rwanda Treaty completes ratification process, 25 April 2024

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

3

Legal challenges and court decisions

Nobody has been removed under the UK-Rwanda partnership since it wasannounced, except for one man who volunteered. The first planned flight inJune 2022 was halted following a European Court of Human Rights injunction,
which the Government strongly criticised.
On 15 November 2023, the Supreme Court found that the Rwanda
arrangements are unlawful. The Government decided to press ahead with the
Rwanda policy, and is attempting to make the arrangements lawful through a
combination of legislation, capacity-building and a new treaty.

3.1

First flight halted by European court
On 10 May 2022, the Government announced that it had notified the firstgroup of people being considered for relocation to Rwanda. It said that it
anticipated legal challenges to prevent removal in some cases and expected
the first flights to Rwanda to take place “in the coming months”. 83
A further press release published on 1 June said that the Home Office had
begun to issue formal removal directions to the first cohort of cases and thatthe first flight was expected on 14 June.84
Those notified of their liability for removal to Rwanda applied for judicial
review of the decision-making in their individual cases. Some campaigningorganisations also challenged the legality of the asylum partnership and thepolicies and procedures underpinning it. 85
In the days leading up to 14 June the number of people due to fly reduced.
Many people had their removal directions cancelled, either by the Home
Office or after their individual cases had been scrutinised by the courts.

85

Home Office press release, First illegal migrants told of impending removal to Rwanda, 10 May 2022
Home Office press release, First migrants set for Rwanda to be given final notice, 1 June 2022
AAA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 1922 (Admin), 20 July 2022;
Public and Commercial Services Union press release, PCS brings legal challenge against plans tosend asylum seekers to Rwanda, 27 April 2022

19

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

83
84

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Some of those remaining applied for injunctions to prevent removal to
Rwanda until judicial review of other relocation cases had finished. The UK
courts refused these applications. 86
But on 14 June the European Court of Human Rights granted injunctions toseveral of those still due to fly, under its ‘Rule 39’ interim measuresprocedures. The decision in one case, NSK v United Kingdom, was confirmed
by press release on the evening of 14 June. That led to the Home Officecancelling the flight very shortly before its departure. 87
According to the press release, the court decided that NSK should not be
removed to Rwanda until the ongoing judicial review had been resolved:
The Court had regard to the concerns… that asylum-seekers transferred fromthe United Kingdom to Rwanda will not have access to fair and efficient
procedures for the determination of refugee status as well as the finding by theHigh Court that the question whether the decision to treat Rwanda as a safe
third country was irrational or based on insufficient enquiry gave rise to“serious triable issues”. In light of the resulting risk of treatment contrary to
the applicant’s Convention rights as well as the fact that Rwanda is outside theConvention legal space (and is therefore not bound by the European
Convention on Human Rights) and the absence of any legally enforceable
mechanism for the applicant’s return to the United Kingdom in the event of a
successful merits challenge before the domestic courts, the Court has decided
to grant this interim measure to prevent the applicant’s removal until thedomestic courts have had the opportunity to first consider those issues. 88

The timing and outcome of the court’s intervention was controversial.
Speaking in the House of Commons the following day, the then Home
Secretary Priti Patel criticised the court’s “opaque” decision-making,commenting that the Home Office had not yet seen the written judgment. 89
The Policy Exchange think tank’s Judicial Power Project described the decision
as “a remarkable abuse of judicial power, which discredits European humanrights law”. 90
The court has since changed the wording of Rule 39 to emphasise that interim
measures should only be granted in “exceptional circumstances”. There havealso been procedural changes relevant to criticism of its Rwanda
intervention, such as naming judges who issue such injunctions. 91

86

87
88

89
90

91

20

R (Public and Commercial Services Union & Ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2022] EWCA Civ 840, 13 June 2022; Supreme Court, Rwanda Permission to Appeal Application
refused, 14 June 2022
“Rwanda asylum flight cancelled after legal action”, BBC News, 15 June 2022
European Court of Human Rights press release, ECHR 197 (2022), 14 June 2022. On the otherinjunctions issued on 14 June, see press release ECHR 199 (2022), 15 June 2022.
HC Deb 15 June 2022 c301
Richard Ekins and the Judicial Power Project, “The Strasbourg court’s disgraceful Rwanda
intervention”, Law Society Gazette, 15 June 2022
European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court (PDF), 28 March 2024; A Lawyer Writes, Strasbourg
tightens rule 39, 29 March 2024

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

3.2

Policy found unlawful by UK courts
Lower court judges split
The judicial review proceeded to the High Court. In December 2022, the court
concluded that the Rwanda policy was lawful overall. 92 But it gave permission
for some of the claimants to take the case on to the Court of Appeal. 93
Ministers confirmed that they would not seek to remove anyone to Rwanda
until legal proceedings had finished. 94
The Court of Appeal issued its judgment in June 2023. It held, by a 2-1
majority, that the Rwanda policy was unlawful. The Lord Chief Justicedissented and would have held that the policy was lawful. 95
The judges found that the UK was not obliged to process all asylum claims
received. 96 There was no objection in principle to sending asylum seekers to asafe third country. 97 These findings were not challenged in the Supreme Court(see below).
The issue for the majority was that Rwanda was not a safe country because of
the risk that it would not decide asylum claims properly and as a result might
send refugees back to countries where their life or freedom would bethreatened (‘refoulement’). The risk of refoulement created a breach of Article
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and therefore of section 6 of
the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998, which makes it unlawful for the Government
to act in breach of the Convention.
The court gave its permission for the Home Secretary (now Suella Braverman)
to take the case to the Supreme Court. 98

Unanimous Supreme Court decision
On 15 November 2023, five justices of the Supreme Court held that sending
asylum seekers to Rwanda was unlawful. 99 They essentially agreed with the
Court of Appeal that problems with the Rwandan asylum system created a

92

93

94
95
96
97
98
99

21

R (AAA and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWHC 3230 (Admin), 19
December 2022
Garden Court Chambers, Rwanda judgment: Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal granted,
18 January 2023. The Court of Appeal itself later gave permission to appeal on additional grounds.
HC Deb 13 December 2022 c887; HC Deb 19 December 2022 c42
R (AAA and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 745, 29 June 2023
As above, paras 118, 321
Free Movement, Reflections on the Court of Appeal’s Rwanda decision, 5 July 2023
“UK government given permission to challenge Rwanda plan in top court”, Reuters, 13 July 2023
R (AAA and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42, 15 November 2023

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnershiprisk of refoulement. The decision did, however, leave open the possibility thatthe system could improve in future and eliminate that risk. 100
Other points made in the judgment include:•

The principle of non-refoulement is part of several international treaties
which the UK has ratified, and is a “core principle of international law”. 101
It also forms part of UK domestic law, not just through the Human Rights
Act 1998, but under immigration legislation from 1993, 2002 and 2004. 102•

Courts have to make their own assessment of whether there is a real riskof refoulement, rather than deferring to the government’s expertise. 103•

Evidence about the asylum situation in Rwanda provided by the UN
Refugee Agency, UNHCR, had “particular significance” because of thatorganisation’s standing and expertise. 104•

That evidence highlighted various deficiencies in the Rwandan asylum
system as it operated in practice, such as refusing claims without giving
reasons and an “untested” appeal system to judges thought to lackindependence from the government. There was also a “surprisingly high”
refusal rate of 100% for claims by citizens of Afghanistan, Syria andYemen between 2020 and 2022. 105•

A previous agreement to take asylum seekers from Israel resulted in“serious breaches” of the Refugee Convention rights of those
relocated. 106•

The general political situation in Rwanda gives rise to “profound humanrights concerns”, which raise “serious questions as to its compliance with
its international obligations”. 107•

Rwanda’s agreement to uphold higher standards under the deal with the
UK was “in good faith”, but “intentions and aspirations do notnecessarily correspond to reality: the question is whether they areachievable in practice”. 108

No appeal from the Supreme Court is possible.

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

22

As above, para 105
As above, para 26
As above, para 33
As above, para 52
As above, paras 64-70
As above, paras 77-94
As above, para 96
As above, paras 75-76
As above, para 102

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

3.3

Government response: Revised Rwanda policy
The Government decided to press ahead with implementation of the Rwanda
policy, making adjustments to render it lawful.
Two days before the Supreme Court handed down its judgment, Suella
Braverman was replaced as Home Secretary by James Cleverly. The
Parliamentary Under Secretary for Migration and Borders, Lord Murray of
Blidworth, also left the Government.
The new Home Secretary gave a statement to the House of Commons on the
day of the judgment, 15 November 2023. He set out the Government’s
intention to continue with the policy, including by firming up commitmentsfrom the original memorandum of understanding in a legally binding treaty:
The important thing to note is that the judgment of the Court today was madeon the basis of facts from 15 months ago. [...]We have been working with Rwanda to build capacity and amend agreementswith Rwanda to make clear that those sent there cannot be sent to anothercountry than the UK. Our intention is to upgrade our agreement to a treaty assoon as possible.
That will make it absolutely clear to our courts and to Strasbourg that the risks
laid out by the Court today have been responded to, will be consistent withinternational law, and ensure that Parliament is able to scrutinise it. […]We have a plan to deliver the Rwanda deal and we will do whatever it takes tostop the boats. 109

The Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, held a press conference later on 15
November. As well a new treaty, he said that the Government would propose“emergency legislation” to confirm that Rwanda is safe, intended to insulate
the policy from challenge in domestic courts. He added that, given thepossibility that the policy could nevertheless face challenge in the European
Court of Human Rights, the Government was “prepared to… revisit thoseinternational relationships to remove the obstacles in our way”. 110
These changes are discussed in section 4 below. But despite the work that hasgone into the scheme over the past six months, the Public Accounts
Committee reported on 29 May 2024 that the Home Office does not have a“credible plan” for implementing the scheme.111

109
110
111

23

Home Office, Update to government’s plan for illegal immigration, 15 November 2023
Prime Minister’s Office, PM remarks on Supreme Court Judgement, 15 November 2023
Public Accounts Committee, Asylum Accommodation and UK-Rwanda partnership, HC 639 2023-24

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

4

Changes in response to the Supreme
Court judgment

4.1

Upgrading the deal to a treaty
The new treaty with Rwanda was signed on 5 December 2023 and ratified on
25 April 2024. Unlike the original memorandum of understanding (MOU), thetreaty is legally binding. The Government considers this significant inproviding a firmer guarantee that refugees will not be removed from Rwanda
in breach of the agreement. 112

Differences between the treaty and the MOU
Paragraph 10(4) of the MOU had envisaged that people refused asylum in
Rwanda could ultimately be removed from the country. Article 10 of the treaty
explicitly rules this out and provides that anyone who does not qualify for
asylum will nonetheless be given a permanent residence permit.
Annex B of the treaty provides for new institutions to decide asylum
applications and appeals by people relocated to Rwanda. Both decisionmakers and judges will be required to consult independent experts, and somejudges will not be Rwandan. A note accompanying the original MOU hadprovided for some procedural safeguards but not to the same extent as in thetreaty.
In paragraph 11 of the MOU, relocated people could be brought back from
Rwanda “should the United Kingdom be legally obliged to facilitate that
person’s return”. Under Article 11 of the treaty, the UK can request that aperson be brought back for any reason (although this provision is under theheading “Facilitation of United Kingdom court proceedings and court orders
and return to the United Kingdom”).
The powers of the independent Monitoring Committee have been expanded. It
can now set its own terms of reference and publish reports of its inspections
as it sees fit (the Home Office does not permit the UK’s own immigration
inspectorate to do this). The committee has been tasked with setting up acomplaints system. It can also hire staff.
Article 3 of the treaty specifies that the rights of relocated people apply“regardless of their nationality, and without discrimination”. This was not in

112

24

Prime Minister’s Office, PM remarks on Supreme Court Judgement, 15 November 2023

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnershipthe MOU and may reflect the Supreme Court’s comments about the treatmentof Middle Eastern asylum seekers in Rwanda. 113
Article 22 contains a mechanism for the UK and Rwanda to resolve disputes
about the agreement. This includes arbitration. The MOU had explicitly ruledout any external dispute resolution mechanism.

Ratifying the treaty
The treaty came into force on 25 April 2024, after being ratified by bothparties.114
As explained in section 2.2 above, the UK’s internal procedures required astatement to be laid before Parliament explaining why the Government is
ratifying despite House of Lords opposition. Mr Cleverly laid a statement tothat effect on 25 April 2024. 115
The Rwandan Parliament passed legislation approving the treaty for
ratification on 18 April 2024. 116

4.2

New law treating Rwanda as safe
The Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 was introduced on 7
December 2023 and came into force on 25 April 2024. 117
The measure is designed to replace the Supreme Court’s judgment that
Rwanda is not safe with a rule that the courts must treat Rwanda as safe. The
intention is that the policy will then be lawful under UK domestic law despite
the ruling. The act also seeks to stop people taking legal challenges to delay
or prevent removal to Rwanda, insofar as those challenges are based onarguments about refoulement or Rwanda being generally unsafe.118
It will still be possible to argue that Rwanda is unsafe based on “compelling
evidence relating to the person’s particular individual circumstances”. This isconsistent with the Government’s position that there will be case-by-casescreening of individual suitability for relocation to Rwanda (see section 1.3

113

114

115

116
117
118

25

R (AAA and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42, 15 November
2023, para 85
Home Office, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provision of an asylum
partnership to strengthen shared international commitments on the protection of refugees andmigrants, 5 December 2023, art 24; Home Office press release, UK-Rwanda Treaty completes
ratification process, 25 April 2024
Home Office, Statutory statement for the provision of an asylum partnership to strengthen sharedinternational commitments on the protection of refugees and migrants, 25 April 2024, p16
Official Gazette, Law n° 040/2024 of 18/04/2024 (PDF), 19 April 2024
Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, s10
See Commons Library briefing CBP-9918, Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill 2023-24

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnershipabove). The Prime Minister has argued that the act sets the bar for a legal
challenge so high that “it will be vanishingly rare for anyone to meet it”.119
Sir Jonathan Jones KC, a former head of the Government Legal Department,
has identified several possible ways in which there could be renewed
litigation on the Rwanda policy despite the new legislation:•

A challenge arguing that the law itself is ‘unconstitutional’ and should be
struck down, although this is unlikely given the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty;•

A challenge seeking a declaration of incompatibility with the European
Convention on Human Rights, under section 4 of the Human Rights Act
1998;

•

Individual challenges based on personal circumstances, as envisaged bysection 4 of the act;•

Individual applications to the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg, including for interim measures (injunctions) under Rule 39 todelay removal pending a full hearing. 120

Section 5 states that ministers can refuse to comply with interim measures
issued by the Strasbourg court. 121 This has always been the case as a matterof UK domestic law. But exercising this power would place the UK in breach ofits treaty obligations under the European Convention. 122
11 Conservative MPs voted against the Safety of Rwanda Bill at third reading,including Suella Braverman, Robert Jenrick and Sir William Cash. 123 They feltthat it did not go far enough in shutting down all possible avenues of legal
challenge.
Conversely, the House of Lords raised multiple concerns about the bill andsuggested a series of amendments over several rounds of ping pong. The bill
was ultimately passed unamended, except for a requirement for the Home
Secretary to report on the removal of human trafficking victims to Rwanda.124

119
120
121
122

123
124

26

Prime Minister’s Office, PM's remarks on illegal migration, 7 December 2023
Institute for Government, Rwanda: what next in the courts?, 23 April 2024
Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, s5
See generally Commons Library briefing CBP-9958, The European Convention on Human Rights andthe Human Rights Act 1998
Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill: Third reading, division 60, 17 January 2024
On the concerns highlighted by the House of Lords, see Commons Library briefing CBP-9944, Safetyof Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill: progress of the bill, 19 April 2024, section 2

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

5

Frequently asked questions about the
Rwanda policy

5.1

When would flights to Rwanda begin?
How could be sent to Rwanda?
Prime Minister Rishi Sunak told the BBC on 23 May that people would start
being sent to Rwanda “in July”, after the general election of 4 July. 125 He
noted that the Government had made extensive preparations, including flightbookings and putting people in immigration detention. 126
Before calling the election, the plan had been for removals to begin in lateJune or early July.127 This was 10 to 12 weeks on from passage of the Safety of
Rwanda Act and ratification of the new UK-Rwanda treaty on the asylum
partnership in late April.
At that point, the Rwandan Government had yet to fully implement all thetreaty guarantees. For example, the treaty requires independent experts toadvise the Rwandan authorities on refusing asylum claims by people
relocated. The process for selecting these was ongoing as of late April,although the Government expected the posts to be filled no later than 27 May
2024. 128
As mentioned in section 4.2 above, it remains to be seen whether legal
challenges would again frustrate the intended timetable. There are two cases
before the courts at time of writing, one taken by the charity Asylum Aid andanother taken by the First Division Association trade union for civil servants. 129
If the Labour Party wins the general election, it says it would call off the
Rwanda policy altogether. Sir Keir Starmer said on 10 May 2024 “we wouldcancel the scheme, so that means no flights, no Rwanda scheme”.130

125

126
127

128

129

130

27

“No Rwanda flights before election, says Rishi Sunak”, BBC News, 24 May 2024 (reporting commentson the BBC Today programme of 23 May
Home Office press release, First phase of detentions underway for Rwanda relocations, 1 May 2024
King’s Bench Division, court orders of 8 May 2024 and 23 May 2024; Prime Minister’s Office, Prime
Minister Rishi Sunak's statement on the plan to stop the boats, 22 April 2024
Home Office, Statutory statement for the provision of an asylum partnership to strengthen sharedinternational commitments on the protection of refugees and migrants, 25 April 2024, p11
Leigh Day, Asylum Aid launches legal action against Home Office Safety of Rwanda policy, 3 May
2024; FDA, Why we’ve launched a judicial review of the Safety of Rwanda Act, 1 May 2024
“Keir Starmer vows to scrap Rwanda asylum scheme 'straight away'”, BBC News, 10 May 2024

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership5.2

How many people would be sent to Rwanda?
Announcing the policy in April 2022, then Prime Minister Boris Johnson said
“Rwanda will have the capacity to resettle tens of thousands of people in theyears ahead”.131 The then Deputy Prime Minister later said that the number ofpeople relocated to Rwanda each year was more likely to be in thehundreds. 132
More recently, Rishi Sunak and James Cleverly have emphasised that the aim
is for multiple flights each month indefinitely. 133 Although there is no publishedtarget, there is no upper limit either; ministers and officials have repeatedly
stressed that the scheme is “uncapped”.
Some observers have suggested that limited capacity in Rwanda to housepeople and process their asylum claims could undermine the policy’s
intended deterrent effect. 134 Rwanda’s recent caseloads of asylum claims
eligible for individual assessment have been small. There were 465 asylum
seekers in Rwanda at the end of 2020 and 228 individual asylum decisions
made, according to UNHCR statistics cited by the Home Office. 135
In terms of accommodation, the evidence before the High Court in 2022 wasthat “the physical capacity for housing asylum seekers in Rwanda was limited
to 100”. 136 The Home Office gave an initial figure of 200 beds. 137
But the Rwandan authorities have said more accommodation will be prepared
if the UK begins to relocate people: “As soon as flights begin, we will be able
to scale up rapidly to meet whatever the requirements are”. 138
More generally, Rwanda has emphasised its willingness to take large
numbers of people if required. A spokesperson told the BBC in November 2023
“we are ready, and willing, to take in as many people as the UK is able tosend”. 139 Home Office Permanent Secretary Matthew Rycroft, speaking to the
Public Accounts Committee in April 2024, agreed with that assessment. 140

131
132
133

134

135

136

137
138
139
140

28

Prime Minister’s Office, PM speech on action to tackle illegal migration, 14 April 2022
“Dominic Raab: Hundreds, not thousands, will be sent to Rwanda”, The Times, 20 May 2022
“Rwanda flights will deport asylum seekers ‘indefinitely’, says Cleverly”, Guardian, 25 April 2024;
Prime Minister’s Office, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak's statement on the plan to stop the boats, 22 April
2024
HC Deb 19 April 2022 c34; Home Affairs Committee, Asylum and migration oral evidence HC 197, 11
May 2022 Q39-44
Home Office, Review of asylum processing Rwanda: country information on the asylum system,
version 10, 9 May 2022 [since withdrawn], para 4.14.1
R (AAA and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 745, 29 June
2023, para 474
PQ 97762 [on: Asylum: Rwanda], 28 November 2022
“UK taxpayers helping fund Rwanda apartments for asylum seekers”, Telegraph, 17 March 2023
BBC Sounds, World at One, 16 November 2023, 16:29
Public Accounts Committee, Oral evidence: Asylum Accommodation and UK-Rwanda partnership,
HC 639, 15 April 2024, Q83

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

5.3

Would the scheme deter unauthorised
journeys to the UK?
Deterrence is a core objective of the Rwanda policy. 141 The Prime Minister has
said it will be considered a success if the boats are stopped.142
In general, the Home Office accepts the “academic consensus” that policychanges in destination countries do not stop people from leaving to seek
asylum. But it argues that policy can affect the choice of destination country,
highlighting examples of this being achieved by countries such as Australia,
Italy and Spain. 143 Oxford University’s Migration Observatory says that theseexamples do not necessarily prove the effectiveness of deterrence policies, as
they mostly involve physically preventing (rather than disincentivising)
unauthorised journeys. 144
There is considerable uncertainty about the likely impact of the Rwanda
policy specifically. The department’s Permanent Secretary requested aministerial direction to proceed in spite of there being insufficient evidence
that it provided value for money. He explained: “This does not mean that the[partnership] cannot have the appropriate deterrent effect; just that there isnot sufficient evidence for me to conclude that it will”. 145
The Home Affairs Committee concluded in July 2022 that there is “no clear
evidence” that the policy will deter small boat crossings. 146 In response, theGovernment said the desired deterrent effect “cannot be quantified with
sufficient certainty at this early stage in isolation from wider efforts to tackle
small boat crossings”. It also stated that it did not expect to achieve muchdeterrence until removals take place. 147
Migration Watch, a think tank that advocates lower immigration, hassuggested that the policy could act as a powerful deterrent if people entering
the UK illegally “are swiftly and routinely sent to Rwanda”. 148

141
142

143
144

145
146

147

148

29

HC Deb 25 April 2022 c454
“Rwanda bill: 'Success is when the boats have been stopped,' PM tells Sky News”, Sky News, 22 April
2024. Tom Pursglove, as illegal immigration minister in the Johnson Government, told the Home
Affairs Committee in May 2022 that a “real drop-off” in boat numbers would demonstrate success.
Home Office, Impact Assessment, Illegal Migration Bill, IA HO 0438 (PDF), 26 June 2023, p13
Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, Why the government’s economic Impact
Assessment of the Illegal Migration Act tells us little about the Act’s economic impact, 26 July 2023
Home Office, Letter from Matthew Rycroft to Rt Hon Priti Patel, 13 April 2022
Home Affairs Committee, Channel crossings, migration and asylum, 18 July 2022, HC 199 2022-23,
p4
Home Affairs Committee, Channel crossings, migration and asylum: Government Response to theCommittee’s First Report, 28 October 2022, pp10-11
Migration Watch, Potential impact of asylum arrangements with Rwanda, 5 May 2022

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

5.4

How much does it cost?
The Government initially said details of the funding arrangement with Rwanda
were confidential and refused to speculate about the likely overall costs. 149 A
National Audit Office investigation has now confirmed the costs of payments
to Rwanda:•

Fixed payments of £370 million into an Economic Transformation andIntegration Fund. The UK has already paid £220 million; it was due to pay
the remaining £150 million in three instalments of £50 million in April
2024, April 2025 and April 2026.

•

There are additional payments due to the Fund depending on the numberof people sent to Rwanda:•-£20,000 per person-£120 million once 300 people have been relocated

The UK will also pay up to £150,874 per person relocated to cover asylum
processing and integration over five years:-

Year 1: £45,262 (this includes £11,000 for the asylum assessment)-

Year 2: £37,718-

Year 3: £30,175-

Year 4: £22,632-

Year 5: £15,087

If the person left Rwanda voluntarily, these payments would cease. 150
This means that, if 300 people were relocated to Rwanda and remained there
for five years, the total cost of the scheme would be £541 million (£1.8 million
per person relocated). If 1,000 people were relocated and remained for five
years, the total costs would be £661 million (£661,000 per person relocated).
If those 1,000 people stayed only for one year, the total costs would be £555
million (£555,000 per person).
In addition to payments to Rwanda, the Home Office will incur its own costs.
These include an estimated £11,000 per person for flights to Rwanda.151

149
150

151

30

PQ 2110 [Asylum: Rwanda], answered on 21 November 2023
National Audit Office, Investigation into the costs of the UK-Rwanda Partnership, HC 577, 1 March2024
As above, paras 2.9-2.10

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

5.5

Are there comparable precedents?
The Government has sought to counter some criticisms of the UK-Rwanda
deal by suggesting that the EU and UNHCR have supported a scheme toremove asylum seekers to Rwanda, and by highlighting a previous Labour
administration’s interest in processing asylum claims outside the UK.
It maintains that the policy is not comparable to other examples, including aprevious arrangement between Israel and Rwanda.

UNHCR’s Emergency Transit Mechanism
The European Union has provided financial support to UNHCR’s ‘Emergency
Transit Mechanism’ project in Rwanda.152 This was established in September
2019 as an emergency humanitarian response to an urgent situation in Libya,
a major transit hub for migrants heading towards Europe.
UNHCR says the scheme:
can currently support up to 700 refugees and asylum seekers at any given
time. Its main aim is to temporarily host refugees and asylum seekers who
have undertaken voluntary evacuation from Libya. While in the ETM, theasylum seekers go through refugee case processing undertaken by UNHCR… 153

There are conceptual and practical differences between this scheme and the
UK-Rwanda arrangement. For example, relocation from the UK to Rwanda is
not voluntary, and asylum processing on arrival would be undertaken by the
Rwandan authorities rather than UNHCR.
As of August 2023, over 1,700 people had been evacuated from Libya to
Rwanda. Around two thirds have since been resettled as refugees in othercountries, such as Canada and Sweden.154

The Blair Government’s proposals
During the early 2000s, the Blair Government considered some ideas fortransferring asylum seekers from the UK to third countries while their claims
were being processed.
These included a proposal that EU member states establish ‘transit
processing centres’ in third countries where asylum claims to the EU would beconsidered. 155 There were also discussions with the Tanzanian Government
152

153
154
155

31

European Union, Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, Enhancing protection, lifesaving assistance andsustainable solutions for evacuees from Libya through the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) in
Rwanda, accessed on 20 November 2023
UNHCR, Emergency Transit Mechanism, Rwanda (PDF), August 2023
As above
Letter from the Prime Minister, New international approaches to asylum processing and protection(PDF), 10 March 2003

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnershipthat reportedly involved the possibility of Tanzania receiving some asylum
seekers and refused asylum seekers. 156
Full Fact, a fact-checking organisation, has concluded that the previous
proposals were “quite different” to the UK-Rwanda deal. 157
None of these policies were implemented. However, some of the legislation
introduced to support the UK-Rwanda plan builds on legislation passed underLabour. For example, section 29 and Schedule 4 of the Nationality and
Borders Act 2022 amend the safe country provisions in Schedule 3 of the
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.

The Israel-Rwanda arrangements
In 2013, Rwanda agreed to take Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers from
Israel and process their asylum claims. According to the UK Supreme Court,
the agreement included an explicit undertaking from the Rwandan
Government to the Israeli Government that it would comply with human rights
and the principle of non-refoulement.
The Supreme Court concluded that, this did not happen:
There is no dispute that persons who were relocated under the agreement
suffered serious breaches of their rights under the Refugee Convention. UNHCR
found that asylum seekers who arrived in Rwanda under the arrangement wereroutinely moved clandestinely to Uganda… In three cases, refoulement toEritrea (via Kenya) had only been prevented by UNHCR’s intervention. 158

Both the UK and Rwandan Governments have said that the two arrangements
are not at all comparable, partly because the UK-Rwanda deal includes
mechanisms to monitor implementation (see section 1.2 above). 159 But theSupreme Court said it “appears” that there were such mechanisms in the
Israel-Rwanda deal as well, and thought the “apparent failure” of Rwanda torespect the non-refoulement principle was relevant to compliance with its
undertakings to the UK.

156
157
158

159

32

“UK plans asylum camp in Tanzania”, BBC News, 26 February 2004
Full Fact, Did David Blunkett propose sending asylum seekers abroad in 2004?, 22 April 2022
R (AAA and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42, 15 November
2023, paras 95-100. For further background, see “How Israel’s Secret Refugee Deals Collapsed in
the Light of Day”, The New Humanitarian, 3 May 2018; Border Criminologies Blog, Moving under
Threats: The Treacherous Journeys of Refugees who ‘Voluntary’ Departed from Israel to Rwanda andUganda and Reached Europe, 12 October 2018.
BBC Sounds, World at One, 16 November 2023, 13:34; HL Deb 20 December 2022 c1071; “Whathappened when Israel sent its refugees to Rwanda?”, BBC News, 23 June 2022; HC Deb 19 April 2002
c37

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

Annex: International law issues

UNHCR opposition to UK’s plans
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has produced several
reports and press releases outlining its opposition to the Migration andEconomic Development with Rwanda.
UNHCR remains firmly opposed to arrangements that seek to transfer refugees
and asylum seekers to third countries in the absence of sufficient safeguards
and standards. Such arrangements simply shift asylum responsibilities, evadeinternational obligations, and are contrary to the letter and spirit of the
Refugee Convention. 160

UNHCR head Filippo Grandi said in April 2022 that the Rwanda policy wasagainst both the letter and spirit of international law:
… wide-ranging inadmissibility rules have the potential to deny refugees theirright to seek asylum in the UK. Such provisions are potentially at variance with
the Refugee Convention.
I am also concerned by the UK’s intention to externalize its obligations toprotect refugees and asylum seekers to other countries. Such efforts to shift
responsibility run counter to the letter and spirit of the Refugee Convention, towhich the UK is a party. These efforts also run counter to the Global Compact
on Refugees, which was affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 2018 and calls
for more equitably sharing the responsibility for refugee protection. 161

The rest of this annex covers the main international legal questions relating to
the UK-Rwanda arrangement.

The Refugee Convention
The 1951 International Refugee Convention acknowledges that some refugees
and asylum-seekers may enter a country illegally. 162 Article 31 of theconvention outlines a state’s obligations when it comes to the treatment of

160
161

162

33

UNHCR, UN Refugee Agency opposes UK plan to export asylum, 14 April 2022
UNHCR, News comment: UNHCR’s Grandi fears UK legislation will dramatically weaken refugeeprotection, 27 April 2022
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April
1954) 189 UNTS 137

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnershipthose seeking refuge by entering a state in a way that would usually beunlawful. The provision states:
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where
their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or arepresent in their territory without authorization, provided they present
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for theirillegal entry or presence.
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees
restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall
only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain
admission into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such
refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain
admission into another country.

There are several legal questions that arise out of the UK-Rwanda
arrangements in light of this provision:•

What amounts to a “penalty” under Article 31(1).

•Whether refugees must come “directly” from the state they are fleeing,or may transit through other states and still be protected by thisprovision.

•

Whether asylum seekers should claim asylum in the “first safe country”
they reach.

Prohibition of penalties
In the UK, the prohibition of penalties against refugees who enter a state
unlawfully is given effect by section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act
1999. This provides a legal defence against some immigration offences, suchas document fraud.
As noted in section 1.3 above, an asylum claim can be declared inadmissible
based on a number of conditions set out in the 2022 Act. This includes wherean asylum seeker has previously been present in another country and failed toclaim asylum there when it would have been reasonable to expect them to doso. 163
Some expert and academic commentators suggest that treating any potential
refugee claim as inadmissible based on the fact they may have entered the
UK illegally runs contrary to Article 31 and could amount to an unlawful
penalty.164

163

164

34

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s80C (inserted by Nationality and Borders Act 2022,
s16)
See, for example, Maja Grundler and Elspeth Guild, The UK-Rwanda deal and its Incompatibility
with International Law, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy blog, 29 April 2022

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

UNHCR further notes that, where penalties are permissible (when the asylum
seekers fall outside the scope of Article 31), they should not interfere with thefundamental right to seek asylum or other Convention guarantees. 165
Where asylum-seekers are not protected against the imposition of penalties
under Article 31(1) (not having arrived directly, presented themselves without
delay or shown good cause for their irregular entry or presence) any penalisingmeasure must not undermine the right to seek and enjoy asylum or be atvariance with other provisions of the 1951 Convention and international andregional human rights law. Thus, such penalties must not involve or
indirectly result in denying asylum seekers access to an asylum procedure.
Nor ... can it involve the denial of the full set of rights guaranteed by the 1951
Convention. UNHCR further considers that the denial of entry or the summary
removal from its territory of asylum-seekers based on their irregular entry orpresence, without necessary safeguards regarding the application of safe third
country concepts, would also be in breach of the UK’s obligations under the1951 Convention and applicable international and regional human rights law. 166

The Home Office’s view is that relocation to Rwanda does not amount to a“penalty”. It emphasises Rwanda’s commitment to non-refoulement and its
treatment of refugees. 167

Interpretation of Article 31
The UK Government interprets the Refugee Convention as excluding someasylum seekers from the scope of Article 31, and therefore the protection
against penalties. In particular, the UK’s interpretation of asylum seekers“coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened”
has been included in section 37 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (inforce from 28 June). Section 37(1) provides that:
A refugee is not to be taken to have come to the United Kingdom directly froma country where their life or freedom was threatened if, in coming from thatcountry, they stopped in another country outside the United Kingdom, unlessthey can show that they could not reasonably be expected to have sought
protection under the Refugee Convention in that country.

The Act does not define what it means for an asylum seeker to have “stopped”
in another country where asylum could have been claimed.
UNHCR rejects the UK Government’s description of the Nationality and
Borders Act as “aligned with”, “based on” and “consistent with” Article
31(1). 168 It argues that the UK’s position is based on a “fundamental

165

166

167

168

35

The right to seek asylum was recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 (1):Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
UNHCR, UNHCR Observations on the New Plan for Immigration policy statement of the Governmentof the United Kingdom, May 2021, Annex para 14
Home Office, Migration and Economic Development Partnership with Rwanda: equality impact
assessment, 4 July 2022, p5
UNHCR, UNHCR Updated Observations on the Nationality and Borders Bill, as amended, January2022, para 26

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

misapplication” of Article 31, reiterating its position that asylum does nothave to be claimed in the first safe country a refugee may reach.
UNHCR provides a different and more specific interpretation of the 1951
Convention, supporting the existing interpretations from UK case law:
Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention prohibits penalising refugees for theirunlawful entry or presence if they come directly from a country where their lifeor freedom was threatened, present themselves to the authorities without
delay, and show good cause for their unlawful entry or presence. This article
was intended to address the situation of refugees who were often unable tosecure the necessary authorisation to enter a country. The exemption in theirfavour could not, however, be claimed by those who were lawfully settled,
temporarily or permanently, in another country and had already foundprotection there and who decided to move onward irregularly for reasons
unconnected to their need for international protection. To them, administrative
penalties for unlawful entry or presence could be applied. It has since been
understood also to apply to those who failed to seek asylum in a timely fashion
or at all, in a country where they could reasonably have done so. The UK High
Court in Adimi introduced three benchmarks to interpret “coming directly”: 1)
the length of stay in the intermediate country; 2) the reason for the delay; and
3) whether or not the refugee sought or found protection de jure or de facto. 169

UNHCR’s position reflects 2001 research on the interpretation of Article 31. 170
This indicated that the interpretation of Article 31, and significant statepractice in implementing it at the time, suggested the meaning of a refugee“coming directly” to a state did not mean that refugees cannot transition
through or even stop in a safe country in order to be protected by Article 31:
Refugees are not required to have come directly from their country of origin.
Article 31 was intended to apply, and has been interpreted to apply, to persons
who have briefly transited other countries, who are unable to find protection
from persecution in the first country or countries to which they flee, or who
have ‘good cause’ for not applying in such country or countries. The drafters
only intended that immunity from penalty should not apply to refugees who
had settled, temporarily or permanently, in another country. 171

UNHCR has also previously outlined that Article 31 does not require an asylum
seeker to seek protection in the first safe country they enter:
The requirement that, in order to benefit from exemption from penalties, anasylum-seeker should be coming “directly” from a territory where their life or
freedom was threatened allows States parties to treat refugees differently only
if they have already settled in a country and subsequently move onwards forreasons unrelated to their need for international protection. It is not meant tosuggest that an asylum-seeker must claim asylum in the first country that
could be reached without passing through another. Given that the 1951
Convention was drafted at a time when air travel was inaccessible to most,

169

170

171

36

As above, para 27, footnotes omitted; case cited: R (Adimi) v Uxbridge Magistrates Court [1999]
EWHC Admin 765, 29 July 1999
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: Nonpenalization, Detention and Protection: A paper prepared at the request of the Department ofInternational Protection for the UNHCR Global Consultations (PDF), October 2001
As above, para 103

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnershipand overland travel was by far the most common mode of transport, such a
principle would have relieved the very States that drafted and signed theConvention of any significant obligations under it. A literal, temporal or
geographical interpretation of “directly” would also undermine the applicationof Article 31(1). Rather, reflecting leading UK jurisprudence, the term “directly”
is to be interpreted broadly as meaning that refugees who have crossed
through, stopped over or stayed in other countries en route, may still be
exempt from penalties. 172

Therefore, while the UK considers refugees who have “stopped” in anothercountry as not coming “directly” to the UK, UNHCR considers such refugees as
still subject to the protections of Article 31.
A previous version of the Home Office’s guidance on inadmissibility decisions
went further in outlining when the UK Government would refuse to consider anasylum claim based on a claimant’s “presence” in a country before reaching
the UK. It included as a possible scenario for inadmissibility where “it isbelieved that a claimant passed through Belgium before arriving in the UK
and claiming asylum”. The standard for inadmissibility was that potential
asylum seekers have “passed through” a third state (rather than stopped, or
had been temporarily or permanently resident). The guidance also referred toevidence that an asylum seeker “has travelled through” a third state as
grounds for an inadmissibility decision. 173
This possible interpretation was also addressed by UNHCR during the passingof the Nationality and Borders Bill, suggesting that such an interpretation
would make the UK an international outlier:
In UNHCR’s view, transit alone ought not be regarded as a “sufficient”
connection or meaningful link to a third country to justify a finding of
inadmissibility, particularly outside the context of formal agreement for the
allocation of responsibility for determining refugee status between countries
with comparable asylum systems and standards. Transit is often the result of
fortuitous circumstances and does not necessarily imply the existence of any
meaningful link or connection. 174

More generally, UNHCR comments that such a right to seek protection does
not equate to an unfettered right to choose where to apply for asylum:
Whilst international law does not provide an unrestricted right to choose
where to apply for asylum, there is no requirement under international law forasylum-seekers to seek protection in the first safe country they reach. This
expectation would undermine the global humanitarian and cooperative
principles on which refugee protection is founded, as emphasized by the1951 Convention and recently reaffirmed by the General Assembly,
including the UK, in the Global Compact on Refugees. It would impose anarbitrary and disproportionate burden on countries in the immediate region(s)

172

173

174

37

UNHCR, UNHCR Observations on the New Plan for Immigration policy statement of the Governmentof the United Kingdom, May 2021, Annex para 12 (emphasis in original)
Home Office, Inadmissibility: safe third country cases, version 6.0, 9 May 2022. This language does
not appear in version 7.0
UNHCR, UNHCR Updated Observations on the Nationality and Borders Bill, as amended, January2022, Annex, para 155

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnershipof flight and threaten the capacity and willingness of those countries toproperly process claims or provide acceptable reception conditions anddurable solutions. This would (and does) threaten to make these first
countries, in turn, unsafe and encourage onward movement. 175

Externalisation policies and ‘safe third
countries’
Guiding principles and legality of transfer
arrangements
The use of agreements between states to share responsibility for theprotection of refugees and asylum seekers is possible in international law, but
only in specific circumstances. UNHCR has warned that such arrangements
may only be in line with the Refugee Convention where they do not amount tothe ‘externalisation’ of states’ international obligations and responsibilities
towards refugees, as set out below.
In May 2013, UNHCR issued guidance on the use of transfer arrangements for
asylum seekers between states. This recognised that “asylum-seekers andrefugees should normally be processed in the territory of the State where they
arrive, or which otherwise has jurisdiction over them” and that the primary
responsibility to provide protection rests with the state where asylum issought. 176
The guidance also recognised an increase in arrangements between states
for sharing the hosting of asylum seekers and the processing of their asylum
claims. It said the legality or appropriateness of such arrangements “need to
be assessed on a case-by-case basis”.177
While not all arrangements will be legal, UNHCR sets out a number ofprinciples to guide where these arrangements may be appropriate. 178 One ofthe principles is that:
There is no obligation for asylum-seekers to seek asylum at the first effective
opportunity, yet at the same time there is no unfettered right to choose one’s
country of asylum. The intentions of an asylum-seeker, however, ought to betaken into account to the extent possible.

Another principle is that states involved in transfer arrangements should beparties to the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, or to other refugee
and human rights treaties. But UNHCR notes that “while being party to
175

176

177
178

38

UNHCR, UNHCR Observations on the New Plan for Immigration policy statement of the Governmentof the United Kingdom, May 2021, Annex para 19 (emphasis in original)
UNHCR, Guidance Note on bilateral and/or multilateral transfer arrangements of asylum-seekers,
May 2013, para 1
As above, para 3
As above

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnershipinternational and regional refugee and human rights instruments is an
important indicator as to whether the receiving State meets the criteria
outlined in this Guidance Note, review of the actual practice of the State andits compliance with these instruments is an essential part of thisassessment”.179
A further principle is:Arrangements should be aimed at enhancing burden- and responsibilitysharing and international/regional cooperation, and not be burden shifting.
Such arrangements should ideally contribute to the enhancement of theoverall protection space in the transferring State, the receiving State and/or
the region as a whole. 180

UNHCR also recommends that such agreements should be legally binding
and allow asylum seekers to challenge their treatment under them. 181
As noted above, the UK-Rwanda MOU is not legally binding. Paragraph 2.2
specifically provides that the arrangement is not justiciable in a court of law
and does not confer rights or obligations. 182
One of the most fundamental principles suggested by UNHCR is made up ofan accumulation of human rights and international legal standards regarding
the treatment of each asylum seeker. Based on these international standards,
UNHCR suggests that any transfer arrangement needs to guarantee thateach asylum seeker:

179
180
181
182

39

•

will be individually assessed as to the appropriateness of the transfer,
subject to procedural safeguards, prior to transfer. Pre-transfer
assessments are particularly important for vulnerable groups, including
unaccompanied and separated children. The best interest of the childmust be a primary consideration;•

will be admitted to the proposed receiving State;•

will be protected against refoulement;•

will have access to fair and efficient procedures for the determination of
refugee status and/or other forms of international protection;•

will be treated in accordance with accepted international standards (forexample, appropriate reception arrangements; access to health,education and basic services; safeguards against arbitrary detention;
persons with specific needs are identified and assisted); andAs above, para 3 (iii)
As above, para 3 (iv)
As above, para 3 (v)Home Office, Memorandum of Understanding between the government of the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the Republic of Rwanda for the provisionof an asylum partnership arrangement, 14 April 2022, para 2.2

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership•if recognised as being in need of international protection, will be able toenjoy asylum and/or access a durable solution. 183

Where these guarantees cannot be agreed to or met, UNHCR considers that atransfer would not be appropriate.

Requirement of a connection with the receiving state
While UNHCR acknowledges in some circumstances it is possible to allow
asylum seekers to be transferred to countries they have a connection to, or
previously claimed asylum in, recently it has argued there should be moremeaningful connections between an asylum seeker and the state they aretransferred to. 184
Connections to the receiving state which may be relevant, the UNHCR
suggests, could include for example:•

family relations;•previously acquired rights in the state, such as previous residence orlong-term visits;•

linguistic, cultural or other similar ties. 185

As mentioned above, section 16 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022
provides for a test that an asylum seeker has a “connection” with a receiving
State. It lists five conditions where an asylum-seeker may have a connection
to a third state, including where they have previously made an asylum claim,
or where they could have been reasonably have been expected to make sucha claim. But it also provides that the Secretary of State can remove an asylum
seeker even where they have no connection to the receiving state.
UNHCR has criticised this as a departure from established international
standards:
In a significant and highly problematic departure from international practiceand UK caselaw, it is irrelevant whether the claimant would be admitted to thesafe third State in question. While a “connection” (in the limited sense of
proposed new Section 80C) between the applicant and the “safe third State” isrequired for a claim to be declared inadmissible, the Secretary of State may
still remove the applicant to any other “safe” third State. The ‘connection’

183

184

185

40

UNHCR, Guidance Note on bilateral and/or multilateral transfer arrangements of asylum-seekers,
May 2013, para 3 (vi)See, for example, UNHCR, Legal Considerations regarding access to protection and a connection
between the refugee and the third country in the context of return or transfer to safe third countries,
April 2018
As above, para 6, footnote 15; see also UNHCR, Considerations on the "Safe Third Country" Concept,
July 1996; UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for
Law and Practice - Detailed Research on Key Asylum Procedures Directive Provisions, March 2010, p
311

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The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

requirement therefore appears to be meaningless in terms of ensuring thereasonableness and appropriateness of actual transfers. 186

It cites in support of this position a 2010 immigration tribunal case whichstated:… the type of case with which we are concerned here, involving intended
expulsion of a refugee, tends only to arise as a matter of international statepractice in situations where the person concerned has some connection withthe third state which is said to be safe, based on nationality, prior residence,
marriage, entitlement to residence, historical ties etc. it [sic] does not arise
simply because there is a safe third country somewhere. 187

UNHCR considers that sending asylum seekers to countries in which they haveno meaningful connection would risk undermining the aims of the 1951
Convention:
This would be fundamentally at odds with international practice, as well as
incompatible with respect for human dignity. It undermines the Refugee
Convention’s fundamental goal of achieving durable solutions for refugees inwhich they can enjoy the “widest possible exercise of … fundamental rights
and freedoms”. This goal is a practical as well as a humanitarian one. If
refugees are sent to countries with which they have no connection and where it
is not reasonable for them to go, many will simply seek ways to moveonwards. 188

Non-refoulement (return to a risk of persecution)
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention provides:
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any mannerwhatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would bethreatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of aparticular social group or political opinion.

This long-standing principle is reiterated in several other international humanrights treaties. A similar principle has developed in the judicial case law
relating to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (theprohibition of torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment) whereby
states are prohibited from deporting people to states where they are at risk ofbeing subject to violations of this human right.
The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 outlines when a country can beconsidered “safe third country”:
For the purposes of this section, a State is a “safe third State” in relation to aclaimant if—

186

187
188

41

UNHCR, UNHCR Updated Observations on the Nationality and Borders Bill, as amended, January2022, para 38
RR (refugee – safe third country) Syria [2010] UKUT 422 (IAC), 13 November 2010, para 11
UNHCR, UNHCR Updated Observations on the Nationality and Borders Bill, as amended, January2022, Annex, para 159

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership(a) the claimant’s life and liberty are not threatened in that State by reason of
their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group orpolitical opinion,(b) the State is one from which a person will not be sent to another State—(i) otherwise than in accordance with the Refugee Convention, or(ii) in contravention of their rights under Article 3 of the Human Rights
Convention (freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment),
and(c) a person may apply to be recognised as a refugee and (if so recognised)receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention, in that State. 189

The UK-Rwanda MoU also provides for a specific commitment in this regard:
9.1 Rwanda will ensure that:
9.1.1 at all times it will treat each Relocated Individual, and process their claim
for asylum, in accordance with the Refugee Convention, Rwandan immigration
laws and international and Rwandan standards, including under international
and Rwandan human rights law, and including, but not limited to ensuring
their protection from inhuman and degrading treatment and refoulement;

UNHCR, however, has been critical of these criteria, suggesting that they do
not go far enough.
Under this provision, a State could be considered “safe” even if the applicant
had been, and perhaps continues to be, at real risk of being subjected tohuman rights violations there that either fall short of threats to life and liberty,
or to which they were not exposed for reasons of a Refugee Convention ground.
Nor would inhuman and degrading treatment make a State unsafe, unless it
were in the context of removal to a further country. 190

UNHCR offers its own suggestions as to what criteria should be consideredwhen determining whether a state is sufficiently safe for the transfer ofasylum seekers. It suggests the criteria must also be met in practice as wellas in the legal systems of those states:
In UNHCR’s view, any definition of a country’s safety should include explicit
benchmarks in line with the standards outlined in the Refugee Convention andunder international human rights law, and these must be met in both law andpractice. At a minimum, therefore, the definition of a “safe” State must include
that the following are guaranteed in law and met in practice: appropriate
reception arrangements and protection against threats to physical safety or
freedom; protection against refoulement; access to fair and efficient asylum
procedures, or to a previously afforded protective status; the legal right toremain during the asylum procedure; an appropriate legal status if found to bein need of international protection; and standards of treatment commensuratewith the Refugee Convention and international human rights law. This includes
189

190

42

Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s80B (inserted by Nationality and Borders Act 2022,
s16)
UNHCR, UNHCR Updated Observations on the Nationality and Borders Bill, as amended, January2022, Annex, para 140 (footnotes omitted)

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

recognition of the positive rights enshrined in the Refugee Convention, and not
merely protection against refoulement. Furthermore, the capacity of the third
State to provide protection in practice should be taken into consideration,
particularly if the third State is already hosting large refugee populations. 191

European Convention on Human Rights
Some people might invoke protections provided by the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) to challenge the Home Office’s decision that it issafe to remove them to Rwanda. The Law Society of England and Wales hasoutlined some potential examples:(1) For instance, if someone:•

has been trafficked to the UK and the UK does not fulfil its obligations toinvestigate the trafficking claim. This could mean that the government isin breach of its obligations under Article 4 European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). Such claims may not even come to light if that
individual does not have access to a legal representative•

has a spouse or parent in the UK then their removal may be in breach of
their right to family or private life under Article 8 ECHR•

has a medical condition or is at risk of suicide the removal could not be inline with the UK’s human rights obligations and so be in breach of Article 2
ECHR•

would be at risk of persecution or inhuman or degrading treatment within
Rwanda, such as LGBT individuals, this may further be incompatible withan individual’s Article 3 rights under the ECHR192

A June 2022 evidence session held by the Joint Committee on Human Rights
considered these issues in further detail.

Other substantive and procedural protections
The principle of non-refoulement, and linked human rights law standards,
sometimes require much more than simply preventing an asylum seeker fromencountering danger when removed from a country. When read in
conjunction with other human rights obligations, such as the right to aneffective remedy for potential human rights violations, established case law
has outlined that states have specific procedural obligations when
considering the removal of an asylum seeker, and that an asylum seeker mustalso be able to challenge their removal.

191
192

43

As above, para 144 (footnotes omitted)
Law Society press release, Rwanda removals raise rule of law questions, 9 June 2022

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

The UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership

For example, the European Court of Human Rights has set out an overview toits established case law on immigration. It summarises that in cases where an
asylum seeker may be removed to a safe third country, the removing state isunder specific procedural duties. In particular, the Court considers thefollowing factors:•

The removing state should examine thoroughly whether there is a realrisk of the asylum seeker being denied access to adequate protection in
the third state from refoulement without a proper evaluation of the risks
they may face.

•

Where guarantees from the third state are insufficient, the removing
state is under a duty not to remove asylum seekers to the third state.

•

To determine whether the removing state has properly assessed theasylum procedures of the third state, the removing state should take into
account the available general information about the receiving third stateand its asylum system in an adequate manner and of their own initiative.

•

An applicant should be given sufficient opportunity to demonstrate thatthe third state is not a ‘third safe country’ in their particular case.

•

Any presumption that a particular country is “safe”, if it has been relied
upon in decisions concerning an individual asylum seeker, must be
sufficiently supported at the outset. 193

Where an asylum seeker has an “arguable complaint” that removal would
expose them to treatment that could violate their right to life (Article 2) or theprohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3), the Court
has said they must have an “effective remedy” at the domestic level. 194
This, according to the Court, requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of
any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk oftreatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3. Such a claim should also have an
automatic suspensive effect (that is, the removal procedure should be halted
until the claim is considered).
The Court has elaborated on the requirements that states should adhere to inthese circumstances, and the factors relevant to considering whether there isa violation of this standard. These include providing adequate information,
the availability of interpreters, staff training, legal aid and giving reasons for
decisions. 195

193

194

195

44

European Court of Human Rights, Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on Human
Rights: Immigration (PDF), updated 31 August 2022, para 55
As above, para 57; see also European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 13 of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Right to an effective remedy (PDF), updated 31 August 2022, paras121-132
European Court of Human Rights, Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on Human
Rights: Immigration (PDF), updated 31 August 2022, para 57

Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 May 2024

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