AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
IIPSRIPSInstitute for International

The Japan Institute ofResearch Institute for

Policy Studies

International Affairs

Peace and Security

Editorial Advisory Board:

No. 203

Akio Watanabe (Chair)
Masashi Nishihara
Yoshiji Nogami
Taizo Yakushiji

14 August 2014

Editorial Committee:

THE NEW INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND
JAPAN

Taizo Yakushiji
Hisayoshi Ina
Tsutomu Kikuchi
Shujiro Urata andToshiro Iijima
Editor & Online Publisher:

Toru ItoYoshji Nogami
President, JIIA

For the first time in ten years an administration ledby the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP; IndianPeople’s Party) has taken power in India.
Although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has noexperience in national politics, the business
community inside and outside the country has highexpectations of him as a business leader who as
Chief Minister of Gujarat helped that state achieve
economic growth. On the other hand, he is also
known to be an exclusionary Hindu nationalist.
Judging from his administration’s first month or so,
it would appear, though, that the latter facet, aconcern among Western countries, has been“shelved” for the time being at least.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should
not be attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes ofStrategic Studies.

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

The administration has been careful to refrain from any words or deeds thatmight conjure up images of Hindu nationalism, and it has been fully dedicating
itself to improving relations with India’s neighbors and major powers toreinvigorate the country’s sluggish economy and improve its businessenvironment.
It goes without saying that this economics-oriented leadership stems fromPrime Minister Modi’s own personality, but the fortunate domestic politicalenvironment in which he finds himself must also be pointed out. With Modi as thecenterpiece of their campaign, the BJP won an unexpected landslide victory in
the general elections, notably marking the first time in 20 years that any party inIndia has won a single-party majority. Consequently, Modi enjoys an extensive
power base within his party, on par with that previously held by Prime Minister
Koizumi in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). There do not appear to be
any senior legislators or factions willing or able to “remote control” him.
The BJP has not dissolved its pre-election alliance (National DemocraticAlliance; “NDA”) despite its overwhelming victory but, although the newadministration is ruling as a coalition government, the influence of the othercoalition partners is now far less than those of minor partners in the Indian
National Congress coalition government or even the previous BJP coalition
government. This is because there is no fear that the government might collapse
if any of the other parties leave the coalition.
As a result, Modi is extremely unlikely to suffer the same troubles as hispredecessor Prime Minister Singh, under whom the federal government’s foreignand security policies were often subject to the influence of regional politicalparties and left-wing forces. Indeed, Modi was able to override the concerns
expressed by Shiv Sena, said to be the most right-wing faction within the NDA,
regarding his inauguration ceremony invitation extended to Prime Minister Sharifof Pakistan.
An extraordinarily “strong coalition government” led by Hindu nationalists
does pose the danger of a more likely resort to hardline measures in reaction toa terrorist attack, foreign incursion or other crisis, but it also has the potential to
improve the heretofore stagnant relations with neighbors and major powers.

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Because he is regarded as a nationalist, he will be able to counter the argumentsof domestic hawks opposed to peace and reconciliation efforts, and his
overwhelming parliamentary majority will allow him to proceed without having totake into account the objections of minority partners. In other words, the federal
government can do much to promote India’s national interest.
It seems that India expects Japan to play a great role in this respect.
Modi’s trip to Japan scheduled for early July has unfortunately been postponed
because he has given priority to attending the parliamentary budget session, but
relations with Japan will likely be more important for him than for the previous
administration. Japan will find it necessary to deal with him in light of hisemphasis on practical benefits as noted above.
Above all, Japan should be cautious about laying stress on the ‘China
threat’. The Modi government is quite alarmed over border issues with China as
well as China’s expanding influence in countries around India, and Modi himself
has indicated that he will be far less hesitant that the preceding administration
about taking countermeasures, including development of border infrastructure,naval expansion and rapprochement with India’s smaller neighbors.
Nevertheless, Modi pragmatically recognizes that cooperation with China,
a neighboring economic power, will be essential to boost the Indian economy, so
he will undoubtedly adopt a more active policy of engagement with China thanthat of his predecessor. He underlined his government’s willingness to welcome
Chinese investment in infrastructure and industrial parks during the first sideline
meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in mid-July.
Accordingly, it is not possible that he will jump on board any blatant effort to senda message about “containing China” that will unavoidably and excessively
provoke China. In this respect, Japan-India or Japan-US-India cooperation will
be limited to low-profile meetings and exercises as well as to confirmation of theimportance of norms and rules such as the freedom of navigation.
The key for Japan will be to convince Prime Minister Modi, who advocatesa policy of economic revitalization known as “Modinomics,” of the degree towhich Japan can contribute in the arena of economics, one in which China’scooperation is regarded as vital. It hardly need be said that, unlike China, Japan

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The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

poses no security threat whatsoever to India. Even though India has atremendously adverse trade balance with China, Japan cannot approach
China’s volume of trade with India, which has high expectations of thepossibilities available from opening the enormous markets of China.
Modi also seems intent on lifting the ban on Chinese investment in Indian
infrastructure and telecommunications, sectors currently restricted for the mostpart, in order to foster India’s lagging industrial base. India is quite likely to place
Japan and China on the scales in future to weigh the respective advantages
each offers, so selling Japan’s impressive technological capabilities will be ofgreat significance.
The specifics of Modinomics have not been worked out yet but, if Modi will
be following the model that he pursued in Gujurat, then he can be expected toadvocate a course of improving infrastructure such as nuclear power and otherelectric power networks and roadways, actively introducing foreign capital into
these infrastructure projects, and expanding India’s lagging manufacturingindustry. Efforts should be undertaken right away to determine the affinities andcomplementarities between Abenomics and Modinomics.

Toru Ito is Associate Professor at Department of International Relations & Graduate
School of Security Studies at National Defense Academy of Japan. He is a specialist on
international relations in South Asia.

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